https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2016/november/bible-never-says-all-men-are-created-equal.html

An Anglican man rang me out of the blue the other day to ask if the New Testament teaches “equality.” “Not really,” I replied. “**The New Testament mentions *equality* once or twice, but when it comes to social relationships, it is far more interested in concepts like oneness, commonness, partnership, union, and joint-inheritance.** If you make all those passages about equality, you flatten their meaning. And in any case, it’s become a blunderbuss word that means everything and nothing.”
…

Two New Testament texts explicitly mention *isotēs*, the Greek word for equality, proportionality, or fairness. In 2 Corinthians 8:13–14, Paul urges the church in Corinth to give generously to the Jerusalem church, “that there might be *equality*.” And in Colossians 4:1, he tells masters to grant their slaves “what is right and *fair*.”

Most of the famous “equality” passages use quite different language. Galatians 3:28 doesn’t say that there is no Jew and Gentile, slave and free, male and female because we are all equal, but because we “are all one in Christ Jesus.” Colossians 3:11 doesn’t talk about equality between barbarians and Scythians, but rather asserts that “Christ is all, and is in all.” Ephesians 3:6 doesn’t say that Gentiles are now equal with Jews, but rather that we are now “heirs together.” Ephesians 6:9 doesn’t talk about equality between slaves and masters, but rather that both have the same Master.

https://www.missioalliance.org/biblical-equality/

For Wilson, the point of Galatians 3:28 is not that Jews and Greeks, slaves and free, and males and females are equal in Christ, but that they are made *one* in Christ. **Wilson argues that oneness is too often confused, thinned, and compromised by an “all men are created equal” rhetoric enshrined in treatises like the US Declaration of Independence.**

Wilson does, however, acknowledge the biblical notion of equality (in 2 Cor. 8:13-14 and Col. 4:1) as it elevates right, fair, and dignified treatment regardless of “class, sex, race or subgroup.” Yet, for Wilson, **Christians too often substitute Scripture’s deeper path of oneness, partnership, and joint-inheritance for individualist notions of “equal access to entitlements and privileges.”**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_266

It has been currently asserted that the premises of the abolitionists were embraced in the Declaration of Independence; so that the United States have been committed to them from the beginning. The words usually referred to are the following: **"That all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,"** etc.
…

It may be true that Jefferson, the draughtsman of the Declaration, did heartily adopt his propositions in the sense of the advocates of the social contract; **for it is well known that he was properly a Democrat, and not, like the other great Whigs of Virginia, only a Republican; that he had drank deeply into the spirit of Locke's political writings; and that he had already contracted a fondness for the atheistical philosophy of the French political reformers.**

https://www.whitenationalism.com/cwar/pillar1.htm

In contrast, examine the statement authored by Thomas Jefferson and placed in our Declaration of Independence – it is the very premise upon which the American nation is founded: "We hold these truths to be self evident – that all men are created equal."

It is obviously and self evidently false.

Our own eyes tell us the contrary – that all men are profoundly unequal in their abilities and aptitudes, and that the groups to which they attach themselves display average inequalities as well.

It is clear that the slave owning Jefferson knew his statement was false at the time he made it.

So then the question is, why did he say it?

The personal driver behind Jefferson's statement was, of course, that all educated property owners were equal to their competitors, the hereditary aristocrats in Europe, and should share power with them.

But when we hear the straight forward declaration of self-interest, we recognize instantly that educated property owners are few in number and are utterly powerless without the support of the millions who are

not educated and do not own property, but are forced to sell their labor. Thus, the educated property owners – the gentleman rentiers – have no claim to political legitimacy unless they can enlist the support of those who are propertyless and uneducated.

The gentlemen rentiers of America's founding must fight a war against the Universalist Empire of Britain and cannot do it alone. **And as the gentleman is inherently manipulative and deceptive, he makes an open ended promise that he knows is based on a wildly and obviously false notion that all men are created equal. It results in an implied promise that Jefferson knows will be utterly impossible to keep. But Jefferson makes the deceptive and manipulative promise anyway, because it is in his individual interest to make it.**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/198/mode/2up?view=theater

In Jefferson's first draft of the Declaration, as it happens, there was no "Creator." "All men are created equal & independent," reads the manuscript, and "from that equal creation they derive rights inherent & unalienable."229

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/262/mode/2up?view=theater

In Jefferson's original draft, the phrase was "sacred & undeniable." The change, which came at Franklin's suggestion, was in this case a fortunate one.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/328/mode/2up?view=theater

In Jefferson's first draft of the Declaration of Independence, interestingly, the relevant clause reads as follows: "all men are created equal & independent." **The phrase "equal & independent" comes from Locke, and here it serves to remind us that neither God nor nature supplies any order of subordination among humans.** In that first draft, Jefferson's derivation of our rights from "that equal creation" – rather than from the Creator – confirms that the equality of concern here is a fact of nature, not an imperative from on high.

https://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/jefferson/jefferson.html#p64

This I believe is the case with every barbarous people. With such, force is law. The stronger sex therefore imposes on the weaker. **It is civilization alone which replaces women in the enjoyment of their natural equality. That first teaches us to subdue the selfish passions, and to respect those rights in others which we value in ourselves. Were we in equal barbarism, our females would be equal drudges.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Mazzei

The contribution of Philip Mazzei to the U.S. Declaration of Independence was acknowledged by John F. Kennedy in his book *A Nation of Immigrants*, in which he states that:[4]

> The great doctrine 'All men are created equal'[5][6] and incorporated into the Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson, was paraphrased from the writing of Philip Mazzei, an Italian-born patriot and pamphleteer, who was a close friend of Jefferson. A few alleged scholars try to discredit Mazzei as the creator of this statement and idea, saying that "there is no mention of it anywhere until after the Declaration was published". **This phrase appears in Italian in Mazzei's own hand, written in Italian, several years prior to the writing of the Declaration of Independence.** Mazzei and Jefferson often exchanged ideas about true liberty and freedom. No one man can take complete credit for the ideals of American democracy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_men_are_created_equal#Origin_of_Thomas_Jefferson's_use_of_the_phrase

At the age of 33, Jefferson may have also borrowed the expression from an Italian friend and neighbor, Philip Mazzei,[9] born in Prato, as noted by Joint Resolution 175 of the 103rd Congress as well as by John F. Kennedy in *A Nation of Immigrants*.[11][12]

> 9. Philip Mazzei, The Virginia Gazette, 1774. Translated by a friend and neighbor, Thomas Jefferson:
>
> > ***Tutti gli uomini sono per natura egualmente liberi e indipendenti. Quest'eguaglianza è necessaria per costituire un governo libero. Bisogna che ognuno sia uguale all'altro nel diritto naturale.***

https://www.njitalianheritage.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/All-Men-are-Equal.pdf

> The idea that "all men are created equal" was part of the political, philosophical, and theological ethos of the period. Earlier, in 1774 the Scottish immigrant to Pennsylvania, James Wilson, wrote in *Considerations*

> *on the Nature and Extent of Legislative Authority of the British Parliament* that **“All men are, by nature, equal and free: No one has a right to any authority over another without his consent.”**
>
> **Wilson could have easily been citing John Locke in 1690, who wrote that “Man being born ... [with] of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world.”** Or, he could have been citing Algernon Sidney’s *Discourses, Concerning Government*, 1698, when he cited others, stating “That Hayward, Blackwood, Barclay, and others who have bravely vindicated the right of kings in this point, do with one consent admit, as an unquestionable truth, and assent unto the natural liberty and equality of mankind. ...”
>
> Like all of the Enlightened political thinkers, Mazzei was very familiar with Roman law and the writings of the third century Roman jurist Domitius Ulpian. **Ulpian wrote that “By law of nature all men are equal,” nearly eighteen hundred years ago. This concept was handed down and reinterpreted for centuries and has evolved into its present definition.** Mazzei’s words may have had an immediate influence on both Mason and Jefferson, but these men were long familiar with a concept that was first heard in ancient Rome and had become a clarion aspect of Western tradition.

...

The Virginia Declaration of Rights, chiefly authored by George Mason and approved by the Virginia Convention on June 12, 1776, contains the wording: **"all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights of which ... they cannot deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."**[17]

...

The Massachusetts Constitution, chiefly authored by John Adams in 1780, contains in its Declaration of Rights the wording: "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness."[19]

...

Richard M. Weaver, **in one of the cornerstone works of traditional conservatism, *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948),** paraphrased a 19th-century writer, stating that "no man was ever created free and no two men [were] ever created equal". He continued: **"The comity of peoples in groups large or small rests not upon this chimerical notion of equality but upon fraternity, a concept which long antedates it in history because it goes immeasurably deeper in human sentiment. The ancient feeling of brotherhood carries obligations of which equality knows nothing. It calls for respect and protection, for brotherhood is status in family, and family is by nature hierarchical."**[39]

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n381/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Of the three slogans, *fraternité*, *liberté*, and *égalité*, the first was a mere operatic phrase, of which practical politics took no account whatsoever, and the two others were irreconcilable opposites.**
>
> https://biblehub.com/commentaries/luke/23-12.htm
>
> *And the same day Pilate and Herod were made friends together.* This union of two such bitter enemies in their enmity against Jesus evidently struck the early Church with sad wonderment. It is referred to in the first recorded hymn of the Church of Christ (Acts 4:27). **How often has the strange sad scene been reproduced in the world's story since! Worldly men apparently irreconcilable meet together in friendship when opportunity offers itself for wounding Christ!**

https://charltonteaching.blogspot.com/2021/08/the-demonic-strategy-of-equality.html

> *Equality is the great dogma on which liberal Western democracies are built.* ***It might have seemed like a step forward at a time when the gap between rich and poor, powerful and weak was as great as it was, and the movement towards less inequality surely did bring certain benefits in the short term.***
>
> ***But the flaw that lies at its heart is now being revealed.*** *If equality, and equality alone, is taken as the foundation of a culture then that culture will collapse into the lowest common denominator and it will eventually collapse altogether.*
>
> *Equality is totally contrary to human nature and to enforce it is to force human beings to live against both their natural and their spiritual instincts. It becomes a tool to push the higher down to the level of the lower.*
> *...*
>
> *Equality is often said to be rooted in Christianity. If it were how strange it is that it is never mentioned in the Bible and was only discovered to be a Christian virtue 1800 years after the time*

> *of Christ.* ***Oneness in Christ is a Christian virtue but that is not equality which is a materialistic distortion of it.***
>
> ***Equality is actually a property of unformed matter, matter untouched by the creative breath of spirit, which is why you see it most at lower levels of evolution. The more life evolves, the more unequal it becomes because the freer it becomes and yet within that inequality there is also a spiritual oneness.***

…

For them we can see what lies behind the drive for equality - a spitefully destructive hatred of creation itself; the desire to reduce creation to chaos. This is *exactly* the core motivation Tolkien attributed to Morgoth (Melkor) - the Satan of his universe.

Thus equality - which sounds to Modern Man as an obvious and major virtue; is actually an instance of ultimate evil. Characteristic of which, is *exactly* this kind of value-inversion - where an ultimate virtue is actually an ultimate evil.

And a world where such value-inversion is ever-more mainstream, official and compulsory; is exactly what is meant by the End Times.

---

https://counter-currents.com/2013/10/becoming-who-we-are-leftist-eurocentrism-the-destiny-of-the-west/

The anti-Western animus of the European Left may be foolish, dishonest, and disastrous – but it is not un-Western.

From the beginning the West has been animated by a spirit of individualism that has involved the willingness to negate even the desire for life in order to achieve the ideal. We have been willing to risk everything, in other words, for individual autonomy, and for our vision of what is *right*. **This is the source of everything great about us, but it is simultaneously our tragic flaw. It seems to lead, in many Westerners, to a form of madness in which one comes to believe that freedom means emancipation from all limits whatsoever.** And so modern Westerners now believe that we are not just capable of taming or channeling our animal desires, but of giving birth to ourselves.

We believe that we can free ourselves from history, from culture, from biology, even from the limits of time and space. **We deny heredity, natural inequality, upper limits on physical and mental development, ethnic and national characters, and even the difference between the sexes.** We want to "have it all" and be all, or anything. But, of course, this really amounts to being nothing at all. **And that really is our goal: the apotheosis of the Western spirit. To be absolutely free of all limits and all otherness; to be free of anything not chosen by the autonomous self. To be free, in fact, of identity.** Pico della Mirandola (in his *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, 1486) understood us correctly: we Westerners are the animal with no nature – or at least we *think* that we are. And this realization, in fact, is what Hegel saw standing at the end of history. **All of history for Hegel was the coming into being, through (Western) humanity of Aristotle's God: the being who is utterly and completely independent, self-sufficient, and undetermined; spinning in an eternal bliss of pure and perfect self-relatedness.**

But, of course, this is complete insanity. It is true enough that we are able to negate our animal nature in the name of an ideal, or to channel our animal drives. But we are not free to be anything we like.

…

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel deals with different conceptions of freedom. Most philosophers and ordinary people take freedom to mean "lack of constraint," and to be the opposite of "determination." But, good dialectician that he was, Hegel argues that this conception rests upon a false dichotomy. If freedom means lack of determination, then freedom is completely impossible. All of us are born into a determinate set of cultural, social, geographical, and historical circumstances.

> https://counter-currents.com/2021/12/fichte-on-self-consciousness-as-the-foundation-of-all-knowledge/
>
> J. G. Fichte holds that the human self has no intrinsic identity, aside from that which we *create* for it. He completely rejects the notion that our identity is in any way determined by nature. **This is the modern "blank slate" theory pushed to a radical extreme. It is to Fichte that we must look if we wish to find the philosophical origins of current intellectual fashions such as "gender fluidity," "social construction" of race and gender, and radical egalitarian claims about human perfectibility.**

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/history/58979-can-we-say-that-communism-is-was-in-some-sense-jewish-give-your-opinions/page69#post1927879

Communism as a modern ideology existed before Hess, but primarily as wishful thinking. **It was Hess who turbo-charged it with the *Wissenschaftslehre* (loosely translated as "the science of science") of Hegel's gifted contemporary, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814),** forming it into what Hess termed *Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus* ("scientific Communism," based on the whole realm of knowledge and social analysis), which was then transmitted to Marx in whose hands it became "scientific socialism," an enthralling epistemology possessed of brutal logic, and a ruthless political machine.
…

In Fichte's philosophy, **the self is not a static thing with fixed properties,** but rather, a self-producing process which owes its existence to nothing but itself. Fichte's concept of a rational agent that constantly interprets itself in light of *normative* standards that it imposes on itself, in both the theoretical and practical realms, is similar to the self-worship of the rabbis.

Notice Fichte's phrase, "normative." The concept of the "normative" underscores the extreme relativism of the whole of the Hegelian theory of knowledge and control which would be further synthesized and refined by Edmund Husserl in his theory of phenomenology. **When one of God's immutable laws becomes inconvenient for the self-invented, self-worshipping Fichtian-Hegelian man, he dismisses it as "normative," i.e. a mere temporal custom, "culturally conditioned" and mistaken for an enduring truth.** When Pope Paul VI was asked why the Church of Rome had dropped certain aspects of the Apostle Paul's teaching concerning women, he is alleged to have replied, "Because they were only normative."

http://faithful-nation.com/2020/06/14/a-white-on-white-conflict/

Beginning in the 18th century, an ever growing number of whites have turned away from the Christian faith and have worshiped human reason in place of the true God, believing that human reason can bring about a heaven on earth. This sinful attitude is attractive to those who wish to set themselves up as the divine law-giver capable of determining good and evil. The apostasy from God's revealed religion is accompanied by a hatred of the created order evident in nature, **and the end result of worshipping human reason is a revolutionary assault on all traditional norms.**
…

The perverted desire to revolt against God coupled with the natural genius of the white race has produced the most destructive human force in history. The bloodiest revolutions and wars have been fought because white utopians desire to remake the world in their own image. They have learned nothing from their past failures and are always ready to plunge the world into greater suffering. We should keep this in mind when attempting to heal society. **Our complaints about black behavior, mass immigration, and even Jewish influence, should be secondary to the issue of white apostasy and the white predilection for abstract, revolutionary thinking.**

https://archive.org/details/foesofourownhous01roos/page/164/mode/2up?view=theater

Professor Carl Pearson, a leading English Socialist, states their position exactly: "The sex relation of the future will not be regarded as a union for the birth of children, but as the closest form of friendship between man and woman. **It will be accompanied by no child bearing or rearing, or by this in a much more limited number than at present. With the sex relationship, so long as it does not result in children, we hold that the state in the future will in no wise interfere, but when it does result in children, then the state will have a right to interfere.**" He then goes on to point out that in order to save the woman from, "economic dependence" upon the father of her children, the children will be raised at the expense of the state; the usual plan being to have huge buildings like foundling asylums.

Mr. Pearson is a scientific man who, in his own realm, is worthy of serious heed, **and the above quotation states in naked form just what logical scientific Socialism would really come to. Aside from its thoroughly repulsive quality, it ought not to be necessary to point out that the condition of affairs aimed at would in actual practice bring about the destruction of the race within at most a couple of generations; and such destruction would be heartily to be desired for any race of such infamous character as to tolerate such a system.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Pearson

After Galton's death in 1911, Pearson embarked on producing his definitive biography – a three-volume tome of narrative, letters, genealogies, commentaries, and photographs – published in 1914, 1924, and 1930, with much of Pearson's own money paying for their print runs. The biography, done "to satisfy myself and without regard to traditional standards, to the needs of publishers or to the tastes of the reading public", triumphed Galton's life, work and personal heredity. **He predicted that Galton, rather than Charles Darwin, would be remembered as the most prodigious grandson of Erasmus Darwin.**

...

> He gave lectures on such issues as "the woman's question" (this was the era of the suffragist movement in the UK)[24]
> and upon Karl Marx. **His commitment to socialism and its ideals led him to refuse the offer of being created an OBE (Officer of the Order of the British Empire) in 1920 and also to refuse a knighthood in 1935.**

---

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/philosophy/69491-on-why-materialism-matters?p=1645835#post1645835

Opus 131:

Leftism begun with Greek rationalism (which survived in the middle ages thanks to nominalism). In essence, without Christianity, the west would have descended into this materialistic hell hole we call modern "civilization" well before it was time for that to happen. **This attempt to blame Christianity for the errors of modernity stems from Aryan denial. It is a way for us to deny our own degeneracy while blaming Semites exclusively,** as if there could possibly be such a thing as human groups which are perfectly good (our own), and human groups which are exclusively evil (everybody else). Sorry, but we all have our share in the decline of human civilizations. Blacks with their violence, Jews with their insidiousness, and us with our soul crushing rationalism. The reign of the anti-Christ has need of subjects, and those will belong to all races. The devil is thoroughly multicultural.

https://voxday.net/2019/09/01/godless-primitivism-is-not-the-answer/

Without Christianity, without the European nations, **without the Graeco-Roman legal and philosophic traditions,** there is no Western civilization.

https://www1.cbn.com/questions/what-are-the-three-parts-of-man

As God is a tripartite -- Father, Son and Holy Spirit -- so man is three parts -- **body, soul and spirit.** In the most explicit example from Scripture of these divisions, the Apostle Paul writes:

> Now may the God of peace Himself sanctify you entirely; and may
> your **spirit** and **soul** and **body** be preserved complete, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Thessalonians 5:23 NASB).

...

> But a **natural (psuchikos -- soulish) man** does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually appraised (1 Cor. 2:14 NASB).

...

> For the word of God is living and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing as far as **the division of soul and spirit**, of both joints and marrow, and able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart (Heb. 4:12 NASB).

We see in this passage of Scripture that the soul and spirit can be divided -- and that it is the Word of God that pierces our heart to bring the division of soul and spirit, something that only God can do.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/18377/18377-h/18377-h.htm#CHAPTER_VII

It must be carefully noted (what ascetics of all ages have overlooked) that the flesh is not the body. Envy and hatred are just as much works of the flesh[1] as revelling and uncleanness. **It is not the body which lusts against the soul, but the evil nature running through them both which refuses the leading of the Spirit of God.** But these are practical statements: the proper psychology of Scripture is given in another series of passages. It comes out clearly in 1 Thess. v. 23—'your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.' Here the division is threefold. **The body we know pretty well, as far as concerns its material form. The soul however, is not the 'soul' of common language. It is only the seat of the animal life which we share with the beasts. Above the soul, beyond the ken of Aristotle, Scripture reveals the spirit as the seat of the immortal life which is to pass the gate of death unharmed.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato%27s_theory_of_soul

The Platonic soul consists of three parts which are located in different regions of the body:[1][2][3]

1. the *logos* (λογιστικόν), or *logistikon*, located in the head, is related to reason and regulates the other parts.
2. the *thymos* (θυμοειδές), or *thumoeides*, located near the chest region and is related to anger.
3. the *eros* (ἐπιθυμητικόν), or *epithumetikon*, located in the stomach and is related to one's desires.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020

[Greece and Rome] survive not in their institutions, but in their ideas, and by their ideas, especially on the art of government, they are—

> The dead, but sceptred sovereigns who still rule
> Our spirits from their urns.

To them, indeed, may be tracked nearly all the errors that are undermining political society—Communism, Utilitarianism, the confusion between tyranny and authority, and between lawlessness and freedom.

---

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2332/2332-h/2332-h.htm#link2H_4_0007

This Essay, silly as it is, was exceedingly well received, both in England and on the Continent. And the reason is evident. **The classical scholars who saw its absurdity were generally on the side of the ancients, and were inclined rather to veil than to expose the blunders of an ally;** the champions of the moderns were generally as ignorant as Temple himself; and the multitude was charmed by his flowing and melodious diction.
...

Christchurch was up in arms; **and though that College seems then to have been almost destitute of severe and accurate learning, no academical society could show a greater array of orators, wits, politicians, bustling adventurers who united the superficial accomplishments of the scholar with the manners and arts of the man of the world;** and this formidable body resolved to try how far smart repartees, well-turned sentences, confidence, puffing, and intrigue could, on the question whether a Greek book were or were not genuine, supply the place of a little knowledge of Greek.

https://www.garynorth.com/Deuteronomy4.pdf

In a very real sense, Julian's edict launched a dilemma that has faced the Western church since the eleventh century. If the knowledge of pagan texts is the legitimate basis of a gentleman's education – an assumption acknowledged by the Christian West until the Darwinian educational reforms of late nineteenth century – then why should Christians seek to become gentlemen?
...

Darwinism has replaced classicism in the modern curriculum, and college graduates are not so much gentlemen as bureaucrats, but the dilemma is in principle the same. The solution is the biblical covenant, which provides Christians with revelational standards of evaluation that are to govern both the form and the content of education, but Christians have never believed this strongly enough to establish biblical guidelines for education.

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The curricula of the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge had always been grounded on the ideal of thorough knowledge of the pagan classics, **and even the Puritans, while always officially skeptical about such training, and always filled with fear and trembling about its threat to the soul, were forced to submit their ministerial candidates and the sons of the gentry and merchants to the classroom rigors of the humanists, generation after generation.**42 They did not succeed in changing the curricula of the universities during the Puritan Revolution, and after that, there was no possibility of trinitarian educational reform.

The classical educational model of Oxford and Cambridge did its steady work of secularization in the English-speaking world, even in Puritan Harvard and Yale.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/38/mode/2up?view=theater

In our time, when Latinity is dying and has retreated to the academy, it is hard to visualize the easy intimate traffic between the eighteenth century and the ancients. **Educated Christians never thought for a moment that their classicism might in any way interfere with their religious duties.**
…

When Oglethorpe's expedition set sail for Georgia, Charles Wesley, with no sense of incongruity, borrowed his pious benediction – *Christo duce et auspice Christo* – from a Horatian ode.1

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51634/51634-h/51634-h.htm#Chap_10

In order to understand what kind of moral education students in Roman Catholic colleges receive, one must only be told that from beginning to the end they are surrounded by an atmosphere in which nothing but Paganism is breathed. The models of eloquence which we learned by heart were almost exclusively taken from Pagan literature. In the same manner Pagan models of wisdom, of honor, of chastity were offered to our admiration. Our minds were constantly fixed on the masterpieces which Paganism has left. The doors of our understanding were left open only to receive the rays of light which Paganism has shed on the world. Homer, Socrates, Lycurgus, Virgil, Horace, Cicero, Tacitus, Cæsar, Xenophon, Demosthenes; Alexander, Lucretia, Regulus, Brutus, Jupiter, Venus, Minerva, Mars, Diana, etc., etc., crowded each other in our thoughts, to occupy them and be their models, examples and masters for ever.

It may be said that the same Pagan writers, orators and heroes are studied, read and admired in Protestant colleges. But there the infallible antidote, the Bible, is given to the students.
…

It is true that the Church of Rome, as an offset to that, gave us her principles, precepts, fables and legends that we might be attached to her, and that she might remain the mistress of our hearts. But these doctrines, practices, principles and fables seemed to us so evidently borrowed from Paganism—they were so cold, so naked, so stripped of all true poetry, that if the Paganism of the ancients was not left absolute master of our affections, it still claimed a large part of our souls.
…

If, therefore, I am asked what moral and religious education we received at college, I will ask in return, What religious education can we receive in an institution where seven years are spent without once being permitted to read the Gospel of God? **The gods of the heathen spoke to us daily by their apostles and disciples—Homer, Virgil, Pindar, Horace! and the God of the Christians had not permission to say a single word to us in that college!**
…

But the greater number of students in Roman Catholic colleges cannot accept the bastard Christianity which Rome presents to them. Of course, during their studies they follow its rules, for the sake of peace; but they have hardly left college before they proceed to join and increase the ranks of the army of skeptics and infidels which overruns France, Spain, Italy and Canada—which overruns, in fact, all the countries where Rome has the education of the people in her hands.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Schopenhauer_as_Educator#2

And so the life of the modern man is passed in see-sawing between Christianity and Paganism, **between a furtive or hypocritical approach to Christian morality, and an equally shy and spiritless dallying with the antique:** and he does not thrive under it.

http://www.thenietzschechannel.com/works-pub/cw/cw.htm

Noble Romans experienced Christianity as *foeda superstitio* [abominable superstition]: I recall how the last German of noble taste, how Goethe* experienced the cross. One looks in vain for more valuable, more *necessary* opposites... —**But such falseness as that of Bayreuth is no exception today. We are all familiar with the unaesthetic concept of the Christian Junker.** Such *innocence* among opposites, such a "good conscience" in a lie is actually *modern* par excellence, it almost defines modernity. Biologically, modern man represents a *contradiction of values*, he sits between two chairs, he says Yes and No in the same breath.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Raven

Simon Arthur Noël Raven (28 December 1927-12 May 2001) was an English author, playwright, essayist, television writer, and screenwriter. He is known for his louche lifestyle as much as for his literary output.
…

His unashamed credo was "a robust eighteenth-century paganism... allied to a deep contempt for the egalitarian code of post-war England".[2]

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1330265/Simon-Raven.html

The upper layer, a schoolmaster's version of Hellenism that was propagated in the public schools, Raven described in the following manner in *The Decline of the Gentleman* (1961):

> *First,* ***the truth must be sought honestly and with intelligence on every level, and must be prized above convenience and even perhaps above freedom itself, because it is not made by man but exists independently of him****... One comes at the truth by logic, patience, and fairmindedness. From which it follows, by extension, that one should always be moderate... With moderation comes tolerance... Being free meant that you were not "servile," i.e... that subject to the general good you did not have to do anything against your will and must not, as a point of honour, do anything for monetary gain... Pericles expressed stern views about women: They should be heard of, he said, neither for good nor ill... [T]he Greeks strongly disapproved of inflated pride... They took the view that anyone who became too pleased with himself or thought himself too clever would be punished by the gods with disgrace and ruin.*

This simplified and sanitized Hellenism was developed for the purpose of civilizing crass public schoolboys, and designed to harmonize with Christianity: the Greeks were presented as proto-Christians, lacking only the knowledge of Christ to make them perfect. But there were layers beneath layers, and to those with sufficient intellect and curiosity the classical authors also delivered an unsanitized, definitely un- and anti-Christian message, entirely subversive of public school values; Raven sucked this up greedily.

> *Here was Horace, openly boasting of how he ran away from a battle. Tacitus, quietly equating enthusiasm with stupidity. Thucydides, grimly announcing that the only law of human affairs was "Necessity." Lucretius, recommending regular one-night stands as a way of securing immunity from passion, which was simply the unwholesome and ridiculous product of suppressed or thwarted lust. Catullus, advocating sex with women or sex with boys, whichever you fancy at the time, because there is no such thing as right or wrong in this context...* ***All of them insistent that you take what pleasure you can from this world because only superstitious fools believe in the existence of the next.***

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/416/mode/2up?view=theater

A key instance of humanism's anachronistic Christianization of pre-Christian thought was indeed precisely this tendency to subsume Platonism, and also Stoicism, into Christian Neoplatonism and generally overstate parallels and similarities between Platonism and early church dogma. This tradition persisted in the later seventeenth century among the Cambridge Platonists, Plato's philosophy being viewed by them as profoundly akin to, and essentially a preparation for, the thought-world of the early Church Fathers. For all his vast erudition and penetrating insights, Cudworth figured in this respect among the principal offenders. Despite the growing sophistication of seventeenth-century erudition, this long-hallowed tradition of scholarship was not challenged, and perhaps could not have been, until the new *critique* based on wholly fresh philosophical criteria arose towards the end of the seventeenth century. **But once the rupture occurred, the implications were far-reaching and of immense consequence.**25

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/162/mode/2up?view=theater

The point was expressed with typical adroitness and humour by d'Argens, during the period he lived in Holland, in the later 1730s. **His Chinese visitor to the West,** reporting back home what he sees as the extraordinarily eccentric behaviour and strangeness of the Europeans, in his *Lettres chinoises*, **[1739-40] remarks that it was astonishing but he had often had reason to reflect that were the Greek and Roman philosophers so widely extolled there actually to return, far from being admired or permitted to expound their doctrines, they would everywhere in Europe be quickly silenced – immediately imprisoned in Paris and Vienna and burnt in Madrid and Rome:** Empedocles, Thales, Anaxagoras, and Pherecydes, he avers, all would suffer the same fate.133

https://rmx.news/religion/the-german-catholic-church-is-nearly-anti-christ-says-hungarian-archbishop/

"**One of the most striking signs of the European Union's anti-Christianity is that its constitution did not mention Europe's Christian roots. They write about Greco-Roman traditions and the Enlightenment, but not about Christianity.** Yet, ancient culture and art survived thanks to Christians: the writings of Virgil, Tacitus, Homer and others were copied by monks in the depths of their cells."

http://garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm

Rushdoony identifies the origin of the myth: "Greece: The Humanist's Homeland."(3) He begins his chapter, "The Unity of the Polis," with this crucial observation: "The importance of Greek thought in Western history cannot be understood by a reading of the works of specialists in the field, **because the prevailing approach is neither philosophical nor historical but religious. ... <u>The majority of scholars turn to Greek culture, not for its own sake, but to find a heritage and a homeland to buttress their anti-Christianity.</u>**"(4)

> https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/18/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel argues that the religion of Hellas does not belong to one people only, it belongs essentially to all humanity as the latter's par excellence faith.** It answers the needs of concrete man because the Greek god (the gods of Homeric mythology)
>
> > has within him the content of the noble and the true which is at the same time that of concrete man. ... **[In this religion] god has no content which would be unknown to man, or which man does not find and know in himself. The confidence of man in the gods is at the same time confidence in himself.**12
>
> ...
>
> It is obvious that 'god' or 'gods' is here merely a convenient expression for our inner world, that it brings a welcome release from the fetters that another religion, the Hebrew-Christian, had imposed on the inner man.13

...

We must take seriously Otto Scott's suggestion: **Christians should study Classical history and culture, not to exaggerate the virtues of Classical civilization, but to understand why it collapsed.**(9)

---

https://www.age-of-the-sage.org/philosophy/footnotes_plato.html

The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.

> https://www.artofmanliness.com/articles/count-no-man-happy-until-the-end-is-known/
>
> "This is why," Solon finally concludes to Croesus, "I cannot answer the question you asked me until I know the manner of your death. **Count no man happy until the end is known.**"
>
> https://web.archive.org/web/20060202014047/http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/havamal.html#men
>
> 80. Praise day at even, a wife when dead, a weapon when tried, a maid when married, ice when 'tis crossed, and ale when 'tis drunk.
>
> https://biblehub.com/matthew/19-30.htm
>
> **But many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first.**
>
> https://biblehub.com/john/2-10.htm
>
> **And he said to him, "<u>Every man at the beginning sets out the good wine</u>, and when the guests have well drunk, then the inferior. You have kept the good wine until now!"**

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/n46/mode/2up?view=theater

Above all it should be insisted upon that the greatest inheritance the Greeks left in practical philosophy was not the splendour of Plato, or the vast erudition of Aristotle, but the systems of Zeno and Epicurus, and the scepticism of Pyrrho. **In the Roman Empire Platonists and Aristotelians were scarce; Stoics and Epicureans occupied all society. And if in the Middle Ages the schoolmen returned to the great classical masters, <u>in our own day the world has again fallen into modern paths, and every thinking man is either a Stoic, an Epicurean, or a Sceptic.</u> These eternal systems were born not in the golden but in the silver age of Greek literature.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14240/14240-h/14240-h.htm
>
> Here Mr. Mahaffy is very pleasant reading indeed. His account of the colleges at Athens and Alexandria, for instance, is extremely interesting, **and so is his estimate of the schools of Zeno, of Epicurus, and of Pyrrho.**

https://archive.org/details/antigonosgonatas00tarn/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Of all the systems of the Greek world, Stoicism is the only one that in any sense comes home to ourselves, or has any affinity to the feelings of modern men and women. And it is not merely through its influence upon St. Paul that Stoicism affects the world to-day. The later Stoics travelled far from Zeno; they learnt much that he did not know; nevertheless, without his impulse they would not have been.66 **We may pass over Aristotle, and treat Plato as poetry; but we cannot imagine a time when men, for their own sakes, will cease to read the slave Epictetus and his imperial pupil.**

Leo Strauss's Indictment of Christain Philosophy on JSTOR

Later writers motivated by the same antitheological passion as Marsilius **would conclude that the orthodox scholastics had been too successful in their attempt to harmonize Aristotle with Christian theology and that a new beginning was needed, a beginning that would entail the rejection of Aristotle and the entire classical tradition.**56

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/82/mode/2up?view=theater

Political preoccupations kept breaking in. **Thus the philosophes slighted whatever contribution Aristotle may have made to the scientific method; they saw him mainly as the favorite of the Scholastics – a pagan who had trafficked with the enemy. Their treatment of Plato, which has long perplexed and annoyed students of the eighteenth century, was equally shabby. Rousseau, who worshipped Plato's writings as *divin*, was a lonely voice in the Enlightenment.** Rather more characteristically, Montesquieu described Plato as a fine poet; Voltaire, puzzled and impudent, called Plato eloquent and unintelligible, a clever fabulist with occasional insights; Wieland equated Plato's metaphysical vision with an otherworldly mysticism; while Jefferson could hardly get through the *Republic*: it seemed to him puerile, whimsical, full of unintelligible jargon and downright nonsense – he simply could not understand how the admirable Cicero could have eulogized Plato so extravagantly. **Despite this condescension, the Enlightenment was permeated with Platonic ideas.** The Stoics, who taught the philosophes a great deal, had studied Plato closely, and had adopted many of his teachings. The neoplatonists had adopted others, and their system was transmitted to posterity in large part by Augustine. **Now the philosophes patronized Plato, ignored the neoplatonists, and ridiculed Augustine, but they inherited, despite themselves, a wide range of Platonic ideas, largely through the Stoics and such modern Platonists as Galileo.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/322/mode/2up?view=theater

The image of a bridge is helpful but incomplete; it fails to evoke the essential hostility between eighteenth-century religion and eighteenth-century secularism: the philosophes rudely treated the Christian past rather as Voltaire treated the plays of Shakespeare – **as a dunghill strewn with diamonds, crying out to be pillaged and badly needing to be cleaned out.**
…

David Hume slyly suggested that the Roman Emperor Julian had conceded "the great Charity of the Christians, which they extended, he says, even sometimes to Heathens: But he asserts, like a Rogue as he is, that they borrow'd that Virtue from the writings of Homer & other heathen poets."1
…

Hence the philosophes – rogues that they were – could claim that they were doing to the Christians what the Church Fathers had claimed they had done to the Greeks and Romans: they were merely taking back what had originally belonged to them.

This philosophic estimate is uncharitable, positively unchristian; still, here as so often before, we encounter the curious duality of the Enlightenment's historical verdicts: **the philosophes were ungenerous and prejudiced and still right in substance. What the philosophes took over from Christian theologians and Christian philosophers were the least distinctively Christian, the least religious, parts of their teachings – they were usually ideas that had come to the Church Fathers from the Stoics.** Moreover the philosophes rarely left these semipagan borrowings untouched – as the ancient Greeks unmistakably made their own what they took from their neighbors, so the philosophes emptied what they borrowed of its religious content.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/66/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus, ancient humanism is not exhausted in the one dictum of Protagoras that 'man is the measure of all things' and the consequences of this dictum, it is also in its systematically influential aspect a syncretism of later theories: **Lucretian materialism, Stoic one-ness with the world-soul (cosmos), and the Pyrrhonic (skeptic) thesis which weighs two sides of all problems and suspends judgment upon**

finding that they are equally uncertain (the doctrine of equipollence). In this syncretic humanism we discern, therefore, three elements: the first, the *Lucretian motive*, is everywhere evident in the history of humanism: dispel the fear of the gods by demonstrating that everything that surrounds man, and man himself, are impersonal matter and motion. Secondly, the *Pyrrhonian motive*, **which underlines the need to substitute philosophy for religion because philosophy's main tool, reason, can never attain certitudes,** only probabilities, sufficient for a worldly attitude which is superficially moral. It keeps us free from troublesome relationships with our fellow men, and protects us against the suspicion of the authorities. The third ingredient in ancient humanism was the *Stoic motive*, **it insisted on man's link with the world-soul (*pneuma*), a half-material, half-spiritual force through which, and through which alone, we transcend our materiality (passions), and believe in, and work for, an entity of a truly human scope, the *cosmopolis*.**

Thus the educated pagan man, the philosopher, became a humanist either by denying the existence of the gods, or, as Hegel suggested, by regarding them as his equals, even his competitors.
…

Thus the true atheist-humanist of antiquity is the Pyrrhonic sage, the skeptic who is nevertheless sufficiently eclectic to allow room in his system for Epicureans and Stoics, to face Zeus as an equal,11 **to see himself and the cosmos as homogeneous, to have a material soul in communication with the world-soul.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Open_Society_and_Its_Enemies

The Open Society Foundations, created by investor George Soros, were inspired in name and purpose by Popper's book.[20]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_M_E5QczOBAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA241#v=onepage&q&f=false

But some part at least of the authoritarian Church of the Middle Ages succeeded in branding such practical humanitarianism as 'worldly', as characteristic of 'Epicureanism', and of men who desire only to 'fill their bellies like the beasts'. **The terms 'Epicureanism', 'materialism', and 'empiricism', that is to say, the philosophy of Democritus, one of the greatest of the Great Generation, became in this way the synonyms of wickedness, and the tribal Idealism of Plato and Aristotle was exalted as a kind of Christianity before Christ. Indeed, this is the source of the immense authority of Plato and Aristotle, even to our own day, that their philosophy was adopted by medieval authoritarianism. But it must not be forgotten that, outside the totalitarian camp, their fame has outlived their practical influence upon our lives.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/22/mode/2up?view=theater

Liberalism at its very essence is the return to this world as the highest good, the embrace of the natural and the rejection of the supernatural. Consequently it is a shedding of the moral seriousness that Christianity had imposed by its embrace of the cross, and a return to the far less morally demanding world of ancient paganism.

But liberalism is a *new* kind of paganism. That we must keep firmly in mind. It is one thing to have a kind of innocent embrace of this world *before* one has heard of Christianity; it is quite another to reject life in the next world as defined by Christianity, and everything in this world that might lead to it.

Liberalism rejected the good things in paganism that Christianity had baptized. They had become too closely associated with the Christian worldview. And it embraced everything in paganism that Christianity had rejected - the crass materialism, the cynicism, the nihilism and fatalism, the hedonism.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/112/mode/2up?view=theater

The old paganism had heartily affirmed the body, but many ancient pagans had also praised the goods of the soul. (Think of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.) Christianity affirmed the essential goodness of creation even while rejecting hedonism, but it took the pagan acclaim of the soul and its virtues up into its own supernatural framework. **For this very reason, modern liberalism had to destroy or reject even the pagan thought that had proven compatible with Christianity.**

> https://biblehub.com/2_peter/2-20.htm
>
> **For if, after they have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, they are again entangled in them and overcome, the latter end is worse for them than the beginning.**

http://garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm

Historian Joseph R. Strayer writes: "**But whatever their constitution, they did not develop a legal tradition that persisted in the West.** The Greeks were deeply concerned with law, but since each small community had its own laws, tailored to fit the needs of that community, it was hard to develop general principles applicable to all of the Greek-ruled areas. **By the time that the Greeks had developed such principles, they had been swallowed up by the Hellenistic monarchies,** which, in turn, were swallowed up by Rome."(54)

Bury wrote much the same thing: contrary to Pericles' funeral oration, **Athens did not become the school of Greece until after the collapse of the empire. Athens became influential through its philosophers and through its new position as a clearing house of cosmopolitan influences**--in short, through its Hellenism. In fact, he argued, Athens had more influence through its theater than through anything else.(55) **It was Hellenism, with its cosmopolitanism, that produced the famed Athenian individualism.**(56) The Athenian's covenantal bond to his city--his *polis*--had been broken. "The citizen of Athens has become a citizen of the world."(57) That is to say, he had become no citizen at all--no civil oath, no democratic sanctions, and no political or judicial legacy to pass on to posterity. **Instead, he and his peers, to the extent that they left a judicial legacy to the future, did so by abandoning their inheritance from the past: the judicial ideal of the *polis*. The politically minded intellectuals among them--and there were fewer and fewer of them as the fourth century progressed--adopted a new ideal.**

This later Hellenistic intellectual development was Stoic natural law philosophy, which was the product of the collapse of the Greek city-states, not the foundation of Athenian democratic politics. **Stoic natural law theory was used to justify the new world empires of Macedonia and Rome.**

https://archive.org/details/richardwagnerspr011346mbp/page/n177/mode/2up?view=theater

One may aver, without exaggeration, that the Antique would have stayed unknown, in its now universal world-significance, had the German spirit not recognised and expounded it. The Italian made as much of the Antique his own, as he could copy and remodel; the Frenchman borrowed from this remodelling, in his turn, whatever caressed his national sense for elegance of Form: the German was the first to apprehend its purely-human originality, to seize therein a meaning quite aloof from usefulness, but therefore of the only use for rendering the Purely-human. ...

One may say that the true idea of the Antique has existed only since the middle of the eighteenth century, since Winckelmann and Lessing.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#TRANSLATORS_INTRODUCTION

Even at this early period of his life Nietzsche was convinced that Christianity was the real danger to culture; **and not merely modern Christianity, but also the Alexandrian culture, the last gasp of Greek antiquity, which had helped to bring Christianity about.** When, in the later aphorisms of "We Philologists," Nietzsche appears to be throwing over the Greeks, it should be remembered that he does not refer to the Greeks of the era of Homer or Æschylus, or even of Aristotle, but to the much later Greeks of the era of Longinus.

Classical antiquity, however, was conveyed to the public through university professors and their intellectual offspring, and these professors, influenced (quite unconsciously, of course) by religious and "liberal" principles, presented to their scholars a kind of emasculated antiquity. It was only on these conditions that the State allowed the pagan teaching to be propagated in the schools; and if, where classical scholars were concerned, it was more tolerant than the Church had been, it must be borne in mind that the Church had already done all the rough work of emasculating its enemies, and had handed down to the State a body of very innocuous and harmless investigators. A totally erroneous conception of what constituted classical culture was thus brought about. Where any distinction was actually made, for example, later Greek thought was enormously over-rated, and early Greek thought equally undervalued.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_133

40. The position we have taken up towards classical antiquity is at bottom the profound cause of the sterility of modern culture; **for we have taken all this modern conception of culture from the Hellenised Romans. We must distinguish within the domain of antiquity itself: when we come to appreciate its purely productive period, we condemn at the same time the entire Romano-Alexandrian culture.** But at the same time also we condemn our own attitude towards antiquity, and likewise our philology.

41. There has been an age-long battle between the Germans and antiquity, *i.e.*, a battle against the old culture. It is certain that precisely what is best and deepest in the German resists it. **The main point, however, is that such resistance is only justifiable in the case of the Romanised culture; for this culture, even at that time, was a falling-off from something more profound and noble.** It is this latter that the Germans are wrong in resisting.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n355/mode/2up?view=theater

420. I do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy: **it is both necessary and perhaps desirable that the philosopher should be a *rare* plant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise of philosophy which is to be found in Seneca and Cicero.** Philosophy has not much in common with virtue.

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/nietzsche-and-persia

In another posthumously published fragment, he deplores a lost historical opportunity: "**It would have been much more fortunate had the Persians become masters (*Herr*) of the Greeks, rather than have the Romans of all people [*gerade die Römer*] assume that role"** (*Sämtliche Werke,* VIII, p. 65). In this note, Nietzsche implicitly expresses once more his radical opposition to Greek metaphysical thought, as developed by Socrates and Plato, and its later prevalence in Western world through the supremacy of Greek culture within the Roman Empire.

42. **Everything classic was thoroughly cultivated by Charles the Great, whilst he combated everything heathen with the severest possible measures of coercion.** Ancient mythology was developed, but German mythology was treated as a crime. The feeling underlying all this, in my opinion, was that Christianity had already overcome the old religion: people no longer feared it, but availed themselves of the culture that rested upon it. But the old German gods were feared.

A great superficiality in the conception of antiquity—little else than an appreciation of its formal accomplishments and its knowledge—must thereby have been brought about. We must find out the forces that stood in the way of increasing our insight into antiquity. **First of all, the culture of antiquity is utilised as an incitement towards the acceptance of Christianity: it became, as it were, the premium for conversion, the gilt with which the poisonous pill was coated before being swallowed. Secondly, the help of ancient culture was found to be necessary as a weapon for the intellectual protection of Christianity. Even the Reformation could not dispense with classical studies for this purpose.**

The Renaissance, on the other hand, now begins, with a clearer sense of classical studies, which, however, are likewise looked upon from an anti-Christian standpoint: **the Renaissance shows an awakening of honesty in the south, like the Reformation in the north. They could not but clash; for a sincere leaning towards antiquity renders one unchristian.**

On the whole, however, the Church succeeded in turning classical studies into a harmless direction: **the philologist was invented, representing a type of learned man who was at the same time a priest or something similar. Even in the period of the Reformation people succeeded in emasculating scholarship. It is on this account that Friedrich August Wolf [1759-1824] is noteworthy: he freed his profession from the bonds of theology. This action of his, however, was not fully understood; for an aggressive, active element, such as was manifested by the poet-philologists of the Renaissance, was not developed.** The freedom obtained benefited science, but not man.

43. It is true that both humanism and rationalism have brought antiquity into the field as an ally; and it is therefore quite comprehensible that the opponents of humanism should direct their attacks against antiquity also. **Antiquity, however, has been misunderstood and falsified by humanism: it must rather be considered as a testimony against humanism, against the benign nature of man, &c. The opponents of humanism are wrong to combat antiquity as well; for in antiquity they have a strong ally.**
...

87. Even in the best of cases, **philologists seek for no more than mere "rationalism" and Alexandrian culture—not Hellenism.**
...

144. The naive character of the Greeks observed by the Egyptians.

145. The truly scientific people, the literary people, were the Egyptians and not the Greeks. That which has the appearance of science among the Greeks, originated among the Egyptians and later on returned to them to mingle again with the old current. **Alexandrian culture is an amalgamation of Hellenic and Egyptian: and when our world again founds its culture upon the Alexandrian culture, then...[12]**

[12] "We shall once again be shipwrecked." The omission is in the original—Tr.
...

159. **Philosophic heads must occupy themselves one day with the collective account of antiquity and make up its balance-sheet. If we have this, antiquity will be overcome. All the shortcomings which now vex us have their roots in antiquity, so that we cannot continue to treat this account with the mildness which has been customary up to the present. The atrocious crime of mankind which rendered Christianity possible, as it actually became possible, is the *guilt* of antiquity.** With

Christianity antiquity will also be cleared away.—At the present time it is not so very far behind us, and it is certainly not possible to do justice to it.
...

161. Christianity has conquered antiquity—yes; that is easily said. In the first place, it is itself a piece of antiquity, in the second place, it has preserved antiquity, **in the third place, it has never been in combat with the pure ages of antiquity. Or rather: in order that Christianity itself might remain, it had to let itself be overcome by the spirit of antiquity—for example, the idea of empire, the community, and so forth.** We are suffering from the uncommon want of clearness and uncleanliness of human things; from the ingenious mendacity which Christianity has brought among men.

http://garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm

Consider Werner Jaeger, author of the multi-volume masterpiece on Greek education, *Paideia*. Hugh Nibley, the remarkable Mormon scholar and linguist, studied under him at the University of California at Berkeley in the 1930's. In an autobiographical essay, Nibley tells of his studies in Hebrew and Arabic (he could learn a new language in a few weeks).

> "The most illustrious visiting scholar of the time was Werner Jaeger, who favored me with long chats and frank revelations over the teacups (my refusal to drink the stuff made an indelible impression on him and his wife). **Professor Jaeger knew very well, he told me, that the Greeks were part of a wider Oriental complex, but he had to bypass all that in his study of the Greek mind, because it tended to disturb the neatness and balance of his great work on Greek Education."**[(20)]
>
> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Among general interpretations of Greek culture, Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The ideals of Greek Culture*, 3 vols. (1936; tr. Gilbert Highet, 2nd edn., 1945), offers a powerful analysis moving from Homer to Plato; **it credits the Greeks with the invention of philosophy and the ideal of "culture." *Paideia* is, as some critics have noted, an essentially aristocratic view of Greek civilization, and this view appears not merely in what it argues but in when it stops. Historians of the Hellenistic age have protested against what they call this "purism"** (see, most recently, Moses Hadas, *Hellenistic Culture: Fusion and Diffusion* [1959], but Jaeger's work retains, at least for me, its authority.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/109/mode/2up?view=theater

Only the expression of a more purely Nordic blood could help redefine a more rigorous form of humanism that, in contrast to the decadent Romans or the French and more in line with the thought of the Greeks themselves, **"thought not in terms of individuals but in terms of races and peoples. This is the true humanism."**60 This true humanism implied a more precise concept of "true" humanity, which the Nazis explicitly redefined in harmony with their version of Greek thought, based on the concepts of hierarchy, race, and eugenics. The German effort after Winckelmann to dust off the Acropolis and return to Greece was **"a search for a Greek model, independent of the Roman tradition," the refusal to accept a "secondhand"**61 **Greek heritage deformed by its passage through Roman hands.**

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/125/mode/2up?view=theater

Walter Eberhardt, a professor at the University of Münster,128 opened the hostilities against Latin in an accusatory 1935 article published in *Nazionalsozialistische Wissenschaft*, a Nazi academic journal.129 The classical scholar agreed with the need to study the values of antiquity in order to revive them in practice, **but only Greek antiquity – not Roman.** While Rome had been the favorite of 16th century French and Italian Renaissance humanists, Greek antiquity had been rediscovered in the 18th century by the Germans. This was not an accident: **"They rediscovered it at a moment when, locked in combat against French classicism (which is, ultimately, Roman and Latin), they needed an ally."**130
...

Eberhardt saw this never completely forgotten cultural and political antipathy as a sign of otherness, a fundamental racial incompatibility between *Germanentum* and *Romanitas*: **"Rome as a global phenomenon is foreign to our race,"**134 **and what was all too easily subsumed under the much-abused term *antiquity* was in fact not a unified and coherent entity.**135 **It was important to distinguish between Rome and Greece. "Our reticence toward Rome … comes from the depths of our being," for "the world of Hellenism and *Romanitas* were two very distinct entities."**136

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/115/mode/2up?view=theater

Nazi humanism thus required a very careful selection of just which humanities it ought to emphasize. **It could not canonize all of the classical tradition but rather needed to separate the Indo-Germanic wheat of archaic and classical Greece from the Semitic chaff of the Orientalized Hellenistic era.**80
...

Bogner argued that traditional humanism erred when it naively believed that "the Greeks wanted to create a man of ideas through paideia," pursuing a universal, abstract ideal unbound by any blood ties or racially determined characteristics.
…

Bogner's attack on this seductive humanism was virulently racist, coming as it did from an article denouncing the *Assimilationsjude* of antiquity – the Jew of the diaspora who dressed in Greek robes to hide in plain sight in the Hellenistic world, then later donned a Roman toga and learned to speak Latin under the Roman Empire.83
…

Only the late, decadent Hellenistic Greeks had sought to promote a concept of education aimed at the universality of mankind or the universal in the individual man: **High Greek culture, which was fundamentally selective and elitist, had been sold off to the highest bidder by degenerate Levantines, who had imposed their idea that "it was not their roots but their culture (paideia) that made the Greeks."**

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/213/mode/2up?view=theater

Vigilance, according to Fritz Schachermeyr, was thus necessary for the scholar of the humanities, classics, or antiquity if they wanted, as the author emphasized, to preserve their role and their place in the new National Socialist state. **Experts in antiquity would have to teach racially valid and spiritually pertinent material: "Until now we have accepted everything that came from antiquity as a sort of sublime revelation. … This is how the humanist, who was on the one hand the conservator of the most noble part of the Nordic spirit, has become the vehicle for all anti-Nordic spiritual patrimony." Only a starry-eyed humanism, a blind adoration for antiquity that did not separate the Nordic wheat from the Asiatic-Semitic chaff, could have preserved the "destructive poison" in a culture that had "eliminated the Nordic peoples of antiquity"**132 – and that still remained an active threat in the contemporary world. **Not all of antiquity was ripe for the eating; any self-respecting humanism thus required a very selective approach to the humanities.**

https://counter-currents.com/2021/12/themis-unblinded/

Many Neo-Classical symbols were culturally appropriated during the French and American revolutions, both of which were heavily influenced by Freemasonry, the Enlightenment, and the childish myth of progress. **These Neo-Classical symbols were used to cast the revolutions as a return to tradition, when in reality they were in many ways the antithesis of the Greco-Roman world.**

Even the most radical of Athenians and Roman Populares would have laughed at the Enlightenment's John Lennonesque talk of a universal brotherhood of man. Rights were understood as ancestral customs that had been established through struggle, not as universal entitlements. Athenian democracy had the flavor of *Starship Troopers*, not a hippy commune. **Latter-day Stoics such as Marcus Aurelius may have been more amenable to Enlightenment ideas,** but by their time the Classical world had passed from what Oswald Spengler describes as *culture*, which is living, to *civilization*, which is dead. **Arguably, Marcus Aurelius was closer to the rising Magian culture than to his Roman ancestors.**

---

https://counter-currents.com/2018/07/how-power-invented-individualism/

But we must remember that social and political individualism, and by extension modern liberalism, could not have come into being from a spiritual doctrine alone. The Eastern Orthodox regions of Europe share the early Christian tradition with Western Europe, yet did not create individualism; Islam stresses the personal ideal of the Prophet, and has produced anti-social 'holy fools', yet did not create individualism. Buddhism and Sikhism were spiritually egalitarian religions that abolished caste distinctions – yet did not create individualism.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/146/mode/2up?view=theater

For the secular occasion of New Year's Day, 1667, Polotsky published *The Eagle of the Russias*, an elaborate secular panegyric to his imperial benefactor, replete with baroque decorations, anagrams on the Tsar's name, and praise above that given to Hercules, Alexander the Great, and Titus.
…

Ukrainians and White Russians also wrote and staged a number of the "school dramas" that had been popular in those Latinized regions. Music accompanied most of these performances, so that Russia "first became acquainted with secular singing and secular instrumental music not in life, but in spectacles."80

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/306/mode/2up?view=theater

The prelates also managed to limit the impact of Peter's cultural revolution among Russia's elites. The tsar thought it essential for reorganizing Russian society and the state that Latin be taught and cultivate as a vehicle of instruction, reading, and scholarly interaction.43 A particularly important strand in this programme was the scheme for fostering Latin colleges, or gymnasia, in Kiev, Moscow, St Petersburg, and Novgorod, **though here he mostly built on pre-existing institutions, like the Slavonic-Greek-Latin Academy in Moscow (founded in 1687) and the Kiev Academy, founded to counter the Jesuit Counter-Reformation in the Ukraine, in the 1630s, institutions which, in fact, remained under ecclesiastical control.**44 The tsar chiefly wanted Latin as a tool for instruction in technical subjects and promoting the study of western mathematics, science, and philosophy. **The church, however,** fearful of the potential effect of the Roman classics and modern philosophical and scientific works in Latin on Russian society and anxious lest the teaching and learning of Latin encourage the further penetration of Roman Catholicism in the Ukraine, and other border lands between Russia and Poland, **quietly but firmly opposed its broader use in Russian higher education. Indeed, virtually no classical pagan Latin or Greek texts were published in Latin or Greek in the Russian empire, much less translated into Russian, before the 1760s.**45 **Through the church's guardianship of education and culture, pagan antiquity in general, whether literary, historical, philosophical, or scientific, was effectively deleted from the Petrine 'revolution.'**

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/188/mode/2up?view=theater

Finally, a cult of classical antiquity began to emerge on Russian soil. **Taken over first from Poland and then from Italian and French visitors was the idea that classical forms of art and life might serve as a supplement (if not an alternative) to Christian forms.** The belief subtly grew that classical antiquity could – unaided by Christian revelation – answer many of the pressing problems of life.
…

The new operas, plays, and ballets of the Elizabethan era were built around classical more often than scriptural subjects – in marked contrast to the theater of Alexis' time.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/212/mode/2up?view=theater

The Kiev-Mogila Academy (which was not made a theological academy until the nineteenth century) was the closest approximation to a Western-style liberal arts university. Between 1721 and 1765, twenty-eight seminaries were founded – all on the Kievan model; **and it is probably not too much to say that Kiev taught Russia not only to read and write in the eighteenth century,** but also to think in the abstract, metaphysical terms which were to prove so attractive to the aristocratic intellectuals.2

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/354/mode/2up?view=theater

The last decade of the eighteenth century had already seen a marked rise in aristocratic suicides. Heroic suicide had been commended by the Roman Stoics, who were in many ways the heroes of classical antiquity for the eighteenth-century aristocrats.
…

Belinsky felt that preoccupation with the cursed questions set his own time apart from that of Lomonosov and the confident, cosmopolitan Enlightenment:

> **In the time of Lomonosov we did not need people's poetry; then the great question – *to be or not to be* – was solved for us not in the spirit of the people (*narodnost'*), but in Europeanism.**146

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/346/mode/2up?view=theater

THE WANING of classical form in art and life was one of the many fateful results of the reign on Nicholas I. **His official ideologists – Uvarov and Pletnev – had found the literary heritage of classical antiquity largely incompatible with the new doctrine of official nationality.** The continued loyalty of the aristocratic intellectuals to the distant world of classical antiquity and the neo-classical Renaissance became sign of their estrangement from official ideology.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026657902/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

The spirit of antiquity has always remained alien to Russia. In the Middle Ages, down to Peter the Great, it scarcely knew the ancient world by name; the Kievans brought from the Polish schools Latin and the Classics, yet this remained wholly fruitless; with but few exceptions, the lettered knew the Classics only from French travesties. People, moreover, were often averse to them; when Karamzín wanted to insert in his "Pantheon of Foreign Literature" some speeches of Demosthenes the Censorship forbade it "because Demosthenes was a Republican, as were Cicero and Sallust, and such people should not be translated." The same point of view was still put

forward after 1848, people complaining particularly of instruction in ancient history, saying that one ought to start from the point of view that it was only as a punishment for their heathenism that God refused the Greeks and Romans appreciation and receptivity for the benefits of Autocracy. **Not till the study of the classical writers had lost all object and only maintained itself in Europe as a tradition, which has become more obstinate in proportion as it has lost its ground of utility, was it, thanks to the triumvirate D. Tolstoy, Katkóv, and Leóntiev, included in the most comprehensive way in the curriculum with the express object of stupefying the young and making studies more difficult.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmitry_Tolstoy
>
> In 1871, Tolstoy was in charge of the college reform, which would result in the prevalence of the classical education (included Latin and Greek languages and ancient literature, among other things).
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_145
>
> 65. **When I observe [Autumn 1874] how all countries are now promoting the advancement of classical literature I say to myself, "How harmless it must be!"** and then, "How useful it must be!" It brings these countries the reputation of promoting "free culture." In order that this "freedom" may be rightly estimated, just look at the philologists!
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=38xQHS4h0yEC&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA574#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> By the way, **it is exactly five years ago [July and August 1876] that we had our so-called classical reform of education. Mathematics and the two ancient languages, Latin and Greek, were acknowledged as the best means to mental and even spiritual development.** This is not something that we alone acknowledged or invented: it is a fact, and an incontestable fact, derived from the experience of the whole of Europe over the course of centuries, and we merely adopted it. But the point here is this: along with the much intensified teaching of these two ancient languages and mathematics, **the teaching of Russian has been all but suppressed.**
> …
>
> But that's just the point: we, the upper classes of Russian society, are no longer born into the living Russian language and have long since ceased to be. We will not have our living language until we merge completely with the People.

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/470/mode/2up?view=theater

In many respects the Hellenistic age was more important for the Enlightenment than the great classical age.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/94/mode/2up?view=theater

"The Greeks were the teachers of the Romans," Diderot remarked to Catherine the Great, "the Greek and Romans have been ours."2 The remark seems obvious, but it must be treated with some reserve. It applied squarely to erudite literary men like himself, to Hume or Gibbon or Lessing, **but for the most part the philosophes, like the culture around them, drew their intellectual sustenance from Rome rather than from Greece – from Roman Stoics, Roman Epicureans, and Roman Eclectics.**

> 2. *Plan d'une université pour le gouvernement de Russie*, in *Ouevres*, III, 477. **For the German Romantic Hellenists, it was, of course, Greece alone – and the Greece of their fond imagination – that shaped their philosophy of life.**

…

Still, the philosophes' choice of Rome seems to reflect on their taste; it seems a choice of sturdiness over brilliance, **of popularizers over genius, of common sense over depth – in a word, of the comfortable second-rate over the unsettling first-rate.**

…

Horace was right: while the great Mediterranean Empire was held together by Roman soldiers, it was nourished by Greek ideas. **The captive had overwhelmed the captor – and so what the philosophes admired about Rome was, for the most part, what was most Greek in it. Yet it was Greek with a difference; it was Greek made plain.** Much like the philosophes of the eighteenth century, Roman literati gave their best talents to explicating, disseminating, and in the process vulgarizing, difficult philosophical ideas. Cicero above all, wrote Montesquieu, had made Greek ideas "available to all men,

like reason itself."6 He had been "the first of the Romans to take philosophy out of the hands of the scholars and detach it from the encumbrance of a foreign language."7

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quarrel_of_the_Ancients_and_the_Moderns#Debate_in_France

In 1674, Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin made a public call on his friend Perrault to "defend France" against "that heretical troop who prefers ancient works to our own." In response to this call, **Perrault and his brother Claude tried to charge Boileau with the crimes of blasphemy and *lèse-majesté* on the grounds that he preferred the works of ancient pagan authors who wrote under a regime of liberty** (in Classical Athens or the Ancient Roman Republic) to the works of modern, Catholic authors who submitted to the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV.[18]

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55905/55905-h/55905-h.htm#link2H_4_0006

His knowledge of the Latin poets, from Lucretius and Catullus down to Claudian and Prudentius, was singularly exact and profound.
…

His knowledge of Greek, though doubtless such as was, in his time, thought respectable at Oxford, was evidently less than that which many lads now **[July 1843]** carry away every year from Eton and Rugby.
…

In the gorge of the Apennines he naturally remembers the hardships which Hannibal's army endured, and proceeds to cite, not the authentic narrative of Polybius, not the picturesque narrative of Livy, but the languid hexameters of Silius Italicus. On the banks of the Rubicon he never thinks of Plutarch's lively description, or of the stern conciseness of the Commentaries, or of those letters to Atticus which so forcibly express the alternations of hope and fear in a sensitive mind at a great crisis. **His only authority for the events of the civil war is Lucan.**

All the best ancient works of art at Rome and Florence are Greek. **Addison saw them, however, without recalling one single verse of Pindar, of Callimachus, or of the Attic dramatists; but they brought to his recollection innumerable passages of Horace, Juvenal, Statius, and Ovid.**
…

The world generally gives its admiration, not to the man who does what nobody else even attempts to do, but to the man who does best what multitudes do well. Bentley was so immeasurably superior to all the other scholars of his time that few among them could discover his superiority. But the accomplishment in which Addison excelled his contemporaries was then, as it is now, highly valued and assiduously cultivated at all English seats of learning.
…

English literature was to the French of the age of Lewis the Fourteenth what German literature was to our own grandfathers. Very few, we suspect, of the accomplished men who, sixty or seventy years ago, used to dine in Leicester Square with Sir Joshua, or at Streatham with Mrs. Thrale, had the slightest notion that Wieland was one of the first wits and poets, and Lessing, beyond all dispute, the first critic in Europe. **Boileau knew just as little about the Paradise Lost, and about Absalom and Ahitophel; but he had read Addison's Latin poems, and admired them greatly. They had given him, he said, quite a new notion of the state of learning and taste among the English.**
…

He thought, indeed, that no poem of the first order would ever be written in a dead language. And did he think amiss? Has not the experience of centuries confirmed his opinion? Boileau also thought it probable that, in the best modern Latin, a writer of the Augustan age would have detected ludicrous improprieties. And who can think otherwise? What modern scholar can honestly declare that he sees the smallest impurity in the style of Livy? **Yet is it not certain that, in the style of Livy, Pollio, whose taste had been formed on the banks of the Tiber, detected the inelegant idiom of the Po?** Has any modern scholar understood Latin better than Frederic the Great understood French? Yet is it not notorious that Frederic the Great, after reading, speaking, writing French, and nothing but French, during more than half a century, after unlearning his mother tongue in order to learn French, after living familiarly during many years with French associates, could not, to the last, compose in French, without imminent risk of committing some mistake which would have moved a smile in the literary circles of Paris?

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n213/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire's first great success was the epic *La Ligue, ou Henri le Grand*, half of which he wrote in the Bastille in pencil between the lines of a book. Five years later he published it, in enlarged and revised form, as *Henriade*. This took the

world by storm. Accustomed as he was to base his artistic plans on rational considerations, he had argued that the French were in need of an epic, and that he was therefore bound to give them one. And his countrymen accepted the gift. The effect of this work can only be understood if we recall the intellectual condition of France and Europe at the time. **It is the cold pale product of a brilliant craftsman and witty cultural philosopher, a work depending on the empty trappings of allegorical personifications such as Love, Peace, Discord, Fanaticism; and inspired, not by Homer, say, or Dante, or Milton, but by Virgil. At that time, however, it would have been considered ludicrous to place Homer above Virgil, so this was all to the good. Frederick the Great declared that every man of taste must prefer the *Henriade* to the Iliad.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA150#v=onepage&q&f=false

As we have seen, from the Renaissance up to the eighteenth century Stoicism proved to be a vital influence on Western thought. The other Hellenistic schools of Epicureanism and Pyrrhonian skepticism also made their mark during this period. As their unofficial ancient reporter, Cicero was read widely. **There was only limited interest in either Aristotle (still associated with medieval scholasticism) or Plato (whose popularity waned after the Italian Renaissance).**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Glanvill
>
> Joseph Glanvill FRS (1636-4 November 1680) was an English writer, philosopher, and clergyman. Not himself a scientist, he has been called "the most skillful apologist of the virtuosi", **or in other words the leading propagandist for the approach of the English natural philosophers of the later 17th century.**[1]
>
> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42823.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> He confesseth [*ibid.*] that he was much *opposed and slighted by the first Fathers*; and in his *Light out of Darkness,* p. 105. he saith, That *Aristotle was condemned by the first Christians, and Honest men of all Ages*. **And I think the times of the *first Fathers* during the *Glory* of the *Roman Empire,* were some of the *wisest* times; and I mention in my Letter concerning *Aristotle,* the Observation of *Gassendus,* that in the *flourishing* times of *Rome,* and *Athens,* the *Academicks* and *Stoicks* were more in Esteem, than the *Sectators* of *Aristotle*; and instance in *Cicero, Pliny,* and *Quintilian,* who though they had a great Esteem of *Aristotle,* did yet prefer *Plato* before him.** So that in those most *wise* Times, and among those wise men, *Aristotle's Account* was not *superlative,* if *Gassendus,* or M. *Stubb* himself be to be believed.

In the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, things began to change. The focus of attention shifted from the Hellenistic schools back to their Hellenic predecessors. The Hellenistic period was increasingly seen as an age of decline and corruption, whereas the Hellenic period was seen as a period of purity and creativity. **Consequently there was renewed interest in the Hellenic philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and a condescending dismissal of the later Hellenistic schools.** This general shift in focus influenced German classical scholars of the period, who were often critical of Stoicism as a philosophical system (see Ierodiakonou 1999: 4). This shift was also mirrored by **a dramatic decline in the reputation of Cicero, who was increasingly disparaged as a second-rate compiler of second-rate philosophy, most famously by the German scholar Theodor Mommsen** (see MacKendrick 1989: 288-9).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wcIPP_ghwqcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA488#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, while early-19th-century Philhellenism – though consistently racist – had both radical and reactionary aspects, the discipline of Classics was conservative from the start. The educational reforms of which it formed the centrepiece were systematic attempts to avoid or prevent revolution.26

> 26. The only possible objection to this is the utopian aspect of Humboldt's original concept of *Bildung* (see above, Note 11). **Professor Canfora (1980 pp. 39-56) argues that there was a right-wing *usurpazione* of Classics at the turn of the 19th century. However, he takes the Jacobin use of Antiquity as his base. Following conventional wisdom in Northern Europe, I do not include this in the tradition of *Altertumswissenschaft*/Classics.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wcIPP_ghwqcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA282#v=onepage&q&f=false

From the beginning, then, *Altertumswissenschaft* in Germany – like its equivalent, Classics, in England – was seen by its promoters as a 'third way' between reaction and revolution. In actuality, however, its effect was to shore up the *status quo*.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA307#v=onepage&q&f=false

Especially for thinkers and writers who understand themselves as "liberal," the classics seemed to offer a way beyond the impasse between the dogmas of orthodox Christianity and the skeptical bent of Enlightenment materialism. This is perhaps the source of the appeal of Neoplatonic ideas of the soul both to Wordsworth and to younger admirers such as John Keats after the turn of the century. The revival of Neoplatonism and the "Plato enthusiasm" in Germany and Britain from the 1790s onward may have seemed to offer a new, less skeptical way thinking about immortality, which also took account of Enlightenment critiques of religious superstition, and that was or seemed reconcilable to scientific discoveries about "life" (see Chandler 1998: 409-17).1

1. **Erasmus Darwin, author of *Zoonomia* (Darwin 1794), a medical and naturalist treatise much associated with radicalism, uses as an epigraph a passage from *Aeneid* 6 associated with Stoicism: "the heaven and earth […] a spirit within sustains, and mind, pervading its members, sways the whole mass and mingles with its mighty frame."** See Potkay 2012: 218.

Yet the classics were also invoked by radicals who wanted to draw attention to the greater political freedom enjoyed by ancient authors to question or even to deny the immortality of the soul. **According to Leigh Hunt, writing in *The Examiner* in 1817, Epicurus "taught his Atheism, or rather his denial of creation and providence, without the least political molestation" while Cicero "was suffered to doubt and to dogmatize alternately, just as he pleased"** (Hunt 1817: 259).

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2167/2167-h/2167-h.htm#link2H_4_0015 **[November 1824]**

Those French and English authors who have treated of the affairs of Greece have generally turned with contempt from the simple and natural narrations of Thucydides and Xenophon to the extravagant representations of Plutarch, Diodorus, Curtius, and other romancers of the same class,—men who described military operations without ever having handled a sword, and applied to the seditions of little republics speculations formed by observation on an empire which covered half the known world. Of liberty they knew nothing. It was to them a great mystery,—a superhuman enjoyment. They ranted about liberty and patriotism, from the same cause which leads monks to talk more ardently than other men about love and women. **A wise man values political liberty, because it secures the persons and the possessions of citizens;** because it tends to prevent the extravagance of rulers, and the corruption of judges; because it gives birth to useful sciences and elegant arts; because it excites the industry and increases the comforts of all classes of society. **These theorists imagined that it possessed something eternally and intrinsically good, distinct from the blessings which it generally produced. They considered it not as a means but as an end; an end to be attained at any cost. Their favourite heroes are those who have sacrificed, for the mere name of freedom, the prosperity—the security—the justice—from which freedom derives its value.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n3/mode/2up?view=theater

Greek philosophy seems to have met with something with which a good tragedy is not supposed to meet, namely, a dull ending. The objective history of philosophy in Greece seems to come to an end with Aristotle, Greek philosophy's Alexander of Macedon, and even the manly-strong Stoics did not succeed in what the Spartans did accomplish in their temples, the chaining of Athena to Heracles so that she could not flee.

Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics are regarded as an almost improper addition bearing no relation to its powerful premises. Epicurean philosophy is taken as a syncretic combination of Democritean physics and Cyrenaic morality; Stoicism as a compound of Heraclitean speculation on nature and the Cynical-ethical view of the world, together with some Aristotelean logic; and finally Scepticism as the necessary evil confronting these dogmatisms. **These philosophies are thus unconsciously linked to the Alexandrian philosophy by being made into a one-sided and tendentious eclecticism.** The Alexandrian philosophy is finally regarded entirely as exaltation and derangement – a confusion in which at most the universality of the intention can be recognised.
…

Should not this relationship urge us at least to an inquiry, to see Greek philosophy ending up with two different groups of eclectic systems, one of them the cycle of Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophy, the other being classified under the collective name of Alexandrian speculation?
…

It seems to me that though the earlier systems are more significant and interesting for the content, the post-Aristotelean ones, and primarily the cycle of the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic schools, are more

significant and interesting for the subjective form, the character of Greek philosophy. But it is precisely the subjective form, the spiritual carrier of the philosophical systems, which has until now been almost entirely ignored in favour of their metaphysical characteristics.

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/56/mode/2up?view=theater

You must not suppose, in the meanwhile, that the philosophers whom the Ptolemies collected (as they would have any other marketable article) by liberal offers of pay and patronage, were such men as the old Seven Sages of Greece, **or as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In these three last indeed, Greek thought reached not merely its greatest height, but the edge of a precipice, down which it rolled headlong after their decease.** The intellectual defects of the Greek mind, of which I have already spoken, were doubtless one great cause of this decay: but, to my mind, moral causes had still more to do with it. The more cultivated Greek states, to judge from the writings of Plato, had not been an over-righteous people during the generation in which he lived. **And in the generations which followed, they became an altogether wicked people; immoral, unbelieving, hating good, and delighting in all which was evil. And it was in consequence of these very sins of theirs, as I think, that the old Hellenic race began to die out physically, and population throughout Greece to decrease with frightful rapidity, after the time of the Achæan league.** The facts are well known; and foul enough they are. When the Romans destroyed Greece, God was just and merciful. The eagles were gathered together only because the carrion needed to be removed from the face of God's earth.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho00unkngoog/page/n36/mode/2up?view=theater

Any one who comes to study **the Hellenic Renaissance in England, which has assumed such force and such extension in our own day, [1887]** cannot but be surprised at the abrupt way in which all its studies stop about midway in Greek History. **By a sort of tacit consent the battle of Chaeronea is considered the minor limit of all that was good and perfect in Greek thought and life.** The conquests of Alexander, the high culture of Rhodes and Alexandria, the profound thinking of the later schools, the deep learning, the splendid art, the multiform politics of Hellenism—**all this is shut out from the schoolboy, as forming no part of the Greek he is to know,** and it is but seldom taken up—with the exception of Theocritus—by those who preserve the habits and prejudices of school in their college life. A man may consider himself, and be considered by the classical English public, an adequate and even distinguished Greek Professor, who has never read Strabo, Diodorus, or Polybius, who has never seen the poems of Aratus, Callimachus, or Apollonius, and who does not know a single date in Greek history between the death of Alexander and the battle of Cynoscephalae. From that time onward the accident that Greece enters into the field of Roman history lifts the veil, **and the student comes upon a Hellenistic world, so different from the old Hellenic republics, that but for the permanence of names and places the people might be difficult to recognise.** After the conquest of Greece by Mummius, Greece as a living moment in the world's history is forgotten. Pharsalia, Philippi, and Actium might as well have been in Asia or in Spain, **and the literary activity of the Greeks under the empire is rather avoided than neglected by modern Hellenists. For there is a notion abroad among many scholars that the study of any but the golden age of Greek literature is a contamination of their spotless Atticism.** The occurrence of later forms, or of constructions unused by Aristophanes, is so foul a stain, that not the infinite richness of story in Polybius, or the splendid morals in Plutarch, or the large information in Strabo, or the wit in Lucian, or the unconscious sublimity in the Gospels, can save them from being rejected as 'bad Greek' and excluded from school and college studies.

This is no doubt the first and most efficient cause of our general ignorance of what is called *Hellenism*, as opposed to *Hellenedom*. **The golden age in literary style ended with Demosthenes, and though this was by no means the case in philosophy and art, the question of style has overridden larger and higher considerations.** No better Greek study than Plutarch's *Lives* could possibly be appointed for boys—with one exception, that of style; and so the intricacies of Demosthenes, the subtleties of Plato, or the contortions of Thucydides are the Greek prose set before them. Great results are indeed required to justify this strict exclusiveness.

A curious accident has, however, aided the 'pure scholars,' and made their triumph in our generation almost complete. Our greatest Greek historian, Grote, was not at all one of their number. His perception of the exact meaning of tenses or particles was such as to excite the rage and contempt of their now forgotten coryphaeus. **But Grote was a radical and a democrat, and composed his great political pamphlet in twelve volumes to show the splendours of republican government. Hence he could only traduce Alexander the Great,** and turn with indignant disgust from the later politics of the petty states of Greece. He had no heart to comprehend the splendour of monarchy, or the wisdom of federations. **But his great book dominated our studies, the smaller handbooks have abridged Grote and not Thirlwall,** and wind up the history of Greece with the close, not of its philosophical and artistic, but of its political and literary supremacy, overlooking the fact that the apparent political death of Greece meant only its absorption into larger systems, and its entry into the wider stream of the world's history.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Grote

1846-1856 – *A History of Greece; from the Earliest Period to the Close of the Generation Contemporary with Alexander the Great* (12 vols.)

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n149/mode/2up?view=theater

The Athenians, strengthened by a generation of prosperity, could afford now to demand the luxury of liberty; gradually, as the dictatorship grew harsher, the cry for freedom grew louder; and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who had conspired for love and passion rather than for democracy,* were transformed by popular imagination into the martyrs of liberty.

https://archive.org/details/catilineclodiust00beesuoft/page/146/mode/2up?view=theater

The establishment of the empire at Rome was a distinct step in advance. It was the only way in which ancient civilization could be kept together. It was an enormous boon to ninety-nine out of every hundred of the population. **Modern Imperialism is retrograde. It prohibits a free press. It refuses the right of public meeting. It fosters the military spirit. Lastly, it returns to the hereditary principle, which was irrevocably condemned by the immortal French Revolution.** It is not so bad as the government of a privileged class. That is all that can be said for it. But no government can meet the wants of modern society unless, whatever be its form, it is in spirit Republican.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n135/mode/2up?view=theater

And now what is the attitude of "society" in the West-European Civilization since 1770, and particularly since 1848, towards the *fact* of this revolution from below, **which has long since reached the stage of scorning and deriding its Liberal beginnings and the concessions they have won, such as freedom of the press, of unions, and of meeting, finally universal suffrage** – after exploiting them to the furthest limits of disintegration?

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_I#cite_ref-9

But philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, has had a twofold origin; it started with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes. The one school was called Ionian, because Thales, a Milesian and therefore an Ionian, instructed Anaximander; the other school was called Italian from Pythagoras, who worked for the most part in Italy. 14. **And the one school, that of Ionia, terminates with Clitomachus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus, that of Italy with Epicurus.** The succession passes from Thales through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, to Socrates, who introduced ethics or moral philosophy; from Socrates to his pupils the Socratics, and especially to Plato, the founder of the Old Academy; from Plato, through Speusippus and Xenocrates, the succession passes to Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, Arcesilaus, founder of the Middle Academy, Lacydes,[10] founder of the New Academy, Carneades, and Clitomachus. **This line brings us to Clitomachus.** 15. **There is another which ends with Chrysippus,** that is to say by passing from Socrates to Antisthenes, then to Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. **And yet again another ends with Theophrastus;** thus from Plato it passes to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to Theophrastus. In this manner the school of Ionia comes to an end.

In the Italian school the order of succession is as follows: first Pherecydes, next Pythagoras, next his son Telauges, then Xenophanes, Parmenides,[11] Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, who had many pupils, in particular Nausiphanes [and Naucydes], who were teachers of Epicurus.

https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%201.170

This was the advice which Bias of Priene gave after the destruction of the Ionians; and that given before the destruction by Thales of Miletus, **a Phoenician by descent,** was good too; he advised that the Ionians have one place of deliberation, and that it be in Teos
(for that was the center of Ionia), and that the other cities be considered no more than demes.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0028%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D170%3Asection%3D3

Φοίνικος. 'Plutarch' (de Mal. Herod. 15) attacks this statement, as 'making Thales barbarian'; H. only means that he was descended from the Thelidae, original settlers of Miletus, who were descended from Cadmus. **As the father of Thales bore a Carian name (Examius, Diog. Laer. i. 1. 22), he probably had non-Hellenic blood in him.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_I#Thales

22. **Herodotus, Duris, and Democritus are agreed that Thales was the son of Examyas and Cleobulina, and belonged to the Thelidae[15] who are Phoenicians, and among the noblest of the descendants of Cadmus and Agenor.** As Plato testifies, he was one of the Seven Sages. He was the first to receive the name of Sage, in the archonship of Damasias[16] at Athens, when the term was applied to all the Seven Sages, as Demetrius of Phalerum mentions in his *List of Archons*. He was admitted to citizenship at Miletus when he came to that town along with Nileos, who had been expelled from Phoenicia. Most writers, however, represent him as a genuine Milesian and of a distinguished family.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wcIPP_ghwqcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA333#v=onepage&q&f=false

In fact, however, **Curtius saw the Pelasgians as a first wave of inferior Aryans who came through Anatolia** and over the Hellespont to Greece leaving traces in Phrygia.
…

Curtius' historical scheme of Aryan Hellenes conquering semi-Aryan Pelasgians has the advantage of combining two ideologically desirable features – northern conquest by a master race, and the preservation of essential racial purity. The new invaders were thoroughly northern. **One of their groups 'took the land way through the Hellespont's ancient portal of the nations: they passed through Thrace into the Alpine land of Northern Greece, and there, in mountain cantons, they developed their peculiar life in social communities … under the name of Dorians.'**61
…

Curtius was much more brief on Ionian origins, noting simply that the Ionians had come straight from Phrygia to the east coast of the Aegean.62 Greek tradition stated clearly that Anatolian Ionia was settled by Ionians from Greece only in the 11th century, but Niebuhr had defied the Ancients on this point. **In this way Curtius had the authority of the new scholarship behind him when he denied the tradition and claimed that Greeks had lived there much earlier. In conclusion to this section he argued that their separate migrations had differentiated the Dorians from the Ionians: hence 'the first foundations had been laid of the dualism which pervades the whole history of this people.'** They were, however, racially united: 'an inner sense of kinsmanship attracted them to one another.'63

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/433/mode/2up?view=theater

> Speer subsequently commented: **"By the Greeks [Hitler] meant the Dorians. Naturally his view was affected by the theory, fostered by the scientists of his period, that the Dorian tribe which migrated into Greece from the north had been of Germanic origin and that, therefore, its culture had not belonged to the Mediterranean world."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n129/mode/2up?view=theater

An active and enterprising people had settled Attica in or before neolithic days, and had hospitably received and intermarried with Ionians—a mixture of Pelasgo-Mycenaeans and Achaeans[28a]—fleeing from Boeotia and the Peloponnesus in the face of the northern migrations and invasions. **Here was no conquering alien race exploiting a native population, but a complex Mediterranean stock, of medium stature and dark features, directly inheriting the blood and culture of the old Helladic civilization, proudly conscious of its indigenous quality,[29] and excluding from its national sanctuary, the Acropolis, those half-barbarian upstarts, the Dorians.[30]**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n159/mode/2up?view=theater

Miletus, southernmost of the Ionian Twelve, was in the sixth century the richest city of the Greek world. The site had been inhabited by Carians from Minoan days; and when, about 1000 B.C., the Ionians came there from Attica, they found the old Aegean culture, though in a decadent form, waiting to serve as the advanced starting point of their civilization. **They brought no women with them to Miletus, but merely killed the native males and married the widows;[20] the fusion of cultures began with a fusion of blood.**

> https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%201.146
>
> For this reason, and for no other, the Ionians too made twelve cities; for it would be foolishness to say that these are more truly Ionian or better born than the other Ionians; since not the least part of them are Abantes from Euboea, who are not Ionians even in name, and there are mingled with them Minyans of Orchomenus, Cadmeans, Dryopians, Phocian renegades from their nation,

> Molossians, Pelasgian Arcadians, Dorians of Epidaurus, and many other tribes; **and as for those who came from the very town-hall of Athens and think they are the best born of the Ionians, these did not bring wives with them to their settlements, but married Carian women whose parents they had put to death.** For this slaughter, these women made a custom and bound themselves by oath (and enjoined it on their daughters) that no one would sit at table with her husband or call him by his name, because the men had married them after slaying their fathers and husbands and sons. **This happened at Miletus.**

Like most of the Ionian cities, Miletus submitted at first to kings who led them in war, then to aristocrats who owned the land, **then to "tyrants" representing the middle class.** Under the dictator Thrasybulus, at the beginning of the sixth century, industry and trade reached their peak, and the growing-wealth of Miletus flowered forth in literature, philosophy, and art.
…

The wealth and luxury of the city became a proverb and a scandal throughout Greece. Milesian merchants, overflowing with profits, lent money to enterprises far and wide, and to the municipality itself. They were the Medici of the Ionian Renaissance.

It was in this stimulating environment that Greece first developed two of its most characteristic gifts to the world—science and philosophy. The crossroads of trade are the meeting place of ideas, the attrition ground of rival customs and beliefs; diversities beget conflict, comparison, thought; **superstitions cancel one another, and reason begins. Here in Miletus, as later in Athens, were men from a hundred scattered states; mentally active through competitive commerce, and freed from the bondage of tradition by long absences from their native altars and homes.** Milesians themselves traveled to distant cities, and had their eyes opened by the civilizations of Lydia, Babylonia, Phoenicia, and Egypt; in this way, among others, Egyptian geometry and Babylonian astronomy entered the Greek mind. Trade and mathematics, foreign commerce and geography, navigation and astronomy, developed hand in hand. Meanwhile wealth had created leisure; **an aristocracy of culture was growing up in which freedom of thought was tolerated because only a small minority could read. No powerful priesthood, no ancient and inspired text limited men's thinking;** even the Homeric poems, which were to become in some sense the Bible of the Greeks, had hardly taken yet a definite form; and in that final form their mythology was to bear the imprint of Ionian skepticism and scandalous merriment. Here for the first time thought became secular, and sought rational and consistent answers to the problems of the world and man.*

Nevertheless the new plant, mutation though it was, had its roots and ancestry. The hoary wisdom of Egyptian priests and Persian Magi, perhaps even of Hindu seers, the sacerdotal science of the Chaldeans, the poetically personified cosmogony of Hesiod, were mingled with the natural realism of Phoenician and Greek merchants to produce Ionian philosophy. Greek religion itself had paved the way by talking of Moira, or Fate, as ruler of both gods and men: **here was that idea of law, as superior to incalculable personal decree, which would mark the essential difference between science and mythology, as well as between despotism and democracy. Man became free when he recognized that he was subject to law.**
…

Poetry seems natural to a nation's adolescence, when imagination is greater than knowledge, and a strong faith gives personality to the forces of nature in field, wood, sea, and sky; it is hard for poetry to avoid animism, or for animism to avoid poetry. Prose is the voice of knowledge freeing itself from imagination and faith; it is the language of secular, mundane, "prosaic" affairs; it is the emblem of a nation's maturity, and the epitaph of its youth. **Up to this time (600) nearly all Greek literature had taken a poetic form;** education had transmitted in verse the lore and morals of the race; even early philosophers, like Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles, gave their systems a poetic dress.
…

The poverty of Greek prose before Herodotus is bound up with the conquest and impoverishment of Miletus in the very generation in which prose literature began. Internal decay followed the custom of history in smoothing the path of the conqueror. **The growth of wealth and luxury made epicureanism fashionable, while stoicism and patriotism seemed antiquated and absurd; it became a byword among the Greeks that "once upon a time the Milesians were brave."[38] Competition for the goods of the earth became keener as the old faith lost its power to mitigate class strife by giving scruples to the strong and consolations to the weak.** The rich, supporting an oligarchic dictatorship, became a united party against the poor, who wanted a democracy. The poor secured control of the government, expelled the rich, collected the remaining children of the rich on threshing floors, set oxen upon them, and had them trampled to death. The rich returned, recaptured power, coated the leaders of the democracy with pitch, and then burnt them alive.[39] ***De nobis fabula narrabitur.*** When, about 560, Croesus began to subject to Lydian rule the Greek coast of Asia from Cnidus to the Hellespont, Miletus saved its independence by refusing to help her sister states. But in 546 Cyrus conquered Lydia, and without much difficulty absorbed the faction-torn cities of Ionia into the Persian Empire. The great age of Miletus was over. **Science and philosophy, in the history of states, reach their height after decadence has set in; wisdom is a harbinger of death.**

Außerdem zeigt die Familiengeschichte der bedeutenden Männer Italiens, wie das Genie die Blüte, aber in den meisten Fällen auch das Ende der Familie ist. **Individualismus und Intellektualismus sind die psychologischen Quellen aller höheren Kulturentwicklung, sie zerstören aber den organischen Bestand der Rasse** und leiten schließlich jenen unabwendbaren Prozeß ein, den man die geistige Selbstverzehrung der Völker genannt hat.

https://archive.org/details/jstor-1835889/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater **[July, 1916]**

But the existence of other forms of "race suicide," so freely gossiped about by writers of the empire, also enters into this question, and here the inscriptions quite fail us. The importance of this consideration must, nevertheless, be kept in mind. **Doubtless, as Fustel de Coulanges (*La Cité Antique*) has remarked, it could have been of little importance in the society of the republic so long as the old orthodox faith in ancestral spirits survived, for the happiness of the *manes* depended upon the survival of the family, and this religious incentive probably played the same role in the propagation of the race as the Mosaic injunctions among the Hebrews, which so impressed Tacitus in a more degenerate day of Rome.** But religious considerations and customs—which in this matter emanate from the fundamental instincts that continue the race—were questioned as all else was questioned before Augustus's day. Then the process of diminution began.
...

The race of the human animal survives by means of instincts that shaped themselves for that purpose long before rational control came into play. Before our day it has only been at Greece and Rome that these impulses have had to face the obstacle of sophistication. There at least the instinct was beaten, and the race went under.

---

https://archive.org/details/earlygreekphilos0000burn/page/330/mode/2up?view=theater

171. **WE have seen** (§§ 31, 12) **that the school of Miletos did not come to an end with Anaximenes, and it is striking fact that the man who gave the most complete answer to the question first asked by Thales was a Milesian.**1 It is true that the very existence of Leukippos has been called in question. Epicurus is reported to have said there never was such a philosopher, and the same thing has been maintained in quite recent times.2 On the other hand, **Aristotle and Theophrastos certainly made him the originator of the atomic theory, and they can hardly have been mistaken on such a point.** Aristotle was specially interested in Demokritos, and his native Stageiros is not very far from Abdera, the seat of the Atomist school.

https://archive.org/details/manhisgods00smit/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

The idea of causality was contained implicitly in the *logos* of Heraclitus as well as in the primordial substances of Thales and his friends, but it was first explicitly worded by Leucippus of Miletus (ca. 450 B.C.), who is credited with the assertion that nothing happens without a cause, but everything with a cause or of 'necessity,' necessity meaning in accordance with the thing's being, or with its nature.

https://ncse.ngo/review-creationism-and-its-critics-antiquity

In the fifth century BCE the Greeks originated a tradition of defending theories about the cosmos and its origins and order by reason. **Almost immediately philosophers conceived of "the argument from design," the claim that the apparent order in the cosmos is best understood as created by an intelligent craftsman. As David Sedley recounts the story, the only fundamental attack on this argument was that of the Atomists.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pericles*.html#ref9

4 But the man who most consorted with Pericles, **and did most to clothe him with a majestic demeanour that had more weight than any demagogue's appeals, yes, and who lifted on high and exalted the dignity of his character, was Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, whom men of that day used to call "Nous,"** either because they admired that comprehension of his, which proved of such surpassing greatness in the investigation of nature; or **because he was the first to enthrone in the universe, not Chance, nor yet Necessity, as the source of its orderly arrangement, but Mind (*Nous*) pure and simple, which distinguishes and sets apart, in the midst of an otherwise chaotic mass, the substances which have like elements.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Democritus

34. Democritus was the son of Hegesistratus, though some say of Athenocritus, and others again of Damasippus. **He was a native of Abdera or, according to some, of Miletus. He was a pupil of certain Magians and Chaldaeans. For when King Xerxes was entertained by the father of Democritus he left men in charge, as, in fact, is stated by Herodotus;[58] and from these men, while still a boy, he learned theology and astronomy.** Afterwards he met Leucippus and, according to some, Anaxagoras, being forty years younger than the latter. But Favorinus in his *Miscellaneous History* tells us that **Democritus, speaking of Anaxagoras, declared that his views on the sun and the moon were not original but of great antiquity, and that he had simply stolen them.** 35. **Democritus also pulled to pieces the views of Anaxagoras on cosmogony and on mind,** having a spite against him, because Anaxagoras did not take to him. If this be so, how could he have been his pupil, as some suggest?

According to Demetrius in his book on *Men of the Same Name* and Antisthenes in his *Successions of Philosophers*, he travelled into Egypt to learn geometry from the priests, and he also went into Persia to visit the Chaldaeans as well as to the Red Sea. Some say that he associated with the Gymnosophists in India and went to Aethiopia. Also that, being the third son, he divided the family property. **Most authorities will have it that he chose the smaller portion, which was in money, because he had need of this to pay the cost of travel;** besides, his brothers were crafty enough to foresee that this would be his choice. 36. **Demetrius estimates his share at over 100 talents, the whole of which he spent.** His industry, says the same author, was so great that he cut off a little room in the garden round the house and shut himself up there. One day his father brought an ox to sacrifice and tied it there, and he was not aware of it for a considerable time, until his father roused him to attend the sacrifice and told him about the ox.

Demetrius goes on: "**It would seem that he also went to Athens and was not anxious to be recognized, because he despised fame, and that while he knew of Socrates, he was not known to Socrates,** his words being, 'I came to Athens and no one knew me.'"
…

Demetrius of Phalerum in his *Defence of Socrates* affirms that he did not even visit Athens. This is to make the larger claim, namely, that he thought that great city beneath his notice, because he did not care to win fame from a place, but preferred himself to make a place famous.
…

He would train himself, says Antisthenes, by a variety of means to test his sense-impressions by going at times into solitude and frequenting tombs. 39. The same authority states that, when he returned from his travels, he was reduced to a humble mode of life because he had exhausted his means; and, because of his poverty, he was supported by his brother Damasus. **But his reputation rose owing to his having foretold certain future events; and after that the public deemed him worthy of the honour paid to a god.[61] There was a law, says Antisthenes, that no one who had squandered his patrimony should be buried in his native city.** Democritus, understanding this, and fearing lest he should be at the mercy of any envious or unscrupulous prosecutors, read aloud to the people his treatise, the *Great Diacosmos*, the best of all his works; and then he was rewarded with 500 talents; and, more than that, with bronze statues as well; **and when he died, he received a public funeral after a lifetime of more than a century.** 40. Demetrius, however, says that it was not Democritus himself but his relatives who read the *Great Diacosmos*, and that the sum awarded was 100 talents only; with this account Hippobotus agrees.

Aristoxenus in his *Historical Notes* affirms that Plato wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could collect, but that Amyclas and Clinias the Pythagoreans prevented him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for already the books were widely circulated. And there is clear evidence for this in the fact that Plato, who mentions almost all the early philosophers, never once alludes to Democritus, not even where it would be necessary to controvert him, obviously because he knew that he would have to match himself against the prince of philosophers, for whom, to be sure, Timon[62] has this meed of praise:[63]

> Such is the wise Democritus, the guardian of discourse, keen-witted disputant, among the best I ever read.

…

44. His opinions are these. **The first principles of the universe are atoms and empty space; everything else is merely thought to exist. The worlds are unlimited; they come into being and perish.** Nothing can come into being from that which is not nor pass away into that which is not. Further, the atoms are unlimited in size and number, and they are borne along in the whole universe in a vortex, and thereby generate all composite things – fire, water, air, earth; for even these are conglomerations of given atoms. And it is because of their solidity that these atoms are impassive and unalterable. The sun and the moon have been composed of such smooth and spherical masses [i.e.

atoms], and so also the soul, which is identical with reason. We see by virtue of the impact of images upon our eyes.

45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, **undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion.** This he calls well-being and many other names. **The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space.** These, then, are his opinions.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D4%3Asection%3D1009b

They think that the truth should not be judged by the number or fewness of its upholders; and they say that the same thing seems sweet to some who taste it, and bitter to others; so that if all men were diseased or all insane, except two or three who were healthy or sane, the latter would seem to be diseased or insane, and not the others. And further they say that many of the animals as well get from the same things impressions which are contrary to ours, and that the individual himself does not always think the same in matters of sense-perception. **Thus it is uncertain which of these impressions are true or false; for one kind is no more true than another, but equally so. And hence Democritus says[1] that either there is no truth or we cannot discover it. And in general it is because they suppose that thought is sense-perception, and sense-perception physical alteration, that they say that the impression given through sense-perception is necessarily true; for it is on these grounds that both Empedocles and Democritus and practically all the rest have become obsessed by such opinions as these.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MSu2w3FqepoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA65#v=onepage&q&f=false

As for Democritus himself, he committed himself to a certain degree of skepticism when he declared "atoms and void to be the only existences and all else to exist by convention."45 This, however, was only individual skepticism, which did not prevent him from practicing cheerfulness (*euthamia*) any more than Pyrrho was prevented from enjoying indifference. To Epicurus, on the contrary, belief or unbelief had become a matter of morals and the happiness of mankind. **He was incapable of taking comfort in a negative attitude, as did Democritus and Pyrrho.** Thus he was compelled by the inward urge to become a pragmatist as well as a dogmatist and to insist that knowledge must not only be possible but also have relevance to action and to happiness. In this matter none of his teachers had set him an example.

A second ground of his defection from Democritus was physical determinism. **Determinism is not offensive to intellectuals, but to moral reformers it is neither conceivable nor tolerable. Moral reform is synonymous with the experience of conversion, and conversion presumes freedom of the will.** To Democritus the prime and only causation in the universe was the motion of the atoms. In this motion there was no deviation, no freedom possible. It constituted an absolute determinism. In order to open an escape from this intolerable physical necessity Epicurus postulated sufficient play in the motion of the atoms to permit of freedom of the will.46 Thus he introduced into the sum of things a new cause, human volition, which was to him at one and the same time a necessity of thought and a necessity of action. **This innovation may not be commendable in physics, but ethical considerations had become paramount and in ethics the desired end had been served by the innovation.** For this invention he was in debt to no teacher.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ct9K-x61CH0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Epicurus' own targets in his philosophical critiques had been above all the Presocratics – especially his chief forerunner Democritus, along with his own Democritean teacher Nausiphanes – and Plato.53 The contemporary Stoic school had apparently achieved prominence too late to feature as a further target. Later Epicureans adopted Epicurus' enemies as their own, but added contemporary ones, above all the Stoics.
…

On the other hand, the simple unrefined denial that anything is known was endemic in the atomist tradition to which Epicurus had aligned himself, from Democritus onwards.111 Democritus himself, whatever his final position may have been on the question, had for example written: 'This argument too shows that in reality we know nothing about anything…'112 **It seems to have been only after Epicurus' intervention that sceptics started to take a firm position on whether their scepticism was reflexive or not.** And it may well have been Epicurus' self-refutation argument that forced the issue into the open. It was at that stage, it seems, that Socrates and Metrodorus were, with hindsight, reinterpreted as belonging to one or the other camp.113
…

Self-refutation arguments as such by no means go out of fashion in this period or after,115 yet the self-refutation argument against scepticism never puts in a reappearance – except, that is, in Lucretius. There is therefore excellent reason to see Lucretius' anti-sceptical argument as one dating back to Epicurus, rather than as reflecting the debates of his own time.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestion00cice/page/56/mode/2up?view=theater

Why should I speak of Democritus? Who is there whom we can compare with him for the greatness, not merely of his genius, but also of his spirit? a man who dared to begin thus: "I am going to speak of everything." He excepts nothing, so as not to profess a knowledge of it. For indeed, what could there possibly be beyond everything? Who can avoid placing this philosopher before Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, or all the rest of his successors? men who, when compared with him, appear to me to be in the fifth class.

But he does not say this, which we, who do not deny that there is some truth, declare cannot be perceived: he absolutely denies that there is any truth. **He says that the senses are not merely dim, but utterly dark;** for that is what Metrodorus of Chios, who was one of his greatest admirers, says of them, at the beginning of his book on Nature. "I deny," says he, "that we know whether we know anything or whether we know nothing; I say that we do not even know what is ignorance and knowledge; **and that we have no knowledge whether anything exists or whether nothing does.**"

https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

As for Democritus of Abdera, he did well to identify atoms as elemental, but since his conception of them was in some respects mistaken, he will be considered in the exposition of our theories.
…

Even Democritus erred in a manner unworthy of himself when he said that atoms alone among existing things have true reality, while everything else exists by convention. For, according to your account, Democritus, it will be impossible for us even to live, let alone discover the truth, since we shall be unable to protect ourselves from either fire or slaughter or [any other force].
…

If anyone adopts Democritus' theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to him: **«Do you [not] know, whoever you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light,—a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?» The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, and not even the wicked [can be justly punished, since they are not responsible for their sins.]**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater

More satisfactory explanations are given by the author of *De placitis philosophorum*:

> Necessity is, according to Democritus, fate and law, providence and the creator of the world. But the substance of this necessity is the antitype and the movement and impulse of matter.33

A similar passage is to be found in the *Physical Selections* of Stobaeus34 and in the sixth book of the *Praeparatio evangelica* of Eusebius.35 **In the *Ethical Selections* of Stobaeus the following aphorism of Democritus is preserved**36 **– it is almost exactly repeated in the 14th book of Eusebius;**37 **human beings like to create for themselves the illusion of chance – a manifestation of their own perplexity, since chance [*Zufall*] is incompatible with sound thinking.** Simplicius similarly attributes to Democritus a passage in which Aristotle speaks of the ancient doctrine that does away with chance.38

> 37. Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV, p. 782. ... **and he (i.e., Democritus) has made chance the master and ruler of the universal and divine, and has claimed that everything happens through chance. At the same time he keeps it away from human life and has decried as stupid those who proclaim it.** Indeed, at the beginning of his teachings he says: "Men like to create for themselves the illusion of chance-an excuse for their own folly; since it is natural that sound thinking is incompatible with chance; and they have said that this worst enemy of thinking rules; or rather, they accept chance instead of thinking by totally removing and abolishing sound thinking. For they do not appreciate thinking as blissful, but chance as the most reasonable."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA124#v=onepage&q&f=false

If these beings are said to affect one another by means of impact, then they must be entirely *homogeneous*: **Democritus holds fast to what Parmenides had said, that Being (ὅν) must be absolutely of the same sort at every point.** Being does not come to one point more than to the others. **If one atom were something other than that which the others are, it would be a Not-Being,** that is, something contradictory. Only our senses show us *qualitatively* determinant differences: "By convention sweet [...,] by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; but in reality atoms and the void. ... None of these appears according to truth but only according to opinion: the truth in real things is that there are atoms and void."24

https://archive.org/details/manhisgods00smit/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

In this atomic scheme man's ego is but a fleeting pattern. 'All human affairs,' Democritus is alleged to have said, 'are worthy only of laughter.'
...

In all the speculations of the *physiologoi*, the gods were dismissed as no more than barbaric superstitions, or at best literary and poetic images. The first principles of Thales and the other atomists, and even of the dynamist, Heraclitus, excluded the reference of capricious deities from earth, sea, stars and life, and if the term 'god' was used it was in a secular sense, the god having been reduced to atomic dimensions, to 'the dull catalogue of common things.'
...

It is probable that Democritus escaped condemnation only because he kept away from Athens, the deistic center of Greek culture.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=gy0rDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA321#v=onepage&q&f=false

4TH BUYER. My god! What a contrast! This one won't stop laughing and that one looks as if he's in mourning; he's crying his eyes out. Hey, you, what's the joke?

DEMOCRITUS. The joke? That ye and all that ye do seemeth ridiculous to me.

4TH BUYER. What's that? You're laughing at us all? You consider all our affairs meaningless?

DEMOCRITUS. They *are* meaningless. For there is nothing in them to be taken seriously. The whole world is merely void, infinity, and atoms in motion.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n219/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Possibly [Voltaire's] true confession of faith is contained in the words he wrote to Madame du Deffand, six years before he died: "**I knew a man who was firmly convinced that the buzz of a bee did not continue after its death.** He said, with Epicurus and Lucretius, that it was absurd to presume an unextended being; an extended being ruled, and pretty badly at that. ... He said Nature had so arranged matters that we think with our heads just as we walk with our feet. He compared us with a musical instrument which does not give forth another note when it is broken. He maintained that man—like every other animal and every plant, and perhaps every being in the world—was manifestly made so that he might be and then not be. **This man, too, when he had grown as old as Democritus, used to do as Democritus did and laugh at everything.**"

https://www.artstor.org/2016/04/21/whats-so-funny-democritus/

As classicist Mary Beard explains in *Confronting the Classics*,

> The most revealing ancient discussion of Democritus' laughing habit is found in an epistolary novel of Roman date, included among the so-called Letters of Hippocrates – a collection ascribed to the legendary founding father of Greek medicine, but in fact written centuries after his death. The fictional exchanges in this novel tell the story of Hippocrates' encounter with Democritus. In the philosopher's home city, his compatriots had become concerned at the way he laughed at everything he came across (from funerals to political success) and concluded that he must be mad. So they summoned the most famous doctor in the world to cure him. **When Hippocrates arrived, however, he soon discovered that Democritus was saner than his fellow citizens. For he alone had recognised the absurdity of human existence, and was therefore entirely justified in laughing at it.**
>
> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius8b.html#c14

> [14e.2] The breast of Alexander had an insatiable desire for praise. **When Anaxarchus his companion, on the authority of Democritus, affirmed that there were innumerable worlds, "How miserable then," said he, "am I, who have not conquered all of one!"**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dstobaeus-joannes-bio-1

STOBAEUS, JOANNES, derived his surname apparently from being a native of Stobi in Macedonia. Of his personal history we know nothing. Even the age in which he lived cannot be fixed with accuracy. He lived, at all events, later than Hierocles, whom he quotes. Probably he did not live very long after him, as he quotes no writer of a later date. **His studious avoidance of all Christian writers seems to render it probable that Stobaeus was a heathen, though his name would rather indicate a Christian, or at least the son of Christian parents.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=i_1u3X4yqdAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q&f=false

D139. Bringing up children is risky; even with good luck it is full of strife and worry, and bad luck there is not exceeded by any other woe. IV.24-29

D140. **I do not think that one should have children;** for in having children I see many great dangers and much distress, and few blessings and those meagre and weak. IV.24.31

D141. **If anyone needs to have a child, it seems to me better that he should choose from his friends' children. That way he will get the sort of child he wants, for he can choose the one he likes;** and the one that seems suitable will follow his bidding as far as its nature allows. And this is a great difference, in that he can choose from many the one he prefers, according as he thinks it should be. But if he has one of his own, there are many dangers; for he has to make do with the one that is born to him. IV.24.32

D142. **People think of having children as necessary because of their nature and their long-established constitution. This is clear from the other animals too; they all have young in accordance with their nature, but not for any benefit.** But when they are born each one takes takes trouble to rear them as best it can and fears for them when they are little and grieves if anything happens to them. The nature of all living things is like that. **But as far as mankind are concerned the opinion has grown up that there is some advantage to be derived from one's offspring.** IV.24.33

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Christian_Library/The_Miscellanies:_Book_2#cite_ref-252

Plato ranks marriage among outward good things, providing for the perpetuity of our race, and handing down as a torch a certain perpetuity to children's children. **Democritus repudiates marriage and the procreation of children, on account of the many annoyances thence arising, and abstractions from more necessary things. Epicurus agrees, and those who place good in pleasure, and in the absence of trouble and pain. According to the opinion of the Stoics, marriage and the rearing of children are a thing indifferent; and according to the Peripatetics, a good.** In a word, these, following out their dogmas in words, became enslaved to pleasures; some using concubines, some mistresses, and the most youths. And that wise quaternion in the garden with a mistress, honoured pleasure by their acts.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/5*.html#ref30

It is related of Democritus (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; **and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness?** Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should bring him cheerfulness of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles *euthumia*, or often *athambia*, that is freedom from alarm. 88 But what he said on this subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; **for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater

> 18. Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel*, X, p. 472. And somewhere he (Democritus) says proudly about himself: **"I have wandered through a larger part of the earth than any of my contemporaries, investigating the remotest things, and I have seen most climates and lands, and I have heard the**

> **most learned men, and in linear composition with demonstration no one surpassed me, not even the so-called Arsipedonapts of the Egyptians, whose guest I was when already turning eighty."** For he went as far as Babylon and Persia and Egypt, where he also studied with the Egyptian priests.

…

Democritus is supposed to have blinded himself so that the *sensuous light of the eye* would not darken the *sharpness of intellect*.20 This is the same man who, according to Cicero, wandered through half the world. But he did not find what he was looking for.

An opposite figure appears to us in Epicurus. Epicurus is *satisfied* and *blissful* in *philosophy*.

> "You must," he says, "serve philosophy so that true freedom will he your lot. He who has subordinated and surrendered himself to it does not need to wait, he is emancipated at once. For to serve philosophy is freedom itself.21 Consequently he teaches: "**Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul.** And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away."22

While Democritus, dissatisfied with philosophy, throws himself into the arms of empirical knowledge, *Epicurus has nothing but contempt for the positive sciences*, since in his opinion they contribute nothing to true perfection.23 He is called an *enemy of science*, a scorner of grammar.24

> 23. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, I, 1. **The case against the mathematici [or: Professors of Arts and Sciences] has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epicurus and by the School of Pyrrho, although the standpoints they adopt are different.** Epicurus took the ground that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom...
>
> 24. Ibid., p. 1 1 [I, 491. And amongst them we must place Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors of Arts and Sciences.
>
> Ibid., p. 54 [I, 2721. ... those accusers of grammar, Pyrrho, and Epicurus...

He is even accused of ignorance. "But," says an Epicurean in Cicero, "it was not Epicurus who was without erudition, but those are ignorant who believe that what is shameful for a boy not to know ought still to be recited by the old man."25

But while Democritus seeks to learn from Egyptian priests, Persian Chaldeans and Indian gymnosophists, Epicurus prides himself on not having had a teacher, on being self-taught.26 **There are some people, he says according to Seneca, who struggle for truth without any assistance. Among these people he has himself traced out his path. And it is they, the self-taught, whom he praises most. The others, according to him, are second-rate minds.**27 **While Democritus is driven into all parts of the world, Epicurus leaves his garden in Athens scarcely two or three times and travels to Ionia, not to engage in studies, but to visit friends.**28 Finally, while Democritus, despairing of acquiring knowledge, blinds himself, Epicurus, feeling the hour of death approaching, takes a warm bath, calls for pure wine and recommends to his friends that they be faithful to philosophy.29

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n389/mode/2up?view=theater

His range was as wide as Aristotle's, his style as highly praised as Plato's.[27] **Francis Bacon, in no perverse moment, called him the greatest of ancient philosophers.**[28]

…

So, like the heretics of Victorian England, Democritus raises upon his scandalous metaphysics a most presentable ethic. "Good actions should be done not out of compulsion but from conviction; not from hope of reward, but for their own sake. ... A man should feel more shame in doing evil before himself than before all the world."[47]

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/16B*.html#ref71

24 **The Sidonians, according to tradition, are skilled in many beautiful arts, as the poet also points out;**[72] and besides this they are philosophers in the sciences of astronomy and arithmetic, having begun their studies with practical calculations and with night-sailings; for each of these branches of knowledge concerns the merchant and the ship-owner; as, for example, geometry was invented, it is said, from the measurement of lands which is made necessary by the Nile when it confounds the boundaries at the time of its overflows.[73] This science, then, is believed to have come to the Greeks from the Aegyptians; astronomy and arithmetic from the Phoenicians; and at present by far the greatest store of knowledge in every other branch of philosophy is to be

had from these cities. **And if one must believe Poseidonius, the ancient dogma about atoms originated with Mochus, a Sidonian, born before the Trojan times.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=EB5UvHrdMpsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false

In possession of such advantages, therefore, [Pythagoras] sailed to Sidon, **being persuaded that this was his natural country,** and also properly conceiving that he might easily pass from thence to Egypt. **Here he conversed with the prophets who were the descendants of Mochus the physiologist,** and with others, and also with the Phoenician hierophants.

https://phoenicia.org/Mochus-of-Sidon-Atomic-Theory.html

Ralph Cudworth, a Philosopher of 1671 wrote:

> "Wherefore we have made it obvious, **that that exceptionally mechanical or atomical rationality, that hath been recently reestablished via Cartesius and Gassendus, with regards to the principle substance of it, was senior to Epicurus,** as well as than Plato and Aristotle, nay, than Democritus and Leucippus additionally, its normally presumed dads. Also, thusly we have no motivation to dishonor the report of Posidonius the Stoic, who, as Strabo lets us know, confirmed this atomical rationality to have been ancienter than the seasons of the Trojan war, and first to have been brought into Greece out of Phoenicia. ... What's more, since it is sure from what we have appeared, that neither Epicurus nor yet Democritus was the primary creators of this physiology, this declaration of Posidonius the Stoic should in motivation to be conceded by us. Presently, **what can be more likely than that this Moschus the Phoenician, that Posidonius talks about, is the specific same individual with that Moschus the physiologer,** that Jamblichus specifies in the Life of Pythagoras, where he avows, that Pythagoras, living some time at Sidon in Phoenicia, spoke with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus the physiologer, and was told by them: ..."

https://www.academia.edu/187238/Ralph_Cudworths_The_True_Intellectual_System_of_the_Universe_and_the_Presocratic_Philosophers

> 20. Cudworth cites one "Mr Selden" (presumably John Selden, author of *De Diis Syris*) as approving the conjecture of "Arcerius, the publisher of Jamblichus that this Mochus was no other than the celebrated Moses of the Jews, with whose successors, the Jewish philosophers, priests and prophets, Pythagoras conversed at Sidon." (I x).

https://books.google.co.kr/books?id=kFl_DgN73UUC&lpg=PA270&hl=fi&pg=PA270#v=onepage&q&f=false

Any consideration of Abdera's history must begin with its Phoenician name. There are two other cities from Antiquity called Abdera. One was in North Africa, near Carthage,5 and the other was on the South coast of Spain.6 This latter is expressly attested as Phoenician, and issued coins with its name in Phoenician letters, or, sometimes, written twice in both the Phoenician and the Roman alphabet.7 So there is no doubt that the name Abdera is Phoenician, and this has long been recognized by good judges.8
…

We must content ourselves, therefore, with the basic fact that Abdera was named by Phoenicians, and that occurred before *c.* 654 BC, the date of the first Greek attempt to colonize the place. **The presence of Phoenicians in the area at that time is attested by Herodotus for Thasos,**19 **and their interest in Abdera is easily explained by the existence in the region of deposits of precious metals.**

> https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%206.47.2
>
> **I myself have seen these mines; by far the most marvellous were those that were found by the Phoenicians who with Thasos colonized this island, which is now called after that Phoenician Thasos.**
>
> https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%202.43.3
>
> At Tyre I saw yet another temple of the so-called Thasian Heracles. **Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple of Heracles built by the Phoenicians, who made a settlement there when they voyaged in search of Europe;** now they did so as much as five generations before the birth of Heracles the son of Amphitryon in Hellas.
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0160%3Abook%3D5%3Achapter%3D25%3Asection%3D12

> [12] The Thasians, who are Phoenicians by descent, and sailed from Tyre, and from Phoenicia generally, together with Thasus, the son of Agenor, in search of Europa, dedicated at Olympia a Heracles, the pedestal as well as the image being of bronze. The height of the image is ten cubits, and he holds a club in his right hand and a bow in his left. **They told me in Thasos that they used to worship the same Heracles as the Tyrians, but that afterwards, when they were included among the Greeks, they adopted the worship of Heracles the son of Amphitryon.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0064%3Aentry%3Dabdera-geo

Abdera was the birthplace of several famous persons: among others, of the philosophers Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxarchus. **In spite of this, its inhabitants passed into a proverb for dullness and stupidity.** (Juv. x. 50; Martial, x. 25. 4; Cic. ad Att. iv. 16, vii. 7.)

http://www.attalus.org/translate/florida.html

Protagoras was a sophist with knowledge on an extraordinary number of subjects, and one of the most eloquent among the first inventors of the art of rhetoric. **He was a fellow citizen and contemporary of the physicist Democritus, and it was from Democritus he derived his learning.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Gellius/5*.html#ref7

1 **They say that Protagoras, a man eminent in the pursuit of learning, whose name Plato gave to that famous dialogue of his, in his youth earned his living as a hired labourer and often carried heavy burdens on his back, being one of that class of men** 2 **whom the Greeks call ἀχθοφόροι and we Latins *baiuli*, or porters.** 3 He was once carrying a great number of blocks of wood, bound together with a short rope, from the neighbouring countryside into his native town of Abdera. 4 It chanced at the time that **Democritus, a citizen of that same city, a man esteemed before all others for his fine character and his knowledge of philosophy,** as he was going out of the city, saw Protagoras walking along easily and rapidly with that burden, of a kind so awkward and so difficult to hold together. Democritus drew near, and noticing with what skill and judgment the wood was arranged and tied, asked the man to stop and rest awhile. 5 When Protagoras did as he was asked, and Democritus again observed that the almost circular heap of blocks was bound with a short rope, and was balanced and held together with all but geometrical accuracy, he asked who had put the wood together in that way. When Protagoras replied that he had done it himself, Democritus asked him to untie the bundle and arrange it again in the same way. 6 But after he had done so, **then Democritus, astonished at the keen intellect and cleverness of this uneducated man, said: "My dear young man, since you have a talent for doing things well, there are greater and better employments which you can follow with me"; and he at once took him away, kept him at his own house, supplied him with money, taught him philosophy, and made him the great man that he afterwards became.**

7 **Yet this Protagoras was not a true philosopher, but the cleverest of sophists;** for in consideration of the payment of a huge annual fee, he used to promise his pupils that he would teach them by what verbal dexterity the weaker cause could be made the stronger, **a process which he called in Greek: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, or "making the worse appear the better reason."**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist1.xhtml#chap23

Among the ancient *Greeks*, *Gorgias* the *Leontine* son of *Philolaus*, and *Protagoras* son of *Democritus*, were famous as to Rhetorical opinion; yet were they as far short of others in wisedome as boies are of men. For opinion neither hears nor sees clearly: whence it oftentimes erres, overprizing some things, undervaluing others.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Protagoras

51. Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question, opposed to each other, and he even argued in this fashion, being the first to do so. **Furthermore he began a work thus: "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." He used to say that soul was nothing apart from the senses, as we learn from Plato in the *Theaetetus*,[71] and that everything is true. In another work he began thus: "As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the shortness of human life."** 52. For this introduction to his book the Athenians expelled him; and they burnt his works in the market-place, after sending round a herald to collect them from all who had copies in their possession.
...

53. **He too first introduced the method of discussion which is called Socratic.** Again, as we learn from Plato in the *Euthydemus*,[74] he was the first to use in discussion the argument of Antisthenes which strives to prove that contradiction is impossible, and the first to point out how to attack and refute any proposition laid down: so Artemidorus the dialectician in his treatise In *Reply to Chrysippus*. He too invented the shoulder-pad on which porters carry their burdens, so we are told by Aristotle in his treatise *On Education*; for he himself had been a porter, says Epicurus somewhere.[75] **This was how he was taken up by Democritus, who saw how skilfully his bundles of wood were tied.**

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n393/mode/2up?view=theater

It is a reproof to those who think of Greece as synonymous with Athens, that none of the great Hellenic thinkers before Socrates belonged to that city, and only Plato after him. The fate of Anaxagoras and Socrates indicates that religious conservatism was stronger in Athens than in the colonies, where geographical separation had broken some of the bonds of tradition. Perhaps Athens would have remained obscurantist and intolerant to the point of stupidity had it not been for **the growth of a cosmopolitan trading class, and the coming of the Sophists to Athens.**
…

Protagoras, the most renowned of the Sophists, was born in Abdera a generation before Democritus. In his lifetime he was the better known of the two, and the more influential; we surmise his repute from the furore created by his visits to Athens.*[84] Even Plato, who was not often intentionally fair to the Sophists, respected him, and described him as a man of high character. **In the Platonic dialogue that is named after him Protagoras makes a much better showing than the argumentative young Socrates; here it is Socrates who talks like a Sophist, and Protagoras who behaves like a gentleman and a philosopher,** never losing his temper, never jealous of another's brilliance, never taking the argument too seriously, and never anxious to speak.
…

Diogenes Laertius accuses him of being the first to "arm disputants with the weapon of sophism," a charge that would have pleased Socrates; but Diogenes adds that Protagoras "was also the first to invent that sort of argument which is called Socratic"[88] —which might not have pleased Socrates.

It was but one of his many distinctions that he founded European grammar and philology. He treated of the right use of words, says Plato,[89] and was the first to distinguish the three genders of nouns, and certain tenses and moods of verbs.[90] **But his chief significance lay in this, that with him, rather than with Socrates, began the subjective standpoint in philosophy.** Unlike the Ionians he was less interested in things than in thought—i.e., in the whole process of sensation, perception, understanding, and expression. Whereas Parmenides rejected sensation as a guide to truth, Protagoras, like Locke, accepted it as the only means of knowledge, and refused to admit any transcendental—suprasensual—reality. No absolute truth can be found, said Protagoras, but only such truths as hold for given men under given conditions; contradictory assertions can be equally true for different persons or at different times.[91] All truth, goodness, and beauty are relative and subjective; "man is the measure of all things—of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not."[92] **To the historical eye a whole world begins to tremble when Protagoras announces this simple principle of humanism and relativity; all established truths and sacred principles crack; individualism has found a voice and a philosophy; and the supernatural bases of social order threaten to melt away.**
…

They applied analysis to everything; they refused to respect traditions that could not be supported by the evidence of the senses or the logic of reason; **and they shared decisively in a rationalist movement that finally broke down, among the intellectual classes, the ancient faith of Hellas.**

> https://biblehub.com/jeremiah/10-11.htm
>
> **Thus you shall say to them: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth shall perish from the earth and from under these heavens."**

"The common opinion" of his time, says Plato, derived "the world and all animals and plants ... and inanimate substances from ... some spontaneous and unintelligent cause."[102] **Lysias tells of an atheistic society that called itself the *kakodaimoniotai*, or Devils' Club, and deliberately met and dined on holydays set apart for fasting.[103] Pindar, at the opening of the fifth century, accepted the oracle of Delphi piously; Aeschylus defended it politically; Herodotus, about 450, criticized it timidly; Thucydides, at the end of the century, openly rejected it.** Euthyphro complained that when in the Assembly he spoke of oracles, the people laughed at him as an antiquated fool.[104]

The Sophists must not be blamed or credited for all of this; much of it was in the air, and was a natural result of growing wealth, leisure, travel, research, and speculation. **Their role in the deterioration of morals was likewise contributory rather than basic; wealth of itself, without the aid of philosophy, puts an end to puritanism and stoicism.** But within these modest limits the Sophists unwittingly quickened

disintegration. Most of them, barring a thoroughly human love of money, were men of high character and decent life; **but they did not transmit to their pupils the traditions or the wisdom that had made or kept them reasonably virtuous despite their discovery of the secular origin and geographical mutability of morals.** Their colonial derivation may have led them to underestimate the value of custom as a peaceful substitute for force or law in maintaining morality and order.
...

The announcement of the relativity of knowledge did not make men modest, as it should, but disposed every man to consider himself the measure of all things; every clever youth could now feel himself fit to sit in judgment upon the moral code of his people, reject it if he could not understand and approve it, and then be free to rationalize his desires as the virtues of an emancipated soul. The distinction between "Nature" and convention, **and the willingness of minor Sophists to argue that what "Nature" permitted was good regardless of custom or law,** sapped the ancient supports of Greek morality, and encouraged many experiments in living.
...

They were the intellectual representatives of their time, sharing its passion for the free intellect; **like the Encyclopedists of Enlightenment France they swept away the dying past with magnificent *élan*, and did not live long enough, or think far enough, to establish new institutions in place of those that loosened reason would destroy. In every civilization the time comes when old ways must be re-examined if the society is to readjust itself to irresistible economic change;** the Sophists were the instrument of this re-examination, but failed to provide the statesmanship for the readjustment. It remains to their credit that they powerfully stimulated the pursuit of knowledge, and made it fashionable to think. From every corner of the Greek world they brought new ideas and challenges to Athens, and aroused her to philosophical consciousness and maturity. **Without them Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle would have been impossible.**

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n363/mode/2up?view=theater

The "*Sophist*" is still quite Hellenic—as are also Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the great Ionians; but only as transitional forms. **The *polis* loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in its rights of dominion over every other *polis*. ... Cultures, that is to say, "the gods," are exchanged, and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative of the *deus autochthonus* is lost. Good and Evil of whatever origin get mixed:** the boundaries separating good from evil gradually *vanish*. ... This is the "Sophist."

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **This belief however, the honour paid to national Gods, the sure assumption of the truth of primal race-traditions, had formed the bond of all community.** Was this now rent and hooted as a heresy, at least the core of that religion had come to light as unconditioned, actual, naked *Man;* **but this Man was no longer the associate man, united by the bond of racial fellowship:** only the *absolute, egoistic, solitary unit,*—man beautiful and naked, but loosed from the beauteous bond of brotherhood.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0247%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D3

3. **And to me the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth]. For before the Trojan war nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common;** [2] nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all.
...

This is conjectured principally out of Homer. [3] For though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not anywhere that name in general, nor indeed to any but those that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis and were the first so called; but in his poems he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. **Nor doth he likewise use the word barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them.**
...

5. **For the Grecians in old time, and such barbarians as in the continent lived near unto the sea or else inhabited the islands after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, became thieves** and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves and to fetch in maintenance for the weak, and falling upon towns unfortified and scatteringly inhabited, rifled them and made this the best means of their living, **being a matter at that time nowhere in disgrace but rather carrying with it something of glory.**
...

6. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed because their houses were unfenced and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. [2] And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to

all the rest. [3] **Amongst whom the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life.**
…

[4] **But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lacedaemonians, amongst whom also, both in other things and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons.** [5] The same were also the first that when they were to contend in the Olympic games stripped themselves naked and anointed their bodies with ointment; **whereas in ancient times the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches, nor is it many years since this custom ceased.** Also there are to this day amongst the barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists and of wrestling, and the combatants about their privy parts wear breeches in the exercise. [6] **It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated that the old Greeks used the same form of life that is now in force amongst the barbarians of the present age.**

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr06.htm

The historian of early Greece must find himself often on the watch for a particular cardinal moment, generally impossible to date in time and sometimes hard even to define in terms of development, when the clear outline that we call Classical Greece begins to take shape out of the mist. It is the moment when, as Herodotus puts it, 'the Hellenic race was marked off from the barbarian, as more intelligent and more emancipated from silly nonsense'.39_1 **In the eighth century B.C., for instance, so far as our remains indicate, there cannot have been much to show that the inhabitants of Attica and Boeotia and the Peloponnese were markedly superior to those of, say, Lycia or Phrygia, or even Epirus.** By the middle of the fifth century the difference is enormous. On the one side is Hellas, on the other the motley tribes of 'barbaroi'.
…

In all probability if a Greek of the fifth century, like Aeschylus or even Pindar, had met a group of the real Hellenes or Achaioi of the Migrations, he would have set them down as so many obvious and flaming barbarians.

https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%201.60

When this offer was accepted by Pisistratus, who agreed on these terms with Megacles, they devised a plan to bring Pisistratus back which, to my mind, was so exceptionally foolish that it is strange **(since from old times the Hellenic stock has always been distinguished from foreign by its greater cleverness and its freedom from silly foolishness)** that these men should devise such a plan to deceive Athenians, said to be the subtlest of the Greeks.

https://archive.org/details/playsandpuritan02kinggoog/page/n227/mode/2up?view=theater

Have they not held that, on the whole, the problems of human nature and human history have been sufficiently solved by Gibbon and Voltaire, Gil Blas and Figaro; **that our forefathers were silly barbarians; that this glorious nineteenth century is the one region of light, and that all before was outer darkness,** peopled by 'foreign devils,' Englishmen, no doubt, according to the flesh, but in spirit, in knowledge, in creed, in customs, so utterly different from ourselves that we shall merely show our sentimentalism by doing aught but laughing at them?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Schopenhauer_as_Educator#4

We are feeling the consequences of the doctrine, preached lately from all the housetops, that the state is the highest end of man and there is no higher duty than to serve it: I regard this not a relapse into paganism, but into stupidity. A man who thinks state-service to be his highest duty, very possibly knows no higher one; yet there are both men and duties in a region beyond,—and one of these duties, that seems to me at least of higher value than state-service, is to destroy stupidity in all its forms—and this particular stupidity among them. **And I have to do with a class of men whose teleological conceptions extend further than the well-being of a state, I mean with philosophers—and only with them in their relation to the world of culture, which is again almost independent of the "good of the state."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.22149/page/n363/mode/2up?view=theater

474. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIND FEARED BY THE STATE.—The Greek *polis* was, like every organising political power, exclusive and distrustful of the growth of culture; its powerful fundamental impulse seemed almost solely to have a paralysing and obstructive effect thereon. **It did not want to let any history or any becoming have a place in culture; the education laid down in the State laws was meant to be obligatory on all generations to keep them at *one* stage of development. Plato also, later on, did not desire it to be otherwise in his ideal**

State. *In spite of* the polis culture developed itself in this manner; indirectly to be sure, and against its will, the polis furnished assistance because the ambition of individuals therein was stimulated to the utmost, so that, having once found the path of intellectual development, they followed it to its farthest extremity.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n369/mode/2up?view=theater

The Sophists were Greeks: **when Socrates and Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they were *Jews* or I know not what.** *Grote's* tactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to raise them to the rank of men of honour and moralisers—but it was their honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/195/mode/2up?view=theater

Platonists and Hellenists argued that in the Third Reich, students needed to be introduced to Plato in high school, for, as Adolf Rusch, a professor of classical literature at the Mommsen gymnasium in Berlin-Grunewald, declared, he as nothing less than "the teacher of the German man."19 In an article with that very title, **Rusch argued that the new German school must forget about the interests of the individual and focus solely on the group, the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Plato was just the man to combat "the sophistic," an expression of "outrageous individualism."** Rather than "the maxim according to which man is the measure of all things," he believed that man existed "wholly within the order of the world" – that is, the order of the polis. …

As an implacable enemy of the feeble, compassionate humanism of the Enlightenment, Günther argued that Plato's ideas had been opposed by none other than **the Sophists, who were "men of the Asiatic race, as racial science has taught us."**66 A secondary-school textbook proclaimed that while the Greeks had indeed been receptive to the Sophists' individualism, it was only because their blood had already been diluted, as could be deduced by the strict determinism that governed the spirit of the race: "**The sophistic is completely foreign to Nordic thought and proves to be a product of the race of Asia Minor, which habitually debates concepts and questions inherited wisdom in order to destroy it.** The influence of this philosophy could grow only because the Greeks had become unfaithful to their origins. If they had remained a people of pure race, the accent that [the Sophists] placed on the exceptionality of the individual and his rights would have seemed incomprehensible to them."67

Part of this paragraph is a virtual copy of a passage written by Hans Günther himself.68 Ever faithful to his racial symptomatology, Günther considered the sophistic "completely impregnated with a non-Hellenic spirit."69

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT76#v=onepage&q&f=false

One should be wary of taking modern philosophy's claim to public-spiritedness at full face value. The fact that Descartes terms his own autobiography a fable or history may be intended to warn the attentive reader that the founder of modern philosophy is quite consciously leading the ordinary men of "good sense" to whom he directs his appeal down the primrose path. In assessing the French philosopher's ultimate purpose, one must not suppose that those who first advocated philosophy's emancipation from clerical tutelage were somehow more egalitarian than their classical forerunners. Though he joined Machiavelli in professing a dedication to "the greatest common benefit of each," Descartes openly argued that "the greatest good that there can be in a state is for it to possess true philosophers." In taking this stand, he asserted not the utility but the dignity of the life of the mind. **It is philosophy "alone," he wrote, "that distinguishes us from the most savage and barbarous of men. Each nation is civilized and polished in proportion to the quality of the philosophy engaged in there."**172 **In private, the French philosopher was even willing to entertain the possibility that there might exist "a man worth more, in himself alone, than the rest of his city." In such a situation, he added, "he would not be correct in being willing to sacrifice himself to save it."**173 Between the populist rhetoric deployed to justify the modern scientific project and the gigantine pride and ambition that animate it, there is a considerable gap.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false

Xenophon described the situation elegantly by posing a rhetorical question. **"How could human beings be more easily defeated in battle," he wrote, "than when each begins to take counsel in private concerning his own safety?"**44 This was the type of deliberation which the *pólis* had to attempt to suppress.

> https://www.bevinalexander.com/excerpts/early-wars/frederick-great-oblique-order-attack.htm
>
> As Frederick [the Great of Prussia] himself commented, **"If my soldiers began to think, not one would remain in the ranks"** because conditions were so bad.
>
> https://archive.org/details/accountofcorsica00bosw/page/348/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Paoli said, "If a man would preserve the generous glow of patriotism, he must not reason too much. Mareschal Saxe reasoned; and carried the arms of France into the heart of Germany, his own country. I act from sentiment, not from reasonings."**

http://garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm

Political success in Athens was based on a man's ability as a public speaker. This led to the rise of the sophists, **who sold the skills of rhetoric to the highest bidders--the superlawyers of their day.** Historian Morton Smith writes that

> "*Athenians were litigious, and any man might find himself compelled to argue for his fortune, if not his life, before a court of several hundred of his fellow citizens. It was necessary to speak for oneself, though a writer might be hired to prepare the speech**. By their studies of rhetoric, argument (whence logic), and grammar, the sophists laid the basis of Greek higher education, from which was to come the mediaeval university program.** By their immediate teaching, however, they--intentionally or unintentionally--obscured the traditional patterns of Greek morality and raised up a generation of skeptics prepared to argue for any action which seemed to their own interest.*"(30)

Otto Scott is even more to the point: "These *sophistae* (teachers of wisdom) taught young adults, for the first time in history. They charged enormous sums: Protagoras demanded 10,000 drachmas ($100,000--or the equivalent of a modern university [education]) for the education of a single pupil. **The Sophists introduced civilization's first 'enlightenment' which questioned tradition, religion, morals and all values.**"(31) **In short, they were the law school professors of their day: they undermined moral law.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sisyphus_fragment

The fragment was preserved in the works of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus. Jan N. Bremmer proposed that it was composed in the 5th-century BCE by a Greek playwright, either Critias or Euripides.[1] **Charles H. Kahn speculates that the author could have been Democritus, as he did not live in Athens and thus had nothing to fear of Athenian impiety laws.**[2] Further, the concepts contained within the Sisyphus fragment echo a fragment from Democritus preserved slightly earlier in the same text.

> And there are some who have supposed that we have arrived at the conception of Gods from those events in the world which are marvelous; **which opinion seems to have been held by Democritus, who says—"For when the men of old time beheld the disasters in the heavens, such as thunderings and lightnings, and thunderbolts and collisions between stars, and eclipses of sun and moon, they were affrighted, imagining the Gods to be the causes of these things."**[2]

...

Karl Popper in his The Open Society and its Enemies noted a 'striking' similarity between the passage ascribed to Critias, and the views Plato, Critias's nephew, developed in his two dialogues, the Republic and the Laws regarding the Noble lie.[24]

https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/302/critias.htm

> A time there was when disorder ruled
> Human lives, which were then, like lives of beasts,
> Enslaved to force; nor was there then reward
> For the good, nor for the wicked punishment.
> Next, it seems to me, humans established laws
> For punishment, that justice might rule
> Over the tribe of mortals, and wanton injury be subdued;
> And whosoever did wrong was penalized.
> Next, as the laws held [mortals] back from deeds
> Of open violence, but still such deeds
> Were done in secret,—then, I think,
> Some shrewd man first, a man in judgment wise,
> Found for mortals the fear of gods,
> Thereby to frighten the wicked should they
> Even act or speak or scheme in secret.
> ...
>
> Even if you plan in silence some evil deed
> It will not be hidden from the gods: for discernment
> Lies in them. So, speaking words like these,
> **The sweetest teaching did he introduce,**
> **Concealing truth under untrue speech.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020

According to the Sophists, there is no duty above expediency and no virtue apart from pleasure. Laws are an invention of weak men to rob their betters of the reasonable enjoyment of their superiority. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong; and as there is no greater good than to do evil

without fear of retribution, so there is no worse evil than to suffer without the consolation of revenge. Justice is the mask of a craven spirit; injustice is worldly wisdom; and duty, obedience, self-denial are the impostures of hypocrisy. **Government is absolute, and may ordain what it pleases, and no subject can complain that it does him wrong, but as long as he can escape compulsion and punishment, he is always free to disobey.** Happiness consists in obtaining power and in eluding the necessity of obedience; and he that gains a throne by perfidy and murder, deserves to be truly envied.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_M_E5QczOBAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA595#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Proceeding to details, I may say first that there is strong evidence that at least in Plato's (and Aristotle's) time, the problem of equalitarianism was clearly seen to be concerned with two fully analogous distinctions, that between *Greeks and barbarians* on the one side and that between *masters (or free men) and slaves* on the other; cp. with this note 13 to chapter 5. Now we have very strong evidence that the fifth-century Athenian movement against slavery was not confined to a few intellectualists like Euripides, Alcidamas, Lycophron, Antiphon, Hippias, etc., but that it had considerable practical success.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GlfUVeQHLFUC&lpg=PA68&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

What I mean is this: Is [good birth] something valuable and worthwhile or, as Lycophron the sophist wrote, something altogether worthless? Comparing it with other goods he asserts: "Now the nobility of good birth is obscure, and its grandeur a matter of words," on the grounds that preference for it looks to opinion, whereas in fact there is no difference between the ignoble and the well-born.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lycophron_(sophist)

This statement may indicate that Lycophron shared the beliefs of Antiphon, that (regardless of their ancestry) both Greeks and barbarians are born with the same capacities: an egalitarian belief that was a minority view in the 5th century BC.[1][3] He is also known for his statement (reproduced by Aristotle, in the latter's Politics, 1280b10), that "*law is only a convention, a surety to another of justice*".[4] Also translated as "*a guarantor of men's rights against one another*". He thus believed that law is a matter of agreement, a social convention and not a natural or universal standard **(there is no evidence that Lycophron rejected the idea that law is a universal standard – indeed his view appears far more universalist than that of Aristotle, in that Lycophron proposes a single standard, what would now be called the non aggression principle, in relation to all states).** In this respect his views on law are similar to those of Protagoras.[1][5]

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D3%3Asection%3D1280b
>
> But the most important thing they do not mention. **If men formed the community and came together for the sake of wealth, their share in the state is proportionate to their share in the property,** so that the argument of the champions of oligarchy would appear to be valid—namely that in a partnership with a capital of 100 minae[2] it would not be just for the man who contributed one mina to have a share whether of the principal or of the profits accruing equal to the share of the man who supplied the whole of the remainder; **but if on the other hand the state was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life (for otherwise a collection of slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it is, it is not a state, because slaves[3] and animals have no share in well-being or in purposive life), and if its object is not military alliance for defence against injury by anybody, and it does not exist for the sake of trade and of business relations[4]—for if so, Etruscans and Carthaginians and all the people that have commercial relations with one another would be virtually citizens of a single state; at all events they have agreements about imports and covenants as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties of alliance for mutual defence;** [1280b] [1] but they do not have officials common to them all appointed to enforce these covenants, but different officials with either party, nor yet does either party take any concern as to the proper moral character of the other, nor attempt to secure that nobody in the states under the covenant shall be dishonest or in any way immoral, but only that they shall not commit any wrong against each other. All those on the other hand who are concerned about good government do take civic virtue and vice into their purview. **Thus it is also clear that any state that is truly so called and is not a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue; for otherwise the community becomes merely an alliance, differing only in locality from the other alliances, those of allies that live apart. And the law is a covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron,[1] a guarantee of men's just claims on one another, but it is not designed to make the citizens virtuous and just.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q&f=false

Despite the general accord that reigned throughout all of Greece, there were men who rejected the primacy of politics and war. **Euripides's Theseus hints at their presence in Athens when he remarks that, in a free city, a man lacking the desire for eminence can choose to remain silent.**122 Lycophron appears to have been such a man, and Aristippus another. If Aristotle and Xenophon can be trusted, neither had much use for the middle ground provided by the public arena. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no Greek thinker, not even these, ever elaborated a *public-spirited political* philosophy grounded in liberal principles. **Lycophron did treat the *pólis* as little more than "a military alliance (*summachía*)," and he reportedly argued that the law was merely "a covenant … a pledge to respect each other's rightful claims" and not an instrument "able to make the citizens good and just."**123 **This denial that the *pólis* is a moral community certainly foreshadows the social-contract theories developed by Thomas Hobbes and his successors. But there is something missing: Lycophron's account is wholly descriptive and never prescriptive.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Hippias_of_Elis

HIPPIAS OF ELIS, Greek sophist, was born about the middle of the 5th century B.C. and was thus a younger contemporary of Protagoras and Socrates. He was a man of great versatility and won the respect of his fellow-citizens to such an extent that he was sent to various towns on important embassies. At Athens he made the acquaintance of Socrates and other leading thinkers. **With an assurance characteristic of the later sophists, he claimed to be regarded as an authority on all subjects, and lectured, at all events with financial success, on poetry, grammar, history, politics, archaeology, mathematics and astronomy.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178%3Atext%3DProt.%3Asection%3D337c

When Prodicus had thus spoken, quite a number of the company showed their approval; then after Prodicus the learned Hippias[1]
spoke: Gentlemen, he said, who are here present, **I regard you all as kinsmen and intimates and fellow-citizens by nature, not by law:** [337d] **for like is akin to like by nature, whereas law, despot of mankind, often constrains us against nature.** Hence it would be shameful if we, while knowing the nature of things, should yet—being the wisest of the Greeks, and having met together for the very purpose in the very sanctuary of the wisdom of Greece, and in this the greatest and most auspicious house of the city of cities—display no worthy sign of this dignity, [337e] but should quarrel with each other like low churls.

> **συγγενεῖς**: **it was the cardinal point of the sophistic ethics, that positive laws are arbitrary restrictions, imposed upon men by powerful individuals or by the majority, with the purpose simply of putting them down, and of restraining the natural rights of the individual, i.e. those things which he desires and regards as his rights.** That Hippias also taught this is shown by Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4.14 ff.
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1177/pg1177-images.html#link2H_4_0006
>
> Then Hippias: **Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Rq5hg4d54m4C&lpg=PA2&hl=fi&pg=PA2#v=onepage&q&f=false

The more "modern" concern about the difference between actually prevailing laws and certain laws which cannot be abrogated or changed by human authorities began to be recognized in the fifth century B.C. Hippias (ca. 460-390 B.C.) spoke about a divine law that can never and nowhere be superseded, and under Socratic influence began to associate the divine or natural law with a universal abstract Form of Law.6

https://iep.utm.edu/hippias/

Hippias appears to have originated the idea of natural law as the foundation of morality, distinguishing nature from the arbitrary conventions or fashions, differing according to the different times or regions in which they arise, imposed by arbitrary human enactment, and often unwillingly obeyed. He held that there is an element of right common to the laws of all countries and constituting their essential basis. **He held also that the good and wise of all countries are naturally akin and should regard one another as citizens of a single state. This idea was subsequently developed by the Cynic and still more by the Stoic schools, passing from the latter to the jurists, in whose hands it became the great instrument for converting Roman law into a legislation for a people.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophistic_works_of_Antiphon#Antiphon_the_Sophist

A treatise known as *On Truth*, of which only fragments survive, is attributed to Antiphon the Sophist. It is of great value to political theory, as it appears to be a precursor to natural rights theory. The views expressed in it suggest its author could not be the same person as Antiphon of Rhamnus, since it was interpreted as affirming strong egalitarian and libertarian principles appropriate to a democracy – but antithetical to the oligarchical views of one who was instrumental in the anti-democratic coup of 411 like Antiphon of Rhamnus.[6]
...

On Truth juxtaposes the repressive nature of convention and law (νόμος) with "nature" (φύσις), especially human nature. Nature is envisaged as requiring spontaneity and freedom, in contrast to the often gratuitous restrictions imposed by institutions:

> **Most of the things which are legally just are [none the less] ... inimical to nature.** By law it has been laid down for the eyes what they should see and what they should not see; for the ears what they should hear and they should not hear; for the tongue what it should speak, and what it should not speak; for the hands what they should do and what they should not do ... and for the mind what it should desire, and what it should not desire.[8]

https://www.iep.utm.edu/sophists/#SH2c

The biographical details surrounding Antiphon the sophist (c. 470-411 B.C.) are unclear – one unresolved issue is whether he should be identified with Antiphon of Rhamnus (a statesman and teacher of rhetoric who was a member of the oligarchy which held power in Athens briefly in 411 B.C.E.). However, since the publication of fragments from his *On Truth* in the early twentieth century he has been regarded as a major representative of the sophistic movement.

***On Truth*, which features a range of positions and counterpositions on the relationship between nature and convention (see section 3a below), is sometimes considered an important text in the history of political thought because of its alleged advocacy of egalitarianism:**

> Those born of illustrious fathers we respect and honour, whereas those who come from an undistinguished house we neither respect nor honour. In this we behave like barbarians towards one another. **For by nature we all equally, both barbarians and Greeks, have an entirely similar origin:** for it is fitting to fulfil the natural satisfactions which are necessary to all men: all have the ability to fulfil these in the same way, and in all this none of us is different either as barbarian or as Greek; for we all breathe into the air with mouth and nostrils and we all eat with the hands (quoted in Untersteiner, 1954).

Whether this statement should be taken as expressing the actual views of Antiphon, or rather as part of an antilogical presentation of opposing views on justice remains an open question, as does whether such a position rules out the identification of Antiphon the sophist with the oligarchical Antiphon of Rhamnus.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GlfUVeQHLFUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA110#v=onepage&q&f=false

The views put forward in the papyrus fragments of the *Truth* are indeed radical, but not necessarily to be associated with ultrademocratic opinions any more than with the critics of Athenian democratic society in the late fifth century. In any case Antiphon would probably have regarded himself, not as an antidemocrat, but as a reformer of democracy. If the critical attitude to contemporary views of *dikaion*, "justice," in the same fragments seem contrary to the extremely conventional views of law expessed in the speeches, **there is no reason to think that the composer of a speech for a client to deliver before an Athenian jury would feel it necessary or desirable to credit his client with anything more than the most conventional attitude to law and religion, whether or not he held such an attitude himself.** Nor are the opinions of the *Concord* on education, psychology, and sociology really at variance with the criticisms of the *Truth*. Much has been made of the so-called inconsistencies between the *Truth* and the speechs on the one hand and the *Concord* on the other,1 but there is nothing which rules out a single author.

Antiphon, put together again, is in himself a striking figure, **a man whose talents might well have been, as Thucydides says they were, both admired and feared by his contemporaries.** He illustrates the wide range of indigenous intellectual activity at Athens before and at the outset of the Peloponnesian War, and more than any other person enables its map to be drawn. He also offers a striking contrast and comparison with Socrates, with whom he shared that intellectual climate, as he shared the fate of trial and death at the hands of an Athenian jury.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tAeFipOVx4MC&lpg=PA16&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

Second, **the opposition between public assent to laws but private freedom from restraint can be paralleled in the work of the contemporary sophist Antiphon, who stated that justice would be most advantageous to a man if "he were to <u>regard the laws as great in the presence of witnesses, but nature as great when deprived of witnesses</u>"** (F 44(a), I, 13-23 Pendrick).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

Anytus has made two related claims about the teaching of virtue: First, he rejects the idea that the sophists are capable of teaching virtue to anyone, and he condemns all those cities who "allow them [the

sophists] to enter and do not drive them out, whether it is a foreigner (*xenos*) or a local (*astos*) who tries to act in this way."43 Anytus may have had the sort of sophist in mind who appears in the almost exactly contemporary *Dissoi Logoi*, a sophistic treatise written about 400 BCE in the Doric dialect. Under the lemma "Concerning Whether Wisdom and Virtue are Teachable," the anonymous author sets out to demonstrate that virtue can be learned. Against those who argue that we are born with innate knowledge of things, the author uses the example of language:

> If someone is not persuaded that we learn our words but thinks that we are born knowing them, let him form a judgment from what follows: **if someone should send a child away to the Persians as soon as he was born and bring him up there, hearing nothing of the Greek tongue, he would speak Persian. And if one were to bring a Persian child here, he would speak Greek.** We learn our words in this fashion and we do not know who our teachers are.44

The idea that social practices (such as virtue and language) are a matter of convention and not somehow innate defined much sophistic thought. Similarly, in another section of the *Dissoi Logoi*, "Concerning Seemly and Disgraceful," we read that "what is noble" is not an absolute standard but rather dependent upon local values. While the Spartans consider it seemly for young girls to go about with bare arms and no tunics, to the Ionians this is a disgraceful practice; the Spartans think it foolish for children to learn to read and play music, while the Ionians value such training for the young. The Thracians tattoo their young girls, while others use the tattoo to stigmatize criminals. In a passage clearly cribbed from Herodotus, the *Dissoi Logoi* points out that the custom of the Massagetae of eating their dead is abhorrent to the Greeks**. In other words, whereas cultural relativism was a central tenet of sophistic teaching, Platonic ontology demands that the philosopher search for absolutes. As Socrates demonstrates at length in the *Gorgias*, the sophist is incapable of teaching virtue since he has no knowledge of its essence.** The claims of the sophists to be able to teach virtue depend upon their conviction that *aretê* is both learned and culturally contingent. On the falsity of the sophists' pedagogical claims, Socrates and Anytus are on the same page, even if Anytus failed to understand Socrates' antipathy toward the sophists.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GlfUVeQHLFUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA279#v=onepage&q&f=false

> (1) Twofold arguments concerning the good and the bad are put forward in Greece by those who philosophize. **Some say that the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, and that a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, ot at one time good and at another time bad for the same person.** (2) I myself side with those who hold the latter opinion, and I shall examine it, using as an example human life and its concern for food, drink, and sexual pleasures: these things are bad for a man if he is sick but good if he is healthy and needs them.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA137#v=onepage&q&f=false

The rhetorician can manipulate conventional appearances for his own sake or that of his clients. Finding himself in a given city, he can adapt to the coloration of the local circumstances like a chameleon. **He can defend that city's justice in his speeches or undermine it, depending on the client's needs. Protagoras argues that any given city's conventions about virtue can be "picked up" by an exposure to the locality, like children pick up language, denying Socrates' attempt to connect a knowledge of virtue to a rigorous and universally valid standard of reason** of the kind prefigured by the arts, one that does not change from place to place.27 In a similar manner, when Gorgias says in reply to Socrates' question about whether he teaches justice that he can indeed give a plausible defense of however the city he happens to be in understands its morality (460). **He does not fathom Socrates' implication that there could be a universally valid knowledge of *politike* that, like geometry or astronomy, would transcend mere local custom and prejudice,** showing genuine perplexity for the first time when Socrates introduces this notion to Polus (463). **For Gorgias, as a student of the primordialist ontology, local custom and prejudice is all justice could ever mean as a phenomenon.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Alcidamas

ALCIDAMAS, of Elaea, in Aeolis, Greek sophist and rhetorician, flourished in the 4th century B.C. **He was the pupil and successor of Gorgias** and taught at Athens at the same time as Isocrates, whose rival and opponent he was.
...

Of other works only fragments and the titles have survived: **Μεσσηνιακὸς, advocating the freedom of the Messenians and containing the sentiment that "all are by nature free";** a *Eulogy of Death*, in consideration of the wide extent of human sufferings; a Τέχνη or instruction-book in the art of rhetoric; and a Φυσικὸς λόγος.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0160%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D15%3Asection%3D6

[6] On the statue of Epaminondas is an inscription in elegiac verse relating among other things that he founded Messene, and that through him the Greeks won freedom. The elegiac verses are these: —

> "By my counsels was Sparta shorn of her glory,
> And holy Messene received at last her children.
> By the arms of Thebe was Megalopolis encircled with walls,
> And all Greece won independence and freedom."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

Both Plato and Aristotle, as we shall see, refer to contemporary controversy about the rights and wrongs of slavery and the proper treatment of slaves. **In our extant evidence, however, only one lone voice is raised at this time in strong dissent from the general assumption that it is normal and right for some men to be slaves. This is a sentence from a speech by the Sophist Alcidamas, delivered after the Messenians in 369 B.C. had been freed from their subjection as helots to Sparta – an event which must have roused wide discussion, at any rate of the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks.** Championing the liberation in opposition to Isocrates, Alcidamas made one of the most categorical statements against slavery in antiquity: **'God has left all men free; nature has made no man a slave.'**7 Some lines preserved from a comedy by Anaxandrides, perhaps first performed in 352 B.C., express once more the thought that slavery is a matter of chance rather than nature; **but it seems likely that the author's main point is to satirise the ease with which slaves can become citizens by admission to the Attic deme of Sunium:**

> Slaves have no city anywhere, my friend.
> Chance gives men first this status, and then that.
> Many who have no liberty today
> Tomorrow become Sunians; the next,
> They're in the market-place. So Fortune shifts
> The helm for each.8

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/6E*.html#ref7

And Anaxandrides in *Anchises*[10] says; 'Slaves, my good sir, have no citizenship anywhere, yet Fortune shifts their bodies in all kinds of ways. **To-day there are many men who are not free, but to-morrow they will be registered at Sunium,**[11] **and on the day after they have full admittance to the market-place.** A divinity guides each man's helm.'

[11] The most remote deme in Attica; a preliminary step to full citizenship.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius8a.html#c7

[7e.6] How great should we think was the zeal of Anaxagoras for learning? **When he returned home after a long journey, and saw that his estate lay untilled and deserted, he said: "I could not have been safe, unless these things were ruined." ['non essem' inquit 'ego saluus, nisi istae perissent']** That was a fitting expression of widely-sought wisdom. For if he had laboured more in the cultivation of his lands than of his mind, he would have remained master of his property at home, but would not have returned to his home as the great Anaxagoras.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_II#Anaxagoras

6. Anaxagoras,[8] the son of Hegesibulus or Eubulus, was a native of Clazomenae. He was a pupil of Anaximenes, and was the first who set mind above matter, for at the beginning of his treatise, which is composed in attractive and dignified language, he says, "All things were together; then came Mind and set them in order."
…

He was eminent for wealth and noble birth, and furthermore for magnanimity, in that he gave up his patrimony to his relations. 7. **For, when they accused him of neglecting it, he replied, "Why then do you not look after it?" And at last he went into retirement and engaged in physical investigation without troubling himself about public affairs. When some one inquired, "Have you no concern in your native land?" "Gently," he replied, "I am greatly concerned with my fatherland," and pointed to the sky.**
…

10. There is a story that he predicted the fall of the meteoric stone at Aegospotami, which he said would fall from the sun.[13] **Hence Euripides, who was his pupil, in the *Phathon* calls the sun itself a "golden clod."**[14] Furthermore, when he went to Olympia, he sat down wrapped in a sheep-skin cloak as if it were going to rain; and the rain came.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius3b.html#c4

[4e.2] **What father Euripides had, or what mother Demosthenes had, was unknown even to the age in which they lived in. Yet the most certain opinion of the learned is, that the mother of the one sold vegetables, and the father of the other dealt in knives.** However, what can be more famous than the tragedies of the one, and the orations of the other?
...

[7e.1] Nor was Euripides to be accounted insolent at Athens, who, when the people required him to remove a sentence from a certain tragedy, **appeared upon the stage, and told them that he composed plays to teach them, not by them to be taught.** Such confidence is certainly to be praised, which weighing a man's worth, arrogates so much to itself, as to keep distant from contempt and insolence.

Thus his answer can be approved, which he gave to Alcestis the tragic poet, who taunted him, because he had not been able to compose more than three verses in the last three days, and that with a great deal of labour too, while the other boasted that he had easily written a hundred lines. **"The reason is," said Euripides, "because yours are only to last three days, and mine are to last for eternity."** For the fluent writing of the one, perished within the first bounds of memory; but the polished and constant style of the other will be carried through all ages upon the wings of time.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-history-of-classical-literature/sophists-and-physicians-of-the-greek-enlightenment/1838A61B516EAC84DA5BAD3C5BD90747#

Sophist basically means wise man and is the word used by Herodotus of Solon and Pythagoras, **but when Hermes hurls it at Prometheus it has already an ironic force, and the presence of sophistic concepts and catchwords in *Prometheus vinctus* suggests that the movement was already well under way at least by the early 450s.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vW_RBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

> EUR. Then from the very opening lines no idleness was shown;
> The mistress talked with all her might, the servant talked as much,
> The master talked, the maiden talked, the beldame talked.
>
> AESCH. For such an outrage was not death your due?
>
> EUR. No, by Apollo, no: That was my democratic way.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vW_RBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

> AESCH. Moreover to prate, to harangue, to debate, is now the ambition
> of all in the state.
> Each exercise-ground is in consequence found deserted and empty: to
> evil repute
> Your lessons have brought our youngsters, and taught our sailors to
> challenge, discuss, and refute
> The orders they get from their captains and yet, when I was alive,
> I protest that the knaves
> Knew nothing at all, save for rations to call, and to sing "Rhyppapae"
> as they pulled through the waves.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D7

Euripides the tragedian durst not openly declare his sentiment; the court of Areopagus terrified him. Yet he sufficiently manifested his thoughts by this method. He presented in his tragedy *Sisyphus*, the first and great patron of this opinion, and introduced himself as one agreeing with him:

> Disorder in those days did domineer,
> And brutal power kept the world in fear.

Afterwards by the sanction of laws wickedness was suppressed; but by reason that laws could prohibit only public villanies, yet could not hinder many persons from acting secret impieties, some wise persons gave this advice, that we ought to blind truth with lying disguises, and to persuade men that there is a God:

> There's an eternal God does hear and see
> And understand every impiety;
> Though it in dark recess or thought committed be.

But this poetical fable ought to be rejected, he thought, together with Callimachus, who thus saith:

> If you believe a God, it must be meant
> That you conceive this God omnipotent.

https://web.archive.org/web/20120207131036/http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius1.htm

From heaven, Lipsius, from heaven are all these miseries sent. Therefore Euripides said it well and wisely, that all calamities are from God. [**Euripides' point may have been that any "god" that is responsible for evil is no god.** Lipsius apparently paraphrases Euripides from memory and gives us no reference to check.--JG]

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0014

Æschylus was, head and heart, a lyric poet. **In his time, the Greeks had far more intercourse with the East than in the days of Homer; and they had not yet acquired that immense superiority in war, in science, and in the arts, which, in the following generation, led them to treat the Asiatics with contempt.** From the narrative of Herodotus it should seem that they still looked up, with the veneration of disciples, to Egypt and Assyria. At this period, accordingly, it was natural that the literature of Greece should be tinctured with the Oriental style. **And that style, we think, is discernible in the works of Pindar and Æschylus. The latter often reminds us of the Hebrew writers. The book of Job, indeed, in conduct and diction, bears a considerable resemblance to some of his dramas.** Considered as plays, his works are absurd; considered as choruses, they are above all praise. If, for instance, we examine the address of Clytemnestra to Agamemnon on his return, or the description of the seven Argive chiefs, by the principles of dramatic writing, we shall instantly condemn them as monstrous. But if we forget the characters, and think only of the poetry, we shall admit that it has never been surpassed in energy and magnificence. **Sophocles made the Greek drama as dramatic as was consistent with its original form. His portraits of men have a sort of similarity; but it is the similarity not of a painting, but of a bas-relief. It suggests a resemblance; but it does not produce an illusion. Euripides attempted to carry the reform further. But it was a task far beyond his powers, perhaps beyond any powers. Instead of correcting what was bad, he destroyed what was excellent. He substituted crutches for stilts, bad sermons for good odes.**

Milton, it is well known, admired Euripides highly, much more highly than, in our opinion, Euripides deserved. Indeed the caresses which this partiality leads our countryman to bestow on "sad Electra's poet," sometimes remind us of the beautiful Queen of Fairy-land kissing the long ears of Bottom. At all events, there can be no doubt that this veneration for the Athenian, whether just or not, was injurious to the Samson Agonistes. **Had Milton taken Æschylus for his model, he would have given himself up to the lyric inspiration, and poured out profusely all the treasures of his mind, without bestowing a thought on those dramatic proprieties which the nature of the work rendered it impossible to preserve.** In the attempt to reconcile things in their own nature inconsistent, he has failed, as every one else must have failed. We cannot identify ourselves with the characters, as in a good play. We cannot identify ourselves with the poet, as in a good ode. The conflicting ingredients, like an acid and an alkali mixed, neutralise each other. We are by no means insensible to the merits of this celebrated piece, to the severe dignity of the style, the graceful and pathetic solemnity of the opening speech, or the wild and barbaric melody which gives so striking an effect to the choral passages. **But we think it, we confess, the least successful effort of the genius of Milton.**

The Comus is framed on the model of the Italian Masque, as the Samson is framed on the model of the Greek Tragedy. It is certainly the noblest performance of the kind which exists in any language. It is as far superior to the Faithful Shepherdess, as the Faithful Shepherdess is to the Aminta, or the Aminta to the Pastor Fido. It was well for Milton that he had here no Euripides to mislead him.
...

Perhaps the gods and dæmons of Æschylus may best bear a comparison with the angels and devils of Milton. The style of the Athenian had, as we have remarked, something of the Oriental character; and the same peculiarity may be traced in his mythology. It has nothing of the amenity and elegance which we generally find in the superstitions of Greece. All is rugged, barbaric, and colossal. The legends of Æschylus seem to harmonize less with the fragrant groves and graceful porticoes in

which his countrymen paid their vows to the God of Light and Goddess of Desire, than with those huge and grotesque labyrinths of eternal granite in which Egypt enshrined her mystic Osiris, or in which Hindostan still bows down to her seven-headed idols. **His favourite gods are those of the elder generation, the sons of heaven and earth, compared with whom Jupiter himself was a stripling and an upstart,** the gigantic Titans, and the inexorable Furies. Foremost among his creations of this class stands Prometheus, half fiend, half redeemer, the friend of man, the sullen and implacable enemy of heaven.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n425/mode/2up?view=theater

Nevertheless tragedy also promoted, only with less abruptness and less vulgarity, the anti-national and Hellenising spirit; and in this point of view it was a circumstance of the most decisive importance, that the Greek tragic stage of this period was chiefly under the sway of Euripides (274-348/480-406).
...

But, when Euripides undertook to present man as he is, the advance was logical and in a certain sense historical rather than poetical. **He was able to destroy the ancient tragedy, but not to create the modern. Everywhere he halted half-way.**
...

While the reverential piety of the older tragedians sheds over their pieces as it were a reflected radiance of heaven; while the limitation of the narrow horizon of the older Hellenes exercises its satisfying power even over the hearer; the world of Euripides appears in the pale glimmer of speculation as much denuded of gods as it is spiritualised, and gloomy passions shoot like lightnings athwart the gray clouds.
...

All the effect in his case lies in the details; and with great art certainly every effort has in this respect been made to conceal the irreparable want of poetic wholeness. Euripides is a master in what are called effects; these, as a rule, have a sensuously-sentimental colouring, and often moreover stimulate the sensuous impression by a special high seasoning, such as the interweaving of subjects relating to love with murder or incest. The delineations of Polyxena willing to die and of Phaedra pining away under the grief of secret love, above all the splendid picture of the mystic ecstasies of the Bacchae, are of the greatest beauty in their kind; **but they are neither artistically nor morally pure, and the reproach of Aristophanes, that the poet was unable to paint a Penelope, was thoroughly well founded.**
...

But, above all, poetic effect is replaced in the tragedies of Euripides by moral or political purpose. Without strictly or directly entering on the questions of the day, and having in view throughout social rather than political questions, **Euripides in the legitimate issues of his principles coincided with the contemporary political and philosophical radicalism, and was the first and chief apostle of that new cosmopolitan humanity which broke up the old Attic national life.** This was the ground at once of that opposition which the ungodly and un-Attic poet encountered among his contemporaries, and of that marvellous enthusiasm, with which the younger generation and foreigners devoted themselves to the poet of emotion and of love, of apophthegm and of tendency, of philosophy and of humanity. **Greek tragedy in the hands of Euripides stepped beyond its proper sphere and consequently broke down; but the success of the cosmopolitan poet was only promoted by this, since at the same time the nation also stepped beyond its sphere and broke down likewise. The criticism of Aristophanes probably hit the truth exactly both in a moral and in a poetical point of view; but poetry influences the course of history not in proportion to its absolute value, but in proportion as it is able to forecast the spirit of the age, and in this respect Euripides was unsurpassed.** And thus it happened, that Alexander read him diligently; that Aristotle developed the idea of the tragic poet with special reference to him; that the latest poetic and plastic art in Attica as it were originated from him **(for the new Attic comedy did nothing but transfer Euripides into a comic form, and the school of painters which we meet with in the designs of the later vases derived its subjects no longer from the old epics, but from the Euripidean tragedy);** and lastly that, **the more the old Hellas gave place to the new Hellenism, the more the fame and influence of the poet increased,** and Greek life abroad, in Egypt as well as in Rome, was directly or indirectly moulded in the main by Euripides.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n451/mode/2up?view=theater

From this point of view, we shall form a juster judgment of the Hellenistic literature, and particularly of the poetry, of the Romans of this period. **If it tended to transplant the radicalism of Euripides to Rome, to resolve the gods either into deceased men or into mental conceptions, to place a denationalized Latium by the side of a denationalized Hellas, and to reduce all purely and distinctly developed national peculiarities to the problematic notion of general civilization,**

every one is at liberty to find this tendency pleasing or disagreeable, but none can doubt its historical necessity. From this point of view the very defectiveness of the Roman poetry, which cannot be denied, may be explained and so may in some degree be justified. It is no doubt pervaded by a disproportion between the trivial and often bungled contents and the comparatively finished form; but the real significance of this poetry lay precisely in its formal features, especially those of language and metre. It was not seemly that poetry in Rome was principally in the hands of schoolmasters and foreigners and was chiefly translation or imitation; but, **if the primary object of poetry was simply to form a bridge from Latium to Hellas, Livius and Ennius had certainly a vocation to the poetical pontificate in Rome, and a translated literature was the simplest means to the end.** It was still less seemly that Roman poetry preferred to lay its hands on the most worn-out and trivial originals; but in this view it was appropriate. **No one will desire to place the poetry of Euripides on a level with that of Homer; but, historically viewed, Euripides and Menander were quite as much the oracles of cosmopolitan Hellenism as the Iliad and Odyssey were the oracles of national Hellenism,** and in so far the representatives of the new school had good reason for introducing their audience especially to this cycle of literature. The instinctive consciousness also of their limited poetical powers may partly have induced the Roman composers to keep mainly by Euripides and Menander and to leave Sophocles and even Aristophanes untouched; for, **while poetry is essentially national and difficult to transplant, intellect and wit, on which the poetry of Euripides as well as of Menander is based, are in their very nature cosmopolitan.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n159/mode/2up?view=theater

Tragedy flourished for just so long as it was inspired by the spirit of the Folk, and as this spirit was a veritably popular, *i.e.* a *communal* one. When the national brotherhood of the Folk was shivered into fragments, when the common bond of its Religion and primeval Customs was pierced and severed by the sophist needles of the egoistic spirit of Athenian self-dissection,—then the Folk's art-work also ceased: then did the professors and the doctors of the literary guilds take heritage of the ruins of the fallen edifice, and delved among its beams and stones; to pry, to ponder, and to re-arrange its members.

https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phil_babich

Now “Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo; and Apollo, finally, the language of Dionysus“ (21, 130/140). In short, after these “glorious experiences” (22, 132/142) of viewing tragedy, anyone who “does not feel that he is above the pathological-moral process, should despair of his aesthetic nature” (22, 133/142). **Aristotle and Lessing, naturally, did not understand tragedy: Mr. N does.**
…

In the end, Euripides himself turns out to be a mask (12, 82/83). Through him the new god, Socrates, speaks. In this old, corny fairy tale of the relationship between those two men, Mr. N thinks he has found the solution for the many mysteries posed by Euripides’s poetry, and perhaps even more so, by his character. **Mr. N’s actual reason for associating those two men is the burning hatred he feels toward both of them.** The means for venting this hatred do not embarrass him; he is happy with any means. For the most part, the poet Euripides—**as dear and familiar to antiquity as was Homer**—has had to forfeit his fame. This is partly justified, and partly because his flaws are more obvious to us than his positive qualities. Many a harsh judgment has been passed upon him (particularly following A.W. Schlegel). **But how can Mr. N have the nerve to claim that Euripides “has been … changed into a dragon by the art critics of all ages?”** (12, 82/83) **Are Aristotle and Quintilian, Lessing, Goethe, and Tieck no critics of art?**
…

But let us return to the mask of Socrates, to this association which rests on only a few comic verses which prove nothing,39 **a tradition consisting only of anecdotes, which, although only of value to the literary historians of gossip, obstruct the entire tradition of personal histories of antiquity.**40 **Then, he invents some silly saying of the oracle.**41 Now, it is not surprising that, to my knowledge, nobody has yet taken the trouble to fully refute this association. Joining the sophistic tragedian with the great sophist seemed so natural.42 It suggested itself to future generations to relate the two most popular figures of the time, both from the same city, on a personal level—especially because the comic tradition seemed to confirm this connection. But it is not too difficult to see through this mistake. **Socrates was fourteen years old when Euripides’s first play was performed.** The remains of the *Peliades* demonstrate that his style was at least as close to the style of *Medea* as *Medea*’s was to the style of the *Phoenician Women*. **The importance of Socrates cannot be proven for the time before Pericles’s death.**43 Euripides’s most important and deepest creations, such as *Medea*, *Hippolytus*, *Aiolos*, and *Bellerophontes*, *Ion*, and *Telephus* all predate this. It can be shown, then, that the declining care in the construction of the verse form, which has long been known, extended to the entire structure and even to the task in general. **Furthermore, if there were any truth to this relationship, especially to the oracle, the Socratics should have known about it. But both Plato and Xenophon nearly ignore Euripides, or else pay him no special note.** The melancholic and resigned poet, the willing student of the Sophists, could not arouse any sympathy in [Plato], the Homer

of philosophy who happened to be their most bitter critic.44 The main point, though, is that we should be able to trace Socratic influences in Euripides' worldview (as can be shown with the teachings of Anaxagoras and Protagoras or with reminiscences of what he read—he was, after all, the first book collector).45 But this is not the case. Mr. N of course boldly claims that Euripides admits to the Socratic principle that virtue is knowledge. But Mr. N does not know Euripides. For even if Euripides at one point, like Protagoras, puts forward the tenet of the teachability of virtue,46 the frequency of omissions in this regard guarantees that he assumed that every man brings into this world an unchangeable, natural predisposition47 (a view also more worthy of the great tragic poet). Tragic actions develop necessarily out of these collisions between—one might say—the personal predestinations of the characters. This view also renders it self-evident why man's striving and wrongdoing, erring and atoning, seemed hopeless and without consolation to Euripides. **And, as far as the Socratic tenet goes, Euripides expresses the exact opposite idea. After deep brooding, Phaedra claims that the misery of this world results from knowing what is right but not doing it,**48 **which is precisely the Christian view that "the mind is willing but the flesh weak."** One might reasonably assert that it is exactly this disrupted harmony between wanting and doing which he brought to the stage through his characters, his all-too-truthful characters. Try as they might, in a wild rage of passion, of love as well as of hate, to break all boundaries, in the end they learn the vanity of their striving and because of it, fade away; **they fight the same hopeless, destructive battle of the individual against the basic laws of nature and tradition, in particular regarding the relationship between the sexes.** Yes, anyone who wishes to go further could even feel tempted to recognize in this disharmony between wanting and doing the actual core, also the worm in the core, of the entire poetical nature of Euripides himself. Everything the poet wanted and knew contrasted with and was overshadowed by Aeschylean glory, by the eternally cheerful amiability of Sophocles, in harmony with himself and the whole world. **But it is not my goal to explain Euripides; I just want to show that Mr. N did not understand him and that he did not make any effort to do so either.**
…

Euripides's basic principle is allegedly that "to be beautiful everything must be intelligible." (12, 83/85) But concluding from what I just said, **he often enough acknowledged bad deeds which Socrates, as we know, denied.**50 Allegedly, it was Euripides who killed myth while actually, like no other, it was he who defined the form of myth for generations to come. **It was through him that some of the most familiar and most moving myths became part of literature and of people's general consciousness.**51
…

Mr. N's way of dealing with Sophocles is too amusing. He does not dare to condemn him but he also does not know how to hide how little he likes him. He admits that Sophocles took the first step to destroy the chorus (BT 14). Apart from this, the already well known art of silence has to suffice,52 e.g., when Euripides's characterization of Odysseus is fiercely rebuked, the even less favorable portrait in *Philoctetes* is ignored.

https://grbs.library.duke.edu/article/viewFile/4871/5431

Thanks to more than a hundred years of concentrated effort on the part of editors, literary critics, translators, and stage producers, the work of Euripides is nowadays perhaps more easily accessible and more widely appreciated than that of either Aeschylus or Sophocles. **The modern rediscovery and revival of Euripides that began during the last quarter of the nineteenth century achieved full momentum only after the traumatic experience of World War I.** Since then the vindication of Euripides has been so successful, and his place as an ancient playwright who appeals more directly to modern sensibilities than his predecessors has been so universally accepted, that it is easy to lose sight of an earlier period, ca 1800 to 1880, when his plays were distinctly less popular and when critical appreciation of them was on the whole inadequate.
…

The negative *Euripidesbild* created by Aristophanes and reinforced by the younger Schlegel pointed the way for the more painstaking and damaging criticism of the poet by August Wilhelm **in his celebrated Vienna lectures of 1808 (published in 1809), which inaugurated, in Ernst Behler's apt phrase, the nineteenth century's *damnatio* of Euripides.**17 The verdict pronounced in these lectures prejudiced the entire world of European letters against the poet. Nietzsche was no exception.
…

When [Nietzsche] entered the elite boarding school of Schulpforte in the fall of 1858, the modern depreciation of Euripides that began in Germany with Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and culminated in the Schlegels had attained the status of absolute academic orthodoxy. Two generations of schoolmasters and university professors had managed to deprive August Wilhelm's verdict of its finer, more conciliatory touches and to reduce it to a crude catalogue of the poet's worst sins against dramatic convention and good taste. The list is long and tedious, and it mixes half-truths with truisms. It blames Euripides for his realism, his rationalism, and his love of rhetoric; for

tendentiousness, sentimentality, theatricality, and indifference to dramatic unity; for irreligiosity and immorality; for his distance from Aeschylus and Sophocles and his affinity with New Comedy.
…

The proscription of Euripides was by no means confined to Germany. The prevailing attitude in England in the late 1870's is vividly illustrated in an episode recalled by Jane Harrison, then an avant-garde student at Newnham Hall, Cambridge. There she reluctantly met William Ewart Gladstone, once and future Prime Minister and one of the most prolific Homerists of the Victorian age, and provoked him with her progressive views on Greek literature: **"He sat down and asked me who was my favourite Greek author. Tact counselled Homer, but I was perverse and not quite truthful, so I said 'Euripides'. Aeschylus would have been creditable, Sophocles respectable, but the sceptic Euripides! It was too much, and with a few words of warning he withdrew."**23

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n455/mode/2up?view=theater

But it would be foolish to judge Euripides chiefly as a playwright; his ruling interest is not dramatic technique but philosophical inquiry and political reform. **He is the son of the Sophists, the poet of the Enlightenment, the representative of the radical younger generation that laughed at the old myths, flirted with socialism, and called for a new social order in which there should be less exploitation of man by man, of women by men, and of all by the state.** It is for these rebel souls that Euripides writes; for them he adds his skeptical innuendoes, and inserts a thousand heresies between the lines of supposedly religious plays. **He covers his tracks with pious passages and patriotic odes; he presents a sacred myth so literally that its absurdity is manifest and yet his orthodoxy cannot be impeached; he gives the body of his plays over to doubt, but surrenders the first and last words to the gods.** His subtlety and brilliance, like those of the French Encyclopedists, is due in some part to the compulsion laid upon him to speak his mind while saving his skin.
…

Almost alone among the great writers of his time he dares to attack slavery; during the Peloponnesian War it became obvious that most slaves were such not by nature but by the accidents of life. **He does not recognize any natural aristocracy; environment rather than heredity makes the man. The slaves in his dramas play important parts, and often speak his finest lines.**
…

He does not clearly tell us what his belief is, perhaps because he feels that the evidence does not lend itself to clear belief; **but his most characteristic expressions are those of the vague pantheism that was now replacing polytheism among the educated Greeks.**
…

After his death he achieved popularity even in Athens. **The ideas for which he had fought became the dominant conceptions of the following centuries, and the Hellenistic age looked back to him and to Socrates as the greatest intellectual stimuli that Greece had ever known.** He had dealt with living problems rather than "dead tales of minstrelsy," and it took the ancient world a long time to forget him. **The plays of his predecessors slipped into oblivion while his own were repeated in every year, and wherever the Greek world had a stage.** When, in the collapse of that expedition to Syracuse (415) whose failure had been forecast in *The Trojan Women,* the captive Athenians faced a living death as chained slaves in the quarries of Sicily, those were given their freedom (Plutarch tells us) who could recite passages from the plays of Euripides.[123] The New Comedy molded itself upon his dramas, and grew out of them; one of its leaders, Philemon, said, "If I were sure that the dead have consciousness, I would hang myself to see Euripides."[124] **The revival of skepticism, liberalism, and humanitarianism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made Euripides almost a contemporary figure, more modern than Shakespeare.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0110%3Acard%3D836

There is one thing in slavery that brings shame, [855] **the name; in all other respects a good slave is no worse than the free-born.**

https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_25_3_02_baumgarth.pdf

Pheidippides gets his father to admit that he beat his son during his childhood for his son's own good: he was wiser than the child. Currently, however, Pheidippides is wiser than his dad, whose elderly status constitutes a second childhood (1414-418). **Such wisdom gives the son the natural right to punish the father for his own good, to correct his ignorance.**
…

Call to mind, again, what event initiated Pheidippides's beating of his father: **it was Pheidippides's attempt to prove the superiority of Euripides over Aeschylus by way of citing a passage from the former poet that involved incest between a brother and his sister.** Given that context,

Strepsiades's thought moves in an alarming direction from the justification of mother beating: **the barnyard birds not only assault their parents but also mate with them and with their siblings.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0241%3Acard%3D1399

Phid. **Was it not then a man like you and me, who first proposed this law, and by speaking persuaded the ancients? Why then is it less lawful for me also in turn to propose henceforth a new law for the sons, that they should beat their fathers in turn?** But as many blows as we received before the law was made, we remit: and we concede to them our having been thrashed without return. **Observe the cocks and these other animals, how they punish their fathers; and yet, in what do they differ from us, except that they do not write decrees?**
…

Strep. Since I am justly entitled to chastise you; and you to chastise your son, if you should have one.

Phid. But if I should not have one, I shall have wept for nothing, and you will die laughing at me.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA135#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although a "small" part of art is connected to nature, according to the Athenian Stranger's rehearsal of the ontology of the motion-men, the realm of convention including justice, piety, and moderation has no basis in nature as an underlying matrix of origination at all. Nature as origination does well up *into* the realm of *nomos*, however. Each city evolves from its unique and unfathomable origins in local "motions" to embody its own special "way." **The realm of convention is "authoritative" (*kurios*) for as long as it lasts. In other words, although motions issue out of chance, whatever settled form they eventually achieve must exist according to necessity, because it cannot be other than it is until the temporary concatenation of motions making it up dissolve back into the flux of becoming.**23 The city's way is authoritative while it lasts, because no conventional view of justice can be transcended in the direction of the eternal and universal truth, inasmuch as justice possesses a wholly phenomenal and local existence confined to the realm of temporal mutability. Accordingly, as Socrates has Protagoras put it in the *Theaetetus*, the characterization of a city's way of life including its view of morality is not "true" – because the truth about nature is that "nothing is" – but an assessment of that way of life can be "correct," inasmuch as it is rooted in that city's unique historical way of life. As as advisor (like Protagoras was to Pericles), the Sophist can help a city better and more clearly pursue is own given way, whatever that has turned out to be.24

> 24. Dodds translates *nomos* as "the conglomerate," a web of interlocking social, religious, legal, and customary prohibitions against vice and impiety. **He also argues that not only those whom we now term the Sophists but the earlier natural philosophers and cosmologists including Heracleitus had been deeply subversive of traditional and conventional morality.** Dodds (1984) pp. 21ff.

Some of the motion-men such as Protagoras tried to defend the realm of convention by arguing that, precisely because its natural underpinnings are in violent strife, we should cling all the more dearly to whatever bulwark of order the city has achieved over time (this is the implication of his myth in the *Protagoras* [320c-323c]). As a fragment attributed to Antiphon put it: "nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy. Hence our forefathers instilled obedience into their children, so that when they grow up they might not be overcome by any great change of fortune (61)." **Others, however, used the primordialist ontology as the basis for a direct assault on all conventional morality in the name of selfish individualism and, taken to its logical extreme, tyranny.** According to the Athenian Stranger, the most consistent implication of the view of nature as motion is indeed the praise of "getting the better" of others as the only truly natural way of life.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA373#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Heracleitean belief that permanence was a mere shell or husk temporarily masking a more profound mutability led, in Plato's and Aristotle's judgment, to the belief that the passions are the part of human life corresponding to the great motions that underlie and generate the visible world and that their limitless gratification constitutes the only natural way to live. Not surprisingly, Machiavelli does return in part to this pre-Socratic and Sophistical view. But he does not merely return to it. The pre-Socratics and Sophists had argued that this primordialist ontology rendered pointless any attempt to account for intrinsic ethical or rational distinctions among the visible, completed forms of constitutions. As Thrasymachus puts it in his general definition of government, behind the façade of the various constitutions, the ruling element pursues its own advantage and designates this as just, gulling the ruled into going along with it. **"Justice" is universally "the advantage of the stronger": the specific regime principles themselves are mere accidental local coloration and custom. At bottom, the pre-Socratics and Sophists think, the natural life of "getting the better" can be lived without any instrinsic connection to the kind of constitution. One can get along in a democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, or what have you**

by aping the local customs and taking advantage of others where one can safely get away with it. The only political way of life that is in complete harmony with nature is that of the tyrant, which for Plato and Aristotle amounts to the destruction of all politics as shared rule or as rule with an ethical responsibility toward the souls of the ruled. **As a kind of antipolitics, tyranny is simply the nature of man as it was understood by the Sophists showing itself openly in its pure individuated selfishness.**

It is important to note that the Sophists' indifference to the distinctions among regimes is not Machiavelli's view. **Although he does not account for distinctions among kinds of governments on the same basis as Plato or Aristotle, he is far from regarding those distinctions as unimportant. Whereas the Sophists avoided this type of debate over the classification of regimes on the grounds that they were all merely conventional, and therefore equally arbitrary,** Machiavelli immerses himself in it as fully as Plato, Aristotle, or Polybius. He regards certain kinds of constitutions as being very much preferable to others, **for he does not believe it is possible for human nature to achieve "virtue" in his much modified sense of the term in pure isolation from other people in a political association.** Machiavelli is in this sense very much a "classical" thinker and not at all a "pre-Socratic."
…

I would argue that, as a consequence, **from Machiavelli's viewpoint, Socrates was correct when he argued to Gorgias that, far from being a mere kaleidoscope of arbitrary local conventions and a trick-bag of rhetorical manipulations, *politike* was a genuine science to which rhetoric was merely subordinate (*Gorgias* 463). The residue of this Platonic elevation of the art of ruling to rigorous knowledge lurks in Machiavelli's conversion of statecraft to the effective and methodical employment of the will.** Whereas Plato saw in the claims of *politike* to genuine knowledge an intimation of the objectively enduring cosmic mind that linked the soul to the wider world, Machiavelli converts statesmanship into a rational project for the imposition of order, organization, and control on a refractory nature. Rightly from Machiavelli's perspective, **Plato and Aristotle had argued that the Sophists could not address the sources of disorder in political life because they identified human excellence with isolated self-preservation and pleasure,** abstracting human nature from the whole welter of relations among citizens and between ruler and ruled. Machiavelli would agree with the classics that the pre-Socratics strayed too far from observable political reality, that they set up too simplistic a dichotomy between nature and convention, when in truth – as Socrates tried to convince Callicles – human nature is so constituted as to find its own prospect for satisfaction in and through convention, through cooperation with others; **that indeed the specific *politeia* under which a man lives, or aspires to live, will be mirrored in his very soul** (*Gorgias* 513).
…

There is a return here to one of the crucial arguments with which Socrates sought to persuade Callicles and Glaucon of the inadequacy of the Sophists' account of justice as a compact made by naturally selfish individuals. **Unlike Antiphon and some of the Sophists who, like Hobbes later, believed that all people are motivated by self-preservation, Callicles and Glaucon (like other of the Sophists and their followers) tended to supplement this unedifying version of the social contract by stressing an important exception to it. They focus on the few "real men" (*andres*) who would have never agreed to it in the first place,** preferring always to rule than be ruled and willing to court the consequent dangers (*Gorgias* 483; *Republic* 359a-c). We have observed in earlier chapters that the Sophists were hampered in giving a fully persuasive account of the qualities of soul that would characterize such a person, the natural master who is noble by nature rather than by convention. Because of their dichotomous distinction between human nature as motivated by prepolitical drives for survival, power and pleasure, and convention as uniformly artificial and unconnected with any natural need, the Sophists had little basis on which to account for the observable qualities and psychological subtleties of superior statesmanship in the world around them. **They admired power, but they tended to depict it in crude subpolitical terms: in Callicles' speech, the natural master is rather like a petty thief, a stealer of cattle, except that he carries off his thefts on a grand scale.** Only an understanding of everyday observable politics – its laws, its customs, its education, and the kinds of human character its principle of justice solicits – can explain how this crude Herculean master could evolve into a subtle and sophisticated ruler like Pericles.

By making the city prior to the individual and by arguing that, contrary to the Sophists, we cannot understand the nature of the individual until we understand the soul "writ large" as the city, Socrates can provide this psychological account of leadership in a far more compelling way than can the Sophists. Callicles and Glaucon are both drawn to tyranny, certainly to being the leading statesman. **But they want such political mastery to entail the noble and admirable qualities of a fully developed and civilized character – skill at governing, generosity to friends, a degree of philosophical cultivation, an exposure to the fine arts, cultivated conversation, and the merited admiration of their fellow citizens or subjects for doing large and good things for their country.** This erotic longing to find a naturally satisfying way of life *within* fully evolved conventional political existence, a way of life that unifies and consummates the talents and virtues solicited by conventional political life, is

what Socrates plays upon. He wants to convince them that, instead of seeing convention as an antonym for nature, a realm of primitive passions and conflict standing across a gulf from an evolved city, they should join Socrates in searching for a specific set of conventions that in contrast to defective sets, allows human nature to fulfill itself *within* the *politeia* in a way that it never could in the subpolitical state of nature.

https://archive.org/details/memoirsrecollect01sg/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

> Such was, however, the blindness of princes and of the great: **they had favored the progress of knowledge, and required a passive obedience, that can only exist in a state of ignorance. They wished to enjoy all the luxeries provided for them by civilization and arts, and would not suffer learned men, artists, or enlightened plebeians, to emerge from a condition bordering upon slavery.** They imagined, in short, what was quite impossible, that the light of reason could spread its brilliancy without dispelling the clouds of prejudices originating in ages of barbarism.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA408#v=onepage&q&f=false

According to the Sophists, one can react to the meaning of nature as chance by 1) private vice and the manipulation of convention through rhetoric to create a public appearance of virtue, 2) the defense of convention as a bulwark against the chaos of the state of nature, or 3) embracing tyranny as the most natural way of life. But because the Sophists tend to see nature as the upsurge of spontaneous motions, they doubt that it can be methodically controlled on the political level. Those who claim that it can run into difficulties. **Hence, for example, Thrasymachus's search for a *techne* of injustice is frustrated by Socrates' demonstration that *techne* is self-forgetting, not self-aggrandizing, and leads to order, harmony, and beneficence.** Protagoras, more insightful, doubts that statecraft is rigorous knowledge at all, seeing it as more akin to a local "way," like picking up a language, analogous perhaps to Burkean "prejudice."

Machiavelli is after much bigger stakes than any of these varieties of ancient conventionalism. In his new science of politics, the disorder of nature is the *source* of political power, stability, and rationality. It can be tapped and channeled by correctly designed institutions. **By imitating the impetuosity of Fortuna, we can gain methodical control over "her" reverses by anticipating them, preempting them and fighting back.** It is the belief in fixed conventions – in political order – that leads to decay, chaos, and weakness and does not, as Protagoras maintained, act as a bulwark against them. **So chance (*tuche*) does not have to be fenced off or concealed under a rhetorical guise that preserves *nomos*. Instead, Machiavelli says: Let chance in; let selective spurts of chaos invigorate and set in motion the levers of power. Statecraft will be more methodical and more consistent if we allow politics to be empowered by disorder.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Marx,_Heinrich_Karl

> In the same year as Darwin's epoch-making work on the origin of species there appeared also Marx's work *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, where he explains in concise sentences in the preface **that philosophy of history which has for the theory of the transformation or evolution of social organisms the same significance that the argument of Darwin had for the theory of the transformation of biological organisms.**

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf

> Unquestionably, there is a religious element in Marxism. But to classify him as an Old Testament prophetic figure is to miss the essential nature of the Marxist message. ***What Marxism represents is a secular throwback to the chaos cults of the ancient world*, and not a modern school of the prophets.**
> ...
>
> **Marx *did* share with the ancients a belief in a past Golden Age, as we have seen; at some point in man's history, albeit a primitive culture, man's world was without alienation.** The coming age will be superior, of course, because mankind will also control the former chaos of the environment around him. In his posthumously published manuscripts, *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1857-58), Marx sketched some of his ideas on the primitive communal social structure, **and as E. J. Hobsbawm has pointed out, Marx's own interests after the publication of *Capital* (1867) were "overwhelmingly concerned with this stage of social development. ..."**142 Engels shared Marx's interest, and he also pictured a primitive Golden Age in his *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884).143

https://www.iep.utm.edu/protagor/#SH3c

Although Protagoras himself seemed to respect, and even revere the customs of human justice (as a great achievement), some of the younger followers of Protagoras and the other Older Sophists concluded that the arbitrary nature of human laws and customs implies that they can be ignored at will, a position that was held to be one of the causes of the notorious amorality of such figures as Alcibiades.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D1%3Acard%3D206

But the son of Peleus again addressed with violent words the son of Atreus, and in no way ceased from his wrath: “Heavy with wine, with the face of a dog but the heart of a deer, [225] never have you had courage to arm for battle along with your people, or go forth to an ambush with the chiefs of the Achaeans. That seems to you even as death. Indeed it is far better throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans to deprive of his prize whoever speaks contrary to you. [230] **People-devouring king, since you rule over nobodies; else, son of Atreus, this would be your last piece of insolence.** But I will speak out to you, and will swear thereto a mighty oath: by this staff, that shall never more put forth leaves or shoots since first it left its stump among the mountains, [235] nor shall it again grow green, for the bronze has stripped it on all sides of leaves and bark, and now the sons of the Achaeans carry it in their hands when they act as judges, those who guard the ordinances that come from Zeus; and this shall be for you a mighty oath. **Surely some day a longing for Achilles will come upon the sons of the Achaeans** [240] **one and all, and on that day you will not be able to help them at all, for all your grief, when many shall fall dying before man-slaying Hector.** But you will gnaw the heart within you, in anger that you did no honour to the best of the Achaeans.”

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D22%3Acard%3D1

Then with a mighty burst of anger spake to him swift-footed Achilles: [15] “Thou hast foiled me, thou god that workest afar, most cruel of all gods in that thou hast now turned me hither from the wall; else had many a man yet bitten the ground or ever they came into Ilios. **Now hast thou robbed me of great glory, aud them hast thou saved full easily, seeing thou hadst no fear of vengeance in the aftertime.** [20] **Verily I would avenge me on thee, had I but the power.**”

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n247/mode/2up?view=theater

And as for glory, this same Achilles, because of a personal grievance, (Agamemnon having wrongfully taken his Briseis from him), **considers himself badly treated by gods and men alike,** demands of Jove that he be restored to honor, withdraws his men from the allied army and his ships from the fleet, and allows Hector to make a slaughter of the Greeks. **Thus in defiance of the devotion that a man owes his fatherland he insists on avenging a personal offense by the ruin of his entire nation.** Indeed, he is not ashamed to rejoice with Patroclus over Hector’s slaughter of the Greeks, and, what is much graver, this man who carries in his heels the fate of Troy expresses the disgraceful wish to Patroclus that all, Greeks and Trojans alike, may die in the war, leaving only the two of them alive.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D16%3Acard%3D74
>
> For I would, O father Zeus, and Athene, and Apollo, **that no man of the Trojans might escape death, of all that there are, neither any of the Argives, but that we twain might escape destruction,** [100] **that alone we might loose the sacred diadem of Troy.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA135#v=onepage&q&f=false

Tyrtaeus’s debt to Homer was enormous. That much is obvious from his diction alone. But despite all that he owed to his great predecessor, the Spartan poet rejected the Homeric precedent and radically altered the heroic ethic. **Tyrtaeus did not glorify that Achilles who had valued his own honor above the interest of the Achaean host;** nor did he celebrate the exploits of Odysseus “the man of many ways” who wandered through “the cities of many men and learned their minds.” **He heaped praise not on the great individual who sought “to be the best and to excel all others,”** but on the citizen who never traveled abroad except on campaign and who fought gamely alongside his companions in the city’s hoplite phalanx.99

https://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2018/05/alcibiades-in-the-shadow-of-achilles-david-stuttard.html

Even from childhood, he seems to have been motivated not by contemporary values of *demokratia* (literally ‘People Power’) but by the creed of the Homeric heroes whose blood pumped in his veins, **the creed that urged them ‘*aien aristeuein kai hupeirochon emmenai allon*’, ‘always to be best and to surpass all others’.** Now, the most famous of all the Greek heroes, whose father sent him off to Troy with these very words, was not in fact one of Alcibiades’ supposed ancestors. It was Achilles, and what

I'd like to do in this talk is not simply give a potted biography of Alcibiades, but rather to explore how Alcibiades did everything he could to live up to Achilles' creed, and how—in doing so—**he set himself on a path that would see him not only mirroring or surpassing many of Achilles' triumphs but repeating many of the Homeric hero's mistakes.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0176%3Atext%3DAlc.%201%3Asection%3D105a

For I believe, if some god should ask you: "Alcibiades, do you prefer to live with your present possessions, or to die immediately if you are not to have the chance of acquiring greater things?" I believe you would choose to die. But let me tell you what I imagine must be the present hope of your life. You think that if you come shortly before the Athenian Assembly—which [105b] you expect to occur in a very few days—**you will stand forth and prove to the people that you are more worthy of honor than either Pericles or anyone else who has ever existed,** and that having proved this you will have the greatest power in the state; and that if you are the greatest here, you will be the same among all the other Greeks, and not only Greeks, but all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if that same god should say to you again, that you are to hold sway here in Europe, [105c] but are not to be allowed to cross over into Asia and to interfere with the affairs of that region, I believe you would be equally loth to live on those sole conditions either—**if you are not to fill, one may say, the whole world with your name and your power; and I fancy that, except Cyrus and Xerxes, you think there has never existed a single man who was of any account.** So then that this is your hope, I know well enough; I am not merely guessing.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Nicias*.html#ref45
>
> Before the assembly had met at all, **Alcibiades had already corrupted the multitude and got them into his power by means of his sanguine promises,** so that the youth in their training-schools and the old men in their work-shops and lounging-places would sit in clusters drawing maps of Sicily, charts of the sea about it, and plans of the harbours and districts of the island which look towards Libya. 2 **For they did not regard Sicily itself as the prize of the war, but rather as a mere base of operations, purposing therefrom to wage a contest with the Carthaginians and get possession of both Libya and of all the sea this side the Pillars of Heracles.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA48#v=onepage&q&f=false

In Aristophanes' parody of their relationship in the *Clouds*, Pheidippides, the Alcibiades stand-in, begins, prior to any exposure to the "sophist" Socrates, as an unthinking libertine and spoiled rich kid. **Once exposed to Socrates, when he reemerges from the "thinkery" (*phrontisterion*) of Socrates' pale-faced crew, he begins to justify his vices with the theoretical language of the distinction between nature and convention, thereby suggesting the possibility that the Aristophanean Socrates may have deepened Pheidippides' corruption by giving it a philosophical basis.** The Platonic Socrates' first encounter with Alcibiades contains a kindred ambiguity. **Socrates prods Alcibiades into confessing that he has a passion to rule not merely in Athens but over the whole world** (104-105). But it is not clear how precisely or self-consciously the youth had formed this ambition for himself beforehand.20 Socrates wants to expand the horizons of the promising young aristocrat beyond Athens, using the two paradigmatic and superior regimes of Sparta and Persia to convince Alcibiades that he needs to make a study of the art of ruling, inasmuch as they embody the best republic and the best monarchy, respectively (121-124). **But by stimulating Alcibiades' ambition to soar above the local level to the universal so as to engage him in pursuing knowledge about the whole, including or through the medium of *politike*, it is not inconceivable that Alcibiades retained the global ambition to which Socrates inspired him without fully cultivating the longing for universally valid knowledge which Socrates hoped would be its final aim,** just as in Diotima's Ladder, the longing for immortality through political honor is the way station to the philosophic life.
…

Alcibiades' lament decades later in the *Symposium* that he wants Socrates when he courts the Demos and wants the Demos when he is with Socrates may be in part self-serving, presenting as an agonizing and tragically moving failure what in fact is his own strong preference for politics over philosophy. **But it may also suggest that the universality of Athenian imperialism, whose main exponent he was – according to Thucydides, after Sicily he planned to conquer Carthage, telling the people that there was no natural limit on their empire (6.18.5-16) – substituted for the universality of philosophy's search for wisdom that was only partially successfully implanted by Socrates in his soul.** If so, Socrates may have soured both alternatives for Alcibiades, dooming him to act on his stronger impulses for political action while cursed with knowing that life to be second rate.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA247#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 100. Cf. Hom. *Il*. 6.208 and 9.443 with *Od*. 11.488-91: **in the story which he tells Alcinous, Odysseus represents Achilles as having repudiated after death the heroic ethic by which he was guided in life.** Achilles reportedly said that he would prefer the indignity of being a thete on earth – even a thete forced to serve a man so poor that he lacked an estate – to the privilege of being king over the dead.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D3%3Asection%3D386b

"And again if he believes in the reality of the underworld and its terrors,[1] do you think that any man will be fearless of death and in battle will prefer death to defeat and slavery?" "By no means." "Then it seems we must exercise supervision[2] also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, [386c] **since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors.**" "Yes, we must," he said. "Then," said I, **"beginning with this verse we will expunge everything of the same kind:**

> "Liefer were I in the fields up above to be serf to another
> Tiller of some poor plot which yields him a scanty subsistence,
> Than to be ruler and king over all the dead who have perished,

https://wikirouge.net/texts/en/Letter_to_Karl_Marx,_November_19,_1844

This egoism is simply the essence of present society and present man brought to consciousness, the ultimate that can be said against us by present society, the culmination of all the theory intrinsic to the prevailing stupidity. But that's precisely what makes the thing important, more important than Hess, for one, holds it to be. We must not simply cast it aside, but rather use it as the perfect expression of present-day folly **and, while inverting it, continue to build on it. This egoism is taken to such a pitch, it is so absurd and at the same time so self-aware, that it cannot maintain itself even for an instant in its one-sidedness, but must immediately change into communism.** In the first place it's a simple matter to prove to Stirner that his egoistic man is bound to become communist out of sheer egoism. That's the way to answer the fellow.

In the second place he must be told that in its egoism the human heart is of itself, from the very outset, unselfish and self-sacrificing, so that he finally ends up with what he is combating. These few platitudes will suffice to refute the one-sidedness. But we must also adopt such truth as there is in the principle. And it is certainly true that we must first make a cause our own, egoistic cause, before we can do anything to further it – **and hence that in this sense, irrespective of any eventual material aspirations, we are communists out of egoism also, and it is out of egoism that we wish to be human beings, not mere individuals.**

> https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
>
> [So if], through paying attention to the arguments of Aristippus, we take care of the body, [choosing] all the pleasure derived from drink, food and [sexual acts] and indeed absolutely all the things which no longer [give enjoyment after the happening], **but neglect the soul, we shall deprive ourselves of the greatest pleasures.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA35#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nor can such an outlook be found in Aristippus. There is, in fact, no indication that he was interested in political problems at all. Yet he was a devotee of personal liberty. **He reportedly argued that, lying between the alternatives of slavery and rule, there was a middle path of freedom (*eleuthería*) – of freedom from the agony of servitude and from the burdens of political participation as well.** "Not for a moment do I place myself in the ranks of those wishing to rule," Aristippus remarks.

> For, in light of the great effort required to provide for oneself, it seems to me be the height of folly not to be satisfied with this, but to take on as well the additional burden of making provision for the needs of the other citizens. How would it not be great folly for a man to give up many of the things that he wants and to incur, as head (*prostátēs*) of the city, the danger of trial if he fails to accomplish all that the city wishes? **The cities think it proper to make use of their rulers just as I make use of my household slaves.** For I think proper for my servants to equip me in abundance with those things I need, but not themselves to lay hands on anything; and the cities think it necessary for their rulers to provide them with as many good things as possible and to abstain themselves from their enjoyment. Should there be those wishing to make trouble for themselves and for others, I would educate them and

> class them with those fitted to rule. But I would rank myself with those wishing to live as easily and as pleasantly as possible.

Socrates found this argument unsatisfactory. It would be fine, he retorts, if one encountered no human beings on the path intermediate between slavery and rule. The strong, he warns, have a way of enslaving those who abstain from political life. **For Aristippus, however, the danger of enslavement was not a serious problem: "To avoid it," he explains, "I do not lock myself up in my own city, but am a stranger (*xénos*) everywhere."** When Socrates responds that the *xénos* is, in all cities, an easy mark with little chance of defending himself, Aristippus shifts his ground, tacitly acknowledging that the middle path of liberty is an illusion. **He is apparently unaware that the polity itself can be refashioned to provide for the needs of those "wishing to live as easily and as pleasantly as possible."** Many centuries would pass before the invention of "a new science of politics" aimed solely at the protection of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
…

The way of life advocated by Xenophon's Socrates is by no means above reproach – **particularly in a world made safe for the likes of Aristippus.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_II#Aristippus

65. Aristippus was by birth a citizen of Cyrene and, as Aeschines informs us, was drawn to Athens by the fame of Socrates. **Having come forward as a lecturer or sophist, as Phanias of Eresus, the Peripatetic, informs us, he was the first of the followers of Socrates to charge fees and to send money to his master.** And on one occasion the sum of twenty minae which he had sent was returned to him, Socrates declaring that the supernatural sign would not let him take it; the very offer, in fact, annoyed him. **Xenophon was no friend to Aristippus; and for this reason he has made Socrates direct against Aristippus the discourse in which he denounces pleasure.**[63]
…

66. He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances. Hence he found more favour than anybody else with Dionysius, because he could always turn the situation to good account. **He derived pleasure from what was present, and did not toil to procure the enjoyment of something not present. Hence Diogenes called him the king's poodle.**[65]

> 65. **Or "royal cynic."** It is impossible to preserve the *double entendre* here, for κύων, dog, also means "cynic"; in fact the very name of that sect proclaims that they gloried in their dog-like attributes, especially in snarling and biting.

…

He bore with Dionysius when he spat on him, and to one who took him to task he replied, **"If the fishermen let themselves be drenched with sea-water in order to catch a gudgeon, ought I not to endure to be wetted with negus in order to take a blenny?"**

68. Diogenes, washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him passing and jeered at him in these terms, "If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings," to which his rejoinder was, "And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables." **Being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, "The ability to feel at ease in any society."**
…

Being once asked what advantage philosophers have, he replied, "Should all laws be repealed, we shall go on living as we do now."
…

71. It happened once that he set sail for Corinth and, being overtaken by a storm, he was in great consternation. Some one said, **"We plain men are not alarmed, and are you philosophers turned cowards?" To this he replied, "The lives at stake in the two cases are not comparable."**
…

Being asked on one occasion what is the difference between the wise man and the unwise, **"Strip them both," said he, "and send them among strangers and you will know."**
…

74. To one who accused him of living with a courtesan, he put the question, "Why, is there any difference between taking a house in which many people have lived before and taking one in which nobody has ever lived?" The answer being "No," he continued, "Or again, between sailing in a ship in which ten thousand persons have sailed before and in one in which nobody has ever sailed?" "There is no

difference." **"Then it makes no difference," said he, "whether the woman you live with has lived with many or with nobody."**
…

He enjoyed the favours of Laïs, as Sotion states in the second book of his *Successions of Philosophers*. 75. To those who censured him his defence was, "I have Lais, not she me; **and it is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being worsted.**" To one who reproached him with extravagance in catering, he replied, "Wouldn't you have bought this if you could have got it for three obols?" The answer being in the affirmative, "Very well, then," said Aristippus, **"I am no longer a lover of pleasure, it is you who are a lover of money."**
…

Those who went through the ordinary curriculum, but in their studies stopped short at philosophy, he used to compare to the suitors of Penelope. For the suitors won Melantho, Polydora and the rest of the handmaidens, but were anything but successful in their wooing of the mistress.
…

Someone accused him of exposing his son as if it was not his offspring. Whereupon he replied, **"Phlegm, too, and vermin we know to be of our own begetting, but for all that, because they are useless, we cast them as far from us as possible."**
…

The disciples of Aristippus were his daughter Arete, Aethiops of Ptolemais,[73] and Antipater of Cyrene. **The pupil of Arete was Aristippus, who went by the name of mother-taught, and his pupil was Theodorus, known as the atheist,** subsequently as "god."
…

Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, **and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another.** 87. The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work *On the Sects*, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end.
…

Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work *On the Sects*. For even if the action be irregular, still, at any rate, the resultant pleasure is desirable for its own sake and is good.
…

They assert that some people may fail to choose pleasure because their minds are perverted; **not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity.**
…

They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; **and they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility. But Meleager in his second book *On Philosophical Opinions*, and Clitomachus in his first book *On the Sects*, affirm that they maintain Dialectic as well as Physics to be useless, since, when one has learnt the theory of good and evil, it is possible to speak with propriety, to be free from superstition, and to escape the fear of death.** 93. **They also held that nothing is just or honourable or base by nature, but only by convention and custom. Nevertheless the good man will be deterred from wrong-doing by the penalties imposed and the prejudices that it would arouse.**
…

The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. **In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found.** 94. They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. 95. **Slavery and freedom,**

nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge.
…

Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled *Of the Gods* which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

98. Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his Successions of Philosophers. **He considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil,** the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain being intermediate to good and evil.
Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are self-sufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.

99. **He said the world was his country. Theft, adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these acts is by nature base, if once you have removed the prejudice against them, which is kept up in order to hold the foolish multitude together.** The wise man would indulge his passions openly without the least regard to circumstances. Hence he would use such arguments as this. "Is a woman who is skilled in grammar useful in so far as she is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." "And is a boy or a youth skilled in grammar useful in so far as he is skilled in grammar?" "Yes." 100. "Again, is a woman who is beautiful useful in so far as she is beautiful? And the use of beauty is to be enjoyed?" "Yes." When this was admitted, he would press the argument to the conclusion, namely, **that he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is useful does no wrong.** And by some such interrogatories he would carry his point.
…

101. However, Theodorus, sitting on one occasion beside Euryclides, the hierophant, began, "Tell me, Euryclides, who they are who violate the mysteries?" Euryclides replied, "Those who disclose them to the uninitiated." "Then you violate them," said Theodorus, "when you explain them to the uninitiated." **Yet he would hardly have escaped from being brought before the Areopagus if Demetrius of Phalerum had not rescued him.** And Amphicrates in his book *Upon Illustrious Men* says he was condemned to drink the hemlock.

102. For a while he stayed at the court of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and was once sent by him as ambassador to Lysimachus. And on this occasion his language was so bold that Lysimachus said, "Tell me, are you not the Theodorus who was banished from Athens?" To which he replied, "Your information is correct, for, when Athens could not bear me any more than Semele could Dionysus, she cast me out." And upon Lysimachus adding, "Take care you do not come here again," "I never will," said he, "unless Ptolemy sends me." **Mithras, the king's minister, standing by and saying, "It seems that you can ignore not only gods but kings as well," Theodorus replied, "How can you say that I ignore the gods when I regard you as hateful to the gods?"** He is said on one occasion in Corinth to have walked abroad with a numerous train of pupils, and Metrocles the Cynic, who was washing chervil, remarked, "You, sophist that you are, would not have wanted all these pupils if you had washed vegetables." Thereupon Theodorus retorted, "And you, if you had known how to associate with men, would have had no use for these vegetables." 103. A similar anecdote is told of Diogenes and Aristippus, as mentioned above.[74]

Such was the character of Theodorus and his surroundings. At last he retired to Cyrene, where he lived with Magas and continued to be held in high honour. The first time that he was expelled from Cyrene he is credited with a witty remark: "Many thanks,[75] men of Cyrene," said he, "for driving me from Libya into Greece."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false

AMONG those Disciples of *Socrates*, who were the Founders of new Sects, we have also *Aristippus*; Chief of the *Cyrenaicks*. *He* a *had the Character of* ***an agreeable Deboshee, a polite Libertine; and a Man of Address, who knew the World,*** *and perfectly understood how to carry himself. Altho' the* Cyrenaicks *were for gratifying Nature, in every Thing she could desire; they did not however assume to themselves the Impudence of the* Cynicks. **They entirely rejected the Law of Nature; b and according to them, Civil Laws and Custom, were the only Foundation of Justice and Honesty.**

...

This Sect was divided into several finall Branches; one of which made open Profession of downright Atheism; and in consequence thereof maintain'd, that f ***a Sage might steal, commit Adulteries, and Sacrileges, whenever he had convenient Opportunities so to do; those Things being evil only, said they, in the Opinion of the Vulgar; which was invented to keep Fools in Awe.***

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/60/mode/2up?view=theater

These hapless caricaturists of the dialectic of Plato, and the logic of Aristotle, careless of any vital principles or real results, ready enough to use fallacies each for their own party, and openly proud of their success in doing so, were assisted by worthy compeers of an outwardly opposite tone of thought, the Cyrenaics, Theodorus and Hegesias. **With their clique, as with their master Aristippus, the senses were the only avenues to knowledge; man was the measure of all things; and "happiness our being's end and aim."** Theodorus was surnamed the Atheist; and, it seems, not without good reason; for he taught that there was no absolute or eternal difference between good and evil; nothing really disgraceful in crimes; no divine ground for laws, which according to him had been invented by men to prevent fools from making themselves disagreeable; on which theory, laws must be confessed to have been in all ages somewhat of a failure. **He seems to have been, like his master, an impudent light-hearted fellow, who took life easily enough, laughed at patriotism, and all other high-flown notions, boasted that the world was his country, and was no doubt excellent after-dinner company for the great king.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

So wide was the difference between the Italians and their neighbors. A similar difference existed between the Greeks of the second century before Christ, and their masters, the Romans. The conquerors, brave and resolute, faithful to their engagements, and strongly influenced by religious feelings, were, at the same time, ignorant, arbitrary, and cruel. With the vanquished people were deposited all the art, the science, and the literature of the Western world. In poetry, in philosophy, in painting, in architecture, in sculpture, they had no rivals. **Their manners were polished, their perceptions acute, their invention ready; they were tolerant, affable, humane; but of courage and sincerity they were almost utterly destitute. Every rude centurion consoled himself for his intellectual inferiority, by remarking that knowledge and taste seemed only to make men atheists, cowards and slaves.** The distinction long continued to be strongly marked, and furnished an admirable subject for the fierce sarcasms of Juvenal.

The citizen of an Italian commonwealth was the Greek of the time of Juvenal and the Greek of the time of Pericles, joined in one. Like the former, he was timid and pliable, artful and mean. But, like the latter, he had a country. Its independence and prosperity were dear to him.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n539/mode/2up?view=theater

The new sophists, like the old, had no common doctrine, phrased their teaching eloquently, drew large audiences, and attained in many cases high social status, imperial favor, or great wealth. **They differed from the earlier Sophists in seldom questioning religion or morality;** they were more interested in form and style, in oratorical technique and skill, than in the great questions that had shaken the beliefs and morals of the world; **indeed, the new sophists were warm defenders of the ancient faith.** Philostratus has preserved for us the lives of the leading sophists of this age; let one example suffice. Adrian of Tyre studied rhetoric at Athens and rose to the state chair of rhetoric there; he opened his inaugural address with the proud words, **"Once again letters have come from Phoenicia."** He rode to his lectures in a carriage with silver harness, in rich attire, and gleaming with gems. When Marcus Aurelius visited Athens he tested Adrian by asking him to improvise an oration on a difficult theme; Adrian carried the matter off so well that Marcus loaded him with honors, silver and gold, houses and slaves. Promoted to the chair of rhetoric at Rome, Adrian's lectures, though in Greek, proved so alluring that senators adjourned their sessions, and the populace deserted the pantomimes, to go and hear him.[19] **Such a career almost announces the death of philosophy; it had been swallowed up in an ocean of rhetoric,** and had ceased to think when it learned to speak.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_36
>
> What! **Was it not the gods who revealed all their learning to Homer, Hesiod, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates and Lysias?**[2] Did not these men think that they were consecrated, some to Hermes,[3] others to the Muses?
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n447/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In the period of Contending States, torrents of blood had reddened the pavements of all world-cities, so that the great truths of Democracy might be turned into actualities, and for the winning of rights without

which life seemed not worth the living. **Now these rights are won, but the grandchildren cannot be moved, even by punishment, to make use of them. A hundred years more, and even the historians will no longer understand the old controversies.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_179

171. The worship of classical antiquity, as it was to be seen in Italy, may be interpreted as the only earnest, disinterested, and fecund worship which has yet fallen to the lot of antiquity. It is a splendid example of Don Quixotism; and philology at best is such Don Quixotism. **Already at the time of the Alexandrian savants, as with all the sophists of the first and second centuries, the Atticists, &c., the scholars are imitating something purely and simply chimerical and pursuing a world that never existed.** The same trait is seen throughout antiquity: the manner in which the Homeric heroes were copied, and all the intercourse held with the myths, show traces of it. **Gradually all Greek antiquity has become an object of Don Quixotism. It is impossible to understand our modern world if we do not take into account the enormous influence of the purely fantastic.**

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_II#Archelaus

16. Archelaus,[23] the son of Apollodorus, or as some say of Midon, was a citizen of Athens or of Miletus; he was a pupil of Anaxagoras, who[24] first brought natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens. Archelaus was the teacher of Socrates. **He was called the physicist inasmuch as with him natural philosophy came to an end, as soon as Socrates had introduced ethics. It would seem that Archelaus himself also treated of ethics, for he has discussed laws and goodness and justice; Socrates took the subject from him and, having improved it to the utmost, was regarded as its inventor. Archelaus laid down that there were two causes of growth or becoming, heat and cold; that living things were produced from slime; and that what is just and what is base depends not upon nature but upon convention.**

"Socrates however (was the) first (who) called philosophy down from heaven, and placed it in cities, and introduced it even in homes, and drove (it) to inquire about life and customs and things good and evil." (Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.4.10)

Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false

As Plato and Xenophon make us aware in innumerable passages, Socrates did not waste one single opportunity to learn from the Sophists, to question their alleged wisdom and elusive knowledge, to engage them in elenchical disputations, and, on occasion, to expose what he perceived to be their emptiness before crowds of attentive young listeners. The Socratic presence, indeed, cannot be grasped if the Sophistical background of Socrates' intellectual excursions is not taken into account, for much of what Socrates thought and said was for the purpose of forcing his contemporaries to transcend the relativistic and nihilistic impasse that Sophistical philosophy had brought into the scene. **Having much in common with the Sophists, Socrates turned out to be the anti-Sophist par excellence.**38

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.85694/page/n479/mode/2up?view=theater

Plato puts these remarkable words in the mouth of a Sophist: "All you who are here, I regard as related to each other. Nature, in default of law, has made you citizens. But the law, that tyrant of man, does violence to nature on many occasions." Thus to oppose nature to law and custom was to attack the ancient political system at its foundation. In vain did the Athenians banish Protagoras and burn his writings: the blow had been struck: the result of the teachings of the Sophists had been immense. The authority of the old institutions perished with the authority of the national gods, and the habit of free examination became established in men's homes and in the public squares.

Socrates, while reproving the abuse which the Sophists made of the right to doubt, was still of their school. Like them he rejected the empire of tradition, and believed that the rules of conduct were graven in the human conscience. **He differed from them only in this; he studied conscience religiously, and with a firm desire to find there an obligation to be just and to do good.** He ranked truth above custom, and justice above the law. He separated morals from religion: **before him, men never thought of a duty except as a command of the ancient gods.** He showed that the principle of duty is in the human mind. In all this, whether he wished it or not, he made war upon the city worship. **In vain he took pains to be present at all the festivals and took part in the sacrifices;**

his belief and his words contradicted his conduct. He founded a new religion, which was the opposite of the city religion. He was justly accused of not adoring the gods whom the state adored.

> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm
>
> It was in this period of defeat and despair that Athens executed Socrates in 399 B.C. **He had been perceived by many critics as a Sophist. They were essentially correct: he was, in fact, a sophisticated dialectician who defended the existence a hypothetical realm of absolute knowledge but also insisted that no one, including himself, had been able to enter it -- a sophist's ploy if there ever was one.** He was also a political authoritarian.[32] In terms of his philosophical undermining of Greek religion, **the Athenians' perception of Socrates was correct. He was guilty as charged.** (He was also a defender of pederasty with adolescents, but that did not bother Athenians any more than it bothers his apologists today.)[33]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA148#v=onepage&q&f=false

[George] Grote has clarified the Sophists; according to the usual notions they are a sect; according to him, a class, an estate.19 According to the standard view they disperse morally corruptive teachings, “sophistical propositions.” They were regular teachers of customs, neither above nor below the level of the times, according to Grote. Plato and his successors were aristocratic teachers, according to the standard view, the established clergy of the Greek nation, and the Sophists [were] the alternative thinkers. [In fact], **the Sophists were the clergy, and Plato [was] the alternative thinker – the socialist who attacked the Sophists (as he attacks the poets and statesmen) not as a special sect but rather as one of the persistent estates of society. For the uneducated masses, Socrates was indistinguishable from the Sophists:** in general, entirely naive custom requires no teacher; the more elevated the teacher, the more offensive. There tragedy and comedy are sufficient – that is the standpoint of Aristophanes. **He sketches the image of an Enlightenment figure in Socrates; characteristics of the Sophists and of Anaxagoras are transferred to him. But the Sophists distinguish themselves in that they completely meet the needs, that they deliver what they promise. In contrast no one could say why Socrates taught, he himself excluded.** Wherever he went he produced the feeling of ignorance; he embittered men and made them greedy for knowledge.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA222#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is clear from the Platonic dialogues that Socrates encouraged all of his interlocutors to distinguish between happiness by nature and happiness by convention, **not in order to encourage them to identify the natural life with *pleonexia*, but on the contrary, to enable them to grasp that mastery was itself the aim of most conventional accounts of the good life, to be contrasted with the naturally superior happiness of philosophizing.** In other words, contrary to the Sophists’ depiction of a naturally enlightened few who pursued mastery and a pusillanimous majority who clung to conventional morality and safety, in Socrates’ diagnosis of the ills of the cities, most people were conflicted about these aims. **The desire for mastery was itself in a way vulgar and demotic. Hence, the inevitable dissatisfaction of Callicles who, as a prospective “best man,” can in Socrates’ judgment only assert his natural excellence by pandering to that same pusillanimous majority** (*Gorgias* 513, 521). Socrates presents philosophy as a way of life that, in the devotion to all its passions to the love of wisdom, **thereby sluicing eros and thumos off from the temptations of tyranny and *pleonexia*, entails the civic virtues of justice and moderation as well.** In this way, he can plausibly present the philosophic life as the best guardian of justice, protecting it from the assaults of the Sophists and the “motion-men,” as well as the best curative therapy for the proto-tyrant (*Republic* 485d-486b).

Nevertheless, **the Platonic Socrates’ defense of justice on philosophical grounds is not the same as believing in it out of custom, habit, and veneration for tradition,** just like the Just Argument in the *Clouds*. Before Socrates can defend justice as natural, he must concede, even stimulate, an awareness of the distinction of between true justice or happiness and their merely conventional versions. **However, while calling the desirability of tyranny into question, that probing into the difference between natural and conventional happiness also calls into question ordinary morality, patriotism, the love of family, and piety. As we earlier observed, the opening move in the *Republic* to examine justice on the analogy of an art subverts property rights almost instantly (including the usefulness of wealth in propitiating the gods through sacrifice). By the time the best regime is set in place, every source of ordinary human decency flowing from family affection and respect for tradition has been abolished** (*Republic* 449c-d, 472 c-e, 462c-d). Socrates must tempt the young to abandon conventional justice to a degree, so as to ground natural justice more firmly in their characters through a vision of the soul and of the whole that connects it to the transcendent truth. This means that, in some way, he *is* subverting the conventional decencies, just as a great teacher whom a student ends up loving more than his own father (like Xenophon’s story of Tigranes and the “Armenian Socrates” *is* in some sense a corrupter of the youth.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D23b

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, [23a] many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; **but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: "Human wisdom is of little or no value."** And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, [23b] and makes me an example, as if he were to say: "This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognizes that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

Therefore I am still even now going about and searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation **I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning,** or of my own, but am in vast poverty [23c] on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, **the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing.** As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person [23d] and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth" and "not to believe in the gods" and "to make the weaker argument the stronger."

https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/10280/1/fulltext.pdf

Burnyeat recognizes how intertwined the city's way of life and religion are:

> Recall how closely a Greek community's sense of its own identity and stability is bound up with its religious observances and the myths that support them. If Socrates rejects the city's religion, he attacks the city. Conversely, if he says the city has got its public and private life all wrong, he attacks religion; for its life and its religion are inseparable. **Let our jurors ask themselves this question: What would be left of traditional (fifth century) religion, hence what would be left of traditional (fifth century) Athenian life, if the city accepted Socrates' view that what divinity demands from human beings is not propitiation and sacrifices, festivals, and processions, but the practice of moral philosophy?**40

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asection%3D5d

> *Euthyphro:* Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, **prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father,** [5e] **or your mother or anyone else,** and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe [6a] that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, **and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons;** but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

> *Socrates:* Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, [6b] accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? **But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?**

> *Euthyphro:* Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.
>
> *Socrates:* **And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs** [6c] **by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea?**

...

If interpreted strictly as heterodoxy there can be little doubt that he is guilty of the charge. Even a sympathetic primary source such as Plato's *Apology* seems to confirm Socrates' guilt.50 Vlastos points out,

> It would be hard to find a human female acting more viciously than this goddess [Hera] does in the myths. What would be left of her and of the other Olympians if they were required to observe the stringent norms of Socratic virtue which require every moral agent, human or divine, to act only to cause good to others, never evil, regardless of provocation? [...] Their ethical transformation would have become tantamount to the destruction of the old gods, the creation of new ones – which is precisely what Socrates takes to be the sum and substance of the accusation at his trial.51

...

Nussbaum, however, argues for a striking difference between the chorus of *Clouds* and the *daimonion* that Socrates mentions in the *Apology*: "the *daimonion* of Plato's Socrates is no standard tutelary deity at all, but an ironic way of alluding to the supreme authority of dissuasive reason and elenctic argument."60 And in opposition to the notoriety that Edmunds argues for, she asserts that "it would not be difficult for [...] any other Athenian [...] to conclude that what is really happening is that reason itself is being made the new god."61

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n411/mode/2up?view=theater

Coming at the close of the Sophistic period, he perceived that the Sophists had created one of the most critical situations in the history of any culture—the weakening of the supernatural basis of morals. Instead of a frightened return to orthodoxy, he moved forward to the profoundest question that ethics can ask: is a natural ethic possible? Can morality survive without supernatural belief? Can philosophy, by molding an effective secular moral code, save the civilization which its freedom of thought has threatened to destroy? When, in the *Euthyphro,* Socrates argues that the good is not good because the gods approve of it, but that the gods approve of it because it is good, he is proposing a philosophical revolution. **His conception of good, so far from being theological, is earthly to the point of being utilitarian.** Goodness, he thinks, is not general and abstract, but specific and practical, “good for something.” Goodness and beauty are forms of usefulness and human advantage; **even a dung basket is beautiful if it is well formed for its purpose.**[176]

...

“It is absurd,” says Xenophon’s Socrates, “to choose magistrates by lot where no one would dream of drawing lots for a pilot, a mason, a flute-player, or any craftsman at all, though the shortcomings of such men are far less harmful than those that disorder our government.”[179]

...

Nothing could save Athens, he thought, except government by knowledge and ability; and this was no more to be determined by voting than the qualifications of a pilot, a musician, a physician, or a carpenter. Nor should power or wealth choose the officials of the state; **tyranny and plutocracy are as bad as democracy; the reasonable compromise is an aristocracy in which office would be restricted to those mentally fit and trained for it.**[181]

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1177/pg1177-images.html#link2H_4_0005
>
> **They are not kings or rulers (he said) who hold the sceptre merely, or are chosen by fellows out of the street,** (12) **or are appointed by lot, or have stepped into office by violence or by fraud; but those who have the special knowledge** (13) **how to rule.** Thus having won the admission that it is the function of a ruler to enjoin what ought to be done, and of those who are ruled to obey, he proceeded to point out by instances that in a ship the ruler or captain is the man of special knowledge, to whom, as an expert, the shipowner himself and all the others on board obey.
> ...
>
> **And thus, in the art of spinning wool, he liked to point out that women are the rulers of men—and why? because they have the knowledge of the art, and men have not.**

Despite these criticisms of Athenian democracy Socrates recognized its advantages, and appreciated the liberties and opportunities that it gave him. **He smiled at the tendency of some followers to preach a "return to Nature," and adopted towards Antisthenes and the Cynics the same attitude that Voltaire would take towards Rousseau**—that with all its faults civilization is a precious thing, not to be abandoned for any primeval simplicity.[182]

Nevertheless the majority of the Athenians looked upon him with irritated suspicion. The orthodox in religion considered him to be the most dangerous of the Sophists; **for while he observed the amenities of the ancient faith he rejected tradition, wished to subject every rule to the scrutiny of reason, founded morality in the individual conscience rather than in social good or the unchanging decrees of heaven,** and ended with a skepticism that left reason itself in a mental confusion unsettling to every custom and belief.

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/94/mode/2up?view=theater

At least in theory, the doctrine of the classic natural right is for Strauss identical with the absolute right of the wise to rule.20 It finds its 'complete answer' in the rule of the wise. Wisdom being superior not only to unwisdom but to law, it would be unnatural to limit the rule of the wise either by law or by the consent of the unwise. As Strauss writes:

> **It would be absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by any regulations;** hence the rule of the wise must be *absolute rule*. It would be equally absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by consideration of the unwise wishes of the unwise; **hence the wise rulers ought not to be responsible to their unwise subjects.**21

…

According to Strauss, Xenophon's message is this: the wise do not despise tyranny for the same reasons others find it objectionable. **In other words, they do not object to the forceful or fraudulent way the tyrant came to be power; nor do they object to the innumerable crimes he has committed; nor to the fact that he rules in the absence of law. What they despise about tyranny is what they despise about every form of government – namely, its failure to listen to the counsel of the wise.** The wise are not so naïve as to think that political affairs can be devoid of force, fraud and injustice; nor are they naïve enough to think that a particular form of government is best. Magistrates are not made good rulers by being duly elected; nor does a king possess the art of governing simply because he has inherited his crown according to the accepted rules of succession. How one acquires power makes no difference. 'Constitutional rule,' or acquiring power by constitutional means, is not essentially more legitimate than tyrannical rule.23 **Any rule is legitimate only to the extent that it 'listens to the counsel of the wise.'**24 **Knowledge is alone the true title to rule.**25

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA199#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The republican maxim "salus populi suprema lex" [the well-being of the people is the highest law], as Cicero expressed it, d'Holbach embraced wholeheartedly. **Every enlightened regime which functions "à l'aide d'une legislation éclairée" [that works with the help of enlightened legislation] is good, every unenlightened regime is malign irrespective of how it is structured.**137

…

Most men despise tyranny because it is rule in the absence of law. But this fact does not disturb the wise. They are painfully aware of what Strauss calls the 'problematic' character of the rule of law.28 **Strauss is not very explicit about this, but he makes it clear that absolute rule without law, if it is wise, is infinitely superior to the rule of law. Therein rests what Strauss refers to as the 'tyrannical teaching' of Plato and Xenophon.**

http://www.anthonyflood.com/bahnsensocratesorchrist03.htm

Whereas the Council of Chalcedon declared that in *Christ* the eternal and temporal are united without intermixture, Socrates proclaimed that the eternal and temporal are combined in *man* by way of admixture.[29] And so it is that Socrates was the prophet of the religion of immanent reason.
…

The result of Socrates' stress upon the intellect and his equation of virtue and knowledge was the doctrine that no man knowingly does evil. This point is argued in the *Gorgias*. Socrates said that all men desire to act for the sake of some good, and hence any man who acts wrongly must be acting in ignorance of the evil he does (in which case punishment should aim at rehabilitation through education). **If "virtue is the knowledge of the good," then an unvirtuous act is one done without knowledge of the good;** thus no man deliberately or knowingly does evil. Wrongdoing must be involuntary or, ignorant.

> https://www.academia.edu/7531536/Plotinus_and_the_Platonic_Response_to_Stoicism
>
> Since Plotinus follows Plato in holding that all wrongdoing is done out of ignorance, we should designate the ignorance of the malefactor as culpable.16

> 16. **See Plato *Ap*. 37A5; *Gorg*. 488A3; *Protag*. 345D8, 358C7; Rep. 589C6; *Tim*. 86D2, E1; *Lg*. 731C-D for the claim, held to unwaveringly by Plato, that *oudeis hekōn hamartanei* ("no one errs willingly").**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

> As we shall see in more detail in later chapters, **the Stoics follow Socrates in holding a unified, monistic conception of the soul and an intellectualist account of the relationship between knowledge and action.** Socrates is famous for asserting that virtue is constituted by knowledge, that if one knows that *x* is right then one will necessarily do *x*. This, in turn, forms the basis for Socrates' famous denial of weakness of will: no one ever does wrong willingly and always acts in accordance with what they believe to be right.

...

"Socrates was destined to restore order out of chaos because, though with Sophists appealing to the self, he appealed to the self as carrying within itself the universal principle of reason and order."[37]
...

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates says that the philosopher who seeks knowledge is always pursuing death, seeing that the body hinders the soul's search for knowledge; the attempt to apprehend the forms and thereby find knowledge is an attempt to leave behind the historical world of particulars. Therefore, Van Til rightly parallels Socrates to his Sophist opponents:

> The objectivity for knowledge and ethics ... which Socrates found by appealing to reason as the universal aspect in man, turns out to be an empty form, **and there is no connection of this abstract universal with particulars except in terms of an irrational principle.** In other words, Socrates, as well as the Sophists, has finally come back to the realm of pure contingency. **Thus we are back to the Sophistic notion that in practice there is no known validity to any moral law except what man, irrational in his individuality, is willing to approve.[43]**

...

Socrates was the prophet of the religion of sovereign, self-sufficient, authoritative reason; to put it as Werner Jaeger does,

> **Socrates was apostle of moral liberty, *bound by no dogma*, fettered by no traditions, *standing free on his own feet*, *listening only to the inner voice* of conscience—preaching *the new religion of this world*, and a heaven to be found in this life by our own spiritual strength, not through grace but through tireless striving to perfect our own nature.[45]**

The *religion of this worla* has a definite doctrine of authority; whether in epistemology or any other field, the *voice of authority* must be found in *man himself*. **Socrates would not have man relinquish his autonomy at any cost. If man is to follow the gods, it must be on man's own terms—namely, that the gods first be scrutinized and approved by the rational judgment of man. In Athens, the views of deity were expressed through the public opinion of the democracy. Socrates resisted such dogma in favor of a more self-conscious and consistent religion of autonomy**—for which he finally stood trial. J.T. Forbes has aptly commented:

> **The question of the seat of authority has lasted through the ages, and the Socratic transference of it to the reflective reason, of which his very discussions on piety and justice were the claim,** demanded an insight and moral earnestness too great for the mass of his fellows. [Yet] the trend of progress of the human mind was with him.[46]

Socrates was a pioneer and religious apologist for the religion of the world; his martyred blood served as just so much seed for spreading the gospel of man's epistemological self-authority, a dogma which he had brought to purest expression.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA903#v=onepage&q&f=false

> By 1839, prodded by Bauer, it seemed bizarre to the young Marx that anyone should think there exists a meaningful analogy between Socrates and Christ. **"If there is an analogy between Socrates and Christ, this could only be in this sense that Socrates is philosophy embodied while Christ is religion personified."**19

...

His autonomous apologetic was a strange combination of omnicompetent reason and mysticism, faith in himself alone, yet ready trust in the divine. To protect his autonomy

Socrates was forced back and forth between the poles of rationality and irrationality. “What Socrates did was to rationalize the known, and to make the mysterious the divine.”[51]

---

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Cato_Major*.html

He married a wife who was of gentler birth than she was rich, thinking that, although the rich and high-born may be alike given to pride, still, women of high birth have such a horror of what is disgraceful that they are more obedient to their husbands in all that is honourable. 2 He used to say that the man who struck his wife or child, laid violent hands on the holiest of holy things. **Also that he thought it more praiseworthy to be a good husband than a good senator, nay, there was nothing else to admire in Socrates of old except that he was always kind and gentle in his intercourse with a shrewish wife and stupid sons.**
...

23 1 This he did, not, as some think, out of personal hostility to Carneades, but because he was wholly averse to philosophy, and made mock of all Greek culture and training, out of patriotic zeal. **He says, for instance, that Socrates was a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his country's tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws.**

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/julian_apostate_letter_to_themistius.htm

But if we conceive this to be true, or that only those are happy who administer public affairs and who are in authority and rule over many, what then are we to say about Socrates? As for Pythagoras and Democritus and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, you will perhaps say that they were happy in another sense of the word, because of their philosophic speculations. But as for Socrates who, having rejected the speculative life and embraced a life of action, had no authority over his own wife or his son, can we say of him that he governed even two or three of his fellow-citizens? Then will you assert that since he had no authority over any one he accomplished nothing? **On the contrary I maintain that the son of Sophroniscus[29] performed greater tasks than Alexander, for to him I ascribe the wisdom of Plato, the generalship of Xenophon, the fortitude of Antisthenes, the Eretrian[30] and Megarian[31] philosophies, Cebes, Simmias,[32] Phaedo and a host of others; not to mention the offshoots derived from the same source, the Lyceum, the Stoa and the Academies. Who, I ask, ever found salvation through the conquests of Alexander?** What city was ever more wisely governed because of them, what individual improved? Many indeed you might find whom those conquests enriched, but not one whom they made wiser or more temperate than he was by nature, if indeed they have not made him more insolent and arrogant. **Whereas all who now find their salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates.** And I am not the only person to perceive this fact and to express it, for Aristotle it seems did so before me, when he said that he had just as much right to be proud of his treatise on the gods as the conqueror[33] of the Persian empire. And I think he was perfectly correct in that conclusion.

> 33. Alexander; Julian seems to be misquoting Plutarch, *Moralia* 78d.

For military success is due to courage and good fortune more than anything else or, let us say, if you wish, to intelligence as well, though of the common everyday sort. **But to conceive true opinions about God is an achievement that not only requires perfect virtue, but one might well hesitate whether it be proper to call one who attains to this a man or a god.** For if the saying is true that it is the nature of everything to become known to those who have an affinity with it, then he who comes to know the essential nature of God would naturally be considered divine.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

The spirit which appears in the passage of Seneca to which we have referred tainted the whole body of the ancient philosophy from the time of Socrates downwards, and took possession of intellects with which that of Seneca cannot for a moment be compared. It pervades the dialogues of Plato. It may be distinctly traced in many parts of the works of Aristotle. **Bacon has dropped hints from which it may be inferred that, in his opinion, the prevalence of this feeling was in a great measure to be attributed to the influence of Socrates. Our great countryman evidently did not consider the revolution which Socrates effected in philosophy as a happy event, and constantly maintained that the earlier Greek speculators, Democritus in particular, were, on the whole, superior to their more celebrated successors.***

> * *Novum Organum*, Lib. i. Aph. 71, 79. *De Augmentis*, Lib. iii. Cap. iv. De principiis, atque originibus. *Cogitata et visa*. Redargutio philosophiarum.

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius3b.html#c4

> [4e.1] But to join foreign examples to the Romans: Socrates, who was not only by common consent of all persons, but also by the oracle of Apollo judged to be the wisest among men, was born of Phaenarete a midwife, and Sophroniscus a stone-cutter; yet he came to be one of the most resplendent lights of glory, and deservedly so. **For when the wits of most learned men were**

busied in pointless disputations – who endeavoured to set forth the measurements of the sun, moon, and the rest of the stars, rather by multiplicity of words, than certain arguments, for they undertook to tell the dimensions of the whole world – he diverted men from these unlearned errors, and taught them to dive into the nature of man, and the secret thoughts that lay hidden in his breast. So that if virtue should be esteemed for itself, he was the master who best taught the rules of life.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n383/mode/2up?view=theater

(Physicists and medical men are hated.) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics, Epicurus) and Pyrrho—a general onslaught upon knowledge in favour of *morality*.
…

443. **At bottom, morality is *hostile* to science:** Socrates was so already too—and the reason is, that science considers certain things important which have no relation whatsoever to "good" and "evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity of our feelings concerning "good" and "evil." What morality requires is that the whole of a man should serve it with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature that *can ill afford waste,* when a man earnestly troubles his head about stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined in Greece, **once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the disease of morality.** The mental altitudes reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a Thucydides, have not been reached a second time.

https://ncse.ngo/review-creationism-and-its-critics-antiquity

Rather than relying on the voluminous, but also problematic, evidence of the Platonic dialogues for his Socrates, **Sedley turns to Xenophon's defense of Socrates against the charges of impiety in his *Memorabilia*. "Xenophon's Socrates," Sedley proclaims, "is a fundamentally anti-scientific creationist"** (p 78). Our uniquely human attributes (intellect, hands, upright posture) and the clear evidence that other animals exist for our use are evidenced to develop an explicitly "anthropocentric teleology" (p 80). **Much later in the narrative we are shown how this very passage serves as a source for Stoic theology** (p 212-25), while passages in Aristotle discussing the same human attributes lead Sedley, with far less plausibility, to ascribe the same sort of teleology to the Stagirite (p 201-3). But Aristotle and the Stoics must wait. **I am convinced by the portrait of Socrates painted here, in part because we hear echoes of these arguments in Plato's Socrates as well.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/6/mode/2up?view=theater

Which kinde of doctrine (excepting what relates to Christian Religion) the most antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity, **either curiously adorned with Verse, or clouded with Allegories, as a most beautifull and hallowed mystery of Royall authority; lest by the disputations of private men, it might be defiled;** Other philosophers in the mean time, to the advantage of mankinde, did contemplate the faces, and motions of things; others, without disadvantage, their natures, and causes. **But in after times, Socrates is said to have been the first, who truly loved this civill Science,** although hitherto not throughly understood, yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the Common weale, and that he set so great a value on this, that utterly abandoning, and despising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced this, as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde. After him comes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well Greeke, as Latine. **And now at length all men of all Nations, not only philosophers, but even the vulgar, have, and doe still deale with this as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every Mother-wit, and to be attained without any great care or study.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n247/mode/2up?view=theater

On the other hand, they have applied to these matters three ideas proper to their own refined and learned minds: the first, that of a justice reasoned on maxims of Socratic morals; the second, that of a glory which is the fame of benefits done to the human race; and the third, the desire for immortality. By following these errors and applying these ideas, they have believed that the kings or other great personages of ancient times consecrated themselves and their families (as well as their entire patrimonies and substance) to bring happiness to the poor, who are always the majority in any city or nation.

667 Yet concerning Achilles, the greatest of the Greek heroes, Homer tells us of three of his qualities which were in complete contrast with the three ideas of the philosophers. As regards justice, in speaking with Hector, who proposes that the victor in the fight shall bury the vanquished, **he forgets their equality of rank and the common lot [of men] (two considerations which naturally induce men to recognize justice)** and makes the following savage reply: "When have men ever made pacts with lions? And when were wolves and lambs ever of one mind?"

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n343/mode/2up?view=theater

In the centre of Greek history, chronologically as well as intellectually, stands the mysterious figure of Socrates, who had a good deal to say to his fellow-countrymen about these things. **Nietzsche, as everyone knows, saw in him a typical decadent, even a criminal, and called his dialectic the victory of mob-resentment; already ninety years ago Carlyle, without any detailed knowledge, led only by his gifts of instinct, expressed the opinion that Socrates with his eternal logic-chopping heralded the end of the true Greek culture.**

https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/2397/twilight-of-the-anti-semites/

At the peak of Wagner's public influence, in 1870, **Nietzsche delivered a lecture on "Socrates and Tragedy" in which he insisted that the "Jewish press" would have deleterious effects on German art in the same way that Socratism had destroyed authentic Greek tragedy. Nietzsche seems to have believed that connecting his academic work on philology and aesthetics to Wagnerian anti-Semitism would impress his new friends.** But, to the contrary, the Wagners thought that Nietzsche had taken a step too far. While agreeing with the main point he was making, Cosima wrote to Nietzsche that his lecture was "much too new to be understood by the audience" and that it could jeopardize the Wagners' entire "program." He dutifully removed the anti-Semitic spur in the published edition of the lecture.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=QL9MFJqMrB0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

Beyond this, he associates Socratism with Alexandria and Rome, and implicitly with the French Enlightenment, which lionized Socrates as one of its cardinal saints and heroes.

Some of these associations Nietzsche adopted from early romanticism, particularly from writings of Friedrich and August Schlegel; others were original to him.63 Among the latter is a point that was somewhat submerged in *The Birth of Tragedy*, but much more salient in an earlier lecture Nietzsche gave at the Freie Akademische Gesellschaft in Basel (1 February 1870), with the title "Socrates and Tragedy." **Here he rehearsed many of the arguments of his first book, but at one critical juncture he went considerably further when, echoing Wagner's obsessions, he identified Socratism with "the modern Jewish press," which he treated as the prime enemy of great tragic art in the present.**64 This went beyond the bounds of propriety and prompted severe criticism. Even though Wagner supported Nietzsche's argument, he wrote to his young admirer and counseled him to be more circumspect in his public pronouncements.65 **The phrasing Nietzsche adopted in *The Birth of Tragedy* – more oblique and opaque, but eminently legible by the man to whom this work was dedicated – came in response to that suggestion.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=5wWUKg6IiN0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In der Vorstufe zu der Abhandlung *Socrates und die Tragödie*, die ihrerseits eine Vorstufe zu GT bildet, wendet sich N. exemplarisch gegen denjenigen, **„der dem Sokratismus unserer Tage verfallen [ist], der freilich weder Märtyrer zu erzeugen vermag, noch nie Sprache des weisesten Hellenen redet, der sich zwar nicht berühmt, nichts zu wissen, aber in Wehrheit doch nichts weiß. Dieser Sokratismus ist die jüdische Presse: ich sage kein Wort mehr."** (KSA 14, 101). N. ersetze das Wort „jüdische" später durch „heutige" [Presse] und verzichtete schließlich auf den ganzen Passus.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#THE_PROBLEM_OF_SOCRATES

2. This irreverent belief that the great sages were decadent types, first occurred to me precisely in regard to that case concerning which both learned and vulgar prejudice was most opposed to my view. **I recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decline, as instruments in the disintegration of Hellas, as pseudo-Greek, as anti-Greek** ("The Birth of Tragedy," 1872).

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/51356/pg51356-images.html#FNanchor_19_21

In very truth, Plato has given to all posterity the prototype of a new form of art, the prototype of the *novel* which must be designated as the infinitely evolved Æsopian fable, **in which poetry holds the same rank with reference to dialectic philosophy as this same philosophy held for many centuries with reference to theology: namely, the rank of *ancilla.*** This was the new position of poetry into which Plato forced it under the pressure of the demon-inspired Socrates.
...

Let us but realise the consequences of the Socratic maxims: "Virtue is knowledge; man only sins from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy": these three fundamental forms of optimism involve the death of tragedy. For the virtuous hero must now be a dialectician; there must now be a

necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, between belief and morality; **the transcendental justice of the plot in Æschylus is now degraded to the superficial and audacious principle of poetic justice with its usual *deus ex machina*.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/51356/pg51356-images.html#Footnote_21_23

One sought, therefore, for an earthly unravelment of the tragic dissonance; **the hero, after he had been sufficiently tortured by fate, reaped a well-deserved reward through a superb marriage or divine tokens of favour.** The hero had turned gladiator, on whom, after being liberally battered about and covered with wounds, freedom was occasionally bestowed. The *deus ex machina* took the place of metaphysical comfort. **I will not say that the tragic view of things was everywhere completely destroyed by the intruding spirit of the un-Dionysian: we only know that it was compelled to flee from art into the under-world as it were, in the degenerate form of a secret cult. Over the widest extent of the Hellenic character, however, there raged the consuming blast of this spirit, which manifests itself in the form of "Greek cheerfulness," which we have already spoken of as a senile, unproductive love of existence;** this cheerfulness is the counterpart of the splendid "naïveté" of the earlier Greeks, which, according to the characteristic indicated above, must be conceived as the blossom of the Apollonian culture growing out of a dark abyss, as the victory which the Hellenic will, through its mirroring of beauty, obtains over suffering and the wisdom of suffering. The noblest manifestation of that other form of "Greek cheerfulness," the Alexandrine, is the cheerfulness of the *theoretical man*: it exhibits the same symptomatic characteristics as I have just inferred concerning the spirit of the un-Dionysian:—it combats Dionysian wisdom and art, it seeks to dissolve myth, **it substitutes for metaphysical comfort an earthly consonance, in fact, a *deus ex machina* of its own, namely the god of machines and crucibles, that is, the powers of the genii of nature recognised and employed in the service of higher egoism;** it believes in amending the world by knowledge, in guiding life by science, **and that it can really confine the individual within a narrow sphere of solvable problems, where he cheerfully says to life: "I desire thee: it is worth while to know thee."**
…

Our whole modern world is entangled in the meshes of Alexandrine culture, and recognises as its ideal the *theorist* equipped with the most potent means of knowledge, and labouring in the service of science, of whom the archetype and progenitor is Socrates. All our educational methods have originally this ideal in view: **every other form of existence must struggle onwards wearisomely beside it, as something tolerated, but not intended.**
…

Now, we must not hide from ourselves what is concealed in the heart of this Socratic culture: Optimism, deeming itself absolute! Well, we must not be alarmed if the fruits of this optimism ripen,—if society, **leavened to the very lowest strata by this kind of culture,** gradually begins to tremble through wanton agitations and desires, if the belief in the earthly happiness of all, if the belief in the possibility of such a general intellectual culture is gradually transformed **into the threatening demand for such an Alexandrine earthly happiness, into the conjuring of a Euripidean *deus ex machina.*** Let us mark this well: **the Alexandrine culture requires a slave class, to be able to exist permanently: but, in its optimistic view of life, it denies the necessity of such a class, and consequently, when the effect of its beautifully seductive and tranquillising utterances about the "dignity of man" and the "dignity of labour" is spent, it gradually drifts towards a dreadful destination.** There is nothing more terrible than a barbaric slave class, who have learned to regard their existence as an injustice, and now prepare to take vengeance, not only for themselves, but for all generations. In the face of such threatening storms, who dares to appeal with confident spirit to our pale and exhausted religions, which even in their foundations have degenerated into scholastic religions?—**so that myth, the necessary prerequisite of every religion, is already paralysed everywhere, and even in this domain the optimistic spirit—which we have just designated as the annihilating germ of society—has attained the mastery.**

While the evil slumbering in the heart of theoretical culture gradually begins to disquiet modern man, and makes him anxiously ransack the stores of his experience for means to avert the danger, though not believing very much in these means; while he, therefore, begins to divine the consequences his position involves: great, universally gifted natures have contrived, with an incredible amount of thought, to make use of the apparatus of science itself, in order to point out the limits and the relativity of knowledge generally, and thus definitely to deny the claim of science to universal validity and universal ends: with which demonstration the illusory notion was for the first time recognised as such, which pretends, with the aid of causality, to be able to fathom the innermost essence of things. **The extraordinary courage and wisdom of *Kant* and *Schopenhauer* have succeeded in gaining the most difficult victory, the victory over the optimism hidden in the essence of logic,** which optimism in turn is the basis of our culture.
…

But now that the Socratic culture has been shaken from two directions, and is only able to hold the sceptre of its infallibility with trembling hands,—once by the fear of its own conclusions which it at length begins to surmise, and again, because it is no longer convinced with its former naïve trust of the eternal validity of its foundation,—it is a sad spectacle to behold how the dance of its thought always rushes longingly on new forms, to embrace them, and then, shuddering, lets them go of a sudden, as Mephistopheles does the seductive Lamiæ. It is certainly the symptom of the "breach" which all are wont to speak of as the primordial suffering of modern culture that the theoretical man, alarmed and dissatisfied at his own conclusions, no longer dares to entrust himself to the terrible ice-stream of existence: he runs timidly up and down the bank. He no longer wants to have anything entire, with all the natural cruelty of things, so thoroughly has he been spoiled by his optimistic contemplation. Besides, **he feels that a culture built up on the principles of science must perish when it begins to grow *illogical,*** that is, to avoid its own conclusions.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/51356/pg51356-images.html#FNanchor_23_26

Let us recollect furthermore how Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit of *German philosophy* streaming from the same sources **to annihilate the satisfied delight in existence of scientific Socratism** by the delimitation of the boundaries thereof; how through this delimitation an infinitely profounder and more serious view of ethical problems and of art was inaugurated, which we may unhesitatingly designate as *Dionysian* wisdom comprised in concepts.

https://research.library.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=phil_babich

> Yes, my friends, believe with me in Dionysian life and the rebirth of tragedy. **The age of the Socratic man is over;** [This strange species of man is also called theoretical man, critic, optimist, non-mystic—all those are quite horrifying things. **But with the exception of the musicians of the future, everything that participates in Hellenic culture since Socrates belongs to this group.** It is also since Socrates that there is something like an “Alexandrian culture” most keenly expressed as culture of the opera] put on wreaths of ivy, put the thyrsus into your hand, and do not be surprised when tigers and panthers lie down, fawning, at your feet.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA144#v=onepage&q&f=false

So says Aristophanes’ *Frogs*:

> Right it is and befitting,
> Not, by Socrates sitting,
> Idle talk to pursue,
> Stripping tragedy-art of
> All things noble and true.
> Surely the mind to school
> Fine-drawn quibbles to seek,
> Fine-set phrases to speak,
> Is but the part of a fool!8

…

A life ruled by thought! **Thinking serves life, while among all previous philosophers life had served thought and knowledge:** here the proper life appears as a purpose; there proper knowledge [is seen as] the highest.

Thus Socratic philosophy is absolutely *practical*: it is hostile to all knowledge unconnected to ethical implications. <u>It is *for everyone* and *popular* because it holds that virtue may be taught.</u> It does not appeal to genius and the highest powers of knowledge. Previously simple custom and religious subscription sufficed; the philosophy of the Seven Sages was merely the vitally practical morality so highly esteemed throughout Greece made into formulas. Now the resolution of moral instinct enters: bright knowledge should be the sole merit, but with bright knowledge humanity has virtue as well, for this is the essentially Socratic belief, that knowledge and morality conjoin. **Now the reversal of this proposition is revolutionary in the highest degree: everywhere luminous knowledge does not exist is the bad (also evil or the ill, τό κακόν). Here Socrates becomes the critic of his times: he investigates how far it behaves from dark drives and how far it behaves from knowledge, thereby yielding the democratic result that the lowest manual laborer stands higher than the statesman, orator, and artist of his times.** A carpenter, coppersmith, navigator, and physician are taken, and their technical knowledge is tested – [each] can cite the persons from whom he learned the means. In contrast, everyone had an opinion concerning [the questions], What is Justice? What is piety? What is democracy? What is law? Yet Socrates found only darkness and ignorance. **Socrates claims the role of a learner, but he persuades his interlocutors of their own rashness.**

His next step was therefore to arrive at a definition from the moral, social, and political realm; in this regard his method was dialectical or epagogic. The entire world of human affairs (ἀνθρώπινα) reveals itself to him as a world of ignorance; there are words but no concepts tightly connected to them. **His task was to order this world, thinking that mankind could do no other than live virtuously if it were so ordered.**

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n221/mode/2up?view=theater

I cannot persuade myself that the history of the Greeks followed that natural course for which it is so celebrated. They were much too variously gifted to be *gradual* the orderly manner of the tortoise when running a race with Achilles, and that is called natural development. **The Greeks went rapidly forward, but equally rapidly downwards; the movement of the whole machine is so intensified that a single stone thrown amid its wheels was sufficient to break it. Such a stone, for instance, was Socrates; the hitherto so wonderfully regular, although certainly too rapid, development of the philosophical science was destroyed in one night. It is no idle question whether Plato, had he remained free from the Socratic charm, would not have discovered a still higher type of the philosophic man, which type is for ever lost to us.** We look into the ages before him as into a sculptor's workshop of such types. The fifth and sixth centuries B.C. seemed to promise something more and higher even than they produced; they stopped short at promising and announcing. And yet there is hardly a greater loss than the loss of a type, of a new, hitherto undiscovered highest *possibility of the philosophic life:*—Even of the older type the greater number are badly transmitted; it seems to me that all philosophers, from Thales to Democritus, are remarkably difficult to recognise, but whoever succeeds in imitating these figures walks amongst specimens of the mightiest and purest type. This ability is certainly rare, it was even absent in those later Greeks, who occupied themselves with the knowledge of the older philosophy; **Aristotle, especially, hardly seems to have had eyes in his head when he stands before these great ones. And thus it appears as if these splendid philosophers had lived in vain, or as if they had only been intended to prepare the quarrelsome and talkative followers of the Socratic schools.** As I have said, here is a gap, a break in development; some great misfortune must have happened, and the only statue which might have revealed the meaning and purpose of that great artistic training was either broken or unsuccessful; what actually happened has remained for ever a secret of the workshop.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37841/37841-h/37841-h.html#Pg241

86. SOCRATES.—**If all goes well, the time will come when, in order to advance themselves on the path of moral reason, men will rather take up the *Memorabilia* of Socrates than the Bible, and when Montaigne and Horace will be used as pioneers and guides for the understanding of Socrates, the simplest and most enduring of interpretative sages.** In him converge the roads of the most different philosophic modes of life, which are in truth the modes of the different temperaments, crystallised by reason and habit and all ultimately directed towards the delight in life and in self. The apparent conclusion is that the most peculiar thing about Socrates was his share in all the temperaments. Socrates excels the founder of Christianity by virtue of his merry style of seriousness and by that wisdom of sheer roguish pranks which constitutes the best state of soul in a man. Moreover, he had a superior intelligence.

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n27/mode/2up?view=theater

Let us not be deceived as to the motives of that moral law which requires, as an indication of morality, obedience to custom in the most difficult cases! **Self-conquest is required, not by reason of its useful consequences for the individual; but that custom and tradition may appear to be dominant, in spite of all individual counter desires and advantages. The individual shall sacrifice himself—so demands the morality of custom.**

On the other hand, **those moralists who, like the followers of Socrates, recommend self-control and sobriety to the *individual* as his greatest possible advantage and the key to his greatest personal happiness, are *exceptions*—and if we ourselves do not think so, this is simply due to our having been brought up under their influence.** They all take a new path, and thereby bring down upon themselves the utmost disapproval of all the representatives of the morality of custom. They sever their connection with the community, as immoralists, and are, in the fullest sense of the word, evil ones. **In the same way, every Christian who "sought, above all things, his *own* salvation," must have seemed evil to a virtuous Roman of the old school.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_II#cite_ref-38
>
> **There is, he said, only one good, that is, knowledge, and only one evil, that is, ignorance; wealth and good birth bring their possessor no dignity, but on the contrary evil.** At all events, when some one told him that Antisthenes' mother was a Thracian, he replied, "Nay, did you expect a man so noble to have been born of two Athenian parents?"
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Jew_of_Malta/Act_1
>
> > I count Religion but a childish Toy,
> > **And hold there is no sinne but Ignorance.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA751#v=onepage&q&f=false

In *Le Procès de Socrate: Examen critique des thèses socratiques* (The Trial of Socrates: Critical inquiry into the Socratic propositions), 1889, Sorel's first major work, the traditional image of the heroic Socrates confronting death was rejected. He became the traducer of the values of heroic Greek culture, one of the quibblers and deceivers and wordmongers of the rising urban civilization of Hellas who ultimately brought about its doom.

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/70/mode/2up?view=theater

Strauss follows Nietzsche in thinking that the 'contemporary West' is the embodiment of 'Socratic culture'. Socrates is the 'turning point' of our civilization, nay the 'vortex of world history', and therefore the 'most questionable phenomenon of antiquity'.77 To understand ourselves, we must understand him.

Following one of the Islamic philosophers, Strauss believes that Socrates must have undergone a 'conversion'.78 The early Socrates portrayed by Aristophanes in the *Clouds* is a Sophist. The Socrates portrayed in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon has been converted. **The Aristophanean Socrates, not the Platonic-Xenophontic Socrates, is responsible for inaugurating what Nietzsche called 'Socratic culture' and what Strauss simply calls modernity.** Therefore, in Strauss's view, Nietzsche rightly attacks the young Socrates as does Aristophanes.
…

The young Socrates is the embodiment of the scientific spirit. **He is green, foolish and degenerately modern.**80 He embodies the optimistic rationalism that characterizes modernity. In other words, he believes that the true is in perfect harmony with the good and the beautiful (i.e. there is nothing 'savage' about the truth).81
…

For Strauss, the young Socrates is the embodiment of the scientific spirit: he is 'anerotic' and 'a-music'; in other words, he is characterized by a most 'inhuman asceticism'.99 His pupils are pale and sickly; they are not permitted to go out into the fresh air, but spend all their time in the 'think-tank' or Thinkery. **His 'zeal' in the pursuit of learning leads him to lead a hard ascetic life characterized by a lack of gymnastics, sexual abstinence, frugality, endurance and continence.**100 He is concerned with truth above beauty. He fails to understand that a culture needs beauty more than it needs truth and ugliness. **By the same token, he fails to recognize that the truth is ugly and destructive.** His dedication to truth is altogether consuming. He is oblivious to its effects on those around him. In spite of his immoderate love of truth, Socrates is not an erotic lover of knowledge for its own sake (i.e. for the sake of the pleasures of contemplation). **For the Aristophanean Socrates, knowledge is a means to the 'relief of man's estate'; it is sought for the sake of 'higher egoism', or collective selfishness.**

Strauss describes the young Socrates as a Promethian benefactor of mankind (and therefore not the godlike sage that he later becomes). **He offers man the light of knowledge without thinking of the unpalatable results of mass enlightenment.** Socrates, like Prometheus, is a fool; only our 'modernity' leads us to labor under the illusion that a Promethian is a hero. Aristophanes knows better. The destruction of the Thinkery by fire at the end of the play is mean to teach Socrates a lesson – namely that his pious devotion to science leads inevitably to his own destruction as well as that of the city.

Strauss concludes that the young Socrates is quintessentially 'modern' in his unconcealed debunking of the gods, his suicidal dedication to truth, his rationalist optimism and his scientific asceticism.
…

In summary, Socrates is the pivotal figure in the drama of Western civilization. The story begins with an early state of innocence that is disrupted by the discovery of nature and the emergence of philosophy. In the beginning knowledge was the preserve of rare sages but later, it was popularized and as a result vulgarized. **Socrates was the decisive figure in this process because the scientific spirit he represented dethroned the gods and undermined the 'Just Speech'. He erroneously believed that neither the gods nor the 'Just Speech' are necessary, but that science alone is the means to salvation.** Aristophanes prophesied that the outcome would be disastrous. He tried to mitigate the danger by ridiculing Socrates. But the damage was already done. Even Socrates's own conversion could not reverse it. We are the heirs of Socrates. **We have deified the man that Athens so wisely condemned.**

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n89/mode/2up?view=theater

In the end, **we have only the Platonic reaction which strove to attain by artifice what the blood alone was already too weak to achieve.** The Nordic Greek recognised no separate priestly caste. His priests came from the aristocratic families. His singers and poets related to him the deeds and acts of his heroes and his gods. The free Greek spirit was as alien to dogmatism as was the earlier Indian and the later Teuton. Gymnastics and music were the substance of his education, and these established the necessary prerequisites for the production of the hoplite, the citizen of the state. **Only a Sokrates could preach such insanity as: virtue could be taught and imparted to all men, an idea further refined by Platon. He who should really understand the nature of the world of ideas must of necessity be virtuous. With the promulgation of such an individualistic and faceless worldview, the axe was truly laid at the roots of Greek life.**

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n215/mode/2up?view=theater

Platon glorified the hair splitter. **In the Platonic dialogues Sokrates declared that a written paper roll could entice him away from the most beautiful natural surroundings. In the midst of the**

extroverted Grecian worldview, this was an admission of the dullest pedantry, yet Sokrates was an example of the spiritual racial strength of genius. However strong his moral philosophy was, Sokrates still failed in the field of aesthetics because of his insistence on universalism. In the devout and beautiful Greek life of old, struggle seemed to be an eternal natural law to the Hellenes in which Pallas Athena herself served. A new epoch of Greek history did not begin with Sokrates, but with him a completely different man entered Hellenic life. **Admittedly, he inherited the sacred traditions of Athens, of Homeros, of the tragedians, of Perikles and the builders of the Acropolis. Admittedly, he took part himself as a soldier in the struggles for political power, but, nevertheless, Sokrates is the ungenial – although noble – brave man of another non Greek race.** He lived in a time when Athens had embarked on false paths, wherein its once aristocratic democracy in which only Greeks, never foreigners, could participate, had begun its slide down into the abyss of chaos. Under the tyranny of the demagogues the great Alkibiades was banished and the entire Athenian army perished before Syracuse, and almost all other conquests were lost. The triumphant aristocrats then made the democrats drink poison by the hundreds. Later, they met the same fate themselves. Aristophanes mocked ancient tradition. The new teachers, Gorgias, Protagoras, and so on, took pride in the new, naked, beautiful forms. **Then the alien man, characterised a thousand times in Greek literature, stepped to the fore. The new alien race unfolded its degenerate values, shaping Greek culture.** The Greek values of sobriety and heroism were replaced. **Sokrates substituted dialectics for substance, the ugly for the beautiful, and academic discussion for heroism.** Beyond this, he sought the good in itself, preached the community of the good, and gathered around him a disputing new Greek generation.

Once Perikles, as lord of Athens, had to beg the court for its indulgence in granting civil rights to his son born of his foreign wife. This was granted him in an exceptional case. This strict racial law, made under Perikles himself, vanished with the progressive impoverishment of the blood of Athens. **But it was Sokrates, the non Greek, who, in a time of decomposition, gave it a death blow.** The idea of a community of the good resulted in a new human classification, not according to races and peoples, but according to individual man. **With the collapse of Athenian racial democracy, Sokrates became the international social democrat of his day. His personal courage and cleverness gave his racially destructive teaching its self advertising blessing. It was his disciple, Antisthenes, the son of a hither Asiatic slave woman, who then drew so many conclusions from Sokrates's ideas and ventured forth to preach the destruction of all barriers between races and peoples in the name of human progress.**

It was because of Platon that Sokrates was immortalised, and is, even today, honoured by armchair great men. Greek genius must recognise Platon as the man who, in the midst of a great decomposition, represented sober prudence. He loved this man, Sokrates, and so created an eternal monument for him. Platon placed the words of his own soul in the mouth of Sokrates. Thus, the true Sokrates vanished from the world. Only a few passages in Platon truly refer to him. **In the *Phaedon*, for example, Platon relates that Sokrates had admitted that he possessed no aptitude for investigation of organic events.** The true nature of things for Sokrates therefore consisted ultimately not in their investigation by observation, but in our thinking about them. One should not ruin one's eyes by viewing things to excess. If man wishes to discover whether the earth is flat or round then it does not suit him to carry on research. Rather, he should ask: What does reason say of this? Is it rational to conceive the earth as the centre of the universe? **While Platon certainly invented this passage, it fits the same Sokrates who turned his gaze away from a racially beautiful Greece in order to talk of a universal abstract mankind, a brotherhood of the good. Here he turned away from the sun of observation to look at the shadows of dogma. As the Jewish dogma has corrupted religion, so Platon's scientific method, hostile to life, has corrupted European philosophy. Aristoteles was its systematic diffuser, and Hegel its last great pupil. Logic is the science of god, said Hegel. These words are an affront to a truly Nordic religion. It is the antithesis of all that is truly German and all that was truly Greek. These words are truly Socratic.** It is not surprising therefore that university professors have canonised Hegel along with Sokrates.

Beauty of soul and beauty of physical appearance certainly do not always coincide. But with Sokrates this was the case. Through an environment where Eros and the Nordic racial beauty of blond Aphrodite ruled, passed the same ideal of beauty, forming and shaping the real Greek world. The ideal was always the slim, white skinned and blond creature – from Dionys of Euripides to the dear little blond heads in Aristophanes' s *The Birds*. **In the midst of all this, the uncouth type of the satyr appears like the symbol of what is alien. In the new, Asiatic Greek world, beauty vanished.** The ugly and all that is repellent to the eye replaced natural beauty in later Greek art. The preaching of the rational good was the parallel phenomenon of Greek racial and spiritual disintegration. **The philosophical good then destroyed the racial good as the idea of beauty. Heroic ideas no longer supported the state and social life. The greatest symbol of this new, hostile, racially unconscious chaotic group – the antithesis of the Hellenic racial soul – was Sokrates.**

Viewed from this aspect of historical development, such a genius as Platon appears to have squandered his entire spirit on this man and presents him with immortality. Platon was essentially an aristocrat, an Olympian fighter, a formative artist, and a profound thinker. At the end of

his life he wished to save his people racially by enacting a powerful constitution. None of this was Socratic; it was the last great flowering of the Hellenic spirit. Praxiteles later formulated a protest against all Socraticism. This was the swansong of Nordic Greek racial beauty. In art this was paralleled by the creation of the magnificent Nike of Samothrace. **But Sokrates remained a symbol of decline. Hellas disappeared in racial chaos. In place of the proud Athenians the universally despised hither Asians populated the provinces.** The Greeks allowed these characterless racial inferiors to educate them. They drove the true Greeks away when they tired of them.

Sokrates triumphed while Hellas perished. Healthy human understanding had destroyed genius in one last great hour. What was ugly became the norm; true beauty was only the good.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/211/mode/2up?view=theater

The repudiation of Socrates by scholars of Plato under the Third Reich was virtually universal. Only Hans Bogner recommended that his Greek class read Plato's *Apology*, which celebrated the figure of a master of whom it could be said Plato was "the most faithful disciple"117 or even an "evangelist."118 Bogner presented an image, as positive as it was rare, of Socrates taking up the sword of dialectic against foreign Sophists who were corrupters of the polis, in an uphill battle against the decline of Athens.

He was truly the only one. **In his take on Platonic racism, Günther completed his tour de force without mentioning Socrates one single, treacherous time in more than a hundred pages.**119
...

For Rosenberg, Socrates heralded the advent of the Stoics, in that he established the basis for Greek philosophical individualism. By teaching that virtue could be learned, Socrates undermined the elitist foundations of Greek inegalitarianism:124 Socrates proposed a new conception of humanity, "a new human classification, not according to races and peoples, but according to individual man. With the collapse of Athenian social democracy, Socrates became the international Social Democrat of his day."125

This deleterious individualism had produced as its monstrous offspring the Western individualistic humanism of more recent centuries, which, **"like Socrates, looked toward man, not the Greek, the German, the Jew, or the Chinese,"**126 and which Günther denounced with the vigor of a Joseph de Maistre.

This unitarian conception of the human community, which destroyed the strict hierarchical and inegalitarian vision that traditionally characterized the Greeks, was taken up by Antisthenes, the true disciple and continuation of Socrates and his legacy.127 Alfred Rosenberg accordingly absolved Plato of any accusations of Socratism: **"It was his disciple Antisthenes, the son of a Hither-Asiatic slave woman, who then drew so many conclusions from Socrates' ideas and ventured forth to preach the destruction of all barriers between races and peoples in the name of human progress."**128
...

From the moment that Socrates, and later the Stoics, proclaimed that the individual was the source of all value, the notions of people and race necessarily lost theirs.

---

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/14*.html#ref6

One could name countless blunders of this sort made by these cities, **but I pass over them since it grieves me to mention even these instances. For I would distinguish Greeks from barbarians, not by their name nor on the basis of their speech, but by their intelligence and their predilection for decent behaviour, and particularly by their indulging in no inhuman treatment of one another. All in whose nature these qualities predominated I believe ought to be called Greeks, but those of whom the opposite was true, barbarians.** 6 Likewise, their plans and actions which were reasonable and humane, I consider to be Greek, but those which were cruel and brutal, particularly when they affected kinsmen and friends, barbarous.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_8

Though you deck your hall from end to end with ancient waxen images, Virtue is the one and only true nobility. [nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus] Be a Paulus, or a Cossus, or a Drusus in character; rank them before the statues of your ancestors; let them precede the fasces themselves when you are Consul. **You owe me, first of all things, the virtues of the soul;** prove yourself stainless in life, one who holds fast to the right both in word and deed, and I acknowledge you as a lord; all hail to you, Gaetulicus, or you, Silanus, or from whatever stock you come, if you have proved yourself to a rejoicing country a rare and illustrious citizen, we would fain cry what Egypt shouts when Osiris has been found.[8] **For who can be called "noble" [generosum] who is unworthy of his race, [genere] and distinguished in nothing but his name?**
...

Tell me, thou scion of the Trojans, who deems a dumb animal well-born unless it be strong? [dic mihi, Teucrorum proles, animalia muta quis generosa putet nisi fortia.] It is for this that we commend the swift horse whose speed sets every hand aglow, and fills the Circus with the hoarse shout of victory; that horse is noblest, on whatever pasture reared, whose rush outstrips the rest, and whose dust is foremost upon the plain. **But the offspring of Coryphaeus[10] or Hirpinus[10] comes to the hammer if Victory light but seldom on his car: no respect is there paid to ancestors, no favour is shown to Shades!** The slow of foot, that are fit only to turn a miller's wheel, pass, for a mere nothing, from one owner to another, and gall their necks against the collar.
...

I would rather that Thersites were your father if only you were like the grandson of Aeacus,[65] and could wield the arms of Vulcan, than that you should have been begotten by Achilles and be like Thersites. Yet, after all, however far you may trace back your name, however long the roll, you derive your race from an ill-famed asylum: the first of your ancestors, whoever he was, was either a shepherd or something that I would rather not name.

http://classics.mit.edu/Apuleius/apol.1.1.html

24. **As to my birthplace, you assert that my writings prove it to lie right on the marches of Numidia and Gaetulia, for I publicly described myself as half Numidian, half Gaetulian in a discourse delivered in the presence of that most distinguished citizen Lollianus Avitus. I do not see that I have any more reason to be ashamed of that than had the elder Cyrus for being of mixed descent, half Mede, half Persian. A man's birthplace is of no importance, it is his character that matters. We must consider not in what part of the world, but with what purpose he set out to live his life. Sellers of wine and cabbages are permitted to enhance the value of their wares by advertising the excellence of the soil whence they spring, as for instance with the wine of Thasos and the cabbages of Phlius.** For those products of the soil are wonderfully improved in flavour by the fertility of the district which produces them, the moistness of the climate, the mildness of the winds, the warmth of the sun, and the richness of the soil. But in the case of man, the soul enters the tenement of the body from without. What, then, can such circumstances as these add to or take away from his virtues or his vices? **Has there ever been a time or place in which a race has not produced a variety of intellects, although some races seem stupider and some wiser than others?** The Scythians are the stupidest of men, and yet the wise Anacharsis was a Scyth. The Athenians are shrewd, and yet the Athenian Meletides was a fool.

https://philarchive.org/archive/BROSTC-2v1

Socrates believes that his dialectical examinations in pursuit of wisdom and virtue are aimed at making people better and count as attempts at the true political expertise: **“I think that I am among the few Athenians—not to say the only one—to undertake the true political expertise and to engage in political matters, and I am alone among Athenians today.”**25 Socrates claims that his *elenctic* mission is genuinely political, whereas ordinary public life in Athens falls short.

When Socrates rejects ordinary politics and takes up extraordinary politics, he is trading in local commitments for cosmopolitan ones. This point is not mysterious: ordinary politics is tied to the reach of the *polis*, whereas extraordinary politics is not. Socrates himself recognizes the cosmopolitan nature of his extraordinary politics; he characterizes his mission of examining others in cosmopolitan terms: “Thus, even now I still go around seeking these things, and in accordance with the god I search after *anyone*, whether fellow citizen or foreigner, whom I think is wise.”26 It is natural to read this claim as an expression of Socrates’s unquenchable thirst for wisdom, but this does not exhaust his meaning. For Socrates believes that his search for wisdom also provides the greatest service to those he examines.27 After all, this is why he considers his work genuinely political and why he calls himself the god’s greatest gift to Athens.28 So his refusal to limit his *elenctic* mission to Athenians is also a commitment to benefit foreigners alongside fellow citizens—this is the cosmopolitanism of Socrates’s extraordinary politics.

Perhaps this explicit commitment to cosmopolitanism has been passed over in so much scholarly silence because it has been thought to be an isolated remark. But this is a mistake: Socrates’s refusal to limit his extraordinary political activity to conventional political boundaries is not an accidental or passing feature of his ethics. **Central to Socrates’s inquiries is his insistence that conventional distinctions among human beings—men and women, old and young, free and slave, citizen and foreigner—are (at least in some important respects) irrelevant.** This is especially clear in his conversation with Meno.29

> 29. **The same orthodoxy which counts Plato’s early dialogues as our best source for the historical Socrates generally regards the *Meno* as a “transitional” dialogue,** partly reflecting the philosophy of Socrates and partly reflecting the philosophy of Plato as it would be developed in the middle-period dialogues. *See supra* note 5 and accompanying text. I take it that the passages I point to from the *Meno* are genuinely Socratic.

When Meno conventionally defines virtue in separate terms as the virtue of a man, the virtue of a woman, the virtue of a child, etc.,30 Socrates chides him,31 and leads him toward the conclusion that "all human beings [*pãntew ênyrvpoi*] are good in the same way, for by achieving the same goals they become good."32 And Meno's very next definition of virtue runs into a similar problem: virtue cannot be "the ability to rule over human beings"33 if the same account of virtue is supposed to apply to a child or a slave.34 **Elsewhere, too, Socrates insists that conventional distinctions hold no water (or at least no wine) when he says that men and women have the same happiness**35 **and that virtue can be recognized in both Athenians and foreigners and in both free persons and slaves.**36

This evidence might be thought to come up short of underwriting a perfectly cosmopolitan scope for Socrates's extraordinary political mission. First, none of these passages explicitly extends Socrates's universalism about virtue to non-Greeks, as opposed to Greek foreigners. It might then be thought that there are limits to Socratic cosmopolitanism. But this seems to me to be excessively uncharitable. **The objection *assumes* that Socrates would disallow the full extension of the capacity for virtue even though his reasoning with Meno clearly supports the full extension. We do better by taking Socrates at his word when he says that "all human beings [*pãntew ênyrvpoi*] are good in the same way."**37
…

Consider the frequent Socratic injunction against harming another human being. **Socrates and Crito agree that one ought never commit an injustice [*édike›n*] or do a wrong [*kakourge›n*] even if one has been done an injustice or been wronged.**39 **Socrates argues against Polemarchus that "it is the function not of the just person to harm [*blãptein*] either a friend or anyone else, but of his opposite, the unjust person."**40 And Socrates relies on similar claims in his attempt to prove to Polus that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.41 In all of these texts, Socrates seems committed to the claim that a person ought not harm another human being, regardless of whether the other is male or female, free or slave, Greek or non-Greek, etc. There is no whisper of a carve-out allowing the just to harm some subset of human beings. So we can conclude that Socrates is committed to at least the following minimal claim of moral cosmopolitanism: human beings have some obligations toward every other human being.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1177/pg1177-images.html#link2H_4_0003

The student of human learning expects, he said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons? Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness? what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman? what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? **and other like problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of nobility on the possessor,** (16) **whereas those who lacked the knowledge might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.**

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0208%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D1%3Asection%3D16
>
> His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;—**these and others like them, of which the knowledge [εἰδότας] made a "gentleman," [καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς] in his estimation, while ignorance [ἀγνοοῦντας] should involve the reproach of "slavishness." [ἀνδραποδώδης]**

…

But there was a passage from Homer (32) for ever on his lips, as the accuser tells us—the passage which says concerning Odysseus,

> *What prince, or man of name,*
> *He found flight-giv'n, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame:*
>
> *"Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid,*
> *You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed."*
>
> *Thus he the best sort us'd; the worst, whose spirits brake out in noise, (33)*

> *He cudgell'd with his sceptre, chid, and said,*
>
> *"Stay, wretch, be still,*
> *And hear thy betters; thou art base, and both in power and skill*
> *Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in war.*
>
> *We must not all be kings.*

The accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though the poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. **Now no such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been tantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself.** What he did say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who were incapable of rendering assistance in time of need to the army or the state or the people itself, **be they never so wealthy,** ought to be restrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.

As to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this—he was plainly a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0208%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D2%3Asection%3D60
>
> [60] But Socrates, at least, was just the opposite of all that: **he showed himself to be one of the people and a friend of mankind. [φανερὸς ἦν καὶ δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὤν] "*kaí demotikós kaí filánthropos*"**

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n323/mode/2up?view=theater

The word "*tao*" underwent in the Late period of China just the same continuous alteration of its fundamental content, and in the same mechanistic direction, as the word "Logos" in the history of Classical thought from Heraclitus to Posidonius, and as the word "Force" between Galileo's day and ours. **That which once had been grandly moulded myth and cult is called, in this "religion of educated people," *Nature* and *Virtue*—but this Nature is a reasonable mechanism, and this Virtue is knowledge.**1 **Confucius and Buddha, Socrates and Rousseau are at one in this.**

http://www.san.beck.org/C%26S-Compared.html

Both Confucius and Socrates lived in cultures where hereditary privilege was the main factor in social status. **Neither of them was extremely high-born, but they certainly were not peasants either. Confucius as one of the many lower aristocrats was just high enough where he would be considered as a possible official in the government, but not high enough so that he was automatically given a position.** Due to his economic circumstances he spent some time working with his hands and in business. Socrates was a citizen, but neither was he related to a ruling family. He probably worked as a stone-mason; he fought in battle not as an officer, but as a citizen soldier.
...

The gentleman or superior man of Confucius and the gentleman or good and beautiful man of Socrates both had tremendous impact in changing their culture's values from the nobility of birth to the nobility of good character.

https://ancientciivilizationsvc9.blogspot.com/2009/11/merit-system.html

Many European and American admirers such as Voltaire and H.G. Creel point to the revolutionary idea of replacing nobility of blood with nobility of virtue. *Jūnzǐ* (□□, lit. "lord's child"), which originally signified the younger, non-inheriting, offspring of a noble, became, in the works of Confucius, an epithet having much the same meaning and evolution as the English term, "gentleman". **A virtuous plebeian who cultivates his qualities may be a "gentleman", while a shameless son of the king is only a "small man".**

http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-16

[15:39] The Master said: "In teaching people, there is no discrimination (of class, type, etc.)"

https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=20,29,35,45&post=25860

Advocating that "in educating there should be no distinction of classes," Confucius was the first person to bring the knowledge previously reserved for the temples of the ruling class to the marketplace of the common man.

This quotation shows the readiness of Confucius to impart instruction: **“From the man bringing his bundle of dried flesh for my teaching upwards, I have never refused instruction to anyone.”** (It was the rule of ancient times that when one party waited on another, he should carry some present or offering. Pupils did so when they first waited on their teacher. Of such offerings, one of the lowest was a bundle of strips of dried flesh.) **He had taught, over a period of 40 years, some 3,000 pupils, of whom 72 had mastered the “six arts” – ritual, music, archery, charioteering, history and mathematics.** They came from all over China, not just the state of Lu, his native place, but from Wei, Chi, Chin, Cheng, Tsin, Sung, Wu and Yueh. This was something unheard of before him. **The popularization of learning produced the unexpected effect of cultural unity for China,** coming some 300 years before Chin Shih Huang, the first emperor of China, united the country. From the 2nd century B.C. to the present day, Confucianism has been synonymous with learning. **Confucius was also revered by the illiterate millions who could not read his Classics but nonetheless practiced what he stood for.**

http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-12

[12:5] Sima Niu, upset, said: “Everyone has brothers, I alone have none.”

Zi Xia said, “I have heard this proverb:”

> Life and death are up to Fate.
> Wealth and honor are held by Heaven.

“**If the noble man is reverent without lapse, and courteous to everyone within the frame of propriety, everything within the four seas will be his brother.** Why should a noble man be concerned about not having brothers?”

http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-18

[17:2] The Master said: **“People are similar by nature, but through habituation become quite different from each other.”** Confucius said: “Only the most wise and the most foolish do not change.”

http://www.gnxp.com/blog/2007/06/on-confucian-human-nature.php

I was reading The Chinese Experience, a cultural history, when I was struck by something in the chapter on Confucianism:

> ... **The belief that all men are born equal and are infinitely perfectible is a basic and profoundly humanistic Confucian doctrine, which is not paralleled in the main Christian tradition, which holds that all men are of equal *value*, rather than that they are born with similar characteristics.** The belief goes back to the *Analects*, which includes the saying, 'By nature men are close to each other; through experience they become remote from each other' ...

The generality of this is not surprising to me. **If you read histories of the intellectual ferment in early 20th century China you note that it was the conservative and reactionary Mandarin class who argued most vociferously against the European ideas regarding the racial chain of being and eugenics.** Instead, liberal progressives were open to Western science, which implied innate between group and within group differences, while the Confucians were immovable form their time tested *tabula rasa* dogma.

Of course, to some extent both groups were guilty of overreach, the Confucians rejected the new science which did point to heritable aspects of human nature and reality of individual differences (though to be fair, their moral-political system was the most robust our species has seen, persisting across 2,000 years). As for the racial science of the early 20th century, it was a coarse and clumsy beast which was vulnerable to the rise of the the *tabula rasa* methodologies in the human sciences, from behaviorism to Boasian cultural anthropology. **But I do think it is important to note that in Geography of Thought Richard Nisbett reports that East Asians are still far more likely to attribute individual performance to context, circumstance and effort than innate aptitudes when compared to Westerners.** My comment a few weeks ago on Confucianism in China was predicated in part on hints like this that the pre-Communist cultural sensibilities have persisted down to the present day. **Many scholars argue that the ostensibly revolutionary Cultural Revolution was at the heart Confucian, placing emphasis on moral worth & will as opposed to technical efficiency & pragmatism. Sometimes you really have to look between the pages of the book to see that the title is deceptive.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/

Mohism originates in the teachings of Mo Di, or “Mozi” (“Master Mo,” fl. ca. 430 BCE), from whom it takes its name. Mozi and his followers initiated philosophical argumentation and debate in China. **They were the first in the tradition to engage, like Socrates in ancient Greece, in an explicit, reflective search for objective moral standards and to give step-by-step, tightly reasoned**

arguments for their views, though their reasoning is sometimes simplistic or rests on doubtful assumptions.
…

A strong argument can be made that it is Mozi, not Confucius, who deserves the title of China's first philosopher. Before the rise of the Mohist school, *Ru* or so-called "Confucian"[2] thought seems to have consisted mostly of wise aphorisms offering moral coaching aimed at developing virtuous performers of social roles as described in traditional *li* (norms of ritual propriety).

> 2. **"Confucianism," the conventional English rendering of *Ru*, is in fact a poor equivalent for the Chinese term, which has a connotation more similar to "classicist" or "ritualist."** In the Chinese tradition, Confucius is the most famous of the *Ru*, but the word '*Ru*' itself does not allude directly to Confucius or his teachings.

…

The Mohist texts provide only the barest handful of clues about Mozi's life. One passage depicts King Hui of Chu (488-432 BCE) refusing to grant him an audience because of his low social status. Several anecdotes in the *Mozi* and other early texts depict him as a master craftsman and military engineer. The *Huainanzi,* a Han dynasty text, claims that Mozi was an apostate *Ru* (Confucian), but the *Mozi* itself provides no particular reason to believe this. **A more likely conjecture, supported by the frequency of references to the crafts in Mohist texts, is that he was originally an artisan of some kind, probably a carpenter. Indeed, the many examples alluding to crafts, mechanics, trade, work, and economic hardship, the apparent "critical outsider" stance of the earliest Mohist texts, and the nearly total absence of references to the *li* (courtly ritual, ceremony, etiquette) so central to Confucian thought all tend to suggest that Mohism emerged from a rising class of craftsmen, merchants, and soldiers that grew in size and political influence during the Warring States era, a time of rapid social and political change.**
…

A Han dynasty text collected in the *Zhuangzi* claims that many Mohists believed it was their duty to emulate the legendary altruistic labors of the ancient sage king Yu:

> **Many of the Mohists of later ages wear furs and rough clothing, clogs and grass slippers, never resting day or night, taking self-sacrifice as the highest. They say, "One who cannot do this is not following the way of Yu and doesn't deserve to be called a Mohist."** … They press each other forward in self-sacrifice until there's no flesh left on their calves or hair on their shins. (*Zhuangzi,* Book 33, "Under Heaven")

Such external testimony—albeit from an unsympathetic source—presents a minor puzzle in the interpretation of Mohist thought, **for the texts preserved in the *Mozi* do not directly advocate self-sacrificing altruism, and at least one clearly rejects it.** The same *Zhuangzi* passage tells us that different groups of Mohists disagreed strongly concerning the details of Mohist doctrine; perhaps this was one of the issues about which they differed.
…

"**Promoting the Worthy**" and "**Identifying Upward.**" The purpose of government is to achieve a stable social, economic, and political order (*zhi*, pronounced "jr") by promulgating a unified conception of morality (*yi*). This task of moral education is to be carried out by encouraging everyone to "identify upward" to the good example set by social and political superiors and by rewarding those who do so and punishing those who do not. Government is to be structured as a centralized, bureaucratic state led by a virtuous monarch and managed by a hierarchy of appointed officials. **Appointments are to be made on the basis of competence and moral merit, without regard for candidates' social status or origins.**

"**Inclusive Care**" and "**Condemning Aggression.**" To achieve social order and exemplify the key virtue of *ren* (benevolence, goodwill), people must inclusively care for each other, having as much concern for others' lives, families, and communities as for their own, and in their relations with others seek to benefit them. **Military aggression is wrong for the same reasons that theft, robbery, and murder are:** it harms others in pursuit of selfish benefit, while ultimately failing to benefit Heaven, the spirits, or society as a whole.

"**Moderation in Use**" and "**Moderation in Burial.**" To benefit society and care for the welfare of the people, wasteful luxury and useless expenditures must be eliminated. Seeking always to bring wealth to the people and order to society, the *ren* (benevolent) person avoids wasting resources on extravagant funerals and prolonged mourning **(customs promoted by the Ru and others).**

"**Heaven's Intent**" and "**Understanding Ghosts.**" Heaven is the noblest, wisest moral agent, so its intent is a reliable, objective standard of what is morally righteous (*yi*) and must be respected. Heaven

rewards those who obey its intent and punishes those who defy it, hence people should strive to be benevolent and do what is righteous. **Social and moral order (*zhi*) can be advanced by encouraging belief in ghosts and spirits who reward the good and punish the wicked.**

"**Condemning Music**" and "**Condemning Fatalism.**" The benevolent (*ren*) person opposes the extravagant musical entertainment and other luxuries enjoyed by rulers and high officials, **because these waste resources that could otherwise be used for feeding and clothing the common people.** Fatalism is not *ren*, because by teaching that our lot in life is predestined and human effort is useless, it interferes with the pursuit of economic wealth, a large population, and social order (three primary goods that the benevolent person desires for society). Fatalism fails to meet a series of justificatory criteria and so must be rejected.

When an audience with the ruler of a state was secured, different doctrines might be advocated first, depending on the circumstances in that state:

> If the state is in disorder, then expound "promoting the worthy" and "identifying upward"; if the state is poor, then expound "moderation in use" and "moderation in burial"; **if the state overindulges in musical entertainment, then expound "condemning music" and "condemning fate";** if the state is dissolute and indecorous, expound "honoring Heaven" and "serving ghosts"; if the state is devoted to aggression and intimidation, then expound "inclusive care" and "condemning aggression." (Book 49, "Questions of Lu").[3]

…

To the suggestion that tradition can serve as a reliable moral standard, they respond by distinguishing between traditional customs and morality as such, pointing out that conformity to tradition is not in itself sufficient to ensure moral correctness. **They make this point by considering—at roughly the same time Herodotus was raising similar issues in Greece—the challenge to parochial conceptions of what is right posed by the existence of disparate cultural practices.**

> Now those who uphold rich burials and prolonged mourning say: "If rich burials and prolonged mourning turn out not to be the Way of the sage-kings, then how do we explain why the gentlemen of the central states perform them without ceasing and maintain them without choosing something else?!"
>
> Our Master Mozi said, "This is what's called deeming their habits convenient and their customs righteous. **In the past, east of Yue there was the country of Gai Shu. When their eldest son was born, they chopped him up and ate him, calling this 'advantageous to the younger brothers.' When their grandfather died, they carried off their grandmother and abandoned her, saying, 'One cannot live with the wife of a ghost.'** These practices superiors took as government policy and subordinates took as custom, performing them without ceasing and maintaining them without choosing something else. Yet how could these really be the Way of benevolence and righteousness?!" (Book 25, "Moderation in Burial")

…

The text concludes that "of these three, parents, teachers, and rulers, none is acceptable as a model for order." An objective standard is needed, one that is not morally fallible in the way that any particular individual role model or cultural tradition might be. The Mohists propose that we can find such a standard by considering the attitudes of an ideally impartial, benevolent, and reliable moral agent: *Tian* (Heaven, nature, the sky), whom they revere as a quasi-personal god.

> That being so, then what is acceptable to take as a model for order? So I say, Nothing is like modeling on Heaven. **Heaven's conduct is broad and impartial; its favors are rich and incur no debt; its brightness endures without fading.** So the sage-kings modeled themselves on it. (Book 4, "Models and Standards")

…

***Fa* is among the key notions through which Mohism had an important influence on the late Warring States Confucian thinker Xunzi and his student Han Fei, leading representative of a style of realpolitik thought that later became known as the *fa jia* (school of *fa*, often translated as "legalism").**

…

The following passage explains the role of "Heaven's intent" as an ethical *fa* by likening it to the compass, a model against which the wheelwright compares objects to distinguish whether they are round or not.

> **Thus our Master Mozi's having Heaven's intent, to give an analogy, is no different from the wheelwright's having a compass or the carpenter's having a set square.** Now the

> wheelwright grasps his compass and uses it to measure the round and not round in the world, saying, “What conforms to my compass, call it ‘round,’ what doesn’t conform to my compass, call it ‘not round.’” Hence round and not round can both be known. What is the reason for this? It’s that the *fa* for “round” is clear. (Book 27, “Heaven’s Intent”)

…

In arguing against fatalism, for example, they contend that **(1) historical examples show that security and order depend on government policy, not fate: the ancient sage kings achieved peace and security under the same social conditions in which the tyrants brought turmoil and danger. (2) No one has ever actually seen or heard fate. (3) Fatalism has detrimental social consequences: If people listen to the fatalists, they will devote no effort to being virtuous or industrious.** (Oddly, the Mohists overlook the obvious fatalist rejoinders that the tyrants’ failure and sages’ success were predestined, that fate is not a physical object, and that some people are fated to be diligent, others not.) Similarly, in arguing for the existence of ghosts and spirits who reward the good and punish the wicked, the Mohists point out that **(1) the sage kings all venerated the ghosts and spirits; (2) countless well-known stories report cases in which ghosts have been seen and heard; and (3) the teaching that ghosts and spirits reward the worthy and punish the wicked has beneficial social consequences, as fear of punishment will deter people from wrongdoing.**

In contexts where empirical support is irrelevant, only the first and third standards are applied. In condemning elaborate musical shows, for instance, the writers contend that levying taxes to pay for expensive musical instruments contradicts the deeds of the sage-kings, who would tax the people only to pay for practical items such as boats and carts, which benefit everyone. Grand concerts and feasts are pleasant, but on balance they do not benefit the populace, since they interfere with work and waste resources that could otherwise be devoted to food and clothing.

…

Moreover, the Mohists seem to overlook the possibility of conflicts between the three, **such as the likelihood that certain practices of the ancient sage-kings might not benefit society today.** The third standard probably takes priority over the others, since the first stipulates only that we find some “root” in the (presumably benevolent) deeds of the sages, not that we imitate them slavishly, **and since, in a remarkable passage in Book 31 (“Elucidating Ghosts”), Mozi is depicted as arguing that even if there really are no ghosts and spirits, we should still behave as if there are, because of the social benefit that ensues.**

…

The plurality of moral standards thus leads to contention, belligerence, and wasted resources. For simplicity, we will quote mainly from the first of the three versions of the theory, which describes the state of primal anarchy in this way:

> Our Master Mozi stated, In antiquity, when people first arose, before there were penal codes and government, probably the saying was, “People have different norms of righteousness (*yi*).” Hence for one person, one norm; for two people, two norms; for ten people, ten norms—the more people, the more too the things they called ‘righteous’. Hence people deemed their norm right and by it deemed others’ norms wrong, so in interacting they deemed each other—wrong. **Thus, inside the family, fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers became resentful and scattered, unable to remain together with each other peacefully. The people of the world all injured each other with water, fire, and poison.** It reached the point that, having surplus strength, they couldn’t use it to labor for each other; letting surplus resources rot, they didn’t share them with each other; and concealing good *dao* (ways), they didn’t teach them to each other. The disorder (*luan*) in the world was like that among the birds and beasts. (Book 11, “Identifying Upward”)

…

To assist him in unifying the world’s morality, the sovereign, or “Son of Heaven,” appoints three dukes, **who help him to divide the world into myriad states and appoint a lord for each.** These lords in turn appoint other officials down to the level of the district, village, or clan head, until a complete hierarchical political system is established.

…

The village head leads his village to emulate the district head, who in turn leads his district to emulate the lord of the state. The lords of states lead their people to emulate the Son of Heaven, who brings order to all under heaven. The Son of Heaven is still fallible, however, and so cannot be the highest moral paragon. Above him is Heaven (*Tian*), to which the people must ultimately conform. In the Mohist myth, politics is not distinct from ethics and religion, **and unlike in Hobbes, the sovereign’s power is not absolute, for he must answer to independent moral standards.**

> **If the people of the world all identify upward with the Son of Heaven but don't identify upward with Heaven, then disasters still will not go away.** Now if in the heavens whirlwinds and bitter rain come again and again, this is how Heaven punishes the people for not identifying upward with Heaven. (Book 11, "Identifying Upward")

…

The individualist stance of the selfish, rational egoist does not occur to the Mohists as an alternative to be addressed or refuted. Nor do they see room for a distinction between public and private morality, between values that everyone must share in order to maintain a stable society and values about which individuals can disagree without disrupting social harmony.

The Mohists devote little or no attention to the rights, liberty, or equality of individuals, nor even to the question of what the most fulfilling kind of individual life is. They simply assume that the best life is one of adherence to *yi* (morality, duty) and thus of promoting overall utility. The paradigmatic individual—the benevolent person (*ren ren*)—is one who devotes himself to "promoting the benefit of and eliminating harm to the world." Legitimate individual interests are identified through the individual's role in the social project. The Mohists, like the Confucians, see individuals as largely constituted by the hierarchical, relational social roles they occupy, such as ruler or subject, father or son, elder or younger brother, male or female, elder or youth, or member of a family or community. It is primarily as occupants of such roles that individuals have ethical norms to follow and interests to pursue.

This communitarian focus is a major point of contrast with Western social contract theories and utilitarian political theory. Utilitarians and social contract theorists (excepting perhaps Rousseau) typically treat individuals' interests as primary and construct social good out of individual good. **The state is justified because it promotes individuals' rights and interests better than any alternative.** For the Mohists, by contrast, the state is instrumentally justified because social order (*zhi*) is an intrinsic good, sought by all, and government by a hierarchy of moral leaders is needed to achieve it.

…

Mohist political theory probably strongly influenced later Warring States political thinkers, such as the Confucian Xunzi and his two most famous students, the realpolitik theorist Han Fei and the statesman Li Si, political architect of China's first empire. Yet this strand of authoritarian political thought did not lack critics. The Mohist conception of social order (*zhi*), along with those of Xunzi and Han Fei, epitomize views that are attacked sharply in ancient Daoist texts such as the *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi*. By contrast, some parts of the *Zhuangzi* imply a relatively liberal political stance, on which individuals would probably be allowed the maximum amount of liberty compatible with avoiding social conflict.

…

The other prominent Mohist political doctrine, "promoting the worthy," contends that to ensure the success of the state in securing wealth, a large population, and social order, appointments to the bureaucracy must be based on ethical merit and professional ability. Talented commoners should be considered for office as well as those from elite backgrounds (particularly kinsmen of the ruler). **This doctrine is partly a response to new administrative challenges arising from population growth, economic expansion, and interstate military rivalry, which called for a move beyond the traditional feudal system and the development of a more specialized, professional cohort of government officials.** It is also a reaction against nepotism and incompetence and an appeal for greater equality of opportunity for those of non-elite origin, such as the Mohists themselves.

Above all, however, the doctrine is an important complement to the Mohist moral education and incentive system, an integral part of the implementation of the unified moral norms the Mohists see as crucial to social order and political legitimacy. For the system to work, it must be perceived as applying consistent, unified norms to promote and reward the worthy while offering a fair opportunity for advancement to all. Otherwise, those below will may be unable to identify with the system and thus may see no reason to emulate their superiors or cooperate with the state. **Consistent with their communitarian orientation, the Mohists' defense of equality of opportunity does not rest on the individualist view that, other things being equal, people intrinsically deserve to be treated similarly.** The argument is rather that the utility of the state and society is promoted by employing the most qualified candidates, without regard for their social background, both because of their competence and because the state must be publicly perceived as enforcing unified, consistent standards.

…

Unlike the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, Mohist consequentialism seeks to promote not individual happiness, but a range of goods, many of them public or collective. The general notion of "benefit" refers to an objective list of three sorts of goods: **material wealth, a large population or family, and social order.** These goods provide relatively concrete moral criteria. Practices and

institutions that tend to advance them are benevolent and righteous; those that do not are malicious and wrong.

> Might it be that, supposing we model ourselves on their statements, use their plans, and have rich burials with prolonged mourning, this can really enrich the poor, increase the few, secure the endangered, and bring order to the disordered? Then this is benevolent, righteous, and the task of a filial son. In planning for others, it is unacceptable not to encourage it. The benevolent will promote it throughout the world, establish it and make the people praise it, and never abandon it.
>
> On the other hand, suppose that, modeling ourselves on their statements, using their plans, and having rich burials and prolonged mourning, this really cannot enrich the poor, increase the few, secure the endangered, and bring order to the disordered. Then this is not benevolent, not righteous, and not the task of a filially devoted son. In planning for others, it is unacceptable not to discourage it. The benevolent will seek to eliminate it from the world, abandon it and make people deem it wrong, and never do it. (Book 25, "Moderation in Burial")

…

Contrary to a common misperception, Mohist ethics does not advocate that we treat everyone alike, but only that we have similar moral concern for everyone.

…

The ethical guideline for which the Mohists are most well known is *jian ai*, sometimes translated as "universal love" but probably better rendered as "inclusive care." *Jian* (together, jointly) in this context has the connotation of including everyone in society together within a whole. **Like the English 'care', *ai* (love, care) is ambiguous, since it may refer to a range of attitudes from strong affection to detached concern.** In Mohist texts the word typically seems to refer to a dispassionate concern about the welfare of its object.

Inclusive care was generally not the doctrine that attracted criticism from the Mohists' contemporaries. **Ancient critics objected mostly to their frugal, austere lifestyle, opposition to music, and plain burial practices, which recognized no differences in social rank. Little was said about their core ethical doctrines. The exception was Mencius, who is reported to have equated inclusive care with renouncing one's father (for this reason, he dismissed Mozi as a "beast").** Many later Confucian critics have followed Mencius in focusing on inclusive care, maintaining that it runs counter to human nature.

…

The Mohists contrast inclusive concern with an attitude they call "exclusion" **(*bie*, distinguishing or separating off as "other").** This attitude is not, as sometimes thought, one of distinguishing differences of degree in our concern for others, according to the closeness of their relation to us. Indeed, the Mohists never seriously consider that alternative.[16] **Rather, *bie* refers to "despising and hurting others," excluding them from moral consideration altogether.** So the Mohists' case is for inclusive care as against complete disregard for others.

…

Oddly, then, the consequences and examples of inclusive care described elsewhere in the texts suggest that the practical requirements of the doctrine are not especially burdensome. Indeed, the specific examples given largely conform to what many citizens of contemporary Western liberal democracies would consider commonsense moral decency. The actual practice of inclusive care seems to demand no more than the absence of harm or hostility to others; virtuous performance of our social roles as ruler, subject, father, son, or brother, thus contributing to the welfare of our family and community; helping friends and neighbors in need; and assisting the elderly, solitary, and orphaned, who have no family to care for them. **Since lacking a family is identified as the main reason people are likely to need assistance, we can infer that the Mohists take the family to be the primary institution for meeting people's needs, and that in practice inclusive care normally involves caring chiefly for our own family. The only individuals expected to work equally on behalf of everyone are government leaders, who are responsible for benefiting all of their subjects. So we find a gap between the description of inclusive care as the attitude of caring equally for everyone and the practical examples in the texts. The latter suggest that inclusive care does not require extensive self-sacrifice or altruism, but is mainly a matter of looking after our family, neighbors, and community and not interfering with others as they attempt to do the same.**

The later Mohist texts provide an explanation of this disparity, though one might dispute whether we are justified in reading the later doctrine into the earlier essays. **Fragments preserved in the *Da Qu*, Book 44 of the *Mozi*, maintain that we are to care equally for everyone, but to benefit some people more and others less, depending on the nature of their relation to us. Equal care does not entail equal treatment.** How we treat people is determined by the notion of righteousness (*yi*),

which is based on intrinsic goods such as social order (*zhi*), the Mohists' conception of which, as we saw above, entails that we do more for those standing in close relationships to us. The later Mohist view is roughly that attributed to a Mohist named Yi Zhi in a dialogue in the *Mencius* (3A:5): **"In care, no degrees; in practice, begin from what is close."**
…

The first and most obvious objection is that inclusive care is too difficult. In response, the Mohists claim that in fact it is far less difficult than other deeds rulers have led their people to perform in the past, such as sacrificing their lives, limiting their diets, and wearing rough clothing. **Inclusive care seems difficult only because people don't recognize that it is to their long-term benefit. If, as Mohist political theory proposes, institutions are set up to encourage cooperation and prevent abuse, then "within a generation" people can be led to practice it, because several existing lines of motivation will converge to support it.** First, people naturally tend to emulate admired and respected leaders, so if rulers encourage inclusive care, people will tend to practice it. Second, rulers can institute rewards and punishments so that practicing inclusive care is in everyone's short-term self-interest. Third, people naturally tend to reciprocate good treatment, so caring for and benefiting others is in our long-term self-interest.
…

The last objection considered is that inclusive care may fail to benefit one's parents and thus interfere with filial piety. **The Mohists' response is that a filial son would desire that others care about and benefit his parents. An effective way to achieve this end, they contend, is by caring for and benefiting others' parents, leading others to reciprocate in kind.** (Here, as in their reply to the first objection, the Mohists make the plausible assumption that humans have a natural tendency toward reciprocity.)
…

Heaven's intention can serve as a fundamental ethical *fa* (model, standard), one that is clear and easy for anyone to apply, just as a craftsman's measuring tools are.

> **Thus our Master Mozi's having Heaven's intention, to give an analogy, is no different from the wheelwright's having a compass or the carpenter's having a set square.** … Above, he uses it to measure how the kings, dukes, and great men of the world administer the penal codes and government; below, he uses it to gauge how the myriad people of the world engage in writings and studies and present statements and discussions. Observe their conduct; if it follows Heaven's intention, call it good intentions and conduct; if it opposes Heaven's intention, call it bad intentions and conduct. Observe their statements and discussions; if they follow Heaven's intention, call them good statements and discussions; if they oppose Heaven's intention, call them bad statements and discussions. Observe their penal codes and government; if they follow Heaven's intention, call them good penal codes and government; if they oppose Heaven's intention, call them bad penal codes and government. So he sets this up as a *fa* (model), establishes this as a standard, and uses it to measure the benevolence (*ren*) and unbenevolence of the kings, dukes, great men, secretaries, and ministers in the world, and, to give an analogy, it is like dividing black from white.

…

Still, there are strong grounds for denying that the Mohists hold a divine command theory. First, the texts never analyze, define, or explain the notion of righteousness (*yi*) in terms of Heaven's intention. To the contrary, all four of the texts about Heaven's intention assign it an epistemic role, as a test or criterion by which to distinguish right from wrong. They argue that Heaven's intention can be taken as a model (*fa*) or canon (*jing*) of righteousness (*yi*). This claim asserts an extensional equivalence, not an analysis, definition, or exposition. **The point is that Heaven's intention and 'righteousness' distinguish the same things, not that what is righteous is so because it is Heaven's intention. Even the claim that righteousness "issues from" Heaven need not be read as implying anything stronger than that a righteous society can exist only when people all follow the model or example set by Heaven's intentions and conduct.**

Second, and more important, the Mohists give independent moral reasons to support their claim that Heaven's intention is a reliable moral guide. Their grounds are not simply the religious belief that Heaven must be obeyed because it is a deity or because it punishes disobedience. Rather, they argue that Heaven is a guide to what is benevolent and righteous because it is a supremely noble, wise, impartial, benevolent, and reliable agent. Their reasons apply evaluative concepts of benevolence, righteousness, good government, and social order (*zhi*) that are independent of Heaven's intention. To support their contention that Heaven desires what is righteous (*yi*), for example, they characterize righteousness as comprising life, wealth, and order and claim that Heaven desires these. **Phrased in terms of the *Euthyphro* dilemma, their stance is fairly clear: What is righteous is not righteous *because* Heaven intends it. Rather, Heaven intends it because it is righteous.** Heaven's conduct and intentions exemplify moral norms that hold independently of its intent.

Given how the Mohists' conception of Heaven fits into the framework of their ethics, the appeal to Heaven to justify and explicate their normative stance risks circularity. **Their conception of Heaven is in effect that of a morally ideal sovereign, whom they characterize as wise or all-knowing, all-embracing, benevolent, generous, and impartial.** The Mohists imply that the correct moral norms are those that such an agent would follow or intend that human beings follow. The problem is that the characteristics they build into this conception of an ideal agent are just those they already hold should be articulated by a satisfactory ethical theory, such as impartial, benevolent concern for the welfare of all. **Arguably, then, the appeal to Heaven does not justify Mohist ethics so much as simply illustrate or articulate it.**
…

With a handful of exceptions, Mohist ethics dismisses aesthetic value and overlooks the psychophysical fulfillment achieved through the exercise of acquired skills—goods that are central to the Confucian and Daoist ways of life. Little attention is devoted to individual happiness or fulfillment or to articulating a conception of well-rounded human excellence. Moreover, the Mohist conception of morality can at times seem aggressively one-sided and burdensome. One passage in the *Mozi* presents a conception of ideal human flourishing as a life of complete devotion to moral duty:

> When silent, ponder; when speaking, instruct; when acting, work. Make these three alternate and surely you will be a sage. You must eliminate happiness and eliminate anger, eliminate joy and eliminate sorrow, eliminate fondness and eliminate dislike, and use benevolence and righteousness. Your hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears undertaking righteousness, surely you will be a sage. (Book 47, "Valuing Righteousness")

…

To be fair, however, the Mohists' minimalist conception of welfare may have been a reasonable response to the difficult social and economic circumstances in which they lived, particularly as representatives of sub-elite social classes. Their texts imply an environment in which hardship due to poverty, poor harvests, cold, hunger, or war is never far off. So naturally they focus on the basic goods needed for physical and economic security: a stable government, material wealth, strong family bonds, and charity to neighbors in need. **Mohism is in effect a refugee ethic, born from hard times, that values material welfare and parsimony above all else.** Their doctrine of "Moderation in Use" advocates eliminating all luxuries—particularly those of the aristocracy—and reducing consumption of food, clothing, and housing to the minimum level needed for basic comfort. **If conditions are really as harsh as the Mohists imply—a premise that Xunzi, a friend of the aristocracy, will deny—then their narrow focus is defensible,** and in arguing that elaborate musical shows and burial practices are wasteful and immoral, for instance, they are on firm ground. The problem is that the Mohists never reflect on the possibility that in more prosperous and egalitarian conditions, music and other cultural activities could be valuable contributions to human well-being.

If Mohist ethics faces a problem of moral motivation, it is probably because their impoverished conception of human welfare excludes too much that people genuinely value. **When the *Zhuangzi* criticizes the Mohists for "going against the heart of all under heaven," it is not referring to inclusive care, but to their severe, frugal lifestyle. As Xunzi said, "Mozi was blinkered by utility and did not recognize adornment"** (*Xunzi*, Book 21, "Dispelling Blindness").
…

***Tian* does not exist outside of time, space, or nature, nor is it considered perfect or unchanging. It is not the creator of nature, but rather *is* nature, or part thereof. (Combined with '*di*' (earth), the word '*tian*' forms the compound '*tian-di*' (sky-and-earth), which refers to the natural world.) *Tian* is personified as a sociopolitical authority, but it is considerably less anthropomorphic than the Judeo-Christian God. It has desires and intentions, and it speaks, but only as if thinking to itself, not directly to humans.** *Tian* generally does not inform humans of its desires or intentions by revelation (though in crises it may dispatch a spirit envoy, such as a fantastic talking bird). **Rather, we must discern them for ourselves by observing its behavior. Humans sacrifice to *Tian*, but usually do not pray to it or address it directly.** However, we do have an implicit agreement with
Tian that if we conform to its desires, it will reward us in turn. Specifically, care for and benefit to others will be rewarded, contempt and injury punished.

The Mohists have no concept of religious salvation or of another realm to which we go after death. (*Tian* is of course not a transcendent place or realm but an embodiment of nature.) When people die, they become ghosts, which exist within the natural world. Unlike in Christianity, people are not rewarded or punished in the next world for their deeds in this one. **Rather, the Mohists insist that *Tian* and the ghosts will reward and punish people while they are alive.** As one might expect, this belief was strongly challenged by the Mohists' opponents, who pointed out instances in

which it is at odds with everyday experience. **Unfortunately, the Mohist responses to these criticisms in the end amount mainly to ad hoc excuses.**

Despite the genuine tone of reverence in the Mohists' descriptions of *Tian*, some readers find Mohist religion to lack the sense of holiness, religious awe, and spiritual transcendence that contemporary Westerners customarily associate with religion, particularly in contrast with Confucian appreciation of the beauty of ritual or Daoist wonder at the mysteries of nature. The mundane tone of their religious thought is perhaps partly due to the Mohists' general disregard of aesthetic and cultural value. **Yet it would be indefensibly parochial to expect them to conform to a modern Westerner's conception of religiosity, since the comparatively mundane character of Mohist religion is typical of much traditional Chinese folk religion.**
…

This status is attested by no less an authority than Mencius, who lamented that "the statements of Mo Di and Yang Zhu [another rival thinker] fill the world," and by the attention Xunzi devotes to refuting Mohist economic doctrines. Though their importance is routinely slighted in Confucian-biased accounts of Chinese thought, the Mohists articulated much of the theoretical framework of early Chinese epistemology, logic, political theory, and ethics. **Their ideas were a crucial stimulus for Mencius, Xunzi, the Daoists, and the so-called "legalist" political thinkers, all of whom either borrowed Mohist ideas or developed their own views partly in reaction to them.** One sign of the Mohists' status is that their shared critics typically paired them with the Confucians (*Ru*) as a bloc, referring to the two as *Ru-Mo*, the two "moralizing" schools devoted to *ren* (benevolence) and *yi* (righteousness). **Confucianism owes an unacknowledged debt to Mohism for its notion of comprehensive moral concern, as reflected, for instance, in Mencius's doctrine of extending our natural concern for kin so that it reaches everyone.** The phrase "inclusive care" begins to appear in Confucian texts toward the end of the Warring States era—a late passage in the *Xunzi* refers to "comprehensive benefit and inclusive care" (Book 25)—and by the Han dynasty, we find the Confucian Gongsun Hong explaining the virtue of *ren* (benevolence) in explicitly Mohist terms, as "extending benefit and eliminating harm, inclusively caring without partiality" (*Han Shu*, Vol. 58).[18]

With few exceptions, Chinese thought after the Han turned away from the Mohists' epistemological, semantic, and logical interests to focus on moral metaphysics and moral psychology, thus passing over what might have been their chief legacy. **Hence Mohism is sometimes depicted as a splinter movement not genuinely representative of the Chinese philosophical tradition. This view is false and anachronistic, however.** Much of what is plausible or intriguing in Mohist thought directly reflects concepts, assumptions, and problems that were elements of mainstream Warring States intellectual discourse.

Following the unification of China under the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE), the Mohist movement declined, eventually vanishing altogether by the middle of the Western Han (206 BCE-24 CE). After Confucianism won imperial favor in 136 BCE, Confucius gradually came to be venerated as China's greatest sage. Mozi and his school fell into neglect and obscurity, their texts largely unread. Centuries later, **the bulk of the *Mozi* was nearly lost to history, surviving only because it had been copied into a massive collection of Daoist scripture.** Interest in Mohism revived only late in the Qing dynasty (1644-1911 CE), when scholars, stimulated partly by contact with the West, went looking for untapped intellectual resources in their own tradition, particularly materials related to science and logic.

A number of factors can be cited to explain Mohism's decline and disappearance. **Graham is probably right, for instance, to suggest that after the Qin unification, the Mohists lost the political influence they had exerted as expert craftsmen and defense specialists who helped smaller states survive during the Warring States era** (1989, p. 34). But the major factor is probably that as a social and philosophical movement, Mohism gradually collapsed into irrelevance. **By the middle of the former Han dynasty, the more appealing aspects of Mohist thought were all shared with rival schools. Their core ethical doctrines had largely been absorbed into Confucianism, though in a modified and unsystematic form.** Key features of their political philosophy were probably shared with most other political thinkers, and their trademark opposition to warfare had been rendered effectively redundant by unification. **The philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and science of the later Mohist Canons were recorded in difficult, dense texts that would have been nearly unintelligible to most readers (and that in any case quickly became corrupt). What remained as distinctively Mohist was a package of harsh, unappealing economic and cultural views, such as their obsession with parsimony and their rejection of music and ritual.** Compared with the classical learning and rituals of the Confucians, the speculative metaphysics of Yin-Yang thinkers, and the romantic nature mysticism and literary sophistication of the Daoists, Mohism offered little to attract adherents, especially politically powerful ones.
…

Unwilling or unable to modify their doctrines or to develop new positions in response to their changing social and intellectual setting, the Mohists probably died out in the imperial era because their Warring States reformist social and political platform had become obsolete.

http://www.silkqin.com/02qnpu/32zczz/mozihanyu.htm

Confucians criticize Mohists for "Obeying One's Superior," "Universal Love," "Honoring the Worthy" and "Understanding Ghosts."[1]

Yet Kongzi was "in awe of great people."[2] When he resided in a state he did not condemn its Chief Counselors. The *Spring and Autumn Annals* criticized ministers who usurped power. Is this not "Agreeing with One's Superior"?

Kongzi "cared broadly" and "was close to the benevolent." He regarded "benefiting broadly" and "saving the masses" as being a sage. Is this not "Impartial Caring"?

Kongzi "treated worthies as worthy." He praised his disciples according to four qualities, and "lamented an age too decadent for words." Is this not "Honoring the Worthy"?

Kongzi "performed sacrifices as if present," criticizing performing sacrifices as if one were not there, saying, "If I perform sacrifices, then I shall receive good fortune." Is this not "Understanding Ghosts"?

Confucians and Mohists are the same in approving of Yao and Shun, and are the same in disapproving of Jie and Tyrant Zhou. They are the same in cultivating oneself and rectifying one's heart in order to bring order to the world and the state.

How is it, then, that they are not pleased with one another? **I believe that the dispute basically began when later students each advanced the theories of their teacher, and condemned the Way of the other teacher. Kongzi would definitely have employed Mozi; Mozi would definitely have employed Kongzi. If they had not employed each other they would have been unworthy to be Confucians or Mohists.**

> [Translator's Comment: *If Han Yu had read the Mohist essays carefully, he would have seen that they explicitly condemn Confucian doctrines and even impugn the character of Kongzi himself. (It is possible, as A.C. Graham has suggested, that the Mohist writings were actually not available for Han Yu to consult, and that he only knew the titles of some of the essays.)* ***What is most interesting about "On Reading Mozi" is not that Han Yu is mistaken, though. What is interesting is that even a harsh critic of Buddhism like Han Yu had been so influenced by Buddhist ideas that he did not see a fundamental tension between universal love and Confucian filial piety.*** *Confucians have always thought we should have some concern for everyone ("Within the Four Seas, all are brothers," says Analects 12.5). But they have also stressed our special obligations to our loved ones (**"Does [the Mohist] truly hold that one's affection for one's elder brother's son is like one's affection for one's neighbor's baby?"** Mengzi asks rhetorically in passage 3A5).* ***The influence of Buddhist ideals pushes Confucianism more toward universal love, and School of the Way ("Neo-Confucian") philosophers wrestle with how to reconcile universal love with filial piety.*** *See, for example, Zhang Zai's "Western Inscription" and Cheng Yi's "Letter in Response to Yang Shi's Letter on the 'Western Inscription.'"*]

---

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0072%3Abook%3D14%3Achapter%3D3%3Asection%3D3arg

These are in fact of this sort: that Plato in his great number of works nowhere makes mention of Xenophon, nor, on the other hand, does Xenophon mention Plato in his writings, although both men, and in particular Plato in the dialogues which he wrote, mention many followers of Socrates.
...

Moreover, they think that this also is added to what I have already said: **that Xenophon, in the book which he wrote as records of the sayings and doings of Socrates,[2] asserts that Socrates never discussed the causes and laws of the heavens and of nature, and that he never touched upon or approved the other sciences, called by the Greeks μαθήματα which did not contribute to a good and happy life;** accordingly, he says that those who have attributed discourses of that kind to Socrates are guilty of a base falsehood. “But when Xenophon wrote this,” they say, “he of course refers to Plato, in whose works Socrates discourses on physics, music and geometry.”

> http://revista.hegelbrasil.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/1-ROCKMORE-_.pdf-prova_.pdf
>
> Yet few philosophers have been as influential as Hegel in changing the world in which we live. **It is well said that Hegel’s rightwing and leftwing students met on the field of battle at Stalingrad.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n195/mode/2up?view=theater

Plato himself was enthralled by the vague figure of Pythagoras. At every turn he takes from him—in his scorn of democracy, his yearning for a communistic aristocracy of philosopher rulers, his conception of virtue as harmony, his theories of the nature and destiny of the soul, his love of geometry, and his addiction to the mysticism of number.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythagoras#Later_influence_in_antiquity
>
> **Bertrand Russell, in his *A History of Western Philosophy*, contends that the influence of Pythagoras on Plato and others was so great that he should be considered the most influential philosopher of all time.**[242]

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178%3Atext%3DGorg.%3Asection%3D507e

And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth [508a] **and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship,** by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order,[1] not of disorder or dissoluteness. **Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: <u>you hold that self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry.</u>**

> 1. **Κόσμος (“order”) was the name first given to the universe by the Pythagoreans.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The *Gorgias* passage already quoted26 continues with a reference to the importance of *geometrical* equality in the cosmos – a principle which does not give the same status to all, but assigns to each his rightful place; and we shall see that Aristotle, following the lines of thought not far removed from Plato’s, did come to think **in terms of a graded system which partly excused, partly revised the traditional distinctions of sex and class and race.**
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Dion*.html#ref13
>
> 13 1 Such was the condition of affairs when Plato came to Sicily,[13] and in the first instances he met with astonishing friendliness and honour. 2 For a royal chariot, magnificently adorned, awaited him as he left his trireme, and the tyrant offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the great blessing that had been bestowed upon his government. 3 Moreover, the modesty that characterized his banquets, the decorum of the courtiers, and the mildness of the tyrant himself in all his dealings with the public, inspired the citizens with marvellous hopes of his reformation. 4 **There was also something like a general rush for letters and philosophy, and the palace was filled with dust, as they say, owing to the multitude of geometricians there.**[14]
> …
>
> 2 And some pretended to be indignant that the Athenians, who in former times had sailed to Sicily with large land and sea forces, but had perished utterly without taking Syracuse, 3 **should now, by means of one sophist, overthrow the tyranny of Dionysius, by persuading him to dismiss his ten thousand body-guards, and abandon his four hundred triremes and his ten thousand horsemen and his many times that number of men-at-arms, in order to seek in Academic philosophy for a mysterious good, <u>and make geometry his guide to happiness</u>,** surrendering the happiness that was based on dominion and wealth and luxury to Dion and Dion's nephews and nieces.
> …
>
> 2 But after time and intercourse had accustomed Dionysius to tolerate his society and discourse, **just as a wild beast learns to have dealings with men,** he conceived a passion for him that was worthy of a tyrant, demanding that he alone should have his love returned by Plato and be admired beyond all others, and he was ready to entrust Plato with the administration of the tyranny if only he would not set his friendship for Dion above that which he had for him.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n385/mode/2up?view=theater

Plato was the culmination of a development that began with Parmenides; he played Hegel to Parmenides’ Kant; and though he scattered condemnation lavishly, he never ceased to reverence his metaphysical father. In the little town of Elea, on the western coast of Italy, 450 years before Christ, there began for Europe that philosophy of idealism which was to wage through every subsequent century an obstinate war against materialism.* The mysterious problem of knowledge, the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, between the unseen real and the unreal seen, was flung into the caldron of European

thought, and was to boil or simmer there through Greek and medieval days until, in Kant, it would explode again in a philosophical revolution.

As Kant was "awakened" by Hume, so Parmenides was aroused to philosophy by Xenophanes; perhaps his was one of many minds stirred by Xenophanes' declaration that the gods were myths, and that there was only one reality, which was both world and God. Parmenides studied with the Pythagoreans also, and absorbed something of their passion for astronomy.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA167#v=onepage&q&f=false

Modern academic philosophy, however, especially in the person of Immanuel Kant, sought to divert attention from the Greeks (and from the ancient Chinese) toward a national German philosophy. **Nor did the later Greeks themselves help in their estimation of earlier thinkers: "Initially Kantian philosophy closed our eyes to the seriousness of the Eleatics; even the later Greek systems (Aristotle) regarded the Eleatic problems too superficially."**

Having rejected these misconceptions and misdirections, Nietzsche must detail his case for the value of the pre-Platonics. **Before that case is developed over a semester of lectures, he must address a question no doubt plaguing everyone in his audience:**

> Now it remains to be explained why I am considering "pre-Platonic" philosophers as a group and not pre-Socratics. **Plato is the first grand *mixed character* both in his philosophy and in his philosophical typology. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements are unified in his theory of the Ideas:** it should not, without further qualification, be called an original conception. Also, as a human being he possesses the traits of the regally proud Heraclitus; of the melancholy, secretive, and legislative Pythagoras; and of the reflective dialectician Socrates. **All subsequent philosophers are of this sort of mixed philosophical type.** In contrast, this series of pre-Platonics presents the pure and unmixed types, in terms of philosopheme as well as of character. Socrates is the last in this series. Whoever wishes to do so may call them all "one-sided." In any case, they are genuine "discoverers." **For all those afterward, it became infinitely easier to philosophize.** They [the pre-Platonics] had to find the path from myth to laws of nature, from image to concept, from religion to science.

The *Nachlaß* offers a note explaining Plato as a mixed type. **Plato was a Heraclitean at first and consequently a skeptic; everything, even thought, is in flux. He is brought by Socrates to see the persistence of goodness, which was accepted as Being.** Through Pythagoras's transmigration of the soul, he could answer how we already know something of the Ideas.26 In another note Nietzsche writes, "**I am speaking of the pre-Platonics, because open hostility to, the negation of, culture begins with Plato.** I want to know, though, how philosophy which is not an enemy, behaves toward a culture at hand or in development: **here [Plato] is the philosopher as poison-mixer to culture.**"27 (In the next note Nietzsche simply gives a possible title for "The Pre-Platonic Philosophers": "The Philosopher as Physician to Culture." We see already a trope used throughout the later, better-known works: "we physicians.")

With this stipulation Nietzsche distinguished himself from the received manners of terminology and method, but then again, everything about his approach challenged the common opinion that the Greeks, especially the pre-Socratics, offer only quaint fragments of parchment of no currency to modern thought, especially to thought as developed as Kantianism, the centerpiece of German spirit for many at that time. Thus he returns again to dismiss sentiments we now find so implausible:

> "It is true misfortune that we have so little left from these original philosophers, and we involuntarily measure them too modestly, **whereas from Plato onwards voluminous literary legacies lie before us.** Many [scholars] would assign the books [of the pre-Platonics] to their own providence, a fate of the books [*fatum libellorum*]. **This could only be malicious, though, if it deprives us of Heraclitus, the wonderful poem of Empedocles, [or] the writings of Democritus, which the ancients compared to Plato, and if it wants to spoil them for us by means of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cicero.**"

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_III

He mixed together doctrines of Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans and Socrates. **In his doctrine of sensible things he agrees with Heraclitus, in his doctrine of the intelligible with Pythagoras, and in political philosophy with Socrates.**

9. Some authorities, amongst them Satyrus, say that he wrote to Dion in Sicily instructing him to purchase three Pythagorean books from Philolaus for 100 minae. For they say he was well off, having received from Dionysius over eighty talents. This is stated by Onetor in an essay upon the theme, "Whether a wise man will make money."

…

He made three voyages to Sicily, the first time to see the island and the craters of Etna: on this occasion Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates, being on the throne, forced him to become intimate with him. **But when Plato held forth on tyranny and maintained that the interest of the ruler alone was not the best end, unless he were also pre-eminent in virtue, he offended Dionysius, who in his anger exclaimed, "You talk like an old dotard." "And you like a tyrant," rejoined Plato.** 19. At this the tyrant grew furious and at first was bent on putting him to death; then, when he had been dissuaded from this by Dion and Aristomenes, he did not indeed go so far but handed him over to Pollis the Lacedaemonian, who had just then arrived on an embassy, with orders to sell him into slavery. And Pollis took him to Aegina and there offered him for sale.
…

20. Anniceris the Cyrenaic happened to be present and ransomed him for twenty minae – according to others the sum was thirty minae – and dispatched him to Athens to his friends, who immediately remitted the money. But Anniceris declined it, saying that the Athenians were not the only people worthy of the privilege of providing for Plato. **Others assert that Dion sent the money and that Anniceris would not take it, but bought for Plato the little garden which is in the Academy.** Pollis, however, is stated to have been defeated by Chabrias and afterwards to have been drowned at Helice,[16] his treatment of the philosopher having provoked the wrath of heaven, as Favorinus says in the first book of his *Memorabilia*.

> 16. In the tidal wave which swallowed up ten Lacedaemonian triremes in the great earthquake of 372 B.C.: Aelian, *Hist. Animal.* xi. 19.

21. Dionysius, indeed, could not rest. On learning the facts he wrote and enjoined upon Plato not to speak evil of him. And Plato replied that he had not the leisure to keep Dionysius in his mind.

The second time he visited the younger Dionysius, requesting of him lands and settlers for the realization of his republic. Dionysius promised them but did not keep his word. Some say that Plato was also in great danger, being suspected of encouraging Dion and Theodotas in a scheme for liberating the whole island; on this occasion Archytas the Pythagorean wrote to Dionysius, procured his pardon, and got him conveyed safe to Athens.
…

23. The third time he came to reconcile Dion and Dionysius, but, failing to do so, returned to his own country without achieving anything. And there he refrained from meddling with politics, although his writings show that he was a statesman. **The reason was that the people had already been accustomed to measures and institutions quite different from his own. Pamphila in the twenty-fifth book of her *Memorabilia* says that the Arcadians and Thebans, when they were founding Megalopolis, invited Plato to be their legislator; but that, when he discovered that they were opposed to equality of possessions, he refused to go.**[17]

> http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist2.xhtml#chap42
>
> The fame of *Plato* and renown of his Vertue came to the *Arcadians* and *Thebans*, who thereupon sent Embassadours earnestly to request him to come over to them, not onely to instruct their young men in Philosophy, but, which was a higher concernment, to ordain Laws. They were ready to have obtained what they desired of him; for the son of *Aristo* was pleased with the invitation, and intended to yield to them. **He asked the Embassadours how they stood affected to Equality of estates: when understanding by them that they were so averse from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refused to goe.**

…

And, as he was the first to attack the views of almost all his predecessors, the question is raised why he makes no mention of Democritus.
…

And it seems that Xenophon was not on good terms with him. At any rate, they have written similar narratives as if out of rivalry with each other, a *Symposium*, a *Defence of Socrates*, and their moral treatises or *Memorabilia*.[41] Next, the one wrote a *Republic*, the other a *Cyropaedia*. And in the *Laws*[42] Plato declares the story of the education of Cyrus to be a fiction, for that Cyrus did not answer to the description of him. **And although both make mention of Socrates, neither of them refers to the other, except that Xenophon mentions Plato in the third book of his *Memorabilia*.** 35. It is said also that Antisthenes, being about to read publicly something that he had composed, invited Plato to be present. And on his inquiring what he was about to read, Antisthenes replied that it was something about the impossibility of contradiction. "How then," said Plato, "can you write on this subject?" thus showing him that the argument refutes itself. Thereupon he wrote a dialogue

against Plato and entitled it *Sathon*. After this they continued to be estranged from one another. **They say that, on hearing Plato read the *Lysis*, Socrates exclaimed, "By Heracles, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!"** For he has included in the dialogue much that Socrates never said.
…

Now where he has a firm grasp Plato expounds his own view and refutes the false one, but, if the subject is obscure, he suspends judgement. His own views are expounded by four persons, Socrates, Timaeus, the Athenian Stranger,[57]
the Eleatic Stranger.[58] These strangers are not, as some hold, Plato and Parmenides, but imaginary characters without names,[59] for, even when Socrates and Timaeus are the speakers, it is Plato's doctrines that are laid down.
…

56. But, just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, **Thespis devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was completed, so too with philosophy: in early times it discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection.**
…

67. The doctrines he approved are these.[66] **He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies,[67] and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical;[68]** and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. He held that it is self-moved and tripartite, the rational part of it having its seat in the head, the passionate part about the heart, while the appetitive is placed in the region of the navel and the liver.[69]
…

78. On good and evil he would discourse to this effect. **He maintained that the end to aim at is assimilation to God,** that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness, but that it needs in addition, as instruments for use, first, bodily advantages like health and strength, sound senses and the like, and, secondly, external advantages such as wealth, good birth and reputation. But the wise man will be no less happy even if he be without these things.
…

And in the dialogues he conceived righteousness to be the law of God because it is stronger to incite men to do righteous acts, that malefactors may not be punished after death also. 80. **Hence to some he appeared too fond of myths. These narratives he intermingles with his works in order to deter men from wickedness, by reminding them how little they know of what awaits them[92] after death.** Such, then, are the doctrines he approved.
…

Monarchy is either regulated by law or hereditary. **At Carthage the kingship is regulated by law, the office being put up for sale.[94]**

> 94. **Plato probably refers to Carthage when he mentions *purchasable* kingship, ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι, amongst barbarians, *Rep.* 544 d.** Aristotle repeats the epithet in his description of the Carthaginian constitution, *Pol.* ii. 11, 1273 a 36. Polybius says that at Carthage magistrates attain office, δῶρα φανερῶς διδόντες, vi. 56. 4.

83. But the monarchy in Lacedaemon and in Macedonia is hereditary, for they select the king from a certain family. **A tyranny is that form in which the citizens are ruled either through fraud or force by an individual.**
…

There are three species of justice. One is concerned with gods, another with men, and the third with the departed. For those who sacrifice according to the laws and take care of the temples are obviously pious towards the gods. Those again who repay loans and restore what they have received upon trust act justly towards men. Lastly, those who take care of tombs are obviously just towards the departed.
…

Nobility has four divisions. First, when the ancestors are gentle and handsome and also just, their descendants are said to be noble. Secondly, when the ancestors have been princes or magistrates, their descendants are said to be noble. The third kind arises when the ancestors have been illustrious; for instance, through having held military command or through success in the national games. For then we call the descendants noble. 89. **The last division includes the man who is himself of a generous**

and high-minded spirit. He too is said to be noble. And this indeed is the highest form of nobility. Thus, of nobility, one kind depends on excellent ancestors, another on princely ancestors, a third on illustrious ancestors, while the fourth is due to the individual's own beauty and worth.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231132/page/n529/mode/2up?view=theater

As the fourth century progressed, a real credit system developed: the bankers, instead of advancing cash, issued letters of credit, money orders, or checks; wealth could now pass from one client to another merely by entries in the banker's books.[13] Businessmen or bankers issued bonds for mercantile loans, and every large inheritance included a number of such bonds. **Some bankers, like the ex-slave Pasion, developed so many connections, and acquired by a discriminating honesty so widespread a reputation for reliability, that their bond was honored throughout the Greek world. Pasion's bank had many departments and employees, mostly slaves;** it kept a complex set of books, in which every transaction was so carefully recorded that these accounts were usually accepted in court as indisputable evidence.
…

The change from landed to movable wealth produced a feverish struggle for money, and the Greek language had to invent a word, *pleonexia*, to denote this appetite for "more and more," and another word, *chrematistike,* for the busy pursuit of riches. Goods, services, and persons were increasingly judged in terms of money and property. Fortunes were made and unmade with a new rapidity, and were spent in lavish displays that would have shocked the Athens of Pericles.
…

In this conflict more and more of the intellectual classes took the side of the poor.[21] **They disdained the merchants and bankers whose wealth seemed to be in inverse proportion to their culture and taste; even rich men among them, like Plato, began to flirt with communistic ideas.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n557/mode/2up?view=theater

Even Plato was moved by the Cynic ideal. In the second book of the *Republic*[59] he describes with relish and sympathy a communistic and naturalistic Utopia. He rejects it, and goes on to portray a "second-best" state; but when he comes to picture his philosopher-kings we find the Cynic dream—of men without property and without wives, dedicated to plain living and high philosophy—capturing the citadel of the finest imagination in Greek history. Plato's plan for a communistic aristocracy was the brilliant endeavor of a rich conservative to reconcile his scorn of democracy with the radical idealism of his time.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n571/mode/2up?view=theater

In his declining years, still longing to be a legislator, **Plato offered a third-best state. The *Laws*, besides being the earliest extant classic of European jurisprudence, is an instructive study in the senile aftermath of youthful romanticism.**
…

Since obedience to parents and the laws can be secured only through supernatural sanctions and aids, the state shall determine what gods are to be worshiped, and how, and when. **Any citizen who questions this state religion is to be imprisoned; if he persists he is to be killed.**[138]

A long life is not always a blessing; **it would have been better for Plato to have died before writing this indictment of Socrates, these prolegomena to all future Inquisitions.**
…

The *Laws* offers the surrender of a dying Athens that had completely lived to a Sparta that, ever since Lycurgus, had been dead. **When Athens' most famous philosopher could find so little to say for freedom Greece was ripe for a king.**
…

But it was his fate that he was a logician as well as a poet; that he was the most brilliant reasoner of antiquity, subtler than Zeno of Elea or Aristotle; that he loved philosophy more than he loved any woman or any man; **and that in the end, like Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor, he concluded to a suppression of all free reasoning, a conviction that philosophy must be destroyed in order that man may live.** He himself would have been the first victim of his Utopias.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Nicias*.html#ref57

The first man to put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon was Anaxagoras. But he was no ancient authority, nor was his doctrine in high repute. It was still under seal of secrecy, and made its way slowly among a few only, who received it with a certain caution rather than with implicit confidence. 3 Men could not abide the natural philosophers and "visionaries," as they were then called,

for that they reduced the divine agency down to irrational causes, blind forces, and necessary incidents. Even Protagoras had to go into exile,[58] Anaxagoras was with difficulty rescued from imprisonment by Pericles,[59] and Socrates, though he had nothing whatever to do with such matters, nevertheless lost his life[60] because of philosophy. 4 **It was not until later times that the radiant repute of Plato, because of the life the man led, and because he subjected the compulsions of the physical world to divine and more sovereign principles, took away the obloquy of such doctrines as these, and gave their science free course among all men.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D12%3Asection%3D948b

Rhadamanthys deserves admiration for the way in which, as we are told, he judged cases of law, **in that he perceived that the men of his time had a clear belief in the existence of gods,—and naturally so, seeing that most men at that time were the offspring of gods, he himself among others, as the story declares.** Probably he thought that he ought not to entrust lawsuits to any man, but only to gods, from whom he obtained verdicts that were both simple and speedy; for he administered an oath [948c] to the disputants regarding each matter in dispute, and thus secured a speedy and safe settlement. **But nowadays, when, as we say,[1] a certain section of mankind totally disbelieve in gods, and others hold that they pay no regard to us men, while a third party, consisting of the most and worst of men, suppose that in return for small offerings and flatteries the gods lend them aid in committing large robberies, and often set them free from great penalties,**—under such conditions, for men as they now are, the device of Rhadamanthys would no longer be appropriate in actions at law. [948d] **Since, therefore, the opinions of men about the gods have changed, so also must their laws change.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D9%3Asection%3D578d

“From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant's numbers are greater.[1]” “Yes, they are.” **“You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves?” “What should they fear?” “Nothing,” I said; “but do you perceive the reason why?” “Yes, because the entire state** [578e] **is ready to defend each citizen.”**
…

“But now suppose,” said I, “that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[2] but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands.” “I think,” he said, [579b] **“that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies.”** “And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? **Yet greedy[1] and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[2] that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[3]** [579c] envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing.”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

Plato believed that the first need of human society, the essential remedy for its contemporary ills, was unity and concord; yet he was equally insistent on divisions that separate men. The combination may seem paradoxical, but it was no more than a variation on the traditional Greek outlook, which from Homer onwards had divided men into high and low, good and bad, worthy and worthless, and held that is is through the acceptance of such distinctions, the recognition that all men are *not* equal, that peace and harmony in the community are to be maintained. **We have seen that in the fifth century B.C., and especially during its last decades, this tradition had become weaker and lost much of its hold on the Greek mind. Plato wanted to restore it.**

To this extent his political thinking was traditional and can be called ‘reactionary.’ In another, and to his contemporaries probably more obvious way it was revolutionary, in that although of high birth and wealthy family himself, Plato rejected birth or property as the ground of discrimination, and followed Socrates in seeking a new basis in the inner character and mentality of men themselves. Socrates had held that true wisdom, the right use of reason, was the real hall-mark of quality among human beings – not possessions or noble blood or the pretended knowledge of those usually regarded as wise. Plato carried this view further by moulding it into a coherent picture of human society, based not on tradition or convention but on nature, and related to an interpretation of reality as a whole.
…

Although Plato sees education as the most important thing in life for those who can profit by it, **he has no belief, like Isocrates, that teaching can raise large numbers of men to higher levels of understanding. Those to whom nature has given the ability to become philosophers are very few, and this will always be so.**
…

Plato's answer to the political problems resulting from the decline of the old aristocracy was a new aristocracy of real wisdom – **not of 'wise statesmen' in the accepted sense, nor of men trained in the 'practical wisdom' of Isocrates, but of wisdom derived from knowledge of universal truth.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D1261a

For example, it is possible for the citizens to have children, wives and possessions in common with each other, as in Plato's *Republic*, in which Socrates says that there must be community of children, women and possessions. Well then, which is preferable, the system that now obtains, or one conforming with the regulation described in the *Republic*[1]?
…

Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the city will not be a city at all for a state essentially consists of a multitude of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, **city will be reduced to family and family to individual,** [20] **for we should pronounce the family to be a more complete unity than the city, and the single person than the family;** so that even if any lawgiver were able to unify the state, he must not do so, for he will destroy it in the process.
…

Also it is curious that a theorist who makes the sons common property only debars lovers from intercourse and does not prohibit love, nor the other familiarities, which between father and son or brother and brother are most unseemly, since even the fact of love between them is unseemly. **And it is also strange that he deprives them of intercourse for no other reason except because the pleasure is too violent; and that he thinks it makes no difference that the parties are in the one case father or son and in the other case brothers of one another. And it seems that this community of wives and sons is more serviceable for the Farmer class than for the Guardians;** [1262b] [1] **for there will be less friendship among them if their children and women are in common, and unfriendliness in the subject classes is a good thing with a view to their being submissive to authority and not making revolution.**
…

Yet the general mass of the citizens of the other classes make almost the bulk of the state, and about these no definite regulations are laid down, as to whether the Farmers also are to have their property in common or to hold it in private ownership, and also whether community of wives and children is to apply to them or not. For if the Farmers are to have the same complete communism, what will be the difference between them and the Guardian class? or what advantage will they gain by submitting to their government? or what consideration will induce them to submit to [20] the government, **unless the Guardians adopt some clever device like that of the Cretans? These have conceded to their slaves all the same rights as they have themselves except that they are forbidden gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms.** But if the family life and property of the Farmers are to be such as they are in other states, what sort of communism will there be? For there will inevitably be two states in one, and these antagonistic to one another. For Socrates makes the Guardians a sort of garrison, while the Farmers, Artisans and other classes are the citizens.[1]
…

The Republic discussed by Socrates therefore possesses these difficulties and also others not smaller than these.

And almost the same holds good of the *Laws* also, which was written later, so that it will be advantageous to make some small examination of the constitution described in that book as well. For in the *Republic* Socrates has laid down details about very few matters—regulations about community of wives and children and about property, and the structure of the constitution (for the mass of the population is divided into two parts, one forming the Farmer class and the other the class that defends the state in war, and there is a third class drawn from these latter that forms the council and governs the state), but about the Farmers and the Artisans, whether they are excluded from government or have some part in it, and whether these classes also are to possess arms and to serve in war with the others or not, on these points Socrates has made no decision, but though he thinks that the women ought to serve in war with the Guardians and share the same education, the rest of the discourse he has filled up with external topics, and about the sort of education which it is proper for the Guardians to have.[16]

[1265a] [1] **But though the *Laws* consists for the most part of a treatise on law, the author has said a little about the form of the constitution, and in a desire to make this more suitable for adoption by actual states he brings it round by degrees back to the other form, that of the *Republic*. For except community in wives and property, he assigns all his other regulations in the same form to both states, for he prescribes for both the same scheme of education, and a life detached from menial tasks, and similarly as regards common meals, except that in the state described in the *Laws* he says there are to be common meals for women also,** and he makes the *Republic* consist of a class possessing arms that numbers a thousand, but the state of the *Laws* has five thousand.
…

And it is also strange that although equalizing properties the writer does not regulate the number of the citizens, but leaves the birth-rate uncontrolled, on the assumption that it will be sufficiently levelled up to the same total owing to childless marriages, however many children are begotten, [1265b] [1] because this seems to take place in the states at present. But this ought to be regulated much more in the supposed case than it is now, for now nobody is destitute, because estates are divided among any number, but then, as division of estates will not be allowed, the extra children will necessarily have nothing, whether they are fewer in number or more. **And one might think that restriction ought to be put on the birth-rate rather than on property, so as not to allow more than a certain number of children to be produced, and that in fixing their number consideration should be paid to the chances of its happening that some of the children born may die, and to the absence of children in the other marriages;** but for the matter to be left alone, as it is in most states, is bound to lead to poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces sedition and crime.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n569/mode/2up?view=theater

First, he fancies, we must find a good king who will let us experiment with his people. Then we must send away all the adults except those necessary to maintain order and teach the young, for the ways of their elders would corrupt the young into an image of the past. **To all the young, of whatever sex or class, twenty years of education will be given.** It will include the teaching of myths—not the immoral myths of the old faith, but new myths that may tame the soul into obedience to parents and the state.* **At twenty all are to be given physical, mental, and moral tests. Those that fail will become the economic classes of our state—businessmen, workingmen, farmers; they will have private property, and different degrees of wealth (within limits) according to their ability; but there will be no slaves.** The survivors of the first test will receive ten further years of education and training. At thirty they will be tested again. **Those that fail will become soldiers; they shall have no private property, and shall not engage in business, but shall live in a military communism.** Those that pass the second test will now (and none before) take up for five years the study of "divine philosophy"[125] in all its branches, from mathematics and logic to politics and law. At thirty-five the survivors, with all their theory on their heads, will be flung into the practical world to earn their living and make themselves a place. At fifty such of them as are still alive shall become, without election, members of the guardian or ruling class.

They shall have all powers, but no possessions. There will be no laws; all cases and issues will be decided by the philosopher-kings according to a wisdom untrammeled by precedent. Lest they abuse these powers, they shall have no property, no money, no families, no permanent individual wives; **the people will hold the power of the purse, the soldiers the power of the sword. Communism is not democratic, it is aristocratic; the common soul is incapable of it; only soldiers and philosophers can bear it.** As for marriage, it must in all classes be strictly regulated by the guardians as a eugenic sacrament: "The best of either sex should be united with the best as often as possible, and the inferior with the inferior; and they are to rear the offspring of one sort of union, but not of the other; for this is the only way of keeping the flock in prime condition."[126] All children are to be brought up by the state, and given equal educational opportunity; classes are not to be hereditary. **Girls shall have an equal chance with boys, and no office in the state shall be closed to women because they are women.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA35#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the fifth book of the *Republic*, after a certain amount of tongue-in-cheek defensive posturing, Socrates raises the question of whether their hypothetical city ought to make use of female as well as male guardians.

> **Do we think that the females of our watchdogs ought to keep watch over the same things as our male watchdogs? Do we think that they ought to hunt as well and do other things in common [with the males]? Or do we think that the females ought to keep watch at home (*οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον*) since they are incapable (*ἀδυνάτους*) – on account of the bearing and rearing of puppies – and that the male will work and keep watch over all the concerns of the flocks?**56

Of course, Glaucon answers, female dogs ought to guard the herd alongside the males and are trained to do it. **Likewise, Socrates continues, the women of the ideal city who possess the nature of guardians must receive the same *paideia* as the men if they are to become guardians of the city;** this is an astonishing idea that leads Socrates to discuss which tasks, by nature, women are capable of performing.
…

Socrates now points out that when they agreed that those with similar natures ought to perform the same social tasks, they did not mean that male and female must be, by nature, entirely alike *in every possible way*. The question, rather, is whether the difference between male and female is relevant to the performance of social and political tasks. Socrates has here formulated an idea that Aristotle would refer to as "proportionate equality" that is neither oligarchic nor democratic. **Although Socrates accepts the premise that those who possess the best natures ought to rule the city, he accepts neither the democratic claim that all free men are equally capable of political behavior nor the aristocratic notion that noble birth entails superiority over the lower born. Socrates charts a radically different course. Like Aristotle's "aristocrat," Socrates maintains that the "best" should rule, but at the same time he denies that there are those who are noble "by nature" (as he remarked in the *Meno*). In the *Republic*, Socrates advocates neither democracy nor aristocracy but "philosophocracy."**
…

Socrates' discussion of the nature of women and social organization in the *Republic* is deeply idiosyncratic – so much so that **such perceptive critics as Allan Bloom**60 **and Arlene Saxonhouse**61 **have refused to accept the idea that Socrates could possibly have expected to be taken seriously in the fifth book of the *Republic*.**

> 60. Bloom, *Republic of Plato* 380-382: "**Book V is preposterous, and Socrates expects it to be ridiculed. It provokes both laughter and rage in its contempt for convention and nature, in its wounding of all the dearest sensibilities of masculine pride and shame, the family, and statesmanship and the city. As such it can only be understood as Socrates' response to his most dangerous accuser, Aristophanes, and his contest with him.** … Socrates with an air of utmost seriousness undertakes absurd considerations; in this he is already comic." **Bloom reads Book V as a response to the feminist dystopia imagined by Aristophanes in the *Ecclesiazousai*.**
>
> 61. Saxonhouse, "The Philosopher and the Female" 190: "[I] cannot accept the view that Socrates wishes to emancipate the Athenian woman." **Saxonhouse reads Book V as an intentional travesty: Socrates pushes his logic about the nature of the soul to such an absurd point that the feasibility of the entire exercise of the *Republic* is called into question.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false

The initial reception of Plato's *Republic* in fifteenth-century Europe was turbulent. It could not be assimilated casually like the works of Aristophanes and Lucian, whose obscenities were dismissed, overlooked, or expurgated as extrinsic – the privilege of jesters – while what was considered their moral teaching was appreciated and imitated. **Plato, whose dialogues pretended to impart true doctrine about virtuous conduct, was encroaching upon a domain where the Church allowed neither alternatives nor flippancy.**
…

When manuscript translations of the *Republic* into Latin began to be diffused in fifteenth-century Italy, **the manifest contradiction between the ideal society of Plato and the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle, which had been an accepted part of Christian culture for more than two hundred years** and had been newly translated by the Florentine humanist Leonardo Bruni in 1414 and 1437, became the focus of spirited controversy. The original motive for Pier Decembrio's translation of the *Republic* in 1437 was, he confessed, a desire to compare on his own the text of Aristotle's attack on Plato in the *Politics* with what Plato himself had written about the community of women and property in the fifth book, though Decembrio had access to the Latin version prepared three decades earlier by his father, Umberto Decembrio, and the Greek scholar Manuel Chrysoloras. **After the Council of Trent (1545-1563), with its formal incorporation of Aristotle and the Scholastics as orthodoxy, there were times when an acknowledged adherence to Plato in any area of thought could be dangerous:** Witness the condemnation of the *Nova Philosophia* of Francesco Patrizi, Bishop of Cherso, and its inclusion on the Index of Prohibited Books.
…

The plain reason for the difference between the medieval and the Renaissance Platos was that knowledge of his writings, once limited to secondary sources **(except for the *Timaeus* and parts of the *Phaedo*)** was now augmented by the dialogues themselves either in Greek or in Latin. After the publication of Marsilio Ficino's translation of the Platonic corpus in 1484 – a fateful year for European culture – doctrines that had once been discussed on the basis of mere hearsay or critical accounts like that of Aristotle or

excerpts preserved in the Church Fathers became available in their totality, along with commentaries and summaries.
…

Even on casual acquiantance, Plato's vision of the ideal city was embarrassing to humanists who adored the spiritual beauties of his other writings. **Leonardo Bruni refused to translate the *Republic* because, he said, "there are many things in these books that, to our ways, are loathsome," and for the honor of Plato it was better to leave them alone.**10

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA153#v=onepage&q&f=false

Often the treatises focused on Aristotle's critique of Plato's *Republic*, and the Italian authors, officials in city-states, **understandably tended to side with the preserver of private property against the idea of communism, which they discussed as though Plato would have applied it to the whole society.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37841/37841-h/37841-h.html#Pg338

285. WHETHER PROPERTY CAN BE SQUARED WITH JUSTICE.—When the injustice of property is strongly felt (and the hand of the great clock is once more at this place), we formulate two methods of relieving this injustice: **either an equal distribution, or an abolition of private possession and a return to State ownership. The latter method is especially dear to the hearts of our Socialists, who are angry with that primitive Jew for saying, "Thou shalt not steal." In their view the eighth[27] commandment should rather run, "Thou shalt not possess."—The former method was frequently tried in antiquity, always indeed on a small scale, and yet with poor success.** From this failure we too may learn. "Equal plots of land" is easily enough said, but how much bitterness is aroused by the necessary division and separation, by the loss of time-honoured possessions, how much piety is wounded and sacrificed! We uproot the foundation of morality when we uproot boundary-stones. Again, how much fresh bitterness among the new owners, how much envy and looking askance! For there have never been two really equal plots of land, and if there were, man's envy of his neighbour would prevent him from believing in their equality. **And how long would this equality, unhealthy and poisoned at the very roots, endure?** In a few generations, by inheritance, here one plot would come to five owners, there five plots to one. Even supposing that men acquiesced in such abuses through the enactment of stern laws of inheritance, the same equal plots would indeed exist, but there would also be needy malcontents, owning nothing but dislike of their kinsmen and neighbours, and longing for a general upheaval.—**If, however, by the second method we try to restore ownership to the community and make the individual but a temporary tenant, we interfere with agriculture.** For man is opposed to all that is only a transitory possession, unblessed with his own care and sacrifice. With such property he behaves in freebooter fashion, as robber or as worthless spendthrift. When Plato declares that self-seeking would be removed with the abolition of property, we may answer him that, if self-seeking be taken away, man will no longer possess the four cardinal virtues either; as we must say that the most deadly plague could not injure mankind so terribly as if vanity were one day to disappear. Without vanity and self-seeking what are human virtues? By this I am far from meaning that these virtues are but varied names and masks for these two qualities. Plato's Utopian refrain, which is still sung by Socialists, rests upon a deficient knowledge of men. He lacked the historical science of moral emotions, the insight into the origin of the good and useful characteristics of the human soul. **He believed, like all antiquity, in good and evil as in black and white—that is to say, in a radical difference between good and bad men and good and bad qualities.**—In order that property may henceforth inspire more confidence and become more moral, we should keep open all the paths of work for small fortunes, but should prevent the effortless and sudden acquisition of wealth. Accordingly, we should take all the branches of transport and trade which favour the accumulation of large fortunes—especially, therefore, the money market—out of the hands of private persons or private companies, and look upon those who own too much, just as upon those who own nothing, as types fraught with danger to the community.

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n349/mode/2up?view=theater

496. THE EVIL PRINCIPLE.—**Plato has marvellously described how the philosophic thinker must necessarily be regarded as the essence of depravity in the midst of every existing society: for as the critic of all its morals he is naturally the antagonist of the moral man, and, unless he succeeds in becoming the legislator of new morals, he lives long in the memory of men as an instance of the "evil principle."** From this we may judge to how great an extent the city of Athens, although fairly liberal and fond of innovations, abused the reputation of Plato during his lifetime. What wonder then that he—who, as he has himself recorded, had the "political instinct" in his body—**made three different attempts in Sicily, where at that time a united Mediterranean Greek State appeared to be in process of formation? It was in this State, and with its assistance, that Plato thought he could do for the Greeks what Mohammed did for the Arabs several centuries later:** viz. establishing both minor and more important customs, and especially regulating the daily life of every man. His ideas were quite practicable just as certainly as those of Mohammed were practicable; for even much more incredible ideas, those of Christianity, proved themselves to be practicable! **a few hazards less and a few hazards more—and then the world would have witnessed the Platonisation of Southern Europe; and, if we suppose that this state of things had continued to our own days, we should probably be worshipping Plato now as the "good principle."** But he was unsuccessful, and so his traditional character remains that of a dreamer and a Utopian—stronger epithets than these passed away with ancient Athens.

https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/n43/mode/2up?view=theater

In particular, Hadas claims that Judaism adopted what 'Plato himself summarized [as] the objectives of his program', in the following well-known passage:

> "The principle thing is that no one, man or woman, should ever be without an officer set over him, and that none should get the mental habit of taking any step, whether in earnest or in jest, on his individual responsibility. In peace as in war he must live always with his eyes on his superior officer... **In a word, we must train the mind not to even consider acting as an individual or know how to do it.**" (*Laws*, 942ab)

If the word 'rabbi' is substituted for 'an officer' we will have a perfect image of classical Judaism.

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D12%3Asection%3D942a
>
> Military organization is the subject of much consultation and of many appropriate laws. The main principle is this—**that nobody, male or female, should ever be left without control, nor should anyone, whether at work or in play, grow habituated in mind to acting alone and on his own initiative, but he should live always, both in war** [942b] **and peace, with his eyes fixed constantly on his commander and following his lead;** and he should be guided by him even in the smallest detail of his actions—for example, to stand at the word of command, and to march, and to exercise, to wash and eat, to wake up at night for sentry-duty and despatch-carrying, and in moments of danger to wait for the commander's signal before either pursuing or retreating before an enemy; and, in a word, [942c] **he must instruct his soul by habituation to avoid all thought or idea of doing anything at all apart from the rest of his company, so that the life of all shall be lived en masse and in common;** for there is not, nor ever will be, any rule superior to this or better and more effective in ensuring safety and victory in war.
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm#FNanchor_21_21
>
> Man himself had been his *greatest* blunder; he had created a rival to himself; science makes men *godlike*—it is all up with priests and gods when man becomes scientific!—*Moral*: science is the forbidden *per se*; it alone is forbidden. Science is the *first* of sins, the germ of all sins, the *original* sin. *This is all there is of morality.*—"Thou shall *not* know":—the rest follows from that.—God's mortal terror, however, did not hinder him from being shrewd. How is one to *protect* one's self against science? For a long while this was the capital problem. **Answer: Out of paradise with man! Happiness, leisure, foster thought—and all thoughts are bad thoughts!**—Man *must* not think.—And so the priest invents distress, death, the mortal dangers of childbirth, all sorts of misery, old age, decrepitude, above all, *sickness*—nothing but devices for making war on science! The troubles of man don't *allow* him to think. ... **Nevertheless—how terrible!—, the edifice of knowledge begins to tower aloft, invading heaven, shadowing the gods—what is to be done?—The old God invents *war*; he separates the peoples; he makes men destroy one another (—the priests have always had need of war...).** War—among other things, a great disturber of science!—Incredible! Knowledge, *deliverance from the priests*, prospers in spite of war.—So the old God comes to his final resolution: "Man has become scientific—*there is no help for it: he must be drowned!*"...
>
> https://biblehub.com/genesis/3-5.htm
>
> **For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.**

---

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_3

The first example takes us to Athens in 392 B.C. during the great urban Dionysia, when Aristophanes presented his comedy *Ecclesiazusae* or *The Congresswomen.* Here he depicts a teaching fashionable in the Athens of the time. The plot is as follows: The women of the city, wearing beards and dressed in men's clothing, come to the assembly and by a majority vote pass a resolution transferring all power in the state to women. **They use this power to introduce a series of measures, which are expounded in a dialogue between Praxagora, the leader of the women, and her husband, Blepyros.** Here are several quotations.

PRAXAGORA:

> **Compulsory Universal Community Property is what I propose to propose; across-the-board Economic Equality, to fill those fissures that scar our society's face. No more the division between Rich and Poor.** ...
> ... We'll wear the same clothes, and share the same food. ...
> ... My initial move will be to communalize land, and money, and all other property, personal and real.

BLEPYROS:

> But take the landless man who's invisibly wealthy... because he hides his silver and gold in his pockets. What about him?

PRAXAGORA:

> He'll deposit it all in the Fund. ...
> **... I'll knock out walls and remodel the City into one big happy household, where all can come and go as they choose. ...**
> **... I'm pooling the women, creating a public hoard for the use of every man who wishes to take them to bed and make babies.**

BLEPYROS:

> A system like this requires a pretty wise father to know his own children.

PRAXAGORA:

> But why does he need to? Age is the new criterion: Children will henceforth trace their descent from all men who *might* have begot them. ...

BLEPYROS:

> Who's going to work the land and produce the food?

PRAXAGORA:

> **The slaves. This leaves you just one civic function: When the shades of night draw on, slip sleekly down to dinner. ...**
>
> **... <u>The State's not going to stint. Its hand is full and open, its heart is large, it'll stuff its menfolk free of charge</u>, then issue them torches when dinner's done and send them out to hunt for fun.** (2: pp. 43-51)

...

We see concealed in Marx's Hegelian phraseology and Aristophanes' buffoonery almost the same program:

1. Abolition of private property.
2. Abolition of the family--i.e., communality of wives and disruption of the bonds between parents and children.
3. Purely material prosperity.

It would even be possible to say that both programs coincide perfectly, were it not for one place in the *Ecclesiazusae*. In answer to Blepyros's question as to who will do the plowing, Praxagora replies: "Slaves!" **Here she proclaims the fourth point of the program, and a most significant one--liberation from the necessity of work. Interestingly enough, on this point Herbert Marcuse, the best-known of the neo-Marxists and one of the leaders of the New Left in the U.S.A., differs from Marx.**

For instance, in his essay "The End of Utopia," **Marcuse says that "it is no accident that for modern avant garde left intellectuals the works of Fourier have become relevant again. Fourier did not flinch where Marx was insufficiently bold. He spoke of a society where work would become play."** And elsewhere in the same essay: "New technical potentialities lead to oppression unless there develops a vital need for the abolition of alienating work." (4: pp. 75, 77)

Students wondering how university officials today can support policies that viciously disparage and persecute men's sexuality should study Hesiod's *Theogony*. That influential work, written in Greek nearly 2700 years ago, **depicts the earth goddess Gaia plotting to castrate Uranus, the sky god, who was both her son and her husband.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0130%3Acard%3D104

After them was born Cronos the wily, youngest and most terrible of her children, and he hated his lusty sire.
…

And again, three other sons were born of Earth and Heaven, great and doughty beyond telling, Cottus and Briareos and Gyes, presumptuous children. [150] From their shoulders sprang a hundred arms, not to be approached, and fifty heads grew from the shoulders upon the strong limbs of each, and irresistible was the stubborn strength that was in their great forms. For of all the children that were born of Earth and Heaven, [155] these were the most terrible, and they were hated by their own father from the first. And he used to hide them all away in a secret place of Earth so soon as each was born, and would not suffer them to come up into the light: and Heaven rejoiced in his evil doing. But vast Earth [160] groaned within, being straitened, and she thought a crafty and an evil wile. Forthwith she made the element of grey flint and shaped a great sickle, and told her plan to her dear sons. And she spoke, cheering them, while she was vexed in her dear heart: [165] "My children, gotten of a sinful father, if you will obey me, we should punish the vile outrage of your father; for he first thought of doing shameful things." So she said; but fear seized them all, and none of them uttered a word. **But great Cronos the wily took courage and answered his dear mother:** [170] **"Mother, I will undertake to do this deed, for I reverence not our father of evil name, for he first thought of doing shameful things."**

So he said: and vast Earth rejoiced greatly in spirit, and set and hid him in an ambush, and put in his hands [175] a jagged sickle, and revealed to him the whole plot. And Heaven came, bringing on night and longing for love, and he lay about Earth spreading himself full upon her.[1] Then the son from his ambush stretched forth his left hand and in his right took the great long sickle [180] with jagged teeth, and swiftly lopped off his own father's members and cast them away to fall behind him.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0241%3Acard%3D889
>
> *Unj.* But I will overturn them by contradicting them; for I deny that justice even exists at all.
>
> *Just* Do you deny that it exists?
>
> *Unj.* For come, where is it?
>
> *Just* With the gods.
>
> *Unj.* **How, then, if justice exists, has Jupiter not perished, who bound his own father?**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0132%3Acard%3D109

First of all [110] the deathless gods who dwell on Olympus made **a golden race of mortal men <u>who lived in the time of Cronos when he was reigning in heaven.</u> And they lived like gods** [115] **without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief: miserable age rested not on them; but with legs and arms never failing they made merry with feasting beyond the reach of all evils. When they died, it was as though they were overcome with sleep, and they had all good things; for the fruitful earth unforced bare them fruit abundantly and without stint.** They dwelt in ease and peace upon their lands with many good things, [120] rich in flocks and loved by the blessed gods. But after the earth had covered this generation —they are called pure spirits dwelling on the earth, and are kindly, delivering from harm, and guardians of mortal men; [125] for they roam everywhere over the earth, clothed in mist and keep watch on judgements and cruel deeds, givers of wealth; for this royal right also they received;—then they who dwell on Olympus made a second generation which was of silver and less noble by far.

> http://www.racerealist.com/yockey_2.htm
>
> **Liberalism is, in one word, *weakness*. It wants every day to be a birthday, Life to be a long party.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DStat.%3Asection%3D271c

Stranger: You have followed my account very well. [271d] No, the life about which you ask, when all the fruits of the earth sprang up of their own accord for men, did not belong at all to the present period of revolution, but this also belonged to the previous one. **For then, in the beginning, God ruled and supervised the whole revolution,** and so again, in the same way, all the parts of the

universe were divided by regions among gods who ruled them, and, moreover, the animals were distributed by species and flocks among inferior deities as divine shepherds, each of whom was in all respects the independent guardian of the creatures under his own care, [271e] **so that no creature was wild, nor did they eat one another, and there was no war among them, nor any strife whatsoever.** To tell all the other consequences of such an order of the world would be an endless task. But the reason for the story of the spontaneous life of mankind is as follows: **God himself was their shepherd, watching over them, just as man, being an animal of different and more divine nature than the rest, now tends the lower species of animals. And under his care there were no states,** [272a] **nor did men possess wives or children; for they all came to life again out of the earth, with no recollection of their former lives. So there were no states or families, but they had fruits in plenty from the trees and other plants, which the earth furnished them of its own accord, without help from agriculture.** And they lived for the most part in the open air, without clothing or bedding; for the climate was tempered for their comfort, and the abundant grass that grew up out of the earth furnished them soft couches. [272b] That, Socrates, was the life of men in the reign of Cronus; but the life of the present age, which is said to be the age of Zeus, you know by your own experience.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Cimon*.html#ref8

And yet we know that Lichas the Spartan became famous among the Hellenes for no other reason than that he entertained the strangers at the boys' gymnastic festival; but the generosity of Cimon surpassed even the hospitality and philanthropy of the Athenians of olden time. 6 For they—and their city is justly very proud of it—spread abroad among the Hellenes the sowing of grain and the lustral uses of spring waters, and taught mankind who knew it not the art of kindling fire. **But he made his home in the city a general public residence for his fellow citizens, and on his estates in the country allowed even the stranger to take and use the choicest of the ripened fruits, with all the fair things which the seasons bring. Thus, in a certain fashion, he restored to human life the fabled communism of the age of Cronus,—the golden age. [τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου μυθολογουμένην κοινωνίαν εἰς τὸν βίον αὖθις κατῆγεν.]**

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/martial_epigrams_book12.htm

LXII. TO SATURN, ON BEHALF OF PRISCUS TERENTIUS.

Great king of the ancient world, and of the primitive state of things, under whose rule quiet repose prevailed, and labour was unknown; [nec labor ullus erat] nor was the thunder-bolt of Jove frequently used, nor lived there those who were deserving of it; and the earth yielded its riches, without being cloven down to the infernal regions; [Scissa nec ad Manes, sed sibi dives humus] come, propitious and gracious, to this solemn festival of Priscus; it befits you to be present at your own sacred rites.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl4/wl422.htm

But it occurred to me to reserve these few days for the employments I have mentioned; during them I resume my authority, that men may remember what life was like in my days, when all things grew without sowing or ploughing of theirs--no ears of corn, but loaves complete and meat ready cooked--, when wine flowed in rivers, and there were fountains of milk and honey; **all men were good and all men were gold.** Such is the purpose of this my brief reign; therefore the merry noise on every side, the song and the games; **therefore the slave and the free as one. When I was king, slavery was not.**

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl4/wl423.htm

'And certify them,' he said, 'that if they do not hereafter, this sharp sickle that I bear is no toy; 'twere odd if I could maim therewith Uranus my father, but not do as much for the rich that transgress my laws; they shall be fitted to serve the Mother of the Gods with alms-box and pipe and timbrel.' Thus he threatened; wherefore ye will do well to observe his decrees.

> FIRST TABLE OF THE LAWS
>
> All business, be it public or private, is forbidden during the feast days, save such as tends to sport and solace and delight. Let none follow their avocations saving cooks and bakers.
>
> **All men shall be equal, slave and free, rich and poor, one with another.**
>
> Anger, resentment, threats, are contrary to law.

http://www.murraymoerman.com/3downloads/books/R.J.Rushdoony-The-Religion-of-Revolution.pdf

In the Second Table of the Laws as cited by Lucian of Samosata, the first law required that the rich, before Saturnalia began, shall record a tithe of their income, properties and clothing, which tithe must be disposed of on the eve of the festival. The rich must also pay the rents and debts of the poor. Gifts must be sent to the poor, and any rich man who, having given away liberally, failed to do so "with glad countenance…be it known to him that he hath incurred that penalty of the sickle, though he himself hath sent all he should…"3 **The sickle, *atharme*, or magic knife, is an ancient symbol of magical power,** whereby the "evil" ones are instantly dissolved or destroyed by the possessor of the sickle.4
…

The link these ancient religions of chaos and the modern revolutionary movements is a very close and real one. The symbols themselves have remained constant throughout the centuries, among them being the ancient Phrygian cap of liberty (i.e. liberty from law, the liberty of chaos) which cap has found its way on to certain U.S. coins, the sickle or *atharme*, the hammer (an ancient symbol of the destroying power of lightning on the one hand, and of antinomian sexual fertility on the other), and others as well.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06132a.htm

There can be little doubt—and medieval censors themselves freely recognized the fact—that the license and buffoonery which marked this occasion had their origin in pagan customs of very ancient date. John Beleth, when he discusses these matters, entitles his chapter "De quadam libertate Decembrica", and goes on to explain: "now the license which is then permitted is called Decembrian, because it was customary of old among the pagans that during this month slaves and serving-maids should have a sort of liberty given them, and should be put upon an equality with their masters, in celebrating a common festivity." (P.L. CCII, 123).
…

The central idea [of the Feast of Fools] seems always to have been that of the old Saturnalia, i.e. a brief social revolution, in which power, dignity or impunity is conferred for a few hours upon those ordinarily in a subordinate position. Whether it took the form of the boy bishop or the subdeacon conducting the cathedral office, **the parody must always have trembled on the brink of burlesque, if not of the profane.**

https://orthosphere.wordpress.com/2016/02/01/pushing-the-eschaton/

It is in the discourse of the Right a commonplace that liberal policies implement Ponzi schemes; **that their wild prodigality can be justified only on the basis of magical thinking which supposes that economic and cultural goods pour forth inexhaustibly from some mysterious cornucopia,** rather than as products of unstinting, intelligent, diligent, difficult, costly labor rightly and prudently directed.
…

The liberal rejection of the traditions, customs, morality, and sexual orders **developed over millennia of scarcity and insecurity** makes some sense when we consider that scarcity and insecurity seem to have been more or less routed in the West since WWII.

https://archive.org/details/mephistophelesan0000elia/page/124/mode/2up?view=theater

In the years 1944-5, a strange new cult appeared in the island of Espirito Santo, one of the New Hebrides. A certain Tsek, the founder of the cult, sent the following message round the villages: men and women must take off and throw away their cache-sexe and take off their pearl necklaces and other ornaments. “Destroy all these objects,” he added, “which you got from the Whites, also all mats and basket-making tools. **Burn your houses and build two large dormitories in each village: one for the men and the other for the women.** Couples must no longer sleep together at night. Build also a large kitchen, in which you will prepare your meals while it is still daylight; it is strictly forbidden to cook during the night. Stop working for the Whites. Slaughter all domestic animals: pigs, dogs, cats, etc.” **Tsek also ordered the suppression of many tribal taboos: for example, the prohibition of marriage within the totemic group, the obligation to buy a wife,** the segregation of the young mother after childbirth. Funerary customs were also to be changed; a dead man must no longer be buried in his hut but exposed on a wooden platform in the jungle. **But the most sensational part of Tsek’s message what that “America” would soon arrive in the island; all adepts of the cult would receive enormous quantities of goods; and what is more, they would never die, they would live for ever.**1
…

Let us note immediately that the nudist cult of Espirito Santo continued to spread for several years. In 1948, Graham Miller noted that the further inland one went, the more powerful it was. A third of the population had joined it. **A common language, called *Maman* had been adopted by its members, although the villages belonged to different linguistic groups. A new unity – of a religious order – has been formed**

outside the traditional tribal structures. The members of the sect are convinced of the excellence of the new order and the badness of the old. The Christianity spread by the missionaries is openly repudiated. The centres of the new cult are located in villages in the centre of the island which probably no White has ever visited.1 Like all the other millenarist movements of Oceania, this cult is anti-White in character.

Nevertheless, its success is not assured. Now that the enthusiasm of the early days is over a certain resistance seems to be appearing. The promised Utopia has not been realized; on the other hand, the gigantic destruction of goods has impoverished whole regions. **Furthermore, the natives object to the nudism and orgiastic promiscuity. For, according to one of Graham Miller's informants, the real reason for the nudism is the encouragement of orgy. The founder of the cult himself is alleged to have said that the sexual act, being a natural function, should be performed publicly and in daylight, after the fashion of dogs and birds. All the women and girls belong, without distinction, to all the men.**2

Justifiably, the natives, including even some followers of the cult, had been upset by the holocaust of their possessions and the sexual promiscuity. For eschatological nudism and the destruction of goods and tools had no sense except as ritual acts portending and preparing for a new era of prosperity, liberty, blessedness and eternal life.
...

Once the old order is abolished the laws, rules and taboos will lose their reason. The prohibitions and customs sanctioned by tradition will give place to absolute liberty; in the first place to sexual liberty, to orgy.
...

So the *malamala*, or nudists of Espirito Santo, try to make their sexual conduct like that of the animals, that is to say to cast away all shame, for they consider themselves without sin. This too is why they expect both immortality and the coming of the Americans loaded with gifts. It is hard to say whether, in the mind of the cult's founder, immortality is one of the Americans' presents or if it is the spontaneous result of the coming of the eschatological Kingdom. In either case, immortality and an abundance of food are the outstanding syndromes of Paradise. **Man lives for ever and in the most perfect happiness, since he eats without having to work and love is freed of its traditional prohibitions.**
...

In nearly all the "cargo-cults" the rejection of Christianity is more or less categorical.
...

Furthermore, in a number of cases, millenarist movements have also rejected the traditional forms of Melanesian religion. **The masks of the secret societies have been destroyed and women allowed to participate in the esoteric ceremonies. The traditional religion has sometimes been completely abandoned.** Not that the natives have become a-religious overnight and thrown aside both Christianity and their ancestral religion in a single gesture. On the contrary, this reversal has marked the resurgence of a truer religious life, infinitely more creative because nourished by a prophetic millenarist experience. The people were preparing for the Kingdom – **and all religious forms of the past had to be abolished.** They were expecting a new life, regenerated from the roots, an existence doubly precious because it proclaimed itself blessed and without end. **We have noticed the same phenomenon in the nudist cult of Espirito Santo, which rejected Christianity, the ethical and economic values of the Whites, and the traditional tribal customs and prohibitions, all at once.** They were preparing for the return of Paradise.

https://archive.org/details/hindumannerscust1906dubo/page/286/mode/2up?view=theater

Amongst the abominable rites practised in India is one which is only too well known; it is called *sakti-puja*; *sakti* meaning strength or power.1 Sometimes it is the wife of Siva to whom this sacrifice is offered; sometimes they pretend that it is in honour of some invisible power. The ceremony takes place at night with more or less secrecy. The least disgusting of these orgies are those where they confine themselves to eating and drinking everything that the custom of the country forbids, and where men and women, huddled together in indiscriminate confusion, openly and shamelessly violate the commonest laws of decency and modesty.

> 1. It is more correctly described as 'the power or energy of the god as represented in some of the many female forms.' **It has been estimated that of the Hindus in Bengal, about three-fourths are devoted to the worship of *sakti*, though the forms of worship vary greatly.** In Bengal the *Vamacharis* observe the most disgusting rites of all.—Ed.

The *Namadharis*, or followers of Vishnu, are the most frequent perpetrators of these disgusting sacrifices. **People of all castes, from the Brahmin to the Pariah, are invited to attend.** When the company are assembled, all kinds of meat, including beef, are placed before the idol of Vishnu. Ample provision is also made of arrack, toddy and opium, and any other intoxicating drug they can lay their hands on. The whole is then offered to Vishnu.
...

They persuade themselves that under these circumstances they do not contract impurity by eating and drinking in so revolting a manner. When they are all completely intoxicated, men and women no longer

keep apart, but pass the rest of the night together, giving themselves up without restraint to the grossest immorality without any risk of disagreeable consequences. **A husband who sees his wife in another man's arms cannot recall her, nor has he the right to complain; for at those times every woman becomes common property. Perfect equality exists among all castes, and the Brahmin is not of higher caste than the Pariah.**
…

Strange to say, it is the Brahmins, and very often the women of this caste, who are frequently the most ardent promoters of these Bacchanalian orgies. However, debauches of this kind entail such heavy expenses as fortunately to prevent their frequent recurrence.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n215/mode/2up?view=theater

We have left for the last the most troublesome, the most popular, the most difficult to classify, of all the Greek gods. **Only late in his career was Dionysus received into Olympus.**
…

The priests of Delphi and the rulers of Athens tried to keep the cult at a distance, but failed; all they could do was to adopt Dionysus into Olympus, Hellenize and humanize him, give him an official festival, and turn the revelry of his worshipers from the mad ecstasy of wine among the hills into the stately processions, the robust songs, and the noble drama of the Great Dionysia. For a while they won Dionysus over to Apollo, but in the end Apollo yielded to Dionysus' heir and conqueror, Christ.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA37#v=onepage&q&f=false

A parallel passage survives from the *Tereus* of Sophocles, which may have been produced about the same time. Although the play's theme seems to have set Greek civilisation and savagery in strong contrast with each other, **the chorus, probably Bacchic worshippers from Thrace, express the egalitarian and unifying spirit which seems to have characterised the worship of their god.** Derivation from common ancestor – probably father Heaven and mother Earth – makes all men one: 'There is one human race. A single day brought us all forth from our father and mother. **No man is born superior to another.** But one man's fare is a doom of unhappy days, another's is success; and on others the yoke of slavery's hardship falls' (fr. 532.)

https://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/4689

In the twilight of the *polis*-phase of Greek existence, in the aftermath of the catastrophic wars between Athens and Sparta, and under the looming shadow of Macedonian hegemony, **Euripides draws a picture of a state in precipitous dissolution, gripped by a combination of religious mania and petulant rebellion against the limitations of civic life.** The source of the crisis is the siren-call of a wandering stranger who urges the women of Thebes to renounce civic order as the equivalent of unbearable tyranny and to desert their city for the sake of orgiastic Amazonism in the surrounding countryside.
…

In Nietzsche's words: **"So also in the German Middle Ages singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, were whirled from place to place under this same Dionysian impulse."** Thus, "in the dancers of St. John and St. Vitus, we rediscover the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks, with their early history in Asia Minor, as far back as Babylon and the orgiastic Sacaea." **Perhaps also in revolutionary disintegration, as in Paris in 1789, or in the Central European Soviets after 1918, the Dionysian wrath against the *principium individuationis* reappears.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0166%3Abook%3D39%3Achapter%3D13

Then Hispala set forth the origin of the mysteries. [8] **At first, she said, it was a ritual for women,**[2] **and it was the custom that no man should be admitted to it.** There had been three days appointed each year on which they held initiations into the Bacchic rites by day; it was the rule to choose the matrons in turn as priestesses. [9] **Paculla Annia, a Campanian, she said, when priestess, had changed all this as if by the advice of the gods; for she had been the first to initiate men, her sons, Minius and Herennius Cerrinius;** she had held the rites by night and not by day, and instead of a mere three days a year she had established five days of initiation in every month. [10] From the time that the rites were performed in common,[3] men mingling with women and the freedom of darkness added, no form of crime, no sort of wrongdoing, was left untried. **There were more lustful practices among men with one another than among women. If any of them were disinclined to endure abuse or reluctant to commit crime, they were sacrificed as victims.** [11] **To consider nothing wrong, she continued, was the highest form of religious devotion among them. [plura virorum inter sese quam feminarum esse stupra. si qui minus patientes dedecoris sint et pigriores ad facinus, pro victimis immolari. nihil nefas ducere, hanc summam inter eos religionem esse.]** Men, as if insane, with fanatical tossings of their bodies, would utter prophecies. [12] Matrons in the dress of Bacchantes, with dishevelled hair and carrying

blazing torches, would run down to the Tiber, and plunging their torches in the water (because they contained live sulphur mixed with calcium) would bring them out still burning.[4] [13] Men were alleged to have been carried off by the gods who had been bound to a machine and borne away out of sight to hidden caves: they were those who had refused either to conspire or to join in the crimes or to suffer abuse. [14] **Their number, she said, was very great, almost constituting a second state; among them were certain men and women of high rank.** Within the last two years it had been ordained that no one beyond the age of twenty years should be initiated: boys of such age were sought for as admitted both vice and corruption.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0166%3Abook%3D39%3Achapter%3D15

15. When the magistrates had been dispatched to these posts, the consuls mounted the Rostra and called an informal meeting[1] of the people, and, when the consul had finished the regular formula of prayer which magistrates are accustomed to pronounce before they address the people, he thus began: [2] "Never for any assembly, citizens, has this formal prayer to the gods been not only so suitable but even so necessary, a prayer which reminds us that these are the gods whom our forefathers had appointed to be worshipped, to be venerated, to receive our prayers, not those gods [3??] who would drive our enthralled minds with vile and alien rites, as by the scourges of the Furies, to every crime and every lust.
…

[8] As regards their number, if I shall say that there are many thousands of them, it cannot but be that you are terrified, unless I shall at once add to that who and of what sort they are. [9] First, then, a great part of them are women, and they are the source of this mischief; **then there are men very like the women, debauched and debauchers,** fanatical, with senses dulled by wakefulness, wine, noise and shouts at night. [10] The conspiracy thus far has no strength, but it has an immense source of strength in that they grow more numerous day by day.
…

[12] Of what sort do you[5] think are, first, gatherings held by night, second, meetings of men and women in common?[6] If you knew at what ages males were initiated, you would feel not only pity for them but also [13] shame. **Do you think, citizens, that youths initiated by this oath should be made soldiers? That arms should be entrusted to men mustered from this foul** [14] **shrine? Will men debased by their own debauchery and that of others fight to the death on behalf of the chastity of your wives and children?**
…

It is already too great to be purely a private matter: its objective is the control of the state. [4] Unless you are on guard betimes, citizens, as we hold this meeting in the day-time, summoned by a consul, in accordance with law, so there can be one held at night. **Now, as single individuals, they stand in fear of you,** gathered here all together in this assembly: presently, when you have scattered to your homes and farms, they will have come together and they will take measures for their own safety and at the same time for your[1] destruction: **then you, as isolated individuals, will have to fear them as a united body.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OAwtAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA154#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 113. Thersites is usually represented unfavorably as the dour Cynic, e.g., Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 7; *Pisc.* 37; *Fug.* 30; *Ind.* 7.

https://sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl3/wl302.htm

He had a good word for Thersites, as a cynic and a leveller.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D2%3Acard%3D188

Now the others sate them down and were stayed in their places, only there still kept chattering on **Thersites of measureless speech, whose mind was full of great store of disorderly words, wherewith to utter revilings against the kings, idly, and in no orderly wise,** [215] **but whatsoever he deemed would raise a laugh among the Argives.** Evil-favoured was he beyond all men that came to Ilios: he was bandy-legged and lame in the one foot, and his two shoulders were rounded, stooping together over his chest, and above them his head was warped, and a scant stubble grew thereon. [220] **Hateful was he to Achilles above all, and to Odysseus, for it was they twain that he was wont to revile; but now again with shrill cries he uttered abuse against goodly Agamemnon.** With him were the Achaeans exceeding wroth, and had indignation in their hearts.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n111/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Here the word “Liberty” takes on the bloody significance that it has in the declining ages. <u>What is meant is: liberation from all the bonds of civilization</u>,** from every kind of form and custom, from all the people whose mode of life they feel in their dull fury to be superior.

...

> **Thus is born Nihilism, the abysmal hatred of the proletarian of higher form of every sort,** of culture as its essence, of society as its upholder and historical product. That anyone should *have* "form," master it, feel comfortable with it, whereas the common person feels fettered by it and unable to move freely under it; that tact, taste, a sense for tradition, should be things that belong to highly cultivated beings by inheritance; that there are circles in which a sense of duty and renunciation are not absurd, but lend distinction: all this fills the Nihilist with a dull fury **which in earlier times crept away into corners and there foamed at the mouth in the manner of Thersites,** but is now widely diffused in the white nations as an actual world-outlook.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT71&hl=fi&pg=PT71#v=onepage&q&f=false

Long before Socrates was executed, some of his companions had become notorious for aping his manner and appearance. Aristophanes made fun of them by turning "Socrates" into a comic term in *The Birds* (produced in 414 B.C.E.), where we are told of odd people in Athens who "wear long hair, go hungry and wild, socratize – and carry sticks!" It is not quite clear what socratizing amounts to here, though apparently it is associated with being harsh, unkempt, and a bit of a spectacle. Plato and Xenophon confirm that some of Socrates' most ardent admirers deserved this reputation, but of the most important Socratics, only Antisthenes (ca. 445-365 B.C.E.) fit the comic image.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0026%3Acard%3D1263
>
> [1280] Before your city was built, all men had a mania for Sparta; long hair and fasting were held in honor, men went dirty like Socrates and carried staves.

Two decades older than Plato and Xenophon, Antisthenes may have been the most prominent of the Socratics for a decade or more following Socrates' execution.
...

Unlike Plato and Xenophon, Antisthenes came under Socrates' influence as an adult, after already embarking on a career as an orator in emulation of Gorgias, and his primary intellectual interests always remained ethics and politics.
...

The second aspect of Socratic strength showed itself in the rejection on convention and artificial social distinctions. **Antisthenes seems to have drawn cosmopolitan consequences from this critique of convention, arguing that virtue was the same for Greeks and barbarians as well as for men and women.**

Perhaps the most striking feature of Antisthenes' appropriation of Socrates, however, was his denial that speaking and learning are important prerequisites for the development of virtue. Rather, the strength and independence necessary are primarily matters of training and exertion, not of understanding. Antisthenes thus seems to have allowed the example of Socrates' freedom to wholly eclipse the example of his wisdom. The Cynics further developed this particular approach to Socratic virtue. **They in turn became an important influence on the Stoics, though Stoicism tried to distance itself from Cynicism's anti-intellectual tendencies and to ground the ascetic and cosmopolitan aspects of Socratic strength in a different conception of wisdom.**

https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/16595/Kennedy_WJ_Thesis%20Final.pdf;jsessionid=53C5547FDC8004C0B81C0FD9D182C192?sequence=1

Elizabeth Irwin mounts a persuasive case that, in fact, Antisthenes himself was an illegitimate *nothos* who was affected by Pericles' law, and it was this that excluded him from political life and prompted his harsh criticism of the democracy (2015b, esp. 90-93). Naming a son after his father was 'much less common' than naming him after one of his grandfathers, uncles, and so on (Matthews 2012, 1022). So by analogy with Pericles son of Pericles (Plu. *Per.* 27) his name in itself perhaps offers circumstantial evidence that he was a *nothos*. However, there is no direct evidence that Antisthenes' status as a citizen was ever called into question and there is no record of him being called a *nothos*.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Firmness_of_the_Wise_Man#XVIII.

Antisthenes was reproached with his mother being a barbarian and a Thracian; he answered that the mother of the gods, too, came from Mount Ida. **[Antistheni mater barbara et Thraessa obiciebatur: respondit et deorum matrem Idaeam esse.]**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/De_exilio*.html#ref124

17 1 **But "exile" is a term of reproach.[125] Yes, among fools, who make terms of abuse of "pauper," "bald," "short," and indeed "foreigner" and "immigrant." But those who are not carried away by such considerations admire good men, even if they are poor or foreigners or exiles.** Nay, do we not observe that like the Parthenon and the Eleusinium, so the Theseum is saluted with reverence by all? Yet Theseus was banished from Athens, though it is because of him that Athens is now inhabited; and that city was lost to him which he did not take possession of, but himself created. What glory remains to Eleusis, if we are to be ashamed of Eumolpus, who, a migrant from Thrace, initiated and still initiates the Greeks into the mysteries? **Whose son was Codrus, who became king? Was it not of Melanthus, an exile from Messenê? Do you not commend Antisthenes' retort to the man who remarked, "Your mother is a Phrygian": "So too is the Mother of the Gods"?[126]** Why then do not you, when "exile" is cast in your teeth, make a similar reply: "So too the father of Heracles the victorious was an exile, so too the grandsire[127] of Dionysus, when sent out to find Europa, like her, did not return, though 'Phoenician born,' but by coming to Thebes expatriated his 'descendant,'[128]

> Euhius Dionysus,
> Rouser of women,
> Him that is adored in frenzy"?[129]

[128] Adapted by Plutarch from the *Phrixus* of Euripides: Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, Eur. 819.3:

> **Φοῖνιξ πεφυκώς, ἐκ δ' ἀμείβεται γένος**
> **Ἑλληνικόν**
>
> **"Phoenician born, his race he did exchange**
> **For Greek."**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Antisthenes

1. Antisthenes,[1] the son of Antisthenes, was an Athenian. It was said, however, that he was not of pure Attic blood. **Hence his reply to one who taunted him with this: "The mother of the gods too is a Phrygian."[2] For his mother was supposed to have been a Thracian.** Hence it was that, when he had distinguished himself in the battle of Tanagra,[3] he gave Socrates occasion to remark that, if both his parents had been Athenians, he would not have turned out so brave. **He himself showed his contempt for the airs which the Athenians gave themselves on the strength of being sprung from the soil by the remark that this did not make them any better born than snails or wingless locusts.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autochthon_(ancient_Greece)#Athenian_autochthony_concept
>
> The Athenians of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, during the age of Athenian Empire, claimed with pride to be an autochthonous nation that had never changed their place of habitation.[11][12] According to Thucydides, Attica, where Athens is located, had known few migrations due to the poverty of the soil.[13] They had personified their autochthony in the form of Erechtheus or Cecrops I and wore golden *tettiges*,[14] or cicada-shaped ornaments in their hair as a token representing their belief that, like cicadas, Athenians were born from the soil and thus had always lived in Attica.[15][16]
> ...
>
> Separate from the political ideology of autochthonism, this concept of Athenian autochthony has been linked to the rise of Athenian democracy. **In contrast to the previous regime of Tyrants and Oligarchs, and their strict power hierarchies, autochthony was as an argument for democracy and egalitarianism. All Athenians were earth-brothers and thus deserved to have equal access to political power.[18]**
>
> The "autochthony" of the Athenians was a common theme on vase paintings, in political rhetoric, and on the tragic stage.[19] In the epideictic oration of Panegyricus,[20] Isocrates addressed to his countrymen with the following passage:
>
> > **for we did not became dwellers in this land by driving others out of it, nor by finding it uninhabited, nor by coming together here a motley horde composed of many races;** but we are of a lineage so noble and so pure that throughout our history we have continued in possession of the very land which gave us birth, since we are sprung from its very soil and are able to address our city by the very names which we apply to our nearest kin; **for we alone of all the Hellenes have the right to call our city at once nurse and fatherland and mother.**

2. To begin with, he became a pupil of Gorgias the rhetorician, and hence the rhetorical style that he introduces in his dialogues, and especially in his *Truth* and in his *Exhortations*.
...

He lived in the Peiraeus, and every day would tramp the five miles to Athens in order to hear Socrates. **From Socrates he learned his hardihood, emulating his disregard of feeling, and thus he inaugurated the Cynic way of life. He demonstrated that pain is a good thing by instancing the great Heracles and Cyrus, drawing the one example from the Greek world and the other from the barbarians.**
...

4. When he was being initiated into the Orphic mysteries, the priest said that those admitted into these rites would be partakers of many good things in Hades. "Why then," said he, "don't you die?" **Being reproached because his parents were not both free-born, "Nor were they both wrestlers," quoth he, "but yet I am a wrestler."**
...

Favourite themes[8] with him were the following. **He would prove that virtue can be taught; that nobility belongs to none other than the virtuous.** 11. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning; **that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of others are his;** that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; **that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but by the law of virtue;** that he will also marry in order to have children from union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved.

12. Diocles records the following sayings of his: **To the wise man nothing is foreign** or impracticable.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/22188/22188-h/22188-h.htm#torm_tag22
>
> MEN. Have you so much leisure, Chremes, from your own affairs, that you can attend to those of others—those which don't concern you?
>
> CHREM. **I am a man,23 *and* nothing that concerns a man do I deem a matter of indifference to me.** Suppose that I wish either to advise *you* in this matter, or to be informed *myself*: if *what you do* is right, that I may do the same; if it is not, *then* that I may dissuade you.
>
> > 23. *I am a man*)—Ver. 77. "Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto." **St. Augustine says, that at the delivery of this sentiment, the Theatre resounded with applause;** and deservedly, indeed, for it is replete with the very essence of benevolence and disregard of self.

...

Esteem an honest man above a kinsman. Virtue is the same for women as for men. Good actions are fair and evil actions foul. **Count all wickedness foreign and alien.**
...

14. Of all the Socratics Antisthenes alone is praised by Theopompus, who says he had consummate skill and could by means of agreeable discourse win over whomsoever he pleased. And this is clear from his writings and from Xenophon's *Banquet*. **It would seem that the most manly section of the Stoic School owed its origin to him.** Hence Athenaeus the epigrammatist writes thus of them:[9]

> Ye experts in Stoic story, ye who commit to sacred pages most excellent doctrines - that virtue alone is the good of the soul: for virtue alone saves man's life and cities. But that Muse[10] that is one of the daughters of Memory approves the pampering of the flesh, which other men have chosen for their aim.

15. **Antisthenes[11] gave the impulse to the indifference of Diogenes, the continence of Crates, and the hardihood of Zeno, himself laying the foundations of their state.** Xenophon calls him the most agreeable of men in conversation and the most temperate in everything else.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is, moreover, unquestionable that there are traces of Sophistical thought in Antisthenes' philosophy: there is a skeptical bent, a rejection of universals, an ostensive theory of definition, **a refusal to place human customs and values on the same level as what is natural,** and an insistence on interpreting mythological traditions in an allegorical way.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false

What is important to bear in mind is that the three stages of Antisthenes' development that we have identified, namely, the Sophistical, the Socratic, and the Cynic, should not be understood as three consecutive and exclusive stages, but rather as three levels of intellectual growth in which earlier ideas and tendencies are subsumed and integrated into later ones. **Thus, Antisthenes the Sophist is followed by Antisthenes the Socratic *and* the Sophist, and Antisthenes the Socratic *and* the Sophist is succeeded by *Antisthenes the Cynic who is also both Socratic and Sophistical.* There is, then, a line of ideological continuity, which explains how it was possible for him to write Sophistical tracts, Socratic dialogues, and Cynic diatribes during his last twenty or thirty years.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

After the death of Socrates, as a scholar had noted,43 "Antisthenes was subject to no restraints." He took on the Cynic uniform, and began at once his campaign against the world, a campaign which amounted to "hating all the order or structure achieved in the world."44
…

Suddenly, the doctrines associated with Socrates became exaggerated and were carried to their extreme consequences. Socrates' ironic mood and good humor were replaced by an uninviting earnestness, and a frowning and unforgiving attitude of contempt. His uncertainties and hesitations were relegated to the background, in order to give place to an implacable stance of moral intransigence. **His respect for the laws and his deference towards the State were buried under an avalanche of revolutionary sentiments, and the polity in which Antisthenes had lived in relative freedom, became his enemy. In a word, Antisthenes the Cynic was born.** The prophecy uttered by Socrates before the Athenian jury that sentenced him to death was about to be fulfilled. This prophecy, as stated by Socrates, was recorded by Plato (*Apology* 39c-d): younger critics, harsher than Socrates himself, would rise up in order to undermine the foundations of the Athenian world.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DApol.%3Asection%3D39c
>
> [39c] And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straight-way after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. **For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than heretofore;** [39d] **men whom I restrained, though you knew it not; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed.**

Antisthenes now emerges as the relentless critic sent by God to punish the Athenians and indeed the entire world. He spares nobody, and no institution is sacrosanct or untouchable in his eyes. He rejects *all* political arrangements, and, considering himself to be above and outside of the law, proclaims himself king. His mission is none other than to destroy "the decrepit trappings of a dying society"46 – a dying society at least from the perspective of a Cynic.

For his task as a destroyer of his social and political world, Antisthenes has at his disposal several powerful weapons: first, his early training under the tutelage of the Sophists, from whom he learned to speak and write as an accomplished rhetorician, and from he received lessons in skepticism and in the logic that he would develop in his own radical way; second, his acquaintance with Socrates, from whom he received lessons in philosophy, and from whom he learned to distinguish what is real from what only appears real, as well as a host of ideas that he would incorporate into his own Cynic program: and third, his mood of disappointment with and estrangement from the world at large. He had never fit comfortably within the Athenian polity: as a bastard, he must have often felt out of place in the world in which he chose to live, but which he never accepted. This world, which had compelled him to remain an outsider, was, moreover, the same world that had sentenced Socrates, whom he loved so much, to an ignominious death.
…

For him, accordingly, the key philosophical questions are not What is it that I can know about the World? or What is the structure of the universe? or What is the nature of reality? or even What does human existence mean?: but rather **What is the best and most rational way *for me* to conduct myself in a world that is filled with confusion and obfuscation?** How can I attain happiness and serenity in the midst of so much blind and uncontrolled striving on the part of those who surround me? **How can I liberate myself from the social and political fetters with which the irrationality of the human world seeks to immobilize me?** To what extent can my example as a free spirit illuminate the path of others, so that they, too, may set themselves free?

…

Gomperz described Antisthenes' ethical stance in these words:

> An insatiable thirst for freedom, a profound sensitiveness to the ills of life, **an unshakable faith in the majesty and all-sufficiency of reason, and a corresponding abysmal contempt for all traditional ideals,** such are the mood and convictions which lie at the roots of Cynicism.76

> "***Inside every cynical person, there is a disappointed idealist.***"—George Carlin

Here we have the kernel of Antisthenes' thought. He presents himself to us as a man who experiences the suffocating effect of the atmosphere of his social and political world. **On account of his illegitimate birth, he has always been an outsider, and he views the world in which he lives as a foreign land, a sort of wasteland.** Beyond the frontiers of Attica, the wasteland extends itself in all directions. **He is endowed with an unusual gift, which from another perspective can be regarded as a curse: a tremendous lucidity or clarity of mind.**77 This gift has been embellished and fortified by his Sophistical training and particularly by his experience of the Socratic presence. He looks around himself and recognizes hardly any redeeming features in the human world, which, as Schopenhauer would say, is bankrupt. **Religious beliefs have no appeal to him; in fact, he finds them meaningless. The gods may not be more than expeditious inventions fabricated by the ruling class in order to control and stupefy the human herd. This idea he may have learned from Critias' *Sisyphus*.**78
…

Antisthenes feels entrapped in so abominable a world. All around him there is senseless human noise. In whatever direction he turns, he finds inexorably the same enthroned nonsense. Even his best friend, Socrates, is gone, removed from life by a world that could not tolerate him. What, then, will he do? He may entertain the idea of ending his life right then and there, but he chooses to linger in the world for a while, because he thinks that despite of this, he can change the currency of world, at least for himself, by declaring himself an absolute rebel, the Absolute Dog.
…

He presents himself to us, therefore, as a thoroughly negative man. **But the true rebel is he who refuses to accept the world but does *not* abandon the world.** That is, in the act of refusal, and precisely because of the refusal, and while shouting "no," the rebel also says "yes." He is, therefore, all appearances notwithstanding, *an idealist*, that is, a man with a mission who is moved by ideals. He defaces and even throws away the existing currency in order to begin the process of minting and circulating some other currency, namely, *his very own*. And this is what Antisthenes intends to do and actually does. But what can *his* currency be? What new coins is this bastard son of a Thracian slave, who teaches in the Cynosarges and calls himself "the Absolute Dog," who walks about in a torn cloak and carries a staff and a wallet – what coins does he propose to circulate, now that he has thrown away the old ones?
…

Perhaps the most important of his ideals is the recognition of reason as the sole criterion of the worth of human actions, ideas, and feelings. Nothing can be undertaken and nothing can be even entertained until reason – personal reflection and thoughtfulness – has delivered a positive dictum. Hence, neither tradition nor emotion can have a determining role in human behavior.
…

In Diogenes Laertius (VI. 2) we are told that according to Antisthenes, virtue is the same for women as for men, because virtue can be acquired regardless of sexual, racial, or even the cultural differences. Whether Greek or Barbarian, man or woman, master or slave, virtue is accessible to every human being. The same can be said of vice, which is also taught: vicious people become vicious through their own choices and as a result of the pressures of the social world.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Valerius_Maximus
>
> **Nothing is known of his personal history except that his family was poor and undistinguished, and that he owed everything to Sextus Pompeius (consul A.D. 14), proconsul of Asia, whom he accompanied to the East in 27. This Pompeius was a kind of minor Maecenas,** and the centre of a literary circle to which Ovid belonged; he was also the intimate of the most literary prince of the imperial family, Germanicus.
> …
>
> But it is as a chapter in the history of the Latin language that the work of Valerius chiefly deserves study. Without it our view of the transition from classical to silver Latin would be much more imperfect than it is. In Valerius are presented to us, in a rude and palpable form, all the rhetorical

tendencies of the age, unsobered by the sanity of Quintilian and unrefined by the taste and subtlety of Tacitus.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius3a.html#c3

[3e.7] **Such things as those arise from minds high and full of knowledge: but this is no less to be admired in a slave. A barbarian slave, grieving at the killing of his master, forthwith set upon Hasdrubal, and slew him.** And although after being arrested he was tormented in all manner of ways, yet he constantly retained in his mouth the joy which he had in his revenge.

Virtue therefore, not fastidious in how it is attained, allows itself to be possessed by those who have vigorous spirits; nor does it afford a portion of itself large or thrifty according to the difference of the persons, but being open equally to all, it values the aspirations that you have more than your worth. [sed omnibus aequaliter exposita quid cupiditatis potius quam quid dignitatis attuleris aestimat] And therefore it leaves you to determine the weight of its benefits, so that you may carry away with you just as much as your spirit is able to bear.

Therefore it happens many times, that men born of humble parentage reach the highest places of honour and preferment; and on the contrary, that men of most noble extraction, falling into some disgrace, change that splendour which they received from their ancestors into darkness. This will appear more apparent by the examples.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

For the development of reason, the individual needs only himself. The world can prove to be an obstacle, for which reason it is necessary to bracket away the world in order to neutralize its influence. The Cynic must learn not to need the world, and to be willing and able to dispense with what the world offers, such as possessions, wealth, honors, positions, pleasures (which produce the illusion of happiness), and even knowledge. The Cynic must become, therefore, self-sufficient and must practice *αὐτάρκεια*, that is, self-sufficiency and self-government: **he owes nothing to anyone, needs nothing from anyone, and is under the control of no one. He is the absolute monarch of himself.**

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Maniac_p1.html

I said to him, "Shall I tell you where the men are who believe most in themselves? For I can tell you. I know of men who believe in themselves more colossally than Napoleon or Caesar. I know where flames the fixed star of certainty and success. I can guide you to the thrones of the Super-men. **The men who really believe in themselves are all in lunatic asylums.**"
...

Imagination does not breed insanity. Exactly what does breed insanity is reason. Poets do not go mad; but chess-players do. Mathematicians go mad, and cashiers; but creative artists very seldom.
...

The poet only desires exaltation and expansion, a world to stretch himself in. The poet only asks to get his head into the heavens. **It is the logician who seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is his head that splits.**
...

Every one who has had the misfortune to talk with people in the heart or on the edge of mental disorder, knows that their most sinister quality is a horrible clarity of detail; a connecting of one thing with another in a map more elaborate than a maze.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q&f=false

The gods converge into one universal God, unknown and unfathomable, infinitely removed from human existence, and yet somehow the source and basis of all things, a sort of rational structure of the cosmos.

This aspect of Antisthenes' thought contains the seeds of the anti-religious stance that constitutes one of the distinguishing characteristics of Cynicism. For the Cynics, the anthropomorphism and ritualism of conventional religions are of no value; they represent a manifestation of the state of obfuscation of human existence, and nothing else. "According to *νόμος* (custom or convention)," Antisthenes maintained, "there are many gods, but in nature there is only one." This theme presupposes a clear distinction between convention and nature: **what is true according to custom and what is true according to nature may or may not be the same; the former is relative and ethnocentric,**

while the latter is one and universal. Beneath the myths and beliefs about the gods, bewildering and varied as they are, there may lurk a universal reality that is accessible only to reason. The Sophists recognized the relativistic value of all customs and belief – hence their skepticism towards religion, which is succinctly expressed in a fragment preserved from Protagoras' *On the Gods*:

> About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many; the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.

The second part – **the suspicion that a higher reality hovers above us and behind the myths of the poets –** was generally *not* taught by the Sophists, who remained skeptical about such matters. But Antisthenes had the opportunity to learn it from Socrates. **For beneath the *apparent* skepticism of Socrates, there is a conviction about the existence of God or some form of universal divine reality. Thus, the rhetorical and Sophistical lessons learned by Antisthenes were corrected and expanded upon by the lessons he learned from Socrates, and it is here that we find the source of the monotheistic (or perhaps pantheistic) frame of reference that sustained his philosophical activities.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA68#v=onepage&q&f=false

When dealing with this matter, it is crucial to differentiate between Antisthenes and other Cynics, since, so far as we can tell from the texts that have survived, Antisthenes' distinction between two levels – one of the unique god, one of the many gods – is not shared by the later Cynics. Furthermore, **Antisthenes is the only Cynic to have worked out a theory of the gods, and a language appropriate to speaking of them. In the strict sense of the word, he was the only theologian among them and also the only one, it seems, of whom we can say that he believed in the existence of a divinity.**
...

If Lactantius reports his views correctly when attributing to him the idea that the gods of popular belief are many,123 but the creator of the universe is singular,124 then it is difficult, so far as Antisthenes is concerned, not to do so, though I agree with Brancacci's slightly qualified view: "This notion has some legitimacy, provided that the 'monotheistic idea' is given a narrow reading, which is to say that of a philosophical criticism put forward within a context of polytheistic theory and having meaning only within this context. At the same time, if it is true to say that monotheism, according to the strict definition of the term, supposes an absolute distinction between God and the world, then clearly one would not dream of ascribing to Antisthenes a transcendental vision of God, given the close relationship he established between the concepts of 'god' and 'nature.'"125

On this point, **I would wish to say that Antisthenes' principal contribution to Cynicism lies in the distinction he established between nature and culture, giving greater importance to nature, and downgrading culture or custom.** Without this point of departure, on which all Cynic morality is based, Diogenes' philosophy could never have existed, nor could there have been any defacing of the currency.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-on-the-nature-of-the-gods#lf0040_head_016

Antisthenes, again, destroys the significance and essential nature of the gods when he declares in the work entitled "On Natural Philosophy," that there are many gods believed in by the people, but only one that is known to nature.

Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus inscribitur popularis, deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Christian_Library/The_Miscellanies:_Book_5#cite_ref-160

And the Socratic Antisthenes, paraphrasing that prophetic utterance, "To whom have ye likened me? saith the Lord,"[161] says that **"God is like no one; wherefore no one can come to the knowledge of Him from an image."**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Divine_Institutes/Part_I#Chap._V.:_Of_the_testimonies_of_poets_and_philosophers

Antisthenes maintained that the gods of the people were many, but that the God of nature was one only; that is, the Fabricator of the whole universe.

Antisthenes multos quidem esse populares deos, unum tamen naturalem, summae totius artificem.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_M_E5QczOBAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA595#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 48. **We know (from Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, and Philodemus, *De Pietate*, that Antisthenes was a monotheist; and the form in which he expressed his monotheism (there is only One God 'according to nature', i.e., to truth, although there are many 'according to convention') shows that he had in mind the opposition *nature–convention* which, in the mind of a former member of the school of Gorgias and contemporary of Alcidamas and Lycophron (cp. note 13 to chapter 5), must have been connected with *equalitarianism*. This in itself does not of course establish the conclusion that the half-barbarian Antisthenes believed in the brotherhood of Greeks and barbarians. Yet it seems to me extremely likely that he did.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_M_E5QczOBAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA237#v=onepage&q&f=false

A similar result was produced by Aristotle's doctrine of definition. First it led to a good deal of hairsplitting. But later, philosophers began to feel that one cannot argue about definitions. In this way, essentialism not only encouraged verbalism, but it also led to the disillusionment with argument, that is, with reason. **Scholasticism and mysticism and despair in reason, these are the unavoidable results of the essentialism of Plato and Aristotle.** And Plato's open revolt against freedom becomes, with Aristotle, a secret revolt against reason.

As we know from Aristotle himself, essentialism and the theory of definition met with strong opposition when they were first proposed, especially from Socrates' old companion Antisthenes, whose criticism seems to have been most sensible.54 **But this opposition was unfortunately defeated. The consequences of this defeat for the intellectual development of mankind can hardly be overrated.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_of_Plato#Family

Plato's father was Ariston, of the deme of Colytus. According to a tradition, reported by Diogenes Laërtius but disputed by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, **Ariston traced his descent from the king of Athens, Codrus, and the king of Messenia, Melanthus.[13] Codrus himself was a demigod fathered by the God of the sea Poseidon.[14] These claims are not however exploited in the philosopher's dialogues.[15]** Plato's mother was Perictione, whose family boasted of a relationship with the famous Athenian lawmaker and lyric poet Solon.[13] Solon's heritage can be traced back to Dropides, Archon of the year 644 b.c. Perictione was sister of Charmides and cousin of Critias, both prominent figures of the Thirty Tyrants, the brief oligarchic regime, which followed on the collapse of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian war (404-403 BC).[16]

...

In contrast to his reticence about himself, Plato used to introduce his distinguished relatives into his dialogues, or to mention them with some precision: Charmides has one named after him; Critias speaks in both *Charmides* and *Protagoras*; Adeimantus and Glaucon take prominent parts in the *Republic*.[25] From these and other references one can reconstruct his family tree, and this suggests a considerable amount of family pride. According to John Burnet, **"the opening scene of the *Charmides* is a glorification of the whole [family] connection ... Plato's dialogues are not only a memorial to Socrates, but also the happier days of his own family".[26]**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D473c

"I am on the very verge," said I, "of what we likened to the greatest wave of paradox. But say it[1] I will, even if, to keep the figure, it is likely to wash[2] us away on billows of laughter and scorn. Listen." "I am all attention," he said. **"Unless," said I, "either philosophers become kings**[3] [473d] **in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, <u>while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded</u>, there can be no cessation of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either.** Nor, until this happens, will this constitution which we have been expounding in theory [473e] ever be put into practice within the limits of possibility and see the light of the sun. **But this is the thing that has made me so long shrink from speaking out, because I saw that it would be a very paradoxical saying.** For it is not easy[1] to see that there is no other way of happiness either for private or public life."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_M_E5QczOBAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA593#v=onepage&q&f=false

The phrase which, for stylistic reasons, I have put in brackets, is important, for in it *Plato demands the suppression of all 'pure' philosophers* (and unphilosophical politicians). A more literal translation of the phrase would be this: 'while the many' (who have) 'natures' (disposed or gifted) 'for drifting along, nowadays, in one alone of these two, *are eliminated by force*'.
…

Whom does Plato wish to suppress? I believe that 'the many' whose limited or incomplete talents or 'natures' Plato condemns here are identical (as far as philosophers are concerned) with the 'many whose natures are incomplete', mentioned in *Republic*, 495d; and also with the 'many' (professed philosophers) 'whose wickedness is inevitable', mentioned in 489e (cp. also 490e/491a); cp. notes 47, 56, and 59 to this chapter (and note 23 to chapter 5). The attack is, therefore, directed on the one hand against the 'uneducated' democratic politicians, on the other hand most probably against the half-Thracian Antisthenes, the 'uneducated bastard', the equalitarian philosopher;
…

Regarding the two passages from the *Republic*, we must remember that, according to the tradition, Antisthenes was a 'bastard' (his mother came from barbarian Thrace), and that he taught in the Athenian gymnasium reserved for 'bastards'. Now we find, in *Republic* 535e, f. cp. end of the note 52 to this chapter), an attack which is so specific that an individual person must be intended. **Plato speaks of 'people who dabble in philosophy without being restrained by a feeling of their own unworthiness', and he contends that 'the baseborn should be debarred' from doing so.** He speaks of the people as 'unbalanced' (or 'skew' or 'limping') in their love of work and of relaxation; and becoming more personal, he alludes to somebody with a 'crippled soul' who, though he loves truth (as a Socratic would), does not attain it, since he 'wallows in ignorance' (probably because he does not accept the theory of Forms); and he warns the city not to trust such limping 'bastards'. I think it likely that Antisthenes is the object of this undoubtedly personal attack; **the admission that the enemy loves truth seems to me an especially strong argument, occurring as it does in an attack of extreme violence.** But if this passage refers to Antisthenes, then it is very likely that a very similar passage refers to him also, viz. *Republic*, 495d/e, where Plato again describes his victim as possessing a disfigured or crippled soul as well as body. **He insists in this passage that the object of his contempt, in spite of aspiring to be a philosopher, is so depraved that he is not even ashamed of doing degrading ('banausic'; cp. note 4 to this chapter 11) manual labour. Now we know of Antisthenes that he recommended manual labour, which he held in high esteem (for Socrates' attitude, cp. Xenophon, *Mem.*, II, 7, 10),** and that he practised what he taught; a further strong argument that the man with the crippled soul is Antisthenes.

Now in the same passage, *Republic*, 495d, there is also a remark about 'the many whose natures are incomplete', and who nevertheless aspire to philosophy. This seems to refer to the same group (the 'Antistheneans' of Aristotle) of 'many natures' whose suppression is demanded in *Republic*, 473c-e, discussed in note 44 to this chapter.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D6%3Asection%3D491a

"We have, then," I said, "to contemplate the causes of the corruption of this nature in the majority, while a small part escapes,[1] even those whom men call not bad but useless; and after that in turn [491a] we are to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp its pursuits **and see what types of souls they are that thus entering upon a way of life which is too high[1] for them and exceeds their powers,** by the many discords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute of which you speak."

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D7%3Asection%3D535c

"In the first place," [535d] I said, "the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[1] in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. **This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[2] or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work.** And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way." "Most true," he said. "Likewise in respect of truth," I said, **"we shall regard as maimed** [535e] **in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[1] and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[2]"**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D6%3Asection%3D495c

“And plausibly,” said I; “for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, [495d] **just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[1] arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.**[2] For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[3] by their vulgar occupations[4] [495e] even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable?” “Quite so,” he said. **“Is not the picture which they present,” I said, “precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[1] who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter** [496a] **who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?”** “There is no difference at all,” he said. **“Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents?” “Will they not be bastard[1] and base?” “Inevitably.”**

1. It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes.

---

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr07.htm#an_fr_87_1

And late in life, after the fall of Athens and the condemnation and death of his master, the man underwent a curious change of heart. **He is taunted more than once with the lateness of his discovery of truth,87_2 and with his childish subservience to the old *jeux d'esprit* of the Sceptics which professed to prove the impossibility of knowledge.87_3 It seems that he had lost faith in speculation and dialectic and the elaborate superstructures which Plato and others had built upon them;** and he felt, like many moralists after him, a sort of hostility to all knowledge that was not immediately convertible into conduct.
…

There was in Athens a gymnasium built for those who were base-born and could not attend the gymnasia of true citizens. It was called Kynosarges and was dedicated to the great bastard, Heracles. Antisthenes, though he had moved hitherto in the somewhat patrician circle of the Socratics, remembered how that his mother was a Thracian slave, and set up his school in Kynosarges among the disinherited of the earth. He made friends with the 'bad,' who needed befriending. He dressed like the poorest workman. He would accept no disciples except those who could bear hardship, and was apt to drive new-comers away with his stick. Yet he also preached in the streets, both in Athens and Corinth. He preached rhetorically, with parables and vivid emotional phrases, compelling the attention of the crowd. **His eloquence was held to be bad style, and it started the form of literature known to the Cynics as χρεία, 'a help', or διατριβή, 'a study', and by the Christians as ὁμιλία, a 'homily' or sermon.**

This passionate and ascetic old man would have attracted the interest of the world even more, had it not been for one of his disciples. This was a young man from Sinope, on the Euxine, whom he did not take to at first sight; the son of a disreputable money-changer who had been sent to prison for defacing the coinage. Antisthenes ordered the lad away, but he paid no attention; he beat him with his stick, but he never moved. He wanted 'wisdom', and saw that Antisthenes had it to give. **His aim in life was to do as his father had done, to 'deface the coinage', but on a much larger scale. He would deface all the coinage current in the world. Every conventional stamp was false.**
…

There was a huge earthen pitcher—not a tub—outside the Temple of the Great Mother; the sort of vessel that was used for burial in primitive Greece and which still had about it the associations of a coffin. Diogenes slept there when he wanted shelter, and it became the nearest approach to a home that he had. Like a dog he performed any bodily act without shame, when and where he chose. He obeyed no human laws because he recognized no city. He was *Cosmopolîtes*, Citizen of the Universe; all men, and all beasts too, were his brothers. He lived preaching in the streets and begging his bread; except that he did not 'beg', he 'commanded'. Other folk obeyed his commands because they were still slaves, **while he 'had never been a slave again since Antisthenes set him free'.**
…

The salvation for man was to return to Nature, and Diogenes interpreted this return in the simplest and crudest way. **He should live like the beasts, like primeval men, like barbarians.** Were not the beasts blessed, ῥεῖα ζώοντες like the Gods in Homer? And so, though in less perfection, were primitive

men, not vexing their hearts with imaginary sins and conventions. Travellers told of savages who married their sisters, or ate human flesh, or left their dead unburied. Why should they not, if they wished to? **No wonder Zeus punished Prometheus the Fire-Bringer, who had brought all this progress upon us and left man civilized and more unhappy than any beast! He deserved his crag and his vulture!**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA414#v=onepage&q&f=false

Who was the first Dog? Opinions are divided between Antisthenes – **a follower of Socrates whose claim is based on a tradition of ancient sources, the only defect of which is that they are late (Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Aelian, Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and the Suda)** – and Diogenes of Sinope, whose claim is supported by modern scholarship.1

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

Diogenes exaggerated the doctrines of Antisthenes, just as the latter had exaggerated the teachings of Socrates: nevertheless, in the attempt to recreate Antisthenes' ethics, we often find ourselves thinking of Diogenes, almost as if we were in the presence of the one and the same philosopher.

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n49/mode/2up?view=theater

But there was this difference – Diogenes was less hampered than Socrates by the ties of family or civic life or the influence of national tradition.

> https://theamericansun.com/2021/10/19/failed-egoists-the-irrelevance-of-right-nietzscheanism/
>
> **For Stirner, Socrates was a sap who was enslaved by his own fixed ideas, reifying a foreign interest over his own egoistic interest.** There is an analogy to the two interpretations, but Stirner is the more consistently nominalistic:
>
> > "How they do praise Socrates for his conscientiousness, which makes him resist the advice to get away from the dungeon! **He is a fool that he concedes to the Athenians a right to condemn him.** Therefore it certainly serves him right; why then does he remain standing on an equal footing with the Athenians? Why does he not break with them? Had he known, and been able to know, what he was, he would have conceded to such judges no claim, no right. **That he did not escape was just his weakness, his delusion of still having something in common with the Athenians, or the opinion that he was a member, a mere member of this people.** But he was rather this people itself in person, and could only be his own judge. There was no judge over him, as he himself had really pronounced a public sentence on himself and rated himself worthy of the Prytaneum. **He should have stuck to that, and, as he had uttered no sentence of death against himself, should have despised that of the Athenians too and escaped. But he subordinated himself and recognized in the people his judge; he seemed little to himself before the majesty of the people.** That he subjected himself to might (to which alone he could succumb) as to a 'right' was treason against himself: it was virtue."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qKiDDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

Some modern historians, **revealingly,** have tried to legitimize Diogenes by placing him within the Socratic tradition.6 **And while one must regrettably admit that there are in fact many similarities** – both men were fiercely independent thinkers, both were frank and open, both prized freedom of speech, both disregarded mass opinion, and went against the grain and substantially, both Diogenes and Socrates embraced a kind of personal austerity and an indifference to worldly honours and successes – **there remain, however, fundamental differences that are too profound and fundamental to ignore and which reveal the essential *dis*similarities of the two.**7

> https://archive.org/details/historicallectur00kinguoft/page/318/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> And what shall I say of him?—who stands alone, like Shakespeare, in his generation; possessed of colossal learning—of all science which could be gathered in his days—of practical and statesmanlike wisdom—of knowledge of languages, ancient and modern, beyond all his compeers —of eloquence, which when he speaks of pure and noble things becomes heroic, and, as it were, inspired—of scorn for meanness, hypocrisy, ignorance—of esteem, genuine and earnest, for the Holy Scriptures, and for the more moderate of the Reformers who were spreading the Scriptures in Europe,—and all this great light wilfully hidden, not under a bushel, but under a dunghill. **He is**

> **somewhat like Socrates in face, and in character likewise; in him, as in Socrates, the demigod and the satyr, the man and the ape, are struggling for the mastery. In Socrates, the true man conquers, and comes forth high and pure; in Rabelais, alas! the victor is the ape, while the man himself sinks down in cynicism, sensuality, practical jokes, foul talk.** He returns to Paris, to live an idle, luxurious life; to die—says the legend—saying, "I go to seek a great perhaps," and to leave behind him little save a school of Pantagruelists—careless young gentlemen, whose ideal was to laugh at everything, to believe in nothing, and to gratify their five senses like the brutes which perish. **There are those who read his books to make them laugh; the wise man, when he reads them, will be far more inclined to weep.**

…

So, since exaggeration is always deliberate (the word means "*to represent extravagantly; to overstate*" and it comes from the Latin *ex* meaning "out" and *agger* meaning "heap" thus to "out-heap"), **and always aware of itself, Diogenes is less a philosopher and more the original self-conscious, cynical, ironic Westerner. Cynicism, self-consciousness, and irony are, of course, three of the *essential* spiritual characteristics of the Western world in the twenty-first century.** Plato once remarked to Diogenes: "How pleasing your simplicity would be if it was not a sham."11

…

Socrates tried to see *through to* the truth, to the eternal and the unchanging, whilst Diogenes sought merely to see *through* the sham of things.15 Diogenes appears to have been sneer made manifest. Sneer: *"A brief satirical utterance that throws a contemptuous light on what it attacks without attempting to prove or disprove."*16 This is not philosophy; it is attitude, merely. **And it is a sneering contempt which Diogenes and the Cynics have evidently bequeathed to later agents of social and political change in the West.** Indeed, it was this very attitude of the Cynics that gave them their name.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Diogenes

22. Through watching a mouse running about, says Theophrastus in the Megarian dialogue, **not looking for a place to lie down in, not afraid of the dark, not seeking any of the things which are considered to be dainties,** he discovered the means of adapting himself to circumstances.

…

24. He was great at pouring scorn on his contemporaries. The school of Euclides he called bilious, and Plato's lectures waste of time, the performances at the Dionysia great peep-shows for fools, and the demagogues the mob's lacqueys. **He used also to say that when he saw physicians, philosophers and pilots at their work, he deemed man the most intelligent of all animals; but when again he saw interpreters of dreams and diviners and those who attended to them, or those who were puffed up with conceit of wealth, he thought no animal more silly.**

…

26. And one day when Plato had invited to his house friends coming from Dionysius, Diogenes trampled upon his carpets and said, "I trample upon Plato's vainglory." Plato's reply was, "How much pride you expose to view, Diogenes, by seeming not to be proud." Others tell us that what Diogenes said was, "I trample upon the pride of Plato," who retorted, "Yes, Diogenes, with pride of another sort."

…

27. Being asked where in Greece he saw good men, he replied, "Good men nowhere, but good boys at Lacedaemon."

…

29. **He would praise those who were about to marry and refrained,** those who intending to go a voyage never set sail, those who thinking to engage in politics do no such thing, **those also who purposing to rear a family do not do so,** and those who make ready to live with potentates, yet never come near them after all.

…

32. There Xeniades once asked him how he wished to be buried. To which he replied, "On my face." "Why?" inquired the other. "Because," said he, **"after a little time down will be converted into up."** This because the Macedonians had now got the supremacy, that is, had risen high from a humble position.

…

Most people, he would say, are so nearly mad that a finger makes all the difference. For, if you go along with your middle finger stretched out, some one will think you mad, but, if it's the little finger, he will not think so.
…

37. One day, observing a child drinking out of his hands, he cast away the cup from his wallet with the words, "A child has beaten me in plainness of living." He also threw away his bowl when in like manner he saw a child who had broken his plate taking up his lentils with the hollow part of a morsel of bread. **He used also to reason thus: "All things belong to the gods. The wise are friends of the gods, and friends hold things in common. Therefore all things belong to the wise."** One day he saw a woman kneeling before the gods in an ungraceful attitude, and wishing to free her of superstition, according to Zolus of Perga, he came forward and said, "Are you not afraid, my good woman, that a god may be standing behind you? – for all things are full of his presence – and you may be put to shame?"
…

All the curses of tragedy, he used to say, had lighted upon him. At all events he was

> A homeless exile, to his country dead. A wanderer who begs his daily bread.[21]

But he claimed that to fortune he could oppose courage, to convention nature, to passion reason. When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, Alexander came and stood over him and said, "Ask of me any boon you like." To which he replied, "Stand out of my light."[22]
…

The Athenians urged him to become initiated, and told him that in the other world those who have been initiated enjoy a special privilege. **"It would be ludicrous," quoth he, "if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are to dwell in the mire, while certain folk of no account will live in the Isles of the Blest because they have been initiated."**
…

When Lysias the druggist asked him if he believed in the gods, "How can I help believing in them," said he, "when I see a god-forsaken wretch like you?" Others give this retort to Theodorus. Seeing some one perform religious purification, he said, "Unhappy man, don't you know that you can no more get rid of errors of conduct by sprinklings than you can of mistakes in grammar?" He would rebuke men in general with regard to their prayers, declaring that they asked for those things which seemed to them to be good, not for such as are truly good.
…

45. Once he saw the officials of a temple leading away some one who had stolen a bowl belonging to the treasurers, and said, "The great thieves are leading away the little thief."
…

46. Being short of money, he told his friends that he applied to them not for alms, but for repayment of his due. **When behaving indecently in the marketplace, he wished it were as easy to relieve hunger by rubbing an empty stomach.**
…

50. On being asked by a tyrant what bronze is best for a statue, he replied, "That of which Harmodius and Aristogiton were moulded."
…

Being asked whether he had any maid or boy to wait on him, he said "No." "If you should die, then, who will carry you out to burial?" "Whoever wants the house," he replied.
…

As Plato was conversing about Ideas and using the nouns "tablehood" and "cuphood," he said, "Table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see." "That's readily accounted for," said Plato, "for you have the eyes to see the visible table and cup; but not the understanding by which ideal tablehood and cuphood are discerned." 54**. On being asked by somebody, "What sort of a man do you consider Diogenes to be?" "A Socrates gone mad," said he.**[31]

> 31. i.e. Plato. This anecdote is found in Aelian, *Var. Hist.* xiv. 33 εἰώθει δέ, φασίν, ὁ Πλάτων περὶ Διογένους λέγειν ὅτι μαινόμενος οὗτος Σωκράτης ἐστίν.

…

59. When some one expressed astonishment at the votive offerings in Samothrace, his comment was, "There would have been far more, if those who were not saved had set up offerings." But others attribute this remark to Diagoras of Melos.

…

He was returning from Lacedaemon to Athens; and on some one asking, "Whither and whence?" he replied, "From the men's apartments to the women's."
…

Asked where he came from, he said, "I am a citizen of the world."[37]

> 37. If this answer is authentic, it apparently shows that the famous term "cosmopolitan" originated with Diogenes.

…

For even the despising of pleasure is itself most pleasurable, when we are habituated to it; and just as those accustomed to a life of pleasure feel disgust when they pass over to the opposite experience, so those whose training has been of the opposite kind derive more pleasure from despising pleasure than from the pleasures themselves. This was the gist of his conversation; and it was plain that he acted accordingly, **adulterating currency in very truth, allowing convention no such authority as he allowed to natural right, and asserting that the manner of life he lived was the same as that of Heracles when he preferred liberty to everything.**

72. **He maintained that all things are the property of the wise,** and employed such arguments as those cited above. All things belong to the gods. The gods are friends to the wise, and friends share all property in common; therefore all things are the property of the wise. Again as to law: that it is impossible for society to exist without law; for without a city no benefit can be derived from that which is civilized. But the city is civilized, and there is no advantage in law without a city; therefore law is something civilized. **He would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice. The only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe. He advocated community of wives, recognizing no other marriage than a union of the man who persuades with the woman who consents. And for this reason he thought sons too should be held in common.**

73. **And he saw no impropriety either in stealing anything from a temple or in eating the flesh of any animal; nor even anything impious in touching human flesh, this, he said, being clear from the custom of some foreign nations. Moreover, according to right reason, as he put it, all elements are contained in all things and pervade everything: since not only is meat a constituent of bread, but bread of vegetables; and all other bodies also, by means of certain invisible passages and particles, find their way in and unite with all substances in the form of vapour.** This he makes plain in the *Thyestes*, if the tragedies are really his and not the work of his friend Philiscus of Aegina or of Pasiphon, the son of Lucian,[43] who according to Favorinus in his *Miscellaneous History* wrote them after the death of Diogenes. He held that we should neglect music, geometry, astronomy, and the like studies, as useless and unnecessary.
…

But some say that when dying he left instructions that they should throw him out unburied, that every wild beast might feed on him, or thrust him into a ditch and sprinkle a little dust over him. But according to others his instructions were that they should throw him into the Ilissus, in order that he might be useful to his brethren.

Demetrius in his work *On Men of the Same Name* asserts that on the same day on which Alexander died in Babylon Diogenes died in Corinth.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA226#v=onepage&q&f=false

Displaying horrendous manners, Diogenes was said to sneeze from the left.25 He was often accused of advocating incest and cannibalism.26

> 26. Incest: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 10.29-30; cf. 7.188. Cannibalism: D.L. 6.73; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 8.14; Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolycum* 3.5; and possibly *Ep. Diog.* 28. **In a tirade against Cynic indecency, Philodemus's treatise *On the Stoics* accuses Cynics of masturbating in public, transvestitism, pederasty, being penetrated in homosexual acts, group marriage, rape, incest, prostitution, and adultery.**

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

If Philodemus is throughout drawing on the writings of Diogenes, we gather that intercourse was to be permitted without restriction of place, person, or sex.2 **It goes without saying that all distinctions of rank and birth were to be abolished.** Such appears to have been the 'ideal state' of Diogenes. That it might be realized he carried on a violent opposition, not merely to the customs and conventions, but to the ordinary business of existing communities.

> **He would praise those who were about to marry and refrained, those who intended to go on a voyage and never set sail, those who thinking to engage in politics do no such thing, those also who purporting to raise a family do not do so, and those who make ready to associate with tyrants and yet never approach them after all.**3

It is the extreme of individualism. To call it a political system at all is doubtless a contradiction, unless we are prepared to admit with Blake the possibility of a benevolent anarchy.

---

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n231/mode/2up?view=theater

In modern times the movement most akin to Cynicism is Anarchism. **In the eighteenth century it appears, though not under that name, in the speculations of Rousseau and Diderot on the Golden Age, or later in Blake's vision of the Age of Innocence;** all marked by nostalgia for an imaginary age when man as an individual had the widest scope for achieving happiness, untrammelled by the constraints of the social system.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Life_of_William_Blake_(1880),_Volume_2/Prose_writings/A_Vision_of_the_Last_Judgment
>
> **Many persons, such as Paine and Voltaire with some of the ancient Greeks, say: 'We will not converse concerning good and evil; we will live in Paradise and Liberty.'**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1860/pg1860-images.html#link2HCH0024
>
> **There, on the stream bank, lay the two renegades from civilized life.** They had cast away their clothes, and painted themselves, like the Indians, with arnotto and indigo.
> …
>
> “Free to be happy,” interrupted the man. “With the best of wives, the best of food, a warmer bed than a duke's, and a finer garden than an emperor's. **As for clothes, why the plague should a man wear them where he don't need them? As for gold, what's the use of it where Heaven sends everything ready-made to your hands?**
> …
>
> Look round!” said he, waving a lazy hand, “and see the works of God, and the place of Paradise, whither poor weary souls go home and rest, after their masters in the wicked world have used them up, with labor and sorrow, and made them wade knee-deep in blood—I'm tired of blood, and tired of gold.
> …
>
> “Christian ordinances? **Adam and Eve had no parsons in Paradise.** The Lord was their priest, and the Lord was their shepherd, and He'll be ours too.
> …
>
> Amyas stood spell-bound. The effect of the narcotic was all but miraculous in his eyes. The sustained eloquence, the novel richness of diction in one seemingly drowned in sensual sloth, were, in his eyes, the possession of some evil spirit. And yet he could not answer the Evil One. **His English heart, full of the divine instinct of duty and public spirit, told him that it must be a lie: but how to prove it a lie?**
>
> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0136%3Abook%3D9%3Acard%3D82
>
> So they went straightway and mingled with the Lotus-eaters, and the Lotus-eaters did not plan death for my comrades, but gave them of the lotus to taste. And whosoever of them ate of the honey-sweet fruit of the lotus, [95] had no longer any wish to bring back word or to return, but there they were fain to abide among the Lotus-eaters, feeding on the lotus, and forgetful of their homeward way.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA386#v=onepage&q&f=false

As they stood in the public rooms of the wealthy amateurs of art and philosophy – and of the unconventional in philosophy – in the great houses and villas of Rome and Italy, the Cynics that accosted the members of these households and their visitors were so small that the engagement of the Cynic was much diminished and the man of taste immune from the violence of their attack. **And we are reminded that the wealthy sometimes invited the Cynics to dinner as, in another age, Baron d’Holbach invited Jean-Jacques Rousseau to his hotel, dressed as Rousseau was in the eighteenth-century equivalent of a *tribōn*.**39 But more often the Cynics were invited into the houses of the great in Rome and Italy when they were long dead.

> 39. **“A nobleman was expected to dress like a nobleman, a bourgeois like a bourgeois, but a philosopher – at any rate a recognized philosopher – could dress as he pleased”:** Maurice Cranston, *Jean-Jacques; The Early life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754* (Chicago 1991) 257.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n287/mode/2up?view=theater

The phenomenon of Rousseau signifies in literature the irruption of exaggerated and brutal plebeianism. Hitherto the efforts of the middle classes had been to climb into the higher strata of society, to attain and, if possible, to surpass the refinement, restraint, and elegance of their manner of life. **But Rousseau scorns “society,” or rather adopts the virtuous rôle of one who scorns it. He stays down, and therein lies his originality and his strength.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/166/mode/2up?view=theater

To create a kind of anti-Genesis, Rousseau erases or denies everything one finds in the Biblical account of human origins. **Human beings are not made in the image of God; that is, they are not rational by nature. Indeed, “the state of reflection is a state contrary to nature and … the man who meditates is a depraved animal.”**4 **Man’s natural, non-depraved condition is to savor “the sentiment” of his own “present existence without any idea of the future.”**5 Man is naturally a feeling animal, not a rational animal, a being absorbed in the here and now, and hence oblivious to eternity. In Rousseau’s account there is no primitive religion, no care or concern for – or even mention of – God. **For Rousseau, belief in God is not natural, and religion is somehow part of the depravity that comes in later, with meditation.**6
…

> His desires do not exceed his physical needs, the only goods he knows in the universe are nourishment, a female, and repose; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger. **I say pain and not death because an animal will never know what it is to die; and knowledge of death and its terrors is one of the first acquisitions that man has made in moving away from the animal condition.**9

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/198/mode/2up?view=theater

> 31. **Sade’s state of nature means, ultimately, a universal freedom for unlimited sex.** For many of his *philosophe* contemporaries too the sexual tabus were the first to be abolished. **In Morelly’s *Basiliade* (1753) the ‘infamous terms incest, adultery and prostitution were unknown. These nations had no idea of such crimes. A sister received her brother’s tender embrace. … Not fear of punishment prevented a widow from accepting the caresses of her son.’** On Sade’s sexual politics see my article, ‘Kakotopia, the politics of Sade,’ in *The Political Science Reviewer*, Vol. III (fall 1973).

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/westminsters_confession.pdf

If you want my thesis of natural law theory in one graphic sentence, I will provide it: ***the most consistent defender of natural law theory was the Marquis de Sade.*** De Sade's incomparable perversity was self-consciously based on his observation of the workings of nature. In this sense, he was a faithful late-eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinker.

De Sade came about as close as anyone ever has in literature to become the fully consistent covenant-breaking man. The American literary critic Edmund Wilson once wrote that the only writer that he could not bear to read while eating breakfast was de Sade. When you think "natural law theory," always think sadism. Natural law theory apart from God's grace, both special and common, leads to sadism.35 So does its logical corollary, political pluralism. **If you doubt me, how do you explain *Roe v. Wade*?** Think of 25 million unborn American infants silently screaming, 1973-1990. This is the Marquis de Sade's moral legacy to America, and Roger Williams' political legacy. "We, the politically sovereign People" have spoken.36

De Sade was a true Enlightenment republican. He wrote these stirring words: "**We need a faith, a faith suited to the republican character and far removed from ever possibly resuming that of Rome.** In an age when we are so convinced that religion must rest on morality, and not morality upon religion, we need a religion in tune with our way of life, as it were the development, the inevitable extension of it, a religion which can elevate the soul and keep it perpetually at the level of that precious liberty which it venerates today as its only idol."37 He was a man opposed to harsh civil sanctions, such as the death penalty.38 He also opposed civil laws against prostitution, adultery, incest, rape, and sodomy. **After all, these are all natural urges and practices; they are found in nature. Marriage and monogamy are not normal in nature.** "Can we possibly imagine Nature giving us the possibility of committing a crime which would offend her?"39

https://supervert.com/elibrary/marquis-de-sade/120-days-of-sodom

"That I deny," said the Bishop with emphasis, "and even for such pleasures as you allude to the boy is worth more than the girl. **Consider the problem from the point of view of evil, evil almost always being pleasure's true and major charm;** considered thus, the crime must appear greater when perpetrated upon a being of your identical sort than when inflicted upon one which is not, and this once established, the delight automatically doubles."

"Yes," said Curval, "but that despotism, that empire, that delirium born of the abuse of one's power over the weak..."

"But the same is no less true in the other case," the Bishop insisted. "**If the victim is yours, thoroughly in your power, that supremacy which when using women you think better established than when using men, is based upon pure prejudice, upon nothing, and results merely from the custom whereby females are more ordinarily submitted to your caprices than are males. But give up that popular superstition for a moment, view the thing equitably** and, provided the man is bound absolutely by your chains and by the same authority you exert over women, you will obtain the idea of a greater crime; your lubricity ought hence to increase at least twofold."

"I am of the Bishop's mind," Durcet joined in, "and once it is certain that sovereignty is fully established, I believe the abuse of power more delicious when exercised at the expense of one's peer than at a woman's."

https://archive.org/details/theworldaswill02schouoft/page/352/mode/2up?view=theater

Therefore Apuleius says (*Florid.*, iv.): *"Crates, ut lar familiaris apud homines suae aetatis cultus est. Nulla domus ei unquam clausa erat: nee erat patrisfamilias tam absconditum secretum, quin eo tempestive Crates interveniret, litium omnium et jurgiorum inter propinquos disceptator et arbiter."* Thus in this, as in so many other respects, they show a great likeness to the mendicant friars of modern times, that is, to the better and more genuine among them, whose ideal may be seen in the Capucine Christoforo in Manzoni's famous romance. **Yet this resemblance lies only in the effects, not in the cause.** They agree in the result, but the fundamental thought of the two is quite different. With the friars, as with the Sannyâsis, who are akin to them, it is an aim which transcends life; but with the Cynics it is only the conviction that it is easier to reduce their wishes and their wants to the *minimum*, than to attain to the *maximum* in their satisfaction, which indeed is impossible, for with their satisfaction the wishes and wants grow *ad infinitum*; therefore, in order to reach the goal of all ancient ethics, the greatest happiness possible in this life, they took the path of renunciation as the shortest and easiest: "*ὅθεν καὶ τὸν κυνισμὸν εἰρήκασι σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν*." (*Unde Cynismum dixere compendiosam ad virtutem viam.*) *Diog. Laert.*, vi. 9. **The fundamental difference between the spirit of cynicism and that of asceticism comes out very clearly in the humility which is essential to the ascetic, but is so foreign to the Cynic that, on the contrary, he is distinguished beyond everything else for pride and scorn:**

> "*Sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives,*
> *Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum.*" *Hor.*

On the other hand, the view of life held by the Cynics agrees in spirit with that of J.J. Rousseau as he expounds it in the "*Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité*." For he also would wish to lead us back to the crude state of nature, and regards the reduction of our wants to the minimum as the surest path to happiness.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020

Communism in its grossest form was recommended by Diogenes of Sinope.

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n233/mode/2up?view=theater

It is especially interesting to find Kropotkin recognizing the 'best exposition from the Ancient World of the principles of Anarchism' in the *Republic* of Zeno, which was of course composed when Zeno was under the influence of Cynicism.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Crates

According to Antisthenes in his *Successions*, the first impulse to the Cynic philosophy was given to him when he saw Telephus in a certain tragedy carrying a little basket and altogether in a wretched plight. So he turned his property into money, – for he belonged to a distinguished family, – and having thus collected about 200 talents, distributed that sum among his fellow-citizens. And (it is added) so sturdy a philosopher did he become that he is mentioned by the comic poet Philemon. At all events the latter says:

> In summer-time a thick cloak he would wear
> To be like Crates, and in winter rags.

Diocles relates how Diogenes persuaded Crates to give up his fields to sheep pasture, and throw into the sea any money he had.
...

Eratosthenes tells us that by Hipparchia, of whom we shall presently speak, he had a son born to him named Pasicles, and after he had ceased to be a cadet on service, Crates took him to a brothel and told him that was how his father had married.

89. **The marriage of intrigue and adultery, he said, belonged to tragedy, having exile or assassination as its rewards; while the weddings of those who take up with courtesans are material for comedy,** for as a result of extravagance and drunkenness they bring about madness.
...

90. **He carried on a regular campaign of invective against the courtesans, habituating himself to meet their abuse.**

When Demetrius of Phalerum sent him loaves of bread and some wine, he reproached him, saying, "Oh that the springs yielded bread as well as water!" It is clear, then, that he was a water-drinker.
...

He was ugly to look at, and when performing his gymnastic exercises used to be laughed at. He was accustomed to say, raising his hands, "Take heart, Crates, for it is for the good of your eyes and of the rest of your body. 92. You will see these men, who are laughing at you, tortured before long by disease, counting you happy, and reproaching themselves for their sluggishness." **He used to say that we should study philosophy to the point of seeing in generals nothing but donkey-drivers.**
...

93. **When Alexander inquired whether he would like his native city to be rebuilt, his answer was, "Why should it be? Perhaps another Alexander will destroy it again." Ignominy and Poverty he declared to be his country, which Fortune could never take captive. He was, he said, a fellow-citizen of Diogenes, who defied all the plots of envy.** Menander alludes to him in the Twin Sisters in the following lines:

> Wearing a cloak you'll go about with me,
> As once with Cynic Crates went his wife:
> His daughter too, as he himself declared,
> He gave in marriage for a month on trial.

...

94. Metrocles of Maroneia was the brother of Hipparchia. **He had been formerly a pupil of Theophrastus the Peripatetic, and had been so far corrupted by weakness that, when he made a breach of good manners in the course of rehearsing a speech, it drove him to despair, and he shut himself up at home, intending to starve himself to death.** On learning this Crates came to visit him as he had been asked to do, and after advisedly making a meal of lupins, he tried to persuade him by argument as well that he had committed no crime, for a prodigy would have happened if he had not taken the natural means of relieving himself. At last by reproducing the action he succeeded in lifting him from his dejection, using for his consolation the likeness of the occurrences. From that time forward Metrocles was his pupil, and became proficient in philosophy. 95. Hecato in the first book of his *Anecdotes* tells us he burned his compositions with the words:[55]

> Phantoms are these of dreams o' the world below.

Others say that when he set fire to his notes of Theophrastus's lectures, he added the line:

> Come hither, Hephaestus, Thetis now needeth thee.

...

96. Hipparchia too, sister of Metrocles, was captured by their doctrines. Both of them were born at Maroneia. She fell in love with the discourses and the life of Crates, and would not pay attention to any of her suitors, their wealth, their high birth or their beauty. But to her Crates was everything. She used even to threaten her parents she would make away with herself, unless she were given in marriage to him. Crates therefore was implored by her parents to dissuade the girl, and did all he could, and at last, failing to persuade her, got up, took off his clothes before her face and said, "This is the bridegroom, here are his possessions; make your choice accordingly; for you will be no helpmeet of mine, unless you share my pursuits."

97. The girl chose and, adopting the same dress, **went about with her husband and lived with him in public and went out to dinners with him. Accordingly she appeared at the banquet given by Lysimachus, and there put down Theodorus, known as the atheist, by means of the following sophism.** Any action which would not be called wrong if done by Theodorus, would not be called wrong if done by Hipparchia. Now Theodorus does no wrong when he strikes himself: therefore neither does Hipparchia do wrong when she strikes Theodorus. He had no reply wherewith to meet the argument, but tried to strip her of her cloak. **But Hipparchia showed no sign of alarm or of the perturbation natural in a woman.** 98. **And when he said to her:**

"Is this she
Who quitting woof and warp and comb and loom?"[56]

56. Eur. *Bacch*. 1236.

she replied, "It is I, Theodorus, – but do you suppose that I have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further time upon the loom I spent it in education?" These tales and countless others are told of the female philosopher.

There is current a work of Crates entitled *Epistles*, containing excellent philosophy in a style which sometimes resembles that of Plato. He has also written tragedies, stamped with a very lofty kind of philosophy; as, for example, the following passage:[57]

Not one tower hath my country nor one roof,
But wide as the whole earth its citadel
And home prepared for us to dwell therein.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist3.xhtml#chap6

***Crates* the *Theban* is known to have been a magnanimous person, as well by other things, as by his despising what the Vulgar admire, as also his Wealth and Country.** That he gave the *Thebans* his estate is generally known. But this other action perhaps is less notorious. He quitted *Thebes* newly restored, saying, "I have no need of a City which *Alexander* or some other may subvert."

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Menedemus

103. Such are the lives of the several Cynics. But we will go on to append the doctrines which they held in common – if, that is, we decide that Cynicism is really a philosophy, and not, as some maintain, just a way of life. **They are content then, like Ariston of Chios, to do away with the subjects of Logic and Physics and to devote their whole attention to Ethics.**
…

At least Antisthenes used to say that those who had attained discretion had better not study literature, lest they should be perverted by alien influences. 104. So they get rid of geometry and music and all such studies.
…

They hold further that "Life according to Virtue" is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his *Heracles*: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life.

105. They also hold that we should live frugally, eating food for nourishment only and wearing a single garment. **Wealth and fame and high birth they despise.** Some at all events are vegetarians and drink cold water only and are content with any kind of shelter or tubs, like Diogenes, who used to say that it was the privilege of the gods to need nothing and of god-like men to want but little.

They hold, further, that virtue can be taught, as Antisthenes maintains in his *Heracles*, and when once acquired cannot be lost; and that the wise man is worthy to be loved, impeccable, and a friend to his like; and that we should entrust nothing to fortune. **Whatever is intermediate between Virtue and Vice they, in agreement with Ariston of Chios, account indifferent.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n553/mode/2up?view=theater

This is the essence of the Cynic philosophy: to reduce the things of the flesh to bare necessities in order that the soul may be as free as possible. **Antisthenes took the doctrine literally, and became a Greek Franciscan without theology.**
…

When a priest explained to Antisthenes how many good things the virtuous will enjoy after death, he asked, "Why, then, do you not die?"[49] Diogenes smiled at the Mysteries, and remarked of the offerings set up in Samothrace by those who had survived shipwreck, "The offerings would have been much more numerous if those who were lost had offered them instead of those who were saved."[50] **Everything in religion but the practice of virtue seemed to the Cynics superstition.** Virtue must be accepted as its own reward and should not depend upon the existence or justice of the gods.
…

Men are not civilized by nature, and bear the restraints of ordered life only because they fear punishment or solitude. **Diogenes stood to Socrates in somewhat the same relation as Rousseau to Voltaire: he**

thought that civilization was a mistake, and that Prometheus had deserved his crucifixion for bringing it to mankind.[56] The Cynics, like the Stoics and Rousseau, idealized "nature peoples";[57] Diogenes tried to eat meat raw because cooking was unnatural.[58] The best society, he thought, would be one without artifices or laws.

The Greeks smiled upon the Cynics, and tolerated them as medieval society tolerated its saints. After Diogenes the Cynics became a religious order without religion; they made a rule of poverty, lived on alms, tempered their celibacy with promiscuity, and opened schools of philosophy.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n541/mode/2up?view=theater

They lived like mendicant friars, had a hierarchical organization with novices and superiors,[20] avoided marriage and work, scorned the conventions and artificialities of civilization, denounced all governments as thieves and superfluities, laughed at all oracles, "mysteries," and gods. Everyone satirized them, Lucian most savagely; yet even Lucian admired Demonax, a cultured Cynic who had abandoned his wealth to live in philosophical poverty. He gave his century of life (A.D. 50-150) to helping others, reconciling hostile individuals and cities; **and Athens, which ridiculed everything, respected him. Indicted before an Athenian court for refusing to offer sacrifice to the gods, he won acquittal by saying simply that the gods had no need of offerings, and that religion consisted in kindness to all.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynic_epistles

The two main groups of letters are a set of 51 letters attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, and a set of 36 letters attributed to Crates of Thebes. None of the letters are genuine. Most of the letters of Diogenes were probably written in the 1st century BCE, whereas the letters of Crates, some of which seem to be based on the Diogenes letters, probably date from the 1st century CE.[1] It is not known who wrote the letters, but they seem to have been written by multiple authors.[2] Written in Koine Greek, **the Epistles are among the few Cynic writings which have survived from the time of the Roman empire.**[3]

In addition to these letters, **there are 10 epistles attributed to Anacharsis and 9 epistles attributed to Heraclitus. The letters of Anacharsis may have been written in the 3rd century BCE, whereas the Heraclitean letters probably date from the 1st century CE.**[1] **Anacharsis and Heraclitus predate the Cynics, but they were both regarded by the Cynics to have anticipated Cynic ideals.** There are also 35 *Socratic epistles* supposedly written by Socrates and his followers (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, Xenophon, etc.), many of these letters were also written by someone with a strong affinity towards Cynic ideals, albeit with a sympathy towards Aristippus rather than Antisthenes.[1] Other fictitious letters, such as some of those attributed to Hippocrates, could also be included among the Cynic epistles.[1]

https://learning.hccs.edu/faculty/gregory.buchanan/huma1301/reading-on-the-types-of-cynics

The issues between the two types are sharpened in six of the Socratic letters in which Simon the shoemaker (and Antisthenes) and Aristippus speak for them (Epistles 913). The topic discussed is whether the Cynic could associate with a tyrant. **Antisthenes asserts that the Cynic should strive for selfsufficiency (autarkeia), and that he cannot associate with tyrants or the masses, for they are ignorant of it** (Epistle 8). **With biting irony the hedonist Aristippus replies that he was a steward of the teaching of Socrates in Dionysius' court** (Epistle 9), **and that his position there had resulted in his saving certain Locrian youths** (Epistles 10; 11). Simon denies that a life of luxury is Socratic; his cobbling is done to make possible his admonition of foolish men and his austerity is of value in the pursuit of sophrosyne. He takes umbrage at Aristippus's jesting about his way of life (Epistle 12). Aristippus responds in conciliatory fashion. He is not ridiculing the humble life, for there is wisdom in it. **But Simon would also have opportunity to practise his craft, and on a larger scale, in Syracuse.** Aristippus assures Simon that he is his friend, in contrast to the harsh, bestial Cynics (Epistle 13)
...

The rigoristic Cynics had an extremely pessimistic view of mankind, which earned them the charge of misanthropy. **This view is especially, but not exclusively, represented by most of the letters attributed to Crates, Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Hippocrates.** Most people, they held, are totally deluded, puffed up in their evil, and completely bereft of reason and selfcontrol. Having sunk to the level of beasts in their ignorance and conduct, nature itself hates them, and takes vengeance on them by punishing them. In contrast, the true Cynic, the epitome of virtue, knows nature and imitates it. Whereas nature punishes them in deed, the Cynic does so in his speech (pseudoDiogenes Epistle 28.5). It is by virtue alone that their souls can be purified of its diseases, and it is the Cynic who is the physician able to bring about their cure. Their putrid condition requires no gentle treatment, but rather the cautery and surgery of scathing Cynic parresia. **It is not that the Cynic wishes to be morbid; their wickedness made him sullen and excised his gentleness (pseudoHeraclitus Epistles 5.3; 7.23).**

The worse the human condition, the greater is the virtue of the Cynic perceived to be. Not everyone is capable of Cynic virtue, and most people, complaining about Cynic indifference, flee the Cynic regimen when they see how hard it is. The Cynic alone has brought moral practice to perfection, and, when people prove to be beyond cure, he withdraws from them. **He separates from the bestial crowd who know neither nature, reason or truth, and associates only with those who understand the word of a Cynic** (pseudoDiogenes Diogenes Epistle 28.8). **He may explain, in selfdefence, that it is men's vice, and not themselves, that**

he hates (pseudoHeraclitus Epistle 7.2), but his hatred for them and for association with them is nevertheless at times stated.
...

To begin with, all men are evil, and hate the Cynic (pseudoHeraclitus Epistles 2; 7.10). Although their folly causes him hardships, and they maltreat him, and he cannot avoid them, still his virtue remains untouched (pseudoCrates Crates Epistle 35). He is superior to them because he has chosen the difficult, Diogenean, way to happiness. It is hard to find a real Cynic (pseudoDiogenes Epistle 29.4). One must be born to that life, otherwise one fears it and despairs of it (pseudoCrates Epistle 21; pseudoDiogenes Epistles 12; 41). But the Cynic is superior in his moral exercise, is more simple in his life, and more patient in hardship (pseudoDiogenes Epistle 27). It is, in the first instance, what he is, as exemplified in his deeds rather than his words, that is important. **Thus, the Cynic dress, which he invests with great importance, sets him off from other people by freeing him from popular opinion** (pseudoDiogenes Epistles 7; 34) and effectively separating him from undesirable people (pseudoCrates Epistle 23).

The Cynic's superiority is also demonstrated in his begging. He begs to sustain himself, but he does so for the right reasons and in the right manner, which set him further apart. Begging is not disgraceful, for it is to satisfy a need arising from voluntary poverty (pseudoCrates Epistle 17). **By surrendering his private property and thus being freed from evil** (pseudoCrates Epistle 7), **he shows himself superior to the values of popular opinion** (pseudoDiogenes Epistle 9). **Furthermore, he is not really begging, but only demanding what belongs to him, for, since all things belong to God, friends have all things in common, and he is a friend of God, all things belong to him** (pseudoCrates Crates Epistles 26, 27; pseudoDiogenes Epistle 10.2). Nor is he indiscriminate in his begging, for vice must support virtue. Thus, he begs only from people who are worthy of him and his teaching (pseudoCrates Epistles 2; 19; 22; 36; pseudo-Diogenes Epistle 38.34).
...

As the major representative of the milder Cynicism advocated in the letters, Aristippus illustrates their irenic tendency. As already noted, he commends Simon. He is further on good terms with Xenophon and other Socratics (Epistle 18), and the enmity between him and Plato is played down as jesting and a reconciliation is hinted at (Epistle 23.3). By selective use of the anecdotal tradition, rivalries are further played down and a harmonious picture is sketched. For example, **although the tradition often records the austere Diogenes's criticisms of Plato, Diogenes does not appear in these letters, and even the less frequently attested opposition between Antisthenes and Plato is omitted, with Antisthenes left to rebuke only Aristippus.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximus_of_Tyre

Maximus of Tyre (Greek: Μάξιμος Τύριος; fl. late 2nd century AD), also known as Cassius Maximus Tyrius, was a Greek rhetorician and philosopher who lived in the time of the Antonines and Commodus, and who belongs to the trend of the Second Sophistic. His writings contain many allusions to the history of Greece, while there is little reference to Rome; hence it is inferred that he lived longer in Greece, perhaps as a professor at Athens.[1] **Although nominally a Platonist, he is really an Eclectic and one of the precursors of Neoplatonism.**[1]

https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_YcYfAAAAMAAJ/page/n219/mode/2up?view=theater

I AM desirous, conformably to the wisdom of the Lydian [Aesop], to compose for you a fable.
...

But they, after their birth, lived without difficulty; for the earth supplied them with aliment, rich meadows, long-haired mountains, and abundance of fruits, such as she is accustomed to bear when undisturbed by husbandmen. The nymphs also supplied them with pure fountains, pellucid rivers, and easily-pervious and copious sources of other streams. To these things also was added a bland heat from the sun, which afforded a solace to bodies by its circumfluent symmetry; and cooling breezes from rivers refreshed them in the summer. To the inhabitants of the earth, thus living in an abundant supply of spontaneous good, hostility was unknown. **Poets appear to me, to be very near to this our fable, who obscurely signify that there was a life of this kind under Saturn, the king of the gods;** a life without war, without iron, without a guard, peaceful, healthful, unindigent: and Hesiod, as it seems, (strenuously alluding to such a life as this) calls it the golden age.

Here, however, let the fable end, and let our discourse, arising out of it, compare in its progress life with life, the latter with the former, whether some one may think proper to denominate it iron, or to give it some other appellation. **When men, therefore, being allotted the earth, had distributed different portions of it among themselves, they enclosed themselves with fortifications and walls, rolled soft bandages round their bodies, and defended their feet with skins.**
...

Let us, however, leave these images together with fables, and direct our attention to a man, **who did not live under the reign of Saturn, but in the midst of this iron race, and who was made free by Jupiter and Apollo. But this man was neither Attic nor Doric; he was neither a pupil of Solon, nor formed from the discipline of Lycurgus, (for neither places nor laws elect the virtues) but he was from Sinope, in Pontus;** and, having consulted with Apollo, he divested himself of all calamitous circumstances, liberated himself from his fetters, and travelled round the earth without restraint, like a bird endued with intellect, fearing no tyrant, compelled by no law, employed by no polity, neither oppressed by the education of children, nor suffering restraint through wedlock, nor detained by agriculture, nor disturbed by military affairs, nor driven from place to place by merchandize; but he derided all who are thus employed and their pursuits, just as we do little children, when we see them seriously employed about their play-things, and striking and plundering each other.

---

http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13d.html

[93.] **And, in short, according to Clearchus of Soli, you do not adopt a manly system of life, but you do really aim at a system which might become a dog; and although this animal has four excellent qualities, you select none but the worst of his qualities for your imitation.** For a dog is a wonderful animal as to his power of smelling and of distinguishing what belongs to his own family and what does not; and the way in which he associates with man, and the manner in which he watches over and protects the houses of all those who are kind to him, is extraordinary. **But you who imitate the dogs, do neither of these things. For you do not associate with men, nor do you distinguish between those with whom you are acquainted;** and being very deficient in sensibility, you live in an indolent and indifferent manner. But while the dog is also a snarling and greedy animal, and also hard in his way of living, and naked; **these habits of his you practise, being abusive and gluttonous, and, besides all this, living without a home or a hearth.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=gy0rDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA319#v=onepage&q&f=false

You won't give a second thought to marriage, children, fatherland – all this will be just so much nonsense to you. You'll leave your home and family to live in a tomb, an abandoned tower, or a tub.
…

In a word, behave exactly like a wild beast. Forget about shame, propriety, moderation. Wipe the blushes from you face forever. Make for the places where crowds gather but, in their very midst, remember to be solitary and and aloof, to stay away from friend and stranger alike; otherwise you'll be undermining our empire. **Don't hesitate to do in the sight of all what the ordinary man wouldn't do even in private; pick the more amusing perversions for your sexual pleasures;** and, finally, if you care to, kill yourself off by eating a raw octopus or squid.6 This is my kind of happiness. And I'll guarantee it for you.
…

But, listen. It's so easy. Anyone can do it. No course of study required, no debates, no nonsense; my road is a short cut to fame.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q&f=false

What an ingenious b modern Writer has said of Diogenes, may be generally apply'd to the Philosophers of that Sect. **"That they of the Number of those extraordinary Persons, who run every Thing into Extremes, without excepting even Reason itself; and who verify the Maxim, * *That there is no great Wit without a Spice Madness*."** They had learn'd from *Socrates*, that Morality was the most useful of all the Sciences; and what deserv'd our greatest Care and Application. From this most true Principle, they absurdly concluded; that Logick, Natural Philosophy, Geometry, Musick, the liberal Arts and Sciences; in a word, every Thing that did not immediately relate to the Science of Morality, was to be despis'd, and intirely thrown aside.
…

I am surpris'd to find this celebrated Author, whose Words I borrow'd, making the *Cynicks* to triumph; as if Reason alone was not sufficient to demonstrate, that their Impudence is vicious, and contrary to the Maxims of the Law of Nature. "It may be objected, says he, to *Diogenes*, that the Sense of Shame, in Cases of this Nature, is a natural Sentiment; so that to be without Shame on these Occasions, is to do Violence to Nature itself. But, to this he will answer; **that was this Sense of Shame a real Dictate of Nature, the other Animals too, who so faithfully follow the Impulse of Nature, would seek for dark Holes and secret Recesses, to perform this Work of Generation in: The contrary of which is most apparent.** At least, this would be universally true as to Men, that they in such Cases always seek out the darkest and most obscure Retreat; which is also w

false.---It will here be reply'd to *Diogenes*, that it is sufficient, that all civiliz'd Nations are subject to this Sense of Shame.---To which he again will make this Return; **that the Nations we are pleased to call barbarous, have much less deviated from the Rules of Nature;** than those, who have, with their refining, and Subtilty of Thought, so vastly multiply'd the Modes and Forms of Decency and Civility; and in short, **since the Law of Nature is not subject to Prescription, it is both right and lawful, at all Times, and in all Places to return back to the Observation of it; without having any Regard to the arbitrary Yoke of Customs and Opinions, however, or wheresoever establish'd.**" **These are the Reasons which Mr. *Bayle* puts into the Mouth of *Diogenes*.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpsocratics.htm#antisthenes

Antisthenes and Diogenes, as already mentioned, were men of great culture. The succeeding Cynics are not any the less conspicuous by their exceeding shamelessness, but they were, generally speaking, nothing more than swinish beggars, who found their satisfaction in the insolence which they showed to others. They are worthy of no further consideration in Philosophy, and they deserve in its full the name of dogs, which was early given to them; for the dog is a shameless animal.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qKiDDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **"With a more decided contempt for all knowledge, and a still greater scorn of all the customs of society, the later Cynicism became a repulsive and shameful caricature of the Socratic spirit."** – German philosopher Albert Schwegler in A History of Philosophy in Epitome, p. 81

...

If the Sophists provide us with a preview of much of what constitutes sociological thought today, the Cynics help us round out that picture and allow us to see more clearly not just the ideas but also the attitudes which animate the SocProgs. **The Cynics like the Sophists both shared a disdain for custom, tradition, and any and all notions of settled or permanent values, of truth. But here the two groups may be said to part ways. Whereas a few of the Sophists actually grew concerned and backtracked a little over all their negations and destructions, the Cynics held no such reserve.** The Cynics loudly and brazenly challenged and ultimately rejected any and all conventions, customs, and traditions they could get their hands on. They even went as far as to imagine a new world, a better world, a world in which there was no property, no custom, no tradition, no morality, and no religion; a world in which everyone was free to have sex with whomever one wished whenever one wanted.

https://bobthune.com/2020/01/seeing-through-cynicism/

The title of the book pays homage to **C.S. Lewis's famous observation in *The Abolition of Man*: "You cannot go on 'seeing through' things forever… To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see."** Keyes adopts this rubric as his baseline definition of cynicism: "Cynicism… has to do with *seeing through* and unmasking positive appearances to reveal the more basic underlying motivations of greed, power, lust, and selfishness."
...

By claiming to "see through" the motives of others, the cynic assumes a posture of omniscience. "Cynics see through the illusory truths of others to get down to the 'real truth' beneath… Far from losing confidence in truth, cynicism has put enormous trust in a different set of truths – its own tools of cynical inquiry." **Though often cloaked in the language of skepticism, cynicism is in fact a claim to absolute truth and objectivity.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=DA4vAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA180#v=onepage&q&f=false

Had either Diogenes or Crates been the beasts which some have represented them, it is wholly incredible that Zeno and the Stoics would have treated their memory with so much respect.
...

In MENEDEMUS, of Lampsacus, the spirit of the Cynic sect degenerated into downright madness. Dressed in a black cloak, with an Arcadian cap upon his head, on which were drawn the figures of the twelve signs of the zodiac, with tragic buskins on his legs, with a long beard, and with an ashen staff in his hand, **he went about like a maniac, saying that he was a spirit, returned from the infernal regions to admonish world.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Menedemus

102. Menedemus was a pupil of Colotes of Lampsacus. According to Hippobotus **he had attained such a degree of audacity in wonder-working that he went about in the guise of a Fury, saying that he had come from Hades to take cognisance of sins committed, and was going to return and report them to the powers down below.** This was his attire: a grey tunic reaching to the feet, about it a crimson girdle; an Arcadian hat on his head with the twelve signs of the zodiac inwrought in it; buskins of tragedy; and he wore a very long beard and carried an ashen staff in his hand.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aghori#Beliefs_and_doctrines

The purpose of embracing pollution and degradation through various customs is the realization of non-duality (advaita) through transcending social taboos, attaining what is essentially an altered state of consciousness and perceiving the illusory nature of all conventional categories.
...

Aghoris base their beliefs on two principles common to broader Shaiva beliefs: **that Shiva is perfect (having omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence) and that Shiva is responsible for everything that occurs:** all conditions, causes and effects. Consequently, everything that exists must be perfect and to deny the perfection of anything would be to deny the sacredness of all life in its full manifestation, as well as to deny the Supreme Being.

Aghoris believe that every person's soul is Shiva, but is covered by *aṣṭamahāpāśa* "eight great nooses or bonds", including sensual pleasure, anger, greed, obsession, fear and hatred. The practices of the Aghoris are centered around the removal of these bonds. **Sādhanā in cremation grounds is used in an attempt to destroy fear; sexual practices with certain riders and controls attempt to release one from sexual desire; being naked is used in an attempt to destroy shame.** On release from all the eight bonds, the soul becomes *sadāśiva* and obtains *moksha*.[8]
...

Barrett (2008: p. 161) discusses the "charnel ground sādhanā" of the Aghora in both its left and right-handed proclivities **and identifies it as principally cutting through attachments and aversion and foregrounding primordiality;** a view uncultured, undomesticated:[11]

> **The gurus and disciples of Aghor believe their state to be primordial and universal. They believe that all human beings are natural-born Aghori. Hari Baba has said on several occasions that human babies of all societies are without discrimination, that they will play as much in their own filth as with the toys around them. Children become progressively discriminating as they grow older and learn the culturally specific attachments and aversions of their parents.** Children become increasingly aware of their mortality as they bump their heads and fall to the ground. They come to fear their mortality and then palliate this fear by finding ways to deny it altogether.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayin_and_Yesh

Hasidic master Dov Ber of Mezeritch says:

> **one should think of one's self as *Ayin*, and that "absolute all" and "absolute nothingness" are the same, and that the person who learns to think about himself as *Ayin* will ascend to a spiritual world, where everything is the same and everything is equal: "life and death, ocean and dry land."**[1][7]

...

In his autobiographical trilogy *Love and Exile*, Isaac Bashevis Singer, an American-Jewish writer and a Nobel Prize laureate, remembers how he studied Kabbalah **and tried to comprehend how could have it been that he,**

> **Rothschild, the mouse in its hole, the bedbug on the wall, and the corpse in the grave were identical in every sense, as were dream and reality...**[14]

http://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/unholy_spirits.pdf

Don Juan, an "uneducated" Indian of the Southwest, has the same view of the world and man's role in it that Immanuel Kant struggled to attain by means of rigorous logic. Man makes up the rules and serves as the game's only umpire. "The *tonal* makes the world only in a manner of speaking. It cannot create or change anything, and yet it makes the world because its function is to judge and assess, and witness. I say that the *tonal* makes the world because it witnesses and assesses it according to *tonal* rules. In a very strange manner the *tonal* is a creator that doesn't create a thing. In other words, the *tonal* makes up the rules by which it apprehends the world. So, in a manner of speaking, it creates the world."94

Kant never said it any better; in fact, he never said it as well. There is no world-in-itself but only a description of the world that men learn to visualize and take for granted.95

…

The sorcerer must discipline his rational side not to collapse in the face of control by the irrational. Don Juan offers this crucial bit of instruction: "The goal of a warrior's training then is not to teach him to hex or to charm, but to prepare his *tonal* not to crap out. A most difficult accomplishment."102
…

The sociological premise of sorcery is *radical atomism*. The sorcerer is cut off from all social institutions, all sense of history, all sense that one thing is any more important than another – except for the quest for power. With respect to the world and the flesh, it is possible to say: "Everything is equal and therefore unimportant."110 **But one had better not say this about the devil; the philosophy of pure relativism, or "controlled folly," does not apply to the agents of his satanic majesty:** "My ally and Mescalito are not on a par with us human beings. My controlled folly applies only to myself and to the acts I perform while in the company of my fellow men."111

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n31/mode/2up?view=theater

14. The Signification of Madness in the History of Morality.—If, despite that formidable pressure of the "morality of custom," under which all human communities lived—thousands of years before our own era, and during our own era up to the present day (we ourselves are dwelling in the small world of exceptions, and, as it were, in an evil zone):—**if, I say, in spite of all this, new and divergent ideas, valuations, and impulses have made their appearance time after time, this state of things has been brought about only with the assistance of a dreadful associate: it was insanity almost everywhere that paved the way for the new thought and cast off the spell of an old custom and superstition.**
…

Let us take a step further: all those superior men, who felt themselves irresistibly urged on to throw off the yoke of some morality or other, had no other resource—*if they were not really mad*—than to feign madness, or actually to become insane. And this holds good for innovators in every department of life, and not only in religion and politics. Even the reformer of the poetic metre was forced to justify himself by means of madness.

https://www.claremont.org/crb/article/are-the-kids-altright/

And a great deal of BAP's silly outrageousness seems to be there to provide air cover for the outrageous things he means in deadly earnest. If so, he might be following Niccolò Machiavelli, who once wrote "that it is a very wise thing to simulate craziness at the right time." The internet pidgin likely serves a similar purpose. It simultaneously attracts the young—who by nature enjoy slang for its exclusionary effect on the duffers (which is why, to remain effective, slang must be constantly reinvented)—while putting off said duffers, who will assume that such drivel cannot be serious and thus is not worth their attention, much less their worry.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA70#v=onepage&q&f=false

The asceticism of Antisthenes and the asceticism of those Christian anchorites are vastly different for a simple reason: **whereas the Christian anchorites knew (or thought they knew) that *this* temporal life is only a moment of trial that would be followed by an eternal life of blissfulness for the good and suffering for the wicked, Antisthenes and, with him, other Cynics were convinced that *this* physical life is the only life given to us.** Thus, whereas the former renounced pleasure and punished the body in order to assure for themselves eternal happiness and pleasure **(proving themselves to be ultimately hedonistic, for eternal pleasure was their real goal),** the latter renounced *some* pleasures, and disciplined the body in order to strengthen their character and and allow for their rational faculty to become liberated from desires and needs, and act as the only ruler of their lives. **Antisthenes' asceticism, therefore, is not otherworldly, and is not based on the expectation of another life. Unlike the Christian anchorites, accordingly, Antisthenes loved and had his pleasures, including the satisfaction of his sexual needs.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D22

It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a certain habit of body: **for if he appears to be consumptive, thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight.** For he

> must not only by showing the qualities of the soul prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent of the things which they admire to be a good man, **but he must also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of living in the open air does not injure even the body. See, he says, I am a proof of this, and my own body also is.** So Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking, and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal appearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he seems to be a beggar: all persons turn away from him, all are offended with him; for neither ought he to appear dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men; **but his very roughness ought to be clean and attractive.**

…

This idea of strength is best understood in terms of the word 'virtue', expressed in Greek as *ἀρετή* (*virtus* in Latin). In it, we come upon the most critical of all the ideas of Antisthenes. **If we insist on using the word 'virtue' to designate what Antisthenes had in mind, however, we must disassociate from it the connotations that have adhered to it through the influence of Judeo-Christian traditions.** 'Virtue' in the Cynic context, and, in fact, in the context of Greek philosophy in general, is only marginally related to ideas such as purity or chastity, piety or religiosity, and is only a distant relative of the canonical virtues of Thomistic theology.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

The idea of taking a fresh look at the religion of the early Cynics first came to me when I realize how widely divergent were the interpretations of their religious attitudes proposed by scholars hitherto, and how completely lacking those interpretations have been in any rigorously systematic approach to the problem. Zeller spoke of *Aufklärung* (enlightenment).1 Bernays wrote of adherents of "the purest deist sect" of antiquity.2 **Gomperz complained that the monotheism of the Cynics introduced a divinity that was "an utterly colorless abstraction, comparable with the First Cause of the English deists."**3 Guthrie referred to the pantheism of Antisthenes.4 Rahn went so far as to entitle one of his articles "Die Frömmigheit der Kyniker." (The Piety of the Cynics).5 And that list takes no account of the reputation for atheism with which certain classical authors saw fit to grace Diogenes of Sinope or Bion of Borysthenes. Such diversity of views cried out for closer examination.

…

When we survey the list of titles of the works of the early Cynics, we notice immediately that there are very few dealing with religious subjects, almost as though religion was something that did not really interest these philosophers. Antisthenes, however, occupies a place apart. **It is impossible, at least as far as religion is concerned, to group him with the other Cynics, for he almost certainly wrote several works dealing with religion,** including *On Injustice and Impiety* (and a *Phusikos*, which can perhaps be identified with the *Peri Phuseōs* and the *Erōtēma peri Phusēos* found in the catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius).65 Among the Presocratic philosophers, this kind of work dealt with the question of the gods.66

…

The inventory is, therefore, rather disappointing, particulary since even looking at the work of later Cynics, **we find only one work – albeit an important one – that took up a position on religion; the *Kata tōn Khrēstēriōn* (*Against the Oracles*) of Oenomaus of Gadara.**70 **Comparison with the Stoics highlights even more clearly the lack of interest in religion and theology shown by the Cynics, always with the exception of Antisthenes.** Persaeus,71 Cleanthes,72 Chrysippus,73 and Posidonius74 each wrote a work entitled *On the Gods*.

…

We read in Diogenes Laertius:77 **"Diogenes also said that when he saw the lives of steersmen, doctors, and philosophers, he thought the man was the most intelligent living being. On the other hand, when he saw interpreters of dreams, soothsayers and those who listened to them, or those puffed up with pride and riches, he thought there was nothing more foolish than a man."** Diogenes was also beside himself when he saw men sacrificing to the gods in order to have good heath and, even while the ceremony was going on, eat in a way that was detrimental to their health.78 He likewise mocked those naive enough to believe that the initiates of the Mysteries had a right to the best places in Hades:79 "Let me laugh! Agesilas and Epaminondas will be crouching in the mire while any nincompoop – provided that he was an initiate – will be staying in the Isles of the Blessed!"80

The third motive is also truly Cynic. **Diogenes seeks to show how popular religion and its practices stem from *nomos* and not from *phusis*.** These practices, inscribed in the framework of custom and convention under all its forms, domestic, social, or political, were always a favorite target of the Cynics, and to such practices they opposed *phusis*, that is to say, nature. **I refer to the famous passage of Antisthenes' *Phusikos* in which he say that according to tradition there are many gods, but according to nature only one.**81 For all the Cynics, popular religion plays a part in social conventions, which is why they criticize it. This is what led to the disrespectful comments of Diogenes, comments which must have shocked his contemporaries. He said, for instance, that there was nothing out of place in robbing a temple.82 For Diogenes, from the moment temples are a human institution, respect for the goods within them becomes a purely social convention.

…

The polemic that opposes Polystratus and his adversaries concerns the psychology of animals. His adversaries, whom Polystratus considers to be full of insolence,95 observe that moral concepts that are generally accepted vary from one culture to another and from one man to another.96 **They conclude that such moral ideas, denuded of *phusis*, have no universal value save that lent them by convention – unlike gold and stone, where the difference is said to be one of nature rather than of convention. In the eyes of Polystratus's adversaries, who are probably Cynics, ethical concepts such as the noble (*to kalon*) or the base (*to aiskhron*) correspond to false beliefs in man and do not deserve to be taken seriously,**97 **since they do not exist objectively (*kat' alētheian*).**98 This position obviously shocked Polystratus, implying as it does a fundamental spiritual identification between the human soul and the souls of animals, an idea that Polystratus hotly contested and attempts to ridicule. This passage is similar in tone to the paradoxical hierarchy mentioned above. It supposes that animals have the same souls as men have, **while the Cynics go even further when they say, as we have seen in the case of Philodemus, that animals are happier than man because they have no knowledge of the divine.**

Such a hierarchy is so fundamental that for a long time it served to symbolize Cynic attitudes. A trace can be found as late as the second century of our era in Tatian's *Discourse to the Greeks* 25.1. While obviously completely unaware of the paradoxical hierarchy of the Cynics, **Tatian addresses one of them with the following reproach: "You who imitate the Dog, you know not God and have descended to the imitation of creatures deprived of reason** [*kai epi tēn alogōn mimēsin metabebēkas*]." This imitation, which Tatian calls a descent, a degeneration, is for the Cynic, on the contrary, an important step in the direction of the stated goal of self-sufficiency.

> http://earlychristianwritings.com/text/tatian-address.html
>
> O man competing with the dog, you know not God, and so have turned to the imitation of an irrational animal. **You cry out in public with an assumption of authority, and take upon you to avenge your own self;** and if you receive nothing, you indulge in abuse, and philosophy is with you the art of getting money.

Cynic criticism thus goes much further than a simple criticism of popular religion and its practices. Certainly the divine may serve as a moral paradigm of self-sufficiency, on a more elevated level than the beasts of the field. **The Cynics nonetheless envy animals, who have no notion of gods or of ethical and religious concepts and can therefore know true detachment. We are here far from Socrates, for whom one of the superiorities of man over animals was the very fact of knowing that the gods exist.**99

> 99. In Xenophon, *Mem*. 1.4.13, Socrates expresses himself thus: "First of all, what other living creature [i.e., what creature other than man] has a soul capable of realizing that the gods who ordered the universe, the greatest and most beautiful of things, exist? And what other race than man worships the gods?"

To Diogenes and his disciples religion seemed to be an obstacle to human happiness, which is why the Cynics considered the state of an irrational creature far preferable to that of men, who suffer from the misfortune of having a concept of the gods.
...

One can certainly say that the Cynics took their criticism of religion to extremes. **But the greatest difference is that they made absolutely no concession to traditional religion.** This is an original attitude if compared with that of the Stoics or Epicureans. We know that Epicurus wrote a book *On the Gods*, one *On Holiness*, and another *On Piety*,114 sacrificed piously to the gods, and encouraged participation in public ceremonies.115 Even if the gods of the Epicureans care nothing for men and do not listen to their prayers, even if they do not engage in any activity, **Epicurus supported the idea that they exist and called madmen those who deny them like Prodicus, Critias, or Diagoras.**116 As far as the Stoic sage is concerned, although like his Cynic counterpart he does not restrain himself from criticizing popular religion, he nonetheless avoids cutting himself off from the beliefs of the majority of people. **Thus it is that he explains and excuses anthropomorphism and manages to safeguard polytheism,**117 **while at the same time showing a clear drift toward monotheism.**

> 117. The stars, years, months, and changes of year were all gods to him (Zeno, *SVF* 1.165 = Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1.36), **even if at the same time he upheld the dogma of divine unity in conceiving a god who is at once Fire, Ether, Breeze, Intelligence, Reason, Destiny, and Providence.**

He displays a pious attitude, offers sacrifices to the gods, and performs purificatory rites.118 In other words, **the theoretical revolution of the Stoic sage is accompanied by extraordinarily conservative attitudes, which were completely alien to the Cynics.** Yet there is more to it than that. Other philosophers, as we have remarked already, had managed to set up new systems that effectively safeguarded popular religion. This was the case with the Platonic Ideas, the Aristotelian Prime Mover, and the Stoic Logos. Even the Epicureans, with their materialist philosophy, managed to keep a place for the gods, whom they situated in the *intermundia*, as though man had, come what may, a need to preserve his concept of the divine.

In the case of the Cynics, however, we see nothing of the sort. They had neither a rational image of the world nor a providentialist conception of nature. They did not think that the universe was created for the benefit of man or that there was a mystery of the world waiting to be uncovered.
...

They accepted the human condition, while at the same time remaining fully aware that it was not a particularly enviable one. **So we find in them an acute desire for lucidity and a desire to preach that lucidity.** This is why they went out into the streets and marketplaces, insisting that man must return to nature and that it is not difficult to do so. **But they refused absolutely to allow that man – whose limits they knew only too well – should abandon his true place and his true nature, and put himself in the hands of the transcendent.**
…

There is, therefore, nothing to prove that Diogenes was a confirmed atheist, and equally little to prove that he was pious. How, then, can his attitude be defined? He was an outright agnostic, who had rid himself, once and for all, of the basic problem of religion and succeeded in extricating himself from embarrassing questions with a display of intellectual agility. Harpalus the thief is happy? It is a testimony against the gods. Lysias the apothecary acts like an enemy of the gods? Then the gods exist. But the most interesting passage is to be found in Tertullian:147 “When Diogenes was asked what went on in heaven, he said: ‘I’ve never been up there.’” Diogenes displays – and I believe that this is his fundamental attitude – not so much atheism as agnosticism about a realm whose secrets no effort of human understanding, nor any human experience, can penetrate. Tertullian continues: “When he was asked if the gods exist, he replied: ‘Do the gods exist? I don’t know, but I know that it is expedient that they should.’”148

Thus the philosopher steadfastly refuses to pronounce on the existence of gods. But he does show that he is well aware of the social role religion can play; the simple fact of believing in the gods instills in man a fear that society is well able to take advantage of.

At the end of the day, we discover that the gods are insignificant in Cynicism and that in Diogenes’ philosophy there is no place for religious preoccupations. In the eyes of Diogenes, religion serves no purpose, and is even an obstacle to the Cynic aim of detachment. Man alone has the ability to create his own happiness. He should count only on his will to follow nature, the only power that he admits is stronger than himself. But do we therefore have to suppose that the Cynics saw a god in this same nature? A passage in Diogenes Laertius could allow of such an interpretation:149 “Diogenes constantly proclaimed that the life the gods had given man was an easy life, but that he spoiled the ease of it by looking for honey cakes, perfumes, and other luxuries of that kind.” **It is obvious that the gods in question here have become one with nature. But we must not lose a sense of perspective. The Cynic sage does not revere nature as one would a divinity. He simply acknowledges it and puts up with it, because he cannot do otherwise, because in the end it is easy to live according to nature.** He who refuses all that could compromise his ideal of detachment, who would be master of his own life, recognizes nature and its constraints as the only limits on his freedom. But once these constraints are admitted, he constructs, with the sole aid of his *iskhus* or will power, a happiness that nothing can threaten.150

> 150. We must not look upon the Cynics as sour-minded. They were, on the contrary, passionate about happiness. Diogenes maintained that “there is only one happiness, which consists in truly rejoicing and never getting upset, whatever the place or circumstances you find yourself in” (Stobaeus 4.39.20 = V B 301 G.). **He asserted that “true happiness is to be found when mind and soul find themselves in continual tranquillity and gaiety”** (Stobaeus 4.2.39.21 = V B 300 G.). **This is just like Crates, in fact, who saw in life a festival for laughing and joking** (Plutarch *De Tranquillitate Animi* 466e = V H 46 G.). **Diogenes reckoned that for man every day is a holiday** (ibid. 477c = V B 464 G.).

A confirmation of this interpretation is to be found in the ideas Diogenes expressed on the subject of his burial. There are various versions in circulation of the alleged final wishes of the philosopher.151 Their limited historical value is of little importance here; what counts is the sentiment behind them. Diogenes variously asked to be left in the open without a tomb so that wild animals could share his body among them, to be shoved into a hole and covered with a handful of dust, or alternatively to be thrown into a river, that he might prove useful to his brothers (which might mean the fish or more indirectly, through them, his fellow men). Diogenes shows thereby that he cares very little about death, that he does not believe in any kind of afterlife, and that he accepts death quite simply as a natural phenomenon and as a normal end to life. In such a system of beliefs the gods can indeed have little part to play.
…

Of the interpretations mentioned at the beginning of my study, I would retain the idea of *Aufklärung* (enlightenment) as formulated by Zeller, qualifying it with the idea of agnosticism. **I would challenge Rahn, who fleshed out the piety of the Cynics by using a Diogenes who was not the Diogenes of history, but rather a creation of Epictetus or of Julian.** I would reject Gomperz’s epiphet “colorless,” which he used, thinking principally of Antisthenes, to describe divinity as conceived of by the Cynics. If this monotheism seems colorless to us, it is because all we have today are the two fragments of the *Phusikos*. As for the Antisthenean pantheism of Guthrie, on the one hand there is a lack of evidence to support the idea, and on the other hand Brancacci has rightly drawn attention to the fact that neither Antisthenes nor his age made this notion a regular theme of inquiry. And one could say the same of the deism proposed by Bernays.

Working from the preceding remarks we can draw the following conclusions. **Antisthenes was not a Cynic in his religious views, but by opposing nature to custom he undoubtedly influenced Diogenes and his successors, particularly in the criticism of tradition. In the end, Antisthenes is the only one of the philosophers we have considered to whom we can ascribe piety, at least of a philosophic kind.**

As far as Diogenes is concerned, **it would certainly be a mistake to lay at his door an atheism that was very probably the invention of his enemies.** Whether or not the gods exist is not his problem, and, indeed, the question does not interest him. He shows a frank agnosticism on the subject. On the other hand he is passionately interested in beign happy, whereas the very idea of religion and gods, as perceived by his contemporaries, contradicts his ideal of human happiness as founded on freedom, detachment, and self-sufficiency – which is why he banished such an idea from his thoughts. Diogenes wants to be master of his own destiny. **The only limits to his freedom that he recognizes – because he cannot do otherwise – are the constraints imposed by nature. But in no way does he revere nature as one would a god. He simply has the wisdom not to struggle against it in vain.**

As far as the later Cynics such as Crates, Menippus, or Bion are concerned, they seem to have remained faithful to the spirit of Diogenes. **In the Cynicism of the imperial age, Oenomaus of Gadara, with his virulent criticism of oracles, does no more, with all his talent and conviction, than follow in the footsteps of Diogenes.**172

I have deliberately not touched upon the various forms of idealization of Diogenes here, as they interfere with the true thought of the philosopher. In Epictetus, our philosopher has actually become a servant of Zeus, sent to earth as an example to man,173 while Julian represents him as *theosebēs*, a man pious in both words and deeds, always acting in the service of the gods.174 **These authors turn Diogenes into a pious man, with a mission from the gods, and attribute to him a discourse on the divine that certainly did not originate with Diogenes.**

> 174. In *Or.* 7 Julian explains how Diogenes was convinced that the gods looked after him and that they had not sent him to Corinth by chance. The city had, in fact, greater need than Athens of a censor. This is why, even after his enfranchisement by Xeniades – when, in other words, he was in no way obliged to do so – he nonetheless chose to stay in Corinth (*Or.* 7.212d). Julian also goes out of his way to justify the fact that Diogenes never had himself initiated. He explains that a candidate for initiation had to be inscribed on the list of Athenian citizens. Diogenes, however, considered himself to be a citizen of the world; consequently, out of respect for the gods, Diogenes had no wish to transgress the law (*Or.* 7.238). Similarly, Julian allows that Diogenes might be reproached for not going anywhere near sanctuaries, statues, or altars. To this he replies that Diogenes served the gods with his soul, giving the most precious thing he had (*Or.* 9.199b). In the same ways he idealizes Crates, who worshipped the gods solely through the holiness of his morals (*Or.* 7.213).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IV#Bion

46. **Bion was by birth a citizen of Borysthenes [Olbia];** who his parents were, and what his circumstances before he took to philosophy, he himself told Antigonus in plain terms. For, when Antigonus inquired:

> Who among men, and whence, are you? What is your city and your parents?[49]

he, knowing that he had already been maligned to the king, replied, **"My father was a freedman, who wiped his nose on his sleeve" – meaning that he was a dealer in salt fish – "a native of Borysthenes, with no face to show, but only the writing on his face, a token of his master's severity. My mother was such as a man like my father would marry, from a brothel.** Afterwards my father, who had cheated the revenue in some way, was sold with all his family. And I, then a not ungraceful youngster, was bought by a certain rhetorician, who on his death left me all he had. 47. And I burnt his books, scraped everything together, came to Athens and turned philosopher.

> This is the stock and this the blood from which I boast to have sprung.[50]

Such is my story. It is high time, then, that Persaeus and Philonides left off recounting it. Judge me by myself."
…

He even abused Socrates, declaring that, if he felt desire for Alcibiades and abstained, he was a fool; if he did not, his conduct was in no way remarkable. The road to Hades, he used to say, was easy to travel; at any rate men passed away with their eyes shut. He said in censure of Alcibiades that in his boyhood he drew away the husbands from their wives, and as a young man the wives from their husbands. When the Athenians were absorbed in the practice of rhetoric, he taught philosophy at Rhodes. To some one who found fault with him for this he replied, "How can I sell barley when what I brought to market is wheat?"
…

Bion at the outset used to deprecate the Academic doctrines,[53] even at the time when he was a pupil of Crates. **Then he adopted the Cynic discipline, donning cloak and wallet.** 52. **For little else was needed to convert him to the doctrine of entire insensibility.**

Next he went over to Theodorean views, after he had heard the lectures of Theodorus the Atheist, who used every kind of sophistical argument. And after Theodorus he attended the lectures of Theophrastus

the Peripatetic. He was fond of display and great at cutting up anything with a jest, using vulgar names for things. **Because he employed every style of speech in combination, Eratosthenes, we hear, said of him that he was the first to deck philosophy with bright-flowered robes. He was clever also at parody.**
…

53. **And in general he made sport of music and geometry.** He lived extravagantly, and for this reason he would move from one city to another, sometimes contriving to make a great show. Thus at Rhodes he persuaded the sailors to put on students' garb and follow in his train. And when, attended by them, he made his way into the gymnasium, all eyes were fixed on him. It was his custom also to adopt certain young men for the gratification of his appetite and in order that he might be protected by their goodwill.[55] **He was extremely selfish and insisted strongly on the maxim that "friends share in common."** And hence it came about that he is not credited with a single disciple, out of all the crowds who attended his lectures. And yet there were some who followed his lead in shamelessness. 54. **For instance, Betion, one of his intimates, is said once to have addressed Menedemus in these words: "For my part, Menedemus, I pass the night with Bion, and I don't think I am any the worse for it." In his familiar talk he would often vehemently assail belief in the gods, a taste which he had derived from Theodorus.** Afterwards, when he fell ill (so it was said by the people of Chalcis where he died), he was persuaded to wear an amulet and to repent of his offences against religion. **And even for want of nurses he was in a sad plight, until Antigonus sent him two servants.** And it is stated by Favorinus in his *Miscellaneous History* that the king himself followed in a litter.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_VII#7

7. **Bion is able to prove by argument at one time that everyone is sacrilegious, at another that no one is. When he is in a mood for casting all men down the Tarpeian rock, he says,** "Whosoever touches that which belongs to the gods, and consumes it or converts it to his own uses, is sacrilegious; but all things belong to the gods, so that whatever thing any one touches belongs to them to whom all belongs; whoever, therefore, touches anything is sacrilegious." **Again, when he bids men break open temples and pillage the Capitol without fear of the wrath of heaven, he declares that no one can be sacrilegious; because, whatever a man takes away, he takes from one place which belongs to the gods into another place which belongs to the gods.** The answer to this is that all places do indeed belong to the gods, but all are not consecrated to them, and that sacrilege can only be done in places solemnly dedicated to heaven. Thus, also, the whole world is a temple of the immortal gods, and, indeed, the only one worthy of their greatness and splendour, and yet there is a distinction between things sacred and profane; all things which it is lawful to do under the sky and the stars are not lawful to do within consecrated walls. **The sacrilegious man cannot do God any harm, for He is placed beyond his reach by His divine nature; yet he is punished because he seems to have done Him harm: his punishment is demanded by our feeling on the matter, and even by his own. [opinio illum nostra ac sua obligat poenae]**

https://www.livius.org/sources/content/philostratus-life-of-apollonius/philostratus-life-of-apollonius-4.6-10/#4.10

And there he saw what seemed an old mendicant artfully blinking his eyes as if blind, as he carried a wallet and a crust of bread in it; and he was clad in rags and was very squalid of countenance. Apollonius therefore ranged the Ephesians around him and said: **"Pick up as many stones as you can and hurl them at this enemy of the gods."**
…

When therefore they had exposed the object which they thought they had thrown their missiles at, they found that he had disappeared and instead of him there was a hound who resembled in form and look a Molossian dog, but was in size the equal of the largest lion; there he lay before their eyes, pounded to a pulp by their stones and vomiting foam as mad dogs do.

> **[The point of this anecdote may be that a Pythagorean philosopher overcomes a Cynic: an element that may have been present in Philostratus' source "Damis" and explains why the demon is portrayed as a beggar, a dog, and an enemy of the gods.]**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oenomaus_of_Gadara

Oenomaus was a native of Gadara,[2] which was then a partially Hellenized community in northern Jordan. He is listed in the *Chronicle* of Jerome as flourishing in the 224th Olympiad (117 to 121 AD): "Plutarch of Chaeronea, Sextus, Agathobulus and Oenomaus are considered notable philosophers."[3]

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n191/mode/2up?view=theater

It does not follow from Oenomaus' arguments that the gods do not exist, for it is open to him to agree with the Epicureans that they do exist, but take no 'interest in human affairs.' **But it is easy to see why Julian calls him 'a scorner of everything human and divine,' whose object was 'to do away with all reverence for the gods and to dishonour human wisdom' (he means, of course, the wisdom of the Stoics).** For according to Julian, the gods manifest their providence (*πρόνοια*) for the human race through the medium of oracles; but the arguments of Oenomaus about the impossibility of knowledge of the future sweep away providence and oracles alike. **If his views of the freedom of choice possessed by the human will were accepted, there would be an end of the reign of the gods,** whose statues he calls 'the wooden and stone masters of man.' But those who do not share the scruples of the pious Emperor must admit that the book is perhaps the most interesting piece of Cynic literature we possess.1

1. Bernays (op. cit., p. 35) calls it 'einer Schrift, die zu den lebendigst geschrieben Prosawerken des zweiten Jahrhunderts gehört.'

Despite its rhetorical tone, lack of original thought, and deficiencies in logic, it is good popular polemic, on much the same intellectual level as popular contributions to the Darwinian controversy in the last century. And it is yet another example of that vein of mocking scepticism which, remembering Menippus and Lucian, we may call the peculiar contribution of Syria to Greek literature.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/To_the_Cynic_Heracleios#cite_ref-19

But now in the Muses' name answer me this question about the Cynic philosophy. **Are we to think it a sort of madness, a method of life not suitable for a human being, but rather a brutal attitude of mind which recks naught of the beautiful, the honourable, or the good?** For Oenomaus[20] would make many people hold this view of it. If you had taken any trouble to study the subject, you would have learned this from that Cynic's "Direct Inspiration of Oracles" and his work "Against the Oracles," in short from everything that he wrote. **This then is his aim, to do away with all reverence for the gods, to bring dishonour on all human wisdom, to trample on all law that can be identified with honour and justice, and more than this, to trample on those laws which have been as it were engraved on our souls by the gods, and have impelled us all to believe without teaching that the divine exists, and to direct our eyes to it and to yearn towards it:** for our souls are disposed towards it as eyes towards the light. Furthermore, suppose that one should discard also that second law which is sanctified both by nature and by God, I mean the law that bids us keep our hands altogether and utterly from the property of others, and permits us neither by word or deed or in the inmost and secret activities of our souls to confound such distinctions, since the law is our guide to the most perfect justice – **is not this conduct worthy of the pit?**[21]

21. The pit or chasm at Athens into which the bodies of criminals were thrown; cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1. 7. 20.

And ought not those who applauded such views to have been driven forth, not by blows with wands, like scapegoats,[22] for that penalty is too light for such crimes, but put to death by stoning? **For tell me, in Heaven's name, how are such men less criminal than bandits who infest lonely places and haunt the coasts in order to despoil navigators? Because, as people say, they despise death; as though bandits were not inspired by the same frenzied courage!** So says at any rate he[23] who with you counts as a poet and mythologist, though, as a Pythian god proclaimed to certain bandits who sought his oracle, he was a hero and divinity – I mean where, speaking of pirates of the sea, he says: "Like pirates who wander over the sea, staking their lives."[24] What better witness can you require for the desperate courage of bandits? **Except indeed that one might say that bandits are more courageous than Cynics of this sort, while the Cynics are more reckless than they. For pirates, well aware as they are how worthless is the life they lead, take cover in desert places as much from shame as from the fear of death: whereas the Cynics go up and down in our midst subverting the institutions of society,** and that not by introducing a better and purer state of things but a worse and more corrupt state.

Now as for the tragedies ascribed to Diogenes, which are, and are admitted to be, the composition of some Cynic – the only point in dispute being whether they are by the master himself, Diogenes, or by his disciple Philiscus, – **what reader of these would not abhor them, and find in them an excess of infamy not to be surpassed even by courtesans? However, let him go on to read the tragedies of Oenomaus – for he too wrote tragedies to match his discourses – and he will find that they are more inconceivably infamous, that they transgress the very limits of evil; in fact I have no words to describe them adequately,** and in vain should I cite in comparison the horrors of Magnesia,[25] the wickedness of Termerus[26] or the whole of tragedy put together, along with satiric drama, comedy and the mime: with such art has their author displayed in those works every conceivable vileness and folly in their most extreme form.
...

It follows then, does it not? that the Pythian god speaks the truth, and moreover that Diogenes was clearly convinced of this since he obeyed the god and so became, instead of an exile, I will not say greater than the King of Persia, but according to the tradition handed down actually an object of envy to the man[27] who had broken the power of Persia and was rivalling the exploits of Heracles and ambitious to surpass Achilles. **Then let us judge of the attitude of Diogenes towards gods and men, not from the discourses of**

Oenomaus or the tragedies of Philiscus – who by ascribing their authorship to Diogenes grossly slandered that sacred personage – but let us, I say, judge him by his deeds.

> https://archive.org/details/loyolajesuitism00taylgoog/page/n381/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Why treat the subalterns with unsparing severity, while he spares the principals?** Why rush with a ruthless vehemence upon the Jesuitism of the seventeeth century, while, over the same Jesuitism of the sixteenth, he throws the veil of a reverential silence?

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA205#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the history of ancient Cynicism the portrayal of Diogenes and his successors is far from being uniform. **Whereas the *chreiai*, the oldest stratum of the Cynic tradition, represent [Diogenes] as the Dog in all his aspects of shamelessness (*anaideia*) and in his unrestrained freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*),**1 **the emperor Julian, toward the end of the movement, ascribes to Cynicism a sublime character and surrounds it with an almost religious aura.** In his eyes Diogenes is a model for a universal and divine philosophy, which, founded on the Delphic maxim *gnōthi sauton* (Know Thyself), results in action (*erga*) rather than in a system of doctrines (*logoi*).2
…

In fact, Julian's idea of austerity seems to coincide perfectly with his conception of the true Cynic, whom he describes in *Oration* 7 (*Against the Cynic Heraclius*): **"He avoids any excess of food and renounces the pleasures of sexual intercourse. … That is the true shortcut to philosophy. A man must completely come out of himself and recognize that he is divine and keep his mind untiringly and steadfastly fixed on divine thoughts, which are stainless and pure. He must also utterly despise his body and regard it, in the words of Heraclitus, as 'more deserving to be thrown out than dung.'"**72 Julian's comparison of the human body with dung reflects the Neoplatonic coloring of the speech, just as does a passage in *Oration* 9 (*Against the Uneducated Cynics*), in which the true followers of Diogenes seem to subscribe to the Platonic doctrine of the soul's superiority to the body.73
…

In Julian's eyes Cynicism is a universal philosophy based on the principle of "Know Thyself."94 **Accordingly, it is neither Antisthenes nor Diogenes who was its founder but Apollo, the god of truth.** Therefore it demands no special study whatsoever but simply requires the practice of virtue and the avoidance of evil.95 **In this syncretistic view of philosophy the old antagonism between Plato and Diogenes is reduced to a matter of mere difference of intent: whereas Plato chose to achieve his aim through words (*logoi*), for Diogenes actions (*erga*) were enough.**96 The ideal Cynic will not let himself be influenced by other people's opinions, but everything he does will first be put to the test of experience. When Diogenes ate the octopus, he did it not out of vanity (*kenodoxia*) but because he wanted to verify whether eating raw meat was in fact unfit for man, while cooked meat is considered a natural diet.97 **This explanation is a tour de force and serves primarily to put Diogenes out of the reach of criticism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA260#v=onepage&q&f=false

Even more vehement, and indeed abusive, was the criticism voiced by the Jesuit François Garasse in *La doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels* (1623),96 **a criticism that Bayle quoted in the notes to his *Dictionnaire* article "Diogenes the Cynic," although he saw it as "a tirade in impertinences."** The gist of Garasse's text is that Diogenes was nothing but a hypochondriac, a madman, a dolt and an idiot, a buffoon, an ill-mannered and self-conceited fool, and an atheist to boot. **Garasse refuses to admire antiquity unreservedly and "canonize every word and deed" of the ancients as though "God had granted them infallibility."** He criticizes Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch for describing the lives Diogenes the Cynic and Democritus in great detail, saying that this is like "describing the acts and words of Brusquet or Maître Guillaume, who were at least as wise as they were." **For "one of them, Democritus, was a joker, and the other, Diogenes, a beggar," and it "was principally those two who introduced atheism into gentile society."**
…

Religiously, he was "an out and out atheist, who laughed at the gods the people generally worshipped, lived like a dog, a brute beast, and preached that we should have no shame about anything natural. We should do whatever our senses tell us, though it be in the middle of the street, like dogs, who relieve themselves and do everything else in public." **This is how the Cynics lived, "using impious language and doing disgusting things that even Tapinambours and cannibals would be ashamed of."**97

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=khpY2fQaIg0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q&f=false

Neither the principles nor the style of life of the older Cynics remained standing, and we can affirm that as the era of classical times drew to a close, the Army of the Dog was finally disbanded, notwithstanding the presence of undisciplined irregulars and and vaguely identifiable militiamen who kept some of the external features of Cynicism. **The harsh barking of the ancient Cynics was at last drowned, first under the shouting and cursing of the hordes of Barbarians who invaded the Roman empire, and then under the ritualistic and lulling Gregorian chants of Christian Europe. Here and there, in medieval times and even in later ages, vestiges of Cynicism survived in monastic orders, whose mendicant monks maintained alive *certain* Cynic-like ideals and types of life, but philosophically and theologically, these had hardly anything in common with the Cynics.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qKiDDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false

But the funny thing is, **at the same time as the Cynics were flinging contempt and contumely on the *polis* they never strayed very far from it,** which is odd. They ridiculed and rejected the state and its laws and its customs but the very thing at which they directed their scorn was the very thing that they could not do without. **The *polis* protected them from harm with its laws.**38 **Too, the *polis* kept the Cynics fed because they were beggars and it's hard to beg in the countryside.**39 But also and perhaps most importantly for our purposes here, a Cynic could simply not be a Cynic without someone there to watch them being Cynical and here again we bump up against that theme of artificiality, of self-consciousness and self-awareness, states of being which do not conduce to either sincerity or honesty. **Cynicism, absent spectators, would simply evaporate. As Robin Hard observed, one must give credit to the Christian ascetics. When they retreated from society, they retreated fully out of public view, grew their own food, and at least tried to support themselves.** And one is reasonably sure that they masturbated in private.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=oyArttEO-_AC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR10#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cynicism was an urban phenomenon. Its practitioners would not withdraw from human society, like some later Christian ascetics, to support themselves in the countryside or wilderness by their own labour. They had to rely instead on alms from people who valued them for providing a moral example or performing a beneficial service as moral preachers.

https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/José_Ortega_y_Gasset#The_Revolt_of_the_Masses_(1929)

Diogenes, in his mud-covered sandals, tramps over the carpets of Aristippus. The cynic pullulated at every corner, and in the highest places. **This cynic did nothing but saboter the civilisation of the time. He was the nihilist of Hellenism.** He created nothing, he made nothing. His role was to undo—or rather to attempt to undo, for he did not succeed in his purpose. The cynic, a parasite of civilisation, lives by denying it, for the very reason that he is convinced that it will not fail. What would become of the cynic among a savage people where everyone, naturally and quite seriously, fulfils what the cynic farcically considers to be his personal role?

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n229/mode/2up?view=theater

Long ago Onesicratus had praised the virtues of the 'noble savage', by the sixth century A.D. the savage had come again and conquered the world. The State and its institutions, which Diogenes had found an intolerable burden on the individual, were shattered, and the ordinary individual worse off than ever before. Having little to hope for in this world, he turned to a religion that would promise him redress in the next. **Cynicism had nothing further to offer mankind.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA107#v=onepage&q&f=false

The most significant point for our purpose is that the Cynics emphasised the cleavage between wisdom and folly to the exclusion of other divisions: among the unnatural conventions to be ignored by the *sophos* were those distinctions of sex, race and class which still retained so strong a hold on the Greek mind, and which Aristotle was so concerned to justify.
...

The same authority twice tells the story of the sale of Diogenes, which is to the point even though it may be a later fiction by Menippus: captured by pirates, put up for sale as a slave, and asked what he could do, Diogenes

replied, ‘Rule men,’ and ‘Sell me to this man here – he needs a master.’62 **The mischance of slavery cannot affect the true distinction of between the worthy and the unworthy, the wise men and the fools.**

The wise man’s superiority to convention, his freedom and independence and separation from ordinary men, were summed up in the one term ‘self-sufficiency’ (*autarkeia*). Aristotle described the philosophic practiser of contemplation as ‘the most self-sufficient of men.’ The *autarkeia* of the Cynic sage is complete. He is primarily an isolated individual, the very opposite of the citizen of Plato’s ideal state.
…

In a sense, of course, the *sophos* has fellow-citizens – not the other inhabitants of the particular locality where he happens to have been born, but the other wise men, fellow-bearers of the knapsack, who share with him citizenship of Pera and of the cosmos. It was in this sense that Crates of Thebes could describe himself as a fellow-citizen of Diogenes of Sinope (93). There is friendship and kinship between the wise (12, 105), so that Plutarch rightly includes Diogenes along with Plato and Zeno as one whose political thought was guided by the principle of concord.68 **Scattered over the world though they may be, they form together a well-knit unity, for ‘when brothers are of one mind, their life together is stronger than any wall’** (6). But this united *politeia* of men of wisdom is nothing like an all-embracing society of all mankind. If it can be described as a state at all, it is a super-state, a state outside all states, the members of which are cut off from the mass of humanity. Although the Cynic wise man, far in advance of most fourth-century thought, ignores the traditional barriers that make female inferior to male, slave to master, foreigner to Greek, the Cynics themselves enlarged and strengthened the other barrier which loomed so large in contemporary thinking about mankind. **The Cynic conception does not unite the human race, but draws a single great dividing line across it, separating the few wise men from the many fools, whom Diogenes described as ‘one finger removed from lunacy.’**69 We may guess that if Diogenes did write a *Politeia*, its subject was life within this fellowship of the wise, not an ideal state in the ordinary sense.

What of the majority on the wrong side of the line of division? The doxographical reference to the value of law, which I have already mentioned, suggests that they should continue their ordinary city-state existence, guided by the traditions and conventions above which the wise man is able to rise. **But whereas other thinkers, such as Protagoras and Aristotle, held that such civilised beings had a primary right to be called ‘men,’ Diogenes declared that the non-wise are *not* men. Hence the story of his walking through the streets of Athens with a lantern in broad daylight, saying ‘I am looking for a man’** (41); **or his description of the gathering assembled at Olympia: ‘a great crowd, but few men’** (60). Only the wise man is truly man, and truly possesses the nature of man. The unwise are sub-human, unhuman, not human at all. **‘Reason – or the noose’ was said to be one of Diogenes’ favourite prescriptions:** those who do not follow reason might as well be dead.
…

They stand out as truly radical critics of the accepted pattern of society in sharp contrast with Aristotle and others who sought to justify it, **and their precept and example must have done much to loosen the rigidity of accepted prejudices and prepare the way for wider views.** They exercised great influence through the Stoics and other thinkers who incorporated some Cynic doctrines into their own in a modified form, and we shall often come upon them again in this indirect way in the further development of our theme. But the appeal of Cynicism itself was always to isolated individuals: through the fourth and the centuries B.C., and again under the Roman Empire, it produced some striking individual figures, powerful critics of society and its follies, but it never passed beyond its negative contempt for conventional barriers to become a major positive factor in the movement of ideas towards the concept of a united mankind.

The Cynics on JSTOR

Aristotle does not denounce the Cynics. **In his usual tolerant and inclusive fashion he goes all the way with them in insisting that the moral life must be a thing complete and all-sufficing in itself. He adopts the very watchword of Cynicism, "self-sufficingness" *αὐταρχεία*.** But then the Aristotelian self-sufficingness is not of the sort that minimizes wants, and leaves the individual isolated from his kind and stripped of life's resources.
…

But there is nothing which so effectually turns the edge of invective as the perception that it is undiscriminating. We feel this about the diatribes of Antisthenes and the rest. **They denounced war, but to what purpose, when we feel that they would have equally denounced a filibuster's raid and the civic devotion of Marathon or Salamis?** They rose above the narrow exclusiveness of the *πόλις* and were the first cosmopolitans; but what of that, when we feel sure that they would have risen above the kingdom of heaven could it have descended four-square upon earth? After an it is a spurious and an easy cosmopolitanism which comes of indifference to the fatherland. The true cosmopolitanism comes by antecedence, not by negation of patriotism. They protested, too, and vehemently enough, against Greek forms of ritual, **but one feels that they would have swamped in one common condemnation the most devout achievements of religious art, and the mere antics of superstition.** It is so all along the line.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D1253a

From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless is either low in the scale of humanity or above it (like the “clanless, lawless, hearthless” man reviled by Homer,[1] for one by nature unsocial is also ‘a lover of war’) inasmuch as he is solitary, like an isolated piece at draughts.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0134%3Abook%3D9%3Acard%3D50
>
> **A clanless, [ἀφρήτωρ] lawless, hearthless man is he that loveth dread strife among his own folk.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA241#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> > **In this context, it is perhaps worth noting that Hobbesian man is modeled on Aristotle’s inarticulate, hunted animal:** cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan* I.13, with Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago 1974) 172-74, and *What Is Political Philosophy?* (New York 1959) 176 n. 2, and see Locke, *TTG* II.ii.8, 10-11, iii.16, vii.79-80, 93, xix.228.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA202#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The standard set by the Greeks for the true man varied to some extent according to the point of view of the thinker, but always, with one notable exception, it involved the idea that a man really worthy of the name is one fitted to be a member of human society and play his part in the life of the community. Homer’s Cyclops, Protagoras’ ‘misanthrope,’ and Aristotle’s ‘cityless’ man all stand outside the true human pattern because they are incapable of social and political association with normal men. **The exception which proves the rule is the paradoxical view of the Cynics, who regarded the mass of ‘civilised’ mankind as sub-human and claimed true humanity for those whom others nicknamed ‘dogs.’**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_X#cite_ref-12

Epicurus used to call this Nausiphanes jelly-fish,[13] an illiterate, a fraud, and a trollop; Plato's school he called "the toadies of Dionysius," their master himself the "golden" Plato,[14] and Aristotle a profligate, who after devouring his patrimony took to soldiering and selling drugs; **Protagoras a pack-carrier and the scribe of Democritus** and village schoolmaster; Heraclitus a muddler;[15] Democritus Lerocritus (the nonsense-monger); and Antidorus Sannidorus (fawning gift-bearer); **the Cynics foes of Greece; [ἐχθροὺς [ekhthrós] τῆς Ἑλλάδος]** the Dialecticians despoilers; **and Pyrrho an ignorant boor.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=anxK6pMCWMUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA50#v=onepage&q&f=false

The sophist Aelius Aristides (*c.* 117-*c.* 180) expatiates on the stereotype by comparing Cynic philosophers whom he is denouncing to “those impious men of Palestine” who “do not believe in the higher powers,” and Aristides suggests that the Cynics resemble the Christians because they too **“have defected from the Greek race, or rather from all that is higher.”**61

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n195/mode/2up?view=theater

The sympathy of outlook is commented upon by Aelius Aristides, who says that the Cynics

> **resemble the impious sect in Palestine in their customs. For with the latter a mark of their impiety is that they do not reverence the gods; and so do these philosophers in like manner cut themselves off from the Greeks, and, indeed, from all divine authority.**1

Aristides, it is to be noticed, speaks of a resemblance and not of a connexion, but the career of Peregrinus is not the only evidence of the relations between the two movements. **The ascetic sect of the 'Encratites' were undoubtedly influenced by the Cynics, as their name suggests; and Hippolytus calls them 'more Cynic than Christian.'** Their leader Tatian was a contemporary of Peregrinus and quotes his writings, and the Cynic philosopher Crescens, though responsible for the martyrdom of Tatian's disciple Justin, was evidently in close touch with the Christians, for Justin says of him that he found it necessary to 'avoid the suspicion of being himself a Christian.'2

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_V/Hippolytus/The_Refutation_of_All_Heresies/Book_VIII/Part_14

Others, however, styling themselves Encratites, acknowledge some things concerning God and Christ in like manner with the Church. In respect, however, of their mode of life, they pass their days inflated with pride. They suppose, that by meats they magnify themselves, while abstaining from animal food, (and) being water-drinkers, and forbidding to marry, and devoting themselves during the remainder of life to habits of asceticism. **But persons of this description are estimated Cynics rather than Christians, inasmuch as they do not attend unto the words spoken against them through the Apostle Paul.** Now he, predicting the novelties that were to be hereafter introduced ineffectually by certain (heretics), made a statement thus: "The Spirit speaketh expressly, In the latter times certain will depart from sound doctrine, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils, uttering falsehoods in hypocrisy, having their own conscience seared with a hot iron, forbidding to marry, to abstain from meats, which God has created to be partaken of with thanksgiving by the faithful, and those who know the truth; because every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected which is received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer."[2] **This voice, then, of the blessed Paul, is sufficient for the refutation of those who live in this manner, and plume themselves on being just;[3] (and) for the purpose of proving that also, this (tenet of the Encratites) constitutes a heresy.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA183#v=onepage&q&f=false

Prior to the Cynics, the goal of philosophy was progress toward wisdom and virtue through successively higher stages of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy, in other words, was an endeavor that involved the gradual improvement over time of the individual and, indeed, the slow enlightenment of mankind in general. **In the Hellenistic period, however, certain intellectuals developed the idea that primitive man somehow possessed knowledge of the truth and that the philosopher "need only unearth and decipher it."**20 **The early Stoics, in particular, seem to have believed that primitive men, while not philosophers, nevertheless lived in such harmonious proximity to nature that they acted philosophically.**21 Later Stoics such as Posidonius taught that vice entered into the human community along with the invention of the arts and sciences (*τέχναι*) that had been, ironically, discovered by the first philosophers themselves.

21. See Boys-Stones' reading of **Seneca's *Epistle* 90, which he takes to be a reflection of early Stoic thought,** esp. 90.36: *faciebant facienda sapientibus* (*Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* 18-27).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_90

35. I am not speaking of that philosophy **which has placed the citizen outside his country and the gods outside the universe, and which has bestowed virtue upon pleasure,[24]** but rather of that philosophy which counts nothing good except what is honourable, – one which cannot be cajoled by the gifts either of man or of fortune, one whose value is that it cannot be bought for any value. That this philosophy existed in such a rude age, when the arts and crafts were still unknown and when useful things could only be learned by use, – this I refuse to believe.

36. **Next there came the fortune-favoured period when the bounties of nature lay open to all, for men's indiscriminate use, before avarice and luxury had broken the bonds which held mortals together, and they, abandoning their communal existence, had separated and turned to plunder.** The men of the second age were not wise men, even though they did what wise men should do.[25] 37. Indeed, there is no other condition of the human race that anyone would regard more highly; **and if God should commission a man to fashion earthly creatures and to bestow institutions upon peoples, this man would approve of no other system than that which obtained among the men of that age, when**

> **No ploughman tilled the soil, nor was it right**
> **To portion off or bound one's property.**
> Men shared their gains, and earth more freely gave
> Her riches to her sons who sought them not.[26]

26. Verg. *Georg.* i. 125 ff.

38. What race of men was ever more blest than that race? They enjoyed all nature in partnership. Nature sufficed for them, now the guardian, as before she was the parent, of all; and this her gift consisted of the assured possession by each man of the common resources. Why should I not even call that race the richest among mortals, since you could not find a poor person among them? But avarice broke in upon a condition so happily ordained, and, by its eagerness to lay something away and to turn it to its own private use, made all things the property of others, and reduced itself from boundless wealth to straitened need. **It was avarice that introduced poverty and, by craving much, lost all.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_savage#Origin_of_term

The *locus classicus* of the 18th-century portrayal of the American Indian are the famous lines from Alexander Pope's "Essay on Man" (1734):

> Lo, the poor Indian! whose untutor'd mind
> Sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind;
> His soul proud Science never taught to stray
> Far as the solar walk or milky way;
> Yet simple Nature to his hope has giv'n,
> Behind the cloud-topp'd hill, a humbler heav'n;
> Some safer world in depth of woods embrac'd,
> Some happier island in the wat'ry waste,
> Where slaves once more their native land behold,
> No fiends torment, no Christians thirst for gold!
> To be, contents his natural desire;
> He asks no angel's wing, no seraph's fire:
> But thinks, admitted to that equal sky,
> His faithful dog shall bear him company.

To Pope, writing in 1734, the Indian was a purely abstract figure – "poor" either meant ironically, or applied because he was uneducated and a heathen, but also happy because he was living close to Nature. **Pope's phrase, "Lo the Poor Indian", became almost as famous as Dryden's "noble savage"** and, in the 19th century, when more people began to have first hand knowledge of and conflict with the Indians, would be used derisively for similar sarcastic effect.[b]

https://archive.org/details/spartantradition0000raws/page/80/mode/2up?view=theater

THE GREAT figures of the fourth century continued to a remarkable extent to dominate Greek intellectual history, whether in rhetoric, historiography, or political theory. One proof of this is the astonishing persistence of interest in Sparta; for the place itself, deprived of territory by Philip, and defeated again under Alexander, was henceforth of no importance beyond the Peloponnese.

It is true, no doubt, that the time for practical laconism was past; among the characters described by Aristotle's pupil and successor, Theophrastus, the laconomaniac has no place, and the 'oligarchic man' does not resemble him. But, though the once very influential political literature of the Academy and Peripatos is lost, the pupils both of Plato and Aristotle seem if anything to have had fewer reserves than their masters in admiration for Sparta. Perhaps more practical and less idealistic, they lay less stress on her intellectual and moral shortcomings. **No longer a menacing rival of Athens (to which most of them did not belong by birth), Sparta, for them, takes off almost wholly into the realm of fantasy.**
…

It may be that the most important for us among Aristotle's pupils ought to be the tantalizing figure of Dicearchus of Messene, so admired by Cicero. **Dicearchus is known to have disagreed with his master and the contemporary Peripatetics in seeing the essence of man in practical not intellectual ability and in setting the active above the contemplative life; the intellectualistic ethics of Plato, and even Aristotle, had regarded them as interdependent. From such a kernel may have sprung a thoroughgoing admiration of Sparta.** At any rate, a treatise of his on the *Lacedaemonian Politeia* is said to have been so highly regarded at Sparta itself that it was by law read out once a year to the young.4

> 4. Wehrli, op. cit., vol. i, fr. 1. Perhaps, it has been suggested, in the archaizing Roman period?

It seems likely, too, that in stressing the importance of the discoveries of practical men and politicians, Dicearchus insisted that the philosophers had learnt from Lycurgus; that he retailed the story that Pythagoras visited Crete and Sparta to study their laws,1 **and declared that Plato was a combination of Socrates with Pythagoras and Lycurgus**2 **– perhaps because, as the source telling us this goes on to say, Lycurgus like Plato preferred 'geometric' proportion to the 'arithmetical' equality of democracy.** One is also entitled to wonder if Dicearchus' primitivism is relevant; in his famous *Greek Life* he represented the Golden Age as a time when men enjoyed health, concord, and leisure owing to their lack of arts and possessions and the moderation of their wants. Did he see Sparta as attempting to prolong this state?3 **For as we shall see, the Noble Savage and the Spartan were being compared at this time.**
…

Cynicism, however, combined the sophistic rejection of law with the Socratic ethical tradition, and thus with one kind of laconism. Though Antisthenes was sometimes regarded as the founder, **and Xenophon was much read by both Cynics and Stoics,** Cynicism proper, which was a way of life

rather than a formal philosophy, takes its origin and its name from Diogenes 'the Dog' in the later fourth century. The true Cynic was identifiable by his life as a wandering beggar, his assault on all superstitions, conventions, and laws, and his appeal to beasts and primitive men for evidence about the natural life. Possibly Diogenes himself knew Sparta; at any rate the saying of his with the best claim to be genuine is to the effect that the taverns are the mess-tables of Attica – a plain criticism of Athenian in the light of Spartan life.2 A less probably authentic remark (also given to Antisthenes) is that to go from Sparta to Athens is to go from the men's to the women's rooms in a house. Later sources, including the letters in his name, put many other references to Sparta in Diogenes' mouth;3 and Lucian, in one of the *Dialogues of the Dead*, makes him try to send up a message from Hades ticking the Spartans off for relaxing their severity.4 Diogenes' *Politeia*, if a genuine work, seems to have advocated a valueless currency and the community of women, who were to dress like men and exercise naked 'as at Sparta'; **Plutarch praised Lycurgus for carrying out what Plato and Diogenes after him only wrote about.**

A pupil of Diogenes, Onesicritus, went to India with Alexander and wrote a highly embroidered account of his adventures. **Not only do his fakirs – 'gymnosophists' or naked sages – emerge as perfect Cynics, but in dilating on the simplicity and *eunomia* of the 'country of Musicanus' in India he apparently explicitly compared its common meals, of simple food largely the product of the hunt, with Sparta's *syssitia*;** and the absence of slaves, though young men acted as servants, with the use of helots in Sparta and Crete. And he may have expected other features of his Utopia, such as the refusal to use gold or silver or study the sciences, to recall Sparta too.1

> 1. *FGH* ii b, no. 134, frs. 24, 25 (cf. 17). **Compare Arrian, *Indica* 10.8: all Indians, like all Lacedaemonians, are free – though the latter have helots.** (From Megasthenes, rather than a comment of Arrian's own, and thus suggesting that Onesicritus' ideas were not unique in his day?)

Here is the first certain forerunner of all those post-Renaissance authors who compare Indians, though American Indians now, to Spartans in simplicity and virtue.

Nevertheless, the natural life was not to be achieved without training. Perhaps this is why Diogenes is represented as praising Spartan boys; and when the story of his enslavement and consequent employment as a tutor at Corinth was elaborated, he was said to have introduced a curriculum with somewhat Spartan features.2 Though the Cynics rejected intellectual disciplines as useless, they were deeply interested in the teaching of practical virtue, and to this end relied greatly on the anecdotes and examples of which some of them are known to have made collections. 'Laconic apophthegms' were already recognized as a useful type of maxim in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (which also recognized the orator's tendency to turn for illustrations to famous events in Spartan history);3 possibly special collections had even been made by then. **But the apophthegms were more popular than ever in the Hellenistic period, and many were certainly used by, if they did not originate with, the Cynics, while enough are put indifferently into the mouths of Spartan heroes or Cynic sages to show how alike the Spartan and Cynic outlook must have been considered.**

Quantities of these stories survive in the literature of later antiquity, and above all in the several collections of laconic and other apopthegms and *exempla* made for the use of writers and orators that have come down to us under the name of Plutarch.4 There are a few hostile illustrations of Spartan deceit (especially Lysander's) or naïveté; but far commoner are examples of Spartan wit at the expense of useless learning or luxury, **and also of superstition.** Their lack of walls and of written laws are admiringly held up to us.
…

The fifth century had thought of Spartan women as immoral hoydens; but in the fourth we enter the age of the Spartan heroine, obedient to Lycurgus' command to eschew elegance, a great housewife, but as devoted to the state as her menfolk, and as liable to apophthegm. Ephorus probably adorned his history with some Spartan mothers;1 a Cynic source produced several, one a typically coarse variant;2 and whether slaughtering one son or burying eight without a tear she is a favourite with the epigrammatic poets.

> 2. Stobaeus iv. 51, going back to Teles (third century B.C.), '*On Apathy*' or impassivity (that Cynic and Stoic virtue) **and ultimately to Bion of Borysthenes, one of the earliest and most famous authors of Cynic diatribes.** Pulling up her skirts she asked her fugitive son 'Are you trying to get back into my womb?'

…

There can be no doubt that the often satiric literature of the Cynics was very widely diffused. Cynicism has been called the philosophy of the proletariat. At any rate it was doubtless instrumental in extending laconism beyond the limited if influential circles in which it had hitherto been at home; while the old democratic ideals that might have worked against such an extension seem to have been passing away even in Athens. **Nor was Sparta associated any longer with exclusiveness of class or race, for the Cynics like the Stoics even managed to see in her a reflection of their cosmopolitan ideal. All men are equal by nature; nature and training together make the good man.** We are informed

by a Cynic source that the foreigner or helot's son accepted for the *agoge* is regarded as the equal of the best in the land, while an unworthy scion of the royal house may be degraded to helot status.2 **Or, as a later Stoicizing writer**3 **puts it, among the things for which Sparta is to be praised is the understanding that citizenship is a matter of virtue and training, not of birth, and the habit of allowing 'Scythians, Triballians, Paphlagonians or barbarians without a name' to become Lacedaemonians.**4

2. Stobaeus xl. 8, going back to Teles (and Bion) again.

3. Bernays, ***Die Heraklitische Briefe*****,** no. ix, p. 90. The author(s) of these rhetorical letters ascribed to the archaic philosopher Heraclitus date from the first century A.D.

4. Foreigners were, as we saw, occasionally, and helots, or more probably the sons of Spartiates by helot women, could probably (at some periods at least) be put through the *agoge*; but that complete equality followed is more than dubious.

Popular as Epicureanism long was, the dominant philosophy of later antiquity was one that, uniting Cynic and Platonic elements, ensured the survival of sympathy for Sparta.
...

The Stoics of the earlier period at least did not share the anti-intellectualism of the Cynics, **and in their physics and theology operated a final reconciliation between those frequent enemies, law and nature. Law was for them dependent on the divine reason or providence that rules the cosmos, a conception that lies at the root of many more modern theories of natural law.** Law, therefore, is divine and absolute, identical for all and co-extensive with virtue, as on different grounds it had been for Plato. Man is primarily a citizen of the universe, a cosmopolitan. But though, for this reason, one could even deny that Lycurgus and other lawgivers were able to make laws at all,2 yet the way was open for Sparta to regain her place as the city most obedient to law.

https://archive.org/details/spartantradition0000raws/page/110/mode/2up?view=theater

Elsewhere Dio links the endurance of Indians and Spartans, the educational qualities of Tyrtaeus and Homer (who perhaps inspired Lycurgus with the idea of *syssitia*), praises Agesilaus for refusing to allow any portrait to be made of him, and calls Lycurgus and other radical lawgivers the true philosophers. Sparta's self-control and regard for law were the cause of her prosperity. **But Dio is also ready to mention the less glorious episodes in her history, and he sets the Stoic cosmopolis, in which all intelligent beings have a share, above the Spartan polis, which excluded the helots altogether.** Indeed, he could argue that no method of enslaving others is just. The Thebans were right to free the Messenians from Sparta.2

https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%204.76

But as regards foreign customs, the Scythians (like others) very much shun practising those of any other country, and particularly of Hellas, as was proved in the case of Anacharsis and also of Scyles. For when Anacharsis was coming back to the Scythian country after having seen much of the world in his travels and given many examples of his wisdom, he sailed through the Hellespont and put in at Cyzicus; where, finding the Cyzicenes celebrating the feast of the Mother of the Gods with great ceremony, he vowed to this same Mother that if he returned to his own country safe and sound he would sacrifice to her as he saw the Cyzicenes doing, and establish a nightly rite of worship. So when he came to Scythia, he hid himself in the country called Woodland (which is beside the Race of Achilles, and is all overgrown with every kind of timber); hidden there, Anacharsis celebrated the goddess' ritual with exactness, carrying a small drum and hanging images about himself. Then some Scythian saw him doing this and told the king, Saulius; **who, coming to the place himself and seeing Anacharsis performing these rites, shot an arrow at him and killed him. And now the Scythians, if they are asked about Anacharsis, say they have no knowledge of him; this is because he left his country for Hellas and followed the customs of strangers.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Solon*.html#ref8

5 1 In particular we are told of private intercourse between Solon and Anacharsis, and between Solon and Thales, of which the following accounts are given.[8] Anacharsis came to Athens, knocked at Solon's door, and said that he was a stranger who had come to make ties of friendship and hospitality with him. **On Solon's replying that it was better to make one's friendships at home, "Well then," said Anacharsis, "do thou, who art at home, make me thy friend and guest."** 2 So Solon, admiring the man's ready wit, received him graciously and kept him with him some time. This was when he was already engaged in public affairs and compiling his laws. **Anacharsis, accordingly, on learning what Solon was about, laughed at him for thinking that he could check the injustice and rapacity of the citizens by written laws, which were just like spiders' webs; they would hold the weak and delicate who might be caught in their**

meshes, but would be torn in pieces by the rich and powerful. 3 To this Solon is said to have answered that men keep their agreements with each other when neither party profits by the breaking of them, and he was adapting his laws to the citizens in such a manner as to make it clear to all that the practice of justice was more advantageous than the transgression of the laws. **But the results justified the conjecture of Anacharsis rather than the hopes of Solon.** It was Anacharsis, too, who said, after attending a session of the assembly, that he was amazed to find that among the Greeks,[a] the wise men pleaded causes, but the fools decided them.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_I#Anacharsis

101. Anacharsis the Scythian was the son of Gnurus and brother of Caduidas, king of Scythia. **His mother was a Greek, and for that reason he spoke both languages. He wrote on the institutions of the Greeks and the Scythians, dealing with simplicity of life and military matters, a poem of 800 lines. So outspoken was he that he furnished occasion for a proverb, "To talk like a Scythian."**

Sosicrates makes him come to Athens about the 47th Olympiad[76] in the archonship of Eucrates. Hermippus relates that on his arrival at the house of Solon he told one of the servants to announce that Anacharsis had come and was desirous of seeing him and, if possible, of becoming his guest. 102. The servant delivered his message and was ordered by Solon to tell him that men as a rule choose their guests from among their own countrymen. Then Anacharsis took him up and said that he was now in his own country and had a right to be entertained as a guest. And Solon, struck with his ready wit, admitted him into his house and made him his greatest friend.

103. After a while Anacharsis returned to Scythia, where, owing to his enthusiasm for everything Greek, he was supposed to be subverting the national institutions, and was killed by his brother while they were out hunting together. When struck by the arrow he exclaimed, "My reputation carried me safe through Greece, but the envy it excited at home has been my ruin." In some accounts it is said that he was slain while performing Greek rites.

Here is my own epitaph upon him:[77]

> **Back from his travels Anacharsis came,**
> **To hellenize the Scythians all aglow;**
> Ere half his sermon could their minds inflame,
> A winged arrow laid the preacher low.

...

When some Athenian reproached him with being a Scythian, he replied, "Well, granted that my country is a disgrace to me, you are a disgrace to your country."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA154#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this context, Anacharsis's odd language (from the point of view of Athenians) forces one to look at what he does, not what he says. And this reinforces the Cynic message – to follow the shortcut to virtue, without philosophizing in endless talk of dialectic and *elegkhos* (refutation). **Anacharsis is the remedy to the threat – apparently quite real in early Cynicism and understandable if Antisthenes is the actual originator of this philosophy – that Platonic-style discourse will drown out the Cynic message.**61

...

This Anacharsis may well have been traditional before the fifth century. We have no way of knowing, but the possibility does offer one final, intriguing thought. Whether or not he began Cynicism, **we can still wonder where Diogenes of Sinope got his notions about street theater – the *paignia* we see him play in the service of effective philosophy, which Dudley maintained belong rather to an anthology of Greek humor than a discussion of philosophy.**62

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl2/wl209.htm

Anacharsis was not the first Scythian who was induced by the love of Greek culture to leave his native country and visit Athens: he had been preceded by Toxaris, a man of high ability and noble sentiments, and an eager student of manners and customs; but of low origin, not like Anacharsis a member of the royal family or of the aristocracy of his country, but what they call *'an eight-hoof man,'* a term which implies the possession of a waggon and two oxen. Toxaris never returned to Scythia, but died at Athens, where he presently came to be ranked among the Heroes; and sacrifice is still paid to 'the Foreign Physician,' as he was styled after his deification. Some account of the significance of this name, the origin of his worship, and his connexion with the sons of Asclepius, will not, I think, be out of place: for it will be seen from this that the Scythians, in conferring immortality on mortals, and sending them to keep company with Zamolxis, do not stand alone; since the Athenians permit themselves to make Gods of Scythians upon Greek soil.

...

In this frame of mind he had already reached the Ceramicus, when his good genius appeared to him in the guise of Toxaris. The attention of the latter was immediately arrested by the dress of his native country, nor was it likely that he would have any difficulty in recognizing Anacharsis, who was of noble birth and of the highest rank in Scythia. Anacharsis, on the other hand, could not be expected to see a compatriot in Toxaris, **who was dressed in the Greek fashion, without sword or belt, wore no beard, and from his fluent speech might have been an Athenian born; so completely had time transformed him.**
...

'What! come to the very door, and then turn back? This is not the language of enthusiasm. However, there is no fear of that--you will not go back, **Athens will not let you off so easily. She is not so much at a loss for charms wherewith to detain the stranger: she will take such a hold on you, that you will forget your own wife and children--if you have any.**
...

'You know not what you say. Nothing gives him greater pleasure than to have an opportunity of showing his hospitality to strangers. **Only follow me, and you shall see how courteous and benevolent he is, and how devout a worshipper of the God of Hospitality.** But stay: how fortunate! here he comes towards us. See, he is wrapped in thought, and mutters to himself.--Solon!' he cried; 'I bring you the best of gifts--a stranger who craves your friendship. He is a Scythian of noble family; but has left all and come here to enjoy the society of Greeks, and to view the wonders of their country. I have hit upon a simple expedient which will enable him to do both, to see all that is to be seen, and to form the most desirable acquaintances: in other words, I have brought him to Solon, who, if I know anything of his character, **will not refuse to take him under his protection,** and to make him a Greek among Greeks.--It is as I told you, Anacharsis: having seen Solon, you have seen all; behold Athens; behold Greece. You are a stranger no longer: all men know you, all men are your friends; this it is to possess the friendship of the venerable Solon. **Conversing with him, you will forget Scythia and all that is in it.** Your toils are rewarded, your desire is fulfilled. **In him you have the mainspring of Greek civilization, in him the ideals of Athenian philosophers are realized.** Happy man--if you know your happiness--to be the friend and intimate of Solon!'

It would take too long to describe the pleasure of Solon at Toxaris's 'gift,' his words on the occasion, and his subsequent intercourse with Anacharsis--how he gave him the most valuable instruction, **procured him the friendship of all Athens,** showed him the sights of Greece, and took every trouble to make his stay in the country a pleasant one; and how Anacharsis for his part regarded the sage with such reverence, that he was never willingly absent from his side.
...

The fact is, my situation is pretty much that of Anacharsis. I crave your indulgence, in venturing to compare myself with royalty. Anacharsis, after all, was a barbarian; **and I should hope that we Syrians are as good as Scythians.**

https://www.salon.com/2008/05/08/anacharsis_cloots/

The Revolution was, for Cloots, an event of messianic significance, the heralding of the Last Days of the tyrants; and a titanic battle between peoples and despots in which the victory of the former would be crowned by the establishment of political paradise on earth -- the Universal Republic. **There the abominations of bureaucracy would be redundant; the postal service would run from Bordeaux to Peking; "there, there will be neither barrier nor walls; neither official nor guard; there will be no more desert and the entire earth will become a garden."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.16695/page/n453/mode/2up?view=theater

Briefly, all nations of the earth were to be welded into one as members of "the only nation" (*la nation unique*), which, by a play on the word *german*, that is to say, "closely allied," he suggested, with an ingenuity worthy of his race, should be known as "the immutable empire of Great Germany, the Universal Republic."1 By way of illustration he had presented himself at the Legislative Assembly, under the title of "the orator of the human race," at the head of a strange procession composed of specimens from all available races—Germans, Swedes, Russians, Poles, Turks, and negroes—whom he had hired for the occasion, in dresses suited to the part, but, since he omitted to pay them as arranged, he found his own door next day beset by a furious crowd,2 **which seemed somewhat to disprove his theory that "the Republic of the human race will never have any dispute with any one since there can be no communication between the planets."**3

In all this Clootz shows himself simply an amiable madman; **it is only on the subject of religion that he grows violent. The second title he had bestowed upon himself was that of "the personal enemy of Jesus Christ."** Christianity filled him with an almost epileptic fury. "Religion," he wrote, "is a social disease which cannot be too quickly cured. A religious man is a depraved animal; he resembles those beasts that are only kept to be shorn and roasted for the benefit of merchants and butchers."4 "The People," he declared, "is the Sovereign and the God of the world; **France is the centre of the People-God;** only fools can believe in any other God, in a Supreme Being."5

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;rgn=main;view=text;idno=n25379.0001.001

"The Supreme Being" says Anacharsis Cloots (the Reporter of the Committee of Public Instruction to the French National Convention) in an official Report of that Committee, "the Eternal Being, is no other than Nature uncreated and uncreatable; and the only Providence is the Association of mankind in freedom and equality. Man, when free, wants no other Divinity than himself. Reason dethrones both the Kings of the earth, and the Kings of heaven. No Monarchy above, if we wish to preserve our republic below. Volumes have been written to determine whether a republic of Atheists could exist. I maintain, that every other republic is a chimera. If you once admit the existence of a heavenly Sovereign, you introduce the wooden horse within your walls! What you adore by day will be your destruction at night. A people of Theists will necessarily become Revelationists."

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n557/mode/2up?view=theater

Are we to be duped by the name of *Minerval Academies*, with which the Sect decorates its schools? Can we observe there any other study than that of applying the sciences to the subversion of science, as well as to the total annihilation of all religion or society, when we remark the anxiety with which the Sect puts the following questions to the adept on his coming out of these academies, wishing to know what progress he has made in its principles before he is admitted to the illuminized priesthood:

"Do the *general* and *common* sciences to which men apply infuse real light? Do they lead to true happiness? Are they not rather the offspring of variegated wants, or of the anti-natural state in which men exist? Are they not the invention of crazy brains laboriously subtle?"24 …

Do you know in what light the illuminizing legislator views these northern clans sallying from their forests and desolating the most flourishing countries of Europe, firing its towns, beating down its empires, and strewing the earth with ruins? **He complacently beholds the precious remains of the patriarchal race, the true offspring of Nature;** it is with their hatchets that he means to regenerate mankind, and shape them out to the views of the Sect. I did not note the lessons of the Hierophant on this subject, when lecturing the future Epopt.—Hear the account which Weishaupt gives of these clans, when he pretends to historify human nature, at that epoch marked in the annals of Europe as a scourge, and called the inundation of the barbarians. Here is his description:

At that period when all Europe had fallen prey to corruption, **"Nature, which had preserved the true race of men in its original vigour and purity, came to the assistance of mankind. From distant, but poor and sterile countries, she calls those *savage nations* and sends them into the regions of luxury and voluptuousness to infuse new life into the enervated species of the south; and with new laws and morals to restore that vigour to human nature which flourished until an ill-extinguished germ of corruption infected even that portion of mankind which originally arrived in so pure a state,"** or those barbarians the pretended regenerators of Europe sent by Nature. …

Here, in the eyes of the adept, is the grand crime of these barbarians; the Hierophant, deploring their fall, exclaims, "Oh had there remained any sages among them, happy enough to have preserved themselves from the contagion, how would they sigh after, and ardently wish to return to the former abodes of their ancestors, there again to enjoy their former pleasures on the banks of a rivulet, under the shade of a tree laden with fruit, by the side of the object of their affections! It was then that they conceived the high value of Liberty, and the greatness of the fault they had committed in placing too much power in the hands of one man—**It was then that the want of Liberty made them sensible of their fall, and seek means of softening the rigour of Slavery;—but even then their efforts were only aimed against the tyrant, and not against tyranny.**"

https://publicdomainreview.org/essay/get-thee-to-a-phalanstery-or-how-fourier-can-still-teach-us-to-make-lemonade/

Fourier's most essential claim would have seen him burnt at the stake a century or so earlier: specifically, that all of humanity's various instincts and passions, including lust, are part of God's grand design and should not be repressed or stigmatized as sinful. **The problem, according to Fourier, is not with our primal urges, but with the way these desires are stifled, stunted, and warped by civilization (a time period in the Western Hemisphere that dates from the ancient Greeks, by his reckoning). Make no mistake, when Fourier uses the term "civilized", he is not marking a higher state or achievement, but rather hurling an insult with a curled lip.** Civilization names a dark age of hypocrisy, disorientation, and universal unhappiness, where even the very rich are imprisoned in simply a more comfortable class of misery than the rest of us. While humanity has made great technical strides, according to our guide, which have led to astonishing leaps in our capacity to exploit nature for profit, we have not paid any attention to our own inclinations, our own souls, our own hunger for freedom, play, sensual exploration, artistic expression, confraternity, and collective erotic interaction.

(Where “Eros” is figured not in its reduced form, as merely the sexual, but as the pulse of life and joy which Lucretius believed lies at the origin of life’s spark.) **In other words, Fourier provided a fully fledged theory of alienation, several decades before Marx, just as he had a fully fledged theory of repression nearly a century before Freud.**

https://archive.org/details/selectionsfromw00fourgoog/page/n172/mode/2up?view=theater

> 1. **Upon beholding this associative fairyland, these harmonies, these prodigies, this sea of delights, created simply by attraction or divine impulse, we shall see aroused a frenzy of enthusiasm for God, author of so beautiful an order; and perfectible, infamous civilisation, will be loaded with universal malediction.** Its political and moral libraries will be spat upon, torn up in the first moment of anger, and delivered over to the meanest uses, until they are reprinted with a critical commentary, facing the text, to make it the enduring laughing-stock of the human race.—(N. M., 287.)

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=SWbABgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA154#v=onepage&q&f=false

Diogenes Laertius reports it as a matter of contention whether Cynicism can be called a philosophical school (*hairesis*) at all, as opposed to simply a way of life (6.103); and though he is willing to call it a school, he immediately adds that the Cynics had nothing to do with logic or physics, confining themselves entirely to ethics – a claim that is quite consistent with the other evidence.
…

Indeed, in this respect they are probably even more anti-theoretical than Pyrrho. For although Pyrrho did not trouble himself with philosophical debates, and took no interest in most of the things with which philosophers generally concern themselves, he is reported, in a much discussed passage of Aristocles (in Eusebius, *Praep. evang.* 14.18.1-5), to have held that a happy life depended on having successfully answered the question “what are things like by nature?”
…

The anecdotes about the Cynics perhaps tend to emphasize a deliberate flouting of convention more than the pure indifference to it that we find in Pyrrho; **but for both Pyrrho and the Cynics, not caring what people think is a prominent feature of their image** and one that I would assume to have some historical basis, regardless of the veracity of any individual story.
…

That there is some influence – and from the Cynics on Pyrrho rather than the other way round, since Diogenes of Sinope was at least a generation older than Pyrrho – is made much more likely by the fact that **the group of philosophers that Alexander took with him on his expedition to India included both Pyrrho and a Cynic, Onesicritus.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Onesicritus
>
> 84. Onesicritus some report to have been an Aeginetan, but Demetrius of Magnesia says that he was a native of Astypalaea. He too was one of the distinguished pupils of Diogenes. **His career seems to have resembled that of Xenophon; for Xenophon joined the expedition of Cyrus, Onesicritus that of Alexander;** and the former wrote the *Cyropaedia*, or *Education of Cyrus*, while the latter has described how Alexander was educated: the one a laudation of Cyrus, the other of Alexander. And in their diction they are not unlike: except that Onesicritus, as is to be expected in an imitator, falls short of his model.
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/15A3*.html#ref:rubbing
>
> But although Megasthenes says that no Indian uses slaves, **Onesicritus declares that slavery is peculiar to the Indians in the country of Musicanus, and tells what a success it is there, just as he mentions many other successes of this country, speaking of it as a country excellently governed.**

…

***Tuphos*, “vanity” or “humbug,” is a common term of Cynic invective,**21 **and Timon appropriates it;** besides using it on Zeno of Citium (DL 7.15), he turns it around and, as we saw, gives Pyrrho the supreme compliment of *atuphos*, “without vanity,” as well as situating Xenophanes, a leading figure in the *Silloi*, on a higher plane than most by calling him *hupatuphos*, “partly free from vanity” (Sextus, *PH* 1.224). Long has also argued convincingly that the satirical poems of the Cynic Crates were an important inspiration behind Timon’s *Silloi*.22

https://books.google.fi/books?id=niaQDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA82#v=onepage&q&f=false

The common ground between Timon and the Cynics is much too extensive to be explained merely due to an ethical consensus among philosophers who have nothing else what unites them. Any doubts on that score must be resolved when we review the form of Timon's *Silloi*. These poems, notwithstanding their eponymous allegiance to the work of Xenophanes, have a much more immediate model in the work of Timon's older contemporary, the Cynic philosopher Crates of Thebes.
…

With his uninhibited and hyperbolical language and the form and content of his *Silloi*, Timon must have intended his readers to recognize a close affinity between his critique of high culture and that of the Cynics. But we should not draw the conclusion that Timon wished to represent Pyrrho as a card-carrying Cynic philosopher, bearing in mind the Cynics' at least partial allegiance to Socrates. **Although none of the *Silloi* attacks Diogenes or any contemporary Cynic by name – which is indeed quite telling – Socrates himself and his non-Academic followers, including the proto-Cynic Antisthenes, are satirized.**69
…

While Timon's ethical judgements accord so well with familiar Cynic preaching, there are also many distinctive Cynic attitudes that he does not endorse in the extant material. These include the mendicant lifestyle, the appeal to non-human animals in the critique of human culture, the cult of shamelessness (*anaideia*), the focus on hardiness, and above all the appeal to reject convention (*nomos*) in favour of nature (*physis*), **which seems completely in variance with Pyrrho's anti-objectivism and insistence on the governance of convention** (DL 9.61 = LS 1A)

https://users.wfu.edu/zulick/300/gorgias/negative.html

Sextus, *Against the Schoolmasters* vii 65

> Gorgias of Leontini began from the same position as those who have abolished the criterion, but did not follow the same line of attack as the school of Protagoras. In what is entitled *On the Nonexistent* or *On Nature* **he proposes three successive headings: first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible; still it is without a doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man.**

https://iep.utm.edu/gorgias/

Gorgias may have believed in a relative notion of truth that was contingent upon a particular *kairos* (an opportune moment or "opening"), that is to say, truth can only be found within a given moment.
…

Bruce McComiskey points out that Plato believed in an "oligarchic government" for Athens, **while many of the sophists "favored the Athenian Democracy the way it was"** (20).
…

Despite efforts by G.W.F Hegel and George Grote toward rehabilitating the reputations of Gorgias and the other sophists in the 19th century, the sophists still had a foul reputation well into the 20th century (as evidenced by the pejorative term "sophistry"). In 1930, French philosopher Jacques Maritain remarked "[s]ophistry is not a system of ideas, but a vicious attitude of the mind;" the sophists "came to consider as the most desirable form of knowledge the art of refuting and disproving by skillful arguments" (32-33). In recent years, however, **modernists and post-structuralists have found great value in the philosophy of Gorgias, especially his theories on truth and language.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_88

43. Let me tell you what evils are due to over-nice exactness, and what an enemy it is of truth! **Protagoras declares that one can take either side on any question and debate it with equal success** – even on this very question, whether every subject can be debated from either point of view. **Nausiphanes holds that in things which seem to exist, there is no difference between existence and non-existence.** 44. Parmenides maintains that nothing exists of all this which seems to exist, except the universe alone.[36] Zeno of Elea removed all the difficulties by removing one; for he declares that nothing exists. **The Pyrrhonean, Megarian, Eretrian, and Academic schools are all engaged in practically the same task; they have introduced a new knowledge, non-knowledge.** 45. You may sweep all these theories in with the superfluous troops of "liberal" studies; the one class of men give me a knowledge that will be of no use to me, the other class do away with any hope of attaining knowledge. It is better, of course, to know useless things than to know nothing. One set of philosophers offers no light by which I may direct my gaze toward the truth; the other digs out my very eyes and

leaves me blind. **If I cleave to Protagoras, there is nothing in the scheme of nature that is not doubtful; if I hold with Nausiphanes, I am sure only of this – that everything is unsure; if with Parmenides, there is nothing except the One;**[37] **if with Zeno, there is not even the One.**

46. What are we, then? **What becomes of all these things that surround us, support us, sustain us? The whole universe is then a vain or deceptive shadow.** I cannot readily say whether I am more vexed at those who would have it that we know nothing, or with those who would not leave us even this privilege. Farewell.

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/58/mode/2up?view=theater

> Such word-splitters were Stilpo and Diodorus, the slayer and the slain. They were of the Megaran school, and were named Dialectics; and also, with more truth, Eristics, or quarrelers. **Their clique had professed to follow Zeno and Socrates in declaring the instability of sensible presumptions and conclusions, in preaching an absolute and eternal Being.** But there was this deep gulf between them and Socrates; that while Socrates professed to be seeking for the Absolute and Eternal, for that which is, they were content with affirming that it exists. With him, as with the older sages, philosophy was a search for truth. With them it was a scheme of doctrines to be defended. And the dialectic on which they prided themselves so much, differed from his accordingly. He used it inductively, to seek out, under the notions and conceptions of the mind, certain absolute truths and laws of which they were only the embodiment. **Words and thoughts were to him a field for careful and reverent induction, as the phenomena of nature are to us the disciples of Bacon.** But with these hapless Megarans, who thought that they had found that for which Socrates professed only to seek dimly and afar off, and had got it safe in a dogma, preserved as it were in spirits and put by in a museum, the great use of dialectic was to confute opponents. Delight in their own subtlety grew on them, the worship not of objective truth, but of the forms of the intellect whereby it may be demonstrated; **till they became the veriest word-splitters, rivals of the old sophists whom their master had attacked, and justified too often Aristophanes' calumny, which confounded Socrates with his opponents, as a man whose aim was to make the worse appear the better reason.**
>
> We have here, in both parties, all the marks of an age of exhaustion, of scepticism; of despair about finding any real truth. **No wonder that they were superseded by the Pyrrhonists, who doubted all things, and by the Academy, which prided itself on setting up each thing to knock it down again;** and so by prudent and well-bred and tolerant qualifying of every assertion, neither affirming too much, nor denying too much, **keep their minds in a wholesome or unwholesome state of equilibrium, as stagnant pools are kept, that everything may have free toleration to rot undisturbed.**

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/emerson-the-morals-vol-1#lf0062-01_head_151

"**Had I not designed to intermix barbarians and Greeks and to civilize the earth as I marched forward, and had I not proposed to search the limits of sea and land, and so, extending Macedon to the land-bounding ocean, to have sown Greece in every region all along and to have diffused justice and peace over all nations,** I would not have sat yawning upon the throne of slothful and voluptuous power, but would have labored to imitate the frugality of Diogenes. But now pardon us, Diogenes. We follow the example of Hercules, we emulate Perseus, and tread in the footsteps of Bacchus, our divine ancestor and founder of our race; once more we purpose to settle the victorious Greeks in India, and once more to put those savage mountaineers beyond Caucasus in mind of their ancient Bacchanalian revels. **There, by report, live certain people professing a rigid and austere philosophy, and more frugal than Diogenes, as going altogether naked; pious men, governed by their own constitutions and devoted wholly to God.** They have no occasion for scrip or wallet, for they never lay up provision, having always fresh and new gathered from the earth. The rivers afford them drink, and at night they rest upon the grass and the leaves that fall from the trees. **By our means shall they know Diogenes, and Diogenes them. But it behooves us also, as it were, to make a new coin, and to stamp a new face of Grecian civility upon the barbarian metal.**"

https://books.google.fi/books?id=53GYDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA28#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pyrrho's tripartite statement is completely unprecedented and unparalleled in Greek thought. Yet it is not merely similar to Buddhism, it corresponds closely to a famous statement of the Buddha preserved in canonical texts.28 The statement is known as the *Trilakṣaṇa*, the 'Three Characteristics' of all *dharmas* 'ethical distinctions, factors, constituents, etc.' Greek *pragmata* '(ethical) things' corresponds closely to Indic *dharma~dhamma* '(ethical) things' and seems to be Pyrrho's equivalent of it.29

The Buddha says, “All *dharmas* are *anitya* ‘impermanent’. ... All *dharmas* are *duḥkha* ‘unsatisfactory, imperfect, unstable’. ... All *dharmas* are *anātman* ‘without an innate self-identity’.”30

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Similarities_between_Pyrrhonism_and_Buddhism

A summary of Pyrrho's philosophy was preserved by Eusebius in *Praeparatio evangelica*, quoting Aristocles, quoting the Pyrrhonist philosopher Timon, quoting his teacher, Pyrrho, in what is known as the "Aristocles passage."[3]

> "Whoever wants to live well (eudaimonia) must consider these three questions: First, how are *pragmata* (ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's answer is that "**As for *pragmata* they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), *astathmēta* (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and *anepikrita* (unjudged, unfixed, undecidable).** Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our *doxai* (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be *adoxastoi* (without views), *aklineis* (uninclined toward this side or that), and *akradantoi* (unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not.[4]

...

Ajñana, which upheld radical skepticism, may have been a more powerful influence on Pyrrho than Buddhism. The Buddhists referred to Ajñana's adherents as ***Amarāvikkhepikas* or "eel-wrigglers",** due to their refusal to commit to a single doctrine.[10]

...

According to legend, Nagarjuna said he was influenced by books inaccessible to other people. He was approached by Nagas (semi-divine serpents) in human form. They invited him to their kingdom to see some texts they thought would be of great interest to him. Nagarjuna studied those texts and brought them back to India.[19][20][21] Matthew Neale illustrated such viewpoint inspired by Joseph G. Walser, "Nāgārjuna was a skillful diplomat concealing novel doctrines in acceptably Buddhist discourse... to conceal their doctrines’ derivation from foreign wisdom traditions."[22]

...

In the *Silloi* Timon of Phlius said “desire is absolutely the first of all bad things”[50]

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/8A*.html#ref46
>
> "Alexis wrote a play called *The Teacher of Profligacy*, says Sotion of Alexandria in his book *On Timon's Satires*. I myself have not come across the play. Although I have read more than eight hundred plays of the so-called Middle Comedy and have made excerpts from them, I have not found *The Teacher of Profligacy*, and I do not even know of anyone who thought it worth cataloguing. Certainly neither Callimachus nor Aristophanes[47] has catalogued it, nor have even those who compiled the catalogues in Pergamum. Well, Sotion says that in this play a slave named Xanthias is represented as inciting his fellow-slaves to high living, and saying:[48] **‘What's this nonsense you are talking, for ever babbling, this way and that, of the Lyceum, the Academy, and the Odeum gates—mere sophists' rubbish? There's no good in them. Let's drink, and drink our fill, my Sicon, Sicon! Let's have a good time while we may still keep the life in our bodies. Whoop it up, Manes! There's nothing nicer than the belly. That is your father, and again, your only mother. Ethics, embassies, army tactics—fine pretences that sound hollow, like dreams. You will have only what you eat and drink. All the rest is dust—Pericles, Codrus, Cimon.’** It would have been better, says Chrysippus, if the inscription over Sardanapalus had been changed thus: ‘Though knowing full well that thou art but mortal, indulge thy desire, find joy in discourse. Eating, though shalt have no delight. Yes, I am but a ragged remnant, although I have eaten and had pleasure to the utmost. I have only what I have learned, what I have pondered, what noble things I have experienced with their aid, and what is left is a legacy altogether sweet.’ **Timon, also, has said very rightly:[49] ‘Foremost among all evils is desire.’**

...

While discussing Christopher Beckwith's claims in *Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia*, Jerker Blomqvist states that:

> On the other hand, certain elements that are generally regarded as essential features of Buddhism are entirely absent from ancient Pyrrhonism/scepticism. **The concepts of good and bad karma must have been an impossibility in the Pyrrhonist universe, if “things” were ἀδιάφορα, ‘without a logical self-identity’, and, consequently, could not be differentiated from each other by labels such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. A doctrine of rebirth, reminiscent of the Buddhist one, though favored by Plato and Pythagoras, was totally alien to the Pyrrhonists.** The ἀταραξία, ‘undisturbedness’, that the Pyrrhonists promised their followers, may have a superficial resemblance to the Buddhist nirvana, but ἀταραξία, unlike nirvana, did not involve a liberation from a

> cycle of reincarnation; rather, it was a mode of life in this world, blessed with μετριοπάθεια, 'moderation of feeling' or 'moderate suffering', not with the absence of any variety of pain. Kuzminski, whom Beckwith (p. 20) hails as a precursor of his, had largely ignored the problem with this disparity between Buddhism and Pyrrhonism.[52]

https://classicalwisdom.com/philosophy/the-greek-buddha/

On top of this Buddhist philosophical foundation, Pyrrho built an innovative technique. **For reasons we can only speculate about, he did not bring back to Greece the Buddhist technique of meditation.** Instead, he took techniques that already existed in Greek thought – principally from Democritus, Protagoras, Gorgias, and the Megarians – synthesizing them and repurposing them to achieve ends that meditation achieves.

Nearly all of Western philosophy serves the end of building up the ego. Look at how clever we humans are for figuring all this stuff out! We are as gods! **Pyrrhonism, like Buddhism, is an assault on the ego.** To be successful in that assault, Pyrrhonism was built to breach the philosophical conceits of the Western ego.

Pyrrhonism turns rationality against itself. It employs the same tools we use to build up our sense of who we are and what our world is to dismantle those constructions, leaving each of us with what is known in the metaphorical language of Zen as our original face: the face we had before our parents were born.

As a consequence, Pyrrhonism has induced viscerally negative reactions from other philosophers, from antiquity to modernity. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus – famous for urging people to "bear and forbear" – was so riled by Pyrrhonism that he thought Pyrrhonists should be tortured (*Discourses* Book 2 Chapter 20).
…

Pyrrho put his translation of *anatta* first in his list, perhaps because it so well countered Aristotle's arguments against Democritus. Buddhist teachings commonly emphasize the personal implications of *anatta* – that we have no real selves, no soul, nothing that is essentially us. Humans, however, are no special case. No physical thing has those attributes.

Democritus had already pointed to this in his famous saying "by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in reality atoms and void." In other words, we have no firm basis for knowing that the attributes we agree that objects have are *really* there. All we really know is that the objects are conditioned things, just as the Buddha pointed out.

Aristotle disagreed with Democritus. He claimed that things do have essences, known now as Aristotelian "substances." **And because things have essences, things can be logically distinguished through what is now known as Aristotelian "differentia" – Latin for the Greek term Aristotle used – *diaphora* – differences in the essences.** Pyrrho translated *anatta* as *adiaphora* to negate Aristotle's claim. There are no *diaphora*. Things have no metaphysical substance or essence that allows the kind of neat, logical categorizing that Aristotle claims.

Buddhists call this "dependent origination." The ancient writer, Aulus Gellius, described the same idea in Pyrrhonism, saying "…there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have reference to something else…" (*Attic Nights* XI, 5, 6-7)

In the Classical era, the Pyrrhonists were always a minority. In the Medieval era, Aristotle's views would so come to dominate that he would become known simply as "the philosopher." **Indeed, we wouldn't even have known that Pyrrho based his teachings on the Three Marks of Existence were it not for Eusebius, a Christian apologist who copied Aristotelian arguments against Pyrrhonism from a book by the Peripatetic philosopher, Aristocles of Messene.**

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_287

Nāgārjuna proceeds on the assumption that that which is not understandable is not real. He then proves that the following are neither understandable nor explicable: motion and rest, time, causality, the notion of the part and the whole, the soul, the "I," Buddha, God and the universe. "There is no God apart from the universe, and there is no universe apart from God, and they both are equally appearances." (159: p. 655) "There is no death, no birth, no distinction, no persistence, no oneness, no manyness, no coming in, no going forth." (159: p. 655) "All things have the character of emptiness, they have no beginning, no end, they are faultless and not faultless, they are not imperfect and not perfect, therefore, O Sariputta, here in this emptiness there is no form, no perception, no name, no concept, no knowledge." (159: p. 656)

http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/38734/1/401701.pdf

I will argue that the state of *ataraxia* ("unperturbedness") as interpreted by the Skeptics is essentially identical to the Zen state of "non-dwelling" as articulated by the Sixth Patriarch Huineng. In doing so, I will attempt to show how the philosophical methodologies of both Sextus and Huineng succeed in **bringing the individual to a state of tranquility through the skillful use of**

opposition pairs, be they in the form of opposed arguments (for the Skeptics) or traditional dichotomies (for the Zennists). I will argue also that simple non-dogmatic reliance on non-rational guides to life (e.g. culture, custom, etc.) as advocated by the Skeptics is equivalent to the Zen idea of returning to life in the ordinary world absent attachment to either ordinary or the transcendent.
…

> The Skeptic way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, **owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed,** we are brought first to *epoché* and then to *ataraxia*. (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, BK I, 8)
>
> If someone asks you about the Dharma, **answer in dichotomous fashion making constant use of opposition pairs to demonstrate their mutual dependency. Do this and eliminate dualistic dharmas once and for all,** leaving them with no place at all to go. (*Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch*, Ch. 45)

…

And although the Buddha made counter-arguments against the dominant view at the time of the existence of *atman*, or eternal Self, he was also careful not to fully endorse the view of no-Self (*anatman*) either. **He referred to his teaching like a "raft," that was to be used for "crossing over and not for taking hold of."**87
…

Two Mahāyāna sūtras in particular, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (*Niepanjing*) or *Nirvana Sūtra* for short, and the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (*Lengqiejing*) teach, respectively, the existence of a "Buddha-nature" (*fo xing*) and "self-nature" (*zi xing*) inherent in all humans. Thus, according to one recent Zen anthology of Zen literature,

> **In substance Zen Buddhism advocates that the nature of the self is the nature of the Buddha, and that the heart of the self is the heart of the Buddha, that Buddha nature is there in everyone, and everyone can attain Buddhahood.**88

Thus, it turns out that the eternal *atman*, the very concept which much of early Buddhism so vehemently rejected, made a comeback in Mahāyāna Buddhism in the form of an unchanging Buddha-nature.
…

One other important development of note within Mahāyāna Buddhism was its non-separation of religious practice and everyday life. This line of thought is developed most fully in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* (*Weimojiejing*), a text which Huineng also mines heavily throughout the *Platform Sūtra*.92 **In the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* the lines between monastic and lay life are blurred and it is affirmed that even lay practitioners may achieve awakening.**93 **This represents perhaps one of the most important transitions from early Buddhism.**

> 92. **Whereas many hold Chinese Zen is a Sinofication of Indian Buddhism, I see it more as an application of the practical spiritual life as already envisioned by the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra*.** One telling point I find is Huineng's rejection of traditional Confucian mourning rituals (*PS* 53).
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vimalakirti_Sutra#Synopsis
>
> Chapter 6
>
> **Vimalakīrti expounds a series of analogies designed to explain the point that the bodhisattva regards sentient beings as, in various senses, illusory or even logically impossible.** A goddess then appears, who has been living in Vimalakīrti's room for twelve years. She creates a shower of heavenly petals. These petals stick to the bodies of the non-Mahāyāna adepts (*mahāśrāvaka*s), but slide off the bodies of the bodhisattvas and drop to the ground. Śāriputra, perturbed (among other things, by a probable infringement of the monastic code, which prohibits personal adornment), even attempts to use his supernatural powers to shed this unwelcome decoration, but in vain. A battle of wits and wisdom ensues, in which Śāriputra is sorely bested and humiliated by the goddess. She explains that he cannot shake off the flowers because he is "attached" (for instance, to a formalistic and superficial understanding of the Dharma and the Vinaya). **Śāriputra asks the goddess, perhaps somewhat peevishly, why she still has the (inferior) body of a woman, if she has attained to such high levels of insight. In response, she uses her own supernatural powers to switch bodies with Śāriputra, who is even more perturbed to find himself in the guise of a woman, but finds that nothing he does allows him to return to his own "true" form.** Eventually, the goddess takes mercy and releases her hold, but the overall effect of the exchange is to show the vast superiority of Mahāyāna doctrine and practice over the other, more traditional forms of Buddhism of which Śāriputra is a paragon. The drama presented in this chapter has been an important reference point for traditional and especially modern attempts to find Mahāyāna perspectives on the nature of gender, and Buddhist feminist attempts to find canonical sources for a stance that ascribes equal spiritual status or potential to women.

Chapter 7

A dialogue ensues between Mañjuśrī and Vimalakīrti. Echoing the dramatic besting of Śāriputra – a famed expert in doctrine – by a mere non-Buddhist deity and female, this dialogue ultimately sees Mañjuśrī, the paragon of Mahāyāna wisdom, upstaged by someone who is apparently a "mere" householder, and (as we saw in Chapter 2), apparently no model of virtue at that – a companion of gamblers and prostitutes.

…

There is no separation from daily activities; in fact it may be said that it can only be fully realized within activity. Huineng quotes from the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* to make just this point: “Externally he is skilled at distinguishing all the various forms of existence, while internally he remains unmoved in the First Principle.”105 This verse from the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* is also an indicator as to why the distinction between lay and ordained life ceases to be of fundamental importance. The monk in earlier traditions had access to the proper environmental conditions necessary to cultivate both mental and physical stillness. But if such conditions were truly the prerequisite of enlightenment, the person in the work-a-day world would of course stand little chance of becoming enlightened. **However, once *internal* stillness becomes the only requirement, *anyone* now who was willing to put in the practice could in fact become a Buddha.**

…

Finally, we should also observe that Huineng also never sees “enlightenment” as a one-time affair, something that is attained for once and for all. It is from the beginning a moment-to-moment process and will depend on one’s state of the mind at any given time: **“If you are deluded during a thought, you are an ordinary person; if you gain understanding with the following thought, you are a Buddha.”**107

…

The whole of Huineng’s teaching may therefore be summed up in four Chinese characters: (*jian xing cheng fo*):115 **“See the self-nature and become a Buddha.”** To quote mysticism scholar Robert Forman: “In wu-nien one directly realizes that one is, in one’s core, not this or that perception, but transcendental to it.”116 **There is neither “Northerner nor Southerner” in the Buddha-nature as Huineng famously said.**117 **And this not seeing one’s self as this or that perception is to see one’s real nature.** On the other hand, by “self-nature” Huineng also has in mind is the notion of an all-encompassing center of being that excludes nothing! There is no conflict here, since philosophically speaking, there is little if any difference between a nature that contains everything and a nature that contains nothing. Or as the late Robert Solomon put in his *The Rise and Fall of the Self* (in the context of 18th century Continental philosophy), **“Between the Self as absolute spirit and the self as nothing at all there is, it turns out, very little difference…”**118 Thus, the self-nature might be interpreted not only as a true self apart from all perceptions, but also that which equally *includes all perceptions* as part of one’s very own nature.119

…

Thus, it seems *only if* X remains undefined can the Skeptic remain in tranquility. And consequently, if it could be proven that, say, being X *was* good by nature, then it *would* seem rational for us to be vexed by the thought of not possessing property X and overjoyed by the thought of possessing it.211 Thus, it appears that the Skeptic’s tranquility only holds in the case of *ignorance!* **That is, the Skeptic is fine *now*, but this is only because she doesn’t know. And in that case, it would also seem evident that the Skeptic has a vested interest in *not finding truth*.**

…

Thus, we can see why Huineng repeatedly admonishes his disciples constantly to not see the faults of others, since fault-seeking usually tends to lead to the unfounded view that there exists some rough-and-ready distinction between one’s “good” Self and the “bad” Other.215

215. See *PS* 14, 36, 44. Huineng is not literally suggesting that we ought to let people get away with murder. Instead his teaching is an expedient means to correcting the habit of being judgmental. **In fact, Huineng tells Shenhui in *PS* 44 that even the practice of not seeing the faults but one’s own faults is itself dualistic: “Seeing (one’s faults) and not seeing [the faults of others] is dualistic (lit. “two-sided,” *liang bian*).”**

…

The Skeptic it seems would hardly stand a chance of becoming a staunch abolitionist. **While this seems true, neither would the Skeptic it seems be anywhere inclined to believe that she or anyone else had a *natural right* to enslave others.** After all, historically, appeal to the moral order has been used to justify slavery just as much as it has been used to fight against it. Thus, the Skeptic seems no worse or better off than the ordinary person in this regard.

American Buddhist monk Bhikkhu Bodhi wrote:

> "The real meaning of upekkha is equanimity, not indifference in the sense of unconcern for others. As a spiritual virtue, **upekkha means stability in the face of the fluctuations of worldly fortune. It is evenness of mind, unshakeable freedom of mind, a state of inner equipoise that cannot be upset by gain and loss, honor and dishonor, praise and blame, pleasure and pain.** ***Upekkha*** **is freedom from all points of self-reference;** it is indifference only to the demands of the ego-self with its craving for pleasure and position, not to the well-being of one's fellow human beings. **True equanimity is the pinnacle of the four social attitudes that the Buddhist texts call the 'divine abodes': boundless loving-kindness, compassion, altruistic joy, and equanimity.** The last does not override and negate the preceding three, but perfects and consummates them."[6]
>
> https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl1/wl179.htm
>
> *Ninth D*. Well, you *are* in a fix! And what have you got those scales for?
>
> *Sc*. **I use them to weigh arguments in, and get them evenly balanced, They must be absolutely equal**--not a feather-weight to choose between them; then, and not till then, can I make uncertain which is right.
> …
>
> *Ninth D*. What! sight and hearing both gone?
>
> *Sc*. And with them judgement and perception, and all, in short, that distinguishes man from a worm.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Pyrrho

61. Pyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates. According to Apollodorus in his *Chronology*, he was first a painter; then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson:[89] thus Alexander in his *Successions of Philosophers*. **Afterwards he joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust.[90] And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that.**

62. He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him. But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts. He lived to be nearly ninety.
…

63. **He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself to his relatives;** this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts. He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty.[91] Often, our informant adds, he would leave his home and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. **And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and *sang-froid*.**
…

In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination, so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him: at all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in disposition but himself in doctrine; **and he would often remark that Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him for information about Pyrrho; and that he was so respected by his native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.**
…

66. **He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay *On Wealth and Poverty*,** now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry perchance or pigs,

and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did. They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker.
…

Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the line

> As leaves on trees, such is the life of man.[96]

He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:

> Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?
> Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,[97]

and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man.[98]
…

71. **Some call Homer the founder of this school, for to the same questions he more than anyone else is always giving different answers at different times, and is never definite or dogmatic about the answer.** The maxims of the Seven Wise Men, too, they call sceptical; for instance, "Observe the Golden Mean," and "A pledge is a curse at one's elbow," meaning that **whoever plights his troth steadfastly and trustfully brings a curse on his own head.** Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus and Euripides, for Archilochus says:[100]

> Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,
> Is but as one short day that Zeus sends down.

And Euripides:[101]

> Great God! how can they say poor mortal men
> Have minds and think? Hang we not on thy will?
> Do we not what it pleaseth thee to wish?

72. Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says,[102]

> Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall know

and Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying, "A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is not"; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, "Opinion says hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space," and again, "Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well."[103]

> 103. This proverbial expression is inadequate; a more literal rendering of ἐν βύθῳ would be "in an abyss."

Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation.[104] Euripides says:[105]

> 73. Who knoweth if to die be but to live,
> And that called life by mortals be but death?

…

And even Heraclitus: "Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely."[108]

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-57
>
> 129. **Neither do [the Stoics] think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether:** so Posidonius in his *Exhortations*.

…

79. **They showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal.** Perplexities arise from the agreements[114] between appearances or judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary. The following are the ten modes laid down.[115]

The *first* mode relates to the differences between living creatures in respect of those things which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them. By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, with the result that such a conflict necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. **For some creatures multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms; others by union, such as man and the rest.**
…

83. The *fifth* mode is derived from customs, laws, belief in myths, compacts between nations and dogmatic assumptions. This class includes considerations with regard to things beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad, with regard to the gods, and with regard to the coming into being and the passing away of the world of phenomena. **Obviously the same thing is regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and bad by others.** Persians think it not unnatural for a man to marry his daughter; to Greeks it is unlawful. The Massagetae, according to Eudoxus in the first book of his *Voyage round the World*, have their wives in common; the Greeks have not. The Cilicians used to delight in piracy; not so the Greeks.
…

101. **There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all.** But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, **Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad;** thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. **But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#cite_ref-137

According to Menodotus [Timon] left no successor, but his school lapsed until Ptolemy of Cyrene re-established it. Hippobotus and Sotion, however, say that he had as pupils Dioscurides of Cyprus, Nicolochus of Rhodes, Euphranor of Seleucia, and Pralus of the Troad.[137] The latter, as we learn from the history of Phylarchus, was a man of such unflinching courage that, **although unjustly accused, he patiently suffered a traitor's death, without so much as deigning to speak one word to his fellow-citizens.** 116. Euphranor had as pupil Eubulus of Alexandria; Eubulus taught Ptolemy, and he again Sarpedon and Heraclides; Heraclides again taught Aenesidemus of Cnossus, the compiler of eight books of Pyrrhonean discourses; the latter was the instructor of Zeuxippus his fellow-citizen, he of Zeuxis of the angular foot,[138] he again of Antiochus of Laodicea on the Lycus, who had as pupils Menodotus of Nicomedia, an empiric physician, and Theiodas of Laodicea; Menodotus was the instructor of Herodotus of Tarsus, son of Arieus, and Herodotus taught Sextus Empiricus, who wrote ten books on Scepticism, and other fine works. Sextus taught Saturninus called Cythenas,[139] another empiricist.

> 139. **Possibly κυδαθηναιεύς, i.e. a member of the well-known Attic deme, into which even Italians with such names as Saturninus might penetrate under the cosmopolitan empire of the Severi.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.69382/page/n285/mode/2up?view=theater

Timon’s doctrine was simple. The source of trouble is contradictory knowledge, but nothing can be known, therefore suspend your judgment and never dogmatise; remember too that nothing matters, not even whether you live or die; thus you will attain the goal, imperturbability. **He attained to a good deal of money by preaching this throughout the world, but did not attain to imperturbability, for much of his life was spent in attacking Arcesilaus for poaching on his preserve; and he left no successor, for with Arcesilaus (*c.* 264-242) Scepticism passed over to the Academy.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aenesidemus

There is no definite evidence about the life of Aenesidemus, but his most important work, the *Pyrrhonian Discourses* was known to be dedicated to Lucius Aelius Tubero, a friend of Cicero and member of Plato's Academy whom Photius described as a colleague. Based on this information, scholars have assumed that Aenesidemus himself was also a member of the Academy. **Furthermore, it has been assumed that he took part under the leadership of Philo of Larissa and probably adopted Pyrrhonism either in reaction to Antiochus of Ascalon introduction of Stoic and Peripatetic dogma into the Academy or Philo's acceptance of provisional beliefs.**
…

We have this summary of its contents from Photius (in his *Myriobiblion*).

> **I read Aenesidemus' eight *Pyrrhonist Discourses.*** The overall aim of the book is to establish that there is no firm basis for cognition, either through sense-perception, or indeed through thought. Consequently, he says, neither the Pyrrhonists nor the others know the truth in things; but the philosophers of other persuasions, as well as being ignorant in general, and wearing themselves out uselessly and expending themselves in ceaseless torments, are also ignorant of the very fact that they have cognition of none of the things of which they think that they have gained cognition. **But he who philosophizes after the fashion of Pyrrho is happy not only in general but also, and especially, in the wisdom of knowing that he has firm cognition of nothing.** And even with regard to what he knows, he has the propriety to assent no more to its affirmation than to its denial. The whole scheme of the book is directed towards the purpose I have mentioned. In writing the discourses Aenesidemus addresses them to Lucius Tubero, one of his colleagues from the Academy, a Roman by birth, with an illustrious ancestry and a distinguished political career. In the first discourse he differentiates between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics in almost precisely the following words. **He says that the Academics are doctrinaire: they posit some things with confidence and unambiguously deny others. The Pyrrhonists, on the other hand, are aporetic and free of all doctrine.**
> ...
>
> **But the Academics, he says, especially those from the present-day Academy, are sometimes in agreement with Stoic beliefs, and to tell the truth turn out to be Stoics fighting with Stoics.** Moreover, they are doctrinaire about many things. For they introduce virtue and folly, and posit good and bad, truth and falsity, convincing and unconvincing, existent and non-existent. They give firm determinations for many other things too. It is only about the cognitive impression that they express dissent.
> ...
>
> The seventh discourse he marshalls against the virtues, saying that those who philosophize about them have uselessly invented their doctrines, and that they have misled themselves into thinking that they have attained the theory and practice of them. **The eighth and last launches an attack on the end, allowing the existence of neither happiness nor pleasure nor prudence, nor any other end which any philosophical persuasion might believe in, but asserting that the end which they all celebrate simply does not exist.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n693/mode/2up?view=theater

Perhaps Polybius, who was then a hostage with Scipio, heard these addresses or of them, for he speaks with the anger of a practical man against those philosophers

> who in the discussions of the Academy have trained themselves in extreme readiness of speech. For some of them, in their efforts to puzzle the minds of their hearers, resort to such paradoxes, and are so fertile in inventing plausibilities, that they wonder whether or not it is possible for those in Athens to smell eggs roasted in Ephesus, and are in doubt whether all the time they are discussing the matter in the Academy they are not lying in their beds at home and composing this discourse in a dream. ... **From this excessive love of paradox they have brought all philosophy into disrepute. ... They have implanted such a passion in the minds of our young men that they never give even a thought to the ethical and political questions that really benefit students of philosophy, but spend their lives in the vain attempt to invent useless absurdities.**[14]

https://archive.org/details/lifeofchrist00papi/page/326/mode/2up?view=theater

Pilate, as shown by his questions put to Jesus, was one of those skeptics of the Roman decadence corrupted with Pyrrhonism, a devotee of Epicurus, an encyclopedist of Hellenism without any belief in the gods of his country, nor any belief that any real God existed at all.

https://archive.org/details/lifeofchrist00papi/page/342/mode/2up?view=theater

A real Roman, a Roman of antiquity, of the true Roman stock, would either at once have satisfied the demands of that turbulent crowd and would not have wasted a moment in defending an obscure visionary; or would at once have decreed, from the beginning, that this man was innocent and was under the august protection of the Empire.

By his stratagems, half-measures, indolent questionings, hesitations and partially executed maneuvers Pilate found himself slowly pushed towards a decision he did not wish to make. **The fact that he had not at once decided the question with a yes or no had increased the insolence of the High Priests and the excitement of the people.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/12B*.html#ref20

But this leads me to another question as to which school of philosophy is like to prove of most service to oratory, although there are only a few that can be said to contend for this honour. 24 For in the first place Epicurus banishes us from his presence without more ado, since he bids all his followers to fly from learning in the swiftest ship that they can find.[21] Nor would Aristippus, who regards the highest good as consisting in physical pleasure, be likely to exhort us to the toils entailed by our study. **And what part can Pyrrho have in the work that is before us? For he will have doubts as to whether there exist judges to address, accused to defend, or a senate where he can be called upon to speak his opinion.** 25 Some authorities hold that the Academy will be the most useful school, on the ground that its habit of disputing on both sides of a question approaches most nearly to the actual practice of the courts.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D20

Man what are you doing?[10] are you refuting yourself every day; and will you not give up these frigid attempts? When you eat, where do you carry your hand to? to your mouth or to your eye? when you wash yourself, what do you go into? do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit? **If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, 'Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath,' I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head.** What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley-drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, mister: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—**If I had three or four fellow-slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind.** But now they mock us by using all the things which nature gives, and in words destroying them.

Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do nothing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter Persephone or a Pluto;[11]
not to mention that they are enjoying the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the stars, and the sea and the land and the co-operation of mankind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these things to turn their attention to them; but they only seek to belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath. But what they shall say, and about what things or to what persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk, they care not even in the least degree, **nor do they care if any generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all the seeds of his generous nature;** nor if we[12] should give an adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts; nor if a public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse from these doctrines; nor if another who neglects his parents should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching.—What then in your opinion is good or bad? This or that?—Why then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from them, or try to convince them? **By Zeus one might much sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils.[13]**

> 13. This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you.' Matthew, xxi. 31. Mrs. Carter.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n545/mode/2up?view=theater

Nevertheless, in this final stage of Hellenistic culture, **there were skeptics who recalled all the doubts of Protagoras, and a Lucian who laughed at belief with the insolence of Aristippus and almost Plato's charm.** The school of Pyrrho was not dead; Aenesidemus of Cnossus rephrased its denials in the Alexandria of our first century, by propounding the famous "Ten Modes" *(tropoi),* or contradictions, that made knowledge impossible.[II] Towards the end of the second century **Sextus Empiricus, of unknown date or place, gave the skeptical philosophy its final formulation in several destructive volumes of which three survive. Sextus takes all the world for his enemy; he divides philosophers into diverse species and slays each breed in turn.** He writes with the vigor necessary to an executioner, the good order and clarity characteristic of ancient philosophy, occasional sarcastic humor, and much dreary chopping of logic.

To every argument, says Sextus, an equal argument can be opposed, so that in the end there is nothing so superfluous as reasoning. **Deduction is untrustworthy unless based upon complete induction; but complete induction is impossible, for we can never tell when a "negative instance" will turn up.[51] "Cause" is merely a regular antecedent (as Hume would repeat), and all knowledge is relative.[52]** Similarly there is no objective good or evil; morality changes across every frontier,[53] and virtue has a different definition in every age. All the arguments of the nineteenth century against the possibility of knowing whether God exists or not are stated here, and all the contradictions between benevolent omnipotence and worldly suffering.[54] **But Sextus is a more complete agnostic than the agnostics, for he affirms that we cannot know that we cannot know; agnosticism is a dogma.[55]** But, he consoles us, we do not need certainty. Probability is enough for all practical purposes, and the suspension of

judgment *(epoché,* holding back; *aphasia,* saying nothing) in philosophical questions, instead of disturbing the mind, brings it a careless peace *(ataraxia).*[56] **Meanwhile, since nothing is certain, let us accept the conventions and beliefs of our time and place, and modestly worship our ancient gods.**[57]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Minucius_Felix/The_Octavius_of_Minucius_Felix/Chapter_13

"However, if you have a desire to philosophize, let any one of you who is sufficiently great, imitate, if he can, Socrates the prince of wisdom. **The answer of that man, whenever he was asked about celestial matters, is well known: '<u>*What is above us is nothing to us.*</u>'** Well, therefore, did he deserve from the oracle the testimony of singular wisdom, which oracle he himself had a presentiment of, that he had been preferred to all men for the reason, not that he had discovered all things, but because he had learnt that he knew nothing. And thus the confession of ignorance is the height of wisdom. **From this source flowed the safe doubting of Arcesilas, and long after of Carneades, and of very many of the Academics,**[1] in questions of the highest moment, in which species of philosophy the unlearned can do much with caution, and the learned can do gloriously. **What! is not the hesitation of Simonides the lyric poet to be admired and followed by all?** Which Simonides, when he was asked by Hiero the tyrant what, and what like he thought the gods to be, asked first of all for a day to deliberate; then postponed his reply for two days; and then, when pressed, he added only another; and finally, when the tyrant inquired into the causes of such a long delay, he replied that, the longer his research continued, the obscurer the truth became to him.[2] **<u>In my opinion also, things which are uncertain ought to be left as they are.</u> Nor, while so many and so great men are deliberating, should we rashly and boldly give an opinion in another direction, lest either a childish superstition should be introduced, or all religion should be overthrown.**"

1. This is otherwise read, "Academic Pyrrhonists." 2. Cicero, *de Natura Deorum,* i. 22.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

But one Thing there is, which to me appears *incontestable*; *viz*. that this Spirit of universal Scepticism, utterly destroys, and overturns the very Foundations of all Religion, and Morality. Nor do I know any Books more dangerous, for Men to read, who have not accustom'd themselves to an accurate Way of Thinking, and discerning between Truth and Falshood; than those, whose Authors make it their whole Business, to accumulate Difficulties against the most evident Truths; without ever resolving them, or preventing the fatal Impressions thereof, by a clear and rational Account, of what may and ought to be held as certain, notwithstanding such Difficulties; which, however considerable, yet can no way lessen, or hinder the Cogency of such direct Proofs, as are really convincing. 'Tis true, the antient *Scepticks* i *did not indeed deny, but that a Man ought to conform to the Customs of his Country; to practise the Duties of Morality; and in all such Cases to be determin'd upon* m *probable Grounds; without insisting upon, or expecting, absolute Certainty*. **But then, as Mr. *Bayle* himself owns, *they* n *did, under Pretence of only opposing the Reasons which the Dogmatists urg'd for the Existence of a Deity; in Effect, undermine the Doctrine itself.*** *Their Way was, first to premise,* o *that as for themselves, they pretended not to be singular in any Thing; but that following the common Course of Life, they, without being addicted to any particular Sect, held that there were Gods, worshipp'd 'em, and ascrib'd to 'em a Providence; but for the rash Reasonings of the Dogmatists about these Matters, 'twas what they could not submit to: Whereupon they produc'd their Objections; which were usually such, as did, by disproving a divine Providence, at the same Time destroy the Existence of a Deity*. As to Morality, there is no doubt to be made, but *Pyrrho* p taught, "that the Honesty and q Turpitude, Justice and Injustice of humane Actions, were intirely dependent upon humane Laws, and Custom." *Carneades*, r after having one Day made an admirable Harangue in Praise of Justice; did the very next shew, that it was only a mere empty Name; opposing it at the same Time more strenuously, than he had before defended it. Thus however excellent, those s Maxims of Morality, which the *Academick* and *Pyrrhonist* give out for Precepts, may be in themselves; yet in their Mouths, they can amount to no more, than empty Sounds, unprofitable Rules, Propositions advanc'd without any Foundation, and in flat Contradiction to their own proper Principles; this too, notwithstanding their Conduct and Demeanour be otherwise never so regular, and umblameable. **<u>According to *Carneades*, the chief End, or supreme Good, of Man, consisted in *the Enjoyment of*, what he call'd, t the *natural Principles*; that is to say, in satisfying Desires of Nature; without giving one's self any Trouble of Concern about Honour and Virtue.</u>**

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/70/mode/2up?view=theater

But once it is proved that God either does not exist or is so remote that his disinterest in men amounts to inexistence, the skeptic's weapon turns against reason itself: the disciples of Pyrrho hold that the world itself in unknowable in its assumed metaphysical reality **and that any judgment about the world can be balanced by a contrary and equivalent judgment. <u>The Sage is in an equipose between the *pro* and the *contra*</u>, hence the morality he adopts can only be an apparent or provisional morality, a submission to what sees useful in the practical order.** The skeptic's epistemology and ethics are thus in harmony, but they are the exact opposite of religious realism: against the latter's affirmation that the human intellect grasps the outside world, God, and the *quidditas* of moral relationships, it argues that since this is not the case, we should adjust our behavior to the prevailing

standards and mores. **This is an undoubtedly softer morality than that of the Stoics (following from the ontology of each), but it too seeks an undisturbed state of mind (*epoché*) related to the Stoics' *apatheia* and derived from the suspension of judgment. No wonder that it is easy to switch from skepsis to Stoicism and vice-versa,** and that Pyrrho's doctrine became so popular: as Pierre Bayle wrote at the end of the seventeenth century, reason is better able to demolish than to build, it knows better what things are not, than what they are. With such an agnosticism in cognitive matters, skepticism justified agnosticism in religious and moral matters too, **allowing a kind of carefully cultivated sloth to spread over mind and soul.**

---

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

When the Paduan School, **mainly Pietro Pomponazzi and his disciples,** proceeded drastically to separate philosophy from religious doctrine and recruit it for science, most defenders of religion seized upon these, for them dangerous arguments to show that indeed reason is not the right instrument of disquisition about God and matters divine, that faith alone is such an instrument. **This fideistic thesis was best summed up by Pierre Charron, seventeenth-century cleric and disciple of Montaigne,** who declared that God had indeed created man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it by himself or by any human means. The senses are deceptive, the real nature of things escapes one's reach, and our intellectual ideas lack objective validity. God was unknowable because we are weak and he is immense. **The only possible way of knowing him, argued Charron making use of the subtle skepticism of medieval radical mystics, is to know him negatively.**
…

It all looks as if Charron, Gassendi, Descartes, and others, and before them Ockham and the Paduan naturalists had elaborated the fideist argumentation less with a view of defending God's existence than of disqualifying those who, in proving his existence, insisted on following the main avenue, that of reason.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false

While many Catholic theologians tried to offer historical evidence to justify the authority of the Church (without being able to show that historical evidence was the criterion), **a suggestion of the sceptical defense of the faith, the defense that was to dominate the French Counter-Reformation, was offered by Erasmus of Rotterdam.**
…

Erasmus' general anti-intellectualism and dislike of rational theological discussions led him to suggest a kind of sceptical basis for remaining within the Catholic Church. His reaction to the philosophers at the University of Paris in his student days and his condemnation, in *The Praise of Folly*, of their intellectual quest per se, culminated in the statement that **"human affairs are so obscure and various that nothing can be clearly known. This was the sound conclusion of the Academics [the Academic Sceptics], who were the least surly of the philosophers."**12
…

This attempt, early in the Reformation, at sceptical "justification" of the Catholic rule of faith brought forth a furious answer from Luther, the *De Servo Arbitrio* of 1525. Erasmus' book, Luther declared, was shameful and shocking, the more so since it was written so well and with so much eloquence. **"It is as if one carried sweepings or droppings in a gold or silver vase."**15 The central error of the book, according to Luther, was that Erasmus did not realize that a Christian cannot be a sceptic.
…

The sole defender of Servetus among the Reformers, the scholar Sebastian Castellio of Basel, saw that the way to argue against the condemnation was to attack the Calvinists' claims to certainty. In his *De Haereticis,*27 written shortly after the burning of Servetus, Castellio tried to destroy the grounds for Calvin's complete assurance of the truth of his religious beliefs, without at the same time destroying the possibility of religious knowledge.

Castellio's method was to point out that in religion there are great many things that are too obscure, too many passages in Scripture too opaque for anyone to be absolutely certain of the truth. These unclear matters has been the source of controversy for ages, and obviously no view was sufficiently manifest so that everyone would accept it. (Otherwise why should the controversy continue, "for who is so demented that he would die for the denial of the obvious?")28 **On the basis of the continual disagreements and the obscurity of Scripture, Castellio indicated that no one was really so sure of the truth in religious affairs that he was justified in killing another as a heretic.**

This mild, sceptical attitude and defense of divergent views elicited a nasty and spirited response. **Theodore Beza saw immediately what was at issue and attacked Castellio as a reviver of the New Academy (**the Platonic academy two generations after Plato, starting mid-fourth century B.C.E.) **and the scepticism of Carneades, trying to substitute probabilities in religious affairs for the certainties required by a true Christian.**29 **Beza insisted that the existence of controversies proves only that some people are wrong.** True Christians are persuaded by the Revelation, by God's Word, which is clear to those who know it. **The introduction of the *akatelepsis* of the Academic sceptics is entirely contrary to Christian belief.** There are truths set up by God and revealed to us, and anyone who does not know, recognize, and accept them is lost.30

Castellio wrote, but did not publish, a reply, in which he tried in a general way to show how little we can know, and the "reasonable" way for judging this knowledge, and then applied his modest standards to the controversies of his time. **The *De arte dubitandi*** 31 **is in many ways a remarkable book, far in advance of its time in proposing a liberal, scientific, and cautious approach to intellectual problems,** in contrast to the total dogmatism of the Calvinist opponents.32
…

These several indications of interest in ancient scepticism in the first part of the sixteenth century are what Villey called "small fires of scepticism which cast a very pale and brief glimmer of light and then quickly disappear."123 None of the figures considered were particularly competent as thinkers; none of them seems to have discovered the true force of ancient scepticism, possibly because, with the exception of the younger Pico, they knew only the less philosophical presentations in Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, or possibly because they were befuddled by the wealth of disagreements that have always existed among men about all intellectual topics.

At any rate, prior to the publication of Sextus Empiricus, there does not seem to be very much serious philosophical consideration of scepticism. **Busson has tried to make the few works dealing with Academic scepticism signs of a vast intellectual movement growing out of the impact of Paduan thought in France.**124 **However, although there was, no doubt, some joint development, the Aristotelianism of the Italian thinkers was far removed from sceptical thought, *except for* its final fideistic conclusion.** The Paduans were confirmed rationalists, whose views of philosophy were the result of accepting a certain philosophical framework and the rational constructions within it. The sceptics, on the other hand, denied or doubted the entire procedure and basis of the Aristotelians. **The sole point of agreement of the two was that the articles of faith could not be supported by rational evidence and must be believed, not proved.** The few discussions of scepticism before 1562 may have occurred historically in the context of Paduan influences, but the ideas stem from ancient discussions about scepticism. Rather than being the culmination of Italian Aristotelianism, as Busson suggests, they appear to be due to isolated rediscoveries about Hellenistic philosophy. Those who write on scepticism do not seem to have studied each other, nor do they seem to be too concerned with serious philosophical analysis of sceptical problems. **It is only after the works of Sextus were published that scepticism became an important philosophical movement, especially as a result of Montaigne and his disciples.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qH6lgQsY3gMC&lpg=PA58&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

Two remarkable events took place in the 1560's to secure the Catholic intellectual position. One was the publication in Latin of the writings of the Greek skeptic, Sextus Empiricus, and the other the installation in Paris of one of the greatest Jesuit controversialists, Juan Maldonat.
…

Veron answered that the so-called rules of reasoning were set down by a pagan, Aristotle, and why should he be taken as the judge of religious truth? And neither Jesus nor any of the church fathers maintained that their views were true because of the logic involved, but that they were true because they were the Word of God.17 When some reformers answered that Zeno of Elea, and not Aristotle, was the author of the rules of inference, Veron retorted, "A great objection: that it be Zeno or another; are they better judges of our controversies?"18 **The Calvinist leader, Pierre du Moulin, countered, in his *Elements de la Logique Françoise*, that logic is not based on the opinions of some ancient Greeks, "For there is a natural logic, which men make use of naturally without applying any art. Even the peasants make syllogisms without thinking about it."**19 About this Veron exclaimed, "poor supposed faith, based on the rules of Zeno's logic, or on the force of a peasant's reason."20
…

This type of fideism reaches its apex with François de la Mothe Le Vayer, "le voluptueux incrédule," who inherited the mantle of Montaigne from Mlle. de Gournay. La Mothe Le Vayer rose to eminence under the patronage of Richelieu and became the teacher of the king's brother and a member of the *Academie française*. **Although hardly an original mind, his skepticism is probably the most far-going of**

any of the Montaignians up to his time. And in spite of the constant attacks on his religion, or lack of it, from his contemporaries like Guez de Balzac and Antoine Arnauld, down to the most recent studies of Pintard, Julien-Eymard d'Angers, and Grenier, almost all his writings include a constant appeal to, and defense of, an extremely fideistic kind of Christianity.66

La Mothe Le Vayer's first love was Sextus Empiricus, whom he called "our master," "the divine Sextus," "the author of our new Decalogue," etc. The endless theme of La Mothe Le Vayer's writings, from his early dialogues down to his final soliloquies, is that Pyrrhonism is the philosophy closest to Christianity, and that the message of St. Paul is really the same as that of Sextus.
…

The beleaguered Calvinists who sounded warnings about the consequences of using François Veron's machine of war were also ignored. **The aggressive, premature anti-skeptics, like Garasse and Descartes, found themselves denounced and persecuted by the most orthodox leaders of the society, while the "Christian skeptics" were thriving as the favorites of Louis XIV and were dominating the intellectual scene. Garasse was condemned by the Sorbonne and silenced by the Jesuit order.** Descartes, offering a positive theory to demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, to replace the skepticism and fideism them current, found himself attacked by a leading Jesuit, Father Bourdin, **and assailed by the Jesuit order until they achieved the condemnation of his works late in the century.** Among the leaders in the struggle against Cartesianism were Father Gabriel Daniel, a Jesuit who preferred the skepticism of Gassendi to the dogmatic metaphysics of Descartes, and Pierre-Daniel Huet, the Bishop of Avranches, and La Mothe Le Vayer's successor as the teacher of the Dauphin, who advocated a complete Christian Pyrrhonism in preference to what he considered the heretical dogmatism of Descartes, heretical for trying to provide a rational basis for religion.85
…

It is hard to date its termination, and the about-face in evaluation of the merits and aims of the Christian skeptics. **But the fate of Father Richard Simon's *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* of 1678, the crowning achievement of the "new machine of war," is probably indicative of what was happening.** This scholarly work purported to demolish the Calvinist appeal to Scripture by showing that (a) no original manuscript of the Bible exists, and (b) nobody knows the original meaning of ancient Hebrew. Therefore Father Simon claimed no one could safely base one's faith on Scripture.

The destructive potentialities of Simon's work were immediately realized, the implications that it had for any and all historical documents, be they scriptural, apostolic, papal, or anything else. The work, dedicated to Louis XIV, was suppressed before publication. **(A copy of this edition survives in the library of the last important leader of the alliance, the last direct-line disciple of Montaigne, Bishop Pierre Daniel Huet.)**

The alliance lasted approximately from the end of the Council of Trent until the period of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, until France was again "toute Catholique."

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century#lf6114_label_327

Even Montaigne, whose Pyrrhonism could be and was used as a means to defend traditional Catholicism, did not survive unscathed: **his essays were finally condemned in Rome in 1676.** And if the greatest religious thinker of seventeenth-century France, Cardinal Bérulle, the founder of the Oratory, contrived to **combine the ideas of Erasmus and Montaigne** with the Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation,36 his disciples, the French Oratorians, soon found themselves in difficulty.

> 36. For Bérulle, whom Mr. Popkin describes (*History of Scepticism,* p. 178) as **"perhaps the most important religious thinker of the Counter-Reformation in France,"** see especially Jean Dagens, *Bérulle et les origines de la restauration catholique* (Bruges, 1950).
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> They were wont to say that Erasmus was suspended between Heaven and Hell, till about the year 1655 the Conclave at Rome damned him for a heretic after he had been dead a hundred and twenty years.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT608&hl=fi&pg=PT608#v=onepage&q&f=false

Huet's scepticism is most fully presented in his *Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l'esprit humain*, written in 1691 and 1692 but only published after his death in 1723. **At first, the Jesuits claimed it was a forgery put forth to embarrass the church.** However, manuscripts of the work existed in Huet's handwriting, and his correspondence made his authorship clear. In the *Traité*, he sets forth the Pyrrhonian position as presented in Sextus Empiricus. He carefully examines criticisms that had been

offered and refutes them. Huet contends that scepticism is the perennial philosophy, the ancient wisdom, that appears in biblical figures, in ancient Greek thinkers, in leading medieval philosophers and theologians such as Averroës, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas, and in more contemporary major thinkers such as Montaigne, Charron, Gassendi, and others.
…

In the *Traité*, in his correspondence, and in his marginal notes in his books (especially his copy of Pascal), **Huet presents an extreme fideism in which he denies that there can be any rational defense of religion, or even any evidence for it.** Pascal, he thought, did this when he put forth his wager arguments. Only faith can lead to any religious views. **It is not clear how much faith Huet himself had, or what he actually believed. As a bishop and a theologian, he set forth extremely latitudinarian views and was friendly with scholars all over Europe regardless of their religious views or affiliations.** He took no part in the French Catholic campaign against the Protestants and even helped some of those who were persecuted.

> https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07513b.htm
>
> **His literary works show him to have inherited and developed the spirit of the sixteenth century, rather than to have identified himself with the mind of the seventeenth century.**
> …
>
> But it was his posthumous work on the limitations of the human mind that drew forth serious protest. **In it Huet is a pure fideist.** For him, as for Pascal, reason and sense are incapable of bringing us to truth with certainty; that can be done only by faith. **The Jesuits refused at first, in the "Mémoires de Trévoux", to believe in the authenticity of the work.** In this they were mistaken; it certainly was Huet's; but they were right when they declared that, by decrying human reason as it did, **such a work was more likely to weaken than to strengthen the foundations of faith, as its author had intended.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA55#v=onepage&q&f=false

Unlike anti-intellectuals like Erasmus, Montaigne developed his doubts through reasoning. Unlike his sceptical predecessors, who presented mainly a series of reports on the variety of human opinions, Montaigne worked out his complete Pyrrhonism through a sequence of levels of doubt, culminating in some crucial philosophical difficulties. **The rambling musings of the "Apologie" have a method in their madness, a method of increasing the fever of doubt until it destroys every possible stronghold of rational activity.**56

The occurrence of Montaigne's revitalization of the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, coming at a time when the intellectual world of the sixteenth century was collapsing, made the *nouveau pyrrhonisme* of Montaigne not the blind alley that historians like Copleston and Weber have portrayed it as being,57 **but one of the crucial forces in the formation of modern thought.** By extending the implicit sceptical tendencies of the Reformation crisis, the humanistic crisis, and the scientific crisis, into a total *crise pyrrhonienne,* Montaigne's genial "Apologie" became the coup de grâce to an entire intellectual world. It was also to be the womb of modern thought, in that it led to the attempt either to refute the new Pyrrhonism or to find a way of living with it. Thus, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Montaigne was seen not as a transitional figure, or a man off the main roads of thought, but as the founder of an important intellectual movement that continued to plague philosophers of their quest for certainty.58

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT49#v=onepage&q&f=false

When the initial volume [of the *Encyclopédie*] appeared in 1751, it included as its introduction an extraordinary document that achieved an instant and lasting success: d'Alembert's "Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot."

In the central and most important section of that essay, d'Alembert singles out four men for special praise – Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Isaac Newton, and John Locke. Before mentioning their names, the French philosophe describes what these four men had actually achieved: **"While adversaries, poorly instructed or malign in intention, openly made war on philosophy, it sought refuge, so to speak, in the works of a few great men – who, without having the dangerous ambition of tearing the blindfolds from the eyes of their contemporaries, prepared from afar, in the shadows and silence, the light (*la lumière*) from which, they supposed, the world would little by little, by insensible degrees secure illumination."**
…

Montaigne may not be a figure whom we would instinctively associate with d'Alembert's conspiracy, but that is merely a sign of our ignorance. **In his own day and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he was generally recognized as one of the founding fathers of modern philosophy.**78 And this was true for politics as well.79 Among the French philosopher's contemporaries, the Dutchman Justus Lipsius was the preeminent student of public affairs. **He championed Stoic political psychology and married it to the skepticism of Carneades; he edited Tacitus and wrote the first political commentary on his works; and he contributed decisively to the revival of Roman military discipline and thereby to the emergence of the modern, professional army.**80 Machiavelli he called "the Tuscan master." Montaigne he dubbed "the Gallic Thaïes." The latter's magnum opus he considered "honest, wise, and very much to my taste."81 In Europe, he had found no one whose thinking accorded more fully with his own. So he told Montaigne in a letter that he eventually chose to publish.82 **Two centuries thereafter, Dugald Stewart, the last great figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, would echo Lipsius's evaluation of the Frenchman's importance. In his estimation, Montaigne had "done more, perhaps, than any other author … to introduce *into men's houses* … what is now called the *new philosophy*, – a philosophy certainly very different from that of Socrates."**83 If anything, Stewart understated the achievement of the man. Montaigne was a popularizer, to be sure. But he was much more as well: as the epiphet conferred on him by Justus Lipsius suggests, his true stature rests on a philosophical accomplishment of untold importance.

In the late sixteenth century, before anyone else seems to have noticed, Montaigne picked up on the argument which lay behind Machiavelli's passing hints and elaborated that argument in a fashion which led him to repudiate his Florentine mentor's exaltation of glory. **In the process, he severed the last, tenuous link connecting modern political philosophy with ancient Greece and Rome, and he launched an assault on heroic virtue that prepared the way for the liberal critique of the Christian saint as well as that of the classical citizen-warrior.** As one perceptive observer put it well over a century ago, "that immoral philosophy" which one finds "displayed in the dark precepts of Machiavel" can also be discovered "lurking in the desultory sallies of Montaigne." There, too, it threatens "to destroy the sense of intrinsic distinctions in the quality of actions, and to convert the maxims of statecraft and dissembling polity into the rule of manners."84

Aristotle strongly emphasized the "intrinsic distinctions in the quality of actions." For this reason, he possessed ample warrant for omitting *philanthropía* from his list of virtues: as the etymologies of the terms *fellow feeling*, *sympathy*, and *compassion* imply, pity is always rooted in the potential for selfpity: as such, it is a passion foreign to the peripatetic's justly proud paragon of moral virtue – "the man of great soul (*megalópsuchos*)."85 **Machiavelli had been able to include pity and humanity on his revised list only because he denied virtue any splendor independent of its function as an instrument for the acquisition of "security and well-being."** In developing the implications of this revolutionary assertion, Montaigne echoed the Italian writer's attack on those who designed imaginary commonwealths; and in the process, he made two insinuations: that heroism and virtuous restraint, in both their Christian and classical forms, are diseases of the soul grounded in an absurd and unjustified pride; and that these putative virtues are largely responsible for man's inhumanity to himself and to others.86 To communicate his reasoning on this and related matters, **Montaigne invented a new genre of prose, which he called essays.** If the French thinker is not properly appreciated today, it is perhaps chiefly because he conveyed his opinions in those essays for the most part by indirection and a studied carelessness. Scholars born and bred in societies peculiar for their tolerance of dissent rarely pay sufficient attention to the rhetorical strategies customarily employed by freethinkers writing in epochs of religious persecution.

The essay entitled "Of Virtue" is a good illustration of Montaigne's modus operandi. There, **the French philosopher begins his discussion by stating the unorthodox opinion that – at least for ordinary men – "resolute steadfastness" is nothing more than "a species of passion," akin to rage, "that drives and agitates" the soul and "to some extent tears it out of itself."** Then, he devotes the bulk of what follows not a discussion of virtue per se, but to a series of anecdotes concerning the practice of suttee in India, the activities of the sect of Assassins in Syria, and the like. **In each case, courage and self-sacrifice turn out to be irrational and highly disagreeable passions rooted in what the men of the time would have recognized as religious fanaticism. In this connection, he makes no mention of Christianity.** But lest his readers miss the point, Montaigne appends a particularly revealing comment to one of the first stories he tells. The tale recounts the woes of a "young gentleman, amorous and spirited (*gaillard*)" who expended considerable effort in softening "the heart of a beautiful mistress" but then found that at the critical moment "he was himself soft and failing." As soon as he reached home, the young man reportedly "deprived himself" of the offending member and dispatched it to the young woman, "a victim, cruel and bleeding, for the purgation of his offense." Montaigne tacitly acknowledges that the anecdote is ridiculous, gruesome, and even offensive. That fact only sharpens its bite and makes his punch line all the more effective: **"If this had been done for reason and religion, as in the case of the priests of Cybele," he wonders, "what would we not say of an enterprise so exalted?"**87

In other essays, the French thinker pursues the same rhetorical strategy. Thus, **he dedicates the first third of the chapter entitled "Of Cruelty" not to an account of cruelty itself, but to a rambling discussion never quite stating but clearly indicating, nonetheless, that heroism and self-sacrifice require one to take a perverse and twisted pleasure in doing violence to oneself.** As he explains at the outset, there is a difference between "virtue" and that "natural mildness (*douceur*) and ease of disposition (*facilité*)" which we call "goodness" and which we would be right in attributing to God. **Virtue can hardly itself be divine: it "demands a road rough and thorny";** and for that reason, it depends on external or internal opposition and often "cannot do without the assistance of vice." Sometimes, in fact, virtue climbs "to so high a point that it not only has contempt for pain but positively enjoys it."

…

Despite appearances, Montaigne is not making an *ad hominem* assault on Cato's integrity. In another context, he speaks of the man as "furnishing every example of virtue." That is, in fact, the point. While ostensibly giving courage and self-sacrifice all due praise, he effectively uses the example of Cato to debunk them both; and at the same time, he discreetly intimates that the one quality really worthy of esteem is that "natural *douceur* and *facilité*" which makes a man like Montaigne himself unable to see an innocent animal pursued and killed without feeling "displeasure."89 **"In the end," he elsewhere observes, "no eminent and spirited (*gaillard*) virtue is without some unruly agitation."**90 **For at the heart of the longing "always to be the best (*ansteúein*) and to be superior to others" lies an uncontrolled anger or rage that somehow remains invisible to men.**91 One might even say that virtue is the disease of which it is said be the cure.

To dispel the charm attached to heroism, Montaigne draws attention to a singular and, in his estimation, highly questionable aspect of modern Europe's Hellenic inheritance. With the term *kalos* or perhaps *kalokagathía* in mind, he notes that "in Greek one and the same word embraces the beautiful (*bel*) and the good." As the essayist was aware, that fact was a reflection of the ethos of of honor which reigned within the ancient city and which had subsequently been adopted by the martial aristocracy that shared dominion within Christendom with the Church. In Montaigne's view, that ethos and the ethical teaching of the ancient philosophers and their modern admirers which sustained is rested on a grand illusion. **He hints at its character by falsely attributing to Aristotle the view that "the right to rule (*commander*) belongs to the beautiful (*beaux*)" and the opinion that, "when there is anyone present whose beauty approaches that of the images of the gods, veneration is similarly to his due."** The French writer makes this assertion in a chapter entitled "Of Physiognomy," and it is clear that he has physical beauty in mind. He deliberately substitutes a discussion of bodies for Aristotle's discussion of the soul in order to draw attention to the difficulty of discerning beauty of soul and to the inevitable tendency to substitute for invisible distinctions of this sort **visible distinctions grounded less often in nature than in artifice and convention.** In a closely related section of the same chapter, Montaigne noted just how easy "it is to speak like Aristotle and live like Caesar."92

One can avoid such confusion and self-delusion – but only by abandoning the Platonic supposition that the soul's longing for the beautiful and noble is an erotic divination of the good. **Montaigne insists on identifying the good with the useful. And of course that requires weighing virtue in the scale of security and well-being.**
…

The essayist holds himself up as a proper model for others precisely because of his own self-absorption: **he lacks that *gaillardise* or spiritedness which the Greeks called *thumos*; and therefore, in contrast to the pagan and Christian paragons of virtue, Montaigne is on principle extremely mild and easygoing in his treatment of himself.** He rejects magnanimity (*megalopsuchía*), and therefore he cannot be considered a man of great soul. Above all, he is free from pride. **He thinks of man as an animal fearful of pain and desirous of pleasure – and not as a being somehow akin to the divine and therefore called on to transcend mere humanity through a pursuit of all that is ennobling and fine. For this reason, the French philosopher is prepared to "strike down" man's "presumption" and "voluntarily abdicate that imaginary kingship over the other creatures which is accorded to us."**94

As a consequence of lowering his sights and and of emphasizing man's kinship with the beasts of the field, Montaigne can write, "I, who maneuver always close to the earth, hate that inhumane wisdom which would make us disdainful of and hostile to the cultivation of the body. **I deem it equal to injustice to set our heart against natural pleasures and to take them too much to heart.** Xerxes was a fool, who, surrounded by all human pleasures, went and offered a prize to anyone who would find him others. But hardly less of a fool is that man who cuts short those that nature has found for him. We should neither pursue them nor flee them, we should accept them."95 **Intimately connected with Montaigne's genial self-indulgence is his relaxed and sympathetic attitude toward the pleasures enjoyed and the pains suffered by other sentient beings.** This broad empathy arises from his "nature" and is confirmed by his "judgment." Both dictate that he "cruelly hate cruelty as the extreme of all vices." And so he cannot see "a chicken's neck wrung without displeasure," and he finds it "painful to hear the scream of a rabbit in the teeth" of his dogs.96 **He considers popular government to be "the most natural and equitable," but he is put off by the spectacle of the Athenians executing for reasons of religion the generals victorious at Arginusae. Indeed, "the inhuman injustice" of this democratic piety makes him "almost ready to vow a hatred irreconcilable against all popular rule."**97 In similar fashion, the essayist is equally appalled by the general ancient practice of torturing slaves suspected of crimes and by the Roman custom of putting on gladiatorial shows. The taste of his contemporaries for bearbaiting and similar entertainments causes him to wonder whether "nature herself" has attacked "to man some instinct for inhumanity."98 **Most important of all, Montaigne presents himself as believing in "a general duty of humanity, that attaches us not to the animals alone, who have life and feeling, but even to trees and plants.** We owe justice to men, and good will and kindness to the other creatures which are capable of accepting it."99

Montaigne's apologia is deliberately exaggerated for comic effect, but it was no less influential for that. **He often denies the importance of his book, but the care he took in composing and publishing it in its various editions belies his claim.** He hints that he intends to be a teacher of statesmen, and he clearly achieved his aim.100

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/288/mode/2up?view=theater

Epictetus, Horace, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, speak in Montaigne's *Essais* many dozens of times, in voices that are their own. Montaigne's Vergil is not the necromancer dear to the Middle Ages, but Homer's greatest descendant; his Ovid is not the compiler of allegories for nuns, but the imaginative poet of fascinating, often lascivious adventures.

This was attractive enough to the Enlightenment; what made it still more attractive was that Montaigne's view of life had undergone marked changes and that these changes, which reflect the teachings of ancient schools, deposited their traces in the *Essais*. It would be unjust to Montaigne to divide his development into rigid stages; even as a young man he was not a doctrinaire. But in his youth, when he dwelled with Roman resignation on the idea that to philosophize is to learn how to die, he echoed the Stoic philosophy of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. **Later – as a vigorous skeptic who coined the motto *Que scais-je?* – he sounded much like the Pyrrhonists and like Cicero in his most skeptical phase.** At last he grew to depend on himself and his experience alone, taking for his only master Socrates, who had taught the supreme virtue of self-knowledge. Montaigne's philosophical pilgrimage thus offered his readers a clear-eyed anthology of pagan thought and an impressive drama of self-liberation.
…

Montaigne never abjured Catholicism; he lived and died a Christian – by his lights. But many of his eighteenth-century readers found it easy to put his tepid religiosity into the service of their secular world view. They appropriated Montaigne's preoccupation with himself, his unashamed pleasure in sensuality, his refusal to repent of his worldliness, his contempt for fanaticism, his humane views on education, **and above all, his Pyrrhonist pronouncements derived so unmistakably from pagan authorities.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#link2HCH0025

Human understanding is marvellously enlightened by daily conversation with men, for we are, otherwise, compressed and heaped up in ourselves, and have our sight limited to the length of our own noses. **One asking Socrates of what country he was, he did not make answer, of Athens, but of the world;—[Cicero, Tusc. Quaes., v. 37; Plutarch, On Exile, c. 4.]—he whose imagination was fuller and wider, embraced the whole world for his country, and extended his society and friendship to all mankind; not as we do, who look no further than our feet.** When the vines of my village are nipped with the frost, my parish priest presently concludes, that the indignation of God has gone out against all the human race, and that the cannibals have already got the pip. Who is it that, seeing the havoc of these civil wars of ours, does not cry out, that the machine of the world is near dissolution, and that the day of judgment is at hand; without considering, that many worse things have been seen, and that in the meantime, people are very merry in a thousand other parts of the earth for all this? For my part, considering the licence and impunity that always attend such commotions, I wonder they are so moderate, and that there is no more mischief done. To him who feels the hailstones patter about his ears, the whole hemisphere appears to be in storm and tempest; like the ridiculous Savoyard, who said very gravely, that if that simple king of France could have managed his fortune as he should have done, he might in time have come to have been steward of the household to the duke his master: the fellow could not, in his shallow imagination, conceive that there could be anything greater than a Duke of Savoy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#chap12

Beasts sufficiently show us how much the agitation of our minds brings infirmities and diseases upon us. **That which is told us of those of Brazil, that they never die but of old age, is attributed to the serenity and tranquillity of the air they live in; but I rather attribute it to the serenity and tranquillity of their souls, free from all passion, thought, or employment, extended or unpleasing, a people that pass over their lives in a wonderful simplicity and ignorance, without letters, without law, without king, or any manner of religion.**

> https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/noble-savages-exposing-the-worldview-of-pornographers-and-their-war-against-christian-civilization
>
> **The early explorers of the Americas encountered cannibals everywhere and yet commonly rhapsodized about the glories of the pure and free primitive man.**2
>
> > 2. See J. H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New, 1492-1650* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 24ff., 42f. **The "classical doctrines of the Golden Age had created an awareness that the solitary forest-dweller could also represent man in a state of primaeval innocence, before he was corrupted by civil life"** (42).

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#link2HCH0030

I long had a man in my house that lived ten or twelve years in the New World, discovered in these latter days, and in that part of it where Villegaignon landed,—[At Brazil, in 1557.]—which he called Antarctic France. This discovery of so vast a country seems to be of very great consideration.
…

Now, to return to my subject, **I find that there is nothing barbarous and savage in this nation, by anything that I can gather, excepting, that every one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in his own country.** As, indeed, we have no other level of truth and reason than the example and idea of the opinions and customs of the place wherein we live: there is always the perfect religion, there the perfect government, there the most exact and accomplished usage of all things. **They are savages at the same rate that we say fruits are wild, which nature produces of herself and by her own ordinary progress;** whereas, in truth, we ought rather to call those wild whose natures we have changed by our artifice and diverted from the common order. In those, the genuine, most useful, and natural virtues and properties are vigorous and sprightly, which we have helped to degenerate in these, by accommodating them to the pleasure of our own corrupted palate. And yet for all this, our taste confesses a flavour and delicacy excellent even to emulation of the best of ours, in several fruits wherein those countries abound without art or culture. Neither is it reasonable that art should gain the pre-eminence of our great and powerful mother nature.
…

Our utmost endeavours cannot arrive at so much as to imitate the nest of the least of birds, its contexture, beauty, and convenience: not so much as the web of a poor spider.

All things, says Plato,—[Laws, 10.]—are produced either by nature, by fortune, or by art; the greatest and most beautiful by the one or the other of the former, the least and the most imperfect by the last.

These nations then seem to me to be so far barbarous, as having received but very little form and fashion from art and human invention, and consequently to be not much remote from their original simplicity. The laws of nature, however, govern them still, not as yet much vitiated with any mixture of ours: but ‘tis in such purity, that I am sometimes troubled we were not sooner acquainted with these people, and that they were not discovered in those better times, when there were men much more able to judge of them than we are. **I am sorry that Lycurgus and Plato had no knowledge of them; for to my apprehension, what we now see in those nations, does not only surpass all the pictures with which the poets have adorned the golden age, and all their inventions in feigning a happy state of man, but, moreover, the fancy and even the wish** and desire of philosophy itself; so native and so pure a simplicity, as we by experience see to be in them, could never enter into their imagination, nor could they ever believe that human society could have been maintained with so little artifice and human patchwork. I should tell Plato that it is a nation wherein there is no manner of traffic, no knowledge of letters, no science of numbers, no name of magistrate or political superiority; no use of service, riches or poverty, no contracts, **no successions, no dividends, no properties, no employments, but those of leisure, no respect of kindred, but common,** no clothing, no agriculture, no metal, no use of corn or wine; the very words that signify lying, treachery, dissimulation, avarice, envy, detraction, pardon, never heard of.
…

As to the rest, they live in a country very pleasant and temperate, so that, as my witnesses inform me, ‘tis rare to hear of a sick person, and they moreover assure me, that they never saw any of the natives, either paralytic, bleareyed, toothless, or crooked with age. The situation of their country is along the sea-shore, enclosed on the other side towards the land, with great and high mountains, having about a hundred leagues in breadth between. They have great store of fish and flesh, that have no resemblance to those of ours: which they eat without any other cookery, than plain boiling, roasting, and broiling. The first that rode a horse thither, though in several other voyages he had contracted an acquaintance and familiarity with them, put them into so terrible a fright, with his centaur appearance, that they killed him with their arrows before they could come to discover who he was. **Their buildings are very long, and of capacity to hold two or three hundred people,** made of the barks of tall trees, reared with one end upon the ground, and leaning to and supporting one another at the top, like some of our barns, of which the covering hangs down to the very ground, and serves for the side walls. They have wood so hard, that they cut with it, and make their swords of it, and their grills of it to broil their meat. Their beds are of cotton, hung swinging from the roof, like our seamen’s hammocks, every man his own, for the wives lie apart from their husbands. They rise with the sun, and so soon as they are up, eat for all day, for they have no more meals but that; they do not then drink, as Suidas reports of some other people of the East that never drank at their meals; but drink very often all day after, and sometimes to a rousing pitch. Their drink is made of a certain root, and is of the colour of our claret, and they never drink it but lukewarm. It will not keep above two or three days; it has a somewhat sharp, brisk taste, is nothing heady, but very comfortable to the stomach; laxative to strangers, but a very pleasant beverage to such as are accustomed to it. They make use, instead of bread, of a certain white compound, like coriander seeds; I have tasted of it; the taste is sweet and a little flat. The whole day is spent in dancing.

Their young men go a-hunting after wild beasts with bows and arrows; one part of their women are employed in preparing their drink the while, which is their chief employment. One of their old men, in the morning before they fall to eating, preaches to the whole family, walking from the one end of the house to the other, and several times repeating the same sentence, till he has finished the round, for their houses are at least a hundred yards long. Valour towards their enemies and love towards their wives, are the two heads of his discourse, never failing in the close, to put them in mind, that ‘tis their wives who provide them their drink warm and well seasoned. The fashion of their beds, ropes, swords, and of the wooden bracelets they tie about their wrists, when they go to fight, and of the great canes, bored hollow at one end, by the sound of which they keep the cadence of their dances, are to be seen in several places, and amongst others, at my house. They shave all over, and much more neatly than we, without other razor than one of wood or stone. **They believe in the immortality of the soul, and that those who have merited well of the gods are lodged in that part of heaven where the sun rises, and the accursed in the west.**

They have I know not what kind of priests and prophets, who very rarely present themselves to the people, having their abode in the mountains. At their arrival, there is a great feast, and solemn assembly of many villages: each house, as I have described, makes a village, and they are about a French league distant from one another. This prophet declaims to them in public, exhorting them to virtue and their duty: but all their ethics are comprised in these two articles, resolution in war, and affection to their wives. He also prophesies to them events to come, and the issues they are to expect from their enterprises, and prompts them to or diverts them from war: but let him look to’t; for if he fail in his divination, and anything happen otherwise than he has foretold, he is cut into a thousand pieces, if he be caught, and condemned for a false prophet: for that reason, if any of them has been mistaken, he is no more heard of.

Divination is a gift of God, and therefore to abuse it, ought to be a punishable imposture. Amongst the Scythians, where their diviners failed in the promised effect, they were laid, bound hand and foot, upon carts loaded with firs and bavins, and drawn by oxen, on which they were burned to death.—[Herodotus, iv. 69.]—Such as only meddle with things subject to the conduct of human capacity, are excusable in doing the best they can: **but those other fellows that come to delude us with assurances of an extraordinary faculty, beyond our understanding, ought they not to be punished, when they do not make good the effect of their promise, and for the temerity of their imposture?**
…

After having a long time treated their prisoners very well, and given them all the regales they can think of, he to whom the prisoner belongs, invites a great assembly of his friends. They being come, he ties a rope to one of the arms of the prisoner, of which, at a distance, out of his reach, he holds the one end himself, and gives to the friend he loves best the other arm to hold after the same manner; which being done, they two, in the presence of all the assembly, despatch him with their swords. After that, they roast him, eat him amongst them, and send some chops to their absent friends.
…

I conceive there is more barbarity in eating a man alive, than when he is dead; in tearing a body limb from limb by racks and torments, that is yet in perfect sense; in roasting it by degrees; in causing it to be bitten and worried by dogs and swine (as we have not only read, but lately seen, not amongst inveterate and mortal enemies, but among neighbours and fellow-citizens, and, which is worse, under colour of piety and religion), **than to roast and eat him after he is dead.**

Chrysippus and Zeno, the two heads of the Stoic sect, were of opinion that there was no hurt in making use of our dead carcasses, in what way soever for our necessity, and in feeding upon them too;—[Diogenes Laertius, vii. 188.]—as our own ancestors, who being besieged by Caesar in the city Alesia, resolved to sustain the famine of the siege with the bodies of their old men, women, and other persons who were incapable of bearing arms.

> “Vascones, ut fama est, alimentis talibus usi
> Produxere animas.”
>
> [“‘Tis said the Gascons with such meats appeased their hunger.”—Juvenal, Sat., xv. 93.]

And the physicians make no bones of employing it to all sorts of use, either to apply it outwardly; or to give it inwardly for the health of the patient. But there never was any opinion so irregular, as to excuse treachery, disloyalty, tyranny, and cruelty, which are our familiar vices. **We may then call these people barbarous, in respect to the rules of reason: but not in respect to ourselves, who in all sorts of barbarity exceed them. Their wars are throughout noble and generous, and carry as much excuse and fair pretence, as that human malady is capable of; having with them no other foundation than the sole jealousy of valour. Their disputes are not for the conquest of new lands, for these they already possess are so fruitful by nature, as to supply them without labour or concern, with all things necessary, in such abundance that they have no need to**

enlarge their borders. And they are, moreover, happy in this, that they only covet so much as their natural necessities require: all beyond that is superfluous to them: men of the same age call one another generally brothers, those who are younger, children; and the old men are fathers to all. These leave to their heirs in common the full possession of goods, without any manner of division, or other title than what nature bestows upon her creatures, in bringing them into the world. If their neighbours pass over the mountains to assault them, and obtain a victory, all the victors gain by it is glory only, and the advantage of having proved themselves the better in valour and virtue: for they never meddle with the goods of the conquered, but presently return into their own country, where they have no want of anything necessary, nor of this greatest of all goods, to know happily how to enjoy their condition and to be content. And those in turn do the same; they demand of their prisoners no other ransom, than acknowledgment that they are overcome: but there is not one found in an age, who will not rather choose to die than make such a confession, or either by word or look recede from the entire grandeur of an invincible courage. **There is not a man amongst them who had not rather be killed and eaten, than so much as to open his mouth to entreat he may not.** They use them with all liberality and freedom, to the end their lives may be so much the dearer to them; but frequently entertain them with menaces of their approaching death, of the torments they are to suffer, of the preparations making in order to it, of the mangling their limbs, and of the feast that is to be made, where their carcass is to be the only dish. All which they do, to no other end, but only to extort some gentle or submissive word from them, or to frighten them so as to make them run away, to obtain this advantage that they were terrified, and that their constancy was shaken; and indeed, if rightly taken, it is in this point only that a true victory consists:

> “Victoria nulla est,
> Quam quae confessor animo quoque subjugat hostes.”
>
> [**“No victory is complete, which the conquered do not admit to be so.”**—Claudius, De Sexto Consulatu Honorii, v. 248.]

…

But to return to my story: these prisoners are so far from discovering the least weakness, for all the terrors that can be represented to them, that, on the contrary, during the two or three months they are kept, they always appear with a cheerful countenance; importune their masters to make haste to bring them to the test, defy, rail at them, and reproach them with cowardice, and the number of battles they have lost against those of their country. **I have a song made by one of these prisoners, wherein he bids them “come all, and dine upon him, and welcome, for they shall withal eat their own fathers and grandfathers, whose flesh has served to feed and nourish him. These muscles,” says he, “this flesh and these veins, are your own: poor silly souls as you are, you little think that the substance of your ancestors’ limbs is here yet; notice what you eat, and you will find in it the taste of your own flesh:”** in which song there is to be observed an invention that nothing relishes of the barbarian. Those that paint these people dying after this manner, represent the prisoner spitting in the faces of his executioners and making wry mouths at them. And ‘tis most certain, that to the very last gasp, they never cease to brave and defy them both in word and gesture. **In plain truth, these men are very savage in comparison of us; of necessity, they must either be absolutely so or else we are savages;** for there is a vast difference betwixt their manners and ours.

The men there have several wives, and so much the greater number, by how much they have the greater reputation for valour. And it is one very remarkable feature in their marriages, that the same jealousy our wives have to hinder and divert us from the friendship and familiarity of other women, those employ to promote their husbands’ desires, and to procure them many spouses; for being above all things solicitous of their husbands’ honour, ‘tis their chiefest care to seek out, and to bring in the most companions they can, forasmuch as it is a testimony of the husband’s virtue. **Most of our ladies will cry out, that ‘tis monstrous; whereas in truth it is not so, but a truly matrimonial virtue, and of the highest form.** In the Bible, Sarah, with Leah and Rachel, the two wives of Jacob, gave the most beautiful of their handmaids to their husbands; Livia preferred the passions of Augustus to her own interest; —[Suetonius, Life of Augustus, c. 71.]—and the wife of King Deiotarus, Stratonice, did not only give up a fair young maid that served her to her husband’s embraces, but moreover carefully brought up the children he had by her, and assisted them in the succession to their father’s crown.
…

Three of these people, **not foreseeing how dear their knowledge of the corruptions of this part of the world will one day cost their happiness and repose, and that the effect of this commerce will be their ruin, as I presuppose it is in a very fair way (miserable men to suffer themselves to be deluded with desire of novelty and to have left the serenity of their own heaven to come so far to gaze at ours!),** were at Rouen at the time that the late King Charles IX. was there. The king himself talked to them a good while, and they were made to see our fashions, our pomp, and the form of a great city. After which, some one asked their opinion, and would know of them, what of all the things they had seen, they found most to be admired? **To which they made answer, three things, of which I have forgotten the third, and am troubled at it, but two I yet remember. They said, that in the**

first place they thought it very strange that so many tall men, wearing beards, strong, and well armed, who were about the king (‘tis like they meant the Swiss of the guard), should submit to obey a child, and that they did not rather choose out one amongst themselves to command. Secondly (they have a way of speaking in their language to call men the half of one another), that they had observed that there were amongst us men full and crammed with all manner of commodities, whilst, in the meantime, their halves were begging at their doors, lean and half-starved with hunger and poverty; and they thought it strange that these necessitous halves were able to suffer so great an inequality and injustice, and that they did not take the others by the throats, or set fire to their houses. I talked to one of them a great while together, but I had so ill an interpreter, and one who was so perplexed by his own ignorance to apprehend my meaning, that I could get nothing out of him of any moment: **Asking him what advantage he reaped from the superiority he had amongst his own people (for he was a captain, and our mariners called him king), he told me, to march at the head of them to war.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_savage#Origin_of_term

> In France the stock figure that in English is called the "noble savage" **has always been simply "le bon sauvage", "the good wild man", a term without any of the anti-paradoxical frisson of the English one. Montaigne is generally credited for being at the origin of this myth in his *Essays* (1580), especially "Of Coaches" and "Of Cannibals".**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#Footnote_3_52

> [3] I dare not speak of those happy nations, who did not even know the name of many vices, which we find it difficult to suppress; **the savages of America, whose simple and natural mode of government Montaigne preferred, without hesitation, not only to the laws of Plato, but to the most perfect visions of government philosophy can ever suggest.** He cites many examples, striking for those who are capable of appreciating them. But, what of all that, says he, they can’t run to a pair of breeches!

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q&f=false

The impact of the Montaigne’s Pyrrhonism occurred both directly, through the influence of the *Essais*, which were very widely read and reprinted in the years immediately after their initial publication,63 **and also through the more didactic presentations of Montaigne’s disciples Father Pierre Charron and Jean-Pierre Camus, bishop of Bellay.**

Pierre Charron is a neglected figure in the development of modern philosophy, neglected because neither his thought nor his style rose to the heights of that of his mentor, Montaigne, and because of his reputation for libertinism. **But in his day, and in the half century after his death, Charron had an influence at least as great as his master’s in furthering the break with tradition and in forming the ideology of both the *libertinage érudit* and the French Counter-Reformation.** Because he was a professional theologian, Charron was able to connect the skepticism of Montaigne more systematically with the main antirational currents in Christian thought, **thereby providing a more thoroughgoing Christian Pyrrhonism by uniting the doubts of Pyrrho with the negative theology of the mystics.** Also, since Charron was a learned doctor, he could present the case for the new Pyrrhonism in a way in which it could be studied by those trained in the Schools, rather than in the more rambling and, for its day, more esoteric method of the French Socrates.
…

In 1589, for better or worse, after his failure to gain admittance to a cloister, the most important event of Charron’s life occurred, his meeting with Michel de Montaigne.64 During the remaining three years of Montaigne’s life, Charron studied and conversed with him, adopting the sceptical insights of the French Socrates as his own. Montaigne found in the preacher an ideal intellectual heir and left him a large worldly and spiritual legacy, as well as adopting him as his son. **(While Montaigne was alive, the sole gift that we know he gave to Charron was a heretical work, the catechism of the extremely liberal Reformer, Ochino.)**
…

The underlying theory of this Catholicism that is based only on complete scepticism is made much more explicit in Charron’s philosophical writing, *La Sagesse*, and his defense of it, *le Petit Traicté de la Sagesse*. The major theme here is that man is unable to discover any truth except by revelation, and in view of this, our moral life, except when guided by Divine Light, should be based on following nature. **This treatise of Charron’s is little more than Montaigne’s “Apologie” in organized form. In so ordering it, Charron presented what was one of the first philosophical writings in a modern language.**
…

Maryanne C. Horowitz has challenged my interpretation of Charron's view of the source of wisdom.88 **She has insisted that a careful textual analysis shows that Charron was a Neo-Stoic. I think we would agree that Charron was very eclectic.** He borrowed in large measure from Montaigne, but also from Du Vair and other classical and contemporary Stoics. Many of the writers of this period, as the late Julien Eymard D'Angers89 pointed out, used Stoic ideas and materials. Nonetheless, what was taken as the message and meaning of Charron was the Christian Pyrrhonism. (The evidence of why he changed certain passages does not indicate that he was trying to alter his views but that he was trying to get his book approved.)90

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03633b.htm

He studied law at Bourges, but after several years' practice he embraced the ecclesiastical state. For thirty years he preached with so much success that the bishops vied with one another to engage his services. Queen Margaret of Navarre entertained him as her preacher in ordinary, and King Henry delighted to hear him even before his conversion to the Catholic Faith.
...

The sceptic spirit which pervades the whole book allows it to be summed up in a very few words: **by his own natural light and strength man is incapable of finding principles of religion and morality sufficiently certain; and, being sure of nothing, it is consequently wise to live as conveniently and pleasurably as the common usage of the people among whom one lives allows. No attempt is made anywhere in the body of the book to conceal the baldness of this doctrine.**

Had Charron, **instead of engraving his easy-going "Je ne sçay" as the essence of all his worldly wisdom on the title-page of his "Sagesse" and over the entrance of his house,** taken, like Descartes, the time and the trouble of finding a solid basis of moral and religious certainty, he would have shown himself a deeper and more independent philosopher and a worthier moralist. As it is, we need not wonder that the second edition of the "Sagesse" encountered great opposition and was allowed to appear only after some passages had been softened down, and others explained or corrected. **Nor is the fierce onslaught of Garasse, who called Charron "*athée et le patriarche des esprits forts*", surprising, especially when, even in our days, nearly the same charge is made and ably supported by Ad. Franck in the "Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques".**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Charron,_Pierre

CHARRON, PIERRE (1541-1603), French philosopher, born in Paris, **was one of the twenty-five children of a bookseller. After studying law he practised at Paris as an advocate, but, having met with no great success, entered the church, and soon gained the highest popularity as a preacher,** rising to the dignity of canon, and being appointed preacher in ordinary to Marguerite, wife of Henry IV. of Navarre.
...

With regard to the nature of the soul he merely quotes opinions. **The belief in its immortality, he says, is the most universal of beliefs, but the most feebly supported by reason.** As to man's power of attaining truth his scepticism is decided; and he plainly declares that none of our faculties enable us to distinguish truth from error. **In comparing man with the lower animals, Charron insists that there are no breaks in nature.** The latter have reason; nay, they have virtue; and, though inferior in some respects, in others they are superior. **The estimate formed of man is not, indeed, flattering.** His most essential qualities are vanity, weakness, inconstancy, presumption. Upon this view of human nature and the human lot Charron founds his moral system. Equally sceptical with Montaigne, and decidedly more cynical, he is distinguished by a deeper and sterner tone. Man comes into the world to endure; let him endure then, and that in silence. **Our compassion should be like that of God, who succours the suffering without sharing in their pain. Avoid vulgar errors; cherish universal sympathy.** Let no passion or attachment become too powerful for restraint. Follow the customs and laws which surround you. Morality has no connexion with religion. Reason is the ultimate criterion.

Special interest attaches to Charron's treatment of religion. He insists on the diversities in religions; he dwells also on what would indicate a common origin. All grow from small beginnings and increase by a sort of popular contagion; all teach that God is to be appeased by prayers, presents, vows, but especially, and most irrationally, by human suffering. Each is said by its devotees to have been given by inspiration. In fact, however, a man is a Christian, Jew, or Mahommedan, before he knows he is a man. **One religion is built upon another. But while he openly declares religion to be "strange to common sense," the practical result at which Charron arrives is that one is not to sit in judgment on his faith, but to be "simple and obedient," and to allow himself to be led by public authority.** This is one rule of wisdom with regard to religion; and another equally important is to avoid superstition, which he boldly defines as the belief that God is like a hard judge who, eager to find fault, narrowly examines our slightest act, that He is revengeful and hard to appease, and that therefore He must be flattered and importuned, and won over by pain and sacrifice. True piety, which is the first of duties, is, on the other hand, the knowledge of God and of one's self, the latter knowledge being

necessary to the former. It is the abasing of man, the exalting of God,—the belief that what He sends is all good, and that all the bad is from ourselves. It leads to spiritual worship; for external ceremony is merely for our advantage, not for His glory. **Charron is thus the founder of modern secularism. His political views are neither original nor independent. He pours much hackneyed scorn on the common herd, declares the sovereign to be the source of law, and asserts that popular freedom is dangerous.**

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/82/mode/2up?view=theater

> It follows that all religions will benefit by getting rid of their non-functional [theoretical] accretions.23

This is a degenerate form of the earlier fideism, **only unlike Charron and Gassendi who were more rigorous thinkers than Schiller even if not necessarily more religious,** Schiller does not appeal to the irrational but authoritative faith of a church, but to growing religious indifference.24

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

In his book, Charron is ostentatiously conservative in the Averroist fashion, insisting that a wise man will conform outwardly, in both word and deed, to the expectations of the society in which he lives,106 **but it is striking that he nowhere endorses, as Averroës does,**107 **Aristotle's claim that man is a political animal and his contention that politics is needed as a supplement to ethics for the promotion of moral virtue.**
…

Moreover, in the clearest possible language, as near as possible to the center of his chief work's central book, Charron openly challenges the Averroist contention that religion – and, in particular, belief in an afterlife where virtue is rewarded and vice punished – is in any way supportive of moral virtue. There, after pointing to the use of religious fear for the purpose of political manipulation, he laments that "execrable crimes" that "the zeal for religion has produced," **and there, without mentioning his source, he quotes two notorious lines illustrating Lucretius' denunciation of religion as an inspiration for monstrous deeds. "Beware," he writes, "of one who is an honest man out of scruple and because of a religious bridle, and esteem him hardly at all."** Beware of "the man who has religion without honesty (*preud'homie*)." Charron is not willing to say that the latter is "more wicked … than one who has neither" religion nor honesty. **But he does regard him as "much more dangerous."** Such a man, he explains, "having no taste, no image, or conception of *preud'homie* except with regard to religion and in its service, and thinking that being a good man is nothing other than taking care to advance and promote his own religion, believes that everything – whether it be treason, perfidy, sedition, rebellion, or any other offense, whatever it might be – is not only lawful and permitted, excused (*colorée*) by zeal and a care for religion." He also believes that such conduct is "praiseworthy, meritorious, and grounds for canonization, if it serves the progress and advancement of religion and the overthrow of its adversaries."109

If Charron broke with the Averroist consensus, if he followed Machiavelli in abandoning the cause of moral virtue and in applying to Christianity Lucretius' savage critique of all religion, he evidently had his reasons. In contrast with Pomponazzi, but like Montaigne, he had witnessed the wars of religion, those in his native France.110 He was no doubt well-informed concerning those that had preceded them in Germany, and he had the sense to recognize that there might well be more such wars to come. **In his book, he said no more than that which Montaigne had intimated,**111 **and fairly often he said what he said using Montaigne's own words.**112 **He was merely voicing what every *politique* took for granted.** But actually saying such things out loud – "in a terse fashion, distinctly, clearly, with an air of certitude" – nonetheless mattered, for the publication of Charron's book appears to have marked a sea change in European thought.

That its influence was profound there can hardly be doubt. In the period stretching from 1601 to 1634, the book was reprinted in one form or another some twenty-four times.113 It first appeared in English in 1608, and it was reprinted in 1612, 1615, 1620, 1630, and 1640. There is reason to believe that *Of Wisdom* was no less important than *De rerum natura* in helping Sarpi to make the transition from an Averroism deeply indebted to Pomponazzi to an outright hostility to religion itself,114 and we know that Elie Deodati and is friends in the *Tétrade* were devotees of Charron.115 **The odds are good, given the work's publication history, that today we see no more than the tip of of what was then a very large iceberg. Though now forgotten, *De la sagesse* was read by virtually all educated men throughout much of Europe.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paolo_Sarpi#Views

Sarpi read and was influenced by the skepticism of Michel de Montaigne and his disciple Pierre Charron.[45] As a historian and thinker in the realist tradition of Tacitus, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini, he stressed that patriotism as national pride or honour could play a central role in social control.[46] **At various times during his lifetime he was suspected of a lack of orthodoxy in religion: he appeared before the Inquisition around 1575, in 1594, and in 1607.**[47]

Sarpi hoped for toleration of Protestant worship in Venice and the establishment of a Venetian free church by which the decrees of the Council of Trent would have been rejected. Sarpi discusses his intimate beliefs and motives in his correspondence with Christoph von Dohna, envoy to Venice for Christian I, Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg.[48] **Sarpi told Dohna that he greatly disliked saying Mass and celebrated it as seldom as possible, but that he was compelled to do so, as he would otherwise seem to admit the validity of the papal prohibition.** Sarpi's maxim was that "God does not regard externals so long as the mind and heart are right before Him."[49] Another maxim Sarpi formulated to Dohna was *Le falsità non dico mai mai, ma la verità non a ognuno* ("I never, never tell falsehoods, but the truth I do not tell to everyone.").[*citation needed*]

Sarpi at the end of his life wrote to Daniel Heinsius that he favoured the side of the Calvinist Contra-Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort.[50][51] Yet although Sarpi corresponded with James I of England and admired the English *Book of Common Prayer*, Catholic theologian Le Courayer in the 18th century wrote that Sarpi was no Protestant, terming him *"Catholique en gros et quelque fois Protestant en détail"* ("Catholic in general and sometimes Protestant in detail"). In the twentieth century, William James Bouwsma found Sarpi to have been a philo-Protestant whose religious ideas were nevertheless "consistent with Catholic orthodoxy,"[52] and Eric Cochrane described him as deeply religious in the typical spirit of the Counter-Reformation.[53] **Corrado Vivanti saw Sarpi as a religious reformer who aspired toward an ecumenical church,**[54] **and historian Diarmaid MacCulloch describes Sarpi as having moved away from dogmatic Christianity.**[55] **On the other hand, in 1983 David Wootton made a case for Sarpi as a scientific materialist and thus as likely a "veiled" atheist who was "hostile to Christianity itself" and whose politics looked forward to a secular society unrealizable in his own time,**[56] a thesis that has won some acceptance.[57] Jaska Kainulainen, on the other hand, asserts that the thesis that Sarpi was an atheist contradicts the historical record, **observing that neither Sarpi's pronounced skepticism nor his pessimistic view of capabilities are incompatible with religious faith:**

> Sarpi's writings do not support the claim that he was an atheist. In fact, from an atheistic point of view, systematic skepticism can be seen as providing support of religious belief, because atheists' position postulates certain knowledge of God's inexistence. ... In his case the fundamental question was not the existence of God, but whether knowledge of God was obtainable by reason or by faith. **His response was unequivocal: he was convinced that knowledge of divine matters was attained sola fide and he explicitly claimed that in religious matters one could not make judgments based on reason, but instead, they had to be based on affection or feeling.**[58]

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

> Sarpi's book has an interesting history. **It was smuggled out of Venice in 1618 by the English ambassador in a series of discrete parcels. In London, with support from James I, Sir Francis Bacon, and the archbishop of Canterbury,** it was edited by Marc' Antonio de Dominis, the renegade Catholic archbishop of Split, published in the original Italian, and then translated into virtually every European language for circulation throughout Western Christendom. **The Anglicans who sponsored its publication and the Protestants on the continent who embraced it seem not to have recognized at the time that its acid analysis of what came to be called priestcraft could and would soon be turned against them.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA62#v=onepage&q&f=false

Another early disciple of Montaigne was Jean-Pierre Camus (1584-1654), **who became a doctor of law at eighteen,** a priest a few years later, and the bishop of Bellay at twenty-five. He became the secretary of St. François de Sales and spent much of his life writing pastoral novels and attacking the monastic orders. **His most philosophical work, *Essay Sceptique*, was written prior to his religious life when he was only nineteen.** Although he was later embarrassed by its light tone, it contained his basic fideistic point of view. Even though he later came to condemn Montaigne's style and literary form, he never gave up Montaigne's ideas, and even defended his mentor against the charge of atheism.96

The *Essay* was written when "I was then fresh from the shop of Sextus Empiricus."97 It is an attempt of a rather novel sort of bring about Pyrrhonian suspense of judgment in order to prepare one for the true faith. As Pierre Villey has pointed out, "The fear of Protestant rationalism is at the base of the scepticism of Camus."98 Hence, by undermining human rational pretensions, he advanced a fideistic defense of Catholicism.

The presentation of the case for scepticism by Camus is unique, though, as he was the first to admit, the content "had been only a pure abridgement of Sextus Empiricus," and the style is an imitation of Montaigne's.99 Rather than rambling through the various themes of Pyrrhonian philosophy, as Montaigne did, or welding them into a battery of arguments, primarily against Aristotelianism, as Charron did, **Camus created a vast structure of Hegelian thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The thesis is Academic scepticism – nothing can be known; the antithesis is dogmatism – something can be known; and the synthesis – "sceptical indifference," the Pyrrhonian suspense of judgment.**

…

For it was Montaigne, Charron, and Sextus who undermined the assurances of the philosophers, who served as the inspiration and source for the skeptics, and about whom the battles against the sceptical menace took place. **Even Bayle, always on the lookout for sceptical heroes, remembered Camus for his sallies against the monks rather than for his presentation of Pyrrhonism in the form of the Dialectic.**106

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Cardinal du Perron, perhaps the greatest of the French Counter-Reformers,61 **and himself a convert to Catholicism, spent practically no time in his controversial writings presenting evidence for his cause but devoted himself primarily to pointing out the inadequacy of the Calvinist theory of religious knowledge.** The cardinal, however, was a friend of Montaigne's adopted daughter, Marie de Gournay, and a great admirer of the fideistic writings of Montaigne's adopted son, Pierre Charron.62 A story about du Perron indicates his evaluation of the merits of human reason in theological matters. He was once invited to dinner by Henri III and, at the table, presented a discourse against atheism, offering proofs of the existence of God. When the king expressed his pleasure at this and praised du Perron, he answered, **"Sire, today I have proved by strong and evident reasons that there is a God. Tomorrow, if it pleases Your Majesty to grant me another audience, I will show you and prove by as strong and evident reasons that there is no God at all." The King, apparently not a fideistic Christian, became angry and threw his guest out.**63
…

Apparently, even to Montaigne's surprise, the Vatican expressed only the mildest disapproval of the views in the *Essais* and invited him to devote himself to writing in defense of the Church.66 Most of the disciples of Montaigne in the early seventeenth century received protection and encouragement from Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin.67 The bishop of Boulogne, Claude Dormy, was a great admirer of Charron and helped him to obtain an approbation for *La Sagesse*. The bishop was so fideistically inclined that he disapproved of Charron's few efforts at moderating his Christian Pyrrhonism in the face of opposition from Sorbonne.68 The king's Confessor, the Jesuit Nicolas Caussin, printed a précis of the core of Charron's fideistic scepticism in his *La Cour Sainte*.69 **Cardinal Bérulle in his critique of rational knowledge offered a view strikingly like that of Charron.**70 In the 1620s, when Charron had been accused of being a "secret atheist,"71 he was defended first by Father Ogier72 and then by the great Jansenist theologian Saint-Cyran (Jean Duvergier du Hauranne). **The latter, who said that Cardinal du Perron had recommended Charron's theology to him, insisted that it was, by and large, just good Augustinianism and that Charron's Christian Pyrrhonism was in accord with the best in religious thought as well as Scripture.**73

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT61#v=onepage&q&f=false

Earlier [in 1685], Charles Cotton published an English translation of Montaigne and dedicated it to George Savile, the marquis of Halifax. In a letter accepting the dedication, which would later serve as a preface to the 1693 edition of Cotton's translation, **this great practitioner of Machiavellian prudence, who had already once helped save England from civil war at the time of the Exclusion Crisis and who would do so again in 1688,** commended Montaigne in language remarkably similar to that employed by Locke.
…

His essays were, the English statesman remarked, "the *Book* in the World I am the best entertain'd with."102

Halifax's own publications deserve at least a passing glance, **for one can easily trace the influence and the political implications of Montaigne's depreciation of human pretensions in the spirited attack on absolute, divine-right monarchy which the Frenchman's most outspoken English admirer launched in his celebrated pamphlet *The Character of a Trimmer*.** When George Savile contemplated "the glittering outside of unbounded Authority," he found "nothing but poor and miserable deformitie within."
…

His point was simple. **Where Aristotle intimated, and the ancient Greeks generally believed, that man is only fully human when aiming to be a god, he contended, instead, that "by aiming to be more than a man, he becomes a Beast."** Mindful of Montaigne's dictum that it is easy to speak like Aristotle and yet live like Caesar, Halifax depicted the individual who sets himself up as God's viceroy in the most scathing of terms: "A mistaken Creature swelled with Panegyriques, and flattered out of his sences: and not only an incumbrance but a common nusance to mankind; A hardned and unrelenting Soule." "And like some creatures that grow fatt with pyosons," the English statesman continued, "**he grows great by other men's miseries; An ambitious Ape of the Divine greatnesse; An unruly Gyant, that would storm even Heaven it selfe, but that his scaling Ladders are not long enough:** In short a wild beast in rich trappings, and with all his pride, no more than a Whip in God Allmighty's hand, to be thrown into the fire when the world has been sufficiently scourged with it."103

The adoption of Montaigne's principles would have profound political consequences. **It would lead men like Halifax to express disdain for "the affected humility of the divines, and the mistaken Ideas of some heroick coxcombs." It would cause them to repudiate the "unnaturall vertue" exhibited by Brutus**

and other patriotic "Romans who killed their own sonnes, when they had offended." And ultimately it would induce them to reject "unlimited Government" on humanitarian grounds, confessing that "if it should be so, that it is not possible for a State to bee great and glorious, except the Subjects are wretchedly miserable, **I am not ashamed to own my low spirited frailtry in preferring such a modell of Government as may agree with the reasonable enjoyments of a free people,** before such a one by which Empire is to bee extended at such an unnaturall price."104

But before we trace in detail the import of Montaigne's thinking for the constitution of government, we must pause and retrace our steps, for John Locke and the marquis of Halifax were by no means the first men of great political stature to discern the Frenchman's importance and to find his writing irresistible, and they may not have been the most influential. **A short time after the appearance of Montaigne's magnum opus, no less a figure than Sir Francis Bacon paid their author the supreme compliment of imitation by publishing a collection of essays himself.**105
...

The English statesman initiates the first discussion [on friendship] by contesting Aristotle's suggestion that someone who "*delighted in solitude*" might be a god rather than a wild beast, and throughout the piece, he emphasizes the degree to which "those that want friends to open themselves unto are cannibals of their own hearts." **He ends the second with a blunt admission: "There is little friendship in the world, and least of all between equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferior, whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other."** The two discussions, though radically different in tone, are in fact intimately linked: **in denying to man the possibility of achieving a godlike capacity for serene and solitary contemplation, Bacon denies to man the capacity for *logos* that he must possess at least in some measure if he is to be capable of a friendship transcending utility** and the desperate craving men feel for a "discharge of the fullness and swellings of the heart."
...

We should not be surprised to find Sir Francis Bacon among the partisans of humanity. **In the universe described by Niccolò Machiavelli, where men who recognize their plight become "cannibals of their own hearts," pity stands in as a substitute for the friendship men need and can never possess.**115
...

As for goodness itself, in Bacon, it has little or nothing in common with the patriotism of the ancients, the contemplative virtues of the classical philosophers, and the otherworldly piety of their Christian successors. Goodness is a secular, cosmopolitan virtue; it properly belongs only to the man who is "a citizen of the world." Though it is the greatest of virtues, it demands only that its practitioner "be gracious and courteous to strangers," that "he be compassionate towards the afflictions of others," that "he easily pardons and remits offences," and that "he be thankful for small benefits." It does not require self-sacrifice, magnanimity, or greatness of soul, **and it does not demand that a man devote himself to the cultivation of human excellence; to the interest, honor, power, and glory of his country; or even to the saving of souls.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_Francis_Bacon,_Volume_1/Essays/Of_Goodness_and_Goodness_of_Nature
>
> Errors indeed, in this virtue, of goodness or charity, may be committed. The Italians have an ungracious proverb, "Tanto buon che val niente;" "So good, that he is good for nothing:" and one of the doctors of Italy, Nicholas Machiavel, had the confidence to put in writing almost in plain terms, "That the Christian faith had given up good men in prey to those that are tyrannical and unjust;" which he spake, because, indeed, there was never law or sect or opinion did so much magnify goodness as the Christian religion doth; therefore to avoid the scandal and the danger both, it is good to take knowledge of the errors of an habit so excellent.
> ...
>
> The parts and signs of goodness are many. **If a man be gracious and courteous to strangers, it shows he is a citizen of the world, and that his heart is no island cut off from other lands, but a continent that joins to them:** if he be compassionate towards the afflictions of others, it shows that his heart is like the noble tree that is wounded itself when it gives the balm: if he easily pardons and remits offences, it shows that his mind is planted above injuries, so that he cannot be shot: if he be thankful for small benefits, it shows that he weighs men's minds, and not their trash: but, above all, if he have St. Paul's perfection, that he would wish to be an anathema from Christ for the salvation of his brethren, it shows much of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ himself.

To bring home the radically novel character of the moral code he recommends, Bacon contrives to end his account of humanity on an apparently pious but, in fact, exceedingly blasphemous note. "But above all," he writes, if the man blessed with goodness "have St. Paul's perfection, that he would wish to be an *anathema* from Christ for the salvation of his brethren, it shews much of a divine nature, and a kind of conformity with Christ himself."118 **Though disguised, Bacon's point – once suspected – is clear. If men are to escape the tyranny and injustice to which traditional Christianity subjects them, they will have to abandon the central tenets of the Christian faith and seek their salvation on earth and not hereafter.**119 **Like the Machiavelli who admitted to loving his "native city" more than his "soul" and who managed to compose *The Prince* and the *Discourses* without ever even mentioning the latter word,**120 **Sir Francis Bacon was the very figure of what his compatriots had just recently learned to call "the politic atheist."**121

...

To see what he has in mind by vulgar belief, one need only turn to the essay immediately following – a piece which could be published in England but which was too shocking to be included in the Italian edition.

In it, Bacon recants and acknowledges that godlessness has a certain charm. In particular, it is far preferable to superstition. **Precisely because it deprives men of the means for exalting themselves above human frailty, disbelief renders them fearful of death and peaceable in general.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_Francis_Bacon,_Volume_1/Essays/Of_Atheism
>
> They that deny a God destroy man's nobility; for certainly man is of kin to the beast by his body; and, if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity, and the raising of human nature; for take an example of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, who to him is instead of a God, or "melior natura;" which courage is manifestly such that creature, without that confidence of a better nature than his own, could never attain. **So man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith, which human nature in itself could not obtain;** therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty.
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_Francis_Bacon,_Volume_1/Essays/Of_Superstition
>
> **Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation:** all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the minds of men: **therefore atheism did never perturb states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further, and we see the times inclined to atheism (as the time of Augustus Cæsar) were civil times: but superstition hath been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new "primum mobile," that ravisheth all the spheres of government.**

...

Indeed, in the modern dispensation, the Englishman tells us, “natural philosophy proposes to itself, as its noblest work of all, nothing less than the restitution and renovation (*instauratio*) of things corruptible, and (what is indeed the same thing in a lower degree) the conservation of bodies in the state in which they are, and the retardation of dissolution and putrefaction.”126 **This exaltation of medical science is precisely what the principles of humanity require if they are properly defined as “the affecting of the weal of men.” <u>It would be hard to imagine a populist rhetoric better suited to weaning the multitude from superstition</u> and to enlisting it among the supporters of philosophy’s emancipation from clerical tutelage.**127

...

To “*the vulgar sort*” who are, like Machiavelli’s “many,” anxious lest they “lose what they have acquired” already, he promises “the conservation of bodies.” **To “*generous spirits*” made “worthy to be princes” by the lust “to dominate” and “have more,” he proffers an enticement exceeding even the Florentine’s wildest dreams.** He offers not just the conquest of political fortune through manly *virtù* but the subjection of nature as a whole.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA215#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> When the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation it inspired rendered the situation of freethinkers within the Christian West increasingly precarious, **Europeans of philosophical temper began to reconsider the alliance of convenience forged with Julian’s Galilaeans so many years before, and a considerable number answered Machiavelli’s clarion call for the establishment of “new modes and orders” and flocked to the banner of revolt that he had unfurled.** Of these, the ablest then began pondering just how someone – perhaps graced “with more *virtù*, more eloquence and judgment” than the Florentine – might “be able to satisfy” the great man’s “intention”, **and in time they devised a strategy for resolving the “ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry” once and for all by recasting the former <u>and equipping it with a new species of populist rhetoric so powerful as to virtually eliminate the multitude’s need for poetry in the traditional sense.</u>**48

---

https://www.exclassics.com/anatomy/anat158.htm

A milder sort of these atheistical spirits there are that profess religion, but *timide et hæsitanter*, tempted thereunto out of that horrible consideration of diversity of religions, which are and have been in the world (which argument Campanella, *Atheismi Triumphati, cap. 9.* both urgeth and answers), besides the covetousness, imposture, and knavery of priests, *quæ faciunt* (as Postellus observes) *ut rebus sacris minus faciant fidem*; and those religions some of them so fantastical, exorbitant, so violently maintained with equal constancy and assurance; whence they infer, that if there be so many religious sects, and denied by the rest, why may they not be all false? or why should this or that be preferred before the rest? **The sceptics urge this, and amongst others it is the conclusion of Sextus Empericus, *lib. 3. advers. Mathematicos*: after**

many philosophical arguments and reasons pro and con that there are gods, and again that there are no gods, he so concludes, *cum tot inter se pugnent, &c. Una tantum potest esse vera*, as Tully likewise disputes: Christians say, they alone worship the true God, pity all other sects, lament their case; and yet those old Greeks and Romans that worshipped the devil, as the Chinese now do, *aut deos topicos*, their own gods; as Julian the apostate, Cecilius in Minutius, Celsus and Porphyrius the philosopher object: and as Machiavel contends, were much more noble, generous, victorious, had a more flourishing commonwealth, better cities, better soldiers, better scholars, better wits.

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n31/mode/2up?view=theater

> Since under the Roman emperors free writers could not blame Caesar, they blamed Catiline, Caesar's luckless prefiguration, and they celebrated Brutus, Caesar's enemy. **After having indicated the principle, Machiavelli immediately turns to applying it by praising the pagan Roman religion,** the enemy of the Biblical religion: his praising the religion of the pagans while he was subject to the Christian Church is almost the exact counterpart of a Roman republican's praising the murderer of Caesar while being subject to the Roman emperors.36

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater

> Christianity was compelled to permit and even to encourage the study of pagan literature. **That study and the admiration for the pagan way of life which it aroused in a few minds could thus become the entering wedge for Machiavelli's criticism of Biblical religion.** His praise of ancient Rome is an essential element of his wholly new teaching, but it is also, and even chiefly, a mere engine of subversion or of what one might call his immanent criticism of the Biblical tradition. **Admiration for ancient Rome was the only publicly defensible base from which he could attack the Biblical religion.**

http://hosted.desales.edu/files/salesian/PDF/PocettoRabelais.pdf

And yet even in the 17th century, an admirer of Francis de Sales apparently saw a close relationship. He had portraits of Rabelais along with Erasmus and the saint in his study and referred to these men as his "*dieux tutelaires*."1 It might even surprise the saint himself to have his name mentioned in the same breath as Rabelais, especially in view of the opinion he had of him. In a letter to Celse-Bénigne, son of St. Jane de Chantal, as he was going off to court, **de Sales advises the young man not to read that "infamous Rabelais and certain other writers of our era who make a career out of doubting everything, of despising everything and making fun of the maxims of antiquity."**2

> 1. Guy Patin, *Lettres de Gui Patin*, éd. Reveillé-Parise, (Paris: J.H. Baillière, 1846), 3 vols. 2: 284. "**Je les [les trente-six de se collègues] traitai dans ma chambre, où pardessus la tapisserie se voyaient curieusement les tableaux d'Erasme ... Montaigne, Charron ... Il y avoit encore trois autres portraits d'excellents hommes, de feu M. de Sales, évêque de Genève, ... et enfin de François Rabelais. ... Que dites-vous de cette assemblage? Mes invités n'étaient ils en bonne compagnie?"**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false

St. Paul's 1 Corinthians, Tertullian's *credo quia absurdum*, and the views of the negative theologians are sung in unison with the "golden books" of Sextus Empiricus.18 The net effect is that of an insipid Montaigne. Unfortunately, **La Mothe Le Vayer was neither the personality that Montaigne had been nor the theoretician that Charron was.**
…

For La Mothe Le Vayer, unlike his contemporaries Descartes and Bacon, the value of the method of doubt lies in clearing away the sciences as well as scientific interest. What remains is the suspension of judgment on all matters, and the divine Revelation. **"O precious Epoche! O sure and agreeable mental retreat! O inestimable antidote against the presumption of knowledge of the Pedants!"**25
…

Beginning with Balzac and Arnauld in the seventeenth century, down to such contemporary critics as Pintard, Grenier, and Julien-Eymard d'Angers, there has been a rather uniform judgment that this so-called Christian sceptic was really a "concealed sceptic" who lacked the religious fervor of Pascal or the possible orthodox intent of Montaigne.35
…

Julien Eymard d'Angers, in his excellent essay **"Stoïcisme et 'Libertinage' dans l'oeuvre de François La Mothe Le Vayer"** has found *evidences* of his nonreligious intent in his style and his use of examples.37 Jean Grenier has gound *evidences* in the flavor of his writings.38 René Pintard has found *evidences* in his career, his associations, and so on.39
…

The religious authorities in the mid-seventeenth century, who were so worried about heretical views, never seemed to have challenged La Mothe Le Vayer or his friends, except for Isaac La Peyrère.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA180#v=onepage&q&f=false

The same tendencies noted in Charron appear also in La Mothe le Vayer,2 who moved in the free-thinking circles of his time. **He was a friend of Charron, familiar with Naudé,** a frequenter of both Gassendi and the irrepressible Guy Patin. Guez de Balzac seemed somewhat suspicious of his ideas, although in their correspondence he treats him with marked courtesy. He became the "protégé" of Mlle de Gournay, who remained his patroness until her death in 1645 and who bequeathed to him her library. **He was celebrated among his contemporaries for his erudition, so renowned, in fact, that he was considered for the position of tutor to Louis XIV and actually did become the preceptor of the Duke of Orléans.** Naudé and Bayle called him "Le Plutarque français," while Sorbière referred to him as "le Plutarque et le Sénèque de la cour, … un parfait modèle de vertu et d'érudition." Bayle remarked upon his erudition and his propensity for quoting others, and regretted that he did not push his own ideas with a greater independence. **Strangely enough, with this reputation for being another Plutarch, he seems to have utilized the works of his patronymic very infrequently, contrary to both Montaigne and Charron.**

Miss Wickelgren has explored the extent of his erudition in her thesis. Starting with his plan for assembling a small model library, she has examined his rather voluminous work with a view to collecting his references to these works. Among those which he seems to utilize the most are the Old Testament and Aristotle, **though he also quotes abundantly from Sextus Empiricus, Seneca, and Cicero. Those whom he recommends are Campanella, Giordano Bruno, Telesio, that is to say the Paduans, and Francis Bacon whose works, particularly the 1619 translation of the *Oeuvres morales* and the 1624 translation of the *Advancement of Learning*, were peculiarly attractive to him. This ability of La Mothe le Vayer to unite the Paduans, Montaigne and his sources, particularly Sextus and Seneca, and Francis Bacon is very interesting, indeed.** When coupled with Sorbière's translation of Hobbes, the extent of the English impact (at least *in potentia*) becomes apparent at a very early date. And when added to La Mothe's quotations from Pliny, from Averroes, Pomponazzi, and Cardano, not to mention the immense interest he took in voyage literature, the full range of this early seventeenth-century erudition and its importance in the evolution of ideas become very impressive.

Perhaps one example will bring out the significance of this remark. La Mothe wrote (Wickelgren, p. 51): "**L'athéisme (dit le Chancellier Bacon dans ses *Essais moraux*) laisse à l'homme le sens, la philosophie, la piété naturelle, les loix, la réputation, et tout ce qui peut servir de guide à la vertu; mais la superstition détruit toutes ces choses et s'érige une tyrannie absolue dans l'entendement des hommes."** In other words, atheism is less a menace than superstition, a point which Voltaire discussed and which became one of the most debated problems of the eighteenth century.

La Mothe's reputation was not restricted to the first half of the seventeenth century. His works were widespread throughout most of the century, so much so that one can subscribe without difficulty to Miss Wickelgren's estimate as to his estimate (p. 2): **"La pensée de La Mothe le Vayer forme en effet un lien entre les idées de la Renaissance et celles du XVIII siècle."**
…

This analysis of the situation certainly does not hold for La Mothe, since it was in 1630 that he published the first volumes of is *Dialogues*. In these articles he defined the nature of his skepticism, based upon Montaigne's concept of diversity of races, of tastes, of conditions, of morality, and of religions. **It is essentially an aristocratic attitude directed against the masses and especially against all forms of dogmatism and intolerance. La Mothe, like Montaigne in the *Apologie*, drew his controlling ideas from the *Hypotyposes* of Sextus Empiricus,** and insisted that the true skeptic is still seeking the truth. For him, as for his predecessor Montaigne, skepticism is a method of examination which compares and opposes objects of the senses to those of the intellect. **Its ultimate goal is to encourage indifference, or at least impassibility. Indeed, for La Mothe as well as for Montaigne, it was conceived as a means of merging stoicism with epicureanism.**

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0268117X.2000.10555468

[…] Le Vayer's interest in Scepticism has been considered only in its epistemological, rather than ethical, aspects.6 **Le Vayer is thus defined too narrowly as a Sceptic, and his Stoicism remains either unacknowledged or misunderstood – which is especially odd given that one contemporary characterized him as a Stoic,**7 **and his conduct invited contemporary comparisons with that of the ancient Sages.**8 Considered from any of these viewpoints, *De la vertu*

des payens baffles or invites dismissal, not least because Le Vayer uncharacteristically equipped it with an elaborate theological apparatus.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA211#v=onepage&q&f=false

A particularly curious example of this is provided by François La Mothe Le Vayer's treatise *On the Virtues of the Pagans*, first published in 1641-42. **Le Vayer is best known as an exponent of philosophical skepticism: in this treatise, however, he stands forth as a theological polemicist, professing to defend the consensus of Catholic theologians against the view that pagans are incapable of genuine virtue. Pretty obviously, his target is Jansenius.** But Le Vayer then shifts the discussion to the more thorny question of whether pagans can be saved, and whether, indeed, any we know of may have been saved. Though careful to maintain that no one can be saved without faith in Christ, he suggests that in general good pagans, who believe in one God, and live well according to the natural light of reason, might be credited by God with an "implicit" faith and saved through divine grace. But he then reviews a number of famous individuals to assess their chances of salvation. **Those he discusses are all philosophers (if we count Julian the Apostate as a philosopher-emperor), and all from Greek or Roman antiquity, apart from Confucius.**

Le Vayer's position is often extremely hard to pin down, because of his habit of arguing *in utramque partem*, and of qualifying the conclusions to which his argument seemed to be leading. His assessment of the Stoics is as balanced, or as equivocal, as that of most the schools or figures he discusses. His account of Zeno of Citium, and of the Stoics in general begins by stressing the proximity of Stoic and Christian ethics, and then proceeds to insist on their differences, as to the nature of God, for instance, or the immortality of the soul. **Commendation for the Stoic enthusiasm for virtue is undermined by criticism of their paradoxes (for instance, the equality of all virtues and vices, of all good actions and all wrong actions).** The portrait of the Stoic sage is likewise condemned, especially Seneca's claims of his equality or superiority to God (Jupiter) (Seneca, *Ep*. 73). So is the view of suicide as legitimate. Yet Le Vayer distinguishes between Stoic teaching, as contrary to Christian faith, and Stoic behavior, often morally admirable (136-7). In the chapter on Seneca, **he holds up to admiration the passage of *De ira* (3.36), where the philosopher describes his daily examination of conscience: what, he asks, could the best Christian do that is more agreeable to God** (La Mothe Le Vayer 1647: 256-7)? (He is, none the less, pessimistic about Seneca's chances of salvation.)

A refutation was immediately produced by Antoine Arnauld, Jansenius's most dogged disciple. *De la nécessité de la foi en Jésus-Christ pour être sauvé* (On the necessity for salvation of faith in Jesus Christ) was not, however, published until 1701, held back, no doubt, by caution. **Le Vayer had powerful protectors; most likely he was writing at the behest of Richelieu, who loathed Jansenius and his followers.** Arnauld is not primarily concerned to discuss individual philosophers: far more important, he clearly sees, is **the general claim that salvation might not require an explicit faith in Christ – for that way deism lies** (Arnauld 1775-81: 321-2).
…

The moral maxims of the pagans are only "lessons in pride," teaching them to depend only on themselves for their virtue and happiness (114). **Arnauld observes with alarm that many contemporary Christians seem to think that the morality of the Scriptures is valid only for the cloister, and that the morality of Seneca and his like is more suitable to a gentleman ("honnête homme")** (129). **It will be seen that here as elsewhere the attack on pagan virtue in general is essentially targeted at its Stoic version; Aristotle is not directly attacked, if only because, Christianized by Aquinas, his ethic had been so heavily incorporated into orthodoxy.**

https://www.academia.edu/35745755/The_Varieties_of_neostoic_Virtue_Erasmus_to_Diderot

The erudite members of the learned French humanist circle known as *la Tétrade* introduced into their vindication of Graeco-Roman ethics, and particularly into the Seneca trial, a supple interplay of partial objections and critical consensus. **Confessional customs, court hypocrisy and self-censure imposed *libertins érudits* – unbelievers, freethinkers and atheists – a devious literary technique of lip service and substantial irreverence.** François de La Mothe Le Vayer, academician and preceptor of the Dauphin, published in 1642 *La vertu des Payens*, a treatise devoted to a systematic survey and vindication of the moral thought of pagan sages. Le Vayer adapted to his purpose the old genealogy of the *prisca sapientia*, asking whether the initiates of the chain who lived before the Christian era deserved eternal salvation. **They had high probabilities of salvation – he suggested – considering their «implicit faith» in God and in the coming revelation.**

This sly suggestion was in fact an understatement of the salvific mission of Christ. But what about Seneca, the former preceptor, minister and later victim of Nero, who committed suicide just two years before the execution of Peter and Paul? The shrewd freethinker affirms that the theory of implicit faith is valid for the older philosophers, but does not hold true in the case of a contemporary of the Christians who was certainly aware of Nero's persecutions against them. The malevolent gossip of Seneca's contemporary accusers and the theological charges of «pride» are quietly rejected thanks to a critical re-reading of Tacitus and Suetonius. **Le**

Vayer prefers to quote and discuss the benevolent tradition of *laudationes* beginning in the patristic age, which was kept alive by the Renaissance humanists. He stresses certain similarities between the Gospels and the *Epistolae ad Lucilium*, even if he discards the apocryphal correspondence between Paul and Seneca, remarking that any real contact between the two men would have left more evident tokens somewhere in the *Corpus Senecanum*. However, the Roman philosopher's views on the *summum bonum* and the immortality of the soul, and his biting satire of the idolatrous cults, quoted by Augustine, show that he can be considered quite close to «Roman orthodoxy». In spite of these reasons, however, Seneca could not aspire to eternal salvation because of the decay of «implicit faith» in his times. **Here Le Vayer's lip service shows the real content of his sceptical method, which set the pros and cons of the various arguments against each other in order to cast doubt on all dogmatic assertions, and finally to show the paradoxical deadlocks of human reason.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA207#v=onepage&q&f=false

Gassendi displays many of the intellectual traits of Erasmus as well as of Pierre Bayle, his successor. Like these two, his erudition was extensive and broadly humanistic. His love of classical poetry was an avocation. He knew well both the historians and philosophers of antiquity – Plato, Seneca, Pliny, Cicero, Plutarch, and Aristotle – and was also familiar with the writers of the Renaissance – Luis Vives, Pico, Ramus, and, of course, Montaigne and Charron.
…

With characteristic vigor Gassendi pointed out contradictions in the Aristotelian text and opposed to this ancient philosopher and his abstract rationalism the more experimental rationalism of other ancient writers. It was a tactic which he was destined to continue, especially in his arguments with Descartes**. He forged for himself a universal pyrrhonism as protection against the persecution of his contemporaries. Of course, this stance was characteristic of the free-thinking of his time: Charron, Naudé, and La Mothe showed the same tendency derived, as we have seen, from Montaigne.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

Montaigne, Charron, Camus, Naudé, Patin, and La Mothe Le Vayer criticized science but usually understood by this either the Renaissance conception of the Scholastic scientist, the Aristotelian, or the motley group of Renaissance alchemists, astrologers, numerologists, pantheists, and so on. Some of the humanistic sceptics knew and admired personally such heroes of the scientific revolution as Galileo. **But their usual notice of what was to become the "new science" was to comment briefly on Copernicus or Paracelsus not as discoverers of new truths but as peculiar figures who denied accepted theories, thus suggesting that if even the most accepted scientific theories could be challenged, nothing in the sciences should be accepted as true.**

On the other hand, thinkers like Leonard Marandé, Pierre Gassendi, and Gassendi's disciple Samuel Sorbière had scientific interests, and were participants in the formation of "the new science."
…

Bayle, in his article on Pyrrho, credited Gassendi with having introduced Sextus Empiricus into modern thought, and thereby having **opened our eyes to the fact that "the qualities of bodies that strike our senses are only appearances."**58 This attack on the attempts to build up necessary and certain sciences of Nature from our sense experience is the starting point of Gassendi's thought.
…

The high point of Gassendi's Pyrrhonian attack occurs in the last chapter, entitled "That there is no science, and especially no Aristotelian science." Here, **the tropes of the ancient Pyrrhonists, of Sextus, Agrippa, Aenesidemus, and others were employed in order to show that our knowledge is always restricted to the appearances of things and can never deal with their real, hidden inner natures. We can tell how things seem to us but not how they are in themselves.** Thus, for example, we know from our experience that honey seems sweet. But we cannot discover if it is *really sweet*.67 The distinction Gassendi made between apparent qualities, how things seem or appear to us, and real qualities, what properties the object actually has, is one of the earliest clear formulations of the primary-secondary quality distinction in modern philosophy.68
…

Later he made perhaps his greatest contribution to modern science by developing the atomic theory of Epicurus as a hypothesis, or mechanical model, for relating appearances and predicting future phenomena.75 The positive side of Gassendi's thought led him to an attempt to mitigate his initial Pyrrhonism into a type of "constructive scepticism" and to develop a theory that would lie between complete scepticism and dogmatism.76 **This later view, fully developed in his *Syntagma*, as well as the theory of knowledge of his friend Mersenne, contitutes, perhaps, the formulation, for the first time, of what may be called the "scientific outlook."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA121#v=onepage&q&f=false

His magnum opus, the *Syntagma*, deals not at all with metaphysics but does treat at great length what his hero, Epicurus, called "canonics" – philosophy of logic and theory of knowledge. Here Gassendi examined the views he had originally espoused, those of the Pyrrhonists, and showed why he was abandoning their total doubt about the possibility of knowledge.
…

Thus, scientific explanation, which for Gassendi is in terms of an atomic theory, accounts for our experience of sense qualities but does not tell us anything about the nature of things-in-themselves, except how they appear in relation to us. This is the type of scientific object that Gassendi wished to protect from the doubts of the sceptics.
…

Having less comprehension of the nature of mathematics than did Mersenne, Gassendi was sceptical of the role that it could play in our understanding of nature and feared that the mathematical physicists were a new brand of metaphysicians, trying to portray the real nature of things in mathematical terms, like the Pythagoreans and Platonists of antiquity.57

But, whatever his limitations might have been, **Gassendi, perhaps even more than Mersenne, had accomplished one of the most important revolutions of modern times, the separation of science from metaphysics.** Building his new outlook on a complete Pyrrhonism with regard to any knowledge of reality, or the nature of things, he was able to develop a method and a system of the sciences that, of all those of the seventeenth century, comes closest to the modern antimetaphysical outlook of the positivists and the pragmatists. Rochot, in his many studies of Gassendi's atomism and his place in the history of scientific and philosophical thought, **shows him to be a most important link between Galileo and Newton, in moving from a conception of the "new science" as the true picture of nature to one wherein it is seen as a hypothetical system based solely on experience, and verified through experience, a conception in which science is never thought of as a way to truth about reality but only about appearance.**58

---

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater

HOW GRATEFUL WOULD YOU BE IF YOU CAME TO ME COMPLAINING of a headache and I chopped off your head? Certainly, I fixed the problem – and permanently so! – but at a rather higher cost than you'd hoped for.

René Descartes' *Discourse on Method* [1637] has had a similar effect on the Western mind. Descartes' little book has done damage to us precisely by seeming to do good, like a bull who kindly offers to straighten up the china shop. Descartes attacked skepticism, but only be denying reality. He confirmed the idea of the immaterial soul against the pronouncements of the crass materialists of the day, but only by recreating us as insubstantial ghosts trapped in clattering machines. **He proved God's existence, but only by making it dependent on our thinking Him into existence. By his good intentions – if indeed they really were good – he fathered every flavor of self-congratulatory solipsism,** led us to believe we are no different from robots, and made religion a creation of our own ego. Thanks a lot, René.
…

He offered a method as medicine, pretending with false modesty that he wasn't really saying that everyone should follows his method, but merely describing what method had worked for him.

This false modesty hid a gargantuan pride. Descartes desired nothing less than that everyone should follow his method, and his wish has been all too handsomely fulfilled. He is known – and rightfully and woefully so – as the father of modern philosophy. If you think that doesn't pertain to you, the great Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville said after his visit to America in the first half of the nineteenth century that **"America is … one of the countries where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and are best applied."**2
…

"I thought it necessary," he tells us in Part IV of the *Discourse*, "that I reject as absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, so as to see whether, after this process, anything in my set of beliefs remains that is entirely indubitable."
…

Even if such a method doesn't lead to insanity, it certainly leads to narcissism, the morbid condition of believing that I sit in god-like judgment of everything else but nothing stands in judgment of me. We suspect that Descartes' method clothes itself in the most abject humility as a way to exert the most naked pride. **It assumes the posture of a quivering ant to presume the imposture of a towering god.**
…

Indeed, there seems to be no underlying common human nature at all, for **“the very same man with his very own mind, having been brought up from infancy among the French or the Germans become different from what he would had he always lived among the Chinese or among cannibals”** (Part II).
…

Recall Descartes’ strange conclusion: **as he could imagine that he had no body and that there was no material world, therefore he “was a substance the whole essence or nature of which was merely to think, and which, in order to exist, needed no place and depended on no material thing.”**

A ghastly conclusion, or rather a ghostly one, for by it Descartes imagined that we were pure spirits trapped in alien bodies (or more accurately, as we soon find out, alien machines). **As Descartes reveals in Part V of the *Discourse on Method*, he is a raving mechanist who believed that all nature was nothing more than machinery.** Animals and plants are no more alive (or dead) than hydraulic pumps, toasters, or alarm clocks.
…

If Descartes is the father of modern dualism, what does dualism itself beget? **A walking philosophical bipolar disorder, a creature who is not at home in creation, a creature who dwells in dual extremes, either as wholly a ghost or entirely a robot.** One day he feels that he is a god, a purely spiritual being, capable of completely mastering and manipulating all nature (including his own body) as he would any machine, and the next day believes that he is a purely material being, a helpless machine entirely mastered by the mechanics of nature.

This brings us to Descartes’ final error, his absolutely awful proof of the existence of God (in Part IV). We recall that Descartes puts as the first principle of his philosophy “I think, therefore I am.” He then asserts that God must exist because he (Descartes, not God) can think of a being more perfect than himself. Therefore, he concludes, **“this idea was placed in me by a nature truly more perfect than I was … and … this nature was God.” To make matters worse, Descartes then claims that it must be the case that his ideas, “insofar as they are clear and distinct, cannot fail to be true” because they too come from God.** Therefore, God exists, because Descartes can imagine Him, and all Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are absolutely true, because God put them there!
…

His beastly reasoning had led us to reject God on the grounds that our thinking about Him is fuzzy, and to accept the most ridiculous utopian fantasies about humanity because we can imagine them quite clearly and distinctly.

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/43/mode/2up?view=theater

Not Bacon, as one often hears, but rather René Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and we will show clearly to what extent German philosophy derives from him.63

> 63. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), British philosopher, is considered the founder of modern scientific method. René Descartes (1596-1650), French philosopher, is known for his starting point of methodical doubt and his foundation of knowledge in self-consciousness (see below). **Heine follows Hegel in granting priority to Descartes.**

René Descartes is a Frenchman, and here, too, great France deserves fame for its initiative. But this great France, this noisy, turbulent, chattering land of the French never provided suitable soil for philosophy; perhaps philosophy will never flourish there. René Descartes felt this and went to Holland, a quiet, silent land of *trekschuiten*64 and the Dutch. There he wrote his philosophical works. **Only there was he able to free his spirit from the traditional formalism and to build up an entire philosophy out of pure thoughts, taken neither from faith nor empirical fact, as has been demanded of every true philosophy since that time.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA144#v=onepage&q&f=false

When and how Descartes came into contact with sceptical views is hard to tell. But he seems to have been well aware not only of the Pyrrhonian classics but also of the sceptical current of his time, and its ever-increasing danger to the cause of both science and religion. **He wrote in his answer to Father Bourdin: “Neither must we think that the sect of the sceptics is long extinct. It flourishes to-day as much as ever, and nearly all who think that they have some ability beyond that of the rest of mankind, finding nothing that satisfies them in the common Philosophy, and seeing no other truth, take refuge in Scepticism.”**7
…

As Pascal and Hume saw, the highest point in sceptical doubt had been reached.34 Once it had been suggested that the reliability of our most rational faculties was questionable, man had been transformed from a repository of truth into a sink of uncertainty and error.35 In his comments on the *malin genié*, in *The Conversations with Burman*, Descartes is reported to have noted that here he made

of man a great doubter and threw him into every possible objection, every possible reason for doubting.36 **Only when scepticism had been carried to this extreme, to engender a *crise pyrrhonienne* greater than that ever dreamed of by the *nouveaux pyrrhoniens*, could one overcome the force of scepticism.** Unless one were willing to pursue the possibility of raising doubts to the end, one could never hope to discover any truth untainted by doubt or uncertainty.
…

Descartes eliminates the possibility that the deity possesses demonic features by stressing the character of *our* idea of God. If the idea of God cannot include demonic elements, then what is clear and distinct about the idea must be true about the object, God himself. **"I recognize it to be impossible that He should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God."**56 Descartes did not consider the possibility that it may be the demon, rather than God, who has supplied him with his idea of God, and who has compelled him to come to antidemonic conclusions about the moral nature of the deity. But, with this conception of God, based on the clear and distinct idea of him, **Descartes was now ready to march on triumphantly to his promised land, the new world of dogmatism where knowledge of truth and reality could be completely assured, since "I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God … to the knowledge of the other objects of the universe."**57
…

The demon having been exorcised from heaven and earth, there then remained no question about the truths of mathematics. Once the criterion of clear and distinct ideas had been founded on God's guaranteed honesty, the initial doubts, the initial Pyrrhonism, vanished, for one could now tell what was true, what constituted evidence, and so forth. From here on, all is relatively safe and easy. Mathematical truths are clear and distinct. We are compelled to believe them, and in this compulsion we are secure since God is no deceiver. The relationship of these truths of Nature can also be discovered by our trust in God. We can be sure that there is a physical world to which the truths about pure extension apply, since God would not make us think so unless there was in fact such a world beyond the reach of our ideas.58

The atheist is not able to have this security about the objective truth of his clear and distinct ideas, because he does not have a God to guarantee what he thinks he knows.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Descartes links his critique of heroism and religious zeal intimately with his new science. **His tacit repudiation of the commonsense distinction between the noble love of God, the honorable longing for glory, and the base lust for money, wine, and sexual relief demands particular attention,** for the grounds for his break with the ancients and for his reorientation of philosophy in general come quickly to light when one considers the foundations he laid for the new morality. As the French philosopher puts it in the very first sentence of his treatise *The Passions of the Soul*, **"There is nothing in which it better appears just how defective are the sciences that we have from the ancients than in what which they have written concerning the passions."**150

Plato, Aristotle, and their successors never tried to explain away everyday, commonsense moral perceptions; in this sphere, as in all others, they took it as their task "to save the appearances (*tà phainómena*)" of popular opinion by showing that ordinary moral perceptions point beyond themselves to a more comprehensive and intelligible account of human experience.151 Accordingly, they attempted to make sense of the common opinion concerning the noble and the base desires: they pointed to the universal experience of internal conflict and explicated that experience on the supposition that each part of the soul must somehow have its own peculiar form of *érôs*.152

Like Bacon, Descartes rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian notion that "true philosophy" can somehow "be coaxed from the preconceptions of the intellect." **The apostle of universal doubt had little or no respect for everyday opinions,**153 **and he dismissed the notion of the divided soul entirely.**154

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Stoics
>
> **If, however, in the science of nature the Stoics can lay claim to no striking originality, the case is different when we come to the science of man.** In the rational creatures—man and the gods—Pneuma is manifested in a high degree of purity and intensity as an emanation from the world-soul, itself an emanation from the primary substance of purest ether—a spark of the celestial fire, or, more accurately, fiery breath, which is a mean between fire and air, characterized by vital warmth more than by dryness. The physical basis of Stoic psychology deserves the closest attention.
> …

> What God is for the world that the soul is for man. **The Cosmos must be conceived as a single whole, its variety being referred to varying stages of condensation in Pneuma. So, too, the human soul must possess absolute simplicity, its varying functions being conditioned by the degrees or species of its tension. It follows that of "parts" of the soul, as previous thinkers imagined, there can be no question; all that can consistently be maintained is that from the centre of the body—the heart—seven distinct air-currents are discharged to various organs, which are so many modes of the one soul's activity.**[1]
> …
>
> With this psychology is intimately connected the Stoic theory of knowledge. **From the unity of soul it follows that all psychical processes—sensation, assent, impulse—proceed from reason, the ruling part;** that is to say, there is no strife or division: the one rational soul alone has sensations, assents to judgments, is impelled towards objects of desire just as much as it thinks or reasons. **Not that all these powers at once reach full maturity. The soul at first is void of content; in the embryo it has not developed beyond the nutritive principle of a plant (φύσις): at birth the "ruling part" is a blank tablet, although ready prepared to receive writing. This excludes all possibility of innate ideas or any faculty akin to intuitive reason. The source of all our knowledge is experience and discursive thought, which manipulates the materials of sense. Our ideas are copied from stored up sensations. No other theory was possible upon the foundation of the Stoic physics.**
>
> Note the parallel between the macrocosm and the microcosm. **The soul of the world fills and penetrates it: in like manner the human soul pervades and breathes through all the body, informing and guiding it, stamping the man with his essential character of rational.** There is in both alike a ruling part, though this is situate in the human heart at the centre—not in the brain, as the analogy of the celestial ether would suggest.

…

Not surprisingly, then, Cartesian psychology subordinates the soul to the body so completely **that one may be justified in suspecting the French philosopher of doubting whether the soul has any desires properly its own.**158 **He makes it clear that, if any such desires do exist, they are weak and of little or no importance:** for at the end of his treatise, he specifies that the pleasures shared by the soul and the body "depend entirely on the passions: so that those men whom the passions can move the most are capable of tasting the greatest sweetness in this life." In fact, **"wisdom is chiefly useful" in teaching men to be "masters of their passions and to regulate (*menager*) them with such address that the evils they cause are quite bearable and one can even draw pleasure from them all."**159

> https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/156/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> You will, I say, be ashamed of that picture which Cleanthes was in the habit of drawing with such accuracy in his description. He used to desire those who came to him as his pupils, to think of Pleasure painted in a picture, clad in beautiful robes, with royal ornaments, and sitting on a throne. **He represented all the Virtues around her, as her handmaidens, doing nothing else, and thinking nothing else their duty, but to minister to Pleasure,** and only just to whisper in her ear (if, indeed, that could be made intelligible in a picture) a warning to be on her guard to do nothing imprudent, nothing to offend the minds of men, nothing from which any pain could ensue. **We, indeed, they would say, we Virtues are only born to act as your slaves; we have no other business.**

Effectively stripped of every form of *érôs* peculiar to itself, the soul reappears as the servant of the body: the *res cogitans* is capable of calculating how best to provide for the body's needs; it can sometimes revolve the conflicts arising from contradictory passions by concentrating attention on one discrete object of desire to the virtual exclusion of all others; and over the long run, it can achieve a species of command over the passions through a process of habituation – but it is not capable of initiating motion on its own.

…

When the soul is reduced to a *res cogitans*, virtue can no longer be understood as a mean,161 **and Descartes therefore replaces magnanimity (*megalopsuchía*) with the quality he calls *générosité*. The latter cannot be "the crowning ornament and ordering principle (*kosmos*) of the virtues" because a soul undivided can possess no principle of order.** *Générosité* is, as its etymology is intended to suggest, an inborn quality, an ingenerate strength of soul, a congenial species of courage rooted in the dispositions of the body. It is an uncontrollable, overpowering lust for mastery; and because it cannot itself be checked, it is the master passion that serves as "the key to all the other virtues" and as "a general remedy against all the disorders of the passions."162 **In fact, *générosité* sums up all the virtues; or, rather, to be more precise, it supplants virtue altogether.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n93/mode/2up?view=theater

This mind, which is always thinking, has no brothers. Cartesianism presents, in a remarkable degree, that rigid isolation into which any consistent rationalism shuts the human being. It is out of the heroic void and

autonomous solitude of pure thought that Descartes formulates his terrible *cogito ergo sum*. Man, as he conceives him, stands alone in the wide world with his *cogito*, his noble power of thinking, ordering, and clarifying, which builds up the whole Cosmos for him: God, man, and nature; world-risings and world-settings; sociologies, astronomies, physics; atoms, vortices, planets; states, passions, virtues. **Yet at bottom (although it will not admit it and is perhaps unaware of it) this *Monas Cartesius*, which thinks and thinks and thinks, is alone real. Sense-perceptions are not true, but only the thought of these perceptions. Similarly in geometry what is real (or at any rate what is essential) is not the actual curve, but the general formula of it that reason discovers.** Sensual conceptions have less reality because they are "unclear." And what guarantee have we that the whole world of the senses is not a dream? "When I consider the matter carefully, I find not a single characteristic which would serve definitely to distinguish the waking conditions from a dream. So similar are the two that I am completely at a loss to know whether I myself am dreaming at this moment." Here Descartes unmasks himself suddenly as a true Baroque philosopher, by degrading the world of the senses to a reality of the second order, conceiving of it—even though only in hypothesis—as a dream, and in any case showing the profoundest distrust of the whole. He show's himself a child of the Baroque, too, **in combining with his fundamental scepticism and extreme revolutionary rationalism an unconditional recognition of actuality so far as its property of power is concerned.** In his human capacity he was, as has been pointed out, strictly conservative, almost reactionary, and in his heart an anti-reformer. For the Reformation was individualistic, democratic, "progressive," libertarian in *practice*—and to this Descartes was ever opposed. **Bossuet said of him that his prudence before the Church went to extremes, and he himself recommends his readers to observe under all circumstances the laws and customs of the country in which they live, hold fast to the religion in which they were bred,** obey the most moderate and widely accepted rules in society, and avoid altogether the discussion of ethical matters, since it is the business of those invested with power, and those only, to set up moral standards for others. He was an aristocrat and a Catholic, and never in any connexion a "protestant," but in spite of this (or more probably because of this) **he created a philosophy more unprejudiced than anything that any bourgeois or reformer of his country ever achieved.** In its there breathes the air of a mind so free that it despises freedom itself.

> https://archive.org/details/leviathaninstate0000schm/page/90/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> With a *humanitas* that is still philosophical in the classical sense, Descartes recognized all existing orders based in religion and tradition, in church and state.
> …
>
> **But the tolerant conservatism of Descartes should not deceive us; precisely because this philosopher understood the human body to be a mechanism, all things human, in their very core, had already been changed in a revolutionary manner.** This change signaled the coming technical-industrial revolution.

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

What Descartes cautiously implied, the radicals of the eighteenth century proclaimed boldly and clearly: that every form of belief and practice that was not founded on a rational basis, such as religious or non-rational or subjective thought or feeling, is so much gratuitous deviation from the one, eternal, timeless truth.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/380/mode/2up?view=theater

What [Bekker] denied was the near universal conviction that Satan, demons, or any spirits can, through spells, possession, bewitchment, or any magical device, alter the normal workings of nature's laws and influence men's lives. **Sticking rigidly to Descartes' dichotomy of 'thought' and 'extension,' he claims their being distinct substances precludes all interaction between the two, so that evil spirits, the essence of which is 'thought,' can no more influence bodies than bodies can spirits.**34 Contact between disembodied spirits and humans is completely impossible. Nor, he asserts, can there be any contradiction between the truths of philosophy and theology, so that if reason proves bodies and souls distinct, Scripture likewise confirms souls have a separate existence from bodies.35 **'Rather than question the accuracy or authority of Descartes,'** remarked the church historian Johann Laurenz Mosheim (1694-1755), **Bekker 'thought fit to squeeze the narrations and doctrines of Scripture into a conformity with the principles and definitions of this philosopher.'**36

Almighty God, holds Bekker, is the only supernatural power capable of changing nature's course and affecting men. God has this power, being neither 'thought' nor 'extension,' nor a single substance combining thought and extension 'as Spinoza raves.'37 Rather God supersedes any substance. Besides God, only good angels act on men since they are tools of the divine will. Even so, nothing about angels is ascertained through reason, while Scripture reveals so little it is otiose to speculate about their number and capabilities. Much of Book II is dedicated to demonstrating that commonly supposed examples in Scripture of Satan influencing men are really nothing of the kind. **Here Bekker stretches Cocceius' exegetical methodology to the limit,** or, as the *Acta Eruditorum* preferred, 'perverts the plain meaning of Scripture in innumerable places with great audacity,' **claiming that apparent interventions of the Devil in the Bible are just poetic, allegorical references to evil inclinations in men.**38
…

Applying his Cartesian dualism of bodies and spirits as separate substances which cannot interact, he rules out all possibility of bewitchment or pacts with the Devil – and therefore witchcraft, spells, exorcism, and magic of any type.42
…

Strive as they might, held Koelman, Cartesians and those who embrace mechanistic philosophy could disown neither Bekker nor Spinoza. Spinoza, he argued, drew his fundamental principles from Descartes, 'especially the doubting of everything in order to find truth,' the notion of the certainty and infallibility of mathematical reason, the technique of interpreting Scripture as a reflection of the imaginings and prejudices of men, **the 'dogma' of the movement of the earth round the sun,** and finally the 'demonstrating of everything with philosophical reasoning.'104 From Cartesian ingredients Spinoza had concocted his 'philosophical religion' which was now poised, with Bekker's support, to challenge all established religion, tradition, and authority.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/692/mode/2up?view=theater

However, this group, while plainly rooted in Fontenelle, Bayle, Boulainvilliers, and a highly critical reading of Malebranche, **contains no direct borrowing from Spinoza, does not invoke Spinoza, and makes no explicit use of the doctrine of one substance.** Hence the texts are not strictly Spinozistic in the same sense as the first main category. Yet it must be admitted this closely allied group**, the second main category of early Enlightenment radical *clandestina*,** encapsulates almost the same corpus of doctrine as the first, this very high degree of intellectual convergence deriving above all from the ubiquitous influence of Fontenelle, Boulainvilliers, Du Marsais, Fréret, and Lévesque de Burigny. **Lévesque's *De l'Examen* has been described as 'hyper-cartésien'** and one might indeed wish to categorize the whole of this latter group as 'radical Cartesian' rather than specifically Spinozist, though such terminology, while differentiating the second from the first main category, and stressing its primarily French provenance, tends to mislead by overstating by implication at least the influence of the scorned Malebranche, **as well as a Descartes himself lambasted by Du Marsais, for example, for proposing to believe only what he could see himself while wilfully but unwarrantably shutting his eyes in metaphysics, theology, and religion.**44
…

A similar procedure is followed in *l'Ame matérielle*, likewise a product of the 1720s, a collage in which Descartes' dichotomy of substances, separating mind and body, is ridiculed **and Locke invoked for the sole purpose of helping to undermine the age-old orthodoxy, or 'superstition' as it is termed here, 'que la matière ne peut sentir.'**47

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/476/mode/2up?view=theater

Yet of the three rival versions of moderate, mainstream, Early Enlightenment – Neo-Cartesianism, Newtonianism (reinforced with Locke), and Leibnizian-Wolffianism, that which in 1700 appeared most formidable, and enjoyed the widest support amongst Europe's ruling élites, Cartesianism, rapidly proved the most precarious intellectually and was the first to collapse under the strain of escalating philosophical and scientific strife. **Many of Europe's acutest minds discarded Cartesianism during the opening years of the new century.** Vico came out publicly against Cartesianism, disparaging Descartes' use of
the *cogito*, in a public oration before the viceroy of Naples in 1708,2 and later expanded his critique in a published version, **granting Cartesian philosophy had dramatically changed our picture of the world but stressing even more the dangers of teaching men to think in exclusively mechanistic terms, disregarding the whole edifice of received thought and education.**3

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/290/mode/2up?view=theater

His *Essais*, Diderot wrote, contain literally hundreds of quotable passages as beautiful as they are irreligious; and his memorable device – *Que scais-je?* – had given the Pyrrhonists their battle cry.5 Significantly, Diderot, who knew and loved his Montaigne better than most of the other philosophes – who indeed knew and loved him well enough – enlisted Montaigne himself among the followers of Pyrrho and placed him directly before Bayle: "But," he wrote, "skepticism had no doughtier athlete, either among the ancients or the moderns, than Bayle."6
…

But for the philosophes, the line from Montaigne's to Bayle's skepticism was straight and unobstructed; they read his opacity and evasiveness, not as signs of inner combat, not as possible clues to a kind of wry fideism, but as tactical devices designed to spread a maximum

of subversive information with a minimum of risk. He was, they said, beyond question or quibble, a trustworthy bridge to a much neglected branch of antique speculation; he was the wittiest, the most reliable, teacher of Pyrrhonist skepticism, **so sensible that he did not practice what he preached: he knew too much, Diderot said, echoing Bayle himself, either to believe or to doubt everything. If there was one work in the large canon of his writings that all the Enlightenment appropriated, it was the article on Pyrrho in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique*:** Pyrrho, Bayle there told his readers, had taught that all things are at bottom mysterious.
…

When Holbach called Bayle that celebrated man "who teaches so well how to doubt,"7 he was uttering a firmly established platitude that testifies to the pervasiveness of Bayle's influence and to the single-minded uses to which his complex work was put.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n119/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Voltaire said of Bayle, very aptly, **that not a line of his contained an attack on Christianity, but that there was not one that did not lead to doubt;** so that, although not himself an unbeliever, he made unbelievers of others.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/72/mode/2up?view=theater

For Bayle, unlike Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Newton, and Leibniz, but like Spinoza, philosophical reason *more geometrico* is the only criterion of what is true.26 In him, as in Spinoza, natural reason produces 'adequate ideas,' that is, ideas which correspond to reality, solely by means of mathematical rationality under which text criticism was subsumed, Bayle too grounding his concept of rational argument on mathematical proportion and exactitude. Holding it undeniable that the whole must be bigger than its parts and that if from equal entities 'on ôte choses égales, les résidus en seront égaux,'27 Bayle sought to exploit to the full reason's scope as an instrument for assessing evidence and determining truth.28
…

Consequently, held Bayle, orthodox theologians (whatever they say), Socinians, and true philosophers ***au fond* all concede that philosophy, not theology, is the true 'queen' – only, no one except Spinoza was willing or able to say so publicly.**
…

Since there is no way to prove revelations and miracles authentic or inauthentic**, nothing prevents one man's 'vérités révélées' being rejected by the next as the most ridiculous 'superstition.'**33 **Characteristically, Bayle leaves this irresolvable dilemma wholly intact, indeed shows no interest in resolving what he takes every care to highlight.**
…

During the long years of their increasingly bitter struggle, **Le Clerc always took particular exception to the article in Bayle's *Dictionnaire* on 'Manichaeism' and the, in his eyes, unmistakable implication it carries that God, if he exists, is manifestly not a God of goodness and justice.**43
…

Who could doubt that Bayle was as averse to 'superstition' as were the *rationaux*? But, this granted, did it not prove, if proof were needed, that Bayle was not a genuine 'fideist'? **Indeed, in his philosophy the distinction between what is certain and what doubtful, far from being meaningless, or open to Pyrrhonist objections, is actually fundamental at every step and not just in history, mathematics, philosophy, and science but no less in morality, society, and politics. In fact it was exclusively matters of faith which Bayle subjected to his withering bogus Pyrrhonism.**
…

The Dutch and Swiss Arminians, English and Irish Latidudinarians, German Leibnizians, and the vying Huguenot intellectual factions were all acutely aware, through the Dutch French-language journals, that Bayle's stance called in question the entire edifice of 'rational religion,' **the parallel systems so painstakingly assembled in their different ways in England by Newton, Locke, and Clarke, in France by Descartes, Arnauld, and Malebranche, and in Germany by Thomasius and Leibniz, as also by the Huguenot *rationaux*.** For all these thinkers held theirs to be an increasingly 'enlightened' age, in which 'reason' set the agenda *and* ensured that religion, authority, and Christian morality were strengthened and confirmed, by the advances of philosophy and science. **In effect, Bayle's philosophy categorically blocked all prospect of a Christian Enlightenment.**
…

Little wonder that Barbeyrac, leading Natural Law theorist and in his mature years a passionate advocate of Locke and especially Locke's insistence on the compatibility of reason, Christianity, and the

basic principles of morality, judged that Bayle's real aim was to undermine respect for Scripture and religion, **and concluded that 'les derniers ouvrages de Mr. Bayle,' as he wrote to Le Clerc in April 1706, referring particularly to the *Continuation des Pensées diverses* and the *Réponse aux questions d'un provincial*, were even more dangerous than 'les livres de Hobbes, et de Spinosa.'**69

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_head_055
>
> It is that we equally avoid the two vicious extremes to which men have been drawn on this question: one is the false thinking of the philosophers and theologians, who have maintained that justice depends on an entirely free divine will whereby God could, were He so to wish, render the unjust just; the other is the opinion of those who, **conceiving justice to be independent of the will of God, and founding it purely in the nature of things, have also depicted virtue as independent of religion, and atheism as a doctrine that retains morality and natural law in all their force. Monsieur Bayle, as we know, in pleading for atheists, has made great efforts to show that "they can believe themselves obliged to conform to the ideas of reason as a rule of the moral good, as distinct from the useful"** (*Continuation des Pensées sur la Comète*, art. clii).

…

Despite the smokescreen of 'fideism' which, indeed, served no real function in Bayle's philosophy other than categorically to separate philosophy from theology and deflect criticism and outrage by concealing the true implications of his stance, being as Barbeyrac later described it just an 'expedient, dont la mauvaise foi est évidente,'77 **Bayle actually bases his thought, as Le Clerc clearly saw, on a radical Cartesian mathematico-historical rationalist foundation, a kind of *Malebranchisme* purged of all theological elements** – or, in other words, a type of crypto-Spinozism. Its aim and effect was to bar every route to a rational theology. Bayle, contended Le Clerc, had entered on a forlorn and lonely path from which there was no escape.

This catastrophe, held Le Clerc, arose from Bayle's outmoded adherence to the mechanistic axioms of Descartes, Fontenelle, and Malebranche and disastrous rejection of the epistemology of the English empiricists.78 Where Bayle, in Le Clerc's opinion, was secretly abetting Spinoza and leading many to perdition, Boyle, Locke, and Newton with their wise empiricism, deployed to defend a 'rational' Christianity and Christ's miracles, has shown the 'republic of letters' the true path to 'enlightenment.'

…

No one else, not even Locke, was a staple of so many libraries or had so wide a general influence, his writings being everywhere acknowledged to be a prime cause of the tide of scepticism, atheism, and materialism sweeping the west of the continent. The Huguenot Laurent Angliviel de la Beaumelle (1726-73), who spent many years in Denmark, reports that, by the late 1740s, Copenhagen and the Danish court had become a veritable Deistic haven. This, he says, was due to philosophy and there could be no doubt which philosopher had most effectively given expression to the insights, doubts, and questions driving this great cultural change: **the Danish 'déistes,' who are very numerous 'parmi les gens d'un certain rang,' he informed his brother in France in April 1748, were all steeped in Bayle, and forever seeking out his books and reading him,** one particular nobleman, the count of Rantzau to whom he was close, speaking incessantly about that philosopher every time he saw him.97

…

By the 1730s and the 1740s, meanwhile, the efforts to check Bayle's influence were helped by the fact that his astounding paradoxes and contorted method of argument were beginning to lose something of their appeal and their force. For as the peculiarly fraught ideological milieu of the 1680s, 1690s, and opening years of the new century which had shaped his philosophical style receded into the past, readers became less attuned and receptive both to his paradoxes and to the constant twists and circumlocutions of which he was the supreme master.

By the late 1740s, the process which eventually led to the eclipse of Bayle's once vast reputation, in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was already apparent. Much more effectively than Maupertuis, Voltaire powerfully intervened, using various lines of attack to deflate Bayle's standing, styling his *Dictionnaire* a mine of miscellaneous and curious information while pointedly always ignoring his philosophy as such.103

…

His strategy for combating Bayle, however, was quite different from that of the *rationaux*: **for he consistently denied Bayle was insidious or dangerous, preferring rather to recast him as a sceptic (like much of the late twentieth-century historiography).** While agreeing that his

'scepticism' sometimes unwittingly functioned as an engine for manufacturing *esprits forts*, producing so many objections to Christian dogmas that many were disturbed by him,105 **he completely rejected Jurieu's view of Bayle as an advocate 'd'idées plus dangereuses que celles de Spinosa.'**106
…

Voltaire was willing to agree that Bayle's life, like Spinoza's, was singularly virtuous;114 but he did not consider the sedentary life of philosophers who, like Bayle or Spinoza, spend their entire careers contemplating reality from their studies to have much broad significance for society, admiring much more the worldly cut and thrust of an active life like his own. **Ridiculing the fact that Des Maizeaux had gone to the trouble of writing a whole book about Bayle's life, he went so far as to suggest that even six pages would have been excessive!**
…

The paradox he suggested was that both these Dutch-based philosophers had enjoyed huge reputations but yet had had no meaningful impact on society. Why was this? **Because men are ruled, says Voltaire, principally by habit and custom 'et non par la métaphysique.' A personality who is eloquent, active, and received in high society can exert a much wider impact among men, he suggests, than a hundred philosophers of the stamp of Spinoza and Bayle 's'ils no sont que philosophes.'**117

Bayle, then, for Voltaire, was not in the least a hero or in any way comparable with Locke, Newton, or Clarke in importance. Rather, Voltaire continued Le Clerc's battle with Bayle, only now with new weapons and a new strategy, continually belittling his status as a thinker and portraying his 'scepticism' as pervasive, certainly, but also overrated and thoroughly tedious. **One of his favourite quips at Bayle's expense was that when it came to Cartesianism and especially Cartesian 'reason,' 'le sceptique Bayle,' he put it around 1752, and later repeated several times, 'n'est pas encore assez sceptique.'**118
…

But he saw that Bayle could be most effectively countered by continually disparaging his alleged long-windedness, inconsistency, and tiresome 'scepticism,' rather than trying to answer his arguments.
…

Introduced to Bayle's *oeuvre* around 1736, whilst still crown prince, by his Huguenot secretary and adviser on books Charles Étienne Jordan (1700-45), Frederick had, early on, been impressed by his writing. **Jordan had adopted Bayle as his own 'maître spirituel,' imbibing a healthy respect for his powerfully subversive tendency, and passed something of this on to Frederick. Reading Bayle had for Frederick, as for so many others, been a decisive step in his own personal intellectual development and especially his growing disenchantment with the philosophy of Wolff.**128

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/290/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The German *Aufklärer*, far less exposed to irreverent writings than the literary men of other countries, experienced his relentless scholarship and ruthless criticisms as a devastating solvent: it was through Bayle that the young Lessing freed himself from the strict Protestantism of his childhood,** while the adolescent Wieland, as I have said before, broke loose from his Pietist upbringing after he managed to get hold of Bayle's *Dictionnaire*. As early as 1729, the *Bibliothèque germanique* had warned that "the works of M. Bayle have unsettled a large number of readers and have cast doubt on some of the most widely accepted principles of morality and religion."8

Consequently, he long continued to regard him as one of the main authors of the Enlightenment: **in 1776, writing to Voltaire of his admiration for those who had inspired the profound 'revolution' brought about by the Enlightenment, the king noted that it was to 'Bayle, votre précurseur,' no less than to Voltaire himself, that the glory is due 'de cette revolution qui se fait dans les esprits.'**129 Voltaire could hardly contradict this royal judgement, but he could encourage the idea that Bayle was his precursor in engineering this great 'revolution' of the age, while gradually whittling down the king's admiration for Bayle, **work in which he was seconded by d'Alembert who disliked the Huguenot's historical, anti-mathematical bias.**130

Thus, Le Clerc's conception of Bayle as a philosopher who seeks, as he put it in 1727, **to 'renverser la religion chrétienne, en feignant de la défendre' [to overturn the Christian religion while feigning to defend it], general in the first third of the eighteenth century,** eventually came to be overshadowed by Voltaire's rigorously pruned and sanitized Bayle.131 Bayle the crypto-*Spinosiste* came to be replaced by Bayle the fideist and sceptic. **By the late eighteenth century, only a few clergy and academics, as well as *philosophes* and *anti-philosophes*, still recalled Le Clerc's,**

Jaquelot's, Bernard's, and Barbeyrac's older (yet assuredly more accurate) designation of Bayle as the thinker who wrote to justify the *athées*, a deeply subversive thinker who refused to accept that 'atheists' should be deemed rebels against the moral order, who wished to tolerate everyone whatever they believe, who propagated the idea of the 'virtuous atheist,' everywhere insinuating crypto-Spinozism, insisting that 'on peut être Déiste ou Athée de bonne foi,' **indeed may act more morally without any faith than anyone else, since true morality has nothing to do with faith and both morality and toleration, among Man's most precious assets, are the discoveries not of peoples, legislators, prophets, or theologians but rather, being a task for pure reason alone, of the philosophers.**132

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm

Just as *Feuerbach* by combating speculative theology was driven further to combat *speculative philosophy*, precisely because he recognised in speculation the last drop of theology, **because he had to force theology to retreat from pseudo-science to *crude*, repulsive *faith*, so Bayle too was driven by religious doubt to doubt about the metaphysics which was the prop of that faith. He therefore critically investigated metaphysics in its entire historical development. He became its historian in order to write the history of its death.** He refuted chiefly *Spinoza* and *Leibniz*.

Pierre Bayle not only prepared the reception of materialism and of the philosophy of common sense in France by shattering metaphysics with his scepticism. **He heralded the *atheistic society* which was soon to come into existence by proving that a society consisting only of atheists is *possible,* that an atheist can be a man worthy of respect, and that it is not by atheism but by superstition and idolatry that man debases himself.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/340/mode/2up?view=theater

In his *Free Thoughts On Religion*, Mandeville restates Bayle's paradox of the 'virtuous atheist,' evidently, many inferred, for the same seditious purpose.53 One of Mandeville's chief critics, William Law, tutor to Edward Gibbon's father, and an adviser of Whiston though no Newtonian, put a particular stress on the link between Mandeville and Bayle, **insisting that the latter had greatly 'increased the numbers of infidels and libertines' and was the 'principal author amongst those, whose parts have been employ'd to arraign and expose virtue and religion as being only the blind effects of complexion, natural temper and custom.'**54

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.82406/page/n59/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Mr. *Bayle* engaged in a Cause, where he found it necessary to assert, that a *Society of Atheists* might be as virtuous Men, as a Society of other People professing Religion; and to maintain this Opinion, **he was further obliged to declare, that religious *Opinions* and *Beliefs*, had no Influence *at all* upon Men's Actions.**
> …
>
> I would not by this insinuate, that he was not a Man of fine Parts; *Bellarmin's* Absurdities, though ever so many, still leave room to acknowledge his great Abilities. This seems to have been Mr. *Bayle's* Case; **he was no *Jesuit* or *Papist*, but he was as great a *Zealot* in his way. *Bellarmin* contradicted himself for the sake of *Mother Church*; and Mr. *Bayle* contradicted himself as heartily, for the sake of an *imaginary* Society, a *Society of Atheists*.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/146/mode/2up?view=theater

For this reason, it is fundamentally incorrect to discern, as some scholars have, a 'surprising convergence' between Bayle's and Locke's theories of toleration; for the two theories are actually totally different and incompatible, the first Protestant, theological, and limited, the latter entirely non-theological and universal.55
…

In the *Supplément* to his main treatise on toleration, published in the year of the Glorious Revolution, 1688, Bayle held that if, as some think, it is correct that the Christian faith justifies the use of coercive force to bring non-Christians within the fold, then the Graeco-Roman pagan authorities before Constantine were surely no less justified in persecuting the Christians, since **Christian doctrine was then not just disrupting the public cults upheld by the state, and publicly defying the laws of the time, but by authorizing coercion in matters of faith disrupting also 'la religion naturelle, les lois de l'humanité, de la raison, et de l'équite.'**58
…

Before his dismissal from his professorship in Rotterdam in 1693, the Dutch Reformed consistory drew up a detailed list of objections to his philosophy based on his anonymously published *Pensées diverses* of 1683, which, by that date, Bayle openly acknowledged as his. Fifteen 'extravagant propositions' were highlighted, and formally condemned by the assembly at its gathering of 28 January 1693, all of which are redolent of Bayle's refusal to assign any innate moral superiority to Christian positions and his basing social justice purely on philosophical reason.

Especially condemned by the Rotterdam Dutch Reformed consistory, in its report to the city government in March 1693, was Bayle's thesis that nothing was ever less of an inconvenience to society than 'atheism' which is why God enacted no miracles to curb it.59 Judged hardly less outrageous were his maxims that atheism is not a greater evil than idolatry;60 **that everything in nature being uncertain 'it is best to keep to the faith of one's parents and profess the religion we learn from them';**61 and that, as the original French puts it, 'l'athéisme ne conduit pas nécessairement à la corruption des moeurs.'62 Totally unacceptable was Bayle's no less notorious proposition that, as the Rotterdam assembly expressed his view, 'een societyt van atheisten ook wel gereguleert kan zyn' [a society of atheists could be well regulated]; **and that the Sadducees, though denying immortality of the soul, were morally worthier than the Pharisees,**63 ideas which again all imply Christian doctrines need not be the basis of a well-ordered society.
…

Bayle's toleration theory, hence, rests squarely on the pseudo-fideist argument that there is no way rationally to ascertain which is the true faith – or whether there is a true faith. In a typically brutal Baylean paradox, he simultaneously proclaims the unqualified primacy and total irrationality of faith.
…

Were one to take his 'fideism' seriously (which would reduce his system to complete and fundamental inconsistency), it would mean, as Doria remarks, that what is most important in human life is totally indistinguishable from 'superstition' which Bayle considers absolutely the worst and most pernicious of things, a position which is manifestly absurd.
…

Indeed, in Bayle, it is never theological doctrine, love, or forbearance which debar and condemn persecution but solely and exclusively the intrinsic injustice, rationally demonstrated, of oppressing the innocent.
…

It was, affirms Bayle, a dreadful and outrageous thing that those who wished to reform the church after its utter perversion by the papacy did not understand 'les immunités sacrées et inviolables de la conscience' but rather adhered to 'le dogme de la constrainte'; **and that in the year 1535, at Geneva, the birthplace of the Reformed Church, the Calvinists suppressed Catholicism, expelling everyone who refused to convert.**75 **Only the Socinians and Arminians, contends Bayle, were free of intolerance; but these were both tiny, fringe churches:** thus the doctrine of tolerance is only recognized as true in a few small corners of Christendom 'qui ne font aucune figure, pendant que celui de l'intolérance va partout la tête levee.'76 **While continually attacking the Socinians for being theologically more muddled and inconsistent than anyone else, it was typical of Bayle that he simultaneously holds that they were exceptionally just and upright.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/558/mode/2up?view=theater

On the fundamental rationality of human morality, in fact, Bayle refuses to compromise and is never sceptical, though some modern scholars have indeed fallen into the trap of assuming – as was alleged (without evidence) by his enemy Barbeyrac – that he is a sceptic on moral issues. The unchallengeable primacy of natural reason in revealing to us what Bayle calls the 'les premiers principes généraux des moeurs' is alike natural, necessary, and universally valid; for it is the only way Man can ever construct the moral system he perennially requires. **Thus, in ancient Greece great progress was made in promoting morality but not at all owing to the pagan cults, which Bayle deemed inherently irrational and corrupt, but solely, he thought, to the efforts of the philosophers who, relying on reason alone, established the principles of ethics, of which equity and reciprocity are the chief.**55 **This, of course, is the very reverse of scepticism.**

No matter how erring and muddled the Socinians may be, argues Bayle, in his *Commentaire philosophique*, in applying reason to speculative matters, there can never be any limit, even when discussing the Bible, when applying reason to moral issues.56 **For him, autonomous reason is the only criterion when establishing and evaluating morality. God himself, he says, must conform to our basic notions of justice, equity, and goodness, for the logic of the moral law is a necessary and unalterable, one not something subject to the divine will and something by definition independent of any divine ruling:** hence, without exception 'il faut soumettre toutes les lois morales à cette idée naturelle d'équité, qui, aussi bien que la lumière métaphysique, illumine tout

homme venant au monde.'57 So important is the principle of basic equality in Bayle's conception of a secular morality divorced from all teleology, divine ordinance, or prior transcendental order **that it prompts him to affirm, as he does repeatedly in his last works, that primitive societies based on equality – such as he took Lahontan's Spinozistic Canadian Indians and the ancient Scythians to be – must *ipso facto* be inherently of a higher ethical level than more hierarchical societies.**58

Hence, while the man of faith, says Bayle, rightly insists the fundamentals of Christianity cannot be explained by reason, and this should never be attempted, the central mysteries of the Christian religion having no connection with reason, **matters are exactly the opposite when it comes to discussing any question of morality.**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/668/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Unquestioning submission of faith is justifiable, philosophically, says Bayle, only by means of Pyrrhonism, leading many later interpreters wrongly to assume that his 'fideism' must therefore by 'Pyrrhonist' and his supposed Pyrrhonism applicable also to moral concepts.23 **Yet, nothing could be less Pyrrhonist than Bayle's system of moral, social, and political thought. Indeed, he vehemently rejects Pyrrhonism in these spheres, especially because (incomprehensibly for those who maintain Bayle's Calvinist piety) Pyrrhonism permits no proper conception of goodness and justice.** Sound moral ideas, holds Bayle, can only be derived by natural reason and, hence, stand diametrically against both faith and every kind of scepticism including fideism.

…

The function of 'fideism' in his system being tactical only, and exclusively limited to rendering questions of faith uncertain, Bayle is in no way being inconsistent when affirming, in his *Commentaire*, that a strict rationalism, reason that is defined as the 'principes généraux de nos connoissances,' is for us always the absolute and only guide when weighing and judging those moral issues posed in, and by, the Bible, since reason is 'la règle matrice et originale' of all Bible exegesis and, moreover, 'en matière de moeurs principalement.'60

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/338/mode/2up?view=theater

According to the Abbé Pluquet, writing in 1757, all those who had hitherto attempted to refute Spinoza had failed, but Bayle, the sharpest of philosophical critics, had, he says, failed more resoundingly than any adversary of Spinoza, having neither interpreted Spinoza correctly nor fought him effectively: **'le célèbre Bayle lui-même, ce destructeur indefatigable de toute doctrine systématique paroît avoir échoue à l'égard de celui-ci [i.e. Spinoza], et porté ses coups en l'air.'**44

Whichever answer one gave, no one could deny, in any case, that Bayle places Spinoza not only at the heart of contemporary philosophical debate but at the heart of all ancient, medieval, and modern intellectual debate. **After telling us, for example, that Xenophanes asserts 'l'unité de toutes choses,' much like Parmenides and Melissus, and that his view of God is an abominable form of 'Spinozisme,' he commences his long article on Zeno of Elea by affirming that this disciple of Parmenides, one of the major philosophers of antiquity, held views almost the same as those of Xenophanes and Parmenides concerning the unity, the incomprehensibility, and the immutability of all things,** the clear implication being that the philosophy of the Eleatics too is akin to Spinozism.45 Bayle takes the opportunity presented by what was known of Zeno's opinions to rehearse a mass of objections to the belief that motion exists outside matter and shows that all the proofs that motion is external to matter fail to stand up to reason. He then asserts, giving an excellent illustration of his general method, that he nevertheless shares the universal view that motion resides outside matter.46 The usefulness of the exercise, he assures readers, lies in its showing the limitations of reason.47 But if reason is truly our guide, then the reader can only infer that there is no way of maintaining that motion is external to matter rationally and that reason inexorably proves motion is inherent in matter. **This is just one of innumerable examples of how Bayle employs Pyrrhonism as a tactical device to push readers towards a conclusion opposed to the fideist position he pretends to adopt.**48

> http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap3.htm
>
> **The first Aryan known as a monotheist was Xenophanes (born c. 570 B.C., died c. 470).** He certainly repudiated the anthropomorphic gods of polytheism and posited one god, spherical because that is the perfect form, eternal, and unchanging; but we are also told that the god was an infinite sphere and identical with the universe. Now, was the universe conscious, and could men, whom Xenophanes thought the products of a kind of chemical reaction between earth and water, pray to the vast being of which they were an infinitesimal part? There is no evidence that Xenophanes thought they could, and I do not see how one could imagine that a man could attract

> the attention of the universe. Even assuming that Xenophanes thought of the universe as a living being (which, of course, is not unchanging), can we imagine one cell in our bodies as praying to us? **My guess is that what has been called "the only true monotheism that has ever existed in the world" was, strictly speaking, atheism.*** **If there are no gods whom men can ask to intervene in human affairs, it is simply an abuse of language to call an impersonal, inexorable force 'god.'**

…

Years later, Des Maizeaux heard from David Durand, the Reformed minister closest to Bayle in his last years, and an exceptionally tolerant pastor, indeed a friend who supplied him with many a Latin quotation, that he had written to him 'quelques jours avant sa mort la lettre du monde la plus tendre pour l'obliger à lever tout expèce de scandale, par une confession édifiante des verities chrétiennes, ou du moins des veritez de la religion naturelle.'56 **Unfortunately, all he received from Bayle by way of reply was a note replete with witticisms drawn from Horace and Martial without a single word about Christian truth.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/388/mode/2up?view=theater

Another newcomer to the campaign against Bayle was his former friend David Durand (*c.* 1680-1763), a great foe of superstition and bigotry and an exceptionally irenic preacher in Rotterdam and The Hague, as well as later in London.78 Durand was so liberal that he approved of van Dale and judged Fontenelle's *Historie des oracles* a treasure.79 **Yet, like Jaquelot, he too, once convinced Bayle had abandoned religion and represented a dire intellectual threat, saw it not just as a pressing duty to help unmask Bayle's insidious paradoxes and deception but as a way of unifying Huguenot opinion. Just as Spinoza had feigned being a Cartesian, and Spinozists today employ the same veil 'pour anéantir la liberté et introduire la fatalité stoïque,' Bayle, he alleged, had counterfeited his 'fideism' the more effectively to propagate illicit ideas.**80

https://books.google.fi/books?id=YwI1AAAAMAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA408#v=onepage&q&f=false

As neither his editor nor our translator have mentioned what first gave rise to this poem, it may not be improper to mention it here: "A seeming chance," as we are told, "first put Polignac upon this undertaking. **The author, in his return from Poland, made some stay in Holland, where, becoming acquainted with M. Bayle, he asked him, which of the sects in vogue he professed? Bayle eluded the question, by repeating some lines out of Lucretius;** and being closer pressed, he made no other answer than that he was a true Protestant. The Abbé still urging him, he answered with some emotion, **'Yes, Sir, I am a true Protestant, and to the utmost extent of the word, for I protest against all that is said or done;' which was followed by another more energetic repetition from Lucretius. The Abbé finding that learned person far gone in the system of Epicurism, or at least of Skepticism, and that these notions were seducingly advanced in his celebrated Dictionary,** immediately conceived a design of refuting those errors, and his two relegations (to the States) proved fortunate for the accomplishment."

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/266/mode/2up?view=theater

Bayle devoted his life to his roundabout, devious idealization of rational philosophy as Man's finest and only effective tool, a quest which, together with his mocking, subversive pseudo-fideism, or more precisely anti-scepticism disguised as fideism, characterized his *oeuvre*, **until in the last few years of his life when, feeling the approach of death, he scarcely troubled any longer,** especially in his *Continuation* and the *Réponse*, to veil the crypto-Spinozist reality behind the 'fideist' mask.21

No philosopher uses sceptical arguments more than Bayle. But he never employs scepticism, like Montaigne or Hume, to counter the force of reason but rather to undercut grounds for belief, undermine systems based on theological premises, and ridicule thinkers like Le Clerc, Jaquelot, and Locke whose efforts to blend theology with philosophy he scorned.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2167/2167-h/2167-h.htm#link2H_4_0015
>
> It is really amusing to observe how he proceeds with his narration when he has no better authority than poor Diodorus. **He is compelled to relate something; yet he believes nothing.** He accompanies every fact with a long statement of objections. His account of the administration of Dionysius is in no sense a history. It ought to be entitled—"Historic doubts as to certain events, alleged to have taken place in Sicily."
>
> **This scepticism, however, like that of some great legal characters almost as sceptical as himself, vanishes whenever his political partialities interfere. He is a vehement admirer of tyranny and oligarchy, and considers no evidence as feeble which can be brought forward in favour of those forms of government.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/618/mode/2up?view=theater

Muslims, from the time of Muhammad in the seventh century onwards, held Bayle, in his article 'Mahomed' in the *Dictionnaire* (1697), a claim later echoed by Voltaire in his *Traité sur la tolérance* (1762), were invariably more tolerant than the Christians.22 **Had Christians ruled the Ottoman Near East instead of the Turks, avers Bayle, there would remain today no 'trace of the Greek Church' and Islam would have been obliterated whereas, by contrast, 'ces infidèles' fully tolerated Christianity.** Delighting in such paradoxes, Bayle suggests further that Muslims following the principles of their faith ought to use violence to liquidate other religions and yet they tolerate them instead. Christians, on the other hand, though commanded to eschew all violence and stick to purely peaceful preaching and proselytizing, from the outset strove to overthrow and exterminate with fire and sword everyone who was not of their religion.23
…

Le Clerc might argue that the obstinate Jews 'ne savent guère mieux raisonner que les Mahométans,' both Muslims and Jews resisting only because they 'n'apprennent nullement à raisonner juste,'25 but Bayle retorted that although faith assures us Christianity is the true religion, by rational assessment and all worldly tests, Islam's claims are superior. For not only is the Islamic world more tolerant and less cruel but it has far less blood on its hands. **'Dans toutes leurs persécutions contre les Chrétiens,' counters Bayle, the Muslims slaughtered far fewer people in the name of their religion than the Christians massacred during the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 in Paris alone.**26

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/596/mode/2up?view=theater

But it was arguably Bayle, more than any other writer of the Early Enlightenment, who most effectively deployed the principle of moral universalism which so impressed Tyssot as a way of discrediting theological justifications for empire, military conquest, and religious expansion in the Indies. **Bayle was probably the first major philosopher, apart from Locke, to use the burgeoning travel literature of the age to assess and evaluate the relationship between Europe and the non-European world.** However, in contemplating relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, he came to dramatically different conclusions from Locke. For the latter even though he refrained from justifying dominion over lands once belonging to Amerindians on the ground of their being 'utterly strangers to Christianity,' stipulating that their idolatry and ignorance 'gives us noe right to expel or treat them ill,' nevertheless, as we have seen, judged that the biblical injunction to 'replenish the whole earth,' and claims based on the argument from effective vacancy, *did* stretch to legitimizing dispossession of the natives.26 Bayle, by contrast, thought that only universal moral criteria could be brought to bear in such a case, questioning the moral, cultural, and political legitimacy of European colonization especially where this was based on theological claims.27

Bayle, proceeding from the same monist philosophical premisses and categorical universalism as Spinoza and van den Enden before him, and Meslier and Diderot later, seems, in several parts of his *oeuvre*, to have a special axe to grind, regarding the missionizing ambitions of the Jesuits in the Far East. He vehemently deplores what he considers the arrogant and unjust proceedings of the missionaries as well as colonial companies, merchants, seamen, and soldiers, clearly implying that China, Japan, Siam, India, and other parts of Asia would not just be morally, culturally, and politically better off without not just these European intruders with their warehouses, goods, ships, and guns, but should certainly also rid themselves of the missionaries who were importing and intolerant and aggressively proselytizing new faith, theology, moral system, and education.

Despite being bound to do so in partly veiled terms, Bayle emphatically endorsed the refusal of the Japanese to allow the Spanish and Portuguese friars to resume their quest for converts there, after their expulsion by the shogunate, in the 1620s and 1630s, in what Bayle significantly chooses to interpret as a struggle to defend the integrity and independence of Japan from European colonial ambitions and pretensions. **Bayle, in his most insinuatingly sardonic fashion, pronounces it extremely 'unfortunate' that the Japanese, 'not having sufficient illumination to renounce their false religion,' failed to make the correct decision as 'between persecuting and being persecuted' and, opting for the former, expelled the Christian missionaries. Despite having made such a disastrously wrong choice, though, he adds, they can perhaps draw some slight comfort from knowing they could 'have preserved their traditional government, customs and worship only by ridding themselves of the Christians.'**
…

Indeed, had the 'true faith' after all been successful in Japan, holds Bayle, it is certain the Christians would have practised what he calls the 'cruel maxims' of the Spaniards, and before long 'by means of slaughtering and hanging, as in America, have brought all Japan under their yoke.'28 Bayle's antipathy to missionaries and efforts at conversion is equally manifest in his discussion of China.29 Astoundingly, he suggests the only reliable solution for the thorny problem facing the Chinese, in his day, was

immediately to expel all the Christian missionaries. **In his *Commentaire philosophique*, he imagines a Chinese imperial council discussing the Jesuits and advising the emperor to eject them all from his dominions 'comme des pestes publiques.'**

Bayle's imagined Chinese advisers press the emperor never to allow them to return: for to do so would be to introduce into his realms 'la semence perpétuelle du carnage et de la désolation des villes et du plat pays.'30 If permitted to stay, the missionaries would doubtless behave impeccably to begin with, peacefully preaching, teaching, and flattering their hosts – apart, that is, from promising Paradise, and threatening Hell, in the afterlife. **But no sooner did they command enough proselytes to seek dominance politically and militarily, avers Bayle, than they would undoubtedly suppress, coerce, persecute, and kill everyone standing in their way or who preferred indigenous Chinese religions.** To secure the upper hand, they would also spread sedition on all sides and organize armed insurgency against the emperor and his advisers. **Should the emperor attempt to resist, they would threaten to summon whole 'crusades' from the West.** Slaughtering large numbers and trampling all opposition under foot, they would replace the emperor, once overwhelmed, with another of their choosing and one more willing to submit to the eternal truths proclaimed by the church.31

Were the Chinese emperor indeed to banish the missionaries, held Bayle, this would be 'avec raison et justice.'32 They would have been ejected not because the Chinese were intolerant but exactly the reverse, because the Jesuits were. **These remarks were, in a way, extremely prescient. For the papacy, ruling on the problem of the Chinese Rites controversy, after a long debate in 1700-1, overruled the Jesuits, declared Confucianism 'atheistic,' and forbade Chinese Catholics to participate in Confucian rites.**33 **On hearing of this, the Chinese emperor, K'ang-Hsi, retaliated by expelling the missionaries.** The papacy's shift to a more confrontational, intolerant stance towards Confucianism in turn reinforced the prevailing impression in Europe that the Chinese neo-Confucianists were indeed, as Arnauld, Malebranche, and other critics of the Jesuits urged, 'atheists' and 'Spinozists.'34 **The expulsion of the Jesuits from China, with Christianity's intolerance being cited as the reason, was later approved by Voltaire and d'Argens, in terms precisely echoing those of Bayle.**35

Denouncing the Crusades, and the Spanish conquest of the Americas 'par des cruautés qui font horreur,' Bayle predicted that the missionaries' zeal would wreak comparable havoc in the future in whichever parts of the world faith 'n'a pas encore ensanglanté.' In singling out for special censure European colonial initiatives using requirements of faith as their justification for imposing western dominance and intolerance,36 his chief concern, clearly, was to discredit use of theological arguments as justifications for any kind of conquest, despoilment, enslavement, or empire.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page113

71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle puts forward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposes to the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. 3140 of the second edition of his *Dictionary*). 'It is enough for me', he says, 'that it be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of the Gospel are above reason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible to settle the difficulties raised by the philosophers, and in consequence that a dispute where only the light of Nature is followed will always end unfavourably for the theologians, and that they will see themselves forced to give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light.' **I am surprised that M. Bayle speaks in such general terms, since he has acknowledged himself that the light of Nature is against the Manichaeans, and for the oneness of the Principle, and that the goodness of God is proved incontrovertibly by reason.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page208

And on the other side, or in other passages, he seems to show more approval of the opinions of those who preserve God's goodness at the expense of his greatness, as Plutarch does in his book against the Stoics. **'It was more reasonable', he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans) 'that innumerable parts' (or atoms flying about at haphazard through an infinite space) 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and, in spite of him and against his nature and will, did many bad and irrational things, than to agree that there is neither confusion nor wickedness but he is the author thereof.' What may be said for both these parties, Stoics and Epicureans, appears to have led M. Bayle to the επεχειν of the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect of reason, so long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sincere submission.**

136. **Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attempting almost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes,** a Persian heretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief of the Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they were named Paulicians.
…

144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and Arimanius, the sources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked upon them as two eternal principles opposed to each other, although there is reason to doubt this assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple of Cerdon, was of this opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that these men used lamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not sufficiently recognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument, which was the difficulty over the origin of evil. **He believes that an able man on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and it seems as though he himself, failing any other, wished to undertake a task so unnecessary in the opinion of many people.** 'All the hypotheses' (he says, *Dictionary*, v., 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians have established parry but poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph when they act on the offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when they have to sustain the attack.' **He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr. Hyde he calls them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soon have been routed by *a priori* reasons, taken from the nature of God; but he thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the**
***a posteriori* reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil.**
...

152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of the oneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness of substance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator of duality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is more consistent with order and *a priori* reasons, but he denies its conformity with experience and *a posteriori* reasons. **'I surpass you', he said, 'in the explanation of phenomena, which is the principal mark of a good system.'**
...

156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in his *Dictionary,* follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on the Manichaeans. **According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the orthodox seem to admit two first principles, in making the devil the originator of sin. M. Becker, a former minister of Amsterdam, author of the book entitled *The World Bewitched*, has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that one should not assign such power and authority to the Devil as would allow of his comparison with God.** Therein he is right: but he pushes the conclusions too far.

https://archive.org/details/pretendeddifficu00gurd/page/136/mode/2up?view=theater

Monsieur *Bayle*, as fond as he shews himself upon all Occasions of the *Hypothesis* which pretends to account for Good and Evil by Two contrary Principles; was yet sensible, that Two such contrary Natures, unless they acted with something like Freedom, could never account for Good and Evil; and therefore when he is making an Apology for *Zoroaster*, he represents him as justifying his Two Principles in this Manner: “**That it was with his Two Principles for some Time, as it was with Mr. *Hobbs*'s Men in a State of Nature,** and before the Establishment of Societies; that every Man was an Enemy to every other Man, and did each other all the Mischief they could; and thus, says he, it was with the Two Principles at first, **till they, as well as Mr. *Hobbs*'s Men, weary of such a confused State of Things, in which one Principle was continually overturning what the other was building up, came at last to an Accommodation, and joyned amicably together for the future, in the several Productions of Nature.**” *

* Histor. Dict. in voce Zoroaster.

Mr. *Bayle* enters into so many Particulars in his Vindication of this Doctrine of *Zoroaster* that we may believe he look'd upon it as the most rational Solution of the present Difficulty. But from hence we may observe, That Two contrary Principles, so long as they acted Necessarily and to the utmost of their Power, could produce nothing but a State of the utmost Confusion and Disorder; because this is supposed and allowed to have been the State of Things previously to the Agreement of the Two Principles: and then without such Agreement, every Thing must have been still in Confusion, and different from what we see at present; **and therefore were it possible that this Account of Things could be the Truth, yet it would do the *Atheist* no Service, unless he would allow the Existence of Beings that act upon Choice, which he always steadily denies,** and while he does so, can have no Right to any Advantage from this *Hypothesis*.

https://archive.org/details/pretendeddifficu00gurd/page/192/mode/2up?view=theater

And therefore Mr. *Bayle* need not have put on such an Air of Concern, as he affects to do * at the *Hypothesis* of free Agents; as if the admitting such particular Self-movers must necessarily exclude an Universal Mover. **He brings an Instance from the *Chinese*, among which People the Belief it seems of many Self-movers had this Effect; the first Universal MOVER being wholly left out of their System of Religion.**

* In voce Spinosa.

But then it must be observed, That the Belief of Free Beings had not this Effect, **till they had so far sunk the Notion of a GOD, as to make Him only an *Anima Mundi*, that was acted upon by Matter, as our Souls are acted upon by our Bodies; and had raised the particular Souls, that animated the several Parts of the World, to such an Height, as to be almost entirely independent upon Him; which is the**

***Chinese Philosophy*, as Mr. *Loubiere* assures us.** But so long as 'tis acknowledged, that the Self-moving Power is derived from GOD, and depends upon Him for its Continuance; so long as 'tis confessed, that in Him we *live, and move*, so long there can be no Fear of shutting out a GOD, from our taking in free Agents. **And I am persuaded Mr. *Bayle* * would have seen no Danger to Religion from free Agency if this had not threatned his darling Notion of a Principle of Evil; for he could easily see that all his Arguments drawn from the Moral Evil that appears in the World, must lose much of their Force, if once Free Agents were allowed of;** because then God might be the Original Cause of Motion, and yet not the Cause of Moral Evil, of the wicked Acts committed by Men, or of the blasphemous Words they sometimes utter.

* *Bayle*'s Dictionary, Voce Spinosa.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/668/mode/2up?view=theater

Total separation of morality and religion was indeed the very cornerstone of Radical Enlightenment, the point at which the systems of Spinoza and Bayle almost totally converge. To detachment of morality from theology, Bayle added, to the consternation of the whole Huguenot diaspora, the proposition that revealed religion based on miracles, church dogma, and an afterlife, whether Christian or not, is neither requisite nor helpful, in upholding a moral order geared to the well-being of society. **Here, Bayle and, later, Diderot ventured beyond Spinoza: for where Christianity, for the latter, teaches 'obedience' to socially useful moral principles, Bayle removes the force even of this,** claiming a society sincere in upholding the Christian ethic would be ill adjusted to the realities of life and unable to survive for long. **The more one studies the history of one's own time, and previous centuries, he argues, the more one sees that every society threatened by neighbours would soon collapse 'si elle se conformoit à l'esprit évangélique.'**20
…

Society cannot subsist, contends Bernard, without 'la pratique de ces devoirs' and hence, 'atheism,' in the sense of denial of a Creator, providence, and revelation, violates society's most precious concerns vastly more than idolatry or paganism, indeed entails 'la destruction totale des sociétez'.45 **But Bayle totally disagreed.** Stressing the frightful consequences of bigotry, cruelty, and credulity, and noting that pagan Greek cults inculcate dread of wholly immoral gods mostly moved by base and violent passions, he argued that anyone reared in such a milieu will be incapable of grasping that pride, greed, ambition, lasciviousness, love of luxury, violence, and desire for vengeance are immoral. On the contrary, what the idolatrous cults of the Graeco-Roman world demanded of men, was exclusively subservience, adoration, and flattery. **In Bayle's eyes, Greek pagan religion meant 'la renversement de la morale' which is why, he alleges, Socrates felt it requisite to stake his life against such idolatry.**46
…

If the political leadership of the Hellenic city-states and republican Rome successfully countered the viciousness fostered by their publicly established cults this was entirely due, contends Bayle, to the influence on public life of reason and the philosophers. Atheistic thinkers like Epicurus, he remarked, believed in no gods but nevertheless had an admirable ability to formulate moral concepts by examining what was and what was not 'conforme aux règles de la raison.'49
…

The idea that ancient philosophers, before Christ, were capable of forging a viable system of moral theory 'whereof,' as Locke put it, 'the world could be convinced,' an ethics able to underpin law and institutions as, in their view, Christianity does, was precisely what the *rationaux*, together with Locke, denied. To them, it was self-evidently true that reason alone is inadequate.
…

Locke's, Le Clerc's, and Bernard's dictum **'the greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe'** was indeed persuasive.53 **Philosophy and reason may be wholly ineffective guides for most, countered Bayle, but they sufficed to instruct the magistrates in the Greek city-states, and in Rome, and therefore for producing philosophically and morally based legislation which did effectively curb the untutored and restrain the religiously fomented immorality of the majority.**
…

Morally and educationally, argues Bayle, religion and philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome stood in direct opposition. Their admirable administrative, legal, and civic achievements stemmed from philosophical reason locked in combat with 'la théologie fabuleuse'; **the good they accomplished was not because but in spite of the latter.**

https://archive.org/details/divinelegationof176501warb/page/72/mode/2up?view=theater

IV. In the last place, he says,a “that the lives of the several atheists of antiquity fully shew, that this principle does not necessarily produce depravity of morals." He instances “in *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Evemerus*, *Nicanor*, and *Hippon*: whose virtue appeared so admirable to a father of the church, that he would enrich religion with it, and make theists of them, in spite of all antiquity.” And then descends to “*Epicurus* and his followers, whom their very enemies acknowledged to be unblameable in their actions, as the *Roman Atticus*, *Cassius*, and elder *Pliny*;” and closes this illustrious catalogue with an encomium on the morality of *Vanini* and *Spinosa*. **But this is not all; for he tells us fartherb of whole nations of atheists, “which modern travelers have discovered in the islands or continents of *Afric* and *America*, which, in point of morals, are rather better, than worse, than the idolaters who live around them. It is true, that these atheists are savages, without laws, magistrate, or civil policy: but this (he says)c makes an argument *à fortiori*: for if they live peaceably together out of civil society, much rather would they do so in it, where equal laws restrain men from injustice.”** He is so pleased with this argument, that he reduces it to this enthymeme:d

> “Whole nations of atheists, divided into independent families, have preserved themselves from time immemorial without law. **Therefore, much stronger reason have we to think they would still preserve themselves, were they under one common master, and one common law, the equal distributer of rewards and punishments.**"

…

The question is, and I have been frequently obliged to repeat it, Mr. *Bayle* so industriously affecting to forget or mistake it, *whether atheism be destructive to the body of a society?* **And yet he, whose business is to prove the negative, brings all his arguments from considerations, which either affect not the gross body of mankind, or affect not that body, in society: in a word, from the lives of *sophists* or *savages*; from the example of a few speculative men far above the view of the common run of citizens; or from *that* of a barbarous crew of *savages* much farther below it.** All his facts and reasonings then being granted, they still fall short and wide of his conclusion.

But the last stroke of his apology is more extravagant than all the rest: for having proved atheism very consistent with a state of nature, lest it should happen to be found not so consistent with civil society, but that one of them must rise upon the ruins of the other, he gives a very palpable hint which of the two he thinks should be preserved; by making it a serious question, discussed in a set dissertation,i WHETHER CIVIL SOCIETY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF MANKIND?j and very gravely resolving it in the negative.

> i. *Contin. des Pens. Div*. c. cxviii. j. Si les societéz sont absolument necessaires pour conserver le genre humain.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=7j8PdlgFRDAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA294#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bayle’s Clarification on atheism is another intensification of his theory in which he said he just did not happen to know any immoral atheists, and he asked readers if they had any information please send it to him and he would consider it. Next, he started presenting his thesis that there was a society of atheists in the world in his time that was getting on much better than any European society. Bayle had been following the information coming to Europe about China and accepted the picture that China was, in fact, a society of atheists, was a highly moral society, and was much more stable and ethical than any European society.

…

Some present-day commentators, like Antony McKenna and Gianluca Mori, have been developing **this picture of Bayle as a complete sceptic in epistemology and metaphysics and as a positive moralist in human affairs.** Some see something like this already in Montaigne, Charron, and La Mothe Le Vayer.23

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page258

It so happens that the ancient Stoics were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarked upon this himself in his *Dictionary* in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem. T. It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to face him with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments that he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in his work on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did the nature of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind, make also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chief design of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in keeping with the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and producing many great things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, found that some drawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in conformity with the original design and purpose; they came about as a sequel to the work, they existed only as consequences. For the formation of the human body, Chrysippus said, the finest idea

as well as the very utility of the work demanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin, fine bones; but because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being able to resist blows. Nature made health, and at the same time it was necessary by a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up. **The same thing applies with regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature, which brought it forth, produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices.** I have not translated literally, for which reason I give here the actual Latin of Aulus Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand that language (Aul. Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1):
…

I do not think that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable, considering his ignorance of the first man's fall, the knowledge of which has only reached us through revelation, and which indeed is the true cause of our miseries. If we had sundry like extracts from the works of Chrysippus, or rather if we had his works, we should have a more favourable idea than we have of the beauty of his genius.'

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA129#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, when Bayle makes remarks about 'the Stoics,' they are almost always highly critical. **The Stoics are called 'the Pharisees of Paganism,' for example, for their unfair campaign of vilification against Epicurus.** 'The Stoics professed a great severity in their morals,' Bayle wrote, so that 'to contend with these people was almost as dangerous as it is at this day to be at variance with Bigots.'9

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA131#v=onepage&q&f=false

When Bayle turns to the epistemological debates between the Stoics and the Sceptics, he emphasises precisely those sceptical objections that could be brought to bear against the modern Cartesians. In 'Arcesilaus,' for example, Bayle observes that it was reported that the question was put to Zeno:

> [W]hat will be the case if the wise man should not be able to know any thing clearly, and if he must admit of any thing for true which is not clear and evident? And that Zeno answered, He will clearly comprehend some things, and therefore will admit of nothing which is obscure. He should afterwards have laid down a rule whereby to judge what things are clearly comprehended. **That which Zeno gave was opposed by Arcesilaus, who urged to him, that falsehood may appear under the shape of truth, as that therefore one would be at a loss to distinguish the one for the other. Zeno granted that nothing could be comprehended, if that which does not exist can appear in the same form as that which does exist; but he denied that there could be that conformity of ideas betwixt that which is and that which is not. Arcesilaus on the other hand insisted upon this conformity.**23

The mistake the Stoics made was to insist that there was necessarily a phenomenological distinction between what was true and what was false; this sceptical objection also lay at the heart of Bayle's anti-Cartesian epistemology, too, for the 'clear and distinct idea' could not be the basis of indubitable knowledge, insofar as it did not carry any kind of guarantee of its own veracity. One implication of this was that the proof of God's existence presented by Descartes in the third of his *Meditations* could not be granted.

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/158/mode/2up?view=theater

Miracles are against all reason. There is nothing more consonant with God's infinite greatness than His maintenance of the laws which He Himself established; there could be nothing more unworthy than to imagine Him intervening to interrupt their regular operation. And intervening for what, pray? **Intervening about something as paltry and insignificant compared with the march of the Universe, as the birth or death of a prince?**

"*The more we study the ways of man, the more we are forced to recognize that pride is his ruling passion, and that he will give himself grandiose airs even when his affairs are at their sorriest. Frail and infirm as he is, he quite persuades himself that when he comes to die, the whole of nature is stirred to its very depths and that Heaven itself must needs go out of its way to lend a touch of splendour to his obsequies. Foolish, ludicrous vanity! If we looked at the universe aright, we should seen realize that the birth or death of a prince was a very small matter indeed against the background of the universal order, far too small for Heaven to make a pother about.* ***We should say, with the wisest and loftiest of all old Rome's philosophers (Seneca), that it is true indeed that the solicitude of Providence includes even ourselves, but that, though we have our allotted place in the general scheme of things, the Heavenly purpose is directed to something far greater than our particular preservation,*** *and that, while we derive great benefits from the movements of the heavenly bodies, it is not merely for the sake of this earth that they set themselves in motion."*1

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/106/mode/2up?view=theater

The name of Sextus Empiricus was hardly known in our schools. *The allurements of the epoch which he described so subtly were as unknown there as was the southern continent, when Gassendi gave us a brief account of it and opened our eyes. Cartesianism put the finishing touches on the work,* ***and now no sound philosopher has any doubt that the sceptics were in the right when they said that the qualities of the objects which we apprehend with our senses are merely appearances.*** *Anyone may say* "I feel the heat when I am close to the fire," *but not* "I know that heat is in itself, what I think it is." *That is the way these*

early Pyrrhonists looked at the matter. ***To-day, the new school adopts a more positive tone. They say that heat, smell, colour and so on are not objects of our senses but modifications of our mind.*** *We know that external objects are not what they appear to us to be. There was an idea that extent and motion might be excluded from this rule, but that was found to be impossible; for if the objects of our senses appear to us to be coloured, hot, cold, odorous, when, as a matter of fact, they are not so, what is to prevent their appearing to be of such and such an extent, of such and such a shape and design, at rest or in motion, when in reality they are none of these things?* ***Those are the kind of ideas with which the new school of philosophy would strengthen the Pyrrhonist position, and which I decline to admit.***

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/294/mode/2up?view=theater

Then, in the fall of 1764, Diderot discovered that Le Breton, the crafty publisher of the *Encyclopédie*, had made extensive cuts in several articles after Diderot had read the proofs. **The article mutilated most severely was "Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophie," and the passages cut most drastically were those in which Diderot had eulogized Bayle's character, abused Bayle's clerical persecutors, and restated, in appreciative detail, Bayle's skeptical philosophy.** Diderot burst out in impotent rage and could barely be persuaded to resume work on the remaining volumes of the *Encyclopédie*; still, while the experience was an infuriating setback for Diderot, it was also a wry tribute to Bayle's corrosive power.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page337

But as in this system all is connected and harmonious, all following from reasons and nothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect indifference, it seems that it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: **for he was here somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference, which, notwithstanding, he contested so strongly on other occasions.** He was much given to passing from one extreme to the other, not with an ill intention or against his own conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settled in his mind on the question concerned. He contented himself with whatever suited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being only to perplex philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; **and never, in my opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against with more eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for the sake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That is what I often said to the late Abbé Foucher, a few specimens of whose work prove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsius and Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, and what M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato.** It must not be possible for us to offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the celebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of the Sorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for some centuries. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT604&hl=fi&pg=PT604#v=onepage&q&f=false

Possibly even more significant were some of the paradoxical views presented in the articles "Pyrrho" and "Zeno" that undermined critical portions of Cartesian philosophy. **Bayle showed that the same sceptical arguments that led the Cartesians to question whether secondary qualities really exist in the world can lead to doubts about whether primary mathematical qualities also exist.** Bayle's argument, in part derived from the sceptic Simon Foucher, led Berkeley to develop his theory. David Hume was immersed in Bayle's texts when he wrote his major work, *Treatise of Human Nature*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA276#v=onepage&q&f=false

Foucher's contribution centers on challenging **the central Cartesian claim that some of our ideas, those of the mathematical or primary qualities, can give us knowledge of the external world, while those of sensory or secondary qualities (tastes, smells, colors, sounds, etc.) cannot.** Descartes and all others (Galileo, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, etc.), of the "new philosophers" who had distinguished primary and secondary qualities had offered standard sceptical reasons for contending that secondary qualities were entirely subjective, that is, in the mind, whereas primary qualities were objective that is, were qualities of the real external world (and hence that a mathematical physics of the real world was possible). **Bayle had noted that modern philosophy began with the ancient Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus, who provided the reasons for doubting the reality of secondary qualities.**3 **Hume later said that the fundamental principle of all of what he called the "modern philosophy"**

> **is the opinion concerning colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold: which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects.** … This principle being once admitted, all the other doctrines of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. For upon the removal of sounds, colors, heat, cold and other sensible qualities from the rank of

> continu'd independent existences, we are reduc'd merely to what are called primary qualities, as the only *real* ones, of which we have any adequate notion.4

Foucher challenged this fundamental principle in two ways, first by questioning if *any* ideas could give us knowledge of external objects, and second by using the *same* sceptical arguments that established the subjectivity of secondary qualities to establish the subjectivity of primary ones.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=7j8PdlgFRDAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA291#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bayle tells us that Gassendi made people aware of the arguments of Sextus Empiricus and the Abbé Foucher had applied such arguments to Cartesianism and undermined any arguments for the real existence of primary or secondary qualities in the real world. **(Bayle's use of Foucher's arguments became the way they were passed on into the eighteenth century to readers of Bayle's *Dictionnaire* such as George Berkeley and David Hume.)** Thus in terms of the Cartesian approach, all that we could know about are ideas in our own minds. We could not tell if these corresponded to the world outside of us.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=7j8PdlgFRDAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA305#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Pierre Bayle, in his article "Pyrrhon" in the *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, rem. B, asserted that modern philosophy began with the reintroduction of Sextus (although Bayle has the date about eighty years later than it actually took place).**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/788/mode/2up?view=theater

Philosophically, perhaps the work's most striking feature is its uncompromising redefinition of scepticism and insistence on turning scepticism into a tool, or first step, of reason itself. Instead of taking scepticism to be chiefly a means of questioning reason, as was usual in Montaigne and many others, **Diderot, here emulating Bayle and several of the clandestine manuscripts, turns scepticism into an instrument primarily for questioning what men believe.** A true philosopher to his mind is someone who weighs all arguments carefully, doubting everything which he and other have been taught or urged to believe, embracing as true only what reason and empirical observation confirm to be true.35 **What is unequivocal here is the rejection of all fideist, Pascalian, and Lockean solutions to the problems of faith, Creation, and miracles, and emulation of Bayle and Spinoza in rejecting all attempted distinctions between truth 'au-dessus de la raison' and truth 'contre la raison,'** that is to judge what is true exclusively on the ground of rational demonstration. 'Si je renonce à ma raison,' remarks Diderot, in his later additions to the text, 'je n'ai plus de guide.'36 **While still ostensibly repudiating atheism, he also strongly reaffirms Bayle's cardinal principle that 'superstition' is a greater evil than atheism.**37

The chief line of enquiry in the *Pensées philosophiques* is whether the 'argument from design' on which the Newtonian system, and hence Voltaire's strategy, hinges remains cogent. In the prevailing Lockean-Newtonian climate of the time this was, of course, no easy doctrine to call into question. **Is it not the very height of absurdity, exclaimed one French Newtonian in 1751, to deny that eyes are for seeing, ears for hearing, and teeth intended for chewing? yet, observes this writer, 'c'est ce que nie Spinosa' in his *Ethics*.**38

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/290/mode/2up?view=theater

David Hume found Bayle congenial all his life. **As a young rebel in search of an alternative to Presbyterianism, he discovered ancient atheists, skeptics, and rationalists through the writings of Bayle;** this was the time when he noted with approval a maxim by the ancient Greek poet Epicharmus: "Keep sober and remember to be skeptical."9 And as the full-fledged philosopher, in his *Enquiries* and his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, he followed Bayle's arguments and often accepted Bayle's conclusions – usually without mentioning Bayle's name.

> 9. Mossner: *Life of Hume*, 78. In the light of the Enlightenment's commitment to common sense and to action, Hume's rejection of Pyrrhonism is revealing: he thought it intellectually excessive, emotionally paralyzing, but in the long run, also ineffective: **"A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles, which may not only be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behavior. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: of if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society." But then, men are rarely content to rest in Pyrrhonist principles; these are usually subverted by "action, and employment, and the occupations of common life."** Like the other philosophes, **Hume would not surrender the virtues of the *vita activa* for those of the *vita contemplativa*, no matter how attractively the latter might present themselves.** (See Hume: *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *Works*, IV, 130-1.)

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/66/mode/2up?view=theater

When Hume looked back on this period, he remembered it as a time of internal debate, which ended with the victory of classical philosophy. **“Upon the whole,” he wrote to Hutcheson in 1739, shortly after he had finished the *Treatise*, “I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero’s *Offices*, not from the *Whole Duty of Man*. I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings.”**4
…

Hume’s *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* is an even more direct testimonial to antiquity than this: it is an imitation of Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum*, which it follows closely in argument, exposition of doctrines, number and disposition of speakers, and even anecdotes. In choosing Cicero, and especially *De Natura Deorum*, Hume was making an ambitious choice; **and surely nothing would have gratified Hume more than the modern judgment that he had surpassed his admired “Tully” in the *Dialogues*.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/402/mode/2up?view=theater

When [Hume] was in Paris in 1765, he looked back across the Channel and observed that the English were “relapsing fast into the deepest Stupidity, Christianity & Ignorance.”4 This dismayed him, for while he did not expect much from the world, he could not bring himself to be complacent about stupidity and ignorance – that is to say, Christianity. **When he wrote about religion, as he often did, he was as implacable as Holbach and as sardonic as Voltaire;** his convictions and purposes were theirs, even though his techniques were largely his own.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0014
>
> Hume, from whose fascinating narrative the great mass of the reading public are still contented to take their opinions, **hated religion so much that he hated liberty for having been allied with religion,** and has pleaded the cause of tyranny with the dexterity of an advocate while affecting the impartiality of a judge.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/356/mode/2up?view=theater

[Hume’s] last months were cheered by his loving friends and by reading in Lucretius and Lucian, the two most implacable enemies of religion – one the fiercest, the other the wittiest – that antiquity had produced. William Cullen, one of a battery of distinguished physicians attending Hume in his last illness, reported that Hume jovially found only one regret at leaving this world: **he “thought he might say he had been very busily employed in making his countrymen wiser and particularly in delivering them from the Christian superstition, but that he had not yet compleated that great work.”**9
…

This did not stop the omnivorous interviewer [Boswell]: “I know not how I contrived to get the subject of Immortality introduced. He said he never had entertained any belief in Religion since he began to read Locke and Clarke,” and added “flatly” that “the Morality of every Religion was bad, and, I really thought, was not jocular when he said ‘that when he heard a man was religious, he concluded he was a rascal, though he had known some instances of very good men being religious.’”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA261#v=onepage&q&f=false

If commentators generally agree that the Scottish Enlightenment was characterized by a blend of Christian and Stoic ideas, they also agree that David Hume (1711-76) is an exception to this trend – both regarding Christianity and Stoicism.
…

Moore (2007: 162) points out Hume’s aspiration to be a truthful “anatomist” rather than a “painter” of human nature**, his treating natural abilities like intelligence and good humor as virtues, and not just benevolence, his linking the moral sense to sympathy, and his conception of justice as an artificial virtue rather than as grounded on natural benevolence.** Such differences also emerge in their respective views of Stoic ideas. Commentators have discussed how Hume’s interpretation of Cicero’s *honestum* as humanity in the sense of a faint “feeling for others that links all mankind in an aversion to cruelty” differs from Hutcheson’s understanding of *honestum* as benevolence, that is the desire to promote the public good (Moore 2007: 385; Harris 2009: 173).

A passage from the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748) will serve to introduce Hume’s criticisms of Stoic moral philosophy:

> It is certain, that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of *Epictetus*, and other *Stoics*, **only a more refined system of selfishness,** and reason ourselves our of all virtue, as well as social enjoyment. *(Hume 2000: 35)*

Hume takes up the Augustinian criticism that the Stoic system is ultimately selfish and morally problematic, yet the target is different. Rather than denouncing the vanity of the Stoics' confidence in self-cultivation, Hume points at the problematic dimensions of the ideal of apathy. Discussing the Stoic attitude to compassion and humanity, Hume's later-withdrawn essay *Of Moral Prejudices* attacks the treatment of pity by Epictetus – **in a similar tone Hutcheson used when speaking only of the "lower Stoicks":**

> When your Friend is in Affliction, says *Epictetus*, you may counterfeit a Sympathy with him, if it give him Relief, but take Care not to allow any Compassion to sink into your Heart, or disturb that Tranquility, which is the Perfection of Wisdom. *(Hume 1987: 540)*

Similarly, the fourth Appendix to the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) **accuses Epictetus of having "scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and compassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it"** (Hume 2006: 107). Many moral philosophers who, like Hutcheson, tied their accounts of morality principles like sympathy or benevolence (which are in some cases presented as "Christian" principles) might have agreed that the conception of virtue presented by *some* Stoics requires a too detached and morally problematic stance towards our fellow human beings. **Hume, however, direct his criticism against the central Stoic figure Epictetus himself, and not just against some "lower Stoicks."**

More generally, Hume criticizes the effects of the

> grave philosophic Endeavour after Perfection, which, under Pretext of reforming Prejudices and Errors, strikes at all the most endearing Sentiments of the Heart, and all the most useful Byasses and Instincts, which can govern a human Creature. The *Stoics* were remarkable for this Folly among the Antients; and I wish some of more venerable Characters in latter Times had not copy'd them too faithfully in this Particular. *(Hume 1987: 539; see also M. Stewart 1991: 285f.; Moore 2007: 156f.)*

…

From a different angle, Hume alludes to the Stoics' vanity in the *Natural History of Religion* (1757), where he reproaches them for having bestowed "many magnificent and even impious epiphets on their sage, that he alone was rich, free, a king, and equal to the immortal gods" (Hume 1998: 174; see also M. Stewart 1991: 287; Brooke 2012: 179f.).

Hume also expresses serious doubts about the *practicability* of Stoicism, **since too much power is attributed to reason, the weakness of which Hume emphasizes throughout his philosophy.** In the frequently discussed *Letter to a Physician* (1734), allegedly written after a mental breakdown, Hume points out the negative influence of the Stoic ideal of self-cultivation on our lives.8 He writes how, impressed by Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch's

> beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy, I undertook the Improvement of my Temper & Will, along with my Reason & Understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with Reflections against Death, & Poverty, & Shame, & Pain, & all the other Calamities of Life. *(Hume 2011: 14)*

The crucial theme is the rejection of externals such as riches, life and health as indifferent, and the exclusive focus on the internal good of virtue, which is advertised in Stoic therapy and self-cultivation. **In an active life, such ideas might serve as guidelines, but "in Solitude they serve to little other Purpose, than to waste the Spirits"** (ibid.). This dovetails with Hume's general criticism that the Ancient moralists philosophized "without regarding human Nature" (ibid.: 16).

The unnatural Stoic ideals of self-perfection have their equivalent on the side of religion, where Hume rejects the problematic moral consequences of equally unnatural "monkish" (and Calvinist) virtues like self-denial and humility (Hume 2006: 73; 1998: 163). **In *A Dialogue*, Hume writes about the Augustinian Pascal that he "made constant profession of humility and abasement, of the contempt and hatred of himself; and endeavoured to attain these supposed virtues, as far as they are attainable"** (Hume 2006: 122). Pascal's austerities, and his rejection of even the most innocent pleasures ultimately lead to an artificial life, departing from the maxims of common reason and bound by religious superstition and philosophical enthusiasm (Hume 2006: 123).

In his philosophy of religion, **Hume attacks the Stoics not only for their superstition and enthusiasm, but more particularly for their ideas about providence** – a point with significant implications. In the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, he addresses the question of liberty and

necessity, and his criticism against the Stoics evidently concerns the religious hypothesis in general. Hume's target is the idea of a whole "ordered with perfect benevolence," according to which every "physical ill" his its specific place:

> From this theory, some philosophers, the ancient *Stoics* among the rest, derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the universe; **and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation.** *(Hume 2000: 76)*

…

Whereas Hutcheson tried to combine some broadly Christian and broadly Stoic streams of thought, Hume confronts them both. However difficult it may be to reach an adequate interpretation of Hume's four essays on happiness (*The Epicurean*, *The Stoic*, *The Platonist* and *The Sceptic*, from 1742), the voice of the Skeptic, who objects to the Stoic – who insists that virtue produces happiness – that "no perfect or regular distribution of happiness and misery is ever, in this life, to be expected" (Hume 1987: 178), seems to echo Hume's own views.9

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA177#v=onepage&q&f=false

The virtue of justice was quite distinct from that of benevolence; and was an example of what Hume called an artificial virtue, insofar as it 'produce[d] pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankind.'142 With the Epicureans, and against the Stoics, Hume located the origins of justice in a social convention for mutual advantage. **And when Hutcheson objected to Hume calling justice an artificial virtue, Hume denied that it was unnatural, just that it was artificial, and he quoted Horace's Epicurean opinion that utility was the mother of justice – the same tag that Grotius had deployed, first approvingly, in *De Jure Praedae*, and later disapprovingly, in *De Jure Belli et Pacis*.**143

This general hostility to Stoicism found expression in a number of other writings. The second, 1742 edition of the *Essays* contained four character sketches, 'The Epicurean,' 'The Stoic,' The Platonist' and 'The Sceptic,' **with the Stoic – subtitled 'the man of action and virtue' – presented as wallowing in smugness, which is punctured in the following essay by the Platonist, who charges that 'Thou surely art conscious of the hollowness of thy pretended probity'**144 **and that 'Thou art thyself thy own idol.'**145

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/54/mode/2up?view=theater

Nevertheless, Hume devotes his powerful philosophical mind and sophisticated social criticism to essentially conservative political, social, and moral goals and was relentless in his attack on the pretensions of philosophy itself. **The ground freed by pruning theology's sway, he proposed to occupy not with 'reason,' whose dominion, he, like Locke, strives to curb, and even ridicule, but with custom, habit, and practical good sense.** Not only does Hume insist our knowledge always derives from experience, he combined this with sceptical arguments, **to extend Locke's attempts to narrow the scope of philosophy, seeking to curb the pretensions of natural philosophy too.** Echoing Newton's empiricist strictures, as well as reacting somewhat to the euphoria surrounding his achievements, and the sweeping claims of other philosophers, **he asserts in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) that 'it must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects, while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends.'**46

Hume sought to restrict the range of philosophy's applicability in the search for truth and, still more, its practical applicability.47 **The latter ensured a head-on clash with the efforts to construct a secular morality and reason-based social theory and politics in Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot,** as we see from his strictures concerning the place of reason in the making and upholding of moral values. Already, in his first major work, the *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), Hume takes up an argument which subsequently remained a central strand of his philosophy: 'since morals have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they can not be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. **Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.**'48 **He proceeds similarly in his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751), the work Hume himself dubbed 'of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best'** albeit one which, like his previous works, also 'came unnoticed and unobserved into the world.' Here, Hume firmly eschews all theological criteria, granting that the 'end of moral speculations is to teach us our duty, and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other'; **but he also refuses to accept that any such result could stem 'from inferences and conclusions of the understanding,' on the ground that reason has no hold over individuals and cannot 'set in motion the active powers of men.'**49 Custom must do the work**.**

…

The fundamental unity and equality of Man urged by the Radical Enlightenment, being based on the idea of a shared reason, and the equivalence of individual volitions or motivation as proved by 'reason,' is definitely not for Hume, whose downplaying of 'reason,' and insistence on experience and practice, undoubtedly reinforced his anti-black bias and inclination 'to suspect that the Negroes and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.'50
…

No matter how defective a form of government, it still acquires legitimacy, **no matter how violent, illegitimate, and upstart in origin, argues Hume, merely from the fact of 'long possession' of power and through the 'right of succession,'** a basic principle in Hume's politics and morality as well as theory of property.55 If chastity and marital fidelity are very widely prized in human societies because the 'long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their young' and this in turn predicates the sanctity of the marriage bed, **the same experience of the facts of nature, in Hume's opinion, ensures that marital infidelity 'is much more pernicious in women than in men. Hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than over the other,'** and Hume feels this is as it should be.56
…

'Where birth is respected, unactive, spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies; the generous and ambitious seek honor and authority and reputation and favour. Where riches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail; arts, manufactures, commerce, agriculture flourish.' Consequently, **Hume thought the 'former prejudice, being favourable to military virtue,' better suited to monarchies and the latter, being more favourable to 'industry, agrees better with a republican government.'**59

Hume's very choice of words shows he had no particular fondness for monarchy or social hierarchy *per se*. His preferring mixed government to absolute monarchy was doubtless reinforced by his perception that poverty and inequality extend furthest under absolute monarchy, and that excessive inequality harms society as a whole,60 though he also believed the social fabric, with all its inequalities, was a delicate thing which could not be sensibly or safely challenged or changed by anything, least of all 'reason.' **Above all, he was emphatic in his belief that philosophy and 'reason' have no business in trying to transform the world.** His conservative scepticism represents a more systematic attack on the capacity of reason than perhaps any other eighteenth-century assault on *l'esprit philosophique*. **Hence, despite the fact that in the long run perhaps no one, next to Spinoza himself, did more to erode belief in miracles, the 'argument from design,' and the supernatural, Hume nevertheless must be regarded as a firm anti-democrat and, on the whole, more of an opponent than an ally of the Radical Enlightenment.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1895/misc/engels-bio.htm

> **These gentlemen preached a criticism which stood above all reality, above parties and politics, which rejected all practical activity, and which only "critically" contemplated the surrounding world and the events going on within it.** These gentlemen, the Bauers, looked down on the proletariat as an uncritical mass. Marx and Engels vigorously opposed this absurd and harmful tendency. In the name of a real, human person – the worker, trampled down by the ruling classes and the state – **they demanded, not contemplation, but a struggle for a better order of society.**

https://m.harunyahya.com/tr/works/716/Idealism-The-Philosophy-Of-The-Matrix-And-The-True-Nature-Of-Matter/chapter/1663/Introduction-We-are-Watching-a-Copy-of-Our-Lives

> > **Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every weapon against fideism [reliance on faith alone], for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism—and that is all that fideism requires. A single claw ensnared, and the bird is lost. And our Machists** [adherents of Machism, developed by the Austrian philosopher Mach, one of the leaders of modern positivism] **have all become ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted, subtle fideism;** they became ensnared from the moment they took "sensation" not as an image of the external world, but as a special "element." It is nobody's sensation, nobody's mind, nobody's spirit, nobody's will.1
>
> > 1. V.I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 334-335

https://m.harunyahya.com/tr/works/581/Communism-In-Ambush/chapter/61/Appendix-I-The-important-reality-that-invalidates-materialism

> "Berkeley retains the merit of having shown that the existence of matter is capable of being denied without absurdity, and that if there are any things that exist independently of us, they cannot be the immediate objects of our sensations."183
>
> 183. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Enhanced Media Publishing, Los Angeles, CA, 2016, p. 12

https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/britain/problems/ch04.htm

> Russell is a latter-day enlightener who has inherited from the old enlightenment not so much its enthusiasm as its idealistic prejudices. Russell is a sceptic through and through. He counterposes the peaceful and gradual methods of science and technology to the violent methods of revolution. **But he believes just as little in the salutary force of scientific thought as he does in the force of revolutionary action.** In his polemic with Nearing he attempts under the cover of pseudo-socialist phrases to belittle, discredit and compromise the revolutionary initiative of the Russian proletariat. **In his polemic against the biologist Haldane he makes a mockery of scientific-technical optimism. In his pamphlet *Icarus* he openly expresses his conviction that the best outcome would be the destruction of all our civilization.** And this man, **worm-eaten through and through with scepticism, egoistic, reclusive and aristocratic,** considers himself called upon to give advice to the British proletariat and to warn it against our communist intrigues! **The British working class is entering a period when it requires the greatest belief in its mission and its strength.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/414/mode/2up?view=theater

Hume had largely completed the manuscript by 1751, revised it carefully, and circulated it among a few chosen friends, including Adam Smith. They urged him to suppress it, and reluctantly, comically proclaiming himself the victim of tyranny, Hume acceded. But he was too fond of the *Dialogues* to permit it to remain in permanent obscurity: in the last months of his life he took precise, almost pedantic measures to guarantee its publication after his death. His solicitude was appropriate to its object: **the *Dialogues* is Hume's "Dictionnaire philosophique," the epitome of his life's work; his "Nathan der Weise," dramatizing his deepest convictions, a work of literary art impressive even to those who reject its conclusions; his "Neveu de Rameau," a conscious, free imitation of a favorite classic, Cicero's *De natura deorum*, which makes its point as forcibly by the resonances evoked by its borrowings as by its departures from the model.**
...

Besides, the universe resembles a watch or a house far less than it does an animal or a vegetable: Philo mischievously proposes that the Creator might be a vegetable rather than a craftsman. Nor is this all: if we observe the universe without our ordinary preconceptions, we may well conclude that the intelligence that created it was little better than an amateurish bungler who, for all we know, made and discarded other worlds before he settled on this one.1

> 1. **This imaginative speculation was a favorite with the philosophes: in his short story, *Songe de Platon*, Voltaire supposes that while God himself is perfect, he left the creation of this world to a lesser angel who made a poor job of it. Hence the presence, indeed prevalence, of evil.**

Little, very little, remains of the "religious hypothesis" after this assault. No matter how rationally argued or energetically defended, it is unconvincing and probably untrue. **"*To know God,*" concludes Philo, significantly quoting Seneca, "*is to worship him.* All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious."**2 **A reasonable man can do no more than to give a philosopher's calm recognition to the possibility that "*the cause of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence*"; but nothing follows from that recognition except the pleasure of modest, rational assent to a sensible proposition.**3 **It warrants no belief in extraordinary tales, justifies no prayer and no church, and does not even provide guidance to conduct.**

http://american_almanac.tripod.com/dehoyos.htm

> **Voltaire asserts in *Plato's Dream* that the "Eternal Geometrician" gave the evil divinity Demogorgon – the ruler of the netherworld in ancient mythology – "a bit of mud that is called Earth" to arrange as he saw fit.** After fashioning what Demogorgon considered a "masterpiece," the evil god was surprised to find himself coming under attack by the other genies attendant to the Great Demiurge, Demiurge also being a specific gnostic subordinate deity who creates the material universe. With his characteristic adolescent wit, Voltaire has the genies say:
>
> > "Your onions and artichokes are very good things; but I don't see what your idea was in covering the earth with so many venomous plants, unless you had the intention of poisoning the inhabitants. ... [you only have] four or five kinds of men; **it is true that you have given this last animal what you call reason; but in all conscience, that reason of his is too ridiculous and comes too close to madness.** Moreover, it appears to me that you set no

> great store by that two-footed animal, since you have given him so many enemies and so little defense, so many maladies and so few remedies, so many passions and so little wisdom. Apparently you do not want many of those animals to remain on earth. ...”

Demogorgon blushed: he fully sensed that there was moral evil and physical evil in the work he had done, **“but,” says Voltaire in a swipe at Leibniz's *Theodicy*, “he maintained that there was more good than evil.”**

At this point in the dream, the genies rage in a battle of polemics against each other over who had made the best planet, until the “eternal Demiurge” silences them, saying:

> “You have made some things good and some bad, because you have much intelligence and because you are imperfect; **your works will last only a few hundreds of millions of years, after which, having learned more, you will do it better;** it belongs to me alone to make things perfect and immortal.”

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n55/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire leaned to Deism, and seemed for some time to have adopted it; but, insensibly falling into Spinosa’s systems, he knew not what to believe. Consulting at one time D’Alembert, at another Frederic, he was, during the remainder of his life, a prey to remorse, if doubts and anguish of mind void of repentance can be so called. At nearly fourscore he expresses himself in the following manner; “**Doubts encompass us round, *and doubting is a disagreeable state*.** Is there a God such as he is said to be? A soul such as is imagined? Analogies such as are laid down? Is there any thing to be hoped for after this life? **Was Gilimer in the right to laugh, though stripped of his dominions, when brought before Justinian; or Cato in preferring suicide to the sight of Caesar? Is glory then but an illusion?** Shall Mustapha, in the effeminacy of his harem, beaten, ignorant, proud, and committing every folly, be happier, provided he digests well, than the Philosopher who digests ill? **Are all men equal before the Great Being that animates nature? In that case, could the soul of Ravaillac be equal to that of Henry IV, or had neither of them a soul?** Let the heroic philosophers unravel all this; for my part I can make nothing of it.”20

D’Alembert and Frederic, being alternately pressed by these questions, answered each after his own way. Unable to fix his own opinion, the former frankly confesses he has not the gift of solving them: “I own to you,” says he, “that concerning the existence of God, **the Author of the System of Nature seems too warm and dogmatic; and on this subject Scepticism seems the most rational.** *What do we know about it?* is with me an answer to most metaphysical questions; and the natural reflection must be, that since we know nothing of the matter, it is, doubtless, unnecessary that we should know more.”21

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n233/mode/2up?view=theater

The co-editor of the *Encyclopédie* was d’Alembert, who wrote the mathematical articles, together with a magnificent preface; later he resigned his share in the work, because the radical materialism of Diderot and most of his assistants did not suit his conciliatory and somewhat nervous spirit nor his exact scientific mode of thought. **Himself he professed a kind of phenomenalism which sounds almost like a presage of Kant and was certainly higher than the naïve dogmatism of the Encyclopaedists; he felt himself forced, he declared, to the assumption that “all we see is sense-phenomenal” and there is nothing outside of us to correspond to that which we think we see.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N25379.0001.001?id=DLPS1;lvl=1;note=inline;rgn=main;view=trgt

* **The following summary of Mr. Hume's doctrines, published some years before his death, Bishop Home says, was never, so far as he could find, questioned, as to its fidelity or accuracy, either by Mr. Hume, or his friends.**
…

That the soul of man is not the same this moment, that it was the last: that we know not what it is; that it is not one, but many things, and that it is nothing at all.
…

That the external world does not exist, or at least, that it's existence may reasonably be doubted.

That the universe exists in the mind, and that the mind does not exist.

That the universe is nothing but a heap of perceptions, without a substance.

…

That man, in all his perceptions, actions and volitions, is a mere passive machine, and has no separate existence of his own, being entirely made up of other things, of the existence of which he is by no means certain; **and yet, that the nature of all things depends so much upon man, that two and two could not be equal to four, nor fire produce heat, nor the sun light, without an act of the human understanding.**
…

That adultery must be practised, if men would obtain all the advantages of life; **that, if generally practised, it would in time cease to be scandalous; and, that, if practised secretly and frequently, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all.**

Lastly, as the soul of man, according to Mr. Hume, becomes every moment a different being, the consequence must be, that the crimes committed by him at one time cannot be imputable to him at another.

---

http://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/unholy_spirits.pdf

David Hume, in the middle of the eighteenth century, provided the classic answer of the skeptic: natural law really does not exist as a force independent of man's mind. Natural law is nothing more than the agreement among men that certain actions follow necessarily from prior actions. **Cause-and-effect relationships, in other words, are nothing but *conventions*.** The sensation of pain when I thrust my finger into boiling water may have no relation to that water. I may experience pain each time, but experience is not the same as rigorous mechanical law. We simply call certain events effects of prior events (the causes). **Nominalism, that is, the denial of the existence of metaphysical forms which order nature, had grown to maturity in the philosophy of Hume.** Whirl once again became king, despite the fact that men naively think that the laws or conventions of their minds relate in some way to a hypothetically lawful universe out there beyond our senses. **Law becomes convention.** As a result, confidence turns into skepticism.

> Prof. Howard Birack: "We assume time is narrow because it is as a clock – **one second is one second for everyone!** Cause precedes effect – fruit rots, water flows downstream. We're born, we age, we die. The reverse never happens... **None of this is true! Say goodbye to classical reality, because our logic collapses on the subatomic level... into ghosts and shadows.**" [*teaching a class on quantum physics*]
>
> https://creation.com/a-new-age-of-quantum-madness
>
> **But rather than embrace the notion of God,[5] Davies attacks the idea of unchanging physical laws. Instead, he proposes that the laws of physics have evolved along with the universe—his term is 'flexi-laws'.** The younger the universe, so goes the theory, the more flexible the laws are; so as the universe ages, the laws become less and less flexible, until they 'focus' on today's.

Men do not normally choose universal skepticism, but Hume's arguments seemed to make it impossible to avoid such a choice. **Hume's arguments were useful in refuting dogmatic theology, so his skepticism could be used against eighteenth-century Christianity, but the price paid for this anti-Christian weapon soon proved to be too high. Such was the conclusion of the philosopher who still stands as *the* philosopher of the modern world, Immanuel Kant.**

Hume's ideas, Kant later wrote, awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers, but the decade of his conversion to Humean skepticism (1763-72) led him to search for certainty, and certainty clearly was not to be found in the contingent rules of human experience. On that, Hume and Kant were in agreement. First comes dogmatism, then skepticism, and finally, Kant said, truly critical certainty. "**Scepticism is thus a resting-place for human reason,** where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings and make survey of the region in which it finds itself, so that for the future it may be able to choose its path with more certainty. **But it is no dwelling-place for permanent settlement.** Such can be obtained only through perfect certainty in our knowledge, alike of the objects themselves and of the limits within which all our knowledge of objects is enclosed."34 To find *a priori* certainty, Kant concluded, men must be humble. They must limit their questions to those that can be answered by the combination of sense data (experience) as interpreted by the universal, fixed categories of human thought.

This Kantian humility is bogus. It is the humility of self-proclaimed autonomous man. It is the humility of the man who says: "The visible, scientific world is capable of being discovered and molded by man's mind and man's activities as a rational species, and nothing that man is incapable of understanding scientifically is relevant in the external world." **But if this is true, *then how can man's morality be autonomous from scientific cause and effect, and yet also be connected to the realm of rational human action?*** In other words, how can man's personality be preserved in a world of strict cause and effect?

> https://academic.oup.com/book/1948/chapter-abstract/141752575?redirectedFrom=fulltext
>
> Recent interpreters of Kant, such as Wood and Korsgaard, have identified several powerful arguments that purport to refute all ethical theories other than Kant's own. But Buddhists have the resources to respond to these arguments. They can block the regress to humanity as an end by rejecting Kant's criticisms of the intrinsic value of happiness. **Kant argues that autonomous self-legislation is the only possible source of moral obligation. But Kant's views depend on regarding the rational mind as an autonomous self, an indefensible attitude.** Buddhists present an ethical perspective that does not involve autonomy or a self. Wood's transcendental argument for the necessity of seeing ourselves as free is a failure. **And Korsgaard's arguments for the practical necessity of the idea of freedom apply only to ordinary people, and not to advanced spiritual practitioners, who have access to a better state that doesn't involve constructing an identity.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/edgarquinethisea00heatuoft/page/302/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> At first Indian philosophy is orthodox, inimical to reason, supporting itself on the Vedas as interpreted by the saints; in its second stage, beginning to regard itself as something, it undertakes to confirm the truths of religion. **Very soon, under the breath of the Indian Descartes, the hosts of material gods are changed into abstractions and moral faculties.** Indra with his three heads, and the more subtle trinity of Brahma, founded on the idea of Being in itself, of its creative word, and of the grand soul of things, both become mere metaphysical abstractions. Finally, philosophy revolts against dogma, crushes tradition into powder, peoples the world with sterile atoms; and, furious to destroy everything, turns at last against itself.
>
> **Doubt arrived at its last limit, faith is born again of spiritual death. A new religion springs out of this abyss of abstractions; the East is still so full of God that scepticism only ends there by giving birth to the New Testament of India.**
>
> In its most extreme departures from orthodoxy, Indian doubt retains its gods, only contesting their eternal duration. When, from examination after examination, philosophy reached the absolute void, **instead of shrinking from the abyss like the European doubter, the Indian went on until he arrived at a new belief.** Outside all created things, outside every form or limit, beyond light and darkness, beyond the bounds of all thought, he found a God who had no relation with the world. **Never did Christianity, even in the heart of the Middle Age, so absolutely anathematise Matter.** To the Oriental the visible world was an imposture; he wished to tear off the mask that covered the universe.
> ...
>
> Here, as it were, at the antipodes both of Nature and Tradition, it found another heaven, another god; **for out of the last efforts of philosophy to overthrow everything, came forth the revelation of Buddha,** a religion which counts to-day a number of adherents greater than the united hosts of all who profess Christianity and Islamism.

...

Nothing can be known without sense data, but without the categories of human thought to assemble the data into coherent wholes, experience tells us nothing. There is therefore no way of knowing anything beyond our senses *as categorized and ordered* by the concepts of the autonomous mind. "Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle *nature*, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there."35 The human understanding, he concluded, is "the *faculty of rules*."36

It is therefore man's autonomous mind which creates that entity which we know as nature. **The "stuff out there," that is, the so-called "things in themselves," must be forever unknown and unknowable to us.** We can only know nature through our own *a priori* categories of reason. *Man's mind legislates the laws of nature!* "Thus the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. Save through it, nature, that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules, would not exist at all..."37 *Man is the ultimate creator of his own reality.* **Man is autonomous. In this there is certainty of knowledge. This is the so-called "humility" of Kantian philosophy.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n325/mode/2up?view=theater

> In the same way Kant hurls man down to the depths of powerlessness and darkness and proves to him irrefutably that he is separated from knowledge of the “true” world, the world-in-itself, by insuperable barriers; but at the same time he makes him the creator and absolute lawgiver of the empirical world, whose enormous expanses can no longer make him fearful. **The *Pure Reason* thus marks at once the lowest subjection and the highest triumph of human reason: man is a vanishingly small point in the universe, but this cipher imposes its laws on the universe.**
> …
>
> At the time of the wonderful discoveries made by Gauss and Riemann of the non-Euclidean geometries, it was believed that the transcendental philosophy had received its death-blow. But so far are they from refuting it that they in fact constitute its confirmation. **For Kant maintained that Euclidean space was *our* idea—ours only, but for us the one possible and necessary conception.** Other spaces are thinkable, but not imaginable. Kant’s doctrine of the a-priorism of space would only be refuted if a man appeared who could visually imagine a non-Euclidean geometry, a flatland life, or a four-dimensional world. **The same is true of the extraordinary discoveries of Einstein; they prove unambiguously that many times are possible, and that the idea of an absolute time valid for all parts of space is a human fiction. From this numerous investigators concluded that the transcendental philosophy was no longer tenable.** For instance, in his admirable *Lectures on the Physical Basis of Natural Science* Franz Exner says: “If we ask ourselves what remains of the absolute concept of space and time postulated and set up by Kant, we must answer, almost nothing.” **But surely Kant’s epoch-making achievement was just that he *destroyed* the idea of absolute space and time.** His whole system is anticipated Relativity, and Relativity is nothing but the exact, scientific establishment of the Kantian doctrine by methods which were not yet at his disposal.

…

Cornelius Van Til, a twentieth-century Christian philosopher and theologian, has argued throughout his career that Kant's philosophy is the touchstone of all modern thought.

…

Spend five minutes or so carefully studying this quotation from Van Til, and the logical tricks of modern (or ancient) atheistic humanism will never be a threat to you again. Pay particular attention to his concept of the "secret treaty" between rationalism and irrationalism - a treaty against God. (For added readability, I have broken his three original paragraphs into seven.)

…

> First there is the need for authority that grows out of the existence of the endless multiplicity of factual material. Time rolls its ceaseless course. It pours out upon us an endless stream of facts. And the stream is really endless on the non-Christian basis.
>
> For those who do not believe that all that happens in time happens because of the plan of God, the activity of time is like to that, or rather is identical with that, of Chance. Thus the ocean of facts has no bottom and no shore.
>
> **It is this conception of the ultimacy of time and of pure factuality on which modern philosophy, particularly since the days of Kant, has laid such great stress. And it is because of the general recognition of the ultimacy of chance that the rationalism of the sort that Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz represented, is out of date. It has become customary to speak of post-Kantian philosophy as irrationalistic.**
>
> > https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/n17/mode/2up?view=theater
> > **[1883]**
> >
> > **Among German philosophers Kant is, perhaps, the last, who shows no traces of Spinozism.** Hegel has declared, that "to be a philosopher one must first be a Spinozist."
>
> It has been said that Kant limited reason so as to make room for faith. Hence there are those who are willing to grant that man's emotions or his will can get in touch with such aspects of reality as are not accessible to the intellect. The intellect, it is said, is not the only, and in religious matters not even the primary, instrument with which men come into contact with what is ultimate in human experience. There is the world of the moral imperative, of aesthetic appreciation, of the religious a priori as well as the world of science. **There is in short the world of "mystery" into which the prophet or genius of feeling or of will may lead us.**
>
> It is of the greatest import to note that the natural man need not in the least object to the kind of authority that is involved in the idea of irrationalism. And that chiefly for two reasons. In the first place, the irrationalism of our day is the direct lineal descendant of the rationalism of previous days. **The idea of pure chance has been inherent in every form of non-Christian thought in the past. It is the only logical alternative to the position of Christianity, according to which the plan of God is back of all. Both Plato and Aristotle were compelled to make room for it in their maturest thought.** The pure "non-being" of the earliest rationalism of

> Greece was but the suppressed "otherness" of the final philosophy of Plato. So too the idea of pure factuality or pure chance as ultimate is but the idea of "otherness" made explicit. Given the non-Christian assumption with respect to man's autonomy, the idea of chance has equal rights with the idea of logic.
>
> In the second place, modern irrationalism has not in the least encroached upon the domain of the intellect as the natural man thinks of it. Irrationalism has merely taken possession of that which the intellect, by its own admission, cannot in any case control. **Irrationalism has a secret treaty with rationalism by which the former cedes to the latter so much of its territory as the latter can at any given time find the forces to control. Kant's realm of the noumenal has, as it were, agreed to yield so much of its area to the phenomenal, as the intellect by its newest weapons can manage to keep in control. Moreover, by the same treaty irrationalism has promised to keep out of its own territory any form of authority that might be objectionable to the autonomous intellect.**
>
> The very idea of pure factuality or chance is the best guarantee that no true authority, such as that of God as the Creator and Judge of men, will ever confront man. If we compare the realm of the phenomenal as it has been ordered by the autonomous intellect to a clearing in a large forest, we may compare the realm of the noumenal to that part of the same forest which has not yet been laid under cultivation by the intellect. The realm of mystery is on this basis simply the realm of that which is not yet known.40

This "secret treaty" between the scientific phenomenal realm and the personalistic noumenal realm has one major purpose: *to shove God out of the universe*.
…

The naive Newtonians did not understood that Newton had personally rested his case for a coherent universe on God's providence, **and that when Kant destroyed men's faith in Newton's providentialism, he thereby in principle destroyed the foundation of predictable science. If God does not hold the universe together, then who does? Man? Man's mind? The *a priori* categories of man's mind? What a feeble foundation!**
…

First, Kant triumphed over Newton, as men were told that the innate categories of their minds provide order to the random noumenal world "out there." Then, after 1964, a world view close to don Juan's began to triumph over Kant, at least within a growing segment of the student population, as well as inside the American book-buying public. **People began to take Castaneda's anti-rational proposition quite seriously: there *is* a separate reality. In fact, there are many realities. Each autonomous man makes his own, in terms of his own categories. The linguistic confusion of the tower of Babel is now paralleled by the confusion of the "universal language" of Kant's categories. (This is the essence, I suspect, of the prevailing epistemology of all those in hell: total autonomy and isolation.)** Kant's faith that universal categories of the human mind necessarily exist and give order to the world is being abandoned; it is "every man for himself."
…

It was Kant, after all, who had asserted that "the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. Save through it, nature, that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to the rules, would not exist at all…"77 The old sorcerer saw what Castaneda's simplistic nineteenth-century rationalism did not prepare him to see, but what humanistic philosophers have maintained for two hundred years: "The world is such-and-such or so-and-so only because we tell ourselves that that is the way it is. If we would stop telling ourselves that the world is so-and-so, the world would stop being so-and-so."78

http://www.christianciv.com/ChristCivEssay_Pt2.htm#Ethics

Kant cannot justify his rule of equal treatment for all humans on the basis of his philosophy because *he cannot even know if other people exist.* According to him, all universals are a projection of the individual, autonomous human mind. To know that other people exist would be to know things-in-themselves, the noumenal world, which is impossible on his view. And even in his isolated, solipsistic world, Kant cannot account for the integration of universals with particulars because his universal begins as a pure blank, excluding all particularity.

https://archive.org/details/christianityand00andrgoog/page/n155/mode/2up?view=theater

It was reserved to Kant (d. 1804) to make Agnosticism an integral part of his philosophy. He affirmed that all we can know of things external to us is their phenomena; of what is back of these phenomena, and

underlying them, we are, and must be, ignorant. Of the three great objects of knowledge, God, Nature, and Man, we can affirm nothing certain.
…

Professor Seth ("Scottish Philosophy") remarks: "Kant is the *fons et origo* of the most cultured agnosticism of the day."

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/79/mode/2up?view=theater

Immanuel Kant's life story is difficult to describe, because he had neither a life nor a story. He lived a mechanically ordered, almost abstract bachelor existence in a quiet isolated lane in Königsberg, an old city on the north-eastern border of Germany. **In my opinion, not even the great cathedral clock there went about its daily labor with less passion and more regularity than its compatriot Immanuel Kant.** Getting up, drinking coffee, writing, giving lectures, eating, walking: everything had its set time, and the neighbors knew that it was exactly half past three when Immanuel Kant, in his grey frock-coat, rattan cane in hand, emerged from his front door and strolled in the direction of small Lindenallee, which is still called "Philosopher's Way" on his account. He walked there eight times back and forth in every season, and when the weather was dismal or grey clouds indicated rain, one would see his servant, old Lampe, walking with anxious concern behind him, a long umbrella under his arm, like an image of Providence.

What a remarkable contrast between the external life of this man and his destructive, world-crushing thought! Indeed, had the citizens of Königsberg sensed the true meaning of this thought, they would have been in much greater dread of him than of the executioner — the executioner, namely, who only kills people. But the good citizens saw in him only a professor of philosophy, and when he walked by at the proper time, they gave him friendly greetings, and set their watches.

If, however, **Immanuel Kant, the great destroyer in the realm of thought, far surpassed Maximilian Robespierre in terrorism,** the two, on the other hand, had certain similarities, which invite us to compare them. First, we find in both the same unrelenting, cutting, unpoetic, and sober honesty. Next, we find in both the same aptitude for distrust, only that the first exercises it upon thought and calls it criticism, whereas the second uses it against people and calls it republican virtue.
…

Why, though, did Kant write his *Critique of Pure Reason* in the grey, dry style of a paper bag? **Since he rejected the mathematical form of the Descartes-Leibniz-Wolffians, I think he was afraid that philosophical science would forfeit some of its dignity if it expressed itself in an easy, accessibly bright tone.** He thus gave it a rigid, abstract form which coldly rejected all familiarity with the lower spiritual classes. He wanted, in aristocratic fashion, to separate himself from the contemporary "popular philosophers" who strove for the most bourgeois clarity, and he clothed his thoughts in courtly and chilled officialese.145 Here, the philistine shows himself in full. But perhaps Kant needed an even more carefully deliberate language for his carefully deliberate mode of thought, and he was incapable of creating a better one. Only genius finds a new word for the new thought. But Immanuel Kant was no genius. **Feeling this deficiency, just like the good Maximilian, Kant was even more distrustful of genius, and in his *Critique of Judgment*, he even claims that genius has nothing to do with science, its contributions belonging solely to the realm of art.**

Kant did much harm with the starchy and ponderous style of his major work. His soul-less imitators mimicked him in this regard, **and this led to the superstition among us that good writing was incompatible with being a philosopher. But at least the mathematical form of philosophy could no longer be used after Kant, who mercilessly criticized it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He said that mathematical form in philosophy creates nothing but card houses, just as philosophical form in mathematics is mere chatter.** For in philosophy there can be no definitions like those in mathematics, where definitions are not discursive, but intuitive, that is, can be demonstrated in intuition; what are called definitions in philosophy can only be produced experimentally, hypothetically; really true definitions appear only at the end, as results.146

How is it that philosophers demonstrate so much fondness for mathematical form? **This fondness began as far back as Pythagoras, who designated the principles of things by numbers.**147 This was a thought of genius. In a number, everything sensuous and finite is stripped away, and yet it designates something definite and this definite thing's relationship to something else definite, which, when also expressed by a number, has the same characteristics of non-sensuousness and non-finiteness. In all of this, numbers are like ideas, which have the same characteristics and the same relationship to each other. **Ideas, as they appear in our minds and in nature, can very well be designated by numbers; but the number remains always the mere sign of the idea, not the idea itself.** The master is always aware of this difference; the pupil however forgets it and transmits to his students only a hieroglyphics of numbers, mere numerals, whose living meaning is no longer known and which are parroted with a sort of school pride. The same is true of the other elements of mathematical form. **The spiritual in its eternal movement cannot be fixed; just as little by line, triangle, square, and circle as by number. Thought can be neither counted nor measured.**
…

I have already mentioned that the *Critique of Pure Reason* did not make the least sensation when it appeared. **Only several years later when a few astute philosophers wrote commentaries about it did it awaken the attention of the public, and in 1789 nothing was more talked about in Germany than Kant's philosophy.** It already had a profusion of commentaries, anthologies, explanations, reviews, apologies, etc. **You need only glance at the first good philosophical catalogue you find, and the enormous number of works which appeared at the time about Kant gives ample testimony of the spiritual movement which started with this one man.** In one, you see bubbling enthusiasm, in the other a bitter annoyance, and in many a wide-eyed curiosity about the end results of this spiritual revolution. We have uprisings in the world of ideas just as you do in the material world, and tearing down the old dogmatism makes us as hot as storming the Bastille makes you. **To be sure, here too there were just a few old invalids who defended dogmatism, that is, Wolffian philosophy. It was a revolution and it did not lack in atrocities. Among the faction of the past, it was the truly good Christians who were the least indignant about these atrocities. Indeed, they wanted even more terrible atrocities in order to exhaust all patience, and thus to spark the counterrevolution, as necessary reaction, all the more quickly.** There were philosophical pessimists here just as you had political pessimists. Some of our pessimists deceived themselves so far as to think that Kant had a secret agreement with them, and that he had only destroyed all previous proofs of God's existence so that the world would see that one can never reach knowledge of God through reason, and that one would therefore be forced to adhere to revealed religion.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Schopenhauer_as_Educator#3

So the first danger in whose shadow Schopenhauer lived was—isolation. **The second is called—doubting of the truth. To this every thinker is liable who sets out from the philosophy of Kant, provided he be strong and sincere in his sorrows and his desires, and not a mere tinkling thought-box or calculating machine.** We all know the shameful state of things implied by this last reservation, and I believe it is only a very few men that Kant has so vitally affected as to change the current of their blood. **To judge from what one reads, there must have been a revolution in every domain of thought since the work of this unobtrusive professor: I cannot believe it myself.** For I see men, though darkly, as themselves needing to be revolutionised, before any "domains of thought" can be so. **In fact, we find the first mark of any influence Kant may have had on the popular mind, in a corrosive scepticism and relativity.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm

Why all the rejoicing over the appearance of Kant that went through **the learned world of Germany, three-fourths of which is made up of the sons of preachers and teachers—why the German conviction still echoing, that with Kant came a change for the *better*?** The theological instinct of German scholars made them see clearly just *what* had become possible again. … A backstairs leading to the old ideal stood open; the concept of the "true world," the concept of morality as the *essence* of the world (—the two most vicious errors that ever existed!), **were once more, thanks to a subtle and wily scepticism, if not actually demonstrable, then *at least* no longer *refutable*…**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n237/mode/2up?view=theater

It was the amateurish confusion between philosophic speculation and exact research, and nothing else, that made it possible for so many even of the most intelligent men of the age to accept materialism as a creed. **The solution of the problem had to wait for Kant, who showed that in reality it was two wholly disparate spheres of the human reason that were in question, and that this could not be properly grasped unless they were treated apart from each other.** And, for that matter, the efforts that are made ever and again, even today, to gloss over or to reject the limits so dearly marked out by Kant, **to be metaphysical as a natural scientist or scientific as a metaphysician, indicate, not a necessary attitude of the time as it did with the materialists of the French Enlightenment, but only an antediluvian imbecility.**

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/kant,_immanuel.html

Kant's expressly stated purpose was to save the morality of self-abnegation and self-sacrifice. He knew that it could not survive without a mystic base—and what it had to be saved from was *reason*.

Attila's share of Kant's universe includes this earth, physical reality, man's senses, perceptions, reason and science, all of it labeled the "phenomenal" world. The Witch Doctor's share is another, "higher," reality, labeled the "noumenal" world, and a special manifestation, labeled the "categorical imperative," which dictates to man the rules of morality and which makes itself known by means of a *feeling*, as a special sense of duty.
…

No, Kant did not destroy reason; he merely did as thorough a job of undercutting as anyone could ever do.

If you trace the roots of all our current philosophies—such as pragmatism, logical positivism, and all the rest of the neo-mystics who announce happily that you cannot prove that you exist—you will find that they all grew out of Kant.
…

Plato was more than a Platonist; despite his mysticism, he was also a pagan Greek. As such he exhibited a certain authentic respect for reason, a respect which was implicit in Greek philosophy no matter how explicitly irrational it became. The Kantian mysticism, however, suffers from no such pagan restraints. It flows forth triumphantly, sweeping the prostrate human mind before it. Since man can never escape the distorting agents inherent in the structure of his consciousness, says Kant, "things in themselves" are in principle unknowable. Reason is impotent to discover anything about reality; if it tries, it can only bog down in impenetrable contradictions. Logic is merely a subjective human device, devoid of reference to or basis in reality. Science, while useful as a means of ordering the data of the world of appearances, is limited to describing a surface world of man's own creation and says nothing about things as they really are.

Must men then resign themselves to a total skepticism? No, says Kant, there is one means of piercing the barrier between man and existence. Since reason, logic, and science are denied access to reality, the door is now open for men to approach reality by a different, *nonrational* method. The door is now open to *faith*. Taking their cue from their needs, men can properly *believe* (for instance, in God and in an afterlife), even though they cannot prove the truth of their belief. … "I have," writes Kant, "therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*."

https://counter-currents.com/2017/09/between-capital-archaic-socialism/

But liberalism, notes Michéa, has become the philosophy of skepticism and generalized deconstruction. There is all the difference in the world between a socialism of ordinary folk and a socialism of intellectuals, the latter being nothing more than a championing of causes by a deconstructivist elite. Liberalism is the philosophy of "indifferentiation anchored in the movement of the uniformity of the market" (p. 133). It is a central thesis of the book that liberalism creates individuation in human societies so that the individual is increasingly isolated and social cohesion declines, while paradoxically and running parallel to this development, the economic structures of the world become increasingly uniform, dominated by the power of capital and concentrated in the hands of an increasingly wealthy few.

https://journals.jcu.edu.au/linq/article/download/2317/2271

Similarly, for all its bravura deconstruction of the university into its constitutive contradictions, **Derrida's analysis is filled with a Kantian longing.** After all, what is the unrepresentable idea of the university other than an improvisation on Kant's theme of the "noumenon," forever beyond the reach of human representation yet forever tempting us to represent it?

https://archive.org/details/OurCauseByDr.WilliamLutherPierce1976

The subject of my talk was the importance of White Americans developing a sense of racial identity and racial pride if we are to survive. When I finished, a White student, about 17-years-old, rose to ask the first question. His question was, "What makes you think it's so important for the White race to survive?"

I was flabbergasted and at a loss for words.
…

But the thing which bothered me even more than the phony collective racial guilt which had been pumped into those boys and girls, was my inability to answer the White kid's question.
Why ***should*** we survive? That's one of those questions like, why is good better than evil? Or, nowadays, why is heterosexuality any better than homosexuality? If two people want to have sex together, who are we to say that it's better that they be a man and a woman than that they be two men or two women? A related question concerns racial mixing: why shouldn't a Black man and a White woman, or vice versa, live together if they can be happy? These are questions which most White people, even normal healthy White people, cannot answer satisfactorily today.

A hundred years ago, before the Jews came flooding into our country and taking over our mass media and our educational system, we might not have really needed answers. We just ***knew*** that it was important for our race to survive and to make progress. We ***knew*** that homosexuality and interracial sex were wrong. Our intuition told us this. The answers were in our souls even if we couldn't express them in words. But then the Jews—who are clever people, very clever people—

came along, and they began asking these very questions. And when we couldn't answer them, they began providing their own answers.
…

The kid who believes that the purpose of life is happiness, knows that there are not many things on this earth happier than a bunch of pickaninnies splashing in a mud puddle. And the businessman who believes that the purpose of life is to make money knows that a Black customer's money is just as green as a White customer's.

A person who accepts that sort of basis, indeed, ***cannot*** see any really convincing reason why the White race should survive.

> http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/011568.html
>
> Zmirak's point is that if Derbyshire's atheism and Darwinism were true, then Derbyshire would have absolutely no basis for believing in *any* of the things he believes in, **including not only the doctrines of atheism and Darwinism, but even his own personhood and reason.**
> …
>
> As I recently explained here, according to the consistent Darwinian view (i.e., the Darwinian view without the escape hatch of unprincipled exceptions), **the only reason people believe or say or do anything is that the instinct to believe or say or do that thing was planted in them by chance genetic mutations that occurred in their distant ancestors and were then passed down to the present generation by natural selection.** Therefore a man has a certain belief, not because it is true, and not because he believes in the possibility of truth as such, but because that belief, having been planted in his ancestors by a random genetic mutation, helped his ancestors survive (i.e., natural selection), or, alternatively, because a distant female ancestor of his had a random genetic mutation that made her want to mate with a male who had that belief, which he in turn had acquired through a random genetic mutation (i.e., sexual selection), or, alternatively, because the man himself has a random genetic mutation which plants that belief in him.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Fragment_of_a_letter_to_a_priest#cite_ref-16

Let us not admit discourses by Epicurus or Pyrrho; but indeed the gods have already in their wisdom destroyed their works, so that most of their books have ceased to be. Nevertheless there is no reason why I should not, by way of example, mention these works too, to show what sort of discourses priests must especially avoid; and if such discourses, then much more must they avoid such thoughts.

https://pyrrhonism.medium.com/epicureanism-versus-pyrrhonism-6932797eb414#_ftn2

This is the case with Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism, both of which are philosophical descendants of Democritus, causing them to have much in common. Epicurus even openly admired Pyrrho, and he studied under one of Pyrrho's students.[3] The Pyrrhonist philosopher, Sextus Empiricus, even referred to Epicurus as "wise"[4] – praise he gave to no other dogmatist.

> [4] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Grammarians*, Chapter 3, Section 57.

On a practical basis, the Epicureans and the other Hellenistic school of hedonism, the Cyrenaics, are largely in agreement with the Pyrrhonists about the senses: they're all we have to go on. **This is in opposition to other schools that claim to provide things beyond the senses to guide us.** Diogenes Laertius reports this on the Pyrrhonist view of the senses:

> *In response, those who put forward doctrines claim that the skeptics do away even with life, insofar as they cast out all the things from which life is constituted. But the skeptics say that these critics engage in misrepresentation. For skeptics do not deny that seeing occurs, but they claim ignorance about how we see. For, we accept a given appearance, but not as if it also were such.* ***We perceive that fire burns, but we refrain from declaring whether it has a burning nature.*** *And we see that someone is moving, and that he perishes. But we don't know how these things occur.* ***Thus, they say, we only take a stand against the non-evident things that subsist beside the appearances. … This is the reason why Timon in his*** **Pytho** ***avows that he has not stepped beyond customary norms.*** *And he says the following in his* Appearances*: "But appearance prevails everywhere it goes."* ***And in his work*** **On Sense Perceptions** ***he says, "I do not posit that honey is sweet, but I concede that it seems so." And, in the first book of his*** **Pyrrhonian Arguments***, Aenesidemus says that Pyrrho determined nothing in a dogmatic fashion because of the opposition of arguments, but that he followed*

> ***appearances. … Thus, according to the skeptics, that which appears is the criterion. Aenesidemus says this, and so does Epicurus.***[5]

Diogenes is a little unclear here at the end as he fails to mention that by "criterion" the Pyrrhonists mean the criterion of action, whereas Epicurus means it to be the criterion of truth, **but the key point here is that the Pyrrhonists and Epicureans agree on what criteria to use for decision making: the senses.**

In Plutarch's *Table Talk* there's an argument that Epicurean epistemology is just disguised Pyrrhonism. [6]

> *Now for wine! I should like to know what made you suspect that it is cold.' I replied: 'Do you actually think that this is my own theory?' 'Who else's?' Florus said, and I answered: 'I remember coming upon Aristotle's discussion of this question too, not recently but quite a long time ago.* ***And Epicurus in his* Symposium *has discussed the matter at great length. The sum of what he has to say, I think, is this: he holds that wine is not hot in an absolute sense, but has in it certain atoms productive of heat and others of cold;*** *some of these it throws off when it comes into the body and others it attracts out of the body until it adapts itself to us, whatever our constitution and nature may be. Accordingly, some men become thoroughly hot when drinking, others experience the contrary.'* ***'This', said Florus, 'carries us via Protagoras straight to Pyrrho; for it is clear that we shall go on about oil, about milk and honey, and other things in like manner and shall avoid saying about each what its nature is by defining them in terms of their mixtures and union with each other.'***

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MSu2w3FqepoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

Of the three named teachers of Epicurus it should be kept in mind that Pamphilus was a Platonist, Praxiphanes a Peripatetic, and Nausiphanes a Democritean atomist.
…

Nausiphanes, however, was no narrow physicist. His reputation for learning was high, and specific testimony to his proficiency in rhetoric has been preserved.24 Attention to this subject was perhaps a necessity, because it was the money-making branch among contemporary studies.25 No specific evidence exists to indicate that he shared an interest in mathematics with the Platonists or in plants and animals with the Peripatetics. His claim to originality arises from his reaction to the contemporary skepticism of Pyrrho, who, after the upsetting experience of viewing the wisdom of Persia and India in the train of Alexander, had returned to deny the possibility of knowledge. Nausiphanes, while yet a young man, became his pupil and was captivated not by his doctrines but by his disposition, which was imperturbable.26 **Epicurus, in turn, becoming the pupil of Nausiphanes, conceived a like admiration of Pyrrho's conduct "and was continually asking for more information about him."**27 Here may consequently be discerned one possible origin for the famous Epicurean doctrine of ataraxy or tranquillity of soul. **The practice of Pyrrho was closer to this than to the cheerfulness (*euthumia*) of Democritus, although Epicurus cultivated this also. It is to be remembered too that Pyrrho recommended abstention from public life (*apragmosune*),** which should remind us that Epicurus disapproved of all public careers.
…

The imperturbability of Pyrrho was indifference and a sort of resignation to belief in the impossibility of knowledge. **With this sort of resignation it is clear that neither Nausiphanes nor Epicurus had any patience. The distinction of becoming the first dogmatists may perhaps be claimed by them.** Nausiphanes admired only the disposition of Pyrrho and rejected his skepticism.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MSu2w3FqepoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA303#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Epicurus] seems at first to have admired the great skeptic, perhaps for his serenity, but later he revolted violently and resolved that happiness must be based upon the certainty of knowledge rather than upon resignation to the belief that knowledge was impossible. **In the heat of this revulsion he declared Pyrrho "incapable either of learning or of being instructed" and became dogmatic on the subject of dogmatism, asserting "that the wise man will dogmatize and not be a doubter."**4

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n233/mode/2up?view=theater

275. Cynics and Epicureans.—The cynic recognises the connection between the multiplied and stronger pains of the more highly cultivated man and the abundance of requirements; he comprehends, therefore, that the multitude of opinions about what is beautiful, suitable, seemly and pleasing, must also produce very rich sources of enjoyment, but also of displeasure. In accordance with this view he educates himself backwards, by giving up many of these opinions and withdrawing from certain demands of culture; he thereby gains a feeling of freedom and strength; and gradually, when habit has made his manner of life endurable, his sensations of displeasure are, as a matter of fact, rarer and weaker than those of cultivated people, and approach those of the domestic animal; moreover, he experiences everything with the charm of contrast, **and—he can also scold to his heart's content; so that thereby he again**

rises high above the sensation-range of the animal. The Epicurean has the same point of view as the cynic; there is usually only a difference of temperament between them. Then the Epicurean makes use of his higher culture to render himself independent of prevailing opinions, he raises himself above them, whilst the cynic only remains negative. He walks, as it were, in wind-protected, well-sheltered, half-dark paths, whilst over him, in the wind, the tops of the trees rustle and show him how violently agitated is the world out there. The cynic, on the contrary, goes, as it were, naked into the rushing of the wind and hardens himself to the point of insensibility.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_X

He says himself that he first came into contact with philosophy at the age of fourteen. Apollodorus the Epicurean, in the first book of his *Life of Epicurus*, says that he turned to philosophy in disgust at the schoolmasters who could not tell him the meaning of "chaos" in Hesiod.[4] According to Hermippus, however, he started as a schoolmaster, but on coming across the works of Democritus turned eagerly to philosophy. 3. **Hence the point of Timon's allusion[5] in the lines:**

> **Again there is the latest and most shameless of the physicists, the schoolmaster's son[6] from Samos, himself the most uneducated of mortals.**

...

Diotimus[7] the Stoic, who is hostile to him, has assailed him with bitter slanders, adducing fifty scandalous letters as written by Epicurus; and so too did the author who ascribed to Epicurus the epistles commonly attributed to Chrysippus. 4. They are followed by Posidonius the Stoic and his school, and Nicolaus and Sotion in the twelfth book of his work entitled *Dioclean Refutations*, consisting of twenty-four books; **also by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.** They allege that he used to go round with his mother to cottages and read charms, and assist his father in his school for a pitiful fee;[8] further, that one of his brothers was a pander and lived with Leontion the courtesan; **that he put forward as his own the doctrines of Democritus about atoms and of Aristippus about pleasure; that he was not a genuine Athenian citizen,** a charge brought by Timocrates and by Herodotus in a book *On the Training of Epicurus as a Cadet*; **that he basely flattered Mithras,[9] the minister of Lysimachus, bestowing on him in his letters Apollo's titles of Healer and Lord.**

...

6. **It is added that he corresponded with many courtesans,** and especially with Leontion, of whom Metrodorus also was enamoured. It is observed too that in his treatise *On the Ethical End* he writes in these terms:[11] "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form." **And in his letter to Pythocles: "Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture."** Epictetus calls him preacher of effeminacy and showers abuse on him.
...

9. But these people are stark mad. For our philosopher has abundance of witnesses to attest his unsurpassed goodwill to all men – his native land, which honoured him with statues in bronze; **his friends, so many in number that they could hardly be counted by whole cities,** and indeed all who knew him, held fast as they were by the siren-charms of his doctrine, save Metrodorus[16] of Stratonicea, who went over to Carneades, being perhaps burdened by his master's excessive goodness; the School itself which, while nearly all the others have died out, continues for ever without interruption through numberless reigns of one scholarch after another;[17] 10. his gratitude to his parents, his generosity to his brothers, his gentleness to his servants, as evidenced by the terms of his will and by the fact that they were members of the School, the most eminent of them being the aforesaid Mys; **and in general, his benevolence to all mankind. [πάντας αὐτοῦ φιλανθρωπία] His piety towards the gods and his affection for his country no words can describe. He carried deference to others to such excess that he did not even enter public life. He spent all his life in Greece, notwithstanding the calamities which had befallen her in that age;[18] when he did once or twice take a trip to Ionia, it was to visit his friends there.[19]**
...

He further says that **Epicurus did not think it right that their property should be held in common, as required by the maxim of Pythagoras about the goods of friends;** such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust, and without confidence there is no friendship. In his correspondence he himself mentions that he was content with plain bread and water. And again: "Send me a little pot of cheese, that, when I like, I may fare sumptuously." Such was the man who laid down that pleasure was the end of life. And here is the epigram[20] in which Athenaeus eulogizes him:

> 12. Ye toil, O men, for paltry things and incessantly begin strife and war for gain; **but nature's wealth extends to a moderate bound, whereas vain judgements have a limitless range.** This message Neocles' wise son heard from the Muses or from the sacred tripod at Delphi.[21]

…

31. **They reject dialectic as superfluous;** holding that in their inquiries the physicists should be content to employ the ordinary terms for things.[43]

…

32. **Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same;[45] nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all.** And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees[46] the truth of our senses.

> https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/70/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **One of the "benefits" of Epicurean materialism is that it allows its adherents to claim omniscience. Lucretius's *On the Nature of Things* claims to tell the truth about everything because (as with Epicurus) Lucretius maintained that he had "seen" the very fundamental constituents of all that there was, is, or could be: atoms and the void.** And as with Epicurus, these constituents are utterly without complexity; that is, completely intelligible to the human mind. **Once we know what an atom is – and who could fail to grasp it, it is so simple – and we know how atoms move through the void, we know everything.**

…

"Moreover, there is an infinite number of worlds, some like this world, others unlike it.[67] For the atoms being infinite in number, as has just been proved, are borne ever further in their course. For the atoms out of which a world might arise, or by which a world might be formed, have not all been expended on one world or a finite number of worlds, whether like or unlike this one. Hence there will be nothing to hinder an infinity of worlds.

…

"Nay more: **we are bound to believe** that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality.

…

79. "But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; **but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information** – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

…

81. "There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; **and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us;** and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, **they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague.**

…

91. "**The size of the sun and the remaining stars relatively to us is just as great as it appears.**[118] [*This he states in the eleventh book "On Nature." For, says he, if it had diminished in size on account of the distance, it would much more have diminished its brightness; for indeed there is no distance more proportionate to this diminution of size than is the distance at which the brightness begins to diminish.*] **But in itself and actually it may be a little larger or a little smaller, or precisely as great as it is seen to be.** For so too fires of which we have experience are seen by sense when we see them at a distance.

…

104. **And there are several other ways in which thunderbolts may possibly be produced. Exclusion of myth is the sole condition necessary;** and it will be excluded, if one properly attends to the facts and hence draws inferences to interpret what is obscure.
…

There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason. Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it. He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. **However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.**

Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. 118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. **As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law,** as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. **Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration:** so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. **No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse.**

119. **Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the *Problems* and in the *De Natura*.** Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose.
…

120b. The school holds that sins are not all equal; that health is in some cases a good, in others a thing indifferent; **that courage is not a natural gift but comes from calculation of expediency;** and that friendship is prompted by our needs. One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as we have to cast seed into the earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life's pleasures.
…

For verily there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. **Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious.**
…

And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. **Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.**[133] 127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.
…

By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. 132. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. **Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues,** for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.

133. "Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. **Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.**
134. **It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed.** The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties.

…

136. He differs from the Cyrenaics[135] with regard to pleasure. **They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion.**
…

137. He further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.
…

Come, then, let me set the seal, so to say, on my entire work as well as on this philosopher's life by citing his *Sovran Maxims*,[137] therewith bringing the whole work to a close and making the end of it to coincide with the beginning of happiness.

1. 139. A blessed and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness.
…

11. **If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.**

12. 143. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.

13. There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.
…

29. 149. Of our desires some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion. [***Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires which bring relief from pain, as e.g. drink when we are thirsty; while by natural and not necessary he means those which merely diversify the pleasure without removing the pain, as e.g. costly viands; by the neither natural nor necessary he means desires for crowns and the erection of statues in one's honour.*** – *Schol.*]

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/38/mode/2up?view=theater

The modern reader of Epicurus is often confused by Epicurus's repetition that one must "become accustomed to" this or that aspect of his theory, and "not become accustomed to" some other rival, nonmaterialist approach. We, who are generally quite accustomed to materialism, think that he should simply have said that *this* is true and *that* is false. **But Epicurus himself nearly always speaks of training the mind to a kind of belief, and the word he uses most frequently is *nomisdein*,** the etymology of which is quite illuminating.14 As a verb, it means to hold or own as a custom or usage, or to recognize by custom. Ironically, its extended meaning includes recognition of the religious beliefs acknowledged by the customs of one's city, or more generally, the recognition of the existence of the gods as such. The root of the verb is *nomos*, custom or convention, or the laws based on custom. **Epicurus was self-consciously creating a new habit, a new custom to replace the old. Meditation on his eternal principles, the immortal atoms, was meant to displace the habits of mind brought about by belief in the eternal gods.** His use of *nomisdein* reflects the gap between his invisible fundamental principles, and the visible universe they purport to explain.

> 14. **The frequency of *nomisdein*, or some compatible word, where we would expect an assertion of fact is too great to ignore.** See the following (I have noted where he used a word other than *nomisdein*): DL "Epicurus" 10.49, 52 ("it is necessary to hold the opinion," *dei ten doxan katechein*); 10.53-56, 58-59, 60 ("it is necessary not to proclaim," *ou dei katagorein*); 10.63 ("it is necessary to view," *dei sunoran*); 10.73-74, 76-77, 78 ("it is necessary to opine," *dei doxasdein*); 10.80.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr07.htm#an_fr_113_1

Here again Epicurus found refuge in the old Ionian theory of Atoms and the Void, which is supposed to have originated with Democritus and Leucippus, a century before. But Epicurus seems to have worked out the Atomic Theory more in detail, as we have it expounded in Lucretius' magnificent poem**. In particular it was possibly he who first combined the Atomic Theory with hylozoism; i.e. he conceived of the Atoms as possessing some rudimentary power of movement**

and therefore able to swerve slightly in their regular downward course. That explains how they have become infinitely tangled and mingled, how plants and animals are alive, and how men have Free Will.
…

Epicureanism had certainly its sublime side; and from this very sublimity perhaps arose the greatest flaw in the system, regarded as a rational philosophy. It was accepted too much as a Revelation, too little as a mere step in the search for truth. **It was based no doubt on careful and even profound scientific studies, and was expounded by the master in a vast array of volumes. But the result so attained was considered sufficient. Further research was not encouraged.** Heterodoxy was condemned as something almost approaching 'parricide'.113_2 The pursuit of 'needless knowledge' was deliberately frowned upon.113_3

> 113_3 Epicurus congratulated himself (erroneously) that he came to Philosophy καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας, 'undefiled by education'. Cf. Fr. 163 to Pythocles, παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε τὸ ἀκάτιον ἀράμενος, 'From education in every shape, my son, spread sail and fly!'

When other philosophers were working out calculations about the size of the Sun and the commensurability of the sun-cycle and the moon-cycle, Epicurus contemptuously remarked that the Sun was probably about as big as it looked, or perhaps smaller: since fires at a distance generally look bigger than they are. The various theories of learned men were all possible but none certain. And as for the cycles, how did any one know that there was not a new sun shot off and extinguished every day?113_4 **It is not surprising to find that none of the great discoveries of the Hellenistic Age were due to the Epicurean school.** Lucretius, writing 250 years later, appears to vary hardly in any detail from the doctrines of the Master, and Diogenes of Oenoanda, 500 years later, actually repeats his letters and sayings word for word.

It is sad, this. It is un-Hellenic; it is a clear symptom of decadence from the free intellectual movement and the high hopes which had made the fifth century glorious.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ct9K-x61CH0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

As Philodemus' writings make clear, **it was normal for contemporary Epicureans to assign virtually biblical status not to the writings of Epicurus alone, but jointly to those of the foursome known simply as οι άνδρες, 'the Great Men.'** These infallible four were the founding figures of the school, Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus,35 and all four were treated as absolutely and equally authoritative.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ct9K-x61CH0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Lucretius] must be astonishingly out of touch with current opinion on the matter.47 It is as if an evangelical missionary in twentieth-century Britain were to tell the public 'If you are going to believe things like that, you might as well deny that God made the world in six days.'

This last is the analogy which suggests the title of my chapter, 'Lucretius the fundamentalist.'48 Lucretius cannot, in my view, be an interacting member of any current philosophical circle. His inspiration comes from the unmediated scriptures of the philosopher he reveres, Epicurus himself. **Like any fundamentalist, he does not expect the numerous contributions made since the composition of his sacred scriptures, either by his school or by its critics, to have added anything worth taking into account.**

I recognize the paradox of speaking in these quasi-religious terms about a self-declared enemy of *religio*. But it is Lucretius himself who, in his proems to books III and V, declares the religious nature of his devotion: Epicurus, whose divinely conceived philosophy is Lucretius' own inspiration and guide, was himself a god, indeed a god who eclipsed the traditional Olympian deities in the importance of his benefactions to mankind.

> https://archive.org/details/pretendeddifficu00gurd/page/54/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> I know our modern Unbelievers would think themselves greatly injured if we charged them with any want of Ability, and so would their Predecessors; **for we find *Lucretius* perpetually Talking with such an Air of Assurance, as if he had actually wrested the Thunderbolt out of *Jupiter*'s Hands; and yet he appears to have been a careless Examiner into Nature, when he accounted for the Production of animals from insensible Matter, by Worms arising from corrupted Carcasses;** which was the only Account he could give of Animal Productions, *viz.* of Life and Sensation;* And yet our present *Atheists* must acknowledge, That he pronounced in this Case as a poor Philosopher, and before he had made a fair Examination: **For I think Equivocal Generations are now generally given up.**
>
> * Quippe videre licet vivos existere vermes, stercore de tetro putrorem cum sibi nacta est, &c.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_33

4. Suppose we should desire to sort out each separate motto from the general stock; to whom shall we credit them? To Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panaetius, or Posidonius? **We Stoics are not subjects of a despot: each of us lays claim to his own freedom. [Non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat.] With them,[4] on the other hand, whatever Hermarchus says, or Metrodorus, is ascribed to one source. In that brotherhood, everything that any man utters is spoken under the leadership and commanding authority[5] of one alone.**

> 5. For the phrase *ductu et auspiciis* see Plautus, *Amph.* i. 1. 41 *ut gesserit rem publicam ductu imperio auspicio suo*; and Horace, *Od.* i. 7. 27 ***Teucro duce et auspice Teucro*.** The original significance of the phrase refers to the right of the commander-in-chief to take the auspices.

https://www.academia.edu/6410739/The_fragments_of_Numenius_of_Apamea

This is what the Epicureans learnt (although it would have been better if they hadn't): no-one has ever caught them opposing Epicurus in any way. And since they all think that they are agreeing with a sage, one can understand why they use this title of themselves. Among later Epicureans, it became an almost invariable rule never to say anything that contradicted themselves or each other or Epicurus, on any matter worth mentioning. **Innovation with them is a crime – or rather a sacrilege – and is condemned.** So no-one dares to do it, and their doctrines rest in great tranquillity due to their constant agreement with each other. **The Epicurean school is like a true republic, completely free of political friction, a single mind shared by all, a single policy.** This is why there have been enthusiastic members of the school – and are and, I suppose, will be.

https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

... [as is supposed by] some of the philosophers **and especially the Socratics. They say that pursuing natural science and busying oneself with investigation of [celestial phenomena] is superfluous and unprofitable, and they do [not even] deign [to concern themselves with such matters.]**

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, **when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science?** After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n695/mode/2up?view=theater

Epicurus would like to explain the operation of the atoms on purely mechanical principles; but as he is interested in ethics far more than in cosmology, and is anxious to preserve free will as the source of moral responsibility and the prop of personality, he abandons Democritus in mid-air, and supposes a kind of spontaneity in the atoms: they swerve a bit from the perpendicular as they fall through space, and so enter into the combinations that make the four elements, and through them the diversity of the objective scene.[20]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.186497/page/n221/mode/2up?view=theater

"The reason why Epicurus brought in this theory was his fear lest, if the atom were always carried along by the natural and necessary force of gravity, we should have no freedom whatever, since the movement of the mind was controlled by the movement of the atom. **The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions.** XI. **Carneades showed greater insight: his doctrine was that the school of Epicurus could have maintained its cause without this fictitious swerve.**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/252/mode/2up?view=theater

Pieces of radical freedom are scattered in the works of the Stoics and Pre-Socratics as well as in every major religious tradition, but for the purposes of understanding the revolutions of the early modern world, Epicurus arrives at the points that matter. In the *Syllabus* included in his I-am-an-Epicurean letter, Jefferson bottles up the central intuition in a concentrated formula. "Man is a free agent."171 At the same time, the philosophy of Epicurus and his successors is very much at odds with the idea of "the freedom of the will" that characterizes the common conception of things. In a universe where every atom follows its prescribed course, there can be no arbitrary capacity for action such as that which is commonly attributed to the free will. Epicurus grapples with this knotty paradox by means of his doctrine of the *clinamen* – the notion that the atoms engage in occasional, unpredictable swerves as they fall through space. **Guiding Epicurus's thought on this point is a profound insight about the mutual interdependence of freedom, the apparent contingency of all things in an infinite universe, and the inherent incompleteness of our understanding of it. But it takes quite some effort to extract this pearl from the murky dogma of the swerwing atoms.**

Beginning with Hobbes, the heirs of Epicurus in the early modern world approach the problem by separating the useful idea of freedom from the confused idea of free will. Freedom in the abstract, says Hobbes, means simply the "absence of opposition," that is, the absence of any outside force that prevents a thing from pursuing what it wants.172 Freedom therefore describes only the circumstances or conditions in which a thing operates, not the faculty of the will itself: "No liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination." **When we say that the will (or any particular inclination) has "freedom," Hobbes continues, the only thing we can really mean is that it has "power," that is, the ability to overcome whatever hindrances stand in its way.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page229

169. **The question of the *possibility of things that do not happen* has already been examined by the ancients. It appears that Epicurus, to preserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, maintained, after Aristotle, that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinate truth.** For if it was true yesterday that I should write to-day, it could therefore not fail to happen, it was already necessary; and, for the same reason, it was from all eternity. Thus all that which happens is necessary, and it is impossible for anything different to come to pass. But since that is not so it would follow, according to him, that contingent futurities have no determinate truth. **To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far as to deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, he denied that every assertion was either true or false.** Here is the way they confounded him: 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should write to-day; it was therefore false.' The good man, not being able to admit this conclusion, was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. **After that, he needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself the trouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, following the account by Cicero in his book *De Fato*:** 'Contendit omnes nervos Chrysippus ut persuadeat omne Αξιωμα aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut enim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, fato fieri quaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non obtinuerit omne quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato fieri possint ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum.' M. Bayle observes (*Dictionary*, article 'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that **neither of these two great philosophers [Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that the truth of this maxim, every proposition is true or false, is independent of what is called *fatum*: it could not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the *fatum*, as Chrysippus maintained and as Epicurus feared.** Chrysippus could not have conceded, without damaging his own position, that there are propositions which are neither true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting the contrary: for, whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true that this proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true or false. Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All that I shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the faculty of prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it would yet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should predict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippus nor Epicurus has taken into consideration.' Cicero, lib. I, *De Nat. Deorum*, **with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the sound opinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) that it would be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent, than to have recourse to such answers.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater

Contrast this with Epicurus:

> “Necessity, introduced by some as the absolute ruler, *does not exist*, but some things are *accidental*, others depend on our *arbitrary will*. Necessity cannot be persuaded, but chance is unstable. **It would be better to follow the myth about the gods than to be a slave to the *heimarinene* [what has been decreed, destiny] of the physicists.** For the former leaves hope for mercy if we do honour to the gods, while the latter is inexorable necessity. But it is *chance*, which must be accepted, *not God*, as the multitude believe.”39 “It is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in necessity is not a necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open. Let us therefore thank God that no man can be kept in life. It is permitted to subdue necessity itself.”40

The Epicurean Velleius in Cicero says something similar about Stoic philosophy:

> **"What are we to think of a philosophy in which, as to ignorant old women, everything seems to occur through fate? ... by Epicurus we have been redeemed, set free.”**41

Thus Epicurus even *denies disjunctive judgment* so as not to have to acknowledge any concept of necessity.42

True, it is claimed that Democritus also used the concept of chance, but of the two passages on this matter which can be found in Simplicius43 the one renders the other suspect, **because it shows clearly that it was not Democritus who used the category of chance, but Simplicius who ascribed it to him as a consequence. For he says: Democritus assigns, generally speaking, no cause for the creation of the world, he *seems* therefore to make chance the cause.** Here, however, we are concerned not with the *determination of the content*, but with the *form* used *consciously* by Democritus. The situation is similar in regard to the report by Eusebius that Democritus made chance the ruler of the universal and divine and claimed that here it is through chance that everything happens, whereas he excluded chance from human life and empirical nature and called its supporters foolish.44
...

The enthusiasm and the seriousness with which Democritus introduces this manner of explanation into the observation of nature, the importance he attaches to the striving to ascertain causes, are naively expressed in his avowal:

> **“I would rather discover a new aetiology than acquire the Persian crown.”**46

Once again Epicurus stands directly opposed to Democritus. Chance, for him, is a reality which has only the value of possibility. ***Abstract possibility*, however, is the direct *antipode of real possibility*. The latter is restricted within sharp boundaries, as is the intellect; the former is unbounded, as is the imagination.** Real possibility seeks to explain the necessity and reality of its object; abstract possibility is not interested in the object which is explained, but in the subject which does the explaining. The object need only be possible, conceivable. That which is abstractly possible, which can be conceived, constitutes no obstacle to the thinking subject, no limit, no stumbling-block. Whether this possibility is also real is irrelevant, since here the interest does not extend to the object as object.

Epicurus therefore proceeds with a boundless nonchalance in the explanation of separate physical phenomena.

More light will be thrown upon this fact by the letter to Pythocles, later to be considered. Suffice it here to draw attention to Epicurus' attitude to the opinions of earlier physicists. **Where the author of *De Placitis philosophorum* and Stobaeus quote the different views of the philosophers concerning the substance of the stars, the size and shape of the sun and similar matters, it is always said of Epicurus: He rejects none of these opinions, *all could* be right, he adheres to the possible.**47 Yes, Epicurus *polemicises* even against the rationally determining, and for precisely this reason one-sided, method of explanation by real possibility.

Thus Seneca says in his *Quaestiones naturales*: Epicurus maintains that all these causes are possible, and then attempts in addition still other explanations. **He *blames* those who claim that any particular one of them occurs, because it is rash to judge apodictically about that which can only be deduced from conjectures.**

One can see that there is no interest in investigating the real causes of objects. All that matters is the tranquillity of the explaining subject. Since everything possible is admitted as possible, which corresponds to the character of abstract possibility, the *chance of being* is clearly transferred only into the *chance of thought*. The only rule which Epicurus prescribes, namely, that “the explanation should *not contradict* sensation," is self-evident; for to be abstractly possible consists precisely in being free from contradiction, which therefore must be avoided. **And Epicurus confesses finally that his method of explaining aims only at the *ataraxy*21 *of self-consciousness,* not *at knowledge of nature in and for itself*.**50

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n27/mode/2up?view=theater

Finally, Bayle,18 supported by the authority of Augustine,29 who states that Democritus ascribed to the atom a spiritual principle — an authority, by the way, who in contrast to Aristotle and the other ancients is without any importance — reproaches Epicurus for having thought out the concept of declination instead of this spiritual principle. **But, on the contrary, merely a word would have been gained with this "soul of the atom," whereas the declination represents the real soul of the atom, the concept of abstract individuality.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n55/mode/2up?view=theater

By contrast, Epicurus' theory of the celestial bodies and the processes connected with them, or his theory of meteors (in this one term he includes it all), stands in opposition not only to Democritus, but to the opinion of Greek philosophy as a whole. Worship of the celestial bodies is a cult practised by all Greek philosophers. **The system of the celestial bodies is the first naive and nature-determined existence of true reason [*Vernunft*].** The same position is taken by Greek self-consciousness in the domain of the mind [*Geist*]. It is the solar system of the mind. **The Greek philosophers therefore worshipped their own mind in the celestial bodies.**

Anaxagoras himself, who first gave a physical explanation of heaven and in this way brought it down to earth in a sense different from that of Socrates, answered, when asked for what purpose he was born: *For the observation of the sun, the moon and the heaven*.1 Xenophanes, however, looked up at heaven and said: The One is God.2 The religious attitude of the Pythagoreans, Plato and Aristotle to the heavenly-bodies is well known.

Indeed, Epicurus opposes the outlook of the whole Greek people.

Aristotle says it often seems that the concept provides evidence for the phenomena and the phenomena for the concept. Thus all men have an idea of the gods and assign the highest region to the divine, barbarians as well as Hellenes, and in general all who believe in the existence of the gods, evidently connecting the immortal with the immortal, for otherwise it is impossible. **Thus if the divine exists – as it actually does – then what we say about the substance of the celestial bodies is also correct.** But this corresponds also to sensuous perception, insofar as human conviction is concerned. For throughout the time that has passed, according to the memories handed down from people to people, nothing seems to have changed, either in heaven as a whole, or in any part of it. Even the name seems to have been handed down from the ancients to the present time, and they assumed that which we also say. **For not once, not twice, but an infinite number of times have the same views come down to us.** For since the primary body is something different, apart from the earth and the fire and the air and the water, they called the highest region "ether," from *thein aei* [to run always], giving it the by-name: eternal time.3 **But the ancients assigned heaven and the highest region to the gods, because it alone is immortal. But the present teaching testifies that it is indestructible, ungenerated and not subject to any mortal ills.** In this way our concepts correspond at the same time to intimations about God.4 But that there is one heaven is evident. It is a tradition handed down from our ancestors and the ancients and surviving in the form of the myths of later generations, that the heavenly bodies are gods and that the divine encompasses all nature. **The rest was added in mythical form for the belief of the masses, as useful for the laws and for life.** Thus the myths make the gods resemble man and some of the other living creatures, and invent similar things connected with and related to this. If we discard the additions and hold fast only to the first, namely, the belief that the primary substances are gods, then we must consider this as having been divinely revealed, and we must hold that after all sorts of art and philosophy had, in one way or another, been invented and lost again, these opinions came down to us like relics.5

---

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

The materialist thesis was best argued by Lucretius whose position, inherited from his much-admired philosophic model, Epicurus, has not been essentially improved upon ever since the first century B.C. He holds the monopoly of materialist atheism the way perhaps Spinoza holds it for spiritualist atheism.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n177/mode/2up?view=theater

Like Euripides, Lucretius is a modern; his thought and feeling are more congenial to our time than to the century before Christ. Horace and Virgil were deeply influenced by him in their youth, and recall him

without name in many a lordly phrase; but the attempt of Augustus to restore the old faith made it unwise for these imperial protégés to express too openly their admiration and their debt. The Epicurean philosophy was as unsuited to the Roman mind as epicurean practices suited Roman taste in the age of Lucretius.* Rome wanted a metaphysic that would exalt mystic powers rather than natural law; **an ethic that would make a virile and martial people rather than humanitarian lovers of quiet and peace;** and a political philosophy that, like those of Virgil and Horace, would justify Rome's imperial mastery. In the resurrection of faith after Seneca, Lucretius was almost forgotten. Not till Poggio rediscovered him in 1418 did he begin to influence European thought.

https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

For indeed, while honouring supreme Zeus and Demeter as deities, [we regard human beings] not as [their] slaves, [but as their friends.]
…

[Let us not think that the gods are capable of examining people who are unjust] and base and [noble] and just. [Otherwise the] greatest disturbances [will be created in our souls.]

Fr. 19

[Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks [all sorts of nonsense] about them, [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear,] as well as inducing the craftsmen to produce inappropriate portrayals. **Some statues of gods shoot arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Origen/Origen_Against_Celsus/Book_I/Chapter_VIII

And here Celsus must be convicted of self-contradiction. **For from other treatises of his it is ascertained that he was an Epicurean; but here, because he thought that he could assail Christianity with better effect by not professing the opinions of Epicurus, he pretends that there is a something better in man than the earthly part of his nature, which is akin to God,** and says that "they in whom this element, viz., the soul, is in a healthy condition, are ever seeking after their kindred nature, meaning God, and are ever desiring to hear something about Him, and to call it to remembrance." **Observe now the insincerity of his character!** Having said a little before, that "the man who had embraced a system of good doctrine ought not, even if exposed to danger on that account from men, to disavow it, or pretend that he had done so, nor yet openly disown it," he now involves himself in all manner of contradictions. **For he knew that if he acknowledged himself an Epicurean, he would not obtain any credit when accusing those who, in any degree, introduce the doctrine of Providence, and who place a God over the world. And we have heard that there were two individuals of the name of Celsus, both of whom were Epicureans; the earlier of the two having lived in the time of Nero, but this one in that of Adrian, and later.**

https://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4167-celsus

In designating his opponent by the opprobrious epithet of "Epicurean," Origen was misled by his prejudice; for Celsus, according to his own teachings, was an eclectic, following Plato and perhaps also Philo. Moreover, he must have lived after Hadrian's time, probably flourishing about 180 under Marcus Aurelius (161-180), since he mentions the Marcionites and the Marcellians. **Lucian, who also denounced Christianity, dedicated to him his "Alexander, the Lying Prophet"** ("Alex." xxi.).

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl2/wl218.htm

Well, well, if any one does cast reflections of that sort upon us, we shall at least have a precedent to plead. **Arrian himself, disciple of Epictetus, distinguished Roman, and product of lifelong culture as he was,** had just our experience, and shall make our defence. He condescended, that is, to put on record the life of the robber Tilliborus. The robber we propose to immortalize was of a far more pestilent kind, following his profession not in the forests and mountains, but in cities; *he* was not content to overrun a Mysia or an Ida; *his* booty came not from a few scantily populated districts of Asia; one may say that the scene of his depredations was the whole Roman Empire.
…

It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by scepticism and insight, **one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.**
...

A time came when a number of sensible people began to shake off their intoxication and combine against him, chief among them the numerous Epicureans; in the cities, the imposture with all its theatrical accessories began to be seen through. It was now that he resorted to a measure of intimidation; **he proclaimed that Pontus was overrun with atheists and Christians,** who presumed to spread the most scandalous reports concerning him; he exhorted Pontus, as it valued the God's favour, to stone these men.
...

Well, it was war to the knife between him and Epicurus, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? **As for the Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, they were his good friends; he had no quarrel with them.** But the unmitigated Epicurus, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile.
...

It was with his eye on this Italian propaganda, too, that he took a further step. This was the institution of mysteries, with hierophants and torch-bearers complete. The ceremonies occupied three successive days. On the first, **proclamation was made on the Athenian model to this effect: 'If there be any atheist or Christian or Epicurean here spying upon our rites, let him depart in haste; and let all such as have faith in the God be initiated and all blessing attend them.'** He led the litany with, 'Christians, avaunt!' and the crowd responded, 'Epicureans, avaunt!'
...

Coming across Epicurus's *Accepted Maxims*, the most admirable of his books, as you know, with its terse presentment of his wise conclusions, he brought it into the middle of the market-place, there burned it on a fig-wood fire for the sins of its author, and cast its ashes into the sea. He issued an oracle on the occasion:

> The dotard's maxims to the flames be given.

The fellow had no conception of the blessings conferred by that book upon its readers, of the peace, tranquillity, and independence of mind it produces, of the protection it gives against terrors, phantoms, and marvels, vain hopes and inordinate desires, of the judgement and candour that it fosters, **or of its true purging of the spirit, not with torches and squills and such rubbish, but with right reason, truth, and frankness.**
...

But secondly I was still more concerned (a preference which you will be very far from resenting) to strike a blow for Epicurus, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him.

---

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/106/mode/2up?view=theater

In the spring of 1417 Epicureanism was awakened from its deep slumber. Poggio Bracciolini, infected with the characteristic Renaissance desire to recover ancient manuscripts, happened upon a copy of Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura*. **In 1430 Ambrogio Traversari published a Latin version of Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*,** which contained not only a biography of Epicurus (and Democritus as well), but Epicurus's three famous letters explaining his doctrines in outline and a collection of Epicurean maxims as well.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/304/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1563 the French Humanist Denis Lambin elaborated this line of defense: in his fine critical edition of *De rerum natura* (which silenced textual arguments for three centuries) **he asserted that Lucretius's philosophical ideas are so patently absurd that they need no refutation and can do no harm.** The ideas of a poet, Lambin suggested, matter little; even Homer is full of impieties and obscenities. What does matter is Lucretius's brilliant evocation of nature, the beauty of his language, and the elevation of his moral sentiments – at least some of the time. This prudent divorce of despicable atheism from admirable poetry, blunted, without silencing, attacks on Lucretius and assured survival to a pagan writer whom pious men looked upon with unmitigated aversion and growing concern. Saved by the industry and adroitness of a late Humanist, Lucretius became a favorite with a small coterie of materialists, with the *libertins* in the late seventeenth century, and finally, with the philosophes.

The continuing popularity of Lucretius was buttressed by the rehabilitation of Lucretius' teacher, Epicurus, undertaken almost single-handedly by Pierre Gassendi, a priest of unimpeachable orthodoxy. Quite like the medieval admirers of Ovid, Gassendi – "the best

philosopher among literary men and the best literary man among philosophers,"9 **– began by clearing Epicurus's character and proceeded by defending his philosophy.**

> 9. Gibbon: *Essai sur l'étude de la littérature*, in *Miscellaneous Works*, IV, 22. **This *bon mot* reads like an unacknowledged reminiscence of Diderot's remark, published in 1755, that it could be said of Gassendi, "Never was a philosopher a better humanist, nor humanist such a good philosopher."** "Epicuréisme," *Encyclopédie*, in *Oeuvres*, XIV, 525.

…

Gassendi, who knew most leading intellectuals of his time, was neither a great scientist nor a great philosopher, but he powerfully influenced both great scientists and great philosophers: **Leibniz thought that Locke was more deeply indebted to Gassendi than to anyone else,** and Voltaire wrote in 1738 that Newton had admired Gassendi as a most intelligent man, entirely correct in his ideas on God, space, and time.1

> https://archive.org/details/aphilosophicalt00huetgoog/page/n54/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> DESCARTES'*s* Philosophy has been in great Repute in our Days. The Novelty of it drew many Disciples to it, **insomuch that it was expected by a great many, that *Aristotle* would be soon forsaken, and *Descartes* succeed him.**
> …
>
> However, **it was not long before I found that the *Peripateticks* still kept their Ground; that there were dangerous Factions form'd against *Descartes*; that *Gassendi* was become the Head of a Party, and had successfully reviv'd the Sect of *Epicurus*,** tho' so much cry'd down and suspected of Impiety, tho' it met with more Adversaries than Admirers.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm
>
> The *metaphysics* of the seventeenth century, represented in France by *Descartes*, had *materialism* as its *antagonist* from its very birth. The latter's opposition to Descartes was personified by *Gassendi*, the restorer of *Epicurean* materialism. French and English materialism was always closely related to *Democritus* and *Epicurus*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA205#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pintard, for his part, subscribes to that point of view which holds that these free-thinkers assembled around Gassendi. **He concedes that after Gassendi's death (1655) they went into an eclipse until 1680,** but he maintains that their works were often printed following their eclipse. **Finally, he stresses the close relationship between those who wrote in the first part of the century and those who came after 1680, particularly Bayle and Fontenelle.**

Indeed, in Pintard's opinion, the event which assured the triumph of libertinism was the revival of Gassendi and his disciples in the salon of Mme de la Sablière, in the work of Guillaume Lamy and a whole group of followers interested in the problem of the animal soul, and especially in Chaulieu, La Fare, and the Marquis de Lassay. **Bayle had noted this appeal of Gassendi in 1686:** "Depuis l'apologie de M. Gassendi pour les moeurs et pour la morale de ce philosophe [Epicurus] on est si bien revenu de la vieille préoccupation, que c'est à présent une chose trop commune que d'être Gassendiste à cet égard-là."
…

In addition, Bayle quoted Guy Patin, and suggested in 1701 and 1703 the publication of the *Naudeana* and the *Patiniana*. **He was extremely interested in Gassendi, while he wrote of La Mother in 1675:** "Il y a bien de l'érudition, mail il y a encore plus d'impiété. Ce sont des coups de jeunesse, je l'avoue; je ne sais pourtant si l'auteur s'en est repenti, car toute sa vie il a écrit à la défense du Pirrhonisme d'une manière qui ne sentoit pas son âme fort dévote."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA220#v=onepage&q&f=false

This forced Descartes to define "esprit": "J'entends en effet l'esprit, non comme une partie de l'âme, mais comme la totalité de l'âme pensante." Descartes identified it with the inner reality of the person, and insisted that it is the only thing which cannot be separated from the *moi*. Gassendi, of course, did not accept this. **It was this divergence of opinion which led Descartes to address Gassendi as Mr. Flesh, and Gassendi to respond by calling Descartes Mr. Spirit.**

Gassendi criticizes continually point after point in Descartes's *Méditations*. **Where Descartes regards as uncertain the testimony of the senses, Gassendi maintains that they are our only source of**

external knowledge. Where Descartes stresses that they deceive, Gassendi, conceding that they may often lead to error, insists that they also lead to truth. **Where Descartes believes that the mind has the capacity of creating ideas within itself, Gassendi asserts that the mind does not possess any idea which does not come from the senses.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT181#v=onepage&q&f=false

In Paris, Mersenne and Sir Kenelm Digby helped Hobbes secure the publication of *De cive* in 1642 and its dispersal thereafter, and both Mersenne and Gassendi wrote letters of commendation for Samuel Sorbiere, the historiographer royal, to use in arranging the publication of a second edition of the book in Amsterdam early in 1647. In defiance of their initial instructions, Sorbiere added the letters to the prefatory material of both the third edition, which was published in Amsterdam later that year, and his own French translation, which appeared two years thereafter. **If *De cive* was an immediate sensation, it was partly because it came so well recommended.**
…

Father Pierre Gassendi, **who was as celebrated for his revival of Epicureanism as was Mersenne for his sponsorship of science,** was cut from similar cloth.21 Both were clearly eager to promote Hobbes's doctrine, for they were both unstinting in their praise for his book. For Mersenne, Hobbes was "that incomparable man" and *De cive* "that outstanding work." He termed his English friend's tome "a great literary treasure." **Because it presented a "noble philosophy, no less clearly demonstrated than the Elements of Euclid," that would cause the reader to "renounce … all the triflings" of the skeptics and make him "confess a dogmatic doctrine based on the firmest of footings," it should be considered a "golden book, augmented and adorned with jewels."** Gassendi spoke similarly of "the excellent Hobbes." He could think of no "writer who examines an argument more deeply than" his friend, and he knew "no one who in his philosophical work is more free from prejudice." As for *De cive*, though the French priest prudently distanced himself from its highly unorthodox treatment of the Christian religion, he nonetheless described it as "truly uncommon, and worthy of being handled by all who are sensible of higher things." In Paris, he remarked, "so few copies of the book were printed, that they produced rather than satisfied a thirst for it." **If Sorbiere should bring other writings by Hobbes "to light," Gassendi continued, he would "have bestowed a great blessing on the whole nation of those who take philosophy seriously.**"22

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/n149/mode/2up?view=theater

I wonder that *Hobbes de cive* should be magnified by such Frenchmen as *Gassendus, Sorberius* and *Mersennus*: But it seems some French Philosophers (and Prelates too) are looser in their principles of policie and Loyalty than we are.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12679

In 1676, a French Jesuit René Rapin had already called Hobbes "one of the boldest Epicureans of modern times" who followed Epicurus "without compromise" (Rapin 1676, 54, cited in Malcolm 2002, 499).
…

Harris then delivered his putatively devastating blow to Spinoza's idea of God. He argued that if cogitation was as essential to matter as extension, then all particles must be an independent entity of "*Thinking Substance or Body*." **Then, every atom will be equal to every other atom in regard to "this *Cogitative Power*." The *reductio ad absurdum*, according to Harris, was: "either there is no Deity at all, or else that every Particle of Matter must be a God by itself"** (Spinoza 1677b; Harris 1698d, 46, 12). Thus, "if this be his [Spinoza'] Opinion, there cannot possibly be a more unaccountable, absurd and impossible Notion of God advanced" since if "*Substance, Matter* and *God*, signifie all the same thing, and all Matter be *Essentially Cogitative*," then all is God, thus underscoring Spinoza's panentheism. However, the only trouble was that Spinoza had actually never gone that far (Spinoza 1677b; Harris 1698d, 47, 14).
…

If God were to be subjugated to a "Physical necessity," then it makes God "nothing at all but Nature, and deprives" both God and humans the "Noble Principle of *Freedom of Will*: **and then they know that there can be no such things as Rewards and Punishments proportionable to Men's Actions; but that all things are alike, without any distinction of Good and Evil."** All of that because of Hobbes's and Spinoza's insistence on being such "zealous Sticklers for a *Corporeal Deity*." Thus, Harris continued that the **"God of the Corporealists is not the True Deity, whatever they may pretend, but a blind, stupid, senseless Idol," that has the name of God immorally affixed to it** (Harris 1698d, 49, 50, 50-51). This fear factor was not inconsiderable, so Harris repeated this in the Sixth of his Boyle Lectures: "That *Justice is founded in Power, and that whatever is Enacted by a Soveraign Power can't be Unjust*," **thereby making room for the quintessence of arbitrary creation of moral and judicial categories as the terminus ad quem of Hobbism and Spinozism** (Harris 1698b, 21).

...

Whether it was from the assertion that "*Good* and *Evil* are only *Thetical things*," **or Spinoza's view that "Bonum et malum nihil Positivum in Rebus scilicet, in se consideratis indicant" or Hobbes's view that "There is nothing simply nor absolutely Good or Evil, nor any common Rule about them to be taken from the Objects themselves, but only from the Person; who calleth that Good which he likes or desires, and that Evil which he hates.**" Another quote of Hobbes that Harris utilized for his polemical purpose was: "That Good and Evil are only Names that signify our Appetites and Aversions; which in different Tempers, Customs, and Doctrines of Men are different" (Spinoza 1677a, *passim*; Spinoza 1677b, 164; Hobbes 1651; Steenbakkers 1997; Harris 1698a, 6, 24, 79).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false

Not long before the Death of *Grotius*, another *English* author appear'd, of a Character quite different from that of *Selden*, I mean o *Thomas Hobbes*; **a great Mathematician, and one of the most penetrating Genius's of his Age.** It is great Pity he suffer'd himself to be misled by the Indignation he had conceiv'd against those, whom he look'd upon as the seditious Disturbers of the Peace of his Country: Had he philosophiz'd without Prejudice, and with a sincere Regard to Truth only; he would doubtless have done her very great signal Service. He publish'd at *Paris* 1642, his p Treatise *de Cive*; **wherein, amongst other dangerous Errours, he endeavours to establish, and that too in the Geometrical Method, the Hypothesis of *Epicurus*; which makes Self-Preservation and Self-Interest, to be the original Causes of Civil Society.**
...

Hobbes *created himself by this Work many Enemies;* ***but, as Mr.*** **Bayle *says,* q *the more discerning and judicious Part of Mankind were forc'd to acknowledge, that no one had ever yet penetrated so far into the Foundations of Civil Policy.*** *Lambert Velthuysen,* a famous Philosopher of the united Provinces, boldly undertook the Defence of this Treatise *De Cive*, as far as related to *Hobbes's* Manner of demonstrating the Laws of Nature.
...

It thereupon we sometimes find in his Works, some seeming Contradictions; **'tis probably, because he durst not trust the Reader with the whole of his Notions;** and was willing to provide for a Retreat, in case he should not be able to stand the Shock of his Adversaries. He had several of 'en; but t they did not all succeed alike. **He pass'd for an Atheist; and perhaps they were not very much out in their Judgments, who thought him so; for he admitted none but Corporeal Substances.**

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/112/mode/2up?view=theater

If we may provide the briefest statement that characterizes the Galilean-Newtonian revolution, we might call it the vindication of atomism through the victory of mathematics. A quick victory it was too. For at the beginning of the seventeenth century Galileo was questioned by the Inquisition and put under house arrest, and by the dawn of the eighteenth century Newton was considered a demigod who had unlocked every secret of nature, a mortal whose thoughts were identical with God's.
...

In regard to the revival of Epicurean materialism, **the arguments of Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) in his *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestum* (1543), which placed the sun at the center of the universe and not the earth, were not nearly as important as the publication by Galileo of his *Siderius Nuncius* (*The Starry Messenger*) in 1610.** Galileo was a lens grinder, brilliant mathematician, powerful rhetorician, implacable foe of Aristotelianism and guarded advocate of materialist atomism.
...

Galileo devoted the first part of *The Starry Messenger* to a detailed description of the actual imperfections of the moon, imperfections previously hidden to the naked eye. The moon, rather than being perfectly smooth and round like a fine jewel in the heavens, was "full of cavities and prominences," "precipitous crags" and "jagged peaks." By the wondrous artifice of the spyglass, Galileo trumpeted, "one may learn with all the certainty of sense evidence that the Moon is not robed in a smooth and polished surface but is in fact rough and uneven, covered everywhere, just like the Earth's surface, with huge prominences, deep valleys, and chasms."4 **To find that one of the heavenly bodies was made of dirt, just like the earth, was a great preparation for the acceptance of Epicureanism, for it meant the eradication of the notion that the heavens were made of some unearthly substance, and therefore paved the way for acceptance of the Epicurean assertion that the universe was homogeneous, made everywhere of one quite humble substance – the lifeless, inglorious atom.**

We who are so accustomed to the knowledge that the moon is made of quite earthy elements, cannot fully appreciate the shock caused by Galileo's reduction of the heavens to the humility of the earth – and doing it not by argument (the only weapon of Epicurus) but by the senses with the aid of a new man-made device. **If the moon were mere dust, then also, it seemed, were the rest of the heavenly bodies – all the way up to God's abode.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D10%3Asection%3D886d

> It is rather the novel views of our modern scientists[1] that we must hold responsible as the cause of mischief. For the result of the arguments of such people is this,—**that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone,** [886e] incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible.

...

Bruno, who was openly indebted to Lucretius, preached the infinity of the universe with evangelical zeal, and wrote the famous Italian dialogue *De l'infinito universe e mondi*, **which combined the radical Augustinian affirmation of God's omnipotence with Epicurean arguments about the infinite universe and the plurality of worlds.** Subsequently, he was burned at the stake on February 17, 1600. But Bruno's fate and Galileo's caution aside, there was no doubt that the spyglass revealed a universe for more immense than had previously been suspected, and the step to infinity was (paradoxically) a small one.7 **This amazing instrument promised to settle with "ocular certainty … all the disputes which have vexed philosophers through so many ages,"**8 and it seemed to be settling things on the side of Epicurean materialism.

...

Since direct empirical evidence could not clinch the Epicurean account of nature in the seventeenth century,11 what did secure such atomism as the reigning view of science during this scientific revolution? Ironically, **it was the analogy based on the effectiveness of geometry as applied to heavenly objects understood as points in astronomy, and gross earthly objects (projectiles) treated as points in ballistics.** Witness the following famous statement of Galileo:

> Natural philosophy is written in a great Book, which holds itself at all times open before our eyes – I mean, the universe itself. But no one can understand it unless to begin with he sets himself to master the language, and recognize the characters, in which it is written. It is written in mathematical language, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures.12

As historian of science Stephen Toulmin rightly points out, **in contrast to the original form of atomism in Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, Galileo "treated the atoms as the physical counterparts of the infinitesimal units of geometry."**13 This advance on ancient atomism via the identification of atomic points with geometric points actually made Epicureanism theoretically stronger in modernity than it had been in antiquity **because atomism could now borrow its legitimacy, rigor and eternality from mathematics,** with the result that the successful application of mathematics to nature on the macroscopic level seemed to "prove" the existence of atoms on the microscopic level even if Galileo had no such magical spyglass to provide "ocular certainty."

https://voxday.net/2009/02/28/daniel-dennett-comic-superstar/

You can trust biologists. Because physicists get amazingly accurate results.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/#NatuPhil

> For Ockham, there is no need for real "mathematical" entities such as numbers, points, lines, and surfaces as distinct from individual substances and qualities. Apparent talk about such things can invariably be parsed away, via the theory of connotation or exposition, in favor of talk about substances and qualities (and, in certain theological contexts, a few relations). This Ockhamist move is illustrative of and influential on an important development in late medieval physics: **the application of mathematics to non-mathematical things, culminating in Galileo's famous statement that the "book of nature" is written in the "language of mathematics."**
>
> Such an application of mathematics violates a traditional Aristotelian prohibition against *metabasis eis allo genos,* grounded on quite reasonable considerations. **The basic idea is that things cannot be legitimately compared in any respect in which they differ in species.** Thus it makes little sense to ask whether the soprano's high C is higher or lower than Mount Everest—much less to ask (quantitatively) *how much* higher or lower it is. But for Aristotle, straight lines and curved lines belong to different species of lines. Hence they cannot be meaningfully compared or measured against one another. The same holds for rectilinear motion and circular motion.
> ...
>
> Once one realizes that we can appeal to connotation theory, and more generally the theory of exposition, without invoking new entities, **the door is opened to applying mathematical**

analyses (all of which are exponible, for Ockham) to all kinds of things, and in particular to physical nature.

…

The crux of the story is this: the existence of an underlying order to things, which the elegance of mathematics captures, is an occasion for awe and wonder, supporting the belief that the universe is intelligently designed. **Of course, this essentially religious response of Pythagoras, this natural reaction of awe and wonder, was anathema to Epicurus because it so easily slips into a recognition that such intricate, intelligible order must be the result of intelligent design,** and *that* would link the divine to nature as a cause.15

In fact, when Euclid's *Elements*, the greatest book on mathematics in the ancient world, was rediscovered in the Renaissance, the original reaction was Pythagorean, or more exactly, Platonic.16 By this I mean that the response to the profundity of Euclid was a kind of semi-religious awe, and the successful application of his geometry to practical matters was likewise an incitement to wonder in regard to the underlying order of created things. As claimed above, **this response, following the Pythagorean spirit, was purely natural, and indeed seems to have been the inspiration behind Galileo's use of mathematics; that is, in spirit, Galileo might well be considered a Pythagorean.**

But even if such is the case, by completely identifying the Euclidean point with the Epicurean atom, Galileo prepared the way for the Epicurean revolution in science, and consequently, for the ultimate quenching of the Pythagorean approach to mathematics.17 The reason is simple: the complete identity of the geometric point and the atom entailed the acceptance of the reductionism inherent in such atomism, by stripping nature of all but the simplest mathematical properties of the point (now considered by Galileo to be a real atomic object).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Democritus

"[Democritus] would seem," says Thrasylus, "to have been an admirer of the Pythagoreans. Moreover, he mentions Pythagoras himself, praising him in a work of his own entitled *Pythagoras*.[60] He seems to have taken all his ideas from him and, if chronology did not stand in the way, he might have been thought his pupil." Glaucus of Rhegium certainly says that he was taught by one of the Pythagoreans, and Glaucus was his contemporary. Apollodorus of Cyzicus, again, will have it that he lived with Philolaus.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA203#v=onepage&q&f=false

The figure of Pythagoras becomes the pivotal point of Nietzsche's chronological maneuvering. Previous historians had taken Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans to be roughly contemporary. Here Nietzsche performs a sweeping revision: **Pythagoras is a master of superstition who creates a cult of religious followers quite different from the scientific types in the community.** These scientific types came much later than Pythagoras and have nearly no connection to him philosophically. **The later Pythagoreans, in this account, became mathematical atomists who perfected the materialism of Democritus.** This aligns the chronological order with the order of discovery as Nietzsche sees it. These later Pythagoreans would be treated separately; **using not only Democritus but also Heraclitus, they discovered a theory closely approximating Nietzsche's own theory at this point of time,** insofar as this could be found in the ancient world.
…

His contention that the Pythagorean community comprised two factions was a thesis Nietzsche borrowed from Erwin Rohde, the author of *Psyche* and many important articles on philology and a close friend.82 Generally, the pre-Platonic philosopher lecture series is closely associated with, and indebted to, Erwin Rohde. Nietzsche wrote to Rohde on June 11, 1872, that Pythagorean *philosophy* occurs after atomism but before Plato and that Pythagoras had not already discovered all the embryonic forms of this philosophy. **Pythagorean number theory, according to Nietzsche, was a new philosophical direction occasioned by the (apparent) failure of the Eleatics, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus.**

https://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-5939

Simmias (1) (or Simias) of *Thebes (1), a main character in *Plato (1)'s Phaedo (and in Plutarch's De genio Socratis, which contains many echoes of the Phaedo), was evidently a veteran member of Socrates' circle. **Although, with *Cebes, he was 'together with' (συγγίγνεσθαι) Philolaus in Thebes (Phaedo 61d–e), his Pythagorean credentials (see Pythagoras (1)) are poor; Plato represents him putting forward an un-Pythagorean theory of soul (as a 'kind of harmony' of bodily constituents),** and generally as a sound (Socratic) philosopher, and instigator of arguments (Phaedrus 242b).

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n377/mode/2up?view=theater

> At Thebes Philolaus the Pythagorean deposed the earth from the center of the universe, and reduced it to the status of one among many planets revolving about a "central fire."[9] Leucippus, pupil of Philolaus, attributed the origin of the stars to the incandescent combustion and concentration of material "drawn onward in the universal movement of the circular vortex."[10] At Abdera Democritus, pupil of Leucippus **and student of Babylonian lore,** described the Milky Way as a multitude of small stars, and summarized astronomic history as the periodical collision and destruction of an infinite number of worlds.[11]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n387/mode/2up?view=theater

> **As Parmenides' denial of motion and change was a reaction against the fluid and unstable metaphysics of Heracleitus, so his monism was a counterblast to the atomism of the later Pythagoreans.** For these had developed the number theory of their founder into the doctrine that all things are composed of numbers in the sense of indivisible units.[12] **When Philolaus of Thebes added that "all things take place by necessity and by harmony,"[13] everything was ready for the Atomic school in Greek philosophy.**
>
> About 435 Leucippus of Miletus came to Elea, and studied under Zeno; there, perhaps, he heard of the number atomism of the Pythagoreans, for Zeno had aimed some of his subtlest paradoxes at this doctrine of plurality.[14] Leucippus finally settled in Abdera, a flourishing Ionian colony in Thrace. **Of his direct teaching only one fragment remains: "Nothing happens without a reason, but all things occur for a reason, and of necessity."[15]** Presumably it was in answer to Zeno and Parmenides that Leucippus developed the notion of the void, or empty space; in this way he hoped to make motion theoretically possible as well as sensibly actual.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-ancient/#PlatPlat

> **Simplicius also compares Pythagorean views to Democritean atomism, inasmuch as both theories posit a cause for hot and cold, rather than taking these to be fundamental principles, as the Aristotelians do.**

…

If points are real (i.e., if atoms can simply function as actual, geometrical points in space), then it follows that the real world, the atomic world, is purely geometrical. **That means, of course, that the goal of science comes to be the reduction of the rich world of everyday experience – the world of colors, smells, tastes and so on – to the invisible world of geometrical, atomic reality.** Ultimately, then, the visible form (or species, such as "dog"), the color, the taste, the smell and even the sound can all be reduced to mathematical relationships. It is clear from his polemical treatise *Il Saggiatore* (*The Assayer*, 1623) that Galileo did accept the reductionism of atomism and incorporated it into his goal of geometrizing nature.

> Hence I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned, **and that they reside only in the consciousness [of the perceiver]. Hence if the living creature were removed [who senses such qualities], all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.** But since we have imposed upon them special names, distinct from those of the other and real qualities mentioned previously [of shape, position, and relation], we wish to believe that they really exist as actually different from those.18

Just as Galileo's identification of Euclidean points with atomic points reinforced the Epicurean notion that everything in nature could be reduced to material points, **so also (whether Galileo intended it or not) his identification of geometric and atomic points reinforced the Epicurean assertion that nature was self-contained and governed by internal necessity with which the divine could not interfere.** To illustrate, there is no need to invoke any outside principles or causes when we add 5+7. In and of themselves, without any divine aid, the numbers added together equal 12, and this operation works universally and eternally. Over and above this, it seems that not even divine power could make it false. **Mathematical relationships seem to be independent of, and imperturbable by, divine power. The same is true of course for geometrical figures and relationships.** Simply because of the intrinsic necessity of two points making a line, and the joining of three straight lines to each other to form a triangle, the three inferior angles of the triangle thus formed must, in and of themselves, without divine aid and in seeming defiance of divine power, equal two right angles.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page236

> Spinoza, moreover, sought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not think that God was determined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treated as chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of his nature; **just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles, without either knowing or willing this.**

…

Thus, the very notion of laws of nature in the modern sense had its source precisely in this assumption of the identity of the geometrical point with the atomic point. But this identity had an obvious Epicurean effect beyond the intention of Galileo: it allowed nature to be considered a closed system that locked divine interference out of nature. Just as God, it would seem, cannot make 5+7 not equal 12, nor can he make a triangle's interior angles not equal to two right angles, so also he cannot disrupt the natural necessity expressed in the relationship of atomic points. **God becomes just like the gods of Epicurus, utterly powerless to interfere with nature, for the inner laws of mathematics and geometry are eternal and unbreakable.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Laocoon_(Blake)
>
> The Gods of Greece & Egypt were Mathematical Diagrams. See Plato's Works.

...

When asked by Napoleon where God was in Laplace's *Traité de la méchanique céleste*, Laplace triumphantly proclaimed, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis." Even when the very principles of Laplace's *System of the World* were destroyed by the advance of more powerful instruments and more powerful minds, **the confidence gained by Laplace's provisional victory remained; that is, even when the Epicurean foundation of eternal atomic points was swept away at the end of the nineteenth century, the habit of mind remained (and remains).** As a consequence, materialists still believe that Laplace's remark is sufficient to parry any attempt to reintroduce intelligent design, **even though its original and only power lay in a quite peculiar situation:** the acceptance of the eternality of matter, the motion of which was inert and which followed the lawlike confines of geometry, coupled with the attempt to inject God, as an alien element, into this closed system.

...

Newton tried to fit God into the Epicurean system by asserting that the atomic points were only quasi-eternal. Ironically, it was the "quasi" that made Newtonianism so effective a medium for the reintroduction of full-fledged Epicurean materialism, for Newton argued:

> All these things being considered, it seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which he formed them; and **that these primitive particles being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation.**21

The assertion that God created the atoms "as never to wear or break in pieces" – just shy of being eternal – made it easier for Christians, against the centuries-long animosity towards Epicureanism, to embrace that very materialism designed by Epicurus to remove all divine action from nature, and consequently from human affairs. Such a compromise – a Christian God creating Epicurean atoms – ended, of course, in the eventual squeezing out of the divine by the materialism, **thereby attesting to Epicurus's genius in designing a deity-proof view of nature. For once the atoms were accepted as quasi-eternal, it soon became a established habit of mind to think of them as eternal, and it therefore became unclear why they needed a cause for their existence.**

...

But if we look more closely, we find in Newton a mixture of incongruous elements from rival cosmologies. In fact, Newton's putting them together greatly facilitated the revival of full-fledged Epicurean cosmology, for (again) it removed the scruples of Christians in accepting the materialism they had been taught to fear. **Contrary to Newton's insistence, if the laws arise from the very nature of the atom acting as a physical, geometrical point, then it is difficult to see why it is "unphilosophical" to assert that the "origin of the world … might arise out of a chaos by the mere laws of Nature,"** especially since Lucretius had already provided an argument, based on Epicurean principles, that the random motion of purposeless atoms could create, over time, the order in nature that we experience.

...

The advent of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* in 1859 was simply the result of the complete Epicurean system falling into place, causing the ejection of the alien element of divine design inserted by Newton.

https://www.newoxfordreview.org/documents/the-christian-the-epicurean/

Most history textbooks identify Deism as a new, rational religion invented by the Enlightenment. Deism was not new, however; it was a revived Epicurean theology wearing a thin Christian disguise, and Deism soon declared itself to be a religion independent of Christianity, rather than just a modification of it.

> https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12679
>
> In his first sermon, Bentley identified the fact that in the 1690s, it was existentially unviable to profess openly one's own atheism, thereby prompting those with such sensibilities to **"shelter and**

> **screen themselves under a new one of *Deists*, which is not quite so obnoxious."** Yet, they did "impugn" divine Providence, denied the "*Immortality* of the Soul," "Universal *Judgment* to come, **and of any *Incorporeal* Essence**" (Bentley 1692c, 5-6). In terms of the intellectual genesis of modern-day atheism, **Bentley identified the "birth" of Deism as no birth at all, but a *renaissance* (rebirth) of Epicurus and Democritus, their idea of Atomism** (Bentley 1692c, 7-8).

...

In a new mechanical metaphor unavailable to Epicurus, God is a watchmaker who has built a watch that runs on its own, not a God upon Whom the very continuing existence of the universe immediately depends, nor a God Who passionately attaches Himself to one people in a covenant. The Deist god does not worry about us, and we need not worry about interference from him. This god cannot interfere with nature, for nature is independent and self-sufficient.

The result of this hypothesis was devastating for Christianity. First since nature is independent of the Deist god, and the atoms move by their own iron laws, there could be no miracles. This is, of course, a direct return to the prohibition of miracles by Epicurus. There is an ironic twist however, to the modern form. **The Epicurean gods could not break the laws of atomic motion because they themselves were likewise made of atoms. They did not exist independently of nature in the same way that the Creator God of the Bible does. <u>But the modern Epicureans, precisely because they were transforming Christianity, took some of the old mixed with some of the new.</u> Their Deist god was the creator of nature but – and one can hardly convey the full strangeness of the irony – this god could not break any of the laws of nature he created.**

> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/636/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Jaeger depicts *Spinocismus* as the ultimate distillation of all that most fatally threatens Christian society.53 Accounting the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* 'famosissimus,' **Tübingen's chancellor identifies as its core contention the view that '<u>God cannot act against the Laws of Nature, because he cannot act against His own nature.</u>'**54 Hence, argues Spinoza, there never have been, and never could be, any miracles, Biblical prophecy arises from overactive imaginations, and theology is not the path to truth but useful only to instil 'piety.'55 **Philosophy is proclaimed the sole path to 'truth' and 'salvation' and there is accordingly an overriding need for 'libertas philosophandi' (liberty to philosophize).**56

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/98/mode/2up?view=theater

The philosophes' two most reliable sources of inspiration in Roman literature, the two writers to whom they could turn with confidence, certain of finding in them support for their great enterprise, were the greatest poet and the greatest publicist of the late Republic: Lucretius and Cicero.

Titus Lucretius Carus is a mysterious and shadowy figure, although the men of the Enlightenment found themselves completely at home in his *De rerum natura* – that poetic rendering of the most unpoetic of philosophies, Epicureanism. They read it often and quoted it to the purpose; Voltaire had at least six editions and translations in his library, and the other philosophes collected him just as assiduously. Yet they had no way of visualizing Lucretius as a man: none of his letters have survived, **and while his ideas and style pervade the writings of his contemporaries, they quoted him without acknowledgement and passed him over in silence.**

There has been much puzzlement over this silence, and it is the other favorite of the philosophes – Cicero – who at least provides a clue: **in a private letter written in 54 B.C., Cicero tells his brother that Lucretius's *De rerum natura* is contructed with craftsmanship and marked by flashes of genius. Ten years later, in a disingenuous aside in the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero implies that he does not know the poem.** Since Cicero was a courageous man, his reason for the denial must reflect a political position. **Lucretius was to the dying Roman Republic much what Hobbes was to the seventeenth century, <u>a disturber of the peace whose work was too great to be ignored but whose name was too disreputable to be praised.</u>** A poet who uses the word *religio* in the pejorative sense in which others used the word *superstitio* was dangerous.

Whatever the circumstances of Lucretius's life, the meaning of his poem was as clear to his readers in Cicero's Rome as it was to his readers in Voltaire's France or Frederick's Prussia. One famous tribute from no less a man than Vergil makes this plain:

> Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
> atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum,
> subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari –

“Happy the man who can know the causes of things, and has trampled underfoot all fears, inexorable fate, and the clamor of greedy hell.”9
…

Still, the real weight of Lucretius’s popularity is hard to assess. It is a plausible reading of the Enlightenment to say that Lucretius had no real hold over it: **deists and atheists alike repudiated his atomism and his teaching that the world arose by chance; no one, except perhaps La Mettrie, accepted his hedonism without modification.** The occasional citations from his epic, therefore, are classical garnishes, decorative but empty.

But such a reading assumes, wrongly I think, that a writer can influence posterity only by compelling it to accept a specific doctrine. **There are other influences, more elusive, perhaps, but equally far reaching:** implicitly as much as explicitly, in his rhetoric and his unflagging zeal against what he considered the forces of obscurantism, Lucretius invited emulation.
…

Certainly, eighteenth-century Christians combated Lucretius as though he were alive. **In the first half of the century, Cardinal de Polignac, a cultivated classicist, found it necessary to malign Epicurus and to refute *De rerum natura* in an interminable didactic poem in Latin;** while the Jesuit *Journal de Trévoux*, usually urbane and generous, especially toward the classics, took the time to denounce Lucretius for his impiety. When Lagrange’s translation appeared, Grimm reported in his newsletter that it was widely considered part of the philosophes’ “favorite project of destroying religion”;5 **and when Holbach’s *Système de la nature* was condemned by the *parlement* of Paris in August 1770, the *parlement* accused the book of “reviving” and “expanding” the “system of Lucretius”**6 **– all of which shows that the philosophes had no monopoly on exaggerating the influence of antiquity on modernity.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false

For if Voltaire possessed at least six editions and translations of Lucretius in his library, and privately scoffed at Cardinal Polignac’s *Anti-Lucretius*,32 **for him, with his providential deism, belief in fixity of species, fervour for Locke and Newton, and commitment to the idea that morality is divinely delivered, Lucretius was no friend, but a challenging, disturbing complication, philosophically and politically,** no inspiration but a menace with respect to final ends and divine Providence that he felt driven to combat.33 Without demolishing Lucretius, Voltaire could not counter the anti-deist critique of Diderot, d'Holbach, and the other eighteenth-century materialists.

If the Radical Enlightenment too viewed Lucretius as the vital bridge connecting ancient Greek materialism with the Renaissance, and Spinozism, where Diderot and d’Holbach applauded, Voltaire, in his last years, furiously demurred. **Loudly invoking the same Memmius, the patron and friend to whom Lucretius addresses his great poem, in his *Lettres de Memmius à Ciceron* (1771), when replying to d’Holbach’s *Système de la nature* (1770), Voltaire tellingly directs his attack simultaneously against Lucretius *and* Spinoza.** By merging his two targets into one he underlined his argument that his Enlightenment combats only priests, and not priests and kings together, like his wrong-headed unnamed Radical Enlightenment adversaries, while also discreetly pointing to the partnership of Diderot and d’Holbach, his target behind the scenes. **Voltaire had no difficulty with their offensive against religion and priestcraft, it was Diderot’s, Raynal’s, and d’Holbach’s denouncing the alleged alliance of priests and kings, a strategy bound to mobilize all the world’s courts and monarchs against the *philosophes*, that deeply alarmed him.** The *philosophie moderne* proselytizing materialist atheism that he opposed, held Voltaire, threatened to wreck the *philosophes*’ standing and (his) reputation where it counted most – at court in Berlin, Petersburg, and Versailles, and in aristocratic circles everywhere. Modern materialism’s advance Voltaire deemed a catastrophe for the *philosophes*’ future, though it would damage him less than the rest, he joked sourly, as he expected to die shortly **and would soon discover who was right concerning the soul’s composition and immortality – Plato or Spinoza, Saint Paul or Epictetus, Christianity or Confucianism.**34

Closely coupling Spinozism with Epicurus and Lucretius was a central feature of Voltaire’s late stance but, by the 1770s, also typified the stance of those, like Lichtenberg, the Göttingen scientist and *litterateur*, among the great prophets of self-emancipation of the *Aufklärung*, who, **while pronouncing Lucretius and Spinoza the twin towering heroes of the human spirit, kept their rejection of the political and social status quo strictly private.** While circumventing the Spinozists’ scheme to transform society and politics, **Goethe and Lichtenberg endorsed Spinoza’s non-providential, evolutionary, and self-creating conception of reality,** the stance Voltaire consistently, and in many writings from the late 1760s onwards, expressly repudiated.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n49/mode/2up?view=theater

Among the Sophisters we should compare Voltaire to Agamemnon, and D'Alembert to Ulysses. If the comparison be too noble, see the latter cunning, cringing, and even yelping like the fox.
…

Voltaire was fiery, passionate and impetuous; D'Alembert cold, reserved, prudent and crafty.—Voltaire was fond of show, D'Alembert almost feared to be seen. **The one, like the chief who is obliged to mask his battery, reluctantly used dissimulation while he wished to wage open war with Christianity, *and die on a heap of Christians*, whom he terms Bigots, *immolated at his feet*5—The other, by instinct a dissembler, waged war like the partizan who, from behind a bush, smiles to see his enemy fall into the snares he has laid.**6 Voltaire, transcendent in polite literature, was but superficial in mathematicks. In the latter D'Alembert was profound, indeed he owed all his reputation to them; for in everything else he was a dry, finical, and confused writer; sometimes as mean and vulgar as Voltaire is noble, easy, and elegant, he would plod to turn a bad epigram, while the latter would have wittily filled whole volumes.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/844/mode/2up?view=theater

But Diderot's radical views and devious intellectual strategy rendered the enterprise far more precarious also in this respect than it would have been in the hands of a genuine Lockean or Newtonian, adherent of the *voltairianisme* of the 1740s, or even **the much more cautious and more 'Baconian' d'Alembert.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/12/mode/2up?view=theater

The pattern is the same in the later French *Encyclopédie* edited by Diderot and d'Alembert: **for all the lavish praise heaped on Locke by d'Alembert in his preliminary discourse to the *Encyclopédie*** – praise which, as we shall see, may have had a diversionary purpose – **in the body of the *Encyclopédie* itself the coverage given to Locke is far less, scarcely one fifth, of the coverage accorded to Spinoza.**41

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n77/mode/2up?view=theater

Prepossessed by these *references*, against the existence of God, let the reader turn to the articles of ENCYCLOPEDIA and EPICURISM. In the former he will be told, *that there is no being in nature that can be called the first or last, and that a machine infinite in every way must necessarily be the Deity*. **In the latter the atom is to be the Deity. It will be the primary cause of all things, by whom and of whom every thing is active, essentially of itself, *alone unalterable, alone eternal, alone immutable*; and thus the reader will be insensibly led from the God of the Gospel to the heathenish fictions of an Epicurus or a Spinosa.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/516/mode/2up?view=theater

For apart from the obvious fact that little further use is found for Bacon, **d'Alembert was utterly convinced society needs two distinct levels of ideas, one composed of popular philosophy to enlighten the wider but unsophisticated public and, completely different, philosophical truth as cultivated by *philosophes* such as himself and Diderot.** While publicly proclaiming them heroes of incomparable wisdom and stature, **privately, among his friends and intimates, d'Alembert – and still more, Diderot – was highly critical of much of Locke's philosophy and rejected key elements of Newton.**7 One has to bear in mind that the *Encyclopédie* was produced in a fraught intellectual and ideological atmosphere with the constant threat of suppression emanating especially from the Church and the *parlements* – but at times also sections of the royal Court – hanging over it.8 **Reassuring noises about its doctrinal implications had to be made, above all in its preface,** to allay the fears of Church and State, which by no means necessarily matched the views of its compilers. **For the crucial point about Newton, Locke, and Bacon is that these thinkers were, from the 1730s, everywhere regarded, even among the most reactionary sections of the French Church, and by the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition, as intellectually safe writers,** innovative perhaps but entirely supportive of revealed religion, Providence, and the political and social order.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n125/mode/2up?view=theater

Who can reconcile this antichristian zeal, ever emphatic, and in a state of ebullition when his imagination is heated, with that real admiration which he often expressed for the Gospel? The following is an anecdote I had from Mr. Beauzée, a member of the academy. Going one day to see Diderot, he found him explaining a chapter of the Gospel to his daughter, as seriously and with as much concern as the most Christian parent could have done. Mr. Beauzée expressed his surprize. "I understand you," said Diderot, "but in truth where could I find better lessons to give her?"

D'Alembert would never have made such an avowal as this. **Though the constant friend of Diderot, we find throughout their lives, and their philosophic course, that same difference which marked their first essays in the apostleship. Diderot spoke out whatever he thought at the moment, D'Alembert never said a word but what he wished to say. I will defy any one to find his real opinion on *God*, or on the *soul*, except in his private correspondence with the conspirators.** His works have all the obscurity and cunning of iniquity, but he is the fox that infects and then burrows himself. Easier would it be to follow the meanderings of the eel, or trace the windings of the serpent gliding through the grass, than to discover the tortuous course he follows in those writings which he owns.23

> 23. From the criticism made of his works in our Helvian Letters the result is this: **D'Alembert will never declare himself a sceptic, or whether he knows of the existence of a God or not. He will even let you think that he believes in God; and then begin by attacking certain proofs of a Deity;** he will tell you that, from zeal for the Deity, man must know how to choose among those proofs. He will end by attacking them all, with a *yes* on one object, and a *no* a little while on the same; he will entangle the minds of his readers, he will raise doubts in them, and smile to see them fallen without perceiving it, into the very snare he had prepared for them**.** He never tells you to attack religion, but he will tempt you with a stand of arms, or place them in your hands ready for combat. (*See his Elements of Philosophy and our Helvian Letters, Let.* xxxvii). He will never declaim against the morality of the church or the commandments of God; but he will tell you that *there does not exist a single catechism on morality fitted to the capacities of youth*; and that it is to be hoped there will at length appear a Philosopher who will supply that *desideratum* (*See Elem. of Phil.* No. 12). **He will not pretend to deny the sweets of virtue; but he will tell you, "that philosophers would have better known our nature, had they been satisfied with simply confining the happiness of this life to the exemption from pain."** (*Preface of the Encyclopedia*). He will not offend his reader by obscene descriptions, but he will tell him. Art. HAPPINESS, "Men all agree as to the nature of happiness; they declare it to be the same as pleasure, or at least they are indebted to pleasure for all that is most delicious in it." **And thus his young pupil is transformed into an Epicurean without knowing it.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n1/mode/2up?view=theater

The experts know that no preliminary studies that are even of the slightest use exist for the subject of this treatise. **What Cicero and Plutarch have babbled has been babbled after them up to the present day. Gassendi, who freed Epicurus from the interdict which the Fathers of the Church and the whole Middle Ages, the period of realised unreason, had placed upon him,** presents in his expositions15 only one interesting element. He seeks to accommodate his Catholic conscience to his pagan knowledge and Epicurus to the Church, which certainly was wasted effort. It is as though one wanted to throw the habit of a Christian nun over the bright and flourishing body of the Greek Lais. It is rather that Gassendi learns philosophy from Epicurus than that he could teach us about Epicurus' philosophy.

This treatise is to be regarded only as the preliminary to a larger work in which I shall present in detail the cycle of Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophy in their relation to the whole of Greek speculation.16 The shortcomings of this treatise, in form and the like, will be eliminated in that later work.

> 16. Marx never realised his plan to write a larger work on the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophies.

To be sure, Hegel has on the whole correctly defined the general aspects of the above-mentioned systems. But in the admirably great and bold plan of his history of philosophy, from which alone the history of philosophy can in general be dated, it was impossible, on the one hand, to go into detail, and on the other hand, **the giant thinker was hindered by his view of what he called speculative thought *par excellence* from recognising in these systems their great importance for the history of Greek philosophy and for the Greek mind in general. These systems are the key to the true history of Greek philosophy.** A more profound indication of their connection with Greek life can be found in the essay of my friend Köppen, *Friedrich der Grosse und seine Widersacher.*17

> 17. This refers to the following passage from the book by Karl Friedrich Köppen, *Friedrich der Grosse und seine Widersacher*, Leipzig, 1840: "Epikureismus, Stoikismus und Skepsis sind die Nervenmuskel und Eingeweidesysteme des antiken Organismus, deren unmittelbare, natürliche Einheit die Schönheit und Sittlichkeit des Altertums bedingte, und die beim Absterben desselben auseinanderfielen" (S. 39) ("Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism are the nerve muscles and intestinal system of the antique organism whose immediate, natural unity conditioned the beauty and morality of antiquity, and which disintegrated with the decay of the latter"). **Köppen dedicated his book to Karl Marx.**

...

Philosophy, as long as a drop of blood shall pulse in its world-subduing and absolutely free heart, will never grow tired of answering its adversaries with the cry of Epicurus:

Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them, is truly impious.19

Philosophy makes no secret of it. **The confession of Prometheus:**

> In simple words, I hate the pack of gods [Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*]

is its own confession, its own aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity. It will have none other beside.

But to those poor March hares who rejoice over the apparently worsened civil position of philosophy, it responds again, as Prometheus replied to the servant of the gods, Hermes:

> Be sure of this, I would not change my state
> Of evil fortune for your servitude.
>
> Better to be the servant of this rock
> Than to be faithful boy to Father Zeus. (Ibid.)

Prometheus is the most eminent saint and martyr in the philosophical calendar.

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n7/mode/2up?view=theater

In the note I quote only one passage from Clement of Alexandria,7 a Father of the Church who deserves to be prominently mentioned with regard to Epicurus, **since he reinterprets the warning of the apostle Paul against philosophy in general into a warning against Epicurean philosophy, as one which did not even once spin fantasies concerning providence and the like.**8

> 8. Ibid., p. 295 [I, 11]. "Beware lest any man despoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the elements of the world and not after Christ" [Col. ii, 8] branding not all philosophy, but the Epicurean, which Paul mentions in the Acts of the Apostles [Acts xvii, 181], which abolishes providence... **and whatever other philosophy honours the elements, but places not over them the efficient cause, nor apprehends the Creator.**

https://archive.org/details/Marx_Karl_-_Doctoral_Thesis_-_The_Difference_Between_the_Democritean_and_Epicure/page/n59/mode/2up?view=theater

In the theory of meteors therefore appears the soul of the Epicurean philosophy of nature. Nothing is eternal which destroys the ataraxy of individual self-consciousness. The heavenly bodies disturb its ataraxy, its equanimity with itself, because they are the existing universality, because in them nature has become independent.

Thus the principle of Epicurean philosophy is not the *gastrology* of Archestratus as Chrysippus believes26 **but the absoluteness and freedom of self-consciousness – even if self-consciousness is only conceived in the form of individuality.**

> 26. Athenaeus, *Banquet of the Learned*, III, 104. ... **One ... must with good reason approve the noble Chrysippus for his shrewd comprehension of Epicurus' "Nature", and his remark that the very centre of the Epicurean philosophy is the *Gastrology* of Archestratus...**

If abstract-individual self-consciousness is posited as an absolute principle, then, indeed, all true and real science is done away with [*aufgehoben*] inasmuch as individuality does not rule within the nature of things themselves. But then, too, everything collapses that is transcendentally related to human consciousness and therefore belongs to the imagining mind. **On the other hand, if that self-consciousness which knows itself only in the form of abstract universality is raised to an absolute principle, then the door is opened wide to superstitious and unfree mysticism. Stoic philosophy provides the historic proof of this.** Abstract-universal self-consciousness has, indeed, the intrinsic urge to affirm itself in the things themselves in which it can only affirm itself by negating them.

Epicurus is therefore the greatest representative of Greek Enlightenment, and he deserves the praise of Lucretius:27

> **When human life lay grovelling in all men's sight, crushed to the earth under the dead weight of religion** whose grim features loured menacingly upon mortals from the four quarters of the sky, a man of Greece was first to raise mortal eyes in defiance, first to stand erect and brave the challenge. Fables of the gods did not crush him, nor the lightning flash and growling menace of the sky... **Therefore religion in its turn lies crushed beneath his feet, and we by his triumph are lifted level with the skies.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03a.htm

In connection with the Stoics, *Democritus* is also mentioned in the following way: a muddled passage of Diogenes Laertius (*Democritus*, Book IX, 7, 45), which in addition has been inaccurately translated, is copied out from some textbook, and made the basis for a lengthy diatribe about Democritus. This diatribe has the distinguishing feature of being in direct contradiction to its basis, i.e., to the above-mentioned muddled and inaccurately translated passage, and converts “peace of mind” (Stirner’s translation of □□□□□□□, in Low German *Wellmuth*) into “rejection of the world”. **The fact is that Stirner imagines that Democritus was a Stoic, and indeed of the sort that the unique and the ordinary school-boyish consciousness conceive a Stoic to be.** Stirner thinks that “his whole activity amounts to an endeavour to detach himself from the world”, “hence to a rejection of the world”, and that in the person of Democritus he can refute the Stoics. That the eventful life of Democritus, who had wandered through the world a great deal, flagrantly contradicts this notion of Saint Max’s; **that the real source from which to learn about the philosophy of Democritus is Aristotle and not a couple of anecdotes from Diogenes Laertius;** that Democritus, far from rejecting the world, was, on the contrary, an empirical natural scientist and the first encyclopaedic mind among the Greeks; that his almost unknown ethics was limited to a few remarks which he is *alleged* to have made when he was an old, much-travelled man; that his writings on natural science can be called philosophy only *per abusum*, [by abuse, i.e., improperly, wrongly] because for him, in contrast to Epicurus, the atom was only a physical hypothesis, an expedient for explaining facts, just as it is in the proportional combinations of modern chemistry (Dalton and others) — all this does not suit the purpose of Jacques le bonhomme. Democritus must be understood in the “unique” fashion, Democritus speaks of euthymia, hence of peace of mind, hence of withdrawal into oneself, hence of rejection of the world. **Democritus is a Stoic, and he differs from the Indian fakir mumbling “Brahma” (the word should have been “Om”),**[50] **only as the comparative differs from the superlative, i.e., “only *in degree*”.**

Of the Epicureans our friend knows exactly as much as he does of the Stoics, viz., the unavoidable schoolboy’s minimum. He contrasts the Epicurean “hedone”, [pleasure] with the “ataraxia” [equanimity, imperturbability, intrepidity] of the Stoics and Sceptics, **not knowing that this “ataraxia” is also to he found in Epicurus and, moreover, as something placed higher than the “hedone” — in consequence of which his whole contrast falls to the ground. He tells us that the Epicureans “teach *only a different attitude to the world*” from that of the Stoics; but let him show us the (non-Stoic) philosopher of “ancient or modern times” who does not do “only” the same. Finally, Saint Max enriches us with a new dictum of the Epicureans: “the world must be deceived, for it is my enemy”.** Hitherto it was only known that the Epicureans made statements in the sense that the world must be *disillusioned* and especially freed from fear of gods, for the world is my *friend*.

To give our saint some indication of the real base on which the philosophy of Epicurus rests, **it is sufficient to mention that the idea that the state rests on the mutual agreement of people, on a *contrat social* (□□□□□□□□ [contract]), is found for the first time in Epicurus.**

The extent to which Saint Max’s disclosures about the Sceptics follow the same line is already evident from the fact that **he considers their philosophy more radical than that of Epicurus.** The Sceptics reduced the theoretical relation of people to things to *appearance*, and in practice they left everything as of old, being guided by this appearance just as much as others are guided by actuality; they merely gave it another name. **Epicurus, on the other hand, was the true radical Enlightener of antiquity; he openly attacked the ancient religion, and it was from him, too, that the atheism of the Romans, insofar as it existed, was derived.** For this reason, too, Lucretius praised Epicurus as the hero who was the first to overthrow the gods and trample religion underfoot; for this reason among all church fathers, from Plutarch to Luther, Epicurus has always had the reputation of being the atheist philosopher *par excellence,* and was called a swine; for which reason, too, **Clement of Alexandria says that when Paul takes up arms against philosophy he has in mind Epicurean philosophy alone.** (*Stromatum*, Book I [chap. XI], p. 295, Cologne edition, 1688.) Hence we see how “cunning, perfidious” and “clever” was the attitude of this open atheist to the world in directly attacking its religion, **while the Stoics adapted the ancient religion in their own speculative fashion, and the Sceptics used their concept of “appearance” as the excuse for being able to accompany all their judgments with a *reservatio mentalis.***

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/290/mode/2up?view=theater

Nothing was so important for reestablishing the divinity-free universe in modernity than the rehabilitation of the eternal atom, for its very eternality eliminated the need for God the creator, and allowed nature to be self-sustained and self-contained. **The brilliance of Epicurus's original strategy was made clear in modernity when all attempts (even and especially Newton's) to integrate a creator with Epicurean atomism ended with the atoms reasserting their self-subsistent eternality,** thereby making the creator superfluous.

> https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
>
> **[Since the first bodies cannot be broken up by anyone,] whether he is god or man, one is left to conclude that these things are [absolutely] indestructible, [beyond the reach of] necessity.** For if [they were destroyed,] in accordance with [necessity, into the nonexistent, all things would have perished.]

...

But the destruction of the eternal atom occurred (if we cared to pinpoint a date) in 1897, in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, England, when J.J. Thompson identified a negatively charged particle of much less mass than hydrogen, the lightest known element. So began the unraveling of the atom into a miniature universe of subatomic particles, not only electrons, protons and neutrons, but mesons, muons and pions, and so on until tens of such subatomic particles have turned into hundreds. **This was not the simple, eternal point of Epicurus, Galileo and Newton.**

Added to this was the discovery of radioactivity during roughly the same period, wherein it became clear that atoms were not eternal, but could quite easily decay. Even above this, the solidity of the atom vanished as well. Not only could it be split, but it consisted mostly of empty space, as Ernest Rutherford discovered when, in 1909, he directed alpha particles at a thin metal sheet, and found that only a very small number were deflected (when they hit the positively charged nucleus), but most went right through. The radius of the atom, as it turns out, is ten thousand times greater than the radius of the nucleus – most of the atom is empty.

...

To recall our analysis, the self-contained nature of physical laws in the modern sense relied on an identity of the Euclidean and atomic point, so that the inner necessity of mathematical relations really existed in nature. **This mathematical necessity was the true binding force of those laws of nature that supposedly disallowed any divine interference** (and, thereby, achieved an Epicurean end). Once the identity of the atom and the point was broken, that is, once the atom lost its geometrically precise and indestructible nature and revealed itself to be not only far more complex than any mathematical entity but also contingent, then the inner necessity of mathematical relationships no longer had their natural counterpart. **A sign of this is the independence of nature from mathematics, or if we want to look at it's the other way around, the dependence of the mathematical analysis of nature upon nature itself (seen in the frenzied attempts to stretch and invent new modes of mathematical analysis to describe the ever-stranger, ever more complex world of physics uncovered in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries).** When Newtonians thought that all of nature had been captured with Euclidean geometry as modified by calculus, then it made sense to claim that nature was a self-contained system and that the laws of nature precluded any external interference. But with the fall of Newtonianism, mathematical analysis once again depends upon nature, and continues to need restructuring in order to capture the actual discovered complexity of nature. **Nature itself breaks the closed circle of mathematical necessity.**

...

All this, one would think, would lead to a reassessment of the belief that nature is a closed system and that material processes were sufficient to explain what previously had been attributed to immaterial intelligence, but the materialist *habit* of mind has continued long after the theoretical presuppositions that undergirded it have fallen away. Materialists still act as if the Epicurean-Newtonian universe is intact, and certified free from deity and soul.

https://www.basicincome.com/bp/pantheismcertainlyis.htm

Men believed in atoms centuries before they had any experimental evidence of their existence. It was apparently natural to do so. And the sort of atoms we naturally believe in are little hard pellets—just like the hard substances we meet in experience, but too small to see. The mind reaches this conception by an easy analogy from grains of sand or of salt. It explains a number of phenomena; and we feel at home with atoms of that sort—we can picture them. **The belief would have lasted forever if later science had not been so troublesome as to find out what atoms are *really* like.** The moment it does that, all our mental comfort, all the immediate plausibility and obviousness of the old atomic theory, is destroyed. The real atoms turn out to be quite alien from our natural mode of thought. They are not even made of hard "stuff" or "matter" (as the imagination understands "matter") at all: they are not simple, but have a structure: they are not all the same: and they are unpicturable. **The old atomic theory is in physics what Pantheism is in religion—the normal, instinctive guess of the human mind, not utterly wrong, but needing correction.** Christian theology, and quantum physics,

are both, by comparison with the first guess, hard, complex, dry and repellent. The first shock of the object's real nature, breaking in on our spontaneous dreams of what that object ought to be, always has these characteristics. **You must not expect Schrödinger to be as plausible as Democritus; he knows too much. You must not expect St Athanasius to be as plausible as Mr Bernard Shaw: he also knows too much.**

https://history.aip.org/exhibits/heisenberg/physics-and-philosophy.html

In the philosophy of Democritus the atoms are eternal and indestructible units of matter, they can never be transformed into each other. With regard to this question modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans. The elementary particles are certainly not eternal and indestructible units of matter, they can actually be transformed into each other. As a matter of fact, if two such particles, moving through space with a very high kinetic energy, collide, then many new elementary particles may be created from the available energy and the old particles may have disappeared in the collision. **Such events have been frequently observed and offer the best proof that all particles are made of the same substance: energy.** But the resemblance of the modern views to those of Plato and the Pythagoreans can be carried somewhat further. **The elementary particles in Plato's *Timaeus* are finally not substance but mathematical forms.** "All things are numbers" is a sentence attributed to Pythagoras. The only mathematical forms available at that time were such geometric forms as the regular solids or the triangles which form their surface. **In modern quantum theory there can be no doubt that the elementary particles will finally also be mathematical forms but of a much more complicated nature.**

---

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/noble-savages-exposing-the-worldview-of-pornographers-and-their-war-against-christian-civilization

Unwin rejected the atomistic view of man and society. Its application to the problems of culture could have only a destructive and uncomprehending effect:

> **It is sometimes said that a human society is a mere collection of males and females. That, in my view, is a profound error.** It would be as true to say that a chemical substance like water is a mere collection of electrons and protons. **Instead, it is an aggregation of atomic groups, which are held together by invisible forces that are not yet understood.** First, the electrons and protons are gathered together into atoms, which vary in size and constitution. These are then collected into molecules. The event we call water emerges from this structure.
>
> In a similar manner, a human society is not a collection of individuals but of human groups, which are held together by forces that have not yet been analysed and understood. The males and females are first united into families, which vary in size and constitution. These are then gathered into clans, moieties, and territorial units. There are also cultural and economic groups, such as secret societies, brotherhoods, sisterhoods, guilds, unions, federations, and fraternities. The event we call a human society emerges from this structure.
>
> **The outstanding difference is that, whereas, so far as we know, an electron can only be part of one atom at one time, a human being can be a member of any number of human groups.** But this fact does not alter the fundamental nature of a society's structure.6

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MSu2w3FqepoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

As for Epicurus himself, even if strict in his views about chastity, there is no doubt that he was an irritating pupil. It will be recalled how he put his early instructor in a corner over the topic of chaos. The following extract reveals no more the irritable teacher than the irritating pupil; the reference is to Nausiphanes: "Well, good riddance to the braggart, for that rotter, when in a temper, would have a torrent of the sophistic bluster at the tip of his tongue, like many another of the servile creatures."36 **It may be mentioned that Epicurus classified all men as slaves who, like the physicists, believed in Necessity, or, like the poets, in Fate, or, like Theophrastus, in Fortune, or, like the people, in divine interference, or like the Platonists, in astral deities, or those who, by pursuing the conventional education, surrendered their freedom for the pursuit of power, fame, or wealth.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false

Though Epicurus was not at all inclined to speak in praise of political ambition and the pursuit of lasting fame, even he was prepared to acknowledge that **“the life of freedom (*eleútheros bíos*) is incompatible with the acquisition (*ou dúnatai ktēsasthai*) of great wealth.”** For, like his more politically oriented compatriots, he was persuaded that **riches cannot be gathered “without servile behavior (*thēteía*) towards dynasts (*dúnastai*) or mobs.**”41

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.512045/page/85/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Ancient philosophers have vaunted of poverty as the safe-guard of independence: Voltaire, that he might be independent, wished to become rich; and he was equally to be commended. The ancients were unacquainted with that secret wealth which may at once be dispersed and secured, in various countries, beyond the reach of power.** Confiscation and its abuses, amongst them, rendered wealth as dangerous as fame, or popular favour. The extent of the Roman empire, and the smallness of the Grecian republics, alike prevented men from the concealment of their riches, or their persons. The difference of manners among neighbouring nations, the almost general ignorance of foreign languages, and a less degree of intercourse throughout the world, were then so many impediments to a change of country. **The ancients likewise knew less of the conveniencies of life, which among us are become necessary to all who are not born in poverty.** Their climate subjected them to less numerous real wants; and the wealthy were more addicted to magnificence, refinement in debauchery, excess, and caprice, than to habitual and daily convenience. **Thus, as it was more easy for them to be poor, and more difficult to be rich without danger, riches were not among them, as among us, the means of escaping from unjust oppression.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D1105

> **So better far in quiet to obey,**
> **Than to desire chief mastery of affairs**
> **And ownership of empires.** Be it so;
> And let the weary sweat their life-blood out
> All to no end, battling in hate along
> The narrow path of man's ambition;
> **Since all their wisdom is from others' lips,**
> **And all they seek is known from what they've heard**
> **And less from what they've thought.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerospractical0000unse/page/266/mode/2up?view=theater

Already in *Natural Right and History* **[Strauss] referred to the poem of Lucretius as "the greatest document of philosophic conventionalism and, in fact, its only document available to us that is both authentic and comprehensive. ..."**45
...

As already implied in his linking Rousseau and Hobbes to Lucretius, the Epicureans indicated for Strauss the presence in pre-modern times of the modern alternative. In Lucretius and the Epicureans, wrote Strauss, "... premodern thought seems to come closer to modern thought than anywhere else."51 The pivotal ancients-moderns distinction for Strauss was not, of course, a rigid periodization but a characterization of the predominant understanding of the end and nature of political life before and after Machiavelli. On each side of the divide between the ancients and moderns, there are present representatives, at least, of the other side. And then too, the divide is one between the predominant understandings of *political thinkers,* and if only in the light of Athens's treatment of Socrates, it can be said that societies only more or less incorporate such understandings. **As the "modern" Epicureans were present in ancient times, so, Strauss has suggested, there is in modern times an "ancient" way of thinking as well as reservoirs of common sense which can provide support for a *healthy* liberal democracy.**52

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/286/mode/2up?view=theater

Then a wholly new brand, a wholly new pattern of morality came upon the scene; the code of self-respect; a psychological morality. It was not averse from drawing on the ancient world, which, in truth, it vastly preferred to Christianity. Nevertheless, its main appeal was to Reason. However, it was a polite, a civilized reason, not the old austere, uncultured brand; it was a reason that betrayed little or nothing of its erstwhile rigidity. **“Let us forget all about those days when to be harsh meant to be virtuous. Polished manners, gallantry, the art of pleasing are now all held in esteem. As for hatred of evil, that should last as long as the world, but let us congratulate ourselves that people now call pleasure what rude and untutored folk of old called vice. Do not compose your stock of virtues from old notions which uncouth and savage nature implanted in primeval man.”**2 This new morality did not

exclude the pleasures of the senses, nor did it banish the passions, provided they were regulated and kept within bounds. … Of course! However, this new code could not claim to have a binding, still less universal, mandate. Duly to understand and practise it, one must be a Saint-Évremond, or a Sir William Temple, or a Lord Halifax. It was the code of the aristocrat, the exquisite, the disillusioned; its structure was frail; it meant making the best of both worlds; **adaptation rather than domination was its note.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/606/mode/2up?view=theater

Unlike Blount, Sir William Temple (1628-99), a far less abrasive deist but likewise a key figure in the emergence of English deism, **seems to borrow little or nothing directly from Spinoza.** Yet Temple was a widely read man who, as we know from his own writings, was familiar with Fontenelle and greatly admired Machiavelli, Sarpi, Montaigne, and Saint-Evremond.53 Like Blount, he too learnt from Isaac Vossius, **a deist, Epicurean, and Sinophile** from who he chiefly derived his enthusiasm for Confucianism.54 Furthermore, it seems that his partiality for republican ideas – despite being a servant of the royal house of Stuart – and religious and intellectual toleration, both strongly reflected in his *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1673), were stimulated by his long residence as English ambassador in Holland and personal friendship for De Witt. **The two most distinctive features of Temple's thought, his Epicureanism and admiration for Confucius, the 'most learned, wise and virtuous of all the Chineses'** may not demonstrate, any more than his residence in The Hague at a time Spinoza lived there, that he knew the latter's philosophy.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

Real "Lucretians" during the early modern age, observed Taylor, were figures like St. Evremond, Fontenelle, or Temple, **standing aside from both religious faith *and* awareness of any need to forge a beneficent new order. The Anglo-Irish Epicurean Sir William Temple (1628-99) perfectly combined early modern drawing on Epicurean moral philosophy with turning his back on research into the sciences.**55

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2332/2332-h/2332-h.htm#link2H_4_0007

He avoided the great offices of State with a caution almost pusillanimous, and confined himself to quiet and secluded departments of public business, in which he could enjoy moderate but certain advantages without incurring envy. If the circumstances of the country became such that it was impossible to take any part in politics without some danger, he retired to his library and his orchard, and, while the nation groaned under oppression, or resounded with tumult and with the din of civil arms, amused himself by writing memoirs and tying up apricots.
…

For in truth his faultlessness is chiefly to be ascribed to his extreme dread of all responsibility, to his determination rather to leave his country in a scrape than to run any chance of being in a scrape himself.
…

The moderns, Sir William owns, have found out the circulation of blood; but, on the other hand, they have quite lost the art of conjuring; nor can any modern fiddler enchant fishes, fowls, and serpents by his performance. He tells us that **"Thales, Pythagoras, Democritus, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus made greater progresses in the several empires of science than any of their successors have since been able to reach";** which is just as absurd as if he had said that the greatest names in British science are Merlin, Michael Scott, Dr. Sydenham, and Lord Bacon.
…

The doctrine of Temple, not a very comfortable doctrine, is that the human race is constantly degenerating, and that the oldest books in every kind are the best in confirmation of this notion, he remarks that the Fables of Aesop are the best Fables, and the Letters of Phalaris the best Letters in the world.

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/126/mode/2up?view=theater

During his stay in Holland, which lasted from 1666 to 1672, he became acquainted with a certain Jew whose name was Spinoza. It gave him pleasure, des Maizeaux tells us, to see "some of the famous philosophers and men of learning who were then in The Hague, particularly, Heinsius, Vossius and Spinoza." We do not know precisely what passed between them; what we do know is that, long after the interview took place, Saint-Évremond was still haunted by the memory of Spinoza. **"In the humble and pensive solitary of Ryneburg and Stilla Veerkade, French libertinism, which, till now has been no more than a vague desire to be free, an impatience of rule, and a revolt against dogma, a spiritual Fronde in other words, is on the look-out for, and now thinks it has found, the required apologist for its unbelief, the right man to give a logical basis and formal expression to the aims it has most at heart."**1

http://blog.despinoza.nl/log/waarom-ontving-richard-popkin-niet-de-nobelprijs-voor-spinoza-studies-2.html

The Prince of Condé had led the French invasion of the Netherlands in 1672 and established his headquarters in Utrecht. In May of 1673 he became sick and had to stay in bed. He invited the most learned men of Utrecht to talk to him. Then, the text relates, **"It is reported that he was desirous to see Spinoza, and told him smiling, *That if he would follow him into France, he would put him in a way to live conformably to the Principles of his Theology; that Paris neither wanted fine Women, nor Pleasures; although he look'd upon him as a Deist, and a Man who had no Religion, he was charm'd with the Conversation he had with him*."**
…

(Morelli said Spinoza told him the details of his visit to the prince over and over again.) The prince would make Spinoza part of his court, would protect him, house and feed him, and give him a pension of one thousand écus. Morelli said Spinoza turned this down because he was afraid that not even the great Prince of Condé could protect him from the bigots in Paris. (Condé was the protector of quite a few people of dubious religious views, including Molière and Isaac de la Peyrère.)

https://sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/corr/corr45.htm

One of my friends sent me a short time since a pamphlet called “Homo Politicus,” of which I had heard much. **I have read it, and find it to be the most pernicious work which men could devise or invent.** Rank and riches are the author's highest good; he adapts his doctrine accordingly, and shows the means to acquire them; **to wit, by inwardly rejecting all religion, and outwardly professing whatever best serves his own advancement, also by keeping faith with no one, except in so far as he himself is profited thereby. For the rest, to feign, to make promises and break them, to lie, to swear falsely, and many such like practices call forth his highest praises.** When I had finished reading the book, I debated whether I should write a pamphlet indirectly aimed against its author, wherein I should treat of the highest good and show the troubled and wretched condition of those who are covetous of rank and riches; finally proving by very plain reasoning and many examples, that the insatiable desire for rank and riches must bring and has brought ruin to states.

How much better and more excellent than the doctrines of the aforesaid writer are the reflections of Thales of Miletus, appears from the following. **All the goods of friends, he says, are in common; wise men are the friends of the gods, and all things belong to the gods; therefore all things belong to the wise. Thus in a single sentence, this wisest of men accounts himself most rich, rather by nobly despising riches than by sordidly seeking them. In other passages he shows that the wise lack riches, not from necessity, but from choice. For when his friends reproached him with his poverty he answered, “Do you wish me to show you, that I could acquire what I deem unworthy of my labour, but you so diligently seek?”** On their answering in the affirmative, he hired every oil-press in the whole of Greece (for being a distinguished astrologer he knew that the olive harvest would be as abundant as in previous years it had been scanty), and sub-let at his own price what he had hired for a very small sum, thus acquiring in a single year a large fortune, which he bestowed liberally as he had gained it industriously, &c.

https://hal.science/hal-03857041/document

The work published under that pseudonym, Pacifius à Lapide, was in fact written or edited by the Nuremberg jurist Philipp Andreas Oldenburger (1617-1678).
…

Already the second paragraph includes some very impious passages, such as the following (the parts in brackets are only on the 1668 edition):

> **And do not listen to the appeal of religion, for it is nothing but coaxing and superstitious piety, nay, a pure deception that the political man, if he wants to attain his goal, will take little account of.** [Come to think of it, I do not recall who it was that wrote that he did not believe that one could make a good emperor of a good Christian or that a good Christian could be a good emperor, but I would add that, given the way things are today, **he who wishes to be a good Christian cannot be a good counsellor, a good courtier, or a good civil servant either. *For today religion is nothing but an empty name.***]”34

…

Similar patterns emerge from Oldenburger’s use of Balzac. The following assertions are accompanied by a reference to Balzac’s *Apologie contre le docteur de Louvain*: **“So this is the true political religion; this is how it should be played today, to believe in one way with the mouth and another with the heart, as did certain monks in Spain who, after having celebrated mass and taught theology publicly for twenty years, when their final hour**

> **arrived, revealed themselves to have been of the Jewish faith although of the Christian confession."**49

https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

If a man believes that the most useful or important books are contemporary ones, he will hardly ever experience the need for historical interpretation. This was the case of Spinoza. The only book which he published under his name is devoted to the philosophy of Descartes. The only books (apart from the Bible) on which he ever wrote extensively, were books by Descartes and Boyle, i.e. by contemporaries. The authority of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of their followers, did not carry much weight with him. **He admired Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius and their followers much more.**16 **Yet there are hardly any unambiguous traces of his having studied their works, or the remnants of their works, with any assiduity; he had easy access to their teaching through the writings of Gassendi, a contemporary. As regards political philosophy in particular, he flatly declares that all political philosophy prior to his own is useless.**17 **He confesses to owe much to certain "outstanding men who have written many excellent things about the right way of life, and who have given counsels full of wisdom to mortals";**18 **he probably has in mind authors like Seneca and Cicero;** but the doctrines to which he refers are by their nature easy for everyone to understand.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA909&printsec=frontcover

He would have been surprised, Spinoza admits in the same letter, had Boxel invoked instead those ancient thinkers for whom he felt greater respect – Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius "or one of the Atomists or defenders of the atoms," but found it unsurprising he should cite precisely those ancient Greek thinkers "who thought up occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms [qualitates occultas, species intentionales, formas substantiales] and a thousand more such idle notions," **these being the very men who contrived also spectres and ghosts giving credence to grandmothers' tales "with a view to disparaging Democritus whose high reputation they so envied they burned all the books he had published amidst so much acclaim."**37 This last alludes to a passage in Diogenes Laertius (AD 180-240), historian of the Greek philosophers, who records that so averse to Democritus' philosophy was Plato that he would like to have burnt it all. **Opening a rare window on Spinoza's biases in the field of ancient philosophy and personal likes and dislikes, this passage breathes real antipathy to scholasticism and to Platonism, and high regard for precisely those Greek thinkers, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius, whom early modern scholars decried and marginalized.**

> https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/6/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> I grant that they are never tired of professing their wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; **still I cannot discover that they teach anything but speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their credit for Christianity) they have made Holy Writ conform;** not content to rave with the Greeks themselves, they want to make the prophets rave also; showing conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of Scripture's Divine nature.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=U2OfzQEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

This poses a problem for Spinoza. **Even though he shares the epicurean rejection of creation *ex nihilo* and of teleology, as well as the position about the inseparability of mind and body, still current advances in physics refute the epicurean position that there are only atoms and void. Further, Spinoza's own position – both in the *Ethics* and in the *Theological Political Treatise* – about the necessity of Nature is incompatible with the accidental nature of the clinamen.** In his reply (*Ep*. 54), the first point Spinoza makes is to deny that the world is made by chance – that is, he denies the clinamen as exemplifying corpuscularianism.

Boxel presses on in a third letter by appealing to the authority of past philosophers (*Ep*. 55). **In the final letter of exchange (*Ep*. 56), Spinoza responds: 'The authority [*auctoritas*] of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates carries little weight with me. I should have been surprised if you had produced Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius.'**13 This is the moment Spinoza affirms his epicureanism as a response to the second provocation by Boxel. He clarifies that despite his rejection of epicurean corpuscularianism in his previous letter, he still holds onto the rejection of creationism as well as the inseparability of mind and body – whereby there are no spirits. **The physics according to which only atoms and void exist, and the idea that nothing can be arbitrarily added to nature, can be separated, whereby modern epicureanism can reject the former but retain the latter.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza, then, did not exaggerate the differences between his philosophy and Stoicism in the preface to the fifth part of the *Ethics* **where he criticizes the Stoics for holding that the emotions 'depend entirely on our will, and that we can have absolute rule over them,'** remarking that 'experience protests against this, and forced them, in spite of their principles, to confess that much practice and a [different] application are needed to restrain and moderate them.'249
…

Reason alone cannot curb emotion, and the only way to master a passion in Spinoza and Du Marsais is by summoning up another, stronger impulse.251 Mostly, men are led more by appetite than reason, and this is why politics and the state are needed to reinforce reason and supply the restraints society needs, **but reason can ally with, deflect, and modify passions already present, demonstrating one's true self-interest;** and insofar as damaging impulses are checked, Man becomes more rational.
…

But where, **for the Stoics, our minds are an aspect of the cosmic intellect, an emanation or fragment of God,**256 and its reason seeks to harmonize with that wider rationality so that in learning to live according to nature one proportionately moves towards God, for Spinoza mind is simply identical to body under another aspect, that is the body's sensibility.

Neither does the mind control the body, held Spinoza, who also criticizes the Stoic doctrine of the soul in his early treatise *De intellectus emendatione* of around 1660-1,257 nor the body the mind; rather all one's thoughts are absolutely coincident with fluctuations in the body.358 Men are governed, like everything else, by their *conatus*, the term Spinoza uses to designate 'that striving by which each thing seeks to persevere in its own being' or the 'actual essence of the thing.'258 **Where Stoic virtue, while contributing to happiness, has a transcendent moral quality, beauty, and fineness apart from any utility or instrumental value, there are no naturally uplifting moral qualities in Spinoza,** and Spinoza's happiness (*laetitia*) is merely awareness of one's success in conserving one's own being, and of passing to a higher state of completeness, or perfection, while sadness, conversely, is a falling away from one's perfection. Whereas in Stoicism, virtue is diminished in some sense by being assessed by its practical results for oneself, or others, rather than as a pattern of behaviour, orientated to what is intrinsically rational and fine in itself, reinforced by practice, the whole flowing from a disposition towards nature's (divine) rationality, Spinoza's 'virtue' lacks this transcendent quality.260

Since desire, or *conatus*, is the fundamental drive, in Spinoza, it is the motive force behind rationality also. Rationality is inherent in man; but he conceives of it as also a passion at odds with other passions. Unlike the Stoics, Spinoza (like Bayle) sees both rationality and virtue as anchored in self-interest and the individual's basic drives.261 **Accordingly, Spinoza, in one of his most characteristic moves, introduces a radically naturalistic definition of virtue: the 'more each person searches for what is useful to him, that is to preserve his being, and is able to do this, the more he is endowed with virtue.'**262 **This is a tenet, like Mandeville's similar concept later, utterly remote from the spirit of Greek moral philosophy generally, and not just Stoic and Christian ethics. In Spinoza, there is no innate 'good' or 'bad,' or any 'Natural Law' distinct from the mechanics of the *conatus*,** and while rationality shows the wise what is just, or conducive to the common good, there can be no generally agreed rules for a collectively adopted code of 'good' and 'bad' except within a particular society, under the laws of a particular state.

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/n33/mode/2up?view=theater

And the root of all this mans inhumanity is his Epicurean principles of Philosophy about God and *Nature*, supposing God to be but the *Eternal necessary necessitating first cause of all things and motions, as the Sun is of Light and heat, who can do no more, nor less than he doth*, moving the world as a Clock or Watch by meer invariable necessity, that never did or can do a miracle, or alter the necessitating course of nature: And that man hath no self determining free-will at all, but is moved as necessarily as an Engine; And that God is no governour, nor hath no Laws (but mens) nor no *Justice*, nor *Mercy*, these being not to be attributed to him, but only natural motion or necessitation; **And that he that lyeth, murdereth, stealeth, rebelleth is equally moved to it by God, as he that speaketh truth, and doth all that is just and good: and therefore it is but our narrow minds and ignorance, that taketh one thing to be better or worse than another, or to be sin or duty, save in respect to our commodity and the will of the strongest.**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/300/mode/2up?view=theater

THE VIRTUE of the deists is often, with better cause, identified with the virtue of the Stoics. Spinoza's ethics is often cast as a version of Stoicism, and Shaftesbury's is said to be nothing but Stoicism. **If one were to keep score by number of citations and favorable mentions, then America's revolutionary deists, too, would have to be counted as Stoics rather than Epicureans.** The first professionally produced play in the colonies, and by far the most popular, was Joseph Addison's *Cato*, a

play all about Stoic “virtue” – a word that is hurled across the stage more than thirty times in the course of the drama.123
…

Indeed, **Stoic virtue is close enough to deist virtue that the same rhetoric often served for both,** and thus Stoic authors – always much more acceptable in polite society – were used to put a respectable face on radical ideas.125

> 125. **In the ancient world – the thoroughly untrustworthy Seneca comes to mind – the convergence of Stoicism and Epicureanism was often, if warily, noted. In early modern debates over the infinite universe, the Stoics sometimes served as the source of a superficially safer version of that dangerous doctrine. Diderot went so far as to represent Stoicism and Epicureanism as two sides of the same story. In the debates over virtue, Stoicism often served to put a respectable face** – the dignified visage of a Cicero, a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius – **on ideas that might otherwise have looked quite outré.**

…

Deist virtue never reached the degree of austerity and self-denial of the Stoics because it simply wasn’t the same thing. The Stoics “had many admirable and virtuous precepts,” the authors of *Cato’s Letters* allow, but “their philosophy was too rigid.” **“It is the highest stupidity to talk of subduing the passions,” they argue, firmly distancing themselves from the doctrines of their namesake.**126

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/206/mode/2up?view=theater

While many of the Enlightenment *philosophes* quoted the Stoics (as more evidence of the superiority of paganism over Christianity), the true source of their paganism was Epicurean materialism. Why? The triumph of Newtonian mechanics, the view of nature that grounded Deism, meant the triumph of Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, not Zeno the Stoic. Consequently, Deists did not appeal to the natural philosophy of the Stoics (where fire is the basic element, and the providence of God directs all things to their natural ends), **or if they did, it was only insofar as the materialism of the Stoics matched the materialism of the Epicureans.** Rather, it was the moral arguments of the Stoics that enamored Deists, but again, such appeals to virtue could fit just as well with the original asceticism of Epicurus. **Even so, Deists soon shifted to a kind of utilitarianism based on pleasure and pain, a view directly antagonistic both to Christianity and Stoicism, but quite at home with the new Epicurean hedonism.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

There was one sect which, however absurd and pernicious some of its doctrines may have been, ought, it should seem, to have merited an exception from the general censure which Bacon has pronounced on the ancient schools of wisdom. The Epicurean, who referred all happiness to bodily pleasure, and all evil to bodily pain, might have been expected to exert himself for the purpose of bettering his own physical condition and that of his neighbours. **But the thought seems never to have occurred to any member of that school. Indeed their notion, as reported by their great poet, was, that no more improvements were to be expected in the arts which conduce to the comfort of life.**

> “Ad victum quae flagitat usus
> Omnia jam ferme mortalibus esse parata.”

This contented despondency, this disposition to admire what has been done, and to expect that nothing more will be done, is strongly characteristic of all the schools which preceded the school of Fruit and Progress. Widely as the Epicurean and the Stoic differed on most points, they seem to have quite agreed in their contempt for pursuits so vulgar as to be useful. The philosophy of both was a garrulous, declaiming, canting, wrangling philosophy. Century after century they continued to repeat their hostile war-cries, Virtue and Pleasure; **and in the end it appeared that the Epicurean had added as little to the quantity of pleasure as the Stoic to the quantity of virtue.**

It is on the pedestal of Bacon, not on that of Epicurus, that those noble lines ought to be inscribed,

> “O tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
> Qui primus potuisti, ILLUSTRANS COMMODA VITAE.”

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#CHAPTER_VIIIc

> **Even in Europe we find considerable differences of appetite between Northern and Southern peoples.** A Spaniard will live for a week on a German's dinner.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n129/mode/2up?view=theater

> **In the Latin South, where one needs little to live on and does little work,** where there is no coal and therefore no industrialism, where thought and feeling are racially different, there developed anarchist and syndicalist tendencies **whose wish-picture was the dissolution of the great national organisms into systemless, small self-sufficing groups, Bedouin-like swarms occupied in doing nothing.** But in the North, where hard winters mean harder work and make such work not only possible but essential, where from time immemorial the battle has been against hunger and cold combined, there arose out of the Germanic will-to-power, and its urge to large-scale organization, systems of authoritarian Communism which aim at a proletarian dictatorship over the whole world.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/154/mode/2up?view=theater

To summarize, **with Bacon modern Epicureanism moved from being passive in regard to the limits of nature (as it had been in Epicurus), to being active;** that is, it moved from being ascetic to hedonistic. The hedonism was based on the desire to remove the obstacles to desire, and sets up a kind of circular, self-perpetuating motion. **Our desires cause us to test and overcome the limits of nature,** and as the limits and imperfections are progressively removed, our desires will be progressively released, only to demand that further limits be removed (thereby duplicating the spiraling confidence of Machiavelli's bold prince).
...

Ironically, the seeds of the Baconian transformation were present in Epicurus. We recall his statement: "If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect's fears about phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains ... then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source – and that is what is bad."

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/134/mode/2up?view=theater

For who is there of you who has not learnt the *κύριαι δόξαι* of Epicurus, that is to say, his fundamental maxims? because they are sentiments of the greatest gravity intended to guide men to a happy life, and enunciated with suitable brevity. Consider, therefore, whether I am not translating this maxim of his correctly.

> **"If those things which are the efficient causes of pleasures to luxurious men were to release them from all fear of the gods, and of death, and of pain, and to show them what are the proper limits to their desires, we should have nothing to find fault with; as men would then be filled with pleasures from all quarters, and have on no side anything painful or melancholy, for all such things are evil."**

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/158/mode/2up?view=theater

What is your idea, O Torquatus, of this?—**that you, a man of your name, of your abilities, of your high reputation, should not dare to allege in a public assembly what you do, what you think, what you contend for, the standard to which you refer everything, the object for the sake of which you wish to accomplish what you attempt, and what you think best in life.** For what can you claim to deserve, when you have entered upon your magistracy, and come forward to the assembly, (for then you will have to announce what principles you intend to observe in administering the law, and perhaps, too, if you think fit, you will, as is the ancient custom, say something about your ancestors and yourself,)—what, I say, can you claim as your just desert, if you say that in that magistracy you will do everything for the sake of pleasure? and that you have never done anything all your life except with a view to pleasure? **Do you think, say you, that I am so mad as to speak in that way before ignorant people? Well, say it then in the court of justice, or if you are afraid of the surrounding audience, say it in the senate: you will never do so.** Why not, except that such language is disgraceful? Do you then think Triarius and me fit people for you to speak before in a disgraceful manner?
...

Say, in any assembly you please, that you do everything with a view to avoid suffering pain: if you do not think that even this language is sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently honourable, say that you will do everything during your year of office, and during your whole life, for the sake of your own advantage; that you will do nothing except what is profitable to yourself, nothing which is not prompted by a view to your own interest. **What an uproar do you not suppose such a declaration would excite in the assembly, and what hope do you think you would have of the consulship which is ready for you?**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=fj8oQ4lzteIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA395#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The Manlii, a house of the patriciate renowned for pride and energy, saw their last consul in 65, and several members perished on the side of Pompeius or for the Republic. **That consul**

adhered to the doctrines of Epicurus.91 The friend of Horace is credited with eloquence, and he may have been a poet.92 No surprise, therefore, if Torquatus in fact renounced the career of honours, disdaining ambition, intrigue, or subsidy from Caesar. **Thus ended the Manlii.**

And can you follow these principles, which, when by yourself, or in conversation with your dearest friends, you do not dare to profess and avow openly? But you have those maxims constantly in your mouth which the Peripatetics and Stoics profess. In the courts of justice and in the senate you speak of duty, equity, dignity, good faith, uprightness, honourable actions, conduct worthy of power, worthy of the Roman people; you talk of encountering every imaginable danger in the cause of the republic—of dying for one's country. When you speak in this manner we are all amazed, like a pack of blockheads, and you are laughing in your sleeve: for, among all those high-sounding and admirable expressions, pleasure has no place, not only that pleasure which you say consists in motion, and which all men, whether living in cities or in the country, all men, in short, who speak Latin, call pleasure, but even that stationary pleasure, which no one but your sect calls pleasure at all.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D116

Can anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of virtues? **And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus, and the philosophers who bear the name of Anniceris find all good to consist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is productive of pleasure.** Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus has come into vogue—an advocate and supporter of practically the same doctrine. **Against such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse and foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our standard of moral rectitude.**

[117] For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus,[1] not only expediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical constitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain sound, then that expediency—and, what is more, the highest expediency, as they estimate it—will assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For, first of all, what position will wisdom occupy in that system? The position of collector of pleasures from every possible source? **What a sorry state of servitude for a virtue—to be pandering to sensual pleasure! And what will be the function of wisdom? To make skilful choice between sensual pleasures?** Granted that there may be nothing more pleasant, what can be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such a rôle?

Then again, if anyone hold that pain is the supreme evil, what place in his philosophy has fortitude, which is but indifference to toil and pain? **For, however many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right manfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.**

And further, if I should listen to him, **I should find that in many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but "the water will not run," as they say.** For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? For self-control is the foe of the passions, and the passions are the handmaids of pleasure.

[118] And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, those philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. **They bring even temperance in —not very easily, to be sure, but still as best they can;** for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I should say, lies already prostrate; **so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society.** For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Cato_Maior_de_Senectute/text*.html#ref36

13 43 I often heard from my elders—who, in turn, said they, when boys, had heard it from old men—that Gaius Fabricius used to marvel at the story told him, while an envoy at the headquarters of King Pyrrhus, by Cineas of Thessaly, that **there was a man[37] at Athens who professed himself "wise"** and used to say that everything we do should be judged by the standard of pleasure. **Now when Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius learned of this from Fabricius they expressed the wish that the Samnites and Pyrrhus himself would become converts to it, because, when given up to pleasure, they would be much easier to overcome.**

[37] *i.e.* Epicurus, who claimed to be not only φιλόσοφος but σοφός.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius4a.html#c3

The prayers of Fabricius were in agreement with those spurned gifts. For when he went as ambassador to Pyrrhus, and heard Cineas the Thessalian telling the king of a certain Athenian famous for his wisdom, **who was of opinion that men should do nothing except for pleasure's sake, he**

regarded it as a monstrous saying, and immediately made a prayer that such wisdom might grip Pyrrhus and the Samnites. Though the Athenians might glory in their learning, yet there is no prudent person who would not rather choose to follow the self-denial of Fabricius, than the precepts of Epicurus.
This was proved true by the outcome. For that city which indulged so much in pleasure, lost a very large empire, but the hard-working country took its own; and the latter city could bestow that liberty, which the former could not defend.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_123

10. And then we begin to speak as follows: "Virtue, Philosophy, Justice – this is a jargon of empty words. The only way to be happy is to do yourself well. To eat, drink, and spend your money is the only real life, the only way to remind yourself that you are mortal. Our days flow on, and life – which we cannot restore – hastens away from us. Why hesitate to come to our senses? This life of ours will not always admit pleasures; meantime, while it can do so, while it clamours for them, what profit lies in imposing thereupon frugality? **Therefore get ahead of death, and let anything that death will filch from you be squandered now upon yourself. You have no mistress, no favourite slave to make your mistress envious; you are sober when you make your daily appearance in public; you dine as if you had to show your account-book to 'Papa'; but *that* is not living, it is merely going shares in someone else's existence.** 11. **And what madness it is to be looking out for the interests of your heir,** and to deny yourself everything, with the result that you turn friends into enemies by the vast amount of the fortune you intend to leave! **For the more the heir is to get from you, the more he will rejoice in your taking-off!** All those sour fellows who criticize other men's lives in a spirit of priggishness and are real enemies to their own lives, playing schoolmaster to the world – you should not consider them as worth a farthing, nor should you hesitate to prefer good living to a good reputation."

12. These are voices which you ought to shun just as Ulysses did; he would not sail past them until he was lashed to the mast. They are no less potent; **they lure men from country, parents, friends, and virtuous ways;** and by a hope that, if not base, is ill-starred, they wreck them upon a life of baseness.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pyrrhus*.html#ref24

14 1 Now, there was a certain Cineas, a man of Thessaly, with a reputation for great wisdom, **who had been a pupil of Demosthenes the orator, and was quite the only public speaker of his day who was thought to remind his hearers, as a statue might, of that great orator's power and ability.** Associating himself with Pyrrhus, and sent by him as ambassador to the cities, he confirmed the saying of Euripides, to wit, "all can be won by eloquence

> That even the sword of warring enemies might gain."

2 At any rate, **Pyrrhus used to say that more cities had been won for him by the eloquence of Cineas than by his own arms;** and he continued to hold Cineas in especial honour and to demand his services. It was this Cineas, then, who, seeing that Pyrrhus was eagerly preparing an expedition at this time to Italy, and finding him at leisure for the moment, drew him into the following discourse. "The Romans, O Pyrrhus, are said to be good fighters, and to be rulers of many warlike nations; if, then, Heaven should permit us to conquer these men, how should we use our victory?" 3 And Pyrrhus said: "Thy question, O Cineas, really needs no answer; the Romans once conquered, there is neither barbarian nor Greek city there which is a match for us, but we shall at once possess all Italy, the great size and richness and importance of which no man should know better than thyself." After a little pause, then, Cineas said: "And after taking Italy, O King, what are we to do?" 4 And Pyrrhus, not yet perceiving his intention, replied: "Sicily is near, and holds out her hands to us, an island abounding in wealth and men, and very easy to capture, for all is faction there, her cities have no government, and demagogues are rampant now that Agathocles is gone." "What thou sayest," replied Cineas, "is probably true; but will our expedition stop with the taking of Sicily?" 5 "Heaven grant us," said Pyrrhus, "victory and success so far; and we will make these contests but the preliminaries of great enterprises. For who could keep his hands off Libya, or Carthage, when that city got within his reach, a city which Agathocles, slipping stealthily out of Syracuse and crossing the sea with a few ships, narrowly missed taking? And when we have become masters here, no one of the enemies who now treat us with scorn will offer further resistance; there is no need of saying that." 6 "None whatever," said Cineas, "for it is plain that with so great a power we shall be able to recover Macedonia and rule Greece securely. But when we have got everything subject to us, what are we going to do?" **Then Pyrrhus smiled upon him and said: "We shall be much at ease, and we'll drink bumpers, my good man, every day, and we'll gladden one another's hearts with confidential talks."** 7 And now that Cineas had brought Pyrrhus to this point in the argument, he said: "Then what stands in our way now if we want to drink bumpers and while away the time with one another? **Surely this privilege is ours already, and we have at hand, without taking any trouble, those things to which we hope to attain by bloodshed and great toils and perils, after doing much harm to others and suffering much ourselves.**"

8 By this reasoning of Cineas Pyrrhus was more troubled than he was converted; he saw plainly what great happiness he was leaving behind him, but was unable to renounce his hopes of what he eagerly desired.

https://newepicurean.com/epicurus/the-crucial-doctrines-of-epicurus-revised-version/

> 7. **For the sake of feeling confidence and security in regard to other men, some men wish to be eminent and powerful, failing to remember the limits of kingly power. If such men happen to achieve a life of safety, then they have attained their goal, which is a good.** But if their lives are not in fact safe, they have failed in obtaining the goal for the sake of which they originally desired power, and that is the result that generally occurs according to Nature.

…

Again, at supper, where all sorts of topics were discussed, and particularly that of Greece and her philosophers, Cineas happened somehow to mention Epicurus, and set forth the doctrines of that school concerning the gods, civil government, and the highest good, explaining that they made pleasure the highest good, **but would have nothing to do with civil government on the ground that it was injurious and the ruin of felicity,** and that they removed the Deity as far as possible from feelings of kindness or anger or concern for us, into a life that knew no care and was filled with ease and comfort. 4 **But before Cineas was done, Fabricius cried out and said: "O Hercules, may Pyrrhus and the Samnites cherish these doctrines, as long as they are at war with us."**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-5#lf0062-05_head_047

31. No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: “We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people.” And yet again, these other words are theirs: **“There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh.” And yet in the constitution of laws and policy, which Colotes so much praises, the first and most important article is the belief and persuasion of the Gods.** Wherefore also Lycurgus heretofore sanctified the Lacedaemonians, Numa the Romans, the ancient Ion the Athenians, **and Deucalion universally all the Greeks,** through prayers, oaths, oracles, and omens, rendering them devout and affectionate to the Gods by means of hopes and fears at once.
…

And it is not the greatest indignity, that, **of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, [the Epicureans] alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them any thing of their own; but far worse is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defence of the laws and policy,** these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal, of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence, and of royalty, that we may shun the living and conversing with kings. Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epaminondas had something of good, but that very little, or μικκόν, for that is the very word they use. They moreover call him iron-hearted, and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a night-cap on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his belly. **But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Metrodorus writ in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus: “Some, through an abundance of vanity and arrogance, have so deep an insight into the business of it, that in treating about the precepts of good life and virtue, they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon.”** What is this? Was it then vanity and abundance of vanity, to set free the city of Athens, to render Sparta well-policied and governed by wholesome laws, that young men might do nothing licentiously, nor get children upon common courtesans and whores, and that riches, delights, intemperance, and dissolution might no longer bear sway and have command in cities, but law and justice? For these were the desires of Solon. **To this Metrodorus, by way of scorn and contumely, adds this conclusion: “It is then very well beseeming a free-born gentleman to laugh heartily, as at other men, so especially at these Solons and Lycurguses.” But such a one, O Metrodorus, is not a gentleman, but a servile and dissolute person, and deserves to be scourged, not with that whip which is for free-born persons, but with that scourge strung with ankle-bones,** with which those gelded sacrificers called Galli were wont to be chastised, when they failed of performing their duty in the ceremonies and sacrifices of the Goddess Cybele, the great Mother of the Gods.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D20

Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the contrary: **That there are no Gods, and, if there are, they take no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and checking wrong doers.**[7]—Well done,

philosopher, you have done something for our citizens, you have brought back all the young men to contempt of things divine.—What then, does not this satisfy you? **Learn now, that justice is nothing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.**—Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the young men, that we may have more with the same opinions as you and who say the same as you. From such principles as these have grown our well constituted states; by these was Sparta founded: Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spartans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile condition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free men more honourable than base, and that those who died at Thermopylae[8] died from these opinions; and through what other opinions did the Athenians leave their city?[9] **Then those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and interpreters. Of whom? of gods who do not exist: and they consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and they report the oracles to others.** Monstrous impudence and imposture.

http://www.attalus.org/translate/aelian_f1.html

[10] One of the orgeones from Eleusis ... **A castrated and androgynous man (if we should grant that he be a man), one who is enfeebled in soul through the study of Epicurus and has become womanish.** Having borne a torch before Stratocles in Athens, a eunuch and a she-male, bewitched and bound as if in an unbreakable chain.
...

[He], sharing in evil wisdom and the atheistic words of Epicurus **and cultivating she-males just for the pleasure of it,** which that man praises, that youth and she-male, ...
...

Then he set at naught the holy things of the Eumolpidae and the Ceryces and the other families who were holy and dear to the gods, choosing a wisdom infamous and effeminate.

And burning to show that god does not care about human affairs, he went to the megaron and thrust himself in; there of course only the hierophant was permitted to go, according to the rule of the rite, but for him it was not allowed. But when he had dared this audacity, a shuddering overcame him and he fell sick with a lengthy disease, and consumption took him; and whatever he dared, crying out and saying, and declaiming tragically in the manner of the most impious persons, and vowing to break off [the life-thread of] the infamous and accursed soul, and at length succeeding in this.

https://www.cs.uky.edu/~raphael/sol/sol-entries/epsilon/2405

And also the Messenians, the ones who live in Arcadia, expelled those reputed to be members of this, let us say, "manger", **saying that they were corrupters of the youth and attaching to their doctrine the stain of infamy because of their effeminacy and impiety;** and they gave orders that, before sunset, the Epicureans be out of the borders of Messenia and that after they had left, the priests purify the temples and the *timouchoi* (this is the name Messenians give to their magistrates) purify the whole city, as delivered from some filthy contaminations and offscourings.

[Note] that in Crete the citizens of Lyktos[9] **chased away some Epicureans who had come there.** And a law was written in the local language, stating that whoever thought of adhering to this effeminate and ignominious and hideous doctrine were enemies of the gods and should be banished from Lyktos; but if anybody dared to come and neglect the orders of the law, he should be bound in a pillory near the office of the magistrates for twenty days, naked and with his body spread with honey and milk, so that he would be a meal for bees and flies and the insects would in the stated time kill them. After this time, if he were still alive, **he should be thrown from a cliff, dressed in women's clothes.**

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07/anf07.iii.ii.iii.xvii.html#fnf_iii.ii.iii.xvii-p1.2

The system of Epicurus was much more generally followed than those of the others; not because it brings forward any truth, but because the attractive name of pleasure invites many.[431] For every one is naturally inclined to vices. Moreover, for the purpose of drawing the multitude to himself, he speaks that which is specially adapted to each character separately. He forbids the idle to apply himself to learning; he releases the covetous man from giving largesses to the people; he prohibits the inactive man from undertaking the business of the state, the sluggish from bodily exercise, the timid from military service. The irreligious is told that the gods pay no attention to the conduct of men; the man who is unfeeling and selfish is ordered to give nothing to any one, for that the wise man does everything on his own account. To a man who avoids the crowd, solitude is praised. One who is too sparing, learns that life can be sustained on water and meal. **If a man hates his wife, the blessings of celibacy are enumerated to him; to one who has bad children, the happiness of those who are without children is proclaimed; against unnatural[432] parents it is said that there is no bond of nature.**

[432] There is another reading, “adversus parentes impio,” “to the son whose conduct to his parents is unnatural.”
…

Although he does not say this in word, yet he teaches it in fact. For when he maintains that the wise man does everything for his own sake, he refers all things which he does to his own advantage. And thus he who hears these disgraceful things, will neither think that any good thing ought to be done, since the conferring of benefits has reference to the advantage of another; nor that he ought to abstain from guilt, because the doing of evil is attended with gain. **If any chieftain of pirates or leader of robbers were exhorting his men to acts of violence, what other language could he employ than to say the same things which Epicurus says:** that the gods take no notice; that they are not affected with anger nor kind feeling; that the punishment of a future state is not to be dreaded, because souls die after death, and that there is no future state of punishment at all; that pleasure is the greatest good; **that there is no society among men; that every one consults for his own interest; that there is no one who loves another, unless it be for his own sake;** that death is not to be feared by a brave man, nor any pain; for that he, even if he should be tortured or burnt, should say that he does not regard it. There is evidently sufficient cause why any one should regard this as the expression of a wise man, since it can most fittingly be applied to robbers!

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/60/mode/2up?view=theater

The “Contrat Social,” and the rest of their doctrines, moral and metaphysical, will always have their admirers on earth, as long as that variety of the human species exists for whose especial behoof Theodorus held that laws were made; and the whole form of thought met with great approbation in after years at Rome, where Epicurus carried it to its highest perfection. After that, under the pressure of a train of rather severe lessons, which Gibbon has detailed in his “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,” little or nothing was heard of it, save *sotto voce*, perhaps, at the Papal courts of the sixteenth century. To revive it publicly, or at least as much of it as could be borne by a world now for seventeen centuries Christian, was the glory of the eighteenth century. **The moral scheme of Theodorus has now [1854] nearly vanished among us, at least as a confessed creed; and, in spite of the authority of Mr. Locke’s great and good name, his metaphysical scheme is showing signs of a like approaching disappearance.** Let us hope that it may be a speedy one; for if the senses be the only avenues to knowledge; if man be the measure of all things; and if law have not, as Hooker says, her fount and home in the very bosom of God himself, then was Homer’s Zeus right in declaring man to be “the most wretched of all the beasts of the field.”

---

https://voxday.net/2010/06/19/atheism-and-action/

It is not atheism itself that is the problem, but as I explained in TIA, atheism *combinea* with a burning ambition to achieve immortality through material ends.
…

For such men of burning ambition, ideology is nothing more than a means to a self-serving end. Men have little to fear from an atheist libertarian or a Christian monarch, **but they have everything to fear from an ambitious atheist who dreams of great actions and is determined to leave the world with the recollection of his existence.**

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n289/mode/2up?view=theater

Machiavelli's claim that he has taken a road not yet trodden by anyone implies that in breaking with the Socratic tradition he did not return to an anti-Socratic tradition, although he could not help agreeing in numerous points with the Socratic tradition on the one hand and the anti-Socratic tradition on the other. We have indicated the kinship of his thought with hedonism. **But he agrees with classical political philosophy against classical hedonism in admitting the high dignity of political life. For classical hedonism, honor and glory are contemptible; for Machiavelli the pleasure deriving from honor and glory is genuine and perhaps the highest pleasure. Classical hedonism, we may say, is insufficiently attentive to the conditions and the context of the highest pleasure,** which it sees to be dependent on philosophy. Since philosophy consists in ascending from opinion to knowledge, and opinion is primarily political opinion, philosophy is essentially related to the city; as transcending the city, it presupposes the city; philosophy must therefore be concerned with the city or be politically responsible. In this important respect Machiavelli agrees with classical political philosophy over against classical hedonism.211

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n219/mode/2up?view=theater

Machiavelli indicates his fundamental disagreement with Aristotle's doctrine of the whole by substituting "chance" (*caso*) for "nature" in the only context in which he speaks of "the beginning of the world." **Polybius had called the cyclical change of regimes a change which takes place "according to nature"; Machiavelli says that that cyclical change occurs "by chance."** By this he does not mean that the changes of regimes occur without any order or regularity, at random or haphazardly, for he shows that they occur with necessity and in an unalterable sequence. He understands "chance" in opposition to "prudence":115 the cyclical change of regimes does not occur because it has been planned by any being or because it serves an end. The substitution of "chance" for "nature," or the understanding of nature as chance was imputed to Democritus in particular. **Among "the philosophic family" surrounding Aristotle in Dante's Limbo we find "Democritus who ascribes the world to chance."** From the point of view of Aristotle, or of Plato, every doctrine which understands the world as the work of soulless bodies not tending towards ends in fact identifies nature and chance.116 By substituting chance for nature when mentioning "the beginning of the world," Machiavelli indicates that he has abandoned the teleological understanding of nature and natural necessity for the alternative understanding. **He speaks very frequently of "accidents" but never of "substances." Just as he never mentions souls in the *Prince* and the *Discourses*, he speaks in those books not of "substances" but of "bodies."**

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n199/mode/2up?view=theater

"In the beginning of the world, the inhabitants being scarce, **men lived for some time dispersed in similitude to the beasts.**"63 If we assume that in considering this sentence Machiavelli remembered the fact that there are gregarious beasts, he would be making two suggestions by means of the sentence quoted: in the beginning of the world men lived both dispersed and in similitude to the beasts. In addition, **the Bible denies that in the beginning of the world men—Adam and Eve—lived dispersed. Certainly, Machiavelli's notion of the beginning of the world is not the Biblical but rather the "Epicurean" notion which presupposes the eternity of "matter";** by assuming that matter is uncreated, one could admit the necessity of evil or of sin without derogating from God's goodness.64

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233642240_In_the_Shadow_of_Lucretius_the_Epicurean_Foundations_of_Machiavelli%27s_Political_Thought

Although repeated attempts have been made over the last half-century to make sense of Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy* as an exposition of classical republicanism, such endeavours are bound to fail. After all, Machiavelli rejected the teleology underpinning the discursive republicanism of the ancients, and his understanding of the ends pursued by republics was profoundly at odds with the understanding predominant in ancient Greece and Rome. **If he had a classical mentor, it cannot, then, have been Aristotle or Cicero or one of the ancient historians. If he had such a mentor, it was surely Lucretius, the leading Roman critic of ancient political idealism--a figure so important to the Florentine that in the late 1490s he copied by hand in its entirety *De rerum natura* and that he drew on it throughout his subsequent career. Machiavelli's republicanism is best understood as an appropriation, critique and reworking of ancient Epicureanism.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_022
>
> The way was paved for absolute monarchy to triumph over the spirit and institutions of a better age, not by isolated acts of wickedness, **but by a studied philosophy of crime and so thorough a perversion of the moral sense that the like of it had not been since the Stoics reformed the morality of paganism.**
> …
>
> And I should have wished to show you that the same deliberate rejection of the moral code which smoothed the paths of absolute monarchy and of oligarchy, signalised the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited power,—that one of its leading champions avowed the design of corrupting the moral sense of men, in order to destroy the influence of religion, and a famous apostle of enlightenment and toleration wished that the last king might be strangled with the entrails of the last priest.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false

But the differences between Machiavellian and Senecan political theory are not just a matter of the one being more tough-mindedly ruthless than the other; rather, they develop out of a radically different approach to princely politics itself. **The ideological fulcrum of Seneca's argument was his claim that the introduction of the principate had restored to the Romans their freedom. The opening sentence of Machiavelli's book, on the other hand, sharply separates principalities from republics** – 'All states, all dominions that have held and do hold empire over men have been and are either republics or principalities' – **and Machiavelli nowhere suggests that a principality can ever be a free regime.**78 **Seneca's argument had depicted the prince as the 'mind' of the**

‘body politics,’ whereas Machiavelli’s princes are never integrated into the states they rule but always remain external to them, as his language of princes ‘acquiring’ states tends to suggest. These differences in turn are generated by Machiavelli’s total rejection of the Stoic providential rationalism that underpins Seneca’s entire political theory. In Machiavelli’s view, not only is Stoic providentialism false but belief in its truth fosters a debilitating psychology, which in turn generates disastrous politics.

On the level of metaphysics, Machiavelli denies Stoic determinism. Chapter 25 begins with Machiavelli noting that he is ‘not unaware that many people have held and hold today the opinion that things of the world are governed by *fortuna* and by God in such a way that men have no power to correct them with their prudence.’ Such people, he suggests, subscribe to a version of what is known as the ‘lazy argument’ that has been deployed against the Stoics since antiquity: ‘and for this reason they could judge that there is no point in sweating much over things: better to leave oneself to be governed by fate [ma lasciarsi governare alla sorte].’79 **Machiavelli rejects this view, ‘so as not to rule out our free will,’** implicitly denying the Stoic claim that it is submission to providence that guarantees our freedom, and goes on to state his famous opinions, **‘I judge that it might be true that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern.’**80 ***Fortuna* becomes pure contingency once more,** and politics correspondingly become a far more uncertain and unstable kind of activity.
…

Machiavelli’s denial that the subjects of a prince retain their liberty is part of his effort to drive a wedge between the prince and his principality and to treat the former as standing outside the latter and owing nothing to it. The prince and his principality do not make up a harmonious whole; rather, the one ‘acquires’ the other and uses it in the service of his – not its – ends. Although Lipsius may agree that the prince’s subjects are not politically free, he nevertheless still insists, against Machiavelli, that the well-constituted state is an integrated unity of the prince and the people. Machiavelli in *The Prince* is chiefly interested in the ‘new prince’ who comes to power either through *virtù* (which is to say, by dint of his own arms) or *fortuna* (by dint of other people’s), **and he has little to say about hereditary principalities.**

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n289/mode/2up?view=theater

> As for teachings like those which Plato put into the mouths of Thrasymachus and Callicles, it suffices here to say that those Platonic characters stop where both Socrates and Machiavelli begin; the originators of such teachings **have not even grasped the essential connection between ruling and service or between private vice and public benefit because they look at political things in the perspective of the exploiter of the city and not in the perspective of its founder.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_595

We are told, that, without education, we should have been in a state of perfect indifference as to virtue and vice; that an education, opposite to that which we have received, would have taught us to regard as virtue that which we now dislike as vice, and to despise as vice that which we now esteem as virtue. In support of these observations, it is farther said, that moral sentiment is different in different countries, in different ages, and under different forms of government and religion; **in a word, that it is as much the effect of custom, fashion, and artifice, as our taste in dress, furniture, and the modes of conversation.** Facts and narratives have been assembled and accumulated, to evince the great diversity and even contrariety that subsists concerning moral opinions**. And it has been gravely asked, whether the wild boy, who was caught in the woods of Hanover, would feel a sentiment of disapprobation upon being told of the conduct of a parricide.** An investigation of those facts and narratives cannot find a place in these lectures; though the time bestowed on it might be well employed. **It may, however, be proper to observe, that it is but candid to consider human nature in her improved, and not in her most rude or depraved forms. “The good experienced man,” says Aristotle, “is the last measure of all things.”u To ascertain moral principles, we appeal not to the common sense of savages, but of men in their most perfect state.**

Epicurus, as well as some modern advocates of the same philosophy, seem to have taken their estimates of human nature from its meanest and most degrading exhibitions; but the noblest and most respectable philosophers of antiquity have chosen, for a much wiser and better purpose, to view it on the brightest and most advantageous side. “It is impossible,” says the incomparable Addison,v6 “to read a passage in Plato or Tully, and a thousand other ancient moralists, without being a greater and a better man for it. On the contrary, I could never read some modish modern authors, without being, for some time, out of humour with myself, and at every thing about me. **Their business is to depreciate human nature, and consider it under its worst appearances. They give mean interpretation and base motives to the worthiest actions—in short, they endeavour to make no distinction between man and man, or between the species of men and that of brutes.**”

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020

Epicurus differed but little from the propounders of the code of revolutionary despotism. All societies, he said, are founded on contract for mutual protection. Good and evil are conventional terms,

for the thunderbolts of heaven fall alike on the just and the unjust. The objection to wrongdoing is not the act, but in its consequences to the wrongdoer. **Wise men contrive laws, not to bind, but to protect themselves; and when they prove to be unprofitable they cease to be valid.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1892/01/socialism-germany.htm

> Be that as it may, for the time being it is not we who are being destroyed by legality. **It is working so well for us that we would be mad to spurn it as long as the situation lasts.** It remains to be seen whether it will be the bourgeois and their government who will be the first to turn their back on the law in order to crush us by violence. That is what we shall be waiting for. You shoot first, *messieurs les bourgeois*.

https://newepicurean.com/epicurus/the-crucial-doctrines-of-epicurus-revised-version/

32. Natural justice arises from a covenant between men for their mutual advantage to refrain from harming one another.

33. **For those living things that are unable to enter into a covenant to refrain from harming one another, nothing is just or unjust, and this applies also to those men who are either unwilling or unable to enter into such a covenant.**

34. **Justice has no independent existence,** but results only from the agreement of men to enter mutual covenants to refrain from harming one another.

35. **Injustice is not evil in itself;** it is evil because fear of not escaping punishment necessarily arises from it.

36. It is not possible for men who secretly violate a mutual covenant not to harm one another to believe that they will always escape detection. Even if they have escaped it ten thousand times already, so long as they live they cannot be certain that they will not be detected.

37. In general, justice is the same for all, for justice is a mutual advantage in the dealings of men with each other, but in different nations and under different circumstances, the application of justice may differ.

38. Among those actions which the law sanctions as just, that which is determined to be of mutual advantage is in fact just whether or not it is universally regarded to be so. But if a law, once established, is determined not to be mutually advantageous, then it is by nature unjust. **As to those laws which were at first just, but later become unjust, such laws were in fact just for the period in which they were of mutual advantage, at least in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty words, but look to the actual facts.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MSu2w3FqepoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA295#v=onepage&q&f=false

The importance he attached to the topic is indicated by the relatively ample coverage in the Authorized Doctrines, eight items out of forty, and every one anti-Platonic. **In respect of the origin of Justice he holds to the theory of the "social contract," which by no mere coincidence experienced its European revival with Hobbes and Locke during the brief interval that witnessed the only public vogue of Epicurean studies in modern times.**15 **Epicurus, however, would have brushed aside the criticism directed against the doctrine in its modern form, that the theory implies a degree of sophistication too advanced for a primitive society. He extended its application to the brute creation.** Unlike Plato's Justice, it was not man-made but "of Nature," Authorized Doctrine 31: "The Justice of Nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another or be injured." This is one of several instances where Epicurus seized upon a fertile idea in Platonic thought and transferred it to a new matrix of meanings. **Plato had written: "It seems advantageous to those who are incapable of escaping the evil of injustice and seizing its rewards to strike a bargain with one another neither to practice unjustice nor to suffer it."**16 **This is the "political contract"; there is no mention of Nature. By looking to Nature for the sanction of it Epicurus changed it to the "social contract."**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Anger/Book_I#VIII.

"What then? do not men, even in the height of their anger, sometimes let their enemies go whole and unhurt, and refrain from injuring them?" They do: but when do they do so? **It is when one passion overpowers another, and either fear or greed gets the upper hand for a while. On such occasions, it is not thanks to reason that anger is stilled, but owing to an untrustworthy and fleeting truce between the passions. [Cum adfectus repercussit adfectum et aut metus aut cupiditas aliquid impetravit. Non rationis tunc beneficio quievit, sed affectuum infida et mala pace.]**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA178#v=onepage&q&f=false

To reiterate an earlier observation: **if there is a close precedent for the physics of matter in motion among the ancients, it would be the stricter atomism of Lucretius, in which there are no immanent qualities of grandeur and heroism of the kind I have attributed to the pre-Socratics' understanding of nature, and for whom the visible world is generated by the sheer, accidental "swerve" of one contentless atom into another.** For Lucretius, the hedonism stemming from materialistic view of life meant that a man should cultivate his pleasures in private and avoid the pain, violence and stupidity of politics. **The genius of liberalism beginning with Hobbes might be characterized as erecting a new theory of the just society on the very basis of this individuating ontology of motion.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/582/mode/2up?view=theater

The first writer systematically to attack the doctrines of Original Sin, and sinfulness of sexual pleasure outside marriage, was Adriaen Beverland (1650-1716), who, as we have seen, was arrested and then expelled from Holland, in 1679, for insinuating lascivious thoughts into the minds of the young, in his Spinozistic *De peccato originali* (1678). This work subsequently became widely known in Europe after reappearing, at Amsterdam in 1714, in a French-language version prepared by Jean-Frédéric Bernard which was again reissued in 1731 and 1741.52 **An expert classicist, Beverland had spent years researching the subject of erotic life in the classical world in the Dutch and English university libraries and composed a long manuscript on ancient eroticism, entitled *De prostibulis veterum*,** subsequently confiscated and suppressed by the Leiden University authorities. **In his *De peccato originali*, Beverland argues, citing Hobbes and Spinoza, that the story of the Fall had been misunderstood for millennia and is nothing more than a poetic allegory describing Adam and Eve's discovery of sexual intercourse.**53 Developing a form of philosophical pantheism embedded in a general theory of eroticism, Beverland sought to liberate readers from negative feelings regarding the private parts and the sex act.34

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1030&printsec=frontcover

Interestingly, Beverland, who was distinctly more interested in the group movement than in Spinoza the person, **styles Adriaan Koerbagh "Amstelodamensis ille Thales," the Thales of Amsterdam, implying he was the first real, authentic philosopher of the age endeavouring to demolish theology's doleful sway over individual life and thought, establish independence of judgement, and promote sexual emancipation of the individual.**114
…

Spending lavishly on books, lady friends, wine and junketing in taverns where Spinozists congregated, as well as on paintings, medals, coins, shells, and other "curiosa," in four years Beverland reportedly exhausted a large legacy he had inherited in 1675.118 In 1678, **forgoing the opportunity of a lucrative career in law,** he focused on completing his chief scholarly project, a general encyclopaedia of ancient eroticism entitled *De Prostibulis Veterum* [On the Prostitution of the Ancients].119

In the late 1670s, officially studying in Leiden, Beverland spent more of his time in The Hague consorting with an emancipated lady friend, the Juffrouw Liefeld, and writing a second book, *De Peccato originali*, that "atheistic and libidinous work" as the Calvinist preacher Leonard Ryssenius calls, it,120 published according to its title-page (like Meyer's *Philosophia*) at "Eleutheropolis" [i.e. Freedom City]. Partly an exercise in Bible criticism, invoking Hobbes, Spinoza, Koerbagh, La Peyrère, and Van den Enden, **it seeks to prove that the dogma of Original Sin taught by all churches (except the Socinians) entirely lacks Scriptural basis,** being a pious fraud contrived during Christianity's formative period to mislead the ignorant and superstitious, as it had "over many centuries." **Beverland held that "the Pentateuch appears to have been forged centuries after Moses by a soothsayer [Ezra]," as explained (following Hobbes) by "that companion of Koerbagh, and disciple of Van den Enden," Spinoza.**121
…

Curiously, Beverland characterizes Spinoza as **"that true descendant of Lucian [genuinum Luciani nepotem, Spinosam],"** referring to the ancient Near Eastern satirist Lucian (*c.* 125-after 180 AD), who specialized in ridiculing superstition, belief in the supernatural, and irrational religious observances. This ancient satirist, a second century AD Greek Sophist (of Aramaic-speaking background) who travelled from Antioch to Italy, Gaul, Macedonia, and Greece, and wrote in Greek, seems an odd choice for a classical comparison, for Lucian was not, as Klever observes, the source of any of Spinoza's philosophical ideas. But the caustic, mocking strain in Spinoza's conversation flaying pedants, preachers, and long venerated earlier philosophers, Plato and Aristotle especially, did strike some as reminiscent of Lucian's satirical mocking of gods and popular belief. Van den Enden, another mocker, likewise was called a veritable "Lucianist."123

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/560/mode/2up?view=theater

Proclaiming the concept of basic equality, **Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot, the three greatest architects of Radical Enlightenment, fix the purpose of the state as the maximization of peace, security, and freedom for the majority, a criterion which in turn provides a universal benchmark by which to judge the actions of regimes of whatever hue or character.** Indeed, with the introduction of this criterion every regime, in theory, automatically falls into one of two categories – either promoting or failing to promote the 'common good' or what Diderot calls the *volonté générale*. **It was precisely this Spinozistic dualism of good and bad political systems evaluated in terms of the 'common good' which Paine later invoked when contrasting 'governments which arise out of society, in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest.'**61

http://www.racerealist.com/yockey_2.htm

> **Liberalism is Rationalism in politics. It rejects the State as an organism, and can only see it as the result of a contract between individuals.** The purpose of Life has nothing to do with States, for they have no independent existence. Thus the "happiness" of "the individual" becomes the purpose of Life. Bentham made this as coarse as it could be made in collectivizing it into "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." If herding-animals could talk, they would use this slogan against the wolves. **To most humans, who are the mere material of History, and not actors in it, "happiness" means economic well being. Reason is quantitative, not qualitative, and thus makes the average man into "Man."** "Man" is a thing of food, clothing, shelter, social and family life, and leisure. **Politics sometimes demands sacrifice of life for invisible things. This is against "happiness," and must not be.** Economics, however, is not against "happiness," but is almost co-extensive with it. **Religion and Church wish to interpret the whole of Life on the basis of invisible things, and so militate against "happiness."** Social ethics, on the other hand, secure economic order, thus promote "happiness."

Where, for Descartes, human minds are equal because they are intrinsically separate from bodies and equally capable of reason and, for Locke, because each soul is equally valid and potentially redeemable through spiritual striving, in van den Enden, Spinoza, Mandeville, and Diderot, with their one-substance monism, there is an altogether neater conjunction of instinct, appetite, will, and mind. Whether men act rationally or irrationally, whether they are primitive or sophisticated, ignorant or knowledgeable, ultimately makes no difference. **Man's motivation is always the same and men's wills always equivalent. Whether a given mind has clear and distinct ideas, or is confused, it 'endeavours,' as Spinoza expresses the point in proposition ix or part iii of the *Ethics*, 'to persist in its own being over an indefinite period of time and is conscious of this *conatus*'** [Mens tam quatenus claras, et distinctas, quam quatenus confuses habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione, et hujus sui conatus est conscia].62

https://www.studylight.org/commentaries/eng/acc/job-1.html

> *And he will curse thee to thy face.*—אם לא על פניך יברכך ***im lo al paneycha yebarechecca*****,** "If he will not bless thee to thy appearances." He will bless thee only in proportion to the temporal good thou bestowest upon him; to the providential and gracious *appearances* or *displays* of thy power in his behalf. If *thou* wilt be gracious, *he* will be pious. **The exact maxim of a great statesman, Sir Robert Walpole: *Every man has his price*. "But you have not bought such a one?" "No, because I would not go up to his price. He valued himself at more than I thought him worth; and I could get others cheaper, who, in the general muster, would do as well."**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1468/pg1468-images.html#linknoteref-17

> According to [Charles II], every person was to be bought: but some people haggled more about their price than others; and when this haggling was very obstinate and very skilful it was called by some fine name. The chief trick by which clever men kept up the price of their abilities was called integrity. The chief trick by which handsome women kept up the price of their beauty was called modesty. The love of God, the love of country, the love of family, the love of friends, were phrases of the same sort, delicate and convenient synonymes for the love of self.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/522/mode/2up?view=theater

> 135. Michael Zuckert gets the idea when he suggests that **Lockean Property "involves an extension of rights from the spheres of one's own life, body, and actions to the external world. It proclaims the rightful power of human beings to make the external their own in the same way they can make their bodies their own."** Zuckert, *The Natural Rights Republic* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 221, and *Launching Liberalism* (University Press of Kansas, 2002.)

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater

Locke, not Marx, was the first to redefine human beings as *homo faber*, "man, the worker," or more accurately, as *homo oeconomicus*, economic man – man, who by his labor, lives for the accumulation of material goods as the highest good. That is, of course, quite distinct from designating us as *homo sapiens*, for this older designation presumed that there was *sapientia*, "wisdom" about heavenly things, things higher than material things. But Locke, following Hobbes (who was following Epicurus), called philosophy down from the heavens, as it were, and focused our efforts on the only real world, the material world, so that our efforts might remake it, our labor redeem it, and the pursuit of wealth might provide a new plenty that would turn the earth into a *real*, not mythical, land of plenty. The recent political phrase "It's the economy, stupid," used by former President Clinton to remind his followers of the true goal of politics, was merely a restatement of Locke's reduction of the political goal to the pursuit and expansion of material gratification.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/222/mode/2up?view=theater

The twist that Locke puts on Hobbes's account is his extension of the natural right of self-preservation to include the right to property – in fact, the limitless accumulation of property.7 So in escaping the chaotic state of nature for civil society, we put ourselves under a civil sovereign to save our lives *and* preserve our property. **Hence, in Locke's famous words, "The great and chief end … of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property."**8
…

And this makes Locke definitely liberal: *in cutting off any higher goal than the preservation of life and property, Locke was siding with Machiavelli and Hobbes in defining the state as purely secular and concerned with the body alone.*
…

Locke was thus the inventor of the "classical liberal" state, concerned with protecting property rights, especially the property rights of the new commercial class, that is, the merchants and money-men who were displacing the old noble class. That is the stratum of society that Locke identified with in England's Glorious Revolution in 1688, **the moneyed class that wrested control from the king and nobles and placed political power in the hands of the Parliament, which better represented its own interests.**

And in the nineteenth century there was yet another wave of newly rich because of the immense wealth gained in the various enterprises of the industrial revolution. They used Locke against the established order (who, ironically, were the heirs of the winners in the Revolution of 1688, who had displaced the established order of that day). Locke became the (classical) liberal guide for these newly prosperous Englishmen.
…

But Locke had ties to radical liberalism, too. As a member of the anti-royalist party he spent time on the continent as a political exile (1683-1689). **And there he became well-acquainted with the circle of Spinozan radicals.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/244/mode/2up?view=theater

Locke is, as we noted above, studiously and strangely ambiguous. He seems to speak at one and the same time as if he's a proponent of something like the Christian natural law tradition and as if he accepts the materialistic natural rights position set out by Hobbes. **Locke seems to have a foot in each camp. He seems to belong with the Deists who looked back on pagan virtue with admiration, and also to the utilitarians who look forward to a hedonistic paradise.**

But where Locke *really* stands, what foot he really puts his weight on, should be clear from the fact that he shifts the goal of government from virtue to the limitless accumulation of material goods. **And it is now crystal clear where Lockean liberalism leads. Today all liberals, whether classical or radical, speak in terms of Hobbesian *natural rights*, not natural law.**

https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2013/06/17/when-the-state-replaces-god/

The father of classical or conservative liberalism is John Locke, **a very ambiguous figure, to say the least.** Locke's aim was to secularize the state, make it entirely defined by this worldly bodily welfare. In his words, the sole aim of government is the protection of property—not the encouragement of virtue, not the care of the souls of the citizens, not a preparation for the next life, **but merely to see to it that its citizens could make money, and those who made it could keep it.**
…

Yet, Locke believed that religion was necessary as a kind of moral prop for this essentially economic endeavor—**religion is necessary to control the unpropertied masses!**—so he didn't want Christianity thrown out.
…

The radicals argued that religion was merely a prop protecting the propertied classes in society, the so-called capitalists (which, of course, was true, given Locke's assumptions).

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP14#v=onepage&q&f=false

Agreeably to his *Chimerical*, and *Atheistical* notions of their GOD, they dream after *Epicurus*; That Men by those Necessary, Mechanical, Unguided Laws of Nature, sprang like Mushrooms out of the Earth, by the genial warmth of the Sun. And *from this Original, and first Condition of Mankind, they* frame that which they call the *State of Nature*, which they assert to be a state of perfect Liberty and Equality; out of which Men first came by their own Consent, in a free Election of a Multitude, or a Select Number, or a single Person, unto whom they transferred their Natural Rights, and gave them Authority to Rule, and Govern them. *They likewise teach*, That this State of Nature, before Men came out of it, was a State of War, and Liberty to Destroy one another; and That the intolerable Inconveniences of it obliged the Primogenial Men to come (*they know not how*) into a Social State of Civil Government, in which they might live securely from the Violences of one another. *From hence again they teach*, That the whole Power, and Authority of the Sovereign in all Forms of Government, is primarily from, and ultimately resolved into the People, who have certain unalienable Rights and Priviledges, which they neither did, nor could confer upon the Supreme Magistrate; and that, if he misuses, or abuses the Power they conferred upon him, they may take it away from him, and Depose him, or, if he Resists them, Kill him, and at any time defend their Natural, and Unalienable Rights against him by Force of Arms, *which also is one of those unalienable Rights*: And That another of those Inherent, Inalienable Rights, of which they cannot divest themselves, is, Not to be Subject to any Laws and Matters of Religion, but to believe, and profess what Doctrines, and Institute what Modes of Worship they please; and in order to this, to form themselves into Religious Societies, in *which the Prince hath no more Power over the Peasant, than the Peasant hath over him*.

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP44#v=onepage&q&f=false

From this general Neglect, and Contempt of *Logick* in *Epicurus*, and for not Arguing like a Man of Reason, the great *Latin Philosopher* also tells us, that almost none read his Books, but those of his own Sect; whereas all read the Works of *Plato*, and of the *Platonick* Writers, and that the *Epicureans* became such from that Wicked Principle of their Master, *That nothing but what brings Pleasure is Honourable, and Just*. He calls both his *Physical*, and *Moral* Notions, his *Dreams*, and *Imaginations*, as this author, for the same Reasons, throughout his whole Book, calls Dr. *Tindal*'s Book of the RIGHTS his RAVINGS, **and particularly, as to the Original of Civil Government, from the *Belluine State* of Nature; which, with all its Absurdities our Deists have espous'd, Right Reason taught this greatest Philosopher, as well as Orator among the *Romans* to despise it, and led him to an *Hypothesis*, very near the *Mosaick* Account of the Original of Mankind, and of Civil Government;** for as this Author hath well observed, he taught, That *Wedlock was the first Society among Men, and that Tribes, Cities, Colonies, and Common-wealths arose by orderly Encrease from Families*; *and* whosoever will consider his Words in * the Margin, must needs admire the Concinuity of his Notion of the Rise of Men, and Civil Societies, and the great Agreement between it, and the six first Chapters of *GENESIS*, **which had he been so happy as to have read, how would he have been ravished to find his Scheme so exactly answer the Propagation of Mankind;** First, from one single Man and Woman join'd in *Holy Wedlock* by their Creator, and then again after the *Flood*, from one single Family, by which the Earth was again Replenished. **The *Deist*'s State of Nature, which is the Corner-stone in the Foundation of the Book of the RIGHTS, is as contrary to the Reasoning of this Philosopher, as to the Narrative of *Moses*; and I appeal to their Consciences, depraved as they are, let them but observe the Directions of their own Thoughts, if they do not find within themselves a Natural Tendency, and Willingness to prefer this *Hypothesis* of *Tully*, and the *Mosaick* Account of the Original of Mankind, and Civil Government, before *Epicurus*'s Dreams of them,** and a strong Aversion in their Reason, to close with that Chymerical Account of the *State of Nature*, and Liberty, which they derive from him, and with the Insuperable Difficulties, and both Natural, and Moral Absurdities, which attend that Atheistical, and Precarious *Hypothesis*.

I would desire as many of them, as are not yet as deaf as an Adder to the Charms of Reason, to consider, what Dishonour it reflects on the Wisdom, and Goodness of God, to suppose, he could Concreate, or let his Servant Nature Comproduce **a *Cadmean* Multitude of Men, and Women in a State of War, and Liberty, to destroy one another, out of which they had no better way to come out, but by as *yet* insignificant Signs, and Sounds, by the help of which they are supposed to have expressed their Minds,** and chosen a Multitude, or a few, or one single Person to Govern them with a Reserve, and Exception of such, and such Rights, which they would not, or could not surrender. **Let my Soul be with *Socrates*, *Plato*, or *Tully*, rather than with these *Christian Epicureans*, who are equally abandoned to *Reason*, and *Faith*, and to the Natural Dictates and Directions of the one, as well as the Supernatural Revelations of the other.**

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA92#v=onepage&q&f=false

Afterwards he makes those Men, **thus sprung up out of the Earth, like so many Mushrooms,** to wander up and down like Wild Beasts, in the Condition describ'd in the foregoing pages. Now,

Here you have a Clear, Comprehensive, and exact Description of the very Thing we have been hitherto seeking for, *viz*. Of our Author's, and his Master's Darling *State of Nature*. **Here you have it set off in its Native Colours, without any Paint, Equivocations, Sophisms, or other the like Knavish Contrivances and Disguises, us'd by the Modern *Atheists*, to conceal from us, what they mean by their *State of Nature*, when they employ those Terms.** *Epicurus* fancied, that Mankind Originally was the Casual, but necessary Product of Mere, but Blindly Operating *Nature*; and, for this Reason, calls their Primitive Condition, the *State of Nature*. **Wherefore, you now plainly see, what is precisely meant by those *Words*, to wit, a State wherein Mankind was squeez'd up out of the Earth, like so many Pumpions,** by a *Mere Necessity* of *Nature*, *Nature so Compelling*, says *Epicurus*; that is, by an *Absolutely, Irresistible, Unavoidable, Blind, Unthinking, Undesigning Necessity of* * *Fate,* or of the Universal Laws of *Nature*, i.e. of Motion, Rest, Gravity, &*c*. **And if you do but consider, what has been hitherto said, you'll perceive, at first sight, how Naturally and Necessarily all our Author's, and his Master's Doctrine deliver'd in the preceding Quotations does agree to, spring from, and Only and Solely center in this pretended *State* of *Nature*.** To be short, in an Assertion intuitively evident, 'tis absolutely impossible, so much as to conceive any other *State* of *Nature*, besides the fore-mentioned, wherein, or by Virtue of which those Prerogatives can be ascrib'd to reasonable Creatures, which our Author and his Masters attribute to Mankind, upon the account of that Condition, which they call, a *State of Nature*. **For, herein, and *herein alone*, Men are *perfectly Equals*, and therefore cannot lose that *Equality*, but by their own *Consent*,** as our Author has it. Here, every one has a *Right to every thing, even to one another's Bodies*. Here Men are *Subject* to no Laws at all; here there neither is, nor can be, either *Justice* or *Injustice*, either *Right* or *Wrong*, *Transgression* or *Sin* committed. And hence it is, that *all Power* is *Originally in*, and *immediately* from the *People*. Hence it is, that they neither are, nor can be Subject to any *Laws* at all, but to those of their own *Chusing* or *Making*. That the *Old* and *New Testament*, are no *Laws* at all, but where the Common-wealth made them so. Hence it is, That Mankind, both *in* and *out* of that *State* of *Nature*, have a *Natural, Inalienable, Inherent Right, to Believe and Profess whatever they please*. That the *Power Naturally* Reverts to 'em upon the *Supposition* of Mal-Administration, with a Natural Right to *Punish* their *Sovereign*, &c. **All the other Points of the Doctrine deliver'd hitherto by our Authors, do singly Center in this *Epicurean* State of *Nature*. Suppose that *Doctrine*, and you immediately Establish this *State*. Suppose this *State*, and you immediately Establish that *Doctrine*.** They mutually and necessarily infer each other.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/236/mode/2up?view=theater

The aggressive and selfish instincts of each individual which Hobbes's sovereign seeks to curb, and which Hobbes views in an essentially negative light, in Spinoza, van Leenhof, and Mandeville – following on from the de La Courts – are instead pitted against each other, in society, and rather than being repressed, are transmuted with the help of Spinoza's mechanics of the passions into positive and beneficial equivalents. **As Spinoza expresses this idea in his *Ethics*, 'it is when every man is most devoted to seeking his own advantage that men are of most advantage to one another,' an insight, one might suspect, rooted in his early experience as a merchant and in business.**55

The main difference here between Spinoza and Mandeville is that where the first deems these 'bad' impulses transformed into 'good,' the latter sees men behaving at the behest of society in ways perceived as 'good,' 'virtuous,' or 'chaste' which, however, do not correspond to genuine 'virtue' but rather an elaborate system of hypocrisy. Men do the right things, argues Mandeville, not by and large out of virtue, but rather for 'honour,' influence, and to avoid disapproval and 'shame.'56 But the difference in this case too may be more apparent than real since Mandeville speak of 'virtue' in the conventional sense **while Spinoza, as so often, redefines the term to denote something quite different from what is conventionally meant.**
…

In Spinoza, as in Bayle and Diderot, the ultimate measure of good and evil is not precisely the law, despite our obligation to obey it, and could not be, for laws are not infrequently misconceived, ineffective, disastrous, or despotic, **but rather the 'common good,' Diderot's 'general will.'** This fundamental disagreement about the nature of law is clearly rooted in a no less profound disagreement about the nature of morality. **Hobbes, in practice, denies there is such a thing as a secular morality underlying law and politics, since, for him, it is only where men conceive of commandments about good and bad as being divine in origin that they can amount to more than the arbitrary dictates of the sovereign.**68 **Here Mandeville may well be closer to Hobbes than to Spinoza.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/70/mode/2up?view=theater

I freely own that if this question was to be decided by the authority of legislators or philosophers it must go against us. For those men generally take it for granted that Vice is pernicious to the public; and that men cannot be kept from vice but by the fear of God, and the sense of a Future State: whence they are induced to think the belief of such things necessary to the well-being of human-kind. This false notion

hath prevailed for many ages in the world, and done an infinite deal of mischief, being in truth the cause of religious establishments, and gaining the protection and encouragement of laws and magistrates to the clergy and their superstitions. **Even some of the wisest among the ancients, who agreed with our sect in denying a Providence and the Immortality of the Soul, had nevertheless the weakness to lie under the common prejudice, that vice was hurtful to societies of men. But England hath of late produced great philosophers,**2 **who have undeceived the world, and proved to a demonstration that private vices are public benefits. This discovery was reserved to our times, and our sect hath the glory of it.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/140/mode/2up?view=theater

All that is said about a moral sense, or moral beauty, in any signification, either of Alciphron, or Euphranor, or any other, I take to be at bottom mere bubble and pretence. The *καλόν* and the *πρέπον*, the *beautiful* and *decent*, are things outward, relative, and superficial, which have no effect in the dark, but are specious topics to discourse and expatiate upon, as some formal pretenders of our sect, though in other points very orthodox, are used to do. **But should one of them get into power, you would find him no such fool as Euphranor imagines. He would soon shew he had found out that the love of one's country is a prejudice: that mankind are rogues and hypocrites, and that it were folly to sacrifice one's-self for the sake of such:** that all regards centre in this life, and that, as this life is to every man his own life, it clearly follows that charity begins at home. Benevolence to mankind is perhaps pretended, but benevolence to himself is practised by the wise. The livelier sort of our philosophers do not scruple to own these maxims; and as for the graver, if they are true to their principles, one may guess what they must think at the bottom.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false

ADAM SMITH OFFERED HIS OWN NARRATIVE of the history of modern philosophy in his anonymous 'Letter to the Authors of the *Edinburgh Review*,' which was published in 1756. **With reference to 'natural philosophy' as well as 'morals, metaphysics, and part of the abstract sciences,' he wrote that until recently, and with the exception of Descartes, 'Whatever attempts have been made in modern times towards improvement in this contentious and unprosperous philosophy, beyond what the antients have left us, have been made in England.'**1 He cited in evidence the names of Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Butler, Clarke, and Hutcheson, all of whom, 'according to their different and inconsistent systems, endeavoured at least to be, in some measure, original; and to add something to that stock of observations with which the world had been furnished before them.' **But, Smith continued, 'This branch of the English philosophy, which seems now to be intirely neglected by the English themselves, has of late been transported into France.'**2 Traces of it were observable in the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert, he thought, and also in Louis Jean Levesque de Pouilly's recent *Théorie des sentiments agréables*, but 'above all, in the late Discourse upon the origin and foundation of the inequality amongst mankind by Mr. Rousseau of Geneva.'

> Whoever reads this last work with attention, will observe, **that the second volume of the Fable of the Bees has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau,** in whom however the principles of the English author are softened, improved, and embellished, and stript of all that tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has disgraced them in their original author.3

Smith went on to explain why he associated Rousseau with Mandeville by picking out three characteristically Epicurean themes in their respective works – although he did not label them as such. **Both writers denied natural sociability** – in Smith's words, echoing a formulation of Mandeville's from 'A Search into the Nature of Society,' 'there is in man no powerful instinct which necessarily determines him to seek society for its own sake.'4 Both 'suppose the same slow progress and gradual development of all the talents, habits, and arts which fit men to live together in society, and they both describe this progress pretty much in the same manner.' Both, finally, **considered the 'laws of justice, which maintain the present inequality amongst the mankind,' to be 'originally the inventions of the cunning and the powerful, in order to maintain or to acquire an unnatural and unjust superiority over the rest of their fellow-creatures.'**5

http://ml.ci.uc.pt/mhonarchive/histport/pdfEDlTv6oEvu.pdf

Dr. Mandeville represents the primitive state of mankind as the most wretched and miserable that can be imagined: Mr. Rousseau, on the contrary, paints it as the happiest and most suitable to his nature. Both of them however suppose, that there is in man no powerful instinct which necessarily determines him to seek society for its own sake: but according to the one, the misery of his original state compelled him to have recourse to this otherwise disagreeable remedy; according to the other, **some unfortunate accidents having given birth to the unnatural passions of ambition and the vain desire of superiority, to which he had before been a stranger, produced the same fatal effect.**
...

Mr. Rousseau however criticises upon Dr. Mandeville: **he observes, that *pity*, the only amiable principle which the English author allows to be natural to man, is capable of producing all those virtues, whose reality Dr. Mandeville denies.** Mr. Rousseau at the same time seems to think, that this principle is in itself no virtue, but that it is possessed by savages and by the most profligate of the vulgar, in a greater degree of perfection than by those of the most polished and cultivated manners; in which he perfectly agrees with the English author.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Helv%C3%A9tius,_Claude_Adrien

HELVÉTIUS, CLAUDE ADRIEN (1715-1771), French philosopher and littérateur, was born in Paris in January 1715. He was descended from a family of physicians, whose original name was Schweitzer (latinized as Helvetius). His grandfather introduced the use of ipecacuanha; his father was first physician to Queen Marie Leczinska of France. Claude Adrien was trained for a financial career, but he occupied his spare time with writing verses. **At the age of twenty-three, at the queen's request, he was appointed farmer-general, a post of great responsibility and dignity worth a 100,000 crowns a year. Thus provided for, he proceeded to enjoy life to the utmost, with the help of his wealth and liberality, his literary and artistic tastes. As he grew older, however, his social successes ceased, and he began to dream of more lasting distinctions, stimulated by the success of Maupertuis as a mathematician, of Voltaire as a poet, of Montesquieu as a philosopher.** The mathematical dream seems to have produced nothing; his poetical ambitions resulted in the poem called *Le Bonheur* (published posthumously, with an account of Helvétius's life and works, by C.F. de Saint-Lambert, 1773), in which he develops the idea that true happiness is only to be found in making the interest of one that of all; his philosophical studies ended in the production of his famous book *De l'esprit*. **It was characteristic of the man that, as soon as he thought his fortune sufficient, he gave up his post of farmer-general, and retired to an estate in the country, where he employed his large means in the relief of the poor, the encouragement of agriculture and the development of industries.** *De l'esprit* (Eng. trans. by W. Mudford, 1807), intended to be the rival of Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois*, appeared in 1758. It attracted immediate attention and aroused the most formidable opposition, especially from the dauphin, son of Louis XV. The Sorbonne condemned the book, the priests persuaded the court that it was full of the most dangerous doctrines, and the author, terrified at the storm he had raised, wrote three separate retractations; yet, in spite of his protestations of orthodoxy, he had to give up his office at the court, and the book was publicly burned by the hangman. The virulence of the attacks upon the work, as much as its intrinsic merit, caused it to be widely read; it was translated into almost all the languages of Europe. **Voltaire said that it was full of commonplaces, and that what was original was false or problematical; Rousseau declared that the very benevolence of the author gave the lie to his principles; Grimm thought that all the ideas in the book were borrowed from Diderot; according to Madame du Deffand, Helvétius had raised such a storm by saying openly what every one thought in secret;** Madame de Graffigny averred that all the good things in the book had been picked up in her own *salon*.
…

His philosophy belongs to the utilitarian school. The four discussions of which his book consists have been thus summed up: (1) All man's faculties may be reduced to physical sensation, even memory, comparison, judgment; our only difference from the lower animals lies in our external organization. (2) Self-interest, founded on the love of pleasure and the fear of pain, is the sole spring of judgment, action, affection; self-sacrifice is prompted by the fact that the sensation of pleasure outweighs the accompanying pain; it is thus the result of deliberate calculation; we have no liberty of choice between good and evil; there is no such thing as absolute right—ideas of justice and injustice change according to customs. (3) **All intellects are equal; their apparent inequalities do not depend on a more or less perfect organization, but have their cause in the unequal desire for instruction, and this desire springs from passions, of which all men commonly well organized are susceptible to the same degree; and we can, therefore, all love glory with the same enthusiasm and we owe all to education.** (4) In this discourse the author treats of the ideas which are attached to such words as *genius*, *imagination*, *talent*, *taste*, *good sense*, &c**. The only original ideas in his system are those of the natural equality of intelligences and the omnipotence of education, neither of which, however, is generally accepted, though both were prominent in the system of J.S. Mill.**
…

As J. M. Robertson (*Short History of Free Thought*) points out, he had great influence upon Bentham, and C. Beccaria states that he himself was largely inspired by Helvétius in his attempt to modify penal laws.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm

In *Helvétius*, who also based himself on Locke, materialism assumed a really French character. Helvétius conceived it immediately in its application to social life (Helvétius, *De l'homme*). The sensory qualities and self-love, enjoyment and correctly understood personal interest are the basis of all morality. **The natural equality of human intelligences, the unity of progress of reason and progress of industry, the natural goodness of man, and the omnipotence of education, are the main features in his system.**
…

There is no need for any great penetration to see from **the teaching of materialism on the original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the influence of environment on man, the great significance of industry,**

the justification of enjoyment, etc., how necessarily materialism is connected with communism and socialism.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n113/mode/2up?view=theater

HELVETIUS will at one time tell us, **that the only rule by which *virtuous actions* are distinguished from *vicious ones*, is the law of princes, and public utility.** Elsewhere he will say, "that *virtue*, or *honesty*, with regard to individuals, is no more than the *habit of actions personally advantageous*, and that self-interest is the sole scale by which the actions of man can be measured;" **In fine, "that if the virtuous man is not happy in this world, we are justified in exclaiming, *O Virtue! thou art but an idle dream*."**30
…

He will inform children, that "the commandment of loving their father and mother is more the work of education than of nature."35 He will tell the married couple, that "the law which condemns them to live together becomes *barbarous and cruel* on the day they cease to love each other."36

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Holbach,_Paul_Heinrich_Dietrich,_Baron_d%27

HOLBACH, PAUL HEINRICH DIETRICH, Baron d' (1723-1789), French philosopher and man of letters, of German origin, was born at Heidelsheim in the palatinate in 1723. **Of his family little is known; according to J. J. Rousseau his father was a rich parvenu, who brought his son at an early age to Paris, where the latter spent most of his life.**
…

Possessed of easy means and being of hospitable disposition, he kept open house for Helvétius, D'Alembert, Diderot, Condillac, Turgot, Buffon, Grimm, Hume, Garrick, Wilkes, Sterne, and for a time J. J. Rousseau, guests who, while enjoying the intellectual pleasure of their host's conversation, were not insensible to his excellent cuisine and costly wines.
…

"It would be useless and almost unjust to insist upon a man's being virtuous if he cannot be so without being unhappy. So long as vice renders him happy, he should love vice." The restraints of religion were to be replaced by an education developing an enlightened self-interest. The study of science was to bring human desires into line with their natural surroundings. **Not less direct and trenchant are his attacks on political government, which, interpreted by the light of after events, sound like the first distant mutterings of revolution. Holbach exposed the logical consequences of the theories of the Encyclopaedists.** Voltaire hastily seized his pen to refute the philosophy of the *Système* in the article "Dieu" in his *Dictionnaire philosophique*, while Frederick the Great also drew up an answer to it.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/794/mode/2up?view=theater

While Epicurean elements gradually became more prominent in the structure of his thought, **La Mettrie's materialism was in crucial respects more Spinozist than Epicurean, especially as regards the mind.** This he interprets as physically indistinguishable from the body, and something whole determined, in the same way that bodies are, our capacity to think arising the organization of our brains, nerves, and other organs rather than owing to the existence of a material 'soul' composed of some subtly elusive substance. **La Mettrie evinced that same strong commitment to 'system' which Cassirer mistakenly thought was not a characteristic of the Enlightenment and which actually characterizes Meslier, Du Marsais, and the entire Radical Enlightenment (as well as Voltaire and Montesquieu), firmly adhering to one substance doctrine.**17 By 1747, he had dropped his earlier pretence to the contrary, openly confessing to being a follower of Spinoza, on the final page of his *L'Homme machine* where he asserts that **'il n'y a dans tout l'univers qu'une substance diversement modifiée,'** a statement which could only be read in Europe at the time as an open declaration of Spinozism.18
…

Despite the strong empiricist bent of La Mettrie's writing, his habit of anchoring his arguments in physiological and medical observations,20 and his familiarity with Locke, **the contemporary debate about his work never focused to any significant extent on Locke, Hobbes (whom he practically never mentions), or Newton, whose physico-theology he rejected outright,**21 **but always rather on Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza** – and with good reason, for the most challenging question posed by La Mettrie's empirical materialism, as the Oratorian Lelarge de Lignac observed, in 1753, was whether there is some valid empirical means of proving there is in man a spiritual 'substance' wholly separate from, but temporarily coexisting with, physical 'substance.'22 To rescue Descartes and

Malebranche's substance dualism, Lelarge develops a theory of the *sens intime*, a pervasive sense of the self of which everyone has experience and which he argues must be both a certain and a non-material reality.

However, what is genuinely Spinozistic in La Mettrie is confined to his approach to the mind-body problem, rejection of providence and all teleology, and conception of matter, that is to his philosophy of nature, life, physiology, and the human body, and his eliminating 'free will,' seeing all human action as invariably determined.23 **The rest, on the other hand, was by no means Spinozistic. Given his growing emphasis on the pleasure principle, and his stripping Descartes's dualism down to what he considered its cogent grounding, he did not lack justification for also calling his thought a 'système épicuro-cartésien.'**24 No contradiction was involved, in any case, when in the final summation of his philosophy, the *Discours préliminaire* to his *Oeuvres philosophiques* ('Londres' [Berlin], 1751), he designates himself a *Spinosiste* while also claiming to be thinker who revives 'le système d'Épicure.'25 While the term 'Spinosisme' was frequently affixed to La Mettrie in the late 1740s and early 1750s,26 **in his case there are good grounds to consider the label somewhat problematic.** For while his conception of matter diverges markedly from that of Epicureanism with its atoms and atomic swerve, his theory of motivation and the passions, and holding the pleasure principle to be the prime determinant, does follow a distinctively Epicurean line.27 **Especially crucial, by substituting a modified Epicureanism for Spinoza's ethics, he avoids, unlike other radical writers, any requirement to draw Spinozistic social, moral, and political consequences from hylozoic materialism,** consequences they, in contrast to him, judged essential for the moral order and the well-being of society.
…

Rousset de Missy likewise closely followed the proceedings, as La Mettrie, securely ensconced in Potsdam, turned out more works in rapid succession further elaborating his materialist system. Among the most notable of these, *L'Anti-Sénèque* (1748) proved too much even for the freethinking Frederick the Great, being immediately banned and withdrawn from circulation by personal order of the king.61
…

Neither did he worry overly that there was no real moral basis to La Mettrie's system; but he could hardly be expected to countenance the Frenchman's openly preaching immoralism **and his insolent contention that monarchy is something altogether arbitrary and hence devoid of any moral principle.**63
…

While genuine philosophy, for La Mettrie, must be based on the study of nature, morality has nothing to do with nature but is really just an indispensable fiction, a 'fruit arbitraire de la politique,' devised for purely social reasons and arbitrarily as well as forcibly imposed by society. Since men are determined in what they do by nature and governed by natural impulse, **we are no more criminal in following our basic drives, contends La Mettrie, than is the Nile in inundating precious farmland.**74 Happiness, according to La Mettrie's moral schema, is an essentially individual affair unconnected with the common good, on the one hand and the moral and intellectual progress of the individual on the other. **The world is full of contented imbeciles, he declared, and unhappy *gens d'esprit*.**75 **Philosophy and morality, being opposites, he argues, are in permanent, irresolvable conflict with each other:** 'diamétricalement opposes jusqu'à se tourner le dos'; what can one conclude from this other than that 'la philosophie est absolutement inconciliable avec la morale, la religion et la politique?'76

This was totally unacceptable to Diderot, Dorthous de Mairan, d'Argens, and the *Spinosistes modernes*. The point at which La Mettrie parts company with the Radical Enlightenment was hence precisely where he diverges from Spinozism itself: precisely, in the sharp differentiation he introduces between nature, reason, and philosophy, on the one hand, which reveal what is true and and 'natural' and what he deems the utilitarian myths of virtue, equity, and justice, on the other, all arbitrary political constructions devised to uphold one or another kind of social order. **La Mettrie, unlike Spinoza, Bayle, Du Marsais, and Diderot, forges a naturalism which offers no ethic of equality based on the equivalence of volitions and consciences, or moral system rooted in the idea of equity, or any concept of 'virtue' linked to a 'common good' in which men rationally and naturally share.** Although he agrees with Spinoza's thesis in the *Tractatus* that government is justified by its social functions, not authority conferred by supernatural agency, and that it is necessary that rulers uphold law and order, **he diverges dramatically from Spinozist thinking in claiming the principles of government and justice are nevertheless wholly arbitrary.**77 **Displaying no particular reverence for monarchy, he showed no commitment to republican ideals either.**

Since 'virtue,' indeed any altruistic motive for sharing in an enterprise, or sense of social and political responsibility, is for La Mettrie purely fictional, the veritable 'morale de la nature' in his view is merely the pursuit of physical pleasures combined with the investigation of nature.78

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT342#v=onepage&q&f=false

La Mettrie was and is best known for his *L'Homme-machine* (1747) where he extended Descartes's view that animals were machines to include the human animal. **(La Mettrie was to discover his forerunner Hobbes in the next year.)** But it was his *Anti-Sénèque ou Le souverain bien* (1748) that earned him the distaste of his fellow materialists, D'Holbach and Diderot. In his treatise *Anti-Sénèque*, La Mettrie (1996: 123), perhaps relying in his memory of the battlefields at Fontenoy and perhaps trying to upstage his philosophic rivals, **declared that opium has provided "more happiness to us than the treatises of all the philosophers."** His philosophic treatise was an assault on Stoicism but began with a fair assessment of Seneca and Stoic doctrine: **"Seneca, the most illustrious of the Stoics, or rather of the Eclectics (for he was Epicurean and Stoic at the same time, and he chose and took what he found best in each sect), added the knowledge of truth" to Stoic ideals of virtue and honor.**
…

He then swung into high gear:

> But we shall be anti-Stoics! Those philosophers are sad, strict and unyielding: we shall be cheerful, sweet-natured and indulgent. They are all soul and ignore their bodies; we shall be all body and ignore our souls. They appear impervious to pleasure or pain; we shall glory in feeling both.

La Mettrie championed *volupté* as the mean between short urgent sensual pleasure (*plaisir*) and unattainable permanent happiness (*bonheur*). There is no good "as exquisite as the great pleasure of love," the "more long-lasting, delicious, enticing, uninterrupted and untroubled this feeling is, the happier one is." However, "Seneca was unhappy and he wrote about happiness as one writes for a lost dog. It is true that he was a Stoic, a sort of leper well armed against the pleasures of life" (La Mettrie 1996: 126).

Nature destined humans to aspire for happiness **but virtue is not essential for happiness; vicious thugs are as likely to be happy as Stoic philosophers if they are physiologically well constituted.** Conscience and remorse are the offspring of prejudice: they are useless and harmful since they do not restrain the vicious but poison the pleasures of the virtuous (La Mettrie 1996: 137-8, 141-2).

…

While La Mettrie did not deny that society requires moral guidelines and must protect itself, ensure maintenance of law and order, and impose its own discipline on people's behaviour, agreeing with Spinoza that rabid dogs must be killed and poisonous snakes eliminated,86 **he thought the laws society enforces to accomplish this are inherently arbitrary and ungrounded in either reason or nature.**87 **For Diderot and the new *Spinosistes*, by contrast, human happiness requires us to live consciously, in thought and action, in conformity with the universal laws of nature and reason, not in the Stoic sense of attempting to tame the passions with reason, a goal Diderot, like Spinoza, believed conflicts with nature, but rather, through moderating our passions in accord with the natural circumstances,** shaping and improving the human condition, our common good, and meeting society's needs.88

From a Postmodernist perspective, and that of such contemporary thinkers as Alasdair MacIntyre or Charles Taylor critical of the Enlightenment's efforts to construct a universal secular morality, the disowning of La Mettrie by the *philosophes* places the latter in a poor light. For it implies they unjustly hounded and vilified someone who had seen through the illusions, pretensions, and contradictions they themselves could not resolve. Interpreted thus, La Mettrie emerges as the perceptive and candid thinker who grasped the ugly reality Diderot and the rest were blind to, a victim of dogmatists, hypocrites, and moral cowards who had aroused their fears of having persecution brought down on their own heads, by pointing out the weaknesses in their system and the obstacles to constructing a secular morality on the basis of materialism.89 **For Diderot, holds MacIntyre, while otherwise sharing La Mettrie's physiological materialism, undermined his own attempt 'to find a basis for morality in human physiological nature' by arbitrarily distinguishing between 'desires that are natural to man' and artificially aroused and corrupt impulses nurtured by civilized society.**90 **The marquis de Sade, adds Charles Taylor, was merely following La Mettrie, when later in the century he 'showed how the utter rejection of all social limits could be embraced as the most consistent and thoroughgoing liberation from traditional religion and metaphysics. Morals, law and virtue are to be thrown off.'**91

La Mettrie has hence proved useful to Postmodernists seeking to press their campaign to discredit and sap the moral foundations of what they disparage as the 'Enlightenment project.' **One author claims La Mettrie '"barbarized" the Enlightenment** and set it on a course toward materialism and

mechanism which proved to be irreversible,' arguing that despite being a mediocre thinker, La Mettrie 'proved to be a devastating force in the demise of the old regime.'92
…

La Mettrie may have propounded what Charles Taylor terms 'a morality of purely egoistic gratification' and his philosophy was certainly grounded in the radical materialism developing in France during the first half of the eighteenth century.94 But there were many other radical materialists prior to 1750, with Boulainvilliers, Meslier, Du Marsais, Boulanger, Vauvenargues, d'Argens, Fréret, Helvetius, Boindin, de Maillet, and Diderot prominent among them **and he was neither a characteristic representative of the moral thinking of this group nor a major influence on the post-1750 French *parti philosophique* as a whole.** If Diderot and other exponents of Radical Enlightenment vociferously protested against La Mettrie's moral theory this was not because they feared that, through La Mettrie, the compromising truth was being told, or inconsistencies in their own thought uncovered, or persecution being brought down on themselves, but because they genuinely abhorred and were angered by his views.
…

The moral code society enforces, holds La Mettrie, has no basis in Man's natural disposition. Consequently, laws and social norms, he thought, lack genuine moral force and since law is the only criterion of 'right' and 'wrong,' **obeying the laws wherever popular and theological ideas hold sway, that is to say in practically every state, obliges he who possesses philosophical insight to live a make-believe life, abide by a charade of hypocrisy, myth, lies, and pretence, systematic deception being indispensable, in his view, to managing the human herd.**98 It was this sweeping nihilism and moral cynicism and La Mettrie's explicit contention in his *Discours préliminaire* that all government and legal systems are morally equivalent in being built on 'superstition,' 'prejudice,' and 'myth' which prompted even the Prussian king to prohibit his *Oeuvres philosophiques* in 1751.

La Mettrie, then, in the end diverged drastically from radical thought. **For he refused to accept either that the moral conscience of the true *philosophe* must, in Diderot's words, be in perfect accord with 'morale universelle,'**99 or d'Argens's principle that laws are made to make individuals 'heureux,' and not to oppress them, and that to promote human happiness, laws must ensure and promote the general interest. **La Mettrie's *épicuro-spinosisme* hence brutally departs from the radical principle that whoever is 'virtuous,' as d'Argens expresses it, is a priest of truth, 'et par conséquent de l'Être Suprême, qui lui-même est la vérite.'**100
…

While Diderot and the Radical Enlightenment pressed for the sexual emancipation of the individual, male and female, and scorned – as d'Argens does in his *Songes philosophiques* – traditional Christian conceptions of marriage and especially the irrational cult of female chastity, condemnation of homosexuality, and denial of the right of divorce, and considered the keeping of unwilling and incompatible couples together as a particularly repellent aspect of the tyranny of the family,102 La Mettrie's anarchic brand of hedonism detached from any moral framework was something they whole-heartedly repudiated. To La Mettrie, the voluptuous person loves life more than others, having a healthy body and a free spirit, and is more tranquil and better able to adore nature's beauties 'parce qu'il les connoît mieux qu'un autre.'103 To reduce the pursuit of happiness to pleasure-seeking **and conceive pleasure as a purely physical process – a continual soothing of the nerves, with the pleasures of love, especially sexual intercourse, ranked highest** – seemed to his radical critics to violate the most basic principles on which their social, moral, and political reform programme rested.

This amoralism of his last works sets La Mettrie firmly at odds with the neo-*Spinosistes* and materialists and hence with the Radical Enlightenment. **For his system implies that crime, egoism, spite, and perversion are ultimately no less 'moral,' legitimate, and apt for producing happiness than the 'charity and justice' Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot proclaim the eternal and unalterable grounding of secular morality. Here indeed was a war *à l'outrance* between what Charles Taylor called 'purely egoistic materialism' and a materialism 'predicated on universal benevolence,' Shaftesbury's and Diderot's 'doing good in the world.'**104 The gulf was further widened by La Mettrie's inference that knowledge and understanding, and therefore emancipation of the individual, are in practice feasible only for a small elite. Most men must remain steeped in superstition and, hence, unemancipated. **However clearly thinkers might demonstrate Man is but a machine, he says, 'le peuple n'en croira jamais rien.'**105 The masses, he asserts, can never be brought to change their outlook or superstitions by philosophy.106

Voltaire reserved his harshest words for La Mettrie even though it was with him alone that he agreed that the *philosophes* should not try to propagate 'philosophical' awareness of fundamental truths about Man, God, and the universe among the common people, as this would be both dangerous to attempt107 and anyway in practice impossible to accomplish.108
…

Hence, La Mettrie, like Voltaire who despised La Mettrie's atheism and materialism, no less than his immoralism, styling him 'ce fou de La Mettrie,'109 **but was in fact closer to La Mettrie's political stance than to the social and political theories of the other materialists,**110 grounded not equality but a new and fundamental kind of inequality. This then, in turn, posed a vexing problem for Diderot, challenging him and his allies to show how their materialism could support the kind of values, and the species of politics, they hinted – and privately if not yet publicly announced – it could. **If Man's mind is biologically determined by his physical make-up what sense does it make to say that the best as well as wisest and most philosophical way is to seek individual happiness through a life based on virtue, especially since in La Mettrie's opinion men are naturally born malicious and bad rather than good?**111 To this question Diderot had to produce a cogent and practicable answer, embodying his principle that there is an organic condition of the body underlying all our states of mind and emotional turns. Our decisions and intellectual processes, he agreed with La Mettrie, are determines by our bodily states, thought deriving from perception and perception arising, by stages, from sensation and sensation ultimately being nothing but 'un toucher diversifié.'112 **But there nonetheless remains, for Diderot, a crucial difference between order and disorder in our states of mind where, for La Mettrie, the deranged individual is as much the product of a blind nature shaping humanity as the happy, tranquil individual.**113 More mechanistic than Diderot's conception, La Mettrie's materialism places less emphasis on the idea of Man and animals as dynamic organic wholes producing harmonies and disharmonies in terms of their own make-up and conduct.114

Here again, Diderot is *Spinosiste*; Le Mettrie is not. Diderot in effect counters La Mettrie by distinguishing between health and sickness, the balanced life and the unbalanced. **The mind of the wise man who loves virtue and the good of all is not something extraneously introduced into human life by an external agent or force, is not a repressive imposition, and is not a metaphysical ideal,** but rather the considered, logical stance of the balanced healthy mind combining intelligence, intuition, and understanding **with properly considered self-interest.**115 Passions, says Diderot, echoing Spinoza, are internal movements. If everyone's state of mind is a constant flux yielding a mêlée of good and bad passions, the good and the bad passions, for Diderot, cannot be straightforwardly equated with those that conduce to more or less tranquillity or feelings of pleasure. **Vital for survival, effectiveness, tranquillity and health is to curb and control emotions that are damaging and disrupt the proper continuities and harmony of the individual's existence,** bearing in mind that everyone depends for his or her security and well-being on their relations with those around him, and society more generally.

If La Mettrie's challenge rests on reasoning derived from the world of medical experience and theory, Diderot's answer relies on a medical analogy, the ideal of the man or woman living well and in health, attuned to the world, to his or her fellows, and him- or herself. **If La Mettrie's nature is driven by a blind necessity producing disorder, mistakes, and cruelty, no less than harmony, Diderot's blind nature is more of a coherent whole, a single substance in a more meaningful sense than La Mettrie's, one in which the overarching coherence of the whole gives its oneness a pervasive significance whch extends also to the realms of ethics and politics.** Diderot no less than Spinoza or La Mettrie banishes all teleology from our world-view. Everything in nature is a product of a blind and unintelligent creative force; **nevertheless, there remains a physico-moral quasi-teleology in which the freak, misfit, despot, and deranged violate and detract from the whole and are not what nature intended.**

The organic coherence of the cosmos is what makes the 'general good' conceivable and politics a proper sphere of action for the *philosophe*. **It was La Mettrie's theory of the biological inequality of men, and ineligibility of most for a rational life free from credulity and prejudice, that served to justify limiting the application of philosophy to the purely private and intellectual, underpinning his thesis that neither politics, nor social organization, nor morality can be guided by the *philosophes*, or even be their proper concern.** Here, as in his rejection of a secular morality based on equality, and endorsement of Frederick's despotism and arbitrary power, La Mettrie's physiological materialism reveals itself to be rather a tool of social hierarchy and political absolutism, and (according to d'Argens) even of the theologians, than a ground for general enlightenment, democratic republicanism, and equality; and this was all the more so in that for him, **the few capable of understanding, and of being emancipated, are not a social or political hierarchy but ultimately a biological elite – those whose physiology and brains happen to be best organized for grasping the workings of nature. To be fully themselves such 'enlightened' men must therefore withdraw from the rest of society.**
…

Thus both the radical wing and the moderate mainstream agreed that La Mettrie's philosophical amoralism, **his principle that happiness, like voluptuousness, is available to everyone equally, 'des bons comme des méchants,' leaving the virtuous no happier than the immoral, a doctrine forcefully restated shortly before his death in his *Anti-Sénèque*,** not only justified but positively required the *philosophes* to disown both the man and his books.121 In the 1760s, d'Argens, having long since renounced his former collaboration with La Mettrie, spoke for all the *philosophes* in accounting

him a kind of Trojan Horse,122 someone who was not in any meaningful way one of them, **insisting that all true *philosophes* were both horrified and astonished that anyone 'aussi pernicieux à la société' should pretend to 'le nom de philosophe' and cast an eternal shame on 'la philosophie.'**123

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

[La Mettrie's] Epicurean outlook exuded a static quality, offering no prospect or project of reform promising to ameliorate the world or make it a more hopeful place than it was in his day for most. Rather, La Mettrie's writings reflect Epicurean aversion to active involvement in the public sphere, recommending those adhering to his recipe for individual happiness to avoid accepting public offices and functions as far as possible. **While striving to influence those who rule, he had no wish for a broader impact via the press.**56 **He broke with Epicurean tradition only in one respect – his impatience with ruses and stratagems to conceal one's philosophical as distinct from political views.** He was un-Epicurean in urging fellow *philosophes* to revolt against the prevailing system philosophically, urging true *philosophes* to be free in their actions a well as their writings: **"monstrons y la fière indépendance d'un républicain" [let's show there the fierce independence of a republican].**57 **But this was his sole genuinely "republican" propensity.**

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D20
>
> And what is it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk, and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like you to be shorn and milked? **For this you ought to say to your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that temperance is a good thing; in order that all things may be secured for you?**[4] Or ought we to maintain this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom then ought we to maintain it? With such as on their part also maintain it, or with such as violate this fellowship? And who violate it more than you who establish such doctrines?

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/45/mode/2up?view=theater

The French philosophers chose John Locke as their master.70 This was the savior they needed. ***The Essay on Human Understanding* became their gospel; they swore by it. John Locke was schooled on Descartes and learned everything that an Englishman could learn from him:** mechanics, the art of analysis, combination, construction, calculation. There was only one thing he was unable to grasp: innate ideas. He thus perfected the doctrine that we attain all our knowledge from outside, through experience. He made the human mind into a kind of calculating device, and the whole human being became an English machine. **This is also true of the human being as constructed by the students of Locke, although they attempt to distinguish themselves from each other by using different names for their points of view. They are all afraid of the final consequences of their first principle, and the follower of Condillac is terrified of being put in the same class as Helvetius, or, even worse, Holbach, or, worst of all, La Mettrie.**71 And yet, it has to be done, and I thus may lump all of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century together, their contemporary followers included, as materialists. ***L'homme machine* is the most ruthlessly consistent book of French philosophy,** and the title is already the last word on its entire view of the world. …

Materialism accomplished its mission in France. It is perhaps now achieving the same results in England, and the revolutionary parties there, namely the Benthamists, the preachers of utility, base themselves on Locke.73 These are mighty spirits who have seized the proper lever to set John Bull into motion.74

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false

Not until the nineteenth century did liberals develop a conception of individual rights broad enough and consistent enough to constitute a clear rejection of classical republicanism. Even British Whigs had emphasized "the rights of the people" against the monarch, rather than individual rights against the majority. Having inherited this outlook, American Revolutionaries believed that the people possessed the right to speak against the king, but denied that individuals had the right to slander the representatives of the people, as the Tories soon discovered. **Even the Bill of Rights, which Antifederalists sought in order to limit the powers of the Federal government, was as much a states'-rights document as a protector of individual rights.** Modern individualism developed very slowly.16

To have highlighted the distinction between the ancient and the modern philosophers – between the modern theory of natural rights and the classical doctrine of natural law from which it derived – **would not only have threatened**

unity during the Revolutionary era, since some patriots adhered more closely to one doctrine than to the other, but would also have forced the founders to confront contradictions in their own beliefs. **In the early days of the republic the founders' attraction to liberalism grew. But they neither relinquished their attachment to classical republicanism nor noted the logical problems posed by their attempt to live in both intellectual worlds simultaneously.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0004

He is the zealot of a sect. We are searchers after truth. He wishes to have the question settled. We wish to have it sifted first. **The querulous manner in which we have been blamed for attacking Mr. Mill's system, and propounding no system of our own, reminds us of the horror with which that shallow dogmatist, Epicurus, the worst parts of whose nonsense the Utilitarians have attempted to revive, shrank from the keen and searching scepticism of the second Academy.**

https://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/mill/auto/auto.c02.html

My father, educated in the creed of Scotch presbyterianism, had by his own studies and reflections been early led to reject not only the belief in revelation, but the foundations of what is commonly called Natural Religion.
...

The Sabaean, or Manichaean theory of a Good and Evil Principle, struggling against each other for the government of the universe, he would not have equally condemned; and I have heard him express surprise, that no one revived it in our time. He would have regarded it as a mere hypothesis; but he would have ascribed to it no depraving influence. As it was, his aversion to religion, in the sense usually attached to the term, was of the same kind with that of Lucretius: he regarded it with the feelings due not to a mere mental delusion, but to a great moral evil. He looked upon it as the greatest enemy of morality: first, by setting up factitious excellencies,---belief in creeds, devotional feelings, and ceremonies, not connected with the good of human kind,---and causing these to be accepted as substitutes for genuine virtues: but above all, by radically vitiating the standard of morals; making it consist in doing the will of a being, on whom it lavishes indeed all the phrases of adulation, but whom in sober truth it depicts as eminently hateful. **I have a hundred times heard him say, that all ages and nations have represented their gods as wicked, in a constantly increasing progression, that mankind have gone on adding trait after trait till they reached the most perfect conception of wickedness which the human mind can devise, and have called this God, and prostrated themselves before it.** This *ne plus ultra* of wickedness he considered to be embodied in what is commonly presented to mankind as the creed of Christianity.
...

I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, of one who has, not thrown off religious belief, but never had it: I grew up in a negative state with regard to it. **I looked upon the modern exactly as I did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned me.** It did not seem to me more strange that English people should believe what I did not, than that the men I read of in Herodotus should have done so.
...

My father's moral convictions, wholly dissevered from religion, were very much of the character of those of the Greek Philosophers; and were delivered with the force and decision which characterized all that came from him. Even at the very early age at which I read with him the Memorabilia of Xenophon, I imbibed from that work and from his comments a deep respect for the character of Socrates; who stood in my mind as a model of ideal excellence: and I well remember how my father at that time impressed upon me the lesson of the "Choice of Hercules."
...

In his views of life he partook of the character of the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the Cynic, not in the modern but the ancient sense of the word. In his personal qualities the Stoic predominated. His standard of morals was Epicurean, inasmuch as it was utilitarian, taking as the exclusive test of right and wrong, the tendency of actions to produce pleasure or pain. **But he had (and this was the Cynic element) scarcely any belief in pleasure;** at least in his later years, of which alone, on this point, I can speak confidently. **He was not insensible to pleasures; but he deemed very few of them worth the price which, at least in the present state of society, must be paid for them.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mill-john-stuart/1863/utility/ch02.htm

To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure – no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit – they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to

whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. **I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included.** But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/70/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Thus Epicurean morality was never considered very high as a completed ethical system, and had to be supplemented from the arsenal of Stoicism in order to suggest that 'enjoyment' was, after all, an enjoyment of higher things, like friendship, tolerance, and serenity. This thesis is hard to sustain because for the Lucretians there can be no higher or lower attitude, only pragmatically adopted conventions as for the skeptics too, or a resigned acceptance of conventions as for the Stoics.** The neo-Lucretian Clément Rosset praises the atomism of Hobbes for rejecting nature whether in physics or in human products. Hobbes's Leviathan is precisely the product of a convention, a drastic substitute for an impossible morality. **The Epicurean is thus driven to subscribe to the Stoic or skeptic morality, and to find ethical behavior in what Professor Feibleman calls a 'flexibility of belief':** a balancing of attachment with non-attachment, practising active non-interference, maintaining half-beliefs, exercising standpointlessness, and reasoning from an unknown god.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q&f=false

Commerce posed a similar threat to public-spiritedness. By accustoming its practitioners to dickering and haggling, it endangered a mean-spirited and selfish individualism inconsistent with the wholehearted commitment to the common good which the *pólis*, as a brotherhood of warriors, demanded.
...

Commercial societies, despite the veneer of bourgeois propriety which they display, are predicated on an emancipation of greed. Over time, they tend to substitute contractual relations – what Thomas Carlyle called "the cash nexus" – for every human tie.132 Of course, acquisitiveness does generate a utilitarian morality all its own.
...

The habit of honesty, and the expectation that it will be reciprocated, link the merchant with his suppliers and with his customers: he assumes that they will abide by their contracts and pay their bills, but he does so only because it is in their interest to sustain their own credit and because he can ultimately depend on their dread of punishment as a guarantee. He does not look for generosity from his fellows, and in the course of hammering out deals, he rarely encounters it. **Except (if he is fortunate) within the bosom of his immediate family, his is a life governed by self-interest, by caution, and by distrust. The businessman's anxious hunger for money and his sense of propriety mask a more fundamental and less respectable passion – the love of mere life.** As one Greek writer of the late fifth century has occasion to note, most men hold possessions and money dear (*philochrēmatoúsin*) because of the things that cast them into fright: things like disease, old age, and the losses caused by fire; things like the deaths of animals and of members of the household – as well as other misfortunes.134 **If the tradesman craves lucre and supports law and order, it is only because he senses that both are a hedge against death. As Madison acknowledged, the foundation of liberal theory and practice is "the great principle of self-preservation."**135
...

To grasp Aristotle's point, we must keep in mind that it is camaraderie which links the citizen-soldier with his fellows. **When he is in danger, he expects them to risk their lives to come to his aid, and he knows that the greatest obstacle to their support is that very fear of violent death which sustains the minimal decency at home in the autonomous marketplace of the liberal polity.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. **It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment".** It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, **for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.**

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/40/mode/2up?view=theater

The assertion of atomic simplicity was actually a purposeful destruction of the "lure" of believing that "apparent" complexity has a divine source. As Epicurus realized, wonder (the kind of wonder that borders on religious awe) springs naturally from the realization that the thing before us is so complex and well ordered that it must be part of a divine conspiracy of order. **To counter this natural awe – indeed, to redefine it as *un*natural – Epicurus posited the eternal, simple atom to numb such wonder at its very root.**

http://www.quebecoislibre.org/05/050415-14.htm

On page 147 of *Human Action*, Ludwig von Mises writes:

> The historical role of the theory of the division of labor as elaborated by British political economy from Hume to Ricardo consisted in the complete demolition of all metaphysical doctrines concerning the origin and the operation of social cooperation. **It consummated the spiritual, moral and intellectual emancipation of mankind inaugurated by the philosophy of Epicureanism.**

...

And although a lot of attention has been devoted to the influence of Aristotle, Aquinas, the Scholastics, the French liberals and others on Austrian ideas, as far as I know, nobody has ever paid attention to Epicurus.
...

To me, Epicureanism is the closest thing to a libertarian philosophy that you can find in Antiquity. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, were all statists to various degrees, glorified political involvement, and devised political programs for their audiences of rich and well-connected aristocrats. Epicurus focused on the individual search for happiness, counselled not to get involved in politics because of the personal trouble it brings, and thought that politics was irrelevant. His school included women and slaves. **He had no political program to offer and one can find no concept of collective virtues or order or justice in his teachings.** On the contrary, the search for happiness implied that individuals should be as free as possible to plan their lives.
...

The section of *Human Action* in which you find the quote I read at the beginning is called, "A Critique of the Holistic and Metaphysical View of Society." In it, Mises denounces all the nonrationalist, nonutilitarian and nonliberal social doctrines which, he says, "must beget wars and civil wars until one of the adversaries is annihilated or subdued."

As most of you probably know, Mises included natural law traditions in these non-scientific doctrines, a crucial point over which Rothbard and many of his followers who are here present disagreed with him. He embraced a utilitarian view instead, for which "Law and legality, the moral code and social institutions are no longer revered as unfathomable decrees of Heaven. They are of human origin, and the only yardstick that must be applied to them is that of expediency with regard to human welfare."
...

Reading the first pages of *Human Action* is like reading an Epicurean treatise. Mises explains in the section "The Prerequisites of Human Action" that "We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action. [...] The incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would have no incentive to change things." He adds a reference here to John Locke who, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, uses the same type of language. Two pages on, Mises mentions Epicurean ataraxia and again defends Epicurus against the attacks of **"The theological, mystical and other schools of a heteronomous ethic" which, he writes, "did not shake the core of Epicureanism because they could not raise any other objection than its neglect of the 'higher' and 'nobler' pleasures."**

http://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2012/01/lucretian-liberalism-ancient-modern.html

That Epicurean philosophy supports modern classical liberalism is also suggested by Leo Strauss. **In his book *Liberalism: Ancient & Modern*, the central chapter and the longest chapter is his "Notes on Lucretius," thus implying that the Epicureanism of Lucretius anticipates modern liberalism.** Strauss was famous for stressing the "quarrel between the ancients and the moderns." But in the Preface of this book, Strauss noted the modernity of ancient Epicureanism:

> The most extensive discussion is devoted to Lucretius' poem. **In that poem, not to say in Epicureanism generally, premodern thought seems to come closer to modern thought than anywhere else. No premodern writer seems to have been as deeply moved as Lucretius was by the thought that nothing lovable is eternal or sempiternal or deathless, or that the eternal is not lovable.** Apart from this, it may suffice here to refer to Kant's presentation of Epicureanism as identical with the spirit of modern natural science prior to the subjection of that science to the critique of pure reason. (viii)

…

And yet, Strauss worries about the sadness of this Epicurean teaching--that the world that we love is not eternal, because every world is mortal within the eternal universe of atoms in motion. He identifies this as "the most terrible truth" (85, 100, 135).

…

Here is where Strauss and the Straussians depart from Lucretian Epicurean science. Following the Nietzsche of his early and late writings, they look to a new religion--perhaps even an atheistic religiosity--that will hide the "deadly truth" of modern science, and especially Darwinian science. **They thus reject the Epicurean and Darwinian liberalism of Nietzsche's middle writings--*Human, All Too Human* and *Dawn.*** Strauss implied this in his essay on *Beyond Good and Evil* by emphasizing the importance of Nietzsche's affirmation of "the eternal basic text of *Homo natura*": **Strauss and Nietzsche long for eternity rather than evolution.**

---

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/#CritNormCompMPS

An early remark of Nietzsche's suggests his answer:

> **Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on the way to turning mankind into *sand*? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand!** Is that your ideal, you heralds of the sympathetic affections? (D 174)

In a later work, Nietzsche says – referring to hedonists and utilitarians—that, **"Well-being as you understand it—that is no goal, that seems to us an *end*, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible…"** (BGE 225).

> https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/72/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **THERE ARE MORE WAYS TO DESTROY THE HUMAN RACE THAN reducing it to a pile of smoldering corpses, and John Stuart Mill championed one of the most drab, utilitarianism.** Even so sympathetic a scholar of Mill as Max Lerner felt compelled to say of *Utilitarianism* that Mill's "little book … leaves a trace of dust in the mouth."1 For the unsympathetic, *Utilitarianism* leaves considerably more than a trace, perhaps enough to fill one's shoes and socks as well. Yet no one can gainsay the enormous influence that Mill's "little book" has had.
>
> Perhaps something should be said of Mill's life so we can get an idea about where some of the dust came from. **Mill's father, James, was a social reformer in the very worst sense, a man who, having been liberated from the "irrationalities" of faith, believed with immoderate intensity that the entire destiny and happiness of humanity rested upon his own efforts.** A very dangerous man indeed.
> …
>
> Mill, however, was too short-sighted to see it. He could not envision, for example, the most likely outcome of utilitarianism: that it would lead to a society addicted to ever more intense, barbaric, and self-destructive pleasures, **and that its members would be gibbering cowards in the face of even the smallest pains.** Nor does he imagine that there might exist souls in a utilitarian society who long for something greater, something more noble, something truly more god-like than spending their days maximizing the physical pleasures of the multitude. Such a soul would soon boil over in contempt and vicious rebellion.

https://archive.org/details/scientificorigin0000gasm/page/82/mode/2up?view=theater

In place of individual and natural rights and the competition and movement of free and equal individuals, Haeckel stressed the importance of the bonds of community and the mutual obligation of every individual to society.5

> 5. **Haeckel never really explained how it was theoretically possible for a [human] society to exist, based on mutual harmony and cooperation, if at the same time the basic law of life was the struggle for existence. The two ideas are obviously in contradiction. When it suited him, Haeckel referred to the universality of struggle and on the other hand, when it was**

> **convenient he spoke of the need for national harmony and unity.** At no time did he give any indication that he was aware of a discrepancy in his thinking. In reality, what Haeckel desired was the harmonious cooperation of those individuals within the state, whose survival had already been determined by eugenic selection. **All remaining antagonisms would have to be directed outward, away from Germany,** thus providing a theoretical justification for imperialism. When stressing national unity the struggle for existence could be accounted for solely as a conflict between nations leaving the individual free to subordinate himself to the national state.

...

'**The biologic (sic!) relation of the cells to the tissues and organs' of lower organisms is the** '**same as that which exists among the higher animals between the individuals and the community of which they are component parts.** Each cell, though autonomous, is subordinated to the body as a whole; in the same way in the societies of bees, ants, and termites, in the vertebrate herds and the human state, each individual is subordinate to the social body of which he is a member.'7

> "***Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.***"—Edward Abbey

...

To a large extent the tone of the argument was set by the Vice-President of the Monist League, Dr. Johannes Unold, **[1860-1935]** who, in a number of books and in the pages of the journals of the League, warned that all of the 'democratic illusions'9 of the past had to be dispelled. **'In place,' he wrote, 'of the natural right fiction of free and equal individuals,' one had to recognize the 'true nature of man.'**10 Men were not only social animals but 'predatory' ones as well and within society there was to be found a 'natural inequality of differently talented personalities.'11 Monism, therefore, could not allow itself to be 'deluded' by the 'phrases and illusions'12 of liberalism. The 'sharp sense of reality'13 which Monism possessed revealed the limitations of liberal democracy. 'Brutal reality has awakened us from the pretty dreams of good, free, equal, and happy people.'14 Rightly considered, **reality demonstrates that 'unlimited freedom leads to ... a lack of regard for the minority and the progressive deterioration of the majority.'**15

This sweeping criticism of democracy and liberalism was not confined to the writings of Dr. Unold. Professor Heinrich Ziegler, for example, a co-founder of the Monist League, and for a time a colleague of Haeckel, also considered liberalism, equality, and democracy harmful philosophies of political organization. 'Many sociologists,' Ziegler wrote, 'proceed from the idea that men are equal by nature. But day to day experience shows that the doctrine of the equality of men is not correct.'16 **The idea of human equality was an erroneous theory of the Enlightenment philosophers** and unfortunately, Ziegler lamented, 'this false theory is still in operation in our own time.'17

...

For Haeckelian Monism, democracy had to fail because of the basic irresponsibility of the masses, who, it was insisted, are more conscious of their physical needs than of higher and more desirable spiritual matters.27 **The masses are lazy and are 'always finding' their 'greatest happiness in the least amount of work and in the most amount of enjoyment.'**28 They are incapable of independent and responsible political judgment and generally 'listen more readily to promises and flattery than to proposals **which demand difficult performance of duty, self-discipline, renunciation of present pleasures in favor of the future,** and respect for others and for the whole [of society].'29

...

The masses 'think only of their personal advantage and not of the far-off future and so there would always be the danger that in the pursuit of their closest interests – real or imagined – they would neglect to consider the good of the state.'31

...

The Monists, therefore, under the guidance of Haeckel, sought to awaken the Germans to the demands of biology and to the danger of physical decline. **The arguments which they advanced in support of their objectives in this matter were strongly conservative and frequently puritanical to the point of ludicrousness. The Vice-President of the Monist League, Dr. Unold, warned, for example, in a series of feverishly written tracts that 'many talented civilizations have faltered by degeneration through the pursuit of pleasure.'**57 And almost every Monist author warned of the dangers of alcohol and of illicit sexual relations.58 Consumption of alcohol, they averred, over and over again, had to be prohibited, and sexual activity and behavior very severely controlled. **'Of what help to a people,' Dr. Unold cried out, 'are all economic, technical accomplishments and progress when its members, in exorbitant egotistical intoxication with life and enjoyment lose interest in the future of their own nation and sentence themselves to die out and bring about racial suicide by underplaying physical fitness.' The pursuit of pleasure, that is, the consumption of alcohol and involvement in illicit sexual relations, weakens the 'force of life in the coming generation and renders it increasingly unfit in the struggle for existence.'**59 And in the same way in which he criticized liberalism for political disruptiveness, so too did Dr. Unold hold it responsible for

the threatening biological decay of Germany. He equated liberalism with ‘libertinism’ and strongly objected to a philosophy which taught that ‘that which pleases is permissible.’ **Dr. Unold singled out August Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, for especially harsh criticism because of his alleged opinion that sexual conduct should be left to the free choice of the individual.** Unold was alarmed that Bebel did not seem to be ‘aware’ of the fact that the ‘survival of nations and of humanity itself was dependent upon the regulation of sexual needs’ and that he did not understand that ‘uncontrolled freedom and desire will lead to impotence and death.’ Dr. Unold even found that pornography was the fruit of liberal civilization. **He thus self-righteously proclaimed that ‘a person who takes a stand against sexually stimulating and scandalous literature which poisons the [minds] of young people through the frivolous use of art, is also setting himself against the liberal principles.’**60
...

To be sure, one of the principal planks in the platform of the Monist League called for the emancipation of women, but this was increasingly understood by the right-wing leadership of the League in a novel way.
...

If a woman, they complained, is ‘free to disregard the marriage obligations of reproduction there did exist the possibility that she would desire to have no children at all or only one or two.’ The full emancipation of women, therefore, based upon exact equality of the sexes, could lead to ‘racial death.’91
...

And despite all the talk about emancipation, these Monists went even so far as to maintain that there had to be a return to the ‘old-fashioned’ point of view which held that the highest obligation of the woman was to her family and that no social or professional obligation could be given priority over family life.92 In the evolutionary state, it was prophesied, motherhood would be honored and glorified. **Birth control would be prohibited.**

https://carolynyeager.net/himmlers-speech-ss-leaders-homosexuality

The attitude about the inferiority of women is a typical Christian attitude, and we also who have been national socialists up to this day – many even who are strict heathens – have unwittingly adopted this set of ideas.

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardNeuordnungUnseresDenkens194044S.ScanFraktur_201708/page/n9/mode/2up?view=theater

Der Mensch läßt sich nicht in Retorten hersteilen. Vor das Geheimnis von der Entstehung des Lebens hat Gott einen Schleier gebreitet, den Menschenhand niemals hinwegziehen wird, mag der Mensch auch die Lebensvorgänge selber bis in alle Einzelheiten erforschen. Diese Verwehrung in die letzte Erkenntnis vom Ursprung des Lebens selbst ist ein Grundgesetz des menschlichen Lebens schlechthin und ein Teil der Ordnung des Daseins, wie sie Gott in diese Welt gesetzt hat.

Es gibt heute viele Menschen, die solche Fragen über Wert und Verlust blutswertlicher Erbanlagen nicht bis zum Ende durchdenken wollen. Sie sagen: **Wir erfinden doch so viel, es geht doch auf allen Gebieten so herrlich vorwärts, warum soll es da nicht auch einmal einem Genie gelingen, im chemischen Laboratorium „Erbanlagen“ zu erfinden, wie man ja auch Flugzeugen und Eisenbahnen, Telephon und Radioapparate erfunden hat!** Wer solches fragt, vergißt, daß wir unendlich viel erfinden können, was die *stofflichen* Güter dieser Welt anbetrifft, aber das Geheimnis des Lebens zu entdecken, ist uns verwehrt. Unsere Sprache sagt uns übrigens auch, daß wir nur „entdecken“ oder „erfinden“, was irgendwie schon vorher da war, denn einmal „decken wir es auf ‘ und das andere Mal „finden wir es“; es ist also schon da, uns bisher nur noch nicht bekannt und wird von uns nicht erst geschaffen. Unsere großen Naturwissenschaftler, unsere Physiker und Chemiker wissen das auch ganz genau. **Hier sind uns Grenzen gezogen, die wir Menschen nicht zu überschreiten vermögen.**

Das ist eine Tatsache, mit der wir uns eben abfinden müssen. Wir mögen uns noch so sehr an allen Erfindungen begeistern und uns am technischen Fortschritt der Zeit berauschen. **In den Fragen des Blutes, soweit wir menschliche Erbeigenschaften darunter verstehen, hört aller Fortschrittstaumel auf.** In den Fragen des Blutes gilt nur das Gegebene, das uns von Gott zu treuen Händen überantwortete Erbgut unserer Vorfahren.

Der einzige und wahre Reichtum unseres Volkes ist sein gutes Blut. **Die stofflichen Güter dieser Welt können wir als Volk und als Einzelne verlieren;** das ist nicht weiter schlimm, solange noch das alte deutsche Blut vorhanden ist, weil dieses sie jederzeit wiedererschaffen kann.

https://archive.org/details/winningofwest04roos/page/24/mode/2up?view=theater

Even a strong race, in its prime, and given the task at the right moment, usually fails to perform it; for at the moment the immense importance of the opportunity is hardly ever understood, **while the selfish interests of the individual and the generation are opposed to the interest of the race as a whole.** Only the most far-seeing and high-minded statesmen can grasp the real weight, from the race-standpoint, of the possibilities which to the men of their day seem so trivial. The conquest and settlement rarely take place save under seldom-occurring conditions which happen to bring about identity of interest between the individual and the race.
...

Few indeed are the men who can look a score of years into the future, and fewer still those who will make great sacrifices for the real, not the fancied, good of their children's children; **but in questions of race supremacy the look-ahead should be for centuries rather than decades,** and the self-sacrifice of the individual must be for the good not of the next generation but perchance of the fourth or fifth in line of descent.
...

The British had no far-reaching design to prevent the spread and growth of the English-speaking people on the American continent. They cared nothing, one way or the other, for that spread and growth, **and it is unlikely that they wasted a moment's thought on the ultimate future of the race.** All that they desired was to preserve the very valuable fur-trade of the region round the Great Lakes for their own benefit.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2612/pg2612-images.html#linknoteref-444
>
> The English sickened and died by hundreds. Even those who were not smitten by the pestilence were unnerved and dejected, **and, instead of putting forth the energy which is the heritage of our race, awaited their fate with the helpless apathy of Asiatics.** It was in vain that Schomberg tried to teach them to improve their habitations, and to cover the wet earth on which they lay with a thick carpet of fern. **Exertion had become more dreadful to them than death.** It was not to be expected that men who would not help themselves should help each other.

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/religion-and-mythology/26747-how-and-why-liberal-christianity-promotes-open-borders-and-one-worldism?p=830577#post830577

But then again, since I only get this one go-round at consciousness before the hungry spark I call my “self” drops like a match into a toilet, **why should I trouble myself with the dreary business of reproduction? My DNA may be selfish, but so am “I.”** If it’s so bloody determined to replicate itself, it had better rejigger my neurons to offer me a better set of hedonic rewards for taking the effort to do its bidding. So far, no sale.
...

I’ve even read that my dinner companion treasures an interest in the mating habits, hierarchical behavior, and grooming preferences of one particular sub-group of the human species—the Caucasoids. It seems that “Derbyshire” shares a tiny bit more DNA in common with this mating pool, and prefers the way they organize their troop. **So he spends part of his dwindling time beneath the sun consumed with fear that this subspecies might dwindle in size, perhaps even lose their dominance over food sources and habitat to different, more aggressive subspecies with higher birthrates.** Well, each man to his hobby.

Perhaps if I’d fed my reptilian brain its rat, and fathered brats, I’d give in to instinctual worry about their fate. I’d fear that they would find uncongenial the new troop organization imposed by the alien subspecies, and I’d spend my precious resources trying to smooth their way in the world. **Except that then I’d remember I’ll soon enough be dead, and never find out what happened to these self-serving half-copies of me.** Let them negotiate their own dominance patterns with the faster-breeding primates, and survive if they are fit.

http://www.racerealist.com/yockey_2.htm

It is but natural that the economically more astute individuals accumulate most of the mobile wealth into their hands. **They do not however, if they are true Liberals, want authority with this wealth,** for authority has two aspects: power, and responsibility.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2853/pg2853-images.html#link2HCH0048

> Petronius had the following on his lips: “Make me pretorian prefect, I will deliver Tigellinus to the people, and pacify the city in a day.” **But his innate slothfulness prevailed.** To be prefect meant to bear on his shoulder’s Cæsar’s person and also thousands of public affairs. And why should he perform that labor?

http://elkorg-projects.blogspot.com/2005/12/savitri-devi-cyclic-view-of-history.html

> Modern man is more of a moral coward. He wants the advantages of violent intolerance – which is only natural – but he shuns the responsibility of it.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_176

167. All religions are, in the end, based upon certain physical assumptions, which are already in existence and adapt the religions to their needs: for example, in Christianity, the contrast between body and soul, the unlimited importance of the earth as the "world," the marvellous occurrences in nature. If once the opposite views gain the mastery—for instance, a strict law of nature, the helplessness and superfluousness of all gods, the strict conception of the soul as a bodily process—all is over. **But all Greek culture is based upon such views.**
...

Now all these bases, the mythical and the politico-social, have changed; our alleged culture has no stability, because it has been erected upon insecure conditions and opinions which are even now almost ready to collapse.—**When we thoroughly grasp Greek culture, then, we see that it is all over with it.** The philologist is thus a great sceptic in the present conditions of our culture and training: that is his mission.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/109

The appearance of the Christian god, as the record god up to this time, has for that very reason brought equally into the world the record amount of guilt consciousness. Granted that we have gradually started on the *reverse* movement, there is no little probability in the deduction, based on the continuous decay in the belief in the Christian god, **to the effect that there also already exists a considerable decay in the human consciousness of owing (ought); in fact, we cannot shut our eyes to the prospect of the complete and eventual triumph of atheism freeing mankind from all this feeling of obligation to their origin, their *causa prima*.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yang_Zhu

The philosophies attributed to Yang Zhu, as presented in Liezi, clash with the primarily Daoist influence of the rest of the work. Of particular note is his recognition of self-preservation (*weiwo* □□), which has led him to be credited with "the discovery of the body".[4] In comparison with other Chinese philosophical giants, Yang Zhu has recently faded into relative obscurity, but his influence in his own time was so widespread that **Mencius (□□) described his philosophies along with the antithetical ideas of Mozi (□□) as "floods and wild animals that ravage the land".[5]**

According to Mencius, “Yang’s principle is, ‘Each for himself’ – which does not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign. Mo's principle is, ‘To love all equally’ – which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father. To acknowledge neither king nor father is to be in the state of the beast. If their principles are not stopped, and the principles of Confucius set forth, their perverse speaking will delude the people, and stop up the path of benevolence and righteousness”.[6]

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Eternal_Revolution_p6.html

> Darwinism can be used to back up two mad moralities, but it cannot be used to back up a single sane one. **The kinship and competition of all living creatures can be used as a reason for being insanely cruel or insanely sentimental;** but not for a healthy love of animals. On the evolutionary basis you may be inhumane, or you may be absurdly humane; but you cannot be human. **That you and a tiger are one may be a reason for being tender to a tiger. Or it may be a reason for being as cruel as the tiger.**

Yang Chu's Discovery of the Body on JSTOR

In his own time Yang Chu (fl. ca. 370-350 B.C.) was regarded as a revolutionary thinker. Mencius considered Yang’s doctrine to be one of the deadliest of the sophistries with which he was forced to contend: “The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the land.”1 According to A.C. Graham, “[Yang’s] intervention provoked a metaphysical crisis which threatened the basic assumptions of Confucianism and Mohism and set them in new courses.”2

Unfortunately, little solid information about Yang Chu remains; we know his thought only from a handful of anecdotes and quotations, all from hostile sources, together with a few later writings which thought to be derived from his. (This should probably come as no surprise: in ancient China, books were most often compiled

by state ministries of culture, **and Yang's antistate teaching was probably one of the main targets of the Ch'in dynasty burning of the books.**)
…

Aloysius Chang believes that the well-attested material about Yang consists of only four items:

1. "Each for himself" (*wei wo*).
2. "Preserve life, maintain the real, don't get entangled with things."
3. He would not sacrifice a hair from his leg in in order to profit the whole empire (or "in order to *gain* the whole empire" – a different interpretation of the Chinese).
4. He would not serve in the army, nor would he remain in a besieged city.3

…

During the Warring States period the relationship between the individual and the state was being redefined, simultaneously producing a new political order and a new sense of self. By providing a new physical definition of human nature, **Yang Chu freed the Chinese elite from the public ritual roles (and, to a lesser extent, from the clan identifications and traditional obligations to the spirits) that had up to that time dominated and defined them.** By treating public honors, court ceremonial, and feudal relationships as external conditions, he struck at the heart of the traditional ritual order defended by the Confucians. Simultaneously, **he made possible new, nonpublic, nonritual forms of individual self-awareness and self-cultivation that were sharply different from the Confucian and traditional forms.**

https://warpweftandway.com/teaching-yang-zhu/

For Yang Chu, this whole public world was external and null, more likely a hindrance than a help. He ignored all public identification and found value only in the private world. His rejection of the ritual world can be thought of in part as a response to the corruption of public life lamented by Confucius, but his goal was not to rectify the public rituals but to avoid them. **In this corrupted world, splendid ceremonials still dominated public life, but they had been stripped of their ethical content and ritual meaning and were merely entertainments–and risky ones at that.** Because of this loss of meaning and because of the risks (dismemberment and death) involved in the new order, Yang Chu's rejection of public life and dedication to self-cultivation, originally a bold minority position, became widely persuasive.
…

Even his supposed refusal to sacrifice a hair from his leg to benefit the empire can be seen to be a transformation of a legend about the altruistic cultural hero Yu, who labored so diligently for the public good that he wore all the hairs from his thighs. Our version of Yang's refusal comes from hostile sources, but with the help of variants of the Yu legend we can guess at the original Yangist story: in many versions of the legend of Yu, Yu not only wore the hairs from his legs but also made himself lame, and in all versions he went for several years without seeing his family. **The Yangist version of the story must have contrasted the good family man Yang Chu to the masochistic, inhuman altruist Yu (representing the Mohists.)**
…

Yang Chu's doctrine was solidly founded on Chinese traditions of family piety older than Confucius. Traditional Chinese religion was a religion of life, fertility, and nurture. Sacrifices were thought of as food returned to the spirits in gratitude for the fruits of the earth, and long life, health, and descendants were the blessings prayed for by the devout. (One of the *Odes* prays for "the fullness of life," *mi sheng*, in language that prefigures Yangism.) To the ancient Chinese, a man's body (or life) was not his own, but belonged to his parents and ancestors. It was his offering to them, and was impure if blemished or mutilated in any way. Since war, with all its perils, was always one of the main avenues to high position, and since mutilation was the customary punishment for failures even in civilian service, **there was an inescapable tension between a man's duty to his ancestors and his duty to the State.**

https://www.academia.edu/10513801/Yangzhus_Guiji_Yangsheng_and_Its_Modern_Relevance

Guocheng Jiao gives a detail examination on how Yangzhu challenged Mohist doctrines,

> Against Modi's idea of sacrificing oneself to die in order to offer an equal and universal love to others, Yangzhu insisted that one should treasure oneself; as opposed to Modi's idea of the promotion of selflessness with morality being the first principle, Yangzhu suggested that one should avoid to tie oneself up to any external burdens; **as opposed to Modi's appeal to ghosts for ensuring one's good performance in social and political services, Yangzhu enhanced the idea of getting rid of the fears of ghosts to ensure one's spirit is at peace and one's nature intact;** as opposed to Modi's challenge on fate by believing that such a challenge would lead to an artificial effort for an external conquering, Yangzhu enhanced a natural attitude toward life. (Guocheng Jiao 1989)5

More features of Yangzhu Yangsheng philosophy were revealed from Yangzhu's challenge to Confucianism. He was against Confucian benevolent moralism where sacrifice of one's personal interests

for the benefits of family and state were at the centre of personal moral cultivation, Yangzhu enhanced an idea of “guiji” in order to encourage everybody to take care of themselves. Yang believed that if only everybody focused merely on taking care of themselves rather than others, the whole world could be in peace:

> **Po-ch’eng-Tze-kao would not benefit others at the cost of one hair; he renounced his state and retired to plough the fields. The great Yü did not keep even his own body for his own benefit; he worked to drain the flood until one side of his body was paralysed. A man of ancient times, if he had benefited the Empire by the loss of one hair, could not [he] have given it; and if everything in the Empire had been offered to him alone, would not [he] have taken it. <u>When no one would lose a hair, and no one would benefit the Empire, the Empire was in good order.</u>** (Graham 1990)6

Against Confucian moral ideal of “qijia” (□□, *harmonizing the family*), “zhiguo” (□□, *managing/regulating the state*), and “pingtianxia” (□□□, *bringing peace to the world*), **Yangzhu suggested individual should pay full attention to treasure their own lives and not put their lives into potential dangers by neither entering a besieged city (buruweicheng, □□□□) nor holding service at the army (buchujunlü, □□□□).**7 He was opposed to the Confucian use of conventional values as a tool to pursue longevity, riches, fame, and honor. Yangzhu insisted that one should not allow oneself to be tied to material things (buyiwuleixing, □□□□□).8 Yangzhu questioned the value of fame and honor in comparison to life: “If anybody cares for one’s own blame or praise so much by torturing his spirit and body, **he will struggle for a name lasting some hundred years after his death. Can the halo of glory revive his dried bones, or give it back the joy of living**” (Anton Forke 2012)?9

…

It is clear that neither the Mohist “universal love” (*jian’ai*, □□) based on the principle of equality and reciprocation, nor Confucian “graded love” (*ren’ai*, □□) based on filial piety and benevolence, is akin to Yangzhu’s “guiji,” a “self love” based on the natural principle indorsed by heaven and earth. **Unlike Mohist “universal love” which takes social and state’s interests as priority, or Confucian “graded love” that takes family interests as priority, Yangzhu’s “self love” is intended to be related to one’s own physical pleasure and mental happiness to give self a supreme position that surpasses the interests of both the family and the state** by separating “ji” from family and state and giving oneself an independent position of priority. Yangzhu makes himself and his doctrine stand out from the mainstream of Chinese tradition.13

> 13. **As a culture that is derived from agriculture background, Chinese culture has a tradition of emphasis on family and society from far antiquity. <u>Confucius had made a great change by shifting human’s focus from one’s clan to one’s family and from filial piety to one’s dead clan ancestor to one’s living parents</u>** (Yanxia Zhao, *Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity*, Sussex Academic Press, 2007, p. 21), **however, both himself and his followers never had intention to separate oneself from his family and society. It was Yangzhu who made self become an independent entity separated from both clan and society.**

The structure of Yangzhu’s “guiji” Yangsheng Philosophy is very clear: “ji” as an independent self entity distinguished from both family and society is right at the centre of Yangzhu’s nourishing life philosophy. This means, nourishing life is to adhere to one’s true self.

> Yen-Ping-Chung asked Kuan-Yi-Wu to cherish life. Kuan-Yi-Wu replied: “It suffices to give it its free course, neither checking nor obstructing it.” Yen-Ping-Chung said: “And as to details?” Kuan-Yi-Wu replied: **“Allow the ear to hear what it likes, the eye to see what it likes, the noses to smell what it likes, the mouth to say what it likes, the body to enjoy the comforts it likes to have, and the mind to do what it likes.”** (Anton Forke 2012)14

…

We can now conclude that “guiji” (*treasure oneself*) is not equal to “weiwo” (*for oneself*) at all.22 **When Mencius uses “weiwo” to replace “guiji” to mark Yangzhu’s doctrine, it is clear that he is deliberately putting a selfish cap onto the head of Yangzhu’s tradition.** From my viewpoint, Yangzhu’s “guiji” philosophy is not only a philosophy of “weiwo” (*for one’s own benefits*), but actually a philosophy of “feiwo” (□□, *deny self*) in terms of persuading individuals to give up their social profitable pursuits and encourage them to cut themselves off from all external attachments, including familial, social, and political profits, as well as one’s economical and moral interests. This idea has been inherited and developed by Zhuangzi in his story of “wusangwo” (□□□, *I abandon myself*), and the “wo” that Zhuangzi intended to depart from or throw away, according to Anxian Luo, is the socialized external self and the reason why one should abandon this secular and socialized “wo,” is for returning to one’s true internal self.23

…

Max Weber declares that the traditional Chinese lacks “inward care” and lived by a process of “adjustment to the outside,” so in such a society, “an individual’s place and ‘self’ are not defined by

nature but one’s social standing or relationships with others” (Max Weber 1964).69 **This statement is simply not true in the case of Yangzhu.**
…

Different from the traditional Cartesian concept of “self” as a thinking that is differentiated from the body,71 Yangzhu’s “ji” never “cut off from its relationship to the body” (Anthony Kenny 1988)72 but rather regarded physical life as an integrated part of “ji” that needs to be satisfied and taken care of.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/ycgp/ycgp13.htm

"All these four sages, while alive, had not one day's pleasure, and after their death a reputation lasting many years.

"Yet reputation cannot bring back reality.

"**You praise them and they do not know it, and you honour them and they are not aware of it. There is now no distinction between them and a clod of earth.**
…

"**These two villains while alive took delight in following their own inclination and desires, and after death were called fools and tyrants. Yet reality is nothing that can be given by reputation.**

"Ignorant of censure and unconscious of praise, they differed in no respect from the stump of a tree or a clod of earth.

"The four sages, though objects of admiration, were troubled up to their very end, and were equally and alike doomed to die.

"The two villains, though detested and hated by many, remained in high spirits up to the very end, and they too were equally doomed to die."

https://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/ycgp/ycgp17.htm

YANG CHU said:

"There are four things which do not allow people to rest:

"Long life. Reputation. Rank. Riches.

"**Those who have them fear ghosts, fear men, power, and punishment.** They are always fugitives. Whether they are killed or live they regulate their lives by externals.
…

"There is an old proverb which says:

"Without marriage and an official career a man would be free from half of his yearnings.

"**If men could do without clothes and food there would be no more kings or subjects.**"

https://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/ycgp/ycgp002.htm

To the capital of Liang, in the State of Wei, came all the philosophers, just as they came to Athens. **Here came Mencius, perhaps one of the greatest of the exponents of Confucianism, a veritable St. Paul of the Confucian movement, and the chief opponent of Yang Chu.** Here came Chuang-Tzŭ, most subtle among the Taoist sophists, Li Kuei the great statesman and law-giver, Hsün-tzŭ the philosopher of the doctrine of original evil, Wênt-zu the able follower of Lao-tzŭ, **and Mo-Ti the apostle of brotherly love, whose name is frequently bracketed with Yang Chu in condemnation by Mencius.**
…

"His teaching is quite detestable." says Dr. Legge, and elsewhere he refers to him as the "least-erected spirit who ever professed to reason concerning the duties of life and man." Balfour in his *Oriental Studies* speaks of "the irreproachable Kuan Chung, who is made to utter the most atrocious doctrines," **and it is doubtful if anybody who has a preconceived or inherited basis of morality or dogma will cease to agree with the two opinions quoted above**. For them the tower of philosophy from whence through many windows strangely tinted, opaque or clear, the philosophers view the world as a small thing viewed with interest and careful detachment, must ever seem something a little aloof, a little repellent. About all philosophy there lingers the haunting sense of the coldness, the

dispassion of the philosopher. Marcus Aurelius will always, to most men, seem a little less than perfectly human, Socrates a little more than the perfect doctrinaire. **The world will always turn for guidance to the idealists like Christ and Buddha rather than to the philosophers like Epictetus and Kanada.** The garden of Epicurus has faded from the minds of men. The garden of Gethsemane will for ever remain like a picture engraved deeply in their hearts.

Unlike the poet, the philosopher has no country. And seldom is this so clearly to be seen as in the fragment of Yang Chu, that contains the essence of his philosophy. Elaborated and subtilised, it forms the basis for the Epicurean philosophy in Greece; **in the calm summit of its indifference it attains the ultimate perfection of the ego realised many centuries later by Max Stirner, and is akin in some respects to the Charvaka philosophy in India, while lacking the harsh note of combative scepticism which leaves the Indian doctrine less a philosophy than a rebellion in thought.**

Both philosophies press upon men the importance of happiness during life, but while to Yang Chu the study and cultivation of the senses are all, Brihaspati is content to leave the expression of pleasure in a formula at once singularly empty, and tinged with the indifference and cynicism of one to whom the subject is really of little moment.

> While life remains let a man live happily. **Let him feed on ghee, though he runs in debt.** When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?

The larger view of the Chinese philosopher in reality transcends the philosophy of Brihaspati by that quality of attention to and intense feeling for life, which in some respects brings him closer to Epicurus, his truer Western prototype, though he accepts no basis of semi-moral self-interest for life, postulates no far-living philosophic deities, and gives to man the solitary satisfaction of his senses, and that only for the brief space of his lifetime.
…

"He who regards as common property a body appertaining to the universe and the things of the universe is a perfect man," says Yang Chu. And this sense of the oneness and freedom of nature is so distinctly true to Taoist teaching that one hesitates to accept the apparent complete antagonism between the two teachings. **The doctrine of universal theft from nature is a purely Taoist doctrine, where all things in nature are common property and all things are stolen.** We steal our very existence from nature, says Lieh Tzu. Such thefts are unconscious thefts.
…

So he evolves a philosophy of life quite logical and quite unmoral, in which all life and all expression of life are centred in the senses, where the cultivation of the senses is the primary law and the gratification of them by the simplest means the ultimate object. Here at any rate, whatever we may dimly suspect, is no metaphysical subtlety. The theory is set before us so plainly, so uncompromisingly, that there is no loophole for escape. **Even Epicurus is weak-kneed beside the calmly smiling sage of Liang.** Here is no philosophic minister to the senses, no subtle qualification. Pleasure is an actual thing, no mere negative phantom. All forms of pleasures are swept into his net. Nothing is bad, nothing is evil.

> "*Allow the ear to hear what it likes, the eye to see what it likes, the nose to smell what what likes, the mouth to say what it likes, the body to enjoy the comforts it likes to have, and the mind to do what it likes.*"

The careful study and cultivation of the senses is the true basis of egoistical philosophy, and it is logically unassailable. It is the basis, if not of much modern thought, at least of a great deal of modern action, and gathers impetus from its reiterated demand from all classes for a fuller, more complete individual expression.
…

The philosopher does not say how this happy condition of life is to be brought about. To him it was possibly a corollary to the discovery of the uselessness of wealth for the purpose of happiness. There is no taint or suspicion of socialism or any tyranny limiting or defining the action of individuals; on the contrary his philosophy is purely individualist and non-authoritarian. **He visualises quite clearly a kind of golden age, a fabulous pre-existing period in the history of the world, where strife for useless power and useless domination and useless fame did not exist, where a full knowledge of the importance of living so brief a life as happily as possible alone guided the actions of men.** In speaking of this period and contrasting it with the later period in which strife and domination and wealth had reduced men to the unhappy condition of manacled slaves, he says:

> "The Ancients knew that all creatures enter but for a short while into life and must suddenly depart in death. Therefore they gave way to their impulses and did not check their natural propensities.

> "They denied themselves nothing that could give pleasure to their bodies; consequently, as they were not seeking fame but were following their own nature, they went smoothly on, never at variance with their own inclinations.
>
> **"They did not seek for posthumous fame. They never did anything criminal, and of glory and fame, rank and position, as well as of the span of their life, they took no heed."**

He was essentially the philosopher of true egoism as opposed to the false egoism under which at his time the world laboured and suffered—**the egoism that oversteps the limits of the true care and cultivation of self and persists, for quite selfish and vain and frequently petty motives, in assuming the care and control of others,** and imposing upon them terms of slavery and hardship, terms that limit and ultimately destroy all individuality, and reduce men to the level of driven and unwilling slaves.

A recent writer [Oscar Wilde] who lent for a brief space a certain dignity to British letters has pointed out, quite truly, that "Selfishness is not living as one wishes to live, it is asking others to live as one wishes to live. And unselfishness is letting other people's lives alone, not interfering with them."

With this selfishness, which is simply the product of a stupid and unreasonable vanity, true egoism has nothing whatever in common. True egoism is essentially unselfish. It suffices for the true egoist to live his own life. Others he will help and assist when help or assistance is required.

So, in the words of Yang Chu:

> "*We may give the feverish rest, satiety to the hungry, warmth to the cold and assistance to the miserable,*"

but for ourselves we must be content to live our own lives, to discover for ourselves the ultimate method of expression for which our lives and natures are suited.
…

On the question of self-sacrifice the philosopher is quite clear. Life of itself is of no importance, save to the liver, and that only for the brief space of his existence. By self-sacrifice there is nothing to be gained, save perhaps a little fame, and if this be at the expense and to the detriment of personality, it is a wrong thing to do. From kindness of heart and a real desire to relieve suffering a man may dispose of and give away those things which are not absolutely essential to his existence. But to himself his life must be sacred. **To spoil one's life for the sake of fame, or because is is considered a splendid thing to do, is to commit a wrong against one's self.** And it is equally wrong that one should be expected to do so. If the world requires this ultimate self-sacrifice, then the world is wrong and the condition of things that calls for this self-sacrifice is wrong. In a chapter devoted to quite clear exposition of this view, a chapter which for its dispassionate contempt of obvious and accepted views has been most singled out for especial condemnation, Yang Chu takes the extreme case of the sage against the universe, and the greater part of the chapter is taken up with a justification of this extreme point of view.

> **"If the ancients," says the philosopher, referring to the golden age of his ideal, "by injuring a single hair could have rendered a service to the world they would not have done it, and had the universe been offered to a single person he would not have accepted it.**
>
> "As nobody would damage a single hair and nobody would do a favour to the world, the world was in a perfect state."

To the philosopher self-sacrifice is simply the corollary of a wrong and unbalanced condition of life. In a community where neither fame nor self-glorification at the expense of others is desired, self-sacrifice would not exist. It would be unnecessary.

Where all are happy and all are contented, there would be no need of either self-sacrifice or self-aggrandisement. That is a simple truth, and if, by the adoption of a false and selfish egoism and a false and equally selfish racial egoism, humanity has reached a point where self-sacrifice has become a good or desirable thing, the fault really lies with the vanity and ignorance that have led humanity to this point, and have ultimately justified a code of morals philosophically unreasonable and unnecessary.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charvaka#Mughal_era

Ain-i-Akbari, a record of the Mughal Emperor Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence[77] (also see Sen 2005, pp. 288–289).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=WjhbAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA218#v=onepage&q&f=false

Chárvaka, after whom this school is named, was an unenlightened Bráhman. Its followers are called by the Bráhmans, *Nástikas* or Nihilists. They recognise no existence apart from the four elements, nor any source of perception save through the five organs of sense. They do not believe in a God nor in immaterial substances, and affirm faculty of thought to result from the equilibrium of the aggregate elements. **Paradise, they regard as a state in which man lives as he chooses, free from the control of another, and hell the state in which he lives subject to another's rule.** The whole end of man, they say, is comprised in four things: the amassing of wealth, women, fame and good deeds. **They admit only of such sciences as tend to the promotion of external order, that is, a knowledge of just administration and benevolent government.** They are somewhat analogous to the sophists in their views and have written many works in reproach of others, which rather serve as lasting memorials of their own ignorance.

> https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
>
> **Military service is dangerous and one is subordinate to others.** Public speaking is full of agitation and nervousness as to whether one can convince. **Why then do we pursue an occupation like this, which is under control of others?**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n281/mode/2up?view=theater

These ancient themes might not have harassed Augustus; **what made Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid really disagreeable to a government that was finding it hard to enlist recruits for the army was the persuasive anti-militarism of this love-loose set. Tibullus laughs at warriors who forage for death when they might have been seducing women. He mourns for the age of Saturn,** when, he imagines,

> there were no armies, no hatred, and no war. ... There was no war when men drank from wooden cups. ... Give me but love, and let others go to war. ... The hero is he whom, when his children have been begotten, old age overtakes in his humble cottage. He follows his sheep, his son follows the lambs, while the good wife heats the water for his weary limbs. So let me live till the white hairs glisten on my head, and I tell in my old man's fashion of the days gone by.[71]

…

To please his patron and his prince Propertius now and then plucked his lyre in praise of war; but to his mistress Cynthia he sang another tune: "Why should I raise sons for Parthian triumphs? No child of ours shall be a soldier."[73] **Not all the martial glory in the world, he assured her, could equal one night with Cynthia.[74]**

…

[Ovid] married twice in early manhood, was twice divorced, and then grazed for a time in public pastures. **"Let the past please others," he sang; "I congratulate myself on being born into this age, whose morals are so congenial to my own."[76]** He laughed at the *Aeneid,* and merely concluded from it that since the son of Venus had founded Rome, it should, if only out of piety, become the city of love.[77]

…

These poems were tolerantly received by Roman society four years after the passing of the Julian reform laws. Great Senatorial families like the Fabii, the Corvini, the Pomponii continued to entertain Ovid in their homes. Buoyant with success, the poet issued a manual of seduction called *Ars amatoria* (2 B.C.). "I have been appointed by Venus," he says, "as tutor to tender love."[86] **He chastely warns readers that his precepts must be applied only to courtesans and slaves;** but his pictures of whispered confidences, secret assignations, billets-doux, raillery and wit, deceived husbands, and resourceful handmaids suggest the middle and upper classes of Rome.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr07.htm#an_fr_107_1

The Garden was not only a philosophical school; it was also a sort of retreat or religious community. There lived there not only philosophers like Mêtrodôrus, Colôtes, Hermarchus, and others; there were slaves, like Mysis, and free women, like Themista, the wife of Leonteus, to both of whom the Master, as the extant fragments testify, wrote letters of intimate friendship. **And not only free women, but women with names that show that they were slaves, Leontion, Nikidion, Mammarion. They were *hetairae*; perhaps victims of war, like many of the unfortunate heroines in the New Comedy; free women from conquered cities, who had been sold in the slave market or reduced to misery as refugees, and to whom now the Garden afforded a true and spiritual refuge. For, almost as much as Diogenes, Epicurus had obliterated the stamp on the conventional**

currency. The values of the world no longer held good after you had passed the wicket gate of the Garden, and spoken with the Deliverer.

https://archive.org/details/tusculandisputat00cicerich/page/242/mode/2up?view=theater

Depending on these dreams, not only Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Hermarchus declaimed against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, **but that little harlot Leontium presumed to write against Theophrastus:** indeed, she had a neat Attic style; but yet, to think of her arguing against Theophrastus! **So much did the garden of Epicurus[97] abound with these liberties, [tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae]** and, indeed, you are always complaining against them.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/17C*.html#ref357
>
> The Cyrenaeans who became famous were **Aristippus the Socratic philosopher, who also laid the foundations of the Cyrenaïc philosophy; and his daughter, Aretê by name, who succeeded him as head of the school; and again her son Aristippus, Aretê's successor, who was called Mêtrodidactus;[358]** and Anniceris, who is reputed to have revised the doctrines of the Cyrenaïc sect and to have introduced in place of it those of the Annicerian sect.

Lucretius' Venus and Stoic Zeus on JSTOR

A long-standing problem of Lucretian scholarship is: **why does Lucretius begin his poem on Epicurean physics by invoking the goddess Venus as ruler of nature, and ask her to assist him in the composition of his verses and to give peace to the Romans,** when he and every other Epicurean believed that the gods have no concern whatsoever with this or any other world?
…

I shall argue in this paper that Lucretius was influenced by the contemporary Stoic view of Zeus to fashion an Epicurean divinity, Venus, who would take the place of Stoic Zeus as well as any other ruling deity. Venus, I suggest, was conceived in part as an allegorical rival to Stoic Zeus: she stands for pleasure and a world ordered by its own spontaneous impulses, as opposed to Stoic Zeus who stands for divine might and a world bound by an inexorable divine will. As a rival to Stoic Zeus, moreover, Venus offers a challenge to all religious and philosophical systems that would impose divine tyranny upon the world. Thus, while Venus is a poetic creation that has been shaped by many influences quite apart from Stoicism, it is only when we see her as a creation set within a contemporary philosophical context, in which the Stoics proposed Zeus as the all-mighty ruler of the world, that we have a sufficient explanation why Lucretius would depart so far from Epicurean orthodoxy as to resort to an all-mighty ruling goddess to introduce a poem designed to expel the gods from this world.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/66/mode/2up?view=theater

Before tackling the subject of the nature of sexuality, [Lucretius] reminded the reader **that in *no* case are any of our bodily organs created for a purpose – that would mean that we were intelligently designed. “That is a vice in such things that you should vehemently desire to escape and [you ought] to avoid [such] an error with dreadful apprehension.”**13

Since our bodily organs are not designed, we cannot read any moral purpose from our physical sexual constitution. Given that we human beings (and everything else, for that matter) are an accidental result of the random motions of atoms over time, **it is only accidental as well that sexual passion happens to be linked to procreation (and hence to marriage).** The gods certainly do not link the two, since they are not creators. It follows that there is no necessity that *we* link the two. We are not surprised, then, that Lucretius gave some very modern advice to men: **“Ejaculate the liquid collected in the body and do not retain it.”**14
…

But the normal goal of love poetry is singing the praises of the beloved to the heavens, and that is precisely what both Epicurus and Lucretius wanted us to avoid. In doing so, **Epicurean asceticism set itself dead against the greatest love poems of all times – among them, Plato’s *Phaedrus*, *The Song of Songs*, and Dante’s *Divine Comedy* – which all happily link earthly sexual desire and love to the desire for immortality and the divine.**
…

The desire for immortality and to be as divine-like as possible are for Aristotle the actual desires behind all procreation, even on the level of a plant, let alone the level of the rational animal, human being. The parents receive kind of natural immortality through the lives of their children who continue after the natural death of the parents. **But this desire for natural immortality would, for Lucretius, be a danger, because it would not only disturb one’s tranquillity by entanglement in the family (and thereby in the larger affairs of the greater political whole), but kindle the unnatural desire for one’s own immortality after death.**16

...

And so it is by accident (both locally and cosmically) that a male and female happen to meet in the forest, and since sexual desire and procreation are likewise linked only by accident and not divine intention, there is no unnatural sexual desire; therefore, it could just as well be a male and male, or female and female, or other combinations too sickening to suggest (although, as we shall see in a later chapter, **even these will be affirmed with gusto by the unabashed modern Epicurean Alfred Kinsey**).
...

For some reason (not all that clear in Lucretius) the parents desire to watch over and protect their offspring. Soon enough, "Venus has weakened manly strength," and the original Epicurean freedom of primitive man has been traded for the softer common life of the family. With this common life comes the origin of all law, for the separate families make a compact (*foedus*) among themselves not to harm one another.17 From this social compact, all morality evolves.

In Lucretius's account, then, **society was purely artificial, cemented by a merely negative agreement,** and all later laws, rather than being reflections of some natural or eternal law, are rooted in what each particular society has found to be useful.

https://ia803106.us.archive.org/27/items/OnPain/On%20Pain.pdf

When one considers pain's penetration into the realm of procreation, one cannot forget the assault on the unborn, **which typifies the simultaneously weak and bestial character of the Last Man. To be sure, a mind incapable of differentiating between war and murder or crime and disease will definitely select in territorial struggles *the* safest and most pitiful method of killing.**

Rob Ludden-Joyer on X: 1. **Abortion/Contraception lead people to feel a post-modern detachment from LINEAGE. It's just a bundle of cells. What is really important is you being you and like, participating in economy and living your best life. Whatever.**

2. **Now that people are detached from the idea of lineage, and especially if they participate in abortion in some way, they will feel EXTREME COGNITIVE DISSONANCE to take up any position which upholds the idea of importance of LINEAGE.**

3. Now that everyone used to the idea that LINEAGE is arbitrary then this opens up idea that well, then, citizenship, nationality, identity, must also be arbitrary.

4. Abortion/Contraception percolates for a decade in the 1970s and then in 1980's mega-immigration begins in earnest. **You can't criticize mega immigration without basically arguing that LINEAGE is sacred fire. If LINEAGE is sacred fire, then everyone in 1970's is basically guilty of baby-genocide. Who wants to admit that or even think about it. Easier to say RACIST! and actually let's INCREASE immigration.**

https://news.gab.com/2023/11/abortion-is-the-sacrament-of-trashworld/

Consumerist, managerial, liberal society requires all of humanity to be deracinated, stripped of particular, historic ways of life, and every single person reduced to bare individuals. The order that God created for humanity, to have marriage, family, and children, the very necessities for a civilization to function and perpetuate itself is now a consumer lifestyle choice, among a myriad of others. There is no marriage as nearly all of human existence has known it. Now it is merely a legal compact for two adults to live and share property together, to be dissolved whenever there is no longer mutual consent.

Abortion allows women to be unshackled from their *telos,* their divinely-ordained, unique purpose—to bear and rear children. Now, they can be bare economic units consuming whatever they produce, and free to pursue whatever way of life they desire, even to become "men." **The basis of our entire society is the freedom to become whatever you want, created realities be damned.** You don't want to be uniquely bestowed with the power to bring new human life into the world? Then we can kill that life whenever it is created in your body.

Abortion is the sacrament of this total freedom and atomized individualism. It is the barbaric ritual-killing, blood must be shed so you can be free to enjoy brunch and swiping right. **The entirety of American society, and especially what the American views as its highest good, requires abortion be held sacrosanct.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diogenes_of_Oenoanda

"He was a remarkable man and a cosmopolitan man," says Hammerstaedt, commenting upon a quote from Smith's translation of a passage in which Diogenes declares that he set up the inscription: **"Not least for those who are called foreigners, for they are not foreigners. For, while the various segments of the Earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire Earth, and a single home, the world."** [Archaeology Magazine, August 2015 "In Search of A Philosophers Stone"]

https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

Fr. 3

[And I wanted to refute those who accuse natural science of being unable to be of any benefit to us.] In this way, [citizens], even though I am not engaging in public affairs, I say these things through the inscription just as if I were taking action, **and in an endeavour to prove that what benefits our nature, namely freedom from disturbance, is identical for one and all.**

And so, having described the second reason for the inscription, I now go on to mention my mission and to explain its character and nature.

Having already reached the sunset of my life (being almost on the verge of departure from the world on account of old age), I wanted, before being overtaken by death, **to compose a [fine] anthem [to celebrate the] fullness [of pleasure] and so to help now those who are well-constituted.** Now, if only one person or two or three or four or five or six or any larger number you choose, sir, provided that it is not very large, were in a bad predicament, I should address them individually and do all in my power to give them the best advice. But, as I have said before, the majority of people suffer from a common disease, as in a plague, with their false notions about things, and their number is increasing (for in mutual emulation they catch the disease from one another, like sheep) **moreover, [it is] right to help [also] generations to come (for they too belong to us, though they are still unborn) and, besides, love of humanity prompts us to aid also the foreigners who come here. Now, since the remedies of the inscription reach a larger number of people, I wished to use this stoa to advertise publicly the [medicines] that bring salvation.** These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.

Fr. 2

... [observing that most people suffer from false notions about things and do not listen to the body] when it brings important and just [accusations] against the soul, alleging that it is unwarrantably mauled and maltreated by the soul and dragged to things which are not necessary **(in fact, the wants of the body are small and easy to obtain—and the soul too can live well by sharing in their enjoyment—while those of the soul are both great and difficult to obtain and, besides being of no benefit to our nature, actually involve dangers).** So (to reiterate what I was saying) **observing that these people are in this predicament, I bewailed their behaviour and wept over the wasting of their lives, and I considered it the responsibility of a good man to give [benevolent] assistance, to the utmost of one's ability, to those of them who are well-constituted.** [This] is the first reason [for the inscription].

I declare that the [vain] fear of [death and that] of the [gods grip many] of us, [and that] joy [of real value is generated not by theatres] and [...and] baths [and perfumes] and ointments, **[which we] have left to the masses, [but by natural science...]**
…

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», **I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.**
…

[So we shall not achieve wisdom universally], since not all are capable of it. But if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass to men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. As for the necessities derived from agriculture, since we shall have no slaves at that time (for indeed [we ourselves shall plough] and dig and tend [the plants] and [divert] rivers and watch over [the crops), we shall] ... such things as ... not ... time ..., and such activities, [in

accordance with what is] needful, will interrupt the continuity of the [shared] study of philosophy; for [the] farming operations [will provide what our] nature wants.
…

[I am confident, as I address the inscription to you,] my friends, [that many will become healthy in soul. Why do I say this]? What in the world are [the remedies]? The [inscription], dearest friends, [will afford help both] to us [ourselves] and [to others; **for I produced it for the benefit of my fellow-citizens; and] I produced [it] above all [from a desire to help our descendants], in case [they should walk up and down this stoa, as well as showing myself benevolent towards those strangers among us [who are well constituted].**

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

Or, to put it another way, as Bentham and the Mills were all atheists, they could not rely upon such a theistic foundation for morality. They had to invent something to take its place. This is trickier than it might sound at first, especially for these three because they were comfortable atheists. **That is, they wanted all the moral benefits of Christianity, except without the Christianity part. They were the kind of self-assured chaps (so common in the nineteenth century) who took the fruits of centuries of Christian moral formation for granted even as they cheerfully chopped down the tree that had borne them.** In consequence, they foolishly thought that because many Englishmen were generally solid and decent folk, moral solidity and decency could be counted on as standard equipment of human nature, and the whole religion thing could be thrown overboard as distracting nonsense. They made the entirely unforgivable assumption we have seen already in Rousseau: that there really is no such thing as original sin.

http://anglicanhistory.org/england/jnfiggis/defects1917/13.html

Before we come to that, let us clear away some of the fog that obscures clear thinking on the relation between Christianity and war. For it is obscured. **Much sentiment is now prevailing to the effect that all war as such is wrong. This is not Christianity, it is nothing but Tolstoyism. Tolstoyism with its over-emphasis on mere passivity has led by reaction to Nietzschean ethics, with their apotheosis of savagery.** Yet many people seem to take it for granted (1) that war is the worst of human evils; (2) that all war is wrong, and that no Christian approves any given war except through hypocrisy. I do not believe either of these propositions, and I will say why.

The first of these, the notion that war is the supreme evil, rests on a view of the world which is ultimately materialism. **Suffering and death are the worst of calamities only on a voluptuary theory of the universe.** The vogue of Christian Science is another instance of a tendency now widespread. If this life be all, doubtless the achievement of ends at the cost of death is more than foolish in the individual, and barely defensible in the State. War, doubtless, causes more obvious and acute physical pain than any other social institution. If, therefore, we are to avoid pain either for ourselves or others, and to avoid it at all costs, no nation would be justified in making war, unless by so doing it made it less probable for a long future. **Such a doctrine is assumed too readily to be Christian.** So far from being Christian, it is the very opposite of the religion of the Cross, which bids us save our life by losing it. It is also opposed to the doctrine of courage in its most ordinary and human tense; and this doctrine is after all only Christianity in embryo.

https://www.newoxfordreview.org/documents/the-christian-the-epicurean/

But the lines of demarcation are blurred by those numerous nominal Christians who are really Epicureans in the Lamb's clothing. **Liberal Christians use the language of love and compassion to advance the sexual license of the Epicurean. Or they use Christ's words against judging others to advance the cause of abortion.** Or they draw from Christ's suffering the Epicurean lesson that suffering is not redemptive but simply evil, and is to, be avoided by suicide and euthanasia. Furthermore, by making God so merciful that we needn't fear His justice, and by consigning Hell to the realm of myth, they duplicate the effect of Epicurus's position. **These are the Liberal Christians, and though the Christian and the Epicurean inhabit different universes, they may be sitting side by side Sunday morning in the same pew.**

https://www.ellopos.net/politics/kalomoiros-papacy.asp?pg=2

It would be naiveté, therefore, if one were to believe that the pacifist disposition that characterizes humanity today proceeds from love. **These words about love are hypocrisy and self-deception. This desire for peace proceeds from loss of ideals, from fear, and from love of comfort. It is the desire to be left in peace to enjoy the good things of this earth. It is the conventional co-operation for acquisition of goods which each person separately would not be able to acquire.** It is a universal understanding upon something which has become the passion of the whole earth: sensualism and materialism. It is a product of necessity.

The peace of which the world speaks is an unconditional capitulation of everything good and sacred and great, and the dominance of pettiness, mediocrity, and lukewarmness. It is the blotting out of the personality of individuals and of peoples. It is a marmalade of compromises and calculations, a sea of hypocrisy, indifference for truth, betrayal of everything holy and sacred.

http://4umi.com/nietzsche/zarathustra/0

And thus spake Zarathustra unto the people:

It is time for man to fix his goal. It is time for man to plant the germ of his highest hope.

Still is his soil rich enough for it. **But that soil will one day be poor and exhausted, and no lofty tree will any longer be able to grow thereon.**

Alas! there cometh the time when man will no longer launch the arrow of his longing beyond man—and the string of his bow will have unlearned to whizz!

I tell you: **one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star.** I tell you: ye have still chaos in you.

Alas! There cometh the time when man will no longer give birth to any star. Alas! **There cometh the time of the most despicable man, who can no longer despise himself.**

Lo! I show you the last man.

“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?”—so asketh the last man and blinketh.

The earth hath then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. His species is ineradicable like that of the ground-flea; the last man liveth longest.

“We have discovered happiness”—say the last men, and blink thereby.

They have left the regions where it is hard to live; for they need warmth. One still loveth one's neighbour and rubbeth against him; for one needeth warmth.

Turning ill and being distrustful, they consider sinful: they walk warily. He is a fool who still stumbleth over stones or men!

A little poison now and then: that maketh pleasant dreams. And much poison at last for a pleasant death.

One still worketh, for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime should hurt one.

One no longer becometh poor or rich; both are too burdensome. Who still wanteth to rule? Who still wanteth to obey? Both are too burdensome.

No shepherd, and one herd! Everyone wanteth the same; everyone is equal: he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the madhouse.

“Formerly all the world was insane,”—say the subtlest of them, and blink thereby.

They are clever and know all that hath happened: so there is no end to their raillery. People still fall out, but are soon reconciled—otherwise it spoileth their stomachs.

They have their little pleasures for the day, and their little pleasures for the night, but they have a regard for health.

“We have discovered happiness,”—say the last men, and blink thereby.—

And here ended the first discourse of Zarathustra, which is also called ‘The Prologue’, for at this point the shouting and mirth of the multitude interrupted him. **“Give us this last man, O Zarathustra,”—they called out**—“make us into these last men! Then will we make thee a present of the Superman!” And all the people exulted and smacked their lips.

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n387/mode/2up?view=theater

Zeno came to Athens about 450, perhaps with Parmenides, and set the impressionable city astir by his skill in reducing any kind of philosophical theory to absurd consequences. Timon of Phlius described

> The two-edged tongue of mighty Zeno, who,
> Say what one would, would argue it untrue.[8]

This pre-Socratic gadfly was (in the relative sense which our ignorance of the past compels us to give to such phrases) the father of logic, as Parmenides was for Europe the father of metaphysics. Socrates, who denounced Zeno's dialectical method,[9] imitated it so zealously that men had to kill him in order to have peace of mind. **Zeno's influence upon the skeptical Sophists was decisive, and in the end it was his skepticism that triumphed in Pyrrho and Carneades.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#cite_ref-47

Aristotle says that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic, as Empedocles was of rhetoric.
…

In all other respects Zeno was a gallant man; **and in particular he despised the great no less than Heraclitus.** For example, his native place, the Phocaean colony, once known as Hyele and afterwards as Elea, a city of moderate size, skilled in nothing but to rear brave men, **he preferred before all the splendour of Athens, hardly paying the Athenians a visit, but living all his life at home.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ct9K-x61CH0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA86#v=onepage&q&f=false

'I know that I know nothing' is not attributed to Socrates by Plato, Xenophon or Aristotle. This non-reflexive sceptical dictum is first known to have been fathered on Socrates by Arcesilaus, i.e. well into the third century BC, in the same breath in which Arcesilaus himself opted for the reflexive alternative.109

> 109. Cic. *Ac.* 1.12: *itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset*. See further, Long (1988b), pp. 157-9, for **Arcesilaus' role in inventing the sceptical Socrates.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IV#Crates

21. Crates, whose father was Antigenes, was an Athenian belonging to the deme of Thria. He was a pupil and at the same time a favourite of Polemo, whom he succeeded in the headship of the school. The two were so much attached to each other that they not only shared the same pursuits in life but grew more and more alike to their latest breath, and, dying, shared the same tomb.
…

22. Hence Arcesilaus, who had quitted Theophrastus and gone over to their school, said of them that **they were gods or a remnant of the Golden Age.**
…

According to Antigonus, their common table was in the house of Crantor; and these two and Arcesilaus lived in harmony together. Arcesilaus and Crantor shared the same house, while Polemo and Crates lived with Lysicles, one of the citizens. Crates, as already stated, was the favourite of Polemo and Arcesilaus of Crantor.

23. According to Apollodorus in the third book of his *Chronology*, Crates at his death left behind him works, some of a philosophical kind, others on comedy, others again speeches delivered in the assembly or when he was envoy. **He also left distinguished pupils; among them Arcesilaus, of whom we shall speak presently – for he was also a pupil of Crates; another was Bion of Borysthenes, who was afterwards known as the Theodorean, from the school which he joined;** of him too we shall have occasion to speak next after Arcesilaus.

https://www.academia.edu/6410739/The_fragments_of_Numenius_of_Apamea

'In the time of Speusippus (Plato's nephew) and Xenocrates (who followed him) and Polemo (who took on the school after Xenocrates), the doctrinal character of the school remained pretty constant – **at least to the extent that the much-trumpeted *'suspension of judgement'* and all the rest of it still lay in the future;** for in fact they did drop some beliefs, distorted others, and did not remain with what was originally passed down to them. They started with Plato, but sooner or later diverged from him, whether through deliberate choice or ignorance – or, in some cases, for some other reason (perhaps not untainted by ambition?). I don't want to end up sniping just because of Xenocrates – but I do want to speak up for Plato. **For it pains me that they were not ready to do or suffer anything to maintain complete agreement with Plato in every way in all aspects of doctrine.**
…

Arcesilaus on the other hand took Theophrastus, the Platonist Crantor and Diodorus, with Pyrrho in addition. Crantor made him persuasive, Diodorus made him a sophist, and Pyrrho made him versatile, reckless, and elusive [lit.: nothing]. This is the origin of the insulting parody about him:

> Plato in front and Pyrrho behind, Diodorus between them. [cf. *Iliad* 6.181]

…

While still in the bloom of youth, his beauty led him to become boyfriend of the Academic Crantor. He joined Crantor; but there was a momentum to such natural talent as he had which his ambition made him eager to exploit, so he went to Diodorus, where he got those persuasive and elegant villainies of his, and also spent time with Pyrrho. **(Pyrrho got started on philosophy through Democritus somehow or other.) Having been trained here, he stayed true to the Pyrrhonian way of attacking everything, except he never called it that.** Anyway, Mnaseas and Philomelus and Timon, who were sceptics, called him a sceptic like them, since he too did away with truth and falsehood and plausibility.

'So he might have been called a Pyrrhonian, on the ground of his Pyrrhonian arguments, but out of respect for his lover he submitted to being called an Academic still. But he was a Pyrrhonian, except in name: he was no Academic, beyond being called one.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Timon

115. Asked once by Arcesilaus why he had come there from Thebes, he replied, **"Why, to laugh when I have you all in full view!"** Yet, while attacking Arcesilaus in his *Silli*, he has praised him in his work entitled the *Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus*.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IV#Arcesilaus

Lastly, he crossed over to the Academy and joined Crantor. For while his brother Moereas, who has already been mentioned, wanted to make him a rhetorician, he was himself devoted to philosophy, and Crantor, being enamoured of him, cited the line from the *Andromeda* of Euripides:[27]

> O maiden, if I save thee, wilt thou be grateful to me?

and was answered with the next line:[28]

> Take me, stranger, whether for maidservant or for wife.

30. After that they lived together.
…

On account of this Ariston said of him:

> **Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, midway Diodorus.**[32]

And Timon speaks of him thus:[33]

> Having the lead of Menedemus at his heart, he will run either to that mass of flesh, Pyrrho, or to Diodorus.

And a little farther on he introduces him as saying:

> I shall swim to Pyrrho and to crooked Diodorus.

…

Again, when some one of immodest life denied that one thing seemed to him greater than another, he rejoined, "Then six inches and ten inches are all the same to you?" There was a certain Hemon, a Chian, who, though ugly, fancied himself to be handsome, and always went about in fine clothes. He having propounded as his opinion that the wise man will never fall in love, Arcesilaus replied, "What, not with one so handsome as you and so handsomely dressed?"
…

He spent his time wholly in the Academy, shunning politics.

40. Once indeed, when at Athens, he stopped too long in the Piraeus, discussing themes, out of friendship for Hierocles, and for this he was censured by certain persons.[42] **He was very lavish, in short another Aristippus, and he was fond of dining well, but only with those who shared his**

tastes. He lived openly with Theodete and Phila, the Elean courtesans, and to those who censured him he quoted the maxims of Aristippus. He was also fond of boys and very susceptible. Hence he was accused by Ariston of Chios, the Stoic, and his followers, who called him a corrupter of youth and a shameless teacher of immorality. 41. He is said to have been particularly enamoured of Demetrius who sailed to Cyrene, and of Cleochares of Myrlea; of him the story is told that, when a band of revellers came to the door, he told them that for his part he was willing to admit them but that Cleochares would not let him. This same youth had amongst his admirers Democharesthe son of Laches, and Pythocles the son of Bugelus, and once when Arcesilaus had caught them, with great forbearance he ordered them off. **For all this he was assailed and ridiculed by the critics abovementioned, as a friend of the mob who courted popularity.**
…

43. Another pleasant story told of him is this. Some one had inquired why it was that pupils from all the other schools went over to Epicurus, but converts were never made from the Epicureans: **"Because men may become eunuchs, but a eunuch never becomes a man," was his answer.**

At last, being near his end, he left all his property to his brother Pylades, because, unknown to Moereas, he had taken him to Chios and thence brought him to Athens. **In all his life he never married nor had any children.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IV#Carneades

62. Carneades, the son of Epicomus or (according to Alexander in his *Successions of Philosophers*) of Philocomus, was a native of Cyrene. **He studied carefully the writings of the Stoics and particularly those of Chrysippus, and by combating these successfully he became so famous that he would often say:**

> **Without Chrysippus where should I have been?**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Fortuna_Alexandri*/1.html#ref28

And yet even Pythagoras wrote nothing at all, nor did Socrates, **nor Arcesilaus, nor Carneades,** who were all most notable among philosophers.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n689/mode/2up?view=theater

THREE strains merged in Greek philosophy: the physical, the metaphysical, and the ethical. **The physical culminated in Aristotle, the metaphysical in Plato, the ethical in Zeno of Citium.** The physical development ended in the separation of science from philosophy in Archimedes and Hipparchus; the metaphysical ended in the skepticism of Pyrrho and the later Academy; the ethical remained until Epicureanism and Stoicism were conquered or absorbed by Christianity.
…

Every hypothesis had been conceived, aired, and forgotten; the universe had preserved its secret, and men had grown weary of a search in which even the most brilliant minds had failed. Aristotle had agreed with Plato on only one point—the possibility of acquiring ultimate truth.[7] **Pyrrho voiced the suspicions of his time in suggesting that it was above all on this point that they had both been mistaken.**
…

By the irony of time it was the followers of Plato who carried forward this attack upon metaphysics. Arcesilaus, who became head of the "Middle Academy" in 269, transformed Plato's rejection of sense knowledge into a skepticism as complete as Pyrrho's, and probably under Pyrrho's influence.[10] "Nothing is certain," said Arcesilaus, "not even that."[11] When he was told that such a doctrine made life impossible he answered that life had long since learned to manage with probabilities. A century later a still more vigorous skeptic took charge of the "New Academy," and pressed the doctrine of universal doubt to the point of intellectual and moral nihilism. Carneades of Cyrene, coming to Athens like a Greek Abelard about 193, made life bitter for Chrysippus and his other teachers by arguing with galling subtlety against every doctrine that they taught.
…

He undertook to refute the materialistic realism of the Stoics by a **Platonic-Kantian critique of sensation and reason.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n119/mode/2up?view=theater

In 155 Athens sent as ambassadors to Rome the leaders of its three great philosophical schools: Carneades the Academic or Platonist, Critolaus the Peripatetic or Aristotelian, and Diogenes the Stoic of Seleucia. **Their coming was almost as strong a stimulus as Chrysoloras would bring to Italy in 1453.** Carneades spoke on eloquence so eloquently that the younger set came daily to hear him.[25] **He was a complete skeptic,**

doubted the existence of the gods, and argued that as good reasons could be given for doing injustice as for being just—a belated surrender of Plato to Thrasymachus.[26]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D358e

“That is excellent,” he said; “and now listen to what I said would be the first topic—the nature and origin of justice. By nature,[1] they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than the excess of good in doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the power [359a] to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and that this is the beginning of legislation and covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of the law the lawful and the just, and that **this is the genesis and essential nature of justice—a compromise between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent to get one's revenge.** Justice, they tell us, being mid-way between the two, is accepted and approved, [359b] not as a real good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, **since anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would never make a compact with anybody either to wrong nor to be wronged;** for he would be mad. The nature, then, of justice is this and such as this, Socrates, and such are the conditions in which it originates, according to the theory.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n435/mode/2up?view=theater

And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one trusts in his own strength, **a kind of compact is formed between the great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human imbecility. [non natura nec voluntas sed inbecillitas mater est]** For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we inflict and that we receive.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT509#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cudworth deliberately bulldozes the complexity out of the argument and gives the crudest possible example of its consequences. His account of the state of nature and the resulting form of government follows the argument in *De Cive*, but with the critical gloss that the theory makes justice and civil sovereignty to be **‘nothing but an *Ignoble* and *Bastardly Brat of Fear*; or else a *Lesser Evil*, submitted to, meerly out of *Necessity*; for the avoiding of a *Greater Evil*, that of War with every one, by reason of mens Natural *Imbecility*.’**76 Hobbes might claim that this theory is no older than his *De Cive*, **but Cudworth cuts him down to size by quoting Glaucon from Plato’s *Republic*, who develops a very similar argument.**

https://archive.org/details/worksralphcudwo02bircgoog/page/204/mode/2up?view=theater

But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; **that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion: for they who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle, or lose the horse.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/32271/pg32271-images.html

"Admitted. But after he had become King--as he could not fail to do, for a Theodoric could never be the servant of another--the Emperor Anastasius, your uncle Justinus, and, later, you yourself, acknowledged him and his kingdom."

"**That was under the pressure of necessity. Now that they are in need, and I the stronger, I revoke that acknowledgment.**"

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n307/mode/2up?view=theater

> 355. **"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong enough to be evil,"** said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2464/2464-h/2464-h.htm#link2H_4_0038

Arms having secured victory, and victory peace, **the buoyant vigor of the martial mind cannot be enfeebled by a more excusable indulgence than that of letters; nor can indolence, with any greater or more dangerous deceit, enter a well regulated community.** Cato was aware of this when the philosophers, Diogenes and Carneades, were sent ambassadors to the senate by the Athenians; for perceiving with what earnest admiration the Roman youth began to follow them, and knowing the evils that might result to his country from this specious idleness, he enacted that no philosopher should be allowed to enter Rome.

> https://archive.org/details/al-farabi-founder-of-islamic-neoplatonism_202107/page/15/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In conclusion, al-Fārābi does not exclude the possibility that certain nations might show some compassion for philosophy, **but those nations are overwhelmed by nations who have passed it in silence or prohibit it altogether.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n79/mode/2up?view=theater

134 **Things do not settle or endure out of their natural order.**

135 In view of the fact that the human race, as far back as memory of the world goes, has lived and still lives conformably in society, **this axiom alone decides the great dispute still waged by the best philosophers and moral theologians against Carneades the skeptic and Epicurus a dispute to which not even Grotius could put an end namely, whether law exists by nature, or whether man is naturally sociable, which comes to the same thing.**

> https://supervert.com/elibrary/marquis-de-sade/120-days-of-sodom
>
> If one were to raise the objection that, nevertheless, all men possess ideas of the just and the unjust which can only be the product of Nature, since these notions are found in every people and even amongst the uncivilized, the Duc would reply affirmatively, saying that yes, **those ideas have never been anything if not relative, that the stronger has always considered exceedingly just what the weaker regarded as flagrantly unjust, and that it takes no more than the mere reversal of their positions for each to be able to change his way of thinking too;** whence the Duc would conclude that nothing is really just but what makes for pleasure, and what is unjust is the cause of pain; that in taking a hundred louis from a man's pocket, he was doing something very just for himself, although the victim of the robbery might have to regard the action with another eye; **that all these notions therefore being very arbitrary, a fool he who would allow himself to become their thrall.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.189333/page/n209/mode/2up?view=theater

So far [the Newer Academy] stands nearly on a parallel with the older method of the sophists; except that, as may be conceived, the sophists made war more against the popular faith, Carneades and his disciples more against their philosophical colleagues.
...

In fact the very first *début* of philosophy on a great scale in Rome was a formal declaration of war against faith and morals. It was occasioned by the occupation of Oropus by the Athenians, a step which they commissioned three of the most esteemed professors of philosophy, including **Carneades the master of the modern sophistical school,** to justify before the senate (599/155). The selection was so far appropriate, as the utterly scandalous transaction defied any justification in common sense; **whereas it was quite in keeping with the circumstances of the case, when Carneades proved by thesis and counter-thesis that exactly as many and as cogent reasons might be adduced in praise of injustice as in praise of justice, and when he showed in the best logical form that with equal propriety the Athenians might be required to surrender Oropus and the Romans to confine themselves once more to their old straw huts on the Palatine.** The young men who were masters of the Greek language were attracted in crowds by the scandal as well as by the rapid and emphatic delivery of the celebrated man; **but on this occasion at least Cato could not be found fault with,** when he not only bluntly enough compared the dialectic arguments of the philosophers to the tedious dirges of the wailing-women, but also insisted on the senate dismissing **a man who understood the art of making right wrong and wrong right, and whose defence was in fact nothing but a shameless and almost insulting confession of wrong.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n429/mode/2up?view=theater

And I wish, as I am about to make use of the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[336] * * *[336] **Let it be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments, but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher, who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere wantonness of wit.**
…

In fact, this justice on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness.
…

In the next place, **he would see in Greece, as among ourselves, magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire universe.** But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this plea for war, **that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece, which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the eyes of their posterity.**

How many—such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians—have thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans and Ætolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedæmonians say that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were their own. **The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence, but not with justice.** You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to slavery.

X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions, manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations, but as they vary likewise in single cities—in this one of ours, for example—I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. **For instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present company—I mean Manilius—if you were to consult him relative to the legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force—an edict which was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently full of injustice with regard to women.** For why should a woman be disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law, while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337] * * *
…

The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice, but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice; and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.

Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the first of these characteristics to animals? **For not only men of moderate abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right to the same justice.** They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever.
…

But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to

forbear touching what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.
…

XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by means of the fecials, **and committing injustice with all legal formality,** always coveting and laying violent hands on the property of others, acquired the possession of the whole world.
…

XV. **This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men had established laws among themselves from considerations of advantage, varying them according to their different customs, and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but that there was no such thing as natural law;** that all men and all other animals are led to their own advantage by the guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice, or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would injure himself while consulting the interests of others. **And he added these arguments, <u>that all nations who were flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be just—that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to others—would have to return to their cottages, and to lie down in want and misery.</u>**

https://archive.org/details/remarksonfableb00lawgoog/page/n204/mode/2up?view=theater

THEN leave Complaints:
Fools only strive
To make a Great an Honest Hive.
T’ enjoy the World’s Conveniencies,
Be fam’d in War, yet live in Ease,
Without great Vices, is a vain
Eutopia seated in the Brain.
…

Bare Virtue can’t make Nations live
In Splendor; they that would revive
A Golden Age must be as free
For Acorns as for Honesty.

https://www.openculture.com/2017/02/13-rules-for-radicals.html

4. *“Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules.” If the rule is that every letter gets a reply, send 30,000 letters.* ***You can kill them with this because no one can possibly obey all of their own rules.***

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Bhe3PiGDOv8C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA86#v=onepage&q&f=false

A figure closer to Psellos’ Basil than Nikephoros Phokas is the Emperor Julian (ruled 361-363), a passionate enemy of Christianity, **<u>who also enjoyed making Christians live up to their own impossible principles.</u>** We mention briefly his controversial edict which prohibited Christians from teaching the Greek classics on the grounds that their professed religious beliefs were incompatible with the texts’ explicit polytheism.192 **According to the ecclesiastical historian Socrates (3.13), Julian also forbade Christians from being provincial governors, claiming that they were not allowed by their own faith to inflict capital punishment.** His concern for their salvation is doubtful.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page312

308. **Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimerical or absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his book *De Fato*) that Carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation of atoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefined indifference to the voluntary motions of souls,** because these motions have no need of an external cause, coming as they do from our nature. But M. Bayle (*Dictionary*, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly replies that all that which springs from the nature of a thing is determined: thus determination always remains, and Carneades' evasion is of no avail.
…

322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find at once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference, assuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought a reason. **Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easily deceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject, where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier to confuse matters, that is to say, from the body**

to the soul. For most philosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking the origin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of the soul itself. **That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so much fault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades, who is no less irrational.** I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was so clear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to the extent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this matter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were more capable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or cause, internal or external; **or as if the great principle which states that nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body.**

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html

The New Academy, founded by Carneades (214-128), who revised the radical scepticism of Arcesilaus, was philosophically the finest product of the Greek mind (A7), **and was concerned with elaborating what is now known as the scientific method and establishing a valid epistemology.** Its cold rationality and keen criticism thoroughly demolished the whole system of Stoicism, reducing it to the status of a religion. **Like all true scholars and scientists, the members of the New Academy regarded politics, even political philosophy, as rather vulgar and tedious, an interest in merely contemporary and ephemeral matters that are trivial in comparison with the eternal truths of nature and human history.**

> (A7. We must, however, note that Carneades' most famous disciple, Clitomachus, was a Semite or possibly of mixed Punic and Berber ancestry. He was a Carthaginian and he was a namesake of Hasdrubal, the famous brother of Hannibal.)
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IV#Clitomachus
>
> 67 **Clitomachus was a Carthaginian, his real name being Hasdrubal, and he taught philosophy at Carthage in his native tongue.** He had reached his fortieth year when he went to Athens and became a pupil of Carneades. And Carneades, recognizing his industry, caused him to be educated and took part in training him. And to such lengths did his diligence go that he composed more than four hundred treatises. **He succeeded Carneades in the headship of the school, and by his writings did much to elucidate his opinions.** He was eminently well acquainted with the three sects – the Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

If Philo's perception of Alexandria lacks historical roots, his family vanishes even more into the background. **He mentions only two family members by name.** Lysimachus, a younger member of the extended family, figures as a rather stylized discussion partner in the badly preserved dialogue *On the Rationality of Animals*. **Tiberius Alexander appears in the same dialogue as Philo's nephew, who preferred political involvement to studies** and participated in an embassy to Rome, presumably the same one Philo headed. Alexander is familiar with Roman customs and expresses radical ideas about the rationality of animals. **His view that humans are neither uniquely endowed with reason nor protected by divine providence is deeply shocking to Philo.**7

https://www.academia.edu/23087417/Dialogic_Format_of_Philo_of_Alexandrias_De_animalibus

As a dialogue, *De anim.* is a remarkable exception in the *corpus* of Philo's works: apart from it, we know of only one other text of his in dialogue form, namely the fragmentarily preserved *De providentia* (= *De prov.*), dedicated to the question of divine providence.9 The Armenian translation of *De prov.* consists of two books; only book II is in the form of a dialogue.10 Together with *Quod omnis probus liber sit* (extant in Greek) and *De aeternitate mundi* (partially preserved in Greek), **the two dialogues belong to Philo's philosophical writings, firmly rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition, with little or no references to Judaism and the Bible. In both *De anim.* and *De prov.* II, Philo is an interlocutor and argues against the views of a character called Alexander, who is identified by scholars with Tiberius Julius Alexander, Philo's apostate nephew.**11

https://www.academia.edu/44247192/The_Apostasy_of_Tiberius_Julius_Alexander_An_Intervention

Philo mentioned Alexander twice in his surviving treatises, and both mentions have been understood as showing Alexander taking "anti-Judaic" positions and as further evidence of his apostasy.98 In *De Animalibus*, presented as a text written by "Alexander" and its oral refutation by Philo,99 Alexander maintains that animals are rational and therefore have souls; **Philo denies it, pretty much in an *ipse dixit*.** This is not a matter relevant to the question of Alexander's supposed apostasy,100 since it concerns philosophical disagreements, not matters of religious belief or practice.101 Indeed, this treatise provides the rare positive evidence that Alexander was not an apostate; the third

character in the treatise, Lysimachus (who agrees throughout with Philo and is otherwise assumed to have been a faithful Jew) is engaged to Alexander's daughter. Would Lysimachus have married the daughter of an apostate, whether or not she would follow him in religious matters after the wedding?

In *De Providentia* Alexander is shown denying the existence of divine providence in human affairs on the grounds that the evil prosper and the good suffer. Scholars have doubted that this is the historical Tiberius Julius Alexander.102 In any event, I cannot claim that denial of divine providence does not concern religious beliefs.103 But there is scant evidence here of apostasy, rather than of a view that appears unusual to us. **Was the denial in the first century of providence significantly less "Jewish" than Philo's own views about the intermediate role of the divine Logos and two powers in heaven?**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false

In a dialogue now extant only in Armenian, Philo addresses the question of whether animals possess the same kind of rationality as human beings. At stake is the status of humans as creatures uniquely endowed with reason and close to God. The dialogue is staged as a discussion between Lysimachus, a younger family member eager to learn, **and Philo, who is deeply disturbed by a treatise of his nephew Tiberius Alexander, who expresses the view that animals are rational and morally equal to humans.** Alexander's text is brought in by a servant, read aloud, and then criticized by Philo. Lysimachus plays only a marginal role, giving Philo the opportunity to expound his ideas on the controversial issue.4

Alexander's argument in favor of animals' rationality is based mainly on observation. **He rejects the common assumption of humanity's superiority, which derives in his view merely from physical considerations, such as the fact that animals crawl on the ground and are thus physically lower than humans. Animals are wrongly denied rationality, he insists, just as women are mistakenly relegated to the margins of society.** Alexander invites his readers to observe the intelligent behavior of animals and appreciate their knowledge, their ability to learn, and even their ability to choose between good and evil. Occasionally, he directly asks, "Have you not observed?" While admitting that their rationality is not perfect, Alexander insists that animals are endowed with both kinds of rationality, namely, the internal Logos of the mind and the external Logos expressed in speech. He moreover stresses that animals acquire technical skills and virtue, while many birds can even speak with a human voice. The bee, for example, is praised as having intelligence that is "hardly distinguishable from that contemplative ability of the human mind." The spider behaves like an artist, protecting its well-designed net, and the swallow raises its young with the "affection of a nurse or a mid-wife."5

Many examples of rational behavior in animals derive from Alexander's experience at animal shows, which he enthusiastically attended. "I saw this very thing," he says with excitement, namely, a fawn dancing and playing with a ball on the stage. "During the performance," he adds, the animal "occasionally stared fearfully at the trainer, I think afraid something may fail." Alexander is especially impressed by the elephants, who behaved in the most domesticated manner, lining up in a row and taking human food and drink on special beds. Some elephants even played the drunkard. Alexander expresses his amazement at the animal performance by stressing that "nowhere else in the world could the appearance of staggering drunks be so demonstrated." **Moreover, Alexander explicitly rejects the biblical idea of humanity's exclusive creation in the image of God and stresses that "we are filled with irrational thoughts, have barren and uncultivated minds," while animals are morally excellent.**6

Philo harshly dismisses these views as unsound, childish, and fashionable, even saying that they are "sacrilege" and an injustice to both nature and the "sacred mind."
…

Philo argues that animals should rather be classified with plants because they do everything by dictate from nature and not as a result of a conscious choice or learning.
…

This urgency is remarkable in light of Philo's far more relaxed discussion in the *Allegorical Commentary*, where he explains the biblical account of humanity's creation in the image of God without relating to any controversy. He even conceives of a similarity between humans and animals in the realm of the irrational. Humans, he suggests, are blessed with additional rationality, while their impulses are as instinctive as those of the animals. **At that point Philo clearly thinks of humans as superior but not fundamentally different from animals.**8
…

Cicero ushers in the discussion in Rome by presenting the belief in humanity's superiority over animals as an important aspect of Stoic theology. Balbus, Cicero's Stoic spokesman, introduces his position by reference to humans' physical nature: they are raised from the ground and stand upright, thus indicating their higher status in the creation. This is precisely the argument that Alexander in Philo's dialogue attacks as a mistaken acceptance of superficial appearances. **Moreover, Balbus polemically dismisses the assumption of equality between humans and animals, suggesting, like Philo, that the man who does not recognize humanity's divine inspiration is "himself devoid of these faculties." In Cicero's dialogue this polemic is directed against the Platonists. Cotta, the Platonic spokesman, responds to**

Balbus's argument by stressing, like Alexander, that a person's mind is neither divinely endowed nor very exceptional.9

The Stoic view of animals became dominant in Rome. Cicero opens his ethical treatise *On Duties* with an emphatic assertion of humanity's superiority. Only human beings are in his view endowed with reason, memory, and speech as well as an ability to search for the truth and plan ahead. Human beings possess the necessary tools for moral behavior, which is denied to animals. Cicero's position is echoed a century later in Seneca's writings, which contain a separate epistle on the question of animal rationality. **Seneca reacts here to the kind of arguments Alexander presented, namely, arguments in favor of animal rationality based on an observation of nature.** Seneca explains why the bee is not as wise as has been claimed and why animals simply act out of a natural impulse rather than learning and conscious choice. The Stoic notion of humanity's exclusive rationality is confirmed by denying animals' intellectual and moral qualifications.10
...

The late Philo embraces a position that became predominant in the Christian West and was forcefully defended by Justin Martyr and Augustine. Pagan Platonists, by contrast, further developed the lenient tradition visible in Philo's early writings and embraced Plato's idea of the soul's transmigration to animals. The Second Sophists Plutarch and Philostratus, for example, show genuine sympathy toward animals and appreciate their humanlike intelligence. Porphyry and Plotinus bring this position to a climax. **Philo thus stands at an important threshold, leaving behind a characteristically Eastern perspective and adopting a view that was to shape the Latin West.**11
...

While Platonists generally followed the *Timaeus* and assumed the demiurge's "fatherly" maintenance of the world, they denied his care for individual humans and the details of nature. On Platonist views, god is too transcendent to be involved in the specifics of the world and humanity. The Stoics, by contrast, adopted a more immanent notion of the deity and identified a divine presence in their very lives and surroundings.12

Alexander challenges Philo's notion of divine providence by pointing to the "vast welter and confusion of things" in the world. **There is no justice, he insists, "or do you alone not realize that good things come in abundance upon the worst and vilest of men?"** In strikingly similar terms Cotta, the Platonic spokesman in Cicero's dialogue, rejects Stoic notions of providence by quoting the following poetic line: "For if they [the gods] cared for men, good men would prosper and bad men come to grief; but this is not so."

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n573/mode/2up?view=theater

Looking back over this body of speculation **we are surprised to see how fully Plato anticipated the philosophy, the theology, and the organization of medieval Christianity, and how much of the modern Fascist state.** The theory of Ideas became the "realism" of the Scholastics—the objective reality of "universals." Plato is not only a *prä-existent Christlich*, as Nietzsche called him, but a pre-Christian Puritan. He distrusts human nature as evil, and thinks of it as an original sin tainting the soul. **He breaks up into an evil body and a divine spirit[139] that unity of body and soul which had been the educated Greek ideal of the sixth and fifth centuries;** like a Christian ascetic he calls the body the tomb of the soul. He takes from Pythagoras and Orphism an Oriental faith in transmigration, karma, sin, purification, and "release"; he adopts, in his last works, the other-worldly tone of a converted and repentant Augustine. **One would almost say that Plato was not Greek if it were not for his perfect prose.**

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/195/mode/2up?view=theater

The Plato of the 1930s and 1940s was, however, read and interpreted in a very specific political light. The center of gravity of the Platonist oeuvre had already begun to shift under the Weimar Republic,10 but it did so far more sharply after 1933: **the emphasis was no longer on the Athenian philosopher's epistemological or gnoseological texts but on his political writings. The metaphysical Plato, the philosopher of ideas, was an acolyte of disembodied humanism and the *Aufklärung* of metastasized rationalism.** He was shoved aside in favour of the political Plato, the philosopher of the ideal city-state and the regeneration of the community.

In a pamphlet aimed at teachers of Greek, **Hans Bogner bluntly declared that the heart of the Platonic oeuvre was the triptych composed of "*Politeia*, *Politikos*, *Nomos*"**11 – that is, *The Republic*, *The Statesman*, and *Laws* – to which the racial scientist Hans Günther added Plato's *Letters*.12 **The Plato who was important now was the "philosopher of the state" and not the "representative of the theory of ideas."** For Günther, Plato was not simply a thinker; he "was of the lineage of Solon and Cleisthenes. This is the history of Athens: they are the great legislators and and men of the state ... who make up the background of his oeuvre," not "the Ionian φνσικοι" or the "first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*."13 His stature was thus due more to his place in the pantheon of lawmakers and statesmen than to his place in that of mere philosophers. As Werner Jaeger forcefully asserted in a 1933 article published in the Nazi journal *Volk im Werden*, in a vigorous attack on the individualist humanism of the eighteenth century, **"The Plato of our generation is a creator of states, a legislator. He is no longer the neo-Kantian systematizer and honourable scholarly**

philosopher, as our predecessors saw him."14 **For Jaeger, Kant was not the saint he was assumed to be in philosophy seminars throughout German universities. Far from being the archetype of German genius, he was a dangerous avatar of a rootless, cosmopolitan Enlightenment.** In contrast, so-called Platonic idealism was actually an unsparingly lucid realism, which "only a superficial reader could argue refers to the inaccessible and celestial Kantian ideal."15

As we have already seen, **the Nazis and their accomplices in the world of pedagogy and the academy resolutely rejected the scrawny, sickly figure of the intellectual, pale and anemic from all his time spent in the dim light of the library within his ivory tower.**16 To them, Plato appeared to be the perfect antithesis of this despicable creature. He was, in contrast, the fullest expression of the "total man," at once a powerful thinker, a respected sportsman, and an accomplished warrior. Nothing surprising when one imagines, as Günther did, that Plato was a Nordic, a product "of the highest Attic nobility ... where the Nordic blood of the original Hellenes was best preserved until a later date."17

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D28

And so there is reason to fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate, when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each other to the death. **For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Marcellus*.html#ref23

5 **For the art of mechanics, now so celebrated and admired, was first originated by Eudoxus and Archytas, who embellished geometry with its subtleties, and gave to problems incapable of proof by word and diagram, a support derived from mechanical illustrations that were patent to the senses.** For instance, in solving the problem of finding two mean proportional lines, a necessary requisite for many geometrical figures, both mathematicians had recourse to mechanical arrangements, adapting to their purposes certain intermediate portions of curved lines and sections. 6 **But Plato was incensed at this, and inveighed against them as corrupters and destroyers of the pure excellence of geometry, which thus turned her back upon the incorporeal things of abstract thought and descended to the things of sense, making use, moreover, of objects which required much mean and manual labour.** For this reason mechanics was made entirely distinct from geometry, and being for a long time ignored by philosophers, came to be regarded as one of the military arts.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

Let us pass to astronomy. This was one of the sciences which Plato exhorted his disciples to learn, but for reasons far removed from common habits of thinking. "Shall we set down astronomy," says Socrates, "among the subjects of study?" [Plato's *Republic*, Book vii.] **"I think so," answers his young friend Glaucon: "to know something about the seasons, the months, and the years is of use for military purposes, as well as for agriculture and navigation." "It amuses me," says Socrates, "to see how afraid you are, lest the common herd of people should accuse you of recommending useless studies."** He then proceeds, in that pure and magnificent diction which, as Cicero said, Jupiter would use if Jupiter spoke Greek, to explain, that the use of astronomy is not to add to the vulgar comforts of life, but to assist in raising the mind to the contemplation of things which are to be perceived by the pure intellect alone. The knowledge of the actual motions of the heavenly bodies Socrates considers as of little value. The appearances which make the sky beautiful at night are, he tells us, like the figures which a geometrician draws on the sand, mere examples, mere helps to feeble minds. We must get beyond them; we must neglect them; **we must attain to an astronomy which is as independent of the actual stars as geometrical truth is independent of the lines of an ill-drawn diagram.**
...

On the greatest and most useful of all human inventions, the invention of alphabetical writing, Plato did not look with much complacency. He seems to have thought that the use of letters had operated on the human mind as the use of the go-cart in learning to walk, or of corks in learning to swim, is said to operate on the human body. It was a support which, in his opinion, soon became indispensable to those who used it, which made vigorous exertion first unnecessary and then impossible. The powers of the intellect would, he conceived, have been more fully developed without this delusive aid. Men would have been compelled to exercise the understanding and the memory, and, by deep and assiduous meditation, to make truth thoroughly their own. Now, on the contrary, much knowledge is traced on paper, but little is engraved in the soul. **A man is certain that he can find information at a moment's notice when he wants it. He therefore suffers it to fade from his mind. Such a man cannot in strictness be said to know anything.** He has the show without the reality of wisdom. These opinions Plato has put into the mouth of an ancient king of Egypt. [Plato's *Phaedrus*.] But it is evident

from the context that they were his own; and so they were understood to be by Quinctilian. [Quinctilian, xi.] Indeed they are in perfect accordance with the whole Platonic system.
…

To Plato, the science of medicine appeared to be of very disputable advantages. [Plato's *Republic*, Book iii.] He did not indeed object to quick cures for acute disorders, or for injuries produced by accidents. But the art which resists the slow sap of a chronic disease, which repairs frames enervated by lust, swollen by gluttony, or inflamed by wine, which encourages sensuality by mitigating the natural punishment of the sensualist, and prolongs existence when the intellect has ceased to retain its entire energy, had no share of his esteem. A life protracted by medical skill he pronounced to be a long death.
…

Plato, considering the moral improvement of the people as the end of legislation, justly inferred that a law which commanded and threatened, but which neither convinced the reason, nor touched the heart, must be a most imperfect law. He was not content with deterring from theft a man who still continued to be a thief at heart, with restraining a son who hated his mother from beating his mother. The only obedience on which he set much value was the obedience which an enlightened understanding yields to reason, and which a virtuous disposition yields to precepts of virtue. He really seems to have believed that, by prefixing to every law an eloquent and pathetic exhortation, he should, to a great extent, render penal enactments superfluous.
…

Our belief is that, among the philosophers themselves, instead of a progressive improvement there was a progressive degeneracy. **An abject superstition which Democritus or Anaxagoras would have rejected with scorn, added the last disgrace to the long dotage of the Stoic and Platonic schools.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap13.htm#then

The knowledge that is suited to our situation and powers, the whole compass of moral, natural, and mathematical science, was neglected by the new Platonists; whilst they exhausted their strength in the verbal disputes of metaphysics, attempted to explore the secrets of the invisible world, **and studied to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, on subjects of which both these philosophers were as ignorant as the rest of mankind.** Consuming their reason in these deep but unsubstantial meditations, their minds were exposed to illusions of fancy. They flattered themselves that they possessed the secret of disengaging the soul from its corporeal prison; claimed a familiar intercourse with daemons and spirits; and, by a very singular revolution, converted the study of philosophy into that of magic. **The ancient sages had derided the popular superstition; after disguising its extravagance by the thin pretence of allegory, the disciples of Plotinus and Porphyry became its most zealous defenders.** As they agreed with the Christians in a few mysterious points of faith, they attacked the remainder of their theological system with all the fury of civil war.

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_2.html

One thing is sure: in Plotinus, as also in some important representatives of the Middle Ages, theological truth or the truth of revelation is at irreconcilable enmity with philosophical truth, or science in the usual sense of the word. But another thing is sure also: **in contrast to the thought of the Middle Ages, Plotinus never expresses his thought on the mutual relationship between these two truths with the clarity and decision which would be desirable. He speaks of this as though there were no question, as though no question were possible, or as though this question answered itself.** In the sixth *Ennead* (ix, 3, 4) he writes: "Whenever the soul approaches the Formless (*aneideon*) it fears lest it be confronted with "nothingness" (*eksolisthanei kai phobeîtai, mê ouden echêi*), being unable to grasp it, because it has no definition and no marks of a special type – and it flees. Before such phenomena it becomes uncertain and withdraws into lower spheres... **The main ground of our uncertainty comes from the fact that the comprehension of the One (i.e. the truth of revelation) is not given us through learned knowledge (*epistêmê*) and also not through thinking (*noêsis*)** like the cognition of other ideal things (*ta alla noêta*) but through a communion (*parousia*) which is something higher than knowledge. **When the soul acquires scientific cognition of a matter, it departs from the One (again meaning, from the truth of revelation) and ceases to be One; for every scientific knowledge presupposes a ground, and every ground presupposes a multiplicity (*logos gar hê epistêmê, polla de ho logos*).**

This means that Plotinus is unfaithful to the fundamental command of his divine master, in that he abandons the *logos* (reason) and becomes in Plato's phraseology a *misologos*, a hater of reason – **for Plato taught that to be a misologist is the greatest misfortune that can befall a man.** Plotinus himself has said: In the beginning is reason and all is reason (*archêi oûn logos kai panta logos*: III, ii, 15) – and his disciples and successors have repeated these words again and again.

If, then, reason is the ground of all things and all things are reason, if it is the greatest of misfortunes to renounce reason and to hate it, **then how, one wonders, could Plotinus exalt with such enthusiasm his "One", and deep participation in it. And what has happened to the law of contradiction, which is also an *archê* (beginning, fundamental principle), indeed, a *bebaiôtatê tôn archôn*, the most unshakable of all fundamental principles?** I think that this question can in no wise be evaded; I think, too, that Plotinus's modern commentators are wrong in trying so hard to prove that Plotinus never renounced reason, and that when he thought and wrote down his thoughts he never turned his gaze away from the law of contradiction. **It seems to me that old Zeller saw more clearly and came nearer the truth when he declared fearlessly: "It is in contradiction with the whole trend of classical thought and a decided approach to the spiritual methods of the East when Plotinus, like some Philo, can find the final purpose of philosophy only in a contemplation of the divine in which all decision of thought and all clarity of self-consciousness vanish in mystical ecstasy"** (V, vi, 11). In another passage Zeller expressed himself more sharply still: "The philosopher (viz. Plotinus) has lost absolute confidence in his thought" (V, iv, 82). Zeller is undoubtedly right. The same Plotinus who extolled reason and thought so often and so passionately has lost his trust in reason and become, in spite of the Platonic tradition, a misologist, a hater of reason.

https://archive.org/details/christiantheoryo0000corn/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

Plotinus wants to be true to the Parmenidean principle of pure logic as determinative of the nature of reality but he does not, in being true to this principle, want to deny the reality of the contingency of the world of sense.

"Intelligence," says Plotinus, “is the first legislator, or rather, it is the very law of existence. **Parmenides therefore was right in saying, ‘Thought is identical with existence.’** The knowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things themselves. That is why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have reminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of those beings is outside of the Intelligence, nor is contained in any location; all of them subsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible. That is why they really are beings.”1a

Over against this real world as identical with the intelligible world stands the world of pure, unrelated contingency. There is an absolute dualism between these two worlds. Plotinus seeks to overcome this absolute dualism by means of the idea of participation. In this he follows Plato.

The facts of the world of sense, the world of contingency, are unreal except so far as they participate in the world of timeless reality. Time is intelligible only if we think of it as timeless.

It is thus that in the philosophy of Plotinus the Greek *paideia* appears as utterly bankrupt. The principle of pure rationality and the principle of pure irrationality are made correlative to one another and thereby cancel each out each other.

It is thus that the Socratic spirit of Inwardness, i.e., of the concentration of all interpretation upon man as the final point of reference stands against the Christian spirit of Inwardness as expressed in Augustine's theology. In Plotinus and Augustine the Greek and the Christian *paideia* stand squarely over against one another, ready for the final duel.

It might seem that in the philosophy of Plotinus rationalism rather than irrationalism rules. Yet this is not the case. Even though thought and being must be said to be identical, Plotinus argues, no man can ever experience such an identification. The identification is always ideal. It is always above the discursive thought of any man. Discursive reason can only point to a unity that is higher than anything that man can say about it. If unity is to be objective then it must be above all the rational thought of man.

Says Plotinus: “(To attain Unity) we must therefore rise above all science, and never withdraw from what is essentially One; we must therefore renounce science, the objects of science, and every other right (except that of the One); even that of beauty; **for beauty is posterior to unity, and is derived from therefrom, as the day-light comes from the sun. That is why Plato says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and undescribable.** Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only to excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this divine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who desired to see some object.”2

Again Plotinus says: “**There must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for Intelligence does indeed to aspire to be one, but it is not one, possessing only the form of unity ... What is above Intelligence is Unity itself, an incomprehensible miracle, of which it cannot be even said that it is essence, lest we make of it an attribute of something else, and to whom no name is suitable.** If however he must be named, we may indeed call him in general Unity, but only on the preliminary understanding that he was not at first something else, and then only later became unity.

That is why the One is so difficult to understand in himself; he is rather known by his offspring; that is, by Being, because Intelligence leads up to being."3

Plotinus gives us here the self-sufficient first principle of his philosophy. This first principle is altogether *beyond* the reach of reasoning. Yet reason says that the ultimate principle *must be* this super-rational sort of being. Nothing can be said of the first principle. Yet is must be the source of all explanation of man and the cosmos.
…

Since the fall of Adam apostate mankind has assumed its own essential divinity. Man is assumed to be participant in deity. When he uses the laws of logic and in particular the law of contradiction, as he must, then he takes for granted this inherent divinity of man. He assumes that his logic is legislative for the nature of reality. Whatever exists, he assumes, must be exhaustively penetrable by the logical powers of man. **As we have seen, Parmenides gave eloquent and terse expression to this assumption when he said that only that which I can think without contradiction, exists.** Plotinus carries this apostate view of logic through even when, in contrast to Parmenides, he seeks to ascribe some measure of reality to temporal things.

In complete contrast to this approach of Plotinus stands that of Augustine. **To be sure, as noted, Augustine makes many a concession to the apostate point of view of logic. But at bottom his commitment is to the idea that man is the creature of God rather than participant in the being of God. In spite of his many concessions to the Greek *paideia* his main principle, as best expressed in his latest works, is that sovereign God gives or withholds his grace to sinners according to his good pleasure.** Therefore if those who operate from a Plotinian point of view charge him with determinism Augustine, following Paul, simply responds: "Who art thou O man that contendest with God." **The judge of the whole earth will do right.**
…

It was not till Plotinus appeared upon the scene that the denial of God as creator and redeemer came to express itself fully in the idea of abstract unity that is beyond all human predication. If Plato and Aristotle still kept up the pretence that it is by the laws of thought that men must come to the idea of a unity that is above the laws of thought, Plotinus maintained that "the principle of identity is derivative from the One and not applicable to it."4 Says Richard Kroner, "Plotinus tried very hard to comprehend the Supreme Being logically and ontologically, but he knew very well that logic finally breaks down; only ecstasy can fill the gap that separates the human intellect from the mystery of the divine."5
…

Following Kant, modern philosophers know with all possible certainty that that God is unknowable. Even though they cannot show how man or the world can be known without God they are certain that man has knowledge and that he has this knowledge without God. Even though they admit that man is a product of chance and that the logical powers of his thought are products of chance yet they know that God cannot be man's creator or redeemer.
…

"The essence of all things is nothing but the knowledge of them in the mind of God. *Nihil enim est aliud omnium essentia, nisi omnium in divina sapientia cognitio.*"23 **The contention of Lovejoy that the rationalism of the principle of plenitude as used by such men as Plotinus and St. Denis is as determinist as is that of Spinoza is manifest with utmost clarity in the thought of Erigena. The final significance of this fact is apparent when we see that according to Erigena the salvation of all men as accomplished by Christ and as shown in his resurrection, takes place in the strength of the power of nature, *naturali virtute*.**24

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/488/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Critics were especially indignant at [Gundling's] endorsing Bayle's identification of the great Neoplatonist Plotinus (AD 205-79) as a proto-Spinozist and, worse, claiming Platonism itself is, at bottom, monist and Spinozistic.106
> …
>
> His thesis hinges on the claim that Plato's God is the immanent cause pervading the cosmos and the world's *causa efficiens necessaria* [necessary efficient cause] just as fire is of warmth, acting in the world blindly and necessarily: 'est enim Deus Platonis mundus, et mundus Deus' [thus the God of Plato is the world, and the world God].108 **Hence, he concluded, Plato's God does not in fact create or form matter but merely pervades it like the Stoic God which, as Buddeus had already confirmed, closely resembles Spinoza's.**109

…

Early Christian theologians were not alert to this fact. **They all too frequently did not realize that once they agreed that their notion of the incomprehensibility of God was the same, in effect, as the idea of the namelessness of God as held to by the Greeks, the gnostics and Plotinus, that they then could logically be compelled to deny the whole of the significance of the appearance of Christ in history.** The God of Christianity is not nameless. He knows himself exhaustively. His creatures therefore also know him. They cannot help but know him. They do not, to be sure, know him exhaustively. God is not fully comprehensible to them. That is what is meant when in terms of the Christian principle God is said to be incomprehensible to man. **This view of the incomprehensibility of God is the opposite of the notion of the incomprehensibility of God involved in the principle of plenitude. In the latter, God is wholly unknown and and unknowable to himself.** On this basis ultimate reality is utterly meaningless. If man says that the world has meaning for him in terms of such a god, he is merely deceiving himself. **On this view no fact of history can be intelligently related to any other fact of history.** Certainly the whole work of creation and redemption is then one colossal farce, a purely imaginary construction in the clouds on the part of man.

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_10.html

> **Epictetus and the other Stoics, and with them the whole official Greek philosophy whose heirs we have involuntarily become, did not admit the possibility of real miracles.** For Epictetus the law of contradiction was the final and supreme law which binds men and gods equally. It would have seemed madness to him if Pascal had said to him that the law of contradiction is precisely that angel with the flaming sword whom God posted at the gate of Paradise after the Fall of our forefather Adam. For Epictetus the way to achieve the Supreme, both for men and for gods, is complete subjection to the law. The law was "in the beginning" and will also be at the end. **He formed an image from the law which he worshipped like a god, for the law is, like a god, "spirit", an ideal entity which knows neither *genesis* (origin) nor *phthora* (destruction).** The doctrine of Epictetus which has so entranced man – and not only the simple but also philosophers – culminates in instilling into them the conviction that the idol which he has created is God, and that there are no other gods beside it, and that the purpose and destiny of man is to serve this idol. He rejects the carven images which his ancestors made, the images of gold and silver, ivory and marble. But he worships the *ideal* image without seeing that it is an image. **And it came to pass that after him even those men who knew the message brought down from Sinai did not perceive that an image formed of ideas as little resembles God as an image formed of any coarse physical matter.**

…

This mystical principle was already expressed by Socrates in his principle of inwardness. **To be sure, Socrates sought to answer the skeptics in his day by thinking of the individual soul as participant in an objective world of intelligence.** But by the time of Plotinus this objective world of intelligence had shown itself to be something that was utterly beyond the reach of all human intelligence. **If in Plato it is Diotema, the inspired, who must lift up the soul to the world of light, so it is by sheer concentration of its own powers that the soul of Plotinus takes its ecstatic flight into the world of light which is darkness now as well as light.**

…

Plotinus was not modern. He was still desirous of joining his soul with a somehow objectively existing principle of unity. The modern view thinks that this is to follow a mirage.

https://archive.org/details/plotinusethicalt01plotuoft/page/n11/mode/2up?view=theater

I. **Plotinus, the philosopher our contemporary, seemed ashamed of being in the body. So deeply-rooted was this feeling that he could never be induced to tell of his ancestry, his parentage or his birthplace.**

…

At forty, in the reign of Philip, he settled in Rome.

…

Another friend was Zethos, an Arabian by descent, who married a daughter of Ammonius' friend Theodosius. Zethos, too, was a doctor. Plotinus was deeply attached to him and was always trying to divert him from the political career in which he stood high. Plotinus was on the most familiar terms with him, and used to stay with him at his country place, six miles from Minturnae, a property which had formerly belonged to Castricius Firmus.

…

Another Senator, Rogatianus, advanced to such detachment from political ambitions that he gave up all his property, dismissed all his slaves, renounced every dignity, and, on the point

of taking up his praetorship, the lictors already at the door, refused to come out or to have anything to do with the office. He even abandoned his own house, spending his time here and there at this friends' and acquaintances', sleeping and eating with them and taking, at that, only one meal every other day. **He had been a victim of gout, carried in a chair, but this new regime of abstinence and abnegation restored his health: he had been unable to stretch out his hands; he came to use them as freely as men living by manual labour. Plotinus took a great liking to Rogatianus and frequently praised him very highly, holding him up as a model to those aiming at the philosophical life.**

http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/eunapius_02_text.htm#PLOTINUS

PLOTINUS was a philosopher of Egyptian birth. But though I just now called him an Egyptian, I will add his native place also; Lyco they call it. Yet the divine philosopher Porphyry did not record this, though he said that he was his pupil and studied with him during the whole of his life, or the greater part of it.

> https://brill.com/view/journals/mnem/52/3/article-p330_6.xml?language=en
>
> In his bitter opposition to the Christian Empire Eunapius may well have wanted to bring into the open the pagan, Neoplatonic city of Lykopolis as Plotinus' place of origin.
>
> For Proclus in the fifth century through David in the late sixth Plotinus was an Egyptian;27 the Souda duly expanded 'Lyko' to 'Lykopolis,' and so the tradition solidified.

Altars in honour of Plotinus are still warm, and his books are in the hands of educated men, more so than the dialogues of Plato. Nay, even great numbers of the vulgar herd, though they in part fail to understand his doctrines, nevertheless are swayed by them.
…

After Porphyry's early education had thus been carried on and he was looked up to by all, he longed to see Rome, the mistress of the world, so that he might enchain the city by his wisdom. **But directly he arrived there and became intimate with that great man Plotinus, he forgot all else and devoted himself wholly to him.** And since with an insatiable appetite he devoured his teaching and his original and inspired discourses, for some time he was content to be his pupil, as he himself says. **Then overcome by the force of his teachings he conceived a hatred of his own body and of being human,** and sailed to Sicily across the straits and Charybdis, along the route where Odysseus is said to have sailed;[8] and he would not endure either to see a city or to hear the voice of man, thus putting away from himself both pain and pleasure, but kept on to Lilybaeum; this is that one of Sicily's three promontories that stretches out and looks towards Libya. There he lay groaning and mortifying the flesh, and he would take no nourishment and "avoided the path of men."[9]
…

Now Porphyry returned to Rome and continued to study philosophical disputation, so that he even appeared in public to make a display of his powers; **but every forum and every crowd attributed to Plotinus the credit of Porphyry's renown. For Plotinus, because of the celestial quality of his soul and the oblique and enigmatic character of his discourses, seemed austere and hard to listen to. But Porphyry, like a chain of Hermes let down to mortals,[14] by reason of his many-sided culture expounded all subjects so as to be clear and easy of comprehension.**

https://www.iep.utm.edu/plotinus/#H4

According to Plotinus, the soul that has descended too far into matter needs to "merely think on essential being" in order to become reunited with its higher part (IV. 8.4). **This seems to constitute Plotinus' answer to any ethical questions that may have been posed to him. In fact, Plotinus develops a radical stance vis-a-vis ethics, and the problem of human suffering.** In keeping with his doctrine that the higher part of the soul remains wholly unaffected by the disturbances of the sense-realm, Plotinus declares that only the lower part of the soul suffers, is subject to passions, and vices, etc. In order to drive the point home, Plotinus makes use of a striking illustration. Invoking the ancient torture device known as the Bull of Phalaris (a hollow bronze bull in which a victim was placed; the bull was then heated until it became red hot), he tells us that only the lower part of the soul will feel the torture, while the higher part remains in repose, in contemplation (I. 4.13). **Although Plotinus does not explicitly say so, we may assume that the soul that has reunited with its higher part will not feel the torture at all.** Since the higher part of the soul is (1) the source and true state of existence of all souls, (2) cannot be affected in any way by sensible affections, and (3) since the lower soul possesses of itself the ability to free itself from the bonds of matter, all particular questions concerning ethics and morality are subsumed, in Plotinus' system, by the single grand doctrine of the soul's essential imperturbability. **The problems plaguing the lower soul are not, for Plotinus, serious issues for philosophy. His general attitude may be summed up by a remark made in the course of one of his discussions of 'Providence':**

> **“A gang of lads, morally neglected, and in that respect inferior to the intermediate class, but in good physical training, attack and overthrow another set, trained neither physically nor morally, and make off with their food and their dainty clothes. What more is called for than a laugh?”** (III. 2.8, tr. MacKenna).

Of course, Plotinus was no anarchist, nor was he an advocate of violence or lawlessness. Rather, he was so concerned with the welfare and the ultimate salvation of each individual soul, that he elevated philosophy — the highest pursuit of the soul — to the level of a divine act, capable of purifying each and every soul of the tainting accruements of sensual existence. **Plotinus’ last words, recorded by Porphyry, more than adequately summarize the goal of his philosophy: “Strive to bring back the god in yourselves to the God in the All”** (*Life of Plotinus* 2).

https://www.midasword.com.au/julians-new-paganism/

> [13] Bradbury, Scott., ‘Julian’s pagan revival and the decline of blood sacrifice’, *Phoenix* 49 (1995): p-332. “**Although keenly interested in sacrifices in his youth, Porphyry’s years with Plotinus (262-268) brought about a profound reorientation of his spiritual life and led him to call into doubt the utility of conventional cult, including blood sacrifice. In the *Letter to Anebo,* composed between 263 and 268, he rejected in a dismissive, even mocking, tone the elements of “low-brow” religion, the daemonology, occult practices, and sacrifices that had been so conspicuous in his early works,** the *Philosophy from Oracles* and *On the Return of the Soul.*”
> …
>
> [19] Meredith, Anthony. “Porphyry and Julian against the Christians” in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Romischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung (Series II)* , Temporini, Hildegard, 1980, 1137. “**This action of Plotinus can be seen as the active counterpart to the total absence of political philosophy in Plotinus, Porphyry or Iamblichus. Under their influence, Platonic philosophy, which under both Plato and later Platonists like Celsus had had a definitely political bias, became apolitical, rigorously spiritualist and individualist.** The Pythagorean tradition, likewise, as represented in the ’De Vita Pythagorica’, by Iamblichus, taught that Pythagoras left Samos for Italy, because he had not enough leisure in his native country adequately to pursue philosophy.”

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/porphyry_abstinence_04_book4.htm#31

> 1. **Though Porphyry excelled in all philosophical knowledge, whence also he was called κατ᾽ εξοχην, *the philosopher,* yet he was inferior to his auditor Iamblichus, in theological information. On this account, Iamblichus was called by all the Platonists posterior to him, *the divine,* and *the great priest.***

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Hymn_to_King_Helios

The Oration is dedicated to his friend and comrade in arms Sallust who is probably identical with the Neo-Platonic philosopher, of the school of Iamblichus, who wrote about 360 the treatise *On the Gods and the World*. Cumont calls this "the official catechism of the Pagan empire," **and Wilamowitz regards it as the positive complement of Julian's pamphlet Against the Christians.**
…

Now for my part I envy the good fortune of any man to whom the god has granted to inherit a body built of the seed of holy and inspired ancestors, so that he can unlock the treasures of wisdom; nor do I despise that lot with which I was myself endowed by the god Helios, that I should be born of a house that rules and governs the world in my time; **but further, I regard this god, if we may believe the wise, as the common father of all mankind.**[9]
…

Now I am aware that the great philosopher Plato,[78] **and after him a man who, though he is later in time, is by no means inferior to him in genius**—I mean Iamblichus[79] of Chalcis, who through his writings initiated me not only into other philosophic doctrines but these also—I am aware, I say, that they employed as a hypothesis the conception of a generated world, and assumed for it, so to speak, a creation in time in order that the magnitude of the works that arise from Helios might be recognised. But apart from the fact that I fall short altogether of their ability, I must by no means be so rash; especially since the glorious hero Iamblichus thought it was not without risk to assume, even as a bare hypothesis, a temporal limit for the creation of the world.
…

And has not Apollo, who is his colleague in empire, set up oracles in every part of the earth, and given to men inspired wisdom, and regulated their cities by means of religious and political ordinances? **And he has civilised the greater part of the world by means of Greek colonies, and so made it easier for the world to be governed by the Romans.** For the Romans themselves not only belong to the Greek race, but also the sacred ordinances and the pious belief in the gods which they have established and maintain are, from beginning to end, Greek. And beside this they have established a constitution not inferior to that of any one of

the best governed states, if indeed it be not superior to all others that have ever been put into practice. **For which reason I myself recognise that our city is Greek, both in descent and as to its constitution.**
…

Aye, but also, through his perpetual generation and the blessings that he bestows from the heavenly bodies, he holds together the region beneath the moon. **For he cares for the whole human race in common, but especially for my own city,**[129] even as also he brought into being my soul from eternity, and made it his follower.
…

This discourse, friend Sallust,[130] I composed in three nights at most, in harmony with the three-fold creative power of the god,[131] as far as possible just as it occurred to my memory: and I have ventured to write it down and to dedicate it to you because you thought my earlier work on the Kronia[132] was not wholly worthless. **But if you wish to meet with a more complete and more mystical treatment of the same theme, then read the writings of the inspired Iamblichus on this subject,**[133] **and you will find there the most consummate wisdom which man can achieve.** And may mighty Helios grant that I too may attain to no less perfect knowledge of himself, and that I may instruct all men, speaking generally, but especially those who are worthy to learn. **And so long as Helios grants let us all in common revere Iamblichus, the beloved of the gods. For he is the source for what I have here set down, a few thoughts from many, as they occurred to my mind.** However I know well that no one can utter anything more perfect than he, nay not though he should labour long at the task and say very much that is new. For he will naturally diverge thereby from the truest knowledge of the god. Therefore it would probably have been a vain undertaking to compose anything after Iamblichus on the same subject if I had written this discourse for the sake of giving instruction.

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/120/mode/2up?view=theater

He is about to commence his discourses on **the Parmenides, that book in which we generally now consider that Plato has been most untrue to himself, and fallen from his usual inductive method to the ground of a mere *à priori* theoriser**—and yet of which Proclus is reported to have said, and, I should conceive, said honestly, that if it, the Timæus, and the Orphic fragments were preserved, he did not care whether every other book on earth were destroyed. But how does he commence?

> "I pray to all the gods and goddesses to guide my reason in the speculation which lies before me, and having kindled in me the pure light of truth, to direct my mind upward to the very knowledge of the things which are, and to open the doors of my soul to receive the divine guidance of Plato, and, having directed my knowledge into the very brightness of being, to withdraw me from the various forms of opinion, from the apparent wisdom, from the wandering about things which do not exist, by that purest intellectual exercise about the things which do exist, whereby alone the eye of the soul is nourished and brightened, as Socrates says in the Phædrus; and that the Noetic Gods will give to me the perfect reason, and the Noeric Gods the power which leads up to this, and that the rulers of the Universe above the heaven will impart to me an energy unshaken by material notions and emancipated from them, and those to whom the world is given as their dominion a winged life, and the angelic choirs a true manifestation of divine things, and the good dæmons the fulness of the inspiration which comes from the Gods, and the heroes a grand, and venerable, and lofty fixedness of mind, and the whole divine race together **a perfect preparation for sharing in Plato's most mystical and far-seeing speculations, which he declares to us himself in the Parmenides, with the profundity befitting such topics, but which *he* (*i.e.* his master Syrianus) completed by his most pure and luminous apprehensions,** who did most truly share the Platonic feast, and was the medium for transmitting the divine truth, the guide in our speculations, and the hierophant of these divine words; who, as I think, came down as a type of philosophy, to do good to the souls that are here, in place of idols, sacrifices, and the whole mystery of purification, a leader of salvation to the men who are now and who shall be hereafter. And may the whole band of those who are above us be propitious; and may the whole force which they supply be at hand, kindling before us that light which, proceeding from them, may guide us to them."

Surely this is an interesting document. **The last Pagan Greek prayer, I believe, which we have on record;** the death-wail of the old world—not without a touch of melody.

http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/marinus_01_life_of_proclus.htm

He regularly observed the great festivals of all peoples, so to speak, and the religious ceremonies peculiar to each people or country. Nor did he, like so many others, make this the pretext of a distraction, or of a debauch of food, but on the contrary they were occasions of prayer meetings that lasted all night, without sleep, with songs, hymns and similar devotions. Of this we see the proof in the composition of his hymns, which contain homage and praises not only of the gods adored among the Greeks, but where you also see worship of the god Marnas of Gaza, Asklepius Leontuchus of Ascalon, Thyandrites who is much worshipped among the Arabs, the Isis who has a temple at Philae, and indeed all other divinities. **It was a phrase he much used, and that was very familiar to him, that a philosopher should watch over the salvation of not only a**

city, nor over the national customs of a few people, but that he should be the hierophant of the whole world in common.

http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2018/2018-03-32.html

Revealed in all these works, along with a steady stream of articles, is Proclus as the last great consolidator of ancient Platonism and its “face” as philosophy shifted into a Christian, and later Islamic, context. **If, as Proclus himself thought, Plotinus was the greatest expositor of the Platonic revelation, Proclus was the supreme systematizer of that revelation. It was through Proclus and definitely not through Plotinus that the principal philosophical school of antiquity was “received.”** It was Proclus, above all others, whose systematic expression of Platonism was found to be most apt for theological re-purposing.

https://archive.org/details/greeklatinauthor0002unse/page/674/mode/2up?view=theater

(141) **He says that the successor of Proclus, Marinus, came from Neapolis in Palestine, a city situated near the mountain called Argarizon.** Then the impious writer uttered the blasphemy that on this mountain there is a most holy sanctuary of Zeus the Highest, to whom Abraham the father of the old Hebrews consecrated himself, as Marinus himself maintains. **Marinus, though originally a Samaritan, gave up their creed, since it deviated from Abraham’s religion and introduced innovations in it, and fell in love with paganism.** (142) Nevertheless, by working hard, and untiring toil, Marinus surpassed in renown the fame of many abler and elder men.

https://www.academia.edu/10493178/MARINUS_AN_ERETZ-ISRAEL_NEOPLATONST_AT_ATHENS_Eng._version_

Oriental influence on Neoplatonic thought is still a vexed question, but there is no doubt concerning the Syrian and Palestinian origins of many of the thinkers themselves. The tendency among philosophers from this region to study Plato may have reached its apogee under Iamblichus, who had founded a center of his own in Syria, many years previously. Phoenicians and individuals from Palestine had risen to prominence even in the New (Sceptic) Academy.10 Although the latter soon broke up and was not succeeded by any particular institution at any one location,11 Phoenicians and Syrians continued to play an important part in Middle Platonism as well as in early Neoplatonism.12 This is particularly true of the Neoplatonic school that Plutarch of Athens established in his city at the beginning of the fifth century C.E. – and which later included a number of professors and scholars of Syrian and Palestinian origin.13 **Thus, when Marinus rose to prominence in the Neoplatonic school of Athens, he would have found no special difficulties as a result of his Samaritan roots.**14 Yet although he was highly esteemed by his master Proclus, who dedicated one of his famous essays on Plato's *Republic* to “my dear friend, Marinus,”15 the latter was much denigrated by his younger contemporaries and students, Damascius and Isidorus of Alexandria.16

http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2000/2000-04-19.html

Considering the format of Thiel's treatise one would expect, within the vast complex of questions which surround these rather fascinating last "Greek" philosophers,2 some elucidation or at least exploration of one or two specific points or issues which have not yet sufficiently been brought into the discussion.

> 2. They are "Greek" or Hellenic insofar as their intellectual background and their philosophizing are Greek, not their origins. **So it seems reasonable to suppose that the first language of at least five of the seven philosophers mentioned in Agathias' report -- Hermias and Diogenes (both from Phoenicia), Isidorus of Gaza, Damascius of Syria and perhaps even Simplicius of Cilicia -- was Syriac (or some other Aramaic dialect close to Syriac). Such a knowledge of Syriac might with some probability also be attributed to Iamblichus of Coele-Syria.**

---

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/6448-gabirol-solomon-ibn

Gabirol was the first teacher of Neoplatonism in Europe. He essayed again the part played by Philo. Philo had served as the intermediary between Hellenic, especially Platonic, philosophy and the Oriental world. He had Orientalized European philosophy and prepared the way for its Christianization. A thousand years later Gabirol Occidentalized Greco-Arabic philosophy and restored it to Europe. **Strangely enough, the philosophical teachings of Philo and Gabirol were alike ignored by their fellow Jews;** and the parallel may be extended by adding that Philo and Gabirol alike exercised a very considerable influence in extra-Jewish circles: Philo upon primitive Christianity, and Gabirol upon the scholasticism of medieval Christianity. **Gabirol's service, in common with that of other Arabic and Jewish philosophers, in bringing the philosophy of Greece under the shelter of the Christian Church, was but a return for the service of the earlier Christian scholars, who had translated the chief works of Greek philosophy into Syriac and Arabic.**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04645a.htm

Albert, who was a contemporary of David, says that David merely renewed the heresy of Alexander, "who taught that God and intellect and matter are one substance". It is impossible to determine whom Albert here means by Alexander, "a disciple of Xenophanes"; probably the reference is to some Arabian work that went under the name of a Greek philosopher. There were several works of that kind current in the early part of the thirteenth century. **Some critics, however, put forward the surmise that David's immediate source was Avicebron's "Fons Vitæ",** or the work "De Unitate", written by Archdeacon Gundisalvi of Segovia, who was well versed in Arabian philosophical literature. **Whatever the source, the doctrines were, as all our authorities concur in describing them, the expression of the most thoroughgoing pantheism.** This of itself would justify the drastic measures to which the Council of Paris had recourse. There were, moreover, circumstances which rendered summary condemnation necessary. **On the one hand the University of Paris was being made the scene of an organized attempt to foist the Arabian pantheistic interpretation of Greek philosophy on the schools of Latin Christendom. Texts, translations, and commentaries were introduced every day from Spain, in which doctrines incompatible with Christian dogma were openly taught.** On the other hand, there was the popular movement in the South of France which found its principal expression in the Albigensian heresy, **while in learned and ascetic communities in the North, the anti-hierarchical mysticism of the Calabrian Joachim of Floris was being combined with the more speculative pantheistic mysticism of John Scotus Eriugena.** In view of these conditions the condemnation of the errors of David of Dinant, the complete extirpation of the sect of Amalricians to which he apparently belonged, and the unwonted harshness of St. Thomas's reference to him cannot be judged untimely or intemperate.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01379b.htm

[The Amalricians] held, besides, peculiar views on the Trinity, distinguishing three periods in the Divine economy with regard to man; the reign of the Father, become incarnate in Abraham, which lasted until the coming of Christ; the reign of the Son, become incarnate in Mary, which had endured until their own time; and the reign of the Holy Ghost, **which, taking its beginning from the dawn of the twelfth century, was to last until the end of time. Unlike the Father and the Son, the Holy Ghost was to become incarnate, not merely in one individual of mankind, but in every member of the human race.** Moreover, as the Old Law had lost its efficacy at the coming of Christ, so, in their day, the law of the Gospel was to be supplanted by the interior guidance of the Holy Ghost, indwelling in each human soul. In consequence of this they rejected the sacraments as obsolete and useless. Those in whom the Holy Spirit had already taken up His abode were called "the spiritualized", and were supposed to be already enjoying the life of the Resurrection. The signs of this interior illumination were the rejection of faith and hope, as tending to keep the soul in darkness, and the acceptance, in their place, of the light of positive knowledge. **It followed from this, that in knowledge and the acquisition of new truths consisted their paradise; while ignorance, which meant adherence to the old order of things, was their substitute for hell.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924029351271/page/186/mode/2up?view=theater

There was already by 1209 a widespread "society" in and about Paris, evidently loosely held together, and yet showing some indications of internal organization. We learn of a specific ministry through "prophets," and we find an important stress placed on ecstasy and inspirational speaking. **The members of the sect rejected, as suited only to the condition of the ignorant and unspiritual, the traditional formulae, rites, and ceremonies of the Church.** They denounced as superstition the worship of saints and the veneration of relics. Goodwill and spiritual insight, they held, are more efficacious than the sacraments.

> "They denied," says the Chronicler Caesar of Heisterbach,1 "the resurrection of the body. They taught that there is neither heaven nor hell, as places, **but *that he who knows God possesses heaven*, and he who commits a mortal sin carries hell within himself just as a man carries a decayed tooth in his mouth.** They treated as idolatry the custom of setting up of statues to saints, and burning incense to images. They laughed at those who kissed the bones of martyrs."

…

If the law is abolished, if the believer holds that God does through him whatever he does, if he has lost all standards of distinction, **so that he asserts that "God spoke through Ovid as much as through Augustine," as one chronicler says they taught,** the step down into an immoral life is very easy. But there is no proof that the disciples of Amaury actually took this step. There is no such charge in the earliest account of the sect, and the charges increase in virulence as the writers are more remote in time from the facts which they record. In the first stage of the movement the lofty, serious purpose of the sect would keep the members from drawing practical consequences, into which a lower type of members might easily fall in the second and third generation.

…

We get a graphic account from a famous inquisitor—Stephen of Borbone—of a sect in Lyons **which looks like a union of the disciples of Amaury with the Waldenses.** The sect exhibits the strict morality of the latter, and the pantheistic metaphysics of the former. Stephen of Borbone made his investigation between 1223 and 1235. He describes the sect as follows:

> "**They absolutely refuse obedience to the Roman Church, which they call the unholy Babylon of the Apocalypse.** They hold that all good persons, according to some, even women, are priests, having received direct ordination from God, while ecclesiastics receive it only from men. All good persons, even women, can pronounce absolution, and can consecrate the bread. They teach that it is sufficient to confess sins to God, and that God alone is able to excommunicate."

Then follows an account of moral and anti-sacerdotal teaching characteristic of the Waldenses,1 and the account continues with a description of an extreme form of mysticism:

> "They pretend that every man is a Son of God in the same manner that Christ was. Christ had God or the Holy Spirit for soul, and they say that other men also have. They believe in the incarnation, the birth, the passion, and the resurrection of Christ, but they mean by it the Spiritual conception, Spiritual birth, Spiritual resurrection of the perfect man. **For them the true passion of Jesus is the martyrdom of a holy man, and the true sacrament is the conversion of a man, for in such a conversion the body of Christ is formed. In the doctrine of the Trinity, the Father is he who converts a stranger to their doctrine. The Son is he who is converted, and the Holy Spirit is the truth by means of which the conversion is accomplished.** This is what they mean when they say that they believe in the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. They declare that the soul of all men since Adam is the Holy Spirit. ... **It is because God thus dwells in them that all good men are priests.** It is God who works through them and gives them power to loose and bind."2

Only a few years after the death of Amaury a powerful sect came to light, with mystical and pantheistical ideas which seem like a propagation and expansion of the views of this group we have been studying. **It was called in its earlier stages the "Sect of the New Spirit," though this name was soon superseded by the name Brethren of the Free Spirit.** The sect appears to have sprung up in the city of Strasbourg, and to have owed its origin to a man named Ortlieb, who was almost certainly an Amaurian.

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/148/mode/2up?view=theater

They were in fact gnostics intent upon their own individual salvation; but the gnosis at which they arrived was a quasi-mystical anarchism – an affirmation of freedom so reckless and unqualified that it amounted to a total denial of every kind of restraint and limitation. **These people could be regarded as remote precursors of Bakunin and of Nietzsche** – or rather of that bohemian intelligensia which during the last half-century has been living from ideas once expressed by Bakunin and Nietzsche in their wilder moments. But extreme individualists of that kind can easily turn into social revolutionaries – and effective ones at that – if a potentially revolutionary situation arises.
...

Accusations of promiscuity were of course often brought by one religious community against another; it was a stock technique of polemic in the medieval as in the early Church. But when they are directed against the adepts of the Free Spirit these accusations take on a different ring. What emerges then is an entirely convincing picture of an eroticism which, **far from springing from a carefree sensuality, possessed above all a symbolic value as a sign of spiritual emancipation** which incidentally is the value which 'free love' has often possessed in our own times.
...

Towards the close of the twelfth century various Spanish cities, and notably Seville, witnessed the activities of mystical brotherhoods of Moslems. These people, who were known as Sufis, were 'holy beggars' who wandered in groups through the streets and squares, dressed in patched and parti-coloured robes. The novices amongst them were schooled in humiliation and self-abnegation: they had to dress in rags, to keep their eyes fixed on the ground, to eat revolting foodstuffs; and they owed blind obedience to the master of the group. **But once they emerged from their noviciate, these Sufis entered a realm of total freedom.** Disclaiming book-learning and theological subtleties, they rejoiced in direct knowledge of God – indeed, they felt themselves united with the divine essence in a most intimate union. And this in turn liberated them from all restraints. Every impulse was experienced as a divine command; now they could surround themselves with worldly possessions, **now they could live in luxury – and now, too, they could lie or steal or fornicate without qualms of conscience.**

> https://iranicaonline.org/articles/korramis

> The idea that women and property could be freely taken also reappears, both in Sufism and elsewhere (e.g. Malaṭi, p. 73f; Nasafi, p. 359; *Haftād o seh mellat*, nos. 27, 72). Evaluating such reports is notoriously problematic, **but we do at least know from Ḥorufi sources that some Ḥorufis held themselves entitled to take everything in existence, believing that they were already in a Paradisical state and thus freed from the constraints of the law:** the *ʿāref* could take whatever was within reach and should endeavor to obtain what was in the hands of others (Browne, pp. 75 f.). This is close to Moqannaʿ's preaching in that the concern is with taking the property (and women?) of others, not with sharing within the community. **All in all, the legacy of Ḵorramism and other pan-psychist forms of Iranian religion in Islam seems to be much greater than that of Zoroastrianism as known from the Pahlavi books.**

…

Certainly every one of the features that characterized Sufiism in twelfth-century Spain – even to such details as the particoloured robes – were to be noted as typical of the adepts of the Free Spirit a century or two later.

…

Early in the thirteenth century the doctrine of the Free Spirit was elaborated into an all-embracing theological and philosophical system. This was the work of a most interesting group, consisting of men who had been trained at the greatest school of orthodox theology in Western Christendom, the University of Paris. The fullest account has been given by a German chronicler, the prior of the abbey of Heisterbach. **'In the city of Paris,' he writes, 'that fount of all knowledge and well of the divine writings, the Devil by persuasion instilled a perverse understanding into several learned men.'** They were fourteen in number and all of them clerics – parish priests, chaplains, deacons and acolytes from Paris and its environs and from such towns as Poitiers, Lorris near Orleans, Troyes. 'Men great in knowledge and understanding,' laments the same chronicler, and in the main the description seems justified: nine of the fourteen had studied theology in Paris and two are mentioned as being sexagenarians.

…

The philosophical master of these sectarians had been Amaury of Bène, a brilliant lecturer in logic and theology at the University of Paris. This man had at one time enjoyed great prestige and the patronage of the royal court; a number of eminent persons, including the Dauphin, had been his friends and had been impressed by his ideas. But in the end, denounced for teaching erroneous doctrine, he was condemned by the Pope and forced to make a public recantation. This experience broke Amaury's spirit: he took to his bed and shortly afterwards – in 1206 or 1207 – he died. When some two of three years later the heretical sect was unearthed the clergy at once proclaimed Amaury's responsibility and labelled the heretics 'Almaricans' or 'Amaurians.'

…

When the Amaurians claimed that 'each one of them was Christ and Holy Spirit,' they meant all that Tanchelm had meant. **They were convinced that what Christian theology regards as the unique miracle of the Incarnation was now being repeated in each one of them.**

…

Through them the Holy Spirit would speak to the world; but as a result of its utterances the Incarnation would become ever more general, until soon it would be universal. Under the guidance of the 'Spirituals' the world was entering on its supreme epoch, in which every man would be, and know himself to be, divine. 'Within five years,' they foretold, '**all men will be Spirituals, so that each will be able to say: "I am the Holy Spirit" and "Before Abraham was, I am";** just as Christ was able to say: "I am the Son of God" and "Before Abraham was, I am."'

…

Moreover amongst the Amaurians the phantasy of the Age of the Spirit did not, any more than it did amongst the German Joachites, oust the older phantasies centred on the Last Emperor. The five years of tribulation were to culminate in the overthrow of Antichrist and his hosts, who were no other than the Pope and the Church of Rome. **Thereafter all kingdoms would be under the domination of the King of France – the reigning king, Philip Augustus, at first, but later Amaury's friend and patron the Dauphin, who would never die but would rule for ever in the Age of the Spirit.** And 'to the King of the French twelve loaves shall be given' – meaning (one may suppose) that Louis VIII was to be a second Christ who – just like Tanchelm and the 'Master of Hungary' – would preside over a privy council or sacred college of twelve, modeled on the twelve Disciples.

…

In southern Europe various hyper-ascetic groups split off from the main body of Franciscans and turned against the Church; the north of Italy and the south of France, where formerly the Cathars had flourished, became the homes of the Franciscan 'Spirituals' and the *Fraticelli*. Northern Europe, on the other hand, saw a great revival of the Free Spirit.

The heresy of the Free Spirit, after being held in check for half a century, began to spread rapidly again towards the close of the thirteenth century. From the onwards until the close of the Middle Ages it was disseminated by men who were commonly called Beghards and who formed an unofficial lay counterpart to the Mendicant Orders. They too were mendicants – **indeed it is probably from their name that the English words 'beg' and 'beggar' derive.**

…

If we hear of Brethren of the Free Spirit who were artisans by origin, we hear of others who came from prosperous and well-established families and of others still – as in all messianic movements – who came from the less privileged strata of the intelligentsia: former monks and priests and clerks in minor orders. But all alike seem to have been literate and articulate: again and again we find the clergy who had to combat these people dismayed by the subtlety and eloquence of their training and by the skill with which they handled abstruse theological concepts.

Like any other *propheta*, **an adept of the Free Spirit owed his ascendancy to his reputation for asceticism – regarded as a guarantee of miracle-working powers** – and partly to personal qualities of eloquence and bearing. **But the following which he sought was different from that of other *prophetae*. He appealed not to the uprooted and disoriented poor but to people who had other but less compelling reasons to feel disoriented and frustrated – to women, and particularly to unmarried women and widows in the upper strata of urban society.** Owing partly to the perpetual wars and feuds and partly to the celibacy of that very large section of the male population which made up the regular and secular clergy, the number of women always far exceeded the number of possible husbands. In the peasant and artisan classes spinsters and widows were absorbed by industry and agriculture, in the aristocracy they could always become nuns. To women born into the families of prosperous merchants, on the other hand, medieval society offered no recognized role save marriage.

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

It is in the fourteenth century that this doctrine first emerges into full view; and the features which it showed then were to remain almost unmodified throughout the history of the movement.

The metaphysical framework was provided by Neo-Platonism; but all the efforts which had been made, from Pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena onwards, to adapt Neo-Platonism to Christian beliefs were discounted. The pantheism of Plotinus, so far from being slurred over, was emphasized. The Brethren of the Free Spirit did not hesitate to say: 'God is all that is,' 'God is in every stone and in each limb of the human body as surely as in the Eucharistic bread,' 'Every created thing is divine.' **At the same time they took over Plotinus' own interpretation of this pantheism. It was the eternal essence of things, not their existence in time, that was truly God; whatever had a separate, transitory existence had emanated from God, but no longer was God.** On the other hand whatever existed was bound to yearn for its Divine Origin and to strive to find its way back into that Origin; and at the end of time everything would in fact be reabsorbed into God. No emanation would remain, nothing would exist in separateness, there would no longer be anything capable of knowing, wishing, acting. All that would be left would be one single Essence, changeless, inactive: one all-embracing 'Blessedness.' **Even the Persons of the Trinity, the Brethren of the Free Spirit insisted, would be submerged in that undifferentiated One.** At the end of time, God really would be all.

Even now reabsorption was the fate of the human soul as soon as the body was dead. On the death of the body the soul disappeared into its Divine Origin like a drop of water which has been taken from a jug and then dropped back into it again, or like a drop of wine in the sea. **This doctrine amounted of course to an assurance of a universal, though impersonal, salvation; and the more consistent of the Brethren of the Free Spirit did in fact hold that heaven and hell were merely states of the soul in this world and that there was no afterlife of punishment or reward.** To have the Holy Spirit incarnated in oneself and to receive the revelation which that brought – that was to rise from the dead and to possess heaven. A man who had knowledge of the God within himself carried his own heaven about with him. **One had only to recognize one's own divinity and one was resurrected as a Spiritual, a denizen of heaven on earth. To be ignorant of one's own divinity, on the other hand, was mortal sin, indeed it was the only sin. That was the meaning of hell;** and that too was something which one carried with one in this life.

Plotinus had held that human beings could even experience something of this reabsorption before the death of the body. It was possible for the soul to escape from its sensual bonds and from its awareness of itself and to sink for a moment, motionless and unconscious, into the One. This was the aspect of Neo-Platonism which appealed to the Brethren of the Free Spirit. **Although the Free Spirit has been traditionally known as 'the pantheistic heresy,' many of the heretics showed little interest in or understanding of pantheist metaphysics.** What they all had in common was a certain attitude to the human soul. 'The soul,' said one woman, 'is so vast that all the saints and angels would not fill it, so beautiful that the beauty of the saints and angels cannot approach it. It fills all things.' For the Brethren of the Free Spirit the soul was not merely destined to be reabsorbed into God on the death of the body; in its essence it had itself been divine from all eternity and was still potentially divine even whilst inhabiting a human body. **In the words of the heretical treatise which was found in the hermit's cell near the Rhine: 'The divine essence is my essence and my essence is the divine essence. ... From eternity man was God in God. ... From eternity the soul of man was in God and is God. ... Man was not begotten, but was from eternity wholly unbegettable; and as he could not be begotten, so he is wholly immortal.'**
...

The heart of the heresy was in fact not a philosophical idea at all but an aspiration; **it was a passionate desire of certain human beings to surpass the condition of humanity and to become God.** The clergy who observed the heretics had no doubts on the matter. These men and women, they complained, set themselves above the saints, the angels, the Virgin and even Christ Himself. **'They say they are God by**

nature, without any distinction,' commented the Bishop of Strasbourg, 'they believe that all divine perfections are in them, that they are eternal and in eternity.' Ruusbroek makes his heretical opponent voice the highest possible claims:

> It is the same with me as with Christ in every way and without any exception. Just like him, I am eternal life and wisdom, born of the Father in my divine nature; just like him, too, I am born in time and after the way of human beings; and so I am one with him, God and man. All that God has given him he has given me too, and to the same extent. ... **Christ was sent into the active life to serve me, so that he could live and die for me; whereas I am sent into the contemplative life, which is far higher.** ... If Christ had lived longer he would have attained the contemplative life which I have attained. **All the honour which is given to Christ is really given to me and to all those who have attained this higher life.** ... When his body is elevated at the altar during the sacrament, it is I who am lifted up; where his body is borne I am borne; for I am one flesh and blood with him, a single Person whom none can divide.

...

'The Spirit of Freedom or the Free Spirit,' said one adept, 'is attained when one is wholly transformed into God. This union is so complete that neither the Virgin Mary nor the angels are able to distinguish between man and God. **In it one is restored to one's original state, before one flowed out of the Deity.** One is illumined by that essential light beside which all created light is darkness and obfuscation. **One can be, according to one's wish, Father or Son or Holy Spirit.**'

...

But it is the heretical tract known as *Schwester Katrei* that gives the fullest account of all. After a whole series of ecstasies in which her soul 'soared up' but after a time fell back again, Sister Catherine experiences one great ecstasy which releases her altogether from the limitations of human existence. **She calls out to her confessor – himself clearly a Brother of the Free Spirit: 'Rejoice with me, I have become God!' 'Praise be to God!' he answers. 'Now leave all people, withdraw again into your state of oneness, for so you shall remain God.'** The woman falls into a deep trance, from which she emerges with the assurance: 'I am made eternal in my eternal blessedness. Christ has made me his equal and I can never lose that condition.'

...

And even this is an understatement, for often an adept would claim to have surpassed God. The women of Schweidnitz claimed that their souls had by their own efforts attained a perfection greater than they had possessed when they first emanated from God, **and greater than God ever intended them to possess.** They claimed to have such command over the Holy Trinity that they could 'ride it as in a saddle.' The Swabian heretics of 1270 said that they had mounted up above God and, reaching the very pinnacle of divinity, abandoned God. **Often the adept would affirm that he or she 'had no longer any need of God.'**

...

In a sketch written about 1330 in the chief stronghold of the heresy, Cologne, the Catholic mystic Suso evokes with admirable terseness those qualities in the Free Spirit which made it essentially anarchic. He describes how on a bright Sunday, as he was sitting lost in meditation, an incorporeal image appeared to his spirit. Suso addresses the image: 'Whence have you come?' The image answers: 'I come from nowhere.' – 'Tell me, what are you?' – 'I am not.' – 'What do you wish?' – 'I do not wish.' – 'This is a miracle! Tell me, what is your name?' – **'I am called Nameless Wildness.' – 'Where does your insight lead to?' – 'Into untrammeled freedom.' – 'Tell me, what do you call untrammeled freedom?' – 'When a man lives according to all his caprices without distinguishing between God and himself, and without looking before or after…'**

What distinguished the adepts of the Free Spirit from all other medieval sectarians was, precisely, their total amoralism. For them the proof of salvation was to know nothing of conscience or remorse. Innumerable pronouncements of theirs bear witness to this attitude: **'He who attributes to himself anything that he does, and does not attribute it all to God, is in ignorance, which is hell. … Nothing in a man's works is his own.'**

...

'They have no uniform,' complains one cleric. 'Sometimes they dress in a costly and dissolute fashion, sometimes most miserably, all according to the time and place. **Believing themselves to be impeccable, they really think that for them every kind of dress is permissible.**' By adopting noble robes in place of the beggar's rags a heretic symbolized his transformation from the 'lowest of mortals' into a member of an elite which believed itself entitled to dominate the world.

...

From the Swabian heretics in the thirteenth century down to the Ranters in the seventeenth the same view is expressed again and again: for the 'subtle in spirit' sexual intercourse cannot under any circumstances be sinful. **And it was held that one of the surest marks of the 'subtle in spirit' was, precisely, the ability to indulge in promiscuity without fear of God or qualms of conscience.**

...

That acute commentator Charlier de Gerson saw the connection perfectly clearly. **He noted that the 'Turlupins' were often naked together, saying that one ought not to blush at anything that was**

natural. To be naked and unashamed, like Adam and Eve, they regarded as an essential part of the state of perfection on earth; and they called this 'the state of innocence.' Similarly the leader of the *Homines intelligentiae* claimed to have a special way of performing the sexual act which was that practised by Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. The same man set himself up as the Saviour whose mission it was to inaugurate the Third and Last Age; and he was certainly not the only adept to fuse these originally disparate phantasies. In 1381 an adept at Eichstätt proclaimed himself as a Second Adam who, replacing Christ, was establishing the Third and Last Age in the form of an earthly Paradise which would last until it was bodily lifted up to heaven. **The Spiritual Libertines whom Calvin denounced declared that they had found the way back to the state enjoyed by Adam before he had tasted of the knowledge of good and evil – and also that they were living in the Last Days, in which the Christian dispensation was to be replaced by a newer and higher one.**
…

Indeed, the deified soul has no need even of God himself. **Once the absolute stillness of the divine Oneness has been reached, neither knowledge nor praise nor even the love of God exist any more. 'At the highest point of being, God himself is abandoned by himself in himself'; meaning that the God of Christianity is left behind, in favour of the God of pantheistic ecstasy.**

And towards terrestrial matters, too, the deified soul feels only profound indifference. 'This soul feels no pain for any sin it may ever have committed, nor for the suffering which God suffered for that soul, nor for the sin and pain in which its neighbours still remain.' 'The thoughts of such souls are so divine that they never concern themselves with past things or things that have been created.' At the same time, such souls are free to use all created things for their own purposes: 'Why should such souls have qualms about taking what they need, when necessity demands it? That would be a lack of innocence and a hindrance to that peace in which the soul rests from all things. ... Such souls use all things that are made and created, and which nature requires, with such peace of mind as they use the earth they walk on.'

All in all, then, Marguerite Porete's book confirms our view of the Free Spirit; an interpretation which originally had to be constructed step by step from a variety of more or less defective sources is shown to have been substantially correct. **As Marguerite repeatedly stresses, she is addressing an elite only – those whom she calls 'the great Church,' as distinct from 'the little Church' which is the institutionalized Church of Rome.** But to this elite she does indeed preach a doctrine of self-deification and of mystical anarchism.

Only on two points does Marguerite's teaching differ from that attributed to, say, Johann Hartmann or John of Brünn or Calvin's Spiritual Libertines. Marguerite nowhere suggests that **the deified soul – or as we would say, the adept of the Free Spirit** – would or should indulge in what were commonly regarded as sins, such as theft or sexual promiscuity; and save by implication she says nothing, either, about community of goods. There is nothing surprising about this. If one examines the Ranter material in the Appendix to the present book one finds that **while all these writers shared much the same mystical doctrine, they differed in the practical conclusions which they drew from it.**

> https://theamericansun.com/2021/10/19/failed-egoists-the-irrelevance-of-right-nietzscheanism/
>
> What could I say about Mad Max to the uninitiated? **He completed the system of German idealism, or rather wrecked it.** At the center of his philosophy is the Unique One [Der Einzige], or the "creative nothing," which is his term for the irreducible and undefinable substance of the individual. The *egoist*. **All ideas, essences, forms and thoughts exist purely for the gratification, play and struggle of the individual egoist, and the moment he starts to reify any ideas as a "higher cause" that he must be subject to, he at that point becomes a pawn of these fixed ideas, these "spooks" as he famously calls them. Now if this sounds like the most solipsistic individualism, one must keep in mind that from the perspective of an atheist or secularist, his reasoning is virtually irrefutable, and indeed Stirner's refutation of all secular ethical systems is absolutely devastating.**
> …
>
> **What made Stirner so aggravating to Marx and Engels (besides his fierce attack on communism) was his decidedly anti-political stance.** The whole notion of an ideal form of society is completely antithetical to his thought. It is also not necessarily true that the Stirnerite egoist should be some hedonistic slave to his passions, and his entire teaching does exhort to a certain self-mastery. **In fact, what is characteristic of egoism is that it does not have to lead to any exterior change in behavior whatsoever.** A man's outward behavior and praxis can remain identical before and after becoming an egoist, as the only necessary change is the internal consciousness of the fact that all thoughts and ideas are tools to be used by himself, the Unique, for his own ends, and not for those ideas to set his ends for him in advance. There is absolutely no way of telling if your neighbor is an egoist or not unless you can read mental states.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemistus_Pletho

Georgius Gemistus Pletho (c. 1355/1360-1452/1454) was a Greek scholar[4] and one of the most renowned philosophers of the late Byzantine era.[5] **He was a chief pioneer of the revival of Greek scholarship in Western Europe.**[6] As revealed in his last literary work, the *Nomoi* or *Book of Laws*, which he only circulated among close friends, he rejected Christianity in favour of a return to the worship of the classical Hellenic Gods, mixed with ancient wisdom based on Zoroaster and the *Magi*.[7]
...

Plethon has also formulated his political vision in several speeches throughout his life. The phrase that boasted in one of the speeches *"We are Hellenes by race and culture"*, and also, the proposition of a reborn Byzantine Empire following a utopian Hellenic system of government centered in Mystras has generated a lively and fruitful discussion about Byzantine and modern Greek identity.[9] In this regard, **Plethon has been labelled both "the last Hellene"[10] and "the first modern Greek".**[11]
...

Believing that the Peloponnesians were direct descendants of the ancient Hellenes, Plethon rejected Justinian's idea of a universal Empire in favour of recreating the Hellenistic civilization, the zenith of Greek influence.[23] In his 1415 and 1418 pamphlets he urged Manuel II and his son Theodore Palaiologos to turn the peninsula into a cultural island with a new constitution of strongly centralised monarchy advised by a small body of middle-class educated men.
...

Plethon derides Aristotle for discussing unimportant matters such as shellfish and embryos while failing to credit God with creating the universe,[18] for believing the heavens are composed of a fifth element, **and for his view that contemplation was the greatest pleasure; the latter aligned him with Epicurus, Plethon argued, and he attributed this same pleasure-seeking to monks, whom he accused of laziness.**[12]
...

> **I myself heard him at Florence ... asserting that in a few more years the whole world would accept one and the same religion with one mind, one intelligence, one teaching. And when I asked him "Christ's or Muhammad's?," he said, "Neither; but it will not differ much from paganism."** I was so shocked by these words that I hated him ever after and feared him like a poisonous viper, and I could no longer bear to see or hear him. **I heard, too, from a number of Greeks who escaped here from the Peloponnese that he openly said before he died ... that not many years after his death Muhammad and Christ would collapse and the true truth would shine through every region of the globe.**—*George of Trebizond, Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis, fol. v63*[24]
>
> https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> At any rate, Machiavelli saw two ways in which the ancient modes and orders might be destroyed. One was the irruption of barbarians, especially of the peoples of the North, such as the Scythians, who are at present held back by the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles. **The other would be the rejuvenation of the West.** It is the purpose of the *Discourses* to prepare this rebirth through awakening primarily the Italian-reading youth.188
>
> > 188. I pr. (90), 12 (129-130), 13 (133), 17 (141), 19 (147), 20, 55 (211-212), II 5, 8 (252, 254), III 1 (327, 330) and 17 end. Cf. *Florentine Histories* I 1.—C. Alexandre quotes the following statement by George of Trebizond (*Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis*) in his introduction to his edition of Gemistus Plethon's *Traité des Lois* (Paris 1858, p. xvi): ***Audivi ego ipsum [Plethonem] Florentiae, venit enim ad concilium cum Graecis, asserentem unam eandemque religionem uno animo, una mente, una praedicatione, universum orbem paucis post amis suscepturum. Cumque rogassem, Christine an Mahumeti? Neutram, inquit, sed non a gentilitate differentem—. Percepi etiam a nonnullis Graecis qui ex Peloponneso hue profugerunt, palam dixisse ipsum, anteaquam mortem obiiset iam fere triennio, non multis annis post mortem suam et Machumetum et Christum lapsum iri. ...***—Cf. also Alfarabius, *Compendium legum Platonis*, liber 3, beginning; Roger Bacon, *Moralis Philosophia* (ed. Massa), 193, 215 and 219; and Pico della Mirandola, *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem* II 5.

...

Gennadius burnt it in 1460; however, in a letter to the Exarch Joseph (which still survives) he details the book, providing chapter headings and brief summaries of the contents.[18] **It seemed to represent a merging of Stoic philosophy and Zoroastrian mysticism,** and discussed astrology, daemons and the migration of the soul. He recommended religious rites and hymns to petition the classical gods, such as Zeus, whom he saw as universal principles and planetary powers. Man, as relative of the gods, should strive towards good. Plethon believed the universe has no beginning or end in time, and being created perfect, nothing may be added to it. **He rejected the concept of a brief reign of evil followed by perpetual happiness, and held that the human soul is reincarnated, directed by the gods into successive bodies to fulfill divine order.** This

same divine order, he believed, governed the organisation of bees, the foresight of ants and the dexterity of spiders, as well as the growth of plants, magnetic attraction, and the amalgamation of mercury and gold.[12]
...

Ezra Pound included Plethon in his poem *The Cantos*. References to Plethon and Sigismondo Malatesta can be found in canto 8. Plethon is also mentioned in canto 23 and 26. Pound was fascinated by the role that Plethon's conversation must have had on Cosimo de Medici and his decision to acquire Greek manuscripts of Plato and Neoplatonic philosophers. By having manuscripts brought from Greece and becoming the patron of "the young boy, Ficino," Cosimo facilitated the preservation and transmission of Greek cultural patrimony into the modern world after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. **Plethon thus played a key but hidden role in the Italian Renaissance.**

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Medi/MediDebo.htm

Cosimo later founded the *Accademia Platonica* in Florence. The first director of the Academy was Marsilio Ficino. Ficino recorded the following about the founding of the Academy:

> **At the time when the Council was in progress between the Greeks and the Latins in Florence under Pope Eugenius, the great Cosimo, whom a decree of the Senate (*Signoria*) designated *Pater patriae*, often listened to the Greek philosopher Gemistos (with the cognomen Plethon, as it were a second Plato) while he expounded the mysteries of Platonism.** And he was so immediately inspired, so moved by Gemistos' fervent tongue, that as a result he conceived in his noble mind a kind of Academy, which he was to bring to birth at the first opportune moment. Later, when the great Medici brought his great idea into being, he destined me, the son of his favorite doctor, while I was still a boy, for the great task.(5)

...

Plethon treats of God in the first three substantive paragraphs of *De Differentiis*. His first claim is that **"...Plato's view is that God, the supreme sovereign, is the creator of every kind of intelligible and separate substance, and hence of our entire universe. Aristotle, on the other hand, never calls God the creator of anything whatever, but only the motive force of the universe."**(8) In this paragraph, Plethon's support for his position is garnered from allusions to texts in Plato and Aristotle. For example, his interpretation of Aristotle's position is supported by reference to *Metaphysics* 1072b10 and *Physics* 258b11. Plethon continues his complaint by noting "...that Aristotle does make God the end and the final cause; but even this must be regarded as a not very exalted claim and not one worthy of God, if he makes God the end not of the existence or essence of particular things but only of movement and change."(9) Plethon's characterization of Aristotle's position, as far as it goes, is accurate.
...

Plethon then marshals more arguments to show that Aristotle did not believe that God was the creator of the universe. **His first is that Aristotle never articulates such a doctrine yet "...he goes on at unnecessary length about such things as embryos and shellfish."**(11)
...

In the text of *De Differentiis* itself, it is not clearly evident that Plethon considers the Platonic conception of God closer to that of the Christian conception than that of Aristotle. However, the subsequent dispute between Plethon and Scholarios does. George Scholarios's *Defence of Aristotle* was written in about 1443. Plethon's *Reply* was written shortly thereafter. **In his *Reply*, Plethon often stresses his belief that Plato is more consistent with Christian doctrine than is Aristotle.** (23) This can best be explained, perhaps, because Scholarios already suspected Plethon of heterodoxy and Plethon's *Reply* provided an opportunity to deflect such suspicions.(24) Let us now turn to Plethon's actual beliefs.
...

During his long lifetime, Plethon had published a fairly large number of works on a wide variety of topics. However, during much of his adult life, Plethon had also been compiling an extensive work on his esoteric doctrines. This work, the *Book of Laws*, was not discovered until after his death. The work contained that which shocked many and confirmed the suspicions of more than a few.

The only copy came into the possession of Princess Theodora, the wife of Demetrios, Despot of Morea. **In the meantime, George Scholarios had been enthroned as Gennadios II, Patriarch of Constantinople, at the insistence of Sultan Mehmet II.** Theodora was not certain how to deal with the manuscript and so she sent it to Gennadios and asked for his advice. After he read it, he sent it back to Theodora with the advice to destroy it. **Meanwhile Mehmet captured Mistras, the capitol of Morea and Theodora escaped to Constantinople with Demetrios and the manuscript. Theodora, reluctant to destroy the only copy of a work by such a distinguished scholar, turned it over to Gennadios. He burnt the work in 1460.** Fortunately, Gennadios wrote a letter to the Exarch Joseph detailing the whole affair. In the letter, he lists all the chapter headings of the *Book of Laws* and gives a short description of the contents.

...

Plethon's arguments in *De Differentiis* against Aristotle's conception of God appear to be consistent with an Orthodox Christian conception of the divinity. A closer examination of Plethon's position in *De Differentiis* when compared to his position in his *Summary* reveals that those two positions are, in fact, consistent with one another and not with any Christian conception whatever. **Plethon may have seen his lectures in Florence as a way to lay a foundation for the spread of his esoteric doctrines.**
...

> (16) **Woodhouse claims that Plethon "... shared the very heresy which he had condemned in Aristotle (and of which he had acquitted Plato), namely the belief that the universe was eternal and had no beginning in time."** *Plethon*, 320. Woodhouse appears to miss the distinction that Plethon is very careful to make, i.e., the distinction between temporal generation and atemporal generation. **Plethon claims that Aristotle recognizes only temporal generation, whereas Plato recognizes both temporal and atemporal generation.** Thus, Aristotle insists on an eternal ungenerated universe, whereas, Plethon thinks, Plato believes that the universe was generated but also eternal. This claim, as we shall see, is consistent with Plethon's position in the *Summary*.

http://nauplion.net/cp-plethon-peritore.pdf

Plethon's contributions to Western learning were so well remembered that Sigismundo Malatesta had his remains reinterred at Rimini in 1465, his epitaph reading in part "prince among the philosophers of his time."2

His influence on the West would, however, have been even greater had not most of his posthumous *Treatise on the Laws* been burnt by the Patriarch Scholarios in an unfortunate act of censorship. The portions which remain show Plethon to have been an advocate of a Platonic-Spartan theocracy which resurrected the pagan Hellenic pantheon.
...

Like Plato in the *Republic* or *Laws*, Plethon was concerned to begin radical restructuring of the polity on a *tabula rasa*. He therefore proposed royal confiscation and redistribution of land to the working peasantry.

> The judgment should be added to what has already been said that by nature all the land is equal and common to those dwelling on it; **no one should lay claim to any part of the land as private but whoever wishes to plant should go where he will, build a house and plow as much land as he is willing and able,** and each shall be master of this much land on condition that he occupies it and does not neglect to work it. No one will pay rent nor be troubled or annoyed by anyone other than those who have previously taken the land through work according to the law of common property which fits the case. Then if he should be of the Helot class, a third of his produce is taken for the common fund as we said and he is to be troubled no further, having once and for all discharged his debt. But if he is a soldier or some other among those serving the state through their acts, he shall pay no taxes but rather do the service to which he was appointed.29

Given Manuel's recent victory over the Peloponnesian *Dynatoi*, or landlords, Plethon optimistically concluded that this necessary condition for the creation of a Platonic system of classes could immediately be realized.

There are historical antecedents other than the Platonic for this proposal. For example, it closely paralleled the revolutionary program of the Hellenistic Spartan kings Agis (264-241 B.C.) and Kleomenes (263-219 B.C.) which Plethon, who lived only a few miles from medieval Sparta, examined in his histories. **The Spartan Kings' redistribution of land and debt cancellation resembled Plethon's homesteading of "nationalized" land by peasants freed from feudal duties and bonds.** The Spartan expansion of the army and citizenship rolls was approximated in his "pairing" of farmers and soldiers and their rotation of functions. The Spartan restoration of the "Lycurgan" lifestyle, considered by Plethon to be unrealistically harsh, found an echo in his advocacy of simplified living and sumptuary laws to restrain the extravagances of the wealthy.30
...

As a bureaucrat, jurist, and philosophical royalist, Plethon was hostile to the landed aristocracy and suggested confiscation of their estates. Because the land therein lay fallow while many peasants remained unemployed, he maintained, labor alone should give title to land, and the largely idle landlords should be forced to "accede to the common good."34 It is likely that through these means **Plethon intended to fuse the highly diverse peoples of the Peloponnese into a unified fighting peasantry on the basis of population mixing, homesteading, and the development of a correspondence between the private interest in land and the common interest in survival of**

Empire. To this end he proposed the "introduction of the opinion" that the land is equal and common to all dwelling on it according to nature.35
...

It must be noted that Plethon recognized the non-monastic clergy as civil servants worthy of modest public support. His hostility extended to the professed quietism of the monasteries rather than to the hierarchy of the Orthodox church, which would later serve as the vehicle of popular national sentiment during the three hundred years of Turkish domination.39

> 39. Hertz, *Nationality*, pp. 109-114. Kohn, Idea, pp. 534-543, 535. Roman Jakobson, "The Beginnings of National Self-Determination in Europe," *Review of Politics* 7 (1945): 29-42 for the Czech case. Plethon argued for a civil religion in his address to Theodore, sounding a theme which would prove central to his later *Laws*. He argued that public and private accord on at least three religious tenets is necessary for public morality and, it would seem, national unity. The first tenet is that God exists, the second that he is concerned with human affairs and governs even minor conduct, and the third that his governance is absolutely just and unaffected by rites or sacrifices. Lampros, *PP*, pp. 125.3-126.7. **In the *Laws* Plethon drops his Christian mask and reveals himself to be a pagan determinist. The *Laws* is a draft of a theocratic state based on mixed Platonic-Stoic institutions, a detailed code of moral regulations, and a complex and richly developed state cult geared to a luni-solar calendar.** His Neoplatonic "Hellenic" theology is designed to provide the religious unity needed for national regeneration, and is composed of a hierarchy of four decads of gods and titans (including "demons") which serve as anthropomorphic representations of the Forms which govern the cosmos. See remains of the text in Alexandre, *Lois*. **Plethon's political use of religion antedates More, Campanella, and Machiavelli** (*Discourses*, i: chap. 11-15) and makes the loss of the political portions of his ms. all the more lamentable.

https://archive.org/details/historyofchurch0003hugh/page/380/mode/2up?view=theater

Nor did Plato come to the age unaccompanied. Only a pace behind, in his very shadow, and not always distinguished from him, came Plotinus and the religious cult of Neo-Platonism which had developed through Plotinus.4 Here was Platonism presented as a religion, where communion with the divine through ecstasy, for which lifelong asceticism prepared the soul, was presented as the supreme achievement of life. It was a "religion" where there was no place for real freedom, nor for personal responsibility, nor prayer, and where sin had no meaning. The world for the Neo-Platonist was not created by the free act of a loving creator, but was the necessary expression of the nature of the first principle of all. **Providence was but the kind of universal sympathy that links all things together in a fixed necessitated movement, all being moved by the single soul of the world. Here, in ultimate logic, is Pantheism and all its horrors; religion without a personal God, without any possibility of the Incarnation,** mystical life without any need of grace and—since there is no such distinction as between creator and created—communion without subordination, and the idea that mystical experience is the basis and the test of truth.

Many things in Platonism and in Neo-Platonism can no doubt be given a Christian interpretation, but of themselves they are not Christian; for Christians with intelligences less than very well trained in Christian teaching, they are obviously dangerous.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1123&printsec=frontcover

Henry More boxed himself into a corner. Spirit remained the essential adjunct to his philosophy of “reason”; yet it was far from clear, as Baxter objected, whether his motley of good and bad spirits possessing extension but diffusing in various ways, like light, were or were not separable from the bodies they pervaded. All considered, **More’s dichotomy of body and spirit seemed more of a quasi-monism than a genuine duality, and his pretended basic distinction resting on penetrability versus inpenetrability, lifeless matter versus extended diffusing spirit activating all life and motion, highly problematic. What stood out most was More’s fury at Spinoza’s disdain for Platonists and Platonism including his appropriation of the Platonic term *natura naturans*. Spinoza was perverting this term into precisely that Cartesian mechanistic materialism he and Cudworth held responsible for the rising tide of “debauchery, skepticism and infidelity” polluting their age.** Avid to repel Spinoza using his Platonic concept of the all-pervasive divine agency of the supreme good infusing, but at the same standing far above, all created things, More’s approach left some suspecting this only rendered his system more susceptible to Spinoza’s dismissing Neoplatonist speculation as worthless “speculation.”

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/672/mode/2up?view=theater

Deriding Spinelli's two-substance doctrine, Doria offers his Neoplatonic philosophy underpinned with arguments which, however, **were bound to strengthen suspicions of disturbing affinities between his Neoplatonism and Spinozism. If Doria is a loyal Catholic who believes Christ's coming is the decisive event in history, why continually claim that in most of the virtues and general culture Europe had lamentably retrogressed since classical Greece?**51 Doria claimed to have rescued the Providence, intelligence, and Will of God from the *Spinosisti*, but it was far from evident that Plato's and Doria's God was distinct from the totality of the universe. When Doria (and for that matter Vico) affirms that the 'Providenza di Dio' is the same as the infinitely perfect order of things, one could hardly fail to suspect that both thinkers were subsuming Providence into the unalterable laws of Nature.52

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n363/mode/2up?view=theater

The Hermetic Masonry, or the Scotch degrees, who work in chymistry, have adopted *Pantheism or the true Spinosism*. With them *every thing is God, and God is every thing*. That is their grand mystery, engraved in one word *Jehovah* on the stone brought by the Knights Templars from the Holy Land.

Let the reader refer to the preface of the zealous Knight of St. Andrew, who has given us such a circumstantial account of these degrees. **He will there see our Knight reducing the result of his whole doctrine to this famous text of Hermes Trismegistus,** "All is part of God; if all is part, the whole must be God. Therefore every thing that is made made itself, and will never cease to act, for this agent cannot repose. And as God has no end, so can his works have neither beginning nor end." **After having recited this passage, our Pantheistical adept tells us, "Such is the summary though expressive belief of the whole Hermetic System;"** in a word the whole religious system of the Scotch degrees with the discovery of which he is so much pleased.

Let not the reader suppose that he attempts to explain away the expression *all is God*. In his opinion nothing but the grossest ignorance and prejudice can disapprove of the assertion. It is in vain to object, that, making the grain of sand, the Heavens, the Earth, the animal, or man, *a part of God*, is rendering the Deity divisible; **for he will answer, that it is only the grossest ignorance which hides from us, that *those millions of millions of parts are so united together and so essentially constitute a God* WHOLE, *that to separate a single particle would be to annihilate the* WHOLE *itself, or the Great* JEHOVAH.** But, lest the Knight of the Craft should be vain on finding himself a part of God, our Hierophant informs us, that *as the little finger is always less than the whole body; so is man, though a small particle of God, infinitely smaller than* JEHOVAH. Our adept may nevertheless rejoice, however small a particle he may be of the Deity, **as the day will come when he is to be reunited to *the great* WHOLE, the day when, every thing being reunited to the great Jehovah, harmony will be complete, *and true Pantheism will be established for ever*.**1

It is to be hoped that the reader does not expect us to trouble ourselves with the refutation of so monstrous a system. The preface however is not the only part of that work which lays down this system as the tenets of these degrees; for, after the description of them, we find what are called *Solomon's Thesis*; also the *Archetype world*; and these are productions all tending to strengthen them in their impiety.2 We shall not therefore be accused of calumniating this branch of Masonry by attributing to it a system which makes the villain, like the just man, a constituent part of the Deity, and represents vice and virtue as the very action of the Deity; **a system which promises the same destiny to the good and to the wicked, of being *reunited to the Deity*; and thus, after having ceased to be man, of being God to all eternity.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA203#v=onepage&q&f=false

Largely, no doubt, because of the general exhaustion and decline of the *pólis*, but partly, perhaps, as a result of Plato's efforts and those of the other Socratics, by the late fourth century, the general atmosphere in Athens and elsewhere seems to have changed somewhat, and it became possible – and perhaps even advisable – for the philosopher to pursue an alternative rhetorical strategy.174 **If, in *The Politics*, Aristotle virtually ignores religion's vital contribution to constituting the life of the *pólis* and if, in the *Poetics*, he gives hardly a hint of the central role the gods played in Greek tragedy, it is not a consequence of negligence, blindness, or folly on his part.**175 **In similar fashion, without even a cursory attempt at explanation, he omits piety when he lists the moral virtues in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Eudemean Ethics*, and *Rhetoric*.**176 The peripatetic appears to have thought the gods more necessary and better suited to prepolitical, village life than to the good life made possible by the Greek *pólis*.177 Moreover, as a philosopher mindful of the fate of Socrates and devoted above all else to fostering and protecting what he considered the best way of life,178 **Aristotle seems to have been less concerned with providing the well-to-do young gentlemen who attended his lectures with an historically accurate account of Greek politics and poetry than with discouraging and therefore downplaying the one feature of ancient civic life most**

likely to fuel the city's intolerance of free inquiry. In his work, as in that of many another great writer, what passes as description is often prescription as well.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D12%3Asection%3D1074b

[1074b] [1] **A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods,[1] and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature. The rest of their tradition has been added later in a mythological form to influence the vulgar and as a constitutional [νόμους] and utilitarian expedient;[2]** they say that these gods are human in shape or are like certain other animals,[3] and make other statements consequent upon and similar to those which we have mentioned. **Now if we separate these statements and accept only the first, that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying and reflect that whereas every art and philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge. To this extent only, then, are the views of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us.**

https://christian.net/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/luther/web/nblty-07.html

What else are the universities, if their present condition remains unchanged, than as the book of Maccabees says, 2 Macc. 4:9, 12: *Gymnasia Epheborum et Graecae gloriae,*[1] in which loose living prevails, the Holy Scriptures and the Christian faith are little taught, **and the blind, heathen master Aristotle**[2] **rules alone, even more than Christ.**
…

It grieves me to the heart that this damned, conceited, rascally heathen has with his false words deluded and made fools of so many of the best Christians. God has sent him as a plague upon us for our sins.

Why, this wretched man, in his best book, *On the Soul*, teaches that the soul dies with the body, although many have tried with vain words to save his reputation. As though we had not the Holy Scriptures, in which we are abundantly instructed about all things, and of them Aristotle had not the faintest inkling! **And yet this dead heathen has conquered and obstructed and almost suppressed the books of the living God,** so that when I think of this miserable business I can believe nothing else than that the evil spirit has introduced the study of Aristotle.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

And indeed, Religion has no Share in the System of *Aristotle*. f Besides that 'tis not yet a settled Point, g whether he believ'd the Immortality of the Soul; he makes no Mention of Providence but by the By; and in such a Manner too, as shews him not to be thoroughly persuaded of it.

> f. **Aristotle *was the least of any made use of by the Greek Fathers. They found, that he spoke slightly of Providence, and of the Nature of the Soul; that his Logick was too intricate, and his Morality too humane:*** *For this is the Judgment St.* Gregory *of* Nazianze *makes of him*, (Orat. 33, P 535, D.) *Fleury, des Etudes*, &c. p.18. Ed. *Brussels*.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_195

> [103] It has in its consequences proved no trifling evil to the Christian world, that Aristotle's Definitions of Nature are all grounded on the petty and rather rhetorical than philosophical Antithesis of Nature to Art—a conception inadequate to the demands even of *his* philosophy. **Hence in the progress of his reasoning, he confounds the *natura naturata***
> **(that is, the sum total of the facts and phænomena of the Senses) with an hypothetical *natura naturans*, a**
> ***Goddess* Nature, that has no better claim to a place in any sober system of Natural Philosophy than the Goddess *Multitudo*; yet to which Aristotle not rarely gives the name and attributes of the Supreme Being.** The result was, that the idea of God thus identified with this hypothetical *Nature* becomes itself but an *hypothesis*, or at best but a precarious inference from incommensurate premises and on disputable principles: **while in other passages, God is confounded with (and every where, in Aristotle's *genuine* works, *included in*) the Universe: which most grievous error it is the great and characteristic merit of Plato to have avoided and denounced.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D3

DEMOCRITUS, Epicurus, and those philosophers who introduced atoms and a vacuum, affirm that the world is not an animal, nor governed by any wise Providence, but that it is managed by a nature which is void of reason. **All the other philosophers affirm that the world is informed with a soul, and governed by reason and Providence. Aristotle is excepted, who is somewhat different; he is of opinion, that the whole world is not acted by a soul in every part of it, nor hath it any sensitive, rational, or intellectual faculties, nor is it guided by reason and Providence in every part of it;** of all which the heavenly bodies are made partakers, for the circumambient spheres are animated and are living beings; but those things which are about the earth are void of those endowments; **and though those terrestrial bodies are of an orderly disposition, yet that is casual and not primogenial.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_Greek_and_Roman_Biography_and_Mythology/Theophrastus

The conceivableness of a spirit entirely independent of organic activity, must therefore have appeared to him very doubtful; yet he appears to have contented himself with developing his doubts and difficulties on the point, without positively rejecting it (Themist. in Arist. de An. 89, b. 91, b; Schneid. 215. 15). **Other Peripatetics, as Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, and especially Straton, more unreservedly and unconditionally gave a sensualistic turn to the Aristotelic doctrine.** Theophrastus seems, generally speaking, where the investigation overstepped the limits of experience, to have shown more acuteness in the development of difficulties than in the solution of them, as is especially apparent in the fragment of his metaphysics. In a penetrating and unbiased conception of phenomena, in acuteness of reflection and combination respecting them and within their limits, in compass and certainty of experimental knowledge, he may have stood near Aristotle, if he did not come quite up to him: **the incessant endeavour of his great master to refer phenomena to their ultimate grounds, his profundity in unfolding the internal connections between the latter, and between them and phenomena, were not possessed by Theophrastus. Hence even in antiquity it was a subject of complaint that Theophrastus had not expressed himself with precision and consistency respecting the Deity, and had understood thereby at one time Heaven, at another an (enlivening) breath** (*pneuma*, Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 44. b; Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 13); that he had not been able to comprehend a happiness resting merely upon virtue (Cic. Acad. i. 10, Tusc. V. 9), or, consequently, to hold fast by the unconditional value of morality, and, although blameless in his life, had subordinated moral requirements to the advantage at least of a friend. (A. Gell. N. A. i. 3. § 23), and had admitted in prosperity the existence of an influence injurious to them. (In particular, fault was found with his expression in the *Callisthenes*, *vitam regit fortuna non sapientia*, Cic. Tusc. iii. 10; comp. Alex. Aphrod. de Anima. ii. extr.) That in the definition of pleasure, likewise, he did not coincide with Aristotle, seems to be indicated by the titles of two of his writings, one of which treated of pleasure generally, the other of pleasure, as Aristotle had defined it (Diog. Laert. v. 44, Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης); **and although, like his teacher, he preferred contemplative (theoretic), to active (practical) life** (Cic. ad Att. ii. 16), **he was at the same time disposed to set the latter free from the fetters of family life, &c. in a manner of which the former would not have approved** (Hieron. adv. Jovinian. i, 189, Bened.)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_V#Theophrastus

Casander certainly granted him audience and Ptolemy made overtures to him. **And so highly was he valued at Athens that, when Agnonides ventured to prosecute him for impiety, the prosecutor himself narrowly escaped punishment.**
…

38. Although his reputation stood so high, **nevertheless for a short time he had to leave the country with all the other philosophers, when Sophocles the son of Amphiclides proposed a law that no philosopher should preside over a school except by permission of the Senate and the people, under penalty of death.** The next year, however, the philosophers returned, as Philo had prosecuted Sophocles for making an illegal proposal. Whereupon the Athenians repealed the law, fined Sophocles five talents, and voted the recall of the philosophers, in order that Theophrastus also might return and live there as before. He bore the name of Tyrtamus, and it was Aristotle who re-named him Theophrastus on account of his graceful style. 39. **And Aristippus, in his fourth book *On the Luxury of the Ancients*, asserts that he was enamoured of Aristotle's son Nicomachus, although he was his teacher.**
…

He is said to have become the owner of a garden of his own after Aristotle's death, through the intervention of his friend Demetrius of Phalerum.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

We hear that a direct accusation for impiety was made by Agnonides against Theophrastus, which also failed,3 **and so we seem to hear an echo of the last struggle of the old traditions against the new schools of thought. From henceforth all opinion is free at Athens;** even Epicurus, with his hardly-veiled atheism; Zeno, with his monotheism; the sceptics with their disturbing logic—all are not only tolerated, but enjoy high position and social respect at Athens.

> 3. If we may trust Bernays's reconstruction of the *Tract on Piety* (*περι εὐσεβειας*) from the quotations of Porphyry, **Theophrastus was indeed a dangerous opponent of orthodoxy. For he there argued that the whole system of sacrificing animals was both offensive in itself and inconsistent with true piety.** It violated the obligation of general benevolence towards other living things, it substituted occasional and costly acts of religious service for the daily duty of worshipping the gods, and replaced the pure and natural gifts (of the fruits of the earth) by a gross and bloody gift, merely invented to cloak the gluttony of the sacrificers, who invariably feasted upon the victim, and therefore selected not the cleanest but the most palatable beasts. Theophrastus appears as a vegetarian, allowing no slaughter of animals unless they be harmful to men. **How this attack on sacrifices must have offended the orthodox, I need hardly insist; it is notable as evidence of the Rationalism or *Aufklärung* which had taken place in religion, for it seems to have made no great stir in the world.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

There are crowds of arguers who contradict this; and those not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but, somehow or other, almost every man of letters; **and, above all, my favorite Dicæarchus is very strenuous in opposing the immortality of the soul:** for he has written three books, which are entitled Lesbiacs, because the discourse was held at Mitylene, in which he seeks to prove that souls are mortal. The Stoics, on the other hand, allow us as long a time for enjoyment as the life of a raven; **they allow the soul to exist a great while, but are against its eternity.**

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cicegoog/page/80/mode/2up?view=theater

You say that nothing can have any power without God. Exactly opposite is the doctrine of Strato of Lampsacus, who gives that God of his exemption from all important business. But as the priests of the gods have a holiday, how much more reasonable is it that the gods should have one themselves? He then asserts that he has no need of the aid of the gods to account for the making of the world. Everything that exists, he says, was made by Nature: not agreeing with that other philosopher who teaches, that the universe is a concrete mass of rough and smooth, and hooked and crooked bodies, with the addition of a vacuum: this he calls a dream of Democritus, and says that he is here not teaching, but wishing;—but he himself, examining each separate part of the world, teaches that whatever exists, and whatever is done, is caused, or has been caused, by natural weights and motions.

https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy-biographies/strato-lampsacus

Modern historians generally have represented Strato as an eclectic trying to combine elements from the systems of Aristotle and Democritus. Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality his thought was a one-sided but legitimate, consistent, and often brilliant development of Aristotle's views, along lines that to a large extent had been marked out by Theophrastus. The occasional resemblances between Strato's doctrine and that of the atomists are fortuitous. **What Strato did was to strip the Aristotelian world picture of its transcendental elements – or, to put it another way, he refused to acknowledge the reality of anything not subject to the natural laws seen to apply in the sublunary world. In doing this he was carrying to its logical conclusion a process begun by Aristotle himself.**

Aristotle had criticized Plato's conception of a world of Forms above and behind the sensible world on the ground that he had failed to show how these two systems were related. **Nevertheless, he continued to teach the existence of an Unmoved Mover outside the physical world and above its laws;** and within the physical world he distinguished two systems subject to different laws, one extending from the center of the universe to the sphere of the moon's revolution, the other embracing the heavenly bodies. The difficulties entailed by the second division can be seen by studying Aristotle's *Meterologica;* those involved by the first were stated by Aristotle's pupil **Theophrastus in his *Metaphysica*, in which the Unmoved Mover and the teleological view of the world are subjected to a critique that in many ways is a continuation of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic Forms.**

It was left to Strato, however, to construct a new cosmology in which the world was explained as the product of immanent forces only. The ancient authorities tried to express this by saying that "everything that exists is the result of natural weights and movements" (fr. 32, from Cicero): that "all divine power is contained in nature, which contains in itself the causes of coming-into-being, growth and decay, but has no consciousness or shape" (fr. 33, from Cicero): that"natural processes are governed by 'what happens spontaneously' (τὸ αὐματον)" (fr. 35, from Plutarch); **and even that Strato regarded heaven and earth as gods (frs. 37 and 39, both derived from Seneca).** The preference for an explanation of the world that does not depend on transcendent causes was shared by Strato with the other chief philosophical schools of his day, the Stoics and the Epicureans; but their teaching was in some ways more naïve and less radical.

Strato differed from the Stoics in denying that nature is conscious and provident, and from the atomists in positing a regulating principle to which all the processes that constitute the world are somehow subordinated.
…

Strato's psychology is consistent with his cosmology. **He denied the existence of an immaterial or immortal soul – he argued at considerable length against the doctrine of Plato's *Phaedo* (frs. 118, 122–127) – or even of a transcendent element in the soul such as Aristotle's "Active Reason";** he insisted, rather, that mental activity is not essentially different from any other kind of movement (fr. 74).
…

Nevertheless, Strato's influence was limited. The centrifugal tendency among the sciences could not be arrested, and philosophical cosmology came to be dominated increasingly by religious considerations. Signs of a reaction against Strato in his own school appear in the last chapter of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De spiritu*, perhaps written within thirty years of his death.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_school#History_of_the_school

After the time of Strato, the Peripatetic school fell into a decline. Lyco was famous more for his oratory than his philosophical skills, and Aristo is perhaps best known for his biographical studies;[19] **although Critolaus was more philosophically active, none of the Peripatetic philosophers in this period seem to have contributed anything original to philosophy.**[20]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_V#cite_ref-43

Strato himself, however, was, as stated above, a man entitled to full approbation,[44] since he excelled in every branch of learning, and most of all in that which is styled "physics," a branch of philosophy more ancient and important than the others.

> 44. πολλῆς τῆς ἀποδοχῆς ἄξιος. **This phrase might be taken as Diogenes Laertius's defence for his inclusion of the Life of Strato. According to the scheme of i. 14, 15, the Peripatetics ended with Theophrastus, whose successors were often held to be vastly inferior, and unworthy to rank beside him;** see Cicero, *De Fin.* v. §§ 12, 13; Strabo xiii. 609. The latter alleges as the reason for this decline the well-known story that the school was deprived of Aristotle's library, which had been carried away to Scepsis.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q&f=false

This kind of atheism, in Cudworth's words,

> **being too modest and shamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would therefore allow to the several parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, such as is devoid of reflexive consciousness, together with a plastic power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themselves to the best advantage of their respective capabilities; something like to Aristotle's nature, but that it hath no dependence at all upon any higher Mind or Deity.** And these Atheists may be also called hylozoic (as the other atomic,) because they derive all things in the whole universe, not only sensitive, but also rational souls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter.48

Hylozoistic atheism was a doctrine, Cudworth noted, that began with the Peripatetic scholarch Strato of Lampsacus, then 'slept in perfect silence and oblivion,' but that had 'of late [been] awakened and revived by some.' Spinoza's work, Passmore judged, Cudworth 'knew only imperfectly but interpreted as reviving a tradition which was worth opposing in detail.'49 **'Cosmoplastic' or 'Pseudo-Stoical' atheism was clearly a variation on this hylozoic theme.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page67

And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancient Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the first cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, with complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understanding in this first source of things.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page332

I discovered at the same time that the laws of motion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are not in reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be; but neither is it necessary that they be so. They do not spring entirely from the

principle of necessity, but rather from the principle of perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of God. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but must always assume something that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity. **Thus these admirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato or Spinoza.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/444/mode/2up?view=theater

Still more often tied to Spinoza during the Early Enlightenment than Xenophanes was the third-century BC philosopher Strato of Lampsacus. Indeed, the question of Strato, **successor of Theophrastus and third head of the Athenian Lyceum which he headed for nearly two decades from 287 BC until his death around *c.* 269 BC,** highlighted by both Bayle and Leibniz, played a not inconsiderable role in the evolution of eighteenth-century materialism.75 All the writings of Strato were lost during late antiquity; and while there survive a few reports by other classical authors, these – as has often been pointed out – are too few and disparate to provide a coherent picture or even a definite outline of his philosophy.
…

His name meant little or nothing to the Middle Ages or the Renaissance humanists. Thomas Stanley in the mid seventeenth century provided a brief entry on Strato in his *History*, but beyond saying 'he prescribed all divine power to Nature' tells us nothing about his ideas.78 Then, in the late seventeenth century, interest in the 'Naturalist' strongly revived and for one particular reason: contemporaries were greatly struck by the affinities between his supposed system and that of Spinoza. **Almost overnight the parallel drawn between Stratonism and Spinozism rendered Strato one of the most intensely debated of all ancient Greek thinkers.**

Though Gerardus Vossius, in his great work on pagan religion *De theologia gentili* and his posthumously published *De philosophorum sectis liber* (1657), already states, relying in Cicero and early Christian accounts,79 that Strato identified God with nature but conceived nature as acting blindly, without intelligence or design, spontaneously generating all living things,80 the real debate began with Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678), a masterpiece aimed against all forms of predestination and necessitarianism.81 Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, since 1654, **and reckoned 'un des plus habiles hommes du XVIIe siècle' by Bayle, Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) was the first to investigate 'a certain form of atheism, never before taken notice of, by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoick:** which nonwithstanding, though it were long since started by Strato, in way of opposition to the Democritick and Epicurean hypothesis; **yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently;** had we not certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived, **by some, who were so sagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the atomick form could never doe their business,** nor prove defensible: and therefore would attempt to carry this cause of atheism, in quite a different way, by the life and preception of matter.'82
…

Cudworth ingeniously differentiates the corpus of ancient Greek philosophical 'atheism' into four main categories or types – a procedure later emulated in numerous early eighteenth-century discussions of ancient philosophy.92 His typology comprised **'first the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from dead and stupid matter in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible'; secondly, 'the atomical or Democritical' where the creative force in nature is 'fortuitous mechanism' of atomic movement;** thirdly, 'the Stoical or Cosmoplastick' supposing 'one plastick and methodical but senseless nature, to preside over the whole corporeal universe'; and finally, and least understood and discussed by previous modern writers, the 'Hylozoick or Stratonical.'93
…

Whereas the second most dangerous category, the 'Atomick Atheism' of Democritus and Epicurus, 'supposes the Notion or idea of Body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; Hylozoism on the contrary makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception and appetite) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions, of one and the same substance, called body.'96 These second and fourth varieties of Greek atheism, the former well known but the latter almost entirely unheard of, represented **'two schemes of atheism, very different from one another; that which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it supposing a plastick life, not in the whole universe, as one thing, but in all the several parts of matter by themselves; the first of which is the atomick and Democritick atheism, the second the Hylozoick and Stratonick.'**97

This ‘Stratonick and Hylozoick atheism which attributes to all matter as such the only substance and first principle of all things,’ **buried in oblivion since Justinian’s time,**98 struck Cudworth as ‘an hypothesis so prodigiously paradoxical, and so outrageously wild, as that very few men ever could have atheistick faith enough, to swallow it down and digest it.’99 That was why, he thought, it had remained so obscure and ‘found so few fautors and abettors, that it hath look’d like a forlorn and deserted thing.’ Indeed **‘we should not have taken any notice of it at this time as a particular form of atheism, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not understood, that Strato’s ghost had begun to walk of late, and that among some well-wishers to atheism, despairing in a manner of the atomick form, this hylozoick hypothesis, began already to be look’d upon, as the rising sun of atheism – et tanquam spes altera Trojae, it seeming to smile upon them, and flatter them at a distance, with some fairer hopes of supporting that ruinous and desperate cause.’**100

This was an astounding insight on Cudworth’s part. For not only did hylozoism, just as he conceived, reappear in Spinoza’s one-substance monism but then it took the lead in Early Enlightenment philosophical atheism and materialism, **emerging, finally, in the refined drawing-room *hylozoïsme* of Diderot, with its most detailed and consummate reworking in that author’s *La Rêve d’Alembert*, of 1769.**101 ‘Now the first and chief assertour of this hylozoick atheism,’ explains Cudworth, ‘was, as we conceive, Strato Lampsacenus, commonly called also *physicus*, that had been once an auditor of Theophrastus and a famous Peripatetick, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetick, into a new-formed kind of atheist.’102
…

Having previously cited Strato only in passing, in the *Dictionnaire* where Stoicism and Epicureanism function as the main ancient equivalents of Spinozism, in the *Continuation* Bayle judges Stratonism the most cogent Greek system and that which the Aristotelians and other Hellenistic schools found hardest to refute.112
…

If Epicurean atomism renders the world a product of chance, Strato’s, held Bayle, makes everything follow an eternally fixed order of necessity, inherent in matter itself; moreover, Strato did not teach that the cosmos is something recent **or, like the atomists, that it is ‘produit par le hasard,’** but rather, says Bayle, ‘comme font les Spinozistes,’ that Nature had fashioned it ‘nécessairement et de toute éternité.’120 **Strato allows no First Mover distinct from Nature,** holding that everything that happens occurs necessarily and that there is no innate ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the cosmos.121 Like Vossius, Bayle stressed Strato’s denial that the cosmos is a living being with intention, intelligence, or sensibility,122 claiming he saw Nature as containing within itself the origin of all conception, growth, and decline, vested in spontaneous movement innate in matter itself. Bayle’s Strato acknowledges no other divine power than that of nature, ‘et il soutint que la nature étoit toute corporelle.’123

While nothing in the surviving sources proves Strato really did thus conceive of Nature’s overall rational coherence, something of the sort can perhaps be legitimately inferred from the fact that **no ancient commentator suggests he advocated, like Epicurus, any doctrine of chaos or random contingency.**124
…

Buddeus and Gundling in fact largely agreed with Bayle about Strato, the first in his *De Spinozismo ante Spinozam* (Halle, 1701) **stating that while Strato differs from Spinoza in some not inconsiderable points, he was nevertheless the first genuine precursor of Spinoza.**140 **Bayle was right, says Buddeus, to say Strato approaches much closer to Spinozism than Epicurus, and anticipated Spinoza in many things, especially concerning motion and sensibility being inherent in the material world where Stratonism and Spinozism contrast sharply with Epicurus’ atomistic universe in which matter in inert and lifeless and the origin of life problematic.**141

Toland thought likewise, as did the rest of the Radical Enlightenment. Collins expressly sanctions Bayle’s interpretation of Strato in his early tract *An Answer to Mr Clark’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr Dodwell* (London, 1708), where he defends both Spinoza and Bayle against Clarke.142 ‘As far as I can judge of the opinions of Strato, Xenophanes and some other ancient atheists from a few sentences of theirs that yet remain, and of that sect call’d the *Literati* in China,’ he maintains, **‘they seem all to me to agree with Spinoza (who in his *Opera Posthuma* has endeavour’d to reduce atheism into a system) that there is no other substance in the universe but matter, which Spinoza calls God, and Strato Nature.’**143
…

Hence, Strato was widely deemed – at least until Brucker intervened to defend him against the charges of ‘atheism’ and affinity to Spinoza144 – the most consistent atheist, materialist, and naturalist among the ancients. This was despite there being no real evidence that his ‘hylozoism’ did actually entail his denying the existence of the lesser gods and despite the fact that he himself would presumably have

been horrified by any suggestion that he was, as the Hellenistic Greeks understood the term, an 'atheist.'145

That movement in Strato's system generates not only animate from inanimate matter but equally mind is confirmed by the well-informed sixth-century AD pagan Alexandrine scholar Simplikios, one of the defiant last seven philosophers who sought refuge at the court of the Persian king Chosroës during the final suppression of non-Christian philosophy under the Emperor Justinian. **Strato's conception of mind, reports Simplikios, was directly linked to his naturalistic cosmology and physics and entailed the complete dissolution of Aristotle's hierarchical structure of sense, soul, and mind.**146
…

Strato, then, abolishes Aristotle's distinction between physical movement and mental activity, reducing all actions of the mind to forms of sense and perception, which means he also eliminates, as both More and Cudworth scornfully remark, all conceivable basis for the immortality of the soul.148 Vossius had already noted that, for Strato, mind if a function of sense.149 Bayle and his contemporaries relied in part on Sextus Empiricus' clear (but perhaps oversimplified) remark that among Greek thinkers there were two rival views regarding the origin of mind, those who distinguished thinking from the sensations, as most did, and those who derived thought from sense perception, as a stretching out, like the tones of a flute. **'This dissenting view,' says Sextus, 'began with Strato the Naturalist and also Aenesidemus.'**150
…

Rather, the role of the historical Strato both as a successor to Theophrastus and as a resolute critic of Aristotelianism seems to have been important to Bayle.154 **The real Strato, attacking the Peripatetics, as it were, from within, argued his way out of an Aristotelian context just like the modern critical philosophy to which Bayle (who had once taught Aristotelianism professionally, at Sedan) devoted his life while simultaneously combating Epicureanism and the Stoic concept of God.**155
…

Jean Meslier, the most systematic and emphatic French materialist writer before Diderot, did not hesitate to rank Strato, with Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, among the first rank of those Greek philosophers who tried not only to integrate everything which is real but, as he saw it, heroically strove to strip away the veil of prejudice and save philosophy from the theologians, someone whose precious teaching – his message (like Meslier's own) being too devoid of marvels for 'des imaginations amoureuses des chimères' – **being subsequently brutally stifled amid the 'conjectures fabuleuses des Platon, Socrate, des Zenon.'**158

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false

***Aristotle* had hitherto, had but very few Followers: He was scarce known in the Western Parts of the World, till towards the Beginning of the sixth Century. The celebrated *Boetius*, by translating some of that Philosopher's Writings, laid the first Foundations of that prodigious, and truly despotick Authority,** which the Peripatetick Philosophy became afterwards possess'd of; and which, even to this Day, in many Places, it still maintains. The *Arabians*, in the eleventh Century, grew fond of it; and introduc'd it into *Spain*. From thence sprung the *Scholastick Philosophy*; which spread itself all over *Europe*, and with its barbarous Cant became even more prejudicial to Religion and Morality, than to the speculative Sciences.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr05.htm

The successors of Aristotle produced rather a school of progressive science, those of Plato a school of refined scepticism. **The religious side of Plato's thought was not revealed in its full power till the time of Plotinus in the third century A.D.; that of Aristotle, one might say without undue paradox, not till its exposition by Aquinas in the thirteenth.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA177#v=onepage&q&f=false

So Aristotle resists the pre-Socratics ontology of origination while at the same time he resists the opposite extreme of making nature synonymous with the rationally constructed. **This latter point is perhaps less obvious because of the influence of Christian Aristotelians led by Thomas Aquinas, who, in Aristotle's name but in a fundamental distortion of his philosophy, erroneously assimilated final and formal cause to the efficient cause of God, the master artificer,**15 **an assimilation of classical teleology to a fabricating act of divine will that, as I have earlier suggested, is then transferred by Machiavelli to the secular prince's conquest of nature and by Hobbes to the artificer of the social contract who remedies the defects of human nature.** Although Aristotle likens the nature to art in some respects in order to refute the pre-Socratics'

emphasis on becoming, his analogy for nature in all respects, as I observed earlier, is that of a “doctor who heals himself” – an irreducible equipoise of generational substratum (the patient’s sick body with its potential for health) and art (the doctor’s medical expertise; [*Physics* 199b27-35]).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA282#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 6. Compare St. Thomas, who represents Aristotelian causality not in its original sense as perspectives on a thing but as successive stages of the divine artisan’s operations on material reality. **Whereas Aristotle treats natural causality as *analogous* to art – in other words, like art in some respects, unlike it in others – Thomas is confident in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* that “nature is *nothing but* a certain kind of art, that is, the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end.”** Thomas (1963) p. 124; my emphasis.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT275#v=onepage&q&f=false

> In the *Korte Verhandeling* Spinoza likewise first introduces, indeed makes his fullest use of, **his famous distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, meaning God (or the laws of nature) determining all created things, a coupling often associated with Spinoza but actually Averroist and medieval scholastic in origin** that seemingly held rather less significance for him later than at this early stage. Spinoza indicates his awareness that Thomists first introduced these terms into Western thought.38 “The Thomists have also understood God by this phrase, but their *natura naturans* was a being, as they call it, beyond all substances,” whereas, for Spinoza, *natura naturans* is God and the sole existing substance.39 **His adopting the twin terms, active and passive, despite only marginally figuring in the *Ethics*, has been aptly called, a “hostile takeover,” as these inherited categories would subsequently never revert to their medieval sense.**40

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA345#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **There is an obvious connection between the politic philosophy Synesius seems to have been taught in Alexandria and what, in Europe, later came to be called Averroism.** Alfarabi, the actual founder of that school of thought, tells us that Muslim Arabs first learned philosophy from Monophysite Christian instructors whose predecessors had abandoned Alexandria for Antioch after the Arab conquest and then moved on later to Harran and ultimately Baghdad – where, in due course, he was a student himself.
> …
>
> In this light, **one should note the close, if not exact, correspondence between the Christian doctrines which Synesius could not accept and the Muslim doctrines which Al-Ghazali accused Alfarabi and Avicenna of denying:** *MPP* 171-74: Averroës, *The Decisive Treatise* 9-12; *Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut* 587.1-6. In this connection, see Muhsin Mahdi, “Alfarabi against Philoponus,” *JNES* 26 (1967): 233-60.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/636/mode/2up?view=theater

The insurrectionary creed of Abu Muslim’s movement, scholars agree, was actually built out of an explosive mix of Shi’ite, Zoroastrian, and Manichaean ingredients,146 **so that while there is no concrete evidence of any Greek strand, Bayle was probably not stretching the truth far in postulating a resurgence of religious impulses of late antiquity, Persian, and Greek, clandestinely opposed to all three revealed religions.**

While it might be objected that Bayle was resorting to pure fantasy in thinking Abu Muslim’s movement adhered to the fundamental unity of all substance, and was proto-Spinozist, **the fact that it was against this background that the freethinking tradition, culminating in Ibn al-Rawandi and Al-Razi, arose means that his construct was perhaps, taking all forms of dissent in the Abbasid era into account, not so remote from the actual historical circumstances after all.** For the philosophical freethinking of Al-Warraq, Al-Rawandi, and Al-Razi was an intellectual revolt against belief in the miraculous, revelation, prophecy, and the supremacy of theology over human life, **and did arise against a backdrop of endemic spiritual revolt, heretical sects, and armed political insurrection simultaneously aimed against the Abbasid caliphate and orthodox religion.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA340#v=onepage&q&f=false

> To indicate that he is fully conscious of what he is doing, **Alfarabi initially lays out an Aristotelian account of the status and character of political science in his *Enumeration of the Sciences* and then silently replaces it with a Platonic account.**
> …

For a popular presentation of this public teaching, see Alfarabi, *Opinions*. **As a consequence of the political strategy adopted by the early *falāsifa*, Aristotle's *Politics* received comparatively little attention within the House of Islam; and, in Averroës' time, it was unavailable in the Muslim West in any form:** *Averroes on Plato's Republic* 22.3-5. In this connection, note Avicenna's contention that Plato's *Laws* is a book about prophecy and the holy law: *MPP* 97: *On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences* 108. **It may not be fortuitous that Alfarabi appears in Raphael's School of Athens as a musician.** Direct divine inspiration is strikingly absent from the prophetology of the *falāsifa* – even in Alfarabi's most popular tract. **In fact, religion is treated as nothing more than a poetic or imaginative approximation to philosophical truth useful for directing the multitude:** see Alfarabi, *Opinions* 4.14.1-11 (esp. 7-9), which should be read with Richard Walzer's commentary (413-23, 471-81) and with Walzer, "Al-Fārabī's Theory of Prophecy and Divination," *Greek into Arabic: Essays in Islamic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 206-19.
...

As Strauss emphasizes in the essays cited above, Maimonides' prophetology owes much to Alfarabi: see *Guide of the Perplexed* II 32-48.

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2164-averroism

While Maimonides, with all his admiration for Aristotle, dared to contradict his theories, or at least sought to attenuate them when they were in direct opposition to religion, Averroes indorsed them to their utmost extent, and seemed even to take pleasure in emphasizing them. "God," says Averroes, "has declared a truth for all men that requires for understanding no intellectual superiority; in a language that can be interpreted by every human soul according to its capability and temper. The expositors of religious metaphysics are therefore the enemies of true religion, because they made it a matter of syllogism" (J. Müller, "Philosophie und Theologie," including the Arabic text, pp. 104 *et seq*.). In expounding what he thought to be the doctrines of Aristotle, it made no difference to Averroes whether they were or were not in harmony with those taught by the Koran. **Thus Averroes asserts again and again the eternity of the universe; although, as Maimonides demonstrated in his "Guide"** (ii. 28, 121-127), **Aristotle himself is not very decisive on this point.** Averroes goes still further and declares that not only is matter eternal, but that form even is potentially existent, otherwise there would be creation *ex nihilo* ("De Cœlo et Mundo," p. 197).
...

However, it was due to Maimonides that the philosophy of Averroes found admirers during four centuries among the Jews, who by their translations and commentaries preserved his writings from destruction and transmitted them to the Christian world.
...

The fifteenth century, though still rich in productions of Averroism, gave signs of decadence. Boldness had vanished from the world of letters, and every author felt himself constrained to break a lance for religion.
...

In the sixteenth century Averroism gave place to theology. People read and studied Averroes, but very evidently only to hunt out his weak points and disprove him. Isaac Abravanel, largely indebted as he was in his commentary on the "Guide" to Averroes, does not scruple to attack him frequently in his "Shamayim Ḥadashim" and other works. Abraham Bibago, who commented on Aristotle's "Analytica Posteriora," abuses Averroism in his "Derek Emuna." Moses Almosnino, about 1538, comments on Al-Gazzali's "Happalat-ha-Filosofim" (Destruction of the Philosophers), and uses it as a weapon against the Peripatetic philosophy. **Many other, but more insignificant, writers essayed to drag the colossus to the ground, but the traces stamped by Averroes on Jewish literature are irremovable.**

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.25058/page/413/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza, with perhaps some lack of historical understanding, criticized Maimonides' allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures as a disingenuous attempt to preserve the authority of the Bible; **but he hailed the great rabbi as "the first who openly declared that Scripture must be accommodated to reason";**[75] and he took from Maimonides some ideas on prophecy, miracles, and the attributes of God.[76]

In Judaism itself Maimonides' influence was revolutionary. His own posterity carried on his work as scholars and Jews: his son Abraham ben Moses succeeded him as *Nagid* and court physician in 1205; **his grandson David ben Abraham and his great-grandson Solomon ben Abraham also succeeded to the leadership of the Egyptian Jews;** and all three continued the Maimonidean tradition in philosophy. **For a while it became fashionable to Aristotelize the Bible through allegorical legerdemain, and to reject the historicity of its narratives;** Abraham and Sarah, for example, were merely a legend representing matter and form; and Jewish ritual laws had only a symbolical purpose and truth.[77]

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/624/mode/2up?view=theater

Christian and Ibero-Jewish Averroism may have become to an extent detached from the real system of Ibn Rushd, and eventually even more radically heretical; nevertheless, this strain was

still perceived as being rooted in Ibn Rushd's philosophy and hence in an authentically Arabic intellectual tradion.69 A submerged Averroism survived, if after a certain point no longer within Islamic culture, in France, Italy, and not least among the Jews and New Christians in early modern Spain;70 **for in the universities (which the Islamic world lacked) this subterranean growth proved ineradicable while reaction against Averroism within late medieval Spanish and Provençal Judaism, though real, was less than within Islam and Christianity.**71

Spanish clandestine academic Averroism became in fact the prime source of the underground Deism rife among the crypto-Jews in the Iberian world from at least as far back as fifteenth century, a current of thought which persisted uninterrupted through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. **Isaac Orobio de Castro encountered several such 'Deistas' among the university-trained New Christians in early seventeenth-century Castile.**72 Among the most active proselytizers of this sort was a certain Dr Juan Pinheiro who studied with both Orobio and Prado at Alcalà de Henares and later moved to Seville where he died around 1662.73 It was reportedly Pinheiro who converted to philosophical Deism none other than Juan de Prado, Spinoza's closest companion and ally during the last year or so of his membership of the Sephardic Jewish community of Amsterdam (1655-6).

> https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Spinoza did not indicate what he owed to Maimonides, to whom he refers more frequently than to ibn Ezra, although in a much less friendly tone. But when saying that Moses "believed or at least wished to teach" that God is zealous or angry, **he merely makes explicit what Maimonides had implied when intimating that the belief in God's anger is required, not for man's ultimate perfection, but for the good ordering of civil society.**74
>
> https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/1574-anthropomorphism#anchor10
>
> **Maimonides was the first Rabbinite Jew to set up the incorporeality of God as a dogma,** and to place any person who denied this doctrine upon a level with an idolater. While his predecessors had contented themselves with rejecting Anthropomorphism as contrary to reason—treating it as a purely theoretic matter—**Maimonides declared it a heresy that would deprive any one holding the doctrine of a share in the world to come** ("Yad ha-Ḥazaḳah, Hilkot Teshubah," iii. 7). The first part of his religio-philosophical work (the "Moreh Nebukim") practically constitutes a treatise on Hebrew synonyms, the object of which is to explain away the anthropomorphisms in the Bible. **But Maimonides was not content to restrict himself to opposing Anthropomorphism. Philosophy being to him not the handmaid, but the mistress, of theology, he pursued his thought until he arrived at the concept of God as a metaphysical being, withdrawn in cold sublimity and isolation from His creatures—with whose weal or wo He could no longer concern Himself—and void of a free will; a being, in short, to whom no attributes could be ascribed except those of a negative character.** Thus Maimonides was confronted with a difficulty similar to that which Philo encountered when he propounded his doctrine of the "Logos": the question, namely, how to establish a communication between a God devoid of attributes and the material universe. **In fact, his lack of success was as complete as that of Philo, at least as far as Judaism is concerned.**
>
> Despite the high esteem enjoyed by Maimonides among the great body of Jews, he was unable to achieve any success with his "intellectualization" of the notion of God. **Only one of his teachings—that of the incorporeality of God—found favor in the eyes of his coreligionists, was accepted in all sincerity, and was even adopted in the ritual of the Synagogue;** a proof that in this doctrine he had caught the true spirit of Judaism.
> …
>
> **Mention must also be made of Ḥasdai Crescas—the greatest Jewish philosopher after Maimonides—**not only because he opposed the latter's doctrine of negative attributes, by asserting that it is possible to ascribe many attributes to Deity without injury to the idea of His unity, **but because he exerted influence upon Spinoza, the greatest of all opponents of Anthropomorphism.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/nativistprophets0000cron/page/322/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Both the Khurramīs and the Persian Zoroastrians associated God with light, but the former did not give him a name or a personality: he was simply the great light or the highest light, the source of all the light there was. **In Muslim parlance the Khurramīs were guilty of *taʿṭīl*, avoidance of anthropomorphism to the point of making God disappear as a person. It was a sin of which the Ismailis were later to be accused.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lazare-bernard/1894/antisemitism/ch13.htm

In the second place, they were the means of disseminating the Arabian philosophy, and were its expounders at a time, twelfth century, to be precise, **when Al Farabi and Ibn Sina were being anathematized in the mosques, and orthodox Muslims were feeding the fires with the writings of the Arabian Aristotelians.** The Jews of this period translated the writings of Aristotle and of the Arabian philosophers into Hebrew, and these, retranslated into Latin, afforded the scholastics an opportunity for becoming acquainted with Greek thought. The most famous of the scholastics, "men like Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, studied the works of Aristotle in Latin versions made from the Hebrew."[226]
...

At the Court of the Emperor Frederick II, "that hotbed of irreligion," they were received with favour and respect. **It was they, as Renan has shown,[228] that created Averroism;** it was they who established the fame of that Ibn-Roshd, that Averroes whose influence was destined to become so great. Without doubt they had their share, too, in the dissemination of the "blasphemies" of the impious Arabians; blasphemies which an Emperor, fond of science and of philosophy, encouraged. These find their type in the so-called "Blasphemy of the Three Impostors," Moses, Jesus and Mohammed, invented by the theologians, **and their spirit is tersely summed up in the saying of the Arabian *soufis,* "What care I for the Kaaba of the Mohammedan, the synagogue of the Jew, or the convent of the Christian!"**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/632/mode/2up?view=theater

> Bayle's *Dictionnaire,* like the first European *encyclopedia* – the *Algemeen Historisch Geographisch en Genealogisch Woordenboek* (The Hague, 1724) – and subsequent eighteenth-century compendia, including Prosper Marchand's *Dictionnaire* (1758) and the great French *Encyclopédie,* all narrate the tale of Ibn Rushd devising the notion of the 'Three Impostors' simultaneously to negate and equate the three great revealed religions. **Ibn Rushd, in all these compendia, is cited as denouncing the revealed faiths in highly offensive terms: 'quod Lex Moysi, est lex puerorum; Lex Christi, lex impossibilitum; lex Mahumeti, lex porcorum'** [that the Law of Moses is a law for children; the Law of Christ an impossible law, and the Law of Muhammad a law of pigs].119

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.22149/page/n365/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Moreover, in the darkest times of the Middle Ages, when Asiatic clouds had gathered darkly over Europe, it was Jewish free-thinkers, scholars, and physicians who upheld the banner of enlightenment and of intellectual independence under the severest personal sufferings, and defended Europe against Asia;** we owe it not least to their efforts that a more natural, more reasonable, at all events un-mythical, explanation of the world was finally able to get the upper hand once more, and that the link of culture which now unites us with the enlightenment of Greco-Roman antiquity has remained unbroken. **If Christianity has done everything to orientalise the Occident, Judaism has assisted essentially in occidentalising it anew; which, in a certain sense, is equivalent to making Europe's mission and history a *continuation of that of Greece*.**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13784a.htm

Siger in fact supported all the beliefs of the Averroist philosophy—the monism of the human intellect; one intellectual spirit for all men, separate from the body, is temporarily united with each human organism to accomplish the process of thought. Man is mortal, but the race is immortal. Hence the question of a future life is without meaning; immortality cannot be personal. **The world is produced by a series of intermediary agencies;** hence there is no providence in the government of men and of earthly things. All these productions are necessary, coeternal with God. All is ruled by cosmic and psychical determinism. **Celestial phenomena and the conjunction of the planets control the succession of events on our globe, and the destinies of the human race.** Man is not a free agent. There is an eternal reversibility of civilizations and religions, the Christian religion included, which is governed by the reversibility of the stellar cycles. Siger wished to remain a professing Catholic, and to safeguard his faith he had recourse to the celebrated theory of the two truths: what is true in philosophy may be false in religion, and vice versa. **It is hard to tell whether such a mental attitude indicates buffoonery or sincerity.**

https://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/tud.htm

> Averroës was most famous, or rather infamous, for his understanding of the human soul, worked out in terms ultimately derived from Aristotle, the Possible and the Active Intellects. **This subject is extremely complicated and obscure,[24] deliberately so because of its dangerously unorthodox implications.**
> ...

An anecdote from an early book on Aquinas shows that as abstruse as Averroës's doctrine of the Possible Intellect appears to be, somehow it filtered down to the level of the common man in the European Middle Ages. **William of Tocco reports the case of a French soldier "who was unwilling to atone for his sins because, as he put it: 'If the soul of the blessed Peter is saved, I shall also be saved; for if we know by one intellect, we shall share the same destiny.'"**[26]
…

It was in fact one of the principal reasons why **Pope John XXII had *De Monarchia* burned in 1329 in Bologna and the Catholic Church officially placed it on its Index of Forbidden Books in 1554 (it was not removed until the nineteenth century, when the Averroist scare apparently had blown over).**[31] Dante employs the idea of the Possible Intellect precisely in Averroës's sense, suggesting that philosophers form a community of thought over the centuries, that the gradual perfection of human thought grows out of a conversation among philosophers over time. We see now how profoundly appropriate it is that Averroës be placed in Dante's Limbo. **Limbo is precisely an allegorical representation of Averroës's idea of the Possible Intellect. The eternal conversation of the philosophers in Dante's Limbo is a metaphor for what Averroës meant by the immortality of human thought. How far this metaphorical conception of immortality can be extended throughout the *Divine Comedy* is a profound question for the interpretation of Dante.**

https://archive.org/details/translationsrepr03univiala/page/10/mode/2up?view=theater

How are we to deal with another monstrous kind of pedant who wears a religious garb, but is most profane in heart and conduct, he who would have us believe that Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome were ignoramuses, for all their wordy treatises? I do not know the origin of these new theologians, who do not spare the great teachers and will soon cease to respect the Apostles and the Gospel itself. They will soon turn their impudent tongues even against Christ, unless He whose cause is at stake interferes to curb the raging beasts. For it has already become a well established habit with these fellows to express their scorn by a mute gesture or by some impious observation whenever revered names or sacred subjects are mentioned. "Augustine," they will say for example, "saw much, but understood little." Nor do they speak less insultingly of other great men.

Recently one of these philosophers of the modern stamp happened to be in my library. He did not, it is true, wear the habit of a churchman, but as we know, the real Christian is known by his belief. **He was one of those who think that they live in vain unless they are constantly snarling at Christ or his divine teachings. When I cited some passage or other from the Holy Scriptures, he exploded with wrath, and with his face, naturally ugly, still further disfigured by anger and contempt, he exclaimed, "You are welcome to your two-penny church fathers; as for me, I know the man for me to follow, for *I know him whom I have believed*."* "But," I replied, "you use the words of the Apostle; would that you would take them to heart!"** "Your Apostle," he answered, "was a sower of words and a lunatic." "You reply like a good philosopher," I said. "The first accusation was brought against him by other philosophers and the second to his face, by Festus, governor of Syria. He did indeed sow the word with such success that, cultivated by the beneficent plow of his successors, and watered by the holy blood of the martyrs, it has borne such an abundant harvest of faith as all may behold." At this he burst forth into a sickening roar of laughter. **"Well, be a good Christian! as for me I put no faith in all that stuff. Your Paul and your Augustine and all the rest of the crowd you preach about, were a set of babblers. If you could but digest Averroes you would quickly see how far superior he was to these empty-headed fellows."** I was very angry, I must confess, and could scarcely keep from striking his filthy, blasphemous mouth. "It is the old feud between me and the heretics of your class. You may go," I cried, "—you and your heresy, never to return." With this I plucked him by the gown and, with a want of ceremony less in consonance with my habits than his own, hurried him out of the house.

There are thousands of instances of this kind where nothing will prevail—neither the majesty of the Christian name, nor the reverence for Christ himself, whom the angels fall down and worship, though weak and depraved mortals may insult Him; not even the fear of punishment or the armed inquisitors of heresy. **Prison and stake are alike impotent to restrain the impudence of ignorance and the audacity of heresy.**

Such are the times, my friend, upon which we have fallen; such is the period in which we live and are already growing old. Such are the judges against whom I have so often inveighed, who are innocent of knowledge or virtue, and yet harbor the most exalted opinion of themselves. Not content with losing the works of the ancients, they must attack their ability and their ashes.

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/arabic-islamic-influence/#Tra

After about 1300, Arabic-Latin translation activities ceased almost entirely, to resume again after 1480. The Renaissance translations were mostly produced by Italian Jews from Hebrew versions of Arabic texts, an exception being Andrea Alpago's Avicenna translations from Arabic, which were produced in Damascus (Tamani 1992; Burnett 1999). **The social context of these translations was the vibrant philosophical culture of Italian universities and especially of Padua, and the patronage of Italian scholars belonging to the Italian nobility, who had been educated in these**

universities (Hasse 2006). **The impact of these Renaissance translations, which is weaker than that of the medieval translations, remains largely unexplored.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/arabic-islamic-influence/#AveUniThe

But that much is clear: there existed at least four groups of authors who explicitly adopted the unicity thesis in one of their writings: Siger of Brabant and possibly other masters of arts in later thirteenth-century Paris; a second Parisian group in the early fourteenth century around Thomas Wilton, John of Jandun and John Baconthorpe; several Italian masters of arts at Bologna university in the fourteenth century; and a larger group of authors in Renaissance Italy and especially in Padua.

When the medievals used the Latin term *averroista*, they referred to authors belonging to these groups. The term *averroista*
came into use in the later thirteenth century, but on rare occasions. The first appearance, as we can see today, is in Thomas Aquinas' treatise *On the Unicity of the Intellect* (*De unitate intellectus*). The additional title phrase *contra averroistas* appears only in the later manuscript tradition and is unlikely to be authentic. **It was in the decades around 1500 that the term was used most frequently.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA62#v=onepage&q&f=false

The act which started the whole movement was the transference of the center of learning from the monastery to the urban university. This one incident, apparently so harmless, transformed the whole condition of knowledge and created a situation in which lay learning began to compete with theology. The changeover was especially successful in the municipal universities of Italy, where a greater freedom obtained than in the more theologically-oriented universities of France and England. Bologna and, especially, Padua early became typical centers of this kind of activity. **Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to state that from Padua sprang the whole liberal movement in ideas which has swept over western Europe and America during the last five centuries.**

The movement really began very early. The initial steps in transforming Padua into a modern center of learning came with the introduction of Averroes (1126-1198), when Padua espoused Arabic medicine and the psychological explanation of phenomena. **The ideas of Averroes, as Renan has shown, have a strangely modern ring.** Semi-mystic, semi-rational, semi-scientific, he taught that God eternally produces the Intelligences by a process of emanation, that matter is an eternal potency, that the active intellect is one for all men, that there is no freedom or personal immortality, and that there may be contradictions between religious and philosophical truths. These ideas are fundamental to Italian naturalism, where such doctrines as the universal soul, the eternity of matter, determinism, the eternal power of nature, and the “double truth,” become increasingly significant. Averroes made other important contributions too. With the introduction of Arabic science and Arabic medicine, a new interpretation of Aristotle became necessary, where the two paramount problems involved the nature of matter, the nature of mind and the relationship between the two. Indeed, it was the reinterpretation of Aristotle which led to the reorganization of the whole corpus of learning and gave added significance to the mathematical and physical sciences. **Moreover, with Pietro d’Abano (1250-1316) who had introduced Averroes, the Paduans had already made a definite effort to clarify the notion of matter.** This attempt, coupled with interest in psychological phenomena, particularly abnormal manifestations, encourage the formation of a corps of knowledge around the rational and experimental sciences, which in time became an area of learning distinct from theology. Thus medicine led to physics, astrology to cosmology, and both medicine and cosmology to natural philosophy. **By the end of the thirteenth century, the new approach was solidly established, though the full development was not attained until two centuries later.** The outstanding Paduan of the Renaissance was Pomponazzi.
…

Doctor of medicine in 1487, Professor of medicine in 1488, Professor of philosophy in 1495, and later Professor at Bologna and Ferrara, **Pomponazzi produced a series of treatises which at one and the same time coordinated the natural and moral philosophy of the ancients with a whole new set of original ideas.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandrists

The Alexandrists were a school of Renaissance philosophers who, in the great controversy on the subject of personal immortality, adopted the explanation of the *De Anima* given by Alexander of Aphrodisias.[1]

According to the orthodox Thomism of the Catholic Church, Aristotle rightly regarded reason as a facility of the individual soul. **Against this, the Averroists, led by Agostino Nifo, introduced the modifying theory that universal reason in a sense individualizes itself in each soul and then absorbs the active**

reason into itself again. These two theories respectively evolved the doctrine of individual and universal immortality, or the absorption of the individual into the eternal One.[1]

The Alexandrists, led by Pietro Pomponazzi, assailed these beliefs and denied that either was rightly attributed to Aristotle. They held that Aristotle considered the soul as a material and therefore a mortal entity which operates during life only under the authority of universal reason.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dwdZEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA330#v=onepage&q&f=false

Renaissance readers could find this line of thought being followed through by another great commentator on Aristotle, namely Alexander of Aphrodisias, who lived in the second century AD. **In the fifteenth century, he was still valued as the most competent guide to Aristotle alongside Averroes, and was standardly interpreted as having held that the soul is indeed mortal, since it is only the form of a mortal body.**

So devotees of Aristotelianism were caught between a rock and a hard place: the materialist theory of Alexander on the one hand, Averroes' hard-to-believe theory of the unity of the immaterial intellect on the other. **Marsilio Ficino thus complained, "Almost the entire world is occupied and divided between two sects of Peripatetics, the Alexandrians and the Averroists. The one sect think our intellect is mortal, the other contend that it is one. Both schools alike are wholly destructive of religion … and in both cases they seem to have been failed by their Aristotle."**8 Ficino responded to the challenge with his massive work *The Platonic Theology*, which devoted hundreds upon hundreds of pages to proving the immortality of individual human souls. Surely at least one of those arguments must be right? The pope evidently thought so, and as we saw Ficino's work has been credited with helping inspire the church's declaration that immortality can be rationally proven.
…

Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that Pomponazzi's treatise was a little less shocking than we might suppose. **He differed from the Renaissance Averroists simply in his choice of which false theory of the soul should be ascribed to Aristotle: Alexander's reading was broadly correct, Averroes' completely wrong.**11
…

Less obviously, **Averroes depicted human thinking as being just like the pure, separate thinking that belongs to God and the celestial intellects of Aristotle's cosmology.** The very fact that we need to use our imaginations to think is a clear sign that our intellects work quite differently than those exalted minds (317). **In fact, Pomponazzi thinks that in comparison to them, we can claim to have only a "shadow of intellect"** (322).
…

Pomponazzi agrees with Thomas in rejecting Averroism: we all have our own single, individual souls. With the emphasis on *single*: we do not have two souls, a mortal one for sensation, and a second, immortal soul for intellection. On this view "soul and body would have no greater unity than oxen and plow" (298).16 But if the single soul is immortal and immaterial, as Aquinas claims, then why would intellectual thought, the signature activity of the immaterial soul, depend on the body for its functioning, as we have seen that it does (305)? **Aquinas' view might be true in the end, as testified by religion, but it cannot be established by reason** (302-3).

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/n523/mode/2up?view=theater

Within this wider context **one of Bayle's major contributions to Early Enlightenment discourse was his introducing, first in his *Dictionnaire*, a powerful new construct which may usefully be termed 'Radical Renaissance.'** The term 'Italian Renaissance' itself had, of course, not yet been coined and neither Bayle nor his contemporaries took much interest in many of the features of the Renaissance which later came to be make it appear so significant an epoch. **Least of all did the Early Enlightenment muster any enthusiasm for Italian humanism or its Platonism or Aristotelianism. But the Italian Renaissance naturalist, libertine tradition culminating in Pomponazzi, Bruno, Vanini, and that key anonymous clandestine text the *Theophrastus Redivivus* (1659), was a different matter** and its study, by Bayle and the German Eclectics especially, lent a wholly new significance to late Renaissance philosophical naturalism which, though Aristotelian, looked also subversive and atheistic in orientation.58 At the same time, the potential impact of this remarkable initiative of Bayle's was then, in turn, largely neutralized by **a marked anti-Italian bias running through much of particularly the French Early Enlightenment, from Boulainvilliers to Diderot and d'Alembert and the *Encyclopédie*'s consequent tendency to de-emphasize the roles of the Italian thinkers and scientists, even Galileo.**59

Bayle includes numerous figures from the Italian Renaissance, including Savonarola and Machiavelli, in his *Dictionnaire*. Among articles of specifically philosophical significance, **it is striking that he takes little interest in the Platonism and syncretism of Ficino and Pico.**60
…

Bayle, in constructing his ‘Radical Renaissance,’ focused on a group of sixteenth-century figures and their early seventeenth-century followers **who seemed to have actively sought to undermine the traditional relationship between Aristotelian scholasticism and theology.** He considers, in particular, Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), Girolamo Cardano (1501-76) whom he deems one of the wisest of philosophers, Andrea Cesalpino (1524-1603), Jacopo Zabarella (1533-89), Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631), and Giulio Cesare Vanini (1584-1619), all figures whom, in one way or another, he explicitly links with Spinoza.
…

Since the late fifteenth century, study of Aristotelianism at Padua had shifted to an investigation of original Greek texts, terminology, and commentators, and Pomponazzi was a major exponent of this return ‘to the original Greek,’ a devotee, in particular, like other whom Bayle identifies as denying the immortality of the soul, of the third-century AD Anatolian Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias.78 In the case of Pomponazzi, Bayle had merely renewed an old controversy, defending him against charges of ‘atheism’ but yet supporting him, on fideist grounds, in his naturalistic arguments, claiming that Creation and the immortality of the soul cannot be proved and detaching philosophy from theology.79 A naturalist in the Renaissance more than the anti-magical Early Enlightenment sense, **Pomponazzi believed in a causal nexus between the super and sublunary spheres and the validity of astrology. Nevertheless, he also lent the new, non-scholastic Aristotelianism a marked tendency to screen divine providence, prophecy, demonic and angelic intervention, and miracles out of the discussion, replacing these with superlunary astral influences.** The stars, according to Pomponazzi, rule not only nature but also history and even the rise and fall of religions.80
…

Regarded by Campanella and others as the philosophical counterpart of Machiavelli’s moral and political naturalism, Pomponazzi’s demystifying arguments doubtless did help prepare the way for the Enlightenment materialism of the future.84 The controversy about him and his writings in any case gained fresh vitality during the Early Enlightenment, thanks to Bayle, in the first place. **Regarding angels and demons,** according to the English version of Bayle’s *Dictionnaire*, **Pomponazzi held ‘they were only particles of God united to a very subtil matter: nay, he pretended that the souls of men and of beasts, were part of the substance of God.’**85
…

Heumann, like Morhof before him, argued that, for Pomponazzi, nature alone moves all worldly occurrence, so that not only is the soul’s immortality denied but miracles are eradicated and exclusively natural causes given to explain biblical wonders, including Christ’s cures: ‘da haben wir also,’ held Heumann, ‘den *Spinozismus* ante *Spinozam*’ [there we have then Spinozism before Spinoza].92
…

Where Pomponazzi, held Heumann, ‘introduces a horrible doubt about the existence of angels and demons,’ Zimmermann, trimming the definition of ‘atheism’ to cover strictly only denial of God’s existence, deemed this objection irrelevant too.
…

Zimmermann’s objections, however, were then countered by Brucker who emphatically confirmed Pomponazzi’s naturalism, impiety, and opposition to Christianity.95

Heumann’s and Brucker’s notion of Pomponazzi as a giant of sixteenth-century thought at war with theology and a proto-Spinoza became, through Boureau-Deslandes and especially Diderot, the view of the *Encyclopédie*. There, in the first volume, published in 1751, Pomponazzi appears as an ‘atheist’ and enemy of religion, notably in the long article on Aristotelianism by the Abbé Claude Yvon. **Yvon claims Pomponazzi denied miracles, divine providence, and human liberty as well as magic and the immortality of the soul while simultaneously deriding the fideist doctrine of double truth, adding that he cannot comprehend how Pomponazzi’s defenders could seriously maintain that he held his libertine views only intellectually, ‘en philosophe,’ while, as a Christian, unquestioningly believing all the ‘dogmas of our religion.’**96
…

For if [Zimmermann] was right to hold Pomponazzi was not an ‘atheist’ *stricto sensu*, recent scholarship also shows that Bayle was closer to the mark then he in portraying Pomponazzi as a Naturalist, denier of miracles and immortality of the soul, and, by insinuation, someone attacking the premisses of revealed religion and church authority.101

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_158

I would have the sceptic, while yet a sceptic only, seriously consider whether a doctrine, of the truth of which a Socrates could obtain no other assurance than what he derived from his strong *wish* that it should

be true; **and which Plato found a mystery hard to discover, and when discovered, communicable only to the fewest of men; can, consonantly with history or common sense, be classed among the articles, the belief of which is ensured to all men by their mere common sense?** Whether, without gross outrage to fact, they can be said to constitute a Religion of Nature, or a Natural Theology antecedent to Revelation, or superseding its necessity? Yes! in prevention (for there is little chance, I fear, of a *cure*) of the pugnacious dogmatism of *partial* reflection, I would prescribe to every man, who feels a commencing alienation from the Catholic Faith, and whose studies and attainments authorise him to argue on the subject at all, a patient and thoughtful perusal of the arguments and representations which Bayle supposes to have passed through the mind of Simonides. **Or I should be fully satisfied if I could induce these eschewers of mystery to give a patient, manly, and impartial perusal to the single Treatise of Pomponatius, *De Fato*.[98]**

> [98] The philosopher, whom the Inquisition would have burnt alive as an atheist**, had not Leo X. and Cardinal Bembo decided that the work might be formidable to those semi-pagan Christians who regarded Revelation as a mere make-weight to their boasted Religion of Nature; but contained nothing dangerous to the Catholic Church or offensive to a true believer.** [He was born in 1462, and died in 1525.—H. N. C.]

When they have fairly and satisfactorily overthrown the objections and cleared away the difficulties urged by this sharp-witted Italian against the doctrines which they profess to retain, then let them commence their attack on those which they reject. As far as the supposed irrationality of the latter is the ground of argument, I am much deceived if, on reviewing their forces, they would not find the ranks woefully thinned by the success of their own fire in the preceding engagement—unless, indeed, by pure heat of controversy, and to storm the lines of their antagonists, they can bring to life again the arguments which they had themselves killed off in the defence of their own positions. **In vain shall we seek for any other mode of meeting the broad facts of the scientific Epicurean, or the requisitions and queries of the all-analysing Pyrrhonist, than by challenging the tribunal to which they appeal, as incompetent to try the question. In order to *non-suit* the infidel plaintiff, we must remove the cause from the faculty,** that judges according to sense, and whose judgments, therefore, are valid only on objects of sense, to the Superior Courts of Conscience and intuitive Reason!

https://archive.org/details/historyofchurch0003hugh/page/464/mode/2up?view=theater

The *Prince* is, evidently, in every line and turn of phrase a Renaissance product, and the worst feature of the book, the final pessimism about human nature,2 is no doubt the effect upon a well-placed observer of the sight of such universal cynical indifference to the elements of morality in the conduct of public affairs. Even the popes, as rulers, had now descended to the level of the condottieri princes. **But there is another, and more enduring reason, for the pessimism. It is a reflection in the political writer of the contemporary revival of Aristotle according to Averroes, of the movement which at Padua, under the influence of Pietro Pomponazzi, was now carrying all before it with the youth of the university. Here, rooted in stern and compelling logic, was the old curse of the theory that man is wholly at the mercy of an impersonal world force, held in the grip of a fixed, unchanging, eternal cosmos. Everything has always been the same; it will always be so.** Since this is the truth about life, and man's destiny, it is best to arrange life accordingly, and to crush out all talk of ideals and betterment and what we should call "progress," for beliefs of this kind can only cause activities in the state that are futile, fated to futility indeed, and a necessary cause of mischievous instability. **Averroism, indeed, had never died despite St. Albert and St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus. And now, in the general disintegration, it was again in the forefront of life, threatening as always the very fundamentals of Christian belief.** Its most evident assault was against the belief that the human soul is destined for a separate, personal immortality.1

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater

Many writers have called Machiavelli a pagan.2 Most of them mean by this that, **“loving his fatherland more than his soul,”** he forgot or denied the other world, and being enamored of the worldly glory of pagan Rome, he forgot or rejected the imitation of Christ. They mean that he forgot to think about everything which is not political in the narrow sense or that he was so self-complacent as to rest satisfied with rebelling passionately and blindly against Christian morality without giving dispassionate thought to the theological premises of that morality. They imagine that he was another Cosimo de’ Medici who said among other things that states cannot be kept with paternosters and was therefore slandered as a man who loved this world more than the other world.3 A man of this sort is not properly called a pagan. Paganism is a kind of piety and one does not find a trace of pagan piety in Machiavelli's work. He had not reverted from the worship of Christ to the worship of Apollo. On the other hand, it is not misleading to count Machiavelli among “the wise of the world.” **He informs us that Savonarola's sermons are full of accusations of “the wise of the world” and of invectives against them.** According to

Savonarola, “the wise of the world” do in fact say that a state cannot be ruled with paternosters. But they also say that they do not wish to believe anything except what rational discourse proves; **they therefore regard the Biblical prophecies as “things for women”; Savonarola has heard them say in their disputations that, speaking philosophically and disregarding the supernatural, the world is eternal, God is the final and not the efficient cause of this world and there is only one soul in all men; they say that faith is nothing but opinion.**4 Those “wise of the world” who transcend the limits of political cleverness reject not only the myths of the pagans but above all revelation and the characteristic teachings of revelation on the ground indicated. They are *falāsifa* or “Averroists.”

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

Other causes might be mentioned. **But it is chiefly to the great reformation of religion that we owe the great reformation of philosophy.** The alliance between the Schools and the Vatican had for ages been so close that those who threw off the dominion of the Vatican could not continue to recognise the authority of the Schools. **Most of the great reformers treated the Peripatetic philosophy with contempt, and spoke of Aristotle as if Aristotle had been answerable for all the dogmas of Thomas Aquinas. “Nullo apud Lutheranos philosophiam esse in pretio,”* was a reproach which the defenders of the Church of Rome loudly repeated, and which many of the Protestant leaders considered as a compliment. Scarcely any text was more frequently cited by the reformers than that in which St. Paul cautions the Colossians not to let any man spoil them by philosophy.** Luther, almost at the outset of his career, went so far as to declare that no man could be at once a proficient in the school of Aristotle and in that of Christ. Zwingle, Bucer, Peter Martyr, Calvin, held similar language.

> * We quote, on the authority of Bayle, from Melchior Cano, a scholastic divine of great reputation.

…

The part which Bacon played in this great change was the part, not of Robespierre, but of Bonaparte. The ancient order of things had been subverted. Some bigots still cherished with devoted loyalty the remembrance of the fallen monarchy, and exerted themselves to effect a restoration. But the majority had no such feeling. Freed, yet not knowing how to use their freedom, they pursued no determinate course, and had found no leader capable of conducting them.

That leader at length arose. The philosophy which he taught was essentially new. **It differed from that of the celebrated ancient teachers, not merely in method, but also in object. Its object was the good of mankind, in the sense in which the mass of mankind always have understood and always will understand the word *good*.**

https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/#SH2b

The end of Hellenism and the Stoic philosophy coincided with the beginnings of the monotheistic religious worldview. Monotheism and the Christian worldview were fundamentally opposed to panpsychism, and thus it is perhaps not surprising that we find relatively little articulation of panpsychist ideas for several centuries.

The next major advance did not occur until the Italian Renaissance. Five of the most important philosophers of that era—Cardano, Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno, and Campanella—were panpsychists. Cardano was the first notable philosopher in over a millennium to put forth an unambiguous panpsychist philosophy.

> https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/#SH2d
>
> In contrast to Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne articulated a clear and explicit form of process panpsychism. **Beginning with his *Beyond Humanism* (1937), he laid out the unambiguous position that all true individuals possess a kind of psyche: “Molecules, atoms, and electrons all show more analogy of behavior to animals than do sticks and stones. The constitutions of inorganic masses may then after all belong on the scale of organic being…”** (pp. 111-112). Elaborating on this notion over four decades, through such articles as “Panpsychism” (1950), “Physics and Psychics” (1977), and “The Rights of the Subhuman World” (1979), his panpsychism (or, “psychicalism”) is a clear and consistent theme. **He combined the insights of Leibniz with Whitehead’s process view into a system which, he claimed, resolved many long-standing philosophical problems: most notably that it serves as a third way between dualism and materialism. Ultimately, panpsychism/psychicalism is, he says, the most viable ontology available to us—certainly preferable to an utterly unintelligible materialism: “the concept of ‘mere dead insentient matter’ is an appeal to invincible ignorance. At no time will this expression ever constitute knowledge”** (1977: 95).
> …

> **Panpsychism, with its long list of advocates and sympathizers, is a robust and respectable approach to mind. It offers a naturalistic escape from Cartesian dualism and Christian theology.**

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12679

In his fourth Boyle lecture entitled, *A Confutation of Atheism from the Structure and Origin of Humane Bodies, Part II*, Bentley attacked Girolamo Cardano and Andrea Cesalpino by calling them "Astrological undertakers" whose putative cosmological theories, **especially concerning human origins spoke of raising "Men like Vegetables out of some fat and slimy soil well digested by the kindly heat of the Sun, and impregnated with the influence of the Stars upon some remarkable and periodical conjunctions"** (Bentley 1693a, 3-4).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA152#v=onepage&q&f=false

> In a zealous endeavor to gather all the strands of sixteenth-century Italian utopian thought, one scholar has even drawn in the paradoxical *Encomium Neronis* by the Milanese genius and libertine Girolamo Cardano. **In this work, which followed his son's condemnation for murder by the Senate of Milan, Cardano advocated a powerful monarchy, with Nero, the archenemy of the senators, portrayed as the protector of poor wretches from the exactions of aristocrats and the merciless verdicts of their justice.**7

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3600/3600-h/3600-h.htm#link2HCH0025

I was privately carried at Pisa to see a very honest man, but so great an Aristotelian, that his most usual thesis was: "That the touchstone and square of all solid imagination, and of all truth, was an absolute conformity to Aristotle's doctrine; and that all besides was nothing but inanity and chimera; for that he had seen all, and said all." A position, that for having been a little too injuriously and broadly interpreted, brought him once and long kept him in great danger of the Inquisition at Rome.

Let him make him examine and thoroughly sift everything he reads, and lodge nothing in his fancy upon simple authority and upon trust. **Aristotle's principles will then be no more principles to him, than those of Epicurus and the Stoics:** let this diversity of opinions be propounded to, and laid before him; he will himself choose, if he be able; if not, he will remain in doubt.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=P_zMW3EHnTEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA319#v=onepage&q&f=false

A follower of the materialist doctrine of the Roman philosopher Epicurus, Campanella did not believe in miracles, or in heaven and hell. The Church had promoted such superstitions, he wrote, to control the common folk by keeping them in fear. Such ideas verged on atheism, and Campanella expressed them incautiously. In 1593 the Inquisition threw him into prison for his heretical beliefs. Six years later, as a form of partial release, he was confined to a monastery in Naples.

Southern Italy was controlled by Spain at the time, and in Naples Campanella became involved in a plot to fight and throw out these invaders. **His hope was to establish an independent republic based on his own ideas of utopia.** The leaders of the Italian Inquisition, working with their Spanish counterparts, had him imprisoned again.
...

To save his life, Campanella feigned madness. He let his inquisitors imagine that his beliefs stemmed from an incontrollable unsoundness of mind. For a while the tortures continued, to see if his insanity was faked, but in 1603 his sentence was commuted to life in prison. **The first four years of this he spent chained to a wall in an underground dungeon. Despite such conditions, he continued to write—although no longer would he be so foolish as to express his ideas directly.**

One book of Campanella's, *The Hispanic Monarchy*, promoted the idea that Spain had a divine mission to expand its powers around the world, and offered the Spanish king practical, Machiavelli-type advice for achieving this. Despite his own interest in Machiavelli, the book in general presented ideas completely the opposite to his own. *The Hispanic Monarchy* was in fact a ploy, an attempt to show his conversion to orthodoxy in the boldest manner possible. It worked: In 1626, six years after its publication, the pope finally let Campanella out of prison.

Shortly after gaining his freedom, Campanella wrote *Atheism Conquered*, a book attacking free-thinkers, Machiavellians, Calvinists, and heretics of all stripes. The book is written in the form of debates in which heretics express their beliefs and are countered by arguments for the superiority of Catholicism. Campanella had obviously reformed—his book made that clear. Or did it?

The arguments in the mouths of the heretics had never before been expressed with such verve and freshness. **Pretending to present their side only to knock it down, Campanella actually summarized the case against Catholicism with striking passion. When he argued the other side, supposedly *his* side, on the other hand, he resorted to stale clichés and convoluted rationales.** Brief and eloquent, the heretics' arguments seemed bold and sincere. The lengthy arguments for Catholicism seemed tiresome and unconvincing.
...

Yet in the years to come, *Atheism Conquered* became a bible for atheists, Machiavellians and libertines who used the arguments Campanella had put in their mouths to defend their dangerous ideas.

> https://books.google.ca/books/download/Novitatum_Cartesianarum_gangraena_seu_Th.pdf?id=ghkNrLF1shoC&output=pdf&sig=ACfU3U3zJVm82weQQYHzVWYixkYs15fW7Q
>
> **Quæ omnia tandem semet exonerant in *Libertinismum*, aut Campanellæ *Religionem communem*, per quam quisque: Ethnicus, Muhammedanus, Judæus, Socinianus, Pontificius &c. in suis placitis servari possit. Adeoque nullam Religionis Christianæ, præ quibusvis aliis, necessitatem esse.** Huc omninò contendit totus ille *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, sigillatim capite XV. cujus *ἀνακεφαλάιωσις* sub sinem exhibetur his verbis: *Verum eos missos facio, quandoquidem me meæ causa satisfecisse puto, quod ostenderim, quaratione Philosophia à Theologia separanda sit, & in quo utraque potissimum consistat, & quod neutra neutri ancilletur; sed quod unaquaque suum regnum sine ulla alterius repugnantia obtineat* &c.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/marechal/1799/atheists.htm
>
> CAMPANELLA (Th. of Calabria) – Cyprianus believes that deep down Campanella had no religion...
>
> He didn't have what it takes to be an atheist, Naigeon said.
>
> **His book entitled "Atheismus triumphatus" would be better titled "Atheismus triumphans."**
>
> **Far from combating and defeating atheism, he handles it mildly and even makes it triumph.**
>
> Twenty-seven years of prison and seven tortures prevented Campanella from going as far as he could have.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT181#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Father Marin Mersenne was a worldly cleric** – intent on recasting scholastic philosophy in such a fashion as to make Christianity more receptive to the new science,18 **and given to defending the faith against the atheists, deists, and libertines of the age in a manner that seems to have been deliberately contrived to give his opponents' arguments a wider circulation than they would otherwise have had.**19 When the old priest died, a friend wrote to the director of the academy at Breda to report the event and remarked, "You are well aware that he did not believe all his religion, ... that he was of the sort well pleased to have the church service done, and that he dared not recite his Breviary often for fear of spoiling his good Latin."20

https://www.exclassics.com/anatomy/anat158.htm

Thus they mutter and object **(see the rest of their arguments in Mercennus in Genesin, and in Campanella, amply confuted),** with many such vain cavils, well known, not worthy the recapitulation or answering: whatsoever they pretend, they are *interim* of little or no religion.

Cousin-germans to these men are many of our great philosophers and deists, who, though they be more temperate in this life, give many good moral precepts, honest, upright, and sober in their conversation, yet in effect they are the same (accounting no man a good scholar that is not an atheist), *nimis altum sapiunt*, too much learning makes them mad. Whilst they attribute all to natural causes, contingence of all things, as Melancthon calls them, *Pertinax hominum genus*, a peevish generation of men, that misled by philosophy, and the devil's suggestion, their own innate blindness, deny God as much as the rest, hold all religion a fiction, opposite to reason and philosophy, **though for fear of magistrates, saith Vaninus, they durst not publicly profess it.** Ask one of them of what religion he is, he scoffingly replies, a philosopher, a Galenist, an Averroist, and with Rabelais a physician, a peripatetic, an epicure. In spiritual things God must demonstrate all to sense, leave a pawn with them, or else seek some other creditor. They will acknowledge Nature and Fortune, yet not God: though in effect they grant both: for as Scaliger defines, Nature signifies God's ordinary power; or, as Calvin writes, Nature is God's order, and so things extraordinary may be called unnatural: Fortune his unrevealed will; and so we call things changeable that are beside reason and expectation. **To this purpose Minutius in *Octavio*, and Seneca well discourseth with them,** *lib. 4. de beneficiis, cap. 5, 6, 7.* "They do not understand what they say; what is Nature but God? call him what thou wilt, Nature, Jupiter, he hath as many names as offices: it comes all to one pass, God is the fountain of all, the first

Giver and Preserver, from whom all things depend," *a quo, et per quem omnia, Nam quocunque vides Deus est, quocunque moveris*, "God is all in all, God is everywhere, in every place." **And yet this Seneca, that could confute and blame them, is all out as much to be blamed and confuted himself, as mad himself;** for he holds *fatum Stoicum*, that inevitable Necessity in the other extreme, as those Chaldean astrologers of old did, against whom the prophet Jeremiah so often thunders, and those heathen mathematicians, Nigidius Figulus, magicians, and Priscilianists, whom St. Austin so eagerly confutes, those Arabian questionaries, Novem Judices, Albumazer, Dorotheus, &c., and our countryman Estuidus, that take upon them to define out of those great conjunction of stars, with Ptolomeus, the periods of kingdoms, or religions, of all future accidents, wars, plagues, schisms, heresies, and what not? all from stars, and such things, saith Maginus, *Quæ sibi et intelligentiis suis reservavit Deus*, which God hath reserved to himself and his angels, they will take upon them to foretell, as if stars were immediate, inevitable causes of all future accidents. Cæsar Vaninus, in his book *de admirandis naturæ Arcanis, dial. 52. de oraculis*, **is more free, copious, and open, in this explication of this astrological tenet of Ptolemy, than any of our modern writers, Cardan excepted, a true disciple of his master Pomponatius;** according to the doctrine of Peripatetics, he refers all apparitions, prodigies, miracles, oracles, accidents, alterations of religions, kingdoms, &c. (for which he is soundly lashed by Marinus Mercennus, as well he deserves), to natural causes (for spirits he will not acknowledge), to that light, motion, influences of heavens and stars, and to the intelligences that move the orbs. *Intelligentia quæ, movet orbem mediante cœlo*, &c. Intelligences do all: and after a long discourse of miracles done of old, *si hæc dæmones possint, cur non et intelligentiæ, cœlorum motrices*? And as these great conjunctions, aspects of planets, begin or end, vary, are vertical and predominant, so have religions, rites, ceremonies, and kingdoms their beginning, progress, periods, *in urbibus, regibus, religionibus, ac in particularibus hominibus, hæc vera ac manifesta, sunt, ut Aristoteles innuere videtur, et quotidiana docet experientia, ut historias perlegens videbit;* ***quid olim in Gentili lege Jove sanctius et illustrius? quid nunc vile magis et execrandum?*** *Ita cœlestia corpora pro mortalium beneficio religiones ædificant, et cum cessat influxus, cessat lex*, ("In cities, kings, religions, and in individual men, these things are true and obvious, as Aristotle appears to imply, and daily experience teaches to the reader of history: **for what was more sacred and illustrious, by Gentile law, than Jupiter? what now more vile and execrable?** In this way celestial objects suggest religions for worldly motives, and when the influx ceases, so does the law,") &c. And because, according to their tenets, the world is eternal, intelligences eternal, influences of stars eternal, kingdoms, religions, alterations shall be likewise eternal, and run round after many ages; *Atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles;* ***renascentur religiones, et ceremoniæ,*** *res humanæ in idem recident, nihil nunc quod non olim fuit, et post sæculorum revolutiones alias est, erit,* ("And again a great Achilles shall be sent against Troy: **religions and their ceremonies shall be born again;** however affairs relapse into the same track, there is nothing now that was not formerly and Will not be again,") &c*. idem specie*, saith Vaninus, *non individuo quod Plato significavit.* These (saith mine author), these are the decrees of Peripatetics, which though I recite, *in obsequium Christianæ fidei detestor*, as I am a Christian I detest and hate.
...

Aristotle is hardly censured of some, both divines and philosophers. St. Justin *in Perænetica ad Gentes*, Greg. Nazianzen. *in disput. adversus Eun.*, Theodoret, *lib. 5. de curat. græc. affec.*, Origen. *lib. de principiis*. Pomponatius justifies in his Tract (so styled at least) *De immortalitate Animæ*, **Scaliger (who would forswear himself at any time, saith Patritius, in defence of his great master Aristotle),** and Dandinus, *lib. 3. de anima*, acknowledge as much. **Averroes oppugns all spirits and supreme powers; of late Brunus (*infelix Brunus*, Kepler calls him), Machiavel, Cæsar Vaninus lately burned at Toulouse in France, and Pet. Aretine, have publicly maintained such atheistical paradoxes,** with that Italian Boccaccio with his fable of three rings, &c., *ex quo infert haud posse internosci, quæ sit verior religio, Judaica, Mahometana, an Christiana, quoniam eadem signa*, &c., "from which he infers, that it cannot be distinguished which is the true religion, Judaism, Mahommedanism, or Christianity," &c. **Marinus Mercennus suspects Cardan for his subtleties, Campanella, and Charron's Book of Wisdom, with some other Tracts, to savour of atheism:** but amongst the rest that pestilent book *de tribus mundi impostoribus*, *quem sine horrore (inquit) non legas, et mundi Cymbalum dialogis quatuor contentum, anno 1538, auctore Peresio, Parisiis excusum*, &c. And as there have been in all ages such blasphemous spirits, so there have not been wanting their patrons, protectors, disciples and adherents. Never so many atheists in Italy and Germany, saith Colerus, as in this age: **the like complaint Mercennus makes in France, 50,000 in that one city of Paris.**
...

But *instar omnium*, the most copious confuter of atheists is Marinus Mercennus in his Commentaries on Genesis: with Campanella's Atheismus Triumphatus. He sets down at large the causes of this brutish passion, (seventeen in number I take it) answers all their arguments and sophisms, which he reduceth to twenty-six heads, proving withal his own assertion; "There is a God, such a God, the true and sole God," by thirty-five reasons. His Colophon is how to resist and repress atheism, and to that purpose he adds four especial means or ways, which who so will may profitably peruse.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA187#v=onepage&q&f=false

The third member of the group was G. Naudé,3 intimate friend of Guy Patin and Gassendi, sometime doctor of Louis XIII, and librarian of Cardinal Mazarin. Like La Mothe and Charron, he had a reputation for erudition. G. Patin (Lettre XLIII) confessed to being overwhelmed by his learning. **Busson likens him to Diderot "style Louis XIII."** This erudition had been acquired, at least in its early stages, at Padua, where Naudé had studied on two occasions, in 1627 and 1633. Although he was a student of medicine, much of his attention was directed to philosophy. **His fullest admiration was accorded to Cremonini, who represented for the seventeenth-century French what Pomponazzi had**

represented in the sixteenth. Naudé gave a glowing account of his master: “Ce Crémonin étoit grand personnage, un esprit vif et capable de tout, un homme desniaisé et guéri du sot, qui sçavoit bien la vérité, mais qu’on n’ose pas dire en Italie.” **Naudé added that all the professors of Italy, but principally those of Padua, were “desniaisés.” The Italy which he adored was, as he said in the *Naudeana*, “pleine de libertins et d’athées.”**

Naudé became the faithful interpreter of the Paduans in France. Time and again, he vaunted Aristotle, the Aristotle of Averroes and Pomponazzi. What he admired most in Aristotle, as well as in Pomponazzi, was clarity of reasoning. **When in 1625 he wrote *Apologie pour les grands hommes accusés de magie*, he applied the same critical method to miracles, possessions, and demonology in general which Pomponazzi had utilized in the *De incantationibus*.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA54#v=onepage&q&f=false

> David Lloyd, who wrote an orthodox reply to Stubbe’s tract, traced the origin of interpretations like Stubbe’s to *De Incantationibus* by Pietro Pomponazzi.85 This early sixteenth-century heretical Aristotelian sought to give naturalistic explanations for events that were conventionally attributed to supernatural interventions in nature by angels and demons.86 In *De Incantationibus* Pomponazzi argued that ‘certain gifted men, **drawing on their own occult powers, can cure by the sheer power of will and imagination.**’87 Among the cures that could be explained in such terms Pomponazzi included the royal touch for the king’s evil.88 Here then is a very likely source for Stubbe’s interpretation of Greatrakes’s cures, made even likelier by the fact that Stubbe possessed copies of Pomponazzi’s works, including *De Immortalitate Animae* (1534).89 Pomponazzi, incidentally, had argued that Galen believed in the eternity of the world and the mortality of the soul.90 **Stubbe then stood in a long line of radical Galenists and Aristotelian humanists.**

…

Naudé’s attitude toward this trickery was ambiguous; in a cynical way he approved the phenomenon, chiefly because he believed the public is so stupid that it wants to be fooled. His cynicism extended further, however. **Living in a regime which held Machiavelli in equal authority with the Catholic breviary, he could not refrain from stating that a good prince will claim all the prerogatives of religion and will say that he is inspired by God. He will produce false miracles, revelation, and prophecies, and will enlist the cooperation of the clergy. They will support each other as “deux coupeurs de bourse,” to quote Meslier,** who was not at all favorably disposed to the practice.
…

He began his career by condemning the Rosicrucians, declaring himself opposed not only to this particular sect, but to all occult sciences, superstitions, ignorance of “chymistes, astrologues, magiciens et charlatans.” He attacked the legends and fables surrounding Zoroaster, Orpheus, and Pythagoras, denying every manifestation of supernaturalism. He made sport of Numa Pompilius and his nymph Egeria, **and called Numa “un politique admirable.”** Thus utilizing the same approach as Pomponazzi a century earlier, Pietro d’Abano two centuries before that, and Cardano his contemporary, he rejected every interpretation based on miracles, when one can always interpret “les expériences inouïes par les principes de la philosophie naturelle.” **All fables are impostures, good when the world was young, ridiculous now that humanity is “déniaisée.”**
…

Nevertheless, in the *Apologie*, he reaffirmed his belief in God and in the devil, and struck out boldly against atheism. When the circumstances required it, he separated the truths of faith from those of reason, as all good Paduans did. It was a way of proceeding which he had learned among the “déniaisés.” Further, as happened at Padua, he had a tendency to deny providence and replace it with a natural chain of causes. **Giordano Bruno had burned for less, but he had not been blessed with an Italian cardinal as his patron.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OymeBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA649#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **There were those in Rome and especially in Paris who still thought it was worth while trying to win Grotius for the Roman Catholic Church. In that year he was put under pressure from a small committee in Paris, which comprised the Jesuit Denys Petau, the erudite libertine Gabriel Naudé and the nuncio Girolamo Grimaldi,** Ranuccio Scotti’s successor. The committee sought to tempt Grotius by offering material advantages. Naudé paid him several visits in his residence on the rue des Saints-Pères, which can be dated to April, 3 September and December 1642. Petau applied for subsidies from the Congregatio de propaganda fide in Rome, while Naudé used his efforts to secure better positions for Grotius’ sons, two of whom were ambitious for a brilliant military career.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/120/mode/2up?view=theater

The first prominent *érudit* fully to express the ideal of the post-confessional, Early Enlightenment library was Gabriel Naudé (1600-53), one of the century's most renowned intellectual 'libertines.'3 Having organized several large libraries in France and, for cardinals, in Rome, Naudé's ideas on bibliography and librarianship were largely shaped by his own experience. While briefly, late in life, he also tended Queen Christina's books in Stockholm, the real summit of his career was as keeper of Mazarin's library, which, in the 1640s under his care, became the largest and most impressive in France. The Bibliothèque Mazarine, open to *érudits* for research from 1643, was indeed the first of the *grandes bibliothèques* of the new era. **The guiding conception behind the Mazarine, however, was rooted in Naudé's libertine philosophical vision. Steeped in the Italian philosophical heretics of the Renaissance – Pomponazzi, Campanella, Cardano, and Vanini – and a confirmed Pyrrhonist as well as an admirer of Montaigne and a friend of Gassendi, Naudé was unrivalled for his breadth of erudition and bibliographical grasp.**

Naudé's treatise on libraries and librarianship, the *Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque*, first published in 1644 (and published in an English translation by John Evelyn in 1661), **advocates, in line with his libertine principles, the ideal of the non-polemical, non-confessional, 'universal' library. He insists on 'universality' rather than theological specificity as the true guiding principle for a library of stature.**4
…

In theology, it is no extravagance, he insists, to include heretical writers because Protestant texts have to be refuted and Catholics have always been permitted to own the Talmud and Koran, works which 'vomit a thousand blasphemies against Jesus Christ and our faith and are more dangerous than those of the Protestants.'6

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

In Italy, Machiavelli and Sarpi were no doubt the odd men out, but they can hardly have been unique. That there were others, that they were tolerably numerous, and that in an age of fierce religious persecution, when the Inquisition was especially active and alert,45 they thought it prudent to practice dissimulation – of this Giulio Cesare Vanini and Tommaso Campanella were no less fully persuaded than were the apologists Garasse and Mersenne.46 **Moreover, the same conviction was held by the as-yet-unidentifed, exceptionally well-read Parisian author who, in the late 1650s, espoused atheism in the widely circulated clandestine tract *Theophrastus redivivus*.**47

> 47. Consider *Theophrastus redivivus*, ed. Guido Canziani and Gianni Paganini (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1981), in light of the analysis by Gregory, *Theophrastus redivivus*, passim. **Had he paid more attention to this document and to what its existence demonstrates with regard to the subterranean intellectual currents operative in Paris in the 1650s, Jonathan I. Israel,** *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), **would not have attributed to Spinoza the influence that he did.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theophrastus_redivivus

Theophrastus redivivus is famous for proclaiming that all the great philosophers, including the eponymous Theophrastus (ancient Greek philosopher c. 371-c. 287 BCE, successor of Aristotle), have been atheists;[3][1] religions are contrived works of men; there is no valid proof for the existence of gods, and those who claim experience of a god are either disingenuous or ill.[3] **However, unlike the *Treatise of the Three Impostors*, another anti-religious work published around the same time, *Theophrastus redivivus* was never mentioned by the Age of Enlightenment philosophers and thinkers of the next century, despite being one of the first explicitly anti-religious works ever published in modern Europe.**[6]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=0bdRDQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false

Some of them even went beyond attacking Christianity or disputing the authority of the Bible by overtly denying the existence of God, among them the anonymous author of **the notorious *Theophrastus redivivus*, the first known atheistic text.** The person who wrote this book 1659 is unknown. But he or she was French and a member of (or an intellectual close to) the *libertinage érudit* circles. Particularly illuminating is a comparison with Koerbagh's *Een ligt schijnende in dyustere plaatsen*. Some parallels between these two texts are conspicuous. Both authors reject the authority of the bible, central Christian dogmas (salvation, trinity etc.), and the very idea of a personal God. More importantly, however, by placing the *Theophrastus redivivus* (as a specimen of the *libertinage érudit*) and Koerbagh's book side by side, an essential difference comes to light: **the *libertins érudits* made no attempt to enlighten the public. They did not address it and, what is more, they emphatically recommended the control and moral guidance of the common people through religion.**
…

In stark contrast to the elitist *libertinage érudit*, Koerbagh and the other three Dutchmen [De la Court, Van den Enden, Meyer] attached great value to addressing themselves to the broader, non-academic public who did not master Latin.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.512045/page/47/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The example of England shewed [Voltaire] that truth was not formed to remain in secret among a few philosophers, and men of the world, the pupils of these philosophers; **who laughed with them at those errors of which the people are the victims, but became themselves the defenders of error, when their office or their rank made it their interest, supposed or real, and were ready to proscribe or even to persecute their preceptors, should they venture to speak what they themselves privately believed.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n61/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> There is however an exception often made by Voltaire, which might have left to Christ some few worshippers among the rabble. He seems little jealous of that conquest when he writes to D'Alembert, **"Both you and Damilaville must be well pleased to see the contempt into which *the wretch* is fallen among the better sort of people throughout Europe; *they are all we wished for* or that were necessary; we never pretended to enlighten *house-maids and shoemakers*; we leave them to the apostles."**23 **Again, he writes to Diderot, "Whatever you do, have your eye *on the wretch. It* must be destroyed among the better sort; but we may *leave it to the rabble* for whom *it* was made;"**24 or when, in fine, he writes to Damilaville, "I can assure you, that in a short time none but the rabble will follow the standard of our enemies; and that rabble we equally despise whether for or against us."25 **Voltaire, despairing of more enlarged success, would sometimes except *the clergy and the great chamber of Parliament.***

https://www.eoht.info/page/Theophrastus%20Redivivus

"Conversely, all the subversive writings of the seventeenth-century *libertins*, and a good many subsequent ones, too, have the ring of familiarity to the student of such matters in the Renaissance: the topoi are the same, illustrating the same themes, turning around the same antinomies—only the tone is slightly more strident, the disguise more transparent. The most exemplary of texts in this regard is certainly the ***Theophrastus Redivivus***, which may fairly be described as an explicit radicalization of many, indeed most of the ideas which the men of a previous century and earlier had **shrouded in the veils of indirection and allegory, had hinted, winked, and nodded at**, had allowed themselves to think—and write—in guarded private moments more or less strictly controlled, in lives of apparently unimpeachable orthodoxy ... and had exchanged in conversation and pleasantry, in convivial table-talk, safely among friends. All these forbidden avenues of thought are followed **openly and relentlessly, with cold logic and devastating coherence**, by the author of the *Theophrastus*, and in his book, we may see clearly just where they lead. Until recently this has been the reverse of easy; indeed, few enough scholars took the trouble to read it, understandably put off by the length and difficulty of the Latin manuscript. In any case, it was not readily available. Tullio Gregory [1979] has made it easy for us, and much of what follows is indebted to his work."—Max Gauna (1992), *Upwellings: First Expressions of Unbelief in the Printed Literature of the French Renaissance* [5]
...

"I use the teachings of the philosophers and thinkers of antiquity to show that god does not exist, that the world is eternal, that the soul is mortal, that hell is nothing but a fairy tale, and that religion is a political artifice. A cunning deception is that death is detestable, because nothing stifles him [it?]. Thus, I have divided the work, as Theophrastus of Eresus did it, into six books: the first on the gods, the second on the world, the third on religion, the fourth on the soul and on hell, the fifth on the contempt of death, the sixth on the natural life. All this belongs to the argument with the gods. If it has been proved that the gods do not exist, the rest understands itself."—Anon Theophrastus (c. 1659), *Theophrastus Redivivus* (pg. 8)[1]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA90#v=onepage&q&f=false

That profound divergences between Renaissance anti-Christian philosophical underground and post-1650 Radical Enlightenment were no less crucial historically than the affinities is well illustrated by the *Theophrastus Redivivus*, among the most important mid-seventeenth century Western clandestine manuscripts. Dating from 1659 and composed seemingly in France, this clandestine text offered a non-Spinozist Neo-Epicurean subversive outlook, rooted in a pre-Spinozist "philosophical atheism" encompassing some elements of the subsequent radical tradition but not others.60 It comprehensively denies all the dogmas of religious faith, a process it terms "throwing off the yoke" [*iugum excutere*].61 **Although the ancient philosopher Theophrastus (*c.* 371-*c.* 287 BCE), Aristotle's successor as the director of the Peripatetic Schools in Athens, was not actually an Epicurean, he influenced Epicurus' views on cosmology and was a professed atheist.**62 What is radical, or rather "radical Aristotelian," in *Theophrastus Redivivus* is the strict

separation of morality from belief in God and religion, elimination of divine providence, and rejection of all religious authority. **But the text is patently Epicurean rather than quasi-Spinozist in evincing little interest in scientific inquiry (unlike the real Theophrastus)** so that here the text is *not* radical. Where the real Theophrastus was a true Aristotelian scientific researcher, seeking the causes of natural phenomena by examining evidence, Epicurus and Lucretius – despite being strict naturalists, viewing thunder, lightning, meteors, and all potentially frightening natural phenomena as of purely natural origin, and not the work of gods, and providing lists of all possible natural explanations – showed scant interest in discovering which plausible explanation actually pertained in each case. What mattered to them was alleviating anxiety and fear, not investigating the specific cause.63 **Unlike the real Theophrastus and the *cercle*, *Theophrastus Redivivus* adheres to a skeptical approach not just to belief and theology but also scholarship and science. Far from presenting nature's laws as revealed by science as our chief verifying principle, *Theophrastus Redivivus*, like William Temple afterwards, sought to downplay, even discredit pursuit of science and "philosophy."**64

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false

The only remedy lay in a proper understanding of Aristotle, the historical Aristotle rather than the corrupt Catholic version. **This proper understanding would support pure Christianity, which was an Arian civil religion shorn of 'uncouth and phantastical' doctrines, shorn too of a separate clergy claiming independent spiritual power.**147 The recovery of the true philosophy, the real Aristotle, would point the way to this true Arian faith.
…

To the extent that popery meant the latter, and could lead to the former, **Stubbe's defense of Aristotle represented an attack on the established church because his Aristotle, the true Aristotle, was consonant with an Arian view of the Godhead.** But this could not be made clear in print; it could, however, be read between the lines. So, by defending Aristotle, Stubbe could conceal his real convictions, while not being untrue to them, indeed – better than that for his purposes – he could feign orthodoxy, while insinuating heresy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page80 **[1710]**

Andreas Cisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who came nearest after Michael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood), was accused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled *Alpes Caesae*) of belonging to these **anti-religious Peripatetics.** Traces of this doctrine are found also in the *Circulus Pisanus Claudii Berigardi*, an author of French nationality who migrated to Italy and taught philosophy at Pisa: but especially the writings and the letters of Gabriel Naudé, as well as the *Naudaeana*, show that Averroism still lived on when this learned physician was in Italy. **Corpuscular philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears to have extinguished this excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to have been intermixed with its teaching. It may be indeed that there have been Atomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of the Averroists, if circumstances so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm such good as there is in Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combined with all that is sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both into harmony with true theology.**

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/43/mode/2up?view=theater

The scholastics were a secret philosophical opposition to the Church. But publicly they feigned the greatest obsequiousness and even fought in some cases for the Church. In processions, they paraded among the followers of the Church, something like the French opposition deputies during the ceremonies of the Restoration.67 **This comedy lasted more than six centuries and became ever more conventional. By destroying scholasticism, Descartes also destroyed the outdated opposition of the Middle Ages.** The old brooms were worn out after such long sweeping, and there was just too much dust. The new times demanded new brooms. After every revolution, the previous opposition has to abdicate; otherwise great idiocies occur, as we ourselves have seen.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1911/boutroux.htm

Really, has the 'cultured' Mr V Bazarov never heard of the so-called '*dual truth*'? This doctrine first saw the light of day in the Middle Ages and reached maturity in the Renaissance period. The whole meaning of it is that the truths of science 'revolve' in quite a different plane from that of the truths of religion. Thus, if 'cultured' people assure us *at the present time* that there is essentially no room for conflict between science and religion they are only warming up something very much of 'the past'.[1]

1. GH Lewes in his *History of Philosophy* alleges that Francis Bacon was one of the first to enunciate the 'doctrine of dual truth'. That is inaccurate. **[The founder of the theory of the 'dual truth' was Averroes.**

> **Later this theory was widespread in other countries including England, where Bacon became Averroes' follower – Editor.]**

…

An impartial observer will readily discern the obvious social causes prompting the present-day 'philosophers' of a certain type to warm up the *old* doctrine of 'dual truth' and serve it with a *new* sauce.[2] E Boutroux is one of those warmers-up whose works constitute what might justifiably be called *twentieth-century scholasticism.*

---

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr07.htm#an_fr_113_4

Aristotle is always surprising us not merely by the immense volume of clear thinking and co-ordinated knowledge of which he was master, but by the steady *Sôphrosynê* of his temper. Son of the court physician of Philip, tutor for some years to Alexander the Great, **he never throughout his extant writings utters one syllable of flattery to his royal and world-conquering employers; nor yet one syllable which suggests a grievance. He saw, at close quarters and from the winning side, the conquest of the Greek city states by the Macedonian *ethnos* or nation; but he judges dispassionately that the city is the higher social form.**

It seems characteristic that in his will, which is extant, after providing a dowry for his widow, Herpyllis, to facilitate her getting a second husband, and thanking her for her goodness to him, he directs that his bones are to be laid in the same grave with those of his first wife, Pythias, whom he had rescued from robbers more than twenty years before.116_1

> 116_1 **Pythias was the niece, or ward, of Aristotle's friend, Hermias, an extraordinary man who rose from slavery to be first a free man and a philosopher, and later Prince or 'Dynast' of Assos and Atarneus.** In the end he was treacherously entrapped by the Persian General, Mentor, and crucified by the king. Aristotle's 'Ode to Virtue' is addressed to him. To his second wife, Herpyllis, Aristotle was only united by a civil marriage like the Roman *usus*.

Other philosophers disliked him because he wore no long beard, dressed neatly and had good normal manners, and they despised his philosophy for very similar reasons. It was a school which took the existing world and tried to understand it instead of inventing some intense ecstatic doctrine which should transform it or reduce it to nothingness.

It possessed no Open Sesame to unlock the prison of mankind; **yet it is not haunted by that *Oimôgê* of Kynoskephalai. While armies sweep Greece this way and that, while the old gods are vanquished and the cities lose their freedom and their meaning, the Peripatetics instead of passionately saving souls diligently pursued knowledge,** and in generation after generation produced scientific results which put all their rivals into the shade.116_2

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_V#Aristotle

Afterwards, however, he departed to Hermias the eunuch, who was tyrant of Atarneus, and there is one story that he was on very affectionate terms with Hermias; according to another, Hermias bound him by ties of kinship, giving him his daughter or his niece in marriage, and so Demetrius of Magnesia narrates in his work on *Poets and Writers of the Same Name*. The same author tells us that Hermias had been the slave of Eubulus, and that he was of Bithynian origin and had murdered his master. **Aristippus in his first book *On the Luxury of the Ancients* says that Aristotle fell in love with a concubine of Hermias,** 4. **and married her with his consent, and in an excess of delight sacrificed to a weak woman as the Athenians did to Demeter of Eleusis;**[4] and that he composed a paean in honour of Hermias, which is given below; next that he stayed in Macedonia at Philip's court and received from him his son Alexander as his pupil; that he petitioned Alexander to restore his native city which had been destroyed by Philip and obtained his request; and that he also drew up a code of laws for the inhabitants.

…

When he thought that he had stayed long enough with Alexander, he departed to Athens, having first presented to Alexander his kinsman Callisthenes of Olynthus. 5. **But when Callisthenes talked with too much freedom to the king and disregarded his own advice, Aristotle is said to have rebuked him by citing the line:**[5]

> **Short-lived, I ween, wilt thou be, my child, by what thou sayest.**

And so indeed it fell out. For he, being suspected of complicity in the plot of Hermolaus against the life of Alexander, was confined in an iron cage and carried about until he became infested with vermin through lack of proper attention; and finally he was thrown to a lion and so met his end.

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius7.html#c2
>
> [2e.11] **Aristotle, when he sent his pupil Callisthenes to Alexander, advised him either to say nothing to the king, or else to speak pleasantly,** evidently so that in the hearing of the king he would be either safer by his silence or more acceptable by what he said. But Callisthenes, when he reproved Alexander, because he prided himself to have the Macedonians salute him after the manner of the Persian flattery, and sought to reclaim him against his will to the ancient customs of his forefathers, was ordered to be put to death, and too late repented his neglect of the wholesome advice that had been given him.

To return to Aristotle: he came to Athens, was head of his school for thirteen years, and then withdrew to Chalcis because he was indicted for impiety by Eurymedon the hierophant, or, according to Favorinus[6] in his *Miscellaneous History*, by Demophilus, **the ground of the charge being the hymn he composed to the aforesaid Hermias,** 6. **as well as the following inscription for his statue at Delphi:**[7]

> This man in violation of the hallowed law of the immortals was unrighteously slain by the king of the bow-bearing Persians, who overcame him, not openly with a spear in murderous combat, but by treachery with the aid of one in whom he trusted.

…

The hymn in question runs as follows:

> 7. O virtue, toilsome for the generation of mortals to achieve, the fairest prize that life can win, for thy beauty, O virgin, it were a doom glorious in Hellas even to die and to endure fierce, untiring labours. Such courage dost thou implant in the mind, imperishable, better than gold, dearer than parents or soft-eyed sleep. **For thy sake Heracles, son of Zeus, and the sons of Leda endured much in the tasks whereby they pursued thy might.** 8. **And yearning after thee came Achilles and Ajax to the house of Hades, and for the sake of thy dear form the nursling of Atarneus too was bereft of the light of the sun.** Therefore shall his deeds be sung, and the Muses, the daughters of Memory, shall make him immortal, exalting the majesty of **Zeus, guardian of strangers,** and the grace of lasting friendship.

…

He attached himself to Plato and resided with him twenty years, having become his pupil at the age of seventeen. He went to Mitylene in the archonship of Eubulus in the fourth year of the 108th Olympiad.[12] When Plato died in the first year of that Olympiad,[13] during the archonship of Theophilus, he went to Hermias and stayed with him three years. 10. In the archonship of Pythodotus, in the second year of the 109th Olympiad,[14] **he went to the court of Philip, Alexander being then in his fifteenth year.** His arrival at Athens was in the second year of the 111th Olympiad,[15] and he lectured in the Lyceum for thirteen years; then he retired to Chalcis in the third year of the 114th Olympiad[16] and died a natural death, at the age of about sixty-three, in the archonship of Philocles, in the same year in which Demosthenes died at Calauria.

It is said that he incurred the king's displeasure because he had introduced Callisthenes to him, and that Alexander, in order to cause him annoyance, honoured Anaximenes[17] and sent presents to Xenocrates.

11. Theocritus of Chios, according to Ambryon in his book *On Theocritus*, ridiculed him in an epigram which runs as follows:[18]

> To Hermias the eunuch, the slave withal of Eubulus, an empty monument was raised by empty-witted Aristotle, **who by constraint of a lawless appetite chose to dwell at the mouth of the Borborus [muddy stream] rather than in the Academy.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermias_of_Atarneus#Early_life

Hermias of Atarneus had surprisingly humble origins given the amount of political prestige and recognition he would gain in the later years of his life.[3] Although his date of birth remains unknown, he is first mentioned as a Bithynian slave to Eubulus, a wealthy banker and despotic tyrant of the lands surrounding Assos and Atarneus, two commercial towns on the Troad coastline of Asia Minor.[3] While several ancient historians, such as Theopompus, claimed that Hermias was a eunuch, modern historians discredit these claims as nothing more than attempts to blacken his reputation.[4]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n575/mode/2up?view=theater

A sharp rivalry developed between the Lyceum, whose students were mostly of the middle class, the Academy, which drew its membership largely from the aristocracy, and the school of Isocrates, which was frequented chiefly by colonial Greeks. The rivalry was eased in time by **the emphasis of Isocrates on rhetoric, of the Academy on mathematics, metaphysics, and politics, and of the Lyceum on natural science.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=SMVgCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA148#v=onepage&q&f=false

To the vast majority of the Athenians, it must be borne in mind, Aristotle was always an unwanted and suspected 'resident alien' (*metic*) living in Athens, a city which had become increasingly intolerant and deplorably anti-intellectual – indeed, xenophobic, especially as regards Macedonians. *VM* 12 (and *VM* 42) as well as *VL* 12 go out of their way to stress the fact that he was a mere *ξένος* or *extraneus* (an 'alien'), and they emphatically contrast him, the powerless alien who had but a few friends and no influential connections in Athens, with Plato, the Athenian citizen, who had many powerful friends and relatives as well as many personal, social and political connections in Athens. In short, Aristotle lived in Athens more by sufferance than by right, always subject to arbitrary persecution, wanton prosecution and sudden expulsion.27 **The Lyceum was never his own personal 'school,' but rather a 'communal' building accessible to all sorts of people. The Academy or Museum, on the other hand, was the personal property of Plato who could leave, bequeath, or transfer this personal property – the grounds, buildings, the library, the inventory etc., of the Academy – to any person of his choice, provided the latter was a male agnate.** The notion that, between 335-34 and 323 B.C., Aristotle owned as well as taught in his 'own school' and that this school consisted of grounds and buildings (*κῆπος*) belonging to Aristotle where the latter also kept his library and other personal belongings, is wholly erroneous.28 **Thanks to the co-operation of Demetrius of Phaleron, the Peripatetics acquired a *κῆπος* only during the scholarchate of Theophrastus.**29 **Hence, it is perhaps not entirely correct to call Aristotle the founder of the Peripatus or, perhaps, the first scholarch of the Peripatus,** although he was unquestionably the founder of Peripatetic philosophy.
…

Moreover, **many of Aristotle's relatives, friends and family connection were in foreign lands and, as has already been shown, he probably had very few close personal friends and acquaintances among the Athenians.** Apparently he had, however, a great many enemies, especially political enemies, not to mention people who simply disliked and distrusted his intellectual outlook and who disagreed with his philosophic views. This widespread and apparently deep-rooted attitude is clearly indicated, for instance, in Democharesʼ utterly prejudiced *Oration Against the Philosophers*, delivered in 306 B.C.30 Among other matters, Democharesgave formal expression to these anti-intellectual and xenophobic views in general. At the same time, he seems to have singled out Aristotle as a particularly untrustworthy, treacherous and dangerous person.
…

Matters were certainly not improved when Aristotle married Pythias, the niece or adopted daughter (or sister?) of Hermias, the 'Bithynian.' **To the average Athenian, who gloried in his prejudices, Hermias was a 'lowly' native of Asia Minor, a former slave of the disreputable Eubulus, a despicable eunuch and an 'inferior barbarian'** who had betrayed and murdered Eubulus, his former master and benefactor. It was also rumoured that Pythias had been the concubine of Hermias, the petty tyrant and friend or ally of Macedonia, who had been credited by Theopompus and Theocritus with every vile deed imaginable.
…

How bad this situation actually was may be surmised from Democharesʼ (a nephew of Demosthenes) and his vicious, but without doubt widely acclaimed and widely accepted, *Oration Against the Philosophers*, which was an eloquent but nasty speech in support of Sophoclesʼ motion (in 306 B.C.) to have all foreign 'subversives' or pro-Macedonian philosophers expelled from Athens.33

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/1774-aristotle-in-jewish-legend

Of Aristotle himself Josephus has preserved ("Contra Apionem," i. 22) a very interesting passage from the writings of Clearchus, the pupil of Aristotle, the authenticity of which is maintained by such authorities as Lobeck, Bernays, von Gutschmid ("Kleine Schriften," iv. 578), and Theo. Reinach ("Textes d'Auteurs Grecs et Romains Relatifs au Judaisme," 1895, pp. 10-12). This passage, prefaced by the remark of Josephus, is as follows:

Fragment of Clearchus.

> "In his first book on Sleep he relates of Aristotle, his master, that he had a discourse with a Jew; and his own account was that what this Jew said merited admiration and showed philosophical erudition. To speak of the race first, the man was a Jew by birth and came from Cœlesyria [Palestine]. **These Jews are derived from the philosophers of India. In India the philosophers call themselves Kalani,**

> **and in Syria Jews, taking their name from the country they inhabit, which is Judea; the name of their capital is rather difficult to pronounce: they call it Jerusalem.** Now this man, who had been the guest of many people, had come down from the highland to the seashore [Pergamus]. **He was a Greek not only in language, but in soul;** so much so that, when we happened to be in Asia in about the same places whither he came, he conversed with us and with other persons of learning in order to test our wisdom. And as he had had intercourse with a large number of sages, he imparted to us more knowledge of his own."

This is Aristotle's own account as recorded by Clearchus, and he adds more specific observations regarding his great and wonderful fortitude in diet and continent mode of living. Obviously it was the Jew's strict observance of the dietary laws that struck Aristotle. **Gutschmid** (pp. 579-585) **thinks that the Jew here spoken of is the same wonder-working magician** (exorcist; see Josephus, "Ant." viii. 2, § 5) **who, by some sort of hypnotism, drew the soul out of the body of a sleeping child and brought it back again with his rod in the presence of Aristotle** (Proclus, Commentary on Plato's Republic, x.), **which part of the narrative Josephus intentionally omitted.**

https://petrarch.petersadlon.com/submissions/Ogilvie.pdf

Petrarch's notion of the purpose of moral philosophy, as expressed in the *Familiari*, drew heavily from his study of Aristotle's ethics. Nonetheless, he could not recommend Aristotle unequivocally, **for Aristotle did not fulfill his own purpose when he stated that ethics was studied not to learn but to become better.** The Philosopher left Petrarch cold; he may have known what was better—after all, he admitted to having learned something—but it did not make him better. Aristotle's text taught what virtue was but lacked the "verbal torches" that would inflame the soul with a love of virtue and a hatred of vice.15

Those torches, Petrarch insisted, should be sought among three Latins: Cicero, Seneca, and Horace.16 Their words will drive the reader to love virtue and hate vice. How, if they are pagan? Petrarch temporizes by distinguishing virtue from salvation. Virtue, taught by the pagans, is not the end to which we aspire, but it is the right road to that end—so long as "virtues are not only known but loved."17

> These are then the true moral philosophers, useful teachers of virtue, whose first and final intention is to make the listener and reader a good person, and who do not just teach what virtue and vice are, and yell the famous name of the first and the dark name of the second in the ears, but also introduce love and devotion of the best thing, and hatred and revulsion for the worst, in the heart. ... **It is better to want what is good than to know what is true.**18

Knowledge was only useful when it was combined with volition—the desire to employ that knowledge. **Cold Aristotle and contentious schoolmen did not inflame that desire; if anything, they quenched it.**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n575/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> For the layman he wrote some twenty-seven popular dialogues, which Cicero and Quintilian considered equal to Plato's; it was chiefly by these that he was known in antiquity.[148] **These dialogues were among the casualties of the barbarian conquest of Rome. What remains to us is a mass of technical, highly abstract, and inimitably dull works rarely referred to by ancient scholars, and apparently composed, in the last twelve years of his life, of notes made for his lectures by himself, or from his lectures by his pupils.** These technical compendiums were not known outside the Lyceum until they were published by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C.[149] Forty of them survive, but Diogenes Laertius mentions 360 more—probably brief monographs. In these ashes of scholarship we must seek the once living thought that in later ages won for Aristotle the title of The Philosopher. **We must approach him expecting no brilliance like Plato's and no wit like Diogenes', but only a rich argosy of knowledge, and such conservative wisdom as befits the friend and pensioner of kings.***

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n583/mode/2up?view=theater

Having collected and studied, with his students, 158 Greek constitutions,* Aristotle divided them into three types: monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy—government respectively by power, by birth, and by excellence. Any one of these forms may be good according to time, place, and circumstance. **"Though one form of government may be better than others," reads a sentence which every American should memorize, "yet there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable to it under particular conditions."**[208]

...

And yet a wise conservative will not let people starve. **"The true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority are not too poor ... he should endeavor that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and as this is also advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the public money should be divided among the poor in such quantity as may enable each of them to buy a little field."**[218]

Having thus given back almost as much as he took away, **Aristotle offers some modest recommendations, not for a utopia but for a moderately better society.**

…

To avoid these illiberal dictatorships from above or below, **Aristotle proposes a "mixed constitution" or "timocracy"**—a combination of aristocracy and democracy, in which the suffrage will be restricted to landowners, and a strong middle class will be the balance wheel and pivot of power. "The land ought to be divided into two parts, one of which should belong to the community in general, the other to the individuals separately."[224] All the citizens will own land; they "are to eat at public tables in certain companies"; and only they shall vote or bear arms. They will constitute a small minority—ten thousand at most—of the population. "None of them should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or live by trade, for these are ignoble, and destroy excellence."[225] But "neither should they be husbandmen; ... the husbandmen should be a separate order of people"—presumably slaves. **The citizens will elect the public officials, and hold each to account at the end of his term.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Rq5hg4d54m4C&lpg=PA2&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

Usually when one hears about the "Aristotelian roots" of natural law, reference is made to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle refers to an unchanging, universal law. But is assessing the references in this text, we should keep in mind the fundamental point of view of the *Rhetoric*: it is like a handbook in the art of persuasion – the sort of things a lawyer *or* a prosecutor might study, in learning how best to make his case.
…

Then Aristotle discusses "universal" law, in a passage which is often cited as recognition and advocacy of natural law:

> Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. **It is this that Sophocles' Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature.**
>
> > *Not of to-day or yesterday it is,*
> > *But lives eternal: none can date its birth.*
>
> And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,
>
> > *Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky*
> > *Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth's immensity.*
>
> **And Alcidamas says in his Messeniac Oration**
>
> > **[*"God has left all men free; Nature has made no man slave"*]**14
> >
> > 14. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, W. Rhys Roberts, trans., in McKeon, *Basic Works of Aristotle*, I, 13, 1373b, 6-17. The speech of Antigone is found in Sophocles, *Antigone* 456:7. The speech from Empedocles in the Wheelwright translation reads, **"What is lawful is not binding only on some and not binding on others. Lawfulness extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the boundless light of the sky"** (Philip Wheelwright, *The Presocratics* [New York: Odyssey Press, 1966], 142).
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060%3Abekker%20page%3D1373b
>
> Alcidamas[150] also speaks of this precept in his *Messeniacus*. ... [3]
>
> > 150. Of Elis, pupil of Gorgias. **The oration is not extant, but the scholiast supplies his words: ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός: οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν ("God has left all men free; Nature has made none a slave").** The Messenians had revolted from Sparta.

When Aristotle refers to a law which is "binding on all men" he seems to be going significantly beyond the concept of what in the Western tradition of political philosophy is called the "social contract." His citation of Sophocles, Empedocles, and Alcidamas could be taken as appeals to recognized authorities, to buttress his arguments asserting the existence of natural law. **The reference to Sophocles's protagonist, Antigone, disobeying King Creon's prohibition of burial for her brother because of a higher law which commands reverence for kinfolk, seems *prima facie* to amount to a defense of natural law.** But the reference to Empedocles is not so clear-cut.

Empedocles was a mystic and sage who preached vegetarianism, and even prohibited the eating of certain types of vegetables – for example, beans, in which reincarnated souls were thought to exist. Is Aristotle seriously arguing here, along with Empedocles, that we should be vegetarians? If so, is it strange that he intimates nothing like this in his ethical writings. Moreover, would Aristotle, who emphasized the unique relationship of the individual soul to a specific body,15 give indirect support to Empedocles's theory of reincarnation? The doubts about Aristotle's intention in these passages become even more pronounced with regard to the citation of Alcidamas. **Alcidamas's notion of freedom as the natural state runs directly counter to Aristotle's theory in the *Politics*16 that there are "natural slaves" in the human race, and that it is best for such people to be under the control of a slave master.**

In *Rhetoric* I, 15, 1375a, 26-31, it becomes clear that, although Aristotle himself may have believed in the existence of natural law, this is not the thrust of his arguments. **Aristotle is *not* citing the example of Antigone and the other instances to argue for the existence or the validity of natural law, but rather as advice to a defense lawyer on how to win his case.** He starts off with the viewpoint of the defense, in an adversary system:

> **If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice.** We must argue that the juror's oath "I will give my verdict according to honest opinion" means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D15

> [4] For it is evident that, **if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice;** [5] and we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws; [6] **that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary** (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law: "For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal ... this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] of any man)[2];" [7] and further, that justice is real and expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, because it does not do the work of the law[3]; that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice; [8] **that it is the part of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written law.**[4]

Aristotle goes on to cite the passage from Sophocles's *Antigone* again, along with other ways of appealing to a universal law. *But then he follows up with advice for the prosecutor*:

> If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath "to give my verdict according to my honest opinion" is not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means. Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself. Or that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at all. Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor: for less harm come from the doctor's mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority. Or that trying to be cleverer than he laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best.

Here Aristotle is offering pointers particularly to prosecutors or judges who are faced with arguments appealing to "eternal laws" or exceptional cases which may invite "equity" decisions or "judicial reviews" which reinterpret or modify the laws. He would have to be a cynic or extreme relativist to make such statements in a strictly normative manner.

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n255/mode/2up?view=theater

> Homer has a court scene represented on the shield of Achilles (*Iliad*, xviii. 497 ff.), Plato's largest works are on politics and the theory of law (the *Republic* and the *Laws*), **Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is in parts simply a handbook for advocates beginning their profession;** notice, for example, how in chap. xv. of the first book he expounds a detailed theory of deceptive sophistry for hedge-lawyers, gives them hints how to twist the law to the advantage of their clients, **and advises them to let their clients swear false oaths in court, whenever it is to their advantage.***
> ...
>
> The great authorities on law, a Mucius Scaevola, a Servius Sulpicius, have a thorough knowledge of Hellenic legal enactments; Cicero, and all that this name stands for, derives his obscure remarks on divine justice, natural law, &c, from Greek philosophers: in the pseudo-Platonic *Minos* he might have read that law is the discovery of an objective thing, not a human invention, **and from Aristotle he quotes the words, "The universal law, because it is the natural law, never changes, but the written law, on the other hand, often does."†**
>
> > † Up to the present day one finds this passage quoted in juristical works, but with little justification, **as Aristotle is here giving merely a rhetorical trick for use in court and on the next page teaches the use of the opposite assertion.** Still less to the point is the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, v. 7, which culminates in the sentence, **"Law is the mean between a certain advantage and a certain disadvantage." How great does Democritus show himself here as always when he says, with that clear insight characteristic of him, that "laws are the fruits of human thinking in contrast to the things of nature"** (Diogenes Laertius, ix. 45).

In his *Nicomachean Ethics* V, 7, 1134b18-1135a4, however, **Aristotle does make observations about "natural justice" which approximate to the concept of natural law, but should not be confused with natural-law theory in the strict sense:**

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054%3Abekker%20page%3D1134b%3Abekker%20line%3D20
>
> Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. **A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting it or not.** A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honor of Brasidas,[1] and ordinances in the nature of special decrees. [2] **Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary.** [3] **That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world,[2] although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable.**
>
> https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html
>
> **Reporting the anecdote that an impressionable Greek, who had attended lectures by the Aristotelians and then heard the Stoics, said that his experience was like turning from men to gods,** Murray remarks: "It was really turning from Greeks to Semites, from philosophy to religion."

...

Conspicuously absent from this analysis of natural justice are norms such as those mentioned above from the *Rhetoric* – duties to kinfolk, as exemplified by Antigone, respect for life, as inculcated by Empedocles, or the natural human freedom theorized by Alcidamas.

...

Finally it is conceivable that natural human sociability itself constitutes a significant element of a latent natural-law theory in Aristotle. For example, his emphasis in the *Politics* on the fact that humans are essentially political animals, and that the state is thus a creation of nature itself, might be arguably interpreted as a natural law forming and participating in cities and states. **But explicitly Aristotle neither enunciates no expands on any natural-law theory in the traditional sense.**18

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ls9ZDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA226#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In his 1962 lecture course in natural right, Strauss argued:
>
> > **Aristotle teaches that exposure of infants and birth control are legitimate.** Thomas Aquinas denies that, and the reason is the dignity of man as created in the image of God, and there is, of course, no such creation according to Aristotle. This question of the dignity of man in the Biblical or non-Biblical understanding is of the greatest importance up to the present day. I mean, for example, in penal law. The second massive substantive difference concerns slavery. **From Aristotle's point of view legal slavery, i.e., the enslavement of men who are not by nature slaves, is simply unjust. Thomas Aquinas, following the Roman law, asserts that legal slavery is just** and has been introduced as a benefit of the so-called *jus gentium*, of the law of nations, and namely it's a benefit because the victor could very well have killed them – the prisoners – and he does them a favor by only enslaving them.27

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D1268b

And the matter leads to another problem and a different inquiry: some persons raise the question whether to alter the ancestral laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the above proposal to honor reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the laws; yet it is possible that persons may bring forward the repeal of laws or of the constitution as a benefit to the community. And since we have made mention of this question, it will be better if we set out a few further observations about it, for, as we said, it involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved beneficial—for example, medicine has been improved by being altered from the ancestral system, and gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and faculties so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the actual events of history, for (one might argue) the laws of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized: **the**

Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to purchase their wives from one another, and all the survivals of the customs of antiquity existing anywhere are utterly foolish, [1269a] [1] as for example at Cyme there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the defendant is guilty of the murder. **And in general all men really seek what is good, not what was customary with their forefathers; and it is probable that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the earth[1] or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm,[2] were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is actually said of the earth-born race, so that it is odd that we should abide by their notions.** Moreover even written codes of law may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that it should have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These considerations therefore make it clear that it is proper for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we consider the matter in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution. **For when it is the case that the improvement would be small, but it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes both of the legislator and of the magistrate should be passed over; for the people will not be as much benefited by making an alteration as they will be harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers.** Also, the example from the case of the arts is a mistake, [20] as to change the practice of an art is a different thing from altering a law; **for the law has no power to compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up in long lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law.** Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every form of constitution, or not? and is any chance person to be competent to introduce alterations or only certain people? for there is a great difference between these alternatives.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA64#v=onepage&q&f=false

In short, this Chapter alone is sufficient, to shew, **that *Aristotle*'s Morality runs wholly upon the Duties of a Subject; and that it does not take in the Duties of Man in general, consider'd as such. Nor is there one single Word to be found concerning the Law of Nature, as it takes place among the Subjects of different States; or such as are not Members of any Civil Community: And, by his Silence at least, this Philosopher seems to favour that inhumane Opinion of the *Greeks*, with respect to those, they were pleas'd to call *Barbarians*. But he seems plainly enough to declare, in his *Politicks*; * all those Nations, that have not enter'd into Treaties of Alliance, to be in a State of War with one another.** And if we may take *Plutarch*'s Word † for it, he advised *Alexander* to behave himself as a legal Prince towards the *Greeks*; and as a despotick Master towards the *Barbarians*; to regard the former, as his Friends, and Domesticks; but *to treat the latter as so many Beasts or Vegetables*.
...

This Philosopher, as well as his Master, seems to have had too much in View, the *Grecian* Forms of Government. Nor does he seem to have just Ideas of the natural Equality of Mankind; and by some of his 7 Expressions, he gives Occasion to believe, that he thought some Men to be by Nature design'd for Slaves. He 8 is against bringing up Children that happen to be born with any bodily Infirmity; and thinks, should the Laws forbid the exposing Infants; **Women should be made to miscarry, when they find themselves with Child, after having had a certain Number of Children, answerable to what the Interest of the State requires;** for, adds he, when we say that such a Thing is lawful, or unlawful, it ought to be understood with respect to Beings, that have Life and Sense. **Thus this vast Genius of Nature, this Philosopher, for whom such Numbers have so great a Veneration; proves to be grosly ignorant of, and without any Scruple treads under Foot, one of the most evident Principles of the Law of Nature.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tabula_rasa#Ancient_Greek_philosophy

In Western philosophy, the concept of *tabula rasa* can be traced back to the writings of Aristotle who writes in his treatise *De Anima* (Περί Ψυχῆς, '*On the Soul*') of the "unscribed tablet." In one of the more well-known passages of this treatise, he writes that:[2]

> Haven't we already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable, though actually it is nothing until it has thought? **What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page408
>
> **He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at least are innate, and in rejecting the *Tabula rasa* of Aristotle and of Mr. Locke.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

IX. **This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for after he had once laid down the position that stripes, torments, tortures, the ruin of one's country, banishment, the loss of children, had great influence on men's living miserably and unhappily, he durst not any longer use any high and lofty expressions when he was so low and abject in his opinion. How right he was is not the question; he certainly was consistent.** Therefore, I am not for objecting to consequences where the premises are admitted. But this most elegant and learned of all the philosophers is not taken to task very severely when he asserts his three kinds of good; but he is attacked by every one for that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many arguments why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. **For in that book he is supposed to say that a man who is placed on the wheel (that is a kind of torture in use among the Greeks) cannot attain to a completely happy life.** He nowhere, indeed, says so absolutely; but what he says amounts to the same thing. Can I, then, find fault with him, after having allowed that pains of the body are evils, that the ruin of a man's fortunes is an evil, if he should say that every good man is not happy, when all those things which he reckons as evils may befall a good man? **The same Theophrastus is found fault with by all the books and schools of the philosophers for commending that sentence in his *Callisthenes*,**

> **Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man.**

They say never did philosopher assert anything so languid. They are right, indeed, in that; but I do not apprehend anything could be more consistent, for if there are so many good things that depend on the body, and so many foreign to it that depend on chance and fortune, is it inconsistent to say that fortune, which governs everything, both what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counsel.

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/194/mode/2up?view=theater

Now let us see what weight these men have in them, excepting the Stoics, whose opinion I think I have sufficiently defended; **and indeed I have explained what the Peripatetics have to say; excepting that Theophrastus, and those who followed him, dread and abhor pain in too weak a manner.**

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pericles*.html#ref64
>
> 38 1 At this time, it would seem, the plague laid hold of Pericles, not with a violent attack, as in the case of others, nor acute, but one which, **with a kind of sluggish distemper that prolonged itself through varying changes, used up his body slowly and undermined the loftiness of his spirit.** 2 **Certain it is that Theophrastus, in his "Ethics," querying whether one's character follows the bent of one's fortunes and is forced by bodily sufferings to abandon its high excellence,** records this fact, that Pericles, as he lay sick, showed one of his friends who was come to see him an amulet that the women had hung round his neck, as much as to say that he was very badly off to put up with such folly as that.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D55

16. There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the one class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those who squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast fights—vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none at all. [56] The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends' debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them in acquiring property or increasing what they have. **And so I wonder what Theophrastus could have been thinking about when he wrote his book on "Wealth." It contains much that is fine; but his position is absurd, when he praises at great length the magnificent appointments of the popular games, and it is in the means for indulging in such expenditures that he finds the highest privilege of wealth.** But to me the privilege it gives for the exercise of generosity, of which I have given a few illustrations, seems far higher and far more certain.

How much more true and pertinent are Aristotle's words, as he rebukes us for not being amazed at this extravagant waste of money, all to win the favour of the populace.
…

[57] His conclusion, too, is excellent: "This sort of amusement pleases children, silly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who weighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of them."

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf206/npnf206.vi.vi.I.html

Seeing they despise the fidelity which Christian purity dictates, let them at least learn chastity from the heathen. A book *On Marriage*, worth its weight in gold, passes under the name of[4610]

Theophrastus. In it the author asks whether a wise man marries. And after laying down the conditions—that the wife must be fair, of good character, and honest parentage, the husband in good health and of ample means, and after saying that under these circumstances a wise man sometimes enters the state of matrimony, he immediately proceeds thus: “But all these conditions are seldom satisfied in marriage. **A wise man therefore must not take a wife.** For in the first place his study of philosophy will be hindered, and it is impossible for anyone to attend to his books and his wife.
…

Then again, to marry for the sake of children, so that our name may not perish, or that we may have support in old age, and leave our property without dispute, is the height of stupidity. **For what is it to us when we are leaving the world if another bears our name, when even a son does not all at once take his father’s title,** and there are countless others who are called by the same name. Or what support in old age is he whom you bring up, and who may die before you, or turn out a reprobate? Or at all events when he reaches mature age, you may seem to him long in dying. **Friends and relatives whom you can judiciously love are better and safer heirs than those whom you must make your heirs whether you like it or not.** Indeed, the surest way of having a good heir is to ruin your fortune in a good cause while you live, not to leave the fruit of your labour to be used you know not how.”

48. **When Theophrastus thus discourses, are there any of us, Christians, whose conversation is in heaven and who daily say[4612] “I long to be dissolved, and to be with Christ,” whom he does not put to the blush? Shall a joint-heir of Christ really long for human heirs?**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA142#v=onepage&q&f=false

After Aristotle, the school became bitterly antagonistic towards Alexander because of the execution of Aristotle’s nephew, Callisthenes; and **Theophrastus’s book *On Grief* began a long-lasting Peripatetic tradition belittling Alexander’s achievements as mere fruits of fortune.**
…

Embedded in Porphyry’s *De Abstinentia* are extracts from Theophrastus, head of the Lyceum from 323 till 288 B.C. or later, which include two passages concerned with the unity of man. The first occurs in a section certainly taken from a book *On Piety*, in which Theophrastus evidently argues against the sacrifice of animals:

> The following point must also be considered. **In spite of the kinship that we have with human beings, we regard it as necessary to punish and put to death all wrongdoers whose individual criminal impulses drive them to harm those they encounter.** Similarly among unreasoning creatures it is perhaps right to kill those that are naturally wild and destructive and impelled by nature to harm those who come near them. **But if animals do no ill to their fellow-creatures and have no natural disposition to do harm, it is presumably no less wrong to slaughter them and put them out of the way, than to kill men of such harmless character.** This seems to show that there is no general principle of justice governing the relations between men and the other living creatures, since among them, as among men, some are harmful and destructive by nature and others not. (II.22)

The second passage probably, but less certainly, also comes from the work *On Piety*. It gives a striking account of the various degrees of kinship, spreading outwards as if in concentric circles from the family to the whole of mankind, and beyond that to the rest of the animal world:

> Theophrastus also used this argument. We describe as naturally akin to each other those who are born of the same father and mother, and we further regard as kin those descended from the same ancestors, and moreover those who are fellow-citizens, because they are partners in a single country and society. This relationship that we find between citizens is not due to common ancestry, except in so far as some of their first forebears may have been the same, being the originators of their stock or descended from them. **So in my opinion there are two grounds for saying that there is kinship or a common relationship between Greek and Greek, and barbarian and barbarian, and indeed between all men: either because they spring from the same ancestors, or because they share the same upbringing and ways and the same stock. Hence we regard all men as akin and related to each other; and indeed for all animals the beginnings from which their bodies have developed are the same.** (III.25)

The passage goes on to give grounds for the kinship of all living creatures, attributing to them not only the same physical constituents but also the same psychological faculties – desire and anger, sense-perception, and even reasoning (*logismoi*). It is doubtful how far actual quotation from Theophrastus continues here, but noteworthy that presently the same line of argument reappears as in the first passage, whether in Theophrastus’ own words or paraphrased and adapted by Porphyry, and this time there is a definite reference to kinship (*oikeiotēs*) between man and beast.2

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA251#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The late Platonists developed an elaborate account of our ethical duties to animals, and the *De Abstinentia ad esu animalium* (On abstaining from animal flesh) of Porphyry and the vegetarian works of Plutarch still offer very rich guidance in this area. Another type of guidance is offered by Aristotle, who does not have an account of our ethical duties to animals, but who was one of

history's greatest biologists, and who does position humans as a type of animal alongside animals, sharing with other end-directed creatures a "common explanation" of motion through desire and cognition.11 His instruction to his students to react with wonder to the complex ordering of all animal lives is the start of my ethical project in the CA.12 **Another fruitful source is the Epicurean tradition, which sees the locus of value as the sentient body, and emphasizes the kinship of all bodies. This tradition did not have an ethics of vegetarianism or good animal treatment, but it did ultimately inspire the first modern advocate of animal rights in the Western tradition, Utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham.**

And once again the eclectic philosopher Cicero stands out for his insight and good sense: for he strenuously objected to gladiatorial games employing elephants, approving of and joining a popular protest on the grounds that elephants have a communality (*societas*) with the human species.13 **Here as elsewhere, Cicero's Stoic affiliations did not stop him from grasping something true; perhaps his allegiance to the Platonic academy, rather than the Stoic school, gave him the requisite freedom of ethical judgment.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is Porphyry again who preserves the account given in Dicaearchus' *Life of Hellas* of the first state of man – a rationalised version of the primeval Age of Kronos described by Hesiod, and later in Plato's *Statesman* and elsewhere. After expounding the other blessings of those early days, Porphyry's version goes on: 'They experienced no wars or conflicts with each other, for there lay before them no prize of sufficient value to become the cause of such violent strife. Consequently their life was characterised by leisure, easy fulfilment of their essential needs, good health, peace, and friendship.'9 It was only when possessions worth fighting for emerged, that 'war came upon the scene as well.' **The thought, of course, is not new; what is remarkable is the re-statement of it by a follower of Aristotle, underlining the Peripatetic belief in the natural kinship and affection between all members of the human race.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dicaearchus

Dicaearchus apparently attempted to write a biography of the Greek nation from earliest times to the reign of Philip II. The most famous passages are those cited by Varro[16] and Porphyry[17] on early history, **which suggest a dualistic view of progress. His anthropological theory combined elements from the Hesiodic tradition of decay with progressivist theories. From Hesiod, he adopted the concept of a "golden race", which led a life of bliss but ultimately degenerated because humans became greedy, which led to war. This is combined with progressivist ideas, such as the harsh life of early man and the gradual invention of the arts.** In his reconstruction, Dicaearchus distinguished three stages: the golden race, in which man lived off the spontaneously grown fruits of the earth, the pastoral life, in which man started domesticating and hunting animals, and the agricultural life, in which agriculture was introduced.[18]

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/porphyry_abstinence_04_book4.htm

Among those, therefore, that have concisely, and at the same time accurately collected an account of the affairs of the Greeks, is the Peripatetic Dicaearchus,[1] who, in narrating the pristine life of the Greeks, says, the ancients, being generated with an alliance to the Gods, were naturally most excellent, and led the best life; so that, when compared to us of the present day, who consist of an adulterated and most vile matter, they were thought to be a golden race; and they slew no animal whatever. **The truth of this, he also says, is testified by the poets, who denominate these ancients the golden race, and assert that every good was present with them.**

The fertile earth for them spontaneous bore
Of fruits a copious and unenvy'd store;
In blissful quiet then, unknown to strife,
The worthy with the worthy passed their life.[2]

Which assertions, indeed Dicaearchus explaining, says, that a life of this kind was under Saturn; if it is proper to consider it as a thing that once existed, and that it is a life which has not been celebrated in vain, and if, laying aside what is extremely fabulous, we may refer it to a physical narration. All things, therefore, are very properly said to have been then spontaneously produced; for men did not procure any thing by labour, because they were unacquainted with the agricultural art, and, in short, had no knowledge of any other art. This very thing, likewise, was the cause of their leading a life of leisure, free from labours and care; and if it is proper to assent to the decision of the most skilful and elegant of physicians, it was also the cause of their being liberated from disease. *For there is not any precept of physicians which more contributes to health, than that which exhorts us not to make an abundance of excrement,* from which those pristine Greeks always preserved their bodies pure. For they neither assumed such food as was stronger than the nature of the body could bear, but such as could be vanquished by the corporeal nature, nor more than was moderate, on account of the facility of procuring it, but for the most part less than was sufficient, on account of its paucity.

Moreover, there were neither any wars among them, nor seditions with each other. For no reward of contention worth mentioning was proposed as an incentive, for the sake of which some one might be induced to engage in such dissensions. So that the principal thing in that life was leisure and rest from necessary occupations, together with health, peace, and friendship. But to those in after times, who, through aspiring after things which greatly exceeded mediocrity, fell into many evils, this pristine life became, as it was reasonable to suppose it would, desirable. The slender and extemporaneous food, however, of these first men, is manifested by the saying which was afterwards proverbially used, *enough of the oak;* this adage being probably introduced by him who first changed the ancient mode of living. **A pastoral life succeeded to this, in which men procured for themselves superfluous possessions, and meddled with animals. For, perceiving that some of them were innoxious, but others malefic and savage, they tamed the former, but attacked the latter. At the same time, together with this life, war was introduced. And these things, says Dicaearchus, are not asserted by us, but by those who have historically discussed a multitude of particulars.** For, as possessions were now of such a magnitude as to merit attention, some ambitiously endeavoured to obtain them, by collecting them [for their own use], and calling on others to do the same, but others directed their attention to the preservation of them when collected. Time, therefore, thus gradually proceeding, and men always directing their attention to what appeared to be useful, they at length became conversant with the third, and agricultural form of life. And this is what is said by Dicaearchus, in his narration of the manners of the ancient Greeks, and the blessed life which they then led, to which abstinence from animal food contributed, no less than other things. Hence, at that period there was no war, because injustice was exterminated. But afterwards, together with injustice towards animals, war was introduced among men, and the endeavour to surpass each other in amplitude of possessions. On which account also, **the audacity of those is wonderful, who say that abstinence from animals is the mother of injustice, since both history and experience testify, that together with the slaughter of animals, war and injustice were introduced.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6HqgC01HJhUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA43#v=onepage&q&f=false

So Aristotle was the first to weaken those Forms which I spoke of a short while ago, which Plato had embraced in a marvellous way, so that he said that there was something divine in them. Theophrastus, a man who was both pleasant in his oratory and so moral that he displayed a certain honesty and nobility [of spirit], in a certain way shattered the authority of the old teaching even more violently: for he robbed virtue of her glory and made her weak, when he denied that living happily depended on her alone.

For Strato his pupil, although he had a keen intellect, should be completely set apart from this school; when he abandoned the most necessary part of philosophy, which involves virtue and ethics, and devoted himself entirely to the investigation of nature he disagreed with his own [school] very greatly even in this.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/246/mode/2up?view=theater

And this point is the especial subject of the book of Theophrastus, on a Happy Life; in which a great deal is attributed to fortune: and if that theory is correct, then wisdom cannot make life happy. **Now, this seems to me rather too tender (if I may say so) and delicate a doctrine, more so than the power and importance of virtue can sanction.** Wherefore let us rather hold with Aristotle, and his son Nicomachus,—whose admirably written books on Morals are said, indeed, to be Aristotle's; but I do not see why the son may not have been like his father; **but, in most cases, let us apply to Theophrastus, as long as we attribute a little more firmness and strength to virtue than he did.**

Let us, then, be content with these guides; for their successors are wiser men, indeed, in my opinion, than the philosophers of other schools: but still they degenerate so from these great men, that they seem to me rather to have arisen from themselves than from them. In the first place, Strato, the pupil of Theophrastus, called himself a natural philosopher: and though, in truth, he is an eminent man in that line, still most of what he said was novel; and he said very little about morals. His pupil Lyco was rich in eloquence, but very meagre in matter. Then his pupil Aristo was a neat and elegant writer, but still he had not that dignity which we look for in a great philosopher: he wrote a great deal, certainly, and in a polished style; but, somehow or other, his writings do not carry any weight.

---

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap52.htm#Progress

Among the ideal systems which have varied with the fashion of the times, **the Arabians adopted the philosophy of the Stagirite, alike intelligible or alike obscure for the readers of every age. Plato wrote for the Athenians, and his allegorical genius is too closely blended with the language and religion of Greece. After the fall of that religion, the Peripatetics, emerging from**

their obscurity, prevailed in the controversies of the Oriental sects, and their founder was long afterwards restored by the Mahometans of Spain to the Latin schools. (58)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franciscus_Patricius#Antiaristotelian_writings

In the *Discussiones peripateticae* Patricius does not consistently go from a Platonic alternative system to Aristotelianism but also takes advantage of arguments based on nonplatonic, rather nominalistic and empirical ideas.[50] In terms of philosophy, he sees a fateful development: **the first pupils of Aristotle still thought independently and also contradicted their teacher; later, however, Alexander of Aphrodisias surrendered unconditionally to the school founder and thus renounced free thinking. The first medieval Arabic-language interpreters, Avicenna, Avempace and Alfarabi, were still relatively unbiased, but then Averroes had the absolute authority of Aristotle proclaimed and thus pointed the way to sterile, scholastic Aristotelism.**[51]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NPA0DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA22#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the Arab world, as has been remarked, the ninth century was indeed the great century of translations.11 The importance of this is clear; **one part of the Greek heritage, the sciences, including medicine, and philosophy (with Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Organon*), was thus transmitted by the Abbasid caliphate to large sections of the medieval world.**12

> 12. **And, as is known, transmitted as far as the West:** see the useful article by R. MENÉNDEZ-PIDAL, L'Espagne et l'introduction de la science arabe en Occident, *La Table ronde*, no. 144, December 1959, pp. 41-61. This "Arab" science is Greek: it is a case of Greek works translated into Arabic, sometimes augmented by Arabic commentaries, which arrived in great numbers in Toledo and were re-translated into Spanish or Latin.

…

From our point of view, however, **it must be said that, though we may speak of a movement which carried ancient Hellenism in part into the Islamic world, we have no proof, not even a hint, of any movement in the opposite direction, from Islam to Greek-speaking lands, to Byzantium.** Baghdad had, within the caliphate, numerous Syriac manuscripts and some Greek ones, and perhaps still procured certain texts from Byzantium, though it seems to me that the evidence which is cited for this is often exaggerated or even legendary.15 We have no examples of manuscripts coming from the caliphate into the Byzantine Empire. In other words, **at this period we have ancient Hellenism clearly influencing Islamic culture, but no sign of any indirect transmission of ancient Hellenism to the medieval Hellenism of Byzantium by way of Islam.**

> 15. An example of these legendary contacts which are themselves not lacking in significance: **Aristotle appeared in a dream to Mamun, who immediately got in touch with the Greek emperor and asked him to send all the works of the ancients which survived;** having obtained, with difficulty, a favourable answer, he sent three people to Byzantium to choose the manuscripts, which were immediately handed over to the translators; see L. LECLERC, *op. cit.*, I, p. 126

Moreover, this hypothesis, in itself rather improbable, seems to me to be conclusively destroyed by one simple fact. **While the renaissance of Hellenism in Byzantium extended progressively and more or less rapidly to all spheres of ancient literature including poetry, theatre, rhetoric, history etc., Islam took an interest only in the sciences on the one hand,**16 **and philosophy on the other, but not all philosophy, just Aristotelian logic and certain aspects, more or less distorted, of Neoplatonism.**17 Thus Islam remained outside the intellectual and aesthetic world of the Greeks.

…

> 16. M. MEYERHOF (La fin de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie…, *op. cit.*, p. 14, note 39) **cited the recommendation, made by an imam, not to destroy the Greek manuscripts which the armies of Islam found in the spoils from a town they had captured, *if they dealt with sciences*.**
>
> 17. Good exposition by T.J. de BOER, *The History of philosophy in Islam*, trans. E.R. Jones, London, 1903, and by G.E. von GRUNEBAUM, *Medieval Islam. A study in cultural orientation*, Chicago, 1946. **In the final analysis, Islam knew and retained essentially those parts of Hellenism which the Syrians had known and retained. This confirms the impression that Arabic translations were normally made from Syriac, and that the translators themselves were most often Syrians, whether converted to Islam or not.**

As for Greek manuscripts, they certainly had been numerous in Nestorian or Jacobite establishments and in some private libraries. However, and this is a not uncommon phenomenon, they disappeared gradually through carelessness or neglect once they had been translated into Syriac in the course of the fifth to eighth centuries and, in a sense, were replaced by the Syriac versions. Those, and I believe they were very few, which were able to survive to the period when Arabic versions were

being made, disappeared in their turn through the very fact of the success and diffusion of these Arabic versions and also because of the progressive neglect of Greek.18
...

And what Islam appropriated – via Syriac (and sometimes Pehlevi) and much more rarely through Greek manuscripts – was a more limited part than has been admitted. The two worlds were strangers to each other and the two phenomena differed not only in the scale and form they took but in their very nature.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9eGtDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA39#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The Arabs did not feel a longing for Greek literature and legends or Roman plays. **They translated philosophy, logic, and medicine from the Greek, but did not translate Homer's *Iliad*.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=H-k9oc9xsuAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA229#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Although Ibn Sina was aware that Homer, in his epics, used blank (unrhymed) verse, he confirmed that **"We [in Arabic culture] almost do not call that which is unrhymed, poetry"** (Ibn Sina, *Jawami' 'ilm al-Musiqa,* ed. Z. Yusuf, Cairo, 1956, 122-3).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=PFPK_jf-Ub4C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The Western Hellenic trunk line whose way stations read: Ennius, Vergil, Horace, Quintilian, Cassiodorus, Alcuin, John of Salisbury, Dante, Petrarch, Scaliger, Bentley, Jowett, and Jebb has an Eastern counterpart, a shorter line to be sure, and bearing less traffic, but not without its interesting stops: Clement, Origen, Basil, Nemesius, John Philoponus, Sergius of Rish'ayna, Ibn al-Bitriq, al-Kindi, Hunyan ibn Ishaq, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd. Behind the obvious exoticisms of language the two lists are quite different. **The Western series is composed of humanists; the Eastern knows only philosophers and theologians.** Names could be added to either, but the truth of each series remains. **Western Hellenism is a variegated inheritance: philosophy, law, science, with a heavy insistence upon the humanities: humanitas, indeed, is a Roman word. Eastern Hellenism is constructed upon a much narrower base; its pillars are mathematics, geography, medicine, and philosophy; supporting them are Euclid, Ptolemy, Galen, and Aristotle. But for all this the East knows not Homer or Sophocles,** and its Thucydides is a graceless Arab chronicler whose felicity is to collect endless chains of shaykhish transmitters.1

https://archive.org/details/alberunisindiaac01brnm/page/24/mode/2up?view=theater

The heathen Greeks, before the rise of Christianity, held much the same opinions as the Hindus; their educated classes thought much the same as those of because of the Hindus; their common people held the same idolatrous views as those of the Hindus. Therefore I like to confront the theories of the one nation with those of the other simply on account of their close relationship, not in order to correct them. For that which is not *the truth* (*i.e.* the true belief or monotheism) does not admit of any correction, and all heathenism, whether Greek or Indian, is in its pith and marrow one and the same belief, because it is only a deviation *from the truth*. **The Greeks, however, had philosophers who, living in their country, discovered and worked out for them the elements of science, not of popular superstition, for it is the object of the upper classes to be guided by the results of science, whilst the common crowd will always be inclined to plunge into wrong-headed wrangling, as long as they are not kept down by fear of punishment. Think of Socrates when he opposed the crowd of his nation as to their idolatry and did not want to call the stars gods!** At once eleven of the twelve judges of the Athenians agreed on a sentence of death, and Socrates died faithful to the truth.

The Hindus had no men of this stamp both capable and willing to bring sciences to a classical perfection. Therefore you mostly find that even the so-called scientific theorems of the Hindus are in a state of utter confusion, devoid of any logical order, and in the last instance always mixed up with the silly notions of the crowd, *e.g.* immense numbers, enormous spaces of time, and all kinds of religious dogmas, which the vulgar belief does not admit of being called into question. **Therefore it is a prevailing practice among the Hindus *jurare in verba magistri*; and I can only compare their mathematical and astronomical literature, as far as I know it, to a mixture of pearl shells and sour dates, or of pearls and dung, or of costly crystals and common pebbles.** Both kinds of things are equal in their eyes, since they cannot raise themselves to the methods of a strictly scientific deduction.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=H-k9oc9xsuAC&lpg=PA349&hl=fi&pg=PA349#v=onepage&q&f=false

Perhaps the most notorious freethinker of medieval Islam, Ibn al-Rawandi was born in Khurasan around 815 CE. He started out as a respected Mu'tazilite theologian but later became estranged from his former colleagues, perhaps due to the association with his mentor, the Manichaean Abu 'Isa al-Warraq. **From that point on Ibn al-Rawandi is depicted by most (though not all) of our sources as a heretic who maliciously scoffs at all religions, particularly Islam.** He left Baghdad, apparently to escape persecution by the authorities, and died in 860 (or, accoding to other sources, in 912).

Although one can see this image as a distorted picture composed by his opponents (as suggested by Josef van Ess), the accumulated information provided by the texts suggests that the image had a firm base in reality, and that Ibn al-Rawandi had indeed out-stepped the boundaries of Islam. He is said to have written numerous books, none of which are extant. Extensive quotations in later Muslim sources, however, allow us to reconstruct many of his arguments. **In his *Book of the Emerald* he argued that the human intellect makes revelation superfluous. God has provided humanity with the intellect. This intellect, which is part of the definition of humanity, is given equally to all human beings and is sufficient to guide them.** The pretenders to prophecy are thus nothing but impostors and charlatans who exploit their knowledge of natural phenomena in order to manipulate and delude simple people. **In this book, those who serve as Ibn al-Rawandi's mouthpiece and who present his antiprophetic lore are the so-called Brahmans: Indian polemicists who uphold the intellectual and spiritual equality of all humans.** This literary device may reflect actual contacts with Indian philosophy, but it may also have been conceived to ward off accusations of heresy, and as a protective device against persecution.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Razi

According to al-Biruni's *Bibliography of al-Razı* (*Risāla fī Fihrist Kutub al-Rāzi*), **al-Razi wrote two "heretical books": "*Fī al-Nubuwwāt* (*On Prophecies*) and "*Fī Ḥiyal al-Mutanabbīn* (*On the Tricks of False Prophets*).** According to Biruni, the first "was claimed to be against religions" and the second "was claimed as attacking the necessity of the prophets."[54] However, Biruni also listed some other works of al-Razi on religion, including *Fi Wujub Da'wat al-Nabi 'Ala Man Nakara bi al-Nubuwwat* (*Obligation to Propagate the Teachings of the Prophet Against Those who Denied Prophecies*) and *Fi anna li al-Insan Khaliqan Mutqinan Hakiman* (*That Man has a Wise and Perfect Creator*), listed under his works on the "divine sciences".[54] None of his works on religion are now extant in full.
...

> 48. Goodman, Lenn (1995). Audi, Robert (ed.). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press. pp. 20-21. **In keeping with the Epicureanism he might have imbibed from Galenic sources, he rejects special prophecy as imposture, arguing that reason, God's gift to all alike, is sufficient guidance.**
> ...
>
> 50. Walker, Paul E. (2000). *Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York: Routledge. p. 744. **Chief among his positive contributions is his advocacy of a doctrine of equal aptitude in all humans, which grants no special role for unique and divinely favoured prophets and which recognizes the possibility of future progress in the advancement of knowledge.**
> ...
>
> 52. Groff, Peter (2007). *Islamic Philosophy A-Z*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 180-181. **Elsewhere, he argues that all human beings have the same fundamental capacity for reason and that the apparent inequality of people in this respect is ultimately a function of opportunity, interest and effort. Accordingly, al-Razi takes a rather dim view of prophecy, which in his view is both unnecessary and delusional, and indeed he criticizes all revealed religions as provincial and divisive. No one individual or group can legitimately claim a monopoly on the truth;** each succeeding generation has the ability to improve upon and even transcend its predecessor's insights through rational argumentation and empirical inquiry.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9b8uQfmQM8kC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false

Walker argued that "in fact, the ways in which al-Rāzī goes about questioning the foundation of apostolic miracles in general, looks remarkably similar, and probably belongs, to the attitude of a number of Mu'tazilite theologians of the third/ninth and early fourth/tenth centuries."

Although it is certainly true that some of the notions used by Rāzī have an important place in Mu'tazilite vocabulary, the striking differences in their respective use of these notions reflect, I believe, the abyss separating the believer from the apostate.

Foremost among these notions is the intellect (*'aql*). Rāzī argued that since the intellect is part of the definition of a human being, all human beings share its possession. Since they are equal in this respect, no human being can claim to be naturally endowed with a superior intellectual quality which will grant him superior knowledge. According to Rāzī, therefore, the notion of prophecy is not only superfluous, but also biologically and logically false.

http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/2164-averroism

> "God," says Averroes, "has declared a truth for all men that requires for understanding no intellectual superiority; in a language that can be interpreted by every human soul according to its capability and temper. **The expositors of religious metaphysics are therefore the enemies of true religion, because they made it a matter of syllogism**" (J. Müller, "Philosophie und Theologie," including the Arabic text, pp. 104 *et seq.*).

The Mu'tazilites likewise accepted the claim that human beings are endowed with intellect, which in principle should suffice to instruct them with whatever they need for their salvation. But they realized that the intellect is not the sole governing principle in human life. Rather, its governance is modified by various other traits of human nature: psychology, which distracts the individual from the better advice of the intellect; the individual characteristics of each person, and the conditions of like which obsctruct the achievement of human goals. According to the Mu'tazila, these additional traits render the prophets indispensable. Divine goodness, which ordained the gift of intellect to humanity, also ordained the accomplishment of God's providence by sending apostles.146 Both the Mu'tazilites and Rāzī thus start from the basic recognition of the sufficiency and universality of the intellect. **But whereas the former found a way to justify the additional necessity of prophets, the latter clung to the initial argument. For him, the sufficiency of the human intellect was final and unconditional.** Rāzī's observations on human nature, and his appreciation of the effects of human psychology and of historical circumstances, strengthened rather than modified his opposition to the so-called prophets. **According to Rāzī, the prophets, driven by their own passion for power, exploited the weaknesses of their fellow-humans, thus increasing humanity's misery.**147

In addition to proclaiming the divine origin of the intellect and its sufficiency, Rāzī also argued for the equality of human intellects: all human beings were born with equal intellectual capacity. **The universality of the intellect and the equality of human beings are often presented (by Rāzī, and therefore by students of his thought) as two aspects of the same doctrine. But in fact, in Rāzī's thought these two ideas are quite distinguishable. He is totally committed to former, but his position on the latter varies.**

In the debate, Rāzī's opponent pointed out that, **notwithstanding his declared egalitarianism, Rāzī claimed for himself superiority to other men in philosophical wisdom.** To this, Rāzī answered by attributing his superiority to practice and motivation rather than to inborn advantage:

> – I [i.e., Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī] said: **You yourself claim that you are singled out in possessing the philosophical sciences which you claim to have.**148 You say that other people are deprived of it, and they depend on you. You thus oblige them to learn from you, and to follow your lead!
>
> – He [i.e., Rāzī] said: I was not singled out from all other [human beings] to possess these sciences, as opposed to others. **But I have sought these sciences, whereas they have neglected them. They are deprived of them only because they fail to reflect, not because of some [inborn] deficiency.** … If [any one of them] had applied himself with resolution to the same things to which I have applied myself, if he had sought what I did, then surely he would have achieved the same [level] as I did.149

Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī tried to corner Rāzī and to extract from him a simple, unequivocal declaration of his egalitarian belief:

> – I said: Are [all] people equal in their intellect, their resolution, their sagacity, or are they not?

Rāzī's answer sems, at first sight, to be in the affirmative:

> – He said: **Had they made an effort**150 **and busied themselves with what would serve them,**151 **they would have been equal in intellect and in resolution.**152

On one level, Rāzī indeed believed in the ability of all human beings to strive for wisdom and thus to make intellectual progress. He thus says:

> No soul can be purged from the turbidity of this world and escape to the next, except by contemplating philosophy. If a person contemplates philosophy and comprehends anything, be it ever so small, his soul is purged from this turbidity and is saved.153

In his philosophical *Apology* (*al-Sīra al-falsafiyya*), however, Rāzī presented exactly the opposite argument. As everyone knows, he argued, human beings are unequal by nature. Some are stronger or more gifted than others. Consequently, even the considerations given to people's life should not be the same for everyone:

> If two men chance to be in a waterless plain, and one of them has water just sufficient to save his life but not his companion's in such a case it is right that the water should go to *the one who is of greater benefit* to his fellows.154

The implication of the fundamental inequality of humans was that the philosopher must not behave like the common people, nor should he share their pleasures and aspirations.

Which one of these two contradictory views did Rāzī believe in, the one he expressed in the debate one the one formulated so crudely in his *Sīra?* Is it of course possible that Rāzī had changed his views over the course of the years.155 If so, and since we do not know the relative dates of these respective works (scil. the *Mahārīq al-anbiyā* and the debate that quotes it, and the *Sīra*), we have no way of knowing Rāzī's final position. **It seems to me, however, that rather than reflecting a change of position, the difference between these statements should be explained by the different contexts in which they were made and the different audiences to which they were addressed. Whereas the egalitarian position suited Rāzī's polemical purpose, elitism was his innermost conviction. He was capable of moderating this position or camouflaging it to suit the needs of the hour. But his equation of intellectual universality with intellectual equality was only a polemical stance.**

> **http://www.ivy-style.com/everyone-is-right-wing-when-it-comes-to-the-things-they-care-about.html**
>
> https://archive.org/details/tyssotdepatothis0000rose/page/44/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> > 35. **Duplicity was such an accepted feature of seventeenth and eighteenth-century social and intellectual life** that one or two notable examples will suffice. **All the *philosophes*, even though they proclaimed egalitarian principles were élitists at heart.** Fontenelle, so often hailed as a popularizer of science, wrote in the "sixième soir" of his *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes*: "Contentons-nous d'être une petite troupe choisie, et ne divulguons pas nos mystères dans le peuple."

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/622/mode/2up?view=theater

Not unlike Spinoza and Bayle in this respect, Ibn Rushd stressed the risks – both intellectual and practical – of mixing theology and philosophy: 'for if you do so you will be neither a rationalist no a traditionalist.'61

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_022

Gregory VII. had begun the disparagement of civil authorities by saying that they are the work of the devil; and already in his time both parties were driven to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, and appealed to it as the immediate source of power.

Two centuries later this political theory had gained both in definiteness and in force among the Guelphs, who were the Church party, and among the Ghibellines, or Imperialists. **Here are the sentiments of the most celebrated of all the Guelphic writers:** "A king who is unfaithful to his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. It is not rebellion to depose him, for he is himself a rebel whom the nation has a right to put down. But it is better to abridge his power, that he may be unable to abuse it. For this purpose, the whole nation ought to have a share in governing itself; **the Constitution ought to combine a limited and elective monarchy, with an aristocracy of merit, and such an admixture of democracy as shall admit all classes to office, by popular election.** No government has a right to levy taxes beyond the limit determined by the people. All political authority is derived from popular suffrage, and all laws must be made by the people or their representatives. There is no security for us as long as we depend on the will of another man." **This language, which contains the earliest exposition of the Whig theory of the revolution, is taken from the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, of whom Lord Bacon says that he had the largest heart of the school divines.** And it is worth while to observe that he wrote at the very moment when Simon de Montfort summoned the Commons; and that the politics of the Neapolitan friar are centuries in advance of the English statesman's.

The ablest writer of the Ghibelline party was Marsilius of Padua. "Laws," he said, "derive their authority from the nation, and are invalid without its assent. As the whole is greater than any part, it is wrong that any part should legislate for the whole; and as men are equal, it is wrong that one should be bound by laws made by another. But in obeying laws to which all men have agreed, all men, in reality, govern themselves. **The monarch, who is instituted by the legislature to execute its will, ought to be armed with a force sufficient to coerce individuals, but not sufficient to control the majority of the people.** He is responsible to the nation, and subject to the law; and the nation that appoints him, and assigns him his duties, has to see that he obeys the Constitution, and has to dismiss him if he breaks it. **The rights of citizens are independent of the faith they profess; and no man may be punished for his religion.**" This writer, who saw in some respects farther than Locke or Montesquieu, who, in regard to the sovereignty of the nation, representative government, the superiority of the legislature over the executive, and the liberty of conscience, had so firm a grasp of the principles that were to sway the modern world, lived in the reign of Edward II., five hundred and fifty years ago.

It is significant that these two writers should agree on so many of the fundamental points which have been, ever since, the topic of controversy; for they belonged to hostile schools, and one of them would have thought the other worthy of death. **St. Thomas would have made the papacy control all Christian governments. Marsilius would have had the clergy submit to the law of the land; and would have put them under restrictions both as to property and numbers.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_of_Jandun

Jandun identified closely with Marsilius of Padua, another Latin Averroist who was rector at the university in Paris from 1312-1313. **Marsilius presented Jandun with a copy of Pietro d'Abano's commentary on the problems of Aristotle.**
...

Jandun tended toward the views of Aristotle, but was not afraid to follow an idea to its logical conclusion. Many of his views were uncommon and controversial, and were not received well by the Catholic Church. **Manuscripts and printed editions influenced the Latin Averroist movement until the time of Galileo.**

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09719c.htm

Contrary to the assertion of several authors, he was only a layman and neither a religious nor the legitimate Archbishop of Milan, though he was a canon of his native city. He served at first in the army of the emperor, and after wards, on the advice of Mussato, began the study of medicine at the University of Padua. To complete his medical studies he proceeded to Paris, and before 25 December, 1312, became rector of the university there.
...

The emperor was looking for help, and Marsilius, who had now begun the study of theology, joined with Jean de Jandun, canon of Senlis, in offering him his assistance. Together they composed the "Defensor pacis" at Paris, and, about 1326, setting out for Germany, presented their work to the emperor. They became his intimate friends, and on several occasions expounded their teaching to him. **What were the doctrines of these two Parisian doctors, the very audacity of which at first startled Louis of Bavaria?** They recalled the wildest theories of the legists of Philippe le Bel, and Cæsarian theologians like Guilaume Durand and the Dominican John of Paris. The teachings of these last mentioned had been proposed with hesitation, restrictions, and moderation of language which met with no favour before the rigorous logic of Marsilius of Padua. **He completely abandoned the olden theocratic conception of society. God, it is true, remained the ultimate source of all power, but it sprang immediately from the people, who had in addition the power to legislate. Law was the expression, not of the will of the prince, as John of Paris taught, but of the will of the people, who, by the voice of the majority, could enact, interpret, modify, suspend, and abrogate it at will. The elected head of the nation was possessed only of a secondary, instrumental, and executive authority. We thus arrive at the theory of the "Contrat Social".** In the Church, according to the "Defensor Pacis", the faithful have these two great powers—the elective and the legislative. They nominate the bishops and select those who are to be ordained. The legislative power is, in the Church, the right to decide the meaning of the old Scriptures; that is the work for a general council, in which the right of discussion and voting belongs to the faithful or their delegates. The ecclesiastical power, the priesthood, comes directly from God and consists essentially in the power to consecrate the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ and remit sins, or, rather, to declare them remitted. **It is equal in all priests, each of whom can communicate it by ordination to a subject legitimately proposed by the community.** Luther would have recognized his theories in these heretical assertions, and the Gallicans of later times would willingly have subscribed to such revolutionary declarations. The two writers are just as audacious in their exposition of the respective roles of the Empire and the Church in Christian society and of the relations of the two powers.

According to the idea of the State propounded by Marsilius all ecclesiastical power proceeded from the community and from the emperor, its principal representative, there being no limit to the rights of the lay State (cf. Franck, "Journal des savants" March, 1883; Noël Valois, "Histoire littéraire de la France", XXXIII). As to the Church it has no visible head. **St. Peter he goes on, received no more power or authority than the other Apostles, and it is uncertain that he ever came to Rome.** The pope has only the power of convoking an ecumenical council which is superior to him. His decrees are not binding; he can impose on the people only what the general council has decided and interpreted. **The community elects the parish priest and supervises and controls the clergy in the performance of their duties; in a word—the community or the state is everything, the Church playing an entirely subsidiary part. It cannot legislate, adjudicate, possess goods, sell, or purchase without authorization; it is a perpetual minor. As is clear, we have here the civil constitution of the clergy.** Marsilius, moreover shows himself a severe and often unjust censor of the abuses of the Roman curia. Regarding the relations between the emperor and the pope, it is maintained in the "Defensor Pacis", that the sovereign pontiff has no power over any man, except with the permission of the emperor; while the emperor has power over the pope and the general council. **The pontiff can act only as the authorized agent of the Roman people; all the goods of the Church belong by right to Cæsar. This is clearly the crudest concept of the pagan empire, an heretical assault on the Church's constitution, and a shameless denial of the rights of the sovereign pontiff to the profit of Cæsar.** Dante, the Ghibelline theorist, is surpassed. Arnold of Brescia is equalled. William Occam could never have proposed anything more revolutionary.

The pope was stirred by these heretical doctrines. In the Bull of 3 April, 1327, John XXII reproached Louis of Bavaria with having welcomed *duos perditionis filios et maledictionis alumnos* (Denifle, "Chart", II, 301). On 9 April he suspended and excommunicated them ("Thesaurus novus anecdotorum", ii, 692). A commission, appointed by the pope at Avignon, condemned on 23 October five of the propositions of Marsilius in the following terms:

> "1) These reprobates do not hesitate to affirm in what is related of Christ in the Gospel of St. Matthew, to wit **that He paid tribute ... that he did so, not through condescension and liberality, but of necessity**—an assertion that runs counter to the teaching of the Gospel and the words of our Saviour. **If one were to believe these men, it would follow that all the property of the Church belongs to the emperor, and that he may take possession of it again as his own;** 2) These sons of Belial are so audacious as to affirm that the Blessed Apostle St. Peter received no more authority than the other Apostles, that he was not appointed their chief and further that Christ gave no head to His Church, and appointed no one as His vicar here below—all which is contrary to the Apostolic and evangelic truth; 3) **These children of Belial do not fear to assert that the emperor has the right to appoint, to dethrone, and even to punish the pope**—which is undoubtedly repugnant to all right; 4) These frivolous and lying men say that **all priests, be they popes, archbishops, or simple priests, are possessed of equal authority and equal jurisdiction, by the institution of Christ; that whatever one possesses beyond another is a concession of the Emperor, who can moreover revoke what he has granted,**—which assertions are certainly contrary to sacred teaching and savour of heresy; 5) these blasphemers say that **the universal Church may not inflict a coactive penalty on any person unless with the emperor's permission.**"

...

As this condemnation was falling on the head of Marsilius, **the culprit was coming to Italy in the emperor's train and he saw his revolutionary ideas being put into practice.** Louis of Bavaria had himself crowned by Colonna syndic of the Roman people; he dethroned John XXII, replacing him by the Friar Minor, Peter of Corbara, whom he invested with temporal power. **At the same time he bestowed the title of imperial vicar on Marsilius and permitted him to persecute the Roman clergy.** The pope of Avignon protested twice against the sacrilegious conduct of both. The triumph of Marsilius was, however, of short duration. Abandoned by the emperor in October, 1336, he died towards the end of 1342.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Marsilius_of_Padua

The *Defensor pacis*, as its name implies, is a work intended to restore peace, as the most indispensable benefit of human society. **The author of the law is the people, *i.e.* the whole body, or at least the most important part (*valentior*) of the citizens;** the people should themselves elect, or at least appoint, the head of the government, who, lest he should be tempted to put himself above the scope of the laws, should have at his disposal only a limited armed force. This chief is responsible to the people for his breaches of the law, and in serious cases they can condemn him to death. The real cause of the trouble which prevails among men is the papacy, a “fictitious” power, the development of which is the result of a series of usurpations. **Marsilius denies, not only to the pope, but to the bishops and clergy, any coercive jurisdiction or any right to pronounce on their own authority excommunications and interdicts, or in any way to impose the observation of the divine law. He is not opposed to penalties against heretics, but he would have them pronounced only by civil tribunals. Desiring to see the clergy practise a holy poverty, he proposes the suppression of tithes and the seizure by the secular power of the greater part of the property of the church.** The clergy, thus deprived of its wealth, privileges and jurisdiction, is further to be deprived of independence, for the civil power is to have the right of appointing to benefices, &c. The supreme authority in the church is to be the council, but a council summoned by the emperor. The pope, no longer possessing any more power than other bishops (though Marsilius recognizes that the supremacy of the Church of Rome goes back to the earliest times of Christianity), is to content himself with a pre-eminence mainly of an honorary kind, without claiming to interpret the Holy Scriptures, define dogmas or distribute benefices; **moreover, he is to be elected by the Christian people, or by the delegates of the people, *i.e.* the princes, or by the council, and these are also to have the power to punish, suspend or depose him.**

Such is this famous work, full of obscurities, redundancies and contradictions, in which the thread of the argument is sometimes lost in a labyrinth of reasonings and citations, both sacred and profane, **but which nevertheless expresses, both in religion and politics, such audacious and novel ideas that it has been possible to trace in it, as it were, a rough sketch of the doctrines developed during the periods of the Reformation and of the French Revolution. The theory was purely democratic, but was all ready to be transformed, by means of a series of fictions and implications, into an imperialist doctrine; and in like manner it contained a visionary plan of reformation which ended, not in the separation of the church from the state, but in the subjection of the church to the state.** To overthrow the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to deprive the clergy of all their privileges, to reduce the pope to the rank of a kind of president of a Christian republic, which governs itself, or rather submits to the government of Caesar—such is the dream formed in 1324 by two masters of the university of Paris.

When in 1326 Louis of Bavaria saw the arrival in Nuremberg of the two authors of the book dedicated to him, startled by the boldness of their political and religious theories, he was at first inclined to treat them as heretics. He soon changed his mind, however, and, admitting them to the circle of his intimates, loaded them with favours. Having become one of the chief inspirers of the imperial policy, **Marsilius accompanied Louis of Bavaria to Italy, where he preached or circulated written attacks against the pope, especially at Milan, and where he came within the sight of the realization of his wildest utopias. To see a king of the Romans crowned emperor at Rome, not by the pope, but by those who claimed to be the delegates of the people (Jan. 17, 1328), to see John XXII. deposed by the head of the Empire (April 18), and a mendicant friar, Pietro de Corbara, raised by an imperial decree to the throne of St Peter (as Nicholas V.) after a sham of a popular election (May 12), all this was merely the application of principles laid down in the *Defensor pacis*.** The two authors of this book played a most active part in the Roman Revolution. Marsilius, appointed imperial vicar, abused his power to persecute the clergy who had remained faithful to John XXII. In recompense for his services, he seems to have been appointed archbishop of Milan, while his collaborator, John of Jandun, obtained from Louis of Bavaria the bishopric of Ferrara.

Marsilius of Padua also composed a treatise *De translatione imperii romani*, which is merely a rearrangement of a work of Landolfo Colonna, *De jurisdictione imperatoris in causa matrimoniali*, **intended to prove the exclusive jurisdiction of the emperor in matrimonial affairs, or rather, to justify the intervention of Louis of Bavaria, who, in the interests of his policy, had just annulled the marriage of the son of the king of Bohemia and the countess of Tirol.** But, above all, in an unpublished work preserved at Oxford, the *Defensor minor*, Marsilius completed and elaborated in a curious manner certain points in the doctrine laid down in the *Defensor pacis*. In it he deals with ecclesiastical jurisdiction, penances, indulgences, crusades and pilgrimages, vows, excommunication, the pope and the council, marriage and divorce. **Here his democratic theory still more clearly leads up to a proclamation of the imperial omnipotence.**

https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/marsilius-radical-medieval-thinker

Marsilius was born between the years of 1275 and 1280. His family had served in the civic administration of his hometown of Padua, in northern Italy. **His father was a notary, and some of his relatives were lawyers.** However, Marsilius did not follow in his family's footsteps. Instead, he chose to study medicine, firstly in his hometown then in the university of Paris. **While studying in Paris, Marsilius encountered the works of Aristotle and Cicero, which would profoundly shape his later political thought.**
...

In arguing that the church should not meddle in secular affairs, **Marsilius pointed to the fact Jesus possessed no political power nor did he wish for his church to exercise political power.** Marsilius based this claim on two pieces of evidence. Firstly, when Jesus was asked by Jewish Pharisees whether or not they should pay taxes to Rome, he replied: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Secondly, Jesus' acknowledgement of the judgement of Pontius Pilate proved for Marsilius that secular authority, at least in this world, has the upper hand on spiritual authority. **Furthermore, Marsilius argues that church authority is derived from "the whole body of the faithful."** The people of each community appoint their priests and bishops. No position is divinely ordained by God.
...

Marsilius writes, "Everyone is prone to pursue one's own advantage." Marsilius believes that, by their nature, all people are self-interested; this is the unavoidable condition of humanity. This was a radical position at the time. During the medieval ages pursuing one's own private advantage was often viewed as a vice which was indicative of man's fallen nature. The bible was invoked when condemning self-interested behaviour, like the verse stating that it was "easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." **Marsilius did not agree with this view and instead believed that as long as we are not harming others, we are free to pursue our own advantage as much as we like.**
...

Marsilius explicitly says he is not a democrat. However, this does not disqualify him as being a democrat. Democracy until the late 18th century was synonymous with anarchy, chaos, and factional strife. For example, **even four hundred years after Marsilius, the Founding Father James Madison explicitly denied that his ideas were democratic, yet today the Federalist Papers are one of the most revered texts arguing for representative democracy.**

> https://www.bopsecrets.org/rexroth/essays/lamennais.htm
>
> **Sometimes, and as his life went on, increasingly, [Lamennais] is sort of an epistemological Averroist and "common sense" becomes a universal intellectual soul, and since *le peuple,* the working class, are more universal than anybody else, they become, for the last half of his career, the source of authority.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TTYAGD7aKBkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA40#v=onepage&q&f=false

But Aristotle's naturalism is a dangerous, double-edged sword. Its use in a different manner by Marsilius of Padua yilded a profoundly original contribution to social theory. Writing in support of imperial claims during the struggle for supremacy between Ludwig of Bavaria and Pope John XXII, **Marsilius wrenched Aristotelian naturalism free from the supernatural framework in which Thomas had hoped to contain it and used it to build a surprisingly modern theory of society. Marsilius also departed from Aristotelian thought, for in attacking the papal view that subordinated society to religious and theological ends, he also rejected Aristotle's attempt to cap social analysis with rationally derived ethical ends.** In effect, what Marsilius did was to merge the four causes of Aristotle and to think only of efficient causation.

Along with this methodological change came a revolutionary change in the concept of human nature. For Marsilius, human beings had no propensities toward ethical or religious ends. They are not rational actors, but willful, appetitive creatures whose conduct came from biological needs and not from teleological tendencies toward absolute moral and ethical values. Given the excesses of human biological desires and appetites, the problem of social peace and survival was almost exclusively the problem of channeling and controlling human biological nature. Social analysis, for Marsilius, can concern itself only with the means of establishing peaceful social concourse; it cannot prescribe the goals of society, which come almost entirely from biological needs. **Accordingly, society is primarily a structure for the satisfaction and augmentation of biological-economic needs, and its institutions and whatever knowledge they create should be evaluated only in terms of how well they served these needs.**

Marsilius's view of human nature and society was far more radical than one might at first suspect. **What he effected was nothing less than a closely reasoned transformation of Aristotelian naturalism into a theory that allowed reason no capacity for establishing moral and ethical ends and that confined religion and the priesthood to a narrowly defined and socially irrelevant spiritual function. By turning reason into a means, and religion into a purely spiritual exercise containing no consequences for the organization of social life, Marsilius revived the primary presupposition of Aristotelian naturalism that society is a self-sufficient structure capable of providing all its moral and material needs.** Further, he reduced social theory to a functional discussion of means and ends in which political and social requirements were determined independent of absolute moral and religious values. His was a secular, dynamic, pragmatic, and "democratic" view that echoed ever more loudly in succeeding centuries.12

Leo Strauss's Indictment of Christain Philosophy on JSTOR

Machiavelli was driven to reinvent political philosophy by what Strauss called, in one place, an "anti-theological ire," and, in another, "an antitheological passion."54

> **When antitheological passion induced a thinker to take the extreme step of questioning the supremacy of contemplation, political philosophy broke with the classical tradition, and especially with Aristotle, and took on an entirely new character.** The thinker in question was Machiavelli.55

These are the concluding lines from an essay on the Christian Averroist, Marsilius of Padua. In opposition to Aquinas, Marsilius employed the pagan political philosophy of Aristotle to condemn the political pretensions of the Church. **But in attacking the Church, Marsilius's Averroism ultimately constituted an attack against the idea that law is rooted in revelation, an idea which Averroes himself had been at great pains to accommodate.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA344#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 30. […] In passages artfully scattered through his book, Marsilius of Padua acknowledges the necessity that there be a civil theology, **asserts that no one but the temporal ruler is empowered to suppress heretical speech, and suggests that he rightly does so only when that speech contravenes "human law," which is restricted to promoting man's welfare in this world:** […]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

A proven, valuable historiographical concept, the "Radical Enlightenment," most contributors to it (myself included) were unaware, prior to Frederik Stjernfelt's May 2013 Brussels lecture on the usage of the term, reaches back much earlier than Margaret Jacob's *The Radical Enlightenment* of 1981. **First introduced into scholarly debate in an innovative and comprehensive fashion by the conservative German Jewish philosopher Leo Strauss (1899-1973) in the 1920s,**68 **his "Radical Enlightenment" rightly viewed the phenomenon as emerging from an older, more variegated social and cultural underground, especially Epicureanism and late medieval Averroism.**

Radikale Aufklärung [Radical Enlightenment] in his view amounted basically to "atheism," an intellectual tendency that by the commencement of the early Enlightenment era had already existed in rudimentary form for many centuries. **Strauss envisaged *Radikale Aufklärung* as not just a rival to, but also as preceding the "Moderate Enlightenment" chronologically and outlasting it.** For him, there was a less profound divide between Radical Renaissance and *Radikale Aufklärung* than is argued for in this volume. Contending that the Enlightenment possessed two main and in part contrary strands, moderate and radical, with only the latter being anti-religious and genuinely secular,69 Strauss presented a philosophical bifurcation of the Enlightenment subsequently further developed by Strauss himself and then Günter Mühlpfordt,70 Henry May, Giuseppe Ricuperati, Margaret Jacob, Silvia Berti, and Wim Klever.

> 69. Strauss, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, 35; Smith, *Spinoza's Book of Life*, 191; **Nicolas Dubos noted, in 2009, that when writing my earlier Enlightenment columes I was, as yet, unaware that the radical-moderate dichotomy first originates with Strauss in the 1920s;** see Dubos, "Hobbes et les Lumières radicales," 38-41.

Strauss introduced the category *Radikale Aufklärung* as part of a general reinterpretation of the Enlightenment on which he embarked while researching Spinoza's Bible criticism.71 To him *Radikale Aufklärung* was the Enlightenment's veritable core; but because his label signified above all "atheism," he chiefly identified what by 1928 he already termed "moderate Enlightenment" in terms of the latter's theistic premises and willingness to compromise with ecclesiastical authority.72 **From the late seventeenth century, "Moderate Enlightenment" may have been the principal reforming project in the eyes of governments, churches, and educators, and have remained so in the minds of most philosophers and historians ever since, but beneath the surface, in terms of effective arguments, contended Strauss, the radical impulse proved sturdier philosophically and culturally,** and in the long run, despite its long clandestine and inconspicuous beginnings, emerged as the "real" or principal Enlightenment, not least in shaping the Enlightenment's troubled legacy, the intellectual paradoxes and dilemmas of post-1800 modernity.73 As well as essentially "atheistic," Strauss unhesitatingly pronounced *Radikale Aufklärung* the "true Enlightenment" while casting Locke, Leibniz, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Moses Mendelssohn, and other committed "moderates" as cautious compromisers who ultimately, with their unworkable philosophical "fixes," weakened rather than strengthened their to many hard-to-defend dualist philosophical contrivances harmonizing reason with faith – and philosophical critique with kings and courts. Strauss also laid particular emphasis on Radical Enlightenment's embracing an exclusively naturalistic conception of science, philosophy, and knowledge, **a naturalism radicals, not unlike Nietzsche later, in his middle period, deployed to ruthlessly strip out all *supernaturalia*.**
…

But although eliminating religious authority must necessarily have far-reaching political and social consequences, Strauss hardly broaches this dimension at all. He did not attach any specific political character to *Radikale Aufklärung*.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/filmer-patriarcha-or-the-natural-power-of-kings#lf0140_label_025

Because the Scripture is not favourable to the Liberty of the People; therefore many fly to Natural Reason, and to the Authority of *Aristotle.* I must crave Liberty to examine or explain the Opinion of this great Philosopher; but briefly, I find this Sentence in the Third of his Politiques. *Cap.* 16. δοκεῖ δέ τιοιν φύσιν ἐι τὸ κύ ον ἕνα πάν ων ἐι πολιτῶν, ὅπϐ συνέςηκεν ξ ὁμίων ἡ πόλις. **It seems to some not to be natural for one man to be Lord of all the Citizens, since a City consists of Equals.** D. *Lambine* in his *Latine* Interpretation of this Text, hath omitted the Translation of this word [τὶσιν] by this means he maketh that to be the Opinion of *Aristotle,* which *Aristotle* alleadgeth to be the Opinion but of some. **This Negligence, or Wilful Escape of *Lambine,* in not translating a word so Material, hath been an occasion to deceive many, who looking no farther than this *Latins* Translation, have concluded, and made the World now of late believe, that *Aristotle* here maintains a *Natural Equality* of Men;** and not only our *English* Translator of *Aristotle's Politiques* is in this place misled by following *Lambine;* but even the Learned *Monsieur Duvall* in his *Synopsis* bears them company: **and yet this Version of *Lambine*'s is esteemed the best,** and Printed at *Paris* with *Causabon*'s corrected *Greek*
Copy, though in the rendring of this place, the Elder Translations have been more faithful; and he that shall compare the *Greek* Text with the *Latine,* shall find that ***Casaubon* had just cause in his Preface to *Aristotle*'s Works, to complain that the best Translations of *Aristotle* did need Correction: To prove that in these words which seem to favour the Equality of Mankind, *Aristotle* doth not speak according to his own Judgment, but recites only the Opinion of others; we find him clearly deliver his own Opinion, that the Power of Government did originally arise from the Right of Fatherhood, which cannot possibly consist with that *Natural Equality* which Men dream of: for in the First of his**

Politiques **he agrees exactly with the Scripture, and lays this Foundation of Government, The first *Society***
(saith he) made of Many Houses is a Village, which seems most naturally to be a Colony of Families or foster-Brethren of Children and Childrens Children. And therefore at the beginning, Cities were under the Government of Kings, for the eldest in every house is King: And so for Kindred-sake it is in Colonies. And in the fourth of his Politiques, *cap.* 2. **He gives the Title of the first and Divinest sort of Government to the Institution of Kings, by Defining *Tyranny* to be a Digression from the First and *Divinest.***

Whosoever weighs advisedly these passages, will find little hope of *Natural Reason* in *Aristotle* to prove the *Natural Liberty* of the *Multitude.* **Also before him the Divine *Plato* concludes a Commonweal to be nothing else but a large Family. I know for this Position *Aristotle* quarrels with his Master, but most unjustly; for therein he contradicts his own Principles for they both agree to fetch the Original of Civil Government from the prime Government.** No doubt but *Moses*'s History of the Creation guided these two Philosophers in finding out of this *Lineal Subjections* deduced from the *Laws* of the *First Parents,* **according to that Rule of St. *Chrysostom, God made all Mankind of One Man, that he might teach the World to be Governed by a King, and not by a Multitude.***

The Ignorance of the Creation, occasioned several Errors amongst the *Heathen* Philosophers. *Polybius,* though otherwise a most profound Philosopher, and Judicious Historian, yet here he stumbles; for in searching out the Original of Civil Societies, he conceited, *That Multitudes of Men after a Deluge, a Famine, or a Pestilence, met together like Herds of Cattel without any Dependency, until the strongest Bodies and boldest Minds got the Mastery of their Fellows;* even as it is (saith he) among *Bulls, Bears and Cocks.*

And *Aristotle* himself, forgetting his first Doctrine, tells us, the first *Heroical Kings* were chosen by the People for their deserving well of the Multitude; either by teaching them some New Arts, or by Warring for them, or by Gathering them together, or by Dividing Land amongst them; also *Aristotle* had another Fancy, that those Men who prove wise of Mind, were by Nature intended to be Lords, and Govern; and those which were Strong of Body were ordained to obey, and to be Servants. **But this is a dangerous and uncertain Rule, and not without some Folly; for if a Man prove both *Wise* and *Strong,* what will *Aristotle* have done with him? as he was *Wise,* he could be no Servant, and as he had *Strength,* he could not be a Master; besides, to speak like a Philosopher, *Nature* intends all things to be perfect both in Wit and Strength. The Folly or Imbecillity proceeds from some Errour in Generation or Education; for Nature aims at *Perfection* in all her Works.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0002

Mr. Mill is exactly the writer to please people of this description. **His arguments are stated with the utmost affectation of precision; his divisions are awfully formal; and his style is generally as dry as that of Euclid's Elements.**
...

The style which the Utilitarians admire suits only those subjects on which it is possible to reason *a priori*. It grew up with the verbal sophistry which flourished during the dark ages. With that sophistry it fell before the Baconian philosophy in the day of the great deliverance of the human mind. The inductive method not only endured but required greater freedom of diction. It was impossible to reason from phenomena up to principles, to mark slight shades of difference in quality, or to estimate the comparative effect of two opposite considerations between which there was no common measure, by means of the naked and meagre jargon of the schoolmen. **Of those schoolmen Mr. Mill has inherited both the spirit and the style. He is an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season. We have here an elaborate treatise on Government, from which, but for two or three passing allusions, it would not appear that the author was aware that any governments actually existed among men. Certain propensities of human nature are assumed; and from these premises the whole science of politics is synthetically deduced!** We can scarcely persuade ourselves that we are not reading a book written before the time of Bacon and Galileo,—a book written in those days in which physicians reasoned from the nature of heat to the treatment of fever, and astronomers proved syllogistically that the planets could have no independent motion,—because the heavens were incorruptible, and nature abhorred a vacuum!

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0004

Mr. Mill's error is exactly of the same kind. He reasons syllogistically about power, pleasure, and pain, without attaching any definite notion to any one of those words. There is no more resemblance, says the Westminster Reviewer, between pain and substantia than between pain and a line or an angle. **By his permission, in the very point to which Lord Bacon's observation applies, Mr. Mill's subjects do resemble the *substantia* and *elementum* of the schoolmen and differ from the lines and magnitudes of Euclid. We can reason *a priori* on mathematics, because we can define with an exactitude which precludes all possibility of confusion.** If a mathematician were to admit the least laxity into his notions, if he were to allow himself to be deluded by the vague sense which words bear in popular use, or by the aspect of an ill-drawn diagram, if he were to forget in his reasonings that a point was indivisible, or that the definition of a line excluded breadth, there would be no end to his blunders. **The schoolmen tried to reason mathematically about things which had not been, and perhaps could not be, defined with mathematical accuracy.** We know the result. Mr. Mill has in our time attempted to do the same. He talks of power, for example, as if the meaning of the word power were as determinate as the meaning of the word circle. **But, when we analyse his speculations, we find that his notion of power is, in the words of Bacon, "*phantastica et male terminata.*"**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_168

148. The desire to find something certain and fixed in æsthetic led to the worship of Aristotle: **I think, however, that we may gradually come to see from his works that he understood nothing about art,** and that it is merely the intellectual conversations of the Athenians, echoing in his pages, which we admire.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D9%3Asection%3D1
>
> **Now what is called indignation[1] is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character.** And both emotions show good character, [2] for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods.
>
> 1. **νεμεσᾶν: "the nobler brother of envy" (Nietzsche).**

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/205/mode/2up?view=theater

The volume of Platonic studies far exceeded the number of books and articles devoted to Aristotle, who, from a quantitative perspective, sank into virtual oblivion and, in qualitative terms, was as derided as Plato was exalted.
...

The fact that Bäumler, a man intimately acquainted with Greek philosophy and letters, mentioned Aristotle's name only once while appropriating his most basic ideas is revealing of the poor esteem in which the Stagirite was held by Nazi intellectuals.
...

Ernst Krieck carried this dismissal of Aristotle even further, making him responsible for the entire decline of traditional Greek education. **Aristotle had encouraged the emergence of a dry, disembodied rationalism, overly literary and abstract, which had lost all sense of proportion between body and spirit.**
...

Aristotle was interesting only, Krieck suggested, as a preserver of the Greek wisdom that he had patiently accumulated in his scrupulous encyclopedias. He revealed himself there, as in other places, to be a simple "curator," in contrast to a true Nordic creator like Plato, **and in any case, he remained a pure "rationalist"**90 **and complete foreigner throughout his life.**

Positive remarks about Aristotle were brief and rare. A few could be found in the work of Ludwig Schemann, who deemed the disowning of Aristotle, as a theoretician of slavery and racial hierarchy, to be "incomprehensible."91

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6mxvEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this essay I distinguish between "intelligence" and "intellect" **using the latter term to indicate the mental scaffolding men erect to deal with what they don't understand.** Belief is from intelligence.

From the crying "Ligo" in Lithuania (to a sun freed of its winter imprisonment),3 down to the Greek archipelago, certain things are believed. **Book instruction obscures them.**
...

The religious element [of Christianity] is to a great extent pagan, but mere paganism is not enough. **The intellectual elements are admittedly Plato and Aristotle, the latter largely destructive of faith, of belief in the sense I have used the word in my opening paragraph.**

---

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#THINGS_I_OWE_TO_THE_ANCIENTS

Fancy judging the Greeks in the German style, from their philosophers; fancy using **the suburban respectability [Biedermännerei]** of the Socratic schools as a key to what is fundamentally Hellenic!... **The philosophers are of course the decadents of Hellas, the counter-movement directed against the old and noble taste (—against the agonal instinct, against the *Polis,* against the value of the race, against the authority of tradition).**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DStat.%3Apage%3D262

Stranger: It was very much as if, in undertaking to divide the human race into two parts, [262d] one should make the division as most people in this country do; **they separate the Hellenic race from all the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless in number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give the single name "barbarian";** then, because of this single name, they think it is a single species. Or it was as if a man should think he was dividing number into two classes by cutting off a myriad from all the other numbers, with the notion that he was making one separate class, [262e] and then should give one name to all the rest, and because of that name should think that this also formed one class distinct from the other. **A better division, more truly classified and more equal, would be made by dividing number into odd and even, and the human race into male and female;** as for the Lydians and Phrygians and various others they could be opposed to the rest and split off from them when it was impossible to find and separate two parts, [263a] each of which formed a class.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DTheaet.%3Asection%3D173c

Socrates: Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, [173d] do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. **And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is.** [173e] **And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions,** as Pindar[14] says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature [174a] of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.
...

Socrates: Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, **and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet.** The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy.
...

Socrates: Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, [174c] when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches [174d] and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to

laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. **When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman**—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, [174e] no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. **And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them;** [175a] **because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks.** And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that [175b] Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_44

> If there is any good in philosophy, it is this, – **that it never looks into pedigrees. [stemma non inspicit] All men, if traced back to their original source, spring from the gods.** 2. You are a Roman knight, and your persistent work promoted you to this class; yet surely there are many to whom the fourteen rows are barred;[1] the senate-chamber is not open to all; the army, too, is scrupulous in choosing those whom it admits to toil and danger. **But a noble mind is free to all men; [bona mens omnibus patet] according to this test, we may all gain distinction.** Philosophy neither rejects nor selects anyone; its light shines for all. 3. Socrates was no aristocrat. Cleanthes worked at a well and served as a hired man watering a garden. **Philosophy did not find Plato already a nobleman; it made him one.** Why then should you despair of becoming able to rank with men like these? They are all your ancestors, if you conduct yourself in a manner worthy of them; and you will do so if you convince yourself at the outset that no man outdoes you in real nobility. 4. We have all had the same number of forefathers; there is no man whose first beginning does not transcend memory. **Plato says: "Every king springs from a race of slaves, and every slave has had kings among his ancestors."[2] [Platon ait neminem regem non ex servis esse oriundum, neminem non servum ex regibus.]**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D470c

“First, in the matter of making slaves of the defeated, do you think it right for Greeks to reduce Greek cities[1] to slavery, or rather that so far as they are able, they should not suffer any other city to do so, but should accustom Greeks [469c] to spare Greeks, foreseeing the danger[1] of enslavement by the barbarians?” “Sparing them is wholly and altogether the better,” said he. **“They are not, then, themselves to own Greek slaves, either, and they should advise the other Greeks not to?”** “By all means,” he said; “at any rate in that way they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands from one another.”
…

“In my opinion, just as we have the two terms, war and faction, so there are also two things, distinguished by two differentiae. The two things I mean are the friendly and kindred on the one hand and the alien and foreign on the other. Now the term employed for the hostility of the friendly is faction, and for that of the alien is war.” “What you say is in nothing beside the mark,” he replied. “Consider, then, [470c] if this goes to the mark. **I affirm that the Hellenic race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to the barbarian.**” “Rightly,” he said. “**We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature,[1] and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred.** Greeks, however, we shall say, are still by nature the friends of Greeks when they act in this way, but that Greece is sick in that case and divided by faction, [470d] and faction is the name we must give to that enmity.”

> 1. Plato shared the natural feeling of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and all patriotic Greeks. Cf. Isocrates *Panegyricus* 157, 184, *Panath.* 163; *Menexenus* 237 ff., *Laws* 692 C and 693 A. **It is uncritical then with Newman (op. cit. p. 430) and many others to take as a recantation of this passage the**

> **purely logical observation in *Politicus* 262 D that Greek and barbarian is an unscientific dichotomy of mankind.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA93#v=onepage&q&f=false

The *Republic* itself contains the seed of the destruction of any kind of neighborly city-state once its contradictions are exposed to the full glare of the universality of reason. For the division of labor on which the tripartite division of the soul and the city is based – that each nature best performs one job – is inherently universalistic. That is to say, **an architectonic meritocracy could not possibly be confined within the boundaries of a single *polis*.** For, very simply, the best people for the best jobs are universally distributed, requiring some kind of cosmopolitan regime. **In this respect, one could say that what is "noble" about the "noble lie" is that it takes a universalistic principle of meritocracy based on the division of labor and grafts it onto a single, autochthonous *polis*,** embedding its natural hierarchy in the earth of a single city's most ancient past (the "myth of the metals" according to which each class springs from the earth their souls mixed, in ascending order, with iron, silver, and gold [415a-d]). **To clarify the lie would mean the doom of the *polis*.**

> https://counter-currents.com/2013/05/eugenics-versus-race/
>
> Muller's blueprint, he explained in his 1936 Letter to Stalin, "represents quite the *antithesis* of the 'Race Purification' and so-called 'Eugenics' of the Nazis and their Kin ..." **Communist eugenics "works for a surplus [population] reproduction that *combines the highest endowments of every race*, as found in a classless society."** (Emphases added.)

Leo Strauss's Indictment of Christain Philosophy on JSTOR

> Christianity proclaims a suprapolitical truth: the brotherhood of all men.35 **The irony is that this Christian teaching actually reproduces a conclusion to which our reason also leads but which it must prudently deny in practice. In fact, the "fraternity of all men" is the natural truth that Plato's noble lie intentionally obscures.** "The particular or closed political society conflicts with the natural fraternity of all men. Political society in one way or another draws an arbitrary line between man and man."36 Arbitrary deliniations are necessary for political life because speech or rational persuasion is severely limited in its capacity to govern men: gentlemen may be amenable to speeches that appeal to their spiritedness; the base must be made to fear punishment, eternal as well as temporal; neither will be satisfied or converted by the love of rational inquiry.
>
> > 36. Strauss, "The Problem of Socrates," in *Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*, pp. 158-59. **Strauss specifically states that the deliberate cultivation of patriotism (love of the *patria*) is part of the noble lie.** Strauss, *The City and Man*, p. 102.

…

In other words, the very notion of a city ruled by philosophy is arguably a way station to some kind of cosmopolitan order.

> https://sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr06.htm#an_fr_73_1
>
> What we have treated hitherto as the mortal weakness of the Olympians, **the fact that they have no roots in any particular soil, little hold on any definite primeval cult,** has turned out to be their peculiar strength.
> …
>
> Yet when the religious imagination of Greece deepens it twines itself still around these gracious and ever-moving shapes; **the Zeus of Aeschylus moves on into the Zeus of Plato or of Cleanthes or of Marcus Aurelius.** Hermes, Athena, Apollo, all have their long spiritual history. They are but little impeded by the echoes of the old frivolous mythology; still less by any local roots or sectional prejudices or compulsory details of ritual. **As the more highly educated mind of Greece emerged from a particular, local, tribal, conception of religion, the old denationalized Olympians were ready to receive her.**
> …
>
> **By the fourth century the average Athenian must have recognized what philosophers had recognized long before,** that a religion, to be true, must be universal and not the privilege of a particular people. As soon as the Stoics had proclaimed the world to be 'one great City of gods and men', the only Gods with which Greece could satisfactorily people that City were the idealized band of the old Olympians.

…

That Plato's Socrates tries to conceal the inevitable universality of the division of labor within the confines of a harmonious and autochthonous *polis* likely stems from two sources – **a disinclination for philosophy to be distracted from its truest concern, the love of wisdom, by a real-world project for a more rational politics through benevolent despotism, along with the Socratic philosopher's own preference for a neighborly *polis*** in which freewheeling and spontaneous conversations about virtue provide his eros with the psychological loam for the art of midwifery that he practices on his mostly younger fellow conversationalists.6
…

Indeed, as Hegel argues, the very emergence of Socratic philosophy may have sounded the death knell of the *polis*, for however much the universality of reason may have been sheathed in the preference for the aristocratic republic, its dynamism was bound to bore through the confines of the neighborly *polis* and lead to the great cosmopolitan empires of Alexander and Rome.8

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.85694/page/n479/mode/2up?view=theater

Plato still yielded, in certain points, to the empire of old ideas. **The state which he imagines is still the ancient city: it is small; it must not contain more than five thousand members.** Its government is still regulated on ancient principles: liberty is unknown in it; the object which the legislator proposes to himself is less the perfection of man than the security and grandeur of the association. The family, even, is almost suppressed, that it may not come into competition with the city: the state is the only proprietor; it alone is free: the state alone has a will; only the state has a religion and a belief, and whoever does not believe with it must perish. And yet in the midst of all this the new ideas appear. Plato proclaims, with Socrates and the Sophists, that the moral and political guide is in ourselves; that tradition is nothing, that reason must be consulted, and that laws are just only when they conform to human nature.

These ideas are still more precise in Aristotle. "The law," he says, "is reason." He teaches that we are to seek, not what conforms to the customs of ancestors, but what is good in itself. He adds that, as time progresses, institutions should be modified. He puts aside respect for ancestors. **"Our first ancestors, whether they came from the bosom of the earth, or survived some deluge, resembled, in all probability, those who to-day are the most degraded and the most ignorant among men. It would be an evident absurdity to cling to the opinions of those men." Aristotle, like all the philosophers, absolutely disregards the religious origin of human society: he does not speak of the prytaneum; he does not admit that these local worships were the foundation of the state. "The state," he says, "is nothing else but an association of equal beings seeking in common a happy and comfortable existence."**
…

Socrates had fulfilled the duties of a citizen; and Plato had attempted to work for the state by reforming it. **Aristotle, still more indifferent, confined himself to the part of an observer, and made the state an object of scientific study.** The Epicureans paid no attention to public affairs. "Do not meddle with them," said Epicurus, "unless some higher power compels you to." The Cynics did not wish even to be citizens.

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43290/the-second-coming

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.

The Stoics returned to politics. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus wrote numerous treatises on the government of states. But their principles were far removed from the old municipal politics. These are the terms in which one of the ancients speaks of the doctrines which their writings contained: "Zeno, in his treatise on government, has undertaken to show us that we are not the inhabitants of such a deme, or such a city, separated from each other by a particular code, or exclusive laws, but that we should see citizens in all men, as if we all belonged to the same deme and the same city."1 **We see from this how far ideas had advanced since the age of Socrates, who thought himself bound to adore, as far as he was able, the gods of the state. Even Plato did not plan any other government than that of a city. Zeno passed beyond these narrow limits of human associations.** He disdained the divisions which the religion of ancient ages had established. As he believed in a God of the universe, so he had also the idea of a State into which the whole human race should enter.2

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr07.htm#an_fr_84_1

Xenophon, an exile from his country, a brilliant soldier and adventurer as well as a man of letters, is perhaps the first Greek on record who openly lost interest in the city. He thought less about cities and constitutions than about great men and nations, or generals and armies. To him it was idle to spin cobweb formations of ideal laws and communities. Society is right enough if you have a really fine man to lead it.

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n289/mode/2up?view=theater

Xenophon's *Hiero* is the classic defense of tyranny by a wise man, and the *Education of Cyrus* describes how an aristocracy can be transformed by the lowering of the moral standards into an absolute monarchy ruling a large empire. We add the observation that Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, which starts from the view that the management rather than the increase of one's landed estate, to say nothing of the pursuit of crafts and trade, befits the gentleman, leads up to the proposal of such a compromise between the noble and the profitable as consists in a certain kind of trading in landed estates; **Xenophon appears to be much more tolerant of that "natural and ordinary desire to acquire" than any other classic.** But Machiavelli refers only to the *Hiero* and the *Education of Cyrus*, not to the *Oeconomicus* or to any other of Xenophon's Socratic writings. **Xenophon's thought and work has two foci, Cyrus and Socrates. While Machiavelli is greatly concerned with Cyrus, he forgets Socrates.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA160#v=onepage&q&f=false

According to Aristotle, **Socrates' demand for the total unity of the city turns it into an *oikos*, a household ruled by its "owner," the philosopher-king. The *polis* is entirely swallowed by the "economy." Perfect unity, Aristotle maintains, is not appropriate for the plural, composite nature of the city.** The more the city tends toward complete unity, the more it moves in the direction of household management and royal rule with its architectonic division of labor. Human nature is a composite of intellect and appetite. These can be well arranged but not made unitary, nor can classes be sorted out on the basis of only one character trait or the other (as Plato does with the Guardians and Auxiliaries). The division of labor is not practicable in political communities, where freezing the ruling element permanently in place will cause "outrage," especially among the spirited Achillean kind of men whom the *Republic* is meant most particularly to assuage (1264b6-10).

This outrage is precisely what does lead in the *Republic* itself to the overthrow of the Guardians by the honor-loving Auxiliaries, a revolution which, as we discussed in the last chapter, might just as plausibly take the form of an individual tyrant coming to power as a timocratic class. As we will see in the next chapter, something roughly akin to this happens in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*, where the young Cyrus leads a revolution of the other young aristocrats of military age in the Persian Republic (a self-governing regime partly patterned on Platonic prescriptions) against the gerontocracy that rules the republic and its unchanging laws and institutions, including its avoidance of foreign conflict as a source of internal disorder through overweening military ambition and its concentration on purely inward-looking self-government. In one of his many interesting variations on Plato and Aristotle, **whereas Plato believes wisdom should rule and Aristotle believes that this will be intolerable to the nonphilosophic honor-loving citizenry,** Xenophon's Cyrus is motivated by his love of honor to lead a revolution of the honor-loving citizenry issuing in a world-state based on the Xenophontic Socrates' art of *oikonomia*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA186#v=onepage&q&f=false

Whereas, as we have seen in the previous chapters, this monarchical claim is muted by Plato and Aristotle for the sake of the political community, Xenophon goes much further than either of them in jettisoning the claims of republican self-government in favor of an open endorsement of rational, benevolent absolutism. Hence, Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* can be regarded as his monarchical utopia, a direct riposte (as noted by later Hellenistic, Roman, and Renaissance commentators) to Plato's republican utopia, the *Republic*.2
…

The Platonic Socrates rather starchily refuses to concede that the great Pericles knew the art of ruling as well as Socrates himself – a seeming absurdity that has his interlocutor Callicles spluttering with incredulous indignation – while praise for Athens is conspicuously absent from Aristotle's *Politics* when it comes to discussing even relatively virtuous regimes (as opposed to a segment devoted to Sparta).3
…

The Greeks were also aware of a far more imposing and successful example of large-scale political authority, however, one that was no mere trade association but had apparently worked out complex institutional arrangements for every aspect of human association. This was the Persian Empire, an

enormous regime embracing millions of people from dozens of different nationalities. The Greeks had fought off the Persian kings' attempts to add them to that empire, and this victory began the Greeks' own rise to the greatness of the classical era, **but the thoughtful among them were far from despising the Persian alternative.** On the contrary, they had frequent occasion to rue the comparison between their own fractious, small, and unstable regimes and what struck them as the awesome power and efficiency of the great multinational monarchy to the east.
…

As presented by Xenophon, Cyrus takes the principle of the *oikos* – the household with its private and economic concerns – and expands it until it becomes the basis of the regime itself, swallowing up the polis.
…

Cyrus blasts the virtuous [Persian] republic apart by throwing open the opportunity to rise in life to all its inhabitants, **eventually even including the large mass of toiling commoners hitherto excluded from any kind of civic education or citizen participation (rather as if the Auxiliaries in Plato's *Republic* invited the Artisans to join them as comrades in the common cause of empire).** In this way, Xenophon explores the possibility that an imperial monarchy could democratize opportunity and allow individual merit to override any injunctions to prefer the common good to one's own. The lesson Cyrus has learned in Media is that the individualism characteristic of the Median king and his privatized subjects can, by employing the skill and courage of the Persian education, acquire for each Persian of all classes "great wealth, happiness, and honor" that they would otherwise never experience (1.5.8-12).

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2085/2085-h/2085-h.htm#2H_4_0004
>
> (8) I have long felt sure that our forefathers were in their time as good men as we. **For their lives were one long effort towards the self-same deeds of valour as are held in honour now; and still, for all their worth, I fail to see what good they gained either for the state or for themselves.** (9) Yet I cannot bring myself to believe that there is a single virtue practised among mankind merely in order that the brave and good should fare no better than the base ones of the earth. **Men do not forego the pleasures of the moment to say good-bye to all joy for evermore—no, this self-control is a training, so that we may reap the fruits of a larger joy in the time to come.** A man will toil day and night to make himself an orator, yet oratory is not the one aim of his existence: his hope is to influence men by his eloquence and thus achieve some noble end. So too with us, and those like us, who are drilled in the arts of war: **we do not give our labours in order to fight for ever, endlessly and hopelessly, we hope that we too one day, when we have proved our mettle, may win and wear for ourselves and for our city the threefold ornament of wealth, of happiness, of honour.** (10) And if there should be some who have worked hard all their lives and suddenly old-age, they find, has stolen on them unawares, and taken away their powers before they have gathered in the fruit of all their toil, such men seem to me like those who desire to be thrifty husbandmen, and who sow well and plant wisely, but when the time of harvest comes let the fruit drop back ungarnered into the soil whence it sprang. **Or as if an athlete should train himself and reach the heights where victory may be won and at the last forbear to enter the lists—such an one, I take it, would but meet his deserts if all men cried out upon him for a fool.**

We can already anticipate Machiavelli's partiality toward Xenophon among the ancients: **an alliance between a prince and the common people based on material self-interest, a project for turning republican virtue outward as the fuel for imperial expansion and prosperity** – these as we will see, are hallmarks of *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, and references to "Xenophon's Cyrus" are woven by Machiavelli throughout his exploration of them.
…

We recall from Chapter 3 that at just the point where he fully and explicitly defines true monarchy as the multinational empire of a man of supreme prudence governing according to the architectonic art, Aristotle draws back from this claim so as to endorse instead a self-governing aristocratic republic. Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* fills that lacuna, taking off from precisely where Aristotle ends, tracing what would happen if a man of Alcibiadean ambition but properly trained in civic virtue were to burst the boundaries of the aristocratic republic precisely by acting on its claim to favor meritocracy. **If Hegel is correct that the universalism of Socratic philosophy spelled the death of the polis by making a cosmopolitan state inevitable, the *Education of Cyrus* would seem to provide the speculative blueprint.** With Xenophon's opening lament of the Greek city-states' ills and his idealization of Cyrus's world state, political philosophy and history come close to touching. **For what begins as a monarchical utopia in the *Education of Cyrus* becomes reality as Alexander of Macedon leads his fellow youths out of their backward polis to conquer Persia, assuming the Cyrean role of universal monarch, just as Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar will do later in subverting the Roman polis** – charismatic imperialists and populists who, like Xenophon's Cyrus, clad themselves in the outward form of republican legitimacy as its restorer and rejuvenator.

To reiterate: **the Cyrean revolution encourages the “career open to talent” (to use Napoleon’s famous phrase) that the old republican education had always claimed to be based on because it claimed to breed the rule of the best.** First as imperial commanders and later as heads of splendid households encompassing the provinces and fiefs of the empire, Cyrus’s comrades excel at the noble and good in ways that were not possible under the republican rule of law with its restrictions on outstanding personal achievement.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2085/2085-h/2085-h.htm#2H_4_0005
>
> (26) **And I would not have you fill their places from our fellow-citizens alone, but, just as you choose your horses from the best stocks, wherever you find them, not limiting yourselves to the national breed, so you have all mankind before you, and you should choose those, and those only, who will increase your power and add to your honour.**
>
> > C2.26. Xenophon's breadth of view: virtue is not confined to citizens, but we have the pick of the whole world. Cosmopolitan Hellenism.
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2085/2085-h/2085-h.htm#2H_4_0010
>
> "But even so," said the Egyptians, "how can we act in honour if we save ourselves?"
>
> "By betraying none of those at whose side you fought," answered Cyrus: "only surrender your arms to us, and become our friends, the friends of men who chose to save you when they might have destroyed you." (43) "And if we become your friends," said they, "how will you treat us?" "As you treat us," answered he, "and the treatment shall be good."
>
> "And what will that good treatment be?" they asked once more. "This," said Cyrus: "better pay than you have had, so long as the war lasts, and when peace comes, if you choose to stay with me, lands and cities and women and servants."
> …
>
> (45) Thus it came about that their descendants are to this day faithful subjects of the king, and Cyrus gave them cities, some in the interior, which are still called the cities of the Egyptians, beside Larissa and Kyllene and Kyme on the coast, still held by their descendants.

…

It is hard not to see in Xenophon’s re-creation of the young Cyrus a version of what Alcibiades might have become if a philosophically grounded education had taken hold of his character from early on, converting him, not into the citizen of a republic friendly to philosophy envisioned by Plato and Aristotle, but into a benign, efficient, moderate, and self-controlled universal ruler extending the pattern of the Good to all peoples under his sway while at the same time gratifying his eros for limitless prestige. In other words, **instead of, as the Platonic Socrates does, leading Alcibiades to the universality of thought by way of his universal ambition so as to deliver him back to his city better equipped to govern it, Xenophon in effect takes him from the universality of thought to the actualization of a universalistic government.** Whereas Plato and Aristotle try to resolve the contradiction between democracy and empire by excluding empire and extolling the reform of republican self-government in accordance with reason, Xenophon resolves it (at least speculatively) by forsaking the *polis* and extolling the reform of empire in accordance with reason.
…

That is to say, a crude and minimalist version of Plato’s and Aristotle’s republican prescription, of their preference for the neighborly and austere small polis over empire and even over the feverish polis Athens, yields at length the Xenophontic *pambasileus* in historical reality. As we see in the chapters to come, this derivation of successful imperialism from republican virtue is precisely Machiavelli’s understanding of the success of the greatest empire ever known in reality, that vastly more stable and long-lived successor to the Alexandrian empire, “the Senate and People of Rome.” **Although in almost all respects Machiavelli must forsake the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts of virtue and the art of ruling, in Xenophon he finds a common stalk.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA385#v=onepage&q&f=false

Machiavelli, by contrast, does not believe that the clash between hostile parties implies any such supervening discursive unity or common good to be actualized through reasoned deliberation. The goal of politics is to maximize security and well-being for both princes and peoples. Even the survival of the constitutional order is secondary to this goal. **So much is this the case that he can even recommend that a republic perpetually racked by partisan strife might be better off by becoming “subject after a while to some neighboring state that is better organized than**

itself.” Aristotle, much as he is against a political community becoming imperialistic, would never argue that it could actually benefit by being absorbed by a more powerful foe itself, which is in any case an endorsement of imperialism from another perspective. The only exception to the prohibition against waging a war that is not in self-defense is a just war aimed at freeing an unjustly oppressed people. But that would preclude absorbing it into one’s own domain (*Politics* 1333a30-35, 133b37-1334a11; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1177b9-11). **Among the classics, only Xenophon in the *Education of Cyrus* comes close to Machiavelli’s position, when he has the young Cyrus wax indignant at the follies of neighboring countries and their governments and claim that conquering and absorbing them would improve them**. For Aristotle, only a small and neighborly polis, independent of foreign domination, eschewing empire, and self-sufficient enough to look inward, can approximate the wholeness that orders the cosmos. A multinational state, however, prosperous and powerful it may become, cannot do this. Its size, diversity, and the absence of civic deliberation shared among a self-governing citizenry prevent it from being a whole within the whole.
…

By contrast, Machiavelli is concerned above all with how political “bodies” can survive, regenerate, and expand their power. If this is better achieved by a multinational empire that, like Rome, absorbs its former foes and adds them to the forces it turns outward on the next enemy, that is all to the good. To be the secure and prosperous ally or even province of such an empire might be preferable to an impoverished and constantly imperiled independence.
…

Machiavelli gives his qualified endorsement to Lycurgus’s constitution for exactly the same reasons on which Aristotle based his critique of it: instead of attempting to mix the three powers of government in the service of the common good, according to Aristotle, Lycurgus let them clash, each retarding the other precisely through the vigor of its ambition, but forced to cooperate to the degree necessary to keep their helot population under control and to stave off their external enemies. Aristotle concedes that this clash and check of powers held Sparta together. But in the case of each of its institutions, he criticizes Lycurgus for allowing its partisans to pursue their own ambition and self-interest and thereby abandoning from the outset any hope that these contending factions could be educated to transcend their passions so that they could deliberate in common according to *logos* about the meaning of the just and unjust, thus fulfilling their natures as political animals:

> **And because the [ephorate] was too powerful, and equal to tyranny, the kings were also compelled to cultivate popular favor, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy.** (1270b6-17)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/History_of_the_Peloponnesian_War/Book_1#Second_Congress_at_Lacedaemon_-_Preparations_for_War_and_Diplomatic_Skirmishes_-_Cylon_-_Pausanias_-_Themistocles

> He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards discovered: "Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. **I may say that I think I am able to do this, with your co-operation.** Accordingly if any of this please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in future conduct our correspondence."
> …
>
> Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea, Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, **became prouder than ever, and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table,** and was quite unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale.
> …
>
> **Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would help him to carry out his plans to the end.**

---

https://archive.org/details/cu31924029750225/page/n259/mode/2up?view=theater

One fine morning this Achilles became Asiatic, and turned his back to Homer and Greece. Babylon, the great mistress in monarchical prostitutions, accomplished in one day upon Alexander those effects which it required a hundred years to produce on the Persians. Shameful and unforeseen spectacle! The conquered found themselves to be the vanquishers. Asia, that

was at that moment worn out, stained, and in the cadaverous condition of Chaldean rottenness,—old Asia obtained her master for her lover. **A gilded sepulchre, the sink of love, through which the world had passed, such was the passion of Alexander the Great. Modern writers, when they see in all this an admirable political sagacity, are insane. If the Greeks had to contract a little of the Asiatic manners and thinking, this certainly was not the way to do it.** Asiatic customs and ideas ought to have been controlled by the lofty Greek spirit. It would have been necessary, above all, to proceed in this business with a very slow prudence, and with wise considerations.
...

He relied solely on the conquered people, and blindly, without shame or precaution, armed them. He was training thirty thousand Persians for fighting against the Greeks, or to drive them away. He wished that the latter, transformed in a moment, and becoming Persians, should worship him in the Eastern manner, abjuring their good sense.

It was not, as some make us believe, a childish thing, and a mere vanity. It was a perverse and calculated thing. Adoration was the touch-stone for the abdication of good sense and human dignity. The magians, his teachers, felt that this would be the limit of Greek obedience, and that if he were resisted, he would hate Greece, and become entirely a Persian.
...

But, more than any other man, **Alexander has been the founder of all monarchical folly,** not only on account of the unmeasurable influence of his glory, but because from him began in our Europe the royal machinery, preserved and servilely imitated. **The conception of the modern king, the court, and the etiquette have come to us taken precisely from him.**

http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_various/homers_competition.htm

Sparta and Athens surrender to Persia, as Themistocles and Alcibiades have done; they betray Hellenism after they have given up the noblest Hellenic fundamental thought, the competition, **and Alexander, the coarsened copy and abbreviation of Greek history, now invents the cosmopolitan Hellene, [Allerwelts-Hellenen] and the so-called "Hellenism."** (Completed on December 29, 1872)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Richard_Wagner_in_Bayreuth#Chapter_IV.

The history of the development of culture since the time of the Greeks is short enough, when we take into consideration the actual ground it covers, and ignore the periods during which man stood still, went backwards, hesitated or strayed. **The Hellenising of the world—and to make this possible, the Orientalising of Hellenism—that double mission of Alexander the Great, still remains the most important event: the old question whether a foreign civilisation may be transplanted is still the problem that the peoples of modern times are vainly endeavouring to solve. The rhythmic play of those two factors against each other is the force that has determined the course of history heretofore.**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n623/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Having lived fourteen impressionable years in Rome, [Antiochus IV Epiphanes] had imbibed a taste for republican institutions; and as if to foreshadow Augustus, it pleased his humor and policy to clothe his monarchical power in the forms of republican freedom.** The chief effect of his passion for things Roman was the introduction of gladiatorial games in Antioch, his capital. The people resented the brutal sport, but Antiochus won them over by lavish and spectacular displays; when they became accustomed to the butchery he considered their degeneration a personal victory. **It was characteristic of him that he began as an ardent follower of the Stoics, and ended as an easy convert to the Epicureans.**

Thus Christianity appears, for instance, as a product of Oriental antiquity, which was thought out and pursued to its ultimate conclusions by men, with almost intemperate thoroughness. As its influence began to decay, the power of Hellenic culture was revived, and we are now experiencing phenomena so strange that they would hang in the air as unsolved problems, if it were not possible, by spanning an enormous gulf of time, to show their relation to analogous phenomena in Hellenistic culture. **Thus, between Kant and the Eleatics, Schopenhauer and Empedocles, Aeschylus and Wagner, there is so much relationship, so many things in common, that one is vividly impressed with the very relative nature of all notions of time.**

…

The earth which, up to the present, has been more than adequately Orientalised, begins to yearn once more for Hellenism. He who wishes to help her in this respect will certainly need to be gifted for speedy action and to have wings on his heels, in order to synthetise the multitudinous and still undiscovered facts of science and the many conflicting divisions of talent so as to reconnoitre and rule the whole enormous field. **It is now necessary that a generation of anti-Alexanders should arise, endowed with the supreme strength necessary for gathering up, binding together, and joining the individual threads of the fabric, so as to prevent their being scattered to the four winds. The object is not to cut the Gordian knot of Greek culture after the manner adopted by Alexander,** and then to leave its frayed ends fluttering in all directions; it is rather to bind it after it has been loosed. That is our task to-day. **In the person of Wagner I recognise one of these anti-Alexanders:** he rivets and locks together all that is isolated, weak, or in any way defective; if I may be allowed to use a medical expression, he has an astringent power.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52190/pg52190-images.html#FNanchor_2_11

Everything in this essay is a prophecy: the proximity of the resurrection of the Greek spirit, **the need of men who will be counter-Alexanders, who will once more tie the Gordian knot of Greek culture, after it has been cut.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14240/14240-h/14240-h.htm **[November 9, 1887]**

In literature, also, Mr. Mahaffy is loud in his lamentations over what he considers to be the shallow society tendencies of the new comedy, and misses the fine freedom of Aristophanes, with his intense patriotism, his vital interest in politics, his large issues and his delight in vigorous national life. He confesses the decay of oratory under the blighting influences of imperialism, and the sterility of those pedantic disquisitions upon style which are the inevitable consequence of the lack of healthy subject-matter. **Indeed, on the last page of his history Mr. Mahaffy makes a formal recantation of most of his political prejudices. He is still of opinion that Demosthenes should have been put to death for resisting the Macedonian invasion, but admits that the imperialism of Rome, which followed the imperialism of Alexander, produced incalculable mischief, beginning with intellectual decay, and ending with financial ruin. 'The touch of Rome,' he says, 'numbed Greece and Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor, and if there are great buildings attesting the splendour of the Empire, where are the signs of intellectual and moral vigour, if we except that stronghold of nationality, the little land of Palestine?'** This palinode is, no doubt, intended to give a plausible air of fairness to the book, but such a death-bed repentance comes too late, and makes the whole preceding history seem not fair but foolish.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.69382/page/n287/mode/2up?view=theater

It has been truly said that in the religious sphere the only vital things in Hellenism were philosophy and the Oriental religions. Twilight was indeed falling on the Olympians, in spite of external show—new epiphanies, new festivals, the attempted religious revival in Greece after 146 (p. 36). The great temples that were built and completed were generally to some alien deity, the Serapis of Alexandria or the Fair-browed goddess of Magnesia; the chief exception was that of Athene Polias at Pergamum, built by the Attalid kings for political reasons, for their real god, ancestor of their line, was Dionysus. What was happening can be seen in the one great temple a Greek city planned to a Greek god: **Apollo's temple at Didyma was still unfinished four centuries later, not for lack of money at Miletus, but for lack of that living faith which had formerly enabled cities to complete their temples in a generation.**
…

But perhaps what settled the matter was the conquest of Asia and Egypt; for it was a conquest by the sword alone, not the spirit. Greece was ready to adopt the gods of the foreigner, but the foreigner rarely reciprocated; **Greek Doura freely admitted the gods of Babylon, but no Greek god entered Babylonian Uruk.** Foreign gods might take Greek names; they took little else. They were the stronger, and the conquest of Asia was bound to fail as soon as the East, in the religious sphere, had gauged its own strength and Greek weakness; for what Greece could give to Asia, science and philosophy, only a chosen few could take; these things were never for the mass. Had Ptolemy I enthroned Zeus in Alexandria and persecuted Osiris, Egypt would have fought but would have understood; **that the Ptolemies instead built temples to Egyptian deities meant to Egyptians not toleration but weakness—the invader had no faith in his own gods. From the second century Hellenism was between the hammer and the anvil, the sword of Rome and the spirit of Egypt and Babylon. One man saw it—Antiochus Epiphanes—and has been called a madman ever since. But his**

attempt to unify his realm on a basis of Greek religion and culture failed; and Greek religion got no second chance.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n615/mode/2up?view=theater

The failure of the city-state accelerated the decay of the orthodox religion; the gods of the city had proved helpless to defend it, and had forfeited belief. The population was intermingled with foreign merchants who had no share in the city's civic or religious life, and whose amused skepticism spread among the citizens. **The mythology of the ancient local gods survived among the peasantry and the simple townsfolk, and in the official rites; the educated used it for poetry and art, the half-liberated attacked it bitterly, the upper classes supported it as an aid to order, and discountenanced open atheism as bad taste.**
…

Only an act of persistent imagination, or a gift for observation, can enable us to realize what it means to a nation to have its traditional religion die. Classic Greek civilization had been built upon a patriotic devotion to the city-state, and classic morality, though rooted in folkways rather than in faith, had been powerfully reinforced by supernatural belief. **But now neither faith nor patriotism survived in the educated Greek;** civic frontiers had been erased by empires; and the growth of knowledge had secularized morals, marriage, parentage, and law.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/303/mode/2up?view=theater

A sequence in the film *Der ewige Jude* (1940),104 used maps and animation to show how the Jewish people spread across the four corners of the globe: **"We probably would have never been bothered by them had they stayed in their Oriental home. The cosmopolitan empire of Alexander the Great … and especially the boundless world empire of the Romans,"**105 **with its peace, infrastructure that favored travel and exchange, and integration of different lands, allowed the diaspora to exist.** The global empire had as its avatar "the international Jewry that we know today."106

> https://mondopolitico.com/library/meinkampf/v2c14.htm
>
> **The Persian empire in the east is ripe for collapse.** And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have been chosen by Fate as witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the folkish theory.
>
> *Our task,* ***the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to such political insight that they will not see their goal for the future in the breath-taking sensation of a new Alexander's conquest,*** *but in the industrious work of the German plow, to which the sword need only give soil.*

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/347/mode/2up?view=theater

But his project of universal rule through the fusion of races proved to be "dangerous for the race."124 **He made the creation of a world empire his ultimate goal, when it should have been but a means to defend and strengthen his race: "World empire represented in his eyes a cardinal value; everything was subordinate to it."** This was the classic error of the Nordic conqueror, given over to hubris and lured by the ideal of unifying the known world under a single power. He thus forgot about the dignity and preeminent importance of his Nordic blood, which was reduced to the same rank of all other blood types, as a mere building block for the creation of an empire: **"For him it was all just pliable material,"**125 leading him to treat the Greeks, the Persians, and all other peoples as though they were of the same rank and level. Since "the idea of race" had "ceased to represent a positive value" in his eyes, Alexander resorted to the "fusion of peoples"; as Schachermeyr wrote, **"It was the *raison d'état* of world empire that dictated his idea for interbreeding."**126 Taeger commented that it was hubris, in wresting him from his native land and setting him off on the route to world conquest, that had caused Alexander to forget his duties to his blood: "**The conqueror uprooted himself from the soil that nourished him and gave him victory.** He became the successor to the Achaemenids, a great Asiatic king, a master of the world who sought to don the royal costume of the Medo-Persians and who tried to introduce the custom of *proskynesis* [prostration before superiors], which caused the otherwise penitent Spartans sent to greet him to object."127

Beyond the Alexandrine example, it was the very notion of a world empire neglectful of racial hierarchy that seemed deleterious. **Schachermeyr reproached Caesar just as he did Alexander; the Roman, who was also a Nordic, had had a similar leveling project for world empire** – but fortunately he had been stopped in his tracks, also like Alexander, by his premature death.128
…

The same contrast between Philip and Alexander appeared in one of Schachermeyr's essays on the figure of the leader in Greek antiquity.131 **Philip of Macedon resuscitated the ideal of the Nordic führer after a period of democratic egalitarianism caused by the racial decline of Athens.** The Macedonian king was rehabilitated and exalted, particularly in comparison to Demosthenes; Philip was "a soldier-king of the purest type, in every respect the true offspring of the Nordic Macedonian people."132

His son, however, although endowed with "personal potential beyond [that of] the ordinary human," **had betrayed the "Nordic *Führerprinzip*," or cult of the leader, for he had "removed himself from his own people." Alexander had become "the representative of the idea of world domination," which "was foreign to the Nordic race and came primarily from the Asiatic East."**133

https://counter-currents.com/2019/07/the-saxon-savior/

Aristotle was adamant, in fact, that whatever we call a collection of people who happen to live in the same place and interact merely for the purpose of making money off each other, we cannot call it a *polis*. Upon closer inspection, then, any of the Germanic tribes described by Tacitus meet Aristotle's definition of a *polis*, and this would apply even later, during the period of the great *Völkerwanderung* that hastened Rome's demise. **But the *polis* had long since died out in Aristotle's homeland, which had much to do with his most famous pupil.**

Alexander the Great & globalism

The seminal event in the ancient world was not the birth or crucifixion of Christ but the career of another man who preached universal brotherhood, Alexander the Great. His conquest of Greece, and the subsequent centuries of rule by his successors over various kingdoms, proved disastrous for Greece politically, economically, ethnically, and culturally. Politically, it put an end to the last vestiges of self-rule that marked the Greek *polis*, as once-proud cities like Athens and Corinth had to get used to being ruled by potentates in distant capitals. Mercenary armies did their fighting, or rather fought over them, and patriotism all but disappeared. Economically, foreign gold flooded the market, leading to spiraling inflation, which crushed the farmers. The availability of goods from places with cheap labor eroded the ability of local producers to compete in the suddenly "global" economy Alexander's conquests had produced.

Ethnically, **Greeks themselves numbered no more than fifteen percent of the population of Alexander's empire,** vastly outnumbered by Middle Easterners. Today, less than half of Greek Y-chromosomes are of European origin, but with due credit to the Turks, this process began much earlier than people suppose, when Alexander the Great inaugurated mass weddings of thousands of his troops to non-Europeans (setting the example himself, as always).
…

Flooded by foreign influences and foreigners themselves, with no power to change their situation, the Greeks grew indifferent, forsaking their old ways and their old Gods for fashionable escapes from society like Cynicism, Epicureanism, or foreign cults. **With the death of the *polis*, Greek culture itself essentially came to an end. What remained were merely second-rate thinkers and dime-novel writers warming themselves over the embers of Plato and Homer.**
…

Before passing on to the religious ramifications of this titanic change in the ancient world, we should note that Rome, though it was originally a *polis*, adopted the Alexandrian globalist model. According to this view, the community can expand indefinitely, ethnic and cultural borders are meaningless, and a civilization can survive the gradual disappearance of its original ethnic stock.
…

In the east, Greek was the *lingua franca* – so much so, that Jews living in Alexandria did not even understand Hebrew anymore, making it necessary to translate the Old Testament into Greek. **A thin veneer of debased Greek culture and language lay atop this simmering racial stewpot, the final fruit of Alexander's dream.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Jerusalem._The_Emanation_of_the_Giant_Albion/To_the_Deists
>
> **But you also charge the poor Monks & Religious with being the causes of War: while you acquit & flatter the Alexanders & Caesars, the Lewis's & Fredericks:** who alone are its causes & its actors.

---

https://archive.org/details/quintus-curtius-rufus-history-of-alexander-loeb-two-in-one-volume-rolfe/page/299/mode/2up?view=theater

"But, he says, the Persians, whom we have conquered, are in high honour with me! In my opinion at least, the surest indication of my moderation is that I do not rule even the vanquished tyrannically. **For I came into Asia, not in order to overthrow nations and make a desert of a half part of the world, but in order that those whom I had subdued in war might not regret my victory.** Therefore those are serving in the army with you and are shedding blood in defence of your empire, who, if they had been treated tyrannically would have rebelled. **That possession is not lasting of which we are made owners*b* by the sword; the gratitude for acts of kindness is everlasting. If we wish to hold Asia, not merely to pass through it, our*c* clemency must be shared with its people; their faith in us will make a stable and lasting empire.** And it is certainly true that we have more than we can carry. But it is the way of insatiable avarice to

wish to fill still fuller a vessel which is already overflowing. Yet I am accused of transferring the customs of the vanquished to the Macedonians! **True, for I see in many nations things which we should not blush to imitate; and so great an empire cannot fitly be ruled without contributing some things to the vanquished and learning from them.**

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4557/4557-h/4557-h.htm#link2H_INTR

Another feature of the medieval theory, pertinent to our inquiry, was an idea which Christianity took over from Greek and Roman thinkers. In the later period of Greek history, which began with the conquests of Alexander the Great, there had emerged the conception of the whole inhabited world as a unity and totality, the idea of the whole human race as one. We may conveniently call it the ecumenical idea—**the principle of the *ecumene* or inhabited world, as opposed to the principle of the *polis* or city.** Promoted by the vast extension of the geographical limits of the Greek world resulting from Alexander's conquests, and by his policy of breaking down the barriers between Greek and barbarian, the idea was reflected in the Stoic doctrine that all men are brothers, and that a man's true country is not his own particular city, but the *ecumene*. [Plutarch long ago saw the connection between the policy of Alexander and the cosmopolitan teaching of Zeno. *De Alexandri Magni virtute*, i. Sec. 6.] **It soon became familiar, popularised by the most popular of the later philosophies of Greece; and just as it had been implied in the imperial aspiration and polity of Alexander, so it was implied, still more clearly, in the imperial theory of Rome.** The idea of the Roman Empire, its theoretical justification, might be described as the realisation of the unity of the world by the establishment of a common order, the unification of mankind in a single world-embracing political organism. **The term "world," *orbis* (*terrarum*), which imperial poets use freely in speaking of the Empire, is more than a mere poetical or patriotic exaggeration; it expresses the idea, the unrealised ideal of the Empire. There is a stone from Halicarnassus in the British Museum, on which the idea is formally expressed from another point of view. The inscription is of the time of Augustus, and the Emperor is designated as "saviour of the community of mankind."** There we have the notion of the human race apprehended as a whole, the ecumenical idea, imposing upon Rome the task described by Virgil as *regere imperio populos*, and more humanely by Pliny as the creation of a single fatherland for all the peoples of the world. [Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* iii. 6.39.]

This idea, which in the Roman Empire and in the Middle Ages took the form of a universal State and a universal Church, passed afterwards into the conception of the intercohesion of peoples as contributors to a common pool of civilisation—**a principle which, when the idea of Progress at last made its appearance in the world, was to be one of the elements in its growth.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/162/mode/2up?view=theater

The ancients had experienced this sort of society as early as Alexander. **The Macedonian triumph over the Greek city-states was a forceful, unanswerable critique of political parochialism,** and Alexander's vastly ambitious project to marry East and West (literally and figuratively), partially realized by his succession states, envisaged peaceful rule over a diversified population. **Aristotelian distinctions between natural masters and natural slaves could have been maintained only by a totalitarian regime far beyond the technical means, and wholly alien to the basic convictions, of ancient statesmen.**

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D5%3Asection%3D154
>
> I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes, to reign as king over the Macedonians,[145] **and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians.** For if you do these things, all men will be grateful to you: the Hellenes for your kindness to them; the Macedonians if you reign over them, not like a tyrant, but like a king; **and the rest of the nations, if by your hands they are delivered from barbaric despotism and are brought under the protection of Hellas.**

Instead, **the creation of empires brought in its train the cosmopolitan conception of man as such, equal, in fact identical, in essential nature and different only in the accidents of wealth, looks, or education.** The Hellenistic states, and later the Roman Empire, destroyed traditional loyalties and social structures; they encouraged the migration of administrators and professors, gave opportunities to freed slaves, and evolved an antique version of what came to be known in modern times as the career open to talents, a doctrine at once the result, and the cause, of a relativist cast of mind. Literary men preached cosmopolitanism in two languages, and their very origins underscored the process of cultural fusion: Seneca, Quintilian, and Martial came from Spain; Cicero, Vergil, Livy, Horace, and Ovid, though all Italians, were all provincials; Apuleius was an African; Plutarch, a Greek; and Lucian, a Syrian.
...

Juvenal's famous diatribe against Eastern immigrants, which conceals anxiety beneath its contempt, sounds like the last cry of aristocratic parochialism against a leveling cosmopolitanism:

> Fellow citizens, I cannot bear a Greek Rome. And yet
> What part of our slum dwellers are Achaian?
> Syrian Orontes flowed into the Tiber long ago,
> Bringing its lingo and habits along.

Fortunately for the philosophes, there was abundant material in antiquity more generous, more relativistic, in a word, more tolerant, than this – much that they could quote for their own purposes.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n607/mode/2up?view=theater

After some minor trials at arms which disposed of lesser contenders, they divided the empire into five parts (321)—Antipater taking Macedonia and Greece, Lysimachus Thrace, Antigonus Asia Minor, Seleucus Babylonia, and Ptolemy Egypt. They did not bother to call a confirming synod of the Greek states. **From that moment, except for some fitful interludes in Greece, and the aristocratic republic of Rome, monarchy ruled Europe until the French Revolution.**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n699/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> This adoption of Oriental despotism by the son of a slave, this identification of god and king, meant the final failure of republican institutions in antiquity, the surrender of the fruits of Marathon; **it was a reversion, like Alexander's, to the forms and theories of Achaemenid and Egyptian courts,** of Ptolemaic, Parthian, and Sassanid kings. **From this Orientalized monarchy came the structure of Byzantine and European kingdoms till the French Revolution. All that was needed now was to ally the Oriental monarch in an Oriental capital with an Oriental faith.** Byzantinism began with Diocletian.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/3A*.html#ref9

6 1 Of all their customs the most astonishing is that which obtains in connection with the death of their kings.[10] **For the priests at Meroë who spend their time in the worship of the gods and the rites which do them honour, being the greatest and most powerful order, whenever the idea comes to them, dispatch a messenger to the king with orders that he die.** 2 **For the gods, they add, have revealed this to them, and it must be that the command of the immortals should in no wise be disregarded by one of mortal frame.** And this order they accompany with other arguments, such as are accepted by a simple-minded nature, which has been bred in a custom that is both ancient and difficult to eradicate and which knows no argument that can be set in opposition to commands enforced by no compulsion. 3 **Now in former times the kings would obey the priests, having been overcome, not by arms nor by force, but because their reasoning powers had been put under a constraint by their very superstition; but during the reign of the second Ptolemy the king of the Ethiopians, Ergamenes, who had had a Greek education and had studied philosophy, was the first to have the courage to disdain the command.** 4 **For assuming a spirit which became the position of a king he entered with his soldiers into the unapproachable place where stood, as it turned out, the golden shrine of the Ethiopians, put the priests to the sword, and after abolishing this custom thereafter ordered affairs after his own will.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n647/mode/2up?view=theater

Literature waned, creative art died; after the third century Alexandria added little to either. **The Egyptians lost respect for the Greeks; the Greeks, if such a thing can be believed, lost respect for themselves. Year by year they forgot their own language, and spoke a corrupt mixture of Greek and Egyptian; more and more of them married their sisters, after native custom, or married into Egyptian families and were absorbed; thousands of them worshiped Egyptian gods.** By the second century the Greeks had ceased to be the dominant race even politically; the
Ptolemies, to preserve their authority, had adopted the Egyptian faith and ritual, and had increased the power of the priests. **As the kings sank into epicurean ease the clergy reasserted its leadership, and won back year by year the lands and privileges which the earlier Ptolemies had taken away.[50] The Rosetta Stone, dated 196 B.C., describes the coronation ceremonies of Ptolemy V as following almost completely the Egyptian forms.** Under Ptolemy V (203-181) and Ptolemy VI (181-145) dynastic feuds absorbed the energies of the royal house, while Egyptian agriculture and industry decayed. Order and peace were not restored until Caesar, as a mere incident in his career, took Egypt with hardly a blow, and Augustus made it a province of Rome (30 B.C.).

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/17A2*.html#ref87

At any rate, Polybius, who had visited the city, is disgusted with the state of things then existing; and he says that three classes inhabited the city: first, the Aegyptian or native stock of people, who were quick-tempered and not[88] inclined to strife; and, secondly, the mercenary class, who were severe and numerous and intractable (for by an ancient custom they would maintain foreign men-at-arms, who had been trained to rule rather than to be ruled, on account of the worthlessness of the kings); and, third, **the tribe of the Alexandrians, who also were not distinctly inclined to civil life,** and for the same reasons, **but still they were better than those others,[89] for even though they were a mixed people, still they were Greeks by origin and mindful of the customs common to the Greeks.**

But after this mass of people had also been blotted out, chiefly by Euergetes Physcon, in whose time Polybius went to Alexandria (for, being opposed by factions, Physcon more often sent the masses against the soldiers and thus caused their destruction)—such being the state of affairs in the city, Polybius says, in very truth there remained for one, in the words of the poet, merely

> "to go to Aegypt, a long and painful journey."[90]

13 **Such, then, if not worse, was the state of affairs under the later kings also;** but the Romans have, to the best of their ability, I might say, set most things right, having organised the city as I have said,[91] and having appointed throughout the country officials called Epistrategi[92] and Nomarchs[93] and Ethnarchs,[94] thought worthy to superintend affairs of no great importance.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.205098/page/n209/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **This account is very defective, for it omits at least two most important classes, the so-called Macedonian or household troops, which in every home document are clearly distinguished from the mercenaries; and the Jews, who had long been a part of the population, and who under Philometor had attained to places of public trust. This account, however, does insist upon the disappearance of the Greek population of Alexandria,** and though we may read with a smile the rubbish of Justin (xxxviii. 8), that the terrified populace fled for fear of death, and left the king alone with his servants, the lord of empty houses, **so that he solicited settlers by an edict (*edicto peregrinos sollicitat*), we may possibly have before us traces of an edict by which Egyptians and Syrians (Jews) were granted the privileges of Alexandrian citizenship, and the Greek population discouraged and reduced.**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ptolemy_VIII_Physcon
>
> **After Ptolemy VI's death in 145 BC, Ptolemy VIII returned to Egypt as co-ruler with his sister.** His cruel treatment of opposition and his decision to marry his niece Cleopatra III and promote her to the status of co-regent led to a civil war from 132 to 126 BC, in which Cleopatra II controlled Alexandria and enjoyed the support of the Greek population of the country, while Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III controlled most of the rest of Egypt and were supported by the native Egyptians. **During this war, native Egyptians were promoted to the highest echelons of the Ptolemaic government for the first time.** Ptolemy VIII was victorious and ruled alongside Cleopatra II and Cleopatra III until his death in 116 BC.
>
> The ancient Greek sources on Ptolemy VIII are extremely hostile, characterising him as cruel and mocking him as fat and degenerate, as part of a contrast with Ptolemy VI, whom they present extremely positively. **The historian Günther Hölbl calls him "one of the most brutal and at the same time one of the shrewdest politicians of the Hellenistic Age."[2]**
> ...
>
> **Although Alexandria had sided with Cleopatra II and she tended to be supported by Greeks and Jews throughout the country, Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III were more popular with the native Egyptian population. Most of Egypt continued to acknowledge Ptolemy VIII as king.** In the south of the country, however, a man named Harsiesi took advantage of the chaos to rebel – following in the footsteps of the rebellion of Hugronaphor and Ankhmakis (206-185 BC). Harsiesi probably declared himself Pharaoh and managed to seize control of Thebes in August or September of 131 BC. **He was expelled in November and pursued by Paos, the *strategos* of the Thebaid, who was also an Egyptian.[63][62]**
>
> Ptolemy VIII and Cleopatra III had returned from Cyprus to Egypt by the beginning of 130 BC. By spring, they were in charge of Memphis. **Impressed by Paos' success against Harsiesi, they promoted him to command over the whole of Upper Egypt and put him in charge of the whole military apparatus – the first time that a native Egyptian had held such a prominent position.** Harsiesi was finally captured and executed in September 130 BC.[63]

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Caesar/Civil_Wars/3D*.html

110 The forces with Achillas were not such as to seem contemptible in respect of number or grade of men or experience in warfare. For he had twenty thousand men under arms. **These consisted of soldiers of Gabinius who had habituated themselves to Alexandrian life and licence and had unlearnt the name and discipline of the Roman people [qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant] and married wives by whom very many of them had children. To them were added men collected from among the freebooters and brigands of Syria and the province of Cilicia and the neighbouring regions; also many condemned criminals and exiles had joined them. All our own fugitive slaves had a sure place of refuge at Alexandria, and assurance of their lives on the condition of giving in their names and being on the army roll; and if any one of them was arrested by his owner he would be rescued by the common consent of the soldiery, who repelled violence done to their comrades as a peril to their own selves, since they were all alike involved in similar guilt. These men had been in the habit of demanding for execution the friends of the princes, of plundering the property of the rich, [bona locupletum] of besetting the king's palace to secure an increase of pay, of driving one man from the throne and summoning another to fill it, after an ancient custom of the Alexandrian army.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antino%C3%B6polis

During the Roman Empire, the city of Antinoöpolis was erected in AD 130 by the emperor Hadrian on the site of Hir-we as the cult centre of the deified Antinoüs. All previous buildings, including a necropolis, were razed and replaced, with the exception of the Temple of Ramses II.[4][2] Hadrian also had political motives for the creation of Antinoöpolis, which was to be the first Hellenic city in the Middle Nile region, thus serving as a bastion of Greek culture within the Egyptian area. **To encourage Egyptians to integrate with this imported Greek culture, he permitted Greeks and Egyptians in the city to marry and allowed the main deity of Hir-we, Bes, to continue to be worshipped in Antinoöpolis alongside the new primary deity, Osiris-Antinoüs.[4]**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=VV8hBcCnYaIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA254#v=onepage&q&f=false

As the basis for the constitution of the new city of Antinoopolis, Hadrian chose that of Naucratis, the oldest Greek *polis* in Egypt, rather than of Ptolemais or of Alexandria – the great city would have been an unsuitable model, for it had been deprived of an essential feature of the *polis*, the council (*boule*), by its Roman conquerors. **It is easy to see why an emperor with such a love of antiquity should prefer the ancient Naucratis to the relative upstart Ptolemais.** Such evidence as there is suggests that the settlers came from families of the '6,475 cleruchs' in the Heptanomia and from Ptolemais; some of the men will probably have been army veterans. **The settlers were encouraged to enrol by a series of very striking privileges, which would put Antinoopolis in an enviable category of its own:** not least, exemption from the poll tax (*laographia*), from the tax on goods in transit (*enkyklion*) – with, initially, some extension of these exemptions to relatives of new citizens who remained in their place of origin – **and exemption from compulsory public services (liturgies) outside Antinoopolis itself,** were all very attractive. Further, Antinoites would enjoy the right to choose to have lawsuits in which they were involved heard at Antinoopolis, an 'alimentary' system was established – a child support scheme, and the distribution of free corn, on the model of the *frumentatio* at Rome, is also attested. At first sight the aim was to create a 'bulwark of Hellenism in Middle Egypt.' **One further privilege, however, requires this view to be modified: Antinoites, both men and women, were granted the right of intermarriage with native Egyptians, *epigamia* – not enjoyed by the Naucratites. This meant that non-Greeks could become citizens of the new foundation, and thus acquire these great benefits. One must infer that Hadrian viewed this as a means of spreading Hellenism – or, put another way, that he did not regard Hellenic identity as having a racial basis.**40

http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13a.html

And this custom of shaving the beard, originated in the age of Alexander, [565] as Chrysippus tells us in the fourth book of his treatise *On the Beautiful and on Pleasure*. And I think it will not be inappropriate if I quote what he says; for he is an author of whom I am very fond, on account of his great learning and his gentle good-humoured disposition.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n353/mode/2up?view=theater

A rather feminine, over-civilized trait shows itself too in the beardlessness which was then universal; one of the Seleucids who did not follow the fashion became so conspicuous that he got the nickname of *πώγων*, the Man with the Beard.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D59

> The next point upon which all nations appear to have agreed, was the employment of barbers.[2] The Romans, however, were more tardy in the adoption of their services. **According to Varro, they were introduced into Italy from Sicily, in the year of Rome 454,**[3] having been brought over by P. Titinius Mena: before which time the Romans did not cut the hair. **The younger Africanus**[4] **was the first who adopted the custom of shaving every day.** The late Emperor Augustus always made use of razors.[5]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=lkFaju2praAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false

With the assistance of Cardinals Albizi and Barberini, La Peyrère made his apology to the Pope.64 From its initial claim that it was Calvinism that led him astray, to his contention that as far as La Peyrère was now concerned, the Pope's will shall be La Peyrére's reason and law, **to his conclusion that Pope Alexander VII would accomplish what Alexander the Great had started, namely uniting all mankind,** the apology reeks with hypocrisy. **Pope Alexander, according to La Peyrère's finale, was going to play the role previously given to the King of France.** He would reunite all of the schismatics and bring about the conversion of the Jews.65

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/36*.html

5 For instance, take the following case. **In our own time the whole of Greece has been subject to a low birth-rate and a general decrease of the population, owing to which cities have become deserted and the land has ceased to yield fruit, although there have neither been continuous wars nor epidemics.** 6 If, then, any one had advised us to send and ask the gods about this, and find out what we ought to say or do, to increase in number and make our cities more populous, would it not seem absurd, the cause of the evil being evident and the remedy being in our own hands?º 7 **For as men had fallen into such a state of pretentiousness, avarice, and indolence that they did not wish to marry, or if they married to rear the children born to them, or at most as a rule but one or two of them, so as to leave these in affluence and bring them up to waste their substance, the evil rapidly and insensibly grew.** 8 For in cases where of one or two children the one was carried off by war and the other by sickness, it is evident that the houses must have been left unoccupied, and as in the case of swarms of bees, so by small degrees cities became resourceless and feeble. 9 **About this it was of no use at all to ask the gods to suggest a means of deliverance from such an evil.** 10 For any ordinary man will tell you that the most effectual cure had to be men's own action, in either striving after other objects, or if not, in passing laws making it compulsory to rear children. **Neither prophets nor magic were here of any service,** 11 **and the same holds good for all particulars.** 12 But in cases where it is either impossible or difficult to detect the cause the question is open to doubt. One such case is that of Macedonia. 13 For the Macedonians had met with many signal favours from Rome; **the country as a whole had been delivered from the arbitrary rule and taxation of autocrats,** and, as all confessed, now enjoyed freedom in place of servitude, and the several cities had, owing to the beneficent action of Rome, been freed from serious civil discord and internecine massacres. ... **But now they witnessed in quite a short time more of their citizens exiled, tortured and murdered by this false Philip than by any of their previous real kings.** ... 14 But while they were defeated by the Romans in fighting for Demetrius and Perseus, yet now fighting for a hateful man and displaying great valour in defence of his throne, they worsted the Romans. 15 **How can anyone fail to be nonplused by such an event? for here it is most difficult to detect the cause. So that in pronouncing on this and similar phenomena we may well say that the thing was a heaven-sent infatuation, and that all the Macedonians were visited by the wrath of God,** as will be evident from what follows.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n341/mode/2up?view=theater

The Greek decadence was taken as the Classical ideal; a Greek that was no longer Greek, as the strong fabric of Hellenic being—such was, unconsciously, the heart of the Classicist theory. Winckelmann took as the “flower” of Greek art works like the Belvedere Apollo, the Belvedere Hercules, the Niobids, which are in truth the over-ripe, withered, and even rotting fruits of the Hellenic creativeness.
...

The Periclean Age having held every one under a continued hypnosis, the Alexandrine period of Greek culture has been passed over for two thousand years, being treated either as decadence or simply as non-existent.
...

If a deeper interest in the Alexandrian age has only recently awakened, there is an obvious, one might say an egoistic, reason for it: it is very like our own.
...

The favourite form of government is absolutism, but enlightened absolutism: **Antigonos Gonatas called monarchy an *ἐνδοξος δουλεία*, a glorious servitude, which sounds quite Frederician,** and the Diadochi loved to give themselves names such as *Euergetes*, the Benefactor, or *Soter*, the Saviour; in fact even the heads of philosophic schools, such as Epicurus, were given such honourable titles.
...

In the Polis the individual had regarded himself simply as a part, member, and organ of a narrow special community which was all in all to him; now, as the Stoa taught, the true State is the cosmos, and the duties of a citizen and father begin to be looked upon with the eyes of the Cynic philosopher whose portrait Epictetus, a few centuries later, limned so shrewdly:

> "**The Kingdom of the Cynic is well worth denying oneself wife and children for its sake. He sees all men as his children. Is it really the greatest benefit for mankind to bring a few snivelling children into the world? Who has done more for humanity as a whole: Priam, who begot fifty wastrels, or Homer?** You ask me if the Cynic will take part in politics? You fool, can there be a greater political problem than his? Is a man to make speeches on taxes and revenues before the Athenians when his duty is to converse with all men, be they Athenians, Corinthians, or Romans, and not about taxes and revenues, about war and peace, but about happiness and misery, good and evil fortune, slavery and freedom?"

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57913/page/n373/mode/2up?view=theater

Scientific worlds are superficial worlds, practical, soulless and purely extensive worlds. The ideas of Buddhism, of Stoicism, and of Socialism alike rest upon them.2

> 2. **The first on the atheistical system of Sankhya, the second (through Socrates) on the Sophists, the third on English sensualism.**

Life is no longer to be lived as something self-evident—hardly a matter of consciousness, let alone choice—or to be accepted as God-willed destiny, but is to be treated as a problem, presented as the intellect sees it, judged by "utilitarian" or "rational" criteria. This, at the back, is what all three mean. The brain rules, because the soul abdicates. Culture-men live unconsciously, Civilization-men consciously. The Megalopolis —sceptical, practical, artificial—*alone* represents Civilization to-day. The soil-peasantry before its gates does not count. The "People" means the city-people, an in-organic mass, something fluctuating. The peasant is *not* democratic—this again being a notion belonging to mechanical and urban existence1—and he is therefore overlooked, despised, detested. **With the vanishing of the old "estates"—gentry and priesthood—he is the only organic man, the sole relic of the Early Culture. There is no place for him either in Stoic or in Socialistic thought.**

---

https://www.counter-currents.com/2018/08/marxism-vs-national-socialism/

Marxism was not created in a vacuum. It could only come into being in a world that was already decaying and already infected with ideas similar to it. Hitler describes the role of Karl Marx thus:

> ... **international Marxism itself is just the transformation, by the Jew Karl Marx, of a long existing World-Concept into a definite political profession of faith. Without the widespread pre-existing foundation of such a poison, the amazing political success of this doctrine would never have been possible.** Among millions of people, Karl Marx was the one man who, with the sure eye of the prophet, recognized the poisons essential to his plan were already in the swamp of a slowly decaying world. He separated and identified those poisons, like a black magic wizard, to make a concentrated solution he could use to speed the destruction of the free nations on this earth. All this was done to serve his race.[22]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_IX#Heraclitus

1. Heraclitus, son of Bloson or, according to some, of Heracon, was a native of Ephesus. He flourished in the 69th Olympiad.[1]

> 1. 504-500 B.C.

He was lofty-minded beyond all other men,[2] and over-weening, as is clear from his book in which he says: "Much learning does not teach understanding; else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or, again, Xenophanes and Hecataeus."[3] For "this one thing is wisdom, to understand thought, as that which guides all the world everywhere."[4] **And he used to say that "Homer deserved to be chased out of the lists and beaten with rods, and Archilochus likewise."[5]**

2. Again he would say: "There is more need to extinguish insolence than an outbreak of fire,"[6] and "The people must fight for the law as for city-walls."[7] He attacks the Ephesians, too, for banishing his friend Hermodorus: he says: "**The Ephesians would do well to end their lives, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless boys,** for that they have driven out Hermodorus, the worthiest man among them, saying, 'We will have none who is worthiest among us; or if there be any such, let him go elsewhere and consort with others.'"[8] And when he was requested by them to make laws, he scorned the request because the state was already in the grip of a bad constitution. 3. He would retire to the temple of Artemis and play at knuckle-bones with the boys; and when the Ephesians stood round him and looked on, "Why, you rascals," he said, "are you astonished? **Is it not better to do this than to take part in your civil life?**"

https://publish.iupress.indiana.edu/read/nietzsche-s-esistential-imperative/section/9a851b55-be5e-4461-a25d-58919afac59e

It is in the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus, after all, that Nietzsche finds his precursors: **“this doctrine of Zarathustra’s could in the final analysis already have been taught by Heraclitus. At a minimum there are traces of it in the Stoics, who inherited almost all of their fundamental ideas from Heraclitus.”**[5]

https://www.oxfordphilsoc.org/Documents/Chadwick/2017_L.pdf

In his seminal *History of Western Philosophy*, **Bertrand Russell describes the outlook of Friedrich Nietzsche as one of “aristocratic anarchism, like Byron’s.”**

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n307/mode/2up?view=theater

480. Envy and Inertia in Different Courses.—The two opposing parties, **the socialist and the national,**—or whatever they may be called in the different countries of Europe,—are worthy of each other; envy and laziness are the motive powers in each of them. **In the one camp they desire to work as little as possible with their hands, in the other as little as possible with their heads; in the latter they hate and envy prominent, self-evolving individuals, who do not willingly allow themselves to be drawn up in rank and file for the purpose of a collective effect;** in the former they hate and envy the better social caste, which is more favourably circumstanced outwardly, whose peculiar mission, the production of the highest blessings of culture, makes life inwardly all the harder and more painful.

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater

The free man is immoral, because it is his *will* to depend upon himself and not upon tradition: **in all the primitive states of humanity “evil” is equivalent to “individual,” “free,” “arbitrary,” “unaccustomed,” “unforeseen,” “incalculable.”**
…

And every individual action, every individual mode of thinking, causes dread. It is impossible to determine how much the more select, rare, and original minds must have suffered in the course of time by being considered as evil and dangerous, *yea, because they even looked upon themselves as such*. **Under the dominating influence of the morality of custom, originality of every kind came to acquire a bad conscience;** and even now the sky of the best minds seems to be more overcast by this thought than it need be.

https://archive.org/details/essayonaristocra00bran/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater

Nietzsche resembles Hartmann in his attacks on socialists and anarchists, with the difference that Hartmann’s attitude is here more that of the savant, **while Nietzsche has the bad taste to delight in talking about “anarchist dogs,” expressing in the same breath his own loathing of the State.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchism_and_Friedrich_Nietzsche

One researcher notes: "Indeed, translations of Nietzsche's writings in the United States very likely appeared first in
Liberty, the anarchist journal edited by Benjamin Tucker." He adds **"Tucker preferred the strategy of exploiting his writings, but proceeding with due caution: 'Nietzsche says splendid things, – often, indeed, Anarchist things, – but he is no Anarchist. It is of the Anarchists, then, to intellectually exploit this would-be exploiter. He may be utilized profitably, but not prophetably.'"**[22]
…

Emma Goldman was profoundly influenced by Nietzsche "so much so that all of Nietzsche's books could be mail-ordered through her magazine *Mother Earth*".[26] Ultimately Goldman's view of Nietzsche can be summarized when she manifests in her autobiography *Living My Life*, "I pointed out that Nietzsche was

not a social theorist but a poet, a rebel and innovator. **His aristocracy was neither of birth nor of purse; it was of the spirit. In that respect Nietzsche was an anarchist, and all true anarchists were aristocrats,** I said" and "[i]n Vienna one could hear interesting lectures on modern German prose and poetry. One could read the works of the young iconoclasts in art and letters, the most daring among them being Nietzsche. The magic of his language, the beauty of his vision, carried me to undreamed-of heights. I longed to devour every line of his writings, but I was too poor to buy them."[30] Goldman even went as far as to "baptize" Nietzsche "as an honorary anarchist".[2]

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n363/mode/2up?view=theater

The Red standards then joined the banner of Nietzsche, and the nomadic wandering Marxist preachers – the sort of men whose doctrine scarcely anyone else had unmasked with such derision as Nietzsche himself. **In his name, racial pollution through Syrians and Blacks was sanctified, although Nietzsche, in fact, strove for selective racial breeding.** Nietzsche has fallen to the dreams of overheated political whores, which is worse than falling into the hands of robbers. The German people heard only of a release from all bonds, subjectivism, personality, and nothing about discipline and inward building up.

https://archive.org/details/talkswithmussoli006557mbp/page/n81/mode/2up?view=theater

For the rest, every revolution creates new forms, new myths and new rites; and the would-be revolutionist, while using old traditions, must refashion them. **He must create new festivals, new gestures, new forms, which will themselves in turn become traditional.** The airplane festival is new to-day. In half a century it will be encrusted with the patina of tradition."

"Don't you think that many young men are only anarchists because they have no chance of becoming rulers?"

"Of course," he replied; "every anarchist is a dictator who has missed fire."

Finally, he became a hater of his kind and wandered on the mountains, and there he continued to live, making his diet of grass and herbs. However, when this gave him dropsy, he made his way back to the city and put this riddle to the physicians, whether they were competent to create a drought after heavy rain. They could make nothing of this, whereupon he buried himself in a cowshed, expecting that the noxious damp humour would be drawn out of him by the warmth of the manure. But, as even this was of no avail, he died at the age of sixty.
…

Hermippus, too, says that he asked the doctors whether anyone could by emptying the intestines draw off the moisture; and when they said it was impossible, he put himself in the sun and bade his servants plaster him over with cow-dung. Being thus stretched and prone, he died the next day and was buried in the market-place. Neanthes of Cyzicus states that, being unable to tear off the dung, he remained as he was and, being unrecognizable when so transformed, **he was devoured by dogs.**

5. He was exceptional from his boyhood; for when a youth he used to say that he knew nothing, although when he was grown up he claimed that he knew everything. **He was nobody's pupil, but he declared that he "inquired of himself,"[10] and learned everything from himself.**
…

7. Here is a general summary of his doctrines. **All things are composed of fire, and into fire they are again resolved; further, all things come about by destiny, and existent things are brought into harmony by the clash of opposing currents; again, all things are filled with souls and divinities.** He has also given an account of all the orderly happenings in the universe, **and declares the sun to be no larger than it appears.** Another of his sayings is: "Of soul thou shalt never find boundaries, not if thou trackest it on every path; so deep is its cause."[13] Self-conceit he used to call a falling sickness (epilepsy) and eyesight a lying sense.[14]
…

8. Coming now to his particular tenets, we may state them as follows: fire is the element, all things are exchange for fire and come into being by rarefaction and condensation;[15] but of this he gives no clear explanation. All things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things flows like a stream. Further, **all that is is limited and forms one world.** And it is alternately born from fire and again resolved into fire in fixed cycles to all eternity, and this is determined by destiny. Of the opposites that which tends to birth or creation is called war and strife, and that which tends to destruction by fire is called concord and peace.[16]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Early_Greek_Philosophy/Herakleitos_of_Ephesos#cite_ref-12

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, **and to confess that all things are one.**[14] R.P. 40.

(2) Though this Word[15] is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep. R. P. 32.
...

(35) **Hesiod is most men's teacher. Men are sure he knew very many things, a man who did not know day or night!** They are one.[27] R. P. 39 b.

(36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire,[28] when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each. R. P. 39 b.
...

(43) **Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away.**[29] ... R. P. 34 d.

(44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods and some men, some bond and some free. R. P. 34.
...

(85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.
...

(91b) **Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare.** R. P. 43.

(92) **So we must follow the common,**[42] **yet though my Word is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own.** R. P. 44.
...

(95) **The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.**
...

(98, 99) **The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.**
...

(111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good.

For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted like beasts.[46] R. P. 31 a.
...

(125) **The mysteries practised among men are unholy mysteries.** R. P. 48.

(126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are. R. P. 49 a.

(127) **For if it were not to Dionysos that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. But Hades is the same as Dionysos in whose honour they go mad and rave.** R. P. 49.

(129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his feet in mud. Any man who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad. R. P. 49 a.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater

Heracleitus has been represented in modern literature as building his philosophy around the notion of change; but the extant fragments hardly support this interpretation. Like most philosophers he

longed to find the One behind the Many, some mind-steadying unity and order amid the chaotic flux and multiplicity of the world. “All things are one,” he said, as passionately as Parmenides (1); the problem of philosophy was, what is this one? Heracleitus answered, Fire. Perhaps he was influenced by the Persian worship of fire; probably, as we may judge from his identification of Fire with Soul and God, he used the term symbolically as well as literally, to mean energy as well as fire; the fragments permit no certainty.
…

Though he finds a consoling constancy in the Eternal Fire, Heracleitus is troubled by its endless transformations; and the second nucleus of his thought is the eternity and ubiquity of change. He finds nothing static in the universe, the mind, or the soul. Nothing is, everything becomes; no condition persists unaltered, even for the smallest moment; everything is ceasing to be what it was, and is becoming what it will be. Here is a new emphasis in philosophy: **Heracleitus does not merely ask, like Thales, what things are, but, like Anaximander, Lucretius, and Spencer, how they became what they are; and he suggests, like Aristotle, that a study of the second question is the best approach to the first. The extant apophthegms do not contain the famous formula, *panta rei, ouden menei*—“all things flow, nothing abides”; but antiquity is unanimous in attributing it to Heracleitus.**[56] “You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are ever flowing on to you” (41); “we are and we are not” (81); here, as in Hegel, the universe is a vast Becoming.
…

Nevertheless, the operations of the Undying Fire are not without sense and order; if we could understand the world as a whole we should see in it a vast impersonal wisdom, a Logos or Reason or Word (65); and we should try to mold our lives into accord with this way of Nature, this law of the universe, this wisdom or orderly energy which is God (91). “It is wise to hearken not to me, but to the Word” (1), to seek and follow the infinite reason of the whole.
…

All in all, the philosophy of Heracleitus, concentrated for us now in 130 fragments, is among the major products of the Greek mind. The theory of the Divine Fire passed down into Stoicism; the notion of a final conflagration was transmitted through Stoicism to Christianity; the Logos, or reason in nature, became in Philo and Christian theology the Divine Word, the personified wisdom with which or through whom God creates and governs all things; in some measure it prepared for the early modern view of natural law. Virtue as obedience to nature became a catchword of Stoicism; **the unity of opposites revived vigorously in Hegel;** the idea of change came back into its own with Bergson. **The conception of strife and struggle as determining all things reappears in Darwin, Spencer, and Nietzsche—who carries on, after twenty-four centuries, the war of Heracleitus against democracy.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false

For Heraclitus the *Logos* – both a universal rational principle or Law, and at the same time the word, the message which the philosopher presents – is the key to all things. Wisdom consists in understanding the *Logos*: ‘Wisdom is one thing: to understand the principle which steers all things through all.’13 Because the *Logos* is ‘common,’ thought also is common to all; **and the universality of the *Logos* lies behind all human laws or customs (*nomoi*):** ‘Those who speak with understanding must rely on what is common to all, as a city relies on its law, and with far greater reliance. **For all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine law, which has all the power it desires and is enough, and more than enough, for all.**’14
…

Men have the power of reason, and so are one; but they fail to exercise it, and so are divided against each other. Only God is completely wise. **‘Although the *Logos* is common, most men live as though their understanding were only their own’** (fr. 2): they ‘are unaware of what they do after waking up, just as they forget what they do when asleep’ (fr. 1). **‘For those who are really awake, there is one well-ordered universe common to all, whereas in sleep each man turns away to a world of his own’** (fr. 89). ‘Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men,’ says another fragment, ‘if they have barbarian souls’ (fr. 107) – **the first occurrence of the word *barbaros* in Greek prose:** the minds of most men, Heraclitus means, do not understand the language of the senses, fail to comprehend the *Logos* which sense observation, correctly interpreted, would convey to them. Few writers have been so contemptuous of fools as Heraclitus, or so condemnatory of those normally praised as wise: **‘What intelligence or sense have they? They trust the people’s singers and use the mob as their teacher, not knowing that “most men are bad, and few good,”’** (fr. 104). Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hecataeus are all included in Heraclitus’ list of fools. The thought that man is a rational animal, yet not rational, that human beings should be brought together by this common gift but actually go their own disastrous ways, is as important as any aspect of Heraclitus’ philosophy, and may lie behind the deliberate obscurity of his style, intended to appeal only to the few.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Early_Greek_Philosophy/Herakleitos_of_Ephesos#cite_ref-100

The most startling of these sayings is that which affirms that good and evil are the same (fr. 57). This does not mean that good is evil or that evil is good, but simply that they are the two inseparable halves of one and the same thing. A thing can become good only in so far as it is already evil, and evil only in so far as it is already good, and everything depends on the contrast. The illustration given in fr. 58 shows this clearly. Torture, one would say, was an evil, and yet it is made a good by the presence of another

evil, namely, disease; as is shown by the fact that surgeons expect a fee for inflicting it on their patients. **Justice, on the other hand, which is a good, would be unknown were it not for injustice, which is an evil (fr. 60). And that is why it is not good for men to get everything they wish (fr. 104).** Just as the cessation of strife in the world would mean its destruction, so the disappearance of hunger, disease, and weariness would mean the disappearance of satisfaction, health, and rest.

This leads to a theory of relativity which prepares the way for the doctrine of Protagoras, that "Man is the measure of all things."[101] Sea-water is good for fish and bad for men (fr. 52), and so with many other things.

> 101. Plato's exposition of the relativity of knowledge in the *Theaetetus* (152 d *sqq.*) can hardly go back to Herakleitos himself, but is meant to show how Herakleiteanism might give rise to such a doctrine. **If the soul is a stream and things are a stream, then of course knowledge is relative. Perhaps the later Herakleiteans had worked out the theory in this direction.**

At the same time, Herakleitos is not a believer in absolute relativity. The process of the world is not merely a circle, but an "upward and downward path." At the upper end, where the two paths meet, we have the pure fire, in which, as there is no separation, there is no relativity. **We are told that, while to man some things are evil and some things are good, all things are good to God** (fr. 61). Now by God, or the "one wise," there 'is no doubt Herakleitos meant Fire. There can hardly be any question that what he meant to say was that in it the opposition and relativity universal in the world disappear. It is doubtless to this that frs. 96, 97, and 98 refer. ...

83. **The moral teaching of Herakleitos is summed up in the rule "Follow the common." The "common" upon which Herakleitos insists is, nevertheless, something very different from common sense, for which, indeed, he had the greatest possible contempt (fr. 111). It is, in fact, his strongest objection to "the many," that they live each in his own world (fr. 95), as if they had a private wisdom of their own (fr. 92);** and public opinion is therefore just the opposite of "the common." The rule is really to be interpreted as a corollary of his anthropological and cosmological views. The first requirement is that we keep our souls dry, and thus assimilate them to the one Wisdom, which is fire. That is what is really "common," and the greatest fault is to act like men asleep (fr. 94), that is, by letting our souls grow moist, to cut ourselves off from the fire in the world.

Herakleitos prepared the way for the Stoic world-state by comparing "the common" to the laws of a city. And these are even more than a type of the divine law: they are imperfect embodiments of it. They cannot, however, exhaust it altogether; for in all human affairs there is an element of relativity (fr. 91). "Man is a baby compared to God" (fr. 97). Such as they are, however, the city must fight for them as for its walls; and, if it has the good fortune to possess a citizen with a dry soul, he is worth ten thousand (fr. 113); for in him alone is "the common" embodied.

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020 **[26th February 1877]**
>
> Heraclitus, of Ephesus, deposited his book in the temple of Diana. The book has perished, like the temple and the worship, but its fragments have been collected and interpreted with incredible ardour, by the scholars, the divines, the philosophers, and politicians who have been engaged the most intensely in the toil and stress of this century. **The most renowned logician of the last century adopted every one of his propositions; and the most brilliant agitator among Continental Socialists composed a work of eight hundred and forty pages to celebrate his memory.**
>
> **Heraclitus complained that the masses were deaf to truth, and knew not that one good man counts for more than thousands; but he held the existing order in no superstitious reverence.** Strife, he says, is the source and the master of all things. Life is perpetual motion, and repose is death. No man can plunge twice into the same current, for it is always flowing and passing, and is never the same. **The only thing fixed and certain in the midst of change is the universal and sovereign reason, which all men may not perceive, but which is common to all. Laws are sustained by no human authority, but by virtue of their derivation from the one law that is divine. These sayings, which recall the grand outlines of political truth which we have found in the Sacred Books, and carry us forward to the latest teaching of our most enlightened contemporaries,** would bear a good deal of elucidation and comment. Heraclitus is, unfortunately, so obscure that Socrates could not understand him, and I won't pretend to have succeeded better.
>
> https://www.lewrockwell.com/2005/11/john-laughland/full-marx-for-george-bush/
>
> We think of Communism as being all about state ownership of the means of production and central planning: in fact, Karl Marx advocated neither. Instead, according to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the "soul of Marxism" lies in something called dialectical materialism. **Derived from Hegel and ultimately Heraclitus, this doctrine holds that the world is in a constant state of flux,**

that nothing is absolutely true or false, and that everything is connected to everything else. Permanent revolution is consequently the natural state of reality, and hence of politics.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/ch02.htm

The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought. The newer philosophy, on the other hand, although in it also dialectics had brilliant exponents (e.g. Descartes and Spinoza), had, especially through English influence, become more and more rigidly fixed in the so-called metaphysical mode of reasoning, by which also the French of the 18th century were almost wholly dominated, at all events in their special philosophical work.
…

This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.[A]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

Thus, quite apart from the general similarity of their ethical doctrine, **the Cynics were materialists; they were also nominalists, and combated the Platonic ideas;** in their theory of knowledge they made use of "reason" (λόγος), which was also one of their leading ethical conceptions. In all these particulars Zeno followed them, and the last is the more important, because, Chrysippus having adopted a new criterion of truth—a clear and distinct perception of sense—it is only from casual notices we learn that the elder Stoics had approximated to Cynicism in making right reason the standard. **At the same time, it is certain that the main outlines of the characteristic physical doctrine, which is after all the foundation of their ethics and logic, were the work of Zeno.** The Logos, which had been an ethical or psychological principle to the Cynics, received at his hands an extension throughout the natural world, in which Heraclitean influence is unmistakable. **Reading the Ephesian doctrine with the eyes of a Cynic, and the Cynic ethics in the light of Heracliteanism, he came to formulate his distinctive theory of the universe far in advance of either. In taking this immense stride and identifying the Cynic "reason," which is a law for man, with the "reason" which is the law of the universe, Zeno has been compared with Plato, who similarly extended the Socratic "general notion" from the region of morals—of justice, temperance, virtue—to embrace all objects of all thought, the verity of all things that are.**

If the recognition of physics and logic as two studies co-ordinate with ethics is sufficient to differentiate the mature Zeno from the Cynic author of the *Republic*, no less than from his own heterodox disciple Aristo, the elaboration on all sides of Stoic natural philosophy belongs to Cleanthes, who certainly was not the merely docile and receptive intelligence he is sometimes represented as being. **He carried on and completed the assimilation of Heraclitean doctrine; but his own contributions were more distinctive and original than those of any other Stoic. Zeno's seeming dualism of God (or force) and formless matter he was able to transform into the lofty pantheism which breathes in every line of the famous hymn to Zeus. Heraclitus had indeed declared all to be in flux, but we ask in vain what is the cause for the unceasing process of his ever-living fire. It was left for Cleanthes to discover this motive cause in a conception familiar to Zeno, as to the Cynics before him, but restricted to the region of ethics—the conception of tension or effort.** The soul of the sage, thought the Cynics, should be strained and braced for judgment and action; his first need is firmness (εὐτονία) and Socratic strength. But the mind is a corporeal thing. Then followed the flash of genius: this varying tension of the one substance everywhere present, a purely physical fact, accounts for the diverse destinies of all innumerable particular things; it is the veritable cause of the flux and process of the universe. **Herein lies the key to the entire system of the Stoics, as Cleanthes's epoch-making discovery continually received fresh applications to physics, ethics and epistemology.** Other of his innovations, the outcome of his crude materialism, found less favour with his successor, who declined to follow him in identifying the primary substance with fire, or in tracing all vitality to its ultimate source in the sun, the "ruling power" of the world—a curious anticipation of scientific truth. **Yet under this poetical Heraclitean mystic the school was far from flourishing. The eminent teachers of the time are said to have been Aristo, Zeno's heterodox pupil, and Arcesilas, who in Plato's name brought Megarian subtleties and Pyrrhonian agnosticism to bear upon the intruding doctrine; and after a vigorous upgrowth it seemed not unlikely to die out.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#Chrysippus

Once when somebody reproached him for not going with the multitude to hear Ariston, he rejoined, "If I had followed the multitude, I should not have studied philosophy." When some dialectician got up and attacked Cleanthes, proposing sophistical fallacies to him,

Chrysippus called to him. "Cease to distract your elder from matters of importance; propound such quibbles to us juniors."
…

184. At last, however, – so we are told by Sotion in his eighth book, – **he joined Arcesilaus and Lacydes and studied philosophy under them in the Academy.** And this explains his arguing at one time against, and at another in support of, ordinary experience, and his use of the method of the Academy when treating of magnitudes and numbers.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dchrysippus-bio-4

With regard to the worth of Chrysippus as a philosopher, it is the opinion of Ritter that, in spite of the common statement that he differed in some points from Zeno and Cleanthes (Cic. *Acad*. 2.47), he was not in truth so much the author of any new doctrines as the successful opponent of those who dissented from the existing Stoic system, and the inventor of new arguments in its support. With the reasoning of his predecessors he appears to have been dissatisfied, from the story of his telling Cleanthes that he only wished to learn the principles of his school, and would himself provide arguments to defend them. Besides his struggles against the Academy, **he felt very strongly the dangerous influence of the Epicurean system; and in order to counterbalance the seductive influence of their moral theory, he seems to have wished in some degree to popularize the Stoic doctrine, and to give to the study of ethics a more prominent place than was consistent with his statement, that physics (under which he included the whole science of theology, or investigations into the nature of God) was the highest branch of philosophy.** This is one of the contradictions for which he is reproached by Plutarch, whose work *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* is written chiefly against his inconsistencies, some of which are important, some merely verbal. The third of the ancient divisions of philosophy, logic (or the theory of the sources of human knowledge), was not considered by Chrysippus of the same importance as it had appeared to Plato and Aristotle; and he followed the Epicureans in calling it rather the organum of philosophy than a part of philosophy itself. **He was also strongly opposed to another opinion of Aristotle, viz. that a life of contemplative solitude is best suited to the wise man--considering this a mere pretext for selfish enjoyment, and extolling a life of energy and activity.** (Plut. *de Stoic. Rep*. ii.)

…

The Stoic system is in brief: (*a*) materialism, (*b*) dynamic materialism, lastly (*c*) monism or pantheism. (*a*) The first of these characters is described by anticipation in Plato's *Sophist* (246 C seq.), where, arguing with those "who drag everything down to the corporeal" (σῶμα), the Eleatic stranger would fain prove to them the existence of something incorporeal, as follows. "They admit the existence of an animate body. Is soul then something existent (οὐσία)? Yes. And the qualities of soul, as justice and wisdom—are they visible and tangible? No. Do they then exist? They are in a dilemma." Now, however effective against Plato's contemporary Cynics or Atomists, the reasoning is thrown away upon the Stoics, who take boldly the one horn of this dilemma. That qualities of bodies (and therefore of the corporeal soul) exist they do not deny; but they assert most uncompromisingly that they are one and all (wisdom, justice, &c.) corporeal. And they strengthen their position by taking Plato's own definition (247 D), namely "being is that which has the power to act or be acted upon," and turning it against him.
…

Obviously, again, the Stoic quality corresponds to Aristotle's essential form; in both systems the active principle, "the cause of all that matter becomes," is that which accounts for the existence of a given concrete thing (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). **Only here, instead of assuming something immaterial (and therefore unverifiable), we fall back upon a current of air or gas (πνεῦμα); the essential reason of the thing is itself material, standing to it in the relation of a gaseous to a solid body.** Here, too, the reason of things—that which accounts for them—is no longer some external end to which they are tending; it is something acting within them, "a spirit deeply interfused," germinating and developing as from a seed in the heart of each separate thing that exists (λόγος σπερματικός).
…

Hereupon follows the first differentiation of primitive substance—the separation of force from matter, the emanation of the world from God. The germinal world-making powers (σπερματικοὶ λόγοι), which, in virtue of its tension, slumbered in Pneuma, now proceed upon their creative task. The primitive substance, be it remembered, is not Heraclitus's fire (though Cleanthes also called it flame of fire, φλόξ) any more than it is the air or "breath" of Anaximenes or Diogenes of Apollonia. Chrysippus determined it, following Zeno, to be fiery breath or ether, a spiritualized sublimed intermediate element.
…

The influence upon Stoicism of Heraclitus has been differently conceived. **Siebeck would reduce it within very small dimensions, but this is not borne out by the concise history found at Herculaneum** (*Index herc.*, ed. Comparetti, col. 4 seq.). **They substituted primitive Pneuma for his primitive fire, but so far as they are hylozoists at all they stand upon the same ground with him.** Moreover, the commentaries of Cleanthes, Aristo and Sphaerus on Heraclitean writings (Diog. Laër. vii. 174, ix. 5, 15) point to common study of these writings under Zeno. **Others again (*e.g.* Lassalle) represent the Stoics as merely diluting and distorting Heracliteanism. But this is altogether wrong, and the proofs offered, when rightly sifted, are often seen to rest upon the distortion of Heraclitean doctrine in the reports of later writers, to assimilate it to the better known but essentially distinct innovations of the Stoics. In Heraclitus the constant flux is a metaphysical notion replaced by the interchange of material elements which Chrysippus stated as a simple proposition of physics.** Heraclitus offers no analogy to the doctrine of four (not three) elements as different grades of tension; to the conception of fire and air as the "form," in Aristotelian terminology, of particulars; nor to the function of organizing fire which works by methodic plan to produce and preserve the world (πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου). **Nor, again, is there any analogy to the peculiar Stoic doctrine of universal intermingling (κρᾶσις δὶ ὅλου).** The two active elements interpenetrate the two lower or more relaxed, winding through all parts of matter and so pervading the greater masses that **there is no mechanical mixture, nor yet a chemical combination, since both "force" and "matter" retain their relative characters as before.** Even the distinction between "force" and "matter"—so alien to the spirit of Heraclitus—is seen to be a necessary consequence.
…

Further, a distinction was drawn between irrational animals, or the brute creation, and the rational, *i.e.* gods and men, leaving room for a divergence, or rather development, of Stoic opinion. The older authorities conceded a vital principle, but denied a soul, to the brutes: animals, they say, are ζῶα but not ἔμψυχα. **Later on much evidence goes to show that (by a divergence from the orthodox standard perhaps due to Platonic influence) it was a Stoic tenet to concede a soul, though not a rational soul, throughout the animal kingdom.** To this higher manifestation of Pneuma can be traced back the "esprits animaux" of Descartes and Leibnitz, which continue to play so great a part even in Locke.
…

As to the physical constitution of bodies, they were content to reproduce the Peripatetic doctrine with slight modifications in detail, of hardly any importance when compared with the change of spirit in the doctrine taught.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater

Stoicism hence comes closer than Aristotle to espousing Socrates' maxim that virtue arises from wisdom.244 Since Stoic virtue is the practice of what perfects human nature by leading us towards a universal code – conduct consonant with the nature of the cosmos – morality, it follows, can be instilled and improved through education.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n367/mode/2up?view=theater

The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance. And it has ultimately shown itself to be right: **every step in the science of epistemology and morality has *confirmed the attitude* of the Sophists. … Our modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent, Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean … to say that it is *Protagorean* is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a synthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.**
…

In practice, it means that **moral judgments have been torn from the conditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some sense, from their Greek and Graeco-political soil,** in order to be *denaturalised* under the cover of being *sublimated*. The great concepts "good" and "just" are divorced from the first principles of which they form a part, and, as "ideas" *become free*, degenerate into subjects for discussion.
…

In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato. … **And then it was necessary to invent the *abstract perfect* man also:**—good, just, wise, and a dialectician to boot—in short, the *scarecrow* of the ancient philosopher: **a plant without any soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all definite ruling instincts;** a virtue which "justifies" itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "individual" *per se*! the highest form of *Artificiality*.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/148/mode/2up?view=theater

The silent antagonism to both Plato and Aristotle is not more remarkable in these schools than their return to older thinkers, whose views they adopted and developed, not without the aid of those recent predecessors whom they despised. **As regards physics they revolted from the spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle to adopt the cruder and easier doctrines of Heraclitus or Democritus; as regards morals they felt that the true descendants of the great master, Socrates, were not the learned and speculative masters of the Academy and the Lyceum, but the outspoken and rude Antisthenes, and the equally outspoken but polished Aristippus.** These men had seized the practical sides of Socrates—Antisthenes, his absolute liberty of spirit and free-thinking, even to a complete break with existing society; Aristippus, his principle that happiness was the first object of man, and that a philosophy which did not take account of pleasure was no adequate rule of life.

But these two men had been almost isolated thinkers, coming before their time, while the Greek State still overshadowed the individual, and they were obscured by the great theorists who deduced the perfection of individual life from the perfection of the state. But now Zeno took up Antisthenes's philosophy; he enlarged its basis and its interest by great physical and cosmical speculations; **he reckoned with vulgar orthodoxy in religion, not as the other had done, by blunt scepticism, but by ingenious allegory and large pantheism, embracing all local creeds; and so he became a power in society and the author of a permanent school of thought, instead of spending his life as an offensive vagrant or as a surly recluse.** And now Epicurus took up Aristippus's theory of pleasure, purified it from its grosser sensuality, enlarged it with theories of the world and of knowledge, stood aside from the popular religion without declared controversy, **substituted personal friendship for the decaying bond of patriotism,** and so created a theory of life which lasts fresh to the present day.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.69382/page/n275/mode/2up?view=theater

The philosophy of the Hellenistic world was the Stoa; all else was secondary. **What we see, broadly speaking, as we look down the three centuries, is that Aristotle's school loses all importance, and Plato's, for a century and a half, becomes a parasite upon the Stoa in the sense that its life as a school of scepticism consists wholly in combating Stoic doctrine;** Epicurus' school continues unchanged, but only attracts small minorities; but the Stoa, which meanwhile has taken under its shield both popular and astral religion and many forms of superstition, finally masters Scepticism, in fact though not in argument, and takes to itself enough of a revived Platonism to form that modified Stoicism or Eclecticism which was the distinguishing philosophy of the earlier Roman empire.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false

The conclusion seems to be inescapable. **Plato had included the 'craftsmen' in his Utopia as an inferior class, because he believed they would contentedly accept their part in the whole.** Zeno rejected this belief that those whose souls are not governed by reason could be free from strife, and regarded inclusion of the unwise, even with inferior status, as impossible. His ideal was a one-class, or classless, society, attaining unity through uniformity. The common denominator of its citizens was not mere rationality, in which all human beings have some share, but the high ideal of wisdom. **Like the Epicurean circle of friends, with which Zeno's Utopia had not a little in common, they might be drawn from any of the accepted divisions of the human race – men or women, Greeks or barbarians, free men or slaves;**26 **but wisdom they must have.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n551/mode/2up?view=theater

Athens, too poor to maintain its state medical service, nevertheless opened private universities that made it, as Isocrates said, the "school of Hellas," the intellectual capital and arbiter of Greece. Having weakened the old religion, the philosophers struggled to find in nature and reason some substitute for it as a prop of morals and a guide to life.

They explored first the paths opened up by Socrates. While the Sophists relapsed for the most part into the teaching of rhetoric, and disappeared as a class, the pupils of Socrates became the storm centers of violently divergent philosophies. Eucleides of Megara, who had often traveled to Athens to hear Socrates, stirred up his native city with "a rage of disputes," as Timon of Athens phrased it,[19] **and developed the dialectic of Zeno and Socrates into an eristic, or art of argument, that questioned every conclusion, and led in the next century to the skepticism of Pyrrho and Carneades.** After Eucleides' death his brilliant disciple Stilpo led the Megarian school more and more towards the Cynic point of view: **since every philosophy can be refuted, wisdom lies not in metaphysical speculation but in such simple living as will liberate the individual from dependence upon the external factors in well-being.** When, after the sack of Megara, Demetrius Poliorcetes inquired how much Stilpo had lost, the sage replied that he had never possessed anything but knowledge, and no one had taken this away.[20] In his later years he numbered among his students the founder of the Stoic philosophy, so that the Megarian school may be said to have begun with one Zeno, and ended with another.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=l4lL8Y9mNvkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA206#v=onepage&q&f=false

Stoicism emerged around 300 B.C., in the immediate aftermath of Epicureanism's arrival on the scene. **It is in many ways best understood as an updated version of Socratic philosophy, and the early Stoics were in fact even willing to be known by the title "Socratics."**4

4. Philodemus, *De Stoicis* XIII 3, ed. Dorandi 1982.

...

The paradox of Stoicism is that it is, **on the one hand, self-consciously unoriginal philosophy, dedicated to recovering, clarifying, and developing its classical antecedents, yet on the other hand the upshot is a highly original approach to philosophical questions,** one which for many centuries was able to rival and at times eclipse the work of Plato and Aristotle.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n7/mode/2up?view=theater

As an adherent of the Peripatetic School myself, I do not hold a brief for the Stoics, but I have endeavoured to do them justice, and perhaps a little more, not having been on the alert to rob them of some borrowed plumes. The Porch has been credited with a great deal that really belonged to the Academy or the Lyceum. If you strip Stoicism of its paradoxes and its wilful misuse of language, what is left is simply the moral philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, dashed with the physics of Heraclitus. **Stoicism was not so much a new doctrine as the form under which the old Greek philosophy finally presented itself to the world at large.** It owed its popularity in some measure to its extravagance.

"***In general, throughout the work, what is new is not good; and what is good is not new.***"

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA150#v=onepage&q&f=false

In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, for instance, G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) presented Stoicism as an unoriginal philosophy, **merely drawing out a creative insight from Cynicism – "to live in accordance with Nature" – and refining it into a theoretical system, adding a dose of physics borrowed from Heraclitus.** The later Stoics' concern with practical questions further damaged whatever speculative value there might have been in the early Stoa.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=DA4vAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false

But though [Zeno] highly admired the general principles and spirit of the Cynic school, he could not easily reconcile himself to their peculiar manners. **Besides, his inquisitive turn of mind would not allow him to adopt that indifference to every scientific inquiry, which was one of the characteristic distinctions of the sect.** He therefore attended upon other masters, who professed to instruct their disciples in the nature and causes of things.
...

After continuing to attend upon the lectures of Stilpo several years, he passed over to other schools, particularly those of Xenocrates and Diodorus Chronus. By the latter he was instructed in dialectics. He was so much delighted with this branch of study, that he presented to his master a large pecuniary gratuity, in return for his free communication of some of his ingenious subtleties. **At last, after attending almost every other master, he offered himself as a disciple of Polemo. This philosopher appears to have been aware that Zeno's intention, in thus removing from one school to another, was to collect materials, from various quarters, for a new system of his own; for, when he came into Polemo's school, he said to him, "I am no stranger, Zeno, to your Phoenician arts; I perceive that your design is to creep slily into my garden, and steal away my fruit."**

Polemo was not mistaken in his opinion. Having made himself master of the tenets of others, Zeno determined to become the founder of a new sect.

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n119/mode/2up?view=theater

Cynicism was, therefore, introduced into the Stoic system by its founder, **and a Cynic element formed a left wing in the school throughout its history.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-49

The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on *Ethics*, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_90

The wise man was easy-going in his way of living. And why not? Even in our own times he would prefer to be as little cumbered as possible. 14. **How, I ask, can you consistently admire both Diogenes and Daedalus?** Which of these two seems to you a wise man – the one who devised the saw, or the one who, on seeing a boy drink water from the hollow of his hand, forthwith took his cup from his wallet and broke it, upbraiding himself with these words:[11] "Fool that I am, to have been carrying superfluous baggage all this time!" and then curled himself up in his tub and lay down to sleep? 15. In these our own times, which man, pray, do you deem the wiser – **the one who invents a process for spraying saffron perfumes to a tremendous height from hidden pipes, who fills or empties canals by a sudden rush of waters, who so cleverly constructs a dining-room with a ceiling of movable panels that it presents one pattern after another, the roof changing as often as the courses,[12] – or the one who proves to others, as well as to himself, that nature has laid upon us no stern and difficult law when she tells us that we can live without the marble-cutter and the engineer, that we can clothe ourselves without traffic in silk fabrics, that we can have everything that is indispensable to our use, provided only that we are content with what the earth has placed on its surface? If mankind were willing to listen to this sage, they would know that the cook is as superfluous to them as the soldier. [tam supervacuum sciet sibi cocum esse quam militem]**

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n123/mode/2up?view=theater

From the fragment of Philodemus2 we see how the Middle Stoa tried to explain away the offensive passages of Zeno and Diogenes – 'Zeno was only a young man when he wrote that ...' 'Anyway, Diogenes didn't write the tragedies, they are the work of certain wicked persons.' ... **Diogenes and Antisthenes were still Stoic saints, and were accepted as such by Posidonius. But the new Stoicism was determined to have no truck with Cynicism in its own day; 'Cynicorum vero ratio tota eicienda est.'**
...

The Stoic street preachers in Rome during the latter half of the first century B.C. were, as we meet them in Horace's *Satires*, Cynic in all but name and tunic; **the Stoics always used Cynic literary genres for what may be called their exoteric teachings.** Thus the Cynic element, present in Stoicism from its foundation, was maintained throughout the three hundred years we are considering, **and indeed the noblest conception of Cynicism ever formulated was to come from the Stoic Epictetus.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA204#v=onepage&q&f=false

The next step was taken by Epictetus, who set out to describe the ideal Cynic, making explicit which elements of Cynicism the Stoa could endorse. M. Billerbeck's studies of Demetrius the Cynic and Epictetus's ideal Cynic (see n. 1 above) show how impudence and immodesty have been removed, while just those qualities are retained that we have argued above would seem advantageous in the Roman context – concentration on practical instruction by example, eloquence, physical toughness, general austerity.
...

When dealing with the personality of the ideal Cynic in the final part of 3.22 (§§90-106), Epictetus draws on anecdotal material about Diogenes. Apart from purging the anecdotes of any provocative points, he even gives the Cynic features of Crates' philanthropic character.14
...

Accordingly, the rejection of friendship, marriage, begetting of children, and engagement in politics called for positive reinterpretation,15 if Cynicism, especially among Romans, was not to become suspect as a subversive movement. **The ideal Cynic, therefore, will not withdraw from his duties as citizen because he rejects them; on the contrary, he renounces them in order to put himself in the service of the whole of mankind** (§§69, 81,85). His mission among men is a divine one; his task, universal – a true vocation, which follows its own rules.
...

The philosopher Epictetus hoped that contemporary Cynics would maintain respect for God and not regress into atheism.58 The ideal Cynic of his handbook looks significantly more dignified than the Cynics of the *chreia* traditions, practicing none of the shameless acts recorded elsewhere.

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/julian_apostate_letter_to_themistius.htm

Chrysippus[9] indeed, though in other respects he seems a wise man and to have been rightly so esteemed, yet in ignoring fortune and chance and all other such external causes that fall in to block the path of men of affairs, he uttered paradoxes wholly at variance with facts about which the past teaches us clearly by countless examples. For instance, shall we call Cato a fortunate and happy man? Or shall we say that Dio of Sicily had a happy lot? It is true that for death they probably cared nothing, but they did care greatly about not leaving unfinished the undertakings which they had originally set on foot, and to secure that end there is nothing that they would not have endured. In that they were disappointed, and I admit that they bore their lot with great dignity, as we learn, and derived no small consolation from their virtue; but happy one could not call them, seeing that they had failed in all those noble enterprises, unless perhaps according to the Stoic conception of happiness. **And with regard to that same Stoic conception we must admit that to be applauded and to be counted**

happy are two very different things, and that if every living thing naturally desires happiness,[10] it is better to make it our aim to be congratulated on the score of happiness rather than to be applauded on the score of virtue. But happiness that depends on the chances of Fortune is very rarely secure. And yet men who are engaged in public life cannot, as the saying is, so much as breathe unless she is on their side ...[11] and they have created a merely verbal idea of a leader who is established somewhere above all the chances of Fortune in the sphere of things incorporeal and intelligible, just as men define the ideas, whether envisaging them truly or falsely imagining them. **Or again they give us the ideal man, according to Diogenes "The man without a city, without a home, bereft of a fatherland,"[12] that is to say, a man who can gain nothing from Fortune, and on the other hand has nothing to lose.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/To_the_uneducated_Cynics#cite_ref-18

Now truth is one and philosophy is one, and they whom I just now spoke of are its lovers one and all; **and also they whom I ought in fairness to mention now by name, I mean the disciples of the man of Citium.** [19] **For when they saw that the cities of Greece were averse to the excessive plainness and simplicity of the Cynic's freedom of manners, they hedged him about with screens as it were, I mean with maxims on the management of the household and business and intercourse with one's wife and the rearing of children,** to the end, I believe, that they might make him the intimate guardian of the public welfare.[20]

> https://archive.org/details/loyolajesuitism00taylgoog/page/n21/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> As an institutor, **Loyola first bowed to his reverend predecessor – the Anchoret; and then warily passed him by.** For himself and his followers, he had high matters to transact – he had a world to vanquish, and to govern.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA112#v=onepage&q&f=false

Indeed, Zeno's original position may well have been inspired by his time studying with the Cynic Crates. But it was Zeno's introduction of the subdivision of indifferents that marks the beginning of a clearly distinguishable Stoic position. The Aristotelians, on the other hand, would agree with the Stoics that externals such as health and wealth should be accorded value. Indeed, Aristotle argued that such things are necessary along with virtue for a happy life (e.g. friends, in *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9). But the Stoics would not want to go that far. Although externals such as health and wealth have value they are not *necessary* for a happy life, claim the Stoics. Virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, and in claiming this the Stoics remained in agreement with the Cynics. **Their position is thus halfway between the Cynic and Aristotelian positions; virtue is the only good, but some externals should be preferred over others.**

Zeno's development of the Stoic position was not unanimously accepted. The Stoic Aristo rejected this subdivision of indifferents (see DL 7.160), maintaining the original position, which was more in line with the position of the Cynics. Perhaps his concern was that Stoicism would all too quickly become indistinguishable from the Aristotelian position.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestion00cice/page/84/mode/2up?view=theater

If we now despise these men, and think them worthless, at all events we ought to show more respect for Ariston, who, having been a pupil of Zeno, adopted in reality the principles which he had asserted in words; namely, that there was nothing good except virtue, and nothing evil except what was contrary to virtue; and who denied altogether the existence of those influences which Zeno contended for as being intermediate, and neither good nor evil. **His idea of the chief good, is being affected in neither direction by these circumstances; and this state of mind he calls ἀδιαφορία; but Pyrrho asserts that the wise man does not even feel them; and that state is called ἀπάθεια.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#Ariston

Ariston the Bald, of Chios, who was also called the Siren, declared the end of action to be a life of perfect indifference to everything which is neither virtue nor vice; recognizing no distinction whatever in things indifferent, but treating them all alike. **The wise man he compared to a good actor, who, if called upon to take the part of a Thersites or of an Agamemnon, will impersonate them both becomingly. He wished to discard both Logic and Physics, saying that Physics was beyond our reach and Logic did not concern us: all that did concern us was Ethics.**
...

The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus

reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, "Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses."

163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, "Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you?" and when the other answered "No," he rejoined,

> Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater

May I not, I replied, rejoin that it would be natural for you, as your opinion in reality is the same as mine, to forbear giving new names to things? for our principles are the same,—it is only our language that is at variance. Indeed, said he, our principles are not the same at all; for I can never agree to your calling anything desirable except what is honourable, and to your reckoning such things among the goods,—and, by so doing, extinguishing honourableness, which is, as it were, the light of virtue, and utterly upsetting virtue herself.

Those are all very fine words, said I, O Cato; but do you not see that all those pompous expressions are shared by you in common with Pyrrho and Aristo, who think all things equal? [qui omnia exaequant]
...

IV. All that you have been saying, Cato, I replied, you might say if you agreed with Pyrrho or Aristo; for you are not ignorant that they consider that honourableness not only the chief good, but also (as you yourself maintain) the only good. And if this is the case, the consequence which I see you aim at follows necessarily, that all wise men are always happy. Do you then praise these men, and do you think that we ought to follow their opinion?

By no means, said he; for as this is a peculiar attribute of virtue to make its selection of those things which are in accordance with nature, **those who have made all things equal in such a manner as to consider all things on either side perfectly indifferent, [qui omnia sic exaequaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent] so as to leave no room for any selection, have utterly put an end to virtue.**

> https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA149#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> And, indeed, his giving the People a Natural Right to Believe and Profess whatever Religion or Opinion they please, either to Invent or Chuse, is only an Artifice to destroy the Christian Religion, **and the very same made used of by * *Julian* the *Apostate*, for the very same End.**
>
> > * Ut quisque nullo vetante Religioni suae serviret intrepidus, *Ammianus Marcellinus*. *Lib*. 22.
>
> And it must be own'd, that it is a *Mean*, very proper, and well chosen for that Purpose. **For the ascribing to the People a Natural Right, to Invent, Chuse, or Profess whatever Religion they please, is the Reducing all Religions to a Level of Indifference *Naturally***, and this, the making each of 'em *equally Good* and *Eligible Naturally*; both which strike at the very *Vitals*, † and *Fundamentally* Subvert the *Christian Religion*.
>
> > † *This likewise evidently prepares the Way for the Introducing of Popery*, &*ce*.
>
> **The Force of this Argument was discover'd by Natural Reason.** For *Cato*, in *Tully*, *Lib*. 3. *de Fin*. Discoursing of certain Philosophers, mention'd before, speaks to the same purpose, in this manner: **"And, therefore, as the Parties aforesaid, have reduc'd all Things to a Level of Indifference, and so made them equally Eligible, they have struck at the very Vitals of *Vertue*. Excellently observ'd," reply'd *Tully*. Now, the Observation in both places is exactly the same, if you do but Substitute the Word, *Religion*, to the Term, *Virtue*, and *vicê versâ*.**

You say right, said I; but I ask you whether you, too, must not do the same thing, when you say that there is nothing good which is not right and honourable, **and so put an end to all the difference between other things?**

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/236/mode/2up?view=theater

XXV. What, then, is the cause of these difficulties? A vain-glorious parade in defining the chief good. **For when it is positively asserted that what is honourable is the sole good, all care for one's health, all attention to one's estate, all regard for the government of the republic, all**

regularity in transacting business, all the duties of life, in short, are put an end to. Even that very honourableness, in which alone you assert that everything is comprised, must be abandoned. All which arguments are carefully urged against Ariston by Chrysippus.

And from that embarrassment it is that all those fallaciously speaking wiles, as Attius calls them, have arisen. For because wisdom had no ground on which to rest her foot, when all the duties were taken away, **(and duties were taken away when all power of selection and discrimination was denied; for what choice, or what discrimination could there be when all things were so completely equal that there was no difference whatever between them?) from these difficulties there arose worse errors than even those of Aristo. For his arguments were at all events simple; those of your school are full of craft. [officia autem tollebantur dilectu omni et discrimine remoto, quae esse non poterant rebus omnibus sic exaequatis, ut inter eas nihil interesset, ex his angustiis ista evaserunt deteriora quam Aristonis. Illa tamen simplicia, vestra versuta.]**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-2#lf0062-02_head_034

So far, I am sure, was Aristo of Chios from being of their humor, that when he was censured for exposing and prostituting the dignity of philosophy by his freedom to all comers, he answered, that he could wish that Nature had given understanding to wild beasts, that they too might be capable of being his hearers. Shall we then deny that privilege to men of interest and power, which this good man would have communicated (if it had been possible) to the brute beasts?

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/acl3129.0001.001/326?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image

It is, however, obvious that those who adopt this theory of the absolute indifference of everything but virtue and vice, in fact take away all materials for virtue to act upon, and confine it in a state of mere abstraction. **This part of Ariston's system is purely cynical, and perhaps he wished to shew his admiration for that philosophy, by opening his school at Athens in the Cynosarges, where Antisthenes had taught.**

He also differed with Zeno as to the plurality of virtues, allowing one only, which he called the health of the soul … This appears to follow from the cynical parts of his system, for by taking away all the objects of virtue, he of course deprives it of variety; and so he based all morality on a well-ordered mind. **Connected with this is his paradox, *Sapiens non opinatur* – the philosopher is free from all opinions (since they would be liable to disturb his unruffled equanimity); and this doctrine seems to disclose a latent tendency to scepticism, which Cicero appears to have suspected, by often coupling him with Pyrrho.** In conformity with this view, he despised Zeno's physical speculations, and doubted whether God is or is not a living Being (Cic. *Nat. Deor*. i.14.) But this apparently atheistic dogma perhaps only referred to the Stoical conception of God, as of a subtle fire dwelling in the sky and diffusing itself through the universe. He may have meant merely to demonstrate his position, that physiology is above human intellect, by shewing the impossibility of certainly attributing to this pantheistic essence, form, senses, or life.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristo_of_Chios

While agreeing with Zeno that Virtue was the supreme good, **he totally rejected the idea that external advantages (health, wealth, etc.), although morally "indifferent", could be ranked in terms of whether they are naturally preferred or not:**

> **Aristo of Chios denied that health, and everything similar to it, is a preferred indifferent. To call it a preferred indifferent is equivalent to judging it a good, and different practically in name alone;** For without exception things indifferent as between virtue and vice have no difference at all, nor are some of them preferred by nature while others are dispreferred, but in the face of the different circumstances of the occasions, neither those said to be preferred prove to be unconditionally preferred, nor are those said to be dispreferred of necessity dispreferred; **For if healthy men had to serve a tyrant and be destroyed for this reason, while the sick had to be released from the service and, therewith also, from destruction, the wise man would rather choose sickness in this circumstance than health.**[17]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA159#v=onepage&q&f=false

Significantly, though, the later tradition remembered (or chose to remember) Aristo as looking back to the Cynics. Ancient doxography holds that Aristo's theory of indifference is the same theory that the Cynics espoused (D.L. 6.105), **but the point must be that Aristo was inscribing back into Stoicism a Cynic tendency that Stoicism in any case displayed, albeit in a weaker form.** Presumably, in the eyes of later

tradition, and surely in his own, Aristo's dissidence lies not in his falling away from the Stoa, but in his **bringing out this recessed trait of Stoicism – which is to say, in resuscitating some of the original and uncompromised force of the Cynic concept, or just attitude, of indifference toward anything save virtue and its opposite.**11
…

The Cynic view of nature and the natural, which Aristo arguably takes over, is far less exalted, and far less determinate, than its Stoic counterpart.12
…

From Plutarch as we know **Aristo's view that "*by nature* there is no native land, just as there is no house or cultivated field, smithy or doctor's surgery; each one of these comes to be so, or rather *is so named and called, always in relation* (*pros*) to the occupant and user."**55 Cynic cosmopolitanism comes directly to mind, not orthodox Stoic views of exile and the reassurances of transcendental law. As Ioppolo observes,56 **Aristo is not interested in erecting a positive, natural ideal over the deficiencies of local examples of cultivated existence, as Zeno was.**

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/De_exilio*.html#ref35
>
> **For by nature there is no such thing as a native land, any more than there is by nature a house or farm or forge or surgery, as Ariston[36] said;** but in each case the thing becomes so, or rather is so named and called, with reference to the occupant and user. For man, as Plato[37] says, is "no earthly" or immovable "plant," but a "celestial" one, — the head, like a root, keeping the body erect — inverted to point to heaven.[38]

…

Aristo not only carved out a terrain of indifferent; he made living indifferently the very *goal* of a life well lived (its *summum bonum*): such indifference is a decidedly moral goal, perhaps even the only legible mark of a virtuous man.78 This alone would have sent palpitations through Zeno's heart. (For him, living harmoniously with nature was the ethical goal.)79 Some overtones with Pyrrho's own version of skeptical indifference are perhaps audible here (the two are not infrequently mentioned in one breath by Cicero and others), nor can the ethical implications of Pyrrhonism be denied.80
…

But it is the absence of a middle ground, perhaps more than the Cynicizing image of the philosopher become a loose cannon, that Seneca finds inhuman and intolerable in Aristo's position. Aristo would reply that he has given us a middle ground, the area of the indifferent. But here, what emerges is that this zone covers the whole are of human conduct (Cicero's *omnis vita*), which can be acted upon by the virtuous or the vicious: it is the entire realm of particular circumstances, which escape generalizations and prescriptions but which nevertheless demand them.
…

The exact place of reason in Aristo's philosophy is as controversial today as it must have been in his own time. **Aristo's position reveals and then radicalizes a strain inherent in the origins of the Stoa: with reason absolutized to such a degree, it can no longer even be completely instantiated.**118 Thus, "perhaps there are no sages. This is the dilemma of Stoic ethics. Nature promises a destination which is approachable by no known road."119 The thought is Kafkaesque, but it is also characteristically Cynic.120

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2d-wCQAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Cynics were not known for their doctrines the way the Pythagoreans or Academics or Epicureans were,67 but even without a set of well-developed theoretical positions, the Cynics were easily recognized by their characteristic behavior. By begging, rebuking, publicly masturbating, engaging in sex, farting, urinating, and defecating68 (hence the title "dog"), the Cynics set themselves against polite conventions and in favor of a "hard primitivist" interpretation of the philosophical motto, "live according to nature."69 The Cynic wanted to unmask unnatural cultural conventions, as is summed up in Pseudo-Diogenes's words to Crates: **"For nature is great, but since it has been banished from life by opinion, we are bringing it back for the salvation of humanity."**70 Hence actions that transgressed societal norms recovered and displayed for others life as nature meant it to be. The Cynics disregarded personal appearance (or, as it often seemed to their critics, they gave great care to appearing poor or disheveled).71 **They were determined to cure people of their unnatural sense of shame.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=xecTAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PT98#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In a paper presented at a conference sponsored by The Institute on East Central Europe and The Center for Israel and Jewish Studies at Columbia University in 1983, Jacob Allerhand claims that 'according to Sabbatian teachings,' **Sabbatai Zevi's drunken orgies**

> **'represented erotic mysteries that were supposed to make a way through the 'gate of lechery' into the hall of eternity.'** In other words, those Jews who were influenced by the Kabbalah – Jews like Nathan of Gaza and his protege Shabbetai Zevi – **could posit 'a connection between the Original Sin, with the origin of shame, and the *tikkun* (repair of the blemish) as the elimination of shame under the new messianic order.'**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0002

> We think that the theory of Mr. Mill rests altogether on false principles, and that even on those false principles he does not reason logically. Nevertheless, we do not think it strange that his speculations should have filled the Utilitarians with admiration. We have been for some time past inclined to suspect that these people, whom some regard as the lights of the world and others as incarnate demons, are in general ordinary men, with narrow understandings and little information. **The contempt which they express for elegant literature is evidently the contempt of ignorance.** We apprehend that many of them are persons who, having read little or nothing, are delighted to be rescued from the sense of their own inferiority by some teacher **who assures them that the studies which they have neglected are of no value,** puts five or six phrases into their mouths, lends them an odd number of the Westminster Review, and in a month transforms them into philosophers.
> …
>
> **It is one of the principal tenets of the Utilitarians that sentiment and eloquence serve only to impede the pursuit of truth. They therefore affect a quakerly plainness, or rather a cynical negligence and impurity, of style.** The strongest arguments, when clothed in brilliant language, seem to them so much wordy nonsense. In the mean time they surrender their understandings, with a facility found in no other party, to the meanest and most abject sophisms, provided those sophisms come before them disguised with the externals of demonstration. **They do not seem to know that logic has its illusions as well as rhetoric,**—that a fallacy may lurk in a syllogism as well as in a metaphor.

…

At times Cynics used their bitter and frank speech to *convey* their message; but not infrequently, inappropriate speech-acts *were* the contravention of cultural norms that formed the *content* of the Cynic gospel.85 **The Cynics' shamelessness was didactic because it "denied the ontological basis of social convention. … Bad manners were culturally significant."**86 All the gross things that came out of the Cynic's body – spit, urine, fecal matter, *or words* – helped in the mission to "deface the common currency."87

We can see something of a lesson when Antisthenes attacked a common Cynic target, superstition: "When he [Antisthenes] was being initiated into the Orphic mysteries, the priest said that those admitted into these rites would be partakers of many good things in Hades. 'Why then,' said he, 'don't you die?'"88 The reply is unpleasant (for the priest), but implicit in it is an argument pertinent to initiatory rites ("if death were *really* so good for initiates…").89

…

Athenaeus includes a long list of the sordid accusations philosophers made, noting that they were "more abusive than the comic poets."110 But although there are plenty of examples of this sort of aggressive wit from philosophers of various schools, **no group could rival the Cynics for the *reputation* of outrageous speech. Unless it was the Stoics.**

…

> 121. So Andrew Erskine comments: **"complete freedom of speech in sexual matters," along with other Cynic elements, "were a feature of mainstream Stoicism in the third century and cannot be limited to the early career of Zeno"** (*Hellenistic Stoa*, 14).

…

If Zeno and Chrysippus, like the Cynics, called into question the wrongness or shamefulness of leaving a body unburied, or refraining from certain forms of sexual intercourse, why not also demonstrate that the taboo against certain words was irrational?139

> 139. **The argument even bears a certain resemblance to Zeno's argument that there was nothing shameful in incest. If there would have been nothing shameful in Oedipus's touching another part of Jocasta, why should there be shame in what actually transpired?** Similarly, if there is nothing inherently shameful in telling the story of Oedipus with "polite" words, why should there be something shameful in using the proper words? Body parts are just body parts; words are just words.

…

"The Stoics hold it proper to call everything *by its name* [*suo nomine*]" (*Fam*. 9.22.1). To use the euphemism *anus* (Latin for "ring") is to apply an *alienum nomen*, and it would be better to use its *own* name (*cur non suo potius?* [*Fam*. 9.22.2]).160 If there should be nothing artificial in speech,161 the sage will use the real words. Thus Zeno's dictum, "The sage will speak bluntly," coheres very nicely with Stoic linguistic theory.162

…

Perhaps early Stoics, who reflected extensively about ethics *and* linguistics, noticed the strangeness of avoiding "real" names.164

> 164. Recall Diogenes's sense of how odd it was that the middle finger should be treated so differently from the others (D.L. 6.35).

…

But we do know more about the Stoics. First of all, we know that the Stoics argued the naturalness of several things that they did not put into practice. **Zeno and Chrysippus may have defended cannibalism and incest in their treatises, but they did not feel obligated to practice them.**176

But beyond the fact that we are not sure to what degree Stoics acted on their belief about foul language, not all Stoics even agreed with Zeno's argument. From the second century B.C. onward, some Stoics clearly did not approve of foul language: they advised against it in their ethical writings; they deleted offensive passages from older Stoic texts; and one Stoic even detected and criticized an impropriety in an innocent line from Virgil.

…

Most ancient philosophers agreed life should be lived "according to nature"; the question was how this should be interpreted.179 **For Diogenes, the motto meant "hard primitivism,"**180 **and Diogenes appealed to primitive man, animals, and uncivilized barbarians as models of what was "natural."**181 The earliest Stoics adopted a similar conception. Chrysippus, for instance, urged people to learn from the behavior of animals that there was nothing unnatural in sex, birth, and death in holy places.182 **"Nature" is what the animals do; where human behavior is at variance, it has fallen prey to mere opinion.**

But Cicero's Stoic model Panaetius understood "nature" in a fundamentally different way,183 and as a result, he marks something of a shift in the Stoics' advocacy of objectionable behavior, including offensive speech. Born to an aristocratic family in Rhodes, **Panaetius studied with Crates of Mallos at Pergamon and later with Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus at Athens.** He knew leading Romans, such as Scipio Aemilianus and C. Laelius.184 He accompanied Scipio on an embassy to Rhodes and Pergamum, and later stayed at his home in Rome.185 He was clearly comfortable with Roman rule,186 **and as the Stoic scholarch from 129 until his death in 110, he "tried to adapt Stoic ethics to the requirements of the life of the Roman *grands seigneurs* with whom he associated, by putting into the foreground the more active and brilliant virtues of magnanimity, benevolence, and liberality."**187 In Cicero's estimation, Panaetius avoided the "gloom and harshness" of other Stoics.188

> 187. Von Fritz, *OCD*2 774, cited by Green, *Alexander to Actium*, 642. **Roman aristocrats must have found the Stoic program more palatable when Panaetius rejected the classic Stoic position that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness; one also needs, said Panaetius, health, strength, *and money*** (D.L. 7.128; see Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 7-10).

For Panaetius, that what is "proper" or "fitting" (πρέπον, which Cicero translates with *decorum*) is precisely what fits a human's superiority "in those respects in which his nature differs from that of the rest of the animal creation."189 Temperance, self-control, and the deportment that suits a gentleman are all derived from nature.190 **Gone is the older assumption that a philosopher must inure himself to "opinion" to discover truth. When Antisthenes was told that many people praised him, he assumed that he must have done something wrong.**191 **This sense of swimming against the popular current is palpable in the older Stoics (Chrysippus thought all existing law codes were mistaken)**192 **and lived on as a Stoic ideal (Seneca, *Const*. 14.4). But for Panaetius, the propriety taught by nature will win the *approbation* of others "by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed."**193 **Not only is indifference to public opinion condemned, but in speech, movement, and posture, nature directs people *to seek* the approval of those they live with (*Off*. 1.126; cf. 1.137). *Vox populi, vox naturae*.** Not only must one observe justice by not wronging others, but one must also observe modesty (*verecundia*) by not wounding their feelings.194

…

Just as nature put the “ugly” parts of the body out of view,197 so also “all right-minded people keep out of sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to Nature’s demands as privately as possible.” (*Ofl*. 1.126-27 [Miller, LCL]).

197. Of course, only if clothing is involved!

The doggish behavior of a Diogenes is now ruled out by nature itself. Where Zeno had urged that “no part of the body be hidden away,”198 Cicero/Panaetius “contrives to enlist ‘nature’ on the side of codes of dress conventional in society.”199 For Cicero/Panaetius, “nature” has various lessons for the proper ways to speak. **Speech is one of the most basic bonds among humans (*Ofl*. 1.50), and must be decorous so as to avoid giving offense, lest it divide rather than unite.**
…

The sense of modesty or shame, which Cynics labored so hard to undo, was reinstated as a natural and healthy part of a human being. Musonius commends αἰδώς frequently,213 claiming that philosophy “presents modesty [αἰδώς] as the greatest good.”214 Epictetus chastises the unbathed philosopher on the grounds that he has insulted others and ignored social convention (*Diatr*. 4.11). **For Epictetus, a sense of shame is not contrary to nature; it is a human possession *by nature*.**216 **It was precisely those things that separate humans from the animals that must belong to human nature.** “Nature says, ‘Wash your teeth.’ Why? In order that you may be a human being, and not a beast or a pig.” (*Diatr*. 4.11.11).217
…

Epictetus will not tolerate foul language.220 In all of this, Epictetus follows and expands upon Musonius, who warned, “One begins to lose his hesitation to do unseemly things when one loses his hesitation to speak of them.”221

In short, philosophers such as Epictetus wanted to cleanse the Cynic in order to cleanse the image of the Stoic. Miriam Griffin argues that “the new, sanitized Cynic ideal helped Stoicism to shed unacceptable features of its historical heritage (Cynic and Stoic) and to exploit Cynic notions that appealed to the Romans.”222 A Roman appreciation for propriety seems also to have contributed to the domestication of some strands of Cynicism and to the Stoics’ separating themselves from their Cynic past and from the more outlandish elements of their own founders.223 Epictetus’s tirades against the Cynics’ shameless talk are a case in point.224 The voice of this sanitized Cynic can be heard in the tone of the Cynic Epistles, as when Diogenes writes to Metrocles, “It is not only bread, water, a bed of straw, and a threadbare garment that teach temperance and endurance, but also, if I may put it this way, the shepherd’s hand” (*Ep*. 44, 1-2). The once outrageous Diogenes now apologizes for a veiled reference to masturbation!
…

Jaap Mansfeld argues that in the Hellenistic period there were “two different views concerned with the continuity between Cynics and Stoics, viz. one (the tradition preferred by Diog. Laert.) emphasizing dignified ethics, the other (sort of tucked away by him) immoral and obscene ideas”.228 **The Stoics were eager to link themselves to Socrates (according to Philodemus they even wanted to be called “Socratics”);**229 **but the line from Socrates to Zeno included Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates.**230 **This lineage made the Stoics heirs of ideas that were difficult for the later Stoa to defend.** Evidence of their attempt to “sanitize” the Cynic elements can be seen in how later Stoics reacted to their predecessors’ writings. As was mentioned before, Zeno’s *Republic* was a source of embarrassment for later Stoics. **Philodemus reports that the Stoics of his day (first century B.C.) tried to excuse the *Republic* on the grounds that Zeno was just a young man when he wrote it (*Stoic*. 9).**231 Philodemus says that even those “noble souls“ who accepted the *Republic* made some defense for the things Zeno had written about διαμηριζειν (*Stoic*. 15). Others even denied he had written the *Republic*, and one Stoic deleted some of Zeno’s offensive lines: “Isidorus likewise affirms that *the passages disapproved by the school were expunged from [Zeno’s] works by Athenodorus the Stoic*, who was in charge of the Pergamene library; and the afterwards, when Athenodorus was detected and compromised, they were replaced.”232 The expunger in question was the Stoic Athenodorus Cordylion.233 **Athenodorus’s work would have been at the beginning of the first century B.C. – not far from the time that Philodemus was mentioning Stoics’ anxiety about Zeno’s *Republic*.**
…

Cicero says that Posidonius made a list of all the actions that were so repulsive that they should not be done even to save one’s country. There is no way to know exactly what sort of words Posidonius used,240 but Cicero finds them **“so shocking, so obscene, that it seems indecent to even mention them” (*sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia* [*Off.* 1.159]).**

https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=LatinAugust21&getid=1&query=Cic.%20Fam.%209.22

However, as I say, **the Stoic doctrine is to call everything by its right name.** They argue as follows: nothing is obscene, nothing unfit to be expressed: for if there is anything disgraceful in obscenity, it consists either in the thing meant or in the word: there is no third alternative.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D128

[128] **But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who are practically Cynics)** who censure and ridicule us for holding that the mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery, fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not indecent to name them. **To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great many other arguments to the same purport.** But as for us, let us follow Nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D148

[148] But no rules need to be given about what is done[1] in accordance with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these are in themselves rules; **and no one ought to make the mistake of supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special privilege. [magnis illi et divinis bonis hane licentiam assequebantur]** But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to **moral sensibility, [verecundiae]** and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/4C*.html#ref17
>
> And, in fact, from now onward, even in his private conversations, [Tiberius] persisted[19] in a contemptuous rejection of these divine honours to himself: an attitude by some interpreted as modesty, by many as self-distrust, by a few as degeneracy of soul:—"The best of men," they argued, "desired the greatest heights: so Hercules and Liber among the Greeks, and among ourselves Quirinus, had been added to the number of the gods. The better way had been that of Augustus—who hoped! **To princes all other gratifications came instantly: for one they must toil and never know satiety—the favourable opinion of the future. For in the scorn of fame was implied the scorn of virtue!" [nam contemptu famae contemni virtutes]**
>
> http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Caligula*.html#ref51
>
> 29 1 **He added to the enormity of his crimes by the brutality of his language. He used to say that there was nothing in his own character which he admired and approved more highly than what he called his ἀδιατρεψία,[52] that is to say, his shameless impudence.**
>
> > [52] **"Immobility," a Stoic virtue. Since in Gaius this took the form of callous indifference to suffering and to public opinion, it became *inverecundia*.**
>
> When his grandmother Antonia gave him some advice, he was not satisfied merely to listen but replied: "Remember that I have the right to do anything to anybody." When he was on the point of killing his brother, and suspected that he had taken drugs as a precaution against poison, he cried: "What! an antidote against Caesar?" After banishing his sisters, he made the threat that he not only had islands, but swords as well. 2 An ex-praetor who had retired to Anticyra for his health, sent frequent requests for an extension of his leave, but Caligula had him put to death, adding that a man who had not been helped by so long a course of hellebore needed to be bled. On signing the list of prisoners who were to be put to death later, he said that he was clearing his accounts. Having condemned several Gauls and Greeks to death in a body, he boasted that he had subdued Gallograecia.

https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/829/pg829-images.html#part04

As these noble *Houyhnhnms* are endowed by nature with a general disposition to all virtues, **and have no conceptions or ideas of what is evil in a rational creature,** so their grand maxim is, to cultivate reason, and to be wholly governed by it. Neither is reason among them a point problematical, as with us, where men can argue with plausibility on both sides of the question, **but strikes you with immediate conviction; as it must needs do, where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoloured, by passion and interest. I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain; and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either.** So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and positiveness, in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the *Houyhnhnms*. **In the like manner, when I used to explain to him our several systems of natural philosophy, he would laugh, “that a creature pretending to reason, should value itself upon the knowledge of other people’s conjectures, and in things where that knowledge, if it were certain, could be of no use.” Wherein he**

agreed entirely with the sentiments of Socrates, as Plato delivers them; which I mention as the highest honour I can do that prince of philosophers. I have often since reflected, what destruction such doctrine would make in the libraries of Europe; and how many paths of fame would be then shut up in the learned world.

Friendship and benevolence are the two principal virtues among the *Houyhnhnms*; and these not confined to particular objects, but universal to the whole race; for a stranger from the remotest part is equally treated with the nearest neighbour, and wherever he goes, looks upon himself as at home. They preserve decency and civility in the highest degrees, but are altogether ignorant of ceremony. **They have no fondness for their colts or foals, but the care they take in educating them proceeds entirely from the dictates of reason. And I observed my master to show the same affection to his neighbour's issue, that he had for his own. They will have it that nature teaches them to love the whole species, and it is reason only that makes a distinction of persons, where there is a superior degree of virtue.**

https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2019/01/jonathan-swift-fall-degeneration-man-gullivers-travels-paul-krause.html

The Houyhnhnm are a satirical parody of the hyper stoic rationalism of Baruch Spinoza and deductive-only reasoning which shuns ratiocinative reasoning (the Houyhnhmn cannot a priori conceive that Gulliver came from another land beside their own because they have no evidence of any other lands beside their isle which already exposes the limits of their "rationality" to the gentle reader as the reader knows Gulliver is from England). At the same time Swift's portrayal of the Houyhnhnm as naturalistically rational animals in a seemingly harmonious relationship with the world they live in is a prophetic foreshadowing of the movement of naturalistic primitivism which culminated in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's noble savage.

The Houyhnhnm are singularly rational animals divorced from all passion. They are the final descent into this brave new life of dead bodies which the modern project is leading man to. Hyper rationalist, body-only, eros denying, hunks of thinking meat and matter. Swift's brilliance in this respect is captured by the fact that **one of the most passionate animals filled with *thymos*, horses, are now depicted without passion.** The Houyhnhnm have the form of horses but lack the spirit, the essence, of horses. There is another creature that is filled with passion: Humans. **The loss of passion in the Houyhnhnm represent the loss of passion in humans in the neo-stoic push for hyper-rationality as the highest good in-of-itself (rather than love).**
…

The allusions to St. Augustine's *Confessions* and *City of God* in the fourth book is even more apparent as Gulliver slips into the sin of pride like the Stoics and Porphyry whom Augustine critiqued in his works. Gulliver is like Porphyry, a man who claims to be dedicated to the pursuit of Truth as the Houyhnhnm are, but who rejects that which is self-evident because of his egoistic pride.

---

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n319/mode/2up?view=theater

And the satire preserved this eternal property with which it was born: that of expressing invective and insult; for the peasants, thus roughly masked and riding in the carts in which they carried the grapes, had the license as the vintagers still have in our happy Campania (once called the dwelling of Bacchus) of hurling abuse at their betters.
…

911 Then Aeschylus brought about the transition from the Old Tragedy, that is the satyr play, to Middle Tragedy by using human masks and by converting the dithyramb of Amphion, which was a chorus of satyrs, into a chorus of men. **And Middle Tragedy must have been the origin of Old Comedy, in which great personages were portrayed and the chorus was therefore fitting.** Afterwards came first Sophocles and then Euripides, who left us the final form of tragedy. The Old Comedy ended with Aristophanes, because of the scandal about Socrates; and Menander bequeathed us the New Comedy, **built around private and fictitious personages, who could be fictitious because they were private, and could therefore be believed to be real, as we have explained above. Hence there was no longer any room for the chorus, which is a public that comments and comments only on public matters.**
…

The iambic meter was certainly appropriate to tragedy, for it is a verse born to give vent to anger, and its movement is that of what Horace calls a swift foot (as noted in an axiom [233]). **Vulgar tradition says that it was invented by Archilochus to vent his wrath against Lycambes, who had refused to give him his daughter in marriage, and that the bitterness of his verses drove father and**

daughter to hang themselves in desperation. This must have been a history of the heroic contest over *connubium*, in which the rebellious plebeians must have hanged the nobles along with their daughters.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius6a.html#c3

> **The Lacedaemonians caused the books of Archilochus to be thrown out of their city, because they thought them not modest and chaste enough to be read.** For they would not have the minds of their children affected by those things, which would be a greater mischief to their manners than a profit to their intellect. And therefore they punished the greatest poet, or the next to the greatest in the world, by exiling his verses, because he wrote smutty satires against a family who had wronged him.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/33*.html

> For while there have been since the world began two poets with whom no other poet deserves to be compared, namely, Homer and Archilochus,[13] one of them, Homer, praised practically everything—animals, plants, water, earth, armour, and horses; in fact it may be said that there is nothing which he failed to mention with praise and honour. At any rate, there is only one out of all the characters in his poems about whom he said harsh things, namely, Thersites, **and even Thersites is called a 'clear-voiced speaker.'**[14] 12 **But Archilochus went to the other extreme, toward censure—seeing, I imagine, that men have greater need of that—and first of all he censures himself.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n463/mode/2up?view=theater

If comedy throughout the fifth century was hostile to democracy, it was partly because poets like money and the aristocracy was rich, but chiefly because the function of Greek comedy was to amuse with criticism, and the democratic party was in power. Since the leader of the democracy, Pericles, was sympathetic to new ideas like the emancipation of woman and the development of a rationalist philosophy, **the comic dramatists ranged themselves, with suspicious unanimity, against all forms of radicalism, and called for a return to the ways and reputed morals of the "Men of Marathon."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n471/mode/2up?view=theater

Coming to him after any other Greek author—worst of all, after Euripides—he seems depressingly vulgar, and we find it difficult to imagine the same audience enjoying them both.

If we are good conservatives we can stomach all this on the ground that Aristophanes attacks every form of radicalism, and upholds devotedly every ancient virtue and vice. He is the most immoral of all Greek writers known to us, but he hopes to make up for it by attacking immorality. He is always found on the side of the rich, but he denounces cowardice; he lies pitilessly about Euripides, living and dead, but he assails dishonesty; he describes the women of Athens as unbelievably coarse, but he exposes Euripides for defaming them; he burlesques the gods so boldly* that in comparison with the pious Socrates we must picture him as an hilarious atheist—but he is all for religion, and accuses the philosophers of undermining the gods.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA99#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Renaissance humanists received the writings of Plato, Aristophanes, and Lucian as if they had been composed by contemporaries, and felt a peculiar closeness toward these classical authors. More and Erasmus lived with them as intimately as with each other. But the humanists were acutely aware of their own individuality; they adopted diverse conceptions from their favorite ancients without being dominated or overwhelmed by any of them. **More's *Utopia* is neither Platonic nor Lucianic; it is both.** Aristophanes and Lucian had made fun of Socrates and were never moved by his high seriousness. Thomas More could jest about the *Republic* and at the same time live devoutly by its ideal. **If Rabelais is added to the humanist brethren, the jocular so far outstrips the grave that allegiance to Aristophanes submerges any admiration for Plato.** But even in the midst of the Rabelaisian ribaldry a solemn processional tone obtrudes as in the magnificent utopian fantasy of the Abbey of Thélème. The utopia of the northern Renaissance, born of both the philosophical and the satirical Greek traditions, used and commingled the literary artifices of both, which endowed it with a special complexity.

A rather substantial corpus of works by Aristophanes and Lucian was transmitted relatively intact to the expanding European intellectual world of the fifteenth century. **The fact that they had written nearly six hundred years apart and represented different literary genres did not prevent their assimilation to each other for purposes of quotation and imitation. They were ordinarily coupled and alluded to in the same breath.** When the northern humanists undertook their mission to reform mankind there were no guides more ingenious than these ancient masters of the art of

castigation, the great debunkers of pomposities, of arrogant official philosophers, of warrior-heroes who devastated the world, of soothsayers and false prophets who deceived and robbed the credulous, of greedy plutocrats and cruel tyrants. The humanists subtly appreciated the immunity that their ancient friends had gained by putting on the comic or satiric mask. For More, Erasmus, and Rabelais were not open rebels against their society, they were its admonishers. True, Aristophanes and Lucian did not hold up before mankind a lofty or a transcendental goal; some scholars today even doubt any moralizing intent on Aristophanes' part. But the Renaissance humanists had Jesus Christ and the evangelical spirit as their ultimate source of illumination; they needed no other. Their own profound religious commitment was never for a moment in question, **and the absence of an ideal in the writings of the pagan satirists did not trouble them.** Moreover, if a reformed Christianity needed counsel from an ancient philosophy in creating a model of conduct in this world, there was always Plato, or Aristotle freed from the glosses of the Schoolmen. **The basic rhetorical devices of utopia were learned from Aristophanes and Lucian.**
...

But his jesting at an Athenian's dream of idleness did not preclude a more sympathetic treatment of the ordinary man's privations. **In his last comedy, the *Ploutos*, the hardships of the virtuous poor were portrayed in a play that was one of his most popular in both the ancient and the medieval worlds.** Its exposure of greed and covetous wealth fitted in with a canonical Christian denunciations of avarice, and it was more acceptable than the plays that were tainted with obscenities. Any reading of More's *Utopia* should keep in mind the *Ploutos*.
...

Aristophanes has been made out to be the conservative voice of the oligarchic faction, a rural democrat, a Panhellenist, a spokesman for the Athenian peasantry in conflict with the interests of the new urban population. More plausible is the idea that he had a utopia of his own that has been called "petty bourgeois," anachronistic as the term is when applied to fifth-century Athens.5 To try to discover a unified political theory in Aristophanes seems fruitless. Later ages, however, admired him for his moral strictures, and this helps to account for his survival: His comedies were regarded as morality plays. Even if his aim was laughter and his attacks on society were in the tradition of the Old Comedy, it was the consensus of the learned that his comedy served a high moral purpose.

In the end the opposition is not between Plato the utopian and Aristophanes the anti-utopian, but between rival guides to the good city. **While Plato regarded war as the ultimate test of the ideal city-state, Aristophanes was bored with battle from the very beginning. All the writers of the Old Comedy were Athenian citizens, but they were commoners, and the heroic ideal that Plato the aristocrat embodied was alien to them.** They neither despised the body nor did they seek to suppress its natural instincts, and they preserved the materials for a sensate utopia to which Western fantasy would return time and again when it grew weary of Platonizing.
...

Peaceful work and honest allowable pleasures were never derided by Aristophanes – a position not too far from Thomas More's in 1516, despite their very different concepts of decorum. But if most humanists regarded Aristophanes as a moralistic mirror of vices, **for Rabelais at least he became much more – the source book for an exuberant utopia of peace and abundance that had a destiny of its own in European culture.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0241%3Acard%3D1353

Strep. He expressed, however, such opinions then too within, as he does now; and he asserted that Simonides was a bad poet. I bore it at first, with difficulty indeed, yet nevertheless I bore it. And then I bade him at least take a myrtle-wreath and recite to me some portion of Aeschylus; **and then he immediately said, "Shall I consider Aeschylus the first among the poets, full of empty sound, unpolished, bombastic, using rugged words?"** And hereupon you can't think how my heart panted. But, nevertheless, I restrained my passion, and said, "At least recite some passage of the more modern poets, of whatever kind these clever things be." **And he immediately sang a passage of Euripides, how a brother, O averter of ill! Debauched his uterine sister.** And I bore it no longer, but immediately assailed him with many abusive reproaches. And then, after that, as was natural, we hurled word upon word. Then he springs upon me; and then he was wounding me, and beating me, and throttling me.

Phid. **Were you not therefore justly beaten, who do not praise Euripides, the wisest of poets?**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/51356/pg51356-images.html#Footnote_16_18

But when after all a new Art blossomed forth which revered tragedy as her ancestress and mistress, **it was observed with horror that she did indeed bear the features of her mother, but those very features the latter had exhibited in her long death-struggle. It was *Euripides* who fought this**

death-struggle of tragedy; the later art is known as the *New Attic Comedy.* In it the degenerate form of tragedy lived on as a monument of the most painful and violent death of tragedy proper.

This connection between the two serves to explain the passionate attachment to Euripides evinced by the poets of the New Comedy, and hence we are no longer surprised at the wish of Philemon, who would have got himself hanged at once, with the sole design of being able to visit Euripides in the lower regions: if only he could be assured generally that the deceased still had his wits. But if we desire, as briefly as possible, and without professing to say aught exhaustive on the subject, to characterise what Euripides has in common with Menander and Philemon, and what appealed to them so strongly as worthy of imitation: **it will suffice to say that the *spectator* was brought upon the stage by Euripides.** He who has perceived the material of which the Promethean tragic writers prior to Euripides formed their heroes, and how remote from their purpose it was to bring the true mask of reality on the stage, will also know what to make of the wholly divergent tendency of Euripides. Through him the commonplace individual forced his way from the spectators' benches to the stage itself; **the mirror in which formerly only great and bold traits found expression now showed the painful exactness that conscientiously reproduces even the abortive lines of nature. Odysseus, the typical Hellene of the Old Art, sank, in the hands of the new poets, to the figure of the Græculus, who, as the good-naturedly cunning domestic slave, stands henceforth in the centre of dramatic interest. What Euripides takes credit for in the Aristophanean "Frogs," namely, that by his household remedies he freed tragic art from its pompous corpulency, is apparent above all in his tragic heroes. The spectator now virtually saw and heard his double on the Euripidean stage, and rejoiced that he could talk so well.** But this joy was not all: one even learned of Euripides how to speak: he prides himself upon this in his contest with Æschylus: how the people have learned from him how to observe, debate, and draw conclusions according to the rules of art and with the cleverest sophistications. **In general it may be said that through this revolution of the popular language he made the New Comedy possible.** For it was henceforth no longer a secret, how—and with what saws—the commonplace could represent and express itself on the stage. **Civic mediocrity, on which Euripides built all his political hopes, was now suffered to speak, while heretofore the demigod in tragedy and the drunken satyr, or demiman, in comedy, had determined the character of the language.** And so the Aristophanean Euripides prides himself on having portrayed the common, familiar, everyday life and dealings of the people, concerning which all are qualified to pass judgment. **If now the entire populace philosophises, manages land and goods with unheard-of circumspection, and conducts law-suits, he takes all the credit to himself,** and glories in the splendid results of the wisdom with which he inoculated the rabble.
…

The saying taken from the well-known epitaph, "as an old man, frivolous and capricious," applies also to aged Hellenism. The passing moment, wit, levity, and caprice, are its highest deities; the fifth class, that of the slaves, now attains to power, at least in sentiment: **and if we can still speak at all of "Greek cheerfulness," it is the cheerfulness of the slave who has nothing of consequence to answer for, nothing great to strive for, and cannot value anything of the past or future higher than the present. It was this semblance of "Greek cheerfulness" which so revolted the deep-minded and formidable natures of the first four centuries of Christianity: this womanish flight from earnestness and terror, this cowardly contentedness with easy pleasure, was not only contemptible to them, but seemed to be a specifically anti-Christian sentiment.** And we must ascribe it to its influence that the conception of Greek antiquity, which lived on for centuries, preserved with almost enduring persistency that peculiar hectic colour of cheerfulness—**as if there had never been a Sixth Century with its birth of tragedy, its Mysteries, its Pythagoras and Heraclitus, indeed as if the art-works of that great period did not at all exist,** which in fact—each by itself—can in no wise be explained as having sprung from the soil of such a decrepit and slavish love of existence and cheerfulness, and point to an altogether different conception of things as their source.

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n289/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Yet Thucydides never calls in question the intrinsic superiority of nobility to baseness,**213 **a superiority that shines forth particularly when the noble is destroyed by the base. Therefore Thucydides' *History* arouses in the reader a sadness which is never aroused by Machiavelli's books. In Machiavelli we find comedies, parodies, and satires but nothing reminding of tragedy.**
> …
>
> Through an irony beyond Machiavelli's irony, his silence about the soul is a perfect expression of the soulless character of his teaching: he is silent about the soul because he has forgotten the soul, just as he has forgotten tragedy and Socrates. It is ironical in the same way in which his half silence about philosophy is ironical.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA135#v=onepage&q&f=false

The writer most often quoted to illustrate the new spirit is Menander, who produced plays at Athens for about thirty years after Alexander's death. Athenian comedy must have been closer to the general Greek outlook of the time than the products of the Alexandrian Museum; and although Menander probably mirrors the ideas of the more prosperous and better educated section of his audience, this only means that he represents those to whom the new circumstances offered the greatest opportunity, those most likely to be alive to the potentialities of the world around them.

The surviving remains of Menander's plays indicate both the extent and the limitations of the change in attitude towards human relationships. The need for goodwill among men (*eunoia*) seems to have been one of his favourite topics, well illustrated by the recently discovered *Dyskolos*. Cnemon, the disgruntled old man whose character gives the play its title, is 'a man that scarcely *is* a man'30 – a striking addition to the list, headed by the Cyclops, of those figures in Greek literature who stand apart from civilised society and are regarded as hardly human at all. **He detests women, hates crowds, and is determined not to be 'one of the mass.'**31 **The main theme of the comedy is the ridicule and discomfiture of this anti-social curmudgeon, who is finally forced to join in the common celebrations that end the play, and in terms reminiscent of the Cynics describes how there would be no law-courts or prisons or war if everyone followed his example** (743-5).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA211#v=onepage&q&f=false

> In Menander's *Dyskolos* (743-5), **where the repentant Cnemon talks like a Cynic (or like Zeno),** war is coupled with law-courts and prisons as due for abolition, if all followed his example of goodwill.

...

Another quotation neatly sums up the conclusion that all men are akin:

> **For me no man who's good**
> **Is foreign. The same nature have we all,**
> **And it is character that makes men kin.** (Fr. 602)

The same thought reappears in the well-known lines from Terence's *Heautontimorumenos*, drawn from Menander's play of the same name.
...

Several fragments repeat the belief that reasoning is the most important human quality; but reason is the special possession of Greeks:

> **Greeks are men, not creatures without sense,**
> **And all they do is done with reason's help.** (Fr. 617)

The spirit of conciliation, so strong in the *Dyskolos* and elsewhere, is a mark of the Greek character:

> I like such talk: 'I'll go halfway to meet him.'
> To accept amends when things go well with you
> Is proof of true Hellenic character. (*Perikeir*. 887-9)

The same thought is probably present in the fragment which most strikingly transcends kinship ties and racial barriers, and points most clearly to merit, rather than blood, as the criterion by which men should be judged. A member of the younger generation is attacking the prejudices of the older:

> 'Good family' will kill me. Mother, please
> Don't bring the family into everything,
> **If there are men who have no natural worth,**
> **They seek escape in this – in monuments**
> **And 'family,' and rattle off their list**
> **Of grandpapas: they've nothing else to say.**
> Yet without grandpapas there's no man born.
> But if through change of home or loss of kin
> Some cannot name them, are they of lower birth
> Than those that can? **If nature's given a man**
> **Good character by birth, then he's well born,**
> **Even though he comes from Ethiopia.**
> **'So and so's a Scythian?' Hell! From Scythia**
> **Came Anacharsis.** (Fr. 533)

The good, like the wise according to Diogenes, are on the same level whichever continent they come from. But it is significant that Anacharsis was a *Hellenised* Scythian sage. The young man is saying in effect: 'See how Greek these "barbarians" can be.' **Conversely, a Greek can be 'barbarian' if he lapses from Greek standards.** 'Barbarian, man without pity!' cries Charisius in the *Arbitrants* (683-4) as he reproaches himself for his ill-treatment of his wife.

...

And a quotation from Menander's contemporary Philemon, flatly denies the idea of 'natural slavery':

> Even a slave is made of flesh and blood.
> No man was ever born a slave by nature:
> Slavery's of the body, and comes by chance. (Fr. Meineke)

Such variety, reminiscent of Euripides, must be taken as a reflection of that wide range of views on slavery in fourth-century Greece which Aristotle mentions in the *Politics*. **If there is one dominant idea about humanity that seems from our limited evidence to recur throughout Menander, it is the thought that character (*tropos*) matters above all else, and can transcend all the divisions of race and class.**

https://archive.org/details/silveragegreekw02mahagoog/page/880/mode/2up?view=theater

Every eulogy [of Plutarch] is reserved for Menander, the only poet (beside Euripides) worth reciting in society, the most perfect outcome of Greek literature, the most perfect mirror of human life.1 **Let the reader turn to my *Greek Life and Thought*,**2 **where I have weighed the Attic New Comedy in the scale of morals. He will be persuaded that a more mesquin and frivolous society has never been brought upon the stage.** But Menander and his society were polished; there was nothing raw or harsh about them; their vices were venial, or at least curable; they went through their lives without any offensive tragedy or any vulgar suicide.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n617/mode/2up?view=theater

Athenian life was portrayed in Menander's plays as a round of triviality, seduction, and adultery.

> https://archive.org/details/playsandpuritan02kinggoog/page/n31/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The prevalence of adultery in any country has always been a sign and a cause of social insincerity, division, and revolution; where a people has learnt to connive and laugh at it, and to treat it as a light thing, that people has been always careless, base, selfish, cowardly,—ripe for slavery. And we must say that either the courtiers and Londoners of James and Charles the First were in that state, or that the poets were doing their best to make them so.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA11#v=onepage&q&f=false

In contrast to Diogenes with his combative style and acerbic tongue, Crates was remembered as a benevolent figure and, thanks to his role as arbiter of family quarrels, actually revered as a household deity at Athens.29 **But his fragments are clearly informed by a satiric (or seriocomic) perspective: "He used to say that we should study philosophy until we see in generals nothing but donkey drivers"** (D.L. 6.82). **Crates was one of the most influential literary figures of the fourth century, and his writings did much to disseminate Cynic ideology and establish parody as a distinctly Cynic mode of "defacing" tradition.**
...

In addition to his wife Hipparchia and his brother Pasicles, Crates' pupils include his brother-in-law Metrocles, who was probably the first to collect and publish Cynic "sayings" (*chreiai*), and Monimus of Syracuse **whose "trifles [*paignia*] blended with covert seriousness"** were early examples of the "seriocomic" style – a hallmark of Cynic literature associated particularly with Crates and his followers.30

Menippus (of the first half of the third century B.C.) is the most famous Cynic of antiquity after Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates. **He is said to have been a pupil of Crates.** The unreliable biographical tradition depicts him as a Phoenician slave who acquired his freedom by begging or usury and hanged himself when his business failed. Be that as it may, Menippus is among the most influential of Hellenistic authors. **He is the only Cynic expressly called *spoudogeloios* ("seriocomic") in antiquity (Strabo 16.2.29, C 759),** and, as the name indicates, he is credited with the invention of Menippean satire, a form that parodied both myth and philosophy. Diogenes Laertius attributes thirteen books to Menippus, including a *Necyia*. **The imitations and adaptions of his work by Varro (116-26 B.C.) and Lucian (in the *Icaromenippus*, the *Menippus*, and the *Dialogues of the Dead*) gave Menippean forms a long and influential afterlife in antiquity and the Renaissance, making Cynicism one of the primary sources of satiric literature in Europe.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VI#Menippus

99. **Menippus,**[58] **also a Cynic, was by descent a Phoenician – a slave**, as Achacus in his treatise on *Ethics* says.

58. "Menippus ille, nobilis quidem canis," Varro *apua* Nonium 333. Cf. Lucian, *Icaromenippus* 15, *Bis Accusatus* 33. **Varro's *Saturae Menippeae*, a mixture of prose and verse, were an imitation of the style of Menippus,** although their subject matter was original and genuinely Roman.

Diocles further informs us that his master was a citizen of Pontus and was named Baton. **But as avarice made him very resolute in begging, he succeeded in becoming a Theban. There is no seriousness[59] in him; but his books overflow with laughter, much the same as those of his contemporary Meleager.[60]**

Hermippus says that he lent out money by the day and got a nickname from doing so. For he used to make loans on bottomry and take security, thus accumulating a large fortune. 100. At last, however, he fell a victim to a plot, was robbed of all, and in despair ended his days by hanging himself. I have composed a trifle upon him:[61]

> May be, you know Menippus,
> Phoenician by birth, but a Cretan hound:
> A money-lender by the day – so he was called –
> At Thebes when once on a time his house was broken into
> And he lost his all, not understanding what it is to be a Cynic,
> He hanged himself.

Some authorities question the genuineness of the books attributed to him, alleging them to be by Dionysius and Zopyrus of Colophon, who, writing them for a joke, made them over to Menippus as a person able to dispose of them advantageously.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=XrNEns3_yd0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR18#v=onepage&q&f=false

Menippean satire is usually identified as a form that mixes verse and prose – as if this feature alone could define a genre or could not be found in some form in other genres as different as Platonic dialogue or Greek romance! **But the idea of mixtures and misalliances of all kinds is generically significant,** and the impropriety by classical standards of embedding characters who speak verse in a prose narrative exemplifies this tendency.11 Historically Menippean satire refers to a tradition of satiric parody that goes back to the Cynic parodist and polemicist Menippus of Gadara (third century BC), whose influence is remarkable but whose writings are lost.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/51356/pg51356-images.html#FNanchor_18_20
>
> If tragedy absorbed into itself all the earlier varieties of art, the same could again be said in an unusual sense of Platonic dialogue, which, engendered by a mixture of all the then existing forms and styles, hovers midway between narrative, lyric and drama, between prose and poetry, and has also thereby broken loose from the older strict law of unity of linguistic form; **a movement which was carried still farther by the *cynic* writers, who in the most promiscuous style, oscillating to and fro betwixt prose and metrical forms, realised also the literary picture of the "raving Socrates" whom they were wont to represent in life.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#THINGS_I_OWE_TO_THE_ANCIENTS
>
> In my opinion Plato bundles all the forms of style pell-mell together, in this respect he is one of the first decadents of style: he has something similar on his conscience to that which the Cynics had who invented the *satura Menippea.*

…

If this all sounds distinctly odd, then we have managed to convey an accurate idea of this genre. As a current historian of the Menippean tradition has argued: **'Menippean satire is abnormal in all of its aspects. It is an anti-genre; insofar as it is a satire it is ultimately a satire on literature itself and all its pretensions to meaning.'**12 This sounds, in turn, suspiciously postmodern, and that may explain why Menippean satire has received so much attention in recent decades after being all but forgotten for generations.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=G075oJ-BCS0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA19#v=onepage&q&f=false

(**The isle of Tyre raised me; my true hometown, however, was Gadara, Syria's Athens.** From Eukrates I sprouted, I Meleager, who first by the help of the Muses raced against Menippos's Graces. **If I am from Syria, so what? We all, stranger, inhabit ONE country: the world; it was ONE chaos that gave birth to all mortals.** In old age I carved these lines into a tablet before [entering] the tomb,

for age is a close neighbor to Hades. But if you greet me, the chatty old man, may you, too, reach chatty old age.)2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qgAtDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA156#v=onepage&q&f=false

Meleager emphasizes the point by saying ‘an Attic fatherland among Syrians – Gadara’ rather than ‘an Attic fatherland in Syrian Gadara’. He also makes it clear that he competed with the elegant work of his fellow Gadarene, Menippus. **Meleager is called ‘the cynic’ by Athenaeus**32 **and the claim that all men are equal and compatriots fits this description.** The idea goes far back, as far perhaps as Antiphon in the late fifth century BC.33
…

There is a second, similar and related poem: **‘Tyre of the godlike boys and Gadara’s holy earth made me a man; lovely Kos of the Meropes took care of me in my old age. So if you are a Syrian, Salaam! If you are a Phoenician, Naidios! If you are a Greek, Chaire! And do you say the same [to me].’**38

Here again Meleager is defiantly cosmopolitan: again he identifies himself as being from Gadara which is called ‘holy’, but its Attic identity is not mentioned. I am not sure why the earth there is called holy; perhaps simply because it was his fatherland?35 **It certainly is unconventional to introduce Aramaic and Phoenician words in a Greek poem.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/4C*.html#ref76

Or is it like what your ancestor Meleager of Gadara, in the work entitled *The Graces*, said of Homer: being a Syrian by birth, he has represented the Achaeans as abstaining from fish according to the practice of his own country, although there is great abundance of them in the region of the Hellespont?

https://archive.org/details/historyrome12mommgoog/page/224/mode/2up?view=theater

Far greater activity and far more important results are apparent in the field of comedy. At the very commencement of this period a remarkable reaction set in against the sort of comedy hitherto prevalent and popular. **Its representative Terentius (558-595/196-159) is one of the most interesting phenomena, in a historical point of view, in Roman literature. Born in Phoenician Africa, brought in early youth as a slave to Rome and there introduced to the Greek culture of the day, he seemed from the very first destined for the vocation of giving back to the new Attic comedy that cosmopolitan character, which in its adaptation to the Roman public under the rough hands of Naevius, Plautus, and their associates it had in some measure lost.** Even in the selection and employment of models the contrast is apparent between him and that predecessor whom alone we can now compare with him. Plautus chooses his pieces from the whole range of the newer Attic comedy, and by no means disdains the livelier and more popular comedians, such as Philemon; **Terence keeps almost exclusively to Menander, the most elegant, polished, and chaste of all the poets of the newer comedy.**
…

Elegance of language was the pride of the poet, and it was owing above all to its inimitable charm that the most refined judges of art in aftertimes, such as Cicero, Caesar, and Quinctilian, assigned the palm to him among all the Roman poets of the republican age. In so far it is perhaps justifiable to date a new era in Roman literature—the real essence of which lay not in the development of Latin poetry, but in the development of the Latin language—from the comedies of Terence as the first artistically pure imitation of Hellenic works of art. **The modern comedy made its way amidst the most determined literary warfare.** The Plautine style of composing had taken root among the Roman *bourgeoisie*; the comedies of Terence encountered the liveliest opposition from the public, which found their "insipid language," their "feeble style," intolerable. The, apparently, pretty sensitive poet replied in his prologues—which properly were not intended for any such purpose—with counter-criticisms full of defensive and offensive polemics; and appealed from the multitude, which had twice run off from his *Hecyra* to witness a band of gladiators and rope-dancers, to the cultivated circles of the genteel world. **He declared that he only aspired to the approval of the "good";** in which doubtless there was not wanting a hint, that it was not at all seemly to undervalue works of art which had obtained the approval of the "few." He acquiesced in or even favoured the report, that persons of quality aided him in composing with their counsel or even with their cooperation.1 **In reality he carried his point; even in literature the oligarchy prevailed, and the artistic comedy of the exclusives supplanted the comedy of the people: we find that about 620/134 the pieces of Plautus disappeared from the set of stock plays.** This is the more significant, because after the early death of Terence no man of conspicuous talent at all further occupied this field.

https://archive.org/details/playsandpuritan02kinggoog/page/n51/mode/2up?view=theater

> We appeal to common sense—would any father allow his own children to personate, even in private, the basest of mankind? **And yet we must beg pardon: for common sense, it is to be supposed, has decided against us, as long as parents allow their sons to act yearly at Westminster the stupid low art of Terence, while grave and reverend prelates and divines look on approving.** The Westminster play has had no very purifying influence on the minds of the young gentlemen who personate heathen damsels; and we only ask, What must have been the effect of representing far fouler characters than Terence's on the minds of uneducated lads of the lower classes?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Terence

No writer in any literature, who has contented himself with so limited a function, has gained so great a reputation as Terence. He lays no claim to the position of an original artist painting from life or commenting on the results of his own observation. **His art has no relation to his own time or to the country in which he lived.** The chief source of interest in the fragmentary remains of Naevius, Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius and Lucilius is their relation to the national and moral spirit of the age in which they were written. Plautus, though, like Terence, he takes the first sketch of his plots, scenes and characters, from the Attic stage, is yet a true representative of his time, a genuine Italian, writing before the genius of Italy had learned the restraints of Greek art. **The whole aim of Terence was to present a faithful copy of the life, manners, modes of thought and expression which had been drawn from reality a century before his time by the writers of the New Comedy of Athens.** The nearest parallel to his literary position may be found in the aim which Virgil puts before himself in his *Bucolics*. He does not seek in that poem to draw Italian peasants from the life, but to bring back the shepherds of Theocritus on Italian scenes. Yet the result obtained by Virgil is different. The charm of his pastorals is the Italian sentiment which pervades them. His shepherds are not the shepherds of Theocritus, nor are they in any sense true to life. **The extraordinary result obtained by Terence is that, while he has left no trace in any of his comedies of one sketching from the life by which he was surrounded, there is perhaps no more truthful, natural and delicate delineator of human nature, in its ordinary and more level moods, within the whole range of classical literature. His permanent position in literature is due, no doubt, to the art and genius of Menander, whose creations he has perpetuated, as a fine engraver may perpetuate the spirit of a great painter whose works have perished. But no mere copyist or verbal translator could have attained that result.** Though without claims to creative originality, Terence must have had not only critical genius, to enable him fully to appreciate and identify himself with his originals, but artistic genius of a high and pure type. The importance of his position in Roman literature consists in this, that he was the first writer who set before himself a high ideal of artistic perfection, and was the first to realize that perfection in style, form, and consistency of conception and execution. Living in the interval between Ennius and Lucilius, whose original force and genius survive only in rude and inartistic fragments, he produced six plays, which have not only reached our time in the form in which they were given to the world, but have been read in the most critical and exacting literary epochs, and still may be read without any feeling of the need of making allowance for the rudeness of a new and undeveloped art.

While his great gift to Roman literature is that he first made it artistic, that he imparted to "rude Latium" the sense of elegance, consistency and moderation, his gift to the world is that through him it possesses a living image of the Greek society in the 3rd century B.C., presented in the purest Latin idiom. **Yet Terence had no affinity by birth either with the Greek race or with the people of Latium. He was more distinctly a foreigner than any of the great classical writers of Rome.** He lived at the meeting-point of three distinct civilizations—the mature, or rather decaying, civilization of Greece, of which Athens was still the centre; that of Carthage, which was so soon to pass away and leave scarcely any vestige of itself; and the nascent civilization of Italy, in which all other modes were soon to be absorbed. **Terence was by birth an African, and was thus perhaps a fitter medium of connexion between the genius of Greece and that of Italy than if he had been a pure Greek or a pure Italian; just as in modern times the Jewish type of genius is sometimes found more detached from national peculiarities, and thus more capable of reproducing a cosmopolitan type of character than the genius of men belonging to other races.**
…

We learn from these prologues that the best Roman literature was ceasing to be popular, and had come to rely on the patronage of the great. **A consequence of this change of circumstances was that comedy was no longer national in character and sentiment, but had become imitative and artistic.** The life which Terence represents is that of the well-to-do citizen class whose interests are commonplace, but whose modes of thought and speech are refined, humane and intelligent. His characters are finely delineated and discriminated rather than, like those of Plautus, boldly conceived. Delicate irony and pointed epigram take the place of broad humour. Love, in the form of pathetic sentiment rather than of irregular passion, is the chief motive of his pieces. **His great characteristics are humanity and urbanity, and to this may be attributed the attraction which he had for the two chief representatives of these qualities in Roman literature—Cicero and Horace.**

Terence's pre-eminence in art was recognized in the Augustan age; and Horace expresses this opinion, though not as his own, in these words (Epistles II. i. 59):—

> “Vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte.”

…

He makes no claim to the creative exuberance of Plautus, but he is entirely free from his extravagance and mannerisms. The superiority of his style over that of Lucilius, who wrote his satires a generation later, is immeasurable. **The best judges and the greatest masters of style in the best period of Roman literature were his chief admirers in ancient times. Cicero frequently reproduces his expressions, applies passages in his plays to his own circumstances, and refers to his personages as typical representations of character.[1] Julius Caesar's lines on Terence, the “dimidiatus Menander,” while they complain of lack of comic power, characterize him as “puri sermonis amator.”** Horace, so deprecatory in general of the older literature, shows his appreciation of Terence by the frequent reproduction in his *Satires* and *Odes* of his language and his philosophy of life. Quintilian applies to his writings the word *elegantissima*. His works were studied and learned by heart by the great Latin writers of the Renaissance, such as Erasmus and Melanchthon; and Casaubon, in his anxiety that his son should write a pure Latin style, inculcates on him the constant study of Terence. Montaigne[2] applies to him the phrase of Horace: “Liquidus puroque simillimus amni.” He speaks of “his fine expression, elegancy and quaintness,” and adds, “he does so possess the soul with his graces that we forget those of his fable.” Sainte-Beuve devotes to him two papers of delicate and admiring criticism. He quotes Fénelon and Addison, “deux esprits polis et doux, de la même famille littéraire,” as expressing their admiration for the inimitable beauty and naturalness of one of his scenes. **Fénelon is said to have preferred him even to Molière. Sainte-Beuve calls Terence the bond of union between Roman urbanity and the Atticism of the Greeks, and adds that it was in the 17th century, when French literature was most truly Attic, that he was most appreciated.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3f7vzTjUQ4EC&lpg=PP3&hl=fi&pg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false

The philosophy of the Greek Stoics is in evidence in Terence’s writing. In accordance with Stoic materialism, Terence retains the principle that the *psychê* is knowable through its external manifestations. As in Menander, the actor is the hidden but material presence animating visible corporeal matter. The Stoics were much concerned with moral responsibility. While the masks of Plautus act rather than think, and their actions seem to have no consequences extending beyond the action of the play, Terence’s masks cannot escape moral responsibility. In *The Brothers* we see, for instance, how two old men display contrasting philosophies of education, two young men contrasting attitudes to marriage. Present actions are seen as having consequences in future life. **While Aristotle perceived most emotions as good or bad only in relation to the situation in which they are experienced, Stoicism tended to regard emotion in general as dangerous.** Stoicism therefore did not encourage its adherents to make fine distinctions between different emotions, but gave credit to those who can conquer all emotions. As I observed in chapter I, **the binary structure of Terence’s narratives sets up a clear opposition between those who surrender to pleasure, and those who reject emotion in preference to duty. Terence’s plays are not Stoic tracts, but they are plainly shaped by an engagement with Stoicism.**

…

Terence’s style is commonly distinguished from that of Menander by his tendency to generalize. This tendency has often been related to Terence’s Stoic concern with ‘humanity’ rather than with one specific society.52 I shall restrict myself to one representative example of this generalizing tendency. Chremes in *The Self-Tormentor* tells his sons that parental severity follows a common pattern, for parents attempt to inculcate virtue in their sons, while sons ‘enslave their minds to base desires’ (lines 204-9); the son responds by claiming that fathers are unfair judges of *adulescentes* (line 213). The plays bear out the implications of this conversation, namely that all fathers have problems in common, and so do all sons. Terence’s concern with the Stoic virtue of self-dominance in respect of all personal desires, his Stoic concept of man’s common humanity, and the whole corporate ethic of Roman society allowed no space for the intricacies of Menander’s masking system.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA393#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **This ”bon sens,” Nitze (like Brunetière) thought, originated in Rabelais and Montaigne, but more particularly in Charron’s *Sagesse*,** which gave Molière his two other major qualities: “prud’homie” or integrity, and “volupté.” **Nitze quoted from Charron to show that underlying this integrity is the law of nature and concluded that Molière was indirectly connected with Montaigne, through Charron, and that the point of contact uniting these three was the philosophy of nature:** “fidelity to custom, avoidance of extremes [“juste mesure”], and searching after pleasure [“volupté”].” From these precepts is derived that “bon sens” so necessary for the good life which Molière counseled in his plays. Having made an analysis of the plays which he thought derived from this view, **Nitze’s final verdict is that although this attitude is not**

> **Christian, it is not "libertin" either, in the brutal, debauched sense of the word, but is preeminently a moralist view.**

https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/n45/mode/2up?view=theater

Not only is humour very rare in Hebrew literature before the 19th century (and is only found during few periods, in countries where the Jewish upper class was relatively free from the rabbinical yoke, such as Italy between the 14th and 17th centuries or Muslim Spain) but humour and jokes are strictly forbidden by the Jewish religion – except, significantly, jokes against other religions. **Satire against rabbis and leaders of the community was never internalised by Judaism, not even to a small extent, as it was in Latin Christianity. There were no Jewish comedies, just as there were no comedies in Sparta, and for a similar reason.**8

Satire as Popular Philosophy on JSTOR

Paneatius had gone so far as to adopt Aristotle's doctrine of the mean which became a typical part of Roman Stoicism. **The friend of Scipio and of Laelius, he can hardly have failed to be the friend of their intimate Lucilius, and the philosophy which they adopted heartily must also have been that of Lucilius. The only long fragment of his, that on *virtus*, in which virtue, the Stoic *summum bonum*, is defined with considerable earnestness, confirms this probability with the strongest evidence.** The exaltation of the good and the responsibility to country and to friend and only in the third place to self is Stoic doctrine.
…

The scholiast to Persius iii. 1 says that that satire is taken from Lucilius' fourth book in which he attacks *luxurium et vitia divitum*. Arnobius (*Adv. nat.* ii. 2) refers to Lucilius as an authority on philosophic questions **and Cicero (*De fin.* 1. 3) is conclusive: *sed neque tam docti tum errant ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris*. For, while Cicero does not highly commend his philosophic worth, he clearly ranks him as a philosophic writer.** And the characterization fits pretty closely the "spoudogeloion" of the Cynic. Horace's description of Lucilius (*Sat.* ii. 1.75) as *scilicet uni aequus virtuti ei eius amicis* has been overshadowed by the preceding line, *primores populi arripuit populumque tributim*, but it is more fundamental and both aspects are necessary to an adequate understanding of Lucilius' work.
…

While Lucilius was putting into "poetic" dress the popular form of Cynic philosophy, the more legitimate form that Menippus had used did not die out. Cicero's characterization of Varro is strikingly like his characterization of Lucilius: *Acad.* i. 3.9: *ipse varium et elegans omni fere numeor poema fecisti, philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellandum satis, as edocendum parum.* **Aulus Gellius (ii. 18.6) specifically calls Menippus a famous philosopher and Varro his imitator.** Varro called his own work *Menippeae*; others sometimes called them that, sometimes *Cynicae*. (Aulus Gellius ii. 18.6 and xiii. 31.1.)

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Gellius/2*.html#ref47
>
> 6 There were not a few other slaves too afterwards who became famous philosophers, 7 among them that Menippus whose works Marcus Varro emulated[48] in those satires which others call "Cynic," but he himself, "Menippean."[49]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_III/Apologetic/Apology/Chapter_XIV

Diogenes, too, makes utter mock of Hercules and **the Roman cynic Varro [Romanus cynicus Varro]** brings forward three hundred Joves, or Jupiters they should be called, all headless.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Varro,_Marcus_Terentius

VARRO, MARCUS TERENTIUS (116-27 B.C.), Roman polymath and man of letters, was born at Reate in the Sabine country. Here he imbibed in his earlier years a good measure of the hardy simplicity and strong seriousness which the later Romans attributed to the men of the early republic—characteristics which were supposed to linger in the Sabine land after they had fled from the rest of Italy.
…

In poetry he seems to have attempted nothing that was very elaborate, and little of a serious character. His genius tended naturally in the direction of burlesque and satire. In belles lettres he showed himself throughout, both in matter and form, the pupil and admirer of Lucilius, after whom he wrote satires. One poetical work probably consisted of short pieces in the style of the more satirical poems of Catullus. It is doubtful whether, as has often been supposed, Varro wrote a philosophical poem

somewhat in the style of Lucretius; if so, it should rather be classed with the prose technical treatises. One curious production was an essay in popular illustrated literature, which was almost unique in ancient times. Its title was *Imagines*, and it consisted of 700 prose biographies of Greek and Roman celebrities, with a metrical *elogium* for each, accompanied in each case by a portrait. **But the lighter works of Varro have perished almost to the last line, with the exception of numerous fragments of the *Menippean Satires*. The Menippus whom Varro imitated lived in the first half of the 3rd century B.C., and was born a Phoenician slave. He became a Cynic philosopher, and is a figure familiar to readers of Lucian. He flouted life and all philosophies but the Cynic in light compositions,** partly in prose and partly in verse.
...

The Latin is frequently as rough and uncouth as that of Lucilius. No doubt Varro contemned the Hellenizing innovations by which the hard and rude Latin of his youth was transformed into the polished literary language of the late republican and the Augustan age.
...

The whole tone of the writer is that of a *laudator temporis acti*, who can but scoff at all that has come into fashion in his own day. From the numerous citations in later authors it is clear that the *Menippean Satires* were the most popular of Varro's writings.

https://archive.org/details/onpagansjewschri0000momi/page/60/mode/2up?view=theater

We are unexpectedly told by Pliny the Elder that Varro arranged for himself by testament a burial in the Pythagorean style (*Naturalis Historia* 35.160). He had been educated in Rome at the school of Aelius Stilo, who had commented in the language of the Twelve Tables and was of the Stoic persuasion. He had later been at the school of Antiochus of Ascalon, where the Platonic tradition had taken a definite turn towards skepticism and student were trained to produce arguments in favor of both sides. Yet if anything emerges from what Varro did and wrote, it is the need to separate one's religious and philosophic opinions from the role one is expected to play in one's own society. In Varro's time it was commonplace to distinguish three types of theology: the *genus mythicum*, which was appropriate to poets and was generally dismissed as unworthy of thoughtful people; the *genus physicum*, which represented the speculations of philosophers about gods, and finally the *genus civile*, or political type, which the citizens and especially the priests of a given state were required to know because it indicated the gods of the state itself, as well as the rites and sacrifices appropriate to them.

> https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap2.htm
>
> **The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful.**

...

Thus, very self-consciously, Varro states that he has on purpose put the *Antiquitates divinae* after the *Antiquitates humanae*. The *civitas* must precede the institutions of the *civitas*, even the religious ones: **even more daringly, the painter precedes the painting – "prior est pictor quam tabula picta."**
...

As Varro was specifically interested in Roman religion, **the first change he thought had happened was the introduction of images of gods in the shape of men.** I am not sure that for Varro this was equivalent to what we would consider the anthropomorphization of the notion of God. **But it certainly occurred to Varro that a religion without human images of gods existed in his own time among the Jews, and it was not a bad thing either** (Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 4.31).
...

Yet he did not feel he had to change his attitude toward Roman religion. **If the Romans had decided in their wisdom to represent their gods in human form, there was nothing left but to comply.**
...

Varro was not the man to conceal his preferences and convictions, but one of his convictions was precisely that there are truths which should remain unknown to the ordinary man and there are falsehoods which should be spread among the mob as truths. Civic religion was ultimately not a matter of truth but of civic cohesion: the Romans owed their empire to their own piety. **It was even useful that people should consider themselves descended from gods, however false that might be, it if added to their self-confidence in undertaking great things.**
...

Even within the description of the religious system of Rome to which he devoted most of his *Divine Antiquities* **Varro would not start from the gods and proceed to their cults.** Very coherently he

started from the pontiffs, the augurs, the *quindecimviri*, that is, from the men who were responsible for the cult. The third section was on the festivals and rites, including games. This left only three books out of sixteen for the gods as such. St. Augustine inevitably found them the most interesting from his point of view, and therefore we know slightly more about them than about the other books.
…

It was highly unusual to find a man who knew so much about the traditions of Rome and had such genuine respect for them, and yet was a recognizable freethinker with a taste for satire and wit.

Satire as Popular Philosophy on JSTOR

Nothing of this seems to justify the statement on Nettleship (*Essays in Latin Literature*, p. 52) **that in the first book of the satires Horace is a pronounced Epicurean.** The citations which Nettleship makes merely serve to illustrate Horace's freedom of thought. He could laugh at the extremes of the Stoics and quote from Philodemus **(Seneca's favorite author for quotation purposes in his Stoic diatribes, the epistles, is Epicurus!),** but the bulk of his philosophy is modified Stoicism, modified first by Panaetius and then by Horace.

In the second book of the *Satires*, Horace's touch is more sure. After the discussion of the literary type in number one, **he proceeds to a presentation of his doctrine of the mean in the matter of living, presented under the guise of a parody on a Stoic sermon.** He follows this up with a more elaborate Stoic sermon in three, in which he attacks avarice, ambition, self-indulgence, superstition. **He mocks at the preacher but he is "telling the truth with a laugh."** The same is true of satire seven, an attack in the form of an indirect Stoic sermon against the inconsistencies and follies of mankind.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14020/14020-h/14020-h.htm#THE_FIRST_BOOK_OF_THE_EPISTLES_OF_HORACE

Now therefore I lay aside both verses, and all other sportive matters; my study and inquiry is after what is true and fitting, and I am wholly engaged in this: I lay up, and collect rules which I may be able hereafter to bring into use. And lest you should perchance ask under what leader, in what house [of philosophy], I enter myself a pupil: **addicted to swear implicitly to the ipse-dixits of no particular master, [nullius addictus iurare in uerba magistri] wherever the weather drives me, I am carried a guest. One while I become active, and am plunged in the waves of state affairs, a maintainer and a rigid partisan of strict virtue; then again I relapse insensibly into Aristippus' maxims, and endeavor to adapt circumstances to myself, not myself to circumstances.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50657/50657-h/50657-h.htm#FNanchor_20_20

If he celebrates the master of the world, it is not until he is asked by him whether he is ashamed that posterity should know them to be friends; and he declines a post, which few of his detractors have merit to deserve, or virtue to refuse. His choice of privacy, however, was in some measure constitutional; for he had an easiness of temper which bordered on indolence; hence he never rises to the dignity of a decided character. **Zeno and Epicurus share his homage and undergo his ridicule by turns: he passes without difficulty from one school to another, and** he thinks it a sufficient excuse for his versatility, that he continues, amid every change, the zealous defender of virtue. Virtue, however, abstractedly considered, has few obligations to his zeal.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n277/mode/2up?view=theater

> * **Almost neglected in the Middle Ages, Horace came into his own in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the age of modern classicism, when every statesman and pamphleteer, above all in England, turned the poet's phrases into prose clichés.** Boileau's *L'Art poétique* revived Horace's *Ad Pisones* and formed and chilled the French drama till Hugo; Pope's *Essay on Criticism* attempted a similar refrigeration in England, but was thawed by Byron's fire.

…

He honored virtue like a Stoic, and respected pleasure like an Epicurean. "Who, then, is free?" he asks, and answers, like Zeno, "The wise man, he who is lord over himself, whom neither poverty nor death nor bonds affright, who defies his passions, scorns ambition, and is in himself a whole."[53] **One of his noblest poems sings a Stoic strain:**

> Iustum et tenacem propositi virum
> si fractus inlabatur orbis
> impavidum ferient ruinae—

"If a man is just and resolute, the whole world may break and fall upon him and find him, in the ruins, undismayed."[54] But despite all this he calls himself, with engaging honesty, "a pig from Epicurus' sty."[55] Like

Epicurus he placed more store on friendship than on love; **like Virgil he lauded the reforms of Augustus, and remained a bachelor. He did his best to preach religion, but he had none.** Death, he felt, ends all.[56]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater

Cicero, though he always classed himself as an Academic, exclaims in one place that he is afraid the Stoics are the only philosophers, and, whenever he is combating Epicureanism, his language is that of a Stoic. Some of Vergil's most eloquent passages seem to be inspired by Stoic speculation.1 **Even Horace, despite his banter about the sage, in his serious moods borrows the language of the Stoics.** It was they who inspired the highest flights of declamatory eloquence in Persius and Juvenal.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0027%3Atext%3DSatyricon%3Asection%3D118

[118] "Yes, my young friends," said Eumolpus, "poetry has led many astray. As soon as a man has shaped his verse in feet and woven into it a more delicate meaning with an ingenious circumlocution, he thinks that forthwith he has scaled Helicon. **In this fashion people who are tired out with forensic oratory often take refuge in the calm of poetry as in some happier haven, supposing that a poem is easier to construct than a declamation adorned with quivering epigrams.** But nobler souls do not love such coxcombry, and the mind cannot conceive or bring forth its fruit unless it is steeped in the vast flood of literature. **One must flee away from all diction that is, so to speak, cheap, and choose words divorced from popular use, putting into practice, "I hate the common herd and hold it afar."**[1] Besides, one must take care that the epigrams do not stand out from the body of the speech: they must shine with a brilliancy that is woven into the material. Homer proves this, and the lyric poets, and Roman Virgil, and the studied felicity of Horace. The others either did not see the path that leads to poetry, or saw it and were afraid to walk in it. **For instance, anyone who attempts the vast theme of the Civil War**[2] **will sink under the burden unless he is full of literature.**
...

[119] "The conquering Roman now held the whole world, sea and land and the course of sun and moon. But he was not satisfied. Now the waters were stirred and troubled by his loaded ships; **if there were any hidden bay beyond, or any land that promised a yield of yellow gold, that place was Rome's enemy,** fate stood ready for the sorrows of war, and the quest for wealth went on. There was no happiness in familiar joys, or in pleasures dulled by the common man's use. The soldier out at sea would praise the bronze of Corinth; bright colours dug from earth rivalled the purple; here the African curses Rome, here the Chinaman plunders his marvellous silks, and the Arabian hordes have stripped their own fields bare.
...

I shrink from speaking plain and betraying our destiny of ruin; **boys whose childhood is hardly begun are kidnapped in the Persian way, and the powers the knife has shorn are forced to the service of lust, and in order that the passing of man's finest age may be hedged round with delay and hold back the hurrying years, Nature seeks for herself, and finds herself not.** So all take their pleasure in harlotry, and the halting steps of a feeble body, and in flowing hair and numberless clothes of new names, everything that ensnares mankind.
...

"The same madness is in public life, **the true-born Roman [Quirites]** is bought, and changes his vote for plunder and the cry of gain. The people are corrupt, the house of senators is corrupt, their support hangs on a price. The freedom and virtue of the old men had decayed, their power was swayed by largesse, even their dignity was stained by money and trodden in the dust.

"Cato is beaten and driven out by the mob; his conqueror is more unhappy than he, and is ashamed to have torn the rods of office from Cato. For the shame of the nation and the fall of their character lay in this, that here was not only one man's defeat. In his person the power and glory of Rome was humbled. So Rome in her deep disgrace was herself both price and prize, and despoiled herself without an avenger. **Moreover filthy usury and the handling of money had caught the common people in a double whirlpool, and destroyed them. Not a house is safe, not a man but is mortgaged; the madness spreads through their limbs, and trouble bays and hounds them down like some disease sown in the dumb flesh. In despair they turn to violence, and bloodshed restores the good things lost by luxury. A beggar can risk everything in safety.** Could the spell of healthful reason stir Rome from the filth where she rolled in heavy sleep, or only madness and war and the lust wakened by the sword?

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n331/mode/2up?view=theater

On that rugged isle, amid a population as primitive as in Ovid's Tomi, the philosopher spent eight lonely years (41-49). At first he took his misfortune with true stoic calm, and comforted his mother with a touching *Consolatio ad Helviam;* but as the bitter years crawled on, his spirit broke, and he addressed to Claudius' secretary a *Consolatio ad Polybium* in a humble appeal for pardon. When this failed he tried to dull his sufferings by composing tragedies.

These strange productions, in which almost every character is an orator, were probably intended for the study rather than the stage; we do not hear of any of them being played; at most some brilliant episodes or resounding speeches were put to music and acted by a mime. **The gentle philosopher incarnadines the stage with violence, as if he would rival in the theater the blood feasts of the games.** Despite these heroic efforts he is too much of a thinker to be a good dramatist: he prefers ideas to men, and loses no chance for reflection, sentiment, or epigram. His plays contain some fine lines, but for the rest they may be forgotten with impunity. **It should be added, however, that many good judges have not agreed with this verdict. Scaliger, lord of Renaissance critics, preferred Seneca to Euripides. When ancient literature came back to life it was Seneca who served as model for the first dramas in modern speech; from him came the classic form and unities that marked the plays of Corneille and Racine and dominated the French stage till the nineteenth century.** In England, which felt his influence less, the translation of Seneca's dramas by Heywood (1559) gave an exemplar to the first English tragedy, *Gorboduc,* and left its mark on Shakespeare.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n35/mode/2up?view=theater

Gryphius did well to call the separate portions of his dramatic works "treatises" (*Abhandlungen*). **He took for his model Seneca (who was himself a frigid and academic imitator) and from him he acquired the taste, shared by all his contemporaries in drama, for things monstrous and ugly, for crude amphitheatre effects.** In his Murder Scenes (*Mordspektakeln*), which, as the title indicates, is nothing but a string of filthy and preposterous scenes of bloodshed, he carries a mean realism to its extreme.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50657/50657-h/50657-h.htm#FNanchor_22_22

In the interval between Horace and Persius, despotism had changed its nature: the chains which the policy of Augustus concealed in flowers, were now displayed in all their hideousness. The arts were neglected, literature of every kind discouraged or disgraced, and terror and suspicion substituted in the place of the former ease and security. **Stoicism, which Cicero accuses of having infected poetry, even in his days, and of which the professors, as Quintilian observes, always disregarded the graces and elegancies of composition, spread with amazing rapidity.**[22]
…

But while he grew pale over the page of Zeno, and Cleanthes, and Chrysippus; while he imbibed, with all the ardor of a youthful mind, the paradoxes of those great masters, together with their principles, the foundations of civil society were crumbling around him, and soliciting his attention in vain. To judge from what he has left us, it might almost be affirmed that he was a stranger in his own country. The degradation of Rome was now complete; yet he felt, at least he expresses, no indignation at the means by which it was effected: a sanguinary buffoon was lording it over the prostrate world; yet he continued to waste his most elaborate efforts on the miserable pretensions of pedants in prose and verse! **If this savor of the impassibility of Stoicism, it is entitled to no great praise on the score of outraged humanity, which has stronger claims on a well-regulated mind, than criticism, or even philosophy.**

Dryden gives that praise to the dogmas of Persius, which he denies to his poetry. "His verse," he says, "is scabrous and hobbling, and his measures beneath those of Horace." This is too severe; for Persius has many exquisite passages, which nothing in Horace will be found to equal or approach. The charge of obscurity has been urged against him with more justice; though this, perhaps, is not so great as it is usually represented. Casaubon could, without question, have defended him more successfully than he has done; but he was overawed by the brutal violence of the elder Scaliger; for I can scarcely persuade myself that he really believed this obscurity to be owing to "the fear of Nero, or the advice of Cornutus."

Satire as Popular Philosophy on JSTOR

Persius followed Horace, but afar off. The genial, intimate touch was gone, **the form became mechanical,** and only the dogged presentation of Stoic doctrine, ineffectual as it was, gave interest to the unnatural, involved satire of Persius.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA6#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **[Isaac Casaubon's] brief text of Persius (23 pages) is followed by a massive commentary (558 pages) full of information about Stoicism. The scale of the commentary famously led Joseph Scaliger to comment that the sauce was better than the meat** (Sandys 1903-8: II 209).

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50657/50657-h/50657-h.htm#FNanchor_26_26

I have observed in the course of the translation, that [Juvenal] embraced no sect with warmth. In a man of such lively passions, the retention with which he speaks of them all, is to be admired. **From his**

attachment to the writings of Seneca, I should incline to think that he leaned toward Stoicism; his predilection for the school, however, was not very strong: perhaps it is to be wished that he had entered a little more deeply into it, as he seems not to have those distinct ideas of the nature of virtue and vice, which were entertained by many of the ancient philosophers, and indeed, by his immediate predecessor, Persius.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_15

What man, what God, would withhold a pardon from bellies which had suffered such dire straits, and which might look to be forgiven by the Manes of those whose bodies they were devouring? **To us, indeed, Zeno[10] gives better teaching, for he permits some things, though not indeed all things, to be done for the saving of life; but how could a Cantabrian[11] be a Stoic, and that too in the days of old Metellus?[12]** To-day the whole world has its Greek and its Roman Athens; eloquent Gaul has trained the pleaders of Britain, and distant Thule[13] talks of hiring a rhetorician.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA200#v=onepage&q&f=false

Much of Cynic teaching took the form of anecdotes about its heroes. Lucian in the *Demonax* imitates that method in portraying his hero largely through a series of anecdotes in which he is seen scoring one-liners in the manner of Diogenes.40 His *Peregrinus*, on the other hand, is a wonderful satire on the Cynic method of teaching by example. **Here the cynic Theagenes, who imitates everything Peregrinus does (24), goes beyond comparing Peregrinus to Socrates, Antisthenes, and Diogenes, and adduces Zeus.** Peregrinus himself, before immolating himself on a pyre, compares himself to Heracles and says that his purpose is to teach men to despise death (23, 33).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false

Lucian had a somewhat different fortune. **He would have rejoiced at being joined with Aristophanes – a “wise and truthful man,” he said, “whose writings are distrusted without reason.”**6 Though certain vulgarities had to be overlooked, many passages out of Lucian had been used by the Church Fathers as witness against the false pagan prophets. If Saint Gregory Nazianzen and Saint John Chrysostom could quote him, why should northern humanists feel inhibited? **Among the small library of books Raphael Hythloday leaves with More’s Utopians, the works of Plato rank first; Aristophanes leads the list of poets, which includes Homer, Euripides, and Sophocles; the Utopians are very fond of Plutarch, but “captivated by the wit and pleasantry of Lucian.”**7
…

More and Erasmus both had a special predilection for Lucian. **His transmission became a communal enterprise of European humanist scholarship, with each writer preparing a few dialogues.** Before 1500, at least twenty-one distinct editions of thirteen different dialogues had been published in Latin.
…

Ulrich von Hutten learned Greek in Bologna by reading Lucian and Aristophanes, **and much of the early pamphleteering of the Reformation imitated Lucian’s style and literary devices.**

Virtually all the major utopian themes of the novelistic Greek utopias are parodied in the *True Story* of Lucian. **This second-century rhetorician and satirist had served as an administrator for the Romans in Egypt,** and in the spirit of the new overlords of the Mediterranean world showed little sympathy for the utopian imagination, though he was well acquainted with its expressions from the mythic tales of the golden age through Plato and Iambulus. In his *True Story*, **which was translated into Latin and published in the same volume as the first book of Diodorus Siculus’ history in a 1476 edition,** he indiscriminately tossed all the great philosophical and military heroes of antiquity into an island community and recounted with malicious delight the ensuing involvements – except for Plato, isolated in a republic he had constructed for himself in accordance with a constitution and laws of his own devising.

Though Lucian’s aim was to satirize, his influence was not unequivocally anti-utopian, **and many a light conceit from the *True Story* and the *Saturnalia* found its way into serious utopian literature.** His picture of the Island of the Blessed, which he described with deliberate and studied exaggeration, piecing together a montage out of elements from the whole body of Greek utopian literature, **was sometimes read as a straight-faced account.** In his own way, Lucian conveniently synthesized the popular and the literary Greek utopian traditions for later generations. **Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century utopia-makers in search of stage sets simply lifted them out of his writings. If Plato dominated the rational argument and formal structures of utopian thought in early modern times, it was Lucian, favorite of More and Erasmus, who supplied many of the colorful details and some of the extravagant imagery.**
…

The friends of More who read the *Utopia* were thus prepared for this type of exercise. **Lucian's mocking exaggeration and the fantasy play were part of their habitual literary practice, even in personal correspondence.** But this does not mean that More's *Utopia* was merely a Lucianic performance, as one recent critic proposes, a parody of a utopia in the sense that Lucian's *True Story* was a parody of the ideal city plans and golden-age myths and fantasy places in Hellenistic novels. The majesty of Plato's presence pervades the Kingdom of Utopia.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA229#v=onepage&q&f=false

For the exposition of his conceptions Bruno had adopted the form of Lucian's dialogues. **(It is odd that Lucian, who satirized utopia, should have so attracted the great utopians from More on.)** But Bruno was no Hellenistic trifler, and his tone was passionately earnest.

http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2003/2003-01-24.html

While being snubbed in his lifetime and almost totally ignored by Philostratus and other worthies of the Second Sophistic High Church, Lucian got his own sweet revenge later on, for not only in Byzantium but also in Western Europe he became one of the most widely read -- and often very much admired -- Greek authors of Roman Imperial times.
…

Erasmus is the greatest Lucianist of his age, and some of his most famous works, *Moriae Encomium* and *Colloquia Familiaria*, are unthinkable without Lucian's influence.5
…

Wieland had meant to do Lucian a favor when he compared him to Voltaire; but this comparison came back to haunt Lucian, as it increasingly contributed to depict his wit as negative and destructive (130-137).
…

B. rightly stresses the importance of Jacob Bernays' book 'Lukian und die Kyniker' (188-193); Bernays more or less ended the controversy about *De morte Peregrini*, **but at the same time he put forward -- in strong and very persuasive terms -- such a dismissive judgment of Lucian's intellectual qualities that the target of this judgment would not recover from this condemnation for a hundred years.**

The last chapter (201-243, under the witty title "Lucianus quinquies accusatus") is devoted to Lucian's fortunes in 20th century Germany. B. distinguishes five reasons why those fortunes sank to their lowest ebb. **In the wake of Bernays, German classicists like Wilamowitz, Hirzel, and Helm dismissed Lucian as a totally nihilistic author and a mere 'journalist'** (201-206). **It did not help that Lucian's age was considered -- even more now than had been the case earlier -- a period of ever increasing decline and that parallels between it and the age of Wieland (as a period markedly inferior to the following classicism of Schiller and Goethe) were very much stressed** (206-209). Also satire, one of Lucian's principal modes of expression, was rejected as obsolete and not on a par with other literary genres, a development that had already begun in the 19th century (209-214). **Related to this was an increasing tendency to compare Lucian to Heinrich Heine, whose satirical works did not enjoy much favor either** (214-217), **and at the end of the 19th century, anti-Semitic sentiments crept in, depicting Lucian as an 'Oriental' and 'Syrian' totally devoid of character and principles** (217-219). Finally the last blow was dealt by Rudolf Helm (in *Lukian und Menipp*, 1906), who tried to show that this author did not have even the slightest claim to literary merit and originality, having taken everything that is worthwhile in his writings out of the works of Menippus (220-224).

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n407/mode/2up?view=theater

Aristophanes had scoffed as Voltaire did in later days; but the satire of both these men had its origin in a positive, constructive thought, and everywhere one sees the flash of fanatical love for the people of the homeland, for the firm, definite, related community, which embraced and supported each one of them with its traditions, its faith and its great men; Lucian, on the other hand, scoffs like Heine,* he has no noble aim, no profound conviction, no thorough understanding; he drifts about aimlessly like a wreck on the ocean, nowhere at home, not without noble impulses, but without any definite object to which he might devote himself, learned, but yet one of those monsters of learning who, Calderon says,

> know everything and understand nothing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucian#Modern_Period

The German classicist Eduard Norden admitted that **he had, as a foolish youth, wasted time reading the works of Lucian,[131] but, as an adult, had come to realize that Lucian was nothing more than an "Oriental without depth or character... who has no soul and degrades the most soulful language".** [131] **Rudolf Helm, one of the leading scholars on Lucian in the early twentieth century, labelled**

Lucian as a "thoughtless Syrian" who "possesses none of the soul of a tragedian"[131] and compared him to the poet Heinrich Heine, who was known as the "mockingbird in the German poetry forest". [131] In his 1906 publication *Lukian und Menipp* ("Lucian and Menippus"), Helm argued that Lucian's claims of generic originality, especially his claim of having invented the comic dialogue, were actually lies intended to cover up his almost complete dependence on Menippus, whom he argued was the true inventor of the genre.[153]

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl2/wl213.htm

> Before many days had passed, I accosted the poet Homer, when we were both disengaged, and asked him, among other things, where he came from; it was still a burning question with us, I explained. He said he was aware that some brought him from Chios, others from Smyrna, and others again from Colophon; **the fact was, he was a Babylonian, generally known not as Homer, but as Tigranes; but when later in life he was given as a *homer* or hostage to the Greeks, that name clung to him.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n547/mode/2up?view=theater

Like Voltaire, whom he resembled in all but pity, he wrote philosophy so brilliantly that no one supposed that he was writing philosophy. **As if to show the spread of Hellenism, he was born at Samosata, in distant Commagene; "I am a Syrian from the Euphrates," he said; his native tongue was Syriac, his blood probably Semitic.[58]**
…

"When I was a boy," says his Menippus, "and heard the tales of Homer and Hesiod about the gods—adulterous gods, rapacious gods, violent, litigious, incestuous gods—I found it all quite proper and, indeed, was intensely interested. **When, however, I came to man's estate I observed that the laws flatly contradicted the poets, forbidding adultery and rapacity.**"
…

In "Zeus Tragoedus" the god is in a gloomy mood, for he observes a great crowd gathering in Athens to hear Damis the Epicurean deny, and Timocles the Stoic affirm, the existence and solicitude of the gods. Timocles breaks down and runs away, and Zeus despairs about his own future. Hermes comforts him: "There are plenty of believers left—a majority of Greeks, the body and dregs of the people, and the barbarians to a man."[61] **That such a piece should have brought no indictment on Lucian's head proves either the tolerance of the times or the twilight of the Greek gods.**
…

In "Charon" he paints a dark picture of the human scene as witnessed by superhuman eyes from some celestial peak: men plowing, toiling, disputing, suing in the courts, lending at usury, cheating and being cheated, running after gold or pleasure; over their heads a cloud of hopes, fears, follies, and hates; over these the Fates spinning the web of life for each human atom; one man is lifted high from the mass and then has a resounding fall; and each in turn is drawn away by some messenger of death. **Charon observes two armies fighting in the Peloponnesus; "Fools!" he comments, "not to know that though each of them should win a whole Peloponnesus he will get but a bare foot of ground in the end."[66] Lucian is as impartial as nature; he satirizes the rich for their greed, the poor for their envy, the philosophers for their cobwebs, the gods for their nonexistence.**

http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl1/wl170.htm

Ni. I, of course, I, the son of Aglaia and Charopus,

> Comeliest of all that came 'neath Trojan walls.

Me. But not comeliest of all that come 'neath the earth, as far as I know. Your bones are much like other people's; and the only difference between your two skulls is that yours would not take much to stove it in. It is a tender article, something short of masculine.

Ni. Ask Homer what I was, when I sailed with the Achaeans.

Me. **Dreams, dreams. I am looking at what you are; what you were is ancient history.**

Ni. Am I not handsomer here, Menippus?

Me. **You are not handsome at all, nor any one else either. <u>Hades is a democracy; one man is as good as another here.</u>**

https://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/ycgp/ycgp04.htm

"**During life there is the difference of intelligence and dullness, honour and meanness, but in death there is the equality of rottenness and putrefaction.**
…

"**In life they are known as Yao and Shun;1 dead they are so many bones which cannot be distinguished.** But if we hasten to enjoy our life, we have no time to trouble about what comes after death."

> Gun Hill Sheriff Bartlett: Far as I'm concerned, you can go out on the street and get yourself killed anytime you want to, but, you know something, **40 years from now the weeds'll grow just as pretty on my grave as they will on yours. Nobody'll even remember that I was yellow and you died like a fool.** That's your long view, son. Always take the long view.
>
> https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_25_3_02_baumgarth.pdf
>
> Hobbes had a good nose for scenting traces of aristocracy, the virtues of which he found unacceptable. **For Hobbes, all laughter indicates a sudden eruption of feeling of vainglory, of perceiving yourself superior to someone else** (1957, 36). **For Hobbes, comedy is an offense against the humble recognition that we all are fundamentally equal respecting our mortality.** Although not all humor is personal and prideful, Hobbes has a point. Comedians get maybe the bulk of their laughs by focusing on their audience's feeling of superiority to the unfortunates who are the brunt of the jokes. Comedy, then, preserved an element of aristocratic pride even in the extreme democracy of Aristophanes's Athens. It is difficult not to laugh when you get the punchline, even though the laugh maybe at some unfortunate's expense: laughter and stern democratic morality are often at odds. **The persistence of the comic is, then, a survival of a positive evaluation of inequality.** The sense of the comic, I venture to say, may be rooted in human nature itself. Yet are we not presently in a "postcomic" society? That is, are all acts of displaying a sense of superiority, which leads to the laugh, held by the most advanced elements of progressive morality to be offensive, maybe criminally so?

---

https://www.speakfreely.today/2019/01/20/stoic-origins-cosmopolitanism/

For example, François-Joseph-Victor Broussais concluded that by examining skulls he could deduce that Caucasians were the most beautiful race, that the Maori people could never live in civil society, and that various African tribes lacked intellectual abilities.
…

Alexander approaches Diogenes who is attentively scanning through an immense pile of human bones. When Alexander asks him what he is doing Diogenes replies *"I am searching for the bones of your father but cannot distinguish them from those of a slave".*

Unlike Broussais, Diogenes saw nothing special in the skulls of the dead. The moral of the story is that there was nothing inherent within any person that made them any more or less worthy than another.

The cynic school of philosophy, which Diogenes aided in founding, importantly posited that **our first and foremost form of affiliation should be to our common humanity, not our uncontrollable secondary characteristics of race, gender or class.** Cynical texts remain in a woefully fragmentary state, meaning that most of our knowledge of cynicism comes from other sources discussing its tenants and not always in a positive light.

Thankfully this is not the end of Cosmopolitanism' journey. Influenced heavily by the Cynics, the Stoic school of philosophy continued moving toward theories not based on individual states, but on based upon a higher natural law.
…

Because reason is the essence of what is essentially human, the Stoics argued that we should downplay our differences in other areas as they are deemed non-essential. Race, class and political alignment are not what make us truly human, and although they are important, they are not essential to our identity as rational beings worthy of respect.

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n537/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> "*Prov*. That is saying a great deal—Is he also superior to prejudice. **Does he prefer the general interest of the universe to that of more limited associations?**"

"*Introd.* Such have been his promises."

"*Prov.* How many others have made similar promises who did not keep them? Is he master of himself? Can he resist temptation? **Are personal considerations of no avail with respect to him? Ask him, whether the skeleton he has before him is that of a king, a nobleman, or a beggar?**"

"*Introd.* **He cannot tell; nature has destroyed all that marked the depraved state of inequality; all that he sees is, that this skeleton was man like us; and the character of man is all that he attends to.**"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Murray

George Gilbert Aimé Murray OM FBA (2 January 1866-20 May 1957) was an Australian-born British[1] classical scholar and public intellectual, with connections in many spheres. **He was an outstanding scholar of the language and culture of Ancient Greece, perhaps the leading authority in the first half of the twentieth century.**
...

He wrote and broadcast extensively on religion (Greek, Stoic and Christian); **and wrote several books dealing with his version of humanism, which he espoused as a naturalistic philosophy, contrasted with Christianity and revealed religion in general.**[54]

https://archive.org/details/stoicphilosophy210murr/page/18/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus the principle will mean: "Nothing is worth living for except goodness." The only good for man is to be good. And, as we might expect, when Zeno says "good" he means good in an ultimate Day-of-Judgment sense, and will take no half measures. **The principle turns out to be not nearly so harmless as it looked. It begins by making a clean sweep of the ordinary conventions.** You remember the eighteenth century lady's epitaph which ends: "Bland, passionate, and deeply religious, she was second cousin to the Earl of Leitrim, and of such are the kingdom of heaven." **One doubts whether, when the critical moment came, her relationships would really prove as important as her executors hoped; and it is the same with all the conventional goods of the world when brought before the bar of Zeno. Rank, riches, social distinction, health, pleasure, barriers of race or nation – what will those things matter before the tribunal of ultimate truth?** Not a jot. Nothing but goodness is good. It is what you are that matters – what you yourself are; and all these things are not you. They are external; they depend not on you alone, but on other people. **The thing that really matters depends on you, and on none but you.** From this there flows a very important and surprising conclusion. You possess already, if you only knew it, all that is worth desiring. The good is yours if you but will it. You need fear nothing. You are safe, inviolable, utterly free. A wicked man or an accident can cause you pain, break your leg, make you ill; but no earthly power can make you good or bad except yourself, and to be good or bad is the only thing that matters.

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_5.html

Epictetus points out again and again that everything not done by man is indifferent to man; only what man himself creates, which is therefore in his power, is important. In his "doctrine" that the soul must liberate itself from the body in order to awake to freedom, Plotinus obviously agrees with Epictetus; he, too, refuses to accept a ready-made "good" from nature or even from the hands of the gods; man must create his own good, and what he cannot himself create has no value. **Like Epictetus, Plotinus despises not only riches, health, and honour, but also friends, kinsmen, and even his fatherland; he is inexhaustible in proofs that all these things are no goods, but illusions, and that only the folly of man could hold illusion for reality.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=53GYDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false

1. Adiaphora *'Without a Self-Identity'*

The first term, *adiaphora*, is the negative of *diaphora* 'differentiated by a logical differentia' and literally means 'undifferentiated by a logical differentia',20 **that is, 'without a logical self-identity':**
...

A direct consequence of the teaching of *adiaphora* 'without a logical differentia, no self-identity' is the explicit denial of the validity of opposed categories, or "antilogies".

20. **A differentia is a kind of categorization that distinguishes a genus from a species, as explained by Aristotle** (*Metaphysics* Δ 6 (1016a) 24– 27, from Ross and Smith 1908): λέγεται δ' ἓν καὶ

> ὧν τὸ γένος ἓν διαφέρον ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις διαφοραῖς—καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται πάντα ἓν ὅτι τὸ γένος ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς διαφοραῖς (οἷον ἵππος ἄνθρωπος κύων ἕν τι ὅτι πάντα ζῷα), translated by Apostle (1966:80) as "Also those things are called 'one' whose genus is one, although they differ by opposing differentiae; and all these are said to be one in view of the fact that the genus underlying the differentiae is one. For example, a horse and a man and a dog are one in this sense: they are all animals" (Apostle 1966: 80). **I.e., "horse", "man", and "dog" all belong to the *genus* "animal", but are all distinct species that "differ by opposing differentiae".**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n163/mode/2up?view=theater

Aristotle describes Thales' view as materialistic; but Thales adds that every particle of the world is alive, that matter and life are inseparable and one, that there is an immortal "soul" in plants and metals as well as in animals and men; the vital power changes form, but never dies.[28] **Thales was wont to say that there is no essential difference between living and dead. When someone sought to nettle him by asking why, then, he chose life instead of death, he answered, "Because there is no difference."[29]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D3%3Asection%3D1280a

Hence inasmuch as 'just' means just for certain persons, and it is divided in the same way in relation to the things to be distributed and the persons that receive them, as has been said before in the Ethics,[1] the two parties agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but dispute as to what constitutes equality in the person, [20] chiefly for the reason just now stated, because men are bad judges where they themselves are concerned, but also, inasmuch as both parties put forward a plea that is just up to a certain point, they think that what they say is absolutely just. **For the one side think that if they are unequal in some respects, for instance in wealth, they are entirely unequal, and the other side think that if they are equal in some respects, for instance in freedom, [ἐλευθερία] they are entirely equal.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1301a

Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have a larger share, for a larger share is unequal.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1174/pg1174-images.html#link2H_4_0003
>
> Yes! Critias, I am, and ever have been, a foe of **those who think that a democracy cannot reach perfection until slaves and those who, from poverty, would sell the city for a drachma, can get their drachma a day.** (20) But not less am I, and ever have been, a pronounced opponent of **those who do not think there can possibly exist a perfect oligarchy until the State is subjected to the despotism of a few.** On the contrary, my own ambition has been to combine with those who are rich enough to possess a horse and shield, and to use them for the benefit of the State. (21)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

We want to say, with Kant and the Stoics, that there is a dignity that shines out even when nature has done its worst. Indeed, if we do not say this we are in danger of losing the very basis for claims of aid: for if there is no longer a human being there, but simply a substance that has been pushed around in various ways by life, we no longer know why we have stringent duties to support that substance. I believe that the Stoics get into difficulty on this point precisely because they are so determined to insist that the basis for moral duties is never effaced by life's contingencies and hierarchies. **Like their predecessors the Cynics, they want to say that wealth, rank, birth, freeborn status, ethnicity, nationality, and even gender are all morally irrelevant, in the sense that they do not create differences in fundamental human worth.** But, like the Cynics, they think that maintaining this requires maintaining, as well, that free status, citizenship, wealth, and so forth don't matter at all for the things that are most important in life. **They seem to be afraid that if they did admit the importance of external goods they would be in danger, once again, of creating plural races of human beings, with different degrees of dignity.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA93#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Stoics have identified a very serious problem for any moderate cosmopolitanism. A few rare human beings may be able to have intense love and concern that is truly cosmopolitan (compatible with

due respect for all human life and due attention to the just claims of all) and to live their lives with an awareness of the equal worth and the equal needs of all. **But once we let the passions back in, we will discover that they are not stably supportive of these ends.** They take their nourishment from the soil of intense particular attachments, and in most people they wither in the absence of such attachments. Aristotle, criticizing Plato's fantasy of intense brotherly love uniting an entire city, wrote, **"There are two things that make people love and care for something: the thought that it is all theirs, and the thought that it is the only one they have. Neither of these will be present in that city"** (*Pol.* 1262b22-23). Instead of intense brotherly love, Plato's city, lacking close erotic and family ties, will contain only a concern that is "watery" all round (1262b15).

Yes, Marcus will say, Aristotle is right. The roots of the strong passions are indeed particularistic. And there is no doubt that my evenhanded cosmopolitan concern will, in consequence, strike some as watery. But watery evenhandedness is the only real alternative to jealousy and competitive hate – just as sex as the rubbing of membranes is the only real alternative to sex as a source of fantasied delight and divisive jealousy. **There's no happy moderate in-between. Because Medea loved her husband, she was "transformed from a human being into a poisonous snake"** (Epict. *Disc.* 1.28.8-9).

It is thus, I believe, in the Stoics' distrust of personal attachment, and their view that all strong attachment is at root non-cosmopolitanly personal, that we should find the deepest source of their rejection of externals. **It is because they think that we must ultimately choose between a self that is respectful of the dignity of all humanity and a self that is devoured by erotic longing and jealousy that they persistently deny the importance of externals for flourishing, even when externals seem required for cosmopolitan politics itself. They have concluded, in effect, that we cannot have cosmopolitan politics without remaking humanity. Marcus's first lesson from his tutor was "not to be a fan of the Greens or Blues at the races, or the light-armed or heavy-armed gladiators at the Circus"** (M. Aur. *Med.* 1.5).

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/013034.html

Jacob M. writes:

You wrote:

> I am always saying that the rule of non-discrimination, if followed consistently, means that no distinct society or culture can exist, no distinct human individual or human family can exist, no distinct species or organism can exist. ***Nothing can exist*, since all things, in order to exist, must be different from, and thus be distinguished and discriminated from other things.**

This reminds me once again of science fiction writer Philip K. Dick's short story, "Null-O", **in which a cadre of materialist-reductionist mutant human beings decide that, because everything at the subatomic level is made up of the same undifferentiated pure energy, there can be no distinctions between one *thing* and another, and set out to rectify this problem of apparent differences by literally destroying the universe.** Dick predicted this in 1958. Our social engineers are latter-day Null-Os.

LA replies: At a multiculturalism conference at Columbia University in the 1990s that I attended, one of the speakers, an Asian-American man, said that he had been at a meeting between Vice President Gore and some Asian-Americans a few years earlier and Gore had said: **"At the molecular level, we're all the same."**

True. But it's also the case that at the molecular level, or at least at the atomic or subatomic level, we're the same as dust. So let's turn ourselves into dust and get rid of all these morally troubling differences among ourselves.

LA continues: Correction: **Gore said that at the *electronic* level, we're all the same.** So forget about dust. **Dust is still too differentiated for a true liberal's taste.** To achieve equality, we must be rendered into pure undifferentiated energy.

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/007815.html

In other words, what's the point of inveighing against "the whites as the cancer of history myth" when the people you're trying to reach don't believe that whites are the cancer of history? **What they believe is that discrimination is wrong and that we must be tolerant. And to destroy your nation, you don't need to believe that it's evil. All you need to believe is that you must be tolerant. That's enough. That simple, un-threatening, apple-pie idea is enough to unstring and dissolve an entire society.** This is what conservatives do not understand. The truth is right in front of them, but they don't see it. They need to see the threat as something big and evil, as the evil left, rather than as the "normal" and "mainstream" (but in reality very extreme) ideas shared by the whole society.

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/014162.html

LA replies:

You are not just rejecting liberal equality. You are not just rejecting the liberal Christian idea of “equality of all souls” (which I also don’t believe in, and if you read the Gospels you will see that Jesus certainly didn’t believe in it, since he constantly speaks of how unequal people are, and I’ve never seen the phrase “equality of all souls” in any traditional Christian liturgy). No. You go further. You reject the idea that human beings are members of the same species. You are saying that blacks are not human beings. You are saying that a Downs Syndrome child is not a human being. **Basically you’re saying that any human that doesn’t come up to your standard is not human. Which actually means that you DO believe in equality, since, according to you, people who are too unequal can’t be members of the same species. For you, humanity must be completely equal. You exclude from humanity those not equal to yourself.**

Obviously I reject this. The falsity and ugliness of your view is a direct result of your materialism. If you’re a materialist, everything is on one level. So if a black is less intelligent than you, he is absolutely of a different order and is not a human being. And in this you show your philosophical commonality with liberals. **Liberals, like you, reject traditional Christianity, reject the God of the Bible. They believe everything is on one level, though they express this level not in terms of materialism, as you do, but in terms of the equality of all human selves and desires.** And therefore if blacks are inferior to whites in faculties, intelligence and so on, that means that their choices and desires, their very selves, are inferior to ours, and therefore (since there is only one level of reality), blacks are *absolutely* inferior to us, they are completely other from us, they are not really human beings, and we can kill them. **That is the terror that drives liberals to deny the manifest facts of racial differences. Lacking belief in God, they think that if it is accepted that blacks are of a lesser order of abilities than ourselves, we will kill them.** And so they fanatically suppress and demonize the truth of racial differences. Ironically, your Nazi-like belief and the liberals’ belief is the same, since you both believe that if a race is different in abilities from our own, we can treat them as non-human. **The only difference between you and the liberals is that you embrace that conclusion, and they fear it. But the liberals’ premise, that humanity cannot accommodate significant differences, is identical to your own.**

Nikephoros II Phokas:

To be fair, some groups tried to give theological underpinnings to the fundemental truth that blacks are in many respects inferior and non-preferable to whites in a white society and culture – like the "curse of Ham". This theological justification was always weak. **It would have been better to argue that since the Holy Scripture and/or Holy Tradition are utterly silent on the matter then such positions are morally neutral at the very least – something the God leaves up to our own judgement as creatures endowed with free will.**

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/Introduction*.html

The most elaborate of Cicero's philosophical writings, it has had fewer readers than his less technical essays on moral subjects. **But it is of importance to the student of philosophy as the only systematic account surviving from antiquity of those rules of life which divided the allegiance of thoughtful men during the centuries when the old religions had lost their hold and Christianity had not yet emerged.** And the topics that it handles can never lose their interest.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

IX. Oh, what a splendid force is there in such genius, and what an excellent reason is this for setting up a new school! **Go on; for it will follow,—and, indeed, you have most learnedly adopted the principle,—that all folly, and all injustice, and all other vices are alike, and that all errors are equal; [omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria]** and that those who have made great progress, through natural philosophy and learning, towards virtue, if they have not arrived at absolute perfection in it, are completely miserable, **and that there is no difference between their life and that of the most worthless of men,—as Plato, that greatest of men, if he was not thoroughly wise, lived no better, and in no respect more happily, than the most worthless of men.**

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/230/mode/2up?view=theater

What follows, then?—“All who are not wise are equally miserable; all wise men are perfectly happy: all actions done rightly are equal to one another; all offences are equal.” But, though all these propositions at first appear to be admirably laid down, after a little consideration they are not so much approved of. For every man's own senses, and the nature of things, and truth itself, cried out, after a fashion, that they could never be induced to believe that there was no difference between those things which Zeno asserted to be equal. [Quae sequuntur igitur? Omnes, qui non sint sapientes, aeque miseros esse, sapientes omnes summe beatos, recte facta omnia aequalia, omnia peccata paria; quae cum magnifice primo dici viderentur, considerata minus probabantur. Sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa veritas

clamabat quodam modo non posse adduci, ut inter eas res, quas Zeno exaequaret, nihil interesset.]

XX. **Afterwards that little Phœnician of yours (for you know that the people of Citium, your clients, came from Phœnicia), a shrewd man, as he was not succeeding in his case, since nature herself contradicted him, began to withdraw his words; [Postea tuus ille Poenulus—scis enim Citieos, clientes tuos, e Phoenica profectos—, homo igitur acutus, causam non optinens repugnante natura verba versare coepit]** and first of all he granted in favour of those things which we consider good, that they might be considered fit, and useful, and adapted to nature; and he began to confess that it was more advantageous for a wise—that is to say for a perfectly happy—man, to have those things which he does not venture indeed to call goods, but yet allows to be well adapted to nature.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater

Here is another simile which is no simile; for as, says he, a pilot blunders equally if he wrecks a ship loaded with straw, as if he wrecks one loaded with gold; so, too, he sins equally who beats his parent, with him who beats a slave unjustly. [Ecce aliud simile dissimile. Ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat, si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat, qui parentem et qui servum iniuria verberat.]

This is not seeing that it has no connexion with the art of the pilot what cargo the ship carries: and therefore that it makes no difference with respect to his steering well or ill, whether his freight is straw or gold. **But it can and ought to be understood what the difference is between a parent and a slave;** therefore it makes no difference with respect to navigation, but a great deal with respect to duty, what the description of thing may be which is affected by the blunder.

http**://www.**perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DMur.%3Achapter%3D29%3Asection%3D61

[61] And since we are not to address this speech either to an ignorant multitude, or to any assembly of rustics, I will speak a little boldly about the pursuits of educated men, which are both well known and agreeable to you, O judges, and to me. **Learn then, O judges, that all these good qualities, divine and splendid as they are, which we behold in Marcus Cato, are his own peculiar attributes. The qualities which we sometimes wish for in him, are not all those which are implanted in a man by nature, but some of them are such as are derived from education. For there was once a man of the greatest genius, whose name was Zeno, the imitators of whose example are called Stoics.** His opinions and precepts are of this sort: that a wise man is never influenced by interest; never pardons any man's fault; that no one is merciful except a fool and a trifler; that it is not the part of a man to be moved or pacified by entreaties; that wise men, let them be ever so deformed, are the only beautiful men; if they be ever such beggars, they are the only rich men; if they be in slavery, they are kings. And as for all of us who are not wise men, they call away slaves, exiles, enemies, lunatics. **They say that all offenses are equal; that every sin is an unpardonable crime; and that he does not commit a less crime who kills a cock if there was no need to do so, than the man who strangles his father. They say that a wise man never feels uncertain on any point, never repents of anything, [nullius rei paenitere] is never deceived in anything, and never alters his opinion.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asection%3D4b

Socrates: Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; **for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.**

Euthyphro: It is ridiculous, Socrates, **that you think it matters whether the man who was killed was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one's hearth** [4c] **and eat at one's table.** For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought [4d] to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For

they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, **yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow,** [4e] **because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.**

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cicegoog/page/88/mode/2up?view=theater

How it was that those stern doctrines of yours forced their way into the Old Academy I do not know, but I cannot bear them; **not because they have anything in them particularly disagreeable to me; for many of the marvellous doctrines of the Stoics, which men call παραδοξα, are derived from Socrates.** But where has Xenocrates or where has Aristotle touched these points? For you try to make out the Stoics to be the same as these men. Would they ever say that wise men were the only kings, the only rich, the only handsome men? that everything everywhere belonged to the wise man? that no one was a consul, or prætor, or general, or even, for aught I know, a quinquevir, but the wise man? lastly, that he was the only citizen, the only free man? and that all who are destitute of wisdom are foreigners, exiles, slaves, or madmen? **last of all, that the writings of Lycurgus and Solon and our Twelve Tables are not laws? that there are even no cities or states except those which are peopled by wise men? Now these maxims, O Lucullus, if you agree with Antiochus, your own friend, must be defended by you as zealously as the bulwarks of your city;** but I am only bound to uphold them with moderation, just as much as I think fit.

XLV. **I have read in Clitomachus, that when Carneades and Diogenes the Stoic were standing in the capitol before the senate,** Aulus Albonus (who was prætor at the time, in the consulship of Publius Scipio and Marcus Marcellus, the same Albonus who was consul, Lucullus, with your own grandfather, a learned man, as his own history shows, which is written in Greek) said jestingly to Carneades—**"I do not, O Carneades, seem to you to be prætor because I am not wise, nor does this seem to be a city, nor do the inhabitants seem to be citizens, for the same reason." And he answered—"That is the Stoic doctrine."** Aristotle or Xenocrates, whom Antiochus wished to follow, would have had no doubt that he was prætor, and Rome a city, and that it was inhabited by citizens.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA202#v=onepage&q&f=false

Even later, in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, **where he was making amends to Cato and called the Stoic paradoxes "Socratic in the highest degree and absolutely true" (*maxime Socratica longeque verissima*),** he also said they were difficult to make acceptable to the general public because they were so contrary to common opinion (4): it was a rhetorical tour de force on Cicero's part to try to turn them into *loci communes* (commonplaces) for the orator trying to persuade an assembly or a jury.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ne_x6FF3P3UC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false

Together with his *Physiologia Stoicorum*, a comprehensive account of Stoic natural philosophy, likewise published in Antwerp, in 1604, in the *Officina Plantiniana*, and with his edition of Seneca, **this *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* formed the fitting culmination of Lipsius's lifelong "promotion" of a new secular ethics** – an ethics, so it has been argued, which could be regarded as a true complement to Christian, biblical morality.23
…

Remarkably, in his *Guide to Stoic Philosophy* the herald Lipsius saw the true fortress of Stoicism in the Stoic paradoxes.25 In fact, Lipsius was the first, since Antiquity, to discern and acknowledge their philosophical "system" and to compare it to a tree of which the root and the trunk (*radix* and *truncus*) are strongly connected to the branches and twigs (*rami* and *ramuli*). **Moreover, and this is proof again of his scholarly genius, Lipsius discerned a remarkable and unique order in Stoic philosophy. It was, so Lipsius emphasised, the Stoic school's proper virtue to have organised all elements of its system in such a way that not only is order ingeniously respected and preserved, but also the connection and coherence itself.**26 As they had once been for Marcus Porcius Cato – the "perfect Stoic" to Cicero (*Brutus*, 31.120, and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*) – the Stoic concise and pointed syllogisms (*consectaria brevia et acuta*) were to Lipsius solid proof of the school's truthfulness.27 Moreover, **although Cicero at first labeled these Stoic, apparently contradictory, doctrines as "startling truths" (*mirabilia*),**28 **he later criticised them as being like wine, which is better to taste than to drink,**29 it was part of Lipsius's new philosophical endeavour to take a serious defence of all Stoic paradoxes in his *Guide to Stoic Philosophy*. In his view Cicero – Lipsius's manuscript copy of Cicero is still preserved at Leiden University Library today30 – only commented upon six of all the extant paradoxes; moreover, even then the rhetorician Cicero did not analyse them in a proper philosophical way. **Just as Plutarch later, Cicero was an Academic and therefore attacked Stoic position *ex professo* and without admitting their deeper meaning: to taste this wine is but one thing; what is obligatory, so Lipsius stated, is to drink it.**31
…

Despite the value of Saunders's general conclusion, his analysis of Lipsius's treatment of Stoic paradoxes remains limited to half a page,35 whereas Lipsius's thorough study of eleven Stoic paradoxes (viz. in *Dissertationes* 3-13 of book III) – eked out by Lipsius with numerous other paradoxes or, as he called them, "paralogisms" (*paraloga*) in *Dissertationes* 14-22 – fill no less than nineteen elaborate *Dissertationes*.
…

When considered in this way, **Lipsius's long chapters on Stoic paradoxes in the third book of the *Manuductio* are more than a simple showing off of his newly acquainted knowledge gathered by means of his exceptional philological skills. They are clearly intended to make all the Stoic paradoxes both intelligible and acceptable.** Not unsurprisingly, however, Lipsius distanced himself from one Stoic paradox, viz. the one claiming that it is the wise man's freedom c.q. duty to take his own life.37
…

Like Gassendi's Epicurean project in the 1640s, Lipsius's systematisation, ordening and synthesising of Stoic doctrine, c.q. their paradoxical thinking, was far more than a philological and historical re-evaluation of a philosophical schools. It was a successful, yet erudite and elite quest for wisdom.

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1010.912&rep=rep1&type=pdf

But nothing is so unbelievable that it cannot be made credible by rhetoric, nothing so rough, so rude, that it would not take on luster and honor in oratory. Because I believe this, I have acted more boldly than even he himself about whom I am speaking. For Cato is accustomed to speak in the Stoic fashion, but with rhetorical embellishments applied, about greatness of soul, self-control, death, the utter praiseworthiness of virtue, the immortal gods, and love of country: **I, on the other hand, have playfully collected in universal proofs those things which the Stoics can scarcely prove, even at leisure in the gymnasia.** 4. Since these things are remarkable and contrary to everyone's opinion (they themselves even call them "paradoxes"), I want to test whether they can be brought into the light, that is, into the forum, and be spoken so that they might be accepted, or whether learned speech is one kind of thing, and popular speech another; **and on that account I have written these arguments rather loosely, because those things they call "paradoxes" seem to me to be especially Socratic, and by far the most true.**
…

The matter in which someone commits an offense can be greater or less, but the offense itself, however you turn it, is the same. **Whether the pilot capsizes a shipload of gold or of chaff makes some difference in result, but none in the inexperience of the pilot.** Desire has made a slip, in the case of a **lower-class woman: [muliere ignota]** pain touches fewer than if it had been wanton with some **well-born and noble maiden; [generosa ac nobili virgine]** but it has offended no less, since to offend is, in a manner of speaking, to cross boundaries: when you have done this, the fault has been committed; how far you go on once you have crossed has no relevance in increasing the fault of crossing.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.25058/page/111/mode/2up?view=theater

The Code [of Justinian] showed some Christian or Stoic influence in its legislation on slavery. The rape of a slave woman, as of a free woman, was to be punished with death.
…

24. "Then does it make no difference," someone will say, "whether one kills his father or a slave?" If you lay down bare cases, what sort they are can't easily be judged. If it is a crime in itself to take your father's life, were the Saguntines, who preferred that their parents die free rather than live as slaves, parricides? **So sometimes it is possible to take even a parent's life without committing a crime, and not possible to take a slave's life without injustice. Therefore it is the motive of the deed, not its nature, that makes the difference. When a good motive attaches to either, it becomes weightier; if it is joined to both, they must become equal.** 25. There is nevertheless this difference, that in killing a slave, if it is done unjustly, one offends once; in doing violence against a father's life one offends many times: he does violence to him who sired, raised, and taught him, him who made his place in house and home and country. He stands out in the multitude of his offenses and therefore deserves the greater punishment.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false

***Mr.* and *Madam Dacier* have undertaken the Apology of the true *Stoicks*, on all these Heads. 4**

4. Preface to the Translation of the Reflections of *Marc. Antonin,* A3, p.2. –

"If these Philosophers," say they, "have mix'd something of Austerity with the Sentiments of their Master *Socrates*; 'twas not so much the Effect of a Savage and morose Disposition; but rather an Expedient, which Prudence suggested to them: **for being well acquainted with the natural Imbecillity, and Supineness of Mankind; they have thought fit, in prescribing Rules of**

Duty, to press them to a greater Degree of Perfection, than they are capable of; that so by exerting their utmost Endeavours to come up to their Precepts, they might at least come to fix in a State of Mediocrity; as Trees which stand bent one Way are set right by a contrary Flexure. Thus when *Zeno*, for Example, said, that all Crimes were equal; his Intent was to reclaim Men from an unhappy Opinion, which they are but too apt to give into; that provided they keep clear of Crimes of the first Magnitude, they are not oblig'd to be so much upon their Guard against the lesser or more venal Transgressions; now his Design was to persuade 'em, that the least Sin, if neglected, becomes incurable; and that in the Eye of *God*, who is the very Essence of Purity; there can be nothing found in us, that is sinful, but what deserves Death; unless we disarm his Justice by a due Atonement and Repentance: **But then comes a *Chrysippus*, who grosly mistaking this Precept; maintains, that there is no Difference between the Stealing of Cabbages out of a Garden, and the committing of Sacrilege; between the cutting one's Father's Throat, and the killing of a Capon; which two Actions he will have to deserve one and the same Punishment: This indeed is so far from restraining; that it rather encourages and prompts Men to the Commission of the greatest Enormities.** When *Zeno* said, that the Sage ought to be void of Compassion; his Aim was to shew, that the Sage does not confine his Beneficence to those Succours alone, which Pity and Compassion extort from him; but thinks himself oblig'd to aid and assist his Neighbour, though he be under no such Emotion: **Though a *Chrysippus* shall take Occasion from hence, to break asunder all the Bands of Society; and trample under Foot that merciful Disposition, which is one of the most essential Characters of the Deity.** When *Zeno* said, that the Sage relies on himself alone for all Things; he only meant to shew, that our true and real Happiness could not depend on the Actions of other Men; and to encounter the supine Laziness of those, who, on Pretence of committing themselves to Providence, expect every Thing immediately from *God*; without ever seeking to obtain his Favour, by their own honest Endeavours and Industry. Besides, as he taught, that the Soul was a Part of *God*, nay, *God* himself; so this Precept, that Men ought to rely on themselves for all Things, was in Effect the same as to say; that we ought in all Things to rely on the Providence of *God*, that governs us. **But then comes a Disciple of his, full of Ignorance and Pride; and intirely perverts this Precept, by drawing from it this pernicious Consequence; That the Sage is above even God himself; and is, independently of that sovereign Being who created him, the sole Author of his own Happiness. Of almost the same Nature are all those other Passages, which have at any Time been made Use of to bring the Doctrine of the *Stoicks* under Odium and Discredit.**"

---

https://archive.org/details/tacitusandother00hutcgoog/page/n22/mode/2up?view=theater

At the moment when Tacitus was born philosophy was enjoying a very rare chance; it was ruling the world. **For at least five years Seneca, its most illustrious representative, was Nero's prime minister, and Trajan estimated those five years as one of the Empire's happiest periods.**1
…

Thus at one stroke letters, science, and philosophy are legitimised; and not only is the name of idlers inapplicable to persons who study the wonders of the world and labour to understand that they may explain them, but it must not even be given to those content to contemplate these wonders, for in admiring them they testify to the divine creation.1 How can a Roman admit that, side by side with the active life and almost on the same level, the contemplative life is authorized? **But Seneca goes further; he rigidly applies his principles and from them deduces all their consequences. This great city which he imagines, 'and which contains both men and gods,' contains all men without exception. Aliens and foes (the same thing for the Romans) are not barred out; slaves too are included.** We have duties to them because they are our brothers: man, whosoever he may be, 'must be sacred for man.'2

These were words unheard till then, and they must have caused prodigious amazement. If they were literally applied, the whole fabric of the ancient world was shaken. Confining ourselves to Rome, nothing could be more antagonistic than such novelties to the very spirit of the institutions and to the character of a city, which, in her poet's phrase, 'lived on her ancient manners.' Whilst people generally professed to respect the traditions and regard them as sacred, Seneca seems to hold them of small account; **in him we rarely find those emphatic eulogies of the old Republic in fashion elsewhere. He judges it coldly, and if he has to celebrate certain heroes, he does so on condition of making them philosophers of his own type and of glorifying himself in their person.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Clemency/Book_II#I.

Your prefect Burrus, an excellent man who was born to be the servant of such an emperor as you are, was about to order two brigands to be executed, and was pressing you to write their names and the grounds on which they were to be put to death: this had often been put off, and he was insisting that it should then be done. **When he reluctantly produced the document and put it into your equally reluctant hands, you exclaimed: "Would that I had never learned my letters!"** O what a speech, how worthy to be heard by all nations, both those who dwell within the Roman Empire, those who enjoy a debatable independence upon its borders, and those who either in will or in deed fight against it! **It is a speech which ought to be spoken before a meeting of all mankind, whose words all kings and princes ought to swear to obey: a speech worthy of the days of human innocence, and worthy to bring back that golden age. [O vocem in contionem omnium mortalium mittendam, in cuius verba principes regesque iurarent! O vocem publica generis humani innocentia dignam, cui redderetur antiquum illud saeculum!]**
…

Just as the gods are worshipped by religion, but are dishonoured by superstition, so all good men will show mercy and mildness, but will avoid pity, which is a vice incident to weak minds which cannot endure the sight of another's sufferings. It is, therefore, most commonly found in the worst people; **there are old women and girls[2] who are affected by the tears of the greatest criminals, and who, if they could, would let them out of prison.** Pity considers a man's misfortunes and does not consider to what they are due: mercy is combined with reason. I know that the doctrine of the Stoics is unpopular among the ignorant as being excessively severe and not at all likely to give kings and princes good advice; it is blamed because it declares that the wise man knows not how to feel pity or to grant pardon. **These doctrines, if taken separately, are indeed odious, [Haec, si per se ponantur, invisa sunt]** for they appear to give men no hope of repairing their mistakes but exact a penalty for every slip. If this were true, how can it be true wisdom to bid us put off human feeling, and to exclude us from mutual help, that surest haven of refuge against the attacks of Fortune? **But no school of philosophy is more gentle and benignant, none is more full of love towards man or more anxious to promote the happiness of all, seeing that its maxims are, to be of service and assistance to others, and to consult the interests of each and all, not of itself alone. [Sed nulla secta benignior leniorque est, nulla amantior hominum et communis boni attentior, ut propositum sit usui esse et auxilio nec sibi tantum, sed universis singulisque consulere.]**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_I#13

[Alexander the Great] did not think of who offered the citizenship, but to whom they had granted it; and being altogether the slave of glory, though he knew neither its true nature or its limits, had followed in the footsteps of Hercules and Bacchus, and had not even stayed his march where they ceased; so that he glanced aside from the givers of this honour to him with whom he shared it, and fancied that the heaven to which his vanity aspired was indeed opening before him when he was made equal to Hercules. **In what indeed did that frantic youth, whose only merit was his lucky audacity, resemble Hercules? Hercules conquered nothing for himself; he travelled throughout the world, not coveting for himself but liberating the countries which he conquered, an enemy to bad men, a defender of the good, a peacemaker both by sea and land; [Hercules nihil sibi uicit; orbem terrarum transiuit non concupiscendo, sed iudicando, quid uinceret, malorum hostis, bonorum uindex, terrarum marisque pacator]** whereas he was from his boyhood a brigand and desolator of nations, a pest to his friends and enemies alike, whose greatest joy was to be the terror of all mankind, forgetting that men fear not only the fiercest but also the most cowardly animals, because of their evil and venomous nature.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_III#18

Besides this, he who affirms that a slave does not sometimes confer a benefit upon his master is ignorant of the rights of man; for the question is, not what the station in life of the giver may be, but what his intentions are. The path of virtue is closed to no one, it lies open to all; it admits and invites all, whether they be free-born men, slaves or freed-men, kings or exiles; it requires no qualifications of family or of property, it is satisfied with a mere man. [Praeterea servum qui negat dare aliquando domino beneficium, ignarus est iuris humani; refert enim, cuius animi sit, qui praestat, non cuius status. Nulli praeclusa virtus est; omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, et ingenuos et libertinos et servos et reges et exules; non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est.]

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Aemilius*.html#ref13
>
> 3 Unless, indeed, it be said that the avaricious conduct of Perseus was good fortune for Aemilius, since it utterly subverted the great and brilliant prospects of the Macedonians for the war (wherein their hopes ran high), because Perseus played the coward with his money.
> …

8 But he, though contending against so large a force, and in a war where such large reserves were maintained, measured out his gold and sealed it up in bags, as afraid to touch it as if it had belonged to others. 9 **And this he did although he was no Lydian or Phoenician born, but laid claim to a share in the virtues of Alexander and Philip, whose descendant he was,—men who mastered the world through their belief that empire was to be bought with money, not money with empire.** 10 At all events, it was a common saying that the cities of Greece were taken, not by Philip, but by Philip's money.
...

7 Accordingly, having most confidence in Nasica, he called for him; but since Nasica was not there, after bewailing his misfortune and carefully weighing the necessity under which he lay, he gave himself into the power of Gnaeus, **thus making it most abundantly clear that his avarice was a less ignoble evil than the love of life that was in him, and that led him to deprive himself of the only thing which Fortune cannot take away from the fallen, namely, pity.** 8 For when at his request he was brought to Aemilius, Aemilius saw in him a great man whose fall was due to the resentment of the gods and his own evil fortune, and rose up and came to meet him, accompanied by his friends, and with tears in his eyes; 9 but Perseus, a most shameful sight, after throwing himself prone before him and then clasping his knees, broke out into ignoble cries and supplications. These Aemilius could not abide and would not hear; but looking upon him with a distressed and sorrowful countenance, said: 10 "**Why, wretched man, dost thou free Fortune from thy strongest indictment against her, by conduct which will make men think that thy misfortunes are not undeserved, and that thy former prosperity, rather than thy present lot, was beyond thy deserts?** 11 And why dost thou depreciate my victory, and make my success a meagre one, by showing thyself no noble or even fitting antagonist for Romans? 12 **Valour in the unfortunate obtains great reverence even among their enemies, but cowardice, in Roman eyes, even though it meet with success, is in every way a most dishonourable thing.**"

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/15C*.html#ref13

On the next, as she was being dragged back in a chair to a repetition of the agony—her dislocated limbs were unable to support her—she fastened the breast-band (which she had stripped from her bosom) in a sort of noose to the canopy of the chair, thrust her neck into it, and, throwing the weight of her body into the effort, squeezed out such feeble breath as remained to her. **An emancipated slave and a woman, by shielding, under this dire coercion, men unconnected with her and all but unknown, she had set an example which shone the brighter at a time when persons freeborn and male, Roman knights and senators, untouched by the torture, were betraying each his nearest and his dearest.** For Lucan himself, and Senecio and Quintianus, did not omit to disclose their confederates wholesale; while Nero's terror grew from more to more, though he had multiplied the strength of the guards surrounding his person.

What, indeed, should we have to trust to for defence against sudden misfortunes, what could a noble mind promise to itself to keep unshaken, if virtue could be lost together with prosperity? If a slave cannot confer a benefit upon his master, then no subject can confer a benefit upon his king, and no soldier upon his general; **for so long as the man is subject to supreme authority, the form of authority can make no difference. If main force, or the fear of death and torture, can prevent a slave from gaining any title to his master's gratitude, they will also prevent the subjects of a king, or the soldiers of a general from doing so, for the same things may happen to either of these classes of men, though under different names.**

Yet men do bestow benefits upon their kings and their generals; therefore slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters. **A slave can be just, brave, magnanimous; he can therefore bestow a benefit, for this is also the part of a virtuous man.**
...

Why need the person of the giver detract from the thing which he gives? why should not the gift add rather to the glory of the giver? **All men descend from the same original stock; no one is better born than another, except in so far as his disposition is nobler and better suited for the performance of good actions.** Those who display portraits of their ancestors in their halls, and set up in the entrance to their houses the pedigree of their family drawn out at length, with many complicated collateral branches, are they not notorious rather than noble? **The universe is the one parent of all, whether they trace their descent from this primary source through a glorious or a mean line of ancestors. [Unus omnium parens mundus est, sive per splendidos sive per sordidos gradus ad hunc prima cuiusque origo perdueitur.]** Be not deceived when men who are reckoning up their genealogy, wherever an illustrious name is wanting, foist in that of a god in its place. You need despise no one, even though he bears a commonplace name, and owes little to fortune. **Whether your immediate ancestors were freedmen, or slaves, or foreigners, pluck up your spirits boldly, and leap over any intervening disgraces of your pedigree; at its source, a noble origin awaits you.** Why should our pride inflate us to such a degree that we think it beneath us to receive benefits from slaves, and think only of their position, forgetting their good deeds? **You, the slave of lust, of**

gluttony, of a harlot, nay, who are owned as a joint chattel by harlots, can you call anyone else a slave? Call a man a slave? why, I pray you, whither are you being hurried by those bearers who carry your litter? whither are these men with their smart military-looking cloaks carrying you? is it not to the door of some door-keeper, or to the gardens of some one who has not even a subordinate office? and then you, who regard the salute of another man's slave as a benefit, declare that you cannot receive a benefit from your own slave. What inconsistency is this? **At the same time you despise and fawn upon slaves, you are haughty and violent at home, while out of doors you are meek, and as much despised as you despise your slaves;** for none abase themselves lower than those who unconscionably give themselves airs, nor are anymore prepared to trample upon others than those who have learned how to offer insults by having endured them.

29. **I felt it my duty to say this, in order to crush the arrogance of men who are themselves at the mercy of fortune, and to claim the right of bestowing a benefit for slaves, in order that I may claim it also for sons.**
…

If I owe all that I now can do to my **original beginning, [initio]** I cannot regard my father or my grandfather as being this original beginning; there always will be a spring further back, from which the spring next below is derived. **Yet no one will argue that I owe more to unknown and forgotten ancestors than to my father; though really I do owe them more, if I owe it to my ancestors that my father begat me. [Atqui nemo dicet me plus debere ignotis et ultra memoriam positis maioribus quam patri; plus autem debeo, si hoc ipsum, quod genuit me pater meus, maioribus debet.]**
…

Do you wish to know how far from a benefit it was to give life under such conditions? **You should have exposed me as a child, for you did me a wrong in begetting me. [Exposuisses; nempe iniuria erat genuisse!]** What do I gather from this? That the cohabitation of a father and mother is the very least of benefits to their child, unless in addition this beginning of kindnesses be followed up by others, and confirmed by other services. **It is not a good thing to live, but to live well.** "But," say you, "I do live well." True, but I might have lived ill; so that your part in me is merely this, that I live. **If you claim merit to yourself for giving me mere life, bare and helpless, and boast of it as a great boon, reflect that this you claim merit for giving me is a boon which I possess in common with flies and worms.**
…

What? supposing that any one were to learn philosophy and teach it to his father, could it be any longer disputed that the son had given him something greater than he had received from him, **having returned to his father a happy life, whereas he had received from him merely life?**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_71

7. Socrates, **who recalled[4] the whole of philosophy to rules of conduct, and asserted that the highest wisdom consisted in distinguishing between good and evil,** said: "Follow these rules, if my words carry weight with you, in order that you may be happy; and let some men think you even a fool. Allow any man who so desires to insult you and work you wrong; but if only virtue dwells with you, you will suffer nothing. If you wish to be happy, if you would be in good faith a good man,[5] let one person or another despise you." **No man can accomplish this unless he has come to regard all goods as equal, for the reason that no good exists without that which is honourable, and that which is honourable is in every case equal. [Hoc nemo praestabit *nisi qui omnia prior ipse contempserit,* nisi qui omnia bona exaequaverit, quia nec bonum sine honesto est et honestum in omnibus par est.]**
…

Socrates used to say that verity[12] and virtue were the same. Just as truth does not grow, so neither does virtue grow; for it has its due proportions and is complete. 17. You need not, therefore, wonder that **goods are equal,[13] [paria esse bona]** both those which are to be deliberately chosen, and those which circumstances have imposed. **For if you once adopt the view that they are unequal, [Nam si hanc inaequalitatem receperis]** deeming, for instance, a brave endurance of torture as among the lesser goods, you will be including it among the evils also; **you will pronounce Socrates unhappy in his prison, Cato unhappy when he reopens his wounds with more courage than he showed in inflicting them, and Regulus the most ill-starred of all when he pays the penalty for keeping his word even with his enemies. And yet no man, even the most effeminate person in the world, has ever dared to maintain such an opinion.** For though such persons deny that a man like Regulus is happy, yet for all that they also deny that he is wretched. 18. The earlier Academics[14] do indeed admit that a man is happy even amid such tortures, but do not admit that he is completely or fully happy.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_94

62. **Alexander was hounded into misfortune and dispatched to unknown countries by a mad desire to lay waste other men's territory.** Do you believe that the man was in his senses who could begin by devastating Greece, the land where he received his education? **One who snatched away the dearest guerdon of each nation, bidding Spartans be slaves, and Athenians hold their tongues?** Not content with the ruin of all the states which Philip had either conquered or bribed into bondage,[31] he overthrew various commonwealths in various places and carried his weapons all over the world; his cruelty was tired, but it never ceased – like a wild beast that tears to pieces more than its hunger demands.
…

64. **It was not virtue or reason which persuaded Gnaeus Pompeius to take part in foreign and civil warfare; it was his mad craving for unreal glory.** Now he attacked Spain and the faction of Sertorius;[34] now he fared forth to enchain the pirates and subdue the seas.[35] These were merely excuses and pretexts for extending his power.
…

66. Do you think that Gaius Marius, who was once consul[37] (he received this office on one occasion, and stole it on all the others) courted all his perils by the inspiration of virtue when he was slaughtering the Teutons and the Cimbri, and pursuing Jugurtha through the wilds of Africa?[38] Marius commanded armies, ambition Marius.

67. When such men as these[39] were disturbing the world, they were themselves disturbed – like cyclones that whirl together what they have seized, but which are first whirled themselves and can for this reason rush on with all the greater force, having no control over themselves; hence, after causing such destruction to others, they feel in their own body the ruinous force which has enabled them to cause havoc to many. **You need never believe that a man can become happy through the unhappiness of another.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_95

30. We are mad, not only individually, but nationally. **We check manslaughter and isolated murders; but what of war and the much-vaunted crime of slaughtering whole peoples? [Homicidia conpescimus et singulas caedes: quid bella et occisarum gentium gloriosum scelus?]** There are no limits to our greed, none to our cruelty. And as long as such crimes are committed by stealth and by individuals, they are less harmful and less portentous; **but cruelties are practised in accordance with acts of senate and popular assembly, and the public is bidden to do that which is forbidden to the individual.** 31. **Deeds that would be punished by loss of life when committed in secret, are praised by us because uniformed generals have carried them out.** Man, naturally the gentlest class of being, is not ashamed to revel in the blood of others, to wage war, and to entrust the waging of war to his sons, when even dumb beasts and wild beasts keep the peace with one another.
…

Man, an object of reverence in the eyes of man, [Homo, sacra res homini] is now slaughtered for jest and sport; and those whom it used to be unholy to train for the purpose of inflicting and enduring wounds, are thrust forth exposed and defenceless; and it is a satisfying spectacle to see a man made a corpse.

34. Amid this upset condition of morals, something stronger than usual is needed, – something which will shake off these chronic ills; in order to root out a deep-seated belief in wrong ideas, conduct must be regulated by doctrines. It is only when we add precepts, consolation, and encouragement to these, that they can prevail; by themselves they are ineffective. 35. If we would hold men firmly bound and tear them away from the ills which clutch them fast, they must learn what is evil and what is good. **They must know that everything except virtue changes its name and becomes now good and now bad.**
…

I grant you that, if warned, a man will do what he should; but that is not enough, since the credit lies, not in the actual deed, but in the way it is done. 41. What is more shameful than a costly meal which eats away the income even of a knight? Or what so worthy of the censor's condemnation[19] as to be always indulging oneself and one's "inner man,"[20] if I may speak as the gluttons do? And yet often has an inaugural dinner cost the most careful man a cool million! **The very sum that is called disgraceful if spent on the appetite, is beyond reproach if spent for official purposes! For it is not luxury but an expenditure sanctioned by custom.**
…

It is indeed worthy of great praise, when man treats man with kindness! Shall we advise stretching forth the hand to the shipwrecked sailor, or pointing out the way to the wanderer, or sharing a crust with the starving? Yes, if I can only tell you first everything which ought to be afforded or withheld; meantime, **I can lay down for mankind a rule, in short compass, for our duties in human relationships:** 52. **all that you behold, that which comprises both god and man, is one – we are the parts of one great body. [omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est; membra sumus corporis magni.] Nature produced us related to one another, since she created us from the same source and to the same end.** She engendered in us mutual affection, and made us prone to friendships. She established fairness and justice; according to her ruling, it is more wretched to commit than to suffer injury. Through her orders, let our hands be ready for all that needs to be helped. 53. **Let this verse be in your heart and on your lips:**

> **I am a man; and nothing in man's lot**
> **Do I deem foreign to me.**[25]

Let us possess things in common; for birth is ours in common. [Habeamus in commune: in commune nati sumus.] Our relations with one another are like a stone arch, which would collapse if the stones did not mutually support each other, and which is upheld in this very way.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_102

21. Tell me rather how closely in accord with nature it is to let one's mind reach out into the boundless universe! **The human soul is a great and noble thing; it permits of no limits except those which can be shared even by the gods. First of all, it does not consent to a lowly birthplace, like Ephesus or Alexandria, or any land that is even more thickly populated than these, and more richly spread with dwellings. The soul's homeland is the whole space that encircles the height and breadth of the firmament,** the whole rounded dome within which lie land and sea, within which the upper air that sunders the human from the divine also unites them, and where all the sentinel stars are taking their turn on duty. 22. **Again, the soul will not put up with a narrow span of existence.** "All the years," says the soul, "are mine; no epoch is closed to great minds; all Time is open for the progress of thought. When the day comes to separate the heavenly from its earthly blend, I shall leave the body here where I found it, and shall of my own volition betake myself to the gods. I am not apart from them now, but am merely detained in a heavy and earthly prison."

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_104

And if you consider the facts, **he lived either in time of war, or under tyrants, or under a democracy, which is more cruel than wars and tyrants. [aut in libertate bellis ac tyrannis saeviore]** 28. The war lasted for twenty-seven years;[10] then the state became the victim of the Thirty Tyrants, of whom many were his personal enemies.
...

29. Do you desire another case? Take that of the younger Marcus Cato, with whom Fortune dealt in a more hostile and more persistent fashion. But he withstood her, on all occasions, and in his last moments, at the point of death, showed that a brave man can live in spite of Fortune, can die in spite of her. His whole life was passed either in civil warfare, or under a political regime which was soon to breed civil war. **And you may say that he, just as much as Socrates, declared allegiance to liberty in the midst of slavery** – unless perchance you think that Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus[13] were the allies of liberty! 30. No one ever saw Cato change, no matter how often the state changed: he kept himself the same in all circumstances – in the praetorship,[14] in defeat, under accusation,[15] in his province, on the platform, in the army, in death. Furthermore, when the republic was in a crisis of terror, when Caesar was on one side with ten embattled legions at his call, aided by so many foreign nations, and when Pompey was on the other, satisfied to stand alone against all comers, and when the citizens were leaning towards either Caesar or Pompey, Cato alone established a definite party for the Republic. 31. If you would obtain a mental picture of that period, **you may imagine on one side the people and the whole proletariat eager for revolution [videbis illinc plebemet omnem erectum ad res novas vulgum] – on the other the senators and knights, the chosen and honoured men of the commonwealth; and there were left between them but these two – the Republic and Cato.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_113

30. Oh with what great mistakes are men obsessed, who desire to push their limits of empire beyond the seas, who judge themselves most prosperous when they occupy many provinces with their soldiery and join new territory to the old! **Little do they know of that kingdom which is on an equality with the heavens in greatness! [ignari quod sit illud ingens parque dis regnum]** 31. Self-Command is the greatest command of all. Let her teach me what a hallowed thing is the Justice which ever regards

another's good and seeks nothing for itself except its own employment. **It should have nothing to do with ambition and reputation; it should satisfy itself.**

Let each man convince himself of this before all else – "I must be just without reward." And that is not enough; let him convince himself also of this: "May I take pleasure in devoting myself of my own free will to uphold this noblest of virtues." **Let all his thoughts be turned as far as possible from personal interests.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Firmness_of_the_Wise_Man#XIII.

The wise man knows that all those who strut about in purple-edged togas,[4] healthy and embrowned, are brain-sick people, whom he regards as sick and full of follies. **He is not, therefore, angry, should they in their sickness presume to bear themselves somewhat impertinently towards their physician, and in the same spirit as that in which he sets no value upon their titles of honour, he will set but little value upon their acts of disrespect to himself.** He will not rise in his own esteem if a beggar pays his court to him, and he will not think it an affront if one of the dregs of the people does not return his greeting. **So also he will not admire himself even if many rich men admire him; for he knows that they differ in no respect from beggars—nay, are even more wretched than they; for beggars want but a little, whereas rich men want a great deal.** Again, he will not be moved if the King of the Medes, or Attalus, King of Asia, passes by him in silence with a scornful air when he offers his greeting; for he knows that such a man's position has nothing to render it more enviable than that of the man whose duty it is in some great household to keep the sick and mad servants in order. **Shall I be put out if one of those who do business at the temple of Castor, buying and selling worthless slaves, does not return my salute, a man whose shops are crowded with throngs of the worst of bondmen?** I trow not; for what good can there be in a man who owns none but bad men? As the wise man is indifferent to the courtesy or incivility of such a man, so is he to that of a king. "You own," says he, "the Parthians and Bactrians, but they are men whom you keep in order by fear, they are people whose possession forbids you to unstring the bow, they are fierce enemies, on sale, and eagerly looking out for a new master." He will not, then, be moved by an insult from any man **for though all men differ one from another, yet the wise man regards them all as alike on account of their equal folly; [omnes enim inter se differant, sapiens quidem pares illos ob aequalem stultitiam omnis putat] for should he once lower himself to the point of being affected by either injury or insult, he could never feel safe afterwards,** and safety is the especial advantage of the wise man, and he will not be guilty of showing respect to the man who has done him an injury by admitting that he has received one, because it necessarily follows that he who is disquieted at any one's scorn would value that person's admiration.

> https://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/dixonclan/dixon.html#dixon179
>
> "Then you don't believe this twaddle about equality?" asked the doctor.
>
> "Yes and no. **Mankind in the large is a herd of mercenary gudgeons or fools.** As a lawyer in Pennsylvania I have defended fifty murderers on trial for their lives. Forty-nine of them were guilty. All these I succeeded in acquitting. One of them was innocent. This one they hung. Can a man keep his face straight in such a world? **Could Negro blood degrade such stock? Might not an ape improve it?** I preach equality as a poet and seer who sees a vision beyond the rim of the horizon of to-day."
>
> The old man's eyes shone with the set stare of a fanatic.

---

https://biblehub.com/acts/18-12.htm

12 **And when Gallio was the deputy of Achaia, the Jews made insurrection with one accord against Paul, and brought him to the judgment seat,** 13 **Saying, This fellow persuadeth men to worship God contrary to the law.** 14 **And when Paul was now about to open his mouth, Gallio said unto the Jews, If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews, reason would that I should bear with you:** 15 **But if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye to it; for I will be no judge of such matters.** 16 **And he drave them from the judgment seat.** 17 **Then all the Greeks took Sosthenes, the chief ruler of the synagogue, and beat him before the judgment seat. And Gallio cared for none of those things.**

https://biblehub.com/commentaries/acts/18-12.htm

Gallio, or to give his full name, M. Annæus Novatus, who had taken the *agnomen* of Gallio on his adoption by the rhetorician of that name, was the brother of L. Annæus Seneca, the tutor of Nero. **The philosopher dedicated to him two treatises on Anger and the Blessed Life;** and the kindliness of his nature made him a general

favourite. He was everybody's "dulcis Gallio," was praised by his brother for his disinterestedness and calmness of temper, as one "who was loved much, even by those who had but little capacity for loving" (Seneca, *Ep.* 104). **On the whole, therefore, we may see in him a very favourable example of what philosophic culture was able to do for a Roman statesman.**

https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/61/mode/2up?view=theater

> The very rise of Christianity was possible because of this relative freedom of the Jewish communities *outside* the two centres [of Palestine and Mesopotamia]. The experience of the Apostle Paul is significant: **in Corinth, when the local Jewish community accused Paul of heresy, the Roman governor Gallio dismissed the case at once, refusing to be a 'judge of such matters';**5 **but in Judea the governor Festus felt *obliged* to take legal cognizance of a purely religious internal Jewish dispute.**6

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0134%3Abook%3D7%3Acard%3D337

> How great art thou,
> Rome, in thy fall! Stretched to the widest bounds
> War upon war laid nations at thy feet
> Till flaming Titan nigh to either pole
> Beheld thine empire; **and the furthest east**
> **Was almost thine, till day and night and sky**
> **For thee revolved, and all the stars could see**
> **Throughout their course was Roman.** But the fates
> In one dread day of slaughter and despair
> Turned back the centuries and spoke thy doom.
> **And now the Indian fears the axe no more**
> Once emblem of thy power, now no more
> The girded Consul curbs the Getan horde,
> Or in Sarmatian furrows guides the share:[2]
> Still Parthia boasts her triumphs unavenged:
> Foul is the public life; **and Freedom, fled**
> **To furthest Earth beyond the Tigris stream,**
> **And Rhine's broad river, wandering at her will**
> **'Mid Teuton hordes and Scythian,** though by sword
> Sought, yet returns not. Would that from the day
> When Romulus, aided by the vulture's flight,
> Ill-omened, raised within that hateful grove
> Rome's earliest walls, down to the crimsoned field
> In dire Thessalia fought, she ne'er had known
> Italia's peoples! Did the Bruti strike
> In vain for liberty? Why laws and rights
> Sanctioned by all the annals designate
> With consular titles? **Happier far the Medes**
> **And blest Arabia, and the Eastern lands**
> **Held by a kindlier fate in despot rule!**
> **That nation serves the worst which serves with shame.**
> **No guardian gods watch over us from heaven:**
> **Jove[3] is no king; let ages whirl along**
> **In blind confusion:** from his throne supreme
> Shall he behold such carnage and restrain
> His thunderbolts? On Mimas shall he hurl
> His fires, on Rhodope and OEta's woods
> Unmeriting such chastisement, and leave
> This life to Cassius' hand? On Argos fell
> At grim Thyestes' feast[4] untimely night
> By him thus hastened; shall Thessalia's land
> Receive full daylight, wielding kindred swords
> In fathers' hands and brothers'? **Careless of men**
> **Are all the gods. Yet for this day of doom**
> **Such vengeance have we reaped as deities**
> **May give to mortals; for these wars shall raise**
> **Our parted Caesars to the gods; and Rome**
> **Shall deck their effigies with thunderbolts,**
> **And stars and rays, and in the very fanes**
> **Swear by the shades of men.** **[Inque deum templis iurabit Roma per umbras.]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0134%3Abook%3D10%3Acard%3D1

> **The madman offspring there of Philip lies,**
> **The famed Pellaean robber, Fortune's friend,**
> **Snatched off by fate, in vengeance for the world.**

In sacred sepulchre the hero's limbs,
Which should be scattered o'er the earth, repose,
Still spared by Fortune to these tyrant days:
For in a world to freedom once recalled,
All men had mocked the dust of him who set
The baneful lesson that so many lands
Can serve one master. Macedon he left
His home obscure; Athena he despised,
The conquest of his sire, and spurred by fate
Through Asia rushed with havoc of mankind,
Plunging his sword through peoples; red with blood
Unknown to them Euphrates, Ganges ran.
Curse of all earth, fell star of evil fate
To every nation! On the outer sea
He launched his fleet to sail the ocean wave:
Nor flame nor flood nor sterile Libyan sands
Stayed back his course, nor Hammon's pathless shoals;
Far to the west, where downward slopes the world
He would have led his armies, and the poles
Had compassed, and had drunk the fount of Nile:
But came his latest day; such end alone
Could nature place upon the madman king,
Who jealous in death as when he won the world
His empire with him took, nor left an heir.
Thus every city to the spoiler's hand
Was victim made. **Yet in his fall was his**
Babylon; and Parthia feared him. Shame on us
That Eastern nations dreaded more the lance
Of Macedon than now the Roman spear.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=njn-dglZFHIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA24#v=onepage&q&f=false

Lucan was the central poet of the republican imagination, and his traces can be found again and again amongst leading Parliamentarians. Yet he has disappeared from sight in much modern literary history. We are constantly told of the importance for early modern poetry of the classical heritage as embodied in the poetry of Horace and Virgil, both of whom, with whatever subtle qualifications and sub-texts, ultimately celebrated the reign of Augustus. **The dust jacket of the current Loeb edition still feels it necessary to apologize: Lucan's 'weighty verse, powerful rhetoric, sour satire, pungent sayings, and belief in a Cause have led readers from the middle ages to quite modern times to over-estimate him.' Reprehensible as such qualities may appear to a certain form of philological purism, they were calculated to fire the early modern period with enthusiasm. Lucan's reception was indeed more troubled than Virgil's precisely because his poetry was a frontal challenge to the norms of courtly writing;** but he had his admirers, especially those who had other reasons for disaffection with the court.
…

A reading of the *Pharsalia* can help us to understand why for Whitelocke and his allies, a civil war was a great evil but failure to fight in a civil war would be even worse. **A poem charged with paradox, the *Pharsalia* at once denounces civil war and incites it.**
…

In a passage modelled on Virgil's praise of Augustus in the *Georgics*, Lucan looks forward to Nero's apotheosis in heaven, and cautions him not to sit anywhere other than the centre of the celestial sphere or his weight will bring it crashing down. In fact, the poet proclaims, to him Nero is divine already: no need to invoke Apollo or Bacchus as his Muse, the emperor himself is Muse enough. This passage disappointed some republican readers. **The Leveller John Lilburne wrote that 'I should have doted on the *Roman Poet* of the *Civil Wars*, had I not found him blessing his Fates for bringing forth a *Nero* through those bitter Pangs and Throws.'**7 Lilburne was not, however, notably sensitive to irony, and most seventeenth-century commentators took it that this passage was 'meere Ironicall flattery,'8 a wicked parody of the ceremonial language of court poetry, with imperial and divine *gravitas* or weightiness being ludicrously literalized in the image of Nero's divine bulk ruining the cosmos.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/14C*.html#ref34

Plautus, with his great fortune, did not even affect a desire for peace, but, not content to parade his mimicries of the ancient Romans, **had taken upon himself the Stoic arrogance and the mantle of a sect which inculcated sedition and an appetite for politics."[36] [adsumpta etiam Stoicorum adrogantia sectaque, quae turbidos et negotiorum adpetentes faciat.]**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/16*.html#ref46

"As once," he said, "this discord-loving state prated of Caesar and Cato, so now, Nero, it prates of yourself and Thrasea. And he has his followers—his satellites, rather—who affect, not as yet the contumacity of his opinions, but his bearing and his looks, **and whose stiffness and austerity are designed for an impeachment of your wantonness.**[51] To him alone your safety is a thing uncared for, your talents a thing unhonoured. The imperial happiness he cannot brook: can he not even be satisfied with the imperial bereavements and sorrows? **Not to believe Poppaea deity bespeaks the same temper that will not swear to the acts of the deified Augustus and the deified Julius. He contemns religion, he abrogates law.** The journal of the Roman people[52] is scanned throughout the provinces and armies with double care for news of what Thrasea has not done! Either let us pass over to his creed, if it is the better, or let these seekers after a new world lose their chief and their instigator. **It is the sect that produced the Tuberones and the Favonii[53]—names unloved even in the old republic. In order to subvert the empire, they make a parade of liberty: the empire overthrown, they will lay hands on liberty itself. [ut imperium evertant libertatem praeferunt: si perverterint, libertatem ipsam adgredientur]** You have removed Cassius to little purpose, if you intend to allow these rivals of the Bruti to multiply and flourish!

https://books.google.fi/books?id=VJ1WDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thrasea, a senator who held the titular rank of consul or head of state in AD 56, had set himself up as a public opponent of the emperor Nero. **While from a wealthy family and married into the old aristocracy, Thrasea hailed from Padua not Rome and thus was an aristocrat of wealth not birth.** Here we see the importance of Tacitus's point about the holocaust of the old aristocracy in the civil wars. Thrasea's pedigree was not sufficient grounds for opposition to Nero, thus he centered his resistance to the regime on philosophical grounds, relying in particular on doctrines of Stoicism. "**Stoic opposition" was an important step away from a pure-blooded aristocratic opposition. Asinius Gallus had no need of an ideology to be an opponent of the principate: the ancestral busts displayed in his *tablinum* were reason enough to oppose a regime which, after all, had been devised by a provincial upstart.** Not only, however, did Stoicism embrace the "aristocracy of the soul" allowing Thrasea his new, "true" nobility, but it also enjoined on its followers resistance to tyranny. This too was important as it allowed Thrasea to escape from accusations of ingratitude.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA206#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Du Vair's Stoicism is not, then, simply intended to strengthen the individual in a time of trouble, but to foster a social ideal of behavior: thoughtful, measured, refined, dignified, responsible. **It is the ideal of a magistrate or civil servant rather than a nobleman. In insisting on the distinction between true honor, founded on the consciousness of virtue, and that which depends on the opinion of the vulgar, and rejecting the idea that ambition is a intermediate stage to virtue, since it favors the concealment rather than the eradication of vice, Du Vair is probably criticizing aristocratic values (80-1). The social model he advocates was to be taken up by the resurgent absolutist monarchy in the early decades of the seventeenth century** (on the political dimension of Neostoicism see Keohane 1980; Oestreich 1982).

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/224/mode/2up?view=theater

Cicero, whose honored place in the Enlightenment we know, was admired as a great rhetor (that is to say, as a technician), **and persistently misread down to the thirteenth century: his praise of Scipio's active leisure – *in otio de negotio cogitabat* – was taken by St. Ambrose as consonant with the monastic life, and by St. Jerome as an outright commendation of the philosophic life in preference to marriage. Thus the greatest antique advocate of the *vita activa* was enlisted under the banner of the *vita contemplativa*.**

By the time of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, there were scholars who dealt with ancient philosophers in a more straightforward manner. In the twelfth century, John of Salisbury and Abelard had still interpreted Cicero as the teacher of eloquence yearning for saintliness; **in the thirteenth century, the great Scholastics interpreted him as the supreme advocate of the active life, but rejected his ideal in favor of another pagan ideal – Aristotle's theoretic life.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/260/mode/2up?view=theater

Then in 1345, Petrarch discovered Cicero's letters to Atticus with mingled excitement and regret. He found in this chatty, candid correspondence, a statesman-lawyer, an ambitious man avid for applause and pathetically in need of reassurance. Here was a pagan thinker in action, without disguise or pretense.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

Among the earliest texts to be printed were Cicero's *Paradoxes of the Stoics* and *On Duties*, in 1465, by the famous Mainz printers Johann Fust and Peter Schoeffer (Stillwell 1972: 27). These were followed not long after by the *Tusculan Disputations*, printed in Rome in 1469 (ibid.: 50). Further works by Cicero followed in the 1470s, along with the *Lives* of Diogenes Laertius in the Latin translation of Ambrosius Traversarius and the philosophical works of Seneca.22 **By the end of the fifteenth century over seventy editions of works by Seneca had been printed** (Goff 1964: 555-8). By contrast the works of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius had to wait until the sixteenth century to make their first appearances in print: **the *Handbook* was first printed in 1529 (but also appeared the year before embedded within the first edition of Simplicius's commentary);** the *Discourses* were printed in 1533; Marcus Aurelius in 1558.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/104/mode/2up?view=theater

While Lucretius supplied the philosophes with passionate slogans and an attitude, their real favorite, Cicero, gave them even more – a philosophy. Montesquieu hailed Cicero as the noblest among the ancients, the man whom, more than anyone else, he wished to resemble. He was a young man when he expressed these extravagant views, but Montesquieu's taste for Cicero never changed. Diderot thought Cicero a "*prodigy* of eloquence and patriotism."9 **David Hume, who was as sensitive to philosophical currents of his day as he was well informed in the history of philosophy, observed that "the fame of Cicero flourishes at present, but that of Aristotle is utterly decayed"**1 – and Hume did not seem unhappy with this state of affairs.

Cicero's reputation in the Enlightenment is hard to appreciate today: nothing illustrates our distance from the eighteenth century better than this. To us, Cicero is at best an interesting politician and a master of certain Latin style; at worst he is a bore or an unknown. It was different in the eighteenth century: as *Tristram Shandy* testifies, even moderately well-educated men affectionately called him "Tully"; Hume borrowed ideas from him; and the others too never ceased to read him. When Conyers Middleton's adulatory *Life of Cicero* appeared in 1741, it sold well despite its length and high price. Horace Walpole confessed to a friend: "I wait with some impatience to see Dr. Middleton's Tully, as I read the greatest part of it in manuscript; though indeed that is rather a reason for my being impatient to read the rest. If Tully can receive any additional honor, Dr. Middleton is most capable of conferring it."2 Gibbon's tribute to the biography was rather more grudging: upon first reading it, he appreciated it "above its true value."3 His reservations were sound: Middleton had borrowed from others even more than was customary in his generous age. Yet Gibbon meant to criticize Middleton for his execution, not for his choice of subject: there could never be too much written on Tully.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008
>
> Never was there a character which it was easier to read than that of Cicero. Never was there a mind keener or more critical than that of Middleton. Had the biographer brought to the examination of his favourite statesman's conduct but a very small part of the acuteness and severity which he displayed when he was engaged in investigating the high pretensions of Epiphanius and Justin Martyr, he could not have failed to produce a most valuable history of a most interesting portion of time. But this most ingenious and learned man, though
>
> > "So wary held and wise
> > That, as 'twas said, he scarce received
> > For gospel what the church believed,"
>
> had a superstition of his own. The great Iconoclast was himself an idolater. **The great *Avvocato del Diavolo*, while he disputed, with no small ability, the claims of Cyprian and Athanasius to a place in the Calendar, was himself composing a lying legend in honour of St. Tully!** He was holding up as a model of every virtue a man whose talents and acquirements, indeed, can never be too highly extolled, and who was by no means destitute of amiable qualities, but whose whole soul was under the dominion of a girlish vanity and a craven fear. **Actions for which Cicero himself, the most eloquent and skilful of advocates, could contrive no excuse, actions which in his confidential correspondence he mentioned with remorse and shame, are represented by his biographer as wise, virtuous, heroic.** The whole history of that great revolution which overthrew the Roman aristocracy, the whole state of parties, the character of every public man, is elaborately misrepresented, in order to make out something which may look like a defence of one most eloquent and accomplished trimmer.

…

The ideal of *humanitas* was first brought to Rome by the philosophic circle around Scipio and further developed by Cicero. For Cicero, *humanitas* was a style of thought, not a formal doctrine. It

asserted man's importance as a cultivated being, in control of his moral universe. The man who practiced *humanitas* was confident of his worth, courteous to others, decent in his social conduct, and active in his political role. **He was a man, moreover, who faced life with courageous skepticism: he knows that the consolations of popular religion are for more credulous beings than himself,** that life is uncertain, and that sturdy pessimism is superior to self-deceptive optimism. Man becomes man as he refines himself; he even becomes godlike: "*Deus est mortali iuvare mortalem*," wrote Pliny, translating a Greek Stoic:5 "To help man is man's true God." Finally, the man who practiced *humanitas* cultivated his aesthetic sensibilities as he listened to his reason: "*Cum musis*," wrote Cicero, "*id est, cum humanitate et doctrina habere commercium*."6 **Virtue, Cicero insisted, is nothing but nature perfected and developed to its highest point, and there is therefore a resemblance between man and God:** *Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura; est igitur homini cum deo similitudo*. **As a modern Humanist, Holbach quoted this Ciceronian dictum with approval; as a good atheist, he omitted its reference to God.**7

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero#Legacy

Camille Desmoulins said of the French republicans in 1789 that they were "mostly young people who, nourished by the reading of Cicero at school, had become passionate enthusiasts for liberty". [154]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n63/mode/2up?view=theater

"*Free*" Art now served as handmaid to these exalted masters, and, looking into the matter more closely, it is difficult to decide who was the greater hypocrite: **Louis XIV, when he sat and heard the Grecian hate of Tyrants, declaimed in polished verses from the boards of his Court-theatre; or Corneille and Racine, when, to win the favour of their lord, they set in the mouths of their stage-heroes the warm words of freedom and political virtue, of ancient Greece and Rome.**

https://archive.org/details/memoirsrecollect01sg/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

Besides, how could the monarchical governments of Europe wonder at the enthusiasm for liberty which was manifested by young men of ardent minds, **who were every where instructed to admire the heroes of Greece and of Rome, before whom the most enthusiastic praises were bestowed upon the release of Switzerland and Holland from thraldom, and who were taught to read and to reflect by constantly studying the works of the most celebrated republicans of antiquity?**

https://archive.org/details/memoirsrecollect01sg/page/100/mode/2up?view=theater

The rising generation, above all, **taught, by a singular contrast, in the midst of monarchies, to admire the great writers and the heroes of Greece and Rome,** carried to an enthusiastic excess the interest with which they were inspired by the American revolution.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n271/mode/2up?view=theater

Schiller, also, is no exception, though text-books and leading articles for a hundred years have pointed to him as the reawakener of German patriotism. He uses the love of one's country in his poems merely as a valuable dramatic subject, without ever giving it a German nationalist colouring.
…

On October 13, 1789 he wrote to Körner: **"The patriotic interest is important only for immature nations, for the youth of the world; it is a narrow, trivial idea to write for but one nation; this limitation is for a philosophic spirit simply unbearable."**

Moreover, patriotic tendencies were not looked upon by the governments concerned with any satisfaction, for they immediately scented republicanism; and since in those days the general idea was that true patriotism had only existed in the Classical age, while at the same time no one could picture the Greeks and Romans as anything but republicans, there was something to be said for this association of ideas.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n185/mode/2up?view=theater

It is natural that we should find in so large a correspondence (864 letters, ninety of them to Cicero) occasional contradictions and insincerities. There is no sign here of the religious piety and belief that appear so frequently in Cicero's essays or in those speeches in which he plays up the gods as his last trump.
…

Nevertheless, he is as skeptical of atheism as of any other dogma. **He rejects the atomism of Democritus and Lucretius; it is as unlikely that unguided atoms—even in infinite time—could fall into the order of the existing world as that the letters of the alphabet should spontaneously form the *Annales* of Ennius.**[64]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Natura_Deorum/2B*.html#ref33

37 93 "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, **and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world?** I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, **if a counts number of copies of the one-and-twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the *Annals* of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse!**

Our ignorance of the gods is no guarantee of their nonexistence; and indeed, Cicero argues, the general agreement of mankind establishes a balance of probability in favor of Providence. He concludes that religion is indispensable to private morals and public order and that no man of sense will attack it.[65]
…

He had all the curiosity of a scientist and all the timidity of a bourgeois; even in his philosophy he remained a politician, reluctant to offend any vote.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater

In this dark time, he wrote a whole collection of philosophical works, **above all, *De natura deorum*, *De divinatione*, and *De officiis*, three books that survived to shape, more than any other products of ancient thought, the mind of the Enlightenment.** Voltaire thought *De natura deorum* "perhaps the best book of all antiquity"; his only other claimant to the title was Cicero's *De officiis*.1 With rare unanimity, the philosophes endorsed Voltaire's claims for these works and accepted Diderot's estimate that Cicero was indeed "the first of the Roman philosophers."2

https://archive.org/details/onpagansjewschri0000momi/page/64/mode/2up?view=theater

The thesis which I want to propose in this part of the paper is that Cicero basically argued with Varro in his earlier philosophic works (*De republica* and *De legibus*), which were probably published before the *Antiquitates divinae* by Varro and may therefore even have influenced Varro. **When, however, Cicero had before him Varro's works circa 46 B.C. he changed his mind and expressed profound skepticism both about the existence of the gods and about the validity of Roman divination.**
…

What matters is that Cicero became more skeptical when his contemporaries became more credulous or at least more sanctimonious. And his skepticism is even more surprising and dramatic because in 45 Cicero's daughter Tullia died, and her father wanted to believe in her immortality.
…

What is obvious that about 53 Cicero tried to give a Roman version of both the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato. He was not obliged to know what some modern scholars have discovered: that the *Republic* and the *Laws* represent two different stages of Plato's thought. In his version of Platonic thought, Cicero never tried to put philosophers in command or to expel poets. He rather accepted the notion of Polybius that the Roman state satisfied the conditions of a mixed constitution. Perhaps the most deeply felt conviction of his work on the *Republic* is that human virtue never comes so near to the *deorum numen*, to divine power, as in the founding or saving of a city (*Rep*. 1.12). The religious interpretation of politics reaches its peak in that surprising and altogether mysterious *Somnium Scipionis* which concludes the *Republic*. **Scipio Africanus appears to Scipio Aemilianus in a dream. The "grandfather" advises his "grandson" to exercise *iustitia* and *pietas* and promises him not only immortality of the soul but a better life in the celestial spheres. Cicero was never again to be so definite about the immortality of the soul or about the link between politics and salvation. But he was here indulging in a dream, and a careful reader cannot avoid noticing a certain contradiction between his depreciation of earthly life and his overpraise of political activity as conducive to salvation after death.** There is the same ambiguity in the unfinished *Laws* which supplement the *Republic*. **On the one hand, he argues that reason unites men and gods: "prima homini cum deo rationis societas" (1.23); consequently, law can be founded on nature, which is reason. One the other hand, he is so far from envisaging a universal law that he makes a point of emphasizing in Book 2 of the *Laws* that he is even more a citizen of Arpinum than of Rome: "hinc enim orti stirpe antiquissima sumus, hic sacra, hic genus, hic maiorum multa vestigia" (2.3).** This is of course little more than a preparation for saying that the city, that is, Rome, which extenced to the citizens of Arpinum the rights of her own citizenship, is now the real "patria," the city to which he, Cicero, owes allegiance. The conclusion of this sentimental outburst is a very practical one: as Rome has the most perfect form of constitution (2.23), **all a legislator has to do is to produce a**

slightly improved form of the *mos maiorum*, of the tradition of the ancestors (2.23). Even the archaic language of the Twelve Tables must be preserved (2.18). When, therefore, in a good Platonic spirit Cicero begins to formulate specific laws about religion, we know that nothing sensationally new will appear. The purpose is to reaffirm that Rome must worship the gods she has always worshiped in the forms she has received from immemorial tradition (2.26). **At the most, some rationalization may have to be introduced. One must divinize virtue, not vice (2.28). Consequently, goddesses like Febris and Mala Fortuna who had their altars, if not their temples, inside Rome must be repudiated.** The whole exposition of the sacred law in the second book of *De legibus* is characterized by three preoccupations: to preserve the main lines of Roman cult, to modify details which for personal or environmental reasons are no longer considered acceptable, and finally to avoid any systematic coverage of the subject which might turn out to be embarrassing. As is evident from the long excursus of 2.47-69 on the interaction between civil and pontifical laws in the matter of family cults, **Cicero was aware of contradictions between *ius civile* and *ius pontificium*. But he never puts the problem in sufficiently general terms to make it an important argument for reform. He was equally aware of the enormous importance which ordinary people still attributed to funeral rites.** Although many of these customs have no appeal to him, he has no intention of interfering with them and speaks about them more to display his competence in comparative law than in the spirit of a reformer.

If one has to make a comparison between what Cicero wrote in the *De republica* and in the *De legibus* and what was the general trend of Varro's *Antiquities*, two difference seem to be evident, but they are not profound. Cicero does not bother to collect the whole of the evidence; at the same time he allows himself a modicum of reform. While he is concerned with the preservation of the tradition, of the *mos maiorum*, he is not obsessed by it, as Varro was.

When about July 45 (*Epistulae ad Atticum* 13.38.1) he began to write *De natura deorum*, he has the whole of Varro's *Antiquitates divinae* before him. He has also accumulated many more sad experiences, not only political, but personal: a few months before, in February 45, his daughter Tullia had died, and he had tried to cope with this as well as he could by reading and writing philosophy, by hopes of the immortality of the soul, and by planning a sort of *apotheosis* for his dead child. It was also the time of the sudden end of his second marriage to Publilia. We therefore expect to find in the *De natura deorum* an increased respect for theism in general and for Roman traditional religion in particular. **The surprise is that there is no noticeable trace of all that in *De natura deorum*.** The *De natura deorum* is very different from Varro in every respect.
…

Sine summa placatione deorum Rome could never have become as powerful as she is (3.5). This is good enough, but very short and followed by a close argument for the impossibility of proving the existence of gods, to which there is no reply. The inescapable conclusion a reader was bound to draw from the end of the *De natura deorum* was that Cicero, with all due precautions (for which cf. 3.95), intended to be negative. It was not the impression one would have derived a few years before from a reading of the *De republica* and *De legibus*.

The impression that from circa 51 to circa 45 Cicero has shifted his ground in the matter of religion cannot simply be contradicted by pointing to the mystical crisis he had experienced in 45 because of his daughter's death. As the *De consolatione*, the treatise he wrote to console himself after her death, is lost, we have no clear idea of what he was saying in it. Nor do we know how closely the idea of immortality was bound up with his belief in gods. The skepticism which unexpectedly emerges from the *De natura deorum* becomes even more conspicuous in the work which followed it, *De divinatione*. This work belongs to the end of 45 and early 44. It was probably drafted before the death of Caesar and revised immediately after the Ides of March. The proem to the second of the two books is certainly later than Caesar's murder and provides an invaluable summary of Cicero's intellectual activities in the previous year.
…

He had of course taken a positive view of Roman divination in his book *De legibus*. At least in the past (he had argued in the *De legibus*) the Roman augurs had been authentic diviners (2.32). The personal, almost intimate, character of the *De divinatione* is immediately made clear by the fact that it is a dialogue between Cicero and his brother Quintus in Cicero's villa at Tusculum, with nobody else present. The brother plays the part of the Stoic who defends the authenticity and legitimacy of divination: he seems to derive many of his arguments in favor of divination from Posidonius. Cicero plays the role of the skeptic from the point of view of the Academy. **He has the final word. He ends by declaring that his denial of any value in divination is meant to save religion from a dubious and dangerous ally: religion must be separated from superstition.** But the impossibility of defending religion from a serious philosophic point of view had already been demonstrated in the *De natura deorum*, to which Cicero pointedly refers in this final passage of *De divinatione* (2.148). No attentive reader could take this escape clause too seriously. What on the contrary is striking is that Cicero so fiercely attacks all forms of divination – Roman or foreign – with the same two basic arguments, namely, the small proportion of verified prognostics in comparison with the multitude of prophecies, and the intrinsic improbability that the entrails of certain animals or the position of remote stars could tell us something specific about what

was going to happen to single individuals at a given date. Cicero does not hesitate to use Roman examples and even his own personal experiences (such as one of his dreams, 2.136) to show the inanity of divination. And it is, as I have said, a denunciation in very personal terms, with the clear intention of assuming full responsibility for what is being said. He repudiates explicitly the arguments in favor of divination of his fellow augur Ap. Claudius Pulcher, who had dedicated a book on the subject to him (2.75).

We are therefore brought to my main point. In 51 B.C. or so we had found another Cicero – a man with ambitions to reform the Roman state on a religious basis. The *Somnium Scipionis* was a remarkable attempt to link the political program with religious aspirations: the good Roman leader was promised immortality in this precise sense. At the same time, the book on *Laws* modified, but substantially defended, the traditional Roman attitude to sacred laws, to *auspicia*, and to the ancestral cults. **Six or seven years later very little of that was left. The *De natura deorum* had paid lip service to the traditional values of Roman religious traditions, including *auspicia*, but had been a rigorous denial of the possibility of demonstrating the existence of the gods. In the *De divinatione* the game was inverted: lip service was paid to religion, but any form of divination, including the traditional forms of Roman religion, was denied any merit and probability.**9
…

Most probably between 51 B.C. and 45 B.C. Varro had published his *Divine Antiquities*, which Cicero himself greeted enthusiastically as a revelation. They provided a uniquely authoritative picture of Roman traditional religion. They invited a restoration of obsolete cults and in any case provided the evidence for a precise discussion of Roman cults. Cicero did not take any of this new material into account when he wrote *De natura deorum* and *De divinatione*.
…

Caesar, who had added to his dignity of *pontifex maximus* that of an *augur* in 47, clearly took pleasure in religious details. He passed a *lex Iulia de sacerdotiis* and (later?) increased the number of *pontifices*, *augures*, and *quinquennales*. May we suspect that Cicero was not amused? He had reconciled himself to Caesar's regime, as long as it lasted, and was bound to Caesar by intellectual ties which he was the last to underrate. But he was never with him at heart. **The more Caesar was involved in religion, the more Cicero tried to escape it.**
…

But the difference between the Caesarean and the Augustan age is immediately apparent. **The men who represented the new age were neither scholars like Varro nor philosophers like Cicero; they were poets** – Horace, Virgil, Propertius, Ovid, Manilius. It was a poet, Ovid, who undertook and did not quite complete the task of collecting the stories attached to the various festivals of the Roman calendar.10

Next there were the historians, among whom Strabo should not be underrated. The lawyers (I shall add the name of Antistius Labeo) come third, the pure antiquarians (such as Verrius Flaccus) are fourth: philosophy in Latin, especially on religious matters, does not seem to have been conspicuous under Augustus. When a poet was encouraged to announce "Tuus iam regnat Apollo," there was less room for philosophers. There was perhaps less astrological speculation about Augustus than J. Gagé has repeatedly suggested,11 but there was enough to offend the *dii manes* of Cicero (although, as we know, Octavian, as early as 30 B.C. when he was not yet Augustus, had made Cicero's son his ally as *consul suffectus* in order to demonstrate that he had had no share in Cicero's murder). **But what would Cicero have said on hearing that a comet, the *sidus Iulium*, had become both the proof of Caesar's apotheosis and the confirmation of Augustus's power** (Pliny *HN* 2.94, from Augustus's autobiography)? Indeed the very title of Augustus alluded to *auguria* and more precisely to the *augusta auguria* which had accompanied the foundation of Rome. Even at their lowest number, there were too many horoscopes and other portents around Augustus. **We can understand why Minucius Felix (by implication) and Arnobius (explicitly) thought the *De natura deorum* to be a refutation of paganism.** Arnobius added that Cicero had taken the risk of appearing impious (3.6). Lactantius, for all his admiration for Cicero (or because of it), declared: **"totus liber tertius de natura deorum omnes funditus religiones evertit ac delet"** (*Div. inst.* 1.17.4). **In a different context and in a different religious situation, St. Augustine was more severe** (*De civ. D.* 5.9: notice "philosophaster" in 2.27).

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0021%3Aspeech%3D1%3Asection%3D13
>
> 6. [13] Do you think, O conscript fathers, that I would have voted for the resolution which you adopted against your own wills, **of mingling funeral obsequies with supplications? Of introducing inexplicable impiety into the republic? [ut parentalia cum supplicationibus miscerentur, ut inexpiabiles religiones in rem publicam inducerentur] Of decreeing supplications in honour of a dead man?** I say nothing about who the man was. Even had he been that great Lucius Brutus who himself also delivered the republic from kingly power, and who has produced posterity nearly five

> hundred years after himself of similar virtue, and equal to similar achievements—**even then I could not have been induced to join any dead man in a religious observance paid to the immortal gods; so that a supplication should be addressed by public authority to a man who has nowhere a sepulcher at which funeral obsequies may be celebrated.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n321/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Against this new development rebellion rose not only in the aristocracy but among the philosophers and in the religions that were flowing into Rome from the East.** The Jews and the Christians refused to adore the godhead of Domitian, the Cynics decried all government, and the Stoics, though they accepted kings, were pledged to oppose despots and honor tyrannicides.

---

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17437/17437-h/17437-h.htm#citation343

As tutor to James I.; as director, for a short time, of the chancery; as keeper of the privy seal, and privy councillor; **as one of the commissioners for codifying the laws, and again—for in the semi-anarchic state of Scotland, government had to do everything in the way of organisation—in the committee for promulgating a standard Latin grammar;** in the committee for reforming the University of St. Andrew's: in all these Buchanan's talents were again and again called for; and always ready. The value of his work, especially that for the reform of St. Andrew's, must be judged by Scotchmen, rather than by an Englishman: but all that one knows of it justifies **Melville's sentence in the well-known passage in his memoirs, wherein he describes the tutors and household of the young King. "Mr. George was a Stoic philosopher, who looked not far before him;"** in plain words, a high-minded and right-minded man, bent on doing the duty which lay nearest him.
…

Not only Catholic Scotsmen, like Blackwood, Winzet, and Ninian, but Protestants, like Sir Thomas Craig and Sir John Wemyss, could not stomach the 'De Jure Regni.' They may have had some reason on their side. **In the then anarchic state of Scotland, organisation and unity under a common head may have been more important than the assertion of popular rights.** Be that as it may, in 1584, only two years after his death, the Scots Parliament condemned his Dialogue and History as untrue, and commanded all possessors of copies to deliver them up, that they might be purged of "the offensive and extraordinary matters" which they contained. The 'De Jure Regni' was again prohibited in Scotland, in 1664, even in manuscript; **and in 1683, the whole of Buchanan's political works had the honour of being burned by the University of Oxford, in company with those of Milton, Languet, and others, as "pernicious books, and damnable doctrines, destructive to the sacred persons of Princes, their state and government, and of all human society."** And thus the seed which Buchanan had sown, and Milton had watered—for the allegation that Milton borrowed from Buchanan is probably true, and equally honourable to both—lay trampled into the earth, and seemingly lifeless, till it tillered out, and blossomed, and bore fruit to a good purpose, in the Revolution of 1688.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR63#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> For what, Bossuet asks triumphantly in the *Cinquième avertissement*, is the most striking recent result of contractarian and popular sovereignty thinking? Nothing less than the judicial murder (as he takes it to be) of Charles I by Cromwell.
>
> > Let us come to the true authors of the crime. It was Cromwell and the fanatics, I grant. But what principles did they use to get the people to enter into their sentiments? What principles does one still see in their apologies – in that of a Milton, and in a hundred other libels with which the Cromwellites inundated all Europe? **Of what are these books full … if not the absolute sovereignty of peoples over their kings, and all the other principles which M. Jurieu, following Buchanan, still maintains?**181
>
> **The *reductio ad Cromwellum*: always effective, even for a liberal constitutionalist such as Kant a century later.**182
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2612/pg2612-images.html#linknoteref-459
>
> The swearing clergy, as they were called, were not a little perplexed by this reasoning. Nothing embarrassed them more than the analogy which the nonjurors were never weary of pointing out between the usurpation of Cromwell and the usurpation of William. **For there was in that age no High Churchman who would not have thought himself reduced to an absurdity if he had been reduced to the necessity of saying that the Church had commanded her sons to obey Cromwell.**

…

Knox and Buchanan, the one from the stand-point of an old Hebrew prophet, the other rather from that of a Juvenal or a Tacitus, tried the other method, and called acts by their just names, appealing alike to conscience and to God. The result was virtue and piety, and that manly independence of soul which is thought compatible with hearty loyalty, in a country labouring under heavy disadvantages, long divided almost into two hostile camps, two rival races.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century#lf6114_label_323

> But Calvinism itself had Erasmian origins. Unlike Lutheranism, it presupposed a reformed, visible, primitive Church; it was also austere, scholarly, scientific; and in its earliest days it appealed to the same class in the same areas—the educated official and mercantile classes of Latin Europe. In submitting to Calvinism the Erasmians of Europe saw rather the common origin than the separate development of their movements. **They were like those European Liberals who, in the 1930s, rather than surrender to Fascism, accepted Communist leadership of the Popular Front. Like these twentieth-century successors, they would soon find their relations with the Party uncomfortable, and afterwards—in happier times—they would seek the way out.**
>
> This slide of the Erasmians into Calvinism is easy to document. Wherever there was a centre of Erasmianism in the 1520s and 1530s—in the cities of France and Switzerland, the Rhineland and the Netherlands, in the princely Courts or noble households of Navarre, Transylvania, Poland—there we shall find a centre of Calvinism in the 1550s and 1560s. We can even watch the process happening. In the 1550s, when the Court of Rome seemed committed to blind reaction and all the works of Erasmus were put on the Index, the humanists of Europe were driven to the Left, driven into the arms of the only organization which seemed capable of preserving, at whatever price, the residue of their philosophy. It was then that the English humanists, fleeing from Marian persecution, accepted the leadership of Geneva; then that the humanists of the Netherlands, persecuted under the *Plakaten*, turned to the Calvinism that was to provide the discipline of their later revolt; then that the French humanists—the sceptical *littérateurs* of the days of François I—chose the road that would end, for many of them, with the massacre of St. Bartholomew; **then that George Buchanan, who was one of them, would return at last to Scotland and become the intellectual leader of Calvinist revolution.** Thanks to such men Calvinism, whose real social strength came from the urban artisanate, organized and disciplined by an indoctrinated clergy, could be said to have attracted the intellectual *élite* of Europe.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Rev._Jonathan_Swift/Volume_2/A_Discourse_of_the_Contests_and_Dissensions_between_the_Nobles_and_the_Commons_in_Athens_and_Rome/Chapter_5

About the middle of queen Elizabeth's reign, I take the power between the nobles and the commons to have been in more equal balance, than it was ever before or since. But then, or soon after, arose a faction in England, which under the name of puritan began to grow popular by moulding up their new schemes of religion with republican principles in government; and gaining upon the prerogative as well as the nobles, under several denominations, for the space of about sixty years, did, at last overthrow the constitution, and, according to the usual course of such revolutions, did introduce a tyranny, first of the people, and then of a single person.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

In England, according to J.H.M. Salmon, 'Seneca and Tacitus became cult figures for many writers on the fringe of court politics.'62 **Sir Philip Sidney had been one of the chief conduits through which French and Dutch Neostoic ideas reached the world of elite English politics.** He had corresponded with Lipsius, who dedicated his book on Latin pronunciation to him, calling him the 'bright star of Britannia,'63 and he and other members of his circle engaged in translating and publishing works by Seneca or other contemporary Stoic-inflected writers, such as Philippe Duplessis-Mornay.64 Sidney died after having been badly wounded by a musket-ball at Zutphen in the Netherlands in the autumn of 1586, whereupon, Salmon writes, 'the entry of Tacitean politics into English Neostoicism was accomplished by those who inherited the tradition of the Sidney … for Sidney left not only his sword and his widow to [Robert Devereux, the Earl of] Essex, but also his support of the international Protestant cause and his following of friends and clients.'65 **Francis Bacon once observed in a discussion of superstition that it was 'not the Schoole of Epicurus, but the Porch of the Stoiques that hath perturbed ancient states,'**66 **but the affinity between Stoicism and sedition was by no means purely a matter of ancient history in the later years of Elizabeth's reign and the Jacobean period.** After Essex's rebellion and execution in February 1601, one of the early political issues faced by King James, after his accession to the English throne in 1603, was how to deal with his Tacitist associates. These included leading courtiers, among them Fulke Greville and Bacon himself, who had betrayed his former patron when he testified against him at his trial for treason in Westminster Hall.67

However much Seneca and Tacitus might have flourished on the fringes of English court politics, they were distrusted at its very centre. James forgave Bacon, Greville, and the others, and would later reward members of the Essex circle with high office, but he was never keen on those who struck a Stoic pose in public life. **Even before becoming king of England he had referred dismissively in his *Basilikon Doron* to 'that Stoick insensible stupiditie that proud inconstant LIPSIVS perswadeth in his *Constantia*,' the charge of inconstancy being a contemptuous reference to Lipsius's frequent change of religious affiliation.**68 For editions of the book published around the time of James's accession to the English throne and afterwards, the specific reference to Lipsius was replaced with a general charge of hypocrisy directed at **'manie in our daies,' who, 'praessing to win honor, in imitating that**

auncient sect, by their inconstant behauiour in their owne liues, belyes their profession.'69 The king was not alone in his concern. Andrew Shifflett has described some of the anxieties that grew up around the figure of the Stoic politician, locating James's remarks in a cluster that included Roger Ascham's identification of the origins of the distinctively Stoic literary style in a 'singular pride in themselves, or some special malice of other, or for some private and partial matter, either in Religion or other kind of learning'; Robert Johnson's verdict that the Stoics were 'busie-headed and turbulent'; and Fulke Greville's 1622 poem, *An Inquisition on Fame and Honour*, which 'stated the problem well ... when he reflected on the political consequences of one who trusts only in a "self-constellation" and "makes himself his end": "Selfnesse [is] even apt to teare it self asunder: / All governments, like man himself within / Being restlesse compositions of the sinne."'70 Political philosophers from Cicero to John Rawls have held that a well-ordered political community is one in which the citizens share an appropriate conception of justice, and the perennial anxiety regarding those who present themselves as Stoics is that however assiduously they may be seen to be performing their various offices, they threaten to disrupt the smooth workings of a hierarchical political regime, substituting their own scale of values – regarding justice or honour, for example – for those that are officially recognised and socially sanctioned, and always placing their paramount concern with their own virtue above what others take to be the needs of the commonwealth for orderly, stable government. **'No matter how indifferent to the world he claimed to be,' Shifflett concludes, 'the Stoic was held to be a dangerous political animal.'**71 If the self-presentation of the Stoic politician was itself hypocritical – and, if Montaigne had been right about the fundamental inconstancy of human nature, it could hardly help but be – then the possibilities for sedition were multiplied.

https://archive.org/details/cicerospractical0000unse/page/260/mode/2up?view=theater

Fink's study focuses on the ideas of the English republican reformers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They include **Harrington, Milton, and Sydney, whose ideas of republicanism were based on the Roman model and the concept of mixed government which, they learned through Polybius and Cicero, had been gradually infused in the Roman state.** They sought to do the same in England though not in every respect as "gradualists," for there were other models of "how to do it" in the classical tradition (Lycurgus above all). The working definition of a "republican" in Fink's study is a supporter of "a state which was not headed by a king and in which the hereditary principle did not prevail in whole or in part in determining headship."33 **Reminiscent of Hobbes's finding Cicero and Aristotle responsible for unsettling democratic ideas in his time, Fink found the royalists in general holding the chief "declaimer" Cicero responsible for the republican thinking of the time. The seventeenth-century reformers had "the Ciceronian dialogues ... lurking in the background in their minds."**34 Not only was the teaching of Polybius on mixed government and the slightly moderated version of Cicero dear to the classical republicans, but Cicero's very view of the greatness of the Republic and the treachery of Caesar seems to have informed the republicans' view of Roman history.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/44/mode/2up?view=theater

Books forced on reluctant schoolboys are rarely more than hateful exercises, laboriously mastered and quickly forgotten, **but all over Europe and America, for all philosophes alike, the ancients were signposts to secularism.**6

> 6. **To make *political* capital of the ancients was not an invention of the philosophes; it placed them in a tradition going back to Machiavelli and beyond – medieval political theorists had quoted Aristotle on forms of government.** But in the sixteenth, and especially the seventeenth century, classical reminiscences had become the property of radicals bent on reforming corrupt present-day institutions by recalling the glories of Sparta and early Rome. In the midst of the English Civil War, Harrington urged Englishmen to establish a republic on the model of "ancient prudence," **while Milton, as Aubrey reports, was moved to write against monarchy "being so conversant in Livy and the Roman authors, and the greatness he saw done by the Roman Commonwealth."** (See Z.S. Fink: *The Classical Republicans* [2nd edn., 1962], 53, 90.) Thus modern republicans drew strength from antique republics and were rebuked for it by their royalist adversaries: **"As to rebellion in particular against monarchy" Hobbes complained in a famous passage, "one of the most frequent causes of it, is the reading of the books of policy, and histories of the ancient Greeks, and Romans."** Reading these books, young men "and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason" come to think of the ancients as thoroughly delightful companions, successful in war and prosperous in peace, and they overlook "the frequent seditions and civil wars, produced by the imperfection of their policy." This sentimental antiquarianism has led callow modern men to preach civil war and public murder: **"Men have undertaken to kill their kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books, and discourses of policy, make it lawful, and laudable, for any man to do so; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant."** (Thomas Hobbes: *Leviathan*, part II, chapter 29.) This political classicism persisted into the eighteenth century, although in attenuated form. The age of tyrannicide seemed at an end; still, it remained fashionable to seek for modern equivalents of ancient heroes and to deplore the decay of modern institutions by pointing to antique virtue. The philosophes, too, played at this political classicism: Diderot ominously called for a modern Brutus; Rousseau spoke highly of Spartan bravery and frugality as models worth imitating. **But more important than this: when the philosophes turned to the ancients for inspiration, they looked for philosophical rather than political models. They wanted evidence to be used not against kings but against clerics.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/238/mode/2up?view=theater

While Spinoza, and still more Bayle, blame religious conflict on the ambitions and the tactics of theologians, Hobbes, while acknowledging rival interpretations of Scripture and competing theologies are a perennial source of strife, does not consider these the only, or even primary, cause of wars of religion, which he dreads, of course, no less than they. Rather, fomenting civil strife generally is to be blamed, in his opinion, no less on Aristotle and much of the rest of the Greek political thought tradition: for he believed much harm had been done by labeling the 'rule of kings tyranny' and inculcating into modern man the, to his mind, pernicious notion that 'only in democracy is there liberty.'66

Democracy here embraces, as also in Spinoza, not only participation of all in politics but also of everyone in deciding what is right and wrong, just and unjust. **But here, once again, a not inconsiderable gap separates Hobbes from radical ideas. For it was the teaching of Greek authors to 'our youth,' in the universities, claims Hobbes, which generated that 'poisonous doctrine' whereby all 'decided about good and evil, just and unjust, laws and religion, each according to his own discretion.'**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n225/mode/2up?view=theater

In the warfare against the Gospel, Equality and Liberty could have been but a shallow pretence; it was their hatred against Christ by which they were hurried away. It is hardly possible that they could have concealed from themselves that it was rather a war waged by their passions against the virtues of the gospel, than a warfare of reason against the mysteries of Christianity. **In the Antimonarchical Conspiracy, the pretext had grown into conviction. The Sophisters believed their principles of Equality and Liberty to be demonstrated, they did not even suspect an error in their principles. They believed the war which they waged against Kings to be a war of justice and of wisdom.** In the former conspiracy, it was the passions inventing principles to combat the God of the Christians; in the latter, it was reason, misled by those same principles, seeking and glorying in the downfall of every crowned head.

Rapid had been the progress of the passions. From his very birth, Voltaire's hatred against Christ had been at its height. Scarcely had he known, ere he hated, scarcely hated when he swore to crush, the God of the Christians. **Not such was the progress of the hatred against Kings. This sentiment had, like opinion and conviction, its gradations.** The very interest of the Sophisters of Impiety thwarted for a long time the measures of those of Rebellion; many years were necessary to enable the sect to form its systems, to determine its plots, and resolve on its object.

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/130/mode/2up?view=theater

3. **The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, that tyrannicide is lawful; nay, at this day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise.** And under the title of tyrants, they mean not only monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any government whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at Athens, but those Thirty also who succeeded him, and ruled together, were all called tyrants. But he, whom men require to be put to death as being a tyrant, commands either by right or without right; if without right, he is an enemy, and by right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a tyrant, but an enemy; **if by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: Who hath told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_114

The *Athenians*, and *Romanes* were free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of *Luca* in great characters at this day, the word *LIBERTAS*; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in *Constantinople*. **Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.**

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; **and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only.** And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from *Aristotle, Cicero*, and other men, **Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the Practise of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular;** as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of *Homer* and *Virgil*. **And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves;** therefore *Aristotle* puts it down in his *Politiques*, (*lib*. 6. *cap*. 2.) *In democracy*, Liberty *is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is* Free *in any other Government*. And as *Aristotle*; so *Cicero*, and other Writers have

grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of *Rome*; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; **as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hobbes-the-english-works-vol-vi-dialogue-behemoth-rhetoric#lf0051-06_head_005

Fourthly, there were an exceeding great number of men of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning their polity and great actions; **in which books the popular government was extolled by that glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they became thereby in love with their forms of government. And out of these men were chosen the greatest part of the House of Commons, or if they were not the greatest part, yet by advantage of their eloquence, were always able to sway the rest.**
…

B. I see what use they make of Aristotle's logic, physics, and metaphysics; but I see not yet how his politics can serve their turn.

A. Nor I. It has, I think, done them no good, though it has done us here much hurt by accident. **For men, grown weary at last of the insolence of the priests, and examining the truth of these doctrines that were put upon them, began to search the sense of the Scriptures, as they are in the learned languages; and consequently studying Greek and Latin, became acquainted with the democratical principles of Aristotle and Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in love with their politics, and that more and more, till it grew into the rebellion we now talk of,** without any other advantage to the Roman Church but that it was a weakening to us, whom, since we broke out of their net in the time of Henry VIII, they have continually endeavoured to recover.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA179#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the landmark essay on Lipsius that appeared in 1914 in *Revue du Seizième Siècle* [Croll] places "la philosophie stoïcienne, avec sa théorie de la supériorité de l'esprit sur les circonstances" at the center of a constellation of writers ranging from Michel de Montaigne in France to John Donne in England to Francisco de Quevedo and Balthazar Gracian in Spain (Croll 1966: 13). **In another seminal essay he calls the period running from 1575 to 1675 "the Silver Age of modern literature" and remarks that "we shall not understand the seventeenth century" until we see that during it Lucan was more influential than Virgil, that "Seneca was more loved and much more effectively imitated … than Cicero had been in previous generations," that Tacitus "almost completely displaced Livy as the model of historical writing," and that Martial, Juvenal, Persius, and Tertullian were more often preferred as models than were Catullus, Horace, and Augustine** (Croll 1966: 96-7).
…

> 7. **Miner 1970 argued on the basis of the *Short-Title Catalogues* that Seneca was less important than Cicero throughout the seventeenth century, although *De officiis* made him unwilling to question the importance of Stoicism itself.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0014

The Puritans espoused the cause of civil liberty mainly because it was the cause of religion. There was another party, by no means numerous, but distinguished by learning and ability, which acted with them on very different principles. **We speak of those whom Cromwell was accustomed to call the Heathens, men who were, in the phraseology of that time, doubting Thomases or careless Gallios with regard to religious subjects, but passionate worshippers of freedom. Heated by the study of ancient literature, they set up their country as their idol, and proposed to themselves the heroes of Plutarch as their examples. They seem to have borne some resemblance to the Brissotines of the French Revolution. But it is not very easy to draw the line of distinction between them and their devout associates, whose tone and manner they sometimes found it convenient to affect, and sometimes, it is probable, imperceptibly adopted.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9785/pg9785-images.html#chap02

Bletson—a true-blue Commonwealth's man, one of Harrison's Rota Club, with his noddle full of new fangled notions about government, the clearest object of which is to establish the tail upon the head; **a fellow who leaves you the statutes and law of old England, to prate of Rome and Greece—sees the Areopagus in Westminster-Hall, and takes old Noll for a Roman consul—**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/9785/pg9785-images.html#chap11

Bletson's theoretical politics had long inclined him to espouse the opinions of Harrington and others, **who adopted the visionary idea of establishing a pure democratical republic in so extensive a country as Britain.**
…

He was a ready subject in practice to the powers existing, and made little difference betwixt various kinds of government, **holding in theory all to be nearly equal in imperfection,** so soon as they diverged from the model of Harrington's Oceana.
…

But Bletson was still more attached to his metaphysical than his political creed, and carried his doctrines of the perfectibility of mankind as far as he did those respecting the conceivable perfection of a model of government; and as in the one case he declared against all power which did not emanate from the people themselves, so, in his moral speculations, he was unwilling to refer any of the phenomena of nature to a final cause. When pushed, indeed, very hard, Bletson was compelled to mutter some inarticulate and unintelligible doctrines concerning an *Animus Mundi*, or Creative Power in the works of Nature, by which she originally called into existence, and still continues to preserve, her works. To this power, he said, some of the purest metaphysicians rendered a certain degree of homage; nor was he himself inclined absolutely to censure those, who, by the institution of holydays, choral dances, songs, and harmless feasts and libations, might be disposed to celebrate the great goddess Nature; at least dancing, singing, feasting, and sporting, being conformable things to both young and old, they might as well sport, dance, and feast, in honour of such appointed holydays, as under any other pretext. But then this moderate show of religion was to be practised under such exceptions as are admitted by the Highgate oath; **and no one was to be compelled to dance, drink, sing, or feast, whose taste did not happen to incline them to such divertisements; nor was any one to be obliged to worship the creative power, whether under the name of the *Animus Mundi*, or any other whatsoever.** The interference of the Deity in the affairs of mankind he entirely disowned, having proved to his own satisfaction that the idea originated entirely in priestcraft. In short, with the shadowy metaphysical exception aforesaid, Mr. Joshua Bletson of Darlington, member for Littlefaith, came as near the predicament of an atheist, as it is perhaps possible for a man to do.
…

It follows, of course, that nothing could be treated with more scorn by Mr. Bletson, than the debates about Prelacy and Presbytery, about Presbytery and Independency, about Quakers and Anabaptists, Muggletonians and Brownists, and all the various sects with which the Civil War had commenced, and by which its dissensions were still continued. “It was,” he said, “as if beasts of burden should quarrel amongst themselves about the fashion of their halters and pack-saddles, instead of embracing a favourable opportunity of throwing them aside.”

Other witty and pithy remarks he used to make when time and place suited; for instance, at the club called the Rota, frequented by St. John, and established by Harrington, for the free discussion of political and religious subjects. **But when Bletson was out of this academy, or stronghold of philosophy, he was very cautious how he carried his contempt of the general prejudice in favour of religion and Christianity further than an implied objection or a sneer.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA130#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **[Harrington] was wont to say that ‘Right reason in contemplation is virtue in action, *et vice versa*. To live according to nature is to live virtuously; the divines [clergy] will not have it so;’ and that ‘when the divines would have us be an inch above virtue, we fall an ell below it.’**

…

He was conscious his doctrines were suspected, and his proceedings watched, by the two principal sects of Prelatists and Presbyterians, who, however inimical to each other, were still more hostile to one who was an opponent, not only to a church establishment of any kind, but to every denomination of Christianity. **He found it more easy to shroud himself among the Independents, whose demands were for a general liberty of conscience, or an unlimited toleration, and whose faith, differing in all respects and particulars, was by some pushed into such wild errors, as to get totally beyond the bounds of every species of Christianity, and approach very near to infidelity itself, as extremes of each kind are said to approach each other.** Bletson mixed a good deal among those sectaries; and such was his confidence in his own logic and address, that he is supposed to have entertained hopes of bringing to his opinions in time the enthusiastic Vane, as well as the no less enthusiastic Harrison, provided he could but get them to resign their visions of a Fifth Monarchy, and induce them to be contented with a reign of Philosophers in England for the natural period of their lives, instead of the reign of the Saints during the Millenium.

https://archive.org/details/nativistprophets0000cron/page/248/mode/2up?view=theater

Intriguingly, **it is in the entourage of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya that we encounter some of the earliest Dahrīs:** one of his officers, explicitly characterised as a Dahrī, did not believe in God or an afterlife, while another was called al-Baqlī because he held humans to be like plants: whether he meant that they came back in other bodies or that there was no afterlife at all is not clear.49 The former was an Arab from Kufa to judge by his name; nothing is known of the latter, but neither is likely to have been recruited in the Jibāl. ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya must have moved in Dahrī circles before he became a rebel (the ideas were popular with the smart set).50 When he moved into the Zagros mountains, however, **he recruited soldiers bearing religious ideas of the kind that the Dahrīs were turning into science in the cities. The irreligious reductionism of the Dahrīs and the wild religious imagination of the Khurramīs are so antithetical that they obscure the structural similarity between their cosmological ideas.**51 But they are clearly related, and this was not lost on al-Nawbakhtī and al-Qummī, or the source they used: **they discerned a fundamental similarity between Shīʿite *ghuluww*, Khurramdīnism, Mazdakism *and* Zandaqa and Dahrism.**52

> 51. See van Ess, *TG*, I, 455; **he thinks that only a Sunnī sensationalist could believe that a Shīʿite Gnostic such as Ibn Muʿāwiya (here assumed to have preached what his followers said) could have had dealings with a Dahrī.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_149

First, **the Power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth;** and the Bishops, who before exercised their Functions in Right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in Right of the Queen and her Successours; though by retaining the phrase of *Jure Divino*, they were thought to demand it by immediate Right from God: And so was untyed the first knot. After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of Episcopacy: And so was the second knot dissolved: And almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians: **And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best:** First, because there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase: and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/122/mode/2up?view=theater

After Spinoza's death, Jelles, who wrote the preface to his illegal *Opera Posthuma* (1677), still considered his friend's philosophy compatible with his Socinian brand of Christianity. Spinoza's idiosyncratic view of Christ as a uniquely inspired but not superhuman individual the substance of whose message 'consists essentially in moral teachings' has long puzzled commentators of both Christian and Jewish background.27
…

Yet he plainly looked forward to the day 'when,' as he puts it in chapter 11 of the *Tractatus*, church schisms and disputes will cease because 'religion shall be separated from philosophic speculations and reduced to those very few and exceedingly simple doctrines [*paucissima et simplicissima dogmata*] which Christ taught his following'; this happier age, he added, would be 'ab omni superstitione liberam', freed from all superstition, a remark showing that for Spinoza 'religio,' or at any rate Socinian religion, is far from being the same thing as 'superstitio' despite its modest status as compared to philosophy.29

The most plausible way to interpret Spinoza's account of Christ, and the latter's significance for humankind, is indeed **to see it as stemming from a deeply felt need to form a tactical alliance for promoting the kind of campaign he believed could potentially reform society and politics, and institute a true *libertas philosophandi*. For it was only with the Socinian Collegiants whose circle in Amsterdam he frequented for some years (1656-61), after his expulsion from the synagogue, that he could hope to form such an alignment.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA343#v=onepage&q&f=false

Walwyn, the cultivated merchant who was the intellectual and spiritual conscience of the [Leveller] group, articulated their doctrine of absolute religious toleration and freedom from any state intervention whatsoever in language that was surpassed in vigor only by Milton's. In defiance of Calvinist precepts, Walwyn stoutly held to the position that there was free justification by Christ alone and that grace came to anyone who repented of his sins. **References to Lucian, Thucydides, and Plutarch were joined to a formidable array of biblical quotations in support**

of freedom of belief. There are passages in Walwyn's religious autobiography, *A Still and Soft Voice from the Scriptures* (1647) that echo the spirit of Erasmian humanism, with its emphasis on moral conduct rather than theological dogma, before the great schism in the Church. "I have no quarrel to any man," Walwyn wrote, "either for unbeleefe or misbeleefe, because I judge no man beleeveth any thing, but what he cannot choose but believe; it is misery enough to want the comfort of true beleeving, and I judge the most convincing argument that any man can hold forth unto another, to prove himselfe a true sincere believer, is to practice to *the uttermost* that which his faith binds him unto: more of the *deeds of Christians*, and fewer of the arguments would doe a great deale more good to the establishing of those that stagger."18 **Walwyn was partial to Montaigne's portrayal of the noble, happy cannibal and his natural goodness. An embryonic Rousseau amid the Puritan saints is a paradoxical apparition.**

It is difficult to reconstitute the atmosphere of petty puritanical spying, squealing, gathering false witness, tale-bearing, plain hallucination, and mythomania that prevailed among the sectarians. **Walwyn was accused of being "an Atheist and denier of Scriptures, a loose and vitious man," one who patterned himself after the "arch-anabaptist Müntzer."**19

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bernstein/works/1895/cromwell/08-atheist.htm

It is said that he questioned the young men: "How can you prove that the Bible is God's Word?" "What better proof have you for the divine authorship of the Bible than the Turk has for his Koran?"

He is said to have taken the young people on Sundays to the various churches, one after another, to let them hear how the preachers of the one inveighed against those of the other, pointing out to them the contradictions and absurdities in the sermons, and after having thus prejudiced them against religion in general, representing "the great mysteries of life and salvation through Jesus Christ as well as the doctrines of justification through His death, resurrection, sanctification, and condemnation by His spirit as mere fancies, as ridiculous, nonsensical, vapid, and empty conceptions", to have embarked upon a criticism of the various political and social systems.

He was specifically accused of having said to some pupils that there was "more wit in Lucian's dialogues than in the whole Bible", that the Proverbs and Psalms were composed by kings, solely for their own ends, that the Song of Songs was a poem written by Solomon about one of his whores, that hell is nothing but the bad conscience of evil men in this life, and that it was inconceivable that God should torment men throughout all eternity for a short period of sinful life. King David and the patriarch Jacob had been a couple of sly foxes and cunning knaves. It was absurd to engage in continuous prayer, and the only true religion consisted in helping the poor. **The Protestant priests were most of them greedy fellows; even the Catholics had not been as bad as they were to the poor. He could not blame the Irish for their rebellion, they were right in demanding liberty for themselves.** It is laid to Walwyn's charge, as a particularly heinous offence, that he even defended suicide, whereby a friend of his wife, who suffered from an incurable disease, had actually been encouraged to kill herself.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Walwyn
>
> In October 1645 Walwyn published *England's Lamentable Slaverie*, **his famous rebuke to John Lilburne, in which he criticised his fellow Leveller for a misguided reliance on the Magna Carta of 1225 as the foundation for citizens' rights.** He argued that Magna Carta was "more precious in your [Lilburne's] esteem than it deserveth", dismissing it as a small set of concessions "wrestled out of the pawes" of Norman conquerors and describing it as, **"a messe of pottage"** and, (in the following year), "but a beggerly thing containing many marks of intollerable bondage".

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA347#v=onepage&q&f=false

Commonwealth apologists like Marchamont Nedham in his *Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated* derided the Levellers as impossible changelings whose desires were unknowable: "What these people aim at and how they would settle is as hard for me to determine as in what point of the compass the wind will sit next, since they are every jot as giddy and rapid in their motions."30 They were "a certain sort of men of busy pates" that had "a mind to seem somebody," **who took a few phrases touching the liberties of the people in the declarations of Parliament and the Army "to frame such comments and chimeras of liberty as might fit their own ends and fantasies; and in time disseminated such strange principles of pretended freedom among the common sort of soldiery and people that it became evident to all the world they sought not liberty but licentiousness."**31 **Their ideal of a commonwealth founded on equality of political rights would inevitably lead, Nedham threatened, to equality of estates and agrarian laws. The Levellers were a prelude to the Diggers and aimed to renounce towns and cities and hold all things in common like the old Parthians, Scythian nomads, and other wild barbarians.** The multitude, whom the Levellers

aroused, were brutish, oscillating between extremes of cruelty and kindness, and could become a most pernicious tyrant.32

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

And because all persons have an *equality of Right* to chuse and be chosen, without respect of *Birth, quality,* or *wealth,* all Orders of men being *Levell'd* in this Particular, therefore the Promoters of this way, are not improperly called *Levellers;* **so that this Term of *Levelling* is equivalent with *Aristotle*'s [in non-Latin alphabet],* which is translated *aequalitas Juris,*** the *Equality of Right* before-mentioned; And the same *Author* saith, this Plea for *Equality of Right* in Government, at length introduceth a Claim for *Equality of Estates,* **and the making of such Lawes as the* *Agrarian* Lawes enacted by the popular *Boutefeus* in *Rome,* whereby it was made criminall for any man to grow *Richer than ordinary.***
...

Such a *Liberty* as this is recorded by *Tacitus,* to have been among the *Parthians,* an *uncertaine loose kind of People, *living rather without government, than in Liberty;* or as *Salust* speaks of the *Aborigines,** *a rude sort of men, without Lawes, without Government, free, and dissolute.*** And *Livy*† tells you, how things were come to that *passe in the popular State of* Rome, *that no regard was had either to the* Senate, *or Magistracy, or Military Discipline, or to the Lawes and Customs of their Ancestors.*
...

***Lastly,* from *Levelling* they proceed to introduce an *absolute Community.* And though neither the *Athenian* nor *Roman Levellers,* ever arived to this high pitch of madnesse; yet we see there is a new *Faction* started up out of ours, known by the name of *Diggers;* who, upon this ground, That God is our *common-Father,* the Earth our *Common-Mother,* and that the Originall of *Propriety* was mens pride and Covetousnesse, have framed a new plea for a Returne of all men *ad Tuguria,* that like the old *Parthians, Scythian Nomades,* and other wild *Barbarians,* we might renounce Towns and Cities, live at *Rovers,* and enjoy all in common.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Marten_(regicide)

Marten was the elder son of the successful lawyer and diplomat Sir Henry Marten;[2] his other known siblings were a brother, George Giles Martin, and three sisters, Elizabeth, Jane, and Mary.
...

He may have been the Henry Marten admitted to Gray's Inn in August 1618 and was certainly admitted to the Inner Temple in November 1619. **In the 1620s he toured Europe and enjoyed much high living there, but also during his time in France he was exposed to the thinking of the French stoical philosophers.**[4]
...

However, he acted with Cromwell in bringing Charles I to trial; **he was one of the most prominent of the 31 of 59 Commissioners to sign the death warrant in 1649.**
...

He had a contemporary reputation as a heavy drinker and was widely said to be a man of loose morals.[2] **According to John Aubrey he was "a great lover of pretty girls to whom he was so liberal that he spent the greatest part of his estate" upon them.**[10] In the opinion of King Charles I he was "an ugly rascal and whore-master".[11]
...

> 12. "Marten also had radical views about religion. He was accused of being an atheist, **but he did make a statement which implied that he did not question whether God existed but that his viewpoint was of radical scepticism because mankind did not possess the faculties to know what or who God was ... Marten's scepticism meant it was incumbent on mankind to allow total toleration of all religious viewpoints. People did not have the knowledge, or the authority that knowledge would have conveyed, to pronounce one opinion on religion more right than another. This was a viewpoint that Marten carried through his political career, arguing for liberty even for Catholics ... Marten also opposed the conquest of Ireland on grounds that the English could not seek religious freedom for themselves and then impose a religious settlement on others.**" (Barber 2008).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=njn-dglZFHIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA481#v=onepage&q&f=false

The tableau of Adam and Eve can be seen as a republican icon. The narrator lays a great emphasis on their nudity – so much so that Eliot found this spectacle more shocking than Milton's Hell. Empson chided Eliot's prudishness,94 but his response so many centuries later is a reminder of how deliberately

provocative Milton was being in glorifying his characters' sexuality. **He would have known how Michelangelo's David had embodied the spirit of the young Florentine republic; in their different way the newly-created Adam and Eve speak for a republican delight in returning to the beginning, in stripping away false customs.** Like so many republicans, Marten had appealed to another anti-Augustan text, Ovid's description of the Creation, in a similar spirit:

> **The Roman Poet that fetchd ye world from its cradle like Moses & (as some think) by reading Moses, could observe that man was a holyer creature, & more capable of high thoughts then ye rest & therefore fitt dominari in caetera not in seipsum. over his own kinde, euery one of whom is by nature (if vn-interrupted) equally holy, & high-minded[.]**

In interpreting Ovid's myth as a gloss on Genesis, Marten was following a long humanist tradition.95 Ovid's first humans, he insists, are worthy of domination over other creatures (*Metamorphoses* i.77), but not over each other.

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

Nedham had much in common also with Marten's associate Chaloner; with their friend Thomas May, poet and official historiographer of the Long Parliament and the Rump; with the former Leveller John Wildman, Marten's agent, confidant, and nephew by marriage; and with Henry Neville, whom Chaloner, Marten, and Algernon Sidney had recruited to the Rump in October 1649. These men were as notorious for their libertinism, their wit, and irreverence as was the editor of *Mercurius Politicus*;50 **and they were despised for their scandalous comportment and their irreligious demeanor by godly republicans as various as Oliver Cromwell and Sir Henry Vane.**51

Marten was "as far from a Puritane as light from darknesse," John Aubrey reports.52 **"All that he moved for was upon Roman and Greek principles," adds Gilbert Burnet.** "He never entered into matters of religion, but on design to laugh both at them and at all morality; for he was both an impious and vicious man"; and even "in his imprisonment" after the Restoration, "he delivered himself up unto vice and blasphemy."53 **What remains of Marten's unpublished writing suggests a firm commitment to republicanism, a keen interest in the thinking of both Machiavelli and Hobbes, a predilection for polygamy, and an all-encompassing religious skepticism on his part.**54

Thomas Chaloner and Thomas May were cut from the same cloth. The former was, we are told by Anthony à Wood, "**as far from [being] a puritan or a presbyterian as the east is from the west; for he was a boon companion, was of Harry Marten's gang, was of the natural religion,** and loved to enjoy the comfortable importances of this life, without any thought of laying up for a wet day, which at his last he wanted." The latter, **who translated and extended Lucan's *Pharsalia* and who was wont to draw comparisons between revolutionary England and republican Rome,** this distinguished antiquarian describes as "a debauchee ad omnia," who "entertained ill principles as to religion, spoke often very slightingly of the *Holy Trinity*, [and] kept beastly and atheistical company, of whom Tho. Chaloner the regicide was one."55
...

Ten years after Wildman's display of skepticism, Neville would be charged with "atheism and blasphemy" by a fellow member of Richard Cromwell's Parliament **when he was overheard remarking – in the presence of three clergymen, no less – that "he was more affected by reading Cicero than the Bible."** At the time, it was thought revealing that his defenders were less inclined to deny the charge than to argue for its dismissal on procedural grounds.59
...

Of the entire group with whom Nedham was associated, one could say what the Anglican divine Gilbert Burnet later wrote of Marten, Wildman, Sidney, and Neville: that they "pretended to little or no religion, and acted only upon the principles of civil liberty."64

> https://archive.org/details/bishopburnetshis01burn/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> As for the Presbyterians, they were so apprehensive of the fury of the Commonwealth party, that they thought it a deliverance to be rescued out of their hands: **Many of the Republicans begun to profess Deism: And almost all of them were for destroying all Clergymen, and for breaking every thing that looked like the union of a national church. They were for pulling down the churches, for discharging the tithes, and for leaving religion free, as they called it, without either encouragement or restraint.** Cromwell assured the Presbyterians, he would maintain a publick ministry with all due encouragement, and he joined them in a commission with some Independents, to be the triers of all those who were to be admitted to benefices. These disposed also of all the churches that were in the gift of the Crown, of the Bishops, and of the Cathedral Churches: So this softened them.
>
> He studied to divide the Commonwealth party among themselves, and to set the Fifth-monarchy men and the Enthusiasts against those who pretended to little or no religion, and acted only upon the principles of civil liberty; such as Algernoon Sidney, Henry Nevill, Martin, Wildman, and

Harrington. **The Fifth-monarchy men seemed to be really in expectation every day when Christ should appear: John Goodwin headed these, who first brought in Arminianism among the sectaries, for he was for liberty of all sorts. Cromwell hated that doctrine: For his beloved notion was, that once a child of God was always a child of God:** Now he had led a very strict life for above eight years together before the war: So he comforted himself much with his reflections on that time, and on the certainty of perseverance. But none of the preachers were so thoroughly paced for him as to temporal matters, as Goodwin was, for he not only justified the putting the King to death, but magnified it as the gloriousest action men were capable of. He filled all people with such expectation of a glorious thousand years speedily to begin, that it looked like a madness possessing them.

It was no easy thing for Cromwell to satisfy those, when he took the power into his own hands; **since that looked like a step to Kingship, which Goodwin had long represented as the great Antichrist, that hindred Christ's being set on his throne.** To these he said, and as some have told me, with many tears, that he would rather have taken a shepherd's staff than the Protectorship, since nothing was more contrary to his genius than a shew of greatness: But he saw it was necessary at that time to keep the Nation from failing into extream disorder, and from becoming open to the common enemy: And therefore he only stept in between the living and the dead, as he phrased it, in that interval, till God should direct them on what bottom they ought to settle: And he assured them, that then he would surrender the heavy load lying upon him, with a joy equal to the sorrow with which he was affected while under that shew of dignity. To men of this stamp he would enter into the terms of their old equality, shutting the door, and making them sit down covered by him, to let them see how little he valued those distances that for form's sake he was bound to keep up with others. These discourses commonly ended in a long prayer. Thus with much ado, he managed the republican enthusiasts. **The other Republicans he called the Heathens, and professed he could not so easily work upon them.**

https://archive.org/details/bishopburnetshis01burn/page/226/mode/2up?view=theater

One person escaped, as was reported, merely by his vices: **Henry Martin, who had been a most violent enemy to Monarchy. But all that he moved for, was upon Roman or Greek principles. He never entered into matters of Religion but on design to laugh both at them and all morality;** for he was both an impious and vitious man. **And now in his imprisonment he deliver'd himself up to vice and blasphemy. It was said, that this helped him to so many friends, that upon that very account he was spared.** John Goodwin and Milton did also escape all censure, to the surprize of all people. Goodwin had so often not only justified, but magnified the putting the King to death, both in his sermons and books, that few thought he could have been either forgot or excused; for Peters and he were the only preachers that spoke of it in that strain. **But Goodwin had been so zealous an Arminian, and had sown such division among all the sectaries upon these heads, that it was said this procured him friends.** Upon what account soever it was, he was not censured.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Burnet

Burnet was born at Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1643, **the son of Robert Burnet, Lord Crimond, a Royalist and Episcopalian lawyer, who became a judge of the Court of Session, and of his second wife Rachel Johnston, daughter of James Johnston, and sister of Archibald Johnston of Warristoun, a leader of the Covenanters.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT4#v=onepage&q&f=false

Called 'the most noted person of his age' by Anthony Wood, Henry Stubbe (1632-76), classicist, polemicist, physician, philosopher and the most important critic of the early Royal Society, has never had a biography. This study seeks to fill that gap, while standing received opinion about him on its head. The older view has it that at the Restoration Stubbe renounced his radical past and became the enemy of scientific progress and a reactionary defender of church and monarchy. **Professor Jacob shows instead that Stubbe continued to espouse radical views after 1660 by devious means.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42823.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

And yet farther to shew what a *friend* he is to MONARCHY, notwithstanding the *former* practices, **in the same Preface against the History of the Royal Society, *p* 3. he tells his Reader, That 'tis *Prudence in every particular person to contribute all he can to the support of the Monarchy against all Anarchical projects,* and *Democratical* contrivances, whereof a *debauched* and *ungenerous* Nation is not capable.** 'Tis *Prudence* to endeavour the support of the MONARCHY *now* as things are, not *Duty.* The *want* of *vertue* and *generosity,* makes the Nation *incapable* of *Democracy* for the present: but when 'tis reclaimed from its *debauches,* and

> grown *generous,* (as it was in the times of M. *Stubbe's former Patrons*) then *Democracy* will be the only *proper* Government. ***Monarchy* may serve for a *debauched* and *ungenerous* Nation; but *Democracy* is the Government of the *vertuous* and *generous.*** This is the Interpretation of the quoted period; and thus M. *Stubbe* cunningly recommends himself to his *Democratical friends,* even when he is pretending friendship to *Monarchy:* **so that should his *old Patrons* return again to their *insolent* Reign, (which Heaven forbid) there is no doubt but *this* Paragraph would be pleaded to prove, that he never deserted *their principles*; and there is a Quotation in the *Margin* of the *same* page, to assure his kindness to *Democracy,* even when 'twas *prudent* to make a *shew* for *Monarchy;—Ut verissime dixerit Cosinus Medices Cardinali Salviato, In tanta opum inequalitate, morumque corruptione Florentinam Rempublicam non esse amplius Libertatis* Capacem, quae *optati* potius, quam *speravi* debeat.**
> …
>
> M. *Stubbe,* I have almost done with you for the present; only give me leave to ask you a few Questions between you, and me. Your great Pretences are the Interests of *Monarchy,* and *Religion;* Pray do you remember what a certain *Physician* for *His Majesty* in *Jamaica,* advised Col. *D.* in *that* Island; and when he was slighted by that Loyal Gentleman, what he counsell'd my Lord *M.* in the same place? Do you remember who talk'd of several *hundred Gospels* that were of old, and made *those we have to owe their Credit to Chance,* in a Discourse to me and two others of *Oxford?* Can you call to mind who told me at Sir *J. L*'s Table at *Bath,* **That being sick, he prepar'd himself for Death with *Lucretius,* and *Beregardus,* and being ask'-d, whether he had not the *Bible* to help prepare him, made a *pish* of it, and said, That *he had not seen a BIBLE in seven Years before, and that it was good for nothing but to make Folks humorsom?*** Do you remember who affirm'd to me, in the Presence of Sir *F. H.* and other Gentlemen, *That there was no more reason to believe there is a God, than to believe there is none;* That he believ'd it, *because he could not help it; and could not help it, because he was carried by an unaccountable impulse;* **That the *Arguments* to *prove a Deity,* drawn from *that Wisdom, Beauty, Order,* and *Usefulness* that is in the Frame of the Creation, signifie nothing, because We cannot tell what Is *Wisdom, Beauty,* or *Order?*** Do you not know the Gentleman that discours'd *thus?*

Stubbe is shown to have been a vitalistic materialist and secular humanist who was influenced by such diverse thinkers as Galen, Pomponazzi, Selden, Hobbes, Harrington, Boyle and Thomas Willis. **On the twin foundations of vitalism and historicism Stubbe built his civic religion which would have stripped the clergy of their authority and reduced Christian doctrine to a set of rules for the rational conduct of life and the pursuit of secular goals** – toleration, free inquiry, national prosperity and moderate economic levelling.
…

Second, his career reveals how the radical Protestantism of the 1640s and 1650s survived in the difficult terrain of the Restoration to re-emerge in the form of radical Whiggery during the Exclusion crisis and after the Revolution of 1688-9. **Stubbe thus becomes an important, not to say vital, link in the tradition connecting Milton, Marvell, Harrington and Hobbes to Blount, Molesworth and Toland.**

https://blogs.bl.uk/untoldlives/2019/05/henry-stubbe-islam-and-religious-toleration-in-restoration-england.html

Henry Stubbe was financially assisted through his education by Henry Vane the Younger, Puritan and Parliamentarian, and after taking his M.A. from Christ Church, Oxford in 1656, Stubbe wrote many texts in support of Vane's ideas.
…

He was described by the antiquary Anthony Wood in *Athenae Oxonienses* as 'the most noted Latinist and Grecian', and 'thoroughly read in all political matters'.
…

Thinkers like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, both contemporaries of Stubbe, wrote on the subject, as had Stubbe himself in *An Essay in Defence of the good old Cause* (1659), where he urges 'an Universal Toleration'.

Stubbe argues that Muhammad was a wise leader, and draws parallels between Islam and Early Christianity. **Stubbe believed that the Christian church had drifted too far from the Early Christian teachings found in the Gospels, thanks to the introduction of doctrines such as Trinitarianism.** Stubbe rejected these doctrines and, **in Islam, he found a model for a radical civil religion, tolerant of dissenters.** Stubbe does not appear to have tried to publish this work in his lifetime and it remained unpublished until 1911, around 240 years after it was written.

> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42823.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> And are we not to believe that *this Anointed Rumper* is a *Zealot* for the Interest of the *present Monarchy*? We have his *word* for't, **and he hath told *me,* that he can say *more* for *Monarchy* than *all* the *Virtuosi:*** No doubt! It would be very much, if M. *Stubb* could not say more for any

> thing than the *Ignoramus's.* **He knows the man, that useth to brag, what he can *say* for *MAHOMET,* and what an Inclination he hath to write the Life of that *Brave Fellow*; And if *Turcism* were among us, I know where the *Alcoran* would have a *Defender,*** and one that can *say* as much for it, as for *Monarchy,* or the *Church* of *England,* if he may be credited himself; but of that no more now.

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

Milton's premise is that "all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself," and that they were, therefore, "by privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to obey." **The establishment of "Citties, Townes and Common-wealths" he traces to "*Adams* transgression," which cause men to fall "among themselves to doe wrong and violence."**
...

In fact, he asserts, from this argument "it follows" that the people may "as oft as they shall judge it for the best, either choose him or reject him, retaine him or depose him though no Tyrant, meerly by the liberty and right of free born Men, to be govern'd as seems to them best."18 **On the face of it, the author of *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* would appear to be much more fully a populist than the Whig theorist John Locke.**19

> 19. Cf. Michael Zuckert, *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 77-93, who errs as well in terming Milton an exponent of political theology. **As Martin Dzelzainis points out, Milton's treatise marks a genuine break with, not just a profound radicalization of, the Calvinist resistance theory found in the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* and in other monarchomach tracts, and it effects this break by making nature, as opposed to revelation, the standard by which the legitimacy of a political regime and of resistance to it is to be judged. As such, though it gestures in the direction of political theology, it is resolutely secular in the argument on which it bases its conclusions. Milton owes more to Aristotle and Cicero than he does to the Bible.** See Dzelzainis, "Introduction," ix-xxv (esp. ix-xix). That Milton's perspective was widely shared among the Puritan supporters of the regicide, Dzelzainis asserts but has not yet established: see Martin Dzelzainis, "Anti-Monarchism in English Republicanism," in *Republicanism: A Shared Heritage I: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe*, 27-41.

In the end, however, Milton robs his own account of the origins and nature of political authority of its democratic potential by reasserting the aristocratic principle of differential moral and political rationality that had underpinned both theory and practice in ancient Greece and Rome.20 **As the royalist writer Sir Robert Filmer was quick to point out, when Milton spoke of "the people," he quite often had in mind a much smaller and more select body of men.**21

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Wharton,_Thomas_(1648-1715)

WHARTON, THOMAS, first Marquis of Wharton (1648-1715), third but eldest surviving son of Philip, fourth baron Wharton [q. v.], by his second wife, Jane, was born in August 1648. The boy's first years were, in the picturesque language of Macaulay, **passed amid Geneva bands, heads of lank hair, upturned eyes, nasal psalmody, and sermons three hours long. When he emerged from parental control the cavaliers may well have been startled by the dissoluteness of the 'emancipated precisian,' who early acquired and retained to the last the reputation of being the greatest rake in England.**
...

His second wife, whom he married in July 1692, was Lucy (d. 5 Feb. 1716), daughter and heiress of Adam Loftus, viscount Lisburne, **a lady who brought him a huge fortune, and whose gallantries he bore with the indifference of a stoic.** Lady Wortley-Montagu calls her 'a flattering, fawning, canting creature, affecting prudery and even sanctity, yet in reality as abandoned and unscrupulous as her husband himself'—that 'most profligate, impious, and shameless of men.'

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Rev._Jonathan_Swift/Volume_5/A_Short_Character_of_Thomas_Earl_of_Wharton
>
> He is without the sense of shame, or glory, as some men are without the sense of smelling; and therefore, a good name to him, is no more than a precious ointment would be, to these.
> ...
>
> He goes constantly to prayers in the forms of his place, and will talk bawdy and blasphemy at the chapel door. He is a presbyterian in politicks, and an atheist in religion; but he chooses at present to whore with a papist.
> ...

> **He bears the gallantries of his lady with the indifference of a stoick,** and thinks them well recompensed, by a return of children to support his family, without the fatigues of being a father.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm#linknoteref-23

Russell, who appears to have been guilty of no offence falling within the definition of high treason, and Sidney, of whose guilt no legal evidence could be produced, were beheaded in defiance of law and justice. **Russell died with the fortitude of a Christian, Sidney with the fortitude of a Stoic.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm#linknoteref-352

Ayloffe showed as much contempt of death as either Argyle or Rumbold: but his end did not, like theirs, edify pious minds. **Though political sympathy had drawn him towards the Puritans, he had no religious sympathy with them, and was indeed regarded by them as little better than an atheist. He belonged to that section of the Whigs which sought for models rather among the patriots of Greece and Rome than among the prophets and judges of Israel.** He was taken prisoner, and carried to Glasgow. There he attempted to destroy himself with a small penknife: but though he gave himself several wounds, none of them proved mortal, and he had strength enough left to bear a journey to London.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Harvard_Classics_Vol._3/Religio_Medici_I#cite_ref-p307a_100-1

There be many excellent strains in that Poet, wherewith his Stoical Genius hath liberally supplied him; **and truely there are singular pieces in the Philosophy of Zeno, and doctrine of the Stoicks, which I perceive, delivered in a Pulpit, pass for current Divinity:** yet herein are they in extreams, that can allow a man to be his own Assassine, and so highly extol the end and suicide of Cato.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cotton Mather, a student of Ezekiel Cheever, had been an ardent classicist. Mather's eulogy of Cheever, who had never missed a school day in seventy years of teaching, bristled with classical allusions. **In his *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de la decadence des Romains* (1734), Montesquieu gushed: "If I could for a moment cease to think that I am a Christian, I should not be able to hinder myself from ranking the destruction of the sect of Zeno among the misfortunes that have befallen the human race."** Latter-day Puritans like Samuel Adams conceded that "the pagans" had been as virtuous as any Christian.

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

Bailyn traced the ideological origins of the American Revolution to five sources: classical antiquity, especially Rome; the writings of Enlightenment rationalism—Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Grotius, Montesquieu, Vattel, Pufendorf, Baccaria; English common law; Puritan covenant theology; and, most important, the "Old Whigs" of the early eighteenth century.54 These were the Commonwealthmen, the intellectual heirs of those dissenting religious and humanist groups that first made their appearance during the English Civil War of 1642-60.55
…

The spiritual heirs of these groups became the Whig Commonwealthmen. **For the most part, their most prominent figures were nontrinitarian in their theology, uninterested in questions of theology and ecclesiology except insofar as these questions in any way interfered with political liberty as they saw it.** Their influence in the colonies was all-pervasive.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false

John Adams considered it it a matter of great importance that his Puritan ancestors had been classicists. Following the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765, Adams boasted of the early colonists: "To many of them, the historians, orators, poets, and philosophers of Greece and Rome were quite familiar: and some of them have left libraries that are still in being, consisting chiefly of volumes in which the wisdom of the most enlightened ages and nations is deposited." **He concluded that his forefathers had detested all of the servile dependencies of the feudal system, since they "knew that no such unworthy dependencies took place in the ancient seats of liberty, the republics of Greece and Rome."** America was the only land in which the classical tradition of liberty was pure, unsullied by the stain of feudalism.55

So skillfully were the classical, Whig, and American traditions interwoven that the founders considered them one and the same: "the tradition of liberty."
…

***Bickerstaff's Almanac* of 1769 expressed a virtually unquestioned opinion when it asserted: "Locke and Sidney revived the spirit of the ancient republics." Similarly, John Adams later recalled: "Whig principles were the principles of Aristotle and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke."**56

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55903/pg55903-images.html#link2H_4_0002 **[July 1832]**

Our constitution has never been so far behind the age as to have become an object of aversion to the people. The English revolutions have therefore been undertaken for the purpose of defending, correcting, and restoring,—never for the mere purpose of destroying.
…

An Englishman too often reasons on politics in the spirit rather of a lawyer than of a philosopher. **There is too often something narrow, something exclusive, something Jewish, if we may use the word, in his love of freedom. He is disposed to consider popular rights as the special heritage of the chosen race to which he belongs.** He is inclined rather to repel than to encourage the alien proselyte who aspires to a share of his privileges. Very different was the spirit of the Constituent Assembly. They had none of our narrowness; but they had none of our practical skill in the management of affairs. **They did not understand how to regulate the order of their own debates; and they thought themselves able to legislate for the whole world.**
…

It was because they had no charter that they ranted about the original contract. As soon as tolerable institutions were given to them, they began to look to those institutions. In 1830 their rallying cry was *Vive la Charte*. In 1789 they had nothing but theories round which to rally. **They had seen social distinctions only in a bad form; and it was therefore natural that they should be deluded by sophisms about the equality of men.**
…

The French, having nothing in their own history to which they could look back with pleasure, had recourse to the history of the great ancient commonwealths: they drew their notions of those commonwealths, not from contemporary writers, but from romances written by pedantic moralists long after the extinction of public liberty. **They neglected Thucydides for Plutarch. Blind themselves, they took blind guides.** They had no experience of freedom; and they took their opinions concerning it from men who had no more experience of it than themselves, and whose imaginations, inflamed by mystery and privation, exaggerated the unknown enjoyment;—from men who raved about patriotism without having ever had a country, and eulogised tyrannicide while crouching before tyrants. The maxim which the French legislators learned in this school was, that political liberty is an end, and not a means; that it is not merely valuable as the great safe-guard of order, of property, and of morality, but that it is in itself a high and exquisite happiness to which order, property, and morality ought without one scruple to be sacrificed. The lessons which may be learned from ancient history are indeed most useful and important; **but they were not likely to be learned by men who, in all their rhapsodies about the Athenian democracy, seemed utterly to forget that in that democracy there were ten slaves to one citizen; and who constantly decorated their invectives against the aristocrats with panegyrics on Brutus and Cato,—two aristocrats, fiercer, prouder, and more exclusive, than any that emigrated with the Count of Artois.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bruno Bauer, in 1843, aptly described the English Revolution of the 1640s as a search for freedom perverted by "religious fanaticism" and a fruitless search for justification of men's "rights" in the "yellowed parchments" of ancient precedent, **a fight for liberty unable to free itself from religion or precedent.**7

7. Bauer, *Christianity Exposed*, 2.

https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bob-black-constitutionalism-the-white-man-s-ghost-dance

Jutting out of the wreckage called Constitutionalism are certain more elevated piles, such as "Common Law" and "Magna Carta." These are, if in no better repair than the rest of the ruins, at least of respectable antiquity. **Back when little was known of English legal history—when history as a discipline scarcely existed—ingenious jurists like Selden, Coke and Hale manipulated these hoary myths to win some limited victories over royal absolutism.**

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater

Most of the historiography simply assumes that the so-called ‘Atlantic’ republicanism of the English gentry is overridingly the most important tradition in post-Renaissance Atlantic republicanism generally, much as Locke and Early Enlightenment English liberalism are assumed, not least in America, to be the real grounding of the modern western liberal tradition.2

Yet there are serious grounds for questioning these assumptions and arguing, in opposition to them, that focusing on the Anglo-American republican tradition, screening out, or marginalizing, the de La Courts and Spinoza as well as van den Enden, Koerbagh, Willem van der Muelen (1659-1739), Ericus Walter (1663-97), Romeyn de Hooghe (*c.* 1645-1708), Frederik van Leenhof (1647-1713), Jean-Frédéric Bernard, Jean Rousset de Missy, and other Dutch and Dutch Huguenot political writers of the Early Enlightenment period, is an error which substantially impedes a proper understanding of the origins of modern democratic republicanism.
…

Furthermore, since agrarian interests in Dutch political thought remained wholly subordinate to urban trade and industry, the implicit basis of social hierarchy inherent in much English classical republicanism is replaced in the Dutch context, with important implications for the whole subsequent history of the Enlightenment, with theories of equality. **Attempting to classify all those not dependent on others – that is, who are not women, children, and servants – as a single category of ‘citizen’, the interests of each of which are strictly equivalent to those of the next,** Dutch republican writers can be said to have initiated an important new trend in western political thought. Indeed, in one of the most militantly democratic texts discussed in this chapter, **the *Vrye Politieke Stellingen* (Free Political Institutions) published in Amsterdam, by the atheistic schoolmaster Franciscus van den Enden (1602-74), in 1665, we find one of the first general affirmations of the universal rationality and fundamental equality (*evengelykheit*) of all men – of whatever race, colour, or creed – of modern times.**3 Envisioning merchants and wage-earners as the backbone of the citizenry, Dutch democratic republicanism at bottom was a republicanism which pivoted on an egalitarian conception of the ‘common good’ as the guiding principle of society and politics.

By contrast, **the pre-1776 Anglo-American ‘classical republican’ tradition has been aptly called the republicanism of an opposition-minded gentry** – agrarian, anti-commercial, asserting the special status of free property-holders and the duty of the citizenry to participate in government; **it was grounded, as one leading authority puts it, ‘on the Machiavellian theory of the possession of arms as necessary to political personality.’**4 In this long-lingering tradition of ‘Harringtonian republicanism’ which has also been called ‘English Machiavellianism,’ the ties between land, republican freedom, and the bearing of arms have been deemed crucial. **‘As in Machiavelli,’ so in this kind of republicanism, we learn, ‘the bearing of arms is the primary medium through which the individual asserts both his social power and his participation in politics as a responsible moral being: but the possession of land in nondependent tenure is now the material basis for the bearing of arms.’**5

In concrete terms, this was the ideology of one strand of the land-based, parliamentary gentry which dominated eighteenth-century England, as well as Ireland and parts of North America and the Caribbean, a creed which bears few real affinities with the neighbouring Dutch ‘burgher’ republican thought when considered in its wider cultural and social setting. This applies to the agrarian dimension but also to the strong and increasing British ‘republican’ preference in the years after 1688 for ‘mixed government’ – the view that if absolute monarchy is tyrannical, **‘absolute democracy,’ as one republican writer, Viscount Bolingbroke, expressed the point, ‘is tyranny and anarchy both.’**6
…

The difference, in other words, stemmed from **the Dutch state being a republic forged by a long and bloody revolt against a fully legitimate monarch,** originally a *de facto* republic which, in the 1580s, had step by step, overcoming considerable domestic hesitation and reluctance, **been obliged to abjure the principles of monarchy and hereditary possession of the state as well as dispense with bishops and a comprehensive state church like that of England;** by contrast post-1688 Britain was an essentially parliamentary monarchy, chiefly managed by a landed aristocracy, with a relatively strong established church which revered the monarch as its head, had a long tradition of praising ‘mixed government’ and was also accustomed to showing due respect for the principle of aristocracy.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

Crystallizing during the early 1660s as a group of enthusiasts debating Cartesianism, before long, as The Hague Cartesian physician Bontekoe noted, the *cercle spinoziste* had become an intellectual pressure group initially occupied with undermining and displacing Cartesianism and academic philosophy more generally.87 With its roots in Amsterdam, Leiden, and The Hague, the network soon percolated to Utrecht, Rotterdam, and other places. Its founding members, apart from Spinoza, were Franciscus Van den Enden (1602-74) who in some respects was more emphatically radical

and democratic than Spinoza and was later executed in Paris by Louis XIV for conspiring against his crown, Meyer, Johannes and Adriaen Koerbagh, the Collegiant Jarig Jelles (*c.* 1620-83), Johannes Bouwmeester (*c.* 1630-80), the prolific translator Johan Hendrik Glazemaker (1620-82), Abraham van Berckel, Abraham Cuffeler (*c.* 1637-94), **and – crucial for the evolution of the group's political thought – Johan and Pieter de La Court. The De La Courts likewise rejected religious authority per se though their views may have originated more in an anti-Calvinist, radical Arminian rather than a wholly secular stance;** De La Court judged *De Jure Ecclesiasticorum* an "excellent" and "irrefutable" book.88
…

No real equivalent existed in pre-1688 England, France, or Germany to these Dutch writers' democratic republicanism, **not even in Switzerland,** and this significantly added to the factors elevating the United Provinces to a unique and unparalled position in the process of generating the Radical Enlightenment during the late seventeenth century. **In political thought, it was a process fed not only by using local intellectual resources but also Machiavelli and Hobbes, whose concepts were intensively reworked and recycled, in particular by the Brothers De La Court and the author of *De Jure Ecclesiasticorum*, as well as Spinoza, to produce what one scholar termed "republican reinterpretations."**102
…

In direct opposition to Machiavelli and, still more, Hobbes, the *cercle spinoziste* transferred and institutionalized the state of nature's freedoms as basic human rights in political society and the "common interest." In claiming the collective power of its individual members, Spinoza expressed the main political thrust of the entire group.105 **Yet Van den Enden, whether or not he led in asserting one-substance monism, was unquestionably first among the Amsterdam group to follow the De La Courts in combining democracy with claiming that enlightening and educating people against "superstition" is the sole and exclusive means to overcome political and religious tyranny; and maintain that a social system spurring everyone to improve their ideas, and discard "superstition," can only effectively pursue the "common good" where based on a democratic form of republicanism.**106 The form of government exalted by the *cercle* they identified as that which best defends the "common good" and is least apt to be captured by private interests infringing it.107 **Their political theory was a strategy rooted in their need for an activist, uncompromising anti-Orangist recipe capable of widening the support for the "True Freedom" and abolishing ecclesiastical direction of morality, society, and education.**

Dutch democratic republicanism as such, it should be noted, first arose as a coherent political thought system neither in Van den Enden, Meyer, Koerbagh, or Spinoza, but in the *ouevre* of Johan de La Court (1622-60) followed by his more famous but less original brother, Pieter de la Court (1618-85). **If none of these, aside from Spinoza, were thinkers of the first order, they engineered a group breakthrough of pivotal importance in political thought that exerted a masked but crucial underground impact on English thought during the critical years from 1688 (followed by publication of the English version of the *Tractatus Theologico-politicus* in 1689), down to Parliament's burning of Tindal's *The Rights* in 1710, in particular through Blount, Toland, and Tindal.**
…

The Revolt retained symbolic significance as a classic instance of rebellion against despotism and persecution; but, **for a theoretical corpus suited to grounding a comprehensive political, moral, and social democratic republican ideology, contemporaries had to wait until the aftermath of Stadholder William II's assault on Amsterdam, in 1650, and the mounting difficulties facing De Witt and the "True Freedom" in the 1660s.** While the rivalry between the stadholders and the most powerful Dutch representative assembly, the States of Holland, was already intense much earlier with major clashes between Prince Maurits and Oldenbarnevelt during the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-21), **an episode still fresh in the collective memory of the *cercle*,** it was the renewed conflict in and after 1650 that revealed the extreme precariousness of the freedoms which the Republic had since fostered and the immediate urgency of finding a political formula and set of values capable of rallying wider support on behalf of those besieged freedoms.

As political observers, the brothers Pieter and Johan de La Court matured in an unusual position. Offspring of a prosperous family of Flemish Protestant exiles, **their father's successful textile manufacturing business afforded sufficient means for them to live comfortably without needing to work for their living, ample leisure to study, debate, and write while simultaneously locking them into an unprivileged, marginal, immigrant social milieu,** and hence into exclusion from participation in the tightly oligarchic republican politics presided over by the seventeenth-century Dutch urban "regent" ruling class. Their marginal situation combined with their status as full-time amateur observers fostered a carefully-crafted, long pondered oppositional attitude.109 **Exclusion from the corridors of power, and marginal social status combined with wealth, ease, and long years of intensive study, explain their rare ability to construct a political theory geared to**

actualities, innovative, and far from academic, but yet also closely tied to existing scholarship and erudition, a republican political theory based on close observation of one particular polity, their own, but yet consciously generalized, and universal in scope. Eager political observers since the 1640s, their first major publication, the *Consideratien en Exempelen van Staat* (Amsterdam, 1660), appeared, at a decidedly late stage in their development, after Johan's death (Pieter was then 42). Although from a public perspective this marked the starting-point, the text forcefully expressed ideas that had evolved in the private, unpublished writings of Johan over many years. Johan had long prevaricated about publishing his work; he knew his merciless analysis of oligarchic republican body politic and church would prove explosive and possibly entail unpleasant consequences for family and friends.

On his deathbed, dying at barely 38 in 1660, Johan instructed his brother that his political theory should not appear, but be destroyed. Pieter ignored his brother's directive, but did tone down some if his more vehemently anti-oligarchic and anti-ecclesiastical rhetoric. The unremittingly anti-oligarchic flavor of Johan's insights Pieter often softened by changing the wording in places to mean simply that republics are better than monarchies rather than provocatively pronouncing the democratic republic superior to monarchy *and* the aristocratic republic. But he by no means removed the democratic emphasis to the extent sometimes suggested.
…

De Witt's "True Freedom" contrasted favourably with the historic Venetian or Genoese model in key respects, especially by allowing greater freedom of expression and religious freedom, and by rejecting the hereditary principle by parading De Witt's central political maxim that in "a free republic no one has any right by birth to the high dignities" and offices of the state,111 **that all office-holders should be chosen purely for their abilities by representatives of the cities and countryside. In theory, De Witt even accepted that the hereditary principle is always an imminent danger to a "free state," as the histories of the Visconti at Milan, and the Medici at Florence, abundantly illustrate. But De Witt's purportedly non-hereditary, non-noble representatives were in practice an entrenched privileged stratum of affluent urban regents, an informal oligarchy of families monopolizing political power, a narrow, exclusive semi-hereditary circle.**

The Brothers De La Court considered it scandalous that not only in the United Provinces from Oldenbarnevelt down to De Witt, but all Europe's "northern" republics, including the leading Swiss cantons, Zurich, Berne, and Geneva, and principal German Imperial Free Cities, **practically no serious effort had been made thus far to study the republicanism all these entities ostensibly acknowledged to be a precious asset benefiting their societies. Prior to themselves, no one had attempted to develop and perfect Europe's most valuable corpus of political theory, or clearly identify its basic principles.** Consequently, all those republics had failed to consolidate and fortify their republican credentials as they should have done.112 The brothers aimed to fill the gap both locally and more generally, in Europe, for which reason they theorized on a broad European level, in a relentless quest for the true foundations of the freest, most stable, prosperous, and enduring republic conceived as a benefit for everyone. **Europe's medieval republics originated in what the Brothers deemed an instinctive, natural movement of resistance to the pretensions of the Visconti and other princes and feudal lords,** an idea Sismondi would later revive in the 1820s. These late medieval Italian republics being small entities had all to grapple uninterruptedly, like the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, with their own obvious vulnerability and instability to defend their independence against grasping larger neighbors; they survived by forming leagues or federal unions like those of the Swiss and Dutch.113

De La Court republicanism was the first in the modern West systematically to assert as its central principle that the representative democratic republic is intrinsically the best form of government for all, contrasting it with aristocratic republicanism which it declares defective and inferior in every respect, a feature not encountered in England, Switzerland, or America, until much later. They dismissed the aristocratic republic whether on the Venetian-Genoese, Swiss, German Imperial City, or Dutch model, even if hitherto invariably more prevalent, as invariably intrinsically inferior.
…

Political thinkers before themselves had always succumbed to pressure to reiterate feeble, scholastic arguments against the democratic republic, a disastrous state of affairs ensuring that what is best for society and all mankind had remained hidden from view, a deep secret concealed over the centuries behind a mass of obscurantist academic verbiage and mystification generated by manipulation, intimidation, and scholars' own vested interest. **Since no rewards or favors can be obtained from the masses, political theorists invariably looked to princes, commanders, and especially grasping tyrants for remuneration and emoluments, rewards deriving only from them.**

> **Democracy, simple democracy, never had a patron among men of letters.** Democratical mixtures in government have lost almost all the advocates they ever had out of England and America. Men of letters must have a great deal of praise, and some of the necessaries, conveniences, and ornaments of life. **Monarchies and aristocracies pay well and applaud liberally. The people have almost always expected to be served gratis, and to be paid for the honor of serving them;** and their applauses and adorations are bestowed too often on artifices and tricks, on hypocrisy and superstition, on flattery, bribes, and largesses. It is no wonder then that democracies and democratical mixtures are annihilated all over Europe, except on a barren rock, a paltry fen, an inaccessible mountain, or an impenetrable forest.

…

While monarchy is always abysmal, what chiefly matters in the De La Courts' republicanism is that they likewise denounced all "mixed government." As "democracy" was the original form of state in their eyes, as well as the most natural and the best,116 **monarchy and aristocratic republicanism are both conceived by them as essentially perversions from an earlier state of "democracy," a view reaffirmed afterwards by Spinoza (and, following Spinoza, in the early 1840s by the young Marx.)**

…

Since everyone, however he or she presents their views, is governed by the laws of nature and pursues only his own quest for happiness, **or what the De La Courts with their Hobbesian psychology call an "inborn drive and necessity to seek his own conservation, advantage and ease,"** formal aristocracies like those of Britain, France, Genoa, and Venice, and informal aristocracies like those running the "republics" of Switzerland, the German Imperial Free Cities, and so forth hardly differed in their contempt for the "common good."

…

Pieter de La Court's last book, the *Aenwysinge der heylsame politique gronden ende maximen vande Republique van Holland* (1669), where he again avows that few of the Republic's citizens grasped the superiority of democratic republics over monarchy and aristocratic republics,120 recommends curbing religious authority, **and praises *De Jure Ecclesiasticorum* as an "irrefutable" book, spelling out the measures needed to widen support for the Republic,** was immediately banned by the States of Holland, at De Witt's insistence, on 28 May 1669, for assailing the preachers "with very harsh, offensive and insulting expressions" **and making highly unflattering remarks about monarchs who were the Republic's neighbors, risking royal allies becoming alienated from their alliances and engagements with the Republic.**121 Yet while De Witt's republicanism fell short in the eyes of all the *cercle spinoziste*, they still saw grounds to defend the "True Freedom" from its internal and external foes. Its broad toleration and respect for individual freedom still deserved their every effort to help conserve and defend it against the encroachments of Orangism and the public church. **Since the "True Freedom" was chiefly vulnerable, in their view, because most people were insufficiently educated, informed, and aware to see through the Calvinist preachers' admonitions that their great men, Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius, and De Witt, were godless traitors and heretics,** it was precisely that fatal defect representative democratic republican theory must devise methods to overcome.

Viewed from a radical perspective, De Wittian deference to kings and clergy only placed "True Freedom" toleration and individual freedom even more immediately at risk, as the events of 1672 and De Witt's overthrow soon demonstrated. De Witt's regime was simply too fragile to withstand the pressures threatening it. **The Republic could survive only if popular support was broadened and popular support could not be broadened without two vital preconditions being met: the Republic had to become more representative of the "common good" while the people's veneration for religious authority and the clergy had to be drastically reduced.** Here, for the first time, we find at the heart of political debate, tightly linked and constantly interacting, the two vital components of Radical Enlightenment – representative democratic republicanism tied intrinsically to rejection of religious authority.

In contrast to contemporary English republicanism, Johan vilified the aristocratic republic just as much as he did monarchy. **The De La Court Brothers' approach meant publically recognizing, as had no one before, that the universal principle grounding *all* monarchy and *all* aristocratic republics is "pure force and deceit" so that both are equally malign.** Only through time, deception, and the people's passivity had these two generally accepted but universally pernicious forms become seemingly legitimized.122 **Both everywhere enjoyed enormous popular support – but only due to ignorance, superstition, lack of appropriate education, and credulity.**

…

Given that everyone seeks his own welfare, and strives for that, it follows necessarily that the voices of all together, decisions by majority vote, embody “het beste van ‘t gemeen” [the welfare of the whole].124 **With office holders and magistrates chosen “yearly,” by majority vote, candidates (despite privately favoring their personal interest like everyone else) find themselves boxed into serving their fellow citizens “with all care and courtesy.” Accordingly, the “democratic or popular form of government” does not thrust unnecessary wars and taxation on the people like monarchies and aristocratic republics (and England more than most).**125 The brothers’ antipathy to ancient Roman bellicosity and all wars of expansion was one more striking contrast between their new brand of republicanism and Harrington’s and Sidney’s gentry republicanism with its unwelcome Spartan leanings.126
…

One reason for the noticeable retreat from Johan’s more forthright democratism, characteristic of Pieter de la Court’s early works, including his 1661 reworking of the 1660 *Consideratien*, the new version appearing under the title *Consideratien van staat, ofte Politijke Weegchaal*,141 was the challenge posed to all the Dutch radicals by the failure of English republicanism. The 1660 Restoration and the triumph of Charles II was widely considered proof in Holland, as elsewhere, that republicanism does not work, though it was also a brutal challenge **demonstrating the need for a more powerful – but, at the same time, more cautious – theoretical formulation of democratic republicanism.**142
…

Spinoza and the Amsterdam circle, unlike seventeenth-century English republicans and Locke, focused on how best to promote the collective “common good” as Spinoza calls it in his last work, the *Tractatus Politicus* (1676-7), when this is defined in exclusively worldly terms, on the basis of a moral theory rooted in the principle of equality and equal justice for all. **Classical example, owning land, and possessing arms and a military bearing were all wholly irrelevant to the urban, mercantile republicanism of the Brothers De La Court, Van den Enden, Koerbagh, Meyer, and Van Leenhof no less than Spinoza – even while these remained central to the gentry republicanism of Harrington and Sidney.** Indeed, English republicanism and its gentry attitudes – Pieter had lived for a time in England and knew English – were an integral part of what Dutch republican writers consciously criticized and rejected.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA39#v=onepage&q&f=false

But, though partly inspired by the Dutch republican example, Sidney’s republicanism relied, unlike that of the Brothers De La Court **which was grounded in Hobbes’s pessimism about human nature,** on appeals to the citizen’s “virtue” and “reason.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pieter_de_la_Court

De la Court's publishing activity had made him a well known protagonist of the republican "party" in contemporary Dutch politics. **This group, consisting primarily of the wealthy businessmen in the cities of Holland and led by Johan de Witt, effectively ran the Dutch Republic from 1650 until 1672.** They strongly opposed the political powers and ambitions of the House of Orange-Nassau which usually held the office of Stadholder, a pseudo-royal position that somehow survived in the otherwise republican institutions of the Dutch Republic, except during this First Stadtholderless Period. **De la Court was probably never close to Johan de Witt, but it has been established that De Witt was actively involved in the writing of De la Court's most outspoken and most widely read text, the *Interest van Holland*.**

When the Orangist faction regained control of the country in 1672, Johan de Witt was lynched by an Orangist mob and **Pieter de la Court fled to Antwerp where he stayed with his brother in law Guglielmo van der Voort.** He returned to Amsterdam in 1673 where he lived as a merchant until his death in 1685.

194c437540e86579b1d65f776ec2be0c3b17.pdf (semanticscholar.org)

From the beginning, Johan and Pieter de la Court were outsiders. Their father, Pieter de la Court senior, was born near Ypres in the southern Netherlands, and migrated in his early twenties to the Dutch Republic. He settled in Leiden, Holland’s second biggest town, and within a few years he became a successful independent entrepreneur in Leiden’s thriving textile business. As a result, not long after his marriage with **Jeanne de Plancke, also of southern origin,** De la Court sr. was able to purchase citizenship rights of the city in 1618.1 In that same year, their son Pieter was born, and four years later came Johan.2 The two brothers would become the most prolific children of the family, and echoes of their origins would resonate throughout their lives and work. **As the sons of a self-made man, they would plead for unrestricted immigration and economic freedom; as members of a successful but much despised minority within the Dutch Republic, they continually behaved like uninvited guests with a certain aversion to conformity.**
…

One of De la Court's travel companions in France was the young controversial preacher Johannes de Mey, who later became an important representative of the Dutch Calvinist endeavour to integrate the study of the Bible with the newest developments in natural philosophy.20 **De Mey's treatise *Euzooia*, written around 1675 and explicitly inspired by Thomas More's *Utopia*, argues among much else for the secular control over the church, the unity of Christianity on the basis of a few fundamental articles of faith, and the freedom of private worship** – issues also prominent in the writings of the brothers De la Court.
…

De la Court left Saumur in the summer of 1642 and continued his trip through the Rhone valley towards Marseille, and from there to Geneva. Again, as earlier during his voyage, **he was clearly fascinated (and at times horrified) by all the peculiarities of local confessional religious practice – from the execution of an "atheist and ridiculer of Scripture" to the burning of various witches and of a "Jew who feigned being Christian".** In an English side note in his diary, De la Court revealed his sceptical attitude as regards such enforced dogmatism, asking "The divel [*sic*] was he ever seene?"22
…

Van den Enden did not exaggerate, **for the treatises of the De la Courts, and especially the *Interest van Holland*, proved to be true bestsellers,** widely diffused among the urban populace and said to be read and discussed even on canal boats. Pamphlets such as the 1662 *Haeghs Hof-Praetje* ["The Hague's Court Talk"] critically dramatized such discussions by staging a debate between diverse opponents of Pieter de la Court, already mentioned by his true name.110 Other Orangist pasquilles followed, defaming in much harsher language this devilish **"new-born Dutch Cromwell alias Leiden Quaker".**111 With the odd blend of vulgar yet humanist reproach that was typical for such libels, **De la Court was scorned for his alien origins and his riches,** and admonished to

> Go, you *Bastard*, go to *Pluto's* dark dwelling
> Maybe *Pluto* will make you the King of Hell
> Go, *Nero's* brother, go to *Aeneas's* cavern
> Receive there forever the fire that never chills.112

…

In short, the De la Courts were trapped in between the vulgarity of the agora and the decorum of the academy.

Still more than its provocative contents, the form of this slippery attempt to please two audiences at once reveals why the works of the brothers De la Court met with such a fierce public outcry. Shocked by the impropriety of their language, the aristocratic author of one opposing pamphlet asserted that "I have never believed that Holland could have reached such an absolute freedom that everyone would be allowed to discuss matters of State and to defame the name of the laudable dead Princes". "No, Holland", he exclaimed, "your liberty does not involve consent to libel".138 Another reaction to the De la Courts insisted similarly that "such things ought not to be made public among the people and the rabble".139
…

Thus, before long the principled anti-Stadholder argument of the De la Courts was depicted as an extremist position, and the Orangists eventually succeeded in arguing that they represented the moderate middle ground. In the course of the 1660s and 1670s, they continued to take the Batavian model of Grotius as their authoritative starting point.141 While the brothers De la Court and their few allies rallied behind the radical claim that a true republic is free of any monarchical element, the Orangist interpretation in the end won over the middle groups in society. **After 1672, Dutch republicanism would merge this support for the House of Orange with the language of commercial interest that was put at centre stage in the work of the brothers De la Court.**142 And so, their attempt to reach two audiences failed: **the establishment turned its back to the brothers' fanaticism, while their appeal to the middle ground was never truly committed, as is revealed by the disdainful references in their work to the 'ignorant rabble'.**
…

The frontispiece of the 1661 edition (see fig. 1), copied in all ensuing editions, shows a highly suggestive scene in which the scales of the title, managed by a divine hand emerging from a sunlit cloud, balance the two weights of politics: at the left, the *ius belli*, adorned with a ribbon mentioning, **in rather crude Latin, *servitus bellium*, and at the right, the *ius civille* (sic), garlanded with *libertas et iusticia*. While a king and his courtiers watch at one side and two wise jurists at the other, the *ius civille* clearly tilts the scales, and from the enlightened sky descends the Ciceronian maxim *cedant arma togae*.**78 **Below, a scene in which a royal family idly wastes its time in corporal pleasures while armies clash at the background, is juxtaposed with an image of flourishing maritime commerce, at the forefront of which stands a diligent farmer cultivating his land,** the archetype of republican virtue.

…

More importantly, the brothers often quote short *sententiae* of two Classical authors in particular: Tacitus, the prime authority for seventeenth-century political writing who is invoked by the De la Courts as a critical insider's account of the abject life at a monarchical court; and Lucan, whose *Pharsalia* offered a telling historical account of what happens when one man tries to attain all power. Clearly, the De la Courts read their Tacitus and Lucan as republican authors, as commentators on the moral and political ruin caused by monarchical rule. This reading of Lucan is particularly significant. **As David Norbrook has shown, a similar anti-monarchical interpretation of Lucan, following Grotius's influential edition of the *Pharsalia* from 1614, informed the republican imagination in England at the opening of the Civil War.**103
…

Out of fanatical bigotry, the De la Courts argue, clerics tend to slander all who disagree with their opinions, in particular men of learning. The consequence is that the common people have always believed their claim "that ***the Jurists*** **were evil Christians, *the Physicians* Libertines,** *the Philosophers* Atheists, *the Politicians* feigning Machiavellians, *the Mathematicians and Astronomers*, Wizards and Fortune-tellers".113
…

While rewriting the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, his brother Pieter added two passages that broaden the line of reasoning. A first addition, clearly meant to ground the argument in the authority of natural law theory, states that self-preservation is not only a passion, but also a right, a right that "surpasses all other *natural Laws*; and all following *civil Laws* are founded on the same, or at least presuppose it". **One of these natural laws, only to be broken when it conflicts with this primary natural right, is the golden rule "do as you would be done by".** This passage ends with a brief yet telling remark: "*See all this more broadly and clearly proven by Th. Hobb. Elem. Phil. De Civ.*"12
…

Hobbes's political philosophy enjoyed a broad and early reception in the Dutch Republic after the first publication of *De Cive*.21 Samuel Sorbière, a French contact of Hobbes who enrolled as a student in 1646 at Leiden University where he attended Heereboord's classes, had brought a copy of *De Cive* to the Netherlands which was published in 1647 by Elzevier. The work, which was sold out and reprinted within a year, had a large impact, and the discussions about the work reflected clear political positions in the Dutch debate. On the one hand, **the Calvinist clergy reproached Hobbes for his moral relativism and allegedly 'Machiavellian' concept of absolute sovereignty, as well as for his subjection of ecclesiastical afffairs to the civil magistrate, one of the main controversies in seventeenth-century Dutch politics.**22 **On the other hand, an important critic of Calvinist orthodoxy, the Utrecht regent Lambert van Velthuysen, openly declared himself a disciple of *De Cive*, although he did so by fundamentally altering Hobbes's subjectivism into a Grotian theory of natural human sociability.**23
…

This appropriation is exemplified by the 1667 Dutch translation of the *Leviathan* by Abraham van Berkel, a former student at Leiden in theology and medicine.26 In his introduction to the work, **Van Berkel compared the execution of Charles I in 1649 with the attempted coup d'état by the Dutch Stadholder a year later: both were illegitimate deeds, he argued,** which resulted from a fundamental misunderstanding of the absolute nature of sovereignty in England and the United Provinces. For Van Berkel, Hobbes's argument against the English tyrannicides was therefore also an argument against the Dutch Orangists – **a highly telling volte-face that mobilized Hobbes for the cause of the provincial sovereignty of the States of Holland.** Moreover, Van Berkel insisted that the *Leviathan* exemplarily revealed the extent of civil liberty and the subordination of ecclesiastical power to the civic magistrate.27
…

The De la Courts found in Hobbes an authoritative source for three important elements of their theory: **the depiction of natural equality and mutual fear as the foundations of political organization, the ensuing argument that all government originates as democracy, and the eventual classification of sovereignty as necessarily absolute and undivided. None of these three issues are exclusively Hobbesian,** and therefore it does not make much sense to speak of the De la Courts as Dutch disciples of Hobbes. Instead, the brothers turned to Hobbes to further substantiate their views on the basis of his evocative, though ambiguous, language. **Hobbes's rhetorical strategies defied a straightforward reading, as Jon Parkin has shown, and one of the main reasons for his influence in the seventeenth century was his ability to entrap the reader and thus address different political agendas** – even the radical republican agenda of the brothers De la Court.31

The writings of Hobbes offered the De la Courts compelling new evidence of what they had been taught when studying at Leiden. **The *politica* of their professor Boxhorn gradually moved away from the**

Aristotelian notion of man as a political animal to a depiction of human nature as essentially self-interested. For Boxhorn civil society originated in necessity and fear, a view shared by other important seventeenth-century scholars on *politica* such as Henning Arnisaeus, who equally acknowledged fear as an important factor in the establishment of politics,32 or the Helmstedt professor Johann Werdenhagen, for whom "fear and indigence" lay at the basis of every commonwealth.33 Hobbes, in particular in *De Cive*, developed this view into a suggestive image of the state of nature that amounted to a full-blown repudiation of Aristotle. **In far more compelling detail and expressive language than his academic predecessors, Hobbes emphasized the fundamental equality of power among all natural human beings. It is this equal "power to kill" that makes mutual fear, and not benevolence, the origin of society.**34 This emphasis on natural equality was readily adopted by the brothers De la Court. All men are by nature equal in their strengths and passions, and

> *out of this natural equality arise commonly mutual fear, modesty, and morality*, **for one feels ashamed and does not dare to desire *that others endure from us what we would not want to suffer from others*.** And since human privation is meanwhile large, and the order to get out from that misery and privation necessary, therefore one very easily, in all diversity of judgment, concedes this fairness: *that* reasonably, *few should comply with the judgment of many*. And this natural fairness and rationality is the foundation of all *Democratic*, or Popular, Governments.35

…

Hobbes's subjectivism, coined in a language of rights, is turned by the De la Courts into a language of 'fairness', in which rights do not play any significant role. For the De la Courts, the natural equality among human beings leads not only to mutual fear but also involves natural justice and morality. It is such morality which enables the contractual foundation of the commonwealth along rational and democratic lines. **This argument merges the Hobbesian prominence of fear with a Grotian emphasis on mutual human recognition, primarily based on the Stoic notion of *oikeiosis*, the natural inclination to self-protection and common support.**42

…

The De la Courts adopt this argument, but they do so to argue that human selfishness in the state of nature makes it *a priori* absurd to conceive of a monarchy instituted by consent. **They thus use Hobbes's own weapons against Hobbes,** while their repudiation of the primacy of monarchy equally undermines the space allocated to kings in the work of Grotius and Parker.52

…

The result is a sort of republican absolutism, which emphasizes the indivisibility of sovereignty to counter any claims on behalf of a political or military role for the Stadholder, while ardently defending the supreme authority of the States of Holland in all religious and political matters. Thus, like Van Berkel, the brothers De la Court employ Hobbes's absolutism to reach a conclusion that would probably have horrified Hobbes himself.

…

Autonomy, being one's own master and *sui iuris*, is for the De la Courts the key principle that enables men to enjoy their civic rights and perform their civic duties. All those who live in a condition of dependence – women, children, servants, the poor, the destitute and the ignorant – cannot enjoy these rights, nor perform these duties, and therefore they are not considered full citizens. **The brothers' conception of citizenship is relatively comprehensive for its criticism of Dutch exclusivist practice and its subsequent plea to abolish the existing juridical discrimination between full *poorters* and newly arrived citizens.** Nonetheless, their idea of what constitutes a citizen remains within the narrow Aristotelian boundaries that dominated seventeenth-century theory and practice, even among 'radical' contemporary circles like the Levellers in England or the spinozists in the Dutch Republic.99 **For instance, Van den Enden, Spinoza's Latin teacher, unequivocally equated citizens with independent males,**100 **while Spinoza employed the very same categories of exclusion as De la Court.**101

…

In line with contemporary practice, he argues that only the rich should be trained in the defence of the state, for they have something to loose and therefore will "serve loyally without payment to protect a *lawful Government*, as well as their *beloved Freedom* and all other private *Goods*, firmly against internal and external violence". The poor, in contrast, should only be allowed to enter the armed forces in times of war, at a small reward and under the command of "trustful rich Citizens as *Officers*" so as to prevent them from rebellion.92

…

In the De la Courts' secular Augustinianism with Hobbesian undertones, human nature always tends to evil unless it is moderated by the rule of law. Hence, "*all the laws of a State should be made thus, as if all men were evil, since they will indeed become evil*, at least for the largest

part, *unless they are restrained by the fear for punishment*. And therefore the saying goes: *La fame & la povertà fa gli homini* [sic] *industriosi & le leggi gli fanno boni*".143
…

A society ruled by a monarch is no true civil society where the passionate excesses of the human condition are bridled, but rather "a country that will be filled with *Fops, Dancers, Players, Cursers, Fornicators, Hunters, Gluttons, and Boozers &c.*"156
…

However, it is important to note that the thought of the brothers De la Court relies neither on a providential divine framework nor on the cultivation of inner virtue to overcome the excesses of human nature. Instead, their approach to the role of the passions in politics centres on a largely secular notion of the rule of law, indebted to, in particular, Machiavelli. Echoing the *Discorsi*, the De la Courts insist that

> in this evil world nothing more detrimental to human society can be thought of *than to envisage, when establishing a government and making Laws, how prudent, virtuous and impassionate Rulers and Subjects ought to be inclined … On the contrary, nothing more beneficial can be thought of than to consider well how cunning, evil, lecherous and fully passionate people will be inclined, so that politics and laws are established in such a way that the evil Rulers and Subjects will always be obliged to behave well.*157

This key passage asserts that politics is not about the elusive concept of virtue but about the harsh reality of the passions, the self-loving nature of rulers and ruled alike. As a result, the conventional emphasis on a range of Ciceronian and Christian virtues, from fortitude to magnanimity, largely disappears from sight in the work of the De la Courts. **Their account replaces the devotional love of one's neighbour with calculated self-interest, it subordinates the fear for God and the afterlife to the fear for worldly punishment.** Significantly, this passage is followed by the remark that such a secular disciplinary framework corresponds among all religions best with Reformed Calvinism. This embrace of a particular creed is thus not the foundation of the analysis, but only a secondary consequence. Moreover, the De la Courts assert **"that the external *Profession* of *Religion*, whether *Jewish* or *Christian*, does not make any change in human nature, and that all People, whether *Jewish*, *Christians* or *Heathens*, are or become very *ignorant and evil* if they are born in or ascend to such *Supremacy* that they are not subjected to any *laws* or *punishments*".**158
…

For example, Sidney unequivocally equated monarchical tyranny with impiety, "idolatry" and "the destruction of the godly",160 while Milton insisted that the execution of Charles I "delivered the Commonwealth from a grievous domination, and religion from a most debasing thraldom".161 **This emphasis on political theology also explains the remarkable popularity of the model of the Hebrew Republic among seventeenth-century English republicans.**162 **Yet even though this model was largely developed by Dutch authors, most importantly Petrus Cunaeus, Grotius, and Spinoza, such religious engagement is largely absent from the republican endeavour of the brothers De la Court. Their emphasis on self-interest largely eclipses any notion of Christian virtuousness, and their anti-monarchical criticism consequently lacks the religious connotation of English republicanism.**
…

The concept of the 'wise merchant' was coined in a famous speech by the Dutch humanist scholar Caspar Barlaeus. On January 9, 1632, Barlaeus gave a lecture at the opening of the Amsterdam 'Athenaeum Illustre', a college that, in the absence of a local university, offered higher schooling to the city's youth.163 **The first chairs of the Athenaeum were taken by Barlaeus and his close friend and colleague Gerard Vossius.** Addressing the fathers of the young men he was about to teach, the prosperous elite of a city that had become famous for its trade, Barlaeus chose an appropriate topic for his speech: the connection between commerce and the study of philosophy, or, as he called it, the ideal of a *mercator sapiens*.164
…

To overcome the threat of such commercial corruption, Barlaeus put forward his central claim:

> Wisdom does not contemn the wealthy but embraces them, under one condition: that they are rich without harm to others, magnificent without luxury, liberal without ostentation, weighty without pedantry, **religious without superstition.**169

Thus Barlaeus sought to justify mercantile enterprise with an account that, **explicitly based on ancient stoicism and in particular on Cicero's *De officiis*,** highlighted the virtuousness of a rational and moderate pursuit of riches in the service of the common good.
…

Barlaeus's contribution to this debate on the social role of commerce and mercantile wealth stands out for its distinctive humanist use of classical sources, which eclipse the religious emphasis that dominated from Coornhert onwards. **Barlaeus did not aim to come to terms with commercial society from a Christian point of view, but rather to turn the icons of humanism, in particular Cicero, into advocates of honourable trade.**
…

As the brothers argue, "people whose *wealth* is devoid of *power* are by most reasons incited to *knowledge* and *virtues* and deterred from all evil … Thus actually not *wealth* but *power* and *licence* are the cause of many evils".194 The De la Courts thus adopt Barlaeus's claim that mercantile riches should be appraised if employed for the sake of wisdom and virtue. At the same time, **they make an implicit move away from the classical concern that the accumulation of goods will lead to corruption.** This concern still haunted Barlaeus's portrayal of the wise merchant. **For the De la Courts, in contrast, mercantile wealth gives no reason for anxiety, since the real source of evil is the unrestrained lust for power.**

The brothers' gradual departure from the traditional mistrust of the accumulation of riches is revealed by the language in which they portray honourable civil conduct. **Barlaeus's humanist vocabulary of the classical virtues of the wise merchant, from piety to prudence, virtually disappears from their writings, while his Ciceronian argument for the overlap between *utile* and *honestum* becomes couched in the consciously modern language of 'interest'.** This gradual move from virtue to self-interest eventually results in a corresponding shift from the common good to private advantage as the standard of mercantile morality. **Like his predecessor Coornhert or his Calvinist contemporary Udemans, Barlaeus primarily emphasized the value of individual commercial activity for society at large, in particular through the practice of charity.** Yet in the thought of the De la Courts charity attains a strikingly different connotation. A crucial passage in the *Sinryke Fabulen* describes charity not primarily as a virtue, but as a passion, a passion that can easily turn into "wrong charity" when directed towards people who indulge in laziness and only hope to profit from the riches of their industrious fellow human beings.195 This remarkable change in emphasis shows how the brothers De la Court depart from the late humanist view on riches and poverty as expressed by Barlaeus. **In the development of their œuvre, and most strikingly in De la Court's last work, the *Sinryke Fabulen*, wealth is increasingly identified as a moral value that characterizes the thrifty, the diligent, and the wise.**
…

With conventional scorn for the unruly rabble, the De la Courts insist that poor people, who "have to spend their time in working for their subsistence", lack the education and resources necessary to harness their passions into "the appropriate *desire for honour*", and hence they lose themselves in wastefulness. The other social pole, the nobility, is equally prone to false self-love:

> *having banned all discipline*, these Lords follow their desires so immoderately that they have run into debt before they realize that their goods are diminishing. And therefore *luxury* brings about the same among them as *need* tends to cause among the *poor* People.196

196. … Cf. the similar argument in Milton, *Defence of the People of England*, in Idem, *Areopagitica and Other Political Writings*, 250: **"… the middle sort, amongst whom the wisest men and most skilful in affairs are generally found; the rest are most commonly diverted, on the one hand by luxury and wealth, on the other by want and poverty, from achieving excellence, and from the study of laws and government."**
…

On the one hand, the brothers repeatedly stress the importance of public service and the civic duty to take up arms in defence of the commonwealth. On the other, **they suggest that true wisdom consists of the acquiescent acceptance of one's fate, taking care of oneself while maintaining a stoic distance from "the slippery ice" of politics: "For in such a state one needs few things, and using properly the small means that one owns, one becomes with little rich and somehow God's equal, [eenigsins Goode gelijk] and one can live as a quiet, forgotten Citizen in his own home on his own way."**199 It is such a life of modesty and utter self-reliance that characterizes those who personify the opposite of base courtly morals. Like hares in a world populated by lions, apes, foxes and parrots, these are the

> ***People who are accustomed to live in peace from their own income without harming others, and who have nonetheless travelled many Countries, as well as learned, heard, and seen a lot. These are people who, having firm and virtuous* Maxims *of life, do not want to bend to pass through life more easily, and one might very well call them* un-Courtiers.**200

…

This convergence between the republican ethics of a mercantile aristocrat from fifteenth-century Florence and two schooled entrepreneurs from seventeenth-century Holland reveals that it is doubtful whether Pieter de la Court, allegedly "*ganz im geist des alten Calvinismus denkend*", would have characterized Alberti's preference for a peaceful family life as "*sündhafte Kreaturvergötterung*" or as "*aristocratische Pathetik*", in line with Max Weber's famous thesis on the Protestant ethic.223 Instead, the 'capitalist spirit' of the De la Courts, like Alberti's, champions the honest pursuit of profit as a laudable civil ambition that connects the private advantage of the household with the public utility of society at large. **This chapter has shown that the brothers' appeal for the disciplinary framework of civil society to overcome the possible corruption of such personal ambition follows from an essentially secular notion of the rule of law. This notion, as the brothers insist, corresponds only secondarily to the dogmas of Reformed Calvinism.** Moreover, the cultivation of personal honour that underlies the mercantile ethics of the De la Courts can hardly be defined as a bourgeois ethic of asceticism. As a language of hierarchy and prestige, it entails above all a civic ethics that defines the individual citizen in relation to his fellow citizens and the commonwealth at large.224 In the De la Courts' reappraisal of Ciceronian ambition, the pursuit of profit is never for the sake of profit itself, but always for the sake of civil honour**. As De la Court summarized in a private letter from 1664: "It is better to be somewhat less searching for profit and more desirous for honour … although it conflicts with the maxims of a merchant who should, *qualitate qua*, search for nothing but profits."**225
…

First, **the De la Courts appropriated the fashionable writing of Hobbes to argue that all legitimate government originates in democratic consent. Reading Hobbes through Grotian lenses, they radicalized mainstream contract theory with the claim that a true civil society can never be a monarchy.** Instead, sovereignty remains indivisibly with the community of contractors, the householders who constitute the ruling citizenry.
…

Since the largest profits are made in international trade, "*these international Merchants* are the most profitable inhabitants and they enrich the country the most".21 Yet they can only make such high revenues if they are left unhindered in their decisions, for "he who has to eat the porridge cooks and cools it best":

> Everyone ought to be totally free and unrestrained in producing and dealing with his own commodity … **Where everyone takes care of himself, everyone is fine, and no one gets lost. This is the natural liberty that the Rulers should never take away from their subjects.**22

The core assertion of De la Courts is that the system of halls and guilds fundamentally obstructs such natural liberty – and hence, Leiden's reason of state. The halls are governed by oligarchic boards of inexperienced people "who never fail to advise to their own advantage, even if it is obviously to the disadvantage of the community". Driven by such wrongly understood self-interest, the governors of the halls will simply try to fill their own purses under the pretext that they care for the common good, "using that nice cover of wanting to make the Industries eternal".23 **Yet the hall's rigid system of regulation cannot obtain that goal of eternity given the vicissitudes of international trade. As the De la Courts insist, "none of our industries is fixed to the ground, and therefore they do not resemble the trees, from which one may cut some branches that bear little fruit".**24
…

As the De la Courts conclude emphatically: "The poison of the Halls is deadlier to the draperies than the bloody swords of looting soldiers."27 With equally vehement language, they continue to reproach the economic policies of the guilds, the central institution of early-modern Dutch corporate politics.28 Like the halls, the exclusivist policies and unifying regulations of the various guilds are "a special pest for Leiden" which obstruct economic freedom and overall prosperity. **Guildsmen, who "live lazily and wastefully at the expense of the other inhabitants" embody the prime characteristic of incivility – the desire for domination.** To counter this "filthy tyranny and the monopoly of the guildsmen and the Governors of the Halls over their fellow inhabitants", all production should be deregulated, wages should be set free, levies and cartels abolished and every one should be able to choose with whom to trade.29 Such economic freedom will increase manufacturing, attract foreigners, and thus enhance Leiden's overall *grandezza*, for "Liberty is Leiden's welfare".30

The second pillar of Leiden's reason of state, next to trade and industry, is its university, which according to the De la Courts requires an equal degree of liberty. **The brothers maintain that commerce and science are strikingly similar endeavours that require a similar approach, for "it is impossible to have such uncertain inhabitants who will leave so easily as Students or merchants in a country town".**31 Just like its merchants, Leiden's students should therefore be cherished and granted freedom of choice.
…

Their fascination was shared by English political pamphleteers such as Marchamont Nedham, who described Athens as “the onely Patern of a Free-state fit for all the world to follow”.43 **While Harrington, like Machiavelli, focused primarily on militant Sparta and Rome, his more commercially-minded contemporaries on either side of the North Sea turned to other republican role models in the classical and contemporary Mediterranean.**44
…

However, Athens also had flaws. First, **the De la Courts criticize its restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship, and insist that these restrictions created “a very large discontent among so many thousands *foreign* Inhabitants”** and hence “*a very large disposition to upheaval*”.48 In short, a policy of restrictive citizenship threatens the stability of the commonwealth, again a clear allusion to the situation in Leiden. Secondly, **the De la Courts criticize the belligerent politics of Athens,** “for nothing more detrimental to a State *built on artisanship, trade and sciences can be thought of than all-destroying and commerce-impeding War*”.
…

For the brothers De la Court, the Roman Republic, “utterly founded on the violence of arms to the ruin of all learning and commerce”, is the ultimate antithesis of good republican rule. With its belligerent spirit and its distaste for trade, Rome, “that all murdering, plundering and the world destroying Republic, had to be an enemy of commerce” – as proved the case when Rome conquered the great trading republics of Athens and Carthage.51 **Eventually, the absence of merchants and the excess of empire made Rome relapse into the tyranny of its own military commanders.**52

This disapproval of the example of Rome was a common theme in the early-modern Netherlands, going back as far as Erasmus’s criticism of Roman expansionism.53
…

Yet the explicit way in which the De la Courts rebuke the Roman Republic is beyond compare. The aristocratic Roman Senate, so the brothers insist with numerous quotes from Lucan, Livy and Tacitus, was enslaved by “the passion and lust to wage war”, which condemned the common citizenry to drudge under unbearable imposts and turned the city into “a *deadly Pest* for the earth”.56 **Indeed, the territorial expansionism of Rome destroyed all the other classical republics and thereby eradicated the ancient European legacy of liberty:**

> For not only *Greece and all the Islands in the Mediterranean*, but also all of *Italy*, *France*, and *Spain* and all of *Germany* was divided among incredibly many Republics, until that … *war-loving and all-destroying Roman Republic* had subdued and destroyed them with her weapons, one by one.57

By way of conclusion to this flamboyant condemnation of Rome, the brothers De la Court express their wonder “*that this murderers’ den, this wolf’s nest*, this *most detestable* and *horrible* Republic that has ever been on this earth, is praised so much by many”.58 The implicit reference to Machiavelli’s *Discorsi* must have been obvious to most contemporary readers, and it serves as a warning to modern historians not to overemphasize Machiavelli’s influence on the De la Courts.59 Moreover, their harsh criticism of Rome’s territorial expansion entails a crucial difference from many English republicans, including Streater, Nedham, **and most importantly Harrington and Sidney, who praised the Roman Republic precisely for its glorious conquests.**60
…

A similar claim had been brought forward before by the Venetian author Paolo Paruta, one of the main propagators of the Myth of Venice in the sixteenth century. **In a clear repudiation of Machiavelli’s celebration of Rome’s military expansionism, Paruta argued that the Venetians “employed other means to defend liberty and to increase their riches, using for the former the navy, and for the latter traffic and merchandizing”.** Such commercial growth, Paruta continued, followed from the maxims of “preserving peace and keeping open and free commerce with all”.62
…

With a metaphor that again implicitly refutes Machiavelli, De la Court concludes that a truly commercial commonwealth should not wrap itself up in a lion’s skin or a fox’s pelt, but rather follow the commendable example of another species:

> a *Cat*, who pays diligent attention to provide for food and takes great care to preserve its own *young ones*, and never barks or snarls at someone who provokes or abuses it … When assaulted and pursued, it immediately flees into some *hole* or *natural stronghold*, where it remains silent until the emergency is over … **So that by these praiseworthy arts, the cats enjoy more quiet**

> **everywhere, live longer, are more pleasant and in much greater number than the *devouring* Beasts, *Lions* … or *cheating Foxes*.**65

…

While "the *Conquests* of other Cities" might lead to "*the demise* of nearly all *Free-States*", they argued that there is also a positive form of expansion, namely "*Conquests that improve Commerce* … like the *Europeans* obtained from the *Indians*".72 Elaborating on this claim, De la Court insisted that the settlement of overseas colonies should be a central policy of a commercial commonwealth like Holland. **One of the characteristics of a republic based on immigration and trade, so De la Court argued, is a large number of unhappy and restless inhabitants.** The capriciousness of commerce causes a continuous threat of instant poverty, and hence there will always be discontented people who prefer to try their luck elsewhere. Moreover, **the constant rotation in government and the meritocracy typical of a true republic result in similar dissatisfaction among the sons of the establishment who are not elected to the ranks of the administration.** They too will therefore long for another territory where they can give full rein to their ambition and where they will be honoured for their deeds. **The powers in being should try to get rid of these young men who, driven by self-love, might easily endeavour to rebel against the government.**
…

De la Court categorically stressed that each city in Holland could easily subsist independently, and that Holland at large, "observing its *own Interest*, could establish here in Europe *a State* without depending on any other".74 While arguing for overseas colonization, De la Court fervently spurned a closer union of the United Provinces beyond a mere alliance for mutual defence. **This rejection of federalisation even entailed the radical proposal of digging a large trench to separate Holland once and for all from the other provinces and hence turn it into an isle of splendid isolation.**75

Like their assessment of the Roman expansionist model, this particularist core of the republican politics of the brothers De la Court involves a crucial distinction of contemporary English republicanism. In spite of their widespread admiration of Dutch prosperity, **English republicans generally maintained that the Dutch Republic suffered from one fundamental shortcoming: its lack of a strong centralized government. Milton, for example, asserted with characteristic bravura that the English Commonwealth would "far exceed the United Provinces by having, not as they … many Sovranties united in one Commonwealth, but many Commonwealths under one united and entrusted Sovrantie".**76 A few years later Sidney similarly rejected the Dutch model by arguing that "their constitutions seem to have a more particular regard to the preservation of the liberties and privileges of each town and province than to the welfare of the whole … **Their commonwealth seems to be a vast building of loose stones, which not well cemented, threatens ruin**".77 In clear contrast, the fragmentation of the Dutch Republic was no issue at all for the De la Courts, whose republican model, unlike Milton's or Sidney's, continued to focus on the self-contained city instead of the centralized national state. A revealing passage in the *Politike Weeg-schaal* stresses the advantage of such an urban republic which, precisely because it is confined to the limits of a single city, must practice a peaceful foreign policy that promotes trade. When rewriting this passage De la Court added a short side note to the effect that republics can very well consist of a federation of different cities, hastily referring the reader to the source of this claim: "All of which has been very well demonstrated in detail by *J. Harrington* in his *Commonwealth of Oceana*. So it is unnecessary to talk about it further."78

This manuscript reference to Harrington – the sole mention of any English republican in the entire œuvre of the brothers De la Court – is particularly significant because it shows how De la Court appropriated an argument wholly secondary to Harrington's thought for his own Dutch republican agenda.79 Ironically, this appropriation thus reveals how little the English republican experience of the 1650s could offer to the fragmented federation of cities and provinces across the North Sea. Clearly, the role model for the De la Courts, as for all their republican compatriots, was not the centralized, expansionist monarchical republic of England but the self-contained city-states of the classical and the contemporary Mediterranean, the colonizing, commercial cities of Athens and Venice. **Just like these shining examples of haughty and stoic self-rule, the republic of the brothers De la Court proudly maintained its distance from the hectic pursuits of the centralized state:** it was, after all, a commonwealth of cats.
…

As the brothers boldly assert, "all Political thinkers generally admit that the highest perfection of Politics and human society consists in this single point, namely, *that the Subjects are left as much natural liberty as is in any way doable*".82

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020
>
> The illiberal sentiments of even the most illustrious metaphysicians are disclosed in the saying of Aristotle, that **the mark of the worst governments is that they leave men free to live as they please.**

…

The De la Courts therefore stress the need to grant all immigrants citizenship rights and the same opportunities to make a living as the indigenous population, for "absolute uniform freedom for all inhabitants, bearing uniform burdens" is apart from a natural right a "powerful means to attract foreigners".84
…

Echoing Grotius' discussion of the creation of individual property, the De la Courts stress "that man is by nature the master and appreciator of his own goods and labour … *for nature gives him privately the judgement over his property*".108 **In other words, private ownership is a natural right that predates the establishment of the commonwealth.** This claim involves an explicit repudiation of the classical arguments in Plato and Thomas More's *Utopia* for the collectivisation of property, which De la Court classifies as "so *alien* to human nature".109
…

In a vocabulary that echoes the *Digests* of Roman law, the De la Courts define this natural right as "the full freedom to do everything that is not conflicting with Politics and human society, either the freedom to serve God or to gain a living here [in Leiden] without the impediment by anyone and with whatever art, trade, or labour it may be".137 In other words, the natural liberty that is preserved in civil society entails the freedom from any obstruction of personal choices as long as these do not undermine society's *raison d'être* by bringing back the state of nature.
…

The brothers' use of the concept, explicitly based on the Roman legal language of liberty as opposed to servitude that was revived in Renaissance Italy, reveals that they consciously positioned themselves in a long-standing tradition of republican liberty which originated in antiquity. **Yet their fierce criticism of the Roman example and their emphasis on individual economic freedom also suggest that the De la Courts moved in a more 'liberal' direction which supposed a break with the classical past. Their case therefore shows that it can be difficult to draw a sharp opposition between republican and liberal notions of liberty:** in the work of the De la Courts these two notions simply reinforce each other, for freedom from interference is only attainable when freedom from arbitrary domination is ensured.150.
…

At odds with the dominant view of Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes,151 **the brothers De la Court suggest that the citizens and cities of Holland are not primarily connected through the institution of a unifying sovereign, but rather (if at all) by sharing a similar general interest.** While Holland is characterized by a "variety of Rulers, Subjects, Lands, and situation" which "necessarily causes variety of interests", still "all its Cities and Lands concur in one thing or *interest*".152 Through a meticulous calculation of Holland's entire population and the rates of employment in all its different economic sectors, De la Court concludes that "*all Inhabitants of Holland, living in freedom, are by a* common well- *and* ill-being *wonderfully linked together*". **This common ground is the all-embracing interest of commerce.**153
…

Essentially, **this endeavour collapses the Aristotelian distinction between monarchy and tyranny:** as the De la Courts contend, "*Monarchy*, where one man may command, is the Government that the *Greeks* and *Romans* of old have called *Tyranny*".162
…

The consequence is that rulers like Caesar and Augustus, "those horrible *Monsters*, are still praised by most Historians as if they had been very pious Heroes".166 Even in the Dutch Republic such admiration of kings remains influential, with the result that many think that the monarchical incivility embodied by the House of Orange deserves the same esteem as the exemplary civic behaviour of the wise merchant:

> And therefore one will say that the *Prince* of *Orange* should be praised for his expansion and growing authority and power in serving or Governing the United Netherlands as much … as a diligent and honest *Merchant*, who knows how to accumulate his goods by Industry and Trade, is commonly esteemed and lauded. **For apparently, all Prince's business and Commerce consist in that *accumulation* of *Power*.**167

In short, courtly hypocrisy obscures the vital distinction between honourable mercantile ambition and the disastrous monarchical desire to dominate.

The brothers De la Court contend that thus far in history there has been only one author who dared to speak his mind to a monarch: George Buchanan, whose work "can serve as a brightly

shining beacon to all contemporary Historians who would like to write scandalous truths about Monarchs".168 With this praise of Buchanan's repudiation of "flattery, which is the nurse of Tyranny, and a most grievous plague of a Kingdome", the De la Courts clearly position themselves in the Monarchomach tradition.169 **Yet unlike Buchanan, they do not maintain that kings are bound to uphold the social contract and that resistance is lawful if they forsake this duty. Instead, the brothers make a decisively more radical move by insisting that monarchy is by its very nature unconducive to the *salus populi*.** Even when checked by the rule of law or balanced in a mixed regime, monarchy is and remains tyrannical.

The De la Courts insist that monarchs consider the population over which they rule as enemies and therefore "try to *decrease* the power, honour, and goods of their subjects as much as possible".170
…

Moreover,

> *Monarchs hate studies and knowledge*, since they consider it dangerous when many people tower above Them in intellect. And because they realize that *an intelligent Community is not tyrannized or ruled as peacefully as one that is less intelligent*, therefore these *Monarchs* extinguish all *knowledge* as much as they can.172

…

"Under a *Single-headed Government*", De la Court warns, "the Lords and their Courtiers envy and deadly hate the most fortunate Owners of Freight-ships, as well as the Merchants and Traders, because with their legally obtained Riches and the use thereof they *obscure* the *lustre* and *pomp* of the *Court* and *Gentry*".176
…

Thus a commonwealth based on commerce and learning will necessarily disintegrate when it is enslaved to such domination, for merchants "shun and should flee from such a government like from *a deadly Plague*".179 De la Court stresses that worldwide historical experience shows that this has been exactly the case, from the imperial Pre-Columbian courts of Cuzco, Quito, and Mexico to the large cities of Japan, China, Persia and India, and from Fez and Cairo to Nineveh and Jerusalem.180 All these instances reveal that if a people lives under domination by the arbitrary will of one man, commerce will collapse: because **"in general, commerce always disappears from those countries and cities where one single man can rob a Merchant at his pleasure of his goods; that is, in short, from all monarchical government".**181
…

In particular, the De la Courts insist that "those of *Asia have always been fainthearted, feminine, and childish, those of Africa dumb and slavish* … but those of *Europe* have always *been more courageous, manly, diligent and rational*".184 Yet in spite of this conventional defence of European superiority, the De la Courts do not consider the Ottoman case as an example of fundamental otherness, typical to the particular culture and mores of the Orient or to Islam. **Instead, the brothers list approvingly the Islamic rules of life and they insist that "*under a Christian Religion those Lands would have been still much more destroyed*".**185 The Ottoman Empire offers therefore a universally valid warning that monarchy degrades humanity.

The only reason that Western Europe has for the most part not yet become prey to this fate, and that "under the Christian European Monarchs *science*, *commerce*, *wealth*, *arts* and *virtues* are not yet extinguished", is because of the republican legacy of Antiquity and the resulting decentralization and fragmentation of power. But the De la Courts feared this tide was changing. Just fairly recently in history, they argued, the European kings had started to reveal their truly tyrannical face. "The evil effects of Monarchical government are therefore, essentially, to be expected in due time."186 In 1685, the year when Louis XIV crowned his absolutist rule with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, De la Court saw these earlier fears justified. In the preface to the *Sinryke Fabulen*, he wrote:

> **Especially in our *Century*, *Single-headed Rule*, both in *Church* and *State* and suppressing so many *Free Republics*, has come to the fore to such an extent,** that if it would continue among the *Tyrants* with the same pace for yet *another Century*, then also in the whole of *Europe* all salutary *Knowledge*, *Sciences*, good *Arts*, *Virtues* and *Riches* of the *People*, indeed the People itself in number, will be diminished, **just like we see it now in *Muscovy*, *Greece*, *Turkey*, *Persia*, *India*,** &c., unless God Almighty would forbid it miraculously.187

…

For Machiavelli, the Roman emperors who lived *sotto le leggi* deserved at least a bit of praise,188 **while Milton made sure to deny "that all kings are tyrants". "As much as a good man differs from a bad", Milton insisted, "so much, do I maintain, that a king differs from a**

tyrant".189 Yet for the brothers De la Court, this distinction between monarchy and tyranny fails because it does not take into account the baseness of human nature.
…

Of all contemporary English republican writings, only Milton's *Defensio pro populo Anglicano,* published in 1651 in reply to the Leiden academic Claudius Salmasius, was disseminated widely in the Dutch Republic, both in its Latin version and in French and Dutch translations.193 Milton indeed wrote this treatise with an international audience in mind, and he frequently addressed the Dutch directly.194 Nevertheless, his Dutch audience remained rather reserved about Milton's endeavour to justify the establishment of the English Commonwealth. **While Isaac Vossius, the son of the rhetorical theorist, stressed that he "had expected nothing of such quality from an Englishman", another scholar, Nicolaas Heinsius (the former schoolmate of De la Court) aptly summarized the general Dutch sentiment by arguing "not so much that a bad cause has been well pleaded by Milton as that Scribonius [i.e. Salmasius] has pleaded most abominably the cause of the unfortunate King".**195 The execution of Charles I had met with widespread condemnation in the Dutch Republic – the Dutch, after all, had abjured but never decapitated their king in the days of the Revolt – and for all his zeal, Milton could not significantly change that attitude.196 Other important writings in defence of the republican regime in England, from the newsbooks and treatises of Nedham to Harrington's *Oceana*, were never published in the Netherlands, let alone translated into Dutch.197

> 197**. Revealingly, the only work of Nedham translated into Dutch was his anti-French pamphlet *Christianissimus christianandus*** (Amsterdam, 1678)

…

The brothers maintained that England's violent past proves that even when a monarch is balanced by a powerful parliament, political upheaval is all too common. **Therefore, "*this blessed, fertile country*", even though it never experienced similar warfare as continental Europe, "has still remained so lowly *only because of the Monarchical government*".**200
…

Following a commonplace in Florentine political thought from Machiavelli to Guicciardini, the De la Courts discuss two examples of such "*Monarchs* in fieri": **the Papal States, which "should be loathed and eradicated", and the Mamluk Sultanate in medieval Egypt and Syria, in their words "the *Saracen Republic* that was so *monstrous* that it should be *smothered*".**202 The De la Courts' version of the history of the Mamluks, based in particular on the fifteenth-century travel account of the Flemish nobleman Joos van Ghistele, discusses in detail the procedures of the election of the sultan, **and it stresses that the regime was exceptionally beneficial for Mediterranean trade.**203 But in spite of these positive qualities, the Mamluks remained under the domination of one ruler. Therefore they merely exemplified "lesser Slavery", **for "*Republics provided with a Head ad vitam who has any Military power, are truly Monarchies, or become so*".**204
…

First, **he maintains with much hyperbole "that never any Country has been in such *great servitude* as Holland during or under the *Service* and *Rule* of the Princes of Orange".** This assertion is further elaborated throughout the work. Until 1650, De la Court repeatedly insists, Holland suffered under the monarchical yoke of the Stadholders, **and only God's intervention prevented a life in eternal slavery with the sudden death of William II.**212
…

De la Court develops this argument further with a meticulous overview of the economic policies of all Stadholders from William the Silent to William II, **concluding that had the last Prince of Orange not died so suddenly, "commerce and navigation would have been subjected here to the same demise as in all other Monarchical Countries".**221 In short,

> for all free States, and especially for those founded on Knowledge and Commerce, no greater disaster can be thought of than to fall from a free City or Republic to a Monarchical Government, where commonly all knowledge, arts, virtues, Wealth and commerce are destroyed, and the Inhabitants devoured like bread.222

To substantiate this assertion that a commercial commonwealth cannot persist under monarchical domination, De la Court enumerates a range of illustrious trading cities of the past that lost their prosperity along with their liberty, such as the Phoenician cities of Sidon and Tyre. **Ancient Sidon, "whose Inhabitants lived in complete peace and certainty under a Free Republic without having a *Supreme Head* or *King* over them", is now deprived of its former wealth under Ottoman domination, "since the Inhabitants cannot peacefully possess their riches and sciences under this Monarchical or Princely Government". Tyre was struck by a similar fate, and thus "these *two Republics* lost their *navigation* and *commerce* not by Wars or Earthquakes … but by the loss of their *Free Government*".**223 **Further examples of this essential link**

between liberty and commerce abound: Carthage, Athens, Rhodes, exemplary republics which all lost their trade and liberty to the Romans; the republics of the Italian Renaissance, like Pisa, Florence and Milan, which "when they obtained the Court of a *Monarch* or his *Stadholder* much decreased in commerce during the Monarchical Government"; and finally, at the end of the list, the Dutch Republic itself, which had a narrow escape yet faces an insecure future.224

All these examples issue an unmistakable warning to those who argue in favour of a Stadholder. **Their crime, De la Court stresses daringly, is "similar to *Adam's* first *sin*", with the same everlasting catastrophic consequences for posterity.**225
…

A crucial text in the establishment of this opposition was Machiavelli's *Principe*, **which in the opening lines famously subdivides all states as either *republiche* or *principati*.**236 **In the course of the sixteenth-century, this non-monarchical meaning of the term 'republic' became common in Italian, and throughout the next century it spread over the rest of Europe,** challenging the dominance of the established Ciceronian understanding.237
…

This same risk loomed large in most Dutch cities, for while the urban population had increased drastically in the seventeenth century, the size of the ruling town councils had remained the same. **All over Holland the "disproportion between Rulers and Subjects has become much larger" and consequently "*that Rule by a few people* (*Paucorum Dominatio*) will not be tolerated for a long time by the idle and uncomfortable Subjects in case the industry and the welfare decline".**254

The brothers De la Court thus argued that the closed urban aristocracies of Holland ought to open up their ranks to comply with the changing demography and to preserve the lawful government vis-à-vis an insecure future. This contention involved a fundamental criticism of the political status quo in Holland under the De Witt regime.255 **The De la Courts contended that the Dutch aristocratic republican government in power was on the brink of lapsing into oligarchy and, sooner or later, into the monarchical domination by a Stadholder, because it did not represent the general citizenry at large.** This critical deviation from the dominant ideology of the establishment clashed openly with the views of De Witt himself in the months prior to the publication of the *Interest van Holland*. **In the manuscript version of this treatise, De la Court argued that none of Holland's citizens ought to be excluded from the government by laws: citizens from foreign descent should be granted the right to be elected to the urban councils.** In a cynical mode, he then added that such a right, though beneficial in theory, would in practice only be "an idle wind", since the "few rulers would always agree on excluding the foreigners in fact, and prefer to leave that privilege to their families instead of to strangers". **This sarcastic remark, which clearly alluded to the nepotistic practices of the ruling regent families, was smothered by the censorious interference of De Witt himself, who erased it from the text with a fervent stroke of his aristocratic pen.**256

In another passage, De la Court voiced his criticism of the powers-in-being still more openly. Discussing the reasons why the Dutch Republic had not profited much more from its recently gained liberty, **he argued that the existing government was, although much better than the rule by a Stadholder, still far from perfect, given that many judiciary offices were exercised for life by members of the elite families.** As De la Court cried out: "I do not know what an *oligarchy* is if it cannot be seen here." He then continued with a strong rebuttal of De Witt's foreign policy, too bellicose in his eyes and only conducive to high taxes instead of commercial diligence.257 **On reading these lines, De Witt deleted the entire passage and replaced it with two large chapters which, on the basis of a concept written by himself, justified in a densely informed prose the "resolute management by the pious Rulers in Holland".**258 Clearly, then, a simplistic classification of the brothers De la Court as mere propagandists of the De Witt regime is untenable.
…

According to the De la Courts, the contrast between aristocracy and democracy is best epitomized in a phrase from Tacitus that constantly recurs in their works: *Dominatio paucorum regiae libidini propior, populi imperium juxta libertatem est*, "while the rule of the few approaches closely to a king's wantonness, a popular government stands near to liberty".259

For the De la Courts, a true civil society that is established when people leave the state of nature must be such an *imperium populi*, **based on the equality of all adult male contractors.** They define this democracy, again in largely Aristotelian terms, as the government

> **where *all people* who are by nature not under someone else's custody, like Women and Children, have the power to appear in an assembly, and to issue laws there with the majority of votes,** and to appoint the executives of those laws to whom every human has to pay obedience.260

…

The importance of this move can hardly be overemphasized: it amounts to the first outspoken theoretical defence of democracy in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, and as such it forms an important steppingstone for Spinoza's argumentation on democracy in the 1670s.267 Yet while the brothers' argument for democracy stands out for breaking new terrain, a strong residue of the age-old criticism remains in their claim that democracies suffer from one fundamental drawback: human ignorance. **Whereas an aristocracy enjoys the benefit of well-educated rulers, a "Popular State, being ruled by the majority, *is also truly ruled by stupid and ignorant people who have neither eyes nor ears*".**
…

The passage is worth quoting at length since it clearly reveals how the authorial ethos of rationality merges with a passionate rhetoric that directly addresses the reader with the question:

> Whether it isn't true that *in Monarchical Governments* the Lord … ruling on his own (which would be the most detrimental of all Governments), **in general wants to rule *to the disadvantage of his Subjects*, according to the Monarchical maxim: *Divide, impera. Pour faire un grand Roy, il faut diviser le peuple?*** Whether it isn't true that *in Aristocratic Governments* the Rulers … always can, will, and shall employ their knowledge and power of Government … to protect and enhance themselves, *also with, and through the ruin and decline of the common Subjects*? Whether it isn't true that only in Popular Governments *the Rulers* (namely, not the *Magistrates*, Servers of the *State*; but *the People*, with whom Sovereignty is there) *search* (*Salus Populi suprema Lex*) their own *welfare, the one of the common Inhabitants*? [note the subtle change from 'subjects' to 'inhabitants'] … And whether therefore the Monarchical Government should not be esteemed very little? **Whether the Aristocratic Government should not be placed far above the Monarchical?** Whether the Popular Government is not evidently more advantageous to the Inhabitants and therefore better than the Aristocratic?270

Thus finishes the first edition of the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, with a rhetorical move that, in engaging the audience to decide for itself, **underscores the work's eventual conclusion: if guided by the trustworthy speech of the wise merchant, the common people should be considered judicious enough to make their own decisions.**

Yet when preparing a new edition of the work after Johan died, Pieter de la Court did not seem to be entirely confident about the form as well as the contents of his brother's conclusion. **Is the independent judgment of the general public really to be trusted? De la Court doubted it, as he equally doubted whether his brother's open plea for democracy could persuade the powers-in-being as a feasible alternative for the established oligarchy in Holland.** Accordingly, De la Court attached a couple of additional chapters that modify Johan's initial conclusion as well as his democratic rhetoric. In a striking change of tone, De la Court takes the reader firmly by the hand, adding a paternalist *assertio* to the text's original reliance on the reader's own judgment. First, De la Court explains the "Reasons why the *Popular Government* has been depicted so favourably until now, although it is truly not the best one". **Then he continues to insist that, although a popular assembly is obviously better than an oligarchy, it does suffer heavily from the ignorance of its members. Therefore, as he concludes resolutely, "an *Aristocracy* that is closest to the Popular Government is surely the best Government".**271

At first sight, this modification of the argument seems to entail a blatant contradiction of the initial embrace of democracy. Indeed, Kossmann maintained that in revising the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, De la Court unjustifiably and wilfully killed his brother's democratic darlings.272 However, as both Haitsma Mulier and Blom have argued, such a portrayal of the development of the brothers' thought is not very convincing. **In Blom's words, the "change is one of emphasis more than of principle":**273 De la Court's additions mainly tried to resolve a tension that characterizes his brother's use of the term popular government from the start. The first edition of the *Politike Weeg-schaal* overtly embraced democracy as the best form of government, but it also stressed that "*one should make a very large distinction between an* illegitimate rebellious assembly of the people … and a lawful assembly of the common Citizenry".
…

Similarly, across the North Sea, a 'popular' republican like Nedham equally stressed that "when we mention *the People*, observe all along, that we do not mean the confused promiscuous Body of the People".276
…

The brothers De la Court still remained firmly within the Athenian paradigm of the city-state where the independent citizenry engages in direct decision-making. **Their plea for a large ruling assembly did not depart radically from Aristotle's claim that the ideal *politeia* entails a perfect fusion of**

oligarchy and democracy, nor from Boxhorn's claim that Holland should be ruled by an open and broad aristocracy of the rich.294 To a large extent, the De la Courts followed this line of reasoning, tentatively moving in a more democratic direction. Their originality lies mainly in the outspokenness with which they tried to free the term 'democracy' from its long-standing negative connotations. **With the De la Courts, democracy started its slow but spectacular rise that changed it from a derogatory description of anarchy into the universal denominator of legitimate rule.** Yet the brothers' description of what a popular government exactly entails was not particularly innovative. After all, the most fundamental and pioneering aspect of their criticism of the Dutch status quo was their categorical rejection of the Stadholderate, which amounted to perhaps the most radical argument against monarchy in Ancien Régime Europe.
…

Milton emphasized emphatically that trade could never be a reason "to prostitute religion and libertie";295 **Harrington claimed that although "in manufactures and merchandise the Hollander has gotten the start of us", the English Commonwealth had "a far more sure and effectual foundation" because it was based on agriculture.**296 Other English republican theorists from the 1650s and 1660s, most notably Marchamont Nedham and Algernon Sidney, were much closer in their argumentation to the brothers De la Court. Nedham's 1656 "Commonwealth-Principles" show many similarities to the thought of the De la Courts – from the claim that republican magistrates will "have made the Publick Interest, and their own, all one", to a rhetorical plea for a broad aristocratic government close to Athenian democracy.297 In the following decade, Sidney's *Court Maxims* continued to stress the republican harmony of private and public interests in similar terms, now with explicit attention to the importance of trade. **As Jonathan Scott has shown in detail, Sidney's adaptation of this language of commercial interest was deeply informed by his exile in the Dutch Republic at the start of the 1660s.**298 Sidney frequently praised the republican example of the Dutch, emphasizing that it is "the king's interest to destroy trade" while Holland's prosperity and power were due to its "good government and liberty of traffic" – two crucial claims that also dominate the work of the brothers De la Court.299
…

Milton took care not to equate monarchy with tyranny, stressing that "both the name and the power of a king are entirely consistent with a greater power in the people and the law".302 In comparable vein, **Harrington emphasized the pre-eminent role of a "Lord Archon" as "the sole legislator of Oceana". Directly contradicting the anti-Orangism of the De la Courts, he argued that "the Low Countries under a monarch were poor and inconsiderable, but in bearing a prince, could grow unto a miraculous height".**303 Even Nedham, who was arguably the fiercest (and most opportunistic) anti-monarchical activist in England, justified a form of elective monarchy. In his words, "if any Kingly Form be tolerable, it must be that which is by Election, chosen by the Peoples Representatives" – a government that the De la Courts would have characterized as merely tyranny in disguise.304 Finally, also Sidney stressed that he "dare[d] not say all monarchy is absolutely unlawful", since legal kingship is just and virtuous, as opposed to the outright "despotical government that is exercised over slaves".305 In short, all the main English republicans of the 1650s and 1660s targeted a corrupted monarchy, not monarchy as such. **The categorical anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court, which remained remarkably consistent from 1660 to 1685, thus proves exceptionally far-reaching and exclusivist in comparison with their contemporaries across the North Sea.**
…

Adopting the Grotian claim that the civil sovereign holds supreme authority over all ecclesiastical affairs, the De la Courts pleaded for a broad public church overseen by the magistracy, which tolerates confessional dissent in private. This ideology of toleration, in particular for the sake of commercial prosperity, was fairly far-reaching since it also included Catholics. Yet the brothers' tolerationist stance remained limited by their embrace of a single true faith, based on the purity of Scripture. **The inviolability of Scripture also delimited the De la Courts' conception of free speech,** which involved a dedicated yet altogether futile attempt to create consensus through outspokenness.
…

Since the days of Erasmus, political thought in the Netherlands was dominated by the language of concord. As the official motto of the Dutch Republic, taken from Sallust, self-assuredly declared: *concordia res parvae crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur*, 'in concord small affairs rise; in discord even the largest decline'.6 The brothers De la Court clearly adhered to this Erasmian legacy that emphasized the values of consensus, resignation, and constancy over conflict, defiance, and agitation. **They emphatically stressed the civic duty of acquiescing to one's political fate and forcefully rejected any attempt to rebel against the powers in being. This sceptical argument against revolutionary change was especially directed against those who, according to the De la Courts, threatened the delicate balance in the Dutch body politic: the supporters of the Stadholderate, organized economic factions such as guilds, and the orthodox clergy.**
…

Reflecting on these experiences, the *Politike Weeg-schaal* ends with a sceptical conclusion that reproves all desire for open rebellion: "For, *rebelling* against *the Government in being* (*de facto*), one immediately establishes the *state of nature or War of all Inhabitants against all.*" **This Hobbesian defence of de facto political power might come as a surprise given the inflammatory anti-Orangist rhetoric of the brothers' work.** Yet as I have argued above in chapter 3, the De la Courts appropriated Hobbes to legitimize the establishment of the regime of 'True Liberty' after the death of William II. They employed the language of de facto rule and the state of nature to strengthen a fairly conventional argument against illegitimate rebellion. **This argument was an essential element of the legacy of Lipsius and his followers.** For example, in his 1590 treatise *Vita politica*, the famous engineer and mathematician Simon Stevin highlighted in a Lipsian vein the disasters that would be brought about by civil disobedience.8 The brothers De la Court, who read Stevin, radicalized this argument to justify the new political order of the Stadholderless era. While Stevin argued in line with the conventional justification of the Revolt against Philip II that "honest violence" should be allowed to overcome tyranny,9 the De la Courts suggested that in principle every *de facto* government is to be obeyed.
…

Similarly, the *Aanwysing* concludes with a resounding quote from Erasmus that a good patriot should always defend the existing order.10 Yet on the other hand, apart from such rhetorical reassurance, the De la Courts' abhorrence of revolt also involves a more fundamental move in its repudiation of resistance theory and Monarchomach thought. **Unlike the resistance republicanism of their English contemporaries such as Milton (and later Locke), the De la Courts have a very sceptical outlook on the utility of sweeping political change. This attitude is in particular informed by the *politique* scepticism of Montaigne and exemplified by the verses of the Lord of Pibrac, which are quoted twice in the brothers' work:**

> *Aime* l'Estat *tel que tu le vois estre,*
> *S'il est* Royal, *aime la* Royauté.
> *S'il est de* Peu, *ou bien* Communauté,
> *Aime l'aussi, car Dieu t'y a fait naistre.*11

These verses, clearly more than just figurative embellishment, reveal above all a deep-rooted conviction that the stability of the commonwealth is always preferable to the incertitude of sudden regime change.
…

To overcome possible revolt, the powers in being have to open up gradually towards a more representative government where no individual enjoys disproportionate powers, so that the motivation and opportunity to rebel are eradicated. With this rhetorical move, **the De la Courts craftily turn a conservative argument against sweeping change into a progressive argument in favour of cautious gradual democratization, in praise of those regents who "*know how to bring Republics in a calm mood and without bloodshed into a better order and form of Government*".**16 As I have argued in detail in the preceding chapter, this superior political order entails the establishment of a broad ruling assembly and a policy of inclusive citizenship and economic freedom in order to attract foreigners and to challenge organized vested interests.
…

Nevertheless, **it is striking that the key Machiavellian notion of the utility of discord, the idea that the tumults between the *nobili* and the *plebe* strengthened the Roman body politic, is largely absent from the thought of the De la Courts.**21 Whereas Machiavelli argued that conflict is to be preferred over consensus because it makes a republic dynamic and hence powerful and free, the De la Courts adhered to the more conventional attitude that stability and concord should always prevail. **Although political strife is unavoidable, in true republics tumults are never fatal but rather function like a strong medicine that eradicates the disease.** However, in a badly ordered government – and here the De la Courts mention the last years of the Roman Republic as an example – conflict will eventually become endemic and lead to the deathblow of republican liberty.22 **This repudiation of the Roman model makes clear that the brothers De la Court experienced less a Machiavellian than an Erasmian Moment:** their republic will persist by peaceful resignation and concord, not by the militant seizure of indomitable fortune.

On one important issue, however, the De la Courts followed both Erasmus and Machiavelli. This issue is their virulent anti-clericalism. Erasmus frequently ridiculed the corruption of the Catholic clergy and the degeneration of Christian doctrine, most famously in *The Praise of Folly*. Machiavelli in turn argued that the moral teachings of the Church were to blame for the downfall of Italian strength and independence.23 The De la Courts' criticism of the Calvinist clergy of their day adopts elements from both Erasmus's ridicule and Machiavelli's outspokenness.
…

This connection between religion and politics became especially clear during the pamphlet war of 1650, when a couple of orthodox ministers, such as the Zeeland minister Maximiliaen Teelinck, stood up as

spokesmen of the Orangist camp. In 1650, at the height of the political storm, Teelinck republished the main work of his late father, who had been one of the key proponents of a 'Further Reformation' in Dutch Calvinism, a puritan movement that sought to strengthen the church's grip on all facets of daily life and public morality.24 **Teelinck dedicated his father's work, a Christian mirror-for-princes suggestively titled *Den politijcken Christen, ofte instructie … tot destructie vande hedendaegsche Machiavelsche wijsheydt* ["The Political Christian, or Instruction to Destroy the Current Machiavellian Wisdom"], to William II.**25 **In unambiguous terms he praised the House of Orange's support for Calvinist orthodoxy. When this dedication was published separately (and probably without authorization) as a pamphlet shortly afterwards, it provoked a furious reaction from those who opposed either the Further Reformation, or the Stadholder, or both.**26 The poet Vondel did not hide his contempt of Teelinck's "rebellious seed", the "Monsters" which, if not tempered by "Civil Discipline", would surely make the country "swim up to the throat in blood and tears".27 This characterization of the clerical provocation of discord and tumult became one of the main commonplaces of anti-clerical writing throughout the next decades. Even in 1668, almost two decades later, Teelinck was still rebuked as a prime example of the "swollen arrogance" of the clergy.28 The Teelinck affair thus caused the clergy to become increasingly politicized, even though Orangism and Calvinist orthodoxy did not necessarily coincide.29

For the brothers De la Court, the designs of the supporters of the House of Orange and of the Calvinist clergy were clearly connected by their shared abuse of rhetoric. Duplicitous speech is fatal for a proper public debate, and the De la Courts insist that clerics, as much as courtiers, avail themselves of exactly this kind of language that blurs the distinction between virtue and vice. Clerics are therefore bad rhetoricians who do not dare to say the truth or even deliberately mislead their congregation. Embodying hypocrisy, "the *Pharisaic Ecclesiastics* are only because of the *Mask* of Wisdom and Virtue considered to be wise and virtuous, for in reality they are ignorant, stupid and vicious People".30 **With their "premeditated, dragging words and artificial gestures", they teach Christian humility only because they "intend nothing else than to be regarded as *devout* People, and to rule under that guise over the Soul and the Thoughts of other Men, and to live in the meantime on the quiet in all lusts and extravagance".** Examples of this behaviour are to be found "among all Religions or *Sects*, be it *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Christians* or *Muslims*" and among all those clerics who are "eloquent".31
…

A fable in the *Sinryke Fabulen* describes how a diligent craftsman, the personification of civic probity, accuses a couple of mendicant friars, who "under the pretext of loving other People more than themselves … carelessly plundered the World".32 The craftsman thus reveals that clerical modesty and humility are merely a façade for the relentless pursuit of self-interest at the cost of others. **Like guildsmen, kings, and courtiers, clerics are therefore guilty of <u>the cardinal sin in the mercantile logic of the De la Courts: self-interest wrongly understood.</u> "Because of their all too large self-love, which commonly stems from larger ignorance and poor judgment", clerics think that they are superior to their equals, indulging in *heerszucht* and haughtiness.**33
…

"Motivated by their *Ambition*, *Haughtiness*, and *personal advantage*", clerics tend to slander the worldly powers in order to increase their own status.38 Hence, they encourage political insubordination for the sake of their personal benefit, while they endanger social concord still further by promoting bigotry and the persecution of all who disagree, especially men of learning. The consequences are fatal: as Machiavelli had argued, art and science fall victim to clerical fanaticism,39 while, "under the cloak of devoting themselves to *God's Glory*", clerics slander all dissenters and eventually "hand them over to *Satan*", thus fundamentally dishonouring their duties as pastors.40 Moreover, **those "*honest* and *openhearted*" people who endeavour to disclose this deceit are accused by the clergy of being "*Libertarians*" and "*Atheists*".**41 Clerical demagogy obstructs the *parrhèsia* that is indispensable for a truly republican political debate.
…

In a passage that might as well be taken from *The Praise of Folly*, this critique entails a vivid denunciation of the teaching of theology at Leiden University, where, as the De la Courts knew from firsthand experience, students were educated that "they occupy the Pulpit with utterly inexperienced brains", having learned how to dissect Holy Scripture "with many meaningless words and senseless disputations".44 In short, the schooled clergy adulterates instead of spreads the word of God.

The extent of this anti-clerical argument becomes especially clear from a letter that De la Court wrote to his brothers-in-law on account of the publication of an Orangist pamphlet in 1663 – a pamphlet that reminded De la Court of Teelinck's dedication to William II back in 1650. Following Teelinck and armed with an arsenal of biblical references, the author of this pamphlet argued that the "true internal peace and Concord" in the Dutch Republic had been maintained by the divinely inspired policy of the Princes of Orange.45 **For De la Court, this assertion was "a sign that among the Reformed Orangists there are such godless people, that they dare to dress God and all the prophets, and Christ and**

all his apostles, in the cloths of comedians to let them play in their theatre". Utterly enraged, he continued to question the credentials of the Dutch clergy and their dubious exploitation of Calvin's legacy:

> **Is this the fruit of the Reformation and of Holy Scripture, to have put the light on the candlestick, and is this what our ministers do? Should one follow their example? Woe these godless people, much worse than atheists … What shall one answer to the papists, who had the light under the bushel, when they point us at this? Which abuse is bigger, theirs or ours? What is better, to be blind, or foolish, or mad? The papists were blind, these Reformed ministers are holy fools, their disciples holy madmen. Quaking was English and now it's played out there; here, the matter is the same but devilish and infinitely blacker.** God beware us of such blackcoats.46

…

As the *Politike Discoursen* argues in language that infuriated the Leiden consistory, **the "*public Ministers* or *commentators of Scripture*" deserve "the name of *Ringleaders, Enthusiasts, Fanatics*, or *Quakers*", they are "*wicked, hypocritical*, or otherwise *ignorant, Melancholic, Medicine-needing People*".**47 If these rebellious clerics gain too much power over their followers, the consequences are the same as when other self-interested pressure groups like guilds become too powerful: it sows the seeds for a "government within the government", an *imperium in imperio*.48 **This distinctive terminology reveals that the view of the De la Courts on the political role of the clergy stems directly from the Arminian position** in the debate that dominated much of seventeenth-century Dutch politics, the debate on the relation between church and state and the sovereignty in ecclesiastical affairs.
…

The tone of the controversy was set by a short treatise by the Arminian (or 'Remonstrant') spokesman Johannes Uytenbogaert, the *Tractaet van 't ampt ende authoriteyt eener hooger christelijcker overheydt, in kerckelijcke saecken* ["Treatise on the Office and Authority of a Superior Christian Government in Ecclesiastical Affairs"], first published in 1610 and reissued several times in later decades. **Uytenbogaert explicitly invoked the *Defensor Pacis* by Marsilius of Padua to highlight his time-honoured battle against the 'papist' political pretensions of the clergy.**50 **His main aim was to reinterpret Calvinist theology in such a way that the church became fully subordinated to temporal authority.** Opposing the claims by the followers of the theologian Gomarus (thus 'Gomarists', or 'Contra-Remonstrants'), the *Tractaet* argued that the civil magistracy exercises supreme power over all ecclesiastical affairs. **For the Gomarists church and state were essentially distinct yet interdependent institutions, and therefore the sovereignty of the church should be distinguished from the sovereignty of the state.**51 **Uytenbogaert insisted that such a view amounts to papist "collaterality", to the establishment of two conflicting supreme authorities.** Such an "equally supreme power of the Ecclesiastical and the Secular Government", whereby "the Care of Religion and Worship, with all that is ecclesiastical and attached to it, in fact belongs to the Ecclesiastical persons and assemblies", meant for Uytenbogaert an unjustifiable infringement of Calvin's teachings and of Scriptural Revelation.52

Uytenbogaert contended that the divine right of the sovereign extends over civil and ecclesiastical affairs alike. This indivisible sovereignty necessitates the civil control and coordination of the public profession of Christianity. The ministers of the church are to be appointed by the magistracy, which thus "takes care that the Gospel is taught purely and well". Moreover, the magistracy has the right to make ecclesiastical laws and ordinances, and to convoke, administer and preside over synods in order to settle theological disputes.53 All matters concerning the external worship of God fall under the responsibility of the secular authorities, who hence oversee the fundamental task of "bringing all erring Subjects through good teachings to the knowledge of the truth and the right Religion, all with the spiritual Sword, which is God's word". **Uytenbogaert thus argued that there is one true interpretation of Christian faith, and that it is the responsibility of the civil powers to ensure that this interpretation is universally taught.**54 **However, the sovereign's powers do not go beyond the affairs of external worship.** In line with the official sanctioning of freedom of conscience in the constitutional charter of the Dutch Republic, the Union of Utrecht, Uytenbogaert stressed that the internal conscience of every individual owes only obedience to God. All matters of public devotion are subjected to the state, but the private conscience remains free.55

In the years following the publication of the *Tractaet*, Uytenbogaert's close friend Hugo Grotius developed this account of inalienable private conscience and a public church administered by the civil powers into a full-blown Erastian theory. Taking sides with the Arminians, Grotius, then employed by the States of Holland, published in 1613 his *Ordinum Pietas* on behalf of the sovereign power of the provincial States over the church. He further specified this position in the treatise *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra*, **written in the 1610s in cooperation with Gerard Vossius** and published posthumously in 1647. *De imperio* focuses on a notion of a single, indivisible supreme power (or *summa potestas*). **It aims to prove "that the authority possessed by**

the supreme power thus defined extends not only to secular, but also to religious matters".56 **Grotius stresses with a reference to Bodin and the Spanish scholastics that the supreme authority he has in mind is that of the provincial States. In a move that radicalizes Uytenbogaert's position, he then openly denies that church and state are fundamentally distinct institutions.** Since sacred and secular cannot be distinguished, the means and the aims of the church are the same as those of the civil society, namely "the outward peace of the community" and "the virtue of individuals". As Grotius insists:

> Now if it is true that the objective which the supreme powers must set themselves is to make the people as religious as possible, and if all things which lead to that end are called religious, it follows that the competence of the supreme power as such, that is its authority, encompasses religion too.57

The supreme powers (i.e. the States of Holland) therefore exercise an undiluted authority over all activities of the church, from the building of places of worship to the election of ministers.58 Moreover, **religion is a necessary means to further the harmony and peace within society: it "makes people quiet, obedient, patriotic and adherents of justice and equity". Apart from such moral instruction, "doctrines or ceremonies are also of great importance to morality and public happiness".** The supreme power cannot renounce its authority over matters that prove to be so essential.59

Grotius therefore pleads for the establishment of one all-inclusive public church which, supervised by the civil magistracy, teaches the fundamentals of Christian belief, the self-evident articles of faith that are necessary for salvation and on which all denominations agree.60 **This irenicist solution to contain religious diversity within the church, leaving the *adiaphora* or 'indifferent matters' of faith to the judgment of each individual,** entails a defence of freedom of conscience and state supervision similar to that of Uytenbogaert's *Tractaet*. In private, people are only accountable to God, yet in public, the secular powers have the authority and the duty to suppress forms of worship that exceed the limits of the public church.61 In line with this argument, **Grotius suggested that Jews be granted admission to Holland and freedom of religion, yet only under the condition of very restricted rules regarding public worship.** In his *De veritate religionis christianae*, he merely tried to convince Jews and Muslims alike to come together under the one true religious umbrella of Christianity.62 Grotius' model, then, is a model of unity and consensus. *De imperio* hints that such concord is endangered by the political pretensions and demagogy of the clergy, for "the mass, victims of vain superstition, obeys the soothsayers better than it does its own leaders". To counter such dangerous defiance, the clergy should be kept under close control by the magistracy, for only then can the stability of society and religion be maintained.63

With the defeat in 1618 of the political regime that championed this Grotian view on church and state, the Arminian cause collapsed. **Following the intervention of Stadholder Maurice of Orange, Grotius was charged of treason and imprisoned, Uytenbogaert fled into exile, and their main political ally, Grand Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, was executed on the scaffold.** The famous National Synod of Dordrecht officially sanctioned the Contra-Remonstrant theology of grace and clerical independence as the orthodox dogma of the Dutch Reformed Church.64 Before long, however, the debate flamed up again. In the course of the 1620s the political dominance of the Contra-Remonstrants diminished, and after the death of Maurice of Orange, most Arminian leaders again openly engaged in the political and religious life of the Republic. Uytenbogaert returned from France in 1626, and although Grotius remained in exile, he continued to influence the Dutch debate, in particular with the publication of his *Verantwoordingh* ["Apology"] that reaffirmed his theory of the ecclesiastical sovereignty of the States of Holland.65 Yet the most important spokesman of the Arminians turned out to be the theologian Simon Episcopius, who strove for the establishment of an independent Remonstrant Church, which was eventually inaugurated, under Episcopius' own guidance, in Amsterdam in 1630. **Radicalising the earlier stance of Uytenbogaert and Grotius, Episcopius maintained the need for civil control over the public church, but he also insisted that outside of this remit the magistracy has no right to prohibit or punish dissenting congregations.**66
…

One of the protagonists in this revived debate was the Utrecht regent Van Velthuysen, also the first continental European to comment publicly upon the political philosophy of Hobbes (see chapter 3 above). With Hobbes's notoriously anti-clerical views as support, Van Velthuysen invigorated the Erastian theory of the Arminians in a number of manifest interventions in the public debate, most importantly in his 1660 pamphlet *Het predick-ampt en 't recht der kercke … tegen het gevoelen van eenige Gereformeerde leeraers, die der selve macht verder uytbreyden als het behoort* ["The Clerical Office and the Right of the Church … Against the Sentiment of Some Reformed Ministers who Extend its Power more than Appropriate"]. As the title makes abundantly clear, this pamphlet aimed to undermine any notion of separate ecclesiastical sovereignty. In several ways that directly echo the Arminians, Van Velthuysen insisted that the civil authorities have the right and the duty to supervise the public church in order to counter discord and strife. For Van Velthuysen, "*the Church is not only part of Politics* … but

the Church is also a *political Society*, like all other Colleges, Guilds, Fraternities, &c".69 **Following the Grotian argument that there is no distinction between church and state, Van Velthuysen maintained that the magistracy has the obligation to take care of the true faith, "like it has to ensure that there are capable *Doctors* and *Surgeons*, capable Captains and Steersmen, capable Judges and Lawyers".**70 **Clerics, in short, are nothing but civil servants. The alternative is "to lapse into Papacy",** a powerful rhetorical argument against Contra-Remonstrant orthodoxy also employed by Uytenbogaert.71 In a second treatise published in 1660, Van Velthuysen also stressed in line with the Arminians that its is both impossible and in contradiction of God's law to control man's private conscience.72

At the other side of the debate stood the towering figure of Gijsbert Voetius, professor of theology at the University of Utrecht since 1636 and one of the main protagonists of the Further Reformation. As the *eminence grise* of Contra-Remonstrant orthodoxy, Voetius played a pivotal role in the political and cultural life of the Dutch Republic around the middle of the century. The three massive parts of his *Politica ecclesiastica*, published in four volumes between 1663 and 1676, can be characterized as the ultimate encyclopaedia of seventeenth-century Dutch Reformed theology.73 In opposition to the Arminians, Voetius essentially defended the independence and autonomy of the church as a self-sufficient institution based on the mutual consent of its members. The church is a community of the faithful who have voluntarily entered its ranks, and therefore it is of a fundamentally different nature than the state, *pace* Grotius and Van Velthuysen. Ecclesiastical power and secular power should be distinguished, for the power of the state only concerns the outward wellbeing and safety of its citizens, while the power of the church concerns the internal, spiritual welfare of its members. **That aim is utterly beyond the range of physical force, and hence beyond the might of the state.**74 **The civil authorities are therefore to be excluded from any ecclesiastical office. Voetius explicitly mentioned Hobbes, Grotius and Episcopius for undermining this principle, and thus he unequivocally equated Arminian theology with the Erastianism of Hobbes.**75
…

The De la Courts, keen readers of especially Grotius's *Verantwoordingh* and Uytenbogaert's *Kerckelijcke Historie*,76 prove to be largely indebted to the Arminian tradition, albeit rather on political than theological grounds. In particular, they adopt the Arminian stance to plea for a broad, inclusive public church which, overseen by the magistracy, frees the republic of clerical bondage and demagogy and thus guarantees social concord, the purity of faith, and the freedom of private conscience.

In a number of key chapters of the *Politike Discoursen*, the brothers De la Court begin by highlighting the fundamental political importance of religion. **Following a standard claim brought forward from Lipsius to Boxhorn, they argue that religion is essential for civil society, for it would be unlikely that the social contract could be maintained on the basis of only fear of punishment or sentiments of honour and gratitude.** Indeed,

> these *punishments*, *promises*, *Honour*, and *gratitude* for enjoyed *protection* would, without *Religion*, which as regards disobedience inflicts fear for *God's* punishment after this life, not be sufficient to maintain people in continuous obligations to their *Government* and their fellow humans.77

…

Yet while religious belief as such is necessary, institutionalized Christianity is not, for it remains possible to "presuppose a Government that would grow out of the *status naturalis*, the natural condition, without public *Religion*". Indeed, "*Indians* and *Pagans*" are a living example that some societies subsist without knowing the true faith.79
…

Yet the influence of Hobbes on the De la Courts' views on the relation between church and state should not be overstated. **The brothers do not refer to Hobbes at all in this context, and in so far as they appropriate Hobbes for their argument, they merely, like Voetius, turn Hobbes into an Arminian.** Their account of the secular control over the church remains largely within the Arminian framework of a single sovereign in both civil and ecclesiastical affairs. With a vocabulary that distantly echoes Grotius's *De imperio*, the De la Courts assert "*that in a Country there is or should be not more than one* supremo [sic] potestas, *High Government*, and that no Subject possesses any public legitimate power *than that which descends from this Sovereign power*".82 The alternative would be a plethora of "*rebellious clerics*" who try to spark off tumults and discord "to their own advantage", making their followers believe "that by their querulous writings and disputing predications or *Conquests* of the unbelievers or dissenters, the true Religion would be propagated".83 For the De la Courts, as for Grotius, the opposite is the case. In order to preserve religion and concord in society, it is necessary that all clerics are restrained in their words and deeds by the civil magistrates, who should "Govern the *State* in such a way that even the *most malicious* and *haughtiest* Preachers would not be able to overturn the Republic and to destroy the Country's welfare".84

This secular government over ecclesiastical affairs to counterbalance the rebellious and demagogical clergy amounts to a public church that is overseen by the sovereign. Inspectors, appointed by the magistracy, administer the external affairs of this public church, **while the magistracy (and only the magistracy) also has the authority to convene a synod "to suppress deviations and to maintain the purity of the *Doctrine*". Such a synod, which settles doctrinal affairs, is made up by delegates of the sovereign, and clerics have "neither a *deliberative*, nor a *sentencing* vote".**85 **All discussion and decision-making about doctrine is therefore left to laymen. Clerics are merely like soldiers who have to execute the orders of the sovereign without asking why.** For the De la Courts, such a strict secular control over the church entails the only policy that corresponds to a true republic:

> Like a Country is happiest when it is governed by a large number of prudent and most eminent Inhabitants, and when it has no discord because of a Government within Government or having the Sovereignty divided amongst different Colleges; so it appears as well in *speculation* that the rule over the *Religion*, being a very considerable part of *Politics*, would in a *Republic* remain best with a large number of the most eminent Citizens.86

…

This clerical ascendancy can be countered if the teachings of the public church are exclusively informed by Scripture and supervised by the sovereign. **As the De la Courts maintain in a move that again merges Erasmus with Machiavelli, this policy boils down to the application of one fundamental principle: the "*Political rule* to keep the State in its ancient liberty and purity, *ad principia redeundum*, namely to turn back on all occasions to the first principles and to the pure fountain of God's word".**88

Significantly, the De la Courts then maintain utter silence about what these first religious principles might be. This silence reveals how little importance they attach to the contents of theological dogma, quite unlike for example Grotius. Yet they do clearly follow Grotius with the further claim that a broad public church, which preserves the purity of faith, necessarily leaves room for individual dissent in private. Like the hypothesis of a civil society without institutionalized religion, this assertion is clarified by a reference to the supposedly primordial state of America. **Imagine, the De la Courts tell their readers, a sovereign power in America that dictates its own faith to all its subjects. This sovereign may be allowed to punish all dissenters who publicly preach another creed. Yet "according to the laws of nature", the sovereign still has to protect those dissenters who remain politically loyal, because the only alternative is to put them back "*in statu naturali*, outside of the Civil state", whereby they would cease to be its subjects.** Through this thought experiment, the De la Courts argue that "man, *coming out of the natural* into *the Civil state*, has not given up his right or power to believe that which appears him to be true". In other words, the social contract does not and cannot imply that people have renounced their freedom of conscience. As a consequence, **"the *Government* is bound, according to the *laws of nature, to allow Freedom of conscience to all its Subjects who would be willing to obey him as far as possible and as much as they are bound*".**89

…

A subsequent pamphlet openly denounced Voetius as a "Scottish Devil" with "Jesuit maxims", an "arch master of mutiny" who propagated a treacherous blend of Catholicism and Presbyterianism.100 In reply, the Voetians returned the accusation of sowing discord and endangering the social harmony.101 Both sides of the debate thus claimed to safeguard concord and peace against the rebellious assaults of the adversary. **Eventually, the controversy also lured more radical freethinkers into the hazardous sphere of public disputation.** Adriaen Koerbagh, a particularly non-conformist author who was close to Spinoza, clearly chose sides by championing the sovereignty of the States of Holland against the "Jesuit maxims" of the "Voetian consistorians".102 In 1665, the dispute was taken at a higher theoretical level with the publication of the treatise *De jure ecclesiasticorum*, issued in the fictional "Alethopolis" ("True-State") under the pseudonym of 'Lucius Antistius Constans'. **Spinoza, Van Velthuysen and De la Court have all been suspected of hiding under this name, yet the least improbable candidate is Lodewijk Meijer,** a graduate in philosophy and medicine from Leiden University and also a member of Spinoza's circle. Meijer's *Philosophia sacrae scripturae interpres*, published anonymously in 1666 in "Eleutheropolis" ("Free-State"), caused a major uproar for its radical subordination of theological dogma to rational inquiry and its rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity.103

The *De jure ecclesiasticorum* does not entail such a radical stance, yet it intervenes directly in the public debate with a comparably provocative attitude **and pushes the Arminian legacy to the extreme.** Condemning the "impious, inept & pernicious *Ambition* of the Ecclesiastics of all ages", the treatise rejects any claim to ecclesiastical independence.104 It follows in the footsteps of Grotius and the brothers De la Court but radicalizes their theory of the establishment of the civil society. **For the author of *De jure*, people leave the state of nature through a double pact, whereby all give up their right and power of judging and deciding how to lead their life. Accordingly, every single**

member of the *civitas* has agreed to "cease being Gods for themselves". Citizens surrender their natural right and power entirely to the sovereign magistrates, the *prodii*, those who "take God's place".105 No member of society can possibly be exempted from this double pact. As a result, all forms of social hierarchy (such as a public ministry) issue from the *prodii* alone: "All Inequality of the Ecclesiastics, which is not less or different than the inequality of other Citizens, proceeds only from the *Prodii*: There is no difference between them [i.e. the Ecclesiastics] and others."106 Rebutting every claim that the clergy enjoys distinctive privileges, ***De jure* thus aims to prove that clerics are just ordinary citizens who always remain dependent on the favour of the sovereign, as does any other civil servant.**107
…

The author of *De jure* emphasizes that speech too is a corporal action. Therefore the contents of public prayers are always to be supervised by the secular powers – an obvious reference to the controversy on the *Public Gebedt*.108 Secondly, *De jure* highlights the value of religion as a political tool. **While Grotius and the De la Courts stressed the political importance of religion, the author of *De jure* pushes their argument further by maintaining that the *utilitas* of religion can in fact be of more importance than its *veritas*. In other words, the *prodii* do not necessarily take the place of the one and only true God: they might propagate a specific creed only for its utility.**109 The implications of this view would be developed further by Spinoza, whose *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, published in 1670, entails by far the most radical intervention in the Dutch debate on the relation between state and church and the political pretensions of the clergy.110

De jure was also read outside of the Republic, for example by Pufendorf, who referred to the treatise as support for his conception of the causes of inequality in civil society.111 Another keen reader of *De jure* was De la Court. In preparing the *Aanwysing*, De la Court saw his own ideas on the position of the clergy demonstrated by that "excellent" and "irrefutable book". **It made him insist once more that the "*potestas coercendi*", the power of coercion, belongs only to the sovereign, "and from the same *Political Power* must descend all *power* and *right* of the *Ecclesiastics*, if they have any".**112 In the end, perhaps because of his manifestly popular rhetoric, De la Court came to be seen as the principal spokesman of this Arminian theory of church and state. Years later, in 1674, many of the Voetian pamphlets concerning the controversy of the public prayer were republished as a general refutation of "the pernicious Maxims of La Court and others".113 And even after De la Court's death, **a pro-Stadholder pamphlet of 1690 accused the "Main Article of the Arminian Faith, Build on the Foundations of *Barnevelt*, confirmed by so many lessons of *Hugo Grotius* … and finally completed by *Pieter la Court*".**114

Yet although his opponents overtly portrayed him as an Arminian, De la Court should not be characterized too hastily as a dedicated disciple of Remonstrant theology. **Theological issues are all but absent from the writings of the De la Courts,** and their adherence to the Arminian legacy is principally political: it is an intrinsic element of their republican account of civil society and their criticism of the monarchical desire to rule.
…

At the same time, **revisionist historiography has maintained that the relatively tolerant practices of the Dutch urban world entailed merely a pragmatic *modus vivendi* that lacked any principled theoretical underpinning.**120 The rather paradoxical consensus on Dutch toleration in the seventeenth century seems to be that the United Provinces were characterized by a far-reaching practice of toleration as compared to other European polities, **while toleration as a theoretical ideal was mainly formulated outside of the Netherlands – or at best by foreigners confronted with the realities of Dutch religious co-existence such as John Locke and Pierre Bayle.**
…

For early-modern Europeans, the Latin *tolerantia* had the obvious connotation of a burden that had to be borne for the sake of a lesser evil. In order to overcome the religious conflicts that shattered Europe in the wake of the Reformation, such forbearance of difference and disagreement was considered necessary for the maintenance of social peace. Yet importantly, it was not seen as a goal in itself. Thus, toleration **(in Dutch *tolerantie* or *verdraagzaamheid*, the literal equivalent to forbearance)** did not originally imply the unconditional acceptance of otherness as a virtue, but rather the provisional connivance with diversity as the only means to counter open conflict.
…

However, this defence of freedom of conscience did not necessarily entail a tolerationist attitude as regards religious dissenters. In its earliest stages, Arminianism in fact proved to be anything but tolerant towards religious diversity.123 **Both Uytenbogaert and Grotius advocated severe measures against those forms of worship that exceeded the limits of the public church. It was only after 1618, when the Arminians themselves became the victims of persecution, that they started to plead openly for religious toleration. As Andrew Pettegree has remarked, early-**

modern toleration was "only ever likely to be the party cry of the disappointed, the dispossessed, or the seriously confused", in short, "it was only ever a loser's creed".124
…

Brandt's colleague at the Remonstrant Seminary of Amsterdam, Philippus van Limborch, proved to be at least as important for the continuation of the Arminian ideal of toleration. Van Limborch was related to Episcopius, whose manuscripts he had inherited, and also by marriage to De Groot. In 1661, he published a tolerationist pamphlet in the form of a dialogue akin to Episcopius's rhetorical strategy of *Vrye godes-dienst*.150 Throughout the next decades, he republished Episcopius's theological works. **He recommended these works (as well a hiding place) to an English exile in Holland, who in reply honoured Van Limborch as the addressee of his 1689 *Epistola de Tolerantia*.** John Locke's famous intervention in the English debate on toleration was thus to a large extent also a part of the Dutch Arminian legacy.151
…

With a biblical message often used by advocates of toleration, **they stress that it is both an "Evangelical Lesson and the Law of Nature *to do nothing unto another but what you want another to do unto you*".**154 A quote from Psalm 73 as well as numerous references to the Old and the New Testament serve as a further proof that "a reasonable Christian Religion is alien to all *coercion*", for "the right path of true Christianity consists of enduring and not committing violence to other People".155
…

This argument that religious persecution is highly unadvisable from the perspective of reason of state makes clear how the brothers De la Court depart from the principles of Lipsius's stoic garden. At the height of the confessional warfare during the Dutch Revolt, Lipsius advised political rulers to rigorously curtail religious fanaticism in order to safeguard social concord. Political stability was essential to protect freedom of conscience in private, Lipsius insisted, but for that purpose public manifestations of confessional diversity had to be punished ruthlessly. **"One religion is the author of unity; and from a confused religion there always grows dissension", as a famous passage in his 1589 *Politica* runs.**160 **For Lipsius the rational management of society required the forceful implementation of one single creed, not for the sake of truth, but for the sake of utility. This view provoked an important controversy when his contemporary, the polemicist Dirck Coornhert, reacted by stating that such a stance implied an unacceptable subordination of the true Word of God to mere political expediency.** For Coornhert toleration was a moral, Christian imperative, and because persecution could impossibly compel the inner soul, toleration was also a necessary means to uphold harmony within society. The alternative would be turmoil and strife, and Coornhert maintained that if all worship was overseen by the magistracy, the purity of Scripture alone would guarantee social peace.161

Lipsius and Coornhert thus articulated diametrically opposed solutions to what Richard Tuck has called "the central dilemma of the age: if religious strife and persecution were to be avoided, the power of the state in religious matters had to be upheld".162 **The brothers De la Court, confronted with the same dilemma, occupy a position that lies somewhere in between. They adopt Lipsius's perspective of reason of state, but discard his plea for persecution as unfeasible and counterproductive. Thus they agree to Coornhert's argument for toleration, yet with a decidedly less resounding spiritualist overtone.**
…

Referring to the fate of the cities of Lübeck, Cologne, and Aachen, this chapter emphasizes the detriment of religious persecution for those polities that are dependent on trade. Commerce is highly volatile and therefore easily chased away; because of the importance of religion for every human being, merchants who are persecuted for their beliefs will simply settle in another country where they can enjoy greater liberty. **This is proven by the desolateness of the German cities, which have since the Reformation lost all their former splendour and riches due to the "impiety" of their clergy, who "teach that it is better to have a pure-religious depopulated Town than one that is very populous and religious, but infected with *heresy*".** For De la Court, of course, the opposite is the case. Therefore he insists on the usefulness "of granting all Inhabitants a larger freedom in the exercise of Religion than they enjoy in other countries".163 Freedom of religion, in short, is an essential element of the liberty that defines a true commercial commonwealth.

This explicit connection between religious liberty and commercial prosperity did not come out of a void. **Coornhert already linked toleration to riches,**164 and in 1619 the Remonstrant ministers of Leiden similarly defended "freedom of conscience and the connivance of several Christian convictions" as a means of increasing the population and promoting "industry and welfare".165 Passchier de Fijne, a Leiden minister and one of the Remonstrant pamphleteers of the 1620s, also argued that persecution undermines prosperity.166 **And so did Vondel, who unfavourably compared the bleak fate of repressive Leiden to the more tolerant policy of Amsterdam, where "the merchant reaches to**

the elbow in gold".167 In short, the argument that toleration stimulates prosperity was far from new, and importantly, it was raised frequently in Leiden, **a city that depended heavily on foreign immigration, yet also practised one of the most strictly orthodox policies as regards religious dissent.**
…

For Milton, "Popery" was on a par with "open superstition, which as it extirpats all religious and civill supremacies, so it self should be extirpat".172 **Harrington too insisted that religious freedom was only to be granted to those "being not Popish, Jewish, nor idolatrous".**173 Bethel even contended that "there is a kind of Natural unaptness in the Popish Religion to business", and hence, Catholicism should be banned for the sake of common prosperity.174 Locke's position was more ambiguous, yet his argument that certain citizens cannot possibly remain loyal to the civil government because of their allegiance to an external power, suggested that Catholics, being dependent on the Vatican, ought not to be tolerated by the magistracy.175

In sharp contrast, **De la Court promotes "the *freedom* of *all Religions* differing from the *Reformed*", explicitly referring to Catholicism.** Reflecting on the substantial Catholic presence in Holland,176 De la Court acknowledges the risk of Catholic commitment to Rome and to the King of Spain, the Dutch Republic's former archenemy. Yet he refutes this oft-raised argument and continues to say that the war with Spain is over, and that persecution of Catholics would either imply that many wealthy inhabitants are forced to leave the country, or that they become hostile to the government.177 It is therefore not toleration, but intolerance that endangers the security and the prosperity of the commonwealth. As De la Court explains with a reference to the French historian Jacques-Auguste de Thou:

> ***Good dissenting* Residents who do well or possess any considerable goods, should not be suspected to lapse into such rebellious thoughts that ruin Themselves and our Country,** as long as one does not make them leave and embittered through any persecution, but on the contrary commit them by such Freedom and a soft and moderate Government to show gratitude to so good Rulers and Magistrates.178

The reference in this context to De Thou is important, not only because De Thou was a strong critic of religious persecution, but also because he embodied the irenicist settlement between Protestants and Catholics in France – a model that De la Court suggests is worth imitating.179

De la Court extends the argument in favour of toleration by insisting that toleration would deprive "imperious, rebellious Residents" of all the followers that they could otherwise mobilize "under the cloak of Religion".180 **Toleration thus serves to enlarge the authority of the sovereign, for by "the protection of all dissenters against the violence of the ecclesiastics … all the former will be boldly committed to the Rulers".**181 As the Leiden professor Burgersdijk had already argued, "diversity of religions among subjects does not avert unity of Politics",182 and **De la Court even maintains that religious uniformity might undermine political unity, for the more people agree on matters of faith, the larger the power of the clergy.**183 The cultivation of religious plurality is therefore an essential means of curbing the clerical desire to rule and to safeguard the stability and welfare of society.

In line with these judgments, De la Court deplores that the religious freedom of the days of the Dutch Revolt has, as he sees it, diminished in his age. **He characterizes Holland as still much more tolerant than its neighbours, yet the "laudable maxim" of toleration has lost ground since 1618, the year that Calvinist orthodoxy was firmly established.** Since then Remonstrants and Catholics have been persecuted and chased away, "which is not less unreasonable than it is detrimental to the Country. For if we cannot lack the advantages of their residence and commerce, why should we prohibit that which is not harmful to the *State*?"184 Like Episcopius and in clear contrast with many of his English contemporaries, De la Court thus unambiguously advocates the toleration of Catholicism on the basis of both reasonableness and expediency. Moreover, his explicit emphasis on "the *freedom* of *all Religions* differing from the *Reformed*" opens up a wider tolerationist horizon beyond the borders of Christianity. **The brothers De la Court concentrate on the position of Catholics and Remonstrants in the Dutch Republic, but some passages in their work also comment on the fate of Muslims and Jews in other polities, such as the expulsion of the *moriscos* from Spain and the inquisitorial persecution of the Jews in Portugal.** The overt religious activity of Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam proves that the Inquisition utterly failed in its own objectives and only provoked migration and feigned conversion, "so that this *pretence is the surest and true fruit of the cruel persecutions*".185
…

Accordingly, Catholics in Holland are to be permitted "in none but small assemblies, at the home of known Citizens with *Priests* agreeable to the *Rulers*". In this situation the "*vexations* would end, and

among the good Residents, *peace* and *friendship*, yes even *the true Religion* would augment more and more".193
…

The De la Courts argue that through such connivance, the civil authorities "will propagate the *Reformed* Religion among their good dissenting Residents, not through compulsion, but through *moderate*, soft means".194 Toleration is supportive of the one true faith, and instead of provoking religious pluralism, it eventually facilitates the victory of truth. Locke famously esteemed "toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true church";195 likewise, the De la Courts insist

> that there could be no greater sign of a false Religion than to persecute those who dissent, for then one does not dare to rely on its truth. So it is clear that the freedom of Religion would not only be very beneficial to the Common Land, but especially for the Reformed Religion, which can and should lean on its evident truth.19

Overall, then, **the theory of toleration of the brothers De la Court stems neither from a sceptical, Pyrrhonist attitude that certainty and agreement in religious matters are beyond human reach (the position later adopted by Pierre Bayle), nor from the universalistic claim, popular among Collegiant circles in the Dutch Republic, that a single true Christian church does not yet exist.**197 Instead, their theory is based on the fundamental assumption that in due course, the Reformed church will be perceived as true by all on account of its moderation and leniency – that is, by virtue of its true interpretation of God's Word.
…

Yet this time, De la Court did not share Koerbagh's stance, on the contrary. When he heard of Koerbagh's arrest, he insisted that "all wise men should accuse him of large mindlessness and imprudence and also of evilness". **De la Court did not agree with the form of punishment, for as he said, a fine would have sufficed for this kind of intellectual offence.** However, he unambiguously rejected Koerbagh's public undermining of Christian dogma.214
…

According to Spinoza, the unenforceability of conscience implies that all individuals have the right to express their opinions in public, as long as they do so rationally and without contradicting the sovereign's authority. **Spinoza famously insists, following his teacher Van den Enden, that such freedom of speech does not endanger the peace and stability of society, indeed that a commonwealth cannot maintain concord if citizens are not allowed to say what they think.**216 This freedom of expression also applies to the contents of Scripture, and Spinoza's *Tractatus* can be characterized as a radical exercise in such free biblical hermeneutics. **In clear contrast, for the brothers De la Court divine revelation is utterly beyond public debate. In order to preserve the purity of Scripture, not only should clerics be thwarted in their political designs, but also writers such as Koerbagh who undermine the Christian articles of faith and thus create confusion, discord, and strife.** Freedom of speech thus ends where God's Word begins.

This fundamental difference between Spinoza and the De la Courts is well captured by their distinct use of the same phrase of Tacitus*: rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet*, "rare is the happiness of times when it is allowed to think as you want and to say what you think". Spinoza employs this saying prominently as the motto of his last, conclusive argument in the *Tractatus* that freedom of speech should be safeguarded by the sovereign.217 The De la Courts quote these words in a different context, namely in explicit relation to the dangers of speaking the truth at a monarchical court.218 **Spinoza's universal principle of freedom of thought and expression, in particular as regards biblical criticism, instead involves for the De la Courts an anti-monarchical message: it is kings who should be criticized, not Scripture.**
…

Spinoza's Latin teacher, Van den Enden, decided to enter the public debate after having read the De la Courts, and his political treatises clearly followed in their footsteps. In particular, Van den Enden engaged in a critical discussion of the inconclusive constitutional design of the brothers De la Court. Referring to the changes in the different editions of the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, he expressed his agreement with De la Court's eventual definition of an aristocracy close to democracy as the best form of government. **As Van den Enden argued, this is "the essential and correct definition of a *right Popular government*, because it would be irrationality itself if Poor and Indigent people … together with serving and other impotent Folk, would have a right to government".** Thus, Van den Enden agreed with the view that a popular government means a government of the independent citizenry. Yet he then continued to criticize the De la Courts for overlooking the practical unlikelihood of such a government where all concur in one general interest, given the many differences in opinion that will divide such a large body of people.28

There is no convincing evidence that Spinoza knew the De la Courts personally, even though he lived just a stone's throw away from Leiden in the small village of Rijnsburg in the years that De la Court gained fame and notoriety.29 Nonetheless, as numerous scholars have highlighted, Spinoza was clearly influenced by the De la Courts.30 He owned a copy of the *Politike Discoursen* and of the revised edition of the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, **and in his unfinished swan-song, the *Tractatus Politicus*, he approvingly referred to the "*prudentissimus Belga V.H.*" (De la Court's pseudonym) as an important source – besides Hobbes and Descartes the only contemporary author Spinoza deigned to mention.**31
…

First, his argument against single rule does not involve the same radical assault of all things monarchical. **Instead, Spinoza asserts that it is conceivable that a people will freely establish a monarchy and transfer to a king "the power to settle disputes and to take rapid discussions", because "a people can maintain a fair amount of freedom under a king" – a direct contradiction of the anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court.**33 Secondly, Spinoza moves beyond their hesitant argument for democracy towards a broader conception of the political significance of the masses. **By collapsing the conventional distinction between *populus* and *multitudo* that is central to the thought of the De la Courts, Spinoza suggests that the most powerful and most stable polity is a commonwealth that enhances the political participation of all its inhabitants.**34 While Spinoza does not follow the radical anti-monarchism of the brothers De la Court, he turns their argument for a broad representative government into a more inclusive notion of popular rule.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franciscus_van_den_Enden

Van den Enden was the son of Johannes (Hans) van den Enden and Barbara Janssens. He was baptized in Antwerp on 6 February 1602. **His parents were manual labourers who worked as weavers. He was a pupil at the Augustinian and the Jesuit colleges of that city. In 1619 he entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus, but in 1633 he was dismissed from the order.**
…

In the late 1650s, Baruch Spinoza and the anatomist Theodor Kerckring were pupils at his school. Van den Enden's daughter Maria was fluent in Latin and taught students in her father's school. A possibly apocryphal story related by Spinoza's early biographer Johan Colerus claims that Spinoza and Kerckerinck were rivals for her affections.[10]
…

Shortly after the marriage of his oldest daughter Clara Maria with Theodor Kerckring (also written as 'Kerckrinck') in 1671, van den Enden moved to Paris, where he opened another Latin school. There he was visited by Antoine Arnauld and Leibniz.
…

In his *Kort Verhael van Nieuw Nederlants Gelegenheit* (1662 – 'a Short Story of a New Dutch Occasion'), Van den Enden gives his views on the political notion of ***Gelijkheidsbeginsels* – equality. "The state must bring benefits in equal measures to all. The well-being-increasing effect of the state must become apparent independently of a person's abilities, sex, property, and social status. He opposes explicitly that equality comes down to equalization. The laws should aim towards the general benefit, while they give to all in the same manner give space for individuality."** (A translation as close as possible to his originally Dutch wordings as per Dutch Wikipedia article on Franciscus van den Enden – A pioneer of the democratic thought).
…

In 1990 Marc Bedjai and Wim Klever, independently from each other, established that Van den Enden was the author of two anonymous pamphlets, the *Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlants* (Brief Account of New Netherland) and the *Vrye Politijke Stellingen* (Free Political Proposals). Mainly on the basis of the last work the claim was made, most strongly by Klever, that the whole of Spinozist philosophy had been developed by Van den Enden. The idea of a strong influence on Spinoza was later adopted in biographies of Spinoza Steven Nadler and by Margaret Gullan-Whur.

http://users.telenet.be/fvde/index.htm?Bio3b

The plot of *Philedonius* was loosely based on the *Pinax* or *Tabula*, at the time generally believed to be written by Cebes of Thebes, a pupil of Socrates, but now considered to be the work of an anonymous Stoic author of the 1st or 2nd century A.D. The *Tabula* were an edifying work that was extremely popular in that period and may have been an inspiration for *Pilgrim's Progress* by John Bunyan (1628-1688).14 The *Tabula* were, moreover, considered an excellent didactical tool to teach Greek as well as morality to young people, as was, for example, pointed out by John Milton (1608-1674) in his educational treatise addressed to Samuel Hartlib (c.1600-1662), and in the *Ratio studiorum*, the official Jesuit educational program.15
…

For the period before the 1660s, **it is obvious, for example from the play *Philedonius*, that Van den Enden was very knowledgeable about classical literature and mythology** and that, as far as philosophy was concerned, he obviously knew the *Tabula* and its alleged author Cebes, and was also familiar with the names of at least Plato and Pythagoras.29 However, the few modern philosophers who can be positively linked to Van den Enden, such as Machiavelli, Grotius and Descartes, seem to have left no mark in Van den Enden's earlier texts and are only mentioned in sources postdating the 1650s.30 **Moreover, in at least one case, that of Machiavelli, there are strong indications that Van den Enden 'discovered' this political theorist somewhere between 1662 and 1665**.31

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

Van den Enden inculcated good Latin style into his pupils, getting them to perform the plays of Seneca and Terence in the original, and certainly helped Spinoza master Latin. It was also his practice, until ugly rumours spread, to insinuate atheistic ideas into those in his charge.89 Koerbagh too, observed Goeree, "through contact with this man did not imbibe anything good […] as is plain from all those offensive entries in his Dictionary, or stinking *Bloemhof*."90 We do not know anything definite about ex-Jesuit Van den Enden's views prior to 1660,91 however, and, in any case, **Spinoza's thought issued not from solitary, detached reflection, but group effort,**92 from a heterodox network that persisted after these individuals' death into the early eighteenth century,93 **a milieu characteristically Dutch but one noticed outside the Netherlands by the principal thinkers of following decades.** The distinctive feature of their collective endeavor in the sciences, arts, scholarship, and philosophy as well as political thought was their eliminating religious authority from morality, social theory, and politics, and combining this with a fundamentally un-Hobbesian and un-Lockean democratic tendency in political thought.94 **Late seventeenth-century Dutch "democratic republicanism" Van den Enden rightly believed to be a fundamentally new conception of profound significance for the entire world.**95
…

"It would seem that by the late 1650s," writes one scholar, **"Van den Enden, Spinoza, Meyer, Bouwmeester, Van Berkel and possibly the Koerbagh brothers had embarked on a common quest."**96 Without entering here into a continuing disagreement about whether Spinoza was initially a disciple of the Antwerp ex-Jesuit, art-dealer, schoolmaster, and atheist, Franciscus Van den Enden, as sometimes claimed, following seventeenth-century Dutch reports, and therefore someone seeking to "elaborate the ideas of Van den Enden,"97 as the Cartesian-Cocceian preacher, Salomon Van Til (1643-1713), expressed it, or, alternatively, as an anynomous notebook discovered in the Utrecht University Library affirms, Koerbagh and Van den Enden "fuerunt praecipui discipuli Spinosae" [were Spinoza's principal disciples], **the truth seems likeliest to lie somewhere between these two extremes: the relationship of Van den Enden and Spinoza was a two-way process.**98

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/168/mode/2up?view=theater

If we accept that for several years, probably as many as five or six before 1655, Spinoza was simultaneously a resolute philosophical rebel and outwardly an observant Jew, neither Prado nor La Peyrère can have precipitated his intellectual rebellion. While Jelles may have contributed to his early formation by encouraging his preoccupation with philosophy, and with Cartesianism especially, **the only personage who seems likely to have guided him powerfully in a specifically radical direction at this early stage, as two early biographies of Spinoza both affirm, was his ex-Jesuit Latin master, Franciscus van den Enden (1602-74).**

While Spinoza himself never mentions Van den Enden anywhere in his books or letters, other evidence proves conclusively that there was a close link between the two at this juncture of Spinoza's life, and that Van den Enden in some way helped direct Spinoza's early philosophical development. **According to his principal biographer, Colerus, the budding thinker 'had the famous Francis vanden Ende for his master, who instructed him in the Latin tongue and first instill'd in him those principles which were the foundation of his future greatness,'** a claim frequently echoed in the early eighteenth century.50 Maximilien Lucas, author of the earliest account of Spinoza's life, likewise notes that, besides Latin, Van den Enden taught Spinoza mathematics, Cartesian philosophy, and a little Greek.51 Willem Goeree, a radical writer in his own right, later commented that, as a young man, he had known Van den Enden, frequented the same company as he, and 'more than once eaten and drunk with him' but learnt little that was edifying, so that he could readily imagine **'Spinoza too picked up few good principles from this master who was very generous in peddling his godless convictions to young and old alike and boasting he was rid of the fable of faith.'**52
…

The early eighteenth-century Amsterdam Anabaptist physician, Johannes Monnikhoff, whose brief account of Spinoza's life is based on Colerus and other early published sources but also incorporates some oral lore about Spinoza still current in Amsterdam in his day, **claims it was Spinoza's parents**

who originally sent him to the ex-Jesuit to learn Latin as a youth, and that, unknown to his father, Van den Enden also 'inculcated into him such ideas as afterwards provided the basis of his philosophy.'54

In would seem, then, that neither La Peyrère's Bible criticism nor Prado's deism nor any internal heretical tendencies within Amsterdam Sephardic Judaism of the mid-1650s guided Spinoza's early philosophical formation or planted the seeds of his spiritual rebellion. Rather, **we may infer that Spinoza was caught up in the general intellectual turbulence in Holland precipitated by Cartesianism, and it was specifically Van den Enden who first pointed him in a radical direction,** either at the beginning of the 1650s or, as seems far more likely, in the late 1640s, when Spinoza was in his late teens.
…

Judging from his earlier interest in alchemy and Van Helmont's mystical speculations, it seems likely that Van den Enden had himself only recently discovered Descartes when the young Spinoza first came him for Latin lessons, and that is was only subsequently that he developed his rigorous 'geometric' Naturalism.
…

Even so, Van den Enden was probably in an outward sense the leader of the 'atheistic,' 'Cartesian' circle active in Amsterdam before Spinoza's departure in 1661, being the oldest, best known, and most forceful, as well as authoritative, person among the group. **In April 1662, Borch noted, 'there are atheists here and especially Cartesians such as Van den Enden, Glasemaker, etc.,' adding that while these 'atheists' speak a lot about 'God' what they mean by God is 'nothing other than the whole universe as lately became clear from a certain text in Dutch composed with much artifice, the name of the author of which has been suppressed.'**57

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/174/mode/2up?view=theater

Van den Enden, Borch noted in his journal in April 1662, was a Cartesian and 'atheist' who denied the sacred mysteries and **whose 'religion, indeed, is nothing other than sound reason, nor does he believe Christ to be God';** he added that Van den Enden had been forbidden by the city government to dispute any longer publicly in Amsterdam, since his discourse smacked of 'atheismum.'1
…

His chief work, the *Free Political Institutions* (*Vrye Politijke Stellingen*), published in 1665, was mostly written between 1662 and 1664.2 This uncompromising, muscular book is noteworthy for its egalitarianism, emphatic democratic tendency, and vitriolic anticlericalism. It is less work of original thought, though, than **an adept *mélange* of ingredients borrowed from Machiavelli, Johan and Pieter de la Court, Aitzema, Pieter Cornelisz Plockhoy, Spinoza, whose *Korte Verhandeling* he certainly knew and used, and possible Van Velthuysen, but strikingly not Hobbes.**3 All his material, except Machiavelli, had only very recently been published or circulated in manuscript.
…

Unlike the brothers De la Court who expound their impassioned anti-monarchism at great length, insisting on the innate inferiority and baseness of monarchy, a system based on hierarchy, flattery, and oppression, Van den Enden takes the perversity and arbitrariness of kings of princes for granted and concentrates rather on developing his ideas for reforming education, advancing equality, and enlightening the people. For only in this way, he urges, can the superstition, greed, and obsequiousness which form the preconditions for monarchy be assailed and overcome.7 **Like the brothers De la Court and Spinoza, Van den Enden too is steeped in Machiavelli, whose *Discorsi* influenced him profoundly.** But he is nevertheless noticeably more critical of the great Florentine than they, condemning in particular his statecraft of artifice, manipulating the apprehensions and credulity of the common people to secure power, but precluding thereby the very process of enlightenment which alone, in his view, can open the way to a just and free commonwealth.8 If equality and enlightenment, in the sense of understanding the truth of things, are essential prerequisites for an enduring, well-ordered commonwealth, then a viable republic is inconceivable without, in particular, the drastic curtailment of **organized religion which, according to Van den Enden – like Machiavelli, Vanini, and Spinoza – is nothing but a political device contrived to discipline and control people through utilizing their ignorance and credulity.**9
…

With the Restoration of monarchy in England in 1660, Plockhoy despaired of realizing his utopian dreams there and returned to Amsterdam, where he and his followers, the 'Plockhoyisten,' approached Van den Enden late in 1661, for his assistance as their spokesman and advocate in negotiations with the city government over a charter for establishing a Plockhoyist colony at Zwanendael, on the Delaware estuary, in New Netherland.26 Van den Enden obliged with his customary fervour, bombarding the regent committee delegated by the city government to administer the Delaware settlements with

memoranda proclaiming the advantages of Plockhoy's scheme, and proposing a detailed political constitution for the new society Plockhoy and his adherents aspired to found. The resulting text, in 117 articles, provided the basis of his subsequently published *Short Account*.27 Echoing Plockhoy's call for complete toleration in the new society, **Van den Enden fervently, if paradoxically, stipulates that conserving such spiritual and intellectual freedom necessarily entails exclusion from the colony of all Reformed preachers, devout Catholics, 'parasitic Jews,' Quakers, Puritans, and 'rash and stupid believers in the Millennium besides all obstinate present-day pretenders to Revelation.'**28 **More coherently, he also uncompromisingly denounced slavery and exploitation, extolling political and legal equality of status.**29
…

That Van den Enden also influenced Plockhoy emerges from the latter's *Short and Clear Project* (1662), **written to advertise the attractions of the new society, a text echoing much of Van den Enden's pamphlet.** The foundation of Plockhoy's new commonwealth was to be 'equality for all' firmly anchored in democratic decision-making based on voting, with major decisions requiring a two-thirds majority of free male citizens.31 Furthermore, **this was equality which dissolved not only confessional but also racial barriers,** for Van den Enden and Plockhoy held decidedly radical views regarding the Indians of New Netherland, a noble people, they insisted, without affectation, who eschew utterly 'telling lies, swearing, slandering and other such like unrestrained passions' and are thoroughly worthy of emulation by Europeans.32 Here again, Van den Enden foreshadows Lahontan and Rousseau.33 Indeed, there can be no clearer instance of the revolutionary resonance of the cult of the 'noble savage' which, from Van den Enden on, was to be one of the *leitmotivs* of Europe's radical philosophical tradition. In his *Free Political Institutions*, Van den Enden weaves this into a general theory of the rationality and equality of all peoples – **except only for the Hottentots of South Africa, should it prove true as alleged, he says, that they lack human reason.**34 **As for the Indians of North America, Van den Enden, undeterred by his never having laid eyes on them, confidently attributes to them an indomitable and exemplary love of naturalness, freedom and equality.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA70#v=onepage&q&f=false

By 1662, seven or more editions of the two distinct versions of the *Consideratien* had already appeared, and the De La Courts' ideas, as Van den Enden remarks, had diffused widely in the Netherlands and beyond. Inspired at least in part by them – though he also criticized them for not being inclusive enough in their concept of democracy – Van den Enden enthusiastically responded to their call for democratic republicanism.143 Their common quest, as Van den Enden expressed it, was to "inquire, how in a collection of people the common best shall be most surely and safely pursued, promoted, and freed from, and protected against, all violence within and from outside so that at all times it will be able to grow and flourish toward an invincible well-being."144 **Here was the commencement of the secular, naturalist, as opposed to theological and Platonic, "general will" concept in modern political thought, a "general will" that achieves expression in assigned basic rights.**145
…

Van den Enden sounds distinctly more optimistic that the "general well-being and common best" can indeed by advanced by enlightening the common people than does Spinoza. **While "one people is better disposed to it, from nature or other circumstances, than another, I still take it that all of them (except the Hottentots at the Cape of Good Hope, if what is written about them, that they are more like an unconscious mass of flesh than humans, is true) can and also must be conducted to their common best by reason, without deceit."**147

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/598/mode/2up?view=theater

Egalitarian, libertarian, and philosophically monist moral concepts forged by Spinoza, Bayle, and Fontenelle, and then amplified by secondary figures like van den Enden, Poulain de La Barre, Tyssot de Patot, Lahontan, Gueudeville, Radicati, Jean-Frédéric Bernard, Doria, and Meslier, laid the basis of a fully-fledged radical Early Enlightenment anti-imperialism. At the same time, their stance encouraged greater appreciation and more extensive study of primitive societies, indeed a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of primitive man as a moral and political being. **Here it was van den Enden, and specifically in his *Kort Verhael* (1662), which includes a remarkable eulogy of the Amerindians of New Netherland, who first initiated, well in advance of Lahontan, Gueudeville, Bayle, Radicati, and Morelly, the myth of the morally admirable and upright noble savage or as Gueudeville characterized the type, in 1706, 'un de ces hommes qui suivent le pur instinct de la nature.'**37
…

In his account of New Netherland, van den Enden deplored all forms of human subjection, pointedly eulogizing the Amerindians.39 His Amerindians are self-sufficient, peaceful, dignified, modest, and truthful men exuding a powerful awareness of equality and liberty. **Besides this, they**

avoid, or so he claimed in 1662, lying and swearing and are 'uit 'er natuur zeer vry, en edelmoedigh van aert' [from nature very free and naturally noble], exactly the sort of material, he insists, from which ancient Athenian and Roman democracy was built 'welke ons ordeels ook mede ever de beste voorde gemeene, en volx vryheit te achten is' [which in our opinion is to be considered by far the best [form of state] for the common and popular freedom].30 The Indians, held van den Enden, detested living in subjection to anyone.

In this way, a new kind of quintessentially 'modern' myth was born. Among such noble *sauvages*, held van den Enden, like Lahontan, Gueudeville, Radicati, and Bernard later, there was far less difference of status, deference, and diffidence, as well as flattery, than 'among us,' moving them to say they cannot understand how, in Europe, one person counts for so much more than another.41 They (supposedly) dwelt in perfect harmony largely free of disputes and it was their admirable custom to take important decisions only in accordance with the view of the majority.42 Hence, in van den Enden's opinion (despite having never been to America), the New Netherland Indians could be said to represent a superior society to that of the Europeans. But there was nothing innate, or ethnically determined, about this superiority which was essentially moral and social in character. For if Europe is marred by inequality, authority, credulity, and luxury but might improve so, equally, the Amerindians might readily be corrupted and deteriorate. **Human imperfection has nothing to do with Original Sin, according to van den Enden, but is no less ubiquitous on that account, arising, as he saw it, from lust to dominate through violence, deception, and pillage as well as thirst for riches and glory, lusts which, alas, are universal.**43

https://www.academia.edu/2387783/Franciscus_van_den_Enden

Spinoza's equation of 'right' and 'power', for instance, is entirely absent in Van den Enden's much more morally defined political theory. **Van den Enden's positive views on the state of nature, as exemplified in his 'virtuous Indian', are not reflected in Spinoza's negative, more Hobbesian, conception of the state of nature.**

http://users.telenet.be/fvde/Works4c.htm

Almost one third of the pamphlet, the description of New Netherland, is at first sight of little value, as it is almost entirely composed of fragments borrowed from other authors, mainly David Pietersz de Vries (1593-1655) and Adriaen van der Donck (c.1620-1655), and possibly also the anonymous writer of the *Broad Advice*.5 Nevertheless, **in one part of the text, the description of the New Netherland natives, it is obvious that Van den Enden has manipulated his sources to fit his political theory. A thorough analysis of the relevant pages reveals that Van den Enden not only carefully avoided repeating less desirable passages, but also added extra comments and in at least one case contradicted all of his sources, and that this was done to put the Indians in a more favourable light.**6 **Not that the authors of these sources drew a negative picture of the North American natives: on the contrary, they gave a rather objective, perhaps slightly embellished account, partly because they polemicized against the Kieft War, partly because they were probably unwilling to scare off potential colonists, and possibly also partly because of a long tradition of Dutch idealization of the original inhabitants of America.**7 In this respect, Van den Enden's image of the 'Noble Indian' was not so very original, and his association of the seventeenth-century Indians with the Batavians from the mythologized image of Dutch antiquity given by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) may not have been completely novel.8

> (6) **One obvious 'small' manipulation by Van den Enden concerns the word 'wilden' (savages), which is either omitted or replaced by 'Indians' or 'natives'.** Furthermore all negative remarks that tend to emphasize the 'wild' or 'savage' character of the Indians were deliberately left out, for instance the observations that they are cannibals, that they are filthy, etc. **In one case, however, he flatly rejects the views of all three of his sources, which unanimously claim that the natives fear the devil and make offerings to him.**
>
> (7) De Vries and Van der Donck had had many personal experiences with the Indians and genuinely seemed to appreciate and even admire them. Moreover, in order to make director Kieft's actions look more objectionable, it made sense for them to describe the Indians as innocent victims. **It is obvious that in this they used tropes of the *Leyenda Negra* (Black Myth), the vehemently anti-Spanish propaganda in which 'innocent' Amerindians were the favourite subjects of Iberian cruelty. Particularly in the Netherlands during the Eighty Years' War, such literature proliferated and was combined with an almost identical discourse in which the Indians were linked linguistically with the 'innocent' victims at home.**

But what was certainly new in his version was the fact that he linked these views with the claim that in any society democracy was necessarily the original form of government.9 **Also new was his description of their religion as a means of criticising superstition, which in his mind was an accurate description of most existing churches of his time.**10 **Van den Enden can thus be considered a forerunner of Louis Armand, Baron de Lahontan (1666-1715?), who promoted a**

similar, but even more far-reaching, idealization of Indian culture as a perfect manifestation of Rationalism.11 Van den Enden's 'Noble Indian' and his defence of democracy also resemble the 'Noble Savage' and political theory in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), as has already been remarked by several scholars.12 However, although there are certainly similarities between the political theories of Rousseau and Van den Enden, for instance the idea that man's nature is good and has been corrupted by society, it is also obvious that Rousseau's image of the Noble Savage is quite different from Van den Enden's description of the Noble Indian.13

> (13) **The idea that man is essentially good and that it is society that corrupts him, is to some degree present in the description of the Indians, but is much more clearly stated in the *Vrye Politijke Stellingen*.** KVNN, p. 20 and *Vrye Politijke Stellingen*, p 2. It is apparent that the idea has some resemblance to the theory about the original 'pure' Apostolic church and its corruption, as advocated by Boreel and Plockhoy. **As far as the comparison with Rousseau's 'Noble Savage' is concerned, Van den Enden's 'Noble Indian' can hardly be compared with the selfish, unsocial and originally non-speaking animal described by Rousseau.**

That a democratic form of government was the main item on Van den Enden's agenda can hardly be doubted, and does not need to be corroborated by evidence from the *Free Political Proposals*. The *Brief Account* is perfectly clear on this matter, as it time and time again repeats that 'popular government' is the most stable, efficient and ethical political form imaginable. This is said in the attack on the 'editor' of the original author of the *Politike Weeg-schaal*, respectively Pieter de la Court (1618-1685) and Johan de la Court (1622-1660),14 **and it is affirmed in the (almost certainly fake) extract "from a certain writing on New Netherland", where the Indian 'popular' form of government is likened to those of the ancient Greeks and Romans and is presented as an example to be followed.**15
...

Although **Van den Enden sharply rejects Pieter de la Court's later edits of the *Politike Weeg-schaal* which were in favour of an aristocratic republicanism,** it is clear that several small details in Van den Enden's plans were taken directly from the writings of the De la Courts, for instance the idea of majority rule and the balloting procedure.19 Moreover, some of the central tenets of Van den Enden's political theory were almost certainly also derived from the texts of the De la Courts: for example, the ideas that equality is the basis of democracy, that aristocracy and certainly monarchy are based on violence and fraud, and that a democracy should not rely on mercenary armies nor conduct expansive warfare.20
...

Most of all, **Van den Enden is eager to point out that the principle of 'Evengelijkheit' (equality) should not be interpreted as a call for egalitarianism, or, in his words, "to take away all distinction between Persons."**24 On the contrary, Van den Enden is convinced that there will always be physical and psychological differences between people that will result in social differences. He insists only that if "common as well as special Members or Citizens are not included in an *Equal Interest* of always being able to attain a better position", this will necessarily cause social unrest and instability.25 Or, in other words, **according to Van den Enden, a good society should establish "such an *Equability* (*between each member more and less intelligent, more and less fortunate, male and female sex, Governor and Governed, etc.*)", that "each member in his rank will not only not be weakened or disadvantaged, *but on the contrary may be Strengthened, and more and more raised and advanced.*"**26 Instead of an elimination of social differences, a complete egalitarianism, he propagates, to use a more up-to-date phrase, an 'equality of chances'.

In order to realize equal opportunities for people of all social strata, he proposes, much in the vein of Plockhoy, a system of social security based on solidarity rather than charity. All "impotent Men and Women, needy Widows and orphans of this Society"should receive help, "not in the form of Alms, but out of dutiful indebtedness resulting from the preceding agreement and enjoyment."27 **This might well be considered one of the most 'radical' ideas in the pamphlet, as it obliterates the traditional notion of Christian charity:** solidarity is not only based on a contract theory, the constitution to which each member agrees as he enters the society, but the duty to contribute to organized solidarity is also directly linked to the fact that one has a right to enjoy it.

> (28) KVNN, p. 61, articles 109-113. In another place Van den Enden again contrasts the **"superstitious and humiliating giving of Alms"** with the task to "dutifully alleviate the needs of common destitute Citizens" (p. 31).

...

Nevertheless, Van den Enden more than Plockhoy emphasizes the idea that a sober public worship should replace the different cults of separate sects and churches.34 As far as the rational character of religion is concerned, he also goes further than Plockhoy, as he sees religious education as "a pure clear rational instruction in all necessary, useful, truly-Civil, and moral propositions that lead to the service of God, the

proof of which should be inferred on the one hand from fixed, and infallible knowledge of Nature, and on the other from the very best experiences and probabilities."35 **It is of course most remarkable that he does not mention the Scriptures as a source of morality or religion, which – to say the least – raises questions about how Christian Van den Enden's 'faith' was, although the word 'Christian' is used frequently in the pamphlet.**36 This may perhaps also account for the unexpectedly stern article banning from the society "all *intractable People*, such as *obstinate Papists* who blindly follow Rome, *usurious Jews*, *stubborn English Quakers*, Puritans, and *insolent stupid Millenarians*, as well as all *incorrigible present-day Apocalypse-pretenders*, *etc.*"37 However, in this Van den Enden was not so much excluding Roman Catholics, Jews, Quakers, and so forth, but excluding the obstinate, stubborn, insolent and incorrigible individuals among them, the 'enthusiasts' or 'fanatics' who would not be receptive to reason. Like Plockhoy, Van den Enden also placed great value on the freedom of speech, a freedom which was by both men considered to be the most efficient way to arrive at the 'truth' in theological and philosophical matters. **However, for Van den Enden this did not so much seem to revolve about religious freedom, as it did in Plockhoy's thought, but was rather seen as a broad intellectual freedom that was a prerequisite for political freedom:**

> What is most harmful and pestilent in a State is that no decent freedom is left **(*we say left, since no power in the world is granted to anyone in particular by God or Nature's ways to give freedom to a whole people, if it had not been usurped before by improper, often violent, means*)** in being allowed to put forward with sound reason anything which one might consider to be beneficial to the common good, and without which no State can possibly be freed of corruption and consequently, without free criticism and clear exposition of its excesses, in one matter or another, they [such states] all must always finally [...] plunge into unavoidable wrack and ruin.38

> (38) KVNN, p. 69. **The phrase 'God or Nature's ways' has given rise to the idea that Van den Enden, between the lines, is referring to pantheism, by equating God with Nature.** It is, however, possible that he is simply suggesting that neither Divine nor natural law can be invoked to justify censorship.

...

The eventual rift between Van den Enden and Plockhoy did not make the latter's influence on the *Brief Account* any less, **but it was neither from him nor from the brothers De la Court that Van den Enden borrowed what is undoubtedly the single most radical idea in his pamphlet. The problem, however, is that it remains unclear exactly where Van den Enden got the idea of rigorously opposing slavery.** Moreover, the fact that a strong and unambiguous rejection of slavery is found in his *Brief Account* poses more problems with regard to the nature of what is known as the Radical Enlightenment, problems that will, however, not be discussed here.49

> (49) Simply stated, the problem arises from the inconsistency between the system of slavery and the fundamental political Enlightenment principles of freedom and equality. **Apart from Van den Enden, there is complete silence with regard to slavery from authors of the Radical Enlightenment, Spinoza included.**

In an attempt to answer the first question, one can look at several earlier critical assessments of slavery, for instance the many comments in the works of Iberian clergymen and jurists, such as Tomás de Mercado (1530-1576), Bartolomé Frías de Albornoz (*fl.* 2nd half 16th C) or Alonso de Sandoval (1576-1652), **or the single statement by a French jurist, in the famous *Six livres de la republique* by Jean Bodin (c. 1530-1596).**50 It is not impossible that Van den Enden had read works by one or more of these authors,51 but they would have provided him with arguments against improper forms of slavery and pleas for a better treatment of slaves: not with an outright refutation of the system of slavery as a whole.52

> (52) In the words of a recent scholar, "the preparedness of Mercado or Albornoz to attack the slave trade, or of Sandoval and Claver to minister to the arriving slaves, has something admirable about it, even if they never attacked slavery root and branch". Indeed, most of the arguments revolved around legal restrictions and traditional religious morals, **but in defence of these authors it must be said that if some of their advocated restrictions had actually been applied, this would have resulted in a de facto end of slavery.** R. Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, p. 155.

> https://blog.jim.com/culture/the-history-of-leftism-against-freedom/

> **It was in the anti slavery movement that the predecessors of today's left began to distinctly depart from Christianity:** For the New Testament takes a tolerant attitude towards slavery: It gently suggests that Christians free their own slaves, but does not require it, and clearly prohibits Christians from freeing other people's slaves, though they are perhaps permitted to close their eyes to other people's runaway slaves and look the other way. **The civil war conspicuously and spectacularly exceeded not only what the New Testament requires, but also what it permits.** Killing people in large numbers and breaking other people's stuff in order to end slavery is clearly and violently unchristian. **A Christian approach to the slavery problem would be to**

> **vigorously enforce the Old Testament rule "He that stealeth a man and selleth him, he shall be put to death", and allow slavery to slowly wither away,** as was successfully done in much of the world.

The same is true for works by preachers such as Cornelis Poudroyen (?-1662) and Georgius de Raad (c. 1625-1677), which can be situated in the strict form of Calvinism endorsed by the theologian Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676).53 De Raad even wrote a whole book on the topic, *Bedenckingen over den Guineeschen Slaef-handel*, but however critical this work was about slavery and **although a strict application of its morals would have made it very hard to buy or sell slaves, it in a way did accept the system of slavery,** as its basic tenet was that the act of buying slaves created a duty for any Reformed Christian "to take care" that these slaves "were not sold to *Idolaters*, *attaching a blame to the true Religion.*"54 **Contrary to all the above sources, Van den Enden's rejection of slavery is not only uncompromising but also based on purely secular arguments: "the keeping of Slaves"is conflicting with "our free disposition and Government", it is inconsistent with reason, and it is "in contradiction with all human fairness and compassion."**55 These statements are remarkable, as what is generally held to be "the first absolutely unqualified denunciation of slavery on record"was written twenty-six years later in Germantown by Quakers, some of whom might in fact have been Mennonites and Lutheran Pietists.56 **Just as remarkable is the fact that the 'Germantown declaration' was set down in a place not so very far from where the Van den Enden-Plockhoy settlement was planned, moreover, a place where in 1694 the blind son of Pieter Cornelisz Plockhoy settled to spend the last years of his life.**57

...

As such, the *Brief Account* holds a middle position between Plockhoy's nostalgia for the 'original' Christian society and the more down-to-earth analysis of human society of the *Free Political Proposals*, which to a much greater degree is affiliated with the political theory of the De la Courts. In this respect it is not without relevance to find that, apart from the De la Courts, no other typical exponents of modern political thought feature in the *Brief Account*. The most obvious names, Machiavelli and Hobbes, are entirely lacking, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is mentioned over half a dozen of times in the *Free Political Proposals*. The only names that can be connected to Van den Enden's sources, invoked to support his plea for freedom of speech, are Agrippa d'Aubigné (1552-1630), Johannes Uytenbogaert (1557-1644) and Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert (1522-1590).59 **Although these sources suggests a Collegiant influence rather than a modern republican one, it is possible that Van den Enden acted as an intermediary who to some degree spread the ideas of the De la Courts in a Collegiant milieu.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/250/mode/2up?view=theater

Van den Enden twice makes a point of the sweeping novelty, as well as universal significance, of the democratic republicanism he so powerfully advocates. The first time he does so, in the *Vrye Politieke Stellingen*, he claims that in upholding the cause of the just commonwealth based on equality he had, to his own knowledge, been preceded (albeit only recently) by two other writers in Dutch. Unfortunately, he fails to tell us their names,44 though presumably he is alluding either to both brothers de La Court or, conceivably, just Johan (whose democratic proclivities were stronger than his brother's) together with the radical Collegiant Zeelander Pieter Cornelis Plockhoy (dates unknown), an associate of van den Enden's in the early 1660s. **Plockhoy was already in the late 1650s a fervent republican and egalitarian – albeit from an essentially biblical perspective, like the Levellers** – a writer in no way inclined to mince words when discussing kings, aristocrats, and priests, as we see from his English-language pamphlet *A Way Propounded to Make the Poor in these and Other Nations Happy* (London, 1659), written whilst revolutionary democratic fervour was still alive in England, and he resided there, hoping his utopian vision could be realized in that country.45

The second occasion van den Enden styled democratic republicanism a fundamentally new idea in the history of political thought occurred a decade later, in 1674, after his arrest by the Paris police in connection with the conspiracy of the chevalier de Rohan. **Under interrogation at the Bastille by the lieutenant-general of police, the marquis d'Argenson in person,** van den Enden was asked to explain the political theory he had expounded in his writings and as a private tutor. This time, he claimed to have invented the new concept himself and to be its chief publicist: over the centuries, he responded, three different kinds of republic had figured in the published literature.
...

Of van den Enden's two incompatible statements about the origin of the modern 'democratic republic,' the earlier seems the more plausible. For in afterwards attributing the invention of the modern democratic republic based on equality to himself, he indefensibly passed over Johan de La Court's *Consideratien van Staat* (1660), **incontestably the founding document of seventeenth-century Dutch democratic republicanism.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater

A notable feature of Van den Enden's thought it his deep preoccupation with France. If, as he maintains, education is the key to enlightenment, and enlightenment the key to creating a republic which serves the common good and provides freedom for all, then language is strategically crucial: **'as a general language, in any given part of the world,' asserted Van den Enden, the most widely current – as, for example, the French language in Europe – 'must be promoted and thoroughly inculcated and taught to young and old alike, in the cheapest and most convenient manner, and to women as well as men, girls as well as boys.'**35 But besides spreading their message in the language best suited to the purpose, Van den Enden, like Spinoza, was acutely conscious of the need for French connections and for avenues of access to French culture.

In fact it had been Van den Enden's practice, possibly ever since the Frondes (1648-53) to cultivate links with French noblemen opposed to the growth of royal absolutism. That massive insurgency involved many segments of the population and while it was mostly no more than a venting of anger and resentment against Mazarin, and his allies at the French Court and in the provinces, nevertheless sporadically, as in Bordeaux, it also produced expressions of republican sentiment. Moreover, the upheaval bequeathed an emotional and psychological legacy which not only helped inspire **later bouts of rebellion such as the Révolte des Gentilshommes of 1657-9 in several parts of the north, including Normandy, and such peasant insurrections as that of May 1658 known as the *guerre des Sabotiers*, and of 1662 in the Boulonnais, of which, the king's ministers suspected, disaffected nobles were the real instigators,** but seemed also to afford a basis for a wider, more ideological campaign against royal absolutism.
…

Van den Enden, a brilliant teacher of Latin and other subjects, who spoke French, Spanish, and other tongues fluently, tutored and became friendly in Amsterdam with several French nobles. His closest French ally over many years was Gilles du Hamel, sieur de la Tréaumont (d. 1674), who had fought in the Frondes, partly for and partly against the Crown, and later been implicated in the Révolte des Gentilshommes. A political fugitive, he resided in Amsterdam during the years 1665-9.36 **In the years 1653-9 he also seems to have backed Condé and worked for the Spanish governor-general in Brussels.** Besides La Tréaumont, Van den Enden established ties with several other French nobles, notably Guy-Armand de Gramont, comte de Guiche (1637-74), a libertine intriguer disgraced at the French Court in 1665, who left Paris in April that year 'pour aller en Hollande.'37
…

Increasingly at odds with the Amsterdam city government, and doubtless feeling less welcome after the trial of Adriaen Koerbagh by the Amsterdam magistracy in 1668, in which both he and Spinoza were cited as malign influences in the city, Van den Enden may well have considered emigration for some time before he actually left in 1671. Official pressure, it seems, helped precipitate his departure. **According to a later radical source, Van den Enden 'fut tellement decrié à Amsterdam, à cause de son athéisme, qu'il fut obligé d'en sortir et de chercher fortune en France.'**23 **But Van den Enden himself later claimed, under interrogation in the Bastille, that he was summoned to Paris by 'plusieurs personnes de qualité' who had frequented his company in Amsterdam 'qui lui disoient que son beau talent ne devoit être enseveli en un si espace que la Hollande, et qu'il devait venir en France.'**40 He was referring here to La Tréaumont and Guiche, both of whom had returned to France and with whom Van den Enden now resumed contact.

His zest for education, philosophy, and political intrigue all undiminished, the aged schoolmaster settled in the Parisian quarter of Picpus, **where he reopened his Latin school, calling it apparently 'Temple des Muses.' A noted *savant*, he became acquainted with various French *érudits*, including Arnauld, and was visited, among others, by Leibniz.**41 Meanwhile, La Tréaumont was urging the feasibility of accomplishing 'en France l'exécution de cette république libre dont ils avoient discouru en Hollande' by stirring up revolt in Normandy, commencing with Quilleboeuf, a small port to which men, arms, and munitions could readily be shipped in from the Spanish Netherlands and which he knew intimately, having twice helped to capture it, in 1649 and 1657.42 Several nobles joined the conspiracy, including Louis, the Chevalier de Rohan (1635-74), a veteran of the Frondes, who agreed to put himself at the head of the dissident group. Guiche too may have been implicated, but having gone off to participate, under Condé, in the French invasion of the Dutch Republic in 1672, and been one of the heroes of the 'passage of the Rhine,' died of fever in the Palatinate later in the war.

Following the Spanish entry into the conflict on the Dutch side in 1673, Rohan and La Tréaumont solicited the help of the Spanish governor in Brussels with Van den Enden acting as go-between. The governor, the Conde de Monterrey, received a secret missive from the conspirators, reavealing that they were planning a major insurrection against the French Crown, commencing in Quilleboeuf, and requesting a substantial subsidy and his promise that, once the port was secured, he would immediately dispatch 6,000 Spanish troops bring arms for 20,000 Norman insurgents.43 As part of the proposed

collusion, Spain would permanently occupy Quilleboeuf and be declared protector of the 'république libre' the insurgent designed to establish in Normandy.
…

The elderly ex-Jesuit was alternately interrogated and tortured several times between mid September and late November 1674. **Louis himself was informed by Louvois of the Dutch schoolmaster who had plotted to overthrow his monarchy with philosophy.** The conspiracy had evidently been revealed to the authorities by a young nobleman lodging and studying Latin with Van den Enden, who had observed the 'grande liaison' between him, La Tréaumont and the Chevalier and, having **'reconnu Van den Enden pour un homme qui n'avoit point de religion, et qui parloit avec trop de liberté de la personne du roi,'** reported all this to the police. During his interrogation on 21 November, Van den Enden was asked to explain his republican ideas, which he did at some length, **claiming that hitherto the literature of political thought had produced three different categories of republic, namely that of Plato ruled by a philosopher-king, that of Grotius, by which he presumably meant oligarchical systems such as those of Venice and the Dutch Republic, and the utopia of Thomas More.**44 In contrast to these concepts, Van de Enden claimed to have introduced a novel type of republic into political theory **'qu'il avoit proposée aux États de Hollande pour l'établir dans la Nouvelle-Hollande, dans l'Amérique,'** that is, the people's 'free republic' or democratic republic, a commonwealth based on the common good and the freedom of all the citizenry, and it was this new political concept he had taught La Tréaumont among others. **The Norman nobleman had been greatly taken with his democratic republic and 'en voulu faire une semblable pour la Normandie.'**45

La Tréaumont may indeed have been a genuine convert to Van den Enden's revolutionary democratic republicanism, **or at least have seen the seditious potential of his republican theories, since the police found at his several lodgings 'quelques projets de la manière de cette république et des placards qui devoient estre envoyez proprement en Normandie et ensuite dans toutes les autres provinces du royaume.'**46 For modern scholars, a particularly tantalizing item among the papers seized by the police was a French translation, presumably prepared by Van den Enden himself, of the complete text of the *Vrye Politijke Stellingen*, only the first part of which had been published in 1665, and the rest of which is now lost; the police, once their investigations were complete, burned all the material they had seized.
…

One by one, Rohan and the others, including Madame de Villars, were brought, in descending order of seniority, to the scaffold and beheaded. **Only Van den Enden, as the sole commoner among the condemned, was denied the more elevated form of execution reserved for those of noble blood.**47 With his fellow conspirators all divided in two, the prophet of the 'free republic' was escorted to the gallows and unceremoniously hanged.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false

Where Van den Enden developed theories of education, and Meyer and the Brothers Koerbagh published "books to educate the people," Spinoza, it has been argued "did nothing comparable."148 But this is best explained as a difference of strategy. Van den Enden's expulsion from Holland and execution in Paris, and Adriaen Koerbagh's early death in prison, can only have confirmed Spinoza's notion that an overly bold activism, provocatively running schools on unacceptably new lines, propagating forbidden ideas in the vernacular, and organizing revolutionary conspiracies, was more likely to prove self-defeating than a more cautious strategy.
…

The one method of enlightenment that might eventually succeed was that presented to his mind by the experiences of his own family and other crypto-Jews facing the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal, a strategy pursued over centuries: forge a forbidden hidden underground of the enlightened like-minded creating networks that quietly and cautiously spread the message by clandestine means, **cultivating chosen potential sympathizers unseen by vigilant as well as oppressive authorities. Clandestine networks might one day grow to the point of becoming formidable enough to undermine the grip of tyrannical monarchs, nobles, churches, and ordinary thinking all lumped together – as indeed they did.** Beating the Inquisitors allied to the ordinary requires immense patience, caution, and discretion.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA7&printsec=frontcover

Spinoza was a "fanatic," a leading French savant and convener of scientists in Paris, Melchisédec Thévenot (*c.* 1620-92) sarcastically remarked in 1675, "qui veut reformer le

monde [who wants to reform the world]," an impossible, even insane ambition.6 But the most staggering fact about Spinoza's life is that, against all odds, gradually, unseen and clandestinely, he eventually partly succeeded. Although the real furore Spinoza universally provoked began only in 1670, during the last six or seven years of his life, more locally Spinoza met with fierce opposition on all sides from a much earlier stage. Such was its cogency that, behind the scenes, his philosophy attracted from the outset, gaining ground with each passing decade, **a small fringe of intellectually inclined types ready to risk being shunned to embrace his philosophy in tiny clandestine groups.** For the immense army of opposing academics, theologians, statesmen, law-makers, magistrates, schoolmasters, and pastors of his own country and neighbouring lands sworn to crush his system and coterie, his movement proved, both in his own day and for two or three centuries after, exasperatingly difficult to attack, persecute, and crush, partly due to its furtive way of organizing and diffusing its ideas and partly because Spinoza's system of ideas was so rigorously and deftly worked out that it proved highly resistant to being rebutted on purely rational and evidential grounds.

Spinoza by no means fits in the same category as Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Bayle, or Rousseau. These were all towering thinkers; but all of these lost their direct relevance to modern life within a few decades, or at any rate half a century, after their deaths, subsequently remaining meaningful mostly to scholars and those interested in the history and development of Western thought. But this is not the case with Spinoza. Spinoza's relevance not only persisted but in much of the world has tended to increase and is today in many countries greater than ever, most strikingly in Latin America, North America, and the Far East. By no means all scholars today rejoice in this fact. But even those most unsympathetic to this only recently fully emerging historical reality – Spinoza's long veiled but unparalleled centrality and historical impact during the Enlightenment era – find it impossible, much to their exasperation, to deny the facts. **"Of all seventeenth-century philosophers," notes Frederick Beiser, a leading expert on the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German thought, in 1999, "Spinoza has come closest to the mentality of the modern age."**7

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1004&printsec=frontcover

Today, an abundance of evidence shows this deeply rooted, long prevalent and widely accepted mythology [about Spinoza being a lone thinker with no wider influence], repeated innumerable times, **is not just totally wrong but may well have originated in conscious, late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment designs to occlude or erase the clandestine, forbidden anti-religious philosophical underground** from men's entire picture of the Early Enlightenment and screen out Spinoza from the record as far as possible as a way of reinforcing the hegemony **and promoting the myth of a largely uncontested, universally embraced Lockean-Newtonian "moderate Enlightenment"** built on the harmonizing compatibility of science and religion, and of philosophical reason with faith.

The picture that Voltaire later enthusiastically subscribed to of a Western Enlightenment that originated entirely in English ideas and influences, especially English empiricism, inspired by Locke and Newton above all, long exerted a powerful and uncontested allure. But it could remain uncontested only as long as one refrained from consulting the numerous passages in texts of the last quarter of the seventeenth century and opening years of the eighteenth by Steno, Stouppe, Van Velthuysen, Van Blijenbergh, Orobio, Kuyper, Bontekoe, Bekker, Aubert de Versé, Poiret, Deurhoff, Leydekker, Halma, Hassel, the *Philopater* novel, Van Til, Limborch, Spandaw, Burman, Bredenburg, Aalstius, Basnage, Roëll, Koelman, Le Clerc, Tuinman, Baxter, More, Simon, Van Leenhof, Earbery, Samuel Clarke, Toland, Collins, Nieuwentijt, and Boulainvilliers, **not to mention Leibniz and a mass of German writers,** bearing emphatic witness to Spinoza's unprecedented, uniquely pervasive pre-eminence as head of a far-reaching underground movement of crucial international importance.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA100&printsec=frontcover

Spinoza's mother and father both belonged to families that had resisted the tyranny of Church and crown in Portugal and France for decades, both religiously and politically, and were directly affected by the Spanish intervention in the French Wars of Religion down to 1598.
…

The general outlook was unpromising, even dismal; but where attitudes rooted in superstition are effectively undermined by clandestine intellectual enlightening, tyranny and repression will erode and eventually totter and collapse, **for these cannot flourish without their chief pillar – credulity and ignorance.**
…

No one, Spinoza came to believe, will conquer the formidable structures of authority and superstition simply by stirring up popular anger and inciting mass insurrection. **Summoning the populace to rise**

in arms, as Dom António's allies and supporters did, and as the Aragonese rebels did in 1591, he judged self-defeating, an inevitable recipe for failure and redoubled repression because the people, through no fault of their own, possess no grasp of the reality of things. He did not want "the common people" to read his work, he declares at the end of the preface to his *TTP*, "and make a nuisance of themselves by interpreting it perversely, as they do with everything."
…

Spinoza sought to undermine the existing order by capturing the intellectually most aware outside the academic and ecclesiastical establishment, that is everyone, rich or poor, able and willing to think critically and independently, and through them eventually the rest of society. **Spinoza thus envisaged his political "revolution" as a veiled process of infiltration like that practised by the Portuguese crypto-Jews among his forebears,** only now a secularized penetration geared to undermine "superstition" and credulity and disarm theology and religious leaders as the path to defeating tyranny itself while eschewing mass insurrection and violence on the failed model of the defeated uprisings of Portugal, the Azores, and Aragon. **The revolution he sought to foster was one hardly anybody would notice most of the time until tyranny's foundations were sufficiently corroded as to approach immanent collapse. To avoid being promptly crushed, the crucial early phases of subverting the monarchical-ecclesiastical complex must remain under cover,** concealed from view like the crypto-Jewish networks in Portugal and, after 1580, in Spain and Spanish America.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA937&printsec=frontcover

Viable opposition to structures of authority based on ignorance, faith, and tyranny can succeed only by making converts to true "philosophy" **and infiltrating hidden sympathizers into the professions and positions of influence.** The political revolution Spinoza sought was thus a veiled process of intellectual subversion, drawing supporters from all corners and social strata, **aimed at disarming kings, priests, fanatics, *and* the ignorant surreptitiously, inconspicuously, and peacefully.** If basic change for the better arising from revolutionary transformation based on reason is achievable, it cannot come about via mass intervention, rioting, or violent insurgency but only by spreading clandestine texts, hidden adherents, and discerning sympathizers horizontally, among the elites, to tilt things in the right direction.

For this to happen, a hidden revolutionary vanguard of highly educated leaders, officeholders, and publicists, freethinkers like Spinoza's friends and allies, must be taught, organized, and motivated first. During the 1660s, when composing his mature works, Spinoza's circle consisted partly of university graduates – physicians, lawyers, and independent gentleman scholars but also partly of non-university trained autodidacts such as Glazemaker, Balling, Rieuwertsz, and Jelles.
…

Frequently viewed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, as Bayle projected him, as the culminating manifestation of "godlessness" in the world, Spinoza was the thinker who imposed shape and order, summing up and reinforcing two thousand years of monism and rejection of *supernaturalia* in European thought.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1175&printsec=frontcover

The philosophical sect and intellectual reform movement Spinoza established, Steno added, liked to divide mankind into two categories, the great mass who "possess only confused knowledge and are driven by the passions," encompassing the vast majority, "and the other class that possesses adequate knowledge and is no slave of the appetites, but follows reason." This latter furtive underground fraternity were sworn to undertake **what a later age would call a mission of "enlightenment," or, as Steno expressed their objective,** "**pretend that by providing mankind with adequate knowledge, they will transform men from slaves into free individuals even though they confess this is difficult and not for everyone** – while, in truth," retorted Steno, "it is for no one."
…

"Followers of this infidelity or apostasy," he explained, by thinking they are reforming existing philosophy, ethics, religion, science, and political thoughts together, "place all their happiness in the enjoyment of every sense and the delights of the imagination [the arts and the theatre], and to secure this enjoyment aim to learn as many natural and mathematical truths as possible."40

To successfully fight Spinoza's burgeoning intellectual underground, Steno urged fellow ecclesiastics and Inquisitors to emulate the recruiting technique of Spinoza's own adherents. **For whenever Spinoza's clique encounter persons who "apply themselves to such studies [as mathematics,**

science, and Cartesianism] they readily approach them, both to learn something new and see whether they can win them over, in the hope their philosophy will attain perfection if more persons apply themselves to it."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT1010#v=onepage&q&f=false

[The editors of Spinoza's posthumous works] were confronted also with the tricky question of how much, if any, personal detail about Spinoza himself to include and, more specifically, how to mould his image and present Spinoza the person to the public. The editorial policy they agreed on clearly reflected a desire to shape Spinoza's image in a particular way, it seeming important, for example, **to stress Spinoza's leading a reclusive life of lofty philosophical tranquillity, totally dedicated to the search for truth while concealing or de-emphasizing indications of group activity, activism, collusion, mocking eminent personalities, or seeking to influence young people and recruit followers.**4

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1038&printsec=frontcover

It is indeed a strange paradox, as **the largest encyclopaedia of the pre-1750 European Enlightenment,** Johann Heinrich Zedler's *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon* points out, in its long article on Spinoza in the thirty-ninth volume, published in 1744, **that Spinoza supposedly disavowed any wish to attach his name to a sect, or organize any such movement, yet an underground sect generated by his disciples came into being** and after his death spread everywhere assuming no small proportions.160

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dZ2hUU_HHcqDB5Hla4DhyZhg5epJ-79U8I8G9LTPBTg/edit

One of the most tantalizing anecdotes in Aubrey's not so brief life of Hobbes concerns Hobbes' (alleged) reaction to Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise* (TTP). As recently emended, the entire passage runs as follows:

> **When Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* first came out [1670], Mr. Edmund Waller sent it to my lord of Devonshire and desired him to send him word what Mr. Hobbes said of it. Mr. H. told his lordship: – *Ne judicate ne judicemini* ["Judge not that ye be not judged" – Matthew 7:1] He told me he had outthrown him a bar's length, for he durst not write so boldly.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/258/mode/2up?view=theater

When his friend Jelles enquired, in 1674, what was the basic difference between his political philosophy and that of Hobbes, **Spinoza answered that it 'consists in this, that I always preserve the natural right in its entirety, and hold that the sovereign power in a state of has a right over a subject only in proportion to the excess of its power over that subject; this is always the case in the state of nature.'**6 Thus, in place of Hobbes' assigning a contracted overriding power to the sovereign, Spinoza leaves the citizen with his natural right intact, according an automatic and inevitable 'right to resistance' (and power of resistance) whenever the State proves unable to assert its authority over its subjects, an incapacity the more likely the further one departs from democracy.7 **Effectively, Spinoza was the first major European thinker in modern times – though he is preceded here by Johan de la Court and Van den Enden – to embrace democratic republicanism as the highest and most fully rational form of political organization,** and the one best suited to the needs of men.
…

Earlier, **in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Spinoza, in line with the political thought of Johan and Pieter de la Court (of whose modifications of Hobbes' ideas he much approved)**16 and Van den Enden, ranks the democratic republic above monarchy and aristocracy, as the best type of governance, because it is 'most natural form of state' and approaches most closely that freedom which Nature grants to every man.17

> https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/206/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy: I have especially desired to do so, **for I believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty.** In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a unit. **Thus all men remain, as they were in the state of nature, equals.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

It is historically important that Spinoza advocated that the many be sovereign rather than, as with Hobbes, the one.66 **He chose democracy rather than monarchy because the former allowed the most extensive expression of natural rights within a civil society;** that is, democracy, since it depended on the will of the majority, allowed for the least inhibited expression of the pre-civil, unlimited, amoral desires – desires that, in and of themselves, were not sinful.
…

Moral doctrines were properly defined solely by popular desire, and if such desire changed, then moral doctrines must follow. The omnipresence of this view today is obvious.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/344/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza's objection is that Hobbes has surreptitiously imported a transcendental claim into his otherwise anti-transcendental conception of the social contract. **We enter into the Hobbesian contract through Natural Right, but then we are barred from leaving it by a juridical obligation to respect our contracts. In a thoroughly anti-transcendental philosophy, however, the social contract can have force not because we have a duty to follow it but because it is useful: "The validity of an agreement rests on its utility, without which the agreement automatically becomes null and void."**88

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/328/mode/2up?view=theater

A characteristically anti-Hobbesian feature of Walten's and de Hooghe's, as of Wildman's, resistance theory was their notion that where, through neglect or 'blindness,' a people is so ill advised as to entrust absolute power to a king, or prince, and swear unbounded obedience to him, directly contradicting the light of reason, and 'the letter of Scripture,' in a contract of the sort Hobbes postulates, **then the people can in no way be held to any such misguided transaction later on when the light of 'pure reason' and their improved understanding teaches them the erroneousness of what they have done.**24 For all princely and royal power, they argue, is always and by definition illegitimate where proclaimed to be 'absolute.' **A crucial difference between Spinoza and Hobbes was precisely that Spinoza held, contrary to Hobbes, that no contract or constitutional arrangement can bind a future generation which does not wish to be bound by it,** a view shocking to most contemporary opinion but inherent in the democratic republican stance.25
…

Here was a genuinely revolutionary concept and one reinforced by Walten's insistence that if one generation acts so unwisely as to entrust their affairs to an absolute monarch in perpetuity, **their descendants where these develop into a people who acknowledge 'for their exclusive guide' the power of 'natural reason and the light of divine revelation' – for Walten (and Spinoza) these were identical** – are in no way required to 'obey such an authority, or subject the subsequently clear thinking of their understanding to the blind impulses and defective judgment of their forebears.'29 Not only must a constitutional monarch, or any prince whose rule is legitimate, proceed in accordance with the laws, held Walten, **but also in accord with Plato's rule that 'royal power is subject to reason.'**

https://archive.org/details/worksralphcudwo02bircgoog/page/204/mode/2up?view=theater

But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,b that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition, that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him, as a citizen. **As when a man speaking Latin, observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him, as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else.**
…

Wherefore, **these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants. Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful;** for, if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/624/mode/2up?view=theater

> In Mandeville, unlike Hobbes, no contract is involved and no government or Church has, or can expect, any automatic right to obedience or loyalty. Rather, **as in Machiavelli, Johan de la Court, and Spinoza,** governments maintain themselves only through their power to conserve themselves and not owing to any obligation or formal submission.

So, for example, **according to Hobbes, if a "theefe" takes me hostage and extracts from me a promise that I will pay him a ransom after he releases me, I am bound to pay him:** "For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break."89 **Our obligation to obey our sovereign, Hobbes indicates, answers to the same logic: a deal's a deal.** Spinoza takes exactly the contrary view. **If a robber demands with threats that we deliver to him goods at a later time, he says, we have the Natural Right to break our promise and even to deceive him.**90 Our obligation to our sovereign, he likewise infers, can never exceed the utility of that obligation perspicuously understood.

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_823
>
> **Such as are not absolutely of a profligate conscience, so far reverence the religion of an oath, to think that even those which are most unjustly and violently imposed ought to be observed; and Julius Caesar, who I think was not over-scrupulous, when he was taken by pirates, and set at liberty upon his word, caused the ransom he had promised to be pay'd to them. We see the like is practiced every day by prisoners taken in unjust as well as just wars: And there is no honest man that would not abhor a person, who being taken by the pirates of Algiers should not pay what he had promised for his liberty.** 'Twere in vain to say they had no right of exacting, or that the performance was grievous; he must return to the chains, or pay. And tho the people of Artois, Alsace, or Flanders, do perhaps with reason think the king of France has no right to impose oaths of allegiance upon them, no man doubts, that if they chuse rather to take those oaths, than to suffer what might ensue upon their refusal, they are as much bound to be faithful to him as his ancient subjects.
>
> https://archive.org/details/Valentin-Antisemitism--HistoricallyAndCriticallyExamined/page/n151/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Typical of the political tendency of this "science," and its fondness for free-and-easy generalisation is Rudolf's assertion, indirectly aimed at Hindenburg's policy, **that while Nordic man—meaning the Nazis!—is in the habit of testing treaties to which he is a party and afterwards rejecting them if they are mendacious or forced upon him, Dalic man, disastrously for his own people, considers himself bound by Germanic fidelity to observe them, and further that the Dalic race is only adapted for peaceful times and normal conditions.**

This is anti-transcendentalism taken to a radical extreme, a kind of Hobbism on steroids – and Hobbes himself appeared to agree. According to a friend, upon reading the *Tractatus* in his old age, Hobbes declared that Spinoza "had overthrown him a bar's length, for he durst not write so boldly."91 The critics also tended to agree: **"Spinosa is more fearless than Hobbes … In his treatise of Politics, especially in the broad assertion that good faith is only to be preserved so long as it is advantageous, [he] leaves Machiavel and Hobbes at some distance and may be reckoned the most phlegmatically impudent of the whole school."**92

> https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/362/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> I have heard, said I, Spinosa represented as a man of close argument and demonstration.
>
> He did, replied *Crito*, demonstrate; but it was after such a manner as any one may demonstrate anything. Allow a man the privilege to make his own definitions of common words, and it will be no hard matter for him to infer conclusions which in one sense shall be true and in another false, at once seeming paradoxes and manifest truisms. For example, **let but Spinosa define natural right to be natural power, and he will easily demonstrate that 'whatever a man can do' he hath a right to do.**1
>
> https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n253/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In his *Political Tractate* (ii. 4 and 8) we read, "The right of each one is in proportion to his power."** Here we might of course imagine that it was merely a question of establishing actual relations, for this second chapter bears the title "On Natural Law." **However, in his *Ethics* (Part IV., Supplement, 8) we find in black and white; "According to the highest law of nature every man has unlimited power to do that which in his opinion will be in his interest":** and in the treatise *On True Freedom* we find the words: "To obtain that which we demand for our salvation and our peace, we need no other principle than this, to lay to heart what is for our own interests."

It is precisely this deep coherence – which is to say, his fidelity to the agenda first articulated by Epicurus – that makes Spinoza's philosophy so powerful in understanding the revolutionary force in modern political thought.

In Spinoza's vision, it now becomes clear that the state of nature is not a historical state at all. It is something closer to an ongoing perspective on all social experience, and we never actually depart from it. It is our reality; though it is only one way of understanding or expressing that reality. The civil state, likewise, is not a historical state but a perspective on our reality. **The social contract has force because it is a more useful and in a sense more accurate representation of the state of nature for all parties, and it fails when it ceases to represent the underlying state of nature.** This claim – that the civil state is just the state of nature perspicuously understood or realized – helps make clear the link with a second way in which Spinoza distinguishes his position from that of Hobbes.

"Although Hobbes thinks otherwise," Spinoza writes in a note appended to his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, "reason is entirely in favor of peace."93
…

Spinoza in effect stays on the sunny side of Hobbes. The conflict among individuals in the "empire of the passions," he points out, follows not from their rationality but from their irrationality, that is, from their passionate nature. **It is not because human beings seek their advantage, but because they fail to seek it in a perspicuous way that they descend into the war of all against all.**

> http://vaviper.blogspot.com/2014/01/spenglers-universal-laws.html
>
> Spengler's Universal Law #1: **A man or a nation at the brink of death does not have a "rational self-interest."**
>
> https://dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/2219/-Green-on-Blue-in-WInd-Sand-and-Stars.aspx
>
> They were dreaming of being victualled in barley by the French administration, and assured of their security by our Saharan regiments. There was no question but that they would, by their submission, be materially better off.
> …
>
> And yet the story of Mammun was that of many other Arab chiefs. **He grew old.** Growing old, one begins to ponder. Pondering thus, el Mammun discovered one night that he had betrayed the God of Islam and has sullied his hand by sealing in the hands of the Christians a pact in which he had been stripped of everything.
>
> **Indeed, what was barley and peace to him?** ... [B]ecause of his pact he was condemned to wander without glory through a region pacified and voided of all prestige. Then, truly, for the first time, the Sahara became a desert.

…

As a first-order materialist, Hobbes conceives freedom as nothing but the freedom of bodily motion. Consequently, he cannot but conceive of the natural condition of humankind as a state of pure freedom in which every individual is free because all can move their bodies in accordance with whatever strikes their fancy at any moment. **The civil state, he inevitably infers, can represent only a severe restriction of freedom, and so he describes the civil laws as nothing more than "Artificiall Chains."**95 According to Spinoza, on the other hand, freedom as Hobbes imagines it – the unfettered ability to act out every impulse – is actually a form of slavery. **As a second-order materialist, Spinoza maintains that we realize our freedom instead through rational self-determination,** that is, by gaining control of ourselves and of our environment through the improvement of the understanding.

Inasmuch as the civil state is the state of nature made reasonable, according to Spinoza, it follows that "the man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives under a system of law than in solitude where he obeys only himself."96

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/234/mode/2up?view=theater

Where for Hobbes the individual's true liberty lies solely in his freedom to do what the sovereign, whether monarchical or otherwise, has not precluded, and liberty itself is viewed as just absence of constraint, in radical thought liberty includes sharing in some way, if only by expressing one's opinion, in the making of constitutions, laws, and important decisions of state which happens the more, the less the state is monarchical.
…

The sudden definitive loss of 'natural right' by a generalized, permanently binding contract under the state, ultimately the least persuasive part of Hobbes's political theory, is crucial to his system and was perhaps bound to be vigorously countered by later naturalistic-minded political thinkers, as also by Pufendorf and the exponents of Natural Law.44 **The de La Courts, Spinoza, Meyer, and Cuffeler diverged dramatically from Hobbes in maintaining that the individual's natural right corresponds unalterably, hence also under the state, to his desires and power, to what Mandeville called that 'natural instinct of sovereignty, which teaches Man to look upon every thing as centering in himself,'** albeit this conception still in some sense derives from Hobbes.45 As Matheron and Negri rightly stress, where Hobbes's concern, with his surrender of the individual's natural right, **is to reinforce sovereignty as much as possible, whether monarchical or otherwise,** by restricting liberty, Spinoza's political thought enhances liberty as much as possible by dispersing and redefining sovereignty, **in particular by depressing the status of monarchy even in states supposedly ruled by kings,** albeit he does not question the right to rule of any ruler who does.46
…

For Spinoza, the kind of ´peace' imposed by the despotic sovereign who disdains the 'common good,' and suppresses freedom of expression, is a wretched thing altogether abhorrent to reason. **Civil 'peace' wrought by tyranny and curbing individual freedom he condemns as the 'peace of the desert,'** not true 'peace' but a state of oppression and slavery; 'nam pax, ut jam diximus, non in belli privatione, sed in animorum unione, sive concordia consistit' [for peace, as we have said, consists not in absence of war, but in a union or concord of minds].47 **Here Spinoza is partly endorsing Hobbes's formulation, as well as partly contradicting it and, in a way, also going beyond it.**
…

For Spinoza, van den Enden, Cuffeler, Walten, de Hooghe, van Leenhof, and Mandeville, then, government has no more 'right' over its subjects than power over them, whereas Hobbes separates right – of the sovereign no less than the individual – fundamentally, from power, through the device of his social contract.50 Where Hobbes sees no way of ensuring safety and peace other than by curbing and repressing Man's impulses through the might of the sovereign,51 Spinoza (and Mandeville) conceive the state as the product of an evolutionary process constituting a single continuum with the state of nature.52
…

Where for Hobbes power can and should be concentrated effectively in a sovereign monarch, for Spinoza true monarchy is literally impossible.54. **Power is always widely dispersed so that even the most despotic monarchy is really nothing but a concealed, unregulated form of aristocracy or unsatisfactory mixture of aristocracy and democracy.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39563/39563-h/39563-h.htm#Footnote_6_6
>
> **The Emperor-King, assuming to rule by the grace of God, in reality ruled by the grace of the old nobility and landed gentry of Prussia, from whose ranks he sprang.** This had been aptly expressed eighty years earlier by the poet Chamisso, in whose *Nachtwächterlied* appear the lines:
>
> > **Und der König absolut, Wenn er unseren Willen tut!**
> >
> > (Let the King be absolute so long as he does our will.)

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-religion-of-the-dutc_stouppe-jean-baptiste_1680/page/n31/mode/2up?view=theater

Some Years since he put forth a Book, entituled, *Tractatus Theologo-Politicus*, **wherein his principal design is, to destroy all Religions, and particularly the *Jewish* and the *Christian*, and to introduce *Atheisme*, *Libertinisme*, and the free Toleration of all Religions. He maintains, That they were all invented, for the advantage and conveniences, which the Publick receives thereby, to the end that all persons subject to Government may live honestly, and obey their Magistrates,** and that they may addict themselves to Virtue, not out of the hope or expectation of any reward after death, but for the intrinsick excellency of Virtue in it self, and for the advantages which accrue to those who follow it, in this life.

Spinoza on the Political Value of Freedom of Religion on JSTOR

The last chapter of Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise* (*TTP*) is a brief for freedom of religion. In our enthusiasm for Spinoza's conclusion it is easy to overlook the blatant contradiction between this thesis and the central claim of the immediately preceding chapter that "right over matters of religion is vested entirely in the sovereign." There Spinoza emphasizes the necessity that there be but one

sovereign in the state and the threat that autonomous religious authorities would pose to the authority of this sovereign. This last claim is, in turn, bolstered by his analysis of the deficiencies of the Hebrew state in the chapter before, chapter 18, according to which it was the usurpation of political authority by priests that ultimately undermined the state. **In other words, in chapters 18 and 19, Spinoza makes the case for the strict political control of religion only to conclude his treatise by arguing, in chapter 20, that the purpose of the state is, in reality, freedom and that that freedom manifests itself, in part, in freedom of religion.** How could this latter not pose exactly the sort of threat to the sovereign and the state that leads Spinoza to insist on the sovereign's absolute control of religion? How can Spinoza insist that religion be both free and controlled by the state?

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/156/mode/2up?view=theater

In the public church, furthermore, 'only patricians or senators should be permitted to perform the principal rites' since it is ruinous, he thinks, in any form of republic to permit anyone but holders of the state's chief offices to be 'ministers of houses of worship and guardians and interpreters of the state religion.' Ideally, there should be no deviation, he argues, from the basic principle of a religion grounded on the 'common good' that 'cultum Dei ejusque obedientiam' [the cult of God and obedience to him] consists in 'sola justitia et charitate sive amore erga proximum' [solely in justice and charity or love of one's neighbor].108 **If the republic permits an organized clergy to evolve, distinct from the ruling elite or democratic office-holders teaching the publicly proclaimed religion,** the 'multitude' will always consider the clergy and its leaders an alternative, and higher, source of authority, believing as they inevitably do that ecclesiastics are closest to God.109

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/200/mode/2up?view=theater

Comte's experts are recognizable as a new iteration of the experts of Spinoza's social pyramid, the middlemen who take the philosophic ideas handed down from the enlightened few at the top of the social pyramid and apply them to the ignorant masses at the bottom. Social physics is not democratic, but elitist: that is, it follows Spinoza in pushing an elite revolution even while appealing to seemingly democratic ideas and goals. **Progress is defined by the liberal elite and imposed by bureaucratic experts using state power. Even while it rests on an ultimate democratization of the cosmos, where all wills are equal because all wills are equally arbitrary, it turns out that only some wills should count.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/554/mode/2up?view=theater

In Spinoza, 'right' and power are equated in a distinctive and surprising fashion. Since, for him, only nature possesses a sovereign right over all things and 'the universal power of Nature as a whole is only the power of all individual things taken together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do all it can do; that is, the right of the individual is co-extensive with its determinate power.'37 **In principle, then, there is no difference between the natural 'right' of men and animals, nor limit on either, beyond what men and all other creatures can actually do. If men rule the animal realm, this is solely because of their greater power, precisely as, through history, men have relegated women to inferior status, and often drudgery, merely through possessing greater physical strength.** Such a thoroughgoing naturalism, equating men with all living creatures, enabled Spinoza to devise a theory of basic equality without floundering in a morass of difficulties over species and type distinction, or how to fix boundaries between men and other creatures, problems which bedevilled Locke's egalitarianism, necessitating resort to theological criteria to underpin his equality.

Basic equality in the Radical Enlightenment, then, is grounded on a principle of moral equivalence, given definite metaphysical expression in part iii of the *Ethics*, 'unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, ins uo esse persevare conatur' [Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being].38 In claiming men and animals possess individually a sovereign and equal right to exist and pursue their own advantage, each as naturally determined, **Spinoza draws no distinction, as he says, between Man guided by reason and the madman, fool or emotionally unbalanced, or indeed between such as proclaim divine inspiration and those who do not.**39 **Under his rule of nature, men who acquire their moral sense through reason enjoy neither any more, nor less, right to conduct their lives as they choose than those who, unrestrained by reason, live 'under the sole control of appetite.' One's beliefs, degree of rationality, and sanity or insanity are all equally irrelevant to the fundamental equality of men and animals, as is what Locke calls 'knowledge of their maker' or its lack, under the state no less than in the state of nature.**
…

For according to Spinoza, a deterministic conception of human motivation whereby every individual will in all circumstances choose what at that moment seems, from their standpoint, the greater good, or lesser evil, to him or her necessarily means no one willingly surrenders more of their natural right, or *potentia agenda* (power to act), than they must to secure advantages, or avoid disadvantages, greater than what is yielded.40 Hence, no contract or agreement of any kind in human life has any force or validity, without some means of demonstrating that the cost of violating it exceeds the burdens of conforming to it.

…

Diderot, in his political articles for the *Encyclopédie* in the early 1750s, needed to adopt a milder, more cautious tone; for he was not writing, like Radicati, Meslier, and Morelly, for others clandestinely or posthumously, and hence uninhibitedly. Nevertheless, for him too, **Man's nature and passions change little owing to the shift from 'state of nature' to life in civil society,**44 **the transition being one of gradual evolution whereas Rousseau, while attacking, and in a sense inverting Hobbes, nevertheless like him regards the change as pivotal and decisive.**
…

Being something they conceived as having evolved naturally out of Man's nature and needs,45 the collective decision of groups of men to congregate in political society cannot have been, held Spinoza, like Vico, Mandeville, and Diderot subsequently, a rational, calculated choice, made at a particular time. Hence it should not be regarded as a formal or binding 'social contract' or 'compact' as we find it in Hobbes and Locke. **What is equal in the life of men, according to this conception, is neither men's individual desires or strength, and still less their degree of rationality or sanity, but primarily the equivalence of their wills, aspirations, and motivation, individual free wills which hence remain equal also after the formation of the state.**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/348/mode/2up?view=theater

When Spinoza moves past Hobbes to the ultra-Hobbesian position that the state of nature persists in civil society, Locke ditches his English mentor to follow the Dutch one. "The Obligations of the Law of Nature cease not in Society," says Locke.105 (For comparison, here is Spinoza rejecting Hobbes: "The natural right of every man ceases not in the civil state.")106 **Tellingly, Locke brings up the case of the promise-demanding thief and emphatically sides with Spinoza.**107 **"A rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection to another for his own harm," he reasons.**108

> http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2170/2170-h/2170-h.htm#link2H_4_0022
>
> What if the Roman Catholics of the present generation hold a different language on this subject from the Roman Catholics of the last generation? Is this inconsistency, which appears to shock the noble lord, **anything but the natural and inevitable progress of all reform? People who are oppressed, and who have no hope of obtaining entire justice, beg to be relieved from the most galling part of what they suffer.** They assure the oppressor that if he will only relax a little of his severity they shall be quite content; and perhaps, at the time, they believe that they shall be content. **But are expressions of this sort, are mere supplications uttered under duress, to estop every person who utters them, and all his posterity to the end of time, from asking for entire justice? Am I debarred from trying to recover property of which I have been robbed, because, when the robber's pistol was at my breast, I begged him to take everything that I had and to spare my life? The noble lord knows well that, while the slave trade existed, the great men who exerted themselves to put an end to that trade disclaimed all thought of emancipating the negroes.** In those days, Mr Pitt, Mr Fox, Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, and even my dear and honoured friend of whom I can never speak without emotion, Mr Wilberforce, always said that it was a calumny to accuse them of intending to liberate the black population of the sugar islands.

…

To Locke, "the State of Nature" refers not to the condition of human beings in their unreasonable humanity in the absence of a civil state, as it does to Hobbes and Spinoza, but to what Spinoza would call the state of reason. "Men living together *according to reason* [emphasis added], without a common Superior on earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature," says Locke. **"The *State of Nature* [emphasis in the original] has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone. And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions."**109 If men lived according to reason, says Locke, miming Spinoza, "there would be no need" of government. Thus, when Locke, targeting Hobbes, asserts that the state of nature and the state of war are "as far distant as a state of peace … and a state of enmity," he is essentially repeating the second claim with which Spinoza distances himself from Hobbes: that reason always favors peace.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Walten

Though influenced by Enlightenment writers such as Descartes and Spinoza in his philosophical thought, **Walten denied the latter as his primary political influence and professed to admire Juan de Mariana as the greatest writer on the powers and responsibilities of kings.** He was one of the most ardent defenders of the Glorious Revolution, justifying the expedition of

William of Orange to England in many pamphlets.[1][2]

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/328/mode/2up?view=theater

Walten in fact saw no difficulty in justifying a universal and wide-ranging 'right' of armed resistance to tyranny of whatever sort. Hence, kings, and for that matter all other forms of regime, he proclaims subject to the laws, and not above them, **arguing that 'not only may kings and regents be punished if they have deserved it, but that subjects may also always resist them, if they do something illegal and attack them in their religion, freedoms or prosperity.'**13 For whoever has the 'power and right' to entrust an office to someone, also has the 'magt en regt' [might and right] to demand compensation and retribution where abuse of office, corruption, despotic conduct, or maladministration damages the public interest. **All this is based on what Walten calls the 'natuurlijke vryhied des menschen' [natural freedom of the individual] and the 'law of nature,' a term to which here and there he gives a distinctly Spinozistic twist by speaking of 'God's law, or the Law of Nature.'**14 **More remarkable still, this 'law of nature' always prevails over other sources of authority. Thus Christians may rest assured that the Bible is God's Law. But Muslims and heathens are equally convinced that the Christian texts are just 'Fabelen en Woorden der Menschen' [fables and the words of men] and they too have 'van Natuur het selve regt' [from Nature the same right] to proclaim the Koran of Muhammad canonical and command their preachers and teachers to abide by its ordinances,** for the law of nature is the only right which reason can recognize as applying universally.15

The most strikingly democratic element in Walten's political thought is indeed the concept that the '*meerder getal* [majority] of a society or nation,' though not of a city or locality within it, **'always has *magt en regt*, to change [the form of] religion and Laws,'** and petition the government to legislate new laws upholding the new form of religion they have chosen.16

> https://biblehub.com/exodus/32-4.htm
>
> **And he received the gold from their hand, and he fashioned it with an engraving tool, and made a molded calf. Then they said, "This is your god, O Israel, that brought you out of the land of Egypt!"**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA369#v=onepage&q&f=false

Denis Vairasse d'Allais (ca. 1630-ca. 1700) had been trained in French law, but he could not find a substantial post in the courts of the countries where he sought refuge. He shuttled between Paris, Amsterdam, and London, managing to subsist as a hanger-on of English nobles like the Duke of Buckingham – in and out of favor – a teacher of languages, geography, and history, an author of French grammar books, perhaps a minor diplomatic agent occasionally engaged in spionage. **His utopia was the dream of a typical Huguenot accommodator who admired the works of Louis XIV and would have embraced most of them if only his kind of people had been tolerated, if the French monarch had really been a Sun King and not a tool of the Jesuits.**
…

The History of the Sevarambians reflects the search for utopia of one Huguenot wanderer in the seventeenth century, an uprooted intellectual no longer bound to the doctrines of his Calvinist ancestors, who became flotsam and jetsam in the turbulent philosophical waters of the age.
…

Compared with the utopias by More, Campanella, and Bacon, which were remarkably compact little books, the work of Denis Vairasse is long-winded, discursive, replete with digressions that are stories in themselves. **It prefigures those lengthy utopian novels that were to become a major literary genre in the eighteenth century, de-Christianized rationalist utopias which increased in size and quantitative output until the French Revolution put a temporary quietus on them.** One exemplar, the *History of the Sevarambians*, should appease the appetite of even the most voracious consumer of this type of fare, which on the eve of the Revolution was spread out in C.G.T. Garnier's 36-volume compendium of *Voyages imaginaires, songes, visions et romans cabalistiques* (Amsterdam, 1787-1789).
…

The utopia is patently autobiographical, with its idealized images of Denis Vairasse in the persons of both Captain Siden and King Sevarias (simple anagrams for the author's names) – one the great voyager to undiscovered countries, the other the brave hero in battle and founder of a perfect society. Vairasse brought his linguistic skills into play when, faithful to the Morean model, he devised a new vocabulary for his Sevarambian subjects. **And he took his vengeance for the years spent in the study and**

practice of the hated legal profession: Though his Captain Siden had also been a law student in his youth, there were no lawyers in Sevarambia.
...

After briefly considering an imitation of the European system that would have divided the population into seven classes ranging from tillers of the soil to seigneurs, Sevarias conceived a better and more just model of government. Having concluded that all wars and dissensions were rooted in pride, avarice, and idleness, he decided that a hereditary nobility would only foster a pernicious desire to be superior to others. **Seigneurs fancied themselves born to command, forgetting that "la nature nous a faits tous égaux,"**2 **portentous words in the 1670s. Hence Sevarias' final determination <u>that there should be no more than one fundamental distinction among the citizens, that separating the magistrates from private persons.</u>** Only inequalities of age would be marked by inequalities in dignities.
...

Of the eight or ten commonly known utopias written before the French Revolution, the *History of the Sevarambians* was the most eclectic. Its underlying spirit was libertine in religion, Hobbesian in the despotic centralism of government, Calvinist in the appraisal of human nature, rather Lucretian in natural philosophy, Colbertian in economic organization.
...

The mood of the Sevarambians is livelier than that of Epicurus in the garden, but he remains one of the hidden gods; <u>perhaps there is an uneasy union with the Stoic idea of service to the state, creating that syncretic Stoic-Epicurean ideal that dominated the philosophes of the next century.</u>
...

Vairasse often does not know where to land. **He favors basic equality, and yet his rather dim Calvinist view of human nature, damned in its penchant for vice and violence, drives him to establish an absolute father authority at the head of the state.** He dares not tamper with that awesome figure, and exalts him to the position of Viceroy of the Sun, invests him with despotic power in matters spiritual and temporal, and houses him in Oriental splendor (decorations by the travelers to the East, Chardin, Melchisédech Thévenot, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, and Nieuhof). **But once the absolute monarch has been placed on his pinnacle, all the sons beneath him must be more or less equal.**

> https://archive.org/details/bim_eighteenth-century_the-history-of-the-sevar_allais-denis-vairasse-d_1738/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In this Research he found, that the Misfortunes of Societies derive principally from three grand Sources; which are, **Pride, Avarice, and Idleness.**
>
> Pride and Ambition put great Numbers upon endeavouring to raise themselves above others, in order to usurp a Dominion over them; and nothing nourishes this Passion so much as the Advantages of an illustrious Extraction, in those Places where Nobility is hereditary. **The Pomp of high Birth dazzles, to such a degree, those who have been thus far indulg'd by Fortune, that they forget their natural Condition, and attach their Minds to this exterior Good, which they owe wholly to their Ancestors, and not to their own Virtue.** And when this comes to be the Case, they are always ready to fancy that other Men ought to be subject to them in all things, and that themselves were born only to command; **<u>without considering, that *Nature has made us all equal, and puts no difference between the Noble and the Peasant*</u>; that, *we are all liable to the same Infirmities, and enter on Life the same way*; that, *neither Riches nor Quality can lengthen the days of Sovereigns one Moment, any more than those of their meanest Slaves*; and, in a word, that, *the most honourable Distinctions amongst Men, are those which derive from Virtue*.** To prevent then the Disorders that Inequality of Birth produces, ***<u>Sevarias</u>* <u>would not allow of any other Distinction among his Subjects, than that of Magistrates and People</u>;** and, with respect to these last, Seniority of Age was always to give Superiority of Rank.
>
> And as Riches, and Property, make a great difference in Circumstance between the Members of Civil Society, from whence Avarice, Envy, Extortion, and an infinite Number of other Evils take their rise; **that he might effectually guard against these, he abolish'd all private Property, and, depriving every Individual of his Substance, vested all the Lands and Riches of the Nation in the Community, to be absolutely at the disposal of the Magistrate; without whose Consent and Licence, no Subject had any right to meddle with the least portion of it.** By this Method, he banish'd at once Covetousness, Taxes, Imposts, Want and Poverty, which cause so many Misfortunes in the several Societies of the World; **<u>and made the *Sevarambians* all rich, by leaving no one any thing that he could call his own.</u> For as all the Substance**

> **of the State belongs to all, each Person may justly esteem himself as happy as the most opulent Monarch in the World;** seeing the Magistrate never fails to furnish every Individual with all the Necessaries of Life, upon a Representation of his need of them; **and thereby frees him from all Solicitude about Food, Raiment, and Lodging, during the several Stages of Life; and also, of the Care of maintaining his Wife and Children, even tho' he should have ever so many.** All these things, I say, are provided for by the State, and the whole Nation lives in a happy Abundance, and an assured Repose, under the Conduct of their Sovereign.

...

Vairasse's religious position was a combination of the doctrines of Hobbes and Spinoza. The de-Christianization of utopia had begun in earnest. Religion was necessary for civility – despite the evidence of a few travel reports, Vairasse could not conceive of an atheistical society – and its institutions served exclusively political purposes. Without abandoning belief in an invisible monotheistic God, Vairasse became another promulgator of the sun religion that experienced so dramatic a revival in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. **The rebirth of the solar religions has been associated with the growth of centralized dynastic states and the Copernican heliocentric theory of the universe. Utopian sun cults were doubtless inspired by both of these developments, as well as the Renaissance revival of images from what was believed to be Egyptian hermeticism. Accounts of Mexican and Peruvian sun worship fortified the idea that this was the primordial natural religion of man, to which he would return when theological Christianity had disappeared.**

The religious settlement of the Sevarambians is what a Protestant accommodator would have asked of Louis XIV. There was an official public religion, but in private man could entertain whatever doctrine about divinity they liked and there were even set times each year when in colleges they could openly debate their opinions, as long as everyone behaved in a decent and respectful manner. **Both the headship of the cult and that of the civil government were vested in the Viceroy and High Priest of the Sun, the office one party of Huguenots would have wished Louis XIV to assume after he had broken with Rome and proclaimed himself the religious chief of a Gallican Church. External conformity to a state religion did not trouble Huguenot libertins as long as they were not required to submit to Rome, and outward practices were not of paramount significance to them if they were vouchsafed freedom of conscience.** Exalting the power of the King as God's representative on earth, allowing him to establish the laws of the cult and of the polity, was one way to end the religious disputes that were tearing the state apart.

The Sevarambian clergy were like ancient Roman priests; their religious status was not important and they could simultaneously hold civil office. A union of spiritual and temporal power, along with official indifference about matters of private conscience, fostered public tranquillity, the ultimate goal of the state, a *politique* position that became the normal one for most of the philosophes in the next century.

...

The state religion was philosophical, founded on human reason, with revelation playing only a minor role that wise Sevarambians knew was a political invention. **Since his book was published with royal approbation, Vairasse gave lip service to the superiority of the "celestial enlightenment of the Gospels" over the Sevarambian creed; but his general position was akin to Montesquieu's later views of Stoicism. Had he not been a Christian, Vairasse would have been a Sevarambian sun cultist.** The limits of intellectual tolerance were broader in France than in the southern part of Europe, and Vairasse's Sevarambian religion could include a belief in the infinity of worlds for which Bruno had been burned by the Inquisition. The syncretistic Sevarambian theology symbolized in a black curtain that hung in the Temple the invisible infinite God whom men with their weak understandings could only sense obscurely, while their religious worship was regularly addressed to a visible Sun. **Since the invisible God could be perceived only with the eyes of the mind, He was the object of formal adoration only once every seven years.**

In the Sevarambian trinity the three persons have an order of excellence: the first is the invisible God, the black cloth, worshiped in one's inner being and represented by the reason that united all men; the second is the Sun, a globe, object of love and gratitude for palpable benefits conferred upon the whole earth; and the third is a female symbol, the image of a mother nurturing many children, which is related to a particular good, the country of one's birth and the immediate source of nourishment and education. **In this imitation of the Christian trinity the most revolutionary substitution is motherhood as the symbol of the land of one's birth. While it may be premature to talk of a Sevarambian nationhood, the political base is not too far removed from that of Bossuet's Gallican religion.**

...

There is a strange interplay of the mechanical and the organic in Vairasse's conception of the world, an amalgam of Cartesian ideas and Stoic speculations about the periodic exhaustion of nature. The mathematical arrangement of things, which is the work of man, militates in the direction of repetitive sameness, but nature itself surveyed over centuries has an organic

pattern of growth and decay. On a universal scale entire peoples die and even the globe itself is doomed to extinction. The arts and sciences serve to maintain a balance in the world, but there is an underlying natural movement toward regression and even toward evil. The order of society cannot overcome this cosmic law, for, as the wisest Sevarambians know, in the infinite universe worlds are constantly dying and being born, like individuals, preserving a fixed quantum of matter and of spirit in the whole.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/591/mode/2up?view=theater

If the Spinozistic novel in Dutch begins with *Philopater* in the 1690s, and assumes the guise of a travel romance with Smeeks' *Krinke Kesmes* (1708), the radical philosophical novel in French began in the late 1670s with two utopian travel stories set in the remote South Pacific, Gabriel de Foigny's *La Terre australe connue* (1676) and, more especially, the 'dainty,' widely read, and notorious *Histoire de Sévarambes* (1677) by Denis Vairasse d'Alais.1

Vairasse, a Protestant lawyer from Alès and a minor official **who played a part in concerting the Anglo-French attack on the United Provinces in 1672,** lived for some years (1665-74) in London, knew such eminent Englishmen as Locke and Lord Arlington, and spoke English fluently. **His utopian novel depicts a gullible people inhabiting the South Seas who are imbued with a revealed religion, invented by the 'Impostor' Omigas, a parody of Moses and Christ,** who 'par diverses ruses et plusieurs faux miracles,' including the 'curing' of several persons whom he pays to feign blindness and other infirmities, gains total mastery over this society, based on revelation.2 Indeed, the people are so credulous and completely under the spell of this 'imposteur' that he has no difficulty in convincing them that the Sun – to whom he has taught them to sacrifice – is displeased with his political opponents. Of course, they unhesitatingly banish the latter from their own country for ever.3 However, this devout society, based on unquestioning authority, is starkly contrasted with another Pacific society, that of the Sévarambes, which is based on deism. **The latter have no cult and no clergy and believe in an infinite and eternal God who prefers to be adored without prayer, priestly intercession, rituals, and sacrifices, purely through the mind.**4 Here the people are not shamelessly abused by false prophets.

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317765/1/283910.pdf

This ambiguity is essential to Locke's civil state as both conceptions, the noble savage living peacefully and in recognition of the law of nature and the ignoble savage entering the state of war over "every the least difference," are needed if Locke is to argue that man by virtue of his natural rights may both recognize civil authority and dissolve it. Thus Locke used the descriptions in the travelogues to create first a reason for entering civil society (thus the ignoble tendency toward a state of war) and then also an alternative preferable to absolute tyranny (namely the noble savage living peaceably together.) Both descriptions can be found in European descriptions of native Americans.
…

Firstly he is trying to undermine Filmer's notion of divine rule and hereditary paternal authority via Adam. Secondly, he is trying to establish that true government originates in consent between individuals of mature reason. Consequently, he is forced to argue that hereditary monarchy, arising from the model of paternal authority, is the most simple and primitive form of government. **Nations, like children, mature and, contrary to Filmer's argument, must ultimately consent to political authority.** Thus Locke's argument leads him to conclude that monarchy must, at this later stage, be established by consent, perhaps even by election.

In order to prove his point Locke ignores Acosta's claims that democracy was the first form of government in Mexico, that many provinces had no such monarchs, that monarchy was the most advanced and best form of government in the Indies, that it arose from democracy and not vice versa, that it was established not by common consent but by aristocrats; and that it was often elective from its inception and not constituted as such later on.

A second element of the *Two Treatises* which illustrates Locke's omission of certain aspects of native American life irreconcilable with the natural man demanded by his political philosophy is his state of war. **Locke's state of nature presupposes individual savages whose decision to enter into a state of war is contingent upon the protection of their individual property.** In fact, most of the warfare which occured between native Americans in the new world was tribal rather than individual. **One of the greatest flaws of the state of nature device, when it is used as a mirror to European civilization, is its complete obliteration of any specific characteristics of the individuals themselves. Thus natural man belongs to no tribe and has no political or ethical codes associated with that collectivity. Rather he is an individual amongst an undifferentiated and ahistorical mass of non-European, non-civil savages.**

War, as a consequence, must be explained in terms of private lives, liberties and properties rather than as a result of conflict between two nations as it might be in civil warfare. In creating such a natural state, Locke ignores the countless references to nationhood in his travelogues and more specifically the fact that tribes, *not* individuals, engage in war. Acuna writes:

> All this new world, if we may call it so, is inhabited by barbarians, in distinct provinces and nations...they exceed one hundred and fifty all with different languages.57

Acuna then goes on to describe each of these nations in some detail. Like all men and all countries, each have their own individual and collective characteristics. **Moreover, nations rarely, if ever fight within themselves. Even the Cashibos, described as "cannibals" who none would "dare to venture amongst," "will not kill someone within his own tribe."**58 Hostilities were not caused either in Europe or the Americas by the lack of a common authority to adjudicate differences. Neither could they simply be explained as the result of individuals protecting their own self interests. **The true state of war is more often than not groups of individuals with common identities and goals fighting against other groups either for access to a scarce common resource, or for their collective pride or glory or both.** The theoretical consequence of such a state of war is to justify the forceful inception of natural men, such as native Americans into a civil state, as the latter is defined as preferable to the former. Locke clearly uses his formulation of the state of war as "one great *reason of Mens putting themselves into Society*, and quitting the State of Nature."59
…

While Grotius and Locke agreed that God had granted to man a positive right of communal ownership, leaving open not how we could own the earth, for that was given, but only the question of how much each man would get and on what basis it would be acquired, **Locke's fundamental premise that one must labour in order to even use the land or any product of it was a step futher than Grotius' argument, which stretched back to the time of Cicero, that it was simply use or occupancy which determined property.**
…

However, the most important *and* original aspect of Locke's political theory with reference to the American Indians was the placement of agrarian labour at the heart of private property. Preachers, legal theorists and politicians all used Locke's theory of property to define the cultivation of land by American citizens as the only legitimate means to claim property. **Occupancy for thousands of years was suddenly and dramatically superceded by Locke's distinctly English form of labour as the basis of holding land.**

The yielding of occupancy to labour was a crucial turning point in the history of the idea of property. Occupancy as the foundation of property had a long history in natural law theory. **From the time of Cicero through to Grotius and Pufendorf, it was argued that any unoccupied area, such as the famous theatre seats, only had to be occupied in order for it to be considered one's own.** England had adopted the notion of discovery and occupancy as the basis for its claims in the new world when it first landed on American shores, but the theory became problematic when England began to settle in America and the Indians proceeded to claim the right to large tracts of land, wanted by the English, on the basis of their prior right of occupancy. The later 18th century British colonies and the early American republic thus needed a new foundation for property, which would go beyond simple occupancy, in order to claim the land in their proposed settlements for their own. Locke's theory of property, based on agrarian labour, provided that new foundation. Moreover, these same players on the American stage could, and in fact did, argue that the until the Indians transformed their labour from hunting and gathering into agrarian cultivation, they could not be considered as the ultimate owners of the soil. Not only did they lose the land they claimed by virtue of past occupancy, but until they transformed their lifestyle into that of the sedentary Europeans, they could claim next to nothing in the future.
…

In the 1823 case of Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, those who argued against Indians claims before this supreme tribunal used, in their testimony, the standard Lockean argument that cultivation was necessary in order to claim property in land. As James Tully comments on this case:

> Counsel for the defendents presented the Lockean argument, that the amount of land anyone can acquire by natural law is limited by their capacity to put it to use. As a consequence, the aboriginals of America have acquired no property in the land over which they wandered or hunted, any more than they do over the water they fish, but only a right in the products. So the land was not occupied in such a way "as to prevent it being appropriated by a people of cultivators."87

John Marshall, chief justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, wrote a precedent-setting decision, which began by dismissing the idea that agricultural labour gives right to land which is deemed vacant because it is being used for hunting or other similar activities, **concluding that the English only had right to the land they claimed because they had conquered the Indians.**

> We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants and manufacturers have a right, on abstract principles to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their limits. ***Conquest*** **[my emphasis] gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions…may be, respecting the original justice of the claim.**88

While rejecting the cultivation argument as a legitimate basis for claiming rights over Indian land, **Marshall simultaneously dismisses the standard Lockean notion of America being, primarily, the home of 'natural' men roaming around in a state of nature without society or government,** into which the more developed and civilized nations of Europe descend. **Because Jefferson and Locke both posited consent, founded on one's natural right to life, liberty and property, to be the basis for government, it was theoretically impossible to consider that natural men could have any type of organic sense of nationhood, without having first acquired the requisites, that is private property and agrarian labour, to establish the social contract.** Marshall disagreed, concluding that the American Indians, like their European counterparts, were split into nations of their own, each with their own languages and forms of government. America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own and governing themselves by their own laws.89

Marshall's judgements were important, not least because they became the foundation for all subsequent decisions on Indian land claims, but also, for the purposes of this thesis, because they completely undercut the Lockean view of the Indians in two ways.

First, the distinction between the natural state of Indians where individuals roamed without property, government, laws, societies, nations or institutions and European civil society which could boast of all these things was summarily dismissed. Those theoreticians, like Locke, who had adopted the state of nature in order to make claims about rights of men in civil society had imposed upon the Indians of North America, the mantle of a natural man simply irreconcilable with their real existence, **for, as Marshall points out, there were distinct nations of people in the Americas, who did indeed govern themselves in accordance with their own laws and institutions.** What Locke had been able to ignore in his own readings of the American Indian, Marshall could not.

Secondly, **Marshall makes clear that it was not peaceful labour or purchase which gave Europe the right to Indian land but sheer force.** It was unnecessary, therefore, to discuss whether 'agriculturists' have the right to expel 'hunters' at all, according to Marshall, for this argument, while providing those who made it with some rational and ethical justification for taking over the land, simply obfuscates the real basis of the Europeans' right, namely '*conquest*.' In other words, the hard reality of international law is that he who conquers wins the land of the vanquished; **those who have justified it in any other way, like Jefferson and Locke, have merely cloaked the bloody spoils of war in a more palatable vision of the just deserts of natural right or law.**

Moreover, Marshall argues that once conquered, not only does the land but the people become subject to the victorious government. Because in America the Indians often resisted such subjugation, they had to be, according to Marshall, ultimately "united by force to strangers."9 **It was not reason than that brought the Indians to civil life in America, but force.**

VI – CONCLUSION

Locke and Jefferson, above all else in the world, believed in reason. Thus, Locke did not believe, as Marshall did, that conquest, or force, was a legitimate basis for the right of property. Locke says himself in his chapter, 'On Conquest,' that although it is a "strange doctrine," no significant piece of land can legitimately appropriated as the result of war. Rather than through force or coercion, both he and Jefferson believed that it was only by simple labour that land could be appropriated, by their own consent that people could be governed, and ultimately by reason that man could be perfected. In all cases, if the choice were to be between force and reason, the latter should always prevail.

Jefferson describes a scene in one of his letters to Dr. Benjamin Rush which illustrates how he believed reason rather than force, distinguished his own thought as well as Locke's from that of his contemporaries and those who had governed before. **Having told Alexander Hamilton that Locke was one of the three greatest men who ever lived, Jefferson was surprised when Hamilton responded that Julius Caesar would be his own choice for the same exalted position.** Upon

reflection, Jefferson concluded that such a choice revealed the essence of Hamilton's politics as opposed to his own. While Locke, and indeed Jefferson himself, vested power in the governed, trusting their reason to choose the right course of action and leaders for a nation, Hamilton through his choice of Caesar seemed to be saying that it was the force of the governor which must prevail in order to keep the people in line. Jefferson concludes of Hamilton's choice:

> Hamilton was honest as a man, but as a politician, [he believed] in the necessity of either force or corruption to govern men.9

Jefferson contrasts in this example, those individuals who believed in force over reason and vice versa. **Both Locke and Jefferson believed that politics could be free of both force and corruption if based on the reasoned consent of those who are governed.** Moreover, reason lies at the heart of both Locke's transition from the state of nature into civil society, and Jefferson's basic policy that Indians must become like Europeans. **In both cases, natural men will never need to be forced into adopting civil society, as Marshall later claimed, because they will, by virtue of their own reason, inevitably choose it for themselves.** Both Jefferson and Locke argue that Indians have chosen to stay hunters and natural men even after being exposed to the superior European civilization only because they are too attached to the habits of their ways. **Thus, where Locke criticizes the Indian for being "bounded within the ways, modes and notions of his own country," Jefferson denounces the Indian who "maintains the ascendency of habit over the duty of improving [their] reason."**92 **In time, reason will prevail; for just as the force of Julius Caesar was not required to keep the governed in line, so coercion will not be necessary to transform the Indians, and civil society, as revealed by reason, will eventually reign supreme.**

http://www.ditext.com/woodward/fitzhugh.html

The trouble started with John Locke and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. **"The human mind became extremely presumptuous" in that era, he wrote, "and undertook to form governments on exact philosophical principles, just as men make clocks, watches or mills. <u>They confounded the moral with the physical world, and this was not strange, because they had begun to doubt whether there was any other than a physical world.</u>" Under their spell, Jefferson and a few misguided patriots embellished an otherwise healthy colonial rebellion with the abstractions of the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Bill of Rights. These principles were "wholly at war with slavery" and, "equally at war with all government, all subordination, all order," in fact.** "Men's minds were heated and blinded when they were written, as well by patriotic zeal, as by a false philosophy, which, beginning with Locke, in a refined materialism, had ripened on the Continent into open infidelity." **For a long time these abstractions were a dead letter, had little effect, and did little harm, since inherited English institutions continued with little change. "Those institutions were the growth and accretions of many ages," he pointed out, "not the work of legislating philosophers." <u>But now that the abolitionists were inflamed with these notions, Locke and Jefferson should be firmly refuted and repudiated.</u>**[27]
…

In renouncing Locke and rationalism and the Enlightenment, Fitzhugh had no notion of renouncing the heritage of the American Revolution—the true heritage, that is. Not at all, he declared. "**All the bombastic absurdity in the Declaration of Independence about the inalienable rights of man, had about as much to do with the occasion as would a sermon or oration on the teething of a child or the kittening of a cat. … Our institutions, State and Federal, imported from England where they had grown up naturally and imperceptibly … would have lasted for many ages, had not thoughtless, half-informed, speculative men, like Jefferson, succeeded in basing them on such inflammable materials.** … The Revolution of 76 was, in its action, an exceedingly natural and conservative affair; it was only the false and unnecessary theories invoked to justify it that were radical, agrarian and anarchical." **<u>These were the theories of John Locke, "a presumptuous charlatan, who was as ignorant of the science or practice of government as any shoemaker or horse jockey."</u>**

https://occidentaldissent.com/2022/08/28/national-review-attacking-the-declaration-of-independence-is-not-conservatism/

National Review:

> "Recently, a friend of mine asked me to read a writing by Michael McKenna entitled "Preserve and protect U.S. Constitution from all enemies." **The author's argument is that one becomes an enemy of the Constitution when using the Declaration of Independence,** the document that initiated and explained why we sought our independence from England, **as a guide to understanding "the foundation of who**

> **Americans are as a people."** According to McKenna, this understanding can come only from the Constitution.
> ...
>
> McKenna begins his argument by trying to diminish the significance of the Declaration: **"The Declaration was the product of one man. The [Second] Continental Congress considered it for about three days and agreed. The bulk of it was a list of mostly lawyerly grievances directed at the crown." In sum, the Declaration should only be viewed as "an excellent bit of wartime propaganda, hastily prepared and hastily approved."**

This is well-trodden ground.

The Confederates believed the Union was created by the Constitution, not the Declaration of Independence.

http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE1/G-AR.html **[May 1890]**

Locke's fancy picture of primitive men, on the other hand, represents them under the guise of highly intelligent and respectable persons, "living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them" ("Civil Government," § 19).

The Law of Nature[7] is, in fact, the law dictated by reason, which "teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, or possessions."

> [7] **This view of the law of nature comes from the jurists.** Hobbes defines it in the same way, but he says that, in the state of nature, the Law of Nature is silent. In speaking of Locke as the founder and father of individualism, **I do not forget that Hooker (to whom Locke often refers), and still earlier writers, have expressed individualistic opinions. Nevertheless, I believe that modern Individualism is essentially Locke's work.**

Elsewhere (§ 4), the state of nature is defined as a state of "perfect freedom," in which men "dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit"; and further as a state of equality,

> "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; **there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature,[8] and the use of the same faculties,** should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection."

Again (§ 7), since the law of nature "willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind," every man has a "right to punish the transgressors of that law"; that is to say, those who invade the rights of others. Moreover, truth and the keeping of faith are commands of the Law of Nature, and belong "to men as men," and not as members of society (§ 14). **Locke uses the term Law of Nature, therefore, in the sense in which it was often (perhaps generally) employed by the jurists,** to denote a system of equity based on purely rational considerations.

There is no connection between this law of nature and "natural rights," properly so called. **The state of nature imagined by Locke is, in fact, the individualistic golden age of philosophical anarchy, in which all men voluntarily rendering *suum cuique,* there is no need of any agency for the enforcement of justice. While Hobbes supposes that, in the state of nature, the Law of Nature was silent, Locke seems to imagine that it spoke loudly enough, but that men grew deaf to it.** It was only in consequence of the failure of some of them to maintain the original standard of ethical elevation that those inconveniences arose which drove the rest to combine into commonwealths; to choose rulers; and to endow them, as delegates of all, with the sum of the right to punish transgressors inherent in each.

In taking this important step, however, **our forefathers exhibited that caution and prudence which might be expected from persons who dwelt upon the ethical heights which they had reached in the state of nature.** Instead of making a complete surrender of all the rights and powers which they possessed in that state, to the Sovereign, and thus creating State omnipotence by the social contract, as Hobbes wrongfully declared them to have done, they gave up only just so much of them as was absolutely necessary for the purposes of an executive with strictly limited powers. **With the Stuarts recognised by France, and hosts of Jacobite pamphleteers on the look-out for every coign of vantage, it would never do to admit the Hobbesian doctrine of complete surrender.** So Locke is careful to assert that when men entered into commonwealths they must have stipulated (and, therefore, on approved *a priori* principles, did stipulate) that the power of the Sovereign was strictly limited to the performance of acts needful "to secure every one's property."

> "§131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve

> himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy."[9]

To listen to Locke, one would imagine that a general meeting of men living in the state of nature having been called to consider the "defects" of their condition, **and somebody being voted to the tree (in the presumable absence of chairs), this earliest example of a constituent assembly resolved to form a governmental company, with strictly limited liability, for the purpose of defending liberty and property; and that they elected a director or body of directors, to be known as the Sovereign, for the purpose of carrying on that business and no other whatsoever.**
...

Liberalism tended to the adoption of Locke's definition of the limits of State action, and to consider persistence in letting alone as a definition of the whole duty of the statesman. But in the hands of even the most liberal governments, these limits proved pretty elastic; and, however objectionable State interference might be, it was found hard to set bounds to it, if indirect as well as direct interference were permissible. **So long ago as the end of the eighteenth century, the distinguished scholar and statesman Wilhelm von Humboldt[12] attempted to meet this difficulty.** He wrote a special treatise, which remained unpublished till sixty years later, for the purpose of showing that the legitimate functions of the State are negative; and that governments have no right to take any positive steps for the promotion of the welfare of the governed. **Von Humboldt does not encumber himself with Locke's "limited contract," but starts an *a priori* axiom of his own,** namely: –

> "That reason cannot desire for any man any other condition than that in which each individual not only enjoys the most absolute freedom of developing himself by his own energies in his perfect individuality, but in which external nature even is left unfashioned by any human agency, but only receives the impress given to it by each individual by himself and his own free will, according to the measure of his wants and instincts, and restricted only by the limits of his powers and rights." (p. 18).

From this very considerable assumption (which I must say does not appear to me to possess the quality of intuitive certainty) the conclusion is deduced that

> "the State is to abstain from all solicitude for the positive welfare of the citizens and not to proceed a step farther than is necessary for their mutual security and protection against foreign enemies; for with no other object should it impose restrictions on freedom."

This conclusion differs but little from that of Locke, verbally. Nevertheless in its practical application, Von Humboldt excludes not only all and every matter of religion, of morals, and of education, but the relations of the sexes, and all private actions not injurious to other citizens, from the interference of the State. However, he permits governmental regulation of the power of testamentary devolution; and (though somewhat unwillingly) interference with acts which are not immediately hurtful to one's neighbours, yet the obvious tendencies of which are to damage them or to restrict their liberties.

> [12] **Von Humboldt's essay was written in 1791; but views so little likely to be relished by the German governments of that day needed cautious enunciation, and only fragments appeared (under the auspices of Schiller) until 1852, when the treatise formed part of the posthumous edition of Von Humboldt's works.** A translation, under the title of *The Sphere and Duties of Government* was published in 1854, by Dr. Chapman (then as now, the editor of the *Westminster Review*), and became very well known in this country.

...

But suppose that, not being blinded by any *a priori* cataracts, we use our eyes upon these premisses – what utter shams and delusions they show themselves to be! I hope that no more need be said about natural rights and the equality of men. But there is just as little foundation in fact for the social contract and either the limited, or the unlimited, devolution of rights and powers which is supposed to have been effected by it. **We have sadly little definite knowledge of the manner in which polities arose, but, if anything is certain, it is that the notion of a contract, whether expressed or implied, is by no means an adequate expression of the process.**

The most archaic polities of which we have any definite record are either families, or federations of families; and the most doctrinaire of political philosophers will hardly be prepared to maintain that the family polity was based upon contract between the *paterfamilias* and his wife and children, and arose out of the expressed desire of the latter to have their liberty and property protected by their governor; or that even any tacit understanding on that subject influenced the formation of the family group. In truth, **the more primitive the condition of a polity, the less is there of a contract, either expressed or implied, between its members** – the more common is it to find that neither wife nor child possessed either liberty, or property, worth speaking of. **The *paterfamilias* of the Aryan stock, at any rate, could say "L'etat c'est moi" with more truth than any later monarch. So far from the preservation of liberty and property and the securing of equal rights being the chief and most conspicuous objects aimed at by the archaic polities of which we**

know anything, it would be a good deal nearer the truth to say that they were federated absolute monarchies, the chief purpose of which was the maintenance of an established Church for the worship of the family ancestors.

Philosophers, proud of living according to reason, are too apt to forget that people who do not profess themselves to be more than ordinary men mostly live according to unreason; or what seems such to the philosophers. **Moderns, who make to themselves metaphysical teraphim out of the Absolute, the Unknowable, the Unconscious, and the other verbal abstractions whose apotheosis is indicated by initial capitals, may find it difficult to imagine that it seemed good to ancient men to perform the same theurgic operation upon their very concrete but deceased forefathers; and to believe that, unless the Manes were regularly propitiated with a supply of such commodities as ghosts can enjoy, they would not only withdraw their benevolent protection, but would make things very unpleasant for their descendants and their fellow countrymen. Yet there can be little question that this theory lies at the foundation of the ancient polity;** and that the dominant purpose of its organisation was not the preservation of liberty or property, by taking order that no man used his freedom in a way to interfere with others' freedom, but the performance of those religious obligations by which the good will of the ancestral gods might be secured. Archaic society aims, not at the freest possible exercise of rights, but at the exactest possible discharge of duties. **The most marked inequalities and seeming iniquities of ancient law, such as succession in the male line, the acknowledgment of agnate blood relationship only, adoption, divorce for barrenness, are direct consequences of the religious foundation of ancient society. Thus the whole fabric of *a priori* political speculation which we have had under consideration is built upon the quicksand of fictitious history.**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/520/mode/2up?view=theater

> 125. **Among America's revolutionary deists, the native population sometimes served as a way of projecting Locke's reasonable State of Nature onto the world.** Here is William Bartram on his travels through North and South Carolina, lauding the quasi-utopia achieved by natives operating free from the white man's religion: **Their "constitution … seems to be nothing more than the dictates of natural reason, plain to every one, yet recommended to them by their wise and virtuous elders as divine, because necessary for securing mutual happiness."** (Bartram, *Travels through North & South Carolina,* p. 494.)
>
> https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2013/04/how-i-am-partly-to-blame-for-mass-immigration.html
>
> When I was a Revolutionary Marxist, we were all in favour of as much immigration as possible. **It wasn't because we liked immigrants, but because we didn't like Britain.** We saw immigrants – from anywhere – as allies against the staid, settled, conservative society that our country still was at the end of the Sixties.

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/12/mode/2up?view=theater

Having somehow or other found his way into the King's forces, where he was a very square peg in a round hole, [Baron de Lahontan] landed, in the year 1683, on the shores of Quebec. His first idea was to carve out a career for himself in Canada, for he lacked neither brains nor courage. He took part in the expedition against the Iroquois; but, impatient of discipline, disgruntled, and forever getting into scrapes, he finally deserted, and came back to Europe where he dragged out the existence of a man who had missed his vocation. **When, however, in 1703 he published his *Travels*, his *Mémoires*, and his *Dialogues*, he left behind him a monument far more enduring than he can have supposed, although he thought no small beer of himself.**

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor03lahogoog/page/n18/mode/2up?view=theater

"Besides the pleasure of so many different sorts of Diversion," he writes, "**I was likewise entertain'd in the Woods with the company of the honest old Gentlemen that liv'd in former Ages. Honest *Homer*, the amiable *Anacreon*, and my dear *Lucian*, were my inseperable Companions. *Aristotle* too desir'd passionately to go along with us, but my Canow was too little to hold his bulky Equipage of Peripatetick Silogisms: So that he was e'en fain to trudge back to the Jesuits, who vouchsaf'd him a very honourable Reception."** We doubtless obtain here a glimpse of the source of the Dialogues with Adario, which occupy so large a share of the second volume; **Lucian apparently furnished the model for those caustic satires on the Christianity and civilization of the seventeenth century.**

The studies and pleasures of this interesting young man-at-arms were occasionally interfered with by the austerities of the priests about him. He indignantly relates that when stationed in Montreal he was "inrag'd at the impertinent Zeal of the Curate of this City."

> https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor03lahogoog/page/n192/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> I spent part of the Winter in Hunting with the *Algonkins,* in order to a more perfect knowledge of their Language; and the rest I spent in this Place, with a great deal of uneasiness: for, here we

> cannot enjoy our selves, either at Play, or in visiting the Ladies, but ‘tis presently carried to the Curate’s ears, who takes publick notice of it in the Pulpit. His Zeal goes so far, as even to name the Persons: and since he refuses the Sacrament of the Holy Supper to Ladies of Quality, upon the most slender Pretences, you may easily guess at the other steps of his Indescretion. **You cannot imagine to what a pitch these Ecclesiastical Lords have screw’d their Authority:** They excommunicate all the Masks, and wherever they spy ‘em, they run after ‘em to uncover their Faces, and abuse ‘em in a reproachful manner: **In fine, they have a more watchful eye over the Conduct of the Girls and married Women, than their Fathers and Husbands have.** They cry out against: those that do not receive the Sacrament once a Month; and at *Easter* they oblige all sorts of Persons to give in Bills to their Confessors. **They prohibit and burn all the Books that treat of any other Subject but Devotion.** When I think of this Tyranny, I cannot but be inrag’d at the impertinent Zeal of the Curate of this City. This inhumane Fellow came one day to my Lodging, **and finding the Romance of the Adventures of *Petronius* upon my Table, he fell upon it with an unimaginable fury, and tore out almost all the Leaves. <u>This Book I valued more than my Life, because ‘twas not castrated</u>;** and indeed I was so provok’d when I saw it all in wrack, that if my Landlord had not held me, I had gone immediately to that turbulent Pastor's House, and would have pluck’d out the Hairs of his Beard with as little mercy as he did the Leaves of my Book. These Animals cannot content themselves with the studying of Mens Actions, but they must likewise dive into their Thoughts. By this Sketch, Sir, you may judge what a pleasant Life we lead here.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor03lahogoog/page/n38/mode/2up?view=theater

Lahontan's *Voyages to North America* was avowedly printed as a last resource on the part of the bankrupt fugitive. We have seen that every vestige of hope regarding the resuscitation of his estate had vanished, and all appeals to the court for reinstatement had proved futile; **in this crisis, the Letters, which in the event of his monarch's favor might have been consigned to the flames, were brought forth from their obscurity and given to the world** – his distress thus proving our gain. While these now classic epistles were printing in Holland, Lahontan passed over to England, where he secured the patronage of the powerful Duke of Devonshire, and put out an English translation of his work, which in some respects is preferable to the original French.

The vogue of the baron's book was immediate and widespread, and must have soon replenished his slender purse.
…

The *Relations* of the Jesuits had been read with absorbing interest by people with a turn for piety. Those more liberal in their thinking turned with amused tolerance to the books of the garrulous and worldly Recollect, Friar Hennepin, or found keen but perhaps not too open enjoyment in the neatly-printed volumes of the audacious and cynical Baron de Lahontan, with their numerous flings at the polity and teachings of the Canadian Jesuits, and many a well-considered thrust at king and ministry also. A glance at Mr. Paltsits's Bibliography is sufficient to prove the demand for Lahontan's *Voyages* – a taste lasting well into the middle of the eighteenth century.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor03lahogoog/page/n48/mode/2up?view=theater

Lahontan's scorn of civilization and exaltation of savagery, culminate in the famous Dialogue between him and Adario – a bit of clever satire modelled on the Dialogues of Lucian, whom we have seen was one of our author's favorite classics. **With vision as keen as his Latin prototype, he scoffs at the hypocrisies, shams, corruptions, and other deformities of the world of the seventeenth century, in a manner as bold and with a wit as incisive as his fellow satirist of the second. Nor do the *Voyages* lack Lucian's obscenity and occasional indecency – indeed, this is of so gross a character that some critics have thought Lahontan, the gentleman, scholar, and officer, could hardly be guilty of it; deeming it not unlikely that these touches were either the additions of the English translator – the Dialogue is much more extended in the English than in other editions – or the emendations of a certain unfrocked and ribald French friar, Nicolas Gueudeville, also a refugee in Holland,** and well known as a political and religious satirist, as well as a writer on geographical discoveries.1
…

Taking him as a whole, Lahontan was a generation in advance of his age. The *Zeitgeist* from the hills of the future descended upon him. In his hatred and scorn of the current ecclesiasticism and despotism, he anticipated Rousseau; his cynical criticism of existing institutions foreshadowed Voltaire; his exaltation of the virtues and blessings of the savage state, preluded the Encyclopedists. In the *Discours sur l’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité parmi les hommes*, Rousseau apparently borrows many ideas from Lahontan's Dialogue; Chateaubriand's gentle barbarian Atala is brother to the astute and charming Adario.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor03lahogoog/page/n106/mode/2up?view=theater

'Twill not be improper to acquaint the Reader by the bye, that those who know my faults, do as little justice to these People, as they do to me, in alledging I am a Savage my self, and that that makes me speak so favourably of my Fellow-Savages. These Observators do me a great deal of Honour, as long as they do not explain themselves, so as to make me directly of the same Character with that which is tack'd to the word Savage *by the* Europeans *in their way of thinking**: For in saying only that I am of the same temper with the Savages, they give me without design, the Character of the honestest man in the World. 'Tis an uncontested truth, that the Nations which are not debauched by the Neighbourhood of the*** Europeans**, *are strangers to the Measures of* Meum *and* Tuum**, and to all Laws, Judges, and Priests.** *This can't be call'd in question, since all Travellers that have visited those Countries, vouch for its truth; and a great many of different Professions, have given the World repeated assurances that 'tis so.* **Now this being granted, we ought not to scruple to believe, that these are such wise and reasonable People. I take it, a Man must be quite blind, who do's not see that the property of Goods (I do not speak of the ingrossing of Women) is the only Source of all the Disorders that perplex the** European ***Societies.*** *Upon that Consideration 'twill be easie to perceive, that I have not spoke wide in describing that Wisdom and Acuteness which shines through the Words and Actions of these poor* Americans. *If all the World had access to the Books of Voyages, that are found in some well stock'd Libraries, they would find in above a hundred Descriptions of* Canada, *an infinity of Discourses and Arguments offer'd by the Savages, which are incomparably stronger, and more nervous than those I've inserted in my Memoirs.*

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n30/mode/2up?view=theater

But there are some among them that do not live so long, because they voluntarily shorten their Lives by poysoning themselves, as I shall shew you elsewhere. **In this Point they seem to join issue with *Zeno* and the *Stoicks*, who vindicate *Self-Murther*; and from thence I conclude, that the *Americans* are as great Fools as these great Philosophers.**

A Short View of the Humors and Customs of the SAVAGES.

The *Savages* are utter Strangers to distinctions of Property, for what belongs to one is equally anothers. If any one of them be in danger at the Beaver Hunting the rest fly to his Assistance without being so much as ask'd. If his Fusee bursts they are ready to offer him their own. If any of his Children be kill'd or taken by the Enemy, he is presently furnish'd with as many Slaves as he hath occasion for. Money is in use with none of them but those that are Christians, who live in the Suburbs of our towns. The others will not touch or so much as look upon Silver, but give it the odious Name of the *French Serpent*. They'l tell you that amongst us the People Murther, Plunder, Defame, and betray one another, for Money, that the Husbands make Merchandize of their Wives, and the Mothers of their Daughters, for the Lucre of that Metal. **They think it unaccountable that one Man should have more than another, and that the Rich should have more Respect than the Poor.** In short, they say, the name of Savages which we bestow upon them would fit our selves better, since there is nothing in our Actions that bears an appearance of Wisdom. Such as have been in *France* were continually teazing us with the Faults and Disorders they observ'd in our Towns, as being occasion'd by Money. **'Tis in vain to remonstrate to them how useful the Distinction of Property is for the support of a Society: They make a Jest of what's to be said on that Head.** In fine, they neither Quarrel nor Fight, nor Slander one another. They scoff at Arts and Sciences, and laugh at the difference of Degrees which is observ'd with us. **They brand us for Slaves, and call us miserable Souls, whose Life is not worth having, alledging, That we degrade our selves in subjecting our selves to one Man who possesses the whole Power, and is bound by no Law but his own Will;** That we have continual Jars among our selves; that our Children rebel against their Parents; that we Imprison one another, and publickly promote our own Destruction. **Besides, they value themselves above any thing that you can imagine, and this is the reason they always give for't, *That one's as much Master as another, and since Men are all made of the same Clay there should be no Distinction or Superiority among them.***

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n231/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> It was then that [Voltaire] wrote the following verses, which contain all that the revolutionary populace have alleged against the wealthy, the nobility, and kings, in proof of its equality.
>
> > **With calm indifference let my friend survey**
> > **The pomp of riches and despotic sway;**
> > This world's a ball, where his undazzled eyes
> > Pierce thro' each silly actor's vain disguise.
> > My Lord, your Highness, are the masks that hide
> > Their little beings and exalt their pride;

But, men are equal; pride do what you can,
The mask may differ but the same the man.
The five weak senses by us all possest,
Of good, of evil, are our only test.
A slave has five, *six can the Monarch claim*?
The same his body and his soul the same.11

This is precisely what the democratic rabble of Paris was wont to say, less elegantly indeed, when it asked whether kings and nobles were not made of the same clay as the simple clown? Whether those who enjoyed large fortunes had two stomachs? And of what use were all those distinctions of Sovereigns, Princes, or Chevaliers, since *all men were equal*?

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2464/2464-h/2464-h.htm#link2HCH0019

We must, therefore, I think, in order to be pardoned for our faults, commit new ones; redoubling the mischief, and multiplying fires and robberies; **and in doing this, endeavor to have as many companions as we can; for when many are in fault, few are punished; small crimes are chastised, but great and serious ones rewarded. When many suffer, few seek vengeance; for general evils are endured more patiently than private ones.** To increase the number of misdeeds will, therefore, make forgiveness more easily attainable, and will open the way to secure what we require for our own liberty. And it appears evident that the gain is certain; for our opponents are disunited and rich; their disunion will give us the victory, and their riches, when they have become ours, will support us. **Be not deceived about that antiquity of blood by which they exalt themselves above us; for all men having had one common origin, are all equally ancient, and nature has made us all after one fashion. Strip us naked, and we shall all be found alike.** Dress us in their clothing, and they in ours, we shall appear noble, they ignoble—for poverty and riches make all the difference.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n158/mode/2up?view=theater

Adario. **When you speak of *Man*, you ought to say *French-Man*; for you know that the Passions, the Interest, and the Corruption we speak of, are not known among us:** But that is not the Point I would be at. Do ye hear, my Brother, I have talk'd frequently to the *French* of all the Vices that reign among them; and when I have made it out that they have no regard to the *Laws* of their *Religion*, they confess'd that 'twas true, and that they saw it plainly and knew it to be so; but at the same time they said 'twas impossible for them to observe those Laws: Upon that I ask'd 'em if they did not believe then that their Souls would be doom'd to eternal Flames; and receiv'd this answer, *That the Mercy of God is so great, that whoever trusts in his Goodness shall be Saved; that the Gospel is a Covenant of Grace, in which God condescends to the Condition and Weakness of Man, who is tempted by so many violent and frequent Attractives, that he is forced to give way;* ***and that this World being a place of Corruption, there can be no Purity in Corrupt Man, unless it be in the Country where God resides*. This, I think, is a less rigid sort of Morality than that of the Jesuits, who send us to Hell for a Trifle. Your *French* Men have reason to say, *That 'tis impossible to keep that Law*; so long as the distinction of *Meum* and *Tuum* is kept up among you:** You need no other proof for this than the Example of all the Savages of *Canada*, who notwithstanding their Poverty are Richer than you, among whom all sorts of Crimes are committed upon the score of that *Meum* and *Tuum*.

Lahontan. **I own, my dear Brother, that thou'rt in the right of it; and I can't but admire the Innocence of all the Savage Nations: And 'tis for that reason that I earnestly wish they were acquainted with the Sanctity of our Scriptures, I mean, that Gospel that thou and I have talk'd so much of. There's nothing wanting but that to render their Souls Eternally Happy.** All of you live so Morally that you will then have but one Difficulty to surmount before you arrive at Paradise; I mean, that Customary Fornication that prevails amongst the single persons of both Sexes, and the liberty that the Men and the Women take in breaking their Marriage Bonds, in order to a Reciprocal Change, and a fresh Choice.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n190/mode/2up?view=theater

Then indeed I shall hope that you'll compleat your Reformation by degrees, that a levelling of Estates may gradually creep in among you; and that at last you'll abhor that thing call'd Interest, which occasions all the Mischief that *Europe* groans under. **When you arrive at that pitch, you'll have neither *Meum* nor *Tuum* to disturb you, but live as happily as the *Hurons*.**
…

Adario. **You fobb me off very prettily, truly, when you bring in your Gentlemen, your Merchants and your Priests. If you were Strangers to *Meum* and *Tuum*, those distinctions of Men would be sunk; a levelling equality would then take place among you as it now do's among the *Hurons*. For the first thirty years indeed, after the banishing of Interest, you would see a**

strange Desolation; those who are only qualify'd to eat, drink, sleep and divert themselves, would languish and die; but their Posterity would be fit for our way of living.
…

Now since we are capable of such things, what should hinder you to do the same, when Interest is laid aside? Are not your Bodies as large, strong and brawny as ours? Are not your Artisans imploy'd in harder and more difficult Work than ours? If you liv'd after our manner, all of you would be equally Masters; **your Riches would be of the same Stamp with ours, and consist in the purchasing of Glory by military Actions, and the taking of Slaves; for the more you took of them the less occasion you would have to Work:** In a word, you would live as happily as we do.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/600/mode/2up?view=theater

A *Spinosiste* writer who signally contributed to developing the radical conception of the unity and equality of mankind was Louis-Armand de Lom d'Arce, baron de Lahontan (1666-1715), a former army officer who spent some eleven years in French Canada, from 1683 to 1694, and who, after certain acts of subordination, had to flee not just Canada but the French empire, absconding to England and Holland **where he poured out his rancour against the French colonial system at The Hague, becoming one of the best-known writers on North American Indians of the Early Enlightenment.**44 His account of the Hurons, Iroquois, and other Canadian Indians, first published in 1703, and appearing in English in 1705 and German in 1709, **in several respects bears a striking resemblance to van den Enden's portrait of the Indians of New Netherland,** especially as regards their alleged ardour for liberty and equality and scorn for Europe's stratified society based on money, rank, and a hierarchy of orders.
…

Particularly 'insupportable,' in his opinion, was the clergy's campaign against books of which they disapproved, in an effort to confine all reading matter in Canada to works of Catholic devotion. The Indians, he maintains, especially blamed and deplored the clergy, lamenting the 'empire despotique' they exercised, by them, over both themselves, and the country generally.46 These were abuses which, in theory, could be corrected by the crown, and Lahontan himself does not directly challenge French royal possession of Canada as such.47 But, in places, **particularly the interpolations inserted in the 1705 edition, reported by Jean-Frédéric Bernard and others to be by Gueudeville,**48 the indictment extends further, to encompass colonial rule itself and subjection of native peoples by Europeans generally. As with van den Enden, Tyssot de Patot, Radicati, and Bernard, the case hinges on the concept of fundamental equality, **human reason being accounted an 'attribut essential de nôtre esprit,'** something universal among nations and peoples everywhere.49 In the dialogue between the baron and the Huron 'Adario,' heavily doctored, probably by Gueudeville, 'Adario' maintains that he and his people recognize no superior and no master, **living as they do 'sans subordination et dans une égalité parfaite.'** Hence, they are 'incomparablement plus nobles en cela' than the French nation which is nothing but a vast mass of slaves 'sous la volonté absolue d'un seul homme.'

Lahontan idealized Indian society as one based on equality and fully in accord with nature and, **like van den Enden before him, claimed the Indians despised Europeans for assigning much more to some than others and for deferring more to those who possess most than to anyone else.** Men being created equal by nature, the Huron and Iroquois, he reported, desired no distinction of ranks or subordination on their society.50 Indeed, exclaims the exiled baron, they thoroughly deride and ridicule 'le grande subordination qu'ils remarquent parmi nous.'51 The French king claimed sovereignty over Canada and hence over the Indians and the French living there. **Adario, who emerges here as a veritable anti-Hobbes,** expounding a rigorous positive naturalism, dismisses such claims as ridiculous as they are unjust. **By what right did Louis XIV acquire his pretended sovereignty over us? Have we sold ourselves to him? 'Avons-nous stipulé que nous lui obéïrons et qu'il nous protégeroit?'**52 Not at all. Rather it was the French who, without justification, came with their guns and 'usurped' lands belonging to the Indians since time immemorial, who, consequently, have every right to reverse matters and impose their rule on the Europeans.

All the Iroquois, claimed Lahontan, regarded themselves as 'aussi grands maîtres les uns que les autres,' saying that since all men are cut from the same block, there should not be any 'distinction ni de subordination entre eux.'53 Another conspicuous feature in Lahontan-Gueudeville is the alleged absence of superstition among the Amerindians. **Ridiculing Jesuit reports that the Iroquois shared in the demonology prevalent in Europe, these writers contend 'le Diable ne s'est jamais manifeste à ses Amériquians,' a claim also made earlier by van den Enden about the *naturellen*, as he calls the Indians of New Netherland.**54
…

Despite its marked utopian dimension, Lahontan's, Gueudeville's, and Bernard's construct was plainly designed to undermine Hobbes's emphatic separation of the 'state of nature' from life

in society, under a form of political organization, in effect to merge the two, to create a society close to the state of nature but harmonious and free of internal disputes, allowing maximum liberty to all.57 Herein lies its essentially radical and Spinozistic character.
…

A critical response to Lahontan's book in the *Histoire des ouvrages des savans* notes that Lahontan's Amerindians deride the Europeans' religion, supposedly amazed at French credulity in believing in the reported 'miracles du Vieux et du Nouveau Testament,' deeming this 'une simplicité dont les sauvages du Canada auroient honte'; this point was later recycled in 1751, by one of Diderot's assistants, the Abbé Pestré, in his contribution to the article 'Canadiens,' a piece heavily influenced by Lahontan's perspective, in the third volume of the *Encyclopédie*.59

The basic injustice of French royal and ecclesiastical 'tyranny' over the egalitarian, freedom-loving Iroquois and Hurons of the Great Lakes **is grounded by Lahontan and Gueudeville on arguments for the basic equality and unity of mankind** and republican rejection of monarchy itself. Both the colonial system and the specific 'tyranny' of the Catholic clergy ultimately rest, they contend, on the principle of royal absolutism. Hence in Canada, as in France, is it not the well-being of the nation 'qui est la loi suprême, c'est la volonté du monarque,' a wholly false principle from which the majority in society derive no benefit.60 Uninhibitedly criticizing France, **Gueudeville's 'Adario' is scornful that so large a nation should live under the will of a single man; indeed, he can conceive of nothing 'de plus bizarre, ni de plus contraire à la droite raison.'**61

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/580/mode/2up?view=theater

As originally published in two volumes at The Hague by the firm of L'Honoré, in the middle of 1702 (albeit with '1703' on the title-page), and reviewed in the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans* in August, Lahontan claimed the Indians 'se moquent des Chrétiens, qui sont escalaves les uns des autres, et qui ne peuvent vivre en société sans renoncer á leur liberté naturelle'29 and derided the credulity of Europeans concerning the miracles recounted in the Old and New Testaments.30
…

The Iroquois insist, contends Lahontan, that the existence of God 'étant inséparablement unie avec son essence, il contient tout, il paroît en tout, il agit en tout, et il donne le mouvement á toutes choses'.37 In effect, God, in their eyes, is identical to Nature; and if the jealous, providential God of the Christians is misconceived, the innumerable divisions and sects among them sufficiently prove that the Christian religion is not a God-given faith.38 **Nowhere, however, did it appear less likely that Lahontan faithfully recounted what he had heard from the Indians, rather than fabricating a radical philosophical construction of his own making,** than where he claimed they maintain that mankind should never discard the advantages of 'reason' when discussing religion, since it is the most noble faculty which God has given us.39

In his catalogue of early eighteenth-century forms of impiety in Germany, Loescher classifies Lahontan as not just one of the prime perpetrators of a Spinozistic conception of God, an unbeliever who expressly elevates reason above Revelation,40 but also, together with Van Dale and Bekker, among the foremost deniers of magical power and the existence of spirits and Satan.41 Indeed, Lahontan emphatically rejects the prevailing notion, found in many books, that the Canadian Indians fervently acknowledged the existence of the Devil.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/594/mode/2up?view=theater

At one point in his most successful fictional work, published around 1714, the *Adventures of Jacques Massé*, Tyssot's hero is imprisoned in the Inquisition dungeons at Goa. There he meets an extraordinary Chinese prisoner who speaks Portuguese and had once been a Catholic, having as a youth been educated by Jesuit missionaries. **The Chinese teaches that all men are equal and, having learnt from bitter experience what harm religious bigotry does, abjures all denominational creeds, including the name of 'Christian,' preferring to label himself a 'universaliste,' or devotee of the religion 'des honnêtes gens.'**
…

Tyssot's Chinese, as a professed *universaliste*, makes no distinctions of a qualitative kind between one society, people, or religion and another: for there are no peoples without both beauties and blemishes, nor any religions, 'et je suis persuadé,' he says, that there is no path by which 'l'on ne se puisse damner ou sauver.'21 This concept pervades his moral philosophy and, **just in case any reader had missed the point, the profession of this inspiring *universaliste*, we are told, was that of grinding lenses for microscopes,** by which labour Spinoza had earned his bread.22

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37400/37400-h/37400-h.htm#CHAP_XIV

> Of what Religion are you, *said I*? I am, said he, *a Universalist*, or of the Religion of honest Men. I love God with all my Heart, I fear him, I worship him, and I endeavour to do to all Men without Exception what I wish they would do to me. All that's very good, *said I*, but you are undoubtedly of some Communion. People seldom attain to your Age, but they declare for a certain Party or Sect. Not I, *said he*, **I make no difference between one Society or Denomination and another; there is not one but has its Beauties and its Blemishes, and I am persuaded there is none in which a Man may not either be sav'd or damn'd.** Verily, *said I*, what you say confirms me in the Opinion I have had a long Time, that there is not a greater Variety in Faces than there is in Sentiments. This is true, *reply'd he*, not only with regard to every Man in particular, but with Regard to every Day of one's Life; **what we thought of Yesterday in one Light, we look upon to-day in another,** and the Mind as well as the Body is subject to a thousand Alterations.
> ...
>
> If ever I get out of their Clutches, *reply'd he*, I assure you I'll never get in again. I have, Thanks to God, wherewithal to live at Home, and can do very well after the manner I propose to myself, and even tho' our Domestic Affairs should not find me Employment, as long as my Father is living, I can spend my Time in making Telescopes and Microscopes.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Tindal,_Matthew

According to his own account he had been brought up in high-church principles, and the 'Roman emissaries,' who were busy at the time, convinced him that upon those principles there was no logical defence for the Anglican schism. On 'going into the world,' however, he was impressed by the denunciations of priestcraft in favour with the opposite party, and became alive to the 'absurdities of popery.'
...

In 1730 he published the book by which he is best known, 'Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature.' **The title expresses the contention of the contemporary deists, and the book marked the culminating point of the controversy to which these writings gave rise.** It received a great number of answers; more than thirty are given in the catalogue of the British Museum. Tindal called himself a 'Christian deist,' and made formal professions of accepting Christianity as a 'most holy religion.' **There could be no doubt, however, that his aim was to show that any positive revelation was superfluous.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica,_Ninth_Edition/Tindal,_Matthew

TINDAL, Matthew (1656-1733), one of the ablest and most popular of the English deists, the son of a clergyman, was born at Beer Ferris, Devonshire, in 1656. **He studied law at Lincoln College, Oxford, where he came under the influence of the High Churchman George Hickes, dean of Worcester;** and in his twenty-second year he was elected fellow of All Souls College, and held his fellowship till his death. About 1685 he saw "that upon his High Church notions a separation from the Church of Rome could not be justified," and accordingly he joined the latter.
...

The first of his two larger works, ***The Rights of the Christian Church asserted against the Romish and all other priests who claim an independent power over it,*** part i., appeared anonymously in 1706 (2d ed., 1706; 3d, 1707; 4th, 1709). The book was regarded in its day as an extremely forcible defence of the Erastian theory of the supremacy of the state over the church, and at once provoked a storm of counter-argument and abuse on the part of those who maintained the independent rights and authority of the church.
...

In this tract[1] he makes a valiant defence of the deists and of the use of reason in religious matters, and anticipates here and there his *Christianity as Old as the Creation; or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature*, London, 1730 (2d ed., 1731; 3d, 1732; 4th, 1733), **which was regarded by friends and foes alike as the "Bible" of deism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vXFOAAAAcAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP22#v=onepage&q&f=false

IT is now, as I guess, **between eleven and twelve Years, [1696-97]** since Dr. *Tyndal* express'd himself to me at *All Souls College*, in such manner, as I related to Mr. F. ... concerning Religion.
...

To which he added, *That he made no doubt, but that within such a Number of Years*, as he then mentioned, and I do not now distinctly remember, *all Men of Sense would settle in Natural Religion*.

> https://www.samizdat.qc.ca/arts/lit/PDFs/Abolishing_Christianity_JS.pdf **[1708]**

> **And yet the curious may please to observe, how much the genius of a nation is liable to alter in half an age.** I have heard it affirmed for certain, by some very old people, that the contrary opinion was, even in their memories, as much in vogue, as the other is now; **and that a project for the abolishing of Christianity, would then have appeared as singular, and been thought as absurd, as it would be, at this time, to write or discourse in its defence.**
> …
>
> **Would any indifferent foreigner, who should read the trumpery lately written by Asgil, Tindal, Toland, Coward, and forty more, imagine the Gospel to be our rule of faith, and confirmed by Parliaments?**
> …
>
> **So it is recorded, that [the Jesuits] have at sundry times appeared in the disguise of Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Independents, and Quakers,** according as any of these were most in credit; so, since the fashion has been taken up of exploding religion, the Popish missionaries have not been wanting to mix with the Freethinkers; among whom Toland, the great oracle of the Anti-Christians, is an Irish priest, the son of an Irish priest; **and the most learned and ingenious author of a book, called the "Rights of the Christian Church," was in a proper juncture reconciled to the Romish faith,** whose true son, as appears by a hundred passages in his treatise, he still continues.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q&f=false

For tactical purposes, Tindal avowed that his aim was to conserve the Protestant Reformation's basic gains against the ravages of priestly ambition. But few doubted that behind this screen, Tindal was among the most articulate and systematic advocates of the early eighteenth-century "religion of nature." He was one of those who helped turn the young Benjamin Franklin into a convinced "deist" already at the age of 17.36
…

Especially outrageous to moderate Whigs as well as Tories and High Churchmen, was that in *The Rights* civil and church authority, as constituted by Parliament after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, were "assaulted" together.44 "**Kings and Queens," complained one detractor, "are but their [i.e. the people's] creatures, made by 'em and for 'em …" with the consequence that "noblemen and gentlemen, deriving their honours from Kings and Queens, are but creatures of a creature from the people; for were the people made for noblemen and gentlemen, any more than for Kings and Queens?"**45 **Tindal's political creed plainly repudiated Locke's focus on "property" as the basis of civil rights and spurned his *supra rationem*.** *The Rights* pronounced it impossible for two independent sources of authority, material and spiritual, to exist, as there can never be any independent power over others in religious matters. **Since there can be only one authority in society, "nothing can be plainer than that all ecclesiastical power has no other foundation than the consent of the society."**46
…

Among the full-scale rebuttals that of the London editor William Oldisworth (1680-1734), an Oxford-educated Tory son of a Hampshire vicar, remarks that the author "has thought fit to found his whole hypothesis upon Mr Hobb's state of nature." Yet the core of his doctrine, Oldisworth also noted, his claiming the "state of nature" is "much wider than is generally imagin'd," and his discarding compacts and contracts to transfer legitimate power,56 diverged markedly from what readers normally gathered from Hobbes and Locke. **Especially un-Hobbesian, noted Oldisworth, anxious to ensure no political faction ever took root in England fed on such appallingly subversive principles, was that the author's "state of nature" was less "quarrelsome" than Hobbes's, indeed by comparison "very peaceable**," without that brutal war of all against all for which Hobbes was notorious.57 The reason for entering into civil society – to defend, stabilize and protect natural rights – according to this disturbing new doctrine was the sole legitimating principle in politics **and its effect is to delegitimize and render secondary and derivative monarchy, nobility, ancient constitutions, existing laws and all precedent, laws, institutions, and churches.**

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP64#v=onepage&q&f=false

From hence it proceeds, **that we see so many crawling backward with Dr. *Tindal*'s Cancer-motions from Christianity to Paganism, from Revealed Religion to the Light of Nature; as he, who said, *he went with more Devotion to a Flower in his Garden to Worship God there, than he went to Worship him at the Altar*.** And from hence, it also proceeds, that so many otherwise at difference among themselves, have happen'd to agree win Commending **that master-piece of Satan, the *Book of Rights*, which is written with all Contrivance, to please, not only the common Enemies of Christianity, but all Sects, and Heresies, that in any wise pretend to be Christians, though unworthy of that Name. The *Scepticks*, and *Latitudinarians* praise it, because it is the**

***Common-Place* of all the Free-Thinkers, the very Sink, into which are emptied all the *large Thoughts* of our Modern *Eleutheropolitans*, who for above forty Years have been endeavouring to set Mankind free from the old, received, narrow, slavish Principles,** and above all, from that of the necessity of a Priesthood, and Revealed Religion, under which the Christian World hath groaned for seventeen hundred Years.

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA42#v=onepage&q&f=false

***Hobbs*, And *Spinoza* do solemnly bind the people singly to an exact External Compliance,** with the Religious Rites, Ceremonies, Worship, &*c*. Establish'd and Practis'd in the Common-wealth, by the Legislative Authority, under Penalty of Transgressing the Laws of God and Man, and of being cut off from the Civil Society: On the contrary, our Author [*Tindal*] not only exempts the People from that Complyance, but even teaches 'em, that they have a Natural Inherent Right to defend *by Arms*, the Free and Publick Profession and Practice of those indifferent Matters, of whatever Religious Rites and Tenets they think fit, either to invite, or to chuse. **Herein therefore the difference upon this Head betwixt those Authors, does precisely consist, *viz*. That *Hobbs* and *Spinoza* would have the People to be a *Pack of Lying, Hypocritical, Conscientiousless Knaves*: And that our Author would have 'em to be a *Rabble* of *Stubborn* and *Ranck Rebels*.** The one or the other they must necessarily be, as to any External Religious Profession; and as to any Internal Belief, *downright Atheists*, according to the darling Hypothesis of those Authors.

But then the Preservation and Safety of the Common-wealth, being the main thing which those Men of *Matter* profess and pretend to secure, and Religion, whether Internal or External, being with them a merely indifferent Business; ***Hobbs* and *Spinoza* have not dar'd, neither indeed were they altogether such silly unthinking Coxcombs, as Publickly, and in Print, to court and press the Mobb to Rebellion, by the strongest Motives imaginable,** to wit, by a *Natural Inalienable Right*, even upon the account of such *things* as they themselves taught to be *merely indifferent*, of little or no moment at all. This equally surprizing and mischievous Attempt has been, it seems, reserved for our Author.

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

For he tells Her Majesty, on the one hand, That She has Right, Power, and Authority to punish the People when they act contrary to Her Laws; and on the other, he informs the People, That they have likewise a Natural Inherent Right to punish their Vice-god, or Her Majesty, when they judge She acts contrary to the End for which they entrusted Her with the Legislative Power. **Now this is exactly *to banter the Vice-god* with the same *Conditions that* Trincalo *allowed to his Rival* Stephano, when he told him, *Thou shalt indeed be* Vice-roy *over me, provided I be* Vice-roy *over thee.***

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

If the contagion propagated by *The Rights* was essentially foreign, the most resolute effort to uncover the sources of Tindal's radicalism was that by an Irish ex-priest converted to High Church Anglicanism, William Carroll (dates unknown), reinforced by his mentor and ally, George Hickes (1642-1715), a former High Anglican Dean of Worcester compelled to resign, in 1690, for refusing to recognize William III's enthronement.70 Carroll and Hickes entitled their joint refutation *Spinoza Reviv'd or, A Treatise proving the Book intitled The Rights of the Christian Church* […] *to be the same with Spinoza's Rights of the Christian Clergy* (London, 1709). Actually, Carroll and Hickes wrongly inferred that the 162-page anonymous radical text published in 1665 that they highlighted – *De Jure Ecclesiasticorum* – issued from Spinoza's pen.71 **It was a common misattribution encountered earlier in Bayle's *Dictionnaire*,** and in subsequent eighteenth-century histories of thought like Giambattista Capasso's *Historiae Philosophiae Synopsis* (Naples, 1728),72 **though some early eighteenth-century authorities disagreed with this attribution given this text's distinctive Latin style and reference to God as "Deus optimus maximus," a term Spinoza never uses.**
…

Still, the important point is that like Bayle and Baumgarten, Carroll and Hickes rightly identified the text's political theory as quintessentially Spinozist;74 Carroll and Hickes showed, by comparing parallel passages, that *De Jure* was indeed the primary source from where Tindal derives his argument.
…

Tindal's primary concepts – "God," "soul," "Christ," man, "spirit of Christ," "spirit of God," state of nature, "natural rights of mankind" – all stemmed directly from the one-substance doctrine expounded in *De Jure Ecclesiasticorum*.76
…

Who did write *De Jure* remains still today unknown. Sometimes attributed to Meyer, it undoubtedly sprang from the *cercle spinoziste* and was printed clandestinely, by an unknown publisher employing

fictitious details on the title-page, with the place of publication given as “Alethopolis” [i.e. Eleutheropolis or “Freedom-city” (hence Amsterdam)].78
…

***De Jure* relies heavily on the claim that all inequality of status, authority, and privilege, including all ecclesiastical establishment, stems exclusively from human rather than divine government, that “aequalitatem omnium hominum naturalem status civilis constitutione in privatis non mutari”**82 **which Carroll rendered as the “natural equality of mankind is not in private persons chang’d by the institution of a commonwealth.”** Since all institutionalized “inequality betwixt man and man, in the civil society, is descended or deriv’d from the vice-gods [i.e. those men speaking for the gods]” and as there cannot be two independent powers in the same society, all differentiated status is exclusively man-made and men’s rights in the state of nature remain intact after formation of the state.83 It is from the secular power alone, contends *De Jure*, that the delegated authority of the representatives of the gods presiding over civil society, that is the clergy’s status “deriv’d, no less, nor otherwise, than that of the other civilians;” as Carroll renders the passage, hence, “there is no difference between the latter and the former.”84

Neither in the Old Testament nor the New does one find any statement delegating jurisdiction over others to priests. Here as with their “universal, impartial, inviolable toleration in matters of religion,” notes Carroll, **“you see all this is bottom’d upon those men’s favourite principle, to wit, That as to matters of conscience, or religion, mankind is actually in their state of nature, wherein every man has an equal, natural, inalienable, inherent right, to believe, or not to believe whatever he pleases.”**85 Individuals are free, there is only one source of legitimate power in society, and churches have no divinely-given independent authority over anyone. **As “all power is originally in, and immediately from the people,” as Carroll summarizes Tindal, “they are the unappealable judges, judges in the last resort,”** so that the individuals constituting society remain “in a state of nature with relation to religious matters,” everyone having natural right “inalienable right to chuse, believe, profess, etc. whatever religion they please,” while retaining the right to take up arms to defend their natural rights, equality, and liberty in whatever respect these are infringed by any authority whatsoever. In the *statu civili* the basic equality reigning among men in the state of nature is conserved only now in a more orderly, structured way than before.86

These principles apply generally throughout the world, affirms *De Jure*, without special reference to any particular society; they are the quintessence of all societies.

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The Framers were determined to gain legitimacy for the Constitution from a trans-historical sovereign in a one-time event that would be difficult to duplicate. **Once the metaphysical People had spoken in the ratifying conventions, they were collectively to go on a permanent vacation, just as the textbook god of the Deists was supposed to do.** Unlike children, who were to be seen but not heard, the People were to be neither seen nor heard after 1788.
…

This praise of the People had been prominent in Protestant political theory since at least the sixteenth century, but it had been offset by the Christian doctrine of the Creator God. He was seen as both the initiating authority and the final authority. Men had long debated over who held lawful claim to be God’s final earthly authority, but there had been no doubt that this final earthly authority was under God. **But in the early eighteenth century, this assumption steadily disappeared in the writings of the Commonwealthmen, especially in the popular newspaper, *Cato’s Letters*.** The language of divinity is applied to the People in this 1721 essay on libel:

> I have long thought, that the World are very much mistaken in their Idea and Distinction of Libels. It has been hitherto generally understood that there were no other Libels but those against Magistrates, and those against private Men: Now, to me there seems to be a third Sort of Libels, full as destructive as any of the former can possibly be; I mean, Libels against the People. **It was otherwise at *Athens* and *Rome*; where, though particular Men, and even great Men, were often treated with much Freedom and Severity, when they deserved it; yet the People, the Body of the People, were spoken of with the utmost Regard and Reverence:** *The sacred Privileges of the People, The inviolable Majesty of the People, The awful Authority of the People, and The unappealable Judgment of the People.*25

Notice the final phrase: the unappealable judgment of the People. This is the essence of the divine right philosophy: a final, *unitary* court of earthly appeal. But in this case, there is no heavenly court of transcendent appeal.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPQR#Historical_context

> The title's date of establishment is unknown, but it first appears in inscriptions of the Late Republic, from c. 80 BC onwards. Previously, the official name of the Roman state, as evidenced on coins, was simply *ROMA*. **The abbreviation last appears on coins of Constantine the Great** (ruled 312-337 AD), the first Roman emperor to support Christianity.
>
> The two legal entities mentioned, *Senātus* and the *Populus Rōmānus*, are sovereign when combined. **However, where *populus* is sovereign alone, *Senātus* is not.**
> ...
>
> **The Roman people appear very often in law and history in such phrases as *dignitās*, *maiestās*, *auctoritās*, *lībertās populī Rōmānī*, the "dignity, majesty, authority, freedom of the Roman people".** They were a *populus līber*, "a free people". There was an *exercitus, imperium, iudicia, honorēs, consulēs, voluntās* of this same *populus*: "the army, rule, judgments, offices, consuls and will of the Roman people". They appear in early Latin as *Popolus* and *Poplus*, so the habit of thinking of themselves as free and sovereign was quite ingrained.
>
> **The Romans believed that all authority came from the people. It could be said that similar language seen in more modern political and social revolutions directly comes from this usage.** People in this sense meant the whole government. The latter, however, was essentially divided into the aristocratic Senate, whose will was executed by the consuls and praetors, and the *comitia centuriāta*, "committee of the centuries", whose will came to be safeguarded by the Tribunes.
>
> One of the ways the emperor Commodus (180-192) paid for his donatives and mass entertainments was to tax the senatorial order, and on many inscriptions, the traditional order is provocatively reversed (*Populus Senatusque...*).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Gordon,_Thomas_(d.1750)

GORDON, THOMAS (d. 1750), miscellaneous writer, was born in Kirkcudbright about the end of the seventeenth century. He is said to have been educated at some Scottish university. **If a 'disputatio juridica' be rightly attributed to him in the catalogue of the British Museum, he became an advocate at the Scottish bar in 1716.**

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1882822.pdf

Be that as it may, however, it is evident from a study of Trenchard and Gordon's work that they were both steeped in a natural law tradition that encompassed Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, Selden, Locke and Hobbes and that they utilised both civic humanist and classic liberal arguments and seem to have seen no contradiction in running the two in tandem. **There is undoubtedly an apparent incompatibility between the two languages. As Pocock would have it, 'the basic concept in republican thinking is *virtus*; the basic concept of all jurisprudence is necessarily *ius*; and there is no known way of representing virtue as a right.'**27

https://books.google.fi/books?id=hubETx7a6oYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false

Confronted, as Cato saw it, by Jacobite counterrevolution and High Church clericalist counterreformation, Trenchard and Gordon abandoned Old Whig constitutionalist positions and endorse illiberal court Whig executive measures to preserve the Hanoverian monarchy from its Tory enemies.8 *Cato's Letters*, therefore, can be seen as ultimately a loyalist work supporting the Hanoverian court, as indeed Thomas Gordon said it was ("The Preface," *Cato's Letters*, 13-14, 24). **Trenchard and Gordon are notable for having produced the "most Erastian and anti-clerical literature of the age"**9 and anti-clericalism has been seen as central to Cato's political project.10

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cato%27s_Letters/Letter_45

SIR, **Men are naturally equal, and none ever rose above the rest but by force or consent:** No man was ever born above all the rest, nor below them all; and therefore there never was any man in the world so good or so bad, so high or so low, but he had his fellow. **Nature is a kind and benevolent parent; she constitutes no particular favourites with endowments and privileges above the rest;** but for the most part sends all her offspring into the world furnished with the elements of understanding and strength, to provide for themselves: She gives them heads to consult their own security, and hands to execute their own counsels; **and according to the use that they make of their faculties, and of the opportunities that they find, degrees of power and names of distinction grow amongst them, and their natural equality is lost.**

Thus nature, who is their parent, deals with men: But fortune, who is their nurse, is not so benevolent and impartial; she acts wantonly and capriciously, often cruelly; and counterplotting justice as well as nature, frequently sets the fool above the wise man, and the best below the worst.

And from hence it is, that the most part of the world, **attending much more to the noisy conduct and glaring effects of fortune, than to the quiet and regular proceedings of nature,** are misled in their

judgment upon this subject: They confound fortune with nature, and too often ascribe to natural merit and excellency the works of contrivance or chance. This however, shews that reason and equity run in our heads, while we endeavour to find a just cause for things that are not just; and this is the source of the reverence which we pay to men whom fortune sometimes lifts on high, though nature had placed them below.
...

That nature has made men equal, we know and feel; and when people come to think otherwise, there is no excess of folly and superstition which they may not be brought to practise. Thus they have made gods of dead men, and paid divine honours to many while they were yet living: They saw them to be but men, yet they worshipped them as gods. And even they who have not gone quite so far, have yet, by their wild notions of inequality, done as much mischief; they have made men, and often wicked men, to be vice-gods; **and then made God's power (falsely so called) as irresistible in the hands of men as in his own, and much more frightful.**

It is evident to common sense, that there ought to be no inequality in society, but for the sake of society; but these men have made one man's power and will the cause of all men's misery. They gave him as far as they could the power of God, without obliging him to practise the mercy and goodness of God.

Those that think themselves furthest above the rest, are generally by their education below them all. They are debased by a conceit of their greatness: **They trust to their blood; which, speaking naturally, gives them no advantage; and neglect their mind, which alone, by proper improvements, sets one man above another. It is not blood or nature, but art or accident, which makes one man excel others. Aristotle, therefore, must either have been in jest, when he said, that he, who naturally excelled all others, ought to govern all; or said it to flatter his pupil and prince, Alexander the Great.** It is certain, that such a man never yet was found in the world, and never will be found till the end of it. Alexander himself, notwithstanding the greatness of his spirit, and his conquests, had in his own army, and perhaps among the common soldiers, men naturally as great and brave as himself, and many more wise.

Whoever pretends to be naturally superior to other men, claims from nature what she never gave to any man. He sets up for being more than a man; a character with which nature has nothing to do. She has thrown her gifts in common amongst us; and as the highest offices of nature fall to the share of the mean as well as of the great, her vilest offices are performed by the great as well as by the mean: **Death and diseases are the portion of kings as well as of clowns; and the corpse of a monarch is no more exempted from stench and putrefaction, than the corpse of a slave.**

> *Mors aequo pulsat pede*.

...

If my father got an estate and title by law or the sword, I may by virtue of his will or his patent enjoy his acquisition; but if I understand neither law nor the sword, I can derive honour from neither: My honour therefore is, in the reason of things purely nominal; and I am still by nature a plebeian, as all men are.

There is nothing moral in blood, or in title, or in place: Actions only, and the causes that produce them, are moral. **He therefore is best that does best.** Noble blood prevents neither folly, nor lunacy, nor crimes: but frequently begets or promotes them: And noblemen, who act infamously, derive no honour from virtuous ancestors, whom they dishonour. A man who does base things, is not noble; nor great, if he do little things: **A sober villager is a better man than a debauched lord; an honest mechanick than a knavish courtier.**

> ***———Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.***
> ———————————————————————
> *Prima mihi debes animi bona; sanctus haberi*
> *Justitiaeque tenax factis dictisque mereris?*
>
> JUV. SAT. 8

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT570#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Here again, Spinoza employs the term “common people” not in the usual sense to denote the ordinary, poor, and lacking in status, but in his special philosophical sense shared by his circle, reminiscent of the medieval Averroists and Maimonides.** Adriaan Koerbagh assures readers in the *Bloemhof* that everybody is “ignoble,” whatever their lineage, if they are ignorant and lack knowledge of the reality of things, and inserts a special footnote about this in his *A Light Shining in Dark Places* (1668): **“I take ordinary people here to mean not lowly people poor in money and status but rather common people in [terms of] knowledge, judgement, and use of learning whether they are noblemen or ignoble, rich or poor.”**

https://www.brepolsonline.net/doi/pdf/10.5555/M.EER-EB.4.00046

As the American historian Clinton Rossiter once noted, **‘no one can spend any time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realizing that *Cato’s Letters* rather**

than Locke's *Civil Government* was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period'.27

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1xxgAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cler. Manners! O my Sides! Why you are the most unmannerly of all Sects: So unmannerly, that there is no living with you; and all that do, despise you.

Qua. Friend, I in particular have given thee no Cause for thy Accusation, nor for thy Contempt; and what thou sayest of us in general, thou sayest passionately, and it comes from Prejudice, or ill Information. **In *Pensilvania*, where we have the Power, we do not molest nor revile any Man of any Religion;** and thou thy self, for all thy intemperate Spirit, mightest live there with full Freedom.

Cler. I live amongst you! I live amongst Fanaticks!

Qua. I do not invite thee. There are no Tithes there to allure, but there are *Indians* to convert. How likest thou the Employment, and the Terms thereof?
...

Qua. So I would, if my Affairs would let me; as I might here, under the Protection of the Law, if thou wouldst let me. **Let me tell thee, Friend, for the Credit of the Quakers Government in *Pensilvania*, there is not a more thriving Colony in *America*. They encourage and protect all Men, and persecute none: They are friendly to the savage *Indians*, who come freely into their Houses by Day, and by Night;** and any Man in a Quaker's Habit may travel safely and singly through all the Nations of *North America*, who will be ready to receive and assist him.

Cler. The Quakers are obliged to live peaceably with their Neighbours: You know they must not fight.

Qua. Knowest thou any better way to avoid fighting, than a peaceable Spirit? And ought not all Men to avoid fighting? The Quakers, since their first Establishment there, have had no Wars: **It is not so in *New England*, where Men, like thee, are for spiritual Dominion, and trust to the Sword. There they use the poor Natives ill, who therefore make frequent Incursions upon them.** Men who will take away by Violence the Lands and Goods of others, and domineer over them, must fight to defend what they do. The Quakers have hurt no Man, and no Man offers to hurt them.

Cler. **Commend me to their human Prudence! The Quakers will make no Man their Enemy by their Zeal for Christianity.**

Qua. Friend, thy Abuse ends in Praise. The Quakers use no Man as an Enemy for his Religion; and they who do, have not Zeal, but Fury and Fanaticism. Our Saviour and his Apostles had no such Zeal.

https://thehistoryofparliament.wordpress.com/2019/03/07/bolingbrokes-reflections-upon-exile/

Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751) was one of the most prominent public figures in Britain in the first half of the eighteenth century, being ubiquitous in both political and intellectual life between entering Parliament in 1701 and the posthumous publication of his collected *Works* in 1754.
...

Bolingbroke's *Reflections upon Exile* was printed as the second piece in the first volume of his collected works in 1754, edited by his literary executor, the Scottish poet David Mallet. It had been published for the first time two years before together with the *Letters on the Use and Study of History.* Mallet's edition dated the *Reflections* as 1716, **but a letter to Jonathan Swift in January 1722, where Bolingbroke said that he had just completed his treatise on exile, suggests that it is a later production.**

Whether it was written in 1716 or in the early 1720s, it remains one of Bolingbroke's earliest writings and probably one of his first, if not his very first, philosophical text. Previously, he had written mainly occasional poetry and on politics. It was written in a period when Bolingbroke was in enforced exile in France. **As a leading minister in Queen Anne's Tory ministry between 1710 and 1714, Bolingbroke had negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 which ended Britain's involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession.** After the death of the queen and the accession of George I, who, as Elector of Hanover, viewed the Peace of Utrecht as a betrayal of Britain's continental allies, the Tories, who were the peace party, were turned out and the Whigs returned to power. As a result of the Whigs' vindictive behaviour (not unusual in eighteenth-century politics when ministries changed hands), Bolingbroke
lost his nerve and went into exile in France. There he was approached by exiled Jacobites and not long after he accepted the position of Secretary of State to James Francis Edward Stuart, the Pretender, serving the Jacobites during the botched 'Fifteen' rebellion. Bolingbroke took much of the flak for the failed rising and was dismissed from the Stuart court in 1716. **From then on, he would be mocked by the Whigs for having betrayed two kings in the space of one year.**

…

When **Edmund Burke** **wrote in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790): "Who now reads Bolingbroke, whoever read him through?"**, he was indeed referring to Bolingbroke's philosophical works, and in particular his anti-clerical ones, as Burke would have known that Bolingbroke's political writings were still widely read and cited. **Having previously engaged closely with Bolingbroke's political journalism, David Hume was disparaging about Bolingbroke's philosophical works when they appeared for the first time in the 1750s.** On the other side of the spectrum, Samuel Johnson told James Boswell that Bolingbroke

> ***was a scoundrel, and a coward: a scoundrel for charging a blunderbuss against religion and morality; a coward, because he had not resolution to fire it off himself, but left half a crown to a beggarly Scotchman [Mallet], to draw the trigger after his death!***

In his *Dictionary,* published the year after Bolingbroke's collected *Works,* he gave the example of irony that "Bolingbroke was a pious man." Bolingbroke's political career, and especially his Jacobite episode in 1715-16, gave him a great deal of notoriety, but it was actually his posthumous philosophical works which were most controversial in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Bolingbroke's *Reflections upon Exile* have often been dismissed as simply an imitation of Seneca, who is frequently cited in the text (along with others). **Much of the text is indeed borrowed from Seneca's *Consolation,* which the Roman had written to his mother when he had been exiled by the Emperor Caligula.** The thrust of Bolingbroke's argument is the same as Seneca's: one should not let one's happiness be dependent on external events or one's environment. It is our character and qualities which will determine how external events affect us, and they will have little impact indeed for the virtuous.

But even if much of the content of the *Reflections* was heavily inspired by and in part an imitation of Seneca's Stoicism, Bolingbroke added his own gloss by concluding that

> ***in truth there is not so much difference between stoicism reduced to intelligible terms, and genuine orthodox epicureanism, as is imagined.***

It was simply 'rivalship' which exaggerated the difference between the two 'sects'. The reason why they, in practice, amounted to the same thing was that living a virtuous life was the highest form of pleasure, and no one could ignore the pleasures of the body. **Bolingbroke hails Aristotle for having taken 'a middle way… and placed happiness in the joint advantages of the mind, of the body, and of fortune', although Bolingbroke stressed that the last was not equal to the other two.** Thus exile, although it had taken Bolingbroke's title and estate away from him, was not a disaster because he could still enjoy the advantages of the mind *and* the body.

This argument about the harmony between Stoicism and Epicureanism is very important for eighteenth-century thought. Its depiction as a clash between Stoicism and Epicureanism has been dominant in recent work on the history of eighteenth-century political philosophy, but much of this debate has been a red herring.

> https://biblehub.com/acts/17-18.htm
>
> **Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, encountered him.**
>
> http://www.racerealist.com/yockey_2.htm
>
> **Here Liberalism found its two poles of thought: economics and ethics. They correspond to individual and humanity.** The ethics of course is purely social, materialistic; **if older ethics is retained, its former metaphysical foundation is forgotten,** and it is promulgated as a social, and not a religious, imperative. **Ethics is necessary to maintain the order necessary as a framework for economic activity.** Within that framework, however, "individual" must be "free." This is the great cry of Liberalism, "freedom." Man is only himself, and is not tied to anything except by choice. Thus "society" is the "free" association of men and groups. The State, however, is un-freedom, compulsion, violence. The Church is spiritual un-freedom.

https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc663317/m2/1/high_res_d/1002773715-Camp.pdf

The intemperance of Lord Bolingbroke was not confined to overindulging in drink or to chasing women. **It manifested itself also as certain stoical concepts--such as indifference to fame and fortune--which Bolingbroke purported to embrace.** To this intemperance of mind Swift was as opposed as to intemperance of body. He had no patience with anybody who pretended to be indifferent to the world and who affected to be content with the barest necessities--especially if that person were the immoderate Viscount Bolingbroke. **Bolingbroke might write *Reflections upon Exile* in the manner of Seneca, he might disdain fame and**

ambition, and he might say that money was not important. Pope could be impressed (or pretend to be impressed) by the reconstructed Bolingbroke: "Lord B. is the most *Improv'd Mind* since you saw him, that ever was without shifting into a new body or being Paullo minus ab angelis."1 Swift was unmoved.
...

During this same period—that is, after his attainder and before his pardon—Bolingbroke wrote *Reflections upon Exile*, *Reflections Concerning Innate Moral Principles*, and *A Letter Occasioned by One of Archbishop Tillotson's Sermons*. 38 T**he first of these, an imitation of Seneca's *De Consolatio ad Helviam*, shows Bolingbroke in his stoical mood.**39 **In the second, he tries to find a respectable substitute for the Bible as a basis of morality.**40 And in the third, he attempts to show that the writings of Moses cannot be deemed historical41 and that the Old Testament cannot have been written under divine influence.42
...

One of Bolingbroke's methods was to borrow from greater thinkers than himself such of their ideas as he needed to support his own preconceptions,62 **and then, having taken what he needed, to reject as much of the rest of their philosophy as did not suit his purposes.** For example, Bolingbroke accepted Hobbes's idea that will is the source of moral law, but rejected that philosopher's contention that the possessor of that will is the civil authority.63 **Bolingbroke advocated the idea of the Great Chain of Being, one of the central concepts of the Platonists,**64 **and yet he rejected vehemently most of the teachings of Plato and of the disciples of Plato.**65
...

Bolingbroke professed to find other acceptable natural religions in ancient China and in ancient Egypt.102 That Bolingbroke valued Christianity only for its system of ethics is further shown by his rejection of certain ideas central to orthodox Christianity, namely, the validity of revelation and the immortality of the human soul.103
...

And, according to Bolingbroke, the Christian was soon busy believing a host of new doctrines, for the Church Fathers' insistence on a metaphysical interpretation of Christ's teachings led to a burgeoning of pernicious theology. An orthodox Christian might be startled to learn that among these pernicious doctrines Bolingbroke included "the trinity, the coeternity, the coequality, in a word the sameness of the son with the father, the procession of the holy ghost from the father and the son, the fires of purgatory, and the real corporeal presence of Christ in the eucharisty."109

However, despite Bolingbroke's misgivings about the validity of orthodox Christianity, **one of his strongest and most persistent loyalties was to the Church of England. The oddity is not so great as it may at first appear.** Certainly Bolingbroke's devotion to the English Church was not founded on reverence for its doctrines and ritual. Rather, he supported the Church because most of his countrymen did--that is, he supported it for political reasons. Also, he always recognized that the Church, corrupt as it might be, served a useful political function by encouraging public and private morality, and by inclining people to obey the law.110 **He said, "To make government effectual to all the good purposes of it, there must be a religion; this religion must be national and this national religion must be maintained in reputation and reverence."**111 **Moreover, he said that something as politically important as religion could not be left to the clergy, but must be controlled by the state.**112

https://archive.org/details/whigswhiggismpol00disruoft/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

> From the moment that Lord Bolingbroke, in becoming a Tory, embraced the national cause, he devoted himself absolutely to his party: **all the energies of his Protean mind were lavished in their service;** and although the ignoble prudence of the Whig Minister restrained him from advocating the cause of the nation in the senate, it was his inspiring pen that made Walpole tremble in the recesses of the Treasury, and in a series of writings, unequalled in our literature for their spirited patriotism, their just and profound views, and the golden eloquence in which they are expressed, **eradicated from Toryism all those absurd and odious doctrines which Toryism had adventitiously adopted, clearly developed its essential and permanent character, discarded *jure divino*; demolished passive obedience, threw to the winds the doctrine of non-resistance, placed the abolition of James and the accession of George on their right basis,** and in the complete reorganisation of the public mind laid the foundation for the future accession of the Tory party to power, and to that popular and triumphant career which must ever await the policy of an administration inspired by the spirit of our free and ancient institutions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Vindication_of_Natural_Society

A Vindication of Natural Society: or, a View of the Miseries and Evils arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society is a work by Edmund Burke published in 1756. It is a satire of Lord Bolingbroke's deism. Burke confronted Bolingbroke not in the sphere of religion but civil society and government, **arguing that his arguments against revealed religion could apply to all institutions. So close to Bolingbroke's style was the work, that Burke's ironic intention was missed by some readers, leading Burke in his preface to the second edition (1757) to make plain that it was a satire. Nonetheless, this work was considered by William Godwin to be the first literary expression of philosophical anarchism.**[1]

> 1. Godwin attributed the first anarchist writing to Edmund Burke's *A Vindication of Natural Society*. "**Most of the above arguments may be found much more at large in Burke's *Vindication of Natural Society*;** a treatise in which the evils of the existing political institutions are displayed with incomparable force of reasoning and lustre of eloquence..." – footnote, Ch. 2 *Political Justice* by William Godwin.

https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/edmund-burke-intellectuals-french-revolution-part-2

The argument that the premises of John Locke and other individualists (natural rights, government by consent, etc.), if consistently applied, will strand us in the anarchistic "state of nature," with no logical way out, had been a popular method of criticizing liberal individualism for many years; and a young Burke transformed this method into a sophisticated satire. But some modern libertarians believe that the *Vindication* was originally written as a *serious* defense of anarchism, and that only later did the youthful radical retreat into conservatism.
...

Years earlier, in 1726, Bishop Butler had taken a similar approach in his *Analogy of Religion*, which maintained that the same arguments used by deists against Christianity could, with equal force, be turned against deism itself. Thus the logical terminus of such rationalistic arguments, according to Butler, is atheism, which the deists vehemently opposed – just as they would never embrace the anarchistic conclusions in Burke's *Vindication*, however logically compelling they might be.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15043/15043-h/15043-h.htm#A_LETTER_TO_LORD__mdash

The ideas of religion and government are closely connected; **and whilst we receive government as a thing necessary, or even useful to our well-being, we shall in spite of us draw in, as a necessary, though undesirable consequence, an artificial religion of some kind or other.** To this the vulgar will always be voluntary slaves; and even those of a rank of understanding superior, will now and then involuntarily feel its influence. It is therefore of the deepest concernment to us to be set right in this point; **and to be well satisfied whether civil government be such a protector from natural evils, and such a nurse and increaser of blessings, as those of warm imaginations promise.** In such a discussion, far am I from proposing in the least to reflect on our most wise form of government; no more than I would, in the freer parts of my philosophical writings, mean to object to the piety, truth, and perfection of our most excellent Church. Both, I am sensible, have their foundations on a rock. No discovery of truth can prejudice them. On the contrary, the more closely the origin of religion and government is examined, the more clearly their excellences must appear. They come purified from the fire. My business is not with them.
...

I think the numbers of men now upon earth are computed at five hundred millions at the most. Here the slaughter of mankind, on what you will call a small calculation, amounts to upwards of seventy times the number of souls this day on the globe: a point which may furnish matter of reflection to one less inclined to draw consequences than your lordship.

I now come to show that political society is justly chargeable with much the greatest part of this destruction of the species. To give the fairest play to every side of the question, I will own that there is a haughtiness and fierceness in human nature, which will cause innumerable broils, place men in what situation you please; but owning this, I still insist in charging it to political regulations, that these broils are so frequent, so cruel, and attended with consequences so deplorable. **In a state of nature, it had been impossible to find a number of men, sufficient for such slaughters, agreed in the same bloody purpose; or allowing that they might have come to such an agreement (an impossible supposition), yet the means that simple nature has supplied them with, are by no means adequate to such an end; many scratches, many bruises undoubtedly would be received upon all hands; but only a few, a very few deaths. Society and politics, which have given us these destructive views, have given us also the means of satisfying them.** From the earliest dawnings of policy to this day, the invention of men has been sharpening and improving the mystery of murder, from the first rude essays of clubs and stones, to the present perfection of gunnery, cannoneering, bombarding, mining, and all those species of artificial, learned, and refined cruelty, in which we are now so expert, and which make a principal part of what politicians have taught us to believe is our principal glory.

How far mere nature would have carried us, we may judge by the example of those animals who still follow her laws, and even of those to whom she has given dispositions more fierce, and arms more terrible than ever she intended we should use. It is an incontestable truth that there is more havoc made in one year by men of men, than has been made by all the lions, tigers, panthers, ounces, leopards, hyenas, rhinoceroses, elephants, bears and wolves, upon their several species, since the beginning of the world; though these agree ill enough with each other, and have a much greater proportion of rage and fury in their composition than we have. But with respect to you, ye legislators, ye civilizers of mankind!

ye Orpheuses, Moseses, Minoses, Solons, Theseuses, Lycurguses, Numas! with respect to you be it spoken, your regulations have done more mischief in cold blood, than all the rage of the fiercest animals in their greatest terrors, or furies, has ever done, or ever could do!

These evils are not accidental. Whoever will take the pains to consider the nature of society will find that they result directly from its constitution. **For as *subordination*, or, in other words, the reciprocation of tyranny and slavery, is requisite to support these societies;** the interest, the ambition, the malice, or the revenge, nay, even the whim and caprice of one ruling man among them, is enough to arm all the rest, without any private views of their own, to the worst and blackest purposes: and what is at once lamentable, and ridiculous, these wretches engage under those banners with a fury greater than if they were animated by revenge for their own proper wrongs.

It is no less worth observing, that this artificial division of mankind into separate societies is a perpetual source in itself of hatred and dissension among them. The names which distinguish them are enough to blow up hatred and rage. Examine history; consult present experience; and you will find that far the greater part of the quarrels between several nations had scarce any other occasion than that these nations were different combinations of people, and called by different names: **to an Englishman, the name of a Frenchman, a Spaniard, an Italian, much more a Turk, or a Tartar, raises of course ideas of hatred and contempt.** If you would inspire this compatriot of ours with pity or regard for one of these, would you not hide that distinction? You would not pray him to compassionate the poor Frenchman, or the unhappy German. Far from it; you would speak of him as a *foreigner*; an accident to which all are liable. **You would represent him as a *man*; one partaking with us of the same common nature, and subject to the same law.** There is something so averse from our nature in these artificial political distinctions, that we need no other trumpet to kindle us to war and destruction. But there is something so benign and healing in the general voice of humanity that, maugre all our regulations to prevent it, the simple name of man applied properly, never fails to work a salutary effect.
…

The consideration of this made Mr. Locke say, with great justice, that a government of this kind was worse than anarchy: indeed it is so abhorred and detested by all who live under forms that have a milder appearance, that there is scarcely a rational man in Europe that would not prefer death to Asiatic despotism. **Here then we have the acknowledgment of a great philosopher, that an irregular state of nature is preferable to such a government;** we have the consent of all sensible and generous men, who carry it yet further, and avow that death itself is preferable; and yet this species of government, so justly condemned, and so generally detested, is what infinitely the greater part of mankind groan under, and have groaned under from the beginning. So that, by sure and uncontested principles, **the greatest part of the governments on earth must be concluded tyrannies, impostures, violations of the natural rights of mankind, and worse than the most disorderly anarchies.**
…

Therefore state the matter fairly: the free states never formed, though they were taken altogether, the thousandth part of the habitable globe; **the freemen in these states were never the twentieth part of the people,** and the time they subsisted is scarce anything in that immense ocean of duration in which time and slavery are so nearly commensurate. Therefore call these free states, or popular governments, or what you please; **when we consider the majority of their inhabitants, and regard the natural rights of mankind, they must appear, in reality and truth, no better than pitiful and oppressive oligarchies.**
…

I have defended natural religion against a confederacy of atheists and divines. I now plead for natural society against politicians, and for natural reason against all three. **When the world is in a fitter temper than it is at present to hear truth, or when I shall be more indifferent about its temper, my thoughts may become more public.** In the mean time, let them repose in my own bosom, and in the bosoms of such men as are fit to be initiated in the sober mysteries of truth and reason. My antagonists have already done as much as I could desire. **Parties in religion and politics make sufficient discoveries concerning each other, to give a sober man a proper caution against them all.** The monarchic, and aristocratical, and popular partisans, have been jointly laying their axes to the root of all government, and have, in their turns, proved each other absurd and inconvenient. In vain you tell me that artificial government is good, but that I fall out only with the abuse. The thing! the thing itself is the abuse!
…

You may criticise freely upon the Chinese constitution, and observe with as much severity as you please upon the absurd tricks, or destructive bigotry of the bonzees. But the scene is changed as you come homeward, and atheism or treason may be the names given in Britain, to what would be reason and truth if asserted of China.
…

The professors of artificial law have always walked hand in hand with the professors of artificial theology. As their end, in confounding the reason of man, and abridging his natural freedom, is exactly the same, they have adjusted the means to that end in a way entirely similar. The divine thunders out his *anathemas* with more noise and terror against the breach of one of his positive institutions, or the neglect of some of his trivial forms, than against the neglect or breach of those duties and commandments of natural religion, which by these forms and institutions he pretends to enforce. The lawyer has his forms, and his positive institutions too, and he adheres to them with a veneration altogether as religious. The worst cause cannot be so prejudicial to the litigant, as his advocate's or attorney's ignorance or neglect of these forms.
…

If the poor man is not able to support his suit, according to the vexatious and expensive manner established in civilized countries, has not the rich as great an advantage over him as the strong has over the weak in a state of nature? **But we will not place the state of nature, which is the reign of God, in competition with political society, which is the absurd usurpation of man.** In a state of nature, it is true that a man of superior force may beat or rob me; but then it is true, that I am at full liberty to defend myself, or make reprisal by surprise or by cunning, or by any other way in which I may be superior to him. **But in political society, a rich man may rob me in another way. I cannot defend myself; for money is the only weapon with which we are allowed to fight.** And if I attempt to avenge myself the whole force of that society is ready to complete my ruin.

A good parson once said, that where mystery begins, religion ends. Cannot I say, as truly at least, of human laws, that where mystery begins, justice ends? **It is hard to say, whether the doctors of law or divinity have made the greater advances in the lucrative business of mystery.** The lawyers, as well as the theologians, have erected another reason besides natural reason; and the result has been, another justice besides natural justice. They have so bewildered the world and themselves in unmeaning forms and ceremonies, and so perplexed the plainest matters with metaphysical jargon, **that it carries the highest danger to a man out of that profession, to make the least step without their advice and assistance.** Thus, by confining to themselves the knowledge of the foundation of all men's lives and properties, they have reduced all mankind into the most abject and servile dependence.
…

In a state of nature, it is an invariable law, that a man's acquisitions are in proportion to his labors. In a state of artificial society, it is a law as constant and as invariable, that those who labor most enjoy the fewest things; and that those who labor not at all have the greatest number of enjoyments.
…

Revolve our whole discourse; add to it all those reflections which your own good understanding shall suggest, and make a strenuous effort beyond the reach of vulgar philosophy, to confess that the cause of artificial society is more defenceless even than that of artificial religion; that it is as derogatory from the honor of the Creator, as subversive of human reason, and productive of infinitely more mischief to the human race.

If pretended revelations have caused wars where they were opposed, and slavery where they were received, the pretended wise inventions of politicians have done the same. But the slavery has been much heavier, the wars far more bloody, and both more universal by many degrees. **Show me any mischief produced by the madness or wickedness of theologians, and I will show you a hundred resulting from the ambition and villany of conquerors and statesmen. Show me an absurdity in religion, and I will undertake to show you a hundred for one in political laws and institutions.** If you say that natural religion is a sufficient guide without the foreign aid of revelation, on what principle should political laws become necessary? Is not the same reason available in theology and in politics? If the laws of nature are the laws of God, is it consistent with the Divine wisdom to prescribe rules to us, and leave the enforcement of them to the folly of human institutions? **Will you follow truth but to a certain point?**

We are indebted for all our miseries to our distrust of that guide which Providence thought sufficient for our condition, our own natural reason, which rejecting both in human and divine things, we have given our necks to the yoke of political and theological slavery. We have renounced the prerogative of man, and it is no wonder that we should be treated like beasts. But our misery is much greater than theirs, as the crime we commit in rejecting the lawful dominion of our reason is greater than any which they can commit. If, after all, you should confess all these things, yet plead the necessity of political institutions, weak and wicked as they are, **I can argue with equal, perhaps superior, force, concerning the necessity of artificial religion; and every step you advance in your argument, you add a strength to mine.** So that if we are resolved to submit our reason, and our liberty to civil usurpation, we have nothing to do but to conform as quietly as we can to the vulgar notions which are connected with this, **and take up the theology of the vulgar as well as their politics.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15043/15043-h/15043-h.htm#PREFACE

Before the philosophical works of Lord Bolingbroke had appeared, great things were expected from the leisure of a man, who, from the splendid scene of action in which his talents had enabled him to make so conspicuous a figure, had retired to employ those talents in the investigation of truth. **Philosophy began to congratulate herself upon such a proselyte from the world of business, and hoped to have extended her power under the auspices of such a leader.** In the midst of these pleasing expectations, the works themselves at last appeared in *full body*, and with great pomp. Those who searched in them for new discoveries in the mysteries of nature; those who expected something which might explain or direct the operations of the mind; those who hoped to see morality illustrated and enforced; those who looked for new helps to society and government; those who desired to see the characters and passions of mankind delineated; in short, all who consider such things as philosophy, and require some of them at least in every philosophical work, all these were certainly disappointed; **they found the landmarks of science precisely in their former places: and they thought they received but a poor recompense for this disappointment, in seeing every mode of religion attacked in a lively manner, and the foundation of every virtue, and of all government, sapped with great art and much ingenuity.**
…

The design was to show that, without the exertion of any considerable forces, the same engines which were employed for the destruction of religion, might be employed with equal success for the subversion of government; and that specious arguments might be used against those things which they, who doubt of everything else, will never permit to be questioned. **It is an observation which I think Isocrates makes in one of his orations against the sophists, that it is far more easy to maintain a wrong cause,** and to support paradoxical opinions to the satisfaction of a common auditory, than to establish a doubtful truth by solid and conclusive arguments.
…

The editor is satisfied that a mind which has no restraint from a sense of its own weakness, of its subordinate rank in the creation, and of the extreme danger of letting the imagination loose upon some subjects, may very plausibly attack everything the most excellent and venerable; **that it would not be difficult to criticise the creation itself;** and that if we were to examine the divine fabrics by our ideas of reason and fitness, and to use the same method of attack by which some men have assaulted revealed religion, we might with as good color, and with the same success, make the wisdom and power of God in his creation appear to many no better than foolishness.

https://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2018/06/natures-god-lucretian-spinozist-and.html

But if one interprets the Declaration's deity as an *immanent* creative power working *through* the laws of nature for the emergent evolution of human beings, that would be compatible with Darwinian science. In this case, **we could see the appeal in the first sentence of the Declaration to "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God" as implying that God and Nature are two ways of talking about the same thing. Nature's God is the God of the deists, the God of Spinoza, a way of talking about God long after the death of God.**

One of the first of America's revolutionaries to declare his belief in "Nature's God" was Thomas Young. **In 1770, three years before he would become the instigator of the Boston Tea Party, Young responded to a sermon by the revivalist George Whitefield denouncing American Deists as Satanic atheists.** In the *Boston Evening Post* (August 27, 1770), Young proudly professed his deist faith in the God who could be known by reasoning about nature rather than from biblical revelation: "That the religion of Nature, more properly stiled the Religion of Nature's God, in latin call'd *Deus*, hence *Deism*, is *truth*, I now boldly defy thee to contest."

To better understand this "Religion of Nature's God," Young recommended "[Alexander] Pope's little *Essay on Man*, confessedly deduced from the inspiration of Lord Bolingbroke, and perhaps every sentence adopted by me." Indeed, the first appearance of the term "Nature's God" in English was in Pope's *Essay on Man*, a philosophical poem published in 1734, where in explaining how "Virtue alone is Happiness below," he observes:

> "Slave to no sect, who takes no private road,
> "But looks thro' Nature, up to Nature's God" (4.331-32)

Echoing the monistic naturalism of Epicurus, Lucretius, and Spinoza, Pope speaks of Nature and God interchangeably, **in denying sectarian religion in favor of a natural religion in which "true piety," as Lucretius declared, is not to bow before the gods, but to contemplate nature's wondrous order** (*On the Nature of Things*, 5.1197-1203).

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentpas0000unse/page/254/mode/2up?view=theater

Writing in defiance of the attempt, most vigorously made by Carl Becker,35 to reduce the Enlightenment to a secularized variant of medieval Christian thought, **Peter Gay provocatively subtitled the first volume of his magisterial work *The Enlightenment; An Interpretation* (1966) *The Rise of Modern Paganism*.** Explicitly drawing on Heine's distinction between "Hebrews" and "Hellenes," he sought to situate the "party of humanity" squarely in the latter camp. **The greatest figures of the Enlightenment – Montesquieu, Fontenelle, Gibbon, Lessing, Rousseau, Diderot, Winckelmann – were virtually all in the thrall of the classical world, moving beyond mere identification with its heroes to an active pagan identity of their own.** "The philosophes," Gay claimed, "did not merely quote antiquity, they earned it, and they experienced it."36 **The battle between the Ancients and the Moderns turned out in a way to be a victory for both.**

> https://userpages.umbc.edu/~jamie/html/on__the_heavenly_city_of_eight.html
>
> In 1957, some twenty-five years after the publication of Becker's work, Peter Gay examined *The Heavenly City* in the June edition of *The Political Science Quarterly*, and found many things worth condemning. **Gay is dismissive of Becker's indictment of the philosophes based on their reliance on the ideas of earlier thinkers, saying, "…no era wholly liberates itself from its antecedents…" He also undercuts Becker's analysis of similar language and concepts, noting that, "Words persist, but their meanings change…Rhetoric may change while ideas persist", calling this "the trap of spurious persistence."** Gay goes on to accuse Becker of using reckless wordplay as evidence for an unsupportable premise, and of utilizing "indefensible" generalizations.
>
> As to the charge that the Enlightenment was still Christian in its outlook, **Gay concludes that the philosophes were more pagan than Christian, noting that many of their ideas could be traced to antiquity, not the Church.** He also challenges Becker's assertion that the philosophers of the eighteenth century clung to the "immortality of the soul", counting Montesquieu, Diderot, Hume, Helvétius, Holbach and perhaps even Voltaire as unbelievers.
>
> **Gay defies any historian to accurately map the growth of the "natural law" tradition, comparing its development to "a map of the Nile Delta", and insists that Becker, in his attempt at doing so, has "done a great deal to confuse the matter". He says that Becker is wrong when he says that "natural law is essentially Christian"** and then goes on to say that "Becker's analysis of natural law is unphilosophical; his analysis of the relation of the *philosophes* [emphasis original] to history is unhistorical."

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/320/mode/2up?view=theater

Gibbon pointed out that revelation had "even in an enlightened age, satisfied or subdued the reason of a Grotius, a Pascal, or a Locke," but it never occurred to him that this was anything but a regrettable lapse, proof of the weakness of man's intellect. When the abbé de la Bletterie, the pious and therefore hostile biographer of the Emperor Julian, called for a "philosophical theologian," Gibbon could think of such a being only as a "strange centaur."4 **Neither Gibbon nor the other philosophes could ever grant that philosophical Christians or Stoic Christians were men with a coherent world view,** and it was precisely this failure that freed the Enlightenment from diffidence and made it revolutionary.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n281/mode/2up?view=theater

The French Revolution had hurled the unfortunate Lewis XVI from his throne, **when the most unrelenting conspirator, that monster Condorcet, thinks it incumbent on him to celebrate the glory of Philosophism,** and trace the progress of this fiend which had kindled the torch of discord and had reared the Republic on crime, bloodshed, and the ruins of the throne.
…

"**In England Collins and Bolingbroke, in France Bayle, Fontenelle, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and *the schools formed by these men*, combated in favour of truth.** They alternately employed all the arms with which learning and Philosophy, with which wit and the talent of writing could furnish reason. *Assuming every tone, taking every shape*, from the ludicrous to the pathetic, from the most learned and extensive compilation to the novel or the petty pamphlet of the day, covering truth with a veil, which, *sparing the eye that was too weak*, incited the reader by *the pleasure of surmising it*, insidiously caressing prejudice in order to strike it with more certainty and effect; seldom menacing more than one at a time, and that only in part; **sometimes flattering the enemies of reason *by seeming to ask but for a half toleration in Religion or a half Liberty in polity; respecting Despotism when they impugned religious absurdities, and Religion when they attacked tyranny; combating these two pests in their very principles, though apparently inveighing against ridiculous and***

disgusting abuses; striking at the root of those pestiferous trees, whilst they appeared only to wish to lop the straggling branches; at one time marking out superstition, which covers despotism with its impenetrable shield, to the friends of Liberty, as the first victim which they are to immolate, the first link to be cleft asunder; at another denouncing it to Despots as the real enemy of their power, and frightening them with its hypocritical plots and sanguinary rage; but indefatigable when they claimed *the Independence of Reason and the Liberty of the Press* as the right and safeguard of mankind;—inveighing with enthusiastic energy against the crimes of Fanaticism and Tyranny; reprobating every thing which bore the character of oppression, harshness, or barbarity, whether in Religion, Administration, Morals or Laws; **commanding Kings, Warriors, Priests and Magistrates in the name of nature to spare the blood of men;** reproaching them in the most energetic strain with that which their policy or indifference prodigally lavished on the scaffold or in the field of battle; in fine, adopting *reason, toleration, and humanity* as their signal and watch-word.

"Such was the Modern Philosophy, so much detested by those numerous classes whose existence were drawn from prejudices—Its chiefs had the art of escaping vengeance, though exposed to hatred; ***of hiding themselves from persecution, though sufficiently conspicuous to lose nothing of their glory.***"3

3. Esquisse d'un tableau historique de l'esprit humain, 9 Epoque.

…

It is no longer a wish, it is a hope, it is the confidence of success, which makes the same Sophister, adopting the prophetic strain, announce to Kings and the Priesthood, that, thanks to the union, toils, and unrelenting warfare of the Philosophers, **"the day will come when the sun shall shine on none but free men, a day when man, recognizing no other master than his reason, when Tyrants and their Slaves, when Priests, together with their stupid and hypocritical agents, will have no further existence but in history or on the stage."**5

5. Of the Republic, by Condorcet, epoch 10.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA205#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pintard also notes that **the philosophy of Fontenelle has very many points of resemblance to the works of Naudé and La Mothe le Vayer: a similar skepticism, a common pyrrhonism in the treatment of history,** a general distrust of superstitions, miracles, and oracles, and a constant accord in exposing the imbecilities and gullibility of the vulgar mob.

…

Pintard concludes that the libertinage of the first half of the seventeeth century transmitted to Bayle and Fontenelle the traditional heritage of the Renaissance. This transmission, however, was not of worn-out facts and dead notions, but an ensemble of tendencies still active, of doctrines still being developed, **of principles now ready to lead to serious consequences, of remarks prepared to be organized into arguments:**

https://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Fontenelle/

Bernard de Fontenelle's mother was Marthe Corneille, the sister of the poets and dramatists Pierre and Thomas Corneille. Bernard's father was François le Bovier de Fontenelle who was a lawyer working in the provincial court at Rouen. **The le Bovier family were by tradition lawyers** who came originally from Alençon, about 150 km south-west of Rouen and about 170 km west of Paris.

…

He began to study law in 1672 and spent the next five years training to be an advocate. However, after completing his training in 1677 he took on his first case which he lost. This marked the end of his very short career as a lawyer for he promptly gave up the profession and turned towards his literary inclinations.

…

The first work by Fontenelle which began to create a reputation for him was *Lettres galantes* (1683) **but his first real major success was *Dialogues des Morts* (1683). In this work he presented new philosophical ideas to the reader in the form of conversations, modelled on the dialogues of Lucian, between philosophers such as Socrates and Montaigne, Seneca and Scarron.** At least twelve editions of this book were published before 1715 and soon translations into English and other languages appeared; **the work became much imitated by other authors.** There quickly followed other successful works by Fontenelle including a biography of his uncle Pierre Corneille who died in 1684. The biography was first printed in the *Nouvelles de la republique des lettres* in January 1685. Fontenelle's most famous work, however, was *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (1686).

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/118/mode/2up?view=theater

As atomism took firmer and firmer hold of the seventeenth-century mind, the possibility of other inhabited worlds soon became a probability and finally a necessity, **culminating in Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle's publication in 1686 of *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (*Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds*), a popularized (and hence quite popular) form of the plurality-of-worlds argument based on the new cosmology.** While Fontenelle was very careful not to step on the toes of Christianity directly – he argued that other intelligent creatures were not the descendants of Adam and hence their presence in the universe did not contradict the importance of the incarnation for humanity – the result of popularizing the argument was ultimately Epicurean.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/358/mode/2up?view=theater

It was a commonplace dictum of the French High Enlightenment that the *esprit philosophique* 'so widespread today owes its beginnings to Fontenelle.'1 **Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), native of Rouen, nephew of Corneille, and star pupil of the Jesuits, was the first prominent high-society *philosophe* and general commentator on science, and the progress of the new learning, in France.** Admired by Voltaire, and Diderot, upon both of whom his influence was considerable,2 he has invariably been reckoned a key precursor and pioneer of the French Enlightenment and one, moreover, who enjoyed great prestige far beyond the confines of France. He was the *philosophes*' 'prototype,' it has been aptly remarked, 'their founder and, finally, their doyen.'3
…

In 1687, soon after the other of his two best-known and most controversial works, the *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (1686), Fontenelle published his *Histoire des Oracles*. It was a book which attracted great interest and has always been assigned a prominent place among the first stirrings of the Enlightenment, a volume addressed to a broad public, written in an elegant, gentlemanly style with the undisguised intention of 'enlightening' as many people as possible, women included.
…

Adroit socially and intellectually, Fontenelle was a European celebrity and, being one of those later classified during the Revolution as the old régime's 'secte de prudents,'7 never forgot to protect his flanks.
…

Buddeus held that if Spinoza revived Stoic ideas, those who in recent times 'ont attribué les oracles des gentils aux seules impostures et fourberies des prêtres,' without allowing any intervention by demons, are reviving the notions of the Epicureans, adding 'je parle ici d'Antoine van Dale.'91 Fontenelle had helped spread Van Dale's pernicious influence, he notes, but thankfully the Jesuit Baltus 'les a réfuté tous deux.'92

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/204/mode/2up?view=theater

As Voltaire also noted, **some Royal Society members openly complained of Fontenelle's presumption in assigning the 'dreamer' Descartes comparable status to Newton in his official eulogy, after Newton's death.**19

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/88/mode/2up?view=theater

When in Holland, in 1739, in discussion with the radical-minded marquis d'Argens **(who had a much higher opinion of Voltaire the poet, dramatist, and story writer than of Voltaire the philosopher),**108 he tried to persuade him that Bayle had greatly over-inflated his *Dictionnaire* with unnecessary matter and was generally far too prolix, showing a deplorable lack of rigour in argument as well as unfortunate love of irrelevant detail. D'Argens firmly disagreed, insisting Bayle was 'un esprit universel, savant philosophe, habile critique, génie vaste,' indeed much more so, he thought privately, than Voltaire.109 **Bayle and Fontenelle, it seemed to him, were the two *philosophes* who had opened up philosophy to society:** 'there is an art of discoursing upon the most sublime subject,' as a contemporary English translation of d'Argens puts it, 'without soaring out of the reach of common capacities; none have been masters of this art more than Mr Bayle and Mr de Fontenelle; **their works are undoubted proofs that the most abstruse subjects may be treated in such a method, as to render them easily understood.**'110

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

Throughout Elizabeth's reign the Holy Synod made repeated efforts to suppress Fontenelle's *Discourse on the Plurality of Worlds*, with its popularized image of a infinite universe.10

Under Catherine, however, the stream became a flood. Fontenelle was freely published but hardly noticed. New books and ideas flowed in from France and were soon superseded by more daring and fashionable ones.

The previous book was discarded before it had been used, like an unworn but suddenly outmoded hat. The first French thinker to enjoy popular vogue under Catherine was “the immortal Fénelon,” whose poem *Télémaque* provided an exciting image of a utopian society and whose *Education of Girls* partly inspired Catherine’s experiments in educating noble women.11 **Fénelon was succeeded by Montesquieu, and Montesquieu by Voltaire – with each infatuation more intense than the last.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/316/mode/2up?view=theater

It is Fontenelle, therefore, who best exhibits the tenacity of pagan Christianity in its decline, for while the philosophes did not claim Newton, they almost claimed Fontenelle as one of their own: **“The *esprit philosophique*, so widespread today,” wrote Grimm shortly after his death, “owes its beginnings to Fontenelle.”**9 Fontenelle spanned two ages; he was born in 1657 in the minority of Louis XIV and died in 1757, a month before his hundredth birthday, outliving Montesquieu. In the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, he was an unabashed modern: we might stand on the shoulders of giants, he wrote, but whatever the reasons, **the moderns saw further than the greatest of the ancients ever had – not in morals or in literature, which are not progressive disciplines, but in the knowledge of nature.** A firm supporter, Fontenelle was also a superlative popularizer of the new science; he wrote with equal competence about its results, its methods, and its philosophy. As Cicero had naturalized Greek philosophy among the Romans, Fontenelle spread Cartesian – and, be it remembered, Baconian – ideas among civilized men and women in elegant and eloquent prose. Through his celebrated *éloges*, which he delivered as Secretary of the Paris Academy of Sciences, he did much to enhance the social position and cultural influence of leading scientists. **As a moralist, he gracefully and persuasively modernized classical ideas: like the Stoics, he urged men to live according to nature; and like the Epicureans, he defined that nature as filled with passions which need to be gratified for the sake of inner peace. He sounded like Hume in his skepticism toward miracles and in his conviction that man’s strongest and most unfortunate inclination was the love of mystery.**
…

And yet this urbane literary man, this admirer of modernity, who anticipated the philosophes in so much of his work, was not a philosophe in his heart: he never made the leap to naturalism, whether it be the deism of Voltaire, the atheism of Holbach, or the skepticism of Hume; he remained, with the century in which he was born, a tolerant, cultivated, firmly committed Christian.

At the same time, Fontenelle stands at the transitional point where one historical period shades off into another: his religiosity was so bland that it offered little resistance to, and even welcomed, subversive ideas.
…

“Once the foundations of a revolution have been laid down,” d’Alembert said, “it is almost always the succeeding generation which completes that revolution.”2

---

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n245/mode/2up?view=theater

We have already mentioned, **that his first productions were those of a young man who had no fixed principles of religion; and this is clearly perceptible in perusing the *Lettres Persanes*.** At a riper age his duty called him to the study of the laws; but not content with the knowledge of those of his own country, and desirous of making himself conversant in those of foreign nations, he made the tour of Europe, stayed sometime in England, and then returned to France full of those ideas which he has developed in the two works that have chiefly contributed to his fame. The first is entitled *Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Roman Empire*, and was published in 1733; the latter was *The Spirit of Laws*, which appeared in 1748.

It was obvious, on the first appearance of his work on the Romans, that Montesquieu had not acquired from his travels an additional esteem for the government of his own country. **One of the prime causes to which he attributes the éclat of the Romans, is their love of a Liberty which begins by dethroning all Kings.**
…

This work teems with satyrical remarks on Rome, when again brought under the dominion of a Monarch; and his frequent expressions of regret for the loss of the Republican Liberty, could not but tend to diminish that love, that admiration, that enthusiasm so natural to Frenchmen for their king. **One might really suspect that he wished to instil into the minds of the people a belief, that what sovereigns call establishing order, is another term for riveting fetters on their subjects.**5

But the work that we have been considering was merely a prelude to the doctrines which he was about to teach (in his *Spirit of Laws*) to all nations governed by a monarch. **Let us premise, and with great sincerity we say it, that had we to perform the task of a panegyrist, causes for admiration would abound;** had we to answer those critics who reproach Montesquieu with having taken the motto, *prolem sine matre creatam*, and giving his work as if it were an original, though he may appear to have followed the footsteps of Bodin, celebrated for his work on Republics, **we nevertheless think we may triumphantly answer, that the dross he may have borrowed from others cannot alloy the sterling value of his own production; and that in spite of the errors contained in the *Spirit of Laws*, it will for ever continue to be considered as the work of a wonderful genius.**6
…

It is equally unfortunate, that his panegyrist, now that the name of Encyclopedist is so justly covered with opprobrium, should extol his zeal for **that monstrous digest, whose object remains no longer a secret,** or when the most revolutionary among the Sophisters positively assert, that *Montesquieu would not have written* had not Voltaire written before him.
…

He was very intimate with the Encyclopedian Deists and Atheists, but always desirous that his friends should die good Christians, and that they should receive all the rites of the church. At that awful period he was an Apostle or Divine, he would exhort and insist until the sick person assented; he would run, though it were at midnight, to call the clergyman whom he thought the most proper to complete the conversion; at least such was his conduct with respect to his friend and relation Mr. Meiran.39

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/284/mode/2up?view=theater

Montesquieu separated Machiavellianism from Machiavelli: **he was too strongly imbued with Stoic ethics to approve of maxims inculcating lying, treachery, and assassination;** still, he followed Machiavelli closely in his own analysis of the politics of religion and cherished him as a pioneer in political sociology: in Montesquieu's *Dissertation sur la politique des Romains dans la religion* and in his masterpiece, *L'Esprit des lois*, Machiavelli the tough-minded methodologist blots out the diabolical poisoner of men's minds – Shakespeare's "murderous Machiavel." In fact, **Montesquieu adopted the view, advanced earlier by a few isolated thinkers like Spinoza, that the real Machiavelli was a lover of liberty,** the Machiavelli of the *Discourses*, not of the *Prince*.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/36/mode/2up?view=theater

In Prussia, Herr von Rochow, a prosperous Junker endowed with exceptional compassion, generously cared for the miserable peasants on his estates, founded schools, composed textbooks, and wrote pamphlets in behalf of popular education. In reply, Frederick's minister von Zedlitz, by no means a fossil, wondered out loud whether peasants really needed to learn anything but obedience: **"The metaphysical education of peasants," he objected, "should not be driven too far." Only "*cosmopolites enthousiastes*" try to "convert peasants into philosophers."**5

There were in fact many, and influential, *cosmopolites enthousiastes* in the eighteenth century, and their influence increased with their number. Montesquieu spoke for them in his aphoristic manner: "If I knew something useful to me," he noted, "but prejudicial to my family, I would reject it from my mind. If I knew something useful to my family but not to my country, I would try to forget it. **If I knew something useful to my country but prejudicial to Europe, or useful to Europe and prejudicial to the human race, I would regard it as criminal.**"6

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/222/mode/2up?view=theater

On the all-important question of government, Catherine was most indebted to Montesquieu. **His mighty *Spirit of the Laws* was both the final product of a lifetime of urbane reflection and the opening salvo in the "war of ideas" against the old older in France.**26
…

To be sure, Catherine's entire effort went against Montesquieu's own assumption that Russia was foredoomed by its size and heritage to despotic rule; and she distorted or neglected some of his most celebrated ideas. **Montesquieu's aristocratic "intermediary bodies" between the monarch and his subjects served not, in Catherine's proposal, to separate power between executive, legislative, and judicial functions but rather to consolidate government functions and create new lines of transmission for imperial authority.**

Nevertheless, Catherine was closer to the spirit of Montesquieu's politics than many who followed him more literally on specific points. Her effort to make monarchy unlimited yet fully rational; her sense of adjusting political forms to environmental necessities; her increasing recognition of the need for active

aristocratic support so that the spirit of honor could be enlisted to support the rule of reason – all of this was clearly in the spirit of the man **who did so much to turn men's eyes from the letter to the spirit of law.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

Shortly after *L'esprit des lois* was published, the bishop of Soissons courteously inquired whether some of its chapters were not infected by a Stoicism incompatible with the True Faith. "About thirty years ago," Montesquieu replied to Monseigneur de Fitz-James, "I conceived the project of writing a book on duty. Cicero's treatise *On Duties* had delighted me, and I took it as my model. **As you know, Cicero had, as it were, copied Panaetius, who was a Stoic, and the Stoics had treated this question most successfully. So I read the Stoics' principal works,** among them the moral reflections of Marcus Aurelius, which struck me as the masterpiece of antiquity. I confess that I was impressed by its morality, **and that I should have liked to make a saint of Marcus Aurelius, as M. Dacier had done.** What impressed me most was to discover that this morality was practical and that the three or four emperors who followed it were admirable princes, while those who didn't were monsters. … Really, now, if I wanted to write my book in order to discredit the Christian religion, I would have to be a big fool."3 **Montesquieu was no fool, and not much of a Christian, but his reply to the worried bishop was not merely a piece of evasive hypocrisy; his generation still knew a neutral zone where pagan and Christian could meet on relatively friendly terms.**

> https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/316/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> At the time which we have now reached, the Stoical School was extending itself and acquiring credit in the empire. **As the earth causes plants to grow in places which the heavens have never looked upon, so it seemed that human nature had made an effort to produce, from its own resources,** this admirable system of philosophy.
>
> https://archive.org/details/accountofcorsica00bosw/page/326/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> One day at dinner, he gave us the principal arguments for the being and attributes of GOD. To hear these arguments repeated with graceful energy by the illustrious Paoli in the midst of his heroick nobles, was admirable. I never felt my mind more elevated.
>
> I took occasion to mention the king of Prussia's infidel writings, and in particular his epistle to Marischal Keith. Paoli, who often talks with admiration of the greatness of that monarch, instead of uttering any direct censure of what he saw to be wrong in so distinguished a hero, paused a little, and then said with a grave and most expressive look, "C'est une belle consolation pour un vieux general mourant, 'En peu de tems vous ne serez plus.' It is fine consolation for an old general when dying, 'In a little while you shall be no more.'"
>
> **He observed that the Epicurean philosophy had produced but one exalted character, whereas Stoicism had been the seminary of great men. What he now said put me in mind of these noble lines of Lucan.**
>
> > Hi mores, haec duri immota Catonis
> > Secta fuit, servare modum finemque tenere,
> > Naturamque sequi, patriaeque impendere vitam,
> > **Nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.**
> > LUCAN. Pharsal. lib. ii. l. 380.
> >
> > These were the stricter manners of the man,
> > And this the stubborn course in which they ran;
> > The golden mean unchanging to pursue,
> > Constant to keep the purpos'd end in view;
> > Religiously to follow nature's laws,
> > And die with pleasure in his country's cause.
> > **To think he was not for himself design'd,**
> > **But born to be of use to all mankind.**
> > —ROWE.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voltaire#Early_life

François-Marie Arouet was born in Paris, the youngest of the five children of **François Arouet (1649-1722), a lawyer who was a minor treasury official,** and his wife, Marie Marguerite Daumard (c. 1660-1701), whose family was on the lowest rank of the French nobility.[11]
…

By the time he left school, Voltaire had decided he wanted to be a writer, against the wishes of his father, who wanted him to become a lawyer.[17] Voltaire, pretending to work in Paris as an assistant to a notary, spent much of his time writing poetry. When his father found out, he sent Voltaire to study law, this time in Caen, Normandy. But the young man continued to write, producing essays and historical studies. **Voltaire's wit made him popular among some of the aristocratic families with whom he mixed.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n49/mode/2up?view=theater

He was particularly intimate with Chaulieu, the poet of voluptuousness, the Anacreon of his day; and with a few Epicureans who held their meetings at the Hotel de Vendôme. His first essays were in satire which gave offence to government, and in tragedy, in which we should have seen the rival of Corneille, Racine, and Crebillon, had he not at the same time emulated Celsus and Porphyrius, with all the other enemies of religion. **At a time when licentiousness in opinion still met with obstacles in France, he sought an asylum in England. He there found men whom the writings of Shaftesbury, commented on by Bolingbroke, had trained up to Deism.** He mistook them for philosophers, and was persuaded that they alone were esteemed by the English. If he was not then mistaken, opinions are since greatly changed. All those Sophisters whom Voltaire extols as the glory of Great Britain, if not forgotten, are more despised than read. Collins and Hobbes, when remembered, are classed with Tom Paine; an Englishman's good sense does not allow him to hate religion, nor make an ostentatious display of impiety.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

Instances of pagan conduct, pointedly contrasted with Christianity, are scattered through his polemical writings: his pamphlets on legal reform, addressed to the largest possible public, compare French cruelty and illogic with the humanity of Roman procedure; his anticlerical diatribes compare Christian persecution with antique toleration. Voltaire's library was filled with ancient authors, and his private notebooks were filled with allusions to them; when he described his article "Superstition" in the *Dictionnaire philosophique* as a "chapter taken from Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch,"4 he was listing a substantial part of his intellectual ancestry.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

> ***Lecteur éclairé et judicieux … de grâce apprenez à vos amis quelle est l'énorme distance des* Offices *de Cicéron, du* Manuel *d'Epictète, des* Maximes *de l'empereur Antonin, à tous les plats ouvrages de morale é'crits dans nos jargons du Nord. Avons-nous seulement, dans tous les livres faits depuis six cents ans, rien de comparable à une page de Sénèque? Non, nous n'avons rien qui en approche, et nous osons nous élever contre nos maîtres!***
>
> Voltaire, Note of 1769, to the poem *Les trois empereurs en Sorbonne*

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire introduces Marcus Aurelius into some of his dialogues as his spokesman, **but the admirable Stoic emperor is little more than a splendid stock figure of generosity, intelligence, and tolerance. The antique pagan becomes a character in a morality play in which Mr. Christian is Mr. Badman.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire, after having written that Atheism would people the earth with robbers, villains, and monsters,9 would pardon Atheism in Spinosa, and even allow of it in a Philosopher;10 and he professes it himself **when he writes to D'Alembert, "I know of none but Spinosa who has argued well."**11 **That is to say, I know of no true Philosopher but he to whom all matter and this world is the sole God;** and after having tried every Sect, he ends by pressing D'Alembert to unite all parties in the war against Christ.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n209/mode/2up?view=theater

He was a singular mixture of epicure and work-ascetic. Even as a boy he was very fond of fashionable clothes and good food, and all his life he strove to surround himself with the luxury of a *grand seigneur*, though it was rather his passion for beauty of form and large-scale conditions than actual love of pleasure that attracted him to these things. **When he appeared on the scene, the man of letters was a socially impossible person—a desperado, a rascal and outlaw, a toady, a starveling, a drunkard.** Voltaire was the first author by profession to break with this deeply rooted tradition.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire greatly admired the Stoics but thought of himself largely as an Epicurean: "The only Stoic principles I have adopted," he wrote in 1755, about three years before he wrote *Candide*, "are the ones that grant the soul to be susceptible to the charms of friendship and pain to be an evil. To spend your life between calumny and colic is a little hard, but study and friendship are consoling."7 Unlike the Stoics, the Epicureans give room to human nature. **And yet, as a true eclectic, Voltaire in *Candide* is the Epicurean as Stoic. His fable enjoins men to cultivate their private selves, but the question remains: how large is our garden?** Voltaire's specific answer to this question, as I have suggested, changed after he published *Candide*: **if we take the last twenty-five years of Voltaire's life, busy, even frantic, with good causes, as a commentary on this question, the answer becomes that our garden is the world – or more realistically, whatever in the world is in our power.**
…

This is uncompromising enough, but *Candide* is uncompromising in yet another and even more decisive respect. **Its central target, after all, is Leibniz, and Leibniz was the great compromiser of the age.** He was the accommodating metaphysician who sought to reconcile religion and philosophy, the principles of Christianity to the principles of rationalism, **the theologian who attempted to justify God to men with arguments which a philosopher steeped in Cicero could respect. *Candide* denies that any such accommodation is possible; the book is like a slap in the face of an adroit and benevolent envoy, a firm rejection of negotiations on any basis, and hence, in essence, a declaration of war on Christianity.**

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denis_Diderot

He abandoned the idea of entering the clergy in 1735[10] and, instead, decided to study at the Paris Law Faculty. His study of law was short-lived, however, and in the early 1740s he decided to become a writer and translator.[10]
…

As atheism fell out of favor during the French Revolution, Diderot was vilified and considered responsible for the excessive persecution of the clergy.[54]

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2332/pg2332-images.html#link2H_4_0012
>
> It might have been expected, that every Englishman who takes any interest in any part of history would be curious to know how a handful of his countrymen, separated from their home by an immense ocean, subjugated, in the course of a few years, one of the greatest empires in the world. **Yet, unless we greatly err, this subject is, to most readers, not only insipid, but positively distasteful.**
> …
>
> The unfortunate Nabob seemed to be made up of those foibles against which comedy has pointed the most merciless ridicule, and of those crimes which have thrown the deepest gloom over tragedy, of Turcaret and Nero, of Monsieur Jourdain and Richard the Third. **A tempest of execration and derision, such as can be compared only to that outbreak of public feeling against the Puritans which took place at the time of the Restoration, burst on the servants of the Company.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/784/mode/2up?view=theater

Temple Stanyan (1677-1752) provided Diderot with some useful perspective on ancient Greece and contributed to the early genesis of his political thought, since the question of how the Greeks had lost their liberty is central to Stanyan's account and **ancient Greece was subsequently always central in Diderot's moral, social, and political philosophy.**20

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temple_Stanyan
>
> **The *Grecian History* was the first major English work on ancient Greece that was aimed at the general public and it became very successful.[8]** It was the standard work on the topic during the 18th century[1] and editions were published in 1751, 1759, 1766, 1774, 1775 and 1781. **It was translated into French by Denis Diderot in 1743.**

…

Diderot thus first became known in Parisian intellectual circles as a leader of the then prevailing *anglomanie* and prime French champion of Shaftesbury. Given the latter's anti-

Christian Deist orientation, the Jesuit *Journal de Trévoux* gave Diderot's reworking of the English thinker a surprisingly enthusiastic reception, proclaiming the young *philosophe* a sound disciple of Locke, advocate of an absolute moral order, and supporter of 'English' principles generally.22 The *Journal des savants*, while criticizing Shaftesbury – as well as the unnamed translator, Diderot – for failing to show the 'necessity of Revelation,' and the superiority of Christianity to all other religions, nevertheless also reviewed the books rather favourably, **congratulating Diderot especially for showing how much atheism 'est opposé à la vertu'** and that true virtue definitely requires belief in a 'Dieu juste, bon et rémunérateur.'23

Such plaudits from the intellectual and academic mainstream reinforced the standing and self-confidence of the young *philosophe*, associating him closely with 'English' ideas and the Voltairean Deist camp. At the same time, the encounter with Shaftesbury exerted a profound and in some respects lasting impact on the evolution of his thought. **For Diderot, moral philosophy *à la Shaftesbury*, wholly detached from religion and assumptions of Original Sin but linked to rejection of all 'superstition' – though he renounced what he saw as Shaftesbury's excessive asceticism – always remained central to his concerns, and directly linked to what conceived of as the ordered, coherent structure of the cosmos, or 'l'ordre universel des choses.'**24 This overarching cohesion applied also to issues of morality, aesthetics, and art, and here too the stimulus and influence of Shaftesbury proved of enduring significance.

Shaftesbury's stressing the need for a system which – in opposition to Locke, Newton, and Condillac – distinguishes even Diderot's earliest forays into the realm of philosophy remained a pervasive preoccupation, as indeed it was of the Radical Enlightenment generally, and something which is indeed rather ironic given his lifelong proneness to be unsystematic in presenting his ideas. **But, above all, Shaftesbury inspired Diderot's initial Deism,** though it is important to remember that Diderot, with his rather free translation, not only absorbed but also, in some degree, tailored a new 'Shaftesbury' adapted to the contemporary French milieu.25 **If it was only briefly that Diderot agreed that ''tis very apparent how conducing a perfect theism must be to virtue and how great deficiency there is in atheism,'**26 **he never ceased to endorse Shaftesbury's view that there is an insufficiency of well-grounded moral philosophy in contemporary culture and that modern philosophers had paid inadequate attention to this important sector. Shaftesbury's idea the there is a 'natural sense of right and wrong' in Man and that this moral sensibility is prior to – the mature Diderot would say independent of – ideas about God seemed to him something of fundamental importance.** Harder to judge is whether Shaftesbury also contributed to Diderot's incipient republicanism.

Initially, Diderot backed Voltaire's campaign against deterministic materialism and atheism, maintaining, like both Voltaire and Shaftesbury, that atheism undermines all morality.27 **It is sometimes suggested that, while morality figured among Diderot's 'most enduring concerns,' he never developed a systematic moral theory;**28 but this, as we have seen, seems to underestimate the extent to which he developed a coherent view of moral problems and gravitated towards a particular type of moral theory which he emphatically linked to the political sphere, later endorsing naturalistic egalitarian principles in such articles for the *Encyclopédie* as those on 'Natural Right' and 'Citizen'; **but the original impulse to formulate a secularized moral theory wholly detached from, and intrinsically opposed to, theological criteria clearly began, in the early 1740s, with his encounter with Shaftesbury** before evolving further in his *Pensées philosophiques* (1746).29

In the first of Diderot's preserved letters documenting serious philosophical concerns, a letter about faith and religion written in 1745 to his brother – who, the following year, became an ordained priest – **just before, or just after, publication of the Shaftesbury translation** (which, indeed, was dedicated to his brother), **his determination to detach theology and religion completely from morality (as well as philosophy) is striking and emphatic.** Nor can it be an accident that he here expresses his utter horror of the effects of religious fanaticism in terms strongly reminiscent of Bayle, who was undoubtedly a prime influence on the radicalization of his thought at this time. Recalling the effects of the French Wars of Religion in which half the French nation bathed its hands 'par piété,' in the blood of the other, wholly suppressing, supposedly to sustain God's cause, 'les premiers sentiments de l'humanité,' as if one must cease to be human 'pour se montre religieux,' he bitterly deplored the inhuman consequences of religious fanaticism.30 **Shaftesbury's separation of morality from religion and theory of the prior nature of moral sentiment never lost its appeal for Diderot though he later became profoundly aware of the philosophical difficulties of such a position.**

https://www.academia.edu/35745755/The_Varieties_of_neostoic_Virtue_Erasmus_to_Diderot

A former pupil of the Jesuit college in Langres and later a proficient undergraduate of the Sorbonne theological faculty in Paris, within the space of a few years Diderot proceeded through the fatal career of theist, deist and atheist. During his impecunious Parisian youth he spent a decade translating English books, but Shaftesbury's *Essai sur la vertu et le mérite* (1745) was perhaps the only one far from hackwork, as clearly emerges from the short and cryptic *Discours préliminaire* prefixed to the first edition. **The**

translator, complaining of the poor moral teaching he had found in confessional schools, emphasizes that the *Essai* concerns only «moral virtue, the virtue that even the Holy Fathers conceded to some pagan philosophers.»24 The former *apprenti théologie* was well aware not only of recent disputes on the topic of pagan virtue, but also of the classical background behind Shaftesbury's vindication of full moral autonomy. **Quoting a passage from Cicero's *De oratore*, he stresses the point: «May we not infer from his definition that the hope of future goods and the fear of eternal punishments would annihilate virtue and merit?»**25 For moral integrity and happiness are one and the same, and a profession of theism or natural religion is the only warrant of both, whereas the zealot who looks forward to heavenly mercy or divine grace is like the trader of a mercenary exchange (*trafic*) first of all within his own conscience.

Diderot's translation of the *Inquiry* and particularly the numerous footnotes he borrowed from several other passages of the *Characteristicks* show how deeply he identified with the third Earl of Shaftesbury. He chose to translate the English writer as a mentor because of his criticism of superstitious religion, ironic deist propaganda, straightforward language in ethics, and gentlemanlike skill in the arts and humanities. **Several Diderot scholars have pointed out in detail how the apprentice *philosophe* interpreted Shaftesbury's fascinating suggestions in the light of his own progress from an early devotion onwards to natural religion.** In so doing, he seemed to be uninterested in an analysis of the historical background of the *Characteristicks*. The young humanist was not only unaware of Shaftesbury's unpublished *Askemata*, but was also unable to recognize at the time the imprint of Stoicism in the published essays, where the author's indebtedness to the late Stoa heritage, particularly to Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca, is only implicit. This may explain the translator's blunder when, **in his commentary, he inserted a short but fierce satire – «la plus laconique, mais la satire la plus violente»**26 **– *against* the Roman philosopher, synthetizing in a footnote a personal vulgate of the dullest and most inveterate commonplace anti-Senecan literature. Thirty years later, in a contrite apology for the «atrocious injury», he added a contemptuous allusion to the «grammairens», his clerical teachers, who in his youth had prevented him from fruitful «méditation des conseils de Sénèque.»**27

In the *Essai sur Sénèque* of 1778 Diderot's retraction on behalf of the philosopher, and more generally his concern for a *stoïcisme mitigé*, are pregnant with meaning. **What was at stake? According to Jean Ehrard, «his eulogy of Stoicism involved ethics emancipated from any reference to the supernatural.»**28 We may go a step further: if we take Shaftesbury's Stoic syncretism for granted, we can try an approach closer to its implications and remark that even in his earlier writings Diderot echoed the English moralist in his own idealization of the ancient sage. For example **Cléobule, the wise, tolerant and upright amphytrion of the *Promenade du sceptique*,** who lives in a magnificent neoclassic mansion and garden, and keeps himself aloof from the quarrels of the sects, is a prototype:

> He speaks freely of virtue; but from the tone he uses, it seems to agree with him. His temperament is nigh godly, for he acts justly, he speaks the truth, he loves good and he is sufficient unto himself.29

In his lifelong enquiry concerning the intricacies of private and public behaviour, and recommending – sometimes emphatically – virtues like *bienfaisance*, rectitude, humanity, tolerance, friendship, patriotism and philanthropy, Diderot returned often to the Graeco-Roman roots of pagan virtue. Might we define him an *anima naturaliter stoica*? **His customary praise of passions seems to be at variance with one of the Stoic doctrines, *apatheia*;** and one should keep in mind that during his imprisonment in the dungeon of Vincennes in 1749 he felt like an «imaginary Socrates» and even translated Plato's *Apology of Socrates* into French.30 **He later declared that he wanted to conclude his literary career with a play devoted to the *Death of Socrates*,** the dramatic subject of some of the contemporary painters he discussed in the *Salons*.

During the years of the encyclopaedic enterprise he abridged in French a large number of articles taken from Jacob Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae*, a monument of erudition containing exhaustive information about all the «sects» and the «placita» of philosophers, ancient and modern. Through this second-hand but extensive survey of the sources, Diderot was able to emphasize for the general reader the ideas and principles of morals he felt closer to his own requirements. **Some of the philosophical articles of the *Encyclopédie* – *Droit naturel*, *Éclectisme*, *Épicureisme*, *Spinosiste* – are also compilations from Brucker,** but they have been analysed as pretexts in which the translator inserted a number of personal comments exhibiting his most intimate predilections. In *Droit naturel*, an outline of the ethical-political theories of the school of Natural Right, significant personal emphasis is given to the concept of general will:

> **In order to know how far he ought to be a man, a citizen, a subject, a father, or a child and when it is proper for him to live or die, the individual should address himself to the general will of mankind** [...]. **Everything that you conceive, every course of action you consider, will be good, great, noble, sublime if it is in accordance with the general and common interest** [...]. Say to yourself often, «I am a man, and I possess no truly inalienable *natural rights* other than those possessed by all mankind». But, you will say, **where is the depository of this general will; where can I consult it?** In the principles embodied by the written law of every civilized nation; in the social behaviour of savage and barbarous peoples; in the tacit agreements obtaining among the enemies of humankind.31

These notions obviously come from the current Neostoic inheritance of Lipsius, Grotius and Pufendorf or, in other words, from the basic Stoic notion of *koinái énnoiai*, the sparks of truth inscribed in everyman's heart, and the cognate idea of a universal *jus gentium*. Jean-Jacques Rousseau – as is well known – quoted, criticized and re-elaborated these sentences in his own version of the

general will. In the article devoted to the ancient Stoa, Diderot brought grist to his mill by adding two short but pregnant remarks to Brucker's exposé: «It is easy to conclude from these principles that the Stoics were materialists, fatalists and, properly speaking, atheists», **and «The Stoic sect was the last branch of the Socratic sect.»**32 **Clearly, not only did Diderot follow Cicero and Seneca himself in fusing into the same syncretic mould Stoical, Sceptical and Epicurean principles, but he also expunged all metaphysical links from his own «materialistic» interpretation of Neostoic ethics.**
…

Diderot inserted in his apology of Seneca a fierce invective against Julien Offray de la Mettrie, author of the pamphlet *Anti-Sénèque* (1748) «dissolu, impudent, bouffon, flatteur». He dissociated himself from this Epicurean vulgar-materialist and immoralist,

> a writer who has no idea of the true foundation of morals, **that immense tree of which the top touches the sky and the roots penetrate to the depths of hell, where everything is linked,** where modesty, decency, manners, the smallest virtues, if there is such a thing, are connected as the leaves to the branch that one dishonours in stripping.34

Instead, he found a more congenial way of observing, exemplifying or developing relevant ethical topics in his tales, dialogues and dramas. Let us only mention the quest for a *morale en action* in the plots and characters mirroring certain personal experiences, such as *Entretien d'un père avec ses enfants*, *Les deux amis de Bourbonne* and *Ceci n'est pas un conte*, not to mention the dramas of his bourgeois theatre or the brilliant self-portrait *Est-il bon? Est-il méchant?* These works involve peculiar literary techniques for testing several samples of public, familiar and private ethics. In other cases, the talent of the moralist is stimulated by hearsay or indirect documentation, **as in *La Religieuse* and the *Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville*, where the most dramatic consequences of confessional customs clash with the conflicting «natural» and «civil» codes of behaviour.** Virtue is never an abstract ideal in Diderot's social satire. **In the *Neveu de Rameau* the dialectics of the Nephew's vicious ego, rooted in the depths of hell, and of the «noble mind» of the philosopher** – as Hegel defined this character in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, using Goethe's German translation – **represents the judgement of the heaven of virtue above the «immense tree» of morals.**

The Neostoic background of Diderot's variations on virtue has scarcely been recognized so far, but is a helpful test for a fuller reassessment, *cum grano salis*, of his lifelong reflections concerning liberty and determinism, virtue and vice, natural and civil law, private and social ethics. **In the course of his vigorous objections to many aspects of the reductionist *De l'Homme* of Helvétius, Diderot avowed his failure to write a systematic moral treatise: «No, I do not feel myself equal to this sublime work; I would have uselessly consecrated my whole life to it.»**35 **What he admittedly had been unable to do was finally achieved – he hinted – by his friend Baron Paul Thiry d'Holbach in the many catechisms the latter devoted to the programme of the moralization of politics, or *ethocratie*, particularly the *Morale universelle* (1776), a book that Diderot welcomed as an exemplary model: «May fathers and mothers recommend it to their children as everyday reading!»**36 But it is easy to see that this generous praise has an intrinsic limitation: the *Morale universelle* has merely pedagogical value. Its flat style and dogmatic content are not comparable with Seneca's «complete course of ethics» nor with Diderot's running commentary of it.37

Seneca, formerly almost absent from *Le système de la nature* and the other anonymous works issued by the baron's workshop, seems to have been fully introduced into the *coterie holbachique* around 1773, when La Grange – the otherwise obscure preceptor of d'Holbach's children, a good Latinist and still a young man – began the complete translation of the *Corpus Senecanum*. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the preceptor, d'Holbach or both first suggested the annexation of this great and controversial figure to the cause of the militant *philosophie*. **D'Holbach certainly decided to support the translation in the light of the debates of past centuries about pagan ethics. His new fervour for the Roman philosopher is confirmed by a series of Latin quotations, particularly the motto introducing his *Ethocratie*: «Constituit bonos mores civitati Princeps», taken from *De clementia*, I,3.**

When La Grange died in 1775, Seneca was certainly a subject of intense conversations about morals and politics in the Grandval circle: **the new editor Jacques André Naigeon asked Diderot to write a life of Seneca and a commentary of all his works (except the dubious tragedies).** These well-known details are important for explaining why, in the summer 1776, the ageing Diderot devoted himself enthusiastically to his last literary enterprise. He carefully reread the ancient historians, friends or foes of Seneca: Tacitus, Suetonius, Quintilian, Pliny, Cassius Dio, Xiphilinus. He digested the huge modern literature concerning the controversy about the pagan's «disguised vices» and Seneca's «Stoic pride», from Montaigne and Erasmus down to the Jansenists and Vauvenargues. **He never quoted Nicolas Malebranche, but certainly reacted to the denigration of Seneca quoted above from the still popular *Recherche de la vérité*.**38 **Thanks to a recent and learned reference book written in defence of Seneca by a former Jesuit writer, he became aware of all the religious implications of his case.**39 Following Tacitus and Lipsius, in his sparkling style Diderot recapitulated the dramatic story of Seneca and Nero, and was adamant in vindicating the philosopher once more from any blemish. In the commentary of his moral legacy, Diderot reacted often to the rigorous asceticism of the ancient Stoa, but praised Seneca as a mitigated Stoic. Moreover, in his unsystematic philosophizing he found a comprehensive framework in which to discuss all the complexities of his own moral

thought. Last but not least, he mirrored himself in the *modèle idéal* of the Roman sage, whose apology – more at length in the second edition of 1782 – became self-vindication against his critics.

Diderot's last work is rarely mentioned in modern bibliographies concerning the Seneca *Forschung*, nor can it be considered a professional contribution to the history of Neostoic scholarship. The *Essai sur Sénèque* – particularly the second edition – has been analysed in some detail for its autobiographical, polemical and political significance. These well-known aspects of the book should not conceal the author's most engaging struggle with the hero of paganism, a substitute for the Holy Fathers of Christianity: *Sancte Seneca!* as he invoked him on two occasions, **alluding to Erasmus' *Sancte Socrates!***40 For the polymath author, this final quest for lay ethics founded on Neostoic themes was an open-ended dialogue with one of the fathers of the Enlightenment, and his swansong.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot's bleak *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron* pits courageous Stoics against superstitious tyrants; Hume finds a minority of sensible men in the midst of darkest medieval England.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/150/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot pronounced Seneca the philosopher who had "struck the most violent blows at the two handles by which the robust man and the adroit priest seize the weak to lead them by the nose,"2 and, to judge from some of his own writings, he was content to strike the same blows in precisely the same manner. When Diderot links tyranny with superstition, uneasiness with credulity, the fear of death with submissiveness to authority, he is merely paraphrasing his Seneca.

> 2. *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron*, in *Oeuvres*, III, 189. **Diderot's image, which for some reason he thought "energetic," is borrowed from the Stoic Arrian.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/308/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot was too much of a Stoic to forgive him his disdain for Seneca, but the other philosophes, less censorious, enjoyed Saint Evremond's work, chiefly for its good taste and urbane wit.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater

As Diderot put it in one of his moments of moral ecstasy, if there is a God, "he cares a great deal more for the purity of our souls than for the truth of our opinions."5
…

I have suggested it before: Diderot the moralist was a Roman out of his time; his incessant and, to us, sometimes tiresome moralizing is the philosophe in Roman dress.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/12/mode/2up?view=theater

Like the ancient Stoic, [the philosophe] would exalt the interest of mankind above the interest of country or clan: as Diderot told Hume in an outburst of spontaneous good feeling, "My dear David, you belong to all nations, and you'll never ask an unhappy man for his birth-certificate. I flatter myself that I am, like you, a citizen of the great city of the world."7 Rousseau's intense patriotism was exceptional. Wieland, with all his pessimism, still thought *Weltbürgertum* a noble ideal: "Only the true cosmopolitan can be a good citizen"; only he can "do the great work to which we have been called: to cultivate, enlighten, and ennoble the human race."8 **Gibbon explained in his magisterial tones that "it is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country; but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as a great republic, whose various inhabitants have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation.**"9

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n125/mode/2up?view=theater

[Diderot] finished his apostleship by his *Life of Seneca*, in which he sees no other difference between him and his dog, but that of their dress; and by his *New Philosophical Thoughts*, where God is supposed to be the *Animal Prototype*, and mortals so many little particles flowing from this great animal, and successively metamorphosed into all sorts of animals until the end of time, when they are all to return to the divine substance whence they had originally emanated.22

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/818/mode/2up?view=theater

The eruption of full-scale intellectual warfare in 1748 was hence hard to foresee in 1746-7; but, once begun, the effects of the upheaval were crucially affected by the widening rift within the ranks of the *parti philosophique* itself, **a revolt against Voltaire and 'English ideas' which simultaneously came to a head in the late 1740s, with the radicalization of Diderot in particular.** While the roles of d'Alembert, Buffon, Helvétius, the recently arrived d'Holbach, and others were all significant, Diderot emerged as the pre-eminent figure among the philosophical vanguard, especially through his function, from 1746, as chief editor of the *Encyclopédie*.

Diderot proved to be an intellectual strategist of genius, an extraordinarily capable operator both on a personal level and in the domain of public opinion. What Rousseau called his 'numberless acquaintances,' his captivating wit, fluency, and sociability, enabled him to function almost like an orchestral conductor, concerting discussion, literary collaboration, propaganda, evasion of the censorship, and lines of communication across a wide spectrum. **A much liked and generous spirit, he was the linchpin who, by 1747, knew practically everyone that counted (apart from Voltaire and the aloof Montesquieu):** among his many associates were Condillac, Buffon, d'Alembert, Fontenelle, Du Marsais, Boureau-Deslandes, Helvétius, Réaumur, Rousseau, La Beaumelle, Raynal, the baron d'Holbach, almost as soon as he arrived in Paris, and, on his arrival in 1749, his henceforth lifelong friend Friedrich Melchior Grimm (1723-1807).14

Within the *parti philosophique*, **the decisive shift to radical ideas,** in terms of both Diderot's own personal intellectual development, and the group as a whole, **occurred in the years 1745-8,** after the appearance of his *Pensées philosophiques*. This was when he penned his philosophical allegory, entitled the *Promenade du sceptique* [Sceptic's Walk] (1747), a text which provides a glimpse of the fraught and crucially formative philosophical debates gripping the *philosophes*' radical wing, among other places at the Café Procope, Café de la Régence, and the tavern Panier fleuri, the location of weekly lunches, in the later 1740s, where Diderot met with Rousseau, Condillac, and sometimes Mably.15 **Long recognized as representing a key step in Diderot's intellectual formation** – especially in his abandonment of Deism and switch to the one-substance atheistic materialism which characterized his thought for the rest of his career – the *Promenade* is a veiled, rather mysterious text recounting a four-or five-cornered intellectual tussle in the form of a dialogue placed in a pseudo-mythical ancient setting.16

A striking feature of the *Promenade* is that the party of the *athées* in Diderot's nomenclature, headed by 'Atheos,' represents an unsatisfactory, incomplete, and rather crudely mechanistic immoral 'atheism' which has been plausibly equated with the thought of La Mettrie; for Diderot seems already to have had some 'inside' knowledge of his materialist antagonist's final position, even though the latter's *L'Homme machine* did not appear until the following year.17 It may also include elements of an older, more moralistic brand of philosophical atheism long bandied about the Café Procope and similar places by the likes of Nicolas Boindin, a declared unbeliever whose ideas were drawn from his holy 'trinity' of Descartes, Bayle, and Fontenelle.18 **Even lower down in the author's esteem comes the party of Pyrrhonist sceptics which Diderot, with his firmly *Bayliste* rejection (or rather redefinition) of scepticism, assigns no positive role to.**19 **Deism rates more highly** but is represented by two contrasting figures, one of which is Cléobule, a reticent aesthete who despairs of enlightening mankind [éclairer les hommes] and who has convincingly been identified with Shaftesbury.20

Cléobule grants that enlightening men would, indeed, be the greatest service one could render them, were the task feasible; but, he contends, it is quite impossible. Were men crass and ignorant merely through not having learnt much, the task might be conceivable, 'mais,' holds Cléobule, 'leur aveuglement est systêmatique.'21 **In the decisive intellectual encounter, however, the Deists are headed not by 'Shaftesbury' but by a more vigorous advocate, Phyloxène, who, we learn, preaches Newtonian providential Deism but in a hectoring, conceited manner unfitting for a true philosopher.** Plainly, he stands for Voltaire or else a conflation of Voltaire, Maupertuis, and Réaumur.22 The highly charged encounter which unfolds leads to the triumph of one particular intellectual faction, but the triumphant school of thought proves to be neither the 'atheists,' nor the sceptics, nor the Newtonian-Voltairean Deists, nor the 'Shaftesbury' Deists. Rather, **the debate ends, to the amazement of those assembled, with the defeat of the Newtonian-Voltaireans by 'Oribaze' and 'Alcmeon' who Diderot expressly states are *Spinosistes*.**23

Clearly, the central issue here is Spinozism, as Venturi observed;24 nor is this fact at all surprising, though some scholars have considered it highly perplexing.25 The 'Spinozist' denouement to Diderot's *Promenade*, far from being inexplicable, reflects the actual process of Diderot's evolution from Voltaire's positions to Spinozism occurring at the time and is indeed essential to a proper grasp of Diderot's intellectual trajectory at this vital juncture. **The first part of the *Promenade* with its uncompromising claim that revealed religion and theology cannot be either true, or part of what is meaningful and universal in human life, claims only philosophies that wholly discard theology and separate faith from reason – like Shaftesbury's Deism, Voltaire's Deism, philosophical atheism, and Spinozism – qualify for consideration by the true philosopher.** The systems of Malebranche, Leibniz, Le Clerc, and Locke are all rather disdainfully excluded *a priori*, just

as they doubtless were in the café discussion in Paris during the mid 1740s, as confused and irrelevant precisely because they unite philosophy with theology. Seeing 'la connaissance des phénomènes de la nature' as the sole and exclusive business of philosophy, he denounced the mixing of theology with philosophy as the worst syncretism, a perfidious threat to intellectual freedom, rationality, and society. **Much like Bayle, a philosopher whom he greatly admired but was prevented by the royal censorship from openly eulogizing,**26 **Diderot sought to divorce all moral and social issues from theology,** ecclesiastical authority, and every form of faith-based justification and authorization.

In the *Promenade*, then, not just Locke's system but all philosophical systems which accommodate, and are linked to, miracles, revelations, and theological criteria are disqualified from the outset. Supernatural agency, including a revised Newtonianism, nevertheless remains firmly on the agenda in the shape of Deist divine providence. **The *athée* (and to begin with the *Spinosistes*) is indeed overwhelmed by the eloquent discourse of the Deists. Phyloxène and his followers proclaim the 'argument from design' proven by close investigation of nature's workings, using microscopes, the intricate construction of small living bodies in particular demonstrating, as La Pluche and Réaumur urged, 'design' for a purpose and hence divine intelligence behind Creation.** Given the wondrous intricacy of the minute, as well as the grandeur and overarching coherence of the universe: 'sa structure n'annonce-t-elle pas un auteur?'27

Yet at the very moment the Deists appear victorious, Oribaze, the chief 'Spinosiste,' arises among the assembled participants, asserting that there cannot have been a Maker of the cosmos prior to the existence of physical structures and beings: if there had ever not been physical beings 'il n'y en aurait jamais' since to impart existence 'il faut agir, et pour agir il faut être.'28 Rather than being the work of a far-seeing, intelligent Creator, **the substance and coherence of the universe, he argues, must ensue from an order immanent in nature itself.** Contrary to what Réaumur supposed, his laborious research on insects reveals not the truth of physico-theology, and hence religion, **but only that 'la matière est organisée.'** It follows, holds Oribaze, that both 'l'être intelligent et l'être corporel sont éternels,' that these two dimensions make up the universe, **'et que l'univers est Dieu.'**29

Philoxène counters by assuring the audience the *Spinosistes* are merely introducing new forms of obscurity and mystification, 'deifying' the emergence of insects, drops of water, 'et toutes les molécules, de la matière.' **Oribaze denies 'deifying' matter or anything else, averring that if his adversary listened, he would appreciate he was attempting, on the contrary, to eradicate 'la présomption, le mensonge et les dieux.'**30 **Already in his *Pensées philosophiques* (1746), Diderot advocates a form of scepticism quite different from that of Montaigne and the Pyrrhonists, a scepticism deriving directly from Bayle which operates chiefly against beliefs and theological doctrines.** What is a sceptic, he asks? It is a philosopher, he replies, who has doubted everything which he believes and who believes only what legitimate usage of his reason 'et de ses sens lui a démontré vrai.'31 **It was this *Bayliste* anti-Pyrrhonist scepticism, labelling as delusion and mad presumption practically everything most men believe, and eschewing everything one's own independent reason and senses cannot verify, which had brought Diderot, finally, to reject his own prior Deism,** as well as Newton's, Fénelon's, Réaumur's, Maupertuis's, and Voltaire's 'argument from design.' For Diderot this was decisive.

Philoxène (Voltaire) is used to success and inclined, notes Diderot, to treat everyone else condescendingly, and, hence, taken aback by this vigorous sortie on the part of an adversary 'don't il avait fait peu de cas,' suddenly becomes disconcerted. Attempting to rally himself, he is all at once paralysed by the sight of 'une maligne joie,' spreading on the faces all around him, prompted by hidden feelings of jealousy to which, comments Diderot, even the most philosophical of men are never altogether immune. The philosophico-historical psychology of the situation seems clear: the Newtonian-Voltairean faction, not without a certain arrogance, having dominated Parisian intellectual life for an over a decade, had become accustomed to their ascendancy; but now suddenly their hegemony collapsed and the whole assembly, all the factions, enjoyed witnessing the public humiliation of the overbearing Philoxène at the hands of an antagonist whom he had treated 'assez cavalièrement.'32

The old-style *athées* are partly blamed for the long primacy of the Newtonian-Voltairean Deists, their thinking and discourse allegedly having been insufficiently flexible, even simplistic. For if they too maintain that 'la matière est organisée,' they fail to develop this idea cogently or demonstrate that life may arise from matter and that matter and perhaps even 'son arrangement, sont éternels.'33 **A key difference between the La Mettrie *athées* and *Spinosistes*, according to Diderot, who had presumably witnessed this himself in the cafés, was that the former infer there is no moral order to uphold, and rely on a rather cynical immoralism – which is precisely what Diderot later accused La Mettrie of doing – while the *Spinosistes*, more high-mindedly, strive to uphold not the theologically deformed or conventional but the true moral order.**34

https://archive.org/details/parisundercommun00broc/page/96/mode/2up?view=theater

> —**A correspondent of the *New York Herald* relates as follows a conversation he held with Bergeret, the printer general of the first days of the Commune.** The correspondent said to him:—
> …
>
> **"What do you substitute for God?"**
>
> **"Universal harmony."**
>
> "What do you mean by that?"
>
> "**The union of everything that exists in one harmonious whole.** Man, animals, flowers, plants, trees, stars, planets—everything."
> …
>
> "Therefore, at this limit of the human understanding there is a barrier which you call universal harmony, whereas we call it God?"
>
> "That is my meaning exactly."

…

Inviting Diderot to visit him, Voltaire desired 'passionément' to know whether *enfin* the younger man counted himself among the *ouvrages* of the divine Creator or as a portion 'nécessairement organisée d'une matière éternelle et nécessaire,' a witty way of enquiring whether Diderot adhered to Voltairean-Newtonian-Lockean ideas or was now a hylozoist *Spinosiste*.46

Diderot's reply is not without interest given the direction of his recent writing. Assuring Voltaire that his letter marked a supreme moment of his life, and that he would answer his question, he declined to pay the requested visit for the time being, under pretext of domestic problems. **(He was not to meet Voltaire, in person, until nearly thirty years later, in 1778.)** His answering letter, remarkably, reiterates, in places almost verbatim, Oribaze's critique of Philoxène in the *Promenade*: if ever there had been no physical beings in the universe, there could never have been any, for physical beings are, by their nature, ontologically and conceptually, if not chronologically, prior to 'êtres spirituels.'47 Minds, he asserts, are accordingly modes 'ou du moins des effets' of matter which, he points out, directly conflicts with Voltaire's view.48 **Both physical and spiritual substance being eternal, he concludes, with a sweeping and, in the circumstances, almost insolent Spinozistic flourish, plainly both of these simultaneously compose our universe and hence 'l'univers est Dieu.'**49

This confirms, as Venturi saw,50 that it was the *Spinosistes* rather than the Deists, Newtonians, and Lockeans with whom Diderot identified at the most decisive moment in his personal development. Moreover, the position he adopted in 1746-7, a deterministic, one-substance materialist *naturalisme* allied to a form of social and moral utilitarianism wholly distinct from La Mettrie's moral theory, was the philosophical stance he adhered to whilst writing the *Lettre* and throughout his maturity. The explicit Spinozism of the *Promenade*, in other words, far from indicating any 'mediating role of Spinozism' intervening between the *Pensées philosophiques* and *Lettre*, as some have suggested, or an immature vagary, as others suppose, signals rather a decisive, permanent shift from the *anglicisme* of his youth to a radical *Spinosiste* stance.51

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/140/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1758, Malesherbes, then chief French censor, who was trying to protect the new ideas without giving them the range the philosophes claimed for them, asked in some irritation whether "M. Diderot couldn't even write a poetics without mentioning religion and the government in two or three places."6
…

Diderot insisted all his life that it was just the matters that had never been questioned before which must be questioned now, in this philosophic time: only "two matters deserve my attention," Diderot has his spokesman say in *La promenade du sceptique*, an early work, "and they are precisely the ones you forbid me to discuss. Impose on me silence concerning religion and government, and I'll have nothing more to say."8 But silence was not merely undesirable; it was impossible: "Everything must be examined," Diderot reiterated in the *Encyclopédie*, "everything must be shaken up, without exception and without circumspection."9

> 9. "Encyclopédie," ibid., XIV, 474. **In his essay on Seneca, as elsewhere, Diderot resorts to the by then well-worn philosophical device of calling for complete freedom of speech in matters of religion, politics, and "manners" and of claiming, at the same time, that true philosophers, members of the most dignified of professions, could never be subversive.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_System_of_Nature

The work was originally published under the name of Jean-Baptiste de Mirabaud, a deceased member of the French Academy of Science. D'Holbach wrote and published this book – possibly with the assistance of Denis Diderot[1] but with the support of Jacques-André Naigeon – anonymously in 1770, describing the universe in terms of the principles of philosophical materialism: the mind is identified with the brain, there is no "soul" without a living body, the world is governed by strict deterministic laws, free will is an illusion,[2] there are no final causes, and whatever happens takes place because it inexorably must.
…

Commenting on the book, Frederick observed:

> **When one speaks in public he should consider the delicacy of superstitious ears; he should not shock anybody; he should wait till the time is sufficiently enlightened to let him think out loud.[5]**

…

According to Will Durant, the *System of Nature* contains the most comprehensive description of materialism and atheism in the entire history of philosophy.[8]

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n305/mode/2up?view=theater

[Frederick] warned Kings, that the grand object of those Sophisters was to deliver them over to the multitude, **and to teach nations *that subjects may exercise the right of deposing their Sovereign when they are displeased with him*.**33 He gives notice to the Kings of France, that their Conspiracy is more particularly aimed at them.

The denunciation is clearly and formally expressed in the following terms: ***"The Encyclopedists reform all Governments. France (according to their plans) is to form a great Republic, and a Mathematician is to be its Legislator.*—Mathematicians will govern it, and work all the operations *of the new Republic* by fluxions.—This *Republic* is to live in perpetual peace, and support itself without an army."**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n127/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> ***This active Liberalism progresses from Jacobinism to Bolshevism logically*.** These are not in opposition of thought and will, but are the Early and the Late form, the beginning and the end, of one single movement. It began about 1770 with sentimental "social-political" tendencies: the structure of society according to class and rank was to be destroyed; **and there was to be a "Return to Nature," to the uniformity of the herd. The place of class was to be taken by that which has no class: money and intelligence, counting-house and lecturer's chair, arithmeticians and clerks;** in place of form-ordered existence, life without form, manners, obligations, respect.

…

"**The Encyclopedists (says he) are a set of pretended Philosophers who have lately started into existence. They look upon themselves as superior to every school which antiquity has produced. *To the effrontery of the Cynic* they add the *impudence* of uttering every paradox their brain can invent. They are a set of *presumptuous* men, who never will own themselves to be in the wrong. According to their principles, the sage can never be mistaken, he is the only enlightened person: It is from him that the light emanates which is to dissipate the dreary darkness into which the silly and blind multitude have been deluded.** And God knows how they enlighten them. At one time it is by unfolding the *origin of Prejudices*; at another, it is by a book *on the Mind*, or a *System of Nature*; in short, there is no end to them. A set *of puppies*, whether from fashion or an air they assume, call themselves their disciples. They affect to copy them, and take upon themselves to be the Deputy Governors of Mankind!"
…

At length however he discovered and was convinced, that from the Conspiracy against the Altar the Sophisters passed to that against the Throne. **It is this latter Conspiracy which he wishes to lay open; and it is with these latter plots that he charges the whole school in the person of Diderot, when he says, "The true sentiments of the Author, on Governments, are only to be discovered toward the end of his work. It is there that he lays down as a principle that subjects ought to enjoy *the right of deposing their Sovereigns* when displeased with them. And it is *to effectuate this* that he is perpetually crying out against great armies, which would prove too powerful an obstacle to his designs.** A person would be tempted to think, it was Fontaine's fable of the Wolf and the Shepherd that he was reading. If ever the visionary ideas of our Philosophers could be realized, it would *be necessary to new-mould every Government in Europe*, and even that would be a mere trifle. It would be necessary again, though perhaps impossible, that *subjects setting up as the judges* of their masters should be wise and equitable; that those who aspired to the crown should be free from ambition; and that neither intrigue, cabal, nor the spirit of independence, should prevail."36

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/128/mode/2up?view=theater

Whether Diderot wrote *Le philosophe* remains uncertain; **that he accepted its point is clear from his mature work, the *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron*.** In this lawyer's plea for Seneca, Diderot also pleads for philosophy, with his customary lyricism. The philosopher, he writes, is "the preceptor of mankind," and Diderot offers his client as a worthy exemplar of the master profession.2 **In his analysis of Seneca's *Epistles*, Diderot merges into Seneca until we can no longer separate the ancient from the modern philosopher:**

> The magistrate deals out justice; the philosopher teaches the magistrate what is just and unjust. The soldier defends his country; the philosopher teaches the soldier what a fatherland is. The priest recommends to his people the love and respect of the gods; **the philosopher teaches the priest what the gods are. The sovereign commands all; the philosopher teaches the sovereign the origins and limits of his authority.** Every man has duties to his family and his society; the philosopher teaches everyone what these duties are. Man is exposed to misfortune and pain; the philosopher teaches man how to suffer.3

Diderot did not think of himself as godlike and knew himself to be anything but free from passion, **but he made most of the claims, for himself as for the rest of the philosophers, that the Stoics had made for the Wise Man.**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/510/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Where, for the German Eclectics, philosophers have a major, if auxiliary, role to play in helping shape education, law, politics, and human society, they wanted no part of the radicals' claim that there is only one virtue, as Diderot puts it, namely justice, and only one goal of human life, to be happy, **and that the exclusive teachers of men are the philosophers, they who are the true 'souverains sur la surface de la terre' as Diderot says, reviving a Greek topos, the only men who remain in the state of nature 'où tout étoit à tous.'**82
>
> https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/132/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Is Napoleon the ontologically transformed man, no longer man but god, "concentrated in one point" and containing in himself the deity? If he is not, **then it is Hegel himself who outdoes the emperor by comprising in his own consciousness both Napoleon and his world-historical significance. Napoleon is the noble metal, but Hegel is the alchemist.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot's dialogues are less formal than Hume's; they often sound like transcriptions of conversations held in Holbach's salon. Unquestionably, Diderot's masterpiece in the form is *Le Neveu de Rameau*. The Satire of Horace which it imitates is a long monologue by Horace's slave Davus, punctuated with a few interjections by his master. Davus takes advantage of a slave's traditional right to speak his mind during the Saturnalia and accuses his master of irrational contradictions in his conduct: he derides Horace as a free man who is actually more of a slave than his slave; a hypocrite who cants about simplicity while living in luxury, and who deplores the disappearance of antique Roman honesty in the midst of an adulterous love affair. *Quisnam igitur liber?* – **"Who is free?" Davus asks. Only the wise man, the man who cares not for honors but is all to himself, and against whom fortune contends in vain.**

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0063%3Abook%3D2%3Apoem%3D7
>
> **You praise the happiness and manners of the ancient [Roman] people; and yet, if any god were on a sudden to reduce you to them, you, the same man, would earnestly beg to be excused;** either because you are not really of opinion that what you bawl about is right; or because you are irresolute in defending the right, and hesitate, in vain desirous to extract your foot from the mire. **At Rome, you long for the country; when you are in the country, fickle, you extol the absent city to the skies.**
> …
>
> Who then is free? The wise man, who has dominion over himself; whom neither poverty, nor death, nor chains affright; brave in the checking of his appetites, and in contemning honors; and, **perfect in himself, polished and round as a globe,[9] so that nothing from without can retard, in consequence of its smoothness;** against whom misfortune ever advances ineffectually. Can you, out of these, recognize any thing applicable to yourself?

Diderot ends at the same point, but his conversation takes a more sinuous and more scenic course. The dissolute, amoral, and highly gifted Rameau is Davus, a penetrating, pitiless observer who lampoons the

wealthy hosts whose parasite he is. **But the other speaker, the virtuous, sensible, slightly sententious "I" of the dialogue, has more to say than Horace; in *Le Neveu de Rameau*, the two protagonists are rather more evenly matched than they are in its Latin prototype.** Rameau, despite his legal freedom and verbal license, is more of a slave than Davus; while "I," for all his limitations, is invulnerable to really serious attack, since his own life is blameless. True dialogue thus becomes possible.

Diderot – that is, "I" – is ready to acknowledge that sensuality is almost irresistible: the hardest thing in the word is to live according to principle. "In the whole country," says Rameau, "only one man walks – the king. Everybody else takes a position." This, Diderot is almost willing to grant – **the observation is, after all, an epigrammatic expression of the truth that freedom and power are conjoined.** Diderot does not share Rameau's view of life, but he takes it seriously enough to present it at length: Rameau is worth debating with. **Just as Voltaire has shrewdly recognized in Pascal the most formidable intellectual adversary of his hedonism, so Diderot recognizes that the most insidious opponent to his Stoicism is just this irresponsible, amoral sensuality:**
…

I have quoted this passage at length even though it is not Diderot's final word about morality. He was too familiar with sensual passion, and valued it too highly, to regard ascetic Cynicism as a satisfactory ethical position. But it vividly evokes the style of philosophizing typical of the Enlightenment: tentative and yet didactic, casual and yet pointed in its classical allusions, hospitable to the variety of experience, and in all respects close to life. **The maker of systems lives alone: he was a Spinoza constructing geometric patterns while he grounds his lenses.** The philosophe thought in public and was in this, too, much like his beloved ancients, who had generally written "in a free and familiar style" and treated "their subjects in the way of dialogue and free debate."7
…

Other works were outright collaborations: Lessing wrote essays with Moses Mendelssohn; Beccaria's *Dei delitti a delle pene* was a virtual group effort; Rousseau's *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, Holbach's *Systême de la nature*, and Raynal's *Histoire des Deux Indes* are the offspring, and in many respects the imitations, of conversations – **all three books contain unknown and undeterminable quantities of Diderot's prose. Raynal's *Histoire*, indeed, was the work of perhaps a dozen philosophers, among whom Diderot was merely the most prominent.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/594/mode/2up?view=theater

The only way to form a moral and political rationale strong enough to counter what was effectively a general convergence of theological justification, mercantilist considerations of national interest, and theories of race superiority and inferiority, **was to adopt the principle of equality and the unity of mankind on the basis of 'la raison universelle'** as Bruzen de La Martinière calls it.19 Declaring universal equality the 'holiest' law of morality, as the latter puts it, something overriding every other claim or justification, **the radical stream offered an avowedly 'universalist' moral-political standpoint intellectually robust enough to underpin a general system of anti-colonialism which was to culminate during the Enlightenment in the final version of the Abbé Raynal's *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes* of 1780,** a ringing denunciation of Europe's ruthless conquest, despoliation, and subjection of Africa, Asia, and the Americas **in which the hardest-hitting sections were written by Diderot.** The origins and roots of this type of anti-colonialism, however, are clearly recognizable much earlier in the writing of van den Enden, Poulain de La Barre, Lahontan, Gueudeville, Bayle, Fontenelle, Radicati, Tyssot de Patot, Doria, Jean-Frédéric Bernard, and Bruzen de La Martinière, as well as Diderot. **For the only way intellectually to undermine such systems of subjection was to uphold the essential equivalence of all individual hopes, wills, and status, and therefore of all peoples and religions, excluding no one, not even unbelievers, heretics, neophytes, and atheists and not even the most primitive nomads. Hence, anti-colonialism as a strand of modernity both actually derived from, and could only derive from, forms of radical thought based on materialist monism.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_des_deux_Indes

According to Melchior Grimm, Denis Diderot contributed a large part of the work.[4] He is certainly one of its main contributors, and it is estimated he wrote between a third and a fifth of the book, especially the parts on philosophical themes.[5]
…

The *Histoire des deux Indes* was a great success. **In France, over thirty different editions were published between 1770 and 1787, and over fifty were published abroad.** Abridged versions were published called *Esprit de Raynal* ("Potted Raynal") and *Raynal de la jeunesse* ("Children's Raynal"). Napoleon Bonaparte proclaimed himself a "willing disciple of Raynal" (French:

zélé disciple de Raynal) and took the book with him on his Egyptian campaign. **Toussaint Louverture read the book and was especially inspired by a passage that predicted slave revolution in the West Indies.**[6] Horace Walpole wrote to Marie Du Deffand: "It attacks all governments and all religions!" (French: *Il attaque tous les gouvernements et toutes les religions!*).

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap21.htm#tole

A modern writer, who, with a just confidence, has prefixed to his own history the honourable epithets of political and philosophical, (163) **accuses the timid prudence of Montesquieu,** for neglecting to enumerate, among the causes of the decline of the empire, a law of Constantine, by which the exercise of the Pagan worship was absolutely suppressed, and a considerable part of his subjects was left destitute of priests, temples, and of any public religion. **The zeal of the philosophic historian for the rights of mankind has induced him to acquiesce in the ambiguous testimony of those ecclesiastics who have too lightly ascribed to their favourite hero the *merit* of a general persecution.** (164)

> 163. Histoire Politique et Philosophique des Etablissemens des Europeens dans les deux Indes, tom. i. p. 9.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4557/4557-h/4557-h.htm#link2HCH0008

Everyone knows how Voltaire and Montesquieu used Hurons or Persians to hold up the glass to Western manners and morals, as Tacitus used the Germans to criticise the society of Rome. **But very few ever look into the seven volumes of the Abbe Raynal's History of the Two Indies which appeared in 1772.** It is however, one of the remarkable books of the century. Its immediate practical importance lay in the array of facts which it furnished to the friends of humanity in the movement against negro slavery. But it was also an effective attack on the Church and the sacerdotal system. The author's method was the same which his greater contemporary Gibbon employed on a larger scale. **A history of facts was a more formidable indictment than any declamatory attack.**

Raynal brought home to the conscience of Europeans the miseries which had befallen the natives of the New World through the Christian conquerors and their priests. He was not indeed an enthusiastic preacher of Progress. He is unable to decide between the comparative advantages of the savage state of nature and the most highly cultivated society. **But he observes that "the human race is what we wish to make it," that the felicity of man depends entirely on the improvement of legislation;** and in the survey of the history of Europe to which the last Book of his work is devoted, his view is generally optimistic.

https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA667422225&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=0307661X&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7E2a1e1a40&aty=open-web-entry

Usually (and incorrectly) attributed to the pen of the Abbé Raynal, its ostensible theme of Europe's colonial expansion allowed Diderot not only to depict the atrocities and greed of colonialism but also to develop an argument in defense of universal human rights, equality, and a life free from tyranny and fanaticism. **More widely read than any other work of the Enlightenment ... it summoned people to understand the causes of their misery and then to revolt.**— *Jennings, Jeremy. "Reason's revenge: How a small group of radical philosophers made a world revolution--and lost control of it to 'Rousseauist fanatics'." TLS. Times Literary Supplement, no. 5695, 25 May 2012, pp. 3+.*

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_113

The spread of socialist ideas in the Age of Enlightenment may be judged by the open sympathy with which they are referred to in the most influential work of the day--the famous *Encyclopédie*. **In an article on "The Legislator" (IX, 1765), the author of which is apparently Diderot, the fundamental goal of every legislator is described as the replacement of the "spirit of property" by the "spirit of community."**

If the spirit of community is dominant in a state, its citizens do not regret that they have rejected their own will for the sake of the common will; love for their homeland becomes their only passion. These somewhat vague pronouncements are rendered more concrete by references to the laws of Peru as models of laws based on the spirit of community.*

> "The laws of Peru strove to unite the citizens by bonds of humanity; while the legislation of other countries forbid doing harm to another, in Peru the laws prescribe tirelessly doing good. **Laws establishing (to the extent possible in the limitations of a natural state) the communality of property weakened the spirit of property--the source of all evil.** The most festive days in Peru were those days when the common field was being tilled, the field of an old man or an

> orphan. He who was punished by not being permitted to work in the common field considered himself a most unhappy man. Each citizen worked for all the citizens and brought the fruits of his labor to state granaries and received the fruit of other citizens' labor as reward." (Quoted in 51: p. 127)

Later, in 1772, Diderot returned to thoughts on the socialist form of state organization. **In his work *Supplement au voyage de Bougainville,* he describes the life of the people of Tahiti, whose island the traveler is supposed to have visited.**

The savages have everything in common. They work their fields together. Marriage does not exist and children are brought up by the community. Addressing the traveler, an old Tahitian says:

> **"Here, everything belongs to all, while you have preached a difference between 'mine' and 'thine.'"** (52: p. 43)
>
> "Leave us our morals. They are wiser and more virtuous than yours. We do not want to exchange what you call ignorance for your useless knowledge. We have everything that we need and whatever is useful to us. Do we deserve contempt merely because we did not invent superfluous necessities? Don't inspire in us either your false necessities or your chimerical virtues." (52: p. 44)
>
> "Our girls and women belong to all. ... A young Tahitian girl giving herself up to the delights of a young Tahitian boy's embrace would wait impatiently for her mother to undress her and bare her breasts. ... Without shame or fear she accepts in our presence, surrounded by innocent Tahitians, to the sound of flutes and the dance, the caresses of him who was chosen by her youthful heart and the secret voice of her feelings. Are you capable of replacing with a more worthy and greater feeling the feeling that we instilled in them and which inspires them?" (52: pp. 43-45)

Diderot's attitude toward socialist theories may also be judged by the fact that when Morelly's *Code of Nature* was included in various collections of his works, he did not protest.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA428#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bougainville also learned that the Jesuits, who wanted to control the innermost thoughts of their Indians, had organized a system of espionage and secret surveillance from which there was no escape. The evils of a totally regulated society were clearly perceived by this worldly eighteenth-century ship's captain. **The Jesuits, the learned Bougainville observed, had ample precedent for their system both in their own order and in the writings of an ancient proponent of a meticulously supervised republic, Plato, in the *Laws*, where a nocturnal, punitive council of elders manipulated a similar information network.**23

After Bougainville had visited Tahiti, he once again bore witness to the flaws in what, at first sight, appeared to be a paradisaical utopia. When he entered the harbor, beautiful naked maidens who clambered aboard his ship, driving his young seamen mad with excitement, made him forget for a moment his scientific mission; **at the sight of the gentle landscape and the profusion of Venuses, he dredged up the description of Eden in Genesis and Ovid's golden age and Anacreon in rapid succession.** But after a time, realistic observation stained the image of perfection and beatitude. There were two races in Tahitian society and the "great ones" exercised the power of life and death over the common people. (Meat and fish were reserved for the magnates.) The inhabitants were in a state of perpetual warfare with tribes on other islands, and they suffered from venereal diseases.24 **Manifestly, Diderot had expurgated Bougainville's original account in a radical manner** when he extolled the ways of Tahitian society in his fanciful *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville.*

The ambivalence of the philosophes to the state-of-nature utopia is most forcefully illustrated, toward the close of the ancien régime, in the Abbé Raynal's voluminous *Histoire philosophique des deux Indes*, **one of the most widely read works of the period if the book-counters are to be credited.** He summarized the body of travel literature and used it as the basis for a slashing indictment of Europeans as destroyers of whole peoples, a veritable chronicle of genocide. But Raynal was no worshiper of the state of nature.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/196/mode/2up?view=theater

Christian morality, on the other hand, strikes the Tahitians as "useless knowledge," as "fetters disguised in a hundred different shapes," which "can only arouse the indignation and contempt" of men in whom "the love of liberty – *le sentiment de la liberté*" is the deepest of feelings.4 **Tahitian indignation is aroused by Western greed and bellicosity, but it is aroused most fiercely by the Christian sexual code.** Diderot, composing an angry oration for his spokesman, an aged Tahitian, eloquently pleads for the pagan sexuality he thinks proper for the Enlightenment: "Only a little while ago, the young Tahitian girl blissfully abandoned herself to the embraces of a young Tahitian man; she

impatiently waited the day when her mother, authorized by the girl's nubility, would lift her veil and show her naked breasts. **She was proud to be able to excite the desires and attract the amorous looks of strangers, of her relatives, of her brother;** she accepted the caresses of the one whom her young heart and the secret voice of her senses had pointed out to her – accepted them without fear and without shame, in our presence, in the midst of a crowd of innocent Tahitians, to the sound of flutes and amid dancing. The idea of crime and the fear of disease entered among us only with you. Our enjoyments, once so sweet, are attended with remorse and dread. **That man in black standing near you, listening to me, has spoken to our boys; I don't know what he said to our girls, but our boys hesitate, our girls blush.** Go bury yourself in the dark woods, if you like, with the perverse companion of your pleasures, but let the good, simple Tahitians reproduce themselves without shame under the open sky, and in broad daylight."5

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this improbable discourse contradicts the Christian condemnation of lust point by point. **In the paradise of Tahiti's innocence, Christian morality acts the part of the serpent. Diderot, one might say, wryly accepts the Fall by transferring the burden of responsibility:** it is not man, but Christianity that is guilty of bringing sin – the sin against nature – into the world.
…

Christianity – and this is the heart of Diderot's indictment and of his pagan psychology – multiplies crime and misery, depraves the conscience and corrupts the mind: "People will no longer know what they must do or not do; guilty in the state of innocence, tranquil in the midst of crime, they will have lost the north star that should guide their course."7

But for Diderot, even in this Tahitian fantasy, sexual liberty is not sexual license: Diderot scoffs at celibacy, monogamy, and the fear of incest, and insists that the sexual impulse, being natural, is as innocent as it is essential for the survival of society. **But Diderot defines "natural" not as primitive- or animal-like, or as everything that is possible; the natural, for him, is the appropriate.** He places distinct limits on taboos on intercourse before maturity has been reached, and the enforcement of these taboos "is the principal object of domestic education, and the most important point in public morality."8 **Bigamy, fornication, adultery, incest are imaginary crimes foisted on a supine humanity by religion, but nature itself sets boundaries which, since they emerge from nature rather than violate it, are truly sacred.** Since Diderot was among the most passionate men – or, in any event, among the most uninhibited writers – of the eighteenth century, his defense of lust is exceptional in its vivacity.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Apart from Rousseau, perhaps the only major philosophe to whom identification with the ancients was a sustained fantasy was Diderot, although with this adventurous genius it is never possible to be sure. A striking and appealing figure, learned, talkative, energetic, changeable, inventive, sensual, and elusive, Diderot embodies the dualism of the Enlightenment to perfection: a partisan of empiricism and scientific method, a skeptic, a tireless experimenter and innovator, Diderot was possessed by the restlessness of modern man. **Our firmest opinions, he once said in a moment of unintentional self-revelation, are not those we have always held but those to which we have returned most often.** At the same time, he belonged to antiquity. **"In my early years," he told Catherine of Russia, "I sucked up the milk of Homer, Vergil, Horace, Terence, Anacreon, Plato and Euripides, diluted with that of Moses and the Prophets."**5
…

Over and over again, more in earnest than in jest, Diderot turned himself into a pagan sage, most notably Diogenes, the self-sufficient cynic, or into an admiring contemporary of other pagan philosophers, of Socrates or Seneca. They were his collective conscience, the invisible Pantheon whose imaginary approval he sought and whose censure he feared. "O sages of Greece and Rome," he once wrote, "when I encounter your statues at the bend of a solitary avenue, and they detain me; when I stand before them delirious with admiration; when I feel my heart shudder with joy at the sight of your august images; when I feel the divine enthusiasm escape from your cold marble and pass into me; when, remembering your great actions and the ingratitude of your contemporaries, tears of compassion fill my eyes, how sweet it would be for me to interrogate my conscience and obtain its testimony that I too have deserved well of my nation and my century!"8
…

The gravest production of Diderot's life was also, significantly his most Roman: his *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron*, composed in the 1770s at the instance of Holbach. The *Essai* is a curious work, in part a biography of Seneca, in part a polemic on behalf of virtue; it falls into no category and follows no formula. **The admirer of Diderot's wit who remembers the *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville* or the unbuttoned *Rêve de d'Alembert* may be repelled by the sententious harshness of this *Essai*.**

…

This is not a paradox: in this *Essai* he is not a psychologist; he is a moralist. His irritable defense of Seneca's conduct and doctrines make his *Essai* into a eulogy of antique greatness. **"After reading Seneca, am I the same man I was before reading him? That's not so – it can't be so."**9

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

> **Once indeed Posidonius, a distinguished writer of the age of Cicero and Caesar, so far forgot himself as to enumerate, among the humbler blessings which mankind owed to philosophy, the discovery of the principle of the arch, and the introduction of the use of metals.** This eulogy was considered as an affront, and was taken up with proper spirit. Seneca vehemently disclaims these insulting compliments. [Seneca, *Epist.* 90.] Philosophy, according to him, has nothing to do with teaching men to rear arched roofs over their heads. The true philosopher does not care whether he has an arched roof or any roof. Philosophy has nothing to do with teaching men the uses of metals. She teaches us to be independent of all material substances, of all mechanical contrivances. The wise man lives according to nature. **Instead of attempting to add to the physical comforts of his species, he regrets that his lot was not cast in that golden age when the human race had no protection against the cold but the skins of wild beasts, no screen from the sun but a cavern.** To impute to such a man any share in the invention or improvement of a plough, a ship, or a mill is an insult. "In my own time," says Seneca, "there have been inventions of this sort, transparent windows, tubes for diffusing warmth equally through all parts of a building, shorthand, which has been carried to such a perfection that a writer can keep pace with the most rapid speaker. But the inventing of such things is drudgery for the lowest slaves; philosophy lies deeper. It is not her office to teach men how to use their hands. The object of her lessons is to form the soul. ***Non est, inquam, instrumentorum ad usus necessarios opifex*****." If the *non* were left out, this last sentence would be no bad description of the Baconian philosophy, and would, indeed, very much resemble several expressions in the *Novum Organum*.** "We shall next be told," exclaims Seneca, "that the first shoemaker was a philosopher." For our own part, if we are forced to make our choice between the first shoemaker and the author of the three books "On Anger," we pronounce for the shoemaker. It may be worse to be angry than to be wet. But shoes have kept millions from being wet; and we doubt whether Seneca ever kept anybody from being angry.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater

The philosophes' practicality was worldly, designed to translate into reality Bacon's and Descartes's grandiose vision of man controlling nature for his profit and delight. It has sometimes been said that Diderot wasted twenty years of his life and ruined his precious eyesight editing a mere Encyclopedia. But except for moments of discouragement, **Diderot considered his editorship as much part of his philosophical vocation as anything else he ever did. As he put it in a rather ominous sentence, man was learning to "torment nature" into yielding her secrets for man's benefit.**
…

The philosopher in the factory was an analogue to the bourgeois drama, in which the rigid separation of styles was giving way to a kind of democracy of sentiment. Hand and intellect, technology and philosophy, separated since the Greeks, were now finding common ground in the utilization of science for the sake of improving man's lot.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/286/mode/2up?view=theater

It is with a short article by Diderot in the *Encyclopédie*, an article which ends with this Voltairian quip, that we penetrate to the heart of Machiavelli's meaning for the Enlightenment. "Machiavélisme" interprets the *Prince* as a vivid warning against tyranny misread by his contemporaries. "They took a satire for a eulogy." It sharply distinguishes Machiavellianism – "detestable politics" – from Machiavelli, who is described as an erudite man of genius, a cultivated man of letters who wrote some good dramas, hated the despotism of the Medici, survived torture through his courage, and died like a philosopher. **If (the article notes a little disingenuously) the reports are to be believed, "he said that he preferred being in hell with Socrates, Alcibiades, Caesar, Pompey, and the other great men of antiquity, to being in heaven with the founders of Christianity."**8

> 8. Diderot: *Oeuvres*, XVI, 32. These last words sound too apt to be authentic; **they sound more like the invention of an eighteenth-century propagandist than the pronouncement of the dying Florentine. But they were first reported in the sixteenth century, and today authoritative biographers like Ridolfi accept them.**

This, for obvious reasons, was an attractive enough picture for Diderot – the modern pagan, brave to the end, joining the ancients whom he had always preferred to the preachers of meekness and superstition. But Diderot goes deeper than this, **he quotes and accepts Bacon's famous verdict:** *Est quod gratias agamus Machiavello et hujus modi scriptoribus, qui aperte et indissimulatur proferent quod homines facere soleant, non quod debeant* – "We are much beholden to Machiavelli and other writers of that class, who openly and unfeignedly declare or describe what men do, and not what they ought to do."9 The Enlightenment's Machiavelli, then, was Bacon's Machiavelli, the historian who had claimed to "open a new route" after "long experience and assiduous research;" the innovator who had invented the science of politics, a study that amalgamated contemporary affairs with ancient history.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/366/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot transcribed much of Brucker's essay on Epicureanism, but where Brucker is the accurate and dry reporter, Diderot is the passionate advocate; again, Diderot transferred long passages from Brucker's essay on Stoicism directly into the *Encyclopédie*, but here he argues with the man he is copying. **Brucker had cold aversion for the Stoics; their good reputation, he suggested, rested on a superficial similarity of their doctrines to that of Christianity and in direct borrowings from Christian writers. Brucker's Stoics are contemptible hairsplitters, eclectics in the pernicious sense of that word, empty-headed compilers, and, in their advocacy of apathy, hypocrites. Clearly this was a verdict that Diderot could not sustain; he was, after all, in his own independent manner a latter-day Stoic and an articulate admirer of Roman Stoicism, which had tried to foster a sense of public obligation rather than apathy.** Therefore Diderot offers sympathetic if slightly ironical portraits of the early Stoics, omits Brucker's cruel story that Chrysippus either laughed or drank himself to death, defends the Stoic doctrine against its critics – that is to say, Brucker – and criticizes, slyly, Christian ethics in turn: the Stoics, he writes, have been reproached with "**bringing scholastic complications into polite society;** it has been argued that they misunderstood the forces of nature, that their ethics were impractical, and that they inspired enthusiasm instead of wisdom. That may be; but then, what enthusiasm! It sacrifices us to virtue, and can keep our minds in a posture so tranquil and so firm, that the keenest pains will not wring from us a sigh, a tear! … **Ordinary philosophers are men of flesh like others: the Stoic is a man of iron; one can break him but not make him complain. … Christian morality is a mitigated Zenonism, and is consequently in more general use; still the number of those who rigorously conform to it is not large.**"9

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/556/mode/2up?view=theater

The philosophes on the Continent had no doubts – especially by 1778, after the colonists' first impressive victories. America, wrote Turgot in that year, was bound to prosper, for the American people were "the hope of the human race; they may well become its model."4 About the same time, **Diderot interrupted his essay on the reigns of Claudius and Nero with a fervent aside:** "After centuries of general oppression," he burst out, "may the revolution which has just occurred across the seas, **by offering all the inhabitants of Europe an asylum against fanaticism and tyranny,** instruct those who govern men on the legitimate use of their authority! May these brave Americans, who would rather see their wives raped, their children murdered, their dwellings destroyed, their fields ravaged, their villages burned, and rather shed their blood and die than lose the slightest portion of their freedom, prevent the enormous accumulation and unequal distribution of wealth, luxury, effeminacy, and corruption of manners, and may they provide for the maintenance of their freedom and the survival of their government!" **In Diderot's frenzied vision, untroubled, it seems, by factual information, rustic American philosophes were facing decadent British barbarians, and enjoying unprecedented opportunities coupled with unprecedented obligations.** They must jealously guard their freedom and always remember how they came to be what they now are: "May they defer, at least for a few centuries, the decree pronounced on all the things of this world; the decree that had condemned them to have their birth, their time of vigor, their decrepitude, and their end! **May the earth swallow up those of their provinces powerful enough, and mad enough, one day to seek the means of subjugating the others!**"5

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR11#v=onepage&q&f=false

FOR ERNST CASSIRER, writing in American exile during the Second World War, ideas drawn from Stoic philosophy played a vital role in the 'formation of the modern mind and the modern world.' The Greek Stoics had taught that one should live in accordance with a moral law of nature, he observed, and the Roman Stoics had both championed **the virtue of *humanitas*, absent from earlier Greek ethics,** and argued for a cosmopolitanism that treated the whole world, gods and humans together, as fellow citizens of one great republic. **In particular, Cassirer attributed to the Stoics the notion of the fundamental equality of all human beings. Stoic ideas persisted beyond the end of the Stoic school itself, Cassirer suggested, finding a place 'in Roman jurisprudence, in the Fathers of the Church, in scholastic philosophy.' But it was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that these ideas took on 'tremendous practical significance.'** In the

world of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the 'unity and the inner harmony of medieval culture had been dissolved,' **'the hierarchic chain of being that gave to everything its right, firm, unquestionable place in the general order of things was destroyed,'** and the 'heliocentric system deprived man of his privileged condition.' The prospects appeared bleak for 'a really universal system of ethics or religion,' one 'based upon such principles as could be admitted by every nation, every creed, and every sect.'

> **Stoicism alone seemed to be equal to this task. It became the foundation of a 'natural' religion and a system of natural laws.** Stoic philosophy could not help man to solve the metaphysical riddles of the universe. But it contained a greater and more important promise: **the promise to restore man to his ethical dignity.** This dignity, it asserted, cannot be lost; for it does not depend on a dogmatic creed or on any outward revelation. It rests exclusively on the moral will – on the worth that man attributes to himself.1

Cassirer thus considered seventeenth-century political philosophy to be in significant measure 'a rejuvenation of Stoic ideas.' He highlighted the importance of works by Justus Lipsius and others, as well as the rapid passage of Neostoic ideas **'from Italy to France; from France to the Netherlands; to England, to the American colonies.' Of the stirring opening phrases of the Declaration of Independence – 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness'** – Cassirer claimed that **'When Jefferson wrote these words he was scarcely aware that he was speaking the language of Stoic philosophy.'**

https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2012/09/happiness-aristotle-american-founding-bradley-birzer.html

Sadly, I must be rather blunt: Aristotle had almost no direct influence on the Founding or the founding generation. And, when he did speak to them, he spoke through his logic and rhetoric first, his politics, second, and his Ethics almost certainly not at all.
...

Until the 1870s, most Americans assumed that education was liberal education. If not liberal, it wasn't education, it was training.

Even the settlers of the so-called "wild west" understood this. "Should the time ever come when Latin and Greek should be banished from our universities and the study of Cicero and Demosthenes, of Homer and Virgil, should be considered as unnecessary for the formation of a scholar," a writer or the Cincinnati *Western Review* warned in 1820, "we should regard mankind as fast sinking into an absolute barbarism, and the gloom of mental darkness is likely to increase until it should become universal."
...

Even then, we would do far better to pick a Roman figure—such as **Cicero (the single most important figure in antiquity for the Founding generation)**, Virgil, Livy, or Tacitus.

Aristotle is

- Never cited once in the three month-long constitutional convention.
- Never cited in *The Federalist Papers*.
- Never cited in Dickinson's *Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer* (though, JD loves Antigone), the most widely read piece of revolutionary literature until the printing of Paine's *Common Sense*).
- Never cited in any of George Washington's letters or speeches (except in mentioning the ordering of a bust of Aristotle, along with a significant number of other classical figures).
- Never cited in the complete works of Alexander Hamilton.
- Never cited in the first history written of the American Revolution by David Ramsey in 1789 or in the second history by Mercy Otis Warren in 1805.

In the works and correspondence of Thomas Jefferson, we find Aristotle's name appearing only a few times.

As a young man, Jefferson embraced Aristotle's ideas of slavery as a justification to continue to enslave blacks, believing them "inferior." [Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics, 97]

> https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0234 **[26 August 1816]**
>
> In answer to your enquiry as to the merits of Gillies's translation of the Politics of Aristotle, I can only say that it has the reputation of being preferable to Ellis's, the only rival translation into English. I have never seen it myself, and therefore do not speak of it from my own knolege. but so different was the state of society then, and with those people, from what it is now & with us, that I think little edification can be obtained from their writings on the subject of government. **they had just ideas of the value of personal liberty; but none at all of the structure of government best calculated to preserve it. they knew no medium between a democracy (the only pure republic, but impracticable beyond the limits of a town) and an abandonment of themselves to an aristocracy, or a tyranny, independant of the people. it seems not to have occurred that where the citizens cannot meet to transact their business in person, they alone have the right to chuse the agents who shall transact it; and that, in this way, a republican, or popular**

> **government, of the 2[d] grade of purity, may be exercised over any extent of country.** the full experiment of a government democratical, but representative, was and is still1 reserved for us. the idea (taken indeed from the little specimen formerly existing in the English constitution, but now lost) has been carried by us, more or less, into all our legislative and Executive departments; but it has not yet, by any of us, been pushed into all the ramifications of the system, so far as to leave no authority existing not responsible to the people: whose rights however to the exercise & fruits of their own industry, can never be protected against the selfishness of rulers not subject to their controul at short periods. **the introduction of this new principle of representative democracy has rendered useless almost every thing written before on the structure of government: and in a great measure relieves our regret if the political writings of Aristotle, or of any other antient, have been lost, or are unfaithfully rendered or explained to us.** my most earnest wish is to see the republican element of popular controul pushed to the maximum of it's practicable exercise. I shall then believe that our government may be pure & perpetual.
>
> https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-09-02-0063 **[13 October 1815]**
>
> the priests have so disfigured the simple religion of Jesus that no one who reads the sophistications they have engrafted on it, from the jargon **of Plato, of Aristotle & other mystics,** would conceive these could have been fathered on the sublime preacher of the sermon on the mount. yet, knowing the importance of names they have assumed that of Christians, **while they are mere Platonists, or any thing rather than disciples of Jesus.**

...

In the most authoritative study on the sources of the Founding, Professor Donald Lutz quantifies the references made to various sources, ca. 1761 to 1802. During that time, he found 36 widely cited authors: **including St. Paul, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Locke, and Hume, and Plutarch as the top 6.** Cicero is #12, Livy #21, Tacitus #24, and Plato #25.

Aristotle does not even make the list.

This, however, is not to suggest that the founders did not absorb the teachings of Aristotle—they did, but secondarily through the works of Machiavelli, Bacon, Sidney, Harrington, Locke, and Montesquieu.

When Aristotle is referenced in the founding generation (a generation, it should be remembered yet again, raised on a love of antiquity), it is never (not once!) for his *Ethics*. His logic, however, appeared as the logic of Isaac Watts's in his popular 1719 textbook on that subject. [Kopff, 74] Many American students also learned the art of rhetoric, in part, from Aristotle.

...

When James Wilson, one of only six men to sign the Declaration as well as the Constitution, and a future member of the U.S. Supreme Court, gave his famous lectures at what is now the University of Pennsylvania in 1790 and 1791, describing the meaning and philosophy of the American founding, he offered an almost purely Ciceronian vision of Natural Law and Natural Rights. Though he draws upon Aristotle here or there, he constantly refers back to Cicero, though his Cicero is, admittedly, more mythologized than real. **As with John Adams, the two revered Cicero, focusing almost exclusively on the Roman's Stoic ethics.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_628
>
> "After having," says the illustrious Neckar, in his book concerning the importance of religious opinions,g "proved myself a citizen of France, by my administration, as well as my writings, **I wish to unite myself to a fraternity still more extended, that of the whole human race.** Thus, without dispersing our sentiments, we may be able to communicate ourselves a great way off, and enlarge, in some measure, the limits of our circle. **Glory be to our thinking faculties for it! to that spiritual portion of ourselves,** which can take in the past, dart into futurity, and intimately associate itself with the destiny of men of all countries and of all ages!"
>
> To the same purpose is the sentiment of Cicero, in his beautiful treatise on the nature and offices of friendship.h "In tracing the social laws of nature," says he, "**it seems evident, that man, by the frame of his moral constitution, is supposed to consider himself as standing in some degree of social relation to the whole species in general;** and that this principle acts with more or less vigour, according to the distance at which he is placed with respect to any particular community or individual of his kind."
>
> This principle of benevolence and sociability, which is not confined to one sect or to one state, but ranges excursive through the whole expanded theatre of men and nations, **instead of being always acknowledged and always recommended, as it ought to have been, has been**

altogether omitted by some philosophers: by some, its existence seems to have been doubted or denied.
…

The very enlarged active power, concerning which I speak, is, to this day, so far as I know, without an appropriated name. The term *philanthropy* approaches near, but does not reach it. We sometimes call it *patriotism,* by a figurative extension of that term, which, in its proper meaning, denotes a circle of benevolence limited by the state, of which one is a member. **When we speak of the most exalted of all characters, of the man who possesses this virtue, we generally describe him, by a metaphor, a "citizen of the world." A "man of the world," which would be the more natural expression, though it is in common use, is used to convey a very different idea.**
…

What immense treasures have been exhausted, what oceans of human blood have been shed, in France and England, by force of the expression "natural enemy!" **'Tis an unnatural expression. The antithesis is truly in the thought: for natural enmity forms no title in the genuine law of nations, part of the law of nature. It is adopted from a spurious code.**

The foregoing rules and maxims of national law, though they are the sacred, the inviolable, and the exalted precepts of nature, and of nature's Author, have been long unknown and unacknowledged among nations. Even where they have been known and acknowledged, their calm still voice has been drowned by the solicitations of interest, the clamours of ambition, and the thunder of war. **Many of the ancient nations conceived themselves to be under no obligations whatever to other states or the citizens of other states, unless they could produce in their favour a connexion formed and cemented by a treaty of amity.**

At last, however, the voice of nature, intelligible and persuasive, has been heard by nations that are civilized: at last it is acknowledged that mankind are all brothers: the happy time is, we hope, approaching, when the acknowledgment will be substantiated by a uniform corresponding conduct.

How beautiful and energetick are the sentiments of Cicero on this subject. "It is more consonant to nature," that is, as he said a little before, to the law of nations, "to undertake the greatest labours, and to undergo the severest trouble, for the preservation and advantage of all nations, if such a thing could be accomplished, than to live in solitary repose, not only without pain, but surrounded with all the allurements of pleasure and wealth. Every one of a good and great mind, would prefer the first greatly before the second situation in life." "**It is highly absurd to say, as some have said, that no one ought to injure a parent or a brother, for the sake of his own advantage; but that another rule may be observed concerning the rest of the citizens: such persons determine that there is no law, no bonds of society among the citizens, for the common benefit of the commonwealth. This sentiment tends to dissolve the union of the state. Others, again, admit that a social regard is to be paid to the citizens, but deny that this regard ought to be extended in favour of foreigners: such persons would destroy the common society of the human race;** and if this common society were destroyed, the destruction would involve, in it, the fate also of beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice. Which last virtue is the mistress and the queen of all the other virtues."j

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_753

Some philosophers, however, have alleged, that society is not natural, but is only adventitious to us; that it is the mere consequence of direful necessity; that, by nature, men are wolves to men; not wolves to wolves; for between them union and society have a place; but as wolves to sheep, destroyers and devourers. Men, say they, are made for rapine; they are destined to prey upon one another: each is to fight for victory, and to subdue and enslave as many of his fellow creatures, as he possibly can, by treachery or by force. According to these philosophers, the only natural principles of man are selfishness, and an insatiable desire of tyranny and dominion. **Their conclusion is, that a state of nature, instead of being a state of kindness, society, and peace, is a state of selfishness, discord, and war.** By a strange perversion of things, they would so explain all the social passions and natural affections, as to denominate them of the selfish species. Humanity and hospitality towards strangers or those in distress are represented as selfishness, only of a more deliberate kind. An honest heart is only a cunning one; and good nature is a well regulated self-love. The love of posterity, of kindred, of country, and of mankind—all these are only so many different modifications of this universal self-love.
…

> **The celebrated Sage of Malmesbury,1 savage and unsociable as he would make himself and all mankind appear, took the utmost pains that, during his life, and even after his death, others might be kindly rescued from the unhappy delusions, by which they were prevented from discovering the truth.b**
>
> b. 1. Shaft. Char. 90.
>
> He told us "**that both in religion and in morals, we were imposed on by our governours;** that there is nothing, which, by nature, inclines us either way; and that nothing naturally draws us to the love of what is without or beyond ourselves." And yet he was the most laborious of all men in composing and publishing systems of this kind—*for our use.*
>
> To such philosophers, animated with this preposterous zeal, this answer, in the spirit of their own doctrines, is plain and easy. If there is nothing to carry you without yourselves; what are we to you? From what motives do you give yourselves all this concern about us? **What can induce you to trim your midnight lamp, and waste your spirits in laborious vigils, for our instruction?** You disclaim all social connexion with your species; what, then, we say again, are we to you?
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D20
>
> Thus Epicurus[2] also, when he designs to destroy the natural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he destroys. For what does he say? 'Be not deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken: **there is no natural fellowship among rational animals;** believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false reasons.'—What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep awake for us? **Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so many books,** that no one of us may be deceived about the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure?

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The clearest statement of this shift came in 1790, two years after the ratification of the Constitution. It was written by James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who had been one of the major participants at the Convention and also in the state legislature in Pennsylvania in the fall of 1787. **He was a member of the nationalist faction, holding a view of centralized political power that was closer to Hamilton's view than Jefferson's.** He was also a strong supporter of the Bank of North America, which had been authorized by the Continental Congress.15

> We are told, however, that, at last, the source of the Nile has been discovered; and that it consists of—what might have been supposed before the discovery—a collection of springs small, indeed, but pure.
>
> The fate of sovereignty has been similar to that of the Nile. Always magnificent, always interesting to mankind, it has become alternately their blessing and their curse. Its origin has often been attempted to be traced. The great and the wise have embarked in the undertaking; though seldom, it must be owned, with the spirit of just inquiry; or in the direction, which leads to important discovery. **The source of sovereignty was still concealed beyond some impenetrable mystery; and, because it was concealed, philosophers and politicians, in this instance, gravely taught what, in the other, the poets had fondly fabled, that it must be something more than human: it was impiously asserted to be divine.**
>
> Lately, the inquiry has been recommenced with a different spirit, and in a new direction; and although the discovery of nothing very astonishing, yet the discovery of something very useful and true, has been the result. **The dread and redoubtable sovereign, when traced to his ultimate and genuine source, has been found, as he ought to have been found, in the free and independent man.**16

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TTYAGD7aKBkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA36#v=onepage&q&f=false

The similarity between all the ideas in Polybius and Stoicism, including thrusting abstract responsibility onto the abstract individual with no reference to institutional support, and the American ideology that looks upon the United States as the culmination of history, as having a mixed constitution (and thus no problem with power), and holds the abstract individual responsible for good and

evil, success and failure (the Protestant-bourgeois ethic) **should be apparent. Even Seneca's religiosity has its counterpart in America's civil religion.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false

In any event, **the founders' advocacy of natural law can be placed in the broader context of an eighteenth-century movement, led by the Scots, to encroach upon the privileged position of English common law, in preference for Roman civil law, which they considered more truly based on natural law.** Like America, Scotland was a society geographically removed and emotionally alienated from English society and self-conscious about its lack of refinement. Hence, both societies embraced the classics as a vehicle for respectability. **James Wilson was himself a Scottish immigrant, Jefferson studied under the Scot William Small at the College of William and Mary, and James Madison learned from the Scot John Witherspoon at the College of New Jersey.** In his first lecture at the College of Philadelphia, Wilson, then an associate justice of the Supreme Court, urged resistance to the slavish adoption of English models and called for "the foundation, at least, of a separate, an unbiased, and an independent law education" in the United States. **Sixth-century Byzantine emperor Justinian's *Institutes* and *Digest*, the leading textbooks on Roman law, became more popular with American law students as both criticism of Britain and praise of France grew during the Revolutionary War, and it became clear that the common law could not provide federal courts with a model for addressing their most crucial cases, those concerning the relationship between federal and state governments.** Even before the Revolution, in the late 1750s, John Adams had studied Justinian so closely that he claimed regarding Massachusetts provincial law: "I know much less than I do of the Roman Law." In 1800 Samuel Chase, Supreme Court justice and signer of the Declaration of Independence, wrote regarding the beginning law student: **"He should next contemplate the maxims of the Law of Nature reduced to a practical system in the Laws of Imperial Rome, for he will find that the principles of the Common Law of England were borrowed from the Civil Law."**17

The civil law was popular in Virginia state courts. **In 1790 George Wythe, head of the Virginia High Court of Chancery, began citing Justinian's Roman law as precedents, though at first somewhat apologetically. By 1795 he was prepared to inveigh against slavish adherence to English authorities, endorsing Roman law as a more rational model.** In the twenty-one cases Wythe reviewed in the 1790s he alluded to classical figures eighty-five times. In one case Wythe compared justice with three of Aeneas' ships (*Aeneid*, 1.112), run aground by "the torrent of authority" of English precedent. **By contrast, though English judges were as classically trained as the American judiciary, classical allusions were exceedingly rare in English courts, since Roman precedents were irrelevant to the common law.**18

Other founders endorsed a greater role for the civil law. Fond of French experts on commercial law, Alexander Hamilton introduced his friend James Kent to civil law works. Kent employed them in the first law lectures delivered at Columbia. **Thomas Jefferson expressed a popular view when, in an 1812 memorandum on Edward Livingston's Louisiana Civil Code, he called Roman law "a system carried to a degree of conformity with natural reason attained by no other."** A few years later Jefferson urged the appointment of Thomas Cooper, who had published a translation of Justinian's *Institutes*, as the first professor of law at the University of Virginia.19

But though the founders may have first learned to appreciate natural law and its alleged product, civil law, from Scottish teachers, most had both the ability and the inclination to turn directly to the Roman Stoics themselves. As in so many other areas, there was a symbiotic relationship between classical and Whig works. Reading a Whig work generally motivated the founders to refer to relevant classical texts, and vice versa. To the founders, there was but one worthy tradition, the tradition of liberty, **and they would not have understood the modern historian's need to distinguish the classical and Whig traditions and to measure the influence of one against the other.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA226#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 1795 [Alexander Hamilton] branded Roman law "a relic of ancient barbarism with too many precedents of imitation," adding that it was inconsistent with both English common law and natural law. **He seemed to have forgotten that only four years earlier he had appealed to the same "barbaric" Roman law to prove the legality of government-created corporations, namely, the Bank of the United States.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA177#v=onepage&q&f=false

Having read and copied the Stoics long before he became familiar with Scottish moral philosophy, Jefferson believed that everyone possessed a "moral sense," **which God had implanted in humans to ensure the preservation of their race.** Not everyone listened to that moral sense; a plowman might decide a moral case better than a professor, if the professor were "led astray by artificial rules." But if people listened to their moral sense, they would find that it spoke the same things to each of them. **Thus, Jefferson wrote that ethics should be taught at the University of Virginia as "moral obligations … in which all sects agree," and praised the Quakers for rallying around their common ethics rather than fragmenting over theological points.** Similarly, John Adams, like his Stoic hero, Cicero, found proof of the existence of God in the universality of human reason. He argued: **"The human Understanding is a revelation from its Maker which can never be disputed or doubted. There can be no Sceptism, Pyrrhonism, or Incredulity, or Infidelity here. No Prophecies, no Miracles are necessary to prove this celestial communication. This revelation has made it certain that two and one make three; that one is not three; nor can three be one." To Adams, the very universality of reason implied interconnection with a universal mind. The Stoic concept of the interconnectedness of individual souls with the World Soul, for which philosophes substituted the Judaeo-Christian God, lay at the very heart of the Enlightenment belief in natural law, a universal code of ethics. Using a circular logic, philosophes deduced a common God from the existence of universal laws, both physical and moral, and the existence of universal laws from a common God.**12

Yet the founders also considered history (“experience”) an essential means of teaching virtue. Intuition could not be awakened without the aid of reason and experience. When seeing virtue represented in present and past examples, children instinctively recognized its inherent beauty and sought to reproduce it. **Conversely, children who rarely experienced virtuous behavior could not develop their moral sense to its full potential.** Jefferson used an enlightening analogy to explain this Stoic concept of the moral sense: “The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of a man as his leg or arm. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body … In this branch, therefore, read good books, because they will encourage as well as direct your feelings.” **Such “good books” included Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, Cicero’s philosophical writings, Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations* (another Stoic work), and Seneca’s essays. But at times Jefferson seemed not to appreciate the implications of this analogy: that any faculty which requires exercise can be considered neither infallible nor equally possessed by all.**13

…

The Stoics helped Jefferson endure the passing of his father (in 1752), his favorite sister (in 1765), and his wife (in 1782). Young Jefferson’s literary commonplace book overflows with Stoic quotations regarding the certainty of sorrow in this world and the need to endure it patiently. For instance, in the late 1750s Jefferson quoted **Euripides, a pre-Stoic stoic** (*Orestes*, 1-3): “There is naught so terrible to describe, be it physical pain or heaven-sent affliction, that man’s nature may not be able to bear the burden of it.”

http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/Vol19/Jefferson.pdf

Though his physics has Epicurean elements—that due, no doubt, to the triumph of Newtonian atomism in his time—Jefferson’s cosmology and moral thinking, the latter being patterned on the former, are decidedly Stoical. Consequently, his thoughts on living a good life and dying the right sort of death have been largely shaped by Stoics, not Epicurus.

…

Finally, Jefferson gives to an argument from authority. At John 4:24, he comments, Jesus says that God is spirit (*pneuma*). **Jefferson adds correctly that *pneuma*, for the ancients, was deemed a material substance, though a tenuous one. He then appeals to Origen, who speaks similarly of deity.**

…

In his *Literary Commonplace Book*, Jefferson abundantly commonplaces Lord Bolingbroke’s religious views from the latter’s *Philosophical Works*. Bolingbroke’s deity is “sovereignly good, … almighty and alwise” (§14), and has no difficulty enabling certain types of matter to think (§§11–13). Bolingbroke’s god does not intervene in foreordained cosmic events—e.g., through Christ’s miracles (§22 and §26), punishment for the fall of man (§15 and §42), or divine superintendency—but establishes once and for all cosmic harmony, as “nothing can be less reconcileable [*sic*] to the notion of an all-perfect being, than the imagination that he undoes by his power in particular cases what his wisdom … once thought sufficient to be established for all case” (§49)—thus, deism, not theism. Moreover, Bolingbroke’s deity has not made “man the final cause of the whole creation” (§16 and §46). Bolingbroke’s deity does not communicate his existence through revelation or inspiration, or only to one type of people (§16, §§20–22, §24, §32). Bolingbroke’s deity does not punish or reward humans in an eternal afterlife, for “justice requires that punishments … and rewards … [ought to] be measured [o]ut in various degrees and manners, according to the various [c]ircumstances of particular cases, and in due proportion to them” (§52)—i.e., justice ought to be meted out in this life. **The religious law of Bolingbroke’s deity—“the law of nature is the law of god” (§36)—is to be found in nature. “Natural religion represents an allperfect being to our adoration and to our live,” and requires humans to “love the lord thy god with all thy heart”** (§56).

Jefferson appropriated Bolingbroke’s conception of god and largely kept that conception throughout his life. Like Bolingbroke and others (e.g., Kames, Hume, Smith, and Tracy) whom Jefferson read and assimilated, Jefferson thought deity was visible in the cosmos. He writes to John Adams (11 Apr. 1823): “When we take a view of the Universe, in it’s parts general or particular, it is impossible for the human mind not to be percieve [*sic*] and feel a conviction of design, consummate skill, and indefinite power in every atom of it’s composition.”

…

Jefferson expressly rejected Stoic ethics—it was said to be *hors de prise* as an ethical ideal18—yet Stoicism drives his ethical thinking more than any other source. **He refers always to Stoic readings—Seneca, Antoninus (Marcus Aurelius), Epictetus, and the ethics works of Cicero (fraught with Stoic content)—in letters to key correspondents in which he recommends ethical works,**19 **and that can only be explicated by mesmeric, perhaps only subconscious, attraction to them.**

Like Cicero, Jefferson recognized the defects of Stoic ethics, yet he was irresistibly drawn to the Stoics, probably because he found irresistible the superordinary demands it made on adherents. That seems to be an extraordinary claim, until one reflects on Jefferson’s temperament. Intolerant of inefficiency and indolence, Jefferson was a demanding person— especially when it came to himself and to those persons most dear to him. Stoic sentiments always seemed to find their way into letters with intimates like John Adams, Joseph Priestley, Peter Carr, Benjamin Rush, his children, and grandchildren. Stoicism, which was commonly appropriated by moralists of Jefferson’s day (e.g., Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Kames), was the predominant ingredient in his moral-sense frame of reference.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT499#v=onepage&q&f=false

Martha C. Nussbaum, whose views on early America inform her arguments on current legal theory, **adds that only in ancient Rome were Stoic ideas more "diffused into the general culture" than in eighteenth-century America, which "runs a close second"** (Nussbaum 2010: 78). But the evidence Richard and Nussbaum adduce is surprisingly thin.
…

If Stoicism's presence was "diffused," what is the interpretative value of knowing that Thomas Jefferson died with a volume of Seneca on his reading stand?

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/54/mode/2up?view=theater

Thomas Jefferson, too, was deeply indebted to Machiavelli for his youthful Epicureanism, but at the Reverend James Maury's school, which he attended between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, he also read the Greek and Latin classics directly and with fair competence. Machiavelli and Bolingbroke confirmed what he had learned in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*; contempt for the fear of death, contempt for "superstition," admiration for sturdy pagan self-reliance. It was from Bolingbroke that he copied this sentence: **while the system of Christ is doubtful and incomplete, "A system thus collected from the writings of antient heathen moralist, of Tully, of Seneca, of Epictetus, and others, would be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from unquestionable principles of knowledge."**4 **Nothing displays the family resemblance among all branches of the Western Enlightenment more strikingly than this earnest entry in a young colonial's commonplace book; the heathen sentiment from Bolingbroke, intellectual parent to Voltaire as much as to Jefferson, went back, like many such sentiments, to a common root: classical Latinity.**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/540/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Parenthetically, another fruitful area for the study of liberal, reasonable Christianity is in the American colonies, **which produced such complex types as Thomas Jefferson, who began as a complete pagan and then reverted to a kind of ethical Christianity with Jesus as the supreme moral teacher.**
>
> https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf
>
> **Jefferson was systematic in his hatred of trinitarian Christianity. In his old age, he sent a letter to James Smith, which he stressed was confidential, in which he expressed confidence that "the present generation will see Unitarianism become the general religion of the United States."**97 In a letter to Benjamin Waterhouse that same year, he wrote: "I trust that there is not a young man now living in the United States who will not die a Unitarian."98

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-40-02-0178-0002

TJ wrote his **SYLLABUS** sometime after 9 Apr., **when he wrote Joseph Priestley to praise Priestley's pamphlet *Socrates and Jesus Compared*, which provided TJ the intellectual framework for his efforts to compare the moral teachings of Jesus with those of other ancient western authorities. He guarded the syllabus carefully, making sure to share it and the letter in which it was enclosed only with people he could trust, and often requesting its prompt return** (see TJ to Henry Dearborn and Levi Lincoln, [23 Apr.]; TJ to Lincoln, 26 Apr.; TJ to Thomas Cooper, 24 Feb. 1804; TJ to Joseph Priestley, Jr., 27 Dec. 1804; RS, 6:160–1, 439–40).

Doctrines of Jesus Compared with Others, 21 April 1803

…

In a comparative view of the Ethics of the enlightened nations of antiquity, of the Jews, and of Jesus, no notice should be taken of the corruptions of reason, among the antients, to wit, the idolatry & superstition of their vulgar, Nor of the corruptions of Christianity by the over1 learned among it's professors.

Let a just view be taken of the moral principles inculcated by the most esteemed of the sects of antt. philosophy, or of their individuals; **particularly Pythagoras, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca, Antoninus.**

I. Philosophers.

1. **Their precepts related chiefly to ourselves, and the government of those passions which, unrestrained, would disturb our tranquility of mind.*** **in this branch of Philosophy they were really great.**

> * **To explain, I will exhibit the heads of Seneca's & Cicero's philosophical works, the most extensive of any we have recieved from the antients.** of 10. heads in Seneca, 7. relate to ourselves, to wit, de irâ, Consolatio, de tranquilitate, de constantiâ sapientis, de otio sapientis, de vitâ beatâ, de brevitate vitae. 2. relate to others, de clementia, de beneficiis. & 1. relates to the government of the world, de providentiâ. of 11. tracts of Cicero, 5 respect ourselves, viz. de finibus, Tusculana, Academica, Paradoxa, de Senectute. 1. de officiis, partly to ourselves, partly to others. 1. de amicitiâ, relates to others: and 4. are on different subjects, to wit, de naturâ deorum, de divinatione, de fato, Somnium Scipionis.

2. **In developing our duties to others, they were short and defective.** they embraced indeed the circles of kindred & friends; and inculcated patriotism, or the love of our country in the aggregate, as a primary obligation: **towards our neighbors & countrymen, they taught justice, but scarcely viewed them as within the circle of benevolence. still less have they inculcated peace, charity, & love to our fellow men, or embraced, with benevolence, the whole family of mankind.**

II. Jews.

1. Their system was Deism, that is, the belief of one only god. **but their ideas of him, & of his attributes, were degrading & injurious.**

2. **their Ethics were not only imperfect, but often irreconcileable with the sound dictates of reason & morality, as they respect intercourse with those around us: & repulsive, & anti-social, as respecting other nations. they needed reformation therefore in an eminent degree.**

III. Jesus.

In this state of things among the Jews, Jesus appeared. **his parentage was obscure,** his condition poor, his education null, his natural endowments great, his life correct & innocent; he was meek, benevolent, patient, firm, disinterested, & of the sublimest eloquence.

The disadvantages under which his doctrines appear are remarkeable.

1. like Socrates & Epictetus, he wrote nothing himself.

2. but he had not, like them, a Xenophon or an Arrian to write for him.2 on the contrary, all the learned of his country, entrenched in it's power & riches, were opposed to him, lest his labours should undermine their advantages: **and the committing to writing his life & doctrines, fell on the most unlettered, & ignorant of men:3 who wrote too from memory, & not till long after the transactions had passed.**

> 2. In the first Tr in DLC and in the Tr in MHi, TJ interlined, **"I name not Plato, who only used the name of Socrates to cover the whimsies of his own brain."**

3. **according to the ordinary fate of those who attempt to enlighten and reform mankind, he fell an early victim to the jealousy & combination of the altar and the throne; at about 33. years of age,4 his reason having not yet attained the maximum of it's energy, nor the course of his preaching, which was but of about 3. years,5 presented occasions for developing a compleat system of morals.6**

4. Hence the doctrines which he really delivered were defective as a whole. and fragments only of what he did deliver have come to us, mutilated, mistated, & often unintelligible.

5. they have been still more disfigured by the corruptions of schismatising followers, who have found an interest in sophisticating & perverting the simple doctrines he taught, **by engrafting on them the mysticisms of a Graecian Sophist,7 frittering them into subtleties, & obscuring them with jargon, until they have caused good men to reject the whole in disgust, & to view Jesus himself as an impostor.**

Notwithstanding these disadvantages, a system of morals is presented to us, which, if filled up in the true style and spirit of the rich fragments he left us, would be the most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by man.

The question of his being a member of the god-head, or in direct communication with it, claimed for him by some of his followers, and denied by others, is foreign to the present view, which is merely an estimate of the intrinsic merit of his doctrines.

1. He corrected the Deism of the Jews, confirming them in their belief of one only god, and giving them juster notions of his attributes and government.

2. **His moral doctrines relating to kindred & friends were more pure & perfect, than those of the most correct of the philosophers, and greatly more so than those of the Jews. and they went far beyond both in inculcating universal philanthropy, not only to kindred and friends, to neighbors and countrymen, but to all mankind, gathering all into one family, under the bonds of love, charity, peace, common wants, and common aids.** a developement of this head will evince the peculiar superiority of the system of Jesus over all others.

3. the precepts of Philosophy, & of the Hebrew code, laid hold of actions only. he pushed his scrutinies into the heart of man; erected his tribunal in the region of his thoughts, and purified the waters at the fountain head.

4. he taught, emphatically, the doctrine of a future state: which was either doubted or disbelieved by the Jews: and wielded it with efficacy, as an important incentive, supplementary to the other motives to moral conduct.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0431 **[12 October 1813]**

we must dismiss the Platonists & Plotinists, the Stagyrites & Gamalielites, the Eclectics the Gnostics & Scholastics4 their essences & emanations, their Logos & Demi-urgos, Aeons & Daemons male & female, with a long train of E^{t}c. E^{t}c. E^{t}c. or, shall I say at once, of Nonsense.
…

the result is an 8vo of 46. pages of pure and unsophisticated doctrines, such as were professed & acted on by the unlettered
apostles, the Apostolic fathers, and the Christians of the 1st century. their Platonising successors indeed, in after times, in order to legitimate the corruptions which they had incorporated into the doctrines of Jesus, found it necessary to disavow, the primitive Christians, who had taken their principles from the mouth of Jesus himself, of his Apostles, & the Fathers contemporary with them. they excommunicated their followers as heretics, branding them with the opprobrious name of Ebionites or Beggars.
…

we must leave therefore to others, younger & more learned than we are, **to prepare this euthanasia for Platonic Christianity, and it's restoration to the primitive simplicity of it's founder.** I think you give a just outline of the theism of the three religions when you say that the principle of the Hebrew was the fear, of the Gentile the honor, & of the Christian the love of God.

An expression in your letter of Sep. 14. that 'the human understanding is a revelation from it's maker' gives the best solution, that I believe can be given, of the question, **what did Socrates mean by his Daemon? he was too wise to believe, & too honest to pretend, that he had real & familiar converse with a superior5 and invisible being.** he probably considered the suggestions of his conscience, or reason, as revelations, or inspirations from the Supreme mind, bestowed, on important occasions, by a special superintending providence.

I acknolege all the merit of the hymn of Cleanthes to Jupiter, which you ascribe to it. it is as highly sublime as a chaste & correct imagination can permit itself to go. yet in the contemplation of a being so superlative, the hyperbolic flights of the Psalmist may often be followed with approbation, even with rapture; and I have no hesitation in giving him the palm over all the Hymnists of every language, and of every time.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-15-02-0141-0001 **[31 October 1819]**

As you say of yourself, I too am an Epicurean. I consider the genuine (not the imputed) doctrines of Epicurus as containing every thing rational in moral philosophy which Greece & Rome have left us. **Epictetus indeed has given us what was good of the Stoics; all beyond, of their1 dogmas, being hypocrisy and grimace. their great crime was in their calumnies of Epicurus and misrepresentations of his doctrines:** in which we lament to see the candid character of Cicero engaging as an accomplice. the merit of his philosophy is in the beauties of his style. diffuse rapid, rhetorical, but enchanting. his prototype Plato, eloquent as himself, dealing out mysticisms incomprehensible to the human mind, has been defied by certain sects usurping the name of Christians; because, in his foggy conceptions, they found a basis of impenetrable darkness whereon to rear fabrications as delirious, of their own invention. these they fathered blasphemously on him whom they claimed as their founder, but who would disclaim them with the indignation which their caricatures of his religion so justly excite. **of Socrates we have nothing genuine but in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.** for Plato makes him one of his Collocutors merely to cover his own whimsies under the mantle of his name; a liberty of which we are told Socrates himself complained. Seneca is indeed a fine moralist, disfiguring his work at time with some Stoicisms, and affecting too much of antithesis and point, yet giving us on the whole a great deal of sound and practical morality. but the greatest of all the Reformers of the depraved religion of his own country, was Jesus of Nazareth. abstracting what is really his from the rubbish in which2 it is buried, easily distinguished by it's lustre from the dross of his biographers, and as separable from that as the diamond from the dung hill, we have the outlines of a system of the most sublime morality which has ever fallen from the lips of man: outlines which it is lamentable he did not live to fill up. **Epictetus & Epicurus give us laws for governing ourselves, Jesus a supplement of the duties & charities we owe to others.** the establishment of the innocent and genuine character of this benevolent3 moralist, and the rescuing it from the imputation of imposture, which has resulted from <*misconstructions of his words by his pretended votaries,*> [artificial systems,* invented by Ultra-Christian sects, unauthorised by a single word ever uttered by him]4 is a most desirable object, and one to which Priestly has succesfully devoted his labors and learning.

> * [*Footnote added by TJ to PoC:*] e.g. the immaculate conception of Jesus, his deification, **the creation of the world by him, his miraculous powers,** his resurrection & visible ascension, his corporeal presence in the Eucharist, the Trinity, original sin, atonement, regeneration5 election, orders of Hierarchy E^{t}c.

it would in time, it is to be hoped, effect a quiet euthanasia of the heresies of bigotry and fanaticism which have so long triumphed over human reason, and so generally & deeply afflicted mankind. but this work is to be begun by winnowing the grain from the chaff of the historians of his life. **I have sometimes thought of translating Epictetus (for he has never been tolerably translated into English) of adding the genuine doctrines of Epicurus from the Syntagma of Gassendi, and an Abstract from the Evangelists of whatever has the stamp of the eloquence and fine imagination of Jesus. the last I attempted too hastily some 12. or 15. years ago. it was the work of 2. or 3. nights only at Washington, after getting thro' the evening task of reading the letters and papers of the day.**—but with one foot in the grave, these are now idle projects for me. my business is to beguile the wearisomness of declining life, as I endeavor to do, **by the delights of classical reading and of Mathematical truths, and by the consolations of a sound philosophy, equally indifferent to hope & fear.6**

---

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n279/mode/2up?view=theater

Be this as it may, such were Montesquieu's principles, that it was impossible to adopt them either in France or elsewhere, without inviting those aweful revolutions which, snatching the most important branch of the Royal prerogative from the Monarch, invest the people with his spoils. **After the *Spirit of Laws* only one thing was wanting to operate such a Revolution; and that was, a man who, sufficiently daring, would assert these consequences without fear,** perhaps even complacently, because he beheld in them a means of annihilating all titles or distinctions, which decorate stations of life superior to his own. The son of a poor artizan, in a word Jean Jaques Rousseau, bred in a watchmaker's shop, proved to be this daring man. He grasped the weapons which Montesquieu had forged to assert the privileges of the multitude, and ascertain the rights of legislation and sovereignty in the poor workman as the former had in the rich man; in the commoner as in the nobleman. **The whole aristocracy of Montesquieu was no more than a scaffolding for the Sophisters of rebellion; and if he ever uses the word *Aristocracy* as expressing the best government, it was only in its**

original signification; he does not understand by it the government of the wealthy and noble classes, but that of the *best* of each, whether rich or poor, who were to be chosen magistrates by the people; and then in the very aristocracy he constitutes the people Legislators and Sovereigns.

Montesquieu believed the Nobility to be necessary intermediates between the King and the People. Jean Jaques detested these intermediate bodies, and thought it absurd that a sovereign people should stand in need of them. **Montesquieu parcels out the authority of Kings, to adorn the aristocracy of riches and nobility with one of its fairest branches.** Jean Jaques, pennyless, shivers the scepter of his King, and proscribes the prerogative of nobility or wealth, and to assimilate himself to the Peer or Nobleman he invests the Sovereignty in the multitude.
…

Every reflecting person could already foresee, that all the rebels of aristocracy would follow Montesquieu as their chief, but that all the lower classes, and all the enemies of aristocracy, whether from hatred or jealousy, would fight under Jean Jaques.
…

Till this period, the hatred which the school of Voltaire, or the brethren of D'Alembert, had conceived against Kings was vague and without any plan. In general, it was a mere thirst after Equality and Liberty, or a hatred of all coercive authority. But the necessity of a civil government stifled all their cries. Here they were convinced, that to destroy was not sufficient, and that in overturning the present laws, it was necessary to have another code to replace the former. Their writings teemed with epigrams against Kings, but they had not attacked their rights; Despotism and Tyranny were represented in the most fantastic light, though they had not yet decided that every Prince was a Despot or a Tyrant. **But this was no longer the case when these two systems had appeared; Montesquieu taught them to govern themselves, and make their laws in conjunction with their Kings; and Jean Jaques persuades them to expell all Kings, and to govern and make their laws themselves.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA200#v=onepage&q&f=false

What Rousseau attempts, more strenuously than any other thinker of the period, is **an extraordinary synthesis of Epicurean, Augustinian, and Stoic argumentative currents.** In common with the modern Epicureans, Rousseau uses claims about self-love to illuminate all areas of human behaviour in modern times. But by presenting that self-love as inflamed *amour-propre*, Rousseau tilts sharply towards the more critical Augustinians than towards those Epicurean writers who were making their apology for commercial society.
…

But even as Rousseau endorses a great deal of the Augustinians' emphasis on understanding corrupted kind of self-love in explaining actually existing human affairs, human unhappiness, and human unfreedom, he refuses to agree with the Augustinians on the foundations of their argument. Indeed, it was Rousseau's flat denial of original sin, his insistence that there could not have been any 'original perversity in the human heart,' that got his book into trouble with the ecclesiastical authorities and sent him fleeing into exile.
…

And as I have tried to describe in this chapter, **the project Rousseau was engaged in after the *Second Discourse*, as he worked to create distance between himself and the other *philosophes* with whom he had earlier been so closely associated, was that of restructuring his argument to move away from modern Epicureanism and towards a reformulated modern Stoicism,** outlined, above all, in the pages of *Emile* I've considered here, with Rousseau's most detailed depiction of what the life according to nature outside the pure state of nature might consist.
…

Human institutions could always threaten to fall out of the picture altogether in ancient Stoicism, preoccupied as it was with the relationship between the individual and the cosmos. **Rousseau's modified Stoicism displaces our attention precisely onto the nature of those institutions** through his claim that if we are to live in accordance with nature, but together in society, then we need certain kinds of social organisation to obtain.

https://www.academia.edu/299389/Rousseaus_Political_Philosophy_Stoic_and_Augustinian_Origins

Given his reputation as the most effective Enlightenment critic of the classical Augustinian doctrine of original sin, we might therefore expect Rousseau fully embracing the dichotomies proposed by the seventeenth-century Augustinians and to take sides against them alongside the Stoics and the Pelagians and the modern natural-rights theorists. Yet this would be much too simple. **For although Rousseau does indeed reject the central planks of Augustine's theology of grace and original sin, his own arguments retain deeply Augustinian elements with respect to both content and structure,** and it is in the way which he synthesizes the Stoic and the Augustinian traditions that his philosophy is at its most creative and original.
…

Yet even as he asserted this heterodox theology Rousseau was not wholly abandoning Augustine, but rather marking a retreat from the older Augustine's obsession with grace to the younger Augustine's account of the nature of the free will presented especially in the dialogue *On the Free Choice of the Will*, a section of which was examined later in this

chapter. For where this "young" Augustine, Stoicism (especially in its presentation by Epictetus), and Rousseau most strikingly converge – with intimations, furthermore, of the Kantian philosophy to come – is in their shared belief that a rightly-directed will is the only genuinely unqualified human good [Riley fns DLA 1.12]. Augustine's *bona voluntas*, directed to the proper love of God; the Epictetan *hegemonikon*, which learns to distinguish between that which is and that which is not truly under our control; and Rousseau's *volonté générale*, whereby the individual citizen enjoys freedom by living in accordance with the shared civic will of the political community: **In each case the right kind of will is the one that transcends the narrow horizons of the self-centred agent to find fulfillment through aligning itself with something of universal, infinite, or general value.**

Augustine ascribed such significant enough powers to the rightly directed freely choosing will in *On the Free Choice of the Will* that his Pelagian opponents quoted his own words back at him during their long-running polemic many years later. In the *Retractations*, compiled at the end of his life, Augustine insisted not that the early account was wrong, but that it was incomplete:49

> **In these and similar statements of mine, because there was no mention of the grace of God which was not the subject under discussion at the time, the Pelagians think or may think that we held their opinion.** But they are mistaken in thinking this. For it is precisely the will by which one sins and lives rightly, a subject we discussed here. Unless this will, then, is freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which it has been made – 'a servant of sin' – and unless it is aided to overcome its vices, mortal men cannot live rightly and devoutly.

One of Augustine's main worries in his dispute with the Pelagians was that they seemed to deny the Fallen state of humankind, making nonsense of the Church's claims about the postlapsarian need for redemption through Christ. And if the early Augustine's account of the will is not coupled with his much later account of grace, he suggests, we may be very close indeed to Pelagianism.
…

To use Ernst Cassirer's phrase, Rousseau sought to transpose the traditional problem of theodicy onto the terrain of politics, locating the origins of evil not in any original sin by the First Couple but in the consequences of the organization of human societies.50
…

Comparative judgments, a sense of superiority, the desire for the approval of others: All are aspects of *amour-propre*, the self-love that comes to poison the simplicity of the primitive life and that leads to hierarchy, poverty, slavery, misery, property, and to the social division of labour.

This is all quite Augustinian, in its way, but Rousseau does not want to embrace all of the Augustinian argument, even in this radically secularised form. **The implication of the Augustinian critique, especially in its strict Jansenist interpretation, as we have seen, is that self-love is always and everywhere bad,** that the principle of self-love or of the natural instinct towards self-preservation could not serve as an adequate foundation of a natural-rights theory. **It is this thought that brings us to the famous distinction between self-love and *amour-propre* and self-love as *amour de soi* in Rousseau's thought, and it also bring us back to Stoicism.**
…

The famous distinction between self-love as *amour de soi* and as *amour-propre* appears in other books by Rousseau, notably *Émile*, and in important respects Rousseau's *amour de soi* closely resembles Stoic *oikeiosis*. For the Stoics as well as for Rousseau, for example, this principle had more content than merely being a mechanical instinct towards bodily self-preservation.
…

Amour de soi is presented as "the source of all our passions" (p. 212), but Rousseau quickly qualifies this to note that the "gentle and affectionate passions are born of *amour de soi*, and … the hateful and irascible passions are born of *amour-propre*," **reminding us of the distinction the Stoics drew between the harmful passions and the benign *eupatheiai* that would come to replace them.** (Rousseau will often use the word sentiment to refer to the affectionate and desirable passions.) The fit is not perfect: The Stoics would not, of course, have considered a principle "prior to reason," but rather one involving judgment or mental assent, however instinctive it might seem to be.

If Rousseau's *amour de soi* does serve as a version of Stoic *oikeiosis*, then what he is doing becomes clear. He accepts the full force of the Augustinian argument about the centrality of self-love – *amour-propre* – in accounting for the corruption of human society; **but he denies what was implicit in the seventeenth-century Augustinian argument, that the baneful effects of self-love can serve as an indictment of a natural-rights theory resting on a principle of self-preservation.** What the French Augustinians found to condemn in self-love speaks only to the domain of *amour-propre*, and this *amour-propre*, we might say, does not go all the way down. It is not the most fundamental principle of postlapsarian human nature, in the way that the Augustinians alleged. ***Oikeiosis* – or, here, *amour de soi* – can still serve perfectly well as the ground for Rousseau's belief in the natural goodness of humankind.**
…

Yet what is going on in this passage is that Rousseau is denying a principle of the natural sociability of human beings that could be used to defend the naturalness of *political* society. Here, Rousseau follows Hobbes, whose contract theory is premised on the artificiality of political community, which has to be a radical construction of human will. **In denying the principle of human sociability in the way that he does, Rousseau is not abandoning Stoic principles: His account of *amour de soi* might generate certain kinds of other-regarding activity, as it does in *Émile*, but it cannot generate the thicker account of human sociability that Hobbes's natural lawyer critics, including Pufendorf, were keen to defend.**55

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/20/mode/2up?view=theater

> II. **The greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning Commonwealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe, That Man is a Creature born fit for Society:**1 The Greeks call him *Zoon politikon*, and on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of Civill Society, as if for the preservation of Peace, and the Government of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary, than that Men should agree to make certaine Covenants and Conditions together, which themselves should then call Lawes. **Which Axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly False, and an Errour proceeding from our too slight contemplation of Humane Nature;** for they who shall more narrowly look into the Causes for which Men come together, and delight in each others company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by Accident: **For if by nature one Man should Love another (that is) as Man, there could no reason be return'd why every Man should not equally Love every Man, as being equally Man, or why he should rather frequent those whose Society affords him Honour or Profit.**

…

A citizen's life under the general will is a disciplined life, as is the life of the Stoics's sage, lived in accordance with the universal law of the cosmos, but in both cases the discipline provides, paradoxically enough, the best chance of being able to live in accordance with nature or of living in freedom. Stoicism brings about the moral transformation of an individual; Rousseau's politics deals with the collective moral transformation of an entire people.58 **Just as Augustine himself once found Stoic philosophical vocabulary helpful for describing the condition of Unfallen Man, Rousseau's Stoic democracy aims to preserve an entire people in an Unfallen condition, safe from the miseries induced by too much *amour-propre*. It is not too much, perhaps to call Rousseau's political theory a strikingly original piece of secular Augustinian Stoicism.**

For those of us who want to be friends of the Stoics, there is something exhilarating about this line of thought. **Although the historical record itself is mixed on this point, the Roman Stoics acquired for themselves a reputation for being pillars of republican virtue and enemies to those who sought or occupied the Imperial throne.** This Stoic pantheon includes Cato of Utica, Marcus Brutus, and Helvidius Priscus, who steadfastly refused to submit to the dictators or tyrants they opposed.59 **Lipsius and the early modern Neostoics, by contrast, had been theorists of a centralised, absolute monarchy; they opposed representative assemblies, and they denied popular sovereignty. Not the least part of Rousseau's Stoic achievement is to have articulated, at long last, the theory of a participatory republican politics, which many people through the ages have often believed was somehow implicit in the Stoics' philosophy of freedom.**

https://www.academia.edu/19860151/Rousseaus_Second_Discourse_between_Epicureanism_and_Stoicism

We generally think of Rousseau as an anti-Epicurean thinker. **In his own day, he was accused of plagiarizing Seneca, one of the most prominent and relentless critics of Epicureanism from antiquity, in the *Discourse on the Arts and the Sciences*; and Seneca also supplied the epigraph to *Emile*: "We are sick with evils that can be cured; and nature, having brought us forth sound, itself helps us if we wish to be improved."**4 If we think of Epicureanism as presenting versions of materialism, atomism, practical atheism, hedonism, and so on, these are not the kinds of things we associate with Rousseau. And if we line up the reasons why Rousseau came to reject the "Radical Enlightenment" of Diderot and the *philosophes* (to use Jonathan Israel's characteristic terminology), a number of these seem to be bound up with what we might associate with popular understandings of Epicureanism. **But, from his time down to our own, Rousseau has repeatedly been identified as being a kind of Epicurean.** An early critic, Jean Castillon, for example, wrote in 1756 of the *Second Discourse* that

> **It is almost a year since he [Rousseau] revived the Epicureans' delusions concerning our origins; that he reduced our earliest ancestors to the ranks of the stupidest beasts; that he accused us of being the most wicked and ferocious of all animals.**5

In the same year, Adam Smith published his anonymous "Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review," which, if it did not identify Rousseau specifically as an Epicurean, argued that the reader of the *Second Discourse* "will observe, that the second volume of the *Fable of the Bees* has given occasion to the system of Mr. Rousseau," thus aligning him with the most notorious "Epicurean" author of the eighteenth century, Bernard Mandeville.6

This idea, that Rousseau organized central elements of the narrative he relates in the *Second Discourse* in accordance with Epicurean philosophy – specifically as it is presented from line 925 of Book V of the Roman poet Lucretius' philosophical poem, *De rerum natura* – has recurred in more recent scholarship. **Two of the more extended presentations of this theme come in Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas's 1935 book, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*, and in James H. Nichols, Jr.'s mildly Straussian book, *Epicurean Political Philosophy* (1976),** and we can juxtapose snippets from these two books to get a clear view of what the major similarities have been thought to be.7 In the pure state of nature, "primeval man was but a solitary, roving, stupid and unmoral beast;"8 he was "originally independent, self-sufficient, with desires limited to natural pleasures."9 **For both Lucretius and Rousseau, "the happiest state of mankind was not the earliest, but that of *la société naissante*, the intermediate between the primitive and the civilized … a state which was reached only after the development of language and the family and the discovery of a number of simple arts."**10

…

Rousseau and Lucretius agree on the artificial nature of political institutions, and, finally, they criticize actually existing politics in similar ways, arguing that "political society is the realm of false opinions, unnatural passions, and aggravated fears, all of which are incompatible with genuine happiness, with natural satisfaction, with unspoiled pleasure."15

…

Richard Tuck, for example, began his Robert P. Benedict lectures at Boston University in 2000 with these words: **"As Rousseau's works became well known in the course of the 1750s, all over Europe they were immediately read as revivals of Hobbes, or – what was always tantamount to the same thing – of Epicurus."**
…

Force juxtaposes "Stoic" and "Epicurean" understandings of the role of self-interest in explaining human motivations to action. His interest is ultimately in the history of modern economics, **and he plausibly identifies what Hume called the "selfish hypothesis" as Epicurean,** further identifying Adam Smith as a critic of this hypothesis in its cruder manifestations. But because he is erroneously identifying Smith as a Stoic – an identification that is coming under severe scrutiny in contemporary scholarship20 – **Force seems to end up lumping together the various writers who criticize the "selfish hypothesis" as being similarly Stoic,** emphasizing an

> important distinction, used in the rest of the book, between two main traditions: an Epicurean/Augustinian tradition, which uses self-interest as its sole principle, and a neo-Stoic tradition, which uses self-interest as one among other principles.21

But this distinction, foundational to the architectonic of his overall argument, is troublesome. First, **we might note that an Augustinian tradition cannot confine itself to one principle, because if it denied grace as well as concupiscence, it would no longer be Augustinian;** this is something that Force notes from time to time, but without quite acknowledging the violence it does to his analytical framework.22 Second, while the Stoics might have argued that rational agents were interested in others as well as themselves, this was not because they had "more than one principle" at work in their accounts of moral deliberation and motivation; instead, they had a rather complex account of *one* principle, *oikeiosis* (as we'll see, in what follows) and they understood this principle, at its core, as a principle of self-interested behavior. Third, **it is curious to line up Mandeville as an "Epicurean" and Rousseau as a "Stoic" in this schema, given that Force agrees that both writers deploy a notion of pity, which alone would appear to put them both on the "Stoic" side of the binary.** As Force himself observes, Rousseau borrows Mandeville's story of the rampant pig menacing the child, precisely in order to argue for the existence of a pity that is not reducible to self-interest.23 Fourth, it is surprising that Force should identify the psychology of pity as a key issue in separating "Stoics" from "Epicureans," **for the Stoics were savagely critical of pity. Their sharply rationalist ethics denied that pity was a virtue; indeed, they identified it as a distinctive vice, because pity made people unhappy when they reflected on things (such as the misery of others) that were not under their control. In contrast, for Rousseau, pity was a *prerational* impulse** and, far from being a vice, was presented as the origin of all of the natural virtues.24

> 24. "In fact, what are generosity, Clemency, Humanity, if not Pity applied to the weak, to the guilty, or to the human species in general?" Rousseau, *Collected Writings,* vol. III, p. 37.

Finally, Nietzsche announced from time to time that he was "*against* Rousseau," **and the recent scholarship on Nietzsche notes that it is precisely when Nietzsche attacks Rousseau's ethics of pity that he is drawing most heavily from Stoic moral philosophy.**25

How, then, should we think about the role that Stoicism might be playing in the argument of the *Second Discourse*? **In my earlier work I argued, in a similar manner to Force, that the Stoic concern with self-preservation, which they associated with *oikeiosis*, had its analogue in Rousseau in his treatment of *amour de soi*.**26 Here, for example, is Cicero, in *De finibus* (the speaker is "Cato"):

> It is the view of those [the Stoics] whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth … a living creature feels an attachment for itself and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution …; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction … [It] would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action.27

Passages like this persuaded me to identify *oikeiosis* with the outlines of Rousseau's *amour de soi*. **As Rousseau famously says, "Man's first sentiment was that of his existence, his first care that of his preservation,"**28 **and the *sentiment de l'existence* was something the Stoic Chrysippus had called *syneidesin*, and which Cicero translated into Latin as the *sensum sui*.** Just as the newborn infant's desires are unreflective, so, too, Rousseau asserted that *amour de soi* was a principle "prior to reason." So the parallels here run very close indeed. **(We might note, furthermore, that the Stoic argument here is pointedly anti-Epicurean, for the instinct to preserve one's own existence comes prior to any experience of pleasure or pain, denying the Epicurean insistence that we are fundamentally pain-avoiding creatures.)**29
…

This maturation of *oikeiosis* helps to explain why the Stoics' principle of self-preservation can underpin two of their distinctive arguments which otherwise seem to cut against the foundations of self-preservation: their argument for the permissibility of suicide, and their argument for the cosmopolitanism of the Stoic sage. In the first case, one might (in certain circumstances) reasonably end one's own animal life out of respect for one's identity as a rational being. In the second case, the Stoics argue that *oikeiosis* is the basis of human sociability, and as we come to associate our own well-being as a rational agent with the well-being of those around us, first through the relations of parents and children, then through the relations with other family and friends, **the circle of those we are concerned about continues to widen, until, ultimately, the Stoic sage is one who is impartially concerned with the well-being of the entire human community.**
…

That thought, however, reminds us of the most obvious difficulty standing in the way of this exploration of Rousseau's *amour propre* in terms of Stoic *oikeiosis*, viz., that, as in this particular case, Rousseau generally writes in a highly critical fashion of *amour propre* and its effects. If we take the "*amour de soi*: Good; *amour propre*: Bad" view that so

much of Rousseau's rhetoric strongly suggests, and that so many commentators – including both myself and Allan Bloom35 – have reiterated, then we would have a severe problem arguing that the backbone of Rousseau's moral psychology might be Stoic or quasi-Stoic in the manner I am suggesting.
…

Oikeiosis takes us all the way from the first stirrings of animal activity through to a pretty fleshed-out account of the moral life; **Rousseau's story about self-love goes from the same animalistic starting point to the development of all the distinctively human capacities,** including the romantic love of Emile and Sophie, and other benign civic sentiments that make life worthwhile, which we might then want to map in turn back onto **the Stoics' distinction between the *passions*, which are bad, because erroneous, and the *sentiments*, or *eupatheiai*, which are benign.**43 For both Rousseau and the Stoics, human beings derive welfare from their participation in activities that suit the distinctive kinds of creatures they are. For human beings living in society – and there is no going back to Rousseau's state of nature – the kind of creatures they are necessarily involves developed *amour propre*. Indeed, once human beings are in society, we can no longer distinguish between our purely "natural" and our "social" needs.
…

As Nietzsche once warned, "he who wants to mediate between two resolute thinkers shows that he is mediocre: he has no eye for what is unique; seeing things as similar and making things the same is the sign of weak eyes."45 The details and the mechanisms at work in their explanations differ, from time to time quite substantially, and Rousseau had many harsh things to say about the Stoics in his various writings, **including the marvellous remark in the *Geneva Manuscript* against "those supposed Cosmopolites who, justifying their love of the fatherland by means of their love of the human race, boast of loving everyone in order to have the right to love no one."**46 And we should, I think, note that the interpretation I have presented here requires support from *Emile* as well as the *Second Discourse*. What is said about the distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour propre* in the *Discourse* does require filling in – Rousseau just doesn't say enough there for us to see the detailed shape of the psychological argument – thus it might seem sensible to draw on Rousseau's own filling in of that argument in *Emile*, even though it comes a few years later. But it might also be the case that Rousseau changed his mind in important ways between the composition of these two texts, **moving from a more "Epicurean" stance in the *Discourse* to a more "Stoic" stance later on;** so that we see in the earlier texts a fairly disparate mixture of Senecan and Lucretian elements, the contradictions of which are finally resolved in favor of an adventurously recast Senecan Stoicism by the time of *Emile*. That seems to me to be a hypothesis that requires more detailed investigation than I can provide here.

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/458/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **More significant than Spartan myths were Roman Stoic educational ideas:** G. Pire has exhaustively proved Seneca's influence on Rousseau, "De l'influence de Sénèque sur les théories pédagogiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," *Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques Rousseau,* XXXIII (1953-5), 51-92, and more comprehensively in *Stoïcisme et pédagogie: De Zénon à Marc-Aurèle, de Sénèque à Montaigne et à J.-J. Rousseau* (1958).
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA189#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> But this was a move that Rousseau went on to make in his latter book, *Emile*, where he presented a much more systematic and a much more thoroughgoing Stoic account of his basic moral psychology of self-love. It seems to me plausible to think, in fact, that there was something of a progression in his thinking, from the largely Epicurean text of the *Second Discourse* as it was submitted to the Acacemy in 1754, to the published version that appeared of the following year, which contained this suggestively Stoicizing moment in the notes, **to the much more Stoic account in *Emile*,** assembled a few years later and published in 1762. (Such a transition might also help to illuminate the significance both of **Denis Diderot's remark that the *Second Discourse* was his favourite text by Rousseau and of Rousseau's own verdict that *Emile* was the 'best of my writings, as well as the most important.'**)42

Was Rousseau a Stoic or an Epicurean? Perhaps this is a silly, a misleading, or even a meaningless question; or perhaps it just doesn't matter whether Rousseau's theory was to some extent Stoic, Augustinian, Epicurean, Hobbist, **or – as I called it in that *Cambridge Companion* chapter – a piece of "secular Augustinian Stoicism," as if that radioactive cocktail could possibly be stabilized,** and as if it is at all sensible to draw attention away from the various and important ways in which Rousseau was quite distinctively not secular, not Augustinian, and not Stoic.47 In manipulating these labels, it would be a shame if we came across as trying to suggest that Rousseau's thought was substantially derivative from that of his predecessors; and if employing and deploying them has created confusion, perhaps it is best to abandon them altogether. **In the *Second Discourse*, after all, Rousseau refers to the "*ataraxia* of the Stoic,"**48 **apparently confusing the Stoics' *apatheia* with the Epicureans' *ataraxia*, and we might choose to read this remark as his way of insisting that one can be Hellenistic in general without being overly sectarian about it.**

Perhaps we should view Rousseau (whether self-consciously or not) as an *eclectic* thinker – remembering that this was itself an important eighteenth-century keyword – one who drew selectively on the various arguments that he found in older texts, juxtaposing them, and sometimes fusing them together as he went about creating his own, utterly distinctive system.

There is certainly *more* Epicureanism than Stoicism in the argument of the *Second Discourse*; but it would, I think, be wrong in virtue of this fact to characterize Rousseau as a modern Epicurean. **It is worth noting, for example, that while the Epicurean or Lucretian theme dominates the presentation of humanity in the pure state of nature and the subsequent narrative of corruption and decline, the Stoic motif comes to resonate most**

fully in an altogether different register, pointing beyond the corruption of actually existing human society to indicate a sketch of what a healthy human community might be like, a society of individuals whose *amour propre* is developed but not enflamed; who are able to function as equals, respecting one another's persons and property; and who live in accordance with their general will (a functional substitute here for the Stoics' cosmic reason).

To turn, at long last, to the concept of freedom with which this volume as a whole is concerned, we can consider the typology of freedoms that Rousseau sets out in the *Social Contract*, Book I, Chapter 8, distinguishing between natural, civil, and moral freedoms, **and we might be struck by the way in which *natural freedom* refers to the more animalistic or Epicurean aspects of his presentation, while the altogether richer and more distinctively human notion of *moral freedom* as autonomy, or freedom under a certain kind of law,** not only looks forward to the subsequent tradition of German idealism and its legacy in modern political thought, but also backwards, **powerfully bringing out the extent of his deep indebtedness to the Stoic tradition and its ideals.**

http://ml.ci.uc.pt/mhonarchive/histport/pdfEDITv6oEvu.pdf

It is by the help of this style, together with a little philosophical chemistry, that the principles and ideas of the profligate Mandeville seem in him to have all the purity and sublimity of the morals of Plato, and to be only the true spirit of a republican carried a little too far.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater

Rousseau's anti-Genesis thus becomes the template for liberal politics. It defines the political good to be achieved by the state.

This should strike us ironic. **How can the view that any and all political order is unnatural** – a fall from our original apolitical blissful and natural condition – **be the inspiration and template for creating a new political order?** Rousseau recognized the contradiction, without resolving it, and so that contradiction remains at the heart of liberalism. **The state is seen as unnatural (that is, purely artificial), something that, like culture itself, represses our original spontaneity.** Yet it is the state that, insofar as is possible, must create the situation whereby individuals can act like Rousseau's natural man and woman.
…

Since the aim of sexuality is only sexual satisfaction, heterosexuality has no privileged position. **State-sponsored sex education must lead the way in remolding sexuality back into its "original" state.** Needless to say, all legal barriers that protect heterosexual privilege must be removed, and educators spend their efforts in inculcating in the young the belief that sexual freedom is a *right* that the state must protect and extend.
…

For Rousseau, the father was originally entirely free of the burden to provide for his offspring. The liberal state, with its welfare programs, allows men once again to have the freedom of the original Rousseauian anti-Adam.

Since the family is artificial, the destruction of the family is liberating. The focus of the state's care is the individual – **the isolated and pleasure-loving individual who emerges from the destruction of the family.** That individual is free from all restrictions on sexuality, free from all duties of fatherhood or motherhood, free from the moral and legal entanglements and burdens of marriage and the family, free from all constraints of gender. **This liberated individual, governed only by his desires, will displace the family as the founding unit and the aim of the state's ministrations.**
…

Therefore, **the liberal state does not define law in terms of the promotion of virtue and the prohibition of vice, but in terms of the protection and promotion of individuals' private pleasures,** which – since all such pleasures are natural – are declared to be *rights*. Any limitation of these "rights" is considered unjust; that is, justice is redefined to mean anyone getting as much of whatever he or she wants as long as he or she doesn't infringe on anyone else's pursuit of pleasure.
…

Hard and soft liberalism both have their roots in Rousseau. As we shall see, the difference between them arises from the above-mentioned contradiction in Rousseau's thought – **the notion that the state is on the one hand unnatural but on the other necessary for the re-creation of our original natural Edenic condition.**

While Rousseau painted an Edenic picture of our unfallen, natural and animal-like condition, he also made it clear that humanity had irredeemably fallen from that condition. That is, we now live in highly developed societies with families, morality, private property and laws that protect it, vices that come with luxury, and virtues that are made necessary by the fact that we are no longer simple animals.
…

Against the debauched luxury of his own age, Rousseau preached the severities of ancient Sparta, of the primitive Teutonic peoples, and especially of republican Rome. All three of these political regimes were defined by a simplicity of life and manners and by the rough equality of citizen-soldiers. And all of them aimed at military virtue rather than artistic, economic, or intellectual development.17 This was a condition at least closer to our natural origins.

...

Rousseau's admiration of the pagan Roman Republic, brought forward from Machiavelli, provided the intellectual inspiration for the Jacobins of the French Revolution, with their stress on virtue against the debauched upper classes and the church. By taking upon themselves the name "republicans" and setting up a French Republic they meant to reject Christianity as well as depraved eighteenth-century notions of nobility. Their return to pagan virtue allowed them to maintain the high moral ground, at least in their own minds, and vindicated their purifying brutality. Thus the figure of Robespierre, at once austerely virtuous and entirely savage.

The hard liberalism of the French Revolution was a child of Rousseau (and a grandchild of Machiavelli), as was the Romantic nationalism of both Fascism and Nazism, rooted in the primitive religio-mythic origins of, respectively, ancient Italy and Germany – pre-Christian cultures that Rousseau himself praised.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232-images.html#chap03
>
> And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, **and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness.** And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them.

...

While hard liberalism embraces Rousseau's praise of Sparta, the Teutonic tribes, and republican Rome, soft liberalism embraces Rousseau's Eden. Both strains of liberalism are inspired by Rousseau, and both represent a rejection of Christianity. And the horrifying excesses of hard liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century have led to the victory of soft liberalism in France and Britain, and now in the United States. **The goal of liberal politics today is not the creation of Spartan or Roman warriors. Instead, liberalism is creating a kind of soft techno-political paradise where Rousseau's Adams and Eves can enjoy pleasure in peace.**

> https://www.marxist.com/origin-of-the-family-engels-morgan.htm
>
> **"The reign of mother-right implied communism; equality for all; the rise of the father-right implied the reign of private property, and, with it, the oppression and enslavement of women", states August Bebel.**[19] **This transformation marks the change from savagery to barbarism.** It was christened the "neolithic revolution" by Gordon Childe.
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/106
>
> Within the original tribal association—we are talking of primitive times—**each living generation recognises a legal obligation towards the earlier generation,** and particularly towards the earliest, which founded the family (and this is something much more than a mere sentimental obligation, the existence of which, during the longest period of man's history, is by no means indisputable). **There prevails in them the conviction that it is only thanks to sacrifices and efforts of their ancestors, that the race *persists* at all**—and that this has to be *paid back* to them by sacrifices and services.
> ...
>
> Perhaps this is the very origin of the gods, that is, an origin from *fear!* And those who feel bound to add, "but from piety also," will have difficulty in maintaining this theory, with regard to the primeval and longest period of the human race. **And, of course, this is even more the case as regards the *middle* period, the formative period of the aristocratic races—the aristocratic races which have given back with interest to their founders, the ancestors (heroes, gods), all those qualities which in the meanwhile have appeared in themselves, that is, the aristocratic qualities.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n217/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> There were essentially three elements and stages in Greek religion: chthonian, Olympian, and mystic. **The first was probably of Pelasgo-Mycenaean origin, the second probably Achaeo-Dorian, the third Egypto-Asiatic. The first worshiped subterranean, the second celestial, the third resurrected, gods. The first was most popular among the poor, the second among the well to do, the third in the lower middle class.** The first predominated before the Homeric age, the second in it, the third after it.
>
> https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr05.htm

> First there is the primitive ***Euetheia*** **or Age of Ignorance, before Zeus came to trouble men's minds, a stage to which our anthropologists and explorers have found parallels in every part of the world.** Dr. Preuss applies to it the charming word 'Urdummheit', or 'Primal Stupidity'.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_savage#Origin_of_term

To be sure, **Rousseau praises the newly discovered "savage" tribes (whom Rousseau does *not* consider in a "state of nature"), as living a life that is simpler and more egalitarian than that of the Europeans; and he sometimes praises this "third stage" it in terms that could be confused with the romantic primitivism fashionable in his times.** He also identifies ancient primitive communism under a patriarchy, such as he believes characterized the "youth" of mankind, as perhaps the happiest state and perhaps also illustrative of how man was intended by God to live. But these stages are not all good, but rather are mixtures of good and bad. According to Lovejoy, Rousseau's basic view of human nature after the emergence of social living is basically identical to that of Hobbes.[39] Moreover, Rousseau does not believe that it is possible or desirable to go back to a primitive state. It is only by acting together in civil society and binding themselves to its laws that men become men; and only a properly constituted society and reformed system of education could make men good. According to Lovejoy:

> **For Rousseau, man's good lay in departing from his "natural" state—but not too much; "perfectability" up to a certain point was desirable, though beyond that point an evil. Not its infancy but its *jeunesse* [youth] was the best age of the human race. The distinction may seem to us slight enough; but in the mid-eighteenth century it amounted to an abandonment of the stronghold of the primitivistic position.** Nor was this the whole of the difference. As compared with the then-conventional pictures of the savage state, Rousseau's account even of this third stage is far less idyllic; and it is so because of his fundamentally unfavorable view of human nature *quâ* human. ... His savages are quite unlike Dryden's Indians: "Guiltless men, that danced away their time, / Fresh as the groves and happy as their clime—" **or Mrs. Aphra Behn's natives of Surinam, who represented an absolute idea of the first state of innocence, "before men knew how to sin."** The men in Rousseau's "nascent society" already had 'bien des querelles et des combats [many quarrels and fights]'; *l'amour propre* was already manifest in them ... and slights or affronts were consequently visited with *vengeances terribles.*[40]

For Rousseau the remedy was not in going back to the primitive but in reorganizing society on the basis of a properly drawn up social compact, so as to "draw from the very evil from which we suffer [i.e., civilization and progress] the remedy which shall cure it."

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#CHAPTER_VIIId

However, as there have always been a prince and civil laws, this double power and conflict of jurisdiction have made all good polity impossible in Christian States; **and men have never succeeded in finding out whether they were bound to obey the master or the priest.** Several peoples, however, even in Europe and its neighbourhood, have desired without success to preserve or restore the old system: but the spirit of Christianity has everywhere prevailed. The sacred cult has always remained or again become independent of the Sovereign, and there has been no necessary link between it and the body of the State. **Mahomet held very sane views, and linked his political system well together; and, as long as the form of his government continued under the caliphs who succeeded him, that government was indeed one, and so far good.** But the Arabs, having grown prosperous, lettered, civilised, slack and cowardly, were conquered by barbarians: **the division between the two powers began again; and, although it is less apparent among the Mahometans than among the Christians, it none the less exists, especially in the sect of Ali, and there are States, such as Persia, where it is continually making itself felt.**
...

I believe that if the study of history were developed from this point of view, it would be easy to refute the contrary opinions of Bayle and Warburton, one of whom holds that religion can be of no use to the body politic, while the other, on the contrary, maintains that Christianity is its strongest support. We should demonstrate to the former that no State has ever been founded without a religious basis, and to the latter, that the law of Christianity at bottom does more harm by weakening than good by strengthening the constitution of the State.
...

Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion, tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship. But whoever dares to say:
Outside the Church is no salvation, ought to be driven from the State, **unless the State is the Church, and the prince the pontiff. Such a dogma is good only in a theocratic government; in any other, it is fatal.**

> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/720/mode/2up?view=theater

> **What is especially remarkable about Rousseau's thought it its Janus-headed mixing of elements from both the radical and mainstream Enlightenment. In it stress on the existence of a Creator and First Mover, on two substances, on the immortality of the soul, and the absolute quality of 'good' and 'evil' in ethics, it is aligned with the mainstream moderate Enlightenment and rejects the radical tradition of Spinoza and Diderot.** Yet in its sweeping rejection of tradition and authority, its delegitimizing of the social and political structures of the day, its egalitarianism, underlying pantheism and, above all, in the doctrine of the 'general will,' it is aligned unmistakably with a radical philosophical tradition reaching back to the mid-seventeenth century.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire was the most active, but vigor was given to Jean Jaques. **With the strength of Hercules he also partook of his delirium.** Voltaire laughed at contradiction, and his pen flew with every wind. Jean Jaques would insist on the paradoxes fostered in his brain, and, brandishing his club on high, would equally strike at truth or falsehood.
…

Jean Jaques had written that the Atheists deserved punishment; that they were *disturbers of the public peace*, and as such guilty of death.12 Then, thinking he had fulfilled Voltaire's wish, writes to the minister Vernier, **"I declare that my sole object in the New Eloisa was to unite the two opposite parties (the Deists and Atheists) by a reciprocal esteem for each other, and to teach the philosophers that one may believe in God without being a hypocrite, or deny him without being a rascal."**13 And this same man writes to Voltaire, that an Atheist cannot be guilty before God. That should the law find the Atheist guilty of death, it was the denounciator who should be burned as such.14
…

Voltaire hated the God of the Christians; Jean Jaques admired, but blasphemed him; **pride wrought in the latter all that jealousy and hatred produced in the former; and it will long be a doubt which has been most injurious to Christianity, the one by his atrocious sarcasms and impious satire, or the other by his sophistry under the cloak of reason.**
…

To be cradled in one's passions gave empire to Voltaire; but to resist Jean Jaques the acutest sophisms were to be penetrated: youth was led away by the former, while those who were advanced in age fell a victim to the latter, and a prodigious number of adepts owed their fall to these two writers.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/canavan-select-works-of-edmund-burke-vol-2#lf0005-02_head_018

As to the rest, the paradoxes of eloquent writers, brought forth purely as a sport of fancy, to try their talents, to rouze attention, and excite surprize, are taken up by these gentlemen, not in the spirit of the original authors, as means of cultivating their taste and improving their style. **These paradoxes become with them serious grounds of action, upon which they proceed in regulating the most important concerns of the state. Cicero ludicrously describes Cato as endeavouring to act in the commonwealth upon the school paradoxes which exercised the wits of the junior students in the stoic philosophy.** If this was true of Cato, these gentlemen copy after him in the manner of some persons who lived about his time—*pede nudo Catonem.*

> L. 13. *paradoxes of eloquent writers.* Burke follows Bishop Warburton in treating all writers who had hinted at revolutionary ideas as mere paradox-mongers. **Cardan seems to have been the first: after him comes Bayle, whose opinion that neither religion nor civil society were necessary to the human race is treated as a pleasant paradox by Warburton,** Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 76. The immediate allusion is to Rousseau, whose "misbegotten Paradoxes" had been long ago exposed by Warburton in the 2nd Book of the "Alliance between Church and State." Burke here maintains the opinion expressed thirty years before in the Annual Register, in reviewing Rousseau's letter to D'Alembert. He thought the paradoxes it contained were, like his own Vindication of Natural Society, intended as satire. **He charges him with "a tendency to paradox, which is always the bane of solid learning. … A satire upon civilized society, a satire upon learning, may make a tolerable sport for an ingenious fancy; but if carried farther it can do no more (and that in such a way surely is too much), than to unsettle our notions of right and wrong, and lead by degrees to universal scepticism."** Mr. Lecky says of Rousseau, "He was one of those writers who are eminently destitute of the judgment that enables men without exaggeration to discriminate between truth and falsehood, **and yet**

eminently endowed with that logical faculty which enables them to defend the opinions they have embraced. No one plunged more recklessly into paradox, or supported those paradoxes with more consummate skill." Hist. of Rationalism, vol. ii. p. 242.

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1010.912&rep=rep1&type=pdf

1. I have often noticed, Brutus, that when your uncle Cato is giving his opinion in the senate, **he draws weighty arguments from philosophy which are not appropriate for that legal and public use, but that nevertheless, in his oratory, he succeeds in making these things plausible even to the common people.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/400/mode/2up?view=theater

A paradox is a private opinion of one man, or a few factious men, assumed or maintained sometimes out of error of judgment, **but commonly out of pride and vain-glorious affectation of singularity, contrary to the common and received opinion of other men. Such paradoxes were the Stoical opinions (Stoics were fruitful in producing paradoxes), that "all sins are equal," and that "a wise man is all things," a good king, a good captain, a good cobbler.g** I hope he will be better advised than to condemn all those of ignorance, who out of civility styled those new-fangled opinions "Stoical paradoxes," rather than Stoical errors. **He saith, "Christian religion was once a paradox."h** Never. A paradox is a private opinion contrary to the common opinion. Points of faith are more than opinions. Faith is a certain assent grounded upon the truth and authority of the revealer. Opinion is an uncertain assent grounded upon the probable conjectures of reason. **We do not use to call Turkish, heathenish, or heretical errors, by the name of paradoxes.** I confess there may be opinions, and consequently paradoxes, in religion; that is, in such points, the truth or falsehood whereof is grounded more upon the probable discussion of reason than upon the evidence of Divine revelation; but errors in essentials of faith are not paradoxes. He who disbelieves any article of his Creed, is not paradoxical but heretical. Such another mistake is his other,—"that but for paradoxes we should be now in that savage ignorance, which those men are in that have not, or have not long had, laws and commonwealth."i Politic precepts, and civil institutions, and practical instructions, which consist not in theory or speculation but in the application of practical truths, neither are, nor ever were called properly, either opinions or paradoxes. But to come to the purpose, I did not, I do not, deny, that there may be some true paradoxes; and rather in such things as are found out by reason, than in such as depend upon revelation, which are delivered from age to age by universal tradition. An able industrious person, by constant meditation, and the help of other men's experience and observations, may sometimes find out a latent truth, or vindicate one from the oppressive tyranny of prejudice or custom. But this is rarely. God and nature do not give all their gifts to one man, lest he should grow proud. **But when men are composed of paradoxes, that as Ovid could not express himself without a verse,j so they cannot speak without a paradox; when they take upon them to censure all ancient truths in divinity and humanity, and seek to obtrude their brain-sick conceptions upon all other men as oracles; I think he who telleth them only of their "paradoxes," dealeth gently with them.** Zaleucus was more severe against innovators; who enacted, that if any man made a proposition for a change in their policy, he should make it with a halter about his neck, that if he failed to justify it by reason, he should justify his attempt by suffering.k

I leave his paradoxes, and come to his subtlety,—that "there is hardly any one action, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in *rerum naturâ*;" and that "there cannot be a motion in one part of the world, but the same must be communicated to all the rest of the world:"l that is to say, in plain English, that there is not a pie that chattereth, nor so much as an aspen leaf that waggeth, here in England, but it maketh some alteration in China and Peru, and the efficacy of it, like Drake or Cavendish, doth encompass the globe of the earth, and mounteth to heaven, and (if there be any such thing) helpeth to make the eighth sphere tremble. **I thought it had been a modest expression to call this a "paradox."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dp33aR2jMSMC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA272#v=onepage&q&f=false

The original Greek sense of the term refers to a statement which is strongly contrary to the orthodox or received opinion, such as Gorgias' praise of Helen or Socrates' argument that philosophers should be kings.3 As a rhetorical device, the ability to defend the apparently indefensible might be taken as a sign of the virtuosity of the speaker, but also leaves him open to a charge of lacking seriousness or being primarily concerned with shocking his audience.
...

The second relevant meaning of paradox, and its major logical and philosophic sense, refers to the simultaneous affirmation of two contradictory propositions. Many of the Stoic paradoxes illustrate

this sense.4 **In the case of Rousseau, it has often been urged that his writings as a whole constitute, in Georges Gurvitch's phrase, "a mass of contradictory affirmations."**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n553/mode/2up?view=theater

The first man who was weary of the *Nomade*, roaming, vagabond, and savage life, built a cot and not a palace. The first who furrowed the earth was in quest of bread and not of gold; but he nevertheless, according to the principles of the Sect, was the man who struck the first deadly blow at Equality and Liberty. **Poor or rich man then, according to the doctrine of the Sect, the field you have recovered from the waste, and that you have cultivated, belongs to me equally as to you, or else to nobody;** I, though idle, and inactive, am entitled to the fruit of your labours; I have a right to share those fruits which you have raised on the land which I left uncultured.
…

The last mysteries or ultimate conspiracy will take place; **and then the poor man will learn, that if Illuminism begins by pillaging the rich, it is only to teach him that he is no better entitled to his property than the rich man was,** and that the time is near when he will also be pillaged and fall a victim to the curse which has been pronounced against every proprietor.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n127/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The scapegoats are now no longer the aristocrats, but the possessors, from peasant to entrepreneur.** The disciples of the movement are promised, not equal rights, but the privilege of the unpropertied; not freedom for all, but the dictatorship of the city proletariat, the "workers."

The progress of this Sophism is worthy of remark. **If we judge by its present growth, what a gigantic form will it assume for posterity! The Genevese Sophister of Equality and Liberty, anticipating the modern *Spartacus*, had already dogmatically asserted, "That the man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, first took upon himself to say *this is mine*, and found beings *simple enough to believe him*, was the true founder of civil society."** He then continues: —"What crimes, what wars, what murders, what miseries, what horrors would that man have spared mankind, who, tearing down the fences or filling up the ditches of this new enclosure, had called out to his equals, beware of hearkening to this impostor, you are ruined if ever you forget that *the fruits belong to all, though the land belongs to none*."22
…

But human imbecility has lavished its praises on this paradox, and have decorated it with the name of Philosophy! The Bavarian Sophister adopts the doctrine of Rousseau, and the delirium of pride has only refined on the phrenzy of wickedness. That which in the mouth of the master had been but a paradox in support of the wildest independence, becomes in the scholar (without divesting itself of its folly) the blackest of conspiracies.

It is now too late to say, that those were the wild chimeras of the Sophisters; at present we are compelled to say, such are the plots contriving against all and each one's property, plots which have been awfully illustrated by the spoliation of the Church, of the Nobility, of the Merchants, and of all rich proprietors—Let them be called chimeras if you are so determined; but remember, that they are the chimeras of Weishaupt, of the genius of conspiring brigands, of a genius the most fertile in sophisms and artifice for the execution of those plans supposed to be chimerical.

> https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/203/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Times had hardly changed. **The struggle and the racial principles at work were the same as in antiquity; the new enemies of the Nordic race were 1789 and the man whom Günther, significantly, called "the sophist Rousseau,"**70 **a worthy offspring of a mongrel France completely in thrall to an egalitarian ideology.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/68/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> If we think back over Rousseau, **we realize that Marx merely turned Rousseau on his head. Rousseau put an entirely fictional state of nature at the beginning of human history,** a state in which there was magically no conflict, no private property, plenty for everyone, no family ties, and free sexual access to any woman. **Marx puts his entirely fictional state of frictionless bliss at the end,** just beyond the great revolutionary conflagration.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA503#v=onepage&q&f=false

It must wait for Rousseau to transform the modern understanding of human nature from Hobbesian perpetual anxiety over the fear of violent death to "the sweet sentiment of

existence," a spontaneous instinct for wholeness which, when collectivized, leads to a republicanism not merely efficiently and rationally employed for the sake of security and material well-being and a worldly patriotism entirely consistent with individual self-interest (as in the early-modern republican prescriptions of Machiavelli, Harrington and Montesquieu), **but that promises transcendence and happiness on a sheerly spontaneous, immanent level. With Rousseau, then, modernity opens up into its second major paradigm.** The first paradigm, Machiavelli's exhortation to the prince to exert his will over nature, narrowed by Bacon and Hobbes into the scientific and methodical reconstruction of nature, leads at its most extreme to a hypertrophic rationalism and an agenda for the complete technological mastery of the world at the service of utility, pedestrian hedonism, and soulless materialism. **The second paradigm, inaugurated by Rousseau in zealous, heartfelt opposition to the first, leads eventually to romantic tribal nationalism, political existentialism and Volkish collectivism.**
…

With Rousseau, however, comes a new watershed, equal in profundity, radicalism, and impact to that of Machiavelli, which carries us beyond the scope of this study into another phase of tyranny, the collective tyranny of *le peuple* and *das Volk*, a collectivist aggressiveness and fervor without which the great antiliberal revolutionary movements beginning with the Jacobin Terror and proceeding through Bolshevism, National Socialism, the Khmer Rouge, and al-Qaeda cannot be fully understood. For, although these revolutionary movements do also partake of the Machiavellian project for the imposition of man's will on nature and human nature – their rejection of liberal democracy and individual rights is seen as being in no way incompatible with embracing modern military or police state technology or economic might – it is for the sake of a new set of aims, not merely security and prosperity or even enforced uniformity, **but the blissful return to the Arcadian origins of the golden age, what the Jacobins termed the return to "the year one."** Starting with the Jacobins, and in stark contrast to the great liberal revolutions of 1689 and 1776, these revolutions are simultaneously both atavistic and futuristic – **they want to rapidly accelerate modernization, but for the sake of returning to a lost age of collectivist harmony and purity.**

This transformation can only come about because, owing to Rousseau, the state of nature is no longer viewed as dangerous and hostile, as it was for Machiavelli and the early moderns, but as, on the contrary, the only condition in which human beings once knew wholeness and happiness. The aim of politics is therefore not merely to repress and control nature as self-evidently destructive, unreliable, or malign, but to liberate us from all restraints, both premodern and modern, that alienate us from our original happiness in the primordial origins.
…

The erotic wholeness that Plato believed only the best could achieve through the lifetime cultivation of moral and intellectual virtue, and which Machiavelli disparaged as imaginary, Rousseau transforms into the spontaneous and effortless possession of all mankind, alienated from us by the political and social order, whether this is seen in terms either of classical or modern political philosophy, such that the aim of revolution becomes to shatter entirely the rule of all convention, premodern and modern alike, and restore "the people" to their spontaneous collective happiness.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_III/Anti-Marcion/The_Prescription_Against_Heretics/Chapter_VII

For (philosophy) it is which is the material of the world's wisdom, the rash interpreter of the nature and the dispensation of God. **Indeed[3] heresies are themselves instigated[4] by philosophy.** From this source came the Æons, and I known not what infinite forms,[5] and the trinity of man[6] in the system of Valentinus, who was of Plato's school. **From the same source came Marcion's better god, with all his tranquillity; he came of the Stoics.** Then, again, the opinion that the soul dies is held by the Epicureans; while the denial of the restoration of the body is taken from the aggregate school of all the philosophers; **also, when matter is made equal to God, then you have the teaching of Zeno; [et ubi materia cum Deo aequatur, Zenonis disciplina est] and when any doctrine is alleged touching a god of fire, then Heraclitus comes in.**

> https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
>
> Well, Heraclitus of Ephesus identified fire as elemental, Thales of Miletus water, Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes air, Empedocles of Acragas fire and air and water and earth, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae the homoeomeries of each thing, **and the Stoics matter and God.**
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Christian_Library/The_Miscellanies:_Book_1#cite_ref-93

> And again, "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ;"[95] **branding not all philosophy, but the Epicurean,** which Paul mentions in the Acts of the Apostles,[96] which abolishes providence and deifies pleasure, and whatever other philosophy honours the elements, but places not over them the efficient cause, nor apprehends the Creator. **The Stoics also, whom he mentions too, say not well that the Deity, being a body, pervades the vilest matter.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA19#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **And as *Clement* of *Alexandria* did in the main give Preference to the *Philosophy* of the *Stoicks*; so we find, in this Work of his, several of their Paradoxes: For example, q he maintains, r *That the Christian, and he alone, is a rich Man*; a Paradox very like that of the Stoicks, who said the same Thing of their wise Man.** Those Philosophers express'd themselves thus: s *That the wise Man, and he alone, is rich*; so that Clement has only chang'd the word *Wise*, for that of *Christian*. The Reasons likewise which he makes use of to prove his *Thesis*, are much the same with those of the *Stoicks*; as any one may see, by comparing what he says, with the Explication, which *Cicero* gives of that same *Stoick* Maxim, in his Paradoxes. t **And when he explains that * Precept in the Gospel, † *When they persecute you in this City, flee ye into another*; he still reasons upon the Principles of the *Stoicks*, who deny'd that *Pain* was an Evil;** *The Lord*, says he, *does not enjoin us to fly, as if 'twas an Evil to be persecuted; nor does he command us to avoid Death by flight, as a Thing to be fear'd*. And then our Doctor, proceeding to shew the Reason, on which this Permission or Commandment of flying from Persecution is grounded, suggests this; that otherwise we should give occasion to Persecutors to commit Murther: *For*, says he, *the Will of Christ here is, that we should not be any ways aiding or assisting to others in the doing of what is evil*, &c. It was the Chimerical Idea of a wise Man, according to the *Stoicks*, to be entirely without Passions: **And thus *Clement* in another place, makes his true u Christian exempt from all Passions or Affections, even the most innocent; x *Excepting those only, which regard the Preservation of the Body; such as Hunger, and Thirst, with others of the like Nature*. Upon this Principle, he maintains, That *Jesus Christ* and his Apostles y had not any Passions at all; and that *Jesus Christ* himself had never any, even the least Impulse of either Pleasure or Pain; That he never had any occasion to Eat; and that, if he did Eat, 'twas for fear of passing for a Ghost.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_III/Apologetic/A_Treatise_on_the_Soul/Chapter_V

Now I am not referring merely to those who mould the soul out of manifest bodily substances, as Hipparchus and Heraclitus (do) out of fire; as Hippon and Thales (do) out of water; as Empedocles and Critias (do) out of blood; as Epicurus (does) out of atoms, since even atoms by their coherence form corporeal masses; as Critolaus and his Peripatetics (do) out of a certain indescribable *quintessence*,[1] if that may be called a body which rather includes and embraces bodily substances;—**but I call on the Stoics also to help me, who, while declaring almost in our own terms that the soul is a spiritual essence (inasmuch as breath and spirit are in their nature very near akin to each other), will yet have no difficulty in persuading (us) that the soul is a corporeal substance.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n665/mode/2up?view=theater

The doughtiest fighter for Christianity in this period was Quintus Septimius Tertullianus of Carthage. Born there about 160, the son of a Roman centurion, he studied rhetoric in the same school that trained Apuleius; then for years he practiced law at Rome. Midway in life he was converted to Christianity, married a Christian, renounced all pagan pleasures, and (says Jerome) was ordained a priest. **All the arts and tricks that he had learned from rhetoric and law were now put at the service of Christian apologetics,** enhanced by a convert's ardor.
…

Once he loved philosophy, and had written works like *De Anima,* applying Stoic metaphysics to Christianity; now he renounced all reasoning independent of revelation, and rejoiced in the incredibility of his creed.
…

As Origen proceeds it becomes apparent that he is a Stoic, a Neo-Pythagorean, a Platonist, and a Gnostic, who is nonetheless resolved to be a Christian. It would have been too much to ask of a man that he should abandon the faith for which he had edited a thousand volumes and flung away his manhood. Like Plotinus he had studied under Ammonius Saccas, and sometimes it is hard to distinguish his philosophy from theirs. God, in Origen, is not Yahveh, he is the First Principle of all things. Christ is not the human figure described in the New Testament, he is the Logos or Reason who organizes the world; **as such he was created by God the Father, and is subordinate to him.[66]** In Origen, as in Plotinus, the soul passes through a succession of stages and embodiments before entering the body; and after death it will pass through a like succession before arriving at God. Even the purest souls will suffer for a while in Purgatory; but in the end all souls will be saved. **After the "final conflagration" there will be another world with its long history,**

and then another, and another. ... Each will improve on the preceding, and the whole vast sequence will slowly work out the design of God.[67]
...

As his heresies ceased to be the secret of a few scholars, the Church found it necessary to disown him; Pope Anastasius condemned his “blasphemous opinions” in 400, and in 553 the Council of Constantinople pronounced him anathema.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n669/mode/2up?view=theater

The Church might be excused for condemning Origen: his principle of allegorical interpretation not only made it possible to prove anything, **but at one blow it did away with the narratives of Scripture and the earthly life of Christ;** and it restored individual judgment precisely while proposing to defend the faith.

https://www.truecovenanter.com/scripture/dabney_doctrinal_various_readings_of_nt_greek.html

Now, what manner of man was Origen? **He is described by Mosheim (in his *Com. de Rebus Christ*, Vol. II., p. 144) as "a compound of contraries, wise and unwise, acute and stupid, judicious and injudicious; the enemy of superstition, and its patron; a strenuous defender of Christianity, and its corrupter; energetic and irresolute; one to whom the Bible owes much, *and from whom it has suffered much*."** While he gained, amidst the superstitious contemporaries who then gave character to Eastern Christianity, a splendid reputation for sanctity, as well as learning, his character was evidently dishonest and tricky, and his judgment most erratic. The disgraceful story that his condemnation by his bishop, Demetrius, and his flight from Alexandria, were caused by his apostasy to Paganism under the impulse of fear, is not only detailed by Epiphanius, the great enemy of Origenism, but by Cedrenus and Suidas. **As a controversialist, he was wholly unscrupulous. His reputation as the great introducer of mysticism, allegory, and Neo-Platonism into the Christian church, is too well known to need recital. Those who are best acquainted with the history of Christian opinion know best, that Origen was the great corrupter, and the source, or at least earliest channel, of nearly all the speculative errors which plagued the church in after ages.**
...

He was strictly a *Rationalist*. No wonder that modern Rationalistic critics should manifest an instinctive sympathy with him, which gives weight to his critical testimony! He disbelieved the full inspiration and infallibility of the Scriptures, holding that the inspired men apprehended and stated many things obscurely. **His philosophy was that of Ammonius, who asserted a common religion in all the schemes of philosophy, *including the Bible*,** which only needed the excision of the excrescences and misconceptions added by poets and priests, to make their universal harmony appear; **and the key-note of all Origen's labors was the effort to reconcile Christianity and this eclectic Pagan philosophy into a substantial unity.**
...

This overweening confidence in the literary autocrat of Cæsarea did not much extend to the Latin churches or to Byzantium and Greece. It chiefly affected the East. The Western churches were never infected with the Origenist controversies, which convulsed the churches of the East during the fourth and fifth centuries. Again: **the admiration of Origen's learning and opinions was chiefly limited to the monasteries. The fanatical monks generally swore by him almost as their God, because his self-emasculation, asceticism, mysticism, self-righteousness, and superstition, exactly favored monkery. The secular clergy usually condemned his sentiments and influence;** and it was by a Byzantine council of such clergy that his name was finally fixed (where it belongs) in the list of *heretics*.

> https://archive.org/details/stephenbarsudai00bargoog/page/n10/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The doctrines of Bardesanes and of Manes preserved great force and influence in the East Syrian Church,** even until the middle of the fourth century, when S. Ephraem wrote and labored against them with all the influence he could wield, as heresies which had deep root among all classes. **From this time forward Syrian mysticism took a more ecclesiastical form, and pantheistic doctrine became subtly infused into the orthodox forms of belief, producing a steadily progressive inversion of the Christian faith.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/stephenbarsudai00bargoog/page/n70/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> It is hardly necessary, however, to question the opinions of this master of Bar Sudaili: the mystical pantheism of the monks of Egypt and Syria from the IV to the VI century, as well as the intimate relations between the two countries, are facts too well-known to require proof. **In both there flourished every degree of pantheism and pan-nihilism, from the gross and material form of the Euchites to the spiritualized forms of the kabbalistic, Neo-platonic and Origenistic sects. Late researches tend to show that much of this was engrafted from the old**

> **Egyptian sects,** with slight transformations required by the new dispensation. How much of this earlier form was embodied in the so-called Hermetic books it is difficult to determine, as they seem to be the work of such different periods.

https://archive.org/details/influenceofgreek00hatc/page/234/mode/2up?view=theater

In that [Origenist] theology, Stoicism and Neo-Platonism are blended into a complete theodicy: nor has a more logical superstructure ever been reared on the basis of philosophical theism.
…

Of this great theodicy, only part has been generally accepted. The Greek conceptions which underlie it, and which preceded it, have survived, but in other forms. Free-will, final causes, probation, have had a later history in which Greece has had no share. **The doctrine of free-will has remained in name, but it has been so mingled on the one hand with theories of human depravity, and on the other with theories of divine grace, that the original current of thought is lost in the marshes into which it has descended.** The doctrine of final causes has been pressed to an almost excessive degree as proving the existence and the providence of God; but His government of the human race has been often viewed rather as the blundering towards an ultimate failure than as a complete vindication of His purpose of creation. **The Christian world has acquiesced in the conception of life as a probation; but while some of its sections have conceived of this life as the only probation, and others have admitted a probation in a life to come, none have admitted into the recognized body of their teaching Origen's sublime conception of an infinite stairway of worlds, with its perpetual ascent and descent of souls, ending at last in the union of all souls with God.**

https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/08/apocatastasis-redux.html

As I recall, Origen's position didn't stop with universal salvation. That would be the optimistic or utopian version of apocatastasis. **But, consistent with his commitment to libertarian freewill, he held to a more pessimistic or dystopian version according to which the Fall might repeat itself.** And libertarian freewill certainly opens the door to a cyclical view of history—"the myth of eternal return"—in Eliade's felicitous phrase.

> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf
>
> Marx explained mankind's history in terms of revolution. *"Revolutions are the locomotives of history,"* he wrote.9 **Problem: what will serve as the engine of progress after the final Communist revolution?**
> …
>
> Marx wrote that man's alienation led to alienated labor, which in turn led to the creation of private property. **He wrote that "though private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather the consequence. …"**10 Then what was the cause of alienated labor? He never really said. Then how can Marxists be sure that men will not fall back into alienation after the Communist society is established? **They cannot be sure. It could happen again.** This is why Communism really has no legitimate reason for its linear view of time.

---

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page353

Nor is it necessary either to seek the origin of evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos before God laid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. It was an opinion which Plato introduced into his *Timaeus*. **Aristotle found fault with him for that (in his third book on Heaven, ch. 2) because, according to this doctrine, disorder would be original and natural, and order would have been introduced against nature.** This Anaxagoras avoided by making matter remain at rest until it was stirred by God; and Aristotle in the same passage commends him for it.

> http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/heavens.3.iii.html
>
> **Thus their view brings them into the contrary position that disorder is natural, and order or system unnatural.** But no natural fact can originate in chance. This is a point which Anaxagoras seems to have thoroughly grasped; for he starts his cosmogony from unmoved things.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D379c

“Neither, then, could God,” said I, “since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the cause.[1] **For good things are far fewer[2] with us than evil, and for the good we must assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other things and not in God.**”

> 2. A pessimistic commonplace more emphasized in the *Laws* than in the *Republic*. **Cf. *Laws* 896 E, where the Manichean hypothesis of an evil world-soul is suggested.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D10%3Asection%3D896e

Athenian: And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things [896e] everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?
…

Athenian: One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—“several.” **Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.**

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_9.html

Long before Plotinus's day the ancient world had come, under the influence of Plato, and still more of the Cynics and Stoics, to believe that the "body" is the source of evil upon earth. Plotinus was apparently the first of the heathen philosophers to accept this doctrine wholly and unconditionally and to transmit it to the Middle Ages as a principle admitting of no doubt and requiring no revision. There is every reason to suppose that this principle was a precondition for the diffusion of Christianity in the world of Graeco-Roman civilization.
…

I should like to quote here a remarkable passage from Valentinus preserved in the works of Clement of Alexandria: "From the beginning (*ap' archês*) you are immortal and children of eternal life; you want to divide Death among you, to conquer him, to destroy him in you and through you, to annihilate and exterminate him. If you destroy the world before it destroys you, you will be rulers over all that is created and transitory." These words express with rare strength and originality a thought already known to us which gave life and content to many chapters of Plotinus's *Enneads*. The Gnostics see the source of evil in the "world", i.e. in physical existence. They maintain that man is by nature immortal and heir to eternal life; only in so far as he is bound up with the outer world is he delivered over to corruption and death. **We must therefore overcome and destroy the world: then all power will lie in man's hands, and death, the supreme terror, will be terrible no more.**

It seems as though Plotinus must have looked on the Gnostics as friends and allies; he too taught, as we remarked, that it is our task to free the soul from the bonds of the body, he too preached flight from the world of phenomena**. But when he heard his own words from the mouths of the Gnostics, he fell into indescribable rage; the whole ninth book of the second *Ennead* is an expression of this rage.** Plotinus declares – as though he himself had never said anything of the sort – that to blame the world is the supreme blasphemy; but to scorn the Creator of the world is worse blasphemy still. **In contradiction to the Gnostics he speaks here of the visible world in almost the same enthusiastic words with which he speaks in the other books of the intelligible world.**
…

Plotinus, apparently, could not endure logical elaboration of his thoughts. He himself could cast off visible, physical things, he could strive to free himself from the world, he could prefer death to life. **But when the Gnostics make all these changing moods into unalterable truth, i.e. into universally valid and necessary judgments, then Plotinus grows furious.** He himself never re-read what he had once written down. How did he feel now when he suddenly saw and heard that something which he had only felt and said at certain times, and only for himself, **was suddenly proclaimed by the Gnostics (and that with the help of Mercury's wand!) as eternal truth, as something that always is, always has been, and always will be, and that cannot be otherwise?**

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Earlier, **I quoted Festugière, who distinguished between a “pessimistic” and an “optimistic” gnosis.** The first posits a heavy, material world from which the soul, rid of matter and thus lightened, attempts to escape to its *true home* in the immaterial divine world. The second posits a living and divine world in which everything is divine for all: the stars, the sun, nature, the earth itself are parts of God.

We note that in both gnoses the soul is of divine nature – whether God is distant and hard to attain or is so near as to coincide with the world. The nucleus of positions *A* and *B* is the divinity of the soul, although in one case this is assumed of it at once, in the other case only after it has ascended to its “true home.”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=spnJDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is not known when the Hermetic framework was first used for philosophy, but the *Asclepius* and the *Corpus Hermeticum*, which are the most important of the philosophical *Hermetica* which have come down to us, are probably to be dated between A.D. 100 and 300.3 **Though cast in a pseudo-Egyptian framework, these works have been thought by many scholars to contain very few genuine Egyptian elements**. Others would allow some influence of native Egyptian beliefs upon them.4 In any case, however, they were certainly not written in remotest antiquity by an all-wise Egyptian priest, as the Renaissance believed, but by various unknown authors, all probably Greeks,5 **and they contain popular Greek philosophy of the period, a mixture of Platonism and Stoicism,** combined with some Jewish and probably some Persian influences.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_MYUAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 22. W. Kroll (PW 8.1:804) disagrees with such divisions. **For him the basis of Hermetic thought is a Platonic dualism that has to tolerate Stoic pantheism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=0zfCrnqj_FUC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

These writings show a strong philosophical influence, in particular of Stoicism and later Platonism. In their teaching about God, the cosmos, and man the Hermetists made use of all kinds of views developed by Greek philosophy and science. It is even possible to write a commentary on these Hermetic tractates almost exclusively based on the Greek philosophical traditions found in them.17 But then one is missing the point, for the central concern of these writings is not philosophical but religious. Their authors were convinced that, in the end, it is not philosophical reasoning but divine revelation that leads to the truth.

http://esoteric.msu.edu/Merkur.html

Hermetism is often and wrongly confused with Gnosticism, which similarly originated in Egypt in roughly the same era. For present purposes, a few salient points of contrast will suffice. **Like the God of Stoicism, the Hermetic God was omnipresent and omniscient through the material cosmos. In Gnosticism, by contrast, God was transcendent, and the physical universe was an evil place created by an evil Demiurge** (van den Broek 1998). **Hermetic ethics celebrated the divine within the world; Gnostic ethics were abstemious, ascetic efforts to escape from the world** (Mahé 1998).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2d-wCQAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA237#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is at least possible to imagine how Christians could have arrived at a different conclusion about foul language, rejecting the common mores in the way Stoics did, rather than endorsing the world’s sense of propriety. They could have advocated foul language and used it as one of the hallmarks of their “freedom in Christ.” Christian baptism claimed to return the baptized to humanity’s earliest condition (cf. Gal 3:28; Col. 3:9-11). What if Christians has asked themselves what speech was like in the Garden of Eden?1 Is not the thought of Edenic euphemism absurd? How could Adam and Eve have used veiled words when even their naked bodies caused no shame (Gen 2:25)? **The Cynics, who strove to live out the golden age of Chronus, used the ribald speech of the festival of Chronus (the Saturnalia), where the normal rules of decorum were set aside. We could at least imagine a group of Christians behaving similarly.** If humans were meant to be free from shame (Genesis 2); if God had once inspired a prophet to talk about the genitalia of horses (Ezek 23:20); if “for the pure, all things are pure” (Tit. 1:15), then perhaps Christians should call things by their “real” names, thereby showing that they transcended the senseless cultural conventions of “the present evil age” (Gal 1:4).

But there do not appear to have been any such Christians. **Clement of Alexandria accused the followers of Prodicus of using foul language, and Theodoret connected them to the nudist Adamites.** Could this have been a group of Christians that reinstituted the life of Eden with naked bodies and naked words? Christendom would one day have its Cynic-style “fools for Christ”;2 it would one day have Martin Luther, who regularly told the devil to lick his ass and eat his shit.3

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II/Volume_I/Church_History_of_Eusebius/Book_IV/Chapter_7

10. Thus it came to pass that the malignant demon, making use of these ministers, on the one hand enslaved those that were so pitiably led astray by them to their own destruction, **while on the other hand he furnished to the unbelieving heathen abundant opportunities for slandering the divine word, inasmuch as the reputation of these men brought infamy upon the whole race of Christians.** 11. In this way, therefore, it came to pass that there was spread abroad in regard to us among the unbelievers of that age, the infamous and most absurd suspicion that we practiced unlawful commerce with mothers and sisters, and enjoyed impious feasts.[20]

> 20. The chief accusations urged against the early Christians by their antagonists were atheism, cannibalism, and incest. These charges were made very early. Justin Martyr (*Apol.* I. 26) mentions them, and Pliny in his epistle to Trajan speaks of the innocent meals of the Christians, implying that they had been accused of immorality in connection with them.
> ...
>
> **The statement of Eusebius in the present case is noteworthy.** He thinks that the crimes were really committed by heretics, and occasioned the accusations of the heathen, and he thus admits that the charges were founded upon fact. **In this case he acts toward the heretics in the same way that the heathen acted toward the Christians as a whole.** This method of exonerating themselves appears as early as Justin Martyr (compare his *Apol.* I. 26). Irenæus also (I. 25, 3), whom Eusebius substantially follows in this passage, and Philaster (c. 57), pursue the same course.

http://www.gnosis.org/library/strom3.htm

5. **But the followers of Carpocrates and Epiphanes think that wives should be common property. Through them the worst calumny has become current against the Christian name.** This fellow Epiphanes, whose writings I have at hand, was a son of Carpocrates and his mother was named Alexandria. On his father's side he was an Alexandrine, on his mother's a Cephallenian. **He lived in all only seventeen years, and at Same in Cephallenia was honoured as a god.** There a temple of vast blocks of stone was erected and dedicated to him, with altars, sacred precincts, and a "museum." The Cephallenians gather at the temple every new moon and celebrate with sacrifices the day when Epiphanes became a god as his birthday; they pour libations to him, feast in his honour, and sing his praises. **He was educated by his father in the general education and in Platonism, and he was instructed in the knowledge of the Monad, which is the root-origin of the Carpocratians' heresy.**

6. This is what he says, then, in the book *Concerning Righteousness*:

"The righteousness of God is a kind of universal fairness and equality. There is equality in the heaven which is stretched out in all directions and contains the entire earth in its circle. The night reveals equally all the stars. The light of the sun, which is the cause of the daytime and the father of light, God pours out from above upon the earth in equal measure on all who have power to see. For all see alike. **There is no distinction between rich and poor, people and governor, stupid and clever, female and male, free men and slaves.** Even the irrational animals are not accorded any different treatment; but in just the same way God pours out from above sunlight equally upon all the animals. He establishes his righteousness to both good and bad by seeing that none is able to get more than his share and to deprive his neighbour, so that he has twice the light his neighbour has. The sun causes food to grow for all living beings alike; the universal righteousness is given to all equally. In this respect there is no difference between the entire species of oxen and any individual oxen, between the species of pigs and particular pigs, between the species of sheep and particular sheep, and so on with all the rest. In them the universality of God's fairness is manifest. Furthermore all plants of whatever sort are sown equally in the earth. Common nourishment grows for all beasts which feed on the earth's produce; to all it is alike. It is regulated by no law, but rather is harmoniously available to all through the gift of him who gives it and makes it to grow.

7. "And for birth there is no written law (for otherwise it would have been transcribed). All beings beget and give birth alike, having received by God's righteousness an innate equality. The Creator and Father of all with his own righteousness appointed this, **just as he gave equally the eye to all to enable them to see. He did not make a distinction between female and male, rational and irrational, nor between anything and anything else at all; rather he shared out sight equally and universally.** It was given to all alike by a single command. As the laws (he says) could not punish men who were ignorant of them, they taught men that they were transgressors. **But the laws, by pre-supposing the existence of private property, cut up and destroyed the universal equality decreed by the divine law.**"

As he does not understand the words of the apostle where he says "Through the law I knew sin," he says that the idea of Mine and Thine came into existence through the laws so that the earth and money were no longer put to common use. And so also with marriage.

"For God has made vines for all to use in common, since they are not protected against sparrows and a thief; and similarly corn and the other fruits. But the abolition, contrary to divine law, of community of use and equality begat the thief of domestic animals and fruits. 8. He brought female to be with male and in the same way united all animals. He thus showed righteousness to be a universal fairness and equality. **But those who have been born in this way have denied the universality which is the corollary of their birth and say, 'Let him who has taken one woman keep her,' whereas all alike can have her, just as the other animals do.**"

After this, which is quoted word for word, he again continues in the same spirit as follows: "With a view to the permanence of the race, **he has implanted in males a strong and ardent desire which neither law nor custom nor any other restraint is able to destroy.** For it is God's decree." And how can this man still be reckoned among our number when he openly abolishes both law and gospel by these words. The one says: "Thou shalt not commit adultery." The other says: "Everyone who looks lustfully has already committed adultery."

And how can this man still be reckoned among our number when he openly abolishes both law and gospel by these words. The one says: "Thou shalt not commit adultery." The other says: "Everyone who looks lustfully has already committed adultery." The saying in the law, "Thou shalt not covet," it shows that one God is proclaimed by law, prophets, and gospel; for it says: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife." But for a Jew the "neighbour" is not a Jew, for he is a brother and has the same spirit. Therefore it remains that "neighbour" means one of another race. **But how can he not be a neighbour who is able to share in the same spirit? For Abraham is father not only of the Hebrews, but also of the Gentiles.**

9. If the adulteress and he who committed fornication with her are punished with death, clearly the command which says "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife" speaks of the Gentiles, in order that anyone who, as the law directs, abstains from his neighbour's wife and from his sister may hear clearly from the Lord, "But I say unto you, Thou shalt not lust." The addition of the word "I," however, shows the stricter force of the commandment, and that Carpocrates fights against God, and Epiphanes likewise. The latter in the same notorious book, I mean *Concerning Righteousness*, writes in one passage as follows: **"Consequently one must understand the saying 'Thou shalt not covet' as if the lawgiver was making a jest, to which he added the even more comic words 'thy neighbour's goods'. For he himself who gave the desire to sustain the race orders that it is to be suppressed, though he removes it from no other animals. And by the words 'thy neighbour's wife' he says something even more ludicrous, since he forces what should be common property to be treated as a private possession."**

These then are the doctrines of the excellent Carpocratians.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_Christian_Biography_and_Literature_to_the_End_of_the_Sixth_Century/Carpocrates
>
> Carpocrates (Καρποκράτης, Irenaeus; Καρποκρᾶς, Epiphanius and Philaster, both probably deriving this form from the shorter treatise against heresies by Hippolytus), a Platonic philosopher who taught at Alexandria early in the 2nd cent., and who, incorporating Christian elements into his system, became the founder of a heretical sect mentioned in one of our earliest catalogues of heresies, the list of Hegesippus, preserved by Eusebius (*H. E.* iv. 22). **These heretics are the first of whom Irenaeus expressly mentions that they called themselves Gnostics;** Hippolytus first speaks of the name as assumed by the Naassenes or Ophites (*Ref.* v. 1). **Of all the systems called Gnostic, that of Carpocrates is the one in which the Hellenic element is the most strongly marked, and which contains the least of what is necessarily Jewish or Oriental.**
> ...
>
> **Jesus he held to be a mere man naturally born of human parents, having no prerogatives beyond the reach of others to attain.** His superiority to ordinary men consisted in this, that His soul, being steadfast and pure, remembered those things which it had seen in the revolution (τῇ περιφορᾷ) in which it had been carried round with the unbegotten God, and therefore power [or a "power"] had been sent from God enabling Him to escape the makers of the world. **Though brought up in Jewish customs, He had despised them, and therefore had received powers enabling Him to destroy the passions which are given to men as a punishment. But in this there was nothing special: others might be the equals or the superiors not only of Peter or Paul, but of our Lord Himself. Their souls, too, might remember the truths they had witnessed; if they despised the rulers of the world as much as Jesus did, they would be given the same privileges as He, and higher if they despised them more.** Thus the Carpocratians gave honour, but not an exclusive honour, to Christ. They had pictures of Him, derived, it was said, from a likeness taken by Pilate's order; and images, which they crowned and treated with other marks of respect; **but this they did also in the cases of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers.**
> ...

The doctrine of the duty of despising the rulers of the world received among the Carpocratians an interpretation which enabled them to practise immorality without scruple. **Things in themselves were indifferent; nothing was in its own nature good or evil, and was only made so by human opinion. The true Gnostic might practise everything—nay, it was his duty to have experience of all.** A doctrine concerning the transmigration of souls which was taught by other Gnostic sects, and which harmonized well with Platonic teaching, was adopted by the Carpocratians in the form that a soul which had had its complete experience passed at once out of the dominion of the rulers of the world, and was received up to society with the God above them: those which had not were sent back to finish in other bodies that which was lacking to them; but all ultimately would be saved.
...

The Carpocratians and the Cainites have often been coupled together as the two most immoral of the Gnostic sects, and in practical effects their doctrines may not have been very different; but the Carpocratian theory of the indifference of human actions fell short of the inversion of good and evil which is ascribed to the Cainites. **Whereas the latter represented the God of the Jews and Maker of the world as an evil Being who ought to be resisted, the former only spoke of the makers of the world as inferior beings whose restrictions it is true enlightenment to despise;** and the arguments of Epiphanes, derived from the equality that reigns in nature, assume that the creation is so far conformed to the will of God that from the laws which pervade it we may infer what is pleasing to the supreme power.
...

According to Neander, the Carpocratian system sees in the world's history one struggle between the principles of unity and of multiplicity. **From one eternal Monad all existence has flowed, and to this it strives to return. But the finite spirits who rule over several portions of the world counteract this universal striving after unity. From them the different popular religions, and in particular the Jewish, have proceeded.** Perfection is attained by those souls who, led on by reminiscences of their former condition, soar above all limitation and diversity to the contemplation of the higher unity. They despise the restrictions imposed by the mundane spirits; **they regard externals as of no importance, and faith and love as the only essentials; meaning by faith, mystical brooding of the mind absorbed in the original unity. In this way they escape the dominion of the finite mundane spirits;** their souls are freed from imprisonment in matter, and they obtain a state of perfect repose (corresponding to the Buddhist Nirwana) when they have completely ascended above the world of appearance.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19104/19104-h/19104-h.htm#fna114

Perversion is the keynote of all the debased forms of Gnosticism. **According to Eliphas Lévi, certain of the Gnostics introduced into their rites that profanation of Christian mysteries which was to form the basis of black magic in the Middle Ages.**[111] The glorification of evil, which plays so important a part in the modern revolutionary movement, constituted the creed of the Ophites, who worshipped the Serpent (ὄφις) because he had revolted against Jehovah, to whom they referred under the Cabalistic term of the "demiurgus,"[112] and still more of the Cainites, so-called from their cult of Cain, whom, with Dathan and Abiram, the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and finally Judas Iscariot, they regarded as noble victims of the demiurgus.[113] Animated by hatred of all social and moral order, the Cainites "called upon all men to destroy the works of God and to commit every kind of infamy."[114]

Another Gnostic sect, the Carpocratians, followers of Carpocrates of Alexandria and his son Epiphanus--who died from his debaucheries and was venerated as a god[115]--likewise regarded all written laws, Christian or Mosaic, with contempt **and recognized only the γνῶσις or knowledge given to the great men of every nation**--Plato and Pythagoras, Moses and Christ--**which "frees one from all that the vulgar call religion" and "makes man equal to God."**[116] So in the Carpocratians of the second century we find already the tendency towards that *deification of humanity* which forms the supreme doctrine of the secret societies and of the visionary Socialists of our day.
...

The further Gnostic sect of Antitacts, following this same cult of human nature, taught revolt against all positive religion and laws and the necessity for gratifying the flesh; **the Adamites of North Africa, going a step further in the return to Nature, cast off all clothing at their religious services so as to represent the primitive innocence of the garden of Eden**--a precedent followed by the Adamites of Germany in the fifteenth century.[117]

https://www.tomorrowsworld.org/magazines/2000/july-august/a-different-gospel

British historian Paul Johnson describes Gnosticism as "a spiritual parasite which used other religions as a carrier... Gnostic groups seized on bits of Christianity, but tended to cut it off from its historical source" (*A History of Christianity,* 1976, p. 45).
...

Johnson also comments **"the most dangerous Gnostics were those who had, intellectually, thought their way quite inside Christianity, and then produced a variation which wrecked the system"** (Ibid.).
...

Gnostics taught that the real God is unknowable and incomprehensible. This world "is a stupendous mistake, created by a foolish or vicious creator-god" (*Mystery Religions in the Ancient World*, Godwin, 1981, p. 84). **Humans are merely "fragments of the universe... sediment from a lost heaven"** (Lacarriere, pp. 16, 19).
...

The *real hope*, to Gnostics, is not to see the *future* kingdom of God, but to regain an imagined *past*, freed from the fetters of this world (spirit from matter, light from darkness) in a timeless and incorporeal Kingdom of Light.
...

The Gnostic *Gospel of Thomas* states, "when you make the male and female into one, so that the male is not male and the female is not female... then you shall enter the kingdom" (*Unearthing the Lost Words of Jesus*, Dart and Riegert, 1998, p. 54). Celibate asceticism—denying one's sexuality and abhorring marriage—was a way of achieving this androgynous ideal and becoming like the true God.

However, other Gnostic teachers advocated just the opposite! Simon Magus appears to have rejected marriage and promoted
free love! Gnostics saw laws given by an evil creator-god as restrictive and inhibiting. **They taught the "practice of free love must be the means of *bursting out of the social straight jacket* specifically invented to stifle its [love's] liberating spontaneity... in the promiscuity of men and women lies the true communion"** (Lacarriere, p. 51). Some Gnostic sects participated in orgiastic rites of almost indescribable perversion. The idea was that to extirpate evil, it must be practiced until it is exhausted!

> https://biblehub.com/2_peter/2-19.htm
>
> **While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the servants of corruption: for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.**

...

Gnosticism was a *theology of liberation—promoting unlimited human freedom*! **Gnostic teachers wanted an "adult Christianity" that was "liberated from the everlasting references to Genesis and the Mosaic commandments"** (Lacarriere, p. 103). Their goal was to break the "mooring ropes" that tied human conduct to the Bible. Sound familiar? For many Gnostics, "total insubordination was lauded as the road to liberation" (Ibid., p. 74). Their practice of communal sex, attempts to gain a state of spiritual ecstasy, refusal to work, desiring to live as philosophical vagabonds, would blend easily with the hippies of the 1960s. **Former rock star John Lennon once commented "It seems to me that the only true Christians were the Gnostics"** (Jones, p. ix).
...

These common interests reveal why New Testament scholar Peter Jones asserts, **"Gnosticism was the earliest expression of 'Christian' liberalism" and that "modern liberals only imitate their long-lost cousins, the Gnostics"** (p. 64).
...

Peter Jones states "feminist thinkers have discovered the revolutionary character of Gnosticism as it applies to gender and patriarchal civilization" and that "an egalitarian, non-patriarchal vision constitutes the agenda of *cutting-edge* theology, sociology, and global politics in the West. ***Gnosticism and feminism are a match made in heaven***" (Jones, p. 162). He quotes a feminist who states, "Gnosticism is becoming a powerful influence in feminist research into the *overthrow* of the male in the divine" (Ibid.).
...

Many Christians today simply do not grasp the *real intent* of feminist theology. Radical feminist Naomi Goldberg has stated, "**the feminist movement in Western culture is engaged in the *slow execution* of Christ and Jehovah.** Yet very few of the women and men now working for sexual equality within Christianity and Judaism realize the extent of their heresy" (Ibid., p. 195). She blames "God the Father of Judeo-Christian Scripture as the architect of the patriarchal society" and states that "like patriarchy, this God will have to go" (Ibid., p. 180).
...

In light of such brazen comments, Peter Jones observes, **"Christians must realize that the religious feminist movement carries with it a *frontal assault* on the normativity of creational heterosexuality and, beyond that, on God Himself as the Creator"** (Ibid., p. 196). This, in essence, was also the Gnostic agenda—to denigrate the creation, its laws and its Creator!

http://internetbiblecollege.net/Lessons/Similarities%20Between%20Liberal%20Churchgoers%20And%20Some%20Wicked%20Gnostics.htm

They were like the modern liberals who claim that God approves of sex between homosexuals or unmarried heterosexuals who supposedly "love" each other. **These Gnostics claimed their "spirituality" changed their evil into good. <u>Modern liberals claim that "love" supposedly changes evil into good.</u>**
...

In his chapter called "Gnostics" in his writing "Panarion", the Early Church writer Bishop Epiphanius of Salamis in Cyprus (approx 310-402 A.D.) wrote about Gnostics in the 300's A.D. who like the most liberal modern Protestants amended their Christianity to fit in with the current philosophies and practices of many non-Christians at the time:

> *"The Gnostics... **basing themselves on pagan superstition, they refashion the fable-filled poetry and illusions of the Greeks,** thereby weaving together truth and falsehood... They base themselves upon idiotic visions and prooftexts in the Gospel which they preach..."*[19]

Epiphanius records that the Gnostics regularly practiced sex outside marriage, homosexuality, public nudity and abortion and mixed popular pagan Greek myths with the teachings of the Bible:

> *"4.1... They have their women in common. 2. And if a stranger belonging to their religion arrives, there is a sign they have of men for women and women for men, in that when they extend the hand in greeting, they stroke and tickle it underneath the palm, thus signaling that the one who has arrived is of their religion. 3. Then when they have recognized each other, they proceed at once to the feast. **They set out an abundance of meat and wine, even if they are poor. Having made their banquet from this and so to speak filled their veins to satiety, they proceed to arouse themselves.** 4. The man, moving away from the woman, says to his woman, 'Arise, hold the love feast with your brother.'*
>
> *And the pitiful pair, having made love... 5... then proceed to hold up their blasphemy to heaven, the woman and the man taking the secretion from the male into their own hands and standing looking to heave. They hold in their hands the impurity and pray.*
>
> *2. **<u>Although they have sex with each other, they forbid the begetting of children.</u> They are eager for the act of corruption not in order to engender children, but for the pleasure**... 3. But when they have finished taking the pleasure, they take into themselves the seeds of their impurity, not depositing them to have children, but consuming the shameful thing. 4. But if one of them fails to anticipate the immission of the seed from the natural effluence and the woman becomes pregnant, then listen to something even more dreadful which they dare to do. 5. **Extracting the fetus at whatever time they choose to do the operation, they take the aborted infant and pound it up in a mortar with a pestle, and, mixing in honey and pepper and some other spices and sweet oils so as not to become nauseous, <u>all the members of that herd of swine and dogs gather together and each partakes with his finger of the crushed up child.</u>** 5. And thus having engaged in cannibalism, they pray to God saying, 'We have not been mocked by the archon of desire, but we have collected the transgression of the brother.' And indeed they consider this the 'perfect Pasch.'*
>
> *7. They dare to do other dreadful things as well. When they fall into a frenzy among themselves, they soil their hands with the shame of their secretion, and, rising, with defiled hands **pray stark naked**, as if through such an action <they were able?> to find a hearing with God. 8. Their bodies they coddle night and day, the women and the men, with **ointments, baths**, and feasts, spending their time in lechery and drunkenness.*
>
> *6.1. They use both the Old and New Testaments, but reject the one who spoke in the Old Testament. **And when they find a word which can have a meaning opposed to them, they say that it was spoken by the worldly spirit**. 2. But if any passage can be given a color similar to the things which they desire, not because of what it is but because of the condition of their debased minds, **they refashion it along the lines of their concupiscence (evil desires) and say that it was spoken by the Spirit of truth.***
>
> *11.1... Some of them do not approach women, but debauch themselves with their own hands, taking their corruption into their hands and consuming it. 2. As a misrepresented proof text they use: 'These hands have sufficed not only for me, but for those with me,' and 'Working with your own hands, that you may be able to give to those who have nothing.' 8... These people, debauched with their own hands, and not only they, but also those who have intercourse with women, **when finally they are satiated with promiscuity with women, burn for each other, men for men...Having come to utter ruin, they congratulate each other, as though they had achieved a choice status.** 9. They also deceive the tribe of women who follow them... saying that so-and-so, who has been debauched these many years and continues to be so every day, is a virgin. Their lechery knows no satiety, but the more shameful anyone is in his actions, the more he is praised by them. 10. **They say that those women are virgins who have never been involved in the wordly sexual relations of marriage according to what is***

> ***customary and natural, which includes semination, but who, although they have sex and fornicate constantly,*** *before the act of pleasure is complete, separate themselves from their seducer with whom they are associated in fornication, and take the aforementioned shamefulness as food.*

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/private-forums/the-ziggurat/50748-michael-hoffman%E2%80%99s-fundamental-paranoia?p=1384772#post1384772

By promoting homosexuality as a viable alternative lifestyle, the consumer culture is saying that fantasy can triumph over reality, which is the essence of the narcissistic personality disorder.
…

Harry's friend Hermione "is particularly interested in Transformation," which is to say, "you know, turning something into something else." Transformation is, of course, "supposed to be very difficult." But that's why we send our children to places like Hogwarts where they begin by believing that they can change "matches into needles and that sort of thing" **and end up believing that maleness and femaleness are cultural constructs that they have transcended through gnosis.**
…

Because he has been taught to choose illusion over reality, **the narcissist sees any social structure which might threaten his illusions—from the family to the local community—as inherently inauthentic.** The only reality is the grandiose self and its unrealistic desires, a fact which is invariably misunderstood by less narcissistic types. As a result, the narcissist world is made up of bifurcations, good parents and bad parents, etc. **It is also essentially Gnostic, having the sense that the true self is enmired in bad matter, in this instance bad social circumstances which do not let the true self express itself fully and properly.**
…

Magic is always at war with stable essences. Lead is gold, when you know magic, and so the slogan of narcissistic education is, as the billboard advertising the local campus of Indiana University puts it, "Be whatever you want to be." Law is also magic, at least constitutional law in the United States. **The Supreme Court believes that "at the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe and the mystery of human life." Law is magic because it is also based on narcissist fantasies of complete hegemony over being,** which is also how Justice Kennedy put in his by now famous mystery clause of *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*.

> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction-lectures.htm
>
> **For the soul of man, God must be more than a thunderer, whereas among the Negroes this is not the case.** Although they are necessarily conscious of dependence upon nature – for they need the beneficial influence of storm, rain, cessation of the rainy period, and so on – yet this does not conduct them to the consciousness of a Higher Power: **it is they who command the elements, and this they call "magic."** The Kings have a class of ministers through whom they command elemental changes, and every place possesses such magicians, who perform special ceremonies, with all sorts of gesticulations, dances, uproar, and shouting, and in the midst of this confusion commence their incantations.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=sOWxzU66-7sC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA107#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Octavian first granted freeborn status to Sex. Pompey's freedman Menas/Metrodorus, who had betrayed his patron and thereby given Octavian control over Corsica, Sardinia, sixty ships, and three legions.198 Later, the freed physician Antonius Musa, credited with Augustus' recovery in 23 BCE, also received the right in addition to many other honours.199 **The new status was a legal fiction 'imago,' which posited that while the recipient remained a freedman in relation to his patron he became an *ingenuus* in relation to all others.**
> …
>
> **The *ius* illustrated how the ruler could overturn the social order, and it may seem surprising that it was Augustus, otherwise intent on maintaining a conservative image, who masterminded this invention.**
>
> **The *ius anulorum aureorum* involved the miraculous suspension of the freedman's servile 'stain,' but emperors would gradually introduce an even more subversive legal device, which transformed the freedman into a freeborn.** Through the process of *restitutio*

> *natalium* emperors would ‘restore’ the free birth of favoured freedmen, granting them complete *ingenuitas*.202 The procedure derived from real cases of restored free birth which could be claimed before the courts.203 In the early empire it seems that some ‘evidence’ of free birth usually was produced, but later the process became entirely fictitious. **As a result, a person’s past could now be retrospectively altered by imperial fiat, and although such instances may have been rare, they nevertheless cast a revealing light on the emperor’s ability to define his own reality.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murray_Rothbard#Ethics

> **The title essay of Rothbard's 1974 book *Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays* held:** "Equality is not in the natural order of things, and the crusade to make everyone equal in every respect (except before the law) is certain to have disastrous consequences".[71] In it, Rothbard wrote: **"At the heart of the egalitarian left is the pathological belief that there is no structure of reality; that all the world is a tabula rasa that can be changed at any moment in any desired direction by the mere exercise of human will".[72]**

---

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09591a.htm

Jesus then instructed Adam and showed him the Father's dwelling in the celestial heights, and Jesus showed him his own personality, exposed to all things, to the teeth of the panther, the teeth of the elephant, devoured by the greedy, swallowed by gluttons, eaten by dogs, mixed with and imprisoned in all that exists, encompassed by the evil odours of Darkness. **Mani's weird but mighty imagination had thus created a "suffering Savior" and given him the name of Jesus. But this Saviour is but the personification of the Cosmic Light as far as imprisoned in matter, therefore it is diffused throughout all nature, it is born, suffers, and dies every day, it is crucified on every tree, it is daily eaten in all food.** This captive Cosmic Light is called *Jesus patibilis.* Jesus then made Adam stand up and taste of the tree of life. Adam then looked around and wept. He mightily lifted up his voice as a roaring lion. **He tore his hair and struck his breast and said, "Cursed be the creator of my body and he who bound my soul and they who have made me their slave."**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Manichaeism

It is significant of the materialistic and pessimistic character of the system that, while the formation of the world is considered as a work of the good spirits, the creation of man is referred to the princes of darkness. The first man, Adam, was engendered by Satan in conjunction with “sin,” “cupidity,” “desire.” But the spirit of darkness drove into him all the portions of light he had stolen, in order to be able to dominate them the more securely. **Hence Adam is a discordant being, created in the image of Satan, but carrying within him the stronger spark of light.**
...

Of course men’s bodies as well as the souls of the unsaved, who according to the oldest conception have in them no light whatever, fall under the sway of the powers of darkness. **A later view, adapted to the Christian one, represents the portions of light in the unsaved as actually becoming lost.**

> https://archive.org/details/edgarquinethisea00heatuoft/page/300/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Excess of spiritual ambition united to excess of humility, is the characteristic of Indian thought. For while man, on the one hand, claims to become not only equal to God, but God himself; on the other, this arrogance is soon disturbed by the contrary sentiment: **he confesses that before he can deify himself he must lose all consciousness of himself, before he adores himself he must annihilate himself;** so that the consummation of the god in him is only attained when there remains nothing more of the man.
>
> https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n155/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> This crushing of one's self, this scorn of one's own nature, this *spernere se sperm,* of which religion has made so much, is really a very high degree of vanity. The whole moral of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here; man takes a genuine delight in doing violence to himself by these exaggerated claims, and afterwards idolising these tyrannical demands of his soul. **In every ascetic morality man worships one part of himself as a God, and is obliged, therefore, to diabolise the other parts.**

https://archive.org/details/ecclesiasticalh02valogoog/page/56/mode/2up?view=theater

Hence it was that a little while before the time of Constantine **a species of heathenish Christianity made its appearance together with that which was real:** just as false prophets and false apostles heretofore insinuated themselves amongst those who were constituted of God.

…

Now the contents of these treatises are apparently accordant with Christianity in expression, but thoroughly Pagan in sentiment: for Manichaeus, being an impious person, incited his disciples to acknowledge a plurality of gods, and taught them to worship the sun.

http://www.avesta.org/dhalla/history5.htm#chap36

Damascius (529 A.D.), on the authority of Eudemus states that sects flourished in Iran which held space as the primordial being that created the rival spirits of goodness and evil.[2]
…

Damascius quotes Eudemus (about 306 B.C.) as stating that Time is the father of Oromasdes or Light and Arimanius or Darkness.[15]

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zurvanism

We are left, therefore, with a very specific and amply attested fact: the myth of Zurvan, which is an alternative version of the Zoroastrian myth of creation known from Greek, Syriac, Armenian, and Arabic sources (texts given synoptically in Zaehner, 1955 and Rezania, 2010). In this myth, **which is surprisingly uniform in the various sources,** the two spirits (Ohrmazd [see AHURA MAZDĀ] and Ahreman [see AHRIMAN]) are presented as the twin offspring of a pre-existing god Zurvan. The difference among versions of the myth is largely restricted to the origin of the two spirits: the myth presents Zurvan as sacrificing for a period of a thousand years, in order to beget a son. Zurvan experienced a moment of doubt; as a result, Ohrmazd came into being because of the sacrifices and Ahreman out of Zurvan's doubt. **When Zurvan realized that two children had been formed in his womb, he promised to give dominion to his first-born, intending it to be Ohrmazd, but Ahreman pierced the womb and presented himself as the first-born.** It is here that the stories vary, but in general it is from the birth of the two spirits onwards that the narration of the cosmogony follows the customary lines known from "standard" Zoroastrianism. **The myth of Zurvan is thus some sort of a "prequel" to the ordinary story of creation, and there are very few (if any) indications that this prequel was considered as imposing by any contemporary Zoroastrian, as it has seemed to modern Western scholars.**
…

Much ink has been spilled on sorting out if the myth of Zurvan was a "reworking" (or even "betrayal") of classical Zoroastrianism in the face of a growing "monotheism" in the Near East in Late Antiquity, **but since there is *nothing* to indicate that this was even noticed by any Zoroastrian of the period, most of this debate has been pointless.**

> https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Religions/iranian/zurvanism.htm
>
> As Boyce (1979: 69) notes, "by declaring that Ohrmazd and Ahriman are brothers, the Zurvanites betrayed Zoroaster's fundamental doctrine that good and evil are utterly separate and distinct by origin and nature."

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09591a.htm

Babylon was still a center of the pagan priesthood; here Mani became thoroughly imbued with their ancient speculations. On Sunday, 20 March, A.D. 242, Mani first proclaimed his gospel in the royal residence, Gundesapor, on the coronation day of Sapor I, when vast crowds from all parts were gathered together**. "As once Buddha came to India, Zoroaster to Persia, and Jesus to the lands of the West, so came in the present time, this prophecy through me, the Mani, to the land of Babylonia",** sounded the proclamation of this "Apostle of the true God".

> http://www.romanitas.ru/eng/THE%20FALL%20OF%20ORTHODOX%20ENGLAND%205X8.htm#_ftnref193
>
> Indeed, **"who would not know that kings and dukes took their origin from those who, ignorant of God, through pride, rapine, perfidy, murders and, finally, almost any kind of crime, at the instigation of the devil, the prince of this world, sought with blind desire and unbearable presumption to dominate their equals, namely other men?"**[194]
>
> > https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/On_Christian_Doctrine/Book_I/Chapter_23
> >
> > Now the health of the soul is to cling steadfastly to the better part, that is, to the unchangeable God. **But when it aspires to lord it even over those who are by nature its equals,—that is, its fellow-men,—this is a reach of arrogance utterly intolerable.**
>
> …

Indeed, as de Rosa writes of a later Pope who faithfully followed Hildebrand's teaching, "**this was Manicheeism applied to relations between church and state. The church, spiritual, was good; the state, material, was essentially the work of the devil.** This naked political absolutism undermined the authority of kings. Taken seriously, his theories would lead to anarchy". [195]

…

What was new, shocking and completely unpatristic in Gregory's words was his disrespect for the kingship, his refusal to allow it any dignity or holiness – **still more, his proto-communist implication that *rulers had no right to rule*.** The corollary of this, of course, was that *the only rightful ruler was the Pope*.

https://www.papalencyclicals.net/bon08/b8unam.htm

However, one sword ought to be subordinated to the other, and temporal authority subjected to spiritual power. For since the Apostle said: '***There is no power except from God and the things that are, are ordained of God***' **[Rom 13:1-2], but they would not be ordained if one sword were not subordinated to the other and if the inferior one, as it were, were not led upwards by the other. For, according to the Blessed Dionysius, it is a law of the divinity that the lowest things reach the highest place by intermediaries. Then, according to the order of the universe, all things are not led back to order equally and immediately, but the lowest by the intermediary, and the inferior by the superior.**
…

Therefore whoever resists this power thus ordained by God, resists the ordinance of God [Rom 13:2], unless he invent like Manicheus two beginnings, which is false and judged by us heretical, since according to the testimony of Moses, it is not in the beginnings but in the beginning that God created heaven and earth [Gen 1:1]. Furthermore, we declare, we proclaim, we define that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=8A4ysGPJO2EC&hl=fi&pg=PA477#v=onepage&q&f=false

The assertion of this papal supremacy strikes a death-blow to the wretched Gallican dualism and to the political atheism which enfeebles and kills the life of every modern nation. We found, more than twenty years ago, that we could not give an effectual refutation of political atheism and defend the divine sovereignty over the political order, or maintain the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, unless we could assert for the pope the very power which Gallicanism denies; and that we could as easily defend Anglicanism as Catholicity on Gallican principles. Gallicanism is the doctrine of sovereigns, their lawyers and courtiers, but never has been the doctrine of the church.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n397/mode/2up?view=theater

IV. But above all, what we should particularly attend to, and compare both in the code of Manes and of the Occult Lodges, are the principles of disorganizing Equality and Liberty. That neither Princes nor Kings, Superiors nor Inferiors might exist, **this Heresiarch taught his adepts, that all laws and all magistracy was the work of the evil principle.**7

7. **Magistrates civiles et politias damnabant ut quae a Deo malo conditae et constituae sunt.** (*Centuriatores Magdeburgenses, Tom. II, in Manetem.*)

V. Lest there should be either poor or rich, **he inculcated that the whole belonged to all, and that no person had the right of appropriating to himself a field, a house,** &c.8

8. **Nec domos, nec agros, nec pecuniam ullam possidendam.** (Ibid. Ex Epiphanio & Augustino.)

…

It cannot be supposed that Condorcet, tracing the origin of the secret associations, and bringing the Templars so near to the *Albigeois*, could have been ignorant of what all history asserts, that **the *Albigeois* and all the ramifications of those sects of the South (the *Vaudois* excepted) were really no other than Manichaeans;** beside, that all those infamous proceedings of the Templars had long since been attributed to the children of Manes; and that all those horrors are easily explained by his doctrines.

When we see the principal adepts of Masonry, such as Lalande, Dupuis, Le Blond, De Launaye, seeking to substitute the errors of the Manichaeans and of the Persians, to the mysteries of the Christian religion, it is still more difficult to believe that they had not surmised the real author of their mysteries.22

…

> They may also consult St. Antoninus, Fleuri, Collier, Baronius; but above all let the Councils which condemned these Sects be attended to, and their decrees compared with history; and then will vanish many false prejudices imbibed against the means adopted both by church and state for the irradicating of those sectaries, who, truly Jacobins, aimed at the absolute destruction of all civil society, and of Christianity itself. **How is it possible to doubt of the tendency of their disorganizing Equality and Liberty, when we know that the proof necessary and pointed out to the Judges for the conviction of these sectaries, consisted in showing that the accused was one of those who held that *no obedience was due to the civil or spiritual powers, and that no authority was entitled to punish any crimes.*** Such is precisely the doctrine of the Council of Taragone, to know whether the famous degrees of the third and fourth Councils of Lateran are applicable to the accused – ***Qui dicunt potestatibus ecclesiasticis vel saecularibus non esse obediendum et poenam corporalem non esse infligendam in aliquo casu et similia*** (Concil. Tarag. anno 1242).

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ix1-religions-in-iran-pre-islamic

According to al-Masʿudi, Mazdak was an “interpreter of the Book of Zoroaster, the Avesta.” His followers were regarded as the quintessential *zendiq*, i.e., those who rely on the *Zand* or interpretation rather than on traditional priestly authority (see Yarshater, 1983, p. 997).

…

As a result of Mazdak’s movement, Ḵosrow I promoted the power of the priesthood at the cost of certain freedoms of the laity. **He called a council of priests and demanded that the laity should be taught Avestan prayers only, and not be admitted to courses on exegesis (*Zand ī Wahman Yasn* 2.1-4). In other words, he forbade lay participation in discussions on the interpretation of religious teaching (*zand*).**

…

Mazdak forbade hate and strife, and taught that these were mostly caused by women and possessions. These he therefore allowed to be freely enjoyed by all, like water and pasture. He taught that there are three elements: Water, Fire, and Earth. From their intermingling arose the Manager of Good and the Manager of Evil. The Supreme Being (who is above the Managers) is seated on this throne above, as Ḵosrow is on his throne on earth. Four Powers stand before him: Discernment, Understanding, Preservation, and Joy, just as four officials stand before the King. These four powers direct the world, with the help of seven Viziers, who “act within” twelve spiritual forces. **When the four, seven, and twelve come together in a person, he becomes ‘divine’ and is exempt from religious duties.**

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/korramis

Though Ḵorramism and Mazdakism are undoubtedly related, the Ḵorramis are too widely attested to be the residue or a revival of a defeated sect.

…

They were found from the mountain ranges of Anatolia to those of Tien Shan, far beyond the boundaries of the Sasanian empire. This suggests that **we should see Ḵorramism as the religion of rural Iran, a Zoroastrian “low church”** (Madelung, 1988, p. 3), **from which the founders of Mazdakism emerged, rather than as a heresy which they founded.** Pursued in local organizations such as that which Bābak took over in Azerbaijan, this “low church” will have functioned much like rural Sufism in later times and should not be envisaged as intrinsically rebellious. Its organized nature did however facilitate revolt when the Ḵorramis were politicized.

…

The idea of the same divine being appearing in different incarnations is attested in the *Bahrām Yašt* (*Yt.* 14; cf. *Yt.* 8.13, 16, 20; see BAHRĀM [Vərəθraγna]), **but something close to the Ḵorrami conception is first attested in the Book of Elchasai, composed around 116 CE in “Parthia,” that is, Mesopotamia under Parthian rule, by a Jewish Baptist and perhaps a follower of Christianity.** The book itself is lost, but the idea that the same divine being appears time and again, putting on different bodies, was shared by the Baptist followers of Elchasai in lower Iraq, the Elchasaite Baptists in Rome, where the book had been brought by a Greek-speaking Syrian, and by diverse Baptist readers of the book in Palestine, including the Ebionites and Nazoreans, from whom it went into the Pseudo-Clementines (Luttikhuizen, modified by Merkelbach and Cirillo). **In Palestine, the doctrine was understood conservatively: only Adam and Christ, the first and the last, were genuine incarnations;** in between, the divine being only appeared to the patriarchs (cf. Gieschen, pp. 208 f.). But the Elchasaite baptists, from whom Mani broke away, seem to have been understood all of them as incarnations, and Mani himself certainly did. **To him, the Buddha, Zoroaster, and Jesus were**

divine beings who had come “without a body” to take up abode in human beings; he himself had become “one spirit in one body” with the Paraclete, and all apostles were incarnations of the pre-existing “Apostle of Light,” who “puts on the saints as his garments.” All were really a single spirit (Cirillo, pp. 50-52; Lieu, pp. 236, 242, 246; Gardner and Lieu, p. 75; Gardner, p. 132).

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cosmogony-iv

Mazdakism differs from gnostic teachings and especially Manicheism in its fundamentally positive, nonascetic attitude toward the world and the powers that govern it, especially in its positive interpretation of the planets, in which it differs also from Zoroastrianism. The possible influence of philosophical ideas cannot be excluded, but a dependence on the thought of the neo-Platonist Porphyry cannot be demonstrated. **It is worth noting, too, that Christian ideas are totally absent from Mazdakism.**

The Ḵorramis envisaged the incarnation of the divine now as periodic and now as continuous. Moqannaʿ held God’s spirit to have taken up abode in messengers (*rosol*) at long intervals, starting with Adam and running via the founders of religions, including Moḥammad, to Moqannaʿ himself, the Mahdi (q.v.). The Ḵorramis of the west similarly believed in **“the change of the name and the body, claiming that all the messengers, with their diverse laws and religions, come into possession of a single spirit”** (Maqdesi, IV, p. 30; cf. *Clementine Homilies*, III, p. 20).
…

The Ḵorramis are reported to have believed in continuous prophecy (Abu ʿIsā in Ebn al-Malāḥemi, p. 584; Biruni in Fück, p. 80; Maqdesi, III, p. 8, IV, p. 30). It is not easy to tell whether they held that there could be prophets such as Adam, Jesus, or Moḥammad in the future or that the sequence of divine community leaders (prophets, spirit-bearers, and the like in Christian parlance, imams in Muslim parlance) would continue forever. **They may not have distinguished sharply between the two, the key difference being rather between such figures and the final, full incarnations of the divine, the Christ or Mahdi, with whom the material world, or the current cycle, would come to an end.**
…

Another term for periodic incarnation is *qalb*, explained in connection with the Ḵedāšiya as **the belief that God can change (*yaqlība*) Himself from one shape (*ṣura*) to another and clothe himself in different visible forms (*manāżir*).**
…

The sectarians denied the resurrection, insisting that there was no world other than this one or, as they also put it, that the resurrection consisted in the spirit leaving the body for another body or form (*qālab*, *ṣura*). Bodies were like clothes that got worn out or houses one moved out of, and only the spirit was rewarded or punished.
…

Some associated reincarnation with cycles: God had created seven Adams, corresponding to seven eras; each Adam would initiate an era of 50,000 years, at the end of which the righteous would be raised to the first heaven as angels while the rest would be placed below the earth. **The ants, scarabs, and dung beetles that crawled around in people’s houses were nations that God had destroyed in the past.** At the end of every era, those who had already been saved or damned would move further up or down to the next heaven or earth. **When all the seven eras were over, religious worship would come to an end.**
…

Like the Manicheans, though in a more positive vein, they seem to have thought of light, the divine element, as all-pervasive. It is this idea, variously called animism, pan-psychism, or pantheism in the modern literature, that lies behind their belief in reincarnation, non-violence, and divine incarnation alike (cf. Šahrastāni, p. 133; tr., I, pp. 511 f.; Malaṭi, p. 17). Ultimately, it was the same light or spirit which manifested itself again and again in different forms and strengths, in humans, animals, and inanimate things alike, rendering all of them live and sentient. **There was no sharp distinction between the divine, the human, and the animal worlds, or between past and present: just as the same divine being incarnated itself time and again, so the same people lived on again and again, in human or animal form.** The fact that there are Indian analogues to the key Ḵorrami and Manichean doctrines (*avatāra*, *saṃsāra*, *ahiṃsā*) should probably be credited to the shared roots of Indian and Iranian religion rather than Indian influence.

https://archive.org/details/nativistprophets0000cron/page/480/mode/2up?view=theater

The founders of the Ḥurūfī and Nuqṭavī movements, by contrast, were insiders who systematised local ideas, and their movements were heterodox from the start. The novelty of Faḍl Allāh Astarābādī (d. 796/1394), the founder of the Ḥurūfīs (who is recognised as an incarnation of Sultan Sahak by the Guran), lay in his systematic letter mysticism; **everything was the word of God and the words are composed of letters, so the sum total of the letters (and their numerical value) was the total of the creative possibilities of God,** and whoever mastered the science of the letters had the key to everything; in particular, man was the book of God, the living letters in which God

manifested himself, being particularly present in beautiful faces; **so God was within and full knowledge was deification.**111
...

The world – or rather the present cycle – consisted of three periods: one of prophethood, closed with Muḥammad; one of sainthood, closed by Faḍl Allāh; and one of divinity, when God was manifested in man. The third period was inaugurated by Faḍl Allāh.114 **According to a later Ḥurūfī work the number of cycles was infinite: each one was inaugurated and closed by the appearance of Adam and ended with the resurrection; and each one was absolutely identical with the next.**115 We are close to the world-view of the followers of Ibn Muʿāwiya here.

Like the followers of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya, **the Ḥurūfīs called the eternal return *rajʿat*, but it is not clear that they believed in actual reincarnation.**116 **Some of them did deny the doctrine of the resurrection, paradise, and hell.** Indeed, some denied that there was any consciousness at all after death: the letters of which humans were composed would come apart as singles (*mufradāt*), and without composition there was no seeing, understanding, or pleasure.117 Denials of life after death turn up among the Bektashis too;118 and a small heresiography composed, probably, in Tabrīz in the eighth/fourteenth or ninth/fifteenth century also mentions heretics, simply called Malāḥida ('godless people'), who denied the afterlife on the grounds that human beings are ultimately composed of earth, wind, water, and fire; as long as their temper is balanced they are healthy, but when their temper is corrupted they perish in the ocean of nothingness and become nothing; restoring the non-existent is impossible; it will never, ever assume the form of existence again. They roundly rejected resurrection and denied the existence of paradise and hell.119 **Once again we see that divine immanence and materialism, *ghuluww* and Dahrism, went hand in hand in the mountains of western Iran.** The materialism formed part of an utterly religious style of thinking. The Ḥurūfīs who denied that there was consciousness after death argued that paradise was knowledge and hell ignorance, **and that since they knew the science of the letters all things were now paradise for them; further, since there were no obligations in paradise, there were no ritual duties or forbidden things for them any more; everything was now lawful to them.**120 **Those who denied the existence of the afterlife and those who believed in the resurrection thus reached the same conclusion: paradise had come, the *ʿārif* was free to help himself to whatever was within reach, and he should strive to remove the rest from the hands of others.** Like al-Muqannaʿ's followers they saw themselves as having inherited the earth. Though the leader of the sect at the time did his best to suppress such views they were prevalent in Rūm, Tabrīz, Shirwān, Gīlān, Luristān, Iraq, and Khurāsān.121
...

The founder of the Nuqṭavīs was Maḥmūd Pasīkhānī (d. 831/1427f), a native to Gīlān who broke away from the Ḥurūfī movement. He retired to the borderland between Arrān and Azerbaijan, where Bābak had once had his centre. Faḍl Allāh was then residing at Shirwān, while the Ṣafavids were at Ardabīl, so the old type of religion could fairly be said to have returned to dominance in the region, though only the Ṣafavids presided over a cult organisation reminiscent of Bābak's. Later Maḥmūd's followers spread all over Iran, and when Shāh ʿAbbās turned against them many of them fled to India, where they were described by a sympathetic Zoroastrian under the name of Wāḥidiyya; in Lār, where Pietro della Valle became friendly with them in 1621, they called themselves Ahl al-Taḥqīq.122

Where Faḍl Allāh Astarābādī saw hidden significance in the letters of the alphabet Maḥmūd Pasīkhānī based his system on points, perhaps meaning the four points used as codes for the four elements in Nuqṭavī writings.123 His science of points was in any case a theory about the elements, and this is where his interest lies in the present context. **Unlike the other sectarians he was an outright pantheist, not a panentheist: God and the world were co-extensive, for God was the four elements, and nothing but the four elements existed.**
...

Time was cyclical and associated with the coming of prophets. In his *Mīzān*, Maḥmūd described a great cycle of 64,000 years, which he probably saw as endlessly repeated; he certainly had followers who held that 'the world is eternal, and that the variations and successions of it are also eternal.'128 He divided the great cycle into four lesser ones of 16,000 years each, and the lesser cycles in their turn were divided into two periods of 8,000 years, of which the first was the age of the Arabs (*dawr-i ʿarab*) and the second that of the Iranians (*dawr-i ʿajam*). **The first cycle of 16,000 years ran from the *afrād*, the simple elements of which were the basis of everything, to the emergence of man;** the second cycle was that of Adam/man, in which the Arab period was taken up by eight perfected Arab messengers (*mursal-i mukammal-i ʿarab*), the Iranian period by eight perfected Iranian expositors (*mubayyin-i ʿajam*); thereafter it would be the turn of the simple elements (*nawbat-i afrād*) again, **and so on until the whole cycle of manifestation (*ẓuhūr*), inwardness (*buṭūn*), secrecy (*sirr*), and openness (*ʿalāniya*) had been completed.**129 The same archetypal events would recur in each cycle, presumably meaning each of the sixteen cycles of 1,000 years that constituted the cycle of man, but they would not be completely identical: in the time of Moses Pharaoh had drowned, but in the time of Ḥusayn he had been victorious (as Yazīd) and denied water to his victim. **When the era of the Iranians came, people would worship**

humans, calling the human essence Reality (*ḥaqq*) and greeting one another as Allāh. When the Iranian era was over people would take the humans who had been worshipped to have been superior to themselves and so make idols of them, and this idolatry would continue till the era of the Iranians came back. This was how it would always go.130 **Maḥmūd marked the end of an Arab period, and a transition from secrecy to openness.** According to his followers, all the prophets and ancient lawgivers had really preached the same as Maḥmūd, but either they had not known this or else they had not wished to disoclose it.131 **The 'Iranian soul' (*nafs-i ʿajami*), that is Maḥmūd,**132 **however, declared himself the mahdi in 800 AH** (which must have corresponded to 8,000 of the cycle he was living in) **and pronounced Muḥammad's religion to have been abrogated.**133 For all his materialism, then, Maḥmūd conforms to the old pattern of the mahdi who presides over the transfiguration of the world as a manifestation of God himself.

Their materialism did not prevent the Nuqṭavīs from believing in reincarnation (*rajʿat*) either. **Humans returned to God when they died, meaning to the four elements of which they were composed, but the knowledge and the deeds (*ʿilm u ʿamal*) they had accumulated in their lives survived and were re-embodied.**
...

How humans came back depended on their merits: the great were being rewarded for their former deeds, the abject were being punished. **Paradise and hell were in this world. There was no disembodied rational soul.**134
...

As we saw, the Dahrī physicists of the early Islamic world likewise allowed for the same body particles to come together again – though only by accident, not by way of reward or punishment. **All these ideas reflect attempts to explain the reappearance of a human being in another body in naturalist terms and even, in the case of the Dahrīs and the Nuqṭavīs, without belief in anything supernatural at all.**

Unlike the Dahrīs, who did not believe in a divine realm, the Nuqṭavīs merely conflated it with that of nature; but what exactly did they take divinity to be? The answer seems to be power (*quvvat*) and purity (*ṣafvat*), more precisely the power that is inherent in the compounds and which drives the progress (*taraqqī*) of the body particles towards ever greater purity and perfection. **This process has been underway since the appearance of Adam the pure (*Ādam-i ṣafī*) and results in Perfect Man (*insān-i kāmil*).**138 (The concept of Perfect Man was also at the centre of ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī's thought.) Perfected humans are God because they represent the acme of power and purity.139 **Like the Stoics the Nuqṭavīs saw God as a force (or, as the Stoics called it, spirit) built into matter, which it organised and animated.** There were also Stoics who defined survival after death as resorption into the elements, as we saw in connection with the followers of ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya and the Dahrīs;140 **and both the Stoics and the Nuqṭavīs held the world to be eternal, but destroyed and recreated at regular intervals, each time resulting in a world similar to or (according to the Stoics and some Ḥurūfīs) exactly the same as its predecessor.** Given the presence of Stoicism in the region in antiquity the similarity may not be accidental: **there are suggestions of Stoicism in the evidence on the Dahrīs too.** If so, this is another case of Greek philosophical ideas being adopted with alacrity because they gave form and definition to notions already present on the Iranian side.
...

The Timurids had no love of Ḥurūfīsm, whose founder they executed, but Shāh ʿAbbas and even Akbar displayed an interest in Nuqṭavism; the devotees of both Nuqṭavism and Ḥurūfīsm included secretaries, physicians, poets, and itinerant dervishes; **and in Lār, where Pietro della Valle met the Nuqṭavis, several were astronomers and mathematicians of an impressive quality in Pietro's estimation.**153
...

Back in the fourth/tenth century al-Maqdisī had deemed Ismailism, or Bāṭinism, as he called it, to be rooted in the Khurramī perversion of Islam; this had started in the days of Abū Muslim, he said, and it had been motivated by a desire to restore sovereignty to the Iranians (*al-ʿajam*).154 **As Ibn Ḥazm explained, the Persians had once been the masters of a large kingdom and endowed with such self-esteem that they called themselves free men/nobles and regarded others as slaves; when the revolts of Sunbādh, Ustādhsīs, al-Muqannaʿ, Bābak, and others failed, they took to subverting Islam from within by means of Shīʿism.**155 Al-Baghdādī cites anonymous historians who similarly traced the roots of Bāṭinism to the descendants of Zoroastrians who hankered for their ancestral religion without being able to profess it openly for fear of Muslim swords; they had joined up with Bābak's Khurramīs and appealed to Iranian restorationists, and they were really Dahrī *zindīqs* in his opinion.156 To others Ismailism owed its existence to a conspiracy of Zoroastrians, Mazdakites, Dualists, and philosophers who imported their pernicious views into ʿAlid Shīʿism so as to destroy Islam from within and return power to the Iranians; adherents of this view also held them to have manifested themselves at different times in different guises.157 Opponents of the new sects continued this storyline. According to

Faḍl Allāh b. Ruzbihān Khunjī (d. 927/1521), Shāh Ismāʿīl's father, Ḥaydar, adopted the law of Bābak.158 **According to tenth/sixteenth century Ottoman polemicists, the Ṣafavids were destroying Islam from within.**159 Afūshtaʾī Naṭanzī, writing under Shāh ʿAbbās (d. 1038/1629), presented Nuqṭavism as the latest in a line of satanic brews that appeared in every age and which had previously displayed itself in Manichaeism and Mazdakism.160 A certain Isḥāq Effendi, writing as late as 1291/1874f., similarly denounced the Bektashis as derived from the Ḥurūfīs, descended in their turn from the Qarāmiṭa and Ibāḥiyya, presumably meaning Khurramīs and/or Mazdakites.161

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/horufism

> Influenced by **Soviet writings that extol the Horufis as humanists, materialists, and strugglers against feudalism,** Persian leftists such as ʿAli Mir Feṭrus (in *Jonbeš-e Horufiya*) began in the 1970s to adopt Faẓl-Allāh and Nesimi as their heroes.

https://archive.org/details/nativistprophets0000cron/page/262/mode/2up?view=theater

One reason that mainstream Muslims found it so easy to believe that the Khurramīs saw themselves as freed from all legal restraints is that Khurramīs did in fact see themselves as thus freed in their relations with *opponents*. They regarded themselves as the true believers, and when the mahdi came the sheep would be sorted from the goats: all the earth would be theirs. **As the only saved the adherents of the mahdi or his precursor were free to kill, rob, and enslave the unbelievers as they wished.** This is the behaviour reported by Dionysius of Tell Mahré for the Khurdanaye, by Muslim sources for the followers of Bābak and al-Muqannaʿ, and misrepresented as a doctrine of Mazdakite sharing in al-Bīrūnī's account of the latter. **The Qarmaṭī Ismailis of Iraq similarly legalised indiscriminate killing and plundering of opponents in the expectation of the imminent return of Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl.**52

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/manicheism-v-in-china-1

In 1120, a major rebellion took place led by Fang La, the owner of a lacquer grove in protest against a special impost on luxury goods. **It was widely believed by the authorities that many of the rebels were members of secret religious sects and that their meeting places were foci of political protest.**
…

The officials were particularly concerned about the well-organized sects whom they vaguely labeled as "Vegetarian demon worshippers" (*ch'ih-ts'ai shih-mo*). As one Confucian official would memorialize:

> "**The sect of the 'demon worshipping vegetarians (*sic*)' is strictly prohibited by the laws.** Even the family members of the offenders who are not privy to their crime are exiled to distant lands and half of the offender's property would be awarded to the informer and the rest confiscated. Nevertheless the number of followers has increased in recent times. The sect originated in Fukien and spread to the Province of Wen and the two Che Provinces (i.e. eastern and southern Chekiang). **When Fang La rose in rebellion, the followers of the sect incited each other to rebel everywhere.** It is said that their rules prohibit the eating of meat and the drinking of wine. They do not worship spirits or Buddhas or ancestors. Nor do they entertain guests.
> …
>
> One hears it said that those who join the sect later become rich. **These common folk are indeed ignorant for they do not realize that abstaining from wine and meat and lavish feasts and sacrifices and elaborate funerals will enable one to accumulate wealth.** There are some who were quite poor when they first joined the sect but other members will help them with contributions. By accumulating these contributions, no matter how small, they can earn a comfortable living. **When a member of the sect goes to or passes through another place, fellow members will provide him with board and lodging even if they do not know him.** Everything is used by any member with no need for prior permission. They speak of themselves as members of one family and hence they use the term 'An all-covering blanket (?)' to entice their followers.
> …
>
> The followers of the sect also chant the *Diamond Sūtra* and take from it the verse: 'They who see me (i.e. the Buddha) by visible form are following a perverse way (*hsieh-tao*)'. **Hence they worship neither spirits nor buddhas but revere the sun and the moon and regard them as real buddhas.** When they interpret the verse: 'The Dharma is even and has no gradations,' they would join the word 'no' [through deliberate mispunctuation] to the first part of the verse (i.e. to make it read: 'The Dharma is not even and has gradations').
> …
>
> **Their refusal to pay respects to their ancestors and their practice of naked burial are detrimental to public morals.** They also assert that human existence is full of misery. Hence, to terminate it by killing is to relieve misery. This is what they call 'deliverance,' and he who 'delivers' many will become a Buddha. Therefore, once their numbers increase, they will take advantage of

> political chaos and rise in revolt. Their greatest crime is the pleasure they take in killing. **They hate Buddhism in particular because its prohibition of killing is an offence to them.**

https://archive.org/details/dawntwilightofzo0000zaeh/page/206/mode/2up?view=theater

Like all things, however, in this state of mixture of good and evil, the luminaries are divided between the good god and his enemy: the constellations or Signs of the Zodiac are on the side of Ohrmazd, whereas the planets are literally the spawn of Satan.39 **Whatever good Ohrmazd transmits to his creatures through the constellations risks being interpreted by the malevolence of the planets and being redistributed unjustly.**

> 'The twelve Signs of the Zodiac ... are the twelve commanders on the side of Ohrmazd, and the seven planets are said to be the seven commanders on the side of Ahriman. **And the seven planets oppress all creation and deliver it over to death and all manner of evil: for the twelve Signs of the Zodiac and the seven planets rule the fate of the world and direct it.**'40

Of the Pahlavi books that have come down to us it is the *Mēnōk i Khrat* that shows the most pronounced fatalist tendencies. **The orthodox themselves did not deny that one's earthly condition was ruled by fate; what they did deny was that fate could affect moral action on which man's ultimate salvation or damnation depended; these rested squarely in man's own hands. In places the *Mēnōk i Khrat* comes perilously near to denying this.** Fate not only determines one's earthly lot, but also one's character.

> '**Though [one be armed] with the valour and strength of wisdom and knowledge, yet it is not possible to strive against fate.** For once a thing is fated and comes true, whether for good or the reverse, the wise man goes astray in his work, and the man of wrong knowledge becomes clever at his work; the coward becomes brave, and the brave man becomes cowardly; the energetic man becomes a sluggard, and the sluggard energetic: for, for everything that has been fated, a fit occasion arises which sweeps away all other things.41 **[So too] when fate helps a slothful, wrong-minded, and evil man, his sloth becomes like energy, and his wrong-mindedness like wisdom, and his evil like good: and when fate opposes a wise, decent, and good man, his wisdom is turned to unwisdom and foolishness, his decency to wrong-mindedness; and his knowledge, manliness, and decency appear of no account.**'42

Such were the views of the Zurvanite fatalists against which the High Priest Āturpāt, son of Mahraspand, struggled during the reign of Shāpūr II; but though he won his battle and saved the doctrine of free will for Zoroastrianism, fatalism, in the long run, triumphed over its rival; for, with the coming of Islam to Iran, it found a ready ally, **and Firdausī himself, who did more than any other man to revive the glories of their Zoroastrian past in the minds of his fellow-countrymen, paints a picture of Zoroastrianism that in no way reflects the spirit of hopeful free enterprise that is characteristic of all phases of that religion;** rather he shows us a universe inexorably ruled by an ineluctable fate, subject to the revolving heavens and a pitiless Time in which all man's striving and all his heroism crumble away to dust.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Firmicus,_Maternus_Julius#

FIRMICUS, MATERNUS JULIUS, a Latin writer, who lived in the reign of Constantine and his successors. About the year 346 he composed a work entitled *De erroribus profanarum religionum*, which he inscribed to Constantius and Constans, the sons of Constantine, and which is still extant.
...

The whole tone of the work is fanatical and declamatory rather than argumentative, and is thus in such sharp contrast with the eight books on astronomy (Libri VIII. *Matheseos*) bearing the same author's name, that the two works have usually been attributed to different writers. **Mommsen (*Hermes* vol. 29, pp. 468-472) has, however, shown that the astronomy—a work interfused with an urbane Neoplatonic spirit—was composed about 336 and not in 354 as was formerly held.** When we add to this the similarity of style, and the fact that each betrays a connexion with Sicily, there is the strongest reason for claiming the same author for the two books, though it shows that **in the 4th century acceptance of Christianity did not always mean an advance in ethical standpoint.**

http://www.skyscript.co.uk/firmicus.html

Such dangers were still very real when the *Mathesis* was written and Firmicus, trained in law, sought to avoid them by warning his readers not to meddle in such matters:

> ... **no astrologer is able to find out anything true about the destiny of the Emperor. The Emperor alone is not subject to the stars and concerning his fate alone the stars have no power to decree.** Since he is master of the whole world, his destiny is governed by the judgement of the Supreme God. (II.xxx)

Such a view is hardly consistent with his frequent declarations in support of determinism but he may have been wise to rate discretion above valour: a generation later, in the purges of the Emperor Valens, a man was tortured and executed for merely possessing a copy of the imperial horoscope.
...

Most educated pagans were Platonists in their philosophy, but Firmicus was a Stoic. The most obvious difference was that the Stoics were determinists. The view that '*the stars incline, they do not compel*' got short shrift from Firmicus and he was resolute in his belief that no man could change his inherent destiny, regardless of his virtue, wisdom or fortitude. His evidence was the nature of life:

> Consider the youth at the height of his physical development – rich, innocent, modest. Driven by no private crime, by no anxiety, he has hanged himself. ... Another man, known to everyone as innocent, fell on a drawn sword. ... A just man maintains his life as a wretched beggar while another, stained by well known crimes, accumulates the highest honours. ... To what do we attribute all this? ... Give us your hand for a little while and hold back from arguments. **Soon you may agree that all that stumbling and weak mortality must bear are decided by the chance movements of the planets.** (I.vii 2-4)

His fatalism made Firmicus a rather uncomfortable author for a Christian readership and the survival of his work is a tribute to the broad-mindedness of those medieval monks who copied and preserved his manuscripts.
...

Posidonius also revived some of Aristotle's theories, such as the idea that the human soul can be seen as having three parts. **The rational soul is of divine origin; the sensitive soul (the seat of instinct and emotion) we share with the animals; the vegetative soul (which gives life to the body) is possessed by all living things. His observations on the influence of the body and its environment on the lower souls were the basis for much later thought, and ultimately for St Thomas' reconciliation of astrology and free will: the argument being that astrological influences operate on the lower soul only, but they usually work because so few of us live on the level of the higher one.**

Astrology and Stoicism complemented each other in many ways. Most Stoics welcomed all forms of prognostication, for gaining knowledge of the future enabled the soul to accept its destiny, and astrology was especially favoured as demonstrating the harmony of the universe. So the astrologer Vettius Valens could quote the philosopher Cleanthes:

> **Those who make truth and the forecasting of the future their profession acquire a soul that is free** ... They have trained their souls to be brave and are not puffed up by prosperity or depressed by adversity, but accept contentedly what comes their way ... Whatever is in store for us will happen, even if we do not pray for it; what is not fated will not happen, despite our prayers. (Valens: *Anthologia*, 5.9)

This was a view echoed by Ptolemy, though with the fatalism carefully rejected. As an Aristotelian, Ptolemy contrasted the regularity of the celestial world with the unpredictability of the sublunary one:

> ... foreknowledge accustoms and trains the mind to attend to distant events as if they were present, and prepares it to accept whatever may come with tranquillity and firmness. And one need not believe that everything that occurs to men as the result of celestial influence is predestined ... celestial motion is produced in accordance with a divine and immutable fate, but terrestrial changes occur in accordance with a natural and mutable one. (*Tetrabiblos*, 1.3)

The Platonists, whose views eventually became the dominant philosophy of antiquity, also rejected determinism because it gave a divine origin to evil. Plotinus complained:

> The belief is that the planets in their courses actually produce, not merely such conditions as poverty, wealth, health, and sickness, but ... vices and virtues and the very acts which spring from these qualities ... We are to suppose the stars to be annoyed with men ... distributing what passes for their good gifts, not out of kindness towards the recipients, but as they themselves are affected pleasantly or disagreeably at the various points of their courses, so they must be supposed to change their plans as they stand at their zeniths or are declining. (*Enneads*, II.3, trans. S. MacKenna)

His answer was that although the universe originates in a single principle, it consists of parts which must have their own functions and hence some degree of freedom. After demolishing the theory that stars exert an actual influence, he asserts that the planets are not causes but signs, for if the universe is a unity (an idea borrowed from the Stoics), then the study of any one part can give a clue to another. As for the concept of 'malefic influences', if we cannot respond well to the universe, then the blame must lie with our lack of capacity to do so.

The Platonists naturally criticised the Stoics for their materialism, but that was in any case increasingly unacceptable to the spirit of the age: later Stoics, such as Emperor Marcus Aurelius, concerned themselves chiefly with ethics. **The Stoic school in Athens seems to have finally closed down in the third century but by then most of its tenets had been assimilated into Christianity. Nevertheless, the concept of fate remained so associated with Stoicism that even a fatalist Christian like Augustine felt a need to avoid the word, declaring that if anyone wished to equate divine providence with fate he could hold that opinion – but should also hold his tongue.**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02018e.htm

Classical antiquity looked upon Berosus, priest of the temple of Bel at Babylon, as the oldest writer on astrology; and according to Vitruvius Berosus founded a school of astrology at Cos. **Seneca says that a Greek translation, made by Berosus, of the "Namar-Beli" from the library the Asurbanipal was known to classical antiquity.**
...

It is significant that in ancient Egypt astronomy, as well as astrology, was brought to an undoubtedly high state of cultivation. **The astoundingly daring theories of the world found in the Egyptian texts, which permit us to infer that their authors were even acquainted with the helio-centric conception of the universe,** are based entirely on astrologico-theosophic views.
...

The earliest mention of the art of astrological prediction in early classical literature is found in the "Prometheus Vinctus" of Æschylus (line 486 sqq.) a comparatively late date. The often quoted lines of the Odyssey (Bk. XVIII, 136 sqq.) have nothing to do with astrology. Astrology was probably cultivated as an occult science by the Pythagorean school which maintained the exclusiveness of a caste. The teaching of Pythagoras on the "harmony of the spheres" points to certain astrological hypotheses of the Egyptian priests. **It is a striking fact that Greek astrology began to flourish when the glory of the early classical civilization had begun to wane.** It was in the age of Euripides, who refers to astrological predictions in a little comedy, that the belief in astrology began to grow popular in Greece.
...

Plato was obliged to take astrology into consideration as a "philosophical doctrine", and his greatest disciple, Aristotle, was the first to separate the science of astrology from that of meteorology, which was reserved for the phenomena of the atmosphere. **The Stoics who encouraged all forms of divination were active promoters of astrology.** The more plainly the influence of Oriental teaching manifested itself in Greek civilization, and the more confused the political conditions and religious ideas of the Greek states became, the greater was the influence of astrologers in public, and the more mischievous their activity in private life. Every professional astronomer was at the same time an astrologer. Eudoxus of Cnidus, the author of the theory of concentric spheres, was perhaps the first to write in Greek on purely astrological topics, being led to select this subject by his studies in Egypt.
...

As late as the time of Constantine the Great the imperial notary Julius Firmicus Maternus, who later became a Christian, wrote on "Mathematics, or the power and the influence of the stars" eight books which were the chief authority in astrology until the Renaissance.
...

The conversion of Constantine the Great put an end to the importance of this so-called science, which for five hundred years had ruled the public life of Rome. In 321 Constantine issued an edict threatening all Chaldeans, Magi, and their followers with death. Astrology now disappeared for centuries from the Christian parts of Western Europe. Only the Arabic schools of learning, especially those in Spain after the Moors had conquered the Iberian peninsula, accepted this dubious inheritance from the wisdom of classic times, and among Arabs it became incentive to pure Astronomical research. **Arabian and Jewish scholars were the representatives of astrology in the Middle Ages,** while both Church and State in Christian countries rejected and persecuted this false doctrine and its heathen tendencies.
...

Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Florentines employed Guido Bonatti as their official astrologer, and, **although Florence then stood alone in this respect, it was scarcely a hundred years later when astrology had entered in earnest upon its triumphant course,** and a Cecco d'Ascoli was already its devoted adherent. In Petrarch's day the questionable activity of the astrologers at the Italian courts had made such progress that this clear-sighted Humanist (De remed. utr. fortm. I, iii, sqq; Epist. rer. famil., III; 8, etc.) again and again attacked astrology and its representatives with the keenest weapons of his wit, though without success, and even without any following except the weak objections of Villani and the still more ineffectual polemics of Salutato in his didactic poem "De fato et fortunâ". **Emperors and popes became votaries of astrology—the Emperors Charles IV and V, and Popes Sixtus IV, Julius II, Leo X, and Paul III.** When these rulers lived astrology was, so to say, the regulator of official life; it is a fact characteristic of the age, that at the papal and imperial courts ambassadors were not received in audience until the court astrologer had been consulted.
...

The hypothesis of an astrological epoch of the world for each religion was widely believed by Italian astrologers of the time, who obtained the theory from Arabo-Judaic sources. Thus it was said that the conjunction of Jupiter with Saturn permitted the rise of the Hebrew faith; that of Jupiter with Mars, the appearance of the Chaldaic religion; of Jupiter with the sun, the Egyptian religion; of Jupiter with Venus, Mohammedanism; and of Jupiter with Mercury, Christianity. At some future day the religion of Antichrist was to appear upon the conjunction of Jupiter with the moon.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA55#v=onepage&q&f=false

Are not all prohibitions and precepts made supererogatory by a spiritual revolution in mankind? **Instead of living under the rule of the tree of good and evil, man will be restored to the Edenic rule of the tree of life, and the divine will be suffused through all things.** The Torah will continue to be the guide, but its commandments will assume a new and more profound meaning. There are contemporary scholars who discern here the influence of the Spiritual Franciscans who preached the eternal gospel of Joachim of Fiore. The ambivalence of the Kabbalist author, the tension between his commitment to the law of the Torah and the need to envisage a spiritual transformation in the Days of the Messiah, has a manifest parallel in the Joachimite prophecy of the third *status* and the new man of the Reign of the Holy Ghost.
...

The parallelism between the conceptions of the Catalonian Kabbalists and those of the followers of Joachim of Fiore, who died in 1202, is striking, though there is no convincing proof of any direct relationship or mutual influence between them; nor can it be demonstrated that Joachim was of Jewish descent, an accusation made during his lifetime. The two are coupled in this study because they represent **contemporaneous complex doctrines of other worlds that were in flagrant contradiction to their respective religious establishments and yet were allowed to survive.** In a way *Sefer ha-Temunah* is the more far-out.
...

The idea that divinity was not restricted to one creation but would continue to fulfill itself in a whole series of creations assumed a radical form in the *Sefer ha-Temunah*, **where the doctrine of aeons, or Schemittas, broke through the confines of traditional biblical chronology with its five- to six-thousand-year timespan and posited a long succession of worlds. The Schemittas are cosmic cycles with beginnings, middles, and ends, and human existence is qualitatively different in each of them – this is no Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence. Our world is in the second Schemitta under the sign of *Gevura* (Power) or *Dîn* (Law) and by all odds is the worst of all possible aeons. Both the preceding one that was dominated by *Hesed* (Benevolence) and the next one under *Rachamim* (Compassion) are far superior in nature,** and so will be all future worlds until the coming of the aeon of *Sabbath*. While we now live under the force of law, we can look back to a paradisiacal aeon in which there were only pure souls luminous as clear water; there were then no diaspora, no transmigration of souls as punishment, no lost souls, no serpent, no evil desire, no uncleanness. **In the past Schemitta, worship was not regulated but was a spontaneous effusion.** Abraham, symbol of benevolence in our world, was a remnant of what all creatures once were like. This world is always a struggle with desires and our Torah is full of prohibitions that raise a barrier against them. The Torah of that former world had only commandments “to do,” no “thou shalt nots.” The coming aeon of Compassion will witness a return to wholeness in all things. Even the moon will not wane. **There will be no families, only one great family,** no death until the end of the Schemitta and then death with a kiss. The symbols of light and water are pervasive: Men will lead bright and translucent lives, like the angels. They will eat manna, not grain; their sabbaths will be long; **absolute equality will prevail among them.**
...

Instead of one revelation, that of Mount Sinai, there are at least three: the first a Torah Kaduma, a heavenly Torah that was the paradigm, so to speak, which God looked into when he created the world; the second, the written Sinaitic Torah; and the third, a Torah that is amenable to constant transformation. When this fluid conception of the Torah is combined with a doctrine of Schemittas, a different view of the past, present, and future emerges that is quite alien to dominant rabbinic thought as enshrined in the Code of Maimonides.

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/antinomianism

Since they believed that redemption had already come they reached the conclusion that the *Torah de-Beri'ah (*"the Torah in its present form"), which is the material Torah of traditional Judaism, should be abolished and one should act according to the esoteric Torah, *Torah de-Aẓilut*. This antinomianism was a revolutionary element in the Shabbatean sect and brought in its wake destructive phenomena in the lives of the radical Shabbateans. Serious sins were considered meritorious, and particularly those sins punishable with *karet* ("divine punishment by premature death"), such as adultery. **Antinomian activities were also introduced as a special religious rite (reading the traditional phrase *matir assurim* as "who permits what is forbidden" rather than as "who frees prisoners"). It attained its most extreme form with the Frankists (see Jacob *Frank). This antinomianism of the Shabbateans and the Frankists was connected with their messianic claims and was based on the talmudic statement that in the messianic period all commandments would be abolished, "all sacrifices would disappear, except for the sacrifice of thanksgiving" (Lev. R. 9: 7; 27: 12), and that all fasts would be converted into feasts.**

[Gershom Scholem]

One of the main sources of kabbalistic antinomianism is the astrological theory of changes of law which depend on Saturn and Jupiter. The rule of a certain planet over a certain period of time, a cosmic cycle, and the corresponding nature of the law that governs during this cycle, has been transferred by some kabbalists to the rule of a certain *Sefirah*, whose specific nature is reflected in the structure of the Torah.

[Moshe Idel (2nd ed.)]

---

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_27

The contemporary scholar H. Grundmann (18) points out in this regard that in the late Middle Ages there was no need to belong to a sect in order to adhere to any sort of free views in sexual matters. The basis of the "orgiastic mass" was strictly ideological. The Free Spirit, who had attained "Godliness," broke completely with his former life. What had been blasphemy for him in the past (and remained so for "rude" folk) now became a sign of the end of one historical epoch and the beginning of another--the new Eon. In this way he was able to comprehend and to express his new birth and the break with the old Eon.
...

In the center of the sect's ideology stood not God but man made divine, freed from the notion of his own sinfulness and made the center of the universe. As a result, Adam played a central role in their teaching, not Adam the sinner depicted in the Old Testament, but Adam the perfect man. Many of the Free Spirits referred to themselves as the "New Adams," and Konrad Kanler even called himself Antichrist ("but not in the bad sense").

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/272/mode/2up?view=theater

In language worthy of any adept of the Free Spirit [Jan Bockelson] explained that pomp and luxury were permissible for him because he was wholly dead to the world and the flesh. At the same time he assured the common people that before long they too would be in the same situation, sitting on silver chairs and eating at silver tables, yet holding such things as cheap as mud and stones.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/62913/pg62913-images.html#FNanchor_533_533
>
> Three causes especially contributed to bring about these hideous disorders of the fanatics. First, the bloody persecutions carried on by Charles V. in the Netherlands against all those who desired to worship God according to their conscience; next, the doctrines of the enthusiasts, mingled sometimes with immorality, **which Tanchelme of Antwerp, Simon of Tournay, Amalric of Bena, the Turlupines, the Pseudo-Cathari, and the Brethren of the Free Spirit, had for centuries professed in different countries, and especially in the Netherlands and on the banks of the Rhine, and which had lately been revived there by emissaries from Germany;** and finally, the need for a change in the social order felt at this period by the least industrious and most fanciful men of the lower orders, and especially of the class of artisans.

https://archive.org/details/rosicrucianeligh0000fran/page/88/mode/2up?view=theater

Here is the general reformation of the world announced in the Rosicrucian manifestos described as a world reformation which the Bohemians expected to achieve through the Elector Palatine. **Whilst involving definite reforms in education, church, and law, this general reformation has millenarian overtones; it will bring the world back to the state in which Adam found it, which was also Saturn's golden age.** So, in the *Confessio*, the second Rosicrucian manifesto, the general reformation is said to presage 'a great influx of truth and light' such as surrounded Adam in Paradise, and which God will allow before the end of the world. And, in the verses of the print, this millennium, this return to the golden age of Adam and Saturn, is said to be assisted by 'the high society of the Rosicrucians' who wish to turn all the mountains into gold. The satire here associates the whole movement with a 'Rosicrucian' type of alchemy, for the gold referred to is not the material gold of alchemical transmutation but the spiritual gold of a golden age and a return to Adamic innocence.

https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/quakerstudies/vol14/iss1/2/

From St Augustine to John Calvin, it had been a fundamental theological truism that 'the soul is made by God' and was 'an immortal yet created essence'.114 As Calvin made clear, 'creation is not inpouring, but the beginning of essence out of nothing';115 hence there was no transfer of divine essence from creator to the created. **The creation and immortality of the soul were not seen as mutually exclusive, nor was the latter a signifier of divinity.** God created an incorporeal element within humans that had the capacity for spiritual knowledge. This conception of the human soul was crucial to a Trinitarian explanation of how human beings could be aware of and believe in God. **By contrast, non-Trinitarian theology did not necessarily adhere to such a notion of the soul; and this was particularly true of the Gnostic tradition.**

...

Augustine denounced the Priscillians as blasphemous liars;116 **while Calvin asserted that, 'if man's soul be from the essence of God through derivation, it will follow that God's nature is subject not only to change and passions, but also to ignorance, wicked desires, infirmity, and all manner of vices'.**117
...

For example, **he noted that in 1673 William Penn had declared 'We (Quakers) assert the unity of God and Soul'.**125 For anti-Quakers, such a declaration appeared to be an admission that Quakers could be divine.

> 125. Penn, W., *Reason against Railing and Truth against Fiction ...*, London, 1673, p. 153; cited in [Cheyney], *Gross Blasphemy*, p. 28. Penn's original text read as follows: **'And from our asserting the Unity of God and the Soul, and our Denyal of their Carnal Resurrection, *He* [Thomas Hicks] *blindly concludes*, that the Soul is part of God ...'**

...

Citing George Fox, in his *Great Mistery of the Great Whore Unfolded* (1659), Cheyney asserted that the Quakers 'do plainly hold *the Soul of Man to be without beginning, and infinite it self*'.127
...

Cheyney played out the hypothetical scenario of conflating God and human: 'O Blasphemy and Impiety! **If mans Soul be God, then God is sinful, and shall be damn'd and tormented in Hell;** for the damned in Hell have Souls, and are damned for sin.'130

https://books.google.fi/books?id=BZzK-LFe_QEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA184#v=onepage&q&f=false

Quakers tended to internalize the Christian drama of Christ's death and resurrection **and to think of heaven and hell as internal states.** In this respect they thought in ways remarkably similar to mystical alchemists whose goal was an internal transformation. **G.F. Nuttall was the first to point out the similarities between the Quakers' belief in man's capacity to transcend sin and the Hermetic view of man as the divine microcosm.**14
...

As Richard Bailey has demonstrated, no Quaker was more convinced of his own divinity than George Fox. Bailey argues that at the root of Fox's theology was the idea of "celestial adoption" or "celestial inhabitation," which mean that Christ literally dwelt within the sanctified individual so that he or she became "flesh of His flesh and bone of His bone."17 **Bailey calls this "Christopresent theology," and claims that only by understanding how radical this idea was can one possibly comprehend the antipathy and downright hatred so many people felt for the Quakers. Quakers literally believed they were divine. As sons and daughters of God they were the true nobility. Thus the world actually had turned upside down, and the Quakers' refusal to kowtow to their social superiors reflected their new status.**18
...

> 19. *The Journal of George Fox*, p. 97. **Fox specifically distinguishes the Quakers from other Christian sects because of their belief in the potential perfectibility of mankind:** "**For all of the sects in Christendom (so called) that I discoursed with, I found none that could bear to be told that any should come to Adam's perfection** – into that image of God, that righteousness and holiness, that Adam was in before he fell; to be clean and pure, without sin, as he was. **Therefore how shall they be able to bear being told that any shall grow up to the measure of the stature of the fullness – of Christ, when they cannot bear to hear that any shall come, whilst upon earth, into the same power and Spirit that the prophets and apostles were in?** – though it be a certain truth that none can understand their writings aright without the same Spirit by which they were written" (ibid., p. 101).
>
> https://archive.org/details/cu31924029371311/page/n325/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Breaking up our Lord's Personality into two is a scheme which enables a man to use the loftiest language concerning the Divinity which dwelt in Jesus, while at the same time holding Jesus Himself to be a man imperfect morally as well as intellectually.** If we hold that the Deity did but dwell in Jesus without being truly and properly one with him, this is to ascribe to him no exclusive prerogative. **Might not the Deity thus dwell with many men?** You will find that one would be able to affirm, in the same words, concerning the founder of Buddhism, everything that, according to the Nestorian hypothesis, you can affirm as to the Divinity of the Founder of the Christian religion.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT622#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> "Christ" figures in Spinoza's thought exclusively as a universal non-sacred moral teacher. **What remains unclear is whether he ever identified his "Christ," the pedagogue, with the actual historical figure, Jesus. Because Spinoza always calls him just "Christ," he seems**

to imply, discreetly, that the historical personage described in the New Testament is not the Christ, or that there is no particular correlation between the two. Spinoza's Christ is a transcendent image, supreme teacher, the "very mouth of God," and ultimate symbol of earthly wisdom and reason and supreme moral example to men, the Jesus of Socinian tradition, that is the best human conceivable, reworked into an extreme rationalist. Like the Koerbaghs, Spinoza views him as a human who "truly has within him the spirit of Christ," that is not a person believing doctrines, performing rituals, invoking commandments or reciting prayers, but one with "salutary opinions and a true conception of living, and truly happy," **belonging to no faith or religion other than Spinoza's "true religion." Christ indisputably occupies a "unique place [...] in Spinoza's thinking"; but his Christ is an unremittingly subversive construct unconnected with the churches' Jesus.**17

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/94/mode/2up?view=theater

> 29. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the belief in man becoming God has hardly diminished. **Henri de Lubac quotes Philarète Chasles as saying that Buddhism, like Gnosticism before it, multiplies divine incarnation in man and makes possible unification with the "eternal substance."**

https://vaticancatholic.com/john-paul-ii-antichrist/#defined2

> Pope Vigilius, *Second Council of Constantinople*, 553: "**The holy synod of Ephesus... has pronounced sentence against the heresy of Nestorius**... and all those who might later... adopt the same opinions as he held... They express these falsehoods against the true dogmas of the Church, **OFFERING WORSHIP TO TWO SONS**, trying to divide that which cannot be divided, **AND INTRODUCING TO BOTH HEAVEN AND EARTH THE OFFENCE OF THE WORSHIP OF MAN.** But the sacred band of heavenly spirits worship along with us only one Lord Jesus Christ."[10]

...

Nestorius dissolved Jesus into two (resulting in the worship of two Christs), while Antipope John Paul II dissolved Jesus into six billion, which resulted in the worship of six billion Christs.

> Antipope John Paul II, *General Audience*, Jan. 25, 1984: "**Christ, the Son of God, by becoming flesh, assumes the humanity of every man**... At this point he becomes united with every person... **In the Encyclical *Redemptor Hominis* I wrote that 'the name for that deep amazement at man's worth and dignity is the Gospel, that is to say, the Good News. It is also called Christianity.'"**[12]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA54#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Henry] Stubbe, the radical Protestant, paganizing Galenist and Hobbesian, found authority for his views in the natural magic of the late Italian Renaissance. Here is another connection between the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century magical and Hermetic traditions and the subversive religion of the late seventeenth-century English radicals. **Stubbe in this respect prefigured John Toland and his circle after the Revolution of 1688-9.**

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

Benjamin Franklin has been regarded as a conservative Deist. He was not. **When he died, a printed document was found in his pocket. He had carried it around with him for years: "Articles of Belief." It declared his faith in the plurality of worlds, a widely held Renaissance doctrine.**66

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-01-02-0032 **[20 November 1728]**

When I think thus, I imagine it great Vanity in me to suppose, that the *Supremely Perfect*, does in the least regard such an inconsiderable Nothing as Man. More especially, **since it is impossible for me to have any positive clear Idea of that which is infinite and incomprehensible, I cannot conceive otherwise, than that He, *the Infinite Father*, expects or requires no Worship or Praise from us, but that he is even INFINITELY ABOVE IT.**

...

I CONCEIVE then, that the INFINITE has created many Beings or Gods, vastly superior to Man, who can better conceive his Perfections than we, and return him a more rational and glorious Praise. As among Men, the Praise of the Ignorant or of Children, is not regarded by the ingenious Painter or Architect, who is rather honour'd and pleas'd with the Approbation of Wise men and Artists.

It may be that these created Gods, are immortal, or it may be that after many Ages, they are changed, and Others supply their Places.

Howbeit, I conceive that each of these is exceeding wise, and good, and very powerful; and that Each has made for himself, one glorious Sun, attended with a beautiful and admirable System of Planets.

It is that particular wise and good God, who is the Author and Owner of our System, that I propose for the Object of my Praise and Adoration.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0080 **[1751]**

And while we are, as I may call it, *Scouring* our Planet, by clearing America of Woods, and so making this Side of our Globe reflect a brighter Light to the Eyes of Inhabitants in Mars or Venus, why should we in the Sight of Superior Beings, darken its People? why increase the Sons of Africa, by Planting them in America, where we have so fair an Opportunity, by excluding all Blacks and Tawneys, of increasing the lovely White and Red?

> https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/hakim-bey-the-lemonade-ocean-modern-times
>
> To understand the beauty of the idea it must be seen in the context of Fourier's grand & brilliant cosmological speculations, rivals in complexity of Blake's prophecies. **For Fourier the universe is composed of living beings, planets, & stars, who feel passion & who carry out sexual intercourse, so that creation itself is continual.** The miseries of Civilization have deflected Earth & humanity from their proper destiny in a literal cosmic sense.
> ***Passion*, which we have been taught to regard as "evil," is in fact virtually the divine principle.** Human beings are microscopic stars, & all passions & desires (including "fetishes" & "perversions") are by nature not only good but necessary for the realization of human destiny.
>
> https://publicdomainreview.org/essay/get-thee-to-a-phalanstery-or-how-fourier-can-still-teach-us-to-make-lemonade/
>
> Our anthropogenic influence, however, would not stop short of the earth and its atmosphere, since, by some kind of unexplained cosmic entanglement of influence, new moons would show themselves in the sky, and—most importantly of all—a crown of benign light and energy would descend over the Northern Pole.[12] (A crown which would render the seas into lemonade, and allow agriculture over the entire globe.) **The only reason our planet does not at present enjoy regal rings, like those of Saturn, is, according to Fourier, due to the fact that our civilization is so "impoverished" that we don't deserve them yet. (He also took it for granted that aliens on other planets were far more evolved than we are, and that we are the slow kids on the cosmic block, having been mired in incoherency for so long.)**

---

https://trisagionseraph.tripod.com/earlychurch.html#Swedenborg

Emanuel Swedenborg would indeed appear to have been a modalist. **At least here the 'Oneness' historians have come up with a genuine modalist; often even that much eludes them.** He's anti-Trinity: "I have quite often talked with angels about this, and they have invariably said that in heaven they are quite incapable of dividing the Divine in three...They have further said that church people coming from the world with the idea of three 'Divines' cannot be let into heaven, since their thought wanders from one to another, and since in heaven they may not think 'three' and say 'one'." (*Heaven & Hell*, Emanuel Swedenborg, 1.2).

He's neither Arian nor Socinian, the commoner anti-Trinity heresies, kicking them out of his heaven: "Church people who deny the Lord, recognizing only the Father, and who let themselves harden in this kind of faith, are outside of heaven." (*Heaven & Hell*, 1.3);

> "People who deny the Divine side of the Lord and recognize only His Human side, like Socinians, are likewise outside of heaven. They are moved forward a bit toward the right and let down deep, so becoming completely separated from everyone else from Christendom." (*Heaven & Hell*, 1.3).

He seems not to have accepted the orthodox distinction of two natures in Christ, human and Divine, much less the 'Oneness' tendency to split these two 'natures' into two interacting persons: "One can see from these selections that the Lord's Human is Divine, and not -- as is believed within the church -- that His Human is not Divine." (*Heaven & Hell*, 11.78). **He seems to have thought, like Joseph Smith, that God has always been a man, as opposed to the orthodox view that He took on human nature in the incarnation:** "The question of the ancients' having an anthropomorphic concept of the Divine is settled by the appearances of the Divine to Abraham, Lot, Joshua, Gideon, Manoah, and his

wife, and others, who did see God as a person, but did worship Him as God of the universe, calling Him 'God of heaven and earth,' and 'Jehovah'. It was the Lord who appeared to Abraham..." (*Heaven & Hell*, 11.84)
...

He thought all who loved the good and true would be granted entry to heaven. Once there, those professing non-Christian religions would receive remedial instruction:

> "Then behind these are people devoted to the Mohammedan religion who lived a moral life in the world, recognizing one Divine Being and recognizing the Lord as the Essential Prophet. Once they withdraw from Mohammed, because he cannot help them, they approach the Lord, worship Him, and recognize what is Divine about Him; then they are taught in the Christian religion ... Mohammedans are taught by angels who were once involved in that religion and have turned to Christianity; the heathen too are taught by their own angels." (Emanuel Swedenborg, *Heaven & Hell*, 53.514-515).

Even pagan idolators are welcome in Swedenborg's heaven:

> "It is customary for Gentiles who have worshipped some god in an image or statue, or some idol, to be introduced when they enter the other life to people who stand in lieu of their gods or idols, so that they may shed their illusions. After they have been with them for a few days, they are brought away." (*Ibid.*, 36.325).

http://esoteric.msu.edu/VolumeV/Blake.htm

Swedenborg had contended that his teaching was a new revelation that would replace the corrupted beliefs perpetuated in all previous Christian churches. He explained that, historically, the world had seen the rise and fall of four ecclesiastical dispensations: the Adamic, the Noahitic, the Israelitish and the Christian Church of the present. As the Christian Church had now reached its end, Swedenborg's "New Jerusalem Church" had arrived as "the Crown of all Churches, which have heretofore existed on this earthly Globe." It spiritualised the biblical notion of a Last Judgment by which mankind would be brought to redemption. Swedenborg's doctrines were promoted as the revelation of a final and true conception of Christianity, and those accepting the "New Jerusalem Church" would be redeemed in the spirit.[10]
...

In *Divine Love and Divine Wisdom* (1788), which Blake owned and annotated, Swedenborg elucidates at length how the Divine in the natural universe has been obscured by the churches. He complains how "all the Things of Religion, which are called Spiritual, have been removed out of the Sight of Man," by "Councils and certain Leaders in the Church." They have mislead Christians to "blindly" believe that being born to a "natural" world, they cannot perceive anything "separate from what is natural." **To preserve their worldly privileges, these religious tyrants have conned their subjects into believing that the "spiritual" world "transcend[s] the Understanding."** They deceive man with the explanation that "the spiritual Principle to be like a Bird which flieth above the Air in the Æther where the Eye-sight doth not reach"; but, Swedenborg counterattacks, the spiritual principle of the world ("By the Sight of the Eye is meant the Sight of the Understanding") is visible to those who break the mental restrains superimposed by the churches.

> "***The poor have been made into slaves by those who teach lies. They don't teach the law of cause and effect. They make the people believe when they see it rain, that a spook is producing it. But the rain is real, how then can the cause be unreal? You are witnessing conditions in the world that are produced by real men, but you don't see the real cause of the effect of your own suffering. Because the Bloodsuckers of the poor make you think that God is some mystery God.***

> *Well, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad said to us that there is 5% who are the Poor Righteous Teachers, who don't believe the teaching of lies of the 10%. But this 5% are all wise and know who the true and living God is, and they teach that* ***the True and Living God is the Son of Man, the Supreme Being, the Blackman of Asia.***"—Louis Farrakhan

...

In his anti-Masonic *Memoirs*, Barruel, who resided in England, did not let pass that the Masons he calls "the brethren of Avignon," Grabianka, Cagliostro and Saint-Martin, were welcome visitors to Chastanier and the Swedenborgians in London during the 1780s. Thus, Barruel claims, one could see

> their disciples thirsting after that *celestial Jerusalem*, that *purifying fire* (for these are the expressions I have heard them make use of) that was to kindle into general conflagration throughout the earth by means of the French Revolution – and thus Jacobin Equality and Liberty was to be universally triumphant in the streets of London.[31]

The aforementioned expressions are commonplace in much mystical Christianity and spiritual alchemy, and are also appropriated by Blake. The rhetoric of "celestial Jerusalem" features most notably in *Milton* and *Jerusalem*, **and, in the early prophecy, *America*, Blake (echoing Nebuchadnezzar's millennial dream in Daniel 2) depicts revolution as an alchemical transformation of man: "Fires inwrap the earthly globe, yet man is not consumd;/ Amidst the lustful fires he walks: his feet become like brass,/ His knees and thighs like silver, & his breast and head like gold."** (8:15-17; E54).

Barruel's account may be both populist and opportunistic, capitalising on the general paranoia and rumour-mongering that swept Europe at the time, but there is no denying that, for many Swedenborgians, spiritual and political regeneration were handmaidens. **The Swedenborgian lecturer James Glen would, for example, in 1795 welcome the French Revolution, which he believed was "sweeping a way for the New Church of the Divine Human."[32]**
…

While active in the New Church, C.B. Wadström and August Nordenskjöld, with some of their international Masonic contacts, published a pamphlet in English describing **a plan for establishing a colony on the coast of Sierra Leone founded and run on Swedenborgian principles. Its title is more than a little indicative of the politics underwriting the project: *Plan for a Free Community upon the Coast of Africa under the Protection of Great Britain; but Intirely Independent of All European Laws and Governments*.**

In an appendix to the pamphlet, a number of articles for governance in the colony are set up. These are conceived on a fairly democratic basis with suffrage for all adult males to an assembly and the dissolution of all social class. Central to the argument of the *Plan* is the eventual abolition of slavery and that the "European" and the "Negro" should live together in harmony.[46] **The political intentions go beyond the question of abolition, for, as the authors ask, "To what purpose is Spiritual Liberty without Civil Liberty?" (xi). There are in fact two kinds of slavery to be abolished: that of the Negro's literal and the European's "Civil slavery" under the "abject servility to innumerable monied Tyrants" (iv-v).**
…

Following a common template in eighteenth-century mythography, Swedenborg believed that the original Christian Gospel – which was once known as unmediated vision and understood by man – had been corrupted and forgotten over time. This template was also adopted by Blake, most notably on plate 11 of the *Marriage*, plate 10 of *Europe*, plates 3-4 of *The Song of Los*, plate 25 of *The Book of Urizen*, and it is a general main theme in the mythological works of the 1790s. **Swedenborg hailed himself as the one who had returned Christianity to its ancient origins and purity, but he also postulated that there was a tribe in Africa, which, undisturbed, had preserved the original Gospel and possessed the highest degree of inner knowledge. Thus he spoke of the Africans as a "more Interior People than any other of the Gentiles."[50]**

> [50] Swedenborg, *True Christian Religion*, n835-40. **Swedenborg's writing on Africa and the African's religion as exemplifying his theology of the *Divinum Humanum* is extensive and has been collected by J.J.G. Wilkinson in *The African and True Christian Religion: His Magna Charta*** (London: J. Speirs, 1892).

Swedenborg had said nothing on the institution of slavery, but his mystical notion of the high spiritual status of the African race provided intellectual fuel for the abolitionist cause, which we otherwise mostly think of as couched in the Evangelical idiom of William Wilberforce or Hannah More. The link between Swedenborg and abolitionism goes back to 1779 when Wadström, in Norköpping, had established a society, **which was probably the first organised abolitionist movement in the world.** He writes in an account that this was "a society of affectionate admirers of the writings of that extraordinary man, Emanuel Swedenborg ... **in consequence of reflection on the favourable account this eminent author gives, both in his printed works and manuscripts of the African Nations.**"[51]

Blake would undoubtedly have been familiar with the *Plan*; not only was it widely advertised in Swedenborgian publications during 1789-90, but its abolitionist programme would also have stirred his interest. Swedenborg's thinking on the Africans is relevant in regard to **Blake's revolutionary spirit Orc, who is referred to as "the Image of God who dwells in the darkness of Africa"** (*America* 2:8-9; E52). Blake appears to draw on Swedenborg's lengthy praise of the Africans, who "excel all other Gentiles in clearness of interior judgment," and therefore have a superior understanding of God. **To Swedenborg, God is not insubstantial "ether" or in "the form of a cloud" as he is to some Christians. The Africans understand that God is man raised to awareness of his own divinity, and they have "no other idea of God than that of a Divine Man."[52]**

In *Divine Love and Divine Wisdom*, Swedenborg writes that the Africans, who "entertain the Idea of God as of a Man," reject the "Idea of God as existing in the Midst of a Cloud," and, "when it is said among the Christians, they deny that it is possible" (n11). **This passage was annotated by Blake: "… to think of holiness as distinct from man is impossible to the affections."** In the poetry of *Jerusalem*, Blake would equally rejected the notion of a "God who dwells in Chaos hidden from the human sight" (23.30; E168), "in the dreary Void … wide separated from the Human Soul" (28.16; E174). **The counter-theology offered is that "the Lord" is seen as "Universal Humanity," the "form a Man"** (96.1-6; E255). In fact, Blake argues a concordant notion throughout his writing: as early as in the "Divine Image" of *Songs of Innocence*, he speaks of "the Human Form Divine" (E12-13). **Blake's aversion against a distant sky-god is spelled out in his satire of "old Nobodaddy aloft," who is the Christian Churches' Godhead put to political use.** In the poetry of Blake's Notebook, he proclaims to "love hanging & drawing & quartering" (the punishment for High Treason against the State) and condemns those who "rebel" to "go to hell" (E499).

The convergence between mystical enlightenment and the discourse of reform in the Swedenborgian milieu opens up a new perspective on what is usually regarded as Blake's more straightforward social commentaries. For example, **when first reading "The Little Black Boy" from *Songs of Innocence*, it appears to share a common ground with abolitionist poems such as Cowper's *Negro's Complaint* (1779) or William Roscoe's *The Wrongs of Africa* (1787).** But, in fact, it is a poem that most clearly evinces a Swedenborgian influence. **We are told that, compared with the white English boy, the black boy is better prepared for Heaven. This is expressed by the metaphor that he has a greater ability to bear the Sun's "beams of love" and that he can therefore shade the white English boy "till he can bear/ To lean in joy upon our fathers knee"** (ll.26-27; E9). That there "in the Spiritual World ... is a Sun distinct from that of the Natural World, the essence of which is pure love from Jehovah God, who is in the midst thereof: that the heat ... is in its essence love, and the light ... [of] Wisdom" is a central belief with Swedenborg, which is why it was also included in section 13 of the circular letter Blake signed.[53] Swedenborg's claim that the African and the child both have unmediated insight into Truth and both live in a state he calls *Regnum innocentiae* may also be at play in Blake's song of *Innocence*.

If we go beneath the veneer of polite social utilitarianism in the *Plan for a Free Community*, it is quite clear that the whole project was nurtured in the soil of millennial Enthusiasm – a return to innocence. Already on the page following the title, Revelations 21:5 is quoted: "*Behold, I make all Things New*."
…

The *Plan for a Free Community* advocates a society of sexual liberty ("the first elementary, powerful, and universal Union, or Bond of Society, is the *Love of the Sex*").[56] **Nordenskjöld and his associates saw love between married couples laid waste by a degenerate social structure:** "It is distressing to observe marriages in their present state are but Seminaries for a corrupt Generation ... false Religions and false Politics have enveloped them in such a thick Darkness" (v-vii). It is the link between political and sexual repression that most closely approximates a staple in Blake's writing. He refers memorably to the "marriage hearse" ("London"; E27), and laments that "she who burns with youth. and knows no fixed lot; is bound/ In spells of law to one she loaths" (*Visions of the Daughters of Albion* 5.21-12; E49). **Blake says of the spirits who rest in Eternity that "they neither marry nor are given in marriage"** (*Jerusalem* 30.15; E176).
…

In the earliest phase, *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* is Blake's most sustained attempt at describing a pathology of sexual violence, conjoining sexual liberation with human freedom. **Here we meet the female Oothoon, castigating her lover Theotormon for his "hypocrite modesty."** Oothoon describes herself as "A virgin fill'd with virgin fancies"; and, in accordance with the image of the virtuous woman at the time, she is barred from expressing her true sexual desires.

In what appears to be a landscape setting akin to the paradise on the coast of Africa described in the *Plan*, Oothoon describes a utopian future time of free love, where she can catch girls for Theotormon and lie "on a bank & view their wanton play/ In lovely copulation bliss on bliss." This is a vision of a future time when "Love! Love! Love! happy happy Love!" can be "Free as the mountain wind" (7:16-30; E50). The reference to "happy copulation" has attracted some attention.
…

In the Notebook, Blake's "I saw a chapel all of gold …" is written in a parallel column on the same page as "The Garden of Love." **In the latter poem, Swedenborg's "Now it is Allowable" is transformed by Blake into a "Thou shalt not," written over the door of the chapel erected in the garden. It was probably also meant as an ironic charge against the pious New Churchmen who had imposed a ban on the mysteries of love when "Nunc Licet" was chosen as a motto on the cover of the splinter magazine, *New-Jerusalem Magazine*, edited by the Universal Society, which now also included Wadström and Nordenskjöld. This magazine had one purpose: to**

publish a translation of Swedenborg's controversial tract on conjugial love. An instalment was included in each number throughout 1790 – until it folded due to lack of subscriptions.

The translation they printed was prefaced with two plates. The first illustrated a scene from *Conjugial Love*, which, interestingly, also alluded to the proposed African project. The design (by the unknown "Metz") showed two Africans taken into Heaven, welcomed by angels. **The text below ("Cidaris Erit Africo") refers to *Conjugial Love* n. 114, which is the last number of Swedenborg's account of a dream vision (n. 103-114), in which "wise men in the kingdoms of Europe" are assembled together in heaven to help "unfold the secret RESPECTING THE ORIGIN OF CONJUGIAL LOVE, AND RESPECTING ITS VIGOUR OR POTENCY." After much debate, some Africans step forward and proclaim: "You Christians deduce the origin of conjugial love from love itself; but we Africans deduce it from the God of heaven and earth … You Christians deduce it conjugial virtue of potency from various causes rational and natural; but we Africans deduce it from the state of man's conjunction with God of the Universe." Swedenborg experiences how their understanding of conjugial love surpasses that of the ever so wise representatives from the European nations, and for this they are divinely commended.**

> http://cambriawillnotyield.blogspot.com/2010/08/till-end-of-time.html
>
> In 1942 a movie came out called *Son of Fury* featuring the incredibly handsome actor Tyrone Power and the incredibly beautiful actress Gene Tierney. And unfortunately the movie was well done. It was unfortunate, because the movie was an anti-European-genre movie, a genre invented by Satan and perpetuated by such anti-European writers as Addison, Dryden, Voltaire and Rousseau. In the movie Power plays a disinherited (by his evil uncle) member of the English nobility. He goes to sea, jumps ship, and discovers a tropical island inhabited by simple, saintly natives. The hero falls in love with a native girl (played by Gene Tierney), but he has to go back to England to reclaim his inheritance and marry the white woman with whom he is also in love. With the aid of hundreds of rare pearls, given to him by the natives who have no need of them (being non-materialistic and virtuous because they are so close to nature), the hero returns to England. Once there, **he beats his mean uncle to a bloody pulp and discovers that the white woman he thought he loved is really a money-worshipping, unnatural product of a decadent civilization. He then gives up his inheritance and returns to the wonderful, natural, brown people who really know how to live.**
>
> The noble savage myth was made more acceptable to the 1942-audience by the presence of a beautiful Caucasian woman playing the native girl. **"See, they are just like us, only better, because they embody as an entire people the noble ideals that only a few of our noblest minds believe in.**"
>
> Of course now that the *Son of Fury* fantasy has become a dogma in church and state virtually every movie and book that comes into the theaters and off the presses is a *Son of Fury* fantasy. **And now the message is not sanitized; the pure, uninhibited natives have free (Margaret Mead style) uninhibited sex with enlightened white people.** The enlightened whites are generally, in the modern books and movies, women. The white males are all evil uncles now.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n669/mode/2up?view=theater

On one side he shows us a Paradise perfectly corresponding with the earth, and the angels doing every thing in the other world that men do in this. On the other, he describes heaven and its plains, its forests, its rivers, its towns, and its provinces; he then proceeds to the schools for the infant angels; to the universities for the learned angels; to fairs for the commercial angels, and particularly for the English and Dutch angels. The spirits are male and female; they marry, and Swedenborg was present at a marriage. This marriage is celestial; "but," says he, "**we are not to infer that celestial couples are unacquainted with voluptuousness.** ... The propensity to unite, imprinted by the Creator, exists in the *spiritual bodies,* as it does in the material bodies. **The angels of both sexes are always in the most perfect state of beauty, youth, and vigor. They enjoy therefore the utmost voluptuousness of conjugal love, and that to a much greater degree than is possible for mortals.**"5
…

Never did any man speak more of the love of God and of the love of his neighbour; never did any person more frequently quote the Prophets and the Scriptures; or affect more respect for Christ and more zeal for Christianity; never did any one better assume the character and tone of a sincere, religious, and upright man: Nevertheless, I must say, never did any man show more duplicity and impiety; never did any one conceal the most resolute design of annihilating Christianity and every Religion, under the mask of zeal, more completely than he did. **Let all his followers protest against this assertion; to expose the *two systems* of their master will amply suffice to justify the imputation. I say *two systems*, because as Swedenborg always had *two senses*, the one *internal* and *allegorical*, the other *external* or *literal*, to explain and overthrow the Scriptures; so he has also *two systems*, the one apparent, for fools and dupes; the other secret and hidden, and reserved for the adepts; the one tending only in appearance to reform Christianity on the reveries of Deism; the other leading to all the Impiety of Atheism, Spinosism, Fanaticism, and Materialism.**

…

For God is also man; indeed it is only the Lord or God, that can be properly called man—This God man *is uncreated, infinite, present everywhere by his humanity*—**Though God and Man at the same time, he is but of one nature, one essence, and particularly *but one in person*. It is true, there is a God the Father, a God the Son, and a God the Holy Ghost; but Jesus Christ alone is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, according as he manifests himself by the creation, redemption, or sanctification; and *the Trinity of persons in God*, according to Swedenborg, *is an Impiety which has produced many others*.**

This doctrine against the Trinity is one of those articles to which the Sophister and his disciples most frequently advert, and particularly insist upon, even in their Catechisms for children.
…

"He imagines that his thoughts are actually his own, and his volition in himself and from himself, while nevertheless the whole is infused into him. If he believed the real fact, he would not then appropriate evil actions to himself, for he would reject them from himself to Hell, whence they came. Neither would he appropriate to himself good actions, and for that reason would pretend to no merit from then. He would be happy; he would see, according to the Lord, the Good and the Evil;"9 **or, in other words, he will find that he is master neither of his thoughts nor actions;** that he is deprived of free-agency, and that he can neither merit nor demerit.

This poor being, who so grossly mistakes himself when he believes himself to be thinking or acting of himself, has also fallen into a multitude of other religious errors, because he does not rightly undertand the sacred scriptures. In the Book of Revelation every things is *allegorical*, every thing has two senses, the one *celestial*, *spiritual*, *interior*; the other *natural*, *exterior*, *literal*. **It is from not having understood the spiritual and celestial sense that Christians have believed in the Son of God made Man, and in his death on the Cross for the Redemption of mankind.** Swedenborg, one day present in Heaven at a great council, heard and repeats these words of an angel, who was a great divine: "How is it possible that the Christian world can abjure sound reason, and rave to such a degree as to establish the fundamental principles of their belief on paradoxes of such a nature, which evidently militate against the divine essence, the divine love, the divine wisdom, the omnipotence, and the universal presence of God? What he is supposed to have done, a good master would not have done against his servants, nor even a wild beast against its young!"10 **The same angel told him many other things, which overturn all the remaining articles of the Christian belief. One point in particular he asserts, which must give pleasure to the wicked, when he teaches them to scoff at Hell, particularly when he says *that it is contrary to the divine essence to deprive a single man of his mercy;* *that the whole of those doctrines are contrary to the divine nature, which the Christian world does not seem to be aware of*.**11
…

It is easy then to conceive what Swedenborg means by *form* or *soul*, or by that *spirit* which has lungs, feet, and all the different parts of the human body. **The soul is *organized matter*, and the spirit is *living matter*.** Terms may be changed, but in fact nothing is to be found but matter, and a monster of hypocrisy, who, after the example of the soul, will reduce his God to matter also.
…

In clearer and more intelligible language, here will be the Deity and its generations according to Swedenborg. In the first place, a Sun, supposed spiritual, forms itself in the higher regions of the most ardent and luminous fire: the heat and light of this fire is God. **This God, in this state, as well as this Sun, is nothing more than matter in a state of expansion, agitation, fire, and incandescence. As long as matter remains in these burning regions, Swedenborg does not chuse to call it matter, but the *spiritual sun*.** Particles less subtle, or not so much heated, are carried to the extremity of these regions. There they cluster together, and the *natural sun* is formed. **They are not matter as yet; but the grosser particles of this second sun unite together at the extremity of its atmospheres; there they clump together, cool, thicken, and form heavy masses, and at length acquire the appellation of matter. These particles are no longer God, or the spiritual sun, because they are no longer in a state of fire. What then is this God of Swedenborg, if it is not fire, or all matter in a state of fire, ceasing only to be God, when it ceases to be burning and luminous?** And what abominable hypocrisy is this, where, under the cloak of thus changing the terms, the most downright materialism is preached?
…

He evidently is the declared enemy of the principal mysteries of revelation, particularly of the Trinity, and of the Redemption of mankind by the Son of God dying on a cross for the salvation of sinners; he nevertheless talks a great deal about revelation; he assumes a devout tone, and with his *allegorical* and *spiritual sense* would appear rather to reform than to destroy all; and his followers do not

perceive that with his allegorical sense he is only repeating the arguments of the Sophisters against revealed religion, in order to renew all the follies and impieties of the Persians, Magi, and Materialists.15

> 15. Some readers, I know, will be surprised to see me charge with materialism a man who talks so much of the spirit, soul, God, and religion. But I must request them to weigh the proofs adduced before they decide against me. **Had I been writing another sort of work I might have prolonged the discussion; but I think I have said sufficient to prove, that Swedenborg never acknowledged any other spirit but matter, or the elementary fire.**

…

But all this revolutionary concatenation as yet only characterizes *the dupes* of the Sect of Illuminizing Jerusalemites. The profound adepts had taken refuge in the dens of the *Rosicrucian masonry*. Those were their natural asylums, the greater part of their tenets perfectly coinciding with those of the ancient Rosicrucians. After the example of their Doctors, Swedenborg tells us, that his doctrines are all of the highest antiquity, and similar to those of the Egyptians, the Magi, and the Greeks; he even asserts them to be anterior to the deluge. His new Jerusalem has also its JEHOVA, its *lost word*, that has been at length revealed to Swedenborg. Should any person be tempted to seek it elsewhere, he must go in quest of it among those clans where Christianity and political laws are not known.19 **Swedenborg tells us that it might be found in the north of China and in Great Tartary, that is to say, among that species of men who have preserved the most of that Equality, Liberty, and Independence, which the *learned* Jacobins pretend to have been anterior to civil society, and which most certainly is incompatible with it.**

> 19. Swedenborg's expressions are, De hoc *verbo* vetusto quod ante verbum Israeliticum in Asia fuerat, referre meretur hoc novum; quod ibi adhuc reservatum sit, apud populos qui in Magna Tartaria habitant. Locutus sum cum spiritibus et angelis qui in mundo spirituali inde erant, qui dixerunt quod possideant verbum, et quod id ab antiquis temporibus possederint Quaerite de eo in Chîna et forte invenietis illud apud Tartaros. *Apocalipsis Revelata*, *Chap*. I. *No*. II.) **Is not this a continuation of that same plan, always holding out nations plunged in the most savage ignorance, and a perpetual prey to anarchy, Equality and Liberty, as the models to which we ought to look up?**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Saint-Martin,_Louis_Claude_de

SAINT-MARTIN, LOUIS CLAUDE DE (1743-1803), French philosopher, known as "le philosophe inconnu," the name under which his works were published, was born at Amboise of a poor but noble family, on the 18th of January 1743. **By his father's desire he tried first law and then the army as a profession.** While in garrison at Bordeaux he came under the influence of Martinez de Pasquales, usually called a Portuguese Jew (although later research has made it probable that he was a Spanish Catholic), **who taught a species of mysticism drawn from cabbalistic sources, and endeavoured to found thereon a secret cult with magical or theurgical rites.** In 1771 Saint-Martin left the army to become a preacher of mysticism. His conversational powers made him welcome in Parisian salons, but his zeal led him to England, where he made the acquaintance of William Law (q.v.), the English mystic, to Italy and to Switzerland, as well as to the chief towns of France.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n367/mode/2up?view=theater

As to the origin of Mr. de St. Martin, who has given them his name, we are ignorant; **but we defy any body to show a greater appearance of probity, or to assume a more devout and mellifluous mystical strain, than the hypocrisy of this spurious offspring of Curbicus the slave.**7 We have been acquainted with men whom he had seduced, with others that he wished to seduce, and all spoke of his great zeal and respect for Christ and his gospel, and for Governments.
…

We are, then, to form an idea of a *first being; one; universal; of himself; and the beginning of all principle*. **At first sight, this *first being* appears to be the *God* WHOLE, or the *Jehovah* of Pantheism: and such really is the *first being* of the Martinists.**8 But this God WHOLE comprehends a twofold God; one the principle of *good*, the other of *evil*. The former, though produced by the *first being, holds of itself the whole of its power, and all its worth*. It is infinitely good, and can *only do good*. It produces another being of its own substance, a first good like itself, but which soon becomes infinitely bad, and can do nothing but evil.9 **The *God* GOOD, though it holds all its power of itself, could neither create this *world, nor any corporeal being, without the means of the God* EVIL:**10 **the one *acts*, the other *reacts*, and from their conflicts the world is framed,** and bodies are formed of the *sparks*, as it were, emanating from this struggle between the *God or principle of* GOOD, and the God or principle of EVIL.

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/146/mode/2up?view=theater

Hegel is, of course, a very subtle thinker: while the spirit (*Geist*) is the original totality and is, as such, self-sufficient, in its desire to know itself it somehow allowed the totality to break up and unravel (according to the dialectical process). The breakup that was the origin of all separation is also, however, a sin, because, **as Hegel holds, sin is division (*Entzweiung*) into subjective and objective, hence the cause of reflection, reasoning, judgment.**1 **If now philosophy puts an end to *Entzweiung*, reason will be automatically abolished (reabsorbed in the *Geist*) in the reestablished oneness.**

> 1. **As Groos remarks (*Der deutsche Idealismus und das Christentum*), the monist Hegel cannot accept creation, preferring the idea of divine fall. Creation becomes evil, while sin becomes creative.** Note how close this reasoning is to the Gnostic concept of fall and ascent.

https://archive.org/details/dawntwilightofzo0000zaeh/page/212/mode/2up?view=theater

The 'Fall' in Zurvanism does not originate with man, it results from an imperfection, an unsureness of self, in the very heart of God.
…

Ahriman, the Devil, is the concretization of God's own imperfection, his failure of nerve; and if God is ever to become perfect, he must become fully identified with Ohrmazd who personifies his essential wisdom, goodness, and light. God *qua* the Infinite is the source of good and evil; but God *qua* creator of heaven and earth proceeds from the Infinite and is absolutely good. The Godhead is divided and can only be restored by the total destruction of evil, when, with the abolition of finite Time, the Infinite and the Good will for the first time be wholly one.

All this is to be found in the *Dēnkart*. It represent an assimilation by orthodoxy of certain Zurvanite ideas.
…

In the Zurvanism presented to us by the non-Zoroastrian sources, however, Ohrmazd is neither omnipotent nor omniscient: he is not even capable of looking after his own interests.
…

Again, **after creating heaven and earth, he can think of no way of illuminating them and has to be instructed on how to do this by a demon who is a renegade from Ahriman's camp.**9
…

This is a genuine, and a fundamental, difference between Zurvanism and orthodoxy, and a Christian convert from Zoroastrianism can thus taunt his inquisitors with these words: **'Should we, then, try to please Ahriman who, according to what you yourselves say, appears wise, knowing, and mighty from his works, just as Ohrmazd appears weak and stupid, for he could create nothing till he had learnt from the disciples of Ahriman.**'11

"**Man already existed at that time, *as no origin can be anterior to man*.** He is antecedent to any being in nature; he existed before the birth of the Genii; nevertheless he only came after them.11 **Man at that time existed without a body, and a much preferable state to that in which he is at present; for, inasmuch as his actual state is limited, and replete with disgust, so was his former unlimited and abounding in delights.**"12

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Kp9uaQTQ8h8C&lpg=PA232&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false

The "Aggañña Sutta" begins by portraying an ideal paradisial time, an Illud Tempus (to use Mircea Eliade's term) of natural, effortless existence. Ethereal, self-luminescent beings live in bliss and know no discrimination between polar opposites such as male and female, good and evil, rich and poor, ruler and subject. The earth itself is made of a delightful soft edible substance that looks like butter and is as sweet as honey. Gradually, however, because of karma remaining from a previous world cycle, this Golden Age is lost. **During a long period of decline that might, perhaps, best be described as a hardening (in the literal and metaphorical sense) of the world and the beings in it, greed, grasping, sex, theft, violence, and murder all come into the world.**

By the ill use he made of his Liberty, he erred from the centre at which the *God* GOOD had placed him; **he then acquired a body, and that was the period of his first fall.** But in his fall he preserved his

dignity; he is still of the same *essence* as the *God* GOOD. To convince ourselves of it, “we have only to reflect on the nature of thought; and we shall soon perceive, that it being simple, one, and unalterable, there can be but one sort of being capable of it; as nothing can be common between beings of different natures. We shall observe, that if man has in himself an idea of a Supreme Being, of an active and intelligent cause which executes his will, he must be of the same essence as that superior Being.”13

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/72/mode/2up?view=theater

> **“IT is the rooted conviction of the West,” writes C.G. Jung, “that God and the ego are worlds apart. In India, their identity was taken as self-evident** (for India, man’s mind is part of the world-creating mind). … The alchemists at least suspected man’s hidden godlikeness.”1

https://contra-gentes.blogspot.com/2008/03/christ-assault-and-triumph-over.html

> **The Continuity of Being viewed everything on a sliding scale of being which one could ascend upward to the divine or downward toward chaos.** One could be fully god and no part man, fully man but not divine, 2/3 god and 1/3 man,[4] etc. but never at two points on the scale at the same time.
> …
>
> **Christ was the most powerful denial of the Continuity of Being, and herein lies the reason for the natural man’s hatred of the Incarnation.** It is, at the same time, the impenetrable wall blocking man’s attempt at godhood as well as the rejection of the belief that man is of no higher importance than the animals.

…

But the Martinist denies the legitimacy of every Empire which may have originated in violence, force, or conquest; he denies all society whose foundation rests on conventions or compacts, though freely entered into. The former are acts of tyranny, which never can be legitimated; no antiquity, no *prescription*, can render them valid, ***prescription*** **being a mere invention of tyranny, as a palliative to injustice, in direct opposition to the laws of nature, which knows of no such invention.** “The edifice formed on a voluntary association is equally imaginary as if it were on a forced association.”18 To prove these two assertions, and particularly the latter, is the main object of our hero’s Sophistry. **He easily decides, that it is *impossible that any social compact could have been freely entered into by all the individuals of a state.*—He asks, whether it stands to reason that man should rely on those who had formed such a compact, or whether they ever had the power of forming it?** He examines the question, and concludes, “that a voluntary association is neither more just nor reasonable than it is practicable, since by such an act, man must invest other men with a right (his own liberty) which he cannot dispose of himself; and since he transfers a right which he has not, he makes a convention which is absolutely void, and which neither himself the chiefs, nor subjects can put into execution, since it can neither have been binding on the one nor the other.”19

…

Does not the Martinist try every means to persuade that same mob that there never existed a legitimate Prince, nor a lawful Government? Is he not perpetually recalling them to their *first origin*, “when the rights of one man over another were not known, because it was impossible that such rights could exist among *equal beings*?”20

…

He tells us, that there is a superiority to be acquired by one man over others, the superiority of learning, of means, of experience, which bring him nearer to his *original state*; and this is a superiority *of fact*, “and of necessity, because other men, having applied less and not having reaped the same advantages, will stand in need of him, from the poverty and dimness of their faculties.”22—The reader will naturally conclude, that according to this system nobody could exercise a lawful authority over his equals, but in right of his virtues, his experience, and his means of being useful. **And that is in reality the first artifice of the Sect, which immediately overthrows all idea of hereditary succession, which submits the rights of the Sovereign to the reveries of the factious and of the populace on the virtue, talents, and success of him who governs.** But let us follow their windings, and unfold their mysterious writings.—**“If every man,” say they, “attained to the same degree of his own power, then every man would be a King.”**

…

The reader may believe it to be a chimerical research to seek in the history of man for a society where he alone commands whose *powers* or faculties have been the best developed in the order of nature, where he alone obeys who has not acquired this *degree of power*, **but the Martinist will carry him back “to those happy days said to have had no existence but in the imagination of the poets, because, distant from them, and strangers to their sweets, we have been weak enough to believe, that because we did not enjoy them, they could not exist.”**24

…

The works of Voltaire himself had not the celebrity of Mr. de St. Martin's Apocalypse. The greater the obscurity the more it attracted the curiosity and piqued the vanity of his disciples; the adepts of the first class tutored and explained it to the young novices, and none were more eager than those of the fair sex.

https://www.bopsecrets.org/rexroth/essays/lamennais.htm

Louis Saint-Martin, *"le philosophe inconnu,"* had died in 1803, but Martinism was still extremely fashionable. Saint-Martin was the leading mystical writer of the Revolutionary period, and translated almost all of Jakob Boehme during the very years of the overturn of all things by fire. **To him the Revolution and Terror were a kind of sacramental showing forth of the Last Judgment. He was an apocalypticist if ever there was one. Furthermore, he believed in the withering away of the Church into a communal theocracy not unlike the Jesuit communes in Paraguay. The guiding principle of human association, action, and faith would be precisely Lamennais's *sensus communis*.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n769/mode/2up?view=theater

It is an incontestable fact to begin with, that Swedenborg's Illuminees, styled in France the Martinists, and also calling themselves the *beneficent Knights*, had their travelling adepts after the manner of the Illuminees of Weishaupt. It is also certain, that these pretended *Philaletes*, or lovers of truth, had formed a code of laws for themselves, had organized societies, and like Weishaupt, had intruded themselves into the Masonic Lodges, there to search after men who might be disposed to receive their mysteries, and adopt their new degrees. Among the latter was one called the *Knights of the Phoenix*. A Knight of this degree giving himself out for a Saxon, and a Baron of the Holy Roman Empire, possessed of the most pompous certificates from several Princes of Germany, came to exercise his Apostleship in France a very few years before the late Revolution.8 **After having spent some time in a *central* town, visited the Lodges, and observed the Brethren, he thought that he had discovered three worthy of being initiated in the higher sciences.** The *Venerable* or Master of the Lodge, in whose words we shall relate the story, was one of these worthies. "All things agreed on," said the Venerable, "we three waited on our Illuminee, ardent to be initiated in the new mysteries which he had promised.

"As he could not subject us to the ordinary trials, he dispensed with them as much as lay in his power. In the middle of his apartment he had prepared a chaffing-dish with a brasier full of fire; on his table were various symbols, and among others a Phoenix encompassed by a Serpent with its tail in its mouth, forming a circle. The explanation of the mysteries began by that of the brasier and other symbols. **'This brasier (said he) is here to teach you, that *fire is the principle of all things*; that it is the great agent of nature, and imparts action to bodies. That man receives from that agent life; with the power of thinking and of acting.'** Such was the tenor of the first lesson. Our Illuminee then proceeded to explain the other symbols.—'**This serpent forming a circle (says he) is the emblem of *the Eternity of the World*, which, like this serpent, has neither *beginning nor end*. The serpent, you may also know, has the property of annually renovating its skin; this will figure to you the revolutions of the universe, and of nature, which appears to weaken and even to perish at certain epochs, but which, in the immensity of ages, only grows old to become young again, and to prepare for new revolutions.** This Phoenix is a still more natural exposition of the succession and perpetuation of these phenomena. Mythology has represented this bird as re-vivifying from its own ashes, only to show how the universe is reproduced, and will continue to be so, from itself.'

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n787/mode/2up?view=theater

> The Germans particularly mark out one *Hülmer*, a famous Martinist of Prussia, and **a *George Föster*, who in his great zeal for the mysteries of Swedenborg would pass fifteen days in fasting and prayer to obtain the vision of a spirit, or to discover the *Philosopher's Stone*.** Since that time, however, they have both turned out to be most outrageous Jacobins.
> …
>
> All this tends to confirm the position, that between the adepts of Swedenborg, and the adepts of Weishaupt, there was but a slight shade of separation. **The supposed theosophy of the one differed but little from the atheism of the other.** Weishaupt goes more directly to the point; but the annihilation of all religion is the real object of both their mysteries. **It is even worthy of remark, that the modern *Spartacus* was on the eve of grounding all his mysteries on that very Theosophy where *fire is the principle*, and on the theology of the Persians, as did the Philaletes and Martinists.**—(*See Knights of the Phoenix, Original Writings, Vol. I. Let. 46.*)

https://kupdf.net/download/libido-dominandi-sexual-liberation-and-e-michael-jones_5a3312ebe2b6f5475426a07e_pdf

Weishaupt had been bom in Ingolstadt on February 6, 1748, and educated by the Jesuits at the Ingolstadt Gymnasium from the time he was seven until his fifteenth year. Under their tutelage Weishaupt developed a love-hate relationship with the Jesuits that would last him for the rest of his life. It would eventuate in a system of “Seelenanalyse” based on Jesuit spirituality, which would have far reaching consequences.

In 1773, Weishaupt was twenty-five years old and already a professor in the law faculty at the University of Ingolstadt. Eleven years later the Bavarian writer Johannes Pezzl would give one of the few character sketches extant of a man who made a career of analyzing the characters of others. **Pezzl described Weishaupt as a “pale, seeming hard and stoic man who was so wrapped up in himself that the only people who ever became close to him were a few fellow academics.”** With the suppression of the Jesuits, Weishaupt was able enhance his stature at the university by taking over the Chair of Canon Law and Practical Philosophy, a chair which had been in the hands of the Jesuits at Ingolstadt for over ninety years, and he was able to do this despite the fact that he was not a theologian.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n461/mode/2up?view=theater

He will select certain sentences from Cicero, Seneca, Aristides, and Isocrates; and, lest he should ever be taken unawares, he will learn those by heart which the legislator has carefully inserted in the code. Though it would be very easy to demonstrate from those very authors, that the ancient mysteries laid down no fixed principles on the important points of the *Providence of God*, and of the *origin and order of the universe*, **the Insinuator is nevertheless to quote those texts to prove that there exists a secret doctrine on these objects,** and above all a doctrine calculated to render life more agreeable, and pain more supportable; and to enlarge our ideas on the majesty of God.
…

Should the Novice be one of those men whom an attachment to the Gospel rendered more circumspect as to the snares laid for his belief, **the very choice of the books would suffice to show him, that the first object of the Insinuator was to persuade him, that it is not even necessary to be a Christian to acquire the perfection enjoined by the statutes. The *Morality* he is taught is that of *Epictetus*, *Seneca*, *Antoninus*, and *Plutarch*, all foreign to Christianity. He will also receive the works of modern Sophisters, such as *Wieland*, *Meiners*, and *Bassadows*, who by no means make perfection to consist in Christianity.** Under the soothing and mellifluous language of a moderate and specious Philosophy, he will be led to lubricity and impiety, traced by the sophisticated pen of Helvetius in his celebrated work *De L’Esprit*.14
…

At the commencement of each sitting, the President is always to read, and, after his fashion, comment on some chosen passages of **the BIBLE, or *Seneca*, of *Epictetus*, *Marcus Aurelius*, or *Confucius*.**4 The care he takes to give to all these works the same weight and authority, will be sufficient to make the pupils view the *Bible* in a similar light with the works of the Pagan Philosophers.
…

The *Minerval* must not finish his Academical course till he has shown how far such fears have lost their influence over him; he shall declare whether he is ready to submit to every torture, rather than give the least information concerning the Order; or even evade the temptation by poison or suicide. A dissertation upon *Cato*, for example, will be given him as a task, and his management of it will show whether he is ready to fall by his own hand for the preservation of the Brethren. **The *patet exitus*, or the *exit is free*, that is to say, that every man is free to leave this life at his pleasure, is one of those grand principles which must be advanced; it must be commented on and discussed by the young adept; and should any of those puerile ideas appear, which lead to believe in a God the avenger of suicide, he is not the man to be entrusted with the secret, and he shall be rejected.**18
…

"The first age of mankind is that of savage and uncouth nature. **A family is the whole society; hunger and thirst easily quenched, a shelter from the inclemency of the seasons, a woman, and, after fatigue, rest, are then the only wants.** *At that period men enjoyed the two most inestimable blessings* EQUALITY and LIBERTY; *they enjoyed them to their utmost extent; they would have forever enjoyed them, had they chosen to follow the track which Nature had traced for them*—**or had it not entered the plans of God and Nature first to show man *for what happiness he was destined*;**

happiness the more precious, as he had begun by tasting it; happiness so early lost, but instantaneously regretted and fruitlessly sought after, **until he should have learned how *to make proper use of his strength*, and how to conduct himself in his intercourse with the rest of mankind.** In his primitive state he was destitute of the conveniencies of life, but he was not on that account unhappy; not knowing them, he did not feel the want of them. Health was his ordinary state, **and physical pain was his only source of uneasiness**—*Oh happy mortals! who were not sufficiently enlightened to disturb the repose of your mind*, or to feel those great agents of our miseries the love of power and of distinctions, the propensity to sensuality, the thirst after the representative signs of all wealth, **those *truly original sins* with all their progeny, envy, avarice, intemperance, sickness, and all the tortures of imagination!**"

Thus we see this primitive and savage state, this first essay of Nature, already transformed (in the mouth of the Hierophant) into the happiest state that man ever knew: *Equality and Liberty* are the sovereign principles of happiness in that state. Should the reader be as much blinded as the proselyte, and not see whither all this is tending, let him proceed, and hear how man was deprived of this happiness by the institution of civil societies.

"An infortunate germ soon vivifies in the breast of man, and his primitive peace and felicity disappear."

"**As families multiplied, the means of subsistence began to fail; the *nomade* (or roaming) life ceased, and PROPERTY started into existence; men chose habitations; agriculture made them intermix.** Language became universal; living together, one man began to measure his strength with another, and the weaker were distinguished from the stronger. This undoubtedly created the idea of mutual defence, of one individual governing divers families reunited, and of thus defending their persons and their fields against the invasion of an enemy; *but hence* LIBERTY *was ruined in its foundation, and* EQUALITY *disappeared*."

"**Oppressed with wants unknown until that period, man perceived that his own powers were no longer sufficient.** To supply this defect, the weakest imprudently submitted to the strongest or to the wisest; not however to be ill-treated, but that he might be protected, conducted, and enlightened.—All submission, therefore, even of the most unpolished mortal, has an existence only in as much *as he wants* the person to whom he subjects himself, and on the express condition that that person can succour him. ***His power ceases when my weakness no longer exists, or when another acquires superiority. Kings are fathers; the paternal power is at an end when the child has acquired his strength. The father would offend his children if he pretended to prolong his rights beyond that term.*** *Every man having attained to years of discretion may govern himself, when a whole nation therefore is arrived at that period, there can exist no further plea for keeping it in wardship*."
…

Subtle as is the artifice in this description of human nature, and in that affectation of beholding on the one side nothing but tyrants and despots, and on the other only oppressed and trembling slaves in the state of society; whatever share Nature may have had in the institution of social order, or in reclaiming mankind from forests and wildernesses to live under laws and a common chief; the Hierophant nevertheless exultingly exclaims, "Such is the faithful and philosophic picture of despotism and of liberty, of our wishes and of our fears. **Despotism was engrafted on liberty, and from despotism shall liberty once more spring. The re-union of men in society is at once the cradle and the grave of despotism; it is also the grave and cradle of liberty. *We were once possessed of liberty, and we lost it but to find it again and never lose it more; to learn by the very privation of it the art of better enjoying it in future*."** Reader, observe these words; if they do not evidently point out the object of the Sect, if you do not perceive the wish of bringing mankind back to those times of the *nomade herds of savages*, and of men destitute of *property*, laws, or government, read and convince yourself by what follows: "*Nature drew men from the savage state and re-united them in civil societies; from these societies we proceed to further wishes, and to a wiser choice* (*aus den staaten tretten wir in neue klüger gewählte*). ***New associations present themselves to these wishes, and by their means we return to the state whence we came, not again to run the former course, but better to enjoy our new destiny***—let us explain this mystery."

"***Men then had passed from their peaceable state to the yoke of servitude; Eden, that terrestrial paradise, was lost to them. Subjects of sin and slavery, they were reduced to servitude and obliged to gain their bread by the sweat of their brow*.—In the number of these men some promised to protect, and thus became their chiefs**—at first they reigned over herds or clans—these were soon conquered, or united together in order to form a numerous people; hence arose nations and their chiefs kings of nations. **At the formation of states and nations, the world ceased to be a great family, to be a single empire; the great bond of nature was rent asunder."**

The impudence of such assertions must astonish the reader; **he will ask himself can there possibly exist beings thus belying evidence itself, and pretending to show the universe forming but one and the same family, and the grand bond of nature in those roaming and scattered herds,**

where the child can scarcely walk when he is separated from his father? How is it possible to represent mankind as divorcing from the great family, at the very period when they unite under the same chiefs and the same laws, for their mutual protection and safety? But, reader, suspend thy indignation. **Let us call up in evidence against the Sect those brigands and sophisticated murderers which it decorated with the high-sounding title of *Patriots*, and which it stimulated to bloodshed and methodized murder by the fanaticizing sounds of *people, nation, country*.** At the very time that they rend the air with such accents, with names so dear as they pretend, hear the maledictions which their mysteries heap upon every *people*, every *nation*, every *country*.

At that period, when men re-united and formed nations, "they ceased to acknowledge a common name—*Nationalism, or the love for a particular nation*, took place of the general love. With the division of the globe, and of its states, benevolence was restrained within certain limits, beyond which it could no longer trespass.—Then it became a merit to extend the bounds of states at the expence of the neighbouring ones. Then it became lawful to abuse, offend, and despise foreigners, to attain that end—*and this virtue was styled patriotism;* and he was styled *a patriot* who, just toward his countrymen, and unjust to others, was blind to the merits of strangers, and believed the very vices of his own country to be perfections.—In such a case, why not restrain that love within a narrower compass, to citizens living in the same town, or to the members of one family; or why even should not each person have concentrated his affections in himself. ***We really beheld Patriotism generating Localism, the confined spirit of families, and at length Egoism. Hence the origin of states and governments, and of civil society, has really proved to be the seeds of discord, and Patriotism has found its punishment in itself … Diminish, reject that love of the country, and mankind will once more learn to know and love each other as men*.** Partiality being cast aside, that union of hearts will once more appear and expand itself—on the contrary, **extend the bonds of *Patriotism*, and you will teach man that it is impossible to blame the closer contraction of love, to a single family, to a single person, in a word, to the *strictest Egoism*."**

But let us abridge these blasphemies. **The Hierophant, under pretence of his universal love, may vent his spleen against the distinctions of *Greeks* or *Romans*, of French or English, of Italian or Spanish, of *Pagan* or *Jew*, of *Christians* or *Mahometans*, which denote nations and their religions:** he may repeat, if he pleases, that amidst these different denominations that *of man is overlooked*; what will be the result of such declamation?—With our illuminizing doctor, in common with every class of the disorganizing Sophisters, is not this pretended universal love to be a cloak for the most odious hypocrisy? He only pretends to universal philanthropy, that he may dispense with loving his neighbour. **He detests the love of one's country, only because he detests the laws of nations; he cannot even brook the love of one's family (he has given us a fine specimen in the person of his sister), and he will substitute that universal love because he is no more attached to them than he is to the Chinese, the Tartar, or the Hottentot, which he neither has seen nor ever will see, and that all human nature may be equally indifferent to him.** He extends the bond that it may lose its elasticity and discontinue its action.—He calls himself citizen of the universe, that he may cease to be a citizen in his own country, a friend in society, or a fond father and dutiful child in his own family. **His love, he tells us, extends from pole to pole, that he may love nothing that is near him.** Such is the philanthropy of our Cosmopolites!
…

The oracles of Weishaupt shall there be confidently repeated by the Hierophant. He draws nigher and nigher to the grand object, to the means of making those misfortunes disappear, which originate, as he pretends, in the institution of laws and governments. "Oh nature!" he continues, "how great and incontestible are thy rights? It is from the womb of disaster and mutual destruction that the means of safety spring! Oppression disappears because it meets with abettors, and reason regains its rights because people wish to stifle it. He, at least, who wishes to mislead others, should seek to govern them by the advantages of instruction and science. **Kings themselves at length perceive, that there is little glory in reigning over ignorant herds**—Legislators begin to acquire wisdom, and they favour *property* and industry:—perverse motives propagate the sciences, and Kings protect them as agents of oppression. **Other men profit of them to investigate the origin of their rights.** They at length seize on that unknown mean of forwarding a revolution in the human mind, and of thus triumphing for ever over oppression. But the triumph would be of short duration, and man would fall back into his degraded state, had not Providence in those distant ages husbanded the means which it has transmitted down to us, of secretly meditating and at length operating the salvation of human kind.

"*Those means are, the secret schools of Philosophy. Those schools have been in all ages the archives of nature and* OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. These schools *shall one day retrieve the fall of human nature*, **AND PRINCES AND NATIONS SHALL DISAPPEAR FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH, *and that without any violence*. Human nature shall form one great family, and the earth shall become the habitation of the man of reason.**—Morality shall alone produce this great Revolution. *The day shall come when each father shall, like Abraham and the Patriarchs, become the Priest and absolute Sovereign of his*

family. REASON SHALL BE THE ONLY BOOK OF LAWS, *the sole Code of man*. THIS IS ONE OF OUR GRAND MYSTERIES. *Attend to the demonstration of it, and learn how it has been transmitted down to us*."
…

At the very time when you thought that you were seconding the views of the Sect against the Nobles, Priests, and Monarchs, only to reinstate the people in their rights of Equality and Liberty, the Sect was aiming its blows at you as the grand artificers of Despotism. At that very period your profession was already proscribed by the mysteries, as that which of all others most surely tended to retain the people in slavery; the Illuminizing Jacobin was teaching his adepts, that "**he who wishes to subject nations to his yoke, need but to create wants which he alone can satisfy.—Erect the *mercantile tribe* (die kaufmanschaft) into an hierarchical body; that is to say, confer on it some rank or some authority in the government, and you will have created the most formidable, the most *despotic* of all powers.** You will see it giving laws to the universe, and on it alone will rest the independence of one part of the world and the slavery of the other. For that man dictates the law who has it in his power to create or foresee, to stifle, weaken, or satisfy want. And who are better enabled to do this than merchants?"
…

"The morality which is to perform this miracle is not a morality of vain subtleties. **It is not that morality which, degrading man, renders him careless of the goods of this world, forbids him the enjoyment of the innocent pleasures of life, and inspires him with the hatred of his neighbour.** It must not be a morality favouring the interests only of its teachers, which prescribes persecution and intoleration, which militates against reason, which forbids the prudent use of the passions; whose virtues are no other than inaction, idleness, and the heaping of riches on the slothful.—***Above all, it must not be that morality which, adding to the miseries of the miserable, throws them into a state of pusillanimity and despair, by the threats of hell and the fear of devils*.**
…

In fine, the conclusions drawn from these impious and deriding explanations, and from many others of a similar nature, are contained in the following words:

"If therefore *the object* of the secret of Jesus, which has been preserved by the institution of the mysteries, and clearly demonstrated both by the conduct and the discourses of this divine master, *was to reinstate mankind in their original Equality and Liberty*, and to prepare the means; **how many things immediately appear clear and natural, which hitherto seemed to be contradictory and unintelligible!** *This explains in what sense Christ was the saviour and the liberator of the world. Now the doctrine of original sin, of the fall of man, and of his regeneration, can be understood. The state of pure nature, of fallen or corrupt nature, and the state of grace, will no longer be a problem.* ***Mankind, in quitting their state of original liberty, fell from the state of nature and lost their dignity.*** *In their civil society, under their governments, they no longer live in the state of pure nature, but in that of fallen and corrupt nature.* ***If the moderating of their passions and the diminution of their wants, reinstate them in their primitive dignity, that will really constitute their redemption and their state of grace.*** *It is to this point that morality, and the most perfect of all morality, that of Jesus, leads mankind. When at length this doctrine shall be generalized throughout the world, the reign of the good and of the elect shall be established*."9
…

BY the great importance which the Sect places in the last mysteries of Illuminism, and the many precautions it has taken to conceal them from the public view, **I am compelled to begin this chapter with candidly declaring, that every attempt to discover the original text of this part of the Code has been fruitless.** Such an avowal, however, should not disconcert the reader. Though the real text may be wanting, we have abundant matter to supply its place.
…

And this he will do in his higher mysteries; for who can expect to find them when he says, **"You know that the *Unity of God* was one of the secrets revealed in the mysteries of Eleusis; *as for that, there is no fear of any such thing being found in mine*."**6

After this, can the name of God be expected ever to be found in the mysteries of the *Illuminized Mage* for any other purpose than to be blasphemed? We see this same Weishaupt reserving all the Atheistical productions for this degree; he writes again to his incomparable man: "With our beginners **let us act prudently with respect to books on Religion and Polity.** *In my plan, I reserve them for the grand mysteries*. **At first we must put only books of history or of metaphysics into their hands.** Let Morality be our pursuit. ***Robinet, Mirabeau* (that is to say, the System of Nature written by Diderot, though attributed to Mirabeau), *the Social System, Natural Polity, the Philosophy of Nature*, and such works, are reserved for my higher degrees.—At present they must not even be mentioned to our adepts, and particularly *Helvetius on Man*.**"7 The reader

here sees a list of the most Anti-religious and the most Atheistical works,8 and that they are reserved for these last mysteries.
…

Did I wish to form a stupid atheist, this would be the work I should chuse to put into his hands. **As early as the third degree, in place of a God reigning as freely as he does powerfully over this universe, I find the universe transformed into a vast machine, in which every thing is held together or put in motion by I know not what fatality, decorated sometimes by the appellation of God, at other of nature. Again: did I wish to decorate with the name of providence a destiny *which cannot annihilate a single atom without depriving the stars of their support and involving the whole universe in ruin*, this would be the work I should recommend:** I would give it to the narrow-minded adept, who, in a world where every thing is said to be necessary, should still pretend to talk of virtue or vices, or who could comfort himself for all the harm which the wicked could do him, by learning that the wicked like the virtuous man only followed the course which nature had traced for him; and that they would both arrive at the same point as himself: In fine, I would put it into the hands of the imbecile, who would call *the art of making merry the art of being always happy* (*ars semper gaudendi*); the art of persuading oneself that one's misfortunes are incurable, or that they are all necessary.11
…

The Religion of Christ is represented as a medley of the reveries of Pythagoras, of Plato, and of Judaism. It is in vain for the Israelites to believe in the Unity of God, in the coming of a Messiah; it is in vain to assert that such was the faith of their forefathers, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, long before they entered Egypt or Babylon; it is in vain to prove, that the adoration of the golden Calf, or of the god Apis, was punished by the Almighty as a prevarication of their Religion: Nothing will serve the Sophister; **he will declare in his *corrected Code*, that the Religion of the Jews was but a modification of the reveries of the Egyptians, of Zoroaster, or of the Babylonians. To *correct* his adepts, he teaches them to cast aside the Creation as a chimera unknown to antiquity, and to reduce all Religion to two Systems—The one, that of matter co-eternal with God, a part of God, proceeding from God, cast forth and separated from God, in order to become the world—The other, matter co-eternal with God, without being God, but worked by God, for the formation of the universe.** On these foundations he builds a general history of all Religions, and makes all appear equally absurd.
…

Knigge then continues: **"After having thus shown to our people that we are the real Christians, we have only a *word to add* against Priests and Princes. I have made use of such precaution in the degrees of Epopt and of Regent, that I should not be afraid of conferring them on Kings or Popes, provided they had undergone the proper previous trials. In our last mysteries we have to acknowledge this *pious fraud*; to prove, upon the testimony of authors, the origin of all the religious impostures, and to expose the whole with their connections and dependencies."**15

> 15. Da nun die leute sehen dass wir die einzigen ächten wahren Christen sind, so därfen wir da gegen ein word mehr gegen pfaffen and fürsten reden; doch habe ich diess so gethan, dass ich päpste und könige nach vorhergegangener prüfung, in diese grade aufnehmen wollte. Indem höheren mysterien sollte man dann A diese *piam fraudem* entdecken, und B aus allen schrifften den ursprung aller religiözen lügen, und deren zusammenhang entwickeln—*Original Writings*, Vol. II. Let. I., from Philo to Cato.

…

The Germans have paid him homage, and, ignorant of his name, they have surnamed him *Biederman*, or Man of Honour; at least, it is under that denomination that his works are generally cited. All that I can say in addition to what the public is already in possession of respecting this gentleman is that nothing could have induced him to continue so disgusting a course, but a zeal for the public welfare, and a just opinion, that the only means of preventing the effects of the conspiracy of the Sect was to make their machinations public.—Having passed through all the degrees, he was at length admitted to the last mysteries.
…

The passage I am about to quote is looked upon as fundamental by all German authors; it is from Biederman, and occurs near the end of his *Critical History*:

"With respect to the two degrees of *Mage* and of *Man King*, there is no reception, that is to say, there are no ceremonies of initiation. Even the Elect are not permitted to transcribe these degrees, they only hear them read; and that is the reason why I do not publish them with this work."

"The first is that of *Mage*, also called Philosopher. It contains the fundamental principles of Spinosism. Here every thing is *material*; God and the world are but one and the same thing; all religions are *inconsistent*, chimerical, and the invention of ambitious men."16

> 16. Der erste, welcher *Magus* auch *Philosophus* heist, **enthält spinosistiche grund-sätze,** nach welchen alles materiell, Gotz und die welt einerley, alle religion unstatthaft, und eine erfindung hersüchtiger menschen ist.

"Divers principles," continues the author, "thrown out in the preceding degrees might in some measure point out the object the Sect had in view." Certainly nothing could be better grounded than such a surmise—Nature, so often united with God, represented active like God, following with the same immensity of power, the same wisdom as God, the course which it had traced; **a hundred such expressions in the mouth of the Hierophant evidently indicated, that the God of Weishaupt was that of Spinosa or Lucretius, no other than matter and the universe; in fine, the God of Atheism.**
…

"**The second degree of the grand mysteries," he says, "called the *Man King*, teaches that every inhabitant of the country or town, every father of a family, is sovereign, as men formerly were in the times of the patriarchal life, to which mankind is once more to be carried back; that, in consequence, all authority and all magistracy must be destroyed.—**I have read these two degrees, and have passed through all those of the Order."18

> 18. Der zweyte, *Rex* gennant, lehrt dass jeder Bauer, Bürger und hausvater ein *souverain* sey, wie in dem patriarchalischen leben, auf welches die leute wieder zurück-gebracht werden müsten, gewesen sey; und dass folglich alle **obrigkeit** wegfallen müsse—Diese beyden graden habe auch ich, der ich in dem orden alles durchgegangen bin, selbst gelesen. *Ibid*.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/sro/pc/pc05.htm

In the beginning of 1783, four professors of the Marianen Academy, founded by the widow of the late Elector, viz. Utschneider, Cossandey, Renner, and Grunberger, with two others, were summoned before the Court of Enquiry, and questioned, on their allegiance, respecting the Order of the Illuminati. They acknowledged that they belonged to it, and when more closely examined, they related several circumstances of its constitution and principles. Their declarations were immediately published, and were very unfavorable. **The Order was said to abjure Christianity, and to refuse admission into the higher degrees to all who adhered to any of the three confessions. Sensual pleasures were restored to the rank they held in the Epicurean philosophy. Self-murder was justified on Stoical principles. In the Lodges death was declared an eternal sleep; patriotism and loyalty were called narrow-minded prejudices, and incompatible with universal benevolence;** continual declamations were made on liberty and equality as the unalienable rights of man. The baneful influence of accumulated property was declared an insurmountable obstacle to the happiness of any nation whose chief laws were framed for its protection and increase. **Nothing was so frequently discoursed of as the propriety of employing, for a good purpose, the means which the wicked employed for evil purposes;** and it was taught, that the preponderancy of good in the ultimate result consecrated every mean employed; and that wisdom and virtue consisted in properly determining this balance. This appeared big with danger; because it appeared that nothing would be scrupled at, if we could make it appear that the Order could derive advantage from it, because the great object of the Order was held as superior to every consideration. They concluded by saying that the method of education made them all spies on each other and on all around them.
…

Nicholai, an eminent and learned bookseller in Berlin, and author of several works of reputation, took the name of Lucian, the great scoffer at all religion. Another was Mahomet, &c. **It is remarkable, that except Cato and Socrates, we have not a name of any ancient who was eminent as a teacher and practiser of virtue. On the contrary, they seem to have affected the characters of the free-thinkers and turbulent spirits of antiquity.**
…

“But this is a ticklish project, and requires the utmost circumspection. The squeamish will start at the sight of religious or political novelties; and they must be prepared for them. We must be particularly careful about the books which we recommend; **I shall confine them at first to moralists and reasoning historians. This will prepare for a patient reception, in the higher classes, of works of a bolder flight, such as Robinet’s *Systeme de la Nature*--*Politique Naturelle*--*Philosophie de la Nature*--*Systeme Social*--The writings of Mirabaud, &c. Helvetius is fit only for the strongest stomachs.** If any one has a copy already, neither praise nor find fault with him. Say nothing on such subjects to intrants, for we don't know how they will be received--folks are not yet prepared. Marius, an excellent man, must be dealt with. His stomach, which cannot yet digest such strong food, must acquire a better tone. **The allegory on which I am to found the mysteries of the Higher Orders is *the fire-worship of the Magi*. We must have some worship, and none is so apposite. LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE SHALL BE LIGHT. This is my motto, and is my fundamental principle. The degrees will be *Feurer Orden, Parsen Orden;* * all very practicable.**
…

Spartacus says, speaking of the priests degree, “One would almost imagine, that this degree, as I have managed it, is genuine Christianity, and that its end was to free the Jews from slavery. **I say, that Free**

Masonry is concealed Christianity. My explanation of the hieroglyphics, at least, proceeds on this supposition; and as I explain things, no man need be ashamed of being a Christian. Indeed I afterwards throw away this name, and substitute *Reason*.
...

Spartacus proceeds, “There shall be but three copies for all Germany. You can't imagine what respect and curiosity my priest-degree has raised; **and, which is wonderful, a famous Protestant divine, who is now of the Order, is persuaded that the religion contained in it is the true sense of Christianity. O MAN, MAN! TO WHAT MAY’ST THOU NOT BE PERSUADED.** Who would imagine that I was to be the founder of a new religion."
...

But the PANTHEISTICON of Toland resembles Weishaupt's Illumination in every thing but its rebellion and its villany. Toland's Socratic Lodge is an elegant pattern for Weishaupt, and his Triumph of Reason, his Philosophic Happiness, his God, or *Anima Mundi*, are all so like the harsh system of Spartacus, that I am convinced that he has copied them, stamping them with the roughness of his own character. But to go on; Spartacus says of the English:

“**Their poet Pope made his Essay on Man a system of pure naturalism, without knowing it, as Brother Chrysippus did with my Priest's Degree, and was equally astonished when this was pointed out to him. Chrysippus is religious, but not superstitious.** Brother Lucian (Nicholai, of whom I have already said so much) says, that the grave Zolikofer now allows that it would be a very proper thing to establish a Deistical Worship at Berlin. I am not afraid but things will go on very well. **But Philo, who was entrusted with framing the Priest's Degree, has destroyed it without any necessity; it would, forsooth, startle those who have a hankering for Religion. But I always told you that Philo is fanatical and prudish.** I gave him fine materials, and he has stuffed it full of ceremonies and child's play, and as Minos says, *c’est jouer la religion*. But all this may be corrected in the revision by the *Areopagitæ*.”
...

“Nothing would be more profitable to us than a right history of mankind. Despotism has robbed them of their liberty. How can the weak obtain protection? Only by union; but this is rare. Nothing can bring this about but hidden societies. Hidden schools of wisdom are the means which will one day free men from their bonds. These have in all ages been the archives of nature, and of the rights of men; and by them shall human nature be raised from her fallen state. **Princes and nations shall vanish from the earth. The human race will then become one family, and the world will be the dwelling of rational men.**

“Morality alone can do this. **The head of every family will be what Abraham was, the patriarch, the priest, and the unlettered lord of his family,** and Reason will be the code of laws to all mankind. THIS,” says Spartacus, “is our GREAT SECRET. True, there may be some disturbance; but by and by the unequal will become equal; and after the storm all will be calm. Can the unhappy consequences remain when the grounds of dissension are removed? Rouse yourselves therefore, O men! assert your rights; and then will Reason rule with unperceived sway; and ALL SHALL BE HAPPY.*

“Morality will perform all this; and morality is the fruit of Illumination; duties and rights are reciprocal. Where Octavius has no right, Cato owes him no duty. Illumination shews us our rights, and Morality follows; that Morality which teaches us to be *of age*, to be *out of wardenship*, to be full grown, **and to *walk without the leading-strings of priests and princes*.**

“Jesus of Nazareth, the Grand Master of our Order, appeared at a time when the world was in the utmost disorder, and among a people who for ages had groaned under the yoke of bondage. He taught them the lessons of reason. **To be more effective, he took in the aid of Religion--of opinions which were current--and, in *a very clever manner*, he combined his secret doctrines with the popular religion, and with the customs which lay to his hand.** In these he wrapped up his lessons--he taught by parables. Never did any prophet lead men so easily and so securely along the road of liberty. He concealed the precious meaning and consequences of his doctrines; but fully disclosed them to a chosen few. He speaks of a kingdom of the upright and faithful; his Father's kingdom, whose children we also are. **Let us only take Liberty and Equality as the great aim of his doctrines, and Morality as the way to attain it, and every thing in the New Testament will be comprehensible; and Jesus will appear as the Redeemer of slaves.** Man is fallen from the condition of Liberty and Equality, the STATE OF PURE NATURE. He is under subordination and civil bondage, arising from the vices of man. This is the FALL, and ORIGINAL SIN. The KINGDOM OF GRACE is that restoration which may be brought about by Illumination and a just Morality. This is the NEW BIRTH. When man lives under government, he is fallen, his worth is gone, and his nature tarnished. By subduing our passions, or limiting their cravings, we may recover a great deal of our original worth, and live in a state of grace. This is the redemption of men--this is accomplished by Morality; and when this is spread over the world, we have THE KINGDOM OF THE JUST.

“But alas! the task of self-formation was too hard for the subjects of the Roman empire, corrupted by every species of profligacy. A chosen few received the doctrines in secret, and they have been handed down to us (but frequently almost buried under rubbish of man's invention) by the Free Masons. These three conditions of human society are expressed by the rough, the split and the polished stone. **The rough stone, and the one that is split, express our condition under civil government; rough by every fretting inequality of condition; and split, since we are no longer one family; and are farther divided by differences of**

government, rank, property, and religion; but when reunited in one family, we are represented by the polished stone.
…

The publisher of the *Neueste Arbeitung* says that he has read them (so says Grollman.) He says, **“that in the first degree of MAGUS or PHILOSOPHUS, the doctrines are the same with those of Spinoza, where all is material, God and the world are the same thing, and all religion whatever is without foundation, and the contrivance of ambitious men.” The second degree, or REX, teaches, “that every peasant, citizen, and householder is a sovereign, as in the Patriarchal state, and that nations must be brought back to that state, by whatever means are conducible--peaceably, if it can be done; but, if not, then by force--for all subordination must vanish from the face of the earth.”**

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-31-02-0297 **[31 January 1800]**

Barruel’s own parts of the book are perfectly the ravings of a Bedlamite. but he quotes largely from Wishaupt whom he considers as the founder of what he calls the order. as you may not have had an opportunity of forming a judgment of this cry of ‘mad dog’ which has been raised against his doctrines, I will give you the idea I have formed from only an hour’s reading of Barruel’s quotations from him which you may be sure are not the most favourable. Wishaupt seems to be an enthusiastic Philanthropist. **he is among those (as you know the excellent Price and Priestly also are) who believe in the indefinite perfectibility of man. he thinks he may in time be rendered so perfect that he will be able to govern himself in every circumstance so as to injure none, to do all the good he can, to leave government no occasion to exercise their powers over him, & of course to render plitical government useless. this, you know is Godwin’s doctrine, and this is what Robinson, Barruel & Morse have called a conspiracy against all government. Wishaupt believes that to promote this perfection of the human character was the object of Jesus Christ.** that his intention was simply to reinstate natural religion, & by diffusing the light of his morality, to teach us to govern ourselves. his precepts are the love of god & love of our neighbor. and by teaching innocence of conduct, he expected to place men in their natural state of liberty & equality. he says, no one ever laid a surer foundation for liberty than our grand master, Jesus of Nazareth. **he believes the Freemasons were originally possessed of the true principles & object of Christianity, and have still preserved some of them by tradition, but much disfigured.** the means he proposes to effect this improvement of human nature are ‘to enlighten men, to correct their morals & inspire them with benevolence. secure of our success, sais he, we abstain from violent commotions. to have foreseen the happiness of posterity & to have prepared it by irreproacheable means, suffices for our felicity. this tranquility of our consciences is not troubled by the reproach of aiming at the ruin or overthrow of states or thrones.’ **as Wishaupt lived under the tyranny of a despot & priests, he knew that caution was necessary even in spreading information, and the principles of pure morality. he proposed therefore to lead the Freemasons to adopt this object, and to make the objects of their institution, the diffusion of1 science & virtue. he proposed to initiate new members into this body by gradations proportioned to his fears of the thunderbolts of tyranny.** this has given an air of mystery to his views, was the foundation of his banishment & the subversion of the Masonic order, and is the colour for the ravings against him of Robinson, Barruel & Morse, whose real fears are that the craft would be endangered by the spreading of information reason & natural morality among men.—this subject being new to me, I have imagined that if it be so to you also, you may recieve the same satisfaction in seeing, which I have had in forming the Analysis of it: **and I believe you will think with me that if Wishaupt had written here, where no secrecy is necessary in our endeavors to render men wise & virtuous, he would not have thought of any secret machinery for that purpose: as Godwin, if he had written in Germany, might probably also have thought secrecy & mystycism prudent.**

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2006.06.003?journalCode=rhei20

Godwin's controversial claim for earthly immortality in the first edition of *Political Justice* has been largely dismissed by scholars as a flaw in his philosophy or as absurd speculation which Godwin cannily omitted from the later editions of the text. In this paper, I will demonstrate, not only that such claims were not nearly as idiosyncratic or eccentric as they have been presented, but that they constitute an intrinsic part of his overall philosophy regarding perfectibility and human progress. Moreover, by examining the revisions made to *Political Justice* in the second and third editions, it will be possible to prove that the essence of his argument regarding material immortality was not as radically altered as is widely accepted.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n751/mode/2up?view=theater

The Parisian Sophisters openly attacked Jesus Christ and all Christianity. **The clubs, or rather schools, of the North of Germany, under pretence *of purifying the Protestant Religion*, and of restoring it to the principles of true Christianity, stripped it of all the mysteries of the Gospel, reduced it to that species of Deism which they decorate with the name of *Natural Religion*,** and thus hoped to lead their adepts to a negation of all Religion. **These new lawgivers did not absolutely proscribe revelation; but revelation was to be subjected to the judgment of their reason.**

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/89/mode/2up?view=theater

Fichte appears after the Kantians have completed their terroristic work of destruction, like Napoleon, who appears after the Convention has, with its own "critique of pure reason," torn down the entire past. Napoleon and Fichte represent the grand unrelenting I, for whom thought and deed are one, and the colossal structures both were able to construct testify to a colossal will. But both structures were soon to go to ruin because of the limitlessness of this will, and the *Wissenschaftslehre*, like the Empire, was soon to fall apart and vanish as quickly as it arose.

The Empire belongs only to history now, but the movement which the emperor brought into the world has not yet been stopped, and our present still lives off of it. It is the same with Fichtean philosophy. **It has entirely collapsed, but our minds are still inspired by the thoughts which spoke through Fichte, and the influence of his work is incalculable. Even if all of transcendental idealism was an error, there was still in Fichte's writings a proud independence, a love of freedom, a manly dignity,** which exerted its salutary influence especially on the youth.

> https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/05/hitlers-forgotten-library/302727/
>
> Here is where the Hitler Library is most useful. In the Fichte volumes given to him by Riefenstahl, I encountered a veritable blizzard of underlines, question marks, exclamation points, and marginal strikes that sweeps across a hundred printed pages of dense theological prose. **Where Fichte peeled away the spiritual trappings of the Holy Trinity, positing the Father as "a natural universal force," the Son as the "physical embodiment of this force," and the Holy Ghost as an expression of the "light of reason," Hitler not only underlined the entire passage but placed a thick vertical line in the margin, and added an exclamation point for good measure.**
> …
>
> Back in 1943 Walter Langer had concluded—correctly, to my mind—that in order to understand Hitler one had to understand his profound belief in divine powers. But Hitler believed that the mortal and the divine were one and the same: that the God he was seeking was in fact himself.

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/99/mode/2up?view=theater

Goethe's pantheism is thus very different from that of the heathen. To express myself concisely: Goethe was the Spinoza of poetry. All of Goethe's poems are suffused by the same spirit which stirs us in Spinoza's writings. There is no doubt that Goethe paid tribute without reservation to the doctrine of Spinoza. At the very least, he occupied himself with it during his entire lifetime; he candidly confesses as much at the beginning of his memoirs as well as in the recently published final volume. I do not remember any more where I read that once, **in irritation, Herder cried out at this preoccupation with Spinoza: "If only Goethe would pick up a book in Latin besides Spinoza!"**179

> 179. As reported by Goethe himself, in his *Journey to Italy*.

…

But it is in the small songs that Goethe's pantheism is documented most purely and charmingly. **Spinoza's doctrine has emerged from its mathematical chrysalis and flutters around us in Goethean song.** Thus the rage of our Orthodox and Pietists against Goethe's songs. They grope with their pious bear claws at this butterfly, which constantly eludes them.

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/157/mode/2up?view=theater

It is unfortunately true, we have to admit it, that it is far from rare that pantheism has made people into indifferentists. The thought goes: if everything is God, then it is all the same what you work with, whether with clouds or antique gems, with folk songs or ape-bones, with people or actors. But herein lies the error: Not everything is God, but God is everything. God does not manifest himself in equal degrees in all things, rather

he is manifested in different things in different degrees, and every thing is impelled from within to attain a higher degree of divinity. This is the great law of progress in nature. **The knowledge of this law, which was described most profoundly by the Saint-Simonists, turns pantheism into a worldview which does not at all lead to indifferentism, but rather to the most self-sacrificing desire for progress. No, God is not manifested to the same degree in all things, as Wolfgang Goethe believed, thus becoming an indifferentist;** and instead of occupying himself with the highest interests of humanity, he chose rather artistic playthings, anatomy, the theory of colors, botany, and observations of clouds.

> https://archive.org/details/scientificorigin0000gasm/page/10/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Haeckel himself openly thought of evolution and science as the domain of religion and his work therefore assumed a character which was wholly foreign to the spirit of Darwin. Darwin's empiricism, his caution in the face of speculative theories, **his general mechanical conception of the workings of nature,** were all in striking contrast to Haeckel's biology. For Haeckel, evolution did not only mean the process of change from one species to the next. **Evolution for him was a cosmic force, a manifestation of the creative energy of nature. In his science-religion, therefore, he sought constantly for meaning, beauty, and regularity as inherent characteristics of nature and as signs of its divinity. For him poetry and science were one. His books and articles were interlaced with quotations from Goethe and as he himself conceded, his pan-psychism was in large measure derived from Goethe.**

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/109/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza's doctrine and *Naturphilosophie* as worked out by Schelling in his better period are essentially one and the same. The Germans, after rejecting Locke's materialism and finding Leibniz's idealism to be unfruitful after taking it to its extreme, arrived finally at the third son of Descartes, Spinoza. Philosophy again completed a great circle, and one can say that it is the same one described two thousand years ago in Greece.194 But a more exact comparison of these two circular revolutions reveals one essential difference. The Greeks had skeptics just as bold as ours; the Eleatics denied the reality of the outside world as definitively as our new transcendental idealists.195 Plato, just as much as Mr. Schelling, rediscovered the intellectual world in the world of appearance. **But we have an advantage over the Greeks, as well as an advantage over the Cartesian school, namely:**

We began our philosophical circle with an examination of the sources of human knowledge, with the *Critique of Pure Reason* of our Immanuel Kant.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/310/mode/2up?view=theater

It is not too much to say that Russia thinkers turned to German idealistic philosophy, not for keys to a better critical understanding of the natural world, but rather – to cite the title of a typical occult handbook of the age – for "the key to understanding the divine secrets." The key appeared as the second volume of "selected readings for lovers of true philosophy,"15 and the most influential philosophic circle to develop late in the reign of Alexander called itself Lovers of Wisdom (*liubomudrye*). Thus, philosophy, as the term came to be understood in the Nicholaevan era, was closer to the occult idea of "divine wisdom" than to the understanding of philosophy as rational and analytical investigation in the manner of Descartes, Hume, or Kant.

The lovers of wisdom circle appears in many ways as a continuation of the last great system of higher order Masonry, that of the lodge Astrea, which defined truth as "that original cause which gives movement to the whole of the universe." Those seeking admission to the lodge were forced to wait in dark room in the presence of a Bible and a skull, which bore the ominous inscription *memento mori*: Remember Death.16 The lovers of wisdom also met in secret, with an inscribed skull greeting them at the door. The language was still Latin, **but the message was different: "Dare to Know" (*Sapere Aude*),**17 **and the book on the table was not the Bible but Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*. As one of the members explained: "Christian doctrine seemed to us to be good only for the popular masses, but unacceptable for us, lovers of wisdom."**18
…

Schelling appears as a kind of absentee grand master of a new higher order. The most popular university lecturer of the period, Professor Pavlov, was master of initiations, greeting students at the door of his lecture hall with his famous question: "You want to know about nature, but what is nature and what is knowledge?"20
…

A philosophic popularizer of the time independently described the creation of a Russian philosophy as "the problem of our time," professing to find three ascending levels of meaning within the maxim "Know thyself." The first, or "Delphic," was knowledge of oneself as an individual person; the second, or "Solonic" level was knowledge of self as "social-national" being; the third and highest – the Socratic level – was knowledge of oneself as a form of divinity.22
…

Schelling's philosophy inspired this and other fanciful ideas. As Odoevsky wrote:

> **You cannot imagine what an impact it produced in its time, what a jolt it gave to people slumbering before the monotonous humming of Locke's rhapsody.** … He opened to man an unknown part of the world, about which there had previously existed only legendary tales: *his soul*. Like Christopher Columbus, he did not find what he sought and raised unfulfilled hopes, but he gave new direction to the activity of man. All threw themselves into this miraculous, luxuriant land.26

…

Under Schelling's influence the greatest biologist of Nicholaevan Russia, Karl von Baer, developed an idealistic theory of purposeful evolution which was to influence subsequent radical thinkers like Kropotkin and Mikhailovsky. More important, however, was the intoxicating effect Schelling's ideas produced on large numbers of thinkers who never acquired more than a confused third-hand knowledge of them. Frustration was drowned in philosophy as men saw themselves promised cosmic redemption, without being tied down to any predetermined schem of how it would take place. **Schelling encouraged men to think that profound changes might be forthcoming from the process of becoming, which was the essence of life itself.** The belief grew that the previous generation's search for hidden keys to the universe, far from being chimerical, was merely immature and unrefined. The search for all-encompassing answers continued; **and Schelling stands as a transitional figure from the crude occultism of Boehme and Eckartshausen to the ideological system of Hegel, Saint-Simon, and Marx.**

---

http://ironink.org/2021/03/diversitys-dirty-little-secret-exposed/

"When considering the broad theme of Oneness, it is important to note that this is not about imposed cultural sameness for the crushing of expression or creativity. Tolerance and openness exist for cultural, ethnic, social, personal, sexual, and religious identities. ***Diversity is encouraged, so long as divisive exclusivity – 'separateness' or 'two-ness' – does not threaten the fabric of anticipated harmony. In fact, distinctive cultural sensitivities and personal tastes are respected so long as they remain within the mosaic.****"—Carl Teichrib, Game of Gods; The Temple of Man in the Age of Re-Enchantment, p. 13*

Understand what is being said here. The Monistic Uniformity that we are headed for will allow the appearance of diversity but only if that diversity contributes to the major theme of Monism. You can be sexually perverted in any direction you like (hence Diversity) but you will not be allowed to say anything that insists that such a thing as sexual perversion exists because that would be to interject a Separateness or Two-ness of right and wrong into the Monism that can not be questioned. **So, people will be allowed diversity in perversion and abnormality but they will not be allowed any diversity that suggests that there is a standard by which all diversity must comply. In such a way the opponents of Two-ism can claim diversity while all the while pursuing Monism (Oneism).**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_V/Hippolytus/The_Refutation_of_All_Heresies/Book_IX/Part_6

In this manner Heraclitus assigns to the visible an equality of position and honour with the invisible, as if what was visible and what was invisible were confessedly some one thing. For he says, "An obscure harmony is preferable to an obvious one;" and, "Whatsoever things are objects of vision, hearing, *and* intelligence," that is, of the (corporeal) organs,—"these," he says, "I pre-eminently honour," not (on this occasion, though previously), having pre-eminently honoured invisible things. **Therefore neither darkness, nor light, nor evil, nor good, Heraclitus affirms, is different, but one and the same thing. At all events, he censures Hesiod[1] because he knew *not* day and night.** For day, he says, and night are one, expressing himself somehow thus: "The teacher, however, of a vast amount of information is Hesiod, and people suppose this *poet* to be possessed of an exceedingly large store of knowledge, and *yet* he did not know (the nature of) day and night, for they are one." **As regards both what is good and what is bad, (they are, according to Heraclitus, likewise) one.** "Physicians, undoubtedly," says Heraclitus, "when they make incisions and cauterize, *though* in every respect they wickedly torture the sick, complain that they do not receive fitting remuneration from their patients, notwithstanding that they perform these salutary operations upon diseases."
…

And he says that what is filthy and what is pure are one and the same, and what is drinkable and unfit for drink are one and the same. "Sea," he says, "is water very pure and very foul, drinkable to fishes no doubt, and salutary *for them*, but not fit to be used as drink by men, and (for them) pernicious." And, confessedly, he asserts that what is immortal is mortal,[4]
and that what is mortal is immortal, in the following expressions: "Immortals are mortal, *and* mortals are immortal, *that is*, when the one derive life from death, and the other death from life." And he affirms also that there is a resurrection of this palpable flesh in which we have been born; and he knows God to be the cause of this resurrection, expressing himself in this manner: "Those that are here[5] *will God enable* to arise and become guardians of quick and dead." **And he likewise affirms that a judgment of the world and all things in it takes place by fire,** expressing himself thus: "Now, thunder pilots all things," that is, directs *them*, meaning by the thunder everlasting fire. **But he also asserts that this**

fire is endued with intelligence, and a cause of the management of the Universe, and he denominates it craving and satiety. Now craving is, according to him, the arrangement *of the world*, whereas satiety its destruction. "For," says he, "the fire, coming upon *the earth*, will judge and seize all things."

https://trisagionseraph.tripod.com/pagan.html#'Oneness'

The third century modalist Sabellius proclaimed **a changing god for changing times,** who was the Father in the Old Testament period, walked on earth as the Son in the incarnation, then morphed into the Holy Spirit for the church age. **The paradigm of a god with multiple 'manifestations' is the oldest pagan idea in the book. The gods of the pagans were morphing gods, which is why Ovid's digest of mythology is called 'Metamorphoses.'**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10448a.htm

The Monarchians properly so-called (Modalists) exaggerated the oneness of the Father and the Son so as to make them but one Person; **thus the distinctions in the Holy Trinity are energies or modes, not Persons:** God the Father appears on earth as Son; hence it seemed to their opponents that Monarchians made the Father suffer and die. In the West they were called Patripassians, **whereas in the East they are usually called Sabellians.**
...

It is impossible to arrive at the philosophical views of Sabellius. **Hagemann thought that he started from the Stoic system as surely as his adversaries did from the Platonic.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Origen/Origen_Against_Celsus/Book_I/Chapter_XXI

Would, indeed, that not only Epicurus, but **Aristotle, whose sentiments regarding providence are not so impious** (as those of the former), and the Stoics, who assert that God is a body, had heard such a doctrine! Then the world would not have been filled with opinions **which either disallow or enfeeble the action of providence, or introduce a corrupt corporeal principle, according to which the god of the Stoics is a body, with respect to whom they are not afraid to say that he is capable of change, and may be altered and transformed in all his parts, and, generally, that he is capable of corruption, if there be any one to corrupt him, but that he has the good fortune to escape corruption, because there is none to corrupt.** Whereas the doctrine of the Jews and Christians, which preserves the immutability and unalterableness of the divine nature, is stigmatized as impious, because it does not partake of the profanity of those whose notions of God are marked by impiety, but because it says in the supplication addressed to the Divinity, "Thou art the same,"[1] it being, moreover, an article of faith that God has said, "I change not."[2]

https://archive.org/details/influenceofgreek00hatc/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater

1. **The chief philosophical expression of Monism was Stoicism.** The Stoics followed the Ionians in believing that the world consists of a single substance. They followed Heraclitus in believing that the movements and modifications of that substance are due neither to a blind impulse from within nor to an arbitrary impact from without. It moved, he had thought, with a kind of rhythmic motion, a fire that was kindling and being quenched with regulated limits of degree and time.1 The substance is one, but immanent and inherent in it is a force that acts with intelligence. The antithesis between the two was expressed by the Stoics in various forms. It was sometimes the bare and neutral contrast of the Active and the Passive. **For the Passive was sometimes substituted Matter, a term which, signifying, as it originally does, the timber which a carpenter uses for the purposes of his craft, properly belongs to another order of ideas;** and for the Active was frequently substituted the term *Logos*, which, signifying as it does, on the one hand, partly thought and partly will, and, on the other hand, also the expression of thought in a sentence and the expression of will in a law, has no single equivalent in modern language. **But the majority of Stoics used neither the colourless term the Active, nor the impersonal term the *Logos*. The *Logos* was vested with personality: the antithesis was between matter and God.** This latter term was used to cover a wide range of conceptions. The two terms of the antithesis being regarded as expressing modes of a single substance, separable in thought and name but not in reality, **there was a natural drift of some minds towards regarding God as a mode of matter, and of others towards regarding matter as a mode of God. The former conceived of Him as the *natura naturata*:** "Jupiter est quodcunque vides quodcunque moveris."1

1. Lucan, *Phars*. 9.579.

The latter conceived of Him as the *natura naturans*. This became the governing conception. He is the sum of an infinite number of rational forces which are continually striving to express themselves through the matter with which they are in union. He is through them and in them working to realize an end. The teleological idea controls the whole conception. He is always moving with purpose and system, and always thereby producing the world. **The products are all divine, but not all equally divine. In His purest essence, He is the highest form of mind in union with the most attenuated form of matter. In the lowest form of His essence, He is the cohesive force which holds together the atoms of a stone. Between these two poles are infinite gradations of being.** Nearest of all to the purest essence of God is the human soul. It is in an especial sense His offspring: it is described by the metaphors of an emanation or outflow from Him, of a sapling which is separate from and yet continues the life of its parent tree, of a colony in which some members of the mother state have settled.1

If all this were expressed in modern terms, and by the help of later conceptions, it would probably be most suitably gathered into the proposition that the world is the self-evolution of God.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07192a.htm

"The rational alone is real" was a favourite motto of Hegel. It means that all reality is capable of being expressed in rational categories. **This is a Gnosticism more detrimental to Christian conceptions than the Agnosticism of Huxley and Spencer. It implies that God, being a reality, must be capable of comprehension by the finite mind. It implies, moreover, as Hegel himself admits, that God *is* only in so far as He is conceived under the category of Becoming; God is a process.** It is by this doctrine, which is at once so out of place in a great system of metaphysics and so utterly repugnant to the Christian mind, that Hegel's philosophy is to be judged. **Hegel attempted the impossible. A complete synthesis of reality in terms of reason is possible only to an infinite mind.** Man, whose mental power is finite, must be content with a partially complete synthesis of reality and learn in his failure to attain completeness he should learn that God, Who evades his rational synthesis and defies the limitations of his categories, is the object of faith as well as of knowledge.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm

Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom—he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, “To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘*love* of knowing’ and be actual knowledge—that is what I have set before me” (Miller, 3; PC, 3). **By the end of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom.**

Hegel’s claim to have attained wisdom is completely contrary to the original Greek conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom, that is, the ongoing pursuit rather than the final possession of wisdom. His claim is, however, fully consistent with the ambitions of the Hermetic tradition, a current of thought that derives its name from the so-called *Hermetica* (or *Corpus Hermeticum*), a collection of Greek and Latin treatises and dialogues written in the first or second centuries A.D. and probably containing ideas that are far older.

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater

Hegelianism is a kind of modern, up-dated hermetism, and so the epistemological ideas of its adepts come to fruition in the perfect *noesis* embodied in the perfect community. Its difference from earlier, similar operations is that they spoke of a community of faithful ascending to spiritual purity, whereas Hegelian and post-Hegelian speculation replaces the *sacred* with the *socio-political* dimension. One may argue, naturally, with the Saint-Simonians, the Marxists, Ernst Bloch, and numerous others that **all spiritual communities in the past chose images and concepts of a “vertical” ascent from fear of persecution in case their “horizontal” preoccupations (revolutionary ideals) become too obvious.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA856#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 21. In a letter to John Stuart Mill on December 1, 1829, Gustave d’Eichthal, who was a close friend of Olinde Rodrigues, described the new religious orientation of Saint-Simon’s last period: **“Saint-Simon, after having in his early writings tried to reorganize society in the name of Science, after having later renewed the same attempt in the name of Industry, realized that he has mistaken the *means* for the *end*; that it is in the name of their *sympathies* that one must speak to men, and above all, in the name of their *religious sympathies*, which should summarize all others.”** J.S. Mill, *Correspondance inédite avec Gustave d’Eichthal* (Paris, 1898), pp. 75-78. D’Eichthal had written in his letter of November 23, 1829, that for two

years none of the disciples was able to grasp the full meaning of the *Nouveau Christianisme*. *Correspondance*, p. 57n. **By December 1, 1829, the key had been discovered and the religion of Saint-Simon had been clothed in the language of romanticized Spinozism: "The religious doctrine of Saint-Simon has this *unitary* character which should gather about it all the men of the future. It puts neither *spirit* above *matter*, nor *matter* above *spirit*.** It considers them as intimately united one with another, as being the condition one of the other, as being the two modes in which *being* is manifest, *living* being, *sympathetic* being." *Correspondance*, p. 74.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/20433/pg20433-images.html **[March 1869]**

To a boy whose notions of his duty to woman had been formed, not on Horace and Juvenal, but on Spenser and Shakespeare,—as I trust they will be some day in every public school,—Mr. John Stuart Mill's new book would seem little more than a text-book of truths which had been familiar and natural to him ever since he first stood by his mother's knee.

I say this not in depreciation of Mr. Mill's book. I mean it for the very highest praise. M. Agassiz says somewhere that every great scientific truth must go through three stages of public opinion. Men will say of it, first, that it is not true; next, that it is contrary to religion; and lastly, that every one knew it already. The last assertion of the three is often more than half true. In many cases every one ought to have known the truth already, if they had but used their common sense. **The great antiquity of the earth is a case in point. Forty years ago it was still untrue; five-and-twenty years ago it was still contrary to religion.** Now every child who uses his common sense can see, from looking at the rocks and stones about him, that the earth is many thousand, it may be many hundreds of thousands of years old; and there is no difficulty now in making him convince himself, by his own eyes and his own reason, of the most prodigious facts of the glacial epoch.

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/55/mode/2up?view=theater

There is truly no more talk of leaving the sword in the hands of Caesar and certainly none of leaving the purse in the hands of his Jews. Serving the prince has lost its privileged honor, and industry has been relieved of its former ignominy. The task now is to become healthy, since our limbs still feel ever so weak; the holy vampires of the Middle Ages sucked out so much of our lifeblood. **Next, we will need to slaughter great sacrifices as atonements to Matter so that it will forgive us the old insults. We might even be wise to set up festivals to do still more extraordinary honor to Matter.** For Christianity, being incapable of annihilating matter, denounced it everywhere, belittled its most noble enjoyments, and forced the senses to be hypocrites, creating lies and sins. **We must dress our women in new blouses and thoughts, and we have to fumigate all of our feelings, as if we had survived the plague.**

The most immediate purpose of all of our new institutions is thus to rehabilitate matter, to reinstate it in its dignity, to recognize its moral worth and give it religious consecration, to reconcile it with spirit. *Purusa* must be remarried to *Prakriti*.93 Their violent separation, so profoundly conveyed in the Indian myth, caused the great rending of the world, evil.

Do you know what in the world is evil? The spiritualists have always accused us of obscuring the difference between good and evil from our perspective of pantheism. But, on the one hand, what they call evil is only a delusion based upon their view of the world; on the other hand, real evil results from the world-order based on this view. From their point of view, Matter is in and of itself evil—this point of view itself is slander, is horrible blasphemy. **Indeed, Matter only becomes evil when it is forced to conspire in secret against the usurpations of spirit, when spirit has denounced it, and it prostitutes itself out of self-hatred, or wreaks its vengeance on spirit with desperate hatred. Evil is thus itself a result of the spiritual world order.**

God is identical with the world. He manifests himself in plants, which lead cosmic-magnetic lives devoid of consciousness. He manifests himself in animals, which in their sensuous dream-lives have more or less vague feelings of existence. But most magnificently, he manifests himself in the human being, who feels and thinks at the same time, who knows how to differentiate himself as an individual from objective nature, and who, in his reason, already possesses the same ideas which exhibit themselves to him in the world of appearance. **In the human being, divinity comes to self-consciousness,** and such self-consciousness again itself reveals the divine by means of the human being. But this revelation does not occur in and through the individual human being, but rather in and through the entirety of humanity, so that each person only grasps and represents a part of the God-World-Universe, but all of humanity together will grasp and represent the entire God-World-Universe in idea and in reality. **Every people, perhaps, has the mission to know and make known a particular part of that God-World-Universe, to comprehend a series of appearances and to bring a series of ideas to appearance, and to hand down these results to the peoples who come after, who have their own, similar missions. God is thus the true hero of world-history; it is his constant act of thinking, his constant action, his word, his deed. And one can justly say of humanity in its entirety, it is an incarnation of God!**94

94. **These views resemble closely those of Hegel.** Heine had the opportunity to hear Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history in Berlin in 1822-1823.

It is a mistaken opinion that this religion, pantheism, leads people to indifferentism. Quite the contrary, the consciousness of one's own divinity will inspire one to express it, and thus only now will truly great deeds of true heroism begin to glorify this earth.

The political revolution based on the principles of French materialism will find no opponents among the pantheists, but allies—**allies whose convictions are taken from a deeper source, from a religious synthesis.** We support the wellbeing of matter, the material happiness of peoples, not because we are contemptuous of the spirit, like the materialists, but because we know that the divinity of the human being is also revealed in his bodily appearance, that misery destroys or demeans the body, the image of God, and that the spirit is destroyed thereby as well. **The great motto of the revolution expressed by Saint-Just: "Bread is the right of the people" reads for us "Bread is the divine right of the human being."**95 **We do not fight for the human rights of the people, but for the divine rights of the human.** In this and several other things, we differ from the men of the revolution. We want to be neither *sans-culottes*, nor frugal citizens, nor parsimonious presidents; we will found a democracy of gods, equally glorious, equally holy, equally joyous. **You demand simple clothes, abstemious morals, and spiceless enjoyments; we, on the other hand, demand nectar and ambrosia, kingly robes, costly fragrances, sensuality and splendor, the dances of laughing nymphs, music, and comedies.**—Please do not complain, o virtuous republicans! We respond to censorious reproaches like one of Shakespeare's fools: "Do you think that because you are so virtuous there shall be no more tasty cakes and sweet champagne on this earth?"96

The Saint-Simonians have understood, and desired, something like this. But they were on unfavorable ground, and the materialism around them beat them down, at least for a time. In Germany, they were better appreciated. For Germany has the most fertile soil for pantheism; it is the religion of our greatest thinkers, our best artists. **Deism, as I will discuss later, has long since collapsed there in its theoretical form. It is still present only in the thoughtless multitude, without rational justification, like so much else. No one says it, but everybody knows it; pantheism is the open secret of Germany.** Indeed, we have outgrown deism. **We are free and want no thundering tyrants.** We are of age and need no fatherly care. We are also not the concoctions of a great mechanic. **Deism is a religion for servants, for children, for Genevans, for watch-makers.**

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/187/mode/2up?view=theater

Nothing is more ridiculous than complaining about the property rights of ideas. Certainly, Hegel used many of Schelling's ideas in his philosophy; but Mr. Schelling never knew what to do with these ideas anyway. He always just philosophized but never could produce a philosophy. In addition, **it can well be maintained that Mr. Schelling borrowed more from Spinoza than Hegel from him. If, some day, Spinoza is freed of his rigid, old Cartesian, mathematical form and made more accessible to the general public, then perhaps it will be clear that he more than any other has the right to complain about the theft of ideas. All of our contemporary philosophers, perhaps often without knowing it, see through the lenses ground by Baruch Spinoza.**

https://www.academia.edu/17053034/_Nothing_Comes_from_Nothing_Judaism_the_Orient_and_Kabbalah_in_Hegel_s_Reception_of_Spinoza

Second, an enormous work, *Kabbala Denudata*, produced by a team that was led by Christian von Rosenroth and included Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont, made available for the first time in Latin translation a major corpus of Kabbalistic texts, including works from the *kitvei ha-Ari* (the writings of Isaac Luria) which would not be printed in Hebrew until the late eighteenth century.5 The first volume appeared in 1677, which was also the publication year of Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma*. Christian interest in Kabbalah was not new, but it had previously been confined to the small number of those who could read the original texts. **The discovery that Jews had their own speculative tradition, with ancient roots but still active, was as monumental in the Christian perception of Judaism as the discovery in the thirteenth century that Judaism was more Talmudic than biblical.**
…

In one volume, Christian von Rosenroth published a nightmare reported by Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist who was a friend of van Helmont. In the dream, an eagle flew from the Orient and through a window into More's room. The room turned into a garden and the eagle, which seemed to be made of only bones and no muscles, began to speak, turning into a boy. **More asked the boy, who said he came from Zion, whether he believed in one god, and the boy answered, "No."** Thereupon, More began to kick the boy, who turned into a bee, threatening to sting More's shins. Awaking abruptly and attempting to discern the cause of his nightmare, More could conclude only that it was the result of reading the Kabbalistic texts that had been made available for the first time in an earlier volume of *Kabbala Denudata*. To be sure, a few ancient and sublime doctrines were to be found therein, symbolized by the eagle's bones. In general, however, Kabbalistic views were not only false but

dangerous, and they even undermined the monotheism on which Judaism and Christianity supposedly agreed.10

> 10. What exactly "creation from nothing" could mean and whether it is essential to Jewish or Christian orthodoxy are of course far from clear. In his *Guide of the Perplexed*, Maimonides had argued that it was essential and, indeed, philosophically legitimate. **But many of his philosophical commentators, strongly influenced by Averroes, thought that Maimonides's esoteric doctrine affirmed a continual creation of the cosmos through ongoing emanation, not a voluntary act creating the world de novo. If Jewish philosophers spoke of "creation from nothing," they often meant it in a very special sense.** As we shall see, kabbalists added to this the idea that no emanation could occur unless God first created nothing (the sefirah known as *keter*, or "crown") out of Godself, whence being (the sefirah known as *hokhmah*, or "wisdom") could now come. **They, too, could speak of creation from nothing, but in an esoteric sense.**

To explain what was so horrifying about the Kabbalah rendered accessible by Rosenroth and his collaborators, More summarized Kabbalistic doctrine in sixteen theses, under the title *Philosophical Fundamentals, or Kabbalah of the Eagle-Boy-Bee*.11 The first was "nothing can be created from nothing."12 **At the heart of the corrupt character of Kabbalah, thought More, lay this denial of the ancient teaching of creation from nothing.** Since it was impossible to create anything from nothing, and since creation from preexisting material would compromise divine omnipotence, everything had to be created from God's spirit. "Nothing can exist independently (*a se*) apart from God."13 But, since there are, evidently, distinct things, these must exist through a division of God into distinct spirits. Through a contraction of the spirit, these distinct essences fell into a state of slumber, from which they could awaken only through expansion. **In their unconscious state, these divine spirits constituted the material world. This was worse than pantheism. It was polytheism.**
…

One more account deserves discussion, **since it was a source for Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy: Jacob Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, published in 1742–44.**33 The second volume contained an extensive account of ancient Jewish thought, including Kabbalah. Brucker includes a comparison of the principles of Egyptian-Alexandrian (i.e., Middle Platonic) philosophy, Oriental philosophy, and Kabbalah, each of which assumed as its first principle that "nothing comes from nothing."34 **Brucker argued that both Middle Platonism and Kabbalah must have originated in Oriental philosophy.** Among the other advantages of this hypothesis was the fact that it confirmed the long-standing view that Jews were not Occidentals or Europeans. Kant, for example, called the Jews "the Palestinians living among us,"35 and, similarly to Brucker, he wrote of the "*pantheism* (of the Tibetans and other oriental peoples)," from whose "philosophical sublimation Spinozism is begotten, which is closely akin to the very ancient *system of emanation* of human souls from the Godhead (and their final reabsorption into it)."36 Like the eagle of Henry More's nightmare, Spinozism had flown in from the Orient.37
…

Jacobi began, like More, with a horrific vision. **But it was one he had experienced while awake, at the age of eight or nine.** In his 1785 *Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn*, he merely mentioned the vision.38 Only in the third supplement to the second edition of 1789, after considerable speculation on the part of his readers, did he specify the vision's content. **It was a vision of annihilation, specifically of the dissipation of individuality within the infinite vastness of eternity.**39
…

This seems related to the charge of nihilism that Jacobi made later against Fichte's idealism, which he characterized as an "inverted Spinozism."50 In his 1799 open letter, *Jacobi to Fichte*, however, and in the pertinent supplements to the second (1789) edition of *Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn*, **Jacobi was less concerned with the details of either Spinoza's or Fichte's arguments than he was with his general account of the besetting sin of rationalism: the displacement of perception by inference; the annihilation of concrete, individual things and agents;** and the privileging, instead, of conceptual models or "mechanisms," which are in fact mere reflections of human activity. The formula, "nothing comes from nothing," may not have been explicitly quoted. Nevertheless, the process of annihilation, in its many variations, may be regarded as an extended commentary on the formula in its substantive interpretation: starting with the absolute I, which is meant to be everything but is therefore nothing, Fichte had succeeded only in establishing a system that treated individual things as nothings.
…

Thus becoming involves both being and nothing as moments. In the passage cited, Hegel wanted to emphasize the difference between this view, which he could present as a conceptual articulation of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and pantheism, whose basic principle is the denial of novelty.

It was this denial that Spinoza had in common with all pantheists, whether Eleatic or Oriental. Indeed, Hegel never missed an opportunity to emphasize that Spinoza's philosophy involves "no development, no life, no spirituality or activity … [T]he One … is something utterly fixed [*Starres*] and immobile."56 Yet there was something distinctive, and distinctively valuable, about Spinoza's philosophy. It was not new, but it was the beginning of novelty, the precursor of the system itself. Spinoza's substance "is what is true. But it is not yet the whole truth."57 "Thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of philosophy."58 **Spinoza returned to the ancient principle that nothing comes from nothing, but in a way that constituted the beginning of modernity.**
…

More original was Hegel's treatment of Spinoza as the *precursor* of the view articulated by Hegel himself. In Hegel's early Jena philosophy, Spinoza's nihilism was the solvent in which traditional metaphysics could be reduced to nothingness, so that the *positive* content given in speculative intuition could take its place. Later, in the mature philosophy that emerged around 1805, Spinoza's nihilism was the necessary prelude to the *self-negating* negativity that could alone *actualize* itself in the system of philosophical science. What was required, on this view, was an even more thoroughgoing nihilism—the "self-consummating skepticism" of the *Phenomenology*—that would annihilate itself and thereby constitute the positive in a speculative sense.
…

I turn now to the second question, what role does Spinoza's Jewishness play in Hegel's account of Spinoza as precursor? A great deal, according to Fackenheim, who wrote, **"Once the Jewish "fear of the Lord" was the beginning of all religious wisdom. Now the beginning of all modern philosophical wisdom is the Spinozistic God."**77 This seems to me correct. The precursor status of Judaism with respect to Christianity was for Hegel no mere historical fact. It was the paradigm of a dialectical pattern. Moreover, **the lack of actuality, the absence of self-movement, the static condition, that Hegel ascribes to Spinozism closely resembles the lack of actuality and the static condition that he attributes to Judaism,** with which he associates a conception of divinity as lacking self-development, and hence an external relationship of the human to the divine.78

However, Fackenheim's statement requires qualification in two respects. First, Spinoza was not the *only* modern stand-in for Judaism. **Spinoza may be said to have universalized Jewish monotheism, but it was Kant and Fichte who universalized Jewish law.** Hegel distributed the precursor function of Judaism among all these figures. Second, Spinoza for Hegel was in an important sense not a Jew at all. Rejecting the divine transcendence and narrative that were so important to Judaism, Spinoza was a throwback to the pantheism of the Oriental worldview.79 In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel is reported to have said, **"Spinoza was a Jew by descent, and what found expression in the form of thought in his philosophy is in general on the oriental intuition according to which everything finite appears merely as something transient, as something vanishing."**80 As we have already seen, Kabbalah was perceived as coming from the Orient, and, indeed, Jews were generally perceived as Orientals. To some extent, this merely meant "non-Europeans." But Oriental thought was also associated with pantheism, as we have seen in the note on Confucius attached to Bayle's article on Spinoza. Surely, the pantheistic doctrine of divine immanence was at odds with the Jewish theme of divine transcendence. While few made subtle distinctions here, Hegel understood Spinoza as returning from Judaism to an Oriental standpoint. However, it must be said that Spinoza's Oriental philosophy was *post-Jewish*. The Jewish contribution was, above all, to make the world prosaic,81 and Spinoza's immanentism was nothing if not prosaic. **Spinoza did not return to Oriental pantheism, with its poetic representations of divinity manifesting itself in innumerable forms. Rather, he orientalized Jewish monotheism, seeing the one God as immanent throughout the natural and prosaic world of mathematical physics.**
…

In particular, it may be argued that the very features that Hegel regarded Spinoza as lacking may be found in Kabbalah, specifically in the Lurianic Kabbalah introduced to the non-Jewish philosophical world through *Kabbala Denudata*.

First, the highest sefirah, thus the beginning of the beginning of divine self-manifestation, is *keter* (crown), which, by the fourteenth century if not earlier, was characterized as *ayin* (nothingness), from which arises the second sefirah, *ḥokhmah* (wisdom) or *yesh* (being).83 **Thus medieval Kabbalists understood creation ex nihilo to mean, not merely the exclusion of the doctrine of creation from preexisting matter, but the substantive doctrine of creation from the principle of nothingness, and this became the standard view,** enshrined in *Raya Mehemna*, a work included in the printed version of the *Zohar*.84 The nothingness in question was internal to the self-manifestation and inner life of God, just as Hegel demanded. Moreover, one of the principal ideas associated with Lurianic Kabbalah, although it certainly predates Luria, was the idea of creation through *ẓimẓum*—that is, through a withdrawal of the infinite that constitutes an empty space within which creation of that which is other than God becomes possible.85 In other words, divine creation was the self-negation of

negativity. Again, this was just the feature that Hegel thought was lacking in Spinoza but present in Boehme.
…

But how could Hegel base his account of Judaism on the Hebrew Bible alone, ignoring the entire development of postbiblical and rabbinic thought? **How, over a century after the publication of *Kabbala Denudata*, could Hegel say that Judaism acknowledged no internal development of God and never developed the story of the Fall,** when these were exactly the topics of Kabbalistic treatises available in translation?
…

Nevertheless, Hegel was able to avoid questioning a deep-seated prejudice insofar as he treated Kabbalah as proto-Christian rather than genuinely Jewish, and as ancient rather than as a vital tradition that had developed in the Middle Ages and that was still developing in modernity. He was thereby able to maintain the view, in which he was deeply invested, that Judaism was paralyzed at a stage of development prior to the advent of Christ. At the same time, **Hegel could ignore the ongoing vitality of Kabbalah in his own day, and he could regard Trinitarian thinkers akin to the Kabbalah, such as Boehme, as providing the necessary complement to Spinozism.**
…

As Judaism had served in antiquity as Christianity's precursor, so Spinozism—with its rigorous yet abstract articulation of the nullity of the finite—served in modernity as Hegelianism's precursor. To convert the nihilism of Spinoza into the science of Hegel, however, it was necessary to synthesize Spinozism with the Trinitarianism of Boehme, and to express this synthesis in adequately conceptual, nonimagistic terms. On this view, Spinoza was no Kabbalist. But neither was Boehme. Others may have regarded Boehme as a Christian Kabbalist, **but Hegel saw modern speculative thought as exclusively Christian,** and relegated Kabbalah to antiquity.
…

Committed to the sublation of Judaism by Christianity in antiquity, **Hegel could not acknowledge, whether in the form of Kabbalah or in the form of Spinozism, the ongoing vitality of Jewish thought in modernity.**93

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/138/mode/2up?view=theater

For Hegel, as for Herder, (and for Schwenckfeld before them), Jesus was the *schöne seele* (the beautiful soul) who attempted the reconciliation between human and divine, the reabsorption into the former of what had been "transported out of it" into the latter.

The God "within" is, thus, the explicit denial of the transcendent and personal God and the affirmation of man as a God.
…

Hegel's critique of religion went naturally much further, since his dialectical method allowed him to find in the Hebrew and Christian God an intolerant and jealous master, robbing his worshipers their own hidden divinity. Thus religion had to be the supreme exaltation of man who finds the absolute within himself. As he wrote to Schelling in 1795, "there is no other world above the senses than the world of the absolute self. And the absolute self is God." How modern Schelling and Hegel's synthesis seems when they define religion as an "active personal participation in an act of taking place in us and through us."22

It is perhaps the first time that the traditional God is excluded without any reservation from the definition of religion – not by two atheist-materialists, let us note – but by men who considered themselves believers, indeed good Lutherans, to the end.23

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

In Hegel's religious discourse this translates as **the necessity for the Christian to realize his total individuality (the synthesis of the universal and the particular), that is, to become what he always believed god was, Christ, the God-man.**37 **Thus the great substitution, the alchemical-speculative operation, has been performed; the universal, transcendent God who before had merely *recognized* man (as a slave – in both Judaism and Christianity) is now replaced by a universal that is immanent in the world and is called the worldly kingdom, the state.** To use the Blochian language, God the hypostasis is now reabsorbed, and the total man, the "tiding-become-man," realizes himself in the human community that is as perfect as God was imagined as being.38 **More prosaically, Hegel taught that in the final world, beyond the revolution and beyond Christianity, German philosophy would take the place of all religious systems and that his own**

absolute science, itself the end of all philosophizing, was called upon to replace, once and for all, religion for mankind.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isma%27ilism#Imamate
>
> **The last Imām of the sixth period, however, would not bring about a new religion of law but rather supersede all previous religions, abrogate the law and introduce *din Adama al-awwal* ("the original religion of Adam") practised by Adam and the angels in paradise before the fall, which would be without ritual or law but consist merely in all creatures praising the creator and recognizing his unity.** This final stage was called the Qiyamah.[56]

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Remember, however, that this was precisely the reproach Hegel made against the eighteenth-century French *philosophes*: God and man are not antithetical, he told them, they are of a common substance, otherwise man would not be able to know God. **"Faith in God in engendered by the believer's very divinity; only a modification of God [that is, man] may know God."**21 This was, of course, Hegel's main thesis from which everything else was later derived.

Genuine being, in his view, is unified being, because each individual becomes himself only through another. Thus the ideal is a being that has no object (*Objektlosigkeit*) – since everything is absorbed in it as subject – hence also no consciousness to be reabsorbed when no object compels it to distinguish between the other and itself (*Bewusstlosigkeit*). This state is realized in God, and, according to Hegel, this is what Jesus meant by advising us to be like children. Hegel regards it as the end of the misery of consciousness, the *conscience malheureuse*,22 because it means a restoration of inner totality in opposition to the positivity (*Gesetzheit*) of the Jewish religion of the Law. Inner totality, inner unification, *conscience heureuse*, religion of love – that is, not of Law – are expressions describing what Hegel regarded as Christ's message through which man may recover his own divinity. **The role of Jesus is that of a restorer, a rediscoverer: he is God, but so are we all. Hegel understood incarnation not as an isolated historical event, but as a manifestation of the Absolute Spirit, taking place in all human beings and at all time.**23 Hence, for Hegel consciousness of God, and this enables consciousness to be treated as Revelation.24

> https://archive.org/details/historypersiafr00malcgoog/page/282/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> A celebrated Soofee teacher,p he observes, has written, **"That the secret of the soul was first revealed when Pharaoh declared himself a god:"** and anotherq has said, "The host of Pharaoh were not lost in the sea of error, but of knowledge:" **and has asserted in the same page, "that the Nazarenes are not infidels because they deem Jesus a God, but because they deem him alone a God."** The Soofees are stated by the authorr so often quoted, to deny the doctrine of reward and punishment; which is as incompatible with their ideas of the re-absorption of the soul into the divine essence, as with their literal belief of predestination.

https://archive.org/details/voicesofthechurc00bearuoft/page/n23/mode/2up?view=theater

In the leading outlines of orthodox Christianity, he found a suitable religious system. But this was an accidental circumstance; convenient, indeed, but not by any means necessary. Had orthodoxy been less fitted and plastic to his hand, he would easily have constructed a religion for himself. As it was, however, its phraseology was most conformable to his philosophical terms. All that had to be done was to use its language in a new sense, and then his philosophy and the popular religion were in strict agreement. He extracted the kernel from the fruit, preserving the shell: **he killed the body, and destroyed the substance;** but could boast, that he converted the shades of departed doctrines from probable into necessary and unquestioned truths.

https://archive.org/details/christianityand00andrgoog/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater

A very recent writer, Professor Wenley ("Contemporary Theology and Theism") says: "The warring of the pantheistic and monotheistic tendencies, both implicitly present in Hegel, ended, unfortunately, in a complete victory for the former."

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater

The impression could not become any more intense, and it remained the governing principle of Hegel's thought: to every accomplishment of *reason*, the universal mind, there corresponds a higher degree of *historical* maturation just as to his own great intellectual performance, the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, there corresponds the Napoleonic empire, the nucleus of the imminent World-State. Thus Hegel came to regard philosophy not as a systematized albeit never

completed apperception of reality, a high articulation of human experience, but as a means of promoting the gestation of history – until mankind reaches its destination and philosophy liquidates itself.

This grandiose view has found easy accreditation with philosophers and intellectuals. **They accept as the irrefutable character of the age and of all future times what Hegel wrote at the end of the Preface to the *Phenomenology*: We live in an epoch in which universality has been consolidated by all the accumulated richness provided by science while the singular, the individual, has correspondingly faded; henceforth "individual participation in the total achievement of the spirit can only be minimal."** The philosopher's honor and duty must then be to help the universal (the collective) in its final accomplishments; philosophy must give its total support to history. **Up until Hegel, history's pressure was bearable because it was ascribed to man's weakness and sinfulness, his willful separation from God's design. This was the Augustinian view which excluded perfection from the *civitas terrena* and saw it achieved in the *civitas Dei*, beyond history.** After Hegel, the pressure of history has redoubled because the tragedies that continued befalling mankind could now be justified by reference to the processes of reason in its historical unfolding. **The chasm that Augustine and other historians saw between the two cities was closed in the Hegelian system.** Thus a new and unheard of legitimacy came to be formulated for the man – philosopher or leader – who speaks in the name of historical reason, the absolute mind. **The nearly universal acceptance of this conception indicates that we live inside the Hegelian worldview.**
…

Thus the underlying theme and secret favorite of Hegelian epistemology – and of other theories of knowledge preceding it or taking it as a model – is *coalescence*: **the soul's absorption in God, the absorption of change in the One, of history in the timeless absolute, of the mind in the world-spirit, the convergence of all human endeavors in the World-State.**

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater

With Hegel we return to the intellectual freedom enjoyed by the earlier "underground" of alchemists and Paracelsian sages, since his teaching benefited by the postrevolutionary philosophical ferment (in the eighteen thirties and forties Hegel's works were in the center of discussion by Russian intellectuals) and also by the ambiguity of his doctrine, which apparently flattered the new Prussian state instead of putting its authorities on their guard. **After all, some students of Hegel regard him even today as a nationalist thinker, who justified the nation-state as the highest expression of historical evolution, and fail to see in him the founder of utopia and utopian religion with unceasing revolutionary potential. The reason is, I think, the impressive elaborateness, the first since St. Augustine's, of a system embracing history, philosophy, politics, anthropology, economics, psychology, and other branches of learning, pulled together in a sweeping phenomenological analysis in which the buildup itself may overshadow the final synthesis.** Yet, it is the synthesis that crowns the edifice and has had the decisive impact on contemporary speculation.

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/kun-bela/pamphlets/1932/12.htm
>
> After the death of Engels the Second International entered upon this stage of Marx-adulteration on a "wholesale" scale, entered upon an "entire stage of the undivided domination of opportunism." Upon the structure housing the leading party of the Second International, the German Social-Democratic Party, **the lately deceased Edward Bernstein openly hoisted the flag of the revision of the Marxian doctrine. In the realm of *philosophy*: against materialism, for idealism; against the "traps of Hegelian dialectics"—"back to Kant."**
> …
>
> *German classical philosophy*, **which translated the great French revolution into the field of philosophy for the cowardly German bourgeoisie,** is to-day as dead as a door nail as far as it (the German bourgeoisie) is concerned. Hegel, greatest representative of the classical school, is again singled out by the bourgeoisie for treatment as a "dead dog."
> …
>
> The bourgeoisie in the period of its crisis had to repudiate Hegel since his dialectics were intolerable for it even in their idealistic covering. Hegelian dialectics preclude precisely that which is most necessary for the ideologists of the bourgeoisie in the course of the crisis: ***the contemplation of the existing, of the existing order of society, as something endowed with finality*.**

http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/arts/lit/PDFs/ScrewtapeLetters_CSL.pdf

He can be taught to enjoy kneeling beside the grocer on Sunday just because he remembers that the grocer could not possibly understand the urbane and mocking world which he inhabited on Saturday

evening; and contrariwise, to enjoy the bawdy and blasphemy over the coffee with these admirable friends all the more because he is aware of a “deeper”, “spiritual” world within him which they cannot understand. You see the idea—**the worldly friends touch him on one side and the grocer on the other, and he is the complete, balanced, complex man who sees round them all.**

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/134/mode/2up?view=theater

Although Hegel described the avatars of the spirit and Marx those of the matter, their respective conclusions were by no means in contradiction. *After* the ontological mutation the problem of mind versus matter, subject versus object, does not arise; the two coalesce in the absoluteness of man.
…

But let us bear in mind that Gnostic logic also took it for granted that in order for creation to be reabsorbed and for the tranquillity of pre-creation to be restored, all men (all *pneuma*) must return to God so as to reestablish original unity. In the Gnostic view, God, deprived of part of his substance, can be rendered integral again – can be saved – only if his scattered fragments, the *pneuma* imprisoned in bodies, are reunited.

This view was easily secularized. It was kept before Western eyes by the Stoics and, more importantly, by the concept of Christ’s mystical body, which, “brought down to earth,” was to serve the solidarity of men. As soon as this togetherness is achieved, God will have been born. Bruno Bauer's critique of his Hegelian confreres is in this respect quite trenchant. The other “young Hegelians,” Bauer believed, misunderstood their master's concept of God: God is not a particular consciousness, the world-soul’s manifestation in man; God is an infinite number of spirits throughout time, until in one of them – Hegel – the world substance becomes conscious of itself.

> https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> For the right understanding of the name of the sect we must not, however, omit to state, **that the word *sien t’ien* also means “that which has preceded heaven,” thus, pre-celestial.** Thinkers of all times have seen in it an allusion to a certain early period, which by dint of reasoning has been found to be that which closed with the reign of China’s first sovereign, the mythical Fuh-hi (see p. 39). After him came the “middle celestial” period, when Shen-nung (see ibid.) ruled the empire; and which was followed by the post-celestial or *heu t’ien*, when the emperor Hwang (27th cent. b.C.) wielded the sceptre. According to Chinese chronologers, these three epochs together embraced some 255 years, falling perhaps between 2852 and 2597 b.C. And so the name of the sect implies also that the members date its foundation back to the very earliest times of which China pretends to have any knowledge. **They claim, indeed, for their founder none less than the primeval power who then, and before all times, ruled the universe, viz. the *Wu-kih* or Apex of Nothingness.**
> …
>
> So the Apex of Nothingness or the Endless in time was the highest and sole universal power working in the chaos; **it therefore represents the very oldest period of the Cosmos, when there was as yet no northern pole or Grand Apex, much less any alternate operations of a *Yang* and a *Yin*.** But the Buddhists explained the matter in their own peculiar way, and took the term in the sense of “Apex of Non-existence,” identifying it with their never understood Nirwāna. So also did the Sien-t’ien sect.
> …
>
> In the papers of this society I find, indeed, the Wu-kih mentioned explicitly both as its founder and as the developer of the world. **Pan-ku, the mythical unraveller of the chaos, did not set to work until commissioned thereto by the Wu-kih, and the product was the Saha-world, as the Buddhists call the earth, the abode of all who are subject to transmigration and suffering, and for whom saving Buddhas appear.** Then the Light-making Buddhas or Dīpankara came, the predecessors of Śākyamuni, all preachers of the doctrines of salvation, and consequently of the doctrines of the Sien-t’ien society. They were all sent down by the Wu-kih. Lao-tsze was one of them, and therefore ranks as a prophet of the oldest and highest order. This mixture of Buddhistic and genuine Chinese myth we find interwoven with classical and unclassical traditions regarding the sovereigns of the most ancient mythical times, until it brings us down to the mid-celestial period of Shen-nung. It is then that Śākyamuni appears upon the scene as an incarnation or emissary of the Grand Apex, in order to restore to its former glory and purity the Dharma, or Universal Order instituted by the hosts of the Buddhas who preceded him.
>
> But even long after that, the Apex of Nothingness sent down a Buddha for the salvation of mankind. “The very highest Wu-kih, our Old Patriarch,” so the manuscripts tell us, the first breath of the chaos, which in far remote antiquity himself came down into the world to save men and

spirits from the ocean of suffering – "once again went up the steps of his court-hall, and thus spoke to the Buddhas: "**Since the creation of the heavens ninety-six milliards of my children of both sexes, born of the womb, were put down on the earth; up to this day these are entangled and confounded in Saha (suffering); their genuine character is submerged (in evil), and nobody kindles among them the light of self-improvement; how then shall they return to this their home? In the pre-celestial period I ordered the light-making Buddhas to bring salvation to two milliards of Taoist anchorites; in the middle celestial period I sent salvation through the Śākya Buddha to two milliards of Buddhist Sangha-members; there remain still ninety-two milliards of people to be saved.** The post-celestial period now governs the world, and I do not yet know who will descend to the earth and lead my children of both sexes back to their home."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiantiandao

Xiantiandao doctrine holds that the origin of the universe is Wusheng Laomu (□□□□; *Wúshēng Lǎomǔ*; 'Unborn Ancient Mother'), creatrix of all living beings. **These children went astray and ended up in the earthly world where they forgot their divine origin.** The wheel of reincarnation started and the return to Heaven was no longer possible.
...

As the focus is on a primordial deity superior to all other gods, Xiantiandao sects claim to represent a Way (Dào) that transcends, comes before, and thus overcomes all existing religions.

---

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/203/mode/2up?view=theater

As regards German philosophy, I had openly let out the school secret which, wrapped up in scholastic formulas, was known only to initiates of the first class. [1834] My revelations aroused the greatest amazement here in France, and I remember that very important French thinkers naively admitted to me that they had always thought that German philosophy was a kind of mystical fog which concealed divinity as in a holy cloud fortress, and that German philosophers were ecstatic seers, who breathed devoutness and the fear of god. It is not my fault that this was never the case, that German philosophy is just the opposite of what we have up to now called devoutness and the fear of god, and that our most modern philosophers proclaim the most complete atheism as the last word of our German philosophy. Mercilessly, and with bacchantic zest for life, they rip the blue curtain from the German sky and call out: "Look, all the gods have fled, and above there remains only an old virgin with leaden hands and a sad heart: necessity."

http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1001/julian/

An aside made by Brandes, in *Main Currents in Nineteenth Century Literature* (1871), on the character of Hegelianism hints at the underlying cause. **"At the time of Hegel's death ... in 1831," Brandes says, "his followers compared him to Aristotle, to Alexander the Great, even to Christ"** (227). Ibsen would have been aware of such inflation and would have reacted against it. In addition to **describing Hegelianism positively as "modern Hellenism," Brandes says that the teaching of the Jena master "acted as an emancipating spiritual power ... that destroyed faith in religious dogma and freed the individual from the burden of the Christianity of the State church"** (227).
...

It was Hegel's student, Christian Baur (1792-1860), who, in his *Christlicher Gnosis* (1835), first linked Hegel explicitly to Late Antique
illuminismus. Baur's evaluation, like Brandes', is positive, however, and not a rejection or a critique. **As Filoramo writes, Baur "regarded the Gnostics as the first philosophers of the Christian religion, the vanguard of the type of reflection that was to manifest itself many centuries later in the Gnosis of the Hegelian system"** (10-11).
...

Says Brandes, himself a materialist, the Left Hegelians "avoid employing the words Jewish or Christian," but they seize instead on Hegel's coinage of "Nazarenic" to indicate "men with ascetic, image-hating dispositions, inclined to morbid spiritualization," whom they despise and whom they oppose to those of a "cheerfully realistic temperament, inclined to genial self-development" (288).

https://archive.org/details/voicesofthechurc00bearuoft/page/n63/mode/2up?view=theater

"Criticism places Jesus in the category of individuals endowed with, high faculties, whose vocation in the different walks of life is to raise the development of the spirit to superior degrees; individuals whom we ordinarily designate by the title of geniuses, in the branches of knowledge that are not religious, and particularly in those of art and science. **This is not, it is true, to**

> **replace Christ in what, strictly speaking, is the Christian sanctuary: it is merely to place him in the chapel of Alexander Severus, by the side of Orpheus and Homer; where he finds himself not only near Moses, but Mahomet also; and where he ought not to disdain the company of Alexander and of Caesar, of Raphael and Mozart.**"*

It is not easy to write these things down with that coolness which is demanded, whilst we are endeavouring to give a true and impartial account of Strauss's opinions.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1917/idealism-materialism/index.htm

In the theological literature of Germany at that time there was a twofold attitude to miracles. The '*Supernaturalists*' acknowledged them as real, whereas the rationalists denied them and strove to find a natural explanation of the alleged miracles. Strauss disagreed with both these viewpoints. He not only refused to believe in the *miracles*, but said that the *very events* which were presented by the Evangelists as miracles, and which the resourceful rationalists were explaining by natural causes, were themselves unauthentic.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/208/mode/2up?view=theater

The title betrays the Spinozan presupposition that what is not in conformity with the laws of nature as defined by the tenets of materialism cannot have happened, and must therefore have its source not in the facts of history, but in the fancy either of the followers of Jesus or the writers of the New Testament. That is, such things must have "been foisted into the sacred writings," to use Spinoza's words. At the head of the criteria defining how we separate historical fact from mythical fiction, Strauss provided the following negative rule. An "account is not historical" and hence "the matter related could not have taken place in the manner described is evident" when

> the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws which govern the course of events. **Now according to these laws, agreeing with all just philosophical conceptions and all credible experience, *the absolute cause never disturbs the chain of secondary causes by single arbitrary actions of interposition* [emphasis added].** ... When therefore we meet with an account of certain phenomena or events of which it is either expressly stated or implied that they were produced immediately by God himself (divine apparitions – voices from heaven and the like), or by human beings possessed of supernatural powers (miracles, prophecies), such an account, is *in so far* to be considered as not historical, And inasmuch as, in general, **the intermingling of the spiritual world with the human is found only in unauthentic records, and is irreconcilable with all just conceptions;** so narratives of angels and of devils, of their appearing in human shape and interfering with human concerns, cannot possible be received as historical.73

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Romance_of_Orthodoxy_p2.html

The man of the nineteenth century did not disbelieve in the Resurrection because his liberal Christianity allowed him to doubt it. **He disbelieved in it because his very strict materialism did not allow him to believe it.** Tennyson, a very typical nineteenth century man, uttered one of the instinctive truisms of his contemporaries when he said that there was faith in their honest doubt. There was indeed. Those words have a profound and even a horrible truth. **In their doubt of miracles there was a faith in a fixed and godless fate; a deep and sincere faith in the incurable routine of the cosmos. The doubts of the agnostic were only the dogmas of the monist.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred,_Lord_Tennyson#Poet_Laureate

His son's biography confirms that Tennyson was an unorthodox Christian, **noting that Tennyson praised Giordano Bruno and Spinoza on his deathbed,** saying of Bruno, "His view of God is in some ways mine", in 1892.[30]

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/critique/index.htm

The only source of salvation lies in a return to nature. It is wrong to look upon nature as contradicting ethical freedom. Nature has built not only the mean workshop of the stomach, but also the temple of the brain. It has not only given us a tongue whose papillae correspond to intestinal villi, but also ears that are enchanted by the harmony of sounds and eyes that only the heavenly and generous being of light ravishes. **Nature opposes only fantastic, not rational, freedom.** Each glass of wine that we drink one too many of is a very pathetic and even peripatetic

proof that the servilism of passions enrages the blood; a proof that the Greek sophrosyne is completely in conformity with nature. **As we know, the maxim of the Stoics – and I mean the rigorous Stoics, those scarecrows of the Christian moralists – was: Live in conformity with nature.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm

Then came Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the "system" was exploded and cast aside, **and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much – in spite of all critical reservations – he was influenced by it, one may read in the *The Holy Family*[E].**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgi_Plekhanov#War_years

Plekhanov was extremely hostile to the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin and was the top leader of the tiny Yedinstvo group, which published a newspaper by the same name.[40] **He criticized Lenin's revolutionary April Theses as "ravings" and called Lenin himself an "alchemist of revolution" for his seeming willingness to leap over the stage of capitalist development in agrarian Russia in advocating socialist revolution.**[40]
...

Despite these disagreements Lenin considered Plekhanov an outstanding philosopher and wrote as late as 1921 that "It is impossible to become an intelligent and genuine communist without studying, precisely studying, all that Plekhanov has written on philosophy, **for what he has written is the best that can be found in the whole international literature on Marxism."**[46]

https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/3/1/article-p3_2.xml?language=en

The relation of ideas to social needs and to class interests is not a simple one. The world of ideas is an autonomous world, subject to its own laws, so that ideas are not the direct expression of class interests. **Intellectuals cannot be reduced to the sycophantic spokespeople of particular interests, but their ideas are nevertheless circumscribed by their historical environment, including their particular intellectual milieu, which in turn is related to those of previous epochs, of other countries and of other classes with which they interact.** Through these complex interdependencies 'ideas, feelings and beliefs are co-ordinated according to their own particular laws' corresponding to the intellectual forms in which they appear. But at the same time 'these laws are brought into play by external circumstances which have nothing in common with these laws' (DMVH, p. 236).

The relationship between interests and ideas is not, therefore, a genetic relationship, <u>but is rather one of a Spinozist correspondence between the material world of interests and the intellectual world of ideas.</u> This conception obviously corresponds very closely to the reality of Russian political and ideological conflicts, which were fought out amongst intellectuals who had very limited contact with any organised class forces, so that the dividing lines of political conflict were drawn not so much in terms of the social forces in struggle, as in terms of the interests which particular ideas supposedly *represented*.9

> 9. **This dislocation appeared most starkly in Lenin's critique of economism in *What is to be Done?*, <u>which reached the bizarre conclusion that proletarian consciousness is bourgeois, while that of the radical bourgeois intelligentsia is proletarian.</u>** Plekhanov, retaining some link between interests, ideas, and the social forces they represent, looked to an *alliance* between the radical bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which was the point at which Lenin broke with him politically. **There can be no doubt that in this division it was Plekhanov who remained closer to Marxism, <u>while Lenin reverted to populism, as indicated by the very title of his text, assimilating Marx to Chernyshevsky.</u>**

It should not be surprising to find that Plekhanov ultimately overcomes this Spinozist dualism in classically Hegelian terms. Ideas obey their own laws, but at the same time are subject to the laws of material necessity, but the laws of material necessity determine that humanity will transcend the rule of necessity to realise its freedom.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1917/idealism-materialism/index.htm

German idealist philosophy played an extremely important role in the history of the development of science in the nineteenth century. It had an impressive impact even on natural science. **But incomparably more powerful was its influence on those 'disciplines' which in France are called the moral and political sciences.** Here the influence of German idealist philosophy must be recognised as decisive in the full meaning of the word. It raised, and to some extent solved, problems of which the solution was absolutely imperative if scientific investigation of the process of social development was to be possible.
…

It was quite natural that his influence should be felt most of all in his native land, Germany. **But after Germany, there was no country where Hegel's teaching had such an influence as it had in Russia.**[1]

> 1. **The consistent influence of Hegel and Feuerbach on Belinsky and of Feuerbach on Chernyshevsky, who said that as a youth he could recite whole pages of Feuerbach by heart, is generally known.**

…

After the forcible removal of Chernyshevsky from the literary scene,[2] a disregard for German 'metaphysics' began to spread in our advanced circles, where Hegel came to be regarded as predominantly a conservative, if not reactionary, thinker. This was a grave error. It is indisputable that towards the end of his life, Hegel was very far from being what he had been earlier. **As young men, he and Schelling had planted a tree of liberty in a meadow near Tübingen, and he had filled pages of his album with exclamations such as 'Vive la liberté', 'Vive Jean-Jacques!', etc.** And in the sunset of his day, as he worked on his *Philosophie des Rechts*, he was indeed ready to preach philosophical 'reconciliation with reality' (Belinsky well understood Hegel as he was then).
…

Everything is fluid, everything changes, everything passes away. Hegel compares the power of dialectics with divine omnipotence. Dialectics is that universal irresistible force which nothing can withstand. At the same time dialectics makes itself felt in each separate phenomenon of each separate sphere of life. Take motion. At a given moment, a body in motion is at a given point, but at the very same moment it is also beyond that point too, since if it remained *only* at the given point it would be *motionless*. **All motion is a living contradiction; all motion is a dialectical process.** But the whole life of nature is motion; so that in the study of nature it is absolutely essential to adopt the dialectical viewpoint. **Hegel sharply condemns those naturalists who forget this.**[3] But the main reproach he addresses to them is that in their classifications they put a wide and impassable gulf between things which in fact pass into one another in obedience to the irresistible force of the law of dialectical motion. The subsequent triumph of transformism in biology clearly demonstrated that this reproach had a quite sound theoretical basis.
…

Socialism had to become a science or cease to exist. This makes it understandable why Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific socialism, came precisely from Hegel's school.
…

Every stage of the development of the world spirit is represented on the historical scene by a separate nation. ***The present historical epoch*** **is the epoch of** ***German*** **culture. According to Hegel, the nation representing the highest stage of development of the world spirit is entitled to regard other nations as mere instruments for the realisation of its historical aims.** This is worth noting. If today the Germans do not stand on ceremony with the vanquished, there is in this, unfortunately, a drop of Hegelian honey.

But the Slav peoples could not willingly accept the hegemony of the Germans. **Since Schelling's time part of the intelligentsia in the Slav countries have been busily occupied with the question of which exact stage of development of the world spirit these peoples are fated to represent.**
…

Speaking, for instance, of the fall of Sparta, he was not content with what could be said of it from the standpoint of the 'world spirit', and sought its cause in the inequality of property (*Ungleichheit des Besitzes*). He explains the origin of the *state*, too, by the growth of property inequality, **and this absolute 'idealist' believed that *agriculture* was the historical basis of marriage.**
…

As we know, Hegel was accused of conservatism on the grounds that he proclaimed the identity of the *rational* and the *real*. But *in themselves*, the words 'what is real is rational; what is rational is real' ('*was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig; was vornünftig ist, das ist wirklich*') are not an indication of Hegel's readiness to accept every given social order, or, for that matter, every given social institution. **To be convinced of this, it will be sufficient to remember his attitude to the excessive power of the father in the Roman family.** To Hegel, not everything by far that existed was real. He actually said: 'Reality is *higher than existence*.' ('*Die Wirklichkeit steht höher als die Existenz.*') **The real is necessary, while not all that exists is necessary.**
…

In the philosophy of Kant, the world of phenomena was sharply contrasted to the world of noumena, man to nature, the subject to the object. This is dualism; **but philosophy, if it is not to mark time, cannot be content with dualism. It strives towards *monism*.** It is easy to understand why: because *only* monism, explaining the world by means of *one* principle, has the right to claim a (more or less correct) solution of the question of the relationship of subject to object. Dualism does not solve this question; it either declares it to be insoluble or appeals to a miracle, that is to say, to the intervention of an omnipotent being standing *above both subject and object*. **But the supreme being is *one*:** so that the appeal to it is itself an attempt to solve—true, by means of a phantom—the fundamental question of philosophy in a monistic sense.[37]

37. Science also strives towards monism. One of the most brilliant representatives of science in modern times, Newton, was attracted to it.

…

The absolute is the subject-object, the identity of thinking and being. So taught Schelling; so taught Hegel. But at the same time, the absolute is the *ego*, the infinite *subject of the spirit*. **Schelling and Hegel both insisted strongly on this conception. Both condemned Spinoza, who, in their words, could not rise from the concept of *substance* to the concept of *self-consciousness*. However, Spinoza's substance, which had two attributes—thinking and extension—had the advantage, that it was in fact the subject-object, the unity of thinking and being.** To 'rise' from substance to self-consciousness, that is to say, to conceive of substance in the manner demanded by Schelling and Hegel, as the absolute *ego*, as spirit, would have meant reducing it to one of its attributes, namely *to thinking*. He who reduces everything to thinking is, of course, a monist. But his monism does not solve the problem of the relation of subject to object, of thinking to being: it *evades its solution*, quite arbitrarily deleting one of the conditions of the problem. Feuerbach, at the beginning an enthusiastic pupil of Hegel's, later on noticed this weak side of *idealist* monism, and then he became a materialist.
…

Unity, but not by any means identity. Identity was proclaimed by idealist philosophy, which reduced everything to spirit.

The *idealist* monism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel arose out of opposition to Spinoza, who with his doctrine of the substance allegedly 'abolished' the freedom of man. **Feuerbach, with his *materialist* monism, returned to the viewpoint of Spinoza. In general he valued Spinoza very highly, and called him the 'Moses of modern freethinkers and materialists'.**

This may appear strange, since Spinozism is usually interpreted nowadays in an idealist sense. But Feuerbach looked at Spinoza's teaching through quite different spectacles. To a question put by himself: 'What actually is, on close examination, that which Spinoza *logically* or *metaphysically* calls *substance*, and *theologically God*?' he replied: 'Nothing else but *Nature*.' **In Spinoza's teaching there was, however, the shortcoming that nature in it appeared as an abstract, metaphysical being. The actions of nature are presented as the actions of God. Spinozism is materialism clad in theological garb. And this garb has**

to be stripped from the essentially correct philosophical theory of Spinoza. 'Not *Deus sive Natura* but *aut Deus, aut Natura*[45] is the watchword of truth', exclaims Feuerbach.
…

Generally, the laws of being are at the same time the laws of thinking. This proposition of Feuerbach's is reminiscent of Spinoza's well-known dictum: *ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum* (the order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things).

The opponents of materialism object that consciousness cannot be explained by material phenomena. The preceding exposition of Feuerbach's views has shown the reader, I trust, that this objection does not in any way affect the basis of Feuerbach's materialist doctrine, which consists in the proposition that the world of *subjective* phenomena is but the other side of the world of objective phenomena. Anyone who would wish to *explain* the subjective world *by means of* the objective world, to *deduce* the first from the second, would thereby demonstrate that he has understood nothing whatsoever of Feuerbach's materialism. **This doctrine, like that of Spinoza, does not *deduce* one side from the other, but simply establishes that they are two sides of the one whole. By the way, in this respect, other major varieties of materialism, at least of present-day materialism, do not differ in any way from Feuerbach's.**
…

As has been said above, the Bauer brothers, by affirming that in religion it is not spirit but man that contemplates his own essence, were following Feuerbach. **No other view of religion could be held by any thinker who, before returning to the Anglo-French materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had passed through that school of idealism which, in the person of Hegel, made it obligatory for philosophers to study phenomena in their process of development.** The French Enlighteners in general and in particular the French materialists, who were the advance guard of the army of the Enlighteners, regarded religion as the product of priests or legislators, who had devised certain beliefs as a means of influencing the simple-minded mass of the people, for the purpose of exploiting or educating them. Remember Voltaire's tragedy *Le fanatisme, ou Mahomet le prophète*. In the nineteenth century, **it became obvious to Hegel's followers that this conception of religion was untenable,** being reduced to the belief that 'opinion' not only rules the world, but also *creates and refashions itself to suit the practical aims of its chief representatives*.
…

What the moral rules of this terrible man were, who from his earliest years did not believe in the immortality of the soul and based his morality upon a materialist foundation, may be seen, incidentally, from the following moral rule of his:

> ***In relation to oneself*, one cannot be *idealist* enough making idealist demands of the will, 'categorical imperatives', but *in relation to others*, with the exception of certain cases which are extremely difficult to define, one cannot be *materialist* enough; in relation to oneself, one cannot be a stoic enough, in relation to others—Epicurean enough.**[54]

These golden words embody the whole secret of the morality upheld by our 'people of the sixties',[55] **who firmly kept to Feuerbach's rules: read through Chernyshevsky's letters from Siberia, and you will see that he was, indeed, harsh—I almost wrote cruel—in relation to himself, and a mild Epicurean in relation to others. On the soil of Feuerbach's materialist morality grew the luxuriant blooms of moral selflessness** (an idealist would say by force of habit: *idealism*).
…

***Law*, like morality, must not be opposed to interest. It is founded upon interest: of course, not personal interest, but social interest.**[58]

This is exactly that very doctrine of morality and law which was preached by the French materialists of the eighteenth century.
…

Just a few years before his death, in a letter to L Kapp, **he said that the terrorism practised during the Great French Revolution was still necessary for Germany.** He is known to have become a Social-Democrat towards the end of his life.

In this respect there was an immeasurable difference between him and Bruno Bauer, who ended his life in the ranks of reaction.

XV

As in morals, so also in politics, as well as in the social field, Feuerbach quite consciously linked his *radicalism* with his *materialism*. He wrote:

> **I do not understand how the idealist or the spiritualist, at least one who is consistent, can make external political freedom the aim of his practical activity.** Spiritual freedom is enough for the spiritualist... From the spiritualist point of view, political freedom is materialism in the field of politics... **For the spiritualist, freedom in thought is sufficient.** [*Dem Spiritualisten genügt die gedachte Freiheit.*][60]

In his *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, Schelling accepted as proved the proposition that the concept of freedom is incompatible with Spinozism, that is to say, in effect, with materialism. The further course of development of philosophical thought in Germany demonstrated the utter groundlessness of this proposition, which, incidentally, Schelling assimilated quite '*dogmatically*'.

If the idealist Fichte in his sympathy with the Great French Revolution even went as far as to justify extreme revolutionary actions, **German idealism in its development moved gradually but very far away from such views:** while in the person of Schelling (in his latest style) it completely hid the concept of freedom under its night-cap. It was only in Feuerbach's materialist philosophy that the freedom-loving aspirations of the noble Fichte were revived and further developed, on an incomparably more reliable theoretical basis.
...

The reaction which followed the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1848-49 gradually brought German philosophy back into the fold of idealism. And it is self-evident that the imperialist Germany of modern times could not recognise Feuerbach as its ideologist. It required philosophers of quite another brand...

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/25012/25012-h/25012-h.html#toc7
>
> Let us remember how enthusiastically Wagner at one time walked in the footsteps of the philosopher Feuerbach. **Feuerbach's words "healthy sensuality" struck Wagner in the thirties and forties very much as they struck many other Germans—they called themselves the young Germans—that is to say, as words of salvation.**
>
> https://www.wagnerheim.com/page/502
>
> What is remarkable about the influence of Feuerbach's distinction of a light and dark principle in God, on Wagner's distinguishing Dark-Alberich from Light-Alberich, is that this distinction is central to Feuerbach's argument that when we speak of a God as a creator, in order to explain the real world we find ourselves in, God must partake not only of spirit (or really, the human mind), but also of matter. **This was of course the basis of much of Spinoza's thought as well, and Feuerbach often spoke of the Jewish philosopher as almost the patron-saint of the modern, secular, scientific world-view, the world-view for which I posit Alberich and his son Hagen as metaphor.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1842/reaction-germany.htm

'Die Reaktion in Deutschland. **Ein Fragment von einem Franzosen**' first appeared in Arnold Ruge (ed.), *Deutsche Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft and Kunst,* nos. 247–51 (Leipzig, October 17th-21st, 1842) under the pseudonym "Jules Elysard." ***Die Reaktion* was written in response to Ruge's call set forth in the Preface to the first edition of *Deutsche Jahrbücher* for all Hegelians to enter into political struggle. This essay marks Bakunin's emergence from purely philosophical studies to active participation in revolutionary sociopolitical movements.** Criticized by his friends as being too abstract, the essay employs Hegelian philosophic language to justify a concept of permanent social and political revolution tailored to Bakunin's temperament. Its polemics are aimed at the "compromisers" – who Bakunin called "positivists" as

opposed to the radical "negativists" with regard, of course, to the *status quo* or establishment – and the radicals. **The religious tone of some passages mark the essay as belonging to the period before his study of socialist ideas, a study which led to his public advocacy of atheism in 1860.**

But there is still a third category of adversaries of the principle of revolution: that is the *Reactionary party* which emerged all over Europe soon after the Restoration. **In politics it is called *Conservatism,* in jurisprudence the *Historical School,* and in the science of speculation, *Positive Philosophy.***
...

Only if it first comes to an awareness of its holy, priestly office through this painful contact with reality; only if it recognizes through the endless difficulties which stand everywhere in its way and which flow not only from the obscurantism of its adversaries, and it often seems to imply, but also and rather from the fullness and totality of human nature which cannot be exhausted in abstract theoretical propositions – only if it first recognizes through these difficulties the inadequacy of its whole present existence and thus comes to understand that its enemy is at hand not only externally but also and much more internally, and that it must therefore begin by conquering its internal enemy; only if it first convinces itself that Democracy not only stands in opposition to the government and is not only a particular constitutional or politico-economic change, but a total transformation of that world condition and a herald of an original, new life which has not yet existed in history; **especially only if it first comes to understand that Democracy is a religion, if it thus through this awareness itself becomes religious, that is, *permeated* by its principle not only in thought and reasoning, but true to it also in real life down to life's smallest manifestations, only then will the Democratic party really conquer the world.**

Consequently, we want to admit candidly that the present power of the Reactionary party is not contingent but necessary. **It has its ground not in the inadequacy of the Democratic *principle* – this is indeed that of the equality of man realizing itself in freedom and thus also is the most intrinsic, universal, and all-embracing, in a word the unique essence of the Spirit self-operating in history.**
...

Democracy does not yet exist independently in its affirmative abundance, but only as the denial of the Positive, and therefore, in this evil state, it too must be destroyed along with the Positive, so that from its free ground it may spring forth again in a newborn state, as its own living fullness. **And this self-change of the Democratic party will not be merely a *quantitative* change, i.e., a broadening of its present particular and hence evil existence: God save us, such a broadening would be the leveling of the whole world and the end result of all of history would be absolute nothingness – but a *qualitative* transformation, a new, vital, and life-creating revelation, a new heaven and a new earth, a young and magnificent world in which all present discords will resolve themselves into harmonious unity.**
...

Indeed, for us alone, who are called the enemies of the Christian religion, for us alone is it reserved, and even made the highest duty even in the most ardent of fights, really to exercise love, this highest commandment of Christ and this only way of true Christianity.
...

Yes, they who so glory in their morality are immoral men, for morality is impossible outside the religion of free humanity which alone brings heavenly joy. One must repeat to them what the author of the Apocalypse said to the Compromisers of his own day:

> I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot. I would thou wert cold or hot.
>
> But because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth.
>
> Because thou sayest: I am rich, and made wealthy, and have need of nothing: and knowest not, that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked.[3]

...

I maintain in reply, however, that contradictions have never been so sharply presented as now, that the eternal contradiction, which is the same at all times except that it increases in intensity and develops itself ever more in the course of history, **that this contradiction of freedom and unfreedom has advanced and soared to its last and highest summit in our time, otherwise a time so similar to the period of dissolution of the heathen world.** Have you not read the mysterious and awesome words, *Liberté, Égalité* and *Fraternité* on the foreground of the Temple of Freedom erected by the Revolution? And do you not know and feel that these words intimate the complete annihilation of the present political and social world? Have you heard nothing of the storms of the revolution, and do you not know that Napoleon, this so-called tamer of Democracy, diffused its leveling principles over all of Europe, like a worthy son of the Revolution? **Have you not also perhaps heard something of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, or do you really know nothing of a philosophy which established the same leveling revolutionary principle in the intellectual world – namely, the principle of the autonomy of Spirit? And do you not comprehend that this principle stands in the highest contradiction to all current positive religions, to all present-day churches?**

‘Yes,’ you will answer, ‘but these contradictions belong to past history; the Revolution was most recently subdued in France itself by the wise reign of Louis-Philippe, and modern philosophy by one of its greatest originators, by Schelling himself. Contradiction is now everywhere dissolved, in all spheres of life.’ And do you really believe in this dissolution, in this subjugation of the Spirit of revolution? Are you then blind and deaf and have you no eyes or ears for what goes on around you? No, Gentlemen, the Spirit of revolution is not subdued, it has only gone back into itself again, after having convulsed the whole world in its foundations by its first appearance; it has only sunk into itself in order soon to reveal itself again as an affirmative, creative principle, and right now it is burrowing – if I may avail myself of this expression of Hegel’s – like a mole under the earth. And that it is not working for nothing you can see from the many ruins with which our religious, political, and social flooring is covered. You speak of resolution, of reconciliation! Just look around you and tell me what has remained alive of the old Catholic and Protestant world. **You speak of the subjugation of the Negative principle! Have you read nothing of *Strauss, Feuerbach* and *Bruno Bauer,* and do you not know that their works are in everyone’s hands?** Do you not see that the whole of German literature, books, brochures, newspapers, indeed, the works of the Positivists themselves, are unwittingly and unwillingly permeated by this negative Spirit? And you call this reconciliation and peace!

You well know that humanity, owing to its high calling, can be satisfied and pacified only by the adoption of a universally practical principle, by a principle which intensely concentrates within itself the thousand different manifestations of spiritual life. But where is this principle, Gentlemen? You must surely now and then experience vital, human moments during the course of your existence, otherwise so dismal; moments when you cast aside the petty concerns of your daily life and yearn for the true, for the noble, for the holy. Answer me honestly, now, your hand on your heart, have you ever anywhere found something vital? **Have you ever discovered under the ruins which surround us this world you long for, where you could wholly surrender yourselves and be once more born anew in this great communion with all humanity?**
...

On the other hand, however, visible appearances are stirring around us, **indicating that the Spirit, this old mole, has brought its underground work to completion and that it will soon come again to pass judgment.** Everywhere, especially in France and England, social and religious societies are being formed, wholly alien to the present political world, societies which derive their life from new sources quite unknown to us and develop and diffuse themselves in silence.
...

Oh, the air is sultry and filled with lightning.

And therefore we call to our deluded brothers: Repent, repent, the Kingdom of the Lord is at hand!

To the Positivists we say: open the eyes of your mind; let the dead bury the dead, and convince yourselves at last that the Spirit, ever young, ever newborn, is not to be sought in fallen ruins! And we exhort the Compromisers to open their hearts to truth, to free themselves of their wretched and blind wisdom, of their intellectual arrogance, and of the servile fear which dries up their souls and paralyses their movements.

Let us therefore trust the eternal Spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unfathomable and eternally creative source of all life. The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too.

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf

To abolish time and time's curses: here was the goal of the pagan world. Eliade writes:

> "**The wish to abolish time can be seen even more clearly in the 'orgy' which takes place, with varying degrees of violence, during the New Year ceremonies. An orgy is also a regression into the 'dark', a restoration of the primeval chaos, and as such precedes all creation, every manifestation of ordered form.** The fusion of all forms into one single, vast, undifferentiated unity is an exact reproduction of the 'total' mode of reality. I pointed out earlier the function and meaning of the orgy, at once sexual and agricultural; at the cosmological level, the 'orgy' represents chaos or the ultimate disappearance of limits and, as time goes, the inauguration of the Great Time, of the 'eternal moment', of non-duration. **The presence of the orgy among the ceremonials marking the periodic divisions of time shows the *will to abolish the past totally by abolishing all creation.***"161

...

Liber, in fact, was a Roman god of chaos, and it is from his name that we derive the world "liberty."

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/11/18.htm

All persecutions and prohibitions have proved ineffectual, and will ever do so; the Germans are a philosophical nation, and will not, cannot abandon Communism, as soon as it is founded upon sound philosophical principles: chiefly if it is derived as an unavoidable conclusion from their own philosophy. **And this is the part we have to perform now. Our party has to prove that either all the philosophical efforts of the German nation, from Kant to Hegel, have been useless — worse**

than useless; or, that they must end in Communism; that the Germans must either reject their great philosophers, whose names they hold up as the glory of their nation, or that they must adopt Communism. And this *will* be proved; this dilemma the Germans will be forced into, and there can scarcely be any doubt as to which side of the question the people will adopt.

There is a greater chance in Germany for the establishment of a Communist party among the educated classes of society, than anywhere else. **The Germans are a very disinterested nation; if in Germany principle comes into collision with interest, principle will almost always silence the claims of interest.** The same love of abstract principle, the same disregard of reality and self-interest, which have brought the Germans to a state of political nonentity, these very same qualities guarantee the success of philosophical Communism in that country. It will appear very singular to Englishmen, that a party which aims at the destruction of private property is chiefly made up by those who have property; and yet this is the case in Germany. **We can recruit our ranks from those classes only which have enjoyed a pretty good education; that is, from the universities and from the commercial class;** and in either we have not hitherto met with any considerable difficulty.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9PViAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA62#v=onepage&q&f=false **[1845]**

The students of other countries are isolated individuals, having no standing of their own in society; but in Germany they form a large recognized section of the body politic, a true republic of letters, the approbation of which men count worth the labour of a lifetime, and in which the manufacture of literature is unceasingly plied, and the rise and fall of the intellectual market observed with the anxiety of a stock exchange. The student, occupied with his appropriate trade, is not thereby severed from his family circle, like the recluse of other lands.
…

Kant is wholly out of date: Hegel, the perfecter of Spinoza, is in the ascendent. His doctrine is a mighty stride of devilry in advance. It is the first German system that promises to work; for it is a philosophy which tallies with principles in the breasts of all classes. But its work will be one of ruin; for the principles which it evokes are those of Antichrist. Its advocates are of various shades—half, whole, and ultra; and there are many who, in spite of its infection, preserve or have recovered a measure of faith and truth, although a far smaller one than they imagine. **But in itself, it is unmixed *Anthropotheism*, not the exaltation of a creature to the place of God, but the assertion that a creature is the sole and essential God. It is the nearest approach yet made to the preparation of Christendom for receiving the Man of Sin. Its slime defiles some of the noblest minds in the land;** and it possesses this remarkable character, that while in its esoteric aspect it is unfathomably abstruse, its exoteric is extremely popular, level to the capacities, akin to the thoughts, congenial to the habits, touching to the interests, kindling the lusts, of all. **It boasts of being based on or confirmed by the "moderne Bewusstseyn"—the modern consciousness. In spite of the rejoicings of pietists that its refutation is accomplished, it gains ground every day.** And it is reasonable that it should; for the delusion has a deeper root, and is of greater calibre, than any amount of truth which superficial textualists or religious society-agents can oppose to it.
…

But herein lies the bad excellence of Hegelism, that, while utterly expunging from creation, as the "populäre Vorstellung!" (popular representation) of Jacob Böhme, a personal Deity, while rejecting an incarnate Saviour, an indwelling Spirit, an inspired record, an apostolic ministry, a present work of grace, and a coming day of judgment—while accusing Hume and his friends of "Ueberschuss des Glaubens!" (excess of faith) and Kant and his friends of obstinate belief in existence after death ("dass sie davon nicht lassen wollen")—its subtilty is such, that there is no point of Christian verity, no office of the adorable Trinity, no text of Holy Writ, for which it has not an appropriate niche in its temple of lies. It contradicts nothing: it stultifies everything: it confounds, neutralizes, and eliminates all objects of personal faith. **It is the first truly philosophical system, which, denying a life to come, eternizes the present; which, as by a wand of magic, transmutes the transmundane entire into the cismundane, and establishes the "absolute Diesseits" against the exploded "Jenseits."** The thought of man is the fountain—the judgment of man the judge of all things. The consonance of the fact with the thought that is God; the exhibition of that consonance—that is Christ; the measure of its attainment that is the Holy Ghost. Or otherwise, production is the Father—abiding product is the Son—the identity of the two is the Holy Ghost. **The king is to be obeyed, not as the object of personal loyalty, but as the exponent of the thoughts of his subjects, or rather of his philosophers; and, of course, if he expound them not aright, these new Jesuits, faithful to the sheep, may slay the royal wolf. The State is that stamp of thought which shall be eternal, that absolute power on earth to which the**

Church is but the temporary minister. And man, though as an individual born and mortal, is as man the eternal essence "king, slave, and lord ennobled into MAN." **Duty and responsibility, without a basis, are therefore without a sanction.**

The infidelities of Semler and Strauss are the most innocent, because most palpable, form of this system of lies. It seems like a net without entrance or exit. Its meshes are at once too fine for the eye, and too strong for the hand of flesh, such as nothing but the power of the Holy Ghost—the Spirit of the Man Christ Jesus at God's right hand—can break or disentangle. By the *Θεανθρωπος* alone shall the *ανθρωποθεος* fall. Faithful and able men have wielded their pens against the system; but though they convict it, they cannot destroy it. It is truly the Catholic religion of Satan—the design for his human image. **It is well styled by Julius Müller "einen neuaufgeputzten, zu einem autolatrischen Genien-Cultus sublimirten Paganismus" (a paganism dressed up anew and sublimed to a self-adoring worship of mind). And if holiness lie in the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, it is not to be wondered at that this philosophy of Antichrist should be one which, in the words of Molitor, "under the semblance of the highest ethics is the direct opposer of morality and the total corrupter of man." It is satan as an angel of light.** A professed convert from the school, hailed flattered, toasted, as a champion of the faith, has spent one winter in demonstrating the existence of an *abstract* God: he proposes to spend another in proving that of an *actual* God; and no one knows when he may arrive at the philosophy of a God *revealed*. **They who do such deliberate violence to the religious consciousness of baptized men must not be surprised if others take up their unfinished work, and proceed by similar reasoning to explode the axioms and expunge the practice of national loyalty and domestic morality.** Where is the Hercules who shall strangle these serpents? How shall this "Gigantomachie" (this war of the giants) be beaten back?

Germany, with such a volcano in its bosom, stands in two very opposite relations to the countries around it on the one hand, and to America on the other. However oppressive in its character, and extravagant in its consequences, the Roman Catholic tyranny over literature and science was, the controversies of Bonn and Paris between the Church and the University have abundantly proved, that if unlawful exercise of control over learning is an evil, its absence is one still greater. **Lawless thoughts need but electric contact with lawless hands to blow up the world.** The German has hitherto dealt with the algebra and logarithms, not with the real quantities, of things. The American, essentially a doer, has sought for principles to realize. Each has found what he sought. The American, without history or pedigree even in literature, unmellowed and uncultered, a *novus homo* in the world, has expressly avoided drawing from British sources, lest his doing so should compromise his liberty, and bring him under bonds to ancient institutions. **The influx of American students, as well as English Dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians, into Germany, and their translations of German works, testify how congenial they find the soil of philosophical license and religious lawlessness.** The caricature, compounded from German pedantry and American slang, of words pregnant with classic import bought up by the gross and misapplied in the "go-a-head" colloquial style of the new country—the sight of ancient garb and gait, plundered from the owner, and not fitted to the wearer, is not a little amusing. But the German has a secret joy in seeing his thoughts realized abroad to an extent which he dared not even imagine at home. What will come of it remains to be seen; but the marriage is one which augurs an evil progeny. **On the other hand, while the German philosophy is rendered more liberal by being transplanted to America, it is itself that which fosters the liberalism and infidelity of its continental neighbours. The Dane, the Swede, the Frenchman, the Italian, the Greek, the Hungarian, and even the Turk, but most of all the Russian, turns to Germany, in the hope of emancipation from the trammels of ancient prejudice. In Russia, the ruler and the ruled, though with different ends, seek, by a rare coincidence, the same things; the Emperor, seeking to cope with Europe by improving his intellectual breed, as a farmer his cattle; the people, stealthily awakening to a consciousness of their wants and of their power.** The education, in search of which the literary emissaries of Russia are spread abroad, has no professed connection with religion. Indeed it cannot; for it is sought at the hands of heretics. In point of fact, it will soon prove a Trojan horse, and subvert the institutions it is intended to sustain. Germany is the great magazine for every free-thinker and liberal of northern Europe. **And this is the more remarkable when we consider that there never was a time when she was nationally more at antipodes with both Russia and France;** hating the duplicity, tyranny, and covetousness of Russia to such a degree that nothing but the alliance of the courts prevents a rupture; and holding everything French at a discount, to an extent which the increased power of Prussia now renders safe.

There are other Christian lands in which Jews are more numerous, and perhaps influential; **but in no part of Christendom, so educated and civilized as Germany, is the Jewish element so great.**
…

In Poland, he is the mortgagee of the earth—in Holland, the receptacle of its gold—**in Germany, the astute student of its learning.** And whether by relaxations on the part of Christian governments, or by compromise on his part, there is no province of literature, and scarce any of public employment, into which he has not crept, and where he is not felt.
…

And of those who have become Christians, too many, baptized for gain and in hypocrisy, only reap, as members of Christ, a heavier judgment, instead of enjoying those higher blessings which they cannot appretiate. **Like the blank leaf between the two Testaments, they stand between both, but shew nothing of either, and are of all classes in society the most unprincipled**—that is, the most destitute of a moral rule for thought or action.
…

On the other hand, **among the literary classes of Germany, there are none whose powers and hopes are so awake, whose consciences are so asleep, and whose habits so sweep and garnish them for the immoveable occupancy of atheism and revolution, as the Judæo-christian *literati*.** When Antichrist shall be revealed, they will be the first to hail him as their Messiah, as their fathers in France hailed his precursor Napoleon. And their confession to the Man of Sin will indissolubly rivet the fetters of delusion on the apostates of the Christian Church.
…

The fever of liberality towards the Jews, which indicates the ignorance of the Gentile as to their present state and peculiar hope, is at its height in Germany. While among us the Christian counsellors of a Christian monarch, almost without one misgiving, recommend the devolution of her authority to men who do not belong to any different Christian persuasion, **but who must, if at all honest, ever seek to destroy the name of Christ as that of an arch-impostor; we find the German liberals of every provincial diet banded together in the cause of suffering Judaism, and classing Jewish emancipation with national parliaments, freedom of the press, and publicity of trial, &c., as things essential to the contentment of the public mind.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Use_and_Abuse_of_History_for_Life#8

I believe there has been no dangerous turning-point in the progress of German culture in this century that has not been made more dangerous by the enormous and still living influence of this Hegelian philosophy. The belief that one is a late-comer in the world is, anyhow, harmful and degrading: but it must appear frightful and devastating when it raises our late-comer to godhead, by a neat turn of the wheel, as the true meaning and object of all past creation, and his conscious misery is set up as the perfection of the world's history. **Such a point of view has accustomed the Germans to talk of a "world-process," and justify their own time as its necessary result. And it has put history in the place of the other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the one sovereign;** inasmuch as it is the "Idea realising itself," the "Dialectic of the spirit of the nations," and the "tribunal of the world."

History understood in this Hegelian way has been contemptuously called God's sojourn upon earth,—though the God was first created by the history. He, at any rate, became transparent and intelligible inside Hegelian skulls, and has risen through all the dialectically possible steps in his being up to the manifestation of the Self: **so that for Hegel the highest and final stage of the world-process came together in his own Berlin existence.** He ought to have said that everything after him was merely to be regarded as the musical coda of the great historical rondo,—or rather, as simply superfluous. He has not said it; and thus he has implanted in a generation leavened throughout by him the worship of the "power of history," that practically turns every moment into a sheer gaping at success, into an idolatry of the actual: for which we have now discovered the characteristic phrase "to adapt ourselves to circumstances." **But the man who has once learnt to crook the knee and bow the head before the power of history, nods "yes" at last, like a Chinese doll, to every power, whether it be a government or a public opinion or a numerical majority;** and his limbs move correctly as the power pulls the string. If each success have come by a "rational necessity" and every event show the victory of logic or the "Idea", then—down on your knees quickly, and let every step in the ladder of success have its reverence! There are no more living mythologies, you say? Religions are at their last gasp? **Look at**

the religion of the power of history, and the priests of the mythology of Ideas, with their scarred knees!

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/190/mode/2up?view=theater

> 44. It is astounding to what an extent it is possible to reconstruct Marxist thought in referring to Hegel and Saint-Simon. **Hegel's notions of the duel between master and slave, the reflection of their material condition in the mind, the role of work and struggle, the final reconciliation, and other ideas more than prefigure, they literally prescribe, Marxist notions of history, the class struggle, the role of the proletariat, and the classless society.**

---

https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/816/pg816-images.html#link2HCH0007

If there be a philosophical system which teaches that all things material and immaterial, visible and invisible, which the world contains, are only to be considered as the several parts of an immense Being, which alone remains unchanged amidst the continual change and ceaseless transformation of all that constitutes it, **we may readily infer that such a system, although it destroy the individuality of man—nay, rather because it destroys that individuality—will have secret charms for men living in democracies.** All their habits of thought prepare them to conceive it, and predispose them to adopt it. It naturally attracts and fixes their imagination; it fosters the pride, whilst it soothes the indolence, of their minds. **Amongst the different systems by whose aid philosophy endeavors to explain the universe, I believe pantheism to be one of those most fitted to seduce the human mind in democratic ages. Against it all who abide in their attachment to the true greatness of man should struggle and combine.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/40868/40868-h/40868-h.html#toc17

If, then, Spinoza calls the world God, it is exactly the same thing as when Rousseau in the "*Contrat social*," constantly and throughout denotes the people by the word *le souverain*; we might also compare it with this, that once a prince who intended to abolish the nobility in his land, in order to rob no one of his own, hit upon the idea of ennobling all his subjects.

https://www.academia.edu/38818023/Vox_populi_vox_Dei_The_Pantheistic_Temptation_of_Democracy

An even stronger rejection of the pantheistic temptation is visible in Schmitt's writings after the Second World War. **Again and again he criticized Spinoza's formula *deus sive natura*—the identification of God and nature—as leading to inhuman concepts of democracy:**

> "**Deus sive natura. Merging in nature. Elimination of every distance, that is of every perspection, the non-perspective forming;** ... theism; transcendence, even intelligence: this all is yet still distance, perspection, difficulty, defection from the pure immanence of an immediate natural undisguised worldliness and an unproblematic bodily existence. **Therefore: down with distance! Pure identity. Do you now realize on which side the logic of pure democracy can be found and who will be given absolution ... from the most inhuman atrocities as long as everything remains democratic?**" (Schmitt 1991, 84-85)

> *m. anjé on X*: **Monism is metaphysical Communism. In it there is no real or essential difference between entities, and thus all hierarchy, distance and distinction is illusory.** You are one with all sewerage and all sewerage is one with you.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/56/mode/2up?view=theater

The atheist-materialists who preceded him were all interpreters of the world, not its transformers, not activists. **Marx did not inherit the atheist ambition from any of them but from the German idealists, from Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling. They were the first after the gnostics of the early Christian centuries, to systematize the notions of an evil creation and to place on man the whole burden of a new creation.** It was Kant, Hegel and Fichte who proposed, really, those elements of Marxist philosophy which may be considered original in a materialist system: the vocation of the subjective will to assume the infinite and the absolute as its object. What the divine self is for Marx's idealist predecessors, namely a temporarily detached part of The One, becomes, when transposed by Marx, a self-engendered Nature, an auto-genesis on the level of mankind also. The popularity of this position resides in the ease with which modern Faustian man can at once grasp it and make it his own. **It is arduous to grasp oneself as an aggregate of atoms and of impersonal mechanical forces. This is an admissible infrastructure for Stoic souls who regard the sharp and brilliant point of their consciousness as a sufficient support of their nobility of character and moral athleticism**

in a world otherwise totally material and indifferent. It is not acceptable to modern man who, whether he likes it or not, has a scriptural view of things, cannot face the Pascalian libertine's icy spaces, but welcomes the ontological promotion to divine status implied in auto-genesis.

https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/11/28/pers-n28.html

On his return trip from Manchester, Engels met Marx in Paris for 10 days of intensive discussion, which resulted in agreement on all important questions. A result of this discussion was *The Holy Family: Critique of the Critical Critics*, a ruthless settling of accounts with the Young Hegelians, which was published under a joint byline in early 1845. **The Young Hegelians, who cast themselves as incredibly revolutionary, advocated criticism that stood above all classes and parties, rejected all practical activity, and viewed the working class contemptuously as an uncritical mass. Both anarchism and the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School would later base themselves on the Young Hegelians.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/introduction.htm

Engels later defined the place of *The Holy Family in* the history of Marxism when he wrote: "**The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach's new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development.** This further development of Feuerbach's standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in *The Holy Family*." (F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*.)

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch00.htm

***Real humanism* has no more dangerous enemy in Germany than *spiritualism* or *speculative idealism*, which substitutes "*self-consciousness*" or the "*spirit*" for the *real individual man* and with the evangelist teaches: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing."** Needless to say, this incorporeal spirit is spiritual only in its imagination. What we are combating in *Bauer's* criticism is precisely *speculation* reproducing itself as a *caricature.* **We see in it the most complete expression of the *Christian-Germanic* principle, which makes its last effort by transforming *"criticism"* itself into a transcendent power.**
...

Paris, September 1844

Engels, Marx

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_c.htm

Robespierre and Saint-Just spoke explicitly of "liberty, justice and virtue" of *ancient times*, belonging only to the "*popular community*". *Spartans*, *Athenians* and *Romans* at the time of their greatness were "free, just and virtuous peoples".

> **"What," asks Robespierre in his speech on the principles of public morals** (sitting of the Convention on February 5, 1794), **"is the *fundamental principle* of democratic or popular government? It is *virtue*, I mean *public* virtue, which worked such miracles in *Greece* and *Rome* and which will work still greater ones in Republican France; virtue which is nothing but love of one's country and its laws."**

Robespierre then explicitly calls the *Athenians* and *Spartans* "*peuples libres*". He continually recalls the ancient *popular commune* and quotes its heroes as well as its corrupters — Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Miltiades, Aristides, Brutus and Catilina, Caesar, Clodius and Piso.

In his report on Danton's arrest (referred to by Criticism) *Saint-Just* says explicitly:

> **"The world has been empty since the *Romans*, and only their memory fills it and still prophesies liberty."**

His accusation is composed in the ancient style and directed against *Danton* as against *Catilina*.

In *Saint-Just's* other report, the one on the general police, the *republican* is described exactly in the *ancient* sense, as *inflexible*, *modest, simple* and so on. **The *police* should be an institution of the same nature as the Roman *censorship*. — He does not fail to mention Codrus, Lycurgus, Caesar, Cato, Catilina, Brutus, Antonius, and Cassius.** Finally, *Saint-Just* describes the "*liberty*, justice and virtue" that he demands in a *single word* when he says:

> **"Que les hommes révolutionnaires soient des *Romains*." ["Let revolutionary men be Romans."]**

Robespierre, Saint-Just and their party fell because they confused the ancient, *realistic-democratic commonweal* based on *real slavery* with the *modern spiritualistic-democratic representative state,* which is based on *emancipated slavery, bourgeois society.* What a terrible illusion it is to have to recognise and sanction in the *rights of man* modern bourgeois society, the society of industry, of universal competition, **of private interest freely pursuing its aims, of anarchy, of self-estranged natural and spiritual individuality, and at the same time to want afterwards to annul the *manifestations of the life* of this society in particular individuals** and simultaneously to want to model the *political head* of that society in the manner of antiquity!

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm

> "***Spinozism* dominated the eighteenth century both in its later French variety, which made matter into substance, and in deism, which conferred on matter a more spiritual name.** ... *Spinoza's French school* and the supporters of deism were but two sects disputing over the true meaning of *his system*. ... The simple fate of this Enlightenment was its decline in *romanticism* after being obliged to surrender to the reaction which began after the French movement."

...

Seventeenth century *metaphysics*, driven from the field by the *French Enlightenment*, notably, by French materialism of the eighteenth century, experienced a *victorious and substantial restoration* in *German philosophy*, particularly in *the speculative German philosophy* of the nineteenth century. **After *Hegel* linked it in a masterly fashion with all subsequent metaphysics and with German idealism and founded a metaphysical universal kingdom,** the attack on theology again corresponded, as in the eighteenth century, to an attack on *speculative metaphysics* and *metaphysics in general*. **It will be defeated for ever by *materialism*, which has now been perfected by the work of *speculation* itself and coincides with *humanism*.**

...

***Descartes* in his *physics* endowed *matter* with self-creative power and conceived *mechanical* motion as the manifestation of its life. He completely separated his *physics* from his *metaphysics*.** *Within* his physics, *matter* is the sole *substance*, the sole basis of being and of knowledge.

Mechanical French materialism adopted *Descartes' physics* in opposition to his metaphysics. **His followers were by profession *anti-metaphysicians*, i.e., *physicists*. This school begins with the *physician Le Roy,* [Henricus Regius] reaches its zenith with the physician *Cabanis*, and the physician *La Mettrie* is its centre.** Descartes was still living when Le Roy, like *La Mettrie* in the eighteenth century, transposed the Cartesian structure of the animal to the human soul and declared that the soul is a *modus of the body* and *ideas* are *mechanical motions*. **Le Roy even thought Descartes had kept his real opinion secret. Descartes protested.** At the end of the eighteenth century *Cabanis* perfected Cartesian materialism in his treatise *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*.

...

1) Hegel's [*Vorlesungen über die*] *Geschichte der Philosophie* presents French materialism as the *realisation* of the Substance of Spinoza, **which at any rate is far more comprehensible than "the French school of Spinoza'.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_f.htm

> **"Modern Criticism,"** we are told, "**had finally dealt with Spinozism;** it was therefore inconsistent of it naively to presuppose Substance in one domain, even if only in individual, falsely expounded points."

...

A few quotations will show that by overcoming *Spinozism Criticism* ended up in *Hegelian idealism*, that from "*Substance*" it arrived at another *metaphysical monster, the "Subject", "Substance as a process", "infinite self-consciousness"*, **and that the final result of "perfect" and "pure" Criticism is the *restoration of the Christian theory of creation* in a *speculative, Hegelian* form.**

...

In *Hegel* there are *three* elements, *Spinoza's Substance*, *Fichte's Self-Consciousness and* Hegel's necessarily antagonistic *unity* of the two, the *Absolute Spirit*. The first element is metaphysically disguised *nature separated* from man; the second is metaphysically disguised *spirit separated* from nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised *unity* of both, *real man* and the real *human species.*

Within the domain of theology, ***Strauss* expounds *Hegel* from *Spinoza's point of view,* and Bauer does so from *Fichte's point of view*, both quite consistently.** They both *criticised* Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was *falsified* by the other, whereas they carried each of these elements to its *one-sided* and hence consistent development. — Both of them therefore go *beyond* Hegel in their criticism, but both also remain *within* his speculation and each represents only *one* side of his system. ***Feuerbach*, who completed and criticised *Hegel from Hegel's point of view* by resolving the metaphysical *Absolute* Spirit into "*real man on the basis of nature*", was the first to complete the *criticism of religion* by sketching in a grand and masterly manner the *basic features* of the *criticism of Hegel's speculation* and hence of *all metaphysics*.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch08_2.htm

She insists that she is not one "to have fits of tears": "*Je ne suis pas pleurnicheuse*" [I am no cry-baby]; but her position in life is sad — "*Ça nest pas gai.*" [It isn't a happy one] **Finally, contrary to Christian *repentance*, she pronounces on the past the human sentence, at once *Stoic* and Epicurean, of a free and strong nature:**

> "Enfin ce qui est fait, est fait." [Well, what is done is done]

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03a.htm

After presenting us with some astounding revelations about the Sophists and Socrates, Saint Max immediately jumps to the Sceptics. He discovers that they completed the work which Socrates began. **Hence the positive philosophy of the Greeks that followed immediately after the Sophists and Socrates, especially Aristotle's encyclopaedic learning, does not exist at all for Jacques le bonhomme.** He strives "to get rid as quickly as possible" of the past and hurries to the transition to the "moderns", finding this transition in the Sceptics, Stoics and Epicureans.
...

The Stoical wise man by no means has in mind "life without living development", but an *absolutely active* life, as is evident even from his concept of nature, which is Heraclitean, dynamic, developing and living, while for the Epicureans the principle of the concept of nature is the *mars immortalis* [immortal death; Lucretius, De rerum natura libri sex, Book 3, Verse 882], **as Lucretius says, the atom, and, in opposition to Aristotle's divine energy, divine leisure is put forward as the ideal of life instead of "active life".**

> "The ethics of the Stoics (their only science, for they were unable to say anything about the spirit except what its relation to the world should be; and about nature — physics — they could say only that the wise man has to assert himself against it) is not a doctrine of the spirit, but merely a doctrine of rejection of the world and of self-assertion against the world" (p. 31).

The Stoics were able to "say about nature" that physics is one of the most important sciences for the philosopher and consequently they even went to the trouble of further developing the physics of Heraclitus; they were "further able to say" that the □□□, masculine beauty, is the highest that the individual could represent, and glorified life in tune with nature, although they fell into contradictions in so doing. According to the Stoics, philosophy is divided into three doctrines: "physics, ethics, logic".

> "They compare philosophy to the animal and to the egg, logic — to the bones and sinews of the animal, and to the outer shell of the egg, ethics — to the flesh of the animal and to the albumen of the egg, and physics — to the *soul* of the animal and to the yolk of the egg" (Diogenes Laertius, *Zeno*).

From this alone it is evident how little true it is to say that "ethics is the only science of the Stoics". **It should be added also that, apart from Aristotle, they were the chief founders of formal logic and systematics in general.**

That the "Stoics were unable to say anything about the spirit" is so little true that even *seeing spirits* originated from them, on account of which Epicurus opposes them, as an Enlightener, and ridicules them as "old women", while precisely the Neo-Platonists borrowed part of their tales about spirits from the Stoics. This spirit-seeing of the Stoics arises, on the one hand, from the impossibility of achieving a dynamic concept of nature without the material furnished by empirical natural science, and, on the other hand, from their effort to interpret the ancient Greek world and even religion in a speculative manner and make them analogous to the thinking spirit.

> https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/114/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Was not spirit some sort of pervading essence, some subtle ethereal fluid, differing from matter principally in being less gross and dense?** This was the point to which they went down rapidly enough; the point to which all philosophies, I firmly believe, will descend, which do not keep in sight that the spiritual means the moral. In trying to make it mean exclusively the intellectual, they will degrade it to mean the merely logical and abstract; and when that is found to be a barren and lifeless phantom, a mere projection of the human brain, attributing reality to mere conceptions and names, and confusing the subject with the object, as logicians say truly the Neoplatonists did, **then, in despair, the school will try to make the spiritual something real, or, at least, something conceivable, by reinvesting it with the properties of matter, and talking of it as if it were some manner of gas, or heat, or electricity, or force, pervading time and space, conditioned by the accidents of brute matter, and a part of that nature which is born to die.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19104/19104-h/19104-h.htm#fna117
>
> **These Gnostics, says Eliphas Lévi, under the pretext of "spiritualizing matter, materialized the spirit in the most revolting ways.** ... Rebels to the hierarchic order, ... they wished to substitute the mystical licence of sensual passions to wise Christian sobriety and obedience to laws. ... Enemies of the family, they wished to produce sterility by increasing debauchery."[118]

The “ethics of the Stoics” is so much a “doctrine of world rejection and of self-assertion against the world” that, for example, it was counted a Stoical virtue to “have a sound fatherland, a worthy friend”, that “the beautiful alone” is declared to be “the good”, **and that the Stoical wise man is allowed to mingle with the world in every way, for example, to commit incest, etc., etc.** The Stoical wise man is to such an extent caught up “in a life of isolation and not in a life in common with others” that it is said of him in *Zeno*:

> “Let not the wise man wonder at anything that seems wonderful — but neither will the worthy man live in *solitude,* for he is *social* by nature and *active in practice*” (Diogenes Laertius, Book VII, 1).

Incidentally, it would be asking too much to demand that, for the sake of refuting this school-boyish wisdom of Jacques le bonhomme, one should set forth the very complicated and contradictory ethics of the Stoics.

In connection with the Stoics, Jacques le bonhomme has to note the existence of the *Romans* also (p. 3 1), of whom, of course, he is unable to say anything, since they have no philosophy. **The only thing we hear of them is that *Horace* (!) “did not go beyond the Stoics’ worldly wisdom”** (p. 32). *Integer vitae, scelerisque purus*! [he of life without flaw, pure from sin. Horace, The Odes, Book I — Ode XXII. Verse 1]

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm

On the other hand, the Germans were professors, state-appointed instructors of youth; their writings were recognized textbooks, and the termination system of the whole development — the Hegelian system — was even raised, as it were, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of state! **Was it possible that a revolution could hide behind these professors, behind their obscure, pedantic phrases, their ponderous, wearisome sentences? Were not precisely these people who were then regarded as the representatives of the revolution, the liberals, the bitterest opponents of this brain-confusing philosophy?** But what neither the government nor the liberals saw was seen at least by one man as early as 1833, and this man was indeed none other than Heinrich Heine.[A]

Let us take an example. No philosophical proposition has earned more gratitude from narrow-minded governments and wrath from equally narrow-minded liberals than Hegel’s famous statement: **“All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real.”** That was tangibly a sanctification of things that be, a philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship. **That is how Frederick William III and how his subjects understood it. But according to Hegel certainly not everything that exists is also real, without further qualification. For Hegel the attribute of reality belongs only to that which at the same time is necessary: “In the course of its development reality proves to be necessity.”**
...

The Roman Republic was real, but so was the Roman Empire, which superseded it. In 1789, the French monarchy had become so unreal, that is to say, so robbed of all necessity, so irrational, that it had to be destroyed by the Great Revolution, of which Hegel always speaks with the greatest enthusiasm. **In this case, therefore, the monarchy was the unreal and the revolution the real. And so, in the course of development, all that was previously real becomes unreal, loses it necessity, its right of existence, its rationality.** And in the place of moribund reality comes a new,

viable reality — peacefully if the old has enough intelligence to go to its death without a struggle; forcibly if it resists this necessity.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=PZPAH2AGAe8C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 48. It would go too far to suggest that Stoics ever consciously justified either slavery or private property simply on the ground that their mere existence makes them part of the divine order. So far as we know they never expressly assert this, as some Christian theologians were to do, making slavery a chastisement imposed by God as a consequence of the fall of Adam. **Granted that 'whatever is, is right', 'whatever is' comprises men with their various characters and impulses; hence it must also be part of the providential order when they are impelled to introduce changes in the status quo and, should they succeed, their success becomes part of it.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA203#v=onepage&q&f=false

IN THE ESSAY PUBLISHED to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death in 1913, Vladimir Ilych Lenin wrote of **the '<u>three sources and component parts of Marxism.</u>'** 'The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true,' he asserted; **it was, furthermore, 'the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism.'**1
…

But a version of Lenin's core thought remains both powerful and plausible: that what eventually crystallized under the banner of Marxism was in an important sense **a putting together, as well as a radical transformation,** of major elements of German idealist philosophy, especially Hegel; of the classical political economy that reaches back to Adam Smith; and of the radical French politics that unfolded over the course of the Revolutionary decade of the 1790s.
…

Immanuel Kant, standing at the head of the tradition of German idealism, admired Rousseau intensely. As a young philosopher, he thought that the 'thirst for knowledge' alone constituted the 'honor of mankind,' but 'Rousseau set me right,' from whom he learned not to despise 'the rabble who knows nothing' and 'to respect human nature,'11 **and the only picture that hung in Kant's house, over his writing desk, was a portrait of Rousseau.**12
…

J.G. Fichte, who held the chair in philosophy at Jena in the 1790s, was a serious student of the writings of both Rousseau and Kant – and of Kant's reading of Rousseau – **and his ideas, set out principally in two major works of political philosophy, the *Foundations of Natural Right* and *The Closed Commercial State*, could look very Stoic indeed.** Fichte argued that autonomy was specifically realised in this twofold sense, subjective and objective, through the work that individuals did, which established a certain relationship of the will with nature. **Perceptive readers of Fichte made the connection to the Stoics: writing in *Le Catholique* in 1827, the Baron d'Eckstein called Fichte's argument a piece of 'transcendent industrialism,' arguing that his closed commercial state was really a 'republic of beavers' <u>and that he sought to transform every citizen into the Stoics' sage.</u>**18 And as Neuhouser has argued persuasively in his study, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory*, these two conditions for autonomy are carried over from Rousseau's thought and firmly embedded in the account of political freedom that G.W.F. Hegel, another Jena philosopher, offered in his 1821 *Philosophy of Right*.

Turning from German idealism to consider British political economy, Adam Smith remained gripped by Rousseau's arguments. As the letter to the *Edinburgh Review* suggests, in the 1750s they had **a shared interest in fashioning a response to Mandeville's social theory by employing Mandeville's own neo-Epicurean premises. But where Rousseau's train of thought took him in an increasingly Stoicizing direction, Smith remained committed to David Hume's more Epicurean optimism about the possibilities of commercial society** – not if the present policies were pursued by Europe's rulers, to be sure, but in a different but by no means utopian alternative future.
…

On 29 Prairial, An III – or 17 June 1795, according to the once and future Gregorian calendar – Gilbert Romme, **who was himself the author of the Republican calendar,** together with five of his fellow Montagnard deputies and various others, was sentenced to death by a military tribunal that had been appointed to restore order to Paris after the popular uprisings of 12 Germinal and 1 Prairial. Shortly after the sentence was handed down, the six deputies attempted to kill themselves with two concealed knives and a pair of scissors, and four of them succeeded. **Their language was Stoic: Romme had told the court that although 'mon corps est à la loi, mon âme reste indépendante et ne peut être flétrie';**30 his colleagues Pierre Amable Soubrany, Jean-Marie Goujon, and Pierre Bourbotte similarly used the rhetoric of Epictetus and Seneca and invoked the example of Cato the Younger.31 The dramas of the French Revolution, Karl Marx memorably noted, were often played out 'in Roman costume and with Roman phrases,'32 and these Montagnards' suicides were exemplary in this regard; **Thomas Carlyle called them the '*ultimi Romanorum*.'**33

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA6#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although Hegel is not discussed at length, my approach is very much influenced by his analysis of the French Revolution in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.6 Hegel locates a change in the meaning of tyranny in modern politics from the tyrant's pursuit of pleasure to an impersonal, self-abnegating, and therefore seemingly "idealistic" destruction of all premodern ties to family, class, and region in the name of a contentless vision of a unified community or state. **Thus, whereas Plato**

considered tyrants to be fundamentally venal, what is so frightening about modern terroristic rulers such as Robespierre, Stalin, Hitler, or Pol Pot is precisely their apparent imperviousness to ordinary greed and hedonistic pleasure in their rigorous dedication to a "historical mission" of destruction and reconstruction. Their savagery becomes a duty that cannot be "compromised" by their own self-interest or love of a noble reputation, which arguably puts them outside of the Platonic starting point for the diagnosis and treatment of the tyrannical personality.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA499#v=onepage&q&f=false

Whereas the classics understood the passion of eros as both the source of tyranny and as containing the potential for its rehabilitation, modern totalitarian tyranny, I would argue, is aimed at the extirpation and suppression of eros altogether in both ruler and ruled. Thus, modern tyrannies like those of Stalin and Hitler must be understood not primarily in erotic terms, or even as deformed versions of eros, but as the radicalization of the will to master nature that includes the repression of human nature, most especially as it is characterized by an erotic longing for the beautiful and the good and the longing for an immortal reputation through noble deeds. The characteristically modern tyrant has therefore much less in common with exemplars of depraved or excessive eros like Alcibiades or (depending on your judgment) Julius Caesar and more in common with Torquemada. **The modern totalitarian tyrant is a secularized fanatic, what Konrad Heiden called "the man in the plain field tunic" who is abstemious and ascetic, or at least not prone to public displays of luxurious personal grandeur, ornamentation, architectural splendor, and robes of state characteristic of traditional monarchs all the way back to Cyrus the Great.** This turn from erotic excess to secularized fanaticism is anticipated, as we earlier observed, in the rise of the terrorist in nineteenth-century Europe and vividly depicted in Flaubert's portrait of the 1848 revolutionary Senecal, as well as Turgenev's portrait of the nihilist Bazarov, and later on in Solzhenitsyn's fictionalized account of Lenin in Zurich.

---

https://archive.org/details/beyondgoodandevi00nietuoft/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

You desire to *live* "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics, what fraud of words!
…

In reality, however, it is quite otherwise with you: **while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature "according to the Stoa," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism!**
…

But this is an old and everlasting story: **what happened in old times with the Stoics still happens to-day, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself.** It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to the *causa prima*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Molnar

Molnar admired Charles Maurras and wrote that French failure to honor Maurras' conservative values was a component of the "agony of France".[2]

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/68/mode/2up?view=theater

He who uses correctly his representations, Epictetus taught, remains master of himself and follows reason, becomes like god and collaborates with him. **Thus, when Epictetus the Slave allowed his leg to be broken by his master and remained unmoved by the pain, he was obeying no ethical injunction like the Christian martyrs in the circus, he was merely marking his adherence to certain epistemological convictions.** If, then, man's nobility consists in the possession of reason (*pneuma*), this gift, or rather natural endowment, is not used for the education of the passion and the will in making right choices according to the admonition of a transcendent agent, **it is used in view of promoting the reasoning self to the status of a grim and stony superman, of a god unmoved by mercy. This god, or supreme point of Nature, turned later into Spinoza's 'serene sage'** with his purely intellectual love of God and man (*amor intellectualis Dei*).

It is perhaps this lack of moral purpose of the Stoics' ethical system which proved to be the cause of Stoicism's enduring influence in the western world where secretly, later overtly, it served as an alternative to Christian moral teaching. The ethically neutral Stoic may be an athlete

of the will in that he silences his own reactions and suffers evil done to him and to others, but he is not a moral man assured of a transcendent object towards which he himself would aspire. Freed of passions, the Stoic sage is also freed of human companionship. **He may count on himself and on the structure of the indifferent universe (and the latter's replica, the abstract cosmopolis based on reason), but the intermediary forms – family, society, fatherland – do not enter either his feelings or calculations because his reason does not present to him intelligible representations of such artificial and passion-filled entities. They are temporary objects only – and the Stoic emperor, Marcus Aurelius, warns us against attaching ourselves to anything temporary.**
…

Needless to say, this denial of passion invariably avenges itself; in concrete life the Stoic desperately searches for suitably noble objects of loyalty and finds such objects in unrealistic, super-human enterprises. He then puts the energy derived from his unused passions at the service of goals which are proportionate with his contempt for everything outside the world-all. **Yet, his selfless endeavor earns him epiphets like 'friend of humanity' (philanthrope), even though he may sacrifice in the process of earning the title a multitude of concrete men or smash concrete human associations.**

> https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/n41/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The difference between the two kinds of policies was well expressed by Hugh Trevor-Roper in his essay 'Sir Thomas More and Utopia'3 in which he termed them Platonic and Machiavellian:
>
> > Machiavelli at least apologized for the methods which he thought necessary in politics. **He regretted the necessity of force and fraud and did not call them by any other name. But Plato and More sanctified them, provided that they were used to sustain their own Utopian republics.**

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/150/mode/2up?view=theater

Zeno started from a large conception of the universe, ruled by the laws of a Divine providence, and exhorted his hearers to ascertain and conform to these laws, promising perfect happiness to him who regenerated his soul by following the great voice of nature, by obeying the will of God in His ordering of the world. **Thus the Stoic sage became the forerunner of the Puritan; he was suddenly, sometimes even unconsciously, transformed from one of the world, from a fool in the Old Testament sense, to a state of wisdom or grace differing *in kind* from his former state.** He was absolutely free, for no power could shackle his mind, and he would leave his body like a garment in the hands of the tyrant if imprisonment or torture assailed his happiness. Nay, he was rich with unfailing treasure. though an-hungered; he was a king, though in the condition of a slave.1 He held the doctrine of Assurance in the highest degree, **and as the sage was incapable of sin, so the righteousness of the fool was but filthy rags, his virtue dross, his knowledge utter ignorance.**

> 1. **There is no mistaking the Stoical training of St. Paul in the splendid periods where he gives all these formulae a newer and deeper meaning,** *e.g.* 'as deceivers, and yet true; as unknown, and yet well known; as dying, and behold, we live; as chastened, and not killed; as sorrowful, yet alway rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things.' — 2 Cor. vi. 8 *sq.*
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA33#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> This is a point where the Stoic moral psychology is much closer to Paul than anything we find in Plato and Aristotle. **In Stoicism grasping the good takes the form of what may be best called a "conversion": a sudden insight that changes all one's previous perceptions and leads to right action.** And that is exactly what we find in Paul too, where the "grasp of the good" (i.e. of the Christ event and its meaning) is something suddenly *believed* (in faith, *pistis*) and *understood* (through the *pneuma*).
> …
>
> When Paul spells out along Stoic lines the change from being what in effect amounts to a Stoic *prokoptôn* (a person making moral progress: here the Jew who wished to follow the law, but did not always manage to do so) to the Christ believer, he in effect describes the latter as a Stoic sage. *Paul saw Christ believers as (Stoic) sages*. Here, of course, he differs entirely from the Stoics themselves, for whom the sage was as rare as the Phoenix.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-3#lf0062-03_head_157

4. He that in the Stoics' account was in the forenoon (for example) the worst man in the world is in the afternoon the best of men; **and he that falls asleep a very sot, dunce, miscreant, and brute, nay, by Jove, a slave and a beggar to boot, rises up the same day a prince, a rich and a happy man, and (which is yet more) a continent, just, determined, and unprepossessed person;** — not by shooting forth

out of a young and tender body a downy beard or the sprouting tokens of mature youth, but by having in a feeble, soft, unmanful, and undetermined mind, a perfect intellect, a consummate prudence, a godlike disposition, an unprejudiced science, and an unalterable habit. **All this time his viciousness gives not the least ground in order to it, but he becomes in an instant, I had almost said, of the vilest brute, a sort of hero, genius, or God.** For he that receives his virtue from the Stoics' portico may say,

> *ASK WHAT THOU WILT, IT SHALL BE GRANTED THEE.*

http://chartes.it/images/attachment/Obbink-Vander%20Waerdt.pdf

All who lack the sage's perfectly consistent and rational disposition are incapable of living in accordance with natural law and, as Zeno remarked controversially, live as enemies to one another.21 On this early Stoic view, natural law does not provide guidance to non-sages in the form of moral rules, obedience to which would constitute conduct of the standard prescribed by the *koinos nomos*.

This is not to say that the *koinos nomos* does not in some sense provide a standard of conduct prescriptive of what other human beings should do and prohibitive of what they should not do. The exordium of Chrysippus' *On Law* (*ap*. Marcian *Inst*. l=*SVF* III 314), no less than Cleanthes' assertions in his *Hymn to Zeus* (*SVF* I 537=Powell, *Call. Alex*. 227ff, from Stob. *Ecl*. 1.2 [I 28 Wachsmuth]) that *Zeus* guides by the *koinos nomos* all things (line 2) and all nature's works (line 11]), both imply that his law enjoins conduct at which all human beings should naturally aim. **But only the godlike sage can attain the standard of conduct (*katorthomata*) prescribed by natural law, since *katorthomata*, in principle inaccessible to ordinary moral progressors, depend on circumstances and therefore cannot be codified in a set of moral rules or precepts that those without the sage's perfectly rational disposition could follow and still act in accordance with natural law.**22 Accordingly, *koinos nomos*, as the early Stoics understand it, corresponds not to a code of moral rules but to a certain mental disposition, namely **the sage's perfectly rational disposition <u>that enables him to make the exceptions to moral precepts required by special circumstances.</u>**23
…

We wish to introduce here even more explicit evidence from Diogenes (perhaps from his treatise *On Rhetoric*) that clearly demonstrates that **the early Stoics, in distinguishing between the merely conventional political regimes of ordinary human beings (the *aphrones*) and the natural community of gods and sages founded in rationality, unequivocally withhold natural law from the latter.**
…

> "[*gap of 6-8 words*] that the statesman always fills all offices in the city [*gap of 10-12 words*] not only [*gap of 2-3 words*] prudence [*gap of 2-3 words*]. And he is not only a good dialectician and grammarian and poet and orator, and perfect in method, having become good at all the arts, but also, **in addition to (that kind of) practical utility, he shares in the government of cities, and not only with those inhabiting Athens or Lacedaemon. <u>For among the foolish there exists no city, nor any law</u>,** but in the confederacy made up of gods and sages he is even truly called general and admiral, treasurer and collection agent, and he is said to administer the rest of the offices in like fashion, since the statesman must of necessity have knowledge of all these matters. But even so, if one must point out [*text breaks off*]"

…

The point, in its original early Stoic formulation, would be that the multiplicity of political organizations possessed by ordinary peoples are for the most part ad hoc conventional measures that are at best imperfect approximations of real government; the only real political institution that meets the standard explicit in Chrysippus' definition of the city (*SVF* III 333, quoted above) is that which exists as a cosmic unity composed of gods and sages. For further substantiation of an early Stoic pedigree for the idea see Philod. *De Stoic*. col. 20.4H (Dorandi [n.36 *infra*] 103: … ("**it is their [*sc*. the Stoic] view that we should not think any of the cities or laws we know to be a city or a law**"); Diogenianus *ap*. Eus. *Praep. Evang*. 6.264 B (*SVF* III 324) addressing Chrysippus: … ("**<u>How is it that you say that all laws that have been posited and all constitutions are in error?</u>**");
…

The consequence of this claim is that the early scholarchs radically deprecate political life as ordinarily understood. **They hold that the conventional political regimes to which human beings belong have no natural status, taking their name and character solely from the inhabitants' conventional and imperfect employment of such institutions** (Ariston *ap*. Plut. *De exil.* 600E=*SVF* I 371); these conventional regimes do not meet the standard explicit in the definition (shared by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes) that only a group of morally good human beings united by natural law constitutes a city;41 and, as this definition implies and as other evidence shows (*supra* nn.17-20), they have no share in natural law, **hence are not communities in which one may attain one's natural end of rational consistency with nature.**

…

This formulation fully accords with the early Stoics' definition of the *koinos nomos* as identical with the sage's right reason – a definition in which *nomos* is not law in the conventional sense of a body of positive enactments and customs that regulate the citizens' social life; it is rather the correct moral reasoning of **sages who, by virtue of their rationality, form a community that recognizes no boundaries drawn merely by convention. Since natural law requires the eradication of all such boundaries** (Plut. *De virt. Alex*. 329 A-B; *cf*. Cic. *Rep*. 3.33), **the Stoic's search for happiness, and for the attainment of his natural perfection, must take place in the *megalopolis*.** Hence it should come as no surprise that the early scholarchs appear to have taken little interest in the relative merits of different forms of regime – none of which, on their original view, would promote a way of life that accords with natural law.42

> 42. No early Stoic text identifies a constitutional preference. **Chrysippus explicitly holds that all existing political regimes are in error, and that we should attach ourselves not to just any regime, but to the right one** (Sen. *De otio* 8.1=*SVF* III 695; *cf*. *Ep*. 68.2) **– a stipulation that only the *megalopolis* can meet.**

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

From such a system only can we explain the many *respectable* tyrants of the succeeding century, men who felt convinced that they knew perfectly what was good for their fellows, and held in a new sense that the philosopher was indeed the only competent king. They felt it lawful to seize supreme power, even by violent means, though their singleness of heart and honesty of purpose were sometimes shown when they found in practice that their theory would not work, and when they consequently resigned their sovranty. But the contempt of torture and death also made Stoics very dangerous advocates of liberty, for if convinced that the removal of a tyrant was in accordance with the will of God, no regard for personal safety restrained them.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Cleomenes*.html#ref1

2 **It is said also that Cleomenes studied philosophy when he was still a stripling, after Sphaerus of Borysthenis had made a voyage to Sparta and busied himself sedulously there with the youth and young men. Sphaerus had become one of the leading disciples of Zeno of Citium, and it would appear that he admired the manly nature of Cleomenes and increased the fires of his high ambition.** 3 For Leonidas of old, as we are told, when asked what manner of poet he thought Tyrtaeus to be, replied; "A good one to inflame the souls of young men." And indeed they were filled with divine inspiration by his poems, and in battle were prodigal of their lives. **However, for great and impetuous natures the Stoic doctrines are somewhat misleading and dangerous, although when they permeate a deep and gentle character, they redound most to its proper good.**

https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/FilosofiaClassica/article/view/1367

Several Stoic (although some are not *only* Stoic) themes can be found in Plutarch's moralizing tale of the lives of his notable Spartans – *Lycurgus*, *Agis*, and *Cleomenes*. **Plutarch quite possibly used Sphaerus's books on Lycurgus and the Spartan Constitution to reference the events and the interpretation of Cleomenes's actions.** Most notably, Stoic concepts can be seen in *Lycurgus* (31) by his references to *homonoia* and the particularly Stoic term *dichonoia*, unity and disunity, respectively. These are central concepts of the Stoic Ideal City that can be found in the works of other notable early Stoics. (Erskine p. 139) *Homonoia* is a feature of the harmonious relationship of wise men in Zeno's Republic, but Plutarch uses this concept specifically when referring to the effects of the reforms imposed by the lawgiver Lycurgus. (Ibid. p. 19) Also, Plutarch is known to use Platonist themes and put them into the mouths of characters in his biographies (Schutrumpf, 1987), but there are a few conversations in the *Cleomenes* that exhibit the Stoic indifference to externals like life and bodily health.
…

Thomas Africa interprets Sphaerus as an opportunistic propagandist who was equally friendly with Ptolemy III who later "betrayed" the Spartan and Ptolemy IV who imprisoned Cleomenes and later desecrated his corpse. (Africa p. 10)
…

Zeno's *Republic* has been argued quite convincingly by Malcolm Schofield in *The Stoic Idea of the City* to have been based on Lycurgan Sparta.1 (p. 40) **Andrew Erskine considers Zeno's *Republic* not to be the work of a young student of philosophy heavily influenced by his Cynic teachers, from which later Stoics would try to distance themselves and their philosophical leader. Rather he argues that Zeno's *Republic* was taken to be a serious, influential work by the early Stoics.** (Erskine p. 11) Zeno's position is that in the Ideal City of sages, wealth and property would be abolished. (p. 37) **Although before Chrysippus it may be anachronistic to speak of an orthodox Stoicism,** one can suspect that Zeno's teachings influenced Sphaerus's philosophy and his vision of the best of

archaic and classical Spartan society and its near-mythical lawgiver, Lycurgus. **Although Lycurgus probably did not intend anything of the sort, equalization of Laconian land, the *kleroi*, was later attributed to him by Plutarch.** Erskine makes his point by discussing the economic upheavals of Hellenistic Greece under the rule of Macedon. (Ch. 4) Another associate of Zeno, Chremonides, had only recently taken the role of general in the unsuccessful fight against Macedonian rule in the Chremonidean War (in fact, his Chremonidean decree2 uses the term *homonoia*). (Erskine p. 94) After the defeat, Stoics like Sphaerus may have sought other berths in which to support uprising by leaders who were equally anti-Macedonian and egalitarian. In this light, Sphaerus is not merely the Greek Goebbels. **He is just as likely a cosmopolitan patriot and a philosopher traveling across the Hellenistic world teaching the Stoic idea that, despite Macedonian hegemony, men are by nature equal – except for virtue.**

Sphaerus's contributions to the Spartan revolution were enabled by the *kathekonta* (appropriate acts) of a sincere, Stoic-influenced Spartan king. The evidence in both the historical data and the physical remnants of the renovations to the *agoge* at the temple of Artemis Orthia show the changes in Sparta to be remarkable. There was evidently enough genuinely Lycurgan elements in Sphaerus's reforms to convince Spartan citizens and *perioikoi* to consolidate and redistribute wealth and property and make any restoration of the *agoge* sustainable. Kennell suggests there may also have been a degree of tension in the scholastic ideology between Sphaerus and the new head of the Stoic school, Chrysippus. The colleagues apparently disagreed on the importance of traditional education. **Possibly Sphaerus's reforms on the Spartan *agoge* may have been his way of confirming his and Zeno's theory on what is in fact necessary for a proper education.** (p. 102)

The details are interesting, but what concern us here are the way and the extent to which the reforms were conducted. **Although the *agoge* was primarily a religious right of passage for boys in Lacedaemon inseparable to the *diaita* (way of life) in archaic and classical Sparta, Sphaerus seems to have transformed it into an education system based on the Hellenistic age-grade model.** However, a typically Spartan emphasis was placed on physical prowess and virtue rather than the typical Greek liberal arts, like geometry and astronomy. (Kennell, *Gymn.*, p. 100) **Endurance, a major component of the Stoic virtue of fortitude, is brought to a bloody reality in Sphaerus's changes to the ritual contest at the altar of Artemis Orthia, where boys from Sphaerus's time onward competed in taking flagellation without complaint, sometimes (on hopefully rare occasions) until death.** (Ibid. pp. 73-4) Among the later Stoics who would nod to this was Epictetus, asserting that only the irrational is unendurable to a rational being: **"Observe how Lacedaemonians take a scourging when they have learned that it is rational."** (*Discourses*, 1.2)
…

T. Africa considers Cleomenes "a most unconventional Spartan." (p. 11) He finds Cleomenes's early education under Sphaerus attested by Plutarch as dubious, **and considers Sphaerus's role in the reforms obscure and slight, if any at all. The latter, at least, is refuted by the evidence found in the remnants of the *agoge* from Hellenistic times during the reign of Cleomenes.** (Kennell ch. 5)
…

Regardless of his actions, or lack of action, **outside Sparta the evidence points to changes that were much more drastic than required for revitalizing the military and social cohesion of 3rd century BCE Laconia.** Interpreting the laws of Lycurgus in a way that would be plausible to the Spartans does not require the complete redistribution of wealth and property that Plutarch mentions. **Nor does it require making citizens of foreigners and Laconians that were disenfranchised by the turns of fortune.** Even sources hostile to Cleomenes argue not against his actions attested to by Phylarchus3 and Plutarch, but the motivations. (Erskine p. 168) **There is no convincing evidence for any equality in Laconian land distribution in the writings of Thucydides and Xenophon in the 4th century BCE. Later writers like Plutarch who are interpreting the actions of previous reformers like Lycurgus and Agis IV are influenced by the Cleomenean revolution of the 3rd century BCE, possibly by the works of Sphaerus himself.** (Ibid p. 139) **The question as to why these changes happened to the degree that they did, if not at all, lies in Sphaerus's Stoic ideals.**

Whatever the truth of the influence of Stoicism on Cleomenes he was primarily a Spartan king, not a professional philosopher, and at any rate his social role would have kept him from realizing Zeno's and Sphaerus's concept of equality among all rational beings outside his kingdom in the Eurotas valley (or to the *helots* until circumstances were dire). **Or just as likely, Sphaerus's goal was to establish his and Zeno's Ideal City in Sparta, a place as resentful to Macedonian rule as possible.** When considering the influence of Sphaerus (and Stoicism) on Cleomenes it is as unfair to hold him accountable for not exporting his reforms to the rest of the Peloponnese as it is to hold Seneca and Cicero accountable for not freeing their own slaves in accordance with their high-minded ideals, or Marcus for not sending court philosophers to spread Stoic wisdom to the Germanic tribesmen. **The upheavals caused by the redistribution of wealth and cancellation of debts inherent in the reforms of Cleomenes and Sphaerus that were so distasteful to aristocrats, and applauded by**

the disenfranchised Peloponnesians, caused the later Stoics to have no truck with the extreme social equality inherent in the philosophy of the early Stoa (Erskine ch. 7). Certainly they had no qualms with slavery qua slavery. It is not always easy to see the implications of one's own ideals, nor is it necessary to be a *sophos* to be influenced by Stoic philosophy.

Conclusion

In our ironical post-modern world the reforms conducted by King Cleomenes III and the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus of Borysthenes have been either cynically attacked or suspiciously dismissed. This work attempts to stop the Spartan retreat and rally against the caustic, unwarranted view of the Spartan as merely a power-hungry, upstart usurper and of the Stoic philosopher as an obsequious, opportunistic intellectual. **In light of the inglorious circumstances of Hellenistic Sparta prior to Cleomenes and Sphaerus, and the social and economic upheaval of the rest of Greece under Macedonian rule, the reforms were an enlightened attempt to return to a Spartan hegemony schooled by the archaic Spartan warrior code of courage and discipline, now wisely influenced by the egalitarian principles of early Stoicism. For better or worse, the successes and failures of the reforms influenced later Sparta and Stoic philosophers alike.** The mixed outcomes would have been an indifferent to a Stoic, but the *kathekonta* of the king and the philosopher deserve their proper respect and place in the history of the Early Stoa and Hellenistic Greece.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

In support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable instances, as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths, who, from the full powers given them, were enabled to shape their laws to the public advantage; but passing over these examples, as of common notoriety, I take one, not indeed so famous, but which merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise laws. Agis, King of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits within which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, because he thought that, from having somewhat deviated from them, his city had lost much of its ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength and power, was, at the very outset of his attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori, as one who sought to make himself a tyrant. **But Cleomenes coming after him in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and writings which he found of Agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained, being stirred by the same desire, perceived that he could not confer this benefit on his country unless he obtained sole power.** For he saw that the ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was useful for many against the will of a few. Wherefore, finding fit occasion, he caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way, to be put to death; after which, he completely renewed the laws of Lycurgus. **And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh life to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that of Lycurgus, had it not been for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek States.** For while engaged with these reforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians, and being by himself no match for them, and having none to whom he could turn for help, he was overpowered; and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were never brought to perfection.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/394/mode/2up?view=theater

This movement, long since visible among the democracies of low franchise, was now reinforced by the appearance of a new champion, the brilliant King of Sparta. His predecessor Agis had already shown the way; he had openly proposed communistic doctrines, the abolition of debts, the redistribution of land, and all this under the guise of Lycurgean principles. He had failed by attempting to persuade his opponents, or to overrule them by political action. **Cleomenes saw, or he had learned from the Stoic firebrand who was constantly beside him, that a downright revolution was necessary;** that the ephors must be, not deposed, but abolished or put to death, and the full power seized by one thorough reformer. He was undoubtedly a tyrant in the real sense, and so he was often called. **But he had the inestimable sentimental advantage of being legitimate king and a Heracleid, whereas the rest were upstarts.**1 Hence his advocacy of democratic principles, his declaration that he would support democracies and the poor if they would give him soldiers, his readiness to abolish oligarchies, **and to stand forth in the perfectly novel position of a Spartan king leading the radical and socialistic democracy of the age.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#influence

Another Hellenistic strong-man, Cleomenes of Sparta, had the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus as one of his advisors. **The reforms instituted in Sparta (including the extension of citizenship to foreigners and the redistribution of land) were seen by some as a Stoic social reform, though it is less clear that it was anything other than an instrument of power for Cleomenes.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/13*.html

6 1 Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians, who had now been in power for over two years, had not yet ventured to attempt any important enterprise, the defeat of Machanidas by the Aetolians being so recent, 2 **but was occupied in laying the foundations of a lasting and oppressive tyranny.** 3 **For he utterly exterminated those of the royal houses[2] who survived in Sparta, and banishing those citizens who were distinguished for their wealth and illustrious ancestry, gave their property and wives to the chief of his own supporters and to his mercenaries,** 4 **who were for the most part murderers, rippers, highwaymen, and burglars.** For such kind of people flocked sedulously to his court from all over the world, people who dared not set foot in their own countries owing to their crimes against God and man. 5 As he constituted himself their protector and employed these men as satellites and members of his bodyguard, it was evident that his rule would long be memorable for its wickedness.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0148%3Abook%3D34%3Achapter%3D31

But then, the name of tyrant, and my conduct, are strong objections against me: **that I call forth slaves to a state of freedom; that I carry out the indigent part of the populace, and give them settlements in lands.**
…

Do not estimate what is done at Lacedaemon by the standard of your own laws and constitution. There is no necessity for comparing particular institutions: you are guided in your choice of a horseman, by the quantity of his property; in your choice of a foot soldier, by the quantity of his property; and your plan is, that a few should abound in wealth, and that the body of the people should be in subjection to them. **Our lawgiver did not choose that the administration of government should be in the hands of a few, such as you call a senate; or that this or that order of citizens should have a superiority over the rest: but he considered that, by equalizing the property and dignity of all, he should multiply the number of those who were to bear arms for their country.** I acknowledge that I have enlarged on these matters, beyond what consists with the conciseness customary with my countrymen, and that the sum of the whole might be comprised in few words: that, since I first commenced a friendship with you, I have given you no just cause to repent it."

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232-images.html#chap09

Nabis,[1] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. **And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,"** for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[2] in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/468/mode/2up?view=theater

This new democratic Sparta was not wanting in grandeur. Nabis established such order in Laconia as had not been known there for a long time. He brought Messenia, Elis, and a part of Arcadia under Spartan rule, and seized Argos. He formed a navy, which was very far from the ancient traditions of the Spartan aristocracy. With his fleet he commanded all the islands that surround Peloponnesus, and extended his influence even over Crete. **He everywhere raised the democracy: master of Argos, his first care was to confiscate the property of the rich, abolish debts, and distribute the lands.** We can see in Polybius what a hatred the Achaean league had for this democratic tyrant. The league determined Flaminius to make war upon him in the name of Rome. Ten thousand Laconians, without counting mercenaries, took arms to defend Nabis. After a check, he desired to make peace; but the people refused: **so much was the tyrant's cause that of the democracy.** Flaminius, as victor, took away a part of his forces, but allowed him to reign in Laconia; either because the impossibility of re-establishing the old government was too evident, or because it was for the interest of Rome that there should be a few tyrants, as a counterpoise to the Achaean league. Nabis was afterwards assassinated by an Aetolian; but his death did not restore the oligarchy. **The changes which he had made in the social state were maintained after him,** and Rome herself refused to restore Sparta to her ancient condition.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D80

[80] 23. Now, it was on account of just this sort of[1] wrong-doing that the Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to death—an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time on—and for the same reason—dissensions so serious ensued that tyrants arose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most admirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. **Nor did it fall alone, but by the contagion of the ills that, starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely and more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. What shall we say of our own Gracchi, the sons of that famous Tiberius Gracchus and grandsons of Africanus? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue that caused their downfall and death?**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.16695/page/n445/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Accordingly France was to be turned into a vast agrarian settlement, in which there were to be no rich and no poor, no large properties and no cramped dwellings; nothing but endless model cottages and small allotments tended by hard-working and virtuous cultivators.
> ...
>
> Thus Courtois, in his report on the papers seized at Robespierre's house after Thermidor, wrote: **“These men, in order to bring us to the happiness of Sparta, wished to annihilate twelve or fifteen millions of the French people, and hoped after this revolutionary transfiguration to distribute to each one a plough and some land to clear, so as to save us from the dangers of the happiness of Persepolis.”**
>
> https://www.johnderbyshire.com/Reviews/China/polpot.html
>
> The Khmer Rouge, a peasant movement led by utopian leftists educated in postwar Paris, took over the country and began shoveling her population around like wet concrete, with the aim of eliminating forever such bourgeois blights as private property, money, love, education, and religion.
> ...
>
> The Cambodia from which these young men came did not at all resemble the industrialized Europe that had brought forth Marx and Lenin. It was a purely agricultural nation in which the major institutions were monarchy and priesthood. **The revolution that got these young men's attention was not the Russian, nor even the Chinese one, but the French. Pol's revolutionary heroes were not Marx and Lenin, but Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Robespierre.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/Laelius_de_Amicitia/text*.html#ref28

37 As to Tiberius Gracchus, when he began to stir up revolution against the republic,[28] we saw him utterly deserted by Quintus Tubero and by the friends of his own age. **And yet Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a protégé of your family,[29] Scaevola, came to me to plead for leniency, because I was present as adviser to the consuls, Laenas and Rupilius,[30] and offered, as a reason for my pardoning him, the fact that his esteem for Tiberius Gracchus was so great he thought it was his duty to do anything that Tiberius requested him to do.** Thereupon I inquired, "Even if he requested you to set fire to the Capitol?" "He never would have requested me to do that, of course," said he, "but if he had I should have obeyed." You see what an impious remark that was! **And, by heavens! he did all that he said he would do, or rather even more; for he did not follow, but he directed, the infatuation of Tiberius Gracchus, and he did not offer himself as the comrade in the latter's fury, but as the leader. [nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit]** And so, as a result of his madness, being in fear of the special court of inquiry, he fled into Asia, joined our enemies, and paid a heavy and righteous penalty[31] for his crimes against the Republic.

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius3a.html#c2
>
> [2.17] The courage of the toga may be mixed in with warlike actions, deserving the same honour in courts of justice as in the camp. **When Ti. Gracchus, having got the favour of the people by his generosity, endeavoured to oppress the commonwealth, he openly declared that the senate ought to be put to death, and all things be transacted by the people. [palamque dictitaret interempto senatu omnia per plebem agi debere]** The senate, being summoned into the temple of Public Faith by Mucius Scaevola the consul, began to consult what at such a time should be done: **and all being of opinion, that the consul ought to protect the commonwealth by force of arms, Scaevola denied that he would do any thing by force.** Then replied Scipio Nasica, "Because the consul, while he follows the course of law, does that which will bring both the law and all the Roman empire in jeopardy, I as a private person offer myself to take the lead according to the senate's will."
>
> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius4b.html#c7

[7.1] Ti. Gracchus was considered to be an enemy to his country: and not undeservedly so, because he valued his own authority above the welfare of his country. Yet in this evil design of his, **how faithful a friend he had in C. Blossius of Cumae,** it will be worth our while to relate. Though an adjudged enemy, suffering the greatest punishment, not permitted the honour of burial, he did not however lack kindness from Blossius. **For when the senate commanded Rupilius and Laenas the consuls to proceed against all those that had been associates of Gracchus, Blossius presented himself before Laelius, on whose advice the consuls particularly relied, to beg pardon for himself, urging his familiarity with Gracchus as an excuse.** Laelius asked him, "If Gracchus had commanded you to set fire to the temple of Jupiter, would you have obeyed him, from that friendship of which you boast?" That, said he, Gracchus would never have commanded. He had done enough and more, for he ventured to defend the behaviour of someone whom the whole senate had condemned.

But that which followed was much more confident and more dangerous; for being still pressed by Laelius to make an answer to his question, he resolutely persisted, affirming, that if Gracchus had commanded him to burn the temple, he would have done it. Who could have thought he had been so wicked, had he held his peace? **Who would not have accounted him wise, had he been less free in his speech, considering the necessity of the time?** But Blossius neither with an honourable silence, nor with a prudent answer cared to preserve himself, lest he should be thought to have silenced the memory of his unhappy friendship.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=WggSBwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

If Cleomenes had his Sphaerus, Tiberius Gracchus had another Stoic, Blossius, who is mentioned as a close advisor for his populist agrarian reforms. After Gracchus was assassinated (purportedly for aspiring to become king), Blossius fled to Asia to advise Aristonicus, as he established the so-called Heliopolis, or Sun-City, in Pergamum.74 **The populist dimension of this revolt inspired Tarn and others in the early twentieth century to make Blossius a kind of Stoic Bolshevik, arguing that the dominance of Stoicism, with its doctrines of universal equality, not only influenced the communist utopias of Zeno, Euhemerus and Iambulus, but together with the revulsion at the vast inequalities during the latter Hellenistic period produced revolts against wealthy elites in Cleomenes' Sparta, the Rome of the Gracchi and especially Aristonicus' Sun-City.**75

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false

ANTHROPOLOGISTS tell us that blessed isles and paradises are part of the dreamworld of savages everywhere. The dogged wanderings of the Guarani tribe in search of a "Land-without-Evil" have been tracked over the length and breadth of Brazil, and the contemporary cargo-cults of Asia and Africa have been investigated for their marvelous syncretism of Christian and native paradises. Neither pictorial nor discursive philosophico-religious utopias are exclusive to the Western world. **Taoism, Theravada Buddhism, and medieval Muslim philosophy are impregnated with utopian elements.** There are treatises on ideal states and stories about imaginary havens of delight among the Chinese, the Japanese, the Hindus, and the Arabs, but the profusion of Western utopias has not been equaled in any other culture. Perhaps the Chinese have been too worldly and practical, the Hindus too transcendental to recognize a tension between the Two Kingdoms and to resolve it in that myth of a heaven on earth which lies at the heart of utopian fantasy.

https://archive.org/details/alberunisindiaac01brnm/page/254/mode/2up?view=theater

We know only of the colour of burnt silver, which occurs, *e.g.* among the Zanj, **who lead a life without sorrow and envy, as they do not possess anything which gives birth to these passions.** They live no doubt longer than we, but only a little longer, and by no means twice as long.
…

The inhabitants of Śâka-Dvîpa are pious, long-lived beings, **who can dispense with the rule of kings, since they do not know envy nor ambition.** Their lifetime, not capable of any change, is as long as a Tretayuga. The four colours are among them, *i.e.* the different castes, which do not intermarry nor mix with each other.
…

The fifth, or Śâlmala-Dvîpa, has, according to the *Matsya-Purâṇa*, mountains and rivers, **Its inhabitants are pure, long-lived, mild, and never angry. They never suffer from drought or dearth, for their food comes to them simply in answer to their wishes, without their sowing or toiling. They come into existence without being born; they are never ill nor**

> **sorry. They do not require the rule of kings, since they do not know the desire for property. They live contented and in safety; they always prefer that which is good and love virtue. The climate of this Dvîpa never alters in cold or heat, so they are not bound to protect themselves against either.** They have no rain, but the water bubbles up for them out of the earth and drops down from the mountains. This is also the case in the following Dvîpas. **The inhabitants are of one kind, without any distinction of caste.** Every one lives 3000 years.
> …
>
> In the east of this Dvîpa are two kingdoms where every inhabitant lives 10,000 years. The water bubbles up for them out of the earth, and drops down from the mountains. They have no rain and no flowing river; they know neither summer nor winter. **They are of one kind, without any distinction of caste.** They never suffer from dearth, and do not get old. Everything they wish for comes to them, whilst they live quiet and happy without knowing anything else but virtue. It is as if they were in the suburb of paradise. **All bliss is given to them; they live long and are without ambition. So there is no service, no rule, no sin, no envy, no opposition, no debating, no toiling in agriculture and diligence in trading.**
>
> According to the *Vishṇu-Purâṇa*, Pushkara-Dvîpa is so called from a large tree, which is also called *nyagrodha*. Under this tree is *Brahma-rûpa*, *i.e.* the figure of Brahman, worshipped by the Deva and Danava. **The inhabitants are equal among each other, not claiming any superiority,** whether they be human beings or beings associating with the Devas.

…

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, descriptive works that imitated the *Utopia* were called utopias, with a minuscule, **and they adhered more or less to traditional literary devices that More himself had received from Lucian of Samosata, who in turn had inherited them from Hellenistic novels, many of them no longer extant.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA82#v=onepage&q&f=false

Greek reasoning about the ideal city-state had reached its zenith in the works of Plato and Aristotle on the eve of the destruction of the independent Greek polis. After the organization of the new Ptolemaic and Seleucid empires, men stopped debating with the tools of logic about the nature of an ideal city; abandoning the rigors of the Socratic dialogue, they surrendered themselves to the imagery of the golden age and spun reveries.
…

Determination of the institutions of civil government, vital to Plato and Aristotle, lost meaning for the utopia-makers living under the new imperial regimes. The Hellenistic utopia was escapist, uncommitted, and gelatinous.

An element of the Stoic and Epicurean privatized morality penetrated the Hellenistic utopia, a longing for a psychic state of calm felicity. **Even when the governmental forms described in the novels preserved vaguely Platonic outlines, the temper of life was an admixture of Stoicism and Epicureanism that valued peace and quiet over athletic exertion of body and spirit. The bonds of a tight political community that Plato had forged at the expense of the family were loosened, giving way to a diffuse, much diluted feeling of universal brotherhood.**

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/188/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover Stoic religion, which derived largely from Chaldean astrology and centred on the worship of the heavenly bodies, soon allotted a position of unique importance to the sun-god, who was celebrated as pre-eminently generous, benevolent, and above all equitable. In the universal diffusion of light by the sun some Stoics saw the supreme example of social justice and even of community of goods – an idea which soon became and long remained a commonplace in the rhetoric of egalitarianism.

Two works which seem to have been written under strong Stoic influence – one probably in the second century B.C. and the other probably in the second century A.D. – illustrate most vividly the kind of egalitarian phantasy which the ancient world was to bequeath to the Middle Ages. The earlier of the two is a description of the Isles of the Blessed which survives only in a summary given by the Greek historian Diodorus Siculus in his *Historical Library* – **in which form it was edited and translated as a separate work dozens of times during the Renaissance.** The seven islands are dedicated to the sun and are inhabited by the Heliopolitans, or sun-men. Each day throughout the year the sun passes immediately over the islands, with the result that the days are always exactly as long as the nights, the climate is invariably perfect and the season invariably summer, abounding in fruit and flowers. The population of each island is divided into four tribes, each 400 strong. **All citizens have the same perfectly healthy constitution and the same perfectly beautiful features.** Each takes his turn to perform every necessary task as hunter or fisherman or in the service of the state. All land, livestock and tools are thus used in turn by every citizen and therefore belong to nobody in particular.

Marriage is unknown and sexual promiscuity complete; the tribe is responsible for bringing up the children, and this is done in such a way that mothers cannot recognize their own. The consequent lack of heirs removes any cause for competition or rivalry; and the Law of Nature, operating in undistorted souls, produces amongst these people a complete and unfailing concord. Even in their expectation of life the Heliopolitans are all equal, for all die voluntarily and peacefully while at the height of their powers, at the age of 150.
…

Recent research makes it seem improbable that Gnostics were responsible for the treatise [*On Justice*]. There is however no reason to doubt either that the treatise itself existed or that Clement's quotations from it are accurate. **Once again one finds a doctrine of absolute egalitarianism supported by the example of the impartially beneficent sun.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false

From the fact that Iambulus' name is said to be Syrian or Phoenician it has been surmised that he was a metic, not a proper Greek. Perhaps the intense yearning for another world that these utopias betray is the mark of a member of a disadvantaged class in the hierarchic society of the Greek occupiers of Egypt and Syria, an alienated "native," solacing himself with a reverie.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/2B*.html#ref68

2 There was a certain Iambulus[70] who from his boyhood up had been devoted to the pursuit of education, and after the death of his father, who had been a merchant, he also gave himself to that calling; and while journeying inland to the spice-bearing region of Arabia[71] he and his companions on the trip were taken captive by some robbers.
…

57 1 These islanders, they go on to say, live in groups which are based on kinship and on political organizations, no more than four hundred kinsmen being gathered together in this way; **and the members spend their time in the meadows, the land supplying them with many things for sustenance; for by reason of the fertility of the island and the mildness of the climate, food-stuffs are produced of themselves in greater quantity than is sufficient for their needs.**
…

5 **Anyone also among them who has become crippled or suffers, in general, from any physical infirmity is forced by them, in accordance with an inexorable law, to remove himself from life.** And there is also a law among them that they should live only for a stipulated number of years, and that at the completion of this period they should make away with themselves of their own accord, by a strange manner of death; for there grows among them a plant of a peculiar nature, and whenever a man lies down upon it, imperceptibly and gently he falls asleep and dies.

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_head_056
>
> **In Taprobane, the island in the great Indian ocean, there was a law against living beyond a certain age, at which point it was necessary—with a light heart—to lie upon a poisonous herb which brought a gentle death** [Diod. Sic, Book II, chap. 57. Today this is the island of Ceylon].

58 1 **They do not marry, we are told, but possess their children in common, and maintaining the children who are born as if they belonged to all, they love them equally;**[75] and while the children are infants those who suckle the babes[76] often change them around in order that not even the mothers may know their own offspring. **Consequently, since there is no rivalry among them, they never experience civil disorders and they never cease placing the highest value upon internal harmony.**

https://www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/10/winston10art.htm

The original of Iambulus' narrative (written sometime between 165 and 50 BC)[1] has perished, and were it not for the excerpts made by Diodorus Siculus in his *Bibliotheke* (§§2:55-60), we should have to rely on two meagre references in Lucian and Tzetzes. In introducing his parody of imaginary-voyage literature, *True Histories*, Lucian singles out Ctesias and Iambulus as representative. The latter, says Lucian, wrote much that was incredible about the lands in the great sea, but though obviously fabulous, it was not an unpleasing story.
…

Each grouping maintains a peculiar large bird, whereby a test is made to determine the psychic state of the infant children. They mount the babies upon the birds, and those who endure the aerial flight they rear, but those who get airsick and panicky they cast out as of an undeserving temperament and unlikely to live long.

…

They are extremely long-lived and mostly free from disease. **Anyone maimed or with any bodily defect is compelled by an irrevocable law to do away with himself. When they reach the age of one hundred and fifty, it is their custom to voluntarily remove themselves by using a strange plant:** whoever lies upon it falls imperceptibly and gently asleep and dies.
…

The earliest detailed analysis of Iambulus was that of Rohde, who remarks that Iambulus' basic theme was that the perfect condition of man lies in the simplest and most primitive state of nature. This was in accord with the doctrines of the elder Stoics, who described the rawest state of nature as the ideal arrangement of human society.[10] **Farrington is equally convinced that Iambulus' Sun-isle is a Stoic utopia and adds that "it exhibits in the most unmistakable way the intimate connection between Stoic and Chaldean conceptions of the universe and society."** The seven islands correspond with the Sun, Moon and five planets (already noted by Pöhlmann). The reed which waxes and wanes with the Moon illustrates the sympathy imagined to exist in Chaldean astrology between heaven and earth. It is because the inhabitants are Sun-men that their society is based on egalitarian communism, **and the island's location on the equator is a symbol of the equality which prevails there.[11]**

The most penetrating appraisal of Iambulus' utopia, though somewhat distorted by an overpowering zeal for socialist theory, is that of Pöhlmann, who notes that Iambulus' narrative is the first political romance known to us, and represents the high-water mark of the Greek poetic utopia. Its author is in fact a socio-economic Jules Verne. Diodorus has unfortunately emphasized the fantastic element, giving little of the social and economic. **It is abundantly clear, however that the whole Sun-state is one large communist association (or unification of such associations: "systemata"),** whose aim is nothing less than a fully communist regulation of the entire economic and social life—possibly under the influence of Aristonicus' uprising. The collectivism of the Sun-state is strongly authoritarian, with a ruling "hegemon" in each group whose power is life-long, and who is not elected. But what might have been an irksome collectivism is softened considerably by the richness of the earth's productivity, which diminishes the necessity of human labour and leaves a maximum amount of leisure for intellectual pursuits. **The fantastic element, Pöhlmann further argues, was necessary if Iambulus wanted to satisfy his audience, who expected it in this genre of literature.** Moreover, just as much of his novelistic framework was drawn from the current literature, so do his ideas correspond to current streams of thought, reminiscent of Platonic, Cynic, and Stoic ideas, which were then, so to speak, in the air.[12]

> 12. Robert von Pöhlmann, *Geschichte der Sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der Antiken Welt,* 3d edn (Munich 1925), 2:305-24. **Upon the death of Attalus III (133 BC) and his deeding of the Pergamene kingdom to Rome, Aristonicus, illegitimate member of the royal family, claimed the throne for himself. Compelled to retire to the hinterland and recruit new forces, Aristonicus appealed to the dispossessed poor and slave populations, offering the latter liberty and the former, it seems, a sparkling social program. These new recruits were specifically designated Heliopolitae** (Strabo, *Geography* §14:1:38 C646), a fact which in the opinion of Pöhlmann (2:404-06) and W.W. Tarn (*Alexander the Great* [UK 1948], 2:411-14) suggests a definite relationship between Aristonicus' social program and the Hellenistic utopian literature, especially Iambulus.

The first to deny that Iambulus' utopia is Stoic was Richter, who agrees with Rohde that the Sun-men are a people in their pristine power and beauty, living in blissful peace, in the simplest sort of organization, based on primal natural rights, but argues that there was nothing specifically Stoic or Cynic in that.[13] Tarn points out that Iambulus' work is a patchwork of ideas typical for the Hellenistic age (true or quasi-scientific details, speculation on the ideal state, travel story, romance, desire for the simple life). Like H.G. Wells, Iambulus was a vivid story-teller, and his utopia is reminiscent of Wells' *Men Like Gods*.[14] Similarly, Africa writes: "**Like Montaigne's cannibals, Iambulus' happy Indians are a romanticized composite of travellers' tales, held up as an existent ideal to mortify corrupt Europeans,** and The Isles of the Sun are closer to Melville's *Typee* than to More's *Utopia*."[15]
…

> 18. It is almost certain that many other utopias imitating the style and technique of Iambulus were composed in the Greco-Roman age. The fact that Lucian singles out Iambulus for special mention in the opening pages of *True Histories* is a clear testimony to his popularity with Greco-Roman readers, and it is inconceivable that he was not imitated by other writers. Further, though Hellenistic utopian literature has for the most part disappeared, **Iambulus seems to have had a distinct influence on the 17th-century utopias by Tommaso Campanella (*Civitas Solis* or *Città del Sole*, 1623) and Gabriel Foigny (*Terre australe connue* or *Les Aventures de Jacques Sadeur*, 1676).** Though Campanella lacks entirely the Cockayne concept, many elements of his City of the Sun are strikingly similar to those of Iambulus' Islands of the Sun, as are many elements of Foigny's Cockayne utopia and *voyage extraordinaire*. **Iambulus was easily accessible to Campanella in the Italian translation of Ramusio** (Note 8) **and to Foigny in the French translation of Leo Africanus** (Note 3).

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_88

The dialogue begins without any explanation with the words of the Host: "Please tell me of all your adventures during your last voyage." In reply, the Seafarer recounts that **on an island in the Indian Ocean** he visited the City of the Sun, the life of which he thereupon begins to describe.

https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2816/pg2816-images.html

Capt. I have already told you how I wandered over the whole earth. In the course of my journeying I came to **Taprobane,** and was compelled to go ashore at a place, where through fear of the inhabitants I remained in a wood. When I stepped out of this I found myself on a large plain **immediately under the equator.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA373#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Renaissance early developed the utopian novel, More's *Utopia* having been published in 1516, and Rabelais's work some fifteen years later. From the start, the genre carried within itself a criticism of contemporary conditions while urging reforms in religious, political, economic, and social life.
…

In 1676, Foigny's *Terre australe connue*, **the first of a series of utopian novels which appeared between 1676 and 1720,** apparently capitalized upon the popularity of the new continent.
…

The natives, red in color, and hermaphrodites, have a law which requires that any foreigner entering the land be put to death. In the case of Sadeur, Foigny's hero, the law is not applied, because of his bravery in combating the birds, and because he too is a hermaphrodite.
…

The buildings are community houses, are geometrically shaped, and are massed in some 15,000 settlements, each of which has 16,000 men. The people's food consists in fruits, some of which have psychological effects, and some kind of nectar. Eight feet tall, the natives are naked and are immortal, but when weary of living, they can commit suicide by overeating a certain fruit. It never rains, and there are no storms, and no insects. In short: "C'est un pays de benediction" which, containing an infinite number of strange and delicate things, is without all the inconveniences which usually surround us.

Each native has to present to the state at least one child, whose generation is a closely guarded secret, so much so that it is a crime to speak of it. There are no property rights. The inhabitants love one another with a true, cordial affection. Sadeur, however, soon becomes very critical of the natives to the point where his life is endangered by his hostility. An elderly citizen endeavors to explain the "australians'" point of view, and succeeds so well that there is an almost total reversal in Sadeur's attitude: he puts aside his hostile criticism and becomes an enthusiastic supporter. The cause of his change lies in in the country's fundamental principle of freedom, which the "Vieillard" explains: **man by nature is born free, and consequently can be subjected to no slavery without thereby ceasing to be a man.**

A lengthy discussion ensues of the religion of the "australians," a delicate subject among them. In fact, it is a crime to discuss it, although everyone takes it for granted in some mysterious way. God, the "Incompréhensible," is respected and honored, but His perfections are not discussed.

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/526955/summary

Foigny writes of a paradise populated by hermaphrodites who live in equality, harmony, and perfect health because they are biologically complete, rational vegetarians. His fictional narrator is an alienated European: a hermaphrodite born and orphaned at sea, Nicholas Sadeur survives several shipwrecks to land accidentally near Tierra del Fuego in an unknown continent where the utopian "Australia" is located. The author—**a defrocked monk whose loose living and unguarded tongue made him an international pariah**—wittily uses Sadeur's adventures to raise questions about human nature and society, reason and faith. One of the central dilemmas is why Sadeur remains a misfit in a society created by fellow hermaphrodites: in this land where sex and religion cannot be discussed and whose inhabitants desire only death, Sadeur breaks every taboo and finally is convicted for treason when he cannot overcome his appetites.

https://books.google.fi/books/about/The_Southern_Land_Known.html?id=YPN_AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y

Peopled by hermaphrodites, Foigny's Australia is a society in which distinctions of both class and gender have been abolished. **It includes, among other things, an indictment of "the great empire that the male usurped over the female" as "rather a form of tyranny than a just cause."**--BOOK JACKET

---

http://www.livius.org/sources/content/appian/appian-the-mithridatic-wars/appian-the-mithridatic-wars-6/

[87] Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2,000 soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made use of to make himself master of the country, putting to death immediately some of those who favored the Romans and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school of Epicurus.

(Nor was it only in Athens that men played the part of tyrants as did he and before him Critias and his fellow philosophers. But in Italy, too, some of the Pythagoreans and those known as the Seven Wise Men in other parts of the Grecian world, who undertook to manage public affairs, governed more cruelly, and made themselves greater tyrants than ordinary despots; whence arose doubt and suspicion concerning other philosophers, whether their discourses about wisdom proceeded from a love of virtue or as a comfort in their poverty and idleness. We see many of these now, obscure and poverty stricken, wearing the garb of philosophy as a matter of necessity, and railing bitterly at the rich and powerful, not because they have any real contempt for riches and power, but from envy of the possessors of the same. Those whom they speak ill of have much better reason for despising them. These things the reader should consider as spoken against the philosopher Aristion, who is the cause of this digression.)

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/5D*.html#ref22

"**To the school of the Peripatetic Erymneus resorted a man named Athenion, who devoted himself sedulously to the philosopher's doctrines. Having purchased an Egyptian slave girl, he lay with her. A son of this woman, whom she bore either by Athenion or someone else, but named after Athenion, was brought up in her master's house.** He was taught to read, and when the master grew old he used to lead him by the hand in company with his mother; **when the elder Athenion died, the younger became his heir, and was illegally enrolled as a citizen of Athens.** He then married a pretty wench, by whose aid he hunted up lads to form a school, and began to practise the profession of a sophist; and after a career as a sophist in Messene and at Larisa, in Thessaly, he amassed a considerable fortune and returned to Athens. He was then elected an ambassador by the Athenians at the time when their interests were inclining to the side of Mithridates,[24] and insinuating himself in the king's good graces he became one of his intimates, receiving the highest promotion. **Wherefore he began through letters to unsettle the Athenians with false hopes, as though he possessed the greatest influence with the Cappadocian monarch—an influence which would enable them not only to live in peace and concord, but even to recover their democratic constitution and receive large doles individually and as a community. All this the Athenians were loudly boasting, convinced that the Roman rule had been completely overthrown.** When, then, Asia Minor had gone over to the king, Athenion began his return to Athens, but bothered by foul weather he put in to Carystia. When the Cecropids[25] learned that, they sent war-galleys and a litter with silver supports to bring him home. But now he is coming in! More than half the population of the town, nearly, poured out to take part in welcoming him; many others joined the running crowd as sight-seers, marvelling at the incredible turn of fortune, that this upstart Athenion[26] should be conveyed back to Athens on a gold-footed litter and purple rugs—he, who in the earlier days of his ragged coat had never seen purple; and what is more, no Roman had ever insulted Attica by luxuriating in such display. And so they joined the running crowd to see this sight—**men, women, children, with highest expectations of Mithridates' bounty, seeing that the poverty-stricken Athenion, who once gave lectures for such fees as he could collect,[27] now parades through town and country with insolent airs on account of the king's favour.** He was also met by the artists of Dionysus summoning the messenger of the new Dionysus to come to the public feast and join in the prayers and libations connected therewith. **He who had in former days gone forth from a hired house was conducted to the house of Diēs,[28] the person who at that time enjoyed great wealth from revenues in Delos;** the house was decorated with couches elaborately spread, with paintings and statues and display of silver vessels.

> [28] **Identified from Delian inscriptions as of Tyrian origin;** Dow, *Class. Phil.*, XXXVII (1942), 311 ff.

…

> **Not many days after, he made himself dictator—this philosopher who thus illustrated the Pythagorean doctrine regarding treachery,[35] and the meaning of that philosophic system which the noble Pythagoras introduced,** as recorded by Theopompus in the eighth book of his *History of Philip*,[36] and by Hermippus, the disciple of Callimachus.[37]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VIII#Pythagoras

After that he returned to Samos to find his country under the tyranny of Polycrates; so he sailed away to Croton in Italy, **and there he laid down a constitution for the Italian Greeks, and he and his followers were held in great estimation; for, being nearly three hundred in number, so well did they govern the state that its constitution was in effect a true aristocracy** (government by the best).
…

According to Timaeus, **he was the first to say, "Friends have all things in common"** and "Friendship is equality"; indeed, his disciples did put all their possessions into one common stock.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater

"Of all men," says Heracleitus, who praised parsimoniously, "Pythagoras was the most assiduous inquirer."[18]
He visited, we are told, Arabia, Syria, Phoenicia, Chaldea, India, and Gaul, and came back with an admirable motto for tourists: "When you are traveling abroad look not back at your own borders";[19] prejudices should be checked at every port of entry. More surely he visited Egypt, where he studied with the priests and learned much astronomy and geometry, and perhaps a little nonsense.[20] Returning to Samos **and finding that the dictatorship of Polycrates interfered with his own,** he migrated to Crotona, being now over fifty years of age.[21]

There he set up as a teacher; and his imposing presence, his varied learning and his willingness to receive women as well as men into his school, soon brought him several hundred students. **Two centuries before Plato he laid down the principle of equal opportunity for both sexes, and did not merely preach it but practiced it.** Nevertheless he recognized natural differences of function; he gave his women pupils considerable training in philosophy and literature, but he had them instructed as well in maternal and domestic arts, so that the "Pythagorean women" were honored by antiquity as the highest feminine type that Greece ever produced.[22]
…

According to the common tradition of antiquity the school of Pythagoras was a communistic aristocracy: men and women pooling their goods, educated together, trained to virtue and high thinking by mathematics, music, and philosophy, and offering themselves as the guardian rulers of the state. **Indeed it was Pythagoras' effort to make his society the actual government of his city that brought ruin upon himself and his followers.** The initiates entered so actively into politics, and took so decidedly the aristocratic side, that the democratic or popular party of Crotona, in an ecstasy of rage, burned down the house in which the Pythagoreans were gathered, killed several of them, and drove the rest out of the city.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA113#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Empedocles] is the *tragic* philosopher, the contemporary of Aeschylus. The most unique thing about him is his extraordinary pessimism, which works on him actively, however, not quietistically. **His political views may be democratic, but the real fundamental idea is nonetheless to lead humanity across to the universal friendship (κοινά τῶν φίλων) of the Pythagoreans and thus to social reform with a dissolution of private property; he moves about as a wandering prophet after he failed to found the rule by all (*Allherrschaft*)**34 **from love in Agrigentum. His influence belongs to the area of Pythagorean influences, which are flourishing in this century** (though not in Sicily). In the year 440 Pythagoreans, repressed everywhere, withdrew to Rhegium: apparently the decline of the Pythagoreans connects to the banishment of Empedocles and to his end in the Peloponnese.

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater

This near eastern African underworld is revealed most vividly in the historically attested figure of Pythagoras. He is said to have travelled throughout Babylonia and to India. **He himself is described as a Pelasgian, and he did in fact practice his mysteries in Asia Minor, joined by ecstatic mystical women. He was unable to gain credence in Greece proper. Aristoteles and Heraclitos referred to him derogatorily, and were plainly resentful of his mathematical cabalism. Aristoteles said**

that Pythagoras' fame was based on his appropriation of alien spiritual values. This was also the opinion of Heraclitos, who said that Pythagoras had woven together a false art and charlatanry from various writings. A pretence at universal knowledge, said the Hellenic sage, does not instruct the spirit.

So Pythagoras moved to the west, to southern Italy, where, like some ancient blend of Rudolf Steiner and Annie Besant, he set up his school of mysteries complete with priestesses. **He was regarded throughout the entire African littoral – whence came the collectivist sexual mysteries of the Egyptian Karpokrates to his aid – as the wisest of the wise. Universal equality is once again promoted in the form of democratic ecumenicalism.** Women and property are held in common, although this had been the basis of non-Nordic Mediterranean ideas when Apollo first battled against them.

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap7.htm

As everyone knows, Pythagoras, who was born on the Greek island of Samos early in the sixth century B.C. **but may not have been an Aryan,** was both a philosopher and the founder of a Puritanic cult, of which the doctrine may or may not have been largely derived from the religions of the Oriental lands which he was said to have visited. **His sect was roughly comparable to the Masonic lodges today,** since members had to undergo a fairly trying and expensive initiation before they were admitted to secret doctrines they had sworn never to reveal to outsiders, **but there was the important difference that the Pythagoreans admitted women to equality with men.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Empedocles

EMPEDOCLES (*c.* 490-430 B.C.), Greek philosopher and statesman, was Born at Agrigentum (Acragas, Girgenti) in Sicily of a distinguished family, then at the height of its glory. His grandfather Empedocles was victorious in the Olympian chariot race in 496; **in 470 his father Meto was largely instrumental in the overthrow of the tyrant Thrasydaeus.** We know almost nothing of his life. The numerous legends which have grown up round his name yield very little that can fairly be regarded as authentic. **It seems that he carried on the democratic tradition of his house by helping to overthrow an oligarchic government which succeeded the tyranny in Agrigentum, and was invited by the citizens to become their king.** That he refused the honour may have been due to a real enthusiasm for free institutions or to the prudential recognition of the peril which in those turbulent times surrounded the royal dignity. Ultimately a change in the balance of parties compelled him to leave the city, and he died in the Peloponnese of the results of an accident in 430.
…

His grand but obscure hexameters, after the example of Parmenides, delighted Lucretius. Aristotle, it is said, called him the father of rhetoric. But it was as at once statesman, prophet, physicist, physician and reformer that he most impressed the popular imagination.
…

The people of Agrigentum have never ceased to honour his name, **and even in modern times he has been celebrated by followers of Mazzini as the democrat of antiquity *par excellence*.**

https://iep.utm.edu/empedocles/

He is reported to have been wealthy and to have kept a train of boy attendants and also to have provided dowries for many girls of Acragas. In dress he affected a purple robe with a golden girdle, bronze sandals, and a Delphic laurel-wreath, and in his manner he was grave and cultivated a regal public persona. **These attributes contrast with his political outlook which is uniformly reported to have been actively pro-democratic. He began his political career with the prosecution of two state officials for their arrogant behaviour towards foreign guests which was seen as a sign of incipient tyrannical tendencies.** He is also credited with activities against other anti-democratic citizens, and even with putting down an oligarchy and instituting a democracy at Acragas by use of his powers of rhetorical persuasion. **Two speeches of his in favour of equality are also mentioned. His surviving poetry certainly shows considerable rhetorical skills, and indeed he is credited by Aristotle with the invention of rhetoric itself. Another report is of his breaking up a shadowy aristocratic political organisation called the 'Thousand'.** As a whole the tradition presents a picture of Empedocles as a popular politician, rhetorician, and champion of democracy and equality. This appears to fit in with the known history of Acragas where after the death of the popular and enlightened tyrant Theron in 473 B.C.E. his son Thrasydaeus proved to be a violent despot. After his forcible removal a democracy was established despite continuing political tensions.
…

In fr. 115 Empedocles describes himself as a 'daimôn', a being to whom long life has been granted, but who has committed the sin of meat-eating and bloodshed and consequently is punished by banishment from the company of the immortal gods. The banishment lasts three myriads of years, either 'three-times countless years' or thirty thousand years. In either case he must atone for his sin by being repeatedly reincarnated into all the different living forms of the different orders of nature. Elsewhere he says: 'For before now I have been at

some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and a mute fish in the sea' (fr. B 117). Empedocles then, has already suffered this nearly endless cycle of reincarnations having been seemingly hurled down to the lowest rung of the scale of nature **but has worked his way up, has been purified at last and, as he tells us in fr. B. 112, is himself now an immortal god.**
...

Empedocles is clearly a follower of Pythagoras, in his ethics and psychology at least, and shares his vegetarianism and pacifism.

b. Meat-Eating and Sin

Slaughter and meat-eating are the most terrible of sins, indeed for him animal slaughter is murder and meat-eating is cannibalism, as shown by fr. 137:

> **The father will lift up his dear son in changed form, and blind fool, as he prays he will slay him, and those who take part in the sacrifice bring the victim as he pleads.** But the father, deaf to his cries, slays him in his house and prepares an evil feast. In the same way son seizes father, and children their mother, and having bereaved them of life devour the flesh of those they love.

Here, in terms reminiscent of Hesiod's description of the coming horrors of the Iron Age in *Works and Days*, we see the appalling consequences of meat-eating: murder, cannibalism, the destruction of whole families and, by extrapolation, of entire societies. **This is a radical position in both political and religious terms. Plato's Protagoras in the eponymous dialogue can simply assume that all men agree that warfare is 'a fine and noble thing'. For Empedocles warfare, one fundamental plank of the Greek city state, is the most appalling of all evils and is punished by the immortals by hurling the perpetrators not only out of their society, but out of human society and even down to the level of the lowest forms of nature.**

c. Theology

In religious terms as well traditional animal sacrifice, another fundamental basis of Greek society, becomes the grossest impiety of all. A probably apocryphal tale reports that Empedocles sacrificed an ox made of honey and meal at Olympia, the religious heart of Greece: a pointed act of criticism of traditional religion. Further evidence for his radical theology lies in his appropriation of the names of the Olympian gods for his roots of matter and his cosmic forces. Implicitly he argues that the Olympian gods came into being as misinterpretations of the natural world: the real 'gods' are the elements of nature and the cosmic forces that direct their endless evolutionary cycle. His religious and ethical teachings then are of purification of the soul in an attempt to achieve perfection and unity with perfect Love. He pictures a time in the past, a sort of golden age, when this universal harmony existed, fr. B 128:

> **They did not have Ares as god or Kydoimos, nor king Zeus, nor Kronos, nor Poseidon but queen Kypris [Love].** Her they propitiated with holy images and painted animal figures, with perfumes of subtle fragrance and offerings of distilled myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, and pouring on the earth libations of golden honey. Their altar was not drenched by the unspeakable slaughter of bulls, **but this was the greatest defilement among men – to bereave of life and eat noble limbs.**

fr. B 130:

> All creatures, both animals and birds, were tame and gentle to men, and bright was the flame of their friendship.

Originally people worshipped only one god, Love, and this resulted in universal harmony, even between humans and animals. **Implicitly the argument runs that the worship of the Olympian gods he mentions, Ares, Zeus and Poseidon, and the sacrifices they demand have destroyed this harmony,** resulting in worship also of Kydoimos, the personification of the noise of battle.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The Agrigentine poet Empedocles, in a fragment appropriately preserved in a treatise on vegetarianism written by the Neoplatonist Porphyry eight hundred years later, **added "abstinence from blood" to the attributes of an age anterior to and even more perfect than the reign of Kronos.** In Empedocles' mystic cycle of Love and Strife, the primal age corresponds to a time when Strife is yet unborn. **Kupris, who in this fragment is Aphrodite and the cosmic force of Love, reigns a solitary goddess at the beginning of things.** She is honored with animal offerings, not in the flesh, not in life-destroying ritual sacrifice, but merely through images. "**They had no god Ares nor Kudoimos nor king Zeus nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kupris as queen.** Her did they propitiate with holy images, with paintings of living creatures, with perfumes of varied fragrance and with sacrifice of pure myrrh and sweet-scented frankincense, casting to the ground libations of golden honey. Their altar was not steeped in the pure blood of bulls, but rather was this the greatest abomination among men, to tear out the life from the goodly limbs and eat them."5

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-23

Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. **Their first count is that in the beginning of his *Republic* he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends.**

33. Again, in the *Republic*, **making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise.** Again, it is objected, in the *Republic* he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of temples, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. **Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part *of the body entirely covered.*** 34. That the *Republic* is the work of Zeno is attested by Chrysippus in his *De Republica*. And he discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled "The Art of Love." Moreover, he writes much the same in his *Interludes*. **So much for the criticisms to be found not only in Cassius but in Isidorus of Pergamum, the rhetorician.** Isidorus likewise affirms that the passages disapproved by the school were expunged from his works by Athenodorus the Stoic, who was in charge of the Pergamene library; and that afterwards, when Athenodorus was detected and compromised, they were replaced. So much concerning the passages in his writings which are regarded as spurious.
...

131. **It is also their doctrine that amongst the wise there should be a community of wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his *Republic* and Chrysippus in his treatise *On Government* [and not only they, but also Diogenes the Cynic and Plato].[58] Under such circumstances we shall feel paternal affection for all the children alike, and there will be an end of the jealousies arising from adultery.**

58. The words in brackets read like a marginal note, afterwards inserted in the text.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-97

There are people who run Chrysippus down as having written much in a tone that is gross and indecent. For in his work *On the ancient Natural Philosophers* at line 600 or thereabouts he interprets the story of Hera and Zeus coarsely, with details which no one would soil his lips by repeating. 188. Indeed, his interpretation of the story is condemned as most indecent. He may be commending physical doctrine; but the language used is more appropriate to street-walkers than to deities; and it is moreover not even mentioned by bibliographers, who wrote on the titles of books. What Chrysippus makes of it is not to be found in Polemo nor Hypsicrates, no, nor even in Antigonus. It is his own invention. **Again, in his *Republic* he permits marriage with mothers and daughters and sons. He says the same in his work *On Things for their own Sake not Desirable*, right at the outset. In the third book of his treatise *On Justice*, at about line 1000, he permits eating of the corpses of the dead.** And in the second book of his *On the Means of Livelihood*, where he professes to be considering a priori how the wise man is to get his living, occur the words: 189. "**And yet what reason is there that he should provide a living? For if it be to support life, life itself is after all a thing indifferent.** If it be for pleasure, pleasure too is a thing indifferent. While if it be for virtue, virtue in itself is sufficient to constitute happiness. **The modes of getting a livelihood are also ludicrous, as e.g. maintenance by a king; for he will have to be humoured: or by friends; for friendship will then be purchasable for money: or living by wisdom; for so wisdom will become mercenary.**"

https://epicureandatabase.wordpress.com/2015/12/28/reasonings-about-philodemus-on-the-stoics/

***On the Stoics* is a polemic written by Philodemus where he argues that the founder of the Stoic school, Zeno, had been a pupil of the Cynics.** The work starts out with historical details, and focuses on an early work by Zeno titled *The Republic*, which Philodemus says is full of faults and exhibits a vicious character, a kind of “disorder from the school to which he had begun to adhere”.

Among the horrors and impieties that the text says *The Republic* finds acceptable, there is mention of incest and cannibalism, apparently because it alludes to Greek tragedies that make these crimes part of the plot. **But there is much more, and in fact a huge portion of the scroll is dedicated to the horrors defended in the text. Here are just a few:**

> ***To renounce their way of life to adopt that of dogs … to masturbate in public … to refuse to acknowledge as city or law that which we know as such …***

There is also mention of evil speech, distrust and betrayal of friends, sexual exploitation of slaves, and adultery. **The author also argues that Zeno never changed his mind, later in life, about the content of *The Republic*, which he says "proposes laws that aren't for real people". This book is praised by Cleanthes, and by Chrysippus while speaking of the uselessness of weapons.** These are two prominent Stoics.

As to the arguments used by Stoics when confronted with these facts, **Philodemus credits them with saying: "We don't judge Epicurus by his early writings, you shouldn't judge our Zeno," however Philodemus says that one can't find anything shameful or impious in the early writings written by our Hegemon during his youth.**

The Supreme End

> *… and it is a thing of inept people to not explain, once the supreme end has been invented, the rest (of the doctrine) in accordance!* ***Now, what is actually coherent with the supreme end, is to admit that which is exposed throughout The Republic.***
>
> *… it would have been better for Zeno not to have become a sage, that way there would be no place for indignation at his error! … but if they had had the sense of moderation, instead of loving the baseness, to the point of attaching themselves to perverse doctrines formulated in unsupportable terms …*

The supreme end, to the Stoics, is virtue. **Philodemus discards this doctrine as an "invention" of Zeno, to accentuate that virtue is not what nature has intended for us.**
…

The content here is very different from what we've seen in all the other scrolls written by Philodemus. The tone of the controversy against the Stoics does seem out of character, and the scroll closes with the author swearing that he is telling the truth.

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n127/mode/2up?view=theater

Epicurean polemic against the Stoics made great play with the Cynic features of Stoicism; **and Philodemus,**2 **castigating the immorality of the *Republic* of both Zeno and Diogenes, exclaims against 'those accursed beings who choose to live the lives of dogs'.**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227986050_The_Stoics_on_Property_and_Politics

A.A. Long has recently argued that the Stoics pioneered two key notions of liberal political and economic thought: first, that every human individual per se is the rightful owner of at least one thing – his own person; and second, that human nature inclines us to acquire private property and to interact with one another in structured societies as property owners.1
…

I will argue that, when it comes to conceptions of private property, the Stoics are not at all Lockean. **Indeed, their views, I imagine, would prove more worrisome to Locke's audience of Whig merchants and rural squires than those of the Levellers themselves.**
…

Zeno abolished currency entirely and Philodemus18 **reports that Chrysippus recommended in his *Republic* the useless currency of knucklebones or dice as the mode of exchange, perhaps suggesting symbolically money's randomness and its vulnerability to fortune.**19 **He also, like Zeno, recommended a thoroughgoing sexual communism without any of the restraints that Plato tried to build into his account of the community of women in his *Republic*.** It has therefore seemed plausible to infer that there would be no private property in the ideal cities of the early Stoics.20

> 20. DL 7.181 relates the claim by Hecato that Chrysippus came to philosophy after his property was confiscated. It is hard to say if this is a case of reading doctrines back onto lives. In any case, it would be dangerous to try to make any psycho-biographical claims one way or another on the basis of this report, since, for instance, Cicero had his house confiscated in BCE 58 and he later came to write a defense of private property. **For those who believe that there may be some connection between a philosopher's words and deeds, it is perhaps worth noting that, unlike its rivals, the Stoa as an institution never acquired any private property.**

Accordingly, that Cicero would be prepared to dance lightly over this particular element in Chrysippus's doctrines is not particularly surprising. Moreover, this certainly seems to be his mode of operation as the passage continues. **His presentation of the Stoics' attitude toward women and children treads very,**

very lightly, indeed, especially if we are to understand him as still reporting a Chrysippean view. **The account is both so selective and so exceedingly discreet that there is nothing in it that could offend a Roman matron's vision of monogamy and nuclear family,**21 **though of course the early Stoics held views that were famously different, including sleeping with mom, sis, and any daughters that could be identified as such.**

> 21. Eric Brown has convinced me that, given that the sage may marry, nuclear families are indeed a possibility in Stoic ideal republics. For detailed argument see chapter six of his forthcoming book, *Stoic Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge University Press). But the possible sexual combinations within these families are clearly not of the sort that, could win Cicero's approval.

…

Yet however ill-suited to these kinds of (often liberal) assumptions about human society, politics, and psychology, **the theater analogy with its notion of politics as a benign, publicly shared experience fits to a tee the Stoics' normative vision of citizens whose political lives are "like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law" in a "philosopher's well-regulated city."**27 The Stoic citizen is a virtuous agent who is able to view himself as a part of a rational community structured by friendship,28 virtue, and divine law. In such a community, there are no inevitable, built-in conflicts of interest. **So too, such agents know that all external goods are random, temporary, and readily interchangeable and that material goods can appear scarce only to those afflicted by irrational passions for self-gratification or by self-defeating appetites for riches and honors.** In such a tranquil context, **where virtue is the only possession of importance,** individuals can go about their political and social lives with no more threat of genuine conflict than people filling a public theater or herds nurtured by a common law coming to graze together. And should any difficulties surface, they typically can be addressed by regulating and coordinating individuals' natural, communal interests, rather than having to resolve any inevitable or pressing conflicts among them.

…

On the Stoic view, no real conflict of interest should occur among the virtuous even in such desert island cases, since one guiding assumption of their virtue is the knowledge that life itself is an indifferent. Survival may be an indifferent, but it is a preferred indifferent and that is presumably why they both do not just drown together.30 **However, death is not of sufficient importance to one leading a virtuous life to warrant any mutual conflict in avoiding it.**

Yet, the introduction of what may appear to be potential utilitarian considerations – that is, it is better to save the sapiens who is more valuable to the state – might appear troubling and a threat to the standard Stoic claim that only questions of virtue matter in assessing actions.

…

In one sense, **it is clear that Stoics continually resort to the notion of possession to distinguish what is in the sphere of the moral personality and what is without.**35 But here, I think, it is the contrast with Hegel that illustrates how difficult it is to get anything morally useful for a defense of property out of the Stoics' particular notions of possession or self-possession. **Hegel argues that the first task of one's will is to appropriate one's own body, to take possession of it, and to give itself an embodiment. When I thus take possession of my body, Hegel argues, I am no longer "a beast of burden"** (*PR* 48). Both the contrasts and parallels with the kind of *oikeiosis* story told by Stoics are instructive here,36 but now contrast Epictetus on the body. For Hegel, it is only after I take possession of my body that I can begin to show my mastery and responsibility as a human being. **For Epictetus, the move is in the opposite direction: it is the body that is a beast of burden and it remains ever on the outside of the self that we possess.**

> You ought to treat your whole body like a poor loaded-down donkey … **if it be commandeered and a soldier lay hold of it, let it go, do not resist nor grumble. If you do, you will get a beating and lose your little donkey just the same.** But when this is the way in which you should act as regards the body, consider what is left for you to do about all the other things that are provided for the sake of the body. Since the body is a little donkey, the other things become little bridles for a little donkey, little pack-saddles, little shoes, barley, and fodder. Let them go too, get rid of them more quickly and cheerfully than of the little donkey itself.37

For Hegel, it is essential to his conception of appropriation that the will operate in a material world that transcends the subjectivity of inner mental life. Physical possession – the interaction of will and objects in a material way – is crucial to an understanding of both property and self. But how can a notion of possession in that sense apply to the Stoic conception of self-possession or self-ownership in the light of the kinds of attitudes to the body expressed by Epictetus? I think it is fairly clear that it cannot.

…

That is, can a Stoic be said to own his actions in a way strong enough to support a parallel to what Locke or Hegel conceive of as ownership? I doubt that such an argument can be made,38 since when the Stoic engages in an action, we are meant to view it exclusively from the restricted sense of his moral motivation, with the result that every action stops short of possession in the required sense.

> 38. Again, I would argue, it is the contrasts with contemporary accounts that are more telling for Stoicism. For someone like Nozick, the notion that we own our bodies is important – it offers us

> protection from consequentialists wishing, say, to lop off our body parts in order to maximize societal utility. **But as Epictetus claims, a Stoic, like Anaxarchus, should be able to bite off his tongue and spit it in his antagonist's face (111.7) or with tranquil equanimity watch his right leg being cut off, since his body is nothing that he owns.** Thus, whereas one can readily understand how our bodies can share attributes with external property and furnish a bridge to them, as it were – and Hegel makes much of these similarities in his accounts of possession and ownership **– it is harder to see how the Stoic notion of inner self-ownership can sustain any significant Hegelian-style extension to the external world of material property.** So while it may be true that the Stoics pioneered the notion of self-ownership, given the wider constraints in their theory about what counts as one's morally relevant self, **I doubt that this is an idea that has the potential of underwriting any useful notions of property generally, much less private property.** Nor would the Stoics find much to attract them in Nozick's use of the notion of self-ownership to defend a radical conception of personal liberty or the consequent social vision that flows from it. **Perhaps a closer contemporary parallel to the Stoics is provided by what Gerald Cohen calls "left-wing libertarianism," a view that attempts to combine self-ownership with the common ownership of external resources** (cf. G. A. Cohen, *Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality* [Cambridge, 1995]).

...

We might typically think of a property right as providing immunity against outside threats and including some notion of justified reparation for the harm done if one's property is violated. But the Stoics have no grounds from within their theory to defend either of these claims. They can neither point to any moral harm that has befallen an agent who has had his property violated, not can they assume the kind of Lockean attitudes towards their property necessary for supposing that it has a rightful immunity from violation. It is useful to hear Seneca on these points:

> What good is there for me in knowing how to parcel out a piece of land, if I know not how to share it with my brother? What good is there in working out to a nicety the dimensions of an acre, and in detecting the error if a piece has so much escaped my measuring-rod, if I am embittered when an ill-tempered neighbor merely scrapes off a bit of my land? **The mathematician teaches me how I may lose none of my boundaries; I, however, seek to learn how to lose them all with a light heart. "But," comes the reply, "I am being driven from the farm which my father and grandfather owned!" Well? Who owned the land before your grandfather? Can you explain what people (I will not say what person) held it originally?** You did not enter upon it as a master, but merely as a tenant. And whose tenant are you? If your claim is successful, you are tenant of the heir. **The lawyers say that public property cannot be acquired privately by possession; what you hold and call your own is public property—indeed it belongs to mankind at large.**39 **[Negant iurisconsulti quicquam usu capi publicum: hoc quod tenes, quod tuum dicis, publicum est et quidem generis humani.]**
>
> https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **This is, forsooth, the Stoic correction and improvement of the old philosophy; but it can never find any entrance into the city, or the forum, or the senate-house.** For who could endure to hear a man, who professed to be a teacher of how to pass life with dignity and wisdom, speaking in such a manner—altering the names of things; and though he was in reality of the same opinion as every one else, still giving new names to the things to which he attributed just the same force that others did, without proposing the least alteration in the ideas to be entertained of them? **Would the advocate of a cause, when summing up for a defendant, deny that exile or the confiscation of his client's property was an evil?—that these things were to be rejected, though not to be fled from?—or would he say that a judge ought not to be merciful? But if he were speaking in the public assembly,—if Hannibal had arrived at the gates and had driven his javelin into the wall, would he deny that it was an evil to be taken prisoner, to be sold, to be slain, to lose one's country?**

The fact, reflected so well here by Seneca, that for the Stoics any loss or violation of property must remain a matter of indifference, ultimately undermines any attempt to attach a right to it.40

> 40. John Cooper has argued that the theological assumptions of the Stoics preclude them from holding any plausible conception of rights. While I am not entirely convinced of this, there are certainly good reasons for thinking he is on the money about property rights. If the cosmos itself is rational and providential, and our happiness and virtue consist in following its divine natural laws, we have to affirm as good anything that happens to us in the world. As Cooper points out, that will mean affirming as good such things as harms to our body and the loss of our property. **Thus, the Stoics' theological postulates steamroll over any attempts to fashion the kinds of immunities and protections necessary for a theory of property rights. The Stoics also fail the Hegelian test for a modern right, since they make divine natural laws the starting point, not the particular wills of individuals, as absolute.**

Moreover, the claim that we are just temporary tenants on land that belongs to mankind at large and that the origins of any individuals' possession of property are contingent further suggests that private property is merely

an illusion.41 Moreover, it raises disturbing questions about the justice of its acquisition. **Indeed, there is some evidence that the early Stoa concluded that all private property is held unjustly and amounts to little more than theft.** At DL 125 we find the flowing claim:

> **Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred on them a perfect right (*exousian*) to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.**42

> 42. I have used Hick's translation here because he uses the language of rights for *exousian*. This may be plausible, if we construe the claim to be about a Hofeldian power right (cf. Miller), in some extremely extended and figurative sense. I take it, however, that even the wise man's property will have no immunities in the sense required by most theories of property rights. This notion of the wise man having *exousian*, however, raises another difficulty for a notion of rights to private property, which in some ways is parallel to a problem that arises for Fred Miller's Aristotle, i.e. the Aristotle who postulates a city structured by an elaborate system of claims, powers, and immunities that embody individual rights. **Aristotle believes that if a wise man were to enter such a city, in some sense all bets would be off, since his entitlement to rule trumps the rights of all others.** There is a corresponding problem for any theory of property rights in Stoicism, though in a starker form. It is only the wise who have *exousian*, **and they apparently have a right that overrides any interest that the unwise may have in their own private property.**

In the passage immediately preceding, it is reported that the wise are friends and hold all things in common (DL 124). By now, this claim and its implications should be fairly familiar. But here it is coupled with the striking claim that the property possessed by the non-wise, whom we might plausibly presume to be ordinary holders of private property, belongs to them in the same way that something dishonestly acquired can be said to belong to a thief. **In others words, property that is not shared communally by those with wisdom is mere theft. This conclusion should perhaps not surprise us, but it certainly brings us to a position antithetical to Locke and liberalism, and to the Thatcherite interpretations of their theory by Long and Schofield.** Thus, rather than, say, their wishing to privatize council houses so that citizens can learn to respect the property of others and come to have a stake in society by learning the virtues of thrift, private savings, and, above all, a respect for law and authority, **it turns out that the Stoics are the kind of wild-eyed hooligans who think that private property is theft and that rationality, virtue, and happiness require that all property be held in common. In short, one should think less Maggie and Ronnie and rather more Kropotkin.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-57

> Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. **And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life,** wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. **But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend.** Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly.

> 125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. **Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things.** It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, **just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state,** in another sense to those who are enjoying it.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

Plato's *Republic* is trenchant and despotic enough in its control of private life, but what was it to the *Republic* of Zeno?
...

> 1. The trenchant character of this work caused it to be suspected as spurious, but Chrysippus declared it genuine. Zeno's speculations on sexual relations were such that the Stoic editors at Pergamum expurgated their edition, but they were detected, and the offensive passages were afterwards restored. **Its coarseness is noted as worse than that of Epicurus by Plutarch** *Symp.* iii. qu. 2 § 1.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0312%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D6%3Asection%3D1

And I protest I had rather that Zeno had inserted his loose topics in some merry discourses and agreeable table-talk, than in such a grave, serious piece as his politics.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0389%3Asection%3D6

It is moreover a doctrine of Zeno's, that temples are not to be built to the Gods; for that a temple is neither a thing of much value nor holy; since no work of carpenters and handicrafts-men can be of much value. And yet they who praise these things as well and wisely said are initiated in the sacred mysteries, go up to the Citadel (where Minerva's temple stands), adore the shrines, and adorn with garlands the sacraries, being the works of carpenters and mechanical persons. Again, **they think that the Epicureans, who sacrifice to the Gods and yet deny them to meddle with the government of the world, do thereby refute themselves; whereas they themselves are more contrary to themselves, sacrificing on altars and in temples, which they affirm ought not to stand nor to have been built.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0389%3Asection%3D22

Moreover, having said in his book of Exhortations, that the having carnal commerce with our mothers, daughters, or sisters, the eating forbidden food, and the going from a woman's bed or a dead carcass to the temple, have been without reason blamed, [Chrysippus] affirms, that we ought for these things to have a regard to the brute beasts, and from what is done by them conclude that none of these is absurd or contrary to Nature; for that the comparisons of other animals are fitly made for this purpose, to show that neither their coupling, bringing-forth, nor dying in the temples pollutes the Divinity. **Yet he again in his Fifth Book of Nature says, that Hesiod rightly forbids the making water into rivers and fountains, and that we should rather abstain from doing this against any altar or statue of the Gods; and that it is not to be admitted for an argument, that dogs, asses, and young children do it, who have no discretion or consideration of such things.** It is therefore absurd to say in one place, that the savage example of irrational animals is fit to be considered, and in another, that it is unreasonable to allege it.

http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13a.html

[12.] And Pontianus said that Zenon of Citium thought that Eros was the God of Friendship and Liberty, and also that he was the great author of concord among men; but that he had no other office. **On which account, he says in his *Republic*, that Eros is a God, being one who cooperates in securing the safety of the city.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=G075oJ-BCS0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q&f=false

Myrtilos then looked towards those who hold to the principles of the Stoa and recited lines from the *Iambi* of Hermeias of Kourion:

> Listen, you bulging Stoic pricks [or: Screwics],4 merchants of drivel,
> hypocritical windbags, who all by yourselves
> snatch whatever's on the platters, before giving a crumb to the wise man,
> and gulp it down: and after that you're caught in the act,
> doing just the opposite of what you pompously proclaim

since you are oglers of boys, and in this alone you ape your wisdom's founding father, Zeno the Phoenician, who never resorted to women, but always boys, as Antigonos of Karystos states in his Life of him.

http://www.logoslibrary.org/theophilus/autolycus/305.html

Since, then, you have read much, what is your opinion of the precepts of Zeno, and Diogenes, and Cleanthes, which their books contain, inculcating the eating of human flesh: that fathers be cooked and eaten by their own children; and that if any one refuse or reject a part of this infamous food, he himself be devoured who will not eat? An utterance even more godless than these is found,—that, namely, of Diogenes, who teaches children to bring their own parents in sacrifice, and devour them.
…

Why, then, do Epicurus and the Stoics teach incest and sodomy, with which doctrines they have filled libraries, so that from boyhood this lawless intercourse is learned?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Christian_Library/The_Miscellanies:_Book_5#cite_ref-91

The Stoics also say that by the first Zeno things were written which they do not readily allow disciples to read, without their first giving proof whether or not they are genuine philosophers.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Origen/Origen_Against_Celsus/Book_I/Chapter_V

In what follows, however, wishing to show that this is a common opinion, and one not first discovered by Christianity, **he quotes a saying of Heraclitus to this effect: “That those who draw near to lifeless images, as if they were gods, act in a similar manner to those who would enter into conversation with houses.”** Respecting this, then, we have to say, that ideas were implanted in the minds of men like the principles of morality, from which not only Heraclitus, but any other Greek or barbarian, might by reflection have deduced the same conclusion; for he states that the Persians also were of the same opinion, quoting Herodotus as his authority. **We also can add to these Zeno of Citium, who in his *Polity*, says: “And there will be no need to build temples, for nothing ought to be regarded as sacred, or of much value, or holy, which is the work of builders and of mean men.”**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.183761/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

And we oppose law to legendary belief when the poets represent the gods as committing adultery and practising intercourse with males, **whereas the law with us forbids such actions;** and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when Chrysippus a says that intercourse with mothers or sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.183761/page/460/mode/2up?view=theater

And what wonder, **when both the adherents of the Cynic philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice [of sodomy] is indifferent?** *f*

> *1* *Cf.* §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. **The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (*De Stoic. repugn.*).** We may ascribe them to the “Back to Nature” movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum “Live according to Nature” might be taken to mean “Disregard conventional morals,” “Cease to repress your natural instincts.” But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories.

Having intercourse with a woman, too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful, is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians; at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like the philosopher Crates, as the story goes. Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly esteemed; at least, they say that those women who have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental ankle-ring as a token of their proud position. *a* And with some of them the girls marry after collecting a dowry before marriage by means of prostitution. **We see the Stoics also declaring that it is not amiss to keep company with a prostitute or to live on the profits of prostitution.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.183761/page/464/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own private part, just as no one would say it was bad for him to rub any other part of her body with his hand. **Chrysippus, *c* too, in his book *The State* approves of a father getting children by his daughter, a mother by her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato *d* in more general terms, has declared that wives ought to be held in common.** Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome, is not disapproved by Zeno; and we are informed that others, too, practise this evil as though it were a good thing. Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of barbarians. *e* Yet why should one speak of “barbarians” when even Tydeus *a* is said to have devoured the brains of his enemy, **and the Stoic School declare that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other men’s flesh or his own?**
...

Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some peoples *a* intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing indifferent; **and some philosophers, *e* too, declare that intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.183761/page/488/mode/2up?view=theater

There remains the assertion that the art of living is apprehended by means of those effects which they describe in their books; and these being numerous and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way of examples. **Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements regarding the rearing of children, says this: “Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no different conduct, but the same, befits and is**

befitting to all alike." And as concerns piety towards parents, the same man states,*c* in reference to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother; "If she had been ailing in one part of her body and he had done her good by rubbing it with his hands, it had not been shameful; was it, then, shameful for him to stop her grief and give her joy by rubbing other parts, and to beget noble children by his mother? And with this opinion Chrysippus also agrees. At least he says in his *State*: "I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which a mother has children by her son,*a* the father by his daughter, the brother by his full sister." **And he proceeds, in the same treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,*b* saying: "And if from a living body a part be cut off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise." And in his book *On Duty* he says expressly, regarding the burial of parents:** "**When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it.** Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when it is good, for food, just as also when some particular part, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that it and the like parts should be so used; but when the flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair."

Of such a kind are most of the philosophers' theories; but they would not dare to put them into practice unless they lived under the laws of the Cyclopes or Laestrygones.*c*

But if they are totally incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the art of living. So then, if the arts must certainly be apprehended by means of their peculiar effects, and no effect is observed that is peculiar to the so-called art of living, this art is not apprehended. Consequently, no one can positively affirm regarding it that it is really existent.

https://archive.org/details/historyofcynicis032872mbp/page/n129/mode/2up?view=theater

1. We have said in dealing with Diogenes that these charges are probably not to be pressed, and the caution applies even more emphatically as regards Zeno. Probably the 'shocking' passages in question amounted to little more than an argument that in certain hypothetical cases even incest and cannibalism would be permissible; **e.g. Chrysippus**1 **seems to have argued that if a Wise Man and his daughter were the sole survivors of some catastrophe which fell on mankind incest would be permissible, 'for the preservation of the human race'.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_XIV/Chapter_20

It is this which those canine or cynic[1] philosophers have overlooked, **when they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs, viz., that as the matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, in the street or in any public place.** Instinctive shame has overborne this wild fancy. For though it is related[2] that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretence of copulation, and not the reality. **Even at this day there are still Cynic philosophers to be seen; for these are Cynics who are not content with being clad in the *pallium*, but also carry a club; yet no one of them dares to do this that we speak of. If they did, they would be spat upon, not to say stoned, by the mob.**

> https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap40.htm#suppressed
>
> Seven friends and philosophers, Diogenes and Hermias, Eulalius and Priscian, Damascius, Isidore, and Simplicius, who dissented from the religion of their sovereign, embraced the resolution of seeking in a foreign land the freedom which was denied in their native country. They had heard, and they credulously believed, that the republic of Plato was realized in the despotic government of Persia, and that a patriot king reigned ever the happiest and most virtuous of nations.
> …
>
> The disappointment of the philosophers provoked them to overlook the real virtues of the Persians; **and they were scandalized, more deeply perhaps than became their profession, with the plurality of wives and concubines, the incestuous marriages, and the custom of exposing dead bodies to the dogs and vultures,** instead of hiding them in the earth, or consuming them with fire.
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Origen/Origen_Against_Celsus/Book_V/Chapter_XIV

> **And yet God *cannot* do things that are disgraceful, nor does He wish to do things that are contrary to His nature;** nor, if (in accordance with the wickedness of your own heart) you desired anything that was evil, would God accomplish it; nor must you believe at once that it will be done. For God does not rule the world in order to satisfy inordinate desires, or to allow disorder and confusion, but to govern a nature that is upright and just.[2] **For the *soul*, indeed, He might be able to provide an everlasting life; while dead *bodies*, on the contrary, are, as Heraclitus observes, more worthless than dung.** God, however, neither can nor will declare, contrary to all reason, that the flesh, which is full of those things which it is not even honourable to mention, is to exist for ever.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/332/mode/2up?view=theater

He saith, that I "would have the judge to condemn no man for a crime that is necessitated; as if" (saith he) "the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that had anteceded both visible and invisible."q If all acts be necessary, it is an easy thing for the judge to know what acts are necessary. I say more, that no crime can be necessitated; for if it be necessitated, it is no crime. And so much all judges know firmly, or else they are not fit to be judges. **Surely he supposeth there are, or have been, or may be, some Stoical judges in the world. He is mistaken; no Stoic was ever fit to be a judge, either capital or civil. And in truth, Stoical principles do overthrow both all judges and judgments.**

---

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.4Secular/page/n573/mode/2up?view=theater

That is to say: the Buddhist saint, in order to be perfect, must make himself a cold, inhuman villain, recreant to every social duty. Such, indeed, their own history makes their chief "hero of the faith," Prince Gautama, who begins his saintship by absconding like a coward, and forsaking all his duties to his wife, his son, his concubines, his parents, and his subjects. But they say he afterward showed sublime altruism by offering his body to be eaten by a hungry tigress, which had not succeeded in torturing and devouring enough antelopes to make milk for her cubs. Bah! methinks he would have done better to care for his own deserted human cub!

Once more, the scheme founds itself on an impossibility. Man can not by his volition expunge native appetencies, because these furnish the only springs of volitions. Can the child be its own father? Eating results in dyspepsia; therefore, not only cease eating absolutely, but cease being hungry. That is the recipe for the distress of dyspepsia! But first, it is impossible; second, were it done, all mankind would be destroyed in a few weeks. **Common sense says that when a man goes to professing the impossible he begins to be a cheat. And this is the practical trait of Buddhism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=G075oJ-BCS0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA39#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hellenistic tradition about Zeno's teaching on sexual matters falls into two opposing strands. On the one hand, Zeno's conception of Eros is presented as a model of temperance and restraint: it prepares the way for friendship, concord, and even liberty (Ath. 13.561c-d = *SVF* 1.61). On the other, Zeno adopted in his early writings many doctrines of the Cynics, which later Stoics, among others, found shocking and tried to purge from the master's writings. **These included a blithe rejection of traditional sexual morality: marriage, for instance, was to be abandoned in favour of purely carnal relations between the sexes** (Diog. Laert. 7.131); **incest might be permissible; men should take male lovers who are willing, but use force on those who are not.**27
…

Interestingly, this more hagiographical view of Zeno tends to displace any questionable behavior onto his sidekick (or low-born doppelgänger), his pupil/slave Persaios, also from Kition (cf. Ath. 13.607a-e, Diog. Laert. 7.36, Ath. 4.162b-e).

http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13d.html

[86.] But you, O philosophers, are far fiercer than dolphins and elephants, and are also much more untameable; **although Persaeus of Citium, in his *Recollections of Banquets*, says loudly, –** "It is a very consistent subject of conversation at drinking-parties for men to talk of amatory matters; for we are naturally inclined to such topics after drinking. And at those times we should praise those who indulge in that kind of conversation to a moderate and temperate degree, but blame those who go to excess in it, and behave in a beastly manner. But if logicians, when assembled in a social party, were to talk about syllogisms, then a man might very fairly think that they were acting very unseasonably. **And a respectable and virtuous man will at times get drunk; but they who wish to appear extraordinarily temperate, keep up this character amid their cups for a certain time, but**

afterwards, as the wine begins to take effect on them, they descend to every kind of impropriety and indecency. Ad this was the case very lately with the ambassadors who came to Antigonus from Arcadia; for they sat at dinner with great severity of countenance, and with great propriety, as they thought, not only not looking at any one of us, but not even looking at one another. But as the wine went round, and music of different kinds was introduced, and when the Thessalian dancing-women, as their fashion is, came in, and danced quite naked, except that they had girdles round their waists, then the men could not restrain themselves any longer, but jumped up off the couches, and shouted as if they were beholding a most gratifying sight; and they congratulated the king because he had it in his power to indulge in such pastimes; and they did and said a great many more vulgar things of the same kind.

"And one of the philosophers who was once drinking with us, when a flute-playing girl came in, and when there was plenty of room near him, when the girl wished to sit down near him, would not allow her, but drew himself up and looked grave. And then afterwards, when the girl was put up to auction, as is often the fashion at such entertainments, he was exceedingly eager to buy her, and quarrelled with the man who sold her, on the ground that he had knocked her down too speedily to some one else; and he said that the auctioneer had not fairly sold her. And at last this grave philosopher, he who at first would not permit the girl even to sit near him, came to blows about her." And perhaps this very philosopher, who came to blows about the flute-playing girl, may have been Persaeus himself; for Antigonus of Carystus, in his treatise on Zenon, makes the following statement: – "Zenon of Citium, when once Persaeus at a drinking-party bought a flute-playing girl, and after that was afraid to bring her home, because he lived in the same house with Zenon, becoming acquainted with the circumstance, brought the girl home himself, and shut her up with Persaeus."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/De_vitioso_pudore*.html#ref47

Lending money to one of his followers Persaeus drew up a contract in the market-place with a banker, evidently remembering Hesiod:[49]

> Be he your brother, laugh and call a witness.

The other was surprised and said: "So legal, Persaeus?" "Yes," he answered, "that the sum may be repaid in the way of friendship, not reclaimed by way of law." For many who start out by waiving security for fear of giving offence later go to law and lose their friend.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/164/mode/2up?view=theater

The long and somewhat devious history of Stoicism demonstrates the survival value of adaptability, the profits that accrue to a sect ready to absorb new ideas.

https://archive.org/details/historyrome12mommgoog/page/204/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoic philosophers showed themselves not insensible to the very lucrative distinction of seeing their system raised into the semi-official Roman state-philosophy, and proved altogether more pliant than from their rigorous principles we should have expected. Their doctrine as to the gods and the state soon exhibited a singular family resemblance to the actual institutions of those who gave them bread; instead of illustrating the cosmopolitan state of the philosopher, they made their meditations turn on the wise arrangement of the Roman magistracies; and while the more refined Stoics such as Panaetius had left the question of divine revelation by wonders and signs open as a thing conceivable but uncertain, and had decidedly rejected astrology, his immediate successors contended for that doctrine of revelation or, in other words, for the Roman augural discipline as rigidly and firmly as for any other maxim of the school, and made extremely unphilosophical concessions even to astrology. The leading feature of the system came more and more to be its casuistic doctrine of duties. **It suited itself to the hollow pride of virtue, in which the Romans of this period sought their compensation amidst the various humbling circumstances of their contact with the Greeks; and it put into formal shape a befitting dogmatism of morality, which, like every well-bred system of morals, combined with the most rigid precision as a whole the most complaisant indulgence in the details.**1

> https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n225/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 209. The Utility of the strictest Theories.—**People are indulgent towards a man's moral weaknesses, and in this connection they use a coarse sieve, provided that he always professes to hold the most strict moral theories.** On the other hand, the lives of free-thinking moralists have always been examined closely through a microscope, in the tacit belief that an error in their lives would be the best argument against their disagreeable knowledge.[6]

"***Give a man a reputation as an early riser and he can sleep 'til noon.***"—Mark Twain

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:EB1911_-_Volume_19.djvu/577

M. Pragmaticus was not, as has been stated, originated by Marchamont Nedham (who about this time turned his coat and became Royalist), but in 1648-1649 he was its writer until he again turned parliamentarian; **"history," says Mr Williams, "has no personage so shamelessly cynical as Marchamont Nedham, with his powerful pen and his political convictions ever ready to be enlisted on the side of the highest bidder; he even wrote for Charles II. in later years."**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marchamont_Nedham

Nedham's later reputation was coloured by the apparent cynicism and opportunism of his wavering allegiances, and by hostility towards his republicanism from subsequent generations of English critics. Yet even some hostile critics have conceded his literary talent and his influence. **Sympathetic modern commentator Paul Rahe has called Nedham "the world's first great journalist".**[20]

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

A second *tacit Condition* latent in *Oaths promissory,* is expressed in these words, out of the Divinity of the *Stoicks,* by *Seneca: Tunc fidem fallam,* & *constantiae crimen audiam, si cum omnia cadem sint, quae erant promittente me, non praestitero Promissum: Alioqui, quicquid mutatur libertatem facit de integro consulendi; & fidem meam liberat.* Then (saith he) let me be accused of falshood and Inconstancy, if when all things remain the same as they were at the time that I promised, I shall not then perform my Promise: **Otherwise, any alteration whatsoever leaves me wholly at liberty, and freeth me from my Engagement.** And a little after (saith he) *Affairs ought to be in the same condition they were, when thou didst promise, to bind thee to the performance.* And in his 39 Chapter he becomes more particular, and saith, *In all promises do lurk these tacit Conditions or Exceptions,* Si potero, *if I am able,* Si debeo, *if I ought,* Si haec ita erunt, *if Things continue as now they are.* ***If you require the performance of my Promise, bring Affairs into the same posture that they were in when I made it: But if any new alterations happen, why dost thou wonder, my condition being otherwise than it was when I promised, that I am changed in my intentions? Render things the same, and I am still the same.***

And that this holds good in *Christian* Divinity, as well as *Stoical,* appears out of the afore-mentioned *Doctor,* whose Doctrine is equivalent, and his Terms convertible with those of *Seneca,* declaring that all *Promises* have these *tacit Conditions, Suppositions,* or *Exceptions;* *Si Deus permiser it; if God permit,* which answers to *Seneca's Si potero; Quoad licet, as far as lawfully I may,* which answers to his *Si debeo;* ***Rebus sic stantibus, as long as things thus stand,* which answers to his *Si haec itaerunt;*** According to which severall *Suppositions* in order, I shall examine both the Oaths of *Allegiance* and *Covenant,* and prove their Non-obligation.
…

But if such an alteration happen, that neither the same persons nor things are in being which I swore to maintaine my Oath is at an end, and the obligation ceaseth; which now is our very Case here in *England,* the Government being changed, and new Governors set over us. **For this the learned *Grotius* hath one instance very pertinent to our purpose.** ***An Oath* (saith he) *binds a man no longer, if the quality or condition of the person to whom he swore, be altered: As for example, if he that was a Magistrate cease to be a Magistrate.* In evidence whereof, the same Author alledgeth a saying of *Caesar*'s to the Souldiers of *Domitius, when Domitius* was a Prisoner.** They were unwilling to serve *Caesar,* because of the military Oath they had taken for the other: But to take away this scruple, saith *Caesar* to them, *Sacramento quidem vos tenère quî potuit, quum projectis fascibus & deposito Imperio, privatus & captus ipse in alienam venisset potestatem?* How can he hold you bound by *Oath any longer, being outed of his Authority and Command, remaining a private man, and a prisoner under the power of another?* Alas, *your Oath ended together with his Authority.*

https://archive.org/details/chapoutot-johann-the-law-of-blood-thinking-and-acting-as-ns-2018/page/297/mode/2up?view=theater

That same year, in 1934, a few months after Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, Carl Schmitt leveled this attack at foreign legal scholars still defending the Treaty of Versailles: **"Why should world history freeze itself precisely on June 28, 1919, and why should that be law?" The Paris treaties were nothing but "instruments for the perpetuation of a specific moment, and a perfectly unjust moment, at that."** 88

> International law should not be constrained to treating facts in treaties as set in stone. In this strange "un-law," the other result of the principle of *ex factis jus oritur* was that, as one situation succeeded another, the law could be revised. In other words, the provisions of international law were not absolute norms, but rather decrees relating to a specific context, which therefore had to evolve as the context evolved. **The high priests of the temple of positivism thus had to temper their *Pacta sunt servanda* with a few extra Latin words: treaties should be respected, but if and only if the doctrine of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* was respected.**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clausula_rebus_sic_stantibus
>
> A key figure in the formulation of *clausula rebus sic stantibus* was the Italian jurist Scipione Gentili (1563-1616), who is generally credited for coining the maxim *omnis conventio intelligitur rebus sic stantibus* ('every convention is understood with circumstances as they stand').[3] The Swiss legal expert Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) was the next key contributor. **Vattel promoted the view that "every body bound himself for the future only on the stipulation of the presence of the actual conditions" and so "with a change of the condition also the relations originating from the situation would undergo a change".[1]:13 During the 19th century, civil law came to reject the doctrine of *clausula rebus sic standibus*, but Vattel's thinking continued to influence international law,** not least because it helped reconcile "the antagonism between the static nature of the law and the dynamism of international life".[1]:4 **While individual cases invoking the doctrine were much disputed, the doctrine itself was little questioned.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201720/page/n533/mode/2up?view=theater

The Romano-Hellenic state-religion and the Stoic state-philosophy inseparably combined with it were for every government—oligarchy, democracy or monarchy—not merely a convenient instrument, but quite indispensable for the very reason that it was just as impossible to construct the state wholly without religious elements as to discover any new state-religion fitted to take the place of the old.
…

Towards the state-religion indeed public opinion maintained an attitude essentially indifferent; it was on all sides recognized as an institution of political convenience, and no one specially troubled himself about it with the exception of political and antiquarian literati. **But towards its philosophical sister there gradually sprang up among the unprejudiced public that hostility, which the empty and yet perfidious hypocrisy of set phrases never fails in the long run to awaken.** That a presentiment of its own worthlessness began to dawn on the Stoa itself, is shown by its attempt artificially to infuse into itself some fresh spirit in the way of syncretism. Antiochus of Ascalon (flourishing about 675/79), who professed to have patched together the Stoic and Platonic-Aristotelian systems into one organic unity, in reality so far succeeded that his misshapen doctrine became the fashionable philosophy of the conservatives of his time and was conscientiously studied by the genteel dilettanti and literati of Rome. **Every one who displayed any intellectual vigour, opposed the Stoa or ignored it. It was principally antipathy towards the boastful and tiresome Roman Pharisees, coupled doubtless with the increasing disposition to take refuge from practical life in indolent apathy or empty irony, that occasioned during this epoch the extension of the system of Epicurus to a larger circle and the naturalization of the Cynic philosophy of Diogenes in Rome.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D51

And yet, **while we should never prosecute the innocent, we need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a guilty person,** provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; **it is sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible, even if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D107

But if they mean to adopt it as a principle, **that a pledge given to the faithless is no pledge, [nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit]** let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury that they seek.

[107] Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare,[1] and fidelity to an oath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: **for an oath sworn with the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. [Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periurium.]**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis#lf0041-01_label_169

1. **The most patent sophistry. If the sincerity with which an oath is taken be the sole ground of its sacredness, free license is opened for unnumbered forms of perjury,** – certainly for the proverbially untrustworthy custom-house oaths, than which the civilization of our time has had no fouler opprobrium.

https://archive.org/details/theprovinciallet00pasciala/page/276/mode/2up?ref=ol&view=theater

"I thought as much," said the Jesuit; "this is something new, sir: I mean the doctrine of mental reservations. **'A man may swear,' as Sanchez says in the same place, 'that he never did such a thing (though he actually did it), meaning within himself that he did not do so on a certain day, or before he was born, or understanding any other such circumstance, while the words which he employs have no such sense as would discover his meaning. And this is very convenient in many cases, and quite innocent, when necessary or conducive to one's health, honor, or advantage.'"**

"Indeed, father! is that not a lie, and perjury to boot?"

"No," said the father; "Sanchez and Filiutius prove that it is not; **for, says the latter, 'it is the intention that determines the quality of the action.'**1
…

"My dear father," I observed, "I had no idea that the direction of the intention possessed the power of rendering promises null and void."

"You must perceive," returned he, "what facility this affords for prosecuting the business of life.

http://www.freepres.org/papacy/pap02-20.htm

The third Lateran Council, which was held at Rome in 1167 under the pontificate of Alexander III., and which all Papists admit to be infallible, decreed in its sixteenth canon, that **"oaths made against the interest and benefit of the Church are not so much to be considered as oaths, but as perjuries."**[1] The fourth or great Lateran Council absolved from their oath of allegiance the subjects of heretical princes.

The Council of Constance, which was holden in 1414, expressly decreed that no faith was to be kept with heretics. The words of this decree, as preserved by M. L'Enfant, in his learned history of that famous council, are, that **"by no law, natural or divine, is it obligatory to keep faith with heretics, to the prejudice of the Catholic faith."**[2]
This fearful doctrine the council ratified in a manner not less fearful, in the blood of John Huss.

[1] "Non quasi juramenta, sed quasi perjuria."

[2] "Nec aliqua sibi fides, aut promissio de jure naturali, divino, et humano fuerit in prejudicium Catholicae fidei observanda."

http://www.freepres.org/papacy/pap02-11.htm

"If any one shall say," says the Council of Trent, "that in ministers, while they form and give the sacraments, intention is not required, at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema."[12]

For example, suppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as the price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception—not even if one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so; **for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the common foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any pledged word nor any oath mutually binding.**

[108] **For swearing to what is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to perform it, that is perjury.** For Euripides aptly says:

"My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath."

But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury[1] the terms and covenants of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an enemy, we have our whole fetial[2] code as well as many other laws that are binding in common between nations.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Brutus*.html#ref2

2 1 Servilia, the mother of Brutus, was a sister of Cato the philosopher, **and Brutus had a higher esteem for him than for any other Roman, Cato being his uncle and afterwards becoming his father-**

in-law. 2 There was practically no Greek philosopher with whom Brutus was unacquainted or unfamiliar, but he devoted himself particularly to the disciples of Plato. 3 **To the New and Middle Academy, as they are called, he was not very partial, but clung to the Old. He was therefore always an admirer of Antiochus of Ascalon, whose brother Aristus he had made his friend and housemate, a man who in learning was inferior to many philosophers, but who in good sense and gentleness vied with the foremost.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/antiochus-ascalon/#OverAntiPhil

> **The epistemology that Antiochus defended was Stoic in all essential points** (Brittain 2012). This was obvious to his contemporaries, some of whom charged that, far from being an Academic of any kind, he was a Stoic and belonged in the Stoa rather than in the Academy (*Acad.* 2.69, 132, cf. 137; S.E. *PH* 1.235). In reply, Antiochus maintained that the Old Academy, the Peripatos and the Stoa were in fundamental agreement. **According to him, far from being an innovator, Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was responsible mainly only for a new terminology and a handful of corrections to the Old Academic doctrine** (Cicero, *Acad.* 1.35). Though unconvincing to many of his contemporaries, this historical thesis explains how Antiochus could defend Stoic epistemology against the arguments made by his Academic predecessors while claiming to revive the Old Academy.

https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n23/thomas-jones/see-you-in-hell-punk

[Brutus] was made a quaestor, the first step on the career ladder, or cursus honorum, towards the consulship. Caesar invited him to serve in Gaul, but he went to Cilicia (southern Turkey) instead, where his patrician father-in-law, Appius Claudius Pulcher, was governor. 'Little is known of Brutus' first wife,' Tempest writes. But her father was consul in 54, and one of her sisters was married to Pompey's eldest son: Brutus was marrying into power. Appius' successor as governor of Cilicia was Cicero, **who found the province 'forlorn and permanently ruined', unable to pay the exorbitant 'taxes' imposed by his predecessor.** Brutus was not only among the exploiters, but had asked Cicero to call in his (not entirely legal) loans for him.

The Cypriot city of Salamis, meanwhile, owed money to Brutus' friend Marcus Scaptius, who was demanding repayment at an eye-watering 48 per cent interest. **Cicero had imposed a maximum interest rate of 12 per cent throughout the province, which the Salaminians agreed to pay, but Scaptius insisted on the full 48, and Brutus backed his claim – because, as it turned out, 'Brutus was the real creditor.'** In an unsuccessful effort to compel them to pay up, Scaptius' troops blockaded the Salaminian senators inside their Senate building 'for so long that five of them died of starvation'. Tempest is careful to point out that Cicero's account may not be entirely reliable, and that Atticus took Brutus' side, which suggests that extorting money from subject populations may have been normal practice among Brutus' contemporaries. **But Cicero took a dim view of it, and Plutarch, with his emphasis on Brutus' 'virtue', passes over the grubby episode in silence.**

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html

(1) **The Stoics claimed to consider only the observed realities of the physical world and to reject all superstitions about the supernatural, but they began by assuming that the universe (which, remember, was for them the earth with its appurtenances, the sun, moon, and stars that circled about it), was single living organism of which the *animus mundi* was the brain.** It followed, therefore, that we are all parts of that organism and so members of the same family and essentially equal, with an obligation to help one another, especially the unfortunate. (A8) **But the Stoics were saved from sentimental slobber about "the brotherhood of man" by the next proposition.**

> A8. This was neatly stated by Seneca in his *Epistulae morales*, 95 (=XV,3), 52: 'Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni; natum nos cognatos edidit. ... Haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit." **"Liberal intellectuals" are wont to sneer at Seneca, because he spoke of human equality while he was one of the wealthiest men in Rome and owned many slaves.** One expects such "intellectuals" to be ignorant, but note that their cavillation is canceled by the proposition I list as (2).

(2) **Since all things happen "according to Nature" (which is controlled by the Universal Mind), there can be no evil or injustice in the world.** Whatever seems unjust or wrong to us is only part of a whole which we do not see and conforms to a purpose we cannot comprehend. The

lungs or liver, considered by themselves, are ugly, but they may form necessary parts of a beautiful woman or wise man.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

The interlocutor utters his scornful “He is a slave” one last time, toward the end of the letter. But this time Seneca does not reply that the person is human and therefore to be treated thus and so:

> “He is a slave.” But maybe he has a free soul. “He is a slave.” **Will this do him any harm? (*hoc illi nocebit?*) Show me anyone who is not a slave: one person is a slave to lust, another to greed, another to ambition, all to hope, all to fear.** (*Ep.* 47.17)

But this tack confounds the person who had just been thinking that the treatment of people *does* matter, who had just been agreeing with Seneca that it is entirely wrong to use a human being the way one uses a beast of burden (47.5). For how can it be wrong to neglect or fondle or terrorize or even beat a slave, if all that matters is the free soul within and that cannot be touched by any contingency?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_II#18

You reply, "I cannot always say 'No': **sometimes I must receive a benefit even against my will.** Suppose I were given something by a cruel and easily offended tyrant, who would take it as an affront if his bounty were slighted? am I not to accept it? Suppose it were offered by a pirate, or a brigand, or a king of the temper of a pirate or brigand. What ought I to do? Such a man is not a worthy object for me to owe a benefit to." When I say that you ought to choose, **I except vis major and fear, which destroy all power of choice. [uim maiorem et metum excipio, quibus adhibitis electio perit]** If you are free, if it lies with you to decide whether you will or not, then you will turn over in your own mind whether you will take a gift from a man or not; **but if your position makes it impossible for you to choose, then be assured that you do not receive a gift, you merely obey orders.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_IV#35

I shall be treacherous, and hear myself blamed for inconsistency, only if I do not fulfil my promise when all conditions remain the same as when I made it; otherwise, any change makes me free to reconsider the entire case, and absolves me from my promise. [Tunc fidem fallam, tunc inconstantiae crimen audiam, si, cum eadem omnia sint, quae erant promittente me, non praestitero promissum; alioquin, quidquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro consulendi et me fide liberat.] I may have promised to plead a cause; afterwards it appears that this cause is designed to form a precedent for an attack upon my father. I may have promised to leave my country, and travel abroad; then news comes that the road is beset with robbers. I was going to an appointment at some particular place; but my son's illness, or my wife's confinement, prevented me. **All conditions must be the same as they were when I made the promise, if you mean to hold me bound in honour to fulfil it. [Omnia esse debent eadem, quae fuerunt, eum promitterem, ut promittentis fidem teneas]**
...

Not only shall I refuse to give what I may have promised rashly, but I shall also demand back again what I may have wrongly bestowed: **a man must be mad who keeps a promise made under a mistake. [demens est, qui fidem praestat errori]**
...

There runs through all these cases, I argue, an implied exception; if I am able, provided it is right for me to do so, if these things be so and so. [Subest, inquam, tacita exceptio: "Si potero, si debebo, si haec ita erunt."] Make the position the same when you ask me to fulfil my promise, as it was when I gave it, and it will be mere fickleness to disappoint you; but if something new has taken place in the meanwhile, why should you wonder at my intentions being changed when the conditions under which I gave the promise are changed? **Put everything back as it was, and I shall be the same as I was.** We enter into recognizances to appear, yet if we fail to do so an action will not in all cases lie against us, **for we are excused for making default if forced to do so by a power which we cannot resist. [deserentem vis maior excusat]**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_123

15. Do you believe me to be stating now that only those men bring ruin to our ears, who praise pleasure, who inspire us with fear of pain – that element which is in itself provocative of fear? **I believe that we are also in injured by those who masquerade under the disguise of the Stoic school and at the same time urge us on into vice. They boast that only the wise man and the learned is a lover.**

[4] **"He alone has wisdom in this art; the wise man too is best skilled in drinking and feasting. Our study ought to be this alone: up to what age the bloom of love can endure!"** 16. **All this may be regarded as a concession to the ways of Greece;** we ourselves should preferably turn our attention to words like these:

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/61*.html

Seneca now found himself under accusation, one of the charges against him being that he was intimate with Agrippina. It had not been enough for him, it seems, to commit adultery with Julia, nor had he become wiser as a result of his banishment, but he must establish improper relations with Agrippina, in spite of the kind of woman she was and the kind of son she had. 2 **Nor was this the only instance in which his conduct was seen to be diametrically opposed to the teachings of his philosophy.** For while denouncing tyranny, he was making himself the teacher of a tyrant; while inveighing against the associates of the powerful, he did not hold aloof from the palace itself; **and though he had nothing good to say of flatterers, he himself had constantly fawned upon Messalina and the freedmen of Claudius, to such an extent, in fact, as actually to send them from the island of his exile a book containing their praises—a book that he afterwards suppressed out of shame.** 3 **Though finding fault with the rich, he himself acquired a fortune of 300,000,000 sesterces; and though he censured the extravagances of others, he had five hundred tables of citrus wood with legs of ivory, all identically alike, and he served banquets on them. In stating thus much I have also made clear what naturally went with it—the licentiousness in which he indulged at the very time that he contracted a most brilliant marriage, and the delight that he took in boys past their prime,** 4 **a practice which he also taught Nero to follow. And yet earlier he had been of such austere habits that he had asked his pupil to excuse him from kissing him or eating at the same table with him.** 5 For the latter request he had a fairly good excuse, namely, that he wished to carry on his philosophical studies at leisure without being interrupted by the young man's dinners. As for the kiss, however, I cannot conceive how he came to decline it; **for the only explanation that one could think of, namely, his unwillingness to kiss that sort of lips, is shown to be false by the facts concerning his favourites.** 6 Because of this and because of his adultery some complaints were lodged against him; but at the time in question he not only got off himself without even being formally accused, but succeeded in begging off Pallas and Burrus besides. Later on however, he did not fare so well.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/62*.html#ref7

2 An excuse for the war was found in the confiscation of the sums of money that Claudius had given to the foremost Britons; for these sums, as Decianus Catus, the procurator of the island, maintained, were to be paid back. This was one reason for the uprising; **another was found in the fact that Seneca, in the hope of receiving a good rate of interest, had lent to the islanders 40,000,000 sesterces that they did not want,**[7] **and had afterwards called in this loan all at once and had resorted to severe measures in exacting it.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

It is very reluctantly that Seneca can be brought to confess that any philosopher had ever paid the smallest attention to anything that could possibly promote what vulgar people would consider as the well-being of mankind. He labours to clear Democritus from the disgraceful imputation of having made the first arch, and Anacharsis from the charge of having contrived the potter's wheel. He is forced to own that such a thing might happen; and it may also happen, he tells us, that a philosopher may be swift of foot. But it is not in his character of philosopher that he either wins a race or invents a machine. No, to be sure. The business of a philosopher was to declaim in praise of poverty with two millions sterling out at usury, to meditate epigrammatic conceits about the evils of luxury, in gardens which moved the envy of sovereigns, to rant about liberty, while fawning on the insolent and pampered freedmen of a tyrant, to celebrate the divine beauty of virtue with the same pen which had just before written a defence of the murder of a mother by a son.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_2

I WOULD fain flee to Sarmatia and the frozen Sea when people who ape the Curii[1] **and live like Bacchanals dare talk about morals.** In the first place, they are unlearned persons, though you may find their houses crammed with plaster casts of Chrysippus[2]; for their greatest hero is the man who has bought a likeness of Aristotle or Pittacus,[3] or bids his shelves preserve an original portrait of Cleanthes.[4] **Men's faces are not to be trusted; does not every street abound in gloomy-visaged debauchees? And do you rebuke foul practices, when you are yourself the most notorious of the Socratic reprobates?** A hairy body, and arms stiff with bristles, give promise of a manly soul; but the doctor grins when he cuts into the growths on your sleek buttocks.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=gy0rDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA327#v=onepage&q&f=false

7TH BUYER. All this is very noble and terribly manly. But I notice that you go in for shylocking and usury. How do you square this with drinking hellebore and being a paragon of virtue?

CHRYSIPPUS. Easily. **No one's better suited for moneylending than the wise man. His forte is the manipulation of syllogisms; moneylending is the manipulation of interest, so the two are very close.** The serious scholar is the one man to handle both together. **And he'll charge not only simple interest, like all the others, but interest on interest.** Perhaps you're not aware that interest produces a second interest upon itself, its offspring, as it were. You see, the syllogism goes this way: if simple interest is charged, compound interest is, too; simple interest *will* be charged, ergo; compound will be too.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl1/wl179.htm

Seventh D. And the same applies to the fees you take from your youthful pupils? None but the true believer sells virtue for a fee?

Chrys. Quite right. **I take the fee in my pupil's interest, not because I want it. The world is made up of diffusion and accumulation. I accordingly practise my pupil in the former, and myself in the latter.**

Seventh D. But it ought to be the other way. **The pupil ought to accumulate, and you, 'sole millionaire,' ought to diffuse.**

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl4/wl428.htm

Pray explain, Zenothemis, or the reputable Diphilus for you, **how it is that you Stoics class the acquisition of wealth among the things indifferent, and then concentrate your whole efforts upon it, hang perpetually about the rich to that end, lend money, screw out your usury, and take pay for your teaching.** Or again, if you hate pleasure and condemn the Epicureans, how comes it that you will do and endure the meanest things for it? you resent it if you are not asked out; and when you are, you eat so much, and convey so much more to your servant's keeping'

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl2/wl205.htm

Her. But you see, Lycinus, I did not depend on their judgement entirely, but on my own too. **I saw the Stoics going about with dignity, decently dressed and groomed, ever with a thoughtful air and a manly countenance, as far from effeminacy as from the utter repulsive negligence of the Cynics,** bearing themselves, in fact, like moderate men; and every one admits that moderation is right.

Ly. Did you ever see them behaving like your master, as I described him to you just now? **Lending money and clamouring for payment,** losing their tempers in philosophic debates, and making other exhibitions of themselves? Or perhaps these are trifles, so long as the dress is decent, the beard long, and the hair close-cropped?

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/6B*.html#ref67

"**The divine Plato[68] and Lycurgus[69] the Spartan not only would not allow anything whatsoever of a luxurious nature to be imported into their states, but they prohibited even silver and gold as well;** they believed that of the materials obtained from mines, iron and copper were sufficient, and excluded the other metals as tending to injure States which had even vigorous constitutions. **But the Stoic Zeno, while he made an exception of the legitimate and honourable use of money, nevertheless placed it in all other respects in the category of the 'indifferent,'[70] and discouraged both the pursuit and the avoidance of it,** ordaining that one should make use of simplicity or superfluity[71] in a purposeful manner. Zeno's intention in this was that men should **maintain an attitude of the soul which evinces neither fear nor wonder[72] toward things which are neither honourable nor dishonourable (*per se*), and so may adapt themselves in general to the things which are 'according to nature';[73]** on the other hand, having no far whatever of anything, men should abstain from what is opposed to nature through reason, and not through fear.

http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13a.html

[19.] **But that wise Zenon, as Antigonus of Carystus says, speaking, as it should seem, almost prophetically of the lives and professed discipline of your sect, said that "those who misunderstood and failed rightly to enter into the spirit of his words, would become dirty and mean; just as those who adopted Aristippus's sect, but perverted his precepts, became intemperate and shameless."** And the greater portion of you are such as that, men with contracted brows, and dirty clothes, sordid not only in your dispositions, but also in your appearance. For, wishing to assume the character of independence and frugality, **you are found at the gate of avarice,** living sordidly, clothed in scanty cloaks, filling the soles of your shoes with nails, and giving hard names to any one who uses the very smallest quantity of perfume, or who is dressed in apparel which is at all delicate. **But men of your sect have no business to be attracted by money, or to lead about the objects of their love with their beards shaved and smooth, who follow you,** as Antiphanes, says: –

> In the Lyceium, with sophists, by Zeus! –
> Thin, starved philosophers, as dry as leather.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA66#v=onepage&q&f=false

All three of these allegations – sedition, glory seeking, and hypocrisy – were regularly to reappear on the charge sheet drawn up against Stoics down the ages that followed.

The most entertaining redeployment of the tropes of glory seeking and hypocrisy in an early modern Tacitist context came in 1612, from Traiano Boccalini in his *Ragguagli di Parnasso*, later translated into English as *Advertisements from Parnassus*, which presents a comic account of how Lipsius had been received into Parnassus. Apollo had ordained that he ride in the procession 'between Moral Seneca and Politick Tacitus,' the two authors he had edited in his lifetime.51 'But there happen'd a mighty Dispute between these two great Men' as to who should ride on the favoured right-hand side, because while Tacitus hitherto had always deferred to the older man, now 'he contended so hotly with him for it.' With the 'Moralists siding with Seneca, and the Politicians with Tacitus,' things would have ended in violence had the former not backed down, it being 'to no purpose to Cope with Politicians, who would be sure to gain the Victory; if not by force, at least by Fraud and Circumvention.' The question was adjudicated by the censors, who 'decided the affair in favour of Tacitus; **telling Seneca, though his Morals had long been respected in the World, they were now grown somewhat musty;** therefore he must now be Contented to give place to the Politick *Tacitus*.'52 'Seneca obey'd the Censors Commands', Boccalini remarks, 'tho' much against his will,' **for the moral philosophers, despite their outward show of humility, were in fact possessed of the vice of '*una intensissima ambizione*.'**53

https://archive.org/details/theworldaswill02schouoft/page/352/mode/2up?view=theater

Now the Stoics proceeded from them in this way they changed the practical into the theoretical. They held that the *actual* dispensing with everything that can be done without is not demanded, but that it is sufficient that we should regard possessions and pleasures constantly as *dispensable*, and as held in the hand of chance; for then the actual deprivation of them, if it should chance to occur, would neither be unexpected nor fall heavily. **One might always have and enjoy everything; only one must ever keep present the conviction of the worthlessness and dispensableness of these good things on the one hand,** and of their uncertainty and perishableness on the other, and therefore prize them all very little, and be always ready to give them up. **Nay more, he who must actually dispense with these things in order not to be moved by them, thereby shows that in his heart he holds them to be truly good things, which one must put quite out of sight if one is not to long after them.** The wise man, on the other hand, knows that they are not good things at all, but rather perfectly indifferent things, *ἀδιάφορα*, in any case *προηγμένα*. Therefore if they present themselves he will accept them, but yet is always ready to let them go again, if chance, to which they be long, should demand them back; for they are *τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. In this sense, Epictetus, chap, vii., says that the wise man, like one who has landed from a ship, &c., will also let himself be comforted by a wife or a child, but yet will always be ready, whenever the captain calls, to let them go again. **Thus the Stoics perfected the theory of equanimity and independence at the cost of the practice, for they reduced everything to a mental process, and by arguments, such as are presented in the first chapter of Epictetus, sophisticated themselves into all the amenities of life.** But in doing so they left out of account that everything to which one is accustomed becomes a need, and therefore can only be given up with pain; that the will does not allow itself to be played with, cannot enjoy without loving the pleasures; that a dog does not remain indifferent if one draws a piece of meat through its mouth, and neither does a wise man if he is hungry; and that there is no middle path between desiring and renouncing. But they believed that they satisfied their principles if, sitting at a luxurious Roman table, they left no dish untasted, yet at the same time protested that they were each and all of them mere *προηγμένα*, not *αγαθά*; **or in plain English, if they eat, drank, and were merry, yet gave no thanks to God for it all, but rather made fastidious faces, and persisted in boldly asserting that they gained nothing whatever from the whole feast. This was the expedient of the Stoics; they were therefore mere braggarts, and stand to the Cynics in much the same relation as well-fed Benedictines and Augustines stand to Franciscans and Capucines. Now the more they neglected practice, the more they refined the theory.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA70#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 72. The Stoics have made Heraclitus superficial. He himself embraced the highest lawfulness of the world, yet without the general Stoic optimism**. How much strength the ethical power of the Stoics possessed may be seen in the fact that they violated their principle in favor of [the doctrine of] the freedom of the will.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57913/page/n53/mode/2up?view=theater

Unlike the Greek stoicism of Chrysippus, the Roman stoicism of Cato and Seneca presupposes a private income;4 and, unlike that of the 18th Century, the social-ethical sentiment of the 20th, if it is to be realized at a higher level than that of professional (and lucrative) agitation, is a matter for millionaires.

> 4. Hence it was that the first to succumb to Christianity were the Romans who could *not afford* to be Stoics.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA196#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Stoics themselves differed over whether *eudoxia* (good repute) had any value even as a positive indifferent22 and Cicero himself was prepared to accept that only true *gloria* based on solid virtue and accorded by good men was worth pursuing (*Off.* 2.43). **But Cicero's own choice of *honestum*, etymologically connected with *honor*, as the Latin equivalent for the Greek *to kalon* (the morally beautiful) reveals an assumption that he makes explicit in the first of the *Paradoxa Stoicorum:*** there, after saying that our ancestors agreed with the Stoics that only *quod rectum et honestum et cum virtute est* (what is right and honorable and accompanied by virtue) is good, he enumerates deeds of these Roman paragons that demonstrate their beliefs that the only thing in life worth seeking is what is worthy of praise and renown (*quod laudabile esset et praeclarum*). **The Roman could not accept that the conduct of the individual should not be governed in any way by the estimation of others.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures3.htm

That, therefore, which was abidingly present to the minds of men was not their country, or such a moral unity as that supplies: the whole state of things urged them to yield themselves to fate, and to strive for a perfect indifference to life – an indifference which they sought either in freedom of thought or in directly sensuous enjoyment. **Thus man was either at war with existence, or entirely given up to mere sensuous existence.** He either recognized his destiny in the task of acquiring the means of enjoyment through the favor of the Emperor, or through violence, testamentary frauds, and cunning; or he sought repose in philosophy, which alone was still able to supply something firm and independent: **for the systems of that time – Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism – although within their common sphere opposed to each other, had the same general purport, viz., rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the real world had to offer.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TTYAGD7aKBkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA36#v=onepage&q&f=false

Roman society had failed long before the sack of Rome in 410. Its end also marks the end of attempts at social theory for well over a thousand years; **genuine social theory as an important element in the life of society does not emerge again until the English Civil War in the seventeenth century.** Rome had seen the steady erosion of the rational worldview of the classic Greeks and the idea of a social theory. **For approximately 700 years, Stoicism had undermined the idea that the destiny of human beings was inseparable from that of a properly organized society. Instead, Stoicism provided legitimacy for a deeply unequal society with fundamental flaws. By declaring all humans as rational individuals in a rational universe, Stoicism effectively saddled individuals with the responsibility for their failure or success.** At first (during the Republic), Stoicism bore some of the elements of social theory by steering the Roman elite towards public service. When the Republic failed, the authoritarian Empire emerged as a solution to Rome's ills, and Stoicism changed to apologize for the new structure of power. Not only did the ideal of public service decline, but a general disillusionment with society set in. **By the time of Marcus Aurelius, the life of human beings and the life of society were separate, and not much was expected from either.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA175#v=onepage&q&f=false

[T.S.] Eliot's address to the Shakespeare Association in 1927 on "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca" was informed by John W. Cunliffe's *Influence of Seneca on Elizabethan Tragedy* (Cunliffe 1893), but its claims were unmistakably his and characteristically contrarian.
…

Eliot, however, insists that living in accordance with nature is always a selfish compensation for not being able to live in some "better" way: "**A man does not join himself with the Universe so long as he has anything else to join himself with; men who could take part in the life of a thriving Greek city-state had something better to join themselves to; and Christians have had something better. Stoicism is the refuge for the individual in an indifferent or hostile world too big for him;** it is the permanent substratum of a number of versions of cheering oneself up" (Eliot 1950: 112).

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/64/mode/2up?view=theater

Even in the Stoics, who boldly and righteously asserted an immutable morality, this was the leading conception. As has been well said of them:

> "If we reflect how deeply the feeling of an intercourse between men and a divine race superior to themselves had worked itself into the Greek character—what a number of fables, some beautiful, some impure, it had impregnated and procured credence for—how it sustained every form of polity and every system of laws, we may imagine what the effects must have been of its

> disappearance. If it is possible for any man, it was not, certainly, possible for a Greek, to feel himself connected by any real bonds with his fellow-creatures around him, while he felt himself utterly separated from any being above his fellow-creatures. But the sense of that isolation would affect different minds very differently. It drove the Epicurean to consider how he might make a world in which he should live comfortably, without distracting visions of the past and future, and the dread of those upper powers who no longer awakened in him any feelings of sympathy. It drove Zeno the Stoic to consider whether a man may not find enough in himself to satisfy him, though what is beyond him be ever so unfriendly. ... **We may trace in the productions which are attributed to Zeno a very clear indication of the feeling which was at work in his mind. He undertook, for instance, among other tasks, to answer Plato's 'Republic.' The truth that a man is a political being, which informs and pervades that book, was one which must have been particularly harassing to his mind, and which he felt must be got rid of, before he could hope to assert his doctrine of a man's solitary dignity.**"

Woe to the nation or the society in which this individualising and separating process is going on in the human mind! Whether it take the form of a religion or of a philosophy, it is at once the sign and the cause of senility, decay, and death. If man begins to forget that he is a social being, a member of a body, and that the only truths which can avail him anything, the only truths which are worthy objects of his philosophical search, are those which are equally true for every man, which will equally avail every man, which he must proclaim, as far as he can, to every man, from the proudest sage to the meanest outcast, he enters, I believe, into a lie, and helps forward the dissolution of that society of which he is a member. I care little whether what he holds be true or not. If it be true, he has made it a lie by appropriating it proudly and selfishly to himself, and by excluding others from it. **He has darkened his own power of vision by that act of self-appropriation, so that even if he sees a truth, he can only see it refractedly, discoloured by the medium of his own private likes and dislikes, and fulfils that great and truly philosophic law, that he who loveth not his brother is in darkness, and knoweth not whither he goeth.** And so it befell those old Greek schools. It is out of our path to follow them to Italy, where sturdy old Roman patriots cursed them, and with good reason, as corrupting the morals of the young.

---

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater

XII. Though Zeno the Cittiæan, **a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner of words, appears to have insinuated himself into the old philosophy; [advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuasse se in antiquam philosophiam videtur] still, the prevalence of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato, who often makes use of this expression, "That nothing but virtue can be entitled to the name of good,"** agreeably to what Socrates says in Plato's *Gorgias*;

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n179/mode/2up?view=theater

The attempt on the part of *anti-paganism* to establish itself on a philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a taste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, **and above all for Plato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in instinct.** ... It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially the work of Semites ("dignity" is regarded as severity, law; virtue is held to be greatness, self-responsibility, authority, greatest sovereignty over oneself—this is Semitic.) **The Stoic is an Arabian sheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.**

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

But when we touch upon these foreign elements, we reach the strongest side of Stoicism. The founder, and the great majority of its leaders, came not from Greece, nor even from Hellenic Asia, but from the rough and mountainous Cilicia, and from Cyprus, where Hellenic blood was deeply affected by oriental races. The mystic side of Stoicism, its pantheism and its allegory, as well as the calm resignation which it preached, bear evident traces of oriental imagination and oriental patience. **This philosophy was therefore one of the first results, and perhaps the greatest, of Hellenism proper—the reaction upon Hellenedom of the thought and culture of the East.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_159
>
> **The constitution of the *polis* is a Phœnician invention, even this has been imitated by the Hellenes.** For a long time they dabbled in everything, like joyful dilettanti. Aphrodite is likewise Phœnician.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Rome was founded by Romulus in 753 BCE, according to tradition. Archeologists found the date too late for settlement and too early for urbanization. **Small villages occupied the hills over the Tiber since around 1000 BCE, but not until the late seventh century BCE, when the low-lying areas later known as the Forum were drained and the hill villages coalesced, would Rome become a city.** The mid-eighth century BCE saw no significant event on the Tiber. However, it did see one that would profoundly change Italy: the coming of Phoenicians and Greeks.67
>
> **Around 1000 BCE, when the Zhou cities were putting down roots all across China, the eastern Mediterranean awoke from its dark age. The Phoenicians invented the alphabet and the Greeks adapted it to an Indo-European language, greatly facilitating the spread of literacy. These two peoples developed a diffused form of government, the autonomous city-states that reproduced themselves like cell division.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n711/mode/2up?view=theater

Many components of the Stoic creed were Asiatic in origin, some were specifically Semitic. **In essentials Stoicism was one elemental phase of the Oriental triumph over Hellenic civilization. Greece had ceased to be Greece before it was conquered by Rome.**

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/207/mode/2up?view=theater

Traditional Greek cosmology looked out upon a finite world, ordered and permanent, where every being and every object tended to find its natural place. It followed that, like the cosmos, the world of men was hierarchical and unequal, with every individual occupying its assigned place in the inherently objective, inegalitarian order of nature – the two worlds, natural (cosmos) and civic (polis), possessing the same structure.93

In contrast to this hierarchical, pluralistic vision of the cosmos, the Stoics possessed a unified, monist conception of mankind and its universe, in which all possessed reason equally.

For the Nazis, the Stoa – the site of late Greek philosophical education – was an expression of the eclipse of the race; it marked the passage from luminous Hellenic Nordicism to crepuscular Hellenism, the antithesis of a pure and heroic Hellas that had persevered until Plato, its final incarnation taking the form of the great Academician.
...

The Viennese historian of antiquity Fritz Schachermeyr agreed and vehemently denounced Hellenism: "Hellenism reveals to us a Greek people in complete dissolution in cosmopolitanism and thus in full de-Nordification. The most remarkable product of Hellenism, the Stoa, points in the same direction. It had been developed by Semites and bastards, becoming a pseudoideal good only for the arguments of the stateless and the racial enemies of later eras."95 Schachermeyr extended his racial punctiliousness so far as to detail, with meticulous precision, the geographic origins – and thus the racial identities – of the leaders of the Stoic school: "Among the scholarchs who came before Panaetius, only one came from a village where the majority were of Greek blood. ... The others came from Cilicia, from Cyprus, and from Babylon. Zeno, the founder, came from the Semitic village of Citium, on the island of Cyprus."96 In another text, Schachermeyr generically provided all Hellenistic philosophers with a "Levantine background."97 **Max Pohlenz, a great expert on the Stoic period and the author of several works on Stoicism definitive up until the 1970s, wrote of Zeno as a *Vollblutphöniker*, a "full-blooded Phoenician":**98 **"We find in the Stoic doctrine a good many traits that remind us that its founders were not Greeks."**
...

Ludwig Schemann, the disciple of Gobineau, denounced the Stoa and the complex of "cosmopolitan and egalitarian ideas"102 that made up the heart of its doctrine as a Semitic poison.

A symptom of Greek racial degeneration, Stoicism was also subsequently a powerful instrument of Roman decadence: after the battle of Cynoscephalae, (197 BC) and the Roman conquest of Greece, Stoicism was in essence a part of the conquerors' spoils. Books, prisoners of war, and the *graeculi* brought back in the train of Rome's legions imported what would, little by little, become the preferred philosophy of the republican and imperial elite. They found in Stoicism a rigor compatible with the *mos maiorum* and a universalist ideology well suited for Roman imperialism and its project for global hegemony.
...

The emperor Caracalla was inspired by Stoicism, as well as obvious fiscal motives, when he granted Roman citizenship to all residents of the empire in 212 through the *Constitutio Antoniniana*,104 which Rosenberg decried as the root cause of "Roman race-chaos."105

Hans Günther averred that "Stoicism has been considered one of the most racially destructive forces in Roman history": the original, strictly hierarchical Nordic republic of the old Romans had been undone by Stoic notions of "individualism" and "cosmopolitan citizenship."106

What truly disqualified Stoicism was that "on the one hand it looked only at the individual in isolation and on the other at the community of betters from all peoples and all races, not as a member of a lineage or a clan or a people or a race. As a doctrine, Stoicism eliminated all blood differences."107

Like Sophism a few centuries earlier, **Stoicism was an intellectual starburst that presaged the Revolution of 1789.** Fritz Schachermeyr asserted, deploringly, that "the result of man's fundamental equality was the notion of the dignity of man, the rights of man, the need for tolerance." **In short, because of Stoicism, "humanity now means levelling,"**108 the most deleterious individualism associated with the most dissolute universalism.
...

This, according to the author of a manual for teachers of history, explained the antipodean opposition between the Platonic conception of the state, which was strictly holistic, and the individualistic sensibility of Hellenistic philosophers. **"In the place of the common good, of belonging to a community defined by blood, the unrestrained domination of the individual, of the cosmopolitan who recognized no other bond than that of reason, imposed itself. The Greek no longer had a fatherland; the world was his country."**110 The advent of the individual, "detached from the state and his people, alone at the center of the world," the fragmentation of the Greek people "into an infinity of atoms, each of which existed only for itself," was the work of racially degenerate philosophers like "the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, a Hellenized Semite."111
...

Nevertheless, **both Günther and Schemann made clear that Stoicism had been able to seduce fundamentally Nordic ancient Romans like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius only because they no longer felt any connection with a racially miscegenated Roman people and thus sought to retreat into the every-man-for-himself ethos of private happiness,** where they could while away the time meditating on the *fatum* and waiting for ataraxy.115 Their estrangement was a choice dictated by the racial mediocrity of the Roman people.

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html

THE MOST IMPORTANT fact about Stoicism is that it was not a product of the Greek mind and was therefore an alien doctrine foisted onto the Aryan peoples of Antiquity. (A1)

Stoicism was founded in the last years of the fourth century B.C. by Zeno, a Semite ('Phoenician'), who was a native of Citium on the eastern shore of the island of Cyprus. He had a very swarthy complexion and an ungainly body, squat, disproportionately obese in places, and flabby. **Since Jews often took cover as 'Phoenicians' or 'Syrians,' it is not impossible that he was a Jew.** (A2)

He was a merchant engaged in the export trade, and when he was more than thirty years of age, he brought a cargo of dye-stuffs to Greece, but was ruined when his ship was wrecked in or near the Piraeus, the harbor of Athens. He walked to the city, where he listened to the lectures of philosophers, doubtless trying to become fluent in Greek, a language which he seems to have spoken with a heavy accent and of which he evidently knew only enough for bargaining in commercial transactions.

Zeno soon decided to become a philosopher himself and impudently suggested that he was the new Plato by giving to his book (probably written with the help of someone at home in Greek) the title of Plato's most famous work, Politea (Latin, *De republica*, whence English 'The Republic,' meaning 'Concerning the constitution of an independent state,' without implying any particular form of government). The later Stoics tried very hard to sweep this book under the rug and then nail the rug down, but a description of its contents has come down to us.

Zeno's book was pure Communism -- not the practical Communism of Lenin and Stalin, but the Utopian communism that was so successfully used as sucker-bait in the later Nineteenth Century and was scarcely distinguished from anarchism before Marx's quarrel with Bakunin, which promised that after the Revolution the state would "wither away" and mankind would become one glorious mass of raceless proletarians. We do not know whether Zeno candidly faced the problem of how a nationless and raceless world was to be created and admitted that it would be necessary to slaughter the better part of every civilized society, but he taught that men would somehow become so reasonable that states, governments, courts, police, religion, money, private property, and marriage would be abolished, and the world would be filled with a mass of raceless proletarians, all cuddling one another, freely exchanging the products of their labor, and having all women in common. (A3)

This absurd farrago apparently found some response in the demoralized society of Athens, racked by economic and political crises, familiar with all the vices of democracy, and accustomed to romantically unrealistic social theories. (A4) But after Stoicism became respectable and accepted by the upper classes, it was a perennial embarrassment to Stoics, who did not want to be reminded of their Semitic founder's folly.
...

I have thought it worthwhile to insist, as most writers on Stoicism do not, on the plebeian, lower-class, and mostly alien origins of the philosophy. As it attained some popularity, there were many Stoics, but almost all of them probably had little or no Greek blood, some coming from such remote places as Seleucia and Babylon. The philosophy was a product of Hellenistic Asia, and of the scores who attained some distinction as Stoic philosophers, we cannot find one whom we can recognize as probably of respectable Greek ancestry until we come to Panaetius of Rhodes. **Unlike Epicureanism and the New Academy, which were philosophic products of the Greek mind and expounded by Greeks, Stoicism was an imported and essentially Asiatic doctrine, and, before Panaetius, appealed chiefly to non-Aryan aliens and hybrids.**

Panaetius (c. 185-109 B.C.) made Stoicism respectable and partly naturalized it. The scion of a Greek family at Rhodes, at Athens **he studied under the head of the Stoic school, a Semite (Jew?) known as Diogenes of Babylon, but he was strongly influenced by the more reasonable works of Aristotle.** Going to Rome, he joined the circle of cultivated and young Romans around "the younger Scipio" (P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, Africanus, Numantinus), whose intimate friend and guest he became, accompanying him on his travels. **Panaetius had the good sense to neglect the formidable dialectics of the Stoic school, a chain of rigidly logical deductions from false premises, and to adapt Stoic ethics to the creed of the Roman aristocracy, with its insistence on duty and patriotism.** He could thus show that the heroes of the early Roman republic, celebrated for their stoicism (in the modern sense of that word) had really been Stoics without knowing it. After Scipio was murdered in 129, Panaetius went to Athens and became head of the Stoic school.

> https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Therefore, for I may now bring this discourse to an end, your Stoics seem to me to be most especially open to this charge, that they fancy they can support two opposite propositions. **For what is so inconsistent as for the same person to say that what is honourable is the only good, and also that the desire of things adapted for human life proceeds from nature? But when they wish to maintain the arguments which are suitable for the former propositions, they agree with Aristo; when they avoid that, they in reality are upholding the same doctrines as the Peripatetics;** they cling to words with great tenacity; and as they cannot bear to have them taken from them one after another, they become more fierce, and rough, and harsher both in their language and manners.
>
> **But Panætius, wishing to avoid their moroseness and asperity, would not approve of either the bitterness of their sentiments, or their captious way of arguing: and so in one respect he was more gentle, and in the other more intelligible.** And he was always quoting Plato, and Aristotle, and Xenocrates, and Theophrastus, and Dicæarchus, as his own writings show. And indeed, I feel very sure that it would do you a great deal of good if you too were to study those authors with care and diligence.

...

That criticism may make you uneasy. I understand. We all respect Stoicism because it was endowed with a glamorous prestige by the great men whose creed it was. We are Aryans, and by a racial imperative inherent in our blood, far stronger than ratiocination, we admire heroism and fortitude. Stoicism was in practice the creed of Cato of Utica and many another Roman aristocrat who lived bravely and died proudly, meeting his fate with unflinching resolution. We instinctively pay homage to such men, and we venerate even more women of exemplary courage, like Arria, the devoted wife of A. Caecina Paetus ("*Paete, non dolet.*") Panaetius did make of an originally Semitic doctrine a creed that includes much that was consonant with the spirit and mentality of our race.

But much as we admire great Romans, we must remember that, as Gilbert Murray remarked, Stoicism retained from its origins a latent fanaticism and religiosity, professing to offer a kind of Salvation to unhappy mankind. Despite its ostentatious appeal to reason, it was a kind of evangelism "whose professions dazzled the reason." **And it was fundamentally irrational when, for example, it claimed to deduce from Nature an asceticism that was inhuman,** limiting sexual intercourse to the begetting of offspring. And it could too readily be turned into poisonous slop about "One World" and "brotherhood." Although it was the creed of heroes, we cannot but feel that there was in it something sickly and deformed. It was, for our race, an intellectual disaster.

> https://www.sacred-texts.com/neu/pre/pre04.htm

> XXXIII. "**Also numbered among the Æsir is he whom some call the mischief-monger of the Æsir, and the first father of falsehoods, and blemish of all gods and men: he is named Loki or Loptr, son of Fárbauti the giant;** his mother was Laufey or Nál; his brothers are Býleistr and Helblindi. Loki is beautiful and comely to look upon, evil in spirit, very fickle in habit. **He surpassed other men in that wisdom which is called 'sleight,' and had artifices for all occasions; he would ever bring the Æsir into great hardships, and then get them out with crafty counsel.** His wife was called Sigyn, their son Nari or Narfi.
>
> XXXIV. Yet more children had Loki. Angrboda was the name of a certain giantess in Jötunheim, with whom Loki gat three children: one was Fenris-Wolf, the second Jörmungandr--that is the Midgard Serpent,--the third is Hel.

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap3.htm

The spread of Stoicism in the Graeco-Roman world is one of the most remarkable phenomena of history. Many have remarked on the paradox that a Semite, a Phoenician merchant in the export trade, who went to Athens on business and happened to attend lectures by one of the Cynic philosophers and who could not speak grammatically correct Greek, should have set himself up as a philosopher in his own right and, despite his alien features and tongue, attracted a large following of Greeks. **And there is the greater paradox that a doctrine which inspired the subversive agitations and revolutionary outbreaks that Robert von Pöhlmann identified as ancient Communism should have become the philosophy of the most conservative Romans.**
…

4. What was most important to the Roman mind, Stoicism (as revised by Panaetius) was the one philosophy which encouraged and even enjoined men to take an active part in political life and devote themselves to service of the state and nation. **Patriotism and the morality that makes great statesmen and generals were disparaged by some other philosophical systems, especially the Cyrenaic, Cynic, and Epicurean, and virtually disregarded by the New Academy, which anticipated the methodology of modern science and represents the intellectual high tide of of Graeco-Roman civilization, but demanded a rationalism and cool objectivity of which only the best minds are capable.**
…

What we have said will suffice to show how the Stoics made monotheism an eminently respectable creed. It became the hall mark of Big Brains.
…

It is true that we know that Zeno and a few other Stoics were Semites and we suspect that quite a few others were, **or perhaps were hybrids, half-Greek and half from some one of the pullulent peoples of Asia Minor that Alexander's conquests had Hellenized,** but the fact is that their doctrine did enlist Aryans (there is no reason to suppose that Panaetius was not of our race) and was unsuspiciously accepted by a majority of the Greeks and Romans of the educated classes. That is what gave it prestige.

Stoicism, furthermore, was not merely an alien ideology foisted on credulous Aryans. It contained elements congenial to our racial psyche. Professor Günther has observed that Aryans "have always tended to raise the power of destiny above that of the gods," and cites the belief in an impersonal, inexorable Moros, Fatum, Wyrd, to which we referred above.
…

Stoicism, furthermore, was an intellectual disaster. It carried with it the poisonous cosmopolitanism that talks about "One World" and imagines that Divine Providence has made all human beings part of the Divine Plan, so that there are no racial differences, but only differences in education and understanding of the Stoics' Truth. **That is why we today so often do not know the race of an individual who had learned to speak and write good Greek (or Latin) and had been given, or had adopted, a civilized name. Our sources of information were so bemused by vapid verbiage about the Brotherhood of Man that they forgot to discriminate.**

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-016-0014-2

Chinese Political Science Review, June 2016, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 322–335

Two Roads to a World Community: Comparing Stoic and Confucian Cosmopolitanism by Yudan Chen

The Stoic school created in the late fourth century B.C. is always seen as the real origin of Western cosmopolitanism. The early development of the school was in the Hellenistic period, when Greek civilization spread into the non-Greek world. **Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was even not an**

authentic Greek. The center of Stoicism in the middle phase began to transit outside the Greek world, and the late Stoa finally had its headquarters at Rome. **Therefore, Stoicism was born with the characteristics of universality and tolerance.** We should not be surprised to read from the works of late Stoics, some of whom were Roman politicians, an ethical tendency of world citizenry.

---

https://biblehub.com/genesis/10-4.htm

And the sons of Javan; Elishah, and Tarshish, Kittim, and Dodanim.

https://archive.org/details/Josephus02War13/Josephus%2004%20Antiquities%201-4/page/62/mode/2up?view=theater

Javan, son of Japhet, also had three sons: of these Halisas *a* gave his name to his subjects the Halisaeans – the modern Aeolians – and Tharsos *b* to the Tharsians; **the latter was the ancient name of Cilicia, as is proved by the fact that its principal and capital city is called Tarsus,** the *Th* having been converted into *T.* Chethimos *c* held the island of Chethima – the modern Cyprus – **whence the name *Chethim* given by the Hebrews to all islands and to most maritime countries;** ***d*** here I call to witness one of the cities of Cyprus which has succeeded in preserving the old appellation, for even in its Hellenized form Cition *e* is not far removed from the name of Chethimos. *f*

https://phoenicia.org/zenocit.html

Zeno was born in 333 B.C. in Citium, a principal Phoenician city in Cyprus, situated on the southeast coast near modern Larnaca. The biblical name Kittim, representing Citium, was also used for Cyprus as a whole. **A Phoenician dedication to the god "Baal of Lebanon," found at Citium, suggests that the city may have belonged to Tyre.**

> http://kyprioscharacter.eie.gr/en/scientific-texts/details/cyprus-and-others/cypriotes-and-phoenicians
>
> **The Kitians, even those with Phoenician names, never used the term Phoenician as a national adjective neither in Cyprus nor when they migrated to Athens and Piraeus.** At these locations tombstones have been identified to bear the adjective “Kitian” but never “Phoenician” or “Carthaginian”.[60]
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=PSFePRxm1jAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In this context it is important to note that later, **in 333 BC, Phoenician merchants received permission to establish a sanctuary of Aphrodite at Athens. They were from Kition** on the island of Cyprus which had become a Phoenician city in the mid-9th century BC.25
> …
>
> These testimonies confirm firstly that Aphrodite Οὐρανία is directly related to the Eastern love-goddess; secondly that her earliest and probably most important cult places were the islands of Cyprus and Cythera;60 thirdly that it was the Phoenicians who brought her to Greece. There is epigraphical evidence that, in 333 BC, it was Phoenician merchants from Kition on Cyprus who gained permission to found at Athens a shrine of Aphrodite, whom they presumably looked upon as their ancestral deity Astarte.61

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cyprus-achaemenid

A Cypro-syllabic inscription mentioning a siege of the important inland Cypriot city of Idalium by the “Medes” (i.e., the Persians) and troops from Citium, the Phoenician center *par excellence* on the island, represents the only direct reference, from the Cypriot side, to the island’s dealings with the Achaemenid regime (Masson, pp. 235-44, no. 217 [“Idalium tablet”], variously dated to sometime between the Cypriot revolt in the 490s and the last third of the fifth century).
…

In particular, Isocrates’ implications of fifth-century Phoenician intrusion into a historically Greek landscape and of a Persian policy of suppression of the Cypriot Greeks with the aid of local Phoenicians remain difficult to accept at face value (Costa; Maier, 1985). **Far from representing a peculiarly Achaemenid phenomenon, Phoenician visibility in Cypriot affairs can be traced as far back as the foundation of Phoenician Citium in the ninth century** (see, in general, Masson and Sznycer; Gjerstad, 1979; Baurain and Destrooper-Georgiades; cf. Na’aman, 1998 and 2001). Given the long symbiosis of Greek and Phoenician elements in Cyprus, **the use of the Phoenician script and occurrences of Phoenician dynasts’ names on Cypriot numismatic issues can be explained as indications of mixed dynasties** (cf. Herodotus, 5.104.1, on the mixed dynasty of Salamis) and, in the particular case of Lapithus, even as manifestations of a mixed community (Seibert, pp. 19-23; cf. Maier, 1985, p. 35). **Evagoras’s expansionist activities, which were reportedly equally opposed by an autochthonous (Amathus), a Greek (Soli), and a Phoenician (Citium) center on the island, would also suggest that incidents of inter-island conflict were just as**

likely to emanate from the divided (material) interests of the different city kingdoms as they were from ethnic causes.

http://snible.org/coins/hn/cyprus.html

The autonomous coinage of Cyprus begins in the latter part of the sixth century, and lasts till the subjection of the island by Ptolemy Soter, B.C. 312. It may be divided into the following principal classes:—(α) the money of the kings of Salamis, Idalium, Paphos, Marium, Soli, Amathus, and perhaps of other towns bearing inscriptions in the *Cypriote* and later in the *Greek* character; (β) the money of the Phoenician kings of Citium and perhaps of Lapethus, bearing *Phoenician* inscriptions.
…

After about B.C. 400 the incuse square gradually disappears, **except on the Phoenician coins of Citium, where it lingers on down to the age of Alexander.**

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/32a1/ecc27395b9d9dc9773e456d8f64d31e62440.pdf

About the middle of the 4th century Pumiathon, the last king of Kition, bought for fifty talents the Kingdom of Tamassos, sold to him by its prodigal king Pasikypros who retired to Amathus as a layman (Athenaeus IV 167 c-d). This Phoenician expansion was solely due to a transaction that enabled Kition to check the land from the coast of Larnaka to central Cyprus and the northern foothills of Troodos. In this way they could exploit the copper deposits of the region of Tamassos, take them through Idalion to Kition where most of the metal workshops were located.

This addition to the Kingdom of Kition did not last long. In 332 Alexander the Great, who meanwhile conquered Tyre, took it away from Kition and handed it over to king Pnytagoras of Salamis for his services towards him. **Very probably Pumiathon of Kition kept a neutral position during the siege of Tyre by Alexander and the deprivation of Tamassos can be regarded as a sort of punishment.**

The Kingdom of Kition did live for twenty more years after the fall of Tyre and it came to an end in 312 B.C. when Ptolemy Soter of Egypt decided to abolish kingship in Cyprus and put the island under the command of a governor appointed by him. The last king of Kition, who reigned for half a century was put to death because he was in touch with Antigonus of Asia Minor. The temple of Herakles-Melqart, the city god, was razed to the ground, an act of political meaning denoting the end of the life of Kition as an independent Kingdom.
…

In conclusion we would say that the Phoenicians established themselves at Kition in mid-9th century B.C. They have been living side by side with the Greeks who were residing in a semi-deserted Mycenaean town. The Phoenicians did have the political power in the town at least from around 700 to 312 B.C., when they established a royal house. **Culturally speaking, the Phoenicians were almost hellenised but they kept their own script (it would have been very surprising if they would adopt the cumbersome Cypro-syllabic) and their fervent for commerce,** an inner force that drove them to almost every part of Cyprus, albeit in small numbers.

At all events, despite the hellenised outlook of their culture, they have always been aware of their ethnic identity, however blunt such a feeling became through centuries of co-habitation with the Greeks of Cyprus. **It seems that it was strong enough not to allow them assimilation by the Greeks and something more than cultural influence was needed. This extra something was the destruction of the temple of Herakles Melqart by Ptolemy I, which was their religious centre for at least four centuries, along with the abolition of kingship.** In this way the Phoenicians lost in one and the same blow not only the political supremacy they enjoyed in the city, but also their religious centre with which their identity was so much connected.

After this event which occurred in 312 B.C. the Phoenicians lose fairly quickly their ethnic identity in the universality of the Hellenistic world. Only rarely we have a few references mostly from funerary inscriptions which speak of the Phoenicians of Kition. When the Romans conquer the island, the Phoenicians have already been absorbed by the Greeks and only some personal names remind us of their long presence in Cyprus, exactly as it happened centuries later with the Lusignian and Venetian rulers of Cyprus, whose presence is reminded by a few monuments and some surnames existing to the present day.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0136%3Abook%3D4%3Acard%3D593

So he spoke, and Menelaus, good at the war-cry, smiled, [610] and stroked him with his hand, and spoke, and addressed him: “Thou art of noble blood, dear child, that thou speakest thus. Therefore will I change these gifts, for well I may. **Of all the gifts that lie stored as treasures in my house, I will give thee that one which is fairest and costliest.** [615] **I will give thee a well-wrought mixing bowl. All of silver it is, and with gold are the rims thereof gilded, the work of Hephaestus; and the warrior [hḗrōs] Phaedimus, king of the Sidonians, gave it me, when his house sheltered me as I came thither,** and now I am minded to give it to thee.”

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0136%3Abook%3D8%3Acard%3D343

So saying the mighty Hephaestus loosed the bonds [360] and the two, when they were freed from that bond so strong, sprang up straightway. **And Ares departed to Thrace, but she, the laughter-loving Aphrodite, went to Cyprus, to Paphos, where is her demesne and fragrant altar.** There the Graces bathed her and anointed her with [365] immortal oil, such as gleams[1] upon the gods that are forever. And they clothed her in lovely raiment, a wonder to behold. This song the famous minstrel sang; and Odysseus was glad at heart as he listened, and so too were the Phaeacians of the long oars, men famed for their ships.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paphos#Aphrodite_and_Paphos

The Greeks agreed that Aphrodite had landed at the site of Paphos when she rose from the sea.[15] According to Pausanias (i. 14), although her worship was introduced to Paphos from Syria, it was much more likely that it was of Phoenician origin. Before being proven by archaeology it was thought that Aphrodite's cult had been established before the time of Homer (c. 700 BC), as the grove and altar of Aphrodite at Paphos are mentioned in the *Odyssey* (viii. 362).[10]
...

Old Paphos was the centre of worshipping Aphrodite for the whole Aegean world. **The Cinyradae, or descendants of Cinyras, were the chief priests; Greek by name but of Phoenician origin.** Their power and authority were great, but it may be inferred from certain inscriptions that they were controlled by a senate and an assembly of the people.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dcinyras-bio-1

CINYRAS, a famous Cyprian hero. **According to the common tradition, he was a son of Apollo by Paphos, king of Cyprus, and priest of the Paphian Aphrodite, which latter office renained hereditary in his family, the Cinyradae.** (Pind. *P*. 2.26, &c.; Tac. *Hist*. 2.3; Schol. *ad Thieocrit*. 1.109.) **Tacitus describes him as having come to Cyprus from Cilicia, from whence he introduced the worship of Aphrodite; and Apollodorus (3.14.3) too calls him a son of Sandacus, who had emigrated from Syria to Cilicia.** Cinyras, after his arrival in Cyprus, founded the town of Paphos. He was married to Metharne, the daughter of the Cyprian king, Pygmalion, by whom he had several children. One of them was Adonis, whom, according to some traditions, he begot unwittingly in an incestuous intercourse with his own daughter, Smyrna. He afterwards killed himself on discovering this crime, into which he had been led by the anger of Aphrodite. (*Hyg. Fab.* 58, 242; Antonin. Lib. 34; Ov. *Met*. x. 310, &c.)

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Fortuna_Alexandri*/2.html#ref154
>
> **Again in Paphos when the reigning king was seen to be unjust and wicked, Alexander expelled him and searched for another, since the family of Cinyradae[a] appeared to be already passing away or extinct. However, they told him that there still survived one poor and obscure person, who eked out a forsaken existence in a certain garden.** Men were sent to fetch him and, when they arrived, he was found watering his garden-plots; and he was much perturbed when the soldiers laid hands on him and ordered him to come with them. He was brought before Alexander and, dressed as he was in a single cheap garment, he was proclaimed king, and received the royal purple, and became one of those who are styled the king's "Companions." **His name was Abdalonymus.**[155] Thus does shifting Fortune create kings, change their raiment, and quickly and easily alter the status of men who expect nothing of the sort, and do not even hope for it.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Evagoras

Aided by the Athenians and the Egyptian Hakor (Acoris), Evagoras extended his rule over the greater part of Cyprus, crossed over to Asia Minor, took several cities in Phoenicia, and persuaded the Cilicians to revolt. **After the peace of Antalcidas (387), to which he refused to agree, the Athenians withdrew their support, since by its terms they recognized the lordship of Persia over Cyprus. For ten years Evagoras carried on hostilities single-handed, except for occasional aid from Egypt. At last he was totally defeated at Citium, and compelled to flee to Salamis.** Here,

although closely blockaded, he managed to hold his ground, and took advantage of a quarrel between the Persian generals to conclude peace (376). Evagoras was allowed to remain nominally king of Salamis, but in reality a vassal of Persia, to which he was to pay a yearly tribute. The chronology of the last part of his reign is uncertain. In 374 he was assassinated by a eunuch from motives of private revenge.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D9%3Asection%3D19

[19] So distinguished from the beginning was the heritage transmitted to Evagoras by his ancestors. After the city had been founded in this manner, the rule at first was held by Teucer's descendants: at a later time, however, **there came from Phoenicia a fugitive, who after he had gained the confidence of the king who then reigned,** and had won great power, showed no proper gratitude for the favor shown him; [20] on the contrary, he acted basely toward his host, and being skilled at grasping, he expelled his benefactor and himself seized the throne. But distrustful of the consequences of his measures and wishing to make his position secure, **he reduced the city to barbarism, and brought the whole island into subservience to the Great King.**[18]

[21] Such was the state of affairs in Salamis, and the descendants of the usurper were in possession of the throne when Evagoras was born.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D9%3Asection%3D47

[47] After he had taken over the government of the city, **which had been reduced to a state of barbarism and, because it was ruled by Phoenicians, was neither hospitable to the Greeks nor acquainted with the arts, nor possessed of a trading-port or harbor,** Evagoras remedied all these defects and, besides, acquired much additional territory, surrounded it all with new walls and built triremes, and with other construction so increased the city that it was inferior to none of the cities of Greece.
...

[49] For who could do justice to a man of such natural gifts, a man who not only increased the importance of his own city, but **advanced the whole region surrounding the island to a regime of mildness and moderation?** Before Evagoras gained the throne the inhabitants were so hostile to strangers and fierce that they considered the best rulers to be those who treated the Greeks in the most cruel fashion.

[50] **At present, however, they have undergone so great a change that they strive with one another to see who shall be regarded as most friendly to the Greeks, and the majority of them take their wives from us and from them beget children, and they have greater pleasure in owning Greek possessions and observing Greek institutions than in their own,** and more of those who occupy themselves with the liberal arts and with education in general now dwell in these regions than in the communities in which they formerly used to live. And for all these changes, no one could deny that Evagoras is responsible.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0100%3Aorator%3DIsocrates%3Aspeech%3D9%3Asection%3D49
>
> **τὸν_τόπον_τὸν_περιέχ** 'The coast adjacent to Cyprus'—meaning esp. the seaboard of Cilicia and Caria. Phoenician trading posts had existed there from early times, **but on the Cilician coast the Greeks had few settlements before the time of Alexander.**
>
> **ἀπροσοίστως, κ.τ.λ.** 'their temper was so unsociable and savage that they deemed those rulers the best who were most cruelly disposed towards the Greeks':—a description which doubtless includes the Phoenician colonists as well as the natives of the Asiatic mainland. **In the pseudo-Lysian speech 'Against Andocides' it is stated that when he visited Cyprus he was imprisoned by the [Phoenician] king of Citium,** καὶ οὐ μόνον θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι, § 26.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D9%3Asection%3D66

Evagoras, from private estate, made himself a sovereign: his entire family, which had been driven from political power, he restored again to their appropriate honors: **the citizens of barbarian birth he transformed into Hellenes, [τοὺς δὲ πολίτας (politās) ἐκ βαρβάρων μὲν Ἕλληνας ἐποίησεν]** [67] cravens into warriors, and obscure individuals into men of note: and having taken over a country wholly **inhospitable [ἄμικτος]** and utterly reduced to savagery, he made it more civilized and gentler:

https://books.google.fi/books?id=smPZ-ou74EwC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

While the age of Alexander marked the beginning of the Hellenistic period in the eastern Mediterranean, **the process of Hellenization had begun in earnest a full century before, both on the Phoenician mainland and in the Punic west.** Much of the impetus came from increased trade with the Greek realm.
...

In the transmission of Hellenic culture to the Phoenician mainland, the island of Cyprus clearly played a focal role. **Such Hellenizing influence intensified in the early fourth century under Evagoras I (411-374 BC),** Salamis' pro-Athenian king. As the material record attests, Hellenism's imprint manifests itself increasingly within the Cypriot Phoenician realm.

As the historical and epigraphical record attests, the fourth century also marked a period of active Phoenician commercial activity in the Aegean. The primary initiator of such trade was Sidon. Hellenic cultural influences there may have reached a peak under **Abdashtart I (376/70-360/58 BC), Sidon's avidly philhellenic king, who adopted the Greek name Straton. Its impact may be seen in the graecizing of personal names, the use of Greek coin types and weight standards, and the adoption of Greek military tactics and techniques.**

https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/IGII2/141

... of the Athenians, and has taken care that the ambassadors whom the People sent to the King[1] should travel as finely as possible, and to reply to the man who has come from the king of Sidon[2] that, **if in the future he is a good man to the People of Athens, he will not fail to obtain from the Athenians what he needs. Also Straton the king of Sidon shall be proxenos of the People of Athens, both himself and his descendants.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicocles_of_Salamis
>
> In 374/3 BC, he succeeded his (presumed) father Evagoras I. Nicocles continued the philhellenic politics of his father**. Nicocles probably died together with Straton of Sidon during the revolt of satraps (362 to 360 BC).**
>
> http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus12b.html
>
> [41.] But Theopompus, in the fifteenth book of his History of Philip, says – "**Straton the king of Sidon surpassed all men in luxury and devotion to pleasure.** For as Homer [*Od.* 8.248] has represented the Phaeacians as living feasting and drinking, and listening to harp-players and rhapsodists, so also did Straton pass the whole of his life; and so much the more devoted to pleasure was he than they, that the Phaeacians, as Homer reports, used to hold their banquets in the company of their own wives and daughters; but Straton used to prepare his entertainments with flute-playing and harp-playing and lyre-playing women. **And he sent for many courtesans from the Peloponnese, and for many musicians from Ionia, and for other girls from every part of Greece; some skilful in singing and some in dancing, for exhibitions of skill in which they had contests before himself and his friends; and with these women he spent a great deal of his time.** He then, delighting in such a life as this, and being by nature a slave to his passions, was also especially urged on by rivalry with Nicocles. **For he and Nicocles were always rivalling one another; each of them devoted all his attention to living more luxuriously and pleasantly than the other.** And so they carried their emulation to such a height, as we have heard, that when either of them heard from his visitors what was the furniture of the other's house, and how great was the expense gone to by the other for any sacrifice, he immediately set to work to surpass him in such things. And they were anxious to appear to all men prosperous and deserving of envy. Nevertheless neither of them continued prosperous throughout the whole of their lives, but were both of them destroyed by violent deaths."
>
> And Anaximenes, in his book entitled *The Reverses of Kings*, giving the same account of Straton, says that he was always endeavouring to rival Nicocles, who was the king of Salamis in Cyprus, and who was exceedingly devoted to luxury and debauchery, and that they both came to a violent end.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D17%3Asection%3D4

[4] Having heard reports both of this state and of the other lands where Greeks live, I desired to travel abroad. And so my father loaded two ships with grain,[1] gave me money, and sent me off on a trading expedition and at the same time to see the world.[2] **Pythodorus, the Phoenician, introduced Pasion to me** and I opened an account at his bank.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Rrg1DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT126#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Apollodorus was the son of an ex-slave, Pasion. We'll revisit their family history in Chapter 8 and here we'll just focus on his name. Apollodorus was born after his father gained his freedom and thus was named by him rather than by Pasion's master. **The name Apollodorus sounds Greek enough: it meant gift of Apollo and was not a rare name for an Athenian citizen. Scholars have also noticed, however, that Pasion counted Phoenicians with similar names, Theodorus and Pythodorus, among his associates** (Trevett 1992, 17 n. 1). Incriptions from the Hellenistic period

> reveal that Phoenicians in Athens often used names representing Greek translations of Phoenician names. These names were often derived from the name of a god, just as Theodorus, Pythodorus, and Apollodorus are. **If Pasion was a Phoenician just like his friends, Apollodorus could well represent a Greek translation of a Phoenician name.** It was perhaps the same original name as Pythodorus; for Apollo was commonly called Pythian Apollo. Pasion may have cleverly combined an allegiance to his homeland and an accommodation with Athenian culture in his choice of a name for his son. **And who knows whether, when he was a boy, Apollodorus' parents called him to dinner with Abd-Reshef (the most likely Phoenician original) or Apollodorus.** In Athens under the Roman Empire, we find a similar case of hybridity: **a chief smelter in the mining district, likely a Semitic slave or ex-slave, had his epitaph written in Greek, but from right to left, the direction of his native system and not the direction Greeks wrote** (*IG* II2 11697).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Anabasis_of_Alexander/Book_II/Chapter_XV

He set out from Marathus and took possession of Byblus[4] on terms of capitulation, **as he did also of Sidon,[5] the inhabitants of which spontaneously invited him from hatred of the Persians and Darius.**[6] Thence he advanced towards Tyre;[7] ambassadors from which city, despatched by the commonwealth, met him on the march, announcing that the Tyrians had decided to do whatever he might command.[8] He commended both the city and its ambassadors, and ordered them to return and tell the Tyrians that he wished to enter their city and offer sacrifice to Heracles.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Anabasis_of_Alexander/Book_II/Chapter_XX

About this time **Gerostratus, King of Aradus, and Enylus, King of Byblus,** ascertaining that their cities were in the possession of Alexander, deserted Autophradates and the fleet under his command, and came to Alexander with their naval force, accompanied by the Sidonian triremes; so that about eighty Phoenician ships joined him.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philocles,_King_of_Sidon

Philocles (Greek: Φιλοκλής, romanized: *Philokles*) was King of Sidon and a military commander under the Ptolemaic dynasty in the late 4th and early 3rd century BC, and one of the architects of Ptolemaic imperialism in the coasts of Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea. He served as an admiral in the Ptolemaic navy during the Second Syrian War.[1]

His life is known only through inscriptions and a single literary passage.[2] Philocles' origin and early life are therefore unknown. **The name of his father, Apollodorus, survives, but it is likely that despite the Greek names used in the Greek sources, both were Phoenicians, and most likely descendants or relatives of the royal line of Sidon.**[2]
...

According to Hans Hauben, **this activity means that Philocles "should probably be considered the main architect, or at least one of the main architects, of early Ptolemaic expansion in the Mediterranean".**[9]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Aratus*.html#ref14

There were in Corinth four brothers, Syrians by race, [Σύροι τὸ γένος] one of whom, Diocles by name, was serving as a mercenary soldier in the citadel. The other three, after stealing some gold plate of the king's, came to Aegias, a banker in Sicyon with whom Aratus did business.
...

He himself, however, in the Commentaries which he left, lays the blame for this attempt upon Erginus, with whose aid he had effected the capture of Acrocorinthus. 3 He says that Erginus attacked the Peiraeus on his own private account, and that when his scaling-ladder broke and the enemy were pursuing him, he kept calling upon Aratus by name, as if Aratus were there, and thus deceived and made his escape from them. But this defence does not seem to be convincing. **For Erginus was a private man and a Syrian, [ἄνθρωπον ἰδιώτην καὶ Σύρον]** and there is no likelihood that he would have conceived of so great an undertaking if he had not been under the guidance of Aratus and obtained from him the force and the fitting time for the attack.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/226/mode/2up?view=theater

And yet not only was the court framed exactly after the model shown by Alexander, and a new capital made for the new kingdom, **but there is evidence that Syria became the peculiar home of Hellenism to a degree that was never attained in Egypt. In Egypt Alexandria stood almost alone, and in the lapse of years Egyptian influences made themselves prominently felt even there.**
...

Juvenal says that it was the Syrian Orontes which flowed into the Tiber, and ultimately Antioch became a greater social and commercial centre than Alexandria.1

> 1. If the LXX. represents to us the Greek of Alexandria, **strangely enough the New Testament gives us our only large example of Syrian Greek.**

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno_of_Citium#Life

According to Apollodorus, as quoted by Philodemus, Zeno died in Arrheneides' archonship (262/1 BC). According to Persaeus (Diogenes Laërtius vii. 28), Zeno lived for 72 years. His date of birth is thus 334/3 BC. A plausible chronology for his life is as follows: **He was born 334/3 BC, and came to Athens in 312/11 BC at the age of 22** (Laërtius 1925, § 28). **He studied philosophy for about 10 years** (Laërtius 1925, § 2); **opened his own school during Clearchus' archonship in 301/0 BC** (Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, col. 4); **and was the head of the school for 39 years and 3 months** (Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, col. 4), **and died 262/1 BC.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#Zeno

1. Zeno, the son of Mnaseas (or Demeas), was a native of Citium in Cyprus, **a Greek city which had received Phoenician settlers.** He had a wry neck, says Timotheus of Athens in his book *On Lives*. **Moreover, Apollonius of Tyre says he was lean, fairly tall, and swarthy [μελάγχρους] – hence some one called him an Egyptian vine-branch, according to Chrysippus in the first book of his *Proverbs*.**
…

2. He was a pupil of Crates, as stated above. Next they say he attended the lectures of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years – so Timocrates says in his Dion – and Polemo as well. It is stated by Hecato and by Apollonius of Tyre in his first book on Zeno **that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the god's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, he studied ancient authors.** Now the way he came across Crates was this. He was shipwrecked on a voyage from Phoenicia to Peiraeus with a cargo of purple. **He went up into Athens and sat down in a bookseller's shop, being then a man of thirty.** 3. **As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found.** Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, "Follow yonder man." From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, **"Why run away, my little Phoenician?"** quoth Crates, "nothing terrible has befallen you."

4. For a certain space, then, he was instructed by Crates, **and when at this time he had written his *Republic*, some said in jest that he had written it on Cynosura, i.e. on the dog's tail.**[1]
…

But at last he left Crates, and the men above mentioned were his masters for twenty years. Hence he is reported to have said, **"I made a prosperous voyage when I suffered shipwreck."** But others attribute this saying of his to the time when he was under Crates. 5. A different version of the story is that he was staying at Athens when he heard his ship was wrecked and said, "It is well done of thee, Fortune, thus to drive me to philosophy." **But some say that he disposed of his cargo in Athens, before he turned his attention to philosophy.**

He used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the painted colonnade, which is also called the colonnade or Portico[2] of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. **It was the spot where in the time of the Thirty 1400 Athenian citizens had been put to death.**[3]
…

6. The people of Athens held Zeno in high honour, as is proved by their depositing with him the keys of the city walls, and their honouring him with a golden crown and a bronze statue. This last mark of respect was also shown to him by citizens of his native town, who deemed his statue an ornament to their city,[4] **and the men of Citium living in Sidon were also proud to claim him for their own. Antigonus (Gonatas) also favoured him, and whenever he came to Athens would hear him lecture and often invited him to come to his court.** This offer he declined but dispatched thither one of his friends, Persaeus, the son of Demetrius and a native of Citium, who flourished in the 130th

Olympiad,[5] at which time Zeno was already an old man. According to Apollonius of Tyre in his work upon Zeno, the letter of Antigonus was couched in the following terms:

> 7. "King Antigonus to Zeno the philosopher, greeting.
>
> "**While in fortune and fame I deem myself your superior, in reason and education I own myself inferior, as well as in the perfect happiness which you have attained.** Wherefore I have decided to ask you to pay me a visit, being persuaded that you will not refuse the request. By all means, then, do your best to hold conference with me, understanding clearly that you will not be the instructor of myself alone but of all the Macedonians taken together. **For it is obvious that whoever instructs the ruler of Macedonia and guides him in the paths of virtue will also be training his subjects to be good men.** As is the ruler, such for the most part it may be expected that his subjects will become."

And Zeno's reply is as follows:

> 8. "Zeno to King Antigonus, greeting.
>
> "I welcome your love of learning in so far as you cleave to that true education which tends to advantage and not to that popular counterfeit of it which serves only to corrupt morals. But if anyone has yearned for philosophy, turning away from much-vaunted pleasure which renders effeminate the souls of some of the young, it is evident that not by nature only, but also by the bent of his will he is inclined to nobility of character. **But if a noble nature be aided by moderate exercise and further receive ungrudging instruction, it easily comes to acquire virtue in perfection.** 9. But I am constrained by bodily weakness, due to old age, for I am eighty years old; and for that reason I am unable to join you. But I send you certain companions of my studies whose mental powers are not inferior to mine, while their bodily strength is far greater, and if you associate with these you will in no way fall short of the conditions necessary to perfect happiness."

So he sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; **and Epicurus in his letter to his brother Aristobulus mentions them both as living with Antigonus.** I have thought it well to append the decree also which the Athenians passed concerning him. It reads as follows:[6]

> 10. "In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth prytany of the tribe Acamantis on the twenty-first day of Maemacterion, at the twenty-third plenary assembly of the prytany, one of the presidents, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the deme Xypetaeon, and his co-presidents put the question to the vote; Thraso, the son of Thraso of the deme Anacaea, moved:
>
> "**Whereas Zeno of Citium, son of Mnaseas, has for many years been devoted to philosophy in the city and has continued to be a man of worth in all other respects,** exhorting to virtue and temperance those of the youth who come to him to be taught, directing them to what is best, affording to all in his own conduct a pattern for imitation in perfect consistency with his teaching, it has seemed good to the people – 11. and may it turn out well – to bestow praise upon Zeno of Citium, the son of Mnaseas, and to crown him with a golden crown according to the law, for his goodness and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus at the public cost. And that for the making of the crown and the building of the tomb, the people shall now elect five commissioners from all Athenians, and the Secretary of State **shall inscribe this decree on two stone pillars and it shall be lawful for him to set up one in the Academy and the other in the Lyceum. And that the magistrate presiding over the administration shall apportion the expense incurred upon the pillars, that all may know that the Athenian people honour the good both in their life and after their death.** 12. Thraso of the deme Anacaea, Philocles of Peiraeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystus, Medon of Acharnae, Micythus of Sypalettus, and Dion of Paeania have been elected commissioners for the making of the crown and the building."
>
> 6. Cf. Tarn, *Antig. Gon.* p. 309, especially note 106; he considers the decree, as we have it, a fusion of two genuine decrees, (1) voting a crown to Zeno in his life-time, (2) decreeing a public funeral after his death.

These are the terms of the decree.

Antigonus of Carystus tells us that he never denied that he was a citizen of Citium. For when he was one of those who contributed to the restoration of the baths and his name was inscribed upon the pillar as "Zeno the philosopher," he requested that the words "of Citium" should be added. He made a hollow lid for a flask and used to carry about money in it, in order that there might be provision at hand for the necessities of his master Crates. 13. **It is said that he had more than a thousand talents when he came to Greece, and that he lent this money on bottomry.**[7]

He used to eat little loaves and honey and to drink a little wine of good bouquet. He rarely employed men-servants; **once or twice indeed he might have a young girl to wait on him in order not to seem a misogynist.** He shared the same house with Persaeus, and when the latter brought in a little flute-player he lost no time in leading her straight to Persaeus. They tell us he readily adapted himself to circumstances, so much so that King Antigonus often broke in on him with a noisy party, and once took him along with other revellers to Aristocles the musician; Zeno, however, in a little while gave them the slip.
…

When Democharés, the son of Laches, greeted him and told him he had only to speak or write for anything he wanted to Antigonus, who would be sure to grant all his requests, Zeno after hearing this would have nothing more to do with him.[8]

> 8. Zeno must have foreseen that this compliment would be followed by a request to use his undoubted influence with the king on behalf of Democharés, who, as an Athenian patriot and the nephew of Demosthenes, was out of favour at the Macedonian court. Indeed the fact of his making such advances at all is so strange that Ferguson (p. 172) and Tarn (p. 94, note 11) feel constrained to offer hypothetical explanations.

15. **After Zeno's death Antigonus is reported to have said, "What an audience I have lost."**[9] Hence too he employed Thraso as his agent to request the Athenians to bury Zeno in the Ceramicus. And when asked why he admired him, "Because," said he, "the many ample gifts I offered him never made him conceited nor yet appear poor-spirited."

His bent was towards inquiry, and he was an exact reasoner on all subjects. Hence the words of Timon in his *Silli*:[10]

> **A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things;** but the meshes of her subtle web have perished, and she had no more intelligence than a banjo.[11]

…

And he had about him certain ragged dirty fellows, as Timon says[12] **in these lines:**

> **The while he got together a crowd of ignorant serfs, who surpassed all men in beggary and were the emptiest of townsfolk.**[13]

Zeno himself was sour and of a frowning countenance. **He was very niggardly too, clinging to meanness unworthy of a Greek, on the plea of economy.** If he pitched into anyone he would do it concisely, and not effusively, keeping him rather at arm's length.
…

He used to say that the very exact expressions used by those who avoided solecisms were like the coins struck by Alexander: they were beautiful in appearance and well-rounded like the coins, but none the better on that account. Words of the opposite kind he would compare to the Attic tetradrachms, which, though struck carelessly and inartistically, nevertheless outweighed the ornate phrases.
…

Some one said that he did not in general agree with Antisthenes, whereupon Zeno produced that author's essay on Sophocles, and asked him if he thought it had any excellence; to which the reply was that he did not know. "Then are you not ashamed," quoth he, "to pick out and mention anything wrong said by Antisthenes, while you suppress his good things without giving them a thought?"
…

22. A Rhodian, who was handsome and rich, but nothing more, insisted on joining his class; but so unwelcome was this pupil, that first of all Zeno made him sit on the benches that were dusty, that he might soil his cloak, and then he consigned him to the place where the beggars sat, that he might rub shoulders with their rags; so at last the young man went away.
…

The young, he thought, should behave with perfect propriety in walk, gait and dress, **and he used continually to quote the lines of Euripides about Capaneus:**

> Large means had he, yet not the haughtiness
> That springs from wealth, nor cherished prouder thoughts
> Of vain ambition than the poorest man.[15]

…

Apollonius of Tyre tells us how, when Crates laid hold on him by the cloak to drag him from Stilpo, Zeno said, "The right way to seize a philosopher, Crates, is by the ears: persuade me then and drag me off by them; but, if you use violence, my body will be with you, but my mind with Stilpo."

25. According to Hippobotus he forgathered with Diodorus, with whom he worked hard at dialectic. And when he was already making progress, **he would enter Polemo's school: so far from all self-conceit was he. In consequence Polemo is said to have addressed him thus: "You slip in, Zeno, by the garden door – I'm quite aware of it – you filch my doctrines and give them a Phoenician make-up."**
…

They say too that he first introduced the word Duty and wrote a treatise on the subject.
…

When he was asked why he, though so austere, relaxed at a drinking-party, he said, "Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked become sweet." Hecato too in the second book of his *Anecdotes* says that he indulged freely at such gatherings. And he would say, "Better to trip with the feet than with the tongue." "Well-being is attained by little and little, and nevertheless it is no little thing itself." [Others attribute this[18] to Socrates.]

27. He showed the utmost endurance, and the greatest frugality; the food he used required no fire to dress, and the cloak he wore was thin. Hence it was said of him:

> The cold of winter and the ceaseless rain
> Come powerless against him: weak the dart
> Of the fierce summer sun or racking pain
> To bend that iron frame. He stands apart
> Unspoiled by public feast and jollity:
> Patient, unwearied night and day doth he
> Cling to his studies of philosophy.

Nay more: **the comic poets by their very jests at his expense praised him without intending it.** Thus Philemon says in a play, *Philosophers*:

> This man adopts a new philosophy.
> He teaches to go hungry: yet he gets
> Disciples. One sole loaf of bread his food;
> His best dessert dried figs; water his drink.

Others attribute these lines to Poseidippus. By this time he had almost become a proverb. At all events, "More temperate than Zeno the philosopher" was a current saying about him. Poseidippus also writes in his *Men Transported*:

> So that for ten whole days
> More temperate than Zeno's self he seemed.

…

29. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus and honoured him in the decrees already cited above, adding their testimony of his goodness. Here is the epitaph composed for him by Antipater of Sidon:[20]

> Here lies great Zeno, dear to Citium, who scaled high Olympus, though he piled not Pelion on Ossa, nor toiled at the labours of Heracles, **but this was the path he found out to the stars – the way of temperance alone.**

30. Here too is another by Zenodotus the Stoic, a pupil of Diogenes:[21]

> Thou madest self-sufficiency thy rule,
> Eschewing haughty wealth, O godlike Zeno,
> With aspect grave and hoary brow serene.
> A manly doctrine thine: and by thy prudence
> With much toil thou didst found a great new school,
> Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.
> **And if thy native country was Phoenicia,**
> **What need to slight thee? came not Cadmus thence,**
> **Who gave to Greece her books and art of writing?**

…

Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on *Men of the Same Name*, says of him: **his father, Mnaseas, being a merchant often went to Athens and brought away many books about Socrates for Zeno while still a boy.** 32. **Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place.**

---

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr06.htm

We do not know whether the old Hellenes had any general word to denote the surrounding peoples ('Pelasgians and divers other barbarous tribes'42_1) whom they conquered or accepted as allies.42_2 **In any case by the time of the Persian Wars (say 500 B.C.) all these tribes together considered themselves Hellenized,** bore the name of 'Hellenes', and formed a kind of unity against hordes of 'barbaroi' surrounding them on every side and threatening them especially from the east.

Let us consider for a moment the dates. **In political history this self-realization of the Greek tribes as Hellenes against barbarians seems to have been first felt in the Ionian settlements on the coast of Asia Minor, where the 'sons of Javan' (Yawan = Ἰάων) clashed as invaders against the native Hittite and Semite.** It was emphasized by a similar clash in the further colonies in Pontus and in the West.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Pamphylia

The legend related by Herodotus and Strabo, which ascribed the origin of the Pamphylians to a colony led into their country by Amphilochus and Calchas after the Trojan War, is merely a characteristic myth. The coins of Aspendus, though of Greek character, bear legends in a barbarous dialect; **and probably the Pamphylians were of Asiatic origin and mixed race.** They became largely hellenized in Roman times, and have left magnificent memorials of their civilization at Perga, Aspendus and Side.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pamphylia#Name

The name *Pamphylia* comes from the Greek Παμφυλία,[2] itself from Ancient Greek: πάμφυλος (*pamphylos*), literally "of mingled tribes or races",[3] a compound of πᾶν (*pan*), neuter of πᾶς (*pas*) "all"[4] + φυλή (*phylē*), "race, tribe".[5] Herodotus derived its etymology from a Dorian tribe, the Pamphyloi (Πάμφυλοι), who were said to have colonized the region.[6] The tribe, in turn, was said to be named after Pamphylos (Greek: Πάμφυλος), son of Aigimios.[7][8]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Anabasis_of_Alexander/Book_I/Chapter_XXVI#cite_ref-3

Alexander then marched to Sidē,[4] the inhabitants of which were Cymaeans from Cyme, in Aeolis. **These people give the following account of themselves, saying that their ancestors starting from Cyme, arrived in that country, and disembarked to found a settlement. They immediately forgot the Grecian language, and forthwith began to utter a foreign speech, not, indeed, that of the neighbouring barbarians, but a speech peculiar to themselves, which had never before existed.** From that time the Sidetans used to speak a foreign language unlike that of the neighbouring nations.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/12C*.html#ref18

9 As for the Paphlagonians, they are bounded on the east by the Halys River, "which," according to Herodotus,[19] "flows from the south between the Syrians and the Paphlagonians and empties into the Euxine Sea, as it is called"; by "Syrians," **however, he means the "Cappadocians," and in fact they are still to-day called "White Syrians," while those outside the Taurus are called "Syrians."** As compared with those this side the Taurus, those outside have a tanned complexion, while those this side do not, and for this reason received the appellation "white."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Herodotus/7B*.html#ref13

91 The Cilicians furnished a hundred ships. These, too, wore on their heads the helmets of their country, carrying bucklers of raw oxhide for shields, and clad in woollen tunics; each had two javelins and shields fashioned well-nigh like the falchions of Egypt. **These Cilicians were in old time called Hypachaei, and took the name they bear from Cilix a Phoenician, son of Agenor.**[14]

[14] **Agenor appears to represent the Phoenician Baal**.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NMkUAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA37-IA2#v=onepage&q&f=false

In like manner to the other historical data, the toponymics show the mixed character of the East Cilician population. Many names of localities bear Hurrian features. But the multiplicity of Semitic toponyms shows that the Semitic population was numerous and had firmly taken root in the country.1

> 1. It should be supposed, in addition to everything else, **that the Greeks had some reason,** based on acquaintance with both peoples, **when they declared Cilix a brother of Phoenix in their mythical genealogies.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=sxurBtx6shoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA163#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bacchus might alternatively be a Semitic loan-word meaning wailing:14 the Greek women who search for Dionysus would then correspond to the women of Israel who bewail Tammuz. **It is quite possible that earlier Cilician-Syrian connections were later overlaid with Phrygian and then Lydian traditions.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NMkUAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false

The conclusion from all these toponymic data is evident. The place-names of Eastern Cilicia in the second millennium were Hurrian, Akkadian, and W-S [West-Semitic], and they survived far into the first millennium. There is no difference, in this respect too, between Eastern Cilicia and the North Syrian states of Alalah (with its vast dependencies) and Ugarit. In was, consequently, inhabited by the same population as North Syria, which in the middle and late second millennium was a mixture of W-S and Hurrian elements living in close symbiosis and ethnic harmony and sharing the same civilization.1

> 1. **It is important to stress that documents from Alalah and Ugarit do not reveal discrimination along ethnic lines in any social sphere. Any group of people, be it a village community, a guild, an army unit, a social estate up to the mariannu-aristocracy, always includes persons with both Semitic and Hurrian names. Cases where a man with a Hurrian name gave his son a Semitic name, and vice versa, are extremely common.** Ugaritians with purely Hurrian names (*Ewr-zı*, *Ewr-srm*, *Tlmyn*) wrote letters in W-S (UM 54; 89; 138; DXXIV, No. 12). Nor was Hurrian religion essentially different from that of their Semitic neighbors. According to E. Laroche, "the Hurrians, at the epoch when they make themselves known to us by abundant evidence, i.e., about the middle of the second millennium, possess a pantheon borrowed from Mesopotamia. But, in adopting it, they gave the Storm-god an outstanding place … It is probable that the presence of Adad with the West Semites played here a capital role. **Hurrian religion, both in its pantheon and in its cult technique, widespread in Kizzuwatna, Ugarit, Aleppo, Mari, Assyria and Upper Euphrates (but not beyond the Antitaurus) is the product of a mixture in which I distinguish three principal elements: 1. an archaic Sumerian stock, 2. national divinities of the Hurrian mountaineers, 3. an Amorite influence**" (CCCXXIIa, 133). **Dussaud may have exaggerated when he drastically stated: "Grattez le khurrite et vous trouverez le sémite"** (CXLVI, 180), **but he was not far from truth.**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurrians
>
> The largest and most influential Hurrian nation was the kingdom of Mitanni, **the Mitanni perhaps being Indo-Iranian speakers who formed a ruling class over the Hurrians. The population of the Indo-European-speaking Hittite Empire in Anatolia included a large population of Hurrians, and there is significant Hurrian influence in Hittite mythology.** By the Early Iron Age, the Hurrians had been assimilated with other peoples. Their remnants were subdued by a related people that formed the state of Urartu. **The present-day Armenians are an amalgam of the Indo-European groups with the Hurrians and Urartians.**[1]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-zL7DAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA311#v=onepage&q&f=false

Meanwhile, Phoenicians were settling on the eastern part of the coast of Cilicia by the ninth century and possibly as early as the eleventh century, **with a particularly strong presence at Tarsus beginning *ca*. 850 BCE.**50

The inscriptional and iconographic evidence from eastern Anatolia and northern Syria after 1000 BCE reveals a multilingual, multicultural society of Phoenicians, Arameans, Assyrians, and Luwians. Bilingual Phoenician-Luwian inscriptions have been found at İvriz and Karatepe, while at Tyana both Hieroglyphic Luwian and Phoenician are attested; at Aleppo inscriptions in both Hieroglyphic Luwian and Aramaic are found; Sam'al (modern Zincirli) mixed Neo-Hittite monumental sculpture with Phoenician and Aramaic inscriptions; and İncirli has provided a trilingual Hieroglyphic Luwian, Neo-Assyrian, and Phoenician inscription. Furthermore, in the ninth and eighth centuries BCE inscriptions in Aramaic appear at the behest of kings with Anatolian names. In fact, **what the Greeks considered to be Phoenician culture overlaps to a large extent with what we call Neo-Hittite culture,**51 an amalgamation of west Semitic traits, already evident in the Late Bronze Age texts from Ugarit, and the remains of the Hurro-Hittite culture exemplified by the texts from the libraries of Hattusa, as conditioned by its north Syrian milieu.52

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/72*.html#ref13

25 "But since Cassius would never consent to adopt this course,—for how could he trust me after having shown himself so untrustworthy toward me?—**you, at least, fellow-soldiers, ought to be of good cheer. For surely Cilicians, Syrians, Jews, and Egyptians have never proved superior to you and never will,** even if they should muster as many tens of thousands more than you as they now muster fewer.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n153/mode/2up?view=theater

The real creators of Greek culture were not the Greeks of what we now call Greece, but those who fled before the conquering Dorians, fought desperately for a foothold on foreign shores, and there, out of their Mycenaean memories and their amazing energy, made the art and science, the philosophy and poetry that, long before Marathon, placed them in the forefront of the Western world. Greek civilization was inherited by the parent cities from their children.

There is nothing more vital in the history of the Greeks than their rapid spread throughout the Mediterranean.* They had been nomadic before Homer, and all the Balkan peninsula had seemed fluid with this movement, but the successive Greek waves that broke upon the Aegean isles and the western coasts of Asia were stirred up above all by the Dorian invasion. **From every part of Hellas men went out in search of homes and liberty beyond the grasp of the enslaving conquerors.**
…

The migration followed five main lines—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, Euxine, Italian. The earliest began in the northern states of the mainland, which were the first to feel the brunt of the invasions from the north and the west. From Thessaly, Phthiotis, Boeotia, and Aetolia, **throughout the twelfth and eleventh centuries, a stream of immigrants moved slowly across the Aegean to the region about Troy,** and founded there the twelve cities of the Aeolian League. The second line took its start in the Peloponnesus, whence thousands of Mycenaeans and Achaeans fled on the “Return of the Heraclids.” Some of then settled in Attica, some in Euboea; many of them moved out into the Cyclades, ventured across the Aegean, and established in western Asia Minor the twelve cities of the Ionian Dodecapolis. The third line was followed by Dorians who overflowed the Peloponnesus into the Cyclades, conquered Crete and Cyrene, and set up a Dorian Hexapolis around the island of Rhodes. The fourth line, starting anywhere in Greece, settled the coast of Thrace, and built a hundred cities on the shores of the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Euxine Sea. The fifth line moved westward to what the Greeks called the Ionian Isles, thence across to Italy and Sicily, and finally to Gaul and Spain.
…

In some cases the conquerors reduced the prior inhabitants to slavery, with all the irony of pilgrims seeking freedom; more often they made friends of the natives by bringing them Greek gifts, charming them with a superior culture, courting their women, and adopting their gods; the colonial Greeks did not bother about purity of race,[3] and could always find in their teeming pantheon some deity sufficiently like the local divinity to facilitate a religious entente. Above all, the colonists offered the products of the Greek handicrafts to the natives, secured grain, cattle, or minerals in return, and exported these throughout the Mediterranean—preferably to the *metropolis*, or mother city, from which the settlers had come, and to which they retained for centuries a certain filial piety.

> http://www.attalus.org/translate/justin7.html#43.3
>
> 5 The Phocaeans, compelled by the smallness and infertility of their territory, had applied themselves more to the sea than to the culture of the ground, supporting themselves by fishing, merchandise, **and above all by piracy, which in those days was thought an honourable occupation.** 6 Venturing accordingly to visit the remotest shores of the ocean, they came into the gulf of Gaul and to the mouth of the river Rhone; 7 and, charmed with the pleasantness of the country, and relating, on their return home, what they had seen, they tempted others to go to the same parts. 8 Of the fleet Simos and Protis were the captains, who applied to the king of the Segobrigii, named Nannus, in whose territory they were anxious to build a city, desiring his friendship. 9 On that day, as it happened, the king was engaged in preparing for the nuptials of his daughter Gyptis, whom, after the custom of that people, he intended to give in marriage to a son-in-law to be chosen at the feast. 10 The suitors having been all invited to the wedding, the Greek visitors were also requested to join the festival. 11 The maiden was then introduced, and being desired by her father to give water to him whom she chose for her husband, she overlooked all the rest, and turning to the Greeks, held out water to Protis, who, from the king's guest becoming his son-in-law, was presented by his father-in-law with the ground for building a city.
> …
>
> [43.4] **From the people of Massilia, therefore, the Gauls learned a more civilized way of life, their former barbarity being laid aside or softened; [Galli et usum uitae cultioris deposita ac mansuefacta barbaria] and by them they were taught to cultivate their lands and to enclose their towns with walls.** 2 **Then too, they grew accustomed to live according to laws, and not by violence; then they learned to prune the vine and plant the**

> **olive; and such a radiance was shed over both men and things, that it was not Greece which seemed to have immigrated into Gaul, but Gaul that seemed to have been transplanted into Greece.**

One by one these colonies took form, until Greece was no longer the narrow peninsula of Homeric days, but a strangely loose association of independent cities scattered from Africa to Thrace and from Gibraltar to the eastern end of the Black Sea. **It was an epochal performance for the women of Greece; we shall not always find them so ready to have children.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OM3QAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR16#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cilicia comprises the long, narrow coastal region, nowhere much more than 100 km wide, stretching for some 370 km from Pamphylia and Pisidia to the Amanos mountains bordering upon northern Syria and Commagene. To the north it is separated by the high Taurus mountain chain from Isauria, Lycaonia, and Cappadocia. **Its inhabitants were regarded by Greeks as a barbarian people and referred to as *Κίλικες* without any further differentiation as to which part they came from.**
…

Broadly speaking, Cilicia Pedias for the most of the first millennium BC lay in the orbit of centres of power situated to its east and was thus more closely oriented to the Levantine coast, Syria, and Mesopotamia than to Asia Minor. Although it shared with Cilicia Tracheia a common Luwian heritage, it was subject to much more intensive external cultural influences from these regions. Thus, in the late eighth century several royal inscriptions are written both in Hieroglyphic Luwian and Phoenician and later, under Persian rule, inscriptions are written in Aramaic. Its administrative history is also revealing.73 **Control of Cilicia by eastern powers was often limited in extent to Cilicia Pedias, as was the case under Assyrian and Babylonian rule.** Following Alexander's conquest, the Seleucids only held territory over the wider region for brief periods, but were firmly entrenched in Pedias for most of the Hellenistic period. Cilicia Tracheia, on the other hand, was for much of the third century under Ptolemaic control.
…

The hellenization of Cilicia Pedias occurred rather earlier than in the rest of Cilicia, though only Soloi has any credible claim to have been a Greek city earlier than the Hellenistic period; its Doric dialect may support the tradition that it was a Rhodian foundation, perhaps dating to the Archaic period, though by the late fourth century a nobler Argive ancestry was preferred.96 **Several of the cities, notably Tarsos and Adana, were much older indigenous settlements referred to in Hittite texts of the second millennium.** The bilingual hieroglyphic Luwian and Phoenician inscriptions of the late eighth century BC from Karatepe (on the eastern edge of the plain) and from Çineköy (south of Adana) in themselves and in their content give some idea of the political organization of the region and its cultural milieu at the time when Greeks first re-established contacts with this corner of the eastern Mediterranean.97
…

Whatever the merits of the case, and it seems highly likely that the person recorded in the Cilician bilingual texts gave his name to the Cilician cities Mopsouestia and Mopsoukrene, **any settlers of Aegean origin during the turbulent times of the end of the Late Bronze Age seem to have been fully assimilated into the local population in culture and language by the eighth century BC.**

> https://www.timesofisrael.com/know-thine-enemy-dna-study-solves-ancient-riddle-of-origins-of-the-philistines/
>
> **Once they arrived in the region that would be named Philistia, the Philistine migrants began intermarrying—or at least "inter-procreating," quipped Master—with the local population. By 1000 BCE, their genes are almost indistinguishable.**
> …
>
> "Within no more than two centuries, this genetic footprint introduced during the early Iron Age is no longer detectable and seems to be diluted by a local Levantine related gene pool," said Jeong.

…

In the Classical period inscriptions in Greek have been found only at Soloi, which also inscribed its coin legends in Greek from the later fifth century. The same practice was also adopted at Mallos and, in the fourth century, at Tarsos and Issos, where Aramaic had previously been and continued to be applied to the coins of the Persian satraps operating in Cilicia. **Aramaic is also the language of a small number of inscriptions on stone of this period, perpetuating the region's older relations with the Assyrians and Babylonians and its earlier familiarity with Phoenician.**101 Soloi and Aigeai are the only cities of Pedias whose inhabitants are attested bearing Greek personal names at this stage of its history.102

So it was not until Alexander's conquest of Cilicia in 333 BC that a strong impulse of hellenization was felt.103 Thereafter the effects were rapid, at least in the cities closest to the coast. From the early third century a considerable number of figures prominent in literary, philosophical, and rhetorical circles emerged from these cities, while others, all bearing Greek names, appear in honorific texts, lists of victors, and on gravestones in the old centres of Greek civilization.104 **This appears not to have been the result of extensive Greek settlement or the foundation of new cities in Cilicia Pedias.**105 **In a region with such a long history of receptiveness to foreign cultural influences and identification with the dominant power, it is perhaps not surprising that local populations, at least at the elite level, should have adopted Greek names so quickly.** Most of the cities were quick to see the advantages of asserting a noble lineage from an ancient Greek metropolis, Argos being the preferred choice, presumably as the supposed ancestral home of the ruling Temenid dynasty of Macedonia.106 **Nevertheless, its pre-Greek identity was not entirely eliminated and ambivalence concerning its Greekness lingered into late antiquity.** The persistence of indigenous cults of Hittite-Luwian origin (e.g. Tarhunt and Sandan) is clearly revealed in the theophoric names which continued in use until Late Antiquity (e.g. names based on the root *Ταρκ–* and *Σανδ–*).107

> 107. **It was common for these local deities to be identified with Syrian or Mesopotamian counterparts both in name and iconography in the Achaemenid period:** see Casabonne pp. 70, 126-9, 178 and *Kulturbegegnung* pp. 63-93, 119-25, 140-5. Subsequently the same process of assimilation with Greek gods occurs.

http://snible.org/coins/hn/cilicia.html

The coin-legends, as might be expected in a country with a mixed population like Cilicia, are frequently bilingual, **the Greek language prevailing in the western, and the Aramaic in the eastern half of the country.**
…

Soli-Pompeiopolis, on the coast near *Mezetlu*, near the border between Cilicia Tracheia and Pedias, was probably of Rhodian origin, but also in some way connected with Athens. The coinage begins about B.C. 450 on the Persic standard.
…

In the time of Alexander or of his immediate successors, silver coins were struck for Soli with the facing head of Athena **and seated Baal,** mint-mark Σ (see Tarsus, p. 732); probably also Alexandrine tetradrachms with Σ (Müller, 1319-1329).
…

Tarsus, on the Cydnus, the most important city in Cilicia, was in the time of Xenophon the capital of its kings, by whom the coins earlier than the time of Tiribazus must have been struck. **The standard is Persic, the *inscr.* Aramaic and Greek.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Tarsus

Tarsus is most accessible from the sea or from the east. Even after the "Cilician Gates" were cut, the crossing of Taurus was a difficult operation for an invading army (as Xenophon and Arrian show). **Hence Tarsian history (where not determined by Greek maritime relations) has been strongly affected by Semitic influence, and Dion Chrysostom, about A.D. 112, says it was more like a Phoenician than a Hellenic city (which it claimed to be).** After the Assyrian power decayed, princes, several of whom bore the name or title Syennesis, ruled Tarsus before and under Persian power. **Persian satraps governed it in the 4th century B.C.; and struck coins with Aramaic legends there.**
…

In spite of its oriental character, it maintained a university where Greek philosophy was taught by a series of famous Tarsians, who influenced Roman history. Chief among them was Athenodorus Cananites (*q.v.*), teacher and friend of Augustus for many years, a man of courage and power, who remodelled the Tarsian constitution (making it timocratic and oligarchic). The picture which Philostratus, in his biography of Apollonius Tyanensis, draws of the Tarsians as vain, luxurious and illiterate, represents the general Graeco-Roman conception of the city. **The legend which was believed to be graven on the statue of Sardanapalus at Anchiale (12 m. S.W. from Tarsus) might have been the motto of most Tarsians: "Eat, drink, play, for nothing else is worth this (gesture)" (referred to by St Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 32).** The statue was probably an archaic work, with Hittite or cuneiform inscription, representing a figure with right hand raised: the letters and the attitude were misunderstood; the figure was supposed to be snapping the fingers and uttering this expression of effeminate and weary sensualism.
…

It is said that the original name of the city was Parthenia, which suggests that a virgin goddess was worshipped here as in so many shrines of Asia Minor and Syria: the virgin goddess Athena appears on

Tarsian coins. **The Baal of Tarsus is named in Aramaic letters on many of its coins in the Persian period.**

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cilicia-3rd-cent

Coins minted at Tarsus and Soli include Persian, modified Persian (e.g., images of satraps, the Great King, Arethusa; for illustrations, see, e.g., Head; Moysey, pls. 1-5), **and non-Persian types, as well as both Greek and Aramaic inscriptions. They reflect the cultural diversity of the satrapy.** For example, on one type Baal of Tarsus is paired with the Achaemenid winged disk; on another Semitic Nergal appears in Persian garb, perhaps reflecting an attempt to identify him with Mithra (Boyce, *Zoroastrianism* II, pp. 271-73).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_Eb5fIvwS6oC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA239#v=onepage&q&f=false

Between 410 and 370, a common type of silver stater in Cilicia had Baal seated on the obverse, while the reverse showed a helmeted male head facing left.129 From 361 to 333, several series of silver staters minted at Tarsus show on the obverse the god seated left, holding a grape cluster, a grain ear, and a scepter, while on the reverse a lion attacks a stag. **On one version of this coin, Aramaic legends proclaim BLTRZ on the obverse and MZDI on the reverse: Baaltars and Mazdaios.** Baal of Tarsus was the patron god of the city; the name Mazdaios is clearly related to (Ahura) Mazda.

The manner in which this non-Anatolian god was portrayed is interesting. Lacking a traditional artistic vocabulary for the deity, the Cilicians used Greek art for stylistic and iconographical inspiration: **Baal/Baaltar looks for all the world like Olympian Zeus.**
…

This, combined with the Aramaic legends, demonstrates the ingenuity of the Cilicians in finding a verbal and artistic métier for displaying and realizing the non-Anatolian manifestation of Tarsus's patron god.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA117#v=onepage&q&f=false

Yet, despite these heroic boasts, Dio must have known that Tarsus's claim to Greek lineage was weak.110 In fact, **the story of the Hellenic credentials of Tarsus surfaces for the first time in Strabo,** who claims that the Tarsians were descendants of the Argives who followed Triptolemus in his search for Io.111

> 110. C.P. Jones (*Roman World* 72) and A.H.M. Jones (*The Cities of the Eastern Roman Empire* 192-215). **The hellenization of Tarsus is a Hellenistic phenomenon, as is the case for most of Cilicia.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/33*.html

[…] or is it because you expect to hear some laudation directed at yourselves, some patriotic hymn in praise of your city, all about Perseus and Heracles and the Lord of the Trident and the oracles that you have received, and how you are Hellenes, yes, Argives or even better, and how you have as founders heroes and demigods—or, I should say, Titans?[1]
…

And would any one call you colonists from Argos,[54] as you claim to be, or more likely colonists of those abominable Aradians?[55] Would he call you Greeks, or the most licentious of Phoenicians?
…

Just as formerly an Ionian mode became dominant in music, and a Dorian, and then a Phrygian also, and a Lydian, so now the Aradian mode is dominant and now it is Phoenician airs that suit your fancy and the Phoenician rhythm that you admire most, just as some others do the spondiac.

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/berossus-babylonian-4th-3rd-century-priest-chronicler-whose-work-has-some-bearing-on-iranian-history

Only one work by Berossus is attested, the *Babyloniaca*, a history of Babylon in three books intended to correct Greek misconceptions about Babylon, which was probably written in 281 b.c. and dedicated to Antiochus I. **As the work was little read in antiquity, hardly any trace remains of it in its original form,** but extensive fragments of an abridgment of it made by the first-century b.c. scholar Cornelius Alexander Polyhistor survive in the works of the first-century a.d. Jewish historian Flavius Josephus and the fourth-century a.d. Christian historian and chronographer Eusebius, who also preserves fragments of an adaptation of Polyhistor's book by an author named Abydenus.

http://www.attalus.org/translate/eusebius4.html#53

When Sennacherib heard that the Greeks had arrived in Cilicia with the intention of fighting, he set out for Cilicia and met them in battle. Although many men from his own army were killed, he defeated the enemy, and as a monument of his victory he set up a statue of himself in that place. He ordered it to be

inscribed with Chaldaean letters, which recorded his bravery and greatness for future generations. **And he founded the city of Tarsus, on the same model as Babylon, and gave it the name of Tharsis.**
…

At this time, Sennacherib became the 25th of the [Assyrian] kings. He conquered Babylon and brought it under his control. He defeated a fleet of Greek ships in a naval battle off the coast of Cilicia. He established a temple of the Athenians, and erected bronze columns on which he inscribed in writing his mighty achievements. **He built Tarsus with a design which was similar to Babylon,** so that the river Cydnus flows through the middle of Tarsus, just as the Euphrates flows through the middle of Babylon.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=NMkUAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **The date of 700 for the beginnings of Posidion as a Greek colony is quite in accord with the first historically attested Greek appearance in Cilicia.** "As the Greeks landed in Cilicia and started a war, the Assyrian king Sennacherib went out to meet them, inflicted upon them a defeat and erected in memory thereof his image with an inscription," **reports Berossus who has utilized cuneiform sources.**1 It is known from Sennacherib's own annals that in 696 this king suppressed a revolt by Kirua, the governor of Illubri in Eastern Cilicia, who had been joined by other Cilician towns, including the city of Tarsus; the Greeks thus came as the principal auxiliaries of the Cilician rebels, and nonwithstanding their defeat, they managed to gain a foothold on the Cilician shore.2 In the same years the Greek colony in Phaselis was established, whose foundation is connected in legend with Mopsos as the giver of the foundation oracle. **It is to this period that one must attribute the rise of the tales that the new Greek settlements in the East Mediterranean had already been founded, back in legendary times, by the heroes of the Trojan war – or still earlier semi-divine characters.**3 **This was, as seen, the general mechanism of legitimizing Greek or Hellenized cities on alien soil in the age of the Great Colonization (750-550).**

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html

Chrysippus was a native of Soli in Cilicia, a city of which the ruins were plundered to build the modern Turkish town of Mersin. **Soli was a Greek foundation, but its inhabitants so deteriorated that their many errors in Greek gave us the word 'solecism.'** He is said to have become a long-distance runner, evidently as a professional, which suggests that he, like Cleanthes, came from a low-class and impoverished family.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/14E*.html#ref23

8 After Lamus one comes to Soli, a noteworthy city, the beginning of the other Cilicia, that which is round Issus; it was founded by Achaeans and Rhodians from Lindus. Since this city was of scant population, Pompey the Great settled in it those survivors of the pirates whom he judged most worthy of being saved and provided for; [24] and he changed its name to Pompeïopolis. Among the famous natives of Soli were: Chrysippus the Stoic philosopher, **whose father had moved there from Tarsus;** Philemon, the comic poet; and Aratus, who wrote the work hand entitled *The Phaenomena*, in verse.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#Chrysippus

179. Chrysippus, the son of Apollonius, **came either from Soli or from Tarsus,** as Alexander relates in his *Successions*.
…

He had good natural parts and showed the greatest acuteness in every branch of the subject; so much so that he differed on most points from Zeno, and from Cleanthes as well, to whom he often used to say that all he wanted was to be told what the doctrines were; he would find out the proofs for himself.
…

Hecato says that he came to the study of philosophy, because the property which he had inherited from his father had been confiscated to the king's treasury. 182. **In person he was insignificant, as is shown by the statue in the Ceramicus, which is almost hidden by an equestrian statue hard by; and this is why Carneades called him Crypsippus or Horse-hidden.**
…

He appears to have been a very arrogant man.[94] At any rate, of all his many writings he dedicated none to any of the kings.

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/15C*.html#ref147

9 Alexander carried off with him all the wealth in Persis to Susa, which was also full of treasures and equipment; **and neither did he regard Susa as the royal residence, but rather Babylon, which he intend to build up still further;** and there too treasures lay stored.
...

10 At all events, Alexander preferred Babylon, since he saw that it far surpassed the others, not only in its size, but also in all other respects.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0160%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D16%3Asection%3D3

[3] I am persuaded that Seleucus was the most righteous, and in particular the most religious of the kings. Firstly, it was Seleucus who sent back to Branchidae for the Milesians the bronze Apollo that had been carried by Xerxes to Ecbatana in Persia. **Secondly, when he founded Seleucea on the river Tigris and brought to it Babylonian colonists he spared the wall of Babylon as well as the sanctuary of Bel, near which he permitted the Chaldeans to live.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Babylon

Ka-dimirra, the Semitic Bab-ili, probably denoted at first E-Saggila, “the house of the lofty head,” the temple dedicated to Bel-Merodach, along with its immediate surroundings.
...

Alexander was murdered in the palace of Nebuchadrezzar, which must therefore have been still standing, and cuneiform texts show that, even under the Seleucids, E-Saggila was not wholly a ruin. The foundation of Seleucia in its neighbourhood, however, drew away the population of the old city and hastened its material decay. **A tablet dated 275 B.C. states that on the 12th of Nisan the inhabitants of Babylon were transported to the new town,** where a palace was built as well as a temple to which the ancient name of E-Saggila was given. With this event the history of Babylon comes practically to an end, though more than a century later we find sacrifices being still performed in its old sanctuary.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/16A*.html#1.16

And as we call the country Babylonia, so also we call the men from there Babylonians, that is, not after the city, but after the country; but we do not call men after Seleuceia, if they are from there, as for example, Diogenes the Stoic philosopher.[19]

http://chartes.it/images/attachment/Obbink-Vander%20Waerdt.pdf

DIOGENES OF BABYLON, fifth scholarch of the Stoa and flourishing in the first half of the second century B.C., has not been accorded the attention his philosophical and historical importance merits.1 He receives only passing notice in the standard histories of Stoicism, despite abundant evidence that he effected a far-reaching revision of Stoic doctrine in such fields as linguistics,2 music education,3 philosophical psychology,4 rhetoric,5 ethics,6 and political philosophy.7

> 4. **Diogenes clearly anticipated the modifications in Stoic psychology often traced to Panaetius or Posidonius by dividing the soul into separate parts along Platonic lines** (*cf. De mus.* IV cols. 56*,57*.40-41,69*.3,74*), **a move that underlies *inter alia* his rehabilitation of music as an important constituent in moral education.**

...

He participated (with the Academic skeptic Carneades and the Peripatetic Critolaus) in the famous embassy sent to Rome in 155 to plead for a reduction in the fine levelled against Athens for her sack of Oropus (Paus. 7.11.4-8). This embassy, celebrated in the Roman literary tradition9 in part because it seemed to illustrate that Greek philosophy threatened traditional Roman moral culture,10 ensured that Diogenes, the first Stoic to lecture at Rome, remained prominent in philosophical circles there well into the next century.

> 9. On this embassy see 389-95 *infra*. **Cicero (*Acad*. 2.137) knew a book by Clitomachus that preserved details of the embassy** and showed that Carneades argued a position (and attributed it to Diogenes) identical to that preserved in the text presented 366f. *infra*. **Diogenes was Carneades' teacher in dialectic:** Cic. *Acad*. 2.98 (from Clitomachus).

Another and probably more important factor in explaining Diogenes' neglect is that **the traditional periodization of Hellenistic philosophy, which correlates philosophical with political developments and marks its end at 31 B.C., has tended to obscure fundamental changes that took place in Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Academic Skepticism in the mid-second century B.C.**11 Diogenes' work initiated an important but poorly understood period in Stoicism, and provides

our best evidence for a period in which the school became centrally concerned to develop the early scholarchs' teaching so as to enable it to compete with its rivals' across the range of philosophical disciplines. In this transitional period, the proper end of Hellenistic philosophy, Stoic philosophers embark on new directions as the early scholarchs' original attempt to appropriate Socrates' authority, by discrediting the directions in which his other philosophical heirs (especially Plato) had developed his philosophy, gives way to a constructive effort to revise the Stoic position in such a way as to incorporate the contributions of other Socratics. Diogenes recognized former rivals – **such as Plato and Aristotle, to whom the early Stoics were uniformly hostile** –as important philosophical authorities,12 and he did not hesitate to draw upon them in his attempt to develop a practical teaching on subjects such as political philosophy, which had been apparently an entirely theoretical enterprise for the school's founders (*cf*. Cic. *Leg*. 3.13-16; discussed 383 *infra*). **Here as in other fields, Diogenes reformulated the early scholarchs' position so effectively that his became the orthodox Stoic position during the second and first centuries B.C.**13 **Cicero's extensive use of Diogenes confirms this claim, as does the extraordinary number of explicit citations of Diogenes in the Herculaneum papyri – a number that vastly exceeds the dozen or so references to Chrysippus and makes Diogenes the most frequently cited philosopher (after Epicurus) in the philosophical library at Herculaneum.**14

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Fortuna_Alexandri*/1.html#ref30

But if you examine the results of Alexander's instruction, you will see that he educated the Hyrcanians[30] to respect the marriage bond, and taught the Arachosians to till the soil, and persuaded the Sogdians to support their parents, not to kill them, and the Persians[30] to revere their mothers and not to take them in wedlock. O wondrous power of Philosophic Instruction, that brought the Indians to worship Greek gods, and the Scythians to bury their dead, not to devour them! **We admire Carneades' power, which made Cleitomachus,[31] formerly called Hasdrubal, and a Carthaginian by birth, adopt Greek ways. We admire the character of Zeno, which persuaded Diogenes[32] the Babylonian to be a philosopher.** But when Alexander was civilizing Asia, Homer was commonly read, and the children of the Persians, of the Susianians, and of the Gedrosians learned to chant the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides.[33]

---

https://archive.org/details/antigonosgonatas00tarn/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

But Antigonos' choice was not any of these. He turned as little to the Macedonian Colonnade as to the Athenian Academy or Garden. **The first two had nothing to teach him; he was not in search of abstract knowledge, or of large collections of facts, or of a rule of conduct befitting the members of a small city state. The Garden had less than nothing to teach him.** What could there be in common between the gentle frugal Athenian, who preached freedom from worry, and the rough-spoken hard-drinking Northerner, to whom half the practical problems of a noisy and troublesome universe were already crying for solution? What it was that led Antigonos elsewhere we do not know; perhaps the advice of Menedemos;50 perhaps it was some touch of greatness in himself that turned him to the greatest man in Athens, or the world.

For the greatest man in Athens at this time was not Polemon or Theophrastos, or even Epicurus. He was a gaunt middle-aged Phoenician, weak of body, swarthy of skin, his face lined and shrunken, who carried his head on one side and loved to sit in the sunshine and eat green figs; Zeno of Kition,51 the founder of the philosophy called Stoic. Of how and why Zeno came to Athens the accounts vary; it is certain that he was for a while a pupil of Krates the Cynic, and always retained traces of the Cynic teaching, and that he was some time in the city before he opened his own school, toward the end of the archonship of Klearchos, 301/0.52 **His Semitic nature**53 **made him very strange in Athens.**

> 53. Contemporaries (e.g. Timon, Krates) regularly called him a Phoenician. **His father, Mnaseas, must have belonged to the Phoenician colony in Kition, for the name is Manasses** (see Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen* (1910), p. 167). His mother might have been Greek.

...

He flung in men’s faces a rule of virtue so unworkable that he had to modify it himself in his own lifetime. He set up as the ideal an imaginary Wise Man so aloof that neither he nor his followers ever pretended to have any chance of attaining to it,59 **and so seemingly ridiculous that every succeeding century riddled it with criticism, each new wit draped it with facile laughter.** Small wonder that his followers were at first but few.

Yet he was of those who have moved the world.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Klein

> And my friends, in this story you have a history of this entire movement. **First they ignore you. Then they ridicule you. And then they attack you and want to burn you. And then they build monuments to you.**

…

It is certain that Antigonos, whose admiration and respect for Zeno knew no bounds, refused to recognize between them any difference of rank or race, or anything but the generous rivalry of a common aim.83

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/emerson-the-morals-vol-1#lf0062-01_head_031

When Zeno of Citium, whom he admired beyond all philosophers, died, [Antigonus] said, The theatre of my actions is fallen.

https://archive.org/details/ /page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

No wonder such a **religion** appealed to kings and statesmen and Roman governors. **Nearly all the successors of Alexander – we may say all the principal kings in existence in the generations following Zeno – professed themselves Stoics.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Demochares

DEMOCHARES (c. 355-275 B.C.), nephew of Demosthenes, Athenian orator and statesman, was one of the few distinguished Athenians in the period of decline. He is first heard of in 322, when he spoke in vain against the surrender of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators demanded by Antipater. During the next fifteen years he probably lived in exile. On the restoration of the democracy by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307 he occupied a prominent position, but was banished in 303 for having ridiculed the decree of Stratocles, which contained a fulsome eulogy of Demetrius.
…

Although a friend of the Stoic Zeno, Democharesregarded all other philosophers as the enemies of freedom, and in 306 supported the proposal of one Sophocles, advocating their expulsion from Attica.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n113/mode/2up?view=theater

Cosmopolitanism is a word which has contracted rather than expanded in meaning with the advance of time. We mean by it freedom from the shackles of nationality. The Stoics meant this and more. **The city of which they claimed to be citizens was not merely this round world on which we dwell, but the universe at large with all the mighty life therein contained. In this city, the greatest of earth's cities, Rome, Ephesus, or Alexandria, were but houses.**1 **To be exiled from one of them was only like changing your lodgings,**2 **and death but a removal from one quarter to another. The freemen of this city were all rational beings – sages on earth and the stars in heaven.** Such an idea was thoroughly in keeping with the soaring genius of Stoicism. It was proclaimed by Zeno in his Republic, and after him by Chrysippus and his followers.3 **It caught the imagination of alien writers, as of the author of the Peripatetic *De Mundo* (vi. § 36), who was possibly of Jewish origin,** and of Philo4 and St. Paul,5 who were certainly so.
…

On a wide view of the matter we may say that the opening up of the East by the arms of Alexander was the cause of the shifting of the philosophic standpoint from Hellenism to cosmopolitanism. If we reflect that the Cynic and Stoic teachers were mostly foreigners in Greece, we shall find a very tangible reason for the change of view. **Greece had done her work in educating the world, and the world was beginning to make payment in kind. Those who had been branded as natural slaves wore now giving laws to philosophy. The kingdom of wisdom was suffering violence at the hands of barbarians.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=RB5aWgr7l-gC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA33#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Perhaps, in the last resort, western theologians like Augustine and Prosper could never quite forget that they were Romans. **They might have had their doubts – indeed, we know that they *did* have their doubts – about the moral tradition which had corralled Christianity safely inside the city walls of the empire; but it was hard to break with the cultural habits of a millennium. It takes an outsider to think the unthinkable.** However, what had still been unthinkable in the age of Augustine and Prosper had become absolutely thinkable by the time that Paulinus encountered Edwin two centuries later. What had happened in between to bring this about?
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=RB5aWgr7l-gC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> To no one had the notion occurred of translating the scriptures into a barbarian tongue which had never been written down before. **Perhaps, as is often the case with simple but revolutionary and**

> **liberating ideas, it could only have come to one who was himself in some sense an outsider [Ulfila].**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n699/mode/2up?view=theater

Since an increasing number of Epicurus' followers interpreted him as counseling the pursuit of personal pleasure, the essential problem of ethics—what is the good life?—had reached not a solution but only a new formulation: **how can the natural epicureanism of the individual be reconciled with the stoicism necessary to the group and the race?—how can the members of a society be inspired to, or frightened into, the self-control and self-sacrifice indispensable to collective survival? The old religion could no longer fulfill this function; the old city-state no longer lifted men up to self-forgetfulness.** Educated Greeks turned from religion to philosophy for an answer; they called in philosophers to advise or console them in the crises of life; they asked from philosophy some world view that would give to human existence a permanent meaning and value in the scheme of things, and that would enable them to look without terror upon the certainty of death. **Stoicism is the last effort of classical antiquity to find a natural ethic.** Zeno tried once more to accomplish the task in which Plato had failed.
…

They accepted Chaldean astrology as essentially correct, and thought of earthly affairs as in some mystic and continuous correspondence with the movements of the stars[55]—one phase of that universal *sympatheia* by which whatever happened to any part affected all the rest.
…

[The Stoic] accepts the state, even monarchy; he has no fond memories of the city-state, and considers the average man a dangerous simpleton; he prefers the Antigonids to King Mob. In truth he cares little for any government; he wishes that all men might be philosophers, so that laws would be unnecessary; he thinks of perfection not, as Plato and Aristotle did, in terms of the good society, but in terms of the good man. He may take part in political affairs, and will support every move, however modest, toward human freedom and dignity; but he will not fetter his happiness to place or power. **He may give his life for his country, but he will reject any patriotism that hinders his loyalty to all mankind; he is a citizen of the world.** Zeno, in whose veins, as we have seen, there probably flowed both Greek and Semitic blood, longed like Alexander for a breaking down of racial and national barriers, and his internationalism reflects Alexander's passing unification of the eastern Mediterranean world.
…

Stoicism was a noble philosophy, and proved more practicable than a modern cynic would expect. It brought together all the elements of Greek thought in a final effort of the pagan mind to create a system of morals acceptable to the classes that had abandoned the ancient creed; **and though it naturally won only a small minority to its standard, those few were everywhere the best. Like its Christian counterparts, Calvinism and Puritanism, it produced the strongest characters of its time. Theoretically it was a monstrous doctrine of an isolated and pitiless perfection.** Actually it created men of courage, saintliness, and good will like Cato the Younger, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius; it influenced Roman jurisprudence in building a law of nations for non-Romans; and it helped to hold ancient society together until a new faith came. The Stoics lent countenance to superstition, and had an injurious effect upon science; but they saw clearly the basic problem of their age—the collapse of the theological basis of morals—and they made an honest attempt to bridge the gap between religion and philosophy. **Epicurus won the Greeks, Zeno won the aristocracy of Rome; and to the end of pagan history the Stoics ruled the Epicureans, as they always will.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

But in his mind these concepts took on a shape, **perhaps inherited from the fifth-century Sophists,** which fitted the outlook of the orator concerned with practical policies, so that for Isocrates *logos* meant the spoken word, eloquent and persuasive speech, quite as much as 'reason,' and his *philosophia* centred on practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) rather than abstract speculation. **These were the qualities which Isocrates looked for in the new intellectual *élite* which, as Jaeger says,**15 **he sought to create in place of the old aristocracy of birth.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT644#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Like the conventional court political culture of his age, Spinoza envisaged the multitude more in educational and ethical terms than as a socio-economic stratum.** But where Tacitus, Lipsius, and the monarchist Tacitists of his time viewed the *multitudo* or *vulgus* as equivalent to the common people and the uneducated, Spinoza characteristically reinterprets the original Tacitean quotes and expressions to project the *vulgus* rather as those who are ignorant, everyone that is possessing neither "iudicium aut veritas [judgement nor sincerity]," as Tacitus puts it.
>
> Spinoza concurs with Tacitus (and Hobbes) that the *vulgus* are the chief source of instability and trouble in the republic, the dissatisfied, superstitious, inherently unreasonable element, always

demanding something new. He quotes and wholeheartedly agrees with Tacitus's dictum that "in vulgo nihil modicum, terrere, ni paveant [in the *vulgus* there is not moderation, they terrify unless cowed]."7 **But he typically does so subverting such familiar contemporary Tacitists as Justus Lipsius, who regularly equated the *vulgus* with the common people, while also contradicting Hobbes (as well as slightly modifying Tacitus himself).** For the reader soon discovers that this ever-present peril to the political stability of society, the overpowering perennial menace of the *vulgus*, embraces everyone whose mind is ruled by ignorance, superstition, and the passions, the direst segment of the "whole world against us" actually being our world's kings, ecclesiastics, aristocracy, and the bulk of its academics. **The sages, or the wise, on the other hand, holding the line for humanity against the *vulgus*, are the few (as in Maimonides and Delmedigo before him), found indiscriminately scattered among the rich, middling, and poor.**

Spinoza then is by no means discriminating against, or looking down on, the poor and uneducated but rather scorning in particular those "who confine to the common people the faults inherent in all mankind."8 **Much as Spinoza cites the New Testament to undermine Christianity, and the Old to sap rabbinic Judaism, he reworks Tacitus to undermine the early modern era's prevailing Tacitean-Lipsian and Hobbesian monarchical political culture.**9 Spinoza's *vulgus* are simply the great majority of humans in their conventional state, that is men thinking in the usual inadequate manner whatever class of the population they belong to, encompassing everyone pursuing power for self-seeking purposes, who amass money to control others, oppress rather than aid others and, by making no effort to seek the truth, sadly miss the reality of things. Since the "credulous and untrustworthy" powerful and rich are usually as much or more of a menace to society than the illiterate, they are consequently more blameworthy than the credulous poor. Conversely, **the poorest and lowliest, where thinking rationally, are in principle just as capable of thinking philosophically and escaping "bondage" as anyone else.** Abominating rulers like Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, and Charles II of England, **Spinoza's overall approach demotes monarchs and their courtiers, along with princes, ecclesiastics, academics, and the wealthy elites to the ranks of the lowest and worst of the "multitude," meaning those thinking harmfully, in inadequate terms.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isocrates

Isocrates was born into a prosperous family in Athens at the height of Athens' power shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). **Suda writes that Isocrates was the son of Theodorus who owned a workshop that manufactured aulos.**
…

Isocrates received a first-rate education. "He is reported to have studied with several prominent teachers, including Tisias (one of the traditional founders of rhetoric), the sophists Prodicus and Gorgias, and the moderate oligarch Theramenes, and to have associated with Socrates, but these reports may reflect later views of his intellectual roots more than historical fact".[6]
...

Around 392 BC he set up his own school of rhetoric (at the time, Athens had no standard curriculum for higher education; sophists were typically itinerant), and proved to be not only an influential teacher, but a shrewd businessman. His fees were unusually high, and he accepted no more than nine pupils at a time. Many of them went on to be prominent philosophers, legislators, historians, orators, writers and military and political leaders.[11][12] As a consequence, he amassed a considerable fortune. According to Pliny the Elder (*NH* VII.30) he could sell a single oration for twenty talents.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isocrates#Panegyricus_50_and_its_contemporary_interpretation

The following passage (from *Panegyricus* 50) is what Isocrates actually stated:

> **Our city has so far surpassed other men in thought and speech that students of Athens have become the teachers of others, and the city has made the name "Greek" seem to be not that of a people but of a way of thinking; and people are called Greeks because they share in our education (*paideusis*) rather than in our birth.[12]**

Extensive analysis shows Isocrates' speech here as restrictive; he is not inviting foreigners to learn Greek.[13] He is warning his fellow Greeks that it is not enough for them to be of Greek blood; they need a proper Greek (that is, Athenian) education as well, lest their culture be overtaken by barbarians.[14][15]

> 13. […] **This passage has attracted great attention, Jaeger going so far as to claim it as 'a higher justification for the new national imperialism, in that it identifies what is specifically Greek with what is universally human'. 'Without the idea which [Isocrates] here expresses for the first time', he continues, '… there would have been no Macedonian Greek world-empire, and the universal culture which we call Hellenistic would never have existed.' Unfortunately for this claim, it has been shown that in this passage Isocrates is not extending the term**

> **Hellene to non-Greeks, but restricting its application; he is in effect saying, 'Hellenes are no longer all who share in the γένος and common φύσις of the Greek people, as hitherto, but only those who have gone to school to Athens; henceforth Greece" is equivalent to Athens and her cultural following.'**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Persians, on the other hand, owe their servility, weakness and cowardice to their upbringing and their political institutions – a way of life which must corrupt the natures of men (*Paneg*. 150-1). **But where human nature is deficient or corrupted, it can be improved. Isocrates justifies his own profession as a teacher of eloquence and general culture by insisting that the nature of man is responsive to *paideia*, education, and *epimeleia*, the attention which a guardian can bestow on those put in his care.** If bodily weakness can be overcome by exercise and effort, surely the *psychē* can be made better through education and *epimeleia*; if lions can be tamed and bears given skill by training, still more can be achieved in changing the nature of human beings.17

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D4%3Asection%3D150
>
> [150] And none of these things has happened by accident, but all of them have been due to natural causes; for it is not possible for people who are reared and governed as are the Persians, either to have a part in any other form of virtue or to set up on the field of battle trophies of victory over their foes.[159] For how could either an able general or a good soldier be produced amid such ways of life as theirs? **Most of their population is a mob without discipline or experience of dangers, which has lost all stamina for war and has been trained more effectively for servitude than are the slaves in our country.** [151] Those, on the other hand, who stand highest in repute among them have never governed their lives by dictates of equality or of common interest or of loyalty to the state; on the contrary, **their whole existence consists of insolence toward some, and servility towards others—a manner of life than which nothing could be more demoralizing to human nature.**
>
> http://www.attalus.org/old/athenaeus13a.html
>
> But among the Greeks, the mother of Phoenix does not tolerate the concubine of Amyntor [Homer, Il. 9.447]. **And Medeia, although well acquainted with the fashion, as one well established among the barbarians, refuses to tolerate the marriage of Glauce, because she has been introduced to better habits amongst the Greeks.** And Clytaemnestra, being exceedingly indignant at a similar provocation, **slays Cassandra with Agamemnon himself, when the monarch brought her back with him into Greece, having yielded to the fashion of barbarian marriages.**
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pompey*.html#ref39
>
> 2 The war was therefore brought to an end and all piracy driven from the sea in less than three months, and besides many other ships, Pompey received in surrender ninety which had brazen beaks. The men themselves, who were more than twenty thousand in number, he did not once think of putting to death; and yet to let them go and suffer them to disperse or band together again, poor, warlike, and numerous as they were, he thought was not well. 3 **Reflecting, therefore, that by nature man neither is nor becomes a wild or an unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural practice of vice, whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place and life; also that even wild beasts put off their fierce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life, he determined to transfer the men from the sea to land, and let them have a taste of gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities and to till the ground.** 4 Some of them, therefore, were received and incorporated into the small and half-deserted cities of Cilicia, which acquired additional territory; and after restoring the city of Soli, which had lately been devastated by Tigranes, the king of Armenia, Pompey settled many there. To most of them, however, he gave as residence Dyme in Achaea, which was then bereft of men and had much good land.

An example has already been provided by the good effects of the wise rule of Evagoras in Cyprus, which has made the fierce and hostile inhabitants friendly to the Greeks and eager to acquire Greek culture (*Evag*. 47-50). At the close of his appeal *To Philip*, which some translators have misinterpreted, Isocrates restates from this point of view the object of his anti-Persian campaign. Philip should have a threefold purpose, corresponding to three levels of mankind:

> I suggest that your aim should be to work for the benefit of the Greeks, to be king over the Macedonians, **and to bring as many barbarians as possible under your rule.** If you follow this course, all will be grateful to you: the Greeks for the benefits they receive; the Macedonians because you reign over them not as a tyrant, but as a king; **and the rest of the peoples, because through you they are set free from barbarian despotism and come under the guardianship (*epimeleia*) of Greece.** (154)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false

The question of whether virtue can be taught has enormous social and political implications.7 An answer to Meno's question about virtue must confront the link between birth and behavior. Like financial acumen, political skill can be used by those who possess it to achieve eminence in a community regardless of lineage, and for this reason, **the notion that virtue can be taught has the potential to threaten the claims of a hereditary aristocracy to privilege.**8 **Surely it is significant that in the *Meno*, alone of Plato's dialogues, Socrates takes a slave as an interlocutor with whom he demonstrates the immortality of the human soul and the idea of metempsychosis.**9 **The slave's soul is as immortal as the aristocratic Meno's and, like Meno's, has "always been in a state of having known"** (*τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὑτοῦ*).10 If every human soul is qualitatively the same as every other human soul, and virtue can be neither taught nor does it exist by nature, it follows that social and political subordination is contrary to nature. **As Socrates puts it, "the noble are not so by nature" (*οὐκ … φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί*).**11 **If they were, surely the Athenians would identify them at an early age and keep them protected in the acropolis as more valuable to the city than gold.** Of course, children of the aristocracy, the *kaloi k'agathoi*, *are* identified precisely from birth and are accorded privileged status, even in the democracy.
…

As Meno's Thessalian origin reminds us, there was a tremendous amount of contact both among the elites of various Greek *poleis* as well as between Greek and Persian aristocrats (in addition to being a *xenos* of Anytus, Meno was also a guest friend of several Persians, including the Great King himself). **As in most premodern societies, Athenian and Thessalian elites would have had more in common with each other (culturally speaking) than they would have with the lower classes of their own city-states.** Indeed, the social mechanism of *xenia* itself evolved in the archaic period as a structure in terms of which inter-*polis* aristocratic relationships might be fostered and recognized.18 By contrast, the myth of autochthony elaborated in Athens over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries, is a democratic reformulation of the meaning of descent and lineage.19 **What Josiah Ober has referred to as the "democratization of *eugeneia*" asserts that Athenian birth, in and of itself regardless of class, confers nobility.**20 Autochthony reinforces the very modern idea that because the nation is a kin group, marriages contracted outside the context of the *polis* threaten the homogeneity of the *polis* in both cultural and ethnic terms. **In the middle of the fifth century, Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0 essentially outlawed this sort of aristocratic marriage.** The law's insistence that Athenian citizenship could properly be held only by those whose parents were both citizens provided a powerful disincentive to those Athenians who would marry noncitizens.21
…

We would expect Anytus, as a wealthy Athenian of obscure family, to make the claim that Athenian birth, in and of itself, has the power to make one virtuous. This is essentially the path that Anytus takes, but he uses heavily coded language that Socrates presses him on. Anytus reject the claims of the sophists to teach virtue, **and reminds us, for good measure, that the sophists, because they are not Athenian citizens, are outsiders:** furthermore, those who allow the sophists to come into the city (*εἰσαφικνέομαι*), Anytus proclaims, ought to be punished.40
…

Anytus's second claim has to do with who *is* capable of teaching virtue in the city, and here Anytus deploys a version of the democratic co-option of the language of the hereditary aristocracy to make the point that any Athenian, qua Athenian, might serve as a teacher of virtue for a non-Athenian. As a prominent democrat and a man of undistinguished birth, Anytus would have been inclined to separate the link between noble birth and virtue.45 **All Athenian citizens, by dint of their Athenian birth, and noble and good (*kaloi k'agathoi*). However, Socrates recognized that the link between birth and behavior of any sort (autochthonous, aristocratic) is a false one.** Indeed, Socrates uncouples lineage and nobility of character still further when he reminds Anytus that many sons of noble fathers failed to display their sires' virtues: Themistocles' son Cleophantus was a good horseman but a lousy politician. Likewise, Pericles and Thucydides failed to produce sons who were good at the same things as their fathers.46
…

Implicit in Meno's initial question is the desire to know "who are the *kaloi k'agathoi* in the Athenian *polis* and how did these men come to be as they are?" Is the nobility of the Thessalian aristocrat legible and valid among the autochthonous Athenians? **The sixth-century aristocratic answer, which the fifth-century *demos* rejected, is that aristocratic lineage (in the sense of birth into one of a select number of "noble" families within the *polis*) makes one virtuous.**52 Such an approach to the idea of nobility would leave the door open to a well-born Thessalian – a notion reflected in the increasing number of alliances between wealthy Athenian elites and the elites of other city-states – alliances that Pericles' citizenship law would have curtailed, as I have discussed above.53 Another answer, the one that Anytus seems to advocate, is that all Athenians possess virtue and can teach it to outsiders by virtue of Athenian birth. **The demonstration of the slave's "knowledge," however, raises the possibility that *all* humans possess the capacity for virtue.** Socrates' final answer about virtue as inspiration strikes me as inconclusive and leaves Meno without a decisive answer to his initial question.

…

Most interesting, Socrates maintains there ought to be two names for the sorts of hostilities in which the city will engage: if the city quarrels with other Greeks, it will be called *stasis*. The word "war" (*polemos*) shall properly refer only to those conflicts in which Greeks fight with barbarians. **The principle that lies behind the semantic distinction is one to which Stoic thought, as we shall see, reacted very strongly.** Socrates maintained that there exists *in nature* a fundamental rift between Greek and barbarian.
…

Socrates does not attempt to explain why barbarians are the natural enemies of the Greeks. As opposed to almost every other facet of life in the city, we find here the simple assertion of commonplaces rather than systematic argumentation. We are left to guess why Socrates insisted on the natural enmity between Greek and barbarian. It is possible that the climatic determinism to which Socrates briefly refers [435a] provided the "natural" justification for Greek hatred of the barbarian. **It is also possible that for Plato, as for so many of his contemporaries, the dream of Greek unity depended upon the othering of the barbarian.**
…

If one were to read only the scientific texts, it would seem that Aristotle conceived of the entire human race as a species defined by the possession of reason. Indeed, Aristotle most often speaks of the "human *genos*" as an undifferentiated whole defined by the possession of reason. How are we to reconcile these passages with the various "types" of humans in Aristotle's political and ethical writings, some of whom (women, slaves, children) either do not possess reason or do so in ways that are either inadequate, immature, or entirely inert?
…

As we might expect, Aristotle claimed that nature has uniquely configured the (male) Greek soul as a political being. To explain this claim, Aristotle made use of the idea that the natural environment of a place determined the physical and psychic character as well as the cultural and political practices of its inhabitants. **The heat and moisture of Asia renders the Asian *genos* clever but unwarlike. In a similar manner, the cold in northern Europe creates a corresponding warlike hardness lacking in intellectual power. The temperate climate of Greece, however, shares in the best of both heat and cold and avoids what is worst.** The result is a Greek *genos* that is warlike and intelligent.
…

The *politeiai* that Plato and Aristotle advocated corresponded to these commitments: **Aristotle's ideal *polis* was a democracy in which free Greek males were enfranchised; Socrates' Kallipolis was ruled by a special class of philosopher kings.**
…

Almost a century ago, the German-born, American Jewish philosopher Horace Kallen (1882-1974) published a new famous essay about the use that American intellectuals had made of Enlightenment ideas about the "equality" of mankind.122 Kallen asked, as many have before and since, how the signatories of the *Declaration of Independence* could subscribe to the doctrine that all men were created equal while, as slave owners, they bought and sold other human beings. Kallen argued that for the founders, there was no real logical inconsistency between the conviction that all men possess certain "inalienable rights," and the practice of slavery. **Rather, Kallen read the Declaration as "an instrument in a political and economic conflict" that had everything to do with class and nothing to do with ethnicity.** Kallen wrote,

> The doctrine of "natural rights" which is its [the Declaration's] essence was formulated to shield social orders against the aggrandizement of persons acting under the doctrine of "divine right": its function was to afford sanction for refusing customary obedience to traditional authority. Such was also the function of the Declaration. Across the water, in England, certain powers had laid claim to the acknowledgement of their traditional superiority to the colonists in America. **Whereupon the colonists, through their representatives, the signatories to the Declaration, replied that they were quite as good as their traditional betters,** and that no one should take from them possessions that were theirs.123
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2613/pg2613-images.html#linknoteref-141
>
> None of those Virginian patriots, who vindicated their separation from the British empire by proclaiming it to be a self-evident truth that all men were endowed by the Creator with an unalienable right to liberty, would have had the smallest scruple about shooting any negro slave who had laid claim to that unalienable right.

And, in the same manner, the Protestant masters of Ireland, while ostentatiously professing the political doctrines of Locke and Sidney, held that a people who spoke the Celtic tongue and heard mass could have no concern in those doctrines. Molyneux questioned the supremacy of the English legislature. Swift assailed, with the keenest ridicule and invective, every part of the system of government. Lucas disquieted the administration of Lord Harrington. Boyle overthrew the administration of the Duke of Dorset. **But neither Molyneux nor Swift, neither Lucas nor Boyle, ever thought of appealing to the native population.** They would as soon have thought of appealing to the swine.142

> 142. In 1749 Lucas was the idol of the democracy of his own caste. It is curious to see what was thought of him by those who were not of his own caste. One of the chief Pariah, Charles O'Connor, wrote thus: "I am by no means interested, nor is any of our unfortunate population, in this affair of Lucas. A true patriot would not have betrayed such malice to such unfortunate slaves as we." **He adds, with too much truth, that those boasters the Whigs wished to have liberty all to themselves.**

...

Indeed, during the century which followed the Revolution, the inclination of an English Protestant to trample on the Irishry was generally proportioned to the zeal which he professed for political liberty in the abstract. If he uttered any expression of compassion for the majority oppressed by the minority, he might be safely set down as a bigoted Tory and High Churchman.143

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:Works_of_Thomas_Carlyle_-_Volume_03.djvu/239

What a change here, in these two years; since that first 'Box of Tricolor Cockades' got through the Custom-house **and atrabiliar Creoles too rejoiced that there was a levelling of Bastilles! Levelling is comfortable, as we often say: levelling, yet only down to oneself.** Your pale-white Creoles have their grievances:—and your yellow Quarteroons? And your dark-yellow Mulattoes? And your Slaves soot-black? **Quarteroon Ogé, Friend of our Parisian-Brissotin *Friends of the Blacks*, felt, for his share too, that Insurrection was the most sacred of duties.** So the tricolor Cockades had fluttered and swashed only some three months on the Creole hat, when Ogé's signal conflagrations went aloft; with the voice of rage and terror.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0446 **[28 October 1813]**

formerly bodily powers gave place among the aristoi. but since the invention of gunpowder has armed the weak as well as the strong with missile death, bodily strength, like beauty, good humor, politeness and other accomplishments, has become but an auxiliary ground of distinction. there is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. the natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. **and indeed it would have been inconsistent in creation4 to have formed man for the social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society.** may we not even say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?
...

But even in Europe a change has sensibly taken place in the mind of Man. science had liberated the ideas of those who read and reflect, and the American example had kindled feelings of right in the people. **an insurrection has consequently begun, of science, talents & courage against rank and birth, which have fallen into contempt. it has failed in it's first effort, because the mobs of the cities, the instrument used for it's accomplishment, debased by ignorance, poverty and vice, could not be restrained to rational action.** but the world will recover from the panic of this first catastrophe. science is progressive, and talents and enterprize on the alert. **resort may be had to the people of the country, a more governable power from their principles & subordination; and rank and birth and tinsel-aristocracy will finally shrink into insignificance even there.**

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n281/mode/2up?view=theater

In his *Deutschen Schriften* (*German Writings*; Munich 1924), Paul de Lagarde correctly recognized in his essay "Konservativ?" ("Conservative?") **that our custom of passing on the noble name to all sons of a noble must and has led to very disastrous consequences.** This

> custom dates back to the age of chivalry, when all sons of a noble were considered noble—not just the eldest who inherited the fief. From this, over the centuries, **a divide developed which resulted in the worthy bourgeois never becoming equal to the nobles, inhibiting the upper classes from coalescing into one.** Whereas in England the nobility, surprisingly wise in this respect, knew how to absorb worthy members of the non-noble classes and how to weed out the incompetent from their own ranks by means of self-acting processes, the German nobility had been erecting artificial partitions since the Middle Ages, nesting within themselves and sealing themselves off from the outside world. **In the end, the most incompetent nobleman, solely by virtue of his birth, was socially superior to the highest-ranking commoner, because even the ennobled commoner was still considered an upstart, along with his family (original nobility, letter nobility,**179 **personal nobility, and so on). Thus a thoroughly unhealthy state of affairs was reached.**180

In other words, the founders used Enlightenment ideas about the unity of mankind as a weapon in a class war against the traditional claims of privilege of European aristocracies. Given the "inhumanity" of African slaves, the doctrine of "human rights" had little relevance for discussions of slavery and ethnicity. However, almost two hundred years later, **on August 28, 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and appropriated the Declaration's democratic critique of aristocratic birth for the civil rights movement.** King declared,

> In a sense we have come to our nation's capital to cash a check. **When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir.** This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.124

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transtheism#Terminology

> **Paul Tillich uses *transtheistic* in *The Courage to Be* (1952), as an aspect of Stoicism.** Tillich stated that Stoicism and Neo-Stoicism
>
> > are the way in which some of the noblest figures in later antiquity and their followers in modern times have answered the problem of existence and conquered the anxieties of fate and death. **Stoicism in this sense is a basic religious attitude, whether it appears in theistic, atheistic, or transtheistic forms.**[5]
>
> **Like Zimmer, Tillich is trying to express a religious notion that is neither theistic nor atheistic. However, the theism that is being transcended in Stoicism according to Tillich is not polytheism as in Jainism, but monotheism, pursuing an ideal of human courage which has emancipated itself from God.**
>
> > The courage to take meaninglessness into itself presupposes a relation to the ground of being which we have called "absolute faith." It is without a special content, yet it is not without content. **The content of absolute faith is the "god above God."** Absolute faith and its consequence, the courage that takes the radical doubt, the doubt about God, into itself, transcends the theistic idea of God.[6]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6xFarBgmCcMC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA159#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Throughout the postwar period, the cross fertilizations continued: the Negroes were becoming modern, and the moderns were becoming Negro. Ernst Krenek wrote *Jonny Spielt Auf*, **and Martin Luther King did his dissertation on Paul Tillich.** (The fact that King plagiarized his dissertation lessens the influence somewhat but not completely.)

https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihaveadream.htm

> I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation **where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.**

…

One might well argue that the ethnic use of the discourse of class is less a rhetorical appropriation than an extension of internal logic. Once black Africans came to be regarded as human in the same way as whites, Enlightenment ideas about human equality in nature destabilized the "natural" basis of racialized thinking. **In a similar way, the democratic critique of aristocratic birth in fifth-century Athens provided both a vocabulary as well as a set of ideas for the "ethnic" critique of Athenian autochthony in the fourth century. Ultimately, various intellectuals of the Hellenistic and early imperial periods will further apply the logic of the rejection of birth as a criterion of identity to cosmopolitan ideas about the unity of the *oikoumenê*.** Like the signatories of the

Declaration, in the *Meno* Anytus rejects the importance of aristocratic birth but insists upon the special character of the Athenian *polis* as a homogenous *natio* with the cohesiveness between all the social orders that entails. Each and every Athenian is *kalos k'agathos* by virtue of the special character of Athenian birth.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D4%3Asection%3D105
>
> On the contrary, we regarded harmony among our allies as the common boon of all, and therefore we governed all the cities under the same laws, deliberating about them in the spirit of allies, not of masters; [105] guarding the interests of the whole confederacy but leaving each member of it free to direct its own affairs; **supporting the people but making war on despotic powers,**[84] **considering it an outrage that the many should be subject to the few, that those who were poorer in fortune but not inferior in other respects should be banished from the offices, that, furthermore, in a fatherland which belongs to all in common**[85] **some should hold the place of masters, others of aliens,**[86] **and that men who are citizens by birth**[87] **should be robbed by law of their share in the government.**
>
> > 86. Citizens under oligarchies are without rights; they are like the metics in Athens—residents on sufferance.
> >
> > 87. By φύσις, nature. Cf. "All men are created equal." **The contrast between nature and convention—φύσις and νόμος—was a favorite topic of discussion among the sophists.** Cf. an echo of it in **Isoc. 1.10**.
>
> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D1%3Asection%3D10
>
> [10] Neither did he order his existence sordidly, but was a lover of beauty, munificent in his manner of life, and generous to his friends; **and he prized more those who were devoted to him than those who were his kin by blood; for he considered that in the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention, character than kinship, and freedom of choice than compulsion.**

What, then, is the status in Athens of an aristocratic *xenos* such as Meno? The idea of autochthony deprives him of his nobility in both aristocratic and democratic terms: in the Athenian context, one such as Meno could point neither to the ennobling effects of autochthonous lineage nor to his own illustrious Thessalian aristocratic lineage.

In the late fifth and early fourth centuries, it seems that certain Athenian intellectuals were becoming aware that the logic of the democratic critique of aristocratic birth had the potential to threaten the naturalness of the "special" quality of Athenian birth. By the end of the fourth century, the stakes of this question would only be raised by the increased mobility of elites not just among the Greek *poleis* but also between Greece and "Asia." At the beginning of the fourth century, Plato's *Meno* framed the question of which "parts" form a coherent whole in the relatively homogenous world of the Athenian *polis* in which a Thessalian aristocrat might plausibly occupy the outer edge of difference. By the middle of the fourth century, as we shall see in chapter 3, Athenian intellectuals were divided on the question of whether Philip or Artaxerxes represented the extreme otherness against which not just Athenianess but Greekness in general must be understood. **At the end of the fourth century,** to which we turn now in chapter 2, **the "Phoenician" Zeno of Citium would come to Athens to rephrase Meno's question once again, this time in heavily accented Greek.**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> From here on, from the shattering of the Greek religion, from the wreck of the Grecian Nature-State, and its resolution into the Political State,—from the splintering of the common Tragic Artwork,—**the manhood of world-history begins with measured tread its new gigantic march of evolution, from the fallen *natural kinsmanship of national community* to the *universal fellowship of all mankind*.** The band which the full-fledged Man, coming to consciousness in the national Hellenian, disrupted as a cramping fetter—*with* this awakened consciousness—**must now expand into a universal girdle embracing *all* mankind. The period from that point of time down to our own to-day is, therefore, the history of *absolute Egoism*; and the end of this period will be its redemption into *Communism*.***

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q&f=false

Zeno began teaching in the Stoa in 301, five years after Epicurus gave his first lectures in the Kepos and a generation after Aristotle welcomed students to the Peripatos. Unlike many institutions in late classical Athens, the philosophical schools were open to both Athenian citizens and noncitizens alike.7 This willingness to accept non-Athenians into the schools produced a decidedly cosmopolitan body of intellectuals at Athens in the fourth and third centuries. **Only the Academy had Athenian citizens for scholarchs for a time, but beginning with Carneades (a native of Cyrene, a Doric foundation, via Thera, in Libya), Plato's Academy would be led by non-Athenian scholarchs well into the Roman period.**8

8. **It is interesting, given Socrates' parochialism, that the Academy would have been alone among the philosophical schools of Athens in maintaining the Athenian character of its leadership well into the second century BCE.**

The other schools were completely nonlocal in their leadership: **no Athenian would ever lead the Peripatos; and the Stoa, beginning with Zeno of Citium, would be under the control of non-Athenian philosophers for the first two hundred years of its existence.**9 Nor were the students at the schools any less heterogeneous in origin: Habicht's sampling indicates that one-third of the students of the three major Athenian schools were from *poleis* other than Athens on mainland Greece and the Aegean islands whole another third came to Athens from Asia Minor.10 Indeed, from Diogenes Laertius's *Life* of Zeno [7.36-8], we learn that Zeno's first followers in the Stoa came from all over the Mediterranean:11 Persaeus, son of Demetrios, came to Athens from Zeno's own Citium; Ariston, the son of Miltiades came from Chios; Herillus from Carthage; Dionysius from Heraclea; Sphaerus from Bosphorus; Cleanthes, who would take over the school at Zeno's death, from Assos; Philonides from Thebes; Callipus from Corinth, Posidonius from Alexandria, Athenodorus from Soli, and Zeno from Sidon. Indeed, Zenodotus's Hellenistic epigram for Zeno offered a challenge that at once proclaimed Zeno's Phoenician origins, the (mythic) Phoenician past of Greece, and the Phoenician origin of Greek writing: **"And if my fatherland is Phoenician, what blame is there? Is not that Kadmus also (Phoenician), on account of whom Hellas possesses the written page?"**12

Scholars have long posited a link between the cosmopolitan makeup of the philosophical schools of Athens in the late classical and early Hellenistic periods and the schools' political and ethical teachings.13 Zeno himself was often referred to by his contemporaries as "the Phoenician,"14 which has led scholars to suspect that the ideas behind the cosmopolitanism of the Stoa were themselves of eastern origin.15

13. For example, Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* 22-29. Cf. Stock, *Stoicism* 105: **"Those who had been branded as natural slaves were now giving laws to philosophy. The kingdom of wisdom was suffering violence at the hands of barbarians."**

15. For example, Baldry, *Unity of Mankind* 151-152: "From these Eastern associations the inference is often drawn that Stoicism, including the Stoic attitude towards human relationships, was an oriental strain introduced by these 'foreigners' and previously alien to the Greek mind." It is important to remember, however, that **Baldry wants to posit an unbroken tradition of Greek thought on universalism, an agenda that leads him to conclude that "whatever blood ran in Zeno's veins, there was nothing un-Greek in his philosophy; and in considering the Stoic conception of humanity, we are still dealing with the continuous evolution of Greek thought"** (152).

Given the state of the evidence, it is of course impossible to discover what if any "Semitic" (whatever that might mean in this context) influences there may have been in Zeno's thought. Unsurprisingly, serious scholarship has never attempted to describe Zeno's "Semiticness" in any detail, aside from a previous generation's vague references to "Adamic" theories about the unity of mankind.16

16. Alleged "Semitic" influences on Stoic philosophy have generally been freighted with the same sorts of proprietary agenda that have driven much of the scholarship on the relationship between Pauline theology and the Stoicism of Seneca. As traditional classicists would defend the Greek "purity" of Stoicism, untainted by any "oriental" influence (see Sandbach's assessment above), so some Patristics scholars claim the sui generis status of the early Christian teaching. A.D. Nock's view characterizes this Christian exceptionalism vis-à-vis Stoic thought (*Christianisme et hellénisme* 126-127). Cf. DeSilva, "Paul and the Stoa," esp. 564. See Lee, *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*. **R.M. Wenley offers the perspective of an earlier generation (*Stoicism and Its Influence* 15): "We have just seen that the Greek was a man of ideas; the Semite was anything but this, and a touch of Greek education (which Zeno probably had) could not suppress his nature."**

Stoic indebtedness to Diogenes17 and Heraclitus, especially in the case of later Stoics such as Marcus Aurelius, is something better attested.18 But it is significant that Zeno's "easternness" seems to have been such an important element of his identity in antiquity. **Zeno's ideas about the nature of belonging in the *polis*, as we shall see, were, in many ways, those of an outsider. This is not to suggest that Zeno's foreignness determined his thought;**19 **it is only to point out that "eastern outsiderness" seems to have been linked with Stoic ideas in the minds of Zeno's contemporaries.** That said, whether or not Zeno's own family roots were in the Levant, it is clear that Zeno himself possessed of a solid Greek education and that the thought of the early Stoa was very much in dialogue with Platonic, Aristotelian, and Cynic ideas about the nature of the human soul and the proper relationship which human souls ought to bear toward one another.20 How might this multiethnic intelligentsia of fourth-century BCE Athens have understood Aristotle's ideas in the *Politics* about the nature of the human soul? Or Plato's restriction of Kallipolis to Greek inhabitants?

…

Nevertheless, the surviving evidence seems that suggest that the early Stoa was more concerned with the line that separated insiders and outsiders in late classical Athens. **In was the Roman Stoics, I hope to show, who fully developed the sort of cosmopolitanism that both ancients and moderns often associate with Zeno. The status of outsider, however, is central to all phases of Stoic political thought and, in this sense, there is an important continuity from the earliest Stoa to that of the high Roman empire.**

The long-entrenched habit of regarding Zeno as a watershed in this history of ideas has tended to obscure fundamental continuities between early Stoic political theory and late classical ideas about the *polis*, in particular the sort of ideas reflected in Aristotle's political thought. First, like Aristotle, Zeno was also concerned with the parts that properly constitute the whole. Second, Zeno also shared with Aristotle the conviction that the citizens of the *polis* ought to share a common nature and that cognitive ability was the trait that differentiated the true citizen from the outsider. Finally, Zeno, like both Plato and Aristotle, seems to have been committed to the very traditional idea that the *polis* was a bounded and limited community. However, **Zeno categorically rejected the very Aristotelian idea that there exists a diversity of "types" of human souls, some of which possess reason and some of which do not. Rather, the early Stoa seems to have insisted on the idea that the human soul is a unified and constant entity that is always qualitatively the same regardless of its embodiment.** This is an idea that will have enormous political implications, as we shall see.
…

Zeno's thought is distinctly nonnationalist (in the sense that I define the term in the Introduction), however, in his rejection of biological kinship as the determining factor of his ideal community. Rather, Zeno wrote that those who are not morally excellent (*σπουδαίοι*) are to be considered enemies, foes, slaves, and foreign. A morally base biological brother is no kin to the morally excellent. Only the morally excellent are true citizens.

The word that Zeno chose to describe the wise man is somewhat unexpected. Instead of the politically charged language traditionally used to describe the aristocracy (*καλοι καγαθοι*), Zeno used a word (*σπουδαίος*) with enormous ethical implications. In the *Poetics*, for example, Aristotle remarks that all human beings are either *σπουδαίος* or not: "they must be morally excellent or absolutely base; the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind."40 Aristotle's bifurcation of the human race into two categories of ethical beings has no bearing on his ideas about political enfranchisement. Citizenship depends upon the ability of the individual to perform the duties of the citizen for Aristotle. This capacity for citizenship depends in turn on the capacity of the individual's soul to reason. **Since reason, in Aristotle's system, is biologically determined and inheres in only one type of soul, the citizen body is de facto a sort of kin group. Zeno, by contrast, linked citizenship to moral excellence and explicitly claimed that ties of kinship did not define citizenship.**

The question is, citizenship in what? **Did Zeno envisage a world-state in which the wise were the only true citizens, or did Zeno advocate a model of citizenship in the classical *polis* based on moral virtue rather than ancestry? There are several reasons to suspect that the latter is the case.** I would suggest that Zeno's *Politeia* was a text that, like Plato's *Politeia*, which Zeno is said to have had in mind as he wrote, imagined an idealized version of the classical city-state. First, the communal possession of women likewise suggests a social structure in which such sharing might take place. As Socrates had in Plato's *Politeia*, Zeno seems to have thought about the ways in which this city might develop so as best to foster wisdom of its inhabitants. The analogy with Plato's *Republic* makes perfect sense of Zeno's rejection of the *εγκύκλιος παιδεία*; Socrates had also rejected traditional education in favor of a more philosophically oriented training (for those with the appropriate natures). We might reasonably assume that a source less hostile than Cassius might have also mentioned how Zeno proposed to educate the young in his ideal city. Likewise, the prohibition of the building of such civic structures as law courts, shrines, and gymnasia, as well as the abandonment of a cash economy, do not suggest a wholesale rejection of the traditional *polis* but a restructuring of the *polis* as it was. In particular, **it seems that Zeno's ideas about citizenship and kinship would have had enormous implications for the construction of the *polis* as a *natio*.**

There is much about Zeno's *Politeia* that we will not know unless the text somehow surfaces. However, a few things are clear: first, Zeno and the rest of the early Stoic school *did* live in a *polis*, and that *polis* was Athens. Second, neither Zeno nor a good number of his students possessed Athenian citizenship since, as we have seen, many were born of non-Athenian parents and came from areas of the eastern Mediterranean considered by most Greeks to be "barbarous." Third, structures of political enfranchisement in late classical Athens were in crisis: the *metaboloi* of the fifth century had only increased in size and frequency in the fourth century. **Might we read Zeno's ideas about citizenship as, in part, a response to changing attitudes toward the nature of the *polis* and the status of outsiders within the *polis*?** Whether or not Zeno himself conceived of a world-state, early Stoic formulations of the meaning of the word *politês* had implications for classical notions of ethnicity, class,

and belonging. **Those within earshot of Zeno as he strolled through the *Stoa Poikilê* in the Athenian Agora would have heard citizenship, and, by extension, political enfranchisement defined in ways that would have made little sense to an Athenian of the fifth century.** Political virtue is not the birthright of the nobleman, as Plato's Meno hoped, nor does Athenian birth entail any particular superiority to non-Athenians, as Plato's Anytus claimed. Rather, Zeno's true *politês* is the virtuous human being.

Stoicism, as it developed in the decades and centuries following the death of Zeno, provided a framework in terms of which a new conception of the meaning of lineage and descent became possible. **Contrary to Aristotle's enormously influential psychology, the Stoics saw no different "types" of human soul. This conviction grew out of a unifying physics that saw the universe as essentially one; Stoic physics, in turn, had ethical consequences that led ultimately to cosmopolitan political ideals.** Our main sources for the ideas of the early Stoa date almost exclusively to the period of the early Roman empire and later: Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, Plutarch, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Aetius, Arius Didymus (in Eusebius), Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus, Galen, Philo, Lactantius, Themistius, Paul of Tarsus, and so on. Many of these sources are hostile, as we have seen in the case of Cassius.41 What is more, later thinkers often attempted to attribute ideas to the "founders" of the school in an effort to lend them greater legitimacy. **More problematic for our present purposes, however, is the strong tendency toward cosmopolitanism that develops most fully in the later Stoa; it is important not to attribute too much universalism to the early Stoa, as did Plutarch and those who followed him (such as Tarn and Baldry). That said, I do hope to demonstrate that the seeds of cosmopolitanism were sown early, even if the flowers came late.**

Cosmopolitan Psychology

To begin with the nature of the human soul: Aristotle, as we have seen, argued that there are different "types" of human souls: the male soul, which possesses reason; the female soul, which possesses reason in a lesser form; and the soul of the natural slave, which does not possess reason. **Like Aristotle, Stoic thinkers also formulated their psychology in terms of the capacity for reason. Also like Aristotle, Stoics saw the nature(s) of the souls of women, men, children, and barbarians as related issues. In stark contrast to Aristotle, however, the Stoics rejected the idea that there are different "types" of human souls and with it the hierarchical social and political structures that Aristotle advocated in the *Politics* and elsewhere.** Stoic psychology, as Christopher Gill has argued, differed from both Aristotelian and Platonic ideas about the soul in that the Stoics did not see the souls as composed of parts but developed a notion of the self rooted in "psychophysical holism."42 **Chrysippus's model of the soul rejected the traditional notion of a central essential "core" – identified with reason – which is the true self that acts upon the other parts of the soul. The early Stoics argued that the active soul (*ψυχη*) and passive bodily matter (*ὕλη*) were entirely "juxtaposed" and "fused" with one another.** As we shall see, this will have enormous implications for Stoic ideas about what sorts of individuals possess reason.

Indeed, Stoic psychology seems to have addressed the question of the presence of reason in the female soul from an early date. **Diogenes Laertius reports that Zeno's student Cleanthes (d. 232 BCE) wrote a treatise called "Concerning the Idea that the Virtue of the Man and the Woman Is the Same."**43 Lactantius adduces evidence of "the Stoics" when he argues that if:

> wisdom is given to humankind, it is given to all without discrimination … because if human nature is capable of wisdom, it is fitting that craftsmen, peasants, and women, – in short, all who bear the human form – be taught to be wise; and it is also fitting that the people be brought together from every language, condition, sex, and age. … **The Stoics understood this to such an extent that they said even slaves and women ought to do philosophy.**44

It is not clear which Stoics Lactantius has in mind, but we find the idea which Lactantius marks as Stoic in a fragment of the Roman Stoic Musonius Rufus mentioned by Stobaeus under the *lemma* "Whether daughters ought to be educated in the same way as [or 'alongside with'] sons."45 Musonius, who was the teacher of Epictetus, responds to the issue of the education of wisdom in a way which recalls Socrates' response in the *Republic*: **breeders of horses and dogs do not train males and females differently, with the result that both perform the same tasks equally.**
…

Under the *lemma* "Whether Women Ought to Do Philosophy," **Musonius makes the argument for female intellectual capacity in terms borrowed from Aristotle, though for precisely opposite ends.** Musonius wrote, "women, as well as men, have taken the same capacity for reason (*logos*) from the gods."47

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D1253b

> And every assistant is as it were a tool that serves for several tools; **for if every tool could perform its own work when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance,** like the statues of Daedalus in the story,[4] or the tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says 'enter self-moved the company divine,'[5]—**if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves, master-craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves.**
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/housing-question/ch01.htm
>
> **And here is the decisive point: as soon as the productive power of human labour has developed to this height, every excuse disappears for the existence of a ruling class.** Was not the final reason with which class differences were defended always: there must be a class which need not plague itself with the production of its daily subsistence, in order that it may have time to look after the intellectual work of society? **This talk, which up to now had its great historical justification, has been cut off at the root once and for all by the industrial revolution of the last hundred years.** The existence of a ruling class is becoming daily more and more a hindrance to the development of industrial productive power, and equally so to science, art and especially cultural human relations. There never were greater boors than our modern bourgeois.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/lafargue/1883/lazy/appendix.htm
>
> **Christian hypocrisy and capitalist utilitarianism had not perverted these philosophers of the ancient republics.** Speaking for free men, they expressed their thought naively. Plato, Aristotle, those intellectual giants, beside whom our latter day philosophers are but pygmies, wish the citizens of their ideal republics to live in the most complete leisure, for as Xenophon observed, "Work takes all the time and with it one has no leisure for the republic and his friends."
> ...
>
> "The prejudice of slavery dominated the minds of Pythagoras and Aristotle," – this has been written disdainfully; **and yet Aristotle foresaw: "that if every tool could by itself execute its proper function, as the masterpieces of Daedalus moved themselves or as the tripods of Vulcan set themselves spontaneously at their sacred work; if for example the shuttles of the weavers did their own weaving, the foreman of the workshop would have no more need of helpers, nor the master of slaves."**
>
> **Aristotle's dream is our reality. Our machines, with breath of fire, with limbs of unwearying steel, with fruitfulness, wonderful inexhaustible, accomplish by themselves with docility their sacred labor.** And nevertheless the genius of the great philosophers of capitalism remains dominated by the prejudice of the wage system, worst of slaveries. **They do not yet understand that the machine is the saviour of humanity, the god who shall redeem man from the *sordidae artes* and from working for hire, the god who shall give him leisure and liberty.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Stoic belief in the unitary nature of the human soul is implicated in the absolute materiality of Stoic physics. Beginning with Zeno, Stoics insisted on the idea that the universe is an undifferentiated whole; as Chrysippus wrote in the second book of his *On Motion*, "the Cosmos is a completed body,"49 an idea that we often find attributed to Stoic authors from the early Hellenistic to the Roman periods.50 This universal body, which the Stoics often described as an animal, is entirely pervaded by the rational, divine principal, referred to variously as *pneuma*, *nous*, *theos*, or *Zeus*.51 Every part of the universe, then, participates in reason. **Crucial to understanding this notion is Chrysippus's formulation of the idea of "total blending" (*κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*) upon which all Stoic physics depends.**

Our fullest source for Chrysippus's doctrine is Alexander of Aphrodisias, who held the chair of Peripatetic philosophy in Athens from 209 CE (probably the chair established by Marcus Aurelius).52 Alexander tells us that there is disagreement within the Stoa about "blending" (*κρᾶσις*) but that, Chrysippus's "opinion about *κρᾶσις* is held in the highest regard among them":53

> **He [Chrysippus] holds that the whole of substance (*οὐσία*) is unified because it is entirely pervaded by a *pneuma*** through which the whole is held together, is stable, and is sympathetic with itself … this type of mixture he says occurs through certain substances and their qualities being mutually coextended in their entirety and preserving their original substance and qualities in such a mixture: **this mixture is blending in the strict sense of the term.**54

It is the *pneuma* through which all matter is one. This *pneuma* pervades the whole universe entirely and is always present everywhere. **Both Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch tell us that Chrysippus used the image of a cup of wine poured into the ocean and becoming coextensive with the ocean to describe the presence of the *pneuma* in the universe.55 Because the *pneuma* is divine and the**

divine is, by definition, pure reason, the universe itself is rational. Alexander paraphrases Chrysippus: "God is mixed with matter and pervades the whole of it and in this way shaping it and forming it and creating the universe. … God is, on their view, body – an intelligent and eternal pneuma."56 Chrysippus is supposed to have described the universe as a "rational, en-souled, and thinking animal."57 Most important for our purposes, **because each human soul is pervaded by the *pneuma*, all human souls have a share in divine reason – regardless of sex or ethnicity.**

To get a sense of how far this idea took the Stoics away from Aristotelian psychology, compare the following statements. Aristotle famously argued in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that "the human being is a political being and designed by nature to live in community,"58 making much the same point in the *Politics*: "the human being is a political animal."59 As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are important qualifications to these statements. First, Aristotle did imagine the *polis* to be the ideal form of human association, not only for politically active men but also for women and slaves. Although the natural slave lacks the deliberative faculty, he nevertheless benefits from living in the *polis* since he is able to apprehend the reason of the logical Greek male. Likewise, the deficient logical capacity of women can only be activated when in the presence of the logical Greek man, and so life in the *polis* is also best for the female of the species. Aristotle's claim that the *anthrôpos* is a political thing does not mean, however, women or slaves have the capacity for deliberative action in the democratic *polis*; rather, it is according to nature for women and slaves to be ruled in the *polis*.

Against the claim of the distinctly Aristotelian notion that the human being is a political animal, compare the definition of "human" that Sextus Empiricus attributes to Chrysippus: "the human is a logical, mortal animal" (*ἄνθρωπος ἐστι ζῷον λογικόν θνητόν*).60 For Aristotle, *anthrôpos* is a *genus* that admits of a diversity of types; not all humans are logical, as Aristotle demonstrates in the *Politics*. **For the Stoics, however, as we shall see, *anthrôpos* is a genus that admits no diversity of cognitive ability.**
…

The *pneuma* is reason and each human soul, by virtue of its being coextensive with the *pneuma* within it, is also possessed of reason. But although Aristotle would continue to define a hierarchy of types of human beings based upon capacity for reason, **the Stoics seem to have made the claim that all human beings possess reason in precisely the same way – Greek and barbarian, male and female.**
…

Oikeiôsis stands at the beginning of all Stoic ethics. **Pembroke, following Pohlenz,**73 **went so far as to state that "the ancient tag about Chrysippus could fairly be transferred from the school's history to its doctrine: if there had been no *oikeiosis*, there would have been no Stoa."**74 *Oikeiôsis* was certainly central to Stoic ethics; Porphyry tells us that "those who followed Zeno stated that *oikeiôsis* is the beginning of justice."75 **Although the Stoics were not the first to use the verbal noun *oikeiôsis* and its cognates (the adjective *oikeios*, the active form of the verb *oikeioun*, and the middle *oukeiousthai*), the Stoics did radically redefine its meaning.**76 At the center of each of these forms is the Greek word for "house" (*oikos*); **those people who were *oikeios* originally referred to persons who were members of one's household,** including those related by blood, marriage, and a host of other domestic relationships.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

Where Zeno differed most importantly from Aristotle, however, was in his insistence that the line that separated the in-group from the out-group was, in the final analysis, permeable. As we saw in the previous chapter, this early Stoic denial of Aristotelian biological determinism provided the conceptual framework in which later Stoic cosmopolitanism developed.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

But, though it arose on Hellenic soil, from lectures delivered in a public place at Athens, **the school is scarcely to be considered a product of purely Greek intellect, but rather as the first fruits of that interaction between West and East which followed the conquests of Alexander. Hardly a single Stoic of eminence was a citizen of any city in the heart of Greece, unless we make Aristo of Chios, Cleanthes of Assus and Panaetius of Rhodes exceptions.** Such lands as Cyprus, Cilicia and Syria, such cities as Citium, Soli, Heraclea in Pontus, Sidon, Carthage, Seleucia on the Tigris, Apamea by the Orontes, furnished the school with its scholars and presidents; **Tarsus, Rhodes and Alexandria became famous as its university towns.** As the first founder was of Phoenician descent, so he drew most of his adherents from the countries which were the seat of Hellenistic (as distinct from Hellenic) civilization; nor did Stoicism achieve its crowning triumph until it was brought to Rome, where the grave earnestness of the national character could appreciate its doctrine, and where for two centuries or more it was the creed, if not the philosophy, of all the best of the Romans. **Properly therefore it stands in marked antithesis to that fairest growth of old Hellas, the Academy,**

which saw the Stoa rise and fall—the one the typical school of Greece and Greek intellect, the other of the Hellenized East, and, under the early Roman Empire, of the whole civilized world. **The transcendent genius of its author, the vitality and romantic fortunes of his doctrine, claim our warmest sympathies for Platonism. But it should not be forgotten that for more than four centuries the tide ran all the other way. It was Stoicism, not Platonism, that filled men's imaginations and exerted the wider and more active influence upon the ancient world at some of the busiest and most important times in all history.** And this was chiefly because before all things it was a practical philosophy, a rallying-point for strong and noble spirits contending against odds. **Nevertheless, in some departments of theory, too, and notably in ethics and jurisprudence, Stoicism has dominated the thought of after ages to a degree not easy to exaggerate.**

…

Zeno's residence at Athens fell at a time when the great movement which Socrates originated had spent itself in the second generation of his spiritual descendants. Neither Theophrastus at the Lyceum, nor Xenocrates and Polemo at the Academy, nor Stilpo, who was drawing crowds to hear him at Megara, could be said to have inherited much of the great reformer's intellectual vigour, to say nothing of his moral earnestness.

…

For a while his motto must have been "back to Socrates," or at least "back to Antisthenes." The Stoics always counted themselves amongst the Socratic schools, and canonized Antisthenes and Diogenes; while reverence for Socrates was the tie which united to them such an accomplished writer upon lighter ethical topics as **the versatile Persaeus, who, at the capital of Antigonus Gonatas, with hardly anything of the professional philosopher about him, reminds us of Xenophon, or even Prodicus.** Zeno commenced, then, as a Cynic; and in the developed system we can point to a kernel of Cynic doctrine to which various philosophies of other thinkers (more especially Heraclitus and Aristotle, but also Diogenes of Apollonia, the Pythagoreans, and the medical school of Hippocrates in a lesser degree) were added.

…

The opposite tendencies, to allow to the individual responsibility and freedom, and to demand of him obedience to law, are both features of the system; but in virtue even of the freedom which belongs to him rational, he must recognize the society of rational beings of which he is a member, and subordinate his own ends to the ends and needs of this society. Those who own one law are citizens of one state, the city of Zeus, in which men and gods have their dwelling. In that city all is ordained by reason working intelligently, and the members exist for the sake of one another; **there is an intimate connexion (συμπάθεια) between them which makes all the wise and virtuous friends, even if personally unknown, and leads them to contribute to one another's good.** Their intercourse should find expression in justice, in friendship, in family and political life. **But practically the Stoic philosopher always had some good excuse for withdrawing from the narrow political life of the city in which he found himself.** The circumstances of the time, such as the decay of Greek city-life, the foundation of large territorial states under absolute Greek rulers which followed upon Alexander's conquests, and afterwards the rise of the world-empire of Rome, aided to develop the leading idea of Zeno's *Republic*. **There he had anticipated a state without family life, without law courts or coins, without schools or temples, in which all differences of nationality would be merged in the common brotherhood of man. This cosmopolitan citizenship remained all through a distinctive Stoic dogma; when first announced it must have had a powerful influence upon the minds of men, diverting them from the distractions of almost parochial politics to a boundless vista.** There was, then, no longer any difference between Greek and barbarian, between male and female, bond and free. All are members of one body as partaking in reason, all are equally men. Not that this led to any movement for the abolition of slavery. For the Stoics attached but slight importance to external circumstances, since only the wise man is really free, and all the unwise are slaves. Yet, while they accepted slavery as a permanent institution, philosophers as wide apart as Chrysippus and Seneca sought to mitigate its evils in practice, and urged upon masters humanity in the treatment of their slaves.

…

When Chrysippus died (Ol. 143 = 208-204 B.C.) the structure of Stoic doctrine was complete. With the Middle Stoa we enter upon a period at first of comparative inaction, afterwards of internal reform. Chrysippus's immediate successors were Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Seleucia (often called the Babylonian) and Antipater of Tarsus, men of no originality, though not without ability; **the two last-named, however, had all their energies taxed to sustain the conflict with Carneades (*q.v.*). This was the most formidable assault the school ever encountered; that it survived was due more to the foresight and elaborate precautions of Chrysippus** than to any efforts of that "pen-doughty" pamphleteer, Antipater (καλαμοβόας), who shrank from opposing himself in person to the eloquence of Carneades.

…

Now it is highly improbable that the earlier Stoics would have sanctioned such interpretations of their dogmas. The mere performance of relative or imperfect duties, they would have said, is something neither good nor evil; the essential constituents of human good is ignored. **And similar criticism is actually passed by Posidonius: "This is not the end, but only its necessary concomitant; such a mode of expression may be useful for the refutation of objections put forward by the Sophists" (Carneades and the New Academy?), "but it contains nothing of morality or well-being"** (Galen, *De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.* p. 470 K). **There is every ground, then, for concluding that we have here one concession extorted by the assaults of Carneades.** For a similar compromise there is express testimony: **"good repute" (εὐδοξία) had been regarded as a thing wholly indifferent in the school down to and including Diogenes. Antipater was forced to assign to it "positive value," and to give it a place amongst "things preferred"** (Cic. *De fin.* iii. 57).
…

In all that the older Stoics taught there breathes that enthusiasm for righteousness in which has been traced the earnestness of the Semitic spirit; but nothing presents more forcibly the pitch of their moral idealism than the doctrine of the Wise Man. All mankind fall into two classes—the wise or virtuous, the unwise or wicked—the distinction being absolute. He who possesses virtue possesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether. To be but a hand's-breadth below the surface of the sea ensures drowning as infallibly as to be five hundred fathoms deep. Now the wise man is drawn as perfect. All he does is right, all his opinions are true; he alone is free, rich, beautiful, skilled to govern, capable of giving or receiving a benefit. **And his happiness, since length of time cannot increase it, falls in nothing short of that of Zeus.**
…

So long as dialectic subtleties and exciting polemics afforded food for the intellect, the gulf between theory and practice might be ignored. But once let this system be presented to men in earnest about right living, and eager to profit by what they are taught, and an ethical reform is inevitable. Conduct for us will be separated from conduct for the sage. We shall be told not always to imitate him. There will be a new law, dwelling specially upon the "external duties" required of all men, wise or unwise; and even the sufficiency of virtue for our happiness may be questioned. The introducer and expositor of such a twofold morality was a remarkable man. **Born at Rhodes *c.* 185 B.C., a citizen of the most flourishing of Greek states and almost the only one which yet retained vigour and freedom,** Panaetius lived for years in the house of Scipio Africanus the younger at Rome, accompanied him on embassies and campaigns, **and was perhaps the first Greek who in a private capacity had any insight into the working of the Roman state or the character of its citizens. Later in life, as head of the Stoic school at Athens, he achieved a reputation second only to that of Chrysippus. He is the earliest Stoic author from whom we have, even indirectly, any considerable piece of work, as books i. and ii. of the *De officiis* are a *réchaufé*, in Cicero's fashion, of Panaetius "Upon External Duty" (περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος).**
…

To attract his Roman pupils Panaetius would naturally choose simple topics susceptible of rhetorical treatment or of application to individual details. He was the representative, not merely of Stoicism, but of Greece and Greek literature, and would feel pride in introducing its greatest masterpieces: amongst all that he studied, he valued most the writings of Plato. He admired the classic style, the exquisite purity of language, the flights of imagination, but he admired above all the philosophy. **He marks a reaction of the genuine Hellenic spirit against the narrow austerity of the first Stoics.** Zeno and Chrysippus had introduced a repellent technical terminology; their writings lacked every grace of style. With Panaetius the Stoa became eloquent: he did his best to improve upon the uncouth words in vogue, even at some slight cost of accuracy, *e.g.* to discard προηγμένον for εὐχρηστον, or else designate it "so-called good," or even simply "good," if the context allowed.
…

Platonism and scepticism had left undoubted traces upon the doctrine of such a reformer as Panaetius. He had doubts about a general conflagration; possibly (he thought) Aristotle was right in affirming the eternity of the present order of the world. He doubted the entire system of divination. On these points his disciples Posidonius and Hecato seem to have reverted to orthodoxy.
…

From Posidonius, the last representative of a comprehensive study of nature and a subtle erudition, it is not surprising that we get the following definition: the end is to live in contemplation of the reality and order of the universe, promoting it to the best of our power, and never led astray by the irrational part of the soul. The heterodox phrase with which this definition ends points to innovations in psychology which were undoubtedly real and important, suggested by the difficulty of maintaining the essential unity of the soul. Panaetius had referred two faculties (those of speech and of reproduction) to animal impulse and to the vegetative "nature" (φύσις) respectively. Yet the older Stoics held that this φύσις was changed to a true soul (ψυχή) at birth. **Posidonius, unable to explain the emotions as "judgments"**

or the effects of judgments, postulated, like Plato, an irrational principle (including a concupiscent and a spirited element) to account for them, although he subordinated all these as faculties to the one substance of the soul lodged in the heart. This was a serious departure from the principles of the system, facilitating a return of later Stoicism to the dualism of God and the world, reason and the irrational part in man, which Chrysippus had striven to surmount.[4]

Yet in the general approximation and fusion of opposing views which had set in, the Stoics fared far better than rival schools. Their system became best known and most widely used by individual eclectics. All the assaults of the sceptical Academy had failed, and within fifty years of the death of Carneades his degenerate successors, unable to hold their ground on the question of the criterion, had capitulated to the enemy. Antiochus of Ascalon, the professed restorer of the Old Academy, taught a medley of Stoic and Peripatetic dogmas, which he boldly asserted Zeno had first borrowed from his school.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false

Even in the Hellenistic period, then, Stoicism was a rich and diverse movement, a living tradition as complex as its reception in the periods since antiquity discussed in the chapters that follow. The significant difference of course is that **few since antiquity have explicitly described themselves as Stoics.**11

> 11. The person who comes closest to describing himself as a Stoic is probably Justus Lipsius. **The person whom many would point to as coming closest to Stoicism, Benedictus Spinoza, explicitly distanced himself from the title.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/510/mode/2up?view=theater

Radical Enlightenment, then, unlike the Cartesio-*Malebranchiste*, Lockean-Newtonian-Voltairean, and Leibnizio-Wolffian streams, became philosophically eclectic during the age of Diderot, embracing a universalism which excluded no aspect of Man's past. While the style and method of systems varies and different terminologies are useful in different contexts, all historical contexts typify a particular stage in the evolution of *l'esprit humain*, and the core of truth, which as time goes on becomes slowly clearer to more and more men, is cosmic, unchanging, and ultimately shared by all. 'Truth,' in this context, is unrelentingly monist and materialist, that is hylozoic, 'Stratonist' in the sense propounded by the late Bayle and by Diderot in his articles on *l'histoire de l'esprit humain*. With its penchant for putting ancient philosophy to work to disclose this 'Spinozistic' hidden core in surreptitious ways, **radical thought here reveals itself as much, or more, the heir to the tradition of *libertinage érudit* as the pupil of the German Eclectics.**

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n373/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The appellation of Eclectic is applied to a Free-mason, as it was formerly to certain Philosophers. We are to understand by this word those of the adepts who, after having passed through the different degrees of Masonry, attach themselves to no particular system,** either political or religious, into which they have been initiated, but adopt from them all whatever may best suit their political or religious views.28 They are neither Hermetic, Cabalistic nor Martinist Masons; they are what they please, Deists, Atheists, Sceptics, an aggregate of all the errors of the Philosophism of the day. They, like the simple Sophisters of the age, have a twofold point of union. **With respect to Religion, they all admit that Equality and Liberty which denies every authority but their own reason, and rejects all revealed religion; as to governments, they admit of no Kings, unless subservient to the will of the people in right of its sovereignty.**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eug%C3%A8ne_Edine_Pottier
>
> During his exile in New York City (1873-1880), Eugène Pottier was received at *Les Égalitaires* lodge in New York.[2] **In his cover letter, he said that Freemasonry "is composed of a group of freethinkers who, having made a clean sweep on tradition and recognizing nothing superior to human reason, consciously dedicate themselves in search of Truth and Justice".**[3]

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/484/mode/2up?view=theater

What makes the eclecticism of the Enlightenment so striking – and so important – it that it is overt, wholly unapologetic. In consequence I discovered I had to abandon an early hypothesis,

namely, that the atheists in the eighteenth century derived from ancient Epicureans, and the deists from ancient Stoics. In fact both Epicureans and Stoics were already eclectics in Rome, and so what the philosophes learned was precisely this – eclecticism.
…

Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, parts II to IV, details the evolution of Stoicism from a strict doctrine to an eclectic collection of ideas.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/266/mode/2up?view=theater

Finally – and this is significant both for the contours of Renaissance thought and for its affinity with the Enlightenment – Ficino was enough in the main stream of Renaissance speculation to be an eclectic; he was ready to sacrifice system to effective thought. The most elegant of doctrines, Ficino argued, is inferior to the truths to be gathered from all teachings, philosophical and theological alike.

With this eclecticism, this urge toward practical philosophizing, we have penetrated to the core of the affinity between Renaissance and Enlightenment. The Humanists, like the philosophes after them, were moral realists: **Petrarch preferred Cicero, Seneca, and Horace to Aristotle and the Scholastics, because the latter merely gave knowledge while the former set the reader afire with love of virtue:** the object of the will, Petrarch wrote, "is to be good; that of the intellect is truth. It is better to will the good than to know the truth." Goodness is better than truth – we seem to be reading Diderot.7

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA202#v=onepage&q&f=false

The remark, practically always made, is that with the exception of Charron, the four others – La Mothe, Naudé, Guy Patin, and Sorbière – form a group which it is customary to establish around Gassendi. In reality, all five as well as Gassendi were centered around Montaigne. Each attempts to develop in his way the ideas in the *Essais*. In general, all of them aspired to a reputation for learning characteristic of Montaigne. They were all library scholars and their erudition was humanistically oriented. When a list of classical books relevant to each is drawn up, it turns out to be with unimportant exceptions the ancient writers who were so dear to Montaigne: Aristotle and Plato, Plutarch and Seneca, Cicero and Lucretius, Sextus Empiricus and, finally, Pomponazzi. **Their attitude toward knowledge represents a merging of stoical thought with Epicurean action, or contrariwise Epicurean thought with stoical action. Not one is stoic in thought and action, or epicurean in thought and action; and in this, they resemble the master also. But the outstanding quality of their thought and action is neither stoical nor epicurean, it is skeptical in the third sense of skepticism as defined by Sextus Empiricus and explained by Montaigne in the *Apologie*:** a constant searching for truth based on the continuous quest for oneself and unyielding determination to draw therefrom all the resources of which one is capable. **They have a tremendous enthusiasm for antiquity, a high regard for the Paduans, and they hold in esteem the Italians.** They have some inclination to pursue the exact sciences, but a special interest in the facts of history. Uniformly, they reject all authority in science and philosophy; they criticize the prejudices of common opinions; they inaugurate and apply with precision the experimental method; they counsel caution in regard to miracles, oracles, superstitions. When the unorthodoxy of their views attracts a hostile comment, they hide behind a fideism which may be sincere but is nevertheless suspect.

They are followers of Gassendi rather than of Descartes; they openly declare for atomism and the vacuum rather than for subtle matter and the plenum. They are greatly preoccupied with the Paduan problems, but not very efficient in coming to positive conclusions about them.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/160/mode/2up?view=theater

They liked to borrow from Eclectics above all, and they chose their models eclectically: this, for the Enlightenment, was the triumph of criticism over theory, the symbol of its intellectual independence.

Among all the aspects of the Enlightenment's eclecticism, this is the most remarkable: it was not embarrassed but exultant; **it was exhibited, not as a last resort or as a declaration of intellectual bankruptcy, but as an appropriate, in fact the most appropriate, style of philosophizing. Diderot expressed the convictions of all the philosophes when he denied that an eclectic is merely a lazy syncretist who collects bits of philosophy from a convenient assortment of ideas.** Rather, the Eclectic preaches and practices autonomy: he "is a philosopher who tramples underfoot prejudices, tradition, antiquity, universal assent, authority, in a word, everything that overawes the mass of minds, who dares to think for himself, to go back to the clearest general principles, examine them, discuss them, admit nothing save on the testimony of his experience and his reasoning."6 **Here, in the guise of an appreciative article on the Eclectics in the Roman Empire, is a virtual self-portrait of the eighteenth-century philosophe.**

Ironically, this declaration of philosophical independence was largely a plagiarism: the article "Eclecticism" was freely adapted from Brucker's history of philosophy. **But since Diderot took only what suited him, and added his characteristic touches, his very borrowing becomes an exhibit in eclectic procedure.** "From all the philosophies he has analyzed…" Diderot writes, almost as though to disarm criticism of his own proceedings, the eclectic "makes a philosophy for himself, individual and personal, one that is his own." That is why modern eclectics, critical of all systems, are critical even of their intellectual ancestors.7

The philosophes agreed that the ancient philosophers, even at their best, had showed the way to the promised land without entering it themselves. "Consider," David Hume wrote,

> **the blind submission of the ancient philosophers to the several masters in each school, and you will be convinced, that little good could be expected from a hundred centuries of such a servile philosophy.** Even the Eclectics, who arose about the age of Augustus, notwithstanding their professing to chuse freely what pleased them from every different sect, were yet, in the main, as slavish and dependent as any of their brethren, since they sought for truth not in nature, but in the several schools, where they supposed they must necessarily be found, though not united in a body, yet dispersed in parts.8

…

The most honored, and the most quoted, among the Eclectic company was, inevitably, Cicero.
…

Diderot observed that while Seneca "valued the Stoic rigorists highly," he was himself only a "modified Stoic, and perhaps even an eclectic"; and, consequently, Diderot energetically rejected La Mettrie's description of Seneca as a rigid sectarian, with "all the asperities of Stoicism," as simply false.1
…

But it was hardly Horace's fault that his poetry had been despoiled to furnish copybook maxims for the trivial moralizing of the eighteenth century. And in fact, to the philosophes, Horace meant more than this: he was a master in the art of living; he was the urbane advocate of moderation, free alike from doctrine and fanaticism, a free spirit who took from the schools what he needed and tested his reading by his experience. **He had described himself as "a hog from Epicurus' herd," but he was enough of a Stoic to detach himself from slavish dependence even on Epicurus.** Being everyone's disciple, he was no one's; living in the interstices of doctrine, he achieved an ideal individuality that moved the philosophes to imitate not merely his writings, but his style of life as well.
…

It is appropriate that the Eclectics' appeal to experience should itself be the fruit of experience. Their teaching gave philosophical formulation to political imperatives; it systematized the relativism and tolerance essential to the management of the enormous empires founded in the Hellenistic age and after.

Relativism, Eclecticism, and toleration are so intimately related that they cannot be strictly separated even in thought. Relativism is a way of looking at the world, the recognition that no single set of convictions has absolute validity; Eclecticism is the philosophical method consequent of relativism – **since no system has the whole truth, and most systems have some truth, discriminating selection among systems is the only valid procedure.** Toleration, finally, is the political counterpart of this world view and this method: it is a policy for a large and varied society.

> http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/005864.html
>
> Modern liberalism stands for principles of equality and non-discrimination **which, if followed consistently, would make a decent life in this world, or any life at all, impossible.** But modern liberal society does not permit the public expression of non-liberal principles, by which rational limits to equality and non-discrimination, or indeed the very falsity of these ideas altogether, can be articulated. **This fact forces liberals continually to make exceptions to their own liberalism, without admitting to themselves and others that they are doing so. Such exceptions must take inchoate, non-conceptual, pre-rational forms,** such as appeals to brute self-interest, to the need to respond to a pressing emergency, or to common sense. For example, liberals who want to escape from the negative consequences of their liberal beliefs in a given instance will often say that the application of a liberal idea in that instance "*goes too far*," without their indicating by what principle they distinguish between an idea that has gone "too far" and one that hasn't. **In fact, it's purely a matter of what suits their own comfort level and convenience.**
>
> Conservatives also must have recourse to the unprincipled exception, but for a different reason than the liberals. Liberals are seeking to escape the negative consequences of their own liberalism. **Conservatives, of course, actively oppose liberalism, or, rather, they oppose *some aspects* of**

> **liberalism.** But, because the conservatives live in modern liberal society, where principled opposition to liberalism is not allowed, and also because the conservatives themselves subscribe to liberalism and are not prepared to think outside its concepts, the conservatives' only available means of opposing some aspects of liberalism is by unprincipled exceptions, such as appealing to common sense, or to the shared unreflective habits of society, or saying, "That's just the way things are," or asserting that a particular liberal belief is "silly" or "stupid" or "extreme." These methods allow conservatives to find fault with various symptoms of liberalism, without attacking liberalism per se.

…

As Condorcet recognized, "The philosophy that claimed to elevate itself above nature, and the one that wanted only to obey it; the morality that recognized no good other than virtue, and the one that placed happiness in pleasure, led to the same practical consequences, even though they started from such contrary principles and used such opposite language."4

> https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/350/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Cicero himself was the first to say, "We are servants of the law in order to be free." **In Cicero's version, moreover, natural law ultimately comes to rest on the understanding that all crime is at bottom a crime against oneself:** "He who does not obey [the law of nature] flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man, and by doing so he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoids the other evils which are usually accounted punishments."114 **Though Cicero places a Stoic deity in charge of this law of nature, Gassendi shows how its intrinsic naturalism ultimately leads to a convergence with the Epicurean position.** "True and natural liberty is easier to be found in a Society," says Gassendi, walking along the bridge that connects Epicurus with Spinoza.115 "As the wise man acts all things for himself, and for his own Good and Satisfaction, there is nothing that will contribute more to this purpose than in carefully observing the Rules of Justice."116

This eclecticism in philosophy was accompanied by syncretism in religion; for many educated people, in fact, the two were the same – a way of seeking truth by an appreciative study of divergent behavior and beliefs. **It was easy to believe, as Plutarch did, that the most diverse mysteries were merely different versions of a single worship; or as the Stoics did, that tales of the gods told in different cultures were all stories of real heroes converted into deities.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA86#v=onepage&q&f=false

Epictetus, however, although he does seem to have shared Marcus's distaste for the sublunar world human relationships, is more interested than Marcus in the practical consequences of our universal humanity and kinship with the divine. In the first book, Epictetus asks, "How from the thesis that we are kin to the divine ought one to proceed to the consequences?"133 **Epictetus's answer begins with the most famous thing Socrates never said** (at least not in the extant *Dialogues* of Plato): **according to Epictetus (and Cicero, Plutarch, and Montaigne), Socrates is supposed to have taught, "never say to one who asks you where you are from, 'I am an Athenian,' or, 'I am a Corinthian;' rather, say, 'I am a *Cosmian*.'"**134 To be a "cosmian" is to claim one's kinship with the divine, a far loftier identity than that derived from one's *oikos* or the lineage of one's ancestors (*τὸ γένος τῶν προγόνων*).135

> 134. *Diss.* 1.9: *μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι κόσμιος*. Cf. Plutarch, *De Exilio* 600f-601a, **who adds that Socrates also believed that one should not call oneself a Hellene, either.** Cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5.108-109: *"Mundanum," inquit, "totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur."* **De Montaigne, "Education of Children" 116: "Socrates was asked where he came from. He replied, 'not Athens," but, 'the world.' He, whose imagination was fuller and more extensive, embraced the universe as his city, and distributed his knowledge, his company, and his affections to all mankind, unlike us who look only at what us underfoot."** See McMahon, "Fear and Trembling" 6. **Plato's Socrates, as we have seen, hardly fits Montaigne's idealized picture of the traveling sage.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus what Teucer said may be applied to every case:

> "Wherever I am happy is my country."

Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he belonged to, replied, "The world;" for he looked upon himself as a citizen and inhabitant of the whole world.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0237%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D9

If what philosophers say of the kinship between God and men be true, what has any one to do but, like Socrates, when he is asked what countryman he is, **never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the universe?**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/De_exilio*.html#ref35

Thus Heracles spoke well when he said

> an Argive I
> Or Theban, for I boast no single exist;
> There is no fort in Greece but is my country;[39]

whereas the saying of Socrates is still better, **that he was no Athenian or Greek, but a "Cosmian"**[40] (as one might say "Rhodian" or "Corinthian"), because he did not shut himself up within Sunium and Taenarus and the Ceraunian mountains.[41]

https://philarchive.org/archive/BROSTC-2v1

“When Socrates was asked to which [country] he belonged, he would say, ‘To the world,’ for he thought that he was an inhabitant and citizen of the whole world.”1 **So we are told by those philosophers in later antiquity who liked to see themselves as the heirs of Socrates and as cosmopolitans.**2 **The story is probably not the literal truth. It looks rather like a simple projection onto Socrates of what was said about the man Plato allegedly called “Socrates gone mad.”**3 But like any good myth, this story has some truth in it.4 I argue that the cosmopolitanism that was developing in fifth century B.C.E. Greek thought and that later flourished among the Cynics and especially the Stoics, influences Socratic ethics as it is presented by Plato’s early dialogues.5 **Plato’s Socrates is consistently a citizen of the world who renders his special service to Athenians without acknowledging any special obligations to do so.**6

> 2. That is, by the Stoics. Musonius and Epictetus are Stoics, **and *Tusculan Disputations* and *De Exilio* are steeped in Stoic tradition.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Sayings_of_Spartans*/main.html#ref52

1 When someone commended the maxim of Cleomenes, who, on being asked what a good king ought to do, said, "To do good to his friends and evil to his enemies," **Ariston said, "How much better, my good sir, to do good to our friends, and to make friends of our enemies?" This, which is universally conceded to be one of Socrates' maxims,**[53] **is also referred to Ariston.**[54]

> [53] But not quite in these words *cf.* Plato, *Republic*, I chap. ix (335B ff.), *Crito*, chap. x (49A ff.), *Gorgias*, 469A-B and 475B-D.

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/1B1*.html#ref42

2 First, I must consider Eratosthenes, at the same time setting forth the objections which Hipparchus urges against the statements of Eratosthenes. Now Eratosthenes is not so open to attack as to warrant my saying that he never saw even Athens, as Polemon undertakes to prove; nor, on the other hand, is he so trustworthy as some have been taught to believe that he is—notwithstanding the fact that he had been associated with many eminent men, as he himself tells us. **"For," says he, "philosophers gathered together at this particular time, as never before within one wall or one city; I refer to those who flourished in the time of Ariston and Arcesilaus."** But I do not think that sufficient; what we need is a clear-cut judgment as to what teachers we should choose to follow. **But he places Arcesilaus and Ariston at the head of the scholars who flourished in his day and generation;** and Apelles is much in evidence with him, and so is Bion, of whom he says: "Bion was the first to drape philosophy in embroidered finery"; and yet he states that people frequently applied to Bion the words: "Such a [thigh] as Bion [shews] from out his rags."[43] **Indeed, in these very statements Eratosthenes reveals a serious infirmity in his own judgment; and because of this infirmity, although he himself studied in Athens under Zeno of Citium, he makes no mention of any of Zeno's successors, but speaks of those men who dissented from the teachings of Zeno and who failed to establish a school that lived after them as "flourishing" at that particular time.** His treatise entitled *On the Good*, also, and his *Studies in Declamation*, and whatever else he wrote of this nature, go to show his tendency, namely, **that of the man who is constantly vacillating between his desire to be a philosopher and his reluctance to devote himself entirely to this profession, and who therefore succeeds in advancing only far enough to have the appearance of being a philosopher;** or of the man who has provided himself with this as a diversion[44] from his regular work, either for his pastime or even amusement; and in a sense Eratosthenes displays this tendency in his other writings, too.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/1D*.html

9 Now, towards the end of his treatise—**after withholding praise from those who divide the whole multitude of mankind into two groups, namely, Greeks and Barbarians, and also from those who advised Alexander to treat the Greeks as friends but the Barbarians as enemies—Eratosthenes goes on to say that it would be better to make such divisions according to good qualities and bad qualities; for not only are many of the Greeks bad, but many of the Barbarians are refined—Indians and Arians, for example, and, further, Romans and Carthaginians, who carry on their governments so admirably. And this, he says, is the reason why Alexander, disregarding his advisers, welcomed as many as he could of the men of fair repute and did them favours**—just as if those who have made such a division, placing some people in the category of censure, others in that of praise, did so for any other reason than that in some people there prevail the law-abiding and the political instinct, and the qualities associated with education and powers of speech, whereas in other people the opposite characteristics prevail! **And so Alexander, not disregarding his advisers, but rather accepting their opinion, did what was consistent with, not contrary to, their advice;** for he had regard to the real intent of those who gave him counsel.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dlMr4UhqQlQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA169#v=onepage&q&f=false

Having befriended Roman leaders while held hostage in Rome for sixteen years (as a cavalry officer for the vanquished Achaean League) and serving as a tutor for the children of one of the city's leading citizens, **Polybius contended that the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean was the product of *Tyche* (Fortune), a vague entity similar to Stoic Fate.** Polybius wrote: "From this point onwards history becomes an organic whole. ... Fortune has steered almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and forced them to converge upon one and the same goal." Through Rome, Tyche sought to unify "almost the whole of the inhabited world."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/1*.html

3 1 The date from which I propose to begin my history is the 140th Olympiad [220-216 B.C.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, 2 (3) in Italy, Libya, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. 3 **Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality;** 4 **but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interlinked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end.** 5 And this is my reason for beginning their systematic history from that date. 6 For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and the continent of Asia.

https://grbs.library.duke.edu/article/view/8141/1751

Hirzel's view,7 **part of the larger thesis that Polybius should be regarded as a fullblown Stoic, was that Polybius's notion of *tyche* is to be equated with the Stoic notion of divine providence or *pronoia*.**8

> 8. See also H. J. Edwards in his introduction to W. R. Paton, *Polybius. The Histories* I (LCL 1922) xiii: "He was a Stoic, and he believed that the Roman order of things was part of a divine Providence that ruled the world."

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Stoics

> **It has been recently established that Polybius the historian was a Stoic,** and it is clear that he was greatly influenced by the form of the system which he learned to know, in the society of Scipio and his friends, from Panaetius.[2]

> > 2. Hirzel, *Untersuch*. ii. 841 seq. **Polybius's rejection of divination is decisive.** See, *e.g.* his explanation upon natural causes of Scipio the Elder's capture of New Carthage, "by the aid of Neptune," x. 11 (cf. x. 2). P. Voigt holds that in vi. 5, 1, τισιν ἐτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων is an allusion to Panaetius.

Hirzel's thesis provoked fierce critical reactions. The thrust of these were first that Polybius did not refer to *tyche* in the sense of divine foresight, and second that where Polybius referred to *pronoia*, he did so in the sense of human rather than divine foresight.9 My aim is more modest: **rather than arguing that Polybius has to be considered as a full-blown Stoic, my proposal is that two approaches with regard to *tyche* can be discerned in Polybius, and moreover that these two approaches can be conceptually reconciled from a Stoic perspective.**
…

To sum up: according to the Stoics, **from the point of view of the perfect person, *tyche* is but an illusion: any event ordinarily ascribed to *tyche* can in the end be explained in terms of reason.** From the point of view of the inferior person, *tyche* can be used as a colloquial expression for that part of the divine rational force which guides all, but which is not yet properly understood by the only beings in the order of things potentially capable of doing so.35
…

Like the Stoics, Polybius did not consider himself to be in possession of perfect understanding, as we saw in his hesitant formulation at 36.17: "We may perhaps be justified" etc.54 In other contexts as well this imperfect point of view is applied, as at 6.56.10, **where Polybius makes clear that in contemporary society gods are needed, because human beings are not sages. (Incidentally, the implication here must be that in an ideal community of sages gods are superfluous.**55**)**

> http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/6*.html
>
> 9 My own opinion at least is that they have adopted this course for the sake of the common people. 10 **It is a course which perhaps would not have been necessary had it been possible to form a state composed of wise men,** 11 but as every multitude is fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger, the multitude must be held in by invisible terrors and suchlike pageantry. 12 For this reason I think, not that the ancients acted rashly and at haphazard in introducing among the people notions concerning the gods and beliefs in the terrors of hell, **but that the moderns are most rash and foolish in banishing such beliefs.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37400/37400-h/37400-h.htm#CHAP_XIV
>
> I will not make use of the Authority of *Polybius*, a very famous Historian about 200 Years before *Christ*, who pretended, as he says in his sixth Chapter, **"That the Gods, as well as Punishments and Rewards after this Life, are only the chimerical Productions of the Ancients, which would be very insignificant if a Republic was to be form'd to consist only of good Men; but because there is no State where the People are not irregular and wicked, 'tis absolutely necessary for keeping them in Awe, to make use of the Panic Terrors of another World, to admit, believe and intirely to conform to them, on Pain of passing for Madmen and Fools."** As this great Man was a Pagan, 'tis not fair to quote him among us upon a Fact of such Consequence.

…

If these conclusions are correct, they also offer a clue to Polybius fr.83b. The Büttner-Wobst edition gives only the latter part; the full passage is *Suda* τ1234:59:

> *Tyche* among the Greeks is an unforeseeable ordering of the world, or a movement coming from what is unclear and going to what is unclear and spontaneous; **but we Christians agree that God governs the universe. And so does Polybius.**

The author rejects the traditional Greek usage of *tyche*: for him ultimately no process or event is unforeseeable, unclear, or spontaneous. Rather, everything is part of a greater and divine scheme of things. In this sense, Polybius can be aligned not only with the Christian view that God governs all, but also with the similar Stoic view that the divine force of reason governs all. **Note, at any rate, that the terminology here, "to govern the universe," (διοικεῖν τὰ πάντα) is Stoic.** This is not to say that there is no difference between Polybius and the Christian view: for the Stoics, as for Polybius, the force is immanent, whereas for Christians this force obviously is located outside the world in the form of the Creator of the world.

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/564/mode/2up?view=theater

As for the old feeling of city patriotism, such as we know it in men like Epaminondas or Demosthenes, Polybius regards it as mere stupid bigotry. He turns aside specially to censure Demosthenes's random use of the word *traitor* for anybody who did not subordinate all other interests to that of the autonomy of the orator's city, and shows that many sensible politicians in that day had been justified by expediency in siding with Macedon—the Arcadians, for example, had liberated themselves from the domination of a nearer and more oppressive neighbour, Sparta—while the policy of Demosthenes only failed to bring ruin

upon Athens owing to the mercy of the conqueror. **It is a question, he says, of degree, and of motive, not of principle,** whether we should side with a foreign power against a section of our own citizens.1 He does not cite Phocion, but he evidently thinks such a man the right man in the right place. **So far removed were now the wisest and noblest men from the splendours of Hellenic patriotism!**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/18*.html

9 Had they in acting thus either submitted to have their towns garrisoned by Philip, or abolished their laws and deprived the citizens of freedom of action and speech to serve their own ambition and place themselves in power, they would have deserved the name of traitor. 10 **But if preserving the rights of their respective countries, they simply differed in their judgement of facts, thinking that the interests of Athens were not identical with those of their countries, they should, I maintain, not have been dubbed traitors for this reason by Demosthenes.** 11 **Measuring everything by the interests of his own city, thinking that the whole of Greece should have its eyes turned on Athens, and if people did not do so, calling them traitors,** Demosthenes seems to me to have been very much mistaken and very far wide of the truth, especially as what actually befel the Greeks then does not testify to his own admirable foresight but rather to that of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiadas. 13 For the opposition offered to Philip by the Athenians resulted in their being overtaken by the gravest disasters, defeated as they were at the battle of Chaeronea.
14 And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and love of glory, their misfortune would have been even more terrible and all due to the policy of Demosthenes. 15 **But it was owing to the men whose names I mentioned that two states of Arcadia and Messene obtained public security and rest from Lacedaemonian aggression, and that so many private advantages to their citizens resulted.**

http://btk.ppke.hu/phd/tortenelemtudomany/mohay_gergely/tezis_en.pdf

First I illustrated with Polybian passages that emotions are almost always measured negatively. The condemnation of emotions can be seen also in the fact that Polybius never deplores if someone has emotions to a lesser extent than he should have, and he never praises emotions. He entirely condemns emotions, not only their excessiveness. **In this regard he thinks similarly to the Stoics and differently from Plato, Aristotle, and Panaetius as well as in that respect that he considers the appearance of emotions to be equal with the unreasoned deed.** It is also similar to the views of the Stoics that Polybius regards the emotions as false judgements (respectively as effects of them), and in some passages as vices, which can be corrected by right reasoning and by changing our thinking.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n377/mode/2up?view=theater

I have ventured [to open our discussion] in this way, not only because it is but just that on State politics the chief man in the State should be the principal speaker, but also because **I recollect that you, Scipio, were formerly very much in the habit of conversing with Panætius and Polybius, two Greeks, exceedingly learned in political questions,** and that you are master of many arguments by which you prove that by far the best condition of government is that which our ancestors have handed down to us.

---

https://archive.org/details/inequalityhuman00gobigoog/page/n184/mode/2up?view=theater

I spoke above of the letters written from the Tusculan Villa: they contain the thoughts of a Conservative with progressive leanings. As against Sulla, Pompeius and Cicero were Liberals. They were not liberal enough for Caesar, and were too much so for Cato.

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap3.htm

Everyone who has read Cicero's *De natura deorum* will remember how he was taken by surprise when Cicero, in the very last paragraph, pronounces in favor of the Stoic position, although Cicero was himself an Academic and, furthermore, cannot have failed to see which of the arguments he has summarized was the most reasonable. **In that last sentence the statesman silenced the philosopher with a *raison d'état*.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater

Aristocracy is good when the really best rule; **but Cicero, as a member of the middle class, could not quite admit that the old entrenched families were the best.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n373/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover, who can think anything in human affairs of brilliant importance who has penetrated this starry empire of the gods? **Or who can think anything connected with mankind long who has learned to estimate the nature of eternity? or glorious who is aware of the insignificance of the size of the earth, even in its whole extent, and especially in the portion which men inhabit? And when we consider that almost imperceptible point which we ourselves occupy unknown to the majority of nations, can we still hope that our name and reputation can be widely circulated?** And then our estates and edifices, our cattle, and the enormous treasures of our gold and silver, can they be esteemed or denominated as desirable goods by him who observes their perishable profit, and their contemptible use, and their uncertain domination, often falling into the possession of the very worst men? How happy, then, ought we to esteem that man **who alone has it in his power, not by the law of the Romans, but by the privilege of philosophers, to enjoy all things as his own; not by any civil bond, but by the common right of nature, which denies that anything can really be possessed by any one but him who understands its true nature and use; [cui soli vere liceat omnia non Quiritium sed sapientium iure pro suis vindicare, nec civili nexo sed communi lege naturae, quae vetat ullam rem esse cuiusquam, nisi eius qui tractare et uti sciat]** who reckons our dictatorships and consulships rather in the rank of necessary offices than desirable employments, and thinks they must be endured rather as acquittances of our debt to our country than sought for the sake of emolument or glory—the man, in short, who can apply to himself the sentence which Cato tells us my ancestor Africanus loved to repeat, “that he was never so busy as when he did nothing, and never less solitary than when alone.”
…

And what power, what magistracy, what royalty, can be preferred to a wisdom which, looking down on all terrestrial objects as low and transitory things, incessantly directs its attention to eternal and immutable verities, and which is persuaded that **though others are called men, none are really so but those who are refined by the appropriate acts of humanity? [sit appellari ceteros homines, esse solos eos qui essent politi propriis humanitatis artibus]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DCaec.%3Asection%3D101

[101] I am not unaware, O judges, although I pass over many things bearing on this right, that still I have dwelt on it at greater length than the plan of your tribunal requires. But I did so, not because I thought that there was any need of urging this defence to you, **but in order that all men might understand that the rights of citizenship never had been taken away from any one, and could not be taken away.** As I wished those men, whom Sulla desired to injure, to know this, so I wished, also, all the other citizens, both new and old, to be acquainted with it. **For no reason can be produced why, if the rights of citizenship could be taken from any new[8] citizen, they cannot also be taken away from all the patricians, from all the very oldest citizens. [Neque enim ratio adferri potest cur, si cuiquam novo civi potuerit adimi civitas, non omnibus patriciis, omnibus antiquissimis civibus possit.]**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0020%3Atext%3DBalb.

13. But the whole of this topic of my speech, and the whole of this discussion, O judges, has reference to the common right of changing one's city; it has nothing in it which is peculiar to the religious observance of treaties. **For I am defending the universal principle, that there is no nation on the whole face of the earth,—whether at variance with the Roman people through some quarrel and hatred, or, on the other hand, united with us by the closest loyalty and mutual good-will,—as to which we are forbidden to adopt any one of its citizens as our own, or to present any one of them with the freedom of our city. [defendo enim rem universam, nullam esse gentem ex omni regione terrarum, neque tam dissidentem a populo Romano odio quodam atque discidio, neque tam fide benivolentiaque coniunctam, ex qua nobis interdictum sit ne quem adsciscere civem aut civitate donare possimus.]**

> http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/002053.html
>
> So long as the Vatican II document *Nostra Aetate* (which calls Muslims “fellow adorers of the one God”) remains authoritative, any **papal criticism of Islam** will only be an unprincipled exception, meaning a non-liberal *attitude* that is not backed up by a non-liberal *principle,* and therefore is inevitably rolled over by *liberal* principle. Thus Cardinal Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict, said in 2004 that Turkey’s admission into the EU would be a grave error, because Europe is Christian and Turkey is not. **But that was just a vestigial, non-liberal *attitude* to which Ratzinger was giving voice. The only**

> **authoritative *principle* for him was that Muslims believe in the same God as Catholics, which inevitably led him to reverse himself and support the admission of Turkey into the EU.**

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/351/mode/2up?view=theater

Cicero, when defining the Optimates (or champions of property and the existing dispensation), boldly extended the term from the senatorial order to cover every class in society, not shutting out freedmen.1

> 1. Pro Sestio 97: '**quis ergo iste optimus quisque? nurnero, si quaeris, innumerabiles, neque enim aliter stare possemus;** sunt principes consili publici, sunt qui eorum sectam sequuntur, sunt maximorum ordinum homines, quibus patet curia, sunt municipales rusticique Romani, sunt negoti gerentes, **sunt etiam libertini optimates.** numerus, ut dixi, huius generis late et varie diffusus est; sed genus universum, ut tollatur error, brevi circumscribi et definiri potest. **omnes optimates sunt qui neque nocerites sunt nee natura improbi nee furiosi nee malis domesticis impediti.**'

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0022%3Atext%3DF%3Abook%3D3%3Aletter%3D7

Pausanias also told me that you said, "What an Appius went to meet a Lentulus, a Lentulus an Appius, and a Cicero refuse to meet an Appius?" Heavens! do even you—a man, in my opinion, of supreme good sense, of great learning, of the widest knowledge of affairs, and I may add a man of politeness (which the Stoics are quite right in counting among the virtues)—**do you, I say, suppose that any Appiusism or Lentulusism has more influence with me than the distinctions bestowed by virtue?** Before I had earned what are held by mankind to be the most splendid honours, I yet was never dazzled by those high-sounding names of yours: it was the men who had bequeathed them to you that I regarded as great. **But when I had so obtained and so administered the highest offices of state, as to make me think that there was nothing left for me to acquire in furtherance of my honour or glory, I hoped that I had become, never indeed the superior, but at least the equal of you nobles. [parem vobis]** Nor, by Hercules, did I perceive that Pompey, whom I put above anybody who has ever lived, nor P. Lentulus, whom I put above myself, take any other view. **If you think otherwise, you will not go wrong if, in order to understand what high birth and nobility are, [ut, quid sit *eugeneia*, quid sit nobilitas, intellegas] you would study somewhat more carefully what Athenodorus, son of Sandon,**1 **says on this subject.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Athenodorus
>
> 1. ATHENODORUS CANANITES (*c.* 74 B.C.-A.D. 7), so called from his birthplace Canana near Tarsus (not Cana in Cilicia nor Canna in Lycaonia), was the son of one Sandon, **whose name indicates Tarsian descent, not Jewish as many have held.**

http://chartes.it/images/attachment/Obbink-Vander%20Waerdt.pdf

Cicero (*Leg*. 1) undertakes to include all mature human beings in the provenance of natural law, **adapting a series of orthodox early Stoic arguments to support the unorthodox position that all human beings are capable of living according to the *koinos nomos*.**25 **He has revised (as argued elsewhere) the early Stoic theory of natural law to accord with the interpretation of the unity of doctrine of the *veteres* advocated by Antiochus, whom Cicero clearly identifies as the principal source for his thinking in *Leg*. 1.26.** More specifically, Cicero's revision renders natural law a standard of conduct attainable by all human beings, not just by sages; it is now the prescription not strictly of the sage's right reason but of the human rationality that all share.27

> 27. Although Cicero adheres to early Stoic formulae in his definitions of natural law in *De legibus*, identifying it with the sage's right reason (*e.g.* 1.18f: *ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula*; *cf*. 2.8; *Rep*. 3.33), he then argues (1.29f) that there is no difference in kind between human beings, **thus collapsing the distinction between the sage's rational disposition and that of everyone else on which the early Stoic position so crucially relies.**

These and related modifications radically change the orientation of the theory of natural law: **whereas *koinos nomos*, as conceived by the early Stoics, presupposes an unbridgeable gulf between man's natural community, the *megalopolis* to which only sages and gods belong, and all existing communities** (see 385 *infra*), the revised theory becomes a practical political doctrine of great philosophical resources that provides detailed guidance in the form of moral rules to enable all human beings to live in accordance with natural law.
…

Thus it appears that Diogenes and Panaetius were the two Stoics who provided an antecedent for Cicero's own project of developing a Stoic political teaching comparable to Plato's. It is

noteworthy that Cicero, whose knowledge of previous political philosophy was extensive, is aware of no Stoic writings concerned with practical political questions before Diogenes. Clearly Cicero has drawn heavily upon Platonic and Peripatetic traditions in *De republica* and *De legibus,* and parallels suggest that he may be drawing upon Diogenes in this respect.

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07/anf07.iii.ii.v.viii.html

And this, indeed, Cicero saw; for, discoursing on the subject of the laws,[982] he says: “As the world, with all its parts agreeing with one another, coheres and depends upon one and the same nature, so all men, being naturally confused among themselves, disagree through depravity; nor do they understand that they are related by blood, and that they are all subject to one and the same guardianship: for if this were kept in mind, assuredly men would live the life of gods.”

https://archive.org/details/treatisescicero00ciceuoft/page/484/mode/2up?view=theater

As one and the same universal nature unites and corroborates all the parts of the world, so did she unite into one harmonious family all mankind. But men through their depravity disagreed and quarrelled, not recollecting that they are all consanguineous and akin, and equally subject to the same paternal providence. **If this fact, indeed, were but kept in mind, all men might live the amiable life of the gods.**

“***Wenn Tugend und Gerechtigkeit den Großen Pfad mit Ruhm bestreu’n, dann ist die Erd’ ein Himmelreich, und Sterbliche den Göttern gleich.***”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the late summer of 45 BCE, seven months before he would stab Caesar on the steps of the senate house, Brutus paid Cicero visit at his Tusculan villa.99 It was probably on this occasion that Cicero presented Brutus with the text of *On Moral Ends* (*De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*), **Cicero’s final attempt to demonstrate the relevance and importance of Greek philosophy to a Roman audience.**
…

Cicero’s version of himself in the dialogue attempts to minimize the revolutionary character of much of Stoic ethics, suggesting that the Stoics simply gave new names to ideas they inherited from earlier philosophical schools: “Zeno, the prince (*princeps*) of the Stoics, was less an inventor of new ideas than of new words.”103 The rest of the third book of the treatise is devoted to Cato’s defense of the importance of Stoic ethics, and he begins with the clearest and fullest surviving explication of Stoic *oikeiôsis*.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

XIX. But they think it is very important with reference to this subject, **that it should be understood that it is the work of nature, that children are beloved by their parents; and that this is the first principle from which we may trace the whole progress of the common society of the human race.**
…

And from this it arises that there is such a recommendation by nature of one man to another, that one man ought never to appear unfriendly to another, for the simple reason that he is a man.
…

And therefore we are by nature adapted for companionship, for taking counsel together, for forming states. **But they think that this world is regulated by the wisdom of the gods, and that it is, as it were, a common city and state of men and gods, and that every individual of us is a part of the world. [mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem]** From which that appears to follow by nature, that we should prefer the general advantage to our own. For as the laws prefer the general safety to that of individuals, so a good and wise man, and one who obeys the laws and who is not ignorant of his duty as a citizen, consults the general advantage rather than that of any particular individual, or even than his own. **Nor is a betrayer of his country more to be blamed, than one who deserts the general advantage or the general safety on account of his own private advantage or safety.**
…

> But as, although a theatre is publicly open, still it may be fairly said that the place which each individual has occupied belongs to him; **so in a city, or in the world, which is likewise common to all, there is no principle of right which hinders each individual from having his own private property.**
> …
>
> But what a grand and magnificent and consistent character is that of the wise man which is drawn by them! For he, after reason has taught him that that which is honourable is alone good, must inevitably be always happy, and must have a genuine right to those names which are often ridiculed by the ignorant. For he will be more properly called king than Tarquin, who was able to govern neither himself nor his family; **he will deserve to be called the master of the people more than Sylla, who was only the master of three pestiferous vices, luxury, avarice, and cruelty; he will be called rich more properly than Crassus, who would never have desired to cross the Euphrates without any legitimate cause for war, if he had not been in want of something. Everything will be properly said to belong to that man, who alone knows how to make use of everything. [recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus]** He will also rightly be called beautiful, for the features of the mind are more beautiful than those of the body: he will deservedly be called the only free man, who is neither subject to the domination of any one, nor subservient to his own passions. He will fairly be called invincible, on whose mind, even though his body be bound with chains, no fetters can ever be imposed.

Cato begins with a fairly orthodox Stoic version of *oikeiôsis*. Much of this is by now familiar from the foregoing analysis of Hellenistic Stoic ethics, but I offer a brief sketch in order to highlight the peculiarly Roman aspect of Cato's account. Cato begins with the familiar claim that an animal born with an innate awareness of itself (*sensus sui*) which leads it to value self-preservation.104 Nature also creates in parents affection for their young and dictates that this bond between parent and child is the origin of all forms of human association.105 Out of this natural affection for our offspring arises "that communal natural affection of human beings for human beings, with the result that it is fitting that a human being never be perceived as alien to another human being given the fact that she is a human being."106

> 106. *De Fin.* 363: *ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis **hominum** inter **homines** naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat **hominem** ab **homine** ob id quod **homo** sit non alienum videri*. My translation of this passage is somewhat awkward but is intended to emphasize the frequency with which Cicero uses the term *homo* and its cognates. Most translators streamline Cicero's repetitiveness at the expense of the meaning of the passage. We see a similar repetitiveness in Terence *Heaut.* 25: *Homo sum, **humani** nil a me alienum puto.*

Cato moves quickly from this "communal natural affection" to the natural sociability of humans which impels us to live in "unions, societies, and states"; our innate desire to form communities, Cato continues, is a result of the fact that the universe itself is like a "communal city and state of human beings and gods, of which each and every one of us is a part."107

This is a fairly straightforward and familiar account of Stoic *oikeiôsis*: reason develops as the rational animal matures; **the mature rational animal understands that association with other rational animals is beneficial to itself (an extension of the innate desire to protect the self); finally, the rational animal comes to see all other rational animals as kin.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA234#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **The Stoics considered human development to be so significant that they expected an adult to look down on "all the things for which he originally felt affection."** The difference between the two stages even demands two separate ethical terms, *kathekonta*, describing the first appropriate acts in childhood, and *katorthomata*, referring to consciously chosen and rightly performed acts in adulthood.19 According to Stoic ethics, primary objects are not sought for their own sake but are merely the object of an inborn impulse. Rightly performed acts, by contrast, involve choice and imply a self-aware following of nature. **Despite these differences the two stages of life are assumed to be meaningfully connected.** In a sense there is a persistent orientation throughout life toward one's natural constitution while that constitution matures to a more rational form and enables one to choose the good for its own sake.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Initially, we value the utility of practical reason solely as means to obtaining natural goods. But 'it often happens,' **Cicero's Cato tells us, 'that when one is introduced to someone, one comes to value that person more highly than one does the person who made the introduction.'**35 According to the Stoic story, the natural maturation of reason leads to individuals first discovering that they don't *just* value practical reasoning as a means (so that they prefer to achieve their ends through the use of reason, as opposed to by any other means), and later to an understanding **that not only is the exercise of practical reason to be valued for its own sake, we prefer its exercise to the possession of the goods it helps to secure** – or, as Annas puts it, that the reasons why we act on a matter are more important than the consequences of acting

on those reasons.36 The culmination of the process of personal *oikeiosis* is the fully rational human being's knowledge that, properly understood, the exercise of practical reason is the *only* good, and coincides perfectly with both virtue and the life according to nature – all of which are different ways of describing the same thing. It is important to recognise, though, that when one is acting rationally, one is still acting to obtain the kinds of things we might have been seeking to obtain before – self-preservation, health, security, wealth, and so on. **It's just that we now think of these ends as being preferred indifferents,** to use the Stoics' distinctive technical term, rather than as strictly goods, a term that is now restricted to virtue – to rational activity itself.

The story about how we come to have concern for other human beings by a parallel process of natural rational development is the story of what Annas calls social *oikeiosis*. If the primal instinct that gets things going in the earlier narrative is the infant's concern for its own self-preservation, social *oikeiosis* is similarly grounded (psychologically, at least) in the concern that a parent has for its own offspring. Plutarch thought this was ludicrous, and ridiculed Chrysippus for the suggestion that we have concern for our offspring as soon as we ourselves are born,37 but, as Annas remarks, 'there is no problem if we take the point to be that at birth we have primitive forms of the instincts for both self-concern and for other-concern,' even if the latter is one that 'will not come into play until we have offspring.' If and when it does, 'it is a form of primitive instinct, not something learned.'38 **The Stoics' thought is that care for our own offspring is instinctual, but that the same instinct can lead us to care for the well-being of others who are close to us, too.** As with the story about personal *oikeiosis*, concerns for self-interest in the form of mutual advantage can play a role in the initial fostering of such a concern, but the relationship that comes into being, if it develops properly – naturally, rationally – isn't then one that is wholly reducible to that mutual advantage. **The Stoics' contention is that once this process begins, there is no rational place for it to stop,** so that the human being with the most fully developed rationality – in other words, the Stoics' celebrated sage – will be someone who is able to treat everyone's concerns as having equal weight in his or her deliberations just because of their human identity.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/294/mode/2up?view=theater

Pope next makes clear, **in sumptuous metaphors drawn from the cosmopolitanism of the Stoic tradition,** that this expanding sphere of self-love is what we mean by virtue itself:

> *Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,*
> *As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake;*
> *The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds,*
> *Another still, and still another spreads;*
> ***Friend, parent, neighbor, first it will embrace,***
> ***His country next, and next all the human race.***99

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

We often hear of his antipathy toward slavery, a product of his latitudinarian, Whig (liberal) background, so we assume that he would be untainted by racism. Indeed, racism would seem to be quashed by the evolutionary spread of sympathy. In Darwin's own inspiring words:

> **[A]s man gradually advanced in intellectual power and was enabled to trace the more remote consequences of his actions; as he acquired sufficient knowledge to reject baneful customs and superstitions; as he regarded more and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men; as from habit, following on beneficial experience, instruction, and example, his sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, so as to extend to the men of all races, to the imbecile, the maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals, so would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher.**12

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_London#Race

Those who defend London against charges of racism cite the letter he wrote to the *Japanese-American Commercial Weekly* in 1913:

> In reply to yours of August 16, 1913. First of all, I should say by stopping the stupid newspaper from always fomenting race prejudice. This of course, being impossible, I would say, next, by educating the people of Japan so that they will be too intelligently tolerant to respond to any call to race prejudice. And, finally, by realizing, in industry and government, of socialism—which last word is merely a word that stands for the actual application of in the affairs of men of the theory of the Brotherhood of Man. **In the meantime the nations and races are only unruly boys who have not yet grown to the stature of men. So we must expect them to do unruly and boisterous things at times. And, just as boys grow up, so the races of mankind will grow up and laugh when they look back upon their childish quarrels.**[84]

https://archive.org/details/scientificorigin0000gasm/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

But, in reality, **internationalism for most members of the German Monist League, was no more than a ritualistic slogan which in no way expressed their true sentiments. Internationalism, for them, was only a residual legacy of the liberalism from which modern science and evolutionary Darwinism had emerged in the nineteenth century.** In actual fact, the German Monists were radically and, at times, irrationally nationalistic, despite an occasional obeisance to cosmopolitan ideals.59

Thus, in an article appearing in the journal of the Monist League, *Das monistische Jahrhundert*, for example, **it was argued that modern civilization had intruded between man and his natural feelings of patriotism and love of country.** The author, Ewalt Fincke, a member of the Monist League in Jena, warned that a dangerous tendency was developing in Germany whereby people seemed to be suppressing the natural feelings which they harbored for their own country.60 He argued that the sense of patriotism which arose naturally from prolonged contact with the natural environment of the nation stood in sharp contrast with the artificially induced attitude of internationalism or cosmopolitanism.
...

This same Monist further cautioned that international relations were a product of civilization and not of nature, and were therefore cold and false.62 Thus, to maintain any cosmopolitan or international attitude was to go completely against nature and hence against the logic of existence**. 'Only he who neglects the wiser influences of nature which the homeland exerts upon him and attains thereby a kind of impotent thought which derives from civilization, only he will fathom the ultimate magic, how to unlearn patriotism and maintain internationalism.'**63

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/39563/39563-h/39563-h.htm#page48

The basic idea of the *Internationale* has already been referred to. **It accepted as a working-creed the biblical doctrine that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men," but it disregarded the further declaration in the same verse of the Scriptures that He "hath determined the bounds of their habitation."** The Socialist creed teaches the brotherhood of man and the equality of all men irrespective of race, color or belief. The inescapable corollary of this creed is that patriotism, understood as unreasoning devotion to the real or supposed interests of the state, cannot be encouraged or even suffered. **And this standpoint necessarily involves further the eventual obliteration of the state itself, for any state's chief reason for existence in a non-altruistic world is the securing of special privileges, benefits, advantages and protection for its own citizens, without consideration for the inhabitants of other states. If this exercise of its power be prohibited, the state's reason for existence is greatly diminished. Indeed, it can have virtually only a social mission left,** and a social mission pure and simple cannot inspire a high degree of patriotism.

Many non-Socialist thinkers have perceived the antithesis between the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man and the particularism of national patriotism. **Björnstjerne Björnson wrote: "Patriotism is a stage of transition." This doctrine may come as a shock to the average reader, yet it is undoubtedly a prophetic and accurate statement of what will some day be generally accepted. Thoughtfully considered, the idea will be found less shocking than it at first appears.** Neither Björnson nor any other non-Socialist contemplates the abandonment of patriotism and state lines except by natural development. The world, in other words, is in a transitional stage, and when this transition shall have been completed it will find a world where the egoism of national patriotism has made way for the altruism of internationalism. And this will have been accomplished without violent revolutionary changes, but merely by a natural and peaceful evolutionary development.

Against such a development, if it come in the manner described and anticipated, nobody can properly protest. But the Socialists of the international school—and this is what makes international Socialism a menace to all governments and gradually but surely undermined the German state—will not wait upon the slow processes of transition.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA82#v=onepage&q&f=false

At this point, what Martha Nussbaum might call "extreme Stoic cosmopolitanism" would dictate that the individual reject all forms of local affiliation as "unreal" claims upon loyalty and affection. The true cosmopolitan is a "citizen of the cosmos," whose care for all human beings is equal, regardless of ethnic, cultural, or familial ties. However, the striking feature of Cato's cosmopolitanism is its insistence on the importance of local ties. Indeed, we see in Cato's formulation of Stoic thought on this point a seed of Appiah's "rooted cosmopolitanism."108 For Cato's Stoic sage, the natural affinity for all of humanity provides the basis of local and specific political allegiance. The sage cares for others more than he cares for himself

because he understands that the good of the part is the same as the good of the whole: “we naturally prefer the common advantage to our own.”109 This is a claim which, as we have seen, often appears in the abstract; for Cato, however, consciousness of one’s affinity to the group draws the attention of the individual to the series of local relationships in which she is enmeshed. The emphasis here is ethical and political: **while Zeno would have the sage abolish the law courts, for Cato, “the good and wise man obeys the laws and is not ignorant of his duty to the State.”**110 From this it follows that it is the duty of the wise man to die for his own country: “that man is to be praised who encounters death for the sake of the republic, since it is seemly that our fatherland be dearer to us than ourselves.”111

For Cato, ties of kinship likewise claim the natural loyalty and affection of the individual. **Whereas the early Stoa taught that the wise alone are kin to one another and all others are strangers, Cato’s Stoic sage cares for posterity; he expresses this concern in the making of testaments (*De Fin.* 3.65) so that his own *private* property might pass on to his *own* descendants.** In short, Cato says:

> We see that a human being has the innate desire to protect and preserve human beings; it follows from this that the wise man, by his very nature, desires to engage and to participate in the [government] of the *res publica*. And so that he might live according to nature, the wise man takes a wife and desires children from her.112

https://academic.shu.edu/russianhistory/index.php/Stalin_on_Rapid_Industrialization

> In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have one. **But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence.**

http://www.cyberussr.com/rus/chernov/chernov-mirovaya-e.html

> **The bourgeoisie preaches the principle that money does not have a homeland, and that, wherever one can "make money," wherever one may "have a profitable business", there is his homeland. Here is the villainy that bourgeois cosmopolitanism is called on to conceal, to disguise, "to ennoble" the antipatriotic ideology of the rootless bourgeois-businessman, the huckster and the traveling salesman.**
>
> Harmful cosmopolitan ideology serves for the bourgeoisie and its agents as a very convenient ideological tool for excusing and covering up all kinds of antipatriotic actions, national treason and political double-dealing. **Marx showed that "bourgeois patriotism... degenerated into a complete sham after its financial, commercial, and industrial activity acquired a cosmopolitanist character"** (Marx-Engels Archive, Vol. III (VIII), p. 355).
> …
>
> National sovereignty, the struggle of oppressed nations for their liberation, the patriotic feelings of freedom-loving peoples and above all the mighty patriotism of the Soviet people – these still serve as a serious obstacle for predatory imperialistic aspirations, they prevent the imperialists' accomplishing their plans of establishing world-wide domination. Seeking to crush the peoples' will for resistance, **the imperialist bourgeoisie and their agents in the camp of Right-wing socialists preach that national sovereignty purportedly became obsolete and a thing past its time, they proclaim the fiction of the very notion of nation and state independence.**
> …
>
> **From the imperialist circles of the USA today issues propaganda of "world citizenship" and "universal government."**
> …
>
> With the aid of cosmopolitan propaganda, the bourgeoisie of Western countries and their agents in the persons of Blum, Bevin, and Schumacher and their like **aspire to excuse their national treason, and to prepare ideologically the total surrender of these countries before American imperialism.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/2*.html#ref14

It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced a natural conformity both of language and of habit; **she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. [se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate] She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas,[14] man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, [sed patriae, sed suis] claims that leave but a small part of him for himself.** 46 Nature has also engendered in mankind the desire of

contemplating truth. This is most clearly manifested in our hours of leisure; when our minds are at ease we are eager to acquire knowledge even of the movements of the heavenly bodies.
…

Battle rages between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. One school declares that nothing is good but Moral Worth, the other that, while it assigns the greatest, and by far the greatest, value to Morality, yet still some bodily and external things are good. **Here is an honourable quarrel, fought out in high debate! For the whole dispute turns on the true worth of virtue. But when one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epicurus is always harping upon them!**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis

Cicero himself was pre-eminently a lover of philosophical thought, study, and discussion, and probably was more intimately conversant with the history of opinions and the contents of books in that department than any man of his time; yet he seems to have lacked profound convictions on the subjects at issue among the several schools. Thus in the *De Officiis*, while he repeatedly professes his adherence to the New Academy and the Peripatetic doctrine of morals, he bases his discussion on the Stoic theory, **and intimates very clearly that he thought his son safer under the rigid discipline of the Stoic school than under the more lax though wise tuition of his Peripatetic preceptor.** It is as if a Mohammedan, while recognizing the divine mission of the Arab prophet, were to write for his son a treatise on the ethics of the New Testament as better adapted than the moral system of the Koran for the training and confirming of a young man in the practice of virtue.

> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/a_pdfs/gncf.pdf
>
> **Presbyterian seminaries in that era indulged in a form of academic initiation, a suicidal practice that led irrevocably to the capture of all of them by the liberals: they sent their young candidates for their faculties to Germany to swim in the cesspool of theological liberalism for a year or two.** About all the guidance the young men received before departing was a warning: "When you inhale, be sure to keep your mouth above water." Can you imagine Martin Luther insisting that every Lutheran scholar spend a year studying theology at the Vatican? **But even this does not do justice to the degree of absurdity. Can you imagine Luther recommending that they study in Istanbul?**8
> …
>
> The denomination recognized higher academic degrees as the main criteria for permanent positions, **and the humanist world that granted such degrees was hostile to the orthodox faith.** Thus, the lure of Harvard, Princeton (University), Yale, and the German theological swamps was too great, just as it has been too great for Christian colleges in the twentieth century. **Academic prestige had been the golden calf for Presbyterians for three centuries, but the worship of this idol became an all-consuming lust after the secularization of higher education in America.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#influence

Panaetius hovers in the background of one of the most influential books in moral philosophy up through the late 19th century: Cicero's *On Duties* or *De Officiis*. In one of his letters to his friend Atticus (XVI. 11.4) Cicero says that he based the first two books of his work on Panaetius' treatise of the same name.

https://archive.org/details/letterstoatticuswins03ciceuoft/page/408/mode/2up?view=theater

The *De Officiis*, so far as Panaetius is concerned, I have finished in two books. He has three: but, though at the beginning he makes a three-fold division of cases in which duty has to be determined, one when the question is between right or wrong, another when it is between expediency and inexpediency, and the third, how we are to decide when it is a conflict between duty and expediency—for example, in Regulus' case to return would be right, to stay expedient—he treated of the first two brilliantly; the third he promises to add, but never wrote it. **Posidonius took up that topic: but I have ordered his book and written to Athenodorus Calvus to send me an analysis of it, and that I am expecting. I wish you would spur him on and beg him to let me have it as soon as possible.** In it duties under given circumstances are handled.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0051%3Asection%3Dintro
>
> Scepticism declared the attainment of absolute knowledge impossible. But there is the easily obtainable golden mean of the probable; and that appealed to the practical Roman. It appealed especially to Cicero; and the same indecision that had been his bane in political life naturally led him first to scepticism, then to eclecticism, where his choice is dictated by his bias for the practical and his

scepticism itself disappears from view. And while Antiochus, the eclectic Academician of Athens, and Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic of Rhodes, seem to have had the strongest influence upon him, he draws at his own discretion from the founts of Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academicians alike; he has only contempt for the Epicureans, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. **But the more he studied and lived, the more of a Stoic in ethics he became.**
…

He translates and paraphrases Greek philosophy, weaving in illustrations from Roman history and suggestions of Roman mould in a form intended to make it, if not popular, at least comprehensible, to the Roman mind. How well he succeeded is evidenced by the comparative receptivity of Roman soil prepared by Stoic doctrine for the teachings of Christianity. Indeed, Anthony Trollope labels our author the "Pagan Christian." "You would fancy sometimes," says Petrarch, "it is not a Pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle who is speaking." **No less an authority than Frederick the Great has called our book "the best work on morals that has been or can be written."**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Officiis

Michael Grant tells us that **"Cicero himself seems to have regarded this treatise as his spiritual testament and masterpiece."**[7]
…

Although not a Christian work, St. Ambrose in 390 declared it legitimate for the Church to use **(along with everything else Cicero, and the equally popular Roman philosopher Seneca, had written).**
…

Illustrating its importance, some 700 handwritten copies remain extant in libraries around the world dating back to before the invention of the printing press. Only the Latin grammarian Priscian is better attested to with such handwritten copies, with some 900 remaining extant. **Following the invention of the printing press, *De Officiis* was the third book to be printed**—third only to the Gutenberg Bible and Donatus's "Ars Minor", which was the first printed book.[13]
…

Sir Thomas Elyot, in his popular *Governour* (1531), lists three essential texts for bringing up young gentlemen:
Plato's works, Aristotle's *Ethics*, and *De Officiis*.[17]

In the 17th century it was a standard text at English schools (Westminster and Eton) and universities (Cambridge and Oxford). It was extensively discussed by Grotius and Pufendorf.[18] Hugo Grotius drew heavily on *De officiis* in his major work, *On the Law of War and Peace*.[14] It influenced Robert Sanderson and John Locke.[18]

In the 18th century, **Voltaire said of *De Officiis* "No one will ever write anything more wise".**[19] Frederick the Great thought so highly of the book that he asked the scholar Christian Garve to do a new translation of it, even though there had been already two German translations since 1756. Garve's project resulted in 880 additional pages of commentary.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D20

The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to another, **unless provoked by wrong;** and the next is to lead men to use common possessions for the common interests, private property for their own.

[21] **There is, however, no such thing as private[1] ownership established by nature, [Sunt autem privata nulla natura] but property becomes private either through long occupancy (as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory) or through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war) or by due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment.** On this principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those things which by nature had been common property became the property of individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that, he will be violating the laws of human society.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D22

[22] But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, **as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, [homines autem hominum causa esse generatos] that they may be able mutually to help one another;** in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D50

The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with reason or speech.

[51] This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with the understanding that, **while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common."**[59]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D89

In administering punishment it is above all necessary to allow no trace of anger. For if anyone proceeds in a passion to inflict punishment, he will never observe that **happy mean [mediocritatem]** which lies between excess and defect. **This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics—and wisely approved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But, in reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated;** and it is to be desired that they who administer the government should be like the laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D107

[107] **We must realize also that we are invested by**[1] **Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, [communis] arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety [honestum decorumque] are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty.** The other character is the one that is[2] assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences; some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. Diversities of character are greater still.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D35

[35] 10. But I am afraid someone may wonder why I am now separating the virtues—as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the same time wise; **for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all.** The explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our language entirely to popular thinking, is another. **And therefore I am speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the practice of Panaetius likewise.** But let us return to the subject.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D20

[20] That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; **and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating [splendidius] than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient.** But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D32

[32] As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite[1] simple: **we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill;—nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society.** And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, **so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D47

11. **Through a specious appearance of expediency[2] wrong is very often committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country in the destruction of Corinth.** A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient; for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. **But no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human nature, whose lead we ought to follow.**

[47] **They, too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and would exclude them from its borders, [Male etiam, qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant] as was done by Pennus in the time of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius.** It may not be right, of course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. **Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the laws of humanity. [Usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos, sane inhumanum est.]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D53

“But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told.”

[53] “Yea,” Antipater will say, “but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man.”

“I do not forget them,” the other will reply; “**but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? [ut nihil suum cuiusque sit?] If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away.**”

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0021%3Aspeech%3D11%3Asection%3D28

Did not Caius Cassius, a man endowed with equal greatness of mind and with equal wisdom, depart from Italy with the deliberate object of preventing Dolabella from obtaining possession of Syria? **By what law? By what right? By that which Jupiter himself has sanctioned, that every thing which was advantageous to the republic should be considered legal and just. [ut omnia, quae rei publicae salutaria essent, legitima et iusta haberentur] For law is nothing but a correct principle drawn from the inspiration of the gods, commanding what is honest, and forbidding the contrary.** Cassius, therefore, obeyed this law when he went into Syria; a province which belonged to another, **if men were to abide by the written laws; but which, when these were trampled under foot, was his by the law of nature. [si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, his vero oppressis suam lege naturae]**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=o-Y7AAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

On the whole Cicero favours the Academy, and particularly the Academy of his time. Its chief, Antiochus of Ascalon, was his teacher, and to this fact owes much of his influence and fame. Like him – and this was a special feature of the Academics – Cicero did not feel dogmatic about claims to certain knowledge. But he also resembled them in his Stoic adherence to virtue as the best practical guide to conduct. **So, in deliberately ‘eclectic’ fashion, he imported Stoic ethics almost unchanged into his philosophical system.**

This Stoic morality was soon to become the common background of most educated Romans. Cicero’s presentation of it, in his undogmatic fashion, was to attract and fascinate, in certain cases against their will, the early Christian thinkers. Throughout the subsequent ages, too, the influence of Cicero’s philosophical writings has been enormous. It is not that they are original. On the contrary, Cicero disarmingly admits this. **‘They are just copies,’ he says, ‘and so all the easier to write: I supply nothing but words, and of those I have plenty.’** But the words were put together with a unsurpassed attractiveness which has had an immense effect on the language of posterity.
…

A man should treat his fellow-men with kindliness because Man himself is worthy of respect – he has some inherent value in himself. **This was a logical deduction from the Stoic Brotherhood of Man, in which by the universal Law of Nature – under the guidance of Providence – human beings counted for something and deserved well of each other regardless of state, race or caste.** This preoccupation with the *human* is characteristic of the best thought of Greece and Rome alike.

Cicero was the interpreter of this Greek idea to the world. **His philosophical writings were the inspiration of the Italian Renaissance in its task of freeing western mankind, with the aid of Greek and Roman precedents, from the shackles of the Middle Ages. Cicero seemed to Renaissance scholars ‘the champion of free thought, free will and individualism’ – the very**

essences of their movement. This was partly because of his active life, on which much was spent in opposition to autocracy. But it was also very largely because of the enlightened spirit of his philosophical treatises. **From the eighteenth century, again, these had a further period of intense influence. This is reflected in the American Declaration of Independence and Declaration of Rights, and in the programme of the first French National Assembly.** Voltaire and the British philosophers, Locke and Hume, bear constant witness to their debt to Cicero: Hume declared that he had the *De Officiis* before him in all his thoughts.

Already in Cicero's lifetime, and soon afterwards, his philosophical writings enjoyed a wide reputation. They had been composed with the patriotic aim of making the contents of philosophy accessible and known to Romans in their own language. This aim was amply fulfilled. **For these treatises played a great part in the extension of Stoic morality. They helped it to become part of the moral and cultural stock-in-trade of most educated men.**

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/Introduction*.html

The task which Diodorus set himself was to write one of "the general histories" (αἱ κοιναὶ ἱστορίαι),[9] or "the general events" (αἱ κοιναὶ πράξεις)[10] (1.4.6; 5.1.4); in other words, to compose a Universal, or World, History from the Creation to his day. The adjective "general" or "common" is used so much by him that it may be possible to find in its connotation the clue to his motive in taking upon himself so great a task. **In the decade between 70 and 60 B.C. he had seen the entire Mediterranean shore brought under the control of Rome by Pompey**—Egypt was still independent only in name, for its kings held their throne at the will of the Roman Senate—the sea swept clean of pirates, Roman supremacy extended "to the bounds of the inhabited world" (1.4.3). If Diodorus had not witnessed the celebration of this incorporation of the Eastern world in the Roman state, he had certainly heard from others of the great triumph of Pompey in 61 B.C., in the course of which banners announced that he had subdued fourteen nations, brought back 20,000 talents to the treasury, and almost doubled the annual revenue of the state. **Under the dominion of Rome the Stoic idea of a *cosmopolis* was on the way to becoming an actuality. All mankind was coming to form a "common" civilization, a "common" society, and Diodorus could speak of a "common life" in the sense that the whole Mediterranean world was now interested in the same things and what benefited one nation was of common value to all. If the term "Western civilization" may properly include two cultures so different, for instance, as those of the United States and Spain, it is no exaggeration to say that by 60 B.C. Syrian, Greek, Iberian and Roman had become one.** The limitations of the old city state, whereby a man was a stranger in any city but the one of his origin, were gone for ever.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/1A*.html

1 **It is fitting that all men should ever accord great gratitude to those writers who have composed universal[2] histories, since they have aspired to help by their individual labours human society as a whole;** for by offering a schooling, which entails no danger, in what is advantageous they prove their readers, through such a presentation of events, with a most excellent kind of experience.
...

3 **Furthermore, it has been the aspiration of these writers to marshal all men, who, although united one to another by their kinship,[4]** are yet separated by space and time, into one and the same orderly body. And such historians have therein shown themselves to be, as it were, ministers of Divine Providence. **For just as Providence, having brought the orderly arrangement of the visible stars and the natures of men together into one common relationship,** continually directs their courses through all eternity, apportioning to each that which falls to it by the direction of fate, **so likewise the historians, in recording the common affairs of the inhabited world as though they were those of a single state,** have made of their treatises a single reckoning of past events and a common clearing-house of knowledge concerning them.
...

8 1 Concerning the first generation of the universe this is the account which we have received.[18] But the first men to be born, he says, led an undisciplined and bestial life, setting out one by one to secure their sustenance and taking for their food both the tenderest herbs and the fruits of wild trees. **Then,** 2 **since they were attacked by the wild beasts, they came to each other's aid, being instructed by expediency, and when gathered together in this way by reason of their fear, they gradually came to recognize their mutual characteristics.** 3 And though the sounds which they made were at first unintelligible and indistinct, yet gradually they came to give articulation to their speech, and by agreeing with one another upon symbols for each thing which presented itself to them, made known among themselves the significance which was to be attached to each term. 4 **But since groups of this kind arose over every part of the inhabited world, not all men had the same language, inasmuch as every group organized the elements of its speech by mere chance.** This is the explanation of the present existence of every conceivable kind of language, and, furthermore, out of these first groups to be formed came all the original nations of the world.

5 Now the first men, since none of the things useful for life had yet been discovered, led a wretched existence, having no clothing to cover them, knowing not the use of dwelling and fire, and also being totally ignorant of

cultivated food. 6 **For since they also even neglected the harvesting of the wild food, they laid by no store of its fruits against their needs;** consequently large numbers of them perished in the winters because of the cold and the lack of food. 7 **Little by little, however, experience taught them both to take to the caves in winter and to store such fruits as could be preserved.** 8 And when they had become acquainted with fire and other useful things, the arts also and whatever else is capable of furthering man's social life were gradually discovered. 9
Indeed, speaking generally, in all things it was necessity itself that became man's teacher, supplying in appropriate fashion instruction in every matter to a creature which was well endowed by nature and had, as its assistants for every purpose, hands and speech and sagacity of mind. 10 And as regards the first origin of men and their earliest manner of life we shall be satisfied with what has been said, since we would keep due proportion in our account.

> [18] G. Busolt, "Diodor's Verhältniss z. Stoicismus," *Jahrb. cl. Phil.* 139 (1889), 297 ff., **ascribes to Posidonius most of the Preface of Diodorus, but finds in this and the preceding chapter Epicurean influence. The fact is that Diodorus' philosophy, if he may be said to have had any, was highly eclectic.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Servile_War

The revolt started in 135 when Eunus, **a slave from Syria who claimed to be a prophet,** captured the city of Enna in the middle of the island with 400 fellow slaves. Soon after, Cleon, a Cilician slave, stormed the city of Agrigentum on the southern coast, slaughtered the population, then joined Eunus' army and became his military commander. **Eunus even proclaimed himself king, under the name of Antiochus, after the Seleucid emperors of his native Syria.**

http://attalus.org/translate/diodorus34.html

32 The Italians, who had large estates in Sicily, bought many slaves, every one of whom they branded with marks on their cheeks, and oppressed them with hard labour, and yet failed to give them sufficient subsistence.

33 **Not only in political life should the powerful behave humanely towards those who are of humble condition, but also in private life the right-minded should not be too harsh on their slaves.** For as in states arrogant behaviour leads to civil dissension amongst the citizens, so in each private home, such behaviour provokes the slaves against their masters, and gives rise to terrible disorders in the cities. **For when those in power act cruelly and wickedly, the character of their subjects is inflamed to reckless action.** Those whom fate has placed in a lowly position will gladly yield to their superiors in honour and glory, but if they are denied the kindness which they deserve, they revolt against the men who act like cruel despots. ...

40 The rebel slaves, venting their fury against the entire household of their masters, committed many terrible outrages. **This revenge was not a mark of their cruel disposition, but the outcome of the unfair treatment that they had experienced, which made them turn angrily to punishing those who had wronged them in the past. Nature itself teaches slaves to give a just response of gratitude or revenge.**

41 After Eunus was declared king, he put many *rich citizens* to death, and spared only those who had commended him for his prophecies at their feasts, to which his master {Antigenes} used to bring him as a jest; those likewise that had been so kind as to give him some of their food, he preserved; **so that the strange turn of fortune was truly astonishing, that a kindness shown to such a poor and humble person should result in a great favour, when it was most needed.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dlMr4UhqQlQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA178#v=onepage&q&f=false

Livy's belief that Rome had been fated by Fortuna, the Roman equivalent of Polybius' Tyche, to conquer the world and establish the pax Romana was a direct product of Stoicism. Like many Stoics, Livy believed in the gods but saw them as subordinate to "fate, by whose law the unchangeable order of human affairs is arranged," a universal force to which all beings must submit. He validated traditional Roman beliefs in omens, dreams, and augury by depicting them as ways in which the fated future could be foreseen to a limited extent. Livy's first ten books suggested that Rome had to undergo a protracted military and civic testing at the hands of Fortuna in order to become physically and morally capable of world rule. **In fact, Livy was more Stoic than Polybius, eschewing Polybius' occasional portrayals of Tyche as capricious and vindictive and offering instead a Fortuna that consistently rewarded virtue and punished vice.**

https://archive.org/details/latinitasandhel00smilgoog/page/n23/mode/2up?view=theater

About thirteen years after the death of Cicero and some twenty-five years after the publication of the *de Oratore,* Dionysius of Halicarnassus settled at Rome as a teacher of rhetoric. The treatises which he has left and his formal letters dealing with questions of literary criticism, afford much illumination for our discussion. **Indeed these writings show quite clearly that Dionysius' theory of style was in no**

way founded on Cicero's conception which made "copiose et ornate dicere" the "summum bonum," but had rather for its basis the Stoic view which made purity of diction (Latinitas or *ἑλληνισμός*) the one thing most to be desired in a speaker or writer.
…

(4) **The Stoic *κατά φύσιν* seems to be a watchword throughout all of Dionysius.**6

> 6. At only one point does Dionysius take direct issue with the Stoics in their harmony-with-nature doctrine. When this doctrine develops into an archaizing tendency and into a search for the "verba antiqua," he objects that the Stoic theory is at war with itself, in so far as the "verba antiqua" are obsolete and unintelligible. For himself, he holds fast to the other Stoic virtue, perspicuity. His position is made clear in the seventh section of the tenth chapter of the *Ars Rhetorica*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA100#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the case of these ancient imperial masters, it should be noted, they still attempted to legitimize their rule as falling within the bounds, and actualizing the highest potential, of nature. **Not for nothing did Augustus very deliberately promote the philosophical school of Stoicism** as encouraging the kind of civic character he claimed to embody in himself and to whose imitation he morally exhorted his fellow Romans in the ruling classes.9

> 9. Syme (1982) remains the classic analysis of Octavian propaganda.

https://www.tertullian.org/fathers/julian_apostate_letter_to_themistius.htm

But since I seem to have harked back to the life of contemplation and to be comparing it with the life of action, though in the beginning of your letter you declined to make the comparison, **I will remind you of those very philosophers whom you mentioned, Areius,[34] Nicolaus,[35] Thrasyllus,[36] and Musonius.[37] So far from any one of these governing his own city, Areius we are told refused the governorship of Egypt when it was offered to him,** and Thrasyllus by becoming intimate with the harsh and naturally cruel tyrant Tiberius would have incurred indelible disgrace for all time, had he not cleared himself in the writings that he left behind him and so shown his true character; **so little did his public career benefit him.** Nicolaus did not personally do any great deeds, and he is known rather by his writings about such deeds; while Musonius became famous because he bore his sufferings with courage, and, by Zeus, sustained with firmness the cruelty of tyrants; and perhaps he was not less happy than those who administered great kingdoms. As for Areius, when he declined the governorship of Egypt he deliberately deprived himself of the highest end, if he really thought that this was the most important thing.

http://www.attalus.org/translate/caesars.html

While Silenus, to whom the gods paid very little attention, was jesting thus, **Octavianus entered, changing colour continually, like a chameleon,** turning now pale now red; one moment his expression was gloomy, sombre, and overcast, the next he unbent and showed all the charms of Aphrodite and the Graces. Moreover in the glances of his eyes he was fain to resemble mighty Helios, for he preferred that none who approached should be able to meet his gaze.

"Good Heavens!" exclaimed Silenus, "what a changeable monster is this! What mischief will he do us?"

"Cease trifling," said Apollo, **"after I have handed him over to Zenon here, I shall transform him for you straightway to gold without alloy. Come, Zenon" he cried, "take charge of my nursling." Zenon obeyed, and thereupon, by reciting over Octavianus a few of his doctrines, in the fashion of those who mutter the incantations of Zamolxis, he made him wise and temperate.**

> https://www.livius.org/sources/content/zosimus/zosimus-new-history-1/zosimus-new-history-1.06/
>
> [1.6.2] **Octavian however appears to have ruled with great moderation, more particularly after he listened to the counsel of Athenodorus the stoic,** and when compared to Tiberius his successor.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3Ddedication

Apion, the grammarian, indeed—**he whom Tiberius Cæsar called the Trumpeter of the World,** but would rather seem to be the Bell of the Town-crier[35],—supposed that every one to whom he inscribed any work would thence acquire immortality.

> https://archive.org/details/Josephus02War13/Josephus%2001%20Life%2C%20Against%20Apion/page/302/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Born in the Egyptian oasis,*a* more Egyptian than them all, as one might say, he disowned his true country and falsely claimed to be an Alexandrian,** thereby admitting the ignominy of his race.

https://archive.org/details/Josephus02War13/Josephus%2001%20Life%2C%20Against%20Apion/page/346/mode/2up?view=theater

(12) "But" (urges Apion) we "have not produced any geniuses, for example, inventors in arts and crafts or eminent sages."*a* **He enumerates Socrates, Zeno, Cleanthes,*b* and others of that calibre;** and genius, then – most astounding master-stroke – adds his own name to the list, and felicitates Alexandria on possessing such a citizen!
…

Well, the custom of slaughtering domestic animals we share with the rest of mankind; and Apion, by criticizing those who practise it, betrays his Egyptian birth. No Greek or Macedonian would have been moved to indignation.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA198#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is significant that the founder of the one native school of philosophy that developed in Rome, Quintus Sextius, is described by Seneca (*Ep.* 64.2) as "a Stoic, deny it though he may" (*licet neget, Stoicus*). This blend of Roman and Stoic values Posidonius found in P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, the consul of 111 B.C. (*FGH* 87, fr. 112.8); Tacitus (*Ann.* 14.57) has Tigellinus identify the same blend in Rubellius Plautus, though with less sympathy: **"mimicry of the Romans of yore with the arrogance of the Stoics thrown in"** (*veterum Romanorum imitamenta, adsumpta etiam Stoicorum adrogantia*).

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n119/mode/2up?view=theater

The Greek conquest of Rome took the form of sending Greek religion and comedy to the Roman plebs; Greek morals, philosophy, and art to the upper classes. These Greek gifts conspired with wealth and empire in that sapping of Roman faith and character which was one part of Hellas' long revenge upon her conquerors. **The conquest reached its climax in Roman philosophy, from the stoic Epicureanism of Lucretius to the epicurean Stoicism of Seneca.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n331/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoic philosophy found **its most doubtful expression in the life, its most perfect expression in the writings,** of Lucius Annaeus Seneca.
…

It was in this atmosphere of leisurely terror that he wrote (63-65) his studies in natural science *(Quaestiones Naturales),* and the most lovable of his works, the *Epistulae Morales.* They were casual, intimate causeries addressed to his friend Lucilius—rich governor of Sicily, poet, philosopher, and frank Epicurean. **There are few books in Roman literature more pleasant than these urbane attempts to adapt Stoicism to the needs of a millionaire.** Here begins the informal essay, which would be the favorite medium of Plutarch and Lucian, Montaigne and Voltaire, Bacon and Addison and Steele. To read these letters is to be in correspondence with an enlightened, humane, and tolerant Roman who has reached the heights and known the depths of literature, statesmanship, and philosophy. **They are Zeno speaking with Epicurus' lenience and Plato's charm.**
…

He rejoices that he has time at last to read the good books he has had so long to put aside. **Apparently he now reread Epicurus, for he quotes him with a frequency and an enthusiasm scandalous in a Stoic.** He is frightened by the excesses of individualism and self-indulgence in Caligula, Nero, and thousands more; he wishes to offer some counterweight to the temptations that beset minds liberated before moral maturity; and he seems resolved to confute the epicureans out of the mouth of the master whose name they abused and whose doctrine they dared not understand.
…

He is too Stoic to be practical, and too lenient to be Stoic. He sees about him an immorality that exhausts the body and debases the soul, never satisfying either; avarice and luxury have destroyed peace and health, and power has made man only an abler brute. How shall one free himself from this ignominious agitation?

> **I read in Epicurus today: "If you would enjoy real freedom you must be the slave of philosophy." The man who submits to her is emancipated there and then. … The body, once cured, often ails again … but the mind, once healed, is healed for good and all.** I shall tell you what I mean by health: if the mind is content and confident; if it understands that those things for which all men pray, all the benefits that are sought or bestowed, are of no importance in relation to a life of happiness. … **I shall give you a rule by which to measure yourself and your development: in that day you will come into your own when you realize that the successful are of all men most miserable.**[40]

…

To the end of antiquity and through the Middle Ages he remained popular; and when the rebirth came **Petrarch placed him next to Virgil** and upon Seneca's prose devotedly modeled his own. Montaigne's brother-in-law translated him into French, and Montaigne quoted him as fondly as Seneca quoted Epicurus. Emerson read him again and again[59] and became an American Seneca. **There are few original ideas in him; but that may be forgiven, for in philosophy all truth is old, and only error is original.** With all his faults he was the greatest of Rome's philosophers and, at least in his books, one of the wisest and kindliest of men. **Next to Cicero he was the most lovable hypocrite in history.**

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/marechal/1799/atheists.htm

PLINY – The ancient, or the naturalist, born in Verona.

"The universe is an august temple, above which it is not permitted us to seek the divinity."

One could not in fewer words and more poetically explain Spinoza's system.

"Pliny communicates to his readers a certain liberty of spirit, a daringness in thought, that is the germ of philosophy." – Buffon.

n.b. Buffon didn't dare take the same liberties, fearing priestly censure.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D5

CHAP. 5. (7.)—OF GOD[1].

> 1. It is remarked by Enfield, Hist. of Phil. ii. 131, that **"with respect to philosophical opinions, Pliny did not rigidly adhere to any sect. ... He reprobates the Epicurean tenet of an infinity of worlds; favours the Pythagorean notion of the harmony of the spheres; speaks of the universe as God, after the manner of the Stoics, and sometimes seems to pass over into the field of the Sceptics. For the most part, however, he leans to the doctrine of Epicurus."**

I consider it, therefore, an indication of human weakness to inquire into the figure and form of God. **For whatever God be, if there be any other God[2], and wherever he exists, he is all sense, all sight, all hearing, all life, all mind[3], and all within himself.** To believe that there are a number of Gods, derived from the virtues and vices of man[4], as Chastity, Concord, Understanding, Hope, Honour, Clemency, and Fidelity; **or, according to the opinion of Democritus, that there are only two, Punishment and Reward[5],** indicates still greater folly.
...

To assist man is to be a God; this is the path to eternal glory. This is the path which the Roman nobles formerly pursued, and this is the path which is now pursued by the greatest ruler of our age, Vespasian Augustus, he who has come to the relief of an exhausted empire, as well as by his sons. This was the ancient mode of remunerating those who deserved it, to regard them as Gods[12]. **For the names of all the Gods, as well as of the stars that I have mentioned above[13], have been derived from their services to mankind.**

> https://archive.org/details/stoicphilosophy210murr/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> There were certain old Greek myths which told how Heracles and other heroes had passed laborious lives serving and helping humanity, and in the end became gods. The Stoics used such myths as allegories. That was the way to heaven; that was how a man may at the end of his life become not a dead body, but a star. **In the magnificent phrase which Pliny translates from a Greek Stoic, God is that, and nothing but that; man's true God is the helping of man; *Deus est mortali iuvare mortalem*.**

And with respect to Jupiter and Mercury, and the rest of the celestial nomenclature, who does not admit that they have reference to certain natural phænomena[14]? **But it is ridiculous to suppose, that the great head of all things, whatever it be, pays any regard to human affairs.[15] Can we believe, or rather can there be any doubt, that it is not polluted by such a disagreeable and complicated office?**
...

By these considerations the power of Nature is clearly proved, and is shown to be what we call God. It is not foreign to the subject to have digressed into these matters, familiar as they are to every one, from the continual discussions that take place respecting God[23].

> 23. **It is scarcely necessary to remark, that the opinions here stated respecting the Deity are taken partly from the tenets of the Epicureans, combined with the Stoical doctrine of Fate.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1

Our first attention is justly due to Man, **for whose sake all other things appear to have been produced by Nature;** though, on the other hand, with so great and so severe penalties for the enjoyment of her bounteous gifts, **that it is far from easy to determine, whether she has proved to him a kind parent, or a merciless step-mother.**

In the first place, she obliges him alone, of all animated beings, to clothe himself with the spoils of the others; while, to all the rest, she has given various kinds of coverings, such as shells, crusts, spines, hides, furs, bristles, hair, down, feathers, scales, and fleeces.[2] The very trunks of the trees even, she has protected against the effects of heat and cold by a bark, which is, in some cases, twofold.[3] Man alone, at the very moment of his birth cast naked upon the laked earth,[4] does she abandon to cries, to lamentations, and, a thing that is the case with no other animal whatever, to tears: this, too, from the very moment that he enters upon existence.[5] But as for laughter, why, by Hercules!—to laugh, if but for an instant only, has never been granted to man before the fortieth day[6] from his birth, and then it is looked upon as a miracle of precocity.
…

For this it is, that many have been of opinion, that it were better not to have been born, or if born, to have been annihilated[13] at the earliest possible moment.

To man alone, of all animated beings, has it been given, to grieve,[15] to him alone to be guilty of luxury and excess; and that in modes innumerable, and in every part of his body. **Man is the only being that is a prey to ambition, to avarice, to an immoderate desire of life,[16] to superstition,[17]—he is the only one that troubles himself about his burial, and even what is to become of him after death.[18]**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n339/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Pliny was not content with natural history; he wished also to be a philosopher; and throughout his pages he scatters comments on mankind. **The life of animals, he thinks, is preferable to man's, for "they never think about glory, money, ambition, or death";[86] they can learn without being taught and never have to dress; and they do not make war upon their own species.** The invention of money was fatal to human happiness; it made interest possible, by which some could live in idleness while others worked";[87] hence the rise of great estates owned by absentee landlords, and the ruinous replacement of tillage with pasturage. **Life, in Pliny's estimate, gives us much more grief and pain than happiness, and death is our supreme boon.[88] After death there is nothing.[89]**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n575/mode/2up?view=theater

Far more renowned than Strabo in his time was Dio Chrysostom—Dio of the Golden Mouth (A.D. 40-120). His family had long been distinguished in Prusa; **his grandfather had exhausted a fortune in gifts to the Bithynian city and then had made another; his father had gone through the same experience; and Dio followed in their steps.[77] He became an orator and a sophist, went to Rome, was converted to Stoicism by Musonius Rufus, and was banished from Italy and Bithynia by Domitian (82).** Forbidden the use of his property or income, he wandered for thirteen years from country to country as a penniless philosopher, refusing money for his discourses, and earning his bread for the most part by the work of his hands.
…

The barbarians on the Borysthenes (Dnieper) heard him as gladly as the Greeks gathered at Olympia, or the excitable Alexandrians; **an army about to revolt against Nerva was mollified into acceptance by the impromptu address of the half-naked exile.** Probably what drew people to him was not his fine Attic Greek, but the courage of his denunciations. **Almost alone in pagan antiquity he condemned prostitution; and few writers of his time so openly attacked the institution of slavery. (He was a bit vexed, however, when he found that his slaves had run away.)[80]** His address to the Alexandrians was a castigation of their luxury, superstition, and vice. **He chose Ilium as the scene of an oration in which he argued that Troy had never existed and that "Homer was the boldest liar in history."** In the heart of Rome he expounded the case of the countryside against the city, painted in vivid narrative a touching picture of rural poverty, and warned his audience that the land was being neglected and the agricultural basis of civilization was in decay.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA116#v=onepage&q&f=false

Dio attempted to negotiate between two very different models of the unity of the *oikoumenê*: **on the one hand, he was deeply committed to the Stoic idea of the absolute unity of all mankind and saw**

in the empire that the Romans created the earthly manifestation of the Stoic ideal.105 **On the other hand, however, Dio seems to have believed deeply in the collectivity of Hellas as a limited and self-sufficient community that would be much better off without the interference of Rome.**106

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/36*.html#ref42

"**Yet all these poets in precisely the same fashion call the first and greatest god Father of the whole rational family collectively, yes, and King besides.** 36 And trusting to these poets men erect altars to Zeus the King and, what is more, some do not hesitate even to call him Father in their prayers, believing that there exists some such government and organization of the universe as that. **Therefore, from that standpoint at least, it seems to me, they would not hesitate to apply the term 'home of Zeus'[43] to the entire universe—if indeed he is father of all who live in it—**yes, by Zeus, and his 'city' too, our Stoic similitude, to suggest the greater office of the god. 37 For kingship is a word more appropriate to a city than to a home. **For surely men would not apply the term King to him who is over all and then refuse to admit that the whole is governed by a king, nor would they admit that they are governed by a king and then deny that they are members of a state or that there is a kingly administration of the universe.** And again, conceding 'administration,' they would not balk at accepting 'city,' or something very like it, as descriptive of that which is administered.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/34*.html#ref28

21 For instance, to leave now the discord of Council and Assembly, of the Youth and the Elders,[28] there is a group of no small size which is, as it were, outside the constitution. **And some are accustomed to call them 'linen-workers,'[29] and at times the citizens are irritated by them and assert that they are a useless rabble and responsible for the tumult and disorder in Tarsus, while at other times they regard them as a part of the city and hold the opposite opinion of them.** Well, if you believe them to be detrimental to you and instigators of insurrection and confusion, you should expel them altogether and not admit them to your popular assemblies; but if on the other hand you regard them as being in some measure citizens, not only because they are resident in Tarsus, but also because in most instances they were born here and know no other city, **then surely it is not fitting to disfranchise them or to cut them off from association with you.**
…

23 **"Well then, what do *you* bid us do?" I bid you enroll them all as citizens—yes, I do—and just as deserving as yourselves, and not to reproach them or cast them off, but rather to regard them as members of your body politic, as in fact they are.** For it cannot be that by the mere payment of five hundred drachmas a man can come to love you and immediately be found worthy of citizenship;[30] and, at the same time, that a man who through poverty or through the decision of some keeper-of-the-rolls has failed to get the rating of a citizen—although not only he himself had been born in Tarsus, but also his father and his forefathers as well—is therefore incapable of affection for the city or of considering it to be his fatherland; **it cannot be that, if a man is a linen-worker, he is inferior to his neighbour and deserves to have his occupation cast in his teeth and to be reviled for it, whereas, if he is a dyer or a cobbler or a carpenter, it is unbecoming to make those occupations a reproach.**[31a]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/7*.html#ref41

Such men bring individuals together in union without love and intercourse without affection, and all for the sake of filthy lucre. They must not take hapless women or children, captured in war or else purchased with money, and expose them for shameful ends in dirty booths which are flaunted before the eyes in every part of the city, at the doors of the houses of magistrates and in market-places, near government buildings and temples, 134 in the midst of all that is holiest. **Neither barbarian women, I say, nor Greeks—of whom the latter were in former times almost free but now live in bondage utter and complete—shall they put in such shameful constraint, doing a much more evil and unclean business than breeders of horses and of asses carry on, not mating beasts with beasts where both are willing and feel no shame, but mating human beings that do feel shame and revulsion, with lecherous and dissolute men in an ineffectual and fruitless physical union that breeds destruction rather than life.**
…

138 **It is our duty, therefore, to give some heed to this and under no condition to bear this mistreatment of outcast and enslaved creatures with calmness and indifference, not only because all humanity has been held in honour and in equal honour by God, who begat it, having the same marks and tokens to show that it deserves honour, to wit, reason and the knowledge of evil and good,** but also because of the following consideration, which we must always

remember: that for flagrant wrong fostered by licence it is difficult to set a limit that it will no longer, through fear of the consequences, dare to transgress.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA124#v=onepage&q&f=false

Meanwhile, in contrast, **Dio Chrysostom occupied a more central place in Renaissance impressions of Stoicism than he does today,** because his writings treat moral philosophy and politics, and because his life fit Renaissance ideals of Stoic virtue. Here was a golden-mouthed orator, who opposed the tyranny of Domitian, charmed great men armed with nothing but his eloquence and Plato and Demosthenes in his pocket, and ultimately advised and shaped the good emperors Nerva and Trajan. **His discourses on distrust, tyranny, monarchy and glory were precisely what humanists wanted from a Stoic, and his life and career made him one, irrespective of his metaphysical beliefs.**

https://www.attalus.org/old/pliny8.html#24

Bear in mind that you have been sent to the province of Achaia, which is the real and genuine Greece, where the humanities, literature, and even the science of agriculture are believed to have been discovered; that your mission is to regulate the status of the free cities, or, in other words, that you will have to deal with **men who are really men and free, men who have preserved the rights, given to them by nature, [qui ius a natura datum ... tenuerunt] by their own virtues, merits, friendship, and by the ties of treaties and religious observance.**
...

Keep constantly before you the thought that this is the land which sent us our **constitutional rights, [iura]** and gave us our **laws, [leges]** not as a conqueror, but in answer to our request.*

> (*) *An allusion to the despatch of ambassadors from Rome to Greece, for the purpose of being instructed in the laws of Solon etc., in 454 B.C.*

https://archive.org/details/silveragegreekw02mahagoog/page/848/mode/2up?view=theater

But Plutarch was a man who abhorred extremes. He loved compromises. **In philosophy his adherence to the Academy was loose even for that very broad and undogmatic school. It would be hard to say whether the Stoic dogmas which he rejects exceed in number those which he quotes with approval.**
...

He will not adopt with Plato the equality of the sexes, or with the Stoics the injustice of slavery, or with the Pythagoreans the rights of the lower animals; yet he goes a long way with all three – magnifying the position and the dignity of the house-mother both by example and precept, inculcating everywhere kindness and consideration to slaves, adopting even vegetarian doctrines in some of his earlier treatises, and upholding with satire and with paradox the superior insight and intelligence of the animals we patronise or oppress.

https://archive.org/details/silveragegreekw02mahagoog/page/870/mode/2up?view=theater

[Plutarch] can tell us how the Jewish high-priest was clothed, but even on Jewish dogmas he manifests the grossest ignorance.1 **His collection of the *placita* of philosophers is superficial and jejune; his studies in comparative religion, though his theory asserted the equal dignity and veracity of all religions, are even more superficial and careless; he professed himself a cosmopolitan thinker; he was really a narrow and bigoted Hellene, as narrow and exclusive as the old opponents of Alexander had been in their day.** This ingrained bigotry was the real secret of the decay and downfall of Greece. While the Asiatic cities had learned at least something from contact with the East, Greece had remained behind, had become poor and depopulated, stagnant in thought as well as in active life. **There is no more signal instance of this stagnation than the sayings and counsels of Plutarch on politics and on religion.**

https://archive.org/details/silveragegreekw02mahagoog/page/878/mode/2up?view=theater

Whether Cynics, or Stoics, or Academicians, or, what was most frequent, Eclectics – all taught serious moral lessons and acknowledged virtues with no greater differences or contentions than, for example, the various sects of Protestants exhibit; disputing often, and sometimes angrily, on special points of doctrine, but still agreeing on the broad general lines, and all supported by serious men as knowing and teaching practical truths. **Plutarch himself derides the paradoxes of the Stoics, and, indeed, his compromising temper was constitutionally opposed to their trenchant attitude; but how many points does he not adopt from them?**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Theseus*.html#ref10

4 For verily that age produced men who, in work of hand and speed of foot and vigour of body, were extraordinary and indefatigable, but they applied their powers to nothing that was fitting or useful. Nay rather, they exulted in monstrous insolence, and reaped from their strength a harvest of cruelty and bitterness, mastering and forcing and destroying everything that came in their path. **And as for reverence and righteousness, justice and humanity, they thought that most men praised these qualities for lack of courage to do wrong and for fear of being wronged, and considered them no concern of men who were strong enough to get the upper hand.** 5 **Some of these creatures Heracles cut off and destroyed as he went about,** but some escaped his notice as he passed by, crouching down and shrinking back, and were overlooked in their abjectness. And when Heracles met with calamity and, after the slaying of Iphitus, removed into Lydia and for a long time did slave's service there in the house of Omphale, then Lydia indeed obtained great peace and security; **but in the regions of Hellas the old villainies burst forth and broke out anew, there being none to rebuke and none to restrain them.**

6 The journey was therefore a perilous one for travellers by land from Peloponnesus to Athens, and Pittheus, by describing each of the miscreants at length, what sort of a monster he was, and what deeds he wrought upon strangers, **tried to persuade Theseus to make his journey by sea. But he, as it would seem, had long since been secretly fired by the glorious valour of Heracles,** and made the greatest account of that hero, and was a most eager listener to those who told what manner of man he was, and above all to those who had seen him and been present at some deed or speech of his. 7 **And it is altogether plain that he then experienced what Themistocles many generations afterwards experienced, when he said that he could not sleep for the trophy of Miltiades.[11] In like manner Theseus admired the valour of Heracles, until by night his dreams were of the hero's achievements, and by day his ardour led him along and spurred him on in his purpose to achieve the like.**

7 1 And besides, they were kinsmen, being sons of cousins-german. For Aethra was daughter of Pittheus, as Alcmene[a] was of Lysidice, and Lysidice and Pittheus were brother and sister, children of Hippodameia and Pelops. 2 Accordingly, he thought it a dreadful and unendurable thing that his famous cousin should go out against the wicked everywhere and purge land and sea of them, while he himself ran away from the struggles which lay in his path, disgracing his reputed father[12] by journeying like a fugitive over the sea, and bringing to his real father as proofs of his birth only sandals and a sword unstained with blood, instead of at once offering noble deeds and achievements as the manifest mark of his noble birth. **In such a spirit and with such thoughts he set out, determined to do no man any wrong, but to punish those who offered him violence.**
...

11 1 In Eleusis, moreover, he out-wrestled Cercyon the Arcadian and killed him; and going on a little farther, at Erineüs, he killed Damastes, surnamed Procrustes, by compelling him to make his own body fit his bed, as he had been wont to do with those of strangers. **And he did this in imitation of Heracles. For that hero punished those who offered him violence in the manner in which they had plotted to serve him, and therefore sacrificed Busiris, wrestled Antaeus to death, slew Cycnus in single combat, and killed Termerus by dashing in his skull.**
...

And verily it seems to be a grievous thing for a man to be at enmity with a city which has a language and a literature. 3 For Minos was always abused and reviled in the Attic theatres, and it did not avail him either that Hesiod[19] called him "most royal," or that Homer[20] styled him "a confidant of Zeus," but the tragic poets prevailed, and from platform and stage showered obloquy down upon him, as a man of cruelty and violence. And yet they say that Minos was a king and lawgiver, and that Rhadamanthus was a judge under him, and a guardian of the principles of justice defined by him.
...

24 1 **After the death of Aegeus, Theseus conceived a wonderful design, and settled all the residents of Attica in one city,** thus making one people of one city out of those who up to that time had been scattered about and were not easily called together for the common interests of all, nay, they sometimes actually quarrelled and fought with each other. 2 **He visited them, then, and tried to win them over to his project township by township and clan by clan. The common folk and the poor quickly answered to his summons; to the powerful he promised government without a king and a democracy, in which he should only be commander in war and guardian of the laws, while in all else everyone should be on an equal footing.** 3 Some he readily persuaded to this course, and others, fearing his power, which was already great, and his boldness, chose to be persuaded rather than forced to agree to it. Accordingly, after doing away with the town-halls and council-chambers and magistracies in the several communities, and after building a common town-hall and council-chamber for all on the ground where the upper town of the present day stands, he named the city Athens, and instituted a Panathenaic festival.
...

25 1 **Desiring still further to enlarge the city, he invited all men thither on equal terms, and the phrase "Come hither all ye people," they say was a proclamation of Theseus when he established a people, as it were, of all sorts and conditions.** However, he did not suffer his democracy to become disordered or confused from an indiscriminate multitude streaming into it, but was the first to separate the people into noblemen and husbandmen and handicraftsmen. 2 To the noblemen he committed the care of religious rites, the supply of magistrates, the teaching of the laws, and the interpretation of the will of Heaven, and for the rest of the citizens he established a balance of privilege, the noblemen being thought to excel in

dignity, the husbandmen in usefulness, and the handicraftsmen in numbers. **And that he was the first to show a leaning towards the multitude, as Aristotle says, and gave up his absolute rule, seems to be the testimony of Homer also, in the Catalogue of Ships,[31] where he speaks of the Athenians alone as a "people."**
...

32 1 Meanwhile Menestheus, the son of Peteos, grandson of Orneus, and great-grandson of Erechtheus, **the first of men, as they say, to affect popularity and ingratiate himself with the multitude,** stirred up and embittered the chief men in Athens. These had long been hostile to Theseus, and thought that he had robbed each one of the country nobles of his royal office,[44] and then shut them all up in a single city, where he treated them as subjects and slaves. **The common people also he threw into commotion by his reproaches. They thought they had a vision of liberty, he said, but in reality they had been robbed of their native homes and religions in order that, in the place of many good kings of their own blood, they might look obediently to one master who was an immigrant and an alien.**
...

And now he lies buried in the heart of the city, near the present gymnasium,[52] and his tomb is a sanctuary and place of refuge for runaway slaves and all men of low estate who are afraid of men in power, since Theseus was a champion and helper of such during his life, and graciously received the supplications of the poor and needy.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Theseus+Romulus*.html

2 In the second place, the chief deed of Romulus was the slaying of a single tyrant of Alba; whereas for mere by-adventures and preliminary struggles Theseus had Sciron, Sinis, Procrustes and Corynetes, by slaying and chastising whom he freed Greece from dreadful tyrants before those who were saved by him knew who he was. Theseus might have travelled to Athens by sea without any trouble, and suffering no outrage at the hands of those robbers; whereas Romulus could not be without trouble while Amulius lived. 3 **And there is strong proof of this; for Theseus, although he had suffered no wrong at their hands himself, sallied out in behalf of others against those miscreants; while Romulus and Remus, as long as they themselves were not harmed by the tyrant, suffered him to wrong everybody else.** And surely, if it was a great thing for Romulus to be wounded in a battle with the Sabines, and to slay Acron, and to conquer many enemies in battle, with these exploits we may compare, on the part of Theseus, his battle with the Centaurs and his campaign against the Amazons; 4
but as for the daring which he showed about the Cretan tribute, whether that was food for some monster, or a sacrifice on the tomb of Androgeos, or whether — and this is the mildest form of the story — he offered himself for inglorious and dishonourable servitude among insolent and cruel men when he volunteered to sail away with maidens and young boys, words cannot depict such courage, magnanimity, righteous zeal for the common good, or yearning for glory and virtue. 5 **It is therefore my opinion that the philosophers[2] give an excellent definition of love when they call it "a ministration of the gods for the care and preservation of the young."**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Lycurgus+Numa*.html

And if we must ascribe to the administration of Lycurgus the treatment of the Helots, 5 **a most savage and lawless practice, we shall own that Numa was far more Hellenic as a lawgiver, since he gave acknowledged slaves a taste of the dignity of freedom,** by making it the custom for them to feast in the company of their masters during the Saturnalia.[1] For this too was one of the institutions of Numa, as we are told, who thereby admitted to the enjoyment of the yearly fruits of the earth those who had helped to produce them. **Some, however, fancy that this custom was a reminder of the equality which characterized the famous Saturnian age, when there was neither slave nor master, but all were regarded as kinsmen and equals.**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Coriolanus*.html

4 Verily, among all the benefits which men derive from the favour of the Muses, none other is so great as that softening of the nature which is produced by culture and discipline, the nature being induced by culture to take on moderation and cast off excess. It is perfectly true, however, that in those days Rome held in highest honour that phase of virtue which concerns itself with warlike and military achievements, **and evidence of this may be found in the only Latin word for virtue, which signifies really *manly valour*; they made valour, a specific form of virtue, stand for virtue in general.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/emerson-the-morals-vol-1#lf0062-01_head_151

It is true indeed that the so much admired commonwealth of Zeno, first author of the Stoic sect, aims singly at this, that neither in cities nor in towns we should live under laws distinct one from another, but that we should look upon all men in general to be our fellow-countrymen and citizens, observing one manner of living and one kind of order, like a flock feeding together with equal right in one common pasture. This Zeno wrote, fancying to himself, as in a dream, a certain scheme of civil order, and the image of a philosophical commonwealth. But Alexander made good his words by his deeds; for he did not, as Aristotle advised him, rule the Grecians like a moderate prince and insult over the barbarians like an

absolute tyrant; nor did he take particular care of the first as his friends and domestics, and scorn the latter as mere brutes and vegetables; which would have filled his empire with fugitive incendiaries and perfidious tumults. But believing himself sent from Heaven as the common moderator and arbiter of all nations, and subduing those by force whom he could not associate to himself by fair offers, **he labored thus, that he might bring all regions, far and near, under the same dominion. And then, as in a festival goblet, mixing lives, manners, customs, wedlock, all together, he ordained that every one should take the whole habitable world for his country, of which his camp and army should be the chief metropolis and garrison; that his friends and kindred should be the good and virtuous, and that the vicious only should be accounted foreigners.** Nor would he that Greeks and barbarians should be distinguished by long garments, targets, scimitars, or turbans; **but that the Grecians should be known by their virtue and courage, and the barbarians by their vices and their cowardice; and that their habit, their diet, their marriage and custom of converse, should be everywhere the same,** engaged and blended together by the ties of blood and pledges of offspring.

Therefore it was that Demaratus the Corinthian, an acquaintance and friend of Philip, when he beheld Alexander in Susa, bursting into tears of more than ordinary joy, bewailed the deceased Greeks, who, as he said, had been bereaved of the greatest blessing on earth, for that they had not seen Alexander sitting upon the throne of Darius. Though most assuredly, for my part, **I do not envy the beholders this show, which was only a thing of chance and a happiness of more ordinary kings.** But I would gladly have been a spectator of those majestic and sacred nuptials, when, after he had betrothed together a hundred Persian brides and a hundred Macedonian and Greek bridegrooms, he placed them all at one common table within the compass of one pavilion embroidered with gold, as being all of the same family; and then, crowned with a nuptial garland, and being himself the first to sing an epithalamium in honor of **the conjunction between two of the greatest and most potent nations in the world,** of only one the bridegroom, of all the brideman, father, and moderator, he caused the several couples to be severally married. Had I but beheld this sight, ecstasied with pleasure I should have then cried out: “Barbarous and stupid Xerxes, **how vain was all thy toil to cover the Hellespont with a floating bridge! Thus rather wise and prudent princes join Asia to Europe.** They join and fasten nations together not with boards or planks, or surging brigandines, not with inanimate and insensible bonds, but by the ties of legitimate love, chaste nuptials, and the infallible gage of progeny.”
…

It was not his design to ransack Asia like a robber, or to despoil and ruin it, as the prey and rapine of unexpected good fortune, as afterwards Hannibal pillaged Italy, and before him the Treres ravaged Ionia and the Scythians harassed Media, — but to subdue all the kingdoms of the earth under one form of government, and to make one nation of all mankind. **So that if the same Deity which hither sent the soul of Alexander had not too soon recalled it, one law had overlooked all the world, and one form of justice had been as it were the common light of one universal government; while now that part of the earth which Alexander never saw remains without a sun.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=PZPAH2AGAe8C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA357#v=onepage&q&f=false

Plutarch actually depicts Alexander as a true philosopher who showed his wisdom in his conduct, though (like Pythagoras and Socrates) he left no treatises behind him.94 Indeed he is made to fit the specific Stoic ideal. His fusion policy was the practical realization of Zeno’s dream ‘that we should look on all men as fellow parishioners and citizens and that there should be one life and one order, as of a herd feeding together in common under a common law’ (329 A B). Like the Stoic sage he combined all the virtues (332 D E). **His adoption of Persian dress was not only prompted by his desire to establish harmony among his subjects: as Eratosthenes said, it showed a philosophic attitude to ‘things indifferent’, and was not at all a manifestation of of vanity (τῦφος);** thus was Seneca among others, answered. Plutarch also tells that Alexander rejected the advice of Aristotle to treat Greeks as a leader and barbarians as a master, holding that it was moral qualities and not race that distinguished mankind (329 B-D); it has often been supposed that here too he drew on Eratosthenes, who is known to have ascribed this latter distinction to Alexander and endorsed it himself (Strabo I 4, 9). Even if this be so, we cannot tell how much of Plutarch’s interpretation comes from Eratosthenes. Still less can we assume that if it does, it represents a Stoic view favourable to Alexander (cf. n. 73). **Eratosthenes could of course have turned Stoic ideas and terminology against Stoic critics of the king. This is what Plutarch often seems to be doing,** though it would go too far to suggest that his essay is essentially an answer to the Stoics (with whom he was often in controversy); his primary aim is simply to discredit the notion that Alexander owed his success chiefly to fortune.

It should not be surprising that Arrian, even if he still remained faithful to Stoicism, did not adopt Plutarch’s line of defence in the *Anabasis*: it was not truly Stoic. We do not know the context in which Zeno propounded the ideal that Plutarch ascribes to him; it may have been no more than a description of the spiritual harmony that would ensue if all men were to live by the truths of Stoic morality.95 However that may be, no later Stoic is known to have envisaged a world state to be created by conquest or any other means available to rulers. **The ‘city of gods and men’ existed at all times and had nothing to do with political organization,**96 and no Stoic had hinted that it would be, as it were, better mirrored in the phenomenal world by an empire that embraced more of mankind than the actual kingdoms, cities and tribes into which men were divided. **Rome had in fact imposed political unity on more peoples**

and over a longer period of than Alexander, but Stoics did not make this a basis for justifying her dominion. Epictetus, in particular, while acknowledging that Caesar seemed to have given men profound peace, added that this was of no value, so long as they were still at war within themselves (III 13, 9 ff.). **He could have never thought that Alexander's great conquests and boundless ambitions could have benefited humanity. Plutarch could take a different view, precisely because he was no Stoic and attached a higher value to external goods such as peace and culture.**

https://www.bradford-delong.com/2017/11/aelius-aristides-the-roman-oration-it-is-a-time-honored-custom-of-travelers-setting-forth-by-land-or-sea-to-m.html

But there is that which very decidedly deserves as much attention and admiration now as all the rest together. **I mean your magnificent citizenship with its grand conception, because there is nothing like it in the records of all mankind.** Dividing into two groups all those in your empire—and with this word I have indicated the entire civilized world—you have everywhere appointed to your citizenship, or even to kinship with you, the better part of the world's talent, courage, and leadership, while the rest you recognized as a league under your hegemony.

Neither sea nor intervening continent are bars to citizenship, nor are Asia and Europe divided in their treatment here. In your empire all paths are open to all. No one worthy of rule or trust remains an alien, but a civil community of the World has been established as a Free Republic under one, the best, ruler and teacher of order; and all come together as into a common civic center, in order to receive each man his due.
...

For the categories into which you now divide the world are not Hellenes and Barbarians, **and it is not absurd, the distinction which you made, because you show them a citizenry more numerous, so to speak, than the entire Hellenic race.** The division which you substituted is one into Romans and non-Romans, to such a degree have you expanded the name of your city.

Since these are the lines along which the distinction has been made, many in every city are fellow-citizens of yours no less than of their kinsmen, though some of them have not yet seen this city. **There is no need of garrisons to hold their citadels, but the men of greatest standing and influence in every city guard their own fatherlands for you.** And you have a double hold upon the cities, both from here and from your fellow citizens in each.

No envy sets foot in the empire, for you yourselves were the first to disown envy, when you placed all opportunities in view of all and offered those who were able a chance to be not governed more than they governed in turn. Nor does hatred either steal in from those who are not chosen. For since the constitution is a universal one and, as it were, of one state, naturally your governors rule not as over the property of others but as over their own. Besides, **all the masses have as a share in it the permission to take refuge with you from the power of the local magnates, but there is the indignation and punishment from you which will come upon them immediately, if they themselves dare to make any unlawful charge.**
...

They no longer dispute over the right to rule and to have first honors, which caused the outbreak of all the wars of the past. Instead, the rulers of yore do not even recall with certainty what domain they once had, while the others, like water in silent flow, are most delightfully at rest. **They have gladly ceased from toil and trouble, for they have come to realize that in the other case they were fighting vainly over shadows.** As in the myth of a Pamphylian, or if not so, then Plato's myth, the cities, already bring laid, as it were, upon the funeral pyre by their mutual strife and disorder, merely received the right leadership all at once and suddenly revived.
...

Going over the entire league, you looked about carefully for those who would perform this liturgy, and when you found them, **you released them from the fatherland and gave them your own city so that they became reluctant henceforth to call themselves by their original ethnics.** Having made them fellow-citizens, you made them also soldiers, **so that the men from this city would not be subject to the levy, and those performing military service would none the less be citizens,** who together with their enrollment in the army had lost their own cities but from that very day had become your fellow-citizens and defenders.
...

So when one looks at the strength of the People and sees how easily they get all that they want and ask, he will deem it a complete democracy except for the faults of democracy. When he looks at the Senate sitting as a council and keeping the magistracies, he will think that there is no aristocracy more perfect than this. **When he looks at the Ephor and Prytanis who presides over all of these, him from whom it is possible for the People to get what they want and for the Few to have the magistracies and power,** he will see in this one, the One who holds the most perfect monarchic rule, One without a share in the vices of a tyrant and One elevated above even kingly dignity.
...

As on holiday the whole civilized world lays down the arms which were its ancient burden and has turned to adornment and all glad thoughts with power to realize them. **All the other rivalries have left the cities, and this one contention holds them all, how each city may appear most beautiful and attractive.**
…

Just as Homer did not fail to realize that your empire was to be, but foresaw it and made a prophecy of it in his epic, **so Hesiod, were he as complete a poet and as prophetic, would not, I think, in listing the Generations of Men have begun with the Golden Race as he actually does. And having once made this beginning, he would not at least, in treating of the last, the Iron Race, have named as the time for its ruin to occur the hour "when those born with hoary temples being," but rather when your protectorate and empire come. That is the hour he would have named for the Iron tribe to perish on the earth.** To Justice and Respect in that period he would have assigned a return amongst men. And he would have pitied those born before your time.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false

On Aelius Aristides' second visit to the city of Rome in 155 CE, the orator from Mysia in Asia Minor delivered an encomium of the Roman empire in nearly flawless Atticizing Greek before the court of Antoninus Pius.1
…

Aristides' Roman empire is, in a sense, "post-local" insofar as its inhabitants have willingly exchanged their various parochial identities for the universal identity of Romanness. **Aristides' repetition of the language of descent (*φυλον, ἔθνος, γένος*) serves only to demonstrate how the traditional meaning of these terms have become obsolete.** What I find perhaps most striking about this passage, however, is how Aristides self-consciously echoed and played with a variety of fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athenian ideas in his effort to describe how own world half a millennium later and several worlds apart: in particular, Aristides' description of the Roman world evokes Isocrates' attempt to redefine the term "Hellene" as a cultural rather than an ethnic marker [*Panegyricus* 50];3 the description of the Roman empire as a *polis* (single, autonomous city state) is indebted to Aristotle's definition of the *polis* as a homogenous whole composed of different parts [*Politics* 1247b];4 **arresting as well is Aristides' use of a "new" language of ethnicity that seems to echo the lost *Politeia* of Zeno in its insistence that an elite portion of the human community forms a single *genos* (descent group) regardless of ethnic origin** [e.g., Zeno's *Republic* (= Diog. Laert. 7.32-4; cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Contr. Acad.* 7.246].5
…

The early Stoa, above all Zeno and Chrysippus, grappled with Platonic and Aristotelian political theory at a moment when Plato's and Aristotle's Athens had morphed into something very different. In the same way, the mid-fourth-century Panhellenism of Demosthenes and Isocrates sought to respond to and conceptualize a much larger world than that envisaged by fifth- and even early fourth-century Athenian intellectuals. **Half a millennium later, participants in the late Stoa such as Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and (arguably) Cicero further developed the fourth-century Stoic response to Plato and Aristotle to think about the unity of the Roman Mediterranean.** Early imperial sophists and writers such as Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, Lucian of Samosata, like the fifth- and fourth-century Athenian models, also sought to define the unity of the *oikoumenê* in terms largely inherited from those classical models they sought to emulate in so many ways.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA125#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aristides has borrowed the universalizing language of the Stoa – which the Stoa had borrowed from the democratic critique of aristocratic birth – to make the claim that the human community is entirely unified. Like Isocrates and other fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democratic thinkers, Aristides questioned the idea that birth was the most important criterion of identity; as it had in late classical Athens, the democratic critique of aristocratic birth enabled an ethnic critique. Aristides has also made use of the markedly Stoic idea that the human race is itself a single undifferentiated *genos*. The achievement of Athens, Aristides claimed, was the creation of a cultural unity that embraced all mankind. In this sense, Athens is the post-Isocratean Alexander. **Although Isocrates limited the transformative power of *paideia* to those who were already Greek in terms of their *genos*, Aristides suggested that the possession of Hellenic culture could make a Hellene even out of a barbarian.** We might even suspect that Aristides' reference to the "bloodless trophy" that Athens has raised over the world is intended as a punning rejection of ethnicity.
…

These are the sorts of passages that have led recent commentators to understand early imperial intellectuals' constructions of Greekness as entirely cultural. However, what scholars have tended to overlook is that there is a strong ethnic current in postclassical sophistic ideas of Greekness that often runs strongly counter to the tide of cultural definitions of identity. **As often as Aristides celebrated the "culture-Greeks" of the empire, he insisted just as strongly, if not more insistently, on an**

ethnic dimension of Greekness that was limited to a separate few. The question is, how does Aristides square his ideas about cultural Greekness with his insistence on genealogical and ethnic purity in other contexts?
…

However, as ecumenical as Aristides' ideas about cultural Greekness were, he returned repeatedly to ethnic models of Greekness. Indeed, **Aristides is even more fulsome in his description of Athens' purity and the power of the connection between the land and the city than some of his classical and late classical models:**
…

The purity of Athens is, as it were, protected by a series of concentric circles: Athens lies in the center of Attica which, in turn, is situated in the center of Hellas; Hellas is the "center of the entire earth." "It lies in the very center of a central land."
…

When in Rome, Aristides did, in fact, do as the Romans did. **In the *Roman Oration*, Aristides abandoned the language of the ethnic purity of the center in favor of a model of kinship in which all the inhabitants of the empire participated equally.** In the last section of this chapter, I want to look at the language of kinship that Aristides used in the *Roman Oration*. I suggest that the odd inconsistency of Aristides' claims for the ethnic homogeneity of the empire was an intentional game on Aristides' part – an attempt to translate the Athenian literal language of kinship into a metaphor for a Roman audience. At the same time, the *Roman Oration* can also be understood as a translation of the Roman language of universalism of the empire as the *orbis terrarum* into the Greek language of kinship.
…

Aristides' *Regarding Rome* is the text of the *ex voto* which he delivered before the court of Antoninus Pius in 155 in a continuation of the tour that had included the performance of the *Panathenaicus* in Athens.142 Both speeches constructed unified visions of the *oikoumenê*: **in the *Panathenaicus*, as we have seen, Aristides developed a two-tiered Isocratean model of Greekness that accommodated both the ethnic Greeks of the mainland and Ionia and the "culture-Greeks" throughout the empire.**
…

There is no part of this enclosure which is not integrated into the whole – there are no Mysians, Sacae, Pisidians, or others, Aristides writes, who occupy independent pockets. The empire of the Romans, unlike that of the Persians and the Macedonians, is a seamless whole.
…

Early imperial Athens took the idea of ethnic purity very seriously; the genius of the *Panathenaicus* was Aristides' ability to formulate a cultural model of Greekness that did not conflict with an ethnic model of Athenianness but complemented and even depended upon it. Aristides took his lead in this from Isocrates, as I have argued. The Roman context, however, enabled Aristides to speak about ethnicity in terms that were far more abstract and playful.

https://archive.org/details/greeklatinauthor0002unse/page/224/mode/2up?view=theater

Celsus may be defined rather as an eclectic philosopher, whose views were tinged mainly by Middle Platonism, the prevalent philosophy of his time, **and who also made free use of the arsenal of Stoic argumentation.**

Origen's quotations from the work show that Celsus had a lofty concept of the Supreme God, who is transcendental, unchangeable, abstract and worshipped under different names. In the accepted tradition of Greek philosophy Celsus **combines a kind of monotheism on principle with acquiescence in the existing polytheism,** as enshrined in popular cults and beliefs, since it was believed that he who worships the different deities ultimately adores the Supreme God.

Galen and the Stoics: Mortal Enemies or Blood Brothers? on JSTOR

Galen is well known as a critic of Stoicism, mainly for his massive attack on Stoic (or at least, Chrysippean) psychology in *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (*PHP*) 2-5. Galen attacks both Chrysippus' location of the ruling part of the psyche in the heart and his unified or monistic picture of human psychology. **However, if we consider Galen's thought more broadly, this has a good deal in common with Stoicism, including a (largely) physicalist conception of psychology and a strongly teleological view of natural entities, shared features which are acknowledged in several treatises outside *PHP*. Why, then, is Galen such a remorseless and negative critic of Stoicism in *PHP*?** Various factors are relevant, including the shaping influence on Galen of the Platonic-Aristotelian (part-based) psychological framework. But, it is suggested here, an important underlying factor is the contrast between two ways of thinking about the part-whole relationship,

a 'composition' and a 'structure' approach or an atomistic and holistic approach. This contrast is **most evident and explicit in one section of *PHP* 5, where Galen, criticising Chrysippus' holistic psychology, denies that the Stoic thinker is entitled to use the concept of *part* at all.** But the contrast is also seen as pervading Galen's response to Stoic thought more generally, in *PHP* and elsewhere, in ways that inform his explicit disagreements with Stoic theory. **Stoicism is presented here as having a consistently 'structure' (or holistic) approach.** Galen's approach is seen as more mixed, sometimes sharing, or aspiring towards, a holistic picture, and yet sometimes (especially in *PHP* 5), adopting a strongly 'composition' or atomistic standpoint.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/galen/

Galen was one of the most prolific intellectuals of western antiquity, his works extending to 21 volumes of roughly 1000 pages each in the standard Greek edition (with a few additional works surviving only in Arabic, Syriac, Hebrew or Latin translations)—a total of more than 4 million words. While most of his scientific and medical writings survive, many of his specialist works of philosophy do not. He is an extremely adversarial author, a vigorous participant in the highly rhetorical and learned competitive intellectual culture of second-century-CE Rome (the so-called "Second Sophistic"); and he is extremely prone to digression. He often expresses his own views through the twin media of polemic against his opponents and textual interpretation and commentary on his intellectual heroes, especially Plato and Hippocrates.
…

Much of his anatomical work, as well as the inception of two great works central to the establishment of his reputation, *The Function of the Parts of the Body* (*UP*) and *The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (*PHP*), belongs to this early period. **The former text aims to establish the purposive, indeed divine, construction, understood in relation to its particular function (*chreia*), of every anatomical feature of the body (see further section 5 below), and explicitly models itself on Aristotelian biological work. The latter constitutes both an exposition of Platonic tripartite psychology, with a vigorous polemic against the Stoic monist alternative, and a synthesis of this Platonic view with Galen's physiology of brain, heart and liver** (see further below, section 7); it contains an account of the famous experiment whereby the function of the brain—in Galen's terms, the fact that it is the seat of the "leading-part" of the soul—is demonstrated by ligation of the spinal cord of a live pig.
…

Galen is committed to the possibility of secure knowledge of the physical world. In *The Best Teaching* (*Opt. Doc.*), in response to contemporary Greek epistemological debates and in particular to Academic Skepticism, he rejects arguments that encourage us to doubt one's natural evaluative faculty (*kritērion*), or to advance arguments on both sides of any proposition in order to reach suspension of judgement; **he also attacks the Stoic terminology of the "apprehensive" or "kataleptic" (*katalēptikē*) impression, a kind of cognitive experience which is so clear as to be self-guaranteeing. (But he seems to regard the distinction between "kataleptic" and his preferred term, "securely knowable", as purely verbal, rather than of philosophical interest.** Relatedly, he mentions, but does not seem to feel a serious philosophical challenge from, the Skeptical objection that one may believe one has a reliable perception also in dreams or in mentally deranged states.)
…

Galen claims that in his youth—partly in response to the confusion caused by mutually contradictory philosophical sects, all claiming certainty on unprovable issues—he nearly succumbed to the lures of Skepticism (*Lib. Prop.* 14/11, 18). **The above possibility of certainty, as provided by mathematics and geometry, is what saved him.**
…

There is a strong emphasis on teleology in nature, and on the inadequacy of causal accounts that omit this. The major context for this is *UP*, a text explicitly inspired by Aristotle. In this 17-volume magnum opus, Galen goes through the parts of the body one by one, in each case giving an account which justifies the proposition of the purposive nature of its construction. Taking Aristotle's approach (especially that of *Parts of Animals*), and the motto "Nature does nothing in vain", as starting-points, **he is concerned to prove the perfect, providential nature of the construction of parts for the benefit of the animal, especially in the context of humans. Important, from the outset, is to insist upon the correct direction of causation: we have hands, etc., because we are intelligent (the view he attributes to Aristotle), not the other way round (the view he attributes to Anaxagoras)** (*UP* I.3, 69-70).

As so often in Galen, the polemical aim is of major importance for the formulation of the argument. **The recurrent target is that group of thinkers who deny intelligence or purpose as an explanans, and omit it from their causal accounts. Here Galen lumps together: a variety of ancient Atomist theorists;** the followers of the Hellenistic medical author Erasistratus; and those of the more

recent Asclepiades of Bithynia. All are accused of giving accounts which omit intelligence in the relevant sense, relying entirely on either spontaneous motions of bodies or mechanistic explanations of biological processes to explain the formation and maintenance of the complex processes of the human body.
…

Here Galen again draws on Stoic terminology, and talks of the "total mixture" (*krasis di' holōn*). In Stoic theory, this "total mixture" involves the notion that the two bodies mixed in this particular way co-inhabit one space. Galen does not commit himself on the precise metaphysical description, but seems to prefer the formulation that the *qualities* (*poiotētes*) undergo total mixture while the bodies do not.
…

It is also significant that Galen equates Plato's *logistikon* ("rational") with the *hēgemonikon* ("leading-part"): the concepts are (in origin at least) distinct and derive from different conceptions of the soul. **The latter is a Stoic term, although probably also prominent in the Hellenistic medical authors just mentioned: it is the notion of a single "command centre" for the soul, which communicates to the rest of the body,** both receiving the information of the different sense organs and giving the command (in Stoic language, the assent) for voluntary actions. Such a single command centre is not (at least explicitly) present in Plato; similarly, such a physically centralized psychic concept is at best vaguely present in Aristotle.

Galen is centrally concerned to refute the Stoic view of the *hēgemonikon* as located in the heart, as against the Platonic-Galenic view of its location in the brain. **In the process, while asserting his allegiance to Platonic thought on the soul, it is at least arguable that he adopts a unitary view of the soul and its "command centre" which is conceptually much closer to the Stoic one** (on this point see Gill 2010).
…

A standard point of school conflict in the ethical discourse of Galen's time was that between the Stoic insistence on the need for *total* eradication of the affections (related to the doctrinal position that any giving-in to *pathos* is in fact a form of madness) and the Platonic-Aristotelian advocacy of a "moderate level of affectedness" (*metriopatheia*). It is perhaps significant that this technical term, employed by Galen's "Middle Platonist" contemporaries, does not appear in his own extant ethics; **and indeed, much of the discourse of both *Aff. Pecc. Dig.* and *Ind.* seems consistent with the aim of *eradication* of the *pathē*.** On the other hand, Galen comes down against the necessity of total eradication, especially in *Ind.*; here, explicitly engaging with this ethical question, **Galen denies that he could be happy inside the Bull of Phalaris (a notorious instrument of torture as well as a stock Epicurean philosophical example), and takes issue with the Stoic Musonius for his reported welcoming of adversity.**

On the one hand, **Galen imposes very high standards in this area, claiming himself to have been "completely undistressed" by the fire in which he lost a huge number of valuables, including a major part of his own writings;** in another sense, he manifests a realistic and down-to-earth approach, asserting that freedom from distress is possible so long as certain basic human needs are met. He acknowledges that certain circumstances might deprive him of his moral equilibrium—exile, for example, or injustice visited upon a friend—and hopes not to encounter those.

There is a broader point about *pathos*: in Aristotle the term is ethically neutral, referring to emotive or non-rational experience quite generally; thus, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, virtues may be understood as involving a mean, between an excessive and an inadequate emotive response. Both the Aristotelian picture and the term *metriopatheia* entail an understanding of *pathos* as not in itself negative; **Galen's understanding of *pathos*, in the ethical context, seems rather in accord with the Stoic conception: it is in its nature undesirable, to be reduced or eliminated as far as possible—even if he does not follow the Stoics in asserting the necessity, or indeed practicability, of its complete eradication.**
…

If it seems difficult to reconcile such a conventional, anthropomorphic manifestation of religion with the philosophical view of God as a teleological cause or as immanent Nature, it should perhaps be said that such a co-existence of abstract theology with traditional individual gods is by no means confined to Galen, amongst Graeco-Roman philosophical writers **(one could mention both Plato and Epictetus in this context). In any case, <u>it is to the divine intelligence manifest throughout the universe, rather than to any individual god, that Galen constantly returns;</u>** it is this intelligence which is the object of his religious—and by the same token of his intellectual, indeed his scientific—fervour.

> Galenism was always open to charges of materialism and moral determinism.78 The suspicions of Latin Christians were aroused against it as early as the fourth and fifth centuries.79 **In Restoration England Galenical physicians were 'generally reputed no better than atheists.'**80
>
> While Galen did not completely dismiss **the Platonic and Christian view of the incorporeal nature of the soul,** he treated it 'as a doubtful hypothesis' and tended 'to consider even the rational soul as the temperament of the brain.'81

https://archive.org/details/TheWorksOfHippocratesAndGalen/page/n357/mode/2up?view=theater

Not unlike the rich are the gentlemen by birth. Possessing no qualifications of their own, they live their lives in the shadow of their ancestors. They are ignorant that titles of nobility resemble pieces of silver, passing current in the city where coined, but in others no better than counterfeit.
…

If distinction of rank means anything, it ought to make us anxious to follow its lead. With every departure, our ancestors should grieve, **if the dead can experience sentiment.** The higher the standing the greater the dishonor in failing to uphold it.

Ignorant men of obscure extraction have at least this advantage – that people do not know what they ought to be. When the origin is illustrious it cannot be concealed. If we live not up to it what can we expect but dishonorable notoriety?

They who prove unworthy of their ancestors deserve less indulgence than others. A vicious man boasting of his birth, makes his conduct all the more reprehensible. To judge common people we have not the same criteria. If they prove mediocre, we willingly pardon them, finding an excuse in the baseness of origin. For the noble born we have no such plea, since they insist on their differentiation from the multitude.

The sensible man then will learn an art. If he is of good family, it will prove no disadvantage. If he is lowly born he has to opportunity of responding with Themistocles when reproached with his birth: **"I am the beginner of a race, yours ends with you."** We refuse to Anacharsis neither our admiration nor the name of sage although of Scythian origin. When he was affronted with his barbarian birthplace he responded: **"My country may be a shame to me; you are a shame to yours;" thus reducing to silence a man whose only recommendation was the culture of his native land.**

On consideration we perceive it is not the cities which make the citizens illustrious, but the reverse. **Whence comes the renown of Stagira, if not from Aristotle; of Soli, if not from Aratus and Chrysippus?** Why is the name of Athens so widely known? Surely not on account of the meager fertility of her soil, but rather the number of superior men who have extended to her the éclat of their renown. This truth stands out when we recall that their being Athenians served only to make the misconduct of the demagogues Cleon and Hyperbole more notorious. As a reproach for their ignorance the Boeotians were called swine, but the poetical talent of Pindar alone was almost sufficient to efface this national disgrace.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yUGzAQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

AELIAN, Claudius (c. 170-235 C.E.), of Praeneste. Rhetorician and anthologer. Aelian, an Italian who worked much of his life in Rome under imperial patronage, taught rhetoric and compiled anthologies in Greek for popular reading and moral instruction. ***On the Characteristics of Animals* was a collection of descriptions of the behavior of animals with special attention to quasi-human behavior, "marvelous" phenomena, and evidence of morality and providential order in nature.** *Miscellanies* (*Varia Historia*) contained a collection of ethnographic information and anecdotes about famous people with moralizing comments. Though the latter survives only in abridged form, it contains a wealth of otherwise unknown historical and biographical information, some relating to the Greek philosophers. Aelian also wrote *On Providence* and *On Evidences of Divinity*, two anthologies that have been lost except for a few quotations. **Aelian's works illustrate the extensive influence of Stoicism on popular culture in the late second century C.E.** and remain important sources for lost authors and writings.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Daelianus-claudius-bio-1

In both works he seems desirous to inculcate moral and religious principles (see *V. H.* 7.44; *De Anim.* 6.2, 7.10, 11, 9.7, and *Epilog.*); and he wrote some treatises expressly on philosophical and religious subjects, **especially one on Providence (Θεοὶ Προνοίας) in three books (Suidas, *s. v.* Ἀβασανίστοις), and one on the Divine Manifestations (Περὶ θειῶν Ἐνεργειῶν), directed against the Epicureans, whom he alludes to elsewhere. (*De Anim*. 7.44.)**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/preface.xhtml

Later in time (as being contemporary with *Philostratus* the *Lemnian* who lived under *Severus*) was *Ælian* the Sophist, of whom
Philostratus gives this account;

> **Ælian *was a* Roman*, but spoke Greek as purely as those who lived in the midst of* Attica*: This man seems to me worthy of praise; First, because though he lived in a City which used another Language, yet he arrived at the purity of the Greek:*** *Next, because being honoured by the Title of Sophist by those who used to confere such attributes, he was nothing the more confident of himself, nor conceited of his own opinion, nor exalted with so great a title, but making scrutiny into himself, and finding himself not proper for publick declamations, he gave himself to writing, in which he was admirable. His style is unaffected, with a gracefulneß beyond*
> Nicostratus*. Sometimes he imitates* Dion *and his way. On a time* Philostratus *the* Lemnian *found him intent upon a Book, and reading it with anger and eagerneß, he asked him what he was about;* ***He answered, I am making a declamation against* Gynnis*, for so I name that Tyrant who so lately by his infamous life dishonoured* Rome.** Philostratus *replied, I should have admired you, if you had declaimed against him whilest he was living; for to oppose a living Tyrant is manly, but every one can revile him when dead. This man said that he never went out of* Italy*, that he never went on Shipboard, or saw the Sea; for which he was much respected by the* Romans*, as one that loved their manners. He was a hearer of* Pausanius*: but he admired* Herod *as the most florid of all Oratours. He lived above threescore years,* ***and died without issue; for he approved not the having of Children or mariage.***

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist12.xhtml#chap25

Ulysses was improv'd by *Alcinous*, *Achilles* by *Chiron*, *Patroclus* by *Achilles*, *Agamemnon* by *Nestor*, *Telemachus* by *Menelaus*, and *Hector* by *Polydamas*; the *Trojans*, as far as they followed him, by *Antenor*; the *Pythagorean* Disciples by *Pythagoras*, the *Democriteans* by *Democritus*. If the *Athenians* had followed *Socrates*, they had been every way happy and skilful in Philosophy. *Hiero* Son of *Dinomenes* was delighted in *Simonides* the *Cean*, *Polycrates* in *Anacreon*, *Proxenus* in *Xenophon*, ***Antigonus* in *Zeno*. And to mention those also who concern me no less then the *Greeks*, inasmuch as I am a *Roman*; *Lucullus* profited by *Antiochus* the *Ascalonite*, *Mecænas* by *Arius*, *Cicero* by *Apollodorus*, *Augustus* by *Athenodorus*.** But *Plato*, who far exceeded me in wisedome, saith that *Jupiter* himself had a Counsellor; but whom and how, we learn from him.[14]

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist2.xhtml#chap20

It is reported that King *Antigonus* was popular and meek. He that hath leisure to make enquiry after him and his actions, may satisfie himself elsewhere. I shall relate onely one act of his full of Clemency and void of Pride. **This *Antigonus*, perceiving that his Son behaved himself rigidly and severely towards his Subjects, "Do you not know, Son, said he, that our Reign is but a glorious Servitude?"** This speech of *Antigonus* to his Son express'd much Mildness and humanity. He who conceiveth otherwise of it, seems in my opinion not to understand either what belonged to a King or a Subject, but rather to have lived under some Tyrant.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist14.xhtml#chap5

The *Athenians* conferred Offices Civil and Military, not onely on native Citizens, but also often preferred strangers before Citizens, and put them in authority over the Commonwealth, if they knew them to be truly good and honest men, and proper for such things. They often created *Apollodorus* the *Cyzicene* their General, though a stranger, so likewise *Heraclides* the *Clazomenian*; for having behaved themselves worthily, they were esteemed not unworthy to govern the *Athenians*. **And for this thing the City is to be commended, which betrayed not truth to gratifie the Citizens, but not seldome bestowed the chief dignity even on those who were nothing allied to them, yet in regard of their vertue most worthy of honour.**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist12.xhtml#chap6

They deserve to be laughed at who are proud of their Ancestors, since among the *Romans* we know not the Father of *Marius*, yet admire him for his parts. To know the Father of *Cato* the elder would require much scrutiny.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist14.xhtml#chap36

They are to be laughed at who think highly of themselves because of their Parents and Ancestors; for we know not the Father of *Marius*, but admire him for his own actions. As likewise *Cato*, *Servilius*, *Hostilius*, and *Romulus*.[16]

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/aelian/varhist2.xhtml#chap31

And who extolls not the wisedome of the *Barbarians*, since none of them have fallen into any Atheism, or question whether there are Gods or not, and whether they take care of us or not? **None of them ever held such Opinions as *Euemerus* the *Messenian*, or *Diogenes* the *Phrygian*, or *Hippo*, or *Diagoras*, or *Sosias*, or *Epicurus*; not any *Indian*, *Celt*, or *Ægyptian*. For these *Barbarians* which I have named attest that there are Gods, and that they have a providential care of us, and that they pre-signifie events by birds, Omens, entrals, and by other observations and rules, which do teach men the providence of the Gods towards them.** They say also that many things are signified before-hand by Dreams and by the Starres. Being firmly setled in this belief, they sacrifice purely, live holily, perform divine rites, observe the rules of the *Orgia* and all the rest: whence it must be acknowledged that they worship and reverence the Gods firmly.

https://www.livius.org/sources/content/philostratus-life-of-apollonius/philostratus-life-of-apollonius-6.1-5/

[6.2] For when he arrived at the confines of Ethiopia and Egypt, and the name of the place is Sycaminus, he came across a quantity of uncoined gold and linen and an elephant and various roots and myrrh and spices, which are all lying without anyone to watch them at the crossways.

I will explain the meaning of this, for the same custom still survives among ourselves. It was a market place to which the the Ethiopians bring all the products of their country; and the Egyptians in their turn take them all away and bring to the same spot their own wares of equal value, so bartering what they have got for what they have not.

Now the inhabitants of the marches are not yet fully black but are half-breeds in matter of color, for they are partly not so black as the Ethiopians, yet partly more so than the Egyptians. Apollonius, accordingly, when he realized the character of the market, remarked: "Contrast our good Hellenes: they pretend they cannot live unless one penny begets another and unless they can force up the price of their goods by chaffering or holding them back; and one pretends that he has got a daughter whom it is time to marry, and another that he has got a son who has just reached manhood, and a third that he has to pay his subscription to his club, and a fourth that he is having a house built for him, and a fifth that he would be ashamed of being thought a worse man of business than his father was before him. **What a splendid thing then it would be, if wealth were held in less honor and equality flourished a little more and 'if the black iron were left to rust in the ground,'** [Hesiod, *Works and Days* 151.] **for all men would agree with one another, and the whole earth would be like one brotherhood.**"

https://books.google.fi/books?id=YzVCAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA57#v=onepage&q&f=false

44. To Hestiaeus, his brother: (1) **Is it any wonder that up to now only my native city fails to acknowledge me, the city for whose sake especially have striven to win renown, while the rest of mankind consider me equal to the gods and some even regard me as a god?** No, it is not any wonder, for I see that it is not even clear to you, my brothers, that I am better than the majority of men both in my words and in my character. For if it were clear to you, how could you make such a harsh charge against me, as if I need to be reminded at all of the only matters about which not even the most ignorant man could endure being lectured – I mean one's native city and brothers. (2) **And yet, you may object, the doctrine that it is good to regard the whole earth as one's native land and all men as one's brothers and friends has not escaped my notice. For all men, so I believe, belong to the family of God and are of one nature; everyone experiences the same emotions, regardless of the place or condition of a person's birth, whether he is a barbarian or a Greek, so long as he is a human being. But bloodties cannot be weakened by any theoretical argument, and kin attracts kin to itself.** Thus, Homer's Odysseus, as they say, did not even prefer the immortality which a goddess offered him to Ithaca. (3) And I observe that this law is in effect even among irrational animals. For no winged creature sleeps outside of its own nest; and every creature of the deep may be dragged off by his assailant, but returns if not overcome. Neither feast nor famine can persuade animals to stay away from from their dens. **A man, even if he is called wise, is still one of the creatures that nature has brought forth.** The earth as a whole may provide everything else for him, but it cannot show him the tombs of his ancestors.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Fragment_of_a_letter_to_a_priest#cite_ref-4

We ought then to share our money with all men, but more generously with the good, and with the helpless and poor so as to suffice for their need. **And I will assert, even though it be paradoxical to say so, that it would be a pious act to share our clothes and food even with the wicked.** [291] **For it is to the humanity in a man that we give, and not to his moral character.** Hence I think that even those who are shut up in prison have a right to the same sort of care; since this kind of philanthropy will not hinder justice. For when many have been shut up in prison to await trial, of whom some will be found guilty, while others will prove to be innocent, it would be harsh indeed if out of regard for the guiltless we should not bestow some pity on the guilty also, or again, if on account of the guilty we should behave ruthlessly and inhumanly to those also who have done no wrong.

This too, when I consider it, seems to me altogether wrong; **I mean that we call Zeus by the title "God of Strangers," while we show ourselves more inhospitable to strangers than are the very Scythians. How, I ask, can one who wishes to sacrifice to Zeus, the God of Strangers, even approach his temple?** With what conscience can he do so, when he has forgotten the saying "From Zeus come all beggars and strangers; and a gift is precious though small"?[5]

Again, the man who worships Zeus the God of Comrades, and who, though he sees his neighbours in need of money, does not give them even so much as a drachma, how, I say, can he think that he is worshipping Zeus aright? **When I observe this I am wholly amazed, since I see that these titles of the gods are from the beginning of the world their express images, yet in our practice we pay no attention to anything of the sort. The gods are called by us "gods of kindred," and Zeus the "God of Kindred," but we treat our kinsmen as though they were strangers. I say "kinsmen" because every man, whether he will or no, is akin to every other man, whether it be true, as some say, that we are all descended from one man and one woman, or whether it came about in some other way, and the gods created us all together, at the first when the world began, not one man and one woman only, but many men and many women at once.** For they who had the power to create one man and one woman, were able to create many men and women at once; since the manner of creating one man and one woman is the same as that of creating many men and many women. And[6] one must have regard to the differences in our habits and laws, or still more to that which is higher and more precious and more authoritative, I mean the sacred tradition of the gods which has been handed down to us by the theurgists of earlier days, namely that when Zeus was setting all things in order there fell from him drops of sacred blood, and from them, as they say, arose the race of men. **It follows therefore that we are all kinsmen, whether, many men and women as we are, we come from two human beings, or whether, as the gods tell us, and as we ought to believe, since facts bear witness thereto, we are all descended from the gods.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirata_Atsutane
>
> Hirata Atsutane (6 October 1776-2 November 1843) was a Japanese scholar, conventionally ranked as one of the Four Great Men of Kokugaku (nativist) studies,[1] **and one of the most significant theologians of the Shintō religion.**
> …
>
> Though he is traditionally ranked fourth in the lineage of *kokugaku* scholars, Hirata actually represents a break with the purely scholarly urban culture characteristic of the revival of classical nativist learning, **and represents a trend toward a populist message. Hirata laid particular emphasis on reaching the average man, and adapted his own style to them by employing at times the vernacular idiom.**
> …
>
> The contents of **his 1841 treatise *Tenchō mukyūreki*, in which he suggested that loyalty to the Emperor ought to take precedence over loyalty to one's lord (i.e. the shogun),** angered the ruling Tokugawa government, and he was sentenced to house arrest in Akita until his death in 1843.
> …
>
> Among Hirata's more enduring contributions to Japanese thought was to remind that all Japanese were descended from the kami, not only the Imperial family and certain aristocratic families. As he put it, "**this,** our glorious land, **is the land in which the kami have their origin, and we are one and all descendants of the kami. For this reason, if we go back from the parents who gave us life and being, beyond the grandparents and great-grandparents, and consider the ancestors of ancient times, then the original ancestors of those must necessarily have been the kami."**[4]

And that facts bear witness that many men came into the world at once, I shall maintain elsewhere, and precisely, but for the moment it will be enough to say this much, **that if we were descended from one man and one woman, it is not likely that our laws would show such great divergence;** nor in any case is it likely that the whole earth was filled with people by one man; nay, not even if the women used to bear many children at a time to their husbands, like swine. But when the gods all together had given birth to men, just as one man came forth, so in like manner came forth many men who had been allotted to the gods who rule over births; and they brought them forth, receiving their souls from the Demiurge from eternity.[7]

It is proper also to bear in mind how many discourses have been devoted by men in the past to show that man is by nature a social animal. And shall we, after asserting this and enjoining it, bear ourselves unsociably to our neighbours?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Against_the_Galileans#cite_ref-35

115. But now consider our teaching in comparison with this of yours. **Our writers say that the creator is the common father and king of all things, but that the other functions have been assigned by him to national gods of the peoples and gods that protect the cities;** every one of whom administers his own department in accordance with his own nature. **For since in the father all things are complete and all things are one, while in the separate deities one quality or another predominates, therefore Ares rules over the warlike nations, Athene over those that are wise as well as warlike, Hermes over those that are more shrewd than adventurous;** and in short the nations over which the gods preside follow each the essential character of their proper god.
...

Come, tell me why it is that the Celts and the Germans are fierce,[36] while the Hellenes and Romans are, generally speaking, inclined to political life and humane, though at the same time unyielding and warlike? **Why the Egyptians are more intelligent and more given to crafts, and the Syrians unwarlike and effeminate, but at the same time intelligent, hot-tempered, vain and quick to learn?** For if there is anyone who does not discern a reason for these differences among the nations, but rather declaims that all this so befell spontaneously, **how, I ask, can he still believe that the universe is administered by a providence?**
...

131. As for men's laws, it is evident that men have established them to correspond with their own natural dispositions; that is to say, constitutional and humane laws were established by those in whom a humane disposition had been fostered above all else, savage and inhuman laws by those in whom there lurked and was inherent the contrary disposition. **For lawgivers have succeeded in adding but little by their discipline to the natural characters and aptitudes of men. Accordingly the Scythians would not receive Anacharsis[37] among them when he was inspired by a religious frenzy, and with very few exceptions you will not find that any men of the Western nations[38] have any great inclination for philosophy or geometry or studies of that sort, although the Roman Empire has now so long been paramount. But those who are unusually talented delight only in debate and the art of rhetoric, and do not adopt any other study;** so strong, it seems, is the force of nature.

https://archive.org/details/politicsphilosop0000them/page/186/mode/2up?view=theater

But this is not the greatest of the benefits we have gained, which is that brotherly love is a sign of love of mankind, just as goodwill towards one's family and relations is the origin and principle from which goodwill to all men derives. For nature, which has placed the highest value on man binds us together with all our fellow men, separate from all other living creatures, [d] has laid down the first principles from what is close at hand and from hearth and home; **he who loves his brother will also love his family, he who loves his family will also love his native land, and he who loves his native land will also love mankind. It is impossible once caught in nature's antechamber not also to become obedient to her prompting.**

[77a] Yet what need is there for me to elaborate in minute detail that those who love a brother must obviously also love mankind? Come hither, O fortunate men, come hither and recognise your true Father, the abundance of his children and the entire host of your brothers.166 **They are not the mere fifty that Aegyptus sired, nor as many as the poets numbered the sons of Priam,**167 **but are as many as possess the distinguishing mark of their Father: the communion of reason and the harmony of the physical and the rational. All these men spring from the same seed and are true brothers to you and to each other.** [b] Look, examine the token of recognition; is it not more reliable evidence than gifts and rings?168 For Pelops' descendants, the fact that some part of the shoulder looked like ivory was sufficient as proof of kinship,169 but for us170 shall not the whole body be sufficient to show our single begetter and ancestor? And yet is the spiritual kinship and likeness not much more obvious than the physical, when it is preserved as it was created? We all try to outdo each other in virtue, we are all ashamed to admit to wickedness, we cannot endure in isolation, we call for each other's help in emergencies; [c] we hasten unsummoned into dangers, a single nurse nurtures us, **we hold a common ancestral property – the earth, sea, air and water, indeed all that grows and lives – some of which we have divided up between us as possessions, the rest remaining as yet undivided among us.** I pass over the rest. We alone of all creatures of earth recognise our Father, either more clearly or more dimly, and even if we are set apart from one another in hierarchical order, we all lean on Him for support.171

> 171. it is interesting to compare Themistius' treatment of religious toleration here with that at *Or*. 5.67c-70c. Some of the same points are made – such as the dependency of all men upon God, and the fact that some see Him more clearly than others – but, in comparison, the latter point is made more firmly, less space and elaboration is given to the importance of diversity, **there is no equivalent of *Or*. 5.70a claiming that God wants Syrians (i.e., Christians), Hellenes and Egyptians to organise themselves differently. Christian sectarianism likewise goes unmentioned. This suggests that Valentinian and Valens adopted a markedly less tolerant form of toleration than had Jovian.**

[d] Surely Homer, in his great wisdom, was not casually improvising in his verses when ceaselessly celebrating the Father of both men and gods as one and the same. And yet why does he not call him the father of horses, or by Zeus, of dogs or lions? Because in all other beasts there is not, in my opinion, the smallest share of their

creator. And so they have no understanding either of him or of each other: it is on mankind alone that the outpouring from the second bowl flows down. [78a] **To share the faculty of reason is nothing other than to share the divine seed.**172 The Boeotian poet [Pindar] thinks the same as Homer,

> **'There is a single race of man, a single race of gods, but we are both born of one mother'**173

neatly assimilating us to the father from the mother too. If then, all men had the same mother and the same father and spring from purer parentage, there would seem to be no difference between love of a brother and love of mankind.174

> 174. While firmly basing himself on Hellenic classics, Themistius thus constructs a vision of human creation which was acceptably reminiscent for Christians of the story of Adam and Eve.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/1/2*.html#ref87

It was probably a few months after the conclusion of this peace that the rhetorician, Themistius, uttered that elaborate oration88 **in its praise,** to which we are indebted for our chief knowledge of these events. We cannot treat these panegyrical harangues as authentic materials for history, and yet with all their falseness they often give us valuable hints as to the thoughts which were passing in the minds of the statesmen to whom they were addressed.

> 'Too often,' says Themistius, 'have orators drawn their inspiration from bloody battle-fields, and magnified their hero by recounting the numbers whom he has slain. None of them has perceived that Peace, wisely and worthily concluded, is more glorious than many trophies. **I for my part am of the same opinion as the divine Plato, that a lawgiver has an imperfect conception of his duty who provides only for the waging of war and not for the administration of peace.** Herein lay the fault of Lycurgus, who made of Sparta one vast camp, agitated by the perpetual sound of war. But (again to quote Plato) each one of us has in himself the germs both of Peace and War; but the impetuous warlike element ought to be subjected to the peaceful guidance of Reason. Even so the Roman Commonwealth has in it two principles—the tumultuous warlike element of the Scythians and the Germans, the calm and reasonable element of the Romans. You, O Emperor, have rightly judged that not even the barbarians ought to be utterly extirpated (since they too are in a sense a portion of your Empire and a complementary part of the human race), but that they should be brought into subjection to our laws and civilisation.89 **Thus do you exhibit yourself an Emperor of all mankind, not a Philo-Persian like Cyrus, not a Philo-Macedonian like Alexander, not a Philo-Roman like Augustus, but a philanthropist pure and simple, absolutely worthy to be called a king because no member of the human race is deprived of your providential care.**
> …
>
> 'To conclude, then, as I began. We celebrate this victory by numbering not our slaughtered foes but our living and tamed antagonists. **If we regret to hear of the entire destruction even of any kind of animal, if we mourn that elephants should be disappearing from the province of Africa, lions from Thessaly, and hippopotami from the marshes of the Nile,** how much rather, when a whole nation of men, barbarians it is true, but still men, lies prostrate at our feet, confessing that it is entirely at our mercy, ought we not instead of extirpating, to preserve it, and make it our own by showing it compassion?
>
> 'The generals of old Rome used to be called Achaicus, Macedonicus, Africanus, to commemorate their victories over devastated lands and ruined nations. **With far more right shall our Emperor be called Gothicus, since he has permitted so many Goths to live, and compelled them to become the friends of Rome.**'

https://archive.org/details/politicsphilosop0000them/page/200/mode/2up?view=theater

Justifying imperial policy in public, of course, brings us very much into the territory of Themistius, and Ammianus gives the following interesting report of how matters had proceeded in Antioch:

> **when … foreign envoys … begged with prayers and protestations that an exiled race [i.e. the Goths] might be received on our side of the river, the affair caused more joy than fear; and learned flatterers (*eruditis adulatoribus*) immoderately praised the good fortune of the prince, which had unexpectedly brought him so many young recruits from the ends of the earth …** (Ammianus 31.3.4)

'Learned flatterers' brings Themistius immediately to mind: an accurate, if hostile, description of him. We also know that, just before travelling west in either 376 or 377, Themistius was indeed with Valens on the Persian front.3 The arguments used – that the arrival of new recruits would assist state finances – also recalls the kinds of cost-benefit argumentation that Themistius had earlier used to justify Valens' negotiated

withdrawal from the Gothic war of 367-9 in Orations 8 and 10.4 **If Ammianus' jibe was directed at Themistius, it is possible that he made some now lost public pronouncement when in Antioch justifying the admission of the Goths.**

https://archive.org/details/politicsphilosop0000them/page/272/mode/2up?view=theater

But with your beloved son before your eyes, already a boy, already a young man, already perfect in speech, soon able even to address the multitude – O what fortitude – **you yielded to virtue, rather than nature** [205a] **just as your ancestor and forefather did. Although he had no children, there were the offspring of his brothers and nieces. Even so, he valued none of them above the esteem in which he held Lusius, a man who was not even Roman, not even a Libyan from the Libyan province, but from an obscure and remote borderland.** He first proclaimed this man consul after his defeat of the Mardi and then appointed him successor to the throne.219 Thus did the emperors of those days think it important that virtue never be deprived of its just rewards.

> 219. **Theodosius claimed descent from Trajan (Orosius 7.34.2), who in 117 appointed the Moor L. Lusius Quietus as consul.**

...

Once [Theodosius] had taken up the reins, and, like the most experienced of drivers first tested his horses to gauge their strength and mettle in his hands,229 **he was the first who dared entertain the notion** [c] **that the power of the Romans did not lie in weapons, nor in breastplates, spears and unnumbered manpower,**230 **but that there was need of some other power and provision,** which, to those who rule in accordance with the will of God, comes silently from the source, which subdues all nations, turns all savagery to mildness and to which alone arms, bows, cavalry, the intransigence of the Scythians, the boldness of the Alans, the madness of the Massagetai yield.231

...

The tale has also been told by Aesop the storyteller of a contest between Persuasion and Force, and in the story, Persuasion achieves more than Force; the sun makes one shed clothes before the raging winds do.236 **In the same way, the poets tell that in their battle with the gods, the Giants resisted Ares to the utmost, but were sent to sleep by Hermes and his wand.**237

The most wise king, finding that this was the only power left to the Romans unscathed and untested by the barbarians, [b] **and recognising that the more they did wrong, so the more they knew it would be to their advantage, realised that forgiveness towards those who had done wrong was better than to fight it out to the bitter end.**

...

But this interpreter and disciple of the celestial Orpheus [Saturninus], using the god-given music – enchanting words flowing sweeter than honey – was sent out so equipped by the man who despatched him [Theodosius], **and casting spells with these weapons, bewitching with them,** exhorting with them, putting forward good hopes for the future and removing the suspicion about those they had wronged, [210a] wafting the king's love of mankind before them like an olive branch,243 led them docile and amenable, all but twisting their hands behind their backs, so that it was a matter of doubt whether he had beaten the men in war or won their friendship.244

...

But see how the most hated name of Scythia is now beloved, now pleasant, now agreeable. They join together with us in the festive celebration of the general, by whom they had the good fortune to be captured, and partake of the feasts that celebrate the triumph over themselves.249 [211a] If they have not been utterly wiped out, no complaint should be raised.250 **For such are the triumphs of reason and universal love, not to destroy but rather to make better those who have caused suffering.** For just suppose that this destruction was an easy matter and that we possessed the means to accomplish it without suffering any consequences, although from past experience this was neither a foregone nor likely conclusion,251 **nevertheless just suppose, as I said, that this solution lay within our power. Was it then better to fill Thrace with corpses or with farmers?** To make it full of tombs or living men? [b] To progress through a wilderness or a cultivated land? To count up the number of the slaughtered or those who till the soil? **To colonise it with Phrygians or Bithynians perhaps, or to live in harmony with those we have subdued? I hear from those who have returned from there that they are now turning the metal of their swords and breastplates into hoes and pruning hooks,**252 **and that while paying distant respect to Ares, they offer prayers to Demeter and Dionysus.**253

Human existence has in the past brought forth many such examples, [c] and our times are not the first when it has come to pass that those who have transgressed have found forgiveness and thereafter been of use to those who had been wronged. Look at these Galatians, the ones on the Pontus. Yet these men crossed over into Asia under the law of war, and, **having depopulated all the region this side of the Halys,** settled in this territory which they now inhabit. And neither Pompey nor Lucullus destroyed them, although this was perfectly possible, nor Augustus nor the emperors after him; rather, they remitted their sins and assimilated them into the Empire. **And now no one would ever refer to the Galatians as barbarians but as thoroughly Roman.** [d] **For while their ancestral name has endured, their way of life is now akin to our own.** They pay the same taxes as we do, they enlist in the same ranks as we do, they accept governors on the same

terms as the rest and abide by the same laws.254 So will we see the Scythians do likewise within a short time. **For now their clashes with us are still recent, but in fact we shall soon receive them to share our offerings, our tables, our military ventures, and public duties.**255 Yet if they had been utterly wiped out, [212a] we would have punished the Thracians as well as the Scythians.

https://archive.org/details/politicsphilosop0000them/page/328/mode/2up?view=theater

Now those who breathe fire, **who were more troublesome to the Romans than Hannibal,** come forward, gentle and tame, handing themselves over, weapons and all, for the king to use as he wishes whether as farmers or soldiers.156 And the consciousness of their enormous and manifold wrongdoings does not frighten them, nor produce distrust of finding mercy and love of mankind in those who had suffered the utmost wrong, but the king's gentleness stands as a stronger security for their safety than what they have acknowledged in themselves.

[XXIII] In the same way, the poets say that the Giants rose up against Ares, Enyo, Zeus' thunderbolt and the gods, and held out for some time. **When, however, Apollo and Hermes appeared, young gods, beautiful and enchanting, they had no need for bow and arrows, but they [the Giants] were charmed by the staff and lyre.**157 **Such are the triumphs of piety: not to destroy but to improve the vanquished.** [XXIV] Come here you Thracians and Macedonians; take your fill of an unbelievable spectacle. The Scythians share our roofs and our libations and the feats in celebration of the victory over themselves. They did not know, it seems, that they would encounter such a gentle man,158 and become entangled in his nets. **They fell suddenly on what were impregnable places as far as the Romans were concerned – the Haemus, the Hebrus and the wastes of Thessaly – but, having crossed over these,**159 **were checked with no great effort by divine defences: piety, justice, mildness, and love of mankind.** Come out now from your fortifications with confidence; it is now time for you to leave your battlements and to look to your herds and ploughs and sharpen the sickle rather than your swords and javelins.160 **The land is now open to travellers and there is no need to sail the sea since there is no fear of going on foot.** Road stations come back to life, and stables and lodgings and they cover the ground providing rest (for travellers) as of old.161 Such a great cloud of hail has suddenly dispersed into the clear air, and the stormy sea into a flat calm, so peaceful, so soundless that the whole affair can be compared to a riddle. For we did not conquer those whom we fought, but, laying down our arms, we won them over to ourselves. Once we counted up those whom we were going to meet in battle, now we count those over whom we will be masters.162 Then we were in trouble if they were many, now we are worried if they are not. [XXV] **Reflect, then, on how much more like a king Theodosius has behaved towards those who angered him, than the descendant of Pelops, the son of Atreus, Homer's Agamemnon of wide dominion.**163 He reproved his brother when he was relenting towards the suppliant, and sent up such a bitter, even barbaric prayer, that none of the Trojans should escape, not even the male child whom his mother yet carries in her womb, that not even he should escape but even those as yet unborn should die before they come into existence.164 But we are gentle towards those who are suppliants; **we nourish their sons and give their daughters in marriage, not hating them as Scythians, but deeming them worthy of mercy as human beings.** For this is how things are. He who visits the ultimate penalty on the barbarians in their wilfulness makes himself king of the Romans alone, but he who conquers but is merciful knows that he is the king of all men, whom one might address with justice as one who truly loves all mankind. As for other rulers, you might call Cyrus a lover of Persians, but not a lover of mankind, Alexander a lover of Macedonians but not of mankind, Agesilaus a lover of Greeks, Augustus of Romans, and any other individual the lover of whatever race or tribe he happened to be king.165 **But a lover of mankind without qualification, and king without qualification is he who asks only this question; whether it is a man who craves fair treatment, and not whether it is a Scythian or a Massagete,**166 **or whether he had done the first wrong in some way or other. For this, even if it is just, is not divine and in accordance with our**167 **great name for divinity, but rather is the characteristic of those who 'go upon the earth'**168 for whom to be hostile or ill-disposed towards someone is not a source of blame, and to injure and give injury in return and to suffer something and to return in due measure has its pardon through the equal balancing of fortune and power.169

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2170/pg2170-images.html#link2H_4_0022

In 1829, at length, concessions were made, were made largely, were made without the conditions which Mr Pitt would undoubtedly have demanded, and to which, if demanded by Mr Pitt, the whole body of Roman Catholics would have eagerly assented. **But those concessions were made reluctantly, made ungraciously, made under duress, made from the mere dread of civil war.**
...

At length, when he was gone, the Roman Catholics began to look, not to cabinets and parliaments, but to themselves. They displayed a formidable array of physical force, and yet kept within, just within, the limits of the law. The consequence was that, in two years, more than any prudent friend had ventured to demand for them was granted to them by their enemies. Yes; within two years after Mr Canning had been laid in the transept near us, all that he would have done, and more than he could have done, was done by his persecutors. **How was it possible that the whole Roman Catholic population of Ireland should not take up the notion that from England, or at least from the party which then governed and which now governs**

> **England, nothing is to be got by reason, by entreaty, by patient endurance, but everything by intimidation?**

https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/1220/2314

Three years after Chrysostom was elected as bishop of Constantinople, Themistius was appointed as prefect of the same city by Theodosius in 384 CE.
...

Themistius (quoted in Heather 1999) states:

> **There is in each of us a barbarian tribe, extremely overbearing and intractable** – I mean temper and those insatiable desires, which stand opposed to rationality as Scythians and Germans do to the Romans. (p. 236)

...

For Themistius, the 'cure' for being barbarian is to become Roman, and for Chrysostom the cure would be to become an orthodox Christian.

https://archive.org/details/lifelettersinfou00gloviala/page/38/mode/2up?view=theater

Though he laments that his contemporaries have not the recuperative power which "sober antiquity, unstained by the effeminacy of an ungirt life," possessed in its unanimity and patriotism,1 he has no regrets for the republic, no sorrow for the Senate of Rome in its glorious effacement, none of the narrow Roman feeling of the city-state days. Three hundred years had brought a good many changes, and all the world was Roman now together, apart from Germans, Goths, and Persians beyond the pale. **The Greek of Antioch is as much a Roman as any one. The result is a striking difference of tone in the historian—a change for the better. We are rid of the jingoism of Livy, and the gloom of Tacitus.**2 **Ammianus himself is tenderer and has larger sympathies than the historians of old.** He can value human life even if it is not a Roman life, and pity the child though a Syrian who begins his experience by being taken captive. **The Roman in Ammianus poses no more. He is far more frankly human.** As a result we feel more with him. In fighting German3 and Persian he is battling for light and civilization, and Christianity itself; and if in the last great fight in book xxxi. we incline to the Gothic side in some degree, it is the fault of a criminal official, and not because our historian alienates our sympathy by a narrow and offensive little patriotism. **Things are more fairly and squarely judged on their merits now when the cramping caste distinction of *civitas* is gone. Even the line between Roman and barbarian was growing faint, when the Frank Nevitta was made consul by Julian, bitter as he was against Constantine for his barbarian consuls.**

But I have said nothing so far of one great change that had come over the world in the triumph of the Church. We hear of it of course from Ammianus, but less than we might have expected. This is easily accounted for. One of our chief interests in the fourth century is the Arian controversy, and Ammianus was a heathen. A heathen of the latter-day type, that is, a rather confused, because so very open-minded a heathen. **We hear little about the gods and a great deal about the vaguely-named *caeleste numen*,** which shews its interest in mankind again and again.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap40.htm#suppressed

The writings of Simplicius are now extant. His physical and metaphysical commentaries on Aristotle have passed away with the fashion of the times; but his moral interpretation of Epictetus is preserved in the library of nations, as a classic book, most excellently adapted to direct the will, to purify the heart, and to confirm the understanding, by a just confidence in the nature both of God and man.

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n335/mode/2up?view=theater

The party of reform emerges, as it were, personified in Marcus Porcius Cato (520-605/234-149). **Cato, the last statesman of note belonging to that earlier system which restricted its ideas to Italy and was averse to universal empire, was for that reason accounted in after times the model of a genuine Roman of the antique stamp; he may with greater justice be regarded as the representative of the opposition of the Roman middle class to the new Hellenico-cosmopolite nobility.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n431/mode/2up?view=theater

Ennius, hardly the most important but certainly the most influential poet of the sixth century, was not a Latin by birth, but on the contrary by virtue of his origin half a Greek. Of Messapian descent and Hellenic training, he settled in his thirty-fifth year at Rome, and lived there—at first as a resident alien, but after 570/184 as a burgess (p. 313)—in straitened circumstances, supported partly by giving instruction in Latin and Greek, partly by the proceeds of his pieces, partly by the donations of those Roman grandees, who, like Publius Scipio, Titus Flamininus, and Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, were inclined to promote the modern Hellenism and to reward the poet who sang their own and their ancestors' praises and even accompanied some of them to the field in the character, as it were, of a poet laureate nominated beforehand to celebrate the great deeds which they were to perform. He has himself elegantly described the client-like qualities requisite for such a calling.1 From the outset and by virtue of the whole tenor of his life a cosmopolite, he had the skill to appropriate the distinctive features of the nations among which he lived—Greek, Latin, and even Oscan—without devoting himself absolutely to any one of them; **and while the Hellenism of the earlier Roman poets was the result rather than the conscious aim of their poetic activity, and accordingly they at least attempted more or less to take their stand on national ground, Ennius on the contrary is very distinctly conscious of his revolutionary tendency, and evidently labours with zeal to bring into vogue neologico-Hellenic ideas among the Italians.** His most serviceable instrument was tragedy. **The remains of his tragedies show that he was well acquainted with the whole range of the Greek tragic drama and with Aeschylus and Sophocles in particular; it is the less therefore the result of accident, that he has modelled the great majority of his pieces, and all those that attained celebrity, on Euripides.** In the selection and treatment he was doubtless influenced partly by external considerations. But these alone cannot account for his bringing forward so decidedly the Euripidean element in Euripides; for his neglecting the choruses still more than did his original; for his laying still stronger emphasis on sensuous effect than the Greek; nor for his taking up pieces like the *Thyestes* and the *Telephus* so well known from the immortal ridicule of Aristophanes, with their princes' woes and woful princes, **and even such a piece as *Menalippa the Female Philosopher*, in which the whole plot turns on the absurdity of the national religion, and the tendency to make war on it from the physicist point of view is at once apparent.** The sharpest arrows are everywhere—and that partly in passages which can be proved to have been inserted1—directed against faith in the miraculous, and we almost wonder that the censorship of the Roman stage allowed such tirades to pass as the following:—

> *Ego deum genus esse semper dixi et dicam caelitum,*
> *Sed eos non curare opinor, quid agat humanum genus;*
> *Nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis, quod nunc abest.*

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n183/mode/2up?view=theater

Marcus Terentius Varro, despite many military campaigns, found time during his eighty-nine years (116-26 B.C.) to synopsize nearly every branch of knowledge; his 620 “volumes” (some seventy-four books) constituted a one-man encyclopedia for his time. Fascinated by the pedigrees of words, he wrote an essay *On the Latin Language,* now our chief guide to early Roman speech. Perhaps in co-operation with the aims of Augustus, he tried in his treatise *On Country Life* (*De Re Rustica,* 36 B.C.) to encourage a return to the land as the best refuge from the disorder of civil strife. “My eightieth year,” said his introduction, “warns me that I must pack up and prepare to leave this life”;[42] he would make his last testament a guide to rural happiness and peace. He admired the sturdy women who were delivered of children in the fields and soon resumed work.[43] He mourned the low native birth rate that was transforming the population of Rome; **“formerly the blessing of children was woman’s pride; now she boasts with Ennius that she ‘would rather face battle three times than bear one child.’”** In his *Divine Antiquities* he concluded that the fertility, order, and courage of a nation require moral commandments supported by religious belief. Adopting the distinction of the great jurist Q. Mucius Scaevola between two kinds of religion—one for philosophers and one for the people[44]—he argued that the second must be upheld regardless of its intellectual defects; **and though he himself accepted only a vague pantheism,* he proposed a vigorous attempt to restore the worship of Rome’s ancient deities.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euripides#Reception

Unique among writers of ancient Athens, Euripides demonstrated sympathy towards the underrepresented members of society.[7][98] His male contemporaries were frequently shocked by the heresies[*clarification needed*] he put into the mouths of characters, such as these words of his heroine Medea:[99]

> [...] ὡς τρὶς ἂν παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα στῆναι θέλοιμ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τεκεῖν ἅπαξ [250–251].[100]
>
> I would rather stand three times with a shield in battle than give birth once.[101]

...

The plan of making an Iliad pronounces its own condemnation. **It was Ennius, who in this poem for the first time introduced into literature that changeling compound of epos and of history, which from that time up to the present day haunts it like a ghost, unable either to live or to die.** But the poem certainly had its success. Ennius claimed to be the Roman Homer with still greater ingenuousness than Klopstock claimed to be the German, and was received as such by his contemporaries and still more so by posterity. The veneration for the father of Roman poetry was transmitted from generation to generation; even the polished Quintilian says, "Let us revere Ennius as we revere an ancient sacred grove, whose mighty oaks of a thousand years are more venerable than beautiful;" **and, if any one is disposed to wonder at this, he may recall analogous phenomena in the successes of the Aeneid, the Henriad, and the Messiad.** A mighty poetical development of the nation would indeed have set aside that almost comic official parallel between the Homeric Iliad and the Ennian Annals as easily as we have set aside the comparison of Karschin with Sappho and of Willamov with Pindar; but no such development took place in Rome. Owing to the interest of the subject especially for aristocratic circles, and the great plastic talent of the poet, the Annals remained the oldest Roman original poem which appeared to the culture of later generations readable or worth reading; **and thus, singularly enough, posterity came to honour this thoroughly anti-national epos of a half-Greek *littérateur* as the true model poem of Rome.**
...

As the Hellenico-Roman literature of this period was essentially marked by a dominant tendency, so was also its antithesis, the contemporary national authorship. **While the former aimed at neither more nor less than the annihilation of Latin nationality by the creation of a poetry Latin in language but Hellenic in form and spirit,** the best and purest part of the Latin nation was driven to reject and place under the ban of outlawry the literature of Hellenism along with Hellenism itself. **The Romans in the time of Cato stood opposed to Greek literature, very much as in the time of the Caesars they stood opposed to Christianity;** freedmen and foreigners formed the main body of the poetical, as they afterwards formed the main body of the Christian, community; the nobility of the nation and above all the government saw in poetry as in Christianity an absolutely hostile power; **Plautus and Ennius were ranked with the rabble by the Roman aristocracy for reasons nearly the same as those for which the apostles and bishops were put to death by the Roman government.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tAeFipOVx4MC&lpg=PA16&hl=fi&pg=PA20#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Euhemerus was particularly successful in Rome where the poet Ennius (239-169 B.C.) translated his work around 200 B.C. into Latin prose, perhaps in preparation of a spiritual climate favorable to the deification of Scipio Africanus, the victor of Carthage and Hannibal. Ennius did not make a literal translation, but he expanded the original somewhat and explained the Greek names to his Roman public, **where his work proved to be highly successful and was read by Varro (116-27 B.C.) and Cicero and, eventually, furnished ammunition to the Christians.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Cato_Major*.html#ref20

22 1 When he was now well on in years, there came as ambassadors from Athens to Rome,[20] **Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic philosopher,** to beg the reversal of a certain decision against the Athenian people, which imposed upon them a fine of five hundred talents. The people of Oropus had brought the suit, the Athenians had let the case go by default, and the Sicyonians had pronounced judgment against them. 2 Upon the arrival of these philosophers, the most studious of the city's youth hastened to wait upon them, and became their devoted and admiring listeners. The charm of Carneades especially, which had boundless power, and a fame not inferior to its power, won large and sympathetic audiences, and filled the city, like a rushing mighty wind, with the noise of his praises. 3 **Report spread far and wide that a Greek of amazing talent, who disarmed all opposition by the magic of his eloquence, had infused a tremendous passion into the youth of the city, in consequence of which they forsook their other pleasures and pursuits and were "possessed" about philosophy. The other Romans were pleased at this, and glad to see their young men lay hold of Greek culture and consort with such admirable men.** 4 But Cato, at the very outset, when this zeal for discussion came pouring into the city, was distressed, fearing lest the young men, by giving this direction to their ambition, should come to love a reputation based on mere words more than one achieved by martial deeds. **And when the fame of the visiting philosophers rose yet higher in the city, and their first speeches before the Senate were interpreted, at his own instance and request, by so conspicuous a man as Gaius Acilius, Cato determined, on some decent pretext or other, to rid and purge the city of them all.** 5 So he rose in the Senate and censured the magistrates for keeping in such long suspense an embassy composed of men who could easily secure anything they wished, so persuasive were they. "We ought," he said, "to make up our minds one way or another, and vote on what the embassy proposes, **in order that these men may return to their schools and lecture to the sons of Greece, while the youth of Rome give ear to their laws and magistrates,** as heretofore."

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n381/mode/2up?view=theater

But the Romans had now reached a crisis of transition. **Now that the power of Rome was no longer confined to Italy but had spread far and wide to the east and to the west, the days of the old**

home life of Italy were over, and a Hellenizing civilization came in its room. It is true that Italy had been subject to the influence of Greece, ever since it had a history at all. We have formerly shown how the youthful Greece and the youthful Italy—both of them with a certain measure of simplicity and originality—gave and received intellectual impulses; and how at a later period Rome endeavoured after a more external manner to appropriate to practical use the language and inventions of the Greeks. But the Hellenism of the Romans of the present period was, in its causes as well as its consequences, something essentially new.
...

Hellenic civilization still doubtless called itself by that name, but it was Hellenic no longer; it was, in fact, humanistic and cosmopolitan. It had solved the problem of moulding a mass of different nations into one whole completely in the field of intellect, and to a certain extent also in that of politics; and, now when the same task on a wider scale devolved on Rome, she took over Hellenism along with the rest of the inheritance of Alexander the Great. **Hellenism therefore was no longer a mere stimulus or accessory influence; it penetrated the Italian nation to the very core. Of course, the vigorous home life of Italy strove against the foreign element. It was only after a most vehement struggle that the Italian farmer abandoned the field to the cosmopolite of the capital;** and, as in Germany the French coat called forth the national Germanic frock, so the reaction against Hellenism aroused in Rome a tendency which opposed the influence of Greece on principle, in a fashion altogether foreign to the earlier centuries, and in doing so fell pretty frequently into downright follies and absurdities.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/847/pg847-images.html

The ancient lays, unjustly despised by the learned and polite, linger for a time in the memory of the vulgar, and are at length too often irretrievably lost. **We cannot wonder that the ballads of Rome should have altogether disappeared, when we remember how very narrowly, in spite of the invention of printing, those of our own country and those of Spain escaped the same fate.** There is indeed little doubt that oblivion covers many English songs equal to any that were published by Bishop Percy, and many Spanish songs as good as the best of those which have been so happily translated by Mr. Lockhart. **Eighty years ago [1842] England possessed only one tattered copy of Childe Waters and Sir Cauline, and Spain only one tattered copy of the noble poem of the Cid.** The snuff of a candle, or a mischievous dog, might in a moment have deprived the world forever of any of those fine compositions. Sir Walter Scott, who united to the fire of a great poet the minute curiosity and patient diligence of a great antiquary, was but just in time to save the precious relics of the Minstrelsy of the Border. **In Germany, the lay of the Nibelungs had been long utterly forgotten, when, in the eighteenth century, it was, for the first time, printed from a manuscript in the old library of a noble family.** In truth, the only people who, through their whole passage from simplicity to the highest civilization, never for a moment ceased to love and admire their old ballads, were the Greeks.
...

Ennius, who flourished in the time of the Second Punic War, was regarded in the Augustan age as the father of Latin poetry. **He was, in truth, the father of the second school of Latin poetry, the only school of which the works have descended to us.** But from Ennius himself we learn that there were poets who stood to him in the same relation in which the author of the romance of Count Alarcos stood to Garcilaso, or the author of the Lytell Geste of Robyn Hode to Lord Surrey.
...

Valerius Maximus gives us exactly similar information, without mentioning his authority, **and observes that the ancient Roman ballads were probably of more benefit to the young than all the lectures of the Athenian schools, and that to the influence of the national poetry were to be ascribed the virtues of such men as Camillus and Fabricius.**

Varro, whose authority on all questions connected with the antiquities of his country is entitled to the greatest respect, tells us that at banquets it was once the fashion for boys to sing, sometimes with and sometimes without instrumental music, ancient ballads in praise of men of former times. **These young performers, he observes, were of unblemished character, a circumstance which he probably mentioned because, among the Greeks, and indeed, in his time among the Romans also, the morals of singing boys were in no high repute.**
...

This proposition being established, it becomes easy to understand why the early history of the city is unlike almost everything else in Latin literature, native where almost everything else is borrowed, imaginative where almost everything else is prosaic. We can scarcely hesitate to pronounce that the magnificent, pathetic, and truly national legends, which present so striking a contrast to all that surrounds them, are broken and defaced fragments of that early poetry which, even in the age of Cato the Censor, had become antiquated, and of which Tully had never heard a line.

That this poetry should have been suffered to perish will not appear strange when we consider how complete was the triumph of the Greek genius over the public mind of Italy. It is probable that, at an early period, Homer and Herodotus furnished some hints to the Latin Minstrels; but it was not till after the war with Pyrrhus that the poetry of Rome began to put off its old Ausonian character. **The transformation was soon consummated. The conquered, says Horace, led captive the conquerors. It was precisely at the time at which the Roman people rose to unrivalled political ascendency that they stooped to pass under the intellectual yoke. It was precisely at the time at which the sceptre departed from Greece that the empire of her language and of her arts became universal and despotic.** The revolution indeed was not effected without a struggle. Naevius seems to have been the last of the ancient line of poets. Ennius was the founder of a new dynasty. **Naevius celebrated the First Punic War in Saturnian verse, the old national verse of Italy. Ennius sang the Second Punic War in numbers borrowed from the Iliad.** The elder poet, in the epitaph which he wrote for himself, and which is a fine specimen of the early Roman diction and versification, plaintively boasted that the Latin language had died with him. Thus what to Horace appeared to be the first faint dawn of Roman literature appeared to Naevius to be its hopeless setting. In truth, one literature was setting, and another dawning.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Naevius,_Gnaeus

> “Immortales mortales si foret fas flere,
> Flerent divae Camenae Naevium poetam;
> Itaque postquam est Orci traditus thesauro
> Obliti sunt Romai loquier lingua Latina.”[1]
>
> **If these lines were dictated by a jealousy of the growing ascendancy of Ennius, the life of Naevius must have been prolonged considerably beyond 204, the year in which Ennius began his career as an author in Rome.** As distinguished from Livius Andronicus, Naevius was a native Italian, not a Greek; he was also an original writer, not a mere adapter or translator. If it was due to Livius that the forms of Latin literature were, from the first, moulded on those of Greek literature, it was due to Naevius that much of its spirit and substance was of native growth.
> …
>
> A strong spirit of partisanship is recognized in more than one of the fragments; and this spirit is thoroughly popular and adverse to the senatorial ascendancy which became more and more confirmed with the progress of the second Punic war.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201720/page/n551/mode/2up?view=theater

The Alexandrian literature was based on the decline of the pure Hellenic idiom, which from the time of Alexander the Great was superseded in daily life by an inferior jargon deriving its origin from the contact of the Macedonian dialect with various Greek and barbarian tribes; or, **to speak more accurately, the Alexandrian literature sprang out of the ruin of the Hellenic nation generally, which had to perish, and did perish, in its national individuality in order to establish the universal monarchy of Alexander and the empire of Hellenism.**
…

But it was by no means simply such accidental occasions which called into existence the Roman Alexandrinism; it was on the contrary a product—**perhaps not pleasing, but thoroughly inevitable**—of the political and national development of Rome. On the one hand, **as Hellas resolved itself into Hellenism, so now Latium resolved itself into Romanism; the national development of Italy outgrew itself, and was merged in Caesar's Mediterranean empire, just as the Hellenic development in the eastern empire of Alexander.**
…

With the scholastic Latin, with the closed number of classics, with the exclusive circle of classic-reading *urbani*, the national Latin literature was dead and at an end; **there arose instead of it a thoroughly degenerate, artificially fostered, imperial literature, which did not rest on any definite nationality, but proclaimed in two languages the universal gospel of humanity,** and was dependent in point of spirit throughout and consciously on the old Hellenic, in point of language partly on this, partly on the old Roman popular literature.

https://archive.org/details/historyrome12mommgoog/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

As the aggregate result of this modern Roman education there sprang up the new idea of "humanity," as it was called, which consisted partly of a more or less superficial appropriation of the aesthetic culture of the Hellenes, partly of a privileged Latin culture as an imitation or mutilated copy of the Greek. **This new humanity, as the very name indicates, renounced the specific characteristics of Roman life,**

nay even came forward in opposition to them, and combined in itself, just like our closely kindred "general culture," a nationally cosmopolitan and socially exclusive character. Here too we trace the revolution, which separated classes and blended nations.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201720/page/n513/mode/2up?view=theater

Wherever the Roman legionary went, the Greek schoolmaster, no less a conqueror in his own way, followed; at an early date we find famous teachers of the Greek language settled on the Guadalquivir, and Greek was as well taught as Latin in the institute of Osca. **The higher Roman culture itself was in fact nothing else than the proclamation of the great gospel of Hellenic manners and art in the Italian idiom;** against the modest pretension of the civilizing conquerors to proclaim it first of all in their own language to the barbarians of the west the Hellene at least could not loudly protest.
...

Even in the ancient world Judaism was an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition, and to that extent a specially privileged member in the Caesarian state, the polity of which was strictly speaking nothing but a citizenship of the world, and the nationality of which was at bottom nothing but humanity.

> http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/10939-mommsen-christian-matthias-theodor
>
> The passage in his "Römische Gesch." (iii. 350), "Auch in der alten Welt war das Judentum ein wirksames Ferment des Kosmopolitismus und der nationalen Dekomposition und insofern ein vorzugsweise berechtigtes Mitglied **in dem cäsarischen Staate, dessen Politik doch eigentlich nichts als Weltbürgertum, dessen Volkstümlichkeit im Grunde nichts als Humanität war**," having been misunderstood and misinterpreted by the anti-Semites, was omitted by Mommsen in a later edition.
>
> https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/dahn/voelker1/voe1214.html
>
> **Eine Nationalreligion aber wird nur überwunden, wenn die Nation äußerlich überwunden und ihr eine fremde aufgezwungen wird** – wie das Christentum so häufig durch die Waffen eingeführt ward – **oder, wenn die Nation jenen Charakter verloren hat, aus welchem die Religion geboren war.** Der Erfolg hat das gelehrt. Länger als drei Jahrhunderte fand das Christentum bei den Römern nur Verachtung, später Haß: als es Eingang fand, fand es keine Römer mehr: **sondern einen entnationalisierten, entrömerten, kosmopolitischen Brei, verdorben durch einen tief und lang entarteten Hellenismus,** entnervt durch die Kulte und Lüste Asiens, gestützt, aber barbarisiert zugleich durch Barbaren aller Grenzvölker. *Diese* Römer, nicht die starken, sondern die tödlich erkrankten hat das Christentum überwunden.

https://archive.org/details/inequalityhuman00gobigoog/page/n184/mode/2up?view=theater

In fact, every man who had any claim to share in the enlightenment of the time strongly asserted the equality of the human race, the right of all men to have their part in the good things of this world, the obvious necessity of the Graeco-Roman civilization, its perfection and refinement, its certainty of a future progress even beyond its present state, and, to crown all, its existence for ever. **These ideas were not merely the pride and consolation of the pagans; they inspired also the firm hopes of the first and most illustrious Fathers of the Church,** of whose views Tertullian was the self-constituted interpreter.*

> * Amédée Thierry, *Histoire de la Gaule sous l'administration romaine*, vol. i, p. 241.

https://www.cristoraul.org/ENGLISH/readinghall/THIRDMILLENNIUMLIBRARY/Biographies/Julian-the-Apostate/THE-EMPEROR-JULIAN-THE-APOSTATE_Book-contents.html

Paganism in its later stages has no more characteristic feature than the carelessness and prodigality of its polytheism. The spirit of cosmopolitanism, inaugurated by Pagan Caesar and consummated in the Edict of Caracalla, affected religion no less than all other parts of thought and life. **Free-trade in religion was alike a recognized theory and an accomplished fact.** It was a quite antiquated proceeding to chain the guardian gods to the walls of the beleaguered city.

Greek enterprise conveyed with it the national gods to favor the disposition of its wares, and in return transported home the deities of the countries where it dealt. At the great centres of commerce, Alexandria, Antioch, and the like, there lived side by side the strangest medley of heterogeneous gods:—gods of all origins, gods of all shapes and sizes, gods of all sexes and colors, found equal honor or dishonor from crowds of speculative worshippers. **Athens, the city of temples, for fear of forgetting someone, reared altars to the unknown gods. Rome solved the same problem by building the Pantheon.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerospractical0000unse/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater

Rome's political peculiarity, I submit, was that it was not simply a *polis* with an empire attached to it (like Athens or, in later times, Venice or Genoa); it was a full community of *citizens* over a large territory, integrating a vast number of people in the Italian peninsula within a *political* organization who in a "normal" empire would simply have been subjects of the metropolis. **Thus, though the level of political integration in the Italian peninsula in Cicero's time was not yet as high as it would be in Augustus's time a generation later (when Augustus could speak of *tota Italia*), it was certainly comparable to the level of political integration of a proto-modern state (seventeenth-century France, for example).** To put the point provocatively, the Roman commonwealth in Cicero's time, at least in the Italian peninsula, had more in common in important respects with a proto-modern state than with a small Greek *polis*, despite the superficial similarity in political institutions between Rome and the typical Greek *polis*.3
…

Cicero's model of political community can thus be understood as an implicit response to the theoretical inadequacies of the available Platonic-Aristotelian (*urbs*, or "city") and Stoic (*orbis*, or "world") models of community in the face of Roman imperial expansion. Cicero attempts to synthesize elements of both of these models of political community in an attempt to sufficiently account for Roman political reality, both normatively and empirically.5 **The result of this synthesis is a model of political community that bears strong structural similarities to the model of community current today, namely the national state, and indeed is a direct ancestor of it via Augustine and later the "republican" tradition of political thought.**6
…

The distinctive contribution of the Stoics to ideas of political community, in brief, is the extreme dissociation of community from any particular set of institutions, whether in the form of a particular political regime (even if, as Erskine argues, they were originally sympathetic to democracy, a controversial contention) or in the form of the tightly linked institutions that guaranteed a Greek *paideia* (as Zeno's rejection of conventional education suggests).24 This dissociation is in turn associated with an emphasis on the virtuous individual who realizes the harmony of the cosmos in himself and in the city as the only properly active part of the community.
…

But Cicero interprets these Stoic elements in the idea of political community in a way that we might call, for lack of a better term, "egalitarian." Instead of the older Stoic idea of a community of the wise whose individual reason is in conformity with the order of the cosmos, we find a community of non-wise people who merely acknowledge as valid an externally given (but reasonable) set of normative expectations.31 In this sense, **the people become a legal concept:** what is, and what is not, a people has almost nothing to do with the common fate of a cultural community (as in modern states) or with the limited but necessary interdependence of families and individuals for the sake of production and reproduction (as in the urban model of community), **but only with the indefinite agreement of a community on the proper rules of interaction (natural law).**

Cicero does not, to be sure, abandon the idea that a political community is tied to the satisfaction of natural needs, and indeed of the natural needs and interdependence of both wise and non-wise. But he is permissive about what this might entail with respect to the limits of the community and its institutional forms, unlike, for example, Aristotle or Plato. Take the case of property. In the "urban" model of political community, property appears as a side-effect, as it were, of the process of production and reproduction from which the community emerges: it is because we eat and have families that there is property at all, and it is because different forms of property stimulate our desires in particular ways (potentially interfering with the possibility of living a virtuous life) that it must also be regulated. **The question for Aristotle or Plato then is about what form of property (common vs. private vs. some mixture of the two; limited through legal regulation or not) will preserve the processes of production and reproduction of the community without endangering the possibility of a virtuous life.**

But this link between property and production and reproduction on one hand, and the life of virtue on the other, is almost totally lost in Cicero due to his focus on *iuris consensus* as the fundamental principle of the community. Thus, **for Cicero the *res publica* is instituted, at least in part, to *safeguard* private property (*Off.* 2.73, 2.78), which is assumed to preexist its establishment; but property is not itself justified with reference to the production and**

reproduction of life in the community, or with respect to its effects on virtue. Indeed, Cicero suggests that (private) property is not "natural" in the sense of being a natural side-effect of the natural processes of production and reproduction of the community, and hence should be justified not by reference to its effects on them (or on the processes that produce virtuous characters, for that matter) but on (what we might call) **purely legalistic and positive grounds, that is, "long occupancy ... conquest ... due process of law ... purchase, or allotment"** (*Off.* 1.121). These "modalities of acquisition and transfer," to use non-Ciceronian terms, are capable of being regulated by fixed rules (and thus are appropriate to a conception of justice as natural law), but they are compatible with any kind and degree of property accumulation. Hence Cicero's rigid rejection of any redistributive schemes except when accompanied by adequate compensation (cf. *Off.* 2.81); **like Locke, Cicero seems to think that once legal relations come into play, what justice requires is merely the regulation of the *process* of acquisition and transfer, not of the outcomes of such transfers, and the idea of the "common utility" does not seem to impose any meaningful constraints on these outcomes.**
…

The *patria* is not ethnically or culturally defined: Cicero distinguishes the *civitas* (*Off.* 1.53; here synonymous with the *patria*) from the *natio* and the *gens* in a fairly standard Stoic way (compare with Hierocles in Stobaeus, 4.671,7-673,11 = Long and Sedley, 57G), **and nowhere clearly identifies the *patria* with any of these plausibly "natural" communities.** At any rate Rome, as Cicero well knew, like other ancient empires, contained in its territory, and even in the Italian peninsula (the most integrated part of Rome), diverse *gentes* and *nationes* and peoples who spoke various languages, despite an advanced process of "latinization" in the core of the empire.32 It would thus have been odd for Cicero to emphasize the cultural unity of his *patria*, though he does at times come close to doing just that.33 Even the setting of the *De Re Publica* suggests that the *patria* cannot be understood in exclusionary ethnic or cultural terms. **Scipio is, after all, the champion of the Italians, the proponent of a policy that Cicero also endorsed, the treatment of the allies as equals.**34

Yet though the *patria* is not a cultural or ethnic community, it is also not simply, unlike the people, a creature of agreement and law alone, but the result of a historically concrete love for particular people, institutions, places, and stories. Thus in Book 2 of *De Legibus*, Marcus (Cicero himself, as a character in the dialogue), claims that "all those who came from the towns" (*municipia*) "have two fatherlands, one by nature [*naturae*], the other by citizenship," and goes on to give the example of Cato, who was "Tusculan by origin [*cum ortu*], Roman by citizenship," though his own example is just as pertinent: Marcus, as he notes, is from Arpinum (by origin or by nature) but a Roman citizen by law (*Leg.* 1.5-6).
…

But as Cicero well knew, *municipia* such as Arpinum or Tusculum used to be self-governing communities.36 These were *poleis* in their own right, who had been conquered by the Romans in the past or had themselves voluntarily surrendered to incorporation into the Roman commonwealth. Indeed, within Cicero's lifetime, many of these *municipia* had struggled against the Romans to recover their independence during the "Social War" (91-89 B.C.).37 **These were not the villages of Aristotle, able to provide for life but not for the good life; they were true *poleis*.**

Perhaps sensing this objection, Cicero *does* attempt to assimilate these cities to Aristotelian villages coming together to create a more self-sufficient community. **He suggests that places like Arpinum or Tusculum were much like the Athenian *demes*, whose inhabitants were "compelled" by Theseus to move from the countryside to the town** (*Leg.* 2.5), and hence indicates a possible way of assimilating Rome to the urban model of community.
…

Italians were not even a single *natio* until the Romans *made* them so, just as the inhabitants of Attica did not form a single city until Theseus compelled them to do so. Thus by stressing the compulsion of the act of foundation and downplaying the differences between the Athenian *demes* and the Italian *municipia*, Cicero again (whether intentionally or not) suggests that the *patria* is created by will, not nature, and is the result of history, not natural sociality. To put the point more strongly than Cicero might have wanted to put it, **the *patria* is not created for the sake of the good or self-sufficient life in the union of partial communities but emerges from the long-term assimilation of conquered subjects into citizens and thus lovers of its institutions.**

This historical dimension in the idea of the *patria*, absent from the notion of the people, seems to be a completely new element in models of political community. And indeed we

find a tension in Cicero between the abstract idea of the people as a community united through agreement in law and the idea of the *patria* as the historically developed object of the people's love. This is manifested in at least two ways. On the one hand, as Cornell as argued,39 **Cicero's historical survey of Roman in *De Re Publica* 2, by omitting any indication of the "Trojan" past of Rome,** makes it hard to figure out how there could have been a *Roman* people for Romulus to rule; Cicero simply seems to assume that there existed a "people" who had the right kind of *consensus iuris et utilitate communione* before Romulus took over them.
…

Yet Scipio is traversing a difficult middle way. His Rome, even as a well-mixed regime, is not the embodiment of the *kallipolis*. **But it is also not the dispiriting reality of actual fact; the ragged edges of history have been excluded from this Rome's story.**
…

Scipio tries (with mixed results in the dialogue) to straddle a middle way in his own history of Rome, attempting to transform the actual fact of Rome into an ideal aspiration: a Rome recognizable enough to be *his* Rome, created by the considered actions of the ancestors of the assembled company (and hence recognizable enough to engender love), **yet pointing toward a higher reality, shimmering like a mirage in the "in between" of political action, mediating between the *kallipolis* and the realities of empire.** This Rome is not offered as a mere reform program (since it embraces the past as well as the future of the republic) though it can be (sometimes) interpreted as that (e.g., in *Leg.*).48 It is the intimation of nobility revealed in the actuality of the city's history and practice, an intimation that can inspire others to recover such nobility in the present. **We might say that Cicero, unlike Plato, wants no noble lies as the source of the love of country, though he might settle for noble half-truths.**
…

Cicero understands the people in terms recognizable to modern thought as a group united in agreement about certain rights and values and acting through what we might call "representative" institutions for its own care, and he understands the community that is cared for (the *patria*) as a *historical*, if not quite a cultural, entity, embodying certain principles in its institutions that deserve to be renewed and recovered through the political action of individuals.
…

The similarity between Cicero's model of political community and the model of the modern national state is not entirely surprising, as I have already intimated, since Rome shows important similarities to the modern state. There are, however, differences worth noticing. Cicero's notions of the *civitas* and the *consilium* do not yet have the full force of the modern notion of the state, even though Cicero's understanding of the constitution of the *civitas* as determining a *status rei publicae*, a condition of the republic (*Rep.* 1.43), opens the way for a differentiated understanding of the state as the organization and legal order that jointly determine the political state of society. **Cicero's patriotism, like Habermas's "constitutional patriotism,"**49 **or like the American kind,**50 **is attached to those principles of justice that it divines in the historical institutions of its country, though it still retains a link to Stoic ideas of natural law that avoid some of the apparent paradoxes of the national state in connection to "human rights."**51 **By the same token, however, Cicero's political community is—in contrast to the modern national state but like Rome—potentially unlimited:** it justifies an empire ruled by law that succeeded in integrating politically many of its conquered peoples, but an empire nonetheless.

> 49. Habermas, "The European Nation-State." **The idea of constitutional patriotism is introduced by Habermas as a bridge between exclusionary solidarity of the national state (the *urbs*) and the universal demands of human rights (the *orbis*).**
>
> https://archive.org/details/historyrome01dickgoog/page/n392/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In any case this municipal constitution—inserted in, and subordinate to, the state proper—is one of the most remarkable and momentous products of the Sullan period,** and of the life of the Roman state generally. Antiquity was certainly as little able to dovetail the city into the state as to develop of itself representative government and other great principles of our modern state-life; but it carried its political development up to those limits at which it outgrows and bursts its assigned dimensions, **and this was the case especially with Rome, which in every respect stands on the line of separation and connection between the old and the new intellectual worlds. In the Sullan constitution the primary assembly and the urban character of the commonwealth of Rome, on the one hand, vanished almost into a meaningless form; the community subsisting within the state on the other hand was**

already completely developed in the Italian *municipium*. Down to the name, which in such cases no doubt is the half of the matter, this last constitution of the free republic carried out the representative system and the idea of the state built upon the basis of the municipalities.

https://archive.org/details/erasmuslutherthe00murriala/page/414/mode/2up?view=theater

According to Seneca all men have the same origin. "All men, if we ascend to the source, have the gods for their father."8 In his judgment even slaves ought to be our friends:9 thus the conception of equality appears. The levelling tendency of the doctrine is patent in the circumstance that the two greatest of the later Stoics were a slave and an emperor. The justification of these charges turns on the fact that in a state of nature there are no slaves: all are free. **There are, however, few watchwords more dangerous than that of "Return to Nature." Does nature mean the ideal which man sets before him as his goal? Or does it mean the earliest stage in his existence as opposed to the latest, which is assumed to be artificial? Is the savage or the animal condition the end to be achieved? From the time of Antisthenes (426-336 B.C.) to that of Rousseau the latter, with disastrous effects, has been the reading chosen.** Two contemporaries of Aristophanes (*c.* 444-*c.* 380 B.C). Crates and Pherecrates, exhibit traces of this meaning. In the *Savages* of the latter, the chorus consists of haters of mankind who threw off the restraints of civilization in the woods,1 experiencing the failure of all such experiments.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178%3Atext%3DProt.%3Asection%3D327d

Likewise in the present case you must regard any man who appears to you the most unjust person ever reared among human laws and society as a just man and [327d] a craftsman of justice, if he had to stand comparison with people who lacked education and law courts and laws and any constant compulsion to the pursuit of virtue, but were a kind of wild folk such as Pherecrates the poet brought on the scene at last year's Lenaeum.[1] **Sure enough, if you found yourself among such people, as did the misanthropes among his chorus, you would be very glad to meet with Eurybatus and Phrynondas,[2]** [327e] **and would bewail yourself with longing for the wickedness of the people here.**

1. A dramatic festival, chiefly for comedies, held about the end of January. 2. Two notorious rogues.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/6E*.html#ref7

Well, Pherecrates says in *The Savages*:[8] **'In those days nobody had a slave, a Sambo or a Dinah, but the women had to toil by themselves over all the housework.** And what is more, they would grind the corn at early dawn, so that the village rang with the touch[9] of the handmills.'

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Thoughts_of_the_Emperor_Marcus_Aurelius_Antoninus/Book_I

14. From my brother[13] Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus;[14] **and from him I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed;**

https://archive.org/details/septimiusseverus0000birl_k3n2/page/48/mode/2up?view=theater

A pressing concern for the emperor was what he should do about his widowed daughter Lucilla. She was a high-spirited and headstrong young woman, not lacking in physical charms. **Some young senators of noble birth may have considered themselves eligible to be the second husband of a princess and stepfather to an emperor's child. But Marcus took no particular note of a man's origin, whether in appointing men to high office or in choosing husbands for his daughters. One was married to a man from proconsular Asia, Claudius Severus. As for Lucilla's two youngest sisters, one was to marry Burrus, from the family of the rising Numidian general Antistius Adventus, the other, Sura Mamertinus, possibly a kinsman of Septimius. It would be absurd to suggest that Septimius himself had any hopes – even in his dreams – of gaining the hand of Lucilla.** But the choice of her husband is something that he must have watched with considerable interest. In the event almost everyone must have been surprised, not least Lucilla herself and her mother. **The emperor married his daughter to a Syrian of equestrian background, Claudius Pompeianus.** Indirectly this match was to affect the fortunes of Septimius. Pompeianus soon became the principal military adviser of his father-in-law, and was able to advance the career of a protégé, Helvius Pertinax.3

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/Introduction*.html

Cassius Dio Cocceianus [*c.* A.D. 150-235] was a near relative, probably a grandson, of the famous orator, Dio Chrysostom, after whom he took the names Dio and Cocceianus, and like him was a native of Bithynia. His father was Cassius Apronianus, a Roman senator, who served as governor of Cilicia and of Dalmatia.[1]
...

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the speeches, which in Dio occupy a disproportionate amount of space (averaging one long speech or debate to the book), seem even farther removed from the realm of actual history than those of the ancient historians generally. The most famous of all these speeches, that of Maecenas to Augustus regarding the establishment of the monarchy, is in reality a political pamphlet setting forth Dio's own views of government, and parts of it are an anachronism in the mouth of Maecenas.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/52*.html

5 **For these are the evils found in every democracy,—the more powerful men, namely, in reaching out after the primacy and hiring the weaker, turn everything upside down,**—but they have been most frequent in our country, and there is no other way to put a stop to them than the way I propose. 6 And the evidence is, that we have now for a long time been engaged in wars and civil strife. **The cause is the multitude of our population and the magnitude of the business of our government; for the population embraces men of every kind, in respect both to race and to endowment, and both their tempers and their desires are manifold;** and the business of the state has become so vast that it can be administered only with the greatest difficulty.
...

7 For of course my purpose in doing this will be, not to hear myself talk, but that you may learn by a strict demonstration that it is both possible and easy, for a man of sense at least, to rule well and without danger.

19 1 "I maintain, therefore, that you ought first and foremost to choose and select with discrimination the entire senatorial body, inasmuch as some who have not been fit have, on account of our dissensions, become senators. Such of them as possess any excellence you ought to retain, but the rest you should erase from the roll. 2 Do not, however, get rid of any good man because of his poverty, but even give him the money he requires. **In the place of those who have been dropped introduce the noblest, the best, and the richest men obtainable, selecting them not only from Italy but also from the allies and the subject nations.** 3 In this way you will have many assistants for yourself and will have in safe keeping the leading men from all the provinces; **thus the provinces, having no leaders of established repute, will not begin rebellions, and their prominent men will regard you with affection because they have been made sharers in your empire.**

4 "**Take these same measures in the case of the knights also, by enrolling in the equestrian order such men as hold second place in their several districts as regards birth, excellence and wealth.** Register as many new members in both classes as you please, without being over particular on the score of their number. For the more men of repute you have as your associates, the easier you will find it, for your own part, to administer everything in time of need and, 5 **so far as your subjects are concerned, the more easily will you persuade them that you are not treating them as slaves or as in any way inferior to us,** but that you are sharing with them, not only all the other advantages which we ourselves enjoy, but also the chief magistracy as well, and thus make them as devoted to that office as if it were their own. 6 **And so far am I from retracting this last statement as rashly made, that I declare that the citizens ought every one actually to be given a share in the government, in order that, being on an equality with us in this respect also, they may be our faithful allies, living as it were in a single city, namely our own, and considering that this is in very truth a city, whereas their own homes are but the countryside and villages.**
...

41 1 Maecenas thus brought his speech to an end. And Caesar heartily commended both him and Agrippa for the wealth of their ideas and of their arguments and also for their frankness in expressing them; but he preferred to adopt the advice of Maecenas. **He did not, however, immediately put into effect all his suggestions, fearing to meet with failure at some point if he purposed to change the ways of all mankind at a stroke;** 2 **but he introduced some reforms at the moment and some at a later time, leaving still others for those to effect who should subsequently hold the principate, in the belief that as time passed a better opportunity would be found to put these last into operation.** And Agrippa, also, although he had advised against these policies, co-operated with Caesar most zealously in respect to all of them, just as if he had himself proposed them.

https://www.livius.org/sources/content/herodian-s-roman-history/herodian-4.10/

[4.10.1] [216] Not long after this, Caracalla, desirous of gaining the title *Parthicus* **and of being able to report to the Romans that he had conquered all the Eastern barbarians,** even though there was peace everywhere, devised the following plan. He wrote a letter to the king of

Parthia (his name was Artabanus [IV]) and sent to him an embassy laden with gifts of expensive materials and fine workmanship.

[4.10.2] He wrote to the king that he wished to marry his daughter; that it was not fitting that he, emperor and son of an emperor, be the son-in-law of a lowly private citizen. His wish was to marry a princess, the daughter of a great king. **He pointed out that the Roman and the Parthian empires were the largest in the world; if they were united by marriage, one empire without a rival would result when they were no longer divided by a river.**

[4.10.3] The rest of the barbarian nations now not subject to their authority could easily be reduced, as they were governed by tribes and confederacies. Furthermore, the Roman infantry were invincible in close-quarter combat with spears, and the Parthians had a large force of highly skilled horse-archers.

[4.10.4] **The two forces, he said, complemented each other; by waging war together, they could easily unite the entire inhabited world under a single crown. Since the Parthians produced spices and excellent textiles and the Romans metals and manufactured articles, these products would no longer be scarce and smuggled by merchants; rather, when there was one world under one supreme authority, both peoples would enjoy these goods and share them in common.**

[4.10.5] At first the Parthian king did not approve of the proposals in Caracalla's letters, saying that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman. **What accord could there be when they did not understand each other's language and differed so radically in diet and dress?** Surely, the king said, there are many distinguished Romans, one of whose daughters he could marry, just as for him there were the Arsacids; it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.

http://don-colacho.blogspot.com/2010/11/2321.html

Without the spread of oriental cults and without the Germanic invasions, Hellenistic civilization would have initiated, with Rome as its starting-point, the Americanization of the world.

> https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n129/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Die Auffassung: „Ich kann mit meinem Gelde machen, was ich will“ ist durch und durch ungermanisch, daher auch undeutsch und übrigens auch unnordisch. **Wie ausgelöscht haben die Germanen die durch und durch unsittliche geldwirtschaftliche Lebensauffassung des riesigen römischen Reiches**1 **und haben weit über ein Jahrtausend hindurch der christlichen Welt ihren germanischen Stempel gegeben, bis das 18. und 19. Jahrhundert diese germanische Auffassung wieder überwand.**

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57913/page/n371/mode/2up?view=theater

In the Late-Classical, we find the event taking place inside Hellenistic-Roman Stoicism, that is, the long death-struggle of the Apollinian soul. **In the interval from Socrates—who was the spiritual father of the Stoa and in whom the first signs of inward impoverishment and city-intellectualism became visible—to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, every existence-ideal of the old Classical underwent transvaluation. In the case of India, the transvaluation of Brahman life was complete by the time of King Asoka (250 B.C.), as we can see by comparing the parts of the Vedanta put into writing before and after Buddha.** And ourselves? Even now the ethical socialism of the Faustian soul, its fundamental ethic, as we have seen, is being worked upon by the process of transvaluation as that soul is walled up in the stone of the great cities. ***Rousseau is the ancestor of this socialism; he stands, like Socrates and Buddha, as the representative spokesman of a great Civilisation.***
...

Each Culture, further, has *its own mode of spiritual extinction*, which is that which follows of necessity from its life as a whole. And hence **Buddhism, Stoicism and Socialism are morphologically equivalent as end-phenomena.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decline_of_Buddhism_in_the_Indian_subcontinent

Moreover, Brahmins had clear ideas about society, law and statecraft (and studied texts such as the Arthashastra and the Manusmriti) and could be more pragmatic than the Buddhists, whose religion was based on monastic renunciation and did not recognize that there was a special warrior class that was divinely ordained to use violence justly.[39] As Johannes Bronkhorst notes, Buddhists could give "very little" practical advice in response to that of the Brahmins and Buddhist texts often speak ill of kings and royalty.[40]
...

Padmanabh Jaini also notes that Buddhist laypersons are relatively neglected in the Buddhist literature, which produced only one text on lay life and not until the 11th century, while Jains produced around fifty texts on the life and conduct of a Jaina layperson.[43]
...

Elements which medieval Hinduism adopted during this time included vegetarianism, a critique of animal sacrifices, a strong tradition of monasticism (founded by figures such as Shankara) and the adoption of the Buddha as an avatar of Vishnu.[58] **On the other end of the spectrum, Buddhism slowly became more and more "Brahmanized", initially beginning with the adoption of Sanskrit as a means to defend their interests in royal courts.**[59] According to Bronkhorst, this move to the Sanskrit cultural world also brought with it numerous Brahmanical norms which now were adopted by the Sanskrit Buddhist culture (one example is the idea present in some Buddhist texts that the Buddha was a Brahmin who knew the Vedas).[60] **Bronkhorst notes that with time, even the caste system eventually became widely accepted for "all practical purposes" by Indian Buddhists** (this survives among the Newar Buddhists of Nepal).[61]
...

For example, some later texts such as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra and the Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra begin to speak of the importance of protecting Buddhist teachings and that killing is allowed if necessary for this reason. Later Buddhist literature also begins to see kings as bodhisattvas and their actions as being in line with the dharma (Buddhist kings like Devapala and Jayavarman VII also claimed this).[63]

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap13.htm

> Zoroastrianism was eclipsed, but it would be an exaggeration to say that it went underground. There was, of course, no persecution, no opposition to it, no official disapproval of it by the Greeks, who were too intelligent and civilized to be susceptible to the fanaticism and pious delirium excited by "universal" religions. **What happened was that the better part of the population spontaneously recognized the superiority of Greek civilization and adopted it,** including its incomparable language, its elegant culture, and the Aryan attitude toward religion. It must not be forgotten that the dominant part of the population of the Persian Empire was composed of Persians, Medes, and other Aryans, the racial kin of the victors and therefore sharing their basic racial instincts.3 **I can imagine that many a cultivated Persian had only to become acquainted with Greek literature and philosophy to free himself from the hariolations of a "revealed" religion and to enjoy kicking the Salvation-peddlers from his door.**

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n225/mode/2up?view=theater

And yet there is a peculiar soullessness in this whole period. Here the sway of understanding is supreme, the heart is dumb; the passionless mechanism affects even the soul, which does right not from love but from reason: Marcus Aurelius' "Monologues" are the mirror of this attitude of mind, and the inevitable reaction appears in the sexual aberrations of his wife Faustina.

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Flag_of_the_World_p7.html

Marcus Aurelius is the most intolerable of human types. He is an unselfish egoist. An unselfish egoist is a man who has pride without the excuse of passion.

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/the-one-and-the-many-studies-in-the-philosophy-of-order-and-ultimacy

The alternative as he saw it was either oneness or anarchy: “But art thou discontented with thy share in the whole? Recall the alternative: *Either Providence or Atoms!* and the abundant proofs there are that the Universe is as it were a state.”344 The alternative was either a universal state, a whole which absorbed all and moved through a repetitious cycle of growth and decay, or universal anarchy and particularity. It was for him a choice between law and no law. In this picture, the individual was nothing in the whole. “Thou has subsisted as part of the Whole. Thou vanish into that which begat thee, or rather thou shalt be taken again into its Seminal Reason by a process of change.” Therefore, “**Cease not to think of the Universe as one living Being, possessed of a**

single Substance and a single Soul; and Now all things trace back to its single sentience; and how it does all things by a single impulse."345

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q&f=false

Marcus really does see life as a kind of dead procession of meaningless occurrences:

> The vain solemnity of a procession; dramas played out on the stage; troops of sheep or goats; fights with spears; a little bone thrown to dogs; a chunk of bread thrown into a fish-pond; the exhausting labor and heavy burdens under which ants must bear up; crazed mice running for shelter; puppets pulled by strings … (VII.3)27

Nothing stands out above anything else, **and everything looks equally devoid of value.**

Nor is this a momentary lapse, or a sign of personal depression. It is of the essence of Stoic cosmopolitanism that things should be seen this way, denuded of their ordinary human significances, since these significances are erroneous. **Marcus does not come by his strange vision of the world naturally, or as the result of a lonely, stress-filled life. It is through Stoic exercises that he strips the humanity from human things, rewriting his inner discourse to bring it into consistency with the doctrine that externals are indifferent.** Consider the following extraordinary passage:

> How important it is to represent to oneself, when it comes to fancy dishes and other such foods, "This is the corpse of a fish, this other thing the corpse of a bird or a pig." Similarly, "This Falernian wine is just some grape juice," and "This purple vestment is some sheep's hair moistened in the blood of some shellfish." When it comes to sexual intercourse, we must say, "This is the rubbing together of membranes, accompanied by the spasmodic ejaculation of a sticky liquid." **How important are these representations, which reach the thing itself and penetrate right through it, so that one can see what it is in reality.** (VI.13)28
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Thoughts_of_the_Emperor_Marcus_Aurelius_Antoninus/Book_VI
>
> 13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish: **[*sensuroitu*]** such then are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. **For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself.**
>
> 14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of the most general kind, **those which are held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives.** But those which are admired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. **But he who values a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except this;** and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA199#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cynicism was famous for neglecting, indeed despising, the other two branches of philosophy, logic and physics, and for concentrating on practical ethics.33 Whereas the Stoics could claim that their concern for logic fit with Socrates' concern with definition34 and his general emphasis on knowledge as the key to morality, the Cynics claimed to be the true heirs to his insistence on human conduct as the proper concern of philosophers.35 **Epictetus' insistence on keeping interest in logic within the bounds of usefulness is an adaptation of the Stoic attitude in the direction of Cynicism. Indeed Seneca, who likes to argue that problems like the fear of death cannot be cured by syllogisms (*Ep.* 82.19-24), expressly indicates the Cynic credentials of his anti-intellectualism in *De Beneficiis*** (7.1.2–5, 7.8.2), when he embodies it in a discourse attributed to Demetrius the Cynic. Seneca says that once one has said what affects *mores* (conduct) there is not point in examining questions that do not contribute to healing the *animus* (mind) but only exercise one's *ingenium* (intellect). **Then he quotes Demetrius giving examples of useless knowledge from natural**

history and human biology and proclaiming that nature only hides those truths that have their own discovery as their only advantage.

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius5b.html#c4
>
> [4e.5] I do not want to detract from the honour of the Argives, or to cloud the glory of Mount Aetna, but I wish to hold the light of knowledge to illuminate a lesser known piety: which makes me renew the memory of an act of Scythian piety. For when Darius invaded their territories with a mighty army, they retreated before him to the remotest wildernesses of all Asia. Thereupon, being asked by his ambassadors, when they would make an end of fleeing, or when they would begin to fight; they replied that they had neither agricultural land, nor any cities which were worth fighting for, **but when they came to the monuments of their ancestors, then he would know how the Scythians were accustomed to fight. By this pious answer, that fierce and barbarous nation redeemed themselves from the charge of savagery. Therefore Nature is the first and best mistress of piety, which does not need the help of speech, nor the use of letters, but through her own silent and proper power infuses love into the breasts of children. What is then the profit of learning?** That their manners should be more polite, but not more honourable. For true virtue is rather born than acquired.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n341/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The *Natural History* is a lasting monument to Roman ignorance. Pliny gathers superstitions, portents, love charms, and magic cures as assiduously as anything else, and apparently believes in most of them. …
>
> When we reflect that this book, and Seneca's *Quaestiones,* were the chief legacy of Roman natural science to the Middle Ages, and compare them with the corresponding works and temper of Aristotle and Theophrastus four hundred years earlier, we begin to feel the slow tragedy of a dying culture. **The Romans had conquered the Greek world, but they had already lost the most precious part of its heritage.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is not obvious why someone philosophically attracted to the immanent materialism of Stoicism would be equally drawn to the otherworldly metaphysics of Neoplatonism just because the latter was rising in popularity. Rather than look for an external reason such as competition from another school it might be worth considering a cause internal to Stoicism. One such possible cause may be found in Epictetus.

Epictetus is named by a number of second-century authors as the pre-eminent Stoic of the day. Aulus Gellius hails him as the greatest of the Stoics (*NA* 1.2.6), Fronto called him a sage (in his *Epistulae* 2.52), while Celsus reports that he was more famous than Plato (Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.2). His texts are reported to have circulated widely.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Origen/Origen_Against_Celsus/Book_VI/Chapter_II
>
> For, if I may venture to say so, **few have been benefited (if they have indeed been benefited at all) by the beautiful and polished style of Plato, and those who have written like him;**[2] while, on the contrary, many have received advantage from those who wrote and taught in a simple and practical manner, and with a view to the wants of the multitude. **It is easy, indeed, to observe that Plato is found only in the hands of those who profess to be literary men;**[3] **[φιλολόγων] while Epictetus is admired by persons of ordinary capacity,** who have a desire to be benefited, and who perceive the improvement which may be derived from his writings.

…

There is indeed evidence that Epictetus used canonical Stoic texts such as treatises by Chrysippus in his own classroom, **but this evidence is more often than not embedded within a passage warning his students not to take the study of these texts too seriously:**

> Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing? "To understand the will of Nature." **Well, then, do you understand it on your own account? In that case, what need have you for anyone else?** … But, by Zeus, I do not understand the will of Nature. Who, then, interprets that? They say Chrysippus. I go and inquire what this interpreter of Nature says. **Then I fail to understand what he means and seek somebody who can interpret him. … For it is not on his own account that we have need of Chrysippus [or his interpreters], but to enable us to follow Nature. …** (*Diss.* 1.17.13-18)

…

Mastery of subtle and complex philosophical arguments is not the ultimate goal of philosophy: “If you could analyse syllogisms like Chrysippus, what is to prevent you from being wretched, sorrowful, envious and, in a word, being distracted and miserable? Not a single thing” (*Diss.* 2.23.44). **For Epictetus, then, the task of the philosopher or quite different from that of the philologist.**
…

For Epictetus, it is not the voluminous author Chrysippus who stands as his philosophical role model; rather it is Socrates, who expresses his philosophy in deeds rather than words. And, like Socrates, Epictetus himself chose not to write, reserving his philosophy for his way of life.

Stoic students who successfully grasped Epictetus’ philosophy would focus all of their attention on the transformation of their way of life in an arduous attempt to approach the life of the sage. **Like Epictetus, they would aspire to be like Diogenes the Cynic and, above all, like Socrates. But what they would not do is engage in philological studies of school texts or write commentaries on them.** It is this ambivalent attitude towards textual studies and the production of commentaries, quite unlike the Platonists and Aristotelians of the same period, that may be one of the reasons why Stoicism declined so quickly and why so many early Stoic texts have been lost. **For it only requires a generation or two of students to pay little or no attention to the preservation of school texts to make it literally impossible for the subsequent generations of potential Stoics to study Stoicism at all.**

This ambivalent attitude towards texts clearly did not mark the entire Stoic tradition. **Early Stoics such as Chrysippus wrote copiously and may even have produced commentaries on earlier Stoic texts, if his *On the Republic* was in fact a commentary on *Zeno’s Republic*.** Cleanthes wrote a commentary on Heraclitus (DL 7.174), who was an important source for Stoic physics, and, later on, Athenodorus the Stoic wrote a commentary on or polemical response to Aristotle’s *Categories* (Porphyry, *in Cat.* 86,22-4). Perhaps more significantly, the Byzantine encyclopedia known as the *Suda* includes an entry on an Aristocles the Stoic who wrote a commentary on Chrysippus’ *How We Name and Conceive Each Thing*. Thus not all Stoics appear to have had ideological objections to the commentary form as such. And later Stoics roughly contemporary with Epictetus, such as Hierocles and Cleomedes, did not appear to share Epictetus’ focus on practical philosophy at the expense of more academic discussion of philosophical topics. **But Epictetus’ somewhat unfavourable attitude towards texts combined with his subsequent popularity may have been the decisive influence on Stoics in the late second and early third centuries.** Any aspiring Stoic in this period would have read Epictetus, the most famous Stoic of the day, and would have learned not to pay excessive attention to the interpretation of school texts at the expense of practical philosophical exercises. **They certainly would not have spent time writing lengthy commentaries on earlier Stoic texts, despite the fact that Alexander of Aphrodisias reports that at that time the commentary was becoming the standard form of philosophical writing** (*in Top.* 27,13-16). **Epictetus’ success in the second century – or, to be more precise, the success of Arrian’s literary account of Epictetus’ lectures – may well have contributed to the tragic loss of so many early Stoic texts and the then inevitable decline of Stoicism.** Ironically, we have to thank opponents such as Plutarch and Galen for recording material from the Chrysippean corpus that would otherwise be totally lost. Even more ironically, it looks as if we should at least in part blame Epictetus (but equally, Arrian) for the decline in the fortunes of Stoicism and the loss of so many Stoic texts.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

In the soul Seneca recognizes an effluence of the divine spirit, a god in the human frame; in virtue of this he maintains the essential dignity and internal freedom of man in every human being. **Yet, in striking contrast to this orthodox tenet is his vivid conception of the weakness and misery of men, the hopelessness of the struggle with evil, whether in society or in the individual.** Thus he describes the body (which, after Epicurus, he calls the flesh) as a mere husk or fetter or prison of the soul; with its departure begins the soul's true life. **Sometimes, too, he writes as if he accepted an irrational as well as a rational part of the soul.** In ethics, if there is no novelty of doctrine, there is a surprising change in the mode of its application. **The ideal sage has receded; philosophy comes as a physician, not to the whole but to the sick.** We learn that there are various classes of patients in “progress” (προκοπή), *i.e.* on their way to virtue, making painful efforts towards it.
…

With Seneca this resignation took the form of a constant meditation upon death. Timid by nature, aware of his impending doom, and at times justly dissatisfied with himself, he tries all means of reconciling himself to the idea of suicide. The act had always been accounted allowable in the school, if circumstances should call for it: indeed, the first three teachers had found such circumstances in the infirmity of old age. **But their attitude towards the “way out” (ἐξαγωγή) of incurable discomforts is quite unlike the anxious sentimentalism with which Seneca dwells upon death.**

From Seneca we turn, not without satisfaction, to men of sterner mould, such as Musonius Rufus, who certainly deserves a place beside his more illustrious disciple, Epictetus. As a teacher he commanded universal respect, and wherever we catch a glimpse of his activity he appears to advantage. His philosophy, however, is yet more concentrated upon practice than Seneca's, **and in ethics he is almost at the position of Aristo.**
…

The beautiful character which rose superior to weakness, poverty and slave's estate is also presented to us in the *Discourses* of his disciple Arrian as a model of religious resignation, of forbearance and love towards our brethren, that is, towards all men, since God is our common father. With him even the "physical basis" of ethics takes the form of a religious dogma—the providence of God and the perfection of the world. We learn that he regards the δαίμων or "guardian angel" as the divine part in each man; sometimes it is more nearly conscience, at other times reason. His ethics, too, have a religious character. **He begins with human weakness and man's need of God: whoso would become good must first be convinced that he is evil. Submission is enforced by an argument which almost amounts to a retractation of the difference between things natural and things contrary to nature, as understood by Zeno. Would you be cut off from the universe? he asks. Go to, grow healthy and rich. But if not, if you are a part of it, then become resigned to your lot. Towards this goal of approximation to Cynicism the later Stoics had all along been tending. Withdrawal from the active duty of the world must lead to passive endurance, and, ere long, complete indifference. Musonius had recommended marriage and condemned unsparingly the exposure of infants. Epictetus, however, would have the sage hold aloof from domestic cares, another Cynic trait.** So, too, in his great maxim "bear and *forbear*," the last is a command to refrain from the external advantages which nature offers.

Epictetus is marked out amongst Stoics by his renunciation of the world. He is followed by a Stoic emperor, M. Aurelius Antoninus, who, though in the world, was not of it. **The *Meditations* give no systematic exposition of belief, but there are many indications of the religious spirit we have already observed, together with an almost Platonic psychology. Following Epictetus, he speaks of man as a corpse bearing about a soul; at another time he has a threefold division—(1) body, (2) soul, the seat of impulse (πνευματίον), and (3) νοῦς or intelligence, the proper *ego*.** In all he writes there is a vein of sadness: the flux of all things, the vanity of life, are thoughts which perpetually recur, along with resignation to the will of God and forbearance towards others, and the religious longing to be rid of the burden and to depart to God. These peculiarities in M. Antoninus may perhaps be explained in harmony with the older Stoic teaching; but, when taken in connexion with the rise of Neoplatonism and the revival of superstition, they are certainly significant.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false

Simplicius also wrote a commentary on the Stoic Epictetus' *Handbook*. **This commentary is unique in so far as it is the only commentary on a Stoic text to survive from antiquity.** However, the commentary itself is more concerned with developing Neoplatonic ethical themes than explicating Epictetus on his own terms.
…

Simplicius also reports a range of Stoic doctrines in his various commentaries on works by Aristotle. However, **in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* he remarks that most Stoic writings are unavailable in his time** (*in Cat.* 334,1-3). It seems likely, then, that his knowledge of Stoicism beyond Epictetus derived from second-hand reports, such as the Aristotelian commentaries of the third-century Neoplatonist Porphyry, which Simplicius says contained much about Stoicism (*in Cat.* 2,5-9).

https://www.academia.edu/7531536/Plotinus_and_the_Platonic_Response_to_Stoicism

By around 200 C.E, we hear very little about active Stoic philosophers. Galen, a Platonist, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, a Peripatetic, were deeply engaged with Stoic theory but hardly at all with any contemporary Stoics. **By the middle of the 3rd century, the dominance of the Platonic school meant that only there would there be found critical scrutiny of Stoicism.** It is to Plotinus that we owe the most extensive and penetrating account of where Stoicism went wrong, at least from a Platonic perspective. His arguments more or less set the tone for all of the later so-called Neoplatonists. Although within two generations or so after Plotinus, some sort of *rapprochement*
with Stoicism was beginning, particularly in the gradual incorporation of Epictetus' *Handbook* into the Platonic curriculum, Plotinus' reasons for rejecting Stoicism remain the standard ones.
…

The discussion of the Stoic view of happiness (*eudaimonia*) begins with the question: "Those [.e., Stoics] who say that happiness is found in the rational life (*logikēi zōēi*), not merely in life, even if the life includes sense-perception, may well be right. **But it is appropriate to ask them why they locate happiness only in rational living.**" (I 4. 2, 31-4). Plotinus' point in posing this question is the following dilemma. Either the Stoics

will identify happiness with rational living because rationality is necessary for attaining “primary natural needs” (*ta prōta kata phusin*) or not. If they do, then even irrational creatures who are, despite their lack of reason, adept at acquiring their primary natural needs, will be happy. **But if the Stoics deny that animals are happy, which they certainly will want to do, then they will have to explain the function or role of reason in the happy life.**
…

The imperviousness to bodily misfortune cannot but bring to mind the Stoic teaching. Epictetus certainly includes these among the things that are not “up to us” and so should be of no concern (cf. *Discourses* I 28, 14, 26). **Plotinus shares the conclusion, but believes the Stoics do not have the resources to explain why this is so. Crudely put, the Stoic can hardly disassociate himself from the bodily since that is all he is. Why, though, can he not insist that it is possible to disassociate himself from everything other than the leading part of his soul, the *hēgemonikon*?** The answer to this question is that since, for the Stoics, the soul is corporeal, disassociation from the rest of the body, were that possible, would be disassociation from another part, that is, a part other than itself (cf. *Enn.* IV 7. 2.1-14).
…

The point comes out rather more clearly in Plotinus’ sustained attacked against the Stoic doctrine of “total mixture” (*krasis di’ holōn*)27 **Plotinus took this doctrine to be in direct opposition to the Platonic doctrine that the body is an instrument of the soul, which is the self** (IV 7. 1, 24-5), **and therefore unmixed with it or at least differentiated from it in kind** (I 1. 1, 3;II 3. 15, 24-8; VI 7. 4, 9-10; cf. Plato, *Alcibiades* I, 129E-130A). But Plotinus also wants to maintain that in fact the body is in a way contained within the soul, as soul is in intellect and intellect in the One (III 9. 3, 1-4; V 5. 9, 29-33; cf. Plato, *Tim*. 36E). This means that the soul is present throughout the body as subject of the body’s instrumental activity.
…

So, Plotinus’ claim is that if the leading part of the soul is disassociated from the rest of the parts of the human being, then in order to do this the materialist must get the phenomenology all wrong regarding sense-perception and thinking. **Accordingly, Stoic “absence of feeling” (*apatheia*) as an ethical goal is something they are not really entitled to embrace.** This is why their interpretation of the anodyne “living in agreement with nature” as “living rationally” must fall prey to the dilemma that this rationality is either instrumental or, if it is non-instrumental, and so free from bodily concern, cannot be sustained within a Stoic materialist context.

Conclusion

By the last quarter of the 3rd century CE, Stoicism had been a spent force for quite some time. There are no known Stoic philosophers from this period. Plotinus’ criticisms are not addressed to any contemporary opponents. They are anchored in the systematic Platonic metaphysical framework Plotinus constructed. On the basis of this framework, Plotinus was in a position to target a variety of historical anti-Platonic positions. The central weakness in Stoicism, according to Plotinus, is its uncompromising materialism and the consequent crippled account of causality. **The Stoics were, for him, basically right on a number of important issues, including their insistence on the infallibility of knowledge and on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. Plotinus’ fundamental complaint, though, is that the Stoics do not have the correct principles with which to justify these claims.** They could achieve consistency were they to eschew infallibilism and embrace some relativistic moral code. But this would only be compounding error. Plotinus’ successors seem to treat Stoicism as one of those “ancient” schools whose deviations from the truth were adequately exposed by Plotinus, whom Proclus called “the great exegete of the Platonic revelation”. **Nevertheless, perhaps already by the time of Iamblichus, and certainly by the time of Simplicius, the moral rectitude of Epictetus led Platonists actually to give his *Handbook* an honored place in an introduction to the study of Platonism.** Simplicius, often quoting from Porphyry, is an important source for our knowledge of Stoicism and, indeed, for much additional material in antiquity now lost. **We should not suppose that Simplicius was unmindful of the absence of a sound metaphysical grounding for Epictetus’ ethical claims. At the beginning of his commentary** (194 Hadot), **he evinces surprise that such a morally uplifting work can be written without the foundational belief in the immortality of the soul.**
…

> 12. Plotinus’ successors continued to develop this argument long after the threat of Stoic materialism had waned. See, e.g., Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, props. 15-17. **Aristotle’s unqualified agreement with Plato on the immateriality of the intellect was frequently remarked on and at least one of the reasons for the widely held view that Aristotle’s philosophy was in harmony with Plato’s.**

…

> 25. At V 9.1, 10-16, Plotinus criticizes Stoics (and Epicureans) for emphasizing virtuous *actions* (*praxeis*) and choices of goods in the sensible world. Cf. *SVF* 3.23, 64, 118 and Sextus Empiricus, *M*. 11.133. This may not seem like an altogether fair criticism of the Stoics, who seem, above all, to emphasize the state of one’s will and not one’s circumstances, achievements, or actions. **Plotinus’ point, however, is that their materialism (“they are unable to see what is above”) prevents them from directing their interior lives to something higher, despite their indifference to the goods of an embodied life.** See Gurtler (1988: 228-35).

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

Shall we give, therefore, any credit to Panætius, when he dissents from his master, Plato, whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, the Homer of philosophers, and whom he opposes in nothing except this single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody denies, that everything which has been generated will perish, and that even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA272#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 20. For the Stoics, life was an "external good" just like money, power, and so on. **This was always odd: for the idea that life is not necessary for human dignity could be sustained, perhaps, by a Platonist believer in the immortal soul, but the Stoics held that the soul is bodily and dies with the person.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q&f=false

Addressing what he took to be the Stoics' position on happiness and virtue directly, Parker argued in each case that **either Stoicism collapsed back into Epicureanism or else it had no power against his own 'hypothesis' or 'supposition,' namely, the Christian argument for the existence of a future state after death involving punishments and rewards.** Parker understood happiness in largely hedonistic terms, and this, as Terence Irwin notes, 'leads him to misunderstand the Stoic and the Aristotelian and Platonic position.'44

> Either then humane Nature is nothing but Body, or compounded of Body and Soul; it it be nothing but Body, then upon the Stoical Principles it is capable of no Happiness at all, seeing they pass nothing in their Account of Good and Evil but onely the Vertues of the Mind, and therefore it they are nothing but Body, all the qualities of their Mind are nothing. But if beside that we have a Soul, either it perishes with the Body or it survives it; if it perishes then it is no more than the sense of the Body it self, and it plainly casts us back upon the Epicurean Principle, that there is no Happiness but present Pleasure and Interest; if it survive, then that entitles it to an Happiness beside that of this Life, and so we are advanced to our own Hypothesis.45

With respect to virtue, Parker noted that 'the whole Sect place it in one Catholick Principle of living according to Nature':

> But then the difficulty is to **discover what they mean by Nature, and there every Man is a Sect to himself,** and we have as many different Accounts of it, as there are ruling Schoolmasters of the Porch. But what Interpretation soever we follow, **unless founded upon our Supposition, we are still forced back to the School of *Epicurus*, for his Principle too was to live according to Nature,** which was to enjoy the utmost Pleasure of this present Life; and if there be no other State, it is certain there can be no other way of living according to Nature.46

Stoic constancy, Parker claimed, 'would amount to no more than this, that every wise Man ought to consult how to live here with as much ease and pleasure as he can; for if there be no other State, he cannot be wisely constant in the pursuit of any better Design.'47

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/David_Strauss:_the_Confessor_and_the_Writer#VI.

There is one passage in the confession-book where the incurable optimism referred to above bursts forth with the full joyousness of holiday spirits (pp. 166-67). "If the universe is a thing which had better not have existed," says Strauss, "**then surely the speculation of the philosopher, as forming part of this universe, is a speculation which had better not have speculated.** The pessimist philosopher fails to perceive that he, above all, declares his own thought, which declares the world to be bad, as bad also; but if the thought which declares the world to be bad is a bad thought, then it follows naturally that the world is good. As a rule, optimism may take things too easily. Schopenhauer's references to the colossal part which sorrow and evil play in the world are quite in their right place as a counterpoise; **but every true philosophy is necessarily optimistic, as otherwise she hews down the branch on which she herself is sitting.**"

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page353

According to Plutarch (*De Iside et Osiride*, and *Tr. de Animae Procreatione ex Timaeo*) Plato recognized in matter a certain maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it was an actual blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believed that matter was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in the first book of the Physiology of the Stoics.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vq1wWM4MseoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA217#v=onepage&q&f=false

Moreover, that the human body was not held in high esteem by the Stoics as well might be implied from the diatribes of Epictetus, who speaks of it as a *sōmation* (diminutive of "body"), *pēlos* (mud), and a *nekros*

(corpse).76 In contrast, however to Eduard Zeller, who interpreted these expressions in the light of Platonic influence,77 Adolf Bonhöffer rightly pointed out that such terms of contempt result from the Stoic definition of the body as a thing neither good nor bad (*adiaphoron*).78

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n493/mode/2up?view=theater

Marcus thinks his premises compel him to puritanism. "Pleasure is neither good nor useful."[55] He renounces the flesh and all its works, and talks at times like some Anthony in the Thebaid:

> **Observe how ephemeral and worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus, tomorrow will be a mummy or ashes.** ... The whole space of man's life is but little, and yet with what troubles it is filled ... and with what a wretched body it must be passed! ... Turn it inside out, and see what kind of thing it is.[56]

…

Soul and body alike return to their original elements.

> For as the mutation and dissolution of bodies make room for other bodies doomed to die, **so the souls that are removed into the air, after life's existence, are transmuted and diffused ... into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and make room for new souls.**[64] ... Thou hast existed as a part; thou shalt disappear in that which produced thee. ... This, too, nature wills. ... Pass, then, through this little space of time conformably to nature, and end thy journeys in content, just as an olive falls when it is ripe, blessing the nature that produced it, and thanking the tree on which it grew.[65]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dlMr4UhqQlQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA161#v=onepage&q&f=false

In fact, Marcus' scorn for material things sometimes created a conflict with his pantheism. Since the World Soul was not only the author of material things, but actually embedded in them as a higher form of matter, contempt for them, while necessary to Stoic ethical teaching as the psychological underpinning for the exhortation to bear misfortune patiently, could become problematic to Stoic metaphysics. **One biographer of Marcus sarcastically called Stoicism a system in which "the sum of despised particulars becomes somehow Divine."**

> ***"Democracy is a pathetic belief in the collective wisdom of individual ignorance."***—H.L. Mencken

…

Like his fellow Stoics, Marcus possessed an optimistic view of both nature and human nature, which he portrayed as complementary. **He wrote, "Nothing that is according to nature is evil." Lacking Aristotle's emphasis on the importance of habit, much less a Judeo-Christian conception of original sin, the emperor believed that reformation of character was a simple matter of the individual choosing to turn back to the good.** Unlike the Platonists, whose hypothesis of reincarnation presented the likelihood that souls already possessed divergent experiences at birth, **Marcus and his fellow Stoics' belief in identical souls emanating from the same World Soul left them without resource to explain why a few individuals chose to live virtuously ("according to nature") but most did not. (The Stoics, while optimistic about the individual in theory, were almost uniformly pessimistic about people in practice.)**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although Marcus's *Meditations* are considered a classic of later Stoic thought, Marcus never calls himself a Stoic and often expouses ideas that are distinctly non-Stoic in character.116

> 116. See Asmis, "Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius" 2228-2229. **Eduard Zeller pronounced Marcus a Platonizing Stoic** (*Die Philosophie de Griechen* 257-261), a characterization of the *Meditations* followed by Rist, "Are You a Stoic?"

However, although Marcus's Stoicism is deeply idiosyncratic the *Meditations* are very much rooted in familiar Stoic ideas: that we ought to live according to nature, that there is an essential unity of the *genos* of humankind, that the human animal is a rational animal, **and that the kinship of gods and humans is based in the universality of the divine *pneuma*.**

…

Certainly, Marcus's understanding of the nature of the empire is lofty [see esp. *MA* 1.14], **but Marcus is entirely Platonic in his disdain for the world of becoming.**

…

For Marcus, universalizing cosmopolitanism is life according to nature. The idea of a universal polis, regulated by a *nomos* that is itself a reflection of divine reason, can be read in both metaphysical

and political terms. However, **Marcus always circles back to the very Platonic distinction between the world of pure being and the dross of the sublunar world in which we are compelled to live.**

There is, indeed, a strong dualism to Marcus's thought that sets him outside of the long tradition of Stoic materialism. **A human being, in the words of Epictetus that Marcus repeats more than once, is "but a soul bearing about a corpse."**
…

Marcus's cosmopolitanism is very much implicated in his dualism; the material world in which actual human relationships take place is a fleeting and impermanent place. One's true affinity is not to others as individuals, but to the share of the divine spark in the other which corresponds to our own. **As Marcus makes plain, the *pneuma* makes us kin, not blood or seed.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MYUHDgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false

The first merely notes something that is also true of Epicureanism (and indeed of scepticism): at the end of the Hellenistic period proper around 100 BCE these were all thriving philosophies; they remained so during the period of investigation, but from around 200 CE onwards they fairly quickly died away. The second consideration then notes that at the end of the Hellenistic period and the beginning of the imperial period – that is, during the first century BCE – the two other philosophies of dogmatic Platonism and Aristotelianism gradually gained prominence in two forms that are more or less radically different from the forms in which they were present in the Hellenistic period itself. **The third consideration then notes that in this process of articulating new forms of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the newcomers interacted fairly extensively either with one another or with *just one* of the 'old' Hellenistic philosophies: Stoicism.** Scepticism lay wholly beyond their horizon, indeed, they themselves partly constituted a reaction against that. And as for Epicureanism, it 'seems to have been largely excluded from this eclectic exchange', as noted by Frede (1999b, 786), presumably because the differences here were too substantial for interaction to make much sense. **Not so with Stoicism, with which both Platonists and Aristotelians interacted much more comprehensively.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA40#v=onepage&q&f=false

Investigation of the influence of Stoicism on Christian writers of the second and early third centuries immediately plunges the scholar into the maelstrom of the interaction in second-century philosophy between Stoicism and Platonism, which eventually led to the victory the latter. This battle had huge repercussions among Christian writers of those two centuries once they began to articulate their Christian beliefs more explicitly in philosophical terminology than their New Testament colleagues had done. **Here too we may see the Christians as being part of the philosophical discussion rather than standing outside it – and even more banefully, as partners in the Platonic takeover of the philosophical scene from the Stoics.**28 This development, which was to have a huge influence on almost all later Christian thinking as a form of Platonism, was prefigured in the first half of the first century by the Jewish Platonist, Philo of Alexandria, whose relationship with Stoicism is another topic that calls for investigation.29 **It is my own contention that the second-century Platonic takeover of Christianity drastically changed the understanding of the earliest, first-century Christian writings that make up the New Testament.** They – or at least those we have been looking at here – were far more Stoic than Platonic.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap16.htm#prog

The zeal and rapid progress of the Christians awakened the Polytheists from their supine indifference in the cause of those deities whom custom and education had taught them to revere. The mutual provocations of a religious war, which had already continued above two hundred years, exasperated the animosity of the contending parties. The Pagans were incensed at the rashness of a recent and obscure sect, which presumed to accuse their countrymen of error, and to devote their ancestors to eternal misery. The habits of justifying the popular mythology against the invectives of an implacable enemy, produced in their minds some sentiments of faith and reverence for a system which they had been accustomed to consider with the most careless levity.
…

Both parties seemed to acknowledge the truth of those miracles which were claimed by their adversaries; and while they were contented with ascribing them to the arts of magic, and to the power of daemons, they mutually concurred in restoring and establishing the reign of superstition.
(139) **Philosophy, her most dangerous enemy, was now converted into her most useful ally. The groves of the Academy, the gardens of Epicurus, and even the portico of the Stoics, were almost deserted, as so many different schools of scepticism or impiety;** (140) **and many among the Romans were desirous that the writings of Cicero should be condemned and suppressed by the authority of the senate.** (141) The prevailing sect of the new Platonicians judged it prudent to

connect themselves with the priests, whom perhaps they despised, against the Christians, whom they had reason to fear.

> 140. Julian ([tom. i.] p. 301, edit. Spanheim) expresses a pious joy that the providence of the gods had extinguished the impious sects, and for the most part destroyed the books of the Pyrrhonians and Epicureans, which had been very numerous, since Epicurus himself composed no less than 300 volumes. See Diogenes Laertius, l. x. c.26.
>
> 141. *Cumque alios audiam mussitare indignanter, et dicere opportere statui per Senatum, abolleantur ut haec scripta, quibus Christiana Religio comprobetur, et vetustatis opprimatur auctoritas*. Arnobius *adversus Gentes*, 1. iii. p. 103, 104, [p. 98, 99, ed. Ant. 1604].

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n661/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover, Celsus was out of step with his time; **he asked men to behave like gentlemen skeptics when they were withdrawing from a society that enslaved so many of them into a mystic world that made every man a god.**
…

Reluctantly, and only late in life, he put his doctrines into writing. He never revised his first draft, **and despite Porphyry's editing, the *Enneads* remain among the most disorderly and difficult works in the history of philosophy.**[III]

Plotinus was an idealist who graciously recognized the existence of matter. But matter by itself, he argued, is only the formless possibility of form. Every form that matter takes is given it by its inward energy or soul *(psyche).*
…

Everything, from atoms to planets, has an activating soul, which is itself a part of the World-Soul; every *Atman* is *Brahman.* The individual soul is eternal only as vitality or energy, not as a distinct character.[49] Immortality is not the survival of personality; it is the absorption of the soul in deathless things.[50]
…

Through Philo, John, Plotinus, and Augustine, Plato conquered Aristotle, and entered into the profoundest theology of the Church.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NG2MDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA161#v=onepage&q&f=false

Against the rising tide of materialism Smith borrows heavily from Plotinus.9 **However, in his treatise "On the Immortality of the Soul" (*Ennead* IV. 7) Plotinus addresses Epicureans only very briefly.**10 **Most often Plotinus seeks to refute the views of Stoics.** Smith, in contrast, sees an ally in the Stoics and is therefore concerned primarily with Epicurean materialism.

https://archive.org/details/plotinusethicalt01plotuoft/page/12/mode/2up?view=theater

14. In style Plotinus is concise, dense with thought, terse, more lavish of ideas than of words, most often expressing himself with a fervid inspiration. **He followed his own path rather than that of tradition, but in his writings both the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are sunk; Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially, is condensed in them, all but entire.**

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03a.htm
>
> Incidentally, if our good man wanted to make the history of ancient philosophy into a history of antiquity, **then as a matter of course he ought to have merged the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics in the Neo-Platonists, whose philosophy is nothing but a fantastic combination of the Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptical doctrine with the content of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.** Instead of that, he merges these doctrines directly in Christianity.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NG2MDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false

Porphyry does not specifically identify which Aristotelian or Stoic doctrines had the greatest impact on his master's thinking. **However, it is easy to see from Plotinus' writings that the Aristotelian technical terminology of substance and accident, of formal, efficient, and final causality, and of potentiality and actuality is everywhere employed in addition to or in place of the non-technical vocabulary of Plato,** although with respect to the use of Aristotelian *doctrine* as such Plotinus adopts a more circumspect approach, in which – for instance – Plato's and Aristotle's views concerning the relation between the One and Intellect or between the categories of the intelligible and sensible worlds are contrasted rather than assimilated.

Among the concealed Stoic doctrines to which Porphyry refers, that of the universal *Logos*, which Plotinus identifies with nature or the lower phase of the world-soul, is perhaps the most significant.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA121#v=onepage&q&f=false

Late Roman figures like Plotinus and Porphyry, seeking to explicate what was obscure in Plato through textual exegesis, introduced elements of not only Stoic but Aristotelian, skeptical and even Epicurean thought. **Porphyry and Plotinus did not consider themselves "Neoplatonists" but Platonists proper, as would Renaissance figures who believed their claims that they explained without altering, and who saw no reason to doubt that Plato had indeed shared such Stoic positions as providence, and the Stoic idea of the universe as a contiguous, unified, rational, living divinity, a model of universally distributed thinking ensoulment** which strongly informs Neoplatonic attempts to describe the layers of reality of Soul and Mind which lie between the sensible world and the supreme One.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dlMr4UhqQlQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA241#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, Plotinus rejected Stoic materialism and pantheism completely; **while the Stoic World Soul was a material entity at one with the universe, Plotinus not only insulated his own version of it from so direct and sordid a connection with the material world, setting up Reason as an intermediary, but also guarded the purity of the ultimate source of existence, the One, behind yet another intellectual barrier, Mind.**

Despite Plotinus' insistence that matter was not evil, it is difficult not to see a visceral disgust for it behind his manic erection of a cumbersome series of abstractions – Mind, the World Soul, and Reason – **intellectual chastity belts clearly designed to protect the One's virginal innocence. Never has there been conceived (no pun intended) a being with so many offspring yet so little direct involvement in the messy process of procreation as Plotinus' One.**

http://www.augnet.org/en/works-of-augustine/writings-of-augustine/2113-dialogues/

After his celebrated moral conversion in the garden at Milan in September of the year 386, Augustine needed some unhurried time to think about what had spiritually happened within him. A few days later Augustine, being ill, took advantage of the autumn holidays and, resigning his teaching position in Milan to go to nearby Cassiciacum, to the country estate of his friend, Verecundus.
…

These early dialogues have an unique aspect among the works of Augustine because they were written soon after he came to Christian belief but before his baptism. As well, they were subsequent to his encounter with Neo-Platonism but before his studies of the Bible. Augustine himself later remarked on how little Scripture he had quoted in them.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=riCbDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false

The splintering of the New Academy, I think, was triggered not so much in opposition to the Old version as it was in opposition to the Stoics.71 Nor indeed, should it be thought of as a splintering, since it was right to refute and discuss the new inquiry introduced by Zeno. For it has been reasonably speculated that the position about not perceiving, although it wasn't triggered by any conflicts, was nevertheless also in the minds of the Old Academics. This is also easy to prove on the authority of Socrates himself and Plato and the rest of the old philosophers, who believed they could be defended from error to the extent that they did not give assent rashly – although they did not introduce their own disputation on this point into their own schools, nor did they ever *straightforwardly* inquire into whether or not truth can be perceived.72 **But Zeno had brought forward something undeveloped and new and was arguing that nothing could be perceived unless it was true in such a way that it could be distinguished from the false by its dissimilar marks, and that it doesn't belong to a wise man to come up with an opinion.**73 And when Arcesilaus74 heard this, he said that nothing of this kind could be discovered by man, nor should the life of a wise man be entrusted to this shipwreck of an opinion. Hence he also concluded that assent should be given to nothing.75

15. "**But when the matter stood in such a way that the Old Academy seemed more augmented than attacked, there stepped forth a disciple of Philo, Antiochus, who (as it seemed to some) was more desirous of glory than truth.**76 [Antiochus] brought the position of both academies into enmity with each other, for he said that the New Academics were trying to introduce something unusual and far, far removed from the opinion of the Old. On this topic he appealed to a trust in the old naturalists77 and the other great philosophers, and he even attacked the Academics themselves, who argued that they were following the 'truth-like' even though they acknowledged that they were ignorant of the truth itself. And he amassed many arguments, which I think should be passed over right now. Nevertheless, **nothing did he defend more than that the wise man can perceive [truth].**78

https://books.google.fi/books?id=riCbDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA106#v=onepage&q&f=false

17.37. “Why, then, did such great men decide to engage in such endless and obstinate controversies, all in order to make it seem that a knowledge of the truth could not befall anyone? **Listen a little more carefully now, not to what I know, but to what I suspect.** In fact, I saved this part for the end to explain (if I can) what seems to me is the nature of the Academics’ whole intention.148

“Plato, the wisest and most educated man of his time,149 spoke in such a way that whatever he said became important, and no matter how he said them, the things he uttered lost none of their importance. After the death of Socrates his master (whom he loved above all), he is said to have also learned many things from the Pythagoreans.150 **Pythagoras,**151 **who had not been satisfied with Greek philosophy (which at the time was virtually nonexistent or at least very obscure), came to believe that the soul was immortal after being roused by the disputations of a certain Pherecydes of Syros;**152 and, journeying far and wide, he also went on to listen to many wise men.153 And thus Plato added to the charm and subtlety of Socrates, which Socrates wielded in moral matters, an expertise in natural and divine things, which Plato had carefully received from those whom I have mentioned.154 And by joining them under dialectic, the foundress and judge, as it were, of those parts (dialectic is either wisdom itself or that without which wisdom can in no way be),155 Plato is said to have compiled the complete discipline of philosophy. Now is not the time discuss this. For what I want, it suffices that Plato sensed that there are two worlds: one intelligible (in which the truth itself dwells) and the other sensible (which we obviously sense through sight and touch).156 And Plato sensed that the former is true while the latter is ‘truth-like’ and made in its image. Thus, truth about the former is polished and brightened, as it were, in the soul that knows itself, while only opinion and not knowledge about the latter can be produced in the souls of the foolish. However, **whatever has been done in this world by means of the virtues that Plato called political**157 **(which are similar to the other true virtues that are known only to the few who are wise) can be labeled nothing else but ‘truth-like.’**

38. “It seems to me that these teachings and others of this kind were preserved by Plato’s successors as much as they could and guarded as mysteries.158 For either these teachings are not easily perceived except by those who, having cleansed themselves from all vices, have in some way appropriated a different way of living that is more than human; or whoever knows these things and wants to teach them to just anyone is sinning grievously.159 **And so I suspect that Zeno, who was the head of the Stoics, was held suspect for having already heard and believed certain things by the time he came to the school bequeathed by Plato and being then maintained by Polemon.**160 **Nor did Zeno seem to them to be the kind of man to whom they should readily reveal and entrust those virtually sacrosanct Platonic precepts before he had first *un*learned the things that he had accepted from others and had brought into this school.**161

“Polemon then dies; he is succeeded by Arcesilaus – a classmate of Zeno, in fact, but one who was under the instruction of Polemon.162 **Consequently, when Zeno began to delight in a certain position of his own about the world and especially about the soul (for which true philosophy is ever vigilant), a position which states that the soul is mortal,**163 **that there is nothing beyond this sensible world, and that in this world nothing is done except by matter**164 **(in fact, he even thought that God Himself is [made of] fire);**165 **since this wicked stuff was slowly spreading high and wide, Arcesilaus – very prudently and advantageously, it seem to me – thoroughly hid the position of the Academy and buried it as if it were gold to be found someday by future generations.**166 **Hence, since the multitude is rather prone to rushing into false opinions and since, by virtue of corporeal habit, it is extremely easy yet harmful to believe that all reality is corporeal,**167 **this most astute and most humane man resolved to *un*teach those poorly taught people whom he was putting up with rather than to teach those whom he did not think were teachable.** From these [considerations] were born all those things that are attributed to the New Academy, because the Old Academics had had no need of them.168

39. “But if Zeno had snapped out of it at some point and noticed that nothing can be grasped unless it is the sort of thing that he himself was defining, and that such a thing can’t be found in bodies (to which he relegated all reality) then this kind of disputation, which very much flared up inevitably, would have been completely extinguished long ago. **But Zeno, deceived by an appearance of consistency – as it seemed to the Academics and as it seems to me as well**169 **– was stubborn, and this pernicious faith of his in bodies lived on in whatever way it could down to the time of Chrysippus, who (for he was especially capable of doing this) gave it enormous power in spreading itself more widely.**170 **And yet on the other side Carneades, who was more astute and vigilant than all the others mentioned above,**171 **opposed this Stoic opinion in such a way that I marvel that it actually survived at all afterwards.** In fact, lest it appear that he wanted to speak out against everything for the sake of ostentation, Carneades first cast aside the effrontery of making virtually false accusations, as he saw that Arcesilaus had to no small extent been defamed by this [tactic]. **But he was particularly determined to smash and overthrow the Stoics themselves and Chrysippus too.**

18.40. “Then, since he was overwhelmed from every direction [with the objection that] if assent is given to nothing, the wise man will do nothing.172 Carneades – O wondrous man and yet not wondrous! for he flowed forth from the very fountains of Plato – wisely took note of the kinds of actions [his objectors] approved of. And seeing that these were similar to some truths or other, that which he would pursue in this world in order to act he named the ‘truth-like.’ For he both skillfully knew and prudently concealed to what these things were similar, and he also called them ‘probable.’ (For whoever beholds an examplum adroitly approves of its image.) Indeed, **how does the wise man give approval or how does he follow what is similar to the true when he**

doesn't know what the truth itself is? Therefore, they *did* know, and they approved of the falsehoods in which they noticed a commendable imitation of true things.174 **But because it was neither proper nor easy to show this to the uninitiated,**175 **so to speak, they left to posterity – and to whomever they could in their own age – a certain sign of their position. They rightly prohibited those dialecticians, however, from raising questions about nomenclature by insulting and mocking them.** On account of this, it is said that Carneades was also the head of the Third Academy and its author.

41. "**This conflict then continued down to our very own Tully. By now it was obviously injured yet poised to inflate Latin literature with its last breath.** (For it seems to me that nothing is more inflated than saying so many things so copiously and elaborately while not believing them!) **Nevertheless, it was by these winds, it seems to me, that that Platonic straw man Antiochus**176 **was sufficiently scattered and dispersed: for the Epicureans' herds built their sunny stables in the souls of hedonistic multitudes.**177 As a matter of fact, Antiochus was a disciple of Philo,178 and Philo, as far as I can tell, was a most circumspect man who had begun to open, so to speak, the gates to his retreating enemies and to call the Academy and its laws back to the authority of Plato. (That said, Metrodorus had also tried to do this before. It is said that he was the first to have admitted that the Academics did not believe the doctrine that nothing can be grasped but took up arms of this kind against the Stoics out of necessity.)179 **And so Antiochus, as I was starting to say, once he had listened to Philo the Academic and Mnesarchus the Stoic, crept into the Old Academy, which was void of defenders and vulnerable to every enemy, so to speak. In the guise of a helper and fellow townsman, he brought with him from the ashes of the Stoics some evil or other that defiled Plato's inner sanctums.**180 **But Philo, having wrested Antiochus's arms away from him for a second time as well, resisted him till the day he died; and our man Tully, who for as long as he lived couldn't stand to have anything he loved undermined or contaminated, crushed whatever remained of him. Indeed, not long after those days, when all the stubbornness and pertinacity was dead, when the clouds of error had been dispersed, the illustrious countenance of Plato, which is the purest and most lucid in all philosophy, shone forth [once again]. And it did so especially in Plotinus, the Platonic philosopher who has been judged to be so similar to him that they seemed to have lived at the same time. There is, however, so much time between them that one should think that in Plotinus Plato lives again.**181

19.42. "**And so, we hardly ever see any philosophers now except Cynics or Peripatetics**182 **or Platonists. Indeed, we see Cynics because a certain liberty and license of life delights them. But regarding the education and the teaching and the mores that look after the soul, there is nevertheless, in my opinion, a single discipline of philosophy that is utterly true which** – because there has been no dearth of extremely astute and alert men who have taught in their disputations that Aristotle and Plato harmonize with each other in such a way that to the ignorant and inattentive they seem to be in conflict183 – **has in fact been refined over many centuries and by many arguments. For this philosophy is not the philosophy of this world that our Sacred [Scriptures] most rightly detest but of the other intelligible world**184 to which that most subtle Reason would never call back souls blinded by the multiform darkness of error and smeared by the deepest filth from the body had not the Supreme God, out of a certain clemency for the multitude,185 humbled and lowered the authority of Divine Understanding all the way into the human body itself,186 so that having been roused up by not only His precepts but His deeds,187 **souls could return to their very selves and even gazes upon their homeland without the bickering of disputations.**188

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57913/page/n381/mode/2up?view=theater

Let us, once more, review Socialism (independently of the economic movement of the same name) as the Faustian example of Civilization-ethics. **Its friends regard it as the form of the future, its enemies as a sign of downfall, and both are equally right.** We are all Socialists, wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly. Even resistance to it wears its form.

Similarly, and equally necessarily, all Classical men of the Late period were Stoics unawares. The whole Roman people, as a body, has a Stoic soul. **The genuine Roman, the very man who fought Stoicism hardest, was a Stoic of a stricter sort than ever a Greek was.** The Latin language of the last centuries before Christ was the mightiest of Stoic creations.

http://biblehub.com/daniel/2-40.htm

39 **After you there will arise another kingdom inferior to you, then another third kingdom of bronze, which will rule over all the earth.** 40 **Then there will be a fourth kingdom as strong as iron; inasmuch as iron crushes and shatters all things, so, like iron that breaks in pieces, it will crush and break all these in pieces.** 41 **In that you saw the feet and toes, partly of potter's clay and partly of iron, it will be a divided kingdom; but it will have in it the toughness of iron, inasmuch as you saw the iron mixed with common clay.** 42 **As the toes of the feet were partly of iron and partly of pottery, so some of the kingdom will be strong and part of it will be brittle.** 43 **And in that you saw the iron mixed with common clay, they will combine with one another in the seed of men; but they will not adhere to one another, even as iron does not combine with pottery.**

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/the-one-and-the-many-studies-in-the-philosophy-of-order-and-ultimacy

Greece began its history as families and clans which became city-states; its religion moved from the religious centrality of the family to the centrality of the city-state. Fustel de Coulanges, in *The Ancient City*, saw the same pattern in Roman origins, and certainly there is much to suggest it. **There is, however, a strong body of evidence to affirm the contrary, the priority of the City of Rome to the Roman family and the creation of a strong family as an act of state. It is today a mark of intellectual respectability to treat ancient records as non-historical, but even an elementary respect for the Roman records points to rather startling conclusions. Two boys, abandoned twins, set out to found a city.** Romulus ploughed a furrow as the first wall around the planned city, with the trench or furrow as the moat, and the overturned earth as the wall. By this act, he created his sacred city. His brother, Remus, expressed his contempt for the wall and moat by leaping across them into the City, whereupon Romulus killed him at once, declaring, "So perish all who ever cross my walls!"

> https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S002238161100051X?journalCode=jop
>
> For Augustine, Romulus' fratricide discloses the limits of pagan virtue and politics and reveals that the civic republican view of an early virtuous republic is nostalgic if not impossible. **Machiavelli agrees with Augustine about the character of Rome, yet embraces the ambitious and acquisitive politics Augustine rebuffs.** Machiavelli not only excuses Romulus' fratricide in "ordering" Rome, but makes it the archetypal act that must be repeated through "reordering" to sustain the state against the perennial problem of corruption.

Rome thus began, *first,* with two boys abandoned by their family, and, *second*, with the murder of a brother as its first sacrifice. The priority of the City to the family is emphatically set forth. But this is not all. *Third*, the first citizens were not members of a common family or clan but neighboring shepherds, outlaws, and stateless people. The City made them Romans, not ties of family or of blood. *Fourth*, Roman family life and Rome's first alliance began by an assault on the family, when the womenless men joined in the rape of the Sabine women, with an ensuing war against their fathers ending in peace and a very close alliance, when the Sabine women, who had been carried off by the Romans, interceded with their fathers to restore peace. A Sabine king, Titus Tatius, then shared the throne with Romulus. **These stories, very much at odds with the origins of other peoples, embarrassing to many later Romans, and clearly hostile to the idea of the priority of the family, have the ring of truth. The family indeed was powerful in Rome, but it was the creature of the City; the City was not an outgrowth of the family. Priority did not belong to the family or to race, although the later aristocracy tried to maintain such a thesis, but to the City, for Rome began as a city and then *created* the Roman people and the Roman family.** Only the rigidity of evolutionary presuppositions has obscured this obvious fact from scholars. The family was the creature of the City, as was marriage, for the only legally recognized marriages in Rome were the marriages of citizens. The right to contract a legal union was like the right to vote, eligibility for magistracy, and the right to serve in a legion a right of citizens only. The same was true of the right to possess, acquire, and bequeath property, and originally most land was periodically re-allotted by the City.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0026%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D1

[3] **There is no question that the Brutus who won such glory through the expulsion of Superbus would have inflicted the gravest injury on the State had he wrested the sovereignty from any of the former kings, through desire of a liberty for which the people were not ripe.** [4] What would have been the result if that horde of shepherds and immigrants, fugitives from their own cities, who had secured liberty, or at all events impunity, in the shelter of an inviolable sanctuary[2] [5]—**if, I say, they had been freed from the restraining power of kings and, agitated by tribunician storms, had begun to foment quarrels with the patricians in a City where they were aliens before sufficient time had elapsed for either family ties or a growing love for the very soil to effect a union of** [6] **hearts?** The infant State would have been torn to pieces by internal dissension. As it was, however, the moderate and tranquilizing authority of the kings had so fostered it that it was at last able to bring forth the fair fruits of liberty, in the maturity of its [7] strength.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Publicola*.html#ref7

3 The rest could not endure to look upon the sight, but it is said that the father neither turned his gaze away, nor allowed any pity to soften the stern wrath that sat upon his countenance, but watched the dreadful punishment of his sons until the lictors threw them on the ground and cut off their heads with the axe. Then he rose and went away, after committing the other culprits to the judgement of his colleague.[7] **He had done a**

deed which it is difficult for one either to praise or blame sufficiently. 4 For either the loftiness of his virtue made his spirit incapable of suffering, or else the magnitude of his suffering made it insensible to pain. **In neither case was his act a trivial one, or natural to a man, but either god-like or brutish.** However, it is right that our verdict should accord with the reputation of the man, rather than that his virtue should be discredited through weakness in the judge. **For the Romans think that the work of Romulus in building the city was not so great as that of Brutus in founding and establishing its form of government.**

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2000/07/unpatriotic.html

In Homer's *Iliad*, the great warrior Achilles, denied a slave girl as a prize, goes off to sulk in a tent while the rest of the Greeks suffer military disaster at the hands of the Trojans. **Virgil's *Aeneid* evokes the Homeric epics in many ways, but the Trojan warrior Aeneas is a dutiful soldier who sacrifices his love life (with Dido) in order to carry out his historic mission of founding Rome.** He is allowed to exact revenge on his enemy—but only after his civic mission has been fulfilled.
…

Another famous story, retold by Livy, described how a consul with the appropriate name of Manlius Torquatus ordered his son Titus Manlius not to attack the enemy. When an enemy soldier dissed him, the young man killed him and returned to camp to brag about his personal victory. In today's Hollywood, the father, played by Mel Gibson, would pat his son on the back: "Like father, like son!" According to Livy, however, Manlius Torquatus said: **"Titus Manlius, you have respected neither consular *imperium* nor your father's *maiestas*, you have left your position to fight the enemy in defiance of my order, and, as far as was in your power, have subverted [military discipline], on which the fortune of Rome has rested up to this day. … I believe that you yourself, if you have a drop of my blood in you, would agree that the military discipline, which you undermined by your error, must be restored by your punishment."**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html
>
> **In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever fought by the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when Torquatus and Decius were consuls.** For it may well be believed that as by the loss of that battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so the Romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the Latins. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the armies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline and in valour, in numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he draws being, that of the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. We find, however, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, the like of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to give steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them obedient to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of the consuls put himself, and the other his son, to death.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/20*.html

2 (2) The Athenians gained repute because they punished as harmful to the state the indolent and idle who followed no useful pursuits, and the Lacedaemonians because they permitted their oldest men to beat with their canes such of the citizens as were disorderly in any public place whatever; **but for what took place in the homes they took no thought or precaution, holding that each man's house-door marked the boundary within which he was free to live as he pleased.** 3 (3) **But the Romans, throwing open every house and extending the authority of the censors even to the bed-chamber, made that office the overseer and guardian of everything that took place in the homes;** for they believed that neither a master should be cruel in the punishments meted out to his slaves, nor a father unduly harsh or lenient in the training of his children, nor a husband unjust in his partnership with his lawfully-wedded wife, nor children disobedient toward their aged parents, nor should own brothers strive for more than their equal share, and they thought there should be no banquets and revels lasting all night long, no wantonness and corrupting of youthful comrades, no neglect of the ancestral honours of sacrifices and funerals, nor any other of the things that are done contrary to propriety and the advantage of the state.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201720/page/n213/mode/2up?view=theater

The political development of the Celtic nation also presents very remarkable phenomena. The constitution of the state was based in this case, as everywhere, on the clan-canton, with its prince, its council of the elders, and its community of freemen capable of bearing arms; but the peculiarity in this case was that it never got beyond this cantonal constitution. **Among the Greeks and Romans the canton was very early superseded by the ringwall as the basis of political unity; where two cantons met within the same walls, they amalgamated into one commonwealth;** where a body of burgesses assigned to a portion of their fellow burgesses a new ringwall, there regularly arose in this way a new state connected with the mother-community only by the ties of piety or at most of clientship. **Among the Celts on the other hand the "burgess-body" continued at all times to be the clan; prince and council presided over the canton and not over any town,** and the general diet of the canton formed the authority of last resort in the state. **The town had, as in the East, merely mercantile and strategic, not political importance; for which reason the Gallic townships, even when walled**

and very considerable such as Vienna and Genava, were in the view of the Greeks and Romans merely villages.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.85694/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater

When Pausanias visited Attica, he found in the little villages ancient traditions which had been perpetuated with the worship; **and these traditions informed him that every little burgh had had its king before the time when Cecrops reigned at Athens.** Was not this a memorial of a distant age, when the great patriarchal families, like the Celtic clans, had each its hereditary chief, who was at the same time priest and judge? **Some hundred little societies then lived isolated in the country, recognizing no political or religious bond among them,** having each its territory, often at war, and living so completely separated that marriage between them was not always permitted.2
...

In the course of time these many little states were reduced to twelve confederations. This change, by which the people passed from the patriarchal family state to a society somewhat more extensive, was attributed by tradition to the efforts of Cecrops: we are merely to understand by this, that it was not accomplished until the time at which they place this personage—that is to say, towards the sixteenth century before our era. We see, moreover, that this Cecrops reigned over only one of these twelve associations, that which afterwards became Athens; **the other eleven were completely independent; each had its tutelary deity, its altar, its sacred fire, and its chief.**1
...

Then appeared Theseus, the heir of the Cecropidae. **All the traditions agree in declaring that he united the twelve groups into one city. He succeeded, indeed, in bringing all Attica to adopt the worship of Athene Polias, so that thenceforth the whole country celebrated the sacrifice of the Panathenaea in common.** Before him, every burgh had its sacred fire and its prytany. He wished to make the prytany of Athens the religious centre of all Attica.3 **From that time Athenian unity was established. In religion every canton preserved its ancient worship, but adopted one that was common to all.** Politically, each preserved its chiefs, its judges, its right of assembling; but above all these local governments, there was the central government of the city.1

> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm
>
> The textbooks downplay the religious side of the Greeks by discussing the myths of Olympus as if they were fairy tales that no influential Greek ever believed. This was in fact the case; **there is little evidence that anyone in authority took seriously the Olympian myths except as political rituals. The Olympian gods were political creations: gods that the families of a city-state might formally worship.** Without formal worship and collectively celebrated rites, there could be no civil law in Classical civilization.[(11)]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/11*.html#ref59

It must never be forgotten that Constantine's revolution was perhaps the most audacious act ever committed by an autocrat in disregard and defiance of the vast majority of his subjects. For at least four-fifths of the population of the Empire were still outside the Christian Church.60

> 60. **Estimates, based on highly conjectural data, of the number of Christians vary from one-twentieth to one-sixth of the total population.** See V. Schultze, *Der Untergang des gr.-röm. Heidentums*, I p22 *sqq.*

https://www.ccel.org/ccel/gibbon/decline/files/volume1/chap28.htm#oppr

The violent and repeated strokes of the orthodox princes were broken by the soft and yielding substance against which they were directed; and the ready obedience of the Pagans protected them from the pains and penalties of the Theodosian Code. (57) **Instead of asserting that the authority of the gods was superior to that of the emperor, they desisted, with a plaintive murmur, from the use of those sacred rites which their sovereign had condemned.**
...

Theodosius might undoubtedly have proposed to his Pagan subjects the alternative of baptism or of death; and the eloquent Libanius has praised the moderation of a prince who never enacted, by any positive law, that all his subjects should immediately embrace and practise the religion of their sovereign. (61)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=qCvlvqCXF8UC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

With the imperial decrees of 391/92 A.D. prohibiting all pagan cults and with the forceful destruction of the sanctuaries, the mysteries simply and suddenly disappeared. There is not much to be said for either the Masons' or modern witches' that they are perpetuating ancient mysteries through continuous tradition.120 Mysteries could not go underground because they lacked any lasting organization. **They were not self-sufficient sects; they were intimately bound to the social system of antiquity that was to pass away.**

---

https://biblehub.com/luke/15-11.htm

11 **Then He said: "A certain man had two sons.** 12 **And the younger of them said to his father, 'Father, give me the portion of goods** [*ousias*] **that falls to me.' So he divided to them his livelihood.** [*bion*] 13 **And not many days after, the younger son gathered all together, journeyed to a far country, and there wasted his possessions** [*ousian*] **with prodigal living.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ousia
>
> The term οὐσία is an Ancient Greek noun, formed on the feminine present participle of the verb εἰμί, *eimi*, meaning "to be, I am", so similar grammatically to the English noun "being". **There was no equivalent grammatical formation in Latin, and it was translated as *essentia* or *substantia*.** Cicero coined *essentia*[3] and the philosopher Seneca and rhetorician Quintilian used it as equivalent for οὐσία, while Apuleius rendered οὐσία both as *essentia* or *substantia*. In order to designate οὐσία, early Christian theologian Tertullian favored the use of *substantia* over *essentia*, while Augustine of Hippo and Boethius took the opposite stance, preferring the use of *essentia* as designation for οὐσία.[4][5]
> ...
>
> **The word *ousia* is used in the New Testament only in relation to the *substance* in the sense of *goods*,** twice in the parable of the Prodigal Son where the son asked his father to divide to him his inheritance, and then wasted it on riotous living.[13][14]

http://laurabetzig.org/pdf/RomanMonogamy.pdf

Primogeniture and patriliny – ceding estates to first-born sons – were the rule in the first six civilizations, in later states, and in medieval and early modern Europe (e.g., Betzig 1992a, Duby 1980, Stone 1977) All – or most – of a family's wealth was funneled into a single vessel. Just one son – the eldest – would take a legitimate wife and sire legitimate heirs. As a result the lineage – and its land – would last from generation to generation. **Why, then, was primogeniture absent in imperial Rome? I think the evidence suggests rich Romans did what they could to practice it, and Roman emperors, from Augustus on, did what they could to prevent it** (see too, e.g., Crook 1967, 104, 132, Brunt 1971, 562-566, Champlin 1991, 183).

They were anticipated by centuries of precedents. **As early as the fifth century BC, the Twelve Tables mandated that intestate Romans leave their estates equally to all legitimate sons – and daughters.** Romans could disinherit sons by will *as long as* each was specifically named. But failure to disinherit in the proper manner made wills void, as a result, rules of intestacy held, and every legitimate son and daughter would get an equal share (Crook 1986, 59-65). In AD 26, the *lex Junia Vellaea* extended that rule to grandsons (p. 64). **And entail was strictly illegal – no one could make unborn generations heirs** (Crook 1967, 122). After the second century AD, trusts set up to get around laws like these were declared invalid (in Hopkins 1983, 76 in 57). John Crook asks: "What is at the back of all this? Well, it looks as if sweeping away all the male heirs (perhaps all but one, to achieve primogeniture by the backdoor and defeat partibility and splitting-up) was not thought very nice" (1986, 65).
...

People have looked in vain for primogeniture in Rome. There isn't any evidence of it. But there is abundant evidence of *celibacy.* What nobody seems to have seen is that they amount to the same thing. To keep the majority from taking legitimate wives and making legitimate heirs is to disinherit them, eventually. Celibate sons' lines die out. Only married sons' lines last. The patrimony gets passed on, intact, to the married minority.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap6.htm#LEG

III. When Augustus resolved to establish a permanent military force for the defence of his government against foreign and domestic enemies, he instituted a peculiar treasury for the pay of the soldiers, the rewards of the veterans, and the extraordinary expenses of war. The ample revenue of the excise, though peculiarly appropriated to those uses, was found inadequate. To supply the deficiency, **the**

emperor suggested a new tax of five per cent. on all legacies and inheritances. But the nobles of Rome were more tenacious of property than of freedom. Their indignant murmurs were received by Augustus with his usual temper. He candidly referred the whole business to the senate, and exhorted them to provide for the public service by some other expedient of a less odious nature. They were divided and perplexed. He insinuated to them that their obstinacy would oblige him to *propose* a general land-tax and capitation. They acquiesced in silence. (102)
…

Such a tax, plentiful as it must prove in every wealthy community, was most happily suited to the situation of the Romans, who could frame their arbitrary wills, according to the dictates of reason or caprice, without any restraint from the modern fetters of entails and settlements. From various causes the partiality of paternal affection often lost its influence over the stern patriots of the commonwealth and the dissolute nobles of the empire; and if the father bequeathed to his son the fourth part of his estate, he removed all ground of legal complaint. (106) But a rich childless old man was a domestic tyrant, and his power increased with his years and infirmities. A servile crowd, in which he frequently reckoned praetors and consuls, courted his smiles, pampered his avarice, applauded his follies, served his passions, and waited with impatience for his death.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#inheritance

The *principle* of hereditary succession is universal; but the *order* has been variously established by convenience or caprice, by the spirit of national institutions, or by some partial example which was originally decided by fraud or violence. **The jurisprudence of the Romans appear to have deviated from the inequality of nature much less than the Jewish,** (143) **the Athenian,** (144) **or the English institutions.** (145) On the death of a citizen, all his descendants, unless they were already freed from his paternal power, were called to the inheritance of his possessions. **The insolent prerogative of primogeniture was unknown; the two sexes were placed on a just level; all the sons and daughters were entitled to an equal portion of the patrimonial estate;** and if any of the sons had been intercepted by a premature death, his person was represented, and his share was divided, by his surviving children.

> 143. **Among the patriarchs, the first-born enjoyed a mystic and spiritual primogeniture,** (Genesis, xxv. 31.) **In the land of Canaan, he was entitled to a double portion of inheritance,** (Deuteronomy, xxi. 17, with Le Clerc's judicious Commentary.)
>
> 144. At Athens, the sons were equal; but the poor daughters were endowed at the discretion of their brothers.
>
> 145. **In England, the eldest son also inherits *all* the land;** a law, says the orthodox Judge Blackstone, (Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. ii. p. 215,) unjust only in the opinion of younger brothers. It may be of some political use in sharpening their industry.

…

But the power of the testator expired with the acceptance of the testament: each Roman of mature age and discretion acquired the absolute dominion of his inheritance, **and the simplicity of the civil law was never clouded by the long and intricate entails which confine the happiness and freedom of unborn generations.**

https://archive.org/details/inquiryintonatur01smit_0/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater

When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession accordingly took place among the Romans, who made no more distinction between elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. **The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately, indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security of the monarchy, may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one of the children.** To which of them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the children of the same family, there can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the female;

and when all other things are equal, the elder every where takes place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances, which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of land is as perfectly secure of his possession as the proprietor of a hundred thousand. The right of primogeniture, however, still continues to be respected, and as of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family distinctions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original estate from being carried out of the proposed line either by gift, or devise, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its successive owners. **They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitutions nor fideicommisses bear any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in the language and form of those antient ones.**

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. **But in the present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more compleatly absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possesses;** but that the property of the present generation should be retrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still respected through the greater part of Europe, in those countries particularly in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. **In Scotland more than one-fifth, perhaps more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at present under strict entail.**

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0446 **[28 October 1813]**

at the first session of our legislature after the Declaration of Independance, we passed a law abolishing entails. and this was followed by one abolishing the privilege of Primogeniture, and dividing the lands of intestates equally among all their children, or other representatives. these laws, drawn by myself, laid the axe to the root of Pseudo-aristocracy. and had another which I prepared been adopted by the legislature, our work would have been compleat. it was a Bill8 for the more general diffusion of learning. this proposed to divide every county into wards of 5. or 6. miles square, like your townships; to establish in each ward a free school for reading, writing and common arithmetic; to provide for the annual selection of the best subjects from these schools who might recieve at the public expence a higher degree of education at a district school; and from these district schools to select a certain number of the most promising subjects to be compleated at an University, where all the useful sciences should be taught. **worth and genius would thus have been sought out from every condition of life, and compleatly prepared by education for defeating the competition of wealth & birth for public trusts.**
…

the law for religious freedom, which made a part of this system, having put down the aristocracy of the clergy, and restored to the citizen the freedom of the mind, and those of entails and descents nurturing an equality of condition among them, this on Education would have raised the mass of the people to the high ground of moral respectability necessary to their own safety, & to orderly government; and would have compleated the great object of qualifying them to select the veritable aristoi, for the trusts of government, to the exclusion of the Pseudalists: and the same Theognis who has furnished the epigraphs of your two letters assures us that ‘Ουδεμιαν πω, Κυρν’, αγαθοι πολιν ωλεςαν ανδρες.’

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fee_tail#Purpose

The fee tail allowed a patriarch to perpetuate his blood-line, family-name, honour and armorials[1] in the persons of a series of powerful and wealthy male descendants. By keeping his estate intact in the hands of one heir alone, in an ideally indefinite and pre-ordained chain of succession, his own wealth, power and family honour would not be dissipated amongst several male lines, **as became the case for example in Napoleonic**

France by operation of the Napoleonic Code which gave each child the legal right to inherit an equal share of the patrimony, where a formerly great landowning family could be reduced in a few generations to a series of small-holders or peasant farmers.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/de-tocqueville/democracy-america/ch03.htm

When the equal partition of property is established by law, the intimate connection is destroyed between family feeling and the preservation of the paternal estate; the property ceases to represent the family; for as it must inevitably be divided after one or two generations, it has evidently a constant tendency to diminish, and must in the end be completely dispersed. The sons of the great landed proprietor, if they are few in number, or if fortune befriends them, may indeed entertain the hope of being as wealthy as their father, but not that of possessing the same property as he did; the riches must necessarily be composed of elements different from his.
…

The English laws concerning the transmission of property were abolished in almost all the States at the time of the Revolution. The law of entail was so modified as not to interrupt the free circulation of property.[05d] The first generation having passed away, estates began to be parcelled out, and the change became more and more rapid with the progress of time. **At this moment, after a lapse of a little more than sixty years, the aspect of society is totally altered;** the families of the great landed proprietors are almost all commingled with the general mass. In the State of New York, which formerly contained many of these, there are but two who still keep their heads above the stream, and they must shortly disappear. **The sons of these opulent citizens are become merchants, lawyers, or physicians. Most of them have lapsed into obscurity. The last trace of hereditary ranks and distinctions is destroyed – the law of partition has reduced all to one level.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Walther_Darr%C3%A9#Nazi_Party_member

Darré campaigned for big landowners to part with some of their land to create new farms**, and promoted the controversial Hereditary Farm Law (Reichserbhofgesetz), which forcibly converted most of the country's small farms (from 7.5 to 125 hectares – 19 to 309 acres),[22] into hereditary estates that were to be passed from father to son under the ancient laws of entailment.** While the law protected small farmers from foreclosure and the ordeal of repossession, it also tied them and their descendants to their hereditary farm forever, not allowing it to be alienated nor mortgaged.

https://orthosphere.wordpress.com/2024/05/17/does-god-inflate-grades/

The political scientist C. Northcote Parkinson once said that the road from aristocracy to democracy begins with sympathy for younger brothers. To endure as exclusive elect, an aristocracy must enforce rigid primogeniture, priority in birth-order being the indispensable requirement for election. But fraternal affection and a healthy fear of assassination caused high-born big brothers to cut their little brothers some slack, and the trek to democracy was begun.
…

Before long there is no appreciable difference between the lower orders of the aristocracy and the upper orders of the bourgeoisie. **And so on, and so forth, until you extend the franchise to hobos and madmen and women.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/56*.html

2 **And when the knights were very urgent, during the games, in seeking the repeal of the law regarding the unmarried and the childless,** [Augustus] assembled in one part of the Forum the unmarried men of their number, and in another those who were married, including those who also had children. Then, perceiving that the latter were much fewer in number than the former, he was filled with grief and addressed them somewhat as follows:
…

5 1 **Yet, if one were to name over all the worst crimes, the others are as naught in comparison with this one you are now committing,** whether you consider them crime for crime or even set all of them together over against this single crime of yours. 2 For you are committing murder in not begetting in the first place those who ought to be your descendants; you are committing sacrilege in putting an end to the names and honours of your ancestors; and you are guilty of impiety in that you are abolishing your families, which were instituted by the gods, and destroying the greatest of offerings to them,—human life,—thus overthrowing their rites and their temples.
…

4 "Bethink you, therefore, what wrath would justly seize the great Romulus, the founder of our race, if he could reflect on the circumstances of his own birth and then upon your conduct in refusing to beget children even by lawful marriages! 5 **How wrathful would the Romans who were his followers be, if they could**

realize that after they themselves had even seized foreign girls, you are not satisfied even with those of your own race, and after they had got children even by enemy wives, you will not beget them even of women who are citizens!
...

6 Yet you have not striven for any of the recompenses nor feared any of the penalties, but have shown contempt for all these measures and have trodden them all underfoot, as if you were not living in a civilized community. **You talk, forsooth, about this 'free' and 'untrammelled' life that you have adopted, without wives and without children;** but you are not a whit better than brigands or the most savage of beasts. 7 1 For surely it is not your delight in a solitary existence that leads you to live without wives, nor is there one of you who either eats alone or sleeps alone; **no, what you want is to have full liberty for wantonness and licentiousness.** 2 Yet I allowed you to pay your court to girls still of tender years and not yet ripe for marriage, in order that, classed as prospective bridegrooms, you might live as family men should; **and I permitted those not in the senatorial order to wed freedwomen,** so that, if anyone through love or intimacy of any sort should be disposed to such a course, he might go about it lawfully.
...

How can the State be preserved, if we neither marry nor have children? 5 For surely you are not expecting men to spring up from the ground to succeed to your goods and to the public interests, as the myths describe! **And yet it is neither right nor creditable that our race should cease, and the name of Romans be blotted out with us, and the city be given over to foreigners—Greeks or even barbarians.** 6 **Do we not free our slaves chiefly for the express purpose of making out of them as many citizens as possible? And do we not give our allies a share in the government in order that our numbers may increase? And do you, then, who are Romans from the beginning and claim as your ancestors the famous Marcii, the Fabii, the Quintii, the Valerii, and the Julii, do you desire that your families and names alike shall perish with you?**
...

3 Later the *Lex Papia Poppaea* was framed by Marcus Papius Mutilus and by Quintus Poppaeus Secundus, who were consuls at the time for a part of the year. **Now it chanced that both of them were not only childless but were not even married,** and from this very circumstance the need of the law was apparent.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#people

The Romans had aspired to be equal; they were levelled by the equality of servitude; and the dictates of Augustus were patiently ratified by the formal consent of the tribes or centuries. **Once, and once only, he experienced a sincere and strenuous opposition. His subjects had resigned all political liberty; they defended the freedom of domestic life.** A law which enforced the obligation, and strengthened the bonds of marriage, was clamorously rejected; Propertius, in the arms of Delia, applauded the victory of licentious love; and the project of reform was suspended till a new and more tractable generation had arisen in the world. (30)

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA35#v=onepage&q&f=false

In many ancient cultures, a person had only one name, with perhaps a patronymic, such as Jesus son of Joseph, which conveys little information about ancestry. **In contrast, a Roman or a Chinese had, besides a given name (*praenomen* or *ming*), a family name (*nomen* or *xing*) and, often for aristocrats, a surname (*cognomen* or *shih*) that kept track of clan branches.** Married women were known by the family name of their parents, so that all women from the house of Julii were called Julia, as were women from the house of Chen called Chenshih.
...

Conformity may encourage mediocrity, but regulated competition and wide distribution of honors created a large body of disciplined aristocrats of high uniform quality, even if less than brilliant. In its consistency and inexhaustibility lay the strength of the Republic.40
...

Chinese aristocrats did not organize their power in a corporate institution. Nevertheless, numerous rituals and behavioral norms succeeded in maintaining harmony and hierarchical deference among them for a long time. **Shortly after the Zhou king fled to Luoyang in 771 BCE, his military power dropped below that of a secondary lord, but morally he was still the unique symbol of authority. No hardcore Huaxia lord who exercised kingly power arrogated the title until the 330s BCE.** Such was the force of *li*.41

The Romans and Chinese both cherished moral influence through exemplary personality, usually reserved for those in power. **The Roman Senate had little *potestas* or official power. Instead, it commanded deference through its *auctoritas* or suasive authority based on excellence and prestige.**42 Cicero deemed the common people imitators, arguing that history shows “the state has taken its character from that of its foremost men. Whatever changes have taken place in the conduct of its leaders have been reproduced in the lives of the people.”43 **A similar view occurred in China, where rulers claimed authority through not *quan*, or official power, but *de*, or effective virtue or moral force.**44 *De* appeared often in the *Documents*, a collection of edicts and announcements of ancient kings, for example, “From *de* derives good policies that take care of the people.”45

Amid similar reverence for moral authority, however, a contrast stood out. **The Romans' respect for senatorial *auctoritas* did not diminish their respect for the law. The Confucian orthodoxy deemed the rule by personal *de* sufficient and denigrated the law as nothing but punishment, a coercive instrument.**46
...

Nevertheless, magistracies were not hereditary. Everyone had to win elections for them. The Roman Republic made a clear legal distinction between the state and the family, which the Chinese under Confucianism had difficulty achieving.

With its roots in feudalistic China, Confucianism confined politics to asymmetric personal relations, all-pervading *guanxi*. In contrast, social relations were fundamental to the Western classical city-states. **Whereas a Chinese was devoted to the ruler as a son was devoted to his father, a Roman citizen pledged allegiance to SPQR,** the *Senatus Populusque Romanus* (Senate and the Roman people). Whereas feudalistic Chinese aristocrats were absorbed by family relations, the Romans were also concerned about the politics of living in the *polis* (city-state) and handling public affairs. **The Chinese *gong*, now understood as the public, originally meant a lord or pertaining to the seigniorial house.**47 **A new dimension shone forth in the name of Rome's *res publica*, the public realm common to the people beyond their family lives in *res privata*, the private realm.** Rome had a vibrant public space, embodied in the forum of the popular assemblies and the Senate of aristocrats. There individuals participated in social relationship and developed the idea of a commonwealth. **The law and other institutions, impersonal and impartial, represented this public space and introduced the notion of the state distinct from the family.** This extra dimension in human life was absent in feudalistic China.

These ingrained traditions and their enduring influences will show up repeatedly in the following discussions. Although Chinese Legalist reformers introduced the public dimension, its growth would be stunted under Confucianism. The public spirit of the Roman Republic mostly collapsed in the Empire, **but the institution of law remained firm.**
...

Compared to the rebellions of Chinese *guoren* discussed later, the secessions of Roman plebs showed more solidarity, respect for the law, ability at reasonable negotiation, and organizational innovations that accrued social and political gains. **Compromises between the plebs and the patricians were not merely private bargains struck between two kin groups, which were local if not ephemeral.** Upheld in the strong public spirit characteristic of the Republic, they persisted, accumulated, and were gradually institutionalized. New forms of institutions are central to successful revolutions. Because of them, the Conflict of the Orders earned the epiphet of "a bloodless revolution."53
...

Contemporaneous Chinese clans feuding for political power swore collective oaths, but the oaths died with the clans, leaving only covenant tables to excite archeologists.55

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n421/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government, **or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners, they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman [inhumanissima] edict, that any marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons—an order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of Canuleius.**

> https://archive.org/details/feudalgermany0000jame/page/168/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Social differences were jealously guarded by social prescription. **The death penalty was imposed on any man who married above his rank; the marriage of a man below his station was severely condemned; bastardy was not tolerated; intermarriage between Saxons and other Germans was frowned upon; and strangers were hated.**1 So tenaciously did the Saxons cling to their ancient customary law that clear traces of these social survivals persisted in Saxony down through the Middle Ages.2

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Patricians

But not only can it be shown that patricians and plebeians coexisted as distinct orders in the Roman state at an earlier date than the evolution of citizenship by the clients. **It has further been established on strong archaeological and linguistic evidence that the long struggle between patricians and plebeians in early Rome was the result of a racial difference between them. There is reason to believe that the patricians were a Sabine race which conquered a Ligurian people of whom the plebeians were the survivors** (see ROME: *History*). Apart from the definite evidence, the theory of a racial distinction gains probability from the fact that it explains the survival of the distinction between the *patricii*, men with a family and genealogy, and the rest of the citizens, for some time after the latter had acquired the legal status of patres and were organized in gentes of their own; **for on this theory privilege would belong not to all who could trace free descent but only to those who could trace descent to an ancestor of the conquering race.** The family organization of the conquering race was probably higher than that of the conquered, and was only gradually attained by the latter.

> https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/333/mode/2up?view=theater

> The regrettable degeneration of the Roman people – the ebbing of their Nordic essence – while being hounded, cornered, and driven back on all sides in an unprecedented racial maelstrom, began very early. **The article argued that "the first step toward this chaos of peoples, as Chamberlain called it, was taken with the law of 443 before the Common Era, which authorized marriages between patricians and plebeians" – and which could conveniently be compared to "the law of 1823 that sanctioned unions between Germans and Jews."**52

…

The traditions of early Rome indeed represent the patricians as receiving the Claudii by a collective act into their body; **but the first authenticated instance of the admission of new members to the patriciate is that of the *lex Cassia*, which authorized Caesar as dictator to create fresh patricians.** The same procedure was followed by Augustus. Later on, the right of creating patricians came to be regarded as inherent in the principate, and was exercised by Claudius and Vespasian without any legal enactment, apparently in their capacity as censor (Tac. *Ann.* xi. 25; *Vita M. Antonini*, i.). Patrician rank seems to have been regarded as a necessary attribute of the princeps; **and in two cases we are told that it was conferred upon a plebeian princeps by the senate** (*Vita Juliani*, 3; *Macrini*, 7). **A comparison of this procedure with the original conception of the patriciate as revealed by the derivation of the word, is significant of the history of the conception of nobility at Rome, and illustrative of the tenacity with which the Romans clung to the name and form of an institution which had long lost its significance.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Sallust/Bellum_Jugurthinum/3*.html#ref123

15 **For my part, I believe that all men have one and the same nature, but that the bravest is the best born; [Quamquam ego naturam unam et communem omnium existumo, sed fortissumum quemque generosissumum.]** 16 and if the fathers of Albinus and Bestia could now be asked whether they would prefer to have me or those men for their descendants, what do you suppose they would reply, if not that they desired to have the best possible children?
…

31 "My words are not well chosen; I care little for that. Merit shows well enough in itself. **It is they who have need of art, to gloss over their shameful acts with specious words.** 32 **Nor have I studied Grecian letters. I did not greatly care to become acquainted with them, since they had not taught their teachers virtue.** 33 But I have learned by far the most important lesson for my country's good – to strike down the foe, to keep watch and ward, to fear nothing save ill repute, to endure heat and cold alike, to sleep on the ground, to bear privation and fatigue at the same time. 34 It is with these lessons that I shall encourage my soldiers; I shall not treat them stingily and myself lavishly, nor win my own glory at the price of their toil. 35 **Such leadership is helpful, such leadership is democratic;** [127] **[Hoc est utile, hoc civile imperium.] for to live in luxury oneself but control one's army by punishments is to be a master of slaves, not a commander. [dominum, non imperatorem]** 36 **It was by conduct like this that your forefathers made themselves and their country famous;** 37 but the nobles, relying upon such ancestors though themselves of very different character, despise us who emulate the men of old, and claim from you all honours, **not from desert, but as a debt. [non ex merito, sed quasi debitos]**

38 "But those most arrogant of men are greatly in error. **Their ancestors have left them all that they could – riches, portrait busts, their own illustrious memory; virtue they have not left them, nor could they have done so; that alone is neither bestowed nor received as a gift.** 39 They say that I am common and of rude manners, because I cannot give an elegant dinner and because I pay no actor or cook higher wages than I do my overseer. This I gladly admit, fellow citizens; 40 **for I learned from my father and other righteous men that elegance is proper to women but toil to men, that all the virtuous ought to have more fame than riches, and that arms and not furniture confer honour.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=fj8oQ4lzteIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false

As a distinction, the patriciate mattered less than to be expected. It may be of some relevance that in the *Annales* the historian nowhere specifies any individual senator as a patrician. Before his time the word had become synonymous with aristocratic birth.21

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/11B*.html#ref37

25 1 The emperor's speech was followed by a resolution of the Fathers, **and the Aedui[37] became the first to acquire senatorial rights in the capital:** a concession to a long-standing treaty and to their position as the only Gallic community enjoying the title of brothers to the Roman people.

Much at the same time, the Caesar adopted into the body of patricians all senators of exceptionally long standing or of distinguished parentage: for by now few families remained of the Greater and Lesser Houses, as they were styled by Romulus and Lucius Brutus;[38] and even those selected to fill the void, under the Cassian and Saenian laws, by the dictator Caesar and the emperor Augustus were exhausted.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrician_(ancient_Rome)#Fading_of_distinction

The last patrician families of the Republic went extinct in the Imperial period, and the latest known members of the "original" patrician houses are Servius Cornelius Dolabella Metilianus Pompeius Marcellus or possibly the Cornelii Scipiones Salvidieni Orfiti.[19]

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/351/mode/2up?view=theater

The Roman Commonwealth in the days of the Republic was composed of three orders, each with definite rank, duties and privileges. They were to remain: **the Romans did not believe in equality.**1 **But passage from below to the equestrian order and from the equestrian order to the Senate was to be made incomparably more easy.** The justification for advancement lay in service—above all, military service. In this way a soldier's family might rise through equestrian to senatorial rank in two or three generations, according to the social system of the Principate; and senators were eligible to purple. **The passage of time extended the process and abbreviated the stages, so that the sons of knights, knights themselves and finally Thracian and Illyrian brigands became emperors of Rome.**

https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/360213031.htm

For there is this difference between the kings of the nations and the emperors of the republic, that the kings of the nations are lords of slaves, but the emperors of the republic lords of freemen.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA132#v=onepage&q&f=false

Indeed, **though it was often challenged, the anti-ethnic character of Romanness is something of touchstone for Roman authors from almost every period of Latin literature.** Indeed, the rejection of blood as a criterion of identity was a central feature of Rome's foundation legend. Livy's Romulus instructs his eligible Roman bachelors **to remind prospective in-laws of neighboring tribes that "men should not be reluctant to mix their blood and lineages with men" (*ne graverentur homines cum hominibus sanguinem ac genus miscere*)** [1.9]; a dictum whose very borrowed vocabulary (*genus/genos*) evokes Rome's openness.143

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0054%3Abook%3D12%3Acard%3D791

The Author of mankind and all that is, smiling benignant, answered thus her plea: "Jove's sister true, and Saturn's second child, what seas of anger vex thy heart divine! But come, relinquish thy rash, fruitless rage: I give thee this desire, and yield to thee free submission. **The Ausonian tribes shall keep the speech and customs of their sires; the name remains as now; the Teucrian race, abiding in the land, shall but infuse the mixture of its blood. I will bestow a league of worship, and to Latins give one language only.** From the mingled breed a people shall come forth whom thou shalt see surpass all mortal men and even outvie the faithfulness of gods; for none that live shall render to thy name an equal praise."

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0026%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D9

Acting on the advice of the senate, Romulus sent envoys amongst the surrounding nations to ask for alliance and the right of intermarriage on behalf of his new community. [3] **It was represented that cities, like everything else, sprung from the humblest beginnings, and those who were helped on by their own courage and the favour of heaven won for themselves great power and great renown.** [4] As to the origin of Rome, it was well known that whilst it had received divine assistance, courage and self-reliance were not wanting. There should, therefore, be no reluctance for men to mingle their blood with their fellow-men. [5] Nowhere did the envoys meet with a favourable reception. Whilst their proposals were treated with contumely, there was at the same time a general feeling of alarm at the power so rapidly growing in their midst. **Usually they were dismissed with the question, 'whether they had opened an asylum for women, for nothing short of that would secure for them inter-marriage on equal terms.'**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/3A*.html

Another argument—and do not take this as said by way of censure or reproach of you Romans, but only from necessity—is the fact that **the Alban race has to this day continued the same that it was under the founders of the city, and one cannot point to any race of mankind, except the Greeks and Latins, to whom we have granted citizenship; whereas you have corrupted the purity of your body politic by admitting Tyrrhenians, Sabines, and some others who were homeless, vagabonds and barbarians,** and that in great numbers too, so that the true-born element among you that went out from our midst is become small, or rather a tiny fraction, in comparison with those who have been brought in and are of alien race. 5 **And if we should yield the command to you, the base-born will rule over the true-born, barbarians over Greeks, and immigrants over the native-born.** For you cannot even say this much for yourself, that you have not permitted this immigrant mob to gain any control of public affairs but that you native-born citizens are yourselves the rulers and councillors of the commonwealth. **Why, even for your kings you choose outsiders, and the greatest part of your senate consists of these newcomers; and to none of these conditions can you assert that you submit willingly.** For what man of superior rank willingly allows himself to be ruled by an inferior? It would be great folly and baseness, therefore, on our part to accept willingly those evils which you must own you submit to through necessity.
...

4 **For we are so far from being ashamed of having made the privileges of our city free to all who desired them that we even take the greatest pride in this course;** moreover, we are not the originators of this admirable practice, but took the example from the city of Athens, which enjoys the greatest reputation among the Greeks, due in no small measure, if indeed not chiefly, to this very policy. 5 **And this principle, which has been to us the source of many advantages, affords us no ground either for complaint or regret, as if we had committed some error.** Our chief magistracies and membership in the senate are held and the other honours among us are enjoyed, not by men possessed of great fortunes, nor by those who can show a long line of ancestors all natives of the country, but by such as are worthy of these honours; **for we look upon the nobility of men as consisting in nothing else than in virtue.** The rest of the populace are the body of the commonwealth, contributing strength and power to the decisions of the best men.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=rfPWAQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA154#v=onepage&q&f=false

6 We must be careful to make a distinction, unlike some who have incorrectly supposed that a single formula (*carmen*) is used both to call the gods out of a city and to devote the city itself to destruction. I have found both formulas in the fifth Book of the *Secret World* (*Res Reconditae*) of Sammonicus Serenus, who stated that he had come across them in an extremely ancient book by one Furius. 7 **The formula to call the gods out of a city encircled by a siege is as follows:** 'Whether god of goddess, under whose protection are the people and the state of Carthage, and to you especially who have been charged with the protection of this city and people, **I pray and do reverence and ask a favour of you all,** that you abandon the people and state of Carthage, forsake their places, temples, shrines, and city, 8 and depart from these; and that you bring fear, terror and bewilderment upon that people and state; **and that, once you have abandoned them, you come to Rome, to me and to mine; and that you take me and the Roman people and my soldiers under your charge that we may know and understand this. If you shall so have done, I vow to you that I shall construct temples and celebrate games.**' 9 With these words victims should be sacrificed, and the authority of the entrails examined to see if they predict these events for the future.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DScaur.%3Asection%3D42

[42] **All the monuments of the ancients and all histories have handed down to us the tradition that the nation of the Phoenicians is the most treacherous of all nations.** The Poeni, who are descended from them, have proved by many rebellions of the Carthaginians, and very many broken and violated treaties, that they have in no respect degenerated from them. **The Sardinians, who are sprung from the Poeni, with an admixture of African blood, were not led into Sardinia as colonists and established there, but are rather a tribe who were draughted off, and put there to get rid of them.**

[43] Wherefore, as there was never anything honest in the nation when united, how must we suppose that its roguery has been sharpened by so many mixtures of different races? And here Cnaeus Domitius Sincerus, a most accomplished man, my ancient and intimate friend, will pardon me **** all who had the freedom of the city conferred on them by the same Cnaeus Pompeius; all of whom we now cite as favourable witnesses; **and other virtuous men from Sardinia will pardon me; for I believe there are some such men there.** [44] **Nor indeed, when I speak of the vices of the nation, do I except no one. But I am forced to speak generally of the entire race; in which, perhaps, some individuals by their own civilized habits and natural humanity [suis moribus et humanitate] have got the better of the vices of their family and nation.**

https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/naziseasternempire/himmlersspeechatposen.html

It is one of those things that's easy to say: "The Jewish people will be extirpated", says every Party comrade, "that's quite clear, it's in our programme: elimination of the Jews, extirpation; that's

> what we're doing." **And then they all come along, these 80 million good Germans, and every one of them has his decent Jew.** Of course, it's quite clear that the others are pigs, but this one is one first-class Jew.

That the greater part of the nation is destitute of faith, destitute of any community and connection with our name, the facts themselves plainly show. **For what province is there besides Sardinia which has not one city in it on friendly terms with the Roman people, not one free city?**

[45a] Africa itself is the parent of Sardinia, which has waged many most bitter wars against our ancestors, and not only in its kingdoms which were loyal to their native monarchs, but even in our very province, it kept itself from all alliance with us at the time of the Punic wars as the case of Utica proves. **The further Spain ennobled by the de[ath of the Scipios, and by the funeral pile of the Saguntine loyalty, has the city of Gades joined to us by reciprocal good offices, by common dangers, and by treaty.** I ask now whether any city of Sardinia can be mentioned which is joined to us by treaty? Not one.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Balbus

1. LUCIUS CORNELIUS BALBUS (called *Major* to distinguish him from his nephew) was born early in the last century B.C. **He is generally considered to have been of Phoenician origin.** For his services against Sertorius in Spain, the Roman citizenship was conferred upon him and his family by Pompey. Becoming friendly with all parties, **he had much to do with the formation of the First Triumvirate, and was one of the chief financiers in Rome. He was careful to ingratiate himself with Caesar, whom he accompanied when propraetor to Spain (61), and to Gaul (58) as chief engineer (*praefectus fabrum*).** His position as a naturalized foreigner, his influence and his wealth naturally made Balbus many enemies, who in 56 put up a native of Gades to prosecute him for illegally assuming the rights of a Roman citizen, a charge directed against the triumvirs equally with himself. Cicero, Pompey and Crassus all spoke on his behalf, and he was acquitted.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0020%3Atext%3DBalb.%3Asection%3D51

And I wish that those men in all quarters of the world who are the defenders of this empire, could all enter this city as citizens, and, on the other hand, that all the enemies of the republic could be got rid or out of it. Nor, indeed, did that great poet of our country intend that exhortation which he put into the mouth of Hannibal to be peculiarly his language, but rather the common address of all generals:

> “The man who slays a foe, whate'er his race,
> Come whence he will, I call my countryman.”

And from what country an ally comes, all men consider and always have considered unimportant. Therefore, they have at all times adopted brave men as citizens from all quarters, and have often preferred the valour of men who may have been meanly born to the inactivity of the nobility.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n237/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But in speaking of race, it is not intended in the sense in which it is the fashion among anti-Semites in Europe and America to use it today: Darwinistically, materially. Race purity is a grotesque word in view of the fact that for centuries all stocks and species have been mixed, **and that warlike – that is, healthy – generations with a future before them have from time immemorial always welcomed a stranger into the family if he had “race,” to whatever race it was he belonged. Those who talk too much about race no longer have it in them. <u>What is needed is not a pure race, but a *strong* one</u>, which has a nation within it.**
>
> https://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/bartram/bartram.html
>
> THE national character of the Muscogulges, when considered in a political view, exhibits a portraiture of a great or illustrious heroes. A proud, haughty and arrogant race of men; they are however, brave and valiant in war, ambitious of conquest, restless and perpetually exercising their arms, **yet magnanimous and merciful to a vanquished enemy, when he submits and seeks their friendship and protection: <u>always uniting the vanquished tribes in confederacy with them; when they immediately enjoy, unexceptionably, every right of free citizens, and are from that moment united in one common band of brotherhood:</u>** they were never known to exterminate a tribe, except the Yamasees, who would never submit on any terms, but fought it out to the last, only about forty or fifty of them escaping at the last decisive battle, who threw themselves under the protection of the Spaniards at St. Augustine.
>
> https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2396760/How-Comanche-Indians-butchered-babies-roasted-enemies-alive.html

Interestingly the Comanche, though hostile to all competing tribes and people they came across, had no sense of race. They supplemented their numbers with young American or Mexican captives, who could become full-fledged members of the tribe if they had warrior potential and could survive initiation rites.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/3B*.html#ref56

15 **Along with the happy lot of their country, the qualities of both gentleness and civility have come to the Turdetanians;** and to the Celtic peoples, too, on account of their being neighbours to the Turdetanians, as Polybius has said, or else on account of their kinship; but less so the Celtic peoples, because for the most part they live in mere villages. **The Turdetanians, however, and particularly those that live about the Baetis, have completely changed over to the Roman mode of life, not even remembering their own language any more. And most of them have become Latins,[61] and they have received Romans as colonists, so that they are not far from being all Romans.**

https://cmuntz.hosted.uark.edu/texts/claudius-lyon-speech.html

5. Certainly it was a new thing when my great-uncle Augustus and my uncle Tiberius decided to admit into this Senate house the flower of the coloniae and **the cities [municipiorum]** from all over the empire--**all of them good and wealthy men of course.** But, you may say, is not an Italian senator more useful than a provincial one? When I start explaining this aspect of my censorship I will reveal what I think about that. But certainly I think that provincials should not be rejected, as long as they will be a credit to the Senate.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/11B*.html#ref27

23 1 In the consulate of Aulus Vitellius[21] and Lucius Vipsanius, the question of completing the numbers of the senate was under consideration, and the leading citizens of Gallia Comata,[22] as it is termed, who had long before obtained federate rights and Roman citizenship,[23] were claiming the privilege of holding magistracies in the capital. Comments on the subject were numerous and diverse; and in the imperial council the debate was conducted with animation on both sides:—**"Italy," it was asserted, "was not yet so moribund that she was unable to supply a deliberative body to her own capital.** The time had been when a Roman-born senate was enough for nations[24] whose blood was akin to their own; and they were not ashamed of the old republic. Why, even to-day men quoted the patterns of virtue and of glory which, under the old system, the Roman character had given to the world! **Was it too little that Venetians and Insubrians[25] had taken the curia by storm, unless they brought in an army of aliens to give it the look of a taken town? What honours would be left to the relics of their nobility or the poor senator who came from Latium? All would be submerged by those opulent persons whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers, in command of hostile tribes, had smitten our armies by steel and the strong hand, and had besieged the deified Julius at Alesia.[26]** But those were recent events! What if there should arise the memory of the men who essayed to pluck down the spoils, sanctified to Heaven, from the Capitol and citadel of Rome?[27] Leave them by all means to enjoy the title of citizens: but the insignia of the Fathers, the glories of the magistracies,—these they must not vulgarize!"

24 1 Unconvinced by these and similar arguments, the emperor not only stated his objections there and then, but, after convening the senate, addressed it as follows:[28]—

"**In my own ancestors, the eldest of whom, Clausus,[29] a Sabine by extraction, was made simultaneously a citizen and the head of a patrician house, I find encouragement to employ the same policy in my administration, by transferring hither all true excellence, let it be found where it will.** For I am not unaware that the Julii came to us from Alba, the Coruncanii from Camerium,[30] the Porcii from Tusculum; that—not to scrutinize antiquity—members were drafted into the senate from Etruria, from Lucania, from the whole of Italy;[31] and that finally Italy itself was extended to the Alps,[32] in order that not individuals merely but countries and nationalities should form one body under the name of Romans. **The day of stable peace at home and victory abroad came when the districts beyond the Po were admitted to citizenship, and, availing ourselves of the fact that our legions were settled throughout the globe, we added to them the stoutest of the provincials, and succoured a weary empire. Is it regretted that the Balbi crossed over from Spain and families equally distinguished from Narbonese Gaul? Their descendants remain; nor do they yield to ourselves in love for this native land of theirs. What else proved fatal to Lacedaemon and Athens, in spite of their power in arms, but their policy of holding the conquered aloof as alien-born? But the sagacity of our own founder Romulus was such that several times he fought and naturalized a people in the course of the same day!** Strangers have been kings over us: the conferment of magistracies on the sons of freedmen is not the novelty which it is commonly and mistakenly thought, but a frequent practice of the old commonwealth.—'But we fought with the Senones.'—Then, presumably, the Volscians and Aequians[33] never drew up a line of battle against us.—'We were taken by the Gauls.'—But we also gave hostages to the Tuscans[34] and underwent the yoke of the Samnites.[35]—And yet, if you survey the whole of our wars, not one was finished within a shorter period[36] than that against the Gauls: thenceforward there has been a continuous and loyal peace. **Now that customs, culture, and the ties of marriage have blended them with ourselves, let them bring among us their gold and their riches instead of retaining them beyond the pale! All, Conscript Fathers, that is now believed supremely old has been new: plebeian magistrates followed the patrician; Latin, the plebeian; magistrates**

from the other races of Italy, the Latin. Our innovation, too, will be parcel of the past, and what to-day we defend by precedents will rank among precedents."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Histories/4C*.html#ref34

73 1 Presently Cerialis called an assembly of the Treviri and Lingones and addressed them thus: "I have never practised oratory and the Roman people has ever asserted its merits by arms: but since words have the greatest weight with you and you do not reckon good and evil according to their own nature, but estimate them by the talk of seditious men, I have decided to say a few things which now that the war is over are more useful for you to hear than for me to say. **Roman commanders and generals entered your land and the lands of the other Gauls from no desire for gain but because they were invited by your forefathers, who were wearied to death by internal quarrels, while the Germans whom they had invited to help them had enslaved them all, allies and enemies alike.** How many battles we have fought against the Cimbri and Teutoni, with what hardships on the part of our armies and with what result we have conducted our wars against the Germans, is perfectly well known. **We have occupied the banks of the Rhine not to protect Italy but to prevent a second Ariovistus from gaining the throne of Gaul.**[35] Do you believe that you are dearer to Civilis and his Batavians or to the peoples across the Rhine than your grandfathers and fathers were to their ancestors? The Germans always have the same reasons for crossing into the Gallic provinces—lust, avarice, and their longing to change their homes, that they may leave behind their swamps and deserts, and become masters of this most fertile soil and of you yourselves: **freedom, however, and specious names are their pretexts; but no man has ever been ambitious to enslave another or to win dominion for himself without using those very same words.**

74 1 "There were always kings and wars throughout Gaul until you submitted to our laws. Although often provoked by you, **the only use we have made of our rights as victors has been to impose on you the necessary costs of maintaining peace;** for you cannot secure tranquillity among nations without armies, nor maintain armies without pay, nor provide pay without taxes: **everything else we have in common. You often command our legions; you rule these and other provinces; we claim no privileges, you suffer no exclusion. [cetera in communi sita sunt. ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris praesidetis, ipsi has aliasque provincias regitis; nihil separatum clausumve.]** You enjoy the advantage of the good emperors equally with us, although you dwell far from the capital: the cruel emperors assail those nearest them. You endure barren years, excessive rains, and all other natural evils; in like manner endure the extravagance or greed of your rulers. There will be vices so long as there are men, but these vices are not perpetual and they are compensated for by the coming of better times: unless perchance you hope that you will enjoy a milder rule if Tutor and Classicus reign over you, or that the taxes required to provide armies to keep out the Germans and Britons will be less than now. **For, if the Romans are driven out—which Heaven forbid—what will follow except universal war among all peoples? [quid aliud quam bella omnium inter se gentium existent?]** The good fortune and order of eight hundred years have built up this mighty fabric which cannot be destroyed without overwhelming its destroyers: moreover, you are in the greatest danger, for you possess gold and wealth, which are the chief causes of war. **Therefore love and cherish peace and the city wherein we, conquerors and conquered alike, enjoy an equal right: [proinde pacem et urbem, quam victi victoresque eodem iure obtinemus, amate colite]** be warned by the lessons of fortune both good and bad not to prefer defiance and ruin to obedience and security."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Histories/2B*.html#ref39

There was nothing that angered the province and the army so much as the assertion of Mucianus that Vitellius had decided to transfer the legions of Germany to Syria, where they could enjoy a profitable and easy service, while in exchange he would assign to the troops in Syria the wintry climate and the laborious duties of Germany. **For the provincials were accustomed to live with the soldiers, and enjoyed association with them; in fact, many civilians were bound to the soldiers by ties of friendship and of marriage, [necessitudinibus et propinquitatibus]** and the soldiers from their long service had come to love their old familiar camps as their very hearths and homes.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n453/mode/2up?view=theater

[Trajan] was the first in a long line of generals whose provincial birth and training seemed to give them the will-to-life that had gone from the native Roman stock. That Rome made no protest against this enthronement of a provincial was in itself an event and omen in Roman history.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/25*.html#ref94

8 But what grieved the very heart of every **patriotic citizen [bonorum]** was this, that fearful of a rival to his power and bearing in mind that it was in Gaul and Illyricum that many men had taken the first steps to loftier power, in his haste to outstrip the report of his coming, under pretext of avoiding perjury he committed an act unworthy of an emperor, **betraying Nisibis, which ever since the time of King Mithridates' reign had resisted with all its might the occupation of the Orient by the Persians.**[96]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/1/2*.html#ref7

The great city of Nisibis, which had with scarcely any interruption belonged to the Roman Empire since the time of Trajan and which had been the great *entrepôt* of the commerce of East and West, was to be surrendered to Sapor: and the cities of Singara and Castra Maurorum with fifteen fortresses were to share the same fate.
...

Here was a city erected upon the highlands of Mesopotamia; whose river, after a devious course, flowed into the Euphrates. From its walls Tigris could perhaps be descried gleaming upon the eastern horizon. It was doubtless essentially Asiatic in its character: **its citizens spoke the Aramaic tongue of Hazael and Benhadad;** those who were most closely connected with Europe and had the most successfully assimilated the Western civilisation, might at the utmost be familiar with the Greek language which had been learned by the subjects of Seleucus and Antiochus. **Yet these Orientals clung with passionate devotion to the name of Romans, and asked for nothing better far from their rulers than to be allowed to fight for their connexion with the far-off City by the Tiber.** In the course of this history we shall often come across cruel cases of oppression by Roman governors; we shall often have to trace the desolating presence of the Roman tax-gatherer; we shall sometimes hear the suggestion that even subjection to the barbarian is better than the exhausting tyranny of Roman prefects. **But this is not the abiding, the universal conviction of the subjects of the Empire. Their own old feelings of nationality have long ago been laid aside, and to them the Empire, or as they call it 'the Commonwealth of Rome,' is home;** loved, notwithstanding all its faults, and not to be abandoned without passionate lamentation.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/Introduction*.html#ref4

We have, for what it is worth, the word of Suidas and the lines of Sidonius Apollinaris,[8] which clearly refer to Claudian and which give Canopus as the place of his birth. (Canopus is almost certainly to be taken as synonymous with Egypt.) But besides these two statements we have only to look at his interest in things Egyptian, *e.g.* his poems on the Nile, the Phoenix, etc., at such passages as his account of the rites at Memphis,[9] at such phrases as "nostro cognite Nilo,"[10] to see that the poet is an Egyptian himself. It is probable that, whether or not he spent all his early life in Egypt, Claudian did not visit Rome until 394. We know from his own statement[11] that **his first essays in literature were all of them written in Greek and that it was not until the year 395 that he started to write Latin.**
...

It is not easy to arrive at any just estimate of Claudian as a writer, partly because of an inevitable tendency to confuse relative with absolute standards, and partly (and it is saying much the same thing in other words) because it is so hard to separate Claudian the poet from Claudian the manipulator of the Latin language. If we compare his latinity with that of his contemporaries (with the possible exception of Rutilius) or with that of such a poet as Sidonius Apollinaris, who came not much more than half a century after him, **it is hard to withhold our admiration from a writer who could, at least as far as his language is concerned, challenge comparison with poets such as Valerius Flaccus, Silius Italicus, and Statius—poets who flourished about three centuries before him.[24] I doubt whether, subject matter set aside, Claudian might not deceive the very elect into thinking him a contemporary of Statius, with whose *Silvae* his own shorter poems have much in common.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/Probino_et_Olybrio*.html#136

Grant it; **so may Scythian Araxes be our vassal and Rhine's either bank; so may the Mede be o'erthrown and the towers that Semiramis built yield to our standards, while amazed Ganges flows between Roman cities.**"

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/In_Rufinum/1*.html#368

The goddess made answer: "Thou shalt rage no further, mad that thou art. Now shall thy creature receive his due, the destined avenger hangs over him, and he who now wearies land and the very sky shall die, though no handful of dust shall cover his corpse. Soon shall come Honorius, promised of old to this fortunate age, brave as his father Theodosius, brilliant as his brother Arcadius; he shall subdue the Medes and overthrow the Indians with his spear. Kings shall pass under his yoke, frozen Phasis shall bear his horses' hooves, and Araxes submit perforce to be bridged by him. **Then too shalt thou be bound with heavy chains of iron and cast out from the light of day and imprisoned in the nethermost pit, thy snaky locks overcome and shorn from thy head. Then the world shall be owned by all in common, no field marked off from another by any dividing boundary, [tum tellus communis erit, tum limite nullo discernetur ager] no furrow cleft with bended ploughshare; for the husbandman shall rejoice in corn that springs untended.** Oak groves shall drip with honey, streams of wine well up of every side, lakes of oil abound. No price shall be asked for fleeces dyed scarlet, but of themselves shall the flocks grow red to the astonishment of the shepherd, and in every sea the green seaweed will laugh with flashing jewels."

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/De_Consulatu_Stilichonis/2*.html#refA

Beneath thy rule the rich tremble not for the safety of ancestral lands or houses; no informer stalks the world set on making no matter whom his victim. Virtue suffers no eclipse by poverty. **Thou exaltest men of all countries, asking what are their merits not their place of birth, what their character not whence their origin. [lectos ex omnibus oris evehis et meritum, non quae cunabula, quaeris, et qualis non unde satus.] A generous prince takes note of our life; rewards allure into the ways of virtue. Hence it comes that the arts of old flourish once more; the path to fortune is open to genius, while poesy again raises her despised head.** Rich and poor strive with equal zeal towards their ends, for both see that, as poverty cannot depress merit, so riches cannot elevate incapacity.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/De_Consulatu_Stilichonis/3*.html#130

'Tis she alone who has received the conquered into her bosom and like a mother, not an empress, protected the human race with a common name, summoning those whom she has defeated to share her citizenship and drawing together distant races with bonds of affection. To her rule of peace we owe it that the world is our home, **that we can live where we please, [quod sedem mutare licet]** and that to visit Thule and explore its once dread wilds is but a sport; thanks to her all and sundry may drink the waters of the Rhone and quaff Orontes' stream, **thanks to her we are all one people. [quod cuncti gens una sumus]**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Rutilius_Claudius_Namatianus

The author is a native of S. Gaul (Toulouse or perhaps Poitiers), and belonged, like Sidonius, to one of the great governing families of the Gaulish provinces. His father, whom he calls Lachanius, had held high offices in Italy and at the imperial court, had been governor of Tuscia (Etruria and Umbria), then imperial treasurer (*comes sacrarum largitionum*), imperial recorder (*quaestor*), and governor of the capital itself (*praefectus urbi*). Rutilius boasts his career to have been no less distinguished than his father's, and particularly indicates that he had been secretary of state (*magister officiorum*) and governor of the capital (i. 157, 427, 467, 561).
...

Only once or twice does Rutilius speak directly of Christianity, and then only to attack the monks, whom the temporal authorities had hardly as yet recognized, and whom, indeed, only a short time before, a Christian emperor had forced by thousands into the ranks of his army. Judaism Rutilius could assail without wounding either pagans or Christians, but he intimates, not obscurely, that he hates it chiefly as the evil root whence the rank plant of Christianity had sprung.

We read in Gibbon that "Honorius excluded all persons who were adverse to the catholic church from holding any office in the state," that he "obstinately rejected the service of all those who dissented from his religion," and that "the law was applied in the utmost latitude and rigorously executed." **Far different is the picture of political life impressed upon us by Rutilius.** His voice is assuredly not that of a partisan of a discredited and overborne faction. We see by the aid of his poem a senate at Rome composed of past office-holders, the majority of whom were certainly pagan still. We discern a Christian section whose Christianity was political rather than religious, who were Romans first and Christians afterwards, **whom a new breeze in politics might easily have wafted back to the old religion.** Between these two sections the broad old Roman toleration reigns.
...

The poet shows as deep a consciousness as any modern historian that the grandest achievement of Rome was the spread of law.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Rutilius_Namatianus/Introduction*.html

Educated on the lines of the ancient learning, Rutilius, as his poem indicates, was a man of literary knowledge and taste, an adherent of paganism, **and influenced by Stoic philosophy.**
...

His tender Stoic melancholy, coloured rather than seared by the memory of Rome's recent capture by the Goths, does not prevent him from cherishing an optimistic confidence in her recovery, even as in long-past history she had recovered after the Allia and Cannae. And so in his encomium upon the imperial city, sincere enough in feeling and yet in phrasing more rhetorical than poetic, **Rutilius has uttered the swan-song of Rome.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Rutilius_Namatianus/text*.html

How greatly and how often can I count those blest who have deserved birth in that happy soil! Those high born scions of Roman nobility crown their honourable birth with the lustre of the Capital! On no other land could the seeds of virtues have been more worthily let fall by heaven's assignment. Happy they too who, winning meeds next to the first, have enjoyed Latin homes![3] **The Senate-house, though fenced with awe, yet stands open to foreign merit, nor deems those strangers who are fittingly**

its own. [religiosa patet peregrinae curia laudi, nec putat externos quos decet esse suos] They share the power of their colleagues in the senatorial order, and possess part of the sacred Genius[4] which they revere, even as from ethereal pole to pole of the celestial vault we believe there abideth the council of the Deity Supreme.
…

As far as living nature hath stretched towards the poles, so far hath earth opened a path for thy valour. **For nations far apart thou hast made a single fatherland; under thy dominion captivity hath meant profit even for those who knew not justice:[10] and by offering to the vanquished a share in thine own justice, [profuit iniustis te dominante capi. dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris] thou hast made a city of what was erstwhile a world.**

"**As authors of our race we acknowledge Venus and Mars—mother of the sons of Aeneas, father of the scions of Romulus: clemency in victory tempers armed strength: both names[11] befit thy character: hence thy noble pleasure in war and in mercy: it vanquishes the dreaded foe and cherishes the vanquished. [quos timuit superat, quos superavit amat]** The god who found the olive-tree is worshipped, the deity too who discovered wine, and the youth who first drove the ploughshare in the soil;[12] the healing art through the skill of the god Paeon[13] won altars: Hercules by his renown was made divine: **thou, too, who hast embraced the world in triumphs fraught with law, dost make all things live under a common covenant. Thee, O goddess, thee every nook of the Roman dominion celebrates, beneath a peaceful yoke holding necks unenslaved. [tu quoque, legiferis mundum complexa triumphis, foedere communi vivere cuncta facis. te, dea, te celebrat Romanus ubique recessus pacificoque gerit libera colla iugo.]** The stars, which watch all things in their unceasing motion, never looked upon a fairer empire. What like unto thy power did it fall to Assyrian arms to link in one? The Persians only subdued neighbours of their own. The mighty Parthian kings and Macedonian monarchs[14] imposed laws on each other through varying changes. **It was not that at thy birth thou hadst more souls and hands: but more prudence and more judgement were thine. By wars for justifiable cause and by peace imposed without arrogance thy renowned glory reached highest wealth. [nec tibi nascenti plures animaeque manusque, sed plus consilii iudiciique fuit. iustis bellorum causis nec pace superba nobilis ad summas gloria venit opes.]**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/6/1*.html#ref64

The army heard with shame the reproofs of their great commander, and laying aside their careless and self-indulgent ways, **'returned,' says the historian, 'to the habits of their ancestors.'**65 **These ancestors were of course supposed to be the men of Rome. It shows what magic yet lay in that mighty name, that this Armenian Eunuch, addressing his motley host of Huns, Heruli, Isaurians, Warni, could win them back from dissipation and self-indulgence by this single argument, 'They are unworthy of your Roman forefathers.'**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false

Our stories on either side begin with massive migrations of pastoralists and raids on the relatively prosperous agriculturalists. In response, the plains states put aside their mutual grievances and closed rank, as a Chinese remarked: "Brothers wrangle at home but unite against external threats."20 **The Zhou states formed a federacy under a hegemon "to resist the Yi." Rome and other Latin cities ceased squabbling and cooperated to defend against Volsci and Aequi intrusions.**21 Eventually the agriculturists prevailed, their states strengthened by the experience of fighting and the incorporation of the vanquished. The names of many pastoral peoples disappeared from later historical records. Their fates varied. Some were massacred, others subjugated; still others expelled or moved away. Most adopted a sedentary life and after several generations became indistinguishable from neighboring farmers.

Fighting aside, intermarriage, colonization, political integration, and cultural assimilation all contributed to the formation of a unitary people. As the major group in each region, the Romans and the Huaxia were chauvinistic, aggressive, discriminative, and jealous of their own advantages. **However, their prejudices were closer to the racism of America after the civil rights movements of the 1960s than to that before the Civil War of the 1860s. Comparing their attitudes with those of contemporaneous Greeks reveals their relative openness to other ethnicities,** which enabled them to adapt and absorb others, thus amplifying their own strength.

> http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-4
>
> [3:5] The Master said: "The tribes of the East and North (Koreans and Mongolians), though having kings, are not equal to our people, even when lacking kings."
>
> > [*Comment*] **Either Confucius is an outright ethnic chauvinist, or he is pointing to a real difference in the relative level of cultural development at that time between the central Chinese kingdoms and the peoples of the outlying regions.**

When Rome began to urbanize, there were some 700 Greek city-states already scattered along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts like frogs around a pond, as Plato remarked. Except for a few giants such as Athens and Corinth, most were rather small, with an average population of several thousand. Citizenship in a Greek city-state carried enormous political, social, and economic privileges. Who were qualified for it? **Aristotle explained, "In practice it is usual to define a citizen as one born of citizen parents on both sides, and not on the father's or mother's side only; but sometimes this requirement is carried still farther, to the length of two, three, or more stages of ancestry."**22 **Not even distant descendants of marriage to an outsider were safe from expulsion.** Double endogamy closed the citizen body upon itself. Its enforcement was so rigorous in democratic Athens that one modern scholar observes, "One gets a distinct sense of siege, of barricades being manned, of determined resistance to constant pressures from outside."23

In contrast, intermarriage among peoples with little penalty was common in Italy and China. Rome gradually extended citizenship together with its privileges to the peoples it conquered. **Imperial China did not institute formal citizenship but routinely extended uniform duties and privileges to all inhabitants. Furthermore, the Chinese tabooed marriage between persons with the same family name. This precluded intermarriage among most ruling houses, whose members were relatives within the Zhou clan and shared a family name.** The necessity of out-marriage compelled many aristocrats to seek unions with locals and commoners, sometimes non-Huaxia in origin.24

Criteria of access to authoritative positions are crucial to any power structure. **Amid Greek exclusiveness, Alexander was a singularity. The Greco-Roman biographer Plutarch wrote, "Alexander did not do as Aristotle advised – play the part of a leader to the Greeks and of a master to the barbarians, care for the former as friends and kinsmen, and treat the latter as beasts or plants, … he behaved alike to all."**25 **As soon as he died, his successors reverted to the Greek tradition and expelled from powerful positions all Persians and other natives of the conquered lands.** Across the vast Hellenistic world, Greeks and Macedonians became "the new master race," to use the term of modern historians; they formed a closed circle to which very few natives gained access, and then only slowly and painfully.26

> http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/18A*.html#ref20
>
> 3 But that he might not appear to be arbitrarily detracting anything from the glory of Alexander, he laid these matters before the common assembly of the Macedonians for consideration. 4 The following were the largest and most remarkable items of the memoranda. **It was proposed to build a thousand warships, larger than triremes, in Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for the campaign against the Carthaginians and the others who live along the coast of Libya and Iberia and the adjoining coastal region as far as Sicily;[21] to make a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles** and, as needed by so great an expedition, to construct ports and shipyards at suitable places; to erect six most costly temples, each at an expense of fifteen hundred talents; **and, finally, to establish cities and to transplant populations from Asia to Europe and in the opposite direction from Europe to Asia, in order to bring the largest continents to common unity and to friendly kinship by means of intermarriages and family ties.** 5 The temples mentioned above were to be built at Delos, Delphi, and Dodona, and in Macedonia a temple to Zeus at Dium, to Artemis Tauropolus at Amphipolis, and to Athena at Cyrnus.[22] Likewise at Ilium in honour of this goddess there was to be built a temple that could never be surpassed by any other.[23] A tomb for his father Philip was to be constructed to match the greatest of the pyramids of Egypt, buildings which some persons count among the seven greatest works of man.[24] 6 **When these memoranda had been read, the Macedonians, although they applauded the name of Alexander, nevertheless saw that the projects were extravagant and impracticable and decided to carry out none of those that have been mentioned.**

…

Putting ability and moral quality above kinship and ethnicity as a criteria of governmental appointment was a Chinese ideal since the First Emperor abolished the feudalistic aristocracy. Top ministers came from all across the country, and a surrendered Xiongnu made co-regent to a boy emperor.27

…

The Romans and Huaxia did discriminate, but based mainly on behavior, not birth; ethics, not ethnicity; politics, not race.28 They make good cases for the thesis that credits relative openness and toleration with an empire's ability to expand and endure.29

…

The Etruscans excelled in engineering and led native Italians in city building. They adapted the Greek alphabets and passed them on to the Latins, together with their own numeral system that we now call "Roman." Many city-states flourished in Latium. Besides language and culture, the Latins shared reciprocal private rights: the rights of citizens from one community to reside, own land, conduct commerce, sign legal contracts, marry partners, and even acquire citizenship in another.69 **These Latin customs were similar to the Etruscan but contrary to the Greek. For the Greeks, ownership of real estate within a city-state was limited to citizens of that state – unless the foreigners were imperial Athenians backed by their powerful navy.**70

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ZqroV-TkIhgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR59#v=onepage&q&f=false

To go forth and conquer, a republic must increase the number of citizens and arm them in order to achieve numerical majority on the battlefield. Rome conquered the Mediterranean world because it **"could already put in arms two hundred eighty thousand men, [whereas] Sparta and Athens never passed beyond twenty thousand each"** (*D* 2.3). The Romans generated this manpower in two ways. After defeating in war,

they often made them into partners (*socii*) who could keep their own laws but had to supply troops to the Romans (*D* 2.4.1, 23.2). **Further, they encouraged foreigners to take residence in their city and liberally admitted them to citizenship** (*D* 2.3) **– contrary to the classical maxim of limiting the citizenship to men of good breeding and honorable occupation for the sake of concord, friendship, and virtue.**

Plato (*Rep*. 415c-417b, 422a-423d; *Leg*. 742a-b) **had argued that the virtue that a city attains from limiting its size and inhibiting foreign commerce would always suffice to vanquish large and open cities in war.** This claim may have seemed plausible at the time, for aristocratic and isolationist Sparta had just defeated the populous and innovative city of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (432-404 B.C.). **But it was shown to be wrong when Rome acquired its empire on account of superior numbers drawn from plebeians and *socii* as well as its inventiveness in warfare.** Hence, Machiavelli was right when he argued that the foreign aspect of the human condition makes the classical conception of a small and virtuous republic nonviable.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/847/pg847-images.html#link2H_4_0003 **[1842]**
>
> At length in the year of the city 378, both parties mustered their whole strength for their last and most desperate conflict. The popular and active Tribune, Caius Licinius, proposed the three memorable laws which are called by his name, and which were intended to redress the three great evils of which the Plebeians complained. He was supported, with eminent ability and firmness, by his colleague, Lucius Sextius. **The struggle appears to have been the fiercest that every in any community terminated without an appeal to arms.** If such a contest had raged in any Greek city, the streets would have run with blood. But, even in the paroxysms of faction, the Roman retained his gravity, his respect for law, and his tenderness for the lives of his fellow citizens.
> …
>
> Two centuries of prosperity, harmony, and victory followed the reconciliation of the orders. Men who remembered Rome engaged in waging petty wars almost within sight of the Capitol lived to see her the mistress of Italy. **While the disabilities of the Plebeians continued, she was scarcely able to maintain her ground against the Volscians and Hernicans. When those disabilities were removed, she rapidly became more than a match for Carthage and Macedon.**
>
> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius2a.html#c3
>
> **The restraint of the people is also to be commended, who by freely offering themselves to the labours and dangers of war, prevented their commanders from enlisting the capite censi, whose extreme poverty aroused suspicion, and made it impossible to trust them to bear public arms.** [3.1] **This custom, confirmed by long use, was first broken by C. Marius, who enlisted soldiers from the capite censi. He was a noble citizen, but he was conscious of his own low birth, and so not favourable to antiquity.** He was not unmindful, that if military pride should persist to despise those of humble birth, he himself might be deemed by a malicious judge of virtues to be a commander risen from the capite censi. **Therefore he thought it best to obliterate that proud method of choice among the Roman armies,** lest the contagion of that stigma should spread itself to obscure his own glory.

https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/1220/2314

It must however be remembered that the *habitus* of barbarism was borrowed from the Greeks. Gruen (2011) states:

> Roman traditions claimed no purity of lineage. **Distinctiveness of blood or heritage never took hold as part of Roman self-conception. Indeed, the Romans lacked a term for non-Roman. They had to borrow the Greek notion of 'barbarian,'** a particular irony since it signified in origin non-Greek speakers – a category into which the Romans themselves fell. (p. 345)
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=OirJPP6mOkEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA66#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Isocrates comes into our picture primarily as the untiring advocate of a Panhellenic crusade against the Persian 'barbarians.'** 'Concord among Greeks and war against barbarians' is the stock theme of his political pamphlets; and although he tells us that this was a common topic of contemporary oratory,13 **we know of no speaker or writer who reiterated it so persistently as he.** Whether under joint Athenian and Spartan leadership, as he proposed in the *Panegyricus* in 380 B.C., or with Philip of Macedon at their head, as he advocated thirty-four years later, the Greeks must unite in military action against their hereditary foes, their *natural* enemies. **Homer owes much of his fame to his glorification of the men who fought against the barbarians – a striking distortion of Homer's real attitude to the Trojans.**

https://archive.org/details/graecoromaninst02reicgoog/page/n19/mode/2up?view=theater

Marcus Antistius Labeo, Capito, Gaius, Papinianus, Paulus, or Ulpian, are still walking amongst us, ready to help us in any practical difficulty, and capable of assisting us whenever we fail to make up the feud between theory and practice. **The works of the Greek scientists and thinkers, although indicative of an incomparably greater power of mind than the works of the Roman jurists, are now-a-days obsolete.** We rarely or never use them as text-books, or as current reference-books of science. The works of the Roman jurists, on the other hand, still continue to be the text-books of students of law all over Europe and America. In what then does this specific excellence consist?

It is of course extremely difficult to reduce the characterization of a complex system of Law to a few words. **But such is the pre-eminent excellence of Roman Private Law that it is more or less easily contrasted with the system, of Private Law of other nations. Roman or Civil Law is the only system of Private Law that has not been unduly influenced by the irrelevant factors of Religion, Politics, and Ethics.**
...

The Romans never suffered their legal institutions to be interlarded with extraneous matter. From the earliest times down to the age of the Emperors, the Romans had a political institution that might have lent itself very easily to an undue interference with institutions of Private Law, after the manner of feudalism. I mean the Roman *clientela*, Roman clients stood to their *patroni* in a relation not unlike that of a feudal tenant to his lord. They held estates from them, they were obliged to do homage and to discharge some of the duties implied in "feudal incidents." All this surely might have easily been used as a means to unduly influence the development of the Roman Law of real property. **It might have been used to create those semi-complete forms of property with which English law abounds, and which go to make the English law of real property a most intricate law. But nothing of the kind happened. The Roman concept of real property, or rather of property in general, was nowise influenced by the grants of land so frequent amongst patrons and clients, and the legal construction of these grants, namely the *precaria*, exercised no influence whatever on the features of *dominium* or *possessio*.**

Or take another great political institution of the Romans: I mean the two classes of patricians and plebeians. Nothing is more patent than the constant struggle of the plebeians with the patricians, and the marked difference in their political standing. Did this well-known difference exercise any influence on the private law of the Romans? **Do we ever hear of an *actio* or private right being denied to a Roman because he is a plebeian? There is no trace either in the XII. Tables, or in any later legislation of any thoroughgoing or even important difference between the plebeians and patricians as to "civil" rights (taking the word "civil" in its Roman sense) after the middle of the fifth century B.C. A plebeian could acquire real property, contract obligations, marry and will his property according to the same principles of Private Law as a patrician.**
...

Now according to what we notice in our own law, we should expect, that no modern civilian will devote his time to the intricate questions of Roman slave-law, Roman *patronatus*, Roman *libertini*, &c., &c., **just as no English practical jurist will devote his time to a laborious study of old English serf- and villein-law. Roman Law, however, is so independent of institutions peculiarly Roman, that while slavery has long ceased to be of any practical interest to the jurists of modern Europe – except as a pretext to grab large territories in Africa – Roman slave-law continues to exercise a most intense interest,** and recent books like Prof. Leist's books on "Roman Patronatus" are eagerly welcomed on all hands as contributions to practical law.

In fact, as we shall see in our next lecture, **Roman slave-law has a value entirely independent of the historical and as it were accidental institution of Roman slavery.** American slavery is a thoroughly historical institution, and the works of Cobb, Hurd, Wilson and others on American slave-law are totally ignored by the present lawyers of Louisiana, Alabama or Mississippi. Not so Roman treatises on slave-law.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/4A*.html#ref48

3 This king also took no small care to enlarge the body of citizens, hitting upon a method that had been overlooked by all the kings before him. **For they, by receiving foreigners and bestowing upon them equal rights of citizenship without rejecting any, whatever their birth or condition, had indeed rendered the city populous; 4 but Tullius permitted even manumitted slaves to enjoy these same rights, unless they chose to return to their own countries.** For he ordered these also to report the value of their property at the same time as all the other free men, and he distributed them among the four city

tribes, in which the body of freedmen, however numerous, continued to be ranked even to my day; and he permitted them to share in all the privileges which were open to the rest of the plebeians.

23 1 The patricians being displeased and indignant at this, **he called an assembly of the people and told them that he wondered at those who were displeased at his course, first, for thinking that free men differed from slaves by their very nature rather than by their condition,** and, second, for not determining by men's habits and character, rather than by the accidents of their fortune, those who were worthy of honours, particularly when they saw how unstable a thing good fortune is and how subject to sudden change, and how difficult it is for anyone, even of the most fortunate, to say how long it will remain with him. 2 **He asked them also to consider how many states, both barbarian and Greek, had passed from slavery to freedom and how many from freedom to slavery. He called it great folly on their part if, after they had granted liberty to such of their slaves as deserved it, they envied them the rights of citizens;** and he advised them, if they thought them bad men, not to make them free, and if good men, not to ignore them because they were foreigners. 3 **He declared that they were doing an absurd and stupid thing, if, while permitting all strangers to share the rights of citizenship without distinguishing their condition or inquiring closely whether any of them had been manumitted or not, they regarded such as had been slaves among themselves as unworthy of this favour.** And he said that, though they thought themselves wiser than other people, they did not even see what lay at their very feet and was to be observed every day and what was clear to the most ordinary men, namely, that not only the masters would take great care not to manumit any of their slaves rashly, for fear of granting the greatest of human blessings indiscriminately, but the slaves too would be more zealous to observe their masters faithfully when they knew that if they were thought worthy of liberty they should presently become citizens of a great and flourishing state and receive both these blessings from their masters. 4 He concluded by speaking of the advantage that would result from this policy, **reminding those who understood such matters, and informing the ignorant, that to a state which aimed at supremacy and thought itself worthy of great things nothing was so essential as a large population, in order that it might be equal to carrying on all its wars with its own armed forces and might not exhaust itself as well as its wealth in hiring mercenary troops; and for this reason, he said, the former kings had granted citizenship to all foreigners.** 5 **But if they enacted this law also, great numbers of youths would be reared from those who were manumitted and the state would never lack for armed forces of its own, but would always have sufficient troops, even if it should be forced to make war against all the world.** 6 And besides this advantage to the public, the richest men would privately receive many benefits if they permitted the freedmen to share in the government, since in the assemblies and in the voting and in their other acts as citizens they would receive their reward in the very situations in which they most needed it, and furthermore would be leaving the children of these freedmen as so many clients to their posterity. 7 **These arguments of Tullius induced the patricians to permit this custom to be introduced into the commonwealth, and to this day it continues to be observed by the Romans as one of their sacred and unalterable usages.**

http://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/tacitusc/annals/chap3.htm#P25

> Romulus governed us as he pleased; then Numa united our people by religious ties and a constitution of divine origin, to which some additions were made by Tullus and Ancus. **But Servius Tullius was our chief legislator, to whose laws even kings were to be subject.**

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius6a.html#c2

[2.3] What? Were the people safe from the assaults of liberty? No, it both assailed them, and found them patiently suffering. Carbo, tribune of the plebs, who was a most turbulent supporter of the recently suppressed Gracchan sedition, and a most absolute firebrand of the growing civil strife, having dragged P. Africanus from the very gate of the city to the rostra, as he returned in triumph from the destruction of Numantia, asked him there for his opinion on the death of Ti. Gracchus, whose sister he had married; so that by the authority of so eminent a person, he might add fuel to the fire already begun. He did not doubt that in regard of his near relative, Scipio would speak somewhat affectionately on behalf of his brother-in-law who had been put to death; **but he answered that Gracchus was rightly slain. Upon which saying, when the whole assembly, aroused by the tribunician fury, began to make a great clamour. "Hold your peace," said he, "you, to whom Italy is but a stepmother." And when they began to make yet more noise, he said, "You shall never make me afraid of you – the freedmen, [solutos] whom I brought here in chains." [alligatos]** Thus were the whole people twice reprimanded by one man with contempt. But – such is the honour they gave to virtue – they soon were mute.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Appian/Civil_Wars/2*.html#ref46

120 1 In this frame of mind they hastened up to the Capitol with their gladiators. There they took counsel and decided to bribe the populace, hoping that if some would begin to praise the deed others would join in from love of liberty and longing for the republic. **They thought that the genuinely Roman people were still as they had learned that they were when the elder Brutus expelled the kings.** They did not perceive that they were counting on two incompatible things, namely, that people could be lovers of liberty and bribe-takers at the same time. The latter class were much easier to find of the two, because the government had been corrupt for a long time. **For the plebeians are now much mixed with**

foreign blood, freedmen have equal rights of citizenship with them, and slaves are dressed in the same fashion as their masters. Except in the case of the senatorial rank the same costume is common to slaves and to free citizens.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/353/mode/2up?view=theater

During the Triumviral period an ex-slave became military tribune. Horace is ferociously indignant—'hoc, hoc tribuno militum'.6 **Horace himself was only one generation better.** Here again, no return to Republican prejudices of birth. In the Principate, sons of freedmen soon occupy military posts;7 and, just as under the Republic, they are attested as senators—in the purified Senate of Augustus.8

https://www.attalus.org/old/pliny7.html#32

I am delighted that the visit of my friend Tiro was so agreeable to you,* but I was immensely pleased to read in your letter that you had taken advantage of the fact that your visitor was a proconsul to give a number of your slaves their freedom. **For while I am anxious that our native district should grow richer in all good things, I am specially anxious that the number of its citizens should increase, as that is the soundest distinction of which a town can boast.**

https://archive.org/details/dailylifeinancie035465mbp/page/n89/mode/2up?view=theater

Appian of Alexandria, writing under Antoninus Pius, remarks that even in externals the slave is in no way distinguished from his master, and unless his master donned the *toga praetexta* of the magistrate, the two were dressed alike.36 **Appian supplements this by recording a thing which astonished him even more: after a slave had regained his liberty he lived on terms of absolute equality with the Roman citizen.**

Rome, **alone of all cities of antiquity,** has the honour of having redeemed her outcasts by opening her doors to them.37
…

An epigraphist walking through the ruins of ancient Rome receives the impression that slaves and freedmen predominated in the life of the imperial epoch, for three times out of four they alone are mentioned in the inscriptions which are still to be read on the walls. In an article remarkable for the quantity and accuracy of its statistics, **Tenney Frank points out that since in the majority of cases the form of a slave name betrays its owner's Graeco-oriental origin, it is easily proved that at least 80 per cent of the population of Imperial Rome had been emancipated from more or less ancient servitude.**40

https://books.google.fi/books?id=sOWxzU66-7sC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false

Already Meyer insisted on the steady improvement of the treatment of slaves and found that Roman manumission represented **a 'generosity … that keeps causing astonishment and admiration.'**15 **Later Carcopino presented an equally sunny picture, declaring that, 'With few exceptions, slavery in Rome was neither eternal nor, while it lasted, intolerable,' since, 'The practical good sense of the Romans, no less than the fundamental humanity instinctive to their peasant hearts, had always kept them from showing cruelty toward the *servi*.'**16 Vogt expanded on this view of Roman slavery, although – for specific ideological reasons – he did not pay much attention to manumission.17 Alföldy, however, offered the most sustained argument for near universal manumission.18

> 17. Vogt (1975). The limited attention paid to manumission might seem surprising given the overall tenor of his work, **but is explicable in terms of Vogt's immediate concern which was to offer a response to Marxist attempts to present the conflict between master and slaves as the driving force behind the transformation of ancient society.** Vogt therefore put particular emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of the master-slave relationship, which he claimed could be both friendly and affectionate; cf. an unpublished paper delivered by Heinz Heinen at a seminar at the University of Edinburgh, 2007. **Viewed from that perspective, manumission was less relevant, since it terminated the owner's *potestas*; indeed it might carry the inconvenient implication that slaves were happy to leave their master's authority.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=sOWxzU66-7sC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA14#v=onepage&q&f=false

The notion that some people were naturally suited for slavery takes us to Aristotle's much-debated theory of slavery, which argued that some slaves were slaves 'by nature.' The model was practically unworkable and Aristotle himself accepted some of its shortcomings, which other Greek writers also seem to have noted.21

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D1255a

[1255a] [1] It is manifest therefore that there are cases of people of whom some are freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both expedient and just. **But at the same time it is not difficult to see that those who assert the opposite are also right in a manner.** The fact is that the terms 'slavery' and 'slave' are ambiguous; for there is also such a thing as a slave or a man that is in slavery by law, for the law is a sort of agreement under which the things conquered in war are said to belong to their conquerors. **Now this conventional right is arraigned by many jurists just as a statesman is impeached for proposing an unconstitutional measure; they say that it is monstrous if the person powerful enough to use force, and superior in power, is to have the victim of his force as his slave and subject; and even among the learned some hold this view, though others hold the other. But the reason of this dispute and what makes the theories overlap is the fact that in a certain manner virtue when it obtains resources has in fact very great power to use force, and the stronger party always possesses superiority in something that is good,**[1] so that it is thought that force cannot be devoid of goodness, but that the dispute is merely about the justice of the matter (for it is due to the one party holding that the justification of authority is good-will, while the other identifies justice with the mere rule of the stronger); because obviously if these theories be separated apart, [20] the other theories have no force or plausibility at all, implying that the superior in goodness has no claim to rule and be master. But some persons, simply clinging, as they think, to principle of justice (for the law is a principle of justice), assert that the enslavement of prisoners of war is just; yet at the same time they deny the assertion, **for there is the possibility that wars may be unjust in their origin and one would by no means admit that a man that does not deserve slavery can be really a slave—otherwise we shall have the result that persons reputed of the highest nobility are slaves and the descendants of slaves if they happen to be taken prisoners of war and sold. Therefore they do not mean to assert that Greeks themselves if taken prisoners are slaves, but that barbarians are.** Yet when they say this, they are merely seeking for the principles of natural slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that there exist certain persons who are essentially slaves everywhere and certain others who are so nowhere. And the same applies also about nobility: **our nobles consider themselves noble not only in their own country but everywhere, but they think that barbarian noblemen are only noble in their own country**—which implies that there are two kinds of nobility and of freedom, one absolute and the other relative, as Helen says in Theodectes[2]:

> "But who would dare to call me menial,
> The scion of a twofold stock divine?"

Certainly, the idea of 'natural slavery' appears to have found little resonance in Rome, where the jurists explicitly rejected it. Florentinus, for example, stated unequivocally that it was 'against nature.'22

22. D. 1.5.4: 'contra naturam;' cf. D. 1.1.4. (Ulpian) and 50.17.32: 'quod ius natural attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt,' 'as far as concerns the natural law all men are equal;' cf. *Inst. Iust.* 1.2.2; 1.3.2.

Many Roman writers, some under the influence of Stoic thought, went even further, stressing not just the common humanity of all people but also the role of chance in deciding one's place in the world. Thus in his *Paradoxa Stoicorum* Cicero implied that slaves were not inferior by nature and that their servitude was determined by external circumstances, while he also referred to the unhappy lot of slaves as 'infima condicio et fortuna.'23 **According to one of Publilius Syrus' proverbs, slavery is honest when brought on by fate – but he was of course a freedman himself.**24 **However, Caesar also noted in passing that all men naturally long for freedom and despise the state of slavery.**25 **Likewise, Seneca Maior declared: 'no one is naturally free or slave. These are titles imposed later on individuals by fortune.'**26

25. *BG* 3.10: **'omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse.'**

The idea was most fully developed in the works of the younger Seneca. In the *De Beneficiis* he stressed the fundamental equality of mankind, who, no matter what their place in society might be, all spring from the same source and share the same origin.27 Similar sentiments were voiced by Greek writers in Rome. **Thus Dionysius of Halicarnassus, despite his apparent hostility to freedmen, included a speech attributed to Servius Tullius which took to task those who thought that free men differed from slaves by their very nature rather than by their condition.** According to the Roman king, slaves were created by fortune, which in principle could strike anyone: all people should therefore be judged on their character and merit.28

The rejection of 'natural slavery' does not mean, however, that the Romans did not discriminate between rightful and wrongful enslavement. Indeed this distinction was crucially important to them, as shown by numerous historical instances. For instance in 172 BCE the senate decided that the surrendered Ligurian Statellates had been unjustly enslaved and should be restored to liberty. If that did not happen, **officials should investigate and punish those 'by whose malice they had become slaves.'**29
…

In this context it is worth remembering that the Roman concept of the 'just war' was highly formalistic and largely determined by observance of proper procedure.31 **Consequently the enslavement of defeated peoples was justified less by moral arguments than by formality.**32

Roman jurists justified slavery by reference to the fact that it was a commonly accepted institution among all peoples.33 As such it was founded on *ius gentium*, i.e. 'the law which natural reason has established among all human beings,' and therefore required no specific justification.34
…

Wrongly enslaved people could regain their freedom and even *ingenuitas* through a process of 'vindicatio in libertatem,' which did not leave them with libertine status afterwards.39 In principle it was impossible for freeborn to forfeit their *ingenuitas*.

The Roman justification of slavery was, in short, based on formalism rather than essentialism. External circumstances – fate and bad luck – made people slaves, not nature. Watson therefore rightly observed that: 'To be a slave is a misfortune for the individual, assuredly a grave one, but it is not inevitable, natural, or necessarily permanent.'40

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Xql9DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA65#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Islamic languages developed a rich vocabulary of terms for "slave," denoting the whole range of the vast slave population, from the humble toilers in fields, mines, and kitchens to the sultan's slaves who commanded armies, governed provinces, and controlled the central administrations. Used of these last, such words as the Arabic *mamlūk* and Turkish *kul*,52 though technically meaning "slave," carried a connotation not of enslavement but of power and dominance.

The Islamic term for "free,"53 until the eighteenth century, had a primarily legal, and occasionally social, significance, and meant one who, according to the law, was a free man and not a slave. Neither term, "free" or "slave," was used in a political context, **and the familiar Western use of the terms "freedom" and "slavery" as metaphors for citizen's rights and oppressive rule is unknown to the language of classical Islamic political discourse.** There too, there is much discussion of good and bad government, but the issue at stake is not freedom but justice.

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/political-arena/47500-democratic-tyranny-is-not-an-oxymoron?p=1322465#post1322465

Muslims regarded slavery as a normal condition of all people. "**The sultans had none of Aristotle's belief that some men are born slaves** … They were themselves sons of 'slaves,' for their harems were likewise made up chiefly of daughters of Christians."[62] **Their denial that *some* men are born slaves was due to a belief that *all* men are born slaves – to Allah or to his representative, the sultan or caliph; the latter was himself the slave of Allah.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ViqQDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA115#v=onepage&q&f=false

The spokesman of the beasts replied, 'He argues that they buy and sell us. The same is done by Persians to Greeks and Greeks to Persians when they conquer one another. So which is the slave and which the master? The Indians treat the Sindians the same way, and the Sindians, the Indians; the Abyssinians, the Nubians; and the Nubians, the Abyssinians. **Which, pray, are the slaves and which the masters?**60 **Are these not, just Majesty, the mere forms of human fortune, with the changing influences of the stars and conjunctions of the constellations?** as God Himself said, These *are but the days whose revolutions I bring about among men*.61 *But none comprehends but the learned*.62

60. **The Ikhwān reject the triumphalist bent of thinkers like Aristotle and al-Fārābī, who entertain the thought that the fortunes of war might tend to enslave those who are fit only to be slaves, or who, at the very least, seem likely to profit from their servitude by acquiring a higher level of culture or religion.** See Aristotle, *Politics* 1.1256b23: 'From one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such kind is naturally just.' Al-Fārābī writes that a prince employs two classes of

persons to form the character of his subjects: '**a group employed by him to form the character of whoever is susceptible of having his character formed willingly, and a group employed by him to form the character of those who are such that their character can be formed only by compulsion.** ... The [province of the] latter is the art of war, the power by which one excels in organizing and leading armies and using the implements of war and warlike people **to conquer nations and cities that do not willingly do what will lead them to happiness.**' Al-Fārābī, *Fī ta ṣīl al-ṣa'āda*, trans. after Muhsin Mahdi in *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 36-37.

https://archive.org/details/alberunisindiaac01brnm/page/100/mode/2up?view=theater

Among the Hindus institutions of this kind abound. **We Muslims, of course, stand entirely on the other side of the question, considering all men as equal, except in piety;** and this is the greatest obstacle which prevents any approach or understanding between Hindus and Muslims.

---

https://archive.org/details/historyrome01dickgoog/page/n242/mode/2up?view=theater

In general, the economic and social condition of Italy was not primarily dependent on political distinctions; **there were allied districts, such as Umbria and Etruria, in which the class of free farmers had mostly disappeared, while in others, such as the valleys of the Abruzzi, the same class had still maintained a tolerable footing or remained almost unaffected**—just as a similar diversity could be pointed out in the different Roman burgess-districts.
...

In consequence of this treatment of the Italians on the part of the Roman government, the variance, which the wisdom of their ancestors had carefully fostered between the Latin and the other Italian communities, could not fail, if not to disappear, at any rate to undergo abatement (ii. 335). **The fortresses of Rome and the districts kept to their allegiance by these fortresses lived now under the like oppression;** the Latin could remind the Picentine that they were both in like manner "subject to the fasces"; **the overseers and the slaves of former days were now united by a common hatred towards the common despot.**
...

In short, while the Italian allies had formerly stood to the Romans partly in the relation of brothers under tutelage, protected rather than ruled and not destined to perpetual minority, partly in that of slaves tolerably treated and not utterly deprived of the hope of manumission, **they were now all of them subject nearly in equal degree, and with equal hopelessness, to the rods and axes of their Roman masters,** and might at the utmost presume like privileged slaves to transmit the kicks received from their masters onward to the poor provincials.
...

Instead of the expected modifications, there was issued in 659/95 a consular law which most strictly prohibited the non-burgesses from laying claim to the franchise and threatened transgressors with trial and punishment—a law which threw back a large number of most respectable persons who were deeply interested in the question of equalization from the ranks of Romans into those of Italians, **and which in point of indisputable legality and of political folly stands completely on a parallel with that famous act which laid the foundation for the separation of North America from the mother-country; in fact it became, just like that act, the proximate cause of the civil war.** It was only so much the worse, that the authors of this law by no means belonged to the obstinate and incorrigible Optimates; they were no other than the sagacious and universally honoured Quintus Scaevola, destined, like George Grenville, by nature to be a jurist and by fate to be a statesman—**who by his equally honourable and pernicious rectitude inflamed more than any one else first the war between senate and equites, and then that between Romans and Italians**—and the orator Lucius Crassus, the friend and ally of Drusus and altogether one of the most moderate and judicious of the Optimates.

http://www.attalus.org/translate/diodorus37.html

[1] **Ever since human actions have been recorded for eternal memory in history, the greatest war known to us is the Marsic War, named after the Marsi.** This war, indeed, surpassed all those that preceded it, both in the bravery of the leaders and in the greatness of their exploits.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Florus/Epitome/2B*.html#VI

III, 18 **Though we call this war a war against allies, in order to lessen the odium of it, yet, if we are to tell the truth, it was a war against citizens. For since the Roman people**

united in itself the Etruscans, the Latins and the Sabines, and traces the same descent from all alike, it has formed a body made up of various members and is a single people composed of all these elements; 2 **and the allies, therefore, in raising a rebellion within the bounds of Italy, committed as great a crime as citizens who rebel within a city.** 3 **So when the allies very justly demanded the rights of citizenship,** for which Drusus, in his desire for power, had encouraged them to hope as members of a State which they had aggrandized by their exertions, the same brand which had consumed him kindled the allies, 4 after he had fallen through the perfidy of his fellow-citizens, to take up arms and attack the city. 5 **What could be sadder, what more disastrous than this calamity?** All Latium and Picenum, all Etruria and Campania, and finally all Italy rose against their mother and parent city.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n145/mode/2up?view=theater

A federal republic was formed, Corfinium was named the capital, and the government was vested in a senate of 500 men chosen from all the Italian tribes except the Etruscans and Umbrians, who refused to join.
…

In three years of war 300,000 men fell, and central Italy was devastated. When Etruria and Umbria were on the verge of going over to the rebels, Rome pacified them by a grant of full Roman citizenship; and in 90 the Roman franchise was offered to all Italian freemen or freedmen who would swear fealty to Rome. These belated concessions weakened the allies; one town after another laid down its arms; and in 89 this ferocious and costly war ended in a sullen peace. The Romans nullified the franchise they had granted by enrolling the new citizens in ten new tribes, which voted only after the existing thirty-five, and therefore usually to no use; besides, only a few of the new citizens could attend the assemblies in Rome. The deceived and desolate communities bided their time. **Forty years later they would open their gates in welcome to a Caesar who offered them citizenship in a democracy that was dead.**

https://archive.org/details/historyrome01dickgoog/page/n262/mode/2up?view=theater

Exactly three hundred years had passed since Rome had last been obliged to submit to the dictation of peace; Rome was now worsted once more, and the peace which she desired could only be got by yielding in part at least to the terms of her antagonists. With the communities, doubtless, which had already risen in arms to subdue and to destroy Rome, the feud had become too bitter for the Romans to prevail on themselves to make the required concessions; and, had they done so, these terms would now perhaps have been rejected by the other side. But, if the original demands were conceded under certain limitations to the communities that had hitherto remained faithful, such a course would on the one hand preserve the semblance of voluntary concession, while on the other hand it would prevent the otherwise inevitable consolidation of the confederacy and thereby pave the way for its subjugation. **Accordingly the gates of Roman citizenship, which had so long remained closed against entreaty, now suddenly opened when the sword knocked at them;** yet even now not fully and wholly, but in a manner reluctant and annoying even for those admitted.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n99/mode/2up?view=theater

There is very little to be gained out of the catchwords derived from the way of thinking that prevails at the moment – such as Bolshevism, Communism, class struggle, capitalism, Socialism – each of which is believed by the user to convey the exact meaning of the problem simply because he is unable to see deep down into the facts. **The same thing has occurred in all former Cultures at the equivalent stage, little as we know of the details.**1

But in the case of the Classical Age we do know enough. The climax of the revolutionary movement lies in the period between the Gracchi and Sulla, but the struggle set in a good century earlier with C. Flaminius, whose agrarian law of 232 Polybius rightly describes (II, 21) as the beginning of the demoralization of the masses.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater

Sulpicius was killed, betrayed by his servant; Sulla had the head of the tribune affixed to the rostrum that had lately rung with its eloquence; he rewarded the slave with freedom for his services, and death for his treachery. **While his soldiers dominated the Forum he decreed that henceforth no measure should be offered to the Assembly except by permission of the Senate, and that the order of voting should be as in the "Servian constitution," which gave priority and advantage to the upper classes.** He had himself chosen proconsul, allowed Cnaeus Octavius and Cornelius Cinna to be elected consuls (87), and then marched off to encounter Mithridates the Great.

He had hardly left Italy when the struggle of the plebeian *populares* and the patrician and equestrian *optimates* was resumed. The conservative supporters of Octavius fought in the Forum with the radical followers of Cinna, and in one day 10,000 men were killed. Octavius won, and Cinna fled to organize revolt in the neighboring towns. **Marius, after a winter in hiding, sailed back to Italy, proclaimed freedom to slaves, and led a force of 6000 men against Octavius in Rome. The rebels won, slaughtered thousands, adorned the rostra with the heads of slain senators, and paraded the streets with noble heads on their pikes as a model for later revolutions.** Octavius accepted death calmly as he

sat in his robes of office on his tribune's chair. **The carnage continued for five days and nights, the rebel terror for a year. A revolutionary tribunal subpoenaed patricians, condemned them if they had opposed Marius, and seized their property.** A nod from Marius sufficed to send any man to death, usually by execution there and then. **All of Sulla's friends were slain; his property was confiscated; he was deposed from his command and was declared a public enemy.** The dead were refused burial and were left in the streets to be devoured by birds and dogs. The freed slaves plundered, raped, and killed indiscriminately, until Cinna gathered 4000 of them together, surrounded them with Gallic soldiery, and had them butchered to death.[21]

Cinna was now (86) chosen consul for the second time, Marius for the seventh. In the first month of his new term Marius died, aged seventy-one, worn out with hardships and violence. **Valerius Flaccus, elected in his stead, passed a bill canceling seventy-five per cent of all debts,** and then left for the East with an army of 12,000 men to depose Sulla from command. Enjoying undivided power at Rome, Cinna changed the Republic into a dictatorship, nominated all successful candidates for major offices, and had himself elected consul for four successive years.

https://archive.org/details/historyrome01dickgoog/page/n340/mode/2up?view=theater

Along with the reign of terror came the *tyrannis*. Cinna not only stood at the head of the state for four years in succession (667-670/87-84) as consul, but he regularly nominated himself and his colleagues without consulting the people; it seemed as if these democrats set aside the sovereign popular assembly with intentional contempt. **No other chief of the popular party, before or afterwards, possessed so perfectly absolute a power in Italy and in the greater part of the provinces for so long a time almost undisturbed, as Cinna; but no one can be named, whose government was so utterly worthless and aimless. The law proposed by Sulpicius and thereafter by Cinna himself, which promised to the new burgesses and the freedmen equality of suffrage with the old burgesses, was naturally revived; and it was formally confirmed by a decree of the senate as valid in law (670/84).** Censors were nominated (668/86) for the purpose of distributing all the Italians, in accordance with it, into the thirty-five burgess-districts—by a singular conjuncture, in consequence of a want of qualified candidates for the censorship the same Philippus, who when consul in 663/91 had chiefly occasioned the miscarriage of the plan of Drusus for bestowing the franchise on the Italians (p. 221), was now selected as censor to inscribe them in the burgess-rolls. The reactionary institutions established by Sulla in 666/88 were of course overthrown. Some steps were taken to please the proletariate—for instance, **the restrictions on the distribution of grain introduced some years ago (p. 237), were probably now once more removed;** the design of Gaius Gracchus to found a colony at Capua was in reality carried out in the spring of 671/83 on the proposal of the tribune of the people, Marcus Junius Brutus; **Lucius Valerius Flaccus the younger introduced a law as to debt, which reduced every private claim to the fourth part of its nominal amount and cancelled three fourths in favour of the debtors. But these measures, the only positive ones during the whole Cinnan government, were without exception the dictates of the moment; they were based—and this is perhaps the most shocking feature in this whole catastrophe—not on a plan possibly erroneous, but on no political plan at all.** The populace were caressed, and at the same time offended in a very unnecessary way by a meaningless disregard of the constitutional arrangements for election. The capitalist party might have furnished a support, but it was injured in the most sensitive point by the law as to debt. **The true mainstay of the government was—wholly without any cooperation on its part—the new burgesses; their assistance was acquiesced in, but nothing was done to regulate the strange position of the Samnites, who were now nominally Roman citizens, but evidently regarded their country's independence as practically the real object and prize of the struggle and remained in arms to defend it against all and sundry.** Illustrious senators were struck down like mad dogs; but not the smallest step was taken to reorganize the senate in the interest of the government, or even permanently to terrify it; so that the government was by no means sure of its aid.
…

The same union of the mightiest plenitude of power with the most utter impotence and incapacity in those who held it, was apparent in the warfare waged by the revolutionary government against the oligarchy—a warfare on which withal its existence primarily depended. In Italy it ruled with absolute sway. Of the old burgesses a very large portion were on principle favourable to democratic views; and the still greater mass of quiet people, while disapproving the Marian horrors, saw in an oligarchic restoration simply the commencement of a second reign of terror by the opposite party. **The impression of the outrages of 667/87 on the nation at large had been comparatively slight, as they had chiefly affected the mere aristocracy of the capital; and it was moreover somewhat effaced by the three years of tolerably peaceful government that ensued. Lastly the whole mass of the new burgesses—three-fifths perhaps of the Italians—were decidedly, if not favourable to the present government, yet opposed to the oligarchy.**
…

[The democrat and the Samnite] leaders then determined to desist from the relief of Praeneste and to throw themselves with all their united strength on Rome, which was only a good day's march distant. By so doing they were, in a military point of view, ruined; their line of retreat, the Latin road, would by such a

movement fall into Sulla's hands; and even if they got possession of Rome, they would be infallibly crushed there, enclosed within a city by no means fitted for defence, and wedged in between the far superior armies of Metellus and Sulla. **Safety, however, was no longer thought of; revenge alone dictated this march to Rome, the last outbreak of fury in the passionate revolutionists and especially in the despairing Sabellian nation. Pontius of Telesia was in earnest, when he called out to his followers that, in order to get rid of the wolves which had robbed Italy of freedom, the forest in which they harboured must be destroyed. Never was Rome in a more fearful peril than on the 1st November 672, when Pontius, Lamponius, Carrinas, Damasippus advanced along the Latin road towards Rome, and encamped about a mile from the Colline gate. It was threatened with a day like the 20th July 365 U.C. or the 15th June 455 A.D.—the days of the Celts and the Vandals.** The time was gone by when a *coup de main* against Rome was a foolish enterprise, and the assailants could have no want of connections in the capital. The band of volunteers which sallied from the city, mostly youths of quality, was scattered like chaff before the immense superiority of force. The only hope of safety rested on Sulla.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Velleius_Paterculus/2A*.html#ref66
>
> 27 1 While Carbo and Marius were still consuls, **one hundred and nine years ago,** on the Kalends of November, Pontius Telesinus, a Samnite chief, brave in spirit and in action and hating to the core the very name of Rome, having collected about him forty thousand of the bravest and most steadfast youth who still persisted in retaining arms, fought with Sulla, near the Colline gate, a battle so critical as to bring both Sulla and the city into the gravest peril. 2 **Rome had not faced a greater danger when she saw the camp of Hannibal within the third milestone, than on this day when Telesinus went about from rank to rank exclaiming: "The last day is at hand for the Romans," and in a loud voice exhorted his men to overthrow and destroy their city, adding: "These wolves that made such ravages upon Italian liberty will never vanish until we have cut down the forest that harbours them."**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pontius_Telesinus
>
> Pontius Telesinus may be an ancestor of Pontius Pilatus (Pilate), a first century Roman governor of Judaea mentioned in Christian texts as presiding over the execution of Jesus.[21]

https://archive.org/details/historyrome01dickgoog/page/n402/mode/2up?view=theater

But the whole country—and not the aristocracy merely—was more indebted to him than posterity was willing to confess. Sulla definitely terminated the Italian revolution, in so far as it was based on the disabilities of individual less privileged districts as compared with others of better rights, and, **by compelling himself and his party to recognize the equality of the rights of all Italians in presence of the law, he became the real and final author of the full political unity of Italy**—a gain, which was not too dearly purchased even by so many troubles and streams of blood. Sulla however did more. **For more than half a century the power of Rome had been declining, and anarchy had been her permanent condition: for the government of the senate with the Gracchan constitution was anarchy, and the government of Cinna and Carbo was a yet far worse illustration of the absence of a master-hand (the sad image of which is most clearly reflected in that equally confused and unnatural league with the Samnites),** the most uncertain, most intolerable, and most mischievous of all conceivable political conditions—in fact the beginning of the end. **We do not go too far when we assert that the long-undermined Roman commonwealth must have necessarily fallen to pieces, had not Sulla by his intervention in Asia and Italy saved its existence.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/3/9*.html#ref18

The rest of the legislation of the younger Gracchus died with him, but this, its worse feature, remained. When supreme power passed from the Senate and the Assembly of the People to the Caesars, these latter rulers, though in many respects the champions of the Provincials against Rome, did not dare to withdraw the supplies of cheap corn from the citizens, though they did limit—eventually to 200,000—the number of persons who were entitled thus to purchase it.
...

It is a labyrinth of Imperial legislation, and all leading to what end? To the maintenance in idleness of the worthless population of four great cities, a population which every wise legislator would have sought by every means in his power to divert from the cities, to lead back into the country, to marry to the land, to raise to something of the dignity of manhood by that wrestling with Nature for her blessings, which makes up the daily life of Agriculture. **But no: the old legal fiction of the sovereignty of the Roman people still survived, and therefore the so called citizen of Rome—the descendant in all probability of a Syrian or Cappadocian slave—must be allowed to spend**

his days in lordly idleness, seeing the charioteers drive, and the gladiators die, and then presenting himself at the appointed time at the steps of his 'regio' to receive his *Panis Gradilis* from the bounty of the Emperor**.**
…

Warned by the experience of Rome, will they shrink from reproducing directly, or indirectly, the political heresy of Caius Gracchus, that he who votes in the Forum must be fed by the State? If they do, perhaps the world may see Democracies as long-lived as the Dynasties of Egypt or of China. If they do not, assuredly now as in the days of our Saxon forefathers, it will be found that he who is 'giver of bread' is also lord.71

> https://archive.org/details/parisundercommun00broc/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> We all know the reactions which followed this revolution,—how the Corsican became First Consul, Dictator, and Emperor, and proved himself as great a tyrant as any of the Bourbons; how, in 1815, the Bourbons were restored and the old traditions of the pre-revolutionary period were re-established; **how, in 1830, the people again revolted, and introduced, with the citizen king, a new and dangerous doctrine, or rather a doctrine which had been held in abeyance since the first revolution, viz., *that it was the duty of the State to provide work for the laboring classes, or, failing in that, to support them without it*. This doctrine, which had proved the destruction of the Roman Empire in the plenitude of its power and glory,** became henceforth the cardinal doctrine of the working and vagrant classes of the French people, and was constantly proclaimed by the ambitious and unprincipled demagogues, who were too numerous for the good of the nation at all times.

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n353/mode/2up?view=theater

This tribunician power had about it an arbitrary character which was necessary at first to make up for the plebeian's lack of rights: **it should, logically, have disappeared as soon as equality of rights had been realized.** Far from that, however, it continued in existence, backed by the Senate, which made clever use of it to check the designs of magistrates who were too independent, and to concentrate finally in its own hands all public authority.19

> 19. "The transformation by which the tribunician power, intended at first as a weapon against the hereditary nobility, was at a later date, when it had passed into the hands of the new 'magisterial' nobility, used by the Senate against the magistrates, and later still served the ends of the budding monarchy against the Senate, is matter for history rather than for public law. This strange institution, the fruit less of practical needs than of political tendencies, without positive function and intended only for negation, could according to circumstances serve the ends of every party in turn, and it did in fact serve for and against all of them in succession. **It was one of the justified ironies of the spirit that rules the world that the tribunician power, in its deepest root a revolutionary power, should in the end have legitimated monarchy.**" *Ibid.*, Vol III, p. 355.

The Senate permitted the tribunes to unite the *plebs* as a separate community within the city, and to arrange for it to pass by vote resolutions of its own, *plebi scita*, resolutions which acquired in the end the status of laws in the true sense.20

These laws were very different both in intent and content from those which had in former days been presented by the magistrates, the Senate consenting; the latter had been limited to the formulation of general principles. The tribunician plebiscites, products for the most part of the needs or passions of the passing hour, came often into conflict with the most fundamental principles of the law.

In this way there was introduced into Roman society the essentially erroneous notion that it is the business of legislative authority to prescribe or forbid anything whatever. Anyone who put forward a proposition of a nature seemingly advantageous for the immediate future was blindly applauded, even though his proposition subverted the entire permanent edifice of order**. It was the tribunate which habituated the people to the idea of a saviour redressing at a stroke the social balance. Marius and Caesar were to be its heirs, and the emperors would find it an easy task to establish themselves on the ruins of the Republic and liberty.**

And who were the men who would try to stay this process? Freemen of the old school. **Brutus's dagger, so dear to the Jacobin heart, was wielded by an aristocratic hand.**
…

When that point had been reached, there were two courses open to the popular leaders. The first was that of Tiberius Gracchus. To him it seemed that the spirit of citizenship, the will to safeguard and defend common interests and sentiments, gets at once lost sight of both at the top and at the bottom when the capitalists have too much to defend and the proletarians not enough. Therefore he sought to re-establish as between citizens a real similitude, together with the solidarity which flows from it: **to put an end to the existence side by side of a plutocracy and a proletariat, and to arrange matters**

so that each single citizen could enjoy effectively an independence and an autonomy such as would bind all together in defence of the system of liberty.

The second course, to which Gaius Gracchus allowed himself to be committed by the failure of his brother, was quite different. To him the monstrous individual strength of the grandees and the utter individual weakness of the ordinary man were accomplished facts on which there was no going back, and he set himself the task of installing a public authority as manager of the people's affairs on their behalf.

The contrast between the policies of the two brothers at once leaps to the eye; the aim of the elder was to restore every citizen to the status of owner, whereas the younger got a law passed which allotted to each citizen his ration of corn at a low price, soon to be given gratis.22 This measure went in the diametrically opposite direction to the policy of Tiberius Gracchus. **Tiberius had sought to multiply the numbers of independent proprietors; Gaius brought into Rome the last of them, lured there by free rations.°**
…

Theodore Roosevelt, considering that the physical independence of the majority of citizens was the essential condition of their attachment to libertarian institutions, **applied himself to fighting a plutocracy which was transforming citizens into salaried dependants.** He came to grief on the same blind egoism of the men of great place as caused the downfall of Tiberius Gracchus.

Franklin Roosevelt accepted the accomplished fact, took up the defence of the unemployed and the economically weak, and constructed, by means of their votes and to their immediate advantage, **such a structure of Power as recalled in striking fashion the work of the first Roman emperors.** The individual right—the shield of each, which had become the bulwark of a few—had to bow down before the social right. **And the free citizen passed a milestone on his way to becoming a protected subject.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/1/9*.html#ref7

There was first the Middle Class, as we should now call it, timid, unenterprising, still perhaps wealthy, though groaning under the heavy burdens imposed upon it by the financial necessities of the sinking Empire. From this class, centuries ago, had emerged the citizens who, with eager emulation, had contended with one another for the honour of a seat in the *Curia* or Senate of their native city, and the glory of being addressed as *Decurio*. That state of things had now long passed away.
…

Above these Curial families stood a small privileged class of functionaries, Prefects, Counts, Consulars, and their children, the most highly prized of whose immunities consisted in this, that they could no longer be called upon to discharge 'Curial obligations.' Below them lay the great sensual, swinish mass of Forum-loungers. All that was onerous in public life, fell with ever-increasing weight on the middle class of Decurions. The collection of the revenue, the responsibility for the corn-rations, the care of the prisons, even the heating of the baths, devolved on these men; and whoever else might by jobbery and peculation defraud the public revenue, it seems clear that the Decurion had no chance of plundering, but only the dreary necessity of making good the deficiency caused by the plundering of others.
…

It is easy to see that it reproduces the so-called 'liturgies' (obligations to undertake certain services to the State), which formed so marked a feature in the life of ancient Athens, and it is indeed under this term that the Curial obligations are constantly spoken of by contemporary orators;10 but the means to discharge these liturgies had grown smaller, the command to perform them harsher and more irresistible, **the inducement which had once been the desire to earn the favour of one's fellow citizens, and to be by them raised to the high places of the State, had vanished altogether.**

But as the rich liturgy-performing aristocracy, so also the pampered democracy of the cities of the Empire, carries us back in remembrance to the days of Aristophanes. **The idea of the Roman Empire was in the main urban, as was that of the Athenian Empire, and not only were they both urban, but both were in a certain sense socialistic. To keep the populace of the capital cities of the Empire in good humour was one of the chief cares of a Roman Augustus, and almost of equal importance with the other two, the maintenance of the loyalty of the army and the repulse of the incursions of the barbarians.** At Antioch, as at Rome, at Constantinople, and at Alexandria, the citizens enjoyed a free distribution of corn or rather of bread, at the expense of the State. The precise amount of this daily ration does not seem to be handed down to us, but there can be no doubt that it was sufficient to support life for the receiver and his family, and to obviate the necessity of work. **The bath—that luxury which is almost a necessity under a Syrian sky—was also open, either gratuitously or at an exceedingly small charge, to all classes of the community;** and when the water was not

heated hot enough, Demos in the Theatre howled his disapprobation and even threw stones at the governor who had been so slack in enforcing the ministrations of the richer citizens to his comfort.11 Twice (in 382 and 384) an unfavourable season raised the price of corn. The people in the Theatre cried out for larger loaves, cheaper loaves. **In spite of the opposition of certain members of the Senate, who had some dim previsions of the science now known as Political Economy, a governor was each time found who issued a decree lowering the price of the loaf. Unable to comply with the decree the bakers left the city and fled to the mountains.** Naturally the famine in the city was not lessened by their departure. The law was withdrawn and the bakers returned but led a precarious existence, always liable to be arrested, and flogged through the streets of Antioch if a governor wished to curry favour with the people, and to repel by this easy demonstration the charge of having himself shared in the profits of the unpopular class.12

We have glanced at the condition of the urban population, of which we always hear most; but we must not forget that there was in the rural districts of Syria a large peasant-class, which is comparatively mute in Imperial history. A sermon of St. Chrysostom13 brings before us the patient, toilful lives of these men, **strangers to the language, to the pleasures, and to the vices of the city-populace, but united to them in faith;** and in their temperate and frugal existence illustrating the spirit of Christianity far better than the noisy theological disputants of Antioch. The yoke of the Imperial government pressed heavily on these men, **who could not shout applause in the Hippodrome, or hurl stones and taunts at the Prefect in the Theatre, and who therefore, as representative government was unknown, had no means of influencing the administration of affairs.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

A people, when assembled in a town, is far more formidable to its rulers than when dispersed over a wide extent of country. The most arbitrary of the Cæsars found it necessary to feed and divert the inhabitants of their unwieldy capital at the expense of the provinces.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2613/pg2613-images.html#linknoteref-467

The most arbitrary prince must always stand in some awe of an immense mass of human beings collected in the neighbourhood of his own palace. Apprehensions similar to those which had induced the Caesars to extort from Africa and Egypt the means of pampering the rabble of Rome induced Lewis to aggravate the misery of twenty provinces for the purpose of keeping one huge city in good humour**.** He ordered bread to be distributed in all the parishes of the capital at less than half the market price. The English Jacobites were stupid enough to extol the wisdom and humanity of this arrangement.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1872/housing-question/ch01.htm

In order to create the modern revolutionary class of the proletariat it was absolutely necessary to cut the umbilical cord which still bound the worker of the past to the land. The hand weaver who had his little house, garden and field along with his loom, was a quiet, contented man “in all godliness and respectability” despite all misery and despite all political pressure; he doffed his cap to the rich, to the priests and to the officials of the state; and inwardly was altogether a slave.

...

But the feeling which will probably be uppermost in the minds of those who study the history of the sedition of Antioch will be compassion for the hard fate of the Senators of that city. Burdened with responsibility, bereft of power, ground between the upper and nether mill-stones of the Emperor and the mob, **these unhappy remnants of a once powerful middle class suffered the fate which will probably always be their portion under a system of Imperial Socialism.** There was still in them something left to grind, but when they had been ground out of existence the Empire ceased to be.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.43156/page/n321/mode/2up?view=theater

The first of these (1) was the general strike of plebeians; **the plebeians seem to have invented the strike, which now makes its first appearance in history. Twice they actually marched right out of Rome, threatening to make a new city higher up the Tiber, and twice this threat proved conclusive.** The second method of pressure (2) was the threat of a tyranny. Just as in Attica (the little state of which Athens was the capital), Peisistratus raised himself to power on the support of the poorer districts, so there was to be found in most periods of plebeian discontent some ambitious man ready to figure as a leader and wrest power from the senate. **For a long time the Roman patricians were clever enough to beat every such potential tyrant by giving in to a certain extent to the plebeians.** And finally (3) **there were patricians big-minded and far-seeing enough to insist upon the need of reconciliation with the plebeians.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0124%3Achapter%3D37

Nor was this disaffected spirit confined to those who were actually concerned in the conspiracy; **for the whole of the common people, from a desire of change, favored the projects of Catiline.** This they seemed to do in accordance with their general character; **for, in every state, they that are poor envy those of a better class, and endeavor to exalt the factious;**[1] **they dislike the established condition of things, and long for something new; they are discontented with their own circumstances, and desire a general alteration; [nam semper in civitate, quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invident, malos extollunt, vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suarum rerum mutari omnia student]** they can support themselves amid tumult and sedition, without anxiety, since poverty does not easily suffer loss.[2]

https://archive.org/details/essaysabrahamco00frisgoog/page/n26/mode/2up?view=theater

The great dealers in this world may be divided into the ambitious, the covetous, and the voluptuous; **and that all these men sell themselves to be slaves, though to the vulgar it may seem a Stoical paradox, will appear to the wise so plain and obvious, that they will scarce think it deserves the labour of argumentation.**

Let us first consider the ambitious; and those, both in their progress to greatness, and after the attaining of it. **There is nothing truer than what Sallust says:**3 **“Dominationis in alios servitium suum, mercedem dant:”** They are content to pay so great a price as their own servitude to purchase the domination over others. **The first thing they must resolve to sacrifice is their whole time;** they must never stop, nor ever turn aside whilst they are in the race of glory, no not like Atalanta for golden apples.
…

Pray let us but consider a little what mean, servile things men do for this imaginary food. **We cannot fetch a greater example of it than from the chief men of that nation which boasted most of liberty. To what pitiful baseness did the noblest Romans submit themselves for the obtaining of a prætorship, or the consular dignity?** They put on the habit of suppliants, and ran about, on foot and in dirt, through all the tribes to beg voices; they flattered the poorest artisans, and carried a nomenclator with them, to whisper in their ear every man’s name, lest they should mistake it in their salutations; they shook the hand, and kissed the cheek of every popular tradesman; they stood all day at every market in the public places, to show and ingratiate themselves to the rout; they employed all their friends to solicit for them; they kept open tables in every street; they distributed wine, and bread, and money, even to the vilest of the people. “En Romanos rerum dominos!”5 **Behold the masters of the world beginning from door to door. This particular humble way to greatness is now out of fashion, but yet every ambitious person is still, in some sort, a Roman candidate.** He must feast and bribe, and attend and flatter, and adore many beasts, though not the beast with many heads. Catiline, who was so proud that he could not content himself with a less power than Sylla's, was yet so humble for the attaining of it, **as to make himself the most contemptible of all servants, to be a public bawd, to provide whores, and something worse,** for all the young gentlemen of Rome, whose hot lusts, and courages, and heads, he thought he might make use of.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D88

Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy equal rights before the law, [In liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate] we must school ourselves to affability and what is called “mental poise”;[101] for if we are irritated when people intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make unreasonable requests, we shall develop a sour, churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and offensive to others.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/13/mode/2up?view=theater

The sovran people of a free republic conferred its favours on whom it pleased.3 Popularity with the plebs was therefore essential. It was possessed in abundance both by Caesar and by his bitter enemy, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. To win a following at elections, to manage bribery, intimidation or rioting, **the friendly offices of lowly agents such as influential freedmen were not despised.** Above all, it was necessary to conciliate the second order in state and society, the Roman knights, converted into a ruinous political force by the tribune C. Gracchus when he set them in control of the law-courts and in opposition to the Senate.

> 3. Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 137. Office was accessible to the 'industria ac virtus' of all citizens. **There was not even a property-qualification. The letter of the law likewise knew no distinction between rich and poor.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0004 **[October 1829]**

> Caligula was, in theory, nothing more than a magistrate elected by the senate, and subject to the senate. **That irresponsible dignity which, in the most limited monarchies of our time, is ascribed to the person of the sovereign never belonged to the earlier Cæsars. The sentence of death which the great council of the commonwealth passed on Nero was strictly according to the theory of the constitution.** Yet, in fact, the power of the Roman emperors approached nearer to absolute dominion than that of any prince in modern Europe. On the other hand, the King of Denmark, in theory the most despotic of princes, would in practice find it most perilous to indulge in cruelty and licentiousness.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA42#v=onepage&q&f=false

The disparate outcomes of democratic movements in the early and late Republic reveal the effect of what political scientists call “the circulation of elites,” whereby the ruling circle enfeebles the masses by creaming off their potential leaders.71 **In the Conflict of the Orders, the plebeians organized the common people and the plebeian meeting functioned as an opposition party. No such popular organization appeared in the struggles of the late Republic, which Sallust identified as the fatal weakness of the democrats.**72 The plebeians had joined the aristocracy. The tribunes, nominally the people’s champions, had become a part of the establishment.
…

The Senate lacked formal coercive power. It exerted its will through the consuls and other magistrates, who had the final say if they chose to balk. However, magistrates usually complied with the Senate’s wishes, as befitting the aristocratic ethos of collective rule.79
…

Formally, the Roman constitution was direct democracy with popular sovereignty in legislation and election.85 In practice, wealthy aristocrats, who filled the Senate and magistracies, enjoyed virtually unchallenged control.86 Legislation gave the people some stake in the government, a way to communicate their desires to the ruling class, and a vent for their grievances. **The annual election of magistrates secured smooth transfer of executive power among aristocrats. It made the people legal arbiters and judges in aristocratic competition, so that they acted as a ballast or brake on rampant escalation of rivalry.** Scholarly evaluations differ in details, partly because of vagueness in the notion of “democracy” itself. Yet they generally agree that the Roman Republic was essentially an aristocracy, although one with a democratic streak.87 One summarizes: **“Rome was in no sense a democracy; but there was apparently a strong ideological tradition in citizens’ rights, backed by the armed force of citizen soldiers, and expressed in popular elections and in legislation by popular assemblies.”**88
…

To paraphrase a famous answer regarding the fall of the Roman Empire, instead of asking why the Republic fell, perhaps one should rather be surprised that it had lasted so long. A political scientist points out that the formal Republican constitution was self-defeating. Ten senior magistrates and ten tribunes each had the power to pilot bills. The magistrates could veto the resolutions of their colleagues and juniors; the tribunes, the resolutions of everyone. **The assemblies had the unlimited power to make into law any bill that came before them.** Checking and balancing each other, they could easily produce a do-nothing government. Yet paralysis rarely occurred, until toward the end. The government worked. How? The political scientist answers, **“It worked, as the British Constitution does today, very differently from what constitutional law propounded, and by the same device: unwritten rules to supplement and/or circumvent its formal provisions.”**89
…

Maintaining the balance, on which the Republic thrived, depended on all sides refraining from claiming their respective full legal prerogative. Self-restraint worked when the open imperial frontier served as an outlet for discontent.
…

Tribunes asked the assemblies to exercise their full legislative power. Aristocrats mobilized their whole arsenal to block popular demands.90

> https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n415/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> We have observed Tarquin, **not by the usurpation of any new power, but by the unjust abuse of the power which he already possessed,** overturn the whole system of our monarchical constitution.
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/5D*.html#ref86
>
> 4 But in the time of our fathers, a full four hundred years after Titus Larcius, **the institution became an object of reproach and hatred to all men under L. Cornelius Sulla, the first and only dictator who exercised his power with harshness and cruelty; so the Romans then perceived for the first time what they had along been ignorant of, that the dictatorship is a tyranny.**
>
> https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap3.htm#IMG
>
> **During a long period of two hundred and twenty years, from the establishment of this artful system to the death of Commodus, the dangers inherent to a military government**

> **were, in a great measure, suspended. The soldiers were seldom roused to that fatal sense of their own strength, and of the weakness of the civil authority, which was, before and afterwards, productive of such dreadful calamities.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n115/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The democracy of the nineteenth century already amounted to Bolshevism: it lacked only the courage of its logical conclusions.**

---

https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/2/mode/2up?view=theater

MEN would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune: but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity.
...

Very numerous examples of a like nature might be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition; that all the portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and fearful minds; **and lastly, that prophets have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in most peril.** I think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the subject.

https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/readers-guide/rg_tommy1.htm

> ***In times of war, and not before,***
> ***God and the soldier men adore;***
> ***When the war is o'er and all things righted,***
> ***The Lord's forgot and the soldier slighted.***

> "***Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times.***"—G. Michael Hopf

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/85

As the power and the self-consciousness of a community increases, so proportionately does the penal law become mitigated; conversely every weakening and jeopardising of the community revives the harshest forms of that law. **The creditor has always grown more humane proportionately as he has grown more rich;** finally the amount of injury he can endure without really suffering becomes the criterion of his wealth. **It is possible to conceive of a society blessed with so great a *consciousness of its own power* as to indulge in the most aristocratic luxury of letting its wrong-doers go *scot-free*.**—"What do my parasites matter to me?" might society say. "Let them live and flourish! I am strong enough for it."—The justice which began with the maxim, "Everything can be paid off, everything must be paid off," ends with connivance at the escape of those who cannot pay to escape—**it ends, like every good thing on earth, by *destroying itself*. —The self-destruction of Justice! we know the pretty name it calls itself—*Grace!* it remains, as is obvious, the privilege of the strongest, better still, their super-law.**

https://biblehub.com/genesis/25-32.htm

And Esau said, Behold, I am at the point to die: and what profit shall this birthright do to me?

> *Carlos That Notices Things on X*: Hey, remember how God hated Esau because he handed over his entire birthright because he wanted some food? I used to think this was very weird behavior. **But watching euros and westerners in general justify replacement immigration with "at least the food is yummy" kinda clicks.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D77

And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well.

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius2a.html#c6

> [6.1] **The city of Sparta followed the same rules, being the nearest to the gravity of our ancestors. They continued for many years most obedient to the severe laws of Lycurgus, and would by no means permit the eyes of their citizens to behold the delicacies of Asia;** lest being tempted with the allurements of that country, they should degenerate into a voluptuous life.
> …
>
> That this was no vain fear of theirs, their general Pausanias made apparent, who after he had performed great deeds, was not ashamed to allow his courage to be softened with the effeminate behaviour and apparel of Asia.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0374 **[2 September 1813]**

I Should render the Greek into English thus.

> **Nor does a Woman disdain to be the Wife of a bad rich Man. But She prefers a Man of Property before a good Man. For Riches are honoured; and a good Man marries from a bad Family, and a bad Man from a good one. Wealth mingles all races. [πλοῦτος ἔμιξε γένος.]**

https://archive.org/details/descentofmansele1874darw/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

The Grecian poet, Theognis, who lived 550 B.C., clearly saw how important selection, if carefully applied, would be for the improvement of mankind. **He saw, likewise, that wealth often checks the proper action of sexual selection.** He thus writes:

> "With kine and horses, Kurnus! we proceed
> By reasonable rules, and choose a breed
> For profit and increase, at any price;
> Of a sound stock, without defect or vice.
> But, in the daily matches that we make.
> The price is every thing: for money's sake,
> Men marry: women are in marriage given.
> **The churl or ruffian, that in wealth has thriven**
> **May match his offspring with the proudest race:**
> **Thus every thing is mix'd, noble and base!**
> If then in outward manner, form, and mind.
> You find us a degraded, motley kind,
> Wonder no more, my friend! the cause is plain.
> And to lament the consequence is vain."
>
> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0002%3Aspeech%3D1%3Asection%3D54
>
> Among the men who spend their time there is one Pittalacus, a slave-fellow who is the property of the city. He had plenty of money, and seeing Timarchus spending his time thus he took him and kept him in his own house. **This foul wretch here was not disturbed by the fact that he was going to defile himself with a public slave, [ἄνθρωπον δημόσιον οἰκέτην τῆς πόλεως] but thought of one thing only, of getting him to be paymaster for his own disgusting lusts; to the question of virtue or of shame he never gave a thought.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is not fortuitous that the modern English word *speculation* has two different meanings. The commerce in goods inevitably gives rise to a commerce in ideas,122 **and subsequent history justified as prescient the stress which Edmund Burke laid on the critical role played by speculators of both kinds in overturning the ancient régime in France.**123 **Nor is it an accident that, just a few decades after coinage became commonplace in Greece, Heraclitus should expound his physics by means of a mercantile metaphor, depiciting "an exchange (*antamoibé*) of all things for fire and fire for all things like the exchange of goods (*chrémata*) for gold and gold for goods."**124 **If Aristotle is to be trusted, the first philosopher may well have been the first man to have conceived of the market as an abstraction.** When reproached for his poverty, Thales is said to have resolved to demonstrate once and for all that philosophy is by no means utterly helpless (*anōpheloús*) in the world of practical affairs. So, for a time, he abandoned his cosmological speculations in order to pursue speculation in a somewhat more vulgar and familiar vein. Having determined in winter that the following year would bring a bumper crop in olives, Thales managed to lease for a pittance all the olive presses in Miletus and on Chios. When a rich harvest came in just as he had predicted, his patience was rewarded, for he employed his corner on the olive-press market to establish a monopoly and to make himself a very rich man.125
…

A century and a half after Thales, the poet Aristophanes would depict the philosopher Socrates as a man suspended in a basket, his head in the clouds, his feet far from the ground. **This absentminded figure was said to be devoting his time to the investigation of "the things aloft" (*tà metéōra*)"**126 It is revealing that the same term recurs in a third-century Ephesian inscription recording a law in which a deceased man's intangible assets – the money he has deposited in a bank, a credit unsecured by a mortgage – are referred to as *metéōron*: "something aloft."127
…

As Aristotle points out, it can hardly be an accident that **the Greek word for coinage (*nomísmata*) is derived from the Greek term for that which exists solely by convention (*nómos*), solely in thought (*nomízein*).**

https://anastrophe.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/perseus/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekNov21&getid=1&query=Hdt.%209.122.4

This Artayctes who was crucified was the grandson of that Artembares who instructed the Persians in a design which they took from him and laid before Cyrus; this was its purport: "Seeing that Zeus grants lordship to the Persian people, and to you, Cyrus, among them, let us, after reducing Astyages, depart from the little and rugged land which we possess and occupy one that is better. There are many such lands on our borders, and many further distant. If we take one of these, we will all have more reasons for renown. It is only reasonable that a ruling people should act in this way, for when will we have a better opportunity than now, when we are lords of so many men and of all Asia?" **Cyrus heard them, and found nothing to marvel at in their design; "Go ahead and do this," he said; "but if you do so, be prepared no longer to be rulers but rather subjects. Soft lands breed soft men; wondrous fruits of the earth and valiant warriors grow not from the same soil."** The Persians now realized that Cyrus reasoned better than they, and they departed, **choosing rather to be rulers on a barren mountain side than dwelling in tilled valleys to be slaves to others.**

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0038%3Abook%3D9%3Achapter%3D122
>
> **φιλέειν γὰρ … τὰ πολέμια.** The relation between 'Physics and Politics' occupied a large space in the minds of Greek thinkers. Hdt.'s own work is saturated with the assumption of a connexion between race and place, between climate and institutions. His interest in the varieties of human kind makes him the father of Anthropology, as his sense of the unity and continuity of human adventure and experience makes him the 'father of history.' Hence his descriptions of the land and river of Egypt as a prelude to his account of the people, their manners and institutions; and so too with Skythia and the Skythians, Libya and the Libyans, the ends of the earth, and the more familiar coasts of the Aigaian. Hdt. has in a remarkable degree the sense of the relativity of human institutions; **it is a part of the sophistical illumination of the age, just begun. It had done something to correct the exaggerated notion of the omnipotence of the *Nomothetes*.** It attains formal expression in the work of his great contemporary Hippokrates of Kos, *de aere aquis et locis* (*Hippocr. opera*, vol. i. ed. Kvehlewein, 1895), and the philosophy of the reaction, with its practical concern for the ideal city-state, does not fail to realise that for the πόλις κατ᾽ εὐχήν a site, a climate, a race κατ᾽ εὐχήν must also be posited. Thucydides (more clearly than Hdt.) mediates the action of physics on politics through the economic conditions (as in his *Archaiologia*): this profounder analysis was not lost in the sequel; Aristotle, for example, not only generalizes (or preserves the generalization) on the relation between τροφή and βίος (*Politics* 1.8=1256 a), but traces in a fashion the merits of the Greek nation to its happy position between the barbarous extremes of cold and heat, of Europe and Asia (*Pol.* 4(7).7=1327 b). It stands to reason that the lesser differences between one Greek folk and another might be in part traceable to differences in the physicogeographical environment; **and as a matter of fact the popular philosophy of Greece early ascribed the superiority of the Attic race to the advantages of its climate,** traced the genesis of political parties to features in the Attic landscape—the shore, the plain, the mountain—or ascribed the development of the democracy (somewhat superficially) to the growing importance of the sea, and sea-power, in the life of the city. Livy (38.17) puts a speech into the mouth of Cn. Manlius (A.U.C. 565) on the Gallograeci, which might be taken as a commentary on this text; **but in general the Roman conqueror believed in race (*fortes creantur fortibus*), and under the cosmopolitan rule of Rome, whether imperial or pontifical, much of the sense of the relativity of human institutions passed out of consciousness, to be rediscovered and reintroduced with the revival of Greek letters and the return to nature.** The idea is now **[1908]** a commonplace of every history of civilisation, or philosophy of history; but an initial place in the bibliography of the subject must always be reserved for Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, 1748 (Livres xiv.-xviii.), as also for Buckle's *Hist. of Civilization in England* (1857), c.ii. **The *regnum hominis*, much as it has advanced in our own day, has not yet succeeded in completely emancipating Man from the physico-geographical conditions of polity;** climate, soil, structure, position, and even physical aspect, are permanent though modifiable factors in the life and character of the race.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false

Then, suddenly and without warning, the father of history transports us two generations back in time to the court of Cyrus the Great. There, he tells us, an ancestor of this same Artayctes had once approached the Great King with the suggestion that the Persians should take advantage of their newly won empire by migrating from their homeland, confined and harsh as it was, to a territory more favourable to human habitation. “It befits men who are rulers to do this sort of thing,” the man purportedly argued. “What finer time there could be – for we now rule over many men and all Asia?” Herodotus’ Cyrus was not much impressed. The Persians might take up this suggestion, he remarked, but only if they wished to rule no longer and to be ruled by others. “From soft countries,” he explained, “come soft men: it does not happen that the same soil produces an admirable harvest and men good in war.” **If the ancient republics and the monarchies that lived on as their relics viewed technological progress with a jaundiced eye, it was because the ancients sensed that a science pledged “to come to the relief of man’s estate” was a science that promised to make of all countries “soft countries” and that thereby threatened to make all men “soft men.” It can hardly be fortuitous that the last word of Herodotus’ great work is the infinitive *douleúein* – “to be enslaved.”**38

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#CHAPTER_XVc

> In Greece, all that the people had to do, it did for itself; it was constantly assembled in the public square. The Greeks lived in a mild climate; they had no natural greed; slaves did their work for them; their great concern was with liberty. Lacking the same advantages, how can you preserve the same rights? Your severer climates add to your needs;[1] for half the year your public squares are uninhabitable; the flatness of your languages unfits them for being heard in the open air; **you sacrifice more for profit than for liberty, and fear slavery less than poverty.**
>
> > [1] **To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the East is to desire to submit to its chains; it is indeed to bow to them far more inevitably in our case than in theirs.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

Five hundred years before the Christian era the citizens of the republics round the Ægean Sea formed perhaps the finest militia that ever existed. As wealth and refinement advanced, the system underwent a gradual alteration. The Ionian States were the first in which commerce and the arts were cultivated, and the first in which the ancient discipline decayed. Within eighty years after the battle of Platæa, mercenary troops were everywhere plying for battles and sieges. In the time of Demosthenes, it was scarcely possible to persuade or compel the Athenians to enlist for foreign service. The laws of Lycurgus prohibited trade and manufactures. The Spartans, therefore, continued to form a national force long after their neighbors had begun to hire soldiers. But their military spirit declined with their singular institutions. In the second century before Christ, Greece contained only one nation of warriors, the savage highlanders of Ætolia, who were some generations behind their countrymen in civilization and intelligence.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pelopidas*.html

At any rate, there was a soldier of Antigonus who was venturesome, but had miserable health and an impaired body. When the king asked him the reason for his pallor, the man admitted that it was a secret disease, 2 whereupon the king took compassion on him and ordered his physicians, if there was any help for him, to employ their utmost skill and care. Thus the man was cured; but then the good fellow ceased to court danger and was no longer a furious fighter, so that even Antigonus rebuked him and expressed his wonder at the change. The man, however, made no secret of the reason, but said: **"O King, it is thou who hast made me less daring, by freeing me from those ills which made me set little value on life."** 3 **On these grounds, too, as it would seem, a man of Sybaris said it was no great thing for the Spartans to seek death in the wars in order to escape so many hardships and such a wretched life as theirs.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Etruria

Diodorus (v. 40) gives a succinct account in which he says that “**their country was so fertile they derived therefrom not only sufficient for their needs but enough to supply them with luxuries.** Twice a day they partook of elaborate repasts at which the tables were decked with embroidered cloths and vessels of gold and silver. The servants were numerous and noticeable for the richness of their attire. The houses, too, were large and commodious. **In fact, giving themselves up to sensuous enjoyments they had naturally lost the glorious reputation their ancestors had won in war.**” This last remark shows that Diodorus recognized the important difference between the early Etruscans who built up the country and the later ones who merely enjoyed it.

> http://attalus.org/translate/orosius4A.html
>
> 3 At that time, too, the Volsinians, the most flourishing of the Etruscan peoples, almost perished as a result of their wantonness. **After making license a habit, they indiscriminately freed their**

slaves, invited them to banquets, and honoured them with marriage. 4 The liberated slaves, admitted to a share of power, criminally plotted to usurp complete rule of the state, and, relieved of the yoke of slavery, were consumed with the desire for power. **Once free, they cursed those masters whom they as slaves had devotedly loved, because they remembered that these men had once been their masters**. 5 **The liberated slaves then conspired to commit a crime and claimed the captured city for their class alone. So great were their numbers that they accomplished their rash purpose without real resistance.** They criminally appropriated the property and wives of their masters, and forced the latter to go into distant exile. These wretched and destitute exiles betook themselves to Rome. **Here they displayed their misery and tearfully pleaded their cause.** They were avenged and restored to their former positions through the stern rule of the Romans.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0166%3Abook%3D38%3Achapter%3D17

And those forefathers of ours had to do with true Gauls, born in their own land; these now are degenerates, of mixed race, and[5] really Gallogrecians, as they are named; just as, in the case of plants and animals, the seeds have less power to maintain their natural quality than the character of the soil and climate in which they live has power to change [10] it. **The Macedonians who hold Alexandria in Egypt, who hold Seleucia and Babylonia and other colonies scattered throughout the world, have degenerated into Syrians, Parthians,** [11] **Egyptians; Massilia,[6] situated among the Gauls, has acquired something of the disposition of its neighbours; what have the Tarentines retained of that stern and dreadful Spartan** [12] **discipline? Whatever grows in its own soil, has greater excellence; transplanted to a soil alien to it, its nature changes and it degenerates towards that in which it is nurtured.** It is Phrygians,[7] therefore, burdened with the weapons of Gauls, whom, even as you slew them in the battle-line of Antiochus, you will slay, victorious over the [13] vanquished. I am afraid that there will be too little of glory rather than too much of war. King Attalus has often repulsed and routed [14] them. **Do not think that it is only beasts which when newly caught first retain that fierceness of their forest life, and then, when long fed by the hands of men, grow tame,** but that in moderating the ferocity of men nature does not do the [15] same. Do you believe that these are the same men that their fathers and their grandfathers [16] were? Exiles on account of the poverty of the land, they left home, travelling through the most inhospitable land of Illyricum, then Paeonia and Thrace, fighting with the fiercest tribes, and seized these lands. Toughened and hardened by so many[8] misfortunes, they were received by a land which could stuff them with its abundance of all [17] things. In a land most rich, under a sky most kindly, among natives mild in disposition, all that fierceness with which they came has grown gentle. **You, by Hercules, being men of Mars, must escape and avoid as soon as possible the pleasantness of Asia:** such power have these foreign delights to destroy the vigour of the soul; such influence does contact with the habits and character of the natives [18] exert.[9]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA160#v=onepage&q&f=false

Italians became the minority in the Senate by the end of the second century. The proportion of Italian soldiers in the legions dropped even faster. **Already the minority under Vespasian, they almost vanished a century later.**42

https://www.uvm.edu/~bsaylor/rome/PanLat10(2).pdf

Panegyric of Maximian Augustus by an Anonymous Orator

1. The date is 21 April, Rome's birthday; the year 289 (Galletier I.8-9). The place is Trier.

…

So where shall I begin? Shall I mention your fatherland's services to the state? **Though who would deny that for many centuries now, from the time when its resources were added to the Roman name, Italy has indeed been the mistress of the nations in duration of glory, but Pannonia**8 **in valor?**3

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_393

Thus did the armies of the East and West set up emperors at their pleasure; **and tho the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Sueves, Alans, and others had cruel wars among themselves, yet they feared and suffered little or nothing from the Romans. This state of things was so soon observed, that in the beginning of Tiberius his reign they who endeavoured to excite the Gauls to take arms, used no other arguments than such as were drawn from the extreme weakness of the Romans, *Quam inops Italia, plebs urbana imbellis, nihil in exercitibus validum praeter externum.*** 6 **It was evident that after the battles of Philippi and Actium, the strength of the Roman armies consisted of strangers; and even the victories that went under their name were gained by those nations which in the time of their liberty they had subdued.** They had nothing left but riches gather'd out of their vast dominions; and they learnt by their ruin, that an empire acquir'd by virtue could not long be supported by money.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Caesar/Gallic_War/4*.html

The Suebi are by far the largest and the most warlike nation among the Germans. It is said that they have a hundred cantons, from each of which they draw one thousand armed men yearly for the purpose of war outside their borders.
...

They make not much use of corn for food, but chiefly of milk and of cattle, and are much engaged in hunting; and this, owing to the nature of the food, the regular exercise, and the freedom of life—for from boyhood up they are not schooled in a sense of duty or discipline, and do nothing whatever against their wish [nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt]—nurses their strength and makes men of immense bodily stature.
...

They suffer no importation of wine whatever, believing that men are thereby rendered soft and womanish for the endurance of hardship.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Germania_(Church_%26_Brodribb)#XXIII
>
> They satisfy their hunger without elaborate preparation and without delicacies. In quenching their thirst they are not equally moderate. **If you indulge their love of drinking by supplying them with as much as they desire, they will be overcome by their own vices as easily as by the arms of an enemy.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/16765/pg16765-images.html#FNanchor_17_IV

Then, indeed, it came about that Gelimer and those about him, who were nephews and cousins of his and other persons of high birth, experienced a misery which no one could describe, however eloquent he might be, in a way which would equal the facts. **For of all the nations which we know that of the Vandals is the most luxurious, and that of the Moors the most hardy. For the Vandals, since the time when they gained possession of Libya, used to indulge in baths, all of them, every day, and enjoyed a table abounding in all things, the sweetest and best that the earth and sea produce.** And they wore gold very generally, and clothed themselves in the Medic garments, which now they call "seric,"[18] and passed their time, thus dressed, in theatres and hippodromes and in other pleasureable pursuits, and above all else in hunting. And they had dancers and mimes and all other things to hear and see which are of a musical nature or otherwise merit attention among men. **And the most of them dwelt in parks, which were well supplied with water and trees; and they had great numbers of banquets, and all manner of sexual pleasures were in great vogue among them.** But the Moors live in stuffy huts[19] both in winter and in summer and at every other time, never removing from them either because of snow or the heat of the sun or any other discomfort whatever due to nature. And they sleep on the ground, the prosperous among them, if it should so happen, spreading a fleece under themselves. Moreover, it is not customary among them to change their clothing with the seasons, but they wear a thick cloak and a rough shirt at all times. And they have neither bread nor wine nor any other good thing, but they take grain, either wheat or barley, and, without boiling it or grinding it to flour or barley-meal, they eat it in a manner not a whit different from that of animals. **Since the Moors, then, were of a such a sort, the followers of Gelimer, after living with them for a long time and changing their accustomed manner of life to such a miserable existence, when at last even the necessities of life had failed, held out no longer, but death was thought by them most sweet and slavery by no means disgraceful.**

> https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/dahn/gelimer/chap041.html
>
> **Man möchte meinen, das ganze Volk der Vandalen bestand in seinem Königshaus und wenigen Edelgeschlechtern. Seit Zazo und die Edeln um ihn fielen, seit der König entschwunden, hört jeder Widerstand auf: wie ein Bündel Stäbe, dem man die zusammenhaltende Schnur durchhauen, fallen sie auseinander.** Seit dem Tage von Trikameron lassen sich die Barbaren überall greifen wie die Schafe: ohne Widerstand. Man findet sie nur mehr, ohne Waffen, in den katholischen Basiliken, wo sie, Zuflucht suchend, die Altäre umfassen, die sie so oft verunehrt hatten! – **Die Männer nicht anders als die Weiber und Kinder.**
>
> Wahrlich, wenn ihre Brüder in Italien, in Hispanien, wenn ihre Vettern, die Franken, Alamannen und wie sie sonst heißen, diese Barbaren in Gallien und Germanien, auch schon so fein gebildet wären wie diese lateinisch und griechisch dichtenden Vandalen: dann würde der Imperator Justinianus durch Belisar und Narses den Germanen alsbald das ganze Abendland wieder abnehmen. **Aber, ich fürchte, die Vandalen stehen allein auf solcher Höhe der Bildung.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D1105

And more and more each day
Would men more strong in sense, more wise in heart,
Teach them to change their earlier mode and life
By fire and new devices. Kings began
Cities to found and citadels to set,
As strongholds and asylums for themselves,
And flocks and fields to portion for each man
After the beauty, strength, and sense of each – **[pro facie cuiusque et viribus ingenioque]**
For beauty then imported much, and strength
Had its own rights supreme. **Thereafter, wealth**
Discovered was, and gold was brought to light,
Which soon of honour stripped both strong and fair;
For men, however beautiful in form
Or valorous, will follow in the main
The rich man's party.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n231/mode/2up?view=theater

And as there had thus been only two classes of the Roman people, so there had been only two kinds of assembly: **one the *curiata*, consisting of fathers or nobles or senators, the other the *tributa*, consisting of plebeians or the ignoble.** But now that Fabius had divided the citizens according to their means into the three classes of senators, knights and plebeians, the nobles ceased to be a separate order in the city and were placed in one or another of the three classes according to their wealth. From that time on patricians were distinguished from senators and knights, and plebeians from the base-born; **and plebeians were no longer contrasted with patricians but with knights and senators. A plebeian no longer meant a base-born person but rather a citizen of small patrimony who might well be a noble; and on the other hand a senator no longer meant a patrician but a citizen of ample patrimony who might well be of low birth.**

627 Consequently from that time on *comitia centuriata,* the assembly by hundreds, was the term applied to the assemblies in which the entire Roman people of all three classes came together to enact the consular laws among other public business.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false

Just as no liberal democracy ever accorded complete autonomy to the economy, so no Greek *pólis* ever fully worked out in practice what was implicit in the absolute primacy of accorded to the transcendent common good. The very existence of the commercial *agorá* ruled out the complete subordination of economic to political concerns; and where local circumstances made a particular city a mercantile center, there was no way to preserve completely the integrity of the political community. It was one thing for the peasant occasionally to visit the *agorá* to exchange grain, olive oil, or wine for metal, pots, clothing, or other finished goods; **it was something altogether different for the craftsman and the merchant to depend on the market for their entire livelihood. Where these last two groups were relatively numerous, as in Corinth, they might achieve something approaching respectability;**1 and where they were influential, as in Chios, they might occasionally even determine policy.2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Greeks perceived that merchants and craftsmen would be less willing to defend the civic territory than farmers,36 and they were acutely aware of the difference between what we still instinctively call real estate and what they termed invisible wealth (*aphanḗs ousía*).37 The latter distinction is particularly instructive, for it is the predominance of invisible wealth which sets the modern apart from the ancient political economy.

In the eighteenth century, **Montesquieu and his disciples treated the invention of the bill of exchange as a turning point in world history. “By this means,” Montesquieu argued, “commerce was able to elude violence and to maintain itself everywhere – since the richest merchant had no possessions other than invisible goods which could be conveyed anywhere and left not a trace.” As a consequence, the princes came to fear that “great and arbitrary actions (*les grands coups d’autorité*)” on their part might drive out the men who conducted the trade on which they depended for revenues.** This, in turn, made it necessary for the sovereigns of Europe “to govern themselves with greater wisdom than they themselves could have imagined.” By making it possible for a man to conceal his substance, the techniques of modern banking were a bulwark against arbitrary rule.38

What the proponents of modern republicanism saw as a virtue their ancient counterparts viewed as a vice. The Greeks knew nothing of the bill of exchange, and their system of accounting was primitive in the extreme.39

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0158%3Achapter%3D1

[10] **Now among the slaves and metics[2] at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can't hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you.** I shall point out

why this is their native practice: if it were customary for a slave (or metic or freedman) to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake on the assumption that he was a slave. For the people there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome. [11] **If anyone is also startled by the fact that they let the slaves live luxuriously there and some of them sumptuously, it would be clear that even this they do for a reason. For where there is a naval power, it is necessary from financial considerations to be slaves to the slaves in order to take a portion of their earnings, and it is then necessary to let them go free.[3] And where there are rich slaves, it is no longer profitable in such a place for my slave to fear you. In Sparta my slave would fear you; but if your slave fears me, there will be the chance that he will give over his money so as not to have to worry anymore.** [12] For this reason we have set up equality between slaves and free men, and between metics and citizens. The city needs metics in view of the many different trades and the fleet. **Accordingly, then, we have reasonably set up a similar equality also for the metics.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n309/mode/2up?view=theater

The most important industrial undertakings, outside of mining, are owned by metics; the ceramic industry is theirs completely; **and wherever middlemen can squeeze themselves in between producer and consumer they are to be found.** The law harasses them and protects them. It taxes them like citizens, lays "liturgies" upon them, exacts military service from them, and adds a poll tax for good measure; it forbids them to own land or to marry into the family of a citizen; it excludes them from its religious organization, and from direct appeal to its courts. But it welcomes them into its economic life, appreciates their industry and skill, enforces their contracts, gives them religious freedom, and guards their wealth against violent revolution. Some of them flaunt their riches vulgarly, but some of them, too, work quietly in science, literature, and the arts, practice law or medicine, and create schools of rhetoric and philosophy. **In the fourth century they will provide the authors and subject of the comic drama, and in the third they will set the cosmopolitan tone of Hellenistic society**. They itch for citizenship, but they love Athens proudly, and contribute painfully to finance her defense against her enemies. Through them, chiefly, the fleet is maintained, the empire is supported, and the commercial supremacy of Athens is preserved.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA349#v=onepage&q&f=false

Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle all identify empire with the elevation of the art of household management – the production of material goods and the division of labor – over the cultivation of the moral and intellectual virtues solicited by civic deliberation about the common good. Whereas republics foster the common good, **empires allow individuals to maximize their individual security and gain.** Whatever their merits, therefore, empires fall short of the highest human excellence. This is implicit, for example, in **Aristotle's remark that, if economics were the chief end of politics, all cities could be united in a single state,** as happens with multinational trade agreements (*Politics* 1280a35-40).

> https://counter-currents.com/2017/09/between-capital-archaic-socialism/
>
> Michéa understands the liberal element of parties of progress as being fundamentally anti-democratic, echoing here the distinction made by the French thinker, Alain de Benoist, between democracy and liberalism. Liberalism, obsessed with minorities and what another socialist, George Galloway, famously mocked as "liberal hothouse" issues, is not in principle opposed to the centralization of economic power at all, according to Michéa. Quite the contrary. **It is, however, opposed to democracy, that is to say, to any entitlement giving a role in the allocation of power to the majority of the people and of any entitlement to a nation to decide its own destiny. In short, liberalism extends economic sovereignty at the expense of political sovereignty.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false

For subsistence, the Corinthians were probably more dependent on commerce and the provision of services than any other Greek community. They possessed a fertile territory, but it was quite limited in extent; and because Corinth was located on a narrow neck of land separating the Saronic from the Corinthian gulf, she possessed two separate harbors.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n399/mode/2up?view=theater

IV. But maritime cities are likewise naturally exposed to corrupt influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or less adulterated by new languages and customs, and they import not only foreign merchandise, but foreign fashions, to such a degree that nothing can continue unalloyed in the national institutions. Those who inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged afar from their homes by winged hope and speculation. **And even when they do not desert their country in person, still their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.**

Nor, indeed, was there any cause which more deeply undermined Corinth and Carthage, and at last overthrew them both, than this wandering and dispersion [hic error ac dissipatio] of their citizens, whom the passion of commerce and navigation had induced to abandon the cultivation of their lands and their attention to military pursuits. [agrorum et armorum cultum]

The proximity of the sea likewise administers to maritime cities a multitude of pernicious incentives to luxury, which are either acquired by victory or imported by commerce; and the very agreeableness of their position nourishes many expensive and deceitful gratifications of the passions. **And what I have spoken of Corinth may be applied, for aught I know, without incorrectness to the whole of Greece. For the Peloponnesus itself is almost wholly on the sea-coast; nor, besides the Phliasians, are there any whose lands do not touch the sea; and beyond the Peloponnesus, the Ænianes, the Dorians, and the Dolopes are the only inland people. Why should I speak of the Grecian islands, which, girded by the waves, seem all afloat, as it were, together with the institutions and manners of their cities?** And these things, I have before noticed, do not respect ancient Greece only; for which of all those colonies which have been led from Greece into Asia, Thracia, Italy, Sicily, and Africa, with the single exception of Magnesia, is there that is not washed by the sea? Thus it seems as if a sort of Grecian coast had been annexed to territories of the barbarians. **For among the barbarians themselves none were heretofore a maritime people, if we except the Carthaginians and Etruscans; one for the sake of commerce, the other of pillage. And this is one evident reason of the calamities and revolutions of Greece, because she became infected with the vices which belong to maritime cities, which I just now briefly enumerated. But yet, notwithstanding these vices, they have one great advantage, and one which is of universal application, namely, that there is a great facility for new inhabitants flocking to them.** And, again, that the inhabitants are enabled to export and send abroad the produce of their native lands to any nation they please, which offers them a market for their goods.

V. **By what divine wisdom, then, could Romulus embrace all the benefits that could belong to maritime cities, and at the same time avoid the dangers to which they are exposed,** except, as he did, by building his city on the bank of an inexhaustible river, whose equal current discharges itself into the sea by a vast mouth, so that the city could receive all it wanted from the sea, and discharge its superabundant commodities by the same channel?

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.201719/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater

From a financial point of view, Carthage held in every respect the first place among the states of antiquity. At the time of the Peloponnesian war this Phoenician city was, according to the testimony of the first of Greek historians, financially superior to all the Greek states, and its revenues were compared to those of the great-king; **Polybius calls it the wealthiest city in the world.**
...

It is absolutely impossible to form an idea of the mass of capital accumulated in **this London of antiquity,** but some notion at least may be gained of the public revenues from the fact, that, in spite of the costly system on which Carthage organised its wars and in spite of the careless and faithless administration of the state property, the contributions of its subjects and the customs-revenue completely covered the expenditure, **so that no direct taxes were levied from the citizens;** and further, that even after the second Punic war, when the power of the state was already broken, the current expenses and the payment to Rome of a yearly instalment of £48,000 could be met, without levying any tax, merely by a somewhat stricter management of the finances, and fourteen years after the peace the state proffered immediate payment of the thirty-six remaining instalments. But it was not merely the sum total of its revenues that evinced the superiority of the financial administration at Carthage. **The economical principles of a later and more advanced epoch are found by us in Carthage alone of all the more considerable states of antiquity. Mention is made of foreign state-loans, and in the monetary system we find along with gold and silver mention of a token-money having no intrinsic value—a species of currency not used elsewhere in antiquity.** In fact, if government had resolved itself into mere mercantile speculation, never would any state have solved the problem more brilliantly than Carthage.

Let us now compare the respective resources of Carthage and Rome. Both were agricultural and mercantile cities, and nothing more; art and science had substantially the same altogether subordinate and altogether practical position in both, except that in this respect Carthage had made greater progress than Rome. **But in Carthage the moneyed interest preponderated over the landed, in Rome at this time the landed still preponderated over the moneyed; and, while the agriculturists of Carthage were universally large landlords and slave-holders, in the Rome of this period the great mass of the burgesses still tilled their fields in person. The majority of the population in Rome held property, and was therefore conservative; the majority in Carthage held no property, and was therefore accessible to the gold of the rich as well as to the cry of the democrats for reform.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/6*.html#ref2

2 **At Carthage nothing which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful;** at Rome nothing is considered more so than to accept bribes and seek gain from improper channels. 3 **For no less strong than their approval of money-making is their condemnation of unscrupulous gain from forbidden sources.** 4 A proof of this is that at Carthage candidates for office practise open bribery, whereas at Rome death is the penalty for it.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

Perhaps Carthaginians were happier after Zama. Like the Romans, they could concentrate on their single love. **While Rome triumphed in the eastern Mediterranean, Carthage prospered on commerce and became, in some reckoning, the richest city in the world.**78 Life as a dependent Roman ally was good, except for one thing their money could not buy. Security depended entirely on Roman pleasure. That dependency proved lethal.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

China is a solid land realm, to which its inhabitants refer as *hainei*, within the seas. “Around the sea” is an apt description for the Roman Empire, whose territories clung to the rim of the Mediterranean. **However, the sea at its heart did not make Rome a maritime empire akin to the nineteenth-century British Empire. It enjoyed naval supremacy shortly after it built a war fleet, but its power rested mainly on its marching legions. In the predominance of infantry, Rome was closer to the Han than the Athenian Empire,** which dominated the eastern Mediterranean with its ramming galleys in the fifth century BCE. The arduous process of conquering Italy had shaped Rome’s character as essentially a land power.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=CK3gBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT397#v=onepage&q&f=false

In contrast to modern imperialism where the flag followed commercial penetration, the Han and Roman Empires attended foremost to geopolitics, not commerce.29 **Roman peace and roads benefited trade, but Rome was indifferent to trade itself and never raised it as an issue in its many treaties with Parthia.** Above all, Rome never allowed trade to interfere with its foreign policies. Although on the verge of bankruptcy when Palmyra rebelled in 273, Rome did not hesitate to sack the city that brought it enormous revenues from the 25 percent import duty it imposed. Palmyra’s commercial network collapsed, pulling down with it much eastern trade.30

Like the Romans, the Han government facilitated trade but put it at a distant second to political and military concerns.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR22#v=onepage&q&f=false

Across the empire, native aristocrats sat in city councils and collected taxes for the emperor in return for his support of their local power. Uniting landlords of the world was a key to success that the Empire inherited from the Republic. **Cohesion within the ruling class was furthered by the development of closely reasoned civil laws, which resolved disputes among the elites and grew the complex institution behind absolute property rights.**24 Throughout Roman history, militarism and legally backed plutocracy stood clear and unwavering. To keep army and wealthy aristocrats in check and balanced was the emperor’s most onerous and precarious job. **When the two ceased to cooperate, dusk gathered in the Empire.**25
...

The Chinese Empire reconstituted itself after the fall, a feat it would repeat several times in the Dragon’s long history. The Roman Empire did not. Its political strength stemmed partly from alignment with the dominant economic class, **but landed interests are necessarily regional.** A far-flung empire based on the unity of landed wealth was a fluke difficult to repeat. **Yet the Eagle would soar again. Rome’s unlimited will to power survived like an acorn, which was portable. It would sprout again on more fertile grounds, in alignment with a more formidable dominant economic class, the capitalist.** The realistic political thinking and reasonable discourse by which the Romans perfected the republican constitution was adaptable to develop laws and institutions for more complex worlds.

> https://news.stanford.edu/2019/10/23/fall-rome-europes-lucky-break/
>
> The Romans succeeded by exploiting a set of conditions that were hard or even impossible to replicate later on. **Through shrewd manipulation of civic obligations, material rewards and alliances, their leadership managed to mobilize vast numbers of ordinary farmers for military operations at low cost.**
>
> Rome also benefited from modest levels of state formation in the western Mediterranean and the fact that larger kingdoms farther east were busy fighting each other. This allowed them to overpower and swallow other societies one by one. **In later periods, by contrast, Europe was full of competing states that prevented any one of them from subduing all the others.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0124%3Achapter%3D11

At first, however, it was ambition, rather than avarice,[1] that influenced the minds of men; a vice which approaches nearer to virtue than the other. For of glory, honor, and power, the worthy

is as desirous as the worthless; but the one pursues them by just methods; the other, being destitute of honorable qualities, works with fraud and deceit. But avarice has merely money for its object, which no wise man has ever immoderately desired. It is a vice which, as if imbued with deadly poison, **enervates whatever is manly in body or mind.**[2] **[corpus animumque virilem effeminat]** It is always unbounded and insatiable, and is abated neither by abundance nor by want.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DMan.%3Achapter%3D2%3Asection%3D6

The most certain and the largest revenues of the Roman people are at stake; and if they be lost, **you will be at a loss for the luxuries of peace, and the sinews of war.**
…

For the revenues of the other provinces, O Romans, are such that we can scarcely derive enough from them for the protection of the provinces themselves. **But Asia is so rich and so productive, that in the fertility of its soil, and in the variety of its fruits, and in the vastness of its pasture lands, and in the multitude of all those things which are matters of exportation, it is greatly superior to all other countries.**
…

[19] In the next place, that which the same Asia, and that same Mithridates taught us, at the beginning of the Asiatic war that, at all events, we, having learnt by disaster, ought to keep in our recollection. For we know that then, when many had lost large fortunes in Asia, all credit failed at Rome, from payments being hindered. For it is not possible for many men to lose their property and fortunes in one city, without drawing many along with them into the same vortex of disaster. But do you now preserve the republic from this misfortune; **and believe me, (you yourselves see that it is the case,) this credit, and this state of the money-market which exists at Rome and in the forum, is bound up with, and is inseparable from, those fortunes which are invested in Asia.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n103/mode/2up?view=theater

On the contrary, the class of big financiers and speculators, the Roman *equites* (a term which since Mommsen has quite erroneously been translated “knights”), always had a perfectly good understanding with the populace and its organizations, the voting clubs (*sodalicia*) and the armed bands like those of Milo and Clodius.1 **They supplied money for elections, insurrections, and bribes, and C. Gracchus in return handed over to them the provinces for unlimited exploitation under State protection.** There they spread incredible misery by plundering, usury, and the selling of whole towns into slavery. To crown all, they took possession of the law-courts, where they were able to sit in judgment on their own crimes and acquit each other. They, for their part, promised the dictator everything, only to drop him and his well-meant reforms as soon as they had secured their own advantages.
…

Marius – a political simpleton like so many popular leaders – and his backers Saturninus and Cinna, thought no differently from Gracchus; and therefore **Sulla, the dictator of the nationalist side, after the storming of Rome organized a terrible butchery among the financiers, from which as a class they never recovered. After Caesar they completely disappeared from history as a *political* element. Their existence as a political power was intimately bound up with the age of democratic party-anarchy and did not survive it.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n359/mode/2up?view=theater

Italy’s dependence upon imported food was her vital weakness; **the moment she could not force other countries to send her food and soldiers she was doomed. Meanwhile the provinces recovered not only prosperity but economic initiative: Italian merchants, in this first century A.D., almost disappeared from Eastern ports, while Syrian and Greek traders established themselves at Delos and Puteoli and multiplied in Spain and Gaul.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44908/44908-h/44908-h.htm#FA_39

Therefore the inference is that, **toward the middle of the third century, Italy had lost the treasure she had won in war,** which had gradually gravitated to the centre of exchanges. This inference is confirmed by history. The movements of Diocletian seem to demonstrate that after 250 A.D. Rome ceased to be either the political or commercial capital of the world.
…

The sequence of events seems plain. Very soon after the insolvency of the government at Rome, the administration quitted the city and moved toward the boundary between Europe and Asia; **there, after some forty years of vacillation, it settled permanently at the true seat of exchanges,** for Constantinople remained the economic centre of the earth for more than eight centuries.

Similar conclusions may be drawn from the fluctuations of the currency. **At Rome the coin could not be maintained at the standard, because of adverse exchanges, but when the political**

and economic centres had come to coincide, at a point upon the Bosphorus, depreciation ceased, and the aureus fell no further.

This migration of capital, which caused the rise of Constantinople, was the true opening of the Middle Ages, for it occasioned the gradual decline of the rural population, and thus brought about the disintegration of the West. **Victory carried wealth to Rome, and wealth manifested its power in a permanent police; as the attack in war gained upon the defence, and individual resistance became impossible, transportation grew cheap and safe, and human movement was accelerated. Then economic competition began, and intensified as centralization advanced, telling always in favour of the acutest intellect and the cheapest labour.** Soon, exchanges became permanently unfavourable, a steady drain of bullion set in to the East, and, as the outflow depleted the treasure amassed at Rome by plunder, contraction began, and with contraction came that fall of prices which first ruined, then enslaved, and finally exterminated, the native rural population of Italy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

The connection between the State and its defenders was reduced to the most simple and naked traffic. The adventurer brought his horse, his weapons, his strength, and his experience, into the market. Whether the King of Naples or the Duke of Milan, the Pope or the Signory of Florence, struck the bargain, was to him a matter of perfect indifference. **He was for the highest wages and the longest term.** When the campaign for which he had contracted was finished, there was neither law nor punctilio to prevent him from instantly turning his arms against his late masters. **The soldier was altogether disjoined from the citizen and from the subject.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ZqroV-TkIhgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA110#v=onepage&q&f=false

Security and riches seem particularly important in the account Machiavelli offers. And this is consistent with the advice Machiavelli offers elsewhere, **when he counsels a prince to "inspire his citizens to follow their pursuits quietly, in trade and in agriculture and in every other pursuit of men, so that one person does not fear to adorn his possessions lest they be taken away from him, and another to open up a trade for fear of taxes**" (*P* 21). This is a far cry from the classical view that trade and commerce are unworthy of the attention of a gentleman, and that human fulfillment is to be found in participation in the life of the *polis*. The refocusing of political life on the concerns of prosperity, commerce, and trade is distinctly modern, at least as far as theory is concerned. **As Hume notes in one of his earliest essays, "trade was never esteemed an affair of state until the last century; and there scarcely is any ancient writer on politics, who has made mention of it"** (*EMPL* 88).

https://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/bruyere/chap6.htm

7. If the financier's venture should fail, the courtiers will say of him: *'He's a bourgeois, a low fellow, a lout';* **if it should succeed, they'll ask for his daughter's hand.**

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_deism-examind-and-_earbery-matthias_1697/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater

But nothing is more fatal to a *Commonwealth* than too much of what you call *Revealed Religion*, which is the Mother of Seditions and Tumults, and a great Enemy to a free Trade. And truly, this (I hope I speak to a Friend) makes me very much wish we would see a *Commonwealth* in *England*, that we might enjoy the liberty of thinking and speaking of Religion as we pleas'd, which now is too much restrain'd. And my Author tells you, *That the Grand Design of his Book was to plead for such a liberty*.
...

I must confess, as for what you say, that Religion is an Enemy to Free Trade, is partly true, because it takes away from Trade, the freedom of lying, and cheating, and defrauding, which some perhaps think essential to it: **But if you Gentlemen desire a *Commonwealth*, that you may barter away our Religion for a Free Trade, I say, pray God bless the *Monarchy* of *England*.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ZqroV-TkIhgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q&f=false

If we are today ill informed concerning the events that took place at Ramillies, Oudenarde, Lille, and Malplaquet in the brief time span of years stretching from 1706 to 1709, it is because we have become accustomed resolutely to avert our gaze from the fundamental realities of political life.
...

And yet Winston Churchill was surely right when he observed that **"battles are the principal milestones in secular history," when he rejected "modern opinion," which "resents this uninspiring truth,"** and

when he criticized “historians” who so “often treat the decisions in the field as incidents in the dramas of politics and diplomacy.” **“Great battles,” he insisted, whether “won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform.”**3
…

Marlborough’s victories were made possible by credit. The United Provinces had learned from the city-states of Renaissance Italy a secret at the heart of modern statecraft – the manner in which a national debt can be a national blessing for a commercial republic intent on the projection of power and able to borrow from its own citizens – and their English allies in the age of William III had capitalized on the discovery made by the compatriots of their Dutch king.6
…

“If I were able to speak to you,” he writes on 9 April 1513 to his friend Francesco Vettori (*O* 1131), “I would be unable to to refrain from filling your head with castles in the air (*castelluci*) because Fortune has brought it about that, since I do not know how to reason about either the silk or the wool trade, either gains or losses, it is necessary that I reason concerning the matters of state (*stato*).” Though he was born in a commune of tradesmen, Machiavelli dedicated his attention primarily to ancient polities governed by warriors and farmers. **He was sensitive to the fact that his beloved Romans had financed their wars by enslaving the conquered and confiscating their land, and he recognized that changes in the *ius gentium* ruled out the implementation of such a policy in Christian Europe.**8 **But he nowhere explained how to pay for modern wars. Repeatedly he denied that money is “the sinews of war”** (*D* 2.10, *AW* 7.178-9).

> https://web.archive.org/web/20120207131045/http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius2.htm
>
> And yet have I not spoken at all of the condition of captive slaves, than the which nothing was more miserable in the ancient wars. Free born men, noble men, children, women, all whatsoever they were did the conqueror carry away. And who knows whether they were led into perpetual servitude or not? **And truly the same such a miserable kind of slavery, as I have to cause to rejoice that not so much as the resemblance of any such has heretofore been, neither at this time is in Christendom. The Turks indeed do practice it; and there is no other thing that makes that Scythian sovereignty more odious and terrible unto us.**

…

By 1710, however, **when it had become clear to all concerned that Louis XIV’s martial France – modeled, as it was, on imperial Rome – could not withstand the modern Carthage on the other side of the English Channel,** the cause of classical antiquity had worn rather thin. To discerning men, such as Hume, Montesquieu, and Franklin, the obsession with Roman greatness that had preoccupied Machiavelli seemed more and more an anachronism, and astute observers came to believe that one cannot reason concerning matters of state without studying the silk and wool trades, profit, and loss.9

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n123/mode/2up?view=theater

At this point “Political Economy” came in, a materialistic science – founded about 1770 by Adam Smith in association with Hartley, Priestley, Mandeville, and Bentham – **that had the presumption to regard men as appurtenances of the economic situation**2 **and to “explain” history in the light of prices, markets, and goods.**
…

The whole history of the formative passions and the creative characters of strong personalities and races is ignored – the will, focused on commanding and ruling, on power and booty; the inventive urge, hatred, revenge, pride in personal strength and its successes; and equally, on the other side, jealousy, laziness, the poisonous emotions of the inferior. And there remain nothing but the “laws” of money and prices, which find expression in statistics and graphs.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1889/champ/pt02.htm

The change in the type of the French bourgeoisie takes place slowly. The burgher during the Regency is not the burgher of the time of Louis XI, but generally speaking, they both conform to the type of the old regime bourgeois. **He has become richer, more educated, more exacting, but he has not ceased to be a roturier, obliged always and everywhere, to give way to the aristocracy. But then comes 1789 and the bourgeois raises his head proudly.** A few years more and he becomes the master.

> https://unherd.com/2020/06/why-the-rich-are-revolting/
>
> “You’ve got that eternal idiotic idea that if anarchy came it would come from the poor. Why should it? The poor have been rebels, but they have never been anarchists: they have more interest than anyone else in there being some decent government. **The poor man really has a stake in the country. The rich man hasn’t; he can go away to New Guinea in a yacht. The poor have sometimes objected to being governed badly; the rich have always objected to being governed at all. Aristocrats were always anarchists.**”

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n305/mode/2up?view=theater

479. Wealth As the Origin of a Nobility of Race.—**Wealth necessarily creates an aristocracy of race, for it permits the choice of the most beautiful women and the engagement of the best teachers;** it allows a man cleanliness, time for physical exercises, and, above all, immunity from dulling physical labour.
…

In this connection, however, **it must be remembered that wealth produces almost the same effects whether one have three hundred or thirty thousand thalers a year;** there is no further essential progression of the favourable conditions afterwards.

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n215/mode/2up?view=theater

Now, however, that [the Jews] unavoidably inter-marry more and more year after year with the noblest blood of Europe, they will soon have a considerable heritage of good intellectual and physical manners, so that in another hundred years they will have a sufficiently noble aspect not to render themselves, as masters, ridiculous to those whom they will have subdued.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius2b.html#c9

[9.5] M. Antonius and L. Flaccus removed Duronius from the senate, because he had abrogated a law, whereby the costs of banquets were limited – and they had very good reason for so doing. For how impudently did Duronius on the rostra utter these words! **"There are bridles put into your mouths, most worthy senators, by no means to be endured. You are bound and constrained in the bitter shackles of servitude. For there is a law made, that you ought to be frugal. Let us abrogate therefore that edict, so deformed with the rust of nasty antiquity. For what need is there of liberty, if they that wish to ruin themselves with luxury, may not do so?" [abrogemus igitur istud horridae vetustatis rubigine obsitum imperium: etenim quid opus libertate, si volentibus luxu perire non licet?]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D69

On the other hand, **they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a favour by accepting one, however great;** and they even suspect that a claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in return. Nay more, **it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a patron or to be called clients.**

[70] Your man of slender means, on the other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard for himself and not for his outward circumstances. **Hence[1] he strives to show himself grateful not only to the one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he expects similar favours in the future—and he needs the help of many;** and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA390#v=onepage&q&f=false

Machiavelli begins by observing that men are only "good" – by which he means orderly and disciplined, and therefore able to acquire power – through being subjected to some external compulsion (necessity, fear, danger, the hostility of Fortuna [1.3]). Freedom without the stimulus of compulsion degenerates into the disorder and confusion produced by too much ease, comfort, and the relaxation of vigor.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=kotPYEqx7kMC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA179#v=onepage&q&f=false

From the moment when the machine first made its appearance it was clear to all thinking people that the need for human drudgery, and therefore to great extent for human inequality, had disappeared. If the machine were used deliberately for that end, hunger, overwork, dirt, illiteracy, and disease could be eliminated within a few generations.
…

For if leisure and security were enjoyed by all alike, the great mass of human beings who are normally stupefied by poverty would become literate and would learn to think for themselves; and when once they had done this, they would sooner or later realize that the privileged minority had no function, and they would sweep it away. **In the long run, a hierarchical society was only possible on a basis of poverty and ignorance.**
…

> War is a way of shattering to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, or sinking in the depths of the sea, materials which might otherwise be used to make the masses too comfortable, and hence, in the long run, too intelligent.

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_173

> **"If knowledge is encouraged and not nipped in the bud, it will increase, and when it will have increased, it will become impossible to rule the land."** (84: p. 182) "If the eloquent and the intelligent are valued, if vagrant scholars are brought into the service of the state, if a man becomes well known thanks to his learning and personal glory, then ways are open in the land to the unrighteous. If these three kinds of persons are not checked in their path, it will be impossible to engage the people in war." (84: p. 224) **And Shang Yang warns darkly: "The people in the whole country have changed, they have taken to eloquence and find pleasure in study; they have started to engage in various crafts and trade; they have begun to neglect agriculture and war. If this trend continues, the hour of death is near for the land."** (84: p. 152) In olden times, he says, things were not this way: "The gifted were of no use and the ungifted could do no harm. Therefore, **the art of ruling well consists precisely in the ability of removing the clever and the gifted.**" (84: p. 231) Finally, this idea is expressed in its most naked form: "If the people are stupid, they can be easily governed." (84: p. 237)

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15700/15700-h/15700-h.htm#THOUGHTS **[December, 1791]**

This [French] system has very many partisans in every country in Europe, but particularly in England, where they are already formed into a body, comprehending most of the Dissenters of the three leading denominations. To these are readily aggregated all who are Dissenters in character, temper, and disposition, though not belonging to any of their congregations: that is, all the restless people who resemble them, of all ranks and all parties,—Whigs, and even Tories; **the whole race of half-bred speculators; all the Atheists, Deists, and Socinians; all those who hate the clergy and envy the nobility; a good many among the moneyed people; the East Indians almost to a man, who cannot bear to find that their present importance does not bear a proportion to their wealth.**
…

Formerly, few, except the ambitious great or the desperate and indigent, were to be feared as instruments in revolutions. What has happened in France teaches us, with many other things, that there are more causes than have commonly been taken into our consideration, by which government may be subverted. **The moneyed men, merchants, principal tradesmen, and men of letters (hitherto generally thought the peaceable and even timid part of society) are the chief actors in the French Revolution.** But the fact is, that, as money increases and circulates, and as the circulation of news in politics and letters becomes more and more diffused, the persons who diffuse this money and this intelligence become more and more important. This was not long undiscovered. Views of ambition were in France, for the first time, presented to these classes of men: objects in the state, in the army, in the system of civil offices of every kind. Their eyes were dazzled with this new prospect.

https://cooperative-individualism.org/marx-karl_on-the-question-of-free-trade-1848.htm

But, in general, **the protective system of our day is conservative, while the free trade system is destructive.** It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch03.htm

Under the Bourbons, big landed property had governed, with its priests and lackeys; under Orleans, high finance, large-scale industry, large-scale trade, **that is, capital, with its retinue of lawyers, professors, and smooth-tongued orators.** The Legitimate Monarchy was merely the political expression of the hereditary rule of the lords of the soil, as the July Monarchy was only the political expression of the usurped rule of the bourgeois parvenus.
…

We speak of two interests of the bourgeoisie, for large landed property, despite its feudal coquetry and pride of race, has been rendered thoroughly bourgeois by the development of modern society. **Thus the Tories in England long imagined that they were enthusiastic about monarchy, the church, and the beauties of the old English Constitution, until the day of danger wrung from them the confession that they are enthusiastic only about ground rent.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924022322527/page/n305/mode/2up?view=theater

> 'Twas otherwise after the Thirty Years War: the nobles found no nation left, to which to feel their kinship; the great monarchic powers shifted from the stricter seat of Germany towards the Slavic east: degenerate Slavs,

> decadent Germans, form the soil of the eighteenth century's history, **a soil to which the Jew might confidently migrate from a Poland and a Hungary sucked dry, since even prince and noble durst no longer be ashamed of doing business with him; for—Pride itself had just been pledged already, exchanged for vanity and greed.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/frenchmotherinwa00drumrich/page/166/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Drumont answered: “The real nobles of days of yore who defended their native land, and used their elbows to prevent the stranger usurping the place belonging to the sons of France; who disturbed the order of battle, so as to be the first to charge, are no more; one may look in vain for them among their descendants.
> …
>
> “**The descendants of those dapper nobles of old are now for the most part on terms of intimacy with all the Mardochée, and all the Jews in creation.**

http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_various/homers_competition.htm

I cannot help seeing in the prevailing international movements of the present day, and the simultaneous promulgation of universal suffrage, the effects of the fear of war above everything else, **yea I behold behind these movements, those truly international homeless money-hermits, as the really alarmed, who, with their natural lack of the state-instinct, have learnt to abuse politics as a means of the Exchange, and state and society as an apparatus for their enrichment.** Against the deviation of the state-tendency into a money-tendency, to be feared from this side, the only remedy is war and once again war, in the emotions of which this at least becomes obvious, that the state is not founded upon the fear of the war-demon, as a protective institution for egoistic individuals, but in love to fatherland and prince, it produces an ethical impulse, indicative of a much higher destiny. If I therefore designate as a dangerous and characteristic sign of the present political situation the application of revolutionary thought in the service of a selfish state-less money-aristocracy, **if at the same time I conceive of the enormous dissemination of liberal optimism as the result of modern financial affairs fallen into strange hands,** and if I imagine all evils of social conditions together with the necessary decay of the arts to have either germinated from that root or grown together with it, one will have to pardon my occasionally chanting a pæan on war.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1889/champ/pt04.htm

Peter had laid the foundation of that industry in Russia. **At the beginning, and perfectly in keeping with the character of its origin, this industry was perfectly subordinate and ancillary to the state.** It was feudally bound, like every other social force in Russia, to serve the state. It maintained itself by the serf labour of peasants enlisted for work in the factories and works.
…

During the 28 years since February 19, 1861, Russian industry has so rapidly forged ahead that its relations to the state have altered quite substantially. **At one time perfectly *subordinate to the state*, it now strives to *subordinate the state to itself*,** to place it at its own service. In one of the petitions which they almost annually present to the government, the merchants of the Nizhny Novgorod Fair naively call the finance ministry the organ of the estate of trade and industry. **Businessmen who formerly could not take a step without directions from the government now demand that the Government shall follow *their* directions.** Thus, as regards Russian economic development, absolutism has already said its piece. Far from being needed by our industry, state tutelage was even *harmful* to it. The time is not far off when our “estate of trade and industry,” convinced by experience that timid remonstrations are useless, **will be forced to remind tsarism in a sterner and severer tone that tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis.**[1]

https://archive.org/details/sinsfatheraroma00dixogoog/page/207/mode/2up?view=theater **[Published March, 1912]**

A new and far more dangerous order of Scalawags has arisen—the man who boldly preaches the omnipotence of the dollar and weighs every policy of state or society by one standard only, will it pay in dollars and cents? And so you frown on any discussion of the tragic problem the negro's continued pressure on Southern society involves because it disturbs business.
…

The Carpetbagger has come back to the South. **This time he is not a low adventurer seeking coin and public office. He is a philanthropist who carries hundreds of millions of dollars to be distributed to the 'right' men who will teach Southern boys and girls the 'right' ideas.** So far as these 'right' ideas touch the negro, they mean the ultimate complete acceptance of the black man as a social equal.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232-images.html#chap17

> **Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women.** But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, **but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mess_of_pottage

> The Hindu nationalist V. D. Savarkar borrowed the phrase, along with quotations from Shakespeare, for his pamphlet
> Hindutva (1923), which celebrated Hindu culture and identity, **asking whether Indians were willing to 'disown their seed, forswear their fathers and sell their birthright for a mess of pottage'.**

https://www.panarchy.org/schumpeter/imperialism.html **[1919]**

Because the sovereign needed soldiers, the modern bourgeois – at least in his slogans – is an even more vehement advocate of an increasing population. **Because the sovereign was in a position to exploit conquests, needed them to be a victorious warlord, the bourgeoisie thirsts for national glory – even in France, worshiping a headless body, as it were.** Because the sovereign found a large gold hoard useful, the bourgeoisie even today cannot be swerved from its bullionist prejudices. Because the autocratic state paid attention to the trader and manufacturer chiefly as the most important sources of taxes and credits, today even the intellectual who has not a shred of property looks on international commerce, not from the viewpoint of the consumer, but from that of the trader and exporter. Because pugnacious sovereigns stood in constant fear of attack by their equally pugnacious neighbours, the modern bourgeois attributes aggressive designs to neighbouring peoples. **All such modes of thought are essentially non-capitalist. Indeed, they vanish most quickly wherever capitalism fully prevails.**

https://mondopolitico.com/library/meinkampf/v1c5.htm

As A YOUNG SCAMP in my wild years, **nothing had so grieved me as having been born at a time which obviously erected its Halls of Fame only to shopkeepers and government officials.** The waves of historic events seemed to have grown so smooth that the future really seemed to belong only to the 'peaceful contest of nations'; in other words, **a cozy mutual swindling match with the exclusion of violent methods of defense.** The various nations began to be more and more like private citizens who cut the ground from under one another's feet, stealing each other's customers and orders, trying in every way to get ahead of one another, and staging this whole act amid a hue and cry as loud as it is harmless. This development seemed not only to endure but was expected in time (as was universally recommended) **to remodel the whole world into one big department store in whose vestibules the busts of the shrewdest profiteers and the most lamblike administrative officials would be garnered for all eternity.** The English could supply the merchants, the Germans the administrative officials, and the Jews no doubt would have to sacrifice themselves to being the owners, since by their own admission they never make any money, but always 'pay,' and, besides, speak the most languages.

Why couldn't I have been born a hundred years earlier? Say at the time of the Wars of Liberation when a man, even without a 'business,' was really worth something?!

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n65/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Neither Mirabeau, Talleyrand, Metternich, nor Wellington understood anything about economics. Undoubtedly they found pretexts in it – but how much worse if, in their place, an economic expert had tried to dictate politics!**

https://archive.org/details/chapoutot-johann-the-law-of-blood-thinking-and-acting-as-ns-2018/page/77/mode/2up?view=theater

On November 28, 1940, from a highly symbolic position on the dais of the Palais-Bourbon, Alfred Rosenberg delivered a speech to the former Chamber of Deputies of the defunct French Republic, in German-occupied Paris. Standing before walls hung with Nazi flags, he drove the last nails into the coffin of the French Revolution, **and affirmed that the war still raging around them, now against England alone, was a "global struggle between gold and blood": against the gold of Judaized British plutocrats, but also against gold as a financial instrument—as a quantitative, democratic, universal equalizer that dissolved all hierarchies, especially those of race and blood.**52

https://www.counter-currents.com/2013/05/eugenics-versus-race/#comment-36537

It seems that the text of William Pierce's article, "Whither America: Elitism or Racism?" isn't online. I should prepare it for republication later this month. Pierce opposed the "elitism" of those who judge people by their socioeconomic status rather than race. Such "elitists" seem to prefer Brazilian-style social stratification (provided that they're in the upper classes) to an organic White society. **These parvenus may think that they're clever—they may pride themselves on the cleverness with which they acquire and use money and power—but they are Nietzsche's "Last Men" rather than Yockey's "men of race." The mere vision of a Judaized, multi-racial cesspool in which one sinks or swims according to the amount of money one can make is disgusting.**

https://archive.org/details/OurCauseByDr.WilliamLutherPierce1976

You may think of that kid as an extreme liberal case, but he is really no different than the average —and I mean the average—businessman in this country. He used to be a segregationist a few years ago, but he became an integrationist when the Blacks started rioting and burning things in the late 1960′s. After all, riots are bad for business.

https://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_296

Sartre now **[1974]** considers Soviet Marxism to be "repressive" and "bureaucratic," and of the French working class he says: **"What is a proletariat if it is not revolutionary? And it is, indeed, not revolutionary."** (143: p. 166)

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In a letter to Marx on the 9th May 1851 Engels speaks of the democratic Red and Communistic mob, and on the 11th December 1851 writes to him: **"What is the rabble good for if it forgets how to fight?"**

https://counter-currents.com/2017/09/between-capital-archaic-socialism/

All prejudices are combated except one: the prejudice of fiscal power. That is to say, nobody should face any barrier other than the barrier of money; and nobody should be excluded from any club, from buying any house, from doing anything he or she wants to do, so long as they have the financial means to do it. If they do not have the financial means to join the club, then their entitlement is withdrawn. Money is everything.

> https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n199/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Where will it end? **In the destruction of all other command for the benefit of one alone—that of the state. In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority, a freedom the price of which is complete submission to the state. In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master—the state. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the state, and in the denial of every pre-eminence which is not approved by the state.** In a word, it ends in the atomization of society, and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is now their common bondage to the state. The extremes of individualism and socialism meet: that was their predestined course.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/guesde/1887/oct/secularisation.htm
>
> **It is written there in all seriousness that the bourgeois Revolution of 1789 was necessary because it "pursued the suppression of privileges" of the nobility and the clergy.** But that the working class revolution of tomorrow would be "a crime" (p 175) because it would touch the privileges of the bourgeoisie...

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Sallust/Bellum_Jugurthinum/1*.html#ref64

10 After going out of the gates, it is said that he often looked back at Rome in silence and finally said, **"A city for sale and doomed to speedy destruction if it finds a purchaser!" [urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit]**

http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Latin/HoraceEpodesAndCarmenSaeculare.htm#anchor_Toc98670052

> 'This fellow, scourged by the triumvir's whip until
> That officer was wearied,
> Sets plough to a thousand Falernian acres,
> His mules scour the Appian Way,
> And ignoring Otho's ruling the great man sits,

Right there in the knights' front row!
What's the point of sending out so many sharp-prowed,
So many heavyweight, warships,
Against the pirates and servile hordes, if this,
***This*, ends up a soldiers' tribune?**'

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trimalchio

Trimalchio is an arrogant former slave who has become quite wealthy by tactics that most would find distasteful. The name "Trimalchio" is formed from the Greek prefix τριϛ and the Semitic מלך (melech) in its occidental form Malchio or Malchus.[1]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_1

[The patron] then bids the crier call up the Trojan-blooded nobles—for they too besiege the door as well as we: "The Praetor first," says he, "and after him the Tribune." "But I was here first," says a freedman who stops the way; "why should I be afraid, or hesitate to keep my place? **Though born on the Euphrates—a fact which the little windows in my ears would testify though I myself denied it—yet I am the owner of five shops which bring me in four hundred thousand sesterces.** [25] **What better thing does the Broad Purple**[26] **bestow if a Corvinus**[27] **herds sheep for daily wage in the Laurentian country, while I possess more property than either a Pallas or a Licinus?**"[28] **So let the Tribunes await their turn; let money carry the day; [uincant diuitiae] let the sacred office**[29] **give way to one who came but yesterday with whitened**[30] **feet into our city.** For no deity is held in such reverence amongst us as Wealth; though as yet, O baneful money, thou hast no temple of thine own; not yet have we reared altars to Money in like manner as we worship Peace and Honour, Victory and Virtue, or that Concord[31] that twitters when we salute her nest.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n361/mode/2up?view=theater

This banking system had come from Greece and the Greek East, and was mostly in the hands of Greeks and Syrians even in Italy and the West; in Gaul the words for Syrian and banker were synonyms.[49] Interest rates, which had sunk to four per cent under the weight of Augustus' Egyptian spoils, rose to six per cent after his death, and reached their legal maximum of twelve per cent by the age of Constantine.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Usury

In the course of two or three centuries the small free farmers were utterly destroyed. By the pressure of war and taxes they were all driven into debt, and debt ended practically, if not technically, in slavery. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the influence of usury on the social and economic history of the Roman republic. In the provinces the evils of the system reached a much greater height. In 84 B.C. the war tax imposed by Sulla on the province of Asia was at first advanced by Roman capitalists, and rose within fourteen years to six times its original amount. **It is interesting to observe that the old law of debt was not really abolished until the dictatorship of Julius Caesar, who practically adopted the legislation of Solon more than five centuries before; but it was too late then to save the middle class.** About this time the rate of interest on first-class security in the city of Rome was only about 4%, whilst in the provinces from 25 to 50% were rates often exacted. Justinian made the accumulation of arrears (*anatocismus*) illegal, and fixed the rate at 6%, except for mercantile loans, in which the rate received was 8%. On the whole, it was truly said of usury during the republic and early years of the empire: "Sed vetus urbi faenebre malum et sedition um discordiarumque creberrima causa."

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch07.htm

But in the course of the nineteenth century the urban usurer replaced the feudal one, the mortgage replaced the feudal obligation, bourgeois capital replaced aristocratic landed property.
…

The army was the "*point d'honneur*" of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer world, glorifying their recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was their own state costume; war was their poetry; **the small holding, enlarged and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of the sense of property. But the enemies whom the French peasant now has to defend his property against are not the Cossacks; they are the *huissiers* [bailiffs] and the tax collectors.** The small holding no longer lies in the so-called fatherland but in the registry of mortgages.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/23*.html#ref46

In this connexion it may be added, though it does not concern the civil law, that the Church happily failed to force upon the State its unpractical policy of prohibiting the lending of money at interest.[49]

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_head_056

On the basis of the false ideas that uninformed ecclesiastics had given him on the subject of interest on money loans, a Christian emperor (Basil the Macedonian), not content with reducing interest to an equitable rate, forbade it altogether as an illegal contract, both in its nature and in the light of the rules of the Gospel. Thanks to this vain scruple and this ill-informed piety, he ruined commerce and reduced a multitude of people to wretchedness, with the result that his son and successor, Leon known as the Philosopher—and more of a philosopher in this respect than his father—was forced to constantly raise the defenses and to permit interest, as previously, on a modest scale [see Leon's *Novelle*, LXXXIII].

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA21#v=onepage&q&f=false

Usury was a problem in Byzantium: **although condemned by the Church Fathers, it was an important part of the Byzantine economy.** The number of insolvent debtors was so high that in the late ninth or early tenth century Patriach Euthymios begged Leo VI to free them of their debts.30 Romanos Lakapenos was forced to bow to this demand: the treasury paid all the debts in Constantinople regardless of the social status of insolvent debtors; the vouchers were burned. It was Leo VI's father, Basil I, who has most radically attacked the problem of usury. The collection of interest was prohibited completely – only minors and orphans were allowed to use their money for this purpose.31 Mortgages were also restricted: the mortgage debt was to be repaid partially in produce. In addition, Basil's lawbook, the *Epanagoge*, prohibited the peasant from mortgaging his field. Basil's legislation failed. **His son and heir, Leo, abolished the law because, he wrote, it badly afflicted the economy of the whole country. Leo, however, established the legal ceiling on interest at 5.5 %.**32

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GTDUdVXjNHsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA13#v=onepage&q&f=false

Roman law, in its recognition of the irrepressible human urge to truck and barter, foreshadowed modern law. Medieval clerics, the main students of the classical Roman texts rediscovered in Bologna in about 1100 A.D., had full access to Roman law regulation of business practices and virtually any other subjects that had ever intrigued Roman jurists.

Roman law sharply distinguished and categorized loan transactions based upon whether a lender's purpose was essentially altruistic or selfish;8 each loan category contained distinct liability rules that have survived in many civil-law systems.9 **Roman tolerance of profitseeking was evident in Roman imperial rulings that authorized lenders to charge their borrowers a reasonable rate of interest.**10 **Yet, on the issue of profitseeking, the Church fathers, despite guidance offered by Christian and pagan emperors,**11 **preferred an outright ban. As if to make this financial policy odder still, the medieval Church engaged in a program of "do as I say, not as I do."** At any historical moment, the Church selectively condemned some usurers, defended certain usurious transactions by means of elaborate casuistry, and itself engaged in lending at interest.12

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D89

[89] To this class of comparisons belongs that famous saying of old Cato's: **when he was asked what was the most profitable feature of an estate, he replied: "Raising cattle [pascere] successfully." What next to that? "Raising cattle with fair success." And next? "Raising cattle with but slight success." And fourth? "Raising crops." ["Arare"]** And when his questioner said, "How about money-lending?" Cato replied: "How about murder?"

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D72

Gaius Gracchus inaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale; this had a tendency to exhaust the exchequer. **Marcus Octavius inaugurated a moderate dole; this was both practicable for the state and necessary for the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to the state.** [73] The man in an administrative office, however, must[1] make it his first care that everyone shall have what belongs to him and that private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played the demagogue, and that time viciously, **when he said that "there were not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." [rem] That speech deserves unqualified condemnation, [capitalis] for**

it favoured an equal distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual property rights might be secured. For, although it was by Nature's guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection of cities. [Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.]

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D151

Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, [videtur iure optimo posse laudari] if those who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port.

---

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/410/mode/2up?view=theater

If we place ourselves back to the time when the plebs had increased and entered the body politic, and compare the law of this epoch with primitive law, grave changes appear at the first glance. **The first and most salient is, that the law has been rendered public, and is known to all. It is no longer that sacred and mysterious chant which men repeated, with pious respect, from age to age;** which priests alone wrote, and which men of the religious families alone could know.
...

Formerly the law was a religious decision; it passed for a revelation made by the gods to the ancestors, to the divine founder, to the sacred kings, to the magistrate-priests. In the new code, on the contrary, the legislator no longer speaks in the name of the gods. The decemvirs of Rome receive their powers from the people. The people also invested Solon with the right to make laws. The legislator, therefore, no longer represents religious tradition, but the popular will. The principle of the law, henceforth, is the interest of men, and its foundation, the consent of the greatest number.

Two consequences flow from this fact. The first is, that the law is no longer presented as an immutable and undisputable formula. As it becomes a human work, it is acknowledged to be subject to change. The Twelve Tables say, **"What the votes of the people have ordained in the last instance is the law."**1 **[quodcumque postremum populus iussisset, id ius ratumque esset]**

Of all the passages of this code that remain to us, there is not one more important than this, or one which better marks the character of the revolution that had then taken place in the law. **The law was no longer a sacred tradition – *mos*; it was simply a text – *lex*; and as the will of men had made it, the same will could change it.**
...

The Twelve Tables, as we have seen above, were written in the midst of social changes; patricians made them, but they were made upon the demand of the plebs, and for their use. This legislation, therefore, is no longer the primitive law of Rome; neither is it pretorian law; it is a transition between the two.

Here, then, are the points in which it does not yet deviate from the antique law: it maintains the power of the father; it allows him to pass judgment upon his son, to condemn him to death, or to sell him. While the father lives, the son never reaches his majority. As to the law of succession, this also follows the ancient rules: **the inheritance passes to the agnates, and in default of agnates, to the *gentiles*. As to the cognates, that is to say, those related through females, the law does not yet recognize them.** They do not inherit from each other; the mother does not succeed to the son, nor the son to the mother.1
...

The following points are those on which this legislation deviates from primitive law: –

It formally admits that the patrimony may be divided among the brothers, since it grants the *actio familiæ erciscundæ*.2

It declares that the father cannot sell his son more than three times, and that after the third sale, the son shall be free.1 **This is the first blow struck by Roman law at the paternal authority.**

Another change still more important was that which gave a man the right to transmit his property by will. Before this period the son was a *self-successor and a necessary*: in default of sons, the nearest agnate inherited; in default of agnates, the property returned to the gens, a trace of the time when the gens, still undivided, was sole proprietor of the domain, which afterwards had been divided. **The Twelve Tables threw aside those old principles; they treated property as belonging, not to the gens, but to the individual; they therefore recognized in man the right of disposing of his property by will.**

Still the will was not entirely unknown in primitive law. Even then a man might choose a legatee outside the gens, but on the condition that his choice should be ratified by the assembly of the curies; **so that nothing less than the entire city could change the order which religion had formerly established.** The new legislation freed the will from this vexatious rule, and gave it a more convenient form – that of a pretended sale. **The man feigned to sell his property to the one whom he had chosen as heir; in reality, he made a will;** in this case he had no need of appearing before the assembly of the people.
…

Ancient rules and formalities had only been applicable and were still applied only to religious families; but new rules and new methods of procedure were prepared which were applicable to the plebeians.
…

Finally, the pretor, continuing to advance in the road which the Twelve Tables had opened, traced out, by the side of the ancient law, an entirely new system, which religion did not dictate, and which approached continually nearer to the law of nature.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater

What changed Roman law from a local rigid formal law into a world-wide rational formless jurisprudence? The answer is: the growth of foreign trade and commerce, the legal problems of which were solved by the praetor's application of the rules of the law of nations (*Jus gentium*). With the increasing territorial conquests of Rome, foreign commerce developed enormously. Foreigners flocked in great numbers to Rome. Legal transactions arose in large volume. Two centuries after the XII Tables, in the year 242 B.C.,21 a special praetor to dispense justice to foreigners was created—the praetor peregrinus.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilia_(Roman_province)#History
>
> Previous Roman conquests in Italy had resulted in direct annexation or asymmetric treaties with Rome as hegemonic power. **These treaties guaranteed substantial internal autonomy to the socii: they were required to contribute troops when requested but not to pay any form of tribute.** [17] Probably because of the island's complex mixture of ethnicities and perhaps also in order to recoup the expenses sustained during the war through a system of fiscal control, which excluded the concession of broad autonomy, **Sicily came to be defined by a different institutional system.** [18]
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Against_Verres/Second_pleading/Book_2
>
> For as you ought to have a careful regard for all the allies and provinces, so especially ought you to have a regard for Sicily, O judges, for many, and those the greatest, reasons:—First, because of all foreign nations Sicily was the first who joined herself to the friendship and alliance of the Roman people. **She was the first to be called a province; and the provinces are a great ornament to the empire. She was the first who taught our ancestors how glorious a thing it was to rule over foreign nations.**

…

With the advent of the praetor peregrinus began that equitable praetorian adjunct to the Civil Law23 which was known as the jus gentium **or Roman law for foreigners and subjects not citizens.**

> 23. **The Romans meant by "civil law" the jus civile or law for citizens only, never "private law" as in modern legal phraseology.**

The Roman source of this jus gentium was the law made by the magistrates or jus honorarium. **Practically the whole of the newer equitable law was to be found only in the magisterial law,** and the only way it could be enforced was through the medium of legal procedure—by granting or refusing a right of action or a right of defense.

Roman law now began to develop along parallel lines. There was *the old law* for citizens—the *jus civile*. There was *the new law* for non-citizens (foreigners and subjects)—the *jus gentium*. **The jus civile was composed of statutes and customs having the force of law.** It was largely legislative law. The jus gentium was law made by magistrates, who drew partly on the jus civile and very largely on those rules of law common to all nations, particularly the neighboring Greeks, as the sources of their inspiration. **It was a body of rules which the Roman praetor thought worthy to govern the intercourse of Roman citizens with the members of all, originally independent but now subject, foreign nations.**24 Occasionally, however, the Romans use the term jus gentium in its modern sense of the "law of nations," that is, "international law."

These two systems of law—*jus civile* and *jus gentium*—continued down through the Later Republic into the Empire, **when finally the older jus civile became fused with the jus gentium losing in the refining process all its local narrowness and formal strength.** The combined product became the jurisprudence of a world,—a universal and no longer a local law.
...

This process of secularizing the law, which began in the 4th century B.C. when the actions furnished by statute (*legis actiones*) were divulged,25 was given an enormous impetus in the 3d century26 B.C. by the first plebeian pontifex maximus Tiberius Coruncanius, who was the first to give *public consultations* to persons needing legal advice. By the 1st century B.C. men giving legal advice and answering legal questions were called jurisconsults (*jurisconsulti*, skilled in the law), **and the lawyer had long since ceased to be a priest.** Moreover, the lawyer's practice soon became the stepping stone to the highest offices of the Roman State.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n69/mode/2up?view=theater

[Publilian Law. Year of the world 3658, of Rome 416.]

104 This law was put into effect in the 416th year of Rome, and contains a most important point of Roman history, for by this law the Roman commonwealth declared its change from an aristocratic to a popular form of government; whence Publilius Philo, who was its author, was called the "people's dictator."
...

But on the basis of the two aforesaid laws, **the plebs finally reached the point where they could make universal laws [binding on the nobles as well as on themselves]. To bring this about required factional movements and revolts at Rome, with the result that it was necessary to make Publilius Philo dictator, an office never created save in times of greatest danger to the commonwealth, such as this was.** For it had fallen into such great disorder as to nourish within itself two supreme legislative powers without any distinction of time, scope or territory, with the result that the commonwealth was on the point of collapse. Wherefore Philo, to cure the ills of the state, ordained that whatever the plebs commanded by plebiscites in the assembly by tribes (*comitia tributa*) "should be binding on all the Quirites" (*omnes quirites teneret*), i.e. should be binding on all the people in the assembly by hundreds (*comitia centuriata*) in which "all the Quirites" (*omnes quirites*) met. **(For the Romans called themselves Quirites only in public assembly, and Quiris in the singular is never found in common Latin speech.)** By this formula Philo meant to signify that laws could not be enacted contrary to the plebiscites. The plebs had already been made in all respects equal to the nobles by laws to which the latter had agreed. **By this most recent move, to which the nobles could offer no opposition without bringing the commonwealth to ruin, the plebs had become superior to the nobles, for without ratification by the senate the plebs could enact general laws for all the people. Thus the Roman commonwealth had now naturally become free and popular.** Philo accordingly proclaimed it such by this law, and hence was called the people's dictator.

113 In conformity with this change in its nature, he gave the commonwealth two ordinances, which are contained in the other two sections of the Publilian Law. **In the first this dictator ordained that authorization by the senate, which had been an authorization by the lords whereby what had first been decided by the people "the fathers had afterwards to ratify" (*deinde patres fierent auctores*)**—so that the election of the consuls and the enacting of the laws, being determined in advance by the people, had been [respectively] public testimonials of merit and public demands of right—**should thenceforth be given by the fathers to the people, who were now sovereign and free, prior to the deliberations of the assembly (*in incertum comitiorum eventum*), as [if they, the fathers, were but] the guardians of the people, who were the real lords and masters of the Roman *imperium*.** The people, if they wished to enact laws, were to do so according to the formula presented to them by the senate. If not, they could make use of their sovereign right and "antiquate" the [proposed] laws; that is, declare they wanted no innovation. Thus everything the senate should henceforth ordain concerning public affairs should be [regarded as] instructions given by it to the people or commissions given to it by the people. Finally there remained the census, for, since the treasury had hitherto been the property of the nobles, they alone had been created censors of it. Since, however, by this law the treasury became the property of the people as a whole, Philo ordered in the third place that the censorship, the only magistracy in which the plebs had as yet no share, should also be extended to them.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n229/mode/2up?view=theater

620 This development gives truth to the tradition that the census of Servius Tullius was the basis of popular liberty, for in it the matter was prepared and from it the occasions were born, as we set forth hypothetically above in the Notes on the Chronological Table, in the passage on the Publilian law. **It was this ordinance, originating in Rome itself, that established the democratic commonwealth there, and not the Law of the Twelve Tables [supposed to have been] brought there from Athens.** Indeed, what Aristotle calls a democratic commonwealth is rendered in Tuscan by Bernardo

Segni as a commonwealth by census, meaning a free popular commonwealth. This is evident even in Livy, for, ignorant as he was of the Roman form of government in those times, he nevertheless states that **the nobles complained that by that law they had lost more in the city than they had gained abroad by force of arms in that year, though it was a year of many great victories.** And for this reason Publilius, the author of the law, was called the people's dictator.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0026%3Abook%3D8%3Achapter%3D12
>
> [14] He made his Dictatorship popular by delivering incriminatory harangues against the senate and also by carrying three measures[1] which were directed against the nobility and were most advantageous to the [15] plebs. One was that the decisions of the plebs should be binding on all the Quirites; the second, that measures which were brought before the Assembly of centuries should be sanctioned by the patricians before being finally put to the [16] vote; the third, that since it had come about that both censors could legally be appointed from the plebs, one should in any case be always chosen from that [17] order. **The patricians considered that the consul and the Dictator had done more to injure the State by their domestic policy than to strengthen its power by their successes in the field.**
>
> > 1. These measures practically annihilated the Assembly of Curies as a political power. The first appears to have been a more stringent reenactment of the Valerian and Horatian Law (see Vol. I. p. 201). The second 'abolished the right of the patrician senate to reject a decree of the community as unconstitutional...in so far that it had to bring forward its constitutional objections, if it had any such, when the list of candidates was exhibited or the project of law brought in; which practically amounted to a regular announcement of its consent beforehand' (Mommsen, I. 297).
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0026%3Abook%3D8%3Achapter%3D15
>
> [9] In this year also Q. Publilius Philo was elected as the first plebeian praetor against the opposition of the consul Sulpicius; **the senate, after failing to keep the highest posts in their own hands, showed less interest in retaining the praetorship.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bVWcAQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA1239#v=onepage&q&f=false

Quintus Publilius Philo was consul in 339, 327, 320, and 315 BCE, censor in 332, and the first plebeian praetor in 336. He reputedly served on a commission to organize debt relief in 352 and as dictator in 339 passed three laws: (1) one *censor must always be plebeian; (2) the sanction accorded by patrician senators (**patrum auctoritas*) must now be given before the presentation of legislation to the centuriate assembly (thus limiting patrician obstruction); (3) decisions of the plebeian assembly (*plebiscita*; see PLEBISCITUM) were to be binding on the whole people.
...

In 327-6 he besieged Naples (*Neapolis) and through his contacts with philo-Roman elements secured its surrender: the Greek interests attested by his *cognomen* Philo (see NAMES, PERSONAL, ROMAN) **may have assisted here and he triumphed in 326 as the first historical proconsul** (see PRO CONSULE).

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n55/mode/2up?view=theater

Law was both *lex* and *ius*—command and justice; it was a relation not only between man and man but between man and the gods. Crime was a disturbance of that relation, of the *pax deorum* or peace of the gods; law and punishment were in theory designed to maintain or restore that relation and peace. **The priests declared what was right and wrong (*fas et nefas*), on what days the courts might open and the assemblies meet. All questions regarding marriage or divorce, celibacy or incest, wills or transfers, or the rights of children, required the priest as now so many of them require the lawyer.** Only the priests knew the formulas without which hardly anything could be legally done. They were in Rome the first *iurisconsulti,* consultants in the law, counselors; they were the first to give *responsa,* or legal opinions. The laws were recorded in their books, and these volumes were so securely guarded from the plebs that suspicion charged the priests with altering the texts, on occasion, to suit ecclesiastical or aristocratic ends.

The Twelve Tables effected a double juristic revolution: the publication and secularization of Roman law. Like other codes of the sixth and fifth centuries—those of Charondas, Zaleucus, Lycurgus, Solon—they represented a change from uncertain unwritten custom to definite written law; they were a result of increasing literacy and democracy. **The *ius civile,* or law of citizens, freed itself in these Tables from the *ius divinum,* or divine law; Rome decided not to be a theocracy.** The priestly monopoly was further deflated when the secretary of Appius Claudius the Blind published (304) a calendar of court days (*dies fasti*—"days of utterance"), and a "formulary" of proper legal procedures, which had till then been known to few but the priests. **Secularization took another step when Coruncanius (280) began the first known public instruction in Roman law; from that time onward the lawyer replaced the priest and dominated the mind and life of Rome.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0104:entry=ti-coruncanius-bio-1

Notwithstanding his provincial extraction, this novus homo was promoted to all the highest offices at Rome. (*Veli*. 2.128.) In B.C. 280, he was consul with P. Valerius Laevinus, and while his colleague was engaged in the commencement of the war against Pyrrhus, the province of Etruria fell to Coruncanius, who was successful in quelling the remains of disaffection, and entirely defeated the Vulsinienses and Vulcientes.
...

About B.C. 254, Coruncanius was created pontifex maximus, and was the first plebeian who ever filled that office (Liv. *Epit*. xviii.), **although, before that time, his brother jurist, P. Sempronius Sophus, and other plebeians, had been pontifices.** (Liv. 10.9.) In B.C. 246, he was appointed dictator for the purpose of holding the comitia, in order to prevent the necessity of recalling either of the consuls from Sicily; and he must have died shortly afterwards, at a very advanced age (Cic. *de Senect*. 6), for, in Liv. *Epit*. xix., Caecilius Metellus is named as pontifex maximus.

Coruncanius was a remarkable man. He lived on terms of strict friendship with M. Curius and other eminent statesmen of his day. He was a Roman sage (*Sapiens*), a character more practical than that of a Grecian philosopher, but he was sufficiently versed in the learning of the times. **That philosophy which placed the highest good in pleasure he rejected, and, with M. Curius, wished that the enemies of Rome, Pyrrhus and the Samnites, could be taught to believe its precepts.** He was a manly orator; his advice and opinion were respected in war as well as in peace, and he had great influence in the senate as well as in the public assembly. (Cic. *de Orat*. 3.33.)
...

There is a passage relating to Coruncanius in Pomponius (*Dig.* 1. tit. 2. s. 8.35). which has given occasion to much controversy. He says that Coruncanius was the first who publicly professed law, since, before his time, jurists endeavoured to conceal the *jus civile*, and gave their time, not to students, but to those who wanted their advice. The statement as to the early concealment of the law has been supposed to be fabulous (Puchta, *Institutionen*, i. p. 301); but here it is proper to distinguish between the rules applicable to ordinary dealings on the one hand, and the technical regulations of the calendar, of procedure and of religious rites, on the other. Schrader (in Hugo's *Civil. Mag*. v. p. 187) assumes that it was usual for jurists before Coruncanius to admit patrician students--those at least who were destined for the college of pontiffs--to learn law by being present at their consultations with their clients. He further thinks that Coruncanius did not profess to give any systematic or peculiar instruction in the theory of law, and certainly there are passages which prove that such theoretic instruction was not common in the time of Cicero. (Cic. *Brut.* 89, *de Amic*. 1, *de Leg*. 1.4, *de Ofi*. 2.13.) **Schrader therefore comes to the conclusion, that Coruncanius first publicly professed law only in this sense, that he was the first to allow *plebeians* and patricians indiscriminately to learn law by attending his consultations.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n81/mode/2up?view=theater

In the period of these struggles, Rome had become a megalopolis of the late-Classical type. **The rustic instincts were more and more pushed back by the intelligence of the city.**1 **Consequently from about 350 we find side by side with the *lex rogata* of the people the *lex data*, the administrative law, of the prætor.** With this the Twelve Tables idea drops out of the contest and it is the prætor's edict that becomes the football of the party battle.

It did not take long for the praetor to become the centre of both legislation and judicial practice. And presently, corresponding to the political extension of the city's power, the jurisdiction of the prætor and the field of his *jus civile*—the law of the citizens—begin to diminish in significance and the peregrin prætor with his *jus gentium*—the law of the alien—steps into the foreground. And when finally the whole population of the Classical world, save the small part possessing Roman citizenship, was comprised in the field of this alien law, **the *jus peregrinum* of the city of Rome became practically an imperial law. All other cities—and even Alpine tribes and migrant Bedouin clans were *civitates* from the administrative point of view—retained their local laws only as supplements, not alternatives, to the peregrin law of Rome.**

It marked the close of Classical law-making, therefore, when Hadrian (about A.D. 130) introduced the *Edictum perpetuum*, which gave final form to the well-established corpus of the annual pronouncements of the prætors and forbade further modifications thereof. **It was still, as before, the prætor's duty to publish the "law of the year,"** but, even though this law had no greater degree of validity than corresponded to his administrative powers and was not the law of the Empire, he was obliged thenceforth to stick to the established text.2 **It is the very symbol of the petrified "Late" Civilization.**3

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D32

Further than this, **who fails to see that those promises are not binding which are extorted by intimidation or which we make when misled by false pretences? Such obligations are annulled in most cases by the praetor's edict in equity,**[3] in some cases by the laws.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D39
>
> [39] 13. Again, **if under stress of circumstances individuals have made any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then.** For instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent to Rome on parole to negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it was he that made the motion in the Senate that the prisoners should not be restored; and in the second place, when his relatives and friends would have kept him back, he chose to return to a death by torture rather than prove false to his promise, though given to an enemy.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#praetors

A principle of discretion more congenial to monarchy was introduced into the republic: the art of respecting the name, and eluding the efficacy, of the laws, was improved by successive praetors; subtleties and fictions were invented to defeat the plainest meaning of the Decemvirs, and where the end was salutary, the means were frequently absurd. The secret or probable wish of the dead was suffered to prevail over the order of succession and the forms of testaments; and the claimant, who was excluded from the character of heir, accepted with equal pleasure from an indulgent praetor the possession of the goods of his late kinsman or benefactor. In the redress of private wrongs, compensations and fines were substituted to the obsolete rigor of the Twelve Tables; time and space were annihilated by fanciful suppositions; and the plea of youth, or fraud, or violence, annulled the obligation, or excused the performance, of an inconvenient contract.

> https://www.attalus.org/cicero/deoratore1C.html
>
> {44.} [195] "**Though all the world exclaim against me, I will say what I think: that single little book of the Twelve Tables, if any one look to the fountains and sources of laws, seems to me, assuredly, to surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in weight of authority, and in extent of usefulness.**
> …
>
> [197] You will receive also this pleasure and delight from the study of the law, that you will then most readily comprehend how far our ancestors excelled other nations in wisdom, if you compare our laws with those of their Lycurgus, Dracon, and Solon. **It is indeed incredible how undigested and almost ridiculous is all civil law, except our own; on which subject I am accustomed to say much in my daily conversation, when I am praising the wisdom of our countrymen above that of all other men, and especially of the Greeks.** For these reasons have I declared, Scaevola, that the knowledge of the civil law is indispensable to those who would become accomplished orators.

…

It was reserved for the curiosity and learning of Adrian, to accomplish the design which had been conceived by the genius of Caesar; and the praetorship of Salvius Julian, an eminent lawyer, was immortalized by the composition of the PERPETUAL EDICT. This well-digested code was ratified by the emperor and the senate; **the long divorce of law and equity was at length reconciled; and, instead of the Twelve Tables, the Perpetual Edict was fixed as the invariable standard of civil jurisprudence.** (35)

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n337/mode/2up?view=theater

Why did the old jurisprudence practice such rigors in applying the Law of the Twelve Tables? **Why did the middle jurisprudence, by the edicts of the praetors, begin to exercise a benignity of reason while still respecting that Law? Why did the new jurisprudence, without even a pretense of regard for that Law, adopt the generous profession of natural equity?**

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n547/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Has he forgotten how strongly the sect enforced the study of morality and of virtue in the first degrees, and how carefully it isolated both from religion?** When pouring forth its encomium on religion, did not the Sect insinuate, that true Religion widely differed from those mysteries and worship which had degenerated in the hands of the priesthood? **Does he**

> **remember with what art and affected respect it spoke of Christ and his Gospel in the degrees of *Major Illuminee*, of *Scotch Knight*, and of *Epopt*; how the Gospel was insensibly metamorphosed into illuminized reason, its morality into that of Nature;** and from a moral, reasonable, and natural religion, how a religion and a morality of the rights of man, of *Equality* and *Liberty*, were deduced?

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n359/mode/2up?view=theater

The Roman plebs, like the Athenian, passed new laws every day for particular occasions, because it was incapable of universals. Sulla, leader of the nobles, when he had defeated Marius, leader of the plebs, repaired the disorder somewhat with the *quaestiones perpetuae* or permanent courts, but, once he had resigned the dictatorship, particular laws began to multiply again no less than before, as Tacitus relates. And, as political writers point out, there is no readier way to arrive at monarchy than through such a multitude of laws. Hence Augustus, for the purpose of establishing it, enacted a, great number of them, and succeeding emperors used the senate above all to issue *senatusconsulta* in the field of private law. Nevertheless, even in these times of popular liberty, the formulae for actions were so strictly guarded that it took all the eloquence of Crassus (whom Cicero called the Roman Demosthenes) to get an expressed pupillary substitution interpreted as containing an unexpressed vulgar or common substitution; and it took all Cicero's eloquence to prevent Sextus Aebutius from keeping a farm of Aulus Caecina's because of the omission of a "d" from the formula. **Finally things reached such a point, when Constantine had done away entirely with the formulae, that every particular motive of equity prevailed over the laws;** so willing are human minds under human governments to recognize natural equity.
…

1003 The Roman gravity and wisdom is much to be admired in this: that, **in these constitutional changes, the praetors and the jurisconsults put forth every effort to insure that the words of the Law of the Twelve Tables should be shifted from their original and proper meanings as little and as slowly as possible.** Perhaps it was principally for this reason that the Roman Empire grew so great and endured so long; for in its changes of constitution it made every effort to stand firm by its principles, which were the same as those of this world of nations, and all political theorists agree that there is no better policy for making a state endure and grow great. Thus the cause which produced among the Romans the wisest jurisprudence in the world (of which we have spoken above) is the same that made the Roman Empire the greatest in the world. **And it is the cause of the Roman greatness which Polybius, in too general a sense, attributes to the religion of the nobles; Machiavelli, on the contrary, to the magnanimity of the plebs; and Plutarch, envious of Roman virtue and wisdom, to their good fortune; this last in his book *De fortuna romanorum*, to which, in other and more indirect ways [than ours], Tasso gave answer in his noble *Risposta*.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n347/mode/2up?view=theater

978 The third was that of civil or modest times, **the times of the natural law of nations, which Ulpian, adding the specific epithet human, calls *Jus naturale gentium humanarum*.** Hence the Latin writers under the emperors call the duty of subjects *officium civile*, and every offense against natural equity in the interpretation of the laws is called *incivile*. It is the last sect of times in Roman jurisprudence, beginning with the time of popular liberty. Hence the praetors, to accommodate the laws to the Roman nature, customs and government, which had now suffered change, had first of all to soften the severity and temper the rigidity of the Law of the Twelve Tables, which had been decreed when it was natural in the heroic times of Rome. **And later the emperors had to remove all the veils in which the praetors had cloaked it and reveal natural equity in all the openness and generosity which was appropriate to the gentleness to which the nations had become accustomed.**

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater

Commerce being small at this time and the world moving but slowly, the XII Tables took cognizance of but few juristic acts and these principally relating to land, the chief property of citizens. **After the XII Tables were enacted their contents were worked out for over 300 years by a process of interpretation.**

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n93/mode/2up?view=theater

Under the Republic the praetorian law as well as the jus civile had grown up and was tinkered for improvement through empirical and administrative methods,—through procedure. But the law of the Empire is characterized by the *belief that law is founded upon ethics.* After the conquest of Greece in 146 B.C. Roman thought began to be influenced by Greek culture and philosophy. The Stoic philosophy in particular appealed to the more intelligent Romans of the Later Republic. Cicero accepted the tenets of this philosophy. And from Cicero to Alexander Severus the ethical principles of Stoic philosophy played a prominent part in Roman education and culture.

https://archive.org/details/treatisescicero00ciceuoft/page/404/mode/2up?view=theater

Marcus.—And you are quite right. For, take my word for it, in no kind of discussion can it be more advantageously displayed how much has been bestowed upon man by nature, and how great a capacity for the noblest enterprises is implanted in the mind of man, for the sake of cultivating and perfecting which we were born and sent into the world, and what beautiful association, what natural fellowship, binds men together by reciprocal charities: and when we have explained these grand and universal principles of morals, then the true fountain of laws and rights can be discovered.

Atticus.—**In your opinion, then, it is not in the edict of the magistrate, as the majority of our modern lawyers pretend, [ut plerique nunc] nor in the Twelve Tables, as the ancients maintained, [ut superiores] but in the sublimest doctrines of philosophy, that we must seek the true source and obligation of jurisprudence.**

Marcus.—For in this discussion of ours, my Atticus, we are not inquiring how we may take proper caution in law, or what we are to answer in each consultation,—that may indeed be an important affair, as in truth it is; and at one time it was supported by many great men, and is at present expounded by one most eminent lawyer [Servius Sulpicius Rufus] with admirable ability and skill. But the whole subject of universal law at jurisprudence must be comprehended in this discussion, in order that this which we call civil law, may be confined in some one small and narrow space of nature.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law#Stoic_natural_law

As the English historian A.J. Carlyle (1861-1943) notes:

> **There is no change in political theory so startling in its completeness as the change from the theory of Aristotle to the later philosophical view represented by Cicero and Seneca ... We think that this cannot be better exemplified than with regard to the theory of the equality of human nature."**[22]

Charles H. McIlwain likewise observes that "the idea of the equality of men is the most profound contribution of the Stoics to political thought" **and that "its greatest influence is in the changed conception of law that in part resulted from it.**[23]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ls9ZDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

McCoy admits an exception here for late Stoicism, which does value the political virtues, but in a way that elevates them over the speculative. **This led to a kind of proto-humanism according to which, contrary to Aristotle's view, man was really the best thing in the universe.** The one positive contribution of this era came from the Stoic understanding of natural law combined with the substance of Roman civil law, **but the full development of these ideas had to await their recontextualization by a Christian political theology that had also reappropriated Aristotle.** As in the case of Plato, McCoy's views here are very different from those of Strauss, at least with respect to the one Hellenistic movement of thought about which Strauss wrote, Lucretius's Epicureanism.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#ChriWrit

The tradition of theories of natural law in ethics seems to stem directly from Stoicism. (Compare Cicero, *de Legibus* I, 18 with later writers like Aquinas in *Summa Theologica* II, 2, q. 94.) Augustine chose to follow the Stoics rather than the Platonists (his usual allies among the philosophers) on a number of points, including on the question of animals' membership in the moral community (*City of God* 1.20) and in his philosophy of language.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TTYAGD7aKBkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA37#v=onepage&q&f=false

As applied to social theory, a subject with which Thomas did not concern himself greatly, Aristotelian philosophy worked against and largely undermined the individualist and equalitarian flavor of Stoic thought.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TTYAGD7aKBkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Stoics saw a correspondence between the rationality of the universe and the rationality of the individual: the individual *qua* individual, following the promptings of reason, possessed the capacity to acquire the virtues inherent in the nature of things and to bring them to bear on social life. **The difference between this mode of thought and that of Plato and Aristotle could not be more complete. In Stoic thought, individuals exist in their own right and are equal to one another in fundamental ways.** Society is no longer thought of as prior to the individual and as the source of reason and virtue. Thinkers no longer assumed that they were searching for the institutional system that could develop humans drawn by their nature to truth and goodness. **Before society is the individual, while**

beyond it is the law of nature, the objective standard of justice and morality by which human beings can judge the shortcomings of their society as well as their own behavior. In short, the Stoics spoke of human beings and not of citizens. By proclaiming an individualistic universalism, in which the source of norms lay outside society, they effectively bypassed the tight, hierarchic communalism that had been the main tradition in Greek thought.

The Stoic belief in universal standards of right and wrong accessible to the individual mind could pose dangers for Rome, or for that matter any social system and political regime. To say that a law of nature exists beyond the shortfalls of historical existence could rally people to demand drastic improvements in social life. Despite the potentially revolutionary import of Stoicism, its distinction between the law of nature and the law of society did not create social tension or inspire revolution.
…

Essentially, Stoicism consisted of vague universalistic abstractions that perfectly complemented the power structure of an expansionist society. Stoic universalism, like the rise of universalistic symbols in the great agrarian empires, was a formalistic mask for a power structure, which, unable to overcome its contradictions and deficiencies, resorted to word magic. (The wide use of universalisms in the modern period to mask incompetence, especially in the United States, is analyzed in due course.)

The natural law assumption that there are objective standards of right and wrong that human reason can discern and (presumably) act on became a favorite of various elites besides those of ancient Rome. **In one form or another, the same doctrine is found among feudal and liberal elites. The reason is obvious: the doctrine of natural law and the idea of objectivity in belief and morals shifts the explanation of behavior and the origins and maintenance of right and wrong from social institutions (power groups) and places it on abstract human nature and the abstract individual. With the waning of natural law in the nineteenth century, the same ideological function would be performed by the concept of objectivity and value neutrality in natural and social science.**

> https://creation.com/marxism-law-and-evolution
>
> Marx's ideas about law were expressed mainly in the *Communist Manifesto*, which he published in collaboration with his friend Friedrich Engels in 1848. **In that paper Marx contends that "law, morality, religion, are so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests." Then he goes on to criticise the whole tradition of government under the rule of law as nothing more than a mere expression of "bourgeois" aspirations:**
>
> > "Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, **just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all;** a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic conditions of existence of your class. The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you."[28]

…

Rome continued the Greek ideal of a self-governing community, an ideal opposed both to arbitrary, personal rule and to localism (the feudal tendency to dissolve society into private, particular interests). Second, Rome developed a body of codified law from the practices of its diverse people and its experiences in dealing with them. **Under the Stoic assumption of a right reason pervading the universe, the Romans selected legal norms and practices that seemed fair and sensible, that protected dependents, and that stressed intent rather than empty formalities.**

https://archive.org/details/unknowngodorins00bracgoog/page/n179/mode/2up?view=theater

Except in one direction, which we have mentioned, Stoicism did not leave any profound influence on society. **It is doubtful if the masses knew anything about it.** The leaders themselves were often priggish, inconsistent, only superficially noble, and sometimes full of inflated pride. They were never in touch with common people. **But on the Roman lawyers the Stoical theories and ideals had an abiding influence and power. They colored the whole system of Roman International Law, and through that have reached all modern States, and have affected political progress for eighteen centuries.**

> https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Besides, Taoism possesses, as an heirloom from classical antiquity, a worship of a selection of historical, semi-historical and fabulous national forefathers, which corresponds entirely to the ancient ancestor-worship, the keystone of Confucianism itself. It is true that the Classics are silent

concerning almost all these deified ancestors, **and that on this ground many pedantic disciples of Confucius profess a haughty disdain for them, until such time as they fancy they need their help and assistance, when they worship them and invoke them as any unlearned human being does. However, to condemn as heretical the old heathen religion merely on that ground, could only be done by an ultra-extremism, an extremism rather too strong for the majority of Confucianists. Not so, however, for the highest power in the State.** We shall see from the second article of the Law against Heresy, reproduced in Chapter IV, that this power during the last six or seven centuries has fully authorised its mandarins to persecute all such native heathenism, and let their blows fall upon the worshippers of its gods, in season and out of season.

https://archive.org/details/hindumannerscust1906dubo/page/288/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus it happens that the prime ministers of Asiatic princes are almost always Brahmins. Shut up in their palaces, and plunged in voluptuous idleness, the nominal rulers rarely give a thought to anything beyond the means of increasing their enjoyments, creating fresh amusements, and giving new zest to their passions by ever-varying means. The welfare of their people and the government of their country are very secondary considerations, if not matters of indifference. Women, baths, perfumes, obscene dances, filthy songs, each in turn excite their senses.
…

The Mahomedan rulers generally make a Brahmin their secretary of state, through whose hands all the state correspondence must pass. Brahmins also frequently fill the positions of secretaries and writers to the governors of provinces and districts. Generally speaking, the Mahomedans of India are so ignorant of the first principles of public administration and so utterly unacquainted with the simplest rules of arithmetic, that they are obliged to have recourse to the Brahmins for everything that requires enlightenment and knowledge.
…

The Brahmins have also been clever enough to work their way into favour with the great European Power that now governs India. **They occupy the highest and most lucrative posts in the different administrative boards and Government offices, as well as in the judicial courts of the various districts.** In fact there is no branch of public administration in which they have not made themselves indispensable. Thus it is nearly always Brahmins who hold the posts of sub-collectors of revenue, writers, copyists, translators, treasurers, book-keepers, &c.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm#INTRODUCTION

The mob, it must be obvious, was very little shaken; even to this day it has not put off its belief in the essential Christian doctrines. But the *intelligentsia*, by 1885, had been pretty well convinced.
…

Such notions, still almost universally prevalent in Christendom a century before, were now confined to the great body of ignorant and credulous men—that is, to ninety-five or ninety-six percent of the race. For a man of the superior minority to subscribe to one of them publicly was already sufficient to set him off as one in imminent need of psychiatrical attention.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n47/mode/2up?view=theater

This commission, under the presidency of a resolute reactionary, Appius Claudius, transformed the old customary law of Rome into the famous Twelve Tables, submitted them to the Assembly (which passed them with some changes), and displayed them in the Forum for all who would—and could—to read. **This seemingly trivial event was epochal in Roman history and in the history of mankind; it was the first written form of that legal structure which was to be Rome's most signal achievement and her greatest contribution to civilization.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0054%3Abook%3D6%3Acard%3D801

"Let others melt and mould the breathing bronze
To forms more fair,—aye! out of marble bring
Features that live; let them plead causes well;
Or trace with pointed wand the cycled heaven,
And hail the constellations as they rise;
But thou, O Roman, learn with sovereign sway
To rule the nations. Thy great art shall be
To keep the world in lasting peace, to spare

> **humbled foe, and crush to earth the proud.**"

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n451/mode/2up?view=theater

It was a happy accident that while the chaos of barbarian invasion was mutilating the legal heritage in the West, the *Code, Digest,* and *Institutes* of Justinian were collected and formulated in Constantinople, in the comparative security and continuity of the Empire in the East.
...

English law itself, the only legal edifice of comparable scope, took its rules of equity, admiralty, guardianship, and bequests from Roman canon law. **Greek science and philosophy, Judeo-Greek Christianity, Greco-Roman democracy, Roman law—these are our supreme inheritance from the ancient world.**

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n279/mode/2up?view=theater

Napoleon was in blood and instinct a real successor of the Caesars; **only just before he put an end to the Roman Empire of the West**178 **revived by Charlemagne 1000 years earlier,**179 Napoleon remodeled Roman-French jurisprudence **and published the first great code of modern Roman law promulgated since Justinian's 6th century Corpus Juris. By this act the grip of Roman law upon the modern world was forever fastened.**

http://www.cambaceres.org/vie-poli/code-civ/cod-civi.htm

"My true glory is not to have gained forty battles; Waterloo will erase the memory of so many victories; what nothing will erase, what will live eternally, my Civil law..." (Napoleon Bonaparte, Saint-Helen's memorial)

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n47/mode/2up?view=theater

"Rome," says Ihering, "conquered the world three times: first by her armies, second by her religion, third by her law. This third conquest, most pacific of all, is perhaps the most surpassing of all."3 A work of judicial conquest has already been completed, the magnitude of which is most amazing. The modern domains of Roman law extend far beyond the vast empire of the Caesars.
...

All the countries of the world save China, and eventually China will be included, have now come under the rule of the Roman laws framed in the Eternal City and codified by Justinian. **All this reveals the eternal character of Roman law, which, firmly retaining the world it has conquered, changes merely its dress with the passing centuries. "The conquest of the world by the Roman Empire has passed away, but the conquest of the world by Roman law has not passed away and there is no sign that it will pass away so long as mankind endures. It rules to-day a wider empire than the Caesars ever knew, and its empire is ever widening."**6

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n437/mode/2up?view=theater

> * **This chapter will be of no use to lawyers, and of no interest to others.**

https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2012/11/the-owl-of-minerva-spreads-its-wings-at-dusk.html

National decline is not just grist for the philosopher's mill, however, it is also perhaps a condition of understanding as Hegel suggests in the penultimate paragraph of the preface to *The Philosophy of Right*:

> When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. **The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at the falling of the dusk.**

Daughter of Jupiter, Minerva in the mythology of the Greeks is the goddess of wisdom. And the nocturnal owl is one of its ancient symbols. **The meaning of the Hegelian trope is that understanding, insight, wisdom arise when the object to be understood has played itself out, when it has actualized and thus exhausted its potentialities, and now faces only decline.**
...

The allusion is to Goethe's *Faust* wherein Mephisto says

> *Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,*
> *Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum.*

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Éminence_grise

> https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/27/archives/stalin-the-man-and-his-era-by-adam-b-ulam-760-pp-new-york-the.html
>
> **He could boast neither Lenin's immense prestige nor Bukharin's personal charm nor Trotsky's literary and oratorical gifts. To Sukhanov, the perceptive chronicler of the Russian Revolution, he was "a grey blur, which flickered obscurely and left no trace."**

http://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#loss

The books of jurisprudence were interesting to few, and entertaining to none: their value was connected with present use, and they sunk forever as soon as that use was superseded by the innovations of fashion, superior merit, or public authority.

> ***"You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you."***
>
> https://quoteinvestigator.com/2021/08/02/interested-war/
>
> **Burnham doesn't recognize dialectics but dialectics does not permit him to escape from its net.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/68/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In 1750 Duclos noted that "Of all empires, that of the intellectuals – *gens d'esprit* – without being visible, is the most extensive":**3 **a dozen years later, the abbé Voisenon told the *Académie française* in his reception speech that "courtiers have learned to reason, men of letters, to converse. The former have ceased to be bored, the latter, to be bores."**4
>
> https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/77/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The thought wants to be deed; the word wants to be flesh.** And wondrously! A human being, like God in the Bible, has only to express his thought, and the world forms itself; there is light or there is darkness, the water divides itself from the dry land, or wild beasts even appear.139 The world is the word's signature.139
>
> > 139. Signature (*Signatur* in German) is a term taken from the tradition of nature mysticism, referring to hidden correspondences between different realms of nature, for example, the inner and the outer.
>
> **Take note of this, you proud men of deeds. You are nothing but the unconscious servants of those men of thought, who, often in modest silence, have plotted out all of your doings in advance.** Maximilian Robespierre was nothing but the hand of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the bloody hand, which, from the womb of his time, pulled out a body for the soul which Rousseau made.
>
> https://harpers.org/2010/11/keynes-the-unseen-power-of-political-ideas/
>
> The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. **Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.** I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.—John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, ch. 24, p. 383 (1935)

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n165/mode/2up?view=theater

Cicero listened eagerly to the trials and debates in the Forum, and rapidly learned the arts and tricks of forensic speech. **"To succeed in the law," he said, "a man must renounce all pleasures, avoid all amusements, say farewell to recreation, games, entertainment, almost to intercourse with his friends."**[36]

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n83/mode/2up?view=theater

(§ 53) As to Cicero,28 the best opinion is that, although the greatest advocate ever called to the Roman Bar, **he was not a great lawyer in the sense of being a jurist.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DMur.%3Achapter%3D10%3Asection%3D23

[23] **And since you seem to me to embrace that knowledge of the law which you have, as if it were a darling daughter, I will not permit you to lie, under such a mistake as to think that whatever it may be, which you have so thoroughly learnt anything very preeminent.** For your other virtues of continence, of gravity, of justice, of good faith, and all other good qualities, I have always considered you very worthy of the consulship and of all honour; **but as for your having learnt civil law, I will not say you have wasted your pains, but I will say that there is no way made to lead to the consulship by that profession;** for all arts which can conciliate for us the good-will of the Roman people ought to possess both an admirable dignity, and a very delightful utility.

11. [24] The highest dignity is in those men who excel in military glory. For all things which are in the empire and in the constitution of the state, are supposed to be defended and strengthened by them. There is also the greatest usefulness in them, since it is by their wisdom and their danger that we can enjoy both the republic and also our own private possessions. The power of eloquence also is no doubt valuable and full of dignity, and it has often been of influence in the election of a consul to be able by wisdom and oratory to sway the minds of the senate and the people, and those who decide on affair. A consul is required who may be able sometimes to repress the madness of the tribunes, who may be able to bend the excited populace, who may resist corruption. It is not strange, if, on account of this faculty, even men who were not nobly born have often obtained the consulship; especially when this same quality procures a man great gratitude, and the firmest friendship, and the greatest zeal in his behalf; **but! of all this there is nothing, O Sulpicius, in your profession.**
...

[25] **First of all, what dignity can there be in so limited a science? For they are but small matters, conversant chiefly about single letters and punctuation between words. Secondly, if in the time of our ancestors there was any inclination to marvel at that study of yours, now that all your mysteries are revealed, it is wholly despised and disregarded.** At one time few men knew whether a thing might be lawfully done or not; for men ordinarily had no records; those were possessed of great power who were consulted, so that even days for consultation were begged of them beforehand, as from the Chaldean astrologers. A certain notary was found, by name Cnaeus Flavius, who could deceive[1] the most wary, and who set the people records to be learnt by heart each day, and who pilfered their own learning from the profoundest lawyers.
...

And while all this was made a mystery of, they who had the key to the mystery were necessarily sought after by men; but as soon as these things were revealed, and were bandied about and sifted in men's hands, **they were found to be thoroughly destitute of wisdom, but very full of fraud and folly.**
...

[28] **Therefore, as I said before, the dignity of a consul has never been consistent with that science; being one consisting wholly of fictitious and imaginary formulas.**
...

Just as men say, when talking of Greek practitioners, that those men are flute-players who cannot become harp-players, so we see some men, who have not been able to make orators, turn to the study of the law. There is great labour in the practice of oratory. It is an important business, one of great dignity, and of most exceeding influence. **In truth, from you lawyers men seek some degree or advantage; but from those who are orators they seek actual safety. In the next place, your replies and your decisions are constantly overturned by eloquence, and cannot be made firm except by the advocacy of the orator;** in which if I had made any great proficiency myself; I should be more sparing while speaking in its praise; but at present I am saying nothing about myself; but only about those men who either are or have been great in oratory.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D65

Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our[3] ancestors was the high respect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the excellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times **the foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in their own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed along with offices of honour and positions of dignity; [nunc, ut honores, ut omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius scientiae splendor deletus est]** and this is the more deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a man[4] who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his predecessors, while in honour he is their peer.
...

[66] Closely connected with this profession, furthermore,[1] is **the gift of eloquence; [dicendi] it is at once more popular and more distinguished.** For what is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has protected? **It was to eloquence, therefore, that our fathers assigned the foremost rank among the civil professions. [toga dignitatis]**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D76

For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, though a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater service to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same time by Publius Nasica, **though not then clothed with official authority, [privatus]** by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong wholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war also, since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that, **executed as a political measure [gestum consilio urbano]** without the help of an army.

[77] The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against[1] which, I am told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail:

> **"Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises,[2] ye laurels."[3] [Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi.]**

Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I was at the helm of state?

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#authority

But these interpreters could neither enact nor execute the laws of the republic; and the judges might disregard the authority of the Scaevolas themselves, which was often overthrown by the eloquence or sophistry of an ingenious pleader. (60) **Augustus and Tiberius were the first to adopt, as a useful engine, the science of the civilians;** and their servile labors accommodated the old system to the spirit and views of despotism.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dialogue_on_Orators#I

You often ask me, Justus Fabius, how it is that while the genius and the fame of so many distinguished orators have shed a lustre on the past, **our age is so forlorn and so destitute of the glory of eloquence that it scarce retains the very name of orator. That title indeed we apply only to the ancients, and the clever speakers of this day we call pleaders, [causidici] advocates, counsellors, [patroni] anything rather than orators.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dialogue_on_Orators#XXXVI

In each case the state was torn asunder, but the eloquence of the age was exercised, and, as it seemed, was loaded with great rewards. **For the more powerful a man was as a speaker, the more easily did he obtain office, the more decisively superior was he to his colleagues in office, the more influence did he acquire with the leaders of the state, the more weight in the senate, the more notoriety and fame with the people.** Such men had a host of clients, even among foreign nations; the magistrates, when leaving Rome for the provinces, showed them respect, and courted their favour as soon as they returned. The prætorship and the consulship seemed to offer themselves to them, and even when they were out of office, they were not out of power, for they swayed both people and senate with their counsels and influence. **Indeed, they had quite convinced themselves that without eloquence no one could win or retain a distinguished and eminent position in the state.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dialogue_on_Orators#XL

No; the great and famous eloquence of old is the nursling of the licence which fools called freedom; it is the companion of sedition, the stimulant of an unruly people, a stranger to obedience and subjection, a defiant, reckless, presumptuous thing which does not show itself in a well-governed state.
…

So too our own state, while it went astray and wore out its strength in factious strife and discord, **with neither peace in the forum, unity in the senate, order in the courts, respect for merit, or seemly behaviour in the magistrates,** produced beyond all question a more vigorous eloquence, just as an untilled field yields certain herbage in special plenty. **Still the eloquence of the Gracchi was not an equivalent to Rome for having to endure their legislation, and Cicero's fame as an orator was a poor compensation for the death he died.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6kVLH5gGZVYC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA256#v=onepage&q&f=false

> As J.P. Sullivan comments, **"Under the Empire political conditions reduced the importance of oratory tremendously";** see his notes on Petronius, *The Satyricon and The Fragments* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1969), 182.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=o-Y7AAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

And when first-class oratory had come to an end, some of the greatest names in the whole of ancient civilization were still to occur; and they were the names of lawyers.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n437/mode/2up?view=theater

Amid the turmoil of the Gracchan and Marian revolution Publius Mucius Scaevola (consul, 133 B.C.) and his son Quintus (consul, 95 B.C.) labored to reduce the laws of Rome to an intelligible system. Cicero, pupil of another Quintus Mucius Scaevola (consul, 117 B.C.), wrote eloquently on the philosophy of law, **and constructed an ideal code designed to preserve the fortune that he had gained and the faith that he had lost.**
...

Not till the Principate had established itself, first by the use of force and then by the force of use, **could the new legislation win acceptance in the minds of men as well as in the courts of power. To the second and third centuries of our era belongs the honor of giving Roman law its final formulation in the West**—an achievement comparable to the formulation of science and philosophy in Greece.

Here, too, Caesar had set the goal; but the actual work did not begin till Hadrian (A.D. 117). **This best educated of the emperors gathered about him a corps of jurists as his Privy Council, and commissioned them to replace the variable annual edicts of the praetors with a Perpetual Edict to be observed by all future judges in Italy.** The Greeks had produced since Solon no masterpiece of jurisprudence, and never a codified system of law; but the Greek cities of Asia and Italy had developed excellent municipal codes. The much-traveled Hadrian knew these cities well and was perhaps inspired by their constitutions to improve and co-ordinate the laws of Rome. Under his successors, the Antonines, the work of codification continued, **and the half-official repute enjoyed by the Stoic philosophy permitted a profound Greek influence upon Roman law.** The Stoics declared that law should accord with morality, and that guilt lay in the intention of the deed, not in the results. Antoninus, a product of the Stoic school, decreed that cases of doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused, and that a man should be held innocent until proved guilty[1]—two supreme principles of civilized law.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n691/mode/2up?view=theater

Papinian, Paulus, and Ulpian, the culminating trio of Roman law, all rose to power under Septimius Severus; **all, as prefects of the Praetorian Guard, were the prime ministers of the realm;** and all justified absolute monarchy on the ground that the people had delegated their sovereignty to the emperor.

---

https://archive.org/details/orientalreligio00cumogoog/page/n36/mode/2up?view=theater

At the beginning of the imperial régime Rome ruled the world but did not govern it. She kept the number of her functionaries down to a minimum, **her provinces were mere unorganized aggregates of cities where she only exercised police power, protectorates rather than annexed countries.**[4]

> 4. See Cicero's statement regarding the ancient Roman dominion (*De off.*, II, 8): "Illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari."

As long as law and order were maintained and her citizens, functionaries and merchants could transact their business, Rome was satisfied. She saved herself the trouble of looking after the public service by leaving broad authority to the cities that had existed before her domination, or had been modeled after her. The taxes were levied by syndicates of bankers and the public lands rented out. **Before the reforms instituted by Augustus, even the army was not an organic and permanent force, but consisted theoretically of troops levied before a war and discharged after victory.**
...

What do we find three centuries later? **A strongly centralized state in which an absolute ruler, worshiped like a god and surrounded by a large court, commanded a whole hierarchy of functionaries; cities divested of their local liberties and ruled by an omnipotent bureaucracy, the old capital herself the first to be dispossessed of her autonomy and subjected to prefects.** Outside of the cities the monarch, whose private fortune was identical with the state finances, possessed immense domains **managed by intendants and supporting a population of serf-colonists.** The army was composed largely of foreign mercenaries, professional soldiers whose pay or bounty consisted of lands on which they settled. **All these features and many others caused the Roman empire to assume the likeness of ancient Oriental monarchies.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4TKC6ACbOrEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

An increasing differentation between the elite and and the others in their social world was occurring in this period, and this dichotomy was in the process of being fixed in the Roman legal code through the juridical dichotomy between the *humiliores* and *honestiores*, the “more humble” and the “more honourable.”6 **The latter designation encompassed Roman senators, knights, and municipal decurions from the provinces, as well as military veterans. Thus, with the**

possible exception of veterans, it was reserved for empire's wealthy and prominent individuals.
...

Walter Scheidel points out that the *humiliores/honestiores* binary did not strictly correlate with economic worth. Wealth could not have been completely monopolized by the *honestiores*, who, he argues, would have accounted for only about 1 percent of the imperial population. **In Scheidel's words, "In the eyes of the government, the other 99 percent of the population may have been 'humble,' but they can hardly all have been of modest means"** (2006: 42). Scheidel proposes that a larger group must have occupied the economic midrange than is usually envisioned in historical discussion.8 He states, **"It is perfectly possible to reconcile the dominance of a disproportionately affluent elite with the presence of a substantial 'middle'"** (2006: 54). Scheidel makes a persuasive case for envisioning a substantial group of people with economic means who were not *honestiores*. **As all dichotomizing binaries are, the *humiliores/honestiores* division would have been porous, and its primary use was in the sphere of criminal law.**
...

Scheidel offers a definition that underscores the connection between the *honestiores* and the mechanics of empire: **"*Honestior* was perhaps not so much a legal as a functional category that lumped together the (free-born) agents of the imperial center"** (2006: 43). Scheidel's point that it is "absurd" to classify all *humiliores* among the lower classes is important, but perhaps it is even more important to note that **the state was categorizing all persons who were not its "agents,"** usually its wealthy, even "disproportionately affluent" agents (senators, knights, municipal leaders), **as *humiliores*, as "humble," as *tenuores*, persons having less presence in society.**
...

Neither a rich freed man nor a wealthy trader nor a poor free citizen (except a poor veteran) would qualify among the *honestiores*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=a99zdvANyGkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q&f=false

The foundations on which Augustus had built – the Roman senate, the Italian citizen class, and the city states of the provinces – had all of them lost their strength. There remained only the imperial government and the imperial army, and, accordingly, the work of restoration had to be carried out from above by a bureaucratic organisation of the most absolute kind.
...

Thus the Roman emperors stepped into the place of the Ptolemies and the Pharaohs and took over the control of a society that embodied the most complete system of state socialism that the ancient world had known. "In direct opposition to the structure of of economic life in Greece and Italy," writes Professor Rostovtzeff, "the whole economic organization of Egypt was built up on the principle of centralization and control by the Government, as well as the nationalization of all production in agricultural and industrial life. Everything was for the State and through the State, nothing for the individual. ... **Nowhere in the whole evolution of mankind can be found so far reaching and so systematic limitations as those that applied to private property in Ptolemaic Egypt.**"6

The social and economic history of the later Empire is the history of the extension to the rest of the provinces of the main principles of this Egyptian Hellenistic system. The administration of the vast imperial estates, the development of the official hierarchy, the régime of tribute in kind and of forced services, above all the fixation of status in the hereditary guilds, and the binding of the cultivator to his holding and and the craftsman and the trader to his calling, were already fully developed institutions in Egypt centuries before they came to be applied to the rest of the Empire. **The system of compulsory state services – *liturgies* or *munera* – was, however, common to the Hellenistic East, and it had begun to make its influence felt in the West as early as the second century.** What Diocletian did, therefore, was not to introduce a new principle, but to make these oriental institutions an essential part of the imperial system. **The old institutions of the city state, which rested on private property and a privileged citizen class, had become an anachronism, and in their place arose a bureaucratic unitary state based on the principle of universal service.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Women_of_the_Caesars/The_sisters_of_Caligula_and_the_marriage_of_Messalina
>
> For instance, **we know that all his servants were Egyptians, and that Helicon, his most faithful and influential freedman, was an Alexandrian.** But shortly after his elevation this

admiration for the land of the Ptolemies and the Pharaohs broke forth into a furor of Egyptian exoticism, which impelled him to an attempt to bring his own reign into connection with the policies of his great-grandfather Mark Antony.
…

In the madness of Caligula, as in the story of Antony and the tragedy of Tiberius, there is forever recurring, under a new form, the great struggle between Italy and the East, between Rome and Alexandria, which can never be divorced from the history of the last century of the republic and the first century of the empire. Whoever carefully sifts out the separate actions in the disordered conduct of the third Roman emperor will easily rediscover the thread of this idea and the trace of this latent conflict. For instance, we see the new emperor scarcely elected before he introduced the worship of Isis among the official cults of the Roman state and assigned in the calendar a public festival to Isis. **In short, he was favoring those Egyptian cults which Tiberius, with his "old-Roman" sympathies, had fiercely combatted. Furthermore**, **we see Caligula prohibiting the festival in commemoration of the battle of Actium, which had been celebrated every year for more than half a century.** At first sight the idea seems absurd; but it must not be considered a caprice; for with this act Caligula was intending to initiate the historical rehabilitation of Mark Antony, the man who had tried to shift the center of Roman politics from Rome to Alexandria. **The emperor meant to make plain to Rome that she was no longer to boast of having humiliated Alexandria with arms, since Alexandria would henceforth be taken as a model in all things.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/3/9*.html#ref27

But as the power of the Emperors grew, and as the forms of popular government by assemblies of the citizens at Rome faded into insignificance, the diversities of privilege between the various cities of the Empire faded also.
…

Thus, **during these early centuries of the Empire, the local government of the towns was both in name and in fact republican.** We need only recur to some familiar examples in the Acts of the Apostles, to understand how these municipal liberties existed side by side with the great machine of the Imperial administration, independent in their own sphere, yet trembling lest by any unauthorised proceeding they should be brought within its far-reaching and heavy stroke.
…

The first two centuries and a half of the Empire may be perhaps considered as the golden age of the *municipia*, and the large amount of prosperity and happiness thus secured to the middle classes of society was probably the chief cause of the admitted success of the Imperial administration during the greater part of that period.
…

This last and fatal phase in the history of the municipalities was probably, in great measure, the result of the remodelling of the Empire by Diocletian.29 That great statesman saw that some change was needed if the Empire was not to be rent asunder by the hands of its own children. The changes which he accordingly introduced have been already briefly described.30 **These changes answered their immediate purpose. The Roman Empire was held together for another century and a half, but it gained life at the cost of the means of living.** According to the old fable,31 Phaethon, when entrusted with the chariot of the Sun-god, drove it too near to the earth and began rapidly to dry up all the pools and fountains of waters. **Even so now, the Imperial Majesty, of which flatterers had made a kind of god upon earth, appearing in all the vigour of its new administrative powers close to every portion of the Empire, began at once to dry up many a reservoir of wealth which had escaped the rapacity of former Emperors.**
…

The *Curiae*, which had once been honoured and envied communities, easily bearing the weight of their public duties, and dispensing comfort and happiness to the district round them, were now mere gaols in which the middle classes were shut up from birth till death, to toil for the Imperial Treasury. The dignity of decurion, or *curialis* as he was now often called, was no longer bestowed on the most worthy by the suffrages of his fellow-citizens. It was a charge descending from the father to the son, which the son, however anxious to be freed from it, could not renounce.34 The longest 'title' (as it is called) in the Theodosian Code, is that which contains the 188 laws, passed during 150 years, concerning the rights and duties of the Decurions. **Of their rights perhaps eight laws speak, of their duties the remaining 180, and that in tones of inflexible severity.**
…

The prohibition went further: they were forbidden to take any kind of journey, lest they should defraud the Curia of their services, and for the same reason they were forbidden to leave the cities and take up their residence in the country.38 **That free circulation of the citizens, which makes the life of modern states, was a crime in the eyes of the Imperial legislator, because it interfered with the machinery of fiscal extortion.**
…

It might have been thought that when every Teutonic and Scythian nationality from the Caspian to the Scheldt was pouring down upon the Empire, when the Romans were

> 'Ringed around with barking dogs of war,'40

the mustering of men for the battle-field would have been an object of primary importance with their rulers, and that if an oppressive conscription were not resorted to, at least every volunteer would be eagerly welcomed. **By no means: the maintenance of the Curia, as a taxing-machine in a state of efficiency, was the first consideration, for upon this depended the splendour of the Imperial household, and the rapid fortunes of Prefects and Counts.**
…

Besides the Church and the Army another career, if he only could succeed in entering it, seemed to promise to the aspiring Curial an exemption from the crushing load of municipal liability. This was service in the vast Imperial households, for the *Palatinus* of whatever rank was not only entitled, as has been already seen, to share in the corn-largesses; **he was also, as the servant of the Emperor, free from 'mancipation' to any other master.** And in this way, no doubt, many thousands of Decurions managed to evade the onerous obligations of local self-government.
…

2. A more substantial privilege doubtless, though from its nature attainable by few, was the prospect of entering the Senate, and so passing from the class of the oppressed into that of the oppressors.
…

From this general survey of the laws relating to the Decurions it will be seen that we have here a state of things not altogether unlike that which existed in France before the Revolution. A court and *noblesse* above,49 exempt from the heaviest part of the national taxation, and with their hands for ever in the national exchequer: below, a people robbed and spoiled, *taillable et corvéable à merci*, that is, without mercy and without foresight, and consequently some of the most fertile countries in the world brought by the tax-gatherer to the verge of starvation. The difference between the two cases is that **in France *taille* and *corvée* reached down to the very lowest of the people:** in the Roman Empire, the slaves and the 'plebeians' (as the class of freemen who lacked the curial qualification were called) were not shut up in the taxing-pen of the Curia. It was essentially an oppression of the middle classes that was thus carried on; but a century and a half of this steady, persevering tyranny had so ground down the once prosperous and thriving Decurions, that it may be doubted whether they were not, when the Western Empire fell, practically lower than the lowest of the proletariat.
…

In Gaul, in Spain, in Italy, the exhaustion and impoverishment of the middle classes was, in the fifth century, so great that it had become a matter almost of indifference who ruled over them, a grandson of Theodosius, the Suevic Count Ricimer, the Herulian Odovacar, or Theodoric the Ostrogoth. **Their condition could not be worse under the barbarian than under the crushing, organised, relentless tyranny of the Roman bureaucracy.** It might be, and as far as Odovacar and Theodoric were concerned it probably was, better.

> https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/65/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> An important part of such privileges, going as far back as the late Roman Empire, is the creation of a Jewish clerical estate which, exactly like the Christian clergy in medieval times, is *exempt from paying taxes to the sovereign* and is allowed to impose taxes on the people under its control – the Jews – for its own benefit. It is interesting to note that **this deal between the late Roman Empire and the rabbis antedates by at least one hundred years the very similar privileges granted by Constantine the Great and his successors to the Christian clergy.**
>
> From about AD 200 until the early 5th century, the legal position of Jewry in the Roman Empire was as follows. A hereditary Jewish Patriarch (residing in Tiberias in Palestine) was recognised both as a high dignitary in the official hierarchy of the Empire and as supreme chief of all the Jews in the Empire.10 As a Roman official, **the Patriarch was *virillustris*, of the same high official class which included the consuls, the top military commanders of the Empire and the chief ministers around the throne (the Sacred Consistory), and was out-ranked only by the imperial family. In fact, the Illustrious Patriarch (as he is invariably styled in**

> **imperial decrees) out-ranked the provincial governor of Palestine.** Emperor Theodosius I, the Great, a pious and orthodox Christian, executed his governor of Palestine for insulting the Patriarch.
>
> At the same time, all the rabbis – who had to be designated by the Patriarch – were freed from the most oppressive Roman taxes and received many official privileges, **such as exemption from serving on town councils (which was also one of the first privileges later granted to the Christian clergy).** In addition, the Patriarch was empowered to tax the Jews and to discipline them by imposing fines, flogging and other punishments.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=a99zdvANyGkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

In fact it was only in this later period that the social unity of the Empire was completely realised and that men became fully conscious of the universal character of the Roman state. The early Empire outside Italy had been a foreign power imposed from above on a number of conquered societies; its relations were primarily not with the individual but with the subject community. To the ordinary man the *state* was not the Roman Empire but his native city. **It was only in proportion as the imperial bureaucracy encroached on the old city administration that a man's local citizenship became subordinated to his membership of the Empire.**

Thus the decay of the old city constitution was not an unmitigated misfortune, for it was accompanied by a development of imperial citizenship. **The third century, which saw the rise of a centralised bureaucratic state, also saw the extension of Roman citizenship to the provincials and the transformation of Roman law from the possession of a privileged class to the common law of the Empire.** And this development rested not merely on the desire of the central government to increase its control over its subjects; it also had a basis in the social and political ideals of the age. **These ideals already find expression in the writings of Greek men of letters, such as Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides, who were the leaders of that somewhat academic revival of classical culture which characterised the second century A.D.** They saw in the Roman Empire the realisation of the traditional Hellenistic idea of the unity of the civilised world – the *oecumene* – and they held up to the emperors the Stoic ideal of an enlightened monarchy in which the ruler dedicates his life to the service of his subjects and regards government, not as a privilege, but as a duty. Thus the great emperors of the second century, from Trajan to Marcus Aurelius, who laid the foundations of the bureaucratic régime, had no intention of destroying civic liberty. Their ideal was that which was expressed by Marcus Aurelius as "the ideal of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the ideal of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed."7 **And the same ideal inspired the great jurists of the following century, such as Ulpian and Papinian, through whom the humane and enlightened principles of the Antonine period became incorporated in the traditions of later Roman law.**

https://archive.org/details/a589105200kinguoft/page/n79/mode/2up?view=theater

If such were the morals of the Empire, what was its political state? One of complete disorganization. **The only uniting bond left seems to have been that of the bureaucracy, the community of tax-gatherers, who found it on the whole safer and more profitable to pay into the imperial treasury a portion of their plunder, than to keep it all themselves.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA66#v=onepage&q&f=false

The administrative apparatus that Legalist reformers built to replace aristocratic functions was ideally bureaucratic.195 The Roman Empire embarked on a similar enterprise later. These were great achievements. **Bureaucracy is such a fixture of modern states we easily forget that after the fall of the Roman Empire, it reappeared in Europe only in the fifteenth century and matured in the nineteenth.** It cut into the privileges of patrimonial aristocrats, who resisted every step.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.505416/page/n197/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Ever since the days of the *Eupatridae* at Athens and of the patricians at Rome, the exercise of judicial functions, just as much as the bearing of arms, has been a most important duty of every aristocracy. Both military power and judicial functions have for their object the complete protection and security of property, and may lead to the acquirement of new rights. **Therefore in the history of the medieval nobilities quite as much attention should be paid to the great days of assize as to the decisive battles.**
> …
>
> In a work of his, written while he was quite a young man, Count Christopher Niczky (who was afterwards the right hand of Joseph II in his attempt to overthrow the older judicial and

> administrative system of Hungary) **considered the fact, that the nobility studied nothing but law, to be a sign of the backwardness of the nation.**2

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n293/mode/2up?view=theater

Responsible, independent action—the hallmark of every true leader—does not coincide with and is in fact the exact opposite of civil service, in the best sense of the term. The Prussian civil servant was the responsible guardian of the gears of the Prussian state, who saw to it that no cog in the Prussian state's great machinery came to harm—but he was not a leader, let alone capable of setting the gears of the Prussian state into motion on his own accord. **Thus it is no wonder that Prussia produced outstanding civil servants of consummate honesty, but hardly any leaders—leading Prussians were almost always Prussians-by-choice, i.e. born as non-Prussians, then voluntarily becoming Prussians.** Around 1809, the Prussian Minister of the Interior at the time, Count Alexander Dohna, noted with surprise:

> In no other country in Europe are all the qualities necessary for a capable representative as unheard of as in Prussia; on the other hand, in no other country can you find so many excellent people for the details of business.

On the same occasion, Freiherr vom Stein wrote about the Prussian civil service (and thus, incidentally, uttered prophet-like words that were to prove surprisingly true in the years after 1918):

> Our misfortune is that we are governed by bureaucrats who are salaried, academic, disinterested, and landless. This list goes on and on. **These four words: salaried, academic, [buchgelehrt] disinterested, landless [eigentumslos]—embody the spirit [der Geist] of our mindless [geistlosen] government machine.** Whether it rains or shines, whether taxes rise or fall, whether old traditional rights are destroyed or left in place, **whether all peasants are considered merely day laborers, and whether bondage to Jews and usurers is substituted for bondage to the lord of the manor—all this is of no concern to them.** They raise their salaries from the state treasury and write, write, write in their quiet, well-locked offices, raising their children to be equally useful writing machines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomenklatura

Milovan Đilas, a critic of Stalin, wrote of the nomenklatura as the "new class" in his book *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, and he claimed that it was seen by ordinary citizens as a bureaucratic elite that enjoyed special privileges and had supplanted the earlier wealthy capitalist elites.[14]

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **All abstract brooding over economic concepts that are remote from any economic experience must, if courageously and honestly followed out, lead in one way or another to reasoned conclusions against State and property, and only lack of vision saves these materialist Schoolmen from seeing that at the end of their chain of thought stands the beginning once more: effective Communism is *authoritative bureaucracy*.** To put through the ideal requires dictatorship, reign of terror, armed force, the inequality of a system of masters and slaves, men in command and men in obedience – in short: Moscow.

---

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf

Engels thoroughly enjoyed the trappings of the wealth he possessed, while Marx spent many years of his life in hock to pawn brokers. He financed Marx throughout their long relationship.42 **He outlived Marx by over a decade, corresponding with many revolutionaries throughout Europe, keeping the Marxist flame burning. He edited and published reprints of Marx's books and his many unpublished manuscripts. His *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*43 has had far more impact in bringing men to Communism than *Das Kapital* has ever had.** He was not a pedant.
...

Engels was not a Ph.D-holding drudge. **Those who *are* Ph.D-holding drudges have a distinct tendency to identify with Marx rather than Engels.** They pretend to suffer with Marx, who was, like themselves, a heavily subsidized "victim" of the hated capitalist system. They share his alienation.
...

They write fat, unreadable books on Marxism, and they attribute to Marx rather than Engels almost everything of intellectual importance in Marxism. **They attribute far greater importance to Marx's academic drudgery than to Engels's original insights. In one sense, however, this assessment may be valid, because Marxism has always been a movement that owes its success to its appeal to envy-driven**

intellectuals and academics who have revolutionary pretentions. This explanation of Marxism's success is seldom discussed by Marxists and academic humanists.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55903/pg55903-images.html#link2H_4_0002

The services which M. Dumont has rendered to society can be fully appreciated only by those who have studied Mr. Bentham's works, both in their rude and in their finished state. The difference both for show and for use is as great as **the difference between a lump of golden ore and a rouleau of sovereigns fresh from the mint.**
…

Posterity will pronounce its calm and impartial decision; and that decision will, we firmly believe, place in the same rank with Galileo, and with Locke, the man who found jurisprudence a gibberish and left it a science. Never was there a literary partnership so fortunate as that of Mr. Bentham and M. Dumont. The raw material which Mr. Bentham furnished was most precious; **but it was unmarketable.** He was, assuredly, at once a great logician and a great rhetorician. But the effect of his logic was injured by a vicious arrangement, and the effect of his rhetoric by a vicious style.
…

If M. Dumont had never been born, Mr. Bentham would still have been a very great man. But he would have been great to himself alone. The fertility of his mind would have resembled the fertility of those vast American wildernesses in which blossoms and decays a rich but unprofitable vegetation, "wherewith the reaper filleth not his hand, neither he that bindeth up the sheaves his bosom." It would have been with his discoveries as it has been with the "Century of Inventions." **His speculations on laws would have been of no more practical use than Lord Worcester's speculations on steam-engines.** Some generations hence, perhaps, when legislation had found its Watt, an antiquarian might have published to the world the curious fact, that, in the reign of George the Third, there had been a man called Bentham, who had given hints of many discoveries made since his time, **and who had really, for his age, taken a most philosophical view of the principles of jurisprudence.**

Many persons have attempted to interpret between this powerful mind and the public. But, in our opinion, M. Dumont alone has succeeded. It is remarkable that, in foreign countries, where Mr. Bentham's works are known solely through the medium of the French version, his merit is almost universally acknowledged. Even those who are most decidedly opposed to his political opinions—the very chiefs of the Holy Alliance—have publicly testified their respect for him. In England, on the contrary, many persons who certainly entertained no prejudice against him on political grounds were long in the habit of mentioning him contemptuously. **Indeed, what was said of Bacon's Philosophy may be said of Bentham's.** It was in little repute among us, till judgments in its favour came from beyond sea, and convinced us, to our shame, **that we had been abusing and laughing at one of the greatest men of the age.**

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater

Typical of this approach was Denys Lambin **whose acclaimed critical edition of *De Rerum Natura*, published in Paris in 1563, was filled with the very highest praise for Lucretius the poet, carefully counterbalanced with condemnation for Lucretius the philosopher.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoics had a tremendous reputation for logic. In this department they were the successors, or rather the supersessors, of Aristotle. For after the death of Theophrastus the library of the Lyceum is said to have been buried underground at Scepsis until about a century before Christ. So that the Organon may actually have been lost to the world during that period. At all events under Strato, the successor of Theophrastus, who specialised in natural science, the school had lost its comprehensiveness. **Cicero**1 **even finds it consonant with dramatic propriety to make Cato charge the later Peripatetics with ignorance of logic!**
…

But, if the Stoics were strong in logic, they were weak in rhetoric.1 This strength and weakness were characteristic of the school at all periods. Cato is the only Roman Stoic to whom Cicero accords the praise of real eloquence. In the dying accents of the school, as we hear them in Marcus Aurelius, the imperial sage counts it a thing to be thankful for that he had learnt to abstain from rhetoric, poetic, and elegance of diction.2 The reader however cannot help wishing that he had taken some means to diminish the crabbedness of his style. **If a lesson were wanted in the importance of sacrificing to the Graces, it might be found in the fact that the early Stoic writers, despite their logical subtlety, have all perished, and that their remains have to be sought for so largely in the pages of Cicero.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D10%3Asection%3D2

> [2] **For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept her fame as a true exponent of her power.** And yet they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. **Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as great as it is.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-89

180. **So renowned was he for dialectic that most people thought, if the gods took to dialectic, they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus. He had abundance of matter, but in style he was not successful.** In industry he surpassed every one, as the list of his writings shows; for there are more than 705 of them. He increased their number by arguing repeatedly on the same subject, setting down anything that occurred to him, making many corrections and citing numerous authorities. **So much so that in one of his treatises he copied out nearly the whole of Euripides' *Medea*, and some one who had taken up the volume, being asked what he was reading, replied, "The *Medea* of Chrysippus."** 181. Apollodorus of Athens in his *Collection of Doctrines*, wishing to show that what Epicurus wrote with force and originality unaided by quotations was far greater in amount than the books of Chrysippus, says, to quote his exact words, **"If one were to strip the books of Chrysippus of all extraneous quotations, his pages would be left bare."** So much for Apollodorus.

https://archive.org/details/academicquestio00cice/page/178/mode/2up?view=theater

Therefore, although in that discourse which was held with Torquatus we were not remiss, still we have now a much sharper contest before us with the Stoics. **For the statements which are made about pleasure are not expressed with any great acuteness or refinement.** For they who defend it are not skilful in arguing, nor have those who take the opposite side a very difficult cause to oppose. **Even Epicurus himself says, that one ought not even to argue about pleasure, because the decision respecting it depends on the sensations, so that it is sufficient for us to be warned respecting it, and quite unnecessary for us to be instructed.** And on this account, that previous discussion of ours was a simple one on both sides; for there was nothing involved or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own language, as it seems to me, was very clear. **But you are not ignorant what a subtle, or I might rather say, thorny kind of arguing [subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus] it is which is employed by the Stoics.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT357#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> To add insult to injury, intentionally or unintentionally (the former seeming more likely), the Latin phrase Schuyl employs when depicting these reprobates hindering solid Christian good sense – **“obscuris, intricatis et spinosis argutiis” – utilizing the Latin word “spinosus” meaning “prickly” or like “piercing thorns,”** plainly resorts to the same pun on Spinoza’s surname that his Sephardic opponents regularly employed.48

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/Introduction*.html#ref21

One mistake of method made it almost impossible for Diodorus to write either a readable story or an accurate history. So soon as he entered the period which allowed precise dating he became an annalist, or, in other words, he endeavoured to present under one year the events which took place in Greece, Sicily, Africa and Italy, to write a synchronistic universal history. For a closely related series of incidents which covered several years this meant that he either had to break the story as many times as there were years, or crowd the events of several years into one.
...

Again and again, and not alone in the Preface to the First Book, the Stoic doctrine of the *utilitas* of history is stressed, and nowhere does he demand that history be entertaining. Of the customs of Egypt he will mention, he tells us, only those which are especially strange and those which can be of most advantage to his readers (1.69.2), of its laws only those that can be of help to lovers of reading (1.77.1).
...

One merit even those critics who have dealt most severely with Diodorus accord him. Long speeches, happily used but unhappily introduced by Thucydides, Diodorus avoids, as he promises that he will do in the Preface to Book XX. With the exception of four instances he eliminates entirely that rhetorical device, which must have wearied even a contemporary audience.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/1B1*.html#ref43

3 As I was saying, Eratosthenes contends that the aim of every poet is to entertain, not to instruct. The ancients assert, on the contrary, that poetry is a kind of elementary philosophy, which, taking us in our very boyhood, introduces us to the art of life and instructs us, with pleasure to ourselves, in character, emotions, and actions. **And our School[46] goes still further and contends that the wise man alone is a poet.**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/10A*.html#ref59

81 Proceeding to the philosophers, from whom Cicero acknowledges that he derived such a large portion of his eloquence, **we shall all admit that Plato is supreme whether in acuteness of perception or in virtue of his divine gift of style, which is worthy of Homer.** For he soars high above the levels of ordinary prose or, as the Greeks call it, pedestrian language, and seems to me to be inspired not by mere human genius, but, as it were, by the oracles of the god of Delphi.
...

84 **The ancient Stoics indulged their eloquence comparatively little. Still, they pleaded the cause of virtue, and the rules which they laid down for argument and proof have been of the utmost value. But they showed themselves shrewd thinkers rather than striking orators, which indeed they never aimed at being.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/12B*.html#ref11

Accordingly this exhortation of mine must not be taken to mean that I wish the orator to be a philosopher, since there is no other way of life that is further removed from the duties of a statesman and the tasks of an orator. 7 **For what philosopher has ever been a frequent speaker in the courts or won renown in public assemblies? Nay, what philosopher has ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state, which forms the most frequent theme of their instructions?** None the less I desire that he, whose character I am seeking to mould, should be a "wise man" in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA20#v=onepage&q&f=false

What especially sets later Stoicism apart from other schools of thought is the view that all theory, including what we would call theory or philosophizing about ethics, must serve an ethics in action. Theory and practice are inextricably intertwined at this point of view, but with an emphasis on practice. To the Stoics, positing pure thought (or even a higher state) as the goal of life and as practice (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1325b) would make little sense, not in the least because they do not recognize a transcendent intelligible and noetic dimension to reality. For them, with their unified view of virtue in which all virtue entail one another, wisdom as the excellence of reason always constitutes *moral* virtue and being engaged *in the world* and a *web of social relations*.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/5*.html#ref15
>
> 13 The mind, on the other hand, and that dominant part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are implanted by their own nature, and which are called non-volitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 'virtues' in the more special sense; **and the latter are the pre-eminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of 'talent,' and their possessors are spoken of as 'talented.'** The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind.
> ...
>
> The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, **and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the non-volitional;** the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the inanimate or nearly inanimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad. 14 But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also**.** In man, however, the whole importance belongs to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; **and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason,[15] a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often.**

> [15] **This definition of moral virtue and the doctrine above of its superiority to intellectual excellence (the exact opposite of Aristotle's view) are Stoic tenets foisted on the Peripatetics by Antiochus.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/Introduction*.html#ref3

> **Antiochus could only maintain his position by ignoring nice distinctions. The Ethics of Aristotle in particular seem to have fallen into complete oblivion.** Aristotle's cardinal doctrines are, that well-being consists not in the state of virtue but in the active exercise of all human excellences, and particularly of man's highest gift of rational contemplation; and that though for this a modicum of external goods is needed, these are but indispensable conditions, and in no way constituent parts, of the Chief Good.

Small wonder, then, that the later Stoics put so much emphasis on training (*meletê-askêsis*, as in Musonius Rufus fr. 6 Hense) as the indispensable bridge between theoretical insights and practice. **This notion, which has connections with the Socratic and Cynic traditions, encompasses much more than Aristotle's habituation, which is meant to shape the lower, irrational aspects of the soul (as in *Eth. Nic.* 2). The Stoics, with the potential and debated exception of Posidonius (see above), do not accept irrational aspects of the soul as existing independently from reason.** Hence, they argue, training and habituation involve a human being's entire disposition, including the process of learning to use one's reason correctly.
…

For the later Stoics, ethics in action means showing one's mettle in ordinary, everyday life circumstances and in one's given socio-political obligations. **For this reason, students are not meant to form settled attachments to a school, as increasingly happened, for instance, with the inner circles of the schools of Platonism.** Instead, the knowledge and training acquired through education has to be portable and to become fully interiorized, or digested as it were (Epictetus, *Diss*. 3.21.1-3; *Ench*. 46; Seneca *Ep*. 2.2-4, 84; *Ben*. 7.2.1). Thus Seneca and Epictetus show their own independence toward their Stoic predecessors and do not extol a Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus above all others. **"We Stoics," Seneca famously claimed, "are not subjects of a despot: each of us lays claim to his own freedom"** (*Ep*. 33.4). **If Chrysippus took the liberty to disagree with his teacher Cleanthes, "why, then, following the example of Chrysippus himself, should not every man claim his own freedom?"** (*Ep*. 113.23).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9-8fIBVgCQYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA134#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aristotle's distinction between apodictic and dialectical reasoning was accepted by the Stoics of the third century B.C. and thereafter. However, **the Stoics viewed dialectical reasoning not as a method of arriving at first principles** but as a method of analyzing arguments and defining concepts by distinction and synthesis of genus and species. And they lacked Aristotle's overriding concern for systematic exposition; **with them dialectics became an independent discipline,** not essentially different from logic but with strong elements also of rhetoric and grammar.

It was in its Stoic form, with the writings of Plato and Aristotle in the background, that Greek dialectics was imported into Rome in the republican period (second and first centuries B.C.). There it was taken up by the educated classes, including jurists, who applied it for the first time to prevailing legal institutions. The Greeks had never attempted such an application. The reasons for that are complex. The Greek cities did not experience the rise of a prestigious class of jurists entrusted with the development of law. Adjudication was by large popular assemblies, and those who argued before the assemblies practiced a mode of declamation that relied less on legal argument than on appeals to moral and political considerations. Moreover, the Greek philosophers did not recognize legal rules as starting points for reasoning. They professed an allegiance to a higher philosophical truth, attainable by observation and reason alone.22
…

Indeed, **Platonic thought attributed a transcendent reality to the idea of justice that inhibited the entrusting of its execution to lawyers.** Only the seeker after wisdom, the *philosophos*, was capable of governing, and then only when he had succeeded in his search and become a knower. **In Carl Friedrich's words, "The very transcendency of justice precludes [for Plato] its realization in a constitutional order." He adds that as a result constitutional law in the Western sense of the term "was unknown at Athens."**23

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_13

> Though giving a detailed account of the life of the philosophers and guardians, Plato says almost nothing about the rest of the population--the artisans and peasants. Laws for them are determined by the philosophers in accordance with the basic principles expressed in the dialogue: "Nay, 'twould not be fitting... to dictate to good and honorable men. For most of the enactments that are needed about these things they will easily, I presume, discover." (425d)

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D4%3Asection%3D425c

"But what, in heaven's name," said I, "about business matters, the deals[3] that men make with one another in the agora—[425d] and, if you please, contracts with workmen[1] and actions for foul language[2] and assault, the filing of declarations,[3] the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police or harbor regulations and the like, can we bring[4] ourselves to legislate about these?"

2. τὰ τοιαῦτα is slightly contemptuous. **Specific commercial, industrial and criminal legislation was not compatible with the plan of the *Republic*,** and so Plato omits it here. Much of it is given in the *Laws*, but even there details are left to the citizens and their rulers. Cf. on 412 B.

3. Plato shows his contempt for the subject by this confused enumeration, passing without warning from contracts and torts to procedure and then to taxes, market, harbor and police regulations.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n375/mode/2up?view=theater

1040 Now, because laws certainly came first and philosophies later, **it must have been from observing that the enactment of laws by the Athenian citizens involved their coming to agreement in an idea of an equal utility common to all of them severally, that Socrates began to adumbrate intelligible genera or abstract universals by induction,** that is by collecting uniform particulars which go to make up a genus of that in respect of which the particulars are uniform among themselves.

1041 Plato, reflecting that in such public assemblies the minds of particular men, each passionately bent on his private utility, are brought together in a dispassionate idea of common utility (according to the saying that men individually are swayed by their private interests but collectively they seek justice), raised himself to the meditation of the highest intelligible ideas of created minds, ideas which are distinct from these created minds and can reside only in God, **and thus he reached the height of conceiving the philosophical hero who commands his passions at will.**

1042 The way was thus prepared for the divine definition which Aristotle later gave us of a good law as a will free of passion, which is to say the will of a hero. He understood justice as queen of the virtues, seated in the spirit of the hero and commanding all the others. For he had observed legal justice seated in the spirit of the sovereign civil power and dictating prudence in the senate, fortitude in the armies and temperance at festivals, as well as the two forms of particular justice: **distributive justice in the public treasuries and commutative justice for the most part in the forum; the latter employing arithmetic proportion and the former geometric. He must have observed distributive justice in the census which is the basis of the popular commonwealths and which distributes honors and burdens in geometric proportion according to the patrimonies of the citizens.** For previously only arithmetic proportion had been understood; wherefore Astraea, heroic justice, was depicted for us with the scales, and in the Law of the Twelve Tables all the punishments—**which philosophers, moral theologians and professors writing on public law now say must be dispensed by distributive justice in geometric proportion**—all the punishments, we read, reduce either to the double (*duplio*) if pecuniary and to the like (*talio*) if corporal. And since the law of retaliation was invented by Rhadamanthus, he was made judge in the lower world, in which punishments are certainly distributed. **In Aristotle's *Ethics* retaliation was called Pythagorean justice,** invented by the Pythagoras whom we have revealed as founder of a nation in Magna Graecia, whose nobles were called Pythagoreans, as above noted. This invention would be a disgrace to the Pythagoras who later became a sublime philosopher and mathematician.

1043 **From all the above we conclude that these principles of metaphysics, logic and morals issued from the market place of Athens.** From Solon's advice to the Athenians, "Know thyself (as set forth above in one of the corollaries of our Poetic Logic), came forth the popular commonwealths, from the popular commonwealths the laws, and from the laws emerged philosophy; and Solon, who had been wise in vulgar wisdom, came to be held wise in esoteric wisdom. This may serve as a fragment of the history of philosophy told philosophically, **and a last reproof, of the many brought forth in this work, against Polybius who said that if there were philosophers in the world there would be no need of religions.** For [the fact is that] if there had not been religions and hence commonwealths, there would have been no philosophers in the world, and if human affairs had not been thus guided by divine providence there would have been no idea of either science or virtue.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n79/mode/2up?view=theater

130 **This axiom dismisses from the school of our Science the Stoics who seek to mortify the senses and the Epicureans who make them the criterion. For both deny providence, the former chaining themselves to fate, the latter abandoning themselves to chance. The latter moreover affirm that the human soul dies with the body. Both should be called monastic or solitary philosophers.** On the other hand [this axiom] admits to our school the political philosophers, and first of all the Platonists, who agree with all the lawgivers on these three main points: that there is divine providence, that human passions should be moderated and made into human virtues, and that the human soul is immortal. Thus from this axiom are derived the three principles of this Science.

VI

131 **Philosophy considers man as he should be and so can be of service to but very few, who wish to live in the Republic of Plato, not to fall back into the dregs of Romulus.**

VII

132 **Legislation considers man as he is in order to turn him to good uses in human society.** Out of ferocity, avarice and ambition, the three vices which run throughout the human race, it creates the military, merchant and governing classes, and thus the strength, riches and wisdom of commonwealths. Out of these three great vices, which could certainly destroy all mankind on the face of the earth, it makes civil happiness.

http://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#philosophy

The jurisprudence which had been grossly adapted to the wants of the first Romans, was polished and improved in the seventh century of the city, by the alliance of Grecian philosophy. **The Scaevolas had been taught by use and experience; but Servius Sulpicius was the first civilian who established his art on a certain and general theory.** (54) **For the discernment of truth and falsehood he applied, as an infallible rule, the logic of Aristotle and the stoics, reduced particular cases to general principles,** and diffused over the shapeless mass the light of order and eloquence. Cicero, his contemporary and friend, declined the reputation of a professed lawyer; but the jurisprudence of his country was adorned by his incomparable genius, which converts into gold every object that it touches. After the example of Plato, he composed a republic; and, for the use of his republic, a treatise of laws; in which he labors to deduce from a celestial origin the wisdom and justice of the Roman constitution. The whole universe, according to his sublime hypothesis, forms one immense commonwealth: gods and men, who participate of the same essence, are members of the same community; reason prescribes the law of nature and nations; and all positive institutions, however modified by accident or custom, are drawn from the rule of right, which the Deity has inscribed on every virtuous mind. From these philosophical mysteries, he mildly excludes the sceptics who refuse to believe, and the epicureans who are unwilling to act. The latter disdain the care of the republic: he advises them to slumber in their shady gardens**. But he humbly entreats that the new academy would be silent, since her bold objections would too soon destroy the fair and well ordered structure of his lofty system.** (55)

> 55. *Perturbatricem autem omnium harum rerum academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem, exoremus ut sileat, nam si invaserit in haec, quae satis scite instructa et composita videantur, nimis edet ruinas, quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo.* (de Legibus, i. 13.)
>
> **From this passage alone, Bentley (*Remarks on Free-thinking*, p. 250) might have learned how firmly Cicero believed in the specious doctrines which he has adorned.**

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/Reflections.html

I have often commented on the last paragraph of Cicero's *De natura deorum*, in which Cicero, the statesman, overrules Cicero, the philosopher, with a *raison d'état*. **Of the three major philosophic systems, Stoicism was the only one that enjoined patriotism and political action on men who had responsible positions in society.**

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/05-03-02-0001-0004-0016 **[3-4 December 1770]**

To use the words of a great and worthy man, a patriot, and an hero, and enlightned friend of mankind, and a martyr to liberty; I mean ALGERNON SIDNEY, who from his earliest infancy sought a tranquil retirement under the shadow of the tree of liberty, with his tongue, his pen, and his sword, **"The law, (says he,) no passion can disturb. Tis void of desire and fear, lust and anger. 'Tis *menc sine affectu;* written reason; retaining some measure of the divine perfection. It does not enjoin that which pleases a weak, frail man, but without any regard to persons, commands that which is good, and punishes evil in all, whether rich, or poor, high or low, —Tis deaf, inexorable, inflexible."**51 On the one hand it is inexorable to the cries and

lamentations of the prisoners; on the other it is deaf, deaf as an adder to the clamours of the populace.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lady_Justice
>
> The origin of Lady Justice was Justitia (or Iustitia), the goddess of Justice within Roman mythology. **Justitia was introduced by emperor Augustus, and was thus not a very old deity in the Roman pantheon.**
> …
>
> The blindfold was originally a satirical addition intended to show Justice as blind to the injustice carried on before her,[7] but it has been reinterpreted over time and is now understood to represent impartiality, the ideal that justice should be applied without regard to wealth, power, or other status. **The earliest Roman coins depicted Justitia with the sword in one hand and the scale in the other, but with her eyes uncovered.[8] Justitia was only commonly represented as "blind" since the middle of the 16th century.**
>
> https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/books/16justice.html
>
> As the Yale Law School professors Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis show in an unusual new book just out, "Representing Justice"—an academic treatise on threats to the modern judiciary that doubles as an obsessive's tour of Western art through the lens of the law—**Lady Justice's familiar blindfold did not become an accessory until well into the 17th century. And even then it was uncommon because of the profoundly negative connotations blindfolds carried for medieval and Renaissance audiences,** who viewed them as emblems not of impartiality but of deception (hence the early use of the word hoodwink as a noun, meaning a blindfold or hood).
>
> "***The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.***"—Anatole France
>
> https://www.marxist.com/law-and-marxism-the-state-and-the-constitution.htm
>
> **The constitutional rules that govern such a state will not be based on a false impartiality, and will not use the fiction of abstract equality before the law.** When those who wield state power are the vast majority of society they no longer have need of such deceptions to keep people ignorant of the real role of the state. **Bourgeois lawyers are fond of saying that 'justice is blind'. But under the socialist constitution justice will have its eyes wide open, and will be looking to defend the interests of the working class.**

---

https://archive.org/details/historyrome12mommgoog/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

This philosophy was really better adapted for Rome than for the land where it first arose. The objection of the pious believer, that **the god of the Stoic had neither sex nor age nor corporeality** and was converted from a person into a conception, had a meaning in Greece, but not in Rome. **The coarse allegorizing and moral purification, which were characteristic of the Stoical doctrine of the gods, destroyed the very marrow of the Hellenic mythology;** but the plastic power of the Romans, scanty even in their epoch of simplicity, had produced no more than a light veil enveloping the original intuition or the original conception, out of which the divinity had arisen — a veil that might be stripped off without special damage. Pallas Athene might be indignant, when she found herself suddenly transmuted into the conception of memory: Minerva had hitherto been in reality not much more.
…

The inclination also of the Stoa towards a casuistic morality and towards a systematic treatment of the professional sciences was quite to the mind of the Romans, especially of the Romans of this period, who no longer like their fathers practised in unsophisticated fashion self-government and good morals, but resolved the simple morality of their ancestors into a catechism of allowable and non-allowable actions; **whose grammar and jurisprudence, moreover, urgently demanded a methodical treatment,** without possessing the ability to develop such a treatment of themselves.
…

Thenceforth the most noted statesmen and scholars professed the Stoic philosophy—**among others Stilo and Quintus Scaevola, the founders of scientific philology and of scientific jurisprudence. The scholastic formality of system, which thenceforth prevails at least externally in these professional sciences and is especially associated with a fanciful, charade-like, insipid method of etymologizing, descends from the Stoa.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_122

26. **Of all sciences philology at present is the most favoured,** its progress having been furthered for centuries by the greatest number of scholars in every nation who have had charge of the noblest pupils.
…

What if the truth were told about antiquity, and its qualifications for training people to live in the present?
…

If the world in general came to know what an unseasonable thing for us antiquity really is, philologists would no longer be called in as the educators of our youth.
…

The real Greeks, and their "watering down" through the philologists.

The future commanding philologist sceptical in regard to our entire culture, and therefore also the destroyer of philology as a profession.

https://web.oriel.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/psaila_l_essay_title_2.pdf

“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “*Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*,” published in 1921, was a pivotal work of the early 20th Century’s ‘linguistic turn’ – a time in which the importance of language was being investigated across many academic disciplines. The aim of Wittgenstein’s “*Tractatus*” is “to draw limit to thought”;1 he argues that for something to exist in the world – either imagined or physical – it must be possible to think of it.2 Therefore, the use of language to express thought is a means to map the boundaries of reality. The interaction between language and thought that Wittgenstein advocated was later labelled ‘linguistic relativism’, following the work of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf.
…

George Orwell’s dystopian classic “1984”, poses questions concerning the nature of a language “designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought” through the “reduction of vocabulary.”3 As Wittgenstein argues, for something to potentially exist in the world, it must be within the range of thought, which he believes to be reflected through the range of language. Therefore, decreasing the scope of language decreases the scope of thought, in turn decreasing the “limits of the world.” **For example, in Orwell’s world the word “free” is purged of its “heretical meaning” to suppress the public’s desire for political freedom, since they supposedly are no longer able to understand the concept.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Stoics

The part Panaetius took in philological and historical studies is characteristic of the man. **We know much of the results of these studies; of his philosophy technically we know very little.** He wrote only upon ethics, where historical knowledge would be of use. Crates of Mallus, one of his teachers, aimed at fulfilling the high functions of a “critic” according to his own definition—that the critic must acquaint himself with all rational knowledge. Panaetius was competent to pass judgment upon the critical “divination” of an Aristarchus (who was perhaps himself also a Stoic), and took an interest in the restoration of Old Attic forms to the text of Plato. Just then there had been a movement towards a wider and more liberal education, by which even contemporary Epicureans were affected. Diogenes the Babylonian had written a treatise on language and one entitled *The Laws*. **Along with grammar, which had been a prominent branch of study under Chrysippus, philosophy, history, geography, chronology and kindred subjects came to be recognized as fields of activity no less than philology proper.**

https://archive.org/details/latinitasandhel00smilgoog/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater

There were perhaps three considerations which had weight with the Stoics in the formulation of their theory of style. (1) Their belief that to speak well was to speak the truth.1 (2) **Their conception that the function of an orator was merely to teach,**2 **and not as Cicero asserted "to teach, to delight, to move." This conception was an outgrowth of the Stoic doctrine of *ἀπάθεια*; they held that it was unworthy of an orator to cloud the reason of his audience by playing upon the emotions in any way.** (3) There was the general Stoic principle that anything to be ideal, whether speech or conduct, must be in harmony with nature. Given now an orator whose function is to speak the truth, to teach, and to use language that is in harmony with nature, it is easy to formulate a theory of style, the virtues of which shall be (1) pure and unperverted speech, (2) clearness, (3) precision, (4) conciseness, (5) appropriateness, (6) freedom from all artificial ornamentation. **And this was the Stoic theory which bore the name of *ἑλληνισμός* or Latinitas.** The reason why the first virtue gave its name to the theory, is quite evident, for the first virtue in a sense embraces the other five. **Speech that is pure and unperverted and in harmony with nature, will be of necessity clear, precise,**

concise, appropriate, and free from all artificiality. This is essentially the form in which we find it in its first extant enunciation, viz., that of Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon as it is preserved in Diogenes Laertius' life of Zeno (7, 59):

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-29
>
> 58. There are, as stated by Diogenes[29] in his treatise on *Language* and by Chrysippus, five parts of speech: proper name, common noun, verb, conjunction, article.
> …
>
> 59. **There are five excellences of speech – pure Greek, lucidity, conciseness, appropriateness, distinction.** By good Greek is meant language faultless in point of grammar and free from careless vulgarity. Lucidity is a style which presents the thought in a way easily understood; conciseness a style that employs no more words than are necessary for setting forth the subject in hand; appropriateness lies in a style akin to the subject; distinction in the avoidance of colloquialism. **Among vices of style barbarism is violation of the usage of Greeks of good standing; while there is solecism when the sentence has an incongruous construction.**

As it was largely through Diogenes of Babylon and his pupil Panaetius that the Stoic doctrine was established at Rome, it may be worth while to examine the foregoing statement with some care. Some light for its interpretation may be had from Herodian who has given a similar enumeration of the *ἄρεταί λόγον* in his treatise *de Barbarismo et Soloecismo*,3 **Herodian presents three views that were held concerning the proper basis for *ἑλληνισμός*.** He says: "Some say that *ἑλληνισμός* is the poet," *i.e.* Homer (he means that a correct diction must be based on the usage of Homer), "others say that *ἑλληνισμός* is the common dialect of the Greeks who went against Ilium, others say that *ἑλληνισμός* is etymology," *i.e.* a correct diction must be based on a careful etymological study of words. These three views concerning the proper basis of *ἑλληνισμός* are important to our discussion only as they afford one of a number of proofs that the idea of *ἑλληνισμός* is thoroughly Stoic. **It was a Stoic tendency and almost a Stoic principle to look back for their ideals to the Golden Age when all things were perfect, even written and spoken language.** There, if anywhere, would be found the "sermo purus et incorruptus." And these three views concerning the proper basis of *ἑλληνισμός* are but three attempts to get back as close as possible to the Golden Age and its perfection. The first view was that a correct diction must be based on the usage of Homer, the earliest poet; the second, that it must be based on the dialect of the pre-Homeric Greeks; the third, that it must be based on a careful search after root meanings, the earliest meanings of words. **A careful search for, and a high valuation of the "verba antiqua" characterize the influence of the Stoic theory at all periods.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0104:entry=crates-bio-3

Crates (Κράτης), of MALLUS in Cilicia, the son of Timocrates, **is said by Suidas (*s.v.*) to have been a Stoic philosopher, but is far better known as one of the most distinguished of the ancient Greek grammarians.** He lived in the reign of Ptolemy Philometor, and was contemporary with Aristarchus, in rivalry with whom he supported the fame of the Pergamene school of grammar against the Alexandrian, and the system of *anomaly* (ἀνωμαλία) against that of *analogy* (ἀναλογία). He is said by Varro to have derived his grammatical system from a certain Chrysippus, who left six books περὶ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας. **He was born at Mallus in Cilicia, and was brought up at Tarsus,** whence he removed to Pergamus, and there lived under the patronage of Eumenes II. and Attalus II. He was the founder of the Pergamene school of grammar, and seems to have been at one time the chief librarian. **About the year 157 B.C., shortly after the death of Ennius, Crates was sent by Attalus as an ambassador to Rome, where he introduced for the first time the study of grammar.** The results of his visit lasted a long time, as may be observed especially in the writings of Varro.
…

Among the ancients themselves he enjoyed a reputation little, if at all, inferior to that of Aristarchus. The school which he founded at Pergamus flourished a considerable time, and was the subject of a work by Ptolemy of Ascalon, entitled περὶ τῆς Κρατητείου αἱρέσεως.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/de_Grammaticis*.html

1 1 1 **The study of Grammar was not even pursued at Rome in early days, still less held in any esteem; and naturally enough, since the state was then still uncultivated and given to war, and had as yet little leisure for liberal pursuits.** The beginnings of the subject, too, were humble, for the earliest teachers, who were also both poets and Italian[2] Greeks (I refer to Livius and Ennius, who gave instruction in both tongues at home and abroad, as is well known), did no more than interpret the Greeks or give readings from whatever they themselves had composed in the Latin language.
…

2 1 1 **In my opinion then, the first to introduce the study of grammar into our city was Crates of Mallos, a contemporary of Aristarchus.** He was sent to the senate by king Attalus between the second and

third Punic wars, at about the time when Ennius died; and having fallen into the opening of a sewer in the Palatine quarter and broken his leg, he held numerous and frequent conferences during the whole time both of his embassy and of his convalescence, at which he constantly gave instruction, and thus set an example for our countrymen to imitate.
…

3 1 1 The foundations of the study were laid, and it was advanced in all directions, by Lucius Aelius of Lanuvium and his son-in-law Servius Clodius, both of whom were Roman knights and men of wide and varied experience in scholarship and statecraft.

Aelius had two surnames, for he was called Praeconinus because his father had followed the occupation of a crier,[3] and Stilo[4] because he used to write speeches for all the great men of the day; and he was so devoted to the aristocratic party, that he accompanied Metellus Numidicus into exile.
…

After this the science constantly grew in favour and popularity, so much so that even the most eminent men did not hesitate to make contributions to it, while at times there are said to have been more than twenty well-attended schools in the city.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Stilo_Praeconinus,_Lucius_Aelius

STILO PRAECONINUS, LUCIUS AELIUS, (*c.* 154-74 B.C.), of Lanuvium, the earliest Roman philologist, was a man of distinguished family and belonged to the equestrian order.
…

His most famous pupils were Varro and Cicero, and amongst his friends were Coelius Antipater, the historian, and Lucilius, the satirist, who dedicated their works to him. According to Cicero, who expresses a poor opinion of his powers as an orator, Stilo was a follower of the Stoic school.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D23
>
> **And therefore we may follow the Stoics, who diligently investigate the etymology of words;** and we may accept their statement that “good faith” is so called because what is promised is “made good,” although some may find this derivation[2] rather farfetched.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Varro,_Marcus_Terentius

The chief teacher of Varro was L. Aelius Stilo, the first systematic student, critic and teacher of Latin philology and literature, and of the antiquities of Rome and Italy. Varro also studied at Athens, especially under the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon, whose aim it was to lead back the Academic school from the scepticism of Arcesilaus and Carneades to the tenets of the early Platonists, as he understood them. He was really a stoicizing Platonist; and this has led to the error of supposing Varro to have been a professed Stoic. The influence of Antiochus is clearly to be seen in many remains of Varro's writings.
…

The second section of Varro's works, those on history and antiquities, form to the present day the basis on which a large part of our knowledge of the earlier Roman history, and in particular of Roman constitutional history, ultimately rests. **These writings were used as a quarry by the compilers and dilettanti of later times, such as Pliny, Plutarch, Gellius, Festus, Macrobius, and by Christian champions like Tertullian, Arnobius and Augustine, who did not disdain to seek in heathen literature the means of defending their faith.** These men have saved for us a few remains from the great wreck made by time. Judging from what has been casually preserved, if any considerable portion of Varro's labours as antiquarian and historian were to be now discovered, scholars might find themselves compelled to reconstruct the earlier history of the Roman republic from its very foundations. **Varro's greatest predecessor in this field of inquiry, the man who turned over the virgin soil, was Cato the Censor. His example, however, seems to have remained unfruitful till the time of Varro's master, Lucius Aelius Stilo Praeconinus.** From his age to the decay of Roman civilization there were never altogether wanting men devoted to the study of their nation's past; but none ever pursued the task with the advantages of Varro's comprehensive learning, his indefatigable industry and his reverent yet discriminating regard for the men and the institutions of the earlier ages.
…

The fifth, sixth and seventh books give Varro's views on the etymology of Latin words. The principles he applies are those which he had learned from the philosophers of the Stoic school: Chrysippus, Antipater and others. **The study of language as it existed in Varro's day was thoroughly dominated by Stoic influences.**

https://archive.org/details/latinitasandhel00smilgoog/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoics had given themselves to a thorough study of grammar and had invented an elaborate grammatical terminology, with this one purpose in view, viz., that their speakers and writers whose sole function was to speak the truth and impart instruction, might have at their command language that was pure and in harmony with nature, – language that would serve as a proper vehicle for the precise and accurate transfer of thought. **That this was the real purpose of the earlier grammatical studies of the Stoics, there can be no doubt. And even in the days of Fronto, when the real purpose that had given birth to them both had almost been forgotten, grammar was still wedded to the Stoic theory of style.** This is proved by the fact that in the grammatical treatise *de Barbarismo et Soloecismo*, which Herodian dedicated to the Stoic Marcus Aurelius, a prominent place is given to an enumeration of the *ἄρεταί λόγου*, which constituted a theory of style almost identical with that which had been enunciated three hundred years earlier by Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon.
…

On page eleven he says: **"It is clear that with him (Fronto) oratory depended for its success almost wholly on the choice of words."** Then he devotes more than a page to quotations from Fronto, establishing this statement. But this fine differentiation of synonyms, this search after *the* word is the Stoic *κυριολογία*.

On page thirteen he comments at length on Fronto's fondness for the pre-Ciceronian writers and his archaizing tendencies. He says: **"Nor must we suppose that Fronto contented himself with merely lauding these antiquated worthies; he got copies to be made of them and dispatched them to his imperial pupil."** In pointing out this very marked characteristic of Fronto, Professor Ellis has failed to observe in it but an example of the general archaizing tendency of the Stoics, which was based upon the belief that the earliest speech was the purest and that the best models of style were those ancient writers who were nearest that Golden Age when all speech was in harmony with nature.
…

It seems clear that the Stoic *ἄρεταί λόγου* dominated the literary activities of Fronto and his contemporaries, and gave the impulse to the grammatical and lexicographical studies for which the age was noted. It must be admitted, however, that, although these *ἄρεταί* were dominant, the purpose which had given rise to the formulation of the theory – and to each of these virtues of style, – had largely been forgotten.

It is quite evident that Fronto in seeking for *συντομία* did not have in mind the avoidance of extraneous and artificial embellishment, but rather the fear of wearying his auditors with a style that was too copious. Again it must be admitted that **while the early Stoic sought *κυριολογία* because of his desire to state the truth with precision, Fronto seems to have sought it chiefly as a means of rhetorical embellishment.** His search for the "verbum inopinatum et insperatum" was prompted by a desire to produce in his hearers a certain intellectual titillation and delectation. Even in following the Stoic archaizing tendency, Fronto may not have been influenced altogether by the early Stoic motive, *i.e.*, a desire for the oldest, purest words. It is likely that here too he had in mind somewhat the embellishment of his style. For as Quintilian says, the "verba antiqua" have about them a certain "novitas," "delectatio" and "maiestas." **We read in the letters of Dante Gabriel Rossetti how the poet read the early English ballads in search of "stunning old words" that would enchain attention and lend a certain dignity and charm of strangeness to his verses.**

So this theory of style which was formulated by those who sought simply "docere" has in the age of Fronto been seized and appropriated by those whose chief object is "delectare." **And although its *ἄρεταί λόγου* remain practically unchanged, the theory which in its origin was wholly at enmity with all that savored of rhetoric, has itself degenerated into a style as truly rhetorical as was that of Gorgias or Cicero.**
…

The evidence of the Stoic theory of style in the *Noctes Atticae* is so varied and so voluminous that it is difficult to give it a full and effective presentation. On nearly every page there is some phrase to remind one of the "sermo purus et incorruptus" which constituted the *Latinitas* of Varro and his predecessors.
…

This defense of Cicero in itself, even if the writings of Gellius were not saturated with the Stoic terminology, would be evidence that there were those in this age who held an ideal of style, directly opposed to that of Cicero.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Gellius/10*.html#ref16

> 15 But if anyone has so rustic and so dull an ear that this brilliant and delightful speech and the harmonious arrangement of Cicero's words do not give him pleasure; **if he prefers the earlier oration because it is unadorned, concise and unstudied, yet has a certain native charm, and because it has, so to say, a shade and colour of misty antiquity** – let such a one, if he has any judgment at all, study the address in a similar case of Marcus Cato, a man of a still earlier time, to whose vigour and flow of language Gracchus could never hope to attain.

…

Again in the fourteenth chapter of the sixth book **he clearly defines this type of speech in describing the "oratio modesta et sobria" of Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon.** He characterizes the style as "gracilis"; its virtues are "venustas et subtilitas"; its faults are exemplified by those "ieiunidici et squalentes" who fall short in their attempt to be "graciles"; as an example of this type among the orators Menelaus is mentioned whose name had been used in a similar way by both Quintilian and the Younger Pliny; **among the poets the representative given is Lucilius who, three hundred years before, had presented the Stoic views of style in the ninth book of his satires. With regard to embellishment, the thing in respect to which the Ciceronian and Stoic styles diverged the most, Gellius seems to have held almost the same view as Lucilius.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Gellius/6*.html#ref78

> 6 **But true and genuine Latin examples of these styles are said by Marcus Varro[79] to be: Pacuvius of the grand style, Lucilius of the plain, and Terence of the middle.** 7 But in early days these same three styles of speaking were exemplified in three men by Homer: the grand and rich in Ulysses, the elegant and restrained in Menelaus, the middle and moderate in Nestor.
>
> 8 This threefold variety is also to be observed in the three philosophers whom the Athenians sent as envoys to the senate at Rome, to persuade the senators to remit the fine which they had imposed upon the Athenians because of the sack of Oropos;[80] and the fine amounted to nearly five hundred talents. 9 The philosophers in question were Carneades of the Academy, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic. When they were admitted to the House, they made use of Gaius Acilius, one of the senators, as interpreter; but beforehand each one of them separately, for the purpose of exhibiting his eloquence, lectured to a large company. 10 **Rutilius[81] and Polybius[82] declare that all three aroused admiration for their oratory, each in his own style. "Carneades," they say, "spoke with a vehemence that carried you away, Critolaus with art and polish, Diogenes with restraint and sobriety."**

https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11295/1/DISSERTATIONFINALVERSION.pdf

> 4. S.D. Olson, *Athenaeus of Naucratis, The Learned Banqueters* Vol 1 (Cambridge Ma. 2006) xi-xii and B. Baldwin, 'Athenaeus and his work' *Acta Classica* 19 (1976) 21-42, esp. 34, have argued against the early third century, as the latest reference to an external event or person is the emperor Commodus, who reigned 180-192 AD. It seems that he is dead by the time of writing, which would place Athenaeus at the most two decades after Pausanias. **The character Ulpian is not to be identified with the jurist Ulpian, who died in AD 228, as was thought by Georg Kaibel in his Teubner edition of Athenaeus (vol. 1, Leipzig 1887, v-vii), but with his father who was, like the character, a grammarian and who died, like the character, a peaceful death.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Athenaeus/1A*.html

> **Of orators there was a company as numerous as that of the Cynics, against whom, as well as all the other speakers, Ulpian of Tyre inveighed.** He, through the constant investigation which he carries on at all hours in the streets, public walks, bookshops, and baths, has won a name that distinguishes him better than his own, Ceituceitus.[5] **This gentleman observed a law peculiar to himself, of never tasting food until he had asked whether or not a word was to be found in literature:** is, for example, the word *hora* ("season") found signifying part of a day?[6]

Ulpian o Keitoukeitos. The Influence of the Stoic Theory of Style in Athenaeus on JSTOR

Quintilian's statement (5, 14, 34): *iurisconsulti, quorum summus circa verborum proprietatem labor est,* can be confirmed by hundreds of citations from the *Digest.*2

Ulpian, whatever his philosophy may have been, had inherited from his Stoic predecessors in the law their traditions about purity and precision of diction.1

> 1. Perhaps the most striking example of Ulpian's indebtedness to the Stoics may be found in his definition of jurisprudence which occurs at the very opening of the Institutes of Justinian. **"Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia iusti atque iniusti scientia." This is simply a combination of the Stoic definitions of *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*.**

…

Out of one chapter of the Digest (50, 16) can be gathered more than seventy similar examples from Ulpian. It appears that this Stoic virtue of style *κυριολογία*, with its kindred archaizing tendency that often manifested itself in etymological studies, were for Ulpian matters of practical importance, necessary to precision of definition in the law. And so it is not strange that, when he dined with the deipnosophists, this should be his principal topic of conversation, in the discussion of which he could out-rhetorician even the rhetoricians.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

It has been well said that the old heroes of the republic were unconscious Stoics, fitted by their narrowness, their stern simplicity and devotion to duty for the almost Semitic earnestness of the new doctrine. **In Greece its insensibility to art and the cultivation of life was a fatal defect;** not so with the shrewd men of the world, desirous of qualifying as advocates or jurists. It supplied them with an incentive to scientific research in archaeology and grammar; **it penetrated jurisprudence until the belief in the ultimate identity of the *jus gentium* with the law of nature modified the praetor's edicts for centuries.** Even to the prosaic religion of old Rome, with its narrow original conception and multitude of burdensome rites, it became in some sort a support. **Scaevola, following Panaetius, explained that the prudence of statesmen had established this public institution in the service of order midway between the errors of popular superstition and the barren truths of enlightened philosophy.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_IV/Chapter_27
>
> **It is recorded that the very learned pontiff Scævola[1] had distinguished about three kinds of gods—one introduced by the poets, another by the philosophers, another by the statesmen.** The first kind he declares to be trifling, because many unworthy things have been invented by the poets concerning the gods; the second does not suit states, because it contains some things that are superfluous, and some, too, which it would be prejudicial for the people to know. It is no great matter about the superfluous things, for it is a common saying of skillful lawyers, "Superfluous things do no harm."[2] But what are those things which do harm when brought before the multitude? "These," he says, "that Hercules, Æsculapius, Castor and Pollux, are not gods; for it is declared by learned men that these were but men, and yielded to the common lot of mortals." What else? **"That states have not the true images of the gods; because the true God has neither sex, nor age, nor definite corporeal members."**
> …
>
> And, truly, in these same books, Scævola is not silent as to his reason for rejecting the poetic sort of gods,—to wit, "**because they so disfigure the gods that they could not bear comparison even with good men,** when they make one to commit theft, another adultery; or, again, to say or do something else basely and foolishly; as that three goddesses contested (with each other) the prize of beauty, and the two vanquished by Venus destroyed Troy; that Jupiter turned himself into a bull or swan that he might copulate with some one; that a goddess married a man, and Saturn devoured his children; that, in fine, there is nothing that could be imagined, either of the miraculous or vicious, which may not be found there, and yet is far removed from the nature of the gods."

---

http://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#praise

In the selection of ancient laws, [Justinian] seems to have viewed his predecessors without jealousy, and with equal regard: the series could not ascend above the reign of Adrian, and the narrow distinction of Paganism and Christianity, introduced by the superstition of Theodosius, had been abolished by the consent of mankind. But the jurisprudence of the Pandects is circumscribed within a period of a hundred years, from the perpetual edict to the death of Severus Alexander: the civilians who lived under the first Caesars are seldom permitted to speak, and only three names can be attributed to the age of the republic. The favorite of Justinian (it has been fiercely urged) was fearful of encountering the light of freedom and the gravity of Roman sages. **Tribonian condemned to oblivion the genuine and native wisdom of Cato, the Scaevolas, and Sulpicius; while he invoked spirits more congenial to his own, the Syrians, Greeks, and Africans, who flocked to the Imperial court to study Latin as a foreign tongue, and jurisprudence as a lucrative profession.** But the ministers of Justinian, (78) were instructed to labor, not for the curiosity of antiquarians, but for the immediate benefit of his subjects. It was their duty to select the useful and practical parts of the Roman law; and the writings of the old republicans, however curious or excellent, were no longer suited to the new system of manners, religion, and government.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/335/mode/2up?view=theater

The perversion of the Roman legal tradition through racial miscegenation ultimately meant that "ink was stronger than blood"61 **– a dash of pen, and no longer their blood, determined a person's status. The simple tools of convention and freedom of choice were more important than biological necessity.** Schachermeyr made his indictment sharper and more specific by naming two jurists of the late empire, Ulpian62 and Papinian,63 both Levantine North Africans, who had left their nefarious mark on a thoroughly Judaized Roman law. Ferdinand Fried followed Schachermeyr's lead, **berating the "Phoenician-Semitic" Ulpian and the "Syrian" Papinian, as well as Salvius Julian, originally from "Africa," and Julius Paulus, "the most important among them, who was in all probability of Semitic origin."**64

https://www.constitution.org/sps/sps11.htm

1. *Ulpianus, On Taxes, Book I.*

It should be remembered that there are certain colonies subject to the Italian Law, as, for example, the magnificent colony of Tyre, in Phoenician Syria (where I was born), [Syria Phoenice splendidissima Tyriorum colonia, unde mihi origo est] the most noble of all, most ancient in point of time, warlike, and most constant in observance of the treaties which it made with the Romans. The Divine Severus and Our Emperor conferred upon it the privileges of an Italian city, on account of the extraordinary and distinguished fidelity which it always manifested in its intercourse with the Roman government.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap2.htm#COL

The municipal cities insensibly equalled the rank and splendour of the colonies; and in the reign of Hadrian, it was disputed which was the preferable condition, of those societies which had issued from, or those which had been received into the bosom of Rome. (33)

> 33. Aul. Gell. Noctes Atticae, xvi. 13. **The emperor Hadrian expressed his surprise, that the cities of Utica, Gades, and Italica, which already enjoyed the rights of 'Municipia', should solicit the title of colonies.** Their example, however, became fashionable, and the empire was filled with honorary colonies.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyre,_Lebanon#Roman_period_(64_BCE_%E2%80%93_395_CE)

In 64 BCE the area of "Syria" finally became a province of the late Roman Republic, which was itself about to become the Roman Empire.[52] **Tyre was allowed to keep much of its independence as a "civitas foederata".[53]** A decree found at Tyre implies that Marcus Aemilius Scaurus – Pompey's deputy in Syria – played the key role in granting Tyre the privileged status of remaining a free city. Scaurus did apparently so "*against a certain payment*".[54]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Hadrumetum

The town was originally a Phoenician colony founded by Tyrians long before Carthage (Sallust, Jug. 19). It became subject to Carthage, but lost none of its prosperity. Often mentioned during the Punic Wars, it was captured by Agathocles in 310, and was the refuge of Hannibal and the remnants of his army after the battle of Zama in 202. During the last Punic War it gave assistance to the Romans; **after the fall of Carthage in 146 it received an accession of territory and the title of *civitas libera*** (Appian, *Punica*, xciv.; *C.I.L.* i. p. 84).
…

Trajan made it a Latin colony under the title of *Colonia Concordia Ulpia Trajana Augusta Frugifera Hadrumetina*; a dedication to the emperor Gordian the Good, found by M. Cagnat at Susa in 1883 gives these titles to the town, and at the same time identifies it with Susa.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pupput

A settlement existed here as early as the 1st century BC, **and this may have been of Berber-Punic origin. It was a simple vicus in Carthaginian territory at the time of the Roman Emperor Antoninus Pius (2nd century AD).[5] The Roman politician Salvius Julianus is thought to have been born in the village and it may be due to him that Pupput became an honorary Colonia under the Emperor Commodus (185-192).[6]** At this time the city was probably a satellite town of its neighbour Neapolis. The earliest documentary record of the city was in 168 when it was promoted to the status of a municipium governed by an elected council.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Africans

> **The willing acceptance of Roman citizenship by members of the ruling class in African cities produced such Roman Africans as the comic poet Terence, the rhetorician Fronto of Cirta, the jurist Salvius Julianus of Hadrumetum, the novelist Apuleius of**

> **Madauros,** the emperor Septimius Severus of Lepcis Magna, the Christians Tertullian and Cyprian of Carthage, and Arnobius of Sicca and his pupil Lactantius; the angelic doctor Augustine of Thagaste, the epigrammatist Luxorius of Vandal Carthage, **and perhaps the biographer Suetonius,** and the poet Dracontius.—*Paul MacKendrick, The North African Stones Speak (1969), UNC Press, 2000, p. 326*

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Djulianus-salvius-bio-1

Julianus, Salvius: an eminent Roman jurist, who flourished under Hadrian and the Antonines. Of his private history little is known, and different opinions have been held as to the place of his birth. **Many of his biographers (as Rivallius, Val. Forsterus, Pancirolus, Rutilius, Bertrandus, Guil. Grotius) make him a native of Milan (Insuber Mediolanensis), while the majority of more modern writers say that he was born at Hadrumnetum, a Phoenician colony on the coast of Africa.** These opposite opinions are both grounded on a passage of Spartianus (*Did. Julian*. 100.1), where it is asserted that the paternal grandfather of the emperor who ascended the throne after Pertinax came from Mediolanum, and the maternal grandfather from Hadrumetum. **It is well ascertained that Salvius Julianus the jurist was a *maternal* ancestor of the emperor Didius Julianus, and it is probable that, according to the express testimony of Spartianus (*l.c.*), the jurist was the great-grandfather (*proavus*) of the emperor,** not, as Politianus asserts (*Epist. ad Jac. Modestum*), the uncle, nor, as Paulus Diaconus (*Hist. Misc.* 10.20) would make him, the grandfather. Eutropius (8.9) hesitates. "Salvius Julianus," says he, "nepos vel, secundum Lampridium, pronepos Salvii Juliani, qui sub Hadriano perpetuum composuit edictum."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvius_Julianus#Among_modern_scholars

Professor William Warwick Buckland and Professor Peter Stein take stock of Iulianus, his rôle and style, and compare him to a great jurist who flourished during the 18th century:[46]

> No other jurist exercised so great an influence on the destinies of the law.[47]

His *Digest* was

> a comprehensive treatise on both civil and praetorian law. ... **The principal characteristics of Julian's work seem to be a very lucid style and a clear recognition of the fact that legal conceptions must move with the times. He seems to have played somewhat the part which Lord Mansfield did in English law.** He did a great work of co-ordination and generalisation, sweeping away unreal and pedantic distinctions. [Prof.] Karlowa justly observes that the appearance of Julian was epoch-making.[48]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aemilius_Papinianus

Little is known about Papinian. He was of Arab origin and birth and a native of Emesa, **for he is said to have been a kinsman of Septimius Severus' second wife, Julia Domna,[4] who was a member of the Emesene dynasty.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Hs2DDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP199&hl=fi&pg=PT199#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> All the world is full of knowing men, of most learned schoolmasters, and vast libraries; and it appears to me as a truth, **that neither in Plato's time, nor Cicero's, nor Papinian's, there was ever such conveniency for studying as we see at this day there is.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dpaulus-julius-bio-2

Paulus, Julius: one of the most distinguished of the Roman jurists, **has been supposed, without any good reason, to be of Greek origin, and from a Phoenician town.** Others conjecture that he was a native of Patavium (Padua), because there is a statue there, with an inscription, Paulus; but the statue and inscription may refer to another Paulus (Gellius, 5.4, 19.7). Paulus was in the auditorium of Papinian (*Dig*. 29. *tit*. 2. *s*. 97; 49. *tit*. 14. *s*. 50), and consequently was acting as a jurist in the joint reigns of Septimius Severus and Antoninus Caracalla, and also during the reign of Caracalla.
...

Paulus was perhaps the most fertile of all the Roman law writers, and there is more excerpted from him in the Digest than from any other jurist, except Ulpian. **It is said that there are 2462 excerpts from Ulpian, in the Digest, and 2083 from Paulus, or 2080, according to Puchta**

(*Cursus*, &c. vol. i. p. 458), which make about one sixth of the whole Digest. The excerpts from Paulus and Ulpian together make about one half of the Digest. Cervidius Scaevola, Paulus, and Ulpian, are named by Modestinus (*Dig*. 27. *tit*. 2. *s*. 13.2), who was the last of the great jurists, τῶν νομικῶν κορυφαίους: Paulus is honoured by Gordian with the title "prudentissimus" (*Coa*. 5. *tit*. 4. *s*. 6). It has been objected to him that his style is too condensed, and that he is sometimes obscure; but his style is as good as that of other writers of the period, though not so easy as that of Ulpian. **Some writers have discovered something of Grecism in him, which is made an argument in favour of his Greek origin.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dmodestinus-herennius-bio-1

Modestinus often cites Ulpian, and he is cited by Aurelius Arcadius Charisius. **Though Modestinus is the latest of the great Roman jurists, he ranks among the most distinguished.** There are 345 excerpts in the *Digest* from his writings, the titles of which show the extent and variety of his labours.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diocletian#Legal

Admittedly, **Diocletian's praetorian prefects – Afranius Hannibalianus, Julius Asclepiodotus, and Aurelius Hermogenianus** – aided in regulating the flow and presentation of such paperwork, but the deep legalism of Roman culture kept the workload heavy.[256] Emperors in the forty years preceding Diocletian's reign had not managed these duties so effectively, and their output in attested rescripts is low. Diocletian, by contrast, was prodigious in his affairs: **there are around 1,200 rescripts in his name still surviving, and these probably represent only a small portion of the total issue.** [257] The sharp increase in the number of edicts and rescripts produced under Diocletian's rule has been read as evidence of an ongoing effort to realign the whole Empire on terms dictated by the imperial center.[258] Under the governance of the jurists Gregorius, Aurelius Arcadius Charisius, and Hermogenianus, the imperial government began issuing official books of precedent, collecting and listing all the rescripts that had been issued since the reign of Hadrian (r. 117-138).[259] **The Codex Gregorianus includes rescripts up to 292, which the Codex Hermogenianus updated with a comprehensive collection of rescripts issued by Diocletian in 293 and 294.**[243] Although the very act of codification was a radical innovation, given the precedent-based design of the Roman legal system,[260] the jurists were generally conservative, and constantly looked to past Roman practice and theory for guidance.[261] **They were probably given more free rein over their codes than the later compilers of the *Codex Theodosianus* (438) and *Codex Justinianus* (529) would have.** Gregorius and Hermogenianus's codices lack the rigid structuring of later codes,[262] and were not published in the name of the emperor, but in the names of their compilers.[263]

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dcharisius-aurelius-arcadius-bio-1

Herennius Modestinus, who was living in the reign of Gordianus III., is usually considered to be the last jurist of the classical period of Roman jurisprudence. "Hic oracula jurisconsultorum obmutuere," says the celebrated Jac. Godefroi (*Manuale Juris*, 1.7), "sic ut ultimum JCtorum Modestinum dicere vere liceat." For an interval of 80 or 90 years after Modestinus, no jurist appears whose works are honoured with citation in the Digest, unless Julius Aquila or Furius Anthianus belongs to that interval. The only two who can be named with certainty as posterior to Modestinus are Charisius and Hermogenianus. Of these two, the priority of date is probably, for several reasons, to be assigned to the former. It may be here mentioned, that Hermogenianus occupies the last place in the Florentine Index.
...

Both the matter and the language of the extracts from Charisius in the Digest mark the declining age of jurisprudence and Latinity. The matter betrays the mere compiler.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aentry%3Dhermogenianus-bio-1

Jacques Godefroi, in the commencement of his Prolegomena to the Theodosian Code (vol. i. p. 193), cites several passages which make it likely that Hermogenianus survived Constantine, and wrote under the reign of his sons. Thus, in *Dig*. 28. *tit*. 1. *s*. 41, *Dig*. 39. *tit*. 4. *s*. 10, *Dig*. 49. *tit*. 14. *s*. 46.7, he speaks of *principes* and *imperatores* in the plural number.
...

Before his time, the living spirit of jurisprudence had departed. He is a mere compiler, and his language, like that of Charisius, is infected with barbarisms.

https://archive.org/details/orientalreligio00cumogoog/page/n38/mode/2up?view=theater

One cannot however deny Rome the glory of having elaborated a system of private law that was logically deduced from clearly formulated principles and was destined to become the fundamental law of all civilized communities. **But even in connection with this private law, where the originality of Rome is uncontested and her preeminence absolute, recent researches have shown with how much tenacity the Hellenized Orient maintained its old legal codes, and how much resistance local customs, the woof of the life of nations, offered to unification. In truth, unification never was realized except in theory.**[7] **More than that, these researches have proved that the fertile principles of that provincial law, which was sometimes on a higher moral plane than the Roman law, reacted on the progressive transformation of the old *ius civile*.** And how could it be otherwise? Were not a great number of famous jurists like Ulpian of Tyre and Papinian of Hemesa natives of Syria? **And did not the law-school of Beirut constantly grow in importance after the third century, until during the fifth century it became the most brilliant center of legal education? Thus Levantines cultivated even the patrimonial field cleared by Scaevola and Labeo.**[8]

> 8. Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 1905, p. 366: "**Seit Diocletian übernimmt der östliche Reichsteil, die *partes Orientis*, auf allen Gebieten die Führung. Dieser späte Sieg des Hellenismus über die Lateiner ist vielleicht nirgends auffälliger als auf dem Gebiet der juristischen Schriftstellerei.**"

In the austere temple of law the Orient held as yet only a minor position; everywhere else its authority was predominant. The practical mind of the Romans, which made them excellent lawyers, prevented them from becoming great scholars. They esteemed pure science but little, having small talent for it, and one notices that it ceased to be earnestly cultivated wherever their direct domination was established. The great astronomers, mathematicians, and physicians, like the originators or defenders of the great metaphysical systems, were mostly Orientals. Ptolemy and Plotinus were Egyptians, Porphyry and Iamblichus, Syrians, Dioscorides and Galen, Asiatics. ...

Attention has often been called to the fact that those men of letters that were considered the purest representatives of the Greek spirit under the empire belonged almost without exception to Asia Minor, Syria or Egypt. The rhetorician Dion Chrysostom came from Prusa in Bithynia, the satirist Lucian from Samosata in Commagene on the borders of the Euphrates. A number of other names could be cited. **From Tacitus and Suetonius down to Ammianus, there was not one author of talent to preserve in Latin the memory of the events that stirred the world of that period,** but it was a Bithynian again, Dion Cassius of Nicea, who, under the Severi, narrated the history of the Roman people.

It is a characteristic fact that, besides this literature whose language was Greek, others were born, revived and developed. **The Syriac, derived from the Aramaic which was the international language of earlier Asia, became again the language of a cultured race with Bardesanes of Edessa.** The Copts remembered that they had spoken several dialects derived from the ancient Egyptian and endeavored to revive them. North of the Taurus even the Armenians began to write and polish their barbarian speech. **Christian preaching, addressed to the people, took hold of the popular idioms and roused them from their long lethargy. Along the Nile as well as on the plains of Mesopotamia or in the valleys of Anatolia it proclaimed its new ideas in dialects that had been despised hitherto,** and wherever the old Orient had not been entirely denationalized by Hellenism, it successfully reclaimed its intellectual autonomy.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius2a.html#c2

[2.2] But how our ancient magistrates behaved themselves in upholding the majesty of the Roman people, may be observed from this, that among all their other marks of care for dignity, **they punctually maintained this rule, to talk with the Greeks only in the Latin language.** And also causing them to lay aside the volubility of their own language, they forced them to speak by an interpreter, not only in our own city, but in Greece and Asia, so that the honour of the Latin language might be spread with greater veneration among other nations. **They did not neglect the study of learning, but they did not hold it appropriate that the toga should in any way be subject to the Greek cloak.** They believed it a poor and demeaning thing, that the weight and authority of government should be tamed by the charms of eloquence.

[2.3] And therefore, Gaius Marius, you are not to be condemned for foolish rigour, not to let your old age, crowned with double laurels, illustrious with German and Numidian trophies, be softened and overcome by the eloquence of a vanquished nation. Perhaps you feared lest, if you appeared a foreigner in the exercise of your wit, you might seem to desert your native customs. **Who therefore opened the way to the Greek pleadings that now deafen the senate's ears? It was Molon the rhetorician, as I am persuaded – who likewise sharpened the studies of M. Cicero.** For he was the first foreigner that was ever heard in the senate without an interpreter; which honour he received not undeservedly,

having greatly advanced the force of the Roman eloquence. **Of conspicuous felicity is Arpinum, whether you respect the one man as a great despiser of learning, or the other as its abounding fountain.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n489/mode/2up?view=theater

We should obscure these outstanding figures if we were to surround them with lesser lights. **After them there were no giants in pagan Latin letters. Reason had made its great effort from Ennius to Tacitus and had spent itself.** It is a shock to pass from the grandeur of the *Histories* and the *Annals* to the scandalous chronicle of Suetonius' *Lives of Illustrious Men* (110); history is here degenerating into biography, and biography into anecdote; portents and miracles and superstitions crowd the pages, and only the Elizabethan English of Philemon Holland's translation (1606) has raised the book to the level of literature. Less disturbing is the descent from Pliny to the letters of Fronto. Perhaps these were not meant for publication, and cannot be fairly compared with Pliny's; some were spoiled by a search for archaic phraseology, but many are touched by real affection of the teacher for his pupil. **Aulus Gellius supported the archaizing movement in his *Attic Nights* (169)—the largest collection of worthless trifles in ancient literature;** and Apuleius brought it to a climax in *The Golden Ass.* **Apuleius and Fronto came from Africa, and the fad may have had partial source in the fact that written Latin there had departed less than in Rome from the language of the people and the Republic.** Fronto rightly believed in strengthening literature with popular speech, as one freshens a plant by turning over the earth at its roots. But youth does not come twice to a man, a nation, a literature, or a language. **Orientalization had set in and could not be stopped.** The common Greek tongue of the Hellenistic East and Oriental Rome was becoming the language of literature as well as of life; Fronto's pupil chose it for his *Meditations.* Appian, an Alexandrian Greek living at Rome, chose Greek for his vivid *Histories* of Rome's wars (*ca.* 160); so did Claudius Aelian, a Roman by birth and blood; a half century later Dio Cassius, a Roman senator, would write his history of Rome in Greek. **Leadership in literature was passing back from Rome to the Greek East; not to the Greek spirit, but to the Oriental soul using Hellenic speech. There would be giants again in Latin; but they would be Christian saints.**

https://www.britannica.com/art/Latin-literature/Silver-Age-ad-18-133

The decentralization of the empire under Hadrian and the Antonines weakened the Roman pride and passion for liberty. Romans began again to write in Greek as well as Latin. The "new sophistic" movement in Greece affected the "novel poets" such as Florus. An effete culture devoted itself to philology, archaism, and preciosity. **After Juvenal, 250 years elapsed before Ausonius of Bordeaux (4th century AD) and the last of the true classics, Claudian (flourished about 400), appeared.**

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap2.htm#GNS

The sciences of physic and astronomy were successfully cultivated by the Greeks; the observations of Ptolemy and the writings of Galen are studied by those who have improved their discoveries and corrected their errors; **but if we except the inimitable Lucian, this age of indolence passed away without having produced a single writer of original genius, or who excelled in the arts of elegant composition.** The authority of Plato and Aristotle, of Zeno and Epicurus, still reigned in the schools; and their systems, transmitted with blind deference from one generation of disciples to another, precluded every generous attempt to exercise the powers, or enlarge the limits, of the human mind. The beauties of the poets and orators, instead of kindling a fire like their own, inspired only cold and servile imitations: or if any ventured to deviate from those models, they deviated at the same time from good sense and propriety on the revival of letters, the youthful vigour of the imagination, after a long repose, national emulation, a new religion, new languages, and a new world, called forth the genius of Europe. **But the provincials of Rome, trained by a uniform artificial foreign education, were engaged in a very unequal competition with those bold ancients, who, by expressing their genuine feelings in their native tongue, had already occupied every place of honour.** The name of Poet was almost forgotten; that of Orator was usurped by the sophists. A cloud of critics, of compilers, of commentators, darkened the face of learning, and the decline of genius was soon followed by the corruption of taste.

The sublime Longinus, who in somewhat a later period, and in the court of a Syrian queen, preserved the spirit of ancient Athens, observes and laments this degeneracy of his contemporaries, which debased their sentiments, enervated their courage, and depressed their talents.

> "In the same manner," says he, "as some children always remain pigmies, whose infant limbs have been too closely confined; **thus our tender minds, fettered by the prejudices and habits of a just servitude, are unable to expand themselves, or to attain that well-proportioned greatness which we admire in the ancients; who living under a popular government, wrote with the same freedom as they acted.**" (111)
>
> 111. Longin, de Sublim. c. 43, p. 229, edit. Toll. **Here too we may say of Longinus, "*his own example strengthens all his laws.*" Instead of proposing his sentiments with a manly**

> **boldness, he insinuates them with the most guarded caution, puts them into the mouth of a friend;** and, as far as we can collect from a corrupted text, makes a show of refuting them himself.

This diminutive stature of mankind, if we pursue the metaphor, was daily sinking below the old standard, and the Roman world was indeed peopled by a race of pygmies **when the fierce giants of the north broke in, and mended the puny breed. They restored a manly spirit of freedom; and after the revolution of ten centuries, freedom became the happy parent of taste and science.**

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap6.htm

It would be a waste of time to multiply examples of religious techniques in the Classical world amid the first great civilization of our race, but we may mention one measure of its decline. Livy knew from his sources the secret of the miraculous torches that were carried by hysterical females during the Bacchanalian craze, excited by a Greek-speaking evangelist in 186 B.C., but in the Second Century, **Suetonius, Cassius Dio, and Pausanias mention chemically similar miracles without indicating that they did not believe them to be of supernatural origin. One hopes those authors were not so credulous, but they lived in a century in which both reason and our race were nearing their end in the mongrelized Empire that was still called Roman.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#third

In the third period, between the reigns of Alexander and Justinian, the oracles of jurisprudence were almost mute. The measure of curiosity had been filled: the throne was occupied by tyrants and Barbarians, the active spirits were diverted by religious disputes, and the professors of Rome, Constantinople, and Berytus, were humbly content to repeat the lessons of their more enlightened predecessors. From the slow advances and rapid decay of these legal studies, **it may be inferred, that they require a state of peace and refinement.** From the multitude of voluminous civilians who fill the intermediate space, it is evident that such studies may be pursued, and such works may be performed, with a common share of judgment, experience, and industry. **The genius of Cicero and Virgil was more sensibly felt, as each revolving age had been found incapable of producing a similar or a second: but the most eminent teachers of the law were assured of leaving disciples equal or superior to themselves in merit and reputation.**

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Grant_(classicist)

He once described himself as "one of the very few freelancers in the field of ancient history: a rare phenomenon". As a populariser, his hallmarks were his prolific output and his unwillingness to oversimplify or talk down to his readership.
...

According to his obituary in *The Times* he was "one of the few classical historians to win respect from [both] academics and a lay readership".[2]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=o-Y7AAAAIAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

But it was not until the second century A.D., and later still, that the greatest names in Roman Law appeared. **The law that these writers handed down is probably the greatest single gift made by Rome to civilisation.**
...

That is to say, they begin at a time when the histories of Latin literature often stop. The legal treatises are not usually included in accounts of this literature. But they should at least be mentioned, for two reasons. First, it is in such legal writings, dry as they are, that the special qualities of Latin, its clarity and precision, show most conspicuously. **Secondly, of all Latin writings these have perhaps been the most influential on the medieval and modern world.**
...

The earliest of the great names of this epoch is Salvius Julianus (*c.* A.D. 100-69). Like many other thinkers and writers of this and the following century, he was a North African.
...

Salvius Julianus and Gaius belong to the great period of Roman peace and prosperity in the second century A.D. It is remarkable that the next epoch of conspicuous progress and of famous legal names coincides with a later and much less happy period, the totalitarian military monarchy imposed on the war-impoverished empire by the African Septimius Severus (A.D. 193-211) and his successors. **This epoch witnessed striking legal advances.**

…

Roman Law continued to develop in these epochs of which the ordinary classical curriculum knows nothing. Even in as brief a study as this, room must be found for the name of a man who lived after the fall of Rome itself – three centuries after the jurists who have just been mentioned. This was Tribonian, who was born in southern Asia Minor and became the closest adviser of the Byzantine emperor Justinian (A.D. 527-65) in a mighty Latin codification of Roman Law. This included extracts from lawyers extending over more than 300 years. **According to the emperor, 3,000,000 lines – of 2,000 books – were read for the purpose of selection, but only 5 per cent of this material was chosen for publication.**
…

Tribonian's work is the basis of modern European law. In the early Middle Ages its effects were already present in the West. At first they were latent; but then the Church began to systematise what it knew. **In the twelfth century A.D. Roman Law came to the fore again, when a manuscript of the *Digest* was discovered at Florence, and 'Canon Law' was codified in Bologna. The old Stoic Law of Nature, in a contemporary guise, was actually held to be fully represented and exemplified by Roman Law.**

We do not, today, give Roman Law this overriding position. But our society has accepted many of the most important legal institutions which Rome had evolved. **We accept, for example, in very much the same way as Roman Law, the concepts of family, of private property, of the sanctity of contracts. But this sort of list by no means exhausts the Roman legal ideas which have had vast effects at different epochs of history – ideas including that of International Law, with its obvious debts to the Law of Nature and the Roman 'right of peoples.'**

We tend to take these things for granted. But the reason why we are able to do so is because the Romans, with the impact of Greek thought – largely introduced by Cicero and Seneca – operating on their native environment and mentality, developed them as workable ideas. Those ideas, at different stages of their development, were recorded by Salvius Julianus, Papinian, Tribonian and the rest. **That is why these must be ranked among the most influential writers in the Latin language.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Phineas_Sherman

Sherman was born into an old New England family in West Springfield, Massachusetts.[1] The American Sherman family began with Philip Sherman, who emigrated from England in 1634 and became the Colony of Rhode Island's first Secretary.[2]
…

Sherman spent ten of these Yale years researching and writing what he called his magnum opus, *Roman Law in the Modern Worla*, which was published in 1917.[16]
…

It is a three-volume work of great ambition. Volume one consists of a history of Roman law from its possible beginnings in Babylon, through the Republic and Empire, medieval times, and into the modern world.[18] Volume two is a "manual," or exposition of the fundamental principles of Roman law, including their expressions in modern legal systems,[19] while volume three is a bibliography of Roman and civil law by subject.[20] **RLMW was a huge undertaking that would have taxed the abilities of even the greatest Roman law scholar,** and most critics decided Sherman had not been fully up to the task.[21]

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n87/mode/2up?view=theater

§ 57 The classical period of Roman law, A.D. 98-244.

The culmination of the development of Roman law from a local city law into a world law occurred under the Early Empire. But this culmination came gradually and was not caused suddenly as if by the blast of a hurricane. The jus civile was slowly submerged by the jus gentium, because the latter was more inherently reasonable and just and more in accordance with the private law of other nations. **From the 2d century to the middle of the 3d century A.D. was the Golden Age of Roman jurisprudence, beginning with the jurist Celsus and ending with Modestinus.** Through the labors of the Imperial jurists, Roman law in the century of the Antonines and Severi attained to such marvelous perfection that the whole period from the reign of Hadrian—better, Trajan—until shortly after the close of the reign of Alexander Severus is commonly called the "classical Roman law."
…

In the year 212 the Emperor Caracalla promulgated a law bestowing citizenship on all free inhabitants of the Empire.15 Thereafter, but few traces of the long-standing Roman antithesis between complete and partial citizenship remained, and these were formally abolished by Justinian. **Caracalla's Edict wiped out the old Republican distinction between Roman citizens and Roman subjects, and set up a new Imperial citizenship. Local citizenship and a local private law became replaced by universal citizenship and a universal private law. *The jus civile became the jus vetus.***

15. "In orbe Romano qui sunt, ex constitutione imperatoris Antonini cives Romani effecti sunt": *Dig.* 1.5.17.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=oR0LAAAAIAAJ&lpg=PA329&hl=fi&pg=PA526#v=onepage&q&f=false

Ius antiquum. The earlier law referred to for comparison with new legal provisions. **In imperial constitutions of the late Empire and with Justinian, *ius antiquum* denotes the classical law, sometimes going as far back as the Twelve Tables. Syn. *ius vetus*.** ant. *ius novum*.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n95/mode/2up?view=theater

From Augustus to Diocletian Roman scientific jurisprudence was fully developed and just before Diocletian's reign attained its final maturity. The formative period of Roman law closed with the jurist Papinian. The jus gentium with its tenets of "natural" law and justice had now triumphed over the jus civile. Roman law became truly a world law,—suited for the wants of all mankind. After the accession of Diocletian, the development of Roman law practically ceased; it was then merely summed up by men of genius and crystallized in the form of codification.

Corpus Iuris Civilis, The Digest, Book L, Title 32.

The Same [Ulpian], On Sabinus, Book XLIII.

So far as the Civil Law is concerned, slaves are not considered persons, but this is not the case according to natural law, because natural law regards all men as equal.

https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/d-50.htm#17

50.17.32

Ulpianus libro 43 ad Sabinum

Quod attinet ad ius civile, servi pro nullis habentur: non tamen et iure naturali, quia, quod ad ius naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Clemency/Book_I#XVIII.

Slaves are allowed to run and take sanctuary at the statue of a god; though the laws allows a slave to be ill-treated to any extent, there are nevertheless some things which the common laws of life [commune ius animantium] forbid us to do to a human being. Who does not hate Vedius Pollio[10] more even than his own slaves did, because he used to fatten his lampreys with human blood, and ordered those who had offended him in any way to be cast into his fish-pond, or rather snake-pond? That man deserved to die a thousand deaths, both for throwing his slaves to be devoured by the lampreys which he himself meant to eat, and for keeping lampreys that he might feed them in such a fashion.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D13

WHEN some one asked, how may a man eat acceptably to the gods, he answered: If he can eat justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and temperately and orderly, will it not be also acceptably to the gods? But when you have asked for warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has brought only tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this acceptable to the gods?—How then shall a man endure such persons as this slave? **Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above?** But if you have been put in any such higher place, will you immediately make yourself a tyrant? **Will you not remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the offspring of Zeus?**[1]—But I have purchased them, and they have not purchased me. **Do you see in what direction you are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that it is towards these wretched laws of dead men?**[2] **but towards the laws of the gods you are not looking.**

2. I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave to another; and when he says “dead men,” he may mean mortal men, as contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Duruy

Already known as a historian by his *Histoire des Romains et des peuples soumis à leur domination* (7 vols, 1843-1844), **he was chosen by Napoleon III to assist him in his biography of Julius Caesar, and his abilities being thus brought under the emperor's notice, he was in 1863 appointed minister of education.**

https://archive.org/details/historyofromeofr05duru/page/498/mode/2up?view=theater

In the doctrine of the λόγος, which unites man to God and men to one another, the new Stoics asserted the principle—the basis of human society and of the divine commonwealth—that we ought to honor the divine spirit that is within us by moral purity, and that which is in our fellow-creatures by love towards them. **Now history has shown us these ideas coming forth from the school to permeate civil law, which they change, and even the administration of justice, which they modify. Jurisconsults such as the world has not seen since, following one another uninterruptedly during two centuries, have transformed the old Quiritarian law, first of all ameliorated by the law of nations, then by the law of nature, into the legislation which has been termed "written reason," or in the words of Ulpian, "the most holy civil wisdom."** Celsus, a friend of Hadrian, defined law as "the science of the good and the just;" and Justinian has placed at the head of his *Pandects* these three sentences of Ulpian: "The precepts of the law are to live honorably, to injure no one, to give to every one his due,"1 **Law became a religion, the worship of justice, and the *prudentes* with pride called themselves its priests.**2

> 2. ***Cujus merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet: justitiam namque colimus et boni et aequi notitiam profitemur*** (Ulpian, in *Digest*, I. i. sect. 1).

The spirit of equity, which the jurisconsults introduced into the law, entered also into government; imperial Rome shared her civil political rights with those whom Republican Rome had termed the foreigner and the enemy, and we have seen how the Antonines alleviated the condition of the woman, the son, and the slave, gave assistance to destitute children, a physician to the sick, and funeral rites to those who were unable to pay for a pyre or a tomb.1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Woodthorpe_Tarn

According to some, **Tarn offered a somewhat idealistic interpretation of Alexander's conquests as culturally inclusive and essentially driven by his vision of the "unity of mankind"** in the Opis Decree. Such a reading, which echoes Hellenistic philosophical ecumenicalism[5] has been challenged by recent revisionists.[6] Jeanne Reames remarked that **"Tarn's portrait of Alexander turned the Greek conqueror into a proper Scottish gentleman".**

https://archive.org/details/antigonosgonatas00tarn/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover, when things indifferent – that is to say, everything intermediate between absolute virtue and absolute vice – were at last admitted to belong to two classes, the Stoic became bounden to choose the preferable class; and therewith came into the world the first beginnings, as a philosophic concept, of the idea of duty.62 **The ideal Wise Man was a monster of self-sufficiency, passionless, pitiless, perfect, but in the attempt to reach perfection the Stoic was led to examine the progress which he was making, and therewith came into the world the idea of conscious moral growth.**63 A philosophy which started from the moral consciousness of the individual was led to take up and develop, though it did not actually originate, the notion of conscience.64 **The idea of conscience is still perhaps incomplete; the idea of duty is still far from the categorical imperative; but it was much to get a start made.** And if the Stoic, happily, never realized his Wise Man, in the struggle toward him he realized much else; and the men whom he formed were men.65

> 64. *συνείδησις*. See Lightfoot, *St. Paul and Seneca*, (in his *Epistle to the Philippians*), p. 301. **The idea itself, which is not found in the Old Testament, appears in Greek literature, as *συνεσις*, first in Euripides (*Or*. 396), from whom, probably, Menander took it (Stob. *Flor*. 24, 3, p. 192, conscience makes cowards of the boldest); but the Stoics first brought it into philosophy.**
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-53
>
> Furthermore, the term Duty is applied to that for which, when done,[54] a reasonable defence can be adduced, e.g. harmony in the tenor of life's process, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals. **For even in plants and animals, they hold, you may discern fitness of behaviour.** 108. **Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct.** Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. [55] And it is an action in itself adapted to nature's arrangements.
>
> > 55. The ordinary meaning of the verb καθήκειν is well seen in Hdt. vii. 22 ὁ γὰρ Ἄθως ἐστὶ ὄρος μέγα τε καὶ ὀνομαστὸν ἐς θάλασσαν κατῆκον ("for Athos is a great and famous mountain, **reaching down** to the sea").

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dalberg-Acton,_1st_Baron_Acton

Acton took a great interest in the United States, considering its federal structure an ideal guarantor of individual liberties. During the American Civil War, his sympathies lay entirely with the Confederacy, for their defence of States' Rights against a centralised government that he believed would inevitably turn tyrannical. His notes to Gladstone on the subject helped sway many in the British government to sympathise with the South. **After the South's surrender, he wrote to Robert E. Lee that "I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo,"** adding that he "deemed that you were fighting battles for our liberty, our progress, and our civilization."[7]

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020

We are dealing, not with the effects of freedom, but with its causes. We are seeking out the influences which brought arbitrary government under control, either by the diffusion of power, or by the appeal to an authority which transcends all government, and among those influences the greatest philosophers of Greece have no claim to be reckoned.

It is the Stoics who emancipated mankind from its subjugation to despotic rule, and whose enlightened and elevated views of life bridged the chasm that separates the ancient from the Christian state, and led the way to freedom. Seeing how little security there is that the laws of any land shall be wise or just, and that the unanimous will of a people and the assent of nations are liable to err, the Stoics looked beyond those narrow barriers, and above those inferior sanctions, for the principles that ought to regulate the lives of men and the existence of society. **They made it known that there is a will superior to the collective will of man, and a law that overrules those of Solon and Lycurgus.** Their test of good government is its conformity to principles that can be traced to a higher legislator. That which we must obey, that to which we are bound to reduce all civil authorities, and to sacrifice every earthly interest, is **that immutable law which is perfect and eternal as God Himself, which proceeds from His nature, and reigns over heaven and earth and over all the nations.**

The great question is to discover, not what governments prescribe, but what they ought to prescribe; for no prescription is valid against the conscience of mankind. Before God, there is neither Greek nor barbarian, neither rich nor poor, and the slave is as good as his master, for by birth all men are free; they are citizens of that universal commonwealth which embraces all the world, brethren of one family, and children of God. **The true guide of our conduct is no outward authority, but the voice of God, who comes down to dwell in our souls,** who knows all our thoughts, to whom are owing all the truth we know, and all the good we do; for vice is voluntary, and virtue comes from the grace of the heavenly spirit within.

What the teaching of that divine voice is, the philosophers who had imbibed the sublime ethics of the Porch went on to expound: It is not enough to act up to the written law, or to give all men their due; we ought to give them more than their due, to be generous and beneficent, to devote ourselves for the good of others, seeking our reward in self-denial and sacrifice, acting from the motive of sympathy and not of personal advantage. Therefore we must treat others as we wish to be treated by them, and must persist until death in doing good to our enemies, regardless of unworthiness and ingratitude. For we must be at war with evil, but at peace with men, and it is better to suffer than to commit injustice. True freedom, says the most eloquent of the Stoics, consists in obeying God. **A State governed by such principles as these would have been free far beyond the measure of Greek or Roman freedom; for they open a door to religious toleration, and close it against slavery.** Neither conquest nor purchase, said Zeno, can make one man the property of another.

These doctrines were adopted and applied by the great jurists of the Empire. The law of nature, they said, is superior to the written law, and slavery contradicts the law of nature. Men have no right to do what they please with their own, or to make profit out of another’s loss. **Such is the political wisdom of the ancients, touching the foundations of liberty, as we find it in its highest development, in Cicero, and Seneca, and Philo, a Jew of Alexandria.** Their writings impress upon us the greatness of the work of preparation for the Gospel which had been accomplished among men on the eve of the mission of the Apostles. **St. Augustine, after quoting Seneca, exclaims: “What more could a Christian say than this Pagan has said?” The enlightened pagans had reached nearly the last point attainable without a new dispensation, when the fulness of time was come.** We have seen the breadth and the splendour of the domain of Hellenic thought, and it has brought us to the threshold of a greater kingdom. The best of the later classics speak almost the language of Christianity, and they border on its spirit.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eoNmDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA46#v=onepage&q&f=false

Jehu Baker, a lawyer, represented the state of Illinois in Congress from 1866 to 1869. He later served two more terms, from 1887 to 1889 and from 1897 to 1899.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/432/mode/2up?view=theater

Of the second sort, we have a fine illustration in **the capital legal conception that all human law ought to be brought into conformity with the law of nature**—a recognition of the "Higher Law" which laid at the foundation of the great and solid jural progress which the Romans made. **It may be added that, as regards *liberty*, the theory of the Roman law was even superior to the theories of the most eminent of the Greek philosophers.** Plato, in his ideal Republic, simply recommends—for an expedient reason—that there should be no slaves of *Hellenic* blood. Aristotle regards liberty and slavery as conditioned upon capacity,—nature, in his view, designing some men for a state of slavery, and others for a state of freedom. **But the Roman lawyers rose to the simple and uniform conception that, by the Law of Nature, Liberty is the status of all men, and that slavery, in contravention of this law, derived its origin from the usages of war;** "for wars ensued, and from these sprang captivity and slavery, which are contrary to natural justice; for by the law of nature all men are born free."6

> 6. *Bella etenim orta sunt, et captivitates secutae, et servitutes, quae sunt naturali juri contrariae: jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur. Inst*., lib. i, tit. ii, 2.

These great jural conceptions—by which the Law of Nature is held up as the ideal standard of all legal excellence, and by which that law is interpreted as the perpetual sanction of Universal Liberty—must take their place among the most precious products of civilization; and they have exerted a very deep and widespread influence upon modern societies.7

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Loring_Brace

Brace's Emigration Plan was also an anti-eugenic movement because despite his religious prejudices Brace believed that one's "gemmules" (an early, pre-genetic concept that blood carried a family's heritability and character) did not predetermine one's future. Brace was deeply moved by Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*, having read it thirteen times.[21] **He argued Darwinism was compatible with charitable efforts like his, against some Social Darwinists who held the opposite view.** Brace was also an outspoken abolitionist who (unusually in his time even for abolitionists) entirely rejected scientific racism, arguing that Black people should have equal rights, and even held their having children with Whites could lead to a better future race.[22] In a bold move (and perhaps inspired by his abolitionist and Darwinian mindset), Brace did away with the centuries-old custom of indenture so that the "placed" children were allowed to leave a home if they were uncomfortable with the placement.

https://archive.org/details/unknowngodorins00bracgoog/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater

From this Stoical principle of the brotherhood of man came forth the greatest influence of Stoicism, that upon the ideas of Roman jurists in international law.
...

These ideas have profoundly influenced modern political thought, and even practical institutions of government. They are the one great bequest of Stoicism to modern times, and they plainly sprang from its religion.7 **It is a mistake to suppose that Stoicism was always harsh and cruel. Zeno is quoted a saying that "the God who rules the city is Love."** The followers of this philosophy were full of the idea that man belongs to all others, and that he is a stranger to none. No school ever taught the brotherhood of man more clearly.

https://snaccooperative.org/view/62773237

Although influenced by the Hegelianism of John and Edward Caird, Wenley considered himself an objective idealist. At the University of Michigan, he was a popular and influential teacher, knowledgeable in both science and classical scholarship.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.103687/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater

Limits of space preclude adequate discussion of Roman law in this connection. Suffice it to point out that this, the greatest gift of Rome to posterity, could not have developed as it did without the interposition of Stoicism. For centuries prior to her effective contact with Greek modes of thought, Rome observed her own law, the civil law (law of the city) or, in the expression which indicates its *local* character, the law of the *Quirites* – of those who shared full rights of citizenship. **As conquest brought expansion and constant intercourse with subject allies, putative enemies, and 'barbarians' (earlier law differentiated sharply between the three classes), another type of law gained recognition slowly.** This was the *Jus Gentium*, not our modern "law of nations," but usages so observed by aliens as to have the effect of law among them. Another and, probably, later name for the new departure seems to have been *Jus Commune*, a norm acknowledged by both parties to a cause almost as matter of 'common sense,' and therefore usual in that it might be anticipated among 'decent' people. **It embodied 'immemorial usage,' not technical or statuted legality which**

might well drift far from equity. But it did not revert to metaphysical principles. Thus another step had to be taken: hence, whatever the origin of the *Jus Gentium* at Rome (still in doubt), it came to be regarded, not as a code drawn in the special interest of aliens, nor even as a selection from their ways, but simply as the body of universal principles 'naturally' presupposed by all particular or municipal laws. This transition was mediated by Cicero and by the great jurisconsults of the Empire who, like directing Romans then, professed Stoicism almost as a religion. It would be a misapprehension to infer that Stoicism dominated specific statutes. In this respect it was like Christianity in Europe later, or the Utilitarian philosophy in liberal England after 1832. It furnished a certain ideal which, operating over a long period, transformed the *Jus Gentium*, an *exception*, into a rational system so flexible and sane as to become the embodiment of equity for western society.

We have seen that the Greeks were agitating high questions about Law and Justice and Right at a time when Rome was little more than a rural village. They were learning that Rights pertain to persons, operate between persons, and that the community would consult its own safety did it abstain from constant meddling with these "faculties." **Moreover, they were seeing dimly what the Romans never saw at all, that there may be Rights, pertaining to immaterial or spiritual affairs of human nature, of such intense significance as to merit the description "absolute."** This reached beyond the most generous Roman interpretation of the *Jus Gentium* or *Jus Commune*, which predicated observances already current. You may term the further step abstraction, if you please. It involved the typical Stoic notion of a "partnership of mankind" inseparable from the order of the universe. As such, it may consort with the *Jus Gentium*. Even so, it portends a transcendental ideal, that is, a state of relations not yet realized, but eminently to be desired. **The Stoics called it *Jus Naturale*, nigh a divine law, assuredly the origin, likewise the final cause, of all law. In other words, they supplied the sole philosophical ideas in which the Romans proved quite at home, – the speculative basis for systematic thought about Law and Justice and Rights. More important, they loosed the impulse whereby changes might be made in the temper of legal institutions. Briefly, the *Jus Naturale* injected a socio-political factor into the calculations of jurists which was destined to be of immeasurable influence later throughout western history. Jumping the centuries, contemporary "unrest" seems to testify to its potency now;** and, if we consider all the implications of the Virginia "Declaration of Rights," of the "Declaration of Independence," and of the Constitution, **we hardly exaggerate in suggesting that, without "the politics of a higher region" incident to the Stoic Law of Nature, the independent commonwealth known as the United States of America would never have found *reason* for existence.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rudolf_von_Jhering

In the second half of the 19th century, Jhering's reputation was as high as that of Savigny's in the first half. Their methods were almost diametrically opposed. Savigny and his school represented a historical approach. Jhering's conception of jurisprudence was as a science to be utilized for the further advancement of the moral and social interests of mankind.
...

He was also the great-great-grandfather of Australian singer and actress Olivia Newton-John through his daughter Helene Ehrenberg and her marriage to the German jurist Victor Ehrenberg.

https://archive.org/details/evolutionaryan01drucgoog/page/n241/mode/2up?view=theater

The advance achieved by Christ can no longer be credited to Judaism. The Semite has never got beyond the idea of the *national exclusiveness* of the deity, which has ever been the starting-point for the conception of a deity; neither has the Jew. **But the Greeks had already got beyond this when Christ appeared, and therefore his doctrine was appreciated by them as it could not be by any Semite.** The Hellenism of that time is characterized by the trait of cosmopolitanism, which animated it externally as well as internally: externally by the dispersion of the Greeks over the whole of the then civilized world, internally by their being elevated above the ideal of national exclusiveness: externally no longer bound to their native soil, cosmopolitans, everywhere met with as bearers of culture to all people; internally, **raised to the corresponding cosmopolitan conception that on religious territory found expression in deliverance from the idea of the national deity.**
...

In whatever way it happened to come about that Christ was influenced by Hellenism, it is quite certain that he went a very long way beyond it. Although the doctrine of the one God which Christ preached was not new to the learned Hellenes of his time, **the idea that God is Love, and that the salvation of mankind is bound up in love – this highest conception of the deity, beyond which there is nothing higher, was altogether new to them. In reaching this not merely intellectual, but moral, height, the principle of the universality of religion was for the first time practically realized, a true message of salvation was proclaimed to all mankind.**
...

That the same God who is for us is also for others – in short, the idea of universality or community in the domain of religion, in contrast to national character or exclusiveness – **this idea, without which Monotheism is but an empty name, was first realized by the Aryans;** and that this was so has its

ultimate proof, not in their superior intellectual endowments – for in this respect they were in no wise superior to the Semites – but in their higher moral elevation, in idealism, which forms the leading trait in their character (§ 36).

This contrast between national character and universality in religion is repeated amongst the Romans in the domain of law. As in the other case, the development begins with the idea of national character and exclusiveness: our law is ours only; the strangers have no part in it.2 In their own interests, for the purpose of furthering their trade, this principle was gradually set aside, but in reality abolished, that is to say it was first replaced, by the principle of universality in the *jus gentium* of the Romans, which was specially instituted by the side of the national law (which was solely for the use of Romans, *jus civile*), as general law, for the use of all nations trading with them. **The *jus civile* stands on a par with the exclusively national Polytheism or Monotheism; the *jus gentium* corresponds to the supra-national Monotheism of Christianity, and Roman lawyers attribute to it the same character of universal validity as the Christian Church ascribes to the former.**1 **The idea of universality first arises with the Aryans; it has always remained foreign to the Semites.**

> 1. ix., *De J. et J.* (l, i.): "*quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur.*" **Similarly in the Middle Ages, Roman law, as "revealed law" (*ratio scripta*), was placed side by side with Christianity, as "revealed religion."**

---

https://miranda.revues.org/6680

Chamberlain scorned this “racial chaos of the late Roman Empire, which destroyed any racial and national principle”16—**this “chaos of peoples of the decadent Roman Empire” being a capital “sin against nature”.**17

> 16. “Das Rassen- und Nationalitätlose Völkerchaos des spätrömischen Imperiums,” *Ibid.*, p. 371.

As a true Wagnerian, Chamberlain needed heroes and saviours. Despite this biological disaster or the inevitable fall of the Romans, the Nordic race did not disappear. The Europe the Romans had ambitioned was saved by a racial messiah: the Germanic tribes which, by invading the Empire, preserved the continent and its civilization. The Teutonic warrior is therefore celebrated by Chamberlain’s book with the same resonating fury as Wagner’s operas:

> Without him, the Indo-Europeans would have disappeared. In a criminal way, the Asian and African slave had crawled up to the throne of the Roman Empire. **The Syrian bastard had taken possession of laws,** and the Jew used the Library of Alexandria to adapt Greek philosophy to the Mosaic Law (…). It was high time the saviour appeared.18

Contrary to what is being taught by “those who are too lazy to think and by flagrant historical lies”, **the Germanic invasions did not destroy the Empire but saved it from its fatal “jewification” and degeneration.**

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/1/13*.html#ref15
>
> Knowing the Roman court and army well, and despising them as heartily, educated in the Christian faith, proud of the willing allegiance of a nation of warriors, fated to destroy, yet not loving the work of mere destruction, **Alaric, and the kings of the Visigoths who followed him, are in fact knights-errant who rear the standard of chivalry—with its errors as well as its noble thoughts—in the level waste of the Orientalised despotism and effete civilisation of the Roman Empire.**
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/3/9*.html
>
> **The Roman Empire of the West fell because it had completed its work, and the time had come for it to be cut down, and to cumber the ground no longer. Its rise, its extension over nearly the whole civilised world, had been a vast blessing to humanity; its prolonged existence, even had it been governed by an endless succession of Emperors like Trajan and Marcus, would have been a bane as great as the blessing.** To all the nations around the Mediterranean sea it had brought peace, discipline, the reign of law, the preparation for Christianity; but it had robbed them of liberty, and as century was added to century, the virtues of the free man were being more and more effaced by the habit of blind submission to authority. **It was time for the Teutonic nations to rejuvenate the world, to bring their noisy energy into those silent and melancholy countries, peopled only by slaves and despots.** It was

> time to exhibit on the arena of the world the ruder virtues and the more vigorous vices of a people who, even in their vices, showed that they were still young and strong; it was time that the sickly odour of incense offered to imbecile Emperors and lying Prefects should be scattered before the fresh moorland-air of liberty. **In short, both as to the building up, and as to the pulling down of the world-Empire of Rome, we have a right to say, 'It was, because the Lord God willed it so.'**

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n229/mode/2up?view=theater

When I read Roman history I feel compelled to turn away with horror; but when I contemplate the two incomparable creations of this people, the ordered State and private law, I can only bow in silent reverence before such intellectual greatness.

But this heroic people died out, and after its complete extinction there came, as we saw, a second period of Roman politics. Foreigners occupied the supreme power and foreign lawyers became the masters of public law and constitutional law as well as of the incomparable private law which had grown like a living thing, and which they preserved, so to speak, in alcohol, in the wise conviction that it could not be made more perfect but at most might degenerate. **These advisers of the crown were mostly natives of Asia Minor, Greeks and Semites, that is to say, the recognised masters in the handling of abstractions and in juristic subtleties.** And now there came an episode of the Roman constitution in which, if nothing absolutely new was invented, there were many new interpretations, which were sublimated to principles, and then crystallised into rigid dogmas. The process is very analogous to that described in the passage dealing with Hellenic art and philosophy. The Roman republic had been a living organism, in which the people was constantly and industriously introducing improvements; the formal question of leading "principles" had never arisen, the present had never wished to hold the future in bondage. That went so far that the highest officials of the law-court, the praetors, nominated for a year, each issued on his entry into office a so-called "praetorian edict," in which he published the principles which he intended to follow in his administration of the law; and thus it became possible to adapt the existing code to changing times and conditions. Similarly everything in this State was elastic, everything remained in touch with the needs of life. **But exactly as the poetical inspirations of the Greek philosophers and their mystical interpretations of the Inscrutable had been transformed in Helleno-Semitic Alexandria to dogmas of faith, so here State and law were changed to dogmas, and pretty much by the same people.** We have inherited these dogmas, and it is important that we should know whence they come and how they arose.

For example, our idea of the monarch is derived neither from the Teutonic nations, nor from the Oriental despots, but from the learned Jurists who were in the service of the Illyrian shepherd Diocletian, of the Illyrian cowboy Galerius and of the Illyrian swineherd Maximinus, **and is a direct parody – if the truth must be told – of the greatest State-ideas of Rome.**
...

Elsewhere despots had ruled as the sons of gods, as for instance in Egypt and even at the present day in Japan – others, in former times and to-day, as representatives of God (I need only mention the Jewish kings and the Khalifs) – others again by the so-called *jus gladii*, the right of the sword. **But the soldiers who had usurped what had once been the Roman Empire founded their claims to rule as absolute autocrats upon Roman constitutional law! They had not in their opinion usurped the power like a Greek tyrant and overthrown the constitutional order; on the contrary, the all-powerful monarch was the flower, the perfection of the whole legal development of Rome: this the Oriental jurists had by their subtlety contrived to establish.** With the help of the transmission theory just explained, the trick had been accomplished – in the main as follows. One of the main pillars of Roman constitutional law is that no enactment has the force of law, if it is not approved by the people. Under the first emperors appearances were still maintained in this respect. But after Caracalla "Rome" had come to mean the whole civilised world. And now all rights of the people were "transmitted" to the Senate to simplify the issuing of new laws, &c. **In the *Corpus juris* it stands thus: "As the Roman people has grown to such an extent that it would be difficult to call it together to one spot for the purpose of approving laws, it was held to be right to consult the Senate instead of the people."** As we now speak of a Viceroy, so the Senate was called henceforth *vice populi*. The approval of the Senate too had become purely a matter of form – **once in possession of so beautiful an abstract principle, there was no stopping half-way; and so the text continues: "but that also which it pleases the Prince to decree has the power of law, for the people has transmitted to him its whole plenitude of power and all its rights."***

> https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/just1.gr.htm#2
>
> ***nam cum auctus est populus Romanus in eum modum ut difficile sit in unum eum convocari legis sanciendae causa, aequum visum est senatum vice populi consuli.*** *6.* ***Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem concessit.***
>
> https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#praetors

> **But it was not before the ideas, and even the language, of the Romans had been corrupted, that a *royal* law,** (39) **and an irrevocable gift of the people, were created by the fancy of Ulpian, or more probably of Tribonian himself;** (40) and the origin of Imperial power, though false in fact, and slavish in its consequence, was supported on a principle of freedom and justice.
>
> > "**The pleasure of the emperor has the vigour and effect of law, since the Roman people, by the royal law, have transferred to their prince the full extent of their own power and sovereignty.**" (41)

...

And this Roman "principate," as it is called, for the title of King was borne by no Caesar, forms to the present day the basis of all European kingships. By the introduction of constitutionalism, but still more by the manipulation of the law there is at present in many countries a movement back to the free standpoint of the ancient Romans; but everywhere "monarchical rule" is still in principle what the legal authorities of the fallen Roman State had made it, an institution which stands in direct contradiction to the true spirit of genuine Rome. **The army is not even at the present day the army of the people, defending the home of that people, it is everywhere (even in England) called the army of the king; the officials are not appointed and invested with authority by the collective will, they are servants of the king.** That is all Roman, but, as has been said, Roman of the cowboy, shepherd and swineherd age.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=x795CgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT470#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 212 CE the emperor Caracalla decreed that all the free inhabitants of the Roman Empire, wherever they lived, from Scotland to Syria, were Roman citizens. It was a revolutionary decision, which removed at a stroke the legal difference between the rulers and the ruled, and the culmination of a process that had been going on for almost a millennium. More than 30 million provincials became legally Roman overnight. **This was one of the biggest single grants of citizenship – if not *the* biggest – in the history of the world.**
...

Whatever lay behind it, this decree changed the Roman world forever, and that is why my story of Rome closes here, at the end of the first Roman millennium. The big question that had guided politics and debate for centuries, about the boundary between the Romans and those they ruled, had been answered. **After a thousand years, Rome's 'citizenship project' had been completed and a new era had begun.**
...

The second Roman millennium – which did not finally end until Constantinople, the capital of the Roman Empire in the East by the sixth century CE, fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE – **was grounded on entirely new principles, on a new world order and, for most of the time, on a different religion.** The autocratic regime established by the first Augustus had been based in a political language and institutions that went back as far as anyone could trace in the first millennium of Roman history, and what I have called the Augustan template of imperial rule provided a relatively stable political framework for almost two hundred years after Augustus' death in 14 CE. **But if the emperor Tiberius, who succeeded the first Augustus, could have slipped fairly comfortably into the imperial shoes of Commodus at the end of the second century CE, he would not have understood what it was to be an emperor a few decades further on. Rome in its second millennium was effectively a new state masquerading under an old name.**

> https://vdare.com/posts/atlantic-the-secret-of-rome-s-success-invade-the-world-enlist-the-world
>
> In Houellebecq's satire *Submission*, the suave Obama-like Muslim politician who becomes president of France frames his power grab as essentially conservative. For example, **he eventually has Muslim North Africa and West Asia invited to join the E.U. in the name of reconstituting the Roman Empire.** By the end of the book, Ben Abbes moves the E.U. headquarters from Brussels to Rome to be more central to Mare Nostrum, as he prepares to be elected President/Emperor of Neo-Roman Empire.
>
> **A new, much publicized history of Rome by Mary Beard, *SPQR*, sounds like an unwitting fleshing out of Houellebecq's jest.** The review in *The Atlantic* emphasizes how much we ought to learn from Rome's grand strategy of Invade the World, Enlist the World.
> ...
>
> > Some readers may feel that Beard overemphasizes the gentler aspects of imperial rule. The newly subjugated were allies in name but not entirely in legal and political fact. **But she is right to stress that the Romans pioneered a revolutionary understanding of citizenship, and in making the concept more central to the whole story of Rome than previous historians have, she highlights its truly distinctive facets. The idea that one could be a citizen, even a partial citizen, of a place where one did not live, and had perhaps never been, was virtually unprecedented.** So was the idea that one could have a dual identity, as both Roman and Mantuan, Roman and Sicilian, or Roman and Oscan (when the Romans conquered the peninsula), or—later—Roman and Greek, Hispanic, Gallic, or British.

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/the-one-and-the-many-studies-in-the-philosophy-of-order-and-ultimacy

The reason for the long survival of Rome was precisely **this readiness to adopt each new movement or "revolution" as a part of the meaning of Rome. As a result, Rome underwent a series of revolutions from monarchy to republic to empire, and, thereafter especially, was in continual revolution as an empire, all of which left Rome sometimes in great self-contradiction to its yesterdays but faithful to eternal, divine, and evolving Rome.** Rome destroyed Carthage as a state in 146 B.C., but in time a Punic emperor, Septimius Severus, proud of his ancestry and speaking Greek and Latin with a Punic accent, came to rule Rome. He disdained to take even a Roman woman to wife, marrying rather Julia Domna, of his own race and the daughter of a prince-priest. He was by adoption made an Antonine, and he was steadily promoted by the Romans, who a few centuries before had destroyed his country, **but he was now a part of the ever-new and yet eternal Rome.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/508/mode/2up?view=theater

Latium had been conquered; of the forty small peoples who inhabited it, Rome had exterminated half. She had despoiled some of their lands, and had left to others the title of allies. In B.C. 340 the latter perceived that the alliance was entirely to their detriment, that they were expected to obey in everything, and that they were required every year to lavish their blood and money for the sole benefit of Rome. **They formed a coalition; their chief, Annius, thus stated their demands in the Roman senate: "Give us equality. Let us have the same laws; let us form but a single state – *una civitas*; let us have but a single name; let us all alike be called Romans." Annius thus announced, in the year 340, the desire which all the nations of the empire, one after another expressed, and which was to be completely realized only after five centuries and a half.** Then such a thought was new and very unexpected; the Romans declared it monstrous and criminal. It was, indeed, contrary to the old religion and the old law of the cities. The consul, Manlius, replied, that if such a proposition should be accepted, he would slay with his own hand the first Latin who should come to take his seat in the senate; then, turning towards the altar, he called upon the god to witness, saying, "Thou hast heard, O Jupiter, the impious words that have come from this man's mouth. **Canst thou tolerate, O Jupiter, that a foreigner should come to sit in thy sacred temple as a senator, as a consul?**"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D7&force=y

Balbus Cornelius, also, the elder, was elected to the consulate;[369] but he had previously been accused, and the judges had been charged to discuss the point whether he could or not lawfully be scourged with rods; **he being the first foreigner,[370]—born even on the very shores of the ocean,—who obtained that honour, which our ancestors denied even to the people of Latium.[371]**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n401/mode/2up?view=theater

We must at the outset recall that by Nero's time they were only geographically Roman. The conditions that Augustus had failed to check—celibacy, childlessness, abortion, and infanticide among the older stocks, manumission and comparative fertility among the new—**had transformed the racial character, the moral temper, even the physiognomy, of the Roman people.**

Once the Romans had been precipitated into parentage by the impetus of sex, and lured to it by anxiety for the post-mortem care of their graves; now the upper and middle classes had learned to separate sex from parentage, and were skeptical about the afterworld. Once the rearing of children had been an obligation of honor to the state, enforced by public opinion; now it seemed absurd to demand more births in a city crowded to the point of redolence.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/505/mode/2up?view=theater

After *novi homines* Etruscan, Samnite or Picene, Spain and Narbonensis open the roll of provincial consuls. **They herald the Empire's invasion of the Roman government, they seize supreme power but do not hold it for long. Africa and the eastern lands are pressing rapidly behind, soon almost to overwhelm Italy and the western provinces in the cosmopolitan Senate of the Antonines.**1

1. Compare the results shown by P. Lambrechts, *La composition du sénat romain de l'accession au trône d'Hadrien à la mort de Commode* (1936), 183 ff.

> **The consular *Fasti* furnish the most patent evidence of the intrusion of alien elements;** but they indicate the climax rather than the origins of the process, which belong generations earlier when provincials were already equestrian officers and political or financial agents of the government, not merely under Augustus but even with Pompeius and Caesar. Once again, Balbus and Theophanes.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap5.htm#OPP

Till the reign of Severus, the virtue and even the good sense of the emperors had been distinguished by their real or affected reverence for the senate, and by a tender regard to the nice frame of civil policy instituted by Augustus. But the youth of Severus had been trained in the implicit obedience of camps, and his riper years spent in the despotism of military command. His haughty and inflexible spirit could not discover, or would not acknowledge, the advantage of preserving an intermediate power, however imaginary, between the emperor and the army. He disdained to profess himself the servant of an assembly that detested his person and trembled at his frown; he issued his commands, where his request would have proved as effectual; assumed the conduct and style of a sovereign and a conqueror, and exercised, without disguise, the whole legislative as well as the executive power.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/76*.html
>
> 8 1 **While reading to the senate a speech, in which he praised the severity and cruelty of Sulla, Marius and Augustus as the safer course and deprecated the mildness of Pompey and Caesar as having proved the ruin of those very men, he introduced a sort of defence of Commodus**
> 2 **and inveighed against the senate for dishonouring that emperor unjustly, in view of the fact that the majority of its members lived worse lives.**

New maxims of the Imperial prerogative.

The victory over the senate was easy and inglorious. Every eye and every passion was directed to the supreme magistrate, who possessed the arms and treasure of the state; **whilst the senate, neither elected by the people, nor guarded by military force, nor animated by public spirit, rested its declining authority on the frail and crumbling basis of ancient opinion.** The fine theory of a republic insensibly vanished, and made way for the more natural and substantial feelings of monarchy. **As the freedom and honours of Rome were successively communicated to the provinces, in which the old government had been either unknown, or was remembered with abhorrence, the tradition of republican maxims was gradually obliterated.** The Greek historians of the age of the Antonines (70) observe with a malicious pleasure, that although the sovereign of Rome, in compliance with an obsolete prejudice, abstained from the name of king, he possessed the full measure of regal power. **In the reign of Severus, the senate was filled with polished and eloquent slaves from the eastern provinces, who justified personal flattery by speculative principles of servitude.** These new advocates of prerogative were heard with pleasure by the court, and with patience by the people, when they inculcated the duty of passive obedience, and descanted on the inevitable mischiefs of freedom. The lawyers and the historians concurred in teaching that the Imperial authority was held, not by the delegated commission, but by the irrevocable resignation of the senate; that the emperor was freed from the restraint of civil laws, could command by his arbitrary will the lives and fortunes of his subjects, and might dispose of the empire as of his private patrimony. (71) **The most eminent of the civil lawyers, and particularly Papinian, Paulus, and Ulpian, flourished under the house of Severus; and the Roman jurisprudence having closely united itself with the system of monarchy, was supposed to have attained its full maturity and perfection.**

> 71. Dion Cassius seems to have written with no other view, than to form these opinions into an historical system. **The Pandects will show how assiduously the lawyers, on their side, laboured in the cause of prerogative.**

The contemporaries of Severus, in the enjoyment of the peace and glory of his reign, forgave the cruelties by which it had been introduced. **Posterity, who experienced the fatal effects of his maxims and example, justly considered him as the principal author of the decline of the Roman empire.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/432/mode/2up?view=theater

Viewed as a single phenomenon, developing in time, the Roman law is deeply marked by two fundamental characters. **On the one hand, it is largely made up of "survivals" from the barbarous state of society in which it took its origin; and on the other, it gradually drew to itself and appropriated more enlightened principles of justice.**

Of the first sort, we have good illustrations in the power which the law gave to the father to sell his children or to put them to death; in the like power, **coupled with the one-sided and absolute liberty of divorce, which it gave to the husband over the wife;** in the power of life and death which it gave to the master over his slaves; and in the power which it conferred upon creditors either to cut in pieces the body of their insolvent debtor, or to sell him into slavery among foreigners. **These, and similar elements of Roman law, are striking instances of savage "survival," carried along by the state in its advance from its rude primitive condition, and gradually falling into desuetude as its civilization improved.**5
…

Thus, in the most comprehensive view which can be taken of the subject, Roman law is to be regarded as a connecting link between the ancient Barbarism of Europe and modern Civilization. Under the one relation, it participates largely of the character impressed upon it by its rude origin; under the other, it anticipates much of what is best in modern law.

> https://archive.org/details/orientalreligio00cumogoog/page/n242/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **From coarse fetichism and savage superstitions the learned priests of the Asiatic cults had gradually produced a complete system of metaphysics and eschatology, as the Brahmins built up the spiritualistic monism of the Vedanta beside the monstrous idolatry of Hinduism, or, to confine our comparisons to the Latin world, as the jurists drew from the traditional customs of primitive tribes the abstract principles of a legal system that governs the most cultivated societies.**

---

https://www.traditioninaction.org/bkreviews/A_017br_Penty.htm

This "communist base" was further destroyed by the development of the codex of Roman Civil Law, which he refers to as "the bible of the Devil" (p. 33).

Then, according to Penty, the communist traditions and spirit of the early Christians replaced the capitalist maxims of Roman Law and created the guilds: "It was the communistic spirit of Christianity that gave rise to the Guilds" (p. 37). **But, the revival of Roman Law made private property return: "The revived study of Roman Law during the Middle Ages operated to undermine the communal relations of society and re-establish private property…"** (p. 33).

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch08.htm

It would necessarily have seemed insanity to the ancients that Greeks and barbarians, freemen and slaves, citizens and peregrines, Roman citizens and Roman subjects (to use a comprehensive term) should have a claim to equal political status. **Under the Roman Empire all these distinctions gradually disappeared, except the distinction between freemen and slaves, and in this way there arose, for the freemen at least, that equality as between private individuals on the basis of which Roman law developed — the completest elaboration of law based on private property which we know.** But so long as the antithesis between freemen and slaves existed, there could be no talk of drawing legal conclusions from general equality of *men;* we saw this even recently, in the slave-owning states of the North American Union.

> https://occidentaldissent.com/2024/12/17/2025-predictions/
>
> **In the 1850s, Americans became obsessed with the "Slave Power" conspiracy.** Americans were growing militant about slavery. And yet, plantation slavery was by this time a relic of a bygone age. **Slaveowners were still extremely powerful in America, but the wealth of the future was in industrialization.**

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch04.htm#4.4
>
> When, however, the economists become conscious of these contradictions, *they themselves* attack *private property* in one or other *particular* form as the falsifier of what is in itself (i.e., in their imagination) rational wages, in itself rational value, in itself rational trade. Adam Smith, for instance, occasionally polemises against the capitalists, Destutt de Tracy against the money-changers, Simonde de Sismondi against the factory system, **Ricardo against landed property, and nearly all modern economists against the *non-industrial* capitalists, among whom property appears as a mere *consumer.***

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_41

When the negro rose in value to two hundred gallons "of real rum" (the sable slave hunters were becoming as acute as Brother Jonathan himself, touching the adulterated article), the conscience of the holy adventurer began to be disturbed about the righteousness of the traffick. When the slave cost two hundred and fifty gallons, the scruples became troublesome; and when his price mounted up towards three hundred, by reason of the imprudence of the naughty man with his large cargo, from Barbadoes, the stings of conscience became intolerable. **By the principles of that religion which "supposeth that gain is godliness,"[22] the trade was now become clearly wrong.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_185

The fact betrays itself in a thousand ways, that envy of the slaveholder and his supposed advantages and power, is the root of much of their zeal. Hence the epithets of "aristocrat," "lordly slaveholder," "Southern nabob," as ridiculously false to fact as envious, which form so large a part of the staple of their abuse. They hate us because they suppose we possessed a privilege of which they were deprived.
...

The wrongs of the slave have been the pretext, sectional and personal aggrandizement the true ends. That party, under the phase of "free-soil," has thrown off the mask, and avowed the declaration that the true meaning of their opposition to the rights of Southern masters in the territories is, that "the soil of America belongs to the white man;" and the poor negro, though now a native of it, is begrudged a home and a living upon it. There is no class of people in America which has expended so little of its money for the actual advantage of the black race, as the abolitionists. Usually, the history of the case has been, that they would give of their money, neither to ransom a slave from bondage, nor to aid the cause of African colonization, nor to assist a distressed free negro of their own section: the only use to which they can be induced to apply it is the printing of vituperations against the masters. **It was the testimony of the fugitive slaves themselves, that the philanthropy of the Abolitionists extended only to seducing them from their homes; thenceforth their whole thought was to make gain of their godliness.**

https://www.abbevilleinstitute.org/thomas-jeffersons-prophetic-anti-city-sentiments/

Years earlier (23 Sept. 1800), he says to Dr. Benjamin Rush: “**I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.** True, they nourish some of the elegant arts, but the useful ones can thrive elsewhere, and less perfection in the others, with more health, virtue & freedom, would be my choice.” To David Williams (14 Nov. 1803), **he states that cities encourage too many citizens to try to live by their heads, and not their hands**—that is, they discourage husbandry and self-sufficiency—and that is for Jefferson an impossible state of affairs for human happiness. They also bode ill for any who have a “turn for dissipation.” **So great was his enmity of cities that in the 1800 letter to Rush he states that the yellow-fever epidemic that hit Philadelphia and wiped out a large number of its citizens might just be Providence’s way of discouraging “the growth of great cities in our nation.”**

Cities for Jefferson marked a sort of natural decay—a slip away from the bucolic, agrarian ideal that Jefferson consistently championed, **though he made certain concessions concerning the need of some manufacture later in life.** In cities, that degree of freedom that gives citizens “a wholesome control over their public affairs” is absent. What is missing, he tells John Adams (28 Oct 1813), is ownership and care of land, which conduces to “law and order.” Owning land, citizens come to know its true value—the yield of arable land is cornucopian—and will wish to defend it in times of intra- or international strife. The mobs in cities—and a mob is a mere instrument of those with rank and birth—wallow in ignorance, poverty, and vice, and thus are incapable of rational activity. “The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body,” writes Jefferson in Query XIX of his *Notes on the State of Virginia* in 1787. To James Madison in the same year (Dec. 20), he writes: **“I think we shall be [virtuous], as long as agriculture is our principal object, which will be the case, while there remain vacant lands in any part of America. When we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there.”**

https://archive.org/details/truestorybarons00reyngoog/page/n188/mode/2up?view=theater

Fortunately for the country, there was an invisible agency—never absent from human affairs, but of which bad men make no account—that was silently thwarting the atrocious plot. **JEFFERSON DAVIS and his satellites were born too late by five hundred years.** The providence of God, which develops out of successive cycles an ever-augmenting sum of good for man, could not allow a type of government indigenous to the Middle Ages to become interpolated into the nobler text of the nineteenth century. **We owe our rescue from the greatest crime ever meditated against civilization to the simple fact that the Divine order could not tolerate so violent an anachronism.**

https://archive.org/details/altonlocketailo06kinggoog/page/n78/mode/2up?view=theater

Folks are getting somewhat tired of the old rodomontade that a slave is free the moment he sets foot on British soil! Stuff!—are these tailors free? Put any conceivable sense you will on the word, and then say—are they free? We have, thank God, emancipated the black slaves; it would seem a not inconsistent sequel to that act to set about emancipating these white ones. **Oh! we forgot; there is an infinite difference between the two cases—the black slaves worked for our colonies; the white slaves work for *us*.** But, indeed, if, as some preach, self-interest is the mainspring of all human action, it is difficult to see who will step forward to emancipate the said white slaves; **for all classes seem to consider it equally their interest to keep them as they are;** all classes, though by their own confession they are ashamed, are yet not afraid to profit by the system which keeps them down.

http://rcarterpittman.org/essays/misc/Which_Shall_It_Be.html

On page 9 he exposes a half-concealed truth in the midst of half-truths. Here it is:

> Against this [liberty] the equalitarianism in the Creed has been persistently revolting. The struggle is far from ended. **The reason why American liberty was not more dangerous to equality was, of course, the open frontier and free land. When opportunity became bounded in the last generation, the inherent conflict between equality and liberty flared up. Equality is slowly winning.** The New Deal during the 'thirties was a landslide.

For once Dr. Myrdal told the God's truth. Liberty and equality cannot coexist.

Hunter Wallace on X: **In the late 20th century, Jews were the top dog in the American elite, and "antisemitism" was strictly verboten.** It was relentlessly policed by the MSM and "watchdog" orgs and relegated to the fringes of society.

This is the world we all grew up in and are accustomed to with Dr. Pierce railing about the lemmings bamboozled by the Jewish media, but that world is ... increasingly archaic?

The analogy that is stuck in my mind is how the Southern planter class was gradually eclipsed by Northern industrialists. Slavery became controversial when it was becoming antiquated. **It suited the interest of Northern industrialists to have the public outraged at the Slave Power.**

> https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/489/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> ‘STEMMATA quid faciunt?’1 The satirist Juvenal makes mock of pedigrees. Not, however, with all the fierce, free invective of a robust democrat. **Juvenal derives his names and examples from the descendants of the Republican nobility—but not the living.** Few of them, indeed, survived in Juvenal’s day, and they mattered not at all. The Empire had broken their power and their spirit. **The satirist did not dare to deride the new nobility, the oligarchy of government in his own day. He makes mock of the needy Greek of low degree, clever, mendacious and unscrupulous.**2 A traditional and literary figure. Very different the proud sons of the great priestly and dynastic houses of Asia, now holding consular rank in the imperial Senate. **Still less does he venture to attack the opulent provincial families issuing from Spain and Narbonensis.** They were now dominant in the social and political hierarchy of the Empire, they wore the purple of the Caesars.

...

The big picture of the Civil War era is how America traded one elite – the old antebellum Southern planter class – for a new one which was the Gilded Age Northern industrialists.

...

In 1820, an activist calling for the abolition of slavery was speaking Truth To Power, but by 1850 that type of activist had become a useful instrument of rising Northern industrial interests. Antislavery was mainstream.

https://www.marxist.com/law-and-marxism-the-state-and-the-constitution.htm

Constitutional laws are a conquest of the bourgeois revolutions against the old feudal order, and they flow, in content and form, directly from a system based on commodity production.

...

In his book, Engels writes about the rise of the Athenian state. **He says that as long as Athenian production was on a low level the “gentile” constitution based on family ties and tribal administration was sufficient. But as the forces of production developed to produce surplus goods, classes of people became recognised on the basis of their relationship to the means of production, not on the basis of their “gens” or tribe.**

…

Yet this apparatus of brutal class dominance is not how the state appears to us today. **The ruling class and individual capitalists do not tend to run their own private armies to enforce their will.**
…

The ancient Athenian state described above, in which the state apparatus was transparently a weapon used by the possessing class against the non-possessors, did not last long. Engels explains that after the initial period of naked class domination through the state, Solon of Athens established a new constitution in 594 B.C.
…

Of course Solon's constitution only protected the free Athenian citizen, not the slaves whose deprivation of rights and protections was the whole basis of the Athenian economy.
…

In other words, the political revolution of Solon in 594 B.C. and the bourgeois revolutions in England, France and elsewhere, transformed the state and its armed bodies of men, but not in any fundamental way. **The state under capitalism remains the same weapon of direct class rule that it was under feudalism, albeit more refined, "perfected", and better suited to its task, i.e. defending the interests of the capitalist class and not the feudal landlords.**
…

A commodity exchange system requires that the market itself determine the exchange value of the commodities being traded. This is something in which the buyer and seller can't play individual roles – it is something to be resolved by the general level of technique in the economy and other socially-determined questions. **This means that the buyer and seller, while in the marketplace, must be stripped of all individuality that might disrupt the process of determining the exchange value of their commodities. In the process of exchange the buyer and seller must be empty vessels through which the commodities owned by them can assert themselves in the marketplace.**

In short, the buyer and seller have to be recognised as entirely equal to one another, even if in reality they are not. This equality is the nature of the legal relationship between individuals in a system of commodity exchange.

It should come as no surprise then that legal equality is one of the rallying cries of the constitutional state. It is part of the famous slogan of the French revolution "*Liberté, egalité, fraternité*", **which established the political supremacy of the bourgeoisie.** In his 2010 book, *The Rule of Law*, the former Law Lord Tom Bingham says that "equality before the law [is] a cornerstone of our society". **And this is the same idea put forward by Thomas Rainsborough during the Putney Debates at the time of the English Revolution in 1647 when he said "For really, I think, the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the greatest he". The origin of this legal idea which seems unquestionable to us today is tied up with the birth of the capitalist system. Equality before the law is essential to the smooth-running of commodity exchange and the capitalist system as a whole.**

> http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/political-arena/62281-the-alt-right-and-christianity?p=1826070#post1826070
>
> So what cucked Christianity then? **It was commerce. When the martial landlords as the dominant class of Europe were replaced by merchants, the cult of "equality" became a necessity for the smooth operation of business.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/558/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **It is assuredly no accident that the modern idea of basic equality first emerged in the later Dutch Golden Age. For as Gregorio Leti, and later Mandeville, noted, a meaningful discourse of equality before the law requires a particular kind of administrative and judicial strength, anchored in the civic context.**52 By equalizing the protection and freedom afforded by the law which the monarchies and aristocracies of the day scarcely aspired to do, the United Provinces set a crucial example. As the Dutch Huguenot radical Jean-Frédéric Bernard had his Persian philosopher remark in 1711, **'cette égalité de protection,'** which he considers the most impressive feature of the Dutch Republic, 'est fondée sur le droit qu'a le citoien, comme membre de l'état.'53
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=huNjDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

> See, capitalism is not fundamentally racist – it can exploit racism for its purposes, but racism isn't built into it. **Capitalism basically wants people to be interchangeable cogs,** and differences among them, such as on the basis of race, usually are not functional. I mean, they may be functional for a period, like if you want a super exploited workforce or something, but those situations are kind of anomalous. **Over the long term, you can expect capitalism to be anti-racist – just because it's anti-human. And race is in fact a human characteristic – there's no reason why it should be a *negative* characteristic, but it is a human characteristic.** So therefore identifications based on race interfere with the basic ideal that people should be available just as consumers and producers, interchangeable cogs who will purchase all the junk that's produced – **that's their ultimate function, and any other properties they might have are kind of irrelevant, and usually a nuisance.**

Much of modern law, including concepts of individual ownership, can be traced back to ideas and principles present in Roman and ancient Athenian law. This is because commodity exchange developed to a fairly high level even in these societies based on slave economies. But precisely because of this economic basis, commodity exchange and therefore a legal system based on commodity exchange could never become generalised in ancient Rome – legal rights could never apply to slaves for example. The generalisation of commodity exchange that characterises capitalism has allowed the development of the concept of equal legal rights to its highest point.

In order for individuals to confront each other in an open marketplace as legal owners with equal rights, certain guarantees need to be in place regarding the safety and security of the individuals and their commodities. **Without these guarantees of rights to personal safety and property ownership, exchange could not take place and commodity production would grind to a halt.**

This wasn't a particularly big consideration in the early days of ancient Athens and the early feudal period because commodity exchange was comparatively rare and very localised. But as the forces of production were developed and a surplus of goods was produced on a regular basis, commodity production became a more common phenomenon. As the seeds of an exchange economy took root, force (or the threat of force) had to be used by those with wealth and power to guarantee the rights of the traders without whom commodity production could not continue. For example, as commodity exchange developed, it fell to the individual feudal lords to guarantee the security of trade in the marketplaces on their land.
…

This is the role of the bourgeois state and its function is to defend the system of commodity exchange. **A set of rules is required to guarantee the independence of this state from any one individual capitalist or group of capitalists, and to guarantee its loyalty to the capitalist system as a whole – these rules are constitutional laws.**
…

What Lenin is explaining here is that a democratic republic, or a constitutional state, builds capitalism into the foundations of the state – into the very rules within which it operates. **This is because, as explained above, it is based on commodity exchange and equal individual legal rights.** Once this has been established, political parties, people and institutions can come and go but they will all be limited by the constitutional rules of the "democratic republic", which means the rules of the capitalist system. This is why Lenin says that such a state is the "best possible political shell for capitalism".

Like everything, this has certain limits, because there are times under capitalism when the ruling class has to resort to *unconstitutional* means to keep itself in power, such as the fascist regimes of the 20th century, and the technocratic governments that were installed in Italy and Greece following the capitalist slump in 2008.

Also, in times of crisis, when the interests of national bourgeoisies can no longer be guaranteed through the 'rule of law', war breaks out to establish a new order, such as the First and Second World Wars. **During the rise of imperialism so-called 'rule of law' did not apply to the colonial peoples whose wealth was taken from them on the basis of *unequal exchange*,** which necessitated the use of the "armed bodies of men" at the disposal of the imperialist states.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/feb/20c.htm

The new civil legislation is being drafted. I find that the P.C.J. is "swimming with the tide". But its task is to swim *against* the tide. **Its task is to create a new civil law, and not to adopt (rather, not to allow itself to be duped by the old and stupid bourgeois lawyers who adopt) the old, bourgeois concept of civil law.** It should not give in to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which "ex officio" conducts the line of "adaptation to Europe", but *combat* this line and work out a *new* civil law, a new attitude to "private" contracts, etc. **We do not recognise anything "private", and regard *everything* in the economic sphere as falling under *public* and not private *law*. We allow *only* state capitalism, and as has been said, it is**

we who are the state. Hence, the task is to extend the application of state intervention in “private legal” relations; to extend the right of the state to annul “private” contracts; **to apply to “civil legal relations” not the *corpus juris romani* but *our revolutionary concept of law*;** to show systematically, persistently, with determination, through a series of model trials, *how* this should be done wisely and vigorously; to brand through the Party and expel those members of revolutionary tribunals and people’s judges who fail to learn this or refuse to understand it.

https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch5-roman-law-after-1917-exile-statelessness-and-the-search-for-byzantium-in-the-work-of-mikhail-von-taube

In assaulting earlier publications on Roman law, Marxist legal theorists like Evgeny Pashukanis believed that it would eventually be possible to develop an alternative legal system not resting on private property.5 German communists like Alfons Paquet also argued that ‘war should be declared on the contemporary civilization which rests on Roman foundations’. He also blamed Roman law for the heightened struggle between nations which led to the collapse of all morality (Paquet 1923: 872-3). At around the same time, in Germany, **the notorious Article 19 of the NSDAP called to replace the ‘materialist’ ideas of Roman law with old ‘German common law’ (*ein deutsches Gemeinrecht*),** an idea which the Nazis began to put into practice partially, but particularly, in the context of the recolonization of Eastern Europe (cf. Landau 1989: 11-24).

---

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Histories/4C*.html#ref12

64 1 So the Tencteri, a tribe separated from the colony by the Rhine,[14] sent an embassy with orders to present their demands in an assembly of the people of Cologne. These demands the most violent of the delegates set forth thus: "**We give thanks to our common gods and to Mars before all others that you have returned to the body of the German peoples and to the German name,** and we congratulate you that at last you are going to be free men among free men; for until to-day the Romans have closed rivers and lands, and in a fashion heaven itself, to keep us from meeting and conferring together, or else—**and this is a severer insult to men born to arms—to make us meet unarmed and almost naked, under guard and paying a price for the privilege.**[15] But to secure for ever our friendship and alliance, **we demand that you take down the walls of your colony, the bulwarks of your slavery, for even wild animals forget their courage if you keep them shut up;** we demand that you kill all the Romans in your territories. Liberty and masters are not easily combined together. The property of those killed is to be put into the common stock that no one may be able to hide anything or separate his own interest. **Both we and you are to have the right to live on both banks, as our fathers once did. Even as Nature has always made the light of day free to all mankind, so she has made all lands open to the brave. [quo modo lucem diemque omnibus hominibus, ita omnis terras fortibus viris natura aperuit.] Resume the manners and customs of your fathers, cutting off those pleasures which give the Romans more power over their subjects than their arms bestow. A people pure, untainted, forgetting your servitude, you will live the equals of any or will rule others.**"

https://archive.org/details/feudalgermany0000jame/page/274/mode/2up?view=theater

Frederick I’s failure to read some of the most manifest signs of the time seems like stupidity. But his defect was not that. It was a colossal egotism which so warped his brain that he had not the intelligence to understand, the sympathy to tolerate, the new political philosophy, the new economic conditions, the new social transformations which Europe was undergoing. **His obstinate adherence to obsolete prerogatives, both in Germany and Italy, his obdurate determination “to maintain the honor of the empire which from the foundation of Rome has been glorious and undiminished,”**3 **in a time when the whole drift of European political development was away from the older medieval idea and toward nationalism – all this conduct makes Frederick I, in spite of his brilliant talents and strict enforcement of justice,**4 **a dangerous anachronism; but unfortunately he was not a lean and solemn phantom as anachronisms usually are, but a power terrible to pervert the present and to maim the future.**
…

Frederick I’s caesaristic madness1 and his mania for application of the Roman law was destructive of the best political traditions of medieval Germany. It is ineffectual argument for his admirers to claim that he never had any intention of introducing the Roman law into Germany, and to cite the decision of 1181 as evidence thereof.2 **For the same man had earlier, in 1165, repudiated German law in the face of the bitter opposition of Worms on the ground of the decrees of his “predecessors.” And whom did he mean by the word? Constantine and Valentinian, whose “sacred laws” he venerated as “oracles.”**3

The crowning wrong perpetrated by Frederick Barbarossa was the destruction of Saxony, the greatest and strongest state in feudal Germany, the real cornerstone on which a new Germany in

harmony with the spirit of the age and the conditions of the time might have been founded, and representative through the Guelf duke, Henry the Lion, of the new, constructive ideas of government.
…

He believed that the great deeds of the German people should be accomplished in Germany, not beyond the Alps. He believed in a forward-looking government, not one that looked backward to ancient Rome or even to Charlemagne for its sanctions. He believed that the feudal state, like all feudal society, was held together by compact; that a king was not of right an absolute monarch, but that he was bound by the rights and liberties of his subjects; that his prerogative was a limited one, and that misgovernment or tyranny justified rebellion. He believed in states-rights for the historic duchies which composed the German kingdom. Finally, as no king in Germany ever had, Henry the Lion possessed a vision of the great destiny of the German people in the New East (like our own New West in 1830) beyond the Elbe River, and labored for its expansion and settlement.1

Henry the Lion was not a political theorist nor a metaphysician, in these contestations, like Calhoun. But his political policies have kinship with those of that famous statesman of the Old South. One may find a concrete illustration in his doctrine (if it may be called by so formal a term in the twelfth century) of the preservation of ducal rights, or what I have denominated “states rights” in this feudal age.
…

Henry fought for the local sovereignty and the historical rights of the German duchies. The wish of the Lombard cities was to be assimilated to the status of grand vassals of the crown as collective or corporate urban feudatories. South of the Alps, as north of them, the test of the rival principles of Guelf and Hohenstaufen was made. The issue was much the same after all allowance had been made for difference in local traditions and in milieu. **Henry the Lion and the Lombard cities were the advocates and representatives of genetic and progressive political and social principles sprung from the womb of feudalism – a self-developing and constructive adjustment of European society to changed conditions.** Frederick I, on the other hand, insisted upon the public law of Europe as it had been in the time of Charlemagne, Louis the Pious, and Otto the Great, which was equivalent to a denial of the traditional rights and the new liberties for which both the Guelf and the communes asked recognition.1
…

The struggle between English customary, traditional liberties and Norman-Plantagenet tendency in the twelfth century offers a parallel to that which was happening in Germany. **Stephen stood for the maintenance of old English liberties; Henry Plantagenet, for Roman absolutism.**1 For Roman civil law, introduced into England by the canonists after 1066, within little more than a generation had become so great a menace to English traditional rights and liberties that Stephen silenced Master Vacarius, the chief teacher of it, and suppressed his books.2 It was as Liebermann describes:

> **The political instinct of the English government, influenced more than ever before or after by the lay baronage, stood up for the Teutonic feudal law of the Anglo-Normans against the decrees of Roman popes and emperors**. The foreign foe … opposed systematic jurisprudence to unwritten customs. It was neither the first nor the last time that the barons replied to canonistic pretentionists. *Noluimus leges Angliae mutari*.3

…

The barons were faithful to English feudal traditions as Henry the Lion strove to be loyal to German feudal traditions, which Frederick I, deeply imbued with the theories and the practices of the Roman law, aimed to suppress and efface.

> https://archive.org/details/richardwagnerspr011346mbp/page/n179/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **It was the incalculable misfortune of Germany that, about the time when the German spirit was ripening for its task upon that high domain, the legitimate State-interests of all German peoples were entrusted to the counsels of a prince to whom the German spirit was a total stranger, to the most thorough-paced representative of the un-German, Romanic State-idea:** Charles the Fifth, King of Spain and Naples, hereditary Archduke of Austria, elected Romish Kaiser and Sovereign of the German Reich, devoured by ambition for world-supremacy, which would actually have fallen to him if he had been able to master France,—**this sovereign felt no other interest in Germany, than to weld it with his empire, an iron-bound monarchy like Spain.**
>
> **With him arrived the grave fatality that later doomed well-nigh each German prince to misunderstanding of the German spirit;** yet he was opposed by the majority of the Reichs-princes of that time, whose interests then coincided, as good fortune would have it, with those of the German Folk-spirit.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=8A4ysGPJO2EC&hl=fi&pg=PA197#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Charles V. would protect her only so far as he could without losing in his military projects the support of the Protestant princes of the empire;** and when he wished to force the pope to his terms, he let loose his fanatical troops under the Constable Bourbon against Rome, who imprisoned him, and spoiled and sacked the city for nine months; **Philip II. would also serve the church and make a war of extermination on heretics in the Low Countries, but only in the hope of using her as an instrument in attaining to the universal monarchy at which he aimed.**

https://archive.org/details/historylatinchr33milmgoog/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater

The strong and remorseless rule of Philip Augustus, the popular virtues of Saint Louis, had lent lustre, and so brought power to the throne, which in England had been degraded by the tyrannical and pusillanimous John, and enfeebled by the long, inglorious reign of Henry III. In France the power of the clergy might have been a sufficient, as it was almost the only organized counterpoise to the kingly prerogative; **but there had gradually risen, chiefly in the Universities, a new power, that of the Lawyers: they had begun to attain that ascendency in the Parliaments which grew into absolute dominion over those assemblies. But the law which these men expounded was not like the common law of England, the growth of the forests of Germany, the old free Teutonic usages of the Franks, but the Roman imperial law, of which the Sovereign was the fountain and supreme head.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.13326/page/n79/mode/2up?view=theater

Though the Bartolists were contemporaries of, sometimes intimate with, some of the greatest literary masters the world has ever seen, as, for example, Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, yet their style is marked by tedious diffuseness, prolixity, commonplace; the observation of Cujas is fully merited—"verbosi in re facili, in difficili muti, in angusta diffusi."

In Italy and France their influence remained till the coming of men like Alciati and Cujas, and here and there persisted even for some time after; in Germany it lasted much longer, indeed till the time of Savigny. In the latter country the definitive "reception" of Roman law took place in the fifteenth century; but it was an impure, glossed, Bartolized Roman law; the "heutiges römisches Recht" was more Roman in name than in substance.

http://www.geschichtsquellen.de/autor/4561

Oberrheinischer Revolutionär: Kunstname für den anonymen Verfasser einer König Maximilian I. gewidmeten Reformschrift. Er wurde wohl 1438 im Oberrheingebiet geboren und hielt sich um 1460 in Italien auf. **Sein Werk weist ihn als juristisch gebildet aus.** Nach K. H. Lauterbach ist er identisch mit Mathias Wurm († 1510), Sekretär Kaiser Friedrichs III. und Maximilians I., nach V. Huth mit dem Dr. iur. utr. Jakob Merswin aus Straßburg († 1514/15).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=18pKEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA349#v=onepage&q&f=false

On the basis of a reforming biblicism shaped by Wyclif, the Revolutionary of the Upper Rhine elaborated a vision of the future which was intended to reinvigorate the weakened power of the emperor by invoking guiding principles derived from Christianity and Scripture.1

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/118/mode/2up?view=theater

Far longer, more detailed and more truculent than the *Reformation of Sigismund* is the *Book of a Hundred Chapters*, by an anonymous publicist who lived in Upper Alsace or the Breisgau and who is generally known as 'the Revolutionary of the Upper Rhine.' This elderly fanatic was thoroughly familiar with the enormous mass of medieval apocalyptic literature and drew freely upon it for the purpose of elaborating an apocalyptic programme of his own. **Written in German in the opening years of the sixteenth century, his treatise is the last and most comprehensive expression of the popular eschatology of the Middle Ages.**
…

To this end God desired a certain pious person – naturally it is the author himself – to organize an association of pious laymen. **Only those born in wedlock and who were themselves married and had always been monogamous would be eligible for membership** (the author's preoccupation with adultery is obsessive).
…

The fanatical layman never tires of portraying – and in the most lurid possible colours – the chastisement which the coming Emperor, that is he himself, will inflict on those children of Satan, the friars and monks and nuns. In particular, he rages against priests who break their vow of chastity and set up households. Such priests, he cries, should be strangled or burnt alive, or else driven with their concubines into the hands of Turks; their children – true children of Antichrist – should be left to starve. **But indeed the whole clergy must be annihilated:** 'Go on hitting them,' cries the Messiah to his army, 'from the Pope right down to the little

students! Kill every one of them!' He forsees that 2,300 clerics will be killed each day and that this massacre will continue for four and a half years. And this is not the end, for scarcely less abominable than the clerics are the 'usurers' who flourish in the towns.
…

All these alike are to be massacred; **assisted by those who are referred to now as 'the pious Christians,' now as 'the common people,' the Emperor from the Black Forest is to burn all usurers and hang all lawyers.**
…

Church property is to be secularized and used by the Emperor for the benefit of the community as a whole and the poor in particular. All income derived either from landed property or from trade is to be confiscated – which amounts to an abolition of the principalities and an expropriation of all the rich. Rents, taxes, dues of every kind are to be imposed by the Emperor alone. But beyond these immediate reforms – sweeping as they are – the Revolutionary looks forward to a far more drastic transformation of society, to a state where private property will be abolished altogether and all things will be held in common: **'What a lot of harm springs from self-seeking! … It is necessary therefore that all property shall become one single property, then there will indeed be one shepherd and one sheepfold.'**
…

But in one respect the Revolutionary of the Upper Rhine was truly original – nobody before him had combined such devotion to the principal of communal or public ownership with such megalomaniac nationalism. **This man was convinced that in the remote past the Germans had in reality 'lived together like brothers on the earth,' holding all things in common. The destruction of that happy order had been the work first of the Romans and then of the Church of Rome. It was Roman Law and Canon Law which had introduced the distinction between Mine and Thine and which had thereby undermined the sentiment of fraternity and opened the way to envy and hate.** Behind this curious idea lay a whole philosophy of history. The Old Testament was dismissed as valueless; for from the time of the Creation onwards it was not the Jews but the Germans who were the Chosen People. **Adam and all his descendants down to Japhet, including all the Patriarchs, were Germans speaking Germans; other languages – Hebrew among them – came into existence only at the Tower of Babel. It was Japhet and his kin who first came to Europe, bringing their language with them. They had chosen to settle in Alsace, the heart of Europe; and the capital of the Empire which they founded was at Trier.** This ancient German Empire was a vast one, for it covered the whole of Europe – Alexander the Great could be claimed as a German national hero. And it was the most perfect of empires, a true earthly Paradise, **for it was governed according to a legal code, known as the Statutes of Trier, in which the principles of fraternity, equality and communal ownership were enshrined. It was in these Statutes, and not in the Decalogue invented by the charlatan Moses, that God had expressed his commandments to mankind** – for which reason the Revolutionary thoughtfully appended a copy of them to his work.

Very different was the history of the Latin peoples. These wretched breeds were not descended from Japhet and were not numbered amongst the original inhabitants of Europe. **Their homeland lay in Asia Minor, where they had been defeated in battle by the warriors of Trier and whence they had been brought to act as the serfs of their conquerors.** The French – a peculiarly detestable lot – ought therefore by rights to be a subject people, ruled by the Germans. **As for the Italians, they were descended from serfs who had been banished over the Alps for offences against the Statutes of Trier; whence the fact, which the publicist had no difficulty in establishing, that Roman history consisted of an almost uninterrupted series of defeats. These Latin peoples were the source of all wickedness – a poisoned source which had gradually polluted the whole sea.** Roman Law, the Papacy, the French, the Republic of Venice were so many aspects of an immense, age-old conspiracy against the German way of life.

Fortunately the time was at hand when the power of evil was to be broken for ever. When the great leader from the Black Forest seized power as Emperor Frederick he would not only cleanse German life from the Latin corruption and bring back the Golden Age based on the Statutes of Trier – he would also restore Germany to the position of supremacy which God intended for her. 'Daniel's Dream,' that old apocalypse which had brought such inspiration to the Jews during the Maccabean revolt, was subjected by the Revolutionary to yet another reinterpretation. **Now the four successive empires turned out to be France, England, Spain and Italy. Enraged by the overweening pride of these nations the Emperor will conquer them all – the Revolutionary claimed already to have discovered by means of alchemy the new explosives which the undertaking would demand.** 'By his cruelty he will instil fear into the peoples'; thereby establishing the Germans as the fifth and greatest empire, which shall not pass away. Next the Emperor, returning from his western campaigns, would utterly defeat the Turks who have penetrated into Europe. Pressing east at the head of a vast army drawn from many peoples he will carry out the task traditionally assigned to the Last Emperor. **The Holy Land will be conquered for Christendom and 'the society of Mohammedans' will be utterly overthrown. The infidel will be baptised 'and those that will not accept baptism are no Christians nor people of the Holy Scriptures, so they are to be killed, then they will be baptised in their blood.'** After all this the Emperor will reign supreme over the whole world, receiving homage and tribute from thirty-two kings.

It is worth remarking that the Christianity which was to be imposed so vigorously is scarcely recognizable as such. According to the Revolutionary the first Christians were the citizens of the Trier Empire and the God whom they worshipped was the same as Jupiter; his holy day was Thursday, not Sunday; **as**

emissaries to the Germans he sent not angels but spirits who dwelt in the Alsatian mountains. The teachings of the historical Christ were directed only to Jews, not to Germans. **The proper religion for Germans was still that which had prevailed in the Golden Age of Trier and this was the religion which the Emperor Frederick was to reinstate. When that happened** – and here the Revolutionary draws heavily on *Gamaleon* – **the spiritual centre of the world would not be Rome but Mainz, where a patriarch would preside in place of the vanquished pope. But this patriarch would be no pope but wholly dependent on the Emperor who would appoint and could if need be depose him. It was the Emperor – the Revolutionary himself, triumphant and glorified – who would be 'the supreme priest' and whom 'one must recognize as an earthly God.'** The future Empire was indeed to be nothing less than a quasi-religious community united in adoration and dread of a messiah who was the incarnation of the German spirit. This is what the Revolutionary had in mind when he cried, jubilantly: 'The Germans once held the whole world in their hands and they will do so again, and with more power than ever.'

In these phantasies **the crude nationalism of a half-educated intellectual** erupted into the tradition of popular eschatology. The result is almost uncannily similar to the phantasies which were the core of the National-Socialist 'ideology.' **One has only to turn back to the tracts – already almost forgotten – of such pundits as Rosenberg and Darré to be immediately struck by the resemblance.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures3.htm

The second point which we have particularly to remark, is the position taken by individuals as *persons.* Individuals were perfectly equal (slavery made only a trifling distinction), and without any political right. **As early as the termination of the Social War, the inhabitants of the whole of Italy were put on an equal footing with Roman citizens; and under Caracalla all distinction between the subjects of the entire Roman empire was abolished. Private Right developed and perfected this equality.** The right of property had been previously limited by distinctions of various kinds, which were now abrogated. We observed the Romans proceeding from the principle of abstract Subjectivity, which now realizes itself as Personality in the recognition of Private Right. Private Right, viz., is this, that the social unit as such enjoys consideration in the state, in the reality which he gives to himself – viz., in property. The living political body – that Roman feeling which animated it as its soul – is now brought back to the isolation of a lifeless Private Right. As, when the physical body suffers dissolution, each point gains a life of its own, but which is only the miserable life of worms; so the political organism is here dissolved into atoms – viz., private persons. Such a condition *is* Roman life at this epoch: on the one side, Fate and the abstract universality of sovereignty; on the other, the *individual* abstraction, "Person," which involves the recognition of the independent dignity of the social unit – not on the ground of the display of the life which he possesses – in his complete individuality – but as the abstract *individuum.* It is the pride of the social units to enjoy absolute importance as private persons; for the Ego is thus enabled to assert unbounded claims; but the substantial interest thus comprehended – the *meum* – is only of a superficial kind, and the development of private right, which this high principle introduced, involved the decay of political life.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpstoics.htm

The Roman jurists are also said to have been likewise Stoic philosophers, but, on the one hand, we find that our teachers of Roman law only speak ill of Philosophy, and, on the other, they are yet sufficiently inconsistent to state it to the credit of the Roman jurists that they were philosophers. So far as I understand law, I can find in it, among the Romans, nothing either of thought, Philosophy or the Notion. If we are to call the reasoning of the understanding logical thought, they may indeed be held to be philosophers, but this is also present in the reasoning of Master Hugo, who certainly does not claim to be a philosopher. The reasoning of the understanding and the philosophic Notion are two different things.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Historical_School

The German Historical School was divided into Romanists and the Germanists. The Romanists, to whom Savigny also belonged, held that the *Volksgeist* springs from the reception of the Roman law. While the Germanists (Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, Jakob Grimm, Georg Beseler, Otto von Gierke) saw medieval German Law as the expression of the German *Volksgeist*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinrich_Heine#Universities

After a year at Bonn, **Heine left to continue his law studies at the University of Göttingen.** Heine hated the town. It was part of Hanover, then also rulers of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the power Heine blamed for bringing Napoleon down. **Here the poet experienced an aristocratic snobbery absent elsewhere. He hated law as the Historical School of law he had to study was used to bolster the reactionary form of government he opposed.** Other events conspired to make Heine loathe this period of

his life: he was expelled from a student fraternity due to anti-Semitism, and he heard the news that his cousin Amalie had become engaged.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/01/arndt.htm

It is against the French especially, whose invasion had been repulsed **and whose hegemony in external matters is based on the fact that they master, more easily than all nations at least, the form of European culture, namely, civilisation** — it is against the French that the iconoclastic fury was directed most of all. The great, eternal achievements of the revolution were abhorred as "foreign frivolities" or even "foreign lies and falsehoods"; **no one thought of the kinship between this stupendous act of the people and the national uprising of 1813; that which Napoleon had introduced, the emancipation of the Israelites, trial by jury, sound civil law in place of the pandects,[102] was condemned solely because of its initiator.** Hatred of the French became a duty.

https://archive.org/details/inequalityhuman00gobigoog/page/n120/mode/2up?view=theater

From the time of the Punic Wars among the Romans, and from that of Pericles, and especially of Philip, among the Greeks, this uniformity tended more and more to break down. The mixture of nations brought with it a mixture of civilizations. The result was a very complex and learned society, with a culture far more refined than before. But it had one striking disadvantage; **both in Italy and in Hellas, it existed merely for the upper classes,** the lower strata being left quite ignorant of its nature, its merits, and its aims. **Roman civilization after the great Asiatic wars was, no doubt, a powerful manifestation of human genius; but it really embraced none but the Greek rhetoricians who supplied its philosophical basis, the Syrian lawyers who built up for it an atheistic legal system, the rich men who were engaged in public administration or money-making, and finally the leisured voluptuaries who did nothing at all. By the masses it was, at all times, merely tolerated.** The peoples of Europe understood nothing of its Asiatic and African elements, those of Egypt had no better idea of what it brought them from Gaul and Spain, those of Numidia had no appreciation of what came to them from the rest of the world. Thus, below what we might call the social classes, lived innumerable multitudes who had a different civilization from that of the official world, or were not civilized at all.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924028280414/page/n47/mode/2up?view=theater

The hatred of the French Revolution and the doctrine of the Equality of man had thrown Gobineau into such antagonism against everything around him that he finally began to hate France down to her very historical roots. He was tempted to see charlatanism, theatricality and exuberant phrase-making (which are the characteristics of a democratic age) everywhere even in that grand early history of the Latin races, **and thus became very unjust, I think, to the whole of Graeco-Latin culture, and especially to the most flourishing ages of that culture, in Greece and Rome.** Henceforth his ideal in history became the Germanic tribes of the Middle Ages, and their feudal institutions, which allowed a man to attach and defend his honour sword in hand – times, when a man was his own master still and not subjected to the law of *Polis* or *Urbs*. **In *Polis* and *Urbs* the lawyers and phrasemongers would always prevail** – among the warrior tribes of the Franks, the Normans, the Lombards, the glib tongue of sly plebeians had never to be feared, and a free and noble personality never stood in danger of being suppressed.

> https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n85/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In any case, **it is a fact that the Germanic family has never been able to live or maintain itself for a long period of time [zu blühen bzw. sich am Leben zu erhalten] in an urban area or in circumstances otherwise detached from rural life without the necessary counterbalance of land ownership.** [*Sehr eindringlich lehren das z. B. die Lübecker Ortsgeschichte und die umfangreichen Urkunden derselben Stadt.*] Other races and peoples seem to have been better prepared for an urban existence detached from the land and rural life—perhaps because their ancestors, as nomads, were once accustomed to an unpredictable way of life79 and to rocky landscapes or treeless steppes without green and fresh forests. For the Germanic peoples, such developmentally favorable requirements for urban life are not present, **and for all of known history the Germanic has hated the city with all the fibers of his heart,** probably out of healthy sentiments. Where the Germanic did become a city-dweller this obviously always happened by force and never did him any good without the counterweight of a country home. **It is very significant that all the Germanic tribes of the Migration Period almost fearfully avoided settling in Roman cities.** As late as the eleventh century, for example, the small landowners of Lombardy, the *vavasours*,80 were the population in whom the Lombard blood had been preserved in the most unmixed form. The aversion to urban areas can be traced back to the Lower Saxons of King Henry I—who resorted to choosing by lot those who were

to live in the cities and castles that he founded, since the Saxon did not want to separate himself from the countryside—**through to the Anglo-Saxons of today's England, who seek their dwellings outside urban areas if at all possible.**81

[81] This is significant—when the French moved into Wiesbaden in 1918, they preferred the good flats close to the city center for their officers and officials. When the English occupying force of Cologne came to Wiesbaden a few years later and replaced the French, the English avoided the flats in the city center as much as possible and looked for flats in the urban outskirts or in the good villa areas of Wiesbaden.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=muAzDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA110#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Maurya Empire had been centred in Magadha, right in the middle of the region where South Asia's second urbanisation was taking place. The Maurya capital, Pāṭaliputra, was a large city, according to some of the world's largest city at its time.4 **Brahmins detested towns and cities. They said so explicitly when obliged to talk about them. More often, they adopted a different strategy: they ignored their existence.**5 **Where possible, they depicted themselves in a world that was no longer there.** In this respect (and to avoid misunderstanding, let me add: only in this respect), their behavior was not dissimilar to that of another group that was obsessed with the past: the National-Socialists of the Third Reich. **In the House of German Art in Munich, opened by Hitler in 1937, there were hundreds of paintings; not one depicted urban and industrial life.**6

https://books.google.fi/books?id=u7tluJEQlZAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q&f=false

Everything that authors such as Hans Frank, Helmut Nicolai, Wilhelm Stuckart, Roland Freisler, Rudolf Walther Darré, Johann von Leers, or Alfred Rosenberg wrote about the reception of Roman law was drawn from the Germanistic literature since Georg Beseler, which had by then been infused with a national-Romantic and anti-Semitic language. **A brief monograph from 1913 reveals that even an emphatic approval of the Civil Code could be combined with this kind of language: "The legal force of Italian law *[welsche Recht]*, which has always remained foreign to the spirit of the German people and for centuries had forced Germanic consciousness under the Caudine yoke of black-haired Roman tyranny, was destroyed by the Civil Code."**64

The "Rembrandt-German" Julius Langbehn, Oswald Spengler,65 Houston Stewart Chamberlain,66 and, finally, Moeller van den Bruck67 were the authorities on the issue. **Their voices were little challenged, since the university publications in the 1930s sounded the same basic tune that the reception of Roman law was a "national misfortune."** What professors such as Herbert Meyer, Walther Merk, Gustav Klemens Schmelzeisen, or Walther Schönfeld said differed little in substance, and sometimes they said it less elegantly: **The received Roman law was alien from the people, selfish, individualistic, liberal, commercial, rational, a dead letter – and certainly "un-German."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n77/mode/2up?view=theater

The man who followed the public career in Rome had necessarily to be jurist, general, administrator, and financial manager. **When he gave judgment as prætor, he had behind him a wide experience of many fields other than law. A judicial *class*, professionally (let alone theoretically) specialized in law as its sole activity, was entirely unknown to the Classical.** The whole outlook of the later jurisprudence was determined by this fact.
...

The earliest stratification that we can now detect consists of the collections (from 700 B.C.) ascribed to mythical or semi-mythical personages like Lycurgus, Zaleucus, Charondas, and Dracon,2 and certain Roman kings.3 That these existed the form of the saga shows, **but of their real authors, the actual process of their codification, and their original contents even the Greeks of the Persian War period were ignorant.**

A second stratification, **corresponding to Justinian's code and to the "Reception" of Roman Law in Germany,** is connected with the names of Solon (600), Pittacus (550), and others. Here the laws have already attained to a structure and are inspired by the city; **they are described as "politeiai," "nomoi," in contrast to old "thesmai" and "rhetrai."**4 **In reality, therefore, we only know the history of *late* Classical law.**
...

These legislative codes are one and all political acts, and party-political acts at that—in the case of Solon a democratic constitution (*πολιτεία*) combined with private laws (*νομοι*) of the same stamp, in that of Dracon and the Decemvirs1 an oligarchic constitution fortified by private law. It was left to Western historians, accustomed to their own durable law, to undervalue the importance of this connexion; Classical man was under no misapprehension as to what really happened in these cases. **The product of the Decemvirs was in Rome the last code of purely patrician character.** Tacitus calls it the end of right law ("*finis æqui juris*," *Annals*, III, 17). For, just as the fall of the Decemvirs was followed very significantly by the rise of another Ten, the Tribunes, so immediately the *jus* of the Twelve Tables and the constitution on which it was founded began to be

attacked by the undermining process of the *lex rogata* (people's law), which set itself with Roman constancy to do what Solon had achieved in one act in the case of Dracon's work, the *πατρίος πολιτεία* which was the law-ideal of the Attic oligarchy. **Thenceforward Dracon and Solon were the "slogans" in the long battle between Oligarchy and Demos, which in Rome meant Senate and Tribunate.** The Spartan constitution associated with the name "Lycurgus" not only stood for the ideal of Dracon and the Twelve Tables, but concreted it. **We can see, parallel with the closely related course of events in Rome, the tendency of the two Spartan kings to evolve from the condition of Tarquinian tyrants to that of tribunes of the Gracchan kind;** the fall of the last Tarquins or the institution of the Decemvirs—a *coup d'état* of one kind or another against the tribunician tendency2—corresponds more or less to the fall of Cleomenes (488) and of Pausanias (470); **and the revolution of Agis III and Cleomenes III (about 240) aligns itself with the political activity of C. Flaminius, which began only a few years later.** But never in Sparta were the kings able to achieve any thorough-going success over the senatorial element represented by the Ephors.
...

At the very moment when the creative mathematic closes off with Archimedes, juristic literature begins with Ælius's *Tripertita*, a commentary on the Twelve (198 B.C.).5 The first systematic private law was written by M. Scævola about 100. **The genuine maturity of Classical law is in the two centuries 200-0**—although we to-day, with quaint perversity, apply the time to a period which was really that of Early Arabian law. And from the relics of these two literatures we can measure the greatness of the gap that separates the thought of two Cultures.
...

Classical law is a law of bodies. In the general stock composing the world it distinguishes bodily Persons and bodily Things and, like a sort of Euclidean mathematic of public life, establishes ratios between them. **The affinity between mathematical and legal thought is very close.** The intention, in both, is to take the prima facie data, to separate out the sensuous-incidental, and to find the intellectually basic principle—the *pure* form of the object, the *pure* type of the situation, the *pure* connexity of cause and effect. **Life, in the Classical, presents itself to the critical waking-consciousness of the Classical man in a form penetrated with Euclidean character, and the image that is generated in the legal mind is one of bodies, of positional relations between bodies, and of reciprocal effects of bodies by contact and reaction—just as with Democritus's atoms.** It is juristic statics.2
...

Before Constantine, even, the Late Classical law of imperial decrees (*constitutiones*, *placita*), though the Roman form of city law was strictly kept, was genuinely a law for the *believers of the "Syncretic Church,"*3 that mass of cults perfused by one single religiousness. In Rome itself, it is true, law was conceived of by a large part of the population as city-state law, but this feeling became weaker and weaker with every step towards the East. The fusion of the faithful into a single *jural community* was effected in express form by the Emperor-cult, which was religious law through and through. In relation to this law Jews and Christians4 were infidels who ensconced themselves with their own laws in another field of law. When in 212 the Aramæan Caracalla, by the *Constitutio Antoniana*, gave Roman citizenship to all inhabitants except *dediticii* peregrins,5 **the form of his act was purely Classical, and no doubt there were plenty of people who understood it in the Classical spirit—i.e., as literally an incorporation of the citizens of every other city in the city of Rome. But the Emperor himself conceived it quite otherwise. It made everyone subject to the "Ruler of the Faithful," the head of the cult-religion venerated as *Divus*.** With Constantine came the great change; he turned Imperial Caliph law on to the creed-community of Christianity in lieu of that of Syncretism, and thereby *constituted the Christian Nation*.
...

The law-history of the West begins in total independence of Justinian's creation. **At that time it was in complete oblivion, so thoroughly unimportant, in fact, that of its main element, the Pandects (Digest), there was but one manuscript, which by accident (an unfortunate one) was discovered about 1050.**
...

The political life of the Gothic springtime, with its peasant, feudal, and simple burgher laws, leads very soon to particular development in three great branches of law which have remained distinct to this day—and there has been no unifying comparative history of law in the West to probe the deep meaning of this development.

The most important by far, owing to the political destinies in which it was involved, was the Norman law, which was borrowed from the Frankish. After the Conquest of England in 1066, this drove out the native Saxon, and since that day in England "the law of the great men has become the law of the whole people." **Its purely German spirit has developed it, without a catastrophe, from a feudal régime of unparalleled stringency into the institutions of the present day which have become law in Canada, India, Australia, South Africa, and the United States. Even apart from the extent of its power, it is the most instructive in West Europe. Its development, unlike that of the rest, did *not* lie in the hands of theoretical jurists. The study of Roman law at Oxford was not allowed to touch practice; and at Merton in 1236 the higher nobility expressly rejected it.** The Bench itself continued to develop the old law-material by means of creative precedents, and it was these practical decisions ("Reports") that formed the basis of law-books such as that of Bracton.1 Since then, and to this day, a statute law, kept living and progressive by the court decisions, and a common law, which always vividly underlies the legislation, exist side

by side, without its ever becoming necessary for the representatives of the people to make single large efforts at codification.

In the South, the law of the German-Roman codices above mentioned prevailed—in southern France the Visigothic (called the *droit écrit* in contrast to the Frankish *droit coutumier* of the north), and in Italy the Lombard **(which was the most important of them, was almost purely Germanic, and held its own till well into the Renaissance). Pavia became a study-centre for German law and produced about 1070 the "*Expositio*" by far the greatest achievement of juridical science in the age, and immediately after it a code, the "*Lombarda*."**2
...

The Diet of Worms in 1495 framed its "*Kammergerichtsordnung*"3 **after an Italian model.** Now there was not only the "Holy Roman Empire" on German ground, but "Roman law" as German common-law. The old German procedures were exchanged for Italian. **The judges had to study their law beyond the Alps, and obtained their experience not from the ambient life, but from a logic-chopping philology.** In this country alone are to be found, later, the ideologues for whom the *Corpus Juris* is an ark to be defended against the profanation of realities.

What, in fact, was it that under the high-sounding name passed into the intellectual keeping of a handful of Gothic men? **About 1100, at the University of Bologna, a German, Irnerius, had made that unique manuscript of the Pandects the object of a veritable Scholasticism. He transferred the Lombard method to the new text, "the truth of which, as a *ratio scripta*, was believed in as implicitly as the Bible and Aristotle."**1 Truth!—but the Gothic understanding, tied to the Gothic life-content, was incapable even of distantly guessing at the spirit of these texts, for the principles fixed in them were the principles of a civilized and megalopolitan life. This school of the glossators, like Scholasticism in general, stood under the spell of concept-realism; **as they held the genuine real, the substance of the world, to be not in things, but in universal concepts, so they maintained that the law was to be found not in custom and usage as displayed in the despised**2 ***Lombarda*, but in the manipulation of abstract notions.**

2. The punning contrast of Lombard *faex* (excrement) and Roman *lex* is Huguccio's (1200).

Their interest in the book was purely dialectical3—never was it in their minds to apply their work to life. **It was only after 1300, and then slowly, that their anti-Lombard glosses and summæ made their way into the cities of the Renaissance.** The jurists of the Late Gothic, above all Bartolus, had fused canon and Germanic law into one whole with a definitely practical intention, and into it they brought ideas of actuality—here, as in Dracon's code and the Imperial Edicts from Theodosius to Justinian, the actuality of a Culture that is on the threshold of its "Late" stage. **It was *the creation of Bartolus that became effective* in Spain and Germany as "Roman law"; only in France did the jurists of the Baroque, after Cujacius and Donellus, get back from the Scholastic to the Byzantine text.**
...

Urban rationalism turned, as in the case of the Sophists and the Stoics, to busy itself with the "law of nature," from its foundation by Oldendorp and Bodinus to its destruction by Hegel. In England the great Coke successfully defended Germanic self-developing practical law against the last attempts of the Tudors to introduce Pandect law. But on the Continent the systems of the learned evolved in *Roman* forms right down to the state codes of Germany and the schemes of the *Ancien Régime* in France on which the Code Napoléon was based. **And therefore Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* is the one purely Germanic Code, and it appeared when the Faustian Culture had already reached the threshold of its Civilization.**
...

A scholar-class is alien to the world, and despises experience that does not originate in thought. Inevitably conflict arises between the "state of knowledge" as the scholar will accept it and the flowing custom of practical life. **That manuscript of the Pandect of Irnerius became, and for centuries remained, the "world" in which learned jurists lived.** Even in England, where there are no law faculties (in the European sense), it was exclusively the legal profession that controlled further growth, so that even here the development of legal ideas diverged from the development of general life.

Thus what we have hitherto called juristic science is in fact either the philology of law-language, or the scholarship of law-ideas. It is now the only science that still continues to deduce the meaning of life from "eternally valid" principles.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=_JghDQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false **[1924]**

From the new synthesis follows necessarily a turning away from our entire present system of education, which on the one hand has become a collection of dead knowledge, and on the other serves abstract doctrines rather than German ideals. The glorification of the humanistic *Gymnasium* was naïve, for it overlooked the fact that this so-called humanistic, that is, purely human educational system, in the last analysis was not representative of *mankind* but presupposed the *Greek nationality*. The Greek educational system, however, was an originally racial one and in the beginning served only the purpose of educating Greeks according to the ideal image of Greek soul. **It was this Greek life-feeling alone which created Hellenic culture, and the present purely abstract thinking is not only not representative of mankind, it is**

also not Greek; it is a mockery of the needs of the Greek nation. In sad imitation of the Greek spirit, admittedly related to ours in many respects, we have shifted the emphasis of our lives outside ourselves; we have used the standards of another people to measure our own achievements, **and we have forgotten in doing so that people, like personalities, can never be measured by the *same* standard.** Just as Michelangelo cannot be measured with the standard of Phidias, so the Strassburg cathedral cannot be considered a development of the Parthenon. **If one applies Greek standards to a Gothic cathedral, then it is the most horrible monstrosity in the world.** In the same way a Greek temple would appear strange to a Gothic master builder.
…

Closely connected to the educational system, a new concept of the law is developing; **nothing is more pleasing than the beginnings of a sharp struggle between the Roman code of law and German legal views. Late Roman law was entirely subservient to capitalism and today it legally protects the exploiter from the exploited;** now for the first time it has been fundamentally disavowed, and it being set aside by the old German conception of cooperative association [*Genossenschaftswesen*]3 and especially protection of the state and race.

https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch6-the-denaturalization-of-nordic-law-germanic-law-and-the-reception-of-roman-law

The German legal historian Peter Landau (Landau 1989: 10-22) has actually discovered conduits between the reflections of nineteenth-century German jurists and the NSDAP, singling out the notable figures of Johannes Lehmann-Hohenberg and Arnold Wagemann, two intellectuals, a professional jurist and a jurophile of sorts, who were precocious members of the young party.[4] **These two incense bearers of Germanic law inspired the programme of the *Deutschsozialistische Partei*,[5] published on 31 May 1919, which states that the question of land and the ownership of land carries a fundamental importance.** Among other things, it is land ownership which is the dividing line between Roman law and 'Germanic law' – the Nazi jurists did not cease to revisit this before crying victory over the enactment of the *Erbhofgesetz* in September of 1933:

> The premier cause of our distress lies with our right of ownership over the earth
>
> … Therefore, we demand:
>
> 1. The free disposition of earth and land …
>
> 2. The abolition of Roman law, dominant up until now, which is to be replaced by a German common law [*Deutsches Gemeinrecht*]. Our right of ownership of the earth rests within Roman law … **Roman law was introduced in Germany 400 years ago by the princes and the high members of the clergy; the people opposed it, without success. The people know well that this foreign law estranges them from their land and their other possessions. The Peasants' War,[6] the first uprising from the community, was a bloody war against Roman law. Relentlessly the farmers demanded reinstatement of ancient Germanic law. Today, we state the same demand.** It is only due to you, the people of Germany, that it does not remain ignored. This question is more important than anyone can fathom: it is the cornerstone of our future way of living and our existence [*Bestehen*]. **Roman law was conceived in an era when Rome, in all her decadence, was flooded with Jews. It is antisocial and protects private profit at the cost of the community. It is a law for knaves and the ill-willed. On that legal foundation, Germany always loses faced with the Jew.** The facts confirm what we are claiming. This is the way the German people need to be provided with a law that corresponds to their race and their culture that respects the old principle: the common good takes precedence over the individual good. **The profound greed, dishonesty and immorality that manifests itself in our market place, this Judaification of our people, is the fault of Roman law, just as our economy is transformed into an economy of pure interest – which has imparted its evil to the world in recent decades, and finally resulted in the war.**

…

Rosenberg incriminates those 'imperial doctors foreign to the people' (Rosenberg 1937: 567-8) (*kaiserliche volksfremde Doktoren*) who, educated *in utroque jure*, introduced the Roman law of suzerainty and individuality to Germanic legal culture.
…

The introduction of legal individuality (it is the individual who is the holder of rights, not the community, the *Gemeinschaft*) and private property **had transformed the land, birth mother**

and property of the race, from its pure form: an immovable good quickly changed to a movable one through the demonic mechanism of sureties. The practice of mortgage had made the land into a pure paper title (*Wertpapier*) that usurers, bankers and other parasites had quickly turned into an object of speculation. Thus the injection of Roman law and its categories not only removed the *Volk* from its land, and separated *Blut* from *Boden*, but at the same time turned the soil into an abstract value, given over to commerce. As a jurist contemptuous of Roman law and its reception holds, one had in this manner 'replaced slavery to a master with slavery to the Jew and the usurer' (Jung 1934: 186).
…

Moreover, one may conclude that the question is nothing but a scholarly matter, and that it acquired a didactic function important enough to figure in a teaching manual for SS officers:

> Let us oppose again and again some maxims of our ancestors from Roman-Byzantine law that they have imposed upon us over recent centuries so that it became alien to our race, to demonstrate to what degree these foreign legal conceptions were – and it cannot be any other way – devastating to our thinking and our racial will: Roman-Byzantine law says: 'The owner may use his good according to his good judgment'. On this, Saxon law lays down: 'The common good goes before the individual good'. Roman law proclaims: 'The land is prone to cession on the same title as that for slaves or animals'. On this, Saxon law lays down: 'One cannot cede the land without the permission of the heirs' … **Or even: 'The law is codified in fifty books for all eternity'. Saxon law says: 'Written law cannot supersede the law of nature.'**[11]

…

This is the notion defended in 1933 by Rudolf Bechert of the University of Munich at a conference pertaining to commercial law and necessary reform of that law. Why were the Romans so prone to abstractions? The Roman Empire was 'international' (Bechert 1933: 81-2): It was applicable to all the races and cultures it absorbed on the basis of a legal discourse that all could comprehend. **The Roman people were also a minority in this Empire, and since 'they were flooded with foreigners' (Bechert 1933: 82), it would not have been feasible to regulate the Empire by means of a '*völkisch*' (Bechert 1933: 82) law, but instead it was reigned over by a law that was '*individualistisch*' (Bechert 1933: 82):** As the *Volk* could not have been the foundation and point of reference for the law, the individual became the smallest common denominator in what Rosenberg termed *racial chaos* when he speaks of Rome in late Antiquity.

The author maintains that he does not aim to 'underestimate the value of Roman legal thinking': The problem is not to establish a dichotomy between values (*Wertunterschied*), but to reiterate a difference of essence (*Wesensunterschied*) (Bechert 1933: 82), in the instance of racial make-up. **The Germanic people, identical to one another and racially coherent, could conceive of a law that was the reflection of this purity and this coherence, a communal law, since this biological community existed, contrary to the Roman case.**
…

In every text one can read the reluctance and the shame that overcomes the jurists in repudiating a Roman law with which they are familiar and which they were otherwise impressed with. Moreover, the existence or non-existence of Germanic law was evident for many jurists, who could do nothing but acquiesce in the statement by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, generally a convinced Germanophile, related to Wagner, and torch-bearer for nationalist-racist Germanic thought: **'Roman law is as peerless and inimitable as Greek art. This teutomaniacal ridicule does not change that. We hear jokes about a "Germanic law" that we have been deprived of by the introduction of Roman law: there never has been a "Germanic law", only a chaos of brutal and contradictory laws, one for each people.'**[15]
…

A small text composed in 1937 (most likely) by the association of National Socialist jurists, *Die Paragraphensklaverei und ihr Ende* ('Slavery to the paragraph and its purpose'), explicitly shows the nuances. Certainly, the text concerns the 'Roman law' of 'debt' (*Schuldenmasse*) necessary for a bankruptcy. But how does it understand Roman law? The text takes pains to determine and distinguish it:

> The ancient Romans were a juristically gifted people. They created a highly developed legal technique. **But none of the ancient Romans were any longer around when it was attempted, in the 15th century, to replace the diversity of Germanic laws by a general legal system. In this era, there was nothing left but decadent late-Roman**

> **legal science,** and it is this foreign legal science that became law in Germany... The spirit of a decadent science from late Antiquity reigned intact for centuries.[16]

…

The pamphlet title *Slavery to the Paragraph* effectively reveals the author and the beneficiary of this legal contamination, in posing the question *cui bono*:

> **Who profits from the law? Roman law, in its decadent form, as it was introduced in Germany, was auxiliary to a materialist perspective on the world. Disconnected from any and all relation to the race and the fatherland, from blood and from soil, it encouraged bourgeois-liberal as much as proletarian-Marxist materialism, which led to disastrous consequences, devastating for the race.[23]**

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n337/mode/2up?view=theater

The grownup son could only withdraw from the tyranny of the head of the family by entry into the league of men, the Curia, the army. **These forces mutually balanced each other, watched over the discipline of state citizens, and created that rigid Roman type which conquered the world.** Its laws still determine the norm of western life even today. **It must be said here at once that the crassly individualistic, private capitalistic Roman law created Roman strength but – released from its environment of intrinsic type – had a disintegrating effect on the Germanic essence.** It must again be eliminated if we wish to recover our health.

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n385/mode/2up?view=theater

The same soul had a creative influence upon our life for thousands of years until when an alien, still not reshaped, religion came on us. The alien ideas of the Roman state and its alien law also destroyed this life. **The Imperial folkish alien doctors transplanted alien law and dishonourable ideas into the Germanic tribes. They operated as mere bailiffs for the powers of the ruling church and the Roman state.** Geyler von Kaisersberg complained about the tongues of tittle tattlers who, with their gossip, were completely harmful to the common good, and who were concerned only with their own advantages. In the year 1513 a poem appeared, the *Marriage with a Foreigner*, which completely consciously attributes the loss of German freedom to the Roman law. Ulrich von Hutten alludes in his conversation in *Die Rauber* to the Lower Saxons who made their way in their law without the new Doctors. Things had gone better in Germany, he said, when the law resided in weapons, not in books. **Thus the first and only German social revolution was fully justified according to its essence. This was the peasant revolt at the beginning of the 16th century against Roman slavery in its threefold form as church, state, and manipulation of law.**
…

The Franks, Alemanns, and the rest, also carried on their wanderings their own racial versions of law. This law then displaced the ancient Roman law. The later disappearance of Frankish and Bavarian blood promoted the late Roman law. **The great French revolution signified the destruction of the Germanic constituents and interpretations of law. Since then France, that is, the land of the Franks, has been Jewish Roman in its determination.**
…

As our humanists of art looked at Hellas as at something which represented an artistic model entirely on its own, and not as organically shaped, so our Humanists also looked to Rome for a model of Law. They overlooked the fact that Roman Law was a product of the Roman people and could not be imitated by us because it related to supreme value other than our own. **The social and military prototype of Rome gave birth as a counterpart to a purely individualistic interpretation of law.** The paterfamilias who presided over the life and death of members of his kindred is an allegory of Roman objectivity and impartiality. **Thus the concept of property taken to its ultimate conclusion. The Roman interpretation of law simultaneously declared holy the concept of individual capitalism. Economic man became the supreme value.** It may defend its justified interests with all possible means, without anyone asking if the honour of the people has suffered harm in establishing this economic egoism. One may certainly not hold ancient Roman Law, which set its unwritten boundaries through the presiding prototypes, responsible for the late Roman bastard phenomena, which at all events possessed some racially identical Langobardic wefts which the Roman state and the Roman church presented us. This was done in order to legally complete the enslavement of free peoples. We have today attempted to take over the capitalist principle of law, although we cannot take over the whole of ancient Roman life. It can never really become alive again. It was torn from the beam supporting it as an organic state structure. It received another function and became even more an absolute measuring rod from a function. The subjective absence of control became a law. This fact has been veiled until today by formalities.

> The Romans would have never increased the legacy of mankind by the idea of a law independent of and equal to the state, if they had not with powerful one sidedness put into reality the opposite of the IVS SINGVLORVM and of the IVS POPVLI. **Here the sovereignty of the one and indivisible state authority, there the sovereignty of the individual; these were powerful levers of Roman legal history.** *Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts*, Berlin, 1889, page 6.

https://archive.org/details/chapoutot-johann-the-law-of-blood-thinking-and-acting-as-ns-2018/page/57/mode/2up?view=theater

Carl Schmitt translated this idea into more technical terms. Seeking to order and establish a typology of legal thinking, he argued that it was necessary to distinguish between legal cultures in which "the law is understood as a rule, as a decision, or as an order"—in the sense of an objective order—and those in which the law was a "concrete order."139 Dominant legal scholarship pertained to these two categories: **"Nineteenth-century legal positivism is the combination of decision and law, of decisionism and normativism," as if it were possible to create law *ex abstracto* and *ex nihilo*,** by making decisions and by constructing abstract hierarchical structures of super- and subordinate norms that had no foundation in concrete, real orders.140 To Schmitt, the "victory of the French Revolution, which had imposed a society of citizens and individuals," and "the liberal 'Ideas of 1789,'" had led to "a disintegration of order thinking"; that is, of concrete legal thinking about the nature of order.141

The French Revolution had designated the individual as the beginning and ending of the law. It made the law—something voted on and therefore decided by Parliament—into the only valid norm. **In this, the French Revolutionaries were the heirs of a long tradition, one that Carl Schmitt traced back to the Stoics, and specifically to the scholar and Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, according to whom the law was "king, overseer, ruler, and master over morality and immorality, right and wrong."**142 **This had been followed by the natural law of the Classical and Enlightenment ages, "the rational law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ... which is part abstract normativism, part decisionism." A good Catholic, Schmitt did not condemn "the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law of the Middle Ages."** This law, which was a law of nature above all, and a theoretical consecration of the order willed by God, was, "from the point of view of legal science, the concrete order."143

https://archive.org/details/chapoutot-johann-the-law-of-blood-thinking-and-acting-as-ns-2018/page/79/mode/2up?view=theater

In a vast survey published in 1937 that reviewed the history of philosophy of law "from the Greeks to today," Professor Kurt Schilling rejoiced that, thanks to Adolf Hitler, the German people "had been saved from extremely threatening dangers"—those of legal abstraction and inveterate egalitarianism.58 **In erudite, compelling terms, Schilling traced this mania for abstraction back to the Stoics, those anemic philosophers "in whose arteries not a single drop of blood still ran"—that is, not a single drop of pure, authentic blood.**59 The noxious Jean-Jacques Rousseau had been the Stoa's rightful heir, and his *Social Contract* horrified our author all the more in that it had been put into practice by proponents of the French Revolution, which had led to "an excessive politicization of the people in the form of the State," as well as in "this idiotic principle of the majority" that was the foundation of democracy.60

Democracy, majority, the parliamentary model—these were all key components of a new era of humanity, of an unprecedented and terrifying anthropology that had been enframed by mathematics. The liberal, industrial, and commercial nineteenth century, as our perspicacious professor noted, was both the age of democracy and that of science: **"Life became science, and science, statistics."**61 **With this transitive leap, he argued, the mystery of life in its organic and biological reality had become a simple matter of numbers, data, averages, and standard deviations. This mathematical age was characterized by abstraction, which was hostile to life.**
...

Gustav Adolf Walz, a professor of public law and chancellor of the University of Breslau, a brilliant and sought-after legal scholar, incriminated the mathematical reason of the Enlightenment and liberal democracy in an abstruse and jargon-filled work titled *Racial Equality against Equality in Principle*, in which he sought to rehabilitate the biology of difference as an argument against the mathematics of equality, and to use it as a new foundation for the law. Walz observed that all legal systems could be divided into two simple categories: first were those legal systems which "regulated on a leveling principle of equality," such as the old Judeo-liberal law; and second, those founded on "the principle of differentiation determined by race," such as the emerging National Socialist legal system.65

For Walz, there could be no doubt that "the regulating idea of equality is a product of the rationalist mentality of European man as it was formed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."66 For understandable, logical reasons, the thinkers of the Enlightenment had wished to awaken humanity from its dogmatic slumber. To do so, they had made use of the admirable faculty known as reason, which they had "enthroned" over dogma. **Thereafter, "mathematics became the alpha and the omega of thought" in all areas of human creation, including the law:** "The law, the rational rule, appeared as the juridical expression of this way of thinking," marked by abstraction and by individualism—reason was, after all, the human faculty that fostered individual autonomy and helped people to throw off their cultural and political chains. This "legal understanding based on the individual is a system of subjective private rights," **although entirely contestable, had been in keeping with the ambitions and the spirit of the age.**67 **Such law**

was both the matrix and the expression of a society (as opposed to a community) that was liberal (and not organic), free (and not determined), mercantile and account-keeping (and not founded on solidarity). Under such conditions, "the law is a utilitarian rationalism intended to regulate relationships among individuals," because individuals were the only acknowledged reality, and their egotistical and private interests the only ones to be defended—both against those of others and against the potentially tyrannical state.68

Like the French revolutionaries fired with the zeal of Rousseau's philosophy, the Stoics had also been fervent defenders of this "legal mathematics."69 Their secret goal had been to promote this legal equality, which was couched in mathematical terms—in other words, in terms of universal equivalence.

https://archive.org/details/chapoutot-johann-the-law-of-blood-thinking-and-acting-as-ns-2018/page/93/mode/2up?view=theater

The Nazis, who took care to criticize Roman law in Article 19 of their 1920 political platform, were following a well-worn path—and racializing it. **In an article that is a tidy summation of the many treatises written on this topic, Hans Frank linked the arrival of the idea of sovereignty in Roman law to the development of the state—or rather, of states, which, in the Germanic sphere, grew from the ashes of the Holy Roman Empire starting in the fourteenth century, with a dramatic acceleration in the seventeenth century.** The development of the state was, naturally, accompanied by the development of the legal theory of sovereignty as well as of a caste of legal scholars who worked in the service of the prince—both lawyers charged with conceptualizing the state and lawmakers whose task it was to ensure that it lived and maintained power. In the Germanic era, the concept of the state and Roman law had been imported via the Roman Catholic Church, which had followed the model of the late and decadent Roman Empire by preserving its legal traditions and its political concepts. **This meant that Germany had undergone a kind of second evangelization: following in the footsteps of missionary bishops such as Ulfilas, *juris doctors* trained in "Italian universities" had surged to the north to "bring it typically Roman legal ideas."** This new plague from Italy sought "to dominate and to shape real life through eternal values according to a concept of life, an abstraction of life, that expressed the rigid ritual mechanism of the Vaticanist regime." 116
...

But heaven forfend it be confused with original Roman law, which was proud, noble, and sound. The racially pure roots of that Roman law were Germanic and Nordic, relics of the time when this great culture had colonized Italy and given birth to a glorious empire which had, alas, been slowly corrupted by the invasion of foreign bloods:

> **The Roman law of the *doctores juris* was unnatural: it was no longer the authentic and proud law of the nobility, of Nordic Romans who had created the greatest empire in Antiquity.** This law, organic, vital, was the law characteristic of a small racial entity based on the pure racial concept of the *civis romanus*. **This term did not mean "inhabitant of Rome" or "Roman citizen," but rather expressed a belonging, through blood, to the Roman racial essence.** So long as the law was an expression of the coarse and tough life of this racial cell, Rome was truly Rome, before the Romans' ill-considered extension of their Reich signed the death sentence of this original law. **The vital law of a race certain of its own destiny deteriorated into an artificial principle of state domination.** The racial citizen became a mere member of a Caracalla-style state.119

...

Ultimately, "the Roman law of Justinian," the law whose codes were studied, taught, and received in Germany, **"contained as much Roman law as all the world's oceans conceal nuggets of gold."**125 **The history of the "great reception" of Roman law was an unhappy one characterized by successive alienations:** first that of the "late Roman" from the "Roman," then that of the "Germanic" from the late Roman.126 Professor Walther Merk was another who deplored "this alienation of the law through the reception of late Roman and Byzantine law": "It was not the authentic and vigorous ancient Roman law, ... but the highly Orientalized law of a population of degenerate European-Asiatic bastards" that had been received in Germany. **Fundamentally foreign, this law "upset everything in the order created by the wisdom of our ancestors."**127

The reception had created a formal system, stupefyingly abstract, universalistic, and egalitarian, **"without the least breath of authentic, strong, and healthy Rome. It is in this form that it arrived in Germany. And it is for this—because of a Byzantine alienation—that our law was massacred"** by separating "the law of the people" from the "law of the state, truly a law of jurists, formal and judicial." The importation of an artificial and complex law had created a double tyranny. Lawyers had created an increasingly absolute princely power, because no one understood the plan these jurists were hatching: the people, fit and pure, armed with good sense, had become the *Hanswurst*, the Punchinellos, of the courts, whose language and hairsplitting they could not understand.

At a deeper level, and far more seriously, **life itself, in all its liberty and plasticity, in its labile and constantly moving indeterminacy, had been mortally stifled by the straitjacket of "paragraphs"—of writing, of death, of all that was fixed and unmoving.** Frank noted with outrage that through the actions of these *doctores juris*, the subsuming "of particular cases (of life!) to articles of law had become the main mission of the justice" system. But, he added, life would take its revenge, because "one does not subject life to formal constraints" for long.
...

According to Frank, the “war that we have declared on Roman law has nothing to do with the law of ancient Rome. It targets the falsification of the Roman law that we appropriated a few centuries ago, in the form of a Romano-Byzantine bastardization.”130

The willingness and energy with which these professional jurists went about discrediting and reviling their own profession is impressive. **What curious brand of masochism could possibly lead those with doctorates in law, who had studied Latin and legal codes, to qualify themselves and their colleagues as a pile of positivist, nit-picking quibblers, as a bunch of degenerates to whom life itself was a foreign concept?**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.180053/page/n113/mode/2up?view=theater **[1940]**

The Hereditary Farmlands Law revives the old Teutonic concept that the landowner is intimately linked to the land. **It is officially stated that “The idea engendered by Roman law that land was so much merchandise to be bought and sold at will is profoundly repugnant to German feelings. To us, soil is something sacred; the peasant and his land belong inseparably together.”** Emphasis is thus laid on the *Bauer*, imperfectly translated by our word *peasant*. The German *Bauer* is an independent landowner, self-respecting and proud of the name. We can best visualize him as like the old English yeoman.

This is the class which National Socialism seeks to foster by making peasant holdings hereditary; keeping the farm in the family, and keeping it intact by having it descend through the oldest son. That was the old Teutonic method, which still prevails by custom in parts of Germany. Over 700,000 of these hereditary farm holdings have now been established.

https://archive.org/details/Valentin-Antisemitism--HistoricallyAndCriticallyExamined/page/n129/mode/2up?view=theater

The prosecutor considered that Rechnitz and the author of the article were perhaps guilty of no crime in the "obsolete" view of the Roman law, but that they deserved sentence nevertheless, since they had attributed false motives to the Jewish policy of the Nazis and insinuated that the German Government did not protect the lives, honour and property of the German Jews as zealously as those of German citizens, an insinuation which was entirely unjustified (!) and might injure the prestige of Germany.

> https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch6-the-denaturalization-of-nordic-law-germanic-law-and-the-reception-of-roman-law
>
> In a novella taking place during the Second World War, Louis Aragon has one of his characters, a military judge, say:
>
> > **I was a professor of Roman law.** But to give priority to Germanic law, it is my point of view one has to erase all traces of Roman law from the modern world. **Roman law as a basis for modern laws is a disgusting absurdity and contrary to the German spirit.**
>
> He adds:
>
> > In these times, our courts are still infested with Roman law, the Napoleonic code, Jewish laws … **Today, we would have never let off Dimitrov; he would have been found guilty … according to Germanic law.**[2]
>
> This novella, entitled *Roman Law Is No More*, suggests a profound knowledge on the part of Louis Aragon of the debates, developments and in-fighting in the world of Nazi jurists.

https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch2-exiled-romanists-between-traditions-pringsheim-schulz-and-daube

When the Nazis took power in 1933, Pringsheim criticized their legal policies early on in his lectures. He would go as far as writing an open letter to Carl Schmitt, at that point the main legal ideologue of the Nazi regime, about the role of Roman law in Germany. The Nazi policy had been to replace Roman law with Germanic people’s law, **but Pringsheim wrote that this was clearly wrong as Roman law was an organic part of the German legal tradition.** Though openly challenged, Schmitt was unenthusiastic about the confrontation and no consequences resulted.[8]

> [8] **Paragraph 19 of the NSDAP party programme from 24 February 1920: ‘We demand that Roman Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced by a German common law.’**

…

In fact, what the research implied was that many of the principles that were dear to the German legal science were in fact the products of the hated post-classical Roman law.[10] This was a long-standing debate that had been exacerbated by the focus on interpolationism. **For Nazi scholars and even many conservatives in academia, the very idea that the texts of Roman law as they were now known were not purely Roman but rather the product of Greek, Hellenistic or even Semitic scholars who had edited them was a matter of great importance and passion. For conservatives like Salvatore Riccobono, the idea of oriental origins laid doubt on the whole legitimacy of Roman law as the product of pure Roman spirit. For Nazis like Ernst Schönbauer, the oriental roots would have meant that the law would be racially impure** (Riccobono 1925-6; Schönbauer 1939: 390-1).

https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch7-the-idea-of-rome-political-fascism-and-fascist-roman-law

Here I would like to look in a different direction, and that is the alleged continuity between Roman law (in particular classical Roman law) and the new codification of Italian civil and commercial law, that, after the preparatory works started in the 1920s (cf. Caprioli 2008: 131ff), was completed with the entry into force of the Civil Code on 21 April (once again that fateful date) 1942, in the middle of the war (at a not unfavourable moment for Italian and German troops).[29]

Rather than a comprehensive analysis of the Code (which would be a titanic work), I intend to restrict my observations to some points in the official 'Report' (*Relazione*)[30] which the minister of justice, the Bologna lawyer Dino Grandi (1895-1988), a former minister for foreign affairs and ambassador in London, formally presented to the king. I am not interested in highly specific technical passages but will recall some points where Grandi more openly (and strategically) quotes ancient Rome and Roman law (cf. Caprioli 2008: 200f).
…

The terminology, while modern and perfectly matching that of legislation of 1865, regains its full historical value acquiring new meaning with the attachment to tradition:

> When we say Civil Code, our thoughts go back to the notion of the Roman *civis*, the active member of the political community of Rome, with its well-defined position with respect to the family and *civitas*. **This notion of *civis* has nothing in common with that of the *citoyen* of the French Revolution. The name of our code will not therefore mean that it is the code that governs the inherent rights of the citizen, as opposed to the rights of the State, much less does it mean the code of the bourgeoisie, that is, citizens of the middle classes (this concept also deriving from the French Revolution) as is sometimes called the French Code.** (*Relazione*: 33ff, § 11)

The uncoupling of liberal values is made clear by the rejection of any connection with French revolutionary ideas: fascist revolution is another thing.

> *For us* – continues the Minister – *the Civil Code means only the code that includes the civil law, in the sense that it was originally in Rome, as defined by Gaius in his Institutions* (I.1): *ius proprium civitatis*. **It is the proper law of the Roman *civitas*, like the walls and the gods born with it or received in it from the people who brought it into being, a law which cannot be confused with that of any other *civitas*. This original concept had necessarily become discoloured later, when what was once the exclusive law of Roman citizens, members of the *civitas*, became the general law of all subjects of the empire of Rome, whatever the race from which they derived.** (*Relazione*: 34, § 11)[31]

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n115/mode/2up?view=theater

350 By the definitions of truth and certitude above proposed [138], **men were for a long period incapable of truth and of reason, which is the fount of that inner justice by which the intellect is satisfied. This justice was practiced by the Hebrews, who, illuminated by the true God, were by his divine law forbidden even to have unjust thoughts, about which no mortal lawgiver ever troubled himself.** (For the Hebrews believed in a God all mind who searches the hearts of men, and the gentiles believed in gods composed of bodies and mind who could not do so.) **This same inner justice was later reasoned out by the philosophers, who did not arise until two thousand years after the nations were founded. In the meantime the nations were governed by the certitude of authority,** that is, by the same criterion which is used by our metaphysical criticism; namely the

common sense of the human race, which we have defined above in the elements [142], and on which the conscience of all nations reposes. So that, in this [third] principal regard, our Science comes to be a philosophy of authority, which is the fount of the outer justice of which the moral theologians speak. Of such authority account should have been taken by the three princes of the doctrine of the natural law of nations, and not of that drawn from passages in the writers. For the authority of which we speak reigned among the nations for more than a thousand years before writers could arise, and they could have taken no cognizance of it. **For that reason Grotius, more learned and erudite than either of the others, combats the Roman jurisconsults in almost every particular detail of this doctrine; but all his blows fall short, for the jurisconsults established their principles of justice on the certitude of the authority of the human race, not on the authority of the learned.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#THE_PROBLEM_OF_SOCRATES

5. With Socrates Greek taste veers round in favour of dialectics: what actually occurs? **In the first place a noble taste is vanquished: with dialectics the mob comes to the top.** Before Socrates' time, dialectical manners were avoided in good society: they were regarded as bad manners, they were compromising. Young men were cautioned against them. All such proffering of one's reasons was looked upon with suspicion. Honest things like honest men do not carry their reasons on their sleeve in such fashion. It is not good form to make a show of everything. **That which needs to be proved cannot be worth much. Wherever authority still belongs to good usage, wherever men do not prove but command, the dialectician is regarded as a sort of clown.** People laugh at him, they do not take him seriously. Socrates was a clown who succeeded in making men take him seriously: what then was the matter?

6. **A man resorts to dialectics only when he has no other means to hand.** People know that they excite suspicion with it and that it is not very convincing. Nothing is more easily dispelled than a dialectical effect: this is proved by the experience of every gathering in which discussions are held. **It can be only the last defence of those who have no other weapons. One must require to extort one's right, otherwise one makes no use of it. That is why the Jews were dialecticians.** Reynard the Fox was a dialectician: what?—and was Socrates one as well?

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n123/mode/2up?view=theater

The distinction between "believing" and "judging" reminds us of a passage in the first chapter of Seneca's *De vita beata*: "**Everyone prefers to believe rather than to judge. One never judges but always believes regarding the things which are vital.** Error transmitted from hand to hand always turns us to and fro and throws us down headlong, and we perish through following examples taken from others. **We shall be cured if we were but to secede from the crowd. As it is, however, the people, the defender of its own evil, stands firm against reason.**" If we desire to understand Machiavelli's thought, we must pay great attention to the kinship which according to Seneca exists between "believing" and "the people."105

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_a_Happy_Life/Book_I

It is harmful to follow the march of those who go before us, and since every one had rather believe another than form his own opinion, we never pass a deliberate judgment upon life, [dum unusquisque mauult credere quam iudicare, numquam de uita iudicatur, semper creditur] but some traditional error always entangles us and brings us to ruin, and we perish because we follow other men's examples: we should be cured of this if we were to disengage ourselves from the herd; but as it is, the mob is ready to fight against reason in defence of its own mistake.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.25058/page/405/mode/2up?view=theater

The life of the mind is a composition of two forces: **the necessity to believe in order to live, and the necessity to reason in order to advance. In ages of poverty and chaos the will to believe is paramount, for courage is the one thing needful; in ages of wealth the intellectual powers come to the fore as offering preferment and progress;** consequently a civilization passing from poverty to wealth tends to develop a struggle between reason and faith, a "warfare of science with theology."

https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/naziseasternempire/himmlersspeechatposen.html

The "commissar" ordering us to attack must be our own bravery, our own loyalty, our own obedience. There is an enormous difference. In our ranks, **we live according to our germanic laws, one of which, a really beautiful one, says, "Honour is compulsion enough."** With foreign peoples, we must apply Asiatic laws. We must never lose sight of that. If we have one of our blood before us, a Norwegian or Dutchman of good racial stock, then we can

> only win his heart over to us according to our, that means his and our, totally germanic laws. **With a Russian or Slav, from a racial point of view, we should never even try to apply our holy laws to them, but rather the tried and tested laws of the Russian commissar.**
>
> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0070%3Aspeech%3D8%3Asection%3D51
>
> [51] But what any free man would call necessity is not merely present now, but is long ago past, and from the necessity that constrains a slave we must surely pray to be delivered. **Do you ask the difference? The strongest necessity that a free man feels is shame for his own position, and I know not if we could name a stronger; but for a slave necessity means stripes and bodily outrage, unfit to name here,** from which Heaven defend us!

https://books.google.fi/books?id=u7tluJEQlZAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Nazi party, insofar as it even took an interest in the content of what was studied, continued to regard Roman law with suspicion after the Curriculum Regulations of 1935, **seeing it as "Jewified" and as the stronghold of everything the Nazis opposed: individualism, formalism, liberalism, "bookish wisdom," and "hair-splitting sophistry."**19 **Roman law became the "foreign" per se;**20 **it was regarded as the "strongly orientalized law of a degenerate mixed European-Asiatic population, a law of the ruthless large-scale capitalist exploitation of one's fellow man."**21
…

Studies over the last few decades have demonstrated that the categorical (a priori) dualism of the law as an idea was foreign to German jurisprudence up to the end of the eighteenth century.57 **Only after 1800 did idealistic philosophy and political and economic liberalism work hand in hand to effect a fundamental separation of state and society, of public and private law, and to enshrine them as categories of supposedly eternal value.** The notion of a dichotomy – if not philosophically "necessary," yet irrevocable in practical terms – saturated the legal order throughout the nineteenth century. Ulpian's formula of the *duae positiones* (*Digest* 1.1.1.2) supplied the venerable principle of categorization.

> https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/d-01.htm#1
>
> 2. ***Huius studii duae sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quaedam publice utilia, quaedam privatim.***
>
> https://www.constitution.org/sps/sps02_j2-01.htm
>
> (2) Of this subject there are two divisions, public and private law. Public law is that which has reference to the administration of the Roman government; private law is that which concerns the interests of individuals; for there are some things which are useful to the public, and others which are of benefit to private persons.

Even when liberalism had passed its zenith in 1878 and found itself on the defensive with regard to the interventionist state,58 **this dichotomy was retained as an intellectual construct.** The new labor and social law, the war administration law, the social tenancy laws, and the business law of the 1920s barely encroached upon this dogma. Even textbooks from the end of the Weimar period gave no indication of serious doubts about this legal dualism.

Only National Socialism made an official and emphatic break with nineteenth-century currents of tradition, proclaiming a new unity of the legal order and declaring that the separation of state and society was as outmoded as the basic rights of the citizen. **Residues of privacy were to be dissolved, society was to be integrated into the state and the state into the "movement."**
…

For instance, in 1935 Herbert Meyer **hailed the end of the separation of public and private law as the restoration of a legal unity that had always existed in Germanic-German law, blaming the reception of Roman law and nineteenth-century liberalism for the fact that this pernicious separation had established itself in the first place.**60 The Romanist who tried to declare that this separation was scientifically untenable, indeed philosophically "nonexistent," and who tried to protect his own discipline by seeking to prove that Roman law was not to blame for the historically undeniable fact of this separation, faced certain difficulties. **He had to classify Ulpian's statement as a product of late Roman decay in order to dismiss it.**
…

Moreover, it became clear, in terms of the politics of scholarship, why the nineteenth century had had such an interest in portraying this dichotomy as timeless, **superimposing it on Roman law as though the kind of separation of state and society that prevailed in nineteenth-century central Europe had existed in the Roman Empire. In this regard the National Socialist period produced "progress" as earlier defined: a persuasive historiographical insight that outlasted the fall of the National Socialist state.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_Hitlerum

The phrase *reductio ad Hitlerum* is first known to have been used in an article written by University of Chicago professor Leo Strauss for *Measure: A Critical Journal* in spring 1951,[10] although it was made famous in a book by Strauss published in 1953[3]
Natural Right and History, Chapter II:

> In following this movement towards its end we shall inevitably reach a point beyond which the scene is darkened by the shadow of Hitler. Unfortunately, it does not go without saying that in our examination we must avoid the fallacy that in the last decades has frequently been used as a substitute for the *reductio ad absurdum*: the *reductio ad Hitlerum*. **A view is not refuted by the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler.**

https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

To recognize the fundamental difference between Christian scholasticism on the one hand, and Islamic and Jewish medieval philosophy on the other, one does well to start from the most obvious difference, the difference in regard to the literary sources. This difference is particularly striking in the case of practical or political philosophy. **The place that is occupied in Christian scholasticism by Aristotle's *Politics*, Cicero, and the Roman Law, is occupied in Islamic and Jewish philosophy by Plato's *Republic* and his *Laws*. Whereas Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* were recovered by the West only in the fifteenth century, they had been translated into Arabic in the ninth century.** Two of the most famous Islamic philosophers wrote commentaries on them: Fārābī on the *Laws*, and Averroes on the *Republic*.
…

By rejecting the notion of "rational commandments," the *falāsifa* implied that the principles of morality are not rational, but "probable" or "generally accepted." **"The rational laws (*nomoi*)" which they admitted, are distinguished from "the rational commandments," or the natural law, by the fact that they do not have obligatory character. The Stoic natural law teaching, which was transmitted to the Western world chiefly through Cicero and some Roman lawyers, did not influence the practical or political philosophy of the *falāsifa*.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerospractical0000unse/page/264/mode/2up?view=theater

In a review of Fink's book, **Strauss hesitated at the suggestion that the classical republicans were really classical, finding them more democratic than "their classical teachers" and more disposed to the modern belief in political perfection independent of the moral qualities of the citizens.**40
…

In *Natural Right and History*, normally taken as the basic statement of Strauss's overall position in political philosophy, there are nearly as many references to Cicero as there are to Plato (the most) and to Aristotle (the second most). No other thinker is there cited nearly as frequently as these three: Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. More restricted in scope than *Natural Right and History* is Strauss's *The City and Man* which, being constituted by studies on Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides, is limited to the Greeks;42 here too Cicero is cited with frequency but surrenders the third place to another Greek, Xenophon. In these books and in other writings, Strauss has cited almost exclusively the philosophical works of Cicero, and among those he has rarely referred to the rhetorical works.
…

Although at times he simply stated the conventional view that Cicero transmitted the Stoic teaching, on other occasions he elaborated so as to make clear that the version of that teaching which Cicero presented, *but did not himself embrace*, is an already rigidified or corrupted version of an original Stoic teaching that was much more Socratic.62
…

Strauss endeavored to sever Cicero's association with the natural law statement by Laelius by portraying the latter as "distrustful of philosophy in the full and strict sense of the term," as "absolutely at home on earth, in Rome," and as one who finds "no difficulty in reconciling natural law with the claims of the Roman Empire." The chief character of the dialogue, Scipio, is suggested as the representative of Cicero, and he "longs for the contemplative life" **and understands that the Roman regime is not simply just, that it can be seen as the best regime only by a standard of "diluted" natural law.** At the same time Strauss noted Cicero's identification with the Academic school and pointed out that another character in the *De Re Publica*, Philus, is an Academic skeptic and is called upon to attack the natural basis of right which Laelius above all defended.64 **This interpretation failed to address directly three considerations: the friendship and respect between those equals or near equals, Scipio and Laelius; that Cicero in his own name in an attack on Epicurean thought in *De Finibus* explicitly called upon the statement Laelius makes here; and the fact that Philus expresses his disgust and disagreement with the position he is here called upon to take.**65 Nor has a persuasive case been made that Laelius is any less aware than Scipio of the imperfections of the Roman past and the model Roman regime. But perhaps most important is the fact that although Scipio is the Roman spokesman in this dialogue for the merits and uses of speculative philosophy, the emphasis on the priority of moral and political philosophy which is put in the mouth of Laelius is consistent with Cicero's position throughout his writings.66

Much is made by Strauss and Holton of the "severe criticism" to which Cicero exposed Stoic metaphysics and theology in other writings, especially the *De Natura Deorum*. Even that work, however, provides especially in its closing lines ground for arguing that Cicero regarded the Stoic teaching as the best even if wanting in many ways. Cicero clearly wanted to distinguish the Stoic moral and political teaching from the metaphysics and theology. And what do Cicero's objections and doubts concerning the latter have to do with establishing his embrace of an earlier rather than later version of Stoic teaching? Would not either version be dependent on a first or fundamental philosophy, a satisfactory version of which Cicero has failed to find? And in fact those parts of the Stoic teaching, which Cicero has found more acceptable than others, were determined so not from a first philosophy but from the practical perspective, the fundamental concern with "human things" that Cicero shared with Socrates. **It must be asked why for Strauss a Stoic teaching that asserts the harmony or congruence of natural law with the essence of civil society was regarded as inaccessible from the perspective of prudence.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ls9ZDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false

Natural law institutionalizes, or believes it can institutionalize, what would be for Plato the decisions of the wise. **Strauss explained that the Stoics were the first to assert that there was a natural law because they were also the first to teach that there was a divine lawgiver who could mete out rewards and punishments for obeying or disobeying the law.**13 As we can see from his analysis of Plato, however, the divine origin of the natural law is not merely important at the level of *enforcement*. Rather, **only a divinity could conceive of a law that would apply in all cases, under all conditions, to all people and adhere to justice each and every time.** Such an achievement in certainly beyond the powers of the human mind, because it would combine the universality of legal justice and the specificity of equity. According to Strauss, echoing Aristotle, “Whereas a good ruler is necessarily beneficent, laws are not necessarily beneficent.”14 **Nevertheless, and related to this, the Stoics expected much more from most people than Plato or Aristotle did: “One is tempted to say that the Stoics treat the study of philosophy as if it were a moral virtue, *i.e.* as something which could be demanded from most men.”**15 The natural law of Thomas Aquinas goes even further than this, according to Strauss, not quite demanding that everyone study philosophy, but insisting that rationality is the path to morality. **This, at least in principle, is a path open to all.** He explained, “Differently stated, as a *rational being* man is by nature inclined toward acting according to reason; acting according to reason is acting virtuously; natural law prescribes therefore the acts of virtue.”16

If the natural law were merely rules handed down to the people from some lawgiver, that would be one thing. But it is more than this. **Aquinas, and perhaps even the Stoics, had to claim that the wisdom of Plato’s philosopher-king was somehow or in principle within the reach of everyone because man is defined for them as a *rational being*.** In other words, life according to reason is not the singular achievement of a few but the inherent capacity of all, if not now, then at some point in the future.17 Making this claim also entails supposing that politics need not be a compromise that wisdom must make with folly; rather, it can be understood rationally and proceed according to a rational plan.18 Put another way, **if all citizens are capable of acting rationally in all their affairs (or are morally expected to do so), political society is no longer a dilution of natural right that would have to be managed with prudence.**19

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/102/mode/2up?view=theater

In a letter to Helmut Kuhn, Strauss says that he realizes that his interpretation of Aristotle on natural right goes contrary to the authority of Aquinas, but it differs 'only by a nuance'. However, he adds that 'there are sometimes subtle nuances which are crucial importance'.54 This is the reason, as he explains to Kuhn, that he purposefully entitled his book *Natural Right*, not *Natural Law*. **Elsewhere he writes that natural law is an invention of the Stoics that was later adopted by Aquinas, and that the very idea of a natural law is for him a 'contradiction in terms'.**55 **This makes it clear that Strauss rejects the doctrine of natural law as having no roots in pagan wisdom. For Strauss, nature does not contain laws of conduct; unless, of course, one believes that there exists a divine legislator.** The pagan idea of natural right does not involve such assumptions.

---

https://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/religions_newpaganism.htm

In fact, Chesterton brilliantly summarized the entire spiritual history of the world in this one sentence: **"Paganism was the biggest thing in the world, and Christianity was bigger and everything since has been comparatively small."**

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/236/mode/2up?view=theater

> 56. Heidegger believes that Greek philosophy laid the foundations for modern rootlessness, and hence for the modern crisis (*SPPP*, p. 33). **It is true that for Strauss, philosophy transcends the roots of political society; it is an attempt to reach the universal truth about the human condition that transcends all ideologies and nationalities.** This is one reason why Strauss describes the philosopher as a stranger. However, for Strauss, the danger rests not so much in philosophy itself as in the 'publication' of philosophy. **Christianity is particularly instrumental in the 'publication' and hence the vulgarization of philosophy. Christianity is for Strauss, as it was for Nietzsche, Platonism for the masses because it introduces into religion, and eventually into politics, the universalistic element of philosophy – i.e. an element that transcends all particularity. But political society is particular and parochial by nature. Universalism succeeds only in perverting it, as the modern project illustrates. Strauss is at his most cautious when he speaks of Christianity;** it is no wonder that his conception of its role in the decline of Western civilization has been missed. See, for example, George Grant, 'Tyranny and Wisdom: A Comment on the Controversy Between Leo Strauss and Alexander Kojève', *Social Research*, vol. 31 (1964) pp. 45-72, reprinted in his *Technology and Empire* (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969).

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07/anf07.iii.ii.iv.iii.html

> **Since, therefore, as I have said, philosophy and the religious system of the gods are separated, and far removed from each other; seeing that some are professors of wisdom, through whom it is manifest that there is no approach to the gods, and that others are priests of religion, through whom wisdom is not learned; it is manifest that the one is not true wisdom, and that the other is not true religion.** Therefore philosophy was not able to conceive the truth, nor was the religious system of the gods able to give an account of itself, since it is without it. But where wisdom is joined by an inseparable connection with religion, both must necessarily be true; because in our worship we ought to be wise, that is, to know the proper object and mode of worship, and in our wisdom to worship, that is, to complete our knowledge by deed and action.
>
> **Where, then, is wisdom joined with religion? There, indeed, where the one God is worshipped, where life and every action is referred to one source, and to one supreme authority:** in short, the teachers of wisdom are the same, who are also the priests of God.[506] Nor, however, let it affect any one, because it often has happened, and may happen, that some philosopher may undertake a priesthood of the gods; and when this happens, philosophy is not, however, joined with religion; **but philosophy will both be unemployed amidst sacred rites, and religion will be unemployed when philosophy shall be treated of.**

Leo Strauss's Indictment of Christain Philosophy on JSTOR

Leo Strauss's writings reveal a subtle but consistent set of accusations against the influence of Christian thinkers on political philosophy. These accusations may be summarized in three charges. **First, the attempt by Aquinas and other Christian scholastics to synthesize faith and reason led later philosophers to eschew political prudence in favor of a humane project to employ science to transform political life.** The result was the destruction of the *modus vivendi*, safeguarded by classical political philosophy, between pious citizens and diffident but inwardly free philosophers. Second, unless all men become philosophers, this universal regime can be only a universal tyranny, ruled by means of perverted faith in the guise of a final philosophy. **Third, Christian thinkers must bear ultimate responsibility for precipitating the early modern rejection of classical political philosophy.**

Without the Christian appropriation of Aristotle, there might never have been a Machiavelli or a Hobbes.
...

Also unlike the classical philosophers, who had never supposed that more than a minority of human beings could ever attain their final end, could become philosophers, **Aquinas, true to the theological understanding of man, asserted that every human being has the potential to attain beatitude.**25 In this, we see that scholasticism has discounted what for classical philosophy had been seen as the most crucial and ineradicable source of inequality among men--the natural capacity for rational, especially speculative, thinking. **Scholasticism broke with the ancients by teaching that we are all equal with respect to the suprarational end of our actions; the moderns would transmute this same emphasis on equality by teaching that we are all equal with respect to the prerational or subrational passions that motivate our action.**
...

In this way, we see that the modern perspective is not a return to the classical view but a reverse image of the scholastic view.27 **Christian scholasticism viewed political life from above the natural horizon of the city; modern philosophy views political life from below the natural horizon of the city.**
...

We may admire the beauty of Thomas's vast intellectual celebration of the marriage of faith and reason, but how must these nuptials appear to a Platonic philosopher? From such a perspective, philosophy will be seen to have suffered at the hands of the Christian tradition a most insidious and perhaps ultimately mortal injury.
...

No longer is theology the political arm, the ministerial art, serving ends known to philosophy; theology has now become the master and philosophy the valued but firmly indentured servant.
...

Indeed, in one place, in a context well protected from casual readers, Strauss actually writes: "And modern philosophy emerged by way of transformation of, if in opposition to, Latin or Christian scholasticism."48 At the risk of being somewhat reckless, I will hazard to say plainly what I think Strauss implied: namely, that without Aquinas (or, at least, without the scholastic fusion of faith and philosophy) there need never have been a Machiavelli or a Hobbes.
...

From being the handmaiden of a faith that had promised to confirm and augment reason's grasp of the eternal truth, philosophy would now become an accessory to the basest passions and appetites shared by all men.65 **The moderns cut the cord that had tethered philosophy to the city's theological opinions only to tie it more firmly than ever to a host of new opinions: political glory (Machiavelli), the pre-political individual's fear of death (Hobbes), acquisitiveness (Locke), equality (Rousseau), until, finally, with Heidegger, we find philosophy embracing indiscriminately whatever may happen to be the dominant opinion among the *Volk*.**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12023a.htm

Born about 25 B.C.. His family, of a sacerdotal line, was one of the most powerful of the populous Jewish colony of Alexandria. **His brother Alexander Lysimachus was steward to Anthony's second daughter,** and married one of his sons to the daughter of Herod Agrippa, whom he had put under financial obligations. Alexander's son, Tiberius Alexander, apostatized and became procurator of Judea and Prefect of Egypt.
...

Furthermore, his method of interpretation appears as something new and original among the juridical commentaries of the Palestinian rabbis. Eliminating what formed the common basis of all commentaries of this kind—the interpretation of the Hebrew proper names (Philo gives them at times a Greek etymology), the particular rules for the signs which indicate that Moses intended us to look beyond the literal sense (Siegfried), the oral traditions added to the account of the Pentateuch (and again, at the beginning of the "Life of Moses" these traditions are clearly of Alexandrine origin), and the prescriptions of the worship in Jerusalem—two essential features remain: first, the conviction that the Jewish law is identical with the natural; and then the allegorical interpretation. The first, according to which the acts of the prophets and the prescriptions of Moses are regarded as ideals conformable to nature (in the Stoic sense), **gives to the Jewish religion a universality incompatible with the narrow national Messianism of the Jewish sibyls. Philo thus abandons entirely the Messianic promises; there is no national tradition to exclude the Gentile from Judaism.** To find his precursors one must go back to the Prophets; tradition he revives, but only with serious modifications. **To the idea of moral universality he adds the idea of nature which he received**

from the Stoics. His interpretation is wholly bent on identifying the Mosaic prescription with natural law.

> https://www.academia.edu/23087417/Dialogic_Format_of_Philo_of_Alexandrias_De_animalibus
>
> Finally, while Philo argues for a doctrine of Stoic provenience, he uses the Platonic genre and emphasizes his Platonic allegiance by means of imitation of and allusions to the *Phaedrus*. This is consistent with Philo's philosophical position, which draws from both Middle Platonism and Stoicism;29 however, **Philo's Stoic position in *De anim.* is noteworthy in the context of the emphatically Platonic format of the dialogue.**
>
> > 29. As Reydams-Schils (2008: 169) observes, **"the scholarly debate over whether Philo should be considered a Stoic or a Platonist has been going strong since Lipsius, in the seventeenth century."**

https://archive.org/details/alexandriaandher00kinguoft/page/90/mode/2up?view=theater

But in one thing he was unfair; namely, in his allegorising. But unfair to whom? To Socrates and Plato, I believe, as much as to Moses and to Samuel. For what is the part of the old Jewish books which he evaporates away into mere mystic symbols of the private experiences of the devout philosopher? **Its practical everyday histories, which deal with the common human facts of family and national life, of man's outward and physical labour and craft. These to him have no meaning, except an allegoric one.** But has he thrown them away for the sake of getting a step nearer to Socrates, or Plato, or Aristotle? Surely not. To them, as to the old Jewish sages, man is most important when regarded not merely as a soul, but as a man, a social being of flesh and blood. **Aristotle declares politics to be the architectonical science, the family and social relations to be the eternal master-facts of humanity. Plato, in his Republic, sets before himself the Constitution of a State, as the crowning problem of his philosophy.** Every work of his, like every saying of his master Socrates, deals with the common, outward, vulgar facts of human life, and asserts that there is a divine meaning in them, and that reverent induction from them is the way to obtain the deepest truths. **Socrates and Plato were as little inclined to separate the man and the philosopher as Moses, Solomon, or Isaiah were.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA149#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In contrast to the rabbis, Philo addresses a general audience intrigued by the otherness of Jewish life and formulates for the first time in Judaism a philosophy of law. **His attention to Mosaic law in his later writings is remarkable in light of his lack of interest in the topic in his earlier Alexandrian period.** In the *Allegorical Commentary* he addresses the issue of observance only once, reacting to Alexandrian Jews who argued that literal observance was no longer necessary if the allegorical meaning was implemented.

http://trisagionseraph.tripod.com/Texts/Free.html

Therefore, discarding all mention of those kinds of freedom which are only a pretense, **and of all those names also which are quite unconnected with nature, but which owe their existence only to opinion, such as slaves born in the house, slaves purchased with money, slaves taken in war, let us now investigate the character of the man who is truly free, who is alone possessed of independence, even if ten thousand men set themselves down as his masters; for he will quote that line of Sophocles, which differs in no respect from the doctrines of the Pythagoreans—**

> "God is my ruler, and no mortal man."

For, in real truth, that man alone is free who has God for his leader; indeed, in my opinion, that man is even the ruler of all others, **and has all the affairs of the earth committed to him, being, as it were, the viceroy of a great king, the mortal lieutenant of an immortal sovereign.**
…

And if any one beholding some persons who may have been bought and sold by traffickers in men, looks upon them at once as slaves, he is widely removed from the truth; for an act of selling does not make him who purchases the master, nor him who is sold the slave, since fathers at times have paid a price for their sons, and sons have often laid down a ransom for their fathers, in cases where they have been carried away as prisoners by some piratical sally, or have been taken captive in regular warfare, **though still the laws of nature, which are more stable than those of men, describe them as free.**
…

But the lawgiver of the Jews ventures upon a more bold assertion even than this, inasmuch as he was, as it is reported, a student and practicer of plain philosophy; **and so he teaches that the man who is wholly possessed with the love of God and who serves the living God alone, is no longer man,**

but actually God, being indeed the God of men, but not of the parts of nature, in order to leave to the Father of the universe the attributes of being both and God.
…

And Zeno, as much as any one else, being under the influence of virtue, ventures boldly to assert that the wicked have not a right to any equality of speech towards the virtuous; for he says, "Shall not the wicked man suffer if he contradicts the virtuous man?" Therefore the wicked man has not a right to freedom of speech as respects the virtuous man.
…

But Zeno appears to have drawn this maxim of his as it were from the fountain of the legislation of the Jews [Genesis 28:1], in the history of which it is recorded that in a case where there were two brothers, the one temperate and the other intemperate, the common father of them both, taking pity on the intemperate one who did not walk in the path of virtue, prays that he may serve his brother, conceiving that service which appears in general to be the greatest of evils is the most perfect good to a foolish man, in order that thus he may be deprived of his independence of action, so as to be prevented from misconducting himself with impunity, and that he may be improved in his disposition by the superintending management of him who is appointed to be his master.
…

X. But since some persons, who have paid but very little attention to literary pursuits, not understanding demonstrative arguments, which establish only general principles of action, are accustomed to ask us, "Who then are the men, whether previously existing or now alive, whom you thus represent to us?" it is well to make answer, that in former times there were some persons who surpassed all their contemporaries in virtue, **taking God alone for their guide, and living in strict accordance with the law, that is to say, with the right reason of nature, and who were not only free themselves, but who also filled all who came near to them with a spirit of freedom.** And now also, in our own time, there are some who are, as it were, images of them, bearing on themselves the stamp of the virtue of those wise men as their archetypal model; for it does not follow, that although the souls of such as contradict those virtuous men are deprived of all liberty for having been completely led away and enslaved by folly and other vices, that on this account the whole human race is so too.
…

But if there were any real anxiety for improvement in us, we ought carefully to trace out the hiding-places of these men, and to sit down before them as suppliants, and to entreat them to come forward to impart a tincture of civilization to life which was previously savage, by announcing, instead of inward slavery and innumerable evils, peace and an abundance of all other good things to flow over it continually.

But as things are, we do investigate all retreats only for the sake of money, and with this object we open the hard and rugged veins of the earth; and a great deal of the champaign country is opened in mines, and no small part of the mountainous district also, while we are seeking for gold, and silver, and brass, and iron, and all kinds of materials. But vain opinion, setting up pride as a god, has descended down to the very lowest depths of the sea in its researches to see whether there is any beautiful thing which might become an object of the outward senses lying covered anywhere; and finding many species of precious stones, some adhering closely to the rocks, and others lying concealed in oyster-shells, which are more valuable still, has thus shown a great desire to deceive the sight; and for the sake of the requirements of wisdom, or temperance, or courage, or justice, even that portion of the earth which is naturally inaccessible is travelled over, and seas which are dangerous to navigate are sailed over at any season of the year by sailors.
…

XII. Moreover Palestine and Syria too are not barren of exemplary wisdom and virtue, which countries no slight portion of that most populous nation of the Jews inhabits. There is a portion of those people called Essenes, **in number something more than four thousand in my opinion,** who derive their name from their piety, though not according to any accurate form of the Grecian dialect, because they are above all men devoted to the service of God, not sacrificing living animals, but studying rather to preserve their own minds in a state of holiness and purity. **These men, in the first place, live in villages, avoiding all cities on account of the habitual lawlessness of those who inhabit them, well knowing that such a moral disease is contracted from associations with wicked men, just as a real disease might be from an impure atmosphere,** and that this would stamp an incurable evil on their souls. Of these men, some cultivating the earth, and others devoting themselves to those arts which are the result of peace, benefit both themselves and all those who come in contact with them, not storing up treasures of silver and of gold, nor acquiring vast sections of the earth out of a desire for ample revenues, but providing all things which are requisite for the natural purposes of life; **for they alone of almost all men having been originally poor and destitute, and that too rather from their own habits and ways of life than from any real deficiency of good fortune, are**

nevertheless accounted very rich, judging contentment and frugality to be great abundance, as in truth they are.

Among those men you will find no makers of arrows, or javelins, or swords, or helmets, or breastplates, or shields; no makers of arms or of military engines; no one, in short, attending to any employment whatever connected with war, or even to any of those occupations even in peace which are easily perverted to wicked purposes; for they are utterly ignorant of all traffic, and of all commercial dealings, and of all navigation, but they repudiate and keep aloof from everything which can possibly afford any inducement to covetousness; **and there is not a single slave among them, but they are all free, aiding one another with a reciprocal interchange of good offices; and they condemn masters, not only as unjust, inasmuch as they corrupt the very principle of equality, but likewise as impious, because they destroy the ordinances of nature, which generated them all equally, and brought them up like a mother,** as if they were all legitimate brethren, not in name only, but in reality and truth.

> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/650/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> By claiming Jesus was a Jewish sectary, an Essene, and a teacher of 'natural religion,'160 Wachter provided just such a historically cogent account of the origins of Christianity, while simultaneously reducing Judaism and Christianity to historical offshoots of what were only ostensibly distinct and antagonistic spiritual traditions, termed 'Christianity' and 'Judaism,' but in reality a single – albeit hidden – tradition of truth reaching back across the ages to the early Greeks. **Among those persuaded by Wachter's Essene thesis was Frederick the Great, who wrote to d'Alembert in October 1770, insisting the historical Jesus was undoubtedly an Essene, that Essene views contained much of the teaching of Zeno, and that the Christian religion as commonly understood is a mere tissue of fiction.**161
>
> > 161. 'Jesus était proprement un Essenien,' wrote Frederick, '**il était imbu de la morale des Esseniens, qui tient beaucoup de celle de Zenon.** Sa religion était un pur déisme, et voyez comme nous l'avons brodée'; quoted in Schröder, 'Einleitung' (1995), 13.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/blanqui/1834/soupe.htm
>
> Yes! **The right of property is in decline. Generous spirits prophesy and call for its fall. The Essenian principle of reality has slowly sapped it over the course of eighteen centuries through the successive abolition of the various servitudes which served as the basis for its power.** It will disappear one day, along with the last privileges that serve as its refuge and nook. The past and the present guarantee us this resolution. For humanity is never stationary. It either advances or goes back. Its progressive march led it to equality. **Its backward march climbs, by all of privilege's steps, to personal slavery, the final word in the right of property.**

But in their view this natural relationship of all men to one another has been thrown into disorder by designing covetousness, continually wishing to surpass others in good fortune, and which has therefore engendered alienation instead of affection, and hatred instead of friendship; **and leaving the logical part of philosophy, as in no respect necessary for the acquisition of virtue, to the word-catchers, and the natural part, as being too sublime for human nature to master, to those who love to converse about high objects (except indeed so far as such a study takes in the contemplation of the existence of God and of the creation of the universe),** they devote all their attention to the moral part of philosophy, using as instructors the laws of their country which it would have been impossible for the human mind to devise without divine inspiration.
…

In the first place, then, there is no one who has a house so absolutely his own private property, that it does not in some sense also belong to every one: for besides that they all dwell together in companies, the house is open to all those of the same notions, who come to them from other quarters; then there is one magazine among them all; their expenses are all in common; their garments belong to them all in common; their food is common, since they all eat in messes; **for there is no other people among which you can find a common use of the same house, a common adoption of one mode of living, and a common use of the same table more thoroughly established in fact than among this tribe: and is not this very natural?** For whatever they, after having been working during the day, receive for their wages, that they do not retain as their own, but bring it into the common stock, and give any advantage that is to be derived from it to all who desire to avail themselves of it; **and those who are sick are not neglected because they are unable to contribute to the common stock, inasmuch as the tribe have in their public stock a means of supplying their necessities and aiding their weakness,** so that from their ample means they support them liberally and abundantly; and they cherish respect for their elders, and honor them and care for them, just as parents are honored

and cared for by their lawful children: being supported by them in all abundance both by their personal exertions, and by innumerable contrivances.

XIII. Such diligent practicers of virtue does philosophy, **unconnected with any superfluous care of examining into Greek names** render men, proposing to them as necessary exercises to train them towards its attainment, all praiseworthy actions by which a freedom, which can never be enslaved, is firmly established.
…

XXII. Therefore having put an end to empty opinion, on which the chief multitude of men depends, and being devoted to that most sacred possession, truth, **let us not use incorrect terms so as to attribute to those who thus call themselves citizens any real share in a free constitution, or any real liberty; nor, on the other hand, let us reproach those who have been born in the house of a master, or who have been bought with money as slaves, but let us rather pass over all ideas of birth, all writings implying mastership, and, in short, everything relating to the body, and let us confine ourselves to investigating the nature of the soul.**

For if it is driven to and fro by appetite, or if it is attracted by pleasure, or turned out of the way by fear, or contracted by grief, or tortured by want, it then makes itself a slave, and makes him who possesses such a soul the slave of ten thousand masters. But if it has resisted and subdued ignorance by prudence, and intemperance by temperance, and cowardice by bravery, and covetousness by justice; it then adds to its indomitable free spirit, power and authority.

And all the souls which are not as yet partakers of either of these two classes, neither of that which is enslaved, nor of that by which prudence is confirmed, but which are still naked like those of completely infant children; those we must nurse and cherish carefully, prescribing for them at first tender food instead of milk, namely, instruction in the encyclical sciences, and after that stronger food, such as is prepared by philosophy, by which they will be strengthened so as to become manly, and in good condition, and conducted on to a favorable end, not more that recommended by you than enjoined by the oracle, **"To live in conformity to nature."**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Embassy_to_Gaius#II
>
> (11) For as they had never yet all together admired any emperor who had ever existed at that time, not expecting to have in future the possession, and use, and enjoyment of all private and public good things, but thinking that they actually had them already as a sort of superfluity of prosperity which happiness was waiting to fill to the brim: (12) accordingly now there was nothing else to be seen in any city, but altars, and victims, and sacrifices, and men clothed in white garments, and crowned with garlands, and wearing cheerful countenances, and displaying their joy by the brightness of their looks, and festivals, and assemblies, and musical contests, and horse-races, and revels, and feasts lasting the whole night long, with the music of the flute and of the lyre, and rejoicings, and holidays, and truces, and every kind of pleasure addressed to every one of the senses. (13) **On this occasion the rich were not better off than the poor, nor the men of high rank than the lowly, nor the creditors than the debtors, nor the masters than the slaves, since the occasion gave equal privileges and communities to all men, so that the age of Saturn, which is so celebrated by the poets was no longer looked upon as a fiction and a fable, on account of the universal prosperity and happiness which reigned every where, and the absence of all grief and fear,** and the daily and nightly exhibitions of joy and festivity throughout every house and throughout the whole people, which lasted continually without any interruption during the first seven months of [Caligula's] reign.

https://www.garynorth.com/Deuteronomy4.pdf

Modernism's gods are the lineal descendants of the gods of the Hellenistic world, which were *influence, wealth, and sophistication*. They are gods of a systematically secular civilization: *politics, economics, and formal education*.
…

Modernism's gods are like the gods of classical humanism, for they are part of the creation. Modernism denies judicial significance to anything outside the space-time continuum. Modernism's gods are gods of man's professed autonomy. **Unlike the gods of classical humanism, they are universal gods that honor no geographical boundaries. They are idols of the mind and spirit. They offer power, wealth, and prestige to those who are willing to submit to their impersonal laws.** They serve as the foundations of empire: man's empire.
…

The gods of the modern world, being universal in their claims, imitate the universalism of the kingdom of God. They undergird the kingdom of man. Their proffered blessings are not uniquely tied to

the land as the gods of the ancient world were. **These gods are not placated by sacred offerings of the field. They are placated only by confession and conformity:** the affirmation of their autonomous jurisdiction within an ever-expanding realm of law – civil, private, or both. Their priestly agents offer positive sanctions to those who conform covenantally: the traditional human goals of health, wealth, power, fame, and security, as well as the great lure of the twentieth century, low-cost entertainment. The last goal has become necessary to offset the side effect of the first five: boredom.
...

The ancient empires adopted syncretism as a way to hold together the political order. Just as the syncretistic gods of the families and clans in Greece and Rome entered into the common pantheon of the city-state, becoming political gods, so did the gods of conquered city-states enter into the pantheon of the Roman Empire. The welcoming of these gods into the Roman pantheon undermined the ritual-theological foundations of the Roman Republic. Empires in the ancient world required the subordination of local gods to the political order.

This is in principle no different in modern pluralism. What has changed is the local character of the participating gods. **They have become universalistic, mimicking the God of the Bible. The modern pantheon is not filled with idols.** Pluralism acknowledges all religions as equal, just an syncretism acknowledged all idols as equal. But in both cases, this equality was the equality of subordination to the god of politics. This god is the supreme god of every political empire.

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm.

Stoicism offered no basis for political theory. **Stoic man, as a citizen of the universe, did not regard participation in politics as the means of maintaining his universal citizenship. This citizenship was granted to him by natural law.** Wolin has identified the elitism of such a view of citizenship, "a kind of invisible church of rational beings."(59) Wolin cites the Stoic emperor (and persecutor of the church),(60) Marcus Aurelius, who defended the existence of common reason, common law, and common citizenship. This rational ideal became the foundation for empire, a one-world State and one-State world: "For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members?"(61)

Citing the same passage, **C.N. Cochrane is even more forthright regarding the pretensions of this absolute religion of reason:** "In point of fact, it constitutes an audacious anthropomorphism, a kind of sky-writing(62) which projects upon the cosmos a merely human rationality and translates it into an account of nature and of God."(63) **Stoic natural law theory was a pagan attempt to restructure the universe in terms of man's reason. It was the antithesis of biblical law, which places man under God's absolute sovereignty, mediated by His revealed law.** Stoicism's command was "follow nature."(64) This means following autonomous reason.(65) In contrast, the Bible's command is "follow God" by obeying His law.
...

Under the influence of Greek philosophy, especially Stoicism, and Roman law, a new guild of Western legal theorists appeared in the twelfth century. They moved from the acceptance of customary tribal laws (civil) and penitential law (ecclesiastical) to the ideal of universal natural law in the guise of a revival of Roman imperial law.(68) This judicial transformation was accompanied by a parallel development among philosophers: an attempted fusion of Greek concepts of autonomous reason and the biblical ideal of God's revealed law.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12679

Robert Boyle's *A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly received Notion of Nature* (1686) captured amiably the problem of ascribing personal qualities to nature, as medieval Aristotelianism had done. Although it was true that "nature is a thing of" God's "establishing, and subordinate to him," **many of Boyle's contemporaries "seldom or never lifted up their eyes to any higher cause" than nature, thus the "agency of God is little taken notice of in their thoughts"** (Boyle 1744, 4:361). One of the key doctrines of orthodox theology was the fundamental Creator-creature distinction. For Boyle, the main culprit for flattening the ontological distinction between nature and God was Aristotle. His propagation of the doctrine of the "eternity of the world" inevitably led to an open denial of God's creation of the world *ex nihilo* **since by "ascribing the admirable works of God to what he calls nature, he tacitly denies him the government of the world"** (Boyle 1744,4:362) Yet, when Boyle read Scripture, he noticed a devastatingly countervailing evidence. When Genesis 1 recounts the story of creation (1:11;1:24; 1:25), Boyle averred that the "divine historian ascribes the formation" of all of creation to "God's immediate *fiat*" without the intermediary of nature. Furthermore, Boyle continued:

> **And I do not remember, that in the *Old Testament*, I have met with any one Hebrew word, that properly signifies nature, in the sense we take it in**...So likewise, though *Job*, *David*, and *Solomon*, and other *Israelitish* writers, do, on diverse occasions, many times mention the corporeal works of God, **yet they do not take notice of nature, which our philosophers would have his great viceregent in what relates to them**...And when St. *Paul* himself, who was no stranger to the Heathen learning, writing to the *Corinthians*, who were *Greeks*, speaks of

> the production of corn out of seed sown, he does not attribute the produced body to nature. (Boyle 1744, 4:368)

This quote above highlights two themes in tension: nature as a putative key and eternal element in Aristotle's philosophy, and Scripture's deafening silence concerning its role in creation narratives in Jewish and Christian Scriptures.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ls9ZDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Strauss argues in many writings that both philosophers and religious believers often fail to see the underlying incompatibility of these two premises. Most are reluctant to admit the exclusive choice of seeing the universe as created or as eternal, as miraculous or as governed by impersonal necessities. **Hence, it is shocking for people to read Strauss's claim that the Hebrew Bible has no word for "nature" because nature in the strict sense means an eternal order that exists on its own power rather than a created order that depends on God.**7

https://www.garynorth.com/public/2280.cfm

Today, only a few conservative social thinkers, a few Protestant conservatives, and followers of Murray Rothbard still proclaim faith in natural law theory as a ground for ethics and society.

WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Natural law theory has always suffered from the dualism of all Greek thought: law vs. change. **The unchanging pure logic of Parmenides cannot be reconciled to the constant historical flux of Heraclitus.** Greek philosophy never resolved this dualism. No humanist philosophy ever has, either.

The problem today is that the tiny handful of natural law theory defenders are trying to breathe life into a long-dead horse. They are wasting precious time. **Natural law theory has never worked as the basis of any social order, but after Charles Darwin, the academic community abandoned natural law theory. Darwin taught that nature is impersonal and not normative.** There is no universal ethics. There is only a constant struggle for personal survival.
…

Christian social theorists (there are not many) are among the few remaining defenders of natural law theory. This is ironic, because natural law theory cannot be defended biblically. **Paul wrote, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God" (I Corinthians 2:14a).** He wrote that natural men turn to false Gods and suppress the truth that is in them (Romans 1:18-22). This undermines any theory of natural law for a consistently Christian society.

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnde/Chapter72.htm

The humanism of natural law theory is obvious. **Prior to Darwin's implicit destruction of all natural law theory, natural law theory was Western humanism's primary judicial alternative to Christian law.** Darwin destroyed men's faith in a common legal order that is grounded in man's reason because men are individuals caught in a purposeless evolutionary process that has no fixed ethical standards.[(5)]
...

Why did God's people have to wait for Roman Stoics to discover the theory of natural law, by which they explained why Rome had the authority to create an empire out of the ruins of the Greek city-states? **The Stoics provided a philosophical justification for empire that could not be provided by the polytheism of classical religion. Yet Christians are expected to believe that God waited until the advent of the tyrannical Roman Empire in order to inform His covenant people of the sole authority of man's universal reason in establishing civil law.** He raised up Stoic philosophers rather than prophets to bring this message to the church. Furthermore, it was not until Roger Williams in the early 1640's discovered pluralism's principle of religiously neutral civil commonwealth that God's church was presented with this theory in the name of Christianity.[(6)]

https://www.garynorth.com/MosesAndPharaoh.pdf

The popularity of natural law concepts has been very great throughout the history of the church. By importing Greek and Roman concepts of natural law into church law, medieval theologians unknowingly mixed together two rival systems of thought. The Greek and Roman concept of natural law rested on the presupposition of man's *autonomy*. It rested on the presupposition of *neutrality* in human thought. The Bible recognizes the common heritage of the image of God in man, but it sees this image as twisted and perverse in rebellious man. Thus, the universality of men's perception of certain aspects of biblical law is a *universality of condemnation*.

…

As men's faith in God and His revealed word has declined along the greased skids of human autonomy—**from Roman law to canon law, to scholastic natural law, to Deism's natural law, and then to the positive law of the State**—the State has become increasingly dominant.

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/04/thomas-train-wreck-and-analogia-entis.html

Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the best known and most articulate expositor of the *analogia entis*. In this respect, Aquinas cobbled together something of an Aristotelian metaphysic with a Pseudo-Dionysian notion of "remotion" – that "we can't know God as he is". Of course, Aquinas also relied on "the Psalms, the Wisdom books of the Greek Old Testament, the patristic tradition, and so on", to achieve his "grand synthesis". "The assumption is that the world reveals the glory of God: the divine presence is more or less evident".

It is this "grand synthesis", this Medieval version of "why can't we all just get along", that has caused the train wreck that is Roman Catholicism. Roman Catholicism is not a Biblical faith; instead, it is an agglomeration of disparate and unrelated thoughts and activities. The notion is that "all truth is related", but the contexts are so different, the result is a mish-mosh of philosophical concepts that may or may not resemble the God of the Bible in any discernible way.

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater

Strauss's criticisms of Aquinas's natural law are subtle, but not undetectable. **In Strauss's view, Aquinas has failed to recognize the radical, threatening and destructive nature of a transcendent natural law independent of political right.** It has the tendency to demote political society, undermine its dignity, status and authority, and as a result, threatens its very survival. If there is a moral order higher than that of the state that is more worthy of their allegiance, men are likely to disregard the conventional rules whenever they come into conflict with the higher law.
…

Strauss objects to natural law not just for being too radical, but for being too timid. It excessively restricts the 'latitude' of prudent statesmen in forbidding certain types of actions that may be necessary for the protection of the state.
…

Strauss does not criticize natural law openly. On the contrary, he tries to blur the distinction between it and natural right. Since the public dissemination of natural law is beneficial, it should not be openly undermined. **As the *falasifa* were well aware, the efficacy of the conventional rules of conduct depends on their being regarded as binding without qualifications, without ifs and buts. But there is not reason for philosophers to mistake a salutary delusion for the truth. Aquinas dispenses with esotericism because he has mistaken a noble lie for the truth.**
…

Aquinas is usually credited with having reconciled Aristotle with the Bible. But for Strauss, such a reconciliation is impossible. **Far from making Aristotle compatible with the Bible, Aquinas has succeeded only in baptizing Aristotle.**82 **He banished philosophy altogether and replaced it with theology. Fortin points out that Aquinas was repudiated by the Latin Averroists who 'objected to the enslavement of the very philosophy that they could credit with having made them free'.**83 This is reminiscent of Strauss's remark, noted earlier, that Christianity (unlike Islam and Judaism) did a disservice to philosophy: by bringing it close to its bosom, it subjected it to ecclesiastical supervision, and as a result, deprived it of the freedom that is its very essence.84

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/100/mode/2up?view=theater

Third, because of the excesses of some who were enamored with Aristotle and neglected or downplayed Scripture as a source of truth (the so-called radical Aristotelians), other Christians (the so-called radical Augustinians) came to see Aristotle's thought as a kind of spiritual contamination and tried to destroy its influence. **The theology they used to combat Aristotelianism, called nominalism, inadvertently paved the way for Epicureanism.**

First, and without going into too much detail, Aristotle's account of nature was itself partially forged against the atomism of Democritus (both Epicurus and Lucretius lived after Aristotle), and Epicurus and Lucretius borrowed heavily from Democritus. Since, as we shall see, Darwinism is simply a modern form of Epicureanism, it turns out that Aristotle's account of nature is directly opposed to Darwinism as well.
…

In his efforts to provide Christianity with a natural philosophy to undergird its revealed view of nature, **Thomas stood as a mean between two extreme tendencies.** On the one extreme, there was radical Aristotelianism, which was so enamored with the pagan philosopher that it seemed to reject Christianity for paganism, elevating natural truth above revealed truth. This extreme alarmed some of the orthodox Christians, who, rejecting Aristotle, embraced radical Augustinianism, which took revelation to be all that was needed, and considered any pagan philosophy whatsoever to be a horrible contagion infecting revealed truth.
…

Christians who believe that the goodness of the natural intellect was only wounded by sin will find themselves attracted by Aristotle, Aquinas and intelligent design theory. Christians who believe that the goodness of the natural intellect was wholly corrupted by sin will find themselves attracted to radical Augustinianism, especially if they believe that Aristotelianism and Thomism (or their combination in scholasticism) have forgotten the wounds of sin completely and have elevated natural reason above revelation (as did the radical Aristotelians in the Middle Ages). This train of radical Augustinianism was given intellectual authority and historical influence at the end of the Middle Ages by the famous Catholic theologian, William of Occam (or Ockham), who lived just after Aquinas, from about 1285 to 1347.
...

By asserting that only particular things were real, and that universals or species names had no reality, nominalism was inadvertently siding with Epicurean materialism's denial of the reality of form/species distinctions. **For Epicurean materialism, we recall, only individual atoms are real. The forms or shapes these atoms happen to make are ultimately unreal, and the names we apply to them ("dog," "cat," etc.) are merely conventional.**
...

But William was not finished. **He argued that not only were all actions utterly particular but actions were good and evil simply because God happened to designate them as either good or evil.** Since God is all-powerful, he could command anything he wanted, completely unrestrained by all merely human conceptions of good and evil. So radical was William's claim for God's omnipotence in this regard that he even asserted that God could change the first commandment:

> Every will can conform to the divine precepts, but God can command the created will to hate him, and the created will can do this (thereby refusing its own happiness and ultimate end). Furthermore, any act that is righteous in this world can also be righteous in the next, the fatherland; **just as hatred of God can be a good act in this world, so can it be in the next.**4

...

Finally, radical Augustinianism affirmed the plurality of worlds, even a plurality of inhabited worlds other than the earth. Again, **this inadvertent support for an Epicurean position was the result of the rejection of Aristotle,** in particular the rejection of Aristotle's argument (rooted in his rather complicated doctrine of natural place) that there could only be one world.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15636a.htm

He was cited before the pontifical Court at Avignon in 1328, but managed to escape **and join John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, who had taken refuge at the Court of Louis of Bavaria. It was to Louis that he made the boastful offer, "Tu me defendas gladio; ego te defendam calamo".**

In his controversial writings William of Ockham appears as the advocate of secular absolutism. **He denies the right of the popes to exercise temporal power, or to interfere in any way whatever in the affairs of the Empire. He even went so far as to advocate the validity of the adulterous marriage of Louis's son, on the grounds of political expediency, and the absolute power of the State in such matters.** In philosophy William advocated a reform of Scholasticism both in method and in content. The aim of this reformation movement in general was simplification. This aim he formulated in the celebrated "Law of Parsimony", commonly called "Ockham's Razor": "Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate". **With this tendency towards simplification was united a very marked tendency towards skepticism: a distrust, namely, of the ability of the human**
mind to reach certitude in the most important problems of philosophy. Thus, in the process of simplification he denied the existence of intentional species, rejected the distinction between essence and existence, and protested against the Thomistic doctrine of active and passive intellect. **His skepticism appears in his doctrine that human reason can prove neither the immortality of the soul nor the existence, unity, and infinity of**
God. These truths, he teaches, are known to us by Revelation alone.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_of_Ockham#Life

Because of the pope's attack on the Rule of Saint Francis, William of Ockham, Michael of Cesena and other leading Franciscans fled Avignon on 26 May 1328, and eventually took refuge in the court of the Holy Roman Emperor Louis IV of Bavaria, who was also engaged in dispute with the papacy, and became William's patron.[18]
...

After Michael of Cesena's death in 1342, **William became the leader of the small band of Franciscan dissidents living in exile with Louis IV.** William of Ockham died (prior to the outbreak of the plague) on 9 April 1347.[24]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham/#Ethi

Thus, in Exodus, the Israelites' "spoiling the Egyptians" (or rather their *intention* to do so, which they carried out) was not a matter of theft or plunder, but was morally permissible and indeed obligatory—because God had commanded it.
…

The divine command themes so prominent in Ockham's ethics are much more muted in his political theory, which on the contrary tends to be far more "natural" and "secular."[53]
…

The Spirituals, among whom were Ockham, Michael of Cesena, and the other exiles who joined them in fleeing Avignon, tried to preserve the original ideal of austere poverty practiced and advocated by St. Francis himself (c. 1181-1226). The Conventuals, on the other hand, while recognizing this ideal, were prepared to compromise in order to accommodate the practical needs of a large, organized religious order; they were by far the majority of the order. The issue between the two parties was never one of doctrine; neither side accused the other of heresy.
…

In short, for John XXII, it follows that it is impossible fully to live the life of absolute poverty, even for the individual person (much less for a permanent institution like the Franciscan order). The institution of property, and property "rights," therefore began in the Garden of Eden, the first time Adam or Eve ate something. These property rights are not "natural" rights; on the contrary, they are established by a kind of positive law by God, who gave everything in the Garden to Adam and Eve.

Ockham disagreed. For him, there was no "property" in the Garden of Eden. Instead, Adam and Eve there had a natural right to use anything at hand. This natural right did not amount to a *property* right, however, since it could not have been used as the basis of any kind of legal claim. Both John XXII and Ockham seem to agree in requiring that "property" (ownership) be a matter of positive law, not simply of natural law. But John says there was such property in the Garden of Eden, whereas Ockham claims there was not; there was only a *natural* right, so that Adam and Eve's use of the goods there was legitimate. For Ockham, "property" first emerged only after the Fall when, by a kind of divine permission, people began to set up special positive legal arrangements assigning the legal right to use certain things to certain people (the owners), to the exclusion of anyone else's having a *legal* right to them. The owners can then give permission to others to use what the owners own, but that permission does not amount to giving them a legal right they could appeal to in a court of law; it can be revoked at any time. For Ockham, this is the way the Franciscans operate. Their benefactors and donors do not give them any legal rights to use the things donated to them—i.e., no right they could appeal to in a court of law. Rather the donation amounts only to a kind of permission that restores the original natural (not legal) right of use in the Garden of Eden.[56]

https://iep.utm.edu/ockham/#SH8b

Ockham extends his commitment to poverty beyond just the Franciscan order, convinced that wealth is an inappropriate source of power for the Catholic Church as a whole. In his view, the Catholic Church has a spiritual power which sets it apart from the secular world. **This conviction leads Ockham to propose the doctrine that was to become the foundation of the United States Constitution: separation of church and state.**
…

Ockham boldly proposes a third alternative: the pope and the emperor should be separate but equal, each supreme in his own domain. **This was an outrageous suggestion, unwelcome on both sides.** Ockham's argument for it stems from reflections that foreshadow the "state of nature" thought experiments of premier modern political theorists Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

In the Garden of Eden, God gave the earth to human beings to use to their common benefit. **As long as we were willing to share there was no need for property among us. After the fall, however, human beings became selfish and exploitative.** Laws became necessary to restrain immoderate appetite for secular or "temporal" goods and to prevent the neglect of their management. Since laws are useless without the ability to enforce them, we arrived at the need for secular power. The function of the secular power is to punish law breakers and in general coerce everyone into obeying the law.

By renouncing property, the Franciscans were attempting to live as God originally intended. In a perfect world, there would be no need for property and the coercive authority it spawns. All Christians should aspire to this anarchic utopia, even though they may never fully achieve it. In the meanwhile, they should avoid mixing the spiritual and the secular as much as possible. Ockham writes,

> **For this reason, the head of Christians does not, as a rule, have power to punish secular wrongs with a capital penalty and other bodily penalties and it is for thus punishing such**

> **wrongs that temporal power and riches are chiefly necessary; such punishment is granted chiefly to the secular power. The pope therefore, can, as a rule, correct wrongdoers only with a spiritual penalty. It is not, therefore, necessary that he should excel in temporal power or abound in temporal riches, but it is enough that Christians should willingly obey him.** [*A Letter to the Friars Minor and other Writings*, p. 204]

For Ockham, the separation of church and state is a separation of the ideal and the real.

Ockham mentions democracy only in passing, arguing in favor of monarchy as the best form of secular government. Moreover, he finds representational forms of government objectionable on the grounds that there is no such thing as a common will. Ockham is not holding out for a superhuman leader. On the contrary, he seems to think that a fairly ordinary, good man can make a decent king. One wonders if Louis of Bavaria, to whose protection he and Michael fled, inspired this confidence. **Perhaps Ockham is content with monarchy because, in his view, the secular world will always be intrinsically flawed. He sets his hopes instead on the spiritual world, and this is why he was so bitterly disappointed in Pope John XXII.**
…

Although Ockham never came to criticize the institution of the papacy itself, as would later Protestant thinkers, he did accuse the popes he opposed of heresy and called for their expulsion. Ironically, Ockham's extensive analysis of the concept of heresy turns into a defense of free speech.

In keeping with his doctrine of the separation of church and state, Ockham maintains that the pope, and only the pope, has the right to level spiritual penalties, and only spiritual penalties, against someone who knowingly asserts theological falsehoods and refuses to be corrected. **A man might *unknowingly* assert a theological falsehood a thousand times, however.** As long as he is willing to be corrected, he should not be judged a heretic, especially by the pope.

Ockham's political treatises are strewn with biblical exegesis, often glaringly ad hoc and sometimes quite interesting, as in the present case. In Matthew 28:20 Jesus promises his disciples: **"I will be with you always, to the end of the age."** This text traditionally provided justification for the doctrine of papal infallibility according to which the pope cannot be wrong when speaking about official church matters. **Ockham rejects this doctrine, however, arguing that the minimum required for Jesus to keep his promise is that one human being remain faithful at any given time, and this one could be anyone, even a single baptized infant. This implies that the entire institution of the church could become completely corrupt.** As a result, any theological claim, no matter how ancient or universally accepted, is always open for dispute.

Even more interesting, however, is Ockham's view of non-theological speech. He writes that

> **… purely philosophical assertions which do not pertain to theology should not be solemnly condemned or forbidden by anyone, because in connection with such assertions anyone at all ought to be free to say freely what pleases him,** [*Dialogus*, I.2.22]

This statement long predates the *Areopagitica* of John Milton (1608-1674), which is typically heralded as the earliest defense of free speech in Western history.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18269/pg18269-images.html#SECTION_V

Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical foundation of its authority;[115] **whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it.**
…

We must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once introduced without reason, and has become reasonable. **We must make it regarded as authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if we do not wish that it should soon come to an end.**
…

337. *The reason of effects.*—Degrees. **The people honour persons of high birth. The semi-learned despise them, saying that birth is not a personal, but a chance superiority. The learned honour them, not for popular reasons, but for secret reasons. Devout persons, who have more zeal than knowledge, despise them, in spite of that consideration which makes them honoured by the learned, because they judge them by a new light which piety gives them.** But perfect Christians honour them by another and higher light. So arise a succession of opinions for and against, according to the light one has.

338. True Christians nevertheless comply with folly, not because they respect folly, but the command of God, who for the punishment of men has made them subject to these follies. ***Omnis creatura subjecta est***

vanitati.[125] ***Liberabitur.***[126] **Thus Saint Thomas**[127] **explains the passage in Saint James on giving place to the rich, that if they do it not in the sight of God, they depart from the command of religion.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA321#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pascal is particularly in accord with the libertines and especially with Hobbes in the matter of justice, law, and custom. He rejects the common orthodox attitude that there is a rational natural law which is the source of our laws and justice.
…

One does not obey a law because it is just, even though the people think it is just; one obeys it because it is a force. And Pascal wrote the marvelous # 298: “Et ainsi, ne pouvant faire que ce qui est juste fût fort, on a fait que ce qui est fort fût juste.”
…

Thus Pascal offered almost simultaneously a critique of rationalistic philosophy and a critique of reason as an instrument for penetrating to truth, and of its optimistic faith in justice. In this latter respect, **he deviated from the humanistic tendency to see the primacy of moral law over political coercion, and the existence of a providential order reason and justice which mankind must respect. This current, which will be resumed in the eighteenth century and which was continued from Erasmus in the Renaissance through Grotius in the seventeenth century, was ignored by the libertines. They were more inclined to subscribe to the more realistic policies of Machiavelli.** Naudé, La Mothe le Vayer and even Cyrano de Bergerac all adhere to the belief that the prince should be the unquestioned ruler of his people without the interference of any form of representational government; Hobbes, of course, was its principal exponent, since it was the keystone of his doctrine of peace. **This idea that the leviathan state is a guarantee of order and peace was accepted by Pascal also, who thereby rejected the principle of an antecedent natural law, seeing that it had been corrupted by the nature of man.** Custom is the only basis of equity, merely because it is accepted by the masses. “Rien, suivant la seule raison, n’est juste en soi.”

The consequences of this doctrine are even more disastrous than Montaigne’s paradoxical stand. Law is just because it is the law, and it must be obeyed merely for this reason. **Property rights are not a natural right; they represent a usurpation which has been confirmed by custom.** The social order does not represent a justice supported by force, but rather a force imposed upon the people as a system of justice. **The power of the king is founded upon the ungovernable folly of the populace.** The wise man, knowing well these incompatibilities with reason, will always retain “la pensée de derrière la tête.” He knows that all social life, which rests only on force, is a comedy.

The point to be noted here is that Pascal’s views which accord with those of the libertines and especially with those of Hobbes **are motivated not only by skepticism (as was the case with the libertines) and by a desire for peace and order (as was the case with Hobbes),** but by a conviction that man’s reason is an unreliable instrument in formulating his world, that facile optimism as regards his natural birthright is totally unjustified, and that (as St. Augustine proclaimed) man’s corrupt nature has corrupted everything. The importance of this position in the evolution of thought lies in the fact that on this stand Pascal and the libertines, and to a certain extent the Jansenists and the libertines, are united against Cartesianism because of a certain compatibility between the skepticism of the libertines and the pessimistic Augustinianism of Jansenism, **whereas, according to Brunetière, there are other times in which the forces of libertinism and Cartesianism are combined against Jansenism.**

Accepting of this interpretation entails seeing in Pascal not only an opponent of Cartesian rationalism but an opponent also of that derivative of Cartesianism, rationalistic optimism. Pascal’s view of man borders upon despair and is the very opposite of the “généreux” of Descartes. Further, Pascal entered upon his subject of demeaning man with such effect that the second part of his program, that of enhancing man’s value, was all but forgotten. Adam explains his pessimistic portrayal as the result of foreseeing the triumph of this rationalistic optimism which was at the origin of the deism adopted by the subsequent period. **It is certainly true that insofar as Voltaire represents the opposite point of view to Pascal’s, it is on the grounds of rationalistic optimism based on confidence in the power of God.** This attitude of Voltaire, however, wore thin in the fifties and was replaced by a view which, while not as permanently hopeless as Pascal’s, was nevertheless full of misery.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR59#v=onepage&q&f=false

But Bossuet, anxious as he is to find a permanent model of perfect government in Hebrew monarchy, and to overturn any suggestion that the throne of David and Solomon arose out of popular concession or “will,” also offered “secular” objections to contractarianism **which show an appreciation of Hobbes’ writing and turns of phrase, if not of his conclusions.** Beginning with an attack on Jurieu, Bossuet soon broadens the argument of the *Cinquième avertissement aux protestants* to take in the whole contract tradition.

> **He [Jurieu] has imagined that the people are naturally sovereign;** or, to speak as he does, that they naturally possess sovereignty, since they give it to whom they please. **Now this is to err in principle, and not to understand terms. For, to consider men as they naturally are, and before all established government, one finds only anarchy,** that is to say a savage and wild liberty in all men, where each one can claim everything, and at the same time contest everything; where all are on guard, and in consequence in a continual war against all; **where reason can do nothing, since each calls reason the passion that transports him; where even natural law itself remains without force, since reason has none;** where in consequence there is neither property, nor domain, nor good, nor secure repose – nor, to speak truly, any right whatsoever, except that of the strongest (and again one never knows who that is, because each can become such by turns, according as the passions conspire to throw more or fewer people together.)168

To know whether "the human race in its entirety" has ever been in such a state of nature, "or whether some peoples have been in it in some places," to know "how and by what degrees they left it" – to know this, Bossuet goes on, "it would be necessary to count to infinity, and understand all the thoughts which can arise in the human heart."169

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false

Take away the government, the earth and all its goods are as common among men, as the air and the light. God said to all men: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth."8 He gave to them all, indiscriminately, "every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind."9 **According to this right of nature, no one has a particular right to anything whatever and every thing is the prey of all.**10

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is thus that the law places, as it were in common, the property that has been divided for the public and private convenience. **It leaves, even in the lands so justly divided, some mark of the ancient community, but reduced to certain limits for the sake of public order.** "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleases: but must carry none with thee. If thou go into thy friend's corn, thou mayest break the ears, and rub them in thy hand: but not reap them with a sickle."5
...

Moses, by this means, recalls to the memory of the possessors, that they should always regard the earth as a common mother and the nurse of all men, and does not will that the division which has been made of it should make them forget the original right of nature [*le droit primitif de la nature*].

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vx75FeIRcRYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR17#v=onepage&q&f=false

The philosophers of the new natural sciences advanced a concept of nature as a non-purposive realm of atoms on which God imposes, by an act of will, motion and an extrinsic order of efficient causes or regularities. The task of philosophers of natural law was henceforth to bring natural law into line with this scientific concept of nature and human nature (Tully 1988).

Pufendorf performs this task at the beginning of *DJN* and *DOH* I.1-2 **by setting forth morality and politics as the extrinsic imposition of moral concepts by a superior on to an unordered realm of human movements that lack any intrinsic moral properties, and of human agents who lack any innate dispositions to moral and political life** (Laurent 1982, Schneewind 1987). Hobbes and Locke share this imposition picture – or moral non-realism – to varying degrees. **However, to take it as a defining feature of 'the modern school of natural law' is apt to be misleading since it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of a modern natural law theory. The voluntarist tradition of natural law associated with William of Ockham shares this feature yet it predates this 'modern' school by 300 years.** Conversely, one of the rival schools of natural law in the seventeenth century accepted the (limited) validity of the new form of explanation in the natural sciences yet went on to argue that this is in no way undermines teleological explanation of human agency and the assumption that moral properties inhere in their objects (moral realism). **Leibniz and the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) constructed modern neo-Aristotelian and neo-Platonic natural law philosophies in response to the revolution in the natural sciences. They argued that their reconstructions were invulnerable to criticisms launched by Mersenne's circle, criticized Hobbes and Pufendorf for reductively modelling moral and political philosophy on the new natural philosophy, and interpreted their theories as a continuation of the old voluntarism** (Leibniz 1698, Lee 1702, Cudworth 1731).

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page159
>
> **I am very far from sharing the opinions of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems, this entirely mathematical necessity,** which I think I have adequately refuted, and perhaps more clearly than is customary.
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page234

> 172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the Council of Constance, seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding. I think that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, without reason, they bring into use new and displeasing expressions. **In our own time the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this same opinion, that what does not happen is impossible.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page285
>
> 259. **M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action.** To that I am not opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so much that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by saying that the virtues of the pagans were only *splendida peccata*, splendid vices. **It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in holy Scripture, and which offends reason.**

https://research.vu.nl/ws/files/1923415/Barbeyrac%20Fathers.pdf

In bringing the Church Fathers to trial before the court of Reason, Barbeyrac has a field day. **Augustine's arguments on property, he contends, are similar to, and just as specious as, the contentions of Thomas Hobbes. Both men believed that the principle of 'mine and thine' did not apply in the state of nature. It was a pity that Hobbes did not utilize Augustine's impressive authority, since the latter's mere approval would have made Hobbes's writings palatable to everyone.** Indeed, there are authors who have taken up the Augustinian-Hobbesian argument, contending that property rights exist only in civil society, and that an absolute monarch is crucial to their maintenance. 'Il n'y a que trop d'exemples, qui prouvent, combien les Ecclésiastiques de l'Eglise Romaine savent persuader aux Rois, qu'ils sont maîtres absolus & des Biens & des Vies de leurs Sujets; bien entendu qu'ils ne touchent point à ce qui regarde les Personnes & les Biens de ces mêmes Ecclésiastiques (…).'22 **Barbeyrac is thinking of that other ecclesiastic, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet.**

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

It has taken the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Supreme Court decisions, beginning around 1960, to make the Constitution's humanistic foundation obvious to everyone except a handful of Christian scholars, most of whom were not trained as historians. **The only people who have been deceived by these interpretations are evangelical Christians. They, like their teachers, are the victims of two centuries of Whig propaganda and two millennia of natural law theory.**
…

For over two centuries, Christian historians have neglected to conduct such a detailed study of the origins of the Constitution. Most of them have accepted the view of the victors of 1788: the Constitution is a philosophically neutral, procedurally neutral, morally neutral, **religiously neutral document that is somehow consistent with "true" Christianity. Yet it is also supposedly consistent with Christianity's rivals. If these assumptions are true, then Stoic natural law philosophers were right, Newtonian unitarians were right, and Freemasons are right: there is a morally and theologically neutral system of fixed law that is both unchanging and accessible to the minds of rational men in the midst of history.** The Constitution is the incarnation of this religion of neutrality.
…

Ancient Rome sought Madison's political goal by inviting all conquered cities of the Empire to send their local gods into the pantheon; Madison told the conquered cities of the republic to keep their gods home and multiply them. He then emptied the pantheon. **This confidence in what should be described as a unitarian political settlement was based on some version of Newtonian or Ciceronian natural law. It was also the worldview of Freemasonry. Freemasons believed that the religious "factions" or traditions—creeds, liturgies, and unique institutional histories—are peripheral to the true spiritual unity of the Brotherhood under the Supreme Architect.**

The Constitution had not yet been ratified when the Antifederalists began organizing to capture Congress under the new Constitution.29 Political factions and parties had already sprung up during the Revolutionary War era.30 They developed even further during the Confederation period.31 They became entrenched after 1788.32 Madison's dream was shattered before sunrise. **There is universal agreement among historians: this Madisonian faith in a world devoid of**

politically influential factions was utopian in 1788, just as it would be utopian today. What few of them are willing to say forthrightly is that the very presence of such a faith marks Madison as the most rationalistic of political philosophers. He paid no attention to the realities of politics in constructing the rationale for the constitutional blueprint. He believed that the Constitution would actually balance real-world politics into oblivion. Patrick Henry's assessment of the man was on target: "a man of great acquirements, but too theoretical as a politician."33 Madison and his peers were totally naive on this point, historians agree. But the historians tend to ignore the origins of his utopian faith; it just somehow was universal among the nationalists. **They do not pursue the obvious: the intellectual ideal of a political world of Newtonian mechanism**34 **and the rhetoric of Ciceronian natural law had fused with the Masonic ideal of a creed-overcoming brotherhood to produce a political world without men's passions and interests.** It was a stillborn ideal by 1788.
…

Rushdoony did not recognize in 1964 what ought to be obvious to any person who has read the tracts and treatises of that Constitutional generation: the American Deists of the second half of the eighteenth century adopted the same strategy of infiltration that the followers of neo-orthodox theologians Karl Barth and Emil Brunner adopted in the twentieth century, namely, *importing alien religious and philosophical principles under the cover of language that had long been considered Christian.* In fact, this process of infiltration has been going on in Christianity since the second century, as Van Til argued throughout his career. **The difference by 1770, however, was that the anti-Christians in America were self-consciously using these alien Greek and Roman stoic concepts to undermine the religious and especially the judicial foundations of what was then clearly a Christian society. Christians had long invoked natural law philosophy as a support for orthodoxy. The main Framers of Constitutional nationalism—Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Hamilton, John Adams, and Madison**27**—used natural law philosophy as a tool to undermine orthodoxy.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiram_Abiff
>
> In 1 Kings 7:13-14, Hiram is described as the son of a widow from the tribe of Naphtali who was the son of a Tyrian bronze worker, sent for by Solomon to cast the bronze furnishings and ornate decorations for the new temple. From this reference, Freemasons often refer to Hiram (with the added Abiff) as "the widow's son."
>
> 2 Chronicles 2:13-14 relates a formal request from King Solomon of Jerusalem to King Hiram I of Tyre, for workers and for materials to build a new temple. King Hiram (Huram in Chronicles) responds **"And now I have sent a skillful man, endowed with understanding, *Ḥuram 'abi.*[6] (the son of a woman of the daughters of Dan, and his father was a man of Tyre), skilled to work in gold and silver, bronze and iron, stone and wood, purple and blue, fine linen and crimson, and to make any engraving and to accomplish any plan which may be given to him, with your skillful men and with the skillful men of my lord David your father."[7]**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Architect_of_the_Universe#Freemasonry
>
> Christopher Haffner's own explanation of how the Masonic concept of a Great Architect of the Universe, as a placeholder for the Supreme Being of one's choice, is given in *Workman Unashamed*:
>
> > Now imagine me standing in lodge with my head bowed in prayer between Brother Mohammed Bokhary and Brother Arjun Melwani. To neither of them is the Great Architect of the Universe perceived as the Holy Trinity. To Brother Bokhary He has been revealed as Allah; to Brother Melwani He is probably perceived as Vishnu. Since I believe that there is only one God, I am confronted with three possibilities:
> >
> > They are praying to *the devil* whilst I am praying to God;
> > They are praying to *nothing*, as their Gods do not exist;
> > **They are praying to the *same God* as I, yet their understanding of His nature is partly incomplete (as indeed is mine — 1 Cor 13:12).**
> >
> > It is without hesitation that I accept the third possibility…
> >
> > *— Workman Unashamed: The Testimony of a Christian Freemason, Lewis Masonic, 1989, p. 39*
>
> http://www.ephesians5-11.org/fogbom.htm
>
> *The Lost Keys of Freemasonry*, by Manly Palmer Hall, explains Masonic teaching further:

> The true Mason is not creed-bound. He realizes with the divine illumination of his lodge that as a Mason his religion must be universal: **Christ, Buddha or Mohammed, the name means little, for he recognizes only the light and not the bearer.** He worships at every shrine, bows before every altar, whether in temple, mosque or cathedral, realizing with his truer understanding the oneness of all spiritual truth. (p. 65)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_VII#cite_ref-64

147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil,[65] taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. **He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers.** They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. **Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.**

148. **The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven,** as well as by Chrysippus in his first book *Of the Gods*, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n327/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoa had begun in the materialism of the Sophists and Cynics, and had explained the whole mythology on allegorical lines, but the prayer to Zeus at table—one of the most beautiful relics of the Classical Second Religiousness1—dates from as early as Cleanthes (d. 232). **In Sulla's time there was an upper-class Stoicism that was religious through and through, and a popular syncretism which combined Phrygian, Syrian, and Egyptian cults with numberless Classical mysteries that had become almost forgotten**—corresponding exactly to the development of Buddha's enlightened wisdom into Hinayana for the learned and Mahayana for the masses, and to the relation between learned Confucianism and Taoism as the vessel of Chinese syncretism which it soon became.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Caec%C4%ABna

AULUS CAECINA, son of Aulus Caecina who was defended by Cicero (69 B.C.) in a speech still extant, took the side of Pompey in the civil wars, and published a violent tirade against Caesar, for which he was banished. He recanted in a work called *Querelae*, and by the intercession of his friends, above all, of Cicero, obtained pardon from Caesar. **Caecina was regarded as an important authority on the Etruscan system of divination (*Etrusca Disciplina*), which he endeavoured to place on a scientific footing by harmonizing its theories with the doctrines of the Stoics.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Chaeremon_(philosopher)

CHAEREMON, of Alexandria (1st century A.D.), Stoic philosopher and grammarian. He was superintendent of the portion of the Alexandrian library that was kept in the temple of Serapis, and as custodian and expounder of the sacred books (ἱερογραμματεύς sacred scribe) belonged to the higher ranks of the priesthood. In A.D. 49 he was summoned to Rome, with Alexander of Aegae, to become tutor to the youthful Nero.
…

Chaeremon was the chief of the party which explained the Egyptian religious system as a mere allegory of the worship of nature.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_20

But these Jews are in part god-fearing, seeing that they revere a god who is truly most powerful and most good and governs this world of sense, and, as I well know, is worshipped by us also under other names.[9] They act as is right and seemly, in my opinion, if they do not transgress the laws; but in this one thing they err in that, while reserving their deepest devotion for their own god, they do not conciliate the other gods also; but the other gods they think have been allotted to us Gentiles only, to such a pitch of folly have they been brought by their barbaric conceit.

https://archive.org/details/greeklatinauthor0002unse/page/484/mode/2up?view=theater

> But the schools of Iamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus consider him (i.e. the god worshipped by the Jews) to be the demiurge, calling him the god of the four elements.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Against_the_Galileans#cite_ref-161

And yet, I call the gods to witness, I am one of those who avoid keeping their festivals with the Jews; but nevertheless **I revere always the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob;[162] who being themselves Chaldaeans, of a sacred race, skilled in theurgy, had learned the practice of circumcision while they sojourned as strangers with the Egyptians. And they revered a God who was ever gracious to me and to those who worshipped him as Abraham did, for he is a very great and powerful God, but he has nothing to do with you.** For you do not imitate Abraham by erecting altars to him, or building altars of sacrifice and worshipping him as Abraham did, with sacrificial offerings. 356. For Abraham used to sacrifice even as we Hellenes do, always and continually. And he used the method of divination from shooting stars. Probably this also is an Hellenic custom.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_51

And since I wish that you should prosper yet more, I have admonished my brother Iulus,[3] your most venerable patriarch, that the levy[4] which is said to exist among you should be prohibited, and that no one is any longer to have the power to oppress the masses of your people by such exactions; so that everywhere, during my reign, you may have security of mind, **and in the enjoyment of peace may offer more fervid prayers[5] for my reign to the Most High God, the Creator, who has deigned to crown me with his own immaculate right hand.** For it is natural that men who are distracted by any anxiety should be hampered in spirit, and should not have so much confidence in raising their hands to pray; but that those who are in all respects free from care should rejoice with their whole hearts and offer their suppliant prayers on behalf of my imperial office to Mighty God, even to him who is able to direct my reign to the noblest ends, according to my purpose. This you ought to do, **in order that, when I have successfully concluded the war with Persia, I may rebuild by my own efforts the sacred city of Jerusalem,[6] which for so many years you have longed to see inhabited, and may bring settlers there, and, together with you, may glorify the Most High God therein.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_I/Letters_of_St._Augustin/Letters_of_St._Augustin/Chapter_16

Grecian mythology tells us, but without sufficient warrant for our believing the statement, that Mount Olympus is the dwelling-place of the gods. But we actually see the market-place of our town occupied by a crowd of beneficient deities; and we approve of this. **Who could ever be so frantic and infatuated as to deny that there is one supreme God, without beginning, without natural offspring, who is, as it were, the great and mighty Father of all? The powers of this Deity, diffused throughout the universe which He has made, we worship under many names, as we are all ignorant of His true name,** the name God[1] being common to all kinds of religious belief. Thus it comes, that while in diverse supplications we approach separately, as it were, certain parts of the Divine Being, we are seen in reality to be the worshippers of Him in whom all these parts are one.

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The Framers at the Constitutional Convention issued a death warrant against Christianity, but for tactical reasons, they and their spiritual heirs refused for several generations to deliver it to the intended victims. They covered this covenantal death sentence with a lot of platitudes about the hand of Providence, the need for Morality, the grand design of the universe, and similar Masonic shibboleths. **The death sentence was officially delivered by the Fourteenth Amendment.** It has been carried out with escalating enthusiasm since the 1950s.

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09771a.htm#VII

Thus French Freemasonry, as the standard-bearer of all Freemasonry, pretends to inaugurate the golden era of the Masonic universal republic, comprising in Masonic brotherhood all men and all nations. "The triumph of the Galilean", said the president of the Grand Orient, Senator Delpech, on 20 September, 1902, "has lasted twenty centuries. But now he dies in his turn. **The mysterious voice, announcing (to Julian the Apostate) the death of Pan, today announces the death of the impostor God who promised an era of justice and peace to those who believe in him.** The illusion has lasted a long time. The mendacious God is now disappearing in his turn; he passes away to join in the dust of ages the divinities of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, who saw so many creatures prostrate before their altars. Bro. Masons, we rejoice to state that we are not without our share in this overthrow of the false prophets. The Romish Church, founded on the Galilean myth, began to decay rapidly from the very day on which the Masonic Association was established".[161]

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

Then came Darwinism. **We can accurately date the advent of unbelief in the United States: 1865-90.**49 With the rapid philosophical erosion of the traditional eighteenth-century worldview, the long-term covenantal basis of U.S. Constitutional law was undermined. No one has described this process better than Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Ph.D., who in 1908 wrote this of the Constitution: "**The government of the United States was constructed upon the Whig theory of political dynamics, which was a sort of unconscious copy of the Newtonian view of the universe. In our day, whenever we discuss the structure or development of anything, whether in nature or in society, we consciously or unconsciously follow Mr. Darwin; but before Mr. Darwin, they followed Newton.** Some single law, like the law of gravitation, swung each system of thought and gave it its principle of unity."50 Once we accept this view of the Constitution, there are inescapable judicial implications. Wilson spelled them out forthrightly.

> **The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.** It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. **No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of purpose.** Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions, no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal. There can be no successful government without leadership or without the intimate, almost instinctive, coordination of the organs of life and action. This is not theory, but fact, and displays its force as fact, whatever theories may be thrown across its track. **Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.**51

https://americanvision.org/6505/is-a-return-to-law-a-good-thing/

Natural law as it was constructed throughout the centuries died in 1859 with the publication of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*. **"Charles Darwin destroyed natural law theory in biological science. … His successors destroyed natural law theory in social science. In the 1920's, quantum physics destroyed natural law theory in the subatomic world. This immediately began to undermine modern legal theory."**[2] An evolving law means a flexible law that can be manipulated by whoever's in power.

http://test.darashpress.com/articles/natural-law-summary-and-critique

Natural law is one of the more difficult subjects that a person can encounter. **Whitehead states: "The concept of natural law is one of the most confused ideas in the history of Western thought."**[1]
…

Natural law proponents consistently make four claims in regard to natural law: 1) there are unchanging principles of law that exist in "nature" (are part of the natural realm) that define for man what is right, just, and good, and which ought to govern his actions; 2) these principles of law are accessible to all men and are discovered by the right use of reason; 3) these principles of law apply to all men at all times and in all circumstances; 4) man-made laws (e.g., those promulgated by the state) are just and authoritative only insofar as they are derivable from the principles of law in nature.[2]
…

Henry summarizes the church's discussion over natural law during this period:

> **There was little debate over the ontological existence of the natural law, but there was significant debate as to the epistemological basis for perceiving the natural law.** Augustine maintained that man's fall into sin so thoroughly corrupted the *imago dei* within him that revelation and grace were necessary foundations for the right use of reason. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, emphasized the structures of the *imago dei* which remained intact despite the fall into sin, suggesting that grace and revelation serve as corrective supplements to the right use of reason. **While Augustine did not deny that even pagans have some concept of natural justice, he obviously placed more emphasis on the supernatural in social ethics than Aquinas.** Generally speaking, Protestant thinkers have generally been "Augustinian" and Catholic thinkers have been "Thomistic" in dealing with the natural law question.[22]

With the coming of the Reformation and a return to the Bible and Augustinianism, the place of natural law in the social ethic of the church diminished (although it retained its prominence among the Roman Catholics, as it does to this day). **Even though John Calvin taught that natural law (which he identified as "equity")**

was normative in civil law and social ethics,[23] the whole system of his theology led to an undermining of the natural law view on social ethics. Therefore, those who adhered to the Calvinistic system began to move away increasingly from natural law to a more biblical formulation of civil law, culminating in the explicit biblical law perspective of the Scottish Covenanters and English and New England Puritans.

However, the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the power of man's reason to discover truth apart from supernatural revelation, led to a revival of natural law thinking in the Protestant church.
…

It is on the basis of what the Bible says about natural revelation that Christian thinkers have sought common ground with the Greek and Stoic concepts of natural law, and have attempted to incorporate the philosophy of natural law into Christian theology and ethics.
…

Gill describes the natural moral law given to Adam as follows:

> The natural law, or law of nature, given to Adam, was concreated with him, written on his heart, and engraved and imprinted in his nature from the beginning of his existence; by which he was acquainted with the will of his Maker, and directed to observe it; which appears from the remains of it in the hearts of all men, and even of the Gentiles; and from that natural conscience in every man, which if not by some means lulled asleep, that it does not perform its office, excuses men from blame when they do well, and accuses them, and charges them with guilt when they do ill, Rom. ii. 14, 15.[31]

There is, therefore, biblical warrant for a concept of natural law, if (and only if) one interprets that concept within the parameters of the biblical doctrine of natural revelation. Natural law, in that context, is the knowledge of God's law and of His righteous judgment as imparted to man through the activity of the mind and conscience. The natural law imprinted upon man's nature is part of the image of God in man and enables him to function as a responsible moral agent.

However, it must be recognized that this concept of natural law is radically different in its presuppositions than the Greek and Stoic notions of natural law. **The natural law of the philosophers is a theory of ethics devised by autonomous man to facilitate his rebellion against God and His law-word (Rom. 1:18-25, Ps. 2:1-3).** Thus, the attempt to reconcile the Greek concept of natural law with the biblical concept of natural revelation is an attempt to reconcile human autonomy (i.e., the sovereignty of reason) with God's sovereignty. **But the claimed autonomy of Athens cannot be reconciled with the covenantal submission of Jerusalem.** All attempts to build a Christian natural law theory on the basis of Greek and Stoic concepts of natural law lead to the introduction of human autonomy into Christian ethics.

Therefore, **Christians must not be fooled by the apparent agreement between pagan theories of natural law and the biblical concept of natural revelation** and be drawn into a natural law perspective on social and political ethics, even if it purports to be Christian.
…

This darkened, carnal, foolish mind, this defiled conscience is the means of knowing and establishing the moral law? Yes, says the theory of natural law. We say, God forbid! The objective standard of God's own infallible Word alone can suffice to reveal His moral law.

Furthermore, nature itself is under the curse (Gen. 3:17-19; Rom. 8:19-22). Nature cannot be normative, even in an unfallen world—to make it such is a form of idolatry, worshipping the creature rather than the Creator[32]—how much more in a world cursed by sin. **As Rushdoony notes: "For the Christian, however, nature is not the standard, because the world of nature is a fallen world, a world in rebellion against God and infected by sin and death. For a standard, we must look beyond nature to God."[33]**
…

Natural law may seem to suffice for those who have no higher vision than the restoration of "family values" or "traditional values" to our culture. But for those who understand the rebellious autonomy inherent in natural law theory; for those who desire to bring every sphere of life under the authority of God and His Word; for those who long to see the crown rights of Jesus Christ acknowledged by all—including presidents, governors, senators, representatives, judges, and "we the people"—natural law theory must be firmly rejected.

https://ironink.org/2023/05/is-thomistic-natural-law-legitimate-part-i/

Conscience is one of those words that has been made to carry a great deal of foreign freight. **In the philosophy of Stoicism "conscience" was made to mean the place where resides the infallible "sense of oughtness" resident in human nature.**

The Biblical concept of conscience is different from the pagan notion of Stoicism.

Interestingly enough the Hebrew OT never refers to the "conscience." There isn't even a Hebrew word for it, though there are times where the KJV will translate the Hebrew word "Heart" as "conscience" but this is an example where people were interpreting instead of translating. **No one who had the Law ever appealed to "conscience" as an inner judge for right and wrong.** It was the Torah that served as judge for right and wrong. Since Jews had the Torah they did not need a conscience.

When we come to the NT, the word "conscience" does not appear in the Gospels and is never referenced by Jesus or His disciples. In the Epistles the Greek word we use for "conscience" can simply mean to be sincere in what one says and does.

Romans 9:1 "*I am telling the truth in Christ, I am not lying, my conscience testifies with me in the Holy Spirit"*

Barclay and Nida in their commentary on Romans point out

"conscience may be variously translated depending upon the particular set of associations connected w/ certain terms or phrases – for example, "my heart," "my innermost," "that which speaks within me," or "the voice of my heart."

The conscience does not have any ontological reality. It seems often to serve as a kind of "Deus ex machina" to communicate the source of one's convictions.

Vincent's word studies give us insight into the meaning of conscience:

"In Scripture we are to view the conscience as Bishop Ellicott remarks, not in its abstract nature, but in its practical manifestations. Hence it may be weak (I Cor. 8:7, 12), unauthoritative and awakening only the feeblest emotion. It may be evil or defiled (Heb. 10:22, Tit. 1:15), through consciousness of evil practice. It may be seared (I Tim. 4:2), branded by its own testimony to evil practice, hardened and insensible to the appeal of good. OTOH, it may be pure (II Tim. 1:3), unveiled, and giving honest and clear testimony. It may be void of offense (Acts 24:16), unconscious of evil intent or act: good as here, or honorable (Heb. 13:18). The expression and the idea, in the full Christian sense, are foreign to the OT, where the testimony to the character of moral action and character is born by external revelation rather than by the inward moral consciousness."

So we see that those who teach that conscience is the place in human nature where there resides the infallible "sense of oughtness" are those who are teaching the meaning according to the ancient pagan philosophy of stoicism and not Christianity.

REGENERATION

As we seek to wrest Romans 2 away from those who teach, by way of pagan Natural Law theories, that God's Law is written on the hearts of all men, we would point to the idea of the work of Regeneration.

In all other references in Scripture to the law being written in the heart what we find is a reference to the work of regeneration.

Jer. 31:33 *"But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days," declares the LORD, "I will put My law within them and on their heart I will write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people."*

---

https://biblehub.com/nkjv/1_corinthians/6.htm

1 **If any of you has a dispute with another, do you dare to take it before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the Lord's people?** 2 **Or do you not know that the Lord's people will judge the world? And if you are to judge the world, are you not competent to judge trivial cases?** 3 **Do you not know that we will judge angels? How much more the things of this life!** 4 **Therefore, if you have disputes about such matters, do you ask for a ruling from those whose way of life is scorned in the church?** 5 **I say this to shame you. Is it possible that there is nobody among you wise enough to judge a dispute between believers?** 6 **But instead, one brother takes another to court—and this in front of unbelievers!**

https://gedsh.bethmardutho.org/entry/Ishobokht-of-Rev-Ardashir?fq=;fq-Browse:Browse;I;

Ishoʿbokht was consecrated by Cath. Ḥenanishoʿ, most likely Ḥenanishoʿ II (d. 779/80). He wrote his law book in Persian, from which language it was translated into Syriac at the instigation of Cath. Timotheos I, probably after Ishoʿbokht's death. It is divided into six books. The first is of a general and theoretical nature. Books 2 and 3 deal with matrimonial law. Book 4 is devoted to inheritance law; book 5 to donations, testaments, and obligations. Book 6 deals with the right of appeal. **Ishoʿbokht brings his knowledge of biblical law, Roman law, Persian law (and to some extent even Islamic law) together and aims at creating a unified system that would transcend local differences existing among Christians.** Ishoʿbokht is familiar with traditions that are incorporated in the Persian 'Book of thousand judgments' (*Mādīgān ī hazār dādestān*) and his work has been used by scholars of Persian-Sasanian law (Macuch). Ishoʿbokht's engagement with Zoroastrian law and customs was used by Sachau as an argument for dating him earlier than Shemʿon, from whose law book Zoroastrian doctrines and practices are largely absent (see under Shemʿon). **Dauvillier regards Ishoʿbokht as a powerful and original mind, and perhaps the best jurist of the Ch. of E.** (340).

https://archive.org/details/SeeingIslamAsOthersSawItASurveyAndEvaluationOfChristianJewishAndZoroastrianWritingsOnEarlyIslam/page/n223/mode/2up?view=theater

A ninth-century Muslim treatise, dedicated to the demonstration of God's existence and unity from the order manifest in terrestrial and celestial phenomena, cites among its sources **“a book composed in the days of the Umayyads, which Ishoʿbokht, metropolitan of Fars, put together and which he wrote in Persian.”**117
…

The legal tract of Ishoʿbokht, called simply *Maktbānūtā d-ʿal dīnē* (“Composition of the Laws”) by its Syriac translator, is a substantial work comprising six books and 82 chapters. It is not merely a collection of canons, but an attempt to systematise and codify the Christian law, and its originality prompts Ishoʿbokht proffer an explanation for his undertaking. He begins by reviewing the motives that impelled men of earlier times to write on history, metaphysics, natural science and the liberal arts, then emphasises that such factors played no part in his decision to take up his pen:120

> Rather I came to this composition for the following reasons: I have observed that there are many differences among people in the matter of laws, not only from religion from religion, from language to language and from nation to nation, **but also in one and the same religion, nation and language, as in the religion of Christianity. While the Jews in every place have one law, as also the error of the Magians and likewise also those who now rule over us, among the Christians the laws which are determined in the land of the Romans are distinct from those in the land of the Persians, and they in turn are distinct from those in the land of the Arameans, and different from Ahwaz, and different in Mayshan, and likewise also in other places.** Thus also from district to district and from city to city there are many differences in the matters of laws. **And though the religion of the Christians is one, the law is not one and the same** and we shall speak of the reason for that later. Moreover, we have learnt that in the same place the laws determined by earlier generations are other than the later generations, each man according to his knowledge and according to his wish. Because of this I desired that I assemble, as far as possible, those things which I have learnt from the tradition of the earlier generations, whether from those fathers who were in our churches or from those who were in other churches, and also what I arrive at from straight thinking, and [then] to put it in this book for the education of myself and of those who, like me, felt in need of such instruction.121

Yet it was not only his own wishes that had spurred him to write, **but also the demands of many friends and bishops similarly distraught at the heterogeneity of Christian law and who sought unity in their province at least, if it could not prevail in the whole church.** Ishoʿbokht now proceeds to discuss, “in the form of question and answer, so that it will be most clear to those reading it,” what is civil law (*dīnā*), what is rectitude (*trīṣūtā*), what is ideal law (*nāmōsā*),122 how do they differ from each other, why the civil laws are not the same for mankind, **“why when the ideal laws of the Christians are the same, their civil laws are not the same?”** The whole of the first book is devoted to such questions of jurisprudence.123

> 122. This is Ishoʿbokht's tripartite definition of law; ***nāmōsā* means the ideal principles found in the New Testament** (e.g. see Matthew v) and so is the same for all Christians (see the last question of this paragraph).

Interest in this subject is not found in pre-Islamic Christian legal writings. There are some hints of related activity by authors of the late seventh and early eighth century,124 but it is the work of Ishoʿbokht which first embarks upon a proper treatment of the matter, and so he is something of a pioneer.

> 124. The whole of catholicos George's preamble to the synod of 676 is taken up with a discussion of mankind's need for laws and the provision of them by God and the church (*Synodicon orientale*, 215-16). **Note also that the Armenian patriarch John of Ojun (718-29) became the first to codify Christian law in his country** (see Albert *et al.*, *Christianismes orientaux*, 146), **and Leo III (717-41) compiled one of the very few Byzantine legal codes, his *Ekloga*** (see Freshfield, "Official Manuals of Roman Law of the Eighth and Ninth Centuries"). Crone, "Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm," 71-73, argues that Leo's *Ekloga* was a response to Islam; see also *eadem* and Cook, *Hagarism*, 180-81 n. 18.

What spurred him to this innovation is clear from the above introduction: the variations in Christian law as compared with that of Jews, Zoroastrians and Muslims ("those who now rule over us"). But he and his friends did not reach this conclusion simply by observation, rather it was pointed out to them, as we see from the heading of one of the chapters of Ishoʿbokht's first book: **"Concerning what is said by the Jews and the *ḥanpē* that the Christians have no laws and it is not possible that their lives be conducted without laws."**125 **The usual Jewish accusation had been that the Christians did not hold to the law of Moses, not specifically that they had no laws.** So the question must have

originated with the *ḥanpē*, which can here only mean the Muslims, as is evident from the occurrence of the same question in a Christian-Muslim disputation:

> **The emir then moved on to ask about the laws of the Christians, what and after what fashion were they and if they were written in the Gospel or not. … And the illustrious emir said: … "Show me that your laws are written in the Gospel and that you conduct yourselves by them, or submit to the law of the Muslims."**126

The Christian interlocutor's reply is that "we Christians have laws which are right and just and accord with the teachings and prescriptions of the Gospel, the canons of the apostles and the laws of the church." **Ishoʿbokht's response is to deny the need for civil laws, arguing that the Christian community is more virtuous than its rivals.** Simeon of Rewardashir, probably writing soon after Ishoʿbokht,127 also considers this issue. His solution is to stress the non-literary modes of transmission of Christian law: **"We have found many other things which, though they have not been handed on to us from the earlier generations in writing, they have come from them to us in their practices."**128

> 128. Simeon of Rewardashir, *Canons* "intro.," 233. Simeon wrote the introduction to his collection of 22 canons on inheritance law in reply to four questions: "Why did our Lord not confer them (ecclesiastical laws) by his own legislation, what is the reason that we do not make *dīnē* according to the *nāmōsā* of Moses, from where did we receive the legal tradition which has reached us, and how are certain special cases of laws in the practice we follow to be treated?"

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/the-one-and-the-many-studies-in-the-philosophy-of-order-and-ultimacy

Meanwhile, also, another threat to Christianity was reviving in the form of natural law. *The Institutes of Justinian* clearly perpetuated the Roman doctrine and transmitted it to the centuries to come.499 The universal sovereignty and government of God was restricted to the realm of grace and revelation, and nature became the universal government rather than God. This appeared clearly in a statement of Orosius: **"Among Romans, as I have said, I am a Roman; among Christians, a Christian; among men, a man. The state comes to my aid through its laws, religion, through its appeal to the conscience, and nature through its claim of universality."**500

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Tribonian

The first article is unquestionably meant for the jurist. It is based on Procopius, whose very words are to some extent copied, and indeed it adds nothing to what the latter tells us, except the statement that Tribonian was the son of Macedonianus, was ἀπό δικηγόρων τῶν ὑπάρχων, **and was a heathen and atheist, wholly averse to the Christian faith.**
…

The charge of heathenism we find in Suidas is probable enough; that is to say, Tribonian may well have been a crypto-pagan, like many other eminent courtiers and litterateurs of the time (including Procopius himself), a person who, while professing Christianity, was at least indifferent to its dogmas and rites, cherishing a sentimental recollection of the older and more glorious days of the empire.

> https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n163/mode/2up?view=theater

> Ecclesiastically, the codification of Justinian reveals great traces of Christian influence. Justinian begins his Code by formulating an Imperial Creed on the Trinity, and by hurling Imperial anathemas against heretics. **Justinian asserted a majestic superiority over the clergy and canonical jurisdiction, although he makes the bishops Imperial judicial officers for certain matters;** for instance, the guardians of lunatics swore before the bishop on the Gospels to administer their trust with fidelity.639
>
> **But in the domain of private law, the influence of Christianity is not easy to trace, and it is to be found only by indirect methods of investigation.** By comparison and analysis of the doctrines of Roman law as they are manifested prior or subsequent to the Christian Emperors it is possible to observe the uplifting influence of Christian ethics. But "the changes in Roman law consequent upon the establishment of Christianity were more largely changes of machinery than of material, for though Christianity could not fail to have far reaching effects on the Corpus Juris Civilis, the principles of that magnificent system were well-nigh definitely settled before Christianity attained temporal supremacy."640 **Hence most of the private law of Justinian reads as if exclusively Roman and seemingly ignorant of the existence of Christianity. It contains quotations from Homer frequently, but never allusions to the sacred Christian writings.** In fact, Tribonian, who framed Justinian's great work of jurisprudence, has even incurred the suspicion of atheism: **from the Institutes of Justinian one would never easily detect the Christianity of Justinian.**

https://archive.org/details/influenceofgreek00hatc/page/168/mode/2up?view=theater

At the end of the fourth century the new state of things was formally recognized by ecclesiastical writers. Love was no more “the handbook of divine philosophy:”1 **the chief contemporary theologian of the West, Ambrose of Milan, formulated the current theory in a book which is the more important because it not merely expresses the ideas of his time and seals the proof of their prevalence, but also became the basis of the moral philosophy of the Middle Ages.** But the book is less Christian than Stoical.1 It is a *rechauffée* of the book which Cicero had compiled more than three centuries before, chiefly from Panaetius. **It is Stoical, not only in conception, but also in detail. It makes virtue the highest good. It makes the hope of the life to come a subsidiary and not a primary motive. Its ideal of life is happiness: it holds that a happy life is a life according to nature, that it is realized by virtue, and that it is capable of being realized here on earth.** Its virtues are the ancient virtues of wisdom and justice, courage and temperance. It tinges each of them with a Christian, or at least with a Theistic colouring; but the conception of each of them remains what it had been to the Greek moralists. Wisdom, for example, is Greek wisdom, with the addition that no man can be wise who is ignorant of God: justice is Greek justice, with the addition that its subsidiary form of beneficence is helped by the Christian society.

The victory of Greek ethics was complete. **While Christianity was being transformed into a system of doctrines, the Stoical jurists at the imperial court were slowly elaborating a system of personal rights. The ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, which the earliest Christian communities endeavoured to carry into practice, have been transmuted by the slow alchemy of history into the ethics of Roman law. The basis of Christian society is not Christian, but Roman and Stoical.** A fusion of the Roman conception of rights with the Stoical conception of relations involving reciprocal actions, is in possession of practically the whole field of civilized society. The transmutation is so complete that the modern question is not so much whether the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount are practicable, as whether, if practicable, they would be desirable. The socialistic theories which formulate in modern language and justify by modern conceptions such an exhortation as “Sell that thou hast and give to the poor,” meet with no less opposition within than without the Christian societies.

> https://archive.org/details/ancientchristia05taylgoog/page/214/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But not one line does this funereal panegyric contain breathing an evangelic feeling, or adverting to the great principles of the Gospel! It would be wrong to speak of this elaborate composition as defective, or ambiguous, or erroneous, in relation to the leading truths of Christianity; for it touches them not even in the remotest manner. **As well say that the Phædo of Plato is wanting in evangelic perspicuity, or that Cicero, De natura deorum, does not fully express the doctrine of the thirty-nine articles. Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, any one we may choose to name, is as evangelic as Ambrose, so far as the composition before us goes.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II/Volume_X/Works/On_the_Duties_of_the_Clergy/Book_I/Chapter_28

132. **Next they considered it consonant with justice that one should treat common, that is, public property as public, and private as private. But this is not even in accord with nature, for nature has poured forth all things for all men for common use. God has ordered all things to be produced, so that there should be food in common to all, and that the earth should be a common possession for all. Nature, therefore, has produced a common right for all, but greed has made it a right for a few. Here, too, we are told that the Stoics taught that all things which are produced on the earth are created for the use of men, but that men are born for the sake of men, so that mutually one may be of advantage to another.**[3] 133. **But whence have they got such ideas but out of the holy Scriptures?** For Moses wrote that God said: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”[4] And David said: “Thou hast put all things under his feet; all sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea.”[5] **So these philosophers have learnt from our writings that all things were made subject to man, and, therefore, they think that all things were produced also for man’s sake.**

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/190/mode/2up?view=theater

At least by the third century A.D. Christian doctrine had assimilated from the extraordinarily influential philosophy of Stoicism the notion of an egalitarian State of Nature which was irrecoverably lost. And although it was hardly possible to talk of social and economic organization of the Garden of Eden, orthodox theologians nevertheless managed to use the Graeco-Roman myth to illustrate the dogma of the Fall.

At the centre of this theory of society stands the distinction between the State of Nature, which was based on Natural Law and expressed directly the divine intention, and the conventional state, which has grown out of and is sanctioned by custom. It was agreed by most of the later Fathers that inequality, slavery, coercive government and even private property had no part in the original intention of God and had come into being only as a result of the Fall.
…

And nevertheless it was above all the teaching of the Church which perpetuated the idea that the 'natural' society was an egalitarian one.
…

It was also to be the judgement of the secular feudal lawyers. The opinion of the famous French jurist Beaumanoir, in the thirteenth century, can be taken as representing the normal opinion of medieval thinkers: **'Although there now exist several estates of men, it is true that in the beginning all were free and of the same freedom; for everyone knows that we are all descended from one father and one mother…'**

Most curious is the way in which Catholic doctrine incorporated and conserved the idea that all things on earth ought to belong to all human beings communally. In the third century we find the stock phrases of the Stoics being repeated by St Cyprian. God's gifts, he points out, are given to all mankind. The day brings light to all, the sun shines upon all, the rain falls and the wind blows for all, the splendour of the stars and the moon are common property. Such is the impartial beneficence of God; and a man who would imitate God's justice should share all his belongings with his fellow-Christians. **By the second half of the fourth century this view had won wide acceptance amongst Christian writers.** We find St Zeno of Verona repeating the comparison, which had become a commonplace: ideally all goods ought to be in common 'like the day, the sun, the night, the rain, being born and dying – things which divine justice bestows equally on all mankind without distinction of persons.' More striking still are certain pronouncements of the great Bishop of Milan, St Ambrose, **in which the tradition once formulated by Seneca finds most vigorous expression:** 'Nature has poured forth all things for all men, to be held in common. For God commanded all things to be produced so that food should be common to all, and that the earth should be a common possession of all. Nature, therefore, created a common right, but use and habit created private right…' **In support of this view Ambrose cites, as though they were wholly concordant authorities, the Stoics and the Book of Genesis.** And elsewhere he remarks: 'The Lord God specially wanted this earth to be the common possession of all, and to provide fruits for all; but avarice produced the rights of property.'

> https://archive.org/details/beyondgoodandevi00nietuoft/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But the struggle against Plato, or – **to speak plainer, and for the "people" – the struggle against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of Christianity (for Christianity is Platonism for the "people"),** produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had not existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow one can now aim at the furthest goals.
>
> http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE1/NatR.html **[February 1890]**
>
> > [4] **Sixteen centuries ago, Ulpian drew the conclusion that, according to the "jus naturale," the elements "mare," "aer," and, at any rate, "litora," are the common property of all living things.** Isidore of Seville (see *Voigt,* p. 576), **probably founding himself on Ulpian,** reckons "communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio corum quæ cœlo, terra marique capiuntur," as among the natural rights of men.

A passage glorifying the communistic state of nature, including free love, is to be found even in Gratian's *Decretum*, **the treatise which became the basic text for the study of Canon Law in all universities and which forms the first part of the *Corpus juris canonici*.** The story of how it came to be there is surely one of the strangest in the history of ideas. Pope Clement I, one of the earliest bishops of Rome, who flourished towards the end of the first century, came to be regarded after his death as a pupil of St Peter himself. The prestige which this brought to his name resulted in a great amount of apocryphal literature being fathered upon him. One of these works purported to be a narrative written by Clement to St James, describing his travels with St Peter and culminating in his 'recognition' of his parents and brothers, from whom he had been separated since childhood. Probably first written in Syria about 265 A.D., the work was given its present form about a century later. In the *Recognitions of Clement* as we possess them the father of Clement appears as a pagan with whom Peter and Clement debate and whom they finally convert. **In the course of the argument the father quotes the following opinions, which he attributes to 'Greek philosophers' – correctly enough, if only he had not then tried to father them on to Plato:**

> For the use of all things that are in this world ought to have been common to all men, but through injustice one man says this is his, and another says that is his, and so division is created amongst mortals. In short, a very wise Greek, knowing these things to be so, says that all things should be in common amongst friends. **And unquestionably amongst 'all things' spouses are included. He also says, just as the air cannot be divided up, nor the splendour of the sun, so the other**

> **things which are given in this world to be held in common by all ought not to be divided up, but really ought to be held in common.**

Some five centuries later this passage acquired an entirely new significance. About 850 A.D. the French monk known as Pseudo-Isidore (because he fathered his works upon Isidore, Archbishop of Seville) was producing spurious decretals and canons for the celebrated collection now known as the False Decretals. The collection opens with five 'Epistles of Pope Clement,' all of them apocryphal and three of them forged by Pseudo-Isidore himself. **In the fifth epistle, which is addressed to St James and the Christians of Jerusalem, Pseudo-Isidore included the passage quoted above – no longer however as the saying of a pagan but as expressing the views of Pope Clement himself. And the Pope is made to reinforce the argument by quoting *Acts* iv on the first Christian community at Jerusalem:**

> And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. ... Neither was there any among them that lacked; for as many as were possessors of lands and houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man according to his need.

It was in this hybrid form, half Christian and half Stoic, that the argument was encountered by the founder of the science of Canon Law. When, about 1150, Gratian came to make his great compilation, he never questioned – any more than his contemporaries did – the genuineness of the decretals of Pseudo-Isidore. The Fifth Epistle of Clement, with its strange affirmation of anarcho-communism, was included in the *Decretum* and thereby acquired an authority which it was to keep until the sixteenth century, when it was discredited along with the rest of the False Decretals. **Gratian, it is true, attaches to the document certain comments which tend to restrict its scope; but elsewhere in the *Decretum* he makes its arguments (save in the matter of free love) unreservedly his own.** And in the later Middle Ages it became a commonplace amongst canonists and scholastics that in the first state of society, which had also been the best state, there had been no such thing as private property because all things had belonged to all people.

> https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2816/pg2816-images.html
>
> G.M. This seems excellent and sacred, but the community of women is a thing too difficult to attain. **The holy Roman Clement says that wives ought to be common in accordance with the apostolic institution, and praises Plato and Socrates, who thus teach, but the Glossary interprets this community with regard to obedience. And Tertullian agrees with the Glossary, that the first Christians had everything in common except wives.**
>
> Capt. These things I know little of. **But this I saw among the inhabitants of the City of the Sun, that they did not make this exception. And they defend themselves by the opinion of Socrates, of Cato, of Plato, and of St. Clement; but, as you say, they misunderstand the opinions of these thinkers.** And the inhabitants of the solar city ascribe this to their want of education, since they are by no means learned in philosophy. **Nevertheless, they send abroad to discover the customs of nations, and the best of these they always adopt. Practice makes the women suitable for war and other duties. Thus they agree with Plato, in whom I have read these same things. The reasoning of our Cajetan does not convince me, and least of all that of Aristotle.**
>
> http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_94
>
> Several years after *City of the Sun,* Campanella wrote another work, *On the Best State,* in which he analyzes certain objections to the social concept expressed in his first book. He justifies, in particular, the communality of property by reference to the Apostolic community, and cautiously defends the communality of wives by quoting various Fathers of the Church. Especially interesting is the passage where he asserts that the possibility of such a state is confirmed by experience: "**And this, moreover, has been demonstrated by monks and lately by the Anabaptists who live in communes;** if they possessed the true dogma of the faith, they would have succeeded in this even more. Oh, were they not heretics and should they do justice as we preach it, then they would serve as an exemplar of this truth."

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater

How much of Thomas Aquinas' law of nature and conception of State is still to be found in Adam Smith and therefore – with the opposite sign – in the Communist Manifesto! **Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism.**

> https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2816/pg2816-images.html
>
> **They deny what we hold—viz., that it is natural to man to recognize his offspring and to educate them, and to use his wife and house and children as his own. For they say that children are bred for the preservation of the species and not for individual pleasure, as St. Thomas also asserts. Therefore the breeding of children has reference to the commonwealth,**

> **and not to individuals, except in so far as they are constituents of the commonwealth.** And since individuals for the most part bring forth children wrongly and educate them wrongly, they consider that they remove destruction from the State, and therefore for this reason, with most sacred fear, they commit the education of the children, who, as it were, are the element of the republic, to the care of magistrates; for the safety of the community is not that of a few.

https://creation.com/the-church-v-galileo-how-the-church-accepted-the-science-of-its-day

> There is nothing particularly Christian about Aristotelian cosmology. In fact there are points at which it cannot be reconciled with the Bible. **How did the church find itself in the position of defending Aristotelian cosmology against the new Copernican cosmology?** It found itself in that position because it accepted the argument of Aquinas that the biblical texts which contradicted Aristotle should not be pressed as the Bible was not written in technical philosophical language. Moses spoke the language of his day.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.103687/page/n135/mode/2up?view=theater

When it comes to universalism, cosmopolitanism, and humanitarianism, the most hide-bound critics are ready to feature the rôle enacted by Stoicism in "the Preparation for Christianity." But, this is not enough. Taken together, these inseparable conceptions not only foreshadowed the Evangelical outlook, but furnished it a standpoint – framework with facts. **Alexander the Great may have been a general of genius; his real importance roots in his abolition of the circumstances which divided Greek from Barbarian, Jew from Gentile, and, eventually, Roman citizen from subject alien. In the same way, Frederick II (1194-1250) may have been the "wonder of the world, in mere accomplishments the greatest prince who ever wore a crown;" his real importance roots in the impetus he gave to alignments wherein nations were to arise once more. Between the two, Stoic cosmopolitanism had free course.** The universe is a single whole, governed by a single Reason, and men are scions of a single race, bound in a single brotherhood. **Zeno's "one flock feeding in one pasture" is a vision no more when the Roman Empire, the foretaste, has been supplanted by the City of God on earth, the Church Catholic.** Plainly enough, if mankind be one, and if the world of their habitation be one, then the common unity, the overruling Power, must flow as freely through things as through souls. "I cannot find it in my heart to be angry with any *man*, for we are all made for mutual help, as the feet, the hands, the eyelids." Such was the cosmopolitanism of Marcus Aurelius. If so, then ultimately the human spirit, in its obligations and destiny alike, must revert to some universal guidance and, seeking, find it in a cosmopolitan organization. Further, with the universal Empire as theorised and supervised by Stoics at actual work in Rome, **this all-inclusive community of perfectionists was bound to take no account of race or place, but solely of its peculiar oecumenical function.** "He cannot have God for his father who has not the Church for his mother," as Cyprian (*c.* 240) was among the first to see. The Stoic City of Zeus had descended from heaven to dwell among men. **Thanks in no secondary measure to Stoic universalism, cosmopolitanism, and humanitarianism, Catholic and Roman became identical, and means were devised which transformed the lives of millions *after* the "*disappearance* of Stoicism"!** What irony! Truth to tell, Stoicism was absorbed in and, eventually, transcended by the Christian system.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9-8fIBVgCQYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA135#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Roman jurists were intensely practical in their approach to law. **Their importation of Greek dialectical reasoning in the second and first centuries B.C, although it was the first scholarly inroad into Roman law, was not the intermarriage of Roman law with Greek philosophy that took place over a thousand years later in the universities of western Europe.** The Roman jurists refused to adopt the Hellenistic system of education; legal training continued to consist chiefly of very informal, individual apprenticeship in the house of an older practitioner. "The [Roman] jurisconsults did not discuss with their pupils basic conceptions like justice, law, or legal science, though to the Greeks these seemed problems of the highest, nay almost of sole importance. The student was plunged straight into practice, where he was faced with the everrecurrent question: What, on the facts stated, ought to be done?"25 Nevertheless, it was in this period – **before the great flowering of so-called classical Roman law in the first to third centuries A.D.** – that jurists first attempted systematically to classify Roman law into its various kinds (genera and species) and with precision to define general rules applicable to specific cases.
...

Subsequently, **in the classical and postclassical periods (first to fifth centuries A.D.),** the Roman jurists refined and developed the dialectical techniques that had been applied by their republican predecessors, without changing them fundamentally. There was a tendency to toward somewhat greater abstraction. In the first part of the second century they began to speak expressly of "rules" (*regulae*) and not only of "definitions."
...

Indeed, the entire Title 50.17 of the Digest must have demonstrated beyond a doubt to the Roman lawyers of Justinian's time the validity of the famous rule of Javolenus, also contained in Title 50.17, **"All rules [*definitiones*] in civil law are dangerous, for they are almost always capable of being distorted." (That, too, was probably aimed at a specific definition.)**38

The classical and postclassical Roman jurists thought of a legal rule as a generalization of the common elements of decisions in a restricted, specified class of cases. Only by thus limiting the scope of legal rules did they hope to achieve their objective of using Greek methods of classification and generalization as a rational basis for deciding cases. **The Greeks had never attempted any such rationalization of legal decisions and rules; for them dialectical reasoning was a technique for deriving valid philosophical conclusions – "propositions" – from agreed premises. The Romans converted the Greek dialectic from an art of discovery to an art of judging.**

It is important to distinguish Roman legal casuistry from the legal casuistry of the western European jurists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and thereafter, as well as from the case method of analysis practiced by English and American common lawyers to this day. On the one hand, the Romans did not use cases in in order to illustrate principles or test them by going back a step, so to speak, in order to see their applications. On the other hand, they reduced their cases to bare holdings, without treating them in their fullness – without discussion of ambiguities or gaps in their fact situations, or alternative formulations of the legal issues involved.39 **Max Weber undoubtedly went too far when he referred to the classical Roman jurists' use of rules as a "merely paratactic and visual association of the analogy."**40 Yet their failure to articulate the assumptions and deeper reasons on which the analogies were founded – indeed, their failure even to define the most important legal terms41 – led to a narrowness, or woodenness, in case analysis; and this was just what the Roman jurists wanted! **When Cicero argued for a more complex systematization of the law, with clear definitions and abstract legal rules, the jurists "answered these strictures by polite silence."**42 They had no reason to try to transform the Roman genius for consistent adjudication into a philosophical system. **They had every reason to be suspicious of the applicability of the higher ranges of Greek philosophy to the practical needs of adjudication.**

The western European jurists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries carried the Greek dialectic to a much higher level of abstraction. They attempted to systematize the rules into an integrated whole – not merely to define elements common to particular species of cases but also to synthesize the rules into principles and the principles themselves into an entire system, a body of law or corpus juris.

One of the techniques the scholastic jurists used to achieve this objective was to treat the Roman *regulae*, found in Title 50.17 of the Digest and elsewhere, as legal "maxims," that is, as independent principles of universal validity. **The word "maxim" was drawn from Aristotelian terminology; it referred to a "maximum proposition," that is, a "universal."**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.103687/page/n149/mode/2up?view=theater

Lecky writes: "In no respect is the greatness of the Stoic philosophers more conspicuous than in the contrast between the gigantic steps of legal reform made in a few years under their influence, and the almost insignificant steps taken when Christianity had obtained an ascendancy in the empire, not to speak of the long period of decrepitude that followed."32 However this may be, one must remember that, when the first onset of the Renaissance (*c.* 1050-1350) manifested itself, at Pavia, Ravenna, and Bologna, **in renewed study of Roman law, Stoic principles were read in the light of Christian problems, theological and political.**
...

In short, a movement has started bound to gravitate toward the *dictum* of Suarez (1569-1619), *Lex injusta non est lex*. With this, a door is opened wide to political casuistry. 'Natural law' takes rank – almost precedence – as an *a priori* source, warranting contrary interpretations of disputable cases. In point of fact, a tendency ensued to erect two abstractions: on the one hand, a *Jus Naturale* or *Lex Naturalis* whereby men share in the moral order of the universe deducible by unaided 'natural reason': on the other, a *Jus Divinum*, revealed to humanity with supernatural intent, to wit, the preservation of the *absolutely* valuable single soul to immortal life. **When the former is subordinated to the latter, and by an authoritative organization, all may go well. But, when Cynic rationalism, guiltless of revealed sanctions, returns to magnify the former, the 'unwritten' law may justify any abrogations and in any interest.** "Universal consent is the voice of nature," as Cicero said; but, consent about what? Allow an ideal of excellence to penetrate practical politics, and you have adopted an ethical conception in semi-legal guise which may lead very far afield. **Thus, going behind the attitude of the Roman jurisconsults, the legal renaissance of the eleventh century hinted the possibility of a code superior to, and therefore capable of abrogating, man-made laws.** So long as "divine law" interpreted by the Church Universal remained powerful, tangential novelties were stayed. But, with the disintegration accompanying the Renaissance and Reformation, **the Stoic doctrine might presage anything, from 'national' rights to counsels of political despair. The 'modern' world was to furnish many examples.**

https://archive.org/details/historyofenglish01polluoft/page/22/mode/2up?view=theater

As to the Digest, during some four hundred years its mere existence seems to have been almost unknown. It barely escaped with its life. When men spoke of 'the pandects' they meant the bible.2 The romantic fable of the capture of an unique copy at the siege of Amalfi in 1135 has long been disproved; **but, if some small fragments be neglected, all the extant manuscripts are said to derive from two copies, one now lost, the other the famous Florentina written, we are told, by Greek hands in the sixth or seventh century.** In the eleventh the revival began. **In 1038 Conrad**

II., the emperor whom Cnut saw crowned, ordained that Roman law should be once more the territorial law of the city of Rome.3 **In 1076 the Digest was cited in the judgment of a Tuscan court.**4 Then, about 1100, Irnerius was teaching at Bologna.5

> 4. Ficker, Forschungen, iii. 126; iv. 99; Conrat, op. cit. 67. **Apparently the most industrious research has failed to prove that between 603 and 1076 any one cited the Digest. The bare fact that Justinian had issued such a book seems to have vanished from memory.** Conrat, op. cit. i. 69.
>
> https://biblehub.com/2_kings/22-8.htm
>
> **Then Hilkiah the high priest said to Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the Book of the Law in the house of the LORD." And Hilkiah gave the book to Shaphan, and he read it.**

Here, again, there is room for controversy. It is said that he was not self-taught; it is said that neither his theme nor his method was quite new; it is said that he had a predecessor at Bologna, one Pepo by name. All this may be true and is probable enough: and yet undoubtedly he was soon regarded as the founder of the school which was teaching Roman law to an intently listening world. **We with our many sciences can hardly comprehend the size of this event. The monarchy of theology over the intellectual world was disputed. A lay science claimed its rights, its share of men's attention.** It was a science of civil life to be found in the human, heathen Digest.1

> 1. Esmein, op. cit. 347: 'Une science nouvelle naquit, **indépendante et laïque,** la science de la société civile, telle que l'avaient dégagée les Romains, et qui pouvait passer pour le chef-d'oeuvre de la sagesse humaine... Il en résulta qu'à côté du théologien se plaça le légiste qui avait, comme lui, ses principes et ses textes, et qui lui disputa la direction des esprits avides de savoir.' It is only by slow degrees that the Digest comes by its rights. **Throughout the middle ages the Code appears, as Justinian intended that it should appear, as the prominent book:** it contains the new law.

A new force had begun to play and sooner or later every body of law in western Europe felt it. **The challenged church answered with Gratian's Decretum (circ. 1139) and the Decretals of Gregory IX. (1234).** The canonist emulated the civilian and for a long while maintained in the field of jurisprudence what seemed to be an equal combat. Unequal is was in truth. The Decretum is sad stuff when set beside the Digest and the study of Roman law never dies.

https://archive.org/details/historyofinquisi01leah/page/58/mode/2up?view=theater

Even more menacing to the Church was the revival of the Civil Law. Whether or not this was caused by the discovery of the Pandects of Amalfi, the ardor with which it came, by the middle of the twelfth century, to be studied in all the great centres of learning is incontestable, and men found, to their surprise, that there was a system of jurisprudence of wonderful symmetry and subtle adjustment of right, **immeasurably superior to the clumsy and confused canon law and the barbarous feudal customs,** while drawing its authority from immutable justice as represented by the sovereign, and not from canon or decretal, from pope or council, or even from Holy Writ. **The clearsightedness of St. Bernard was not in fault when, as early as 1149, he recognized the danger to the Church, and complained that the courts rang with the laws of Justinian rather than with those of God.***

> https://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Italian/DantPar8to14.php#anchor_Toc64099868
>
> **So the Gospels and the Great Doctors are neglected, and only the Decretals, the law-books are studied, as can be seen by their margins.** On that, the Pope and Cardinals are intent: their thoughts do not stray to Nazareth, where Gabriel's wings unfolded.

https://archive.org/details/historyofenglish01polluoft/page/110/mode/2up?view=theater

But we must add that in any case the middle of the twelfth century would have been critical. Even had Harold held his own, had his sons and grandsons succeeded him as peaceful and conservative English kings, their rule must have come into contact with the claims of the cosmopolitan but Roman church, and must have been influenced, if only in the way of repulsion, by the growth of the civil and canon law. **Of all the centuries the twelfth is the most legal. In no other age, since the classical days of Roman law, has so large a part of the sum total of intellectual endeavour been devoted to jurisprudence.**

We have told above how Irnerius taught at Bologna.1 Very soon a school had formed itself around his successors. The fame of 'the four doctors,' Bulgarus, Martinus, Jacobus, Hugo, had gone out into all lands; the works of Placentinus were copied at Peterborough. **From every corner of Western Europe students flocked to Italy. It was as if a new gospel had been revealed. Before the end of the**

century complaints were loud that theology was neglected, that the liberal arts were despised, that Seius and Titius had driven Aristotle and Plato from the schools, that men would learn law and nothing but law.1 This enthusiasm for the new learning was not soon spent; it was not spent until in the middle of the thirteenth century Accursius had summed up its results in the *Glossa Ordinaria* **and Azo of Bologna had taught Bracton what a law-book should be.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_I,_Holy_Roman_Emperor#Frederick_and_the_Justinian_code

The historian Norman Cantor described Corpus Iuris Civilis (Justinian Body of Civil Law) as "the greatest legal code ever devised".[102] **It envisaged the law of the state as a reflection of natural moral law (as seen by the men of the Justinian system), the principle of rationality in the universe.** By the time Frederick assumed the throne, this legal system was well established on both sides of the Alps. **He was the first to utilize the availability of the new professional class of lawyers.** The Civil Law allowed Frederick to use these lawyers to administer his kingdom in a logical and consistent manner. It also provided a framework to legitimize his claim to the right to rule both Germany and northern Italy. **In the old days of Henry V and Henry VI, the claim of divine right of kings had been severely undermined by the Investiture controversy. The Church had won that argument in the common man's mind. There was no divine right for the German king to also control the church by naming both bishops and popes. The institution of the Justinian code was used, perhaps unscrupulously, by Frederick to lay claim to divine powers.**[103]

In Germany, Frederick was a political realist, taking what he could and leaving the rest. In Italy, he tended to be a romantic reactionary, reveling in the antiquarian spirit of the age, exemplified by a revival of classical studies and Roman law. **It was through the use of the restored Justinian code that Frederick came to view himself as a new Roman emperor.**[104] **Roman law gave a rational purpose for the existence of Frederick and his imperial ambitions. It was a counterweight to the claims of the Church to have authority because of divine revelation. The Church was opposed to Frederick for ideological reasons, not the least of which was the humanist nature found in the revival of the old Roman legal system.**[105] When Pepin the Short sought to become king of the Franks in the 8th century, the church needed military protection, so Pepin found it convenient to make an ally of the pope. **Frederick, however, desired to put the pope aside and claim the crown of old Rome simply because he was in the likeness of the greatest emperors of the pre-Christian era.**

https://archive.org/details/frederickthesecо000027mbp/page/292/mode/2up?view=theater

By his organisation of the emancipated "secular" spirit Frederick II broke once and for all the spell which the Church had laid on the whole domain of the non-material as an intellectual and spiritual unity. **Even more clearly than by the state philosophy, the complete mental independence of the new State was demonstrated by the fact that the clergy ceased to play a part in the administration of Sicily, and their spiritual influence on it gradually ceased.**

The Sicilian state itself is the proof that lay education had made great strides in Frederick's century, for the Emperor was able to risk basing his whole kingdom on it. On the other hand the existing supply of educated laymen was not sufficient, and in order to be able to draw on larger numbers Frederick founded the University of Naples. In the Charter of the University Frederick stated: "We propose to rear many clever and clearsighted men, by the draught of knowledge and the seed of learning; men made eloquent by study and by the observation of just law, who will serve the God of all and will please us by the cult of Justice. ... We invite learned men to our service, men full of zeal for the study of *Jus* and *Justitia*, to whom we can entrust our administration without fear."
...

The whole state was thick-sown with lawyers. Ousting the clergy, hitherto the only representatives of education and culture, the jurists now had the entry to the Emperor's court, and the replacing of a clerical atmosphere by an emancipated secular atmosphere was pregnant with momentous change even in the highest politics. The Church had long been striving to enlist to her side the newly-awakened town-dweller. Frederick II now entered the lists, and while the Church, with the support of the mendicant orders, was successful in capturing the masses the Emperor won over the educated classes, the new intellectual aristocracy. These were usually inclined to support the Government. It was, therefore, of the greatest importance that Frederick II, recognising their vigour and their potentialities, enlisted the town lawyers in his service, gave them the widest possible scope, in administration, in his chancery work, and in his court circles, and by this means within a few years revolutionised the whole central government of Sicily and even of the Empire. The two administrations of Sicily and of the Empire were originally to be kept apart, in accordance with the agreement with Rome, but they were afterwards amalgamated.
...

The young judge next had an opportunity of entering the narrower State service as *judex* to one of the justiciars, or, later, in Northern Italy, to one of the numerous vicars, vicars general or podestas. With good fortune he might ultimately reach the office of High Court Judge. This was not the only avenue to the High

Court bench, for we know of High Court Judges who had never officiated as ordinary judges: the famous Thaddeus of Suessa, for example, a courtier and one of Frederick's intimates. It is worth noting that quite a number held the title of High Court Judge without having officiated at all. These were the *consiliarii*, the counsellors who were employed in the imperial Chancery and on diplomatic missions and formed part of the Emperor's immediate following. **This is the first time that professional lawyers figure in the permanent personnel of an Emperor's court, not merely as occasional experts.** The judges of lower degree could find many niches for themselves in the service; we find them as chamberlains, as tax collectors, as overseers of the accounts departments, as keepers of the King's treasury and in other capacities; in offices which might perfectly well have been filled by non-legal nobles or burgesses. **It is important to note how the lawyers were thrusting into posts of every sort.**
...

This penetration of the secular state by the legal spirit was only a reflection of what had already taken place within the bosom of the Church. **A knowledge of Canon Law was indispensable for every cleric of any position.** The carefully cultivated style of the notaries was also originally a product of the Church. It followed that a course of study at Naples and employment in the imperial Chancery might be the opening of a clerical career. There was the possibility of Church promotion for anyone who had mastered both laws, and if this did not offer the Chancery was a safe refuge. We have already alluded to the Emperor's efforts to secure the appointment of his notaries to vacant bishoprics. In the early days these efforts always failed, but after the second excommunication the Emperor flung aside all restraint and began to appoint Sicilian bishops of his own choice, or allow Archbishop Berard of Palermo to do so, except in cases where he preferred to keep a vacancy. **The Ottos and the Salians long ago in Germany used to rear up their private chaplains to be their future bishops, and the Chancery of the Imperial Court now served the same purpose as of old the private chapel of the Emperor. The radical innovation was that these clerical Chancery officials, never very numerous, were appointed not because they were clerics but because they were jurists, and in spite of their being clerics.** The Emperor found them in no way indispensable, and their priestly character was a matter of indifference to him, fraught with no danger. **Walter of Ocra, notary and chaplain of the Emperor, and one of his busiest officials, rose to be Sicilian Chancellor, but he was on an entirely different footing from the bishop-chancellors of earlier days: he was simply an imperial official who happened to be a cleric.** The higher clergy were still represented at Court, especially by prelates who were able to adapt themselves to the new spirit of the times. The Archbishops Berard of Palermo, and Jacob of Capua, belonged to the most intimate circle of the Emperor. Frederick had utilised the latter as collaborator in the Constitutions of Melfi, especially in those sections which dealt with the Church and the Sicilian clergy. A few other bishops were intimate with the Emperor, Archbishop Berard of Messina and Bishop Peter of Ravello. These prelates had weight in the intellectual life of the court only in so far as they accommodated themselves to the literary and mental pursuits around them. They were no longer themselves the independent purveyors of spiritual life as bishops had been wont to be. Still we must not undervalue the fact that the mental atmosphere of the Court was sufficiently catholic to give scope even to canonistic culture. It was inevitable that the University of Naples should have a number of clerical students, since all Sicilian subjects were compelled to attend it. **One of the greatest of all churchmen was a product of Naples: Thomas Aquinas, the *doctor angelicus* of the Roman Church.**

Two years after founding the University of Naples Frederick II had closed the University of Bologna on account of the fiasco of the Cremona Diet in 1226. In so doing he had a special intention of his own. **He wrote to the professors as well as to the scholars of Bologna: the last thing he wished was that learned men should suffer through the recalcitrance of the rebellious Bolognese who had joined the Lombard League. He invited them, therefore, to quit Bologna and come to Naples, "where instituted by us with much care, study flourishes ... the beauty of the neighbourhood attracts, no less than the lavish supplies of everything, and the reverend community of doctors."** This great plan of transferring to Naples the famous Law School of Bologna fell through. The Pope's intervention secured a truce with the Lombard League, and the Emperor had to retract his outlawry of Bologna and permit the reopening of the University. The scholars of Bologna made merry over the imperial University of Naples: this ambitious home of all sciences was at best an embryo, and one not likely to thrive. For it depended on the caprice of its founder, who had no obligations and whose mood might easily change. The Bolognese were not far wide of the mark. For better or worse the fate of this suddenly-founded University was linked with the fate of the Emperor and his State. When the Papal troops invaded the kingdom all study ceased in Naples, though only for a few years. In 1234 Frederick re-established the University and attracted a really excellent teaching staff. At first Roffredo of Benevento taught Civil Law; the Canon Law scholar, Bartholomew Pignatellus, the Decretals; Master Terrisius of Atina gave instruction in Arts; a Catalonian, Master Arnaldus, lectured on Aristotle's natural philosophy. The grammarian, Walter of Ascoli, was secured, and completed in Naples his great Etymological Encyclopaedia, begun in Bologna. Finally, Peter of Ireland, the teacher of Thomas Aquinas, whom his contemporaries called *gemma magistrorum et laurea morum* represented natural science.

Frederick II's severe struggles with the Church compelled certain retrenchments of study to be made at a later date, but the university was never again dissolved. After its re-establishment in 1234 its

administration was in the hands of a Justiciar of Students, so that the University enjoyed a certain independence, though it remained immediately connected with the High Court and with the imperial Chancery. Students and professors were well aware who was the determining personality; when they begged, in 1234, for the opportunity of resuming their studies, they did not appeal direct to the Emperor but to the "Master," who was even then considered as "the expounder of the sole truth for the ears of the Emperor," the High Court Judge, Piero della Vigna.
...

As Logothetes, "one who places words," this greatest Latin stylist of the Middle Ages was, both in writing and speaking, the mouthpiece of imperial thought and act, the creator of the imperial diction and the majestic utterance; **as jurist, probably the author of all the Emperor's laws;** as scholar and humanist of the first water, the counsellor and intimate, nay the friend of the Emperor. He was quite indispensable to Frederick, this master of expression, who had at his command the most telling phrase for each phase of the versatile Emperor's activity, who supplied the most convincing explanation of his master's acts, and often in so doing helped to determine the next step, whose duty it was to announce and make plausible Frederick's constant changes of front.
...

Legend ascribed the basest origin to Piero della Vigna, son of an unknown father, and an abandoned mother, who miserably supported herself and her infant by beggary. **He was, in fact, of reputable family, his father probably a town judge in Capua,** where Piero was certainly born. The boy seems to have gone to Bologna without the family approval, and to have carried on his studies in canon law and civil law amid considerable hardships. At last he addressed a petition to Archbishop Berard of Palermo. It is a testimony to both that on the strength of this one letter, so the story goes, Berard of Palermo immediately commended the petitioner to the Emperor's attention. When Frederick returned in 1221 he installed the young man as notary in his Chancery, and, recognising his outstanding ability, speedily promoted him to be High Court Judge, then Chief Notary of the Sicilian kingdom, till he finally created for him the post of Logothetes, who should actually speak for the Emperor in the High Court, as well as write for him. As High Court Judge Piero della Vigna was one of the legal Counsellors in the closest attendance on the Emperor. **In this capacity he formulated the whole body of Laws that comprised the Constitutions of 1231. So amply did he play "Tribonian to the Justinian of Sicily" that posterity inserted his name at the end of the *Liber Augustalis*.** Later, della Vigna took over the sole direction of the imperial Chancery, and his fame rested more especially on his stylistic accomplishment.
...

Piero della Vigna is the last creative writer of living Latin. It was a living language that spoke with pomp and pride and smooth-flowing magnificence from his obscure periods. Its comprehensiveness and joy in style bore within them the seeds of classic humanistic Latin. **Della Vigna's speech, a *Summa* in its own domain, exhausted every possibility of Latin-Christian linguistics in the realms of Church and Empire.**

For centuries to come, long after the Christian Roman world that had begotten them was dead, his collected letters lived on in the Chanceries of Europe as masterpieces of style, and preserved the image of that Emperor who had imposed it on his spokesman. How much in these letters is Piero della Vigna, and how much Frederick, will never be known, but the composite result dictated the style of all the other imperial secretaries. **The Capuan's elaborate and emotional forms of expression would have rung false and hollow without the living reality that underlay them, without the wide circle of the Roman Empire, and in the background the Emperor holding the pen. King Manfred's letters in della Vigna's style disclose a painful discrepancy.**

The information we crave about Piero della Vigna's personal and private life is not forthcoming, but his poems, letters and manifestos betray him as one of those highly-cultured literati whom humanism, awaking with Petrarch, later produced in numbers. Piero della Vigna was the most eminent amongst the few existing in the early thirteenth century. On the one hand he was master of the old: the formalism of the time, canon and civil law, scholastic and ancient philosophy, ancient authors and church divines, rhetoric, versifying, letter-writing. On the other hand he was zealous to face the new with an elemental fire and passion that flash from his writings. He was ready to turn his hand to anything: scholar and judge, philosopher and artist, stylist, diplomat and courtier, ambassador and go-between, even warrior when occasion demands, drawing up the lines of battle, perhaps even taking part in the fight.
...

Piero della Vigna's duties to the Naples University and to the imperial Chancery and High Court were not confined to the administration, but extended also to the personnel. For one thing, Court officials gave lectures at the University; amongst them the High Court Judge, Roffredo of Benevento, and later an imperial Court Notary, Nicolas of Rocca, who started rhetorical courses in Naples. The relation of the Chancery to the students was even more important, for the budding jurist, especially the young notary, received the groundwork of his training at the University, but the final polish at the Emperor's court. **The literary education of the favoured few was more or less directly in the hands of Piero della**

Vigna, in whose Chancery they acquired the *stilum supremum*. Piero della Vigna was in this the upholder of a tradition which lingered, not in the Court, but in his native town of Capua. For the art of style, the *ars dictandi*, had been so specially cultivated in this town that one may fairly talk of a Capuan School, the peculiar character of which was its direct reversion to late classical prose. **Piero della Vigna very possibly learnt his own skill in Capua, whereas the stylists of preceding generations had adopted the famous epistolary manner of the Roman Curia under the great Innocent. Piero della Vigna quite probably owed the Archbishop of Palermo's recommendation to the fact that the Emperor was anxious for his Chancery to attain the same distinction of style as the Curia.** Della Vigna's first petition must have displayed remarkable skill to lead to his reception in the High Court. The value which Frederick II attached to the style of his letters, and his ambition to compete in this with the Curia, would have combined with his own artistic appreciation to perceive the political significance of such unusual ability. **The Emperor had to win public opinion by his manifestos, which supplied in the Christian world the place of the ancient Forum. Epistolary art replaced the forensic eloquence of Rome and the Greek cities. People justly compared Piero della Vigna, the orator of Capua, to Cicero.**

There was at the beginning of the thirteenth century in Capua a flourishing school of written rhetoric, of which Piero della Vigna himself was a product. It was extremely significant that he established a close connection between it and the High Court and even transplanted it to the imperial Chancery. The Chancery itself thus became a school of rhetoric, the focus of the literary life of the Court. **Everything about the Emperor's Court which seems a foretaste of Humanism: the reversion to classic models; the Emperor's cult of Rome; his echo of the Caesars in formula and title, simile and metaphor, all this had its roots in the learned circles of Piero della Vigna, who were inspired on their side by the presence of a living Caesar. The two reinforced each other: Frederick II could pose as Caesar because his entourage could accept him in such a role, and he was driven to pose as Caesar because rhetorical and literary style proclaimed him such.** The same applied to his Christian attitude: for the imperial art of letter-writing sprang from the curial style which provided all the Biblical comparisons, including the comparisons with Christ. This blend of the Christian and the ancient Roman which prevails in Frederick's writing and smacks of the Renaissance, is the product of this group of stylists to whom a knowledge of the Bible was as necessary as a knowledge of the classics.
...

One prelate wrote: "Vinea was the *Petrus* on whose rock the Emperor's Church was founded when the Emperor refreshed his spirit by a meal with his disciples." They called him "the Emperor's Vicar," corresponding to the Prince of the Apostles, Peter, Vicar of Christ, and as such the "Bearer of the Keys" of this world's empire, of the Emperor's heart, a simile of which Dante later made use. Della Vigna's indirect influence on Court society was no less great. Men hummed round him as Frederick's favourite; the highest dignitaries of Church and State inquired of him the general temper of the Court, the mood of the "Dominus" or the "Caesar." They reproached him for his long silence, or for warded requests and recommendations for the Emperor, begging his support. All these letters seek to attain the lofty style of the master, and his answers often show a touch of delicate irony as he couches them in even more pompous phrase and metaphor. Piero della Vigna maintained intercourse with the law professors of Bologna for some time. **But whereas in earlier days Roman Emperors turned to Bologna to enquire the interpretation or application of a law, the doctors of Bologna now betook themselves to Frederick II to enquire from him about some enactment peculiar to Sicily, and right gladly Frederick answered them. Piero della Vigna's Constitutions of Melfi represent one of the greatest legal achievements of the century.** Commentaries on the *Liber Augustalis* began to appear almost at once, and many of the commentators were alumni of the University of Naples. Thus one creation reacted on the other.

The art of writing Latin verse was part of the school routine for students of style and rhetoric; **it was practised almost exclusively in legal stylistic circles. Secular Latin literature was a relatively late growth in Italy, and one of the earliest goliard compositions in Italy is ascribed to Piero della Vigna. It is a long satirical poem, directed against the greed of prelates and mendicant monks, and differs from the other songs of vagrant poets by its positive political importance.**
...

Certain philosophical lines of thought which were simply dubbed "Ghibelline ideas" in later times were a product of the spirit that flowed from Frederick II and his circle: **The recurrence of Nature, Reason, Necessity in certain connections, the belief in Fortune instead of Providence, the disappearance of threadbare Bible tags in favour of quotations from the classics.** Frederick's contemporaries were ripe for these things. Della Vigna's activity has shown, however, how conscious, intentional and well-thought-out was the intellectual preparation of the ground.
...

The whole imperial group was young, not only in spirit but in years, incomparably young, full-blooded and alive. Aged, aged Pope Gregory had good reason to feel afraid; he even lodged a complaint against the

excessive youthfulness of the imperial officials. **The Emperor curtly retorted that it was none of the Pope's business, and begged to call the Pope's attention to the fact that, according to the Sicilian Book of Laws, to debate about the suitability of imperial officers was sacrilege.** That was fairly cynical.

https://archive.org/details/fredericktheseco000027mbp/page/522/mode/2up?view=theater

After the second excommunication it became the fashion for the courtiers to keep up this "style" even in conversation amongst themselves. **It is noteworthy, indicating the plane on which the Emperor moved, that all their allusions are either to Caesar or to Christ, never to Charlemagne or any of the great medieval Emperors. Piero della Vigna had had the largest share in creating this figure of his master.** The vital thing was that Frederick II found spirits to praise him and recognise him: that he not only felt himself to be the emissary of God but was believed to be so by his followers.

It is Piero della Vigna and his circle of jurists, stylists and literati who supply the enduring expression of this conception. The time believed that the first and second ages of Adam and of Christ were overpast and that the third was drawing on. Piero della Vigna boldly pointed to his imperial master as the hero of the third and coming age, the ruler "whom the Great Artificer's hand created man," "into whose breast all virtues are poured, on whom the clouds rain justice and the heavens send their dew." And della Vigna praises in this last Emperor of the ancient Empire the "ideal of good," "who is free from crooked sight, who bindeth the corners of the earth and ruleth the elements, that frost is mated with fire, and wet with dry, and rough with smooth, and the pathless is wedded to him whose ways are straight."

The marriage of opposites had been from of old the token of an *aurea aetas*, a Golden Age in which strife and war shall cease: an age of peace which the Saviour-Emperor shall bring. The Logothetes, therefore, praises his master: "In his day shall the bonds of evil be loosened and with might shall security be sown: men shall beat their swords to ploughshares for the bond of peace causeth all fear to cease."
...

Della Vigna became "like unto the new Law-bearer, Moses, descending from Sinai, bringing the tables of the law from Heaven to men," or, again, "a second Joseph to whom as a true interpreter the mighty Caesar whose power the Sun and Moon admire has handed over the direction of the kingdoms of the earth. He was the Peter who bears the keys of Empire and locks what no man may open, and opens what no man again may lock." "Peter, the humble fisher, the Prince of the Apostles, who left his nets and followed God ... but this law-bearing Peter quits not his Master's side. The Galilean thrice denied his Lord ... far be it from the Capuan to deny his Master once." The trend of courtly thought is even more clearly revealed in the half serious letter which was written to Piero della Vigna. "And the Lord said: 'Peter, lovest thou me? Feed my sheep,' and thus the Lord who loveth Justice wished to build justice on this rock and give the reins of law into the hands of Peter, making you the custodian of justice. **To show this the more clearly the Lord hath placed you over against the face of him who is the President but also the Perverter of the Church, that the true vicegerent Peter may rule through Justice while the false Vicar of Christ perverts his vicegerency to the injury of many in body, goods and name.** ... If such a charge oppresses you, since you are unaccustomed to it and never sought it ... you can only answer 'Lord thou knowest that I love thee. If I can serve thy people I refuse not the service: Thy will be done.'"

This was not, as has sometimes been assumed, a serious suggestion that Piero della Vigna should be, in fact, elevated as a real Anti-Pope, but it contained the idea that the Head of the "imperial Church," the jurist hierarchy, should be in a special sense an "Anti-Pope." Below the half-serious, half-jesting flattery with which the courtier recalls the master to his lofty duties, urging: "the Pope is useless, do thou, as the true Peter, discharge his duties," we detect the lofty sense of dignity and responsibility which inspired the Court, **and the clear consciousness that the imperial hierarchy of jurist and official formed an independent spiritual order like the Pope's Church, and quite as good. Napoleon's thought: "Gown against gown, esprit de corps against esprit de corps, judge against priest," was anticipated, in other words, at Frederick's court.** To express ideas such as these was in those days only possible by using the symbols of the only spiritual kingdom then known: the Church with Christ her King.

To establish the worship of a spiritual ruler without the Church men were fain to employ the Church's methods; while to celebrate the warlike triumphs of the Emperor their thoughts leaped forthwith to the pagan Caesars. **Thus it is that the State is called the *imperialis ecclesia*, the provinces are conceived as bishops' dioceses and the purchase of office as simony.** At moments men went further and stated that the Emperor's Church, founded on Peter, was manifest whenever "the spirit of the Illustrious Emperor draws strength from a supper with his disciples.''

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bBHcDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR5&hl=fi&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false

Giuseppe Mazzotta describes the historical Pier thusly:

> **Pier delle Vigne … was the chancellor of the empire, and he conceived the first state university in Europe, the University of Naples, because Frederick wanted a university that would prepare lawyers, diplomats, people who could go on a state mission and write papers for the state … the first lay secular school in Europe.** Pier delle Vigne was a poet, and he also compiled the so-called institutes of justice for the kingdom, all of which are inspired by the language of moderation, the idealistic language of order, and the natural law that could be used to organize the state … **he is the secterary of the emperor, a role that becomes crucial throughout the Renaissance.** He is a counselor. … Quite a figure of prestige, he views himself as, and he was, a strict collaborator of the emperor.8

https://archive.org/details/historylatinchr33milmgoog/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater

The clergy had retired to their own stronghold of the canon law, while they seemed not aware of the dangerous rivals which were rising up against them. The Lawyers became thus, as it were, a new estate: they lent themselves, partly in opposition to the clergy, partly from the tendency of the Roman law, to the assertion and extension of the royal prerogative.

The hierarchy found, almost suddenly, **instead of a cowering superstitious people, awed by their superior learning,** trembling at the fulminations of their authority, a grave intellectual aristocracy, equal to themselves in profound erudition, resting on ancient written authority, appealing to the vast body of the unabrogated civil law, of which they were perfect masters, opposing to the canons of the Church canons at least of greater antiquity. The King was to the lawyers what Caesar had been to the Roman Empire, what the Pope was to the Churchmen. **Caesar was undisputed lord in his own realm, as Christ in his. The Pandects, it has been said, were the gospel of the lawyers.**1

https://archive.org/details/albigensiancrusa00stra/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater

The one escape from the growing provincialism of Languedoc was to become more French than the French and more royalist than the king. Guillaume de Nogaret, who had been a judge in the South and the become one of the chief ministers of the King Philip the Fair, offers one of the earliest and best examples of this attitude. **When Nogaret became convinced that Pope Boniface VIII was trying to subvert the authority of the king, he simply took the pope prisoner, in order, as he said, "to defend my fatherland." To justify his position, Nogaret practically had to invent French patriotism.** In excusing his actions, he spoke again and again of his *patria* – his fatherland – which was the kingdom of France.
…

But the traditions that clustered around Reims and St. Denis meant little to the men of the South. The religion of monarchy was a northern religion. Wholehearted acceptance of French domination in the South could not be based on personal loyalty to the king or on the myths of the Capetian house.
…

It was easier for Nogaret (and some of his friends) to develop the concept of an all-embracing French patriotism because they had had thorough training in Roman law. Nogaret's idea of a fatherland was full of reminiscences of Latin writers; he had even absorbed the idea that man's highest duty was to die for his fatherland. The common welfare demanded the preservation and the strengthening of the kingdom of France; anyone who threatened France was to be struck down, even if he were a pope. **It is quite possible that some of Nogaret's ancestors had been heretics. In any case, like most southerners, he had little respect for the organized Church.** He gave his full devotion to the French state, and as a result he attained a higher position than any other southerner was to hold for generations. For over ten years (1302-1313) Nogaret was one of the most influential ministers of Philip the Fair; he kept the king's confidence to the day of his death.

https://www.traditioninaction.org/History/F_002_RCR2_Tendencies_ASG.html

Pope Boniface VIII intervened, asking the King to free the Prelate. He sent Philip the Bull *Ausculta fili* [Listen to me, my son], in which he stated the doctrine of St. Gregory VII about the superiority of the Pope over temporal monarchs. **The bull was burned by the advisors of the King in his presence, and the King and his legist counselors prevented it from being circulated in France.** Instead, Flote and Nogaret wrote a false bull, which was broadly disseminated and was aimed at stimulating French nationalism and setting the people against the Pope. This fake bull was intended to fuel the slanders already being spread by the trio that Pope Boniface VIII was a heretic, simoniac, and an invalidly elected Pope. The King called a meeting of the Estates General in Paris **and Pierre Flote delivered a skillful speech against the Pope, painting him as an enemy of the Kingdom.**

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12004a.htm

These legists were called the *chevaliers de l'hôtel,* the *chevaliers ès lois,* the *milites regis;* they were not nobles, neither did they bear arms, but they ranked as knights. The appearance of these legists in the Government of France is one of the leading events of the reign of Philip IV. Renan explains its significance in these words: "An entirely new class of politicians, owing their fortune entirely to their own merit and personal efforts, unreservedly devoted to the king who had made them, and rivals of the Church, whose place they hoped to fill in many matters, thus appeared in the history of France, and were destined to work a profound change in the conduct of public affairs."
...

"The reign of Philip IV," writes Renan, "is the reign which contributed most to form the France of the five succeeding centuries, with its good and bad qualities. The *milites regis,* those ennobled plebeians, became the agents of all important political business; the princes of the royal blood alone remained superior to or on an equality with them; the real nobility, which elsewhere established the parliamentary governments, was excluded from participating in the public policy." Renan is right in declaring that the first act of the French magistracy was "to diminish the power of the Church *per fas et nefas*" to establish the absolutism of the king; and that such conduct was for this magistracy "an original sin."

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

Such, in the very heyday of its strength, was the theory of divine sovereignty; so little favourable was it to the exercise of a boundless authority that emperors and kings, seeking Power's enlargement, could not but clash with it. Sometimes, to escape the Church's yoke, we see them advance the plea that, since their authority is immediately held from God, it is not for man to supervise their use of it (this argument rests mainly on the Bible and St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans); but more often, and to more purpose, **they have recourse to the tradition of the Roman jurists which ascribes sovereignty not to God, but—to the people!**

It is for this reason that Marsilius of Padua—an adventurer who was pushing the claims of the then uncrowned Emperor, Louis of Bavaria—and many other champions of Power besides, supplanted the postulate of divine sovereignty with that of popular sovereignty: "The supreme legislator of the human race," he asserts, "is none other than the Totality of mankind, to whom the sanctions of Law fall to be applied. ..."11 The reliance of Power on this idea to render itself absolute is very significant.12
...

The medieval champions of Power conducted their case clumsily enough. Marsilius of Padua, for instance, after postulating that the supreme legislator" was the "totality of mankind," goes on to the proposition that this authority has been conferred on the Roman people; and he reaches this triumphant conclusion: "Finally, if the Roman people has conferred legislative power on its prince, then there is no escaping the conclusion that this power belongs to the prince of the Romans"—to, in other words, Marsilius's client, Louis of Bavaria. The argument makes no attempt to conceal its lack of disinterestedness. The point of it is, as any child could see, that the multitude has been endowed with this majestic authority merely that it may pass it on, stage by stage, to a despot. In course of time, however, the selfsame dialectic will find more plausible guise in which to present itself.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=8A4ysGPJO2EC&hl=fi&pg=PA199#v=onepage&q&f=false

We look upon Gallicanism, as expressed in the four article adopted at the dictation of the government by the assembly of the French clergy, in 1682, **and which had shown itself all along from Philip the Fair, the grandson of St. Louis, which broke out in great violence with Louis XII., and his *petit concile* of five cardinals at Pisa, acted on by the *politiques* of Henry IV.,** and formulated by the great Bossuet under Louis XIV., as the most formidable as well as the most subtle enemy the church has ever had to contend with.

The essence, the real virus, so to speak, of Gallicanism is not, as so many suppose, in the assertion that the dogmatic definitions of the pope are not irreformable – though that is a grave error, in our judgment – but in the assertion of the independence of the state in the face of the spiritual order. **No doubt Bossuet's purpose in drawing up the four articles was to prevent the French government from going further and carrying away the kingdom into open heresy and schism; but the subtle secularism to which he gave his sanction, especially as sure to be practically understood and applied, is far harder to deal with than either heresy or schism, and it seems to us far more embarrassing to the church. It forbids the Catholic to be logical, to draw from his Catholic principles their proper consequences,** or to give them their legitimate application; takes away from the defences of faith its outposts, and reduces them to the bare citadel, and proves an almost insurmountable obstacle to the church in her efforts to reach and subdue the world to the law of God.
...

James I., the English Solomon, declared himself ready to accept the church, if allowed to do it on Gallican principles. Protestants have very little controversy with out-and-out Gallicanism. They feel instinctively that the Catholics who assert the independence, which means practically the supremacy, of the

secular order, and bind the pope by the canons which the church herself makes, are near enough to them; and if they are not separated from the church, it is all the better, because they can better serve the Protestant cause in her communion than they could if out of it.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=RtHLCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false
> **[1703]**
>
> **Everyone knows that in France people are only half-Catholic; please God that they were sufficiently Christian!** The authority of the Pope, even in ecclesiastical matters, is considered there only when they want to flatter him, in order to have him in their thrall, to oppress him one day with the others.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06351a.htm

According to the Gallican theory, then, the papal primacy was limited, first, by the temporal power of princes, which, by the Divine will, was inviolable; secondly by the authority of the general council and that of the bishops, who alone could, by their assent, give to his decrees that infallible authority which, of themselves, they lacked; lastly, by the canons and customs of particular Churches, which the pope was bound to take into account when he exercised his authority.
...

Parliamentary Gallicanism, therefore, was of much wider scope than episcopal; indeed, it was often disavowed by the bishops of France, and about twenty of them condemned Pierre Pithou's book when a new edition of it was published, in 1638, by the brothers Dupuy.
...

"Of all Christian countries", says Fleury, "France has been the most careful to conserve the liberty of her Church and oppose the novelties introduced by Ultramontane canonists". **The Liberties were so called, because the innovations constituted conditions of servitude with which the popes had burdened the Church, and their legality resulted from the fact that the extension given by the popes to their own primacy was founded not upon Divine institution, but upon the false Decretals.**
...

At the opening of the fourteenth century, however, the conflict between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII brings out the first glimmerings of the Gallican ideas. That king does not confine himself to maintaining that, as sovereign he is sole and independent master of his temporalities; he haughtily proclaims that, in virtue of the concession made by the pope, with the assent of a general council to Charlemagne and his successors, he has the right to dispose of vacant ecclesiastical benefices. **With the consent of the nobility, the Third Estate, and a great part of the clergy, he appeals in the matter from Boniface VIII to a future general council—the implication being that the council is superior to the pope.** The same ideas and others still more hostile to the Holy See reappear in the struggle of Fratricelles and Louis of Bavaria against John XXII; they are expressed by the pens of William Occam, of John of Jandun, and of Marsilius of Padua, professors in the University of Paris.
...

From Eugene IV to Leo X the popes did not cease to protest against the Pragmatic Sanction, until it was replaced by the Concordat of 1516. But, if its provisions disappeared from the laws of France, the principles it embodied for a time none the less continued to inspire the schools of theology and parliamentary jurisprudence. **Those principles even appeared at the Council of Trent, where the ambassadors, theologians, and bishops of France repeatedly championed them, notably when the questions for decision were as to whether episcopal jurisdiction comes immediately from God or through the pope, whether or not the council ought to ask confirmation of its decrees from the sovereign pontiff, etc.** Then again, it was in the name of the Liberties of the Gallican Church that a part of the clergy and the *Parlementaires* opposed the publication of that same council; and the crown decided to detach from it and publish what seemed good, in the form of ordinances emanating from the royal authority.

Nevertheless, **towards the end of the sixteenth century, the reaction against the Protestant denial of all authority to the pope and, above all, the triumph of the League had enfeebled Gallican convictions in the minds of the clergy, if not of the parliament.** But the assassination of Henry IV, which was exploited to move public opinion against Ultramontanism and the activity of Edmond Richer, syndic of the Sorbonne, brought about, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, a strong revival of Gallicanism, which was thenceforward to continue gaining in strength from day to day. **In 1663 the Sorbonne solemnly declared that it admitted no authority of the pope over the king's temporal dominion, nor his superiority to a general council, nor infallibility apart from the Church's consent.**
...

In spite of these disavowals, the Declaration of 1682 remained thenceforward the living symbol of Gallicanism, professed by the great majority of the French clergy, obligatorily defended in the faculties of theology, schools, and seminaries, guarded from the lukewarmness of French theologians and the attacks of foreigners by the inquisitorial vigilance of the French parliaments, which never failed to condemn to suppression every work that seemed hostile to the principles of the Declaration.

From France Gallicanism spread, about the middle of the eighteenth century, into the Low Countries, thanks to the works of the jurisconsult Van-Espen. Under the pseudonym of Febronius, Hontheim introduced it into Germany where it took the forms of Febronianism and Josephism. **The Council of Pistoia (1786) even tried to acclimatize it in Italy. But its diffusion was sharply arrested by the Revolution, which took away its chief support by overturning the thrones of kings. Against the Revolution that drove them out and wrecked their sees, nothing was left to the bishops of France but to link themselves closely with the Holy See.** After the Concordat of 1801—itself the most dazzling manifestation of the pope's supreme power—French Governments made some pretence of reviving, in the Organic Articles, the "Ancient Gallican Liberties" and the obligation of teaching the articles of 1682, **but ecclesiastical Gallicanism was never again resuscitated except in the form of a vague mistrust of Rome.** On the fall of Napoleon and the Bourbons, the work of Lamennais, of "L'Avenir" and other publications devoted to Roman ideas, the influence of Dom Guéranger, and the effects of religious teaching ever increasingly deprived it of its partisans. **When the Vatican Council opened, in 1869, it had in France only timid defenders.** When that council declared that the pope has in the Church the plenitude of jurisdiction in matters of faith, morals, discipline, and administration, that his decisions ex cathedra are of themselves, and without the assent of the Church, infallible and irreformable, it dealt Gallicanism a mortal blow.
...

At the beginning, its first advocates were Pierre d'Ailly and Gerson, whose somewhat daring theories, reflecting the then prevalent disorder of ideas, were to triumph in the Council of Constance. In the sixteenth century Almain and Major make but a poor figure in contrast with Torquemada and Cajetan, the leading theorists of pontifical primacy. But in the seventeenth century the Gallican doctrine takes its revenge with Richer and Launoy, who throw as much passion as science into their efforts to shake the work of Bellarmine, the most solid edifice ever raised in defence of the Church's constitution and the papal supremacy.
...

"The Gallican Liberties", Joseph de Maistre has said, "are but a fatal compact signed by the Church of France, in virtue of which she submitted to the outrages of the Parliament on condition of being allowed to pass them on to the sovereign pontiff".
...

It was Gallicanism which allowed the Jansenists condemned by popes to elude their sentences on the plea that these had not received the assent of the whole episcopate. **It was in the name of Gallicanism that the kings of France impeded the publication of the pope's instructions,** and forbade the bishops to hold provincial councils or to write against Jansenism—or at any rate, to publish charges without endorsement of the chancellor. **Bossuet himself, prevented from publishing a charge against Richard Simon, was forced to complain that they wished "to put all the bishops under the yoke in the essential matter of their ministry, which is the Faith".** Alleging the Liberties of the Gallican Church, the French Parliaments admitted *appels comme d'abus* against bishops who were guilty of condemning Jansenism, or of admitting into their Breviaries the Office of St. Gregory, sanctioned by Rome; and on the same general principle they caused pastoral letters to be burned by the common executioner, or condemned to imprisonment or exile priests whose only crime was that of refusing the sacraments and Christian burial to Jansenists in revolt against the most solemn pronouncements of the Holy See. Thanks to these "Liberties", the jurisdiction and the discipline of the Church were almost entirely in the hands of the civil power, and Fénelon gave a fair idea of them when he wrote in one of his letters: "In practice the king is more our head than the pope, in France—Liberties against the pope, servitude in relation to the king—The king's authority over the Church devolves upon the lay judges—The laity dominate the bishops". **And Fénelon had not seen the Constituent Assembly of 1790 assume, from Gallican principles, authority to demolish completely the Constitution of the Church of France. For there is not one article of that melancholy Constitution that did not find its inspiration in the writings of Gallican jurists and theologians.**

https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/marquis-de-sade-dialogue-between-a-priest-and-a-dying-man

Think, preacher! Your Jesus was no better than Muhammad, Muhammad was no better than Moses, and none of these three was superior to Confucius, **though Confucius did set down a number of perfectly valid principles whereas the others talked nonsense.** But they and their ilk are mountebanks who have been mocked by thinking men, believed by the rabble, and should have been strung up by due process of law.

PRIEST: Alas, such was only too true in the case of one of the four.

DYING MAN: Yes, He who deserved it most. He was a seditious influence, an agitator, a bearer of false witness, a scoundrel, a lecher, a showman who performed crude tricks, a wicked and dangerous man. He knew exactly how to set about hoodwinking the public and was therefore eminently punishable in the type of kingdom and state of which Jerusalem was then a part. It was a very sound decision to remove Him and it is perhaps the only case in which my principles, which are incidentally very mild and tolerant, could ever admit the application of the full rigour of Themis. **I forgive all errors save those which may imperil the government under which we live; kings and their majesty are the only things that I take on trust and respect. The man who does not love his country and his King does not deserve to live.**

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15125a.htm

> The Revolution adopted this polemical term from the old regime: **the "Divine State", formerly personified in the prince, now found its personification in the people, becoming more "Divine" than ever as the State became more and more laic and irreligious, and, both in principle and in fact, denied any other God but itself.** In presence of this new form of the old state-worship, the "Ultramontane" is the antagonist of the atheists as much as the non-Catholic believers, if not more--**witness the Bismarckian *Kulturkampf*, of which the National Liberals rather than the orthodox Protestants were the soul.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecco;cc=ecco;rgn=main;view=text;idno=004837226.0001.000

Henry VII. ever ruled by a faction, and that by the lesser faction. To give full scope to his tyrannical rapacity, he nominated for his ministers Empson and Dudley, two profligate men, **equally enabled by their knowledge in the law to pervert the forms of justice to the oppression of the innocent,** and perfectly qualified to prey upon the defenceless people.

https://web.archive.org/web/20160316234515/http://www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Erasmus%20to%20Ulrich%20von%20Hutten.pdf

[Thomas More] had drunk deep of Good Letters from his earliest years; and when a young man, he applied himself to the study of Greek and of philosophy; but his father was so far from encouraging him in this pursuit, that he withdrew his allowance and almost disowned him, because he thought he was deserting his hereditary study, being himself an expert professor of English Law. **For remote as that profession is from true learning, those who become masters of it have the highest rank and reputation among their countrymen; and it is difficult to find any readier way to acquire fortune and honour. Indeed a considerable part of the nobility of that island has had its origin in this profession, in which it is said that no one can be perfect, unless he has toiled at it for many years.** It was natural, that in his younger days our friend's genius, born for better things, should shrink from this study; nevertheless, after he had had a taste of the learning of the Schools, he became so conversant with it, that there was no one more eagerly consulted by suitors; **and the income that he made by it was not surpassed by any of those who did nothing else;** such was the power and quickness of his intellect.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA124#v=onepage&q&f=false

Not only does *Utopia* depict an earthly society, however virtuous its inhabitants; it is an urban society, **conceived by the son of a London lawyer and the grandson of a London baker.** The Arcadian mode, much imitated in the Renaissance, was alien to the first utopia. Though he passed a brief period in Oxford, More was very much a city man, educated in London, practicing law in the courts or listening to public lectures and sermons, often indistinguishable from each other. More's teacher Colet has established his school of humanist education at St. Paul's in the heart of London.
…

Utopia is pointedly antifeudal – there are no great baronial estates or manors; nor does it glorify a return to nature. The society is composed of families who have all tilled the soil at one time or another, **but who come back from their rural stint to dwell in the cities.** The fundamental institutions of Utopia are urban.
…

Great warrior nobles and their retainers are barbaric enemies in Utopia. The cities will manage to defend themselves with mercenaries and through the bribery and subversion of foreign courts. For the most part the heroic virtues are superfluous. The monarch depends upon civilian councillors in Utopia as in contemporary England, where ambassadors were lawyers and great clerics, not soldiers. The high valuation of learning in Utopia was not revolutionary; it was an extension of what was already taking place in the royal service of many European monarchies.16 **More was the educator of the new merchant classes who were related by birth and marriage to scholars and lawyers.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Guicciardini,_Francesco

His family was illustrious and noble; and his ancestors for many generations had held the highest posts of honour in the state, as may be seen in his own genealogical *Ricordi autobiografici e di famiglia* (*Op. ined.* vol. x.). After the usual education of a boy in grammar and elementary classical studies, his father, Piero, sent him to the universities of Ferrara and Padua, where he stayed until the year 1505. The death of an uncle, who had occupied the see of Cortona with great pomp, induced the young Guicciardini to hanker after an ecclesiastical career. **He already saw the scarlet of a cardinal awaiting him, and to this eminence he would assuredly have risen. His father, however, checked this ambition, declaring that, though he had five sons, he would not suffer one of them to enter the church in its then state of corruption and debasement. Guicciardini, whose motives were confessedly**

ambitious (see *Ricordi, Op. ined.* x. 68), turned his attention to law, and at the age of twenty-three was appointed by the Signoria of Florence to read the *Institutes* in public. Shortly afterwards he engaged himself in marriage to Maria, daughter of Alamanno Salviati, prompted, as he frankly tells us, by the political support which an alliance with that great family would bring him (*ib.* x. 71). **He was then practising at the bar, where he won so much distinction that the Signoria, in 1512, entrusted him with an embassy to the court of Ferdinand the Catholic.** Thus he entered on the real work of his life as a diplomatist and statesman.
…

If one single treatise of that century should be chosen to represent the spirit of the Italian people in the last phase of the Renaissance, **the historian might hesitate between the *Principe* of Machiavelli and the *Ricordi politici* of Guicciardini.** The latter is perhaps preferable to the former on the score of comprehensiveness. It is, moreover, more exactly adequate to the actual situation, for the *Principe* has a divine spark of patriotism yet lingering in the cinders of its frigid science, an idealistic enthusiasm surviving in its moral aberrations; whereas a great Italian critic of this decade has justly described the *Ricordi* as "Italian corruption codified and elevated to a rule of life."

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.13326/page/n81/mode/2up?view=theater

[Alciati] was an only son, and **his father, Ambrogio, a wealthy merchant,** was a decurion (municipal magistrate or councillor) in Milan, and had acted as envoy to Venice; **his mother, Margherita, was a woman of high nobility.**
…

As Paolo Giovio (Paulus Jovius) said,1 almost in Alciati's words, the flame of knowledge was extinguished in Italy about the middle of the sixteenth century, and passed over to France and Germany.
…

His aim was to demonstrate the intrinsic significance of the Roman law, **to clear it from the spurious additions made by alien hands, to set it forth in the condition in which it left the classical jurisconsults,** and interpret its meaning and application not through the vision of subsequent glossators and commentators, but from the point of view of the time and place of its elaboration.
…

Thus he was perhaps the first of lawyers in whose writings we find purity and elegance of diction, and that marked personal note, that indefinable charm which characterizes the cultured humanist and the true artist.
…

Thus Albericus Gentilis maintained that the presumptuous humanists or Alciatists ("Alciatei," as he called them) were scarcely entitled to the name of jurists at all, and that jurists could get on well enough without devoting themselves to Greek and Latin letters.1 **However, Alciati throughout insisted on independence and culture as against the shackles of blind faith and tyrannous authority.** He emphasized that conviction based on right and adequate knowledge, and sound judgment founded on the actual materials concerned (as the ultimate data from which valid conclusions may be drawn), are of greater import than a passive acceptance of the conclusions of scholastic exegesis, and still more so than acquiescence in the accumulated opinions of commentators merely repeating each other.2 **Truth, inviolable, immutable, is alone the all-compelling authority. Though he was near to becoming a cardinal, yet he denied the large claims of the pope, and even refused to accept the Bible as finally decisive.**

The new method introduced in the sixteenth century into the science of Roman law is not the result of an isolated manifestation, but is at one with the general revolt of the human mind against the burdens of tradition and its accompanying abuses; it is part of the gradual efflorescence of the human intellect in all the regions of thought and belief. Thus it has a close affinity with the religious insurrection of Luther and Calvin, with the philosophic doubt of Descartes, with the scepticism of Rabelais and Montaigne, with the pioneer work of scholars like Scaliger and Lipsius, with the general literary revolt in Europe, with the efforts to reintroduce classical types of architecture, and with many other phenomena of a like tendency. In a word, it indicates the passing away from medievalism with its dogma and authority and stifled individuality, to modernism with its freedom, expansion of personality, and demand for the actual and real.

Already in the first of his published writings, the Commentary on the last three books of the Code, Alciati proclaims defiantly in his prefatory dedication the demands of the new method in jurisprudence, and the necessity to bring it into line with humanism. **He realizes that before him some effort had here or there been made to bring about an emancipation from the old incubus by appealing to the Corpus Iuris and taking refuge in it.**
…

Alciati did not eliminate from his consideration canon law, customary and local law, German, Lombard, French, or Italian; as an advocate he had frequent occasion to refer thereto. But when he speaks of jurisprudence he means, of course, Roman law; and in his view it would be the highest glory of a modern jurist to grasp it and expound it as forcibly and acutely as a Papinian or a Scaevola. Times and seasons, he says, come and go; but the Roman system remains in all its splendour and greatness,—as the ancients said, it is a work of the eternal gods.3 A great jurist is only a priest in the service of Justice.
…

One perusal of the Corpus Iuris itself is far more profitable than a whole life given to *interpretationes*, *repetitiones*, and *disputationes*. What would Justinian have said of the dialectical proceedings concerned, as they were, more with words than with things, more with dogmatic asseverations than with unprejudiced searching for truth?4 Return, then, to the method of Justinian if you would find your way out of the existing confusion. And again, besides going to the veritable sources, we must effect a constant alliance of the study of law with that of other relative subjects, so that the results of the latter will help to explain or reinforce, or if need be modify, the conclusions of the former. On account of the unity of knowledge and essential correlation of its branches, the subsidiary subjects in question will be numerous; but some are of especial importance, *e.g.* history, philology, literature ("bonae literae").
…

As to the glossators and commentators, Accursius, Bartolus, and their associates, not once did they even sip of non-juristic knowledge.7 True jurisprudence, indeed, necessarily embraces, or is closely related to, all other sciences: ''Haec ars ceteras omnes in se continet,"8 and so is, in a sense, pre-eminent. **The comparative method, therefore, of Alciati aims at revealing the indissoluble connection of the Corpus Iuris with the entire ancient culture,** by making systematic use of mutual illustration and exemplification; and the sound application of this method consequently demands many-sided knowledge.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89tienne_de_La_Bo%C3%A9tie

La Boétie was born in Sarlat, in the Périgord region of southwest France, in 1530 to an aristocratic family. His father was a royal official of the Périgord region **and his mother was the sister of the president of the Bordeaux Parliament (assembly of lawyers).** Orphaned at an early age, he was brought up by his uncle and namesake, the curate of Bouilbonnas, and received his law degree from the University of Orléans in 1553. His great and precocious ability earned La Boétie a royal appointment to the Bordeaux Parliament the following year, despite his being under the minimum age. There he pursued a distinguished career as judge and diplomatic negotiator until his untimely death from illness in 1563 at the age of thirty-two. La Boétie was also a distinguished poet and humanist, translating Xenophon and Plutarch, and being closely connected with the leading young
Pleiade group of poets, including Pierre de Ronsard, Jean Daurat and Jean-Antoine de Baïf.[6] La Boétie was favorable to the conciliation of Catholicism and Protestantism; "warned of the dangerous and divisive consequences of permitting two religions, which could lead to two opposed states in the same country. The most he would have allowed the Protestants was the right to worship in private, and he pointed out their own intolerance of Catholics. His policy for religious peace was one of conciliation and concord through reforms in the church that would eventually persuade the Protestants to reunite with Catholicism".[7]

https://www.lewrockwell.com/1970/01/murray-n-rothbard/overthrowing-the-state/

La Boétie's great contribution to political thought was written while he was a law student at the University of Orléans, where he imbibed the spirit of free inquiry that prevailed there.
…

The study of law in those days was an exciting enterprise, a philosophical search for truth and fundamental principles. **In the sixteenth century, writes Paul Bonnefon, "The teaching of the law was a preaching rather than an institution, a sort of search for truth, carried on by teacher and student in common, and which they feverishly undertook together, opening up an endless field for philosophic speculation."[2]** It was this kind of atmosphere in the law schools of Orléans and other leading French universities in which Calvin himself, two decades earlier, had begun to develop his ideas of Protestant Reform. [3] And it was in that kind of atmosphere, as well, that lawyers were to form one of the most important centers of Calvinist strength in France.
…

The *Discourse* was circulated in manuscript form and never published by La Boétie. One can speculate that its radical views were an important reason for the author's withholding it from publication. It achieved a considerable fame in local Périgordian intellectual circles, however. **This can be seen by the fact that Montaigne had read the essay long before he first met La Boétie as a fellow member of the Bordeaux Parlement in 1559.**

The first striking thing about the *Discourse* is the form: La Boétie's method was speculative, abstract, deductive. This contrasts with the rather narrowly legal and historical argument of the Huguenot monarchomach writers (those sectarian writers who argued for the right of subjects to resist unjust rulers) of the 1570's and 1580's, whom La Boétie resembled in his opposition to tyranny. **While the Huguenot monarchomachs, best exemplified by François Hotman's *Franco-Gallia* (1573), concentrated on grounding their arguments on real or presumed historical precedents in French laws and institutions, La Boétie's only historical examples were numerous illustrations of his general principles from classical antiquity, the very remoteness of which added to the timeless quality of his discourse.** The later Huguenot arguments against tyranny tended to be specific and concrete, rooted in actual French institutions, and therefore their conclusions and implications were limited to promoting the specific liberties against the State of various privileged orders in French society. In contrast, **the very abstraction and universality of La Boétie's thought led inexorably to radical and sweeping conclusions** on the nature of tyranny, the liberty of the people, and what needed to be done to overthrow the former and secure the latter.
...

Thus, Emile Brehier makes a point of contrasting the cynical realism of Machiavelli with the "juridical idealism" of Étienne de La Boétie.[5] **In fact, however, La Boétie's concentration on abstract reasoning and on the universal rights of the individual might better be characterized as foreshadowing the political thinking of the eighteenth century.** As J. W. Allen writes, the *Discourse* was an "essay on the natural liberty, equality and fraternity of man." The essay "gave a general support to the Huguenot pamphleteers by its insistence that natural law and natural rights justified forcible resistance to tyrannous government." **But the language of universal natural rights itself, Allen correctly adds, "served no Huguenot purpose. It served, in truth, no purpose at all at the time, though, one day, it might come to do so."[6] Or, as Harold Laski trenchantly put it: "A sense of popular right such as the friend of Montaigne depicts is, indeed, as remote from the spirit of the time as the anarchy of Herbert Spencer in an age committed to government interference."[7]**

The contrast between the proto-eighteenth-century speculative natural rights approach of La Boétie, and the narrowly legalistic and concrete-historical emphasis of the Huguenot writers who reprinted and used the *Discourse*, has been stressed by W. F. Church. **In contrast to the "legal approach" which dominated political thought in sixteenth-century France, Church writes, purely speculative treatises, so characteristic of the eighteenth century, were all but non-existent and at their rare appearances seem oddly out of place.** Church then mentions as an example of the latter La Boétie's *Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*.[8]
...

He makes clear also that this opposition is grounded on a theory of natural law and a natural right to liberty. In childhood, presumably because the rational faculties are not yet developed, we obey our parents; but when grown, we should follow our own reason, as free individuals. **As La Boétie puts it: "If we led our lives according to the ways intended by nature and the lessons taught by her, we should be intuitively obedient to our parents; later we should adopt reason as our guide and become slaves to nobody."[12]** Reason is our guide to the facts and laws of nature and to humanity's proper path, and each of us has "in our souls some native seed of reason, which, if nourished by good counsel and training, flowers into virtue, but which, on the other hand, if unable to resist the vices surrounding it, is stifled and blighted."[13] **And reason, La Boétie adds, teaches us the justice of equal liberty for all. For reason shows us that nature has, among other things, granted us the common gift of voice and speech.** Therefore, "there can be no further doubt that we are all naturally free," and hence it cannot be asserted that "nature has placed some of us in slavery."[14] Even animals, he points out, display a natural instinct to be free. **But then, what in the world "has so, denatured man that he, the only creature really born to be free, lacks the memory of his original condition and the desire to return to it?"[15]**
...

La Boétie concludes his exhortation by assuring the masses that to overthrow the tyrant they need not act, nor shed their blood. They can do so "merely by willing to be free." In short,

> Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break in pieces.[16]

...

But while La Boétie cannot be considered an anarchist, his sweeping strictures on tyranny and the universality of his political philosophy lend themselves easily to such an expansion. All this considerably disturbed La Boétie's biographer, Paul Bonnefon, who wrote of the *Discourse*:

> **After having failed to distinguish legitimate from illicit authority, and having imprudently attacked even the principle of authority, La Boétie put forth a naive illusion. He seems to believe that man could live in a state of nature, without society and without government, and discovered that this situation would be filled with happiness for humanity.** This dream is puerile...[22]

...

After graduating from law school, Étienne de La Boétie took up an eminent career as a royal official in Bordeaux. He never published the Discourse, and as he pursued a career in faithful service of the monarch, never a hint did he express along the lines of his earlier treatise. Certainly one of the reasons for Montaigne's stout insistence on his friend's conservatism and monarchical loyalty is that La Boétie had changed his political views by the time they met around 1559. **Indeed, in late 1562, shortly before he died, La Boétie wrote but did not publish a manuscript forgotten and lost until recent years, in which he, with moderate conservatism, advised the State to punish Protestant leaders as rebels, to enforce Catholicism upon France, but also to reform the abuses of the Church moderately and respectably by the agency of the king and his Parlements.** Protestants would then be forced to convert back to Catholicism or leave the country.[55]

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n265/mode/2up?view=theater

Legal instruction in France during the 16th century was marked with a scientific clearness and breadth unknown since the days of the classical Roman jurisconsults.55 This is the era of the so-called Humanists, the French historical school of jurisprudence.
…

And yet, although the Humanists were highly philosophical and systematic in considering and studying Roman law in connection with Roman literature and history, **they still lacked the fundamental idea of the modern historical school founded by Savigny—namely that law is the product of the entire history of a people, an evolution by organic growth.**57

Influenced by the Renaissance, the Humanists aimed to revive and introduce a better knowledge of Roman law for the practical purpose of ameliorating French law and judicial administration.58 The founder of the Humanist school of jurisprudence was the renowned Alciat.59 The greatest of all the Humanists was the very famous Cujas,60 who lived during the same century.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Cujas,_Jacques

CUJAS (or CUJACIUS), JACQUES (or as he called himself, JACQUES DE CUJAS) (1520-1590), French jurisconsult, was born at Toulouse, **where his father, whose name was Cujaus, was a fuller. Having taught himself Latin and Greek, he studied law under Arnoul Ferrier, then professor at Toulouse, and rapidly gained a great reputation as a lecturer on Justinian.**
…

Recalled to Bourges at the death of Duaren in 1559, he remained there till 1567, when he returned to Valence. There he gained a European reputation, and collected students from all parts of the continent, among whom were Joseph Scaliger and de Thou.
…

In the religious wars which filled all the thoughts of his contemporaries he steadily refused to take any part. *Nihil hoc ad edictum praetoris*, "this has nothing to do with the edict of the praetor," was his usual answer to those who spoke to him on the subject. His surpassing merit as a jurisconsult consisted in the fact that he turned from the ignorant commentators on Roman law to the Roman law itself. He consulted a very large number of manuscripts, of which he had collected more than 500 in his own library; but, unfortunately, he left orders in his will that his library should be divided among a number of purchasers, and his collection was thus scattered, and in great part lost. His emendations, of which a large number were published under the title of *Animadversiones et observationes*, were not confined to lawbooks, but extended to many of the Latin and Greek classical authors. **In jurisprudence his study was far from being devoted solely to Justinian; he recovered and gave to the world a part of the Theodosian Code, with explanations; and he procured the manuscript of the *Basilica*, a Greek abridgment of Justinian,** afterwards published by Fabrot (see BASILICA).

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.13326/page/n117/mode/2up?view=theater

In his hands, therefore, the *Corpus Juris* was not treated as a homogeneous body of laws (for such it had been frequently assumed before him), but a complex mass which could not well be understood without decomposing it again and examining all its parts. It was his bold design to re-create what Tribonian, that versatile and remarkable minister of Justinian, had altered or consigned to oblivion, to restore the purity of Roman traditions which had been adulterated by the pretentious barbarism of Byzantium, to resuscitate the work of the classical jurisconsults by uniting scattered fragments, to set forth the very principles of Roman jurisprudence as they had been in the minds of those who conceived them, to show the magnificent Roman heritage in its most favourable, that is, in its true, light. Cujas brought to bear on his work the disinterested judicial view of an historian, the imagination of a creative artist, and the exact learning of a scholar.
…

In pursuance of his design he inquired into and annotated the *Regulae* of Ulpian, the *Sententiae* of Paul; he wrote a commentary on Africanus; and restored the work of Papinian, that profound legal genius and victim of Caracalla. This supreme jurist's works had reached us only in mutilated fragments; but Cujas applied himself to these sacred remains, and with diligence and penetration brought them to life, and extracted their secret, hitherto unascertained.
…

In some quarters the methods of Cujas met with strong opposition — for it is to be remembered that the Roman law found a hardy opponent in the customary law, which had powerful adherents and advocates. **The old maxim, ''coutume passe droit'' (*i.e.* Roman law), was often emphasized. Indeed, in the university of Paris the teaching of the civil law had by ordinance been for a considerable time forbidden,** and, as we have seen, it was partially revived by way of a special favour to Cujas.
…

And so the work of Cujas served as an authoritative appeal and powerful inspiration to successive ages, until it was in a large measure finally embodied in the French Civil Code, which has still more assured it perennial vitality.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.13326/page/n107/mode/2up?view=theater

Cujas, however, did not assume such an uncompromising or decisive attitude towards religion. **He perhaps belonged, with Erasmus and Montaigne, to that party which was characterized by a mild scepticism or by the broadest toleration, and detested fanaticism of any kind.** This point of view was not due to lack of courage or vacillation; when necessity arose, he was ready to risk his life rather than surrender his convictions to the seditious clamours of a threatening crowd of leaguers. **He practised Catholicism, but it is significant that in his will he made no declaration in its favour, forbade the sale of his books to the Jesuits, and recommended his wife and daughter simply to abide by the precepts of the Holy Scripture.** It was thought that he had openly embraced the reformed faith, for we find Hotman accusing him of deserting it again. However, **in his discussions, whenever legal matters were confronted by religious arguments, he was wont to observe: "Nihil hoc ad edictum praetoris," and thus constantly emphasized that the spheres of law and religion were separate, affirmed the secular character of jurisprudence, and declared that it could no longer be the humble servant of theology.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/364/mode/2up?view=theater

Hence Voltaire's unbending maxim that 'if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him,' though this was actually an old topos in French thought, **Bayle attributing to Bodin the remark that if God did not exist the interest of the human race would require men to be ignorant of this truth, 'et qu'ils se persuadassent le contraire.'**102

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02609a.htm

Bodin represents a reaction against Machiavelli in the field of moral and political science. **Unlike Cujas and the "Romanist" jurisconsults, who confined themselves to the observation of Greek and Roman antiquity, he drew upon the modern history of Germany, England, Spain, and Italy.** His theory of the influence of climates foreshadows that of Montesquieu. Bodin collects carefully numerous small facts, definite and concrete information; daily experience and the observation of current events are the sources of his almost "scientific" researches concerning the laws of political life. It is somewhat surprising to note that as early as 1580 this thoughtful writer wrote a work (La Démonomanie des Sorciers) to demonstrate the existence of sorcerers and the legality of their condemnation, **on the basis of "experience" and respect for *res judicatae* or the reliability of the courts.** This belief in witchcraft rests on the same arguments as his theory of civil government.

In 1576 this somewhat puzzling man was chosen a deputy of the Third Estate (*tiers état*) to the States-General of Blois where he championed the cause of the Reformers, thereby incurring the royal displeasure. **Fourteen years later (1590) as Attorney-General at Laon, he sided with the "Ligue", persuaded the citizens to do likewise, and finally went over to Henry IV.** This superstitious believer in sorcery left in manuscript a work known as "Colloquium Heptaplomeres" which propounds a certain rationalistic spiritualism. Though a civil magistrate and a partisan of the Ligue, his writings exhibit him as one of the earliest advocates of the theory of religious toleration. Brunetière assigns Bodin a place in French literature beside Henri Estienne and Amyot; **at a time when men looked to antiquity for guidance only in the domain of good taste, all three showed that from the same source could be drawn lessons in history, politics, and morality.**

Though Bodin never abandoned the Catholic religion, and was buried in the Franciscan Church at Laon, **his writings often betray an un-Catholic temper, when they are not more or less openly hostile to the existing ecclesiastical order. In religion he inclines to an abstract theism.** In keeping with the Gallican legists of France he champions the absolute supremacy of the State, though he bases it on the Divine will and the natural law; his ideal prince is not an impious and unjust ruler of the Machiavelli type. **All the works of**

Bodin were placed on the Index in 1628; the edition of 1900 continues the prohibition of his "Universae naturae theatrum".

https://iep.utm.edu/bodin/

Bodin joined the Carmelite brotherhood at an early age. Surviving documents tell us that he was released from his vows a few years later. He is known to have studied, and later, taught law at the University of Toulouse during the 1550s. Bodin was unable to obtain a professorship at the university, and this may have driven him away from Toulouse and academic life.
…

He was at the very heart of French political power in the 1570s – first during the reign of Charles IX and also, after Charles' death in 1574, during the reign of his brother, Henri III. **In 1576, Bodin lost the favor of King Henri III after he opposed, among other things, the king's fiscal policies during the States General of Blois where Bodin served as representative for the third estate of Vermandois.**
…

Bodin writes that there are four kinds of interpreters of law. The most skilled among them are those who are

> …trained not only by precepts and forensic practice but also in the finest arts and the most stable philosophy, **who grasp the nature of justice, not changeable according to the wishes of men, but laid down by eternal law; who determine skillfully the standards of equity; who trace the origins of jurisprudence from ultimate principles;** who pass on carefully the knowledge of all antiquity; who, of course, know the power and the dominion of the emperor, the senate, the people, and the magistrates of the Romans; **who bring to the interpretation of legislation the discussion of philosophers about laws and state;** who know well the Greek and Latin languages, in which the statutes are set forth; who at length circumscribe the entire division of learning within its limits, classify into types, divide into parts, point out with words, and illustrate with examples. (Bodin 1945, 4-6)

…

Bodin is recognized today as one of the earliest advocates of the abolition of slavery. For him, slavery was a universal phenomenon in the sense that slaves exist in all parts of the world, and slavery was widely accepted by the *droit des gens*. **Bodin writes that there are difficulties concerning slavery that have never been resolved.** He wishes to answer the following question: "Is slavery natural and useful, or contrary to nature?"

Bodin opposes Aristotle's opinion (*Politics* 1254a) according to which slavery is something natural – some people are born to govern and command, while it is the role of others to serve and obey. Bodin admits that "there is certain plausibility in the argument that slavery is natural and useful in the commonwealth." After all, Bodin continues, the institution of slavery has existed in all commonwealths, and in all ages wise and good men have owned slaves. But if we are to consider the question according to commonly received opinions, thus allowing ourselves to be less concerned with philosophical arguments, we will soon understand that slavery is unnatural and contrary to human dignity.

Bodin's opposition to slavery is manifold. First of all, he considers slavery in most cases to be unnatural, as the following passage attests: **"I confesse that servitude is well agreeing unto nature, when a strong man, rich and ignorant, yeeldeth his obedience and service unto a wise, discreet and feeble poore man: <u>but for wise men to serve fools, men of understanding to serve the ignorant, and the good to serve the bad; what can bee more contrarie unto nature?</u>"** (Bodin 1962, 34) Secondly, slavery is an affront to religion since the law of God forbids making any man a slave against their good will and consent. Thirdly, slavery is against human dignity, because of the countless indescribable humiliations that slaves have been forced to suffer. **According to one interpretation, Bodin's opposition to slavery must above all be understood within the context of his opinions concerning the commonwealth in that slavery poses a permanent threat to the stability of the state.** Bodin relies on a historical narrative to prove that slavery is incompatible with a stable commonwealth (Herrel 1994, 56). Thus, in the following passage, he states:

> Wherefore seeing it is proved by the examples of so many worlds of years, so many inconveniences of rebellions, servile warres, conspiracies eversions and changes to have happened unto Commonweals by slaves; so many murthers, cruelties, and detestable villanies to have bene committed upon the persons of slaves by their lords and masters: who can doubt to affirme it to be a thing most pernitious and daungerous to have brought them into a Commonweale; or having cast them off, to receive them againe? (Bodin 1962, 44)

…

Like many of his contemporaries, Bodin held that the levying of new taxes without consent was a violation of the property rights of the individual, and, as such, contrary to the law of God and nature. He was particularly firm in opposing new taxation without proper consent and sought confirmation for his opinion in French and European history. One of the main differences between a legitimate ruler and an illegitimate one concerns the question of how each treats the private property of their subjects.
…

The matter of true religion is discussed in the final three books of the *Colloquium heptaplomeres*. **True religion, Bodin holds, is tolerant of all religions, and accepts different ways to approach God. Leathers Kuntz has observed that "no religion is true whose point of view is not universal, whose expression is not free, whose center does not reflect the intimate harmony of God and nature"** (Bodin 2008, xliii). The same opinion is expressed in the *Démonomanie* and in Bodin's letter to one Jean Bautru des Matras, an advocate working in Paris.
…

Leathers Kuntz has detected three stages in the development of Bodin's religious thinking. She has argued that Bodin's religious views became more liberal as he grew older (Bodin 2008, xliii-xliv). In 1559, when he wrote the *Discours au Senate et au peuple de Toulouse*, **Bodin held that people should be brought up publicly in one religion. This he considered as an indispensable element in the cohesiveness of the state.** Religious unity should be preserved, and religion should not be debated, since disputations damage religion and cast doubt upon it. When writing the *République*, Bodin's main concern was the political stability of the French state. He considered religion to provide for the unity of the state, and as supporting the king's power. Furthermore, religion strengthened the subjects' obedience toward their sovereign prince and their respect for the execution of laws. **Uniformity of worship must be enforced within the commonwealth when it is possible, but tolerance should become the norm when religious minorities become influential enough to no longer be repressed.** The final and most liberal stage of Bodin's religious opinions becomes most apparent in the *Colloquium heptaplomeres*, "in which his religious opinions seem to have developed into a kind of theism which leaves each man's religion, provided he has some, to his own personal conscience" (ibid.).
…

Although Bodin's understanding of true religion as something profoundly personal, for which no church was required, made him an unorthodox believer in the eyes of many, it seems inconceivable that he should be considered an atheist (Bodin 2008, xxix). In fact, he considered atheism to be extremely dangerous to the commonwealth, as the following passage from the *République* (4, VII), discussing the difference between atheism and superstition, proves:

> And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which thinke that the same punishment is to be appointed for them that make many gods, and them that would have none at all: or that the infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and everliving God is thereby taken away. **For that superstition how great soever it be, doth yet hold men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrats;** as also in mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas mere Atheisme doth utterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing evill. (Bodin 1962, 539)

…

According to Bodin, law is divided into two categories: natural (*ius naturale*) and human (*ius humanum*). **Bodin thus rejects the common threefold division based on the *Digest* – natural law, law of peoples and civil law** – because he considers dichotomy more convenient. The two principal divisions of human law are *ius civile* (civil law) and *ius gentium* (law of peoples). **Bodin strongly criticizes law professors, or Romanists, for he writes that they have concentrated almost exclusively on *ius civile* – particularly the civil law of the Romans – and that, as a consequence, the *ius gentium* has not been properly studied, and, therefore, has no proper methodology. Bodin's personal interest lies precisely in the *ius gentium* because it is concerned with the universal laws that are common to all peoples.** The methods of the Romanists are inadequate for the study of *ius gentium* because the *ius civile* varies from state to state and no universally valid truths can be derived from it; in this sense it is not even part of legal science. A new critical method is therefore required; a method that is both historical and comparative.

Bodin's system of universal law is a drastic rupture with the exegetical methods of the Middle Ages. **Medieval jurists applied Roman law to their own societies and saw no problem in doing so. It is with the arrival of the so-called humanist scholars, in the sixteenth century, and their use of the methods of classical philology, that the internal coherence and authority of the *Corpus juris civilis* were challenged.**
…

As the work's numerous editions and translations attest, Bodin's *République* was widely read in Europe after its publication, up until the mid-seventeenth century. **It was subsequently forgotten, however, and Bodin's influence during the eighteenth century was only marginal.** It was not until the twentieth century that his works, slowly, but decisively, began to interest scholars again. Growing interest in his works has assured Bodin the place he deserves among the most important political thinkers of the sixteenth century.
…

Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published his renowned *De jure belli ac pacis* in 1625; Grotius does not conceal his admiration for Bodin, nor for the method used by French writers that consisted of combining the study of history with the study of law.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

> Thirdly, private and particular persons have no Right to question how those came by their Power that are in Authority over Them; for, if that were once admitted, there would be no end of disputes in the world touching Titles. It is ground enough for the submission of particular Persons in things of politicall equity, that those which have gotten the Power are irresistable, and able to force it if they refuse:* **For, as touching this Case (saith the most excellent *Grotius) Private persons ought not to take upon them to meddle with these Controversies in point of Title, but rather to follow them that are in possession.*** For, all Power is from God; and, our Saviour told *Pilate,* the Power that he had was given him from above, though all the world knows that *Pilate* was but a Deputy-governour, and (in a civill acceptation) received his Power from *Caesar,* who was an Usurper. **To this accords that of *Bodinus* 1.* *de repub. cap.* 6. who saith, that *all Governments are lawfull in respect of the first Cause,* viz. *God; but on the other side, if we regard secondary Causes, all Governments have had their Beginning and Foundation upon Force and Violence.***

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/124/mode/2up?view=theater

Jean Bodin (1530-1596), **who had provided the original Divine Right-style justification for the French crown, is generally considered the first apologist for the modern theory of Divine Right kingship. Interestingly, while Bodin began by denouncing Machiavelli (such denunciations had, even by then, become a standard pose), in fact "Machiavelli's influence on Bodin is omnipresent."**6 It is fair to say that Bodin's theory is not fully Machiavellian, and so not really secular in a precise sense, but his account certainly was influential among other monarchs, including English monarchs, whose aims were secular.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n263/mode/2up?view=theater

> 6. We may safely assert, that if Montesquieu has borrowed such dross as the System of Climates from Bodin, he has thrown aside many articles which by no means coincided with his ideas. For example, the definition of a Sovereign given by Bodin could never agree with Montesquieu's notions of a free people, or of its representatives. The former is exaggerated. **In Bodin's language, we might say, that the covenant by which the Sovereign is constituted, gives him the right of disposing at pleasure of the lives and fortunes of every citizen: That the sole distinction between the Tyrant and the lawful King is, that the former exercises his authority for the subjugation, while the latter exerts his for the happiness of the people.** The generality of Montesquieu's principles appear not to recognize a sufficient Sovereignty in the real Monarch; but the opposite excess into which Bodin had fallen may, by disgusting Montesquieu, have driven him into the opposite extreme.

https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2658919/view

The vital statement for this thesis is Bodin's proclamation: **"Just as Almighty God (*Dieu*) cannot create (*ne peut faire*) another God equal with Himself (*pareil à lui*), since He is infinite (*entant qu'il est infini*) and two infinities cannot co-exist, so the sovereign prince, who is the image of God (*l'image de Dieu*), cannot make a subject equal with himself (*un sujet égal à lui*) without self-destruction (*anéanti*)."**119 **Bodin concludes that the only limitations that can be placed on the absolute sovereign are the laws of "God" and "Nature" (*la loi naturelle et divine*):** "…the sovereign…cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another".120 By "natural law", Bodin understands the eternal mathematical principles of "natural reason" (*raison naturelle*).121 By "divine law", Bodin understands those normative acts which are "directly contrary to the law of God" (*directement contraire à la loi de Dieu*) such as "incest, adultery, parricide" (*incestes, adultères, parricides*) and so on.122

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/150/mode/2up?view=theater

One of the central motives behind the labours of the Renaissance jurists and their disciples, particularly in France, was the conviction that eternal and universal truths, of inestimable value for the conduct of men

everywhere, had been known to the great Greek and Roman thinkers, and could, with sufficient effort, be recovered. **They believed that this *restauratio* could be achieved once the distortions, confusions, interpolations and incrustations of Byzantine and medieval editors and interpreters, from Justinian's editor Tribonian to the medieval Accursians and Bartolians and their successors (sadly affected as these last were held to be by the anti-pagan bias of the traditions of the Church), were identified and removed, and the original texts disinterred, reconstructed and understood.** In part, the work of restoration was stimulated by sheer love learning, by intellectual curiosity, by desire to rescue the truth from ignorance, error and deliberate perversion, and by pure admiration for the classical world, free from any utilitarian or ethical purpose. **But together with such disinterested motives, there clearly were at work theological and political passions too: Protestant, anti-papal, anti-medieval, and, particularly in France, Gallican and nationalist.** Nevertheless, it remains true that the dominant impulse was that of the Platonic and humanist faith that, in the light of the newly discovered standards of ideal truth and ideal beauty, gifted and energetic men, unaffected by the condemnations of this world by the *tristes docteurs*, and liberated from the tyranny of a superstitious and obscurantist priesthood, could once again develop the rich potentialities of human nature, and build a life worthy of their new-found knowledge and genius. The timeless principles in the light of which Roman law was built – whether *jus naturale* or *jus gentium* or *jus civile* – would, once the ground was cleared of the accumulated rubbish of centuries, be the basis of a new life, both social and individual, which rational men, from whose eyes the medieval scales had fallen, **would establish in accordance with the unalterable laws of nature, which were identical with those of human reason as they were formulated by the great philosophers and jurists.**
…

Thus the route to the genuine past, it was now believed, lay via 'philology.' Valla (and Dumoulin and Cusanus) demonstrated this in the course of exposing the forged Donation of Constantine; the great historical jurists – Budé, Cujas, Alciati – and their disciples used the new method to clear away the medieval rubble and Byzantine carelessness which, in their view, concealed the authentic texts of the great Roman lawyers.
…

The great Gallican controversialist, Charles Dumoulin, the disciple of Valla and the one-time friend of Calvin, appealed to linguistic usage in interpreting the true tradition in his defence of the claims of the French monarchy against Roman universalism. In the same spirit the defender of Roman orthodoxy, Raymond Le Roux, takes Dumoulin to task for being over-literal: words change meanings; lawyers who deal with facts and not with mere words should not fall into the error of attaching static meanings to words; central terms change meanings at different times and in different states.1 But the same principle could be used with equal effect by the opponents of Rome: language and monuments can be used not only to expose clerical anachronisms and forgeries, but to reconstruct the structure of past societies in terms of which alone the significance of this or that sentence in the Digest or Ulpian can be understood.2 **So François Baudouin demanded knowledge of universal history on the part of anyone claiming true mastery of the law; to understand the tradition of the Church one must understand the Commonwealth 'in whose bosom, as it were, [the Church] is nourished';**3 **all history and all jurisprudence should ideally be united in one single *corpus*.**4 **Law and history are one and indivisible.**5 **It is by adhering to this principle that Budé and Cujas, Alciati and Le Douaren and their disciples succeeded in purging the texts of Roman law from the distortions and blunders of medieval 'barbarians' – Bartolists and Accursians.** Indeed it was only by using such methods that **the unhistorical lumping together of Roman texts of different dates by Justinian's editor Tribonian – the *bête noire* of the new school of French jurists** – could be exposed, and the chronology and therefore the significance and relationships of the texts properly established.
…

One of the original motives for labouring to restore the texts of Gaius or Papinian was the belief that they contained the clearest statement of those universal rules of conduct to which all men aspire by nature, no matter how barbarous or deeply perverted they may be, so that contemplation of the principles of Roman law should give any man a sense of homecoming, of return out of the long night of the Middle Ages to the rule of reason and the light of day. **But what was gradually discovered was a way of life that seemed remote or, at the very least, unfamiliar to those seekers for the single true tradition. The more faithfully the despised medieval accumulation was removed, the stranger the classical world appeared: if anything, it was the alleged monkish distortions that gave it such affinity to the ideas of later ages as it once seemed to have.** This was not what had been expected by neo-Stoics, neo-Aristotelians, or Platonists and Neoplatonists of the Renaissance. But it was grist to the mills of those who wished to protect local or corporate liberties and privileges against the encroachment of the great centralising powers – whether papal or royal. **Legal historians have often remarked on François Hotman's unceasing effort, while ostensibly wholly engaged on learned labours intended to establish the true meaning of Roman law, to emphasise the unbridgeable differences between it – and, indeed, the rules of *jus naturale*, too – and the ancient customs of France, which followed an authentic, native, 'Franco-Gallic' tradition; from which it**

followed that Roman law, whether 'municipal' or international, was not relevant to the French State. Hotman's and his allies' insistence on the gulf that divided Roman law from the 'immemorial' native Franco-German traditions was part of their defence of feudal, or local, or national rights against the champions of uniformity, centralisation and all those who appealed to timeless and universal truths to support claims to overriding authority.

This great argument, stemming as it did from many sources – early consciousness of nationhood, the zeal of reformers, Gallicans and other dissenters against the Roman hierarchy, the claims of estates and provincial *parlements* and corporations against the central executive: from every movement or outlook that found it advantageous to underline differences between places, times, ways of life – was eagerly seized upon by the defenders of local custom, ancient ways, individual traditions that varied from place to place with roots too remote and tangled to be rationalised and fitted into any universal system. This great political and theological conflict, one of the great ideological battles which has continued into our day, as often as not clothed itself in legal forms, appeals to precedents and historical institutions the path to which was built by embattled jurists and grammarians. In the effort to diminish the authority of Roman law, to undermine the notion that civil law, even if it was not always, at least always strove to be, the application of natural law to particular situations, Hotman speaks of 'les saisons et mutations des moeurs & conditions d'un peuple,'1 which divide it from other people's, and indeed even from its own past; the French have their own *complexions* and *humeurs*.2 What have they to do with the laws of a society long dead and originating in another country? **What have the lists of 'natural law' maxims enunciated by Gratian or his predecessors, obedient mouthpieces of the Vatican, or spokesmen for an ancient civilisation born in far-away Athens and flourishing in an only slightly less distant Rome, what have they to do with our own peculiar, unique, Frankish, that is, in the end, Germanic, or 'Franco-Gallic,' individuality or 'complexion'? In his *Anti-Tribonianus* (which Vico cites in another connection),**3 **Hotman uses this appeal to historical continuity in resisting royal claims as against the customary law of the Frankish conquerors of Gaul,** or against other codes which had developed out of the needs and traditions of the varied associations of men of whom the King's realm consists. The Romans had a *respublica*, not a monarchy: the administration of France 'has nothing in common with' that of Rome, said Étienne Pasquier.1 The argument from the 'irrelevance' of what the Romans did to modern situations became a powerful weapon in the hands of the defenders of the prerogatives of various estates – Montesquieu's later defence of such *corps intermédiaires*, and his anti-centralist pluralism, drew sustenance from the sharp contrasts between the variety of systems, each valid for its own day. Hence flowed relativism, historicism, political pluralism, and, more particularly, **suspicion of abstraction, of tidy general schemas, whether a priori or naturalistic, advocated by no matter whom – Aristotle, Seneca, Ulpian, the Digest, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, the *philosophes*.** Hence, above all, ever since Lorenzo Valla and the new 'philology,' the appeal to the concrete and the particular in specific times and places.

Nor is the new path to the past confined to historical lawyers. The *mos gallicus* captured history proper as well. Étienne Pasquier looks on laws as custom recorded in writing, and since society and its language and habits alter, there is need of constant readjustment. One can reconstruct the past not by attending to narrative history, so much as by renewed study of acts of *parlements*, juridical records, papal bulls, poems, coins, statues; historians tend to be subjective, a 'je ne sçay quoy de passion'2 is apt to affect them, especially if religion is at issue.3 Pasquier's distaste for Roman law and architecture throws the dissimilarity between the Roman past and the French tradition into sharp relief: this is surely the direct result of the doctrines taught in the schools of Bourges, Valence, Toulouse, Turin. **Vignier, who treats Homer and the Bible in the same detached fashion as he does coins and inscriptions, shows no respect for the 'immemorial wisdom of the ancients.'**
…

In England this movement took the form of Coke's sense of the common law, and Matthew Hale's doctrine that law was born not made, and those other forerunners (such as Hume and Bolingbroke) of Burke, who reacted against the cut and dried 'rigidities of ordered reason' and 'towards the customary, the native, the feudal and the barbarous … the primitive, the inarticulate and the mutable.'2

> 2. Pocock, p. 15. **So began what Maitland once called 'a Gothic revival' in jurisprudence. 'English Law and the Renaissance'** (1901): p. 146 in *Selected Historical Essays of F. W. Maitland,* ed. Helen M. Cam (Cambridge, 1957).

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_032

Lack of executive power had always been the weak point of the Common Law, and in order to keep faction permanently repressed, after Henry VII's victory had closed the dynastic strife, more drastic methods were required. What the Chancellor was already doing in matters of private law was now to be done by the King's Council in the Star Chamber and in the special palatine and frontier jurisdictions. Thus Sir Thomas Smith tells us of 'the insolency of the noblemen and gentlemen of the north part of England, who being far from the king and the seat of justice made almost as it were an ordinary war among themselves'; and Bacon speaks in like manner of 'maintenance or headship of great persons' as one

chief reason why jurisdiction of this kind was needful and politic; and we could have no two more competent witnesses to the traditions of sixteenth-century statecraft. More than this, **there was a time when the demand for strong government was virtually leagued against the Common Law with a learned intellectual movement among Romanizing scholars and publicists.** Maitland has given us the proofs in his brilliant essay – not the less solid because brilliant – on English Law and the Renaissance. **Towards the middle of the century, the situation might well have seemed critical;** a foreign observer might even have expected that the Court of Chancery, not yet officially declared to be an ordinary court of justice, would easily be drawn into the confederacy. Such a forecast would have been wrong but not without plausibility. What actually followed we know; **the last quarter of the sixteenth century saw, concurrently with the steady growth of equity jurisdiction, a great revival of the Courts at Westminster, based on clear and proud consciousness of their historical authority and doctrine.** Antiquarian jurisprudence was militant and triumphant, with the compilers of the Abridgments and the printers of the Year Books for its armourers, **and Sir Edward Coke for its champion; a champion to be venerated, still active and valiant, by a younger generation fighting the battle of constitutional right with like weapons against Charles I.** The history was not always critical in either case, but that was not material for the result. **Such a revival is among the most impressive evidences of a vitality not only professional but national, which might be obscured but could not be suppressed by adverse conjunctures.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Bacon,_Nicholas

BACON, Sir NICHOLAS (1509-1579), lord keeper, born in 1509, probably in a house belonging to the parents of Sir Francis Walsingham at Chislehurst, Kent, was the second son of Robert Bacon, of Drinkstone, Suffolk, **sheepreeve to the abbey of Bury St. Edmunds.**
...

On his return he studied common law at Gray's Inn, being called to the bar in 1533, and becoming an 'ancient' of the society in 1536. A little later Archbishop Cranmer recommended Bacon to the minister Cromwell for the appointment of town-clerk of Calais.
...

Bacon was desirous that the confiscated revenues of the dissolved monasteries should be applied to useful purposes, and with two friends, Thomas Denton and Robert Cary, drafted a scheme for their employment in the establishment of a college for the education of statesmen. **It was proposed to erect a house in London where young men of good family and attainments should be taught civil law, Latin, and French.** Some of the students were to be attached to foreign embassies, and others were to compile histories of official transactions. But the proposal met with little favour, and the monastic estates were distributed among the king's friends.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0008

It is hardly necessary to say that Francis Bacon was the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, **who held the great seal of England during the first twenty years of the reign of Elizabeth.** The fame of the father has been thrown into shade by that of the son. But Sir Nicholas was no ordinary man. **He belonged to a set of men whom it is easier to describe collectively than separately, whose minds were formed by one system of discipline, who belonged to one rank in society,** to one university, to one party, to one sect, to one administration, and who resembled each other so much in talents, in opinions, in habits, in fortunes, that one character, we had almost said one life, may, to a considerable extent, serve for them all.

They were the first generation of statesmen by profession that England produced. Before their time the division of labour had, in this respect, been very imperfect. Those who had directed public affairs had been, with few exceptions, warriors or priests; warriors whose rude courage was neither guided by science nor softened by humanity, priests whose learning and abilities were habitually devoted to the defence of tyranny and imposture. The Hotspurs, the Nevilles, the Cliffords, rough, illiterate, and unreflecting, brought to the council-board the fierce and imperious disposition which they had acquired amidst the tumult of predatory war, or in the gloomy repose of the garrisoned and moated castle. On the other side was the calm and subtle prelate, versed in all that was then considered as learning, trained in the Schools to manage words, and in the confessional to manage hearts, **seldom superstitious, but skilful in practising on the superstition of others;** false, as it was natural that a man should be whose profession imposed on all who were not saints the necessity of being hypocrites; selfish, as it was natural that a man should be who could form no domestic ties and cherish no hope of legitimate posterity, more attached to his order than to his country, and guiding the politics of England with a constant side-glance at Rome. But the increase of wealth, the progress of knowledge, and the reformation of religion produced a great change. **The nobles ceased to be military chieftains; the priests ceased to possess a monopoly of learning; and a new and remarkable species of politicians appeared.**

These men came from neither of the classes which had, till then, almost exclusively furnished ministers of state. **They were all laymen; yet they were all men of learning; and they were all men of**

peace. They were not members of the aristocracy. They inherited no titles, no large domains, no armies of retainers, no fortified castles. **Yet they were not low men, such as those whom princes, jealous of the power of a nobility, have sometimes raised from forges and cobblers' stalls to the highest situations.** They were all gentlemen by birth. They had all received a liberal education.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.13326/page/n131/mode/2up?view=theater

Gentilis is the first great writer of *modern* international law, the first clearly to define its subject-matter, and to treat it in the way which is fundamentally in harmony with the conception and practice of our own time.1 For this reason it may justifiably be claimed that—as the precursor of Grotius, and as the one who substantially prepared the way for him and greatly influenced his and all succeeding work—Gentilis is the real "father" of the modern law of nations (that is, if it is at all proper to confer such a title on any particular jurist).2
...

Notwithstanding various shortcomings—indeed, inevitable at the time he wrote—the entire work of Gentilis is manifestly superior to all previous productions, such as, for example, those of Ayala, Victoria, Soto, Belli, or Suarez, who either confused civil law with rules regulating international relations or failed to grasp the difference between philosophical or theological principles and juridical rules, or, again, confounded the rules of interstatal war with the municipal prescriptions of military discipline,1 or identified the "societas gentium" with an exclusive Christian commonwealth. **The theological basis of the whole subject, which was generally affirmed or assumed by his predecessors, was once and for all undermined. The dogmatic procedure of the theologians was unreservedly impugned; they were roundly advised not to meddle with matters which did not concern them, "silete theologi in munere alieno."**2
...

Grotius approves St, Thomas's interpretation of the fifty-first Psalm as to the irresponsibility of princes and their superiority to law; Gentilis, though writing earlier, shows himself to be more in harmony with modern views when he asserts that it is a hallucination of theologians, mere adulation of lawyers to represent to kings that they are permitted to do everything, and that their sovereignty is absolute.3

Finally, having conceived of a ''societas gentium'' on a civil basis, a system of rules freed from the bonds of theological casuistry, **Gentilis took a further step—a remarkable one, though a corollary flowing from his general thesis—and included in this society of States infidel and even barbarian communities.**1 The common opinion of writers was that only Catholic, or, at most, Christian, princes could be vested with *dominium*; but Gentilis held that heretics and infidels could legitimately enjoy the right of sovereignty in their own domains. **Heresy or infidelity or even idolatry is not intrinsically a just cause of war.**2 Treaty relationships may be established with peoples of this character,3 who possess also the right of legation.4 **On the other hand, those who have no religion at all are in the position of pirates,**5 **as the natural enemies of mankind, and are therefore outside the pale of the society of States;** they are on the level of the lowest brutes and are in a sense opposed to God and to nature, and consequently ought to be warred upon and compelled to follow the ways of the rest of mankind.6
...

The Christian wars against the Turks were lawful, not for religious reasons, or for reasons of natural enmity, but because of their perfidious, harassing, hostile conduct; whereas had they remained peaceful any attack on them would have been illegitimate.7
...

Hence, **resistance may be justly offered to the Turks and to the Spaniards, as it is manifest they are aiming at universal dominion.**10 **Further, there is "honesta defensio,"**11 **which permits help to be given to a nation against its unjust aggressors:**1 **for the ''generis humani societas" is a unity, the world is one body, "mundus unum est corpus."**2 Gentilis quotes with approbation the statement of Ambrose3 as a principle of canon law: "Plena est iustitia quae defendit infirmos."4 May we defend the subjects of another State as against their sovereign?5 If the dispute between them is a private one, it is a question for their own tribunals; **but in a public conflict, in which a great number of subjects rebel against their ruler, we may intervene if it is clear that he is grossly unjust or cruel;** hence the justifiable intervention of England in the Netherlands, especially so in view of the ties of old friendship and consanguinity. Gentilis heartily approves of the Earl of Leicester's policy in favour of the Belgians, **and agrees with Justus Lipsius that Spanish violence would be left unrestrained if that part of the continent fell.**6
...

The work of Gentilis is of enduring value in the history of the law of nations. **He did more than any other writer to free international law from the besetting theological importations and the incubus of scholastic casuistry.** In his clear recognition of and constant insistence on the

predominant positive aspects of the subject, he foreshadowed the modern prevailing view, which emphasizes that the regulation of interstatal relationships is based on law and not merely on courtesy. **He frequently appeals to divine law; he is always ready to invoke the authority of "natural reason,'' of the law of nature, but in doing so his aim is to apply additional sanctions to matters which are universally affirmed by the intuitive consciousness of mankind.** Metaphysical abstractions and dialectic subtleties he avoided as being a menace to the stability of the very foundations of the subject.
...

He clearly marked out the respective spheres of the international jurist and the theologian; he carefully differentiated between the work of the international lawyer and that of the civilian. He is not given to fallacious presumptions of analogy between the civil law and the law of nations—**presumptions which govern the fundamental classification of the work of Grotius.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f=false

Meanwhile, jurists like Coke equated English common law with natural law. **They declared that custom, the basis of the common law, was the product of natural law.** Often unconsciously, humans wrote into law those customs which worked best – that is, which best conformed to experience and nature. **The passage of time refined the law through trial and error, making it ever more compatible with natural law. The process was a form of legal natural selection.**5

https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false

Memorandum: when the play *Ignoramus* (made by one Ruggle of Clare Hall†) was acted with great applause before King James, **they dressed Sir Ignoramus like Chief Justice Coke** and cut his beard like him and feigned his voice. Mr Peyton, our vicar of Chalk, was then a scholar at King's College and saw it. **This drollery did lead to serious evil: <u>it set all the lawyers against the clergy</u>,** and shortly after this Mr Selden wrote of tithes that they were not according to God's laws.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA283#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> He was one of the assembly of divines, and Whitlock, in his memoirs, says he was wont to mock the assembly men about their little gilt Bibles, and would baffle them sadly: said he, 'I do consider the original.'
> ...
>
> When he was near death, the minister (Mr Johnson) was coming to him to absolve him: **<u>Mr Hobbes happened then to be there: said he, 'What, will you that have written like a man, now die like a woman?'</u> So the minister was not let in.**
> ...
>
> All the judges had mourning, as also an abundance of persons of quality. The Lord Primate of Ireland, Usher, preached his funeral sermon.
> ...
>
> He was one of the assembly of divines in those days (as was also his highness the Prince Elector Palatine), and was like a thorn in their sides; for he did baffle and vex them; **for he was able to run them all down with his Greek and antiquities.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Selden,_John

His father, John Selden, is described by Selden himself as 'ex familia quæ tunc ibi viguit honesta;' by Aubrey as 'an yeomanly man of about 40l. per annum,' and in the baptismal register of his son as 'the minstrell,' an office which appears from the parish accounts to have involved attendance at the church ales. Selden's mother was Margaret, only daughter of Thomas Baker of Rushington, of a knightly family in Kent. She is said to have been won by the musical talents of her husband, and to have brought him a pretty good estate.
...

A fourth and still more important book appeared in the same year (1617), the 'History of Tythes,' the best known of all Selden's productions, except his 'Table Talk.'
...

In more than one passage of this essay Selden handles the question whether tithes are payable *jure divino*. In the sixth chapter (section 6), he first approaches the subject; **he does not deny that they are payable by what he calls 'ecclesiastical or positive law,' but he denies that they are payable by what he calls 'the divine moral law or the divine natural law, which should bind all men and**

ever;' and he endeavours to show that the practices of the early church were consistent only with this view. In the seventh chapter he again reverts to the subject, and states the chief question in debate among divines in these terms: 'whether by God's immediate moral law the evangelical priesthood have a right to tythes in equal degree as the layman hath to his nine, or if they have them only as by human positive law and so given them for their spiritual labour.' It obviously follows that if tithes are of divine law, both as to their existence and their quota, they cannot be affected by human law; and here Selden's love of the common law comes into play, and he urges the fact that **'the practised common law … hath never given way herein to the canons, but hath allowed customs and made them subject to all civil titles, infeodations, discharges, compositions, and the like.'** It is not perhaps difficult to guess in which direction the mind of Selden leaned on this crucial question between the canon and the common law, but it is difficult to find in the treatise any direct expression of his private judgment.
...

In this preface he with more than usual spirit turns on his critics; he energetically protests that his book is 'not written to prove that tythes are not due by the law of God; not written to prove that the laity may detain them; not to prove that lay hands may still enjoy appropriations; in sum, not at all against the maintenance of the clergy; neither is it anything else but itself—that is, a mere narrative of the History of Tythes.' **With increased heat he pointed to the opposition which the clergy offered in past times to the progress of true knowledge and to the suspicions with which they had viewed 'the noble studies' of Roger Bacon, Reuchlin, Budæus, and Erasmus.**
...

In the same year Selden, with some other members of both houses, sat in the assembly of divines at Westminster. In the debates of this body (says Whitelocke) 'Mr. Selden spake admirably, and confuted divers of them in their own learning. And sometimes when they had cited a text of scripture to prove their assertion, he would tell them, "Perhaps in your little pocket-bibles with gilt leaves" (which they would often pull out and read) "the translation may be thus, but the Greek or the Hebrew signifies thus and thus," and so would totally silence them.' **Selden proved a thorn in the sides of the Westminster divines, for he liked the claims of presbytery no better than those of episcopacy; and, according to Fuller (*Church Hist*. bk. xi. sect. ix. par. 54), he used his talents rather 'to perplex than inform' his auditors, his interests being 'to humble the jure-divinoship of presbytery.'**
...

During the trial and execution of the king and the rise of Cromwell, Selden abstained from any expression of his views. **'The wisest way for men in these times is to say nothing' was a maxim of his,** on which he seems to have rigorously acted (*Table Talk*, Peace).
...

Of his deathbed several narratives have been preserved, though none of them seem to be first-hand accounts. One given by Aubrey represents him as refusing to see a clergyman through the persuasion of Hobbes; another, found in the Rawlinson MSS. at the Bodleian, as refusing to receive Hobbes, confessing his sins, and receiving absolution from Archbishop Ussher, and as expressing the wish that he had rather executed the office of a justice of the peace than spent his time in what the world calls learning (Macray, *Annals of the Bodleian Library*, 2nd edit. p. 110 *n.*).
...

It was not till 1689, when the revolution had given freedom to the press, that the 'Table Talk' of Selden, the book by which he is generally known to fame, was first printed. This work was composed by Richard Milward [q. v.], a secretary of Selden, and contains reports of Selden's utterances from time to time during the last twenty years of his life. Its authenticity was doubted by Dr. Wilkins, but for reasons which have not satisfied the world; **and the work may safely be accepted as the most vivid picture extant of the habits of thought and the modes of expression of the great Erastian lawyer. The conversations cover a great range of subjects relative to human life and history; but Selden was never metaphysical and rarely philosophical.** The book exhibits him with a great and varied knowledge of life; as a man of strong and somewhat scornful intellect; as delighting to illustrate his discourse by similitudes; **as solving all questions in church and state by a reference to one or two simple principles—the sovereignty of the state, and the contract between the sovereign and his people. 'All is as the state pleases;' 'every law is a contract between the king and the people, and therefore to be kept'—are two sentences characteristic of Selden's habitual thought. Such principles are destructive of the claims to *jus divinum* alike of kings, bishops, and presbyters; and they exclude those theories of natural right to which ardent reformers are wont to have recourse.**
...

The tone adopted by him in his discussion of ecclesiastical questions, the devout language of his last will, and the circumstances of his deathbed, all seem to show that he was a genuine believer in Christianity as a religion having a divine origin, though he thought far otherwise of

the particular modes of government and of the ceremonies of the church. His latitudinarian views, coupled probably with a cynical mode of speaking on the questions which were so keenly debated in his time, together with the fact that Selden was on friendly terms as well with Hobbes as with Archbishop Ussher, are probably the source of the rumour that Selden 'was at the heart an infidel and inclined to the opinions of Hobbs.' Sir Matthew Hale, says Richard Baxter, 'oft professed to me that Mr. Selden was a resolved, serious Christian, and that he was a great adversary to Hobbs's errors, and that he had seen him openly oppose him so earnestly as either to depart from him or drive him out of the room' (Baxter's App. to the 'Life and Death of Hale,' Hale's *Works*, 1805, i. 112).

In politics, if Selden did not exhibit the character of a hero, a martyr, or a saint, he played the part of an honest man. **The fact that he was consulted alike by the commons on their rights and by the lords on their privileges is a remarkable testimony not only to his learning, but to his freedom from party bias.** He seems in all cases to have maintained what he believed to be the right, and to have been diverted from this course neither by the hope of popular applause nor by the favour of the court, nor by resentment for wrongs by which many men would have been soured. His desire was for an ordered liberty, and that he thought was to be found in the ancient constitution of the country. **He had no democratic feeling, and no admiration for the great mass of mankind.** 'So generous,' he says, 'so ingenuous, so proportioned to good, such fosterers of virtue, so industrious, of such mold are the few; so inhuman, so blind, so dissembling, so vain, so justly nothing but what's ill disposition are the most' (Dedication to *Titles of Honour*). Nor did he cherish the sanguine belief which characterises the zealous reformer, that all change is for the better and that all movement is forward. On the contrary, **he had perhaps to a degree unusual even with Englishmen the love of precedent;** he felt that in the records of the race was to be found the only remedy for the shortness of the life of the individual.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA32#v=onepage&q&f=false

But with the Hobbesism Stubbe now mixed for the first time in print another element deriving from the Hebrew scholarship of John Selden (1584-1654), an element that would bulk even larger in his thinking after the Restoration and indeed to the very end of his life. Selden had been at the head of the Erastian faction in the Long Parliament and the Westminster Assembly, and supported his religious position, close in spirit to Hobbes's own, with his Biblical and rabbinical studies. The Scottish Presbyterians in the Westminster Assembly were fond of arguing that their form of church government rested on divine right **and pointed for evidence to support their case to the example of the Jewish Sanhedrin. <u>But Selden shot back 'that the Jewish State and Church was all one, and that so in England it must be, that the Parliament is the Church.'</u>**39

There was much else in Selden's thought to delight Stubbe the Hobbesian Independent. **Selden's rational views led him to deny the existence of 'spiritual jurisdictions' and the notion of heresy.**40 His remarks in the Westminster Assembly were recorded by his secretary Richard Milward and eventually published in *Table Talk* (1662).41 There he revealed himself as a believer, but one who accepted a natural religion based upon God's commands as set down in Scripture.42
…

Selden claimed that the ancient Hebrews had practiced toleration and that it was their example in this regard that should be followed. Stubbe repeated his argument.
…

There was John Selden of course, **and we have seen Selden's scholarship was chiefly responsible for supplying Stubbe with his model for natural religion, the precepts of Noah, which Stubbe was willing to adopt as a basis of religious belief and practice in revolutionary England.** Stubbe also probably knew of the religious views of a fellow student of Selden, James Harrington,54 who preached a civil religion in which the citizen's devotion to the equal commonwealth would amount to a universal form of religious worship, another kind of natural religion, in which controversy and turmoil would disappear in favor of service to the republic.55

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater

III. ***Is it the Principles of the*** **Old Greeks and Romans** ***which you prefer before ours? If you never read them, believe not me, but believe*** **Hobbes** ***and multitudes of other sorts that say, They mostly hated Kings;*** *and even* Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, *&c. took it for a meritorious act to kill tyrants: (and whom did they mean?)* ***<u>Of all men set not them before us.</u>***

IV. ***Is it the*** **new Philosophers;** ***such*** **Cartesians** ***as*** **Spinosa,** ***and such as*** **Hobbes** ***that you prefer?*** *I shall tell you after, what are their politicks.*

V. *Is it the famous Lawyers and Politick writers of* Europe, *Papists or Protestants? I have told you after what they hold.* ***What heaps of Testimonies doth the Great Lawyer*** **Hottoman** ***in his*** **Franco-Gallia** ***bring, to***

prove the Power of Nobles and Parliaments limiting the Monarch formerly in* France? *And* Bodin *is against him as to the Constitution of* France, *and by the information of* Dale *the English Embassador, taketh* England *also to be an Absolute Monarchy, and that the Parliament hath no* Authoritative *part in* making Laws, *but only a* requesting *and* advising *part, and the King the only Legislative. Yet see what are even* Bodins *Principles.

1. Pag. 98. *He saith* Sovereign Majesty *and* absolute power, consisteth principally in giving Laws to the Subjects in general without their consent.

2. Chap. 5. ***He taketh slavery to be unlawful.***

3. Page 88. c. 8. ***He maketh Monarchy to be the gift of the people*, voluntarily disseising and despoiling themselves of the Sovereign power to seize and invest another in it.** (As if a man should by a pure gift deliver to another man the propriety and possession that to him belongeth); *And so he maketh the Ruler to have just so much power as the people give him.* ***And at this rate Lawyers ordinarily speak both Protestants and Papists.***

4. ***He even excepteth from the absolute Sovereigns power, all that is commanded, or forbidden by the Law of God and Nature, which no man can abrogate,*** pag. 89, &c.
...

11. ***Though he justly blame* Aristot. (p. 206.) *for defining a King to be him, who chosen by the people, reigneth as they desire*] from whose will if he never so little depart he becometh a tyrant;** *And though* Althusius *blame* Bodin *for being for* absolute Monarchy, *yet* Bodin l. 2. c. 4. *describeth a Tyrant just as* Althusius (*after cited*) *doth, if not more copiously and odiously:* ***The learned Reader may peruse* pag. 212. *his difference between a King and a Tyrant, too large to be recited, and scarce safe for the vulgar to read, lest they should think most Princes by those Characters be Tyrants:*** *I am sure it goeth far beyond our Language.*

12. ***And it's the more dangerous in that* c. 5. p. 220, 221. *he teacheth* [that it is a fair *and* magnifical thing, for a Prince (*of another land*) to take up Arms to relieve a whole Nation *and* People unjustly oppressed by the cruelty of a Tyrant.** [*And that* [it is lawful for any stranger to kill a Tyrant,] that is to say, a man of all men infamed and notorious for the oppression, Murder and slaughter of his Subjects. But as for Subjects to do the same, it must be known whether the Prince be an Absolute Sovereign, or not: For if he be no absolute Sovereign, then must the Sovereignty of necessity be either in the people or the nobility, in which case there is no doubt but that it is lawful to proceed against a Tyrant by way of Justice, if so men may prevail against him. Or else by way of fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise have reason. ***As the* Senate *did against* Nero *and* Maximinus.**— *p.* 222. It shall be lawful not only for strangers, but for the Subjects themselves also to take them out of the way].

Albericus Gentilis [1552-1608] *was made* Professor *of the* Civil Law *in* Oxford: *(where he unsuccessfully wrote for Stage-Plays against* D. Jo. Reignolds): *And therefore he was one of the Church of* England; *And in his book* De jure Belli, *he holdeth,*
...

5. ***And to prove that men must defend each other, contrary to* Hobbes *and* Spinosa, *he notably sheweth that Christians and Heathens agreed that all the world is one Body, house, city, of which all are members, made under one law*, c. 15. *and citeth* Bartolus, Baldus, Alciatus, Albericus *and many more Lawyers to prove that the omission of defending others is a sin: especially when they are our near friends: citing* Ulpian *and* Tully *for it as the Law of Nature.***

6. C. 16. *He writeth for Princes defending the Subjects of other Princes, if unjustly oppressed, yea sometime though the Subjects were unjust, to keep them from immoderate penalty: Much more I pass by.* ***And are these Lawyers Doctrines more loyal than ours here professed?***

In a word, ***Libraries and Booksellers shops abound with such Books, as teach such Doctrines, Philosophers, Historians, Papists and Protestants; and yet no such outcry of Treason and Rebellion hath been raised against them, but the Books commonly tolerated and read:*** *And we that never owned such things are by Plotters represented as if we were ready by our disloyal Doctrine to destroy the King and Kingdom.*

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_032

Far more deliberate, though much less known to posterity, was the attack made on the Common Law in America not by Popes or bishops but by Puritans. The settlers of Massachusetts refused to admit any authority but that of their own enactments, tempered by a general deference to 'God's word,' meaning thereby the text of the Mosaic law: not the system of the great medieval Rabbis, but the letter of the Pentateuch interpreted after their own fashion. **Such was the prevailing temper, down to the eighteenth century, throughout the New England States,** and the zeal of Massachusetts was equalled or even exceeded elsewhere (I do not, of course, refer to the spurious 'Blue Laws' of Connecticut; the genuine examples are sufficient). Besides the constant Puritanic or Judaizing bias, these early colonial ordinances exhibit curious reversions to archaic ideas and classification. Outside New England there was not the same downright

aversion to English law and procedure, but it would be hard to find even in Virginia or the Carolinas, within the same period, any received presumption in favour of the Common Law being the groundwork of local jurisprudence.1 **It may seem a paradox, but it is a fact which research more and more tends to confirm, that it was none of the Pilgrim Fathers, but the Fathers of the Constitution, who, in the very act of repudiating allegiance to king and parliament, enthroned our lady the Common Law on the western shores of the Atlantic.**

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

> It is only against the background of the Old World Enlightenment that we can appreciate the political achievements of the men who were to be immortalized as Founding Fathers of the new Republic, their resourcefulness, their ingenuity, their wisdom, their sagacity, their virtue. **Where most of the philosophes of the Old World were recruited from Naturalists and doctors and ecclesiastics—how the Abbés disported themselves in the pages of the Encyclopédie!—in America most of them were students of the law.** Law was the common denominator of Jefferson and Madison, of George Mason who wrote Virginia's famous Bill of Rights and George Wythe who presided over her highest court, of Alexander Hamilton and of John Jay, of John Adams who was the chief justice of his state (he never took office, to be sure) and Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and the American Blackstone, James Wilson, and his fellow commentator on the Constitution, Nathaniel Chipman of Vermont, and the two brilliant Pinckneys of South Carolina, and even of the educator and lexicographer Noah Webster. **And even those who were not trained to the law, like Franklin, Dr. Rush, and Tom Paine, were more than lawyers, they were political philosophers. <u>It was the lawyers who had written the Declaration of Independence and the Northwest Ordinance—and it was mostly lawyers who drafted the Constitutions of the States and of the new United States.</u> For forty years every President of the new nation, with the exception of Washington himself, and every Vice-President and Secretary of State, without exception, was a lawyer.** In America politics was the universal preoccupation, legislation the universal resource, and Constitutions the universal panacea.
>
> Henry Steele Commager (1977)1

…

They saw the need to escape an Anglican bishop in the colonies, but they did not see the enormous threat to Christian civilization posed by the unitarians and Masons who were becoming the colonial leaders, and who were articulating the civil principles of the Revolution. The pastors became "the black regiment" of the Revolution,7 but they did not become its general officers. In 1776, they became chaplains at home and in camp for an army that was under the hierarchical control of a dedicated Mason of great public virtue. They preached their fast-day sermons and their regimental sermons just as they had preached election-day sermons since the Indian wars of 1675-76: as anointers of the state. Their messages had been self-consciously devoid of specific biblical judicial content for a century by the time of the Revolutionary War.8 This did not change, 1776-1788. The pastors had long since deferred politically to the lawyers. **The lawyers inherited the kingdom of politics during the American Revolution. They did this ingeniously; <u>in fact, like the rise of the empire in Rome, politics fell into their hands as a by-product of war.</u>**

…

To put it another way, why were the lawyers in charge of the Convention and the pastors absent? **Why were the pamphlet debates of 1787-88 conducted in terms of Roman historical examples and not biblical historical examples? Why was there never any appeal to specific biblical laws, but endless appeals to natural laws?**

…

But, on the whole, Schaff's statement is representative of two centuries of incomparable historical misrepresentation—a myth that is taken seriously by virtually all conservative American Christians.

The conspirators of 1787 were successful beyond their wildest dreams. Their victims still do not know what happened to them. That a serious historian could write about the oath in this manner—the oath that is in fact the exact opposite of what Schaff claimed it is—is mind-boggling. It is self-deception on a scale not normally encountered, even in academia. This oath does indeed recognize the Supreme Being, to whom the oath is a solemn appeal; that Supreme Being is the sovereign incorporating People.

…

> **<u>The church … was thrown out into the street by the lawyers of Philadelphia, who decided not to have a Christian country.</u> … [I]n effect, they took all the promises of**

> **religion, the pursuit of happiness, safety, security, all kinds of things, and they set up a lawyers' paradise, and the church was disenfranchised totally.**
>
> Otto Scott (1988)2
>
> https://archive.org/details/secretsixjohnbro00scot/page/96/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The United States was a government whose constitution claimed no higher authority than its own laws. **That was essentially a lawyer's concept of civilization, and could be traced not to the church, but to Roman tradition.**15

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OymeBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA133#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 26. *BW* I, no. 181, [24 December 1609]. Grotius hurried to make known his good intentions. He was unwilling to pass judgment on the controversy with Arminius: 'Caeterum, quae Arminio tecum ac cum bonis multis disconvenere, ea nec satis scio, nec si sciam temere me interponam. Habet ista res suos iudices.' In a letter to J. Rutgersius, 24 December 1609 (*BW* I, no. 182) **he says that he did not understand the greater part of the theological polemic, but referring to a knock-down argument used by the famous Jacobus Cuiacius (Cujas) when asked his opinion of the French wars of religion ('Nihil hoc ad edictum praetoris'),** Grotius claimed that a modicum of theology was enough for him: 'Nobis modica theologia sufficit.'

…

Although Gomarus' followers stubbornly refused to tolerate the moderate ideas of Arminius, **Grotius steadfastly played the role of honest broker before the outside world.** In many letters he spoke out as an energetic advocate of peace; he sought to calm heated passions, to win over such moderate conservative theologians as Anthonius Walaeus for the cause of toleration, to restrain such fanatical Remonstrants as Petrus Bertius, and to keep the perpetually timid Gerardus Joannes Vossius in the background as his anonymous adviser.

But Grotius' professions of impartiality were a smokescreen. This is clear enough from the ferocity with which he attacked the quarrelsomeness and intolerance of the professional theologians on the Contra-Remonstrant side.33 **In reality he and Wtenbogaert were in the vanguard of the Arminian pressure group,** each of them deploying his own particular talents and strong points.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Erastus,_Thomas
>
> "Erastianism," as a by-word, is used to denote the doctrine of the supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical causes; but the problem of the relations between church and state is one on which Erastus nowhere enters. **What is known as "Erastianism" would be better connected with the name of Grotius.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OymeBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA657#v=onepage&q&f=false

This biography has already referred many times to the *Grotiana*, a collection of erudite confidences and *bons mots* which the Paris physician Guy Patin noted down from Grotius' lips during several conversations in the rue des Saints-Pères from 1 June 1643.

…

Grotius also made some noteworthy remarks to Patin about his teachers and intellectual models, particularly their confessional attitudes. Of course he reminisced to Patin about Scaliger, who had abandoned the Catholic Church early on because he could not reconcile himself to the abuses that prevailed in it. **Grotius agreed with the jurist Jacques Cujas (Jacobus Cuiacius), who had tried to persuade Scaliger that he ought not to leave the Catholic Church for the sake of a few abuses, which a reasonable man, 'un habile homme,' would certainly take in his stride. One could stay within the Catholic Church, as Erasmus had done, and still criticize the ignorance of the priesthood and the dissolute, perfidious life of the monks.** According to Grotius, Scaliger had been too obstinate to take advice from anyone and so he had rejected Cujas's arguments. Here Grotius was clearly agreeing with the idea that the abuses in the Church were not serious enough to justify leaving it.265

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_jure_belli_ac_pacis

De iure belli ac pacis (English: *On the Law of War and Peace*) is a 1625 book in Latin, written by Hugo Grotius and published in Paris, on the legal status of war.[1] It is now regarded as a foundational work in international law.[2]

…

According to Pieter Geyl:

> It is an attempt by a theologically and classically educated jurist to base upon law order and security in the community of states as well as in the national society in which he had grown up. **In the rather naïve rationalism, the belief in reason as the lord of life, is revealed the spiritual son of Erasmus.**[5]

In particular, this work is remembered for the Latin sentence:

> *Et haec quidem quae iam diximus, locum aliquem haberent etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana.*[6]
>
> What we have been saying would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness: that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern to Him.[7]

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/270/mode/2up?view=theater

The law of God, the law of Nature. … It was not Grotius who invented this twofold formula. It had done duty long before his time; the Middle Ages were acquainted with it. What then was it that was new about it? How came it to be criticized and condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities? Why did it create such a stir?

Its novelty lay in the patent separation of the two terms; in the no less evident tendency to stretch their opposition; and then in an attempt to reconcile the two, which of itself implied that the rift was a real one. Above all, it lay in an idea of which we have already made mention, an idea which, though not as yet clearly defined, was full of vigour: **War, violence, disorder, which the law of God does not repress but suffers rather, and even justifies, as being part of an inscrutable design, all the ills which man is heir to – perhaps the day will come when some human law will bring about their mitigation, their abolition. Thus it is that we are invited, with manifold excuses for such boldness, to pass from the Order of Providence to the Order of Humanity.**

> https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n133/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 395 **First Grotius, just because of the great love he bears the truth, sets aside divine providence and professes that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be left out of account. Thus all the reproofs which in a great number of matters he brings against the Roman jurists, do not touch them at all,** since they took divine providence for their first principle and proposed to treat of the natural law of nations, not that of the philosophers and moral theologians.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA36#v=onepage&q&f=false

Who was it, I pray, that introduc'd in the last Age, the methodical Study of the Law of Nature; that first attempted to give the World a System of this so vast, and necessary a Science? Was it any of the Ecclesiasticks, or Professors of Divinity? No: 'twas the illustrious *Grotius*; whose Memory wou'd on this very Account, be for ever bless'd amongst all sincere Lovers of Truth and Virtue; tho' he had not otherwise gain'd an immortal Reputation, by the many Pieces he has wrote of another Nature; all excellent in their kind.—**Yet no sooner did that admirable Treatise, of the *Right of War and Peace*, appear in the World; but the Ecclesiasticks, instead of returning thanks to the Author for it; every where declar'd against him:** And his Book was not only put into *the Expurgatory Index* of the k *Roman Catholick* Inquisitors, (which is not so much to be wonder'd at;) **but many, even Protestant Divines, labour'd to cry it down. And thus it far'd too with Mr. *Pufendorf*'s Book of, *The Law of Nature and Nations*.** The *Jesuites* of *Vienna* caus'd it to be prohibited; l and many Protestant Divines, both of *Sweden* and *Germany*, did their best, to make this excellent Work share every where else the same Fate.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/jean-barbeyrac-on-the-need-to-disobey-unjust-laws-1715

The French jurist and translator of Grotius and Pufendorf, Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), also expressed his own interpretations of natural law in very lengthy footnotes and appendices to his translations, thus meriting being taken seriously as a legal theorist in his own right.

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_head_056
>
> **For in the end, the instant that the most genuine laws of the most legitimate sovereign conflict in any way whatsoever with these immutable laws written in our heart, there is no question of seeking a balance, because it is absolutely necessary, cost what it may, to disobey the former in order not to do damage to the latter. Men's submission to civil government does not extend, and never could extend even when they wished it, to the**

point where a human legislator is set higher than God, the author of nature, the creator and supreme legislator of men. As for things indifferent, it is entirely reasonable if, beyond the mountain or the river, something is considered just, while as a result of the contrary wills of the legislators of two different states, on this side it is considered unjust. But when it is a question of that which is clearly commanded or forbidden by the universal law of humankind, all the laws in the world can no more render just what is unjust than they can render healthy what is toxic for our bodies.11

https://books.openedition.org/larhra/735

Frustrated in his attempt to become a full minister of the French church—on account of his supposed Socinian leanings—he turned instead to the study of natural law.
…

Most revealing, perhaps, is the remarkable address Barbeyrac held in 1721, four years after his arrival in Groningen: *De magistratu, forte peccante, e pulpitis sacris non traducendo*. The address questioned the lawfulness of denouncing magistrates from the pulpit. **Barbeyrac's message was unmistakable. No clergyman, he claimed, has the right to publicly criticize the magistracy for any reason whatsoever.** A minister of the church has the same obligation as any other citizen.
…

It would probably not be far off the mark to claim that most Dutch law students—many of whom would later follow a career as a magistrate—were quite familiar with the contents of Barbeyrac's anticlerical address. Moreover, in the course of the eighteenth century references to the address surfaced time and again, in poems, in moral weeklies, in sermons, and so on.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Nor has there ever been, amongst all the Philosophers, l yet extant, who have spoke in stronger Terms of the fatal Necessity of Things; or who have more magnify'd m the Liberty of Man, than the *Stoicks*." These Principles, I must own, are monstrous; and the several Philosophers of that Sect have, each in particular, added thereto some new Absurdities. However, bating some certain Things, nothing can be more beautiful than their Morality, consider'd in itself; which, **by only correcting a few of its Maxims, with some small Difference in their Explanation; might be easily reduc'd to a System of Morality, very near approaching to that of the Gospel;** to that, I say, which alone is entirely conformable to the Dictates of right Reason.
…

There was never any Sect of Philosophers, who so well understood, and so strongly press'd those indispensable Duties of Humanity, which Men, precisely consider'd as such, owe to one another. A learned *Englishman*, x in the Preface to his great and instructive Commentary on the *Reflections* of *Marcus Antoninus*, has given us a short Summary of the most shining Precepts of the Morality of the *Stoicks*; taken chiefly from the Writings of that Emperour, *Epictetus*, and *Seneca*; who are the only Philosophers of that Sect, whose Writings we have left. I am persuaded, it will not be displeasing to insert it here; **since this will serve to let us see how far the Light of Reason alone, tho' not exactly follow'd, and in some Things too a little defac'd; has carry'd those among the Pagans, who have thought fit to consult her.**
…

This is the beautiful Side of the Morality of the Stoicks; **and it must be further acknowledg'd, to their Praise, that they stopp'd not at general Notions; and indeterminate unapply'd Maxims:** But on the contrary, to judge of the Matter only by those few Writings, we have left us by the three Persons above mention'd, with the Fragments of others, and the Writings of those who have reason'd upon their Principles; **it may be truly affirm'd, that of all the Philosophers of Antiquity, they are the Men, who have gone the farthest into the Particulars of Morality;** and have the best apply'd its general Precepts to the several States of Life; and the different Exigences of humane Affairs.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false

The *Roman Lawyers*, of whom the greatest Part were *Stoicks*, contributed very much to the perfecting that Part of Morality, which may be call'd *Natural Jurisprudence*. y The Study of the Law having under the Emperours, become a principal Step to Preferment; the Men of the greatest Genius, and Parts among the *Romans*, continu'd to apply themselves to this Study, for near the Space of two Centuries. It were to be wish'd, that we had had the Writings of those famous Lawyers intire; they would no doubt have afforded us very great Light. But the Emperour *Justinian*, having been pleas'd to a bridge the *Roman* Laws; of which the Decisions of these Lawyers, were the most considerable Part; their Works hereupon grew out of Use; so that we have now left of 'em, only some Fragments in the

> *Digest*. *Tribonian* the Lawyer, to whose Care the Emperour had committed this Work; has left us a very Chaos, z full of Obscurity and Contradictions; which afford a vast Field for Chicanery; and which have, in the latter Centuries, produc'd that prodigious Number of senseless, and confus'd Commentaries.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-vol-1-book-i#lf1032-01_head_009

V. *But since it would be a vain Undertaking to treat of Right, if there is really no such thing; it will be necessary, in order to shew the Usefulness of our Work, and to establish it on solid Foundations, to confute here in a few Words so dangerous an Error. And that we may not engage with a Multitude at once, let us assign the man Advocate.* ***And who more proper for this Purpose than*** **Carneades,** ***who arrived to such a Degree of Perfection, (the utmost his Sect aimed at,) that he could argue for or against Truth, with the same Force of Eloquence?*** *This Man having undertaken to dispute against Justice, that kind of it, especially, which is the Subject of this Treatise, found no Argument stronger than this.*1 *Laws (says he) were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest; and hence it is that they are different, not only in different Countries, according to the Diversity of their Manners, but often in the same Country, according to the Times.* ***As to that which is called*** **Natural Right,** ***it is a mere Chimera. Nature prompts all Men, and in general all Animals, to seek their own particular Advantage: So that either there is no Justice at all, or if there is any, it is extreme Folly, because it engages us to procure the Good of others, to our own Prejudice.***

VI. *But what is here said by the Philosopher, and by the Poet after him,*

> By naked Nature ne'er was understood
> What's Just and Right.1

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0063%3Abook%3D1%3Apoem%3D3%3Acard%3D76

> They who are pleased [to rank all] faults nearly on an equality, are troubled when they come to the truth of the matter: **sense and morality are against them, and utility itself,[6] the mother almost of right and of equity.** When [rude] animals, they crawled[7] forth upon the firstformed earth, the mute and dirty herd fought with their nails and fists for their acorn and caves, afterward with clubs, and finally with arms which experience had forged: **till they found out words and names, by which they ascertained their language and sensations: thenceforward they began to abstain from war, to fortify towns, and establish laws:** that no person should be a thief, a robber, or an adulterer. For before Helen's time there existed [many] a woman who was the dismal cause of war: but those fell by unknown deaths, whom pursuing uncertain venery, as the bull in the herd, the strongest slew. It must of necessity be acknowledged, if you have a mind to turn over the aeras and annals of the world, that laws were invented from an apprehension of the natural injustice [of mankind]. **Nor can nature separate what is unjust from what is just, in the same manner as she distinguishes what is good from its reverse, and what is to be avoided from that which is to be sought: nor will reason persuade men to this, that he who breaks down the cabbage-stalk of his neighbor, sins in as great a measure, and in the same manner, as he who steals by night things consecrated to the gods.**

*must by no Means be admitted. For Man is indeed an Animal, but one of a very high Order, and that excells all the other Species of Animals much more than they differ from one another; as the many Actions proper only to Mankind sufficiently demonstrate. Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of*2 *Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own Kind,* ***not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of his Understanding; which Disposition the*3 **Stoicks** ***termed*** **Οἰκείωσιν.4** *Therefore the Saying, that every Creature is led by Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be granted.*
…

VIII. ***This Sociability, which we have now described in general, or this Care of maintaining Society*1 *in a Manner conformable to the Light of human Understanding,*2 *is the Fountain of Right, properly so called;*** *to which belongs the Abstaining*3 *from that which is another's, and the Restitution of what we have of another's, or of the Profit we have made by it, the Obligation of fulfilling Promises, the Reparation of a Damage done through our own Default, and the Merit of Punishment among Men.*

> 1. **Hence it appears that our Author does not mean that bare natural Instinct in the Rule of the Law of Nature; but that he adds Reason for the Direction of such Instinct, without which it might misguide us, and induce us to consult only our private Interest.** Hence it is also that he elsewhere makes what belongs to the Law of Nature consist in a necessary Conformity to, or Difformity from a reasonable and sociable Nature, Book I. Chap. I. § 12. Num. I. **So that it is ridiculous to object, as Gaspar Ziegler has done, that the Desire of Society, which Grotius lays down as the Foundation of the Law of Nature, might be gratified, though a Man were united in Society and Friendship with one Nation only, or even with one single Family: and that Highwaymen and Pyrates have also their Societies,** &c. **For Reason, which is peculiar to Man, and which is more natural to him than the Desire of Society, of which we find some Traces in Beasts, clearly**

teaches us that it is not proper to confine Sociability and Affection to a small Number of Persons, or to one single Community; but that it ought, in some Manner or other, to extend to all Men, or to all of our own Species; on whom it is equally diffused by Virtue of the Design of Nature, and on the Account of their being naturally all alike and equal. I shall not here enlarge on this Subject, but refer the Reader to the Explication and Defence of the general Principle of Sociability, in my Notes on PUFENDORF's *Law of Nature and Nations*, Book II. Chap. III. So that, on the whole, a Man must be very wrong headed, who will hereafter expose himself by starting and multiplying frivolous Difficulties against a Truth, which when well understood, leaves no room for any plausible Objection.

2. **SENECA makes an excellent Application of this Principle.** "That a Sentiment of Gratitude," says he, "is a Thing valuable in its own Nature, appears from the odious Character which Ingratitude bears in the World, there being nothing so destructive of Concord and the Union of Mankind, as this shameful Vice. **In reality, on what does our Security depend, but on the mutual Exchange of good Offices? Certainly nothing but this Commerce of Benefits can make Life commodious, and put us in a Condition of guarding against unforeseen Insults and Invasions. How miserable would Mankind be, if every one lived apart, and had no Resource, but in himself? So many Men, so many Persons exposed every Moment to be the Prey and Victims of other Animals: Blood continually ready to be spilt, in a Word, Weakness itself. Other Animals are strong enough to defend themselves. All such as are designed for a wandering Life, and whose natural Ferocity doth not allow them to go in Bodies, come into the World armed, as I may say. Whereas Man is defenceless on all Sides, having neither Claws nor Teeth to make him formidable.** But in Society with his like he finds the wanted Succours. Nature to make him amends, has furnished him with two Things, which from weak and miserable as he would have been, render him very strong and powerful; I mean, Reason and a Disposition to Society. So that he, who when alone was not able to resist any other, by this Union becomes Master of all. The Disposition to Society gives him the Dominion over all the Animals, not even excepting those bred in the Sea, which live in another Element. It is Society also that furnishes him with Remedies against Distempers, Assistance in his old Age, Relief and Comfort in the midst of Sorrows and Afflictions. This is what puts him in a Condition of defying Fortune, if I may use the Expression. Take away the Disposition to Society, and you will at the same Time destroy the Union of Mankind, on which the Preservation and Happiness of Life depend. Now to maintain that Ingratitude is not a detestable Vice and what ought to be avoided for its own Sake, but only on the Account of its pernicious Consequences, is no better than destroying the Disposition to Society." *De Benefic.* Lib. IV. Cap. XVIII. GROTIUS.

...

XI. *And indeed, all we have now said would take place,*1 *though we should even grant, what without the greatest Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no Care of human Affairs.* ***The contrary of which appearing*2 *to us, partly from Reason, partly from a perpetual Tradition, which many Arguments and Miracles, attested by all Ages, fully confirm;*** *it hence follows, that God, as being our Creator, and to whom we owe our Being, and all that we have, ought to be obeyed by us in all Things without Exception, especially since he has so many Ways shewn his infinite Goodness and Almighty Power; whence we have Room to conclude that he is able to bestow, upon those that obey him, the greatest Rewards, and those eternal too, since he himself is eternal; and that he is willing so to do ought even to be believed, especially if he has in express Words promised it; as we Christians, convinced by undoubted Testimonies, believe he has.*

XII. *And this now is another Original of Right, besides that of Nature, being that which proceeds from the free Will*1 *of God, to which our Understading infallibly assures us, we ought to be subject: And even the Law of Nature itself, whether it be that which consists in the Maintenance of Society, or that which in a looser Sense is so called, though it flows from the internal Principles of Man, may notwithstanding be justly ascribed*2 *to God, because it was his Pleasure that these Principles should be in us.* ***And in this Sense* Chrysippus3 *and the* Stoicks *said, that the Original of Right is to be derived from no other than* Jupiter *himself; from which Word* Jupiter *it is probable*4 *the* Latins *gave it the Name* Jus.**

1. For this Reason, according to the Sentiment of MARCUS ANTONINUS, every Man, who commits an Act of Injustice, renders himself guilty of Impiety. Ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀσεβεῖ. Lib. IX. § 1. GROTIUS.

2. "When I speak of Nature," says St. CHRYSOSTOM, on 1 Cor. xi. 3. "I mean God; for he is the Author of Nature." And CHRYSIPPUS expresses himself thus. **"For it is not possible to find any other Principle or Origin of Justice, than *Jupiter* and universal Nature; for there we must always begin, whenever we design to treat of Good and Evil."** Book III. *Of the Gods.* GROTIUS.

XIII. *There is yet this farther Reason for ascribing it to God, that God by the Laws which he has given,* ***has made these very Principles more clear and evident, even to those who are less capable of strict Reasoning, and has forbid us to give way to those impetuous*1 *Passions,*** *which, contrary*2 *to our own Interest, and that of others, divert us from following the Rules of Reason and Nature; for as they are exceeding unruly, it was necessary to keep a strict Hand over them, and to confine them within certain narrow Bounds.*

XIV. *Add to this, that sacred History, besides the Precepts it contains to this Purpose,* ***affords no inconsiderable Motive to social Affection, since it teaches us that all Men are descended from the same first Parents. So that in this Respect also may be truly affirmed, what* Florentinus *said in***

another Sense, That*1 *Nature has made us all akin: Whence it follows, that it is a Crime for one Man to act to the Prejudice of another.

1. *Digest.* Lib. I. Tit. I. *De Justitiâ & Jure.* Leg. III. **The Ideas of the Stoicks, and such was this Lawyer, concerning the Origin of Mankind, were very confused; and though they introduced the Divinity, it was in a very different Manner from what MOSES uses in his History of the Creation.** See JUSTUS LIPSIUS's *Physiolog. Stoic.* Lib. III. Dissert. IV. **The *Kindred*, which they conceived as subsisting among Men, did not consist in their considering all Mankind as descended from the same Father and the same Mother; but only in the Conformity of their Nature, and the Principles or Materials of which they thought them composed.** See MARCUS ANTONINUS, Book II. § 1. and GATAKER'S learned Notes on that Place.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0036.007?view=text;rgn=main#N34-ptr1

One of the most influential works in framing the Enlightenment theory of comparative religion, Bernard de Fontenelle's *De l'origine des fables*, was published in the same year as Lafitau's *Moeurs*. [37] **Alfonso Iacono stresses the importance of the differences between these authors' assumptions, writing that "while Lafitau postulates a sole origin from which peoples' times unfold genetically ... for Fontenelle the principle that unites men and peoples ... [is] the uniformity of human nature."**[38]

...

XVII. *Therefore the Saying, not of* Carneades *only, but of others,*

Interest, that Spring of Just and Right.1

1. ***Atque ipsa Utilitas Justi propè mater, & Aequi.*** HORAT. Lib. I. Sat. III. Ver. 98. Upon which Place, an ancient Commentator on HORACE, whether ACRON or any other Grammarian, makes the following Remark. **"The Poet here opposes the Tenets of the Stoicks; for his Design is to prove that Justice is not Natural, but derived from Interest."** See what St. AUGUSTIN says against this Opinion, *De Doctrina Christiana,* Lib. III. Cap. XIV. GROTIUS.

if we speak accurately, is not true; for the Mother of Natural Law is human Nature itself, which, though even the Necessity of our Circumstances should not require it, would of itself create in us a mutual Desire of Society: And the Mother of Civil Law is that very Obligation which arises from Consent, which deriving its Force from the Law of Nature, Nature may be called as it were, the Great Grandmother of this Law also. ***But to the Law of Nature Profit is annexed: For the Author of Nature was pleased, that every Man in particular*2 *should be weak of himself, and in Want of many Things necessary for living commodiously, to the End we might more eagerly affect Society:*** *Whereas of the Civil Law Profit was the Occasion; for that entering into Society, or that Subjection which we spoke of, began first for the Sake of some Advantage. And besides, those who prescribe Laws to others, usually have, or ought*3 *to have, Regard to some Profit therein.*

XVIII. *But as the Laws of each State respect the Benefit of that State; so amongst all or most States there might be, and in Fact there are, some Laws agreed on by common Consent, which respect the Advantage not of one Body in particular, but of all in general.* ***And this is what is called the Law of Nations,*1 when used in Distinction to the**2 ***Law of Nature. This Part of Law*** **Carneades** ***omitted, in the Division he made of all Law into Natural and Civil of each People or State;*** *when notwithstanding, since he was to treat of the Law which is between Nations (for he added a Discourse concerning Wars and Things got by War) he ought by all means to have mentioned this Law.*

...

XLIII. ***Among Philosophers*** **Aristotle** ***deservedly holds the chief Place, whether you consider his Method of treating Subjects, or the Acuteness of his Distinctions, or the Weight of his Reasons. I could only wish that the Authority of this great Man had not for some Ages past degenerated into Tyranny, so that Truth, for the Discovery of which*** **Aristotle** ***took so great Pains, is now oppressed by nothing more than the very Name of*** **Aristotle.** *I, for my Part, both in this and in all my other Writings, take to myself the Liberty of the ancient Christians, who espoused no Sect of Philosophers; not that they held with those who asserted that nothing can be known, than which there is nothing more foolish; but were of Opinion, that there was no one Sect that had discovered all Truth, nor any but what held something that was true. Therefore to collect into a Body the Truths that were dispersed in the Writings of each Philosopher and each Sect, they conceived to be nothing else, but*1 *to deliver the true Christian Doctrine.*

1. **This is what LACTANTIUS says,** ***Would any one but collect what Truths are scattered through the Writings of each of them, and diffused through the several Sects, and reduce them into one Body, he would not differ from us.*** Instit. Divin. *Lib.* VII. *Cap.* VII. (*Num. 4. Edit. Cellar.*) JUSTIN MARTYR speaks to the same Purpose in his first Apology: *Not*, says he, *because the Doctrines of* PLATO *are entirely different from those of* CHRIST; *but because they are not conformable to them in every Particular.* ***Which is also the Case in regard to the Tenets of the other Philosophers, as of the Stoicks, and of the Poets and Historians; for each of them, being directed by a Ray of the Light of innate Divine Reason, discovered something conformable to it, and spoke well so far*** (p. 34. *Edit. Oxon.*) **TERTULLIAN frequently calls SENECA,** ***our Seneca;*** but then he observes

that, *none but* CHRIST *could give us a complete Body of Spiritual Virtues*, (Adv. Jud. Cap. IX.) St. AUGUSTINE lays it down as a Fact that *those Rules of Morality, which are so highly commended by* CICERO, *are taught and learnt in the Christian Churches, diffused through the whole World*, Ep. CCII. See what the same Father says in regard to the *Platonists*, whom he maintains to be almost Christians, *Ep.* LVI, in his Treatise *De Verâ Religione*, Cap. III. and *Confess.* Book VII. Chap. IX. and Book VIII. Chap. II. GROTIUS.

XLIV. ***Among other Things, (that I may mention this by the by, as not being foreign to our Purpose,) it is not without Reason, that some of the*** **Platonists** ***and ancient***[1] ***Christians seem to dissent from*** **Aristotle** ***in this, that he placed the very Nature of Virtue***[2] ***in a Mediocrity of Passions and Actions;*** *which being once laid down, drove him to this, that of Virtues of a different Kind, as for Instance,*[3] *Liberality and Frugality, he made but one; and assigned*[4] *to Veracity two Opposites between which there is not an equal Contrariety*, viz. *Boasting and false Modesty; and imposed the Name of Vice upon some Things, which either are not in Nature, or in themselves are not Vices, as, the*[5] *Contempt of Pleasure and*[6] *Honours, and an Insensibility to Injuries, which*[7] *hinders us from being angry against Men.*

XLV. *But that this Principle of Mediocrity, taken universally, is not rightly laid, appears from the Instance of Justice itself, whose Opposites, too much and too little, when he could not find in the Affections and their subsequent Actions,*[1] *he sought for* Both *in the Things themselves about which Justice is conversant.* ***Which very thing is in the first Place to leap from one kind of Thing to another, which he deservedly blames in others;*** *and in the next Place, to receive less*[2] *than one's Due may indeed happen to be a Vice, when the Circumstances of himself or his Family cannot allow of any Abatement; but certainly it cannot be repugnant to Justice, since it consists wholly in abstaining from that which is another Man's. Like to which Mistake is that of his not allowing*[3] *Adultery proceeding from Lust, and Murder from Anger, to belong properly to Injustice: Whereas the very Nature of Injustice consists in nothing, else, but in the Violation of another's Rights; nor does it signify, whether it proceeds from Avarice, or Lust, or Anger, or imprudent Pity, or Ambition, which are usually the Sources of the greatest Injuries. For to resist all Temptations of what Kind soever, and that for this only Reason*, viz. *the preserving of Human Society inviolable, is indeed the proper Business of Justice.*

XLVI. *To return from this Digression, true indeed it is, that to some Virtues it happens, that they moderate the Affections, yet not for the Reason, that it is the proper and perpetual Office of all Virtue to do so; but because right Reason, which Virtue always follows,*[1] *prescribes a Measure to be followed in some Things; in others it excites us to the utmost we are capable of.* ***We cannot, for instance,***[2] ***serve God with too much Ardour; for the Crime of Superstition consists not in serving God with too much Ardour, but in serving him perversely. Neither can we too much desire eternal Happiness, nor too much dread eternal Misery, nor too much hate Sin.*** *It is therefore truly said of* Gellius,[3] *there are some Things whose Extent has no Bounds, and which are so much more commendable as they are carried to a higher Pitch.* Lactantius,[4] *after having discoursed largely on the Passions, says*, Wisdom does not consist in moderating them, but in regulating the Impressions of the Causes that produce them, for they are excited by external Objects. Neither ought a Restraint to be put principally upon them, because it is possible for them to be very weak in those who commit the greatest Crime, and to be very violent without leading to any Crime at all. ***Our Purpose is to set always a high Value upon*** **Aristotle,** ***but so as to reserve to ourselves the same Liberty which he himself took with his Masters,*** *for the Sake of finding Truth.*
…

XLIX. *The Authority of those Books which Men inspired by God, either writ or approved of, I often use, but with a Difference of the Old and New Law. Some there are who*[1] *urge the Old Law for the very Law of Nature, but they are undoubtedly in the wrong: For many Things*[2] *in it proceed from the Free Will of God, which yet is never repugnant to the Law of Nature itself; and so far an Argument may be rightly drawn from it,* ***provided we carefully distinguish the***[3] ***Rights of God, which God sometimes exercises by the Ministry of Men, from the Rights of Men among themselves.***

> 3. **From what God is pleased to do or command by Virtue of his supreme Authority over the Life and Goods of his Creatures, no Consequence can be drawn that the same Thing is ordered in Regard to Men, or allowed by the Law of Nature.** On this Occasion are alledged the Example of *Abraham*, whom God commanded to sacrifice his Son: And that of the *Israelites* who received an express Order from him to carry off the *Egyptians* Gold and Silver Vessels, and utterly exterminate the seven Nations of *Canaanites*, after having seized on their Country, and all their Possessions.

…

LI. *The* New Testament *I use for this Purpose,* ***that I may shew, what cannot be elsewhere learned, what is lawful for Christians to do; which Thing itself, I have notwithstanding, contrary to what most do, distinguished from the Law of Nature; as being fully assured, that in that most holy Law a greater Sanctity is enjoined us, than the meer Law of Nature in itself requires.***
…

LIV. *Of those that profess the Knowledge of the* Roman *Laws, there are three Sorts.* ***The first is of those whose Works appear in the Digest, the Codes of*** **Theodosius** ***and*** **Justinian,** ***and the Novels. The second is, of those who succeeded***[1] **Irnerius,** ***as***[2] **Accursius, Bartolus,**[3] ***and many others, that for a long time reigned at the Bar. The third comprehends***[4] ***those who joined the Knowledge of the*** **Belles Lettres** ***with the Study of Laws. For the first I have a great Deference; for they both supply us with Reasons, and those often the very best, to demonstrate what belongs to the Law of Nature;*** *and also*

*often give Testimony to it, as well as to the Law of Nations; yet so as that they, as well as others, often*5 *confound these Words, nay and often call that the Law of Nations, which prevails among some Nations only, and that not by a sort of tacit Agreement, but by Imitation of one another, or even by a casual Consent. But again,* ***those Things which really belong to the Law of Nations, they often handle promiscuously and indiscriminately with those that belong to the*** **Roman** ***Law,*** *as appears from the*6 *Title concerning* Captives *and* Postliminy. *Therefore we took Pains to have these distinguished.*

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_022

The French philosopher Charron was one of the men least demoralised by party spirit, and least blinded by zeal for a cause. In a passage almost literally taken from St. Thomas, he describes our subordination under a law of nature, to which all legislation must conform; and he ascertains it not by the light of revealed religion, but by the voice of universal reason, through which God enlightens the consciences of men. **Upon this foundation Grotius drew the lines of real political science.** In gathering the materials of international law, he had to go beyond national treaties and denominational interests for a principle embracing all mankind. **The principles of law must stand, he said, even if we suppose that there is no God. By these inaccurate terms he meant that they must be found independently of revelation.** From that time it became possible to make politics a matter of principle and of conscience, so that men and nations differing in all other things could live in peace together, under the sanctions of a common law. Grotius himself used his discovery to little purpose, as he deprived it of immediate effect by admitting that the right to reign may be enjoyed as a freehold, subject to no conditions.

When Cumberland and Pufendorf unfolded the true significance of his doctrine, every settled authority, every triumphant interest recoiled aghast. None were willing to surrender advantages won by force or skill, because they might be in contradiction, not with the Ten Commandments, but with an unknown code, which Grotius himself had not attempted to draw up, and touching which no two philosophers agreed. It was manifest that all persons who had learned that political science is an affair of conscience rather than of might or expediency, must regard their adversaries as men without principle, that the controversy between them would perpetually involve morality, and could not be governed by the plea of good intentions, which softens down the asperities of religious strife. Nearly all the greatest men of the seventeenth century repudiated the innovation. In the eighteenth, the two ideas of Grotius, that there are certain political truths by which every State and every interest must stand or fall, and that society is knit together by a series of real and hypothetical contracts, became, in other hands, the lever that displaced the world.

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317765/1/283910.pdf

Samuel Pufendorf was a student of Grotius and developed his theory in Sweden. Neither Sweden, nor his native Germany resembled Spain, England or Holland in colonial method. **Pufendorf does not begin with war as a given and then consider the conditions under which it may be just, neither does he begin with the origins of property and then consider man's natural state. These are the premises of and the questions put to political theorists living within an aggressive colonial power. Pufendorf, unlike Grotius or Locke, is not attempting to reconcile natural law with his patron's colonial needs.**
…

Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf begins his examination of the natural state not in the context of property but of moral science. Like Grotius, he considers man to be in a state of natural liberty but one which must be “conditioned by a certain restraint of sound reason and natural law.”37 **Pufendorf derives the 'natural state' by stripping civil man of his civilities.** He begins his discussion of natural man, thus:

> By the natural state of man we [understand] that condition for which man is understood to be constituted, by the mere fact of his birth, all inventions and institutions either of man or suggested to him from above, being disregarded.38

It is interesting to note the natural state for Pufendorf is something which existed only in a primitive time. **He does not refer, unlike Locke, Hobbes and Grotius, to America or other parts of the colonial world as examples of contemporary natural states.**39 **On the contrary, Pufendorf makes clear that he believes the inhabitants of the Americas are not atomised individuals within one great natural state, as Locke and Grotius seem to believe,** but members of nations who must be treated with the same respect as those of European states.
…

Pufendorf challenges Hobbes's position that the state of nature is concurrently a state of war. **Quoting "the infallible authority of the sacred scriptures," Pufendorf concludes, "the natural state of men was one of peace rather than war and that men were more like friends to one another than enemies."**44 This natural peace is based on natural law but is "a weak and untrustworthy thing and therefore ... it is, without other safeguards but a poor custodian of man's safety."45
…

Thus, while consent was crucial to both Grotius's and Pufendorf's conceptions of property and was to be attacked directly by Locke, it nevertheless played profoundly different roles in each theorist's thought. **For Grotius, the original community of things was positive in that each individual had the right to claim, through simple use, private ownership of a thing.** An agreement by consent therefore, simply recognized those private possessions which individuals had already claimed as their own. **Pufendorf, on the other hand, begins with a negative form of community where use implied no right of ownership and the agreement could give rise to any form of private or communal division of property.**
…

According to Richard Tuck, the removal of the state's right to punish undermines the Europeans' claims to have the right to attack native tribes in the new colonies such as the Americas.56

This becomes explicit when Pufendorf directly contradicts Grotius's claim that war can be waged against "those who feed on human flesh," revealing an understanding that such arguments were often used to justify attacks on Arnericin natives as a whole.

> **Thus we cannot agree…that sufficient cause for waging war upon the Americans can be found in the fact that they can be held condemned by the very law of nature, because it is their custom to sacrifice men and eat human flesh.** On this matter we should carefully consider whether a Christian prince can attack the Indians, as men condemned by nature, merely because they eat the flesh of their own religion, or because they eat that of strangers. And in connexion with their treatment of strangers we must again inquire, whether those foreigners come to their shores as enemies and robbers, or come as innocent guests or driven by storms – for only in the last case does a right of war lie with those whose citizens are treated with such cruelty, not in the others.57

…

The starting point for Locke and Grotius is the same. **Property is assumed to be given by God as a positive communal right of ownership.** Nothing could reflect more clearly the aggressive colonialism of the Dutch and English than the assumption that we actually possess everything on earth and it is up to each individual person or nation to grab its claim before anyone else does.

Pufendorf, on the other hand, believes that nobody owns anything but everyone is free to use, rather than possess, the world.
…

Locke writes, "It seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a *Property* in any thing."8 **The 'some' that Locke refers to includes Samuel Pufendorf, the natural law theorist.** Locke's statement at the end of this paragraph that he hopes to show how men come to have a property in several parts of the 'common' "without any express Compact of all the Commoners" is a clear reference to Pufendorf's insistence that property can only be made private when consented to by all.9 As James Tully concludes in reference to this paragraph:

> Who are the some who find difficulties with this particular problem of individuation of common property? ... one member of the 'some' is clearly Pufendorf.10

…

Pufendorf challenged both Grotius and the Spanish legal theorist Francisco Vitoria on the right of entering new lands, claiming that the Indians of the Americas have greater rights, by natural law, than either of these colonial powers had yet granted them. **Pufendorf most pointedly rejected the notion of a natural state of nomadic and solitary figures amongst the American Indians,** in order to claim that Indian nations, like those of Europe, have an equal right to defend themselves from the encroachment of others.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=VJ1WDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

In a century that saw a flourishing discourse about the rights of man, Boulainvilliers, in his political and historical writings between 1700 and 1722, focused particularly on the rights of nobles. Anticipating the abbé Mably, who would draw on France's deep medieval past to articulate the primordial rights of the nation, Boulainvilliers celebrated a primitive nation whose rights were nonetheless restricted to an elite.

In a time when increased attention was being given to the power of education and environmental conditioning, Boulainvilliers aggressively argued for the determining rights of lineage and *race*.
…

By right of conquest, in Boulainvilliers's accounting, the Franks had reduced the Gauls to a form of servility that made inequality an organic feature of the emerging French social order. It bears emphasizing, however, that in making this point Boulainvilliers acted less as an apologist for violence than as a defender of historical contingency. **His portrayal of Frankish superiority offered not a moral argument about "might making right" but a political argument about the undeniable social effects of the exercise of power in history. "Violence," he wrote in his "Dissertation on the French Nobility" of 1700, "has established the distinctions between liberty and slavery, nobility and common status."**4

https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1895/anarch/bourgeois-revolution.htm

> **When the representatives of the nobility and clergy, in one of the first sessions of the estates, fell back upon the foundation of their privileges—the historic right of conquest**—the theoretician of the bourgeoisie, Abbé Sieyès, proudly replied: '*Rien que cela, messieurs? Nous serons conquérants a notre tour!* '—which means: 'Nothing but that, gentlemen? Well, we too shall be conquerors in our turn!'

For this reason, he acknowledged in his *Memoir for the Nobility of France* of 1716, that one could be justified in regarding nobility itself as "odious" because of the "horrifying violence" attendant upon its creation.5 **"It is certain," Boulainvilliers granted, "that according to natural law [*droit commun*] all men are born equal" – thus demonstrating, already in 1700, his awareness of and debt to the natural law arguments that were so critical to the formation of Enlightened attitudes in the eighteenth century.**
…

Boulainvilliers thus celebrated nobility both as a historical inevitability and as a positive moral good. **The distinction between noble and commoner "is of such long-established usage in the world that it has acquired the force of a natural law (*loi naturelle*)."**13
…

The words equality, liberty, rights, and nation thus resonated within a very particular register of meaning for Henri de Boulainvilliers. **He spoke this language for a specific linguistic community, one might say – the community of aggrieved nobles anxious about the multiplying status distinctions within the second estate and eager to combat the arbitrariness of modern royal authority. He used a language of liberation and justice without regard for its possible appropriation by a wider community users and without regard for its potential to fuel a critique of nobility itself.**
…

Henri de Boulainvilliers, of course, had found much worth recovering in the Frankish forests, including the pure principles with which he hoped to liberate the modern nobility from its unwarranted state of servitude. But by burrowing so deeply into that time of "blindness and violence," Boulainvilliers also seems to have blinded himself and his many admiring readers to the multiple visions of nationhood that the prospect of liberation from despotism would finally yield. **After all, article one of the Declaration of the Rights of Man – "men are born and remain free and equal in rights" – had already been anticipated by Boulainvilliers himself. Not only were men "born equal" in his eyes, but they also "have naturally equal shares of reason and humanity."**53 What he failed to recognize, and what seems to have surprised the nobility at large in 1789, what that the habit of criticizing unjust hierarchies, once widely dispersed across a population practiced in the language of equality and rights, might move actors outside the nobility to contemplate the destruction of legal hierarchy itself.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/406/mode/2up?view=theater

A few philosophers among the ancients, notably those cosmic cosmopolitans, the Stoics, had deplored slavery; but inclined as they were to accept the course of the world with dignified resignation, they argued not for its abolition in law, but, as it were, in men's minds. They taught that the slave is free if he learns to disdain cruel fortune, freer indeed than his master, driven by the anxieties and crushed by the burdens that society imposes in a man of wealth and rank. Such teachings may have done something for the morale of educated slaves; they did not lead to the abolition of slavery. **The Roman Law described slavery as contrary the laws of nature and solely sanctioned by the laws of men, the *ius gentium*;** Christianity, with its doctrine of individual salvation, contained and concealed a kind of "latent egalitarianism."9 But for centuries, **the tensions that the reasonings of Roman lawyers and doubts of Christian theologians introduced into the discussion of slavery were repressed, or, rather, resolved, in favor of the slaveholder. In the sixteenth century, Jean**

Bodin, the greatest theorist of sovereignty, reopened the debate, arguing that there were sound, in fact compelling, moral and legal arguments against an institution that that positive law had condoned for centuries; in the seventeenth, and in the philosophes' own century, a sense of moral outrage over slavery, even of guilt, spread to a certain number of Quakers and other Protestant Dissenters, and to a handful of Anglicans and Catholics who took the virtue of Christian charity seriously.
…

Quakers like William Penn had still owned slaves; with his descendants, conscience, and (as both the abbé Raynal and Adam Smith noted) the relative insignificance of slaves to the economy in Pennsylvania, induced them to abolish slavery among themselves and to petition for general emancipation. Earlier, as early as 1702, Daniel Defoe, as usual one of the first to discern, applaud, and encourage dawning humanitarian impulses, had vigorously satirized the slave trade. And by mid-century, Horace Walpole began to punctuate his correspondence with energetic denunciations of slavery in general, and of the slave trade in particular.
…

The denunciations of slavery by Horace Walpole and Samuel Johnson, by Granville Sharp and the marquis de Lafayette, came half a century after Montesquieu first vented his antislavery sentiments in the *Lettres persanes*. Before Montesquieu, certainly, objections to slavery had been comfortably unspecific. **It is true that John Locke had assailed the very idea of slavery in the first sentence of his *First Treatise*: "Slavery," he had written there, "is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly to the temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it."** But then, this energetic declaration was really directed against Filmer's paternalistic theory of government; and besides, Locke's part in the establishment of the Carolina colonies, and his investments in the slave-trading monopoly, the Royal African Company, shows plainly enough that actual slavery did not trouble his conscience. **It may be charged that it was easy for Montesquieu and his fellow philosophes to detest slavery: they had no financial stake in it;** after all, when one of them, Thomas Jefferson, did have such a stake, he might denounce it vigorously but could still live with, and off it. But at least, **except for those philosophes who happened to be Virginians, their conduct did not compromise with their pronouncements.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/420/mode/2up?view=theater

Samuel Johnson was a passionate adversary of slavery. Boswell, much to his regret, was constrained to report that Johnson, "upon one occasion, when in company with some very grave men at Oxford," had offered the toast: "'Here's to the next insurrection of the negroes in the West Indies.'"5 Johnson deeply resented the clamor of American colonists for freedom as nothing less than revolting hypocrisy: "How is it," he asked, "that we hear the loudest *yelps* for liberty among the drivers of negroes?"6
…

Johnson's abolitionism rose above a humane and angry sympathy for particular victims to general principles, **and his expression of those principles sounded practically like a plagiarism from a writer whom he detested almost as much as he detested slavery:** Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In 1777, joining in the legal struggle initiated by Granville Sharp to have slavery declared illegal in Britain, Johnson dictated a memorandum to Boswell in which he expressed his doubts **"whether slavery can ever be supposed the natural condition of man. It is impossible not to conceive that men in their original state were equal."**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/414/mode/2up?view=theater

When Voltaire argued, in the *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie*, that slavery is an innovation that violates man's original free nature, he was saying what Montesquieu and others had said before him. **But then he went beyond Montesquieu: partisans sometimes suggest that a poor laborer would rather be a pampered slave, but ask the laborer – he will cling to his freedom.** And a slave, in turn, will choose freedom over slavery, even if he must leave the kindest of masters to face unforeseen hardships. **Lawyers like Grotius and Pufendorf may say what they like, if they hold that slavery is ever legal they are wrong and, Voltaire insists, it is nature that proves them wrong.**3

Other philosophes also pitted the law of nature against the natural lawyers. Jaucourt argued in the *Encyclopédie* that a Negro cannot divest himself of his natural right, which is freedom, and that no one else can legally deprive him of it.4 Rousseau argued the same case in the first book of his *Contrat social*: it is true, as Aristotle and other defenders of slavery since his time have said, that some men are born slaves, but they have mistaken the effect for the cause – men born into slavery, knowing nothing else, may lose the desire for freedom and love their chains. **"So if there are slaves by nature, that is because there have been slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, their cowardice perpetuated their slavery."**5 **But force, Rousseau insists, does not create rights. A man who gives himself away is insane, and even if one actually could enter slavery voluntarily, he cannot**

commit his children: "They are born men, and free."6 Grotius claims to derive his argument from international law: the conqueror may spare his prisoners in return for their selling their own freedom. But this, Rousseau objects, is a misreading of that law: war is a conflict between states which in no way entitles the victor to kill the vanquished. Grotius's supposed legal argument is nothing better than a sophism; slavery rests on a gigantic illogicality that touches man in his very essence. "To renounce one's liberty," Rousseau concludes in an emphatic paragraph, "is to renounce one's humanity, one's human rights, and even one's duties – *sa qualité d'homme, aux droits de l'humanité, même à ses devoirs*. There is no possible reparation for the one who renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man; it is to remove all morality from his actions and all freedom from his will."7 **By making his particular case against slavery a special instance of his general case for freedom, Rousseau supplied abolitionism with arguments of absolute universality.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/456/mode/2up?view=theater

Reformers found arguments from natural law extraordinarily convenient: **the distinction between nature and convention that lay at its heart, a distinction, it was argued, that was easy to discover in the hearts of good men everywhere and therefore universal in its application,** made it a potentially devastating critic of existing laws and institutions. It gave rational men good reasons for disapproving and perhaps disobeying positive law. **Aristotle had already said that an unjust law is not a law, and Roman lawyers had drawn the implication from this distinction by arguing that while the positive law depends quite simply on man's will, the natural law rests firmly on his noblest endowment, his reason. Slavery, as we know, was legal in the courts of men, but not in the court of nature.**

For the Stoics and other natural lawyers in antiquity, these claims had metaphysical, even religious status; the appeal from positive law to natural law, from *lex scripta* to *recta ratio*, was an ethical injunction: as a participant in the universal right reason which he often violates but to which he is still subject, man has a duty to discover what he ought to do. **In the Christian era, natural law had been overshadowed by higher laws; compared to divine edicts manifesting themselves in revelations, to Scriptures and the decrees of the church, it was humble enough.** But humble things had their place in the Christian scheme of the world, and natural law served effectively in the pious endeavor to discover the legal order in which Christian men should live. Then, in the seventeenth century, **when natural-law doctrines like the state of nature, the social contract, and natural rights became staples of political argumentation, natural law was secularized.** Grotius, the greatest among the founders of modern natural law and a widely read if controversial author in the Enlightenment, was anything but impious, yet he insisted that the law of nature would retain its universal validity, and should still be obeyed, even if there were no God. Early in the Enlightenment, Montesquieu said precisely the same thing: **"Even if there should be no God, we should always love justice"; indeed, "though we might be free from the yoke of religion, we should never be free from the yoke of equity," for in truth, "justice is eternal and does not depend on human conventions."**5 **Montesquieu's beloved Cicero had not put it any differently.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/294/mode/2up?view=theater

What was most problematic, then, about Montesquieu's 'structuralism' from any 'enlightened' viewpoint – radical or moderate – was that it precluded any absolute standard, or fixed point of justice and liberty, by which it becomes possible to condemn despotism, slavery, or serfdom, and, in sharp contrast, to Boulainvilliers, Voltaire, and Mably, precludes also any mechanism of 'revolution.' **Admittedly, Montesquieu's instinctive aversion moves him to make an exception in the case of black slavery, and step momentarily outside his structural framework: since all men are born equal 'il faut dire que l'esclavage est contre la nature'; but literally only for a moment.**161 Slightly further on, reverting to his system of climate of *moeurs*, he suggest that in certain lands slavery too 'est fondé sur une raison naturelle.' With respect to despotism and serfdom, moreover, this difficulty with his system is left completely unmitigated.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Spirit_of_Laws_(1758)/Book_XV

SLAVERY, properly so called, is the establishment of a right which gives to one man such a power over another, as renders him absolute master of his life and fortune. **The state of slavery is in its own nature bad. It is neither useful to the master nor to the slave;** not to the slave, because he can do nothing through a motive of virtue; not to the master, because by having an unlimited authority over his slaves, he insensibly accustoms himself to the want of all moral virtues, and from thence grows fierce, hasty, severe, choleric, voluptuous, and cruel.

In despotic countries, where they are already in a state of political slavery, civil slavery is more tolerable than in other governments. Every one ought to be satisfied in those countries with necessaries and life. Hence the condition of a slave is hardly more burdensome than that of a subject.

But in a monarchical government, where it is of the utmost importance that human nature should not be debased, or dispirited, there ought to be no slavery. In democracies, where they are all upon an equality; and in aristocracies, where the laws ought to use their utmost endeavours to procure as great an equality as the nature of the government will permit, slavery is contrary to the spirit of the constitution; **it only contributes to give a power and luxury to the citizens which ought not to have.**

CHAP. II. *Origin of the Right of Slavery among the Roman Civilians.*

ONE would never have imagined that slavery should owe its birth to pity, and that this should have been excited three different ways[1].

The law of nations, to prevent prisoners from being put to death, has allowed them to be made slaves. The civil law of the Romans empowered debtors, who were subject to be ill used by their creditors, to fell themselves. And the law of nature requires, that children, whom a father reduced to slavery is no longer able to maintain, should be reduced to the same state as the father.

These reasons of the civilians are all false. It is false that killing in war is lawful, unless in a case of absolute necessity: but when a man has made another his slave, he cannot be said to have been under a necessity of taking away his life, since he actually did not take it away. **War gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing any further harm, by securing their persons. All nations[2] concur in detesting the murdering of prisoners in cold blood.**

2. Excepting a few Canibals.

2. Nor is it true, that a freeman can sell himself. Sale implies a price; now when a person sells himself, his whole substance immediately devolves to his master; the master therefore in that case gives nothing, and the slave receives nothing. You will say, he has a *peculium*. But this peculium goes along with his person. If it is not lawful for a man to kill himself, because he robs his country of his person, for the same reason he is not allowed to sell himself. The liberty of every citizen constitutes a part of the public liberty; and in a democratical state is even a part of the sovereignty. **To sell one's citizenship[3] is so repugnant to all reason, as to be scarce supposeable in any man.**

3. I mean slavery in a strict sense, as formerly among the Romans, and at present in our colonies.

If liberty may be rated with respect to the buyer, it is beyond all price to the seller. The civil law, which authorizes a division of goods among men, cannot be thought to rank among such goods, a part of the men who were to make this division. The same law annuls all iniquitous contracts; surely then it affords redress in a contract where the grievance is most enormous.

The third way is birth; which falls with the two former. For if a man could not sell himself, much less could he sell an unborn offspring. It a prisoner of war is not to be reduced to slavery, much less are his children.

The lawfulness of putting a malefactor to death, arises from this; the law, by which he is punished, was made for his security. A murderer, for instance, has enjoyed the benefit of the very law which condemns him; it has been a continual protection to him; he cannot therefore object against it. **But it is not so with the slave. The law of slavery can never be beneficial to him; it is in all cases against him, without ever being for his advantage; and therefore this law is contrary to the fundamental principle of all societies.**

If it be pretended, that it has been beneficial to him, as his master has provided for his subsistence; slavery at this rate should he limited to those who are incapable of earning their livelihood. But who will take up with such slaves? As for infants, nature, who has supplied their mothers with milk, had provided for their sustenance, and the remainder of their childhood approaches so near the age in which they are most capable of being of service, that he who supports them cannot be said to give them an equivalent, which can intitle him to be their master.

Nor is slavery less opposite to the civil law than to that of nature. **What civil law can restrain a slave from running away, since he is not a member of society, and consequently has no interest in any civil laws?** He can be retained only by a family law, that is, by the master's authority.
...

I WOULD as soon say that religion gives its professors a right to enslave those who dissent from it, in order to render its propagation more easy.

This was the notion that encouraged the ravagers of America in their iniquity[5]. Under the influence of this idea, they founded their right of enslaving so many nations; for these robbers, who would absolutely be both robbers and Christians, were superlatively devout.

Lewis XIII.[6] was extremely uneasy at a law, by which all the negroes of his colonies were to be made slaves; but it being strongly urged to him as the the readiest means for their conversion, he acquiesced without further scruple.
...

CHAP. VI. *The true Origin of the Right of Slavery.*

IT is time to enquire into the true origin of the right of slavery. It ought to be founded on the nature or things; let us see if there be any cases where it can be derived from thence.

In all despotic governments, people make no difficulty in selling themselves; the political slavery in some measure annihilates the civil liberty.

According to Mr. Perry,[7] the Muscovites sell themselves very readily: their reason for it is evident; their liberty is not worth keeping.

At Achim every one is for selling himself. Some of the chief lords[8] have not less than a thousand slaves, all principal merchants, who have a great number of slaves themselves, and these also are not without their slaves. Their masters are their heirs, and put them into trade. In those states, the freemen, being overpowered by the government, have no better resource than making themselves slaves to the tyrants in office.

This is the just and rational origin of that mild law of slavery, which obtains in some countries: and mild it ought to be, as founded on the free choice a man makes of a master, for his own benefit; which forms a mutual convention betwixt the two parties.

CHAP. VII. *Another Origin of the Right of Slavery.*

THERE is another origin of the right of slavery, and even of the most cruel slavery, which is to be seen among men.

There are countries where the excess of heat enervates the body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited, **that nothing but the fear of chastisement can oblige them to perform any laborious duty:** slavery is there more reconcileable to reason; and the master being as lazy with respect to his sovereign, as his slave is to him, this adds a political to a civil slavery.

Aristotle[9] endeavours to prove, that there are natural slaves, but what he says is far from proving it. If there be any such, I believe they are those of whom I have been speaking.

But as all men are born equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural, though in some countries it be founded on natural reason; and a wide difference ought to be made betwixt such countries, and those where even natural reason rejects it, as in Europe, where it has been so happily abolished.

Plutarch, in his life of Numa, says, that in Saturn's time, there was neither slave nor master. Christianity has restored that age in our climates.

CHAP. VIII. *Inutility of Slavery among us.*

NATURAL slavery, then, is to be limited to some particular parts of the world. In all other countries, even the most laborious works of society may be performed by freemen.

Experience verifies my assertion. **Before Christianity had abolished civil slavery in Europe, working in the mines was judged too toilsom for any but slaves or malefactors: but at present, there are men employed in them, who are known to live[10] happily.** They have, by some small privileges, encouraged this profession; to an increase of labour, they have joined an increase of gain; and have gone so far, as to make them better pleased with their condition than with any other which they could have embraced.

10. As may be seen in the mines of Hartz in Lower Saxony, and in those of Hungary.

No labour is so heavy, but it may be brought to a level with the workman's strength, when regulated by equity, and not by avarice. The violent fatigues which slaves are made to undergo in other parts, may be supplied by commodious machines, invented by art, and skilfully applied. The Turkish mines in the Bannat of Temeswar, though richer than those of Hungary, did not yield so much; because their invention reached no further, than the strength of their slaves.

I know not whether this article be dictated by my understanding, or by my heart. Possibly there is not that climate upon earth, where the most laborious services might not, with proper encouragement, be performed by freemen. Bad laws having made lazy men; they have been reduced to slavery, because of their laziness.

CHAP. IX. *Several Kinds of Slavery.*

SLAVERY is of two kinds, real and personal. The real annexes the slave to the land, which Tacitus[11] makes the condition of slaves among the Germans. They were not employed in the family; a stated tribute of corn, cattle, or other moveables, paid to their master, was the whole of their servitude. **And such a servitude still continues in Hungary, Bohemia, and several parts of lower Germany.**

Personal slavery consists in domestic services, and relates more to the master's person.

The worst degree of slavery is, when it is at once both real and personal, as that of the Helotes among the Lacedæmonians. They underwent the fatigues of the field, and suffered all manner of insults within the house. This Helotism is contrary to the nature of things. The real slavery is to be found only among nations[12] of a plain manner of living; all family business being done by the wives and children. The personal slavery is peculiar to voluptuous nations; luxury requiring the service of slaves in the house. But Helotism joins in the same persons the slavery established by voluptuous nations, and that of the most simple.
…

Men grow reconciled to every thing, and even to servitude, if not aggravated by the severity of the master. **The Athenians treated their slaves with great lenity; and this secured that state from the commotions raised by the slaves among the austere Lacedæmonians.**

It does not appear that the primitive Romans met with any trouble from their slaves. Those civil wars[22], which have been compared to the Punic wars, were the consequences of their having divested themselves of all humanity towards their slaves.

22. Sicily, says Florus, suffered more in the servile than in the Punic war. Lib. 3.

A frugal and laborious people generally use their slaves more kindly, than those who are above labour. **The primitive Romans lived, worked, and eat with their slaves; they behaved towards them with great justice and humanity.** The greatest punishment they made them suffer, was to make them pass before their neighbours with a forked piece of wood on their backs. Their manners were sufficient to secure the fidelity of their slaves; there was no necessity for laws.

But when the Romans aggrandized themselves; when their slaves were no longer the companions of their labour, but the instruments of their luxury and pride; **as they then wanted morals, they had need of laws.** It was even necessary for these laws to be of the most terrible kind, in order to establish the safety of those cruel masters, who lived in the midst of their slaves, as in the midst of enemies.
…

The law of Moses was extremely severe. "If any one struck his slave so that he died under his hand, he was to be punished; but if he survived a day or two, he was not, because he was as his money." **Strange that a civil law should thus amongst these people relax the law of nature!**

http://turretinfan.blogspot.com/2013/04/the-bible-and-slavery-some-limitations.html

I'm sure that the regulations above are insufficient for Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment anti-slavery proponents, but the regulations were actually pretty substantial. While slaves were recognized as property of their owners (see the 10th commandment for example) and while God uses the master-slave metaphor to describe his relationship to us, the regulations on slavery in Israel maintained the fact that the slaves had the image of God and consequently were to receive the sign of the covenant, were to be treated leniently, were not to be killed, and were to be freed in many cases.

http://christian-thinktank.com/qnoslave.html

Summary: It should be QUITE CLEAR from the above, **that the institution in the Mosaic law involving voluntary, fixed-term, flexible, and protected servant-laborer roles was unlike "western", chattel labor in almost ALL RESPECTS.** To label it as 'slavery', except in the most general/metaphorical sense of the word, is significantly inappropriate.

By a law of the Greeks[30] a slave too roughly treated by his master, might insist upon being sold to another. In the latter times there was a law of the same nature[31] at Rome. A master displeased with his slave, and a slave with his master, ought to be separated.

30. Plutarch on *superstition.* 31. See the constitution of Antoninus Pius, *Institut. Lib. 1. tit. 7.*
…

At Athens[34] he who had abused the slave of another, was punished severely, and sometimes even with death. The law of Athens was very reasonable, in not adding the loss of safety to that of liberty.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/828/mode/2up?view=theater

The moment *L'Esprit des lois* appeared, recalled La Beaumelle in 1750, it was as eagerly sought after everywhere as it had, for years, been impatiently awaited by his friends; in fact, he asserted, **everyone who was not 'Jésuite ou Janséniste, dévôt ou bel-esprit' (an admission that the real *esprits forts* were unimpressed), judged it the triumph of 'l'humanité, le chef d'oeuvre du genie, la Bible des politiques.'**70
…

La Beaumelle's claim that a dozen editions of *L'Esprit des lois* sold out in six months was by no means an exaggeration: for around fifteen editions had appeared by the end of 1749 in four different countries.72 From Ireland to Italy, *L'Esprit des lois* resoundingly won **the unprecedented status of being a philosophical best-seller,** something which undoubtedly struck some royal officials, as well as many churchmen, as distinctly disturbing in itself: for this hardly seems to bear out Voltaire's maxim that few men both read and think. How could any work of *philosophie* become a best-seller?

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sharswood-commentaries-on-the-laws-of-england-in-four-books-vol-1#lf1387-01_label_2250

I. As to the several sorts of servants: I have formerly observed (a) that pure and proper slavery does not, nay, cannot, subsist in England: such, I mean, whereby an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and fortune of the slave. And indeed it is repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law, that such a state should subsist anywhere. **The three origins of the right of slavery assigned by Justinian** (b) **are all of them built upon false foundations.** (c)

(c) Montesq. Sp. L. xv. 2.

As, first, slavery is held to arise "jure gentium," from a state of captivity in war; whence slaves are called *mancipia*, *quasi manu capti*. The conqueror, say the civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having spared that, has a right to deal with him as he pleases. But it is an untrue position, when taken generally, that by the law of nature, or nations, a man may kill his enemy: he has only a right to kill him, in particular cases: in cases of absolute necessity, for self-defence; and it is plain this absolute necessity did not subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made him prisoner. **War is itself justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and therefore it gives no other right over prisoners but merely to disable them from doing harm to us, by confining their persons: much less can it give a right to kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to enslave, an enemy, when the war is over.** Since therefore the right of *making* slaves by captivity depends on a supposed right of slaughter, that foundation failing, the consequence drawn from it must fail likewise.

But, secondly, it is said that slavery may begin "jure civili;" when one man sells himself to another. **This, if only meant of contracts to serve or work for another, is very just: but when applied to strict slavery, in the sense of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is also impossible.** Every sale implies a price, a *quid pro quo*, an equivalent given to the seller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but what equivalent can be given for life and liberty, both of which, in absolute slavery, are held to be in the master's disposal? His property also, the very price he seems to receive, devolves *ipso facto* to his master, the instant he becomes his slave. In this case therefore the buyer gives nothing, and the seller receives nothing: **of what validity then can a sale be, which destroys the very principles upon which all sales are founded?**

Lastly, we are told, that besides these two ways by which slaves "fiunt," or are acquired, they may also be hereditary: "servi nascuntur;" the children of acquired slaves are *jure naturæ*, by a negative kind of birthright, slaves also. **But this, being built on the two former rights, must fall together with them.** If neither captivity nor the sale of one's self, can by the law of nature and reason reduce the parent to slavery, much less can they reduce the offspring.

Upon these principles the law of England abhors, and will not endure the existence of, slavery within this nation; so that when an attempt was made to introduce it, by statute 1 Edw. VI. c. 3, which ordained, that all idle vagabonds should be made slaves, and fed upon bread and water, or small drink, and refuse meat; should wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs; and should be compelled, by beating, chaining, or otherwise, to perform the work assigned them, were it never so vile; the spirit of the nation could not brook this condition, even in the most abandoned rogues; and therefore this statute was repealed in two years afterwards.(d) **And now it is laid down,(e) that a slave or negro, the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman;** that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his person, and his property.1

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* was published in 1765. Almost immediately, it became the standard textbook for apprentices in law in the American colonies.
…

Blackstone said that he believed in a literal ethical Fall of a literal man. The Fall of man had corrupted human reason. "**And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this.** But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error."15 Therefore, God gave us revelation regarding His law in the Bible. "The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures."16

He went so far as to argue that “the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law.” He based this conclusion on the weakness of human reason to understand the natural law. Revealed law is more certain. “If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.”17

Having said this, he then spent four volumes describing English common law with only a few footnote references to the Bible. In the first three volumes, running almost 500 pages each, each has one footnote reference to the Bible. The fourth volume, on criminal law (*Public Wrongs*), has 10 references. Not one of them is taken by Blackstone as authoritative for civil law; they were seen merely as historical examples. **There is not a single reference to “Bible,” “Moses,” or “Revelation” in the set’s index.**

How could this be if he was persuaded that biblical law and natural law are the same, but with biblical law so much clearer to us? Blackstone’s preliminary remarks were familiar in his era. **Englishmen commonly tipped the brim of their epistemological caps to God and the Bible, but they did not take off their caps in the presence of God.** They pursued their academic specialties just as Christians do today: with no systematic study of what biblical law specifically reveals regarding those disciplines. **It was considered sufficient for Blackstone to have formally equated biblical law with natural law. Having done so, he could then safely ignore biblical law.**
…

Thus, by the time that the *Commentaries* appeared, the foundation of his defense of the superiority of biblical law to natural law—the greater clarity of biblical revelation compared to reason’s perception of natural law—was not believed by most men who called themselves educated.

This raises another question: Was Blackstone in fact deliberately lying? **In a perceptive essay by David Berman, we learn of a strategy that had been in use for over a century: combating a position by supporting it with arguments that are so weak that they in fact prove the opposite. This was a tactic used by those who did not believe in immortality to promote their skepticism.** Berman makes a very shrewd observation regarding academic historians and scholars: “Most of us do not like liars or lying; nor are we inclined to accept conspiracy theories or explanations that postulate secret codes or cabals. These aversions may explain why the art of theological lying has been so generally ignored. …”20 There is at least reasonable suspicion that Blackstone was lying. **If he was not lying, then he was naive beyond description, for his lame defense of biblical revelation greatly assisted the political triumph of the enemies of Christianity in the American colonies.**

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317765/1/283910.pdf

Donald S. Lutz argues that Blackstone is second only to Montesquieu in the number of times he is quoted by American writers during this period.

> **In a survey of all the published American political writing in the founding era, the period from 1760 to 1805, finds that Montesquieu and Blackstone were by far the most commonly cited sources but that the next common were Locke and Hume.**33

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9sHebfZIXFAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

In her work on the *Nakaz*, however, Catherine felt that she was guided most of all by one of the greatest thinkers of the French Enlightenment, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu. She wrote to d’Alembert:

> For the sake of my Empire, I have stolen from Montesquieu, without mentioning him by name. If he sees me at my work from the next world, **I hope that he will pardon me this plagiarism, for the good of twenty million men.** He loved humanity too well to take offense at it. His book is my breviary.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

Her position on the throne as initially little more secure than that of her recently murdered husband, Peter III. **Threatened in particular by the plan of Nikita Panin to limit severely imperial authority by an aristocratic Imperial Council,** Catherine turned in 1763 to the drawing up of a comprehensive defense of absolute monarchy. After three separate drafts, she submitted it to **a specially convened legislative commission of 1766-7 which had a majority of non-aristocratic elements subject to her bidding.** The

commission unanimously awarded Catherine the title “Catherine the Great, Wise, Mother of the Fatherland” and arranged for the publication in Russian, German, French and Latin of the final draft of her flowery philosophic defense of monarchy, generally known as the Instruction, or *Nakaz*.14
…

According to the *Nakaz*, Russia was a European state, its subjects “citizens,” and its proper laws those of the rational, natural order rather than the traditional historical one. Although the *Nakaz* was not widely distributed within Russia, the legislative commission was broad enough in its representation to carry its ideas to every social group in Russia except the bonded peasantry. With four out of 18 million Russians represented by the 564 deputies, the commission was the first crude attempt at a genuinely national assembly since the *zemsky sobors* of the early seventeenth century;15 **but it is strikingly different from all previous assemblies ever held on Russian soil in that it was totally secular. There was one deputy from the Synod, but none at all from the clerical estate.**

Catherine’s basic idea of the “good” and “natural” encouraged scepticism not only toward revealed religion but toward traditional natural philosophy as well. Her “Instruction” directed men’s thinking not to ultimate truths or ideal prototypes but to a new relativistic and utilitarian perspective. It seems altogether appropriate that Jeremy Bentham, the father of English utilitarianism, was one of the most honored of foreign visitors to Catherine’s Russia; and that translated books of and about Bentham in Russia soon began to outsell the original editions in England.16

Like a true utilitarian, Catherine defined legislation as “the Art of conducting People to the greatest Good,” which is “whatever may be useful to mankind” in a given tradition and environment. Autocracy must rule through intermediary powers and clear laws, which require that the individual “be fully convinced that it was his Interest, as well as Duty, to preserve those Laws inviolable.” **The French monarchy rightly appraised the subversive implications of such an approach to the justification of authority,** confiscating some two thousand copies en route to France in 1771, and preventing any of the twenty-four foreign versions of the work from being printed there.17

Catherine admired not only Bentham but his adversary, Blackstone, whose *Commentaries* she carefully studied and had translated in three volumes. She was widely admired not only in England but also in Italy, where a vast treatise was dedicated to her in 1778, celebrating the victorious alliance of power and reason in the eighteenth century.18 Nearly one sixth of the articles in Catherine’s *Nakaz* were take directly from the work of another Italian, Beccaria’s *On Crimes and Punishment*, which armed Catherine with her conviction that crime comes from ignorance and poor laws, and punishment shold be precise and pedagogic rather than arbitrary and vindictive.19

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Murray,_1st_Earl_of_Mansfield

As the most powerful British jurist of the century, Mansfield's decisions reflected the Age of Enlightenment and moved the country onto the path to abolishing slavery. He advanced commercial law in ways that helped establish the nation as world leader in industry, finance and trade; modernised both English law and the English courts system; rationalized the system for submitting motions, and reformed the way judgments were delivered to reduce expense for the parties. For his work in *Carter v Boehm* and *Pillans v Van Mierop*, **he has been called the founder of English commercial law.**
…

Other Americans such as Julian S. Waterman, the founder of the University of Arkansas School of Law, described him as **"not only the greatest common law judge but the greatest judge in Anglo-American legal history",** while Joseph Story himself said that Mansfield "broke down the narrow barrier of the common law, redeemed it from feudal selfishness and barbarity" and that **"he was one of those great men raised up by Providence, at a fortunate moment, to effect a salutary revolution in the world".**[121]

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_050

For a parting word concerning Lord Mansfield, **let us note that, being a Scotsman by birth, he followed, consciously or unconsciously, the Scottish tradition of cosmopolitan jurisprudence rather than the insular learning of the Inns of Court.** Without that temper, made a ground of reproach against him by short-sighted enemies, the peaceful conquest of the Law Merchant by the Common Law might not have been achieved, or not so well.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n91/mode/2up?view=theater

In a public classroom of the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, there is one embellishment,—a statue of Socrates under which are inscribed these words of Lord Mansfield: "I will take the liberty of calling him the great lawyer of antiquity, since the first principles of all law are derived from his philosophy."30

http://www.commonlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1772/57.pdf

[Mr. Hargrave] **There is now at last an attempt, and the first yet known, to introduce [slavery] into England; long and uninterrupted usage from the origin of the common law, stands to**

oppose its revival. All kinds of domestic slavery were prohibited, except villenage. The villain was bound indeed to perpetual service; liable to the arbitrary disposal of his lord. There were two sorts; villain regardant, and in gross: the former as belonging to a manor, to the lord of which his ancestors had done villain service; in gross, when a villain was granted over by the lord. Villains were originally captives at the Conquest, or troubles before.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law#History
>
> **The common law** – so named because it was "common" to all the king's courts across England – **originated in the practices of the courts of the English kings in the centuries following the Norman Conquest in 1066.**[10]
>
> https://www.historytoday.com/archive/normans-and-slavery-breaking-bonds
>
> In 1070 William the Conqueror deposed the elderly pre-Conquest Archbishop of Canterbury, Stigand, and replaced him with Lanfranc, **one of the leading lights of the reform movement and William's own moral tutor since boyhood. The new archbishop was soon urging his pupil to abolish the slave trade and the Conqueror complied.**
> …
>
> The effect of the Conquest on slavery was not immediate and the Conqueror's ban was clearly not wholly effective. **As late as 1102 a Church council condemned 'that shameful trade by which in England people used to be sold like animals'. But this was, significantly, the last ecclesiastical council to issue such a prohibition.** By the time William of Malmesbury was writing in the 1120s slavery was gone and at least some of his contemporaries were willing to give credit where it was due. 'After England began to have Norman lords', wrote the monk Lawrence of Durham, 'the English no longer suffered from outsiders that which they had suffered at their own hands. In this respect they found that foreigners treated them better than they had treated themselves.'

[Mr. Alleyne] 'Tis well known to your Lordships, that much has been asserted by the ancient philosophers and civilians, in defence of the principles of slavery: Aristotle has particularly enlarged on that subject. **An observation still it is, of one of the most able, most ingenious, most convincing writers of modern times, whom I need not hesitate, on this occasion, to prefer to Aristotle, the great Montesquieu, that Aristotle, on this subject, reasoned very unlike the philosopher. He draws his precedents from barbarous ages and nations, and then deduces maxims from them, for the contemplation and practice of civilized times and countries.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somerset_v_Stewart

> **The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of now being introduced by Courts of Justice upon mere reasoning or inferences from any principles, natural or political; it must take its rise from positive law;** the origin of it can in no country or age be traced back to any other source: immemorial usage preserves the memory of positive law long after all traces of the occasion; reason, authority, and time of its introduction are lost; **and in a case so odious as the condition of slaves must be taken strictly, the power claimed by this return was never in use here; no master ever was allowed here to take a slave by force to be sold abroad because he had deserted from his service, or for any other reason whatever;** we cannot say the cause set forth by this return is allowed or approved of by the laws of this kingdom, therefore the black must be discharged.

https://web.archive.org/web/20070102150330/http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/24.3/cleve.html

The main reason that Lord Mansfield chose not to declare that English common law prohibited chattel slavery was that to have done so would have confronted him with two equally unpalatable choices. **Either, as Lord Hardwicke had reasoned in *Pearne v. Lisle*, Mansfield would also have outlawed slavery in at least part, if not all, of the British colonies, or Mansfield would have been forced to confirm Blackstone's position that there were two systems of law where slavery was concerned, one for England under the common law and one for the colonies that were governed "outside" that law as conquests.** Either result would have been politically divisive, if not wholly unacceptable, in 1772, since one result would have politically threatened colonial slaveowners whose allegiance Britain wanted while the other would have offended both English and colonial opponents not just of slavery but of Crown American policy.
…

In an important case on the authority of common law courts, *Harrison v. Evans*, **Lord Mansfield took the position that the common law could not create a crime where Parliament had decided none existed.** In *Harrison*, heard in the House of Lords on appeal in 1767, a London by-law made it an offense punishable by a substantial fine for a Dissenter to decline to serve in Corporation offices such as sheriff.[196] However, Dissenters were by statute disabled from serving in such offices. Defending religious

toleration, Lord Mansfield vigorously attacked Blackstone's position supporting the by-law, and the House of Lords sustained Mansfield's position. Mansfield argued that if nonconformity were a crime now, it must be by virtue of common law. He reasoned:

> [N]o usage or custom ... makes Nonconformity a crime. ... Natural Religion ... [and] Revealed Religion are part of the Common law. ... But it cannot be shewn from the principles of Natural or Revealed Religion, that ... temporal punishments ought to be inflicted for mere opinions with respect to particular modes of worship. **Persecution for ... conscience, is not to be declared from reason or the fitness of things;** it can only stand upon positive law. ...[197]

...

Given *Harrison*, Lord Mansfield surely appreciated that for the slaveowners, his decision was a "poisoned chalice." **A positive law rationale without emancipation preserved the *short-term political*—but *not the long-term legal*—status quo on colonial slavery.** Although Mansfield protected the colonial status quo until Parliament acted, he did so by creating a legal framework that also deliberately devalued slave property **and did as much damage to the legitimacy of the slaveowners' position as possible, short of an outright ruling against them.** Mansfield's deliberate devaluation of slave property had foreseeable adverse consequences for slavery's continuation throughout the empire. **Not surprisingly, major slaveowner representatives immediately and vigorously attacked the decision, while abolitionists applauded it.**

Mansfield's comment in the judgment that slavery had originated not just in England but in every country solely from positive law was a deliberate effort to demolish legal justification for slavery on any other basis, in England as well as in the colonies. Mansfield's positive law holding meant that slavery existed only within those jurisdictions where positive law sanctioned it, and only to the extent it was sanctioned. **The fact that slavery became entirely a creature of positive law also meant that it could be selectively altered or abolished in the colonies.** By the late eighteenth century, the English Crown had limited legal authority to govern in the colonies without Parliament's acquiescence; therefore, **Mansfield's creation of a positive law framework for slavery in the context of rising abolitionist sentiment laid the groundwork for Parliamentary control of colonial slavery.**[200]

> [200] O'Shaughnessy analyzed the political importance to England of the continued allegiance of the West Indies in the American Revolution. **One important effect of the Revolution was to diminish sharply the political force of the British slaveowners' lobby, because it represented only half as many slaves after the Revolution as before.** O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided*, xii.

Perhaps equally important was that making slave property a creature of positive law raised substantial issues about whether compensation to slaveowners would be required if Parliament chose to alter or abolish slavery.[201]

Mansfield's positive law holding also knowingly devalued slave property by making slave status wholly dependent on the law of individual jurisdictions, which he (and slaveowners) knew meant that slave flight would increase because fugitive slaves could become free or protected against excessive force and compelled return, not just in England but in the colonies.[202]

Whether Lord Mansfield qualified his remarks on slavery's origin by referring to limits on the powers of "courts of justice" to sanction slavery or not, a larger point remains. **Reached after extraordinarily comprehensive and highly visible public arguments from England's preeminent lawyers, Lord Mansfield's conclusion on the origin of slavery, even if qualified, was inevitably, as he well knew, profoundly destructive of the moral and legal legitimacy of slavery, since it made slave property an artificial creature of statute and deprived slavery of the sanction of the common law.[203] The sanction of the common law was also the sanction of religion and morality because it was widely believed at the time that they were subsumed within the common law.** Mansfield's argument in *Harrison* and the religious and political arguments of Somerset's counsel amply illustrate the power of the contemporary view that the common law must be consistent with morality and religious belief. The sweeping nature of Mansfield's statement on positive law intentionally undermined the moral and religious, and thus the political, legitimacy of colonial slavery.

Although Lord Mansfield's decision may have bought time for slaveowners, as intended, it was "the handwriting on the wall" for them.[204] **That colonial slaveowners understood Mansfield's unwillingness to defend their position largely accounts for their concerted attacks on the judgment that began almost immediately after it was announced.**[205] Mansfield's public defection in *Somerset* meant that it was really only a question of time until public opinion deserted slaveowners as well.

...

Yet, *Somerset* expanded freedom when it banished any doubt that English law protected certain fundamental "rights of man" even for African slaves in England, including the right of access to the courts to protect against unlawful imprisonment or abuse, and freedom from chattel slavery. *Somerset* was also

a farsighted decision to narrow sharply the legal authority for slavery, devaluing slave property by destroying its "imperial property" status and its moral, and hence political, legitimacy. **Mansfield was a loyal servant of the Crown, but he was also a friend of justice.** Mansfield's decision in *Somerset*, though an effort to serve both masters at a time when many thought their interests conflicted, nevertheless commends him to history.

http://www.ouramericanrevolution.org/index.cfm/page/view/m0149

The year 1772 was a watershed of sorts in the history of slavery—it might be called the beginning of its end, as the legal framework upon which slavery was based began to crumble, at least in England, beginning with the landmark decision in *Somerset v. Stewart*.

> https://valerietarico.com/2015/02/13/christianitys-painfully-mixed-track-record-on-slavery/
>
> It took John Wesley, founder of the Methodist denomination, to bring abolitionism into the Christian main current. **A son of the Enlightenment as well as the Christian tradition, Wesley drew on both secular and religious tools to make his case.**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/346/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In the light of such denunciations it is ironic that pagan classicism should touch even the Methodists – but it did.** John Wesley, as we know, studied his ancients as assiduously as his Bible; he had to be recalled from his “philosophy” by a stern Moravian. And when his brother Charles learned of John’s marriage, a marriage which he rightly feared would be a disaster, he took from his shelf a volume of Marcus Aurelius’s *Meditations* to learn patience in affliction.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_203
>
> Neither primitive, nor reformed, nor Romanist, nor modern divines taught the doctrine of the intrinsic sinfulness of slaveholding. The church as a body never dreamed it. Slavery remained almost universal. **It remained for the political agitators of atheistic, Jacobin France, almost eighteen hundred years after Christ's birth, to give active currency to this new doctrine, and thus to infuse energy into the fanaticism of the few erratic Christian teachers, such as Wesley, who had hitherto asserted this novelty.**

> https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/anvil/24-2_097.pdf
>
> **Evangelical Christians were prominent in the campaign to bring about the end of the British slave trade in 1807.** However, John Coffey here shows how, in the mid-eighteenth century, evangelical Christians on both sides of the Atlantic acquiesced in the slave trade and slavery. **By the 1770s to 1780s their ideas underwent a dramatic change and with the establishment of the committee to Effect the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787 evangelicals joined Quakers at the heart of the new abolitionist movement.**
> …
>
> On 15 September 1791, the Connecticut Society for the Promotion of Freedom held its annual meeting in the university town of New Haven. Its speaker was the Rev. Dr. Jonathan Edwards Jr., pastor of the local Congregational church, and son of the famous revivalist and theologian. His sermon was on *The Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave Trade, and of the Slavery of the Africans*. The preacher realised that some in his audience might struggle to embrace abolitionism, ‘because it seems to bear hardly on the characters of our pious fathers, who held slaves’. **‘Thirty years ago’, he noted, ‘scarcely a man in this country thought either the slave-trade or the slavery of Negroes to be wrong’. The previous generation had been like Abraham, Jacob, David and Solomon, who ‘were ignorant that polygamy or concubinage was wrong’.** ‘As to domestic slavery’, he continued, ‘our fathers lived in a time of ignorance which God winked at; but now he commandeth all men everywhere to repent of this wickedness’.2
> …
>
> **At no time in the 1750s (or indeed in the 1760s or 1770s) did [John] Newton express remorse for trading in slaves. He retired from the business not because of moral qualms, but because of a minor stroke he suffered as he was preparing to embark on another slaving voyage in 1754.** When he published his autobiographical *Authentic Narrative* (1764), he lamented the sins of his youth, blasphemy, drunkenness and immorality. **But this classic Evangelical text did not seriously question the ethics of the slave trade; indeed, Newton wrote that ‘I never knew sweeter or more frequent hours of**

divine communion, than in my last two voyages to Guinea'. In his mind (and in the eyes of nearly all his contemporaries), slave trading was just a job.10

The case of Newton confirms that one could experience a full-blown Evangelical conversion without feeling any real compunction about the slave trade.
…

The first generation of Evangelicals, then, signally failed to question the morality of the African slave trade. There was no Evangelical equivalent to the prophetic Quaker voices of Benjamin Lay, John Woolman and Anthony Benezet. The early Evangelicals preached about turning from 'the world', but when it came to the slave trade, they were social conformists.

https://brycchancarey.com/Carey_BJRL_2003.pdf

Until the early 1770s, with the exception of the period in America, references to slavery occur only infrequently in both Wesley's letters and his *Journal*. On 12 August 1772, however, Wesley records in his *Journal* that he had been reading a 'book, published by an honest Quaker, on that execrable sum of all villainies, commonly called the Slave-trade'.13
…

It is not coincidental that Wesley was reading Benezet's work at this time. **Slavery had been in the news recently following the landmark legal decision in the case of James Somerset.**16 Somerset was a slave, the property of Charles Stewart of Boston, Massachusetts, who had absconded, been recaptured, and was now imprisoned on a ship bound for Jamaica. Following the intervention of Granville Sharp, the captain of the ship was ordered to produce Somerset before the court of King's Bench where Lord Chief Justice Mansfield heard his case. This attracted a great deal of attention in the press, and members of the public donated funds for lawyers on both sides of the argument. **On 22 June 1772, Lord Mansfield ruled that: 'no master was ever allowed here to take a slave by force to be sold abroad because he deserted from his service, or for any other reason whatever'.** Somerset was discharged, and his supporters, who included both black and white Londoners, immediately celebrated a great victory.
…

Clearly, Wesley was interested in the Mansfield judgement, as it is just six weeks later that he records reading Benezet's work. However, this may not have been Wesley's introduction to antislavery sentiment. **Wesley's biographers, using the evidence of his journal and correspondence, have traditionally dated his interest in antislavery from this date,** but there is evidence to show that he was already corresponding on the subject earlier in the year, if not the previous year.
…

Accordingly, early in 1774, a short fifty-three-page pamphlet appeared with the simple title of *Thoughts upon slavery by John Wesley, A.M.*19

https://docsouth.unc.edu/church/wesley/wesley.html

3. But waving, for the present, all other considerations, I strike at the root of this complicated villainy. I absolutely deny all slave-holding to be consistent with any degree of even natural justice. **I cannot place this in a clearer light, than that great ornament of his profession, judge *Blackstone* has already done.**
…

It clearly follows, that all slavery is as irreconcileable to justice as to mercy.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n95/mode/2up?view=theater

§ 66 Survival to modern times of the doctrine of "natural law."

The Roman theory of natural law and its universal applicability has survived to modern times and in great vigor. The so-called "natural law" or "natural philosophers" of the 18th century, such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, repeat the tenets of the Greek philosophers, especially the Stoics. **All the familiar phrases of the "natural rights of man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and many other expressions cherished by the modern world as embodying eternal principles of justice merely repeat the phrases of the Roman law as furnished by philosophy. Our wonderful Declaration of Independence—a monument to 18th century philosophy—enshrines many a tenet of Roman jurists who confessed the alliance of philosophy with law. "By natural law all men are equal," is the famous statement of the great Ulpian.**38

38. *Dig*. 50, 17, 32. See also *Inst*. 1, 2, 2: "Jure enim naturali ab initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur."

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n275/mode/2up?view=theater

The leaders of the so-called school of the philosophers of the "Natural Law" were Fénelon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Mirabeau. The one immutable law of nature whereby all men are born free and equal, the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the social contract of liberty, fraternity, and equality, constitute the teachings and legacy of this group of clerical and lay philosophers, which arose while the monarchy was at its zenith under Louis XIV,—"whom Fénelon treated more severely than the disciples of Voltaire did Louis XV."158 The tenets of these thinkers spread over all Europe and America, and are still very much alive. **Whence came this theory of theirs as to the universal Law of Nature, and the natural inalienable rights of man? From the medieval scholastics and the Canon Law, into which had descended the philosophical speculations of the Roman jurists due to the culture-influence of Greece.**159

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_James_Sumner_Maine

Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, KCSI (15 August 1822-3 February 1888), was a British Whig[1] comparative jurist[2] and historian.[3] **He is famous for the thesis outlined in his book *Ancient Law* that law and society developed "from status to contract."[4] According to the thesis, in the ancient world individuals were tightly bound by status to traditional groups, while in the modern one, in which individuals are viewed as autonomous agents, they are free to make contracts and form associations with whomever they choose.**

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n15/mode/2up?view=theater

The space allotted in the third and fourth chapters to certain philosophical theories of the Roman Jurisconsults has been appropriated to them for two reasons. **In the first place, those theories appear to the author to have had a wider and more permanent influence on the thought and action of the world than is usually supposed.** Secondly, they are believed to be the ultimate source of most of the views which have been prevalent, till quite recently, on the subjects treated of in this volume. It was impossible for the author to proceed far with his undertaking without stating his opinion on the origin, meaning, and value of those speculations.

H. S. M.

LONDON, *January 1861*.

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

The most superficial student of Roman history must be struck by the extraordinary degree in which the fortunes of the republic were affected by the presence of foreigners, under different names, on her soil. The causes of this immigration are discernible enough at a later period, for we can readily understand why men of all races should flock to the mistress of the world; but the same phenomenon of a large population of foreigners and denizens meets us in the very earliest records of the Roman State.
...

Whatever were the circumstances to which it was attributable, **the foreign element in the commonwealth determined the whole course of its history, which, at all its stages, is little more than a narrative of conflicts between a stubborn nationality and an alien population. Nothing like this has been seen in modern times; on the one hand, because modern European communities have seldom or never received any accession of foreign immigrants which was large enough to make itself felt by the bulk of the native citizens,** and on the other, because modern states, being held together by allegiance to a king or political superior, absorb considerable bodies of immigrant settlers with a quickness unknown to the ancient world, where the original citizens of a commonwealth always believed themselves to be united by kinship in blood, and resented a claim to equality of privilege as a usurpation of their birthright.
...

The circumstances of the origin of the Jus Gentium are probably a sufficient safeguard against the mistake of supposing that the Roman lawyers had any special respect for it. **It was the fruit in part of their disdain for all foreign law, and in part of their disinclination to give the foreigner the advantage of their own indigenous Jus Civile.** It is true that we, at the present day, should probably take a very different view of the Jus Gentium, if we were performing the operation which was effected by the Roman jurisconsults.
...

But the results to which modern ideas conduct the observer are, as nearly as possible, the reverse of those which were instinctively brought home to the primitive Roman. What we respect or admire, he

disliked or regarded with jealous dread. The parts of jurisprudence which he looked upon with affection were exactly those which a modern theorist leaves out of consideration as accidental and transitory; the solemn gestures of the mancipation; the nicely adjusted questions and answers of the verbal contract; the endless formalities of pleading and procedure. The Jus Gentium was merely a system forced on his attention by a political necessity. He loved it as little as he loved the foreigners from whose institutions it was derived and for whose benefit it was intended. **A complete revolution in his ideas was required before it could challenge his respect, but so complete was it when it did occur, that the true reason why our modern estimate of the Jus Gentium differs from that which has just been described, is that both modern jurisprudence and modern philosophy have inherited the matured views of the later jurisconsults on this subject. There did come a time, when from an ignoble appendage of the Jus Civile, the Jus Gentium came to be considered a great though as yet imperfectly developed model to which all law ought as far as possible to conform.** This crisis arrived when the Greek theory of a Law of Nature was applied to the practical Roman administration of the Law common to all Nations.

> https://biblehub.com/psalms/118-22.htm
>
> **The stone which the builders rejected Has become the chief cornerstone.**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-made_law#Historical_change:_from_lowest_rank_to_supreme_law
>
> **In the Thomist view of the Middle Ages, man-made law was the lowest form of law. Above it were the *lex naturalis*, the *lex divina*, and the *lex aeterna*.** Man-made law only had authority in as much as it expressed and concurred with higher laws.[11][12]
>
> **Over the centuries, this idea has been turned on its head. Rather than being a lesser law because it is made by man rather than by the divine, modern conceptions of man-made law rank it as fundamental and supreme law *because* it is man-made,** thanks to the notion of the sovereignty of the people that saw expression in events such as the American Revolution and French Revolution of the 18th century.[10][13]
>
> Legal theory in the Soviet Union went further, not recognizing any such thing as divine or natural law, and considering the state to be sovereign. **Only man-made law, as made by the state, existed according to Marxist legal theory.[14]**
>
> Although laws higher than the man-made law of the sovereign people are not formally recognized in the legal theories of countries such as the United States, **the Thomist idea of man-made law being subordinate to divine law is still espoused by many people in those countries.** For example: Martin Luther King, Jr., in his *Letter from Birmingham Jail* cited Thomas Aquinas in his ways to know that a law is unjust:[15][16]
>
> > "A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law."—*King 1963*
>
> In several Islamic countries, man-made law is still, in 20th and 21st century legal theory, considered to be subordinate to divine law, in the form of the sharia. **In that legal theory, the sovereign power is Allah, not the people, and God-made law takes precedence over man-made law.[17]**
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apeiron#Apeiron_as_an_origin
>
> Searching for some universal principle, Anaximander retained the traditional religious assumption that there was a cosmic order and tried to explain it rationally, using the old mythical language which ascribed divine control on various spheres of reality. This language was more suitable for a society which could see gods everywhere; therefore the first glimmerings of laws of nature were themselves derived from divine laws.[8] **The Greeks believed that the universal principles could also be applied to human societies. The word *nomos* (law) may originally have meant *natural law* and used later to mean man-made law.[9] Greek philosophy entered a high level of abstraction. It adopted *apeiron* as the origin of all things, because it is completely indefinite.**

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n65/mode/2up?view=theater

Now, just as the oldest Greek theorists supposed that the sports of chance had changed the material universe from its simple primitive form into its present heterogeneous condition, so their intellectual descendants imagined that but for untoward accident the human race would have conformed itself to simpler rules of conduct and a less tempestuous life. To live according to *nature* came to be considered as the end for which man was created, and which the best men were bound to compass. **To live according to *nature* was to rise above the disorderly habits and gross indulgences of the vulgar to higher laws of action which nothing but self-denial and self-command would enable the**

aspirant to observe. It is notorious that this proposition—live according to nature—was the sum of the tenets of the famous Stoic philosophy. Now on the subjugation of Greece that philosophy made instantaneous progress in Roman society. It possessed natural fascinations for the powerful class who, in theory at least, adhered to the simple habits of the ancient Italian race, and disdained to surrender themselves to the innovations of foreign fashions. Such persons began immediately to affect the Stoic precepts of life according to nature—an affectation all the more grateful, and, I may add, all the more noble, from its contrast with the unbounded profligacy which was being diffused through the imperial city by the pillage of the world and by the example of its most luxurious races. In the front of the disciples of the new Greek school, we might be sure, even if we did not know it historically, that the Roman lawyers figured. We have abundant proof that, there being substantially but two professions in the Roman republic, the military men were generally identified with the party of movement, but the lawyers were universally at the head of the party of resistance.

The alliance of the lawyers with the Stoic philosophers lasted through many centuries. Some of the earliest names in the series of renowned jurisconsults are associated with Stoicism, and ultimately we have the golden age of Roman jurisprudence fixed by general consent at the era of the Antonine Cæsars, the most famous disciples to whom that philosophy has given a rule of life. **The long diffusion of these doctrines among the members of a particular profession was sure to affect the art which they practised and influenced.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fabian_Society#Establishment
>
> According to author Jon Perdue, "The logo of the Fabian Society, a tortoise, represented the group's predilection for a slow, imperceptible transition to socialism, while its coat of arms, a 'wolf in sheep's clothing', represented its preferred methodology for achieving its goal."[3]
>
> https://www.conservapedia.com/Long_march_through_the_institutions
>
> "**Revolution is not a short act when something happens once and then everything is different. Revolution is a long, complicated process, where one [*der Mensch*] must become different...the process goes along this way, which I have once named 'The Long March through the Established Institutions',** in which [*institutions*], through clarification [*Aufklärung*], systematic clarification and direct actions, awareness is brought [*Bewusstwerdung*] to further minorities in and outside the university, in schools, in trade schools, in engineer schools, also technical universities and finally in factories, where workers are currently worrying about their jobs. The process has begun, and that is a long story, which right now has been set on its course by us."[7][8]

Several positions which we find in the remains of the Roman jurisconsults are scarcely intelligible, unless we use the Stoic tenets as our key; but at the same time it is a serious, though a very common, error to measure the influence of Stoicism on Roman law by counting up the number of legal rules which can be confidently affiliated on Stoical dogmas. It has often been observed that the strength of Stoicism resided not in its canons of conduct, which were often repulsive or ridiculous, but in the great though vague principle which it inculcated of resistance to passion. Just in the same way the influence on jurisprudence of the Greek theories, which had their most distinct expression in Stoicism, consisted not in the number of specific positions which they contributed to Roman law, but in the single fundamental assumption which they lent to it. After nature had become a household word in the mouths of the Romans, **the belief gradually prevailed among the Roman lawyers that the old Jus Gentium was in fact the lost code of Nature,** and that the Prætor in framing an Edictal jurisprudence on the principles of the Jus Gentium was gradually restoring a type from which law had only departed to deteriorate. **The inference from this belief was immediate, that it was the Prætor's duty to supersede the Civil Law as much as possible by the Edict, to revive as far as might be the institutions by which Nature had governed man in the primitive state.** Of course, there were many impediments to the amelioration of law by this agency. There may have been prejudices to overcome even in the legal profession itself, and Roman habits were far too tenacious to give way at once to mere philosophical theory. The indirect methods by which the Edict combated certain technical anomalies, show the caution which its authors were compelled to observe, and down to the very days of Justinian there was some part of the old law which had obstinately resisted its influence. **But, on the whole, the progress of the Romans in legal improvement was astonishingly rapid as soon as stimulus was applied to it by the theory of Natural Law.**
...

But then, while the Jus Gentium had little or no antecedent credit at Rome, **the theory of a Law of Nature came in surrounded with all the prestige of philosophical authority, and invested with the charms of association with an elder and more blissful condition of the race.** It is easy to understand how the difference in the point of view would affect the dignity of the term which at once described the operation of the old principles and the results of the new theory. **Even to modern ears it is not at all the same thing to describe a process as one of "levelling" and to call it the "correction of anomalies," though the metaphor is precisely the same.** Nor do I doubt that, when

once Æquitas was understood to convey an allusion to the Greek theory, associations which grew out of the Greek notion of *ἰσότης* began to cluster round it.
...

At Rome, as the intervention of the Praetor was at first dictated by simple concern for the safety of the state, it is likely that in the earliest times it was proportioned to the difficulty which it attempted to get rid of. Afterwards, when the taste for principle had been diffused by the Responses, he no doubt used the Edict as the means of giving a wider application to those fundamental principles which he and the other practising jurisconsults, his contemporaries, believed themselves to have detected underlying the law. **Latterly he acted wholly under the influence of Greek philosophical theories, which at once tempted him to advance and confined him to a particular course of progress.**
...

Another remarkable characteristic of both English and Roman Equity is the falsehood of the assumptions upon which the claim of the equitable to superiority over the legal rule is originally defended. **Nothing is more distasteful to men, either as individuals or as masses, than the admission of their moral progress as a substantive reality. This unwillingness shows itself, as regards individuals, in the exaggerated respect which is ordinarily paid to the doubtful virtue of consistency.** The movement of the collective opinion of a whole society is too palpable to be ignored, and is generally too visible for the better to be decried; but there is the greatest disinclination to accept it as a primary phenomenon, and it is commonly explained as the recovery of a lost perfection—the gradual return to a state from which the race has lapsed. This tendency to look backward instead of forward for the goal of moral progress produced anciently, as we have seen, on Roman jurisprudence effects the most serious and permanent. **The Roman jurisconsults, in order to account for the improvement of their jurisprudence by the Prætor, borrowed from Greece the doctrine of a Natural state of man—a Natural society—anterior to the organisation of commonwealths governed by positive laws.**

> https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n195/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 550 In this way the boundaries of the fields were fixed and maintained. **This division, too generally set forth by Hermogenianus the jurisconsult, has been imagined as taking place by deliberate agreement of men, and carried out with justice and respected in good faith,** at a time when there was as yet no armed public force and consequently no civil authority of law. But it cannot be understood save as taking place among men of extreme wildness, observing a frightful religion which had fixed and circumscribed them within certain lands, and whose bloody ceremonies had consecrated their first walls.

In England, on the other hand, a range of ideas especially congenial to Englishmen of that day, explained the claim of Equity to override the common law by supposing a general right to superintend the administration of justice which was assumed to be vested in the king as a natural result of his paternal authority. The same view appears in a different and a quainter form in the old doctrine that Equity flowed from the king's conscience—**the improvement which had in fact taken place in the moral standard of the community being thus referred to an inherent elevation in the moral sense of the sovereign.**
...

It will be inferred from what has been said that the theory which transformed the Roman jurisprudence had no claim to philosophical precision. It involved, in fact, one of those "mixed modes of thought" which are now acknowledged to have characterised all but the highest minds during the infancy of speculation, and which are far from undiscoverable even in the mental efforts of our own day. The Law of Nature confused the Past and the Present. **Logically, it implied a state of Nature which had once been regulated by natural law; yet the jurisconsults do not speak clearly or confidently of the existence of such a state, which indeed is little noticed by the ancients except where it finds a poetical expression in the fancy of a golden age.** Natural law, for all practical purposes, was something belonging to the present, something entwined with existing institutions, something which could be distinguished from them by a competent observer. The test which separated the ordinances of Nature from the gross ingredients with which they were mingled was a sense of simplicity and harmony; **yet it was not on account of their simplicity and harmony that these finer elements were primarily respected, but on the score of their descent from the aboriginal reign of Nature. This confusion has not been successfully explained away by the modern disciples of the jurisconsults,** and in truth modern speculations on the Law of Nature betray much more indistinctness of perception and are vitiated by much more hopeless ambiguity of language than the Roman lawyers can be justly charged with. There are some writers on the subject who attempt to evade the fundamental difficulty by contending that the code of Nature exists in the future and is the goal to which all civil laws are moving, but this is to reverse the assumptions on which the old theory rested, or rather perhaps to mix together two inconsistent theories. The tendency to look not to the past but to the future for types of perfection was brought into the world by Christianity. Ancient literature gives few or no hints of a belief that the progress of society is necessarily from worse to better.

But the importance of this theory to mankind has been very much greater than its philosophical deficiencies would lead us to expect. Indeed, **it is not easy to say what turn the history of thought, and therefore of the human race, would have taken, if the belief in a law natural had not become universal in the ancient world.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=K-mRDQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT27#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is an old trick of political innovator to describe that which they seek to realize as Ancient and Natural, as something which has existed from the beginning and which has been lost only through the misfortune of historical development; men, they say, must return to this state of things and revive the Golden Age. **Thus natural law explained the rights which it demanded for the individual as inborn, inalienable rights bestowed upon him by Nature. This was no question of innovation, but of the restoration of the "eternal rights which shine above, inextinguishable and indestructible as the stars themselves."** In the same way the romantic Utopia of common ownership as an institution of remote antiquity has arisen. Almost all peoples have known this dream. In Ancient Rome it was the legend of the Golden Age of Saturn, described in glowing terms by Virgil, Tibullus, and Ovid, and praised by Seneca.13 Those were the carefree, happy days when none had private property and all prospered in the bounty of a generous Nature.14 **Modern Socialism, of course, imagines itself beyond such simplicity and childishness, but its dreams differ little from those of the Imperial Romans.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/10/23.htm

Although Fourier's writings do not display those bright sparks of genius which we find in Saint-Simon's and some of his disciples; although his style is hard, and shows, to a considerable extent, the toil with which the author is always labouring to bring out his ideas, and to speak out things for which no words are provided in the French language — nevertheless, we read his works with greater pleasure; and find more real value in them, than in those of the preceding school. **There is mysticism, too, and as extravagant as any, but this you may cut off and throw it aside, and there will remain something not to be found among the Saint-Simonians — scientific research, cool, unbiased, systematic thought; in short, *social philosophy;* whilst Saint-Simonism can only be called *social poetry.*** It was Fourier, who, for the first time, established the great axiom of social philosophy, that every individual having an inclination or predilection for some particular kind of work, the sum of all these inclinations of all individuals must be, upon the whole, an adequate power for providing for the wants of all. From this principle, it follows, that if every individual is left to his own inclination, to do and to leave what he pleases, the wants of all will be provided for, without the forcible means used by the present system of society. **This assertion looks bold, and yet, after Fourier's mode of establishing it, is quite unassailable, almost self-evident — the egg of Columbus.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/352/mode/2up?view=theater

O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for a crime committed by the father or the grandfather?
…

Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given authority to the poets, [Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem] I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be condemned.

https://archive.org/details/historyrome12mommgoog/page/202/mode/2up?view=theater

Far different were the position and influence of the Stoic philosophy in Italy. In direct contrast to these schools it attached itself to the religion of the land as closely as science can at all accommodate itself to faith. To the popular faith with its gods and oracles the Stoic adhered on principle, in so far as he recognized in it an instinctive knowledge, to which scientific knowledge was bound to have regard and even in doubtful cases to subordinate itself. **He believed in a different way from the people rather than in different objects;** the essentially true and supreme God was in his view doubtless the world-soul, but every manifestation of the primitive God was in its turn divine, the stars above all, but also the earth, the vine, the soul of the illustrious mortal whom the people honoured as a hero, and in fact every departed spirit of a former man.

http://www.attalus.org/translate/justin7.html#43.1

3 The first inhabitants of Italy were the Aborigines, whose king, Saturnus, is said to have been a man of such extraordinary justice, **that no one was a slave in his reign, or had any private property, [privatae rei] but all things were common to all, and undivided, as one estate [patrimonium] for the use of every one;** 4 **in memory of**

> **which way of life, it has been ordered that at the Saturnalia slaves should everywhere sit down with their masters at the entertainments, the rank of all being made equal.** 5 **Italy was accordingly called, from the name of that king, Saturnia; and the hill on which he dwelt Saturnius, on which now stands the Capitol, as if Saturnus had been dislodged from his seat by Jupiter.** 6 After him, third in descent, they say that Faunus was king, in whose time Evander came into Italy from Pallanteum, a city of Arcadia, accompanied with a small band of his countrymen, to whom Faunus kindly gave land, and the mountain which he afterwards called Palatium.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n391/mode/2up?view=theater

Killings of plebeians, on the other hand, were either committed by their own lords against whom no accusation could be brought, or by others who could indemnify the man's own lord for the loss as if he had been a slave, as is still the custom in Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. **But the learned interpreters of Roman law did not see this difficulty because they relied on the vain opinion of the innocence of the golden age, just as the political theorists for the same reason relied on Aristotle's statement that in the ancient commonwealths there were no laws concerning private wrongs and offenses; whence Tacitus, Sallust and other writers who are otherwise most discerning, when they speak of the origin of commonwealths and laws, relate that in the primitive state preceding the cities men led lives like so many Adams in the state of innocence.**

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0124%3Achapter%3D2
>
> **In early times, [initio] accordingly, kings (for that was the first title of sovereignty in the world) applied themselves in different ways;[1] some exercised the mind, others the body. At that period, however,[2] the life of man was passed without covetousness;[3] every one was satisfied with his own.** But after Cyrus in Asia[4] and the Lacedæmonians and Athenians in Greece, began to subjugate cities and nations, to deem the lust of dominion a reason for war, and to imagine the greatest glory to be in the most extensive empire, it was then at length discovered, by proof and experience,[5] that mental power has the greatest effect in military operations.
>
> http://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/tacitusc/annals/chap3.htm#P25
>
> 26. **Mankind in the earliest age lived for a time without a single vicious impulse, without shame or guilt, and, consequently, without punishment and restraints. Rewards were not needed when everything right was pursued on its own merits; and as men desired nothing against morality, they were debarred from nothing by fear. When however they began to throw off equality, and ambition and violence usurped the place of self-control and modesty, despotisms grew up and became perpetual among many nations.**
>
> **Vetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libidine, sine probro, scelere eoque sine poena aut coercitionibus agebant. neque praemiis opus erat cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. at postquam exui aequalitas et pro modestia ac pudore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenere dominationes multosque apud populos aeternum mansere.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

Eventually the myth of the golden race, with all the ambiguities of a myth in Greek culture, was reduced to a matter-of-fact description of an actual historical epoch. In the intermediate stages along the way, the mythic and historical components were inextricably intermingled. **At some point difficult to establish, but surely by Hellenistic times, Hesiod's five races were completely supplanted by four ages (the race of heroes was dropped) and the golden race became a golden age.** When this occurred, the temporal and historical character of the myth was firmly established.
…

Many later utopias would seek to reproduce the continence and benevolent spirit of Plato's early ages of mankind. More than two thousand years after Plato, a young French engineer, Nicolas Boulanger, member of the philosophical circle of the Baron d'Holbach, revived much of the Platonic phraseology in his *L'Antiquité dévoilée* (published posthumously in 1766), an impassioned re-creation of the human condition after upheavals in the physical structure of the earth. His purpose was to relate the naturally moral postdiluvians to the rational good men who were being fashioned in European society by the Enlightenment. The Platonic lawgiver aimed to

institute at one fell swoop what the most sanguine of the eighteenth-century philosophes hoped to achieve only gradually. **What for Plato was still a myth became scientific truth for the engineer-philosophe, who could prove that the deluge had in fact occurred by pointing to seashells on the mountains, and who derived the image of tender and gentle postdiluvian man from mythology and Plato's text.** Nothing in Plato ever died; in new guises his images were reborn in the utopian fantasies of later generations.

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D3%3Apage%3D678
>
> *Athenian:* In the first place, **owing to their desolate state, they were kindly disposed and friendly towards one another; and secondly, they had no need to quarrel about food.** [679a] For they had no lack of flocks and herds (except perhaps some of them at the outset), and in that age these were what men mostly lived on: thus they were well supplied with milk and meat, and they procured further supplies of food, both excellent and plentiful, by hunting. They were also well furnished with clothing and coverlets and houses, and with vessels for cooking and other kinds; for no iron is required for the arts of moulding and weaving, [679b] which two arts God gave to men to furnish them with all these necessaries, in order that the human race might have means of sprouting and increase whenever it should fall into such a state of distress. **Consequently, they were not excessively poor, nor were they constrained by stress of poverty to quarrel one with another; and, on the other hand, since they were without gold and silver, they could never have become rich.** Now a community which has no communion with either poverty or wealth is generally the one in which the noblest characters will be formed; [679c] for in it there is no place for the growth of insolence and injustice, of rivalries and jealousies. **So these men were good, both for these reasons and because of their simple-mindedness, as it is called; for, being simple-minded, when they heard things called bad or good, they took what was said for gospel-truth and believed it.** For none of them had the shrewdness of the modern man to suspect a falsehood; but they accepted as true the statements made about gods and men, and ordered their lives by them.
> …
>
> *Athenian:* And shall we not say that people living in this fashion for many generations were bound to be unskilled, as compared with either the antediluvians or the men of today, **and ignorant of arts in general and especially of the arts of war as now practised by land and sea, including those warlike arts which, disguised under the names of law-suits and factions, are peculiar to cities, contrived as they are with every device of word and deed to inflict mutual hurt and injury;** [679e] **and that they were also more simple and brave and temperate, and in all ways more righteous?**

The vision of man in a primitive state of nature in Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, its most noteworthy modern envelopment, makes only peripheral reference to Plato's fable of early mankind, though Rousseau knew the *Dialogues*. **From his notes we gather that he was inspired rather by the work of a later writer, Dicaearchus of Messana, a pupil of Aristotle who spent most of his life in Sparta. His *Bios Hellados* (Life in Greece), the first universal history of culture ever written, is preserved in a summary by Porphyry in that same treatise to which we owe the fragment from Empedocles on the primitive reign of love, and came to Rousseau circuitously through excerpts in Saint Jerome. Dicaearchus completely demythicized the golden age and reduced it to plain historical reality. Virtually all the physical and moral qualities that grace Rousseau's state-of-nature man have an antecedent in this Hellenistic portrait of the first generation,** an age extolled as the best life ever enjoyed by men, when they were truly like unto the gods. They ate little – no heavy foods – and therefore did not sicken from loaded down with foul matter. The arts had not yet been invented, and men thrived, without care or toil, on the spontaneous fruits of nature. Similarly, Rousseau's natural man was superior to societal man in "physique" and in "morale," he never suffered from disease, and he needed no doctors, the bane of civilized existence. Both in Dicaearchus and in Rousseau the acorn sufficed the peaceful primitives. There was no conflict or emulation among them because there was nothing of value about which to contend. **To the later multiplication of desires Dicaearchus, a true forerunner of Rousseau, imputed all the evils that had beset mankind.**8

By the time Aratus of Soli wrote his astronomical poem, the *Phaenomena*, for the Macedonian court in the third century before Christ, the temper of the golden age had been subtly changed. **No**

longer depicted as primitive, it was a philosophical epoch in which the first men practiced the rationalist moral virtues esteemed by the author.
…

Life had lost something of its easygoing character as men ploughed the fields with oxen, but the air of the pastoral idyll was preserved: Existence remained simple, nature was generous, and the pernicious influences of foreign trade had not yet corrupted men by stimulating a taste for luxury. The poem of Aratus was popular in the Roman world; it was translated by Cicero and adapted by Hyginus, who added nothing to the original.
…

Far better known than the Greek poets, Vergil and especially Ovid were pivotal figures in preserving and handing down the myth of a golden age.
…

Beginning with the Renaissance, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was one of the most popular schoolbooks in Western Europe; and his portrayal of the golden age in Book I, which filled out Hesiod's spare text, was the definitive form in which the myth was infused into utopian thought. Ovid, who was a friend of Hyginus, did not disguise his close kinship with Hesiod, for all his rich embellishments of the *aurea aetas*; **but the atmosphere had become heavily scented with the primitivist nostalgia of an oversophisticated society.**
…

As one moves from Ovid through time, the literary rendering of a golden age becomes ever more laden with ornaments until in the epics of the Italian Renaissance the exuberance of detail is oppressive and suffocating. **The reign of natural righteousness without legal sanctions, with which Ovid began, was in itself utopia for the law-ridden society of Rome and its heirs. The elimination of any need for the external compulsions and restraints of law remained a dominant theme in utopian thought down through Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program*, albeit his concept was animated by a romantic idea of *Gemeinschaft* which no Roman would have countenanced.**

There are two special dangers to which law, and society which is held together by law, appear to be liable in their infancy. **One of them is that law may be too rapidly developed. This occurred with the codes of the more progressive Greek communities, which disembarrassed themselves with astonishing facility from cumbrous forms of procedure and needless terms of art, and soon ceased to attach any superstitious value to rigid rules and prescriptions.** It was not for the ultimate advantage of mankind that they did so, though the immediate benefit conferred on their citizens may have been considerable. One of the rarest qualities of national character is the capacity for applying and working out the law, as such, at the cost of constant miscarriages of abstract justice, without at the same time losing the hope or the wish that law may be conformed to a higher ideal. **The Greek intellect, with all its mobility and elasticity, was quite unable to confine itself within the strait waistcoat of a legal formula;** and, if we may judge them by the popular courts of Athens, of whose working we possess accurate knowledge, the Greek tribunals exhibited the strongest tendency to confound law and fact. The remains of the Orators and the forensic commonplaces preserved by Aristotle in his Treatise on Rhetoric, show that questions of pure law were constantly argued on every consideration which could possibly influence the mind of the judges. No durable system of jurisprudence could be produced in this way. **A community which never hesitated to relax rules of written law whenever they stood in the way of an ideally perfect decision on the facts of particular cases, would only, if it bequeathed any body of judicial principles to posterity, bequeath one consisting of the ideas of right and wrong which happened to be prevalent at the time.** Such a jurisprudence would contain no framework to which the more advanced conceptions of subsequent ages could be fitted. It would amount at best to a philosophy, marked with the imperfections of the civilisation under which it grew up.

Few national societies have had their jurisprudence menaced by this peculiar danger of precocious maturity and untimely disintegration. It is certainly doubtful whether the Romans were ever seriously threatened by it, but at any rate they had adequate protection in their theory of Natural Law. **For the Natural Law of the jurisconsults was distinctly conceived by them as a system which ought gradually to absorb civil laws, without superseding them so long as they remained unrepealed.** There was no such impression of its sanctity abroad, that an appeal to it would be likely to overpower the mind of a judge who was charged with the superintendence of a particular litigation. **The value and serviceableness of the conception arose from its keeping before the mental vision a type of perfect law, and from its inspiring the hope of an indefinite approximation to it, at the same time that it never tempted the practitioner or the citizen to deny the obligation of existing laws which had not yet been adjusted to the theory.** It is important too to observe that this model system, unlike many of those which have mocked men's hopes in later days, was not entirely the product of imagination. **It was never thought of as founded on quite untested principles. The**

notion was that it underlay existing law and must be looked for through it. Its functions were in short remedial, not revolutionary or anarchical. And this, unfortunately, is the exact point at which the modern view of a Law of Nature has often ceased to resemble the ancient.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Reform_or_Revolution%3F
>
> In the end, Luxemburg concluded that Bernstein was not simply arguing for a "more realistic" way to socialism, but had thrown out the prospect of socialism:
>
> > That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Our program becomes not the realization of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the wage labor system but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself.

The other liability to which the infancy of society is exposed has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their usages were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity, and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies; **but it is still true that, over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the original legislator.** If intellect has in such cases been exercised on jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenor. **I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be superior to the laws of the Hindoos, unless the theory of Natural Law had given it a type of excellence different from the usual one.**

> http://ambedkar.org/ambcd/38B1.%20Who%20were%20the%20Shudras%20PART%20I.htm#_msoanchor_100
>
> **From this brief survey of the basis of rights and disabilities in Roman Law, it will be clear that the basis was the same for all. They did not differ from community to community.** Rights and disabilities according to Roman Law were regulated by general considerations, such as *caput* and *existimatio.* Whoever had *caput* and *existimatio* had rights. Whoever lost his *caput* and his *existimatio* suffered disabilities. What is the position under the Brahmanic Law? There again, it is quite clear that rights and disabilities were not based on general uniform considerations. They were based on communal considerations. All rights for the first three *Varnas* and all disabilities for the Shudras was the principle on which the Brahmanic Law was based.
> ...
>
> It may be that the Roman Law did recognise communal distinction in distributing rights and disabilities. **The point is that the disabilities of the Plebians were not regarded as permanent.** Although they existed they were in course of time removed. That being so, the protagonists of Brahmanic Law cannot merely take solace in having found a parallel in the Roman Law **but have to answer why the Brahmanic Law did not abolish the distinction between the Traivarnikas and the Shudras as the Roman Law did by equating the Plebians with the Patricians?**
> ...
>
> The next feature of the Roman Law which distinguishes it from the Brahmanic Law is most noteworthy. It relates to the extinction of disabilities. Two points need be borne in mind. **First is that the disabilities under the Roman Law were only contingent. So long as certain conditions lasted, they gave rise to certain disabilities. The moment the conditions changed, the disabilities vanished and a step in the direction of equality before law was taken.** The second point is that the Roman Law never attempted to fix the conditions for ever and thereby perpetuate the disabilities. On the other hand, it was always ready to remove the conditions to which these disabilities were attached as is evident in the case of the Plebians, the Slaves, the Foreigners and the Pagans.
> ...
>
> **Thus, the Brahmanic Law not only seeks to impose disabilities but it endeavours to make them permanent.** One illustration will suffice. A Shudra is not entitled to perform Vedic sacrifices as he is not able to repeat the Vedic *Mantras.* Nobody would quarrel with such a disability. But the Dharma Sutras do not stop here. **They go further and say that it will be a crime for a Shudra to study the Vedas or hear it being pronounced** and if he does commit such a crime his tongue should be cut or molten lead should be poured into his ear. **Can anything be more barbarous than preventing a man to grow out of his disability?**
>
> https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler#Hitler's_Table_Talk_(1941-1944)_(published_1953)
>
> 6 August 1942.

> As for the ridiculous hundred million Slavs, we will mould the best of them as we see fit, and we will isolate the rest of them in their own pig-styes; **and anyone who talks about cherishing the local inhabitants and civilising them, goes straight off into a concentration camp!**
>
> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dio_Chrysostom/Discourses/36*.html#ref43
>
> 38 "This, then, is the theory of the philosophers, a theory which sets up a noble and benevolent fellowship of gods and men **which gives a share in law and citizenship, not to all living beings whatsoever, but only to such as have a share in reason and intellect, introducing a far better and more righteous code than that of Sparta, in accordance with which the Helots have no prospect of ever becoming Spartans, and consequently are constantly plotting against Sparta.**

In this one exceptional instance, simplicity and symmetry were kept before the eyes of a society whose influence on mankind was destined to be prodigious from other causes, as the characteristics of an ideal and absolutely perfect law. **It is impossible to overrate the importance to a nation or profession of having a distinct object to aim at in the pursuit of improvement.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_About_Mormons
>
> Stan's anger doesn't upset anyone in the Mormon family other than Gary, who confronts Stan and the other boys the next day, **pointing out that he believes his religion does not need to be factually true, but it still supports good family values and helping the poor.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/stoicphilosophy210murr/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **If the Gods of tradition had proved themselves capable of protecting their worshippers, doubtless their many moral and intellectual deficiencies might have been overlooked.** But they had not. They had proved no match for Alexander and the Macedonian phalanx.
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/107
>
> The *fear* of ancestors and their power, the consciousness of owing debts to them, necessarily increases, according to this kind of logic, in the exact proportion that the race itself increases, that the race itself becomes more victorious, more independent, more honoured, more feared. **This, and not the contrary, is the fact. Each step towards race decay, all disastrous events, all symptoms of degeneration, of approaching disintegration, always *diminish* the fear of the founder's spirit, and whittle away the idea of his sagacity, providence, and potent presence.**

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n93/mode/2up?view=theater

The eighteenth century was half over when the most critical period in the history of Natural Law was reached. Had the discussion of the theory and of its consequences continued to be exclusively the employment of the legal profession, there would possibly have been an abatement of the respect which it commanded; for by this time the *Esprit des Lois* had appeared. Bearing in some exaggerations the marks of the excessive violence with which its author's mind had recoiled from assumptions usually suffered to pass without scrutiny, yet showing in some ambiguities the traces of a desire to compromise with existing prejudice, **the book of Montesquieu, with all its defects, still proceeded on that Historical Method before which the Law of Nature has never maintained its footing for an instant.** Its influence on thought ought to have been as great as its general popularity; but, in fact, it was never allowed time to put it forth, **for the counter-hypothesis which it seemed destined to destroy passed suddenly from the forum to the street, and became the key-note of controversies far more exciting than are ever agitated in the courts or the schools.** The person who launched it on its new career was that remarkable man who, without learning, with few virtues, and with no strength of character, has nevertheless stamped himself ineffaceably on history by the force of a vivid imagination, and by the help of a genuine and burning love for his fellow-men, for which much will always have to be forgiven him. **We have never seen in our own generation—indeed the world has not seen more than once or twice in all the course of history—a literature which has exercised such prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from Rousseau between 1749 and 1762. It was the first attempt to re-erect the edifice of human belief after the purely iconoclastic efforts commenced by Bayle, and in part by our own Locke, and consummated by Voltaire;** and besides the superiority which every constructive effort will always enjoy over one that is merely destructive, it possessed the immense advantage of appearing amid an all but universal scepticism as to the soundness of all foregone knowledge in matters speculative. **Now, in all the speculations of Rousseau, the central figure, whether arrayed in an English dress as the signatory of a social compact, or simply stripped naked of all historical qualities, is uniformly Man, in a supposed state of nature. Every law or institution which would misbeseem this imaginary being under these ideal circumstances is to**

be condemned as having lapsed from an original perfection; every transformation of society which would give it a closer resemblance to the world over which the creature of Nature reigned, is admirable and worthy to be effected at any apparent cost. **The theory is still that of the Roman lawyers, for in the phantasmagoria with which the Natural Condition is peopled, every feature and characteristic eludes the mind except the simplicity and harmony which possessed such charms for the jurisconsult; but the theory is, as it were, turned upside down. It is not the Law of Nature, but the State of Nature, which is now the primary subject of contemplation.** The Roman had conceived that by careful observation of existing institutions parts of them could be singled out which either exhibited already, or could by judicious purification be made to exhibit, the vestiges of that reign of nature whose reality he faintly affirmed. Rousseau's belief was that a perfect social order could be evolved from the unassisted consideration of the natural state, a social order wholly irrespective of the actual condition of the world and wholly unlike it. **The great difference between the views is that one bitterly and broadly condemns the present for its unlikeness to the ideal past; while the other, assuming the present to be as necessary as the past, does not affect to disregard or censure it.** It is not worth our while to analyse with any particularity that philosophy of politics, art, education, ethics, and social relation which was constructed on the basis of a state of nature. It still possesses singular fascination for the looser thinkers of every country, and is no doubt the parent, more or less remote, of almost all the prepossessions which impede the employment of the Historical Method of inquiry, **but its discredit with the higher minds of our day is deep enough to astonish those who are familiar with the extraordinary vitality of speculative error. Perhaps the question most frequently asked nowadays is not what is the value of these opinions, but what were the causes which gave them such overshadowing prominence a hundred years ago. The answer is, I conceive, a simple one. The study which in the last century would best have corrected the misapprehensions into which an exclusive attention to legal antiquities is apt to betray was the study of religion.** But Greek religion, as then understood, was dissipated in imaginative myths. The Oriental religions, if noticed at all, appeared to be lost in vain cosmogonies. There was but one body of primitive records which was worth studying—the early history of the Jews. **But resort to this was prevented by the prejudices of the time. One of the few characteristics which the school of Rousseau had in common with the school of Voltaire was an utter disdain of all religious antiquities; and, more than all, of those of the Hebrew race.** It is well known that it was a point of honour with the reasoners of that day to assume not merely that the institutions called after Moses were not divinely dictated, nor even that they were codified at a later date than that attributed to them, but that they and the entire Pentateuch were a gratuitous forgery, executed after the return from the Captivity. **Debarred, therefore, from one chief security against speculative delusion, the philosophers of France, in their eagerness to escape from what they deemed a superstition of the priests, flung themselves headlong into a superstition of the lawyers.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1860/pg1860-images.html#link2HCH0024

Humboldt has somewhere a curious passage; in which, looking on some wretched group of Indians, squatting stupidly round their fires, besmeared with grease and paint, and devouring ants and clay, he somewhat naively remarks, that were it not for science, which teaches us that such is the crude material of humanity, and this the state from which we all have risen, he should have been tempted rather to look upon those hapless beings as the last degraded remnants of some fallen and dying race. One wishes that the great traveller had been bold enough to yield to that temptation, which his own reason and common sense presented to him as the real explanation of the sad sight, instead of following the dogmas of a so-called science, which has not a fact whereon to base its wild notion, and must ignore a thousand facts in asserting it. **His own good sense, it seems, coincided instinctively with the Bible doctrine, that man in a state of nature is a fallen being, doomed to death—a view which may be a sad one, but still one more honorable to poor humanity than the theory, that we all began as some sort of two-handed apes. It is surely more hopeful to believe that those poor Otomacs or Guahibas were not what they ought to be, than to believe that they were.** It is certainly more complimentary to them to think that they had been somewhat nobler and more prudent in centuries gone by, than that they were such blockheads as to have dragged on, the son after the father, for all the thousands of years which have elapsed since man was made, without having had wit enough to discover any better food than ants and clay.

Our voyagers, however, like those of their time, troubled their heads with no such questions. Taking the Bible story as they found it, they agreed with Humboldt's reason, and not with his science; or, to speak correctly, agreed with Humboldt's self, **and not with the shallow anthropologic theories which happened to be in vogue fifty years ago; [1855]** and their new hosts were in their eyes immortal souls like themselves, “captivated by the devil at his will,” lost there in the pathless forests, likely to be lost hereafter.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#A_DISCOURSE_b

The philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature; but not one of them has got there. Some of them have not hesitated to ascribe to man, in such a state, the idea of just and unjust, without troubling themselves to show that he must be possessed of such an idea, or that it could be of any use to him. Others have spoken of the natural right of every man to keep what belongs to him, without explaining what they meant by belongs. **Others again, beginning by giving the strong authority over the weak, proceeded directly to the birth of government, without regard to the time that must have elapsed before the meaning of the words authority and government could have existed among men.** Every one of them, in short, constantly dwelling on wants, avidity, oppression, desires and pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the savage, they described the social man. **It has not even entered into the heads of most of our writers to doubt whether the state of nature ever existed; but it is clear from the Holy Scriptures that the first man, having received his understanding and commandments immediately from God, was not himself in such a state; and that, if we give such credit to the writings of Moses as every Christian philosopher ought to give, we must deny that, even before the deluge, men were ever in the pure state of nature;** unless, indeed, they fell back into it from some very extraordinary circumstance; a paradox which it would be very embarrassing to defend, and quite impossible to prove.

Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world. **Religion commands us to believe that, God Himself having taken men out of a state of nature immediately after the creation, they are unequal only because it is His will they should be so: but it does not forbid us to form conjectures based solely on the nature of man, and the beings around him, concerning what might have become of the human race, if it had been left to itself.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#FNanchor_8_67

I have endeavoured to trace the origin and progress of inequality, and the institution and abuse of political societies, **as far as these are capable of being deduced from the nature of man merely by the light of reason, and independently of those sacred dogmas which give the sanction of divine right to sovereign authority.** It follows from this survey that, as there is hardly any inequality in the state of nature, all the inequality which now prevails owes its strength and growth to the development of our faculties and the advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by the establishment of property and laws.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

But there was another reason for Rousseau to call such reasonings “hypothetical and conditional” – that of Machiavelli. **As Rousseau noted, "Religion commands us to believe that ... God Himself took men out of the state of nature immediately after the creation."** In order to avoid persecution, Rousseau was compelled to present his Epicurean account as merely hypothetical, for religion "commanded us" what to believe. Yet, Rousseau hastily added, religion "does not forbid us to form conjectures, drawn solely from the nature of man and the beings surrounding him, about what the human race might have become if it had remained abandoned to itself."54 But such, of course, was a ruse. It is quite clear, as Rousseau's analysis proceeds, **that he considered Lucretius to be the true authority on human origins, not the Bible, for he soon dropped any pretense of offering a hypothetical account.**
…

Life in the state of nature was not "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" as the Epicurean hedonist Hobbes would have it, but solitary and tranquil, as Lucretius had described it, a condition in which our desires were at a bare minimum, and sexual desire was fortuitously aroused and easily satisfied without any of the disturbing entanglements of love, the family, or society, or any of the worrisome burdens or morality, for "men in that state, not having among themselves any kind of moral relationship or known duties, could be neither good nor evil, and had neither vices not virtues."57

As with both Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau provided an Epicurean counter-myth of human origins to displace the Genesis story, an account not based on evidence, but simply on the requirements of materialism devoid of divine design.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aggañña_Sutta#Digging_Deeper_Into_the_Sutta

According to Richard Gombrich, **the sutta gives strong evidence that it was conceived entirely as a satire of Hindu claims regarding the divine nature of the varnashrama, showing that it is nothing but a human convention.**[2][3]

> According to Gombrich, the Buddha satirizes the Vedic "Hymn of the Cosmic Man" and etymologizes "reciter of the Veda" so as to make it mean "non-meditator" instead.[4]

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n97/mode/2up?view=theater

Looking back, however, to the period at which the theory of the state of nature acquired the maximum of political importance, there are few who will deny that it helped most powerfully to bring about the grosser disappointments of which the first French Revolution was fertile. **It gave birth, or intense stimulus, to the vices of mental habit all but universal at the time, disdain of positive law, impatience of experience, and the preference of *à priori* to all other reasoning.** In proportion too as this philosophy fixes its grasp on minds which have thought less than others and fortified themselves with smaller observation, its tendency is to become distinctly anarchical. **It is surprising to note how many of the *Sophismes Anarchiques* which Dumont published for Bentham, and which embody Bentham's exposure of errors distinctively French, are derived from the Roman hypothesis in its French transformation, and are unintelligible unless referred to it.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55903/pg55903-images.html#link2H_4_0004
>
> The literature of France has been to ours what Aaron was to Moses, the expositor of great truths which would else have perished for want of a voice to utter them with distinctness. **The relation which existed between Mr. Bentham and M. Dumont is an exact illustration of the intellectual relation in which the two countries stand to each other.** The great discoveries in physics, in metaphysics, in political science, are ours. **But scarcely any foreign nation except France has received them from us, by direct communication.** Isolated by our situation, isolated by our manners, we found truth, but we did not impart it. France has been the interpreter between England and mankind.

On this point too it is a curious exercise to consult the *Moniteur* during the principal eras of the Revolution. The appeals to the Law and State of Nature become thicker as the times grow darker. They are comparatively rare in the Constituent Assembly; they are much more frequent in the Legislative; in the Convention, amid the din of debate on conspiracy and war, they are perpetual.

There is a single example which very strikingly illustrates the effects of the theory of natural law on modern society, and indicates how very far are those effects from being exhausted. **There cannot, I conceive, be any question that to the assumption of a Law Natural we owe the doctrine of the fundamental equality of human beings. That "all men are equal" is one of a large number of legal propositions which, in progress of time, have become political. The Roman jurisconsults of the Antonine era lay down that "omnes homines naturâ æquales sunt," but in their eyes this is a strictly juridical axiom.** They intend to affirm that, under the hypothetical Law of Nature, and in so far as positive law approximates to it, the arbitrary distinctions which the Roman Civil Law maintained between classes of persons cease to have a legal existence. **The rule was one of considerable importance to the Roman practitioner, who required to be reminded that, wherever Roman jurisprudence was assumed to conform itself exactly to the code of Nature, there was no difference in the contemplation of the Roman tribunals between citizen and foreigner, between freeman and slave, between Agnate and Cognate.** The jurisconsults who thus expressed themselves most certainly never intended to censure the social arrangements under which civil law fell somewhat short of its speculative type; nor did they apparently believe that the world would ever see human society completely assimilated to the economy of nature. But when the doctrine of human equality makes its appearance in a modern dress it has evidently clothed itself with a new shade of meaning. Where the Roman jurisconsult had written "æquales sunt," meaning exactly what he said, the modern civilian wrote "all men are equal" in the sense of "all men ought to be equal." **The peculiar Roman idea that natural law coexisted with civil law and gradually absorbed it, had evidently been lost sight of, or had become unintelligible,** and the words which had at most conveyed a theory concerning the origin, composition, and development of human institutions, were beginning to express the sense of a great standing wrong suffered by mankind.

As early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, the current language concerning the birth-state of men, though visibly intended to be identical with that of Ulpian and his contemporaries, has assumed an altogether different form and meaning. The preamble to the celebrated ordinance of King Louis Hutin enfranchising the serfs of the royal domains would have sounded strangely to Roman ears. "**Whereas, according to natural law, everybody ought to be born free;** and by some usages and customs which, from long antiquity, have been introduced and kept until now in our realm, and peradventure by reason of the misdeeds of their predecessors, many persons of our common people have fallen into servitude, therefore, We, etc."

> https://www.historytoday.com/archive/normans-and-slavery-breaking-bonds

The idea that slavery in Europe declined as Christianity spread has long been discredited. **Until the turn of the first millennium the Church had little problem with slavery.** The Bible is full of stories of slaves and their masters; churchmen were generally content to urge slaves to be obedient and masters to be merciful. **Nevertheless in the decades around the millennium the powerful Church reform movement began to take root and reformed churchmen took an increasingly dim view of concubinage and bastardy.** In France lay leaders, who in the past had thought nothing of having several wives, now found themselves subjected to opprobrium, if they took up with more than one.

Perhaps more important were the simultaneous structural changes taking place in French society. The political fragmentation of France during the 10th century, the increase in knights and growth of castle-building, had made violence and warfare more endemic and, precisely for this reason, better regulated. **Warriors concluded it was better to capture and ransom each other in war rather than risk death every time they took to the battlefield. At the same time the Peace of God movement urged the protection of non-combatants.** By the 11th century young men and women were no longer a legitimate target in warfare, to be led away in chains once the fighting was over.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n261/mode/2up?view=theater

The earliest law school in France is that of Montpellier. This was founded in the 12th century by the Italian Placentinus,16 who had taught law at Mantua and Bologna. **The study of Roman law was embraced at Paris with such extraordinary fervor that Pope Honorius III in the year 1220 had to issue a decree forbidding ecclesiastics from leaving holy orders and betaking themselves to Paris for the study of law.** Paris being forbidden, law schools were then started at Toulouse17 and elsewhere.

https://archive.org/details/HistoryOfFranceV1/page/n373/mode/2up?view=theater

The young feudal king, humanized by the want of money, did not disdain to treat with serfs and with Jews. The famous ordinance of Louis Hutin for the enfranchisement of the serfs of his domains, is exactly similar to that of Philippe-le-Bel for the Valois, already quoted:—"**As according to the right (law) of nature each ought to be born free,** and through ancient usages and customs which from time long past have been introduced and observed in our kingdom hitherto, and perchance for the misdeed of their predecessors, many of our common people have fallen into bond of servitude and of diverse conditions, which is exceedingly displeasing to us—**We, considering that our kingdom is called and named the kingdom of the Franks, (freemen,) and desiring that the reality accord with the name,** and that the condition of the people be amended by us and by the advent of our new government—by deliberation of our grand council, have ordained and do ordain, **that generally throughout our kingdom, so long as it may belong to us and to our successors,** such servitudes be restored to franchises, and that to all those who, by origin, or antiquity, or newly, by marriage, or by residence of place in servile condition, have fallen or may fall into bond of servitude, franchise be given on good and suitable conditions."§

> § **Comme selon le droit de nature chacun doit naistre franc;** et par aucuns usages et coustumes, qui de grant ancienneté ont esté entroduites et gardées jusques cy en nostre royaume, et par avanture pour le meffet de leurs prédecesseurs, moult de personnes de nostre commun pueple, soient encheues en lieu de servitudes et de diverses conditions, qui moult nous desplaît: **Nous considerants que nostre royaume est dit, et nomme le royaume des Francs, et voullants que la chose en vérité soit accordant an nom,** et que la condition des gents amende de nous et la venue de nostre nouvel gouvernement; par délibération de nostre grand conseil avons ordené et ordenons, **que generaument, par tout nostre royaume, de tant comme il pent appartenir à nous et à nos successeurs,** telles servitudes soient ramenées à franchises, et à tous ceus qui de origine, ou ancienneté, ou de nouvel par mariage, ou par residence de lieus de serve condition, sont encheues, ou pourroient eschoir ou lieu de servitudes, franchise soit donnée à bonnes et convenables conditions. Ord. i. p. 583.

It is curious to see the son of Philippe-le-Bel admitting serfs to liberty; but it is trouble lost. The merchant vainly swells his voice and enlarges on the worth of his merchandise; the poor serfs will have none of it. Had they buried in the ground some bad piece of money, they took care not to dig it up to buy a bit of parchment. In vain does the king wax wroth at seeing them dull to the value of the boon offered. **At last, he directs the commissioners deputed to superintend the enfranchisement, to value the property of such serfs as preferred "remaining in the sorriness (chétiveté) of slavery," and to tax them "as sufficiently and to such extent as the condition and wealth of the individuals may conveniently allow, and as the necessity of our war requires."**

But with all this it is a grand spectacle to see proclamation made from the throne itself of the imprescriptible right of every man to liberty. The serfs do not buy this right, but they will remember both the royal lesson, and the dangerous appeal to which it instigates against the barons.*

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/montesquieu-complete-works-vol-3#lf0171-03_head_106

> It is a long time since the Christian princes set free all the slaves in their kingdoms; because, say they, Christianity makes all men equal. **It is true, this act of religion hath been very serviceable to them. They destroyed, by this means, the power of the nobility, by which they kept the people in subjection to themselves.** They afterwards made conquest in countries where they found it was to their advantage to have slaves; they allowed of buying and selling them; forgetting those principles of religion, which had so much touched them. What shall we call this? Truth at one time, error at another.

This is the enunciation not of a legal rule but of a political dogma; **and from this time the equality of men is spoken of by the French lawyers just as if it were a political truth which happened to have been preserved among the archives of their science.** Like all other deductions from the hypothesis of a Law Natural, and like the belief itself in a Law of Nature, it was languidly assented to and suffered to have little influence on opinion and practice until it passed out of the possession of the lawyers into that of the literary men of the eighteenth century and of the public which sat at their feet. With them it became the most distinct tenet of their creed, and was even regarded as a summary of all the others. **It is probable, however, that the power which it ultimately acquired over the events of 1789 was not entirely owing to its popularity in France, for in the middle of the century it passed over to America. The American lawyers of the time, and particularly those of Virginia, appear to have possessed a stock of knowledge which differed chiefly from that of their English contemporaries in including much which could only have been derived from the legal literature of continental Europe.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5655/pg5655-images.html#link2H_4_0011
>
> Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our Colonies which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of this untractable spirit. I mean their *education*. **In no country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful; and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to the Plantations.** The Colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter on your table. **He states that all the people in his government are lawyers, or smatterers in law;** and that in Boston they have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. The smartness of debate will say that this knowledge ought to teach them more clearly the rights of legislature, their obligations to obedience, and the penalties of rebellion. All this is mighty well. But my honorable and learned friend on the floor, who condescends to mark what I say for animadversion, will disdain that ground. He has heard, as well as I, **that when great honors and great emoluments do not win over this knowledge to the service of the state, it is a formidable adversary to government.** If the spirit be not tamed and broken by these happy methods, it is stubborn and litigious. *Abeunt studia in mores.*26 This study readers men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defence, full of resources.

A very few glances at the writings of Jefferson will show how strongly his mind was affected by the semi-juridical, semi-popular opinions which were fashionable in France, and we cannot doubt that it was sympathy with the peculiar ideas of the French jurists which led him and the other colonial lawyers who guided the course of events in America to join the specially French assumption that "all men are born equal" with the assumption, more familiar to Englishmen, that "all men are born free," in the very first lines of their Declaration of Independence. The passage was one of great importance to the history of the doctrine before us. The American lawyers, in thus prominently and emphatically affirming the fundamental equality of human beings, gave an impulse to political movements in their own country, and in a less degree in Great Britain, which is far from having yet spent itself; **but besides this they returned the dogma they had adopted to its home in France, endowed with vastly greater energy and enjoying much greater claims on general reception and respect. Even the more cautious politicians of the first Constituent Assembly repeated Ulpian's proposition as if it at once commended itself to the instincts and intuitions of mankind;** and of all the "principles of 1789" it is the one which has been least strenuously assailed, which has most thoroughly leavened modern opinion, and which promises to modify most deeply the constitution of societies and the politics of states.

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/canavan-select-works-of-edmund-burke-vol-2#lf0005-02_head_018

Judge, Sir, of my surprize, when I found that a very great proportion of the Assembly (a majority, I believe, of the members who attended) was composed of practitioners in the law. It was composed not of distinguished magistrates, who had given pledges to their country of their science, prudence, and integrity; not of leading advocates, the glory of the bar; not of renowned professors in universities—but for the far greater part, as it must in such a number, of the inferior, unlearned, mechanical, merely instrumental members of the profession. There were distinguished exceptions; but the general composition was of obscure provincial advocates, of stewards of petty local jurisdictions, country attornies, notaries, and the whole train of the ministers of municipal litigation, the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village vexation. **From the moment I read the list I saw distinctly, and very nearly as it has happened, all that was to follow.**

The degree of estimation in which any profession is held becomes the standard of the estimation in which the professors hold themselves. Whatever the personal merits of many individual lawyers might have been, and in many it was undoubtedly very considerable, **in that military kingdom, no part of the profession had been much regarded, except the highest of all, who often united to their professional offices great family splendour, and were invested with great power and authority. These certainly were highly respected, and even with no small degree of awe.** The next rank was not much esteemed; the mechanical part was in a very low degree of repute.
…

It was not an event depending on chance or contingency. It was inevitable; it was necessary; it was planted in the nature of things. They must *join* (if their capacity did not permit them to *lead*) in any project which could procure to them a *litigious constitution;* which could lay open to them those innumerable lucrative jobs which follow in the train of all great convulsions and revolutions in the state, and particularly in all great and violent permutations of property. **Was it to be expected that they would attend to the stability of property, whose existence had always depended upon whatever rendered property questionable, ambiguous, and insecure?**

> https://archive.org/details/aglanceatrevolu03macfgoog/page/n291/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Even without changing the French laws of inheritance and other laws which ought to be changed – for they were conceived in the very spirit of ultra-democratism, and their tendency is to bring all men and families down to a dead level, and to render any prolonged existence of an aristocracy an impossibility** – I am of opinion that most important and beneficial changes (as beneficial to the country as to themselves) would ensue if all the Neapolitan nobility would forsake the capital for six months every year, and pass that time on their estates.
> …
>
> **It is precisely from this plunderous class of "middle-men" and agents and factors that the *ultra-liberali*, the presidents and orators of clubs, and the real architects of the barricades have sprung,** and do yet spring, not only in this kingdom, but through the rest of Italy, where the noblesse have been equally negligent and averse to a country life, and have been equally pillaged. **Italian robbers always call the man they rob a thief and assassin. Men always hate those whom they most wrong.** In acquiring the estates of the nobility, these provincial, rustical agents have not been able to obtain a footing in the noble society of Naples, or the *entrée* at court. They are fenced out. Family pride has survived the decay of family wealth; and it is only on very rare occasions that the *novi homines* are to be seen in the house of a second-rate nobleman at Naples, let their wealth be what it may. **But these enriched rustics very commonly send their sons up to Naples to be educated, and to study the law – and these young lawyers from the provinces are your revolutionists *par excellence*.**

…

Were they then to be awed by the super-eminent authority and awful dignity of an handful of country clowns who have seats in that Assembly, some of whom are said not to be able to read and write? and by not a greater number of traders, who, though somewhat more instructed, and more conspicuous in the order of society, had never known any thing beyond their counting-house? No! **both these descriptions were more formed to be overborne and swayed by the intrigues and artifices of lawyers,** than to become their counterpoise. With such a dangerous disproportion, the whole must needs be governed by them.
…

Such in general was the composition of the *Tiers Etat* in the National Assembly; in which was scarcely to be perceived the slightest traces of what we call the natural landed interest of the country.
…

> **The magistrates of the supreme courts and bailliages belonged to the order of the Nobility, and were represented in its representation to the number of 28;** and even if

> they had been eligible, the electors of the Third Estate would hardly have entrusted them with their interests. But 162 magistrates of other tribunals were among the representatives of the Third Estate.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estates_General_of_1789#Elections_of_early_spring_1789

The Third Estate representation was doubled to 578 men, representing about 98 percent of the population of roughly 28 million. Half were well-educated lawyers or local officials. Nearly a third were in trades or industry; 51 were wealthy land owners.[13][14]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobles_of_the_Robe

Under the Ancien Régime of France, **the Nobles of the Robe or Nobles of the Gown (French: *noblesse de robe*) were French aristocrats whose rank came from holding certain judicial or administrative posts.** As a rule, the positions did not of themselves give the holder a title of nobility, such as baron or viscount (although the holder might also have such a title), but they were almost always attached to a specific function. The offices were often hereditary, and by 1789, most of the holders had inherited their positions. **The most influential of them were the 1,100 members of the 13 parlements, or courts of appeal.**

https://archive.org/details/lazarecarnotrepu0000dupr/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater

Lazare's father was the twentieth "homme de robe" in the family since the sixteenth century. On the paternal side, of seventy-four ancestors since the end of the sixteenth century there were twenty lawyers, notaries or judicial functionaries, four ecclesiastics, five public or private administrators, one officer, three doctors and surgeons, and one painter.
…

At the age of fourteen, Lazare, with his older brother, was lodged with a Madame Gondier, in Autun, and enrolled in the Collège d'Autun for the study of the classics. The Oratoriens had recently succeeded the Jesuits in the governance of this excellent *Collége*. At the time, of course, elementary and secondary education in France was almost exclusively in the hands of the various orders of the church. **After the suppression and expulsion of the Jesuits in 1762, the Oratoriens took the lead in the instruction offered in the thirty *colleges* scattered throughout France.**16 It is quite evident that the Oratoriens were liberal innovators in education in the eighteenth century. They took the lead in introducing the study of the French language and literature and in the simplification of the study of Latin. In addition to the improved study of the classics, this order introduced and emphasized the teaching of geography, history, mathematics, and science. **The Oratoriens also warmly supported the philosophy of Descartes.**
…

A perusal of the plan of studies of the Oratoriens for 174517 reveals how central was the place of Cicero, Cato, Ovid, Virgil, Caesar, Terence, St. Chrysostome, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Suetonius, Horace, Seneca, Juvenal, Demosthenes, Homer, Pindar, Sophocles, Euripides, and other literary and history-writing figures of ancient Greece and Rome. **Erasmus and Comenius were also given an important place.**

Carnot was thoroughly absorbed in the study of classical antiquity. This was common for his class in the period.18 There is no doubt that this discipline and this taste date from the years which he spent in the Collège d'Autun.
…

Later on in life Carnot translated a great deal from the Latin for his own pleasure and profit. His political speeches and writings are replete with classical references and allusions that reveal a thorough familiarity with the history of Greece and Rome.19

His feelings for a common humanity, his leanings towards a universal principle of justice and right, and his theory of natural rights bear testimony to his close study of the Stoic philosophy. The natural tendency of the period to idealize and glorify ancient Greece and Rome was characteristic of Carnot. Dissatisfied with their own society, the educated of the period looked back to the model of an earlier one, in order to sketch a new order for themselves.
…

During his first eighteen months in this private school the youth systematically studied theology largely under his own direction and under the compulsion of his own conscience and doubts. **He suffered the ridicule of his classmates because of his piety. He ended this period by discarding theological works forever and by adopting the prevalent ideas of deism.** He retained, however, a deep respect for the holy books of Christianity. His son noted much later that "as to his religious principles, these were based upon a deism freed of all mythology, and upon a considered confidence in immortality."22

> https://archive.org/details/lazarecarnotrepu0000dupr/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Carnot was president of the Convention on May 16, when the Jacobins presented their address congratulating the Convention on this decree. "Replying coldly," writes Professor Aulard, "**[Carnot] spoke more as a disciple of Diderot than as an admirer of Savoyard Vicar, appeared to confound God with nature,** and by the shades of his language, showed as well as he could without risking his head, that he did not adhere to the new cult."23 Carnot said, in part, "Justice, humanity, love of country, consolation for the one who suffers,

> hope of a better future ... **all these things together make the Supreme Being;** he is the unification of all thoughts which are the happiness of man, of all sentiments which spread flowers in the way of life.
>
> "**To deny the Supreme Being is to deny the existence of Nature;** for the laws of Nature are supreme wisdom itself. What is the Supreme Being, if it is not the great final truth which contains all truth, the eternal order of nature, immutable justice, the sublime virtue which includes all the virtues, the love which embraces all pure affections. ... To invoke the Supreme Being is to call on the spectacle of nature."24
> ...
>
> At a later date Carnot's son summarized the religious beliefs of his father: "Without seeking a metaphysical explanation of God, **Carnot accepted the idea of a Supreme Wisdom, working together with love for the conservation of the world.** He did not question that man was the master of his own destiny, and because of that belief, he disdained all speculation which did not lead directly to the improvement of the individual or to the progress of the social order: **his philosophy took a very practical direction.**"27

https://archive.org/details/lazarecarnotrepu0000dupr/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

In this *Mémoire* Carnot combined general political discussion with the technical treatment. His general position was revealed when he wrote **"War is the art of conserving; the art of destruction is its abuse. … Every just war, every war which merits the name, is essentially defensive."** He criticised rulers for invoking divine sanction for their wars of aggression, and in no uncertain terms he protested against wars of conquest. **"If there is a country in Europe," he wrote, "whose particular interest is in accord on this point (the laws of equity and natural religion) with the principles of this universal morality, of this great political philosophy which considers all nations as parts of the same humanity, it is undoubtedly France."** Thus this military engineer reveals his absorption in the ideas of the *philosophes* which were the current stock in trade of the literate, sensitive bourgeoisie. **His ideas also attest his familiarity with the central theses of the Stoics in Ancient Greece and Rome.**

https://archive.org/details/lazarecarnotrepu0000dupr/page/58/mode/2up?view=theater

Carnot returned to Paris around January 9, 1793. On January 12 the official Report of the Commission was deposited in the Convention. It was read there before the members in the session of January 29 by Carnot.47 The applause of the Convention frequently interrupted the reading of the Report and it was ordered to be printed and distributed. Throughout, the Report was a most thorough, practical, sane, concrete document of grievances and of suggested remedies.48 It spoke particularly in terms of specific abuses rather than in terms of principles, and asked for their redress by the responsible government. The report breathed the spirit of Turgot. It is truly a masterly document in practical politics. **It gives the "highest idea of Carnot, as thinker and as writer."**49
...

Some of the demagogical phraseology of the republicans appears in the introduction: **"The irresistible voice of reason, in proclaiming the rights of the people and in opening their eyes, taught them that they have no other sovereigns than themselves, no other enemies than the stupid idols worshipped under the name of Kings, and that in the whole world there should no longer be any but equals, friends and brothers."**50 The Report went on to state that the league of princes formed to preserve their own tyranny would be dissolved by the general love of equality and by the courage of free men.

https://archive.org/details/lazarecarnotrepu0000dupr/page/192/mode/2up?view=theater

He believed in a strongly centralized government for the crisis, and he was responsible for the defense of France, both within and on the frontiers of the Nation. **He saw the need for absolute control at home. He opposed tyranny but he favored the virtual dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety.** He claimed only to be a specialist.
...

Sorel has written of Carnot in this regard, **"He confined himself to his rôle, achieving a sort of stoicism of state and imposed upon himself as a duty, … this capitulation of his humanity; letting the Terrorists guillotine so long as they let him defend France."**93

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Codex_Iustiniani_Meynier_Louvre_INV20092.jpg

The Earth receiving from the emperors Hadrian and Justinian the codex of Roman law dictated by Nature, Justice and Wisdom.

La Terre recevant des empereurs Adrien et Justinien le code des lois romaines dictées par la Nature, la Justice et la Sagesse.

Meynier. An onze. [Meynier. Year eleven.]

---

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm

Camille Desmoulins, Danton, Robespierre, St. Just, Napoleon, **the heroes as well as the parties and the masses of the old French Revolution, performed the task of their time – that of unchaining and establishing modern bourgeois society – in Roman costumes and with Roman phrases.** The

first one destroyed the feudal foundation and cut off the feudal heads that had grown on it. The other created inside France the only conditions under which free competition could be developed, parceled-out land properly used, and the unfettered productive power of the nation employed; and beyond the French borders it swept away feudal institutions everywhere, to provide, as far as necessary, bourgeois society in France with an appropriate up-to-date environment on the European continent. **Once the new social formation was established, the antediluvian colossi disappeared and with them also the resurrected Romanism – the Brutuses, the Gracchi, the publicolas, the tribunes, the senators, and Caesar himself.** Bourgeois society in its sober reality bred its own true interpreters and spokesmen in the Says, Cousins, Royer-Collards, Benjamin Constants, and Guizots; its real military leaders sat behind the office desk and the hog-headed Louis XVIII was its political chief. **Entirely absorbed in the production of wealth and in peaceful competitive struggle, it no longer remembered that the ghosts of the Roman period had watched over its cradle.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_032
>
> Indeed it is notorious that in political convulsions the legal part of an established order has often fared the best. **When the French Revolution had swept away the rank and privileges of the nobles, the substance of the civil law remained in other respects much as it had been before.** Napoleon's codes were based on the customs and ordinances of the monarchy; they were found quite well fitted to serve, with a moderate amount of editing and local amendment, for the Province of Quebec, where the Revolution had never passed.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1717/1717-h/1717-h.htm#link2H_4_0005

But that modern movement which many would count the most anarchic of all is in this sense the most conservative of all. **Never was the past more venerated by men than it was by the French Revolutionists.** They invoked the little republics of antiquity with the complete confidence of one who invokes the gods. The Sans-culottes believed (as their name might imply) in a return to simplicity. They believed most piously in a remote past; some might call it a mythical past.

https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr06.htm#an_fr_40_1

This claim of a new thing to be old is, in varying degrees, a common characteristic of great movements. The Reformation professed to be a return to the Bible, the Evangelical movement in England a return to the Gospels, the High Church movement a return to the early Church. **A large element even in the French Revolution, the greatest of all breaches with the past, had for its ideal a return to Roman republican virtue or to the simplicity of the natural man.**40_2

> 40_2 Since writing the above I find in Vandal, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, p. 20, in Nelson's edition, a phrase about the Revolutionary soldiers: 'Ils se modelaient sur ces Romains ... sur ces Spartiates ... et ils créaient un type de haute vertu guerrière, quand ils croyaient seulement le reproduire.'

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9-8fIBVgCQYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA112#v=onepage&q&f=false

Like the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, the Papal Revolution pretended to be not a revolution but a restoration. Gregory VII, like Cromwell, claimed that he was not innovating, but restoring ancient freedoms that had been abrogated in the immediately preceding centuries. **As the English Puritans and their successors found precedents in the common law of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, largely passing over the century or more of Tudor-Stuart absolutism, so the Gregorian reformers found precedents in the patristic writings of the early centuries of the church, largely passing over the Carolingian and post-Carolingian era in the West.** The ideological emphasis was on tradition, but the tradition could only be established by suppressing the immediate past and returning to an earlier one. **Writings of leading Frankish and German canonists and theologians of the ninth and tenth centuries were simply ignored.** In addition, the patristic writings were interpreted to conform to the political program of the papal party, and when particular patristic texts stood in the way of that program they were rejected. **Faced with an obnoxious custom, the Gregorian reformers would appeal over it to truth, quoting the aphorism of Tertullian and St. Cyprian, "Christ said, 'I am the truth.' He did not say 'I am the custom.'"** Gregory VII quoted this against Emperor Henry IV. Becket quoted it against King Henry II. **It had a special force at a time when almost all the prevailing law was customary law.**

It is the hallmark of the great revolutions of Western history, starting with the Papal Revolution, that they clothe their vision of the radically new in the garments of a remote past, **whether those of ancient legal authorities (as in the case of the Papal Revolution), or of an ancient religious text, the Bible (as in the case of the German Reformation), or of an ancient civilization, classical Greece (as in the case of the French Revolution), or of a prehistoric classless society (as in the case of the Russian Revolution).** In all these great upheavals the idea of a restoration – a return, and in that sense a revolution, to an earlier starting point – was connected with a dynamic concept of the future.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19104/19104-h/19104-h.htm#fna738

It will be remembered that Rousseau like Weishaupt held that the Golden Age of felicity did not end in the garden of Eden, as is popularly supposed, but was prolonged into tribal and nomadic life. Up to this moment Communism was the happy disposition under which the human race existed and which vanished with the introduction of civilization. **Civilization is therefore the *fons et origo mali* and should be done away with. Let no one exclaim that this theory died out either with Rousseau or with Weishaupt;** the idea that "civilization is all wrong" runs all through the writings and speeches of our Intellectual Socialists to-day.

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/lafargue/1883/lazy/ch01.htm
>
> Look at the noble savage whom the missionaries of trade and the traders of religion have not yet corrupted with Christianity, syphilis and the dogma of work, and then look at our miserable slaves of machines.[1]
>
> > [1] **European explorers pause in wonder before the physical beauty and the proud bearing of the men of primitive races, not soiled by what Paeppig calls “the poisonous breath of civilization.”** Speaking of the aborigines of the oceanic Islands, Lord George Campbell writes: “There is not a people in the world which strikes one more favorably at first sight. Their smooth skin of a light copper tint, their hair golden and curly, their beautiful and happy faces, in a word. their whole person formed a new and splendid specimen of the ‘genus homo’; their physical appearance gave the impression of a race superior to ours.” **The civilized men of ancient Rome, witness Caesar and Tacitus, regarded with the same admiration the Germans of the communist tribes which invaded the Roman empire.** Following Tacitus, Salvien, the priest of the fifth century who received the surname of master of the Bishops, held up the barbarians as an example to civilized Christians: “We are immodest before the barbarians, who are more chaste than we. Even more, the barbarians are wounded at our lack of modesty; the Goths do not permit debauchees of their own nation to remain among them; alone in the midst of them, by the sad privilege of their nationality and their name, the Romans have the right to be impure. (Pederasty was then the height of the fashion among both pagans and Christians.) The oppressed fly to the barbarians to seek for mercy and a shelter.” (*De Gubernatione Dei*) **The old civilization and the rising Christianity corrupted the barbarians of the ancient world, as the old Christianity and the modern capitalist civilization are corrupting the savages of the new world.**

I have referred elsewhere to Mr. H.G. Wells's prediction that mankind will more and more revert to the nomadic life, and Mr. Snowden has recently referred in tones of evident nostalgia to that productive era when man "lived under a system of tribal Communism."1

> 1. Mr. Philip Snowden in debate on Socialism in the House of Commons on March 20, 1923: **"By far the greatest time that man has been upon this globe he has lived not under a system of private enterprise, not under capitalism, but under a system of tribal communism, and it is well worth while to remember that most of the great inventions that have been the basis of our machinery and our modern discoveries were invented by men who lived together in tribes."**

...

Here, then, is the theory on which this yearning for a return to nature is based. **For it is quite probable that if a Golden Age ever existed it was Communistic; it is also true that certain primitive tribes have found it possible to continue the same system,** for the simple reason that when and where the earth was very thinly populated it brought forth, without the artificial aid of agriculture, more than enough to supply each man's needs. **There was therefore no need for laws to protect property, since every man could help himself freely to all that he required. If at the present time a dozen people were shipwrecked on a fertile island some miles in area, the institution of property would be equally superfluous;** if, however, several hundred were to share the same fate, it would at once become necessary to institute some system of cultivation which in its turn would necessitate either the institution of property, by which each man would depend on his own plot of land for his existence, or a communal system, by which all would be obliged to work for the common good and force applied to those who refused to do their allotted share.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n349/mode/2up?view=theater

981 The two greatest eternal properties of the aristocratic commonwealths, as we have said above, are the guarding of the frontiers and the guarding of the orders.

982 The guarding of the frontiers began to be observed, as we have seen above, by bloody religions under the divine governments, **for it was necessary to set up boundaries to the fields in order to put a stop to the infamous sharing of things in the bestial state. On these boundaries were to be fixed the frontiers first of families, then of clans or houses, later of peoples, and finally of nations.** Hence the giants, as Polyphemus tells Ulysses, lived separately, each in his own cave with his wife and children, and did not meddle in one another's affairs, thus following the habits of their recent savage origin; and they savagely slew any who entered within their boundaries, as Polyphemus

attempted to slay Ulysses and his companions. (In this giant, as we have remarked several times, Plato discerns the fathers in the state of the families.) From this, as we showed above, **the custom was derived whereby the cities for a long period of time looked upon each other as enemies. So much for the harmonious division of the fields described by Hermogenianus the jurisconsult and received in good faith by all interpreters of Roman law.** From this first and most ancient principle of human things, with which its subject matter began, it would be reasonable to begin also the doctrine which teaches *De rerum divisione et acquirendo earum dominio* —"Of the classification of things and of acquiring ownership of them." This guarding of the frontiers is naturally practiced in the aristocratic commonwealths, which, as political writers point out, are not established by conquest. But later, **when the infamous communism of things had ceased and the boundaries of the peoples were well fixed,** came the popular commonwealths which are made for the expansion of empires, and finally the monarchies which are even more efficient in that respect.
...

985 **The guarding of the orders began in divine times from jealousy** (the jealousy of Juno, the goddess of solemn matrimony, as noted above) **with a view to the certainty of the families as against the nefarious communism of women.** Such vigilance is a natural property of the aristocratic commonwealths, **desirous of keeping family relationships, successions, and consequently wealth and through it power, within the order of the nobles.** On this account testamentary laws were late in appearing among the nations.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Polanyi

Polanyi graduated from Budapest University in 1912 with a doctorate in Law.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Transformation_(book)

Prior to the Market Society, markets had a very limited role in society and were confined almost entirely to long-distance trade.[9] As Polanyi wrote, **"the same bias which made Adam Smith's generation view primeval man as bent on barter and truck induced their successors to disavow all interest in early man, as he was now known not to have indulged in those laudable passions."**[10]

The modern market economy was forced by the powerful modern state, which was needed to push changes in social structure, and in what aspects of human nature were amplified and encouraged, which allowed for a competitive capitalist economy to emerge. For Polanyi, these changes implied the destruction of the basic social order that had reigned throughout pre-modern history. **Central to the change was that factors of production, such as land and labor, would now be sold on the market at market-determined prices instead of allocated according to tradition, redistribution, or reciprocity.**[11]
...

Polanyi also remarks that the **pre-modern economies of China, the Incan Empire, the Indian Empires, Babylon, Greece, and the various kingdoms of Africa operated on principles of reciprocity and redistribution with a very limited role for markets,** especially in settling prices or allocating the factors of production.[12] The book also presented his belief that market society is unsustainable because it is fatally destructive to human nature and the natural contexts it inhabits.

Polanyi attempted to turn the tables on the orthodox liberal account of the rise of capitalism by arguing that "laissez-faire was planned", whereas social protectionism was a spontaneous reaction to the social dislocation imposed by an unrestrained free market. He argues that the construction of a "self-regulating" market necessitates the separation of society into economic and political realms. **Polanyi does not deny that the self-regulating market has brought "unheard of material wealth",** but he suggests that this is too narrow a focus. The market, once it considers land, labor and money as fictitious commodities, and including them "means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market."[13]
...

He ended his work with a prediction of a socialist society, noting, "after a century of blind 'improvement', man is restoring his 'habitation.'"[14]
...

The sociologists Fred L. Block and Margaret Somers argue that Polanyi's analysis could help explain why the resurgence of free market ideas has resulted in "such manifest failures as persistent unemployment, widening inequality, and the severe financial crises that have stressed Western economies over the past forty years." **They suggest that "the ideology that free markets can replace government is just as utopian and dangerous" as the idea that Communism will result in the withering away of the state.**[18]
...

Deirdre McCloskey has criticized several aspects of the *Great Transformation*. She notes that Polanyi's account of "pre-market" societies are inconsistent with anthropological evidence which suggests these societies were not as equitable, socially stable, and successful as Polanyi makes them appear to be. **McCloskey notes that**

market-based societies are not a nascent invention, as Polanyi claims, but that they extend further back in time. She also criticizes Polanyi's conceptualization of self-regulating markets whereby any and all government intervention in the markets means the markets are no longer markets.[16]

> https://archive.org/details/foesofourownhous01roos/page/160/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Neither absolute Individualism nor absolute Socialism would be compatible with civilization at all; and among the arguments of the extremists of either side the only unanswerable ones are those which show the absurdity of the position of the other.** Not so much as the first step towards real civilization can be taken until there arises some development of the right of private property; that is, until men pass out of **the stage of savage socialism in which the violent and the thriftless forcibly constitute themselves co-heirs with the industrious and the intelligent** in what the labor of the latter produces. But it is equally true that every step toward civilization is marked by a check on individualism.

http://kpolanyi.scoolaid.net:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10694/565/Con_13_Fol_06%20REVISED.pdf?sequence=3

Marx starts from primitive Communism as the original state of mankind. Human relationships in daily life are here immediate, direct, personal.

In a developed market-society distribution of labour intervenes. Human relationships become indirect; instead of immediate co-operation there is indirect co-operation by the medium of the exchange of commodities. The reality of the relationships persists; the producers continue to produce for one another. But this relationship is now hidden behind the exchange of goods; it is impersonal; it expresses itself in the objective guise of the exchange value of commodities, it is objective, thing-like. Commodities, on the other hand, take on a semblance of life. They follow their own laws; rush in and out of the market; change places; seem to be masters of their own destiny. **We are in a spectral world, but in a world in which *spectres are real*. For the pseudo-life of the commodity, the objective character of exchange value, are *not* illusion.** The same holds true of other "objectifications" like the value of money, Capital, Labour, the State. They are the reality of a condition of affairs in which man has been estranged from himself. Part of his self is embodied in these commodities which now possess a strange self-hood of their own. **The same holds true of all social phenomena in Capitalism, whether it be the State, Law, Labour, Capital, or Religion.**

But the true nature of man rebels against Capitalism. Human relationships are the reality of society. In spite of the division of labour they must be immediate, i.e. personal. **The means of production must be controlled by the community.** Then human society will be real, for it will be humane: a relationship of persons.

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/08/07.htm
>
> But the community from which the workers is *isolated* is a community of quite different reality and scope than the *political* community. **The community from which *his own labor* separates him is *life* itself,** physical and spiritual life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature. *Human nature is the true community of men*. **Just as the disastrous isolation from this nature is disproportionately more far-reaching, unbearable, terrible and contradictory than the isolation from the political community,** so too the transcending of this isolation and even a partial reaction, a *rebellion* against it, is so much greater, **just as the *man* is greater than the citizen and human life than political life. Hence, however limited an industrial revolt may be, it contains within itself a *universal* soul: and however universal a political revolt may be, its *colossal* form conceals a *narrow* split.**

…

It is always a suggestive fact when a line of thought unconsciously takes off at a point that proves to be a crossroad.

Bachofen's work on matriarchy was, apart from Morgan, the main source of the Marxian vision of primitive society. Marx and Engels might have been as much fascinated as Klages himself by its poetic emphasis on the alleged unity of human existence in prehistoric times. But their impulses lie in opposite directions. **Nietzsche's Dionysian principle and Klages's Body-Soul represent a move backwards to the blissful regions of undeveloped harmony. Marxism represents the move onward towards a higher replica of the primeval harmony of man with his environment.** Thus, Socialism and Fascism appear for an instant on the same plane, representing alternative roads, as it were, to the conditions of closer human community. **But the reactionary road is illusionist. Regression – but how far back?** German Nationalists proposed to go back beyond 1918. Reactionary romantics like Moeller van der Bruck made it 1789.

Spann and the German Christians proclaimed a counter-Renaissance, thus extending the recession to half a millennium. The German Faith Movement realized that unless we put back the clock by full two thousand years there is neither safety nor permanence in reaction. **It is Klages's achievement to have shown that the destruction of Christianity is not enough; ten thousand years is nearer the mark!**

The revolutionary solution was based on realities. The counter-revolutionary one leads to an endless regression.

https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/noble-savages-exposing-the-worldview-of-pornographers-and-their-war-against-christian-civilization

Sigmund Freud saw man as being basically determined by the remnants in man's unconscious of the primordial horde, the id and the ego, so that this need, to cope with himself, is to understand that his will to live is the desire for parricide, incest, and cannibalism.15 Both the will to live and the will to death emerge out of man's primordial past, a world of chaos, and man must understand his past to live in the present. Freud saw no hope for regeneration, but some of his followers insisted on affirming hope by means of eros. Marcuse saw Freud's conception of man as "reactionary."16 **Marcuse's goal is a "nonrepressive culture," one which will supposedly have all the benefits of Christian civilization and all the "advantages" of the primitive cultures. There would be a regression behind the attained level of disciplined rationality.** According to Marcuse,

> This regression would be psychical as well as social; it would reactivate early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the development of the reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which the reality ego exists. **In terms of these institutions, instinctual liberation is relapse into barbarism.** However, occurring at the height of civilization, as a consequence not of defeat but of victory in the struggle for existence, and supported by a free society, such liberation might have very different results. **It would still be a reversal of the process of civilization, a subversion of culture—but *after* culture had done its work and created the mankind and the world that could be free. It would still be "regression"—but in the light of mature consciousness, and guided by a new rationality.** Under these conditions, the possibility of a nonrepressive civilization is predicated not upon the arrest, but upon the liberation, of progress—so that man would order his life in accordance with his fully developed knowledge so that he would ask again what is good and what is evil. If the guilt accumulated in the civilized domination of man by man can ever be redeemed by freedom, then the "original sin" must be committed again: **"We must again eat from the tree of knowledge in order to fall back into the state of innocence."**17

17. *Ibid.*, 198. The concluding quotation is from Heinrich von Kleist. Marcuse's position is like that of the girl, a university student in the 1960s, who upon advocating the abandonment of civilization and work was asked, "Who will provide the food?" Her answer: "Food is."

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treatise_of_the_Three_Impostors#Trait%C3%A9_sur_les_trois_imposteurs,_from_1719

According to Silvia Berti, the book was originally published as *La Vie et L'Esprit de Spinoza* (The Life and Spirit of Spinoza), containing both a biography of Benedict Spinoza and the anti-religious essay, and was later republished under the title *Traité sur les trois imposteurs*.[21] The creators of the book have been identified by documentary evidence as Jean Rousset de Missy and the bookseller Charles Levier.[22] The author of the book may have been a young Dutch diplomat called Jan Vroesen or Vroese.[21][22] Another candidate, to whom Levier attributed the work, is Jean-Maximilien Lucas.[23]

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/694/mode/2up?view=theater

Philosophically, the text is of little significance and less originality, being little more than a crude vulgarization of Spinoza supplemented with a collage of additional matter drawn from several writers. But none of this detracts from its appreciable historical significance as a propaganda tool of the Radical Enlightenment, the most ubiquitous and influential of the clandestine philosophical manuscripts throughout Europe as far afield as Stockholm, St Petersburg, Poland, and Hungary.61 Vehement in tone, it constitutes a veritable declaration of war on the entire existing structure of authority, faith, and tradition, proving that by the 1680s there was already a European intellectual fringe fired with a zealotry which was unabashedly revolutionary, dogmatic, and intolerant.

…

The *Traité* in its final form is a collage drawn from Spinoza, Hobbes, Charron, Naudé, La Mothe le Vayer, and Vanini, skilfully woven by Levier, Rousset, and Aymon into a coherent, dynamic unity. **The opening two chapters, setting the scene and laying down the basic philosophical principles on which the work is based, are borrowed directly from Spinoza.**
…

Once the philosophical framework is established in the opening chapters, however, the *Traité* no longer draws directly on Spinoza. Subsequently, material is taken from writers representing quite different philosophical traditions,78 a circumstance which has led to the frequently repeated thesis that the *Traité* is really eclectic rather than representative of a particular philosophical outlook. **But the borrowings from Hobbes, Naudé, and others are actually used only to illustrate Spinozistic arguments** and do not substantially influence the systematically mechanistic, deterministic, materialist, and non-providential principles on which the work is uncompromisingly based.
…

The fundamental aim of the *Traité* is nothing less than to convince readers 'there are no such things in Nature as either God or Devil or Soul or Heaven or Hell, after the fashion as they are described' and that the 'theologians, that is to say, these men who exhibit and spread about ridiculous *Fables* for sacred truths divinely revealed are all of them except some few ignorant dunces … people of villaneous principles, who maliciously abuse and impose on the credulous populace.'80 **This was not remotely Hobbes' message (even if he agreed with parts of it privately) and still less was it the battle cry of intellectual libertines like Charron or Naudé. Nor were any of the latter intending to destroy the presumption of the theologians that 'all that far greatest part of mankind, whom they audaciously term the lay vulgar, were only capable of chimera** or that they ought not to be nourished with any other food than this insipid truth of theirs, wherein is to be found nothing but folly, emptinesse, and nonsense, without a single grain of the salt of truth and wisdom.'81 **The Spinozists alone entertained this design.**

https://infidels.org/library/historical/unknown-three-impostors/

Only a little good sense is needed to see that God is neither passionate nor jealous, that justice and mercy are false titles attributed to him, and that nothing of what the Prophets and Apostles have said constitutes his nature nor his essence.
…

By this it may be seen that Nature or God does not propose any end, and that all final causes are but human fictions. A long lecture is not necessary since this doctrine takes away from God the perfection ascribed to him, and this is how it may be proved. If God acted for a result, either for himself or another, he desires what he has not, and we must allow that there are times when God has not the wherewith to act; he has merely desired it and that only creates an impotent God.
…

I. **Until now we have fought the popular idea concerning the Divinity, but we have not yet said what God is, and if we were asked, we should say that the word represents to us an Infinite Being, of whom one of his attributes is to be a substance of extent and consequently eternal and infinite.** The extent or the quantity not being finite or divisible, it may be imagined that the matter was everywhere the same, our understanding not distinguishing parts. For example, water, as much as water is imagined, is divisible, and its parts separable from one another, though as much as a corporeal substance it is neither separable nor divisible. [So of water, however, it may be subject to generation and corruption, as long as it is substance it is not subject to separation and division.] **Thus neither matter or quantity have anything unworthy of God, for if all is God, and all comes surely from his essence, it follows quite absolutely that He is all that he contains, since it is incomprehensible that Beings quite material should be contained in a Being who is not. That we may not think that this is a new opinion, Tertullian, one of the foremost men among the Christians, has pronounced against Apelles, that, "that which is not matter is nothing," and against Praxias, that "all substance is matter," without having this doctrine condemned in the four first Councils of the Christian Church, ecumenical and general.**

II. These sentiments are plain and the only ones that good and sound judgment can form of God. However, there are but few who are satisfied with such simplicity. **Boorish people, who are accustomed to adulation of opinion, demand a God who resembles earthly kings.**
…

Yes, such is the malice and stupidity of men that they prefer to pass their lives disputing with one another, **and worshipping a book received from ignorant people; a book with little order or method, which everyone admits as confused and badly conceived, only serving to foment**

divisions. Christians would rather adore this phantom than listen to the law of Nature which God—that is to say, Nature, which is the active principle—has written in the heart of man. All other laws are but human fictions, and pure illusions forged, not by Demons or evil spirits, which are fanciful ideas, but by the skill of Princes and Ecclesiastics to give the former more warrant for their authority, and to enrich the latter by the traffic in an infinity of chimeras which sell to the ignorant at a good price.
…

Before the word Religion was introduced in the world mankind was only obliged to follow natural laws and to conform to common sense. **This instinct alone was the tie by which men were united, and so very simple was this bond of unity, that nothing among them was more rare than dissensions.** But when fear created a suspicion that there were Gods, and invisible powers, they raised altars to these imaginary beings, so that in putting off the yoke of Nature and Reason, which are the sources of true life, they subjected themselves by vain ceremonies and superstitious worship to frivolous phantoms of the imagination, and that is whence arose this word Religion which makes so much noise in the world.
…

What is said of the Immortality of the Soul? of the Resurrection, of Hell, and the greater part of his Morals, I see nothing more admirable than in the works of Epictetus, Epicurus and many others. In fact, the latter was cited by St. Jerome (Book VIII, against Jovian, ch. viii), as man whose virtue puts to the blush better Christians, observing that all his works were filled with but herbs, fruits and abstinence, and whose delights were so temperate that his finest repasts were but a little cheese, bread and water. **With a life so frugal, this Philosopher, pagan as he was, said that it was better to be unlucky and rational, than rich and opulent without having good sense,** adding, that it is rare that a fortune and wisdom are found in the same individual, and that one could have no knowledge of happiness nor live with pleasure unless felicity was accompanied by prudence, justice and honesty, which are qualifications of a true and lasting delight.

As for Epictetus I do not believe that any man, not excepting Jesus himself, was more austere, more firm, more equitable, or more moral. I say nothing but what is easy to prove, and not to pass my prescribed limit I will not mention all the exemplary acts of his life, but give one single example of constancy which puts to shame the weakness and cowardice of Jesus in the sight of death. Being a slave to a freeman named Epaphroditus, captain of the guards of Nero, it took the fancy of this brute to twist the leg of Epictetus. Epictetus perceiving that it gave him pleasure said to him, smiling, that he was well convinced that the game would not end until he had broken his leg; in fact, this crisis happened. “Well,” said Epictetus with an even smiling face, “did I not say that you would break my leg?” **Was there ever courage equal to that? and could it have been said of Jesus Christ had he been the victim?** He who wept and trembled with fear at the least alarm, and who evinced at his death a lack of spirit that never was witnessed in the majority of his martyrs.
…

II. God is either a natural being or one of infinite extent who resembles what he contains, that is to say, that he is material **without being, nevertheless, neither just nor merciful, nor jealous, nor a God in any way as may be imagined, and as a consequence is neither a punisher nor a remunerator.** This idea of punishment and recompense only exists in the minds of the ignorant who only conceive that simple being called God, under images which by no means represent him. Those who use their understanding without confounding its operations with those of the imagination, and who are powerful enough to abandon the prejudice of a limited education, **are the only ones who have sound, clear and distinct ideas. They consider him as the source of all beings which are produced without distinction:** one being no more than another in His regard, and man no more difficult to produce than a worm or a flower.

III. **That is why it is not to be believed that this natural and infinite being which is commonly called God, esteems man more than an ant, or a lion more than a stone, or any other being more than a phantasy, or who has any regard for beauty or ugliness, for good or bad, for the perfect or imperfect.** Or that he desires to be praised, prayed, sought for or caressed, or that he cares what men are, or say, whether susceptible of love or hate, or in a word that he thinks more of man than of any other creatures of whatever nature they be. **All these distinctions are only the invention of a narrow mind, that is to say, ignorance has created them and interest keeps them alive.**
…

VII. Not to shuffle, as all these philosophers have done, and to have as perfect an idea as is possible of the souls of animals, **let us admit that in all, without excepting man, it is of the same nature,** and has no different functions, but by reason of the diversity of organs and humors; hence we must believe what follows.

It is certain that there is in the universe a very subtle spirit, or a very delicate matter, and always in motion, the source of which is in the Sun, and the remainder is spread in all the other bodies, more or less, according to Nature or their consistency. That is the Soul of the Universe which governs and vivifies it, and of which some portion is distributed among all the parts that compose it. This Soul, and the most pure Fire which is in the universe does not burn of itself, but by the different movements that it gives to the particles of other bodies where it enters, it burns and reflects its heat. The visible fire has more of this spirit than air, the latter more than water, and the earth much less than the latter. Among the mixed bodies, plants have more than minerals, and animals more than either. To conclude, this fire being enclosed in the body, it is rendered capable of thought, and that is what is called the soul, or what is called animal spirits, which are spread in all parts of the body. **Now, it is certain that this soul being of the same nature in all animals, disperses at the death of man in the same manner as in other animals,** from whence it follows that what Poets and Theologians sing or preach of the other world, is a chimera which they have invented, and which they narrate for reasons that are easy to guess.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Meslier

None of the arguments used by Meslier against the existence of God were original. In fact, he derived them from books written by orthodox theologians in the debate between the Jesuits, Cartesians, and Jansenists.
…

In his book *In Defense of Atheism* (2007) the atheist philosopher Michel Onfray describes Meslier as the first person to write an entire text in support of atheism:

> For the first time (but how long will it take us to acknowledge this?) in the history of ideas, a philosopher had dedicated a whole book to the question of atheism. He professed it, demonstrated it, arguing and quoting, sharing his reading and his reflections, and seeking confirmation from his own observations of the everyday world. His title sets it out clearly: *Memoir of the Thoughts and Feelings of Jean Meslier*; and so does his subtitle: ***Clear and Evident Demonstrations of the Vanity and Falsity of All the Religions of the World*. The book appeared in 1729, after his death. Meslier had spent the greater part of his life working on it. The history of true atheism had begun.**[25]

…

According to Colin Brewer (2007), who co-produced a play about Meslier's life,

> **Historians argue about who was the first overt, post-Classical atheist but Meslier was arguably the first to put his name to an incontrovertibly atheist document.** That this important event is largely unrecognised (Meslier was absent from both Richard Dawkins' and Jonathan Miller's recent TV series on atheism) is due partly to Voltaire who published, in 1761, **a grossly distorted "Extract" that portrayed Meslier as a fellow-deist and entirely suppressed Meslier's anti-monarchist, proto-communist opinions.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/716/mode/2up?view=theater

As with Challe, so with Meslier, the writer who was arguably the most coherently and systematically radical thinker of the French early eighteenth century, **a key figure whose vast text, mostly written in the early 1720s, similarly cites no English sources at all and whose otherwise inexplicable neglect in conventional accounts of the Enlightenment may indeed be partly explicable in terms of his remarkable system obvious having nothing to do with English authors and ideas.** This renegade priest built his elaborate atheistic materialism wholly on elements taken from Descartes, Malebranche, and Bayle as well as Tournemine's critique of Spinoza, **most of his polemical barbs being directed against Malebranche and Fénelon.**72
…

Erudite in an old-fashioned way, familiar with Scripture, the Fathers, ancient history and some Roman authors, besides Montaigne and Pascal, Meslier was aware of remarkably few books published after 1700. **He apparently knew nothing of Locke, Clarke, Toland, Collins, or Newton or indeed Hobbes.** He knows about Spinoza, though, of whom he approves as a thinker who 'ne reconnoissoit aucune divinité,' but only at second hand, thanks to Tournemine's widely read refutation of that thinker.114
…

Meslier's social and political criticism, and doctrine of the equality of all men, rests on a systematic materialism using strands of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Averroes but especially, as we have seen, Descartes, Bayle, Malebranche, and Tournemine's refutation of Spinoza.121 **For him our whole cosmos integrally coheres, unified by that same 'raison universelle' which yet has no author which *Malebranchisme* can be construed to hint at, on which Bayle's 'Stratonism' rests, and Bruzen de La Martinière rightly identified as the basis of Bayle's sedition.**122

https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/michel-onfray-jean-meslier-and-the-gentle-inclination-of-nature

Meslier believes in natural law. Not that of the Christians (their religion transformed the laws of nature into its own cultural law) but that of judicial naturalists — whom he has probably not read. (Hugo) Grotius, (Baron Samuel von) Pufendorf… — according to whom people naturally by the law of life have each day the right to nourish themselves, to clothe themselves, to house themselves, to assure a decent education for their children, but also to enjoy their natural liberty, then to work for public usefulness and the common welfare of all.

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_106

Meslier considers religion to be responsible for the majority of human misfortunes. In particular, it sows dissent and promotes religious wars. **But at the same time, he himself calls with sincere conviction for an uprising, the killing of kings, and the annihilation of all who could be considered more fortunate and prosperous.**

> "In this connection, **I am reminded of the wish of one man who expressed the desire that 'all the mighty of this world and the noble lords be hanged and strangled with loops made of priests' bowels.'** This judgment is certainly somewhat coarse and harsh, but there is some naive frankness about it. It is brief but eloquent and in a few words expresses what people of this kind really deserve." (49: I: p. 71)

…

The person of Christ is especially hateful to him, and here he literally runs out of terms of abuse. "And what of our God--and Christ--worshipers? To whom do they ascribe divinity? To the paltry man who had neither talent, nor intelligence, nor knowledge, nor skill, and was utterly scorned in the world. Whom do they ascribe it to? Shall I say? Indeed I shall: they ascribe it to the lunatic, demented, wretched bigot and ill-starred gallows-bird." (49: II: p. 25) **The champion of the rights of the poor perceives irrefutable proof of Christ's teaching in the fact that "he was always poor, and was merely the son of a carpenter."** (49: II: p. 26)

…

In his *Testament* there is nothing said about concrete measures for improving the position of the poor nor about the rich doing something to help. The book merely fans the hatred of the former for the latter.

> "You are told, dear friends, about devils; they frighten you with the devil's name alone; you are forced to believe that devils are the most evil and repulsive of creatures, that they are the worst enemies of humankind, that they strive only to ruin people and render them unhappy in hell forever. ... **But know, dear friends, that for you the most evil and true devils, those you ought to fear, are those people of whom I speak--you have no worse and no more evil enemies than the noble and the rich.**" (49: II: p. 166)

The essence and true cause of inequality is private property, which also is justified by religion.

> "For this reason some drink and stuff themselves, wallowing in luxury, while others die from starvation. For this reason some are almost always happy and gay, while others are eternally sad and grieving." (49: II: p. 201)

Meslier's entire social program comes down to a few lines:

> **"What a great happiness it would be for people if they used all life's blessings together."** (49: II: p. 209)

In a just society, Meslier feels, production and consumption must be organized according to principles of communality.

> "People ought to possess all wealth and riches of the earth together and on equal terms and also use them together and equitably." (49: II: p. 198)

Food, clothing, education for children, ought not to differ greatly in different families. Everyone ought to work under the guidance of wise elders (in another passage, Meslier speaks about elected officials).

These measures would lead to miraculous results. No one would be in need; everyone would love his neighbor. Heavy work, deceit, vanity, would all disappear. **Then, Meslier says, "no unhappy people would be seen on earth, whereas at present we come across them on every hand."** (49: II: p. 217)

Family relations would also change, for a great evil introduced by the church would fall away--the indissolubility of marriage.

> "**It is necessary to provide the identical freedom to men and to women to come together without hindrance, following their own inclination,** and the freedom also to separate and leave one another when life together becomes intolerable or when a new attraction moves them to contracting a new union." (49: II: p. 214)

...

To those he called "brethren," Voltaire wrote repeatedly, urging them to circulate extracts from the *Testament.*

> "Know that God's blessing is on our nascent church: In one of the provinces, three hundred copies of Meslier have been distributed, which has produced many new converts." (49: III: p. 417)

The work was thought to be dangerous. In arguing for its publication, Voltaire wrote:

> "Is it impossible, without compromising anyone, to turn to that good old soul Merlin? I would not wish for any of our brethren to take the slightest risk." (49: III: p. 416)
>
> **"Let us thank the good people who distribute it gratis and pray to the Lord to bless this useful reading."** (49: III: p. 419)
>
> "You have clever friends who would be not unwilling to have this book in a safe place; moreover, it is suitable for the edification of youth." (49: III: p. 408)
>
> "Jean Meslier must convince the whole world. Why is his Gospel so little circulated? You are too retiring in Paris! You are hiding your lamp." (49: III: p. 410)
>
> "In a Christian fashion, I wish for the *Testament* of the priest to be multiplied like the five loaves to nourish four or five thousand souls." (49: III: p. 411)

Later, in 1793, when the Convention was carrying out a program of de-Christianization and introducing the cult of Reason, **Anacharsis Cloots proposed putting up in the temple of Reason a statue of the first priest to reject religious error--"the brave, magnanimous and great Jean Meslier."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=pgTDlLHAMekC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

In his ninety-four-page pamphlet, *A Philosophical Dissertation upon Death* (1732), Radicati seeks to defend and legitimize suicide against Christianity and the state.

...

This right to death is based on a radically materialist conception of nature and inspired by Epicurean and Stoical arguments that suicide is an honourable gesture: the legitimate withdrawal from a state of unbearable pain. Such views were rejected as paganism by the Christian tradition, notably in Augustine and Aquinas, **although, as we have already seen, one already finds arguments against suicide in Plotinus.**

...

By definition, the fear of death cannot be based in experience as no one experiences death twice, as it were. Nor can the fear of death be ascribed to our natural constitution. **Therefore, the fear of death has been imposed on mankind by**

> **Ambitious Men, who, not contenting themselves with the State of Equality which Nature had given them, took it into their heads to thirst for Dominion over others.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/74/mode/2up?view=theater

Indeed, **in Radicati the revolutionary impulse went further than in almost any other Early Enlightenment *philosophe*.** For not only does he affirm unequivocally that if the prince or magistrates alter or change laws 'the people have a right to depose and punish them, according to their deserts seeing that the conditional obedience promised to them, ceases as soon as they cease to do their duty,'85 but Radicati also insists that republics are intrinsically better than other kinds of government, and especially monarchies, which are 'the worst of all,' but that, in order to succeed they have to be placed on a democratic basis. The 'republics of Geneva, Switzerland, and others,' he says, 'notwithstanding they designed to settle a perfect democracy, were not able to succeed in it, because they did not establish it upon a proper foundation.'86 What this 'proper foundation' entails, holds Radicati, is a fundamental social and economic reorganization so that 'men are equal in nobility, power and riches.' To this end, he asserts, **'all possessions must belong to the republic, which like a good mother, must distribute them to every man, according to his necessities; so that no man must**

be reduced to beggary, and no man must enjoy superfluities.'87 **Influenced perhaps by reading the Baron Lahontan's eulogy of equality in his *Nouveaux voyages* of 1703, Radicati goes so far as to condemn private property itself as 'inconsistent with the nature of a democratical government, and destroying it in its very infancy.'**88

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/598/mode/2up?view=theater

Yet it was virtually only radical writers who took the significant step of asserting the equal, and in some respects superior, moral worth of primitive men. If Hobbes, asserted Radicati, had investigated the 'state of nature' with greater care, he would have changed his opinions regarding its alleged brutishness and blatant inferiority to society under the state. **'Witness the ancient inhabitants of the Canary-Islands,' he remarks, 'who, before they were discovered by the Christians had always lived in the blessed state of Nature. For they fed upon herbs and fruits, lay upon leaves in the forests, went naked, and their women, and all other things were in common amongst them.'**38

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/226/mode/2up?view=theater

Radicati, whose democratic republicanism drew on Machiavelli, Sarpi, Sidney, and 'the ingenious Mr. Toland,' besides Bayle and Spinoza, **went furthest, of those writing before Rousseau, in assailing Hobbes's notion of the 'state of nature.' Envisaging the 'state of nature' as a utopia of primitive communism, not unlike Morelly, who later spoke of 'le doux empire de la nature et de la vérité,'**9 **Radicati insists, against Hobbes, that 'savages and brutes of the same species, that follow the laws of nature only, are more sociable among themselves than men that are civilized: since they live together with great kindness and cordiality, and observe the laws of equity in everything;** each enjoying the fruits of the earth, and their females and suffering the rest to do so, without envy or ambition, being all equal, and having everything in common.'10

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/244/mode/2up?view=theater

Morelly's anonymous *Code de la Nature* (1754), **having as its subtitle 'ou le véritable *Esprit* de ses Loix,' a text usually attributed to Diderot during the French Revolution (and publicly condemned during the trial of Babeuf, in 1797, as one of the prime roots of revolutionary social radicalism),** full-frontally attacks Montesquieu's conservative, hierarchical conception of society, seeking to substitute an uncompromisingly democratic, if also thoroughly utopian, vision in its place.10

An idealist-materialist and, yet, 'Deist' thinker, Morelly had espoused a radical conception of democracy by the early 1750s, building his democratic vision on typically Spinozistic premises. These included the ideas that every man seeks his own 'conservation,' that a new worldly and sensual morality is needed, that monarchy grows in outward splendour and inner corruption and the *bien général* suffers, the more inequality of status and property in society increases,11 and that **as our needs are equal and wills equivalent** so a fundamental equality is the general principle on which a truly secular politics must be structured, nature having shown men 'par la parité de sentimens et de besoins, leur égalité de conditions et de droits, et la nécessité d'un travail commun.'12

https://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_111

The Code of Nature or the True Spirit of the Law by Morelly appeared in 1755. Almost nothing is known about the author; arguments are still going on as to whether he ever existed or whether "Morelly" is simply a pseudonym.
…

Mankind once lived in a natural state, the Golden Age, the memory of which is preserved among all peoples. But this state was lost due to the mistaken introduction of private property by legislators. **A return to a condition where no private property exists will take place thanks to progress, which Morelly considers to be the basic driving force of history.**

> "The phenomena that I observe demonstrate everywhere, even in a gnat's wing, the presence of a consistent development. I experience, I feel the progress of reason. I am justified, therefore, to say that by some miraculous analogy there also exist favorable transformations in the moral field, and that despite their power and pleasantness, the laws of nature do only gradually gain complete power over mankind." (50: p. 159)

Only after having experienced various forms of rule will the people understand what is truly good. The society described by Morelly will arise ultimately, as an inevitable triumph of reason, and mankind will come to the end of its journey from the unconscious Golden Age to the conscious one.

https://www.franz-oppenheimer.de/state2.htm#II_a

> As compared with unions of families, the state represents, doubtless, a much higher species; since the state embraces a greater mass of men, in closer articulation, more capable of conquering nature and of warding off enemies. It changes the half playful occupations of men into strict methodic labor, and thus brings untold misery to innumerable generations yet unborn. **Henceforth, these must eat their bread in the sweat of their brow, since the golden age of the free community of blood relations has been followed by the iron rule of state dominion. But the state, by discovering labor in its proper sense, starts in this world that force which alone can bring about the golden age on a much higher plane of ethical relation and of happiness for all. The state, to use Schiller's words, destroys the untutored happiness of the people while they were children, in order to bring them along a sad path of suffering to the conscious happiness of maturity.**

https://www.academia.edu/11673887/Anacharsis_Cloots_and_the_Birth_of_Modern_Cosmopolitanism

Cloots was born on 24 June 1755 in the family castle of Gnadenthal (Val-de-Grâce in French) near Cleves, and baptised Joannes Baptista Hermannus Maria—or Jean-Baptiste. His family is of Dutch origins, his father having made a fortune as a merchant in Amsterdam, and then sought social recognition in Prussia and managed to get the title of baron after becoming adviser to Frederic the Great, and to acquire a castle and lands near Cleves, a town near the Dutch border. **His mother's brother was none other than the renowned philosopher Cornelius de Pauw (1735-1799), who became canon in the nearby town Xanten when Cloots was a child.**

Cloots had a typical aristocratic education, entirely in French, which remained the language for his writings. He certainly also knew German and Dutch, as his correspondence in these languages show, even if he never wrote in these languages. He was sent at nine to a Catholic boarding school in Brussels, together with his brother, who died two years later. Cloots was sent to the Jesuits in Mons, before asking to be educated at the Jesuit collège du Pléssis-Sorbonne in Paris a eleven years old, **and studied at the same benches as other future revolutionaries like La Fayette. He would proudly recall later in his writings an episode when he ate a bacon omelette on a Friday, defying authorities.** He then went to the prestigious and elitist *Académie militaire de Berlin*, where he was notably taught by Professor Sulzer (1720-1779), a disciple of Christian Wolff, and read Grotius and other works on the law of nations.
…

"Anacharsis" was the object of a biography by the Jesuit scholar Barthélemy (1788) that told the story of this Scythian philosopher, Anacharsis, who travelled South from his native North to Athens to discover philosophy.
…

Wolff, as translated by Formey, has had arguably a great influence on French natural law theories and the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* (Renaut *et al.* 1999, 71). **Wolff posits the universality of humankind since the essence or nature of man is the same everywhere.** Man is determined by his freedom that gives him will.
…

Barbeyrac introduces the concept of a moral community in French natural law theory, which is the "*communauté de Droite Raison*":7

> […] the first Society that Men have, is with GOD, because of this community of Right Reason, out of which a Law is born, which they have in common; **in such a way that the Universe is like a great Body of State, composed of Gods and Men.** (Quoted in French in Hochstrasser 1993, 298)

…

In his article on natural law in the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot considers that the individual must look at the "general will" to find the limits of natural rights, and this limit is to do only what is not contested by the rest of humankind (Diderot 1755). General will is deduced from the pure act of reason of any individual stifling his passions. Since only the general will is always right, and individual will can be wrong, legislative power must belong to the general will. The general will also exists between individual societies for Diderot, but he does not stress explicitly the existence of a legislative power above the nations.

Rousseau responded in the first version of his *Social Contract* to Diderot's conception of "general will," which reflects his views well, even if it was unpublished. Like Holbach, Rousseau rejects the idea of a "golden age" of the state of nature (Rousseau 1887).8

> 8. This first version of the *Social Contract* was only discovered and published in 1887.

…

Humankind, however, is separated into societies. Through the concept of "general will", Rousseau introduces the fact that a society forms a "political body", that is, a moral person with a will of its own, which always aims

at the conservation of its members. This principle stops at other “political bodies” because for them, this general will is then a particular will. However, justice is still applied because it finds its source in natural law:

> **[…] for then the big city of the human race becomes the political body of which the law of nature is always the general will, and of which the states and the peoples are but individual members.** (Rousseau 1755, 245)

Rousseau’s system of particular society defined by a social contract is not unsympathetic to the idea of a more general society (cf. chapter by Lex in this volume). **Rousseau defended Saint-Pierre’s (1713) project. He believed in the existence of a “European society”, established by a common history and culture since the Greek and Roman time, making all European nations mutually dependent (Rousseau 1761). A “coercive force” must then be set in place to complete this state of unfledged society. This can only be done through a union between the most important sovereigns in the form of a *Diète* or Senate. However, Voltaire (1761) would sarcastically note that the Chinese emperor was not invited to this “universal” assembly.**

Cloots in a letter to his cousin directly mentions his admiration for Barbeyrac’s preface to his translation of Pufendorf. Burlamaqui is not directly mentioned in any of Cloots’ work, but his continuation of Barbeyrac’s thought is directly relevant to the whole natural law tradition in France.
…

Cloots’ political system can be traced in three of his major post-revolutionary political writings: *L’Orateur du genre humain, ou dépêche du prussien Cloots au prussien Hertzberg*, March 1791; *La République universelle, ou adresse aux tyrannicides*, February 1792; *Bases constitutionnelles dela république du genre humain*, April 1793.
…

On the one hand, **recent French history is constantly evoked by Cloots, against Montesquieu’s analysis of a separation of powers, to argue that no sub-national “corporation” should ever exist without having the possibility to gather sufficient power to create violent conflicts.** And obviously, no multiple national powers should ever exist, as armies and wars are the only way they can solve conflicts. Only the “perfect fusion” of a “Confederation of individuals” can exist for Cloots.

Cloots expressed his atheism previously on diverse occasions. **All metaphysical discussion for him is vain.** To the natural law theorists discussing if God is sovereign because he created man, or if it is man who ought to respect God’s power through reason, one could consider his answer to be what he writes about God: “The study of man makes us careful and lenient. Let us see nature as she is and not as we imagine it to be” (Cloots 1792, 257); “Does the chicken come before the egg or the egg before the chicken?” (p. 251); for “We belong to earth and not to the heavens” (p. 258).

So if God is out of the equation, it is the people that represent the only possible source of power. The only truth comes from the people: **“The people is my oracle; truth does not come down the heavens, but down the rostrum”** (Cloots 1793, 475). Cloots is here even more explicit in replacing the sovereign God of natural law. “[…] the human race is God […]” (p. 476), or “[…] the human race, the supreme Being […]” (p. 476).

In other words, the cosmos is complicated enough, without adding supposition about a possible *theos*. One should just examine nature, because humankind is subject to primitive laws just as animals are (Cloots 1793, 494). And this natural state is the same as the civil state.

> The human species is subjected to primitive laws, like the family of bees or beavers. Let us rise to animal instinct, let us subject ourselves to the invariable laws. Natural laws are not distinct from civil and political laws because the social state is as natural to man as it is to bees or ants. (Cloots 1793, 497)

And if nature is one, society is equally one. It is by consulting nature, claims Cloots (1793, 476), that he discovered his political system. The goal of a society is the conservation of natural rights (Cloots 1793, 497). What are natural rights? Natural rights are expressed in the 1789 *Declaration*. **Cloots ascribed thereby a special status to this *Declaration*. It is the one and definitive expression of natural law. A curious position, when one considers the debates that surrounded the *Declaration*, its provisory character due to the compromises made, as well as its apparent division, at least implicitly, between civil and pre-civil (natural) rights.**

The *Declaration* states that all men are born free and equal. Cloots’s reasoning is twofold. If all men are free, then none can claim power over another. Anyone claiming sovereignty would be in contradiction with the “eternal principle” of the *Declaration*, on which Cloots bases his reflection. No individual or any group of individuals can claim sovereignty over a territory without being in contradiction with the eternal principle of freedom and equality. Only one community can exist in cohesion with human freedom: the whole of humankind.

Secondly, **this freedom does not mean anything if it is limited,** if others represent a constant threat to it, if barriers are needed to contain this threat, if military expenses for safety drive society into financial crisis, if the borders are a limit to the freedom of movement of persons and freedom of trade, or if they confine industries within limited territories.

This is why only the whole of humankind can hold sovereignty. Moreover, sovereignty is so despotic that no other power than humankind should hold it (Cloots 1793, 495).

In fact, Cloots would use French history, and the privileges and Machiavellian intrigues of the "corporations", to illustrate his system. Thanks to its unification, France managed to crush the corporations, not only professional ones, but also provincial or local ones. **Therefore, the same principle ought to apply to the whole globe.**

One more argument evokes the most fundamental principle of politics: that it ought to be founded on the general interest. The general will, as Cloots underlines, is the first principle of politics. In that, Cloots is faithful to Rousseau or Diderot. **However, Cloots posits that Rousseau was wrong in delimiting this general will to tiny republics. If Rousseau would have lived in Cloots's own time, Cloots condescends, Rousseau would have agreed with him that the general will is in fact the universal will for all humankind.**

Individuals are the foundation on which legitimate power is ascribed. Their rights are enshrined in the *Declaration*. Together they all form what Cloots calls a "confederation of individuals". Only collectively can individuals achieve something greater. Alone, they are pathetic creatures. **United in a nation, like France, they are able to create great things. With a bit of imagination, Cloots argues that the whole nation of humankind could achieve even greater marvels.**

The concepts of nation or *patrie* are not limited to France for Cloots. There is not space here for a *Begriffsgeschichte* of these two concepts (studied by e.g. Dann 1997; Delon 1987; Fehrenbach 1986), but one should indicate along with Koselleck that **they were highly contested, together with the concept of sovereignty, especially between 1750 and 1850. The nation was not only used to describe a specific type of people, but also became—and Sieyès is the most famous example—the new concept replacing the King as the holder of sovereignty.** Philosophers ascribed an idealist and abstract content to nation and *patrie*, as a collective of free and equal individuals, and a "*civitas*" in which these individuals would be citizens and not subjects. There is thus no contradiction in speaking of a nation of humankind, and of being patriotic in defending the nation. **A patriot fights for the universality of the rights of man and the citizen.**9

> 9. **Kymlicka (2001) has equally—among others—argued that liberal nationalism was close to cosmopolitanism in its Enlightenment roots** and Conversi (2000) discussed the complexity of such an antagonism.

As nature is the model, Cloots considers his system in a highly positivist manner: "Liberty has only one form" (Cloots 1793, 477).

In line with the dominating conception of sovereignty, Cloots defines it as follow:

> **Sovereignty resides essentially in the whole human race; it is one, indivisible, imprescriptible, immutable, inalienable, imperishable, unlimited, absolute, without boundaries and all mighty;** consequently two peoples could not be sovereigns, because, by reuniting, there would only be one indivisible sovereign; thus no partial reunion, no individual can grant oneself sovereignty. (Cloots 1793, 476-477)

This immutable model based on nature and reason, as scientific as physics, admits therefore no division of power. For that reason, Cloots rejects any proposition for a federal constitution, and heavily criticizes the American constitution for being weak in that respect, and for necessarily leading to future conflicts among the thirteen states. Cloots distrusted any separation of powers for two reasons. Firstly, because of the French experience of various corporations with their privileges and powers, leading to the paralysis of the country and the creating of obstacles to the general will. Secondly, **Cloots notices that in a united country like France, provinces do not engage in wars against each others, unlike Italian or German polities. To Cloots any provincial or national division is a barbarian political model, absurd and feudal. The division of humankind on the globe is nothing but a global feudalism in a barbaric time.**

Therefore, and contrary to what Kleingeld argues (2011, 63-65), **Cloots's argument is not entirely ahistorical and merely philosophical, but rather semi-historical and semi-philosophical.** Cloots does not merely claim that the only nation possible is all humankind solely based on extending Rousseau's contract theory to the whole world—200 years before Beitz's extension of Rawls's revival of the contract theory (Beitz 1979; Rawls 1999). He also observes that it is in the world's interest, and puts forward historical evidence. **When France started to form only one political body, the peoples inhabiting its territory stopped engaging in wars against one another, and instead engaged in peaceful judicial litigation.** In comparison, Cloots notes that this is not the case for instance in Italy, or with the German countries (Cloots 1792, 8). This leads Cloots to think that sovereignty should not be divided. By the same token, Cloots is strongly opposed to any federation of states.

This historical observation of the peaceful effect of uniting peoples under one modern political body named the "nation", coupled with the philosophical argument of the nation as the abstract entity of free and equal men, leads Cloots to present his "system" of the unique sovereign nation of the human race.

The French revolution represents this hope, and is therefore a universal revolution. **The French national assembly is in fact a representative and embryonic assembly of all humankind because the revolution was based on the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*.** The new constitution should protect this fact and take into consideration the very likely future adhesion of other members to the French constitution.

However, Cloots negates all French imperialism. These principles are not French; they are universal. The declaration is not French but for everyone: **“Liberty, never mind what Montesquieu says, is a plant that becomes acclimatized everywhere”** (Cloots 1792, 249). Cloots even suggests, as we have seen earlier, that France drop its “beautiful name” for the one of Germany, the German Republic, as in the original meaning of German, that is, *brotherhood*.

In short, the universal republic is a minimal state in charge of protecting human rights. All collectivity in the universal republic is free to decide on the use of taxes, as long as universal taxes are collected.
...

As Gauthier (1998) or Conversi (2000) show in their studies, the ideals of natural law disappeared during the revolution. The idea of social law without any further reference to the “Supreme Being” imposed itself.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/bax/1911/babeuf/ch01.htm

Old Claude Babeuf, we are told, on his deathbed, handed to his son, as a last gift, a well-worn copy of Plutarch’s *Lives*, telling him that the book had been his solace throughout the joys and sorrows of his life. He continued to press upon his son to study the lives of the great men of antiquity. “As for me,” he went on to say, “I could have wished to have resembled Caius Gracchus, even though I were doomed to perish like him and his for the greatest of all causes, the cause of the common welfare; but circumstances have not been favourable to the accomplishment of my designs.” Expressing his conviction that his son would follow in his steps: “Swear,” said he, “upon this sword, that has never yet departed from the path of honour, never to abandon the interests of the people, which are everything, and to pour out, if need be, the last drop of your blood to enlighten and defend this downtrodden race.” The oath on the sword was taken as desired.

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/conspiracy-equals/1787/letter.htm

July 8, 1787.

The system of the Reformer of the whole world, and the reflections of your correspondent concerning the reformation of the Code, have provoked me today into further reflections, through which I will undertake to examine what these different projects of reform have in common, and what they have not.

Both seem to be tenderly disposed toward the common good. But, dream for dream, paradox for paradox, I hardly know to which of the two thinkers I would accord preference. Meanwhile, the aim of one of them covers far more ground than that of the other. The Apostle of the Universal Code seems to desire that men of all classes, in every country, be accorded the same rights in the order of succession to property; and *that would be very good.* **But the general Reformer would like to obtain for all individuals, without distinction, an absolutely equal portion of all the goods and advantages that can be enjoyed in this mean world; and *that, it seems to me, would be even better.***

The inconsistency of our Customs is astonishing. But it seems to me that when one goes back to the epoch in which they were formed, one can no longer be surprised about anything that he sees. The men of those times, ignorant and barbaric, could have created only things in conformity with their character. Exalted by the enthusiasm over their conquests, they found themselves driven, as if by a natural outcome of that inhuman inclination from which the incredible feudal system had newly gathered its strength, to establish practices that would serve to satisfy their ridiculous vanity.

A lucky brigand would be only half-satisfied when he had succeeded in assuring himself a rich property. His gluttonous pride would suffer when, looking into the future, he envisaged this property being parcelled out among all his descendants, and saw that it could not thus suffice for very long to provide for its possessor the foolish importance that blind fortune ordinarily imparts, especially in the eyes of men guided by prejudices like those with which men were generally smitten in the era about which I am speaking.

To ward off this possible draw back, a new indignity was conceived. It was necessary to smother the voice of kinship for the sake of ostentation, **and so almost the very means of subsistence were taken away from the younger sons in order to load up the eldest with superfluities, and give him a pretended illustriousness by passing on to him usurped goods and a name that had once been odious.**

This is the origin of the so-called "nobility," and of all these revolting distinctions in every segment of society.

Whoever was less ferocious, less deceitful, or more unfortunate in combat, was placed at the service of others and made the object of their contempt.

This, furthermore, was the source of those bizarre codes that served as confirmatory titles for the usurpers, made it legitimate for them to pillage, and rendered irrevocable the confiscation of the goods of the families that were defeated.

Moreover, things were arranged in such a way as to prevent these defeated families from ever rising again from this debasement, and to keep them, rather, in such a state that they could never be regarded by the victorious class as constituting anything but a most inferior class of humanity.

To satisfy both the pride and the great acquisitiveness of this supposed nobility, it was set down that they need recognize as their principal heir only the oldest male among their children, and that the younger children, and even those daughters that were older than the principal heir, would be considered only halves, quarters, or even very often only fifths, of a child. Those who had, in the assemblies convoked for the purpose of drawing up the codes, greater influence and authority because of their wealth, saw to it that the articles were formulated in accordance with their desires. This is the reason for the inconsistency and inconsequentiality of these productions that men sometimes cite as works of prudence and of the utmost fairness, and that really present only the most unequivocal proof of the passions that always guided them.

What, then, would a new code amount to if it contained no other change than that of *putting an end to the prohibition in one province of that which is legitimate in some other?* A very small palliative for a very great evil. It would not put a stop to these children being born poor and deprived, while those of my neighbor start gorging themselves from the moment that their eyes first see the light of day. It would not prevent this neighbor, bloated with his immense fortune, from looking down upon me with sovereign contempt for no other reason than that I am an unfortunate, crushed under the weight of indigence. **It would not prevent the feudal heir of this high and mighty man from becoming a very fat lord of the manor, while his younger brother remains but a rather skinny fellow by comparison, or from forcing his sister, whose tender heart is a long way from disgusted at the prospect of tying the hymenal knot, to ensconce herself in a gloomy cloister, so that he can fatten himself still more.** It would not prevent, etc., etc., and still a great deal more, etc.

But how I like the general Reformer! It is really too bad that he leaves unexplained the means he has in mind for bringing about his reforms. I hope that he can soon have his subscription filled, so that he can explain this matter to us. His plan covers all points, and I do not see, all things considered, that any punishable crime would remain in existence, once his arrangements had been brought about, except that of failing to participate in some way in the common effort for the good of all humanity. For all this to be achieved, kings would have to renounce their crown, and all titled persons would have to give up their dignities, posts and positions in society. But that would not suffice. For a major revolution to be wrought, there would have to be great changes. What is the meaning, after all, of all these dignified titles? Are they anything more than vain and chimerical expressions, invented by pride and confirmed by baseness? Must there be any distinctions at all between men? Why accord any greater dignity to him who carries a sword than to him who forges it? **Did Nature, who gave predominance to our species, command that it submit to other laws than those drawn up for all the other species of animate beings? Did it desire that one individual be less well-fed, less well-clothed and less well-housed than another? Is it likely that this is the way things were done in the earliest ages of life on earth? Our most advanced knowledge of what were the natural customs of our brothers, the American Indians, before we discovered their peaceful country and began treating them so poorly, certainly would disprove any assertion to that effect.**

The first man, says the author of *Emile,* who, after enclosing a plot of land, saw fit to say: "This is mine," was the initial author of all the evils that afflicted humanity. Jean-Jacques said elsewhere that these evils opened the way for all the knowledge that we have acquired since that time. But he maintains that all we have acquired only renders us less happy than we were in the earliest state of nature; he seems, therefore, to want us to return to it, in order to obtain the highest well-being that can possibly be enjoyed.

It seems to me that our Reformer does better than the citizen of Geneva, whom I have sometimes heard called a dreamer. **In truth, he dreamed well, but our man dreams better.** Like the citizen of Geneva, he maintains that, since men are absolutely equal, they must not have any private possessions, but must enjoy everything in common, so that no one can, by the mere fact of birth, be either more or less rich, or be considered less worthy, than any of those around him. **But far from sending us back into the woods,** as M. Rousseau does, in order to live thus, to sate ourselves under an oak, refresh ourselves at the nearest stream, and then repose serenely under the same oak where we first found our

food, instead of all this, **our Reformer has us eat four good meals a day, dresses us most elegantly, and also provides those of us who are fathers of families with charming houses worth a thousand *louis* each.**

This is a fine reconciliation between the worthy aspects of social life and those of the natural and primitive life.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA572#v=onepage&q&f=false

Babeuf hated the existing social order, **whose humiliations he had endured as a clerk,** and it was now permissible to hate vehemently, to give utterance to feelings that had been choked up.
...

Babeuf, **who had once sorted the papers of the aristocrats,** had gone back to the documents and found the real origins of their possessions, those feudal “rights” that they were bent of restoring.
...

He was surprised to find that he had become unfit for anything but journalism (*publicisme*) and matters of related to legislation – meditation on the true principles of what the laws should be and their implementation. Before the Revolution Babeuf had dabbled in pure theory; as the Revolution progressed, he became ever more deeply involved in action. Not long before the Conspiracy of the Equals was crushed, his journal *Le Tribun du Peuple* called for a new apocalypse: “All evils have reached their peak. Things cannot get worse. **A cure can come about only through a total upheaval!!! Let confusion reign! Let all the elements be confounded and entangled, let them clash with one another! May everything return to a primitive chaos, and out of chaos may a new, regenerated world be born.**”20
...

Babeuf’s conduct at his Vendôme trial set a precedent for the use of the establishment’s judicial procedure to broadcast revolutionary doctrine. He constantly interrupted the prosecutor, refusing to play the compliant victim and throwing the judges into confusion. **Classical rhetoric flowed from the mouth of an antique Roman in modern dress.** Two days after his imprisonment Babeuf addressed a letter to the Directorate: “Death or exile would be for me the road to immortality **and I shall march in that direction with heroic and religious zeal.**”32 At one dramatic moment, by prearrangement, Babeuf and his fellow conspirator Darthé tried to rob the oppressors of their victims by stabbing each other. But the noble Romans were out of phase, and, as Buonarroti reports, “the fragility of their daggers, which broke in their hands, did not allow the condemned to deprive each other of life.”33

> http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_124
>
> Buonarroti believed that "the teaching of Jesus, if depicted as flowing out of the natural religion from which it does not differ, could become a support of a reform based on reason." (55: I: p. 168) **But Babeuf held a more narrow view: "I attack relentlessly the main idol, until now venerated and feared by our philosophers, who dared to attack only his retinue and surroundings. ... Christ was neither a *sans-culotte* nor an honest Jacobin nor a wise man nor a moralist nor a philosopher nor a legislator."** (55: II: p. 398)
>
> http://www.ditext.com/kropotkin/french/70.html
>
> Babeuf is the direct descendant of ideas which stirred the masses to enthusiasm in 1793; he, Buonarotti, and Sylvain Maréchal have only systematised them a little or even merely put them into literary form. **But the secret societies organised by Babeuf and Buonarotti were the origin of the *communistes matérialistes* secret societies through which Blanqui and Barbes conspired under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis-Philippe.** Later on, in 1866, the International Working Men's Association appeared in the direct line of descent from these societies.
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/10/23.htm
>
> The French Revolution was the rise of democracy in Europe. Democracy is, as I take all forms of government to be, a contradiction in itself, an untruth, nothing but hypocrisy (theology, as we Germans call it), at the bottom. **Political liberty is sham-liberty, the worst possible slavery; the appearance of liberty, and therefore the reality of servitude.** Political equality is the same; therefore democracy, as well as every other form of government, must ultimately break to pieces: **hypocrisy cannot subsist, the contradiction hidden in it must come out; we must have either a regular slavery — that is, an undisguised despotism, or real liberty, and real equality — that is, Communism. Both these consequences were brought out in the French Revolution; Napoleon established the first, and Babeuf the second.** I think I may be short upon the subject of Babouvism, as the history of his conspiracy, by Buonarroti, has been

translated into the English language. The Communist plot did not succeed, because the then Communism itself was of a very rough and superficial kind; and because, on the other hand, **the public mind was not yet far enough advanced.**

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/conspiracy-equals/1796/song.htm

During humanity's childhood
We saw no gold, no war,
No ranks, no sovereign,
No luxury, no poverty!
Sacred and sweet equality
Fills the earth and makes it fertile.
In these days of felicity
The sun shines for all.

Everyone loved everyone else, all lived happily,
Enjoying a common ease;
Regrets, shameful debates
Didn't trouble independence.

Alas! Soon **ambition**
Relying on imposture
Dared to contemplate the plot and outrage
Of usurpation.

We saw princes, subjects,
The opulent, the poverty-stricken;
We saw masters, valets:
The day before all were alike.

https://www.marxists.org/glossary/people/m/a.htm#marechal-sylvain

After studying law Sylvain Maréchal very early turned to literature. Heavily influenced by Rousseau and the atheist priest Jean Meslier, his ideology was a mix of utopian (mainly agrarian) socialism and materialism.

In 1780 he published his "Alamanach des Honnetes Gens," which replaced the saints on the Catholic calendar with scholars and writers, a book that earned him three months in prison. In 1790 he became editor of "Revolutions de Paris," but remained aloof from the struggle between the Girondins and the Jacobins. After the ninth of Thermidor and the fall of Robespierre he was one of Babeuf's Equals and was the author of the "Manifesto of the Equals."

Thanks to the anonymous nature of his work with Babeuf he escaped the repression that fell on the failed conspiracy. The most militant of atheists, in 1799 he published a "Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Atheists."

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/marechal/1799/preliminary-discourse.htm

Ecce vir

There was not always a God. <u>There was a time when a man, living with his family, knew no other authority than that of his father.</u> He had few needs because he had few desires. He wasn't a brute, a barbarian, or an eater of men, as we have been led to believe. Nor was he a polished and false city-dweller, vain and servile: he was a man in all his plenitude, ignorant of the art of writing, perhaps even that of speaking, but knowing how to live; that is, he loved his father, his wife and his children. He worked for them, with them and died in their embrace. **In his eyes his fields were the entire universe.** Regulating his occupations by the sun's movements and the earth's fecundity, his arms and his heart comprised his entire fortune and pleasure. **Suspecting nothing beneath the vegetal layer of the soil he cultivated,** man of that time was a stranger to sciences and vices, to social virtues and crimes, but was entirely given over to nature, to innocence.

<u>Travelers have found a few faint traces of the golden age: it is not a chimera. Poets have rendered its existence doubtful by loading it with factitious ornaments, but that happy age once shone.</u>

Why should we feel any repugnance about believing such things? Are they in the realm of the possible? Is it so difficult to live in this way? And isn't the current existence of humankind even more astonishing?

At that time man, limited to the surface of heaven and earth, neither had nor could he have had any idea of any power other than that which put him on earth and raised him. Do we think about something we have no need of? And what need do we have of a God when we have a father, a wife, children, a friend, arms, eyes and a heart?

But a true atheist is the man of the golden age. The atheist is he who, retreating into himself and freeing himself from the ties he has been forced to contract, or that were made unbeknownst to him, retreats from civilization to that former state of humanity and, in the forum of his conscience, laying low all prejudices of every color, approaches as nearly as possible that fortunate time when there was no suspicion of the divine existence, where all was well, where we contented ourselves strictly with family obligations. The atheist is the man of nature.

Nevertheless, placed today in a more complicated and narrow sphere he fulfills his obligations as a citizen and resigns himself to the decrees of necessity. **While groaning about the vicious bases of political institutions, while striking with contempt those who so poorly organize them, he submits to the public order of the place he lives.** But we don't find him becoming chief of a party or of opinion. We never meet him on the banal road that leads to useful or brilliant posts. Consistent with his principles, he lives among his corrupted or corrupting contemporaries like the voyager who, having to traverse muddy beaches, protects himself from the venom of reptiles. He gets off with only being deafened by their insults. He goes his way among these evil beings without taking on their tortuous and servile allure.

The true atheist is thus not the sybarite who, taking himself for an epicurean when he is nothing but a debauchee, doesn't fear to say deep in his worn-out heart: "There is no God, thus there is nor morality, so I can permit myself everything."
…

The true atheist is not he who says: "No, I don't want a God." Rather it is he who says: "I can be wise without a God."

The true atheist doesn't reason with great argumentative skill against divine existence. On the contrary, the weakest theologians could embarrass him if he crossed swords with them.

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/marechal/1799/atheists.htm

BORNO – The peoples of Borno have neither law nor religion. – Dapper

n.b. Yet they are no less wise or happy.
…

CANARIES – Nature was the only divinity of the ancient inhabitants of the Canaries – Herbert, English traveler
…

EGYPTIANS – Jablonski, in the article on Phtha, depicts the Egyptians as atheists, whose system so resembles that of Spinoza that, if one has the least power of observation, it is impossible to mistake it.
…

MYTHOLOGISTS – **The authors of mythology, both poets and prose writers, were Spinozists, composing their gods of personified parts of nature.**

The Mythologists had more imagination and good faith than the theologians, their successors.

> https://stoneageherbalist.substack.com/p/the-metaphysics-of-aztec-violence
>
> In Burr Brundage's book *The Fifth Sun: Aztec Gods, Aztec World,* he describes the relationship between the Aztec gods and the monistic underlying unity of the world:
>
> > the blatant polytheism which appears to be so characteristic of ancient Mexico is simply a symbolic reference to natural phenomena. **The two thousand gods were only so many manifestations of the One.** In the figure of Tonacatecuhtli we find a substitute for monotheism. … In order to express the idea that the cosmic forces were emanations of the divine principle the gods of nature were called children of Tonacatecuhtli.

https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/conspiracy-equals/1796/manifesto.htm

Written by Sylvain Marechal, one of the conspirators, the Manifesto didn't meet with unanimous support from the directors of the revolt. **Especially contested was Marechal's "Let the arts perish, if need be, as long as real equality remains."**

For fifteen centuries you lived as slaves and, consequently, unhappy. For the last six years you barely breathe, waiting for independence, freedom and equality.

EQUALITY! The first wish of nature, the first need of man, the first bond of all legitimate association! People of France! You were not more blessed than the other nations that vegetate on this unfortunate globe! **Everywhere and at all times the poor human race, delivered over to more or less deft cannibals, served as an plaything for all ambitions, as prey for all tyrannies.** Everywhere and at all times men were lulled with beautiful words; at no time and in no place was the thing itself ever obtained along with the

word. **From time immemorial they hypocritically repeat to us: *all men are equal*;** and from time immemorial the most degrading and monstrous inequality insolently weighs upon the human race. As long as there have been human societies the most beautiful of humanity's privileges has been recognized without contradiction, **but was only once put in practice: equality was nothing but a beautiful and sterile legal fiction. [l'égalité ne fut autre chose qu'une belle et stérile fiction de la loi.]** And now that it is called for with an even stronger voice they answer us: be quiet, you wretches! Real equality is nothing but a chimera; **be satisfied with conditional equality; you're all equal before the law.** What more do you want, filthy rabble?

---

https://mundabor.wordpress.com/2016/04/02/of-course-the-woman-should-be-punished/#comment-25314

Abortion is based on the obviously unfactual legal fiction that an unborn human is not a person.

Legal fictions are used to prevent laws coming into conflict with one another, such as the law concerning murder and the law concerning abortion.

> "Legal Fiction
> noun
> an assertion that is accepted as true for legal purposes, even though it may be untrue or unproven."

Abortion's lay adherents outside the legal trade confuse the legal fiction with an empirical truth, and because it is obviously not so their attempts to defend it as empirical truth makes them appear as fools.

> http://www.romans45.org/articles/finney.htm
>
> Finney spends a considerable amount of time in several of his works arguing against "that theological *fiction* of *imputation*" [*Memoirs,* 58]. Those who have any grasp of Protestant doctrine will see immediately that his attack at this point is a blatant rejection of the doctrine of justification by faith alone *(sola fide).* It places him outside the pale of true evangelical Protestantism. **The doctrine of imputed righteousness is the very heart of the historic difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism.** The whole doctrine of justification by faith hinges on this concept. But Finney flatly rejected it. He derided the concept of imputation as unjust: **"I could not but regard and treat this whole question of imputation as a theological fiction, somewhat related to our legal fiction of John Doe and Richard Roe"** [*Memoirs,* 60].
> ...
>
> Protestants have historically insisted that justification is a purely forensic declaration, giving the penitent sinner an immediate right standing before God on the merit of Christ's righteousness, not their own (cf. Rom. 10:3; Phil. 3:9). **By *forensic,* we mean that it is a legal declaration, like a courtroom verdict or a marriage pronouncement ("I now pronounce you husband and wife"). It changes the person's external status rather than affecting some kind of internal change; it is a wholly *objective* reality.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_fiction#Development_of_the_concept

Typically, a legal fiction allows the court to ignore a fact that would prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction by simply assuming that the fact is different.
...

Proponents of legal fictions, particularly their use historically (for example, before DNA evidence could give every child the right to have both genetic parents determined easily), identify them as "scaffolding around a building under construction".[6]
...

The concept of the law treating corporate entities as if they were persons dates back to Ancient Rome.[8] This simple fiction enabled corporations to acquire wealth, expand, and become the preferred organizational form for businesses of all sizes.
...

Henry Maine argued that legal fictions seem an ornate outgrowth of the law that ought to be removed by legislation. Jeremy Bentham sharply criticised the notion of legal fictions, saying that "fictions are to law what fraud is to trade."[4][5]

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=ewcSBwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA37#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **This essay contains the famous statement that 'Natural rights is simple nonsense; natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.'**19 It is a vigorous and sustained attack on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man originally issued in

1789, on parts of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man issued in 1795, and on parts of a draft Declaration of Rights written by Emmanuel Sieyès in the summer of 1789.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/55902/55902-h/55902-h.htm#link2H_4_0003

However sharply he may speak of us, **we can never cease to revere in him the father of the philosophy of Jurisprudence.**
…

The theory of the original contract is a fiction, and a very absurd fiction; but in practice it meant, what the "greatest happiness principle," if ever it becomes a watchword of political warfare, will mean—that is to say, whatever served the turn of those who used it.
…

The "original contract" meant in the Convention Parliament the co-ordinate authority of the Three Estates. If there were to be a radical insurrection to-morrow, the "original contract" would stand just as well for annual parliaments and universal suffrage.
…

The whole science of Jurisprudence is his. He has done much for political economy; but we are not aware that in either department any improvement has been made by members of his sect. He discovered truths; all that *they* have done has been to make those truths unpopular. **He investigated the philosophy of law; he could teach them only to snarl at lawyers.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

Whether therefore men be equall by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequall, because they are like to contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, *that they be esteemed as equall*; and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature, *That every man be accounted by nature equall to another*, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE.

https://www.amren.com/archives/back-issues/august-2011/#cover

In a nutshell, whites lie about race because it is rational, and craven rationality will nearly always trump idealistic truth seeking. It is a matter of incentives: liars are rewarded, truth-tellers punished. Both whites and blacks are equally guilty in this infatuation with mendacity, though for different reasons. **When all is said and done, dishonesty makes perfect sense in a society where keeping the racial peace is paramount,** and no one cares about really curing anybody's pathologies or scoring points as a truth teller.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Schopenhauer_as_Educator#8

The state has never any concern with truth, but only with the truth useful to it, or rather, with anything that is useful to it, be it truth, half-truth, or error. A coalition between state and philosophy has only meaning when the latter can promise to be unconditionally useful to the state, to put its well-being higher than truth.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/liberty-matters-knud-haakonssen-pufendorf-on-power-and-liberty#leadessay

Pufendorf's other starting point is a sharp distinction between the natural and the social world, the *entia physica* and the *entia moralia* respectively. The latter are all either directly or indirectly introduced into the world through acts of human will; they are, as he says, imposed upon the natural world. The natural, or physical, world is obviously not irrelevant to us in our formation of intentions and exertions of will. It is the case that we refer to nature in making our choices in life – the "natural goods" of food or the "natural evils" of climate or violent animals or other humans. But we do not *derive* our choices, our "moral goods" and "moral evils," from nature. **Pufendorf therefore sharply rejects what he took to be Thomas Hobbes's attempt to derive natural rights and the legitimacy of authority from the characteristics of human nature. No doubt we will take our neighbor's physical or psychological prowess into account when considering what moral status (entity) to ascribe to him or her, but it is our choice whether to see the other person as friend or foe.** In other words, natural rights and natural equality are as much moral entities as rights and equality in positive law in that they are introduced into the world through intentional human activity. **They are juridical fictions in natural law: irrespective of how naturally equal or unequal people are, we have to *regard* them as equal and we have to *ascribe* to them certain basic qualities, such as being a person (cf. Locke on "person" as a forensic term) different from animals and capable of choosing to be subject to the law of nature.**

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater

Vico's intellectual courage – even if it is the only kind of courage he possessed – was very great. **It was a very bold undertaking to attack the ancient conception of natural law as being something universal, absolute, objective, a set of eternal truths in the light of which Europe had lived for two millennia. It was especially audacious to do so in the century the greatest jurists of which had laid it down that these laws were as certain as those of mathematics and could not be altered even by God himself;** and to substitute for this the notion of natural law as a set of rules covering all the vast variety of social experience, organised not by its deducibility from a single set of timeless axioms, but by its relation to the fundamental – not perhaps wholly immutable – categories in which human beings in fact think and act.
...

Where the natural law theorists are abstract, Vico is concrete; where they invented fictions, the natural man, or the state of nature, he remained uncompromisingly committed to what he called history, a history which may not have been accurate, but which was time-bound through and through. Where they distinguished morals from politics, he regarded these as one organic evolutionary process, connected with every other self-expression of human beings in society. Where the natural lawyers were individualists, he grasped the social nature of man – in the sense that he thought that the majority of human activities would not be intelligible if one attempted to describe them as the acts of solitary Robinson Crusoes. For Vico, men acted as they did because their membership of social groups, and their sense of this relationship, was as basic and as decisive as their desire for food, or shelter, or procreation, as their lusts and sense of shame, their search for authority and truth, and everything else that makes men what they are. **Where the lawyers were exact, clear, formal, rationalistic, utilitarian, he remained religious, vague, intuitive, disordered, and painfully obscure.**
...

Two hundred years before our time he conceived of mathematics as the invention of fictions, as an art or game like chess, not as a descriptive procedure, or system of tautologies.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n77/mode/2up?view=theater

The same cunning is to be found in the article of the SOUL. When the Sophisters treat directly of its essence they give the ordinary proofs of its *spirituality and of its immortality*. They will even add in the article BRUTE, that the soul cannot be supposed *material*, nor can *the brute be reduced to the quality of a mere machine, without running the hazard of making man an Automaton*. **And under NATURAL LAW we read, that if the determinations of man, or even his oscillations, arise from any thing *material, and extraneous to his soul, there will be neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust, neither obligation nor right*. Then *referred* to the article LOCKE, in order to do away all this consequence, we are told that it is of no importance *whether matter thinks or not; for what is that to justice or injustice, to the immortality of the soul and to all the truths of the system, whether political or religious*;** the reader, enjoying the Equality and Liberty of his reason, is left in doubt with regard to the spirituality, **and no longer knows whether he should not think himself all matter. But he will decide when, under the article ANIMAL, he finds *that life and animation are only physical properties of matter*, and lest he should think himself debased by his resembling a plant or an animal, to console him in his fall,** they will tell him, article ENCYCLOPEDIA and ANIMAL, *that the only difference between certain vegetables, and animals such as us, is, that they sleep and that we wake, that we are animals that feel, and that they are animals that feel not*; and still further in the article ANIMAL, that the sole difference *between a stock and a man, is, that the one ever falls, while the latter never falls after the same manner*. After perusing these articles *bona fide*, the reader must be insensibly drawn into the vortex of Materialism.

In treating of Liberty or free agency we find the same artifice. **When they treat of it directly, they will say, "Take away Liberty, all human nature is overthrown, and there will be no trace of order in society—Recompense will be ridiculous, and chastisement unjust.—The ruin of Liberty carries with it that of all order and of police, and legitimates the most monstrous crimes.—So monstrous a doctrine is not to be debated in the schools, but punished by the magistrates, &c. *Oh Liberty!* they exclaim. *Oh Liberty, gift of heaven! Oh, Liberty of action! Oh, Liberty of thought!* thou alone art capable of great things."** [*See articles* AUTHORITY and the PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE.] But at the article CHANCE (*fortuit*) all this liberty of action and of thought is only *a power that cannot be exercised, that cannot be known by actual exercise*: and Diderot in the article EVIDENCE, pretending to support Liberty, will very properly say, **"This concatenation of causes and effects supposed by the Philosophers, in order to form ideas representing the mechanism of the Universe, is as fabulous as the Tritons and the Naïads;" but both he and D'Alembert will descant again on that concatenation,** and, returning to CHANCE (*fortuit*), will tell us "That though it is *imperceptible*, it is not the less *real*; that it *connects* all things in nature, and that *all events depend on it*; just as the wheels of the watch, as to their motion, depend on each other; **that from the first moment of our existence, we are by *no means masters of our motions*;** that were there a thousand worlds similar to this, simultaneously existing, and governed by the same laws, every thing in them

would be done in the same way; and that *man, in virtue of these same laws, would perform at the same instants of time the same actions* in each one of these worlds." This will naturally convince the uninformed reader of the chimera of such a Liberty or free agency, which cannot be exercised. **Not content with this, Diderot in the article FATALITY, after a long dissertation on this *concatenation of causes*, ends by saying, that it *cannot be contested* either *in the physical world*, or *in the moral* and *intellectual world*.** Then what becomes of that Liberty without which there no longer exists *just* or *unjust*, *obligation* or *right*.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/416/mode/2up?view=theater

I have suggested that after Montesquieu the Enlightenment's denunciations of slavery yield little that is new. But there was at least one other argument, the utilitarian, that gained prominence, fittingly enough, in the second half of the eighteenth century, in tune with the Enlightenment's shift of temper from natural law to utility. Like war, the argument runs in brief, slavery is, in addition to all its other palpable and irreparable vices, a bad bargain. **Among the first to develop this line of reasoning was David Hume.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/454/mode/2up?view=theater

Hume had no use for the "mere philosophical fictions"3 **that underlay current political philosophy. His most conspicuous target was "the suppos'd *state of nature*," the "fallacious and sophistical" theory of the social contract,**4 **and with it the whole school of natural law. He piously insisted that he was in wholehearted agreement with the liberalism of the natural lawyers; he professed to share their aims and to reject only their reasoning.** Despite these reassurances, however, Hume's attack on natural law remains an ambiguous venture; it was part of the Enlightenment's general attack on fictions, but it exposed the attackers to considerable risks. **After all, natural law, almost from its emergence among the Greeks and codification among the Romans, had served ends to which the philosophes also subscribed.**
…

Increasingly (though, it is worth repeating, by no means exclusively), the philosophes came to legitimize the state on the ground of its utility, rather than on tradition or an original contract. This justification was a test of governmental conduct and if necessary a call to revolution: Bentham complained that Blackstone's natural-law doctrines were actually a defense of conservatism, and insisted that utilitarianism alone, with its persistent questioning, was consistently progressive.
…

The point of Hume's argument is not to vindicate authority at all costs; on the contrary, **he constructed it to show that while the doctrines of natural law are untenable in logic and history alike, their disappearance in no way implies a return to religious or traditionalist doctrines of authority.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/676/mode/2up?view=theater

It is generally agreed that in the course, and through the agency, of the Enlightenment, natural law was in decline in the eighteenth century. In his widely used *A History of Political Theory* (3rd edn., 1962) George H. Sabine entitles his chapter on French eighteenth-century thought "France: The Decadence of Natural Law." **I have gone beyond that to argue (*Voltaire's Politics*, appendix I, and in this volume) that even philosophes who used the rhetoric of natural law abandoned its logic and remained loyal to tatters of natural-law argument for convenience's sake only.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/458/mode/2up?view=theater

Natural law is essentially a rational and a rationalist construct. **As historians and sociologists, the philosophes recognized differences in men's ways; as reformers, they insisted on the imperfections of positive laws. Now these very differences and imperfections proved the assertions of natural law to be organized wishes rather than current realities,** moral imperatives rather than generalizations from experience. **True, the philosophes called upon factual evidence to make their generalizations; Diderot in particular, with his appeal to the practice of nations and the universal passions of men, sought to give the natural law an empirical grounding.** Just as the philosophes had repudiated objective laws in aesthetics but argued for a consensus on works of art, so in their political writings the philosophes thought they possessed good grounds for asserting the existence of laws that were higher than the laws in the statute books.

It was a brave but unsuccessful attempt to rescue what the philosophes should not have tried to rescue. **Yet, while they were destroying the logic of natural law with their epistemology, their sociology, and their history, they continued to use its language as a support for their social criticism and guide for their reform program.** Natural law appears in their writings as a commonplace, a kind of shorthand on which all educated, and many uneducated men, may be presumed

to agree, or, with Kant, as an aim toward which mankind should strive. **It is no accident that natural-law phrases should figure prominently in the pamphlets of the American and French Revolutions:** they were appealing battle cries, slogans of reform, humanity, and constitutionalism. **As pragmatists, many of the philosophes preferred effectiveness to consistency, and they persisted in proclaiming what their own thought made implausible.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA187#v=onepage&q&f=false

Like Spinoza, d'Holbach believed Nature endows people with very different strengths and weaknesses both mental and physical so that nothing is more illogical than averring, as Rousseau does, that people are equal by nature. The "rights of mankind" which d'Holbach deploys so effectively for the first time in the history of modern political thought, and on which Brissot, Condorcet, Volney, Destutt, and the rest built during the Revolution, **are essential to empowering the law to offset the natural inequalities of wealth, strength, and intellect.**
…

It is because people are fundamentally unequal by nature that laws designed to equalize by formalizing equal rights are needed to enable the democratic republic based on popular sovereignty and the common good, or what Condorcet called the "bien général de tous," to properly function, doing so by evening things up.
…

The formalized "rights" and freedoms that men enjoy in society, where equal, are always the artificial, political creation of the (democratic) republic itself which is why monarchies and aristocracies are innately inferior to the democratic republic. D'Holbach's doctrine is thus identical to Spinoza's,70 while Rousseau's innate, natural equality and unmediated "general will," d'Holbach, like Diderot and Condorcet, who both also dismissed Rousseau's natural, inalienable equality as destabilizing and dangerous, scorned utterly.71 **Where Rousseau views men as equal by nature, and Robespierre later expressly rebuked Condorcet for proceeding, when discussing rights of mankind, as if the eternal laws of nature were less inviolable "que les conventions des hommes"** [than the conventions of men], d'Holbach "condemns inequality before the law," that is the man-made inequality, here once again diverging widely from Voltaire, who simply sanctioned social inequality,72 as well as from Abbé Henri Grégoire, the revolutionary Catholic churchman who, on his deathbed, was refused the last rites by the Archbishop of Paris owing to his near radical views, **a clergyman strenuously advocating emancipation of blacks and Jews, certainly, but claiming that men's equal rights derive from their Maker and can be justified only within the context of Revelation.**73

While in its early stages the French Revolution sought to anchor its "universal and equal" rights in nature, declaring "natural rights," a concept Bentham firmly opposed, during the transition of 1795 in revolutionary debate, the neo-Brissotin leaders, Danou, Sieyès, Louvet, and others shifted equal rights from being anchored in Nature to *l'état social*, the needs of society. With this the Rousseauist view of universal rights gave way to the (Spinozist) Diderotian and d'Holbachian approach.74 Where man's individual will is passionate, unreasonable, violent, and precipitate, **the "general will" or "l'intérêt général de la société," as d'Holbach also dubs it, is calm, dispassionate, and intent on forging a "balance of power" out of the everyday clashes of individual wills.**

> http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_various/homers_competition.htm
>
> In order now to attain, through the medium of the state the highest furtherance of their selfish aims, it is above all necessary, that the state be wholly freed from those awfully incalculable war-convulsions so that it may be used rationally; **and thereby they strive with all their might for a condition of things in which war is an impossibility. For that purpose the thing to do is first to curtail and to enfeeble the political separatisms and factions and through the establishment of large equipoised state-bodies and the mutual safeguarding of them to make the successful result of an aggressive war and consequently war itself the greatest improbability;** as on the other hand they will endeavour to wrest the question of war and peace from the decision of individual lords, in order to be able rather to appeal to the egoism of the masses of their representatives; for which purpose they again need slowly to dissolve the monarchic instincts of the nations. **This purpose they attain best through the most general promulgation of the liberal optimistic view of the world, which has its roots in the doctrines of French Rationalism and the French Revolution, i.e., in a wholly un-Germanic, genuinely neo-Latin, [gänzlich ungermanischen, echt romanisch] shallow, and unmetaphysical philosophy.**

Whereas each individual "in the savage state," according to d'Holbach's anti-Rousseauist viewpoint, is a "brutal, ignorant animal, a wicked and ferocious beast, like bears and ourang-outangs," the society, guided by Enlightenment, social science, and the state, can become a **"community of citizens, united**

by fraternal sentiments, and reciprocal wants, turning their respective strengths into one common force," a "bank of interest," where love of one's neighbor infuses the whole.75 It was on the basis of these characteristically *Idéologue* social and moral principles that Volney and Destutt initiated moves in the National Assembly, in 1789-90, to ban all dynastic, royal, and colonial wars and warfare and later renewed Raynal's war on the great colonial trading companies, including the French Compagnie des Indes (for which Destutt earned a public rebuke from Edmund Burke).76

The "inequality that nature interposes between individuals," holds d'Holbach, far from being the the source of misfortune, is the "true base of their happiness." **Only through "entire dependence" on society, explains Condorcet, does d'Holbach's individual attain the "happiness" that is his main object in life.**77 D'Holbach was actually among the very first to deploy "universal and equal rights" as a political construct designed to correct the state of nature where society functions in pursuit of the common good. **Despite men being wholly unequal by nature, society's legislation can correct this: "des loix impartiales et inflexibles commandent également à tous: c'est en cela qu'elles établissent une egalité très-réelle, la seule à laquelle les hommes aient le droit de pretendre" [impartial and inflexible laws command equally to everyone, it is there that they establish a very real equality, the only one men have a right to claim].**78 Condorcet warmly endorsed d'Holbach's analysis, deeming it the sole correct philosophical foundation of the French Revolution's universal and equal rights and the "general will." **Natural inequality between individuals, physically and in their talents, being irreducible for d'Holbach and Condorcet (as for Spinoza), only through becoming members of society "are men invited and compelled to join together to lend each other mutual help. Inequality of strength and talents obliges them to rework in common, for the good of all, what nature assigns each individual in particular."**79 No genuine liberty exists where some men enjoy rights or privileges that others lack. **D'Holbach's logic was so compelling, suggested Condorcet, during the Revolution, that he and his fellow architects of public policy should now altogether abandon the "fictive equality believed [by Rousseau] to have originally existed among men."** Government by representatives of the people, whether constitutional monarchist or republican, being innately superior in d'Holbach's eyes to all other forms of government, **he firmly rejected Rousseau's "illusion" that "a people ceases to be free" from the moment in chooses "representatives"** just as he did Rousseau's natural equality.80

Rousseau was never a "moderate"; but after 1757 he abandoned the radical stance of his early phase and developed an immensely influential but idiosyncratic political thought that in the 1790s has often been considered the most formative intellectual influence on the Revolution – though it caused intractable difficulties for the revolutionary leadership. A key consequence of the clash between the rival human rights and "general will" systems of d'Holbach and Rousseau is that **whereas in Rousseau, as in Montesquieu, only small countries, like the Swiss cantons, are fitted for the republican form of government, in d'Holbachian political thought, it is the reverse: small republics do not depend on elected representatives, and large councils, as much as big ones, and hence are more "popular" and populist, nearer to direct democracy, and thus more irrational,** anarchic, and vulnerable to faction. Big republics require fixed constitutional rules, elections and representation and hence remain inherently more stable and rational.81
…

[D'Holbach's] ideal electoral candidate facing the electorate would be "riche et bon" (like himself). But special care was needed to ensure representatives did not become, or come to represent, a particular social group or economic stratum. Along with being self-supporting and having a stake in society, integrity, talent, and enlightenment are the essential qualifications and most likely to converge in persons owning some land. **What he proposed was what a Marxist would despise as an elusive bourgeois idyll for prominent urban and rural proprietors.**86
…

The convergence between d'Holbach's doctrine of representation and that of Sieyès was reflected in the work of the revolutionary National Assembly's *Comité de Constitution*, in 1789, when the committee's leading figures, Sieyès and Thouret, drew heavily on earlier French Enlightenment thought, **expressly endorsing d'Holbach's doctrine as expounded in the article on "Representatives," in the *Encyclopédie* (and later work), that "it is possession of property which makes a man a citizen."**93 For d'Holbach, elected representatives gathered in a national assembly constitute the supreme safeguard against ordinary people's irrationality, ignorance, and "superstition," **and are the means to organize government for the people without the people being able to "command."**94
…

Here the distinction between violent revolution via the masses, the Marxist conception, **and revolution not initiated by social forces but generated from within society by underground intellectual networks, or what we have termed Spinoza's alternative revolutionary strategy,** is what matters. **The prospect of mass insurgency filled d'Holbach (like Spinoza, Bayle, and Toland) with revulsion, but this did not preclude far-reaching, sweeping structural change guided by "reason."**

…

Reviling social turmoil, strife, and war, they preferred peace and social harmony. **What they conspired to engineer was another kind of revolution altogether – sweeping structural change plotted and instigated by their underground fraternity of reason.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n65/mode/2up?view=theater

> But the Rights of Man enthusiasts soon made the discovery that the wild onsets of these uniformed masses produced something quite unexpected: a glorious, barbaric, and quite untheoretical joy in danger, mastery, and victory. It was the relic of healthy race-instinct, the trace of Nordic heroism left in these nations.

…

The right to elect representatives belongs to all “vrais citoyens” [true citizens], as d’Holbach and Diderot first affirmed in their article “Représentants” for the *Encyclopédie*, written between 1762 and 1764; **by “true citizens” d’Holbach meant settled inhabitants with a stake in society:** the right to vote should be withheld from vagabonds, mercenaries, and criminals.153 He who owns nothing, or is a vagabond, held d’Holbach, lacks ties to his country.
…

Behind the scenes, without the public knowing it, d’Holbach’s political ideas played a formative role in the French Revolution, much as Condorcet claimed, albeit not directly among the public but rather in a private more subtly subversive fashion, among the top vanguard of the democratic republican intellectual leadership. Especially those gathering in the entourages of Mirabeau and Sieyès, and at Auteuil in the salon of Madame Helvétius, the front line of French democratic republicanism, judged his political ideas a crucial resource. Meanwhile, the dense haze of mystery and concealment d’Holbach deliberately fostered around himself and his activities from the end of the 1760s down to 1789, during which his anonymously-published books were widely propagated in Europe (principally from Holland), only partially lifted during the Revolution. No doubt this was principally owing to his being a wholly unknown quantity among the general public as a result of the longstanding, masked, illicit way his influence had diffused earlier.

Yet modern scholarship has lamentably failed to draw attention, let alone do justice, to his crucial innovations. The lingering anonymity and secrecy shrouding his authorship of key subversive works during the 1770s, and contributions to political articles in the later volumes of the *Encyclopédie*, and continued semi-anonymity still after 1789, no doubt helped explain why, despite his extensive revolutionary significance, he has long languished among the most underestimated, marginalized, and ignored of the revolutionary age’s major political theorists. **Even so, his almost complete subsequent eclipse, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, still remains hard to explain.**
…

Scholars commenting on the profound differences between the two rival “general will” theories acknowledge d’Holbach’s concept is more fixed and universal, more tolerant, cosmopolitan, and firmly tied to promotion of man’s happiness and the good of society,207 **but then revert to the old view that, as far as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* of 1789 is concerned, “Rousseau is the only source that really matters,” naturally without giving any reason for a judgment, the erroneousness of which should be obvious to anyone who reflects.** For it was not Rousseau, but d’Holbach, who was on the right track, as far as Diderot, Condorcet, Volney, Destutt, Naigeon, and other key democratic republican late Enlightenment “general will” theorists and adversaries of Rousseau’s and Robespierre’s ideas were concerned.208

D'Holbach, affirms the author of the classic account of his life and work in French, Pierre Naville (1903-93), son of a Protestant Swiss banker and friend of André Gide, successively a Stalinist, Trotskyist, and finally a founder of the French New Left, “did not want and did not foresee a revolution.” Of course, d’Holbach was not thinking of a socialist revolution brought about by the proletariat; but Naville also claims d’Holbach was not a “republican” or a “democrat.” **He hugely misled many.** Daniel Roche agrees that the Revolution revealed what he too saw as the basic contradiction between d’Holbach’s “philosophical radicalism” and his “political moderation,” further befogging the issue by insisting d’Holbach was an unremarkable “moderate” and “monarchist” not very different in general outlook from Voltaire (a revived familiar theme nowadays) in no way propagating advanced ideas. **For many, Marxists and Postmodernists alike, there cannot be any direct link between ‘l’athéisme de salon” and the politics of the Revolution.**210 **Both are greatly mistaken.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false

Fundamental to the "Radical Enlightenment" throughout was that its "democratizing republicanism" was always focused on "representative democracy"; all Radical Enlightenment theorists from Spinoza to d'Holbach, Condorcet, Price, Volney, Destutt, and Bentham rejected pure "direct democracy," considering the common people of their time still too ignorant, superstitious, and prey to "priestcraft" to understand the issues, though they hoped, and some optimistically expected, this would change in the future. **For "democracy," as they understood it, to work, the "common good," or "general will," contrary to Rousseau's teaching, must be represented by responsible, aware, and well-educated spokesmen and delegates. Radical Enlightenment hence invariably opted for "representative democracy" or, in its most sophisticated versions – as with Condorcet or the post-1810 Bentham – a complex balancing of representative and direct democracy backed by frequent re-election of representatives.**6 Pure "direct democracy," by contrast, the voice of the streets, Rousseau's dispensing with representation, radical thinkers down to 1848 invariably abjured as "unenlightened" and dangerous. **Failing to see this, critics assuring readers the thesis collapses because key radical enlighteners like d'Holbach and Volney repudiated "direct democracy," as indeed they did, are confusing the issue.**7

What is sometimes called Robespierre's "ultra-democratic project," direct popular sovereignty, was intrinsically alien to the Radical Enlightenment creed which remained relentless in stressing the ignorance of "the multitude," **albeit "multitude" understood not in terms of class but in terms of ability or inability to understand the "reality of things." In Spinoza and d'Holbach this exacting standard by no means ruled out unprivileged, poor, and humble individuals who are perceptive and aware.** But their "multitude" definitely did encompass most kings, princes, courtiers, aristocrats, professors, and clergymen who, radical enlighteners typically assumed, either fail to grasp or deliberately obfuscate the reality of things. Radical Enlightenment was inherently and always entirely at odds with Rousseau's "sublime science of simple souls."8

> https://counter-currents.com/2012/06/from-salon-to-guillotine/
>
> At this critical point in the argument, where explicitness and clarity are most indispensable, Rousseau turns coy and vague: the general will is "in conformity with principles"; it "only exists virtually in the conscience or imagination of 'free men,' 'patriots.'" Cochin calls this "the idea of a *legitimate people*—very similar to that of a legitimate prince. **For the regime's doctrinaires, the people is an ideal being**" (p. 158).
> …
>
> Incredibly, to the very end of the Terror, the Jacobins had no *legal standing*; they remained officially a private club. **"The Jacobin Society at the height of its power in the spring of 1794, when it was directing the Convention and governing France, had only one fear: that it would be 'incorporated'—that it would be 'acknowledged' to have authority"** (p. 176). There is nothing the strict democrat fears more than the responsibility associated with public authority.
>
> **The Jacobins were proud that they did not *represent* anyone. Their principle was direct democracy, and their operative assumption was that they *were* "the people."** "I am not the people's defender," said Robespierre; "I am a member of the people; I have never been anything else" (p. 57; cf. p. 154). He expressed bafflement when he found himself, like any powerful man, besieged by petitioners.
>
> Of course, such "direct democracy" involves a social fiction obvious to outsiders. **To the adherent "the word *people* means the 'hard core' minority, *freedom* means the minority's tyranny, *equality* its privileges, and *truth* its opinion,"** explains our author; "it is even in this reversal of the meaning of words that the adherent's initiation consists" (p. 138).

https://www.nestormakhno.info/english/equality.htm **[February 1926]**

The 14th Congress of the Russian Communist Party has roundly condemned the notion of equality. Prior to the congress, **Zinoviev had mentioned the idea in the course of his polemic against Ustrialov and Bukharin. He declared then that the whole of contemporary philosophy was sustained by the idea of equality.** Kalinin spoke up forcefully at the congress against that contention, taking the line that any reference to equality could not help but be harmful and was not to be tolerated. His reasoning was as follows:

> *"**Can we talk to peasants about equality? No, that is out of the question, for in that case, they would set about demanding the same rights as workers, which would be in complete contradiction with the dictatorship of the proletariat.** Likewise, can we talk of equality to workers? No, that is out of the question too, for if, say, a communist and a non-party member do the same job, the difference resides in the former being paid twice the wage of the latter. **To concede equality would allow non-party members to demand the same pay as is paid out to a communist.** Is that acceptable, comrades? No, it is not. Can*

> *we call for equality among communists then? No, that is not on either, for they too occupy different positions, in terms of their rights and their material circumstances alike."*

On the basis of such considerations, Kalinin concluded that Zinoviev's use of the term "equality" could only have been demagogic and harmful. In his reply, Zinoviev in turn told the congress that, whilst he had spoken of equality, he had meant it in quite a different sense. **As for himself, all he had had in mind was "socialist equality," that is, the equality that would one day come to pass in a more or less distant future.** For the time being, until such time as the world revolution had taken place and as there was no way of knowing when it would, there could be no question of any equality. In particular, there could be no equality of rights, for that would risk dragging us in the direction of very dangerous "democratic" deviations.

This understanding on the notion of equality was not spelled out in a resolution from the congress. But, essentially, the two camps that clashed at the congress were agreed in regarding the idea of equality as intolerable.

Formerly, and not all that long ago, the Bolsheviks spoke quite a different language. It was under the banner of equality that they operated during the great Russian revolution, to overthrow the bourgeoisie, in concert with the workers and peasants, at whose expense they rose to political control over the country.

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1928/3rd/ti03.htm#p1-10
>
> From prominent leaders of the Comintern we have had to hear such an argument as: **the theory of socialism in one country, of course, is unfounded, but it provides the Russian workers with a perspective in the difficult conditions under which they labor and thus gives them courage. It is difficult to plumb the depths of the theoretical debacle of those who seek in a program not for a scientific basis for their class orientation but for moral consolation.** Consoling theories which contradict facts pertain to the sphere of religion and not science; and religion is opium for the people.
> ...
>
> But in need of it is the functionary who looks down on the masses from above; the petty administrator who does not want to be disturbed; **the apparatus retainer who seeks to dominate under cover of an all-saving and consoling formula. It is they who think that the ignorant people need the “good tidings,” and that there is no dealing with the people without consoling doctrines.** It is they who catch up the false words about “90% socialism,” for this formula sanctions their privileged position, their right to dominate and command, their need to be rid of criticisms on the part of “skeptics” and men of “little faith.”
>
> http://chronicle.com/article/In-Praise-of-Marx/127027/
>
> The truth is that Marx was no more responsible for the monstrous oppression of the communist world than Jesus was responsible for the Inquisition. **For one thing, Marx would have scorned the idea that socialism could take root in desperately impoverished, chronically backward societies like Russia and China.** If it did, then the result would simply be what he called "generalized scarcity," by which he means that everyone would now be deprived, not just the poor. It would mean a recycling of "the old filthy business"—or, in less tasteful translation, "the same old crap." Marxism is a theory of how well-heeled capitalist nations might use their immense resources to achieve justice and prosperity for their people. **It is not a program by which nations bereft of material resources, a flourishing civic culture, a democratic heritage, a well-evolved technology, enlightened liberal traditions, and a skilled, educated work force might catapult themselves into the modern age.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/dec/13.htm

Stalin: The kind of socialism under which everybody would get the same pay, an equal quantity of meat and an equal quantity of bread, would wear the same clothes and receive the same goods in the same quantities—such a socialism is unknown to Marxism. All that Marxism says is that until classes have been finally abolished and until labor has been transformed from a means of subsistence into the prime want of man, into voluntary labor for society, people will be paid for their labor according to the work performed. **"From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."** Such is the Marxist formula of socialism, i.e., the formula of the first stage of communism, the first stage of communist society. **Only at the higher stage of communism, only in its higher phase, will each one, working according to his ability, be recompensed for his work according to his needs.** "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

It is quite clear that people's needs vary and will continue to vary under socialism. **Socialism has never denied that people differ in their tastes, and in the quantity and quality of their needs.** Read how Marx criticized Stirner for his leaning towards equalitarianism; read Marx's criticism of the Gotha Programme of 1875; read the subsequent works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and you will see how sharply they attack equalitarianism. **Equalitarianism owes its origin to the individual peasant type of mentality, the**

psychology of share and share alike, the psychology of primitive peasant "communism." Equalitarianism has nothing in common with Marxist socialism. Only people who are unacquainted with Marxism can have the primitive notion that the Russian Bolsheviks want to pool all wealth and then share it out equally. That is the notion of people who have nothing in common with Marxism. **That is how such people as the primitive "Communists" of the time of Cromwell and the French Revolution pictured communism to themselves.** But Marxism and the Russian Bolsheviks have nothing in common with such equalitarian "Communists."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path#Use_of_violence

The Shining Path rejected the concept of human rights; a Shining Path document stated:

> We start by not ascribing to either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Costa Rica Convention on Human Rights, but we have used their legal devices to unmask and denounce the old Peruvian state... **For us, human rights are contradictory to the rights of the people, because we base rights in man as a social product, not man as an abstract with innate rights. "Human rights" do not exist except for the bourgeois man, a position that was at the forefront of feudalism, like liberty, equality, and fraternity were advanced for the bourgeoisie of the past.** But today, since the appearance of the proletariat as an organized class in the Communist Party, with the experience of triumphant revolutions, with the construction of socialism, new democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, **it has been proven that human rights serve the oppressor class and the exploiters who run the imperialist and landowner-bureaucratic states.** Bourgeois states in general... Our position is very clear. We reject and condemn human rights because they are bourgeois, reactionary, counterrevolutionary rights, and are today a weapon of revisionists and imperialists, principally Yankee imperialists. — *Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path, Sobre las Dos Colinas*[127]

---

http://www.ditext.com/woodward/fitzhugh.html

For an intellectual tradition that stands in desperate need of contrast and suffers from uniformity—albeit virtuous liberal uniformity—this oversight is unfortunate. Granting his wicked excesses and sly European importations, Fitzhugh could at least furnish contrast. The distance between Fitzhugh and Jefferson renders the conventional polarities between Jefferson and Hamilton, Jackson and Clay, or Hoover and Roosevelt—all liberals under the skin—insignificant indeed. **When compared with Fitzhugh, even John Taylor of Caroline, John Randolph of Roanoke, and John C. Calhoun blend inconspicuously into the great American consensus, since they were all apostles in some degree of John Locke.**
…

But what of the Revolutionary generation of the Virginia Enlightenment—the Masons, the Randolphs, the Jeffersons, the Madisons, the Washingtons—and their apparently firm commitment to the antithesis of Filmerism, to the Lockean principles of rationalistic individualism and its picture of an atomistic society? **Whatever principles these gentry subscribed to in the 1770's and later, they were one and all patriarchs on their own—Thomas Jefferson included.** The anthropological, sociological, and political realities of Virginia society were those of the patriarchal family. Those realities might better be understood in Filmerian than in Lockean terms. **And curiously enough, many of these Revolutionary Lockeans were blood relatives—remote "cozens" of Sir Robert himself.** "In Virginia the Filmers and the Filmer connections," writes Laslett, "were associated with all the great families which finally gave to the thirteen colonies their Revolutionary leadership in the 1770's—the Washingtons, the Byrds, the Berkeleys, and the Randolphs and so the Jeffersons. Whatever the subsequent literary and philosophical reputation of Sir Robert Filmer, he had been a great genealogical success."[70] Sir Robert was a family man in more ways than ideological.

It was not "simple fraud" that led George Fitzhugh to seize upon Filmer in his search for some ideological basis on which to construct his defense and his understanding of Virginia society, even in mid-nineteenth century. As a sociologist he had got hold of some firm anthropological data. **It is rather more a wonder that the patriarchs of Revolutionary Virginia should have temporarily embraced Locke than that their sons should have returned to Filmer.**

> http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/economics/38387-classical-liberalism-private-property-and-christianity#post828603
>
> > *Property is related to propriety, and is an ethical institution. It is a feature of our civilization.*[1]
> >
> > **This is how a great Classical Liberal, Gottfried Dietze, starts his book, *In Defense of Property*. We can safely say that his book is the greatest treatise on the defense of**

private property written by a Classical Liberal. Dietze was a respected scholar of the Austrian School, a friend of Hayek, his book on the Federalist Papers was an astonishing success, and he was known for the "symmetry, precision, and profundity" of his writings.

And yet, throughout the book, he fails to defend his thesis in his first sentence. **He defends property on linguistic grounds, historical grounds, biological grounds, pragmatic grounds, "natural law" grounds.** But he never touches the issue of the intrinsic ethical goodness of private property. He starts the book with the claim that property is an ethical institution, but then he subjects its ethical value to many other things. **He doesn't show how property is good *per se*.** He doesn't show any eternal ethical values in property. Property is good because it is part of our civilization; or because property rights have been acknowledged by so many law codes in the past; or because it has been an integral part of the rise of the West; and so on. **But we don't see anywhere a statement that private property is good just because it is good, period.** The ethical institution is lost or forgotten, as Dietze progresses with his defense of property.
…

Ludwig von Mises—the man whose name is symbolic of the Austrian School—**devoted only two pages to private property in his 900-page fundamental work, *Human Action*. The book was Mises' magnum opus, a superb defense of free markets.** Mises was a profound thinker and scholar. He knew economic thought was not isolated from philosophy, so he started it with a thorough exposition of his epistemology and a defense of his methodological individualism. The book is a delight to read—page after page of rational, precise definitions, arguments and conclusions. And yet, when he comes to private property, he is next to silent. He says at the very beginning of the small subsection on "Private Property" in Chapter 24, on page 682: **"Private ownership of the means of production is the fundamental institution of the market economy."**[2]

One would think "the fundamental institution" would deserve at least a chapter in such a book. But no, it only get's two pages. And no defense on ethical grounds. **To the contrary, unlike Dietze, Mises makes sure he points to the fact that there is no defense of property on ethical grounds: "Private property is a human device. It is not sacred."**[3]
…

Dietze, Mises, Rand, and other Classical Liberal or Objectivist authors know this very well; they know very well that a rational defense of an ethical institution is impossible. But they are nevertheless reluctant to build an ethical defense of property. Why?

Because they have prior commitment to a philosophy that rejects any possibility for ethical defense of anything: evolutionism.

Being strong believers in natural law, the Classical Liberals saw property and property rights as evolving from an earlier state of common ownership of resources. **In this they agreed with another strong proponent of natural law in the antiquity, Cicero. While he defended property rights, he admitted that in their natural state before they created civilizations, humans owned all things in common.** Mises agreed with this: property came as a result of human action; a very useful and beneficial result indeed, but it was not part of the original "natural" state.

> https://web.archive.org/web/20160407204516/http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/cicero/dnv1-1.htm
>
> II. For there was a time when men wandered at random over the fields, after the fashion of beasts, and supported life on the food of beasts; nor did they do anything by means of the reasoning powers of the mind; but almost everything by bodily strength. **No attention was as yet paid to any considerations of the religious reverence due to the gods, or of the duties which are owed to mankind: no one had ever seen any legitimate marriages, no one had beheld any children whose parentage was indubitable; nor had any one any idea what great advantage there might be in a system of equal law.** And so, owing to error and ignorance, cupidity, that blind and rash sovereign of the mind, abused its bodily strength, that most pernicious of servants, for the purpose of gratifying itself.

…

In order to defend property, we must declare its sacredness. We must declare its intrinsic goodness. And we must declare its naturalness. **If it is not sacred, if it is not intrinsically good, and if it is not part of human nature—as opposed to external to human nature—property is only an expedient tool to be disposed of at will.** If it is so, we have no recourse against those that want to confiscate our property in the name of expediency or of "return to nature."

And the only way to declare its sacredness, goodness, and naturalness is to accept the Bible's claim that man was created an owner, and that he owned private property from the very beginning of his created existence. **Humans did not develop the concept of property, nor did it evolve in result of man's praxis or interaction.** Property was inextricably part of man's existence in the Garden, and there is no way to define man as a being without property.
…

This definition of man as a being that naturally has life and property is not a mere philosophical assumption; it flows from the very nature of objective reality because God Himself is a Proprietor. In the Third Commandment—which corresponds to the Eighth in the first five Commandments—God declares limits to man's use of His name. God is not a remote being. He owns everything, including the breath from our mouth, and we are not allowed to use that breath in a way that violates God's name. Using God's name in an inappropriate way was as heavy a crime as worshipping other gods, and violating His property was a crime against the Person of God. **In the same way, Biblically, violating a man's property was a crime against the person of man.**

http://www.christianciv.com/ChristCivEssay_Pt2.htm#Economics

That aggregates of people ought to value the same thing, whether a high GNP or individual property rights, also presupposes a fixed human nature, but that is inconsistent with naturalistic evolution. Marx argued that human nature is not fixed, and therefore economic systems should evolve as well. **As Gary North says, "What if the socialist argues that we are entering into a new era? The old laws of capitalism, including bourgeois morality, are now being superseded by a new era of proletarian production, proletarian morality, and proletarian economics! This is precisely what Marx and his followers have been arguing since the 1840's. This has been an extremely successful argument."**[24] Given that atheist capitalists accept the premise of naturalistic evolution, they cannot avoid the reasonableness of Marx's conclusion.

https://archive.org/details/essayonaristocra00bran/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

I am of opinion that the institution of marriage, **which may have been very useful in taming brutes,** causes more misery to mankind than even the Church has done. Church, monarchy, marriage, property, these are to my mind four old venerable institutions which mankind will have to reform *from the foundations* in order to be able to breathe freely. And of these marriage alone kills the individuality, paralyses liberty and is the embodiment of a paradox. **But the shocking thing about it is that humanity is still too coarse to be able to shake it off.**

http://reason.com/archives/1974/02/01/slavery-and-socialism/1

Of socialist views on property, Fitzhugh, a self-educated lawyer and historian, remarked: **"None but lawyers and historians are aware how much truth, justice, and good sense there is in the notions of the Communists, as to the community of property."** [S, p. 161]

https://archive.org/details/sociologyforsout00fitz/page/184/mode/2up?view=theater

Property is not a natural and divine, but conventional right; it is the mere creature of society and law. In this all lawyers and publicists agree.

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n241/mode/2up?view=theater

It was worse when their Asiatic love of dogmatism and stickling for principle induced the really important legal teachers of the so-called "classical jurisprudence" to formulate clearly **the quite un-Roman idea of a natural law** and to introduce it systematically. Ulpian calls natural law that "which is common to animals and men." A monstrous thought! Not merely in art is man a free creator, in law too he proves himself a magnificent inventor, an incomparably skilled, thoughtful workman, the forger, of his own fate. **Roman law is as characteristic a creation of the one individual human spirit as Hellenic art.**

What would be said of me if I were to speak of a “natural art” and then tried to draw an analogy, however far-fetched, between the spontaneous chirping of a bird and a tragedy of Sophocles? **Because the jurists form a technical guild, many of them have for centuries talked nonsense like this without the world noticing it.**
...

But the ghost of natural law still merrily haunts certain brains; for example, legal theorists, as far apart as Hobbes and Rousseau, agree in this one idea; but the greatest achievement was the famous Hugo Grotius' division in natural, historical, and divine law, which makes one ask whether then the divine law was unnatural? or the natural a work of the devil? It needed the brilliant intellect and the outspoken impertinence of a Voltaire to venture to write: **"Rien ne contribue peut-être plus à rendre un esprit faux, obscur, confus, incertain, que la lecture de Grotius et de Pufendorf."***

* *Dictionnaire philosophique*. **J.J. Rousseau, too, calls Grotius "un enfant, et qui pis est, un enfant de mauvaise foi"** (*Emile*, v.).

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-vol-1-book-i

In the famous dedication of his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* to the Republic of Geneva, Jean-Jacques Rousseau drew a vivid picture of his father sitting at his watchmaker’s bench. “I see him still, **living by the work of his hands, and feeding his soul on the sublimest truths. I see the works of Tacitus, Plutarch, and Grotius,** lying before him in the midst of the tools of his trade. At his side stands his dear son, receiving, alas with too little profit, the tender instruction of the best of fathers. ...” Rousseau’s reminiscence is testimony to the authority which Grotius’s *De Iure Belli ac Pacis* had come to possess in the century since it was first published in 1625; in the eyes of both father and son, the book had the same standing as the great works of classical antiquity. **Rousseau was to devote much of his life to a complicated and subtle repudiation of Grotius, but he never lost his sense of the book’s importance, describing Grotius in *Emile* as “the master of all the savants” in political theory (though he added that, nevertheless, he “is but a child, and, what is worse, a dishonest child,”** and that “true political theory is yet to appear, and it is to be presumed that it never will”).1
...

As this publishing history in itself illustrates, it would be hard to imagine any work more central to the intellectual world of the Enlightenment. But from the late eighteenth century onward, the stream of new editions dried up, and the book came to be treated not as the formative work of modern moral and political theory but as an important contribution to a different genre, “international law” (a term coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1780). Many intellectual developments of the period contributed to this shift, including the criticisms of Grotius found (alongside his admiration) in Rousseau, and the contempt expressed by Kant for the “sorry comforters” such as Grotius and Pufendorf, whose works “are still dutifully quoted in *justification* of military aggression, although their philosophically or diplomatically formulated codes do not and cannot have the slightest *legal* force, since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint.”7 William Whewell, professor of international law at Cambridge and translator of Grotius, tried in the mid-nineteenth century to restore Grotius as a major moral thinker, but with limited success; **by the time of the post–First World War settlement, Grotius was regarded almost exclusively as the founder of modern civilized interstate relations, and as a suitable tutelary presence for the new Peace Palace at The Hague. As we shall see, in some ways that was to radically misunderstand Grotius’s views on war; he was in fact much more of an apologist for aggression and violence than many of his more genuinely pacific contemporaries.**
...

Each element also had a different range of supporters: broadly speaking, the Calvinist Church and its ministry looked to the princes of the House of Orange to secure its power over the population, while other more heterodox religious groups looked to the oligarchical urban rulers for their protection.

During the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the religious antagonisms within the republic reached the point where civil war was threatened. **Many people (including to some extent Grotius himself) felt that there had been little point in throwing off the tyranny of Spain if it was to be replaced by the tyranny of an organized and intolerant Calvinist Church.** Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius worked tirelessly on behalf of the Estates to try to protect the more liberal theologians (in particular, the ministers who agreed with Jacobus Arminius’s denial of the Calvinist doctrine of grace) from the attacks of the Calvinists; Grotius also circulated privately a theological work of his own in which he argued for a minimalist and irenic version of Christianity.8 **But in the end, both Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius seem to have concluded that the only way to secure religious toleration in the republic was in effect to mount a military coup against the Statholder and thereby to remove the principal weapon in the hands of the Calvinists.** There is a close parallel with events thirty years later in England, when the representatives of heterodox religious groups in the House of Commons also came to the conclusion that only a coup against their prince would destroy the power of the church that he supported. **In England, the Commons won, though only after a long and bloody civil war; in the United Provinces, Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius lost.** Prince Maurice arrested

them both and had them arraigned for treason; Grotius gave evidence against his old friend and was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Oldenbarnevelt was publicly beheaded in May 1619.
…

Rousseau was to remark sardonically that Grotius's use of quotations concealed the fundamental similarity between Grotius and Hobbes: **"The truth is that their principles are exactly the same: they only differ in their expression. They also differ in their method. Hobbes relies on sophisms, and Grotius on the poets; all the rest is the same."**11

> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> Since after the miserable Confusions of a *Civill War,* there is in the end a necessity of some Settlement, it cannot in Reason be imagined (when the Controversie is decided by the *Sword*) that the *Conquerours* should, as to the manner of settlement, submit to the will of the *Conquered Party,* though more in number than Themselves; nor are they obliged to settle the Government again, according to the former Lawes and Constitutions, **but may, in this case, use such means as* nature instructs them in, and erect such a Form as they thewselves conceive most convenient for their own Preservation.* To this truth we have the Testimony of the most Learned *Grotius,* which I wil set down at large. *In bello Civili, scripta quidem Jura, id est civilia, non valent; at valent non scripta, id est, quae natura dictat, aut gentium consensus constituit.* In a Civil war, (saith he) written Laws, that is, the established Laws of a Nation, are of no Force, but those only which are not written, that is, which are agreeable to the dictates of Nature, or the Law and custom of Nations. And then that only is Law (saith he) which shall be declared by the *prevailing Party.*** *Jus dicitur esse id quod validiori placuit, ut intelligamus fine suo carere Jus, nisi vires ministras habeat.* That onely which it pleaseth the stronger Party to enact is said to be *Law,* since it cannot accomplish the outward end of a Law,* except it be attended by Force to constrain obedience. **Hence came it (saith the *Florentine Secretary.*) that *all the Prophets that were arm'd, prevailed; but those that were unarm'd were too weak. And therefore it behaves all Legislators to be so provided, that if the People will not be ruled, they may compell them by Force.* Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, *and* Romulus, *would never have been able long to continue the Authority of their Laws, had they been without Arms at Command.***
> …
>
> Moreover, as to the late Contest betwixt *King* and *Parliament, Grotius* speaks very home to justifie the Parliaments late Proceedings in positive Terms:* *Si Rex partem habeat summi Imperii, partem alteram populus aut Senatus, Regi in partem non suam involanti, vis justa opponi poterit, quia eatenus Imperium non habet: Quod ubi fit, potest Rex etiam suam Imperii partem belli Jure amittere;* that is in *English,* if the Authority be divided betwixt a King and his People in Parliament, so that the King hath one part, the People another; the King offering to incroach upon that part which is none of his, may lawfully be opposed by force of Arms, because he exceeds the bounds of his Authority. And not only so, but he may lose his own part likewise, by the* *Law of Arms.*

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA22#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Natural law arguments associated with Hugo Grotius, in particular, played a distinctive part in the formation of the opposing ideas of Bayle and Jurieu** on the nature of moral and political obligation and the possibility of civil toleration. **That Grotius' arguments could be deployed on the same topic to such wholly divergent ends was precisely expressive of** not only the range of views on resistance to sovereigns within the Refuge but also **the spectrum of opinions that could be identified in Grotius' own writings.**

…

Grotius boldly stated his central argument as follows:

> **God created man αὐτεξούσιον, "free and *sui iuris,*" so that the actions of each individual and the use of his possessions were made subject not to another's will but to his own.** Moreover, this view is sanctioned by the common consent of all nations. For what is that well-known concept, "natural liberty," other than the power of the individual to act in accordance with his own will? **And liberty in regard to actions is equivalent to ownership in regard to property. Hence the saying: "every man is the governor and arbiter of affairs relative to his own property."**19

…

And he made clear in his long defense of violence, Book I, Chapter II, that these laws did not supersede our natural right to defend ourselves: **"The Christian Religion commands, that we should lay down our Lives one for another; but who will pretend to say, that we are obliged to this by the Law of Nature[?]"** (I.II.6.2).

The natural state of man was thus one of wary defensiveness: **men should not unnecessarily injure one another, but they need not actually help one another.** Only if they formed civil associations, with the

express intention of improving one another's lives and creating something richer than the state of nature, would principles such as mutual aid apply.
…

Although the Prolegomena to *De Iure Praedae* began with the simple statement "What God has shown to be His Will, that is law," even in that work Grotius refused to derive the laws of *nature* from "oracles and supernatural portents."27 Instead, they were to be deduced solely from "the design [*intentio*] of the Creator" as manifested in the generally recognized constitution of the natural world. **Self-defense was the first and most basic of all principles: all individuals (not just men, but also animals, and even inanimate objects) possessed a fundamental drive to preserve themselves**. **Grotius was even prepared to say (quoting Horace) that to this extent "expediency [*utilitas,* "profit" or "self-interest"] might perhaps be called the mother of justice and equity,"** though he acknowledged that only part of justice was based on self-defense.
…

It is clear that both Grotius's derogation of the role of God and the priority he gave to self-interest were alarming to many of his contemporaries, particularly among the Calvinists who surrounded the Prince of Orange. In order to accommodate the book more to their views when he produced the second edition, Grotius toned down his argument. **Thus he cut out the claim that man was driven purely by self-interest "before he came to the use of that which is special to man" and replaced it with the emphatic assertion that "*the Saying, that every Creature is led by Nature to seek its own private Advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be granted.*"** Similarly, he contrived to widen the scope of God's authority. For example, in 1625 the very first sentence of the Prolegomena included the claim that "few people have tackled the law that mediates between different countries or their rulers, whether that law stems from nature itself or from custom and tacit agreement, and so far no one at all has dealt with it comprehensively and methodically." In 1631, this read "*that Law, which is common to many Nations or Rulers of Nations, whether derived from Nature,* ***or instituted by Divine Commands,*** *or introduced by Custom and tacit Consent, few have touched upon, and none hitherto treated of universally and methodically*"—Grotius now allowed that the law of nature might be "instituted by Divine Commands." Similarly, **he dropped the word "necessarily" from the sentence where he had said that the natural law "necessarily derives from intrinsic principles of a human being" and added to his discussion at that point the thought that**

> ***God by the Laws which he has given, has made these very Principles more clear and evident, even to those who are less capable of strict Reasoning,*** *and has forbid us to give way to those impetuous Passions, which,* contrary *to our own Interest, and that of others, divert us from following the Rules of Reason and Nature;*32 *for as they are exceeding unruly, it was necessary to keep a strict Hand over them, and to confine them within certain narrow Bounds.* (*Preliminary Discourse,* XIII)

So he now conceded that the natural law might properly be deduced not from the necessary constitution of the physical world, but from the records of God's pronouncements about the law directly to mankind.

Almost all these changes are found in the Prolegomena; the remainder of the book continued to lay out the same case that Grotius had advanced in the first edition. The result of this was to throw many of his later readers, including Barbeyrac, into some confusion; Barbeyrac consistently sought to emphasize the wider character of Grotian sociability and to bring him in line with Pufendorf (whose main aim was to attack the account of man's narrow and self-interested natural life found in Hobbes).33 **But anyone who read the first edition (as Hobbes himself probably did), or who could see through the confusion artfully introduced by Grotius (as Rousseau seems to have done), would be aware that Grotius's theory of the law of nature was more like Hobbes's than Pufendorf and Barbeyrac were ever prepared to acknowledge.** When Rousseau said of Grotius and Hobbes (in the passage I quoted earlier) that "their principles are exactly the same," he may well have been surprisingly close to the mark.
…

Throughout his discussion of property, especially in Book II, Chapters II and III of *De Iure Belli ac Pacis,* but also in *Mare Liberum* (which was the relevant portion of *De Iure Praedae*), Grotius made clear the extremely weak character of private property. In a state of nature, all commodities were in common, in the sense that each man took what he needed from the common store of nature and left what he did not need for other people to use; allocation of resources was simply on the basis of "first Occupancy" (II.III.1). The introduction of private property gave the owners merely a presumptive right to first use, entitling their own needs to be met by the commodity that they owned, before those of anyone else (II.II.8); but once the owners' needs had been met, Grotius always argued, the surplus could be claimed by the genuinely needy. A regime of private property did not give people a moral right to more extensive possessions; it merely changed the method by which they laid claim to the necessities of life.

Thus the sea could not be owned, as he insisted throughout *Mare Liberum* and in II.II.3 of *De Iure Belli ac Pacis,* because use of the sea itself (as distinct from the fish taken from it) could not be regarded as answering a basic need. The same was true of the original wastelands of the world, over which wild animals roamed. Agricultural land, on the other hand, could be owned, since (Grotius believed) only settled possession enabled the farmers to plant seed and harvest crops unmolested, and thereby to produce new commodities that could be used to fulfill basic needs. **The paradoxical consequence was that, according to Grotius, it was not the European settlers who were guilty of any injurious actions when they took hunting grounds away from the primitive peoples of the world; it was the primitive peoples themselves who were**

behaving badly when they tried to resist the settlements, and who could be punished for their conduct.35

> 35. See II.II.17. Grotius there and elsewhere distinguished between "Property" and "Jurisdiction": **Just as a fleet at sea can claim the right to regulate the use of the sea in its neighborhood** (always allowing for the moral rights of other people to use surplus resources), **so an aboriginal nation could regulate the use of its territory. But if it failed to allow settlement under its aegis, the land could be taken from it as punishment for its breach of the law of nature.**

…

However, one practice that could *not* be used as justification for the conquest of primitive peoples was their religion. It had occasionally been argued that "infidels" could rightly be conquered by Christians, but Grotius was always adamant that war could never be made against any theists on the grounds that their religion was false. As he said in II.XX.46, **"That there is a Deity, (one or more I shall not now consider) and that this Deity has the Care of human Affairs, are Notions universally received, and are absolutely necessary to the Essence of any Religion, whether true or false," and "those who first attempt to destroy these Notions, ought, on the Account of human Society in general, which they thus, without any just Grounds, injure, to be restrained, as in all well-governed Communities has been usual."** So atheism was a moral crime, as it was to be for Locke (though not for Hobbes). But any religion that corresponded to this minimal definition should be tolerated, and Christianity could not be forced on its adherents (II.XX.48), though Christianity itself had to be tolerated by nonbelievers on pain of international punishment (II.XX.49).
…

Whatever their different views about what he had done, Grotius's readers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were united in their praise for his originality, for in *De Iure Belli ac Pacis* we have indeed found many of the central themes of modern political theory. **Grotius's men are born free, under no authority but that which all men will recognize, the authority of a minimal kind of natural law. They are equal, for the essence of Grotius's natural justice (as distinct from the distributive justice characteristic of civil societies) is that it treats all men as equal and does not recognize distinctions of rank or even of merit;** furthermore, in nature our property is extremely exiguous, and no one can claim property rights at the expense of the poor. And yet, on the other hand, his men are competitive and censorious, eager to conquer new territories if that will promote the rational use of the world's resources, and eager to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations if they see injuries being suffered by the innocent. **The world Grotius depicted is indeed recognizably our world, for good or ill.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n41/mode/2up?view=theater

Then, too, during the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were Europe's sole middlemen: their mercantile marine was three times as big as that of all other countries. And although—or indeed because—the whole world depended on it, there arose a bitter hatred against it (contrasting strangely with the extravagant admiration accorded to their manners and comforts) which was intensified by the brutal and reckless extremes to which they went in maintaining their advantage. **"Trade must be free everywhere, up to the gates of hell," was their supreme article of faith. But by free trade they meant freedom for themselves—in other words, a ruthlessly exploited monopoly.** This was also the kind of freedom that Grotius meant when in his famous treatise on international law, *Mare liberum*, he stated that the discovery of foreign countries does not in itself give right of possession, and that the sea by its very nature is outside all possession and is the property of everyone. **But as the sea was in fact in the possession of the Dutch, this liberal philosophy was no more than the hypocritical mask for an economic terrorism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

For Benjamin Straumann, **'the reason why Cicero's arguments in favor of a natural law lent themselves to Grotius was that both Cicero's and Grotius's doctrines originally stem from an attempt to legally defend imperial expansion,' with Cicero's argument in *De re publica* being set out specifically as a response to the arguments of Carneades.**76

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR13#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> More recently, **Richard Tuck has proposed that the arguments of Lipsius and Michel de Montaigne, which drew on two of the Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism and Scepticism, were the inspiration behind much of what he calls the 'new humanism'** that spread across Europe in the early decades of the seventeenth century and which in turn formed the crucial intellectual background for the political theories of first Hugo Grotius and later Thomas Hobbes.
> …
>
> Tuck's narrative of modern political philosophy has at its heart an interpretation of Grotius as a thinker who drew on an Epicurean understanding of self-love to fashion a reply to Scepticism, **but his argument overstates the role of both Scepticism and Epicureanism in Grotius's thinking and radically underplays the significance of Stoicism.**

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317765/1/283910.pdf

Grotius' natural state was originally one of “primitive simplicity,” identified from the outset as that of Indians.

> This primitive state ... exemplified in the community of property arising from extreme simplicity, may be seen among certain tribes in America which have lived for many generations in such a condition.15

The state of nature has suddenly been profoundly transformed. Beginning with Grotius, and followed shortly by Thomas Hobbes and later John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the natural state, as it has developed in political and Christian thought from Cicero through Aquinas, is with the 17th century thinkers wholly grafted without consideration for its implications on to the European notion of America and its natives. **Christianity and legal theory are fused and become, through natural law, the singular viewpoint for understanding the new world and its inhabitants.**

Like the Christian Edenic myth, Grotius' natural state is quickly corrupted. Thus, he states:

> **But men did not however continue to live this simple and innocent life, but turned their thoughts to various kinds of knowledge, the symbol for which was the tree of knowledge.**6

Natural law has also changed. **For the first time, Grotius incorporates the idea of natural rights into his theory of natural law.** Rights are defined as “a moral quality of a person, making it possible to have or do something lawfully.”17 Grotius, it should be noted, is concerned primarily with the rights of nations or companies, rather than individuals.

Secondly, ‘ius gentium’ is redefined. **Previously defined as the law *of* nations, that is those aspects of law common to all nations, Grotius's ‘ius gentium’ becomes the law *between* nations and Grotius, himself, becomes the founder of international law. Implicit in his analysis, as shall become explicit in Locke's, is that man under natural law in the state of nature is equivalent to European nations under the very same law, with the same natural rights.** The state of nature becomes a metaphor for explaining the relationship between states which have no overarching authority beyond that of God and natural law.
...

While Hugo Grotius, employed by the East Indies Company, defended Holland's right in common with all, to the sea; Locke and his patron Shaftesbury were more interested in the defense of England's private rights to American soil. It was argued that natural law allowed land to be appropriated only through cultivation rather than occupation. **Thus, lack of private ownership of the seas and the beginning of such ownership in the lands formed the fundamental bases for the laws of nature posited by Grotius and Locke, respectively. Samuel Pufendorf, on the other hand, with no colonial master, founds his theory of natural law on an “sociable attitude.”**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=nCB0DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA211#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The distinction of the property of the goods of this world, whereby every man ought to be master and assured possessor of his own, has been introduced by the law and right of nature, which wills that to every man be yielded what belongs to him; or else by the right of nations, which all comes to one end. This distinction of property maintains the commerce and traffic among men; it entertains buying and selling, permutations, loans, and such like, which are bonds of all human society. And if the distinction of property is not maintained in the world, all commerce is destroyed, and all society decayed and resolved. **For although some poets and philosophers praise the community of goods, remembering us of that golden world of Saturn, yet it is plainly evident to all people of judgment that communism induces and brings a carelessness, idleness, discord, and confusion into the commonwealth,** as learnedly Aristotle demonstrates in his *Politics*.
>
> https://archive.org/details/originofpropert00fust/page/2/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Long before the present century, there were thinkers who loved to picture to themselves mankind living together, when society was first formed, in a fraternal communism. **What is new in this, what is peculiar to our own times, is the attempt to rest this theory on a foundation of historical fact,** to support it with quotations from historical documents, to deck it out, so to speak, in a learned dress.
>
> https://archive.org/details/scientificorigin0000gasm/page/116/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Therefore, [Dr. Johannes Unold] wrote, with the outlandish exaggeration typical of the Monists, ‘**considered from an evolutionary point of view Social Democracy was the most**

reactionary of all the political parties. For it was not content, as were some of the conservatives, or [members] of the Center Party, to return to medieval political conditions, but wished rather to impose primitive forms of state and social organization on our richly evolved civilized communities with their densely and highly individualized populations, their many activities, and their diverse needs.'34 In fact, **the only time in history when the Marxist program had ever been fulfilled in any way was at the dawn of civilization when common tribal ownership of land existed. 'At that time there was no classes but only equality of rights and equality of duties for all.'** But with social evolution all that has changed and society can never return to the condition of its origin. By its support of common ownership of the means of production, therefore, Marxism simply was advocating a return to the most promitive conditions of mankind's past. **'In the Social Democratic proposals one may observe a deliberate pursuit ... of evolution in a reverse direction, a complete return to truly original stages, a form of state and social organization which is similar to the phenomenon of child-like behaviour in old age.'**35

https://www.nature.com/articles/nature17159.epdf

Here we test the social control hypothesis by applying Bayesian phylogenetic methods to a geographically and socially diverse sample of 93 traditional Austronesian cultures. **We find strong support for models in which human sacrifice stabilizes social stratification once stratification has arisen, and promotes a shift to strictly inherited class systems.**
…

According to the social control hypothesis, human sacrifice legitimizes class-based power distinctions by combining displays of ultimate authority—the taking of a life—with supernatural justifications that sanctify authority as divinely ordained2,8,13.
…

Ethnographic descriptions highlight that the sacrificial victims were typically of low social status, such as slaves, and the instigators were of high social status, such as priests and chiefs3,4,27.
…

The approach adopted in this paper demonstrates the way causal hypotheses about major transitions in human social organization can be tested by combining computational models and language phylogenies with a wealth of cultural and historical data. **Unpalatable as it might be, our results suggest that ritual killing helped humans transition from the small egalitarian groups of our ancestors, to the large stratified societies we live in today.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hakluyt-the-free-sea-hakluyt-trans#lf0450_label_099

By the first law of nations, which sometimes also is called natural and which the poets elsewhere describe in the golden age, and in another place in the kingdom of Saturn or Justice, nothing was proper, which Cicero affirmed: "For by nature nothing is private."3

3. Cicero, *De officiis,* I.8.21.

And Horace:

nam proprie telluris herum natura nec illum,
*nec me, nec quemquam statuit.*4

4. "Nature, in truth, makes neither him nor me nor anyone else lord of the soil as his own": Horace, *Satires,* II.2. 129–30.

For nature could not distinguish lords. In this signification, therefore, we affirm all things common at that time, signifying the same thing which the poets do when they say the first men sought the middle and justice held the middle of things by a chaste and inviolable covenant; which, that they might more plainly express, **they deny that the fields were divided by bounds at that time or that there was any traffic:**

promiscua rura per agros
*praestiterant cunctis communia cuncta videri.*5

5. "The farms scattered throughout the fields showed that all things seemed common to everyone": Avienus, *On Aratus' Phaenomena,* 302–3.

This word *videri* is rightly added by reason of the translation of the word as we have said. But this communion was referred unto use:

> *pervium cunctis iter,*
> *communis usus omnium rerum fuit.*6
>
> 6. “Open to all the way, in common was the use of every thing”: Seneca, *Octavia,* 402–3.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Octavia_(play)
>
> *Octavia* is a Roman tragedy that focuses on three days in the year 62 AD during which Nero divorced and exiled his wife Claudia Octavia and married another (Poppaea Sabina). The play also deals with the irascibility of Nero and his inability to take heed of the philosopher Seneca's advice to rein in his passions.
>
> The play was attributed to Seneca, but modern scholarship generally discredits this, since it contains accurate prophecies of both his and Nero’s deaths.[1] **While the play closely resembles Seneca's plays in style, it was probably written some time after Seneca's death in the Flavian period by someone influenced by Seneca and aware of the events of his lifetime.**[2]
>
> https://archive.org/details/cu31924104730209/page/670/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Then it was the Virgin Justitia (Astraea) that goddess of such distinguished reputation amongst the deities commissioned from Heaven, with that sacred trust, ruled the earth with mildness—The human race had never known what wars were, nor had they ever heard the battle-inspiring blasts of the shrill war-trumpet! and the people of those days were unacquainted with the weapons used in battle—**they did not surround their cities with walls—the land was one grand highway, open to all; and the enjoyment of all things was within the reach of and common to everyone—and the smiling earth freely disclosed its fruitful bosom,** and this Parent was happy in having the protection of such contented children.

By reason whereof there was a certain kind of dominion, but universal and indefinite. For God gave all things not to this man or that but to mankind and after that manner many may be wholly lords of the same thing; **but if we take dominion in that signification which it hath at this day it is against all reason, for this includeth a propriety which then no man had.** But that is most aptly spoken:

> *omnia rerum*
> *usurpantis erant.*7
>
> 7. “All things belonged to anyone who could take them”: Avienus, *On Aratus’ Phaenomena,* 301-2.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/grotius-the-free-seas-a-bibliography

The manuscript of Grotius’s reply to Welwod, like that of *De Jure Praedae,* was discovered in 1864 among the de Groot family papers.13

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hakluyt-the-free-sea-hakluyt-trans#lf0450_head_034

Welwod first cites what was said by God to Adam and Eve: “You shall have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, and all the beasts crawling upon the earth.”16 **But this passage has no connection with the question of property, for the ownership which God there confers is universal, not particular, as was properly explained in the *Mare Liberum.* God gave those things not to this person or that person, but to the human race.** For Adam and Eve bore the personality of the whole human race, both because they were the only human beings of that time, and because the line of the human race that was to come was contained in those two as the very cause and principle of being. **Therefore there is no question there of a right which is competent to men against other men, but of one to all men against the lower creatures.**
…

There is no reason, therefore, why Welwod boasts of the authority of Holy Writ, in which there is not the least bit of support for his position. **There is no reason also why in this attack he should escape the testimony of illustrious authorities in favor of the freedom of the sea. For when we have not the divine words, the next best thing to be considered in a question of the law of nations is, what have the different nations decided from ancient times;** and if it is clear that they have held the same opinion, this should be considered as a great argument for truth. For, as Heraclitus rightly said, “the common word is the best criterion, for what seems best to all is trustworthy.”23

Among these [common opinions] **I greatly wonder that that statement of Cicero should be ridiculed, namely, that “there is nothing private by nature,”**24 **since it is of most evident truth. For Cicero does not mean thereby that nature is opposed to ownership, and, as it were, forbids**

anything at all becoming property, but that nature of itself does not cause anything to be property. This can be gathered from the following. Nature produces the rest of things for men, but without distinction, not “this for this one and that for that one.” Therefore, in order that this thing become the property of that man, some deed of the man should intervene, and therefore nature itself does not do this by itself. Hence it is evident that community is prior to property. For property does not occur except through occupation, and before occupation, there must precede the right of occupation. Now this right is not competent to this man or that man, but to all men equally, and is rightly expressed under the term “natural community.” And hence it happens that what has not yet been occupied by any people or by a man is still common, that is, belongs to no one, and open equally to all. By this argument it is surely proved that nothing belongs to anyone by nature.

Another argument can be added, namely, **that necessity, which reduces everything to the natural law, because the mother of positive law is utility which should yield to necessity, makes common again things formerly owned. By this law, if food becomes scarce on board ship, what each one has is gathered together in a common store.**25 **By this law, for the sake of warding off fire, it is licit to cut down neighboring buildings.**26 **Many things of this tenor can be seen in Thomas Aquinas and his interpreters.**27

> https://counter-currents.com/2018/01/christianity-inverted/
>
> Not only is lying acceptable but, according to Rev. Cox, Liguori taught 30 different ways to lie.[36] By way of contrast, the Benedictine monk John Barnes wrote in 1625 that, “You should not lie even to save your life.”[37] For his efforts Liguori was elevated to the sainthood, appointed a Doctor of the Church, promoted to the office of a heavenly patron of confessors and declared a teacher of moral theology. **Six times in his *Homo Apostolicus* and 16 times in *Theologia Moralis* Liguori laid down the principle that as soon as a man is reduced to extreme poverty all goods become common and that the thief has a right to what belongs to others.**[38]
>
> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_022
>
> I would have tried to explain the connection between the doctrine of Adam Smith, that labour is the original source of all wealth, and the conclusion that the producers of wealth virtually compose the nation, by which Sieyès subverted historic France; **and to show that Rousseau’s definition of the social compact as a voluntary association of equal partners conducted Marat, by short and unavoidable stages, to declare that the poorer classes were absolved, by the law of self-preservation, from the conditions of a contract which awarded to them misery and death; that they were at war with society, and had a right to all they could get by exterminating the rich,** and that their inflexible theory of equality, the chief legacy of the Revolution, together with the avowed inadequacy of economic science to grapple with problems of the poor, revived the idea of renovating society on the principle of self-sacrifice, which had been the generous aspiration of the Essenes and the early Christians, of Fathers and Canonists and Friars; of Erasmus, the most celebrated precursor of the Reformation; of Sir Thomas More, its most illustrious victim; and of Fénelon, the most popular of bishops, but which, **during the forty years of its revival, [28th May 1877]** has been associated with envy and hatred and bloodshed, and is now the most dangerous enemy lurking in our path.

Add also the fact that eminent theologians are of the opinion that in the primeval state of Paradise there was no property, that is, as distinct from use, and that there would not have been, had not sin intervened. This can be all the more probably defended, because both the Essenes of old and some peoples in America have made use of community of property, which even now a few congregations make use of, and indeed without great inconvenience. By this example it is proved that the statement, which is usually made and is adduced by Welwod, that “what is common is neglected, that community carries with it difficulty of administration, and that discord even arises therefrom,”28 **is not “absolutely necessary,” but “a result of hypothesis,” since we have taken into consideration the cupidity of men who consult their own interest to the neglect of others. For otherwise, if the human race were of such character as the Christian disciples of the Apostles were in the earliest times, whose hearts and souls were one,**29 **why could there not be observed what was then observed, namely, that nothing belong to anyone, but all things be common?**

Why is it that today even, although amid such great corruption of morals, still we see many things remaining common, not among private individuals only, but likewise among peoples, and not only for many years, but for centuries? **Welwod himself wishes the sea to be common to the citizens of a single people.** Consequently, even from this it is apparent that it has not been always and universally true that the disadvantages of community of ownership are greater than the advantages.

Nor is it unworthy of mention that, shortly after the creation of the world, when the number of the human race was small and living was simpler, that ownership of individual things which is distinct from

use was much less necessary than it is now, than it became afterwards. For a certain necessity of ownership as it were arose from the fact that some things were sufficient for the uses only of a few individuals. Thus we see in arid regions there has been a departure from community of land after competition over wells had arisen. Thus with the increase in the number of cattle, the lands which were common to Abraham and Lot soon began to be divided. **Hence you may without rashness gather that, even after sin entered the world, many things remained common, which by degrees, as the human race grew and the desire for luxuries likewise increased, yielded to individual right.**

I do not regret having said these things incidentally, **in order that it might be evident that those statements, which very estimable authorities have set down with regard to the original community of property, had their origin in truth, whether an inference of reason led them to that conclusion or whether they themselves had transmitted to posterity the story received from their progenitors.** Since all these same authorities relate that by degrees the earth was afterwards divided among many owners, while the sea remained perpetually common to all men, rightly should those who contend to the contrary be suspected of novelty, seeing that out of all antiquity they can not adduce even a single supporter of such unheard of doctrine.
…

For since those things common to all (among which is the sea) are sometimes distinguished from those things which are public and sometimes are called public, **it follows necessarily that the meaning of the word "public" is twofold.** For sometimes the word is properly taken for that which belongs to the people and sometimes in a broader sense to include also those things which belong to the entire human race, by a metaphorical use of the word which is not obscure; **because the human race is like a great people, and hence some philosophers call this world a city and themselves "cosmopolitans."**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/scott-the-freedom-of-the-seas-latin-and-english-version-magoffin-trans#lf0049_head_001

Therefore the distinguished English lawyer, scholar, and publicist, John Selden by name, bestirred himself in behalf of his country and wrote his *Mare Clausum* in 1617 or 1618, although it was not published until 1635, to refute the little tractate, *Mare Liberum*.1 In the dedication to King Charles I, Selden said: "There are among foreign writers, who rashly attribute your Majesty's more southern and eastern sea to their princes. **Nor are there a few, who following chiefly some of the ancient Caesarian lawyers, endeavor to affirm, or beyond reason too easily admit, that all seas are common to the universality of mankind.**"

https://www.hetwebsite.net/het/profiles/coke.htm

Roger Coke was born after 1626, **the grandson of the great English common law jurist, Sir Edward Coke.** Roger Coke was educated at Queen's College, Cambridge, but did not take a degree. Although demonstrating an early aptitude for mathematics, Coke's earliest writings were in political philosophy, notably a treatise against Hobbes (1660).
…

Justice vindicated from the false fucus put upon it by Thomas White, Gent., Mr. Thomas Hobbs and Hugo Grotius, *as also elements of power and subjection, wherein is demonstrated the cause of all humane, Christian, and legal society, and as a previous introduction to these, is shewed, the method by which men must necessarily attain arts & sciences,* 1660

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3wllAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PP31#v=onepage&q&f=false

If I edified but little by Mr. *Hobbs*, yet I received much less satisfaction from *Grotius*; for Mr. *Hobbs* defines his terms so clearly, as to me, he was easily understood; whereas all *Grotius* his Principles are so perplexed, and equivocal, that it is not possible for any Man to understand anything clearly from him. As the first thing in his *Preface*, he confounds, is, *Societas & Communitas*; whereas *Societas* is as different from *Communitas*, as black is from white; *Societas*, according to the definition of *Aristotle*, being *Unum quid ita constans ex diversis personis, ut sit unum quod imperet, alterum quod pareat*. **Society is one thing so made up of divers persons, that one may command, another obey; Whereas community is, where any company of Creatures are, without the offices of commanding and obeying.**
…

Well; *Grotius* says, ***In the beginning of Mankind, Community was another thing then what Dominion now is:*** *For now* Dominium *signifies something proper, which thing (to wit) is so one mans, as it is not anothers in the same manner. We call that thing Common, whose propriety is collated amongst many by a certain consort or consent, excluding other men.* Linguarum paupertas coegit voces easdem in re eadem usurpare: *The poverty of Tongues hath forced men to use the same words in a thing not the same.* ***The Community which then was, was nothing else but what was simply opposed to Property.***

But in his Preface to this Book *De Jure Belli & Pacis, & para*. 3. *lib*. 1. *cap*. 1. He shall not need to complain, that the poverty of Tongues compells him to use the same words, in a thing not the same. For he himself useth things not the same, (viz. *Communitas & Societas*) in the same word, viz. *Communitas*.

Now, that Community and Society is not the same thing: **There is not, nor ever was since the beginning of the world, any Family where men did not live in Society; but in no Family did men ever live in Community. Nor did ever men desire such a Community, as he here, and before in his *Mare Lib.* speaks of;** Nor can Mankind subsist in such a Community; and so he himself confesses. And Man may be therefore not improperly said to be a reasonable creature, because he does not love and affect another because he is of the same kind with himself, (as other creatures who live in companies do) but chooses his society, as his Reason or conversation leads him.

But this Community (he says) which Man desires, *is not of whatsoever Community, but of peaceable, and ordained for the manner of his understanding, with them who are of his own kind: which Community the Stoicks called οἰχείωσιν.*

Does any Creature that lives in flocks and herds, not desire the community of its own kind? and therefore Hogs, Deer, and Goats keep in herds, and Sheep in flocks. **Or does any man think that *Grotius* could ever imagine, that his Countrimen did desire Society or Community with other Nations for their Understanding, or Profit?**
…

When he is got loose from these Principles, he then saies, ***But this keeping of society, which in a rude manner we have expressed convenient to humane intellect, is the fountain of that right or law* (ejus juris) *which is properly so called,*** *by which abstinence from what is anothers, obligation to perform promises, reparation for wrong done &c. do appertain.*

But sure the Man does much forget himself; **for in this Community he here speaks of, there can be no *meum* or *tuum*, and therefore no *alienum*, and by consequence no *alieni abstinentia*;** nor can any Man perform any promise, who can have nothing wherewith to perform; nor make reparation for wrong, when he can neither do any, nor has any thing to repair it withall.
…

These things therefore granted, and being the easie, and known Principles upon which *Grotius* laies his foundation, and so plain and perspicuous, as no exception, nay not so much as equivocation can be taken against them, any of them, or any part of them; Sure he shall not need much to use the help of Geometry, to build a most exact and noble Structure, which shall not only be a Land-mark, but also a Sea-mark for all Kings and Commonwealths, now and hereafter to govern and steer their actions by *tam per mare, quam per terram*, as well by Land as Sea; **but also a secure Rule for Subjects to continue their obedience, until they pretend a necessity for rebellion; if otherwise they cannot find some relief out of such popular Orators as *Cicero, Demosthenes, Cleon, &c*. which *Grotius* shall esteem of like weight with any testimony of Scripture.**

It is a most pleasant thing to see the excellencie of Truth in her pure and simple nakedness, how plain, easie, and beautiful she appears: whereas Falshood, with all the art, learning and industry of man, is still rendred more perplext, confused and dark, by how much is added to it.

And therefore to what a volume here has *Grotius* increased his *Jus Naturale!*
…

Whereas if he had made use of that plain and short Sentence, which the greatest Glory of all the Heathen Roman Emperors professed he learned of the Christians, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, ne feceris alteri*; **it would have signified infinitely more, then is contained in all the confused obscurity which he imposes upon the world in this Book *De Jure Belli & Pacis*, found upon this false and feigned Principle of the *Original right and power of the People*, from whence he derives all power in Government.**
…

Well, but let us see why *Jus Naturale* is immutable by God himself. **(Note, *Grotius* everywhere almost confounds *Jus* with *Lex*; and here he takes *Jus Naturale*, for *Lex Naturae*.)** For, *Although* (says he) *the power of God is immense, yet some things may be said to be, to which it does not extend it self; because those things so said, are only said, and have no sense which may express the thing, but are repugnant to themselves: So that twice Two should not make Four, cannot be effected by God.*

It is true, that God cannot make contradictory things, and things repugnant to agree, and to be the same. But this is nothing to *Grotius* his purpose, for a Similitude proves nothing; nor is there any analogie between the things propounded by *Grotius*: For though things simply necessary be immutable by God, yet the Law of Nature is the Law of God; and therefore being a creature of God's, it cannot have any obligation upon God; but being the Law of God given to Mankind, it is immutable by them; **and God might, if it pleased him, have given something else for the Law of Nature to Mankind.** Both *Grotius* his Positions therefore in this Section are manifestly false, absurd, and blasphemous, viz. *That the Law of Nature is immutable by God himself*; And, *That* Usus communis *is* Jure naturali, *and yet mutable by the will of Man.*

And if I be demanded to shew an example, that God is not obliged to the Law of Nature, or that the Law of Nature is not immutable by God: I say, *Jus suum cuique tribuere*, is from the Law of Nature; yet did the Children of Israel borrow Jewels of gold, of silver, and raiment of the Egyptians, and all such things as they required of them, and spoiled them by not making restitution, without any violence upon the Law of Nature, because God commanded them; nay, they had sinned and disobeyed God, if they had not done it.
...

Yet can no man borrow, with a resolution of not-restitution; nor any Father put his Son without cause to death, where God does not command, though all the world should command it, without a violence upon the Law of Nature. Nay I say, the Laws of Nature being eternal, **there was never any time when men ought not to give every man his due; and so by consequence, no time when *Grotius* his *Usus communis* was, since Men were born; but ever since Men were in the world, Dominion and property have been.** *Cain* had his Fruit of the Tillage of the ground, and *Abel* had his Flock and the Firstlings of his Flock; neither of which could be, if *Grotius* his *Usus communis* had been.

But you may say, Property presupposes humane Laws, which must give it; and humane Laws must happen in succession of time: **And that therefore before these humane Laws were, there could be no Property, and by consequence, all things were common and undivided.**

For the satisfying of this doubt, we must consider that God, in the Creation, only created one Man, and out of him made Woman; and that ever since no Man was ever made, but the species of Mankind hath been continued by generation. **I grant that all things were common to *Adam* (except the forbidden fruit;)** but no Man that was ever born into the world (and not a Posthumous King) who was not born into subjection to humane laws. **Nor did ever *Adam* derive this Legislative right which he had over his Wife and Children, by any Pact, Contract, or Submission of his Wife and Children; but had it from God, because he was first made. It is therefore manifestly false, which these men beg, *That by Nature all Men are equal, and that the will of Man brought in Dominion.*** Nor do these men shew out of any sacred or prophane History, that ever Dominion was brought in by Man, or that Men had things common and undivided among them.
...

And so in the instance which *Grotius* gives, a Debtor is by the law of nature obliged to pay his Creditor: but this Debt being paid, the particular cause ceasing, the obligation of the law of nature ceases also. What need therefore was there of *Arrianus* his Greek out of *Epictetus*, to prove a prime and necessary truth, **which is of more authority then forty *Arrianuses*, and all the Greek in *Epictetus*, *Grotius*, and all his Authors and Poets to boot?**

Grotius goes on: *So if God commands any man to be killed, or to take away any thing that is anothers; It is not lawful that Murder or Theft be done, which terms involve vice; but it is not Murder or Theft which is done by God, the Author of life and all things.*

They say, *Nulla similitudo quatuor pedibus currit*. I am sure this similitude runs not upon one foot, for in this last the particular cause remains, whereas in the former it is taken away; **and if the law of nature be immutable by God, and *Thou shalt not kill or steal*, be from the law of nature, then it is Murder and Theft, although commanded by God. Thus hath *Grotius* instead of clearly propounding his principles and orderly reasoning from them, thatched a company of equivocal and contradictory principles, with Poets and Authors brought in by head and heels;** so as not any one proposition is clearly stated and disputed, but the whole Treatise most perplexed and unsignificant thing.

God conferred upon Mankind generally, Jus (*Right) immediately after the Creation; and again when the world was repaired after the flood, over all the things of this inferior nature.* ***There were, as* Justin *saies, all things common and undivided to all men, even as one Patrimony should be to all Men.*** *God was pleased peculiarly to give rights* (dare jura) *to one only people, viz. the* Hebrews.

Which is absurd and impossible by the ninth Notion of the first Book of *Euclid*, *viz*. a part equal to the whole; the *Hebrews* not being all mankind, but a part.

Grotius goes on, *Hence it came to pass that every man gathered whatsoever he could snatch to their own uses, and consume what could be consumed; and whatsoever any man had so snatched, that could no man take from him, but by injury: but this State could not long continue.*

How's this? This is more monstrous and absurd then the other: what, God gave a Right to Mankind, and that so immutable that it is unalterable by God himself, and yet not possible long to continue!

To prove this first Common Right of all things common and undivided to Mankind, he refers to *Gen*. 1.29.30. *And God said, I have given ὑμῖν* (the Septuagint has it *to you* in the plural number, when *Adam* only was created*) every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of the earth, and every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yeelding seed, to you it shall be for meat, &c*. Now how could God speak to *Adam* in the plural number, when *Adam* only was created? It is said *verse* 27. *So God created* Adam *in his own image, in the Image of God made he Man, Male and Female created he them*: And therefore God speaks here to *Adam* and *Eve*. **Now whether God gave this Right to *Adam* and *Eve* in Community to both alike, as *Grotius* would have it, or to *Eve* in subordination to Adam, I refer it to any Christian Man to judge.** *Let the Woman learn in silence*

with all subjection, &c. and the reason the Apostle giveth is, *Man was first made, then Eve*. But suppose that God gave this Right not only to *Adam* and *Eve*, but to all Mankind in *Adam* and *Eve*; yet by the authority of the Holy Ghost had *Adam* dominion over all Mankind, because *Adam* was first made, and therefore God at the Creation of Man made Government with Mankind.

Let us see whether *Grotius* has any better luck with his common and undivided Right of all things, &c. immediately from the time of the world repaired after the flood; which to prove, he refers to *Gen*. 9.2.3. *And the feare (ὑμῶν) of you, and the dread of you shall be upon every beast, &c. every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you, even as the green herb have I given you all things.*

Now then; **if this were not given to *Noah* his Wife, and *Noahs* Children in subordination to *Noah*, but as *Grotius* would have it, in community, to all alike;** then had *Sem* as much Right to all things as *Noah*, *Ham* as *Sem*, *Japheth* as *Ham*, *Sems* wife was an intercommoner with *Noah*, *Ham* with *Japheths* wife, and *Noahs* wife with them all, **(if this be true, Mr. *Hobbs* makes *Noahs* Sons in an ill case, where he saies, *filium in statu naturali intelligi non posse*, no Son can be understood in the state of nature, and *Sem*, *Ham*, and *Japheth* are Bastards, and not *Noahs* Sons.)** Well, if *Noah* and his Wife, his Son and their Wives had all things in common, that is, every one of them get what they could snatch to their own uses, and consume what might be consumed; from whence did *Noah* snatch his Vineyard, and drank the wine thereof untill he was drunken? If you beleeve *Grotius*, it was *Sems* Vineyard as much as *Noahs*; *Japheths* Wives as much as *Sems*, and *Hams* Wife had as much right to it as any body else. Poor *Noah*, thou hast taken great pains here to little purpose if *Hugo* be thy judge.

Well, Mr. *Hobbs*, rather then he will run upon *Scylla*, shall split himself against *Charybdis*? **and he makes *jus* to be the same thing with *libertas, and the foundation of* juris naturalis *to be, that every Man as much as he can, may defend his life and members.* And, *Natura dedit unicuique jus in omnia*. *Grotius* saies, *Erant omnia communia & indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium.* Which is all one and the same thing, differently expressed.**

Thus far these Wits jump; we shall see them far enough asunder by and by. **But Mr. *Hobbs* no where tells us, when this *Jus Naturale* was in the world; (sure it was when Apes could speak, and Owls sing.)** They both agree too, that this was a time when there was no Government, or subordination of Men (nor Women, for ought I can find) under one another; before Men had made Government, by giving up their will to any Man, or Court. Mr. *Hobbs* calls this time, *Status mere naturalis*: *Grotius*, *Status qui durare non potuit*. A little before he says, *Quod quisque arripuerat, id ei eripere alter nisi per injuriam non poterat*. Mr. *Hobbs* says, *It was not at all profitable to Men, that they had such a common Right in all things; for the effect of that Right is almost the same, as if there had been no Right at all: For although a Man might say of every thing, This is mine; yet he could not enjoy it because of his Neighbour, who with equal right, and force* (here the Wits begin to disagree) *might pretend the same thing to be his*. Nay, Mr. *Hobbs* goes further, and is so far from supposing it an injury to take any thing from any Man, in the state of pure Nature, that he makes this state *hostile, and that Men may kill one another, and yet do them no injury*. And the reason he gives for it, is, *That injury is done only to him, with whom we have made a Contract; otherwise it is only damage any Man can do to another*.

Here we see these Wits plainly to differ; next bout we shall see them removed as far as *Gades* is from *Ganges*.
...

He almost every where makes a great stir with *populus, & populus vult, & populus mutare potest voluntatem expresse, & tacite*; but never (that I can any where find) defines, what the People is. If he had said the People of *Rome*, or the People of *Athens*, or the People of *Syracuse*, he had said something, though nothing to his purpose. **For when a Man speaks of the People of *Rome*, or *Athens*, &c. he speaks not formally of Men, as born in the *Roman* or *Athenian* territories; but as men who were *civitate donati*, which it may be were not the tenth part of the *Romans*, or *Athenians*; nor were ever the *Roman*, *Athenian*, or *Syracusan* People, free People *jure naturali* (as he saies) but by Civil sanction,** having made themselves so, unjustly usurping dominion over the rest in their Tyranny and Dominions. It cannot be then that *Grotius* means by People, such People as were the *Romans* or *Athenians*: If by People he means any thing in the world, for above this 1700 years, there have not been any such upon the face of the earth (if the Inhabitants of *Switzerland* be not such, who taking advantage from the remiss Government of *Wenceslaus*, having beaten the Archduke *Leopoldus* about the year 1400, made themselves a Democracy, and have almost ever since continued Mercenary Man-killers to the interests of the Pope, the kings of *France* and *Spain*.) ***Grotius* then not meaning such people, as were the *Romans*, &c. I cannot imagine what he should mean by People, unless he means Men, Women, and Children of all ages and conditions, all of them in a parity or equal condition, abstracted from all Laws of God, or Man;** and what a Harmony of Confessions would arise from such a rout, any sober wise Man may judge? Thus much for his *populus*.

Well, but be the People what it will, a beast, or no beast, a thing, or nothing; it is from its will, all right of reigning proceeds, a *cujus voluntate jus regnandi proficiscitur*.
...

Besides, for ought he knows, or can find by *Cicero*, *Tacitus*, *Demosthenes*, *Cleon*, or any tale told by any Poet, the time when *Jacob* lived and died, was then when all things were common and undivided; and how then could *Jacob* disinherit *Ruben*?
...

1. Herein do all my three Adversaries and I differ: They all say, that by Nature all men are in a like equal condition, and out of society, until by voluntary pacts and acts of their will they shall have formed themselves into society. **I say, that Men are by Nature born into society and subordination.** To warrant this, I have not only the consent of the present Age, but the constant practice of all Ages in the world, **from the testimonies of all Prophane and Sacred History;** and that not only since the Flood, but before, if God made Adam an universal Monarch, as well over his wife and children, as over all other creatures; and that that there was a constant succession of the Patriarchs in the First-born, from Seth to Noah.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3wllAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=RA2-PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is the silliest thing in the world for men to dream of a Golden age, in which all things were alike and common to all men, and that men lived promiscuously in a parity or equal condition; *and never tell when that time was, or who lived therein: And to say that the Dominion and Subjection now in use, Mans will brought in; and yet never tell who, any where in the world, did ever introduce it.* ***And sure if this commanding and obeying were brought in by wills of men, against that natural right and law wherein God hath made man, it could not possibly continue at all times and in all places of the world, but that somewhere men would return to their own natural liberty.***
...

12. **If, as *Grotius* affirmeth, the state of Man had been *Jure naturali* in a parity or promiscuous condition immediately after the Flood, and that this *Jus naturale* be immutable by God himself;** and that this Dominion which is now in use, the will of Man brought in, and that not the will of the party commanding, but in subjection: **It had been a very vain curse in *Noah* (or rather of God by *Noah*) to have cursed *Chanaan*, and made him *a servant of servants to his brethren*;** or that God should bless both *Sem* and *Japheth*, and make *Chanaan* a servant to them both.

https://www.academia.edu/299389/Rousseaus_Political_Philosophy_Stoic_and_Augustinian_Origins

Grotius was more than a generation younger than Lipsius, writing at a time when the restatement of arguments drawn from ancient Scepticism was becoming extremely popular, and these arguments were being formulated with great skill and devastating results.21 In particular, the exploration of much of the non-European world was nurturing the varieties of moral relativism that often accompany the serious contemplation of cultural difference. **Grotius's distinctive contribution to modern moral philosophy – hailed by the eighteenth-century scholar Jean Barbeyrac as his "breaking the ice" of medieval moral philosophy**22 – was to claim that the natural *instinct* towards self-preservation served to ground a natural *right* of self-preservation, and that this natural right could be used as the foundation of a universally valid, nonrelativistic moral code. **It might not be surprising that he used a Stoic idea to ground a post-Sceptical philosophy, for the Stoics had been the most sustained opponents of the ancient Sceptics and had fashioned their conceptual tools in opposition to Scepticism. (René Descartes would follow suit, using the "clear and distinct idea" – a variant of the Stoics' *phantasia kataleptike* – as his chief epistemological weapon against Sceptical doubt.)** Although Grotius drew carefully on Stoic arguments in fashioning this ethical theory, he stressed that none of the ancient schools would have objected to his emphasis on the right of self-preservation: **"For on this point, the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Peripatetics are in complete agreement, and apparently even the Academics have entertained no doubt."**23
...

In restating the Augustinian doctrine of two antithetical loves in uncompromising terms and deliberately locating Stoic philosophy on the prideful, self-loving, anti-God side of the stark binaries, the Augustinians assembled all the elements that were needed for a powerful attack on the Grotian enterprise, even if they did not make it themselves. **Of all the Augustinian writers, it was Blaise Pascal who drew the connection between Augustinian self-love and Stoic *oikeiosis* most explicitly in a fragment that simply runs, "Thus we are born unjust, for each inclines towards himself."**46 If Grotius became notorious for his claim that his theory would be valid even if we were to grant (*etiam daremus*) that there is no God, it would seem to be the case in light of this objection **that his theory most obviously loses all of its force if there is in fact a God and if He should turn out to be a French Augustinian.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/liberty-matters-knud-haakonssen-pufendorf-on-power-and-liberty#response2

Grotius endorses and remains loyal to a very truncated but nonetheless real part of Aristotelianism; Hobbes identifies the Aristotelian philosophy as part of the "kingdom of darkness".[6] That difference is reflected in turn in several divergences in their political philosophies overall and in their natural-law doctrines in particular. The largest difference probably is the most trite but is nonetheless of great importance: Grotius maintains a version of the Aristotelian claim that "man is by nature a political animal." For Grotius that claim persists in the modified form of "man is the social animal" or the "rationally sociable animal." **On the Aristotelian maxim Grotius accepts in modified form Hobbes comments: "this axiom, though very widely accepted, is nonetheless false; the error proceeds from a superficial view of human nature (*De Cive*, 1.2).**

In place of rational sociality Hobbes places his extraordinarily individualistic doctrine, to which both Grotius and Pufendorf object. Natural law is accordingly quite differently derived in the two thinkers. For Grotius human beings are by nature sociable beings and the natural law is what conduces to social life. As the law of human nature, it contains all the necessary marks of law, including especially obligatoriness. **Compared to the understanding of natural law in the Thomistic tradition, this is a narrow view, limited as it is to society and its requirements. But compared to Hobbes it is very robust.** Among other important

implications of Grotius's doctrine is the relation between right and law so far as these come to be distinguished in his theory. **Law and therefore duty is the primary concept, and derivative from that is right (as the claim an individual may raise under law).**
…

According to Hobbes right is genuinely natural and exists in "a state of mere nature"; it serves as the basis from which laws, even the laws of nature, are derived. But contrary to Grotius, **Hobbes describes the laws of nature as "but conclusions, or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves,"** i.e., conduces to that to which, under the right of nature, human beings have a right. The laws of nature make men more sociable, but they are in the service of the individualistic "conservation and defence of themselves" (*Leviathan*, ch. 15 end). He has also said that these "dictates of reason" which he has called laws of nature are improperly so called. They are but "conclusions or theorems." His point is that they are neither natural nor law. **They are no more natural than, e.g., genetically modified food, which serves a human natural need but for all that is not thereby natural.**

http://leostrausstranscripts.uchicago.edu/navigate/10/15/

Grotius of course did not know modern natural right because it came in after his time. That is not quite correct—someone reminded me of the fact that Grotius had read Hobbes's *De cive*. Can you find the passage and read it?

Student: This is in a letter to his brother dated April 11, 1643.

LS: *De cive* appeared in 1642.

Student: He writes:

> "My brother, our interpretations of prophetic passages in the reading of the Bible we will affirm for the time being. Meanwhile, I ask friends to suspend their judgment. **I have seen the book, *On the Citizen*, and those things are pleasing which the author speaks in behalf of kings.** The fundamentals, however, on which he constructs his thoughts I cannot accept. **He argues that war exists by nature among all men and holds other such views not harmonious with our own, for he believes in the duty of the private citizen to follow the religion accepted in the country, if not by assent, at least by compliance.** These and other such things I cannot accept. I do not consider the book to be venal, but prying. I will be glad if the cause of the king is thus defended, as it ought to be, on which subject I have written some appropriate remarks."

…

Grotius was how old at that time? In the fifties at least, **and a very big shot, what they call now a pundit.** And he reads this book by a completely unknown man. Was *De Cive* anonymously published? I do not know at the moment. And he reads it and then he looks at this young man who was already also fifty and sees [a teaching that is] in some respects surely quite sound, but he goes a bit too far in his giving power to the secular authorities regarding the church. **It is a bit too far right in this respect, if we apply this simple schema. And then of course the starting point: fear and not benevolence is the foundation of all lasting societies.** That's quite terrible and unacceptable, but since it leads up to such a pleasant view as favorable to kings, he won't take it too seriously. **It is like the *National Review* not minding atheists in the case of Ayn Rand so much because she comes up on the side of capitalism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT100#v=onepage&q&f=false

If the publication of *De Cive* had begun to drive a wedge between Hobbes and his Anglican Royalist friends on the basis of his religious beliefs, the reception of his work between 1648 and the appearance of *Leviathan* in the spring of 1651, eventually served to confirm the worst fears of those, like Bramhall and Clarendon, who had seen in Hobbes's contract theory the potential for a dangerously conditional account of allegiance. It is, however, important to stress that it was far from evident to other early readers of the second edition of *De Cive* that Hobbes's theory was subversive. Indeed, the earliest political discussion on his work tended to revolve around what was perceived to be his excessive Royalism. Ironically, it would be this identification that would ultimately encourage republicans to trumpet the ambivalence of his political theory as they gleefully deployed the theory of a notorious Royalist to undermine Royalism itself. As historians have now come to recognise, one certainly didn't need to have read Hobbes to talk about issues of allegiance in terms of natural jurisprudence. **In July 1648, Anthony Ascham produced the first edition of his celebrated *Discourse*,**179 **the first major treatment of what has become known as 'de factoism,' or the doctrine that obedience is owed to those with *de facto* authority, even if their rule is not *de jure*. Ascham's suggestion that obedience is owed to those that can protect us, and correspondingly is not owed in situations where such protection is at an end, sounds superficially Hobbesian, but as several commentators have noted, the analytical framework within which Ascham makes these claims seems to be derived from Grotius,** with un-Hobbesian concessions to accounts of right reason and

God's providence. There is no evidence that at this stage Ascham had either read *De Cive* or the *Elements,*180 or that he needed to have read him in order to come up with this sort of conclusion. Indeed, when *De Cive* did enter discussion, it was to be the object of criticism for its absolutism.

The occasion for this debate was a pamphlet published by Hammond in mid-January 1649, which rehearsed the Royalist argument that once individuals had parted with their natural liberty they were indissolubly bound to obedience to a sovereign empowered by God with a right of life and death. **In the wake of the regicide, Hammond's claims were attacked by supporters of the new regime.** In May a writer with the pseudonym Eutactus Philodemius181 published a pamphlet called *The original and end of civil power*, in which he rejected Hammond's one-way account of rights transfer and defended the idea of popular sovereignty. Part of the discussion focused on property rights, considered by Eutactus to be natural rights that should not be violated by arbitrary authorities. **Hobbes was accused of committing 'an intellectual rape upon nature' for his suggestion that property rights are grounded in contracts rather than nature itself, a position that Eutactus seems to identify with the absolutists he opposed.**182

…

In citing both Grotius and Hobbes on the conditional character of obedience, Ascham may well have been deliberately mischievous because he goes on to attack both authors for their willingness to 'argue severall ways for obliging people to one perpetuall and standing Allegiance.'186 **Ascham's earlier references to *De Cive* fit into a broader strategy to convict both Hobbes and Grotius of fundamental inconsistencies in their absolutist theories. As they had both admitted, *de facto* obligations *are* at an end when conquest has occurred or sovereignty has been abdicated.**

…

Hammond had used Grotius to support the idea of irrevocable transfer; Hobbes's *De Cive* appeared to fall into the same category. **Ascham had shown that they could be refuted on their own premises** and even used to support a *de facto* theory like his own.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vx75FeIRcRYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR18#v=onepage&q&f=false

Moreover, **if the imposition premise is a defining feature of a school of natural law, then Grotius is not a member, yet Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and their modern commentators take him to be the founder.** Grotius wrote *On the laws of war and peace* (1625) prior to the publications of the Mersenne circle. In addition, **he advances a dispositional account of human agency and a form of natural law realism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false

Then [Pufendorf] addresses at length the merits and failings of the two methodologies most likely to produce a science of natural law, the mathematical method of Weigel, and the sociological approach of Grotius.

> In my view there are two routes presented here, and it may be understood after following one of these who has constituted philosophical schools correctly: **the followers of the first route are above all mathematicians, who love to derive a huge body of conclusions from a few first principles;** the second way is trodden by those eager to investigate natural phenomena so that through observation and comparison of many individual instances they may finally arrive at some general statement.43

He launches a vigorous attack against the Grotian technique of observing the customs and laws of selected countries in order to extract eternal principles of natural law. **This approach was open to all sorts of sceptical objections.** First, the technique of amassing instances could easily be ridiculed by the citation of counter-examples outside the experience of the observer: 'You will find few who can boast of knowing the number and names of all the peoples in the world: it would be beyond the powers of one man to assemble or comprehend all their laws and institutions.'44 **The method could also be impugned on grounds of cultural imperialism, for the positive laws of European countries are inevitable accorded importance at the expense of the legislative product of oriental countries: 'From this one may rightly infer that many laws which we consider to be handed down to us through nature, are not in fact strictly essential to human society.'**45 Grotius' method is not without value as a useful contribution to the study of *Jus Gentium*; but as a method for extracting the essence of natural law it must be firmly rejected:

> It is not, as some may say, that we should not be concerned about barbarian peoples. It is sufficient for our purpose to consider those conventions observed by the more moral peoples: from comparison of these some complete system of the law of nations can be compiled. But apart from the fact that this is a huge undertaking, **who can clearly judge which race should be categorised among the barbarian and which among the civilised peoples?**46

…

Böcler's contention was simply that Pufendorf's claim to be the successor to Grotius was vitiated by his reluctance to examine the process of historical reference that had been a crucial means to the creation of Grotius' book. If he had done this he would not have made the mistake of claiming priority for a concept of the fundament of natural law which was in fact Cicero's – an antecedent recognised and integrated by Grotius:

> **He writes that in his undertaking there is no help to be had from good writers, a view one might marvel at, if one does not recognise how massively and variously his talent is dependent on the best reasonings of Grotian argument … If the *socialitas* of human nature is Pufendorf's first principle, then he ought to know first of all that it is not the fruit of his own talent, but that Cicero in his *de officiis* and others, even before Theognis was known, sought to extract all the precepts of law and duty from this source.**59

Böcler was in a position to dogmatise on this issue because he had spent so much of his career using his vast erudition in ancient philosophy to track down unacknowledged references in Grotius: his 1663 edition of book one of *De Jure Belli* was essentially a compilation of these ascriptions, and in his preface he insists on Cicero's importance in the sequence of disguised indebtedness he had unearthed:

> The whole glory of the Latin philosophers is represented in Cicero, whose two works (the *de legibus* and especially the *de officiis*) can speak volumes on this subject … Grotius is indebted at many points to these books, even when he does not show it.60

In his commentary on section ix of Grotius' 'Prolegomena' to *De Jure Belli* (the section that identifies the basis of natural law in the Stoic concept of *oikeiosis*), he is quite explicit in attributing the derivation of Grotius' doctrine to sources in antiquity. It is this perception which provides the context for his exasperation at Pufendorf's alleged innovations:

> **But Grotius' view on the origin of natural law, which he sets out in his Prolegomena, should not be broken up or mutilated.** For he says that natural law arises from a noble desire for society, and through the judgement of right reason indicating conformity or disharmony with human nature, and even from divine will, which is not only part of nature, but also (as Christians know very well) renewed in the Decalogue and revealed clearly by writings. Many of these points stem from Cicero, **and Cicero took them from the Stoics above all, although Aristotle and Plato were of a like mind.**61

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA84#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this respect Pufendorf was entirely correct to identify Grotius and Hobbes as his crucial predecessors, **since both had forced their opponents to fight them on new ground of their own choosing: Grotius, by insisting that the source of natural law must be located in a principle to which all nations could assent to irrespective of religious affiliation; and Hobbes, by his contention that the individual is capable of creating his own moral world from his personal psychological calculations.**
…

It is indicative of how far orthodox natural law was forced back on to the defensive that Leibniz never systematised his thoughts on natural law, restricting himself to brief, if acute, observations on the defects of Hobbes and Grotius. Likewise, it is revealing that for all his scriptural ingenuity, Alberti's concept of *status integritatis* essentially conceded his enemy's case: for, by trying to prove the survival into the modern world of a pre-lapsarian morality, he effectively admitted that the argument was to be resolved not in the studies of theology and metaphysics, but in the empirical field of the actual historical behaviour of human societies as recorded in the Bible. **While it is very easy to talk of 'paradigm shifts' in the history of ideas, in this instance there seems no other appropriate label to describe the innovative formulations of the science of natural law that Pufendorf inherited and brought to final form.**
…

Pufendorf thus combines the central insights of Grotius and Hobbes within the same theory of natural law, a fact which Überweg has remarked upon with precision:

> His interpretation of natural law is essentially defined in relation to Grotius and Hobbes, **in that he takes over from the former the principle of sociability, from the latter the interest of the individual, and unites them in the principle that sociability lies in the interest of every individual.**70

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q&f=false

This Grotian doctrine of an underlying general legal truth that pre-dates sovereignty and the state was to become a powerful element in the Brothers De La Court's, and Spinoza's, breaking of Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty and their replacing it with the irreversible "carry-over" of basic democratic rights and freedoms into the state.32

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA51#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **In places, Tindal cited Grotius; but this struck critics as just another ploy rather than an authentic derivation (though Grotius *was* actually a significant source for republican "carry over" of the basic freedoms from the state of nature into civil society).**61

https://www.academia.edu/19876318/Stoicism_on_the_Threshold_of_the_Scottish_Enlightenment

Against those like Richard Tuck who would read Grotius as offering a "minimal" ethic—possibly even an "Epicurean" ethic rooted in self-interest or minimal sociability17—**it seems to me we need to take very seriously not only those bits of the text where Grotius says that he's engaging with Cicero and the Stoics, but also the idea**

that the distinctive elements of his theory—thin sociability and the fetishisation of actually-existing property rights—are precisely what you get when you work closely with Cicero on this score.

And it is in the face of Hobbes's provocative publications—*De Cive* and *Leviathan*—that his critics remind themselves of this Stoic foundation; **Tim Hochstrasser has explored the correspondence in Pufendorf's circle, for example, as they excavated the Stoic foundations of the Grotian project while considering the best way to reply to Hobbes;**18 and Jon Parkin's new book on the reception of Hobbes outlines the way in which Hobbes became labeled as an Epicurean—and I'll quote at length here from the end of chapter two, because he does such a good job of covering the relevant ground in a thoroughly efficient manner. Here's Parkin:

> **From the late 1650s onwards Hobbes would be cast as a disreputable imitator of classical and more modern Continental Epicureanism.** Given the difficulty of establishing exactly what Hobbes was in philosophical terms this characterisation supplied a simple answer, 'deciding' his paradoxical arguments in favour of traditions with which contemporaries were more familiar. **Hobbes's complex argument would be regularly reduced to the caricatured anti-providential hedonism with which Epicureanism was commonly associated.** This identification was also useful to Hobbes's critics because of the battery of anti-Epicurean arguments available in Cicero's works, particularly *De natura deorum* and *De finibus*. If Hobbes was really an Epicurean, then all one needed to do was to quote Cicero's anti-Epicurean characters against *Leviathan*. **This classical mode of argument also carried with it additional benefits for those who might be worried about Hobbes's proximity to their own discourse;** by redefining Hobbes as an Epicurean it was possible to put some clear classical water between *Leviathan* and one's own argument. For these reasons, the presentation of Hobbes as a disreputable Epicurean became a recurrent feature of anti-Hobbes works. Robert Sharrock's suggestively titled *De officiis* (1660) would attack Hobbes using a large dose of Cicero. Charles Wolseley in 1669 would redefine Hobbes almost exclusively as an Epicurean atheist, Richard Cumberland's 1672 refutation of Hobbes would rely heavily upon a Ciceronian stoic critique of Hobbes's Epicureanism, and right at the end of the century Richard Bentley's celebrated Boyle Lectures of 1692 would deploy exclusively anti-Epicurean arguments against Hobbes. **In all of these cases, the authors had good reason to ensure that Hobbes's complexity and relationship to their own position was flattened out in a blanketing use of the anti-Epicurean critique.**19

Thats all from Parkin; but we can immediately see how the renewed anti-Epicurean polemic makes a fairly bland, generic or Ciceronian Stoicism look quite good, as theistic (rather than atheistic), political (rather than apolitical), sociable (rather than unsociable), providential (rather than atoms-in-a-void), and so on; **an ideology supported by the continuing presence of Cicero's Stoic-inflected works like *De Officiis* on all the educational curricula, and the rise to influence of anti-Calvinist Latitudinarian theology and theologians in the C. of E., who do seem to have been rather attracted to what I think of as this soft Roman Stoicism.**20

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Some_Thoughts_Concerning_Education/When_Grammar_should_be_taught%3F#Part_I

Section 186. **When he has pretty well digested Tully's Offices, and added to it, Puffendorf de Officio Hominis & Civis, it may be seasonable to set him upon Grotius de Jure Belli & Pacis, or, which perhaps is the better of the two, Puffendorf de Jure naturali & Gentium;** wherein he will be instructed in the natural rights of men, and the original and foundations of society, and the duties resulting from thence. This general part of civil-law and history, are studies which a gentleman should not barely touch at, but constantly dwell upon, and never have done with.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Wilson_(founding_father)

One of the most prominent lawyers of his time, Wilson was the most learned of the Framers of the Constitution.[19] He was one of the most prolific speakers at the Constitutional Convention, with James Madison's notes indicating that Wilson spoke 168 times, second only in number to Gouverneur Morris.[20][21]
...

Wilson became the first professor of law at the College of Philadelphia in 1790 – only the second at any academic institution in the United States.[67] Wilson mostly ignored the practical matters of legal training; like many of his educated contemporaries, he viewed the academic study of law as a branch of a general cultured education, rather than solely as a prelude to a profession.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_head_095

While men were few, and the supplies of every thing were abundant, it is probable that many things were possessed and used in common. With regard to the possession and use of some things, however, this could never be strictly the case. In the fruit plucked or gathered by one for his subsistence; in the spot which he occupied for his shelter or repose; in the bow which he has made for ensuring his safety, or procuring his subsistence; in the skin which he has obtained by his skill and swiftness in the chace, and which covers his body from the inclemency of the weather, **he gains a high degree of exclusive right; and of this right he cannot be dispossessed without a proportioned degree of injustice.** "A publick theatre," says Cicero,e with his usual luminous propriety, "is common to all the citizens; but the seat which each occupies may, during the entertainment, be denominated his own." **But, in the early period of society, concerning which we now speak, things, in general, would be viewed as belonging equally to all;** in other words, to those who should first have occasion to use or possess them.

In this situation, we have reason to believe, society continued after the deluge, while "the whole earth was of one language and of one speech."f On the confusion of languages, and the dispersion of families, when mankind dwelt no longer in "the same plain,"g this general society was dissolved, and no one subject of property could, in this new situation, be reasonably deemed as belonging equally to all. The different families and associations, however, who diverged from the common centre of emigration, would still consider many things, and particularly the country in which they commenced their new settlements, as common to each family or association.

> f. Gen. xi. 1. Erant omnia communia et indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. 1 Just. l. 43. c. 1.

…

Even after agriculture became known and was practised in some imperfect degree, still the land continued to be the common property of the association. **Cecrops, who emigrated from civilized Egypt, was the first to teach the wandering hunters or shepherds of Attica to unite in villages of husbandmen. After their union, their agricultural labours were carried on in common; and the soil, together with its immediate productions, corn, and wine, and oil, were regarded as a common property.i**

…

But agriculture, and the industry attendant on agriculture, introduced gradually a new scene of things, and a new train of sentiments. This first of arts was not unknown to the restorer of mankind. Noah, after the deluge, began to be a husbandman, and he planted a vineyard.s **Before the confusion of languages, the whole human race dwelt in the plain of Shinar.** In that plain and its neighbourhood, the knowledge of agriculture was never entirely lost. Among the Babylonians, it is traced to the most early periods of their history.

…

When agriculture was once introduced, and its utility was known and experienced; it became natural to search and adopt the measures necessary for distinguishing possessions permanently; that every one who laboured and who excelled in this fundamental profession, might be secured in enjoying the fruits of his labours and his improvements.

---

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/222/mode/2up?view=theater

To begin with, the very pretense that there was a pre-social state of nature in which every individual was free to do what he liked is **antithetical both to the Christian natural law tradition and to the commonsense notion that the first society was and is the family.**

> https://biblehub.com/genesis/3-23.htm
>
> **Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken.**
>
> https://biblehub.com/genesis/4-2.htm
>
> **And she again bare his brother Abel. And Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/decive4.htm

IV. **What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things, or concerning the introduction of *meum* & *tuum*,** We perceive in the first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot, Gen. xiii. 8, 9. *Let there be no strife I Pray thee, between thee and me, and between thy heard-men, and my heard-men, for we be brethren. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thy selfe I Pray thee from me.* **And all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours, as, *Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal*, &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between *Mine*, and *Thine*. for they suppose *the right of all men to all things* to be taken away.**

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater

Hobbes thought so, and his great innovation (or one of them) **was to assume that human beings at their worst gives us a horrid but accurate glimpse of what they really are once the veneer of civilization is ripped away.** Having witnessed the savagery of men during war – he wrote *Leviathan* just after the Thirty

Years' War (1618-1648) and during the English civil wars that occurred in the mid-seventeenth century – **Hobbes concluded that war was natural and peace unnatural, that butchery and barbarism are innate while charity and civility are entirely artificial,** that the real garden of nature is a killing field and the bucolic Garden of Eden a pitiful pipe dream.

We must dwell upon this last point. **It is characteristic of the authors we're examining that, as they are nearly all atheists, they passionately desired to replace the biblical account of human origins with one of their own contriving.** In fact, in many respects all of modernity is an attempt to replace the biblical account of Eden with an entirely new story (just as it is an attempt to replace a heavenly kingdom with an earthly utopia). For our purposes, it doesn't matter whether you think the Edenic account is a fable, because the really important thing is to see that one story about human nature and human origins is being replaced by another. **Hobbes's state of nature is a new revelation, a counter-Genesis account meant to reveal what we really were at the dawn of humanity and hence what, deep down, we truly are now.** But it is entirely a fiction.

Please drink in these words, swirl them around in your soul, meditate upon them: **Hobbes's state of nature is entirely a fiction. A myth. A fable. A tall tale. An utterly imaginary state.** Neither Hobbes nor anyone else living in the seventeenth century could have had a clue what human origins were really like. Archaeology wasn't even in its infancy. But even more obvious, if human beings had been like Hobbesian men and women at the dawn of humanity, the nightfall of humanity would quickly have descended through self-destruction. How could families ever gave begun and grown into tribes if men were little more than bloodthirsty killers and wandering rapists, and women became cannibals soon after they became mothers or simply bashed in the heads of their offspring because they found them inconvenient?

Sane critics of Hobbes pointed out almost immediately upon *Leviathan*'s printing that his state of nature was a complete fiction. So if it was seen as a complete fiction then, and we can see it as one now, why go on about it? **Because it is an enduring fiction. It is becoming, more and more, the myth by which we live.** *Leviathan* has become our Bible, and Hobbes's state of nature our Edenic myth.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ZXxbAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false

Tacitus says we ought to submit to what is present, and should wish for good Princes, but whatsoever they are endure them, and *Machiavel* terms this a Golden Sentence, adding, that whosoever do's otherwise, Ruins both himself and Country: Certain it is, the condition of no Nation was ever bettered by a Civil War, **for when the People and the Government draw the Sword against each other, all former Compacts and Agreements for securing of Liberty and Property are dissolved, and become void; for flying to Arms is a state of War, which is the meer state of Nature of Men out of Community, where all have an equal right to all things, and I shall enjoy my Life, my Substance, or what is dear to me, no longer then he that has more Cunning, or is Stronger than I, will give me leave;** for Natural Conscience is not a sufficient Curb to the violent Passions of Men out of the Laws of Society. And the few that shall survive the Calamities and Devastations that Ambition or Revenge shall make in Civil Dissension, must ever after submit to the Arbitrary Power of the Conquering Party.

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1317765/1/283910.pdf

From the earliest accounts of explorers to North America, Locke would have found descriptions of a 'state of nature'. **Sir Walter Raleigh, the first Englishman to attempt colonizing New England, wrote extensively about the peoples of America and his travels there.** In 'A Discourse of the Original and Fundamental Cause of Natural, Arbitrary, Necessary and Unnatural War', he introduces the 'state of nature':

> The mere state of nature, of men out of community, where all have an equal right to all things; and I shall enjoy my life, my substance, or what is dear to me, no longer than he that has more cunning or is stronger than I, will give me leave: for natural conscience is not a sufficient curb to the violent passions of men out of the laws of society.

It should be noted that Raleigh bases his state of nature on his observations of American Indians. He claims a fundamental freedom and equality in this natural state. **Moreover, even though natural law exists, man will still, eventually, succumb to the greater forces of passion within himself. This is similar to Locke's conception of natural man.** Raleigh goes on to say:

> A people leaving the state of nature have entered into a community, and made laws, as they justly may to preserve that community, which laws are to be obeyed under the penalty of displeasing God himself; yet the administrators of those laws, being visibly and incurably defective in preserving the whole may be removed; for ... where the people have no such right, they have lost all liberty.12

Here we see that Raleigh's natural men, like Locke's, enter into a community and thereby form laws to insure its preservation. **Moreover, Raleigh allows for a dissolution of government where the**

'administrators' can no longer preserve the whole. The people's right to dissolve such governments is clearly based on their more fundamental right of natural 'liberty' and is reflected, in part, in Locke's important chapter in the Second Treatise on the dissolution of government.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_094

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: <u>but there are many places, where they live so now.</u> For the savage people in many places of *America*, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.

> https://archive.org/details/winningofwestvol01roos/page/n137/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Again, the loose governmental system of the Indians made it as difficult to secure a permanent peace with them as it was to negotiate the purchase of the lands. **The sachem, or hereditary peace chief, and the elective war chief, who wielded only the influence that he could secure by his personal prowess and his tact, were equally unable to control all of their tribesmen, and were powerless with their confederated nations.** If peace was made with the Shawnees, the war was continued by the Miamis; if peace was made with the latter, nevertheless perhaps one small band was dissatisfied, and continued the contest on its own account; and even if all the recognized bands were dealt with, the parties of renegades or outlaws had to be considered; **and in the last resort <u>the full recognition accorded by the Indians to the right of private warfare,</u> made it possible for any individual warrior who possessed any influence to go on raiding and murdering unchecked.** Every tribe, every sub-tribe, every band of a dozen souls ruled over by a petty chief, almost every individual warrior of the least importance, had to be met and pacified.

...

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War.

https://brill.com/display/book/9789004464728/BP000028.xml

The Legalist view of the world, of human nature, power and how to obtain it, was *radically* different from the Confucian and Taoist perspectives which focused on order and *harmony* in terms of a historic state which had been violated and needed to be restored. Despite the significant differences between Taoism and Confucianism, they shared evident points of convergence. For Confucius it was a matter of restoring the ancient principles of government to ensure unity between the emperor, the princes and the people, like those which had characterised three glorious dynasties of the past: Xia, Shang and Chou. According to the Taoists, harmony had been compromised because the rulers had forsaken the Tao, the Way, which they should have pursued in order to govern the empire. Culture, to put it in modern terms, had sought to impose itself upon nature, and the result was social, cultural and political degeneration. *Harmony* was to be found only in a return to the principle of non-action, which meant allowing the Tao to act according to its own laws. **On the contrary, <u>the Legalist School, believed that order and harmony were an exclusively human *creation*.</u> The greatest exponents of the School – Shen Tao, the Lord of Shang and Han Fei Tzu – entertained no illusions about ancient times. <u>They believed that a golden age had never existed and, that if there had been a “decent” society, this had been due to *ecological* conditions when there were few people and many resources.</u>** Furthermore, they held that the nature of human beings was intrinsically evil and that only control of the bad could lead to order and prosperity (*The Lord of Shang*, 1,4: 200).

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuxi
>
> Pangu was said to be the creation god in Chinese mythology. He was a giant sleeping within an egg of chaos. As he awoke, he stood up and divided the sky and the earth. Pangu then died after standing up, and his body turned into rivers, mountains, plants, animals, and everything else in the world, among which is a powerful being known as Huaxu. Huaxu gave birth to a twin brother and sister, Fuxi and Nüwa. **Fuxi and Nüwa are said to be creatures that have faces of human and bodies of snakes.**[3]
>
> Fuxi was known as the "original human", and he was said to have been born in the lower-middle reaches of the Yellow River in a place called Chengji (possibly modern Lantian, Shaanxi province, or Tianshui, Gansu province).[4]
>
> **A possible historical interpretation of the myth is that Huaxu (Fuxi's mother) was a leader during the matriarchal society (c. 2,600 BC) as early Chinese developed language skill while Fuxi and Nüwa were leaders in the early patriarchal society (c. 2,600 BC) while Chinese began the marriage rituals.**[5] However, the "matriarchal society" is an invention of Communist history, as

Marxist theory requires that societies begin as matriarchal, and there is no actual evidence that any such time period ever actually existed in China.
…

On one of the columns of the Fuxi Temple in Gansu Province, the following couplet describes Fuxi's importance: **"Among the three primogenitors of Huaxia civilization, Fu Xi in Huaiyang Country ranks first."**[4] During the time of his predecessor Nüwa, society was matriarchal.

> **In the beginning there was as yet no moral or social order. Men knew their mothers only, not their fathers. When hungry, they searched for food; when satisfied, they threw away the remnants. They devoured their food hide and hair, drank the blood, and clad themselves in skins and rushes.** Then came Fu Xi and looked upward and contemplated the images in the heavens, and looked downward and contemplated the occurrences on earth. **He united man and wife, regulated the five stages of change, and laid down the laws of humanity. He devised the eight trigrams, in order to gain mastery over the world.**—*Ban Gu, Bai Hu Tongyi*[6]

Fuxi taught his subjects to cook, to fish with nets, and to hunt with weapons made of bone, wood, or bamboo. **He instituted marriage and offered the first open-air sacrifices to heaven.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Sovereigns_and_Five_Emperors

The Emperors were asserted as ancestors of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties.[7] The following appear in different groupings of the Three Sovereigns: Fuxi, Nüwa, Shennong, Suiren, Zhurong, Gong Gong, Heavenly Sovereign, Earthly Sovereign, Tai Sovereign, Human Sovereign, and even the Yellow Emperor.

The following appear in different groupings of the Five Emperors: Fuxi (Taihao), Yan Emperor, Yellow Emperor, Shaohao, Zhuanxu, Emperor Ku, Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun.

https://archive.org/details/shahnama07firduoft/page/26/mode/2up?view=theater

The archimage, who took this for an order, turned aside
Toward the village and informed the folk: –
"This verdant spot – all fruitage, men, and cattle –
Hath greatly pleased Bahrám, the king of kings,
Who hath a new design respecting it.
He raiseth all of you to noble rank
To turn this pleasant village to a city.
Here, lord and hireling, ye shall be all equal.
Men, women, children, ye shall be all chiefs,
Each of you be the master of the village."

Glad shouts rose from that prosperous settlement
Because the people were all lords alike.
Thenceforth, man's rede or woman's, 'twas all one,
And slave and hireling were their master's peers.
The village-youths, no longer checked by awe,
Cut off their elders' heads, then fell upon
Each other and, where roads were not, shed blood.
At that to-do folk fled incontinent.
The helpless aged remained, but there remained not
The implements of culture, goods, and crops.
The settlement had ruin in its face,
The trees were withered and the streams ran dry,
The land and houses were all desolate,
And shunned of man and beast.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274867081_The_Origins_of_Hobbes%27s_State_of_Nature

Hobbes uses the expression state of nature to mean a state of natural liberty, without religious connotations. His "science" would rely on natural reason alone. **His contemporaries confused his concept with the post-lapsarian state,**7 **but the origin of its account of primitive history is pagan.**
…

The theory of decline first appeared in ancient Greece as the myth of the four Ages of Man (Gold, Silver, Bronze and Iron), later simplified to the two Ages of Saturn and Jupiter (the primitive age and today).10 **The theory of progress first rose to prominence with the Sophists in the fifth century B.C.**11

The best known ancient theorists of historical cycles were Plato and Polybius; both applied them to explain the rotation of forms of government.
…

Hobbes employs all three theories. ***De Cive*** **eulogizes the dutiful obedience of the world's first subjects as the Golden Age,** while *Behemoth* uses the cyclical theory to describe the shifts in English sovereignty between the Long Parliament and the Restoration.13 **But it was the theory of progress, with the benefits of the advance of civilization, that provided the historical framework of the state of nature.**

> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **I suppose those antients foresaw this, who rather chose to have the Science of justice wrapt up in fables, than openly exposed to disputations:** for before such questions began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already exercised the supreme power. They kept their Empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing the wicked, and protecting the good; likewise Subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men, but by the Lawes of the Realme; nor were they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority: **yea they reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in a councell, as a certain visible divinity;** therefore they little used as in our dayes, to joyn themselves with ambitious, and hellish spirits, to the utter ruine of their State; **for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved; in truth, the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore it was peace, and a golden age, which ended not before that Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings.**

…

It has been suggested that Thucydides' account of early Greece was the inspiration for the state of nature. But that account begins with towns without walls, not with scattered individuals.16 Hobbes would have encountered the narrative of scattered individuals in three writers he knew well: Diodorus Siculus, Cicero and Horace. **Diodorus Siculus, whom Hobbes calls "the greatest antiquary perhaps that euer was,"**17 says that the "first men" led "an undisciplined and brutish life, each going off to feed by himself . ..." They were "miserable" because nothing "useful" had been "discovered."18 They had no language, no clothing, no shelter and no cultivation, and often died from cold, starvation and wild predators. **According to Cicero, one of Hobbes's favorite authors whose extant works were available to him in the Hardwick library, men lived "scattered and dispersed" and "had no other possessions" but what "they had been able either to seize by strength and violence, or keep at the cost of slaughter and wounds."**19

> http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nikiu2_chronicle.htm
>
> 1. And after the deluge in Attica, the sovereignty passed into the hands of the Athenians. 2. And there ruled there a man named Elwates[56] and he established the (common) meal as a legal institution. 3. **And he was also the first to ordain that all men should take as their wives young virgins and name them spouses:** and that they should dig a fountain in a hidden place in order to cause milk to spring (from the earth) in abundance as a visible stream. 4. **Now before his reign the women of Attica and the Athenians lived in unclean intercourse and male was joined to male. And they were like beasts: each lusted (after the other) and none had a woman to himself; but they ravished with wicked violence as we have already recounted.** 5. **And they knew not their own offspring, either their male or female. And who could have known, seeing that none of them had fathers and all whom they bare[57] were begotten by all. Owing to their promiscuous intercourse they could not know whether they had male or female offspring. And they were all pleased with this unclean mode of living.**

…

An early example of the idea can be found in Plutarch, who attributes it to the Epicurean Colotes of Lampsacus: **"The men who appointed laws and usages and established the government of cities by kings and magistrates brought human life into a state of great security and peace and delivered it from turmoil. But if anyone takes all this away, we shall live a life of brutes, and anyone who chances upon another will all but devour him."**27 **Plutarch objected that people educated in philosophy can be virtuous even without laws but Hobbes agreed with Colotes.**
…

Hobbes's account of total anarchy seems to depend in part on Thucydides' account of the ***stasis*** **or civil war in Corcyra.** Moral values were subverted, agreements reconciling groups lasted only as long as they could not take revenge, all social bonds were loosened, and "it was far the best course [for people] to stand diffidently against each other with their thoughts in battle array. ..."30 "All forms of death were seen," Thucydides reports, even filicide.31
…

Good and evil are subjective and relative to person, place and time. "Nor is there any such thing as absolute goodness," he wrote in an early draft of ***The Elements of Law*****, "considered**

without relation."37 **He seems to have owed this position to Pyrrhonism, an ancient philosophy which held that no truth can be known. The Parisian intellectual circles which revolved around Marin Mersenne, which Hobbes became part of in the 1630s, were a hotbed of Pyrrhonist sceptical debate. Though Hobbes used Pyrrhonist arguments, however, he was not a sceptic in the Pyrrhonist sense of suspending philosophical judgment. Relativity is not scepticism because the agent can know what is right or wrong for himself.**38

Sextus attacked traditional theories of absolute good and evil by arguing that they are merely psychological phenomena which have nothing to do with external objects. Good is just what we are attracted to and bad what repels us. Montaigne, following Sextus, used differences in laws and customs in different places and times to show that there are no absolute good and evil by nature. "Each soul is Queen in her own state," he wrote. "So let us no longer seek excuses from the external qualities of anything: the responsibility lies within ourselves. Our good or our bad depends on us alone."39 **For Montaigne, Brazilian cannibals validated the theory of moral relativity by proving that good and evil represent just the diverse customs and beliefs of local peoples.**40 In pointing out the moral diversity of ancient pirates and Germans Hobbes was implicitly tapping into the Pyrrhonist argument.

Hobbes employed both types of argument – good and evil as psychological phenomena, and differences of laws and customs – to help explain why the subjective values of the state of nature must result in a state of war. **A classic sceptical argument for the impossibility of knowledge based on sense perception was that different people sensed the same thing as pleasant and unpleasant.**

> ***Good*, and *Evill*, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different:** And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of Common life. ... From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill. ...41

A similar idea can be found in Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean *stasis*, where the virtues lost their commonly accepted meanings and became relative to the person using them. People used the virtues and vices to praise or blame actions as it suited their interests.42
…

Annabel Brett has suggested plausibly that the source of Hobbes's concept of right was the influential sixteenth-century **Spanish humanist jurist Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, who conceived of *dominium* (lordship or ownership) simply as liberty. He calls it "the natural faculty of doing what it pleases anyone to do, unless it is prohibited in any way by force or by law."**53 **This is Florentinus' definition of liberty (*Institutes*, I.iii.1). The connection between Vázquez and Hobbes is clearer in Hobbes's definition of right in *De Cive* as "a *natural liberty* not created by laws but left by them."**54

Hobbes's inalienable natural right of self-preservation had a much longer history. **The Stoic idea that people and all other living creatures have an instinct for self-preservation was enormously influential during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.** The medieval theme of a fundamental right of self-preservation derived from this instinct was also common. In the fourteenth century William of Ockham had made it inalienable.55
…

Thucydides' account of the Corcyraean *stasis* may well have been central to Hobbes's assessment of the equality of agents in situations of extreme violence. It was mostly those with "the least wit" who took the initiative against the wise because the former did not wish to become the victims of the latter's persuasive arguments. "Whereas the other [the wise], not caring though they were perceived and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain."72 The less intelligent proved equal to the wise in ability to kill. "Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome," Hobbes wrote later, "do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory."73

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT518&hl=fi&pg=PT518#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hobbes claimed that *Leviathan* was the first work to make politics a science and that it could be placed alongside the achievements of Galileo in dynamics and William Harvey in physiology. In major respects his claim was justified. The model for his method of presentation was Euclidean geometry, the power of which, it is said, was brought home to him only by chance when he was over forty years old.

Hobbes's fame does not rest on his political theory alone, for *Leviathan* and his other major works together constitute a comprehensive philosophy. **Within a tightly deductive system, he argues for a materialist metaphysics that is one of the founding statements of modern thought.** That he has not received the credit undoubtedly due to him in this regard is in part explained by the hostility his philosophical views have so often generated.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/156/mode/2up?view=theater

Hobbes was enamored with atomism, not only the ancient atomism of Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius, **but the modern atomism of Galileo and the "Newcastle circle,"** a group of royalist émigrés from England under the patronage of William Cavendish, Marquis of Newcastle.21 Hobbes also made his allegiance to atomism clear in his autobiographical poem written in Latin.22

But Hobbes was also enamored with the deductive precision of Euclidean geometry, and it was his dream to introduce a new science of politics based on Epicurean materialism, as reformed by Galileo, and constructed on the same deductive model as Euclidean geometry.
...

But in contrast to Lucretius, **Hobbes's main concern was not individual tranquillity, but *social* tranquillity.** "If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away ... by which crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience."23
...

Needless to say, Hobbes had not examined the entire universe, either the macrocosm or the microcosm. **His confidence that materialism was universally applicable came from his appreciation of Galileo.** That is why Hobbes began with a restatement of the Galilean law of inertia as applied to human action.

> **That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, namely that nothing can change itself, is not so easily assented to.**25

Whether or not Galileo meant to apply the principle of inertia universally, Hobbes extended it to human nature, for human nature was just one more collection of atoms.
...

We recall that for Epicurus, the moral boundaries were rooted in natural limitations, and the natural limitations were taken to be permanent and general. **Even though nature was amoral, the limitations present in the human species guaranteed a kind of universality and solidity to his asceticism. But Hobbes wiped those boundaries away completely by applying perpetual atomic motion to the human constitution itself.** "And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object."28
...

Indeed, it was the affirmation that our natural state was naturally chaotic that allowed Hobbes to create one of the great political fictions of all time, the "state of nature," a fiction that was a strangely transformed version of Lucretius's Epicurean Edenic state. And out of this Epicurean state Hobbes fashioned an even greater fiction, modern natural right, the very fiction which was to become the foundation of modern jurisprudence and moral discourse.

In examining what Hobbes had to say about the state of nature, we must constantly hold in mind that (like the atom itself) the state of nature (being so far in the past) was something for which he could not possible have had any direct evidence, but which was necessary for the overall project of eliminating disturbance from the divine and bringing Epicurean tranquillity to earth. For Lucretius, we recall, the account of the primitive state was actually a projection of the Epicurean ascetic back into the origins of humanity. **For Hobbes the only difference was that, rather than projecting an Epicurean ascetic, he projected a modern Epicurean hedonist instead.** Further, since Hobbes (unlike Lucretius) was confronting a rival account of human origins, that found in Genesis, his state of nature was also fashioned, in part, as a foundational myth specifically meant to displace the Genesis account.

In both Lucretius's and Hobbes's versions, primitive state is amoral, apolitical and areligious. In this condition, like a homogeneous collection of atoms, all human beings are equal. But in contrast to Lucretius's ascetic account, Hobbes's hedonistic account presented human beings as originally filled to overflowing with a multitude of desires. In parallel to the original atomic state, human motion is purposeless, that is, absolutely nonteleological, or endless. **Human action has no goal, for "there is no such *finis ultimus*, utmost aim, nor *summum bonum*, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers."** Because we have no natural end for our purposeless, desire-driven motion, each individual has for his greatest desire only to "assure for ever, the way of his future desire." Consequently, Hobbes "put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death."31 **The perpetual motion of atomic individuals perfectly matched the perpetual and restless motion of atoms moving through the void.**

…

Therefore Hobbes invented "modern natural rights," **which are, as philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, complete and utter fictions.**33 It is only by viewing the genesis of these natural rights in Hobbes that we will see how indebted we are to him, and how completely we have been defined by his moral fiction.
…

But for Hobbes's modern natural rights theory, since nature is ultimately ordered not by intelligence but chance, rights precede laws, and all laws are merely conventional, having as their *only* purpose balancing claims of rights.
…

Isn't the family natural? Hobbes anticipated the question, and his answer was a modified form of that of Lucretius: one of the violent passions, which is of itself no sin, is the sexual passion. His proof was vaguely anthropological. **He pointed to the existence of "the savage people in many places in America" where "the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust" and who therefore "live at this day in the brutish manner."**38 **This mode of proof – used ever after by Epicureans from Rousseau to Margaret Mead – became standard procedure for modern Epicurean materialism. The atomistic individualism that Hobbes's account promoted must continually view the natural family as a side effect of sexual desire.** As a consequence of this myth, modern Epicurean hedonism will continually strive to liberate sexual desire from its unintended side effect, procreation. Another important hallmark of Epicurean hedonism will follow upon this: as opposed to the natural law argument that the family is the foundation of society, modern Epicureanism will make the individual – the presocial unit, as it were – the foundation of society.

Fourth, it should be clear how indebted much of contemporary jurisprudence and nearly all contemporary moral debate are to the Hobbesian myth that society begins when the individual "*lay*[s] *down this right to all things; and* [remains] *contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.*"39 **The foundation of this myth, as we have seen, was the belief that our natural, original condition was one of the complete freedom to express our desires as asocial, atomic individuals.** This mythical state was designed to be an exact reflection of the freely moving atoms prior to their accidental assembly into larger units. **The word "right" was merely the name Hobbes applied to the desire to continue one's motion in the moral void,** and liberty comes to mean simply the absence of impediments to one's amoral, original desires.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698230.2015.1122354

When he gave his first political work the title *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, Hobbes signalled an agenda to revise and incorporate continental Roman and Natural Law traditions for use in Great Britain, and from first to last he remained faithful to this agenda, which it took his entire corpus to complete. The success of his project is registered in the impact Hobbes had upon the continental legal system in turn, specific aspects of his theory, as for instance the right to punish, entering the European civil code through Pufendorf, and remaining to this day.

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/4/mode/2up?view=theater

And upon this it was, that when I applyed my Thoughts to the Investigation of Naturall Justice, I was presently advertised from the very word *Justice*, (which signifies a steady Will of giving every one his *Owne*) that my first enquiry was to be, from whence it proceeded, that any man should call any thing rather his *Owne*, than *another man's*. And when I found that this proceeded not from Nature, but Consent, (for what Nature at first laid forth in common, men did afterwards distribute into severall *Impropriations*, I was conducted from thence to another Inquiry, namely to what end, and upon what Impulsives, when all was equally every mans in common, men did rather think it fitting, that every man should have his Inclosure; **And I found the reason was, that from a Community of Goods, there must needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest, and from that Contention all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensue, which by the instinct of Nature, every man is taught to shun.**

> https://www.constitution.org/sps/sps02_j2-01.htm
>
> 10. *Ulpianus, Rules, Book I.* **Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give to every one that to which he is entitled.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater

These things I found most bitterly excepted against: that I had made the civill powers too large, but this by Ecclesiasticall persons; that I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience, but this by Sectaries; **that I had set princes above the civil Laws, but this by Lawyers;** wherefore I was not much moved by these mens reprehensions, (as who in doing this did but do their own business) except it were tye those knots so much faster.

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/132/mode/2up?view=theater

Lawes therefore are set for Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler: **however, by the ambition of Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate, but their Prudence.**

> http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE1/G-AR.html
>
> **Hobbes was a thinker and writer of marvellous power, and, take him altogether, is probably the greatest of English philosophers; but it was given to him, as little as to Locke, to escape from entanglement in the *a priori* speculations which had come down mainly from the Roman jurists.**[1]

---

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/128/mode/2up?view=theater

But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. **In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true,** in chap. i. art. 9.
...

Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command, and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. **But private men, while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as kings,** which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal. The most ancient of all God's commands is, (Gen. ii. 17): *Thou shall not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil;* and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5): *Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil;* and God's first expostulation with man, (verse 11): *Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?* As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil?

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR15#v=onepage&q&f=false

On the other hand, **while pride was obviously a concern for religious thinkers, it also became a critically important issue for more secular political thinkers, too. It was central to Hobbes's political philosophy, for example, where it was transposed from being an offence against God to being one against the equality of our fellow human beings,** so that when Hobbes explained why his book was called *Leviathan*, he quoted from the 'two last verses of the one and fortieth' chapter of the book of Job, where God calls the great sea-monster 'King of all the children of pride.'6

> https://biblehub.com/job/41-33.htm
>
> 33 **Nothing on earth is his equal—a creature devoid of fear!** 34 **He looks down on all the haughty;** [gā-ḇō-ah] **he is king over all the proud."** [bə-nê-šā-ḥaṣ]
>
> https://biblehub.com/matthew/20-12.htm
>
> **Saying, These last have wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal** [*isous*] **unto us, which have borne the burden and heat of the day.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false

The proud – those who consider themselves superior to others, those who glory over others, and demand to be honoured – are a perennial threat to stable government, which requires their expulsion from the arena of politics altogether so that they can do no harm to the body politic. It might be God who humbles the proud, according to the text of the *Magnificat*, but Hobbes assigns this task to the secular sovereign.
...

If this examination of Hobbes began by considering his continuities with Stoic and Neostoic thinking, it ends at the heart of what we might call the Augustinian Hobbes – **or at any rate, a Hobbes who set about systematically secularising themes that were familiar from Augustinian theology and displacing theological voluntarism into the world of politics.** Pride was central to his analysis, though no longer understood as an offence against God but as an offence against one's fellow human beings; **and the Leviathan was characterised as nothing less than 'Mortall God' whose decree was law, whose law was necessarily just.**102

https://books.google.fi/books?id=M93i2SyX-a0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA94#v=onepage&q&f=false

4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the rule of nature must needs be one of these: lot, or alternate use; for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be imagined.

And for alternate use, he that beginneth hath the advantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is not other way but lot: **in things, therefore, indivisible and incommunicable, it is the law of nature, *That the use be alternate, or the advantage given away by lot*; because there is no other way of equality; and equality is the law of nature.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=M93i2SyX-a0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false

2. In this chapter it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our nature hath placed us, and what probability it hath left us of continuing and preserving ourselves against the violence of one another. And first, if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge between men of mature age, and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit, or in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger, since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a man's life; **we may conclude that men considered in mere nature,* ought to admit amongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed moderate.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Anger/Book_I#III.

> **"The weakest of men," argues he, "are often angry with the most powerful: so you may be sure that anger is not a desire to punish their antagonist—for men do not desire to punish him when they cannot hope to do so."** In the first place, I spoke of a desire to inflict punishment, not a power to do so: now men desire even what they cannot obtain. **In the next place, no one is so low in station as not to be able to hope to inflict punishment even upon the greatest of men: we all are powerful for mischief. [Deinde nemo tam humilis est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit; ad nocendum potentes sumus]**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/24/mode/2up?view=theater

III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men, partly in their mutuall will of hurting: whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to our selves the least security: For if we look on men fullgrown, **and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it)** and how easie a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can doe equall things. **All men therefore among themselves are by nature equall; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the Civill Law.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the naturall, but civill state; for it hath been shewed before, Chap. I. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equall, **and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civill Law. I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others onely to serve; as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptnesse, that is, a certain kind of naturall knowledge, or ignorance;** which foundation is not onely against reason (as but now hath been shewed) but also against experience: for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe, than to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger doe contest, have these ever, or often the upper hand of those.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_094

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) **I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.** That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/552/mode/2up?view=theater

Descartes, however, nowhere integrates his conception of the human mind into a theoretical structure requiring and justifying the fundamental moral and political equality of men in society. **Here Hobbes came closer with his path-breaking concept of a general equality in the 'state of nature,' an invaluably flexible analytical tool, afterwards taken up by Spinoza and to a degree also by Locke.** 'When all is reckoned together,' Hobbes affirms in the *Leviathan*, the differences between men in their faculties of body and mind are 'not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.'27 Roughly speaking, men are equal in terms of their power and even more equal in their minds than their bodies. If one is stronger, another may be more cunning, and 'such is the nature of men,' observes Hobbes, 'that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they well hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves.' This is because we know the details of our own thoughts, he suggests, but mostly oversimplify the reasoning of others: 'but this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal.'28 **'From this equality of ability,' contends Hobbes, 'ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends.'**

Precisely this 'equality of hope' in fulfilling our aspirations was to dominate the democratic republicans' gradual construction of a general political theory of equality. For as Hobbes again observed, 'if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them.'29 Even in Hobbes, this budding principle of fundamental equality is in a few respects carried over to life under the commonwealth, notably regarding administration of justice, **'so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity when they do violence, dishonour or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to one of them.'**30 Significantly, **Hobbes, for whom all subjects are and should be alike in status under the absolute monarch, even tries to argue for an 'equality of imposition' in matters of taxation, asserting the illegitimacy of all forms of exemption or privilege on the basis of noble, ecclesiastical, or other special social status,** regardless of the fact that in the great majority of continental Europe at the time no such fiscal equivalence of subjects actually existed.31

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT165#v=onepage&q&f=false

A Kentish gentleman with a legal training, Sir Robert Filmer was an almost exact contemporary of Hobbes. He had come to pamphleteering late in life but in the later 1640s had gone into print to defend the Royalist cause, assaulting Philip Hunton's *Treatise on monarchy* in his *Anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy* (1648).
…

Filmer's deep and abiding prejudice against contract theory motivated his anonymous *Observations* of 1652, which targeted in turn Hobbes, Milton and Grotius as theorists afflicted by theoretical misunderstandings of the source of political authority. Filmer had evidently read *De Cive* but had delayed his assault upon the same political theory in *Leviathan* until after Hobbes had returned home, strongly suggesting that, in grouping Hobbes in the company that he did, he was making a statement about Hobbes's new position on the political map. Indeed, Filmer's short preface seems to single out those aspects of Hobbes's theory which had already been pressed into service by republican propagandists, with the intention of showing that he was less of a friend than they might think.

Filmer's preface begins with praise of Hobbes's absolutism immediately and crushingly qualified:

> With no small content I read Mr Hobbes' book *De Cive*, and his *Leviathan*, about the rights of sovereignty, which no man, that I know, hath so amply and judiciously handled. **I consent with him about the rights of exercising government, but I cannot agree to his means of acquiring it. It may seem strange that I should praise his building and yet mislike his foundation, but so it is. His *jus naturae* and his *regnum institutivum* will not down with me, they appear full of contradiction and impossibilities.**62

Filmer exploits Hobbes's occasional comments upon the absolute authority of fathers before the establishment of states to offer the philosopher a better foundation for his sovereignty in the principles of *regnum patrimoniale*. That Hobbes's theory might work better if its patriarchal dimension were taken seriously had been an implicit thought in Ascham's adaptation of Hobbes, and

would continue to fascinate writers for whom the state of nature was an abstraction too far, but here Filmer's suggestion is mischievous: 'If, according to the order of nature, he had handled paternal government before that by institution, there would have been little liberty left in the subjects of the family to consent to institution of government.'63

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ErkQDnw7Ob4C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA209#v=onepage&q&f=false

Civilians,* canonists, politicians and divines are not a little perplexed in distinguishing between the law of nature and the law of nations. About *jus naturae* and *jus gentium* there is much dispute by such as handle the original of government, and of property and community.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n105/mode/2up?view=theater

313 **This same axiom establishes the difference between the natural law of the Hebrews, the natural law of nations, and the natural law of the philosophers.** For whereas the gentile nations had only the ordinary help of providence, the Hebrews had extraordinary help from the true God; on this account the latter divided the whole world of nations into Hebrews and gentiles. **The philosophers reason it out more completely than the gentiles are wont to, for they did not appear until some two thousand years after the gentile nations were founded.** On account of their failure to observe these differences between the three [natural laws], the three systems of Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf must fall.

…

As the civilians sometimes confound, and sometimes separate the law of nature and the law of nations, so other-whiles they make them also contrary one to the other. 'By the law of nature all men are born free': '*jure naturali omnes liberi nascentur*'; but servitude is by the law of nations: *'jure gentium servitus invasit*' [by the law of nations servitude came in], saith Ulpian [*Digest* 1, i, 4; p. 29].

…

Again, the civil law teacheth that 'from the law of nature proceeds the conjunction of man and woman, the procreation and education of children' [*Digest* 1, i, 1, 3;]. **But as for 'religion to God, and obedience to parents' [*Digest* 1, i, 2; p. 29] it makes it to be by the law of nations.**

…

A principal ground of these diversities and contrarieties of divisions was an error which the heathens taught, that 'all things at first were common,' and that 'all men were equal.' This mistake was not so heinous in those ethnic* authors of the civil laws, who wanting the guide of the history of Moses were fain to follow poets and fables for their leaders. But for Christians, who have read the Scriptures, to dream either of a community of all things, or an equality of all persons, is a fault scarce pardonable.

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/186/mode/2up?view=theater

It was from the Greeks and Romans that medieval Europe inherited the notion of the 'State of Nature' as a state of affairs in which all men were equal in status and wealth and in which nobody was oppressed or exploited by anyone else; a state of affairs characterized by universal good faith and brotherly love and also, sometimes, by total community of property and even of spouses.

In both Greek and Latin literature the State of Nature is represented as having existed on earth in some long-lost Golden Age or 'Reign of Saturn.' **The version of the myth in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* was to be repeatedly echoed in later literature and to exercise considerable influence upon communistic speculation during the Middle Ages.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ErkQDnw7Ob4C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA217#v=onepage&q&f=false

This determination of Mr Selden's being consonant to the history of the Bible, and to natural reason, doth contradict the doctrine of Grotius. **I cannot conceive why Mr Selden should afterwards affirm that 'neither the law of nature nor the divine law do command or forbid either communion of all things or private dominion, but permitteth both'** [Selden 2, p. 20].

As for the general community between Noah and his sons which Mr Selden will have to be granted to them [Selden 2, p. 18], Genesis ix, 2, the text doth not warrant it.

…

But whether with Grotius, community came in at the creation, or with Mr Selden at the Flood, they both agree that it did not long continue. *'Sed veri non est simile hujusmodi communionem diu obtinuisse'* [but it is not true that this kind of common ownership lasted for long] is the confession of Mr Selden [Selden 2, p. 18]. It seems strange that Grotius should maintain that community of all things should be by the law of nature, of which God is the author, and yet such community should not be able to continue. Doth it not derogate from the providence of God Almighty to ordain a community which should not continue? Or doth it not make the act of our forefathers, in abrogating the natural law of community by introducing that of property, to be a sin of high presumption?

The prime duties of the second table are conversant about the right of property. But if property be brought in by a human law, as Grotius teacheth, then the moral law depends upon the will of man. **There could be no law against adultery or theft if women and all things were common.**

Mr Selden saith that the law of nature or of God '*nec vetuit nec jubebat, sed permisit utrumque, tam nempe rerum communionem quam privatum dominium*' [neither forbade nor commanded, but equally permitted both, that is to say common ownership as well as the private dominion of things] [Selden 2, p. 20]. And yet for property (which he terms '*primaeva rerum dominia*' [the form of ownership in the earliest times]) he teacheth that 'Adam received it from God' (*a numine acceperat*) [Selden 2, p. 19]. And for community he saith: '**We meet with evident footsteps of the community of things in that donation of God by which Noah and his three sons are made *domini pro indiviso rerum omnium* [lords in common of all things]'** [Selden 2, pp. 17-18]. Thus he makes the private dominion of Adam as well as the common dominion of Noah and his sons to be both by the will of God.
…

I find no cause why Mr Selden should call community a pristine right, since he makes it but to begin in Noah and to end in Noah's children or grandchildren at the most. **For he confesseth the earth '*a Noachidis seculis aliquot post diluvium esse divisam*' [was divided by Noah's descendants some centuries after the Flood]** [Selden 2, p. 18].
…

Many conclusions in Grotius his book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* are built upon the foundation of these two principles:

1. **The first is that *'communis rerum usus naturalis fuit'* [the use of things in common was natural]** [Grotius 1, i, x, 7].

2. **The second is that *'dominium quale nunc is usu est, voluntas humana introduxit'* [property as it now exists was introduced by human will]** [Grotius 1, i, x, 4].

Upon these two propositions of natural community and voluntary property depend divers dangerous and seditious conclusions, which are dispersed in several places.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ErkQDnw7Ob4C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA234#v=onepage&q&f=false

If our first parents, or some other of our forefathers did voluntarily bring in property of goods and subjection to governors, and it were in their power either to bring them in or not, **or having brought them in to alter their minds and restore them to their first condition of community and liberty, what reason can there be alleged that men that now live should not have the same power? So that if any one man in the world, be he never so mean or base, will but alter his will and say he will resume his natural right to community, and be restored unto his natural liberty, and consequently take what he please and do what he list, who can say that such a man doth more than by right he may?** And then it will be lawful for every man, when he please, to dissolve all government, and destroy all property.

Whereas Grotius saith that by the law of nature all things were at first common [Grotius 1, i, x, 7] and yet teacheth that after property was brought in it was against the law of nature to use community [Grotius 1, i, x, 4], **he doth thereby not only make the law of nature changeable, which he saith God cannot do,** but he also makes the law of nature contrary to itself.
…

It is not probable that any sure direction of the beginning of government can be found either in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Polybius, or in any other of the heathen authors, who were ignorant of the manner of the creation of the world. We must not neglect the Scriptures

and search in philosophers for the grounds of dominion and property, which are the main principles of government and justice. The first government in the world was monarchical, in the father of all flesh.
…

There never was any such thing as an independent multitude, who at first had a natural right to a community. This is but a fiction or fancy of too many in these days, who please themselves in running after the opinions of philosophers and poets to find out such an original of government as might promise them some title of liberty, to the great scandal of Christianity and bringing in of atheism – since a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of Adam. And yet this conceit of original freedom is the only ground upon which not only the heathen philosophers but also the authors of the principles of the civil law, and Grotius, Selden, Hobbes, Ascham and others, raise and build their doctrines of government and of the several sorts or kinds, as they call them, of commonwealths.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=JAV-pVZkC7MC&lpg=PR3&hl=fi&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q&f=false

Even Bentham could be moved to recognise the predominant idiom taken by social relations in his own day, with a rare (though unpublished) endorsement of Filmer:

> **Filmer's origin of government is exemplified everywhere: Locke's scheme of government has not ever, to the knowledge of any body, been exemplified any where.** In every family there is government, in every family there is subjection, and subjection of the most absolute kind: the father, sovereign, the mother and the young, subjects. **According to Locke's scheme, men knew nothing at all of governments till they met together to make one. Locke has speculated so deeply, and reasoned so ingeniously, as to have forgot that he was not of age when he came into the world** … Under the authority of the father, and his assistant and prime-minister the mother, every human creature is enured to subjection, is trained up into a habit of subjection. **But, the habit once formed, nothing is easier than to transfer it from one object to another. Without the previous establishment of domestic government, blood only, and probably a long course of it, could have formed political government.**

Filmer had failed to prove divine right, insisted the secularized Bentham; **but he *had* proved 'the physical impossibility of the system of absolute equality and independence, by showing that subjection and not independence is the natural state of man.'**188

> 188. **Bentham's mss 'Locke, Rousseau and Filmer's Systems,'** printed in Elie Halévy, *La Formation du Radicalisme Philosophique* (3 vols., Paris, 1901-4), I, Appendix III: **this key document was omitted from the English translation of Halévy's seminal work, and long overlooked. Bentham's critique of Locke might be compared with that of Joseph de Maistre in *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*,** noted in E.D. Watt, '"Locked In": De Maistre's Critique of French Lockeianism,' *JHI* 32 (1971), 129-32.

This showed a degree of ignorance of Locke: in some places he accepted a large degree of the patriarchalist case. Nevertheless, for much of the eighteenth century, many people, and especially churchmen, saw instead in Locke an ecclesiology potentially so extreme as to make them wish to attack Locke's contractarian weaknesses, not stress areas of agreement with him. **Hard-nosed realists, like the churchmen discussed in chapter 3 below, or Karl Marx, agreed with Bentham, not Locke: the family was a 'double relationship' wrote Marx, both natural and political.**189

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3D2%3Asection%3D41
>
> [41] 12. **Now it seems to me, at least, that not only**[1] **among the Medes, as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy justice.** For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was conspicuous for his virtue; and, as he shielded the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right.
>
> **The reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings.** [42] **For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. [Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa quae regum. Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile; neque enim aliter esset ius.]** If the people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice.
>
> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis#lf0041-01_label_143
>
> > 2. **According to Herodotus, Deioces, ambitious of sovereignty, commenced as arbitrator in his own village, and on account of the reputation thus obtained for**

> **justice was chosen king.** His administration is represented as having been, though impartial, annoyingly inquisitorial and relentlessly severe. But as his reign began more than seven centuries before the Christian era, he may be regarded as a semi-mythical personage, and a like doubt may be thrown on the origin of the Median sovereignty. **The theory of the origin of kingly power here given seems to have been a favorite notion with Cicero, and is found in other works of his. It perhaps defines what ought to have been; but in fact the kingly office was probably at the outset but an extension of patriarchal sovereignty.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT286#v=onepage&q&f=false

Bramhall drew attention to the passage in chapter 21, which Filmer had also noticed, where Hobbes had argued that a group of rebels who expected execution if caught had the liberty to join together and defend each other. **Although their initial rebellion was unjust, their attempts to defend their lives were not.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_114
>
> To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; **because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us;** and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? **Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent.** There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.

'Why should we not change the name of *Leviathan* into the Rebels' Catechism?' asks Bramhall, 'T.H. alloweth rebels and conspirators to make good their unlawful attempts by arms. Was there ever such a trumpeter of rebellion heard of before?'23

In a similar fashion, Bramhall attacks Hobbes's *de factoism,* foreshadowed by the discussion in chapter 7 of *De Cive,* and fully spelled out in chapter 21 and the 'Review and Conclusion' to *Leviathan*. **In *De Cive,* much to the horror of Royalists, Hobbes had suggested that sovereignty was lost after conquest.**

> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/98/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In the second place, if the kingdom fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he, who before had the supreme authority, hath now lost it:** for when the subjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being conquered, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no less endeavour, labour to perform.

This brief suggestion was for Bramhall fleshed out in *Leviathan* where Hobbes argued that obligation lasted as long as the sovereign was able to provide protection. Bramhall fastened on the passages of the 'Review' which suggested that living under the protection of a conqueror constituted submission and consent:

> **Where these principles prevail, adieu honour, and honesty, and fidelity, and loyalty; all must give place to self-interest. What? For a man to desert his sovereign upon the first prevalence of an enemy, or the first payment of a petty contribution, or the first appearance of a sword that is more able to protect us for the present?**232

…

Bramhall completes his analysis of by demonstrating from chapter 9 of *De Cive* that Hobbes's theory not only subverted political relationships but also non-political forms of dominion; **Hobbes undermined paternal dominion by suggesting that women might have power over their children and that there was nothing inevitable about women's subordination to men.** He even appeared to suggest that slaves might justly kill their masters. Hobbes's novel theory eroded all forms of traditional restraint and authority: **'T.H. taketh a pride in removing all the ancient land-marks, between prince and subject, father and child, husband and wife, master and servant, man and man.'**234

> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/104/mode/2up?view=theater

Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent over his children, have brought no other argument than that of generation, as if it were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a triangle, it appears presently without any further discourse, that its angles are equal to two right. Besides, **since dominion, that is, supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two masters, but two persons, male and female, must concur in the act of generation; it is impossible that dominion should at all be acquired by generation only.** Wherefore we will, with the more diligence, in this place inquire into the original of paternal government.

2**. We must therefore return to the state of nature, in which, by reason of the equality of nature, all men of riper years are to be accounted equal.** There by right of nature the conqueror is lord of the conquered. By the right therefore of nature, the dominion over the infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power. But it is manifest that he who is newly born, is in the mother's power before any others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up, or adventure him to fortune.

3. If therefore she breed him (because the state of nature is the state of war) **she is supposed to bring him up on this condition, that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey her.** For since by natural necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands. **And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a mother and a lord. But what some say, that in this case the father, by reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the mother, becomes lord, signifies nothing. For both reason shows the contrary, because the inequality of their natural forces is not so great, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without war, and custom also contradicts not. For women, namely Amazons, have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of their children at their own wills. And at this day in divers places, women are invested with the principal authority.** Neither do their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they who have the supreme power, are not tied at all (as hath been shewed) to the civil laws. **Add also that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the father, but by the testimony of the mother;** the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it, and therefore hers. Wherefore original dominion over children belongs to the mother: and among men no less than other creatures, the birth follows the belly.
...

6. **But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the command of the other**, **the children are the mother's, for the reasons above given in the third article, unless by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the mother may by pact dispose of her right as she lists, as heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves.** But in a civil government, if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the father's, because in all cities, to wit, constituted of fathers, not mothers governing their families, the domestical command belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to the civil laws, is called matrimony.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/17D*.html#note76

> **Arrian mentions Amazons only in other contexts (4.15.4; 7.13.2-6) and expresses the doubt that any still existed**—especially since they were not mentioned by Aristobulus or Ptolemy. Plutarch, *Alexander*, 46.1, gives a full list of authorities in favour of or opposed to the visit, but doubts the story (46.2), because it is poorly attested, not because Amazons did not exist. **Disbelief in Amazons as such is a modern phenomenon.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/552/mode/2up?view=theater

He did prudently, to deny that virtue did consist in a mean;o for he himself doth never observe a mean. All his bolts fly over or under, but at the right mark it is in vain to expect him. **Sometimes he fancieth an omnipotence in kings, sometimes he strippeth them of their just rights.** Perhaps he thinketh, that it may fall out in politics as it doth sometimes in physic; "*Bina venena juvant*"—"two contrary poisons" may become a cordial to the commonwealth. I will begin with his defects, where he attributeth too little to regal power.

First, he teacheth, that no man is bound to go to warfare in person, except he do voluntarily undertake it.—**"A man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, . . may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice."p Of these "many cases," he setteth down only two: first, "when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place, for in this case he deserteth not the service of the commonwealth;" secondly, "there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, . . or men of feminine courage."q** This might pass as a municipal law, to exempt some persons at some time in some places; but to extend it to all persons, places, and times, is absurd, and repugnant to his own grounds; who teacheth, that "justice and injustice do depend upon the command of

the sovereign," that "whatsoever he commandeth, he maketh lawful and just by commanding it."r **His two cases are two great impertinencies; and belong to the sovereign to do or not to do, as graces,—"Who is timorous or fearful, let him depart;"—not to the subjects as right.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_114
>
> When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.
>
> Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. **When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise.** But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

He forgetteth, how often he hath denied "all knowledge of good and evil" to subjects, and subjected their will absolutely to the will of the sovereign;—The sovereign "may use every man's strength and wealth at his pleasure."s His acknowledgment,—that the "sovereign hath right enough to punish his refusal with death,"t—is to no purpose. The question is not, whether his refusal be punishable or not, but whether it be just or not. Upon his principles, a sovereign may "justly enough" put the most innocent subject in the world to death; as we shall see presently.u **And his exception—"when the defence of the commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms,"x—is no answer to the other case, and itself a case never like to happen. He must be "a mortal God"y indeed, that can bring all the hands in a kingdom to fight at one battle.**

Another of his principles is this:—**"Security is the end for which men make themselves subjects to others; which, if not be enjoyed, no man is understood to have subjected himself to others, or to have lost his right to defend himself at his own discretion: neither is any man understood to have bound himself to any thing, or to have relinquished his right over all things, before his own security be provided for."z** What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox, and what a large window it openeth to sedition and rebellion, I leave to the reader's judgment.
…

And howsoever in words he deny all resistance to the sovereign, yet in deed he admitteth it.—"No man is bound by his pacts, whatsoever they be, not to resist him, who bringeth upon him death or wounds or other bodily damage."b—**(By this learning the scholar, if he be able, may take the rod out of his master's hand, and whip him.)**
…

But his next conclusion will uncase him fully, and shew us what manner of man he is.—"If the commonwealth come into the power of its enemies, so that they cannot be resisted, he who had the sovereignty before, is understood to have lost it."l What "enemies" he meaneth, such as have the just power of the sword or such as have not; what he meaneth by "the commonwealth," the whole kingdom or any part of it; what he intendeth by "cannot be resisted," whether a prevalence for want of forces to resist them or a victory in a set battle or a final conquest; and what he meaneth by "losing the sovereignty," losing it *de facto* or *de jure*, losing the possession only or losing the right also;—he is silent. **It may be, because he knoweth not the difference.**
…

These are part of T.H. his faults, on the one hand, against monarchs; opposite enough to peace and tranquillity; which none can approve, who either have a settlement, or wish one. But his faults are ten times greater and grosser for monarchs, on the other hand; **insomuch as I have thought sometimes, that he observed the method of some old cunning Parliament-men, who, when they had a mind to cross a bill, were always the highest for it in the House, and would insert so many and so great inconveniences into the Act, that they were sure it could never pass.**

> "Tuta frequensque via est per amici fallere nomen."y
>
> y [Ovid., Art. Amat, i, 585.]

So he maketh the power of kings to be so exorbitant, that no subject, who hath either conscience or discretion, ever did or can endure; so to render monarchy odious to mankind.

I pass by his accommodating of the four first Commandments of the Decalogue to sovereign princes,z which concern our duty to Almighty God. Let his first paradox of this kind be this:—"A monarch doth not bind himself to any man by any pacts for the empire which he receiveth:"a and, "It is vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenants; the opinion, that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition" (learnedly expounded!) **"proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath" (mark that) "have no force to oblige," &c., "but from the public sword."b What is now become of all our coronation oaths, and all our liberties and great Charters?**

Another paradox is this:—"Every monarch may make his successor by his last will; and that which one may transfer to another by testament, that he may by the same right give or sell whilst he is living: therefore, to whomsoever he disposeth it, either for love or money, it is lawfully disposed:"c and," There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign."d **The whole body of the kingdom of England were of another mind in King John's case; and if he had disposed the sovereignty to a Turk, as some of our historiographers relate that he made an overture,e it is not likely that they would have turned Turkish slaves.**
…

His oeconomics are no better than his politics. He teacheth parents, that "they cannot be injurious to their children, so long as they are in their power."f Yes, too many ways, both by omission and commission. He teacheth mothers, that "they may cast away their infants or expose them at their own discretion lawfully."g He teacheth parents indifferently, that "where they are free from all subjection," they "may take away the lives of their children" or kill them, and this justly.h What horrid doctrines are these!
…

Hitherto he hath been too high for the parents. Now they must expect a cooling card. **"The question who is the better man, hath no place in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal."q Are the parent and child equal? Yes: "they are equal, who can do equal things one against another; but they who can do the greatest things, that is to kill, can do equal things; therefore all men by nature are equal among themselves."r** If the son have as strong an arm and as good a cudgel as his father, he is as good a man as his father.
…

How repugnant is this which he saith of the mother's dominion over her children to the law of nations! By the Law of the twelve tables a father might sell his child twice;—"*bis venum duat.*"b The mother had no hand in it. Neither doth the judicial law of the Jews dissent from this;—"If *a man* sell his daughter to be a maid-servant."
…

In the next place, his principles destroy the subordination of a wife to her husband. "The inequality of natural strength is less than that a man can acquire dominion over a woman without war."d And he giveth this reason, why the contrary custom prevaileth;—because "commonwealths" were "constituted by fathers of families, not by mothers of families," and from hence it is that "the domestical dominion belongs to the man."e The Scriptures assign another reason of the subjection of the woman, and the rule of the man; namely, the ordinance of Almighty God. And St. Paul secondeth it:—"Women are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law;"—**I trow that law was not made "by fathers of families:"**
…

I might cite St. Peter to the same purpose; **but I am afraid, lest he should accuse both St. Peter and St. Paul of partiality, as well as the first founders of commonwealths.**
…

So as, according to his principle, if a servant (that is more than a captive), having not only had his life spared by a just conqueror, but also contracted and engaged himself to be a loyal servant, as firmly as may be, **shall nevertheless be cast into any bonds by his master, or be restrained of his corporal liberty, upon delinquency, or just suspicion, he is acquitted of all his "pacts" and obligations, and as free to run away, or cut is master's throat, as if he had never "pacted" or engaged at all.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/576/mode/2up?view=theater

Sometimes he saith the laws of nature are God's laws:—"Whose laws (such of them as oblige all mankind), in respect of God, as He is the God of nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as He is King of Kings, are laws;"p and, "Right reason is a law;"q and he defines the law of nature to be "the dictate of right reason."r **Where by the way observe, what he makes to be the end of the laws of nature;—"the long conservation of our lives and members, so much as is in our power."s By this the reader may see what he believes of honesty or the life to come.**

…

He teacheth, that "the laws of nature are eternal and immutable; that which they forbid can never be lawful, that which they command never unlawful."a At other times he teacheth, that "in war, and especially in a war of all men against all men, the laws of nature are silent:"b and that they do not oblige as laws, before there be a commonwealth constituted;—"When a commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before."c
…

In one place he maintaineth, that "all men by nature are equal among themselves;"x in another place, that "the father of every man was originally his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death."y

> x De Cive, c. i. § 3. [p. 5.—"**Sunt igitur omnes homines naturâ inter se aequales.**"]

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/592/mode/2up?view=theater

A principal cause of his errors is a fancying to himself a general state of nature; which is so far from being general, that there is not an instance to be found of it in the nature of things, where mankind was altogether without laws and without governors, guided only by self-interest, without any sense of conscience, justice, honesty, or honour. He may search all the corners of America with a candle and lanthorn at noon day, and after his fruitless pains, return a *'non est inventus.'*

Yet all plants and living creatures are subject to degenerate and grow wild by degrees. Suppose it should so happen, that some remnant of men, either chased by war or persecution, or forced out of the habitable world for some crimes by themselves committed, or being cast by shipwreck upon some deserts, by long conversing with savage beasts, lions, bears, wolves, and tigers, should in time become more "brutish" (it is his own epithet) than the brutes themselves, **would any man in his right wits make that to be the universal condition of mankind, which was only the condition of an odd handful of men? or that to be "the state of nature," which was not the state of nature, but an accidental degeneration?**

He that will behold the state of nature rightly, must look upon the family of Adam, and his posterity in their successive generations from the creation to the deluge, and from the deluge until Abraham's time, when the first "kingdom of God by pact" is supposed by T.H. to begin.t **All this while (which was a great part of that time the world hath stood) from the creation, lasted "the kingdom of God by nature," as he phraseth it;u and yet in those days there were laws and governments, and more kings in the world than there are at this present;** we find nine kings engaged in one war, and yet all their dominions but a narrow circuit of land. And so it continued for divers hundreds of years after; as we see by all those kings which Joshua discomfited in the land of Canaan. Every city had its own king. **The reason is evident;—the original right of fathers of families was not then extinguished.**

Indeed T.H. supposeth, that men did spring out of the earth like mushrooms or mandrakes:—"That we may return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if they were even now suddenly sprouted and grown out of the earth, after the manner of mushrooms, without any obligation of one to another."v **But this supposition is both false and atheistical, howsoever it dropt from his pen.**
…

All other writers of politics do derive commonwealths from the sociability of nature, which is in mankind; most truly. But he will have the beginning of all human society to be "from mutual fear"l as much contrary to reason as to authority. We see some kind of creatures delight altogether in solitude, rarely or never in company. We see others (among which is mankind) delight altogether in company, rarely or never in solitude. Let him tell me, what mutual fear of danger did draw the silly bees into swarms? or the sheep and doves into flocks? and what protection they can hope for, one from another? and I shall conceive it possible, that the beginning of human society might be from fear also.

And thus having invented a fit foundation for his intended building, ycleped "the state of mere nature,"m which he himself first devised for that purpose, he hath been long moduling and framing to himself a new form of policy, to be builded upon it: but the best is, it hath only been in paper; all this while he hath never had a finger in mortar. **This is the new frame of "absolute sovereignty;"n which T.H. knew right well would never stand, nor he should be ever permitted to rear it up in our European climates, or in any other part of the habitable world, which had ever seen any other form of civil government. Therefore he hath sought out for a fit place in America,o among the savages;** to try if perhaps they might be persuaded, that the laws of God and nature, the names of good and evil, just and unjust, did signify nothing, but at the pleasure of the sovereign prince.

And because there hath been much clashing in these quarters about religion, through the distempered zeal of some, the seditious orations of others, and some pernicious principles, well meant at first, but ill understood, and worse pursued; to prevent all such garboils in his commonwealth, he hath taken an order to make his sovereign to be "Christ's lieutenant upon earth, in obedience to whose commands true religion doth consist;"p **thus making policy to be the building, and religion the hangings,** which must be fashioned just according to the proportion of the policy; and not (as Mr. Cartwright would have had it)q making religion to be the building, and policy the hangings, which must be conformed to religion.

Well, the law is costly, and I am for an accommodation;—**that T.H. should have the sole privilege of setting up his form of government in America, as being calculated and fitted for that meridian; and if it prosper there, then to have the liberty to transplant it hither.** Who knoweth (if there could but be some means devised to make them understand his language), whether the Americans might not choose him to be their sovereign? **But all the fear is, that if he should put his principles in practice as magistrally as he doth dictate them, his supposed subjects might chance to tear their "mortal God"r in pieces with their teeth, and entomb his sovereignty in their bowels.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT324#v=onepage&q&f=false

In November 1660 Stillingfleet published the first edition of *Irenicum*, a treatise that sought to use natural law theory to cut through the intractable scriptural debates between Presbyterians and Episcopalians as to which form of church government was *jure divino*.
…

Stillingfleet postulated a state of absolute liberty where the silence of the law of nature constituted a natural right of permission for individuals to do whatever they wanted.23 Knowing well enough that this might raise the suspicion of unacceptable Hobbism, **Stillingfleet was careful to point out that even Hobbes in *De Cive* acknowledged that this was a *hypothetical* state and that in reality children are born into patriarchal authority.**24 This much established, Stillingfleet went ahead with a contractarian story in which individuals part with their natural right establish a civil state.25
…

Stillingfleet clearly knew that he was playing with dangerous ideas when he deployed these concepts in *Irenicum*. In order to avoid misunderstanding he made it clear that the duties of natural law were not subject to positive human law, **this being the notorious Hobbesian inversion of the traditional relationship between the two forms of obligation.**26

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT628#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 13. In fact in the same section, **Stillingfleet covertly follows Hobbes by agreeing with 'the Best Writers on this Subject' that a bound slave possesses a right of war against his master.** This section of chapter 8 of *De Cive* had been assaulted by Clarendon and Bramhall as a legitimation of rebellion.

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/100/mode/2up?view=theater

But we must know in the first place by what means the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons of men. **Where such a right is gotten, there is a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a king, is nothing else but to have dominion over many persons; and thus a great family is a kingdom, and a little kingdom a family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly (like mushrooms) come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other.** There are but three ways only, whereby one can have a dominion over the person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutual contract made between themselves (for peace and self-defence's sake) they have willingly given up themselves to the power and authority of some man, or council of men; and of this we have already spoken. The second is, if a man taken prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting his own forces, (to avoid death) promises the conqueror or the stronger party his service, that is, to do all whatsoever he shall command him. In which contract, the good which the vanquished or inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might have been deprived of; but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By virtue therefore of this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the divine laws; for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before he knows what he will command him, is simply and without any restriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tied, is called a servant; he to whom he is tied, a lord. Thirdly, there is a right acquired over the person of a man by generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following chapter.

2. Every one that is taken in the war, and hath his life spared him, is not supposed to have contracted with his lord; for every one is not trusted with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able, if he desired it,

either to fly away, or quit his service, or contrive any mischief to his lord. And these serve indeed, but within prisons, or bound within irons; and therefore they were called not by the common name of servant only, but by the peculiar name of slave, **even as now at this day, *un serviteur*, and *un serf*, or *un esclave* have diverse significations.**

3. **The obligation therefore of a servant to his lord ariseth not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives from contract; but where is no trust, there can be no contract, as appears by chap. ii. art. 9, where a compact is defined to be the promise of him who is trusted.** There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty; so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had happened, he might not only have made his escape, but also have killed his lord, who was the preserver of his life.

4. Wherefore such kind of servants as are restrained by imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of servants given above, because those serve not for the contract's sake, but to the end they may not suffer. **And therefore if they fly, or kill their lord, they offend not against the laws of nature. For to bind any man is a plain sign, that the binder supposes him that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation.**

5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is not, than over one that is bound; for he hath a supreme power over both, and may say of his servant no less than of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine. Whence it follows, that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the lord's; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath he, by his lord's distribution, a propriety and dominion over his own goods, insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, **that a subject hath nothing properly his own against the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow-subject.**

6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and all that belongs to him are his lord's, and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant, according to his own will and pleasure.

7. Furthermore, **what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive government, namely, that he who hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also concerning servants,** because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their wills, but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.

8. **But if it happen that the lord, either by captivity or voluntary subjection, doth become a servant or subject to another, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his servants;** supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now because not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord's; therefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord have an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be derived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly passed over by the civil law.

9. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection. First, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission; which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city. Secondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him, which in a city is banishment; neither differs it from manumission in effect, but in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment: in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things, so servants also are acquired by war, whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir. For no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. **Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given.** But the lord who himself serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme; for, as hath been shewed before, **such servants are not his, but the supreme lord's.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/110/mode/2up?view=theater

Neither do I know that any writer hath fully declared what liberty, and what slavery is. Commonly to do all things according to our own fancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed to be liberty; not to be able to do this, is judged bondage; which in a civil government, and with the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done, because there is no city without a command and a restraining right.

> **Liberty, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion; as water shut up in a vessel is therefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders it from running out; which, the vessel being broken, is made free.**
> …
>
> **In which sense all servants and subjects are free, who are not fettered and imprisoned.**
> …
>
> **And herein consists civil liberty; for no man, whether subject, son, or servant, is so hindered by the punishments appointed by the city, the father, or the lord, how cruel soever, <u>but that he may do all things, and make use of all means necessary to the preservation of his life and health.</u>**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3wllAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PP29#v=onepage&q&f=false

But because I would not seem to see only with mine own eyes, I desired yet to be better informed of these things, and from whom better then Mr. *Hobbs*, and *Hugo Grotius*, (Men no doubt of as eminent learning and parts, as any this last Age hath produced) **these Men both derive their *civitas* from such Principles, as is before spoken of, *viz. From the Pacts and contracts of Men in a parity and equal condition*;** but so far was I from being convinced, that (if I understand them aright) I was amazed to see such inconsistible and impossible things to come from Men, otherwise so learned.

For though Mr. *Hobbs* does lay down his Principles, and persue his method much more clearly then *Grotius* does; yet his Principles are so monstrous, That to me it is impossible any ingenuous Man should assent to them. Indeed if Mr. *Hobbs* would have supposed, that the state of Man had been either in Society, or out of Society; and that out of Society, Men had been in such a state as he makes them, in his state of pure Nature, I should never have stumbled at it: **But, he forsooth, requires it for a Principle, *That all Men* jure naturali, *are in a parity and equal condition, and may kill one another without any offence or sin; and that Men continue in this estate, until by their civil Pact, they oblige themselves to one another, that the will of the* civitas *shall be the will of them all.***

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT369#v=onepage&q&f=false

Coke bases his case for natural inequality upon an assumption about the character of divine obligations. If God had granted Adam any authority at all, then no two men could have been equal since.
…

The juridical problem stemmed from Hobbes's attempt to separate *lex* and *jus*, where the latter now took precedence; for Coke, rights transfer alone could not create obligations, because obligations could only arise from laws. **If *jus naturae* was superior to *lex naturae* then, as Coke puts it, every man's natural right is superior to any law.** For Coke Hobbes confirmed this in his statements about the end of obligation in 2.18.

> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/38/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 18. **No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his body.** For there is in every man a certain high degree of fear, through which he apprehends that evil which is done to him to be the greatest; and therefore by natural necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is supposed he can do no otherwise. When a man is arrived to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight or fight. **Since therefore no man is tied to impossibilities, they who are threatened either with death, (which is the greatest evil to nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to endure them. Furthermore, he that is tied by contract is trusted, (<u>for faith only is the bond of contracts</u>) but they who are brought to punishment, either capital, or more gentle, are fettered, or strongly guarded, <u>which is a most certain sign that they seemed not sufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts.</u>** It is one thing, if I promise thus: if I do it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist. All men, if need be, contract the first way, but there is need sometimes. This second way, none; neither is it ever needful; **for in the mere state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state itself affords you a right;** insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterwards kill him. But in a civil state, where the right of life, and death, and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme; that same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. **<u>Neither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to yield to his punishment, but only this, that no man offer to defend others from him.</u>**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3wllAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=RA1-PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nor does he only make Fear to be the prime cause of all Humane Government and Civil Society, but also (*chap.* 16. *art.* 1.) he makes it the cause of all Religion, and Worship of God.

As if that men were not obliged to submit to higher Powers, *not only for wrath*, (take it in what sense you will, either fear of the wrath of the higher Powers, or mutual fear of the wrath of other men) *but also for conscience sake*: And that God were not in gratitude to be worshipped and served by ingenuous men, because he is good, and created them intellectual and reasonable creatures; but only by a servile fear of his Judgments, from whence only vile and vitious men seem to, but never truly serve or honor him. **A pretty institution of Religion and Government for the Men of *Bedlam*, and Wives of *Billingsgate*.**
...

If Mr. *Hobbs* had by a state of Nature understood such a state as S. *Paul* does, ***viz*. of men who have only the Law of Nature, and not Gods Divine Law supernaturally revealed in the Scriptures, to be their rule and guide;** and that men in such a state not having the Law, may by Nature do the things contained in the Law, (for this Law is ingraven in the hearts of all men) he should have disputed without an Adversary for me. **But when he makes all men *Jure naturali* (which is superior, and the cause of all Laws of Nature) to be equal, and in a parity of condition,** and every man by his own natural right to have a power over every man, and to kill and destroy them, whensoever it seems good unto him, and yet without any sin; and that this State is only to be cured by the Laws of Nature of his own making, (although he would have them to be Divine Law, and contrary to Natural rights) is such a monstrous Paradox and absurdity, as I wonder any Ingenuous man should assent to it.
...

It is not worth the examining, what he would have under the title of *Religion*; for men say, the man is of none himself, and complains (they say) he cannot walk the streets, buy the Boys point at him, saying, *There goes HOBBS the Atheist!* It may be therefore the reason, **why in all his Laws of Nature, he allows no place for the Worship and Service of *GOD*.**
...

1. His marginal Note up *Art*. 3. *Cap*. 1. is, ***Homines naturâ aequales esse inter se*.**

There is no one Proposition in the world more false then this, nor more destructive to all faith, and truth of Sacred History. For whereas he says, that by nature Men are equal to one another; if the Scriptures be true, that God made *Adam* an Universal Monarch (as he says) as well over his Wife and Children, as other Creatures; and that since *Adam*, God did never create any Man, but the species of Mankind was continued by generation, and that (as he says) Primogeniture is preferred by the Law of Nature, (which *Cap*. 3. *Art*. 29. is immutable;) **then it is impossible that since *Adam* any two men in the world can be equal, where God does not make them so.**
...

2. His argument to prove the Natural equality of all Men, is, *Aequales sunt, qui aequalia contra se invicem possunt: At qui maxima possunt, nimirum occidere, aequalia possunt: Ergo, Homines natura aequales inter se*.

His minor Proposition is no where proved; and I am sure, contrary to what God says, *Whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made he man*.
...

4. *Filium in statu naturali intelligi non posse*.

And therefore from *Adam* to our Saviour, could there be no such natural state; For S. *Luke*, *cap*. 3. gives a Genealogie of *Adams* sons, and sons sons, to our Saviour: And since, I do not think Mr. *Hobbs* can shew, that ever there was such a state in the world.
...

11. *No man can be obliged by his Pact, not to resist him, who brings or intends damage to his body.*

And therefore no penal Laws can be executed; but Subjects are freed from their obedience, whensoever they have so far transgressed Laws, that they become liable to any corporal punishment; for where men may resist, there can be no subjection.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Parker_(bishop_of_Oxford)

His *Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie* (1670) advocated state regulation of religious affairs, and is his major work.[8] It has been called "the most ferocious of the Restoration assaults upon the dissenters".[9]

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17388/17388-h/17388-h.htm#CHAPTER_V

He was a coarse-fibred, essentially irreligious fellow, **the accredited author of the reply to the question "What is the best body of Divinity?" "That which would help a man to keep a Coach and six horses,"** but he is a lucid and vigorous writer, knowing very well that he had to steer his ship through a narrow and dangerous channel, avoiding Hobbism on the one side and tender consciences on the other. **Each generation of State Churchmen has the same task.** The channel remains to-day just as it ever did, with Scylla and Charybdis presiding over their rocks as of old. Hobbes's *Leviathan* appeared in 1651, and in 1670 both his philosophy and his statecraft were fashionable doctrine. **All**

really pious people called Hobbes an Atheist. Technically he was nothing of the sort, but it matters little what he was technically, since no plain man who can read can doubt that Hobbes's enthronement of the State was the dethronement of God:—
…

The Church of England, though anxious both to support the king and suppress the Dissenters, could not stomach Hobbes; but if it could not, how was it to deal with Hobbes's question, "if it is *ever* right to disobey your lawful prince, who is to determine *when* it is right?"

Parker seeks to grapple with this difficulty. He disowns Hobbes.

> "When men have once swallowed this principle, **that Mankind is free from all obligations antecedent to the laws of the Commonwealth, and that the Will of the Sovereign Power is the only measure of Good and Evil,** they proceed suitably to its consequences to believe that no Religion can obtain the force of law till it is established as such by supreme authority, that the Holy Scriptures were not laws to any man till they were enjoyn'd by the Christian Magistrate, **and that if the Sovereign Power would declare the Alcoran to be Canonical Scripture, it would be as much the Word of God as the Four Gospels.** (See *Hobbes*, vol. iii. p. 366.) **So that all Religions are in reality nothing but Cheats and impostures to awe the common people to obedience. And therefore although Princes may wisely make use of the foibles of Religion to serve their own turns upon the silly multitude, yet 'tis below their wisdom to be seriously concerned themselves for such fooleries.**" (Parker's *Ecc. Politie*, p. 137.)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Preface_to_Cato%27s_Letters

> But whatever offence the high claimers of spiritual dominion gave Mr. Trenchard, he was sincerely for preserving the Established Church, and would have heartily opposed any attempt to alter it. He was against all levelling in church and state, and fearful of trying experiments upon the constitution. He thought that it was already upon a very good balance; and no man was more falsely accused of an intention to pull it down. The establishment was his standard; and he was only for pulling down those who would soar above it, and trample upon it. **If he offended churchmen, while he defended the legal church, the blame was not his. He knew of no authority that they had, but what the laws gave them; nor can they shew any other. The sanctions of a thousand synods, the names and volumes of ten thousand fathers, weigh not one grain in this argument. They are no more rules to us, than the oracles of Delphos, no more than a college of augurs. Acts of Parliament alone constitute and limit our church government, and create our clergy; and upon this article Mr. Trenchard only asserted what they themselves had sworn.**

As against this fashionable Hobbism, Parker pleads Conscience.

> "When anything that is apparently and intrinsically evil is the Matter of a Human Law, whether it be of a Civil or Ecclesiastical concern, here God is to be obeyed rather than Man."

He forcibly adds:—

> "Those who would take off from the Consciences of Men all obligations antecedent to those of Human Laws, instead of making the power of Princes Supreme, Absolute and Uncontrollable, they utterly enervate all their authority, and set their subjects at perfect liberty from all their commands. **For if we once remove all the antecedent obligations of Conscience and Religion, Men will no further be bound to submit to their laws than only as themselves shall see convenient, and if they are under no other restraint it will be their wisdom to rebel as oft as it is their interest.**" (*Ecc. Politie*, pp. 112-113.)

But though when dealing with Hobbes, Parker thinks fit to assert the claims of conscience so strongly, when he has to grapple with those who, like the immortal author of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, "devilishly and perniciously abstained from coming to Church," and upheld "unlawful Meetings and Conventicles," his tone alters, and it is hard to distinguish his position from that of the philosopher of Malmesbury.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q&f=false

In *A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature and of the Christian Religion* (1681), Bishop Samuel Parker of Oxford, **in contrast to Cumberland, argued that God backed up the natural laws not with natural sanctions in this world but with supernatural sanctions after death.** It was the threat of punishment and the promise of reward in an afterlife, he thought, that provided us with the right kind of motivation to obey the natural law. Parker's critique of the Epicureans was familiar: they 'would take away all natural Obligations to Religion, Justice and Honesty' and they 'first endeavour to free the minds of men from all apprehensions of a Divine Providence.'38 **'Without a Lawgiver there can be no Laws,' he remarked in a classically voluntarist manner, using this observation to slide from the Epicureans, who were at least 'consistent with themselves and their Principles,' over to a consideration of 'Master *Hobs*,' who, 'that he may be constant to his own way of contradicting himself,' has 'given us a Body of Natural Laws that were never enacted by the Authority of**

a Legislator.'39 **This kind of criticism of the Epicureans was not, however, balanced with any praise for the Stoics.** Rather, 'having thus far and fairly casheird the Epicurean Principles' over thirty pages, Parker continued with a section on 'the vanity of the stoical Philosophy represented.' Here he could be 'so much the more brief, he judged, in part owing to the way in which 'they relie upon the same Principles' as the Epicureans, so that 'when reduced to practice [they] will resolve themselves into the same Actions.'40

The basic mistake of the Stoics, according to Parker, was their belief that 'every Man's Happiness' could be 'spun out of his own Bowels.'41 'This indeed were a great and glorious Account of things, were it supported by any wise and sober Principles,' he wrote, 'but alas it is so far from having any real Foundation, that it is inconsistent with the first and fundamental Principle of humane Nature,' which Parker described as 'the natural passion of Self-love' that led mankind 'to pursue what it supposes will advance its Content and Happiness, and shun whatever may impair or destroy it.'42 The Stoics' vanity induced them to neglect the fact that 'their Bodies are one half of their Natures,' with 'sensual Appetites too gross to be satiated by bare Thoughts and Reflections'; **and their pedantry made them far too concerned with the 'power of Phrases' at the expense of 'the nature and reality of things.'**43

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Tenison,_Thomas

TENISON, THOMAS (1636-1715), archbishop of Canterbury, was born, according to the parish register, on 29 Sept. 1636 at Cottenham, Cambridgeshire.
...

His first book, 'The Creed of Mr. Hobbes examined,' was published in 1670.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/a64353.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

Mr. *Hobbes.*

The natural condition of Mankind may be thus explained.

Nature hath made Men so equal[a] in the faculties of Body and Mind; as that, when all is reckoned together, the difference between Man and Man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two Men, desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become Enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their Delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. Whereupon some are invited to invade others, and from others may fear the like invasion.

From equality of ability, competition ariseth fomented by equality of hope; and from thence diffidence of one another: And from this diffidence attended with desire of glory in conquering, there ariseth a war of every Man against every Man.

And therefore, whatsoever is consequent to a time of War, where every Man is enemy to every Man; the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth, no Navigation, nor use of the Commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledg of the face of the earth; no account of time, no Arts; no Letters; no Society; **and, which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.**

To this War of every Man against every Man, this also is consequent. That nothing can be unjust. The notions of Right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. **Force and Fraud, are in war the two Cardinal Virtues. Justice and Injustice are none of the Faculties, neither of the Body, nor Mind.** If they were, they might be in a Man that were alone in the World, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to Men in Society, not in Solitude. **It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but only, that to be every Man's that he can get; and for so long as he can keep it.**

And this is the ill condition, which Man by meer nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it: consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that encline men to peace, are, fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; & a hope by their industry to obtain them. **And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which Men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.**

Stud.

It is a very absurd and unsecure course to lay the ground-work of all civil Polity and formed Religion, upon such a supposed state of Nature, as hath no firmer support than the contrivance of your own fancy. Let *Ptolemy* endeavour a Solution of those appearances which arise from the heavenly Bodies, by one sort of Scheme; and *Tycho* by another, and *Copernicus* by a third; and let *Des-Cartes* attempt a fourth; for the declaring, not only in what manner, but by what Efficient Cause, the Starrs may move; for thus far the interests of Men remain secure, not being minded by such remote Models and Hypotheses. But when the Temporal and Eternal safety of Mankind is concerned (as in the Doctrines of Civil and Moral, and Christian Philosophy) then are Hypotheses, framed by imagination, and not by reason assisted with Memory touching the passed state of the World, as exceedingly dangerous as they are absurd. **Wherefore, such persons who trouble the World with fancied Schemes and Models of Polity, in Oceana's and Leviathan's, ought to have in their Minds an usual saying of the most excellent Lord *Bacon* concerning a Philosophy advanced upon the History of Nature.** That[a] such a work is the World as God made it, and not as Men have made it: for that it hath nothing of Imagination.

The faithful Records of time give us another account of the Origin of Nations; and common Sense, whereby one apprehends in another's birth, the manner of his own, doth sufficiently instruct us in this truth, that we are born, and grow up under Government; **Our Parents being[a] before the Institution of Commonwealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families: And as *Hierocles* speaketh,[b] Gods upon Earth.** Wherefore *Cicero,* discoursing of the many Degrees of the Society of Men, calleth[c] Wedlock the beginning of a City; and, as it were, the Seminary of a Kingdom.

c. *Cicero de Offic. l.* 1. *S.* 17. *op p.* 1217. *Principium urbis & quasi Seminarium Reipublicae.*

So that, to talk of such a state of nature as supposeth an Independency of one person upon another, is to lay aside not only the History of *Moses*, but also of Experience, which teacheth that we are born Infants, (of Parents, for that reason, to be obey'd), and to put some such cheat upon the World, **as Nurses are wont, in sport, to put upon unwary Children, when they tell them, they started up out of the Parsley-bed.** And verily some such odd conceit is to be suspected in that Man who says, that all is Matter, and by consequence, that Mankind arose, at first, out of the fortuitous Concretions of it. ***Epicurus* therefore in sequel of that doctrine of his, that all things were produced by atoms, explained the birth of Man, by supposing certain swelling bags or wombs upon the earth, which brake at last, and let forth Infants[d] nourished by her Juice, clothed by her Vapours, provided of a bed in the soft grass: and he also taught that in the beginning (though he knew not when) Men wander'd about like Beasts, and every one was for himself, and that meerly to secure themselves, they combin'd into Societies; and that those Societies were formed by Pacts and Covenants, and that from those Covenants sprang good and evil, just and unjust.** For, such a Romance is to be read, at large, in his Compurgator, *Gassendus,*[a] who subjoyneth no Essay of confutation.

d. *Lucret. Crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti, &c.* a. *Gassend. Phil. Epi. Synt. c.* 26. *de Orig. Juris, p* 238, 239.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D772

Then it was
This earth of thine first gave unto the day
The mortal generations; [mortalia saecla] for prevailed
Among the fields abounding hot and wet.
And hence, where any fitting spot was given,
There 'gan to grow womb-cavities, by roots
Affixed to earth. And when in ripened time
The age of the young within (that sought the air
And fled earth's damps) had burst these wombs, O then
Would Nature thither turn the pores of earth
And make her spurt from open veins a juice
Like unto milk; even as a woman now
Is filled, at child-bearing, with the sweet milk,
Because all that swift stream of aliment
Is thither turned unto the mother-breasts.
There earth would furnish to the children food;
Warmth was their swaddling cloth, the grass their bed
Abounding in soft down. Earth's newness then
Would rouse no dour spells of the bitter cold,
Nor extreme heats nor winds of mighty powers –
For all things grow and gather strength through time
In like proportions; and then earth was young.
...

In suchwise, then, the lapsing aeons change
The nature of the whole wide world, and earth
Taketh one status after other. **And what**
She bore of old, she now can bear no longer,
And what she never bore, she can to-day.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/740/mode/2up?view=theater

> Mirabaud, **from 1742 the Abbé Houtteville's successor as permanent secretary of the Académie Française,** formerly friendly with Boulainvilliers and now a central figure of the budding *parti philosophique*, stoutly maintained in his *Le Monde, son origine et son antiquité*, composed probably before 1722 and later published clandestinely in 1751,40 **that the ancient Greek philosophers made no recourse to any 'Être intelligent' in order to explain 'la production des animaux.'**
> …
>
> But as articulated by Mirabaud the idea still seemed implausibly simplistic. **For he got no further than surmising, like his favourite philosophical ancients, that men, animals, and plants just sprang or grew up out of the earth in some way, no doubt 'comme des champignons' – as a Jesuit critic commented sarcastically.**42

Mr. *Hobbes.*

It may[b] peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of War, as this now described; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the World: But there are many places where they live so now. For, the Savage People in many places of *America,* except the Government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on Natural Lust, have no Government at all, and live at this day in a brutish manner.

Stud.

I am sorry that so much barbarousness being charged upon Mankind, so little of the imputation can be fairly taken off Yet that the condition of human nature is not so very rude as you seem to represent it, appeareth from many passages in undoubted Story. *Iustin,*[c] in his Epitom of *Trogus Pompeius,* describeth the ancient *Scythians* in such a manner, that their Behaviour seemeth to upbraid those People, who call themselves, The Civilized parts of the World. By him we are informed,

> That they had neither Houses, nor Enclosures of ground, but wander'd with their Cattel in solitary and untilled Desarts; That Justice had honour derived, to it, not from positive Law, but from the good natures of the People. That no man was more odious, amongst them than the Invader of such things as were occupied by another.

In consideration of which inbred civility, the Historian wisheth that the other Nations of the World were followers of the *Scythick* Moderation; after which, he thus concludeth.

> It may seem a matter fit to be admired, that Nature should bestow that upon the *Scythians,* which the *Graecians* themselves, though long instructed by the Doctrines and Precepts of Law-givers and Philosophers, have not attain'd to: and that formed manners should be excelled by uneducated Barbarity.

But, let it be supposed that many brutish Families in *America* **(in whose stead you might have rather mentioned the wild *Arabes*[a]),** are so many dens of Robbers, and live by such prey as their power and wildness can provide for them. Yet by this Instance, because it is made in Families, where Government has place, you rather overthrow than prove your supposed state of Nature. Wherefore, in a note added, upon second thoughts, to your Book *de Cive*[b] in order to a Solution of this Argument [that the Son killing his Parent, in the state of Nature, acteth unjustly] you subjoin an Answer to this effect: A man cannot be understood to be a son in the meer state of Nature, seeing as soon as he is born he is under the lawful[c] Power and Government of them, to whom he oweth his conservation; to wit, of his Mother or Father, or to him who affords him Provisions of common life.

It is further to be marked, that one Family, as it stands separated from another, is as one Kingdom divided from the Territories of a Neighbouring Monarch. **If therefore the state of Nature remaineth in a Family not depending upon another Family, in places where there is no common Government; then all Kingdoms which have not made Leagues with one another, are, at this day, in the same state.** Whereas they rather are in a state of defence dictated by prudence; and, as you say, in the posture[a] of Gladiators, having their swords pointing, and their Eyes fixed on one another, than in a state of War, prompted by pride and insatiable ambition. And therefore no affront being offered to a foreign Prince before his Invasion, he is esteem'd both injurious and unjust, whilst for no other reason than his greedy Will, he thrusts inoffensive people out of ancient possession. I know you esteem all distinct Kingdoms in a state of War in relation to each other,[b] and that therefore they have a right, if they have a Power of invading: **but he that consults *Grotius,* in his Book *de jure belli & Pacis* (designed chiefly[c] to set forth the Rights, not of Domestick, but Forensick War) will not be much of your opinion; neither will he, easily, be reconcil'd to the Practice of the *Romans,* in *Petronius Arbiter,*[d] (a Practice to which that of the *Spaniards* is akin), who made foreign Nations to be Enemies, as Princes sometimes make their Subjects, Traytors; for the sake of their Riches.**

> d. *Si qua foret tellus quae fulvum mitteret aurum, hostis erat.*

…

And thus, the Prince is always in a state of danger, because he cannot be, a day secure, of remaining uppermost; **seeing the people are taught by you, to believe that the right of Authority is a deceit, and that every one would have as good a title, if he had as long a sword:** For the many-headed Beast will throw the Rider when he burthens and galls them, having no check of inward Law. For the Prince has but the strength of a single man, and the people can't confer irresistible Power, unless when they lift up their hands on high, they can give up their nerves, and muscles, and spirits, as well as testifie their present approbation. **Wo to all the Princes upon earth, if this doctrine be true, and becometh popular:** if the multitude believe this, the Prince, not armed with the scales of the *Leviathan,* that is, with irresistible power, can never be safe from the Spears and Barbed irons, which their ambition and presumed interest will provide, and their malice will sharpen, and their passionate violence throw against him. **If the Beast, we speak of, come but to know its own strength, it will never be managed:** Wherefore such as own these pernicious doctrines, destructive to all Societies of men, may be said to have Wolves heads, as the Laws of old were wont to speak concerning excommunicated Persons; and are like those ravenous beasts, so far from deserving our love and care, that they ought to be destroyed at the common charge. **What you have written three times over, in your *de cive, de corpore politico,* and *Leviathan,* ought rather to be esteemed seeds of sedition, then Elements of government and societie: the Principles of the Zelots amongst the Papists (who obey a Forrein Power against the King) are not consistent with the government of *England*; yet, like the Elements in *Aristotle,* they are not burthensome in their proper place of *Italy*: but of such large infection is the doctrine, that it will endanger the life of the Common-wealth, wheresoever it is entertained in the consequences of it.**

Mr. *Hobbes.*

At *Paris*[a] I wrote my Book *de cive in Latine*—and I know no book more magnified then that beyond the Seas. Natural Philosophie[b] is but young; but civil Philosophie yet much younger, as being no older (I say it provoked, and that my detractors may know how little they have wrought upon me) then my own book *de Cive:* a short[c] sum of that book of mine, now publiquely in French, done by a Gentleman I never saw, carrieth the title of *Aethics demonstrated:* accuse not then such Politics, as are, though new, yet of sure foundation.

Stud.

Your Doctrine is old enough, and I wish it had one propertie of Age, to be attended with decay. *Carneades* and divers others bottom'd Policy and self-Interest, and you have only wire-drawn that which is delivered by them in a lump: and for this, as is the manner of divers who have an itch of writing, you claw your self. I could repeat to you, divers sayings of the ancient deceivers in Moralitie; such as are, *Armatus leges ut cogitem? nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum, —utilitas justi prope mater & aequi,* and the like: but you would then turn all off, by deriding me for having made a motly Oration. **I have somtimes, by my self, made this conjecture, that you being so conversant with *Thucydides*; the Oration of *Euphemus*[d] delivered there, might first hint to you your sandy Politicks:** for that *Athenian* Embassadour to the *Camarinai,* amongst other things tending much that way, at last plainly told them, that to a Governour nothing which was profitable was dishonest, or unreasonable: which Doctrine, because it invites ambitious men to step into Authority when the door is open, and mercenary soldiers to decide a dispute, not in favour of the right, but the most profitable side; because it moveth them that are supream to become Tyrants in the exercise of that power, which Religion ought to limit, though the people may not, and to make their passions their chief rules, and to govern with Armies rather then Laws, or, if with both, to dy their Flags, and to write their Edicts, in the blood of whom they please: because, I say, it taketh off all sence of what we call humanity from the supream powers, and so, not unlike to a *Porta Sabina,* calls in innumerable evils upon such people as are quiet and modest; it therefore ought, no more to be sucked in, by Prince or People, then pernicious air in time of common Pestilence.
…

In some things you are just to the Praerogative of Kings; but in others, you ought to have remembred the words of our Lord, who adviseth us to give to *Caesar* the things that are *Caesars,* and unto God the things that are Gods. For your cavil at the name Tyrant, it is in the sense I us'd it (for exercise of unlimited power) unbecoming a Prince: but I know how very frequently it is misapply'd by those, who will call the very bridling of their licentiousness, hateful Tyranny; and find fault with the law, for no other reason but because it is a restraint upon their supposed freedome: whereas the hedges which the law sets down, are to keep them only in the truest and safest way. **The absolute Princes of *Syracuse* were called Tyrants, though some of them deserved the title of Benefactors: and amongst our selves, the best of Kings was branded with that ignominious character.** For that which you have justly said in favour of a Monarch, had it bin Printed before Forty eight, it might have bin of good effect, at least it might have shewed a disposition to promote Loyalty. **But being published, after the Kings Martyrdom, and his Sons exile, it served the purposes of those people who had then the *Militia* in their hands.** For you say[a] that the Rights of a Common-wealth by acquisition, are the same with those, by Institution or Succession: That the power of the Representative (whether in one or many) cannot without consent be transferr'd, forfeited, accus'd, punish'd: and that such a person is Supreme Judge. The Parliament therefore ought to have return'd you thanks, for ascribing to them the strength of the Leviathan, and for keeping their *nostrils* free from the *books* of the right Heir and his adherents. They ought, especially, to have given you the thanks of the House for saying,[b] *I maintain nothing in any Paradox of Religion; but attend the end of that dispute of the Sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my Country-men decided) by which all sorts of Doctrine are to be*

approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech and writing; (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, be obeyed.

But notwithstanding all this, **what you seem to build up on the side of the Soveraign, you pull down on the side of the People.** For whilst you found all upon single Self-interest, (to the advancement of which all safe means are, by you, esteemed[c] lawful) these specious rights are no longer his, then by main force he can keep possession of them. That will not be long, if great Delinquents call'd in question, and miserable people (who, like such as stake their Cloak in an over-hot day, are willing to hazard the life they would be rid of; and are easily misled, not looking upon the stumbling-blocks in the way, but[d] on the light that others carry before them), if these, can promote their private good, by Sword, or Poyson, or Mutiny. **The people, if they believ'd that a company of Delinquents,[e] joyning together to defend themselves by Arms, do not at all unjustly; but may, lawfully, *repel* lawful *Force, by Force*; they would soon be stirred up, and suffer none, for whom they have respect, to be brought to justice.**

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA38#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is therefore already demonstrated, that each of them [*Hobbes and Tindal*] does give the Magistrate as great a Power in those Matters, as the other complements him with: **And indeed it is but a Bare, Mere, Impious, Dangerous, Deceitful, Antichristian, Blasphemous, *Atheistical* Flattery, to complement him with all the Power relating to Religion that Man is capable of, *only* and *solely* because he is Elected Governor of the Common-wealth by a *Mobb*, still in a *State of Nature*. And really I think one must be very short-sighted, if he does not see whence this Doctrine comes, whether it tends, and what the *Hypothesis* is, upon which 'tis solely bottom'd.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n85/mode/2up?view=theater

177 **Wherever a people has grown savage in arms so that human laws have no longer any place among it, the only powerful means of reducing it is religion.**

178 This axiom establishes the fact that divine providence initiated the process by which the fierce and violent were brought from their outlaw state to humanity and entered upon national life. It did so by awaking in them a confused idea of divinity, which they in their ignorance attributed to that to which it did not belong. **Thus through the terror of this imagined divinity, they began to put themselves in some order.**

179 Such an [initiating] principle of things Thomas Hobbes failed to see among his own "fierce and violent men," because he went afield in search of principles **and fell into error with the "chance" of his Epicurus.** He thought to enrich Greek philosophy by adding a great part which it certainly had lacked (as George Pasch observes in his *De eruditis huius saeculi inventis*): the study of man in the whole society of the human race. **But the result was as unhappy as the effort was noble. Nor would Hobbes have conceived this project if the Christian religion had not given him the inspiration for it. For it demands of all mankind not merely justice but charity. From this point begins the refutation of the false dictum of Polybius that if the world had philosophers there would be no need of religions. For if there were in the world no commonwealths, which cannot arise without religions, it would have no philosophers.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n197/mode/2up?view=theater

553 **Among the impious giants who had continued the infamous sharing of property and women, the quarrels produced by the sharing finally brought it about, at the end of a long period of time, that (to borrow the language of the jurists) Grotius's simpletons and Pufendorf's abandoned men had recourse to the altars of the strong to save themselves from Hobbes's violent men,** even as beasts driven by intense cold will sometimes seek salvation in inhabited places. Thereupon the strong, with a fierceness born of their union in the society of families, slew the violent who had violated their lands, and took under their protection the miserable creatures who had fled from them. **And above the heroism of nature which was theirs as having been born of Jove or engendered under his auspices, there now shone forth preëminently in them the heroism of virtue. In this heroism the Romans excelled all other peoples of the earth, practicing precisely these two aspects ot it, sparing the submissive and vanquishing the proud: *Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/546/mode/2up?view=theater

Political sophistication, the arts, civilization itself being inseparable from hierarchy in Voltaire's schema, he tended to be bitingly sarcastic about the concept of equality. **In a 'state of nature,' such as primitive man had once shared with the quadrupeds, birds, and reptiles, he was willing to grant, Man had doubtless lived in a state of perfect equality.** There 'domination' would indeed have been unthinkable, an absurdity. But, as far as he could see, in any more developed society, the

concept was not in any way constructive or in the least appealing: 'l'égalité,' as he summed the matter up, 'est donc à la fois la chose la plus naturelle, et en même temps la plus chimérique.'9

German Natural Law theory and Barbeyrac, while, like Hobbes, certainly proclaiming a fully secularized 'natural equality' in the pre-political status of Man and one applying universally, were scarcely less disdainful of equality under society and the state than Voltaire. Anxious to underpin the patriarchal family, aristocracy, and kingship, **these theorists immediately cancelled their starting point of 'natural equality,'** asserting the 'natural' inequality ordained by God in his highly unequal distribution of authority, family sway, status, and property.10
…

Locke, of course, in his *Second Treatise of Government*, likewise asserts that 'all men by nature are equal.'32 But for both Hobbes in large part, and also Locke, this 'equality of men by nature' effectively ceases with the advent of the state and has no reformist social implications and few other than strictly constitutional consequences in society constituted under a ruler;33 and where it does, it persists in Locke primarily as an equality of conscience and the duty of salvation. **Hobbes was undoubtedly the first general theorist of equality in the state of nature;** but, by insisting, as he does, on the huge qualitative change that occurs with the transition, through the social contract, to life under the state, **it is equally correct to say that he constructs a naturalist theory of structured, justified inequality: 'the inequality of subjects,' he affirms in the *Leviathan*, 'proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power,'** something which, for him, overrides most of the natural rights preceding the state of society and politics. **Locke too immediately claws back from his statement 'that all men by nature are equal,' listing 'birth' rather obscurely as one important qualification, meaning certainly subjection of children to parents, and women to men, but implying at least also subordination of those of lower social status to royalty and nobility.**34

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Disquisition_on_Government

A Disquisition on Government is a political treatise written by U.S. Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina and published posthumously in 1851.

https://archive.org/details/adisquisitionon00cralgoog/page/n66/mode/2up?view=theater

Liberty, indeed, though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that of protection; inasmuch, as the end of the former is the progress and improvement of the race,—while that of the latter is its preservation and perpetuation. And hence, when the two come into conflict, **liberty must, and ever ought, to yield to protection; as the existence of the race is of greater moment than its improvement.**

> https://ifstudies.org/blog/what-home-ownership-has-to-do-with-healthy-families
>
> **In 1911, G.K. Chesterton described family ownership of income-generating property as not only one policy goal among many, but the only proper criterion by which to judge a government:**
>
> > An honest man falls in love with an honest woman; he wishes, therefore, to marry her, to be the father of her children, to secure her and himself. All systems of government should be tested by whether he can do this. **If any system, feudal, servile, or barbaric, does, in fact, give him so large a cabbage-field that he can do it, there is the essence of liberty and justice. If any system, Republican, mercantile, or Eugenist, does, in fact, give him so small a salary that he can't do it, there is the essence of eternal tyranny and shame.**[1]

It follows, from what has been stated, **that it is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike;**—a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous and deserving;—and not a boon to be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded and vicious, to be capable either of appreciating or of enjoying it.
…

There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the one which has just been considered. **I refer to the opinion, that liberty and equality are so intimately united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality.**

That they are united to a certain extent,—**and that equality of citizens, in the eyes of the law, is essential to liberty in a popular government, is conceded.** But to go further, and make equality of *condition* essential to liberty, would be to destroy both liberty and progress. The reason is, that inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is, at the same time, indispensable to progress.
…

These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion that all men are born free and equal;—than which nothing can be more unfounded and false. It rests upon the assumption of a fact, which is contrary to universal observation, in whatever light it may be regarded. **It is, indeed, difficult to explain how an opinion so destitute of all sound reason, ever could have been so extensively entertained, unless we regard it as being confounded with another, which has some semblance of truth;—but which, when properly understood, is not less false and dangerous. I refer to the assertion, that all men are equal in the state of nature; meaning, by a state of nature, a state of individuality, supposed to have existed prior to the social and political state; and in which men lived apart and independent of each other.** If such a state ever did exist, all men would have been, indeed, free and equal in it; that is, free to do as they pleased, and exempt from the authority or control of others—as, by supposition, it existed anterior to society and government. But such a state is purely hypothetical. **It never did, nor can exist; as it is inconsistent with the preservation and perpetuation of the race. It is, therefore, a great misnomer to call it *the state of nature.* Instead of being the natural state of man, it is, of all conceivable states, the most opposed to his nature—most repugnant to his feelings, and most incompatible with his wants. His natural state is, the social and political—the one for which his Creator made him, and the only one in which he can preserve and protect his race.** As, then, there never was such a state as the, so called, state of nature, and never can be, it follows, that men, instead of being born in it, are born in the social and political state; and of course, **instead of being born free and equal, are born subject, not only to parental authority, but to the laws and institutions of the country where born and under whose protection they draw their first breath.**

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/002826.html

In 1860 in New Orleans, Sherman reacted to the secession of South Carolina by saying to neighbors that if the Union allowed a Southern republic to secede, it itself would soon divide: **“If Louisiana joins this unhallowed movement to dismember our government how long will it be till her parishes and people insult and deride her?”**

He felt that a North shorn of the south could still survive and thrive as long as it possessed the Mississippi. But not if Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas should secede: “Then there must be war, fighting that will continue till one or the other party is subdued.”

> You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty and you cannot refine it … I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices today than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and division of our country. **If the United States submits to a division it will not stop but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war** …

https://www.covenanter.org/reformed/2016/5/22/womens-rights-women

To meet the argument of these aspiring Amazons fairly, one must teach, with Moses, the Apostle Paul, John Hampden, Washington, George Mason, John C. Calhoun, and all that contemptible rabble of “old fogies,” that political society is composed of “superiors, inferiors, and equals”; that while all these bear an equitable moral relation to each other, they have very different natural rights and duties; that just government is not founded on the consent of the individuals governed, but on the ordinance of God, and hence a share in the ruling franchise is not a natural right at all, but a privilege to be bestowed according to a wise discretion on a limited class having qualification to use it for the good of the whole; **that the integers out of which the State is constituted are not individuals, but families represented in their parental heads; that every human being is born under authority (parental and civic) instead of being born “free” in the licentious sense that liberty is each one’s privilege of doing what he chooses; that subordination, and not that license, is the natural state of all men;** and that without such equitable distribution of different duties and rights among the classes naturally differing in condition, and subordination of some to others, and of all to the law, society is as impossible as is the existence of a house without distinction between the foundationstone and the cap-stones.

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.4Secular/page/n7/mode/2up?view=theater

Our fathers valued liberty, but the liberty for which they contended was each person's privilege to do those things and those only to which God's law and Providence gave him a moral right. **The liberty of nature which your modern asserts is absolute license; the privilege of doing whatever a corrupt will craves, except as this license is curbed by a voluntary "social contract."**

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.3Philosophical/page/n365/mode/2up?view=theater

(1.) A hundred years ago French atheism gave the world the Jacobin theory of political rights. **The Bible had been teaching mankind for three thousand years the great doctrine of men's moral equality before the universal Father, the great basis of all free, just, and truly republican forms of civil society.** Atheism now travestied this true doctrine by her mortal heresy of the absolute equality of men, asserting that every human being is naturally and inalienably

entitled to every right, power, and prerogative in civil society which is allowed to any man or any class. **The Bible taught a liberty which consists in each man's unhindered privilege of having and doing just those things, and no others, to which he is rationally and morally entitled.** Jacobinism taught the liberty of license—every man's natural right to indulge his own absolute will; and it set up this fiendish caricature as the object of sacred worship for mankind.

> http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Augustine/De_libero_arbitrio/L1
>
> A. Then, if a people is well-disciplined and observant of social good, and such that every individual puts public before private interest, is not this people rightly granted by law authority to elect its own officials to govern its affairs, that is, the affairs of the state?
>
> E. Certainly.
>
> A. If the people gradually deteriorates and prefers private to public interest, and sells its vote for bribes, and is corrupted by ambitious politicians, and puts into power criminals with no sense of honour, **would not any honest man of sufficient influence who is left be justified in depriving this people of self-government, and in putting them under the authority of a few honest men or even of one?**13
>
> E. Quite justified.

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.3Philosophical/page/n27/mode/2up?view=theater

1. **The Jacobin theory totally repudiates all imputation of the consequences of moral conduct from one person to another as irrational and essentially unjust. It declares that "imputed guilt is imputed nonsense." From its premises it must declare thus, for it asserts that each individual enters social existence as an independent integer, possessed of complete natural liberty and full equality. But the Bible scheme of social existence is full of this imputation.** I shall not dwell upon the first grand case, the sin and fall of the race in Adam, although it is still determining, in a tremendous manner, the conditions of each individual's entrance into social existence. **I add other instances, some of which are equally extensive.** "The woman was first in the transgression," for which God laid upon Eve two penalties (Genesis 3:16), subordination to her husband and the sorrows peculiar to motherhood.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n211/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 1. From the inherited farm, workshop, or old-established firm to hereditary monarchy. **The Republic has, from 1789, been a form of *opposition* to the hereditary idea, and nothing more.**

https://archive.org/details/historyofjacobin01play/page/364/mode/2up?view=theater

> * **Far as the levelling principles have been attempted to be carried, their ultimate extent is not yet known, or, at least, has not been applied.** If posterity are not bound by what their predecessors have done, why are the creditors of the state paid interest or reimbursed their capitals? What right has one man to exact rent from another for a house, which he himself neither built nor purchased, but which came to him by inheritance? **According to the principles of the revolutionists applied in a pure manner, property would no more descend than personal virtue or vice; and no man would have a right to any thing which he had not made, or purchased with the fruits of his own labours.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch02.htm

> Nevertheless, in most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.
>
> 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
> 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
> **3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_241

The popular theory of man's natural rights, of the origin of governments, and of the moral obligation of allegiance, is that which traces them to a *social contract*. The true origin of this theory may be found with Hobbes of Malmesbury. **It owes its respectability among Englishmen, chiefly to the pious John Locke, a sort of baptized image of that atheistic philosopher;**[90] and it was ardently held by the infidel democrats of the first French revolution. **According to this scheme, each person is by nature an independent**

***integer*, wholly *sui juris*, absolutely equal to every other man, and naturally entitled, as a "Lord of Creation," to exercise his whole will. Man's natural liberty was accordingly defined as *privilege to do whatever he wished*.** True, Locke attempts to limit this monstrous postulate by defining man's native liberty as privilege to do whatever he wished within the limits of the law of nature.
...

Once more, this theory draws a broad distinction between man's civil liberty as a subject of government, and his natural liberty. The latter it defines as *privilege to do whatever the man pleases*, within the limits of natural law as interpreted by himself. **All government, therefore, is not only of the nature of restraint; it is essentially *restraint upon one's rights*. The advocates of the theory distinctly represent government as of the nature of a natural evil and wrong, but adopted as an expedient against the worse evil, anarchy; and therefore the obligation to obey it has no higher source than expediency.** But worse yet; if there is any such thing as intrinsic morality, government is an immoral restraint, for it is a *restraint upon rights*. Whatever good government may bring us, it is of that species which St. Paul reprobates, as "doing evil that good may come." **The great Hobbes was therefore perfectly consistent, in teaching that there is no original morality in acts, and that there was at first no such thing as right, distinct from might.** Morals are factitious distinctions invented under civil society for expediency. Let the thoughtful reader consider how this monstrous conclusion uproots all obligation, and order, and allegiance. No man can hold the theory of the origin of government in the social contract, unless he either holds, with Hobbes, this damnable error, **or with some abolitionists, (who are thoroughly consistent here,) that *all government is immoral*.**

https://archive.org/details/cannibalsallorsl00fitz/page/368/mode/2up?view=theater

> **We warn the North, that every one of the leading Abolitionists is agitating the negro slavery question merely as a means to attain ulterior ends, and those ends nearer home.** They would not spend so much time and money for the mere sake of the negro or his master, about whom they care little. But they know that men once fairly committed to negro slavery agitation—once committed to the sweeping principle, "that man being a moral agent, accountable to God for his actions, should not have those actions controlled and directed by the will of another," **are, in effect, committed to Socialism and Communism, to the most ultra doctrines of Garrison, Goodell, Smith and Andrews—to no private property, no church, no law, no government,—to free love, free lands, free women and free churches.**
>
> There is no middle ground—not an inch of ground of any sort, between the doctrines which we hold and those which Mr. Garrison holds. **If slavery, either white or black, be wrong in principle or practice, then is Mr. Garrison right—then is all human government wrong.**

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/120/mode/2up?view=theater

> To understand the full macabre nature of the Bolshevik state, we need to grasp that Lenin, following Marx and Engels, **viewed the state as a purely negative thing – an idea that came ultimately from Hobbes.**
> ...
>
> Hence Hobbes portrayed the state as entirely negative: born out of chaos, it exists only to suppress chaos.
>
> Marx, Engels, and Lenin adopted this idea, but rather than focusing on individuals in the state of nature, they focused on classes. **Thus the "state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms."**10 That is why the state does not and cannot act as "an organ for the *conciliation* of classes."11 **If there could be reconciliation, Lenin thunders, there wouldn't be a need for the state to begin with.** The state is by definition irredeemably oppressive.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/David_Strauss:_the_Confessor_and_the_Writer#VII.

With a certain rude self-satisfaction, he swathes himself in the hirsute garment of our Simian genealogists, and extols Darwin as one of mankind's greatest benefactors; but our perplexity is great when we find him constructing his ethics quite independently of the question, "What is our conception of the universe?" In this department he had an opportunity of exhibiting native pluck; **for he ought to have turned his back on his "We," and have established a moral code for life out of *bellum omnium contra omnes*[4] and the privileges of the strong. But it is to be feared that such a code could only have emanated from a bold spirit like that of Hobbes', and must have taken its root in a love of truth quite different from that which was only able to vent itself in explosive outbursts against parsons, miracles, and the "world-wide humbug" of the Resurrection.** For, whereas the Philistine remained on Strauss's side in regard to these explosive

outbursts, he would have been against him had he been confronted with a genuine and seriously constructed ethical system, based upon Darwin's teaching.

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n105/mode/2up?view=theater

92. The Origin of Justice.—**Justice (equity) has, its origin amongst powers which are fairly equal,** as Thucydides (in the terrible dialogue between the Athenian and Melian ambassadors) rightly comprehended: that is to say, **where there is no clearly recognisable supremacy,** and where a conflict would be useless and would injure both sides, there arises the thought of coming to an understanding and settling the opposing claims; the character of *exchange* is the primary character of justice. Each party satisfies the other, as each obtains what he values more than the other. Each one receives that which he desires, as his own henceforth, and whatever is desired is received in return. Justice, therefore, is recompense and exchange based on the hypothesis of a fairly equal degree of power,—thus, originally, revenge belongs to the province of justice, it is an exchange. Also gratitude.—**Justice naturally is based on the point of view of a judicious self-preservation, on the egoism, therefore, of that reflection, "Why should I injure myself uselessly and perhaps not attain my aim after all?"** So much about the *origin* of justice. Because man, according to his intellectual custom, has *forgotten* the original purpose of so-called just and reasonable actions, and particularly because for hundreds of years children have been taught to admire and imitate such actions, the idea has gradually arisen that such an action is un-egoistic; upon this idea, however, is based the high estimation in which it is held: which, moreover, like all valuations, is constantly growing, for something that is valued highly is striven after, imitated, multiplied, and increases, because the value of the output of toil and enthusiasm of each individual is added to the value of the thing itself. **How little moral would the world look without this forgetfulness! A poet might say that God had placed forgetfulness as door-keeper in the temple of human dignity.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924021569284/page/n221/mode/2up?view=theater

26. Legal Conditions as Means.—**Law, where it rests upon contracts between equals, holds good so long as the power of the parties to the contract remains equal or similar.** Wisdom created law to end all feuds and useless expenditure among men on an equal footing. Quite as definite an end is put to this waste, however, when one party has become decidedly weaker than the other.
...

31. Vanity as an Anti-Social Aftergrowth.—**As men, for the sake of security, have made themselves equal in order to found communities, but as also this conception is imposed by a sort of constraint and is entirely opposed to the instincts of the individual,** so, the more universal security is guaranteed, the more do new offshoots of the old instinct for predominance appear. Such offshoots appear in the setting-up of class distinctions, in the demand for professional dignities and privileges, and, generally speaking, in vanity (manners, dress, speech, and so forth). **So soon as danger to the community is apparent, the majority, who were unable to assert their preponderance in a time of universal peace, once more bring about the condition of equality, and for the time being the absurd privileges and vanities disappear. If the community, however, collapses utterly and anarchy reigns supreme, there arises the state of nature: an absolutely ruthless inequality as recounted by Thucydides in the case of Corcyra. Neither a natural justice nor a natural injustice exists.**

https://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Howell.pdf

It is strange that scholars of political philosophy who have written on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* haven't paid much attention to the section entitled 'Of the New Idol' where Zarathustra explicitly criticizes a favorite topic of political scientists, the state. **It is even stranger given the comparison of the state to a 'cold monster,' and Nietzsche's identification of English philosophy as the origin of modern ideas, that scholars haven't drawn more explicit comparisons to Thomas Hobbes' great work of political philosophy *Leviathan*** (Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 191-192 aph. 253).
...

Modernist despotism remains a means to accomplish the goal of modernism, to transform man into the 'perfect herd animal', or last man, in the name of freedom (Human, All too Human, pp. 173-174 aph. 473; Beyond Good and Evil, p. 118 aph. 203). **In Zarathustra's language state is the means by which the last man will triumph.**
...

Hobbes argues all are equal and that any inequality is authorised by the sovereign. All those who seek to distinguish themselves, who seek something higher are compelled to serve the interests of the state or the run the risk of a confrontation with the state (Hobbes, p. 117 or 2.18.19).
...

For Nietzsche the struggle for the future, for the meaning of earth, is between **the 'wretched contentment' which Leviathan and Baconian science make possible** and the higher men and new tables of values heralded by the superman.
...

For Nietzsche state support of culture and universities is a great danger because that support is conditional on their usefulness to the state. For Hobbes this is precisely the point. The *Leviathan* should determine what should be taught and not taught according to its interests, including in the universities. Hobbes is clear that modern science and his political science are consistent with the state's

interests and so there is no conflict. **For Nietzsche the state supports culture and education to attract talented men of knowledge so it can "steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise" to further enhance the power of the state. 'New Idol', from the view of philosophical politics, is the error of mistaking state supported or popular intellectual pursuits as the highest.** Stated more strongly, the highest danger is that the new idol, the Leviathan, will be mistaken for a new god, winning the best disciples. Nietzsche's critique of Leviathan is not so much political as it is religious.

In a certain sense Nietzsche's politics can be reduced to this point – Leviathan competes with Zarathustra for the attention and dedication of the most gifted and Zarathustra must find a way to win that competition. Nietzsche's politics in its most moderate form appears libertarian, with the dictum – *as little state as possible* (Day Break, pp. 107-108 aph 179; Human, All too Human, p. 174 aph 473).

> https://counter-currents.com/2021/04/barbarians/
>
> **Not to put too fine a point on it, but all of us are stolen from our parents by globohomo's indoctrination machine masquerading as an education system.** We are all janissaries who'll be stolen, brainwashed, and put in service of the evil empire, and the way out is the way into the tribal life. **But the tribal life means we abjure glory and greatness within the empire,** meaning our greatest potential will never be fulfilled.
>
> Having a rooted identity comes at a price. **As Mishima was told by a Leftist student, to have a national identity is to be limited—and as Mishima replied, that's okay.** All of us who are here made Arminius' choice—rather than soaring into the great imperial heavens, chasing glory and prestige, we elected to inhabit a smaller, more intimate, dare I say, cozier space. **The price, of course, of imperial height are our roots, our flesh, and blood, our children, born and unborn**—our lives, which are ground away into nothingness by the relentless Mammon-machine of Empire. **But how is one to reach ever-higher if one is weighed down by smelly, flabby flesh?**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=iDE56HLy4XMC&lpg=PR4&hl=fi&pg=PA54#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hobbes' position on the especially sensitive question of the belief in miracles was entirely agnostical. He maintained that nobody can know for certain whether an occurrence is or is not a miracle. In articulating such a basic attitude, he became one of the first and most daring critics of every form of belief in miracles, irrespective of whether it was biblico-Christian or expressive of any other religion. **His critique was thoroughly enlightened, and in propounding it, he appears as the true inaugurator of the eighteenth century.** In a style almost reminiscent of Voltaire's, he explored the possibilities of error, delusion, and open or hidden deceit; the tricks of forgers, actors, ventriloquists, and other swindlers. **He did this in a manner so vivid that in this domain every claim to credence seems to be senseless and no longer a subject appropriate for discussion.** Critical readers of Chapter 37 of his *Leviathan* must conclude that a belief in miracles is invariably a superstition, at best a remnant of radical agnosticism which, in this respect, holds certain things as possible but none as true. Yet Hobbes, the great decisionist, here too accomplished his typically decisive turn: *Auctoritas, non Veritas*. Nothing here is true: everything here is command. **A miracle is what the sovereign state authority commands its subjects to believe to be a miracle; but also – and here the irony is especially acute**2 **– the reverse: Miracles cease when the state forbids them.**
…

If, by means of certain spoken words an individual asserted that bread had been transformed into something entirely different, namely, the human body, **then, says Hobbes, nobody would have a sensible reason to believe it; but if the power of a state decrees this to be so, then it is a miracle,** and everyone has to obey this command to profess the belief because it was proclaimed by the sovereign state.
…

But at this place, at the zenith of the sovereign power that brings about the unity of religion and politics, occurs the rupture of the otherwise so complete, so overpowering unity, the decisive point, concerning miracle and belief, that Hobbes evades. **Concerning the question of the belief in miracles, he made his non-eradicable, individualistic proviso in a way that renders any discussion of whether he was an "individualist" superfluous for our consideration. At this point enters the differentiation between inner faith and outer confession into the political system of the *Leviathan*.** Hobbes declares the question of wonder and miracle to be a matter of "public" in contrast to "private" reason; but on the basis of universal freedom of thought – *quia cogitation omnis libera est* – **he leaves to the individual's private reason whether to believe or not to believe and to preserve his own *judicium* in his heart, *intra pectus suum*.** But as soon as it comes to public confession of faith, private judgment ceases and the sovereign decides about the true and the false.

The distinction between private and public, faith and confession, *fides* and *confessio*, is introduced in a way **from which everything else was logically derived in the century that ensued until the rise of the liberal constitutional state. The modern "neutral" state, derived from agnosticism and not from the religiosity of Protestant sectarians, originated at this point.** If looked at from the perspective of constitutional history, a dual beginning was made here: first, **the juristically (not theologically) constructed beginning of modern, individualistic right of freedom of thought and conscience** and thereby the characteristic individual freedoms embodied in the structure of the liberal constitutional system; and, second, the evolution of state from one inherently void of substantive truth into a justifiable external power, the *stato neutrale e agnostico* of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

> https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> In order to free the prince, the temporal ruler, to do the things that really need to be done for the glory of his own earthly estate, Machiavelli has to convince him to shed the belief that he has a soul. That will free him from the hold Christianity and morality have on his actions. **But this means, of course, that the prince ceases to be concerned about heaven and hell. He is thereby *liberated* from the next world. (Here we get a hint of the real foundation of modern *liberalism*'s essential connection to modern secularism.)**
> ...
>
> **So with Machiavelli the wall of separation between church and state is entirely interior and invisible.** It's a wall inside the prince's mind, separating what the prince actually believes from what he wants to appear to his subjects to believe. **He alone is liberated from belief in the next world, and he uses his subjects' belief to control them.**

...

Only a few years after the appearance of the *Leviathan*, a liberal Jew [des ersten liberalen Juden] noticed the barely visible crack in the theoretical justification of the sovereign state. In it he immediately recognized the telling inroad of modern liberalism, which would allow Hobbes' postulation of the relation between external and internal, public and private, to be inverted into its converse. Spinoza accomplished the inversion in the famous Chapter 19 of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, which appeared in 1670. Already in the subtitle of his book he speaks of the *libertas philosophandi*. He begins his exposition by maintaining that in the interest of external peace and external order, **the sovereign state power can regulate the public religious cult and that every citizen must accommodate himself to this regulation. Everything that refers to religion receives its legal validity, *vim juris*, only through the command of the state's power.** The state's power, however, determines only the external cult. Hobbes laid the groundwork for separating the internal from the external in the sections of the *Leviathan* that deal with a belief in miracles and confession. **The Jewish philosopher pushed this incipient form to the limit of its development until the opposite was reached and the leviathan's vitality was sapped from within and life began to drain out of him.** "I am speaking explicitly," says Spinoza, "only of the external cult, not of piety itself or of the internal worship of God." Inner conviction and "piety itself" belong to the private sphere of individuals. **"Internus enim cultus et ipsa pietas uniuscujusque juris."**

Spinoza expanded this thought in Chapter 20 of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* into a universal principle of freedom of thought, perception, and expression, with the proviso that public peace and the rights of sovereign power would be respected. Spinoza's treatise is strongly dependent on Hobbes.4 **But the Englishman did not endeavor with such a proviso to appear out of context of the beliefs of his people but, on the contrary, to remain within it, whereas the Jewish philosopher, on the other hand, who approached the religion of the state as an outsider, naturally provided a proviso that emanated from the outside.** Hobbes focused on public peace and the right of sovereign power; individual freedom of thought was an implicit right open only as long as it remained private. Now it is the inverse: **Individual freedom of thought is the form-giving principle, the necessities of public peace as well as the right of the sovereign power having been transformed into mere provisos. A small intellectual switch emanating from the nature of Jewish life accomplished, with the most simple logic and in the span of a few years, the decisive turn in the fate of the leviathan.**

...

In this connection the "Thoughts of Thomasius" published in 1724 in German, are the most apt, because they convey Hobbes' and Spinoza's thoughts and, at the same time, as Bluntschli correctly stated, they constitute "the learned preparatory course [die wissenschaftliche Vorschule] for the state of Frederick the Great."5 According to those "Thoughts," presented in the form of theses, the prince has no rights of coercion either in religious matters or in all those that are concerned with the "doing and imagination of the human intellect"; to be sure he is not required to tolerate atheists and those who deny the existence of the creator and providence but only because it is anticipated that they will "disturb the peace of the common order."

“Nobody should express a judgment that is different from what he thinks.” Henceforth the state becomes essentially police which is restricted to maintaining “public” calm, security, and order.

Since Thomasius, the separation of right and morality has become a standard theory and a *communis opinio* of jurists and politicians. By contrasting juristic heteronomy and moral autonomy Kant, in his theory of right and the state, undertook to present a sanctioned summary of such views of the eighteenth century, which was meant perhaps to rebalance but not annul the fundamental separation between inner and outer, the state remaining, for the time being, rather intolerant. For example, Christian Wolff proposed the banning of pietists and opted for a strict censorship; Kant decisively rejected the right to resist. In retrospect, however, such variations are not decisive for the comprehensive development of constitutional law. **What is of significance is the seed planted by Hobbes regarding his reservation about private belief and his distinction between inner belief and outer confession. As it unfolded, it became an irresistible and all-governing conviction.**

The separation of inner from outer and public private governed not only juristic thinking but also conformed to the general thinking of all educated people. The relegation of the state to an outward cult, as proposed by Spinoza, became the basic thesis of Goethe’s Strasbourg dissertation dealing with the relation of church and state.
…

The advocates of such inner reservations advanced various arguments, some of which were opposed to one another, for example, secret societies and secret orders, Rosicrucians, freemasons, illuminates, mystics and pietists, all kinds of sectarians, the many “silent ones in the land,” **and, above all, the restless spirit of the Jew who knew how to exploit the situation best until the relation of public and private, deportment and disposition was turned upside down.** In the eighteenth century it was Moses Mendelssohn who in his work *Jerusalem, A Treaty on Religious power and Judaism* (1783) validated the distinction between inner and outer, morality and right, inner disposition and outer performance and demanded from the state freedom of thought; **he was of not great mind, intellectually not comparable to Spinoza, but endowed with the unerring instinct for the undermining of state power that served to paralyze the alien and to emancipate his own Jewish folk.**

Moses Mendelssohn’s work was also the inducement for the publication of the first great and truly profound discussion of German wisdom and the Jewish tactic of drawing distinctions, namely, Johann Georg Hamann’s *Golgatha und Scheblimini* (1784).
…

Public power and force may be ever so completely and emphatically recognized and ever so loyally respected, but only as a public and only an external power, it is hollow and already dead from within. **Such an earthly god has only the appearance and the *simulacra* of divinity on his side. Nothing divine lets itself be externally enforced.** *Non externa cogunt Deos*, said in the presence of a Nero the stoic philosopher in the political situation of a Seneca.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=iDE56HLy4XMC&lpg=PR4&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

Stahl-Jolson, who brought this about, boasts therefore what is understandable from his standpoint, the distinction between morality and right as advanced by Christian Thomasius, which he characterizes as “substantial progress,” made by a theorist **who “secured forever the separation of both” so that “inner and outer peace, the enforceability of right and nonenforceability of ethics could be demarcated in all respects.” This strange champion of the divine right of Christian kings established that Hobbes, in contrast to Grotius, differentiated the state not only from the prince but also from the people.**4 What a formulation of “conservatism”! Imagine what Hamann, who called Spinoza’s manner of philosophizing “incompetent and unauthorized,” would have said about such an apologist of Christian monarchy! Using many beautiful words to justify the “Christian state” and antirevolutionary “legitimacy,” the Jewish philosopher, with a sure goal and instinct, extended the line drawn by Spinoza and advanced by Moses Mendelssohn.

https://americanmind.org/salvo/reductio-ad-hitlerlum/

Schmitt was instrumental in getting Strauss the grant money that allowed him to leave Germany in 1932. Strauss privately wrote to Schmitt the most penetrating and detailed criticism of his major work, *The Concept of the Political,* that Schmitt received from any quarter. **Schmitt later enthused that Strauss “saw through me and X-rayed me as nobody else has.”**

https://counter-currents.com/2013/01/leo-strauss-the-conservative-revolution-and-national-socialism/

Schmitt, however, appealed to Hobbes as a foil for liberal democracy. Thus, Strauss argued, Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy was insufficiently radical, for Hobbes is actually the true founder of liberalism. **Although the**

Leviathan seems anything but liberal, the premises from which Hobbes seeks to deduce it are the basic principles of liberalism.

> http://www.counter-currents.com/2014/08/leo-strauss-the-conservative-revolution-and-national-socialism-part-3/
>
> But what *is* Strauss's account of the contingent situation that led German nihilists to embrace National Socialism? Strauss's analysis turns out to be quite thin.
>
> **First, he suggests that some embraced nihilism because <u>they accepted the false premise that communism is the culmination of civilization</u> and thus decided to dispense with civilization rather than embrace communism** (p. 360).

https://archive.org/details/derleviathaninde0000carl/page/194/mode/2up?view=theater

Hobbes' starke Tendenz, das Volk von der Politik fernzuhalten,20 **stand im Gegensatz zum Bemühen der Nationalsozialisten, es unaufhörlich zu mobilisieren und es gerade so zu seinem wahren Sein zu bringen.** Die Differenz ist, schematisch, die zwischen autoritärem Staat und totalitärer Bewegung. So konnte der Nationalsozialist Koellreutter, schon früh ein scharfer Gegner Schmitts, in einer Rezension des Schmitt'schen „Leviathan" ausführen: „Die … Staatsauffassung von Hobbes hat … unserer Zeit nichts mehr zu sagen, eine ‚Hobbes-Renaissance' entspricht nicht dem politischen Denken unserer Tage. ***Auctoritas, non veritas facit legem*.** Die Staatsmacht allein ist Gesetzgeber, Recht ist nur das vom Staate gesetzte positive Recht, Bekenntnis ist nur das, was der Staat anordnet. **<u>Damit werden aber alle tiefsten Quellen des Volkslebens verschüttet und gegenstandslos gemacht.</u> – Für Hobbes gab es das entscheidende Problem unserer Zeit nicht,** die Tatsache, daß die Völker sich ihrer als politische Größen bewußt werden, dieses Geheimnis der Nationwerdung, die elementare Erkenntnis, daß Volk zu Volk will, daß gleiches Ahnenerbe auch politisches gleiches Schicksal haben will. **Das Problem existierte für ihn nicht, obwohl gerade in seinem Volke sich dieser Prozeß zum ersten Male vollzog.**"21
…

Verständlich, daß Hobbes bei den Nationalsozialisten eine noch schlechtere Presse bekommt, wenn man ihn zum Ahnen des Liberalismus ernennt. Dann leiten sich aus seiner Theorie der „moderne Individualismus" **und, da für Hobbes der Tod das größte Übel ist, auch der „radikale Pazifismus" ab. Hobbes ist dann an allem schuld: Er „entwickelt die Grundpositionen der kapitalistischen Grundauffassung, da bei ihm der Enfolg des Lebens sich bemißt nach Maß des Überschusses der Lust über die Unlust"; beim ihm liegt „der Ursprung der marxistischen Wirtschaftslehre und des Klassenkampfgedankens," wird doch bei ihm „jede überindividuelle Wertung … abgelehnt."** Die „reine Gegenposition zu Lebensauffassung und Menschenideal der beiden europäischen Revolutionen" – denjenigen Hitlers und Mussolinis – ist Hobbes' Theorie. Diese ist das „mephistophelische Prinzip" schlechthin, nämlich, **„die Negation aller Höchstwerte des arischen Menschentums und damit die Negation der Grundlagen der abendländischen Kultur."** Ein Volk stellt „in seinen rassisch bedingten Höchstwerten die Gegenposition zur Hobbes'schen Wertskala" dar – **<u>Hobbes' Konzept mündet in „rassischer Zersetzung" und in die „Heraufführung des politisch Minderwertigen durch die Aufstellung unheroischer Wertbilder."</u>**24

https://archive.org/details/politicalideasof0000drur/page/94/mode/2up?view=theater

Thirdly, classic natural right, like conventionalism, is elitist or inegalitarian.17 **It rejects pre-Socratic or egalitarian natural right.** According to the latter, all men are by nature free and equal.18 But political rule is akin to the rule of master over slave, and it is against any man's gain to be treated as a slave. **<u>Strauss maintains that egalitarian natural right is closely allied to the doctrine of a golden age or an ideal state of nature where men lived in a state of equality and freedom prior to the emergence of political rule.</u>** But for the egalitarians, innocence is not irretrievably lost, society can and must be made harmonious with nature or natural right by being based on the consent of free and equal individuals. **Socratic or classical natural right considers this view of nature to be altogether fictitious.** Far from being characterized by equality, nature is distinguished by hierarchy, by higher and lower, superior and inferior.
…

Strauss endorses the complaints of Marsilius against the politically radical nature of natural law. He criticizes it, just as Hobbes did, for dividing sovereignty between the secular and sacred domains, or between kings and priests. He argues that this does not advance the cause of peace, and so undermines the essential purpose of the state. In short, natural law encourages anarchy and chaos because it forgets that 'any regime is better than anarchy.'77
…

<u>Strauss's classic natural right shares with modernity more than he would care to admit.</u> In practice, it follows Machiavelli and Hobbes in making peace, stability and preservation the supreme ends of politics, and sanctioning whatever means are necessary to attain them.

> https://web.bookstruck.in/book/chapter/20191

> **The traditional and Vedic view is that worldly action is subordinate to contemplation, so that ritually, the king is the bride and the priest is the groom.** Evola turned this upside down, affirming the primacy of the royal function: partly, this was an exaggerated exaltation of the martial function typical of the interbellum period (when marching in uniform was an almost universal style for all kinds of movements, due to the militarization of a whole generation in World War 1); **partly, it was a projection of a medieval conflict in the Holy Roman Empire between the Emperor and the Pope,** a conflict in which Evola's retrospective sympathies lay with the Emperor.
>
> At any rate, it took a top-ranking scholar genuinely rooted in a genuine tradition, the Brahmin art historian and philosopher Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, to correct the deviations of the Western enthusiasts of "Tradition." He commented: **"As it is, Evola's argument for the superiority of the *Regnum*, the active principle, to the *Sacerdotium*, the contemplative principle, is a concession to that very "mondo moderno" [= modern world] against which his polemic is directed."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA452#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aside from this psychological lacuna of the hidden tyrant, **the Hobbesian social contract is a bloodless, rootless mechanism, with no connection to history, tradition, or patriotism** – a despotic algorithm for internal peace that can be imposed anywhere, or indeed, everywhere, a precursor of Kojeve's universal homogeneous state. In the European aesthetic consciousness, it becomes the nightmare of the faceless, omnipresent bureaucratic state of Kafka's *The Castle*, or to use Weber's bleak phrase for modern life, "technicians without vision" ruling over "voluptuaries without heart." This pedigree proceeds straight down to Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange*, **in which Alcibiadean ambition can find no outlet in a dreary welfare state dystopia except base criminality, and whose psyche must be rejigged in the correct Hobbesian direction through torture, behavior modification, and regular visits from a social worker.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA473#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this sense, **Stalin was one of history's most consistent Hobbesians.** He used terror in a relentless campaign to re-create human nature as empty integers interchangeable with one another, stripped of ambition, living in enforced harmony.
…

Moreover, we must recall again that Hobbes's own preferred solution to the problem of ambition was not this constant, institutionalized use of terror, which would be a kind of concession that the nature of the vainglorious was irrepressible and ineradicable. Instead, Hobbes hoped and believed that his new psychology of pedestrian appetitiveness, to be taught "in the universities" ([1971] p. 728) in the place of "Aristotelity," **would over time genuinely convince people that they should understand all their passions, including honor seeking, as deriving from a desire for comfortable self-preservation and fear of violent death,** thereby realizing the irrationality of honor seeking and especially tyrannical ambition.
…

Hobbes will not admit of an exception to this reduction of honor seeking to self-preservation in anyone guided by a true understanding of nature (as opposed to the spontaneous and misguided impulse for mastery characteristic of some in the state of nature), making his view of the state of nature different from that of the Sophists, who had maintained that there was a just and noble life by nature as opposed to convention; that while the just and noble life by convention was indeed the morality of equality and contract, based on pedestrian appetites and the fear of being tyrannized over, there would always be certain naturally noble "masters" who would never submit. **Gorgias, Callicles, and the other Sophists would have never agreed with Hobbes that the distinction between master and servant existed solely by "consent" and not in nature. Unlike Hobbes, the Sophists would not have disagreed with Aristotle that the distinction between the superior and inferior man existed by nature.** Their disagreement would have been over what the nature of that superiority, including the most satisfying way of life, really is. Hobbes believes that this kind of man, the alleged master by nature idolized by Callicles, can eventually be brought to understand that he is not truly independent or set apart from the many who are concerned with mere survival and comfort.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA76#v=onepage&q&f=false

Just as for Machiavelli, for Hobbes man's rationality is not given from an objectively reasonable world, but instead dawns on him as he struggles not to be destroyed by nature's purposeless chaos and the grip of that chaos on him through the passions. Hence, **the criterion for rationality is what the passions require for their own safe and efficient pursuit.** This symmetry between passion and rationality requires that the passions move even further in the direction of abstract homogeneity than was the case in Machiavelli. Starting as he did with the full range of political phenomena, the same broad canvas of war, peace, honor, and domestic faction surveyed by Aristotle, **Machiavelli recognized that glory**

could plausibly be more worth pursuing than self-preservation, and in rare spirits constitutes an independent source of human motivation. He in effect preserves the distinction made by Xenophon's Simonides – whose advice to the tyranny Hiero is one of the models, as we will see in Chapter 4, for Machiavelli's art of princely rule – **between the "real men" (*andres*) who aim for mastery and the common run of "humans" (*anthropoi*) who are content with self-preservation** (*Hiero* 2.1; 7.3). Since, for Machiavelli, domestic policies are inevitably connected to foreign policy – indeed, a republic that does not wish to atrophy and die must have an expansionist dynamic – the pursuit of glory through conquest is an irreducible necessity for healthy political bodies. **Because Hobbes, by contrast, confines himself to the internal ordering of the polity, and begins with an a priori method – the "similitude of the passions" – even these Machiavellian approximations of eros (as the glory attendant upon successful imperialism) fade away, replaced by the abstract and contentless *summum malum* of non-existence, the fear of violent death.** This reduction of the passions to the desire for self-preservation makes it possible to make the state synonymous with what Aristotle had called the art of household management. But for Hobbes, unlike Aristotle, there is no distinction between good and bad, noble and ignoble usages, for household management and property. Whereas **Aristotle had argued for an economics of sufficiency to enable citizens to devote themselves to politics and philosophy,** and for wives and children to cultivate the virtues appropriate for their potentials, in contrast with open-ended economic maximization and despotic authority, Hobbes opted for the latter alone, draining the teleological substance of Aristotle's distinctions and turning household management into a pure method of management and productivity.

Since, as he argues in the *Leviathan*, **the "objects" of the passions** – what we want from, and how we relate to, the political community and the world – **are too diverse and changeable (as are we ourselves) for us ever to be able to agree on what they are and whether they are good or bad (and even if we agreed for a time, we would change and no longer agree with our own selves), we should turn away from the world and look inward to the "similitude" of the passions themselves** (Hobbes [1971] pp. 82-83). Severed from their objects in the world (and opinions about them), the passions of every individual are universally reducible to such simple modes of self-preservation as fear and desire. **Aristotle had argued that humans fulfill their natures by living in a polis and offering reasoned opinions about the just and the unjust, the noble and the base, and the advantageous and the disadvantageous.** These reasoned opinions correspond to what Hobbes terms the "objects" of the passions. By denying that these opinions possess any rank order or even stability, Hobbes in effect demolishes the Aristotelian understanding of the common good. Every man becomes a pedestrian tyrant motivated by the desire to stay alive and avoid violent death. By orienting ourselves by the similitude of the passions rather than their objects, we also deny from the outset the existence of intrinsic natural differences among human beings of virtue, "wit," and prudence, as well as the classical assumption that there is an independent capacity in the souls of some men to seek honor for its own sake, as opposed to mere self-preservation. **Every one who introspects and understands his true motive will realize that he seeks power to remain alive. In Xenophontic language, there are no "real men," only "humans."**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1175/1175-h/1175-h.htm
>
> Yes, Hiero, and herein precisely lies the difference between a man and other animals, in this outstretching after honour. (7) Since, it would seem, all living creatures alike take pleasure in meats and drinks, in sleep and sexual joys. **Only the love of honour is implanted neither in unreasoning brutes** (8) **nor universally in man. But they in whose hearts the passion for honour and fair fame has fallen like a seed, these unmistakably** (9) **are separated most widely from the brutes. These may claim to be called men,** (10) **not human beings merely.**
>
> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/58242/pg58242-images.html#Chapter_30
>
> Viciousness is love of what is bad. The vicious man is one who associates with men convicted in public suits, and who assumes that, if he makes friends of these fellows, he will gain in knowledge of the world, and so will be more feared.
>
> **Of upright men, he declares that no one is by nature upright, but that all men are alike, and he even reproaches the man who is honorable. The bad man, he asserts, is free from prejudice, if one will but make the trial,** and, while in some respects he admits that men speak truly of such a man, in others he refuses to allow it.
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.175029/page/n331/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **When it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then the danger is great!**
> …

> **When Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox arose: "The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!"** And thus the path was prepared for an *image of God* which was as remote as possible from the image of the mightiest,—God on the Cross!

https://bronzeagepervert.substack.com/p/race-in-america-and-the-dork-right

Hobbes was the prophet of the bourgeois man dominated by the fear of death. Hobbes' two villains, the men who wouldn't fit into this new order, were the religious fanatic driven by powerful beliefs that made the next world first in one's mind and this life not valuable enough to fear losing, and on the other hand the noble and warrior driven by vainglory and combative spirits and not fearing death for that reason. The men who don't fear death and who aren't driven by what Nietzsche calls the English ideal of comfort are unpleasant reminders that not all human natures fit in this scheme, but will always form a powerful minority faction against it.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/136/mode/2up?view=theater

I think we can cut through a lot of tedious debate by noting that modern liberalism simply transfers to the individual the kind of absolute autocratic power Hobbes ascribes to the king.
...

Modern liberalism's dispute with Hobbes is like a disagreement between a son and a father – it's still the same family.
...

Moreover, **contrary to their own self-image, contemporary liberals are not quite as democratic as they think they are. They show a marked tendency to use state power to effect political and cultural change from the top down, especially through the courts.** If they can't get their proposals through the duly elected legislature, they resort to executive order or regulation by unelected bureaucrats. **They also have a tendency to try to rule society through "experts" who deny the legitimacy of common opinion,** especially religiously informed opinion, and substitute "scientific" knowledge, which somehow always seems to end up being secular and secularizing. Finally, very much in tune with Machiavelli, liberals tend to want to remold society by co-opting public education, another mode of top-down imposition of the secular worldview, forming individuals in accordance with state-sponsored secular goals. **This kind of autocracy is not all that far removed from Hobbes's.**

> https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n105/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 320 Golden is the definition which Ulpian [0.48.4.1.1] assigns to civil equity: **"a kind of probable judgment, not naturally known to all men" (as natural equity is) "but to those few who, being eminently endowed with prudence, experience, or learning, have come to know what things are necessary for the conservation of human society"** (*probabilis quaedam ratio, non omnibus hominibus naturaliter cognita, sed paucis tantum, qui, prudentia, usu, doctrina praediti, didicerunt quae ad societatis humanae conservationem sunt necessaria*). **This is what is nowadays called "reason of state."**
>
> https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/bob-black-constitutionalism-the-white-man-s-ghost-dance
>
> In 1607, the king announced that he would join his judges on the bench at Westminster. Common Law, he had heard, was "Natural Reason"—as Krawchuk would say, common sense—and he had at least as much Natural Reason as anybody! Gently but firmly, Sir Edward Coke corrected His Majesty. **It was true that the Common Law was based on Natural Reason, but it was not identical with it. To expound "the Artificial Reason of the Law" required experts: judges.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA763#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **The notion that the great majority must be compelled to be free, that "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free," is sometimes scorned by modern commentators as a ridiculous paradox in political thought more associated with Rousseau than the true originator of this idea, Spinoza.**48 But it is basic to Spinoza's freedom that it is constituted less by limits placed on state power than by use of state power to impose limits on human selfishness and unconcern for others.49 The sources, moreover, firmly indicate that Rousseau derives his *volonté générale*, like much else, via Diderot, from Spinoza. **The principle of "General Will" actually makes less sense in the context of Rousseau's society where ordinary men and women, the world's "simple souls," are naturally good and men have far less need to learn anything from books or be guided by reason to acquire "virtue" than in Spinoza where the ignorant, far from naturally finding the right path themselves to a free, virtuous, and stable life, must be shepherded by the state**

inculcating a dogma-free rational civil religion.50 And while state coercive power alone cannot "free the mind from theological prejudices [mentem a praejudiciis theologicis liberare]," it can in Spinoza's judgement effectively curb the immense harm would-be charismatic "leaders," prophets, Pharisees, mullahs, preachers, inquisitors, and theologians universally inflict on mankind.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA184#v=onepage&q&f=false

"De toutes les tyrannies, la tyrannie démocratique est la plus cruelle et la moins raisonée" [of all the tyrannies, democratic tyranny is the cruelest and least rational].51 But in dismissing "pure" or direct democracy, the baron was merely decrying what all radical enlighteners rejected, not least Paine, Cérutti, Condorcet, Destutt, and Volney. **This does not alter the fact that, like these others, he warmly endorses representative democracy, a point that needs to be heavily underlined.**52
…

No eighteenth-century thinker did more than d'Holbach to profile the basic distinction, decisive for democratic revolutionaries like Condorcet and Destutt, between representative democracy and "démocratie pure, ou anarchie," as Destutt calls it. **Where direct democracy, "la démocratie originelle," as he also terms it, is contemptible, something mankind, they thought, must at all costs avoid, a quagmire inevitable at the lowest level of Destutt's three stages of "civilization," totally different is "démocratie de la raison éclairée" [Enlightenment rational democracy] typifying Destutt's third and highest level of civilization.** Representative democracy, the sole legitimate form of "gouvernement réprésentatif" for d'Holbach, therefore has nothing in common with monarchy, aristocracy, or "démocratie pure."56 What compounds much of the confusion characterizing the "negative critique," including the mistaken view that d'Holbach was a "moderate" enlightener opposed to "democracy," is simply failure to grasp **that for d'Holbach and his legacy, pure democracy and representative democracy were not just different but virtual opposites:** where the former is destructive, "insupportable," representative democracy is the only form capable of affording liberty, stability, and men's rights and conserving the "general will."

Like Spinoza and Toland earlier, and the *Idéologues* later, d'Holbach loathed royal courts and despised aristocrats, but dreaded even more the irrationality of the masses.57 **What has been said of Destutt de Tracy, writing in the later 1790s and under Napoleon, that his political theory sought "a balance between principles of democracy and enlightened leadership,"**58 **fully applies to the entire Radical Enlightenment, remaining a defining feature down to the 1840s.** Where, for d'Holbach, ancient Athens abundantly demonstrated the instability, follies, and vulnerability to faction and popular passions of "pure democracy," no direct government by the people can ever amount to more than an unstable, priest-ridden, fleeting phenomenon given its inherent tendency to defer to the dictatorship of demagogues capturing the citizenry's unquestioning allegiance by exploiting their prejudices and "superstition."59 In direct democracy, the "people, sovereign in appearance, is generally the slave of perverse demagogues who flatter them and incite their passions, and thereby become tyrants."60
…

Radical enlighteners never had much good to say about ordinary people's beliefs and opinions, as distinct from their needs, moral capacity, and rights. **Arguably, one detects here a deep-seated contradiction and one that perhaps contributed more than anything else to the ultimate failure of the Radical Enlightenment.** But while d'Holbach, like all radical enlighteners, scorns regimes characterized by what to him were the ignorance and prejudices of the multitude, he (and they more generally) also believed "the duties of morality and precepts of reason" are intrinsically within the common people's reach, or can be made accessible to the masses, where government and education act to propagate sound values among the people.
…

In representative democracies, the chief danger is that **the principle of "equality" is pushed beyond its legitimate limits, the sphere of equal rights, toward equality of influence in administration and decision-making,** thereby rendering ordinary opinion and prejudices predominant, in d'Holbach's eyes an inevitable recipe for disaster.65

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/164/mode/2up?view=theater

The "choice" in "pro-choice" could only come from Hobbes's definition of *liberty* as "the absence of external impediments" within a moral void, for what other view of the universe would claim a right for each individual to decide whether a particular act was murder or not? Moreover, **the presocial relationship of the mother to the unborn child duplicates Hobbes's presocial state of nature, for in such "a condition of war of every one against every one," that is, the mother against the invading fetus, "every man [and here**

we must add “every woman”] has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body [here, the life of the fetus].”

> http://ironink.org/2013/02/wherein-the-pro-death-crowd-takes-the-mask-off/
>
> http://www.salon.com/2013/01/23/so_what_if_abortion_ends_life/
>
> *Here’s the complicated reality in which we live: All life is not equal. That’s a difficult thing for liberals like me to talk about, lest we wind up looking like death-panel-loving, kill-your-grandma-and-your-precious-baby storm troopers. Yet a fetus can be a human life without having the same rights as the woman in whose body it resides. She’s the boss. Her life and what is right for her circumstances and her health should automatically trump the rights of the non-autonomous entity inside of her. Always.*
>
> 1.) Don’t you just love Cultural Marxists? You bang and bang on them to try to get them to see that all life is not equal, in the sense that all life is the same, (boys are different than girls, ballerinas are different then Weight-lifters, Japanese are different then Nigerians) **and then when they bring themselves to admit that all life is not equal they say “all life is not equal” in the sense that all life isn’t worthy of life, and then they apply the idea of life that is not worthy of life to those who are judicially innocent.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/184/mode/2up?view=theater

The great liberal thinker Isaiah Berlin rightly noted,

> Most modern liberals, at their most consistent, want a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realise as many of their ends as possible, **without assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may frustrate the purposes of others.** They wish the frontiers between individuals or groups of men to be drawn solely with a view to preventing collisions between human purposes, **all of which must be considered to be equally ultimate, uncriticisable ends in themselves.**1

…

But what exactly does a non-teleological universe look like? It looks like Hobbesian materialism – **the cosmology that, as we’ve seen, Hobbes adopted from the materialist pagan thinkers that Christianity had rejected.**

…

And so materialist science is the kind of science that liberalism preaches, and it does so with real evangelical fervor. Think of men such as Thomas Huxley, Ernst Haeckel, and Karl Vogt, who enthusiastically spread the Darwinian evolutionary dogma of a world without ends.

…

But materialism also frees the human will from the restrictions of nature itself. If no God stands behind the order of nature, including human nature, then human beings are free to manipulate nature, and especially their own nature, without fear of transgressing any moral limit or inviting divine retribution. And, in a kind of vicious circle, the successful manipulation of our nature in turn becomes an argument for the materialist cosmology that justified it in the first place. **Continually overcoming the restrictions of nature “proves” that the limits being transgressed were not laid down by an omnipotent God.**

…

In the liberal account, we live in a purposeless universe, **so that each person has just as much right as anyone else to pursue his or her arbitrarily defined goals or ends.** Notice how desires are given moral weight by being categorized as exercises of “rights.” **And there is ultimately no other justification given for the existence of such rights than the one originally offered by Thomas Hobbes** – the assertion that there are no intrinsic ends, natural goals, or moral standards written into nature. As a result, in our liberal world today, **there is no real difference between “having a desire” to do something (anything!) and “having a right” to do it.**

The full implications of liberal “natural rights” philosophy became clear only in the closing decades of the twentieth century. Think of the Supreme Court ruling in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* quoted above, which justified the right to abortion with the liberal axiom, **“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”** As we have seen, the groundwork for the liberal justices’ understanding of natural rights was laid by Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes designed his “natural rights” philosophy to displace the Christian understanding of the *natural law*. **It’s a typical case of a liberal thinker using the pagan thought that Christianity had rejected against the pagan thought Christianity had accepted.** The Christian understanding of the natural law was largely based on the pagan philosophy of Cicero and the Stoics, who in their turn had learned from Plato and Aristotle. The materialism espoused by Hobbes and embraced by liberalism is indebted to the pagan Greek philosopher Epicurus and his Roman disciple Lucretius instead.

…

Second, and perhaps even more destructive, **Christians themselves have largely adopted the "natural rights" language of Hobbes.** They continually attempt to reframe Christian moral arguments in terms of rights, and thereby continually undermine their own efforts.

Thus Christians defending "the right to life" are surprised to find themselves confronted with equally fervent claims that a woman has a "right to choose" or a "right to control her own body." The rights of Christian churches to recognize only traditional marriage is trumped by the right of others to marry whomever they wish. Christians assert the right to practice their religion free from the state's interference, but then find that the same right is claimed by atheists, pantheists, neo-druids, worshipers of a revivified pagan Roman pantheon, and even Satanists.

Christians never get anywhere with this rights language adopted from Hobbes because Hobbes's natural rights were built upon a foundation of complete moral relativism, which was designed precisely to replace Christianity's exclusive moral claims. Once the liberal understanding of rights is adopted, all views are equalized, and the secular state assumes the power to ensure that all views can be equally expressed and represented.

> https://canadafreepress.com/article/santorum-and-st.-thomas-versus-the-catholic-bishops
>
> To state the conservative case for the millionth time, **a right, if it is anything at all, is a claim against others.** For example, your right to life is your claim against anyone else's desire to end or curtail your life without reasonable cause. That is why modern secularist attempts to detach rights from a theory of human nature can only lead to practical nihilism and moral relativism: **If my right—my claim—has no grounding deeper than my own desires, then there is no reason, other than an arbitrary quasi-contractual agreement, why anyone is obliged to acknowledge that right, or respect it.**
> …
>
> If you truly had a right to healthcare, a service provided by humans, then this rights claim would create a specific positive obligation for other human beings, namely the obligation to provide this service for you. However ingeniously the concept of positive rights is decorated by its thousands of dedicated theorists, the basic premise is simple and brutal: a positive right is a claim to the servitude of other human beings—that is, a legal claim against their time, labor, and/or property.
> …
>
> **Though writing long before the birth of Lockean natural rights theory, St. Thomas is describing law as an application of force for the express purpose of defending men against the violations of other men.** And, alongside this view, he is acknowledging that virtue and vice—apart from those instances of vice that bring harm to others—are, to use Santorum's words, properly left to "people of faith, families, communities."
> …
>
> On this question, St. Thomas is unequivocal. Addressing the specific issue of whether it is the purpose of laws to "repress all vice," i.e. to institutionalize virtue, he says this:
>
> > "**Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous [alone] abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain;** and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like."
>
> **Laws do not prohibit all vice, because that would be to restrict unduly the free will of the majority of men, who are imperfect. In other words, virtue in general is a private, which is to say non-legal, matter.** The purpose of human law is to restrict the kind of vicious behavior ("murder, theft and such like") which directly harms other people, thereby, if left unchecked, causing the breakdown of human society. That is, **the law ought to restrict only those behaviors which the majority of men, though imperfect, can and will abstain from of their own free will.** Stated differently, the law ought not to touch the actions of the majority of men. Laws ought to be of a limited and "negative" character.
>
> **Therefore, there is no place in modern Catholic political theory for so-called "positive rights," such as the right to healthcare, a job, a guaranteed income, a home, and so on. Positive rights extend the law's coercive power far beyond the small minority of "depraved" individuals for whom force and fear are the only possible restraints and correctives;** such man-made "rights" impose coercive power, in principle, on every man, woman and child within a society. As such, they violate St. Thomas' sound principle of leaving the imparting of virtue, for the vast majority of humans, as a matter of familial authority. Hence, socialism, even taken on very naive terms (i.e. assuming its goals are the noble ones the Catholic

> bishops have falsely assumed), is completely opposed to the most profound Catholic teaching on the role and limits of human law.

...

Liberals don't just believe in equal political representation or even equal incomes. **They believe that no principle or belief is any better or worse than any other – all are equally unfounded, equally arbitrary.** So, to quote Isaiah Berlin once again, all ends "must be considered to be equally ultimate, uncriticisable ... in themselves." They are "uncriticisable" because there is no standard built into nature by a creator God by which to judge them; **there is nothing above the human will.**

This kind of extreme democracy entails the belief that any notion of higher and lower, better or worse, noble or base, is entirely unfounded. All instances of hierarchy, restriction, or limit are suspect – as being based merely upon someone else's arbitrary will.

...

Materialist, extreme democratic liberalism is therefore *reductionist*. **It assumes that any higher motives or capacities expressed by human beings must be reducible to something lower and even ignoble.**

...

All these reductionist views, including even the seemingly anti-democratic ones, such as Nietzsche's, have a leveling effect. They destroy any natural hierarchy, undermine any notion that there is anything better or worse than anything else in our purposeless cosmos. All these views are therefore helpful to liberalism as tending to level any standard or limit that might infringe on our "right" to pursue any end we desire. **Liberalism thus embraces a version of democracy, a notion of equality, that ultimately rests on nihilism. All notions of intrinsic order or nobility that would define and limit the human will are considered to be tyrannical, dismissed as hypocritical masks for self-interest. At bottom, there is nothing but the self-interested will.**

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/philosophy/90152-the-liberty-of-the-slaves

The visible social badge of Liberty no longer lies in rising above the debased and the despicable, as it did for the old-school bourgeoisie, but in deliberately and conspicuously sinking beneath bourgeois respectability and the republican civic virtue and dignity of the freeborn citizen.

...

The ostentatious Gong-Show antics of personal "empowerment" betrays the profound impotence of citizens at once allowed and in fact, exhorted to insolently swagger and strut about like they own the world even as they seem to vanish in the shadow of a grotesquely bloated State Leviathan on steroids that polices their every step from cradle to grave, and wields more power than the subjects of any of the so-called "absolute" monarchies of old (whose own power was strictly limited by Divine, Natural, and customary right, and/or by the powers and privileges of the Church and the family) would have tolerated in their Prince.

I once was a solidly Blue-pilled, Locke-quoting, Constitution-adoring, fervent true believer of the cult of Liberty when I first began to notice this – although for years I continued to systematically fail to notice it in the very course of noticing it. Such is the power of the blue pill over the mind. **Then one day the red pill presented itself in the form of a passing remark in Seneca:**

> [C]hildren will strike their parents in the face, and the infant tumbles and tears his mother's hair and slobbers upon her, or exposes to the gaze of the family parts that were better covered over, and a child does not shrink from foul language. Yet we do not count any of these things an insult, and why? Because he who does them is incapable of being contemptuous. For the same reason the waggery of slaves, insulting to their masters, amuses us, and their boldness at the expense of guests has license only because they begin with their master himself; **and the more contemptible and even ridiculous any slave is, the more freedom of tongue he has.** For this purpose some people buy young slaves because they are pert, and they whet their impudence and keep them under an instructor in order that they may be practised in pouring forth streams of abuse; and yet we call this smartness, not insult. (emphasis mine).

...

Indeed, **one of the few social norms governing public speech and writing nowadays is a taboo on even attempting to speak authoritatively,** on assertively declaring something state of affairs or course of action to be right or wrong, some person or set of people superior or inferior to another, some precept true and another one false. To do so is to be "judgmental", which is terribly poor form, as scandalously impolite as breaking out into a string of oaths and expletives in mixed company once would have been.

...

As Seneca says, it is acceptable, indeed fitting, for a slave to talk a lot of vile trash and generally act like a total jackass in public – for by doing so, he proves to himself and everybody else that he is good for nothing but servitude. **What isn't acceptable, though, is for this same creature to pass discriminating judgements and make authoritative pronouncements on this or that,** precisely because he is a slave.
...

It follows that it is indecorous for a slave to be "judgmental"; the slave who undertakes to judge has lost mind of his place, and immodestly puts on airs.

Under the red light, then, the true meaning of present-day admonitions against being "judgmental" becomes abundantly clear, as does the meaning of such suggestively self-abnegating conventions of speech as "it's not my place to judge." Additionally, **under red light the formal theoretical expression of the social taboo against discriminating judgment** – namely, the so-called "relativism" that holds that all truth-claims are at once equally true and equally false, that no culture is better than another, and which forbids any attempt to rank-order the differences that obtain between individuals – **may, as a salute to Nietzsche, be designated a slave epistemology.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=7j8PdlgFRDAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA205#v=onepage&q&f=false

In organized society, Hobbes saw that basic disagreements and conflicts arose over defining what is secular and what is religious, and over what is good and right. Individual right reason is not adequate to settle the problems, since there is no indubitable or satisfactory criterion for determining whose right reason to accept. **But, to prevent social disintegration that would ensue, political authority has to determine what is true in religion and morals. The bizarre and authoritarian theory of truth spills over into scientific, mathematical, and logical questions as long as there are disagreements and social consequences of views in these areas.**82

Karl Marx turned the issue around by contending that the intellectual activities going on at any time are a reflection of the economic-political determinating forces. There have been feudal idea-systems, there are capitalistic ones, and for Marx, there will be socialistic ones. **Hence the political authorities will propound intellectual truths in all areas.**83

> http://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/unholy_spirits.pdf
>
> The humanists have been tied to top-down rationalism politically since at least Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651). **The French Enlightenment simply transferred Hobbes' vision of the king's sovereign central power to the democratic State's sovereign central power.** The French Revolution was the result of this vision. So was the Russian Revolution.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT621#v=onepage&q&f=false

In addition, there is no reason to suppose that, like Harrington, radicals would not pick and choose which elements of the Hobbesian project they bought into. **As Margaret Jacob notes, 'the radicals simply stripped Hobbes of his royalism,' taking what they wanted from his politics and capitalising upon the religious implications of his materialism.**72

> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/16/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Last of all, I have propounded to my self this rule through this whole discourse; First, not to define ought which concerns the justice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the laws. Next not to dispute the laws of any government in special, that is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to declare what the laws of all countries are. **Thirdly not to seem of opinion, that there is a lesse proportion of for obedience due to an *Aristocraty* or *Democraty*, than a *Monarchy*; though I have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth Chapter to gain a belief in men, that Monarchy is the most commodious government (which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated) yet every where I expresly say, that in all kind of Government whatsoever, there ought to be a supreme and equall power.** Fourthly, not in any wise to dispute the positions of Divines, except those which strip Subjects of their obedience, and shake the foundations of civill government.
>
> https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/134/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> VIII. In the last place, it's a great hindrance to Civill Government, especially Monarchicall, that men distinguish not enough between a *People* and a *Multitude*. **The *People* is somewhat that is *one*, having *one will*, and to whom *one action* may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The *People* rules in all Governments, for even in *Monarchies* the *People***

> **Commands; for the *People* wills by the will of *one man*; but the Multitude are Citizens, that is to say, Subjects.** In a *Democraty*, and *Aristocraty*, the Citizens are the *Multitude*, but the *Court* is the *People*. And in a *Monarchy*, the Subjects are the *Multitude*, and (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the *People*.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/226/mode/2up?view=theater

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that major components had been, and continued to be, detached by radical thinkers from Hobbes's system, and perhaps especially his notion that 'democracy' is the first kind of instituted commonwealth 'in order of time' **and his doctrine that sovereignty, after the making of the state, is what has been called the 'aggregate of private wills,' an idea afterwards centrally adopted by Spinoza. This extracted, more equitable, 'democratic Hobbesianism' to no small degree helped define and refine the theoretical apparatus of the early modern democratic republicans, and hence of the Radical Enlightenment as a whole.**3 James Harrington was certainly not alone among early modern republicans in nothing that 'Mr Hobbes holdeth democracy to be of all governments the first in modern order of time.'4 **Furthermore, this has been part of the justification of what in recent decades has developed into an important theme in history of political thought studies – the thesis that, for Hobbes, as it has been put, 'democracy was prior both chronologically and logically to other forms of government,'**5 and that Hobbes's sovereign has what has been called 'an elective, republican character,' **so that, in short, 'Hobbes is the true ancestor of constitutional liberal democracy.'**6

> https://archive.org/details/inlandofisrael00ozam/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> "**As soon as we finish this phase, the violence phase, step right up, it'll be your turn to play your role.** You can make us a civilization with humanistic values here. Do the brotherhood-of-man bit – Light unto the Nations – whatever you want – the morality of the Prophets. Do the whole bit.
> …
>
> Oh, boy, will you be forgiven! The international audience will adore your conscientiousness. **They'll receive you in the fanciest salons! But only after my cannon or my nasty napalm calms down the Indians and makes sure they don't scalp your children and mine;** and only after millions of Zhids have come home, here: and only after the house is big enough, with enough rooms for the whole family.
>
> Col. Jessup: Son, we live in a world that has walls, and those walls have to be guarded by men with guns.
> …
>
> **You don't want the truth because deep down, in places you don't talk about at parties, you want me on that wall.** You need me on that wall.
>
> http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/miscellaneous/73733-class-clowns
>
> They were silly values, of course, these liberal values. Crackers, really, if you thought about them. We lower-middle classes might be far and away the densest of the English social class, **but we are under no illusions about the true nature of political power.** All political power, even in democracies, is underpinned by violence, or the threat of it; not by love, and certainly not by tolerance or daydreams about equality, still less by this bloody 'cohesion' you keep talking about these days.
>
> And how do we know this? How did the lower-middle class acquire this one important, cold-blooded insight, among all the other hocus-pocus that we've fallen for over the years?
>
> **Because we were once employed by you middle-class ladies and gentlemen as a sort of safety bulwark between you and the mob. Why, doing your dirty work has always been our job, sir! It's why you let us sleep in your porch.** What a shame you've repudiated our little secret and have gone away with the fairies!

…

Radical authors, then, while mostly viewing Hobbes as an apologist for tyranny, calumniator of republican assemblies, champion of censorship, and a thinker who had drawn an excessively pessimistic picture of natural humanity, and especially its proneness to aggression and conflict, **consistently did so in a curiously equivocal, even paradoxical, way, hardly ever altogether disowning him and his system, and often betraying an unmistakably strong sympathy for elements of his thought and writing.** As Anthony Collins remarked, however much free thinkers disapproved of what he terms Hobbes's 'High-Church Politicks,' meaning his compliant views on ecclesiastical authority and book censorship, as well as monarchical sovereignty, and other 'false opinions,' there was no denying Hobbes was what he approvingly styles a 'great influence of learning, virtue and free-thinking.'8

…

The comprehensive toleration central to Spinoza, van den Enden, and the brothers de La Court is neither explicitly recommended by, nor integral to, Hobbes **who indeed is more inclined to recommend censorship, imposing uniformity and suppression rather than toleration wherever political stability and the security of the state are threatened.**29

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n703/mode/2up?view=theater

> But the conditions that Rome faced would not permit liberal policies; Marcus Aurelius and Alexander Severus had tried these and failed. Confronted by enemies on every side, **the Roman state did what all nations must do in crucial wars; it accepted the dictatorship of a strong leader, taxed itself beyond tolerance, and put individual liberty aside until collective liberty was secured.** Diocletian had, with more cost but under harder circumstances, repeated the achievement of Augustus.

Unrestricted individual freedom under an (equitable) law, including full freedom of speech and expression, is always fundamental in the radical tradition **but is found in Hobbes only in a very restricted sphere concerned with the pursuit of private interests.** For he sharply segregates the internal world of freedom, confined to the mind of the individual, and the latter's private dealings, from an external world of public obedience and outward conformity to the law in matters of faith.30
…

Thus far, the Spinozists were merely following Hobbes. **But precisely because natural equality, in his view, is dangerous, destabilizing, and to be avoided in favour of order and social hierarchy, this potential route to a purely secular and autonomous morality under the state, the path chosen by Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot, is peremptorily blocked off by Hobbes.** For he reduces the content of natural morality, underpinning the social contract and the rule of positive law, to an absolute minimum with little applicability to political life under the state, **coupling a doctrine of the indivisibility of sovereignty closely aligned with that of Bodin to the idea that 'in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty.'** In this way, he interposes an absolute divide between ruler and ruled and insuperable polarity between natural right and law.42

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA277#v=onepage&q&f=false

When asked what difference existed between his views and Hobbes', he replied: **"Elle consiste en ce que je conserve toujours fidèlement le droit naturel et n'attribue pas dans chaque cite au magistrat suprême plus de droit sur ses sujets que n'en comporte le degré de puissance qui fait sa supériorité, ce qui a toujours lieu dans l'état naturel."** Thus Spinoza moved from the concept of the state as absolute to the more reasonable concept of the state as liberal. Thus, also, he insisted that the state not only must confirm free-thinking, but must also protect the right of every man to free thought. Thus, finally, he tended to a more democratic form of government. **And while Hobbes founded right on force and both Grotius and Leibniz founded it on natural law, Spinoza, striking a middle ground between the two positions, established it upon force and reason, at the same time attempting to preserve the integrity of natural law in the social state.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA193#v=onepage&q&f=false

> "Government" d'Holbach defines as the combined force society as a whole employs to oblige its members to adhere to the terms of the "pacte social" that rescues men from the "state of nature."99 **His "state of nature" was a halfway-house between the "monstruous constraint" of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, on one side, and Rousseau's "imaginary" natural equality on the other.**100 This principle, so proximate to Spinoza's, tied d'Holbach's utilitarian ethics to his political theory.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT452#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although Dryden seems closest to Hobbes in these areas, already explored in print and on stage in the 1660s, **the poet only attracted critical attention for his Hobbism as a result of the publication of his blockbuster heroic tragedy of 1670, *The conquest of Granada*** (1672). Here Dryden had strayed into riskier terrain, giving off Hobbesian signals in his dramatic theory and his characters at a moment when the critical environment was peculiarly sensitised to such allusion.
…

In 1673 Richard Leigh accused Dryden of violating the accepted rules of heroic tragedy by creating a hero who knew no restraint. In doing so he had secured 'the Reason and Politicall Ornaments from Mr Hobs.' Dryden's Almanzor was undoubtedly an almost superhuman and shocking character, whose speeches and actions portrayed a naturalistic individual initially unbound by any form of conventional restraint. Having intervened in a factional struggle, Almanzor is condemned to death by the king, Boabdelin. Almanzor's now famous defence of himself reminded some of Hobbes's natural man:

…

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.93351/page/n69/mode/2up?view=theater

> *Almanz.* No man has more contempt than I of breath,
> But whence hast thou the right to give me death?
> Obeyed as sovereign by thy subjects be,
> But know, that I alone am king of me.
> **I am as free as nature first made man,**
> **Ere the base laws of servitude began,**
> **When wild in woods the noble savage ran.**

The character's apparently wayward conduct during the play led Leigh to comment that he was the subject of **'a Poeticall Free-State … where all were Monarchs … and all swore Allegiance to themselves … where every man might invade anothers Right, without trespassing in his owne, and make, and execute what Lawes himself would consent to each man having the power of Life and Death so absolutely, that if he kill'd himself, he was accountable to no body for the murder.'** Almanzor was exempt from both poet's rules and prince's laws, 'and in short, if his revolting from the *Abencerrages* to the *Zegrys*, and from the *Zegrys* to the *Abencarrages* again, had not equally satisfi'd both parties, it might admit of the same defence, Mr *Drydens* Out-cries, and his Tumults did, that the Poet represented Men in a *Hobbian* State of War.'209

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Blount,_Charles_(1654-1693)

In 1673 he published, anonymously, 'Mr. Dreyden vindicated, in Reply to the friendly vindication of Mr. Dreyden, and reflections on the Rota.' **This was a warm defence of Dryden against the criticisms of Richard Leigh in a pamphlet called 'The Censure of the Rota on Mr. Dryden's Conquest of Granada.' Blount afterwards took some part in a translation of Lucian,** and Dryden makes a complimentary reference to him in the life of Lucian prefixed to the translation (which was not published till 1711).
…

Blount sent a copy of it to Hobbes, with a letter dated 1678 (*Oracles of Reason*, p. 97), in which he praises Hobbes's 'incomparable' treatise on heresy,' then in manuscript, and takes occasion to impugn the authority of councils. Soon after Hobbes's death (4 Dec. 1679) he published a broadsheet called 'Last Sayings and Dying Legacy' of Mr. Thos. Hobbes of Malmesbury. **It consists chiefly of extracts from the 'Leviathan,' and is clearly not intended, as Wood says, 'to expose' Hobbes. It is the work of a disciple.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/604/mode/2up?view=theater

> **English philosophical incredulity effectively began with Blount, who, though often disparaged as unoriginal and a plagiarist, was nevertheless a crucial figure in the rise of English radicalism.**38 His first clearly deistic work, the *Anima Mundi*, appeared in 1678. Already here, and in his works of the early 1680s, Blount, **deploying Herbert's conception of a true natural religion which requires no priests or formal theology,** discards the theological systems of the revealed religions as fraud and trickery contrived by cunning impostors for their own advantage, linking this analysis to radical republicanism by showing that, generally in history, despots encourage such priestly manipulation to strengthen their own sway while, equally, priests sanctify tyranny the better to nurture their own status and authority. Similarly, he dismisses all religious prophecy, precisely like Spinoza, as the result of exceptional 'imagination': 'to set up for a Prophet, the chief thing necessary is a lively strong fancy and imagination.'39 **But this self-proclaimed disciple of Herbert, who clearly borrowed much from Hobbes, also drew extensively not just on Spinoza but other Dutch sources, including the elder Vossius**40 **and his son Isaac Vossius (1618-89), the *savant* and former acquaintance of Spinoza of whom Charles II quipped that 'he believed everything except what was in the Bible'** – a confirmed libertine who, after a short period in Sweden, settled in England.41 It was seemingly Isaac Vossius who inspired Blount's claims that the Biblical Flood occurred only in Palestine and that Chinese history is older than that of the Jews.42

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/228/mode/2up?view=theater

Yet, once again, Bayle's account of Hobbes is no more predominantly a negative one than is Diderot's. As with most late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century French authors, **Hobbes was not in fact a particularly important source of reference or inspiration for Bayle despite the obvious similarities of their politics.** Where Bayle's article on Spinoza is the longest in his *Dictionnaire*, and reveals something of his lifelong obsession with Spinoza, that devoted to Hobbes, even if still substantial compared to those devoted to the other philosophers for whom Bayle provides entries, is nevertheless

very brief by comparison. **Hobbes did not have a comparable importance for Bayle to that of Spinoza; nevertheless, he treats him in some respects in an almost parallel fashion, especially when praising his character, viewing him, as the English translation of Bayle's *Dictionnaire* puts it, as a 'great observer of equity' while simultaneously stressing, like Diderot as early as his reworking of Shaftesbury in 1745, that he did not believe in God.** Parts of Hobbes's system were clearly regarded by Bayle with considerable sympathy.17

Bayle's prime criticism of Hobbes – that he simply went too far in his preference for monarchy – is remarkable for someone who shared many of his strictures about democracy and republicanism. 'Hobbes was enrag'd against the principles of the Parlementarians,' he observed, citing this as the reason he 'went to the other extreme, and taught that the authority of the kings ought to have no limitation, and that in particular the externals of religion, as being the most fruitful cause of civil wars, ought to depend upon their will.'18

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#CHAPTER_VIIId

Of all Christian writers, the philosopher Hobbes alone has seen the evil and how to remedy it, and has dared to propose the reunion of the two heads of the eagle, and the restoration throughout of political unity, without which no State or government will ever be rightly constituted. But he should have seen that the masterful spirit of Christianity is incompatible with his system, and that the priestly interest would always be stronger than that of the State. **It is not so much what is false and terrible in his political theory, as what is just and true, that has drawn down hatred on it.**[4]

> [4] **See, for instance, in a letter from Grotius to his brother (April 11, 1643), what that learned man found to praise and to blame in the *De Cive.*** It is true that, with a bent for indulgence, he seems to pardon the writer the good for the sake of the bad; but all men are not so forgiving.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater

As for the flourish of Rousseau's rhetorical sword – **"whoever dares to say *there is no salvation outside of the church* should be chased out of the State, *unless the State is the church*, and the prince is the pontiff" [emphasis added].**29 Unless, indeed. Note that Rousseau is not opposed to theocracy – as long as it's a theocracy of the religion of the liberal state.

> https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **As Rousseau remarked of Machiavelli in his *Social Contract*, "While pretending to give lessons to kings, he gave great ones to the people. Machiavelli's *The Prince* is the book of republicans."**18 Rousseau pretended that Machiavelli was just fooling, so to speak, when he gave his ruthless advice to the prince – he really meant it for the people. Actually, **Rousseau was taking over Machiavelli's advice for his own purposes, with the result that the radical secular "republicans" of the French Revolution would act with the ruthlessness of Machiavellian princes,** openly rejecting Christianity, pitilessly slaughtering priests and nuns, desecrating churches, and setting up a "religion of reason" in place of Christianity.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/224/mode/2up?view=theater

Though firmly hostile to Hobbes's anti-democratic stance, **in his article on 'Hobbes' for the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot was far from wholly unsympathetic to his general aims, motives, and philosophy.** He excuses Hobbes's to his mind overly negative depiction of the state of nature as due to the unusually grim situation facing England during the years he wrote his *De cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651). He praises Hobbes's honesty and insight, and his devising a system which, despite its averred loyalty to revealed religion, seemed to him to be a form of atheistic materialism, that is, something of which (from 1747) he entirely approved. Yet despite these positive and mitigating features, Diderot in the end felt Hobbes erred badly owing to an excessively pessimistic view of humanity: **taking a particularly menacing set of circumstances 'pour les règles invariables de la nature,' he sums up, he became 'l'agresseur de l'humanité et l'apologiste de la tyrannie.'**1
…

Diderot, for all his criticism of Hobbes's views about society, hence warmly praises his metaphysics and epistemology, recognizing important elements here which he shared with Hobbes. **For the latter, as for himself, Bayle, and Spinoza but not Descartes, Locke, or Hume, philosophy and science are ultimately the same thing, and simultaneously wholly separate from theology.**
…

Applauding Hobbes's rejection of Cartesian dualism, Diderot remarks that the English thinker, flatly contradicting Descartes, was far from agreeing 'que la matière étoit incapable de penser'; where Descartes had famously said 'I think, therefore I am,' Hobbes, observes Diderot, says 'je pense, donc la matière peut penser.'14 But the feature of Hobbes's system that most of all appealed to radical minds,

though rooted in his metaphysics, was at the same time an aspect of his political and social theory, **namely that morality and law are not based on divinely given criteria but are purely social constructs, such that, as Diderot puts it, 'les loix de la société sont donc la seule mesure commune du bien et du mal.'**15

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baron_d%27Holbach

According to Faguet: **"d'Holbach, more than Voltaire, more than Diderot, is the father of all the philosophy and all the anti-religious polemics at the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century."**[49]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holbach/#EthiVirtForSakeHapp

Like his major influence in this area, Spinoza, he undertakes to explain human beings with the same clarity and rigor that others explain geometry (*Eléments de la morale universelle*, Preface). The laws that Holbach depends upon in accounting for human nature are primarily psychological laws and may be peculiar to human beings. For Holbach, like Spinoza and Hobbes, holds that each person seeks his own preservation (*System of Nature*, 40; cf, Spinoza's *Ethics* IIIp9 and Hobbes's *De Homine*, Chap. 11—**Holbach's is still the most widely available French translation of the latter**).
…

Holbach's foundational view is that the most valuable thing a person seeking self-preservation can do is to unite with another person: "Man is of all beings the most necessary to man" (*Système social*, 76; cf. Spinoza's *Ethics* IVP35C1, C2, and S).
…

Holbach is a thoroughgoing utilitarian: where the government fails to secure the general welfare, which consists principally in securing property and basic freedoms such as the freedoms of speech and religion, society has a right to revolution (*La politique naturelle*, 4.5).

Perhaps because of the less cautious advocacy of right to revolution among other members of his coterie, particularly Naigeon, **or perhaps because he criticized the kings of his time so fiercely,** Holbach is sometimes regarded as an advocate of revolution. Holbach's discussion is tentative, however. He describes the right in *La politique naturelle* (4.5 ff.) as a product of the natural instinct for self-preservation. **Like Hobbes (*Leviathan*, XXIX, 23), Holbach expects that obedience to a sovereign will break down where individuals feel the need to secure their own lives.** This is also why sovereigns need to take care to look after citizens' welfare and education. Where they fail to do these things, citizens come to be ruled not by reason but by passion, and revolution results. Holbach's right to revolution, then, is less an advocacy of revolution than a warning to avoid the conditions that lead to it.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false

Being, strangely, often mistakenly denied by modern scholars, the passion behind d'Holbach's anti-monarchism needs stressing. "A good king is such a rare outcome, there is no room for peoples to flatter themselves they will see one often."25
…

Unlike Voltaire, Diderot and d'Holbach excluded Frederick from among monarchs sufficiently "enlightened" to serve the Enlightenment cause; rather, the "opposition between d'Holbach and Frederick was total."117 "Despotism," states d'Holbach's *Essai sur les préjugés*, is a dreadful, destructive factor in human life; Frederick quickly grasped that d'Holbach was alluding to him. Not only did royal government impede "l'esprit humain" by permitting churchmen to control education, it hinders it too by failing to advance the sciences, merit, useful knowledge, and basic morality. **Frederick patronized La Mettrie the atheist; Lucretius' *De rerum natura* counted among his favorite books; but d'Holbach's strictures in the *Essai sur les préjugés* and *Système de la nature* were another matter;** his "overt challenge to political and religious authority" incurred the king's intense wrath.118

Among the worst factors causing humanity's universally wretched predicament, held d'Holbach, was the "indifference sovereigns show for the education of their subjects" – and to their talents and virtues.119
…

No believer in Christianity, Frederick nevertheless agreed with Voltaire that the masses need religion and in his realms scrupulously maintained the church's grip, whether Catholic hegemony in Silesia (conquered in 1740), Calvinism in Cleves-Mark and at court, or Lutheranism in the rest. Frederick was indeed widely criticized by Mirabeau and other radicals for his education policy. If churchmen are pernicious teachers, in d'Holbach's eyes, it was due to the "negligence of sovereigns" (including

Frederick) that there was “no country where the education system was appropriate for producing statesmen, magistrates and *citoyens utiles*.”122
…

D'Holbach who, of all the major eighteenth-century thinkers, has been the one most routinely sidelined, ignored, and marginalized by the general historiography, was actually among the most revolutionary of eighteenth-century political thinkers, **a thinker intent, Frederick recognized, on overturning the whole established order [*tout l’ordre établi*].**202
…

Yet d’Holbach, the figure the “negative critique” maintains was no radical political thinker, followed up the *Système de la nature* with no less than four full-scale works of political theory.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n301/mode/2up?view=theater

The reader may be surprized at hearing that the System of Nature was not the most virulent production which the Club of Holbach had published to incite the people to rebellion and to persuade them to consider their Kings and Princes in no other light than as monsters to be crushed. **The adept or adepts who had composed the *Social System* availed themselves of the impression Diderot's work had made. They are more reserved on Atheism, only to be more virulent against kings.** The object of this work is to persuade the people that they are the victims of a long state of warfare, which ended by throwing them under the yoke of Kings. But they were not to abandon all hope of breaking their chains, and even of loading their Kings with them, though they had been hitherto unsuccessful. There the imagination is worked upon, and the meanest subject is taught to say to his Sovereign, “**We have proved the weakest, we have submitted to force; *but should we ever become the strongest, we would wrest that usurped power from you* whenever you exercised it for our unhappiness. It is only by your attention to our prosperity that you can make us forget the infamous titles by which you reign over us.** *If we are not strong enough to shake off the yoke we will only bear it with horror.* You shall find an enemy in each of your slaves, and every instant you shall tremble on the thrones which you have unlawfully usurped.”24
…

With the same excess of phrensy, commenting on the axiom.

> **Some lucky soldier was the first of Kings,**

full of his Voltaire, like the Pythoness inspired by the devil, from the summit of his fiery tripod the same adept, addressing himself to all nations, tells them, “**Thousands of executioners crowned with laurel and wreaths of flowers,** returning from their expeditions, carry about in triumph an *idol* which they call *King*, Emperor, Sovereign. They crown this idol and prostrate themselves before it, and then, at the sound of instruments, and of repeated, senseless and barbarous acclamations, they declare it in future to be the *Sovereign Director* of all the bloody scenes which are to take place in the realm, and to be ***the first executioner of the nation*.**”

Then, swelling his chest, foaming at the mouth, and with haggard eyes he makes the air resound with the following frightful declamation:

“***To the pretended masters of the earth*, scourges of mankind, illustrious tyrants of your equals,** *Kings*, *Princes*, *Monarchs*, *Chiefs*, *Sovereigns*, all you, in fine, who, raising yourselves on the throne, *and above your equals*, have lost all *ideas of equality*, equity, *sociability* and truth; in whom *sociability* and goodness, the beginnings of the most common virtues, have not even shown themselves, I cite you all at the tribunal of reason. If this miserable globe, silently moving through the etherial space, drags away with it millions of unhappy beings fixed to its surface, and fettered with the bonds of opinion; if this globe, I say, has been a prey to you, and if you still continue to devour this sad inheritance, **it is not to the wisdom of your predecessors, nor to the virtues of the first inhabitants, that you are indebted for it; but *to stupidity, to fear, to barbarity, to perfidy, to superstition. Such are your titles.***

http://www.ftarchives.net/holbach/good/gs3.htm#139

Rulers infallibly decide the religion of the people. The true religion is always the religion of the prince; the true God is the God, whom the prince desires his people to adore; the will of the priests, who govern the prince, always becomes the will of God. A wit justly observed, that *the true religion is always that, on whose side are the prince and the hangman*. Emperors and hangmen long supported the gods of Rome against the God of Christians; the latter, having gained to his interest the emperors, their soldiers, and their hangmen, succeeded in destroying the worship of the Roman gods.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/6/11*.html#ref61

> All round the coast of Istria, at Grado itself, and probably among the lagunes of Venetia—in fact, **wherever the galleys of Constantinople could penetrate—churchmen were desirous to return into unity with the Emperor and the Pope,** and were willing to admit that Theodoret, Theodore and Ibas were suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. On the mainland, at Aquileia itself, in the great old desolate Venetian cities, Padua, Vicenza, and the like, in the little towns under the shadow of the Dolomites, **wherever the swords of the Lombards flashed, men took a more hopeful view of the spiritual prospects of the three Syrians.** At the death of Severus, in 606, the divergence became manifest.

...

We cannot reasonably propose to divest the people of their follies; **but we may perhaps cure the follies of those who govern the people, and who will then prevent the follies of the people from becoming dangerous.** Superstition is to be feared only when princes and soldiers rally round her standard; then she becomes cruel and sanguinary.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n117/mode/2up?view=theater

> Frederic seemed to be nearer to simple toleration when he thus answered Voltaire: **"It is not the lot of arms to destroy *the wretch*.—It will perish by those of truth."**10 At length he begins to think that force must strike the last blow at Religion. He is not averse to this force, and we see him willing to employ it had the occasion offered when he writes to Voltaire, **"To Bayle, your forerunner, and to yourself, no doubt, is due the honor of that Revolution working in the minds of men. But, truly to speak, it is not yet complete; bigots have their party, and *it will never be perfected but by a superior force: from government must the sentence issue that shall crush the wretch.* Enlightened Ministers may forward it, *but the will of the sovereign must accede*. Without doubt this will be effectuated in time; but neither of us can be spectators of that long-wished for moment."**11
>
> 11. From Frederic, 8 Sept. 1775, Vol. 66, Let. 97, P. 230.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm

In *Bacon*, its first creator, materialism still holds back within itself in a naive way the germs of a many-sided development. On the one hand, matter, surrounded by a sensuous, poetic glamour, seems to attract man's whole entity by winning smiles. On the other, the aphoristically formulated doctrine pullulates with inconsistencies imported from theology.

In its further evolution, materialism becomes *one-sided. Hobbes* is the man who *systematises Baconian* materialism. Knowledge based upon the senses loses its poetic blossom, it passes into the abstract experience of the *geometrician*.
Physical motion is sacrificed to *mechanical* or *mathematical* motion; *geometry* is proclaimed as the queen of sciences. **Materialism takes to *misanthropy*. If it is to overcome its opponent, *misanthropic, fleshless* spiritualism, and that on the latter's own ground, materialism has to chastise its own flesh and turn *ascetic*.** Thus it passes into an *intellectual entity*; but thus, too, it evolves all the consistency, regardless of consequences, characteristic of the intellect.

https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=3269&context=ocj **[May 23, 1857]**

What happened lately in France is an example. In 1848 a pure democracy was established there. During a short time there was reason to expect a general spoliation, a national bankruptcy, a new partition of the soil, a maximum of prices, a ruinous load of taxation laid on the rich for the purpose of supporting the poor in idleness. **Such a system would, in twenty years, have made France as poor and barbarous as the France of the Carlovingians.** Happily, the danger was averted; and now there is a despotism, a silent tribune, an enslaved press. Liberty is gone, but civilization has been saved. I have not the smallest doubt that if we had a purely democratic government here the effect would be the same. Either the poor would plunder the rich, and civilization would perish; or order and prosperity would be saved by a strong military government, and liberty would perish. **You may think that your country enjoys an exemption from these evils. I will frankly own to you that I am of a very different opinion. Your fate I believe to be certain, though it is deferred by a physical cause. As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land, your laboring population will be far more at ease than the laboring population of the Old World, and, while that is the case, the Jefferson politics may continue to exist without causing any fatal calamity.** But the time will

come when New England will be as thickly peopled as old England. Wages will be as low, and will fluctuate as much with you as with us. You will have your Manchesters and Birminghams, and in those Manchesters and Birminghams hundreds of thousands of artisans will assuredly be sometimes out of work. Then your institutions will be fairly brought to the test.
…

There will be, I fear, spoliation. The distress will produce fresh spoliation. There is nothing to stop you. Your Constitution is all sail and no anchor. **As I said before, when a society has entered on this downward progress, either civilization or liberty must perish. Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand, or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth;** with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by your own institutions.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LPbBdyxGNhQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA66#v=onepage&q&f=false

How could it simultaneously be the case that “there had never been” any such literal state-of-nature war, when in the previous paragraph he had just said that some *were* living like that now? As a result of this ambiguity, Hobbes has been characterized as a literal contractarian by some commentators and as a hypothetical contractarian by others. But I think this minor mystery can be cleared up once we recognize that there is a tacit racial logic in the text: **the *literal* state of nature is reserved for nonwhites; for whites the state of nature is *hypothetical*. The conflict between whites is the conflict between those with *sovereigns*, that is, those who are already (and have always been) in society.** From this conflict, one can extrapolate (gesturing at the racial abyss, so to speak) to what might happen in the absence of a ruling sovereign. But really we know that whites are too rational to allow this to happen to *them*. **So the most notorious state of nature in the contractarian literature – the bestial war of all against all – is really a *nonwhite* figure, a racial object lesson for the more rational whites, whose superior grasp of natural law (here in its prudential rather than altruistic version) will enable them to take the necessary steps to avoid it and not to behave as “savages.”**

Hobbes has standardly been seen as an awkwardly transitional figure, caught between feudal absolutism and the rise of parliamentarianism, who uses the contract now classically associated with the emergence of liberalism to defend absolutism. But it might be argued that he is transitional in another way, in that in mid-seventeenth century Britain the imperial project was not yet so fully developed that the intellectual apparatus of racial subordination had been completely elaborated. **Hobbes remains enough of a racial egalitarian that, while singling out Native Americans for his real-life example, he suggests that without a sovereign *even Europeans* could descend to their state, and that the absolutist government appropriate for nonwhites could also be appropriate for whites.**57 The uproar that greeted his work can be seen as attributable at least in part to this moral/political suggestion. **The spread of colonialism would consolidate an intellectual world in which this bestial state of nature would be reserved for nonwhite savages, to be despotically governed, while civil Europeans would enjoy the benefits of liberal parliamentarianism.** *The Racial Contract began to rewrite the social contract*.

One can see this transition more clearly by the time of Locke, whose state of nature is normatively regulated by traditional (altruistic, nonprudential) natural law. **It is a moralized state of nature in which private property and money exist, indeed a state of nature that is virtually civil.** Whites can thus be literally in this state of nature (for a brief period, anyway) without its calling into question their innate qualities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Stewart_(philosopher)

Nature’s God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic (2014)

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/314/mode/2up?view=theater

Probably most people today, if pressed, will say that the principles of liberalism are the elaboration of a certain moral intuition about treating other people with respect. Some might add that those principles are the arbitrary artifact of a particular culture, or of a certain social or economic system. Still others will point to a source from on high. In the abstract reaches of academic political theory, these common ideas about liberalism often take the form of a theory of justice,

according to which the principles of liberalism are said to arise from a universal concept of justice as fairness or something like that.
…

In fact, these common ideas about liberalism describe a political order that probably could not exist and in any case would not last very long.

Liberalism in its original form is not the elaboration of some common moral intuition, the articulation of an arbitrary creed or cultural formation, or a theory of justice. It is a theory of power. Its principal claim is that the source of human power and freedom is the understanding. It rests in an essential way on the same radical philosophy that begins with Nature's God and passes through nature's virtue. **And that radical philosophy remains the ultimate source of liberalism's revolutionary power to the present.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA70#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the fourth century, the Spartan king Archidamus was among the first of those residing in the Peloponnesus to witness the newfangled catapult launch a projectile. Though impressed by the event, he did not welcome what it portended. **Archidamus's only reaction was to swear by his putative ancestor Heracles that "manly virtue (*andrós aretá*) has perished from the earth." As the Macedonian conquest of Hellas would soon reveal, progress in the art of war could only too easily signal the obsolescence of the hoplite militia – and, with it, the demise of the *pólis* and the entire Greek way of life.**26

"***God created men. Sam Colt made them equal.***"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Gotlib_Bloch#Influence

To the British readers of *The Contemporary Review*, Bloch wrote in 1901:

> Having busied myself for over fourteen years with the study of war in all its phases and aspects, **I am astonished to find that the remarkable evolution which is rapidly turning the sword into a ploughshare has passed almost unnoticed even by the professional watchmen who are paid to keep a sharp look-out.** In my work on the war of the future I endeavoured to draw a picture of this interesting process. But writing for specialists, I was compelled to enter largely into details, the analysis of which ran into 3,084 pages. **The facts which are there garnered together, and the consequences which flow from them, run too strongly counter to the vested interests of the most powerful class of the community to admit of their being immediately embodied in measures of reform.** And this I foresaw from the first. What I could not foresee was the stubbornness which [it] not only recoiled from taking action but set itself to twist and distort the facts. **Patriotism is highly respectable, but it is dangerous to identify it with the interests of a class.** The steadfastness with which the military caste clings to the memory of a state of things which has already died is pathetic and honourable. Unfortunately it is also costly and dangerous. Therefore I venture now to appeal to the British masses, whose vital interests are at stake and whose verdict must be final.

https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,886699-2,00.html

In the light of the past, the significant fact about 1945 was that it was the last year of World War II. **But in the light of the future, it was the first year in which civilization possessed, in the sober words of the Smyth Report, "the means to commit suicide at will."**

What the world would best remember of 1945 was the deadly mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Here were the force, the threat, the promise of the future. In their giant shadows, 45,000 feet tall, all men were pygmies.
…

The feeling was abroad that the complexity of modern life had made all men, even Presidents, even Men of the Year, mere foam flecks on the tide.

https://voegelinview.com/nietzsche-the-diabolical-saint-of-acceptance/

The strong murder the weak; and the mob are always stronger than the individual, as Socrates points out in *The Gorgias*, much to the disgust of Callicles. Nietzsche sides with Callicles in praising the strong, but his position suffers from the same defect. **The many, the rabble, can beat the few. Nietzsche then finds himself in the ludicrous situation of**

defending the strong against the weak, a logically and rhetorically contradictory position.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_185

183. **If, then, the Romans had spurned the Greek culture, they would perhaps have gone to pieces completely.** When could this culture have once again arisen? **Christianity and Romans and barbarians: this would have been an onslaught: it would have entirely wiped out culture.** We see the danger amid which genius lives. **Cicero was one of the greatest benefactors of humanity, even in his own time.**

There is no "Providence" for genius; it is only for the ordinary run of people and their wants that
such a thing exists: they find their satisfaction, and later on their justification.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.175029/page/n175/mode/2up?view=theater

In the human race, also, the *superior specimens*, the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid the fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to every form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone, already decadents. ... **The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the Caesar, is *sui generis*: such things are not hereditary.** The *type* is inherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly "happy" about a type. ... It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the "evil will" of Nature, but merely of the concept "superior type": the higher type is an example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity—a greater sum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration becomes a thousand times more threatening. "Genius" is the sublimest machine in existence—hence it is the most fragile.
...

Anti-Darwin.—What surprises me most on making a general survey of the great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of what to-day Darwin and his school sees or *will* persist in seeing: selection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the progress of the species. **Precisely the reverse of this stares one in the face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre, and even of those who are *below mediocrity*.**
...

That will to power, in which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change, explains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions and of the lucky cases: **the strongest and happiest natures are weak when they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious instincts and the fear which possesses the weak.** My general view of the world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the destiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not prevail: but rather the decadent specimens, —perhaps there is nothing more interesting in the world than this *unpleasant* spectacle. ...

Strange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against the sick and physiologically botched.
...

I do indeed find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred to; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the lowly.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/368/mode/2up?view=theater

Many historians today interpret "the sovereignty of the people" as a collective act of make-believe.172 It is a fiction that cleverly masks the fact that the people are anything but sovereign, or so they say. Probably most people today read "the sovereignty of the people" as an imperative. The people *ought* to be sovereign, they should be given a voice in government, even if they usually are not. Yet within the radical political theory that ultimately decided the course of the modern world, the sovereignty of the people is neither a fiction nor an imperative. It is a statement of fact. **The sovereign simply *is* the people.**

This fact of popular sovereignty follows in a primordial way from the axiom that human beings are natural equals. Insofar as human beings are naturally equal, according to the radical line of thought, the power through which rulers impose their will on others can come only from the people themselves. All the money, titles, rights, and influence that individuals wield as instruments of power within society are

in reality nothing more than the power of other people in society appropriated according to certain ideas. **If human beings were as naturally unequal as lions and lambs, to put it in the converse, the sovereign might be identified with a particular (leonine) subset of a human collective; but they aren't, so it isn't.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_904
>
> There was therefore a power in nations before there were kings, or there could never have been any; and Nimrod could never have been king, if the people of Babylon had not made him king, which they could not have done if they had not had a power of making him so. **'Tis ridiculous to say he made himself king, for tho he might be strong and valiant, he could not be stronger than a multitude of men. That which forces must be stronger than that which is forced; and if it be true, according to the ancient saying, that Hercules himself is not sufficient to encounter two, 'tis sure more impossible for one man to force a multitude, for that must be stronger than he.** If he came in by persuasion, they who were persuaded, were persuaded to consent that he should be king. That consent therefore made him king. But, *Qui dat esse, dat modum esse:*2 They who made him king, made him such a king as best pleased themselves. **He had therefore nothing but what was given: his greatness and power must be from the multitude who gave it:** and their laws and liberties could not be from him; but their liberties were naturally inherent in themselves, and their laws were the product of them.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/338/mode/2up?view=theater

In the pursuit of the foundations of justice and power, however, **the heirs of Epicurus arrived at the insight that "right" is indeed nothing but "might" perspicuously understood. They wrapped this insight in a respectable language of "natural rights" and "laws of nature" purportedly ordained by God above.** But in fact they found a way of explaining rights that reduces God to nothing more than the very principle that all rights may be explained in terms of power.
…

"Engraved" hearts also happen to be a staple of deist literature, and are enthusiastically cited in the works of Spinoza and Locke, as well as Vanini, Tindal, Jefferson, and Allen, among others. But the laws of Nature's God are dramatically different from – indeed they are in a crucial way the opposite of – the "Natural Law" of the theologians.75
…

Modern Natural Law theorists tend to discover, for example, that gay sex, contraception, and other practices that disagree with their convictions or otherwise make the feel uncomfortable constitute violations of natural law. **The "Laws of Nature" of the deist tradition, on the other hand, impose no obligations, cannot be violated, and reduce the idea of a "crime against nature" to a contradiction in terms.**

Arguably the first and in any case the most influential expression of the deist conception of the laws of nature is to be found in the work of Hobbes.76 **A law of nature, according to Hobbes, is "a dictate of right reason about what should be done or not done for the longest possible preservation of life and limb."**77 So, for example, since drinking heavily is not conducive to long life, one should not drink heavily if one wishes to live long. Hobbes adumbrates a list of nineteen or twenty such laws, depending on the moment of writing. So far, so medieval, one could say. But then, **in what marks a critical break from the Natural Law idea, Hobbes makes a startling yet eminently reasonable observation:** "These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; **whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others.**"78
…

Hobbes is among the first theorists to offer a version of unalienable rights, though his position on the matter is deeply conflicted.130 In places he allows that individuals cannot surrender to the sovereign his life and "all things else without which a man cannot live well." In other places, however, his absolutist instincts dominate, and he reduces this vestige of Natural Right in civil society nothing more than the right to make a run for it as one is hustled blindfolded to the gallows.

> 130. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1.14. In *Leviathan*, 2.21, for example, Hobbes says, **"It is manifest, that every Subject had Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred."** Hobbes allows that individuals are under no obligation to obey laws that require them to act against the laws of nature, such as to kill themselves, but, having transferred absolute authority over all things to the sovereign, Hobbes by no means disallows the state from attempting to demand such actions. (*De Cive*, 2.18-19, 6.13)

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/smith-leviathan-1909-ed#lf0161_label_095

> And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. **And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.**

https://archive.org/details/deciveorcitizen00inhobb/page/78/mode/2up?view=theater

> **If therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not bound to do it; for though I deny to do it, yet the right of dominion is not frustrated, since others may be found, who being commanded, will not refuse to do it; neither do I refuse to do that which I have contracted to do.** In like manner, if the chief ruler command any man to kill him, he is not tied to do it, because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent, or guilty, and condemned by the law, **since there are others who, being commanded, will do that, and a son will rather die, than live infamous, and hated of all the world.** There are many other cases, in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some, and not by others, obedience may, by right, be performed by these, and refused by those; and this, without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler. **For in no case is the right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by right, given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God.**

…

Unalienable rights can in fact be divided in any number of ways (just as laws of nature can be so divided, as Hobbes inadvertently reveals when he changes his list of "immutable" laws from one book to the next), **because all are ultimately perspectives on a singular Natural Right, the right to self-preservation, or the self-realization of the conatus,** and the process of their division and enumeration involves the introduction of the specific conditions of experience. Among the radical philosophers of the early modern world, **there is one distinction between different kinds of experience that is most fundamental, as we know, and it is the one associated with the distinction between mind and body.** And it is on this account that unalienable rights divide most easily into the dyad favored by Young and Allen: "Liberty and Property… the household gods of Englishmen."

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/322/mode/2up?view=theater

The lion is the king of the beasts; kings are like lions among men; and God is the lion king of them all – or so the common sense of the matter goes. In modern societies, the same intuition takes a different form, yet it is not so different in substance as is often imagined. **Not many people today are inclined to say that the order of society is grounded in the order of nature; but quite a few assume that the order of society is follows from the nature of individual human beings.** The lions among us rise to become CEOs; the mice become something less than full-time workers.

Given this common intuition that people are naturally or inherently unequal, the common consciousness universally interprets the claim that "all men are created equal" as a moral imperative. Justice, the common conception supposes, involves treating people as equals *despite* the fact that they are not. It means granting them the power to rule themselves *despite* the fact that in the natural order of things they would have to submit to the rule of others. **Since this imperative so obviously runs counter to the motives and the powers that are perceived to arise from the nature of things, the common conception further infers that it can have force only insofar as it arises from some transcendental authority.** Only a commandment from God (or some uncontrollable feeling of empathy among human beings) can compel people to treat unequal people as equals.

The radical philosophy that guided the American Revolution, on the other hand, begins not with this common assertion of the *moral* equality of human beings but with an explicit denial of the premise concerning the *natural* inequality of human beings. Human equality begins in nature, it says, not in moral imperatives. **Although the history of the idea should properly be traced to Lucretius's natural history of justice, in the early modern world it was Thomas Hobbes – whose debt to Epicurus on the point was so obvious to his contemporaries that it hardly needed to be stated**15 **– who made the first and sharpest claim for natural equality:**

> Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.16

This natural equality, it should be clear, is neither exact nor universal with respect to all human attributes. It is a rough equality between human beings considered in the abstract and has to do principally with one particular attribute: power. **Take away our ability to command the resources of society, says Hobbes, and we are roughly equal in power. More graphically, he asserts, we are equal because, left to our own devices, we all have the power to kill one another. (Or perhaps more accurately: any two human beings, considered abstractly in terms of their basic faculties in maturity, can overcome any one individual.)**17

> https://archive.org/details/AndThenThereWereNoneByAgathaChristie_201810/page/n183/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Wargrave said sharply: "Mr. Lombard, you are a very strongly built and powerful young man, but ex-Inspector Blore is also a man of powerful physique. I do not know what the outcome of a struggle between you would be but I can tell you this. On Blore's side, assisting him to the best of our ability will be myself, Dr. Armstrong and Miss Claythorne. **You will appreciate, therefore, that the odds against you if you choose to resist will be somewhat heavy.**"

To find genuine natural inequalities, according to this line of thought, one would have to look across categories or species. Human beings and chickens, for example, are naturally unequal, since people can almost always defeat poultry in battle. **(And indeed, a Hobbesian would point out, there is not much justice between people and chickens: we raise them in captivity, and then we eat them.)**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_510
>
> Had it been the intention of Providence, that some men should govern the rest, without their consent, we should have seen as indisputable marks distinguishing these superiours from those placed under them, as those which distinguish men from the brutes. The remark of Rumbald,12 in the nonresistance time of Charles the second, evinced propriety as well as wit. He could not conceive that the Almighty intended, that the greatest part of mankind should come into the world with saddles on their backs and bridles in their mouths, and that a few should come ready booted and spurred to ride the rest to death.q **Still more apposite to our purpose is the saying of him, who declared that he would never subscribe the doctrine of the divine right of princes, till he beheld subjects born with bunches on their backs, like camels, and kings with combs on their heads, like cocks;** from which striking marks it might indeed be collected, that the former were designed to labour and to suffer, and the latter, to strut and to crow.r

The natural equality of human beings does not imply that we have a moral obligation to treat all people as equals in every context. Indeed, as a royalist, Hobbes comes to almost exactly the opposite conclusion. **Its core meaning is just that the inequalities observable among individuals in any actual society are not attributable to the nature of people or things. That is, there is no natural order of subordination among human beings. Lucretius made the point first when he observed that "slavery and freedom, poverty and wealth, war and peace" are not properties of the atoms themselves, but only of human arrangements.**18

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D1%3Acard%3D418
>
> NOTHING EXISTS per se EXCEPT ATOMS AND THE VOID
>
> > But, now again to weave the tale begun,
> > All nature, then, as self-sustained, consists
> > Of twain of things: **of bodies and of void [nam corpora sunt et inane]**
> > In which they're set, and where they're moved around.
> > ...
> >
> > Name o'er creation with what names thou wilt,
> > Thou'lt find but properties of those first twain,
> > Or see but accidents those twain produce.
> > ...
> >
> > **But state of slavery, pauperhood, and wealth,**
> > **Freedom, and war, and concord, and all else**
> > **Which come and go whilst nature stands the same,**
> > **We're wont, and rightly, to call accidents.**
>
> **servitium contra paupertas divitiaeque,**
> **libertas bellum concordia cetera quorum**
> **adventu manet incolumis natura abituque,**
> **haec soliti sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Reign_of_Quantity_and_the_Signs_of_the_Times

The poet Charles Upton writes that:

> in the *Reign of Quantity*, Guénon sees history in terms of the Hindu concept of the manvantara, the cycle of manifestation composed of Golden, Silver, Bronze and Iron ages; [...] **This cycle is an inevitable descent from the pole of Essence (or forma) toward the pole of Substance (or materia).** [...] **Essence is qualitative while substance is quantitative; As the cycle progresses or descends, the very nature of time and space changes.** [...] In earlier stages, time is relatively eternal, as the cycle moves on, however, time begins to take over and accelerate, **but this constant acceleration of time can't go on forever. Time, the "devourer" ends by devouring itself. At the end of time, Time will be changed into space again.** [...] This ultimate timeless point is simultaneously the end of the cycle of manifestation and the beginning of the next. [...] Before this ultimate transformation, in the latter days of the present cycle certain final developments must take place. Since quantity has particularly to do with matter, the *Reign of quantity* must also be the reign of materialism. **The age of miracles ceases, the world becomes less permeable to the influences of the higher planes of reality.**[8]

John Griffin also writes that:

> **Guénon claims that essence is qualitative while the substance of our specific world (*materia secunda*) is quantitative (*materia signata quantitate*).**[9]

"Our actual inequality," Hobbes emphatically concludes, "has been introduced by civil law."19 **An indication of just how seriously Hobbes takes this claim concerning natural equality is his stance on paternal authority, which he maintains is also a product of civil and social arrangements – quite a radical position in the unthinkingly patriarchal world of the time.**

The idea of natural equality figures centrally in the thought of Spinoza – who agrees with Hobbes and Gassendi that human beings "share in one and the same nature"20 – but the most influential (and misunderstood) theorist on the subject is Locke. Locke's equality, too, is an "*equality* of Men by Nature."21 Men are equal on account of their "being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature."22 **Locke goes on to offer an implicit version of Hobbes's argument, that the natural equality of men is evident in the fact that in the state of nature men are equally able to kill one another.**23 **In a phrase that remains popular all the way down to Jefferson, he abbreviates the claim that there is no natural subordination among human beings into the slogan that all men are "equal and independent."**24

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/282/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Incomparably less vigorous, less profound than either Grotius or Pufendorf,** and often illogical, **Locke, nevertheless, succeeded in bringing about the popularization of this law. Liberty, Equality! He might well have taken those words for his motto.** "The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, **that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.**"2

In his writings about equality, Locke makes liberal use of Nature's God, and among some audiences then and now, his invocations of the deity have been taken to prove that his point is that we have the moral obligation to treat people equally in virtue of a commandment from God. **Nothing could be farther from the meaning of Locke's actual arguments:**

> Man has a *Natural Freedom* ... **since all that share in the same common Nature, Faculties, and Powers, are in Nature equal, and ought to partake in the same common Rights and Privileges,** till the manifest appointment of God, who is *Lord over all, Blessed for ever*, can be produced to show any particular Persons Supremacy.25

The appearance of the "Lord over all" sounds vaguely pious, **yet the fact is that God's presence here is made known only by his absence. Human equality arises from the deity's failure to countermand the equality of humankind that we observe in nature.** Thus, equality depends not on the word of God but on the silence of God. We can of course say – as Locke and countless successors do – that the equality we observe in nature has a divine source, inasmuch as all of nature is the work of God. But we can do so only by supposing that our equality is not distinct from anything else in nature on this point, which is in turn to imply that whatever obligation arises specifically from this equality does not depend on the claim that it is of divine origin. We would also have to acknowledge that divine revelation is entirely dispensable, since the observation of nature alone suffices to demonstrate our

natural equality. **In short, as happens repeatedly in Locke, we can keep God in the picture by rendering "God" functionally interchangeable with "Nature."**
…

Today we tend to lose sight of the impiously anti-transcendental origins of the political theory that guided the American Revolution. But the defenders of orthodoxy in the early modern world certainly did not. **The divine rights theorist Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) vehemently attacked Hobbes for saying – as in fact he did – that men "emerged from the earth like mushrooms … without any obligation to one another."**41 **Pointing the finger at Hobbes, Grotius, and (*avant la lettre*) Locke,**42 **he inveighed that the power of the King is a "donation of God," not "of the people,"**43 **and that the "conceit of original freedom" is a "great scandal of Christianity" and the gateway to "atheism."**44 A century and a half later, Timothy Dwight pummeled his students at Yale with the same, furious insistence on the transcendental origins of the political order. "*The foundation of all government is, undoubtedly, the Will of God,*" he declaimed. "Government, since the days of Mr. Locke, has been extensively supposed *to be founded in the Social Compact.* No opinion is more groundless than this."45
…

In Jefferson's strident *Summary View of the Rights of British Colonists* of 1774, to name one of countless examples, the argument against parliamentary power rests on a theory of purely natural equality: "Can any one reason be assigned why 160,000 electors in the island of Great Britain should give law to four millions in the states of America, every individual of whom is equal to every individual of them in virtue, in understanding, and in bodily strength?"47 **Jefferson, too, begins by suggesting that our natural equality is the gift of God. <u>But by the end of the *View*, God proves dispensable, and the colonists can claim their equal rights directly "from nature."</u>**

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Maine,_Sir_Henry_James_Sumner

Meanwhile Maine had published in 1885 his one work of speculative politics, a volume of essays on *Popular Government*, designed to show that democracy is not in itself more stable than any other form of government, and that there is no necessary connexion between democracy and progress.

https://archive.org/details/popgovernme01maingoog/page/n14/mode/2up?view=theater

A portion of the notions which prevail in Europe concerning Popular Government are derived (and these are worthy of all respect) from observation of its practical working; a larger portion merely reproduce technical rules of the British or American Constitutions in an altered or disguised form; **but a multitude of ideas on this subject, ideas which are steadily absorbing or displacing all others, appear to me, like the theories of jurisprudence of which I have spoken, to have been conceived *à priori*. <u>They are, in fact, another set of deductions from the assumption of a State of Nature.</u> Their true source has never been forgotten on the Continent of Europe,** where they are well known to have sprung from the teaching of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who believed that men emerged from the primitive natural condition by a process which made every form of government, except Democracy, illegitimate. **In this country they are not often explicitly, or even consciously, referred to their real origin,** which is, nevertheless, constantly betrayed by the language in which they are expressed. Democracy is commonly described as having an inherent superiority over every other form of government. It is supposed to advance with an irresistible and pre-ordained movement. It is thought to be full of the promise of blessings to mankind; yet if it fails to bring with it these blessings, or even proves to be prolific of the heaviest calamities, it is not held to deserve condemnation. **These are the familiar marks of a theory which claims to be independent of experience and observation <u>on the plea that it bears the credentials of a golden age</u>, non-historical and unverifiable.**
…

Meantime, **the ancient British Constitution has been modifying itself with a rapidity which could not be foreseen in Bentham's day.** I suspect that there were few observant Englishmen who, in presence of the agitation which filled the summer and autumn of 1884, were not astonished to discover the extent to which the Constitution of their country had altered, under cover of old language and old forms.

https://archive.org/details/popgovernme01maingoog/page/n82/mode/2up?view=theater

Villari4 **has shown that the modern State of the Continental type, with distinctly defined administrative departments as its organs, was first constituted in Italy. It grew, not out of the medieval Republican municipalities, which had nothing in common with modern government, but out of that most ill-famed of all political systems, the Italian tyranny or Princedom. <u>The</u>**

celebrated Italian state-craft, spread all over Europe by Italian statesmen, who were generally ecclesiastics, was applied to France by Louis XIV. and Colbert, the pupils of Cardinal Mazarin; and out of the contact of this new science with an administrative system in complete disorder, there sprang Monarchical France. The successive French Republics have been nothing but the later French Monarchy, upside down.

Similarly, the Constitutions and the legal systems of the several North American States, and of the United States, would be wholly unintelligible to anybody who did not know that the ancestors of the Anglo-Americans had once lived under a King, himself the representative of older Kings infinitely more autocratic, and who had not observed that throughout these bodies of law and plans of government the People had simply been put into the King's seat, occasionally filling it with some awkwardness.
…

If the whole of the known history of the human race be examined, we shall see that the great authors of legislative change have been powerful Monarchies. The long wail at the iniquities of Nineveh and Babylon, which runs through the latter part of the Old Testament, is the expression of Jewish resentment at the "big legislation" with which the nations that most study the Old Testament are supposed to have fallen in love.

The trituration of old usage was carried infinitely further by the Roman Emperors, ever increasing in thoroughness as the despotism grew more stringent. The Emperor was in fact the symbolic beast which the Prophet saw devouring, breaking to pieces and stamping the residue with its feet. We ourselves live in the dust of Roman Imperialism, and by far the largest part of modern law is nothing more than a sedimentary formation left by the Roman legal reforms.

The rule holds good through all subsequent history. The one wholesale legal reformer of the Middle Ages was Charles the Great. **It was the French Empire of the Bonapartes that gave real practical currency to the new French jurisprudence which has overrun the civilised world,** for the governments immediately arising out of the Revolution left little behind them beyond projects of law or laws which were practically inapplicable from the contradictions which they contained.

The truth seems to be that the extreme forms of government, Monarchy and Democracy, have a peculiarity which is absent from the more tempered political systems founded on compromise, Constitutional Kingship and Aristocracy. **When they are first established in absolute completeness, they are highly destructive.**
…

What the old monarchies, established in the valleys of the great Eastern rivers, had to contend against was religious tenacity and tribal obstinacy; and they transported whole populations in order that these might be destroyed. What a modern Democracy fights with is privilege; and it knows no rest till this is trampled out.
…

As is well known to scholars, **the ancient republics hardly legislated at all;** their democratic energy was expended upon war, diplomacy, and justice; **but they put nearly insuperable obstacles in the way of a change of law.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html
>
> **And if princes surpass peoples in the work of legislation,** in shaping civil institutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, so far do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been established, as to merit no less praise than they.

…

Mr. Grote did his best to explain away the poor opinion of the Athenian Democracy entertained by the philosophers who filled the schools of Athens; but the fact remains that the founders of political philosophy found themselves in presence of Democracy, in its pristine vigour, and thought it a bad form of government. The panegyrics of which it is now the object are, again, of French origin. They come to us from the oratory and literature of the first French Revolution, which, however, soon exchanged glorification of the new birth of the human race for a strain of gloomy suspicion and homicidal denunciation. The language of admiration which prevailed for a while had still remoter sources; and it may be observed, as an odd circumstance, **that, while the Jacobins generally borrowed their phraseology from the legendary history of the early Roman Republic, the Girondins preferred resorting for metaphors to the literature which sprang from Rousseau. On the whole, I think that the historical ignorance which made heroes of Brutus and Scaevola was less abjectly nonsensical than the philosophical silliness which dwelt on the virtues of mankind in a state of natural democracy.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.512045/page/n491/mode/2up?view=theater

> It is true he hated, beyond even monarchical power, aristocratic despotism, which unites rigour to hypocrisy and tyranny more austere to morals more perverse; nor was he ever the dupe of the parliaments of France, or the nobles of Sweden and Poland, who give the name of freedom to the chains with which they would load their vassals. **In this opinion, Voltaire has been joined by all philosophers who have sought the definition of a free state in the nature and mind of man, and not, like the pedant Mably, in examples, drawn from the tyrannical anarchies of Italy and Greece.**

If anybody wishes to know what was the influence of Rousseau in diffusing the belief in a golden age, when men lived, like brothers, in freedom and equality, **he should read, not so much the writings of the sage, as the countless essays printed in France by his disciples just before 1789. They furnish very disagreeable proof that the intellectual flower of a cultivated nation may be brought, by fanatical admiration of a social and political theory, into a condition of downright mental imbecility.**1

> 1. **Brissot, the Girondin leader, while still a young man and an enthusiastic Royalist, had argued, long before Proudhon, that Property is Theft. There is, he said, a natural right to correct the injustice of the institution, by stealing. But he held the still more remarkable opinion, that cannibalism is natural and justifiable.** Since, he argued, under the reign of Nature the sheep does not spare the insects on the grass, and the wolf and the man eat the sheep, why have not all these creatures a natural right to eat creatures of their own kind? (*Recherches philosophiques sur le droit de propriété et sur le vol considéré dans sa nature.* Par Brissot de Warville.)

https://archive.org/details/populargovernme01maingoog/page/n176/mode/2up?view=theater

Theoretically, at any rate, Thackeray hated the artificialities of civilisation, and it must be owned that some of his favourite personages have about them something of Rousseau's natural man as he would have shown himself if he had mixed in real life—something, that is, of the violent blackguard.
…

The language of Rousseau sometimes suggests that he meant his picture of early social transformations to be regarded as imaginary;6 **but nevertheless the account given of them is so precise, detailed, and logically built up, that it is quite inconceivable its author should not have intended it to express realities.**

> 6. "Comment ce changement s'est-il fait? Je l'ignore."—*Contrat Social,* chap. i. **I have myself no doubt that very much of the influence of Rousseau over the men of his own generation, and of the next, arose from the belief widely spread among them that his account of natural and of early political society was literally true. There is a remarkable passage in the *Penseés* of Pascal (III. 8) which describes the powerful revolutionary effects which may be produced by contrasting an existing institution with some supposed "fundamental and primitive law" of the State.** The reflection was obviously suggested by the sedition of the Fronde. The Parliament of Paris firmly believed in the "fundamental and primitive laws" of France; and, a century later, the disciples of Rousseau had exactly the same faith in the State of Nature and the Social Compact.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18269/pg18269-images.html#SECTION_V

> The art of opposition and of revolution is to unsettle established customs, sounding them even to their source, to point out their want of authority and justice. **We must, it is said, get back to the natural and fundamental laws of the State, which an unjust custom has abolished.**

…

But the theory, as he put it together, owes to him its extraordinary influence; and it is the undoubted parent of a host of phrases and associated notions **which, after having long had currency in France and on the Continent, are beginning to have serious effect in this country, as the democratic element in its Constitution increases. From this origin sprang the People (with a capital P), the Sovereign People, the People the sole source of all legitimate power.** From this came the subordination of Governments, not merely to electorates but to a vaguely defined multitude outside them, or to the still vaguer mastership of floating opinion. Hence began the limitation of legitimacy in governments to governments which approximate to democracy.

A vastly more formidable conception bequeathed to us by Rousseau is that of the omnipotent democratic State rooted in natural right; the State which has at its absolute disposal everything

which individual men value, their property, their persons, and their independence; the State which is bound to respect neither precedent nor prescription; the State which may make laws for its subjects ordaining what they shall drink or eat, and in what way they shall spend their earnings; **the State which can confiscate all the land of the community, and which, if the effect on human motives is what it may be expected to be, may force us to labour on it when the older incentives to toil have disappeared.**

Nevertheless this political speculation, of which the remote and indirect consequences press us on all sides, is of all speculations the most baseless. The natural condition from which it starts is a simple figment of the imagination. So far as any research into the nature of primitive human society has any bearing on so mere a dream, all inquiry has dissipated it. The process by which Rousseau supposes communities of men to have been formed, or by which at all events he wishes us to assume that they were formed, is again a chimera. No general assertion as to the way in which human societies grew up is safe, but perhaps the safest of all is that none of them were formed in the way imagined by Rousseau.

The true relation of some parts of the theory to fact is very instructive. Some particles of Rousseau's thought may be discovered in the mental atmosphere of his time. **"Natural law" and "natural rights" are phrases properly belonging to a theory not of politics, but of jurisprudence, which, originating with the Roman jurisconsults, had a great attraction for the lawyers of France.** The despotic sovereign of the ''Contrat Social," the all-powerful community, is an inverted copy of the King of France invested with an authority claimed for him by his courtiers and by the more courtly of his lawyers, but denied to him by all the highest minds in the country, and specially by the great luminaries of the French Parliaments. **The omnipotent democracy is the King-Proprietor, the lord of all men's fortunes and persons; but it is the French King turned upside down.** The mass of natural rights absorbed by the sovereign community through the Social Compact is, again, nothing more than the old divine right of kings in a new dress.
…

The conceptions of Nature, of Natural Law, and of Natural Right, which prompted and shaped his political speculations, are first found in the language of the Roman lawyers. It is more than doubtful whether these illustrious men ever believed in the State of Nature as a reality, but they seem to have thought that, under all the perverse technicalities of ancient law, there lay a simple and symmetrical system of rules which were in some sense those of Nature. Their natural law was, for all practical purposes, simple or simplified law. **This view, with all its philosophical defects, led to a great simplification of law both in the Roman State and in modern Europe, and indeed was the chief source of law-reform until the system of Bentham, which also aimed at the simplification of law, made its appearance.**

---

http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE1/NatIneq.html **[January 1890]**

> https://mathcs.clarku.edu/huxley/CE1/NatIneq.html#note1
>
> I shall often have to quote *Ancient Law.* **The first edition of this admirable book was published in 1861, but now, after twenty-nine years of growing influence on thoughtful men, it seems to be forgotten, or wilfully ignored, by the rack of political speculators.** It is enough to make one despair of the future that Demos and the Bourbons seem to be much alike in their want of capacity for either learning or forgetting.
>
> [4] If I had not reason to think that Mr. Morley's *Rousseau* and Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law,* especially the admirable chapters III. and IV., must be unknown to many political writers and speakers, and *a fortiori* to the general public, there would be no excuse for the present essay, which simply restates the case which they have so exhaustively treated.

What is the meaning of the famous phrase that "all men are born free and equal," which **gallicised Americans,** who were as much "philosophes" as their inherited common sense and their practical acquaintance with men and with affairs would let them be, put forth as the foundation of the "Declaration of Independence"?
…

Rousseau, like the sentimental rhetorician that he was, and half, or more than half, sham, as all sentimental rhetoricians are, sagaciously fought shy, as we have seen, of the question of the influence of natural upon political equality. But those of us who do not care for sentiment and do care for truth may not evade the consideration of that which is really the key of the position. If Rousseau, instead of letting his children go to the *enfants trouvés,* had taken the trouble to discharge a father's duties towards them, he would hardly have talked so fast about men being born equal, even in a political sense. For, if that merely means that all new-born children are political zeros – it is, as we have seen, though true enough, nothing to the purpose; while, if it means that, in their potentiality of becoming factors in any social organization – citizens in Rousseau's sense –

all men are born equal, **it is probably the most astounding falsity that ever was put forth by a political speculator; and that, as all students of political speculation will agree, is saying a good deal for it.** ...

It may be pointed out that, after all, whatever estimate we may form of him, the author of works which have made such a noise in the world could not have been a mere fool; and that, if, in their plain and obvious sense, the doctrines which he advanced are so easily upset, it is probable that he had in his mind something which is different from that sense.

I am a good deal disposed to think that this is the case. **There is much to be said in favour of the view that Rousseau, having got hold of a plausible hypothesis, more or less unconsciously made up a clothing of imaginary facts to hide its real nakedness.** He was not the first nor the last philosopher to perform this feat.

https://www.garynorth.com/public/2280.cfm

Natural law theory was born in a time of breakdown: the breakdown of faith in the Greek city-state. Alexander and then Rome had conquered them all. Stoic philosophers sought a substitute theory of the local religious rites-based theory of the city-state.

The substitute was a theory of universal mankind, an idea foreign to classical Greek politics. This universal humanity possesses a common reason, they argued. Common reason allows men to come to agreement about ethics and law. **Natural law theory was an attempt by philosophers to provide legitimacy for a world empire.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0054%3Abook%3D1%3Acard%3D272

To these I give no bounded times or power, but empire without end. [imperium sine fine] Yea, even my Queen, Juno, who now chastiseth land and sea with her dread frown, will find a wiser way, and at my sovereign side protect and bless the Romans, masters of the whole round world, who, clad in peaceful toga, judge mankind. Such my decree!

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D3&force=y

I am by no means unaware that I might be justly accused of ingratitude and indolence, were I to describe thus briefly and in so cursory a manner the land **which is at once the foster-child[356] and the parent of all lands; chosen by the providence of the Gods [numine deum electa] to render even heaven itself more glorious[357], to unite the scattered empires of the earth, to bestow a polish upon men's manners, [ritusque molliret] to unite the discordant and uncouth [ferasque] dialects of so many different nations by the powerful ties of one common language, to confer the enjoyments of discourse and of civilization upon mankind, [conloquia et humanitatem homini daret] to become, in short, the mother-country of all nations of the Earth.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n451/mode/2up?view=theater

The jurists of Rome, by a patriotic fiction, described the *ius gentium* as law common to all nations. But they were too modest about Rome's part in it. Actually it was local law adapted to Roman sovereignty, and designed to govern the peoples of Italy and the provinces without giving them Roman citizenship and the other rights of the *ius civile.*

By a corresponding fiction the philosophers attempted to identify the Law of the Nations with the "Law of Nature." The Stoics defined the latter as a moral code implanted in man by "natural reason." Nature, they held, was a system of reason, a logic and order in all things; this order, spontaneously developing in society, and coming to consciousness in man, was natural law. Cicero phrased the fancy in a famous passage:

> True law is right reason in agreement with nature, world-wide in scope, unchanging, everlasting. ... We may not oppose or alter that law, we cannot abolish it, we cannot be freed from its obligations by any legislature, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder of it. **This law does not differ for Rome and for Athens, for the present and for the future; ... it is and will be valid for all nations and all times.** ... He who disobeys it denies himself and his own nature.[47]

It was a perfect statement of an ideal that grew in force as Stoicism reached the throne in the Antonines. **Ulpian developed it into the far-reaching principle that class distinctions and privileges are accidental and artificial; and from this it was but a step to the Christian conception of all men as fundamentally equal. But when Gaius defined the *ius gentium* as**

> **simply "the law which natural reason has established among all mankind,"[48] he was mistaking Roman arms for Divine Providence.** Roman law was the logic and economy of force; **the great codes of *ius civile* and *ius gentium* were the rules by which a wise conqueror gave order, regularity, and time's sanctity to a sovereignty based upon the legions' strength. They were natural, but only in the sense that it is natural for the strong to use and abuse the weak.**

As soon as men began to think about political problems, it must have struck them that, if the main object of society was the welfare of its members (and until this became clear, political action could not have risen above the level of instinct[13]), there were all sorts of distinctions among men, and burdens laid upon them, which nowise contributed to that end. **Even before the great leveller, Rome, had actually thrown down innumerable social and national party-walls, had absorbed all other forms of citizenship into her own, and brought the inhabitants of what was then known as the world under one system of obligations, thoughtful men were discovering that it was desirable, in the interests of society, that all men should be as free as possible, consistently with those interests; and that they should all be equally bound by the ethical and legal obligations which are essential to social existence.** It will be observed that this conclusion is one which might be arrived at by observation and induction from the phenomena of past and present experience. My belief is that it is the conclusion which must be reached by those means, when they are rightly employed – and that, in point of fact, **the doctrines of freedom and equality, so far as they were preached by the Stoics and others, would have had not the least success, if they had not been so far approved by experience and so far in harmony with human instincts, that the Roman jurists found they could work them up with effect into practical legislation. For the *a priori* arguments of the philosophers in the last century of the Republic, and the first of the Empire, stand examination no better than those of the philosophers in the centuries before and after the French Revolution.** As is the fashion of speculators, they scorned to remain on the safe, if humble, ground of experience, and preferred to prophesy from the sublime cloudland of the *a priori;* so that, busied with deduction from their ideal "ought to be" they overlooked the "what has been," the "what is," and the "what can be."

It is to them that we owe the idea of living "according to nature"; which begot the idea of the "state of nature"; which begot the notion that the "state of nature" was a reality, and that, once upon a time, "all men were free and equal" – which again begot the theory, that society ought to be reformed in such a manner as to bring back these halcyon days of freedom and equality; which begot *laissez faire* and universal suffrage; which begot the theory so dear to young men of more ambition than industry, that, while every other trade, business, or profession requires theoretical training and practical skill, and would go to the dogs if those who carry them on were appointed by the majority of votes of people who know nothing about it and very little about them – the management of the affairs of society will be perfectly successful, if only the people who may be trusted to know nothing, will vote into office the people who may be trusted to do nothing.
…

The conclusion of the whole matter, then, would seem to be that the doctrine that all men are, in any sense, or have been, at any time, free and equal, is an utterly baseless fiction.
…

And if, instead of appealing to philosophy we turn to revealed religion, I am not aware that either Judaism or Christianity affirms the political freedom or the political equality of men in Rousseau's sense. They affirm the equality of men before God – but that is an equality either of insignificance or of imperfection.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch08.htm

Christianity knew only *one* point in which all men were equal: that all were equally born in original sin — which corresponded perfectly to its character as the religion of the slaves and the oppressed. Apart from this it recognised, at most, the equality of the elect, which however was only stressed at the very beginning. The traces of community of goods which are also found in the early stages of the new religion can be ascribed to solidarity among the proscribed rather than to real equalitarian ideas. Within a very short time the establishment of the distinction between priests and laymen put an end even to this incipient Christian equality. — **The overrunning of Western Europe by the Germans abolished for centuries all ideas of equality, through the gradual building up of such a complicated social and political hierarchy as had never existed before. But at the same time the invasion drew Western and Central Europe into the course of historical development, created for the first time a compact cultural area,** and within this area also for the first time a system of predominantly national states exerting mutual influence on each other **and mutually holding each other in check.** Thereby it prepared the ground on which alone the question of the equal status of men, of the rights of man, could at a later period be raised.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0247%3Abook%3D5%3Achapter%3D89
>
> 89. *Ath.* 'As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences, as, that having defeated the Medes, our reign is therefore lawful, or that we come against you for injury done, make a long discourse without

> being believed; so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying either that you therefore took not our parts because you were a colony of the Lacedaemonians or that you have done us no injury. **But out of those things which we both of us do really think, let us go through with that which is feasible, both you and we knowing that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.**'

…

The demand for liberation from feudal fetters and the establishment of equality of rights by the abolition of feudal inequalities was bound soon to assume wider dimensions, once the economic advance of society had placed it on the order of the day.

…

And as people were no longer living in a world empire such as the Roman Empire had been, **but in a system of independent states dealing with each other on an equal footing and at approximately the same level of bourgeois development, it was a matter of course** that the demand for equality should assume a general character reaching out beyond the individual state, **that freedom and equality should be proclaimed *human rights.***

> https://news.stanford.edu/2019/10/23/fall-rome-europes-lucky-break/
>
> The disintegration of the Roman empire freed Europe from rule by a single power. Imperial monopolies provided peace and stability, but by seeking to preserve the status quo also tended to stifle experimentation and dissent. When the end of empire removed centralized control, rival political, military, economic and religious constituencies began to fight, bargain and compromise and – in the process – rebuilt society along different lines**.**
>
> **Those 1,500 years (all the way up to World War II) were full of conflicts as Europe splintered into a violently competitive state system.** But for all the suffering it caused, this fragmentation and competition fostered innovation that eventually gave rise to unprecedented change in knowledge production, economic performance, human welfare and political affairs. This path to modernity was long and tortuous, but also unique in the world.

---

http://www.online-literature.com/chesterton/2592/

This blind intention to absorb, to change the shape of everything and digest it in the darkness of a dragon's stomach; this is what is really meant by the Pantheism and Cosmic Unity of the East. The Cosmos as such is cannibal; as old Time ate his children. The Eastern saints were saints because they wanted to be swallowed up. The Western saint, like St. George, was sainted by the Western Church precisely because he refused to be swallowed. The same process of thought that has prevented nationalities disappearing in Christendom has prevented the complete appearance of Pantheism. **All Christian men instinctively resist the idea of being absorbed into an Empire; an Austrian, a Spanish, a British, or a Turkish Empire.** But there is one empire, much larger and much more tyrannical, which free men will resist with even stronger passion. **The free man violently resists being absorbed into the empire which is called the Universe.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm#INTRODUCTION

"In me," he once said, "the Christianity of my forbears reaches its logical conclusion. **In me the stern intellectual conscience that Christianity fosters and makes paramount turns *against* Christianity. In me Christianity … devours itself.**"

…

It was as if his apostasy from the faith of his fathers, filling him with the fiery zeal of the convert, and particularly of the convert to heresy, had blinded him to every other element in the gigantic self-delusion of civilized man.

http://4umi.com/nietzsche/zarathustra/11

11. The New Idol

SOMEWHERE there are still peoples and herds, but not with us, my brethren: here there are states.

A state? What is that? Well! open now your ears unto me, for now will I say unto you my word concerning the death of peoples.

A state, is called the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people."
...

Where there is still a people, there the state is not understood, but hated as the evil eye, and as sin against laws and customs.
...

"On earth there is nothing greater than I: it is I who am the regulating finger of God." – thus roareth the monster. And not only the long-eared and short-sighted fall upon their knees!
...

Yea, it findeth you out too, ye conquerors of the old God! Weary ye became of the conflict, and now your weariness serveth the new idol!

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n297/mode/2up?view=theater **[1878]**

473. Socialism, With Regard to Its Means.—**Socialism is the fantastic younger brother of almost decrepit despotism, which it wants to succeed;** its efforts are, therefore, in the deepest sense reactionary. For it desires such an amount of State power as only despotism has possessed,—indeed, it outdoes all the past, in that it aims at the complete annihilation of the individual, whom it deems an unauthorised luxury of nature, which is to be improved by it into an appropriate *organ of the general community.* Owing to its relationship, **it always appears in proximity to excessive developments of power, like the old typical socialist, Plato, at the court of the Sicilian tyrant; it desires (and under certain circumstances furthers) the Cæsarian despotism of this century, because, as has been said, it would like to become its heir.**

> https://archive.org/details/threelecturesde01kinggoog/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater **[January 1867]**
>
> He shows, moreover, that the acquiescence in a centralised administration; the expectation that the government should do everything for the people, and nothing for themselves; the consequent loss of local liberties, local peculiarities; the helplessness of the towns and the parishes: and all which issued in making Paris France, and subjecting the whole of a vast country to the arbitrary dictates of a knot of despots in the capital, was not the fruit of the Revolution, but of the Ancien Regime which preceded it; **and that Robespierre and his 'Comité de Salut Public,' and commissioners sent forth to the four winds of heaven in bonnet rouge and carmagnole complete, to build up and pull down, according to their wicked will, were only handling, somewhat more roughly, the same wires which had been handled for several generations by the Comptroller-General and Council of State, with their provincial intendants.**
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/jan/31.htm
>
> **The extent to which present-day society has matured for the transition to socialism has been demonstrated by this war, in which the exertion of national effort called for the direction of the economic life of over fifty million people from a *single* centre.** If this is possible under the leadership of a handful of Junker aristocrats in the interests of a handful of financial magnates, it is certainly no less possible under the leadership of class-conscious workers in the interests of nine-tenths of the population, exhausted by starvation and war.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/48

Granted the truth of the theory now believed to be true, that **the very *essence of all civilisation* is to *train* out of man, the beast of prey, a tame and civilised animal, a domesticated animal,** it follows indubitably that we must regard as the real *tools of civilisation* all those instincts of reaction and resentment, by the help of which the aristocratic races, together with their ideals, were finally degraded and overpowered; though that has not yet come to be synonymous with saying that the bearers of those tools also *representea* the civilisation.
...

These "tools of civilisation" are a disgrace to humanity, **and constitute in reality more of an argument against civilisation, more of a reason why civilisation should be suspected.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_VII#19
>
> Men do not change from the best to the worst; even in becoming bad, he would necessarily retain some traces of goodness; virtue is never so utterly quenched as not to imprint on the mind marks which no degradation can efface. **If wild animals bred in captivity escape into the woods, they still retain something of their original tameness, and are as remote from the gentlest in the one extreme as they are in the other from those which have always been wild, and have never endured to be touched by man's hand. No one who has ever applied**

himself to philosophy ever becomes completely wicked; his mind becomes so deeply coloured with it, that its tints can never be entirely spoiled and blackened.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/Fortuna_Alexandri*/1.html#ref35

For, when Themistocles in exile had obtained great gifts from Artaxerxes, and had received three cities to pay him tribute, one to supply his bread, another his wine, and a third his meat, he exclaimed, **"My children, we should be ruined now, had we not been ruined before."** Thus Alexander's new subjects would not have been civilized, had they not been vanquished; Egypt would not have its Alexandria, nor Mesopotamia its Seleuceia, nor Sogdiana its Prophthasia, nor India its Bucephalia, nor the Caucasus a Greek city[36] hard by; for by the founding of cities in these places savagery was extinguished and the worse element, gaining familiarity with the better, changed under its influence. **If, then, philosophers take the greatest pride in civilizing and rendering adaptable the intractable and untutored elements in human character,** and if Alexander has been shown to have changed the savage natures of countless tribes, it is with good reason that he should be regarded as a very great philosopher.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n251/mode/2up?view=theater

281. If, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain regulations for ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of course, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of "existence," nor a certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and development of this "existence" and "attitude of mind." But then the idealist of virtue, the *moralist*, comes along and says: "God sees into the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain acts: ye are not any better on that account!" Answer: **Mr. Longears and Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite satisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not *harm* one another—and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take a particular direction—that is to say, when they are against our own interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same actions are directed against the enemies of our community—against you, for instance—we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient honour.** We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the fullest extent.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2085/2085-h/2085-h.htm#2H_4_0004
>
> (31) Then the father said, "My son, we are told that in the days of our forefathers there was such a teacher once. This man did actually teach his boys righteousness in the way you suggest, to lie and not to lie, to cheat and not to cheat, to calumniate and not to calumniate, to be grasping and not grasping. He drew the distinction between our duty to friends and our duty to enemies; and he went further still; he taught men that it was just and right to deceive even a friend for his own good, or steal his property. (32) And with this he must needs teach his pupils to practise on one another what he taught them, just as the people of Hellas, we are told, teach lads in the wrestling-school to fence and to feint, and train them by their practice with one another. Now some of his scholars showed such excellent aptitudes for deception and overreaching, and perhaps no lack of taste for common money-making, that they did not even spare their friends, but used their arts on them. (33) **And so an unwritten law was framed by which we still abide, bidding us teach our children as we teach our servants, simply and solely not to lie, and not to cheat, and not to covet, and if they did otherwise to punish them, hoping to make them humane and law-abiding citizens.** (34) **But when they came to manhood, as you have come, then, it seemed, the risk was over, and it would be time to teach them what is lawful against our enemies. For at your age we do not believe you will break out into savagery against your fellows with whom you have been knit together since childhood in ties of friendship and respect. In the same way we do not talk to the young about the mysteries of love, for if lightness were added to desire, their passion might sweep them beyond all bounds."**

Did we share that "god-fearing" radicalism which your holy craziness recommends, **if we were greenhorns enough to condemn the source of those forbidden "acts" by condemning the "heart" and the "attitude of mind" which recommends them, that would mean condemning our very existence,** and with it its greatest prerequisite—an attitude of mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By our decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and venting itself in a useless way—we are prudent when we prescribe such laws for ourselves; we are also *moral* in so doing. ... Have you no idea—however vague—what sacrifices it has cost us, how much self-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to exercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even feel as if we could devour each other. ... But the "communal spirit" is master of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of morality?

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT60&hl=fi&pg=PT54#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Put in other terms, the natural condition of Machiavellian man is Thomas Hobbes's state of nature: he is not by nature a political animal; **he is Aristotle's beast of prey, a hunted animal (*thērion*) alone and at war with the world. On this premise, it would seem entirely appropriate that the author of a mirror for princes should advise rulers to use against their subjects and allies in ordinary circumstances the very weapons which, Cicero thinks, a political community should employ only against enemies – and, at that, only in time of war.**71

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/89

It is necessary to make an even more serious confession:—viewed from the most advanced biological standpoint, **conditions of legality can be only *exceptional conditions*,** in that they are partial restrictions of the real life-will, which makes for power, and in that they are subordinated to the life-will's general end as particular means, **that is, as means to create *larger* units of strength. A legal organisation, conceived of as sovereign and universal, not as a weapon in a fight of complexes of power, but as a weapon *against* fighting, generally something after the style of Dühring's communistic model of treating every will as equal with every other will, would be a principle *hostile to life*, a destroyer and dissolver of man, an outrage on the future of man, a symptom of fatigue, a secret cut to Nothingness.—**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/109

Progress towards universal empires invariably means progress towards universal deities; despotism, with its subjugation of the independent nobility, always paves the way for some system or other of monotheism.

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/507/mode/2up?view=theater

Therein lay the tragedy—**the Empire gave no scope for the display of civic virtue at home and abroad, for it sought to abolish war and politics. There could be no great men any more:** the aristocracy was degraded and persecuted.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2Q19hMwsNgYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false

All government, in its essence, is a conspiracy against the superior man: its one permanent object is to oppress him and cripple him. If it be aristocratic in organization, then it seeks to protect the man who is superior only in law against the man who is superior in fact; if it be democratic, then it seeks to protect the man who is inferior in every way against both.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1313b

Also the things that occur in connection with the final form of democracy[7] are all favorable to tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as well (for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler). Hence also the flatterer is in honor with both—with democracies the demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people), and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of flattery. [1314a] [1] **In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base;** for tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes.[1] **And it is a mark of a tyrant to dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself alone the right to bear that character, and the man who meets his pride with pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority.** And it is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers make no claim against him.[2]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Gaspar_Rodr%C3%ADguez_de_Francia

> José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia y Velasco (6 January 1766-20 September 1840), also known as Doctor Francia or to Paraguayans of his time as Karai Guasu (in Guaraní, means "Great Lord"), was a lawyer, politician, statesman **and the first dictator (1814-1840) of Paraguay[1] following its 1811 independence from the Spanish Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.**
> ...

> During his studies, he was influenced by the ideas from the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and he was an avid reader of Voltaire, Rousseau, and the Encyclopédistes.
>
> Despite rumors that his father was a mulatto, Francia was awarded a position in the department of theology at the Royal Seminary of San Carlos in Asunción in 1790. **His radical views made his position as a teacher there untenable, and he soon gave up theology to study law.**
> ...
>
> **In March 1814, Francia imposed a law that no Spaniard may intermarry with another Spaniard, and that they may only marry *mestizo*s, Amerindians, or Africans.** This was done to eliminate any socioeconomic disparities along racial lines, and also to end the predominantly *criollo* and *peninsulare* influence in Paraguay. **De Francia himself was not a *mestizo*, but feared that racial disparities would create tensions that could threaten his absolute rule.** [8]
>
> ...
>
> One Latin American scholar, Antonio de la Cova, summarised Francia's rule as follows:
>
> > "... we find a strange mixture of capacity and caprice, of far-sighted wisdom and reckless infatuation, strenuous endeavours after a high ideal and flagrant violations of the simplest principles of justice. **He cut off Paraguay from the rest of the world by stopping foreign commerce, but carefully fostered its internal industries and agriculture under his personal supervision.** Dr. Francia disposed to be hospitable to strangers from other lands, and kept them prisoners for years; lived a life of republican simplicity, and severely punished the slightest want of respect. As time went on he appears to have grown more arbitrary and despotic. **Deeply imbued with the principles of the French Revolution, he was a stern antagonist of the church. He abolished the Inquisition, suppressed the college of theology, did away with the tithes, and inflicted endless indignities on the priests. He kept the aristocracy in subjection and discouraged marriage both by precept and example, leaving behind him several illegitimate children.** For the extravagances of his later years the plea of insanity has been put forward."[9]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA89#v=onepage&q&f=false

But, in the end, the public peace obliges kings to keep everyone in a state of fear – the great still more than ordinary individuals, because it is from the side of the great that the greatest troubles can come.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924014201044/page/n31/mode/2up?view=theater

Less than a year after the Revolution had begun, Mirabeau wrote secretly to the king, "Compare the present state of things with the old regime, and console yourself and take hope. **A part—the greater part of the acts of the national assembly are decidedly favorable to a monarchical government. Is it nothing to have got rid of Parliament, separate states, the clerical body, the privileged classes, and the nobility? Richelieu would have liked the idea of forming but one class of citizens; so level a surface assists the exercise of power.** A series of absolute reigns would have done less for royal authority than this one year of Revolution."

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/political-arena/47500-democratic-tyranny-is-not-an-oxymoron?p=1334654#post1334654

Petr, I synthesized a theory of the relationship between absolutism and equality from de Jouvenel and other thinkers in the tradition of aristocratic liberalism over at nic's forum. It's clunky and spergish, but I think it captures some of the topics you've been discussing here.

Two terse and contentious definitions:

A notable/noble/aristocrat is a self-sufficient individual with resources adequate for self-sustenance and the physical enforcement of his liberty against others. He is a man of good stock with excellent physical and mental capacities, good character, future-oriented goals, and a relatively loyal and equally robust extended family. Often he is an independent power that exercises authority over a set of consenting individuals, as in autocephalous societies like medieval kingships where a federation of aristocrats is presided over by a "king", or unwilling individuals, as in heterocephalous societies where kingship is imposed exogenously through conquest. Such a man is "free" in the ancient sense of the term.

The masses, in contrast, are individuals who are only self-sufficient to a limited extent and who, if at all, occupy positions of authority with a very limited scope, such as the

head of a family. Often they are subject to the authority of the notables. Here we find the early bourgeoisie, the peasants, the proletariat, the serfs and slaves.

With these definitions in place we can assert an equally contentious axiom of human behavior:

Man has a will-to-power such that in every association he will inevitably attempt to maximize his power and aggrandize his person at the expense of others in that association.

Absolutism and equality

Wherever there is a set of nobles and each has relatively equal military and economic resources, there will be a true balance of powers and the tendency toward absolutism will be muted. **However, where there is a chance for one noble to compel obedience from the others, there will be conflict, from which the positive relationship between absolutism and equality emerges. The reason for the conflict is clear: the independent authority of the less-powerful nobles represents an obstacle to the imposition of the aspiring absolutist's will.**

Historically, the two principle ways for the absolutist to conquer the federation of conquerors are 1) by appealing to the interests of those subjugated by the rival nobles (Caesar), or 2) by conquering foreign peoples and employing them in offices traditionally performed by the other nobles (Alexander). **In each case the authority of the exalted is marginalized at the expense of uplifting the unexalted.**

The conquest of the conquerors does not signal the end of absolutism's egalitarian march; instead, the absolutist must continue down the hierarchy of independent authorities until there is no longer any impediment to his will. In each case those who are subject to, or enemies of, the authority in question ultimately benefit from absolutism's attack on the authority. Below the rule of the nobility are the religious, ethnic, municipal and familial authorities, all of which present potential obstacles to the absolutist's power, and all of which subjugate a potential class of new allies for the aspiring monarch.

But this trajectory is not followed uniformly to its conclusion in all possible associations. In non-democratic manifestations of absolutism, such as those that obtained in early-modern Europe, the process of equalization is arrested by external and internal restrictions.

External restrictions include the existing effective authorities that remain independent by virtue of their physical distinction from the personality of the absolutist, such as the Church, the nobility and the common people. The physical distinction between the monarch and other authorities magnifies class-consciousness within each authority so that the authority is strengthened vis-a-vis the monarch. Thus we see in the history of absolutism that the triumph over traditional authorities was rarely complete.

Internal restrictions originate from the absolutist himself and include those cosmological and religious principles that govern the scope of an individual's will-to-power as natural law did in the middle ages and Christian common law did in the age of absolutism. **In addition to the moral and religious principles that may temper his appetite, economic calculation itself provides an internal restriction on the absolutist, as Hoppe has demonstrated.** These restrictions explain the relatively "conservative" and pious dispositions of many monarchs.

Most of the external and internal distinctions are only eliminated with the success of the revolutions against absolutism. Empowered by the egalitarian creations of the absolutist, **the masses finally wrest control of the monarch's apparatus for the enforcement of his will – the State – from the monarch himself.** Borrowing the legitimacy accumulated by the State over the centuries of its growth, the masses then set about eliminating every opposition to its authority. In the place of the concrete personality of the monarch they set a whole multitude of egos, but the goal of the state remains the same, and its power increases.

No longer the manifestation of a single concrete person but rather the embodiment of the will of everyone under its power, the State is able to eliminate nearly every external restriction on its power. What the absolute monarch failed to do over the course of several centuries is accomplished in a few years by the new "republics."

No longer requiring the legitimacy of divinity to justify the state (for the State is now a creation of the people), the State abandons its commitment to a supernatural origin of

law. Divine law is supplanted by positive law, which permits every arbitrary rule to be classified as law and enforced.

Both of these innovations accelerate the process of equalization so that every time a new aristocracy or elite threatens to emerge, the State quickly allies with those subjugated by the new elite, becoming the ally of workers, minorities, women, etc. Since there are authorities in all spheres of life, the State extends its legislative power to all spheres of society and effectively becomes total.

https://www.johnderbyshire.com/Readings/secretpeople.html

> **And the face of the King's Servants grew greater than the King:**
> He tricked them, and they trapped him, and stood round him in a ring.
>
> https://archive.org/details/personalgovernm03gardgoog/page/n255/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Rumours reached Panzani that Parliament was to be summoned. The Secretary assured him that they were quite untrue. "O the great judgments of God," said Windebank. "He ever punishes men with those means by which they have offended. **That pig of a Henry VIII. committed such sacrilege by profaning so many ecclesiastical benefices in order to give their goods to those who being so rewarded might stand firmly for the King in the Lower House; and now [April 1635] the King's greatest enemies are those who are enriched by these benefices.**"

https://counter-currents.com/2018/07/how-power-invented-individualism/

In Alt-Right circles and beyond them, one comes across many explanations for the unique individualism of the West. **There is the theory of John Hajnal, which states that the marriage patterns of Western Europe diverged from the regions beyond it as a result of developments in the Middle Ages, giving rise to several 'modern' behaviour patterns including high individualism.** Alan MacFarlane's study of the English argues that this people, at least, displayed individualist and proto-capitalist social patterns as far back into the Middle Ages as one cares to look, with the roots of this behaviour presumably lying in the obscurity of the Saxon and Viking freebooter cultures. Kevin MacDonald traces the origins of our individualist tendencies all the way back to the Ice Age.

All of these theories suggest that Western Europeans may be predisposed – or, should we say, *susceptible* – to individualism. But they cannot explain the origins of individualism, because they approach the question from the wrong end of society, and fail to recognise the crucial role of Power in social change. **Explaining *individualism* in terms of a racial-cultural stress on *individuality* is like explaining *feminism* in terms of *female nature* – such a theory might tell us why feminism is able to mobilise half of the human race against the other, but it cannot explain why that human race did not succumb to feminism throughout thousands of years of history, until Power gained the resources to supplant the social role of husbands.**

In the same way, explanations from culture and biology cannot tell us how Europeans contrived to spend the vast majority of their history in 'collectivist' societies. (And not only does this arrow miss the target, it also shoots the Alt-Right in the foot, by enshrining individualism in our biological heritage and thus turning the collectivist defence of this heritage into a contradiction in terms).

> https://www.surnamedb.com/Surname/Haskins
>
> **Surnames became necessary when governments introduced personal taxation. In England this was known as Poll Tax.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/188/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The word *persona* was used to describe the new portraits which were painted of men in their actual, human state rather than in the spiritualized saintly manner of the icons. By the late seventeenth century, this word had begun to acquire the more general meaning of an important or strong individual. **Even he who was not important enough to become a *persona* in his own right was now considered an individual "soul" by the all-powerful state, which began to exact taxes and services directly from the individual rather than from the region or household.**
>
> Prokopovich introduced the word "personal" (*personal'ny*) in its modern sense early in the eighteenth century; and the first precise terms for "private" and "particular" also entered the Russian language at this time. Words that are now used for "law" and "crime" had long existed in Slavic, but "they did not penetrate into the language of Russian jurisprudence with their modern meaning until the eighteenth century."62

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

In the 1787 "Vices" essay, **[Madison] inserted this conclusion immediately following the paragraph on state religious oaths:** "The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to controul one part of the society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society."7 **This was his argument against Montesquieu, who had argued that republics can only function in small nations. On the contrary,** argued Madison in *Federalist 10,* **republics can insulate themselves best from the effects of faction by becoming so large that the factions offset themselves.** To control the power of any given faction, we must create lots of factions.

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0274 **[24 October 1787]**

***Divide et impera*, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles. It must be observed however that this doctrine can only hold within a sphere of a mean extent.** As in too small a sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed against the weaker party; so in too extensive a one a defensive concert may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted with the administration. The great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sovereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society to controul one part from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society. **In absolute monarchies, the Prince may be tolerably neutral towards different classes of his subjects, but may sacrifice the**36 **happiness of all to his personal ambition or avarice. In small republics, the sovereign will is controuled from such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but it is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it.** In the extended Republic of the United States, the General Government37 would hold a pretty even balance between the parties of particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently restrained by its dependence on the community, from betraying its general interests.38

> https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-16-02-0184 **[1 September 1820]**
>
> Th: Jefferson returns his thanks to Doct^r^ de la Motta for the eloquent discourse on the Consecration of the Synagogue of Savannah which he has been so kind as to send him. it excites in him **the gratifying reflection that his own country has been the first to prove to the world two truths, the most salutary to human society, that man can govern himself, and that religious freedom is the most effectual anodyne against religious dissension: the maxim of civil government being reversed in that of religion, where it's true form is 'divided we stand, united we fall.' he is happy in the restoration, of the Jews particularly, to their social rights, & hopes they will be seen taking their seats on the benches of science, as preparatory to their doing the same at the board of government.**
>
> https://counter-currents.com/2011/02/the-cold-war-on-whites/
>
> Most of Truman's top advisers, including the "Wise Men" who helped him create the Cold War state, came from the old WASP elite and tended to be racial conservatives (contemptuous not only of Negroes, but of Jews). **Though at times sympathetic to Southern concerns and with no particular affection for "the poor Negro" of liberal imagination, they too would be forced to embrace the cause of civil rights**—linked, as it was, to the Cold War.
> …
>
> As the first president since Reconstruction to mobilize the army in defense of black civil rights, Eisenhower had not wanted to intervene, but the breakdown of law and the continuing Soviet propaganda binge about US "racial terror" had forced his hand.
>
> **He acted, revealingly, more to uphold federal authority and repair the country's international image than he did to promote racial equality.** In a national televised address, he said "it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world." **In a word, Little Rock's resistance to desegregation was a threat to national security.**
>
> **At this point, the Cold War logic of civil rights became nearly irreversible.**
>
> http://www.occidentaldissent.com/2021/09/06/race-and-american-imperialism/

Long before we were born, the world that we live in today was fundamentally shaped and set in motion in those crucial decades between the 1920s and 1950s. The American ruling class, which was already liberal and capitalist in the Victorian sense, became antiracist, modernist and cosmopolitan. **The American elite developed a globalist outlook.** Jews climbed into the American elite in these decades. “Racism” became taboo between 1937 and 1945. “Anti-Semitism” became taboo at this same point. The ghost of Nazi Germany and the polarization it created has continued to haunt us ever since.

In the aftermath of World War II, Jim Crow came under assault. **The American Empire had defined itself against the “racism” of Hitler’s Germany.** We had created the U.N. and invited the entire world to stand in judgment of the United States. We competed with the Soviet Union which we rescued from Hitler’s Germany for the “hearts and minds” of the Third World during the Cold War. As a result, **foreign policy dominated America for the next several decades and crucial decisions about domestic policy such as ending segregation and changing American immigration laws in order to transform America into a miniature version of the U.N. were motivated by the needs of the American Empire.**

There isn’t much that is wrong in this country today which ultimately doesn’t trace back to imperialism and which doesn’t flow out of the needs of our decadent elites to maintain the American Empire. The deindustrialized Heartland was sacrificed to the foreign policy need to bind our new “allies” to the American Empire through favorable trade deals which rebuilt their industries. The Chinese Exclusion Act, for example, was repealed because China was an American ally against the Japanese. The opening wedge against America’s race-based immigration laws was bringing back war brides from the Philippines. **We created the Deep State to crush internal and foreign dissent against American foreign policy.**

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater

Probably Athens had needed, after Solon, just such a man as Peisistratus: one with sufficient iron in his blood to beat the disorder of Athenian life into a strong and steady form, and to establish by initial compulsion those habits of order and law which are to a society what the bony structure is to an animal—its shape and strength, though not its creative life. When, after a generation, the dictatorship was removed, these habits of order and the framework of Solon’s constitution remained as a heritage for democracy. **Peisistratus, perhaps not knowing it, had come not to destroy the law but to fulfill it.**
…

Hence the road to power in Greek commercial cities was simple: to attack the aristocracy, defend the poor, and come to an understanding with the middle classes.[89]
…

Forced to depend upon popularity instead of hereditary power, the dictatorships for the most part kept out of war, supported religion, maintained order, promoted morality, favored the higher status of women, encouraged the arts, and lavished revenues upon the beautification of their cities. **And they did all these things, in many cases, while preserving the forms and procedures of popular government, so that even under despotism the people learned the ways of liberty. When the dictatorship had served to destroy the aristocracy the people destroyed the dictatorship;** and only a few changes were needed to make the democracy of freemen a reality as well as a form.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0058%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1310b

And these two different sorts of monarchy have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them. And this is manifest from the facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slandering the notables.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0158%3Achapter%3D1

[14] In regard to the allies: the Athenians sail out and lay information, as they are said to do; they hate the aristocrats inasmuch as they realize that the ruler is necessarily hated by the ruled and that if the rich and aristocratic men in the cities are strong, the rule of the people at Athens will last for a very short time. **This is why they disfranchise the aristocrats, take away their money, expel and kill them, whereas they promote the interests of the lower class. The Athenian aristocrats protect their**

opposite numbers in the allied cities, since they realize that it will be to their advantage always to protect the finer people in the cities. [15] **Someone might say that the Athenians' strength consists in the allies' ability to pay tribute-money; but the rabble thinks it more advantageous for each one of the Athenians to possess the resources of the allies and for the allies themselves to possess only enough for survival and to work without being able to plot defection.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/58242/pg58242-images.html#Chapter_26

Oligarchy is a love of power that clings tightly to personal advantage. The oligarch rises in the people's councils, when assistants to the archon are elected for the management of a fête, and says: "These men must have absolute control." And although others have suggested ten, he insists that *one* is enough, but he must be a *man*. **The only line of Homer that stays in his memory is: "A crowd's rule is bad; let there be one ruler." He knows no other verse.**
...

"When," he asks, "is a stop to be put to this ruin of our property by taxation for fêtes and navy? How odious is this crew of demagogues! Theseus," he says, "was the forefront of all this offending, for out of twelve cities, he brought the masses into one, to overthrow the monarchies. He met his just reward,—he was the first to fall a victim at their hands." This is the way he talks to foreigners and to citizens of his own temper and party.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/6*.html

4 Then as long as some of those survive who experienced the evils of oligarchical dominion, they are well pleased with the present form of government, and set a high value on equality and freedom of speech. But when a new generation arises and the democracy falls into the hands of the grandchildren of its founders, **they have become so accustomed to freedom and equality that they no longer value them, and begin to aim at pre-eminence; and it is chiefly those of ample fortune who fall into this error.** 6 So when they begin to lust for power and cannot attain it through themselves or their own good qualities, they ruin their estates, tempting and corrupting the people in every possible way. 7 **And hence when by their foolish thirst for reputation they have created among the masses an appetite for gifts and the habit of receiving them, democracy in its turn is abolished and changes into a rule of force and violence.** 8 **For the people, having grown accustomed to feed at the expense of others and to depend for their livelihood on the property of others, as soon as they find a leader who is enterprising but is excluded from the houses of office by his penury, institute the rule of violence;** 9 **and now uniting their forces massacre, banish, and plunder, until they degenerate again into perfect savages and find once more a master and monarch.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n393/mode/2up?view=theater

When, says Plato, the insatiate jaws of the populace are fired with the thirst of liberty, and when the people, urged on by evil ministers, drains in its thirst the cup, not of tempered liberty, but unmitigated license, then the magistrates and chiefs, if they are not utterly subservient and remiss, and shameless promoters of the popular licentiousness, are pursued, incriminated, accused, and cried down under the title of despots and tyrants. I dare say you recollect the passage.
...

Scipio. Plato thus proceeds: Then those who feel in duty bound to obey the chiefs of the State are persecuted by the insensate populace, who call them voluntary slaves. **But those who, though invested with magistracies, wish to be considered on an equality with private individuals, and those private individuals who labor to abolish all distinctions between their own class and the magistrates, are extolled with acclamations and overwhelmed with honors, so that it inevitably happens in a commonwealth thus revolutionized that liberalism abounds in all directions, [plena libertatis esse omnia]** due authority is found wanting even in private families, and misrule seems to extend even to the animals that witness it. Then the father fears the son, and the son neglects the father. All modesty is banished; **they become far too liberal for that. [ut plane liberi sint]** No difference is made between the citizen and the alien; the master dreads and cajoles his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters. The young men assume the gravity of sages, and sages must stoop to the follies of children, lest they should be hated and oppressed by them. **The very slaves even are under but little restraint; wives boast the same rights as their husbands;** dogs, horses, and asses are emancipated in this outrageous excess of freedom, and run about so violently that they frighten the passengers from the road. **At length the termination of all this infinite licentiousness is, that the minds of the citizens become so fastidious and effeminate, that when they observe even the slightest exertion of authority they grow angry and seditious, and thus the laws begin to be neglected, so that the people are absolutely without any master at all.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/adams-the-works-of-john-adams-vol-4#lf1431-04_head_040

The modern aristocracies of Holland, Venice, Bern, &c., have tempered themselves with innumerable checks, by which they have given a great degree of stability to that form of government; and though liberty and life can never be there enjoyed so well as in a free republic, none is perhaps more capable of profound sagacity. **We shall learn to prize the checks and balances of a free government, and even those of the modern aristocracies, if we recollect the miseries of Greece, which arose from its ignorance of them. The only balance attempted against the ancient kings was a body of nobles; and the consequences were perpetual alternations of rebellion and tyranny, and the butchery of thousands upon every revolution from one to the other.** When kings were abolished, aristocracies tyrannized; and then no balance was attempted but between aristocracy and democracy. This, in the nature of things, could be no balance at all, and therefore the pendulum was forever on the swing.

It is impossible to read in Thucydides,* his account of the factions and confusions throughout all Greece, which were introduced by this want of an equilibrium, without horror. “During the few days that Eurymedon, with his troops, continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended the massacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime alleged was, their attempt to overturn the democracy. Some perished merely through private enmity; some, by the hands of the borrower, on account of the money they had lent. Every kind of death, every dreadful act, was perpetrated. Fathers slew their children; some were dragged from altars, some were butchered at them; numbers, immured in temples, were starved. **The contagion spread through the whole extent of Greece; factions raged in every city; the licentious many contending for the Athenians, and the aspiring few for the Lacedæmonians.** The consequence was, seditions in cities, with all their numerous and tragical incidents.”

“Such things ever will be,” says Thucydides, “so long as human nature continues the same.” But if this nervous historian had known a balance of three powers, he would not have pronounced the distemper so incurable, but would have added—*so long as parties in cities remain unbalanced.*
…

Mr. Hume has collected, from Diodorus Siculus alone, a few massacres which happened in only sixty of the most polished years of Greece:—“From Sybaris, 500 nobles banished; of Chians, 600 citizens; at Ephesus, 340 killed, 1000 banished; of Cyrenians, 500 nobles killed, all the rest banished; the Corinthians killed 120, banished 500; Phæbidas banished 300 Bœotians. Upon the fall of the Lacedæmonians, democracies were restored in many cities, and severe vengeance taken of the nobles; the banished nobles returning, butchered their adversaries at Phialæ, in Corinth, in Megara, in Phliasia, where they killed 300 of the people; but these again revolting, killed above 600 of the nobles, and banished the rest. In Arcadia, 1400 banished, besides many killed; the banished retired to Sparta and Pallantium; the latter were delivered up to their countrymen, and all killed. Of the banished from Argos and Thebes, there were 500 in the Spartan army. The people, before the usurpation of Agathocles, had banished 600 nobles; afterwards that tyrant, in concurrence with the people, killed 4000 nobles, and banished 6000; and killed 4000 people at Gela; his brother banished 8000 from Syracuse. The inhabitants of Ægesta, to the number of 40,000, were killed, man, woman, and child, for the sake of their money; all the relations of the Libyan army, fathers, brothers, children, killed; 7000 exiles killed after capitulation. These numbers, compared with the population of those cities, are prodigious; yet Agathocles was a man of character, and not to be suspected of wanton cruelty, contrary to the maxims of his age.”1

Such were the fashionable outrages of unbalanced parties. In the name of human and divine benevolence, is such a system as this to be recommended to Americans, in this age of the world? Human nature is as incapable now of going through revolutions with temper and sobriety, with patience and prudence, or without fury and madness, as it was among the Greeks so long ago.
…

Monarchies and aristocacies are in possession of the voice and influence of every university and academy in Europe. Democracy, simple democracy, never had a patron among men of letters.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/448/mode/2up?view=theater

As men departed from the ancient system, a poor class began to grow up. **Before, when every man belonged to a gens, and had his master, extreme poverty was almost unknown. A man was supported by his chief; the one to whom he owed obedience was bound in turn to provide for his wants. But the revolutions which had dissolved the *γένος* had also changed the conditions of human life.** The day when man was freed from the bonds of clientship, he saw the necessities and the difficulties of existence stand out before him. Life had become more independent, but it was also more laborious and subject to more accidents. Thenceforth each one had the care of his own well-being, his enjoyments, and his task. One became rich by his activity or his good fortune, while another remained poor. **Inequality of wealth is inevitable in every society which does not wish to remain in the patriarchal state or in that of the tribe.**
…

In earlier times they had respected the right of property, because it was founded in a religious belief. So long as each patrimony was attached to a worship, and was reputed inseparable from the domestic gods of a family, no one had thought of claiming the right to despoil a man of his field; **but at the time to which the revolutions have conducted us, these old beliefs are abandoned, and the religion of property has disappeared.** Wealth is no longer a sacred and inviolable domain. It no longer appears as a gift of the gods, but as a gift of chance. A desire springs up to lay hold of it by despoiling the possessor, and this desire, which formerly would have seemed an impiety, begins to appear right. **Men no longer saw the superior principle that consecrates the right of property.** Each felt only his own wants, and measured his rights by them.

We have already seen that the city, especially among the Greeks, had unlimited power, that liberty was unknown, and that individual rights were nothing when opposed to the will of the state. **It followed that a majority of votes might decree the confiscation of the property of the rich, and that the Greeks saw neither illegality nor injustice in this.** What the state had declared was right. This absence of individual liberty was for Greece a cause of misfortunes and disorders. **Rome, which had a little more respect for the rights of man, suffered less.**

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0153%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D9
>
> 9. While these things were going on in Rome, **[443 B.C.]** there came envoys from Ardea begging the Romans in the name of their ancient alliance, renewed by the recent treaty, to send help to their city, which was on the brink of ruin. [2] **For the enjoyment of peace, which they had most wisely preserved with the Roman People, had been denied them, owing to civil war.** [3] **This is said to have had its cause and origin in the rivalry of factions, which have been and will be fraught with destruction to more nations than foreign wars, or famine and pestilence, or whatsoever other scourges men attribute, as the most desperate national calamities, to the wrath of Heaven.**
> …
>
> **The plebs were routed, but, unlike the Roman plebs, [nihil Romanae plebi similis] having armed and withdrawn from their city and encamped upon a certain hill, they sallied forth, sword and torch in hand, to sack the farms of the nobles.** [9] **They even prepared to besiege the city itself, for the entire body of artizans, [opificum] even those who had hitherto had no part in the quarrel, had been called out by the hope of plunder;** [10] nor was there wanting any form of the horrors of war, as though the nation had been infected with the madness of the two young men who sought a fatal marriage in the ruin of their country. [11] Neither side saw that there had been enough of war and arms at home; **the optimates called upon the Romans to relieve their beleaguered city; the plebeians sent for the Volsci to help them capture Ardea.**

…

"There was at Miletus a war between the rich and the poor. At first the latter were successful, and drove the rich from the city; but afterwards, regretting that they had not been able to slaughter them, they took their children, collected them into some threshing-floors, and had them trodden to death under the feet of oxen. The rich afterwards returned to the city, and became masters of it. They took, in their turn, the children of the poor, covered them with pitch, and burnt them alive."1

> 1. Heracleides of Pontus, in Athenæus, XII. 26. **It is quite the fashion to accuse the Athenian democracy of having set Greece the example in these excesses and disorders. Athens was, on the contrary, the only Greek city, known to us, that did not see this atrocious war between rich and poor within its walls.** This intelligent and wise people saw, from the day when this series of revolutions commenced, that they were moving towards a goal where labor alone could save society. They therefore encouraged it and rendered it honorable. **Solon directed that all men who had not an occupation should be deprived of political rights.** Pericles desired that no slave should labor in the construction of the great monuments which he raised, and reserved all this labor for free men. **Moreover, property was so divided up, that a census, taken at the end of the fifth century, shows little Attica to have contained more than ten thousand proprietors.** Besides, Athens, living under a somewhat better economical *régime* than the other cities enjoyed,

was less violently agitated than the rest of Greece; the quarrels between rich and poor were better, and did not end in the same disorders.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2167/2167-h/2167-h.htm#link2H_4_0015

It is true that among the dependencies of Athens seditions assumed a character more ferocious than even in France, during the reign of terror—the accursed Saturnalia of an accursed bondage.
...

From such calamities Athens and Lacedaemon alone were almost completely free. At Athens the purses of the rich were laid under regular contribution for the support of the poor; and this, rightly considered, was as much a favour to the givers as to the receivers, since no other measure could possibly have saved their houses from pillage and their persons from violence. **It is singular that Mr Mitford should perpetually reprobate a policy which was the best that could be pursued in such a state of things, and which alone saved Athens from the frightful outrages which were perpetrated at Corcyra.**

...

With two or three honorable exceptions, **the tyrants who were set up in all the Greek cities in the fourth and third centuries reigned only by flattering all that was worst in the multitude, and by destroying all that was superior in birth, wealth, or merit.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Dionysius_of_Halicarnassus/7A*.html#ref6

3 1 In the sixty-fourth Olympiad, when Miltiades was archon at Athens,[7] **[524/3 B.C.]** the Tyrrhenians who had inhabited the country lying near the Ionian Gulf,[8] but had been driven from thence in the course of time by the Gauls, joined themselves to the Umbrians, Daunians, and many other barbarians, and undertook to overthrow Cumae, the Greek city in the country of the Opicans founded by Eretrians and Chalcidians, though they could allege no other just ground for their animosity than the prosperity of the city. 2 **For Cumae was at that time celebrated throughout all Italy for its riches, power, and all the other advantages, as it possessed the most fertile part of the Campanian plain and was mistress of the most convenient havens round about Misenum.**
...

3 Aristodemus allowed a few days to pass, during which he performed his vows to the gods and waited for the merchantmen that were late in arriving, and then, when the proper time came, he said he desired to give the senate an account of the circumstances of the battle and to show them the spoils taken in the war. **Then, the authorities having assembled in great numbers, he came forward and made a speech, in which he related everything that had happened in the battle; and while he was speaking, the accomplices in the plot with whom he had arranged matters rushed into the senate-house in a body with swords under their garments and killed all the members of the aristocracy.** 4 Thereupon there ensued a flight of those who were in the forum and a rush of some to their houses and of others away from the city, except of such as were privy to the conspiracy; the latter in the mean time captured the citadel, the dockyards, and the strong places of the city. The following night he released from the prisons all who were under sentence of death, of whom there were many, arming them together with his friends, among whom were the Tyrrhenian prisoners, he formed out of these a bodyguard for himself. 5 When it was day, he assembled the people and after inveighing at length against the citizens who had been put to death by his orders, he said that those men, having often sought his life, had been justly punished by him, **but that, as for the rest of the citizens, he had come to give them liberty, equal rights of speech, and many other advantages.**

8 1 **When he had said this and thereby filled all the common people with wonderful hopes, he established two institutions which are the worst of all human institutions and the prologues to every tyranny—a redistribution of the land and an abolition of debts.** He promised that he would take upon himself the care of both these matters if he were appointed general with absolute power till the public tranquillity should be secured and they had established a democratic constitution. 2 **When the common people and the unprincipled rabble gladly accepted the proposal to pillage the goods of other men,** Aristodemus conferred upon himself the supreme command, and proposed another measure by which he deceived them and deprived them all of their liberty. For pretending to suspect that the rich would raise disturbances and insurrections against the common people on account of the redistribution of the land and the abolition of debts, he said the only means he could think of to prevent a civil war and the slaughter of citizens and to guard against these miseries before they happened, was for all of them to bring the arms out of their houses and to consecrate them to the gods, in order that they might make use of them against foreign enemies who should attack them, whenever the necessity should arise, and not against one another, and that in the mean time they would be suitably placed in the keeping of the gods. 3 When they agreed to this also, he disarmed all the Cumaeans that very day, and during the following days he searched their houses, where he put to death many worthy citizens, alleging that they had not produced all their arms for the gods. **After this he strengthened his tyranny by three sorts of guards. The first consisted of the filthiest and the most unprincipled of the citizens, by whose aid he had overthrown the aristocracy; the second, of the most impious knaves, whom he himself had freed for having killed their masters; and the third, a**

mercenary force, consisting of the most savage barbarians, who amounted to no fewer than two thousand and were far better soldiers than any of the rest. 4 He destroyed the statues of those he had put to death in all places both sacred and profane and set up his own in their stead; and seizing their houses and lands and the rest of their fortunes, he reserved for himself the gold and silver and everything else that was worthy of a tyrant, and divided the remainder among those who had aided him in gaining his power. **But the most numerous and the largest gifts he made to the slaves who had killed their masters. Thereupon these insisted also on marrying the wives and daughters of their late masters.**

9 1 At first he paid no attention to the male children of those who had been put to death, but afterwards, either at the direction of some oracle or influenced also by the reflection he might naturally make, that in them no small danger was being secretly reared up against him, he resolved to destroy them all in one day. 2 **But at the earnest entreaties of all the men with whom the children's mothers were living and the children themselves were being brought up, since he wished to grant them this favour also, he saved them from death, contrary to his intention.** Taking precautions, however, against them, lest they should combine together and conspire against his tyranny, he ordered them all to depart from the city and to live in the country dispersed here and there, receiving instruction in no profession or branch of learning becoming to the children of freemen, but tending flocks and performing the other labours of the husbandmen; and he threatened with death anyone of them who should be found in the city. 3 **These children, accordingly, forsaking the houses of their fathers, were brought up in the country like slaves, serving the murderers of their fathers. And to the end that no noble or manly spirit might spring up in any of the rest of the citizens, he resolved to make effeminate by means of their upbringing all the youths who were being reared in the city, and with that view he suppressed the gymnasiums and the practice of arms and changed the manner of life previously followed by the children.** 4 For he ordered the boys to wear their hair long like the girls, to adorn it with flowers, to keep it curled and to bind up the tresses with hair-nets, to wear embroidered robes that reached down to their feet, and, over these, thin and soft mantles, and to pass their lives in the shade. And when they went to the schools kept by dancing-masters, flute-players and others who, like these, pay court to the Muses, their governesses attended them, taking along parasols and fans; and these women bathed them, carrying into the baths combs, alabaster pots filled with perfumes, and looking-glasses. 5 **By such training he continued to enervate the youth till they had completed their twentieth year, and from that time permitted them to be considered as men.** Having by these and many other methods abused and insulted the Cumaeans without refraining from any kind of lust or cruelty, when he thought himself secure in the possession of the tyranny, being now grown old, he was punished to the satisfaction of both gods and men and extirpated with all his family.

10 1 Those who rose against him and freed their country from his tyranny were the sons of the citizens he had murdered, all of whom he had at first resolved to put to death in one day, but being prevailed upon by the entreaties of his bodyguards, to whom he had given their mothers, had refrained, as I said, 2 and ordered them to live in the country. **A few years later, as he was making a progress through the villages, he saw a large number of these youths, who made a brave appearance; and fearing they might conspire together and rise against him, he purposed to forestall them by putting them all to death before any one should be aware of his intention.** Assembling his friends, accordingly, he considered with them how the youths might most easily and speedily be put to death in secret. 3 The youths, being apprised of this, either by the information of some person who was acquainted with his purpose, or suspecting it themselves by reasoning from probabilities, fled to the mountains, taking with them the iron implements they used in husbandry. They were speedily joined by the Cumaean exiles who resided in Capua, most distinguished of whom and possessing the largest number of friends among the Campanians were the sons of Hippomedon, who had been commander of the horse in the war against the Tyrrhenians. These were not only well armed themselves, but also brought with them arms for the youths as well as a goodly band of Campanian mercenaries and of their own friends which they had raised. 4 **When they had all united, they made descents after the manner of brigands and plundered the lands of their enemies, lured the slaves away from their masters, released the men confined in prisons and armed them,** and whatever they could not carry or drive off they either burnt or killed.
...

4 Having wiped out the whole family of the tyrant, so as to leave neither children, wives, nor anyone related to them, and having spent the whole night in hunting down all the abetters of the tyranny, as soon as it was day, they proceeded to the forum. Then, calling the people together, they laid down their arms and restored the traditional government.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Diodorus_Siculus/15D*.html#ref2

3 While these things were going on, **in the city of Argos civil strife broke out accompanied by slaughter of a greater number than is recorded ever to have occurred anywhere else in Greece. Among the Greeks this revolutionary movement was called "Club-law," receiving this appellation on account of the manner of the execution.** 58 1 Now the strife arose from the following causes: the city of Argos[3] had a democratic form of government, and certain demagogues instigated the populace against the outstanding citizens of property and reputation. **The victims of the hostile charges then got together and decided to overthrow the democracy.** 2
When some of those who were thought to be implicated were subjected to torture, all but one, fearing the agony of torture, committed suicide, but this one came to terms under torture, received a pledge of immunity, and as informer denounced thirty of the most distinguished citizens, and the democracy without a thorough investigation put to death all those who were accused and confiscated their property. 3 But many others were

under suspicion, **and as the demagogues supported false accusations, the mob was wrought up to such a pitch of savagery that they condemned to death all the accused, who were many and wealthy. When, however, more than twelve hundred influential men had been removed, the populace did not spare the demagogues themselves.** 4 For because of the magnitude of the calamity the demagogues were afraid that some unforeseen turn of fortune might overtake them and therefore desisted from their accusation, whereas the mob, now thinking that they had been left in the lurch by them, were angry at this and put to death all the demagogues. **So these men received the punishment which fitted their crimes as if some divinity were visiting its just resentment upon them, and the people, eased of their mad rage, were restored to their senses.**

https://archive.org/details/historyofgreece05mitfiala/page/260/mode/2up?view=theater

It is a truly curious account, free from inconsistency and the marvellous, remaining from Diodorus, of the consequences of that peace by which independency, under the patronage of Thebes supported by Persia, was assured to all Grecian cities. **The most important particulars, unmentioned by Xenophon, sufficiently accord with the tenor of Xenophon's narrative; and the whole deserves notice the more, because, contrary to Xenophon, all Diodorus's partiality was for the cause of Thebes and democracy.**

The establishment of the sovereignty of the people in every city,49 says the historian, produced great disturbances and numerous seditions; especially in Peloponnesus. **For, the people there having been mostly accustomed to oligarchal government, their new democratical authority was exercised with eager but unskilful zeal.**50 Many of the most respectable men, in various cities, were driven into banishment: many, through calumnious and interested accusations, were executed; confiscated property, divided among the people, was as a reward held out to incite hasty and unjust condemnation. To obviate these evils sedition soon grew busy; and, to avoid them, emigration abounded.51

> 51. This translation of a passage written eighteen hundred years ago, and applying to times four hundred years before, **so exactly describes what has just been occurring in France, that it may almost be necessary to desire the reader to look at the original, for proof that it is not a forgery. What follows wants only the change of a name or two to make it apply equally to the French as to the Grecian revolution.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/462/mode/2up?view=theater

What saved Sparta was the extreme division which existed in the lower orders. The Helots did not agree with the Laconians; and the Mothaces despised the Neodamodes. No coalition was possible; and the aristocracy—thanks to its military education and the close union of its members!—was always strong enough to make head against any one class of its enemies.

The kings attempted what no class could realize. All those among them who aspired to escape from the state of inferiority in which the aristocracy held them sought support among the lower classes. During the Persian war Pausanias formed the project of elevating royalty and the lower orders at the same time by overthrowing the oligarchy. The Spartans put him to death, accusing him of having conspired with the king of Persia; his real crime was, rather, entertaining the thought of freeing the Helots.1 **We can see in history how numerous were the kings who were exiled by the ephors. The cause of these condemnations is easily guessed; and Aristotle says, "The kings of Sparta, in order to make head against the ephors and the senate, became demagogues."**2 ...

The small number of Spartans by birth (there were, including all the different classes, no more than seven hundred) and the debasement of character, a result of long oppression, explain why the signal for changes did not come from the lower classes. It came from a king. Agis undertook to accomplish this inevitable revolution by legal means, which increased for him the difficulties of the enterprise. He presented to the senate—that is to say, to the rich men themselves—two bills for the abolition of debts and the partition of the lands. We cannot be too much surprised that the senate did not reject these propositions. Agis had perhaps taken his measures to have them accepted. But the laws, once voted, remained to be put in execution; and these reforms are always so difficult to carry through that the boldest fail. Agis, stopped short by the opposition of the ephors, was constrained to go outside the law; **he deposed those magistrates, and named others by his sole authority. He then armed his partisans, and established, for a year, a reign of terror. During that time he was enabled to apply the law concerning debts, and to burn in the public square all evidences of debt; but he had not time to divide up the land**. We do not know whether Agis hesitated at this point, frightened at his own work, or whether the oligarchy circulated well-devised accusations against him. At any rate the people left him, and allowed him to fall. The ephors put him to death, and the aristocratic government was re-established.

Cleomenes took up the projects of Agis, but with more skill and fewer scruples. He began by massacring the ephors; he boldly suppressed this magistracy, which was odious to the kings

and to the popular party, and proscribed the rich. After these measures he carried through the revolution; he distributed the lands, and gave the rights of citizens to four thousand Laconians. **It is worthy of remark that neither Agis nor Cleomenes avowed that he was carrying through a revolution, and that both, claiming to act in the name of the old legislator, Lycurgus, pretended that they were bringing Sparta back to her ancient usages.** Assuredly the constitution of Cleomenes was very far from them. The king was really an absolute master; there was no other authority as a counterpoise. **He reigned after the manner of the tyrants who then held sway in most of the Greek cities, and the Spartan people, satisfied to have obtained lands, appeared to care very little for political liberty.** This situation did not continue long. Cleomenes wished to extend the democratic rule to all Peloponnesus, where Aratus, at the very same time, was laboring to establish liberty and a well-regulated aristocracy. In all the cities, the popular party agitated in the name of Cleomenes, hoping, like Sparta, to obtain an abolition of debts and a distribution of lands. It was this unexpected insurrection of the lower classes that obliged Aratus to change all his plans. He thought he could count upon Macedonia, whose king, Antigonus Doson, was then acting on the plan of attacking the tyrants and the popular party everywhere, and therefore introduced him into Peloponnesus. Antigonus and the Achaeans conquered Cleomenes at Sellasia. The Spartan democracy were again overthrown, and the Macedonians re-established the ancient government (B.C. 222).

But the oligarchy could no longer support itself. Disturbances continued a long time; **one year, three ephors, who were favorable to the popular party, massacred their two colleagues; the following year the five ephors belonged to the oligarchs. The people took arms and killed them all. The oligarchy wanted no kings; the people were in favor of kings; one was nominated and elected outside the royal family—a thing that had never been known before at Sparta.** This king, named Lycurgus, was twice dethroned, once by the people, because he refused to divide the lands, and a second time by the aristocracy, because they suspected him of wishing to make the partition. It is not known how he closed his reign; **but after him there was a tyrant, Machanidas, at Sparta—a certain proof that the popular party had gained the ascendency.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laconicus

In 192, Nabis was murdered by a contingent of 1000 Aetolian allies led by Alexamenus, who were present in the city to help Nabis in his war against the Achaean League.[5] The Spartans then massacred the Aetolians and appointed Laconicus as king. **However, the strategos of the Achaean League Philopoemen took advantage of the crisis to enter Sparta and forced the city to join his League, ending the independence of Sparta.[6] The kingship was abolished, and Sparta came under the rule of an oligarchy loyal to Philopoemen.[6][7]**

---

http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/airwatpl.12.12.html

I say, then, that Asia differs very much from Europe as to the nature of all things, both with regard to the productions of the earth and the inhabitants, **for everything is produced much more beautiful and large in Asia; the country is milder, and the dispositions of the inhabitants also are more gentle and affectionate.** The cause of this is the temperature of the seasons, because it lies in the middle of the risings of the sun towards the east, and removed from the cold (and heat), **for nothing tends to growth and mildness so much as when the climate has no predominant quality, but a general equality of temperature prevails.**

http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/airwatpl.16.16.html

And with regard to the pusillanimity and cowardice of the inhabitants, the principal reason the Asiatics are more unwarlike and of gentler disposition than the Europeans is, the nature of the seasons, which do not undergo any great changes either to heat or cold, or the like; for there is neither excitement of the understanding nor any strong change of the body whereby the temper might be ruffled and they be roused to inconsiderate emotion and passion, rather than living as they do always in the state. It is changes of all kinds which arouse understanding of mankind, and do not allow them to get into a torpid condition. **For these reasons, it appears to me, the Asiatic race is feeble, and further, owing to their laws; for monarchy prevails in the greater part of Asia, and where men are not their own masters nor independent, but are the slaves of others, it is not a matter of consideration with them how they may acquire military discipline, but how they may seem not to be warlike,** for the dangers are not equally shared, since they must serve as soldiers, perhaps endure fatigue, and die for their masters, far from their children, their wives, and other friends; and whatever noble and manly actions they may perform lead only to the aggrandizement of their masters, whilst the fruits which they reap are dangers and death; and, in addition to all this, the lands of such persons must be laid waste by the enemy and want of culture. **Thus, then, if any one be naturally warlike and courageous, his disposition will be changed by the institutions. As a strong proof of all this, such Greeks or barbarians in Asia as are not under a despotic form of government, but are independent, and**

enjoy the fruits of their own labors, are of all others the most warlike; for these encounter dangers on their own account, bear the prizes of their own valor, and in like manner endure the punishment of their own cowardice.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA71#v=onepage&q&f=false

> But to the extent that there was in antiquity a deliberate and systematic application of scientific reasoning (*lógos*) to the development of the mechanical and industrial arts (*téchnai*), **it took place under the patronage of tyrants and kings, not republics** – and even then the promotion of applied science by men like Dionysius of Syracuse and the Ptolemies in Egypt was an extraordinary phenomenon virtually restricted to the stratagems of war.32 **The ancient monarchs had no stake whatsoever in maintaining the fragile military infrastructure that had made republicanism viable,** and the most ambitious among them were fully prepared, even eager, to take advantage of every new weapon that their technicians and engineers could devise.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D3%3Apage%3D692

Many are the discreditable charges one would have to bring against Greece in relating the events of that war; indeed, it would be wrong to say that Greece defended herself, for had not the bondage that threatened her been warded off by the concerted policy of the Athenians [693a] and Lacedaemonians, **practically all the Greek races would have been confused together by now, and barbarians confused with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians,—just as the races under the Persian empire today are either scattered abroad or jumbled together and live in a miserable plight.**

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144%3Aspeech%3D5%3Asection%3D39

[39] Now perhaps someone will venture to object to what I have proposed, saying that I am trying to persuade you to set yourself to an impossible task, **since the Argives could never be friendly to the Lacedaemonians, nor the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans,** and since, in general, those who have been accustomed throughout their whole existence to press their own selfish interests can never share and share alike with each other. [40] **Well, I myself do not believe that at the time when our city was the first power in Hellas, or again when Lacedaemon occupied that position, any such result could have been accomplished,**[23] since the one or the other of these two cities could easily have blocked the attempt; but as things are now, I am not of the same mind regarding them. **For I know that they have all been brought down to the same level by their misfortunes, and so I think that they would much prefer the mutual advantages which would come from a unity of purpose to the selfish gains which accrued from their policy in those days.**[24]
…

[42] But I marvel that those who think that none of these proposals could possibly be carried out are not aware, either by their own knowledge or by tradition, that there have been many terrible wars after which the participants have come to an understanding and rendered great services to one another. **For what could exceed the enmity which the Hellenes felt toward Xerxes? Yet everyone knows that we and the Lacedaemonians came to prize his friendship**[1] **more than that of those who helped us to establish our respective empires.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=as_OTst8jvoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false

Perhaps the most interesting and promising approach to the question of the sources of Alexander's seemingly ecumenical approach to the various ethnic groups of his empire is that of Pierre Briant. **As Briant reminds us, it is astonishing that scholars of Alexander so easily forget that the Achaemenid empire (550-330) which Alexander conquered was *itself already* a multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual entity.**53 Contrary to what centuries of Western scholarship has claimed, the Achaemenid empire was not the decadent "eastern despotism" whose inevitable decline after the sack of Babylon by Cyrus in 539 rendered it a moribund entity awaiting the arrival of Europeans.54 Indeed, the locution of "pre-Hellenistic" that scholars have used to describe the Near East prior to Alexander effectively erases the entire Achaemenid empire from history. The origins of Alexander's multicultural empire, in other words, might be found in the multicultural empire he found when he arrived. **For this reason, in an important article of 1979, Briant styled Alexander "the last of the Achaemenids"**55 **– a notion which, perhaps unsurprisingly, has met with some resistance amongst classicists.**56 At the considerable risk of minimizing Alexander's revolutionary genius, Briant has drawn our attention to the fact that for over two centuries prior to the arrival of Alexander, the Achaemenids had been developing strategies for the control of an ethnically, culturally, religiously, and linguistically diverse empire by a dominant "ethno-class."57 This was an empire that stretched from the Aegean to the Indus, composed of myriad ethnic groups speaking at least fifteen languages – there were six forms of writing in Egypt alone. **What does seem clear is that the dominant Persian ethno-class guarded their privileges jealously throughout this empire and strictly controlled the access to power of non-Persian elites.** As Briant put it, the Achaemenids had no interest in the creation of a "melting-pot."58

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Aratus*.html#ref45

47 1 But upon the death of Antigonus[46] the Aetolians, **despising the Achaeans on account of their slothful ways (for now that they were accustomed to save themselves by other men's prowess and had taken shelter behind the Macedonian arms, they were living in great inactivity and lack of discipline),** proceeded to interfere in the affairs of Peloponnesus;[47] and after plundering the territories of Patrae and Dyme on their way, they invaded Messenia and ravaged it.

http://www.latinvulgate.com/verse.aspx?t=0&b=45

43 **And king Antiochus wrote to all his kingdom, that all the people should be one: [ut esset omnis populus unus] and every one should leave his own law.** 44 **And all nations consented, according to the word of king Antiochus.** 45 **And many of Israel consented to his service, and they sacrificed to idols, and profaned the sabbath.** 46 **And the king sent letters by the hands of messengers to Jerusalem, and to all the cities of Juda; that they should follow the law of the nations of the earth.**

https://archive.org/details/Josephus02War13/Josephus%2007%20Antiquities%2012-14/page/132/mode/2up?view=theater

(5) *a* But when the Samaritans saw the Jews suffering these misfortunes, they would no longer admit that they were their kin or that the temple on Garizein was that of the Most Great God, thereby acting in accordance with their nature, as we have shown;*b* **they also said they were colonists from the Medes and Persians,** and they are, in fact, colonists from these peoples. Accordingly, they sent envoys to Antiochus with a letter in which they made the following statements.

> "To King Antiochus Theos Epiphanes,*c* a memorial from the Sidonians in Shechem.*d* Our forefathers because of certain droughts*e* in their country, and following a certain ancient superstition,*f* made it a custom to observe the day which is called the Sabbath by the Jews, and they erected a temple without a name on the mountain called Garizein, and there offered the appropriate sacrifices. Now you have dealt with the Jews as their wickedness deserves, but the king's officers, in the belief that we follow the same practices as they through kinship with them, are involving us in similar charges, **whereas we are Sidonians by origin, as is evident from our state documents.** We therefore petition you as our benefactor and saviour to command Apollonius, the governor of the district,*a* and Nicanor, the royal agent,*b* not to molest us in any way by attaching to us the charges of which the Jews are guilty, **since we are distinct from them both in race and in customs, and we ask that the temple without a name be known as that of Zeus Hellenios.*c* For if this be done, we shall cease to be molested, and by applying ourselves to our work in security, we shall make your revenues greater.**"

To this petition of the Samarians the king wrote the following reply.

> "King Antiochus to Nicanor. The Sidonians in Shechem have submitted a memorial which has been filed.*d* Now since the men sent by them have represented to us sitting in council with our friends that they are in no way concerned in the complaints brought against the Jews, **but choose to live in accordance with Greek customs, [Ἑλληνικοῖς ἔθεσιν]** we acquit them of these charges, and permit their temple to be known as that of Zeus Hellenios, as they have petitioned."

---

https://archive.org/details/hindumannerscust1906dubo/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Numa Pompilius, again, could devise no better way of putting an end to the racial hatred between Sabines and Romans than by separating the body of the people into different castes and classes. The result of his policy was just what he had desired. **Both Sabines and Romans, once amalgamated in this manner, forgot their national differences and thought only of those of their class or caste.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/22/mode/2up?view=theater

Modern history furnishes us an example of the same thing which then took place in Rome: and this is very noteworthy; for, since men have had the same passions in all ages, the occasions which produce great changes are different, but the causes are always the same. **As Henry VII of England increased the power of the commons for the purpose of humbling the aristocracy, Servius Tullius before him had extended the privileges of the people in order to humble the senate.**8 **But the people—become at once more bold—overthrew the one and the other monarchy.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0124%3Achapter%3D7

At this period every citizen began to seek distinction, and to display his talents with greater freedom; **for, with princes, the meritorious are greater objects of suspicion than the undeserving, and to them the worth of others is a source of alarm. [nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt, semperque iis aliena virtus formidulosa est.] But when liberty was secured, it is almost incredible[1] how much the state strengthened itself in a short space of time, so strong a passion for distinction had pervaded it. Now, for the first time, the youth, as soon as they were able to bear the toil of war,[2] acquired military skill by actual service in the camp,** and took pleasure rather in splendid arms and military steeds than in the society of mistresses and convivial indulgence.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0168%3Abook%3D45%3Achapter%3D18

18. **First of all it was voted that the Macedonians and Illyrians should be given their independence, so that it should be clear to all nations that the forces of the Roman People brought not slavery to free peoples, but on the contrary, freedom to the enslaved. [ut omnibus gentibus appareret arma populi Romani non liberis servitutem, sed contra servientibus libertatem adferre]** [2] The senate wished nations which were free to consider that their freedom was assured and lasting under the protection of the Roman People, and that those who lived under kings should feel **for the time being** that their rulers were milder and more just under the eye of the Roman People, and, if at any time their kings should make war on the Roman People, that the outcome of the war would bring victory to the Romans, but freedom to themselves.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15702/15702-h/15702-h.htm#FOURTH_LETTER
>
> The Committee for Foreign Affairs were such slovens, and stunk so abominably, that no muscadin ambassador of the smallest degree of delicacy of nerves could come within ten yards of them; but now they are so powdered, and perfumed, and ribanded, and sashed, and plumed, that, though they are grown infinitely more insolent in their fine clothes even than they were in their rags, (and that was enough,) as they now appear, **there is something in it more grand and noble, something more suitable to an awful Roman Senate receiving the homage of dependent tetrarchs. Like that Senate, (their perpetual model for conduct towards other nations,) they permit their vassals (during their good pleasure) to assume the name of kings, in order to bestow more dignity on the suite and retinue of the sovereign Republic by the nominal rank of their slaves:** *Ut habeant instrumenta servitutis et reges.*"
> ...
>
> **But in this the French Republic has followed, as they always affect to do, and have hitherto done with success, the example of the ancient Romans, who shook all governments by listening to the complaints of their subjects, and soon after brought the kings themselves to answer at their bar.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/132/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Whenever any people or prince withdrew their obedience from their sovereign, they immediately accorded to them the title of allies of the Roman people,3 and thus rendered them sacred and inviolable; **so that there was no king, however great he might be, who could for a moment be sure of his subjects, or even of his family.**

https://archive.org/details/greeklifeandtho03mahagoog/page/596/mode/2up?view=theater

Far worse was the case of Macedonia, where every man of mark, every noble, every official, was deported, so that the whole country was deprived of its upper classes and therefore of all its culture. For here it was only the dominant caste that had attained culture; the soldier-peasants were no better than they now are—shepherds and clephts.
...

The Romanised Polybius, or at least Polybius in the history he composed for Roman readers, wonders at the heaven-sent madness of the Macedonians, who, after they had received 'their liberty,' and their taxes were reduced to half the amount they had paid their kings, yet rose in constant insurrections,1 and joined the standard of any pretender to the royal blood who promised to rescue them from their new and precious privileges! There is no judgment in the historian more monstrous. **A people of old feudal and monarchical habits had their royal family abolished, their nobility destroyed, all the tokens of their ancient splendour carried away as spoil, and were given a brand-new democratical code by the victors as an ample substitute!**2 **And this was called *liberty*, when the country was divided into four sections, and all intercourse strictly forbidden between them!** What family ties must have been broken, even among those who had not been deported, what trade relations ruined among all those whose business was more than parochial! How intolerable to old friends and connexions through Macedonia to find all intercourse interdicted, and their noble fatherland cut into sections by new and artificial boundaries! **And presently they found Roman merchants going freely to and fro and**

monopolising by this privilege even the real home trade of their country, which the new laws had rendered impossible to native enterprise.
...

The first thing that strikes us when we hear of the whole nobility of Macedonia, and then of Achaea, being scattered through Italy, is that this large though compulsory immigration ought to have had an important influence on Italian life.3 **And yet, except in the solitary instance of Polybius, not one word transpires to tell us that such was the case. We do not hear of a single remarkable man descended from this foreign blood, and tracing his origin to Macedonian or Greek nobility. We do not hear of any country town which was humanised by these noble exiles, or which benefited by their culture.** What on earth became of them all? The son of King Perseus was a petty clerk in a country town, and so earned a miserable livelihood.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n215/mode/2up?view=theater

He subordinated the Senate almost to the role of an advisory council. **He enlarged it from 600 to 900 members and permanently transformed it with 400 new appointees.** Many of these were Roman businessmen; many were leading citizens of Italian or provincial cities; some had been centurions, soldiers, or sons of slaves. The patricians were alarmed to see the chieftains of conquered Gaul enter the Senate and join the rulers of the Empire; even the wags of the capital resented this and circulated a satiric couplet:

> ***Gallos Caesar in triumphum ducit, idem in curiam;***
> ***Galli braccas deposuerunt, latum clavum sumpserunt—***

...

Cicero sought to unite the middle classes with the aristocracy; Caesar sought to unite them with the plebs. Many of the great capitalists, from Crassus to Balbus, helped to finance him, as similar men helped the American and French Revolutions. Nevertheless, Caesar ended one of the richest sources of financial profiteering—the collection of provincial taxes through corporations of publicans.
...

In 49 he had enfranchised Cisalpine Gaul; now (44) he drew up a municipal charter, apparently for all the cities of Italy, equalizing their rights with Rome's; probably he was planning some representative government by which they would have had a democratic share in his constitutional monarchy.[55] He took the appointment of provincial governors out of the hands of the corrupt Senate and himself named to these posts men of proved ability, who remained at every moment subject to recall at his will. He reduced provincial taxes by a third, and entrusted their collection to special officials responsible to himself. He overrode ancient curses to restore Capua, Carthage, and Corinth—completing again the work of the Gracchi. To the colonists whom he sent to found or people a score of cities from Gibraltar to the Black Sea, he gave Roman or Latin rights, **and evidently hoped to extend Roman citizenship to all free adult males in the Empire; the Senate was then to represent not a class in Rome, but the mind and will of every province. This conception of government, and Caesar's reorganization of Rome and Italy, completed the miracle whereby the youthful spendthrift and roisterer had become one of the ablest, bravest, fairest, and most enlightened men in all the sorry annals of politics.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0022%3Atext%3DA%3Abook%3D14%3Aletter%3D12

You know how fond I am of the Sicilians, and what an honour I consider it to be their patron. Caesar granted them many privileges with my full approval, though their having the *ius Latinum* was intolerable; [scis quam diligam Siculos et quam illam clientelam honestam iudicem. multa illis Caesar neque me invito, etsi Latinitas erat non ferenda.] yet, after all—But look at Antony! For an enormous bribe he has put up a law—alleged to have been carried at the comitia by the dictator, granting the Sicilians full Roman citizenship; though while he was alive there was never a word said about it. Again: take the case of my client Deiotarus, isn't it exactly parallel? He, of course, deserved any kingdom you please, but not through Fulvia.[1] There are hundreds of similar cases.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Caesar*.html#ref96

55 1 But to resume, when Caesar came back to Rome from Africa, to begin with, he made a boastful speech to the people concerning his victory, asserting that he had subdued a country large enough to furnish annually for the public treasury two hundred thousand Attic bushels of grain, and three million pounds of olive oil. 2 Next, he celebrated triumphs, an Egyptian, a Pontic, and an African, the last not for his victory over Scipio, but ostensibly over Juba the king. 3 **On this occasion, too, Juba, a son of the king, a mere infant, was carried along in the triumphal procession, the most fortunate captive ever taken, since from being a Barbarian and a Numidian, he came to be enrolled among the most learned historians of Hellas.**

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/299/mode/2up?view=theater

> The children of Cleopatra presented a more delicate problem. ‘A multitude of Caesars is no good thing.’3 That just observation sealed the fate of Ptolemy Caesar, whom many believed to be son of the dictator. Alexander Helios and Cleopatra Selene were reserved to walk in a Roman triumph. The boy is not heard of again—he was probably suppressed. **The girl was enlisted as an instrument of Roman imperial policy, being given in marriage to Juba, the prince of the Numidian royal stock who became King of Mauretania.**

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap3.htm#CHA

Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names; nor was he deceived in his expectation, that the senate and people would submit to slavery, provided they were respectfully assured that they still enjoyed their ancient freedom.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2332/2332-h/2332-h.htm#link2H_4_0007
>
> At the beginning of the [17th] century, the sovereign perpetually violated, with little or no opposition, the clear privileges of Parliament. **At the close of the century, the Parliament had virtually drawn to itself just as much as it chose of the prerogative of the Crown. The sovereign retained the shadow of that authority of which the Tudors had held the substance.** He had a legislative veto which he never ventured to exercise, a power of appointing Ministers, whom an address of the Commons could at any moment force him to discard, a power of declaring war which, without Parliamentary support, could not be carried on for a single day. …
>
> There is perhaps no other instance in history of a change so complete in the real constitution of an empire, unaccompanied by any corresponding change in the theoretical constitution. **The disguised transformation of the Roman commonwealth into a despotic monarchy, under the long administration of Augustus, is perhaps the nearest parallel.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Em18DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> We forfeited the right to revere the Constitution, the governmental principles and mechanisms it established, and the men who wrote it when we put Dr. King into the pantheon. **The federalism, rule of law, states' rights, limits on majority rule, checks and balances, and separation of powers that characterize the Constitution all are incompatible with the full blossoming of the egalitarian democracy** that Dr. King envisioned and which is the completion of the radical reconstruction to which his holiday commits us.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0164%3Abook%3D34%3Achapter%3D9

9. Even at that time Emporiae consisted of two towns separated by a wall. One was inhabited by Greeks from Phocaea, whence came the Massilienses also, the other by the Spaniards; [2] but the Greek town, being entirely open to the sea, had only a small extent of wall, of less than four hundred paces in length, while the Spaniards, who were farther back from the sea, had a wall three miles around. [3] A third class of inhabitants, Roman colonists, was added by the deified Caesar[51] after the final defeat of the sons of Pompey, **and at present all are fused into one mass, [nunc in corpus unum confusi omnes] the Spaniards first, and later the Greeks, having been received into Roman citizenship.**

https://archive.org/details/L203JosephusIITheJewishWar13/page/468/mode/2up?view=theater

“**But if there is one people above all others which should be tempted by its grand opportunities to raise the standard of revolt, it is surely the Gauls with their magnificent natural ramparts,** on the east the Alps, on the north the river Rhine, on the south the chain of the Pyrenees, on the west the ocean. But, though encompassed by such formidable barriers, though swarming with a population of three hundred and five nations,*b* possessing, so to say, in their native soil the springs of prosperity and irrigating well-nigh the whole world with the overflow of their products, **the Gauls are yet content to be treated as a source of revenue to the Romans and to have their own prosperous fortune meted out to them at their hands.** And this they tolerate, not from any lack of spirit or because they are an ignoble race, they who for full eighty years*c* fought for their independence, but because they are overawed at once by the power of Rome and by her fortune, which brings her more triumphs even than her arms. **That is why they submit to the orders of twelve hundred soldiers,*d* they who have cities enough almost to outmatch that number.*e***

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/champion-an-account-of-denmark-with-francogallia-and-some-considerations-for-the-promoting-of-agriculture-and-employing-the-poor#lf1577_label_372

It was the Misfortune of this most valiant and warlike People, to submit at length to the Great Beast, as it is called in Scripture, with which however they so strove for Empire for eight hundred Years, (as Josephus informs us) that no Wars with any other Nation, so much terrified Rome.
…

Now Tacitus in his Life of Agricola, attributes the Loss of this their so remarkable Valour, to the Loss of their Liberty; “Gallos in bellis floruisse accepimus, mox segnities [segnitia] cum otio intravit, amissa Virtute pariter ac Libertate.”54

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/56*.html

The Romans were holding portions of [Germany]—not entire regions, but merely such districts as happened to have been subdued, so that no record has been made of the fact—2 and soldiers of theirs were wintering there and cities were being founded. The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways, **were becoming accustomed to hold markets,** and were meeting in peaceful assemblages. They had not, however, forgotten their ancestral habits, their native manners, their old life of independence, or the power derived from arms. 3 **Hence, so long as they were unlearning these customs gradually and by the way, as one may say, under careful watching, they were not disturbed by the change in their manner of life, and were becoming different without knowing it.** But when Quintilius Varus became governor of the province of Germany, and in the discharge of his official duties was administering the affairs of these peoples also, he strove to change them more rapidly. **Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations.** 4 To this they were in no mood to submit, **for the leaders longed for their former ascendancy and the masses preferred their accustomed condition to foreign domination.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Histories/1A*.html#ref10

Although Nero's death had at first been welcomed with outbursts of joy, it roused varying emotions, not only in the city among the senators and people and the city soldiery, but also among all the legions and generals; **for the secret of empire was now revealed, that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.**[11] **[evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri]** The senators rejoiced and immediately made full use of their liberty, as was natural, for they had to do with a new emperor who was still absent. The leading members of the equestrian class were nearly as elated as the senators. **The respectable part of the common people [pars populi integra]** and those attached to the great houses, the clients and freedmen of those who had been condemned and driven into exile, were all roused to hope. **The lowest classes, [plebs sordida] addicted to the circus and theatre, and with them the basest slaves, as well as those men who had wasted their property and, to their shame, were wont to depend on Nero's bounty, were cast down and grasped at every rumour.**
…

The provinces without an army, and especially Italy itself, were exposed to slavery under any master and destined to become the rewards of war. [in pretium belli cessurae erant] This was the condition of the Roman state when Servius Galba, chosen consul for the second time, and his colleague Titus Vinius entered upon the year that was to be for Galba his last and for the state almost the end.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cassius_Dio/75*.html

4 **But some found fault with [Severus] particularly because he abolished the practice of selecting the body-guard exclusively from Italy, Spain, Macedonia and Noricum,—a plan that furnished men of more respectable appearance and of simpler habits,—and ordered that any vacancies should be filled from all the legions alike.** 5 Now he did this with the idea that he should thus have guards with a better knowledge of the soldier's duties, and should also be offering a kind of prize for those who proved brave in war; but, as a matter of fact, **it became only too apparent that he had incidentally ruined the youth of Italy, who turned to brigandage and gladiatorial fighting in place of their former service in the army,** 6 and in filling the city with a throng of motley soldiers most savage in appearance, most terrifying in speech, and most boorish in conversation.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap14.htm#andc

The final abolition of the Praetorian guards was a measure of prudence as well as of revenge. Those haughty troops, whose numbers and privileges had been restored, and even augmented, by Maxentius, were forever suppressed by Constantine.
…

By suppressing the troops which were usually stationed in Rome, Constantine gave the fatal blow to the dignity of the senate and people, **and the disarmed capital was exposed, without protection, to the insults or neglect of its distant master.**

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/503/mode/2up?view=theater

Vespasian's nobility was his own creation. The Flavians had cause to be suspicious. Though the murderous tyranny of the Julio-Claudians has all but exhausted the Republican and the Augustan nobility, there are still on the *Fasti* three Republican *nobiles* and some seven or eight men sprung from Triumviral or Augustan consuls: only one man of this class commands an army, and a small one at that. He was Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, an old man and a personal friend of Vespasian.1 **Thenceforward a newer nobility, sons or grandsons of Roman knights for the most part, govern the great military provinces of the Empire.**

http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/martial_on_the_games_of_domitian_01_text.htm

What race is so distant from us, what race so barbarous, Caesar, as that from it no spectator is present in thy city? The cultivator of Rhodope is here from Orpheus' Haemus:[1] the Sarmatian nourished by the blood drawn from his steed, is here. He too who drinks the waters of the Nile where it first becomes known to us, and he whose shores the surge of the remotest ocean laves. The Arabian has hastened hither, the Sabaeans have hastened, and Cilicians have here dripped with showers of their own perfume. **With locks twisted into a knot, are come the Sicambrians; and with hair twisted in other forms, the Ethiopians. Though different the speech of the various races, there is but one utterance, when thou art hailed as the true father of thy country.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924028288722/page/294/mode/2up?view=theater

In reading the history of the Roman emperors, we are wearied with the vast number of people whom they caused to be put to death in order that they might confiscate their estates. **We find nothing similar in our modern histories.** This difference, as we have just intimated, ought to be attributed to manners which are more gentle, and to a religion which is more restraining; **and it may be added that we have not the families of senators to despoil who had ravaged the earth.**
...

Nero, Caligula, Commodus, Caracalla, were regretted by the people because of the very follies in which they indulged; for these emperors loved with fervor that which the people loved; they contributed to their pleasures with all their power, and even with their persons; they lavished upon them the wealth of the empire; and, when this was exhausted, **the people looked on without pain whilst all the great families were despoiled.** They enjoyed the fruits of the tyranny without any alloy of fear, for they found safety in their baseness. It was natural that such emperors should hate good men. They knew that they were not approved by them.6 Indignant at the contradiction or the silence of an austere citizen, and drunk with the applause of the populace, they came to imagine that their government constituted the public happiness, and that none but evil-minded men could censure it.7

> 7. **In seeking an explanation for that good understanding which existed between the populace and the worst of the emperors, I think we shall find it, not only in the causes mentioned in the text, but in the fundamental fact that *the empire itself was but the permanent triumph of the popular over the patrician faction.*** This fact was one of the traditions of the people, and hence they regarded the successors of Caesar rather in the light of popular chiefs.—TRANSLATOR.

...

Here we may fitly indulge a reflection upon the course of human affairs. When in the past history of Rome we see so many wars undertaken, so much bloodshed, so many peoples destroyed, so many great actions, so many triumphs, so much policy, wisdom, prudence, constancy, and courage; **when we contemplate that scheme for the conquest of all nations,** which was so well conceived, so ably sustained and so successfully executed —in what has it all ended at last, except to satiate the passions of five or six monsters? **That senate has only struck down so many kings in order to fall itself into the most degrading slavery at the hands of some of the worst citizens of the state, and—to exterminate itself by its own decrees!** Men only build up their power to the end of seeing it completely overthrown! they only labor to increase it in order to see it turned against themselves in more fortunate hands!

https://archive.org/details/dailylifeinancie035465mbp/page/n93/mode/2up?view=theater

Up to the time of Claudius, the imperial "cabinet" was composed almost exclusively of slaves.44 They received the petitions of the empire, issued instructions both to provincial governors and to the magistrates of Rome, and elaborated jurisprudence of all the tribunals including the highest senatorial court. The emperors from Claudius to Trajan inclusive recruited their cabinet from their freedmen. **Just as the French nobility of the seventeenth century chafed under the domination of "*la vile bourgeoisie*" of ministers and their clerks, so the senators of the empire with rage in their hearts silently bowed before the power of an ex-slave.**
...

Hadrian took the initiative, which his successors respected, of reserving all places in his cabinet for members of the Equestrian Order.46 **If he had wished to carry this reform through with thoroughness, he should, however, have gone a step further and regulated also the tenure of secondary posts.** For in order to command obedience and not to fear malpractices which they were

powerless to stamp out, the emperors and their great men preferred to continue, as before, to select foreign slaves to be the *procuratores* and *institores* of their administration. **They imagined these men to be in their power, while in fact, with the extension of the frontiers and the elaboration of the fiscal system, they themselves fell more and more into the power of their slave subordinates.** It would be unjust to deny that there were among these *servi*, anxious to earn their manumission by their zeal, and among these *liberti* who felt a gratitude for their manumission exceeding their obligations, many conscientious servants, honest stewards, faithful and devoted agents; **and the fact that the machinery of empire ran as smoothly as it did during the second century was due perhaps less to the vigilance of its supervising engineers than to the professional care and skill of its mechanics.** The flock, however, was too large not to contain a proportion of black sheep: agents too harsh in their demands and exactions and too greedy of commissions and gratuities, administrators who were insolent, cruel, and untruthful. It was surely a fatal paradox for a government honestly concerned to improve its efficiency to delegate its functions to men born in chains and destined for slavery.

Instead of witnessing a logical and gradual evolution which would have demonstrated the value of imperial institutions, the Romans had continually to endure the civic degradation entailed by this arbitrary and drastic inversion of classes and of roles. Both in town and country it demoralised the citizens. **Juvenal was infuriated to see the sons of free men in the Rome of Trajan constrained by self-interest to pay court to the slaves of the rich:**

> "*Divitis hic servo claudit lotus ingenuorum*
> *Filius ...*"47

Under Commodus free citizens, as colonist volunteers, cultivated the African estate of Suq al Khmis (Thursday Market), and **were mercilessly and unjustly flogged in the emperor's name by the slave steward of his *Saltus Burunitanus*.**48

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap13.htm#elev

The parents of Diocletian had been slaves in the house of Anulinus, a Roman senator; nor was he himself distinguished by any other name than that which he derived from a small town in Dalmatia, from whence his mother deduced her origin. (1)

> 1. Eutrop. ix. 19 [13]. Victor in Epitome [c. 39]. The town seems to have been properly called Doclia, from a small tribe of Illyrians (see Cellarius, Geograph. Antiqua, tom. i. p. 393); **and the original name of the fortunate slave was probably Docles; he first lengthened it to the Grecian harmony of Diocles, and at length to the Roman majesty of Diocletianus. He likewise assumed the Patrician name of Valerius,** and it is usually given him by Aurelius Victor.

It is, however, probable that his father obtained the freedom of the family, and that he soon acquired an office of scribe, which was commonly exercised by persons of his condition. (2) Favourable oracles, or rather the consciousness of superior merit, prompted his aspiring son to pursue the profession of arms and the hopes of fortune; and it would be extremely curious to observe the graduation of arts and accidents which enabled him in the end to fulfil those oracles, and to display that merit to the world. Diocletian was successively promoted to the government of Moesia, the honours of the consulship, and the important command of the guards of the palace. He distinguished his abilities in the Persian war; **and after the death of Numerian, the slave, by the confession and judgment of his rivals, was declared the most worthy of the Imperial throne.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap13.htm#newb

But the most fatal though secret wound which the senate received from the hands of Diocletian and Maximian was inflicted by the inevitable operation of their absence. **As long as the emperors resided at Rome, that assembly might be oppressed, but it could scarcely be neglected.** The successors of Augustus exercised the power of dictating whatever laws their wisdom or caprice might suggest; but those laws were ratified by the sanction of the senate. The model of ancient freedom was preserved in its deliberations and decrees; and wise princes, who respected the prejudices of the Roman people, were in some measure obliged to assume the language and behaviour suitable to the general and first magistrate of the republic. **In the armies and in the provinces they displayed the dignity of monarchs; and when they fixed their residence at a distance from the capital, they forever laid aside the dissimulation which Augustus had recommended to his successors.** In the exercise of the legislative as well as the executive power, the sovereign advised with his ministers, instead of consulting the great council of the nation. **The name of the senate was mentioned with honour till the last period of the empire;** the vanity of its members was still flattered with honorary distinctions; (96) but the assembly which had so long been the source, and so long the instrument of power, was respectfully suffered to sink into oblivion. **The senate of Rome, losing all connection with the**

Imperial court and the actual constitution, was left a venerable but useless monument of antiquity on the Capitoline hill.
…

Notwithstanding these precautions, **the political union of the Roman world was gradually dissolved, and a principle of division was introduced, which, in the course of a few years, occasioned the perpetual separation of the eastern and western empires.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924026480370/page/n375/mode/2up?view=theater

Why should the child of Paulus Æmilius, the nephew of Æmilius, the descendant of such a noble family and so glorious a republic, inquire how there can be two suns in heaven, **and not ask how there can be two senates in one Commonwealth, and, as it were, two distinct peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and the whole system [ratio] of his tribuneship, has divided one people into two parties.**

https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506079/page/289/mode/2up?view=theater

The Empire might split into two parts—very easily. **It is one of the miracles of Roman history that in subsequent ages the division between West and East was masked so well and delayed so long.** The loss of dominions beyond the sea would be ruinous to an Italy that had prospered and grown rich from the revenues of the East, the return she gained from her export of soldiers, financiers and governors.
…

When the Triumvir Antonius abode for long years in the East men might fear lest the city be dethroned from its pride of place, lest the capital of empire be transferred to other lands. The propaganda of Octavianus had skillfully worked upon such apprehensions. Once aroused they would be difficult to allay: their echo could still be heard. **Horace produces a divine decree, forbidding Troy ever to be rebuilt;**5 **Virgil is quite explicit;**6 and Livy duly demonstrates how the patriot Camillus not only saved Rome from the invader but prevented the citizens from abandoning the destined seat of empire for a new capital.7

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0054%3Abook%3D12%3Acard%3D791

But ask one boon, which in the book of fate is not denied; for Latium's good I sue, and high prerogatives of men that be thy kith and kin: when happy wedlock vows (aye, be it so!) shall join them by strong laws of chartered peace, let not the Latins lose their ancient, native name. **Bid them not pass for Trojans, nor be hailed as Teucer's sons; no alien speech, no alien garb impose. Let it be Latium ever; let the lords of Alba unto distant ages reign; let the strong, master blood of Rome receive the manhood and the might of Italy. Troy perished: let its name and glory die! [sit Romana potens Itala virtute propago: occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0025%3Abook%3D3%3Apoem%3D3

> Let the wide waters sever still
> Ilium and Rome, the exiled race
> May reign and prosper where they will:
> **So but in Paris' burial-place**
> **The cattle sport, the wild beasts hide**
> **Their cubs, the Capitol may stand**
> **All bright, and Rome in warlike pride**
> **O'er Media stretch a conqueror's hand.**
> …
>
> Yet, warlike Roman, know thy doom,
> **Nor, drunken with a conqueror's joy,**
> **Or blind with duteous zeal, presume**
> **To build again ancestral Troy.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap14.htm#disc

The privileges which had exalted Italy above the rank of the provinces were no longer regarded: and the officers of the revenue already began to number the Roman people, and to settle the

proportion of the new taxes. Even when the spirit of freedom had been utterly extinguished, the tamest subjects have sometimes ventured to resist an unprecedented invasion of their property; **but on this occasion the injury was aggravated by the insult, and the sense of private interest was quickened by that of national honour. The conquest of Macedonia, as we have already observed, had delivered the Roman people from the weight of personal taxes. Though they had experienced every form of despotism, they had now enjoyed that exemption near five hundred years; nor could they patiently brook the insolence of an Illyrian peasant, who, from his distant residence in Asia, presumed to number Rome among the tributary cities of his empire.** The rising fury of the people was encouraged by the authority, or at least the connivance, of the senate; and the feeble remains of the Praetorian guards, who had reason to apprehend their own dissolution, embraced so honourable a pretence, and declared their readiness to draw their swords in the service of their oppressed country. It was the wish, and it soon became the hope, of every citizen that, after expelling from Italy their foreign tyrants, they should elect a prince who, by the place of his residence, and by his maxims of government, might once more deserve the title of Roman emperor.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/3/9*.html

But if the question be asked, 'What was the effect of the building of Constantinople on Italy and Old Rome?', if it be considered that the true object of a statesman of the Lower Empire should have been, not to protract the existence of a semi-Greek, semi-Asiatic dominion, a kind of bastard Rome, but to keep the true Rome, the City of the seven hills, in her high place at the forefront of humanity or, if she must needs fall, to make her fall as honourable and her transformed spirit as mighty as possible,—then our answer will be widely different, and we shall have to rank the founder of Constantinople **foremost among the destroyers of the Empire.**

We have seen in the course of this history the infinite mischief wrought by the rivalry between the Ministers of the Eastern and Western Empires. At the critical moment of Alaric's preparations for his invasion Stilicho alone might probably have crushed him; but the subtle Goth

> 'Sold his alternate oaths to either throne.'

Each Empire trusted that the blow was about to fall on the other—a blow which the sister-realm would have witnessed with Christian resignation—and thus the time for anticipating it and for destroying the destroyer passed away.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2AyaCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PA81&hl=fi&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q&f=false

It had always been extremely rare for Greeks to take the trouble to learn what most of them had never ceased to regard as a barbarian language, and in the Later Empire there were few indeed who took the trouble to learn it for any but strictly practical reasons, with a view to one of the careers where at least a smattering of Latin was still essential, the law, the army, or the civil service. **Gibbon was not exaggerating much when he remarked that there is not one allusion to Vergil or Horace in the whole of Greek literature from Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Libanius.** Libanius affected complete and ostentatious ignorance of Latin, and even required an interpreter to make out a letter written in the language.134 **The emperor Julian was able to make himself understood in Latin ("Latine... disserendi sufficiens sermo," as Ammianus patronisingly observed), but "seems guiltless of the most rudimentary acquaintance with Latin literature."**135

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NHgvpINWV_QC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA529#v=onepage&q&f=false

But as the fourth century progressed, there was a sharp decline in knowledge of Greek in the West. **Given the enormous consequences of this decline for East-West relations in the centuries that followed (political and ecclesiastical no less than cultural), it has attracted surprisingly little scholarly attention.**12
…

The decisive factor in the decline of Greek in Rome was the de facto division of the empire by Diocletian and the creation by the tetrarchs of a series of new administrative capitals, especially those in the East. By the fourth century, Trier and Milan, Nicomedia, Antioch, and (most important of all) Constantinople were taking over many of the roles previously monopolized by Rome. **From the age of the Scipios to the reign of Gallienus, Rome had been the central and inevitable source of patronage for ambitious Greeks.** But from Diocletian on, court followed emperor from one to another of these secondary capitals, paying no more than the occasional brief visit to Rome. At the same time, the central government was tightening its grip at every level. **The vast expansion of Roman administrative control in the East transformed both cultural and political life for the old Greek elites, who increasingly withdrew from their traditional role in the cities to seek positions in the imperial service.** Rome rapidly became a cultural as well as a political

backwater. The aristocracy of Rome might continue to regard itself as *pars melior humani generis*, but by Symmachus's day prominent Greek intellectuals had long been looking elsewhere for patronage. **We do not know the name of a single Greek grammaticus in late antique Rome, as against nine Latin grammatici in Constantinople;**15 **and no certainly identifiable Greek rhetor either.** A rescript of Gratian fixing the salaries of professors for Trier, then an imperial capital, envisaged difficulty in finding a competent Greek grammaticus.16

16. *Graeco etiam, si qui dignus repperiri potuerit …*, *Cod. Theod.* xiii. 3. 11 (376).

In the late Republic and early empire it was altogether exceptional for Greeks to learn Latin – **a situation transformed in the fourth century by the rapid growth of a Latin-speaking civil service in the East** (p. 641). The gains made by Latin in the East may have played a part in the decline of Greek in the West. According to Matthews, **Ammianus and Claudian "were the tip of an iceberg, for the west was full of such Latin-speaking Greeks."**17

https://archive.org/details/a589105200kinguoft/page/n87/mode/2up?view=theater

I must add yet one more feature to this fearful, but accurate picture, and say how, a few generations forward, an even uglier thing would be seen. **The English aristocracy would have been absorbed by foreign adventurers.** The grandchildren of these slaves and mercenaries would be holding the highest offices in the state and the army, naming themselves after the masters who had freed them, or disguising their barbarian names by English endings. The De Fung-Chowvilles would be Dukes, the Little-grizzly-bear-Joe-Smiths Earls, and the Fitz-Stanleysons, descended from a king of the gipsies who enlisted to avoid transportation, and in due time became Commander-in-Chief, would rule at Knowsley in place of the Earl of Derby, having inherited the same by the summary process of assassination. Beggars on horseback, only too literally; married, most of them, to Englishwomen of the highest rank; but looking on England merely as a prey; without patriotism, without principle; they would destroy the old aristocracy by legal murders, grind the people, fight against their yet barbarian cousins outside, as long as they were in luck: but the moment the luck turned against them, would call in those barbarian cousins to help them, and invade England every ten years with heathen hordes, armed no more with tulwar and matchlock, but with Enfield rifle and Whitworth cannon. And that, it must be agreed, would be about the last phase of the British empire. **If you will look through the names which figure in the high places of the Roman empire, during the fourth and fifth centuries, you will see how few of them are really Roman.** If you will try to investigate, not their genealogies—for they have none—not a grandfather among them—but the few facts of their lives which have come down to us; you will see how that Nemesis had fallen on her which must at last fall on every nation which attempts to establish itself on slavery as a legal basis. **Rome had become the slave of her own slaves.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/1/5*.html

54. A strong confirmation of the theory (probably on *à priori* grounds) that the Goths enjoyed special immunities from taxation and from the rule of the civil magistrates of the Empire, is afforded by a passage in the XVIth Oration of Themistius. He brings forward the example of the Gaulish invaders of Asia Minor, who had been settled in Galatia and had given their names to that province. **'Now,' he says, 'no one could call them barbarians but altogether Romans. Their manner of life is the same as ours: they pay the same tributes, undergo the same military service, receive the same magistrates, obey the same laws. So too before long it will be with the Goths.** Now the wounds which they have inflicted are recent: but soon we shall have them bound by the same treaties, eating at the same tables, **serving with us in the same army, undertaking the same public duties.**' Evidently this was not the state of things established by the foedus.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/14*.html#ref26

3 **At the time when Rome first began to rise into a position of world-wide splendour, in order that she might grow to a towering stature, Virtue and Fortune, ordinarily at variance, formed a pact of eternal peace; for if either one of them had failed her, Rome had not come to complete supremacy.** 4 **Her people, from the very cradle to the end of their childhood,[27] a period of about three hundred years, carried on wars about her walls.** Then, entering adult life, after many toilsome wars, they crossed the Alps and the sea. Grown to youth and manhood, from every region which the vast globe includes, they brought back laurels and triumphs. **And now, declining into old age, and often owing victory to its name alone, it has come to a quieter period of life.** 5 **Thus the venerable city, after humbling the proud necks of savage nations, and making laws, the everlasting foundations and moorings of liberty, like a thrifty parent, wise and wealthy, has entrusted the management of her inheritance to the Caesars, as to her children.** 6 And although for some time the tribes[28] have been inactive and the centuries [29] at peace, and there are no contests for votes but the tranquillity of Numa's time has returned, **yet throughout all regions and parts of the earth she is accepted as mistress and queen;** everywhere the white hair of the senators and their authority are revered and the name of the Roman people is respected and honoured.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Claudian/De_Bello_Gildonico*.html#ref2

Time was when my men bore arms and my greybeards met in council; mistress of the world was I and lawgiver to mankind. From rising to setting sun I sped in triumph. **When proud Caesar had transferred my people's power to himself, when manners became corrupt and forgetful of war's old discipline I declined into the servile lap of peace, [postquam iura ferox in se communia Caesar transtulit et lapsi mores desuetaque priscis artibus in gremium pacis servile recessi] the emperors rewarded me with Africa and Egypt that they might nourish the sovereign people and the Senate,** arbiter of peace and war, by means of summer-sped fleets, and that the winds, blowing alternately from either shore, should fill our granaries with corn.
...

Destruction threatens me hourly; **a few days will set a limit to my uncertain food-supply. Out upon thee, prosperity! Why hast thou given me seven hills and such a population as a small supply cannot nourish?** Happier I, had my power been less. Better to have put up with the Sabines and Veii; in narrower bonds I passed securer days. **My very magnitude undoes me;** would that I could return to my former boundaries and the walls of poor Ancus. Enough for me then would be the ploughlands of Etruria and Campania, the farms of Cincinnatus and Curius, and at his country's prayer the rustic dictator[5] would bring his home-grown wheat.

https://archive.org/details/historyoflaterro00arno/page/n537/mode/2up?view=theater

The worst effect, however, of the imperial dominion as of that the commonwealth, **was the helplessness of mind which a cowardly policy taught it to encourage amongst the people of the provinces. It was maintained by Aristotle,**50 **that a state could not consist of so great a number as a hundred thousand citizens;** and although we may smile at the exaggeration of this doctrine, **yet it was founded on the justest notions of the duties of a political society,** where all should have a common interest, and should be keenly alive to the welfare of each other, and of the whole body. The Greeks, therefore, distinguished between a state and a dominion; and it was by the latter name that they characterized that vast mass of countries yoked together at the time of which we are treating under the sovereignty of Rome. The inhabitants then of the greatest part of the empire were subjects, and not citizens; **and that activity and attention to public affairs which is the great virtue of a citizen, is most unwelcome to a sovereign when he sees it in his subjects. An enlightened despot, like Trajanus, is frequently desirous of promoting the good of his people, but he dreads to see them able and zealous to promote their own;** not considering that wealth and security lose half their value when they are passively received from another; and that men will dwindle into children in understanding and energy, when they are obliged to depend in childlike helplessness on the protection of their rulers. **It is remarkable, with what exceeding suspicion Trajanus regarded every thing like a principle of internal organization and self-dependence in the people of his empire.**

> https://archive.org/details/gulagarchipelago00solzrich/page/430/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 2. In the Criminal Code of 1926 there was a most stupid Article 139 – “on the limits of necessary self-defense” – according to which you had the right to unsheath your knife only after the criminal’s knife was hovering over you. **And you could stab him only after he had stabbed you. And otherwise *you* would be the one put on trial.** (And there was no article in our legislation saying that the greater criminal was the one who attacked someone weaker than himself.) **This fear of exceeding the measure of necessary self-defense led to total spinelessness as a national characteristic.** A hoodlum once began to beat up the Red Army man Aleksandr Zakharov outside a club. Zakharov took out a folding penknife and killed the hoodlum. And for this he got ... ten years for plain murder! **“And what was I supposed to do?” he asked, astonished. Prosecutor Artsishevsky replied: “You should have fled!”**
> ...
>
> Any genuine initiative like that shown in the French film *The Waterfront at Dawn*, in which the workers went about catching thieves and punishing them themselves without the knowledge of the authorities, would in our country have been suppressed as illicit! **Could one even *imagine* that way of thinking and that sort of film in our country?**

...

In the reign of Trajanus certainly, the government was sufficiently ready to promote any scheme of improvement that promised to be beneficial; **but when other emperors succeeded, who had neither the ability nor the disposition to forward such plans, the evil of encouraging helplessness in the people became apparent, and when the provinces were neglected by their rulers, they had lost the energy to act for themselves.**

> https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap38.htm#resistance
>
> **While the continent of Europe and Africa yielded, without resistance, to the barbarians, the British island, alone and unaided, maintained a long, vigorous, though an**

unsuccessful, struggle, against the formidable pirates who, almost at the same instant, assaulted the northern, the eastern, and the southern coasts. The cities, which had been fortified with skill, were defended with resolution; the advantages of ground, hills, forests, and morasses, were diligently improved by the inhabitants; the conquest of each district was purchased with blood **and the defeats of the Saxons are strongly attested by the discreet silence of their annalist.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA391#v=onepage&q&f=false

This brings us to what is possibly the central and most difficult paradox of Machiavelli's new political science: the republic's achieved goal of power, wealth, and security through its rise to empire is precisely what at length causes it to unravel into effeminacy and laziness. Its *virtu* is its own gravedigger.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asabiyyah#Overview

He explains that ruling houses tend to emerge on the peripheries of existing empires and use the much stronger
asabiyya present in their areas to their advantage, in order to bring about a change in leadership. This implies that the new rulers are at first considered 'barbarians' in comparison to the previous ones. **As they establish themselves at the center of their empire, they become increasingly lax, less coordinated, disciplined and watchful, and more concerned with maintaining their new power and lifestyle. Their *asabiyya* dissolves into factionalism and individualism, diminishing their capacity as a political unit.**

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.4Secular/page/n187/mode/2up?view=theater

It is only pride which hides the danger from our eyes. A friend from Virginia was conversing, in London, with an old English navy surgeon, who was intimately acquainted with the British West-India Islands. He assured the Virginian that the "reconstruction acts" tended directly to amalgamation, and would surely result in it if persevered in. **"Never," exclaimed my Virginia friend, "In our case, our people's pride of race will effectually protect them from that last infamy." "Had ever any people," replied the ex-surgeon, "more pride of race than the English? Yet they are amalgamating in Jamaica. We have the teachings of forty years' experience in this matter; when your emancipation has become, like ours, forty years old, you will see." The Virginian was silenced.** Even now, after ten years of the misery and shame of subjugation, one has only to open his eyes to see the crumbling away of the social barriers between the two races. **[Feb. 21, 1876]**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houston_Stewart_Chamberlain#Kaiser_Wilhelm_II

In 1903, Chamberlain wrote to Wilhelm to claim that as in the last decadent days of Rome, "the *civis britannicus* is now become a purely political concept" with no racial content being involved.[133] Chamberlain wrote with disgust how for two shillings and a sixpence, "every Basuto nigger" could now carry a British passport.[133] **Chamberlain went on to predict that within the next fifty years "the English aristocracy will be nothing but a money oligarchy, without a shred of racial solidarity or relation to the throne."**[133]

Baron of the Taiga on X: Yes, in some ways that is also true. **You could see it in comparing the maternal protectiveness of the British over Ulster, then a long period of quiet, and the next time they even entered the British conscience, they were "backward DUP homophobic abortion-deniers."**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/7684/pg7684-images.html#link2HCH0006

The Norman position in France, indeed, in much resembled that of the Spartan in Greece. He had forced a settlement with scanty numbers in the midst of a subjugated and sullen population, surrounded by jealous and formidable foes. **Hence sobriety was a condition of his being, and the policy of the chief lent a willing ear to the lessons of the preacher. Like the Spartan, every Norman of pure race was free and noble; and this consciousness inspired not only that remarkable dignity of mien which Spartan and Norman alike possessed, but also that fastidious self-respect which would have revolted from exhibiting a spectacle of debasement to inferiors.** And, lastly, as the paucity of their original numbers, the perils that beset, and the good fortune that attended them, served to render the Spartans the most religious of all the Greeks in their dependence on the Divine aid; so, perhaps, to the same causes may be traced the proverbial piety of the ceremonial Normans; they carried into their new creed something of feudal loyalty to their

spiritual protectors; did homage to the Virgin for the lands that she vouchsafed to bestow, and recognised in St. Michael the chief who conducted their armies.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/14A*.html#ref59

27 1 **In the same year, [60 AD] Laodicea, one of the famous Asiatic cities, was laid in ruins by an earthquake, but recovered by its own resources, without assistance from ourselves.** In Italy, the old town of Puteoli acquired the rights and title of a colony from Nero. Veterans were drafted into Tarentum and Antium, but failed to arrest the depopulation of the districts, the majority slipping away into the provinces where they had completed their years of service; while, as they lacked the habit of marrying wives and rearing families, the homes they left behind them were childless and without heirs. **For the days had passed when entire legions—with tribunes, centurions, privates in their proper centuries—were so transplanted as to create, by their unanimity and their comrade-ship, a little commonwealth. [ut consensu et caritate rem publicam efficerent] The settlers now were strangers among strangers; men from totally distinct maniples; leaderless; mutually indifferent; suddenly, as if they were anything in the world except soldiers, massed in one place to compose an aggregate rather than a colony. [quasi ex alio genere mortalium repente in unum collecti, numerus magis quam colonia]**

...

Rome, however, by Machiavelli's own admission, did undermine the vigor of its original virtue by the enjoyment of its material results. **The empire's achievement of unprecedented wealth, security, and peace sapped the capacity for honor seeking and ambition, destroyed all local traditions of national independence, and at length generated a spiritual longing for a permanent kingdom of peace on earth, the seed bed of Christianity.**11 Much as he praises the ruthless dexterity of Rome's leaders, that praise is conspicuously absent when it comes to Julius Caesar and Octavian, who began the transition to a permanent peace and therefore the effemination of virtue.12

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n259/mode/2up?view=theater

The very peace that Augustus had organized, and the security that he had won for Rome, had loosened the fibre of the people. No one wanted to enlist in the army, or recognize the inexorable periodicity of war. Luxury had taken the place of simplicity, sexual license was replacing parentage; **by its own exhausted will the great race was beginning to die.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Florus/Epitome/1A*.html#I

7 The next period is the hundred and fifty years down to the time of Augustus Caesar, during which it spread peace throughout the world. This was the manhood and, as it were, the robust maturity of the empire. 8 **From the time of Caesar Augustus down to our own age there has been a period of not much less than two hundred years,[3] during which, owing to the inactivity of the emperors, the Roman people, as it were, grew old and lost its potency, save that under the rule of Trajan it again stirred its arms and, contrary to general expectation, again renewed its vigour with youth as it were restored.**

https://www.livius.org/sources/content/herodian-s-roman-history/herodian-2.11/

The men of Italy, long unused to arms and war, were devoted to farming and peaceful pursuits. [2.11.4] **As long as Roman affairs were governed by republican principles and the senate selected the generals who took charge of military affairs, all the Italians were under arms,** and controlled the lands and the seas, waging wars with Greeks and barbarians. There was no place on earth, no place under heaven, to which the Romans did not extend the borders of their empire. [2.11.5] **From the time when Augustus assumed control of the government, however, the *princeps* freed the Italians from the necessity of working and of bearing arms;** establishing forts and camps for the defense of the empire, he stationed mercenaries in these to serve as a defensive bulwark on the frontiers.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA454#v=onepage&q&f=false

The paradox of modernity, already foreseen by Machiavelli, is that although it liberates desire, thereby understanding itself to be more realistic and hard-headed than the ancient philosophers' "imagined republics," **that success in the liberation of desire leads in the long run to "effemination" and the unrealistic longing (far more unrealistic than anything envisioned by the ancient thinkers) for permanent peace. Much as Machiavelli admires the dynamic evolution of Rome from republic to empire, he deplores the full-blown imperial outcome,** which destroyed the spirit of

liberty as it crushed every remaining local republic, and, by making the subjects of its world-state soft, prosperous and insulated from the dangers that had prompted the republic's original rise, opened up a craving for universal peace and its religion, Christianity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War_(Machiavelli)

Written between 1519 and 1520 and published the following year, it was Machiavelli's only historical or political work printed during his lifetime, though he was appointed official historian of Florence in 1520 and entrusted with minor civil duties.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/machiavelli-the-art-of-war-neville-trans#lf0523_head_004

FABRIZIO: I will tell you willingly what I think. You know of the men excellent in war there have been many famed in Europe, few in Africa, and less in Asia. This results from (the fact that) these last two parts of the world have had a Principality or two, and few Republics; but Europe alone has had some Kingdoms and an infinite number of Republics. **And men become excellent, and show their virtu, according as they are employed and recognized by their Prince, Republic, or King, whichever it may be.**
…

Few men, therefore, spring up in Asia, because, as that province was entirely subject to one Kingdom, in which because of its greatness there was indolence for the most part, it could not give rise to excellent men in business (activity). The same happened in Africa: yet several, with respect to the Carthaginian Republic, did arise. More excellent men come out of Republics than from Kingdoms, because in the former virtu is honored much of the time, in the Kingdom it is feared; whence it results that in the former, men of virtu are raised, in the latter they are extinguished. Whoever, therefore, considers the part of Europe, will find it to have been full of Republics and Principalities, which from the fear one had of the other, were constrained to keep alive their military organizations, and honor those who greatly prevailed in them.
…

It is true, therefore, that where there are many Empires, more valiant men spring up, and it follows, of necessity, that those being extinguished, little by little, virtu is extinguished, as there is less reason which causes men to become virtuous. And as the Roman Empire afterwards kept growing, and having extinguished all the Republics and Principalities of Europe and Africa, and in greater part those of Asia, no other path to virtu was left, except Rome. **Whence it resulted that men of virtu began to be few in Europe as in Asia, which virtu ultimately came to decline; for all the virtu being brought to Rome, and as it was corrupted, so almost the whole world came to be corrupted, and the Scythian people were able to come to plunder that Empire, which had extinguished the virtu of others, but did not know how to maintain its own.**

> https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap47.htm#Vth
>
> But the Latin churches were more jealous of the honor of Leo and the synod of Chalcedon: and if they had fought as they usually did under the standard of Rome, they might have prevailed in the cause of reason and humanity. **But their chief was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy; the throne of St. Peter, which had been disgraced by the simony, was betrayed by the cowardice, of Vigilius, who yielded, after a long and inconsistent struggle, to the despotism of Justinian and the sophistry of the Greeks.** His apostasy provoked the indignation of the Latins, and no more than two bishops could be found who would impose their hands on his deacon and successor Pelagius. **Yet the perseverance of the popes insensibly transferred to their adversaries the appellation of schismatics;** the Illyrian, African, and Italian churches were oppressed by the civil and ecclesiastical powers, not without some effort of military force; (97) the distant Barbarians transcribed the creed of the Vatican, and, in the period of a century, the schism of the three chapters expired in an obscure angle of the Venetian province. (98)
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II/Volume_XII/Gregory_the_Great/Register_of_Epistles/Book_V/Chapter_10
>
> Who is this that, against the evangelical ordinances, against the decrees of canons, presumes to usurp to himself a new name? Would indeed that one by himself he were, if he could be without any lessening of others,—**he that covets to be universal.**
> …
>
> **If then any one in that Church takes to himself that name, whereby he makes himself the head of all the good, it follows that the Universal Church falls from its standing (which God forbid), when he who is called Universal falls.** But far from Christian hearts be

that name of blasphemy, in which the honour of all priests is taken away, while it is madly arrogated to himself by one.

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/003338.html

However, alongside its good and sensible parts about Judaism, *Nostra Aetate* also had some very foolish and dangerous things to say about Islam:

> Since in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems,
> ***this sacred synod urges all to forget the past*** and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom. [Italics added.]

…

No wonder Europe forgot. The historic core of Europe, the Catholic Church, *told* it to forget.

And although afterwards that Empire, because of the inundation of those barbarians, became divided into several parts, this virtu was not renewed: first, because a price is paid to recover institutions when they are spoiled; another, <u>because the mode of living today, with regard to the Christian religion, does not impose that necessity to defend it that anciently existed</u>, in which at the time men, defeated in war, were either put to death or remained slaves in perpetuity, where they led lives of misery: the conquered lands were either desolated or the inhabitants driven out, their goods taken away, and they were sent dispersed throughout the world, so that those overcome in war suffered every last misery. Men were terrified from the fear of this, and they kept their military exercises alive, and honored those who were excellent in them. **But today, this fear in large part is lost, and few of the defeated are put to death, and no one is kept prisoner long, for they are easily liberated.** The Citizens, although they should rebel a thousand times, are not destroyed, goods are left to their people, so that the greatest evil that is feared is a ransom; so that men do not want to subject themselves to dangers which they little fear. **Afterwards, <u>these provinces of Europe exist under very few Heads as compared to the past</u>, for all of France obeys a King, all of Spain another, and Italy exists in a few parts;** so that weak Cities defend themselves by allying themselves with the victors, and strong States, for the reasons mentioned, do not fear an ultimate ruin.
…

And that that which I have discussed is true, **consider Germany, in which, because there are many Principalities and Republics, there is much virtu, and all that is good in our present army, depends on the example of those people, who, being completely jealous of their State [as they fear servitude, which elsewhere is not feared] maintain and honor themselves all as Lords.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap53.htm#Franks

> In the beginning of the tenth century, the family of Charlemagne had almost disappeared; his monarchy was broken into many hostile and independent states; the regal title was assumed by the most ambitious chiefs; their revolt was imitated in a long subordination of anarchy and discord, and the nobles of every province disobeyed their sovereign, oppressed their vassals, and exercised perpetual hostilities against their equals and neighbours. **Their private wars, which overturned the fabric of government, fomented the martial spirit of the nation. <u>In the system of modern Europe, the power of the sword is possessed, at least in fact, by five or six mighty potentates;</u> their operations are conducted on a distant frontier, by an order of men who devote their lives to the study and practice of the military art: the rest of the country and community enjoys in the midst of war the tranquillity of peace, and is only made sensible of the change by the aggravation or decrease of the public taxes. In the disorders of the tenth and eleventh centuries, every peasant was a soldier,** and every village a fortification; each wood or valley was a scene of murder and rapine; and the lords of each castle were compelled to assume the character of princes and warriors. To their own courage and policy they boldly trusted for the safety of their family, the protection of their lands, and the revenge of their injuries; and, like the conquerors of a larger size, they were too apt to transgress the privilege of defensive war. The powers of the mind and body were hardened by the presence of danger and necessity of resolution: the same spirit refused to desert a friend and to forgive an enemy; **and, instead of sleeping under the guardian care of a magistrate, they proudly disdained the authority of the laws.** In the days of feudal anarchy, the instruments of agriculture and art were converted into the weapons of bloodshed: the peaceful occupations of civil and ecclesiastical society were abolished or corrupted; and the bishop who exchanged his mitre for a helmet, was more forcibly urged by the manners of the times than by the obligation of his tenure. (89)

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

> **Amongst the rude nations which lay beyond the Alps, valor was absolutely indispensable. Without it none could be eminent, few could be secure. Cowardice was, therefore, naturally considered as the foulest reproach.** Among the polished Italians, enriched by commerce, governed by law, and passionately attached to literature, everything was done by superiority of intelligence. Their very wars, more pacific than the peace of their neighbors, required rather civil than military qualifications. Hence, while courage was the point of honor in other countries, ingenuity became the point of honor in Italy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1232/pg1232-images.html#chap04

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; **or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince.** Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, **and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.**

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. **But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_XII_of_France
>
> Louis XII did not encroach on the power of local governments or the privileges of the nobility, in opposition with the long tradition of the French kings to attempt to impose absolute monarchy in France.
>
> https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06207a.htm
>
> His victory at Marignano (1515) over the Swiss who were defending Maximilian Sforza established the young king's reputation in Italy. He took advantage of this at "the interview of Bologna" to bring to a successful termination the efforts of his predecessors, Charles VII and Louis XI, to impose on Leo X the concordat which governed the organization of the French Church from that time till the end of the old regime (see FRANCE). **This marked the beginning of a series of measures destined to establish in France the preponderance of the royal power.** Francis I sought by every means, even by exceptional tribunals, to destroy among the nobles, both bishops and *seigneurs* (lords), the spirit of independence. **The formula of royal edicts "car tel est notre bon plaisir" (because it is our good pleasure) dates from his reign.**

…

The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, **there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people;** and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to Marcus, and contrast it with that which went before and that which came after, and then let him say in which of them he would wish to have been born or to have reigned. For during these times in which good men governed, he will see the prince secure in the midst of happy subjects, and the whole world filled with peace and justice. **He will find the senate maintaining its authority, the magistrates enjoying their honours, rich citizens their wealth, rank and merit held in respect, ease and content everywhere prevailing, rancour, licence, corruption and ambition everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in which every one might hold and support what opinions he pleased.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ZqroV-TkIhgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA110#v=onepage&q&f=false

Machiavelli makes no mention of men being fulfilled or made fully human by political participation. And in any event, such participation was not widespread under the emperors.24 **Indeed, his description of the golden times included freedom of opinion or conscience – a concern notably absent from the ancient *polis*, but characteristic of modern liberal societies.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n697/mode/2up?view=theater

Epicurus respected the state as a necessary evil, under whose protection he might live unmolested in his garden, but he appears to have cared little about national independence; **indeed, his school seems to have preferred monarchy to democracy, as less inclined to persecute heresy[32]—an arresting inversion of modern beliefs.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2464/pg2464-images.html#link2HCH0018

The eight carried on the war, and the others admonished during three years, when the death of the pontiff put an end to the hostilities, which had been carried on which so much ability, and with such entire satisfaction to the people, that at the end of each year the eight were continued in office, **and were called *Santi*, or holy, although they had set ecclesiastical censures at defiance, plundered the churches of their property, and compelled the priests to perform divine service. So much did citizens at that time prefer the good of their country to their ghostly consolations, and thus showed the church, that if as her friends they had defended, they could as enemies depress her;** for the whole of Romagna, the Marches, and Perugia were excited to rebellion.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Eight_Saints

Florence incited a revolt in the Papal States in 1375. Florentine agents were sent to more than forty cities in the papal states – including Bologna, Perugia, Orvieto and Viterbo – to foment rebellion, many of which had only been re-submitted to papal authority by the efforts of Cardinal Gil Álvarez Carrillo de Albornoz.[3] **Humanist Chancellor of Florence Coluccio Salutati disseminated public letters urging the cities to rebel against the "tyrannical" and "corrupt" papal rule, instead urging a return to *all'antica* Republicanism.**[3]
…

Pope Gregory XI excommunicated all members of the government of Florence and placed the city under interdict on March 31, 1376,[6] banning religious services in Florence and legalizing the arrest and enslavement[7] of Florentines and the confiscation of their property throughout Europe.[3] Initially, rather than attempting to disobey the interdict, Florentines organized extra-ecclesiastical processions (including flagellants) and confraternities, including the re-emergence of groups such as the Fraticelli, who had previously been deemed heretical.[3] **The edifice of the Florentine inquisition was destroyed, and the Signoria rolled back legal restrictions on usury and other practices frowned on by the (now defunct) ecclesiastical courts.**[8]

However, in October 1377, the government of Florence forced the clergy to resume religious services causing Angelo Ricasoli, Bishop of Florence, and Neri Corsini, Bishop of Fiesole, to flee Florentine territory.[3] **The heavy fines and confiscations issued by the Signoria on prelates who left their posts,**[3] **the "most extensive liquidation of an ecclesiastical patrimony attempted anywhere in Europe before the Reformation," may have been motivated to pay for the increasingly expensive conflict.**[1] The total cost of the war for Florence would reach approximately 2.5 million florins.[9]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernardo_di_Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli

Bernardo di Niccolò Machiavelli (between 1426 and 1429-1500) was a citizen of Florence and father to Niccolò Machiavelli. Although **he was a Doctor of Law (hence, his title of *Messer*),** debts inherited from his father and uncles limiting his career prevented him from joining the legal guild. In the year 1480, Bernardo reported being unemployed on his tax return.[1]

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must, as is shown by all who have treated of civil government, and by examples of which history is full, assume that all men are bad, and will always, when they have free field, give loose to their evil inclinations; and that if these for a while remain hidden, it is owing to some secret cause, which, from our having no contrary experience, we do not recognize at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time, of whom we speak as the father of all truth.

In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the closest union prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that the nobles, laying aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to sympathize with the people as to have become supportable by all, even of the humblest rank. **This dissimulation remained undetected, and its causes concealed, while the Tarquins lived; for the nobles dreading the Tarquins, and fearing that the people, if they used them ill, might take part against them, treated them with kindness.** But no sooner were the Tarquins got rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of their fears, when they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom which before they had kept in their breasts, offending and insulting them in every way they could; **confirming what I have observed already, that men never behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to act as they please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once into confusion and disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty and hunger are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to make them good.**

https://freeread.com.au/@RGLibrary/FelixDahn/Julian-G-2.html#ch2

> Aber Spurius schüttelte den Kopf: »'s ist nicht nur das! Sie wissen recht gut, kommt es zum Krieg, Merowech wird auch von ihren Gauleuten zum Herzog gekoren, Merowech müssen auch sie dann folgen.«—»Jawohl«, rief Mälo schmerzlich, »das ist's!«—»Ja«, schloß Merowech: »Lieber dem Fremden, dem Römer dienen als dem Stammgenossen sich fügen auch nur ein weniges. Siehst du, Spurius, hörst du, Adgandester: **Das ist die eine Gefahr, die furchtbare, die unser Volk bedroht; der uralte Neid, die Eifersucht, die trotzige Selbstgenügsamkeit, die Unbotmäßigkeit.** Nicht in bald vier Jahrhunderten haben sie's gemerkt, daß diese Sinnesart sie alle miteinander zugrunde gerichtet. **Nur die Not, die Not gemeinsamen Krieges, kann sie heilen von dem Erblaster der zwieträchtigen Eifersucht.**«

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n291/mode/2up?view=theater

We also cannot accept the assertion that he was the first to realize what some people call the narrowness of the traditional condemnation of tyranny. This assertion is indeed confirmed rather than refuted by the fact that Machiavelli sometimes takes up what Aristotle said about the means for preserving tyranny; for, as soon as we consider the context, **we see that Aristotle treats tyranny as a monstrosity whereas Machiavelli rather deals with tyranny as essential to the foundation of society itself.**
...

Machiavelli's most emphatic attack on "all writers" is directed, not against the traditional condemnation of tyranny but against the traditional contempt for the multitude.218 **This may incline us to believe that he was the philosopher who originated the democratic tradition; the undeniably non-democratic character of classical political philosophy might thus seem to some extent to justify Machiavelli's revolt which, through Spinoza and Rousseau, led to democratic theory proper.** But just as in the case of tyranny, we must note here that the change in judgment is only a part of a comprehensive argument meant to lay bare the essential dependence of morality on society: the unmasking of the alleged aristocracy of the classics as oligarchy leads necessarily to a somewhat more favorable judgment on the common people, and the unmasking of the rule of men of moral worth is part of the destructive analysis of moral virtue. The result of that analysis can be stated as follows. **Moral virtue, wished for by society and required by it, is dependent on society and therefore subject to the primary needs of society. It does not consist in the proper order of the soul. It has no other source than the needs of society; it has no second and higher source in the needs of the mind.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, **which, as I have said, all writers are agreed to condemn,** I take upon me a task so hard and difficult that I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or pursue it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever shall judge it a fault, to support opinion by arguments, where it is not sought to impose them by violence or authority. **I maintain, then, that this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude, may with equal reason be charged against every individual man, but most of all against princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled multitude.** Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes existing, or who have existed, few indeed are or have been either wise or good.

I speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the reins by which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those kings who reigned in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that country was governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include those kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in our own times reign in France, which kingdom, more than any other whereof we have knowledge at the present day, is under the government of its laws.
...

Wherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the nature of princes, since both equally err when they can do so without regard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides those already given, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and of other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people.

I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that a people when they have the management of affairs are changeable, fickle, and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise than as they exist in individual princes; **so that were any to accuse both princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make exception in favour of princes is a mistake;** for a people in command, if it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a people.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cato%27s_Letters/Letter_119

If we now consider absolute monarchy, we shall find it grafted upon ingratitude, which is blended with the root of it. **Arbitrary princes cannot, dare not, be grateful to elevated merit, which by the tenour of their power they are obliged to dread.** They only consider their single selves, and their separate interest; and must cut off, for their own security, every man whose true glory may eclipse their false, and who draws away, in any degree, the thoughts and eyes of the people. If they have no magnanimity of their own, they hate or fear such as have; or if they are brave themselves, they will be jealous of those who are more so, or as much. The same may be said of every other virtue. **They may heap wealth upon buffoons, and confer dignities upon parasites; but celebrated virtue, conspicuous abilities, and signal services, are their eye-sores and certain aversion.**

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Heretics/Paganism_and_Mr_Lowes_Dickinson_p6.html

The weak point in the whole of Carlyle's case for aristocracy lies, indeed, in his most celebrated phrase. **Carlyle said that men were mostly fools. Christianity, with a surer and more reverent realism, says that they are all fools. This doctrine is sometimes called the doctrine of original sin. It may also be described as the doctrine of the equality of men.** But the essential point of it is merely this, that whatever primary and far-reaching moral dangers affect any man, affect all men. All men can be criminals, if tempted; all men can be heroes, if inspired. And this doctrine does away altogether with Carlyle's pathetic belief (or any one else's pathetic belief) in "the wise few." There are no wise few. **Every aristocracy that has ever existed has behaved, in all essential points, exactly like a small mob.**

https://web.archive.org/web/20120207131045/http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius2.htm

The Romans in time past imposed a grievous yoke upon the neck of the whole world, but yet a yoke that proved wholesome in the end, whereby barbarism was expelled from our minds, as the sun drives away darkness from our eyes. What had the Frenchmen, we ourselves, and the Germans been at this day if the light of that mighty empire had not shined upon us? Fierce, uncivil, delighting in slaughters betwixt ourselves and others, contemners of God and men. **Even so, I guess, it will come to pass with the new world which the Spaniards have wasted with a profitable severity, and themselves will shortly replenish again with people and inhabit it.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

And as to our present case **Machiavel** ***speaks very aptly;**** ***that*** **a Nation which hath cast off the yoke of Tyranny or Kingship, (*for in his language they are both the same thing*)** and newly obtained their Liberty, must look to have all those for Enemies, that were Familiars and Retainers to the King or Tyrant, who having lost their Preferments, will never rest, but seek all occasions to re-establish themselves upon the ruines of Liberty, and to aspire again unto a Tyranny; that exercising an arbitrary Power, they may take the more sharp Revenge, against all those that dare but pretend unto Liberty. ...

In our Country here, before the time that *Caesar*'s Tyranny tooke place, there was no such thing as *Monarchy:** For, the same *Caesar* tells us, how the *Britains* were divided into so many severall States; relates how *Cassevellanus* was, by the Common Councell of the Nation, elect in this their publique danger, to have the principall administration of the State, with the businesse of Warre: and afterward how the severall Cities sent their Hostages unto him. Whereby we perceive it was of old no *Monarchy,* but like to the *Gaules,* with whom it was then one also in Religion, divided into provincall Regiments;* without any entire rule or Combination; onely in case of common perill, by Invasion, &c. they were wont to chuse a Commander in Chief, much like the *Dictator* chosen by the *Romans* upon the

like occasion. **And now we see all the *Western* world (lately discovered) to be, and generally all other Countries are, *in puris naturalibus,* in their first and most innocent condition, setled in the same Form, before they come to be inslaved, either by some predominant power from abroad, or some one among Themselves more potent and ambitious than his Neighbors. And such was the State heretofore, not onely of our Nation, but of *Gaule, Spaine, Germany,* and all the West parts of *Europe,* before the *Romans* did by strength and cunning unlock their Liberties.** And such as were then termed *Kings,* were but as their *Generalls* in War, without any other great Jurisdiction.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA359#v=onepage&q&f=false

Machiavelli already foresees that his "new path" will require "unknown lands" comparable to the one discovered by Columbus, and the founding of a New Rome required by the international and multinational scope of Machiavelli's republican prescription. Hobbes's philosophy, by contrast, envisions politics as nothing but a mechanism for internal control, one in principle capable of limitless extension but bereft of the full-blooded patriotism, love of the earthly fatherland, and the exhilarating scope of imperial conquest and Elizabethan swashbuckling to which Machiavelli gives rise. This is why, as we consider in more detail in the Conclusion, a visionary of Atlanticist, Protestant republicanism like James Harrington – a project for commercial imperialism already underway in Tudor and Stuart mercantilism and exploding in the New World – could extol Machiavelli's republicanism while decrying Hobbes as an apologist for absolute monarchy without any sense of contradiction. **Hobbes is a successor of Machiavelli, but only of a narrow version of his thought.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA454#v=onepage&q&f=false

Yet whereas Machiavelli is troubled by the universal pacification that is the outcome of an "effectual" politics and regrets what is arguably its inevitability, Hobbes is an unqualified proponent of it – another symptom of his narrowing of Machiavelli's vibrant phenomenology of political existence to a mere set of authoritarian techniques. Hobbes is confident that men can be changed by his new psychology of power seeking, brought to trade in their dangerous ambitions for honor and glory in exchange for a guaranteed net gain in security and material well-being. **Although the Sovereign holds in reserve the emergency capacity to terrorize the contumacious, this is probably not (to amplify an earlier observation) Hobbes's preferred solution.** Indeed, the need for its constant use might prove that vainglorious ambition was not eradicable, calling into question Hobbes's core contention that the pursuit of honor is not strictly speaking or intrinsically a facet of human fulfillment at all, in contrast with what the classical political thinkers would have maintained. For Hobbes, the solid and lasting change in human conduct will come not primarily through terror and direct coercion, but through the steady and peaceable spread of "right reason," of enlightenment. Under the influence of the new psychology of appetitive desire, man will come to set aside martial strife and pride and, as Voltaire urged, to cultivate his garden. **When James Madison argues that the new American republic's checks and balances will allow "ambition to counter-act ambition," the Machiavellian surface of this observation is underlain by the Hobbesian premise that ambition will already have been largely channeled into the competition for success through the peaceful arts of commerce.** It is not that a Cato will counteract a Catiline but that a Bill Gates will counteract a Warren Buffet.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Of_Anger/Book_I#X.
>
> X. For this cause reason will never call to its aid blind and fierce impulses, over whom she herself possesses no authority, and which she never can restrain **save by setting against them similar and equally powerful passions, [nisi pares illis similisque opposuerit] as for example, fear against anger, anger against sloth, greed against timidity. May virtue never come to such a pass, that reason should fly for aid to vices!** The mind can find no safe repose there, it must needs be shaken and tempest-tossed if it be safe only because of its own defects, if it cannot be brave without anger, diligent without greed, quiet without fear: such is the despotism under which a man must live if he becomes the slave of a passion. **Are you not ashamed to put virtues under the patronage of vices? Then, too, reason ceases to have any power if she can do nothing without passion, and begins to be equal and like unto passion;** for what difference is there between them if passion without reason be as rash as reason without passion is helpless? **They are both on the same level, if one cannot exist without the other. Yet who could endure that passion should be made equal to reason? [Par utrumque est, ubi esse alterum sine altero non potest. Quis autem sustineat adfectum exaequare rationi?]**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA472#v=onepage&q&f=false

By denying the capacity of all varieties of honor seeking for moral or philosophical transcendence, Hobbes might at first blush appear to be more realistic than the ancients, given what we know from history and experience about how people really act when they claim to be motivated by honor – amply demonstrated, as Hobbes believed, by Thucydides' history of ancient Greece and by the political strife of his own England. **Yet Hobbes's reductionist account of honor seeking is for the ultimate purpose of suppressing or even eradicating honor seeking altogether. The notion that political ambition of the kind leading to empire and immortal glory could be extirpated from human beings arguably makes Hobbes ultimately much *more* optimistic than the ancients about the prospects for permanent peace** – optimistic to the point of being delusional himself, based on how people have actually acted since Hobbes's efforts to enlighten them about their own motive of self-preservation.

Hobbes's social contract requires that one honor-seeking man – the Sovereign – discipline his pleasures so as to crush methodically all the other proud ones. He can then allow the peaceable majority to prosper and live as they please in private life as long as they do not contest the Sovereign's absolute authority.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6wweBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT550#v=onepage&q&f=false

For all that he rejected Hobbes's general philosophy, Thomas Barlow's *The original of kingly and ecclesiastical government* (1681) could occasionally echo *Leviathan*. **Rubbishing the idea that there could be such a thing as a free state, or republic,** Barlow commented that 'I could find the word *Libertas*, fairly written over their Gates, but within their Walls the greatest Bondage and arbitrary power that could be possibly be imagined in any part of the world, but no Liberty at all that I could find, but only some few there were, who had liberty to do what they would with all the rest.' **The passage paraphrases Hobbes's disparaging remarks about Lucca in chapter 21 of *Leviathan*. Barlow's lesson is similarly Hobbesian in its anti-republicanism: when it comes to liberty, it is not self-government that matters, but rather the extent to which you are left alone.**195

> **Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, 11 November 1755 (archives.gov)**
>
> **Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.**9

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_393

Mankind is inclin'd to vice, and the way to virtue is so hard, that it wants encouragement; but when all honours, advantages and preferments are given to vice, and despised virtue finds no other reward than hatred, persecution, and death, there are few who will follow it.
…

The first fruit was such an entire degeneracy from all good, that Rome may be justly said never to have produced a brave man since the first age of her slavery. Germanicus and Corbulo were born *expirante libertate;*3 and the recompence they received did so little encourage others to follow their example, that none have been found in any degree like to them; and those of the most noble families applied themselves to sleep, laziness, and luxury, that they might not be suspected to be better than their masters. **Thrasea, Soranus, and Helvidius were worthy men, who resolved to persist in their integrity, tho they should die for it; but that was the only thing that made them eminent; for they were of unknown families, not Romans by birth, nor ever employ'd in war:** And those emperors who did arrive to any degree of virtue, were Spaniards, Gauls, Africans, Thracians, and of all nations, except Romans.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_1024

Those who have estates at a rack rent, have no dependents. Their tenants, when they have paid what is agreed, owe them nothing; and knowing they shall be turn'd out of their tenements, as soon as any other will give a little more, **they look upon their lords as men who receive more from them than they confer upon them. This dependence being lost, the lords have only more money to spend or lay up than others, but no command of men; and can therefore neither protect the weak, nor curb the insolent. By this means all things have been brought into the hands of the king and the commoners,** and there is nothing left to cement them, and to maintain the union. The perpetual jarrings we hear every day; the division of the nation into such factions as threaten us with ruin, and all the disorders that we see or fear, are the effects of this rupture. These things are not to be imputed to our original constitutions, but to those who have subverted them: **And if they who by corrupting, changing, enervating and annihilating the nobility, which was the principal support of the ancient regular monarchy, have driven those who are truly noblemen into the same interest and name with the commons,** and by that means increased a party which never was,

and I think never can be united to the court, they are to answer for the consequences; and if they perish, their destruction is from themselves.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm#linknoteref-336

> Though proscribed and a fugitive, [the Earl of Argyll] was still, in some sense, the most powerful subject in the British dominions. In wealth, even before his attainder, he was probably inferior, not only to the great English nobles, but to some of the opulent esquires of Kent and Norfolk. **But his patriarchal authority, an authority which no wealth could give and which no attainder could take away, made him, as a leader of an insurrection, truly formidable. No southern lord could feel any confidence that, if he ventured to resist the government, even his own gamekeepers and huntsmen would stand by him.** An Earl of Bedford, an Earl of Devonshire, could not engage to bring ten men into the field. Mac Callum More, penniless and deprived of his earldom, might at any moment raise a serious civil war. He had only to show himself on the coast of Lorn; and an army would, in a few days, gather round him.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/henderson-cato-a-tragedy-and-selected-essays#lf0714_head_035

> And here I cannot but take occasion to congratulate my country upon the increase of this happy tribe of men, since, by the wisdom of the present Parliament, **I find the race of Free-holders spreading into the remotest corners of the Island. I mean that Act which passed in the late Session for the encouragement of loyalty in *Scotland:*** by which it is provided, *That all and every Vassal and Vassals in* Scotland, *who shall continue peaceable, and in dutiful allegiance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, holding lands or tenements of any offender* [guilty of High-treason] *who holds such lands or tenements immediately of the Crown, shall be vested and seized, and are hereby enacted and ordained to hold the said lands or tenements of his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, in fee and heritage for ever, **by such manner of holding, as any such offender held such lands or tenements of the Crown,*** &c.6
>
> By this means it will be in the power of a Highlander to be at all times a good tenant, without being a rebel; and to deserve the character of a faithful servant, without thinking himself obliged to follow his Master to the gallows.
>
> How can we sufficiently extol the goodness of his present Majesty, who is not willing to have a single slave in his dominions!7 or enough to rejoice in the exercise of that loyalty, which, instead of betraying a man into the most ignominious servitude, (as it does in some of our neighbouring kingdoms) entitles him to the highest privileges of freedom and property! **It is now to be hoped, that we shall have few Vassals, but to the laws of our country.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The struggle with feudalistic powers was bloody. Slowly, persistent Legalist reforms took root. Aristocratic power dwindled as birthrights eroded and fiefs came under state laws. **Fief holders could not command troops without specific authority from the king. Theirs became “income fiefs,” mere sources of revenue that were helpless against the wrath of the state.**

https://archive.org/details/threelecturesde01kinggoog/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

> Historians will tell you how, as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, Henry IV. complained that the nobles were quitting their country districts; **how succeeding kings and statesmen, notably Richelieu and Louis XIV., tempted the noblesse up to Paris, that they might become mere courtiers, instead of powerful country gentlemen;** how those who remained behind were only the poor *hobereaux*, little hobby-hawks among the gentry, who considered it degradation to help in governing the parish, as their forefathers had governed it, and lived shabbily in their chateaux, grinding the last farthing out of their tenants, that they might spend it in town during the winter.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm#linknoteref-283

While he was excluded from the Court, from the Admiralty, and from the Council, and was in danger of being also excluded from the throne, only because he could not help believing in transubstantiation and in the authority of the see of Rome, **he made such rapid progress in the doctrines of toleration that he left Milton and Locke behind. What, he often said, could be more unjust, than to visit speculations with penalties which ought to be reserved for acts?** What more impolitic than to reject the services of good soldiers, seamen, lawyers, diplomatists, financiers, because they hold unsound opinions about the number of the sacraments or the pluripresence of saints? He learned by rote those commonplaces which all sects repeat so fluently when they are enduring oppression, and forget so easily when they are able to retaliate it. **But his zeal for the rights of conscience ended with the**

predominance of the Whig party. When fortune changed, when he was no longer afraid that others would persecute him, when he had it in his power to persecute others, his real propensities began to show themselves.
...

In England his authority, though great, was circumscribed by ancient and noble laws which even the Tories would not patiently have seen him infringe. Here he could not hurry Dissenters before military tribunals, or enjoy at Council the luxury of seeing them swoon in the boots. Here he could not drown young girls for refusing to take the abjuration, or shoot poor countrymen for doubting whether he was one of the elect. Yet even in England he continued to persecute the Puritans as far as his power extended, **till events which will hereafter be related induced him to form the design of uniting Puritans and Papists in a coalition for the humiliation and spoliation of the established Church.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

> Only radicals embraced *le tolérantisme*, then, as did Morelly, in 1751, with the added admonition that it should be regarded as an essentially political rather than theological construct, something which has to be imposed, against their wishes, on the churches and sustained by the secular authority.94 **For every church or sect in Europe which in his time endorsed toleration, he contended, would speak very differently were they not obliged by present circumstances to embrace that principle.**

http://www.jacobite.ca/documents/16870404.htm

We cannot but heartily wish, as it will easily be believed, that all the people of our dominions were members of the Catholic Church. **Yet we humbly thank Almighty God, it is and has of long time been our constant sense and opinion (which upon divers occasions we have declared) that conscience ought not to be constrained nor people forced in matters of mere religion;** it has ever been directly contrary to our inclination, as we think it is to the interest of government, which it destroys by spoiling trade, depopulating countries, and discouraging strangers, and finally, that it never obtained the end for which it was employed.
...

We do likewise declare, that it is our royal will and pleasure, that from henceforth the execution of all and all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical, **for not coming to church, or not receiving the Sacrament, or for any other nonconformity to the religion established, or for by reason of the exercise of religion in any manner whatsoever,** be immediately suspended; and the further execution of the said penal laws and every of them is hereby suspended.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1349/1349-h/1349-h.htm#link2HCH0018

From the Nonconformist point of view, Peter had very strong claims to be considered Antichrist. He had none of the staid, pious demeanour of the old Tsars, and showed no respect for many things which were venerated by the people. He ate, drank, and habitually associated with heretics, spoke their language, wore their costume, chose from among them his most intimate friends, and favoured them more than his own people. **Imagine the horror and commotion which would be produced among pious Catholics if the Pope should some day appear in the costume of the Grand Turk, and should choose Pashas as his chief counsellors!**
...

The Nonconformists were constantly convicted of political disaffection—especially of "insulting the Imperial Majesty"—and were accordingly flogged, tortured, and beheaded without mercy. But when Peter had succeeded in putting down all armed opposition, and found that the movement was no longer dangerous for the throne, he adopted a policy more in accordance with his personal character. Whether he had himself any religious belief whatever may be doubted; certainly he had not a spark of religious fanaticism in his nature. Exclusively occupied with secular concerns, **he took no interest in subtle questions of religious ceremonial,** and was profoundly indifferent as to how his subjects prayed and crossed themselves, provided they obeyed his orders in worldly matters and paid their taxes regularly. **As soon, therefore, as political considerations admitted of clemency, he stopped the persecutions,** and at last, in 1714, issued ukazes to the effect that all Dissenters might live unmolested, provided they inscribed themselves in the official registers and paid a double poll-tax. Somewhat later they were allowed to practise freely all their old rites and customs, on condition of paying certain fines.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n296/mode/2up?view=theater

The best thing the *Danes* ever did, was that of setting their Kings upon the same Foot as they now are. The Prince that sways the Scepter at present, exercises an Arbitrary Power with as much Equity as his Predecessor. Before their Government was reduc'd to this happy lay, the Kingdom was

overrun with factious Clubs and Civil Wars; the State and Society it self was all in disorder; **the Grandees crush'd the inferiour Subjects, and even the Kings themselves were oblig'd to stoop (if I may so speak) to the Laws of their Subjects. In a word, their Eyes being dazled with that Phantasm of Liberty, which by a treacherous lustre imposes upon several other Nations; they were thereby render'd Slaves to so many petty Kings, who acted like absolute Soveraigns without fearing the limited Power of their Monarchs.**
…

From hence it appears that this Monarch is convinc'd that Men of Honour will rather disserve their Religion than act counter to the Fidelity due to their Master: And to be plain with you, I believe the King is in the right of it: For since the Foundation of all Religion consists in the Fidelity we owe to God, to our Friend and to our Benefactor; nothing will be able to unhinge a Man of Honour, or to tempt him to act contrary to his Duty. I will not pretend to measure the actions of others by my own Standard; but for my own part, **I assure you if I had listed my self in the Service of the *Turks*, with the liberty of continuing Popish; and if Orders were issued forth for laying *Rome* in Ashes, I would be the first Man to set fire to it, in obedience to the *Grand Seignior*'s Orders.** But we have enough of that.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/116/mode/2up?view=theater

Even Bayle, whose doctrine of toleration was, in general, broader than Locke's, is extremely reticent when it comes to freedom of the press which, indeed, he nowhere seriously urges.107

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/336/mode/2up?view=theater

It was not owing to any moral, metaphysical, or theological justification but exclusively owing to his subservient attitude to the secular sovereign that Bayle finally leaves freedom of expression, and of the press, far more limited and vulnerable than do Spinoza and the professed radicals and concedes a mechanism for excluding atheists.24
…

The personal break between Jurieu and Bayle, the first aligning with the Orangist faction in Dutch politics and the latter with Paets and the States party, became irreparable in 1690, after Bayle – this time employing a more elaborate subterfuge to conceal his authorship – published (or colluded with the publication of) the *Avis important*, **a key political tract urging the Huguenots of the diaspora not to support William III's invasion of Britain or take up arms against their rightful and legitimate king, Louis XIV, which is precisely what Jurieu was urging them to do.**29

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_510
>
> After all, I am much inclined, for the honour of human nature, to believe, that all this doctrine concerning the divine right of kings was, at first, encouraged and cherished by many, from motives, mistaken certainly, but pardonable, and even laudable, and that it was intended not so much to introduce the tyranny of princes, as to form a barrier against the tyranny of priests.
> …
>
> It is not improbable, that, in this disagreeable predicament, the divine right of kings was considered as the only principle, which could be opposed to the claims of the papal throne; and as the only means, which could preserve the civil, from being swallowed by the ecclesiastical powers.
>
> This conjecture receives a degree of probability from a fact, which is mentioned in the history of France.
>
> **In a general assembly of the states of the kingdom, it was proposed to canonize this position—"that kings derive their authority immediately from God." That such a proposition was made in an assembly of the states, the most popular body known in the kingdom, will, no doubt, occasion surprise. This surprise will be increased, when it is mentioned, that the proposition was patronized by the most popular part of that assembly: it was the third estate, which wished to pass it into a law.** But every thing is naturally and easily accounted for, when it is mentioned further, that the principal object, which the third estate had in view by this measure, was to secure the sovereign authority from the detestable maxims of those, who made it depend upon the pope, by giving him a power of absolving subjects from their oath of allegiance, and authorizing those who assassinated their princes as hereticks.n

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/270/mode/2up?view=theater

If the Gospel maxim 'Contrains-les d'entrer' justifies in enforcing ecclesiastically sanctioned religious uniformity on their subjects, then it would be wholly inconsistent, declares Bayle, to deny ecclesiastics and common people the right, and also the obligation, to compel kings always to submit to the requirements of religion and the church. It is absurd, he insists, for theologians to maintain that Jesus Christ decrees coercion for ordinary individuals, and then refuse to allow that this applies also to kings, denying that 'l'Église ait droit de les déposer';37 and while Catholic apologists try to circumvent such blatant inconsistency by saying God expressly decrees that 'c'est par lui que les rois règnent,' in turbulent times, like the French Wars of Religion, this rule is routinely ignored. Nor, once it is established that individuals must be compelled to submit to theological requirements, argues Bayle, can there be the slightest prospect of political stability for anyone: **it is clear and necessary consequence of the position he seeks to refute, he contends, to spare neither crowned heads, 'ni rien qui soit au monde, quand il s'agit d'avancer la prospérité de la religion.'**38

> https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap49.htm#StateofItaly
>
> The modern champions of Rome are eager to accept the praise and the precedent: this great and glorious example of the deposition of royal heretics is celebrated by the cardinals Baronius and Bellarmine; (27) **and if they are asked, why the same thunders were not hurled against the Neros and Julians of antiquity, they reply, that the weakness of the primitive church was the sole cause of her patient loyalty.** (28)
>
> > 28. *Quod si Christiani olim non deposuerunt Neronem aut Julianum,* ***id fuit quia deerant vires temporales Christianis,*** (honest Bellarmine, de Rom. Pont. l. v. c. 7.)
> >
> > **Cardinal Perron adds a distinction more honourable to the first Christians, but not more satisfactory to modern princes**—the *treason* of heretics and apostates, who break their oath, belie their coin, and renounce their allegiance to Christ and his vicar (Perroniana, p. 89.).
>
> https://archive.org/details/theprovinciallet00pasciala/page/290/mode/2up?ref=ol&view=theater
>
> "But, sir, what then becomes of what Father Petau2 himself is obliged to own, in the preface to his Public Penance, 'that the holy fathers, doctors, and councils of the Church agree in holding it as a settled point, that the penance preparatory to the eucharist must be genuine, constant, resolute, and not languid and sluggish, or subject to after-thoughts and relapses?'"
>
> "Don't you observe," replied the monk, **"that Father Petau is speaking of the *ancient Church?* But all that is now *so little in season*, to use a common saying of our doctors, that, according to Father Bauny, the reverse is the only true view of the matter.**

…

Rather like the Arminians and Socinians he professes to scorn, but totally unlike the orthodox Calvinists he claims to align with, Bayle entirely rejects the common assumption that plurality of sects endangers the body politic, maintaining that society actually becomes less divisive thereby and more stable. If plurality of creeds often foments strife this occurs because each church refuses to countenance the others and seeks to impose its doctrine by force: in a word discord and conflict 'vient non pas de la tolerance, mais de la non-tolérance.'39 **Where Bayle especially differs from Locke, Le Clerc, and the Remonstrants, and indeed also Montesquieu, is in his contention that all organized churches persecute when they can and, hence, that toleration must and can only be a political construct enforced by the secularized state. Toleration, consequently, always finds itself pitted against popular opinion which Bayle deems irredeemably theological and hence inherently intolerant.**

…

In his *Défense de L'Esprit des lois* (1750), directly contradicting Bayle's thesis that a genuinely Christian society surrounded by non-Christian or insincerely Christian neighbours would not be viable, indeed, being politically and militarily weakened by its Christian ethic, would eventually be overwhelmed, Montesquieu contends that the *principes de christianisme* (a term of Le Clerc's) would, on the contrary, prove more viable and ultimately stronger than the mere worldly moralities of non-Christian republics and monarchies.43

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n863/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **In your writings beware of falling into an error similar to that of a celebrated author, who thinks he is serving the cause of monarchy when describing religion as a fruitless ally. How is it possible that he should not better feel the consequences of that sarcastic sentence borrowed from Bayle and Rousseau,** he who, in the midst of the most pressing and most apposite exhortations to princes to unite and combine against Jacobinism, forgets himself so

> far as to say, “In a similar crisis, the Romans would have flown to arms resolved to conquer or die, *the primitive Christians would have sung hymns to Providence and rushed to martyrdom*; their successors neither die nor fight.”3

…

Quintessentially Baylean is his claim that sovereigns need unlimited authority in the practical sphere of action, to curb crime and suppress those who harass their neighbours and destroy public peace ‘où chacun doit être sous la majesté des lois,’ while simultaneously proclaiming the sovereign’s total lack of legitimate sway in the sphere of private conscience, morality, and belief.48 Here indeed is the problematic crux on which Bayle’s political thought hinges. For if some features of his system evince radical traits – especially his sweeping toleration, subordination of theology to philosophy, and deployment of atheism – his insistence on the need for unrestricted monarchy in the public sphere, with a free hand to suppress all disorder, unruliness, and opposition, at first sight look far more Hobbesian than radical.49

…

Bayle *does* admittedly consider unrestricted monarchy the safest and most reliable form of political organization and shows no interest at all, unlike Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu, in devising, or even acknowledging the need for, institutionalized constitutional constraints on monarchical power. Indeed, where Montesquieu felt a deep aversion to Louis XIV’s policy of crippling or eliminating ‘intermediary powers,’ like the *parlements* and the remaining French provincial estates, Bayle was positively averse to schemes for applying limits to royal authority.50 Yet he was not an opponent, as Jurieu maintained, of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ as such. If he was not, like Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu, an enthusiast for the post-Glorious Revolution ‘British model,’ he nonetheless demonstrated his loyalty to the States General and William III and did not criticize the Dutch intervention in Britain as distinct from the Huguenot resort to arms against Louis XIV. **Indeed, though not unsympathetic to (the tolerant) James II,**51 **his remarks about ‘suppositious’ royal heirs in the article on François I of France in the *Dictionnaire* damaged the Jacobite cause.** For Bayle was no conventional champion of ‘l’absolutisme monarchique’;52 in particular, he was never a stickler for the hereditary principle, much less ‘divine right’ or social hierarchy.53

Rather Bayle dreads the disruptive consequences of ‘constitutions de gouvernement,’ **fearing that division of legislative power ‘entre un prince et un corps de juges’ only hinders firm government and obstructs law-making, with judges constantly thwarting what the sovereign intends.** He repeatedly cites the disastrous consequences of the French *parlements*’ interventions during the Wars of Religion when judges and office-holders sought to curtail royal authority, manipulate administration of justice, and block royal edicts.54 Denying the *parlements* should form a constitutional check on royal power, and supporting absolutist steps to reduce their powers, **Bayle argued that France had never, before or since, been so sunk in disorder and anarchy as during the reigns of Charles IX and Henri III when the crown was, for a time, effectively subjected to constitutional restraints.**55

Bayle’s absolutism, unlike the clerically sanctioned variety propagated at the courts of Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, and Vienna, was thus a purely secular, essentially Bodinian, construct devoid of confessional content.

…

Monarchy, holds Bayle, should be absolute but only in what he deems the public sphere. His absolutism encompasses no right to invade the private world of conscience, belief, thought, individual property, or personal lifestyle, is purely functional rather than legitimist, and has no relevance to the sphere of established republics like the United Provinces, Genoa, Lucca, or Venice. **For what Bayle is really urging is not monarchical absolutism *per se* but the undivided sovereignty and supremacy of the secular state,** however constituted, over lesser authorities, factions, and especially (but not only) all types of brigandage, lawlessness, factionalism, aristocratic influence, and ecclesiastical power.57

…

Even so, he judges republics and republicanism inadvisable in the main.59 While a republican constitution like that of the Dutch or Venetians can function well in a particular context, and remain stable, he seriously doubts, like Montesquieu later, whether republican governments can attain more generally the orderliness and freedom from faction requisite for stability. **Here, for once, agreeing with Le Clerc, who thought the ancient republics or Athens and Rome offer no useful model to posterity, Bayle deems self-rule by the people in principle no better, and usually worse, than the sway of an absolute monarch.**60

The ancient Greek democratic republics Bayle, like Hobbes, reckoned a disaster, though this was less the fault of the Greeks, in his view, than democracy as such.61 **In his *Dictionnaire* article on Julius Caesar’s assassin Marcus Junius Brutus, ‘le plus grand républicain que l’on vit jamais,’ Bayle agrees with Dio Cassius that experience shows monarchy to be preferable to democratic**

government, classical history proving that cities and individuals encounter fewer difficulties and adversities 'sous l'authorité d'un seul, que sous le gouvernement populaire.' **Although a few societies have prospered under a democratic government, he adds, that was only until they gained a certain 'point de grandeur, et de puissance,' after which they invariably sank into internecine conflict and chaos owing to envy, faction, and ambition.** Once Rome's power attained a certain point it became impossible that her inhabitants should not abandon the bridle on their greed and passions 'au milieu de la liberté républicaine.'62

Where Montesquieu's political ideal was that of limited monarchy, Bayle was less a defender of monarchical absolutism in the usual sense, and still less of 'divine right,' than a supporter of unified, undivided, and uncompromisingly secular sovereignty, preferably monarchical, but, where it works, also republican.63 **This might still seem to leave him without radical credentials in politics beyond toleration and individual liberty. But there is a further dimension to his radicalism:** for unlike Montesquieu, but like Vico contemplating the *conditio humana* from the standpoint of Naples' unruly history, Bayle sees monarchy as more than just the safest path to a secure and orderly existence for subjects, the highest political good. He envisages it also as the aptest way to establish equality before the law and eliminate privilege, baronial factionalism, and society's disruption by nobles. **In Bayle, like Vico, absolutism becomes a levelling instrument invaluable for eradicating factional, aristocratic, and especially ecclesiastical interference with legislation, administration, and enforcement of the laws. It is for this reason especially that mixed monarchy could hold no attraction for him.**

Monarchy then, is esteemed by Bayle partly as a tool for disarming noble factions which he, like Vico, considers incorrigibly ambitious, antisocial, and violent. To demonstrate how easily constitutional limits on monarchy can be ruinously exploited, at the expense of everyone else (but the dominant clergy), by a powerfully entrenched nobility, or corrupt legal aristocracy, to further ther own power and privileges, Bayle (like Vico and de Hooghe) cites the case of Poland, Europe's most dismal fiasco, to his mind, where the nobility, through opposing royal authority, had virtually emasculated the state and its institutions. What could be more appalling or despicable, he asks, than the demise of a formerly flourishing haven of coexistence and toleration through noble arrogance allied with ecclesiastical ambition and popular credulity, manipulating intolerance and office-holders' negligence?64

Bayle, then, offers nothing whatever of that partiality for nobility, or checks, limiting agencies, and intermediary institutions, so typical of Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu. Quite the contrary, Bayle deems all hierarchical privilege and priority, noble, ecclesiastical, or judicial, a constant menace to both individual liberty and everyone's tranquillity.65
…

Bayle, much as he resists all theological involvement in government, denies any right of any segment of society to oppose the ruler in the name of popular sovereignty.67 The least suggestion of popular participation fills him with dread, the people in his eyes being irretrievably sunk in superstition – and hence devoid of rationality. In his politics, the menace of insurrection, demagoguery, and fanaticism always outweigh that of tyranny, being ineradicably rooted in subservience to theological notions: **what would have happened to Europe in the sixteenth century, he asks rhetorically, if the fanatic Munzer 'eût pu gagner deux batailles?'**68
…

Where Spinoza's philosophy teaches democratic republicanism, and the core radical tradition in the eighteenth century was firmly republican and democratic, especially after 1750, explicitly in Mably, Morelly, and Boulanger, and in Diderot at least in underlying tendency, Bayle rejects democratic republicanism as a plausible option because he thinks the common people, for all the efforts of philosophers, can never be emancipated from the sway of credulity or subservience to religious demagogues. While he envisaged philosophy – as the project of the *Dictionnaire* proclaims – as the chief engine of 'enlightenment' and our best hope if men are ever to be freed from the tyranny of superstition, and hence be civilized and humanized, **he evinces nevertheless unmitigated pessimism regarding the 'multitude.'**69 The deep emotion he invests in the quarrels over *consensus gentium* and whether idolatrous paganism is worse than 'atheism' was rooted ultimately in his insuperable abhorrence of popular zeal as 'une peste très-dangereuse aux societez.'70

Constitutional doctrines locating sovereignty in the people, and proclaiming the people's right to resist tyrannical kings, like those of the *Monarchomachi*, **strike Bayle as serving no purpose other than encouraging malcontent nobles and clergy to scheme,** plot rebellion, and take up arms against kings. **Such doctrines, he thinks, foment a basically theological view of politics.**71 What he conceives as the people's ingrained proneness to be manipulated by nobles, churchmen, magistrates, or demagogues urging the dictates of religion emerges with brutal clarity in the article on 'Loyola' in the *Dictionnaire* where he stresses the need to counter what he sees as a constant peril. **In France, it was especially the Jesuits, in his view, who proclaim the notion that royal authority 'est inférieure à**

celle du people' and that kings may justifiably be deposed by the people where they, or rather their religious instructors, consider this necessary.72

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

Contrary to Roche, Lilti, Citton, Negri, and here also Borghero, "Spinozism" *was* broadly coherent and meaningful as a concept and tradition, albeit not infrequently detached from Spinoza's political and social thought so that, in practice, one could, **like Boulainvilliers, La Mettrie, or Goethe,** be a "Spinozist" in important respects, and in Boulainvilliers' case a key figure of the clandestine literature, without strictly being part of the Radical Enlightenment at all. **Laurent Bove is very likely correct in arguing that Boulainvilliers' "spinozisme" was confined to his attack on religion, and not reflected in his political and social writing to the extent I earlier suggested;** still, this does not obviate the main reason for including Boulainvilliers as a notable contributor to the rise of the Radical Enlightenment given his pivotal role as an underground transmitter of Spinozist texts and concepts in France.45

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/282/mode/2up?view=theater

Cultivating the right attitudes and *moeurs* enabled the French monarchy to flourish during the Middle Ages, which he conceived as a kind of golden age, **prompting Voltaire later to ridicule him for portraying French feudalism as 'le chef-d'oeuvre de l'esprit humain.'**105 Since the late fifteenth century (i.e. the reign of Louis XI), however, a combination of adverse developments, argues Boulainvilliers, had lowered the standing and prestige of the *noblesse*. In the sixteenth century, Italian influence had further sapped French aristocratic values, by introducing deplorable courtly servility and flattery, effeminate refinement, and also the study of Greek political literature. **Since Frenchmen dwelt in a monarchy completely opposed 'à l'esprit républicain et aux maximes des Grecs et des anciens Romains,'**106 **there was, he claims (echoing Hobbes), much that was highly damaging in the elite being educated in Latin and Greek texts. His antipathy to what today we call the Renaissance extended also to Machiavelli, a theorist less of republicanism, in his view, than of base tyranny and moral irresponsibility.**107

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02713a.htm

Now, what caused Frenchmen or nobles to be dispossessed of their rights? **First, the Crusades. To defray the expenses of these expeditions many noblemen either mortgaged or sold their fees and wealthy plebeians,** who were not noble, but, according to Boulainvilliers, "ignoble", thus became the owners of fees and, by introducing themselves into the nobility, corrupted it. Next came the ignorance of the lords or owners. **The ignorance and negligence of the lords rendering them generally incompetent to discharge the functions that rightfully belonged to them, the principal of which was to dispense justice in their fees, they soon transferred all their judicial authority to clerks or jurists.** Thanks to the dignity of their role, these clerks or jurists soon became as important as the lords and thus originated the *noblesse de la robe* (nobility of the long robe) which Boulainvilliers considers a monstrosity.

Finally came the policy of the Capetian Kings which Boulainvilliers regards as chiefly instrumental in ruining feudalism and therefore the French nation. This policy consisted in adding the great fees to the royal domain by reason of conquest, purchase, or marriage, with the result that the Kings of France assumed an importance theretofore unknown to them, and which soon became entirely disproportionate; **while the lords, fascinated by the brilliancy of the royal courts, instead of remaining the peers of these kings, became their servants.** The kings diminished the power of the French nobles still more by favouring the emancipation of the communes and raising to the ranks of the nobility plebeians whom they entrusted with high offices to which they had no right. **Moreover, they admitted to seats in the States General, which should have been composed exclusively of representatives of the French, delegates from among the lower clergy and liberated serfs,** and of course this arbitrary measure completed the overthrow of the nobility. Such then, is the teaching set forth in Boulainvilliers's three most important works: 'Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement de France", "Lettres sur les parlements ou Etats-Généraux", and "Essais sur la noblesse" which, taken as a whole, constitute an earnest plea for feudalism against monarchism. These works written by Boulainvilliers for his grandchildren, did not appear until after his death.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=VJ1WDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false

Long before Rousseau's *First Discourse*, and long before the rise of the sentimental novel in the 1740s, Henri de Boulainvilliers placed a premium on authenticity. Like other noble reformers associated with the Burgundy circle – the group of advisors who, until 1712, sought to prepare the ill-fated Duke of Burgundy to take over as monarch one day – **Boulainvilliers was motivated by a strong distaste for the posturing, artificiality, and calculating ambition that characterized the "court society" of Louis XIV** (here the phrase court society is employed in the way intended by Norbert Elias, referring not only to the gilded halls of Versailles proper but to the competitive quest for status that marked relations between all who were in or near elite circles in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.)3 **The proliferation of what Boulainvilliers took to be false markers of**

status implanted in this proud Norman an obsession with unmasking impostors. The determination to separate the true from the false nobles led to a critique of modern social hierarchies that was central to his attack on despotism.
…

“At the start,” Boulainvilliers observed in the *History of the Former Government of France* that he wrote between 1709 and 1711, “the Franks were all free and perfectly equal and independent.”8 He noted that all mature males carried arms in anticipation of the next battle, and this rough warrior equality shaped the political structure of the Frankish people, since these “lovers of liberty” took for granted their right to elect their kings and thereby “avoid oppression.”9

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Fr%C3%A9ret,_Nicolas
>
> FRÉRET, NICOLAS (1688-1749), French scholar, was born at Paris on the 15th of February 1688. His father was *procureur* to the parlement of Paris, and destined him to the profession of the law.
> …
>
> He was hardly twenty-six years of age when he was admitted as pupil to the Academy of Inscriptions. One of the first memoirs which he read was a learned and critical discourse, *Sur l’origine des Francs* (1714). **He maintained that the Franks were a league of South German tribes and not, according to the legend then almost universally received, a nation of free men deriving from Greece or Troy, who had kept their civilization intact in the heart of a barbarous country. These sensible views excited great indignation in the Abbé Vertot, who denounced Fréret to the government as a libeller of the monarchy.** A *lettre de cachet* was issued, and Fréret was sent to the Bastille.

…

When service ceased to be a personal duty and feudal levies were supplemented or supplanted by mercenaries and commoners, noble status came to be regarded as the equivalent of “exemption from the *taille*.” Social superiority, in other words, was only the expression of a legal privilege granted and guaranteed by the crown, and not a signifier of inborn qualities or innate moral rectitude.19
…

A turning point had come with the Italian wars and the introduction of Italian manners at the royal court which, “under the pretext of a greater politeness,” led French nobles to abandon many of their ancient customs – keeping their heads proudly covered even in the presence of the king, for example – and to become “great imitators” of the Italians.22 Then, in the course of the reign of Francis I, “the magnificence of dress, buildings, homes, [and] retinue, gave France a new face.” Nobles left the countryside and “struggled in every which way to win the favor of kings or those who surrounded them.” **An essential merit grounded in distinguished birth was no longer sufficient to ensure the success of the young noble scion. It now became necessary to add “charm, and next came accommodation, which soon degenerated into servility and the loss of self [*oubly de soy mesme*].”** Bending to the new if generally unspoken requirements of courtly protocol, the nobility had “embraced the shadows of court and favor and forgotten its true dignity.”23 The reigns of Henry II and Henry III “were the reigns of favorites, that is to say, of factions and of artifice.”24 Building on the precedent of Francis I, who had introduced the sale of offices to help pay for his wars, his successors created new ennobling offices to sell, and distributed letters of ennoblement to “an infinity of families” that were wealthy and happy for the chance to raise themselves above the common herd.25

Boulainvilliers considered it no accident that it was also in the sixteenth century, at the time of the Estates-General meeting of 1576, that princes of the blood were accorded a special place, elevated above the rest of the nobility by virtue of their placement in the line of royal succession.26 Cultivating a thirst for rank and distinction, and multiplying the means for claiming such distinctions, had been a divide-and-conquer technique of government used by kings since the late fifteenth century. Already they had erected “duchies and peerages to satisfy the most wealthy and favored courtiers, with no attention given to their birth.” New orders of chivalry had also been founded – first the Order of St. Michael under Louis XI in 1469, then the Order of the Holy Ghost under Henry III in 1578 – and a range of offices were created, all for the purpose of “dividing the nobility and lowering it [in importance] beneath courtly favors.” As a result of these developments, Boulainvilliers lamented, “the title of gentleman [*gentilhomme*] has been debased, so much so that it is the least praiseworthy title currently in use among us.” The creation of “offices of governor, lieutenant general, and an infinity of other posts of all sorts, **all proceeding alongside the sale of nobility of which has, over the past hundred years, assimilated twenty thousand commoner families into the nobility, without even counting those who have acquired the status through the possession of certain positions in the judiciary or the chancelleries,** all of this, I say, has increasingly diminished and confused the ancient nobility, leaving it no real grandeur except through the power of the sovereign, who confers dignities, or through money without which virtue has no standing.”27 Ever since the sixteenth century,

“history has shown us nothing but extreme confusion among all the members of the state,” and the chief beneficiary of this confusion had been **a monarchy that – <u>like that of the Turks</u> – used the unregulated mixing of the blood and status of its subjects to extend its authority and undercut any opposition to its designs.**28

> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A32922.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> And again, when ever the King shall please to take his Progresse into the Country, let him so contrive his *Gists,* as that He may lye upon these Barons; and so under the pretext of doing them Honour, may force them to be at a great charge in entertaining Him. **Let Him give a willing ear to the People, when they make any complaints of them.** Neither ought *Nobility* to be higher prized by the King, then *Virtue;* which is a Rule that deserves to be observed above all the rest. Besides, in all the Metropolian Cities in his several Kingdomes, as at *Lisbon, Toledo, Antwerp,* and the rest, as well in this, as in the other Hemisphere, **the King under pretext of doing them honours may constitute, in each of them, five, eight, or ten Ranks, or Orders of Barons; such as are at *Naples*;** that when they are to treat of any Affairs of State, each of them may go into his own Order and Place. **For being thus divided, they will never be able to determine any thing that shall be Prejudicial to the King,** by reason of the Ambition that will be amongst them, and so, where there shall be three Lawes perhaps made, to the Kings prejudice, there will alwaies be eight made for his advantage. **<u>And the common People also may in like manner, be distributed into their several *Classes* and Ranks.</u> And this is much the more honourable, and secure way, then to cause divisions, and sidings into parties among them, which is the counsel of some Writers, who have a Saying, *Divide, & impera*: Cause Divisions among thy subjects, and thou shalt rule them well enough.**

…

“Thus one attacked the nobility by the head, by establishing, in violation of ancient usage, distinctions and ranks for those who were richest or who were allied with or related to kings. And thus one attacked the nobility by the tail, by securing entry into it for popular families [that is, common families] lately risen from servitude.”30

…

This concern for the nature of the hierarchy constructed *within* the nobility explains many of Boulainvilliers’s obsessions in the first years of the eighteenth century. Louis XIV’s legitimization of his bastard children and the anxieties this aroused among princes and other titled nobles; the new pretensions of the parlements in the wake of the establishment of the Regency government, which the parlement of Paris had validated by rescinding the late king’s last will and testament; the “affaire du bonnet” that pitted magistrates of the parlements against the dukes and peers of the realm, who claimed that the judges should doff their caps to them in a sign of deference whenever they asked their opinions and counsel in *lit de justice* ceremonies; the continuing sale of ennobling offices and letters of nobility during the financially ruinous War of the Spanish Succession; for Boulainvilliers, all of these controversies involved the unauthorized fabrication of “masks of virtue” – artificial strata of nobility – that resulted in “iniquity and injustice” for the nation as a whole.31 The proliferation of legal titles and distinctions that came from royal favor or caprice or money amounted to nothing more than a set of “accidental dignities” whose existence had nearly suffocated the qualities of soul that characterized the originally free and independent Franks. **“True and incommunicable nobility” – that simple but natural distinction that came from the ancient nobility’s rights of birth – “subsists always,” but pride in the shared equality that arose from inborn distinction had to be rekindled if the nation was to have any chance to turn back the tide of despotism.**32

…

Repeating one of the central arguments of Boulainvilliers, Alès de Corbet insisted that nobility existed independent of any “positive law” and that monarchs lacked the authority to create new nobles.33 **Tellingly, however, both the abbé, in his *Letters on the origin of the French Nobility*, and Alès de Corbet, in his *Origin of the French Nobility*, emphasized the dignity and value of all subjects of the French crown – whether noble or common.**

…

Alès de Corbet, more consistent with the vision of Boulainvilliers, sought to preserve distinctions that rightfully belonged to the nobility alone. He too, however, eagerly affirmed the worth of those outside the nobility. **“<u>I am far from regarding other citizens as having descended from vile blood, still soiled, so to speak, by the legacy of slavery.</u> … I wish to demonstrate [in this history] that a great number of families, not only among the high bourgeoisie but even among the lower sort, have enjoyed the advantages of liberty since time immemorial, and that several shared with the most illustrious families the honor of having shared the blood not only of Roman and Gaulish nobles but even that of the brave Franks, their conquerors.”**36

…

Alès de Corbet wanted to affirm more than the legal and historical reality of status differences, however. He placed great emphasis on the moral value and the moral function of such status differences, which, he

acknowledged, arose against a background of natural equality between men. **(He even quoted Rousseau at length on natural equality and its corollary – the inevitable development of social inequalities.)**43 His main point about the establishment of inequalities, one resonant with the political currents of the 1760s, was that noble status had always reflected and must continue to reflect the collective will of the people. **Status must follow, but never precede, a reputation for glorious actions and generous inclinations. (In this respect, Alès de Corbet was no less insistent than Mignot de Bussy that aristocracy must have a meritocratic basis, with the key merits embedded in the family lineage through the force of habit.)** Because of the people's role in ensuring the legitimacy of noble status, Alès de Corbet, like Boulainvilliers before him, contested the monarchy's claim that it had the authority to create nobles and to grant nobility in exchange for money or the promise of future services. **True nobility is created only when moral qualities have become such an unconscious habit in some families that the posterity of those families comes to be recognized, respected, and honored by their fellow citizens.**
…

Alès de Corbet envisioned a nobility whose existence, and whose privileges, would be accepted and remain consonant with "public opinion" **(in this argument one hears an echo of Boulainvilliers's assertion that royal authority among the early Franks only subsisted with the continued support of the nation assembled on the Champ de Mars).**
…

"Ennoblement thus happens to men already distinguished by their virtue and brilliant actions; at that moment the Prince, who is nothing more than the organ of the public's voice, moves to ensure that their posterity will enjoy both the privileges and the consideration due to nobility."45
…

By the time Alès de Corbet wrote his "Origins of the French Nobility" in 1766, in other words, the cultural, intellectual, and political climate of France was far different from that prevailing under the waning years of Louis XIV. Boulainvilliers's early eighteenth-century dream of mitigating royal despotism through the mechanism of a revitalized and newly self-conscious nobility had largely faded from view. Talk of rights and liberties and of the history of the French nation resonated in circles much wider and more socially heterogeneous than those Boulainvilliers had addressed.
…

As is well known, between the meeting of the Assembly of Notables in February 1787, and the late summer of 1788, prominent nobles had taken the lead in the fight against Louis XVI's "ministerial despotism." In resisting the broad reform agendas of first Calonne and then Brienne, and in calling on the king to convene an Estates-General, nobles had effectively performed, whether by design or by force of circumstance, the role assigned to them in the political imaginations of both Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu – the role of bulwark against despotism. In so doing, they had earned a certain amount of good will in the process. **But when representatives and self-appointed spokespersons for the second estate made the fateful decision to defend corporate prerogatives while they simultaneously championed the nation's rights in the fall of 1788, a newly politicized public seized on this apparent contradiction as a sign of fecklessness and insincerity and moved opinion decisively against the corporate claims of the second estate.**49 The reaction inspired by the intransigence of prominent aristocrats – a reaction that included the abbé Sieyès's influential *What is the Third Estate?* – set the stage for the Third Estate's final appropriation of power in the spring of 1789.
…

The engineer, essayist, and devoted Jacobin Jacques-Antoine Dulaure would later crystallize this key contradiction within aristocratic thinking by using imagery that evoked the Frankish fantasies of Boulainvilliers himself. **In his *Critical History of the Nobility* in 1790, written in the wake of the abolition of nobility in June of that year, Dulaure observed that the very existence of hereditary nobility represented a "crime against the rights of that part of the nation deprived of it." Hereditary nobility, he wrote scathingly, had emerged from a "cesspool of darkness and horrors" that characterized the "barbarous centuries" that followed the fall of Rome, a time of "blindness and violence."** Thankfully, he added in the afterglow of the nobility's legal abolition, all citizens now recognized that "equality of rights [constitutes] the strength and honor of any government," and hereditary privilege is "the source of every problem."52

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n211/mode/2up?view=theater

In this fashion, to use the well-known phrase of the jurisconsult Pomponius, "things themselves dictating it, kingdoms were founded" (*rebus ipsis dictantibus, regna condita*), **a phrase in keeping with the doctrine of Roman law which declares that the natural law of nations was established by divine**

providence (*ius naturale gentium divina providentia constitutum*). Such was the generation of the heroic kingdoms. And since the fathers were sovereign kings of their families, the equality of their state and the fierce nature of the Cyclopes being such that no one of them naturally would yield to another, **there sprang up of themselves the reigning senates, made up of so many family kings.** These, without any human discernment or counsel, were found to have united their private interests in a common interest called *patria*, which, the word *res* being understood, means "the interest of the fathers."
...

585 Evidence that the first kings on earth were of this nature is afforded by the fact that the heroic poets imagined Jove in heaven to have just such kingship over men and gods, as is shown by that golden passage in Homer where Jove explains to Thetis **that he can do nothing contrary to what the gods have once determined in their great celestial council. Here speaks a true aristocratic king. On this episode the Stoics later erected their dogma of a Jove subject to fate, but in fact Jove and the other gods held council concerning the affairs of men and freely determined them.**
...

And among all human possibilities, once we have seen that civil governments were not born either of fraud or of the violence of a single man (as we have already shown and shall show more fully later), **one cannot imagine any way but the one we have described by which civil power could emerge from family authority, or the eminent domain of civil states from the paternal natural domains** (which, as we have indicated above, were *ex iure optimo* in the sense of being free of every private or public encumbrance).

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater

Solon, however, had admonished the plebeians to reflect upon themselves and to realize that they were of like human nature with the nobles and should therefore be made equal with them in civil rights. Unless, indeed, Solon was [a poetic character for] the Athenian plebeians themselves, considered under this aspect [of knowing themselves and demanding their rights].

415 The ancient Romans must also have had such a Solon among them. For the plebeians in the heroic struggles with the nobles, as ancient Roman history openly tells us, kept saying that the fathers of whom Romulus had composed the Senate (and from whom these patricians were descended) *non esse caelo demissos*; that is, that they did not have that divine origin of which they boasted, **and that Jove was equal [just] to all. This is the civil history of the expression, *Iupiter omnibus aequus*, into which the learned later read the tenet that all minds are equal and that the differences they take on arise from differences in the organization of their bodies and in their civil education. By this reflection the Roman plebeians began to achieve equality with the patricians in civil liberty, until they entirely changed the Roman commonwealth from an aristocratic to a popular form.**

> https://topostext.org/work/548
>
> § 2.326 FERUS IVPPITER summae necessitatis est, cum etiam sacerdos in convicia ruit deorum: quod servat Vergilius ne umquam tradat Aeneae. **'ferus' autem invidiose dictum est, et ad tempus epitheton: nam Iuppiter aequus est omnibus, ut "rex Iuppiter omnibus idem".** hinc et paulo post "ipse deos in Dardana suscitat arma", hoc est qui aequalis esse consuevit.

...

416 **Hence Solon was made the author of that celebrated saying, "Know thyself," which, because of the great civil utility it had had for the Athenian people, was inscribed in all the public places of the city.** Later the learned preferred to regard it as having been intended for what it is, a great counsel respecting metaphysical and moral things, and because of it Solon was reputed a sage in esoteric wisdom and made prince of the Seven Sages of Greece. In this way, **because from this reflection there sprang up at Athens all the orders and laws that shape a democratic commonwealth,** and because of the first peoples' habit of thinking in poetic characters, these orders and laws were all attributed by the Athenians to Solon, just as, by the Egyptians, all inventions useful to human civil life were attributed to Hermes Trismegistus.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n327/mode/2up?view=theater

THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS

925 The first were divine, or, as the Greeks would say, theocratic, in which men believed that everything was commanded by the gods. This was the age of oracles, which are the earliest thing we read of in history.

926 The second were heroic or aristocratic governments, which is as much as to say governments of the optimates in the sense of the most powerful. In Greek they were called governments of Heraclids (men sprung from the race of Hercules), in the sense of nobles; these were scattered throughout early Greece, and survived at Sparta. They were also called governments of Curetes, which the Greeks found scattered in Saturnia (ancient Italy), Crete and Asia; and hence governments of Quirites among the Romans, that is of armed priests in public assembly. In governments of this kind, **in virtue of the distinction of a nobler nature ascribed to divine origin, as we have noted above, all civil rights were confined to the ruling orders of the heroes themselves, and the plebeians, being considered of bestial origin, were only permitted to enjoy life and natural liberty.**

927 The third are human governments, in which, **in virtue of the equality of the intelligent nature which is the proper nature of man, all are accounted equal under the laws, inasmuch as all are born free in their cities.** This is the case in the free popular cities in which all or the majority make up the just forces of the city, in virtue of which they are the lords of popular liberty. It is also the case in monarchies, **in which the monarchs make all their subjects equal under their laws, and, having all the force of arms in their own hands, are themselves the only bearers of any distinction in civil nature.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n363/mode/2up?view=theater

1007 The monarchical form was introduced in accordance with this eternal natural royal law, felt by all the nations which recognize in Augustus the founder of the Roman monarchy. This law has escaped the notice of the interpreters of Roman law, preoccupied as they have all been with the fable of the "royal law" of Tribonian, of which he openly professes himself the author in the *Institutes*, but which he attributes to Ulpian at one point in the *Pandects*. Yet it was well understood by the Roman jurisconsults, who were well acquainted with the natural law of nations. For Pomponius, in his brief history of Roman law, discussing the royal law of which we speak, described it for us in the well-considered phrase: ***rebus ipsis dictantibus, regna condita*:—"kingdoms were founded at the dictation of things themselves."**

1008 This natural royal law is conceived under this natural formula of eternal utility: Since in the free commonwealths all look out for their own private interests, into the service of which they press their public arms at the risk of ruin to their nations, to preserve the latter from destruction a single man must arise, as Augustus did at Rome, and take all public concerns by force of arms into his own hands, leaving his subjects free to look after their private affairs and after just so much public business, and of just such kinds, as the monarch may entrust to them. Thus are the peoples saved when they would otherwise rush to their own destruction. In this truth the professors of modern law concur when they say that *universitates sub rege habentur loco privatorum*—"corporations are treated as private persons under the king"—because the majority of the citizens no longer concern themselves with the public welfare. Tacitus, most learned in the natural law of nations, points out as much in his *Annals* within the family of the Caesars itself, by this order of human civil ideas: As the death of Augustus became imminent, *pauci bona libertatis incassum disserere***—**"a few spoke in vain of the blessings of liberty"; as soon as Tiberius came, *omnes principis iussa adspectare***—**"all looked to the commands of the emperor"; under the three subsequent Caesars first came *incuria* or indifference and finally *ignorantia reipublicae tanquam alienae*, ignorance of public affairs as something foreign. **Thus, as the citizens have become aliens in their own nations, it becomes necessary for the monarchs to sustain and represent the latter in their own persons. Now in free commonwealths if a powerful man is to become monarch the people must take his side, and for that reason monarchies are by nature popularly governed:** first through the laws by which the monarchs seek to make their subjects all equal; then by that property of monarchies whereby sovereigns humble the powerful and thus keep the masses safe and free from their oppressions; further by that other property of keeping the multitude satisfied and content as regards the necessaries of life and the enjoyment of natural liberty; and finally by the privileges conceded by monarchs to entire classes (called privileges of liberty) or to particular persons by awarding extraordinary civil honors to men of exceptional merit (these being singular laws dictated by natural equity). **Hence monarchy is the form of government best adapted to human nature when reason is fully developed,** as we have said before.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n43/mode/2up?view=theater

39 The last type of jurisprudence was that of natural equity, which reigns naturally in the free commonwealths, where the peoples, each for its particular good (without understanding that it is the same for all), are led to command universal laws. They naturally desire these laws to bend benignly to the least details of matters calling for equal utility. This is the *aequum bonum*, subject of the latest Roman jurisprudence, which from the times of Cicero had begun to be transformed by the edict of the Roman praetor. **This type is also and perhaps even more connatural with monarchies, in which the monarchs have accustomed their subjects to attend to their own private interests, while they themselves have taken charge of all public affairs, and desire all nations subject to them to be made equal by the laws, in order that all may be equally interested in the state.**

Wherefore the emperor Hadrian reformed the entire heroic natural law of Rome with the aid of the human natural law of the provinces, and commanded that jurisprudence should be based on the Perpetual Edict which Salvius Julianus composed almost entirely from the provincial edicts.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n369/mode/2up?view=theater

1023 Again, the barbaric wars of the heroic times meant the ruin of conquered cities, and the surrendered foes became herds of laborers scattered over the countryside to cultivate the fields of the victors. (Such, as we explained above, were the heroic inland colonies.) Then the magnanimity of the popular commonwealths, as long as they were ruled by their senates, took from the vanquished the law of heroic nations but left them in free enjoyment of the natural law of human nations of which Ulpian speaks. (As conquests were extended, all the rights later called *propriae civium romanorum* were restricted to Roman citizens. These rights, such as solemn nuptials, paternal power, *sui heredes*, agnates, gentiles, quiritary or civil ownership, mancipation, usucapion, stipulation, testaments, guardianship and inheritance, must all have been possessed as civil law rights of their own by the subject nations when they were still free.) **Finally came the monarchies, which seek, as under Antoninus Pius [i.e. Caracalla], to make one Rome of all the Roman world. For it is a vow characteristic of great monarchs to make one city of the whole world, as Alexander the Great used to say that for him all the world was a single city of which his phalanx was the citadel. Thus the natural law of nations, developed in the provinces by the Roman praetors, came home at long last to dictate laws in the Romans' own house. The heroic law which the Romans had exercised over the provinces was relinquished, because monarchs desire all their subjects to be made equal by their laws.**

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n443/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **Nero allowed maltreated slaves to use his statue as an asylum and appointed a judge to hear their complaints**—a modest advance that seemed revolutionary to Rome, since it opened the courts to slaves.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Internationale#French_original
>
> > ***Il n'est pas de sauveurs suprêmes***
> > ***Ni Dieu, ni César, ni tribun***
> > *Producteurs, sauvons-nous nous-mêmes*
> > *Décrétons le salut commun*

And Roman jurisprudence, which in heroic times had been based entirely on the Law of the Twelve Tables, and which in the times of Cicero (as he notes in his *Laws*) had begun to follow the edict of the Roman praetor, finally, from the days of the emperor Hadrian on down, concerned itself entirely with the *Edictum perpetuum* or "Perpetual Edict," composed and arranged by Salvius Julianus almost wholly from the provincial edicts.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n359/mode/2up?view=theater

1002 Hence, as we believe, **it came about that in the rude days of the returned barbarism the nations forgot the Roman laws, so much so that whoever invoked one on his behalf was severely punished in France, and in Spain even suffered death. Certainly in Italy the nobles counted it a disgrace to regulate their affairs by Roman laws and professed to be subject to those of the Lombards.**

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/7/5*.html#ref89
>
> **It is only in this casual reference to an act of immorality that we find in all the laws of Rothari [22 November 643 AD] the slightest express reference (doubtless there are many implied references) to the great mass of the subject population of Italy who called themselves, and were called by their conquerors, by the once proud name of Roman.**
> …
>
> The Roman Law, as codified by Justinian, was then in force at Ravenna and at Naples, as it is now, with necessary modifications, in force at New Orleans and at Batavia. Yet to this Code, one of the most splendid achievements of the human intellect, King Rothari and his peers do not refer in one line of their Edict. **Their only mention of the great name of Rome, as has been already pointed out, is in that passage where an injury done to a Roman female slave is assessed at a lower rate than a similar injury to her Teutonic fellow-sufferer.**
> …

> The Code of Rothari, promulgated on the sacred soil of Italy, in a land which had once witnessed the promulgation of the Code, the Institutes, and the Digest of Justinian, **is like the black tent of the Bedouin pitched amid the colonnades of some stately Syrian temple, whose ruined glories touch no responsive chord in the soul of the swart barbarian.**

The plebeians, who were slow in shaking off their old customs, continued to observe some Roman laws by force of habit. This is the reason why the corpus of the laws of Justinian and other monuments of western Roman law were lost to us in Italy, and the Basilica and other monuments of eastern Roman law fell into oblivion among the Greeks. **But later, when the monarchies were reestablished and popular liberty reintroduced, the Roman law comprised in the books of Justinian was universally received, so that Grotius declares that it is now a natural law of the nations of Europe.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n391/mode/2up?view=theater

1083 From all the matters here enumerated, we must conclude that the realms were everywhere aristocratic, we do not say in constitution but in government, as in the cold north that of Poland still is (and as those of Sweden and Denmark were until a century and a half ago). **In time, if extraordinary causes do not impede its natural course, Poland will arrive at perfect monarchy.**

1084 So true is this that Bodin himself goes so far as to say of his kingdom of France that it was aristocratic, not in government as we assert but in constitution, during the Merovingian and Carlovingian dynasties. But here we may ask Bodin how the kingdom of France became perfectly monarchical as it now is? Perhaps by some royal law by which the paladins of France divested themselves of their power and conferred it upon the kings of the Capetian dynasty?—**If he has recourse to the fable of the royal law invented by Tribonian, by which the Roman people supposedly divested itself of its free sovereignty and conferred it on Augustus,** to prove it a fable it suffices to read the first pages of the *Annals* of Tacitus in which he narrates the last acts of Augustus, legitimizing the beginning of the Roman monarchy in his own person, as indeed all nations perceived that it began with Augustus.—Perhaps because France was conquered through force of arms by one of the Capetian kings?—But all the histories keep it at a safe distance from such an unhappy fate. **Bodin therefore, and with him all the other political and legal authorities who have written on public law, must recognize this eternal natural royal law by which the free power of a state, just because it is free, must be actualized.** Namely, that in proportion as the optimates lose their grip the strength of the people increases until they become free; and in proportion as the free peoples relax their hold the kings gain in strength until they become monarchs. Wherefore, just as the natural law of the philosophers (or moral theologians) is that of reason, so this natural law of nations is that of utility and of force, which, as the jurisconsults say, is observed by the nations *usu exigente humanisque necessitatibus expostulantibus*, "as use requires and human necessities demand."

1085 From all these beautiful and elegant expressions of ancient Roman jurisprudence, with which the learned feudists do in fact mitigate and might even further mitigate the barbarousness of feudal doctrine (since the ideas of the latter fit the expressions of the former in their full propriety, as we have shown), **let Oldendorp (and all the others with him) consider whether feudal law was born from the sparks of the fire set by the barbarians to Roman law.** On the contrary, Roman law was born from the sparks of the fiefs observed in the first barbarism of Latium, such fiefs as were the origin of all the commonwealths in the world. As we have demonstrated this in a particular discussion above of the Poetic Politics of the first commonwealths, so in this [fifth] book (in a demonstration promised in the Idea of the Work) we have seen that the new realms of Europe have their origins within the eternal nature of fiefs.

1086 But finally, **with the studies undertaken in the universities of Italy and the teaching of the Roman laws contained in the books of Justinian, laws therein based on the natural law of human nations, minds already developed and grown more intelligent were dedicated to the cultivation of the jurisprudence of natural equity, which makes the common people and the nobles equal in civil rights, just as they are equal in human nature.** And just as from the time when Tiberius Coruncanius began to teach the laws publicly in Rome their secrecy began to slip from the hands of the nobles, and the power of the nobles gradually declined, so it happened in the case of the nobles of the realms of Europe, which had been ruled by aristocratic governments before passing into free commonwealths and thence into perfect monarchies.

1087 **These last two forms of state, since both involve human governments, readily admit of change from either to the other, but a return from either to an aristocratic state is almost impossible in the nature of civil things.** So much so that Dion of Syracuse, although he was a member of the royal family and had driven into exile a monster of princes, Dionysius the tyrant, and although he was so well favored with civil virtues as to be worthy of the friendship of the divine Plato, was nevertheless barbarously slain when he attempted to restore the aristocratic state. And the

Pythagoreans (that is, as above explained, the nobles of Magna Graecia), for the same attempt, were all cut in pieces save for the few who had taken refuge in strongholds and were burned alive by the multitude. **For the plebeians, once they know themselves to be of equal nature with the nobles, naturally will not submit to remaining their inferiors in civil rights; and the equality they seek may be found either in free commonwealths or under monarchies.** Wherefore, in the present humanity of the nations, the few remaining aristocratic commonwealths must take infinite pains and shrewd and prudent measures to keep the multitude at the same time dutiful and content.
…

1089 **Today a complete humanity seems to be spread abroad through all nations, for a few great monarchs rule over this world of peoples.** If there are still some barbarous peoples surviving, it is because their monarchies have persisted in the vulgar wisdom of imaginative and cruel religions, in some cases with the less balanced nature of their subject nations as an added factor.

1090 Beginning with the cold north, the Czar of Muscovy, although Christian, rules over men of sluggish minds. The Knyaz or Khan of Tartary dominates an effeminate people, like to the ancient Seres who formed the larger part of his great empire, a part which is now united with that of China. The Negus of Ethiopia and the powerful kings of Fez and Morocco reign over peoples too weak and sparse.

1091 In the mid-temperate zone, however, where the nature of men is better balanced, to begin with the Far East, the Emperor of Japan practices a humanity similar to that of the Romans at the time of the Carthaginian wars. He imitates their ferocity in arms, and, as learned travelers observe, his language has a Latin ring about it. **Yet, through a religion of fierce and terrible imagination with dreadful gods all armed with frightful weapons, he retains much of the heroic nature. For the missionary fathers who have been there report that the greatest difficulty they have encountered in converting the people to Christianity is that the nobles cannot be persuaded that the plebeians have the same human nature as themselves.** The Emperor of the Chinese, who reigns under a mild religion and cultivates letters, is most humane. The Emperor of the Indies is rather humane than otherwise, and practices in the main the arts of peace. The Persian and the Turk have mingled the rude doctrine of their religion with the softness of Asia, which they rule; and thus both, and particularly the Turks, temper their arrogance with magnificence, pomp, liberality and gratitude.

1092 **But in Europe, where the Christian religion is everywhere professed, inculcating an infinitely pure and perfect idea of God and commanding charity to all mankind, there are great monarchies most humane in their customs. It is true that those situated in the cold north, such as Sweden and Denmark until a hundred and fifty years ago, and Poland and even England still today, although they are monarchic in constitution yet seem to be governed aristocratically; but if the natural course of human civil things is not impeded in their case by extraordinary causes they will arrive at perfect monarchies. In this part of the world alone, because it cultivates the sciences, there are furthermore a great number of popular commonwealths, which are not found at all in the other three parts.** Indeed, because of the recurrence of the same public utilities and necessities, there has been a revival of the form of the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. Just as the latter were conceived by the Greeks because of the necessity of protecting themselves against the overwhelming power of the Romans, so the Swiss cantons and the united provinces or states of Holland have organized a number of free popular cities into two aristocracies, in which they stand united in a perpetual league of peace and war.
…

1094 Now to come back to our subject, **in Europe today there are only five aristocracies:** namely, Venice, Genoa and Lucca in Italy, Ragusa in Dalmatia and Nuremberg in Germany. Almost all of them have small territories.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/668/mode/2up?view=theater

For while he was neither a republican nor democrat, **Vico's advocacy of 'enlightened' monarchy is unquestionably linked to a vigorous social egalitarianism. Indeed, within the entire corpus of Early Enlightenment radical thought no other thinker produced so devastating a critique of nobility as did Vico.**

Vico's Providence is in fact nothing other than the historical process which gradually shepherds mankind, as he describes it, from barbarism to a more settled, orderly state, and a society based upon reason. **People act from selfish motives, but this does not inhibit the wider historical process.** Thus, for example, 'the reigning orders of nobles mean to abuse their lordly freedom over the plebeians' but in time, precisely through trying to exploit them, they themselves 'are obliged to submit to the laws which establish popular liberty.'27 Nobility in Vico's schema arises during the heroic age and entails domination of society and property through sheer violence and exploitation. But with time 'and the far greater development of human minds, the common people finally grow distrustful of the claims of heroism and begin to conceive themselves to be of equal human nature with the nobles.'28 With this the

principle of equality begins and Providence, as Vico puts it, 'permitted' a struggle in which the people emerged as sovereign. Moreover, once the power of the nobles declines it cannot be revived. 'For the plebeians, once they know themselves to be of equal nature with the nobles, naturally will not submit to remaining their inferiors in civil rights; and they achieve equality either in free commonwealths or under monarchies.'29 But Providence, insists Vico, ensures that popular régimes, with their inherent weaknesses, rapidly degenerate into 'anarchy or the unchecked liberty of free peoples which is the worst of all tyrannies.' **Thus great monarchies, according to Vico, spring from liberty itself, that is, 'Providence ordains that the very form of the monarchic state shall confine the will of monarchs, in spite of their unlimited sovereignty.' 'For without this universal satisfaction and content of the peoples,' contends Vico, not unlike Spinoza in the *Tractatus Politicus*, 'monarchic states are neither lasting nor secure.'**30 **By their nature monarchies 'seek to make their subjects all equal,' and 'humble the powerful and thus keep the masses safe and free from their oppressions.'**31

A drastic inequality in distribution of land and wealth prevails during the heroic age, which is based partly on violence but equally, or more, on credulity and ignorance. For both nobles and serfs believe their social system is ordained by the gods.32 The fact that for Vico 'monarchy is the form of government best adapted to human nature when reason is fully developed,'33 implies that the progress of human reason involves a related process of social and political struggle. Hence social violence, including revolution, is neither good nor bad in itself, but just the inevitable accompaniment of historical development.34 Before making judgements about popular tumults one must first determine what they are about. For if its purpose is to overthrow the tyranny and pretensions of aristocracy, Vico seems clearly to infer that revolution is good. **Hence, Vico's 'divine Providence' furnishes what has aptly been termed a 'natural right to insurrection'** arising from man's inevitable eventual quest for self-liberation from oppression and exploitation.35

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT101#v=onepage&q&f=false

In Vico's estimation, "this public virtue" of the ancients was not what it purported to be. It was, in fact, not public at all; it was not rooted in self-sacrifice and in a concern for the "common good." If the ancients "did not hesitate, for the safety of their various fatherlands, to consecrate themselves and their families to the will of the laws," it was because – in "maintaining the common security of the fatherland" – they could at the same time keep "secure for each of them a certain private monarchical reign over his family." **The public virtue so celebrated in antiquity was grounded on "the grievous, ugly, and cruel private vices" of an aristocracy intent on retaining absolute control of a *familia* that included slaves and clients as well as children and wives.**95

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius5b.html#c6
>
> We have seen piety to personal relatives, and we will now show it towards our native country; **to whose majesty paternal authority, though almost equal to that of the gods, has ever submitted, and to which brotherly affection willingly yields, and for good reason too. For a family may be ruined, and yet the commonwealth could be safe; but the ruin of the commonwealth necessarily draws with it the destruction of every family.**

In a strikingly similar fashion, Montesquieu later traced the "frightful tyranny" of emperors like Caligula not to lawless rule itself but to a cause more profound: "the *esprit general* of the Romans." **When the republic fell, he contended, "their fierce humor remained; the citizens were treated as they themselves had treated the enemies they had conquered, and they were governed on the same plan.**"

> https://biblehub.com/matthew/7-2.htm
>
> **For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/348/mode/2up?view=theater

In June 1740, when Frederick II came to the throne as Voltaire's declared disciple, he proclaimed toleration in two celebrated pronouncements. **When the General Directory inquired whether a Roman Catholic might become a citizen of Frankfurt an der Oder, he wrote in vigorous if rather uncertain German:** *Alle religionen seindt gleich und guht, wan nuhr die leute so sie profesieren Erlige leute seindt und wenn Türken und Heiden kähmen und wollten das Land pöpliren so wollen wir sie Mosqueen und Kirchen bauen* – **"All religions are equal and good, if only those people who profess them are honest people; and if Turks and heathens came and wanted to populate the country, we would build them mosques and churches."** Again, asked whether the Roman Catholic schools for soldiers should remain open, he replied: *Die Religionen müssen alle toleriret werden und mus der Fiscal nuhr has Auge darauf haben, dass keine der anderen Abbruch tuhe,* ***denn hier mus ein jeder nach seiner Fasson selich werden*** – "Religions must all be tolerated; only the Attorney General

should see to it that none of them injures any other, for here everyone must be saved in his own fashion."9

Frederick – Epicurean, atheist, and cynical exploiter of the human animal – was an exception in his House. But the outline of his religious policy was much the same as that of his predecessors in his own state and that of his contemporaries elsewhere. **The territorial churches – *Landeskirchen* – of the German states were more dependent on the secular power than the Anglican church under Walpole, and to say that is to say a good deal. Germany was a conglomeration of Erastian states: Hobbes, had he lived to see it, would have approved.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2333/2333-h/2333-h.htm#link2H_4_0004

With these associates, and others of the same class, Frederic loved to spend the time which he could steal from public cares. He wished his supper parties to be gay and easy. **He invited his guests to lay aside all restraint, and to forget that he was at the head of a hundred and sixty thousand soldiers, and was absolute master of the life and liberty of all who sat at meat with him.** There was, therefore, at these parties the outward show of ease. The wit and learning of the company were ostentatiously displayed. The discussions on history and literature were often highly interesting. **But the absurdity of all the religions known among men was the chief topic of conversation; and the audacity with which doctrines and names venerated throughout Christendom were treated on these occasions startled even persons accustomed to the society of French and English freethinkers.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n51/mode/2up?view=theater

While only Prince-royal he was in correspondence with Voltaire, chiefly on religion or metaphysics; and even at that early age it appears he deemed himself a Philosopher; for he says—"To speak with my usual freedom, I must confess to you, that whatever regards the *God made man* displeases me in the mouth of a Philosopher, who should be above popular error. Leave to *the great Corneille*, when *doating and falling back to childhood*, the insipid talk of versifying the *Imitation of Christ*; and whatever you may give us, let it be your own. **We may speak of fables, but merely as fables;** and a profound silence in my opinion should be kept concerning those fables of the Christians which have been sanctified by time and the credulity of the absurd and stupid."7

7. From Frederic, May, 1738, Vol. 64, Let. 53, P. 275.

…

He upbraids Voltaire with the praises that he had bestowed on Christ, and three years after is not ashamed to write—"For my part, I own that, whatever people may enlist under the banners of Fanaticism, I never shall. **I may indeed compose a few Psalms to raise a good opinion of my orthodoxy. Socrates incensed the household Gods, so did Cicero, and he was not credulous.** We must give way to the fancies of a frivolous people, in order to avoid blame and persecution; for, after all, what is most desirable in the world is to live in peace; let us then live foolishly with fools, that we may live quietly."11

11. From Frederic, 6 Jan. 1740, Vol. 64, Let. 107, P. 471.

The same Frederic had written, that the Christian religion *yielded none but poisonous weeds*;12 and Voltaire had congratulated him, ***as having above all Princes fortitude of soul, with sufficient perspicacity to see that for the seventeen hundred years past the CHRISTIAN SECT had never done any thing but harm,***13 though we afterward find him the opponent of that work of Philosophic insight, or rather of infamous profligacy, *the System of Nature*.

13. To Frederic, 5 April, 1767, Vol. 65, Let. 159, P. 374.

"One might be tempted," he says, to suspect its author of want of sense and skill when, calumniating the Christian religion, he imputes to it failings that it has not. **How can he with truth assert that religion can be the cause of the misfortunes of mankind! He would have been more correct, had he simply said, that men from ambition and self-interest, *concealed under the veil of religion*, had sought to disturb the world and gratify their passions.** What is there reprehensible in the morals of the commandments? Were there in the whole Gospel but this single precept, *Do as thou wouldst be done by*, we should be obliged to confess, that those few words contained the whole quintessence of morality: —The forgiveness of injuries, charity, and humanity—were not these preached by Jesus in his excellent sermon on the mount?"14

…

But, strange to say, after having viewed religion in so clear a light, he compliments Voltaire on being its scourge,15 he still communicates plans for its destruction,16 and foresees, that should it be preserved

and protected in France, *the fine arts and higher sciences must fall*, and that *the rust of superstition will completely destroy a people, otherwise amiable and born for society*.17

17. From Frederic, 30 July, 1774, Vol. 66, Let. 59, P. 137.

https://archive.org/details/marquisdargenson00ogleuoft/page/64/mode/2up?view=theater

It was in this very summer of 1732 that the great conflict of old French privilege and tradition against the arrogant zeal of the Ultramontane party reached its acutest stage; and it happened that that was the question of all others with which d'Argenson was competent to deal. **He had been for some years a member of the ecclesiastical committee of the Council, and at the Entresol, as we have seen, he had been charged with the department of canon law.**[178]
…

Among the documents destroyed at the Louvre was one written by d'Argenson when the struggle was at its height. It is in the form of a letter from an Englishman to a Frenchman.[182] In the course of it he says: **"Wherever the sovereignty may reside, it is necessary that authority should be entire, without partition, and should bow to the judgments of God alone."** He proceeds to urge the necessity of doing away with the superior courts, or of placing them absolutely at the disposal of the Crown. In replying to the objection that that would establish "a veritable Turkish government," he reveals the secret of his peculiar attitude with regard to royalty in France. "What of it?" he rejoins. "You live in France under a despotic authority. The die is cast, so to speak. You must either obey it or destroy it entirely." **Its only restraint must be that imposed by "opinion, reason, delicacy, public spirit. Is it not the case that for two centuries the progress of authority in France has been that of peace, art, and morality, and is it not increasingly active in suppressing violence, whether public or private?**"

https://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/bruyere/chap9.htm

40. **The nobility risk their lives for the safety of the State and the glory of their sovereign; the magistrate relieves the Prince of part of the responsibility of judging the nation:** both of these functions are lofty and exceptionally useful; men are scarcely capable of greater things, **and I cannot think whence the Law and the Army have derived the contempt they feel for one another.**

https://archive.org/details/marquisdargenson00ogleuoft/page/178/mode/2up?view=theater

What d'Argenson proposed was simply to dismiss the score or so of clerks, tax-collectors and hangers-on who managed parochial affairs under the direction of the Sub-delegate without sympathy or regard for the wishes of the people: and to transfer these affairs to a little parish council, consisting, for example, of the neighbouring squire, the village curé, a couple of farmers, and an erudite cobbler or so, who would look after the roads, assist the poor, assess and collect the parochial taxes, and attend to all matters which were not beyond the capacity of half-a-dozen intelligent countrymen, guided and supervised by the Sub-delegate. **The two poles upon which the system revolved were not "royalty" and "a democratic society,"**[419] **but in plain prose, the bureau of the Controller-General at Versailles, and the parish room or the inn parlour of the village of Argenson in the "généralité" of Touraine.**
…

M. de Boulainvilliers and d'Argenson had been struck by the same evils; but the former attributed them to the iniquitous usurpation by which the people had been withdrawn from the protection of their feudal lords, and subjected to oppression by the irresponsible minions of the royal authority. His remedy was a reversion to the society of the thirteenth century. D'Argenson's proposal was a very different one. He saw very clearly that as a great political instrument the French noblesse existed no longer; and that if local government was to be reformed, the reform must come from the people themselves. If these shopkeepers, peasants and the rest, had no political tradition or knowledge, they were primarily concerned in acquiring it; and he enunciates, perhaps for the first time, the great principle of all democratic development, **the principle that in matters of government interest is more valuable than intelligence.**
…

The Catholic Establishment shall be maintained as

"la base de la morale, dont le maintien est essentiel à la tranquillité et au bonheur public. Ceux que auraient le malheur de n'être pas convaincus des vérités qu'elle nous enseigne"

will be ineligible for public office; but no step shall be taken in the direction of persecution or proscription.

Complete toleration shall be maintained in so far as it is compatible with public order.

Such was the constitution projected by d'Argenson during the few years before his death. Its real meaning is clear and unmistakable: yet it has not escaped the evil fortune which has pursued so many of its author's plans. It is true that to concede to thirty-two provincial assemblies a virtually absolute power, while providing that the authority of the Crown shall be in no way diminished, may appear at first sight as strange an inconsequence as M. de Broglie[429] and others have found it. Yet a patient reading of d'Argenson's scheme is sufficient to show that with all its elaborate reservations, **it involved nothing more nor less than the provisional surrender of the Sovereignty of France into the hands of the French people.**
...

The provision that the King alone should make laws and impose taxes might be really little more than a constitutional fiction, which, so long as the laws were prudently made and the taxes equitably imposed, might pass as undisputed fact. The proposition that the royal ordinances must always be accepted might prove to be a fiction of the same kind. **Indeed, in certain eventualities the whole scheme might be one continued fiction in so far as it relates to the Crown.**
...

It is true that we do not find him stating, in this uncompromising way, the revolutionary aspect of his programme; he would have shrunk from formulating it clearly even to himself. At the same time we know that it was by no means distant from his mind. Notwithstanding, he cannot have regarded it as of any immediate or direct importance; for he could not but think that only by an access of inconceivable folly on the part of the people or of inconceivable madness on the part of the Crown, could such a revolutionary ferment be occasioned.

We cannot better appreciate the spirit and scope of d'Argenson's proposal than by comparing it with the universally admired design broached, about twenty years later, by the great minister Turgot. The principle of the two policies was practically the same. Turgot proposed, like d'Argenson, to entrust to the people and popular organisations the whole administration of the interior, while retaining the entire legislative authority in the hands of the Crown.[432] The people, as in d'Argenson's scheme, had merely the power of suggesting legislation, though the actual law must proceed from the King. Between the two plans, however, there was one great difference of detail. **D'Argenson had surrounded the authority of the Crown with a sacred barrier; behind that barrier the people might exercise all the effective powers of popular control: beyond it they were forbidden to pass. In the proposal of Turgot that barrier was destroyed.** Above the circle of Provincial Estates he desired to constitute a Municipality of the Whole Realm; by doing so he would have brought the sphere of popular action into direct juxtaposition with that of the Crown, and have surrounded the very palace gates with the acclamations or with the clamour of the people.

https://archive.org/details/marquisdargenson00ogleuoft/page/156/mode/2up?view=theater

The clergy refused to administer extreme unction to those who had not accepted the Bull Unigenitus; they were opposed by the resolution of the Parlement of Paris; the Crown interfered on behalf of the clergy; and Church and Crown united their forces in an endeavour to coerce the Parlement. **At the same time the attempt of the Controller-General Machault to force the vingtième upon clergy and people alike united the Church and the Parlement in opposition to the Crown.**
...

D'Argenson's attitude throughout the controversy may be summed in a single word. **He was with the Parlement against the Church, and with both against the Crown.**
...

So acute an observer could not fail to see that the most alarming features of the struggle were the indirect results which it might produce. It had scarcely begun when he devoted to it one of the boldest and most penetrating of all his reflections.

> "I am afraid that all this, if pushed too far, may produce some great outbreak. **Men may arise who, under colour of the clerical cause, will sustain the cause of the nation. With little merit or ability of their own, these men will obtain influence, they will secure the affection of the people.** Let no one say that such men exist no longer. The statue is in the block of marble; the meanest of men will rise to the occasion. Even to-day mark how many writers there are of learning and enlightenment. For some years the wind has been blowing from England upon these materials; the materials may catch fire. Look at the tone of the remonstrances against the vingtième prepared by the Parlements and the Estates. These Attorneys-General of Parlement, these syndics of Estates, such might be these great men I speak of; the whole nation might catch fire, the Nobility throwing in its lot with the Clergy, and afterwards the Third Estate. If the result

> were that it became necessary to summon the States-General of the Realm, they would find occasion to regulate the finances and the demands of money for the future. **Those Estates would not assemble in vain. Let the men in power have a care; they would be very much in earnest**" (December, 1750).[385]

D'Argenson's apprehensions were soon confirmed. A year later he writes:

> "To-day the popular mind is occupied with this approaching revolution in the government; people talk of nothing else, and every one is full of it, even the bourgeois" (November, 1751).[386]

Among high and low the feeling was the same.

> "**The evil consequences of our absolute monarchy are finally persuading every one, both in France and throughout Europe, that it is the worst of all forms of government. Among men of enlightenment (*philosophes*) I hear nothing but the confident assertion that even anarchy is to be preferred to it;** for it leaves to each inhabitant at least the enjoyment of his property, and whatever disorders or acts of violence may occur are to the prejudice of private people only, and not, as now, to the body of the state" (September, 1752).[387]

These eight years of clamour and coercion, violence and weakness, produced a very profound impression upon French society, and upon d'Argenson himself.

> "The opinion of the nation is gaining ground, and may lead us far. **It is remarked that never until to-day have the names of 'Nation' and 'State' been so frequently in use.** Under Louis XIV. these two names were never pronounced, and people had no idea even of their meaning. Never has knowledge of the rights of the nation and of liberty been so widely diffused as it is to-day. **Even I, who have always made these matters the subject of thought and study, had a very different mind and feeling with regard to them. The change is due to the Parlement and the English**" (June, 1754).[388]

...

Among the "honnêtes gens tranquilles, qui ne maîtrisent pas leur langue," none had more reason to tremble than d'Argenson. **For some time a remarkable political work of his[395] had been circulating quietly among the Philosophic party; and his religious opinions were at least as licentious as any to be found even among the clergy.[396] By political profession he was an adherent of the Gallican Church; by private conviction he was a deist after the manner of Voltaire, but with none of Voltaire's apostolic bitterness.** Deist or Gallican, he was a confirmed enemy of obscurantism in all its forms.[397]

...

He tells us how Madame de Pompadour invited Diderot and d'Alembert to resume the work upon the Encyclopædia which their Jesuit enemies had been unable to continue: and his reflections from time to time enable us to measure the growing influence of the Philosophic leaders. In May, 1754, was written this eloquent tribute to their advancing power.

> "**It is averred that everything is preparing in France for a great reform in religion. It will be a very different thing from that rude Reformation, a medley of freedom and superstition, which came to us from Germany in the sixteenth century.** Both have been brought about by the intolerable tyranny and avarice of the priests; **but as our age and nation are far more enlightened than that of Luther, we shall not stop half way. Priest, priestcraft, revelation, mystery, all will be banished; and we shall be content to see God through the greatness and goodness of His works. It is in our own hearts that He has written His law, His love, our gratitude, our hopes in Providence, and our fear of its justice. As to the attributes of God, we are as wise as the priests;** we can adore Him by ourselves, and without the help of these persons pious by profession, who call themselves the ministers of the altar and who are only the drones of the hive" (May, 1754).[400]

And before blotting his page, he enables us to comprehend in a single glance the parallel movements of the time.

> "Soon with this reformation in religion will come the reformation in government. **Political tyranny is interlinked with ecclesiastical tyranny. Against them are turned the two branches of the forward movement,[401] the one in the direction of moderate democracy, the other towards adoring God in mind and heart alone.** We give up the attempt to do anything more with these two forms of government, and in politics and society we see matters as they ought to be. ... **Nature tells us all that we need; we listen and follow her when the imposture of tyranny exists no longer.**"[402]

We have only to compare Citizen d'Argenson with the former Absolutist of 1732 to realise the rate at which France was travelling.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#Footnote_5_46

> [5] **"In the republic," says the Marquis d'Argenson, "each man is perfectly free in what does not harm others."** This is the invariable limitation, which it is impossible to define more exactly. I have not been able to deny myself the pleasure of occasionally quoting from this manuscript, though it is unknown to the public, **in order to do honour to the memory of a good and illustrious man, who had kept even in the Ministry the heart of a good citizen, and views on the government of his country that were sane and right.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n81/mode/2up?view=theater

At this time the court of Louis XV began to be overrun with ministers who on religious matters thought like a Voltaire or a Frederic.—They had no ecclesiastical states, no ecclesiastical electors to pillage; but the possessions of the numerous religious orders dispersed through France could satiate their rapacity, and they conceived that the plan of Frederic might be equally lucrative to France. **The Marquis D'Argenson, counsellor of state and minister of foreign affairs, was the great patron of Voltaire. It was he who, adopting all his ideas, formed the plan for the destruction of all religious orders in France. The progress of the plan was to be slow and successive, lest it should spread alarm.** They were to begin with those orders that were least numerous; they were to render the entrance into the religious state more difficult; and the time of professions was to be delayed until that age when people are already engaged in some other state of life. The possessions of the suppressed were artfully to be adapted to some pious use, or united to the episcopal revenues. **Time was to do away with all difficulties, and the day was not far off when, as lord paramount, the Sovereign was to put in his claim to all that belonged to the suppressed orders,** even to what had been united, for the moment, to the sees of the bishops; the whole was to be added to his domains.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n151/mode/2up?view=theater

A minister whose assiduity in corresponding with Voltaire indicates more clearly their perfect coincidence with each other, was the *Marquis D'Argenson*, whom we have already noticed tracing the plan for the destruction of the religious orders. **It was he who first protected Voltaire at Court and with the Marquise de Pompadour; he was also one of the most impious of his disciples; and to him it is that Voltaire writes constantly, as to one of the adepts with whom he was most intimate. In fact, he appears more resolute in his antireligious opinions than his master; his Philosophism coincided more with that of the King of Prussia's; for he was also convinced that he was not two-fold, and that he had nothing to fear or hope for, when once his body should rest in eternal sleep.**2

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n243/mode/2up?view=theater

AMONG the adepts who must have foreseen the consequences which naturally ensued from the application of a pretended equality of rights, and of an irreligious liberty, to politics, none could have done so more intuitively than the Marquis D'Argenson. **This man, minister of the foreign department, had lived during the greater part of his life near the person of his Sovereign, and enjoyed that favour, to which he was thought to be entitled by having consecrated his life to the Royal service.** Yet he was the man who, during the reign of Lewis XV, drew the outlines of those Sophisticated Systems, which were to oppose Regal authority, and gradually metamorphose the French Monarchy into a Republic.

We have seen Voltaire, as early as the year 1743, extolling the affection which this Marquis bore to Equality, to Liberty, and to the Municipal Government. These praises of the Premier Chief evidently show, that Mr. D'Argenson had already conceived his Municipalizing System, and all those wild plans, **which the future rebels, under the title of a Constituent Assembly, were to adopt as one of the leading features of their Royal Democracy,** at once the most senseless and most seditious as well as the most heterogeneous form of government that could be conceived, and more especially for Frenchmen: They also prove, that he made no secret of his plans to his confidents and co-operators.

His system consists in the division and subdivision of the Provinces into small States, first called *Provincial Administrations* by Necker, and afterwards termed *Departments* by Turgot and Mirabeau.

According to D'Argenson's plan, **resumed and corrected by Turgot and Necker,** each of those petty states was, under the inspection of the King, to be charged with the interior administration of its

districts, and the levying of taxes; to superintend the different plans adopted for the relief of the people; to inspect the hospitals, the high roads, the establishments useful to commerce, and other such objects. The administrators could not determine on any subject of importance without the orders of his Majesty, and this was judged a sufficient fence to the Royal prerogative, especially as at the first formation of these provincial administrations, one half of the members were to be nominated by the King, which half when assembled chose the remaining moiety. The distinction of the three orders, of the Clergy, the Nobility, and the third Estate, was preserved, as it used to be in the States General.1

The towns and boroughs, and even the villages were to have their respective municipalities, all acting on the same plan, and under the direction of the Provincial Administrations, in their secondary districts.

Though at first sight this system appears extremely advantageous, yet, on examination, **we shall find, that its sole tendency was to apply Republican forms, as much as circumstances would permit, to a Monarchical government;** that its object was to cramp the authority of the Monarch, to clog and weaken it; **and to annihilate the power of his officers, or direct agents, the intendants of provinces.**

Soon was France by means of these assemblies and their committees, or permanent offices, to be filled with ambitious men starting forth in the new political career; men indeed who, in the first instance, would have recognized the authority of a King, but who would soon have considered themselves better informed of the wants of the people (being nearer to them) than his ministers, and therefore more fully acquainted with the means of alleviating their distresses. Remonstrances and philosophic reasonings would soon have followed, and sufficed to justify disobedience. The people, under a fond persuasion, that these provincial administrators supported their interests against the court, would easily have been brought to believe them the bulwark of their liberties and privileges, assigning every happy event to them, and attributing every misfortune to the King and his ministers. **Each municipality coalescing with the administrators, a hundred petty Republics start into existence, ready to league against their Sovereign, who, under the title of King, would scarcely have retained the authority of a Doge.**

In time we should have seen a swarm of polticasters, or petty tribunes, sallying forth from these administrative bodies, who would have left no means untried to persuade the populace that such a King was rather a burden than an advantage to the state; that it would be proper to lay him aside, since he was unnecessary; that the provincial and municipal administrations would then be able to follow up in a more effectual manner, the salutary measures they had conceived for the good of the people: and thus, step by step, the Monarchical government would have been overthrown, and a municipal administration established, with the freedom of which Voltaire and D'Argenson had been so fascinated in Holland. **The man who could not readily foresee that such would be the consequence of this municipalizing system, must have been very ignorant of the character of Frenchmen,** and especially of French Philosophers when drawn into the vortex of modern politics.

Even the admission of the clergy into these provisional administrations must have proved a fatal boon to the church, as it necessarily tended to change the spirit of its ministers. **Priests and bishops were admitted, or rather called upon, to form a part of their administrations, so foreign to their sacred functions, for the conspiracy had not yet attained sufficient force to cast them off.** The zeal for salvation was to be superseded by the wild ambition of moving in a sphere so contrary to their calling. Already were several prelates distinguished by this new title of Administrators. Soon should we have seen them become rather the disciples of D'Argenson, Turgot and Necker, than of Christ; **soon seen the bishoprics conferred upon none but Morellets and Beaudeaus, with whom religion would have been a very subordinate object, when compared to the glorious enterprize of system-making, or of resisting the Ministers and the Sovereign.** This was a sure method of ruining the church, by robbing her of the real bishops, and substituting petty politicians, who would easily be carried away by the torrent of impiety and ambition, and join with heart and hand a Brienne or an Expilly.

Whatever might have been the consequence to the church, it is very evident that all these new forms of administration tended directly to republicanize the state. Each of these petty administrators would soon have swelled himself into the representative of the province, and the aggregate would have styled themselves the Representatives of the Nation. The bare appellation of National Representative, combined with Modern Philosophism, sufficed to crush the Monarchy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#A_DISCOURSE

[1] **Sovereigns always see with pleasure a taste for the arts of amusement and superfluity, which do not result in the exportation of bullion, increase among their subjects. They very well know that, besides nourishing that littleness of mind which is proper to slavery, the increase of artificial wants only binds so many more chains upon the people. Alexander, wishing to keep the Ichthyophages in a state of dependence, compelled them to give up**

> **fishing, and subsist on the customary food of civilised nations.** The American savages, who go naked, and live entirely on the products of the chase, have been always impossible to subdue. What yoke, indeed, can be imposed on men who stand in need of nothing?

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.505416/page/n181/mode/2up?view=theater

In the first place, **Acts VII and IX of 1715 had already extended the *crimen laesae majestatis* to refer to the taking up of arms against the King, and to extend punishment beyond the offenders themselves, and to condemn their whole families to a forfeiture of their property. Hereby the Hungarian magnates were deprived of a means of protecting their own privileges and the rights of their country, to which they had often resorted during the seventeenth century.** We cannot assert that this measure endangered the existence of the nobility as such, but there can be no doubt that it restricted the policy of the several magnate families to much narrower limits than those they had possessed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In the second place, **it was part of the King's policy to raise men belonging to the gentry to a position of wealth and dignity equal to that of the older and more prominent families of magnates. In this manner a kind of aristocracy of office rose into being side by side with the aristocracy of birth.** In the nature of things, the members of this new aristocracy (a species of *novi homines*) owed their distinction primarily to the offices they held; and in this manner the King's service was as it were set up in opposition to the personal and family authority derived from descent from an ancient and famous house.1

In the third place, **by constant residence in Vienna or in the neighbourhood of the Court, by having their sons educated in such surroundings, and by intermarriage with the leading Austrian families,**2 **the Hungarian magnates began to lose that strong national sentiment which had previously been their distinguishing feature. Though not yet an accomplished fact, we see the day approaching when the Hungarian aristocrats considered their national tongue and manners as strange and foreign.**3 The fact that they represented not merely a privileged class but the whole nation, had always constituted the mainstay and the surest foundation of the authority of the nobility in opposition to the kingly power. **Now the nobility itself began to be disloyal to its own traditions.** That Hungarian aristocracy—which had been a military one for so many centuries, and in the course of the eighteenth century had been transformed into an official and governing class—now assumed the character of a Court nobility. Personal service in the immediate neighbourhood of the monarch at Vienna now became their chief ambition, supplanting in importance their duty (a duty which their birth should have obliged them to undertake) towards the country for which their ancestors had lived and died.
…

The legislative system of Hungary had indeed protected the property of the nobility against every political or legal danger; but no legislature has the power to provide that the expenditure shall not exceed the receipts. The law of aviticity (which secured the possessions of the noble families (1351)), a number of other more or less calculated legislative measures, above all the fact that in Hungary persons not of noble birth could not possess landed property, protected the estates of the Hungarian magnates, whether they were ancestral or recently acquired. The continual increase of colonisation and of foreign trade added to their revenues. **The deficiency of the means of communication and the decline of industry, together with the abundance and cheapness of labour and of food-stuffs, made it practically impossible for the magnates to spend their whole incomes, so long as they stayed in their own country. On Hungarian soil, like Antaeus, the nobles could not but derive fresh strength from mother earth.**

Once on foreign soil this advantage ceased, and the strength derived from it was gone. In Vienna the Hungarians exchanged the simple and healthy enjoyments of their homes for the extravagances of a Court life on a high level of culture and civilization. **In Court society they could not wear their ancestral costumes (which, though representing a value of thousands of florins, were often centuries old), but were compelled to adopt the dress of fashionable Europe.** Their ancestral estates were unable to supply the wants of their owners who lived on foreign soil. As many, if not more, servants were required where everything had to be bought for money, whereas at home everything had been provided by the soil and had cost next to nothing. The somewhat vulgar but comparatively cheap pleasures of the table were replaced by the Court entertainments, balls, games and the like, which, though more refined and aristocratic, were far more expensive.1
…

Yet it was no easy matter, during the reign of a sovereign like Maria Teresa, for any family to avoid such a course, unless it chose to allow its ancestral fame and glory to rust within the bastions of an ancient castle. Family pride required that Hungarian magnates should take part in the entertainments and service of the Court, side by side with the Bohemian and German aristocracy. It was

here only that they could acquire those administrative and military qualifications, which enabled them to serve their country and their sovereign in positions of increasing dignity.
…

An extremely clear-sighted and clever traveller, whose only defect is that he is too fond of fault-finding, describes the relations between the Hungarian noblemen and the Court at Vienna in the following terms:2

“**The proud Hungarians, who on their country estates were engaged in planning schemes of liberty, have been allured to the Court or to town.** By the grant of dignities, titles, and offers of marriage, and in other ways, every opportunity has been given them of spending their money in splendour, of contracting debts, and of throwing themselves on the mercy of the sovereign when their estates have been sequestrated. Thus enticed away from their homes, the Hungarians have thought it an honour to form connections by marriage with some of the great German families, whose authority at Court and whose influence on the affairs of the whole monarchy is altogether greater than that of the Hungarians. By wedding women from Vienna they have limited their own freedom of action, and their foreign wives, by introducing more refined customs and a higher standard of comfort into their new homes, have done all in their power to bring about sequestration, **The whole aristocracy of Hungary is now related to that of Vienna, and these alliances have served to propagate the so-called fine manners, which have exhausted the resources of the Hungarians and made them the slaves of the Court.** There is scarcely a single prominent family in Hungary which is free from debt, and, following the example of their Viennese compeers, the Hungarian nobles take particular pride in their debts. **Having thus converted the most powerful part of the Hungarian nobility into spendthrifts, debauchees, and cowards, the Court has no longer occasion to fear a revolt.**

> https://elfinspell.com/ClassicalTexts/TacitusAgricola/Part2.html#topref32
>
> 21. The succeeding winter was employed in the most salutary measures. In order, by a taste of pleasure, to reclaim the natives from that rude and **unsettled [dispersi]** state which prompted them to war, and reconcile them to quiet and **tranquillity, [otio]** he incited them, by private instigations and public encouragements, to erect **temples, courts of justice, [fora] and dwelling-houses.** He bestowed commendations upon those who were prompt in complying with his intentions, and reprimanded such as were dilatory; **thus promoting a spirit of emulation which had all the force of necessity.** 2 **He was also attentive to provide a liberal education for the sons of their chieftains, preferring the natural genius [ingenia] of the Britons to the attainments [studiis] of the Gauls;** and his attempts were attended with such success, that they who lately disdained to make use of the Roman language, were now ambitious of becoming eloquent. Hence the Roman habit began to be held in honor, and the toga was frequently worn. **At length they gradually deviated into a taste for those luxuries which stimulate to vice; porticos, and baths, and the elegances of the table: [conviviorum elegantiam] and this, from their inexperience, they termed politeness, while, in reality, it constituted a part of their slavery. [Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset.]**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n263/mode/2up?view=theater

When Frederick heard the news of Maria Theresa's death, his first words were: “*Voilà un nouvel ordre des choses!*” The new order made itself felt in almost every sphere; the nobility was put on an equality before the law with the middle classes.
…

All processions and pilgrimages were banned, holy days considerably diminished, various brotherhoods broken up, monasteries and church property secularized.
…

The universities were robbed of all their privileges and completely officialized, to their considerable detriment; **for the new education decree changed them from homes of scientific research to mere training centres for future officials,** and only those subjects which could serve this end were taught, and taught by miserably paid professors.
…

The idea was to metamorphose, at a moment’s notice and without consulting anybody’s wishes, a clerical population into a liberal, a peasant and bourgeois society into a bureaucratic.

But most ill-timed of all were the attempts to force into a unitary state the whole variegated mass of Germans, Poles, Czechoslovaks, Serbocroats, Ruthenians, Roumanians, and Italians, which could only hang together, if at all, as a federal state. **“The German language,” ran an Imperial edict, “is the universal language of my kingdom”; it was the obligatory medium of intercourse in all schools and offices. The aim of this forced Germanization, which extended to all the provinces with the exception of Belgium and Lombardy, was merely centralist, and not at all nationalistic**—for the Emperor, in accordance with the fashion of the time, was cosmopolitan-minded—but it aroused nevertheless the bitterest resentment.

> https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap21.htm#tole

> The partial acts of severity which he occasionally exercised, though they were secretly prompted by a Christian zeal, were coloured by the fairest pretences of justice and the public good; **and while Constantine designed to ruin the foundations, he seemed to reform the abuses, of the ancient religion.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n329/mode/2up?view=theater

Initiated in the Sophisticated mysteries, Joseph II had found means of combining the ideas of Equality and Liberty with those of the Despot, **and, under pretence of reigning like a Philosopher, levelled every thing around him, that he and his systems might tower alone above the ruined plane. With his pretended Liberty of conscience, he would have been the greatest persecutor of his age, had not the French Revolution followed him so closely. With his pretended Equality, he only sought to vilify and plunder the Nobility, and to fling their fortunes into the hands of their vassals, in order to overthrow the laws of the Empire, and those of property as well as those of religion, that he might not meet with a greater opposition from the Nobility than he would from their vassals.—With all his pretensions to genius, the most awful lessons were necessary to persuade him that the real tendency of this Philosophism of Equality and of religious and political Liberty, was the destruction of the throne as well as of the altar.**

Such was the Philosophy of that Prince: whatever may have been his intentions, his innovating genius was unfortunate enough to furnish the pretext for a most cruel insurrection against the Nobility of a large portion of his dominions. **The celerity with which he was accustomed to make himself obeyed, may cast cruel doubts on the dilatory manner in which he went to the succour of the unhappy victims.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap2.htm#POP

We are informed that when the emperor Claudius exercised the office of censor, he took an account of six millions nine hundred and forty-five thousand Roman citizens, who, with the proportion of women and children, must have amounted to about twenty millions of souls. The multitude of subjects of an inferior rank was uncertain and fluctuating. But, after weighing with attention every circumstance which could influence the balance, it seems probable that there existed, in the time of Claudius, about twice as many provincials as there were citizens, of either sex, and of every age; and that the slaves were at least equal in number to the free inhabitants of the Roman world. The total amount of this imperfect calculation would rise to about one hundred and twenty millions of persons; **a degree of population which possibly exceeds that of modern Europe,** (62) **and forms the most numerous society that has ever been united under the same system of government.**

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap2.htm#COU

The natives of Europe were brave and robust, Spain, Gaul, Britain, and Illyricum supplied the legions with excellent soldiers, and constituted the real strength of the monarchy. **Their personal valour remained, but they no longer possessed that public courage which is nourished by the love of independence, the sense of national honour,** the presence of danger, and the habit of command.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap7.htm#WAN

The superior prerogative of birth, when it has obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the monarch. **To the firm establishment of this idea, we owe the peaceful succession, and mild administration, of European monarchies.** To the defect of it, we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers. Yet, even in the East, the sphere of contention is usually limited to the princes of the reigning house, and as soon as the more fortunate competitor has removed his brethren, by the sword and the bowstring, he no longer entertains any jealousy of his meaner subjects. **But the Roman empire, after the authority of the senate had sunk into contempt, was a vast scene of confusion. The royal, and even noble, families of the provinces, had long since been led in triumph before the car of the haughty republicans.** The ancient families of Rome had successively fallen beneath the tyranny of the Caesars, and whilst those princes were shackled by the forms of a commonwealth, and disappointed by the repeated failure of their posterity, (1) it was impossible that any idea of hereditary succession should have taken root in the minds of their subjects. **The right to the throne, which none could claim from birth, every one assumed from merit.** The daring hopes of ambition were set loose from the salutary restraints of law and prejudice; and the meanest of mankind might, without folly, entertain a hope of being raised by valour and fortune to a rank in the army, in which a single crime would enable him to wrest the sceptre of the world from his feeble and unpopular master. **After the murder of Alexander Severus, and the**

elevation of Maximin, no emperor could think himself safe upon the throne and every barbarian peasant of the frontier might aspire to that august, but dangerous station.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#ofpersons

The distinction of ranks and *persons* is the firmest basis of a mixed and limited government. In France, the remains of liberty are kept alive by the spirit, the honours, and even the prejudices, of fifty thousand nobles. (99) **[1788] Two hundred families supply, in lineal descent, the second branch of English legislature, which maintains, between the king and commons, the balance of the constitution.** A gradation of patricians and plebeians, of strangers and subjects, has supported the aristocracy of Genoa, Venice, and ancient Rome. **The perfect equality of men is the point in which the extremes of democracy and despotism are confounded; since the majesty of the prince or people would be offended, if any heads were exalted above the level of their fellow-slaves or fellow-citizens.** In the decline of the Roman empire, the proud distinctions of the republic were gradually abolished, and the reason or instinct of Justinian completed the simple form of an absolute monarchy. The emperor could not eradicate the popular reverence which always waits on the possession of hereditary wealth, or the memory of famous ancestors. He delighted to honor, with titles and emoluments, his generals, magistrates, and senators; and his precarious indulgence communicated some rays of their glory to the persons of their wives and children. **But in the eye of the law, all Roman citizens were equal, and all subjects of the empire were citizens of Rome.** That inestimable character was degraded to an obsolete and empty name. The voice of a Roman could no longer enact his laws, or create the annual ministers of his power: his constitutional rights might have checked the arbitrary will of a master: **and the bold adventurer from Germany or Arabia was admitted, with equal favor, to the civil and military command, which the citizen alone had been once entitled to assume over the conquests of his fathers.**

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n207/mode/2up?view=theater

At the top was the court, in which the divergent interests of the barons found expression. **The king slipped into it some ecclesiastics, not any of the great bishops, who were as baronial as the barons, but humble priests who had in strict reason no place in what was really an assemblage of petty sovereigns. But their habit and their knowledge brought them respect: and their opinions supported the king's.** Next, he introduced some lawyers of plebeian rank, who sat humbly on the steps of the benches reserved for the peers and upper barons—as Saint-Simon contemptuously records6—that they might be consulted when it was convenient to do so. **Raised from nothing by the king, they gave advice, having for its inspiration the Roman law,**7 **which was always favourable to the central authority.**

> 7. The monarchy was at first hostile to the Roman law, on which the Emperor rested his claims. It became friendly to it, once there was nothing to be feared from the Emperor, because it buttressed its own claims to absolutism.

In the end the sovereign permitted them to express opinions, thus subverting the primitive constitution by which a man's importance in the state was in proportion to the strength which he wielded in society. At long last, the court became the parliament—the expression of none but the royal interest.
…

Infantry did not become capable of withstanding cavalry charges until the Swiss had revived the Greek tactical formation of the "hedgehog": and it was only then that, backed by plebeian mercenaries, the monarchy could make itself absolute.

The nerve centres of the political high command were at first the "great officers of state," powerful barons who supervised, controlled, and bridled the king, and on occasion turned against him. The king in his turn took every occasion of noiselessly removing these dangerous auxiliaries. That was what happened to the seneschal. This "officer of state" was charged with the oversight of the king's table, and, when that was served, with victualling the king's men-at-arms; this meant that it was he who also led them to battle and was their military commander. But, besides that, since the provisioning of the court fell in those days on the provosts who administered the royal estates, the seneschal, as was natural, controlled the provosts and superintended the estates.

When functions of this character had been concentrated in the hands of a baron who was already powerful in his own right, anything might be feared. It took a palace revolution to bring about the fall of Étienne de Garlande in 1127, and Philip Augustus did away with the office in 1191. **Later, however, the constable, who carried the king's sword, was to prove, as is shown by the Constable de Bourbon's treason, no less dangerous.**9

9. Once more, the word “treason” implies the idea of a state as the kings conceived it and as we conceive it. But the constable saw things differently: **the realm in his eyes was a confederation of manors, at the head of which was Francis I. And one of the offices of the confederation was that of constable: but it was lawful for a confederate member to quit the confederation and rely on his own forces.** Men thought thus throughout the Middle Ages. In the time of Francis I this conception no longer corresponded to reality in France, but it still corresponded to it in Germany, where the Empire had visibly taken on the character of a confederation of aristocratic authorities and where the central authority had been reduced to a shadow.

It was in the military sphere that the monarchy let itself be served longest by the great barons. In all others it may be seen having systematic recourse to plebeian servants.

What could be more essential to the royal authority than finance? And how could its management possibly be left to a powerful baron, such as the chamberlain, whose key denotes that the safe is in his keeping? For that reason the sovereign took for the effective administration of his revenues humble ecclesiastics and mere bourgeoisie. **Borelli de Serres has given us the names of these officials from the time of Philip the Fair in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: all of them are men of humble rank.**

There we see it: plebeian counsellors, plebeian soldiers, plebeian officials; these are the instruments of a Power which seeks, more or less consciously, to make itself absolute.

3. In popular imagination a monarchy keeps its employments for the nobles and excludes from them the common people. **In fact the exact opposite happens; it endures the services of the great only so far as it stays under aristocratic tutelage; but it calls on the services of the common people so far as it aims at becoming absolute.**

The most total Power that Europe in the days of the *ancien régime* ever knew was that of the Ottoman Turks. And where, if you please did their *grand seigneur* find his most faithful soldiers and his surest servants? Not among the Turkish nobility, the companions of his conquests, of whose pride and turbulence he went in fear. He recruited his janissaries among the subject Christian races. To them, too, he went for his administrators, and even for his grand vizier. In this way he raised above the natural aristocracy **a statocracy composed of men who had nothing and owed him everything.**10

Our French kings moved on the same road. **Some of them moved consciously, as in the case of Louis XI (1461-1483), who is shown us by Commines as being “the natural friend of the middle class and the enemy of the great who could do without him.”** The other kings followed instinctively the same course.

The natural requirements of Power made the fortunes of the common people. All those “little people,” whom Dupont-Ferrier11 shows us staffing the Treasury Court and the Taxes Court, no sooner found their niche in the state than they set about advancing their own fortunes along with their employer’s. At whose expense? The aristocrats’. **With a boldness born of obscurity they encroached progressively on the taxing rights of the barons and transferred to the royal treasury the incomes of the great.** As their invasions grew, the financial machine grew larger and more complicated. That there might be new posts for their relations, they discovered new duties, so that whole families came to take their ease in a bureaucracy which grew continually in numbers and authority. Again, as more and more taxes were demanded from the people of the realm, the middle-class officials of the Taxes Court took the chance presented to secure the elevation of their provincial colleagues. Assessment and collection were at first entrusted to men chosen by the taxpayers; but these officials soon came to be appointed by the administration and continued in office from one tax to the next, spawning the while a whole hierarchy of underlings—deputies, clerks, registrars. **So it was that everywhere the service of the state became the road to distinction, advancement, and authority for the common people.**12

The judicial world went the way of the financial. **The poor bachelors of law who were summoned to the king’s court steadily pushed the barons out of it, gained assurance, put on a periwig, became the parliament,° and forced their way by degrees even into the baronial estates; this last they did by setting up as judges between the baron and his followers: in other words, by robbing him of his authority.**

What a sight it is, this rise of the clerks,13 this swarming of busy bees who gradually devour the feudal splendour and leave it with nothing but its pomp and titles! Does it not leap to the eye that the state has made the fortunes of all these common people, just as they have made the state’s?

13. On the eve of the Wars of Religion, Augustin Thierry wrote: “**The Third Estate found itself, by a sort of prescriptive right which operated less completely against the clergy than against the nobility, holding nearly the whole of the offices in the civil administration, including the highest, including even those which have since received the name of ministries.** It was from the plebeian class, rising by way of university degrees and more or less numerous tests, that there came the

> Chancellor Keeper of the Seals, the Secretaries of State, the Master of Requests, the advocates and procurators of the crown, and the entire judicial body. Similarly, in the financial administration, the officials of every rank—superintendent treasurers, intendants, controllers, receivers general and particular—all belonged to the class of educated bourgeoisie who went by the name of 'gentlemen of the robe.' As for the jurisdiction of the seneschals, the bailiffs and the provosts of the king—if these offices were still held by gentlemen at all, the gentlemen must needs find substitutes and assessors to do the work." A. Thierry, *Histoire du Tiers État* (ed. 1836) pp. 83-84.

They are bound by a passionate attachment to the offices the possession of which transforms their lives. When the King was mad and the Dauphin imbecile, and the Duke of Burgundy, flown with pride and popularity, had given Paris over to anarchy and butchery, it was Jean Jouvenel, King's Advocate, who, all alone, vindicated and retrieved the laws of the state.

Their love of office, though essentially conservative, has its aggressive side. In putting down the mighty they not only serve the state, they take their revenge at the same time. There are, as it happens, certain aristocratic interests which are also the interests of society. "The continuance of prosperity," said Renan, "needs to be safeguarded by institutions which, though admittedly they give a privileged position to some, form notwithstanding organs of the national life without which certain of its needs stay unsupplied."14 **There is no asking your plebeian official to understand the meaning of that. "The various small fortresses," adds Renan, "in which are stored the things that pertain to society, come to look like feudal castles."** Against these feudal castles the men of the king tirelessly renew their attacks.

The historians of the Italian cities picture to us the bourgeoisie setting out on expeditions against the nearby châteaux, attacking them, and, once they had taken them, demolishing them stone by stone. Those who had been the barons were forced by the bourgeoisie to live, alongside themselves, the lives of plain citizens; and in this way the citizens extended the city's authority over the open country. The same memories of past humiliations and deeply felt jealousies, the same passion for the city—which is the City of Command—to which he belongs, impel the politician of the people to destroy every private authority, and anything else that bounds, limits, or stays the majesty of the public authority.
…

In favouring the freeing of the serfs and limiting the right of the barons to exploit their underlings, the king thereby weakens his natural enemies. In encouraging the formation of a stratum of well-to-do bourgeoisie, an oligarchy of commoners and a mercantile class, he gets himself servants and assures himself support. **In instituting the farming of taxes, he opens to this bourgeoisie the gates of the state. In allowing these taxes to become a heritable property, he links with his own fortunes entire families among the bourgeoisie. He encourages the universities, which provide him with his most effective champions. These maintain his cause, whether against the Emperor or the Pope,** in brilliant theses, but, also and still more, they gnaw darkly and continuously at the foundations of baronial right. Augustin Thierry has, therefore, good reason to assert:

> **For a period of six centuries, from the twelfth to the eighteenth, the histories of the Third Estate and royalty are indissolubly linked together. … From the coming of Louis the Fat to the death of Louis XIV,** each decisive period in the advance of the various plebeian classes towards liberty, well-being, enlightenment and social importance, corresponds, in the list of reigns, to the name of a great king or of a great minister.15

During minorities, or when the sovereign was a weak one and took his orders from the nobility, as was the case with Louis X or Louis XVI, this advance was interrupted and a reaction took shape.

But, the greedier was the monarch of Power, the harder he hit the social princes and the further he pushed the work of emancipation. This was well understood by the Third Estate, and, at the States-General, its representatives—who knelt down to speak—were the most ardent supporters of Power. **Sometimes, when their grievances had anticipated the wishes of the king, they incited him to speed his seizure of the baronial jurisdictions.**16

> 16. When the process had already gone a long way, the Third Estate at the States of 1562 protested that the barons were exacting *corvées* and taxes in excess of their legal rights, and were haling their subjects "before judges who were their own liegemen"; it claimed that **"for the future, in causes between barons and their subjects in which the former have a personal interest, the subjects should only be summoned before a *royal* judge of the province."** How useful complaints of this kind were to the expansion of Power!

At other times they gave vigorous support to his authority, as at the first convocation summoned by Philip the Fair, **and we even see them handing to the monarchy in 1614 an irrevocable mandate**

to do what it pleased,17 **such as might have emanated from the brain of a Hobbes and to which only a class with a vested interest in absolutism could ever have agreed.**

> 17. Here is the article which the Third Estate put at the head of its memorandum entitled “The Fundamental Law”: “The king shall be entreated to promulgate in the assembly of his Estates, as a fundamental law to be known to and kept inviolate by all, that, as he is the recognized sovereign in his state, **holding his crown from God alone,** there is no authority on earth of any kind, temporal or spiritual, which has any power in his realm to take it from the sacred person of our king, or to dispense and absolve his subjects from the obedience which they owe him, on any cause or pretext whatsoever, and that all his subjects, of whatever quality and condition, will keep this law for true and sacred and as conforming to the word of God, without distinction, equivocation or limitation of any kind; it shall be sworn to by all the States deputies and after them by all the beneficiaries and officers of the realm, before entering on the possession of their benefices and the performance of their duties; all tax-collectors, regents, doctors and preachers shall be instructed to teach it and make it known; **that the contrary opinion, that it is lawful to kill or depose our kings, to rise up in rebellion against them and to shake off the yoke of obedience to them for any reason whatever, is impious, detestable, contrary to truth and contrary to the constitution of the State of France, which is in direct dependence on God alone.**"
>
> No doubt this declaration is occasional, and is in response to a campaign organized by the Jesuit doctors; in it may be felt the memory of the frightful disorders of the days of the League. But, whatever the particular reasons which inspired it, the declaration was made, and is unquestionably an unlimited and irrevocable mandate.
>
> https://biblehub.com/1_corinthians/1-28.htm
>
> 28 **And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are:** 29 **That no flesh should glory in his presence.**

The aristocracy was no less aware that the principal instrument of its progressive decline was the plebeian staff into whose hands Power was falling ever more completely. **We have only to listen to Saint-Simon’s° bitter cries against Mazarin. Saint-Simon well understood that at the time of the Fronde a revolution happened, not of the tumultuous sort at which the Frondeurs tried their hand, but rather an invisible one,** which was accomplished by the minister who was Richelieu’s heir and Louis XVI’s tutor.

> **All his attention and care were devoted to abolishing in every possible way the distinctions of birth and to despoiling persons of quality of every sort of authority, for which purpose he tried to keep them away from affairs of state;** to bringing into the administration people of as low extraction as his own; to magnifying their offices in point of power, distinction, credit and wealth; to persuading the king that as every nobleman was the natural enemy of his authority, he should prefer to them, to handle his affairs, **men of no account, who could at the first sign of discontent be reduced to insignificance by having their employments taken from them as easily as the gift of them had raised them from insignificance;** whereas the nobility, being already men of importance by reason of their birth, their marriage connections and often by their establishments, acquired through high office and ministerial patronage a formidable strength and became, for the same reason, dangerous to remove from office. **That was the cause of the entry into public life of men of the pen and the long robe and of the destruction, still felt and seen, of the nobility at a rate which will seem a prodigy; the men of the pen and the long robe well knew the means of hastening this destruction, and made their yoke worse every day until a point was reached at which the greatest nobleman in the land became of no use to anyone and became in a thousand and one ways dependent on the vilest plebeian.**18

And again, speaking of Mazarin, he said:

> **A foreigner coming from the dregs of the people, a man of no account and having no other gods than his own greatness and power, has no care for the state [i.e. nation] that he governs other than as he is himself affected. He despises its laws, its genius, its interests; he disregards its rules and forms; *he thinks only of subjugating and confounding all, of contriving that the all shall be the common people.***

Let us stop to admire how the invective of a great writer flourishes in the soil of truth. To subjugate and confound all, to contrive that the all shall be the common people, therein is the real genius of a monarchical administration. **Historians of the sentimental school have sometimes regretted that royalty became absolute, while at the same time rejoicing that it installed plebeians in office. They deceive themselves. Royalty exalted plebeians just because it aimed at becoming absolute; it became absolute because it had exalted plebeians.**

…

The French aristocracy managed badly the day-to-day defence of itself; it proceeded by way of violent, disorderly, clumsy, and brutal counter-offensives, as when, in Louis X's reign, it hanged Enguerrand de Marigny and put to the torture Pierre de Latilly, Chancellor of France, and Raoul de Presle, King's Advocate.21

> 21. A. Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 29. "The lawyers of the fourteenth century, who were the founders and ministers of the royal autocracy, came to the end common to great revolutionaries. The boldest perished in the reaction of the interests they had injured and the folkways they had violated."

It could not carry with it the Third Estate by making it understand that the only motive for freeing it from superiorities which time had sweetened was to subject it to the crushing domination of the state. If the two did find themselves working together, as at the start of the Fronde, the aristocracy soon lost the others' support through incapacity to give its revolt the appearance of a defence of the general interest; soon it was split itself by the greed of the rebels, each of whom was ready, if it was made worth his while, to make his private treaty of peace with the crown.

In short, it lacked the political sense, and knew no other way of recapturing lost positions than under cover of civil disturbances, such as the Wars of Religion or the Fronde—events which weakened authority and so allowed the nobles to resume in the general disorder their part of petty potentates whose return to the fold, when the task of pacification began, would have to be bought.22

> 22. Saint-Simon saw clearly how disturbances worked to the advantage of aristocracy: "All that Henry IV could do, with the support of his faithful nobles, was, after endless toil, to get himself fully recognized for what he claimed to be, ***by buying as it were the crown from his subjects*** **by means of treaties and the millions in money which they cost him,** ***the vast establishments and the assured places for Catholic and Huguenot leaders*****.** Nobles with places so assured, and who yet felt much disappointed after the positions which each had dreamt of for himself, were a difficult team." *Op. cit.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 9.

The English aristocracy knew better how to work together; the reason perhaps being that, **whereas in France the Parliament passed into the hands of the lawyers and so became an instrument of the crown, in England it remained an organ of the social authorities and a rallying-point for their opposition.** So well did it understand the art of giving to its resistance a plausible show of public advantage that the Magna Charta, to take one instance, though in reality nothing more than the capitulation of the king to vested interests acting in their own defence, contained phrases about law and liberty which are valid for all time.

Whereas the French nobles got themselves known to the people as petty tyrants, often more unruly and exacting than a great one would be, **the English nobles managed to convey to the yeoman class of free proprietors the feeling that they too were aristocrats on a small scale,** with interests to defend in common with the nobles.
…

The English aristocracy, perhaps because of the nabobs' infiltration into it, was so well in control of economic phenomena that it stopped dead every attempt at monetary devaluation, thereby assuring the stability of its income in terms of goods, and in the eighteenth century even raising its value, thanks to the downward movement of prices during that period.

Thus armed with power and wealth, the British aristocracy was, under the Hanoverian kings, to be the true master of the state. When at a much later date democracy raised its head, it was to find in England a Power quite surrounded by a network of aristocratic defences, whereas in France it seized at a stroke a Power which was an unrestricted monarchy.
…

Saint-Simon shows us the upper nobility waiting for the death of Louis XIV to recover the ground which they had lost since Mazarin. How to do it? Was it a case of setting up against the king a moderating counter-authority? The dukes thought otherwise and aimed at laying hands on the state. **Apt scholars of the plebeian officers of state, whose victims they had been, their only idea of political action was to use the levers of state authority.**

> My plan [says Saint-Simon] was to start installing in the ministry nobles with all the dignity and authority that belonged to them, **thereby displacing the clerks and the lawyers; I planned to manage things prudently and gradually and empirically, so that bit by bit this rabble should lose all its posts which were not of a purely judicial character and be replaced in all its offices by seigneurs and nobles only;** in this way the entire field of administration would have come under the nobility.26

This senseless project, seasoned by Fénelon's utopian ideas, had already entered the head of the Duke of Burgundy. It implied to start with a mistake as to the composition of the aristocracy; **it was no longer composed exclusively of the nobility, but included also the class of gentlemen of the robe, who had interests in common with the nobility—whom the nobility were now in their folly seeking to shut out.** It implied, secondly, a non-comprehension of the aristocracy's historical role, which was, not to govern, but to act as buffer-stop to the government. The examples furnished by Venice and England of government by aristocracy had turned French heads. **But the composition and temperament of the Venetian nobility were quite different. It was not a collection of independent princes with separate interests which one prince had brought into subjection, but a body of notable citizens who had been elevated to the charge of public affairs.** As for the English nobility, it had fitted itself into the government by means of a long *tête-à-tête* with it in Parliament.

The reaction that occurred in France in 1715 resulted merely in the disorganization of the state, through "the ignorance, idleness and frivolity of a nobility whom practice had made good for nothing but getting themselves killed."27 The plebeian clerks, who had had to be kept on as the secretaries of the now preposterous councils, were noiselessly reinstalled as heads of the administration. But now Power had been weakened, to the profit of those competent folk, the gentlemen of the robe. In origin they were statocrats. Raised up in the shadow of the state, as they acknowledged,28 they prided themselves, and with good reason, on having raised up the state:

> ***If the pride of the great vassals has been forced to humble itself before the throne of your ancestors, to renounce its independence, and to recognize in the king a supreme jurisdiction and a public authority which is superior to that exercised by themselves...***29 these are all services, the most important doubtless ever rendered to the royal authority, which are due, as history testifies, to your Parliament.30

29. At this point the Parliament added: "... if the independence of your crown has been maintained against the attacks of the Court of Rome, whereas sovereigns nearly everywhere had bent their necks beneath the yoke of ultramontane ambition; lastly, **if the sceptre has been passed down to the eldest son of the royal house by the longest and most prosperous succession of kings ever seen in the annals of Empires...**"

30. Representations of December 3, 1770.

Strong in services rendered, the now wealthy heirs of Power's lawyer-servants claimed henceforward to control its actions,31 and assuredly there was no other body of men in the country better qualified to hold Power in check.

31. **The clergy's remonstrances in 1788 show what a hold ideas of the limitation of Power had now taken: "The will of the prince may, if it has not been elucidated by his courts, be regarded as *his will of the moment*. It only acquires the majesty which assures it of execution and obedience if the explanations and remonstrances of your courts have first been heard in your privy council."** The truth is that the idea that every expressed wish of the sovereign had not *ipso facto* sovereign force played a role of capital importance under the *ancien régime*. It was eclipsed momentarily, and then not completely, only at the height of Louis XIV's reign.

If offices were bought, the control over the sales exercised by this body hedged in the appointment of a new magistrate with guarantees which ensured that no senate was ever recruited better. If the members of the Parliament were not elected by the public, they deserved on that account more of the public confidence, as being less its flatterers by design than its champions by principle. Taken as a whole, they formed a weightier and more capable body of men than those of the British Parliament. Was it right, then, for the monarchy to accept and sanction this counter-Power? Or did its dignity demand that it react against the pretensions of Parliament? **That was the policy of one party, which called itself Richelieu's heir and was in fact led by d'Aiguillon, a great-nephew of the great Cardinal. But if the need was to smash now this aristocracy of the robe and extend the royal authority ever further, it had to be done as in former days to the plaudits of the common people and by employing a new set of plebeians against the present wearers of periwigs.** Mirabeau saw as much, but d'Aiguillon's faction were blind to it.

That faction consisted of nobles who had been more or less plucked by the monarchical Power and were now getting new feathers by installing themselves in the wealth-giving apparatus of state which had been built by the plebeian clerks. Finding that offices were now of greater value than the manors, they fell to on the offices. Finding that the bulk of the feudal dues had been diverted into the coffers of the state, they put their hands in them. And, occupying every place and obstructing every avenue leading to Power, **they succeeded in weakening it both by their incapacity and by their feeble efforts to prevent it from attracting, as formerly, to its banners the aspirations of the common people.**

In this way the men who should have served the state, finding themselves discarded,32 turned Jacobin.

> 32. **Notably by the ridiculous regulation of 1780 which made a patent of nobility going as far back as 1400 a condition of belonging to the court.** In this way the king was forced to live in the midst of an unadulterated nobility. And for what purpose? **The purpose was pure greed, so as to have a monopoly of the favours and places which the king did not grant to those who were out of his sight.**

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n249/mode/2up?view=theater

Louis XIV had strictly excluded the nobles from every political office, but now this crowd of courtiers, greedy of power and place, started to wage a continuous war against the king's ministers, each of whom had henceforward to raise his own faction to maintain himself in office.
…

To keep the men of law in service to authority, as in their beginning they had been, all that was needed was that their ranks should be filled either from the bodies of poor clerks attached to the courts or, at the least, from a middle class between whom and the nobility there was a great social gulf. But hereditary offices, which had at first attached certain middle-class families to the interests of the state, had detached them from the middle class, and made of them a distinct caste, which constant intermarriage bound to the interests of the higher nobility. **The Parliament men, who were at first statocrats, with no more status than their offices gave them, had become aristocrats, with an authority proper to themselves and interests which were distinct from those of the state.** If an attempt was made to cut down the absurdly bloated number of officials, which got in the way of the dispatch of business, the Parliament men obstructed it. The reason was that the officials, like the Parliament men, had bought their offices (which had been created in lean times to bring in a revenue) and the Parliament men could not permit any attack on a form of property7 which gave them their own importance. If an attempt was made to spread taxation evenly over all the orders, with regard henceforward paid to nothing but ability to pay, the Parliament men, who themselves had fiscal privileges, made common cause with everyone else who had them. In view of the conflict looming inevitably between Power and themselves, **they made themselves, they who were by tradition the enemies of local immunities, the paradoxical defenders of those very immunities.**

They became in the end so strong that Maupéou's dismissal of them in 1770 amounted to a *coup d'état*. Such was the feebleness of authority at the time that some courtiers of the parliamentary faction were able to maltreat the Minister of Finance in the antechamber of the king itself.8

Behind the Parliament were the nobility, the clergy, the provinces, and the princes themselves. There was no king's party to be found. Or, rather, it was the people.

8. In 1788 the administration confronted everywhere forces which thwarted it. It had been reduced to the lowest level of impotence. The Revolution was suddenly to liberate it from all its adversaries.

The retreat of the monarchy had gone so far that it had had to throw to popular clamour its provincial intendants, who were the executors of the central government's will; **they were succeeded by provincial assemblies—a move which was in the opposite direction to all French history.** The Revolution, on the other hand, was to subject the entire country, more strictly and uniformly than ever before, to the will of Power.

The work of the Revolution was the restoration of absolute monarchy. The direction of the common people's aspirations had been understood by Philip the Fair: for that reason he—the first to do it—had summoned the Third Estate to the States-General. **Nearly five centuries later the event still justified him; but Louis XVI was no Philip the Fair. And the restoration was to take place without a king.**
…

But one thing is clear enough: that from the start the Constituent Assembly sacrificed the interests of just those privileged persons who had demanded the convocation of the States-General. A few sessions saw the destruction of privileges on which the kings had never dared lay hands. **The suppression of the States-Provincial, which had been an object of royal policy for centuries, was the work of a moment. The vast possessions of the clergy were made over no less swiftly to Power, and the Parliaments, whose obstructionist tactics had brought about the convocation of the States-General, received a more summary dismissal than in the time of Maupéou.**

The checks and balances were all swept away, and here, as Mirabeau saw, lay the king's great opportunity.9 He wrote to him: **"The idea of forming all the citizens into but one class would have pleased Richelieu, for an equality of this kind facilitates the work of Power."**10 Mirabeau saw himself filling the part and place of the great Cardinal, gathering the fruits of this stupendous lopping of heads.

> 9. In a memorandum of remarkable lucidity he notes: “In the course of a single year liberty has triumphed over more of the prejudices impeding authority, *has wiped out more enemies of the throne*, and has obtained more sacrifices for the national prosperity, than the royal authority could have done in several centuries. I have always called attention to the fact that the obliteration of the clergy, the Parliaments, the state lands, the feudal nobility, the provincial jurisdictions and every species of privilege was a victory both for the nation and for the monarchy.” Twenty-eighth memorandum for the Court, dated September 28, 1790, in *Correspondance de Mirabeau avec le Comte de La Marck*, in 3 vols. (Paris: 1851) Vol. II, p. 197.

…

“Yes, I assure you,” cried Mirabeau, “I can think of nothing more terrible than a sovereign aristocracy of six hundred people.” Yet it came, inexorably.

…

“As for the equilibrium of powers, we have in the past let ourselves be the dupes of its prestige...” exclaimed Robespierre, but now,

> **what do we care for devices devised to balance the authority of tyrants?** It is tyranny that must be extirpated: the aim of the people should be, not to find in the quarrels of their masters short breathing-spaces for themselves, but to make their own right arms the guarantee of their rights.12

In other words: when the Power was held by others, we favoured limiting it; now that we hold it ourselves, it cannot be too big.

…

By all means let the people be an absolute sovereign in the hour of choosing its representatives, for in that way the representatives hold from it unlimited authority. <u>But when it has conferred on them this authority, its role is finished and it is of no further importance: it is now the subject, and only the assembly is sovereign.</u> Only the assembly is the place where the general will is formed,15 and consultation with the people is no more than a species of cookery **which boils down the entire nation into a microcosm of six hundred persons who, by an exceedingly courageous fiction, are deemed to be the assembled nation itself.**16

Yet this exalted sovereignty, which dared to send the king to the scaffold and rejected contemptuously the Girondins’ proposal of appeal to the electoral assemblies, abased and humbled itself—before whom? Before the bands of unbridled fanatics who were welcomed at the bar of the Convention and whose crazy petitions were accepted as the expression of the popular will.

…

The true incarnation of this new Power was Sieyès. No one had played a larger part than he in the unfolding of the Revolution; having been a member of the Constituent Assembly, of the Convention, and of the Committee of Public Safety, a Director and a Consul, he prompted, no doubt, these words of Napoleon, which, had he been in a position to do so, he would have spoken on his own account: “The Revolution is closed; its principles are fixed in my person. The government in being is the representative of the sovereign people. There can be no opposition to the sovereign.”

…

The wish of the population was to be quit of the royal intendants and to administer itself by localities. The Constituent Assembly gave it apparent satisfaction by entrusting all departments of government to elected local assemblies. But simultaneously it destroyed just those historical units which had the ability and the will to govern themselves. **<u>The geometrical intelligence of Sieyès conceived the idea of cutting up the country into twenty-four equal rectangles, themselves divided into nine equal *communes*, which, by the same infantile geometry, spawned nine cantons each.</u>**18 **Though this crazy plan was not followed through, it remained the ideal of the creators of the *départements*. It was safe enough after that to give these artificial creations an autonomous existence!** As though there were danger of such as they feeling the breath of a life of their own!

> The systematic spirit [said Benjamin Constant]19 at first went into raptures over symmetry. The passion for Power soon found out what an immense advantage this symmetry procured it. **It nearly came to the point of denoting cities and provinces by numbers, just as numbers were used to denote legions and army corps:** so great was the apparent fear of any moral idea being attached to whatever was done!

…

Independent, majestic, and capable of withstanding the king himself, the judiciary influenced profoundly the character of the people.

> **Judicial habits had become in many respects the habits of the nation.** The courts had spread the idea widely that every dispute was subject to argument and every decision to appeal; they had made publicity customary and formality desirable, both of them things which keep servitude at bay.23

This independence has never reappeared: **“The subordination of the magistracy to the government is one of the triumphs of the Revolution. At the moment of proclaiming the rights of man, it destroyed their castle and paralysed their defenders.”**24

---

https://archive.org/details/cu31924014201044/page/n29/mode/2up?view=theater

ONE of the first measures of the French Revolution was an attack upon the Church. **Of all the passions to which that Revolution gave birth, that of irreligion was the first kindled, as it was the last extinguished.** Even when the first enthusiasm of liberty had worn off and peace had been purchased by the sacrifice of freedom, hostility to religion survived. Napoleon subdued the liberal spirit of the Revolution, but he could not conquer its anti-Christian tendencies. Even in the times in which we live, **men have fancied they were redeeming their servility to the most slender officials of the state by their insolence to God, and have renounced all that was free, noble, and exalted in the doctrines of the Revolution, in the belief that they were still faithful to its spirit so long as they were infidels.**

> https://biblehub.com/luke/19-14.htm
>
> **But his citizens** [*politai*] **hated him, and sent a message after him, saying, We will not have this man to reign over us.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/28046/pg28046-images.html#BARERE **[April, 1844]**

The policy of the Jacobins, in this situation, was to subject France to an aristocracy infinitely worse than that aristocracy which had emigrated with the Count of Artois—to an aristocracy not of birth, not of wealth, not of education, but of mere locality. **They would not hear of privileged orders; but they wished to have a privileged city. That twenty-five millions of Frenchmen should be ruled by a hundred thousand gentlemen and clergymen was insufferable; but that twenty-five millions of Frenchmen should be ruled by a hundred thousand Parisians was as it should be.** The qualification of a member of the new oligarchy was simply that he should live near the hall where the Convention met, and should be able to squeeze himself daily into the gallery during a debate, and now and then to attend with a pike for the purpose of blockading the doors. It was quite agreeable to the maxims of the Mountain that a score of draymen from Santerre’s brewery, or of devils from Hébert’s planting house, should be permitted to drown the voices of men commissioned to speak the sense of such cities as Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Lyons; **and that a rabble of half-naked porters from the Faubourg St. Antoine should have power to annul decrees for which the representatives of fifty or sixty departments had voted.**

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n271/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The Empire was immense, **and the people in this immense Empire, so far from being Sovereign, were a people enslaved by a Despotic Metropolis, by an army *of four hundred thousand soldiers* called Citizens, always ready to burst forth from an entrenched camp called *Rome*, to crush any town or province which should dare to assert its own liberties.** Athens followed the same conduct with respect to its colonies and allied towns.
>
> These examples adduced by Jean Jaques only showed what the French Revolution has, since, so well demonstrated: that when the inhabitants of an immense town, like Rome or Paris, take up their arms, they may style their Revolutions by the names of Equality and Liberty, but all the real distinction is, that in place of one King whom they may have banished or murdered, the inhabitants are transformed into four or five hundred thousand Despots and Tyrants over the Provinces, while they in their turn are tyrannized by their tribunes. **Are not the ashes of Lyons, are not the unfortunate people of Rouen or Bourdeaux the unhappy examples that may be cited to show what fate awaited the miserable town that might attempt to shake off the yoke of the suburbs of St. Marceau, St. Antoine, or of the citizens of Paris?**

It was necessary to find some pretext for so odious and absurd a tyranny. Such a pretext was found. **To the old phrases of liberty and equality were added the sonorous watchwords, unity and indivisibility. A new crime was invented, and called by the name of federalism. The object of**

the Girondists, it was asserted, was to break up the great nation into little independent commonwealths, bound together only by a league like that which connects the Swiss cantons or the United States of America. The great obstacle in the way of this pernicious design was the influence of Paris. To strengthen the influence of Paris ought therefore to be the chief object of every patriot.

The accusation brought against the leaders of the Girondist party was a mere calumny. They were undoubtedly desirous to prevent the capital from domineering over the republic, and would gladly have seen the Convention removed for a time to some provincial town, **or placed under the protection of a trusty guard, which might have overawed the Parisian mob;** but there is not the slightest reason to suspect them of any design against the unity of the state. Barère, however, really was a federalist, and, we are inclined to believe, the only federalist in the Convention.
…

He long continued to maintain that the ascendency of one great city was the bane of France; that the superiority of taste and intelligence which it was the fashion to ascribe to the inhabitants of that city were wholly imaginary; and that the nation would never enjoy a really good government till the Alsatian people, the Breton people, the people of Bearn, the people of Provence, should have each an independent existence, and laws suited to its own tastes and habits. **These communities he proposed to unite by a tie similar to that which binds together the grave Puritans of Connecticut and the dissolute slave-drivers of New Orleans. To Paris he was unwilling to grant even the rank which Washington holds in the United States.** He thought it desirable that the congress of the French federation should have no fixed place of meeting, but should sit sometimes at Rouen, sometimes at Bordeaux, sometimes at his own Toulouse.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Napoleon%27s_Addresses/Part_II#Proclamation_to_the_Troops_on_Embarking_for_Egypt.2C_June.2C_1798

"The people amongst whom we are going to live are Mahometans. The first article of their faith is this: 'There is but one God and Mahomet is His prophet.' Do not contradict them. **Behave to them as you behaved to the Jews—to the Italians. Pay respect to their muftis and their imaums, as you did to the rabbis and the bishops. Extend to the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran and the mosques the same toleration which you showed to the synagogues, to the religion of Moses and of Jesus Christ.**

"**The Roman legions protect all religions.** You will here find customs different from those of Europe. You must accommodate yourselves to them.
…

"People of Egypt: You will be told by our enemies, that I am come to destroy your religion. Believe them not. **Tell them that I am come to restore your rights, punish your usurpers, and raise the true worship of Mahomet. Tell them that I venerate, more than I do the Mamelukes, God, His prophet, and the Koran. Tell them that all men are equal in the sight of God; that wisdom, talents, and virtue alone constitute the difference between them.** And what are the virtues which distinguish the Mamelukes, that entitle them to appropriate all the enjoyments of life to themselves? **If Egypt is their farm, let them show their lease, from God, by which they hold it.** Is there a fine estate? It belongs to the Mamelukes. Is there a beautiful slave, a fine horse, a good house? All belong to the Mamelukes. But God is just and merciful, and He hath ordained that the Empire of the Mamelukes shall come to an end. Thrice happy those who shall side with us; they shall prosper in their fortune and their rank. Happy they who shall be neutral; they will have time to become acquainted with us, and will range themselves upon our side. But woe, threefold woe, to those who shall arm for the Mamelukes and fight against us! For them there will be no hope; they shall perish."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA86#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 1810, after acknowledging to [Benjamin] Rush that his wife opposed the classics on feminist grounds, Adams noted: "**Hobbes calumniated the classics because they filled young men's heads with ideas of liberty and excited them to rebellion against Leviathan. Suppose we should agree to study the oriental languages, especially the Arabic, instead of the Greek and Latin. This would not please the ladies so well, but it would gratify Hobbes much better.** According to many present appearances in the world, many useful lessons and deep maxims might be learned from the Asiatic writers. There are great models for the imitation of the emperors of Britain and France." **Having cited Tamerlane, who had once declared that "as there is but one God, there ought to be but one King," as a typical hero in oriental literature, Adams asked facetiously: "Where can you find in any Greek or Roman writer a sentiment so sublime and edifying for George and Napoleon? There are some faint traces of it in the conduct of Alexander and Caesar, but far less frank and noble, and these have been imprudently branded with infamy by Greek and Roman orators and historians."** Adams further claimed that what little classical learning Napoleon possessed had "damped his ardor and prevented his rising as yet to the lofty heights of the Asiatic emperors." When Rush blamed the "classical revival" in Europe on Napoleon, Adams disagreed, writing: "I cannot … do so much honor to him as to ascribe this … resurrection of learning to him; it is rather due to the American Revolution. This great event turned the thoughts and studies of men of learning to the ancient Greeks, their language, their language, their antiquities, their forms of government."2

https://archive.org/details/britishbaronetag31play/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater

The first thing that the revolutionists in France aimed at was to destroy nobility altogether: now this has been considered by the present ruler as depriving him of gratifying his vanity, and rewarding services at a cheap rate; but it is worth observing in what an artful manner he has restored titles. In the first place, the titles created are only personal; **they are not hereditary, as they had been since Hugh Capet's time;** but moreover, they are not official, or magisterial, as before his time, but merely dependent on the will of the chief ruler. This is a very great change; **for when they were official, though they were not hereditary, they were sure to exist in succession, independent of the will of the Prince; but now they are entirely dependent on his will.**

After stating this as a fact hitherto unnoticed, it may not be useless to observe, that the change is highly agreeable to revolutionists of all descriptions, who, considering themselves as men of merit, are greatly displeased with seeing rank and honours passing from father to son. They have, it must be admitted, many specious arguments in favour of personal nobility, of which the first of all is, that personal merit, or public service, being the origin of title, ought to be its attendant throughout. **Now all those things added together make the present danger to hereditary rank greater than when first attacked; for equality, being impracticable, could not last long: this being practicable, and agreeable both to rulers and people, may very possibly be established in other countries;**

https://archive.org/details/napoleoninexile01omegoog/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater

During the conversation, I took the liberty of asking the emperor his reasons for having encouraged the Jews so much. He replied, "**I wanted to make them leave off usury, and become like other men.** There were a great many Jews in the countries I reigned over; by removing their disabilities, and by putting them upon an equality with Catholics, Protestants, and others, **I hoped to make them become good citizens, and conduct themselves like others of the community. I believe that I should have succeeded in the end.** My reasoning with them was, that, as their rabbins explained to them, that they ought not to practise usury to their own tribes, but were allowed to do so with Christians and others, that, therefore, as I had restored them to all their privileges, and made them equal to my other subjects, they must consider me to be the head of their nation, like Solomon or Herod, and my subjects as brethren of a tribe similar to theirs. That, consequently, they were not permitted to practise usury with me or them, but to treat us as if we were of the tribe of Judah. That having similar privileges to my other subjects, they were in like manner, to pay taxes, and submit to the laws of conscription and others. **By this, I gained many soldiers. Besides, I should have drawn great wealth to France, as the Jews are very numerous, and would have flocked to a country where they enjoyed such superior privileges. Moreover, I wanted to establish an universal liberty of conscience. My system was to have no predominant religion, but to allow perfect liberty of conscience and of thought, to make all men equals whether Protestants, Catholics, Mahometans, Deists, or others;** so that their religion should have no influence in getting them employments under government. In fact, that it should neither be the means of serving, or of injuring them; and that no objection should be made to a man's getting a situation on the score of religion, provided he were fit for it in other respects. **I made every thing independent of religion.** All the tribunals were so. Marriages were independent of the priests; even the burying grounds were not left at their disposal, as they could not refuse interment to the body of any person, of whatsoever religion. My intention was to render everything belonging to the state and the constitution, purely civil and independent of any religion. **I wished to deprive the priests of all influence and power in civil affairs,** and to oblige them to confine themselves to their own spiritual matters, and meddle with nothing else." I asked if uncles and nieces had not a right to marry in France. He replied, "Yes, but they must obtain a special permission." I asked if the permission were to be granted by the pope. "By the pope?" said he, "No;" **catching me by the ear and smiling, "I tell you that neither the pope, nor any of his priests, had power to grant any thing.—By the sovereign."**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures3.htm

The political institutions were united in the person of the Emperor; no moral bond any longer existed; **the will of the Emperor was supreme, and before him there was absolute equality.** The freedmen who surrounded the Emperor were often the mightiest in the empire; for caprice recognizes no distinction.

https://marxists.architexturez.net/archive/marx/works/1844/condition-england/ch01.htm

The eighteenth century represents the revival of the spirit of antiquity as against that of Christianity. Materialism and the republic; the philosophy and politics of the ancient world, arose anew, and the French, the exponents of the ethos of antiquity within Christianity, assumed the historical initiative for a time.
…

That Germany, France and England are the three foremost countries at the present moment in history, I can doubtless take for granted; **that the Germans represent the Christian spiritual principle, the French that of classical materialism, in other words, that the former represent religion and the church and the latter politics and the state, is equally obvious or will be made so in due course;** the significance of the English in recent history is less conspicuous and yet for our present purpose it is the most important.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n59/mode/2up?view=theater

These gladiators and fighters with wild beasts, were sprung from every European nation; and the kings, nobles, and serfs of these nations were all slaves alike of the Roman Emperor, who showed them, in this most practical of ways, that all men were equals; just as, on the other hand, he himself was often shown most palpably by his own Pretorian Guard, that he also was no more than a mere slave.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.156971/page/n73/mode/2up?view=theater

To the Greek the fair, strong man alone was free, and this man was none other than *himself*; whatever lay outside the circle of Grecian manhood and Apollonian priesthood, was to him *barbarian*, and if he employed it,—*slave*. **True that the man who was not Greek, was actually barbarian and slave; but he was still a *man*, and his barbarianism and his slavery were not his nature but his fate: the sin of history against his nature,** just as to-day it is the sin of our social system, that the healthiest nations in the healthiest climates have brought forth cripples and outcasts. This historical sin, however, was destined soon to be avenged upon the free Greek himself. Where there lived among the nations no feeling of *absolute human-love*, the Barbarian needed only to subjugate the Greek: and all was over with Grecian freedom, strength, and beauty. Thus, in deep humiliation, two hundred million men, huddled in helpless confusion in the Roman empire, too soon found out that—when *all* men cannot be *free alike* and *happy*—all men must *suffer alike* as *slaves*.

https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/n45/mode/2up?view=theater

However, all this was changed by two parallel processes – **beginning in Holland and England,** continuing in revolutionary France and in countries which followed the example of the French Revolution, and then in the modern monarchies of the 19th century: the Jews gained a significant level of individual rights (in some cases full legal equality), **and the legal power of the Jewish community over its members was destroyed. It should be noted that both developments were simultaneous, and that the latter is even more important, albeit less widely known, than the former.**
…

Similarly, one can quote from the *responsa* written shortly before 1832 by the famous Rabbi Moshe Sofer of Pressburg (now Bratislava), in what was then the autonomous Hungarian Kingdom in the Austrian Empire, **and addressed to Vienna in Austria proper, where the Jews had already been granted some considerable individual rights.**2 **He laments the fact that since the Jewish congregation in Vienna lost its powers to punish offenders, the Jews there have become lax in matters of religious observance,** and adds: 'Here in Pressburg, when I am told that a Jewish shopkeeper dared to open his shop during the Lesser Holidays, I immediately send a policeman to imprison him.'

This was the most important social fact of Jewish existence before the advent of the modern state: observance of the religious laws of Judaism, as well as their inculcation through education, were enforced on Jews by physical coercion, from which one could only escape by conversion to the religion of the majority, amounting in the circumstances to a total social break and for that reason very impracticable, except during a religious crisis.3

However, once the modern state had come into existence, the Jewish community lost its powers to punish or intimidate the individual Jew.
…

Nicholas I of Russia was a notorious antisemite and issued many laws against the Jews of his state. **But he also strengthened the forces of 'law and order' in Russia** – not only the secret police but also the regular police and the gendarmerie – **with the consequence that it became difficult to murder Jews on the order of their rabbis,** whereas in pre-1795 Poland it had been quite easy. 'Official' Jewish history condemns him on *both* counts.
…

The Metternich regime of pre-1848 Austria was notoriously reactionary and quite unfriendly to Jews, but it did not allow people, even liberal Jewish rabbis, to be poisoned. During 1848, when the regime's power was temporarily weakened, the first thing the leaders of the Jewish community in the Galician city of Lemberg (now Lvov) did with their newly regained freedom was to poison the liberal rabbi of the city, whom the tiny non-Orthodox Jewish group in the city had imported from Germany. One

of his greatest heresies, by the way, was the advocacy and actual performance of the Bar Mitzvah ceremony, which had recently been invented.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924014201044/page/n33/mode/2up?view=theater

But a close inspection brings to light from under the ruins an immense central power, which has gathered together and grasped all the several particles of authority and influence formerly scattered among a host of secondary powers, orders, classes, professions, families, and individuals, sown broadcast, so to speak, over the whole social body. No such power had been seen in the world since the fall of the Roman empire.
…

It was the simple, regular, grand form of this central power which Mirabeau discerned through the dust of the crumbling institutions of olden time. The masses did not see it, great as it was. Time gradually disclosed it to all; and now, princes can see nothing else. Admiration and envy of its work fill the mind, not only of the sovereigns it created, but of those who were strangers or inimical to its progress. **All are busy destroying immunities, abolishing privileges throughout their dominions; mingling ranks, leveling, substituting hired officials in the room of an aristocracy, a uniform set of laws in the place of local franchises,** a single strong government instead of a system of diversified authorities. Their industry in this revolutionary work is unceasing; when they meet an obstacle, they will sometimes even borrow a hint or a maxim from the Revolution. They have been noticed inciting the poor against the rich, the commoner against the noble, the peasant against his lord. The French Revolution was both their scourge and their tutor.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_352

The Roman republic laboured to crush the subjugated nations into a homogeneous and obedient mass; but the increase which the proconsular authority obtained in the process subverted the republican government, and the reaction of the provinces against Rome assisted in establishing the empire. **The Cæsarean system gave an unprecedented freedom to the dependencies, and raised them to a civil equality which put an end to the dominion of race over race and of class over class. The monarchy was hailed as a refuge from the pride and cupidity of the Roman people; and the love of equality, the hatred of nobility, and the tolerance of despotism implanted by Rome became, at least in Gaul, the chief feature of the national character.**
…

Roman Gaul had so thoroughly adopted the ideas of absolute authority and undistinguished equality during the five centuries between Cæsar and Clovis, that the people could never be reconciled to the new system. **Feudalism remained a foreign importation, and the feudal aristocracy an alien race, and the common people of France sought protection against both in the Roman jurisprudence and the power of the crown.**
…

The monarchy which had been engaged from the thirteenth century in curbing the nobles, was at last thrust aside by the democracy, because it was too dilatory in the work, and was unable to deny its own origin and effectually ruin the class from which it sprang. All those things which constitute the peculiar character of the French Revolution,—**the demand for equality, the hatred of nobility and feudalism, and of the Church which was connected with them, the constant reference to pagan examples,** the suppression of monarchy, the new code of law, the breach with tradition, and the substitution of an ideal system for everything that had proceeded from the mixture and mutual action of the races,—all these exhibit the common type of a reaction against the effects of the Frankish invasion.
…

Monarchy unconnected with aristocracy became popular in France, even when most uncontrolled; whilst the attempt to reconstitute the throne, and to limit and fence it with its peers, broke down, because the old Teutonic elements on which it relied—hereditary nobility, primogeniture, and privilege—were no longer tolerated. **The substance of the ideas of 1789 is not the limitation of the sovereign power, but the abrogation of intermediate powers. These powers, and the classes which enjoyed them, come in Latin Europe from a barbarian origin;** and the movement which calls itself liberal is essentially national. If liberty were its object, its means would be the establishment of great independent authorities not derived from the State, and its model would be England. But its object is equality; and it seeks, like France in 1789, to cast out the elements of inequality which were introduced by the Teutonic race.

> **The Failure of Universal Suffrage on JSTOR**
>
> Toward the end of the middle ages we find the relations of kings and peoples the reverse of what they afterward became. **We find oppression divided and diffused in the persons of a multitude of**

feudal tyrants, and the masses looking to their sovereign as a protector. The feudal oppressor was both his enemy and theirs, and the progress of monarchical centralization was in the interest both of prince and peasant. **It was not until feudalism was prostrate that the masses ceased to bless their sovereign as a friend, and began to curse him as a tyrant.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_3_May_1791#Features

By reducing the enfranchisement of the noble classes, this law introduced major changes to the electoral ordinance.[64]
Previously, all nobles had been eligible to vote in *sejmiks*, which *de facto* meant that many of the poorest, landless nobles – known as "clients" or "clientele" of local magnates – voted as the magnates bade them.[31][64]
Now right to vote was tied to a property qualification: one had to own or lease land and pay taxes, or be closely related to somebody who did, to vote.[65][87] 300,000 of 700,000 previously eligible nobles were thus disfranchised.[64]
...

"The worst possible news have arrived from Warsaw: the Polish king has become almost sovereign" was the reaction of one of Russia's chief foreign policy authors, Alexander Bezborodko, when he learned of the new constitution.[108]

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n227/mode/2up?view=theater

The Roman idea certainly still lived on, but it had concentrated itself or, so to speak, become merged in one person – the Emperor; **the privileges of the Romans and their summary powers had not disappeared from the world, they had all been delegated to a single man: that is the course of events from Augustus to Diocletian and Constantine.** The first Caesar had been satisfied with uniting in his own hands all the most important offices of State,* and that had been granted to him only for one definite object limited in respect of time, namely, to restore legal order in the civilised world (*restauratio orbis*); **within three centuries things had come to this, that a single individual was invested not only with all offices but with all the rights of all the citizens.** Just as in early times (at the time of the first successor to Augustus) the "majesty of the people" had become the "majesty" of one man, so gradually each and every power, each and every right passed over to him. Augustus had, like every other citizen, still given his vote in the Comitia; now there sits a monarch on the throne, whom one may only approach "reverentially" on one's knees, **and before him all men are alike, for all, from the foremost statesman to the lowest peasant, are his subjects.**

http://antitechnocrat.net/node/1430

There is, however, another enemy of Patriotism and Nationalism. It is equipped with power and wealth and a good chance of success in practical politics and it is but the disguise of cosmopolitanism. It is Imperialism, or as we would say, 'Globalism'. In Chesterton's opinion the Empire was neither for the benefit nor the glory of the English, it was for their exploitation. We had been put to work, to suffer, to bleed and to die, for the benefit of international banking and trade, that is, 'Globalism', and when we had served our purpose the assets would be stripped and lodged elsewhere. The price of such glory as we might enjoy from seeing the map painted red, was our impoverishment, our deculturation, our mongrelization, our destruction as a Nation. Chesterton presented this succinctly in 'The Flying Inn' (1904) **"Did you ever hear the great destiny of Empire? It is in four acts: Victory over barbarians. Employment of barbarians. Alliance with barbarians. Conquest by barbarians. That is the great destiny of Empire."**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924021569284/page/n163/mode/2up?view=theater

317. Possession Possesses.—**Only up to a certain point does possession make men feel freer and more independent; one step farther, and possession becomes lord, the possessor a slave.** The latter must sacrifice his time, his thoughts to the former, and feels himself compelled to an intercourse, nailed to a spot, incorporated with the State—perhaps quite in conflict with his real and essential needs.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D9%3Asection%3D578e

“But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[1] and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. **What and how great would be his fear,[2] do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?” “The greatest in the world,[3]” he said, “if you ask me.”** [579a] **“And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[1]? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.”** “He would certainly have to,” he said, “or else perish.”

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/Annals/15A*.html#ref29

21 1 "There was a day, indeed, when we sent not merely a praetor or a consul, but private citizens, to visit the provinces and report upon the loyalty of each; and nations awaited in trepidation the verdict of an individual. **But now we court foreigners; we flatter them; [colimus externos et adulamur] and, as at the nod of one or other among them, there is decreed a vote of thanks, so—with more alacrity—is decreed an impeachment.**

https://mondopolitico.com/library/meinkampf/v1c3.htm

The central idea of this new Habsburg, whose family had ceased to speak anything but Czech (the Archduke's wife, a former Czech countess, had been morganatically married to the Prince – she came from circles whose anti-German attitude was traditional), **was gradually to establish a Slavic state in Central Europe which for defense against Orthodox Russia should be placed on a strictly Catholic basis. Thus, as the Habsburgs had so often done before, religion was once again put into the service of a purely political idea,** and what was worse – at least from the German viewpoint – of a catastrophic idea.
...

But when after the great war the House of Habsburg began with desperate determination slowly but inexorably to exterminate the dangerous German element in the dual monarchy (the inner convictions of this element could not be held in doubt), for such would be the inevitable result of the Slavization policy – **the doomed people rose to a resistance such as modern German history had never seen.**

For the first time, men of national and patriotic mind became rebels.

Rebels, not against the nation and not against the state as such, but rebels against a kind of government which in their conviction would inevitably lead to the destruction of their own nationality.

For the first time in modern German history, traditional dynastic patriotism parted ways with the national love of fatherland and people.

The Pan-German movement in German-Austria in the nineties is to be praised for demonstrating in clear, unmistakable terms that a state authority is entitled to demand respect and protection only when it meets the interests of a people, or at least does not harm them.
...

In general it should not be forgotten that the highest aim of human existence is not the preservation of a state, let alone a government, but the preservation of the species.

And if the species itself is in danger of being oppressed or utterly eliminated, the question of legality is reduced to a subordinate role. Then, **even if the methods of the ruling power are alleged to be legal a thousand times over,** nonetheless the oppressed people's instinct of self-preservation remains the loftiest justification of their struggle with every weapon.

Only through recognition of this principle have wars of liberation against internal and external enslavement of nations on this earth come down to us in such majestic historical examples.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blood_and_soil

Carl Schmitt argued that a people would develop laws appropriate to its "blood and soil" because authenticity required loyalty to the *Volk* over abstract universals.[15]
...

The program received far more ideological and propaganda support than concrete changes.[19] When Gottfried Feder tried to settle workers in villages about decentralized factories, generals and Junkers successfully opposed him.[20] Generals objected because it interfered with rearmament, and Junkers because it would prevent their exploiting their estates for the international market.[21] It would also require the breakup of Junker estates for independent farmers, which was not implemented.[7]

The *Reichserbhofgesetz*, the State Hereditary Farm Law of 1933, implemented this ideology, stating that its aim was to: "preserve the farming community as the blood-source of the German people" (*Das Bauerntum als Blutquelle des deutschen Volkes erhalten*).

https://archive.org/details/risefallofthirdr0000will_g4y3/page/354/mode/2up?view=theater

To carry it out Hitler appointed Walther Darré, one of the few party leaders who, though he subscribed to most of the Nazi myths, knew his field professionally and well. An outstanding

agricultural specialist with suitable academic training, he had served in the Agriculture Ministries of Prussia and the Reich.

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n73/mode/2up?view=theater

Als die Germanen das Römische Reich zertrümmert hatten, fanden sie in seinen Grenzen eine Bevölkerung vor, die seelisch vollkommen verfault war und unter der Herrschaft einer in Rom zusammengezogenen Geldmacht restlos entartete; in diesem Zivilisationssumpf hatte das Christentum eine zwar amtlich anerkannte Stellung inne, war aber weder innerlich noch äußerlich fähig, gegen die Fäulnis vorzugehen oder sie zu überwinden. **Bemerkenswert ist für uns die Tatsache, daß in diesem Römischen Reich eine restlose Vernichtung des Bauerntums bereits eingetreten war.** Es gab nur Großgrundbesitz mit Sklaven.
…

Da nun der germanische Bevölkerungsüberschuß im Osten nicht mehr untergebracht werden konnte, im Innern des Reiches gleichzeitig eine teilweise Umgestaltung der ehemals freien Bauern in Hörige unaufhaltsam um sich griff, gerieten beide Kräfte in eine gleichsinnige Richtung und drängten die Verhältnisse langsam aber sicher in ein Verhängnis hinein. **In den Bauernkriegen versuchte sich das alte Freiheitsbewußtsein der Germanen noch einmal gewaltsam Luft zu schaffen.** Das Ergebnis ist ja bekannt; hier muß aber auch die Tatsache betont werden, daß man diesen Bauernfriegen bisher noch viel zu wenig Beachtung geschenkt hat. Man könnte diese Bauernkriege des 16. Jahrhunderts—deren religiöser oder geistiger Beweggrund uns hier einmal nicht zu beschäftigen braucht—auch als warnendes Beispiel für das heutige Deutsche Volk, für das „Volk ohne Raum“ betrachten. **In Wirklichkeit ist diese Gefahr aber deshalb nicht vorhanden, weil wir in den *bäuerlichen Erbgesetzen des BGB*. eine Einrichtung getroffen haben, *die ganz selbsttätig jede Übervölkerung des Bauernstandes abdrosselt*.**[1] **Der germanische Bauernstand Deutschlands wird vielleicht in kurzer Zeit der Geschichte angehören.**
…

Daran trägt nicht etwa der Reichsfreiherr vom Stein die Schuld; erstens war der Gedanke der Bauernbefreiung ein uralter Lieblingsgedanke der Hohenzollern, und Stein führte nur aus, was die Hohenzollern längst erstrebten; zweitens stützte sich Stein einerseits auf Untersuchungen in der englischen Geschichte, andererseits auf sie Erfahrungen, die er als Kammerpräsident der Grafschaft Mark in Westfalen, mit den dortigen alten Gemeindefreiheiten der Bauern gemacht hatte. Aber seine Nachfolger, die die von ihm eingeleitete Entwicklung nicht folgerichtig zu Ende führten, sind die Auslöser der meisten Bauernvernichtungen im 19. Jahrhundert. **Herr der Lage blieben die Geldmächte.** Bald begann im Deutschen Reiche, wo immer die deutsche Zunge erklang, jene kaltschnäuzige Entwurzelung und Vernichtung uralter bodenständiger Bauerngeschlechter, **die eine fernere Zeit wohl als den schwärzesten Punkt unserer deutschen Geschichte betrachten wird.**
…

Deutschland hat durch seinen industriellen Aufschwung von 1871-1914 derartige Hekatomben von Bauerngeschlechtern geopfert, daß einem biologisch geschulten Menschen über diese auch noch als „Fortschritt“ gepriesene Selbstentleibung die Haare zu Berge stelen können.

So ist aus *wirtschaftlichen* Ursachen seit der Reichsgründung ein großer Hundertsatz **unseres besten nordischen Blutes von Lande fort und in die Unfruchtbarkeitsmaschine, genannt Stadt, hineingetrieben worden.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n91/mode/2up?view=theater

Der germanische Rechtsbegriff, *der vollkommen auf der verantwortungsbewußten Persönlichkeit aufbaut*, steht allerdings einem mechanisierten Rechtsbegriff, wie ihn jede reine Geldwirtschaft hervorbringt—die notwendigerweise jedes Persönlichkeitsbewußtsein entthront und den Menschen zur Sache herabdrückt—so gegensätzlich wie nur möglich gegenüber. Daher ließe sich der Verbacht aussprechen, daß die Geldherren in Rom weit weniger das Schwert der Germanen gefürchtet haben, als deren Sittlichkeitsbegriffe, die sich durch Geld nicht lenken ließen. Der einzelne germanische Söldner war ungefährlich, aber ein geschlossen innerhalb der Grenzen angesiedeltes Volk der Germanen konnte u. U. eine Quelle ständiger innerstaatlicher Unruhen werden.

Das Recht der Germanen ist auch tatsächlich merkwürdig. „Vom gemeinen Mann ging es aus, in seinem Bewußtsein und mehr noch in seinem Gefühl lebte es“ (v. Amira). Es ist durchaus geeignet, einen Geldmenschen, der nur in Zahlen und Sachen rechnet, entweder zum Hohne zu reizen—**sofern er die**

Macht besitzt, sich diesen Hohn leisten zu können—oder aber mit Grauen zu erfüllen, sofern nicht er sondern der Germane die Macht in den Händen hält. Der merkwürdigste Umstand am germanischen Recht ist nämlich die Einheit von Recht und Gott. Nach germanischer Auffassung lassen sich beide nicht trennen; *Gott ist selber Recht*. Das Recht ist dem Germanen einfach nur die Ausdrucksform seines gewachsenen Daseins. Daher gibt es auch—um ein Beispiel zu nennen—bei den Germanen keine Verjährung; **„Hundert Jahre Unrecht machen nicht eine Stunde Recht," sagt eine altdeutsche Rechtsauffassung. Das ist durchaus folgerichtig gedacht, weil jede Verjährung notwendigerweise eine menschliche Einwirkungsmöglichkeit auf das Recht vorausetzt.** Aus dem gleichen Grunde ist das Recht wohl auch nicht niedergeschrieben sondern nur *gewiesen* (Weistümer) worden; **auch das wäre folgerichtig, denn eine *lebendige* Sache kann man nur weisen, erklären, leiten, aber nicht schriftlich festlegen.**
…

Als die Germanen den römischen Staat kennen lernten, war er bereits nichts weiter als eine riesengroße Verwertungseinrichtung im Hinblick auf alle Gütererzeugungsstellen, die die damalige Welt kannte; **der damalige römische Staat hatte also im wesentlichen den modernen Gedanken der Weltwirtschaft bereits durchgeführt. Im diesem Staate bestand kein weiteres Gemeinschaftsgefühl unter den Bürgern, als das des gemeinsamen Nutzens;** wem es gelang, sich rücksichtslos nach oben in die reichen Schichten hineinzuarbeiten, der war eben ein gemachter Mann, und auf das „Wie" oder auf die Tränen derer, die durch seinen Aufstieg vernichtet wurden, kam es dabei gar nicht an.

Der *Germane* ging nun von einer grundsätzlich anderen Einstellung an den Staatsbegriff heran. *Der Germane kannte **die schrankenlose Ich-Freiheit der Einzelpersönlichkeit** überhaupt nicht*; er gliederte den *Freien* grundsätzlich in die *Gesamtheit der Freien* ein und *wertete* ihn auch nur im Hinblick auf das, *was er für die Gesamtheit wert war*.1
…

Hat uns der Engländer Froude in eindrucksvoller Weise den Grundgedanken im Unterschied der germanischen und ungermanischen Staatsauffassung klargemacht, so werden mir jetzt bei einem deutschen Juristen den gleichen Unterschied im Gegensatz vom römischen und germanischen Recht wiederfinden. Merk1 sagt z. B. darüber:

> „*Das römische Recht ist individualistisch, das deutsche Recht ist genossenschaftlich und sozial*. **Die Römer haben schon früh mit äußerster Folgerichtigkeit im Privatrecht die Einzelpersönlichkeit von allen natürlichen und sozialen Banden losgelöst und ganz auf sich selbst gestellt; der Zusammenhalt dieser atomisierten Einzelnen ist allein auf das Zwangsband eines allmächtigen Staates gegründet.**
> …
>
> Der Gedanke der Selbstherrlichkeit und unumschränkten Machtsfülle des Rechtsinhabers durchdringt das ganze römische Recht. **Möglichst schrankenlos soll der Herrschaftswille des Berechtigten schalten und walten, im öffentlichen Rechte der Wille des Staatsoberhauptes, im Privatrechte der Wille des Eigentümers und der anderen Inhaber subjectiver Rechte.** Diesem reinen einseitigen Rechte des Berechtigten, das von aller Verpflichtung und Gegenleistung losgelöst ist, pflegt das römische Recht die ebenso einseitige Pflicht anderer Personen gegenüberzustellen. **Hemmungen lagen allein in der Macht der Sitte und der öffentlichen Meinung, und diese Gegengewichte waren im allgemeinen wirksam, solange die Römer vom alten kernhaften Schlage lebten,** die durch die eiserne Zucht des Heeres hindurchgegangen und von Vaterlandsliebe, Achtung vor dem Althergebrachten und vom Geist der Ordnung und Gesetzlichkeit beseelt waren. In den Verfallzeiten des späteren Römerreichs, **wo diese sittlichen Kräfte geschwunden waren, mußte diese Freiheit in Zügellosigkeit und in schamlose Ausbeutung der wirtschaftlich schwächeren Volksschichten ausarten. Ebenso schädlich mußte dieser Mechanismus des römischen Rechtes bei seiner Übertragung auf Völker mit anderen Lebensauffassungen und Lebensgewohnheiten wirken.** In der Hand des wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus und des Kapitalismus der Neuzeit wurde er eine wuchtige Waffe zur Zertrümmerung der mittelalterlichen sozialen Gebundenheiten im bürgerlichen und Wirtschaftsrecht.
> …
>
> **Sozial war vor allem der Eigentumsbegriff des mittelalterlichen Rechts im Gegensatz zum individualistischen Eigentumsbegriff des Corpus Juris.** Das germanische Grundeigentum war mit weitgehenden Pflichten gegenüber der Allgemeinheit durchsetzt, insbesondere zugunsten der Familie, der Markgenossenschaft und des Staates gebunden. ***Der Grundbesitz konnte nicht wie im spätrömischen Recht wie eine Ware beliebig verschleudert und verschachert werden;*** *er bildete die Grundlage für die wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und öffentlich-rechtliche Stellung einer Familie und sollte der Familie erhalten bleiben.* Der Eigentümer hatte daher auch keine freie Verfügung von Todes wegen, vielmehr bestanden am Grundbesitz unentziehbare Wartrechte der nächsten Blutserben. Der Grundbesitzer, der Handwerker sollen nach mittelalterlicher Auffassung ihre Stellung als Leiter ihres Unternehmens als eine Art *Amt im Dienste der Allgemeinheit betrachten*.

> Wegen der sittlichen und sozialen Schranken, die jeder Berechtigung im germanischen Recht gezogen sind, ist eine Rechtsausübung, die nur den Zweck verfolgt, einem anderen zu schaden (z. B. die Errichtung eines „Neidbaues“ nur um den Nachbarn die Aussicht zu versperren) als *Rechtsmißbrauch* im deutschen Recht von jeher untersagt. Entsprechendes Mißbrauchsverbot im BGB. § 226. **Anders grundsätzlich das römische Recht: *Qui iure suo utitur, neminem laedit*. Der Shylock-Standpunkt, der sich auf das formale Recht auch dort versteist, wo die Geltendmachung als unanständig und unsittlich erscheint, findet vor dem Richterstuhl des germanischen Rechts kein Gehör.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n135/mode/2up?view=theater

Der grundherrschaftliche Gedanke ist dort, wo er zu einer Auswertung der Hörigenarbeit wird, *nicht* altgermanisch, worüber wir uns oben ausführlich geäußert haben; und durch und durch ungermanisch wäre eine Arbeitseinrichtung zur Auswertung der bäuerlichen Arbeitskraft. **Das alles hat der germanische Adel erst in der Neuzeit gelernt,** als man den Begriff der Steuer—die im Mittelalter noch „Bitte“ hieß, weil sich der Grundherr von seinen Untertanen das notwendige Geld „erbitten“ mußte—verwendete (und mit Recht verwendete), um ein Staatsgebäude aufzubauen; **wenn dann der Absolutismus unter dem Einfluß von Frankreich den Begriff der Steuer entsittlichte, so ist das eine zeitgeschichtliche Krankheitserscheinung, die man keinesfalls auf das deutsche Mittelalter ober gar auf die Germanen übertragen darf.**2

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater

Damit stand Sparta am Wendepunkt seiner Geschichte. Denn von dem Augenblick an, wo das bäuerliche Anerbenrecht sich auf das Ein- oder Zweikindersystem stützt, bzw. sich aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen stützen muß, tritt sehr leicht Entartung ein; dies schon aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil die geringe Kinderzahl seine gesundsheitliche Ausmerze mehr gestattet und Erbe wird, wer ehen da ist, statt, wie das bei einer größeren Kinderzahl üblich ist und in Sparta nachweislich gebräuchlich war, der gesündeste und angesehenste Sohn.
…

Als dann aber ganz Hellas mit der Unterwerfung unter den asiatischen Großherren bedroht würde, begann die hellenische Vormachtstellung Spartas, der dieser Staat auf die Dauer biologisch nicht gemachten war. Notwendigerweise begannen jetzt auch Geld und Gold für die Spartaner ihre Bedeutung zu erhalten und wirften sich mit der Zeit geradezu verheerend aus. Das Verbot des Privatbesitzes an Gold und Silber führte unter den *veränderten* Verhältnissen auf Grund der weltpolitischen hellenischen Vormachtstellung Spartas nur dazu, unter den Spartanern den Wunsch und die Habgier danach zu steigern. Denn die Kriege fosteten Geld, und dieser Umstand brachte es dahin—ob sich auch einige Altspartaner mit Händen und Füßen dagegen wehrten—das Geld erst einmal für politische und militärische Zwecke in Sparta zuzulassen. **Nachdem sich Sparta aber einmal in seinen öffentlichen Angelegenheiten an Geld gewöhnt hatte, war der Schritt nicht mehr sehr weit, es auch für die eigene Bedürfnisbefriedigung zu wünschen.** Alle Spartaner galten schließlich für habsüchtig und bestechlich. Man prophezeite, daß Habsucht, nichts anderes, Sparta überwinden würde; die Ephoren und Geronten galten als bestechlich. Kurz und gut, **es bildete sich aus den ehemals bäuerlichen Spartiaten eine „Feudal-Plutokratie“, wie wir sie ähnlich im horigen Jahrhundert in England erlebt haben.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n185/mode/2up?view=theater

Nun tritt in der Geschichte aller indogermanischen Staaten ein Augenblick ein, der eine ganz entscheidende Wende in der bisherigen Entwicklung einleitet: Zahlungsmittel werden die Edelmetalle. Die Ursprungsquelle dieses Gedankens ist der Orient, wo seit urältesten geschichtlichen Zeiten Edelmetalle im Handel üblich waren. **Im Orient begann die Herrschaft des Geldes ihren Siegeszug um die Welt anzutreten.**
…

Nun ist es eine alte Erfahrung, daß der Handel dann immer am besten gedeiht, wenn die Beweglichkeit und Ungebundenheit der Waren weitestgehend durchgeführt ist und wenn dem Kaufmann—(wir sprechen allerdings hier besser nicht vom Kaufmann sondern vom Händler)1—für seine Person möglichst keine Bindungen und Einschränkungen auferlegt werden. **Aber diese Tatsache stieß im Altertum unweigerlich feindlich zusammen mit dem ganzen Gedanken des indogermanischen bodengebundenen Familienrechts.** Und weil nun der Handel sich auf Schritt und Tritt von diesem Familienrecht beengt fühlte, stellte er rein triebmäßig diesem Recht einen erbitterten Widerstand

entgegen und versuchte in einem zähen Kleinkrieg die Unterlagen dieses Rechts zu untergraben. **In diesem Kampfe ist der Handel bisher noch immer Sieger geblieben.**2

> 2. **Erst die Germanen haben gie Gegensätze zu überbrücken verstanden; seit Hardenberg und dem Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert ist der Handel allerdings wieder der unumschränkte Sieger.**

Die Abschnitte dieses Kampfes, der sich fast immer über einige Jahrhunderte hinzieht—**(in Griechenland z. B. vom 7. bis 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.)**—, sind gesennzeichnet durch gewisse Erscheinungen, die sich mit fast gesetzmäßiger Regelmäßigkeit wiederholen. Die Überschriften der drei Hauptabchnitte seien hier genannt: *Verkündigung des Individualismus*, d. h. **Verherrlichung der nur sich selbst werantwortlichen und ausschließlich auf eigenen Füßen stehenden Persönlichkeit;** *Bauernbefreiung*, d. h. Aufhebung der Hörigkeit, eine Tat, die allerdings meistens gerecht ist, **weil die ursprünglich sozial sehr verantwortungsbewußte Grundherrschaft unter dem Druck der aufkommenden Geldherrschaft meistens in drückende Fronherrschaft ausartete und auch längst Bauern zu Hörigen gemacht hat, deren Vorfahren mit den Vorfahren der herrschenden Adelschicht als gleichberechtigte Eroberer ins Land kamen;** *Demokratie* mit ihrem Gefälle vom ständisch gebundenen Königtum bis zur schrankenlos herrschenden Plutokratie.
...

Man hob daher mit dem Anerbenrecht auch den Gedanken der bodengebundenen indogermanischen Familienverfassung auf. Damit fiel praktisch der Begriff der indogermanischen Familie in sich zusammen, und mit ihm verschwanden sehr bald und folgerichtigerweise alle jene *sittlichen* Werte, die aus der Quelle der indogermanischen Ehe gespeist wurden.
...

Jedenfalls ist dieser geschichtliche Zustand im Leben eines indogermanischen Staates derjenige Zeitabschnitt, der bei aller Scheinbaren kulturellen Höhe hoch schon den Keim der Fäulnis in Sich trägt und daher oft, trotz aller politischen Machtstellung des Staates, den grausig schnellen Absturz in das Dunkel der Geschichte bewirft.1

> 1. Man lasse sich durch die scheinbar anders verlaufene Entwicklung Roms nicht täuschen. **Unmittelbar nach den punischen Kriegen endigt die Geschichte eines von nordischen Geschlechtern geführten Roms, und es beginnt die Geschichte einer durchaus unnordisch aufgezogenen Plutokratie, die von Jahrzehnt zu Jahrzehnt das letzte nordische Blut in Rom immer mehr ausrottet,** um schließlich in der Gründung des Cäsarentums ein Mittel gefunden zu haben, welches selbst die verfaultesten Staatszustände vor einem Zusammenbruch zu bewahren vermochte; **aber mit einer indogermanischen Staatsauffassung hatte dieses von G. J. Cäsar geschaffene Cäsarentum schlechthin nichts mehr zu tun.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n277/mode/2up?view=theater

*Merk*1 sagt über die Germanen: „**In den von ihnen eroberten Ländern haben sie durch ihre Ansiedlungen und ihr Bodenrecht die Entvölkerung des platten Landes und das ungesunde Übergewicht der Städte beseitigt** und ein kräftiges Bauerntum wieder hergestellt. *In die durch die römische Staatsallmacht geknechtete Welt haben sie wieder die persönliche Freiheit gebracht.*“

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n285/mode/2up?view=theater

Staatspolitisch haben aber die Nomaden durch ihr Verwertungsbedürfnis der vorhandenen Kulturen und die Notwendigkeit, den Genuß dieser Kultur zu schützen, **etwas erfunden und ausgebildet, was dem nordischen Staatsgedanken, der auf Selbstverwaltung und Wahl der Führer beruht, ursprünglich gänzlich fremd war; es ist das ein fest angestelltes, nur der Staatsleitung verantwortliches Beamtentum.** Wir haben uns ja in Abschnitt I bereits ausführlich über die genialen innerstaatlichen Verwertungseinrichtungen der Nomaden ausgelassen. **Tatsache ist jedenfalls, daß die Germanen das echte Beamtentum erst durch Kaiser Friedrich II. kennen lernten. Dieser hatte es den Sarazenen abgesehen und es probeweise in Sizilien eingeführt.**1 In Sizilien bewährte sich dieser Brauch so glänzend, daß der Hochmeister des Deutschritter-Ordens und Vertraute des Kaisers, Hermann von Salza, den Grundplan dieses Verwaltungskörpers für seinen Orden übernahm. Dieser Umstand ist dann nicht zum wenigsten ein Hauptgrund für die Macht und die kolonisatorischen Erfolge des Ordens gewesen. ***Der Deutschritter-Orden in Preußen ist der erste germanische Staat auf deutschem Boden gewesen, der auf rein nomadischer Grundlage aufgebaut war.*** Der schließliche Sturz hängt z. T. damit zusammen, daß es der Orden später nicht verstand, seinen

ungermanischen Verwaltungskörper mit einer germanischen Selbstverwaltung zu verknüpfen; der Ordensstaat als solcher hat in dem Lande, wo er herrschte, niemals Wurzel zu schlagen vermocht; **und er verdankt es nur den von ihm angesiedelten Bauern, daß sein Werk dem Deutschtum nicht mehr verloren ging.** Erst der preußiche Staat hat versucht, für diese Fragen eine Lösung zu finden und zwar, indem er den nomadischen Gedanken der einheitlich geleiteten Regierungsgewalt mit dem altgermanischen, d. h. altnordischen Gedanken der Selbstverwaltung organisch zu verknüpfen suchte. Den Anfang dieses Versuchs darf man wohl mit König Friedrich Wilhelm I.1 annehmen.

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n305/mode/2up?view=theater

> Cato arbeitete übrigens mit seinen Knechten zusammen auf dem Acker und aß auch mit ihnen am selben Tische. Bezeichnenderweise sagt Plutarch weiterhin von ihm: „*Ein Mann hingegen, der nach alter Sitte mit eigenen Händen arbeitete*, ..., Ein solcher Mann war eine große Seltenheit, *weil schon damals der römische Staat seiner Größe wegen sich nicht bei der alten Reinheit der Sitten erhielt.*“ **Daraus geht zweierlei ganz klar hervor: erstens die alten Patrizier waren noch selbst arbeitende *Bauern*, also *Bauern von echtem Schrot und Korn*, wie wir heute sagen würden, und zweitens, die Patrizier geben das bäuerliche Arbeiten auf dem Felde erst auf, als ihre politischen Erfolge sie zu verwöhnen beginnen. Es ist mithin genau der gleiche Zustand, wie wir ihn heutigentags in *Südafrika, Australien, Vereinigte Staaten von Nord-Amerika* beobachten können,** wo der rastlose Sleiß nordischer Bauern das Land der Kultur erschließt und durch diesen Umstand die erschlossenen neuen Gebiete in den Bereich der Weltpolitik hineinzieht; **daraufhin gewöhnt sich das alte Bauerntum langsam an Herrentum, verliert im gleichen Maße seinen Zusammenhang mit Grund und Boden, und es ist dann nur eine Frage der Zeit bis wann die Entnordung vollendet ist.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n323/mode/2up?view=theater

Aber Cäsar wertete die Lage aus. Seine Boten leiteten unter den Kelten ein geschicktes Spiel ein, und schließlich baten die romfreundlichen Keltenparteien Cäsar um Hilfe gegen den Germanenkönig. Cäsar nahm die Bitte—wie man sich denken kann—sehr gnädig an und warf sich nunmehr Ariovist gegenüber als Erretter der Gallier vor germanischer Gewalt auf.1

> 1. Vergleiche hinken bekanntlich, aber hier wird man doch fast handgreiflich auf eine ähnliche Erscheinung im vergangenen Weltkriege hingelenkt, wo es unter dem rührseligen Schlagwort von der Not des vergewaltigten Belgiens durch die deutschen Barbaren, **der angelsächsische Welthandel so ausgezeichnet verstand, seine weltpolitischen Ziele zu verdecken.**

...

Gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts gelang es dann schließlich den Engländern doch, das tapfere Bauernvolk in die Gewalt zu bekommen.1 Der Bauernstaat der Sueven unter Ariovist und der Bauernstaat der Holländer in Südafrika ähneln sind ganz zweifellos in ihrer Anhänglichkeit an die Scholle; was sehr natürlich ist, weil kein Bauer gerne die in den Grund und Boden hineingesteckte Arbeit leichtfertig aufgibt; **sie ähneln sich aber auch darin, daß sie gegenüber dem rein weltmachtpolitisch eingestellten Ziele ihres Gegners blind sind** und den Krieg erst aufnehmen, als ihnen gar nichts anderes übrig bleibt.

> 1. Übrigens: **Genau so wenig wie man den nordischen Patrizier Altroms für die weltmachtpolitische Einstellung Cäsars verantwortlich machen kann, genau so wenig kann man den nordischen Engländer für die weltmachtpolitische Einstellung seiner politiker im 19. Jahrhundert verantwortlich machen.** Es ist hier aber nicht der Ort, über diese Dinge zu reden.

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n331/mode/2up?view=theater

Sehr viel wichtiger ist aber eine andere Überlegung von *Jhering*. Er stellt zunächst einmal fest, **daß man im römischen Recht genau den Übergang vom altnordischen (arischen n. Jhering) Recht der Patrizier zum mechanischen Recht der späteren Zeit feststellen kann (Zwölftafel-Gesetze).** Dabei kommt er darauf zu sprechen, daß man deutlich zwei Wurzeln der Heeresverfassung aufzudecken vermag. „In meinen Augen begründet das Auftreten der Zahl in der hier geschildekten Funktion einen kulturhistorischen Wendepunkt, **sie bezeichnet die Erhebung von der organischen Gliederung des Volkes zur mechanischen, jene ist geworden, diese gemacht** ... Die lateinische Sprache kennt für Heer zwei Ausdrücke, von denen der eine: *exercitus* der neueren, der andere *classis* der *älteren* Zeit angehört. *Exercitus* ist sprachlich gedacht als sie aus der Burg (*ex arce*) ausbrechende Schar, die Burg

aber mit der sie umgebenden Staat stammt erst aus der Periode der Seßhaftigkeit. *Der Ausdruck classis führt uns sprachlich das durch mündliches Rufen* (*calare*) *entbotene Heer vor Augen*...1

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n395/mode/2up?view=theater

Die Patrizier sahen nach Jhering in der Ehe mit Plebejern eine Vermischung des edlen Blutes (Liv. IV, 1 *contaminare sanguinem*). „***Mit der Erteilung des connubium an die Plebejer durch die lex Canuleja hatte man die Axt an den patrizischen Geschlechterstaat gelegt,*** *die Raschheit, mit der sich fortan im öffentlichen Recht der Gegensatz ausgleicht, kommt im wesentlichen auf Rechnung der lex Canuleja.*“2 **In diesem kurzen Satz kennzeichnet Jhering mit dürren Worten die Gründe für den schließlichen Niedergang von Rom; obwohl er das gar nicht zu sagen beabsichtigt sondern nur ausdrücken will, daß sich dadurch der Übergang von der organischen zur mechanischen Rechtsauffassung erklären läßt.**

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardDasBauerntumAlsLebensquellDerNordischenRasse1942500S.ScanFraktur_201711/page/n457/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Es ist im wesentlichen die leichtsinnige Schuld Hardenbergs gewesen, daß man die Zunftordnung *gedankenlos* aufhob, ohne zu berücksichtigen, welcher Schatz von kulturellen Werten damit ebenfalls über Bord geworfen wurde.** Mit flammendem Eifer, wenn auch leider vergeblich, trat der Freiherr vom Stein Hardenberg entgegen; auch er hielt zwar eine *Reform* des Zunftwesens für richtig, hatte aber auch klar erkannt, welche Nachteile in kultureller Hinsicht die Aufhebung der Zünfte mit sich bringen mußte; was galten ihm technische Fortschritte neben der sittlichen Entwicklung des Volkes, dem eigentlichen Zwecke des Staates.
>
> **Wir haben zwar heute auf dem Gebiete der Gewerbepolitik manches wieder gutgemacht, was ein übereifriger Liberalismus vor hundert Jahren zerstörte.** Aber an der Tatfache, daß die alte deutsche Zunftordnung es verstanden hatte, die gesunden Grundlagen des Bauerntums auch auf die Stadt zu übertragen und auf diese Weise der germanischen Eheform auch in der Stadt zu einer sittlichen Entfaltungsmöglichkeit zu verhelfen, sind wir die letzten hundert Jahre fast blind vorbeigegangen. **Und nun sitzen wir auf den Trümmern einer deutschen Familienkultur und wundern uns über die heute um sich greifende Entsittlichung des deutschen Volkes.**

...

Erst das Aufkommen der Klöster hat in dieses bäuerliche und adelige Landsknechtstum eine Bresche geschlagen, und zwar dadurch, daß man einen Stand schuf, der die nicht erbberechtigten Freien aufnehmen konnte, ohne daß die deswegen ihre Zugehörigkeit zum Stande der Freien aufzugeben brauchten. Im Grundsatz war der Gedanke ja schon vorher gegeben, indem der Priesterstand den Freien vorbehalten blieb. Aber es gab nicht so viele Priesterstellen, als daß mit ihnen allein die Frage zu lösen gewesen wäre; das gelang erst, als das Kloster aufkam und diese Einrichtung dem Germanen durch den Begriff des Gottesstreitertums verständlich wurde. **Das Kloster verdankt seine Entstehung ursprünglich einem ganz unnordischen Gedanken in Ägypten.** Aber seine kulturgeschichtliche Bedeutung für die Germanen liegt darin, daß es den nicht erbberechtigten Söhnen Germaniens—die sowieso nicht geheiratet hätten—eine Heimstätte bot und diesen sonst nur für den Degen geborenen Männern ein neues Betätigungsfeld verschaffte, nämlich das Gebiet der Wissenschaft. Sich auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft zu tummeln, war nunmehr eines Freien ebenso würdig wie im Heeresgefolge eines großen Herrn zu reiten; mancher Abt des deutschen Mittelalters, der mit dem Kopfe ebenso trefflich zu streiten verstand wie mit seinem Schwerte, wird unter diesen Gesichtspunkten verständlicher. Als die Zeit der Klöster sich dann erfüllt hatte, war die Bahn frei für *Dr. Martin Luther*.

Hoch heute ist es in England üblich, daß sich jüngere Söhne eines adeligen Geschlechtes dem geistlichen Stande widmen. Dieser Umstand hat in England genau so wenig zur Entnordung beigetragen, wie es die Klöster ursprünglich im Mittelalter getan haben. Ja, man kann sogar sagen, der englische Adel verdankt es nicht zum wenigsten diesem Brauch, daß er sich dem von ihm geführten Volke nie entfremdet hat. Auf diesem Gebiet hat der protestantische Adel Deutschlands zweifellos versagt, obgleich sein Verhalten aus dem Verlauf der Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus verständlich wird.

...

Erst mit der allgemeinen Einführung der ländlichen Erbgesetze im BGB. hat das deutsche Volk zum erstenmal die Axt an die Wurzel seines Volkstums gelegt und damit—das kann wohl ruhig so gesagt werden—auch den Lebensnerv der Nordischen Rasse im deutschen Volkskörper zerschnitten.

Es dürfte übrigens auch ungeschichtlich sein, den Untergang des alten mittelalterlichen Adels auf eine Entnordung durch Kriege zurückzuführen. Der Vorgang dieser Entnordung hängt ebenfalls mit dem ländlichen Erbgesetz zusammen, nur—in umgefehrter Richtung. **An und für sich behielt der mittelalterliche Adel seine altnordischen ländlichen Erbgesetze, verfiel aber in den Fehler, den Grund und Boden nicht mehr als Ernährungsunterlage *einer* Eheschließung zu betrachten sondern begann in ihm ein Mittel zur Macht zu erblicken.** Damit war der Weg frei, um durch Zusammenlegung von Gütern, d. h. von Herdstellen, sich eine sog. Hausmacht zu schaffen. Diese Politik der Hausmacht, die das Haus Habsburg wie kein zweites zu meistern verstand, mußte notwendigerweise die Möglichkeiten zur Entzündung von Herdfeuern fortlaufend verringern. Dadurch schälte sich zwar immer deutlicher ein sog. Hochadel heraus, der aber in seinem Werden das Gesetz mitschleppte, den eigentlichen altnordischen Ausgangsstoff des ursprünglichen Adels fortdauernd zu vermindern. Am 9. November 1918 fand diese Entwicklung dann ihr Ende.

Zusammenfassend möchte der Verfasser noch einmal sagen, daß die heutige Ansicht von der Entnordung durch Kriege ganz offenbar am Kern der Frage vorbeigeht. **Bei *gesunden* Bodenrecht und *gesunden* Ehen hat der Nordischen Rasse noch niemals ein Krieg im *biologischen* Sinne geschadet.** Erst wenn eine Abkehr vom ländlichen Leben eintritt und die Ehe keine Aufgabe mehr an der Gesamtheit ist sondern zum Geschäft oder zum Privatvergnügen oder eine Angelegenheit der Hausmacht-Politik wird, greifen die Kriege „entnordend“ ein, weil unter solchen Anschauungen die Kinderzahl notwendigerweise nachläßt und nunmehr der vorher unmaßgebliche Hundertsatz an Gefallenen sich verheerend auswirfen muß; **auch in der Beziehung, daß die biologische Auslese unter den Hoferben nicht mehr genügend scharf sein kann, da die Auswahl immer kleiner wird.**
…

Sowie in einer nordischen Gemeinschaft die *Mitgift* aufkommt, und die Eheschließung nicht mehr eine biologische Zweckmäßigkeit ist sondern ein Geschäft im *geldlichen* Sinne wird, **ist es allerdings meistens sehr schnell mit der Reinerhaltung des Blutes und einer nordischen Kultur vorbei.** Die Gründe, die zu dem Schritt der Mitgiftjägerei führten, mögen in der Geschichte der nordischen Rasse nicht überall dieselben gewesen sein, aber *die Wirkung war in allen Fällen gleich*. Bereits 550 v. Ch. schildert *Theognis* diesen Vorgang sehr hübsch und treffend wie folgt:

> „Gilt’s Kurmes, Rinder oder Pferde ziehn,
> Dann Handeln wir vernunftgemäß und wählen
> Zu Nutz und Wehrung jedenfalls die Tiere
> Aus kerngesundem Stamm und fehlerlos.
> Doch Handelt sich’s bei uns um eine Ehe,
> Gibt stets der Preis den Ausschlag: nur um Gold
> Heiraten Männer, gibt man Töchter fort.
> Der Lump, der Tölpel, der im Golde schwimmt
> Kann mit dem ält’sten Stamm sein Kind vereinen.—
> So mengt sich alles, Edles und Gemeines!
> Wenn du daher in Sitten, Form und Geist
> Als ein entartet Mischgeschlecht uns findest
> Dann wundre Freund dich nicht! Der Grund ist klar
> Und müßig wär’s, die Folgen zu beklagen.“

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n49/mode/2up?view=theater

But after the defeat of Carthage, the internal laws of the Roman Empire changed. **The civil servants no longer felt themselves to be the agents of self-governance, but slowly and imperceptibly transformed under the influence of the moneyed people who were gaining more and more power in the state;** they became the actual masters and developed into an independent leadership. **The civil service, although still supplemented from the old Roman families, turned into the tool of the bankers.** This state of affairs only became apparent in the time of Caesar, especially after his assassination, when the people began to deify his person in the oriental sense. Such a process would have been unheard of earlier in the Roman Republic, and it proves the Roman people’s complete turning away from the old Roman way of thinking and their accustoming to an unconditional leadership. With this, the path was clearly marked out and Augustus consequently followed; he designed the Roman state as an institution of expediency structured from top to bottom, which was fundamentally superior to the rights of the individual and served to carry out the subjugation of the peoples according to expedient points of view, irrespective of their uniqueness or peculiarities. Through this system the Roman state was able to weld together the Mediterranean basin into a kind of economic unit. **At the same time, of course, the power of economic interests, which, through the influence of the bankers, was becoming more and more equal to that of the state, had priority over the interest of the personal freedom of individual citizens.** Its success was ultimately an outwardly more or less clearly delimited empire with astonishingly developed institutions of expediency with regard to its domination

and to the economy. **There is no doubt that the Roman Empire of the Caesars realized, in a certain sense, the supranational world economy that we are striving for again today,** for the Mediterranean basin was initially its own little world for the peoples living along the Mediterranean. **But this Roman Empire, as far as man is concerned, was built over the peoples! [Völkerbrei]**

This is a fine example—Rome's battles over Gaul prove it most clearly. **Rome needed Gaul's wealth and later needed Gaul as part of its economic zone from the Atlantic Ocean to the Orient. It was in the time of Augustus that this process was both initiated and completed, and we can clearly observe it historically. In carrying out his plan, Augustus resisted the tribal idiosyncrasies of the Gauls as well as other ethnic concerns.** It is revealing to note that Augustus then deliberately set about suppressing ethnic issues in Gaul through measures that would take us far too long to discuss in detail here. His attempts to bring the Germanic tribes into the same economic dependence as the Gauls in order to protect the eastern border of Gaul failed. When the Roman governor Varus, who had been trained in the Orient and had been transferred from there to Germania, also tried to impose a tribute plan on the Germanic tribes—as was common practice in the rest of the Roman Empire—the well-known uprising in 9 A.D. arose, which, with the battle in the Teutoburg Forest,61 put an end to such Roman efforts for centuries to come.

The late Roman empire was thus a fully constructed system, the external boundaries of which were, as far as possible, oriented towards the material laws of the economy and whose inner workings were also oriented towards this goal. **The human being played a secondary role. The laws of blood were either not taken into account at all or only to the extent that they did not disturb the state as such nor its activities.**

Nevertheless, **despite its disregard for human freedom and the human dignity of each individual,** this Roman Empire was built on the recognized inequality of the human race. The inequality was no longer driven by noble patrician dynasties that could be confident of their people's admiration because of their divine descent, but by property and economic wealth; **the idea of the hereditary inequality of human beings was thus transferred from blood to the ownership of property.**
…

Accordingly, it was in Gaul that the conflict between late Roman and Germanic law, and between the late Roman and Germanic political systems, came to a head and initiated a struggle that lasted through the millennia until it was conclusively decided by Napoleon I, who finally and conclusively imposed the late Roman administrative system.

We must keep in mind, however, that the Franks brought personal freedom to Gaul with their law and accustomed its people, which had completely degenerated and been enslaved in the mire of late Roman civilization, to freedom and human dignity again.62

> [62] Strictly speaking, the French Revolution of 1789 can be called a joke of world history in its justifications. Louis XIV had imposed absolute monarchy in France. H. von Moltke writes in *Die Westliche Grenzfrage* (*The Western Border Question*), **"This transformation of France under Louis XIV may justly be regarded as a Gallo-Roman reaction against the Germanic element which had hitherto still prevailed in France, as an annihilation of both the old Frankish popular liberties and the representation of the estates, and as a return to the former Roman despotism, such as what had been indigenous to Gaul for five hundred years from Caesar down to Clovis." The French people rose up against this despotism and simply demanded back the safeguards of the old Frankish, old Burgundian, and so on constitutions, i.e. the old Germanic institutions of the original assemblies, the army, and the imperial assembly.** But it is a great irony of world history that these demands of the French, certainly no longer a very Germanic people, had to be forced upon their still predominantly Germanic, i.e. blond and blue-eyed, nobility. Meanwhile the French revolutionary, who boasted of wanting to chase Germanism back into the forests of eastern France and who was not afraid to send a blond and blue-eyed man to the scaffold—even if he was not a nobleman, and who presented himself as the guardian and heir of Roman liberties, simultaneously demanded Germanic institutions from his Romanized nobility of Germanic blood. **With which things were indeed turned upside down in every respect!**

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n97/mode/2up?view=theater

The land of a family is not a matter of the head of the household's ego, but part of the idea of the family itself, in the sense of a succession of dynasties. Thus the ego, including the ego of the head of the household, is always only one part of the family, as the family itself is the superior whole, and the head of the household is obligated to serve the land with regard to the family and its preservation. **The selfish possessiveness [ich-gieriges Besitzertum] of land is fundamentally alien to both the**

ancient Roman and the Germanic sense of justice, because every ego-related claim to land ownership necessarily presupposes the detachment of the ego from the idea of family.87
…

When Rome gained control of the economic nodes of Mediterranean trade following the defeat of Carthage, financial thinking began to prevail and the old patrician conception of life and the state was pushed aside. **This development began after the First Punic War and was basically completed by the end of the last one, although it was not until the time of Caesar that the final dividing line was drawn between the old Roman and the new Roman political systems.**
…

In the old patrician view of dynastic succession, a dynasty was, so to speak, a tree rooted in the ground. It is therefore more than natural that the land belonging to one dynasty was awarded undivided to the heir; **the ever-burning hearth fire, the monogamy, and the indivisible land ownership formed and remained a thoroughly living unity.** With the transformation of the idea of the succession of dynasties into the idea that the family represents a group of individuals with the father of the family at the head and as the center, the uprooting of the family was sealed, because it now remained indifferent as to where this group of family members resided.89 From then on, it was not much of a leap to the view that the head of the household could dispose of property independently of the family, and, hand in hand with the increasingly dissolving concept of the family, **a private law centered on the individual [das Ich] had to come into being. This individualist legal form was developed to perfection [Vollendung] in late Roman law.**

Such a development of Roman law from the original idea of family protection in the broadest sense to the unconditional affirmation of the individual led not only to a political system that regarded the people merely as a sum of individuals, but also completely shattered every idea of family. This development had a particular effect in two directions which concern us: first, marriage was no longer necessarily a matter concerning the family or the production of children, but became a purely I-and-thou affair, in which the production of children was left to the discretion of the individual; and secondly, land was now managed according to a purely individual-centric concept of property, **and it did not even occur to anyone to consider it in terms of the nutritional or economic basis of a family.** In other words, the moral connection between marriage and land ownership had been thoroughly torn apart.90

The Germanic tribes brought with them a concept of marriage that corresponded exactly to that of the patricians. Thus, just as ancient Roman and late Roman marriage law contradicted each other, so did late Roman and Germanic marriage law. **The Germanic peoples' ascendancy in and mastery over Western Europe following the Migration Period allowed Germanic law to initially become authoritative or, where it did not directly replace Roman law, indirectly influence it.** Naturally, Germanic law was also influenced by late Roman law in return.

The Germanic states established in Italy fell in line with late Roman legal ideas relatively quickly. This is particularly true of the Lombard Empire. **Even if Christianity certainly influenced this development, another circumstance also played a decisive role and is important for us to learn about—late Roman law particularly benefited trade.** Trade, however, thrives best in urban centers. The Germanic peoples, however, settled outside the cities, living in the countryside according to their own law. Thus, **the very un-Germanic institution of the city was relatively untouched by Germanic influence,** meaning that late Roman legal ideas were able to survive well in Roman cities.
…

It was the responsibility of Hardenberg, the Chancellor of Prussia, to decide on the German economic direction and it was he who opened the door to an un-German, purely individualist financial attitude. Hardenberg had a great opponent in this matter, Freiherr vom Stein. Few people today in Germany know of Freiherr vom Stein's struggle against Hardenberg, and even fewer have grasped the significance of this struggle. Our people have generally paid little attention to this clash, **even though Hardenberg marks the beginning of an economic chapter of our people that quite logically ends with Gustav Stresemann and would have gotten to that point much earlier had Bismarck had not delayed this development for decades.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Hardenberg,_Karl_August_von
>
> In 1782 he entered that of the duke of Brunswick, and as president of the board of domains **displayed a zeal for reform, in the manner approved by the enlightened despots of the century, that rendered him very unpopular with the orthodox clergy and the conservative estates.**
> …
>
> He continued amiable, charming and enlightened as ever; but the excesses which had been pardonable in a young diplomatist were a scandal in an elderly chancellor, **and could not but**

> **weaken his influence with so pious a *Landesvater* as Frederick William III.** To overcome the king's terror of Liberal experiments would have needed all the powers of an adviser at once wise and in character wholly trustworthy.

It was the greatness of Germanism that it derived its laws from its concept of God and from this belief placed life-promoting laws above the laws of the economy and the individual. In other words, blood and—as part of the idea of blood—soil stood above all individualist economic considerations. This basic attitude of the Germanic people towards the economy remained unbroken into the nineteenth century, and despite all the shocks to which it was subjected to over the course of history—often pushing it to the brink of ruin—the old conception triumphed again and again. **It was only in the nineteenth century that this pattern came to an end, and we could almost say that the much-praised BGB**93 **of 1900 was the key reason.**

> [93] Editor's note: *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* (BGB) or the German Civil Code is the central codification of German private law. The BGB regulates the legal relationships between private individuals and is thus distinct from public law.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n361/mode/2up?view=theater

> **On the opening day of the 20th century the new Civil Code swept away the motley collection of state private laws throughout Germany, with the exception of a few express reservations in favor of state law dealing with matters of local importance, or the laws of the princely houses of Germany.** Germany, although a federated country of twenty-six states, has since 1900 been living under one system of private law. **By its uniform and codified law modern Germany now testifies to the fulfillment within her borders of the world mission of Roman law. The most lasting achievement of the German Empire was the completion of a uniform system of codified law for all Germany.**180 The German Civil Code is a very late 19th century republication of Roman law as adopted in Germany. It also embodies many rules of Germanic customary law, especially as to land rights. But without the Roman Corpus Juris181 as a key to unlock it, this modern law of Germany cannot be understood. In the German code of 1900 the Roman law element is predominatingly supreme.182
> …
>
> **The German Civil Code is one of the greatest and perhaps the best exposition of modern Roman law ever framed. It is thoroughly suited to our age. Its influence upon the world has only just begun.** The modern Japanese Civil Code of 1898 largely imitates the German, while the Swiss Civil Code of 1912 reveals marked traces of the same German influence.184 One thing is certain: no future Civil Code anywhere in the world should ever be drawn up without consulting the German, in which the codifiers have made such a judicious use of both native and Roman law materials. The national federal codes of modern Germany are also an object-lesson to refute the fallacious argument, that a federated country must cling to diversity of State law and can never attain to a national uniformity of private law without destroying the States themselves.

…

Liberalism, however, does not recognize the idea of blood, i.e. that the owner of land has—in addition to the enjoyment of his property—**a blood duty either in the old sense to his race [Geschlecht] or in the modern sense to his people. [Volke]** The ideological foundations of Liberalism in this question are essentially the same as those of Marxism. We could almost be tempted to say that **Liberalism and Marxism are two worldviews that have been devised in order to, in one way or another, deal a death blow to the German idea of blood and soil.** Thus, after Hardenberg opened the way for liberal economics in Germany, Liberalism, in cooperation with its twin brother Marxism, unleashed a fury against everything that—on the basis of the old German sense of justice—did not allow individual's unconditional freedom in the use of property. **Thus, late Roman economic law and late Roman idolatry of the individual, [Vergottung des Ichs] which even the age of absolutism could not fully impose on Germany, finally made their unconditional and unrestrained entry into Germany. It is no exaggeration to say that what Varus failed to impose on the Germanics almost two millennia ago was ushered into Germany during the nineteenth century and has been made a reality in the years after 1918.**

…

Or do we seriously believe that the German people could have ever overcome the damage of the Thirty Years' War if the agricultural system of that time had not been subject to policies that offered an incentive to entrepreneurs who wanted to try their hand at building something lasting? **We cannot imagine that with today's absurd [Drunter-und-Drüber] views on roots and soil-boundness (which have received a legal basis through the German Civil Code) that a German culture can be kept alive for more than half a century!**98

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n183/mode/2up?view=theater

This old German marriage law was the bulwark that protected valuable German humanity and kept sub-humanity out of the German social order by considerably limiting its possibilities for reproduction—

sometimes even making it impossible. **It must be emphatically pointed out that the present victory of "sub-humanity"** (which the American Lothrop Stoddard wrote about in his well-known work *The Revolt Against Civilization, the Menace of the Under Man*, which discussed a question being considered by today's geneticists, namely the root causes of the excessive growth of inferior and undesirable populations—i.e. human races that have an unfavorable influence on the German social order) **has only become a problem for the German people as a result of Hardenberg's decision about a hundred years ago to embark on a path that was bound to end in the current dismantling of all restrictions on marriage.** Read what Freiherr vom Stein, with a clear understanding of the causal connections, proclaimed to the German people regarding these insane measures: **it is convincing that our present condition is solely the consequence of having turned away from that time's German views on marriage, thus creating the subsoil upon which inferiority of all kinds could thrive.**

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n203/mode/2up?view=theater

The marriages of our ancestors were not **individualist [Ich-und-Du]** affairs as they are today. We cannot return to their conception today because we have become more **individualist (i.e. more selfish) [„individueller" d.h. ichsüchtiger]** and because we have taken away the domestic basis of our marriages and thus deprived the wife of a large part of her life's work in the sense of the old idea of marriage—**we have lost all this only since Hardenberg.**

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n229/mode/2up?view=theater

For the last one hundred years or so, we have removed marriage from any form of family-promoting legal protections and made it a purely I-and-thou affair. Yes, we have happily reached the point where we now regard marriage and childbearing to be two different concepts, a distinction largely protected by the law. We can even be as callous as to say that **marriage today is either merely an ecclesiastical concept or the legally sanctioned form of sexual satisfaction.**

https://archive.org/details/a-new-nobility-of-blood-and-soil-by-richard-walther-darre-1930/page/n251/mode/2up?view=theater

We explained in Chapter VII, Section 2 that **we cannot breed a race against an environment that does not suit it.** The race in and of itself does not determine the state's form—it can do so if certain conditions apply, such as among the Icelandic peasants—but it is not the case that this condition always applies. **For example, the entire structure and nature of the political system of the Roman Empire since Gaius Julius Caesar was thoroughly un-Nordic. In fact, it was so un-Nordic that even today's Germans still suffer from the contradictions between the Germanic and the late Roman political systems, which has neither been fully carried out [ausgetragenen] nor been examined through to the last detail. [bis zum letzten durchdachten]** Since the time of Caesar, Germanism had been penetrating the Roman Empire in ever-greater numbers and had attained increasingly higher ranks and honors, meaning that it would have been in a position to exert influence on the state. In fact, one of the very first governors of Gaul—a prisoner of war of Caesar and his house slave—was a Germanic, to whose influence, for example, the conquest of Germania under Tiberius can be attributed. Constantine once raised 40,000 Goths for military service in a single campaign. **According to a conservative estimate by Kauffmann in *Altertumskunde* (*Ancient History*), half of all senior officers in the Roman army were Germanic under Julian.** This alone, therefore, should have been enough Nordic blood to steer the development of the Roman state—which since Caesar had visibly taken an un-Nordic course—back into a Nordic direction. **The fact that this indeed did not happen, that the high percentage of Germanic peoples in the Roman state were not enough to stop the disintegration and decay of the declining Roman civilization (or even to renew it) proves quite clearly that the physical presence of the race alone is in no way sufficient to actually shape the state corresponding to it.** In this respect, things have deeper roots! In addition to the physical presence of the race, an understanding of its own kind of state and a desire for it must also exist in order for this state to come into being —in order to, as it were, prepare the seedbed upon which it can first develop.

The situation is somewhat different when the Nordic race is forced to adopt an alien form of government and is later allowed to administer this form of government independent of foreign influences. In this scenario, one can observe that the Nordic race tries to shape, or at least to administer, the alien form of government in a way that it suitable to its nature. **The end result is a state that may not, strictly speaking, be called Nordic, but rather can be classified as "Nordic-modified." Undoubtedly, a classic example of this remains Frederick the Great—he is an absolute monarch and is thus also the state. Such absolutism is as un-Nordic and thoroughly late Roman as can be,** see Chapter II, Section 1. Significantly, however, Frederick the Great managed his absolutist state with a Nordic sense of stewardship—he placed the state above himself and felt, as it were, only charged with

running the state responsibly. **Thus the non-Nordic concept of absolutism was changed, if not in form, then at least in meaning, to the Germanic-Nordic political system of a responsible (i.e. commissioned) leadership of the people** (see Chapter II, Section 1). One could demonstrate the same of the political systems of many rulers of the German Middle Ages, just as the behavior of the Ostrogoths as lords of Italy is particularly instructive in this respect. **Nordic man can clearly shape or at least administer a non-Nordic state, the prerequisite for this being that he is free of non-Nordic control. If he does not have this independence, the result will be nil,** as is demonstrated by the Goths in their capacity as administrators and officers of the Roman Empire before their conquest of Italy. Or alternatively—as German history shows—it results in a struggle that has lasted for millennia: **German history is, for the most part, nothing more than an attempt to force a non-Nordic political system onto Nordic man in order to control him by assimilating him into a non-Nordic condition—and, on the other hand, the continual rebellion of Nordic man against this.**

But these facts must not mislead us into believing that the political system is so much more significant than the concept of race that race can be disregarded altogether—that it is therefore enough to simply create a Nordic state and everything else will follow. This is the mistake that certain "nationalists" are making today! Certainly, a German state shaped in the Nordic sense and based on Germanic concepts would indirectly and, so to speak, automatically promote Nordic blood in the nation—but a prerequisite for this is that Nordic blood still exists in the first place for this purpose. If this is no longer the case, then even the most beautiful state structure is of no help. **It is therefore necessary to combat both the narrow-mindedness of a purely "nationalistic" point of view (i.e. one that only pays attention to the political system) and that of a purely racial point of view, which expects that all salvation will come from the physical existence of the race alone.** Instead, we must promote the idea that only from the interaction of both views can something which is beneficial and profitable for our people arise.

https://archive.org/details/TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury_400/page/n359/mode/2up?view=theater

The victory of Roman Christianity signified the abandonment of the organic Germanic ideas of the king as a measuring rod of worldly action. We have, in its stead, the ethereal idea of emperor which was arrogated by the church as the legacy of ancient Rome. A thousand years passed until – beginning with Henry the Lion or Heinrich der Lowe, and continued by Brandenburg – the Nordic kingdom renewed itself while the Roman Emperorship declined in the swamp of the House of Habsburg. Admittedly, the Staufers were also self sufficient enough to declare their IMPERIVM as German and independent of Rome. **At the meeting at Besancon, for example, the Papal delegates, who described the IMPERIVM as a Papal endowment, were beaten half dead by the counts and dukes of Friedrich II. Nevertheless, this self consciousness was not built upon a doctrine firmly laid down in principle of the predominance of emperor over pope. Thus it was not a tradition or a perpetuated, type forming, force.**
…

After the collapse of absolute monarchy in 1789, Democratic principles struggled with the National idea. Separated from the start, and later bringing both movements into rigidity, **a new doctrine of power alien to the blood was formulated which reached its peak in Hegel. It was then taken over in renewed falsification by Karl Marx, who equated state with class rule.** Today, we confront the problem. The state has delivered itself and the people to the dishonourable forces of trade. It has appeared to the broad masses more and more as a soulless tool of violence. The views of Hegel concerning the absolutist state in itself became predominant during recent years in Germany, and not only in Germany. **The official moved more and more into a position of master, and forgot, thanks to the identical attitude of those ruling, that he was nothing other than a representative of the entire folk whose duty it is to fulfil the technical or political needs of the folk.** The state and the state official thus became separated from the organic body of the people, and appeared as a special mechanical apparatus toward the latter, in order to lay claim to control over life. Millions took a hostile attitude against this development, but since no opponent dared to appear openly in the national camp, those who were discontented moved to the side of international social democracy, although they inwardly really were not Marxists.
…

State and folk thus often confronted each other openly as enemies. From 1918 to 1933 they even appeared as deadly enemies. Our destiny will be shaped according to the manner in which this inner conflict is resolved.

> https://voxday.net/2020/10/21/the-french-fight-back/
>
> The lie of civnattery has got to die. *The state is not the nation!* There is literally no political philosophy, not even communism, that is more intrinsically statist than civic nationalism.

Today, the state is no longer a separated idol before which we are all supposed to lie in the dust. The state does not even have a purpose unless it acts to preserve the concept of folk. The state is only one means to do this. Church, law, art and science must do likewise. State forms change and state laws pass away, but the folkish concept remains. **It follows from this that the nation is the first and last consideration to which everything else is to be subordinated. And it also follows from this that there can be no state judges, only people's judges.** Unless this be true the entire legal foundation of life would alter. The only other possible result would be such degrading conditions as have been common during the last decade. One and the same state attorney had earlier to represent the Kaiser's state, then the Republican. An independent judge was likewise dependent upon one basic system. **Thus it is possible that, on the basis of Roman law, the state attorney as servant of the state in the name of the people hindered the folkish guiding of the people.** Abstract popular sovereignty of Democracy and the contemptuous words of Hegel – The people is that part of the state which does not know what it wants – have produced the same insubstantial scheme of so called state authority.
…

In 1871, the state began to make itself independent of the people; people which had actually first created it. Today, the people finally begins consciously to lay claim to the place rightfully befitting it.

The demand for freedom as well as the call for authority and type have almost everywhere been falsely posed and inorganically answered. Authority was demanded in Europe in the name of an abstract state principle or in the name of Liberal individualism and church universalism. **In each case the claim was laid that all races and peoples had to subordinate themselves to this god given authority and its forms.** The answer to this rigid dogma was the cry for unrestricted freedom – for anarchy. Rome and Jacobinism – in its old forms and in its later purest shaping in Babeuf and Lenin – actually condition one another inwardly.

https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb31.htm

> Goebbels credited himself with a rhetorical masterpiece. His diary entry for 14 September 1940 notes: “My speech to the Czechs was a tremendous success. It entirely changed their outlook. Even I hadn’t expected that to happen.”

…

Our German Reich went through a similar process about a hundred years ago. It was splintered into larger and smaller entities, just as Europe is divided today. This collection of small states was possible as long as the transportation system was such that it took considerable time to travel from one small principality to the next. **The invention of the steam engine, however, rendered this situation untenable.**
…

I once needed twelve hours to travel from Berlin to Prague by train. Now I can fly in an hour. Technology has once again brought people closer together. It is certainly no accident that this technology has developed only recently. The population of Europe has grown, presenting Europe with entirely new problems in agriculture, the economy, finance, and the military. And the continents, too, have grown closer as a result of new technology. **Europeans are more and more realizing that our differences are only family squabbles when measured against the vast problems that the continents must solve.**

I am convinced that, just as we look back with some amusement on the narrow-minded conflicts between German provinces in the 1840’s and 1850’s, our posterity in fifty years will look back with similar amusement on what is going on today in Europe. They will see the “dramatic battles between nations” of small European states as family squabbles. I am convinced that in fifty years we will no longer think in terms of nations, but of continents, and that entirely different, and perhaps much larger, problems will concern Europe.
…

Do not tell me that the Czech people wants this or that. **I think I know something about leadership. A people thinks the way its intelligentsia teaches it to think.** It has the ideas of its intellectual leaders.
…

The average man does not see very far. **The task of the intelligentsia is to help him see further, to help him imagine things that will be.** The role of the intelligentsia is to open the way to coming events, not be blind servants of the present.

https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/naziseasternempire/himmlersspeechatposen.html

I would like us to issue a motto for us, namely this, that for men and women of this Order, this racial community of the SS, **the word 'work' will be writ large; that no work done for Germany is shameful, be it with an axe or spade, or with the pen, whether in agriculture, in the home or factory, or whether with the sword or plough.**
…

Above all, we must keep people from saying, 'Servant girl, oh no, no German girl can do that, that's for foreigners.' We would end up like the ancient Romans, bringing over slave nationalities by whom we would be racially contaminated.

---

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/61161/pg61161-images.html#Page_162

I have called the right to entertain a *Comitatus*, or body of household retainers, a very jewel in the crown: it was so because it formed, in process of time, the foundation of all the extended powers which became the attributes of royalty, **and finally succeeded in establishing, upon the downfall of the old *dynasts* or nobles by birth, a new order of nobles by service,** whose root was in the crown itself.
…

Nor does it seem probable that a community would at once discover the infinite danger to themselves that lurks in such an institution: far more frequently must it have seemed matter of congratulation to the cultivator, that its existence spared him the necessity of leaving the plough and harrow to resist sudden incursions, or enforce measures of internal police; or that the strong castle with its band of ever-watchful defenders, existed as a garrison near the disputable boundary of the Mark.

The *Germania* of Tacitus supplies us with a detailed account of the institution of the Comitatus, which receives strong confirmation on every point from what we gather from other authentic sources. In his own words:—

> "Illustrious birth or the great services of their fathers give the rank of princes even to young men: they are associated with the rest who have already made proof of their greater powers. **Nor is there any shame in appearing among the comites[294].**
>
> 294. This very assertion proves that the position of the comes was, *in itself,* inferior to that of the freeman.

…

As the proper name for the freeman is ceorl, and for the born-noble eorl, so is the true word for the comes, or comrade, gesíð. **This is in close etymological connection with síð, a journey, and literally denotes one who accompanies another.**
…

The comes may indeed have become the possessor of land, even of very large tracts[310], by gift from his prince; but he could not be the possessor of a free Hide, and consequently bound to service in the general *fyrd*, or to suit in the folcmót: **he might have wealth, and rank and honour, be powerful and splendid, dignified and influential, but he could not be free:** and if even the freeman so far forgot the inherent dignity of his station as to carry himself (for his éðel I think he could not carry) into the service of the prince,—an individual man, although a prince, and not as yet the state, or the representative of the state,—can it be doubted that the remunerative service of the chief would outweigh the barren possession of the farmer, or that the festive board and adventurous life of the castle would soon supply excuses for neglecting the humbler duties of the popular court and judicature? **Even if the markmen razed him from their roll, and committed his éðel to a worthier holder, what should he care, whom the liberality of his conquering leader could endow with fifty times its worth; and whose total divorce from the vulgar community would probably be looked upon with no disfavour by him who had already marked that community for his prey?** Nor could those whom the gesíð in turn settled upon lands which were not within the general mark-jurisdiction, be free markmen, but must have stood towards him in somewhat the same relation as he stood to his own chief. Upon the plan of the larger household, the smaller would also be formed: the same or similar conditions of tenure would prevail; and the services of his dependants he was no doubt bound to hold at the disposal of his own lord, and to maintain for his advantage. **We have thus, even in the earliest times, the nucleus of a standing army, the means and instruments of aggrandizement both for the King and the praetorian cohorts themselves;** practised and delighting in battle, ever ready to join in expeditions which promised adventure, honour or plunder, feasted in time of peace, enriched in time of

war; **holding the bond that united them to their chief as more sacred or stringent than even that of blood[311], and consequently ready for his sake to turn their arms against the free settlers in the district,** whenever his caprice, his passion or his ambition called upon their services. In proportion as his power and dignity increased by their efforts and assistance, so their power and dignity increased; his rank and splendour were reflected upon all that surrounded him, **till at length it became not only more honourable to be the unfree chattel of a prince, than the poor free cultivator of the soil, but even security for possession and property could only be attained within the compass of their body.** As early as the period when the Frankish Law was compiled, we find the great advantage enjoyed by the Comes over the Free Salian or Ripuarian, in the large proportion borne by his wergyld, in comparison with that of the latter[312].

The advantage derived by the community from the presence and protection of an armed force such as the gesíðas constituted, must have gradually produced a disposition to secure their favour even at the expense of the free nobles and settlers: **and a Mark that wished to entrust its security and its interests to a powerful soldier, would probably soon acquiesce in his assuming a direction and leadership in their affairs,** hardly more consistent with their original liberty, than the influence which a modern nobleman may establish by watching, as it is called, over the interests of the Registration. Even the old nobles by blood, who gradually beheld themselves forced down into a station of comparative poverty and obscurity, must have early hastened to give in their adhesion to a new order of things which held out peculiar prospects of advantage to themselves; and thus, the communities deserted by their natural leaders, soon sunk into a very subordinate situation, became portions of larger unities under the protection, and ultimately the rule, of successful adventurers, and consented without a struggle to receive their comites into those offices of power and distinction which were once conferred by popular election.
…

In the strict theory of the comitatus, the gesíð could possess no property of his own; all that he acquired was his lord's, and even the liberalities of the lord himself were only *beneficia* or loans, not absolute gifts[318]: he had the usufruct only during life, the *dominium utile*: the *dominium directum* was in the lord, and at the death of the tenant it is obvious that the estate vested in the lord alone: **the gesíð could have no *ius testamenti*, as indeed he had no family: the lord stood to him in place of father, brother and son.**
…

The circumstances thus brought under review show clearly that the condition of the gesíð was unfree in itself; **that even the free by birth who entered into it, relinquished that most sacred inheritance, and reduced themselves to the rank of thanes, ministers or servants.** Certain rights and privileges grew up, no doubt, by custom, and the counts were probably not very long subject to the mere arbitrary will of the chief: they had the protection of others in a similar state of dependency to their own, and chances, such as they were, of subservience to the king's wishes: a bond of affection and interdependence surpassing that of blood, and replacing the mutual free guarantee of life and security, was formed between them; and they shared alike in the joys and sorrows, the successes and reverses of peace and war: **but with it all, and whatever their rank; they were in fact menials, housed within the walls, fed at the table, clothed at the expense of their chief;** dependent upon his bounty, his gratitude or forbearance, for their subsistence and position in life; bound to sacrifice that life itself in his service, **and, strictly considered, incapable of contracting marriage or sharing in the inestimable sanctities of a home.** They were his cupbearers, stewards, chamberlains and grooms; even as kings and electors were to the emperor, whom they had raised out of their own body. The real nature of their service appears even through the haze of splendour and dignity which gradually surround the intimate servants of royalty; **and as the chief might select his comites and instruments from what class he chose, it was the fate of these voluntary thanes, not unfrequently to be numbered in the same category with the unfree by birth, and thus, in their own persons, to witness the destruction of that essential principle of all Teutonic law, the distinction between the freeman and the serf[321].**

> 321. **"Libertini non multum supra servos sunt, raro aliquod momentum in domo, nunquam in civitate; exceptis duntaxat iis gentibus, quae regnantur: ibi enim et super ingenuos et super nobiles ascendunt: apud caeteros impares libertini libertatis argumentum sunt."** Tac. Germ. xxv.
>
> https://archive.org/details/a589105200kinguoft/page/n351/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **What was the essential fault of these Lombard laws—indeed of all the Teutonic codes? This—that there was one law for the free man, another for the slave. Ecclesiastical dominion was necessary, to make one law for all classes, even though it were a law of common slavery. As the free had done to the slave, even so, and far worse, would the Roman clergy do to them.** The Albigense persecutors, burning sixty ladies in one day; Conrad of Marpurg scourging his own sovereign, St. Elizabeth; shaving the Count of Saiym's head; and

> burning noble ladies almost without trial; Sprenger and his compeers, offering up female hecatombs of the highest blood thoughout Germany; English bishops burning in Smithfield Anne Askew, the hapless court-beauty, and her fellow-courtier Mr. Lascelles, just as if they had been Essex or Berkshire peasants;—all these evildoers were welding the different classes of the European nations, by a community of suffering, into nations; into the belief that free and slave had one blood, one humanity, one conscience, one capacity of suffering; and at last, **one capacity of rebelling, and making common cause, high and low alike, against him who reigned in Italy under the 'Romani nominis umbram.'**

…

As the royal power steadily advanced by his assistance, and the old, national nobility of birth, as well as the old, landed freeman sunk into a lower rank, the gesíð found himself rising in power and consideration proportioned to that of his chief: **the offices which had passed from the election of the freemen to the gift of the crown[322], were now conferred upon him, and the ealdorman, duke, geréfa, judge, and even the bishop, were at length selected from the ranks of the comitatus.** Finally, the nobles by birth themselves became absorbed in the ever-widening whirlpool; day by day the freemen, deprived of their old national defences, wringing with difficulty a precarious subsistence from incessant labour, sullenly yielded to a yoke which they could not shake off, **and commended themselves (such was the phrase)** to the protection of a lord; till a complete change having thus been operated in the opinions of men, and consequently in every relation of society, **a new order of things was consummated, in which the honours and security of service became more anxiously desired than a needy and unsafe freedom;** and the alods being finally surrendered, to be taken back as *beneficia*, under mediate lords, the foundations of the royal, feudal system were securely laid on every side.

https://archive.org/details/the-schutzstaffel-as-an-anti-bolshevist-combat-organization/page/n7/mode/2up?view=theater

The EXCESSIVE VALUATION of the value of the equally good blood, of the PROUD SELF, made it impossible for a nobleman to obey somebody else, for a duke to remain loyal to another, for one to subordinate himself to another. Germanic men of the same blood never made it possible for their own leaders and rulers – who no doubt existed, from Widukind to Florian Geyer – to create a German state. In the final analysis empire after empire fell into ruin because of these faults – the empires of the Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alemans and others.

When Germans could not create a state based on Germanic spirit, OTHER GERMANS forced them with a mailed fist to accept a state based on foreign spirit – with bloodshed, tears and misery.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to be from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the population there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support them, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to drive them forth and none to keep them back. **And if, for the last five hundred years, it has not happened that any of these nations has actually overrun another country, there are various reasons to account for it.** First, the great clearance which that region made of its inhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than thirty nations issued from it in succession; and next, **the circumstance that the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations came, are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort,** and consequently are not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides which, since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race, they serve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring Scythians, who for this reason do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force a passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale have oftentimes been begun by the Tartars, **and been at once withstood by the Hungarians and Poles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and the Church would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms.**

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n189/mode/2up?view=theater

4. **The great societies which are called "political" do not, as Hobbes supposed, spring forth ready armed, leaving to Power the subsequent task of establishing order in a crowd of individuals.** On the contrary, they are the result of the coalescence, whether by violence or by consent, of smaller and much more ancient societies which are called, in the case of the Indo-European peoples, clans.

…

The king's concern was only with murders in which the murderer and his victim belonged to two different groups. And even then his role was a pacificatory one. He did not punish an act at which the only people entitled to be angry were the dead man's clansmen. He strove to prevent the pursuit of

vengeance destroying the harmony between the groupings, and to that end exacted from the murderer's family such reparation as might satisfy the avengers.
…

The king is in consequence constrained to unceasing consultation with his peers, for they alone can supply him with the troops he needs. Must it not be a standing temptation to him to substitute for his mediatory authority an immediate one, to claim direct obedience from the members of the clan? **But in that case he poaches on the preserves of the Elders and comes into conflict with them. And by the same stroke of policy he becomes the ally of all those who seek to escape from the harsh rule of the patriarchate.**

To break the cadre of the clans is, therefore, of the first importance to kings. Their resistance is the reef on which kings are shipwrecked; but the Power which succeeds them, although but a mandatory of the aristocracy of the clans, carries on the work of breaking the clans, because that work is essential to the development of Power. **That is why the classifications of the people, attributed to Solon and Servius Tullius,° assume so capital an importance in Greek and Roman history. They mark the break-up of the natural groups, the members of which were now divided up into categories, to be in their individual capacities soldiers, taxpayers, and electors.**

Power's war with the cell of the clan is never over. It continues through all history. **With admirable perspicacity Maine† hung his exposition of the evolution of Roman law on the thread of the successive recoils of the *patria potestas*.** In the beginning the legislator did not have to concern himself at all with the son, the daughter, and the slave, for these fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the father. **Step by step they all become subject to the law: the state had broken through into a world from which it was at first excluded, and had claimed as subject to its own jurisdiction those who had in former days been subjects of the father alone.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

But to make plain what I mean when I speak of *gentlemen*, I say that those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the revenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the cultivation of these estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their support. **Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or country.** But even more mischievous are they who, besides the estates I have spoken of, are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals and retainers who render them obedience. **Of these two classes of men the kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy are full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth or free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort are the sworn foes to all free institutions.**
…

From what has been said, it follows, **that he who would found a commonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do so unless he first gets rid of them; and that he who would found a monarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails, will never succeed, unless he raise above the level of that equality many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament**, whom he must make gentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on them castles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with retainers; **that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help, he may maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their ambition; all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force and force alone imposes on them.**

https://www.academia.edu/16284517/Irishmen_Aristocrats_and_Other_White_Barbarians

We tend to forget that the primary objects of social discipline, regimentation, and repression in the sixteenth century were not women; nor were they Jews, Moors, or Anabaptists. Rather, the civilizing process under the Tudors attempted to control white upperclass men – precisely because white upperclass men had what those others did not: namely, guns, swords, retainers, horses, and a habit of using them when aggrieved.3

The most trenchant Tudor/Stuart critiques of aristocratic warrior society, however, do not discuss England but two other islands: Utopia and Ireland. Thomas More's low opinion of the armigerous nobility being well-known, I want to consider the socio-political ramifications of the two most important Irish tracts: Spenser's *A View of the Present State of Ireland* (1596) and Sir John Davies's *A Discovery of the True Causes Why Ireland Was Never Entirely Subdued* (1612).
…

Prior to the 1580s, Tudor histories do not include England's barbarian origins, preferring the more respectable national pedigree provided by Brutus's Trojan band and the offspring of Old Testament patriarchs. As late as Holinshed's 1577 *Chronicles*, the earliest inhabitants of

England (and Ireland) could be imagined as the highly civilized grandchildren of Noah, whose northward migrations had been recorded (and invented) by Giovanni Nanni, or the pseudo-Berosus; following Nanni, the *Chronicles* relate how one grandson, Bartolenus, settled Ireland, while another, the pious and learned Samothes, headed for England, where he built numerous towns and cities, leaving his great-grandson Druiyus to establish a college of Druid sages, who subsequently taught the Greek alphabet to the Athenians.8

But with the publication of Camden's *Britannia* in 1586, a radically different model of English prehistory replaces these legitimating myths. In Camden, no *kulturhelden* roam the British isles during the years following the Deluge. Instead of the *Chronicles*' devolutionary scheme, which portrays early British history as the gradual decline of an advanced civilization, *Britannia*'s opening chapters narrate British origins as the slow and bloody civilizing process that followed Roman colonization, which "chased away all savage barbarisme from the Britans minds... and reduced the naturall inhabitants of the Iland unto the society of civill life" (although at the cost of their native culture and liberty).9 For Camden, the early inhabitants of Britain – like all northern Europeans – were "uncivill," "rude," "most warlike, and exceedingly given to slaughter." The English and lowland Scots attained civility, Camden adds, because, unlike the Irish, they became subject to the "Roman yoke" – which leads Camden to the interesting generalization that "wheresoever the Romans were victours, they brought them whom they conquered, to civility: **neither verily in any place else throughout Europe was there any civility, learning, and elegance, but where they ruled.**"10
...

In Caesar, and even more sharply in Tacitus, **this grim picture of barbarian life is complicated by a grimmer realization that the barbarian alone remains free;** as Tacitus remarks of the Gauls, "a life of ease has made them unwarlike: their valour perished with their freedom."23 **The consequence of beating one's sword into a plowshare is slavery, not only because an indolent people is easily conquered but because civilized persons *prefer* comfortable subjection to the harsh freedom of the forests and bogs.**
...

The *Germania* ends with an account of the Fenni, a people "astonishingly savage and disgustingly poor," who survive on "wild herbs, dress in skins, and sleep on the ground." Yet, Tacitus remarks, "they count their lot happier than that of others who groan over field labour, sweat over house-building, or hazard their own and other men's fortunes in the hope of profit and the fear of loss [*spe metuque*]. Unafraid of anything that man or god can do to them, they have reached a state that few human beings can attain." **Free from hope and fear, the bestial Fenni attain Stoic *ataraxia*, while civilized men sweat and groan under their burdens.**
...

Fynes Moryson, secretary to the Lord Deputy of Ireland Charles Mountjoy from 1600 to 1606, similarly notes that it "may well be said of the Irish which Caesar in his Commentaries writes of the old Germans; like beasts they doe all things by force and Armes."27 Although Spenser, Davies, and Moryson recognize that these hostilities are sometimes directed against English colonial encroachments, they view political resistance as only one aspect of the incessant and pervasive violence of Ireland's barbarian society. Thus according to Davies, "As for oppression, extortion, and other trespasses, the weaker had never any remedy against the stronger: **whereby it came to pass that no man could enjoy his life, his wife, his lands or goods in safety if a mightier man than himself had an appetite to take the same from him.**"28

> 27. Moryson, 193. Portions of Moryson's *Itinerary* were published in 1617, but the chapters on Irish politics and customs, probably written between 1617 and 1620, remained in manuscript until 1903. **Moryson's observations frequently overlap those of Spenser and Davies, but he lays far greater stress on the dangers resulting from both Irish Catholicism and English political corruption.**

Irish society, Davies implies, is a warrior aristocracy, like that of the ancient northern European tribes. The tracts thus point out that the Hibernian nobility – both indigenous and Anglo-Irish – retain companies of fighting men loyal only to themselves, whereby they "exercise plain tyranny over the common people," using "husbandmen... as slaues."29 **These lords wield a nearly absolute power over their inferiors, compelling their sizeable body of dependents "to followe them into any action whatsoever."**30

The same aristocratic ethos has major socio-economic implications, especially since (in Spenser's words) **"all the Irishe almost, boste them selues to bee gentlemen... for yf he can deryve him self from the heade of a septe [clan], as most of them can... then he holdeth him self a gentleman." But, anyone who considers himself a gentleman, Spenser continues, "scorneth eftsoones to worke or vse any handy labor, which he sayth is the lyfe of a peazante or Churle, but thensforth eyther becometh a horseboy or a stocage to some kearne, envring him self to his weapon, and**

to his gentlemanly trade of stealinge."31 Davies and Moryson similarly remark upon the Irish identification of status with the sword, the former commenting that this "scorn to descend to husbandry or merchandise" lies behind a good deal of the poverty and violence of Irish society, since "these poor gentlemen... rather chose to live at home by theft, extortion, and coshering" than engage in farming or any other peaceful and productive vocation.32

> 32. Davies, 165-6; cf. Spenser, 1934, 35; Moryson, 196, 200, 234, 483. **I hesitate to discount this as Protestant propaganda since Roman Catholics made similar observations; for example, a sixteenth-century Jesuit missionary reported that the Irish "account it no shame or infamy to commit robberies, which they practice everywhere with exceeding cruelty... neither are they persuaded that either violence or rapine or manslaughter displeaseth God"** (quoted in Quinn, 1966, 46-47).

As a result, **none of the Irish "build any stone or brick house for his private habitation... Neither did any of them in all this time plant any gardens or orchards, enclose or improve their land, live together in settled villages or towns, nor made any provision for posterity," most of the native population instead leading a semi-nomadic existence, their time divided between herding cattle and fighting.**33
...

Barbarian Ireland, that is, does not only resemble ancient Britain; it resembles England at least up to the Tudor period, **it being, Spenser tellingly admits, "but even the other daye, since England grewe Civill."**40

Spenser and Davies underscore this point by insisting upon the similarities between Irish tribal society and Anglo-Irish feudalism. The "wild Irish" and the Anglo-Irish are both northern barbarians. **Thus the Anglo-Irish families, like the septs, engage in unending "private warrs one against another."**41 **Their soldiers use "all kynde of outragious disorder and villanye, both towardes thee poore men that victell and lodge them, and also to all the rest of the countrie about them, whom they abuse spoyle and afflicte, by all the meanes they can invent," while the Anglo-Irish nobleman, "loving the Irish tyranny... better than a just and lawful seigniory," makes "his will and comaundment a lawe vnto his owne vassall," whom he treats as "a very slave and villein."**42 Spenser thus concludes that "the chefest abuses which are now in that realme [Ireland], are growne from the Englishe, and the Englishe... are now much more lawlesse and lycencious, then the verie wilde Irishe."43

> 43. Spenser, 1934, 82; **Davies in fact argues that the Anglo-Irish settlers "uncivilized" the Irish by expropriating the open flatlands, thus driving the natives into the fens and woods** (136, 160). **Stanyhurst vehemently denies such accusations, claiming that the new English administrators and government officials slanderously blame the Anglo-Irish nobility for problems stemming from their own venality and incompetence** (6:5, 46-52, 67); **Stanyhurst, it should be noted, was himself Anglo-Irish.**

...

If the Tudor state gradually brought its restive nobility to heel during the late sixteenth century, **the aristocratic culture of violence that "flourished from the days of Beowulf to those of Sir Philip Sydney" had not yet lost its hold on men's imagination when Essex and his followers rode into London in 1601.** Elizabethan magnates still maintained considerable retinues of armed and liveried servants and, when requisite, mobilized their tenants to prosecute private quarrels. **Lawrence Stone thus recounts how in the 1570s, Lord Chandos, in a most Irish-like manner, mobilized "armed retainers with guns at the ready" to intimidate Crown officials, "protected servants of his who robbed men on the highway," rigged juries, and blackmailed the local peasantry.**47 As these accounts suggest, the Hibernian chieftain and the English nobility stand together in the ranks of the barbarian, just as the Irish rebel, praised by native bards because "his musicke was not the harpe nor layes of loue, but the cryes of people, and Clashinge of armor," bears an unmistakable resemblance to Hotspur, the quintessential English warrior aristocrat.48 **The Irish tracts, in other words, do not just concern Ireland but implicitly offer a drastic critique of the whole aristocratic culture of honor.**
...

For Spenser, that is, civilizing the barbarian requires the forcible imposition of an alien order; for Davies, who strongly condemns the refusal of the Anglo-Irish to grant common law privileges to the "mere Irish," the same project is reconfigured as extending the benefits of common law to the lower orders rather than forcing it down the Irish's throats.

Apart from this, however, Spenser's and Davies's proposals for civilizing Ireland are by and large identical. In particular, they both employ what does not seem anachronistic to term a "materialist" interpretation of culture as the offspring of political economy. Spenser argues repeatedly that one

cannot civilize a country by punishing barbarians for acts of barbarism; rather, to attain (or impose) civility requires a prior sweeping redistribution of power and property.52
...

In the Irish system, land belonged to the sept rather than to individuals, and hence was not heritable; moreover peasant tenures were generally very short – a couple of years or so – at which point the lord of the manor could either alter or terminate the lease.53 In place of these customs, Spenser and Davies uniformly advocate the introduction of private property, patrilineal inheritance, and heritable freehold tenures.54 The works specify two principal reasons for these changes. First, **the changes would sharply curtail the military power of the nobility (both Irish and Anglo-Irish), since if the country people had a *right* to their land they no longer risked eviction for refusing to follow their lord "into what action soever he will enter."**55 Private property in the Irish tracts is thus not viewed as a means to secure individual rights from the encroachments of the state – its function in the English constitutional struggles leading up to the Civil War – but as a way to protect both common people and commonwealth from the depredations and extortions of the nobility. **The Irish ruling classes do not observe "*Meum* and *tuum*," a Captain Nicholas Dawtrey wrote to the Queen in 1594, because "they will have all that their sword can command and depart [i.e., part] with nothing that the same sword can keep."**56 **In contrast, Spenser maintains, the English aristocracy no longer presents a serious threat to the commonwealth, since "the Noblemen how ever they should happen to be evill disposed haue noe commaund at all over the Commonaltye, though dwellinge vnder them, because euerie man standeth vpon him self."**57

> 57. Spenser, 1934, 190. Similarly, **Spenser argues that the Irish should be forced to abandon their tribal appellations (O'Brian, MacCarthy, and the like) and instead take agnatic surnames derived from an individual's "trade or facultie or... some qualitie [sic] of his bodye or mynde, or of the place where he dwelte," in order to instill a sense of personal identity independent of clan affiliation** (200-01).

Revamping traditional patterns of land ownership would also spark a georgic revolution; that is, it would shift the basis of the Irish economy from grazing to agriculture, thus creating a substantial body of prosperous yeoman farmers, each of whom would "bee drawen to build him self, some handsome habytacion... to dytch and inclose his ground, to manure and husband yt as good Farmers vse... And to all these other comodyties he shall in shorte tyme fynde a greater added that is his owne wealth and riches, encreased, and wounderfullie enlarged."58 The Irish tracts presuppose a direct relation between cultivating crops and people;59 **so Davies claims that if the Irish, having been "transplanted from the woods and mountains," were given arable land, "(like wild fruit trees) they might grow the milder, and bear the better and sweeter fruit."**60

> 59. This relation holds outside Ireland as well; Harrison thus notes that English, Welsh, and Scottish farmland has "euen now in these our daies growne to be much more fruitfull, than it hath beene in times past. The cause is for that our countriemen are growne to be more painefull, skilfull, and carefull through recompense of gaine... **[Previously] verie little other food and liuelihood was wont to be looked for (beside flesh) more than the soile of it selfe, and the cow gaue; the people in the meane time liuing idelie, dissolutelie, and by picking and stealing one from another. All which vices are now (for the most part) relinquished, so that each nation manureth hir owne with triple commodities to that it was before time**" (1.184)

Whereas semi-nomadic grazers have little real property and therefore little investment in peace, agriculture breeds civility since farmers, in contrast, are understandably reluctant to see the fruits of their bone-wearying toil destroyed overnight by marauding soldiers. **Because the Irish peasant, Spenser remarks, "hath noe such estate in any his holdinge, noe such buildinge vpon anye farme, noe such costes ymployed in fencinge and husbandringe the same" there is nothing to "withhold him from anye such wilfull course as his Lordes cause and his owne lewde disposition may carrie him vnto";** conversely, "husbandrye beinge the Nurse of thrifte and the daughter of Industrie... is most enemye to warr."61
...

Nor does the social regimentation and discipline entailed by this work ethic aim at stamping out folk festivities and other manifestations of the popular carnivalesque spirit; the Irish tracts do not attack the Hibernian equivalents of Maypoles and Church ales. On the contrary, they favor industry, both georgic and civic, as a way of eliminating the pinching lenten poverty afflicting the Irish commons, enabling the kingdom, Davies writes, to "merit the name of a 'commonwealth,' which at this time may properly be termed a 'common-misery.'"65 The goal, if not quite a perpetual carnival, has a distinctly festive aspect: **in the new Irish towns, the citizens will "liue plentifully vnder good gouernment, and... growe rich by trades and traffique... and happy in all aboundance," having exchanged "sorrow, famine, howling, and cursing... [for] ioy, iolitie, plentie."**66
...

To make the king's writ run in Ireland serves the same ends as the other proposed reforms: transferring power to the crown and commons (whose interests are presumed to coincide) at the expense of the nobility, so that peaceful subjects might work and prosper in safety, protected by royal justice from aristocratic exploitation.69 Richard Beacon thus recommends sending royal commissioners to Ireland, who "as iudges shall restraine and suppresse the ambition of the nobles, and shall carefully defende the people from oppressors... [Since] it is saide that a Monarchie governed popularlie is then secure and voide of perill: for in the multitude or people consisteth the strength and force of every kingdome."70 **The Anglo-Irish nobility had long refused to impose English law on the Irish because, Davies bitterly remarks, they feared that if the Irish became "free subjects," the crown would "ennoble some of them, and enfranchise all and make them amenable to the law, which would have abridged and cut off a great part of that greatness which they had promised unto themselves."**71 Instead, the Anglo-Irish classified the natives as unfree aliens, "so far out of the protection of the law as it was often adjudged no felony to kill a mere Irishman in the time of peace." Moreover, the Anglo-Irish prohibition against intermarriage with the native population makes it evident "that such as had the government of Ireland under the Crown of England did intend to make a perpetual separation and enmity between the English and the Irish, pretending, no doubt, that the English should in the end root out the Irish."72 **When in the early seventeenth century, English justices of assize began going on circuit through the Irish countryside, the common people first learned, Davies reports, "that they were free subjects to the kings of England, and not slaves and vassals to their pretended lords," with Moryson adding that "the inferiour Gentlemen and all the Common people, gladly imbraced this liberty from the yoke of the great lords."**73

Precisely because the law "doth reduce all the people... to the condition of subjects," the warrior nobility "doe speciallye rage at... the lawes them selues... as most repugnante to theire libertie and naturall fredome,"74 the characteristic mark of hard-core aristocrats – whether Brutus's sons, Germanic chieftains, or the Earls of Tyrone and Essex – being a deep-seated hostility to any authority viewed as liable to restrict their personal autonomy. Against this notion of freedom as the liberty of the strong man to do as he pleases, the Irish tracts claim that juridical subjection creates liberty, since a free person differs from a serf or slave in that the former is governed, not by the arbitrary will of a master, but by law.75 This claim, it should be noted, does not imply absolutist or imperialist propensities; rather, **from antiquity through the Renaissance, *constitutional* theorists, whether royalist or republican – Aristotle, Polybius, Aquinas, Hooker, Buchanan, Languet – see the rule of law as the key feature distinguishing legitimate government from despotism *because* law protects the weak from what one Elizabethan denominated "Irish rule": namely "a government as the mightiest do what they list against the inferiors."**76
...

The tracts thus presuppose the position familiar from Cicero's *De officiis* that civil society exists to protect the weak from the strong a function which they, like Cicero, associate with kingship and law.78 **In this sense Beacon, in a rather stunning fusion of the *Aeneid* and the Magnificat, contrasts the rapacious Irish nobility to the Roman colonial governors, who labored "nothing more then to humble and deiect the mightie & to protect and defend the feeble & weake, and deliver the people from oppressions."**79

> 78. "Mihi quidem... iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. **Nam cum premeretur inops multitudo abiis, qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem...** Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae regum" (*De officiis* 2.12.41).

...

Significantly, both Spenser and Moryson propose that Irish society be refashioned according to the model of the Low Countries – the late Renaissance epitome of civic independence and bourgeois prosperity; **Moryson in fact recommends importing Flemings into Ireland as a pattern for the natives of "a Free people... vsed to liue of themselues... [and] not vsed to the absolute Commandes of lordes after the seruile manner of Ireland."**82
...

By shifting the classical focus on what civility means for the free and noble barbarian warrior to its implications for the peasantry, **the Irish tracts eliminate the moral ambiguities characteristic of the Roman narratives;** for this population, ruthlessly exploited by both tribal and feudal aristocracies, civility promises to bestow rather than destroy liberty.86 **From the perspective of the churl, civilization is not a matter of exchanging heroic self-sufficiency for servile constraint, but passing from feudal bondage to the status of a "free subject" with full legal rights and protection.**87
...

According to Plutarch, the early Romans were a savage and violent people. Faced with the task of ruling these "daring and warlike spirits," Numa thus embarked upon a series of reforms designed "above all things... to lead them to good order and quiet." **Therefore, Plutarch reports, he organized the state on "democratic" (that is, non-aristocratic) lines, with "goldsmiths and flute-players and shoemakers constituting his promiscuous, many-colored commonality"; divided the population into trade guilds designed to override tribal and ethnic allegiances;** and, by "turning people to husbandry," instilled in them "a relish for peace." The reforms bore the desired fruit: the "love of virtue and justice" and a "general longing for the sweets of peace and order, **and for life employed in the quiet tillage of the soil, bringing up of children, and worships [sic] of the gods.**"91

The Irish tracts have an obvious debt to this georgic and *gemeinschaftlich* version of the *pax Romana*, which, as Plutarch makes quite clear, represents the antithesis of Sparta's aristocratic warrior society.92

> 92. See, for example, Plutarch, 1:171. Yet, somewhat confusingly, in Spenser (as in Beacon) the critique of aristocratic violence also betrays the influence of Machiavelli's *Discourses*, which, despite their celebration of ancient military virtu, are unequivocally hostile towards "gentlemen" – those "who live idly upon the proceeds of their extensive possessions, without devoting themselves to agriculture or any other useful pursuit to gain a living." **The armigerous nobility in particular "are pernicious to any country... [and] everywhere enemies of all civil government." A country infested with such men, Machiavelli continues, can only achieve "any kind of order" by setting up a strong monarchy to control the aristocracy "with a royal hand, and with full and absolute powers." Thus the French have survived as a nation only because of their "determined constancy in repressing the ambition of the nobles"** (254-55, 402). **If, like Machiavelli, Spenser condones drastic measures to suppress internal enemies, like Machiavelli he also generally identifies these enemies with the first, not third, estate, pointing out that "all the rebellyons... in Ireland, are not begunn by the Common people but by the Lordes and Captaines"** (189-90).

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2612/pg2612-images.html#linknoteref-321

While the old Gaelic institutions were in full vigour, no account of them was given by any observer, qualified to judge of them fairly. Had such an observer studied the character of the Highlanders, he would doubtless have found in it closely intermingled the good and the bad qualities of an uncivilised nation. **He would have found that the people had no love for their country or for their king; that they had no attachment to any commonwealth larger than the clan, or to any magistrate superior to the chief.**
...

He would have seen, wherever he turned, that dislike of steady industry, and that disposition to throw on the weaker sex the heaviest part of manual labour, which are characteristic of savages. He would have been struck by the spectacle of athletic men basking in the sun, angling for salmon, or taking aim at grouse, while their aged mothers, their pregnant wives, their tender daughters, were reaping the scanty harvest of oats. Nor did the women repine at their hard lot. In their view it was quite fit that a man, especially if he assumed the aristocratic title of Duinhe Wassel and adorned his bonnet with the eagle's feather, should take his ease, except when he was fighting, hunting, or marauding. To mention the name of such a man in connection with commerce or with any mechanical art was an insult. Agriculture was indeed less despised. Yet a highborn warrior was much more becomingly employed in plundering the land of others than in tilling his own.
...

This contemptuous loathing lasted till the year 1745, and was then for a moment succeeded by intense fear and rage. England, thoroughly alarmed, put forth her whole strength. The Highlands were subjugated rapidly, completely, and for ever.
...

A political and social revolution took place through the whole Celtic region. **The power of the chiefs was destroyed: the people were disarmed:** the use of the old national garb was interdicted: the old predatory habits were effectually broken; and scarcely had this change been accomplished when a strange reflux of public feeling began. Pity succeeded to aversion.
...

Scarcely had the chiefs been turned into mere landlords, when it became the fashion to draw invidious comparisons between the rapacity of the landlord and the indulgence of the chief.
...

The old tie, they said, had been parental: the new tie was purely commercial. What could be more lamentable than that the head of a tribe should eject, for a paltry arrear of rent, tenants who were

his own flesh and blood, tenants whose forefathers had often with their bodies covered his forefathers on the field of battle?
…

There was one inexhaustible source of discontents and disputes. **The feudal system had, some centuries before, been introduced into the hill country, but had neither destroyed the patriarchal system nor amalgamated completely with it. In general he who was lord in the Norman polity was also chief in the Celtic polity; and, when this was the case, there was no conflict. But, when the two characters were separated, all the willing and loyal obedience was reserved for the chief. The lord had only what he could get and hold by force.** If he was able, by the help of his own tribe, to keep in subjection tenants who were not of his own tribe, there was a tyranny of clan over clan, the most galling, perhaps, of all forms of tyranny.
…

As the individual Celt was easily turned into a soldier, so a tribe of Celts was easily turned into a battalion of soldiers. All that was necessary was that the military organization should be conformed to the patriarchal organization. The Chief must be Colonel: his uncle or his brother must be Major: the tacksmen, who formed what may be called the peerage of the little community, must be the Captains: the company of each Captain must consist of those peasants who lived on his land, and whose names, faces, connections, and characters, were perfectly known to him: the subaltern officers must be selected among the Duinhe Wassels, proud of the eagle's feather: the henchman was an excellent orderly: the hereditary piper and his sons formed the band: and the clan became at once a regiment.
…

But those very institutions which made a tribe of highlanders, all bearing the same name, and all subject to the same ruler, so formidable in battle, disqualified the nation for war on a large scale. Nothing was easier than to turn clans into efficient regiments; but nothing was more difficult than to combine these regiments in such a manner as to form an efficient army. From the shepherds and herdsmen who fought in the ranks up to the chiefs, all was harmony and order. Every man looked up to his immediate superior, and all looked up to the common head. **But with the chief this chain of subordination ended. He knew only how to govern, and had never learned to obey. Even to royal proclamations, even to Acts of Parliament, he was accustomed to yield obedience only when they were in perfect accordance with his own inclinations.** It was not to be expected that he would pay to any delegated authority a respect which he was in the habit of refusing to the supreme authority. He thought himself entitled to judge of the propriety of every order which he received. Of his brother chiefs, some were his enemies and some his rivals. It was hardly possible to keep him from affronting them, or to convince him that they were not affronting him. All his followers sympathized with all his animosities, considered his honour as their own, and were ready at his whistle to array themselves round him in arms against the commander in chief. **There was therefore very little chance that by any contrivance any five clans could be induced to cooperate heartily with one another during a long campaign.** The best chance, however, was when they were led by a Saxon. It is remarkable that none of the great actions performed by the Highlanders during our civil wars was performed under the command of a Highlander. Some writers have mentioned it as a proof of the extraordinary genius of Montrose and Dundee that those captains, though not themselves of Gaelic race or speech, should have been able to form and direct confederacies of Gaelic tribes. But in truth it was precisely because Montrose and Dundee were not Highlanders, that they were able to lead armies composed of Highland clans. Had Montrose been chief of the Camerons, the Macdonalds would never have submitted to his authority. Had Dundee been chief of Clanronald, he would never have been obeyed by Glengarry. **Haughty and punctilious men, who scarcely acknowledged the king to be their superior, would not have endured the superiority of a neighbour, an equal, a competitor.** They could far more easily bear the preeminence of a distinguished stranger, yet even to such a stranger they would allow only a very limited and a very precarious authority. To bring a chief before a court martial, to shoot him, to cashier him, to degrade him, to reprimand him publicly, was impossible. Macdonald of Keppoch or Maclean of Duart would have struck dead any officer who had demanded his sword, and told him to consider himself as under arrest; and hundreds of claymores would instantly have been drawn to protect the murderer. **All that was left to the commander under whom these potentates condescended to serve was to argue with them, to supplicate them, to flatter them, to bribe them;** and it was only during a short time that any human skill could preserve harmony by these means. For every chief thought himself entitled to peculiar observance; and it was therefore impossible to pay marked court to any one without disobliging the rest. **The general found himself merely the president of a congress of petty kings.** He was perpetually called upon to hear and to compose disputes about pedigrees, about precedence, about the division of spoil. His decision, be it what it might, must offend somebody. At any moment he might hear that his right wing had fired on his centre in pursuance of some quarrel two hundred years old, or that a whole battalion had marched back to its native glen, because another battalion had been put in the post of honour. **A Highland bard might easily have found in the history of the year 1689 subjects very similar to those with which the war of Troy furnished the great poets of antiquity.** One day Achilles is sullen, keeps his tent, and announces his

intention to depart with all his men. The next day Ajax is storming about the camp, and threatening to cut the throat of Ulysses.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0018

In such a state of society as that which existed all over Europe during the middle ages, very slight checks sufficed to keep the sovereign in order. His means of corruption and intimidation were very scanty.
...

The army, now the most formidable instrument of the executive power, was then the most formidable check on that power. Resistance to an established government, in modern times so difficult and perilous an enterprise, was, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the simplest and easiest matter in the world. Indeed, it was far too simple and easy. An insurrection was got up then almost as easily as a petition is got up now. In a popular cause, or even in an unpopular cause favoured by a few great nobles, a force of ten thousand armed men was raised in a week. If the King were, like our Edward the Second and Richard the Second, generally odious, he could not procure a bow or halbert. He fell at once and without an effort.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2439/pg2439-images.html#linknoteref-57
>
> There can be little doubt that, if Charles had frankly made to the Short Parliament, which met in the spring of 1640, but one half of the concessions which he made, a few months later, to the Long Parliament, he would have lived and died a powerful King. **On the other hand, there can be no doubt whatever that, if he had refused to make any concession to the Long Parliament, and had resorted to arms in defence of the ship money and of the Star Chamber, he would have seen, in the hostile ranks, Hyde and Falkland side by side with Hollis and Hampden.** But, in truth, he would not have been able to resort to arms; for nor twenty Cavaliers would have joined his standard. It was to his large concessions alone that he owed the support of that great body of noblemen and gentlemen who fought so long and so gallantly in his cause.

...

There have always been monarchies in Asia, in which the royal authority has been tempered by fundamental laws, though no legislative body exists to watch over them. **The guarantee is the opinion of a community of which every individual is a soldier. Thus, the king of Cabul, as Mr. Elphinstone informs us, cannot augment the land revenue, or interfere with the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.**

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/sherman-said-that-an-entire-class-of-southerners-had-to-be-killed.157237/

Upon receipt of a letter from Halleck, dated August 29, 1863, which brought up "the question of reconstruction in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas," Sherman replied "unofficially" as Halleck had suggested, so that he could express himself freely without being annoyed by the press.
...

[Sherman lists and describes four classes: **The large planters, the "smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers", the Southern-residing Union adherents, and finally, "the young bloods of the South."** I have bolded one sentence.]

Fourth. The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyers about towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never did work and never will. War suits them, and the rascals are brave, fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in every sense. They care not a sou for ******s, land, or any thing. They hate Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past, present, or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty of forage, and an open country, they are happy. This is a larger class than most men suppose, and they are the most dangerous set of men that this war has turned loose upon the world. They are splendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless. Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson, are the types and leaders of this class. **These men must all be killed or employed by us before we can hope for peace.** They have no property or futures, and therefore cannot be influenced by any thing, except personal considerations.

http://www.romanitas.ru/eng/THE%20FALL%20OF%20ORTHODOX%20ENGLAND%205X8.htm#_ftnref15

According to Solonevich, **feudalism could be defined as “the splintering of state sovereignty among a mass of small, but in principle sovereign owners of property”.** Contrary to Marx, it had nothing to do with ‘productive relations’ and was far from being an advance on previous forms of social organisation.

"It is sufficient to remember the huge cultural and unusually high level of Roman 'production'. **Feudal Europe, poor, dirty and illiterate, by no means represented 'a more progressive form of productive relations' – in spite of Hegel, it was sheer regression. Feudalism does not originate in productive relations. It originates in the thirst for power beyond all dependence on production and distribution.** Feudalism is, so to speak, *the democratisation of power* [my italics – V.M.] – its transfer to all those who at the given moment in the given place have sufficient physical strength to defend their baronial rights – *Faustrecht*... Feudalism sometimes presupposes a juridical basis of power, but never a moral one.

"**The feudal lord does not rule 'in the name' of the nation, the people, the peasants, or whoever else there might be.** He rules only and exclusively in his own interests, which have been strengthened by such-and-such battles or parchments. **For the feudal lord the monarch is not the bearer of definite moral ideals or even of the practical interests of the people or nation, but only 'the first among equals', who has had the luck to be stronger than the rest…**

"The thirst for power is, of course, a property common to all humanity, and therefore the tendency to the development of feudalism will be to a greater or lesser degree characteristic of all countries and all peoples of the world. … **But if we discard trivialities, then we must say that Rome, for example, had no knowledge at all of feudal relations. There were landowners and there were senators, there were proconsuls and there were emperors, <u>but there were no barons. The sovereign power 'of the people and senate of Rome', engraved on the Roman eagles, remained the single indivisible source of all power</u> – even the power of the Roman emperors.** The civil wars of Rome bore no relation to the feudal wars of medieval Europe. Nor did Ancient Greece with its purely capitalist relations know feudalism. Yes, Greece was split up into a series of sovereign states, but, though tiny, these were nevertheless states – monarchies and republics, in principle having equal rights in relation to each other and by no means in relations of feudal submission or co-submission."[16]

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Coriolanus*.html#ref32

29 1 But after he had taken Bola, a city not more than twelve miles away from Rome, where he got much treasure and put almost all the adults to the sword; and after the Volscians even who had been ordered to remain in their cities grew impatient, and came trooping in arms to Marcius, declaring that he was the sole and only general whom they would recognize as their leader, then his name was great throughout all Italy, **and men thought with amazement how the valour of a single man, upon his changing sides, had effected such a marvellous turn in affairs.**

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#abolition

The barbarous practice of wearing arms in the midst of peace, (182) **and the bloody maxims of honor, were unknown to the Romans;** and, during the two purest ages, from the establishment of equal freedom to the end of the Punic wars, the city was never disturbed by sedition, and rarely polluted with atrocious crimes.

> 182. *πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο.* Thucydid. l. i. c. 6 **The historian who considers this circumstance as the test of civilization, would disdain the barbarism of a European court.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=fj8oQ4lzteIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA16#v=onepage&q&f=false

Ruthless competition for office and honour had also exacted their toll. **Since <u>the practice of duelling was not condoned among citizens in this aristocracy</u>, violence was liberated for language, and feuds were conducted through prosecution in the courts of law.**7 Signal mishaps in political life might consign a family or whole group to obscurity for a generation, or for ever.
…

In a single year (109) no fewer than four consulars suffered condemnation and exile.9 Five years later a lost battle in Gaul and the prosecution of Servilius Caepio (*cos.* 106) impaired and depressed an illustrious family of the patriciate.

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/84/mode/2up?view=theater

There were two important results in the dissolution of the empire: **(1) bishops often became the default source of legal-political order wherever the imperial order had been destroyed,**11 **and (2) with the imperial order gone, political order where it did exist was local – amounting to the rule by a duke or king of his personal *estate*,** on which he often endowed a church or monastery.12

...

As we look at this historical process, **we'll have a much better understanding of what went on if we substitute "estate" for "state," because after the collapse of imperial rule the political regimes in the West are defined by the rule of a person over his personal lands, that is, his *estates*.** (Even when their reigns were dressed in imperial language, Frankish or Germanic "emperors" really amounted to Frankish or Germanic kings ruling over their own territorial estates.)

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/4/9*.html#ref15
>
> The two bishops journeyed together to Ravenna, and were received with all veneration by the King.
>
> **And here let us observe for a moment, that we have in this embassy an excellent illustration of the way in which barbaric conquest forced the Church onwards in the path of temporal dominion.** The edict against the adherents of Odovacar was a purely civil edict. Whether wise or foolish, it in no way specially concerned the Church, nor trenched upon ecclesiastical privilege. Neither was it, like the revenge wreaked by Theodosius on the citizens of Thessalonica, an outrage upon humanity, a gross and obvious breach of the law of God. It was a very harsh and ill-conceived measure, but it related to matters which were entirely within the domain of the civil governor; and as such, **we cannot imagine that either Ambrose or Eusebius would have felt himself entitled to remonstrate against it, nor that Theodosius or Constantine would have tolerated such an interference.** Now, however, that a Barbarian, instead of a Roman, sits in the seat of power, the moderating influence of the ecclesiastic in purely political matters is eagerly invoked by the governed, and not repelled by the governor.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_022

If the Church had continued to buttress the thrones of the king whom it anointed, or if the struggle had terminated speedily in an undivided victory, all Europe would have sunk down under a Byzantine or Muscovite despotism. For the aim of both contending parties was absolute authority. But although liberty was not the end for which they strove, it was the means by which the temporal and the spiritual power called the nations to their aid. The towns of Italy and Germany won their franchises, France got her States-General, and England her Parliament out of the alternate phases of the contest; and as long as it lasted it prevented the rise of divine right. A disposition existed to regard the crown as an estate descending under the law of real property in the family that possessed it. But the authority of religion, and especially of the papacy, was thrown on the side that denied the indefeasible title of kings. **In France what was afterwards called the Gallican theory maintained that the reigning house was above the law, and that the sceptre was not to pass away from it as long as there should be princes of the royal blood of St. Louis.** But in other countries the oath of fidelity itself attested that it was conditional, and should be kept only during good behaviour; and it was in conformity with the public law to which all monarchs were held subject, that King John was declared a rebel against the barons, and that the men who raised Edward III. to the throne from which they had deposed his father invoked the maxim *Vox populi Vox Dei.*

And this doctrine of the divine right of the people to raise up and pull down princes, after obtaining the sanctions of religion, was made to stand on broader grounds, and was strong enough to resist both Church and king. In the struggle between the House of Bruce and the House of Plantagenet for the possession of Scotland and Ireland, the English claim was backed by the censures of Rome. But the Irish and the Scots refused it, and the address in which the Scottish Parliament informed the Pope of their resolution shows how firmly the popular doctrine had taken root. Speaking of Robert Bruce, they say: "**Divine Providence, the laws and customs of the country, which we will defend till death, and the choice of the people, have made him our king.** If he should ever betray his principles, and consent that we should be subjects of the English king, then we shall treat him as an enemy, as the subverter of our rights and his own, and shall elect another in his place. **We care not for glory or for wealth, but for that liberty which no true man will give up but with his life.**"

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_016

Better even bad rules than a rule which is not of law. It was a great and a true word that Jhering spoke when he said: 'Form is the sworn foe of caprice, she is Freedom's twin sister.'1 The giants of the prime are stark and grim figures in our sight, yet their force cleared a way for the Gods through chaos, and without them the Gods would never have come to Valhalla. **But the guardians became tyrants when, in a community growing civilized, the judicial results of a semi-magical ritual ceased to be tolerable, and the so-called judgments of God were openly deemed unjust alike by men of war and by men of religion.** Their ways could not be mended; they must be broken, and a new body must be fashioned for the justice which in its old embodiment was too visibly blind even in the eyes of twelfth century suitors. **The masters who were no longer protectors but oppressors must be fought with and overthrown if the law were to be**

made an organ of living righteousness. Truly the spirit of our infant laws had need of a mighty champion. It was written of the Church that kings should be her nursing fathers. No less truly might it be said of the Common Law. **The king's overriding power, a power both to devise and to execute, was the only one strong enough for the work. Royal inquests, royal precepts and decisions, ingenuity of royal officers at least as eager to bring fees into the king's coffers and enhance the reputation of the king's court as to procure ease and satisfaction to suitors, were the means, not precisely of abolishing the inflexible and cumbrous old procedure – we had not formally begun to abolish anything – but of relegating it to an obscurity where it was speedily forgotten, and so completely forgotten too that professed antiquarian lawyers could, almost down to our own time, believe trial by jury to be immemorial.** Indeed, we should be speaking almost literal truth if we said that our lady the Common Law never had much trouble with the forms of archaic proof. By the time she had got to serious work they were hardly more dangerous than Giant Pagan.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

In every other part of Europe, a large and powerful privileged class trampled on the people, and defied the government. But, in the most flourishing parts of Italy, the feudal nobles were reduced to comparative insignificance. In some districts they took shelter under the protection of the powerful commonwealths which they were unable to oppose, and gradually sank into the mass of burghers. In other places, they possessed great influence; **but it was an influence widely different from that which was exercised by the aristocracy of any trans-Alpine kingdom. They were not petty princes, but eminent citizens. Instead of strengthening their fastnesses among the mountains, they embellished their palaces in the market-place.** The state of society in the Neapolitan dominions, and in some parts of the Ecclesiastical State, more nearly resembled that which existed in the great monarchies of Europe. But the Governments of Lombardy and Tuscany, through all their revolutions, preserved a different character.

https://archive.org/details/feudalgermany0000jame/page/282/mode/2up?view=theater

In the Emperor's eyes the consular colleges in the Lombard cities formed courts of first instance from which an appeal lay to the imperial tribunal. **Conrad III had never appeared in Italy, and during his reign the Lombard cities, from the point of view of the public law of Europe, had acquired a status as legitimate as customary law could give them.** Thus when Frederick Barbarossa came to the imperial throne a complete revolution in the political condition of North Italy had taken place. It would tax the ability of a modern historian better to describe this condition than did Otto of Freising. His account is as sound and fresh and clear today as when it was written:

> **Almost the whole country pertains to the cities, each of which forces the inhabitants of her territory to submit to her sway. One can hardly find, within a wide circuit, a man of rank or importance who does not recognize the authority of his city.** … They surpass all other cities of the world in riches and power; and the long-continued absence of their ruler across the Alps has further contributed to their independence. … Although they boast of living under law, they do not obey the law. … Among all these cities Milan has become the leading one. … The bishop of Asti and William, marquis of Montferrat, a noble and great man [are] almost the only princes in Italy who have kept themselves independent of the cities.1
>
> https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA55#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Governmental and aristocratic traditions seem to have stifled innovative urban institutions; **the inhabitants of Byzantine towns never developed the urban self-consciousness typical of medieval culture in the West. There was no distinction in Byzantine terminology between fortress (*kastron*) and town (*polis*), or between town and borough (*polichnion*),**134 **and there did not exist a special notion analogous to the *burgensis* of the West.**
>
> When rhetoric was revived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, praise of the city (*polis*), a theme well known to Menander, the foremost rhetor of the third century A.D., was not practiced by the Byzantines. **Their epideictic attention was devoted to such traditional institutions as the imperial court and the patriarchate, and only after the fall of Constantinople in 1204 did *enkomia* of the *polis* begin to appear at all. Late Antique civic pride in one's *polis* never revived.**
> …
>
> To summarize: **while there was economic growth in provincial towns during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, this was not accompanied by political liberation.** Subjugated to the state, to the episcopate, and to the landed magnates, the urban populations did not become an independent, antifeudal political and cultural force.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/20063/pg20063-images.html#p62

Diocletian, the second founder of the Empire, was the son of a slave; Justinian—an even greater name—was the nephew of a Macedonian peasant, who with a sheepskin bag containing a week's store of biscuit, his only property, tramped down from his native highlands to seek his fortune in the capital. Zeno, as we have seen, though perhaps better born than either Diocletian or Justinian, was only a little Isaurian chieftain. Thus the possibilities open to aspiring ambition were great in the Empire of the Caesars. **As any male citizen of the United States, born between the St. Lawrence and the Rio Grande, may one day be installed in the White House as President, so any "Roman" and orthodox inhabitant of the Empire, whether noble, citizen, or peasant, might flatter himself with the hope that he too should one day wear the purple of Diocletian, be saluted as Augustus, and see Prefects and Masters of the Soldiery prostrating themselves before "His Eternity." This was, in a sense, the better, the democratic side of the Roman monarchy.**
…

When we compare the polity of Rome or Constantinople, where a century was a long time for the duration of a dynasty, with the far simpler polities of the Teutonic tribes which invaded the Empire, almost all of whom had their royal houses, reaching back into and even beyond the dawn of national history, supposed to be sprung from the loins of the gods, and rendered illustrious by countless deeds of valour recorded in song or saga, **we see at once that in these ruder states we are in presence of a principle which the Empire knew not, but which Mediaeval Europe knew and glorified, the principle of *Loyalty*.** This principle, the same that bound Bayard to the Valois, and Montrose to the Stuart, has been, with all the follies and even crimes which it may have caused, an element of strength and cohesion in the states which have arisen on the ruins of the Roman Empire. **The self-respecting but loving loyalty, with which the Englishman of today cherishes the name of the descendant of Cerdic, of Alfred, and of Edward Plantagenet, who wields the sceptre of his country, is utterly unlike the slavish homage offered by the adoring courtiers of Byzantium to the pinchbeck divinity of Zeno Tarasicodissa.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0014
>
> Thinking as we do that the cause of the King was the cause of bigotry and tyranny, we yet cannot refrain from looking with complacency on the character of the honest old Cavaliers. We feel a national pride in comparing them with the instruments which the despots of other countries are compelled to employ, with the mutes who throng their antechambers, and the Janissaries who mount guard at their gates. **Our royalist countrymen were not heartless, dangling courtiers, bowing at every step, and simpering at every word. They were not mere machines for destruction, dressed up in uniforms, caned into skill, intoxicated into valour, defending without love, destroying without hatred.** There was a freedom in their subserviency, a nobleness in their very degradation. The sentiment of individual independence was strong within them.

https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/03/26/byzantine-origins-of-gun-control/

Justinian's *Novella 85* strictly forbade the sale of weapons to citizens. Only small knives and domestic axes were exempted from the regulation. The ancient Romans had previously forbidden the possession of weapons by citizens within urban areas, but the preface to *Novella 85* highlights an explicitly Christian orientation in the formulation of the new and more comprehensive law.

Novella 85 begins: "Calling upon the great God and Jesus Christ, our Savior, and invoking His aid, we strive to keep our subjects, whom God has given to us to govern, from all damage and harm, and prohibit fights, which, undertaken through thoughtlessness, end in slaughter, and bring double penalty —that which the combatants bring upon themselves and that which the law visits upon them for their madness."

> http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/novels/81-100/novel%2085_replacement.pdf
>
> **c. 4. *In order to make it clear what arms are prohibited by us to be made by all private and other persons except those enrolled in the imperial armories, and which are prohibited to be sold to private persons, we also are pleased to indicate them. We forbid all private persons to make and sell: bows, arrows, broad, two-edged swords (spathas), swords carried on the hips, cuirasses, pikes, lances made in any form or shape, javelins called monocontia by the Isaurians and the missiles called zibynoi, also shields and helmets. We permit no one to make these arms except those who are enrolled in the imperial armories. We permit only small knives to be made by and sold to private persons, which cannot be readily used in war.***

Put simply, Justinian believes that it is his God-appointed responsibility to protect the welfare of citizens. He further believes that he can best ensure the welfare of citizens by criminalizing the sale of weapons to citizens. ***Novella 85*** **remained in effect for the final 900 years of the Byzantine empire.**
…

But authoritarianism offers only a partial explanation. Given the explicit invocation of Christian faith in *Novella 85*, we should also consider how Justinian's law might reflect Christian ethical norms at the time. While our surviving theological sources do not directly ask or answer a question about the moral suitability of an armed citizenry, they do have plenty to say about the moral injury that occurs in the taking of another life. **Believing that it would lead to spiritual healing, St. Basil famously prescribed that soldiers who had killed in the line of duty should not receive Eucharist for three years. For his part, St. Ambrose rejected out-of-hand the possibility that a Christian citizen might kill another in self-defense: "I do not think that a Christian, a just and a wise man, should save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed assailant he cannot return his blows, because in defending his own life he would compromise his love for his neighbor."** (Ambrose, *De Officiis*, 3).
…

Many Orthodox across the globe look nostalgically to an authoritarian Byzantium or Tsarist Russia precisely because they offered a political space where Christian teaching could be enshrined in legislation. **Perhaps there is no greater example than Justinian's *Novella 6*, which decreed that the decisions of Church councils possessed the weight of imperial law. What often goes unnoticed is that this relationship was reciprocal, meaning that all imperial law had canonical bearing for Orthodox Christians living within the empire. The most famous interpreters of Canon law in later centuries of Byzantium made little distinction between laws that originated from Church councils and laws that originated from the government.** In other words, Justinian's *Novella 85* would have been interpreted by Church officials in Byzantium as a canonical regulation for all Christians.

https://archive.org/details/historybyzantin00finlgoog/page/330/mode/2up?view=theater

The taking of Thessalonica [in 904 AD] affords a sad lesson of the inefficiency of central governments, which deny the use of arms to the people, to defend the wealthy and unfortified cities of an extensive empire. The tendency of a court to expend the revenues of the state on the pageantry of power, on palaces, churches, and *fêtes* in the capital, without bestowing a thought on the destruction of a village or the loss of a parish, reveals to us one of the paths by which despotic power invariably tends to degrade the mass of human civilisation.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/3/9*.html#ref57

In Egypt and in Syria the Arabs, fresh from the desert, easily overturned, amid shouts of *Lo Ellah il Allah!* the pallid resemblances of Graeco-Roman municipalities. In the other provinces of the Byzantine Empire they still cumbered the ground with the spectacle of their decay until the close of the ninth century, **when Leo VI, surnamed the Philosopher, removed from the theory of the constitution both the Senate of the Empire and the Curiae of the towns. Of the latter he said, 'The ancient laws passed as to the Curiae and Decurions impose on the Decurions intolerable burdens, and confer on the Curiae the right to nominate certain magistrates, and to govern the cities by their own authority. Now that civil affairs have taken another form, and that all things depend entirely on the care and government of the Imperial Majesty, these laws wander, so to speak, vainly and without object, around the soil of legality. We therefore abolish them by the present decree.'**58

In the West, the agony of the Municipia had been shorter, and the remembrance of the days of their prosperity and usefulness was therefore less easily effaced. It would be an interesting task, but one outside of our present field, to show how, **under the barbarian kings, aided in many cases by the influence of the Church, the Curiae rose again,** as it were, from the tomb, until, in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, local self-government, as set forth in the Italian *Commune*, reached, perhaps, the noblest elevation at which the world has seen, or is likely to see it.

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

Unquestionably, medieval lordship, *seigneurie* – involving a dependent peasantry and the principal forms of medieval rent (rent in cash, in kind, and by *corvée*) – did exist in Byzantium. Even the exploitation of the so-called free peasant on state lands was associated with the seigneurial system. **But this *seigneurie* cannot be equated with "feudalism" as the term has been used historiographically to describe Western society.** The specific structure, involving links of personal obligation both vertical and horizontal, that characterizes the medieval West, and particularly its ruling class, is found only in an

embryonic state in Byzantium. Similarly the characteristic ties binding together people of the same social layer in a feudal society are underdeveloped in the empire. Nevertheless, certain social and economic features emerged in Byzantium that resembled feudal links.

During the eleventh and twelfth centuries there did exist large retinues owing allegiance to great magnates.149 **Such retinues perhaps represented the reaction of threatened populations to the feebleness of the state's defensive apparatus;** groups may have formed around local dynasts in an attempt to protect themselves. **But the relationship between a lord and the local peasantry never became formal vassalage.**150
…

Although from the tenth century on, a landed, hereditary nobility began to arise, it was never fully established; vertical mobility remained characteristic of Byzantine society through the eleventh century.153 During that century, the aristocracy was divided into two major groups according to military and civil functions. **The military aristocracy originated primarily in the frontier regions: Cappadocia, Armenia and Syria in the east, Bulgaria and Macedonia in the northwest.** Even when settled in Constantinople and embedded in the imperial hierarchy, these aristocrats preserved connections with their homelands. There they possessed estates (*oikoi* or *proasteia*) or even palaces and small fortresses to which they could retire in case of imperial disfavor. Not coincidentally, the military aristocrats of the eleventh century often drew their family names from the sites where their estates were located: the Botaneiates of Botana, for example, of the Dokeianoi of Dokeia, or the Dalassenoi of Dalassa.
…

Romanos III Argyros was drowned in a bathhouse in 1034, but Michael IV gained both Romanos's wife and his throne; Constantine Dalassenos failed in his expectations once more. He was indignant, especially since his rival was, as Constantine put it, "a vulgar and worthless [literally, "three-penny"] man" (Skyl. 393.34-35), an arrogant, aristocratic criticism, though one with some foundation – **Michael came from a family of usurers and money-changers, not warriors and governors.**
…

In the meantime, however, an imperial functionary had uncovered a subversive plot in Antioch, the seat of the Dalassenoi's power. Eleven rich and noble men were arrested identified as Dalassenos's supporters; Dalassenos was seized and banished on this pretext. When friends and members of his family protested, they were exiled or imprisoned and their property was confiscated. **It is clear from such episodes that despite their considerable power, landed aristocrats were restricted in their independence; they were not autonomous barons but imperial functionaries who could be dismissed, exiled, or dispossessed at any time.** This certainly led, in Ahrweiler's terms, to the "Constantinopolitization" of the Byzantine aristocracy, with its tight bonds with the capital and imperial court.155 **Probably only toward the end of the twelfth century was there formed a substantial stratum of provincial aristocracy that, while not tied to imperial service, nevertheless received the highest imperial titles.**
…

In contrast to the military aristocracy, the civil nobility originated primarily from Constantinople, Greece, the Aegean islands, or the coastal cities of Asia Minor. Some of these families had practiced urban trades and crafts; their patronyms, which are sometimes derived from the profession (e.g., Saponai, "soapmakers"; Phournatarioi, "bakers") or from Constantinopolitan quarters (e.g., Akropolitai, Blachernitai, Makrembolitai) testified to their past.
…

At least thirty eunuchs are known to have occupied important posts within the state and ecclesiastical organization between the death of Basil II (1025) and the beginning of the reign of Alexios I (1081).159
…

It is not clear why eunuchs were so important in the Byzantine administration. Were they more reliable because eunuchs were not allowed to ascend the imperial throne? But they could, as John Orphanotrophos showed, acquire the throne for their brothers or nephews. Were they less arrogant because of their castration? But there are numerous testimonies to the haughty behavior and impudent aspirations of eunuchs. **Or was perhaps the prominence of castrates in Byzantium a symbol of the civil nature of power, an emblematic denial of the aristocratic principle of blood and lineage? It is worth noting that the eunuch became prominent in hagiography:** angels appeared as youths or eunuchs clad in white robes before the eyes of mortals; in pious visions eunuchs accompanied the Virgin. **For whatever reason, eunuchs were important both in myth and reality in the tenth and eleventh centuries.**

> **Nothing is so cruel as a man raised from lowly station to prosperity;** he strikes everything, for he fears everything; he vents his rage on all, that all may deem he has the power. No beast so fearful as the rage of a slave let loose on free-born backs; their groans are familiar to him, and he cannot be sparing of punishment that he himself has undergone; remembering his own master he hates the man he lashes. **Being a eunuch also he is moved by no natural affection and has no care for family or children.**
> …
>
> Hippolyte fell but by the arrow of Hercules; the Greeks fled before Penthesilea's axe; **Carthage, far-famed citadel, proud Babylon with her hundred gates, are both said to have been built by a woman's hand.** What noble deed did a eunuch ever do? What wars did such an one fight, what cities did he found?
> …
>
> **I admit I have long learned to tolerate this unmanned tribe, ever since the court exalted itself with Arsacid pomp and the example of Parthia corrupted our morals.** But till now they were but set to guard jewels and raiment, and to secure silence for the imperial slumber.
> …
>
> **Let eunuchs govern the East by all means, for the East rejoices in such rulers, let them lord it over cities accustomed to a woman's sway:** why disfigure warlike Italy with the general brand and defile her austere peoples with their deadly profligacy?
>
> https://archive.org/details/vicarsofchristda0000dero/page/84/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> No sooner was he elected than Gregory VII set about reforming everything. **First, in order to ensure that church property was never given away, he tried to eliminate the universal 'fornication,'** that is, the marriage of the clergy.
>
> https://archive.org/details/vicarsofchristda0000dero/page/588/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> For such a system to work, it needed operatives completely at the beck and call of superiors. **The conservatives at Trent were quite frank about this. They actually said that without celibacy the pope would be nothing more than the Bishop of Rome. In brief, the papal system would collapse without the unqualified allegiance of the clergy;** celibacy alone could guarantee that sort of allegiance. Celibacy, on Trent's own admission, was not and never was primarily a matter of chastity but of *control*.

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA103#v=onepage&q&f=false

With the shift in the structure of society toward the extended family, lineage became increasingly important in determining an individual's status and power. **The use of patronymics was an external sign of this new concern. Althought patronymics occasionally appear in the sources from the late ninth century, they become commonplace only after 1000.** Patronymics did not consistently indicate patrilinear sequence. A man could assume his mother's name or that of his mother's mother, as well as that of his father. **The widespread adoption of patronymics, in any case, corresponds with the emergent ties between the individual and the extended family. The glories and honors of one generation began to be assumed by another.**

Similarly, interest in genealogy grew. The status of the individual became increasingly tied to the historic position of his forebears. Constantine Manasses' eulogy of Nikephoros Comnenus, grandson of the *caesar* Nikephoros Bryennios, a veritable apotheosis of nobility, included an elaborate genealogy.70 The writer was not content to simply to allude to the aristocratic ancestry of the deceased, but rather insisted that his hero was descended from kings. **These kings were not the sons of impious gods like the wretched Pelops and Kekrops, but in fact scions of two noble families, the Comneni and the Doukai, who, in mixing their heroic blood, created a house renowned for its intelligence, power, and martial capacity.** This fetish for lineage is rejected by Michael Italikos, who mocked his contemporaries' preoccupation with genealogical investigations (Mich. Ital. 148.18-24), and by Euthymios Tornikes, who censured those whose conceit was based solely on high birth.71 **While the military aristocracy was proud of its fabricated genealogies, the civil nobility used patronymics to extol its own moral virtues, names such as Eugenianoi ("of noble birth") and Eirenikoi ("peace lovers").**
…

By contrasting the attitudes of writers from the earlier and later parts of the period under consideration, one can trace the evolution of nobility in Byzantium. The traditional neglect of the aristocracy characterizing Agapetos and the *Strategikon* of Maurikios75 continued into the eleventh century. **For instance, Kekaumenos considered nobility in terms of moral excellence rather than a quality**

of blood or of family origins. He tended to contrast the common fellow not to an aristocrat, but rather to a well-to-do, high-ranking official. But there were signs of change at the same time.

> 75. *Das Strategikon des Maurikios*, ed. G.T. Dennis (Vienna, 1981), 70.36, required of the general only piety and justice; aristocratic origins were not mentioned.

…

Psellos consistently identified nobility with virtue and talent, though he implicitly recognized the value of good breeding.76 He was indignant that people of inferior backgrounds could worm their way into power and censured the excessive vertical mobility of his society. **He stressed that the nobility in the flourishing states of antiquity were distinguished from men whose origins were obscure. "In our state," he complained, "this excellent practice has been contemptuously abandoned, and nobility counts for nothing." In Byzantium, he continued, many administrators were ex-slaves bought from barbarians; the high offices of state were entrusted not to men of the stamp of Perikles or Themistokles, but to worthless rascals like Spartacus** (Ps. *Chron*. 2:35, no. 134.14-17). Apparently Psellos felt an aristocratic presence was needed in society: he was confused by the social openness of Byzantium. While Psellos was somewhat ambiguous in his appreciation of the nobility, for his contemporary Attaleiates aristocratic birth was an unquestionable value. In contrast to Psellos, Attaleiates assumed that noble ancestry implied virtue, at least of a military nature:77 he feigned a distinguished genealogy for his hero, Nikephoros Botaneiates, relating him not only to the Phokas family of the tenth century, but even to the Roman Fabii, who were noble both in blood and in action. **For all his praise of nobility, it should be noted that Attaleiates was himself of simple origin and of civil occupation; he was not writing to aggrandize his own class, but rather reflecting in his work a significant ideological shift.**

…

A concern with the military aristocracy is even more evident in the *Memoirs* of Nikephoros Bryennios. **In his presentation, history develops not as a result of actions of emperors in relation to their adversaries and functionaries, but rather as the outcome of aristocratic rivalries among the great families – the Doukai, Comneni, and Bryennioi.** Bryennios's nobles were primarily military figures; their activities were consistently described as "valiant," "courageous," and "glorious." They were esteemed even by their adversaries: Alexios Comnenus, for instance, admired the strength and height of the usurper Nikephoros Bryennios (the author's grandfathers or father), and Comnenus's victory was the greater for being won from a strong, brave general, who possessed the soul of a hero (Bryen. 281.10-14). Further, Bryennios wrote respectfully of a number of noblemen, including Argyros ("noble and wealthy"), George Palaeologus ("valiant"), Alexios Charon ("reasonable, strong, and courageous"), and John Tarchaneiotes ("an experienced warrior").79 In contrast, eunuchs and servitors were despised: Nikephoritzes was "wretched"; John Protovestiarios was "swaggering and cowardly." The work of Nikephoros Bryennios is probably the most aristocratically biased Byzantine history of this period: it presented the noble warrior in a fully generalized and idealized form. The *caesar* Bryennios, himself a great seigneur, was, in all, the ideologue of the Comnenian military aristocracy.

…

Military competitions and tourneys were introduced, partially under Western influence, just at this time. **An attempt by Nikephoros Phokas to conduct a military competition at the end of the tenth century created panic in Constantinople** (Skyl. 276.94-96). In contrast, Byzantine noblemen and even emperors in the twelfth century readily participated in tourneys with Crusader knights, occasionally even suffering severe wounds.82

…

When the Comneni, members of the Byzantine military aristocracy, took possession of the throne, they typified the new imperial virtues. **The traditional conception of the emperor (*basileus*) originated with Agapetos in the sixth century and with Emperor Justin II's speech to his successor Tiberios in 574,** which was preserved independently by Theophylaktos Simokatta and several other contemporary authors; Simokatta's version was eventually revised by such chroniclers as Theophanes in the ninth century and Zonaras in the twelfth.87 The main tenets of this concept were further developed in the ninth and tenth centuries, when there appeared three works all connected in one way or another with Basil I – the *Hortatory Chapters* attributed to Basil himself, the funeral speech dedicated to Basil and his wife by their son Leo VI, and Basil's biography written by his grandson Constantine Porphyrogenitus. All these writings stressed the Christian principles of imperial power: the emperor was believed to be chosen by God; he obtained divine succor by means of his love and imitation of God. The list of imperial virtues depended heavily upon classical ethics and included righteousness, philanthropy, generosity, chastity, love of truth, and intelligence. **Neither martial deeds nor noble origins were included among the essential qualities. Quite the contrary, the *Hortatory Chapters* eulogized the emperor not as a warrior but as a peacemaker** (*PG* 107.XLV B) **and commanded, "Do not brag about the nobility of the body, nor be scornful of humbleness; neither honor beauty nor turn aside from ugliness, but look at the beauty of the soul and be loving of the soul"** (XXV B-C). **Further, it admonished, "Do not respect and admit those who are noble by dint of their**

body, but those who are dear by dint of their spirit." The author explained that horses' nobility consisted in magnificent stature, dogs' in their hunting abilities, while human nobility was determined by the virtues of the soul (LII A-B). **Leo VI preferred not to discuss his father's origins; he touched on them only so that he not be accused of ignorance. He mentioned the semi-official, quite legendary account of Basil's descent from the Armenian Arsacids and the Persian Artaxerxes, but he put the greatest emphasis on the personal virtues of his hero, not on his family. The humble man, he said, was embellished by his deeds, whereas the nobleman of necessity had to assume glory from his ancestry.**88 **In Constantine Porphyrogenitus's biography, his grandfather's personal military achievements were never mentioned;** rather, he vaguely confirmed that Basil extended the frontiers of the empire through his labor, his manliness, and his lofty spirit (Theoph. Cont. 265.5-7) and most warmly described Basil's successful administration of the state, not his command on the battlefield. The only military episode depicted in any detail was the crossing of the Euphrates, when the emperor carried a load three times heavier than that of the ordinary soldier (269.1-15). Constantine, too, spoke of Basil's Arsacid ancestry, albeit late in the narrative, but otherwise ignored the topic of noble origins.
…

For Kekaumenos the four essential qualities of the ruler were fortitude, justice, chastity, and reason, but with some qualifications. **Fortitude referred not to military courage, but to spiritual perseverance.** Nor were fortitude and reason considered absolute virtues, since they could be put to evil use.

Military attributes, previously associated exclusively with Nikephoros Phokas, began to reappear at the end of the eleventh century in the writings of historians and publicists. Attaleiates dedicated his historical work to the praise of Nikephoros Botaneiates. Besides the traditional imperial virtues, Attaleiates gave Nikephoros two new ones: noble birth and military prowess.
…

Somewhat later than Attaleiates, Theophylaktos Hephaistos, the future Bulgarian archbishop, wrote a didactic work addressed to his pupil Constantine Doukas, the presumptive heir to Alexios I's throne. This author, too, required in his good emperor both military and traditional moral virtues: **"Do not think that the servants of Ares, lionlike men, will bring you a crown of gold and a cloak of purple unless they see you donned in armor and directing the battle."**90
…

The Late Roman custom of proclaiming an emperor by raising him on a shield was probably revived around the middle of the eleventh century. **This ritual, a mark of the bond between a ruler and his army, seems to have been common in late antiquity, from the fourth to sixth centuries. After Phokas's usurpation of 602, however, it disappeared.**93 The fact that Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the middle of the tenth century mentioned this ceremony as a Khazar tradition94 incidates that it had fallen into disuse in Byzantium. Revival of the custom is first clearly indicated in Psellos's writing. According to Psellos, the rebellious Bulgars in 1040 proclaimed Peter Deljan ruler by raising him on a shield (Ps. *Chron.* 1:77, no. 40.21-22). In a more thoroughly Byzantine milieu, the usurper Leo Tornikes was raised on a shield in 1047 (2:18, no. 104.4-5). In the twelfth century the description of the ruler raised on the shield even appeared as a part of a Byzantine romance, *Rodanthe and Dosikles* by Prodromos (chap. 5, v. 109-11).95 Akropolites in the thirteenth century treated Theodore Laskaris's elevation on a shield as a commonplace.96 It is not clear, however, when between the middle of the eleventh and middle of the thirteenth century this ritual became customary.

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

The mid-eleventh century witnessed the full realization of traditional Byzantine vertical mobility; during that period an attempt was made to draw urban, principally Constantinopolitan, elements into state government.162 Attaleiates' evidence concerning the myriads of senators receiving rewards during the reign of Nikephoros II suggests that senatorial ranks were then swollen with foreigners and merchants living in Constantinople (Attal. 275.12-19). At the end of the eleventh and in the twelfth century, dramatic changes took place. The highest military elite was consolidated in a closed body of powerful families connected by intermarriage and forming a "clan" around the ruling Comnenian dynasty. **The higher military administrative functions were monopolized by the Comnenian clan, while the families of the military aristocracy who were not included in this clan either disappeared or entered the ranks of the civil nobility** (Ex. 6).
…

In the eleventh century there was no unbridgeable gap between the military and civil elites. Some families of the civil aristocracy performed military functions. Intermarriage between the two groups was common. After the Comnenian clan was established, the situation changed: marriage between members of the Comnenian dynasty and the bureaucratic families was discouraged; **in general, the senators, i.e., the civil elite, were regarded as socially inferior.** The consolidation of a narrow ruling stratum

(landowners and military commanders) excluded from power both the eunuchs and the foreign mercenaries. As mentioned above, about thirty eunuchs appear in the sources for the years between 1025 and 1081; many of them occupied high administrative positons. The number of eunuchs at Alexios I's court was still considerable; twelve are mentioned in the sources. Only one of them, however, Leo Nikerites, *strategos* and *doux* of several districts, belonged to the highest echelon of the Byzantine elite. In addition, Eustratios Garidas was patriarch, and two men, Eusthatios Kyminanos and Symeon, were grand *droungarioi*. **Garidas and Symeon, notably, were active only in the earliest years of the reign of Alexios. Alexios's other eunuchs were servants, doctors, and the like, with no political power. And in the reigns of John II and Manuel I (i.e., the years 1118-80) only five eunuchs are found in the sources, none of whom possessed a military command – they were church hierarchs, courtiers, and princes' teachers.**

The consolidation of Comnenian power also led to the exclusion of foreigners. The Comneni were regarded by contemporaries as being benevolent toward the Latins (Ex. 7). **Even Latin writers such as William of Tyre or Robert of Auxerre eulogized Manuel for his esteem of the Latins, whom he is said to have promoted to important positions** (*PL* 201.857D; *MGH* SS 26:246). Prosopographical evidence, however, does not support this view: surprisingly, Latin generals do not seem to have held high military positions in significant numbers. **There was no one in those years comparable to Hervé or Roussel in the eleventh century.** Except for some hellenized families such as the Rogers and Petraliphas, Latins at the Byzantine court served as diplomats or theologians rather than as military commanders. **Turks played a greater role in the armies of John II and Manuel I, but even they were not mercenaries, but rather immigrants.**

The consolidation of the semi-feudal aristocracy at the end of the eleventh and in the twelfth century had political and social significance. The military and landed aristocracy was conscious of its privileged position and its hereditary superiority. Initially formed around the Comnenian house, it acted as a centripetal force that contributed to the temporary strengthening of the state. **But in vain; the military nobility was demolished under Andronikos I.** At the end of the twelfth century, the influence of the civil aristocracy, which was connected with the upper layers of the merchant and craft classes and with the intellectuals of Constantinople, again increased.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Andronicus_I
>
> Andronicus, now (1183) sole emperor, married Agnes, widow of Alexius II., a child eleven years of age. His short reign was characterized by strong and wise measures. He resolved to suppress many abuses, but, above all things, to check feudalism and limit the power of the nobles. **The people, who felt the severity of his laws, at the same time acknowledged their justice, and found themselves protected from the rapacity of their superiors. The aristocrats, however, were infuriated against him, and summoned to their aid William of Sicily.** This prince landed in Epirus with a strong force, and marched as far as Thessalonica, which he took and destroyed; but he was shortly afterwards defeated, and compelled to return to Sicily. **Andronicus seems then to have resolved to exterminate the aristocracy, and his plans were nearly crowned with success.**

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 1157, an agreement was concluded between Manuel I and Baldwin III of Jerusalem: Manuel agreed to marry his niece Theodora to Baldwin, offering a dowry of 100,000 golden *hyperpera* – one pound of gold consisted of 72 *hyperpera* – as well as gifts worth 30,000 *hyperpera* and 10,000 more for wedding expenses. Theodora received as her dower from Baldwin not gold or precious stones but the stronghold of Acre and all its territory.140 **The agreement of 1157 thus clearly reveals the differences between two distinct economic systems – in Byzantium wealth was measured in bullion, while in the Latin world property was still the measure of prosperity.**

There was considerably more direct state exploitation of the primary producer in Byzantium than in the contemporary West. Even though the extent of the *dominium directum*, the right of the sate over all the territory within its boundaries, is controversial, it seems likely that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries most Byzantine peasants paid taxes in gold and in kind to the state, in addition to fulfilling various services.141 Private estates, though certainly increasing in size and number, were still not the rule. Accordingly, the notion of freedom was radically different in Byzantium from that in the West or from that what it had been in antiquity. **The Roman concept of freedom as the opposite of slavery was still preserved in juridical manuals, such as that of the eleventh-century judge Attaleiates, but it had lost its practical significance. Similarly the Western concept of freedom as a positive quality – the possession of landed wealth and independent jurisdiction – was also inoperative in Byzantium.** The same Attaleiates denied the Roman definition of freedom in his *History*. **Those who were genuinely free, he stated, were not those who obtained liberty with a gold ring and a box on the ear (referring to the ancient ritual of manumission), but those who were safe from fear**

of taxes (Attal. 284.6-9). In the taxpaying society of Byzantium, real freedom was the freedom from levies.

http://www.historytoday.com/alexander-kazhdan/byzantium-emperors-new-clothes

To sum up, Byzantium was an atomistic society with the family as its cornerstone. **The man was primarily the member of the family and not of the municipium (as he was in Greco Roman antiquity) or community or guild (as he was to be in the medieval West). Formal wedding ceremonies, prohibition of divorce, abolition of concubinage; all these contrasted with the 'free' late Roman family. Lineage played an insignificant role and vertical (hierarchical) links remained practically unknown.** Small family-like monasteries were common, and family-orientated terminology permeated both political and ecclesiastical relations.

The aristocratic principle was underdeveloped. This does not mean that all the emperor's subjects were equal in rights and wealth, even though western observers kept repeating disparagingly that they were. In the tenth century, for instance, the German ambassador Liutprand asserted that all the participants in the imperial procession in Constantinople wore shabby and frayed costumes. **The principle of inequality in Byzantium differed from that of the West; the Byzantines created a meritocracy based not on the individual's 'blood' or origin but on his place in the bureaucratic machine. A system which, while less stable than nobility in the West, enabled more vertical mobility. This does not mean that they were less arrogant, but it does mean that, while less restricted by tradition, they were less defiant of the emperor's omnipotence.**

The imperial power was both feeble and strong. It was strong since the emperor, in theory, was not restricted by law; he was the law itself. He combined in his hands legislative, administrative and judicial power, was the supreme army commander and claimed control of ideology. But he was poorly protected against schemes and plots, and half of all the Byzantine emperors ended their rule as victims of violence. **Feeble as individuals (certainly some emperors had a strong personality) they were omnipotent as symbols of government; the emperors themselves might be criticised, but the principle of unlimited monarchical power was never questioned.**

In practice, of course, everything was more complex, and many an emperor met social and religious resistance, even blunt bureaucratic intransigence. **However, we can call the Byzantine empire a totalitarian state. And it was the only totalitarian state of the European Middle Ages.**
...

The problem is intensified by Byzantine ideological duplicity. A striking example is the fate of Roman law in Byzantium, the Roman law summarised and codified by Justinian I during the last stage of the late Roman empire. It was never abolished, although some attempts to make it simpler were made. **Byzantine legal text-books adhered to Roman law, repeating, time and again, formulations that were in disaccord with reality.** For instance, the official law-book of the ninth century, the *Basilika*, described administrative institutions that existed during the sixth century and had ceased to exist by the ninth. Furthermore, the agrarian terminology of the *Basilika*, translated from Latin into Greek, applied to no Byzantine reality, and often made no sense whatever. **Whereas Roman law reflected the principles of the legal state, protecting individual rights and private ownership, the Byzantine empire did not give any legal protection to its subjects. Emperors could execute any citizen without trial and could confiscate any land without argument. Texts of the tenth century state that any land on which the emperor had put his foot could be taken from its owner.** As more private documents have been published in recent decades, we can see more clearly that the Byzantine law of things and law of obligations deviated from Roman norms and that Byzantine tribunals acted on principles distinct from the Roman; **but the words often remained the same, and private ownership of land was repeatedly affirmed in legal text-books.**

> https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Further, in the tenth century the Byzantine state proclaimed its supreme right over all the lands of the empire. Leo VI in his Novel 114 asserted that property throughout the Byzantine Empire (*pan akineton*) was *hypodemosios*, that is, literally “put under the treasury” or “due to taxation.” Did Leo consider *pan akineton* to be in some sense state property, or simply taxable property? **He clarified his position further by stating that private property was allowed to individuals who fulfilled state “burdens.”** Basil II in the Novel of 996 affirmed that the claims of the exchequer could not be denied through reference to *praescriptio longis temporis*: **the emperor had the right to reclaim all lands that had at any time belonged to the state, even if they had been in private hands since the time of Augustus** (Zepos, *Jus* 3:315.20-23). Whether or not the notion of the *dominium directum* could be applied to the Byzantine concept of state ownership of land is controversial. Two important points, however, are evident: the Byzantine

> state possessed rights to most of the taxes on the population, and the state could confiscate estates of any magnate, whether lay or ecclesiastical.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=9-8fIBVgCQYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA417#v=onepage&q&f=false

If the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, which was the leading kingdom of Europe in the twelfth century, had had a future comparable to that of the Norman Kingdom of England, the political and legal institutions of that were created in twelfth-century Sicily would be as much studied and as widely known today as those of twelfth-century England. **For the Kingdom of Sicily constituted the first modern territorial state in the West, with the first modern Western system of royal law.**
...

The history of Sicily shows, on the contrary, that it was possible for a highly developed system of royal law, which penetrated the country from top to bottom, to coexist with the despotic power of the ruler. There are striking similarities between the systems of royal law in England and in Sicily in the twelfth century: in both, the monarchy established links with the nation as a whole, and, by constructing a legal system that reached down to all the people, succeeded in confining the special interests of the feudal aristocracy. **Yet in England, as Mitteis has said, "the royal law always found its limit in the legal sense of the community."**14 **In southern Italy there had never been a strong tradition of tribal (clan) and regional customary law such had existed in Germanic and Frankish Europe.** Perhaps the weakness of the legal sense of the community led its rulers to excesses; perhaps their claim of unlimited authority weakened still further that legal sense. **A simpler though not unrelated explanation is that in England, as in all other countries of the West except Sicily, the Church of Rome was strong enough to limit substantially both the power and the authority of the monarchy.**
...

Born in December 1095, Roger was nine years old when his father, the Great Count Roger I, died in 1105. His mother, Adelaide, a north Italian, the Great Count's third wife, ruled as regent, **relying principally on Sicilian ministers of Greek and Arab extraction.**
...

Both during the regency and in the first decades of his own reign there were frequent baronial revolts. **Roger was a determined and successful but unenthusiastic warrior. He had not been trained in feudal virtues and values. He had been trained, rather, for absolute power of the kind wielded formerly by the Roman emperors of Byzantium and contemporaneously by the Sultan of Egypt.**
...

Roger's achievement, which was embodied in the Assizes of Ariano (1140) was closely related to his personality and character, and especially to the combination of his Norman, Byzantine and possibly Arab qualities. **Max Hoffman has rightly called Roger the "first modern Prince," who "founded the first absolute monarchy of Western Europe."**16 But he did more than that. He founded the first modern system of royal law.
...

In contrast to the Germanic kings of an earlier time, who were judges but not legislators, the Norman rulers of the twelfth century and thereafter considered it part of the office of the king to make new laws. Roger II declared that the king is a "maker of laws" (*conditor legum*). Indeed, Roger promulgated the first modern code of royal law in the history of the West, the Assizes of Ariano.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_II,_Holy_Roman_Emperor

Historian Donald Detwiler wrote:

> A man of extraordinary culture, energy, and ability – **called by a contemporary chronicler *stupor mundi* (the wonder of the world), by Nietzsche the first European, and by many historians the first modern ruler – Frederick established in Sicily and southern Italy something very much like a modern, centrally governed kingdom with an efficient bureaucracy.**[7]

...

In the Kingdom of Sicily, he built on the reform of the laws begun at the Assizes of Ariano in 1140 by his grandfather Roger II. His initiative in this direction was visible as early as the Assizes of Capua (1220, issued soon after his coronation in Rome) but came to fruition in his promulgation of the Constitutions of Melfi (1231, also known as *Liber Augustalis*), a collection of laws for his realm that was remarkable for its time and was a source of inspiration for a long time after. **It made the Kingdom of Sicily an absolutist monarchy; it also set a precedent for the primacy of written law.** With relatively small modifications, the *Liber Augustalis* remained the basis of Sicilian law until 1819.
...

Modern medievalists no longer accept the notion, sponsored by the popes, of Frederick as an anti-Christian. They argue that Frederick understood himself as a Christian monarch in the sense of a Byzantine emperor, thus as God's "viceroy" on earth.[8]

https://archive.org/details/the-schutzstaffel-as-an-anti-bolshevist-combat-organization/page/n9/mode/2up?view=theater

The State of Frederick II in Sicily

This knightly order participated in the creation of the FIRST MODERN STATE, BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION and authoritarian obedience, that was founded by Frederick II in Sicily. Filled with this knowledge, the order was transplanted to the German East by the politically wise priest-nobleman Hermann von Salza in the first half of the 13 century. There it founded the order's German state in the east so well known to you.

The Teutonic Order's State in East Prussia

For the first time it was then easy to INTRODUCE OBEDIENCE INTO GERMAN TERRITORY. In addition to the absolute rule of the Christian religion came the fact that knights of the racially best German blood – men from the noblest clans and proven in combat – formed a ruling class over folks and mixed-bloods racially not equal to our folk. The values of achievement and personality stood next to obedience to the church.

The Prussian Army

From this EAST PRUSSIA, that was taken over by the Electors of Brandenburg as the Kings of Prussia, the PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION of administration, of cleanliness and above all of unconditional obedience were adopted by Prussia. The PRUSSIAN ARMY with its mercenaries became inside Germany the FIRST GREAT SCHOOL OF ABSOLUTE DISCIPLINE.

https://archive.org/details/fredericktheseco000027mbp/page/310/mode/2up?view=theater

People have often praised Frederick for his disregard of position and parentage in his choice of officials. His appointment of town-bred lawyers and his reinforcement of official cadres by outsiders seem to support this view. **He was actuated not so much by freedom from snobbery as by a love of playing the oriental despot, who can take his scullion of to-day for his Grand Wazir of to-morrow**—a trait which is quite in character.

https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater

It is this necessity to divide and thus to defeat the particular hostile combination confronting him which made Machiavelli surpass Livy and devise an entirely new strategy of spiritual warfare.190 But his hope for the success of his teaching rests on **the certainty that one of the two parties of which the Christian republic consists**191 **will be attracted by his proposals. One may describe that party provisionally as the Ghibellines, as men who would have gone with Frederick the Second of Hohenstaufen. More precisely that party consists of those who "esteem the fatherland more than the soul"** or who, driven and perhaps blinded by passion for the liberty of their fatherland, **are more attached to their earthly fatherland than to the heavenly fatherland, or who are lukewarm Christians. They are people "of little faith," i.e., of little Christian faith** who, impatient of alleged or true abuses of ecclesiastical authority, do not hesitate to attack ecclesiastical authority with more than masculine courage but become afraid once they realize the ultimate consequence of their action.192

> 191. Savonarola *Prediche sopra Ezechiele* XXXIII: ***la Chiesa ha el corpo misto di buoni e di cattivi.***

https://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap13.htm

I have often thought that the Mithraic cult, in the form in which we know it, would have particularly appealed to the Parthian aristocracy, whose special devotion to Mithras is attested by their use of such common names as Mithridates. They were officially Zoroastrians and maintained Magi at their courts to keep the sacred fires alight and provide holiness when needed, but they were so negligent in their observation of the Zoroastrian proprieties that the Zoroastrians of the Sassanid period regarded them as little better than infidels. They, like the Mithraists of whom we know, had so little godliness that they never felt a yen to persecute and kill *ad maiorem gloriam Dei*. **So marked was this lack of zeal among the Parthian aristocracy that Professor Tarn remarks that "one gathers the impression that they thought all religions useful, none material; what mattered to a man was his horse, his bow, and his own right arm."**

https://archive.org/details/rogersicilyandn00curtgoog/page/n523/mode/2up?view=theater

The Law-book of Frederick, the "Constitutions of the Realm of Sicily," was the work of this constitutional lawyer; published at Melfi in 1231 it proclaimed, as the Assises of Ariano proclaimed, the principles by which the King intended to govern. **The Constitutions are the declaration of an Absolutism unknown to the West since the days of the Roman Empire—Caesar is to be the one source and guardian of law, all statutes, and customs adverse to the new Constitutions are to be quashed—the laws and edicts of the Norman kings the predecessors of Frederick are revived in full force and crowned with an Absolutism greater even than theirs.**
...

Frederick's success was completer than Roger the Second's as his means and his opportunities were greater. The nobles were the ancient foe, the standing enemies of the Crown and the source of its ultimate downfall. For thirty years at least they had to bow their necks to the yoke. **They were deprived of criminal jurisdiction, forbidden to carry on private war on pain of capital penalties,** such privileges as they had obtained since the death of William II. were carefully scrutinised, **they were forbidden to carry weapons or erect castles, all but the highest feudatories were brought under the jurisdiction of the Master Justiciars,** whose office no prelate, count, baron, or knight might exercise. The strong hand was also fastened upon the Church; a mortmain act checked the acquisition of vassal-lands by ecclesiastics, **the Church courts were forbidden to exercise jurisdiction over laymen,** the property of vacant sees was put into the hands of royal baillis. The cities and towns of the kingdom had during the interregnum recovered powers which they had not enjoyed since the days of the Apulian dukes, and Frederick himself had thought it politic early in his reign to grant privileges to several of them. But at Melfi in 1231 another note was sounded: henceforth no town might set up podesta, rector, or consul on pain of being laid waste. Naples, Amalfi, Salerno were henceforth to have no judges save the King's judges, Gaēta lost her consuls, the royal policy strove to bring all law-appeals from the towns to the Curia. The *boni homines* who survived in the communes of Southern Italy were now chosen by the King or local noble, these town-councils were presided over by the royal bailli. **A foe of the communes, Frederick was yet a friend of the lower orders; personal slavery was forbidden on the royal domains, the lords were forbidden to ill-treat the peasants, and an edict forbade the cattle of the poor to be seized for debt.**
...

The all-prominent figure in the government of the realm is now that of the Grand Justiciar, the "Mirror of Justice"; these officials, aided by judges of the Imperial Court or *Magna Curia*, sitting for the mainland at Capua, supervise all justice and control the under-justiciars; at certain periods they go on assise throughout the kingdom; **paid by the treasury and drawn from the middle classes, they represent the very spirit of the anti-feudal and anti-communal administration.**

O Felix Asia! Frederick II, the empire of Nicaea and the «Caesaropapism» (researchgate.net)

Six letters (three in Latin, three in Greek) are extant from Frederick II to John Vatatzes who had become his son-in-law (probably in 1241/1242) and with whom he shared an increasing hatred of the Pope. Despite his position of real superiority and his insistence thereon, reinforced by family ties, **Frederick expresses his admiration of the submission of the Church hierarchy to the political power in the tiny empire of Nicaea.**

---

http://www.historytoday.com/alexander-kazhdan/byzantium-emperors-new-clothes

In fact Kievan temporal society absorbed very little of Byzantium: their weaponry came from the West, their glass producers followed western, not Byzantine recipes, **their political structure was as distanced from the Byzantine one as possible. Political marriages of high rank between the two countries were almost unknown.** Kievan Rus as a state did not travel the path the Byzantines had worn.

Only in the fifteenth century when Russian grand princes began to build up their centralised monarchy did they discover their Byzantine ancestry; Russia did not inherit Byzantine totalitarianism but used the model for their political ends.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/60/mode/2up?view=theater

In the civil sphere there were no permanent administrative chanceries (even of the crude *prikaz* variety) until the early sixteenth century.39 In the ecclesiastical sphere, the lack of any clear diocesan structure or episcopal hierarchy made it difficult for leading prelates to provide an effective substitute for political authority during the long period of political division. Nor was there even a clear line of precedence among the monasteries. **In contrast to the medieval West, where compendia of Roman law were waiting to be discovered and where the Moslem invader brought the texts of Aristotle with him, distant Muscovy had almost no exposure to the political and legal teachings of classical antiquity. At best they read some version of Plato's arguments for the closed rule of a philosopher-king** – but only to fortify their conclusion that a good and holy leader was necessary, never as an exercise in Socratic method.
...

Ivan's legislative council of 1549-50 – which provided some precedent for later parliamentary "councils of the land" (*zemskie sobory*) – was conceived as a religious gathering.60 The Church code enacted in 1551 known as the hundred chapters was designed only to "confirm former tradition," and prescribed rules for everything from icon painting to shaving and drinking. Every day of the calendar was covered **and almost every saint depicted in the 27,000 large pages of the encyclopedia of holy readings, *Cheti Mnei*.**61 Every aspect of domestic activity was ritualized with semi-monastic rules of conduct in the "Household Book" (*Domostroy*). Even the *oprichnina* was bound together with the vows, rules, and dress of a monastic order.

The consequence of this radical monasticization of society was the virtual elimination of secular culture in the course of the sixteenth century. Whereas Russia had previously reproduced a substantial number of secular tales and fables – drawn both from Byzantium and the West through the Southern and Western Slavs respectively – **"there did not appear in Russian literature of the sixteenth century a single work of belles lettres similar to those already known in the fifteenth. … There cannot be found in Russian manuscripts of the sixteenth even those literary works which were known in fifteenth century Russia and were subsequently widely disseminated in the seventeenth."**62 **The chronicles and the newly embellished genealogies, hagiographies, military tales, and polemics of the age were purged of "useless stories."** Nil Sorsky, no less than Joseph of Volokolamsk, favored this form of censorship; and the "hundred chapters" of 1551 extended these prohibitions on secular culture to music and art as well.

https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv3n2/ivant.htm

Stalin. More or less? I am also a little familiar with history. You have shown the *oprichnina* incorrectly. **The *oprichnina* was the army of the king. It was different from the feudal army which could remove its banner and leave the battleground at any moment – the regular army, the progressive army was formed.** You have shown this *oprichnina* to be like the Ku-Klux-Klan.
…

Tsar Ivan was a great and a wise ruler, and if he is compared with Ludwig XI (you have read about Ludwig XI who prepared absolutism for Ludwig XIV), then Ivan the Terrible is in the tenth heaven. The wisdom of Ivan the Terrible is reflected by the following: he looked at things from the national point of view and did not allow foreigners into his country, he barricaded the country from the entry of foreign influence. By showing Ivan the Terrible in this manner you have committed a deviation and a mistake. **Peter Ist was also a great ruler, but he was extremely liberal towards foreigners, he opened the gate wide to them and allowed foreign influence into the country and permitted the Germanisation of Russia. Catherine allowed it even more. And further.** Was the court of Alexander I really a Russian court? Was the Court of Nicolaus I a Russian court? No, they were German courts. **The most outstanding contribution of Ivan the Terrible was that he was the first to introduce the government monopoly of external trade. Ivan the Terrible was the first and Lenin was the second.**
…

One of the mistakes of Ivan the Terrible was that he did not completely finish off the five big feudal families. If he had destroyed these five families then there would not have been the Time of Troubles. If Ivan the Terrible executed someone then he repented and prayed for a long time. God disturbed him on these matters... It was necessary to be decisive.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ivan_the_Terrible/Part_3/Chapter_2

The Russian people not only submitted to Ivan—it admired, applauded, loved him. Of all the crowd of comrades about him, it has retained two names and two faces only: one of these figures is that of a *parvenu*, the other that of an executioner—Nikita Romanovitch Zakharine and Maliouta-Skouratov.
…

If Ivan, when he fought against the boïars, was not defending the fundamental principles of Russian life—the absolute power, Orthodoxy, nationality—as some writers have asserted, he was certainly protecting the integrity of the common fatherland after a more general fashion. **Kourbski, as we have seen, was no less orthodox and no less Russian than the most fanatical of his peasants, and devotion to the absolute power can hardly, at that period at all events, be taken to be a feature in the popular psychology of a country in which the memory of the ancient *viétchié* had not entirely died out.** But when Kourbski and his likes entered into secret intercourse with Poland they were betraying their Sovereign and their country. They were conspiring with the foreigner, **and treason in every form, dogging Ivan's steps, crushed twenty times over in its own blood, and perpetually raising its head afresh, is the *leitmotiv* of all the poems which take the Terrible for their hero.**

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/114/mode/2up?view=theater

Under Alexis Mikhailovich and his son Peter the Great, Russia in effect adopted the aesthetic and philosophic culture of Poland even while rejecting its Catholic faith, and the administrative and technological culture of Sweden and Holland without either the Lutheran or the Calvinist form of Protestantism.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

The atmosphere was charged with expectation that 1666-7 was to bring portentous new events. The expectations were justified, for 1667, **the first year of the expected reign of the Antichrist,** was in many ways the beginning of a new order in Russia.

The Great Change

THE DECISIVE TURNING POINT in the religious crisis of seventeenth-century Russia was the church council of 1667, which excommunicated the fundamentalists en bloc. It was, superficially, a victory for Nikon, because the council upheld the central authority of the hierarchy and all of Nikon's reforms except his "our God" form of address in the Lord's prayer and his elimination of a dual blessing of the waters on Epiphany. Moreover, the ecclesiastical administration was greatly enlarged by the addition of twenty new dioceses to the already existing fourteen, and by the addition of four metropolitans, five archbishops, and nine bishops to the hierarchy.70

Yet defeat for the fundamentalists did not mean victory for the theocrats. **On the contrary, the council devoted most of its attention to the final deposition and exile of Nikon. Its main result was to establish the clear subordination of church to state by flooding the church bureaucracy with new priests who were, in effect, state appointed.** One new Ukrainian metropolitan admitted with remarkable candor in sentencing Avvakum that "we have to justify the Tsar, and that is why we stand for these innovations – in order to please him."71 Joachim, the new patriarch, was blunt in addressing the Tsar: **"Sovereign, I know neither the old nor the new faith, but whatever the Sovereign orders I am prepared to follow and obey in all respects."**72

A cosmopolitan, primarily Ukrainian and western Russian hierarchy was replacing the older Great Russian Church administration, just as Muscovy, having wrested from Poland key sections of these regions, was rapidly being transformed into a multi-national empire. The ideal of an organic religious civilization – whether fundamentalist or theocratic in structure – was becoming as anachronistic as the ill-defined economic and administrative procedures of patriarchal rule.

The defenders of the Muscovite ideal of an organic, religious civilization were being confronted in their own land with a sovereign secular state similar to those of Western Europe. **The year 1667 accelerated this trend through the formal transfer of Kiev from long years of Polish overlordship to Muscovite control and the promulgation of a new decree to insure national control over all foreign trade.**73 The process of freeing autocratic authority from any effective restraint by local or conciliar bodies had already been accomplished in the early years of Alexis' reign by the crushing of town revolts and the abolition of the *zemsky sobors*.
…

Ligarides' tangled history is so full of deceit and intrigue that it is hard to ascribe anything but opportunistic motives for him. He had passionately defended Greek ways in Rumania, where he had gone in the late forties to set up a Greek school at Jassy **and help produce a Rumanian edition of the basic Byzantine digest of canon law.**
…

Whereas the fundamentalists particularly hated Rome and the Poles, Nikon appears to have been more fearful of Protestantism and the Swedes. **He opposed the war against Poland of 1653 and the rebaptism of Catholics.** Some of his assistants in the correction of books were former Uniats from White Russia and the Ukraine; **and the decision of the council in 1667 to confirm his abolition of the requirement of 1620 for rebaptising Catholics was one of the many concessions to these non-Great Russian priests.**
…

[Nikon] called Nikita Odoevsky, the principal author of the Law Code of 1649 and leading apologist for the subordination of church to state, "a new Luther."117

The multiple ironies as well as the confessional confusions of the age are demonstrated by the fact that the principal collaborator of this "new Luther" in the trial of Nikon was Ligarides, a former Vatican agent wearing the robes of an Orthodox metropolitan. It seems only fitting that this erstwhile Grecophile from distant Gaza ended up destroying Nikon's Greek revival and posing as the defender of Muscovite tradition. **Ligarides summoned up the distinctively Russian symbol of the icon screen as the model for an ordered hierarchical society to challenge Nikon's concept of a symphony of powers between civil and ecclesiastical authority. Recognizing the patriarch as in any way equal to the Tsar would, Ligarides warned, place two icons in the center of the *chin*, where only the "Christ enthroned" is traditionally found; and man "cannot serve two masters … pray through two icons."**118
…

The conflict between Nikon and Avvakum was not a theological debate, but a death struggle between two towering frontiersmen in a world of one truth. **Only after they had destroyed one another did Russia become a safe place for Ligarides' doctrine of state service and many, shifting truths.**
…

In contrast to the fiery martyrdom of the archpriest, the dethroned patriarch died peacefully on his way back to Moscow in 1681 with a partial pardon from the imperial court. **Nonetheless, Nikon used prophetic terminology similar to that of Avvakum in denouncing the principal author of the resolutions of the Church council as a "precursor of the Antichrist." He saw in the new "Babylonian captivity" of the Russian Church to state authority a worse bondage than the Mongol yoke.**131
…

The Russian Church after 1667 tended to borrow secular ideas rather than spiritual ideals from each of the old positions. The official Church became neither a prophetic community as the fundamentalists had wished nor a self-governing sacramental institution as the theocrats had desired. From the fundamentalists modern Russia took not fervid piety so much as xenophobic fanaticism; from the theocrats, not so much Christian rule as ecclesiastical discipline.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater

The official court *apologia* for Peter's rule, *The Justice of the Monarch's Will*, echoed the pessimistic, secular arguments of Hobbes about the practical need of a debased humanity for absolute monarchy. Its author, Feofan Prokopovich, was the first in a long line Russian churchmen willing to serve as "an ideologist of state power using Christianity as its instrument."46
…

The historical importance of the Old Believers in the development of Russian culture is out of all proportion to the relative smallness of their numbers. By effectively seceding from the political and intellectual life of the empire, this important nucleus of the Great Russian merchant community helped turn the main centers of Russian life over to foreigners and to the Westernized service nobility.
…

Thus, **whereas the development of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in the late medieval West tended to encourage the growth of rationalism in twelfth-century Paris and of sceptical humanism fifteenth-century Florence and Rotterdam,** the emergent merchant class of early modern Russia played no such role. In reality, no Russian bourgeoisie analogous to that of the West survived the transformations wrought by Alexis and Peter. **Shorn of their ancient privileges and immunities after the urban riots of the mid-seventeenth century, the entrepreneurial leaders of Old Muscovy had only two choices. They could melt into the medium and upper level of officialdom of the new state along with various foreign and mercenary elements.** Or they could cling to their former ways and ideals by moving on to newly opening areas of the empire and blending their xenophobic complaints with those of other dispossessed elements. **One could choose bureaucracy or *raskol*,**75 the "homeless cosmopolitanism" of the new urban centers or the narrow chauvinism of the Russian interior.

https://archive.org/details/orthodoxeasternc00fort/page/276/mode/2up?view=theater

It is again the old Byzantine idea of making the Church follow the vagaries of civil politics, that we saw to be the root of the claims of the See of Constantinople, and indeed the original root of the great schism. Only the idea is turned against the very see that had grown and flourished on it. **And that see finds the national and political idea much less sympathetic now that she stands to lose by it.**

The principle of the independent Church in the independent State finds no favour in the Phanar. The Patriarchs worked so hard and grovelled so low in the old days for the sake of getting a big Patriarchate, naturally they do not like losing it piece by piece, as they have done throughout the 19th century. **The process is nearly always the same. As soon as the first National Assembly, or House of Deputies, or whatever it may be, of the new State meets, it passes a law that the national Orthodox Church of the land acknowledges no Head but Christ; it then forms a Holy Synod on the Russian model, giving all possible authority over the Church to the civil government ("no Head but Christ" always means this), and lastly sends a note to the Patriarch to inform him that he has ceased to reign in the land in question.** Of course the Patriarch is furious, generally begins by excommunicating the new schismatics in a mass, but eventually has to accept things (Russia makes him do so as a rule), and, swallowing his pride, he receives the Holy Synod as his "Sister in Christ." Only in the quite specially bitter case of the Bulgarian Church has he hitherto refused, and the Bulgars are still excommunicate. But here, too, he will have to give in at last.

Naturally the Phanar hates the national idea; in 1872 it held a synod to declare that *Philetism*1 (the love of one's race in ecclesiastical matters) is the latest and most poisonous heresy. But it is a most astonishing case of poetic justice. It was on the strength of this very national idea that centuries ago the Patriarch waxed strong and rebelled against his over-lord, the Pope. **Now he sees his own children, having learned it from him, also wax strong on it and rebel against him. And so**

he finds Philetism to be a deadly heresy. Poor Patriarch! in his glory he was only a very feeble imitation of the Pope, and now he is fixed between two theories, and either way he loses. Shall he denounce Philetism, stand out for the old rights of the hierarchy and of the chief sees, preach unity and ancient councils? Alas! his see is not even an Apostolic one; he would have to go down below Alexandria and Antioch. Every one knows which is the first see in Christendom, and every one knows that unity means returning to the obedience of that see. Or shall he, taking up a cry that seems to come more naturally from Constantinople, talk of equality and national Churches, national rights and no aggression, no Head, in short, but Christ? But, then, what shall he say to the Bulgars? **Of course what he wants is just enough national idea to disobey the Pope and not enough for the Bulgars to disobey him.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/5/23*.html#ref38

Justinian had undoubtedly gathered all the laurels that could reward such a petty and ignoble contest. **He, the amateur theologian, after a struggle as long as the siege of Troy, had imposed his definition of the right faith on all the four Christian patriarchates,** and had bound those who believe in the infallibility of General Councils to accept it henceforward as an essential article of the Christian creed that the soul of Theodore of Mopsuestia suffers eternal torment.
…

Travelling as [Vigilius] did at least four times from one point to the diametrically opposite point of the theological compass,39 he deeply injured the credit of the Roman See, which now passed through half a century of obscurity til the arising of the first and greatest Gregory. He must certainly be held to have been an unsuccessful general of the forces of the Papacy, but there is no proof that he was a coward, and his censors have perhaps hardly enough considered whether at his particular point in the campaign success was possible. For six years he had to dwell at the seat of the rival Patriarch, daily beholding the majesty of the Emperor and begirt by evidences of his power. **To resist the commands of this omnipotent Caesar, from a modest dwelling within a mile or two of his palace, was a task which required much more hardihood than merely hurling spiritual thunderbolts from the Lateran or the Vatican at some unseen and unknown Frederick or Henry on the other side of the Alps.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/7/9*.html

That visit of the Emperor may be considered to have been the lowest point of the humiliation both of the Bishop and the City of Rome. Vigilius and Martin had been indeed dragged away from their episcopal palace and their loyal flock, and had suffered indignities and hardships in the city by the Bosphorus; **but it was surely a lower depth of degradation to stand by, as Vitalian must needs do in trembling submission, with a smile of feigned welcome on his lips,** while Constans the heretic, the author of the *Type* against which the Lateran Synod had indignantly protested, alternated his visits to the basilicas with the spoliation of the monuments of Rome.
…

The day was passing away in which it was possible for the Eastern Caesar to send a policeman to arrest the Pope and drag him off to a Byzantine prison. We shall see one Exarch after another attempt this invidious duty in obedience to his master's mandate, and one after another will fall back disheartened before the manifestations of the popular will, which in the end will take the shape of an armed and organised National Guard.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rise_of_the_Ottoman_Empire#Government

The early Ottoman state's expansion was fueled by the military activity of frontier warriors (Turkish: *gazi*), of whom the Ottoman ruler was initially merely *primus inter pares*. Much of the state's centralization was carried out in opposition to these frontier warriors, who resented Ottoman efforts to control them.
…

Of particular importance for Ottoman success was their ability to keep the empire intact from generation to generation. **While other Turkic groups frequently divided their realms between the sons of a deceased ruler, the Ottomans consistently kept the empire united under a single heir.**[32]

The process of centralization is closely connected with an influx of Muslim scholars from Central Anatolia, where a more urban and bureaucratic Turkish civilization had developed under the Seljuks of Rum. Particularly influential was the Çandarlı family, which supplied several Grand Viziers to the early Ottomans and influenced their institutional development. Some time after 1376, Kara Halil, the head of the

Çandarlı family, encouraged Murad I to institute a tax of one-fifth on slaves taken in war, known as the *pençik*. This gave the Ottoman rulers a source of manpower from which they could construct a new personal army, known as the Janissaries (*yeniçeri*).
…

Of great symbolic importance for Ottoman centralization was the practice whereby Ottoman rulers would customarily stand upon hearing the sound of martial music, indicating their willingness to participate in *gaza*. **Shortly after the Conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II discontinued this practice, indicating that the Ottoman ruler was no longer a simple frontier warrior, but the sovereign of an empire.[36] The empire's capital was shifted from Edirne, the city symbolically connected with the frontier warrior ethos of *gaza*, to Constantinople,** a city with deeply imperial connotations due to its long history as the capital of the Byzantine Empire.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Belon

Belon was born in 1517 at the hamlet of Souletière near Cérans-Foulletourte.[2] **Nothing is known about his descent.**
…

With the recommendation of Duprat, he became an apothecary to Cardinal François de Tournon. Under this patronage, he was able to undertake extensive scientific voyages. **Starting in December 1546, he travelled through Greece, Crete, Asia Minor, Egypt, Arabia and Palestine, and returned to France in 1549.** A full account of his *Observations* on this journey, with illustrations, was published in Paris, 1553.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=HXy0DQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

“In this country,” explains Belon, “there is no point in claiming to be noble,” *il ne sert de rien en ce pays là de s’avouer estre Gentilhomme.*” This is because there is nothing like a hereditary nobility in Turkish society, he discovers.55 **In a sense, all Turks are social equals since all of them are equally the Sultan’s slaves.**
…

Having made his point about the profound difference between the Turkish and European élites, Belon proceeds to theoretical considerations: **“Since various societies have defined nobility in different ways,”** some, like the French, maintaining that it was a genetically inherent quality, others, like the Turks, viewing it as an administrative position in no way transmissible to one’s heirs, it would seem to follow that **“nobility is whatever one wishes it to be.”**56
…

Obviously inclined to embrace the natural equality of human beings as axiomatic, Belon relishes the egalitarian customs of the Turks, customs which, in his view, are closer to Nature than are the customs of Europeans.
…

These *façons de faire* clearly meet with Belon’s approval, in part because of his philosophical convictions and, perhaps, in part also because of his own modest origins. The customs of the Turks appear to him as far more rational than those of his own countrymen. **He goes out to make the Turks seem like noble savages whose natural simplicity has only recently given way to more civilized behavior through their contact with educated Jews of western origin.**58

https://archive.org/details/11ShahakJewishHistoryJewishReligion/page/69/mode/2up?view=theater

As is well known, the Ottoman regime was based initially on the almost complete exclusion of the Turks themselves (not to mention other Muslims by birth) from positions of political power and from the most important part of the army, the Janissary corps, both of which were manned by the sultan’s Christian-born slaves, abducted in childhood and educated in special schools. **Until the end of the 16th century no free-born Turk could become a Janissary or hold any important government office.** In such a regime, the role of the Jews in their sphere was quite analogous to that of the Janissaries in theirs. **Thus the position of the Jews was best under a regime which was politically most dissociated from the peoples it ruled.** With the admission of the Turks themselves (as well as some other Muslim peoples, such as the Albanians) to the ruling class of the Ottoman empire, the position of the Jews declines. However, this decline was not very sharp, because of the continuing arbitrariness and non-national character of the Ottoman regime.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A32922.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

The Great *Turk,* that he may prevent the latter of these Mischiefs, putting by all such as are bottom’d only upon Others Nobility, takes notice of such onely as are Eminent for some worth of their own: **Neither doth he suffer any son to succeed in the Estate, or Goods of his Father by Right of Inheritance; but he is to receive**

the same at his hands, as a reward of his Service, if so be he deserve it. But in case he do not, he must then serve him either in some Ignoble Art, or else in some inferiour Office in his Wars.

The Former of these Inconveniences any King of Spain may prevent, if he but confer these rewards upon such onely, as are deserving Persons; **but the Remedy of the Second, which is practised by the Turks cannot be made use of among Christians.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=KKMuTmW98DEC&hl=fi&pg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false

Having formerly entred into discourse of the several great Officers of State, **it will be necessary to declare what care the *Turks* take to preserve the body of their Empire free of Faction and Rebellion;** for there being many Provinces in the *Sultan*'s Gift, which are remote, rich and powerfull, and so administer temptation to the Governours to throw off the yoke of their dependence, and make themselves and their Posterity absolute; great care is taken to prevent this mischief by several Arts, **none of which hath been more effectual amongst the *Turks*, nor more sedulously practised, than the destruction of an ancient Nobility; and admitting no Accession to Offices of Riches, but onely in the direct Ottoman Line, as my Lord *Verulam* says, *Essay* 14. *A Monarchy where there is no Nobility at all, is ever pure and absolute Tyranny, as that of the Turks*;** *for Nobility attempers Sovereignty, and draws the people somewhat aside from the Line Royal.*
...

And this is the reason the *Turks* value not their great Men when taken by the Enemy; for not otherwise looking on them than on ordinary Soldiers, they exchange them not with Commanders and persons of Quality on the Christians; **for the favour of the *Sultan* makes the *Pashaw*, and not the noble Bloud or Vertues; so that the *Pashaw* imprisoned losing the influence of his Sovereign's protection and greatness, loses that also which rendered him noble and considerable above other persons.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mt6lu0MtKCUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA19#v=onepage&q&f=false

As to civil dissensions, in all monarchies **(but that of Turkey, where these three court maxims take place contrary to all Christianity: first, as soon as the monarch has a son, all his brothers and nephews are killed so that there be no competitor; secondly, he destroys the nobility and makes that no man can be heir of his father's goods; thirdly, he weakens all conquered provinces to an impossibility of revolt – *Atque ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant*45)** the court factions have been far more pernicious than popular tumults in commonwealths.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=3jiGsoP_ExgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR50#v=onepage&q&f=false

To be sure, one can indeed hope that a God-reflecting monarch will be neither as murderous as Saul or Herod nor as feeble as Pilate; **for one of Bossuet's great points is that monarchs must be absolute but not arbitrary. Unquestionable sovereignty must unquestionably be regular, lawful, respectful of property and personal rights –** and not degenerate into the *gouvernement à l'Ottomane* which was soon to be described in the final pages of Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes*.

> There is among men a kind of government which is called arbitrary, **but which is not found among us in well-ordered states.** Four attributes accompany these kinds of government.
>
> Firstly: subject peoples are born slaves, that is to say truly serfs; and among them there are no free persons.
>
> Secondly: **no one possesses private property: all the sources of wealth belong to the prince, and there is no right of inheritance, even from father to son.**
>
> Thirdly: the prince has the right to dispose as he wishes, not only the goods, but also the lives of his subjects, as one would do with slaves.
>
> And finally, in the fourth place, there is no law but his will.137

Declining to ask whether arbitrary power is "permissible or illicit," Bossuet contents himself with noticing that "there are nations and great empires which are content with it; **and it is not for us to awaken doubts in them about the form of their government.**" Nonetheless such power is "barbarous and odious," and is "quite far from our own *moeurs*," so that in France "there is no arbitrary government."138

https://archive.org/details/asurveyturkishe00etongoog/page/458/mode/2up?view=theater

Can Russia, in all its extended provinces, when every foreign contact will be poison; when every breath, except from the frozen ocean, will be full of miasma, escape the contagion? **None will escape but the elder brethren of Jacobinism, the Turks, whose equally monstrous, though less dangerous**

tyranny, has for so many centuries insulted mankind, trodden underfoot the laws of nations, and blasphemed Christianity; who, unprovoked, attacked, conquered and slaughtered nations without number, murdered their sovereigns and spilt every drop of royal blood, massacred their priests at the altar, extirpated nobility, plundered the opulent, and bound the wretched remains of the people in fetters of perpetual and hereditary slavery. **They alone, till the reign of Jacobinism had made property a crime, the violation of property a legal resource of government, and the lives and possessions of men the right of tyranny; they alone had hitherto confounded the hereditary ranks among mankind;** had depressed genius, learning, and the Christian religion, and governed their barbarous empire by slaves and assassins. **Like the Jacobins, they taught Christian children to fight against their fathers and their father's God;* they too hold it lawful to murder prisoners in cold blood, they too possess a claim to every country in the universe, and a sacred right to subject all people to their law; they too hold all other sovereigns as usurpers, and dethroning them as the highest merit.** But still the Turks have a religion, and though it permits them numberless enormities to their own sect, and all enormities to others, they acknowledge a God, and many moral duties. Not the contagion of their doctrine was to be feared, but their cruel sword, which once threatened the conquest of the universe, and the extinction of all virtue, dignity, and science in the world; **yet was not this first monster so tremendous, in the insolence of his power, as an enemy, as is this second monster, in the insolence of his successes, as a brother.**

https://archive.org/details/historypersiafr00malcgoog/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

> 1. I visited the court of Sulimân Pâchâ in A.D. 1800, and was struck by the simplicity and manliness of his character. **This chief, like most of those who enjoy a high station in the Turkish territories, had been a slave; but no unpleasant feelings seemed associated with the recollection of his former condition.** After he had introduced me to some of his chief officers, he called up a person, and said, "This, Captain Malcolm, is the son of my first master. He treated me with the greatest kindness. I try to repay the obligation by considering his son as my own child!"

https://archive.org/details/turkeyanditsdes04macfgoog/page/n26/mode/2up?view=theater

He replied that the Turks had lost their fanaticism; that he had many great friends among the Turkish Pashas of the new school, who, as was well known, had no religion at all; that the Grand Vizier, Reschid Pasha, was his friend, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs likewise, and that they were no more Mussulmans than he was, and cared no more for Mahomet and the Koran than he did. **"Besides," said he, "the Vizier is all for *amalgamation*—amalgamation of races as well as of religions." [Of this amalgamation scheme I had heard something before, and I was soon assured, at Constantinople, that it was the *one idea* of Reschid Pasha.]**

https://archive.org/details/turkeyanditsdes04macfgoog/page/106/mode/2up?view=theater

Whole rows of Turkish houses most pleasantly situated on the sides and ridges of hills, overlooking the Sea of Marmora and the Asiatic coast, and being in my time – though only of wood – rather stately edifices, had entirely disappeared in some parts, and were decaying and (to appearance) deserted in others. **The class of Osmanlees that occupied them has been obliterated.** Men of old families living on their revenue from hereditary estates are scarcely to be found anywhere in the Empire; and the higher class of Oulema, who derived large incomes from the endowments of the mosques, are nearly all sunk into poverty since the Government has taken those endowments and vakoofs into its own hands. **Sultan Mahmoud was a great leveller; he both dreaded and hated men of hereditary rank and property; and his son and successor, Sultan Abdul Medjid, whose ministers and advisers have, with very few exceptions, been raised from the very lowest grades, has carried out the levelling operation to such an extent that it may now be said there are no men of note or mark left, except such as are in the immediate service of Government, and occupy its highest posts;** for, while the chief Ministers and leading Pashas are enormously paid—paid far more than any of our Ministers in England—all the rest of the employés, civil or military, are but poorly recompensed. **The lovers of dead levels ought to go to Turkey. Verily, two reforming Sultans have democratised the land more than revolutionists have democratised France.**

https://archive.org/details/macedoniaitsrace00braiuoft/page/n47/mode/2up?view=theater

The feeling beneath this absolute rule of ascendancy is difficult to define. It is not the sense of racial superiority which we ourselves feel in India. **Certainly we should never place a native Mohamedan officer over white troops. [1906] But the Turks will give a military commission to a negro without the slightest sense that white Mohamedans are thereby degraded.**

https://archive.org/details/macedoniaitsrace00braiuoft/page/234/mode/2up?view=theater

And yet they remain a race apart from the Turks and profoundly hostile to them. There is no community of blood between them, and even in their mosques the barrier between East and West divides them. **For the Albanian is essentially a European—a European of the Middle Ages. Alone of all races in Turkey, he**

has an hereditary aristocracy and a feudal system. Islam, among Eastern peoples, is everywhere a leveller. It obliterates birth and race. A labourer may rise to be a Pasha, and it is no rare sight to see a negro in officer's uniform commanding white troops. But the Albanians have kept their pride of birth. The Ghegs are organised in clans, which obey none but their hereditary chiefs. **Even among the much more civilised Tosks of the South, wealth and rank count for little, and the poorest and youngest *bey* of an old family will claim precedence in public over the most venerable *nouveau riche*.** The marriage customs of the Turks make no account of social distinctions. A Turk will marry some Georgian or Circassian slave. **The Albanians who became Moslems have remained strict monogamists.**1 They never marry outside their own race and their own rank. A marriage with a wealthy Greek woman or an Albanian girl of new family is held to be a *mésalliance*. **The mixing of blood which has resulted in the virtual extinction of the old Turkish stock in Stamboul is utterly unknown in Albania, and the primitive structure of society has remained un-modified by the conquest.**

https://archive.org/details/orthodoxeasternc00fort/page/236/mode/2up?view=theater

Religion to the Moslem is the only thing that matters at all. **Islam is the perfect example of a theocratic democracy, governed of course, like most democracies, by an irresponsible tyrant.** Neither race nor language nor colour makes any difference.1 All True Believers are equal and any one of them may rise to any position: **the world of the Arabian Nights, in which barbers become Great Wazirs and pastry-cooks marry Sultans' daughters really exists (or did exist until the invasion of Western manners quite in our own time [1907]) round the Bosphorus.** All Islam are brothers.

http://beautifulislam.net/articles/kamal_ataturk.htm

Turkey – Emil Lengyel, 1941, p. 134

Kemal cared nothing about Allah; he was interested in himself and in Turkey. He hated Allah and made him responsible for Turkey's misfortune. It was Allah's tyrannical rule that paralyzed the hands of the Turk. **But he knew that Allah was real to the Turkish peasant, while nationalism meant nothing to him. He decided, therefore, to draft Allah into his service as the publicity director of his national cause. Through Allah's aid his people must cease to be Mohammedans and become Turks. Then, after Allah had served Kemal's purpose, he could discard him.**

---

https://biblehub.com/kjv/genesis/11.htm

1 **And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.** 2 **And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.** 3 **And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick, and burn them throughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for morter.** 4 **And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.** 5 **And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded.** 6 **And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.** 7 **Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.** 8 **So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.** 9 **Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.**

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_155

The epoch of small states and royal households in Mesopotamia (the twenty-fifth and twenty-fourth centuries B.C.) was followed by a period of fierce warfare which ended in the conquest of Mesopotamia by the Akkadian king Sargon, who subjugated the ensi of the other cities. **It was about this time, apparently, that the idea of a "world empire" first arose, something which later inspired Cyrus, Alexander and Caesar.** Sargon's state was truly huge in comparison with the small city-states of the preceding epoch. It extended from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.
...

In the twenty-second century, Mesopotamia was again united under Utuchegal, the ruler of the city of Uruk, who took the title "King of the Four Lands of the World." After his death, a new dynasty was established by King Ur-Nammu; this is referred to as the third dynasty of Ur. **Mesopotamia, Elam and Assyria came under its rule in the twenty-second and twenty-first centuries. It was a centralized state with a single economy managed by an imperial bureaucracy.**

The king headed the state as an absolute sovereign. He was surrounded by a bureaucracy of "king's men" or "slaves to the king," among whom the highest post belonged to the "great emissary." (66: pp. 256, 259, 262) **In this epoch, we no longer encounter a nobility aware of its genealogy and tracing its roots to a deity.**

> https://archive.org/details/romanandteutonas003327mbp/page/n99/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> They, like all other German tribes, were ruled over by two royal races, sons of Woden and the Asas. The Ostrogoth race was the Amalungs—the 'heavenly,' or 'spotless' race; the Visigoth race was the Balthungs—the 'bold' or 'valiant' race; **and from these two families, and from a few others, but all believed to be lineally descended from Woden, and now much intermixed, are derived all the old royal families of Europe, that of the House of Brunswick among the rest.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=HkKwSZr3t00C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA13#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **It seems that no king by the late seventh century could do without the status that descent from Woden entailed.** The East Saxons never claimed Woden, but kept *Seaxneat* ('companion of Saxons') as their founder. Because the East Saxons began to lose their jurisdiction to neighboring kingdoms even before the Anglo-Saxon conversion was complete in the second half of the seventh century, Seaxneat's name for them was perhaps a token of independence.32 **In all other Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of which records have survived, Woden is claimed as a royal ancestor.**

The top element in the state consisted of bureaucrats, administrators, royal war chiefs, priests, all living on government allowances. **The governing body itself did not reflect the former city-states. The ensi, although retaining their title, were merged with the royal officials;** they were appointed by the king, sometimes only for a limited period, and were shunted about from one town to another. Their primary duty was to manage the royal estates and perform administrative, judicial and religious functions. **Temples began to lose their economic independence and came under the protection of the king.** (65: pp. 247, 250)

Production was centralized to the same degree as the administration of the country. Former ensial estates entered into the state economy as subordinate units. Parties of workers, in cases of necessity, were shifted from one town to another. Numerous records have been preserved concerning the distribution of allowances to such newly arrived parties (from Lagash to Ur, from Ur to Uruk, etc.) (65: pp. 248, 264) **All lines of authority came together in the capital, Ur.**

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enmerkar
>
> The historian David Rohl has claimed parallels between Enmerkar, builder of Uruk, and Nimrod, ruler of biblical Erech (Uruk), who, according to some extra-biblical legends, was supposedly the architect of the Tower of Babel. One parallel Rohl has noted is between the epithet "the Hunter", applied to Nimrod, and the suffix *-kaı* at the end of Enmerkar's name, which means "hunter". Rohl has also argued that Eridu near Ur is the original site of the city of Babel and that the incomplete ziggurat found there is none other than the Biblical tower itself.[11]

https://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/etcsl.cgi?text=t.2.1.7#

315-322. Gudea rose -- it was sleep; he shuddered -- it was a dream. Accepting Ninĝirsu's words, he went to perform extispicy on a white kid. He performed it on the kid and his omen was favourable. Ninĝirsu's intention became as clear as daylight to Gudea.

323-329. He is wise, and able too to realise things. The ruler gave instructions to his city as to one man. The land of Lagaš became of one accord for him, like children of one mother. **He opened manacles, removed fetters; established ……, rejected legal complaints, and locked up (?) those guilty of capital offences (instead of executing them).**

330-344. **He undid the tongue of the goad and the whip, replacing them with wool from lamb-bearing sheep. No mother shouted at her child. No child answered its mother back. No slave who …… was hit on the head by his master, no misbehaving slave girl was slapped on the face by her mistress.** Nobody could make the ruler building the E-ninnu, Gudea, let fall a chance utterance. The ruler cleansed the city, he let purifying fire loose over it. He expelled the persons ritually unclean, unpleasant to look at, and …… from the city.
…

1211-1223. He had everything function as it should in his city. Gudea had built the E-ninnu, made its powers perfect. He brought butter and cream into its dairy and provided its …… with bread (?). **He had debts remitted and made all hands clear. When his master entered the house, for seven days**

the slave woman was allowed to became equal to her mistress and the slave was allowed to walk side by side with his master. But the ritually unclean ones could sleep only at the border of his city. He silenced the evil-speaking tongue and locked up evil.

1224-1231. He paid attention to the justice of Nanše and Ninĝirsu. **He provided protection for the orphan against the rich, and provided protection for the widow against the powerful. He had the daughter become the heir in the families without a son.** A day of justice dawned for him. He set his foot on the neck of evil ones and malcontents.

> https://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/section1/tr1823.htm
>
> 134-155 "Chant to him the holy song, the incantation sung in its chambers -- the incantation of Nudimmud: "**On that day when there is no snake, when there is no scorpion, when there is no hyena, when there is no lion, when there is neither dog nor wolf, when there is thus neither fear nor trembling, man has no rival!** At such a time, may the lands of Cubur and Hamazi, the many-tongued, and Sumer, the great mountain of the *me* of magnificence, and Akkad, the land possessing all that is befitting, and the Martu land, resting in security -- **the whole universe, the well-guarded people -- may they all address Enlil together in a single language!** For at that time, for the ambitious lords, for the ambitious princes, for the ambitious kings, Enki, for the ambitious lords, for the ambitious princes, for the ambitious kings, for the ambitious lords, for the ambitious princes, for the ambitious kings -- **Enki, the lord of abundance and of steadfast decisions, the wise and knowing lord of the Land, the expert of the gods, chosen for wisdom, the lord of Eridug, shall change the speech in their mouths, as many as he had placed there, and so the speech of mankind is truly one.**""

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-4#lf0062-04_head_020

But the fatal time is now approaching, in which Arimanius, who by means of this brings plagues and famines upon the earth, must of necessity be himself utterly extinguished and destroyed; **at which time, the earth being made plain and level, there will be one life and one society of mankind, made all happy and of one speech.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2eglCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR23#v=onepage&q&f=false

The relatively frequent abdications, as well as other evidence such as the role Zal and Rostam play as kingmakers after the murder of the king Nozar, are further evidence of the eastern origin of the stories that make up the legendary part of the poem. Two traditions of kingship exist simultaneously in the work. **One is that espoused by the Sasanians, through whom Ferdowsi must have received his sources; this is in essence the ancient Middle-Eastern notion of kingship, one that ties kingship to religion and to the sanction of God, that elevates the king to a quasi-divine position as God's representative on earth, and which derives from the pre-Iranian Babylonian dynasties. The other derives from "the practice of the steppe" and involves the acclamation of the king by his peers, the notion that the king can always be replaced if he becomes incompetent (or too old to rule efficiently), and that he rules by virtue of his abilities and the consent of the nobility in general.** The poem's "abdications" would seem largely to derive from this latter tradition, though in keeping with his practice elsewhere Ferdowsi frequently rewrites the topos as a problem of personal ethical choice. (**There is a certain irony in the fact that of the two traditions of kingship it is the Eastern, less absolutist, one that seems to be authentically Iranian and the Western absolutist one that is ultimately Babylonian and non-Iranian;** though due to the Achaemenids' espousal of the Babylonian tradition, and its adoption by subsequent Iranian dynasties, especially the Sasanians, it is this tradition that has come to be seen as essentially Iranian.)
...

As with the Achaemenids, the historical record of the Parthians, who ruled Iran from the third century B.C.E. until the third century C.E., **is largely absent from [the *Shahnameh*]; this is almost certainly due to the success of the Sasanians in deliberately obliterating the memory of the dynasty they replaced.**

https://www.garynorth.com/MosesAndPharaoh.pdf

There are several kinds of chronological documents, including the actual monuments. "The chronological value of these various sources of information is, however, in every case slight. **The great defect of these monuments is their incompleteness. The Egyptians had no era. They drew out no chronological schemes. They cared for nothing but to know how long each incarnate god, human or bovine, had condescended to tarry on the earth.** They recorded carefully the length of the life of each Apis bull, and the length of the reign of each king; but they neglected to take note of the intervals between one Apis bull and another, and omitted to distinguish the sole reign of a monarch from his joint reign with others."8
...

Bertrand Russell, the British socialist philosopher and mathematician, saw clearly the dilemma of socialism: to produce rising per capita wealth, low-productivity socialism requires zero population growth. **Socialism also still requires the imposition of harsh penalties against rival populations that continue to grow, just as it did in ancient Egypt.** "Socialism, especially international socialism, is only possible as a stable system if the population is stationary or nearly so. A slow increase might be coped with by improvements in agricultural methods, **but a rapid increase must in the end reduce the whole population to penury, and would be almost certain to cause wars.** In view of the fact that the population of France has become stationary, and the birth rate has declined enormously among other white nations, it may be hoped that the white population of the world will soon cease to increase. The Asiatic races will be longer, and the negroes still longer, before their birth-rate falls sufficiently to make their numbers stable without the help of war and pestilence. **But it is to be hoped that the religious prejudices which have hitherto hampered the spread of birth control will die out, and that within (say) two hundred years the whole world will learn not to be unduly prolific.** Until that happens, the benefits aimed at by socialism can only be partially realized, **and the less prolific races will have to defend themselves against the more prolific by methods which are disgusting even if they are necessary. In the meantime, therefore, our socialistic aspirations have to be confined to the white races, perhaps with the inclusion of the Japanese and Chinese at no distant date.**"19

> 19. Bertrand Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (2nd ed.; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 273. **First edition: 1923. He did not change his views enough to warrant a revision of this passage.**

...

By Joseph's day, the pharaohs no longer built pyramids. **The total centralization of the Pyramid Age had disintegrated.** Nevertheless, the theology of the continuity of being was still basic to Egyptian theology, and the lure of centralized power in the person of the Pharaoh was still ready to find its political expression. Although it is true that Joseph had bought all the land of Egypt, excepting only the land belonging to the priests (Gen. 47:20-22), in the name of the Pharaoh (Sesostris I), the visible and institutional manifestation of that implicit centralization (public works pyramids) did not take place until a century later. **When Sesostris III abolished the prerogatives of the regional princes, simultaneously placing the Hebrews in bondage, he thereby asserted the sovereignty of *theocratic monophysitism*,** with the Pharaoh as the link between heaven and earth.

...

Max Weber, the influential German historian-sociologist, devoted the last fifteen years of his life to a series of studies on the West's tendency to rationalize and bureaucratize itself. In 1909, he wrote: "To this day there has never existed a bureaucracy which could compare with that of Egypt."19 Lewis Mumford, who has specialized in the history of architecture, concluded that nothing short of total bureaucratization would have enabled Egypt to construct its pyramids. More than this: it required the creation of a social machine. **Egypt became the first *megamachine*, to use Mumford's terminology.**20

...

The only major change, late in Egyptian history, long after the Exodus, was an extension of the process of divinization to the common man, so that he, too, might become Osiris after his death, as the pharaohs had before him.27

...

What kind of society was early dynastic Egypt, the Egypt of the Pyramid Age? Mumford's words ring true: "Bureaucratic regimentation was in fact part of the larger regimentation of life, introduced by this power-centered culture. **Nothing emerges more clearly from the Pyramid texts themselves, with their wearisome repetitions of formulae, than a colossal capacity for enduring monotony: a capacity that anticipates the universal boredom achieved in our own day.** Even the poetry of both early Egypt and Babylonia reveal this iterative hypnosis: the same words, in the same order, with no gain in meaning, repeated a dozen times—or a hundred times. **This verbal compulsiveness is the psychical side of the systematic compulsion that brought the labor machine into existence.** Only those who were sufficiently docile to endure this regimen at every stage from command to execution could become an effective unit in the human machine."47

...

"He was a lonely being, this god-king of Egypt," writes Wilson. "All by himself he stood between humans and gods. Texts and scenes emphasize his solitary responsibility. The temple scenes show him as the only priest in ceremonies with the gods. A hymn to a god states: 'There is no one else that knows thee except thy son, (the king), whom thou causest to understand thy plans and power.' It was the king who built temples and cities, who won battles, who made laws, who collected taxes, or who provided the bounty for the tombs of his nobles."5 **Egypt possessed the necessary theology for a consistent socialist commonwealth, but this theology was wrong, as the Egyptians learned in the year of the Exodus.**

> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf
>
> Man, in short, is not God; capitalism recognizes this fact, and it tries to regulate production and distribution as efficiently as possible, given the basic limitation on mankind. Mises puts it very nicely: **"That Socialism would be immediately practicable if an omnipotent and omniscient Deity**

were personally to descend to take in hand the government of human affairs, is incontestable."123

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n113/mode/2up?view=theater

If, therefore, the king offers to the mass of his subjects a god for all, he is conferring on them an immense favour. The modern critic who thinks that the rulers of Egypt imposed on their humiliated subjects the cult of a god who was more or less themselves, is quite wrong. What happened was, on the contrary, that, basing themselves on the sentiments of their time, **they gave the mass a newfound right and dignity, by including them with the nobles in a common cult.**19

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n199/mode/2up?view=theater

What, then, will an egalitarian society, in which the high command no longer resembles an excited crowd, look like? The Ancient Egyptian Empire, which Jacques Pirenne has strikingly depicted, may give us some idea.13

> **In an individualist society in which no family or social group exists, every public duty is performed exclusively by the State.** First among them is that of assuring external security. To guarantee it the State disposes of an up-to-date military organization, which is distinct from the civil authorities and of which the king is the supreme head. The army is divided into tactical units which are placed under the command of regular officers; it is equipped, victualled and supplied by a commissariat service; the fleet, composed of large ships, is built in the shipyards of the State; the frontier forts are built by the military labour corps. In addition, the army is formed out of recruits; **and the only security the Nation knows is that which it gets itself by supporting the burden of military service imposed on it by the State.**
>
> Internal peace is assured by the judicial body, which holds pride of place among all the administrative bodies. All justice emanates from the king, in whose name the various courts of first instance and appeal pronounce their judgments. The litigants may, it is true, resort to arbitration, which, however, derives all validity and authority from the assurance that the State will execute its awards.
>
> The social life, whose external and internal security is assured by the army and the judicial body respectively, rests on the service of the civil departments, which give to each and preserve for each his place in Society, **of the land-survey, which is the foundation of all property rights,** and of the registry of documents, which, by transcribing all conveyances and contracts, can assure at need respect for the pledged word and guarantee to each the free disposal of his own goods and rights.
>
> The economic life largely depends on the service of the inland waterways. The ever more powerful State is ever more lavishly housed by the public works administration. The coordination of the various departments is the work of the chancery.
>
> The offices of all these various services are spread over the country; in all parts of it officials of all grades write minutes on papyrus rolls, which are then collected and filed in the State archives.
>
> **In this way the administration makes itself not only the foundation but the very condition of existence in this individualist society;** that society owes life itself to the supremacy of a State which guards, but, for that very reason, encroaches further and further.
>
> And so, in the act of developing, the administration fastens closer and closer the grip of the State and multiplies incessantly the number and importance of its services and officials.
>
> All these functions must be paid for. The State, it is true, possesses vast estates with enormous revenues. But the charges which it has to meet grow unceasingly. Not only does the administration itself cost more and more, but the growing authority of the State increases continually the prestige of the king, who, now canonized not only into a god but into the god of gods, surrounds himself with a Court the measure of whose luxury calls for an ever more numerous retinue of priests, courtiers, employees and servants. **Thus the requirements of the State come to exceed by far the revenues of its estates. Recourse is then had to taxation.**
>
> The civil departments, the land-survey, the registry of documents, thanks to which each single Egyptian is secured in his property and in his rights, have the further effect of giving the State a very good idea of what each possesses and of levying taxation on it accordingly. The administration of the finances and the taxation service then assumes an importance second to none, **for, if Egyptian Society, from the third to the fifth dynasty, is viable only by reason of its competent and complicated administrative machine, that machine itself lives only**

> **on the strength of the taxation yield.** So that the fiscal weapon is seen as an essential feature of the Egyptian Empire under the fourth dynasty.
>
> **All Egyptians are equal before the Law,** but this equality of theirs levels them all into an equal subservience to a more and more omnipotent State as represented in the king.

7. There we see where the development of the state leads. **The social hierarchy is in ruins;** the individual members are like peas shelled from their pods and form a numerical whole composed of equal elements. The state is the beginning and end of organization; it must apply itself to the task with the highest degree of authority and attention to detail. But is that to say that there are now no longer any privileged persons? There are indeed; but as regards the state they are no longer privileged as men preceding its authority. They hold their privileges in and from the state.

> **The *cultus* of the king, established as it was to assure the supremacy of the sovereign and to exalt him far above those ancient local cults to which in former times the territorial nobility had owed its power and its prestige,** undoubtedly played a large part in destroying this ancient nobility; simultaneously, however, it brought to birth in the heart of the services of the Crown a new and non-hereditary nobility which, though owing everything to the king, was bound little by little to raise up against his authority a new social force of considerable strength.13

Bureaucratic omnipotence tends naturally to convert the holders of key positions in the vast administrative machine into a new variety of notables and nobles. **So it happened in the later Roman Empire. The aristocratic families had been ground to powder by taxation. Those, on the other hand, often the freedmen of subject races, who occupied strategic positions in the wealth-absorbing machine, got from it immense fortunes not unmixed with personal regard.** On this subject Rostovtzev says:

> The reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, by implementing a policy of systematic spoliation to the profit of the State, made all productive activity impossible. **The reason is not that there were no more large fortunes: on the contrary, their build-up was made easier. But the foundation of their build-up was now no longer creative energy, or the discovery and bringing into use of new sources of wealth, or the improvement and development of husbandry, industry and commerce.** It was, on the contrary, the *cunning exploitation of a privileged position in the State*, used to despoil people and State alike. The officials, great and small, got rich by way of fraud and corruption.14

We may be sure that this new race of barons will try to make their own the offices which bring them such advantages and to assure their transmission to their descendants. It will be the feudal system over again.15

Conqueror though it is of the aristocracy which took shape in society, the state will in the end be dismembered by the statocracy which it itself has borne. **The beneficiaries of the state leave it, taking with them a veritable dowry of wealth and authority, leaving the state impoverished and powerless.** Then it becomes the turn of the state to break down these new social molecules, containing as they do the human energies which it needs. And so the process of the state’s expansion starts all over again.

Such is the spectacle which history presents to us. Now we see an aggressive state pulling down what other authorities have built up, **now we see an omnipotent and distended state bursting like a ripe spore and releasing from its midst a new feudalism which robs it of its substance.**

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_164

The officials who governed separate regions were not its rulers in the feudal sense. Although they usually came from the "aristocracy" by birth, and their official title was not infrequently passed from father to son, nevertheless the position of an official was determined not by his birthright but by the king's grace--in other words, by the given official's position in the bureaucratic hierarchy. No one possessed the automatic right to rule by birth. Service began usually in the lower ranks, and a successful official moved from one province to another frequently, without acquiring stable connections anywhere. On official seals, the name of an official was never indicated--only his position and the pharaoh's name. **Inscriptions found in tombs make no reference to the social origin of the deceased or even to his father's name (except in the case of princes of the blood).** An official's career and material welfare depended entirely on the state as personified by the pharaoh, who could even grant immortality (by allowing construction of a tomb near his own burial place). **As Meyer says: "Egypt by the time of Mena [creator of a united state comprising Upper and Lower Egypt] was not an aristocratic state but a bureaucratic state."** (72: p. 156) Furthermore: "The Ancient Kingdom

is an extreme example of a centralized absolute monarchy ruled by a bureaucracy that depended only on the royal court and was educated in state schools for the training of officials." (72: p. 193)
…

Despite the fact that almost the entire population was to a great extent directly dependent on the state, the society of the time cannot be called either a slave system, as in classical antiquity, or a feudal system. Written records contain numerous terms indicating dependence on the state--i.e., people sent to compulsory work or war prisoners used in building and other state works. **However, not one of these terms can be interpreted as slave under the personal control of another individual and employed in economic activity.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n637/mode/2up?view=theater

The Ptolemies accepted this system, and extended it by appropriating the great tracts which, under previous dynasties, had belonged to the Egyptian nobles or priests. A great bureaucracy of governmental overseers, supported by armed guards, managed all Egypt as a vast state farm.[7] Nearly every peasant in Egypt was told by these officials what soil to till and what crops to grow; his labor and his animals could at any time be requisitioned by the state for mining, building, hunting, and the making of canals or roads; his harvest was gauged by state measurers, registered by the scribes, threshed on the royal threshing floor, and conveyed by a living chain of fellahs into the granaries of the king.[8] **There were exceptions to the system: the Ptolemies allowed the farmer to own his house and garden; they resigned the cities to private property; and they gave a right of leasehold to soldiers whose services were rewarded with land.** But this leasehold was usually confined to areas which the owner agreed to devote to vineyards, orchards, or olive groves; it excluded the power of bequest, **and might at any time be canceled by the king.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n549/mode/2up?view=theater

EGYPT should have been the happiest of lands, for not only was the earth freely nourished by the Nile, **but the country was the most self-sufficient in the whole Mediterranean basin—rich in cereals and fruits, cutting three crops a year, unexcelled in its industries, exporting to a hundred nations, and seldom disturbed by foreign or civil war. And yet—perhaps for these reasons—"The Egyptians," Josephus notes, "appear never in all their history to have enjoyed one day of freedom."**[1] Their wealth tempted, their semitropical lassitude suffered, one despot or conqueror after another through fifty centuries.

Rome classed Egypt not as a province but as the property of the emperor, and ruled it through a prefect responsible only to him. Native Greek officials administered the three divisions—Lower, Middle, and Upper Egypt, and the thirty-six "nomes" or counties; and the official language remained Greek. **No attempt was made to urbanize the population, for Egypt's imperial function was to be the granary of Rome. Large tracts of land were taken from the priests and turned over to Roman or Alexandrian capitalists to be worked as latifundia by fellaheen accustomed to merciless exploitation. The state capitalism of the Ptolemies was continued in reduced form.** Every step in the agricultural process was planned and controlled by the state: proliferating bureaucrats determined what crops should be sown and in what quantities, annually allotted the requisite seed, received the product into government warehouses (*thesauroi,* treasuries), exported Rome's quota, took out taxes in kind, and sold the rest to the market. Corn and flax were state monopolies from seed to sale; so, at least in the Fayum, was the production of bricks; perfumes, and sesame oil.[2] **Private enterprise was permitted in other fields, but under ubiquitous regulation.** All mineral resources were owned by the state, and the quarrying of marble and precious stones was a governmental privilege.
…

Slaves outside of domestic service were few in Egypt, since "free" workers were paid only a notch above nudity and starvation.

https://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_133

1. Incas--the ruling class, descendants of a tribe that in the past had conquered an ancient state near Lake Titicaca. **Various authors refer to them as aristocracy, the elite, the bureaucracy.** From this class came the administrators, the army officer corps, priests and scholars--and of course, the absolute ruler of the country, the Inca. **This class was hereditary, but chiefs of conquered tribes and even soldiers distinguished in war might occasionally enter it.**
…

There was a special category of women--the so-called elect. **Each year, officials were sent to all sections of the country to select girls eight or nine years old. These were called the "elect." They were brought up in special houses (called "convents" in some Spanish accounts).** Every year during a special celebration, those who had reached thirteen years of age were sent to the capital, where the Inca himself divided them into three categories. Some, called Solar Maidens, were returned to the "convent," where they were to engage in activities associated with the worship of the gods of sun, moon and stars. They had to observe chastity, although the Inca could give them to his circle as

concubines or take them for himself. Girls from the second group were distributed by the Inca as wives or concubines. A gift of this kind from the Inca was regarded as a high distinction. Finally, a third group was intended for the human sacrifices that took place regularly, but on a particularly large scale at the coronation of a new Inca. The law provided for the punishment of parents who showed their grief when their daughters were chosen for the "elect." (57: pp. 161-162)

Apart from the "elect," all unmarried women were also at the disposal of the Incas, but not as private property; rather, they were allotted to them by government officials for use as concubines and servants. **The oppressed status of women in the Inca state is particularly notable against the background of the neighboring Indian tribes, where women enjoyed much independence and authority.** (57: p. 159)
...

The workers in the bureaucracy were trained in schools that only children of the Incas were permitted to attend. (The law forbade education for the lower levels of the population.) Teaching was performed by the *amautas* or "scholars." Their duties included the writing of history in two versions: **one, objective records in the form of quipu, which were preserved in the capital and intended only for special authorized officials,** and the other in the form of hymns to be narrated to the people at festivals. If a dignitary was deemed unworthy, his name was removed from the "festival" history. (56: pp. 75-76, 78)
...

The complete subjugation of life to the prescriptions of the law and to officialdom led to extraordinary standardization: identical clothing, identical houses, identical roads. Repetition of the same descriptive details is characteristic of the old Spanish accounts. The capital city, built of identical houses made of identical block stone and divided into identical blocks, undoubtedly created the impression of a prison town. (56: p. 117)

As a result of this spirit of standardization, anything the least bit different was looked upon as dangerous and hostile, whether it was the birth of twins or the discovery of a strangely shaped rock. Such things were believed to be a manifestation of evil forces hostile to society. Events were to show that the fear of unplanned phenomena was quite justified: the huge empire proved powerless against less than two hundred Spaniards. Neither their firearms nor their horses (animals unknown to the Indians) can explain this extraordinary turn of events. The same difference in armaments was after all involved in the subjugation of the Zulus, but they were able to mount a long and successful resistance to large detachments of English forces. The reason for the collapse of the Inca empire must apparently be sought elsewhere--in the complete atrophy of individual initiative, in the ingrained habit of acting only at the direction of officials, in the spirit of stagnation and apathy. **Ondegardo, a Spanish judge who served in Peru in the sixteenth century, noted a similar phenomenon. In his books, he constantly laments the complete regimentation of life and the removal of all personal stimuli which led to a weakening of and, sometimes, the complete destruction of family relationships. Grown children, for instance, often refused to take care of their parents.** (56: p. 127) **Baudin, a French student of Latin American history, sees in many traits of the contemporary Indians the aftermath of Inca rule--indifference to the fate of the state, lack of initiative, apathy.** (56: pp. 124-125)

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_189

All economic relationships were based on the assumption that the state, in the person of the king, was the proprietor of all sources of income. Any use of these sources was to be redeemed by deliveries to the state or by performance of obligatory work. **Labor conscription by the state was considered just as natural as universal military conscription is today.** Laborers were organized into detachments and armies (often under the command of officers) and were set to work on tremendous construction projects. They worked state fields, repaired, dug and cleaned irrigation and navigation systems, built roads, bridges, city walls, palaces and temples, pyramids and other tombs. They were used in transporting the goods of the state. **Sometimes such duties were imposed on conquered peoples, and, as Heichelheim believes, it was precisely this that gave rise to the whole system of duties--i.e., the state began to take the exploitation of conquered peoples as a model in the treatment of its own subjects.** (90: p. 176)

Most land either belonged to the state or was controlled by it. Temple lands were usually under the control of the state officials who directed work on them. The peasants got tools, seeds and cattle from the state and were often told exactly what to sow. They were obliged to work the state and temple fields on a set schedule. **The bulk of the agricultural population depended to a large degree on the state, but in most cases the peasants were neither slaves nor private chattel. I.J. Gelb (69) applies the term "serfs" to them--i.e., "attached" and "protected peasants."** He writes: "The productive labor population of Mesopotamia and the ancient East in general, in Mycenaean and Homeric Greece, later in Sparta and on Crete, in Thessalia and in other parts of Greece (with the exception of Athens), as well as in India, China, etc., is the basic work force employed either all the time or part of

the time on the public lands of the state, of the temple or of the large landowners, who as a rule acted simultaneously as state officials. **This work *force* was half independent.**" (69: p. 83)

Slaves in the majority of cases were house servants. In connection with the classical East, Meyer says: "It is hardly possible that slavery... played a basic role in the economy." (91: p. 190, quoted in 89)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indica_(Megasthenes)#Historical_reliability

Megasthenes states that there were no slaves in India, but the *Arthashastra* attests to the existence of slavery in contemporary India;[38] Strabo also counters Megasthenes's claim based on a report from Onesicritus. Historian Shireen Moosvi theorizes that slaves were outcastes, and were not considered members of the society at all.[39] **According to historian Romila Thapar, the lack of sharp distinction between slaves and others in the Indian society (unlike the Greek society) may have confused Megasthenes: Indians did not use large-scale slavery as a means of production, and slaves in India could buy back their freedom or be released by their master.** [40]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA68#v=onepage&q&f=false

Scattered textual evidence indicates that sales of human beings appeared in the Chinese Warring States period simultaneously with the private ownership of land.201 Slavery as an institution and slaves as a group with distinctive customary or legal status appeared in early imperial times and persisted. Slaves originated mostly from state prison, debt bondage, and the sale of children during famine. **Together they constituted less than 1 percent of the total population in the Han Dynasty.**202
...

Only five slave-based societies are known in the whole of world history. Two are ancient: classical Athens and many other Greek cities (but not Sparta): and Roman Italy, Gaul, and Spain (but not all parts of Rome's empire). Three are modern: the antebellum southern United States, the Spanish Caribbean, and Portuguese Brazil. **In each of the five, the slave population at its peak exceeded 30 percent of the total population.**204

A paradox leaps from the short list. Athens and the United States are showcase democracies and champions of freedom. The Roman Republic, although not fully democratic, also advocated liberty. **"How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?" asked a witness of modern slavery.**205 The puzzle began in antiquity, as a scholar remarks: **"The cities in which individual freedom reached its highest expression – most obviously Athens – were cities in which chattel slavery flourished."**206 Is it coincidental that the world's first democracy and first slave-based society are identical and emerged simultaneously with the articulation of the concept of political freedom?

The paradox leads to a related question: Why did traditional China lack a robust concept of political freedom? This is usually explained in terms of its stratified and deferential social structure. The explanation carries much truth, but a counterexample reveals its incompleteness. As a modern historian points out, "Roman society was sharply stratified. Divisions of status underlay all social and political life: division between the free man and the slave; the citizen and the non-citizen; the senator and the equestrian; the patrician and the plebeian. This point deserves great emphasis. All Romans knew their place."207 Yet the Romans extolled liberty. Could the social-stratification explanation possibly be supplemented by what was absent in China but conspicuous in Rome and its liberal predecessor Athens – *massive* slavery as an institution vital to the economy and salient in society?
...

Instead of the slave/free man dichotomy in the West, the Chinese traditionally lumped slaves with base people, *jianmin*, in contrast to whom common folks are called good people, *liangmin*. A few slaves attract scant social attention. A historical sociologist explains, "Only when slaves became the main dependent labor force was the concept of personal freedom first articulated (in ancient Greece), and words were then created or adapted to express that idea. It is literally impossible to translate the word 'freedom' directly into Babylonian or classical Chinese."208 **Babylon and China were not slave-based societies.**

Rome was the largest of the five slave-based societies.209 A prominent part of its laws concerned slaves. **When talking tools became essential to the economy, they stimulated conceptualization and intellectual reflection, especially the notion of their antithesis, freedom.**210 Classical scholars explain: **"The very idea and valuation of freedom was generated by the existence and growth of slavery."**211 "In Rome, as in Greece, freedom is primarily the legal status opposed to slavery."212

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Zymp_kM33ZcC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA24#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aeschylus was not the first to suggest that men who submitted to the rule of a king were slaves,59 and he was by no means the last. Herodotus picked up the refrain – and in Aristotle's day, the great minds of the age were disputing whether the subjects of the Great King were obsequious by nature, by education, or because of the climate.60
...

Persia's monarch governed his vast empire as a household; for this reason, where the king spoke of *manā badaka* ("my subject or vassal"), his Greek scribe – lacking a vocabulary for

feudal relations – employed the term *doûlos*. The great magnates of the royal house were not women; they were not children; and so they could only be slaves.62

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

Had they but once tasted the sweets of *Peace* and *Liberty* both together, **they would soon be of the opinion of * *Herodotus* and *Demosthenes*, that there is no difference between *King* and *Tyrant*,** and become as zealous as the antient *Romans* were in defence of their *Freedom.*

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/fletcher-selected-discourses-and-speeches#lf0427_head_009

With what face can we oppose the tyranny of princes, and recommend such opposition as the highest virtue, if we make ourselves tyrants over the greatest part of mankind? Can any man, from whom such a thing has once escaped, ever offer to speak for liberty? But they must pardon me if I tell them, that I regard not names, but things; and that the misapplication of names has confounded everything. **We are told there is not a slave in France; that when a slave sets his foot upon French ground, he becomes immediately free:** and I say, that there is not a freeman in France, because the king takes away any part of any man's property at his pleasure; and that, let him do what he will to any man, there is no remedy. **The Turks tell us, there are no slaves among them, except Jews, Moors, or Christians;** and who is there that knows not, they are all slaves to the grand Seignior, and have no remedy against his will?
…

The condition of such a servant is to be esteemed free; **because in the most essential things he is only subject to the laws, and not to the will of his master, who can neither take away his life, mutilate, torture, or restrain him from the comforts of wife and children:** but on the other hand, for the service he does, is obliged to ease him of the inconveniences of marriage, by providing for him, his wife, and children, clothes, food, and lodging: and the condition of a bashaw, or great lord, under arbitrary government **(who for the sake, and from a necessity of what they call government, has joined to the quality of a slave the office of a tyrant, and imagines himself a man of quality, if not a little prince, by such pre-eminence)** is altogether slavish; since he is under the protection of no law, no not so much as to his life, or the honour of his wife and children; and is subjected to stronger temptations than any man, of being a slave to men in St. Paul's sense, which is a worse sort of slavery than any I have yet mentioned.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Spirit_of_Laws_(1758)/Book_XV#347

THE multitude of slaves has different effects in different governments. **It is no grievance in a despotic state,** where the political slavery of the whole body takes away the sense of civil slavery. Those who are called freemen, in reality are little more so than they who do not come within that class; and as the latter, in quality of eunuchs, freedmen, or slaves, have generally the management of all affairs, the condition of a freeman and that of a slave are very nearly allied. **This makes it therefore almost a matter of indifference whether in such states the slaves be few or numerous.**

But in moderate states, it is a point of the highest importance, that there should not be a great number of slaves. The political liberty of those states, adds to the value of civil liberty; and he who is deprived of the latter, is also deprived of the former. **He sees the happiness of a society, of which he is not so much as a member; he sees the security of others fenced by laws, himself without any protection.** He sees his master has a soul, that can enlarge itself; while his own is constrained to submit to a continual depression. **Nothing more assimilates a man to a beast, than living among freemen, himself a slave.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n275/mode/2up?view=theater

Had it been objected, **that it was precisely among those nations who carried their ideas of Equality, Liberty, and Sovereignty to the greatest lengths, that the greatest number of slaves were to be found,** [Rousseau] would have contented himself with answering, "Such, it is true, was the situation of Sparta.—**But as to you, people of the present day, you have no slaves, *but are yourselves enslaved*.—You purchase their Liberty at the expence of your own.** Forbear then to exult in a presence which discovers, in my opinion, more of indolence than of humanity."32

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_b.htm

In the same way *civil society* as a whole is this war against one another of all individuals, who are no longer isolated from one another by anything but their *individuality*, and the universal unrestrained movement of the elementary forces of life freed from the fetters of privilege. The

> contradiction between the *democratic representative state* and *civil society* is the completion of the *classic* contradiction between public *commonweal* and *slavery*. **In the modern world each person is *at the same time* a member of slave society and of the public commonweal. Precisely the *slavery of civil society is in appearance* the greatest *freedom* because it is in appearance the fully developed independence of the individual, who considers as his *own* freedom the uncurbed movement, no longer bound by a common bond or by man, of the estranged elements of his life, such as property, industry, religion, etc., whereas actually this is his fully developed slavery and inhumanity.** *Law* has here taken the place of *privilege*.

https://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_190

The king's household was the basic economic force in the country. **Weber describes this structure as the king's *oikos,* underlining the fact that the entire state was ruled from one center as the estate of a single master. In Egypt, the name Pharaoh ("big house") corresponds literally to the word *oikos.* Heichelheim asserts that the state controlled about 90 percent of the whole economy.** He writes:

> "The kings of the ancient Orient were economically the center points from which the greater part of the capital investment and the economic life of the empires radiated. From here only capital surplus which had been amassed by the people could be reinvested or distributed, for productive purposes, among individuals or to whole groups of people. **Scholars have attempted, and not without some justification, to describe the system of government of the ancient Orient as a patriarchal socialism.**" (90: pp. 169-170)

...

Heichelheim points to similar parallels:

> **For scholars who have studied this development in detail, it is no secret that the planned economy and the collectivism of our modern Age of Machines has returned subconsciously to ancient Oriental conditions wherever we try to abolish or to modify the individualistic and libertarian forms of society which have been characteristic for the Iron Age of the last three glorious millennia.** Instead our turbulent twentieth century shows a tendency to link together our own traditional state organization, society, economic and spiritual life with the rudiments of ancient Oriental collectivist forms of organization as they have survived subconsciously in the life and customs of many modern nations. ... **The modern great powers are closer in analogy to the great empires of the cuprolithic and bronze ages than is generally realized, or to similar later forms of rule which developed from ancient Oriental foundations either directly or indirectly. Whenever our century shows some attempt to achieve not personal liberty but widespread control it has strong affinities to the planned city life of the kings of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, the rule of the pharaohs in Egypt, the early Chinese emperors. ... The spiritual ties which the nineteenth century had with. ... Israel, Greece and Rome are more often replaced, to a greater degree than we know, by a return to ancient Oriental foundations.** (90: pp. 99-100)

---

https://www.garynorth.com/public/19046.cfm

For a thousand years, China was administered by Mandarins. These bureaucrats swore loyalty to the emperor. Then they were granted enormous control over the entire society. **From the days of the Pharaohs until the twentieth century, the Mandarin class was the world's most powerful bureaucracy.**

To enter the ranks of the Mandarin class, a young man had to pass a rigorous written examination. The examination covered Chinese classical poetry. What did a knowledge of Chinese poetry have to do with ruling a vast empire? Directly, very little. Indirectly, a great deal.

A student needed five things to pass the exam: (1) advanced literacy; (2) enough leisure to study for the exam; (3) a very high IQ; (4) a teacher; (5) the ability to endure intense boredom for many years under a nearly absolute master.

The teacher was a man who had failed to pass the exam.

Had he passed, he would not have become a teacher.

This system, or something very close to it, has very nearly conquered America.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR22#v=onepage&q&f=false

The literati-officialdom, a prominent feature of the Dragon, was one of the most long-lived conservative political elites in world history. Its success depended much on the institutional architecture designed by Legalists: a centralized monarchy with bureaucratic administration, another characteristic of imperial China. Nevertheless, literati-officials vilified Legalist rule by law and subverted the bureaucracy's operational principles of efficiency and impersonal regulation by a culture of moralization and personal connection, *guanxi*. **The result partly explains the curious bipolar images projected by the Chinese state.** Focusing on institution building, a Western scholar remarks with emphasis, **"there is good reason for paying closer attention to China than to Greece and Rome in studying the rise of the state, since China alone created a *modern* state." Focusing on government culture, other Western scholars find a weak notion of state: "China is a civilization pretending to be a nation-state."**28

https://uselesstree.typepad.com/useless_tree/2005/11/confucianism_on.html

I participate in a listserv of people who follow Chinese politics and, **in debating the extent to which China has ever really lived up to Confucian political ideals, one of the posts used this term, *rubiao, fali* – "Confucianism on the surface, Legalism within."** It struck me as an excellent term for understanding the role of Confucianism in traditional China, as well as summarizing the politics of post-Mao reform.

As I have turned, in recent years, to reading the Chinese classics, I have been struck by the strong demand, in Mencius in particular, for political leaders to be held publicly accountable for their actions. It is not quite a call for modern electoral democracy – that mechanism of public accountability was simply too alien to the ancient Chinese political milieu. But it is certainly a proto-democratic expectation that leaders should not contradict the interests of the people at large: taxes should be low; the administration of justice should be fair; war should not be pursued offensively or pre-emptively (are you listening Mr. Bush?); and public welfare should be the leading concern of the state.

But this worldview has always been limited in China, at least since the Qin dynasty, by the countervailing Legalist perspective that political leaders must, first and foremost, concentrate on what needs to be done to maintain power. "Traditional" China is famous for strict laws and severe punishments, a la Legalism. **This is written into the language: "kill one to warn a hundred;" "kill the rooster to scare the monkey," etc.** It is that tradition that carries on, though in somewhat modified form, in the politically micro-managed society of Singapore. And it is that tradition that underwrites the lack of justice in the PRC legal system: where the law is understood to be a tool used by the state to control society, not as a bulwark of the individual against the state.

Yet in "traditional" China there was a hesitation to simply say "we are Legalist;" perhaps because of Legalism's explicit acceptance of coercive power to preserve the prerogatives of the ruler. Confucianism provides a much more humane (that is its main goal, after all) and reasonable rationale for politics and power. **And that was the genius of the Han dynasty: invoke Confucianism as state ideology, while maintaining much of the political infrastructure of the Legalist Qin dynasty. Say that you rule by Confucian principles, while always holding on to the Legalist club to repress potential challengers.**

https://archive.org/details/romanandteutonas003327mbp/page/n371/mode/2up?view=theater

Even Voltaire himself acknowledged that; and when he pointed to the Chinese as the most prosperous nation upon earth, ascribed their prosperity uniformly to their virtue. We now know that he was wrong in fact: for we have discovered that Chinese civilization is one not of peace and plenty, but of anarchy and wretchedness. But that fact only goes to corroborate the belief, which (strange juxtaposition!) was common to Voltaire and the old Hebrew Prophets at whom he scoffed, namely, that virtue is wealth, and vice is ruin**. For we have found that these Chinese, the ruling classes of them at least, are an especially unrighteous people; rotting upon the rotting remnants of the wisdom and virtue of their forefathers, which now live only on their lips in flowery maxims about justice and mercy and truth, as a cloak for practical hypocrisy and villany;** and we have discovered also, as a patent fact, just what the Hebrew Prophets would have foretold us—that the miseries and horrors which are now destroying the Chinese Empire, are the direct and organic results of the moral profligacy of its inhabitants.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/4/14*.html#ref15

Many a man whose journal records the most excellent maxims for the conduct of his life, has been a torment to his family and friends. Many a public company, with admirably-framed Articles of Association, has chosen the pleasant road to an early bankruptcy. **Many an Oriental state has**

proclaimed, and is proclaiming at the present day, the most excellent principles of government, not one of which it ever dreams of reducing into practice.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false

The notion of *tianming*, the mandate of heaven, which the Zhou invented for its attack on Shang, authorizes no holy war.144 **It is based on the allegation that Shang lost the mandate because it mistreated the people.** Furthermore, it comes with a warning against future misgovernment: "The mandate of heaven is not constant."145

http://www.chinaandrome.org/English/essays/religion.htm

Most religious rituals were familial and private matters for the Chinese, whose ancestor worship was more intense than that of the Romans. As to the relation between religion and universal rule, the Chinese were less certain. The notion of *tianming* □□, the mandate of heaven, appeared almost a millennium before empire. **Tian or Heaven was originally anthropomorphic, although more aloof than the Roman sky-god Jupiter.** Surveying four quarters of the world for the welfare of the people and deciding that the clan of Shang had misgoverned, Tian withdrew its *ming* or mandate from Shang and bestowed it on the clan of Zhou. **The story appears often in the *Poetry* and *Documents*, the two most ancient and venerated texts. In distinction to usual winner's propaganda, it is often accompanied by admonitions:**

> The mandate is not easy to maintain.
> Do not bring on your own destruction.
> Promulgate brightly your virtue and fame,
> Remember the verdict Tian passed on the Shang.[8]

"The mandate of heaven is not constant." **The warning to derelict rulers did not diminish when Tian morphed into the impersonal heaven *tian* that functioned "without sound or smell" and expressed its will mainly through the people:** "*Tian* hears and sees through the people's audition and sight; *tian* rewards and reprimands through the people's incentive and castigation."[9] The depersonalized *tian* has four meanings: sky, fate, nature, and the primordial cosmic principle. **In all senses related to the supreme, it retains the inclusiveness and impartiality symbolized by the heavenly vault.**[10]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandate_of_Heaven

Dynasties such as the Han and Ming dynasties were founded by men of common origins, but they were seen as having succeeded because they had gained the Mandate of Heaven. The concept is in some ways similar to the European concept of the divine right of kings; however, unlike the European concept, it does not confer an unconditional right to rule**. Intrinsic to the concept of the Mandate of Heaven was the right of rebellion against an unjust ruler.** The Mandate of Heaven was often invoked by philosophers and scholars in China as a way to curtail the abuse of power by the ruler, in a system that had few other checks. **Chinese historians interpreted a successful revolt as evidence that Heaven had withdrawn its mandate from the ruler.** Throughout Chinese history, times of poverty and natural disasters were often taken as signs that heaven considered the incumbent ruler unjust and thus in need of replacement.

The concept of the Mandate of Heaven was first used to support the rule of the kings of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE), and legitimize their overthrow of the earlier Shang dynasty (1600-1069 BCE).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shangdi#Zhou_dynasty

The Duke of Zhou justified his clan's usurpation through the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which proposed that the protection of Shangdi was not connected to their clan membership but by their just governance. Shangdi was not just a tribal but instead an unambiguously good moral force, exercising its power according to exacting standards.[12] It could thus be lost and even "inherited" by a new dynasty, provided they upheld the proper rituals.

Nonetheless, the connection of many rituals with the Shang clan meant that Shang nobles continued to rule several locations (despite their rebellions) and to serve as court advisors and priests. The Duke of Zhou even created an entire ceremonial city along strict cosmological principals to house the Shang aristocracy and the nine tripods representing Huaxia sovereignty; the Shang were then charged with maintaining the *Rites of Zhou*. Likewise, **the Shang's lesser houses, the *shi* knightly class, developed directly into the learned Confucian gentry and scholars who advised the Zhou rulers on courtly etiquette and ceremony.**[13]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false

A Western historian wrote of the Zhou: "they were conspicuous for their ability to plan far ahead, and for their discipline, even before their conquest of the Shang. They had two virtues that the early Romans held in high esteem: *gravitas* (gravity) and *constantia* (constancy)."37 The preconquest Zhou had an adult male population of 60,000 to 70,000, as indicated the scale of excavated settlements. Texts report their army of conquest comprising about 300 war chariots, 3,000 armored warriors, and 45,000 auxiliaries assembled from hundreds

of ethnically diverse tribes.38 **China was sparsely populated then, but even so, the Zhou were a small minority.** To rule the vast territory they conquered the Zhou fanned out to maximize their power. The Zhou king invested hereditary lords, the great majority of them whom were relatives. He assigned warrior followers to them, sent them to build cities at remote strategic locations, allowed them significant sovereignty in their cities, and demanded certain political and military obligations in return. **Unlike Greek colonies that stemmed from population pressure and severed political ties with the mother city, the Zhou colonies were political and strategic in design.** Hundreds of widely scattered Zhou cities constituted a loose political federation under the king, a "screen of defense for Zhou."39 **Their functions resembled the colonies that Rome planted in Italy, the "chains of bastions" that tied its peoples together.**40 Originally garrisons, they took root as civilian institutions and spread the Huaxia ways of life in the ensuing peace.41

Three centuries of dominance and relative tranquility bred refinement and complacency. Then, in 771 BCE, a great drought scorched the Wei Valley where the Zhou capital sat. Court corruption prevented effective famine relief. Marauding Rong compounded the people's sorrows. The Zhou king was killed in an incursion. His heir, together with great lords in the area, fled east to the Central Plain, never to return. **During the royal evacuation, the general from peripheral Qin distinguished himself and was invested as a lord, who alone dared to remain behind in Zhou's original base.**42 By decades of arduous fighting and administration, Qin made itself "the hegemon among the western Rong."43 The Rong's vitality and resources, tamed and absorbed, would help Qin's empire-building enterprise.

The Zhou court moved to Luo on the Yellow River, where it languished until Qin finished it in 249 BCE. **Tradition names the years 722 to 479 BCE after the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, China's first systematic history, written by Confucius toward the end of the period.** The subsequent Warring States period ended with Qin's unification of China in 221 BCE.
…

As the Spring and Autumn period dawned, the military colonies that Zhou planted in its early days had grown into hundreds of sovereign city-states, although their rulers retained the title of lord. Wey, Lu, and other states centrally located in the heartland, originally most advanced and prestigious, had stagnated for want of room to expand. Four fringe states – Qi, Jin, Chu and Qin – rose to hegemonic powers by developing their hinterlands and incorporating neighborhood pastoralists (Map 4). In terms of the seigniorial house, only Jin was certifiably Huaxia, but its lords too married pastoral women. Lord Wen, who first brought it to hegemony, had a Di mother and appointed many Di to high ministries.44
…

From the day of the Zhou conquest, political dominance did not blind military colonists to the diverse traditions of subject peoples. Officials from various cities traveled the countryside to collect songs and sayings, which conveyed information about native minds and local elites. Many such "country airs" survive in the *Odes*, the oldest Chinese literature. Singing less of sackers of cities than tillers of fields and seekers of mates, it offers a glimpse into the variegated customs of the vast land. Besides out-marriage, **the Zhou principle was "to improve education but not to change traditions, to regiment government but not to change what are appropriate to local situations."**52 Implementations of the policy varied, as did results. The first lord of Qi spent five months simplifying Zhou rituals to suit local customs. Qi grew rich and powerful because people flocked to it, attracted by its straightforward rule. The first lord of neighboring Lu took three years to mold local conventions according to complicated Zhou rituals. Lu became the citadel of Zhou culture and the home of Confucianism.53

The Zhou aristocratic culture – rich in rituals, poetry, music, and moral norms – was a cohesive force among Huaxia states and a magnet to non-Huaxia elites. Early Zhou bronze and ceramic vessels of similar design appear in archeological sites more than 1,000 kilometers apart. Regional artifacts show cultural convergence during the following centuries, although it was mainly confined to the upper crust of society.54 The peoples of Wu and Yue man Man Yi who blackened their teeth, painted their faces, and tattooed their bodies. The ruling classes, like that of Chu, admired Huaxia refinement. **Their efforts to develop their realms and enhance their own prestige simultaneously inculcated some Huaxia ways among their peoples, just as the municipal aristocrats of Italy led the Hellenization of Italians.**55 Yet the acculturation did not penetrate deep; much diversity persisted among the lower classes. Furthermore, rulers of various states were also eager to maintain regional identity that bolstered the loyalty of their subjects.
…

The acknowledgment of related lineages, fictive or not, fashioned a sense of affinity between peoples. Thus the lords of Wu gained acceptance into the Huaxia circle as descendants of an alleged minor branch of the Zhou lineage.62 Similar practice occurred in the Western world. A prominent example was the alleged Roman ancestry of the Trojan Aeneas, through whom Rome was adopted into the Greek culture.63
…

To evict old elites and inject new settlers were favorite policies of Chinese conquerors. When Chu annexed states in the more advanced areas, it routinely sent their aristocrats to the deep south, where natives were heterogeneous and economies backward. After Qin took over Sichuan, home to the Shu, "elder of the Rong and Di," it promptly infused 10,000 households and concluded covenants with natives to smooth conflicts with immigrants. **Geographical isolation made Sichuan an ideal place for the dangerous and undesirable. Tens of thousands of political exiles landed there, as did aristocrats and elites from the lands that Qin conquered.** Some carried a little money that survived their dislodgement, others nothing except their knowledge, skill, and leadership. **The influx "makes us prosperous and our land plentiful," Shu locals said.**93 Yet their distinctive culture submerged.94
…

The unifying efforts of the First Emperor of Qin went further. **After Qin annexed six rival states to create China's first imperial dynasty, it registered all inhabitants in individual households of equal status. Thus treated, the eastern Yi peoples quickly blended into the general population. More important, Qin abolished local**

aristocracies, leveled all barriers of travel and trade, proclaimed uniform codes of law, and standardized measure, coinage, and the Chinese script.97

The Han-Chinese spoke many dialects but shared a common written language, and theirs was “the country of caps and belts.” Native tongues of Italy gradually disappeared. Italians sharing the Latin language inhabited “the domain of toga-wearers.”98

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA48#v=onepage&q&f=false

Wey’s political structure was typical of the states that grew from the Zhou’s military colonization four centuries earlier. A state comprised three major groups of people: the aristocracy with the lord at its top, the *guoren* or city people, and the *yeren* or field people. **The aristocrats and *guoren*, the descendants of the original conquerors and colonists, mostly lived in the city and its immediate environs. The *yeren* were natives who inhabited the outlying countryside.**104

The non-aristocrats mostly engaged in communal farming, but the *guoren* organized their communities according to kinship, the *yeren* according to domicile.

> http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_171
>
> **The French Sinologist Maspero believes that marriage in the true sense existed only for the aristocracy, for which it had the effect of sustaining the religious cult. Common folk did not establish clans and the family did not have a religious character.** Marriage was denoted by different terms for the aristocracy and the peasantry; Maspero translates the former term as "marriage" and the latter as "union." (77: p. 117)

In the “well-field” arrangement, members of a community collectively worked the lord’s demesne. Besides farming, they were obliged to perform corvée labor and submit textile and other goods. For their own subsistence, individual households got allotments of farmland, rotated periodically to give everyone equal access to good and poor fields.105

The *guoren* and *yeren* resembled the common Roman citizens and the conquered subjects. **The field people were excluded from military service and politics. The city people constituted the army reserve.** They paid a military tax but did not provide individual armament as the Roman legionary did; aristocratic houses maintained the equipment for chariot warfare. **When not called up, *guoren* mainly farmed, but among them were also artisans, traders, and *shi*, who served as stewards, clerks, and place guards.**106

The *guoren* as a group derived considerable power from military service **and lineage cohesion.** They could conclude covenants with the lord independently of aristocratic ministers, with whom they sometimes disagreed. In aristocratic faction fights, the voices of the *guoren* could be stabilizing, although far less effective than Roman elections stabilizing aristocratic competition. There was no institutionalized forum or consultation channel akin to the Roman assemblies. **If a lord chose to ignore them, the *guoren* could only resort to violence. They had deposed many lords and killed many high ministers. Their potential for rebellion or desertion might deter rulers from outrageous transgressions, but at the cost of creating social havoc.**107

Late Bronze Age aristocrats held the bulk of power and justified their prerogatives by long pedigrees and traditions. **Three intertwined principles underwrote their political organization: *zongfa* or lineage rule, *shiguan* or hereditary ministry, and *fengjian* or feudalistic parceled sovereignty.**
…

Zhou’s *zongfa* was based on patrilineal genealogy. **The head of the principal lineage passed his position as the clan’s patriarch to the eldest son from his principal wife.** His other sons established secondary lineages. They were subordinate to the principal lineage but, as founders, they became heads of their respective lineages and passed their positions to their eldest sons, while their younger sons established tertiary lineages under their authority. The lineages maintained ancestral temples and burial grounds, sponsored schools and ceremonies, and provided hardship relief. The *zongfa* system cemented large kindred groups. **Its rigid rules and power hierarchy would decay, but its custom of networking relatives would persist in relaxed forms as a major social bond for millennia.**108

Fengjian was the political basis of the early Zhou’s military colonization. **In feudalistic parceling of sovereignty, the Zhou king reigned over all under heaven, but actually ruled a limited royal domain.** Extra territories he split into parcels, which he apportioned as fiefs to various lords. Within his fief, the lord was suzerain with juridical, fiscal, and military power. His relation with the king changed over time. **The strong kings of early Zhou demanded certain services and appointed ministers for the lord’s fiefs. By the Spring and Autumn period, the king had lost all ability to interfere, and the lords become sovereigns except the title.** A lord organized his state as the king did, albeit on a smaller scale. He directly governed a seigniorial domain and apportioned the remaining territories to his vassals, who acquired titles and managed their own fiefs autonomously. The notion of landlord was undifferentiated from that of lord. The lord exacted corvée labor from his subjects, who worked his demesne in the well-field arrangement.109

In Zhou’s feudalistic organization, the lords were mostly sons and relatives from secondary lineages of the royal clan. Similarly, tertiary lineages constituted the bulk of vassals. The lineage system and parceled sovereignty worked hand-in-glove. ***Qinqin*, the love of relatives, was the chief political virtue.** Politics based on familial and personal bonds would become a major component in Confucianism.110

State ministers administered the king’s royal domain or the lord’s seignorial domain. State ministries were usually hereditary, and the top ones usually claimed by lords to the king or vassals to the lord. Most minister-vassals were

relatives, whom the lord found difficult to dismiss without being attacked for vitiating *qinqin*.111 **A minister-vassal attended to both affairs of his lord (*gong*) and affairs of his own fief (*si*). These were the original meanings of the words *gong* and *si*, now understood as meaning "public" and "private."**112

An ancient text described the feudalistic hierarchy of Zhou government: "The son of heaven founds the state (*guo*). The many lords establish families (*jia*). Ministers set up side houses. Officials start minor lineages. The *shi* have dependent relatives."113 *Guo* and *jia* originally had similar organizations and functions, differing only in their status and size. **While texts on the early Zhou referred to the king's state and the lord's family, those on the Spring and Autumn period referred to the lord's state and the minister's family. *Guojia*, the modern Chinese term for the state, is literally "state-family."**
…

The feudalistic aristocracy hollowed out, its power gravitating toward the monarch above and the common people below. The old lord of Jin was the big brother among aristocrats. The new lords of Zhao, Wei, and Hann were embryonic monarchs keen on centralizing power. **Recognizing aristocratic threats from their own adventures, the usurpers tried to kick away the ladder behind them.** Parceling of annexed authority and hereditary ministries were too dangerous. Instead, they experimented with direct rule through salaried offices.
…

In 513 BCE, twenty-three years after Zichan in the state of Zheng published the first code of law in China, Jin followed suit and inscribed its penal code on an iron cauldron.121 **This was the first mention of an iron implement in reliable texts.** The temporal proximity of the two firsts was probably not coincidental.
…

As individual households became more confident in producing surpluses to save for hard times, communal farms unraveled. Demesne fields lay in waste. State extraction by corvée labor failing, Lu initiated the land tax in 594 BCE. It diffused to other states as household farms mushroomed on lands previously too difficult to cultivate. **The city people's political leverage dissipated. Their communities and lineages decayed. Their charioteering skills approached obsolescence. Infantry increasingly dominated warfare and the field people could fill the ranks equally well. Gradually, *guoren* and *yeren* merged into a single class of commoners.**
…

China's population grew, passing the 10 million mark in the Warring States period.124
…

We have met the *shi* at the bottom of the feudalistic aristocracy and the top of the city people, serving as petty officers. Aristocratic lineages ideally educated their members. The multiplication of lineages piled up excess descendants at the bottom, as did poverty and loss in power struggles. Efforts saved by elevated farming productivity allowed some commoners the leisure for learning.

> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/#HisCon
>
> Crises and bloodshed aside, the Warring States period was also an age rife with opportunities for intellectually active individuals. It was an exceptionally dynamic period, marked by novel departures and profound changes in all walks of life. **Politically, the loose aristocratic entities of the Springs-and-Autumns period were replaced by centralized and bureaucratized territorial states** (Lewis 1999). **Economically, the introduction of iron utensils** (Wagner 1993) **revolutionized agriculture, allowing higher yields, prompting the development of wastelands, and bringing about demographic growth, as well as accelerating urbanization and commercialization of the economy.** Militarily, new technologies, such as the crossbow, as well as new forms of military organization, brought about the replacement of aristocratic chariot-led armies by mass infantry armies staffed by peasant conscripts, resulting in a radical increase in warfare's scale and complexity (Lewis 1999). **And socially, the hereditary aristocracy that dominated the Zhou world during much of the Bronze Age (ca. 1500-400 BCE) was eclipsed by a much broader stratum of *shi* □ (sometimes translated as "men of service"), who owed their position primarily to their abilities rather than their pedigree** (Pines 2013c).
> …
>
> During the aristocratic Springs-and-Autumns period, the overwhelming majority of officials were scions of hereditary ministerial lineages; only exceptionally could outsiders join the government. **This situation changed by the fifth century BCE, as aristocratic lineages were largely eliminated in internecine struggles and members of lower nobility—the so-called "men of service," *shi* □—could advance up the ladder of officialdom.** It was then that the new meritocratic discourse of "elevating the worthy" (*shang xian* □□) proliferated and upward social mobility became legitimate (Pines 2013c). Yet who were the "worthy" and how to determine one's worth was a matter of considerable uncertainty and confusion.

…

In the sociopolitical upheaval, where aristocrats and commoners met became a conduit of social mobility. From it emerged the transformed *shi*, self-conscious and ambitious. **Because of feudalistic segmentation of loyalty, the *shi*, who was rather low on the hierarchy, owed no duty to his native state and could freely serve an enemy state. To kings, foreign officers were often more insightful and less threatening than native aristocrats.** The movement of *shi* among various states spread novel ideas and political innovations. They supplied the brainpower for state building.125

“The four peoples, *shi*, farmer, artisan, and merchant, are the state’s foundation stones.”126 This text, probably written in the Warring States period, was the first articulation of a social division. Set alongside Aristotle’s four chief divisions of the masses – farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and day laborers127 – we see three major occupations ranked in the same order. The day laborer may be universal, but the *shi* was not. **Educated citizens abounded in Greece, but they did not constitute a politically significant class as they did in China.** Born of the decaying aristocracy, the *shi* as a group never severed its unbilical cord to political power. Diverse and intellectually vibrant in its early days, the *shi* would mature into the monocultural and doctrinal *shidafu*, the literati-officials, the signature ruling elite of imperial China.128

https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1975/PR1975-16a.htm

> Originally, the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius were the ideology of the declining slave-owning class of old China. When the feudal landlord class became conservative and reactionary after taking over rule from the slave-owning class, it adopted the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius to save itself and changed them into the ideology of the landlord class. Compromising with the landlord class, the weak bourgeoisie of China took over and turned these doctrines into reactionary ideological weapons to defend their own political and economic interests. **The concepts of bourgeois right, from the ideas of private ownership and hierarchy to attitudes towards physical labour and mental labour and so on in China, can all without exception trace their roots to the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.**

The preeminent *shi*, Confucius, was an impoverished aristocrat who threw open the door of education by welcoming any student who paid tuition. He styled himself not as an originator but as a transmitter of tradition, especially the Zhou tradition, whose moral underpinning he brought into relief. Acceptable ruling-class customs, interpreted in ethical terms, receive a fresh life rooted in daily practices, especially in family life. **The *junzi*, originally meaning the son of the ruler, gradually changes to a superior man, noble in character but not necessarily in birth, clinging to aristocratic values even while slipping in rank and power.** Appealing to people’s empathy and moral intuition, Confucius expounds the supreme virtue of *ren*, benevolence, which his followers supplement with *yi*, righteousness.
…

The procrastinating Qin had lost much territory to the reformed Wei and Hann. Knowing that Qin must respond to geopolitical pressure that forced other states to improve, Lord Xiao called for ideas and attracted Shang Yang from Wei. With the lord’s backing, **Shang initiated in 356 BCE a series of political and socioeconomic reforms that turned Qin from a straggler to the top dog.**131

Shang Yang was the most successful of a long line of reformers stretching back through Wu Qi of Chu and and Li Kui of Wei to Zichan of Zheng. Further back was Guan Zhong (Guanzi), who helped Lord Huan of Qi to hegemony. After Shang came Hann Fei and Li Si, who contributed to Qin’s unification of China.
…

Shang Yang shared the fate of Wu Qi in aristocratic backlash. **Each was immediately killed upon the death of the lord who backed his reforms and vilified as a mean if not wicked character.** Entrenched Chu aristocrats rolled back many of Wu’s reforms. The aristocracy was weaker in Qin. Shang was torn to pieces, but his centralizing policies survived to make Qin the winner and, more important, to seed the institutional architecture of imperial China.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/11952/pg11952-images.html#link2HCH4

> After the death of Philip the Handsome, the opposition made head more extensively and effectually; and it produced two results: ten ordinances of Louis the Quarreller for redressing the grievances of the feudal aristocracy, for one; and, for the other, the trial and condemnation of Enguerrand de Marigny **“coadjutor and rector of the kingdom” under Philip the Handsome.**

https://archive.org/details/catilineclodiust00beesuoft/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

> * The career and fate of Sejanus strikingly resemble those of a much better man, Thomas Cromwell. Both had incurred the savage hatred of the class into which and above which they had raised themselves. **When Tiberius and Henry VIII. saw cause to distrust their ministers they had only to abandon them to the nobles, who rushed on them like a pack of hounds.**

When Shang died in 338 BCE, Mengzi, an eloquent third-generation disciple of Confucius, was intensifying his political activity in the east. Three decades of solicitation in various states won him fame, wealth, and a high ministry in Qi, but no rejoinder to the charge of retiring without achievements that actually benefited the people. **Lifelong experience and accusations of impracticality did not temper his conviction of being the only man capable of restoring order to the world.**133 His bitterness at his lack of success was comforted posthumously, since he is honored as the sage second only to Confucius.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/10/mode/2up?view=theater

> It was Mencius, however, born about 372 b.C., nearly a century after the death of Confucius, who first by both word and example laid upon all future ages the duty of persecuting heresy. Indeed,

we read in the Classic which bears his name, that he violently attacked all heretics, and two men in particular had to bear the outbursts of his fury: **Yang Chu, a preacher of epicureanism of the worst kind; and Mih Tih, advocate of universal philanthropy to be practised even at the expense of one's parents, and also of simplicity in the funeral rites.** To wage war against their doctrines, which evidently had made alarming progress in his time, was the chief aim and object of the sage. Listen how he hurls the shafts of his indignation against them: "If their doctrines be not stopped, those of Confucius cannot possibly come to the front; the people will be led into error by that heretical language, and benevolence and righteousness will find the way blocked; **then, as a consequence, man, imitating the beasts, will devour man, the one tear the other to pieces.**" So hideous are the consequences of heresy! "I am alarmed by these matters," our sage goes on to say in the same breath; "distressed about the doctrines of the Sages of the past, I oppose Yang and Mih, and drive away heretical (*yin*) doctrines, in order that no preachers of heresies (*sié*) may do their work. Do such men work on people's minds, they do harm to their business; if they influence their business, they harm the government. **Should the Sages rise again, they would not alter these my words.** … It is also my desire to render the minds of men orthodox (*ching*), and thus to make an end of heretical (*sié*) doctrines; I wish to raise an obstacle against criticism, and thus to banish heretical (*yin*) talk; – in this manner I carry on the work of the three Sages. Should I do so from a desire to criticise? No, I cannot do otherwise. **He who can oppose Yang and Mih is a disciple of the Sages.**"1

Mencius then is the classical sage who tells us, categorically, what we are to understand by heresy: this is in fact everything that diverges from the teachings of the sages, and more particularly of three among them, who have been identified by commentators and scholars of all times as Yü the Great, abovementioned; Cheu-kung, "the prince of Cheu," brother and right hand man of the founder of the Cheu dynasty (12th cent. b.C.), who is the principal author of the *Yih* and of other classical writings; and lastly Confucius.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/148/mode/2up?view=theater

The clause, apparently eighty years old, granting pardon to renegades who betray their co-religionists, we must not too readily take for a fruit of generosity. Besides being a mean enticement to betray, it is probably a classical concession extorted by the holy Mencius. According to the writings ascribed to him, this second Confucius said: "**They who run away from Mih cannot do otherwise than take refuge with Yang (comp. p. 11), and on running away from the latter, they must needs have recourse to Confucianism.** They who do this, must be received with open arms, and there the matter must rest. They who after that still controvert Yang and Mih, act like one who, when catching a loose pig, still pursues and calls it when it is already in its sty."1

…

Mengzi talks much about winning the hearts of the people. The people are heterogeneous, especially in stratified and hierarchical societies such as China and Rome. Thus one has to be careful about the meanings of "the people" in political writings. For instance, **analyses of the constitutional writings of Polybius and Cicero have revealed that "the people" who shared power with aristocratic senators and magistrates were often only the equestrians and perhaps rich proprietors who could afford the full panoply of heavy infantry.**137 Similarly, in reading modern writings on Mengzi's government "for the people," it is well to ask: for what people foremost?

Mengzi writes, **"Those who apply their mind to govern others; those who apply their brawn are governed. Those who govern live on provisions produced by others; the governed supply the provisions. This is the righteous principle of all under heaven."**138

…

Aristocratic power was declining, but still formidable. **Devoted to the Way of ancient kings, Confucians tried to reinvigorate the aristocracy and aspired to join it.** Confucius often equated the superior man with the aristocrat. Reinforcement of hereditary ministry was a central plank of Mengzi's "benevolent policy." **He also urged plush patronage of superior men, who nudged close to aristocrats with an arrogant posture.**140

While Mengzi pitied the starving people of his time, he everywhere took gold and gifts from aristocrats. His retinue of tens of carriages and hundreds of followers lived off one lord after another, inciting students' scruples about extravagance without contribution or official responsibility.141 It had been common knowledge that the proliferation of consumers of tax revenue was a reason for the people's poverty. **Joining Daoists and Mohists, Legalists deprecated special privileges and unproductive big talkers as "lice" who leeched off peasants and weakened the state.**

…

Confucians justify elitist privilege by the doctrine of rule by men: **With superior men in ruling positions radiating their personal virtues, world order would be attained effortlessly in one great leap forward.**144 **Confucius likens superior men to the wind and the people to grass: "swayed by the wind, grass necessarily bends."**145 The most potent superior man is of course the king. **Confucians constructed stories about exemplary sage kings in the Three Eras and prehistoric times: Yao and Shun of the third millennia BCE.** References to them fill political discourses.

...

Mengzi reiterates: "The Way of Yao and Shun is nothing more than filial piety and brotherly love." "The love of relatives is benevolence. Deference to seniors is righteousness." "Everyone loves his relatives and obeys his seniors and the world is well ordered."150 After becoming king, Shun executed enemies but made his evil brother lord. Mengzi dismisses a student's protest of unfairness by praising the sage king's brotherliness. Fealty, filial piety, and other personal virtues dominate. Substantive political considerations hardly venture beyond the web of unequal personal relations.151 **For those seeking concern for justice and the public good, disappointment waits everywhere in *Mengzi*.**

The Confucian political world is mostly confined to the personal plane as depicted in Figure 2.2a. This condition may have seemed natural to feudalistic aristocrats in their tiny, family-like states. However, political and socioeconomic realities had changed radically by Mengzi's time, a fact Mengzi and his disciples stubbornly ignored over the millennia. **States and populations had surged tenfold in size, and the expansion would continue. Rulers and ministers have to tend to the welfare of millions of strangers. Can principles such as loving relatives keep them from falling into nepotism and cronyism?**

They cannot, Legalists argue. Perhaps a sage king can manage, but sages are rare and hypocrites aplenty. A good and stable government must supplement personal virtue by institutions that function properly even under mediocre kings. It must rule according to the law.152 While the rule by men relies on the inscrutable virtues of elites, the rule by law relies on the law's publicity, fairness, understandability to the common people, and trustworthiness.153 **With these novel concepts, Legalists introduced in Chinese thinking a new dimension, the social and political dimension. In their writings, the meaning of *gong* turns from the lord to the public.**154
...

Legalist rule *by* law fails to consider legislative procedure and falls short of the rule *of* law as constitutionalism. Nevertheless, it contains the embryonic ideas of the state existing beyond all its constituents and institutional restraints on the ruler. **Why these ideas died in embryo is an important question in Chinese history that deserves far more attention than it gets.**

Equality under the law was a revolutionary idea, as Hann Fei asserts: "Under the law, clever violators can find no pretext. Criminal penalties do not excuse high ministers. Rewards do not exclude commoners."157 Shang Yang did not spare even the crown prince for wrongdoing. Aristocrats and superior men, accustomed to immunity from punishment, denounced the law's impartiality and impersonality as callous and destabilizing. It cut into their prerogatives and self-styled superiority in many ways. **Shang Yang refused to revere the enigmatic sayings of superior men and insists that the common people are capable of understanding the law.** Thus he demands that the laws be clear and accessible to them and that the state institute jurists as teachers. Knowing what to avoid, the people would behave themselves. Knowing that the people know the law, the elite would not dare to abuse them.158 Excavated documents reveal how Qin officials explained the laws by case examples and answers to questions.159 **The law empowers the people. Confucius sensed its threat in his revulsion against Jin's first publication of law: When people can appeal to the law, they would be less deferential to aristocrats.**

> http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_144
>
> **De Escadón writes that the corregidors and alcaldes reported to one of the Fathers every morning to get their decisions approved and to receive instructions as to the work order of the day. "This was accomplished as in a good family, where the father tells everyone what he must do for the day."** (61: p. 148) "The limited intelligence of the Indians compelled the missionaries to take care of all affairs and to guide them in secular as well as in spiritual matters," as the Jesuit Charlevoix (in *History of Paraguay)* quotes his contemporary Antonio de Ulloa. **There were no laws--only the decisions made by the Fathers.**

...

Confucians and Legalists both bow to kings, but the former revere the person of the monarch, the latter promote the institution of monarchy. Legalists argue that the king's authority emanates not from his person but from his *shi*, the throne's supreme position in a generally respected political institution, which structures the delegation of authority to various offices.163 **Nowadays we all know that to assault a police officer is a serious crime, not because the officer is blue-blooded but because he holds institutional authority, so the offence is not only against his person but also against the institution of justice. At that time, however, the novelty and abstractness of institutional ideas made them difficult to grasp, especially amid the loud denunciations of aristocrats.**

Political authority in the feudalistic regime was fused with family relations. Legalist reformers toiled to tease them apart to build a political institution based on rational principles. To maximize cooperation and minimize the chance of power scrambles and duty evasion, they established offices with definite authority and responsibility, a defined position in the chain of command, and specific rank, compensation, and criteria of advancement for its occupants: all characteristics of what moderns call a bureaucracy.164
...

The government should monitor behaviors to prevent officers from abusing their authority. That is why modern police departments institute an internal-affairs section. Legalists were aware of this need. "The sagacious ruler supervises his officers, not the people," writes Hann Fei. The supervisory techniques are *shu*. "The techniques are to appoint an officer suitable for job of the office and demand performance according to the responsibility of his title."165 As they developed, many supervisory techniques were formalized and integrated into government regulations. **Not surprisingly, supervision exasperated aristocrats and superior men, who found accountability insulting to their claimed virtue.**166

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_173

In order to transform his people into clay in his hands, the ruler is advised to renounce love of man, of justice and of the people--**qualities that the author categorizes collectively as virtue. These qualities should not be assumed among the people either; they must be ruled like a collection of potential criminals with an appeal made only to fear and selfish advantage. "If the state is governed by virtuous methods, large numbers of criminals are sure to appear."** (84: p. 156) "In a state where the depraved are treated as if they were virtuous, sedition is inevitable. In a state where the virtuous are treated as if they were depraved, order shall reign and the state surely shall be powerful." (84: p. 163)
…

The ruler "should issue a law on mutual surveillance; he should issue a decree that the people ought to correct each other." (84: p. 214) **"Regardless of whether the informer is of the nobility or of low origin, he inherits fully the nobility, the fields and the salary of the senior official whose misconduct he reports to the ruler."** (84: p. 207)
…

The author pictures this entire system as a more profound and significant form of humanity, a path toward the dying away of punishment, execution and denunciation, **almost a withering away of the state--through its maximum increase in strength. "If punishment be made severe and a system of mutual responsibility for crime is established, people will not dare to expose themselves to the force of law. And when people begin to fear the results, the very necessity of punishment will disappear."** (84: p. 207) "Therefore, if by war, war can be abolished, then even war is permissible; if by murder, murder can be abolished, then even murder is permissible; if by punishment, punishment can be abolished, then even harsh punishment is permissible." (84: p. 210) **"Such is my method of returning to virtue, by the path of capital punishment and reconciliation of justice and violence."** (84: p. 179)

> https://www.holocausthistoricalsociety.org.uk/contents/naziseasternempire/himmlersspeechatposen.html
>
> Many people say, "Oh, the Finns are an honest people". Yes sir. **Do you know why they're so honest? Not because they've got simply fantastic moral inclinations, but because they had laws for 300 years, that anybody who stole one Finnish mark should have his hand hacked off.** And that was so painful and so distressing that the whole people, as a result of such measures and such education, gradually became honest.
>
> *Sohrab Ahmari on X*: **As I've said, when legal coercion works its educative effects, the people won't even remember that a week earlier they held the contrary opinion. They'll somehow convince themselves that they were always walking in the path now illumined by the law.**

What is the social structure that Shang Yang proposes to achieve by these means? He singles out two concerns for the sake of which other human interests should be suppressed and to which everything should be subordinated: **agriculture and war. He ascribes such exclusive importance to these entities that he introduces a special term to define them, translated as "concentration on the One Thing" or "unification."** The whole future of the country depends upon this factor: "The country that achieves unification, be it for one year, will be powerful for ten years; the state that achieves unification for ten years will be powerful for a hundred years; the state that achieves unification for a hundred years will be powerful for a thousand years and will achieve dominion under-the-heavens." (84: p. 154)
…

The implementation of these principles, however, is prevented by a force which the book deals with at length. To denote this force Shang Yang uses a term that is translated as "parasites" or (literally) "lice." Sometimes six parasites are enumerated, sometimes eight, in still other instances ten. **These are the *Shih Ching* and the *Shu Ching (The Book of Songs* and *The Book of History,* the sources of artistic and historical education), music, virtue, veneration of old customs, love of mankind, selflessness, eloquence, wit, etc. Elsewhere, knowledge, talent and learning are added.** What seems to be meant is culture in its broadest understanding and involving a certain level of ethical and moral demands.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D10%3Apage%3D889
>
> **Fire and water and earth and air, they say, all exist by nature and chance, and none of them by art;** and by means of these, which are wholly inanimate, the bodies which come next—those, namely, of the earth, sun, moon and stars—have been brought into existence. It

is by chance all these elements move, by the interplay of their respective forces, and according as they meet together and combine fittingly,—hot with cold, dry with moist, [889c] soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as result from the chance combination of these opposites,—in this way and by those means they have brought into being the whole Heaven and all that is in the Heaven, and all animals, too, and plants—after that all the seasons had arisen from these elements; **and all this, as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and chance.**[1] **As a later product of these, art comes later; and it, being mortal itself and of mortal birth, begets later playthings** [889d] **which share but little in truth, being images of a sort akin to the arts themselves—images such as painting begets, and music, and the arts which accompany these. Those arts which really produce something serious are such as share their effect with nature,—like medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic. Politics too, as they say, shares to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art; and in like manner all legislation which is** [889e] **based on untrue assumptions is due, not to nature, but to art.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA134#v=onepage&q&f=false

In Book 10 of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger gives a succinct and telescoped summary of this pre-Socratic ontology of primordialism (what the Gorgias fragment terms “the arguments of the cosmologists”).
…

The arts are “mortal” and “paltry” because they are short-lived fabrications of man in contrast with the primordial motions of nature. **Certain arts like “music” (tragic and lyric poetry) are utterly paltry.** (This judgment probably reflects the claim of Gorgias and other rhetoricians to have replaced the role of the old poets in shaping opinion.) **Some arts, however, like medicine, farming, and gymnastic, are relatively “serious” because they share their power “in common” with the life forces of nature.** We can tap into the potency of nature through agriculture and through the care of the body. **The realm of convention, by contrast, is utterly artificial and opposed to nature, even more so than the arts.** *Nomos* adjures us to be pious, just, to seek peace and respect the lives and property of others. The natural man’s passions will impel him to strive spontaneously for “victory” over others, “by force” if need be, shattering the artificial dictates of conventional morality and equality. Echoing Callicles’ speech in the *Gorgias* extolling the natual master, the pre-Socratics’ and Sophists’ view as summarized in the *Laws* stresses that, for a real man to accept these dictates is to live like “a slave.” It may be just and noble by convention to treat others as equals, but it is just and noble by nature (another echo of Callicles) to tyrannize over others whenever one can. **Finally, the whole subject matter of statecraft and legislation is held to be purely by art, and therefore entirely unnatural – except for a “small part” of the art of ruling which is in “partnership with nature” like the other “serious” arts of medicine, gymnastic, and farming. That “small part” is in my view the art of rhetoric, which for the Sophists is tantamount to everything meaningful about statecraft,** a point I will enlarge on subsequently.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burning_of_books_and_burying_of_scholars#Punishment_of_the_scholars

> Chancellor Li Si Said: "I, your servant, propose that all historians' records other than those of Qin's be burned. **With the exception of the academics whose duty includes possessing books,** if anyone under heaven has copies of the ***Shi Jing*** [Classic of Poetry], the ***Shujing*** [Classic of History], or the writings of the hundred schools of philosophy, they shall deliver them (the books) to the governor or the commandant for burning. **Anyone who dares to discuss the *Shi Jing* or the *Classic of History* shall be publicly executed. Anyone who uses history to criticize the present shall have his family executed.** Any official who sees the violations but fails to report them is equally guilty. Anyone who has failed to burn the books after thirty days of this announcement shall be subjected to tattooing and be sent to build the Great Wall. **The books that have exemption are those on medicine, divination, agriculture, and forestry.** Those who have interest in laws shall instead study from officials."[a]—*Shiji* Chapter 6. "The Basic Annals of the First Emperor of Qin" thirty-fourth year (213 BC)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ow5EY_upzRkC&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA192#v=onepage&q&f=false

As we saw earlier, already in the Western Han a number of authors were crafting a very different image of Han Fei as an enemy of traditional morality and its source, the Five Classics. **Unlike Mencius and Xunzi, Han Fei was also associated with texts like “the Five Vermin” that attacked the core dogma of the emerging imperial ideology,** i.e., that the cultivation of virtue by rulers, his ministers, and the people was The Way to achieve good order (*zhi* 治). The view that “following Han Fei’s *shui* [is tantamount to] despising the way of emperors and kings,” to quote Dong Zhongshu, soon overshadowed

> the moral reading of “The Difficulties of Persuasion” and even turned this widely read text into a symbol of its author’s immorality. **With the establishment of the Five Classics, Han Fei’s role in the Chinese tradition came to resemble that of the Greek sophists in the Western tradition, those rhetorically adept thinkers whose supposed opposition to objective standards of right and wrong made them the perennial others of true “philosophy.”**57

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_179

Plato, for instance, sought a ruler who would organize a state in the spirit of his teaching. **Plato's attempts ended when the Syracuse tyrant Dionysius, upon whom he had set his hopes, sold him into slavery. Shang Yang, however, found his ruler and had the opportunity to realize his ideals.** The prince of the state of Ch'in made him first minister and Shang Yang succeeded in carrying out a number of reforms. Here is what is known of Shang Yang's legislation:

1. Farmers ("those engaged in the essential thing") were freed from obligatory service.

2. Those discovered engaging in "nonessential" activities were turned into slaves.

3. Ranks of nobility were obtainable only through military service. High positions in the government could be given only to those who had already earned the rank of nobility. Those without rank were forbidden to display luxuries. **(In this way, the ruling class was transformed from a hereditary aristocracy into officials dependent on the favor of their superiors and the monarch.)**

4. The state was divided into provinces ruled by state officials.

5. Large families were split up, and grown sons were forbidden to live with their fathers. (This measure is seen as an attempt to destroy the village community.)

6. **Fields were marked off with boundary lines.** A number of historians see in this the destruction of community and the subordination of the peasantry directly to officials; others view it as indicative of the freedom to buy and sell land. (The spirit of Shang Yang's book would seem to render the latter interpretation quite unlikely.)

7. Capital punishment was introduced for the theft of a horse or an ox.

8. Every five households were united into a unit of shared responsibility and linked to another five. If one member of the group of ten households committed a crime, the others were to report him--otherwise they were to be cut in half. The informer was to be rewarded in the same manner as one who had killed an enemy.

These laws met with great resistance, but Shang Yang managed to cope with the opposition. Individuals expressing their discontent were removed to the frontier regions. Danger struck from quite a different quarter. His patron died and the heir to the kingdom, who hated Shang Yang, executed him along with his entire family. **But Shang Yang's reforms were left in effect and led, as he had asserted, to the achievement of hegemony under-the-heavens by the Ch'in kingdom. In the third century B.C., China was united in the highly centralized Ch'in empire in which the ideas of Shang Yang were implemented even more consistently and on a greater scale.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=gSwrDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA295#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> His decrees “smashed the obsolete political structure in the state of Ch’in” and were “his indelible merits in history.” **Those who considered his conduct a little savage should remember the words of Engels: “Without violence, without unrelenting harsh means, nothing in history would succeed.”** In consequence, the reactionaries had ordered him to be torn apart by chariots, and “he died a martyr at his post, laying down his life in the cause of reform.”
>
> **He had proved, the *Red Flag* emphasized in another article, that “it was possible for a backward state to advance by leaps and bounds and become a developed one, provided it moved with the tide of history and firmly adhered to the Legalist Line.”** Shan Yang, Hsun Tzu (“Men are born evil”), and Han Fei (who united the principles of “law,” “power,” and “technique") were all hailed as teachers who **“reflected the progressive nature of a new vigorous class bent on carrying out social changes”** and had “stood in the van of the tide in their day.”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q&f=false

Xunzi, a Confucian master whose students included Hann Fei and Li Si, attends to reality and tries to bridge the gap. **However, he is excluded from orthodox Confucianism, which exalts idealistic Mengzi.**169 On Mengzi’s ideas the following brief comparison with legalists will focus.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=v65aBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA130#v=onepage&q&f=false

I reply: "This Way of which I speak is not what the Daoists and Buddhists refer to as the Way. Instead, this Way was transmitted by Yao to Shun; it was transmitted by Shun to Yu; it was transmitted by Yu to Tang; it was transmitted by Tang to Wen, Wu and the Duke of Zhou. Wen, Wu and the Duke of Zhou transmitted it to Kongzi. It was transmitted by Kongzi to Mengzi. **When Mengzi died, it did not succeed in being transmitted. Xunzi and Yang Xiong grasped parts of it but not its essence; they spoke of it but not in detail.**12 **Up to the Duke of Zhou, [these sages] were rulers.** Hence, their actions were put into effect. **After the Duke of Zhou, they were ministers.** Hence, they offered more developed explanations.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xunzi/

Xunzi □□ (third century BCE) was a Confucian philosopher, **sometimes reckoned as the third of the three great classical Confucians (after Confucius and Mencius).** For most of imperial Chinese history, however, Xunzi was a *bête noire* **who was typically cited as an example of a Confucian who went astray by rejecting Mencian convictions.**
…

Famously, Mencius argued that the *xing* of human beings is good (*shan* □), by which he meant that all human beings *have the capacity to become* good, even though, in reality, not all people are good, because they fail to exert themselves sufficiently—or even take the obligation seriously.

In *Xunzi*, "Human Nature is Evil" is framed as an argument with Mencius (who was probably long dead), and takes the view that the *xing* of human beings is the very opposite of *shan*, namely *e*. **The basic meaning of *e* is close to "detestable" (as a transitive verb, *wu* □ means "to hate"); the translation "evil" is acceptable only with the understanding that something like an Augustinian conception of evil is not intended. (Some scholars opt for "bad", another standard antonym of "good" in English.)** But in prosecuting this position, Xunzi uses *xing* in a fundamentally different sense: "What is so by birth is called *xing*" (*Xunzi* 22.1b).[3] Thus *xing* refers to the basic faculties, capacities, and desires that we have from birth, which cannot be called "good" because following the impulses of our *xing*, without reflecting on them and moderating them, will lead us to act harmfully (Hutton 2000; Tang 2016: 51).

In effect, both Xunzi and Mencius argued that human beings all have the capacity to become good, even though some people develop this capacity and others do not (Graham 1989: 250; Shun 1997: 222-31). The main differences, only recently appreciated, are that they were not operating with the same implicit definitions of *xing*, and Xunzi's recommendations for moral self-cultivation—that is, how to overcome one's inherently detestable nature—were more complex than Mencius's, as we shall see. **Because of Mencius's subsequent prestige, it was commonly supposed that Xunzi's definition of *xing* was heterodox, if not deliberately subversive. But a collection of Confucian manuscripts recently excavated from a tomb near the modern town of Guodian □□ and dated to ca. 300 BCE suggests that it may have been *Mencius's* usage of *xing*, not Xunzi's, which was considered eccentric in ancient times.**[4] The Guodian text called *The* Xing *Emerges from the Endowment* (*Xing zi ming chu* □□□□) defines *xing* in a manner very similar to Xunzi: the set of inborn characteristics shared by all members of a species (Goldin 2005: 38).

Fixating on the title "Human Nature Is Evil" (which may or may not derive from Xunzi himself) can lead to an elision of **the second half of the chapter's credo: "what is good [in people] is their artifice"** (*qi shan zhe wei ye* □□□□□). "Artifice" (*wei*)[5] refers to all the traits and habits that we acquire through our own conscious actions. And if we achieve any goodness, it must be because of our artifice: whereas

> **obeying one's *xing* and following one's emotions must result in contention and robbery** … the transformation [brought about by] the methods of a teacher and the Way of ritual and morality will result in deference and courtesy, in accordance with refinement and principles, and return to order. (*Xunzi* 23.1a)

…

In some passages, Xunzi attributes, in a manner superficially reminiscent of Hobbes or Rousseau, the genesis of the rituals to the sages' recognition that unbridled competition produces a globally unsustainable situation:

> **If people follow their desires, then boundaries cannot contain them and objects cannot satisfy them. Thus the Former Kings restrained them and established for them ritual and morality in order to divide them [into classes].** (*Xunzi* 4.12; cf. 19.1a)

…

First, **Xunzi elsewhere explicitly denies that an arbitrarily chosen set of rituals would be effective.** Rather, the rituals of the sage kings are legitimate because they accord with "that which

makes humans human" (*ren zhi suoyi wei ren zhe* □□□□□□□); by implication, any competing ritual code would necessarily fail.
…

Xunzi's immediate purpose in this section was to counter the Mohist view that music is wasteful. **Xunzi counters that by focusing exclusively on the material costs, Mo Di □□ (d. ca. 390 BCE) and his followers failed to recognize the psychological utility of music as an instrument of moral suasion** (Cook 1997: 21-24; Graham 1989: 259-61).

> When music is centered and balanced, the people are harmonious and not dissipated. When music is stern and grave, the people are uniform and not disorderly. When the people are harmonious and uniform, the army is firm and the citadels secure; enemy states dare not invade. (*Xunzi* 20.2)

…

Xunzi even extends this theory of "human portents" to contend that religious ceremonies have no numinous effect; we carry them out merely for their inherent beauty and the social cohesion that they promote.[8]

> If the sacrifice for rain [is performed], and it rains, what of it? I say: It is nothing. Even if there had been no sacrifice, it would have rained. … **Thus the noble man takes [these ceremonies] to be embellishment, but the populace takes them to be spiritual. To take them as embellishment is auspicious; to take them as spiritual is inauspicious.** (*Xunzi* 17.8)

8. **In this connection, he is often compared to Émile Durkheim** (1858-1917), e.g., by Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 157-60 and Campany 1992. For objections, see Goldin 1999: 64-65 and Robson 2014: 140.

…

At[12] the end of his life, Xunzi was the leading teacher and philosopher in the Chinese world. Among his former students were some of the most influential men in politics, including Han Fei □□ (d. 233 BCE), Li Si □□ (d. 208 BCE), and Zhang Cang □□ (ca. 250–151 BCE), as well as transmitters of several leading redactions of canonical texts, including Fuqiu Bo □□□ and perhaps Mao Heng □□ (Goldin 1999: xii).
…

Dong Zhongshu is reported to have written a paean to Xunzi (now lost), and writers of late antiquity, such as Wang Chong □□ (27-ca. 100 CE) and Ban Gu □□ (32-92 CE), still took him seriously as a philosopher. But thereafter, Xunzi's star began to set. In later centuries, the two tirelessly repeated clichés about Xunzi were that he propagated the anti-Mencian doctrine that human nature is evil, and that, by serving as Li Si's and Han Fei's teacher, he furthered the cause of Legalism (*fajia* □□) and thus subverted high-minded principles. Ji Kang □□ (223-262), for example, obliquely identified Xunzi as the chief architect of everything that Ji and his group disdained: artificial ritualism, counterfeit erudition, and an oppressive network of laws that serve only to interfere with the innocuous enjoyment of life (Goldin 2007: 140-42).

By the Tang □ dynasty, even literati who admired Xunzi—such as Han Yu □□ (768-824)—were careful to add that his works contain grave mistakes (Kong Fan 1997: 281; Liu Youming 2006: 48-50). In the Song □, there were still some voices that praised him, but the opinion with the greatest long-term consequences was that of Zhu Xi □□ (1130-1200), who declared that Xunzi's philosophy resembled those of non-Confucians such as Shen Buhai □□□ (fl. 354-340 BCE) and Shang Yang □□ (d. 338 BCE), and that he was indirectly responsible for the notorious disasters of the Qin dynasty (Kong Fan 1997: 291-95). For the rest of imperial history, Xunzi was rejected by the cultural mainstream;[13] **into the twentieth century, he was criticized by intellectuals such as Kang Youwei □□□ (1858–1927), Tan Sitong □ □□ (1865-1898), and Liang Qichao □□□ (1873-1929) as the progenitor of the Confucian scriptural legacy, which, in their view, had derailed the original Confucian mission and plunged China into a cycle of authoritarianism and corruption that lasted more than two thousand years.**

Today the tide has reversed almost completely. Xunzi is one of the most popular philosophers throughout East Asia, and has been the subject of a large number of books published over the past two decades. From a twenty-first-century perspective, this revival of interest in Xunzi is not hard to explain: **his body of work has always been one of the best preserved, and with the commonplace scholastic objections to his philosophy having lost most of their cogency,** it is only to be expected that philosophical readers should be attracted to his creative but rigorous arguments. In this sense one could say that Xunzi has finally been restored, more than two millennia after his death, to his erstwhile position as *zui wei lao shi*.

Being certain about the potency of virtuous intentions, Confucians pay little attention to problems of realization. **Confucius dismisses questions on agriculture as fit only for the petty man: "The superior man is no instrument."**170 Along this vein, Confucians disdain instrumental reason and technical knowledge, including law,

economics, and management.171 **Economics invariably leads one to consider utility, efficiency, interest, cost, and benefit, which aristocrats snub. Confucius says, "The superior man considers righteousness; the inferior man, utility."**172 **Mengzi elevates anti-utility into an influential moral doctrine and brands utility chasers as robbers.**173

Mengzi gained audience with King Hui of Wei. The king asked, "How do you propose to benefit our state?" Mengzi replied: **"Why does your majesty attend to benefits? All that matters is benevolence and righteousness."** The king was interested in the beneficial consequence expected of Mengzi's proposal. Without any evidence for it, Mengzi attributed a selfish intention to him, sneered at his famine relief as merely a lesser evil, and proceeded to "rectify the ruler's heart" by lecturing on benevolent motivation.174 We will see how such airy moral denunciations hamstrung utilitarian officers toiling to achieve something constructive in difficult situations.

The opposition between righteousness and utility was only one manifestation of Mengzi's idealism that polarized complex matters into simplistic good and evil and declared war between them. Another set kingship against hegemony.175 ***Ba*, like the Greek *hēgemōn*, originally meant an eminent leader,** as we saw in section 1.4. **Athens changed its behavior after the Persian War; therefore other Greeks changed the epiphet, using *polis tyrannos* instead of *hēgemōn*.**176 In contrast, Mengzi degraded *ba* to a despicable tyrant basing not on actual behavior but on an intolerant ideology. **The leadership of Lord Huan of Qi and other hegemons had won applause from many, Confucius included.** Mengzi dismissed them as beneath discussion simply because they fell short of the ideal king's perfect benevolence.177

Mengzi advocated heavy punishments for "robbers of the people," generals, diplomats, and officers who led land reclamation and distribution.178 How to maintain national security in the age of warring states? He answered with the mantra "The benevolent ruler is invincible."179 His benevolent policy called for rejuvenating the well-field system, but never considered the realistic problem of how to obtain the land needed for poor families. The difficulty that bedeviled the Gracchi brothers in Rome was also present in China. **In contrast to the Gracchi who took the responsibility of addressing the land problem, Mengzi made it almost impossible by opposing both infringement on great houses and development of new land, which was effortful.**180

Mengzi's "robbers" were Legalists, statesmen aiming at *fuguo qiangbing*, to enrich the state and strengthen the army. **Superior men ignorant of economics and disdainful of production interpreted this as impoverishment of the people, because they imagined the ruler and the people fighting over a pie of fixed size.**181 Those who considered production knew that good policies can create a win-win outcome by enlarging the pie to be divided. To grow the economy, Legalist reformers organized people for water-works and other projects that put land under cultivation. To maximize land and labor productivity, Qin, Wei, Zhao, and other states systematically distributed standard plots to individual households. The land distribution programs helped independent family farms to their feet and became a model for several imperial dynasties.182

Because of its equal treatment of households, the Legalist land distribution program is often confused with Mengzi's well-field system. Actually, it replaced the well-field by a new socioeconomic organization. **Dong Zhongshu, leading Confucian scholar of the early Han Dynasty, remarked, "Qin adopted Shang Yang's law, abandoned the Way of ancient kings, abolished the well-field, and allowed people to buy and sell land."**183 **He rightly located the innovation as alienable private landed property, although wrongly blamed it all on Shang.** The ideas of sovereignty, right of land usage, and ownership of land were on the verge of differentiation in the Spring and Autumn period. Lands changed hands, but justifications for the claims and transactions were murky and inconsistent. Land ownership, which depends on legal definitions of location, occupation, income, transaction, and disposal, is peculiarly complex, even today. Legalist laws and and distribution programs provided clearer formulation and state backing of it. **Landed property right, absent under the well-field system, greatly stimulated the economy.** Dong's hostility to it, surprising to us, reflected the anti-utility ideology.

Another difference is the form of government taxation. **Corvée levy in the well-field system set the interests of the peasant and the lord against each other. The result was apparent in contemporary reports of peasants working sluggishly on the lord's field in order to save their energy for their individual plots.**184 **No wonder Mengzi was eager to purge the people's mind of self-interest and indoctrinate them with righteousness: "No one who is righteous puts the ruler's matters second."** Because of his low estimate of petty folks, however, his benevolent ideal ensured that no one "dared" attend to his own affairs before finishing the lord's business.185 Instead of futile brainwashing, Legalist policies changed the rules so that while peasants tended their own interests, they simultaneously suited the state's purpose.
…

According to Sima Qian, whose *Records of the Historian* initiated the tradition of *Standard Histories*, a decade after Shang started reforms, taxes were fair, families prospered, and the common people rejoiced. However, most aristocrats seethed.188

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false

Qin alone among the Chinese states integrated farming and armed service. The Romans blamed Carthage's defeat on its preference to trade over conquest. Each conquered the civilization to its east but submitted to its cultural superiority. Most influential high ministers on Qin came from the east.
…

Carthage and Chu, the toughest enemies of Rome and Qin respectively, were themselves marcher powers.8 **A successful power at the border between high civilization and high barbarism leverages the vitality of the latter by the knowledge of the former.**
…

Qi and Qin, at the eastern and western ends of the Chinese world, revealed the diversity within a rather homogeneous culture. Agriculture was the economic base in all states. Unlike Qin's single-mindedness, however, **Qi on the eastern seaboard also encouraged commerce, fishing, and the salt industry.** Contrary to the simplicity of Qin's capital Xianyang, Qi's Linzi, with a population of about 70,000 households, flaunted expensive lifestyles. Adjacent to Lu, the bastion of Zhou tradition and Confucianism, Qi shared the enthusiasm for high culture. Its kings built a Palace of Learning at Jixia, sponsored thousands of students, granted posh stipends to seventy-six masters, and built them big houses.24
…

Qin's 316 BCE strategic decision disclosed its grasp of balancing power. A minister urged attacking Hann because it was the gateway to Zhou, and by capturing Zhou's emblems of power and controlling the son of heaven, Qin would gain the prestige to command the whole world. **Yet the opposition prevailed: "To assault the son of heaven would incur notoriety, not advantage. It brings the name of injustice. It is dangerous to attack what the world is unwilling to see endangered."**30 Qin did lust after Zhou's emblems, but it left Zhou alone until 255 BCE and refrained from destroying Hann or any other major state even longer. **It understood the necessity to avoid galvanizing opponents. Swallowing peripheral states such as Shu was fair game; so was robbing major states of some land and population. To extinguish a great power, however, would inflame the fear and loathing of other great powers.**
…

In Qin's carefully prepared campaign, the six states fell like leaves in a gale. United China began in 221 BCE.37

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA116#v=onepage&q&f=false

We think of empire as a large territorial state under a unified government. **To the Romans, however, empire meant power foremost. *The imperium populi Romani* meant the domination of the Romans over the peoples, with or without annexing their territories.** Not until the mid-first century BCE did a clear territorial connotation appear and *imperium Romanum* begin to assume the familiar meaning of the Roman Empire.2 It was then badly governed. Government necessitated numerous officers in provincial administrations. **Unlike Chinese states that allowed in talented commoners, the Roman aristocracy jealously guarded the ruling circle and the ambition if its individual members. Instead of draining the circle for provincial governors and risking the danger that individual governors would become too powerful, it preferred to use cronies, collaborators, and private contractors to do the exploitative work.** Driven only by self-enrichment and lacking government oversight, these predators were usually harsher on the subject people and less efficient for the state, but they were good enough for the senatorial aristocracy. Farsighted statesmen such as Pompey and Caesar realized that the situation was unsustainable but offered no viable alternative. Not until Augustus did the Romans find a way to enjoy the fruits of victory in a lasting imperial monarchy, but at the heavy price of sacrificing their republican spirit.3

The classic verb for Qin's actions on other states is *canshi*, literally "to munch like a silkworm." A caterpillar devours a leaf not by swallowing but by relentess shaving. Swallowing implies a notion of the whole; shaving does not. Domination and encroachment seemed to be the major concern of Qin and its fellow warring states. People tired of incessant wars harked nostalgically back at the early Zhou, when concord prevailed under a strong feudalistic king. **Anticipation for a unified imperial China was scarce.**4 **It was conspicuously absent in *Lü's Annals* under the eponym of Qin's premier Lü Buwei, published one year before the future First Emperor reached adulthood and began to rule.** The new political vision crystallized in the young king's court. In the time span that Caesar conquered Gaul, Qin swallowed six rivals whose combined population more than quintupled its own. The First Emperor destroyed not only entrenched kingdoms, but also the traditional regime type by abolishing the feudalistic aristocracy. **Reaping the experience of more than a century of Legalist reforms, he instituted a centralized monarchy with bureaucratic apparatuses regulated by law. This vision was so revolutionary that he had to burn books to suppress aristocratic reactionaries.**
…

Ying Zheng, the future First Emperor, was born in Zhao amid intense hostility toward Qin. His father was a neglected Qin prince serving as hostage to Zhao. **The merchant Lü Buwei saw in the prince an exotic commodity and, with much gold and political shrewdness, caused him to be inserted into Qin's line of royal succession. The investment paid off handsomely. Lü became premier when the prince became king. To this premiership was added regency when King Zheng inherited the throne at age twelve.**55

During King Zheng's minority, state matters were controlled by Lü, the queen dowager, and her consort Lao Ai. They did not survive the first encounter with the king when he reached adulthood and began his rule in 238 BCE. The queen dowager was dismissed and Lao executed on conspiracy charges. Lü, in forced retirement, drank poison for fear of further recrimination. **Within two years, King Zheng had secured for Qin the internal solidity indispensable for external expansion.**56

Lü and Lao were both aliens. So were most of Lü's numerous clients. Then it was discovered that Zheng Guo, who masterminded a grand waterworks project, was a Hann agent charged with diverting Qin's resources from pressuring Hann. **Urged by native aristocrats, King Zheng expelled all aliens, among whom was Li Si, originally a petty clerk from Chu. However, he rescinded the edict upon reading Li's memorial on the rationale of garnering talents from all under heaven.** Recalled, Li became his ablest minister, and he was far from the only foreigner who contributed to Qin's final success. **Li argued that Qin had the capacity "to unite the whole world under one government."** In the court of the young king emerged a resolve not to squander the historic opportunity.57

The annexation of Hann in 230 BCE was Qin's equivalent of crossing the Rubicon. The old system was left behind. Henceforth a new grand strategy reigned supreme: China was to be united. Fighting was fierce, but Qin's diplomatic preparations and lightning attacks preempted attempts at coalition when it extinguished Wei, Chu, Yan, Zhao, and Qi between 225 and 221 BCE.58

Peace and stability were the major achievements that the First Emperor claimed: “The kings of six states captured, all under heaven is united. Conflicts and calamities terminated, arms are laid forever to rest.”59 **He had the weapons of the former six states destroyed, fortifications and city walls everywhere levelled, and barricades in mountain defiles removed. Even Han literati usually eager to disparage Qin admitted, “The masses rejoiced at relief from the hardship of warfare.”**60
…

The Chinese speak many dialects, some mutually incomprehensible and susceptible to evolving into distinct languages, as Latin evolved into the Romance languages. **Binding the dialects and cementing the nation is the common written script, a celebrated legacy of Qin.** Before unification, several scripts coexisted, similar but with significant variations. Li Si and others worked hard to promote a standard script convenient for writing. Also standardized were administrative and penal laws, weights and measures, coinage and metal currencies, and the gauge of vehicles that could henceforth run in the same ruts. **Such standardization “seems conventional today, and it requires a leap of imagination to realize what innovations they were in the third century B.C. Many of these advances did not appear in Europe until the French Revolution, over two millennia later,”** writes a Western historian.63

No military operation was on official record for six years after unification, although scattered actions might have lingered in the mountains. The First Emperor inspected the northern region in 215 BCE. Afterward he ordered Meng Tian, whe had been guarding the frontier, to mobilize troops and drive nomads out of the area south of the long wall built by Zhao. **A year later, Qin established three new provinces in the south and consolidated them with forced colonization. Thus it expanded to cover roughly the core territory of imperial China** (Map 9).64

Massive building projects filled the last three years of the First Emperor’s reign. The long walls built by various warring states to fortify their northern frontiers were repaired and extended. A straight road connected the frontier to Xianyang. **Chinese roads were made of stamped earth, easier to build than Roman roads paved with cut stones but requiring greater diligence for maintenance.** More profligate were contructions near Xianyang, whch allegedly employed 700,000 convicts. The new Ebang palace with its gigantic mausoleum reached its final stage.65 The extravagance of these buildings is undoubted, but they have perished, so we are unable to compare them with the “city of marble” that Augustus left in Rome.

The emperor made five extensive tours of the country to visit the troops and pacify distant peoples, as he announced in the six stone inscriptions erected on sacred mountains that he ascended. **Inspection of local conditions resulted in directives such as breaching enbankments designed to flood enemy territories in the previously war-torn heartland.** As the duty of the supreme ruler demanded, he offered sacrifices to heaven and earth. He also enjoyed the sea and went whale hunting.66

During his fifth tour in 210 BCE, the First Emperor died. **Loath to mention death in the prime of life, he did not designate an heir until, gravely ill,** he wrote a sealed letter to his elder son Fusu, who was with Meng Tian. The letter was in the charge of the imperial secretary Zhao Gao, a eunuch who was a confidant of his youngest son, Huhai. Zhao somehow secured premier Li Si’s quiescence as he altered the letter, ordered Fusu and Meng to commit suicide, and erected Huhai as Ershi, the Second Emperor. Li would pay for his treachery.67
…

The Second Emperor’s three-year reign surpassed the combined malice of Emperor Claudius, manipulated by freedmen, and Emperor Nero, who fiddled while Rome burned. A puppet of Zhao Gao, he wantonly stepped up the excesses of the First Emperor and perpetrated a bloodbath of royal kin and high ministers.

Ten months into his reign, heavy rains held 900 conscripts heading for the northern frontier at Dazexiang in former Chu territory. They had no way to report for duty on time. The officers in charge expected punishment for being late. Chen Sheng, a locally selected section chief, conferred with another, Wu Guang: **“Escape or revolt, we risk death. It is death anyway; why not die for a kingdom?”** After psychological manipulation, the pair killed the Qin officers and swayed the conscrips by a grim picture of garrison.68 In the words of early Han scholar Jia Yi, Chen “stepped from the common rank, rose among centurions, led poor wearied soldiers in the hundreds, and revolted against Qin. They cut trees to make weapons and raised flags on utility poles. All under heaven gathered like clouds and reverberated like echoes.”69 Attraching followers on the way, they seized the provincial capital from which Chu previously ruled. There Chen declared himself king and dispatched lieutenant Zhou Wen to attack Xianyang. **Thus began the first large-scale rebellion in the history of imperial China.**

News of rebellions reached the Qin capital quickly, but no one dared to suggest deploying troops for suppression after the Second Emperor penalized messengers who told the truth. Finally, when Zhou Wen’s troops walked through the unguarded mountain passes, he agreed to reprieve and arm the convicts working on the royal mausoleum. Led by Zhang Yan, the hastily assembled army smashed the approaching rebels and proceeded to rout Chen’s main army, already intoxicated by power and weakened by internal conflicts. **The victories were too late for Qin. Former royal houses and elites had reasserted themselves, and opportunists mushroomed in the eastern countries. They killed many Qin governors and declared allegiance to Chen.** Qin garrisons, if present, were ineffective. Xiang Yu took over Huiqi Province in the Yangzi Delta, and Liu Bang the Pei County to its north. **While the rebels strengthened, Qin’s army of ex-convicts received meager reinforcement from its supposedly mighty war machine.** Zhang surrendered at Julu, defeated by Xiang’s small army of soldiers who showed their determination by sinking their boats after crossing the Yellow River, smashing all cooking utensils, and carrying only three days’ rations. While Xiang engaged the Qin force, Liu reached Xianyang with little opposition and received Qin’s surrender in 206 BCE, but it would be years before he could defeat Xiang and become Gaodì, the founding emperor of the Han Dynasty.70
…

Qi, Chu, and other states that Qin annexed had eight centuries of history, each with its peculiar and sophisticated culture. Qiren or Churen (*ren* means “man” or “people”) sounded as natural as “Englishman” or

“Frenchman” does to us. Their native dialects were probably mutually incomprehensible. Look at a political map and imagine that, within several years, eastern Asia had changed from a patchwork of color, as in Western Europe today, into a single color, and then you may appreciate what Qin had done. **Of course the Qiren or Churen hated the old enemy turned new master, to whom many had lost loved ones in previous wars.** In the rebels’ efforts to win popular support, Chen Sheng invoked the memory of a Chu hero who died defending the homeland, and Xiang Yu erected a king from the former Chu royal house, to whom Liu Bang also pledge allegiance.74 Their actions revealed the hearts of people lying with their old kings. **The main target of their uprising was not a brutal ruler but a foreign occupier. That explains why lands of the old Qin state remained quiet.**
…

Far more surprising than the outbreak of revolt is Qin’s failure to quash it. I reject the received view that blames the failure on tyranny; Qin would have done much more to suppress the revolt if the government were as brutal as alleged. **The aftershocks of conquest aside, little evidence points to deteriorating material conditions for the masses. I will argue that those most aggrieved were the political elites who lost privileges in Qin’s abolition of the feudalistic aristocracy and resented legal supervision of officers.** Qin’s failure to mollify the elites, including those working in its government, intensified the peril of imperial overreach and rapid demobilization. **Later, the literati fabricated stories about Qin brutality, blamed Qin’s demise on its abandonment of the Way of ancient kings that favoured aristocrats,** and deployed Confucian ethics to warn emperors against following Qin in putting the law above elitist privileges.

> https://archive.org/details/catilineclodiust00beesuoft/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The execrations of nineteen centuries lie piled on the grave of the successor of the Gracchi and the forerunner of Caesar. **It is not good to make a literary man your enemy.**
>
> Catiline and Cicero were not merely political opponents. **The natures of the two men were thoroughly antipathetic. Cicero thought that society existed for the glory of clever writers and eloquent speakers.** The strength of character and prudence which make the practical statesman were in his eyes very vulgar qualities. He shrank with dislike and fear from a resolute man. **He reverenced constitutional forms as framed in the interest of talkers. His idea of good government was a state of things where talkers should always have full swing, and be listened to with respect, while rough practical men should humbly do their bidding.**

…

Equality under the law aside, Qin discouraged large households and distributed land to nuclear families. Financial independence boosted the dignity of young couples, so that sons showed pride in lending tools to their fathers and daughters dared to argue with their mothers-in-law. Han Confucians condemned such behaviours as beastly immoral.79 However, Legalists did not set to destroy filial piety as charged. Primary sources recorded Qin laws that granted special treatments to sick and elderly persons. One law stipulated the state’s refusal to accept accusation of parents by their offspring, thus leaving certain authority to the head of family.80 Other excavated documents taught honesty, uprightness, diligence, and other traditional virtues. *Lü’s Annals*, a broadminded anthology not lacking criticism of the government, was publicly posted in Xianyang’s marketplace. The First Emperor instituted the office of Erudites of scholars, including Confucians, and listened to them before making his own decisions.81

Sima Qian observed that as soon as Qin fell, some Erudites spread lies about it.82 Western historians warn readers that Han writers, “because they are so often marked by evident anti-Qin bias, should be approached only with extreme caution.”83 **Vilification of Qin served the interest of Han, rebels eager to justify themselves and prevent others from following their rebellious example.** The *Book of Han* records many cases of Han literati “borrowing Qin as an analogy,” ascribing to it whatever they thought bad, and using its dire fate as an object lesson to push their own agenda.84 **Qin became identified with evil, just as Yao, Shun, and the Three Eras were identified with virtue.** In either case, the ascriptions mix history with fiction. One politician told contradictory stories when advocating different policies.85 Where scholarship meant quoting each other, repetition generated a false air of truth. **A modern researcher outside the echo chamber observes that “the archaeological and textual evidence exposes these criticisms as self-serving Han propaganda with little relation to Qin policy or its failure.”**86
…

Ban’s lengthy Annals of Gaodì details his fiscal measures and efforts to win hearts. **Conspicuously absent is any mention of general tax reduction, which would be the most benevolent and popular act worth trumpeting. Historians concur that the Han generally adopted Qin institutions.**91 Dong Zhongshu, the leading Confucian scholar of early Han, specifically asserted continuity in tax rates.92 The most cogent evidence comes from excavated bamboo trips: documents interred about 217 BCE, four years into the Qin Dynasty, and fragments of the Han law published about 187 BCE, fifteen years into the Han. Fragments of “land laws” indicate that both dynasties collected the land tax in the form of grain and fodder. Both stipulated the same amount for the latter, and in the same words.93 If the same applied to grain, then the Han’s initial land tax rate of one-fifteenth was inherited from the Qin Dynasty. For comparison, Lu collected one-fifth in taxes at the time of Confucius, and Mengzi’s ideal demanded one-ninth.94
…

Considering various factors in Appendix 3, I estimate that long-wall construction under the First Emperor required roughly 238,000 man-years of labor. If this is correct, then Meng Tian’s 300,000 troops could have accomplished the mission in one year and then been discharged. It would explain why they were never mentioned in 209 BCE when the government desperately needed troops to suppress rebels. **Those condemning Qin for unremitting militarism fail to answer a crucial empirical question: Where was the Qin army in time of dire need?**

In sum, if we look past propaganda at available facts, Qin's tax and levy were not harsh by contemporary standards. **However, that obtained only for ordinary people. For those in the powerful and previously privileged class, conditions worsened.** Many warring states built long walls, but only Qin's wall building inspired horrible stories.
...

Venerated ministers led by the premier advocated the Way of ancient kings, in which territories of the former six states would be divided into subordinate territories ruled by kings chosen from the emperor's sons. **Li Si alone objected. Pointing to the endless fighting among descendants of relatives enfeoffed by the Zhou, he argued that long-term peace and stability required the emperor to rule the whole country directly. The First Emperor agreed: "To re-establish feudatories would be to encourage the use of arms."**101

In 213 BCE, eight years after the abolition of feudalistic aristocracy, Chunyu Yue, an Erudite from former Qi, urged restoring the Zhou model: "**Your majesty possesses all under heaven, but your sons and brothers are mere commoners. … I have never heard of any undertaking that endures without imitating antiquity."** The emperor, as usual, referred the matter to court discussion. **Li Si argued that times had changed, so why should the emperor imitate the Zhou? To stop bigots from using the authority of books to mislead the people, he proposed limiting the access of most books to official scholars.** The First Emperor ordered many books burned, except the copies at the imperial library. His purpose was mainly political, to protect the new institutions of centralized government and pacify conquered peoples. Spared were books on medicine, agriculture, and other practical topics.102 **The prime targets were histories of the former six states, followed by the *Odes* and *Documents*, the authority for the Zhou model. The books of "a hundred masters" suffered little damage.** Intellectual creativity continued. Many classical texts attributed to pre-imperial masters, including *The Mean*, were actually written during the Qin and early Han dynasties.103

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_183

> The emperor's chief counselor proposed the form of the decree. In his letter he wrote: "**At present, Your Majesty has performed great deeds whose glory will spread through ten thousand generations. This, of course, cannot be understood by foolish scholars. ... At present, when You the Emperor have united the country, separated black from white and established unity, they honor their science and associate with people who disapprove of laws and directives. When they learn of an edict they discuss it in accordance with their scholarly principles.** When they enter the palace they disapprove in their souls; when they come out again they engage in open discussion. ... And if this is not forbidden, then the condition of the ruler at the top will become worse, and at the bottom the parties will gain strength. It would be useful to forbid it." (81: pp. 150-152)

One year after the book burning came "the massacre of Confucians," although not all victims fit the name. Many literati made huge fortunes by pitching ideas of the supernatural to the First Emperor. Among them, Lu and Hou promised the elixir of immortality. Unable to deliver and fearing the law for fraud, the pair fled and denounced the emperor as a tyrant unworthy of it. The enraged emperor ordered an investigation. Literati incriminated each other. The emperor executed almost 500, ignoring Fusu's warning: "The world is newly pacified. The allegiance of distant peoples is not yet solidified. The literati all follow Confucian teachings. Your majesty punishes them according to the law. I fear it may cause instability."104 Fusu was prescient. Three years later, many Confucians, including a direct descendant of Confucius, hastened to join Chen Sheng's rebellion.105 **Contrary to the subsequent propaganda, the First Emperor did not intend to root out Confucians. The massacre was limited.** Erudites continued to attend court. One, Shusun Tong, a Confucian master with more than 100 students, misrepresented intelligence to ingratiate himself with the Second Emperor, then deserted, served one warlord after another, and finally landed a plush post by designing court rituals for the Han Dynasty.106

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n449/mode/2up?view=theater

> The great parties of the Gracchan age had long become retinues—Cæsarians and Pompeians—and finally there only remained on the one side the formless omnipotence, the plain brutal "fact," the Cæsar—**or whoever managed to get the Cæsar under his influence**—and on the other side the handful of narrow ideologues who concealed dissatisfaction under philosophy and thenceforward sought to advance their ideals by conspiracy. **What these Stoics were in Rome, the Confucians were in China**—and, seen thus, the episode of the "Burning of the Books," decreed by the Chinese Augustus in 212, begins to be intelligible through the reproach of immense vandalism that the minds of later literates fastened upon it. **But, after all, these Stoic enthusiasts for an ideal that had become impossible had killed Cæsar,**5 to the Divus-cult they opposed a Cato- and Brutus-cult, the philosophers in the Senate (which by then was only a noble club) never wearied of lamenting the downfall of "freedom" and fomenting conspiracies such as Piso's in 65. Had this been the state of things at Nero's death, it would have been Sulla over again; and that is why Nero put to death the Stoic Thrasea Pætus, why Vespasian executed Helvidius Priscus, and why copies of the history of Cremutius Cordus, which lauded Brutus as the last of the Romans, were collected and burnt in Rome. **These were acts of defensive State necessity *vis-à-vis* blind ideology—acts such as those we know of Cromwell and Robespierre—and it was in exactly the same position that the Chinese Cæsars found themselves *vis-à-vis* the school of Confucius, which had formerly worked out their ideal of a state-constitution and now had no notion of enduring the actuality. This great Burning of the Books was nothing but the destruction of one part of the politico-philosophical literature and the abolition of propaganda and secret organizations.**1 This defensive lasted in both Imperia for a century, and then

even reminiscences of party-political passions faded out and the two philosophies became the ruling world-outlook of the Imperial age in its maturity.2

2. **Tacitus, even, failed to understand.** He hated these first Cæsars, because they defended themselves by every imaginable means against a stealthy opposition—in *his own* circles—**an opposition that from Trajan's time no longer existed.**

Book burning responded to the subversive agitation to reinstate the feudalistic aristocracy. Swindling lit the fuse for the massacre. However, the two events are often rolled together as Qin's gravest crime. They exposed deep-rooted tensions. Most apparent was the struggle between the two parties of officers, as Lu and Hou reproached the emperor: **"He trusts only law officers and works closely with them. The seventy Erudites he only appoints but does not heed."**107 Underlying this power struggle was an ideological conflict of lasting impact. "The Faults of Qin," an essay by Jia Yi, was widely quoted and influential.108 **Its gist was summarized by a Confucian historian in late imperial China: "Qin enshrined the law, sidelined benevolence and righteousness, so that the rebellion of a few commoners led to a landslide in the world."**109
…

The love of relatives was the crux of the feudalistic power structure. Confucians, who advocated benevolent governments, added a moral halo that turned the love of relatives into the crux of benevolence and hence a universal political doctrine. Confucius regarded good government as an extension of filial piety and brotherliness. **To set an example, the sagacious ruler should "elevate his relatives to high positions, grant posh provisions, and share their desires."**110 Mengzi similarly preached, "The love of relatives is the substance of benevolence." As an exemplar, **he argued that the sage king Shun must have enfeoffed his wicked brother: "Being the son of heaven but allowing his brother to be a mere commoner, how can that be love?"**111 Chunyu Yue used almost identical words in attacking the Qin institution. The ruler's exemplary effect was paramount in Confucian rule by men. By making his relatives mere commoners, the First Emperor set a bad example that deserved denunciations of "malevolence" and "ingratitude," staples in anti-Qin propaganda.112

More ponderous than morality was the self-interest of political elites. For the ruler to split land and enfeoff lords was the hope of the ruling circle. Aristocratic titles were the common desire of rebels: many promptly declared themselves kings and lords.113 **Enmity to Qin's centralized government oozed from the words carved on a meteorite that fell ten years after unification: "The First Emperor dies and the land is parceled."**14 Learning the lesson, the Han Dynasty started by reinstituting feudatories.
…

A modern scholar summarizes the condition of Zhou as depicted in the classics: "awe of ruthless power is more evident than the virtue of leniency and generosity."120 **As far as the common people were concerned, the trope of benevolent Zhou and cruel Qin was a blatant double standard.**

It was another matter with the privileged elites. Sentimental talk of bloody punishment hid the elite's chief grievance, which was not penalties per se but the law that stipulated them: specifically, legal impartiality. Early Han historian Sima Tan expressed the elitist assessment: **"Legalists make no distinction between relatives and strangers, aristocrats and lowly people. They apply the law uniformly to all, ignoring the love of relatives and deference to high statuses. This can serve temporary expediency, but should not be adopted in the long term."**121 **Fairness and equality under the law were to the literati not virtues but necessary evils akin to war, perhaps useful in conquests, but to be discarded in peacetime in order to maintain harmony within the ruling circle. "Punishment does not reach up to ministers" was the Zhou tradition.** Against it Qin insisted, "Criminal penalties do not excuse high ministers."122 Jia Yi compared the two, praised Zhou's heartfelt indulgence for cementing the ruling circle, and blamed callous legal equality for Qin's quick demise. In Jia's view, privileges ensured the loyalty of ministers, and stability of rule depended on aligning with the powerful. By putting impartial law above elitist prerogative, Qin imperiled the ruler's vital asset, a friendly ruling class.123

Holding officers accountable for fair adjudication protected the common people. However, to sentence crooked officials to long-wall building was, Jia Yi's simile, **to try to stop a rat from stealing from a precious vessel by throwing a stone at it.** The stone endangered the vessel – that is, the throne.
…

Qin had ignored Mengzi's tenet: "Government is not difficult, do not antagonize the great houses." **"If the ruler regards ministers as dust and grass seed, then ministers regard the ruler as bandit and foe."**125

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism

The first to use the term *fa jia* was Sima Qian's father, Sima Tan □□□ (d. 110 BCE). In an essay on the "essence of the six schools of thought," **Sima Tan notices that *fa jia* are "strict and have little kindness," and "do not distinguish between kin and stranger, nor differentiate between noble and base: everything is determined by the standard (or law, *fa*)."** Sima Tan criticized the Legalists' approach as "a one-time policy that could not be constantly applied," but also hailed the *fa jia* for "honoring rulers and derogating subjects, and clearly distinguishing offices so that no one can overstep [his responsibilities]" (*Shiji* 130:3289-3291; for translations cf. Smith 2003: 141; Goldin 2011: 89).
…

The first and best-known argument in favor of dispensing with the past models is presented in the first chapter of the *Book of Lord Shang*. Shang Yang is cited saying: **"there is no single way to order the generation; to benefit the state, one need not imitate antiquity"** (*Shang jun shu* 1:4; *Book of Lord Shang 1.4*).
…

For instance, Shang Yang depicts social evolution from primeval promiscuous life to an incipient stratified society and then to a fully mature state with laws, regulations, officials, and the power of coercion (*Shang jun shu* 7:51-53; *Book of Lord Shang* 7.1). **At the earlier stages of human history, the people could be constrained by moral suasion; yet this was simply because that was the age of relative abundance: "Formerly… the people cut trees and slaughtered animals [for food]; the people were few, whereas trees and animals plenty. … Men plowed to obtain food, women wove to obtain clothing; [the ruler] used neither punishments nor regulations, but there was order"** (*Shang jun shu* 18:107; *Book of Lord Shang* 18.1). **Han Fei echoes Shang Yang: in the remote past "the people were few whereas goods were plenty; hence people did not compete"** (*Han Feizi* 49:443). Now, this age of primeval morality has gone forever. Both thinkers emphasize the devastating impact of demographic growth on human mores. **"Nowadays, five children are not considered too many, and each child also has five children; the grandfather is still alive, and he already has twenty-five grandchildren. Therefore, the people are plenty whereas commodities and goods are few; people work laboriously, but provisions are scanty; hence the people compete"** (*Han Feizi* 49:443). Under these new circumstances, moral norms are no longer relevant; contention is the rule, and it can be quelled only through coercion.

The evolutionary view of history and especially the emphasis that economic conditions can alter moral values, distinguish the Legalists critically from proponents of alternative models of state formation (Pines 2013a). The Legalists imply that everything is changeable: as socioeconomic conditions change, human behavior changes as well; and this in turn requires adaptation of political institutions. Shang Yang summarizes:

> **When the affairs of the world change, one should implement a different Way. … Therefore, it is said: "When the people are ignorant, one can become monarch through knowledge; when the generation is knowledgeable, one can become monarch through force"** (*Shang jun shu* 7:53; *Book of Lord Shang* 7.1-7.2).

The last phrase represents the rationale behind Shang Yang's model of state formation. If radical restructuring of society was legitimate in the past, so it is in the present. In the current situation, when the people are "knowledgeable," a powerful state, which is able to coerce its subjects, is the only viable solution. **The *Book of Lord Shang* (but not *Han Feizi*) allowed for the possibility that in the future the need for excessive reliance on coercion would end and a milder, morality-driven political structure would evolve,** but these utopian digressions are of minor importance in the text (Pines 2013a).
…

That "the people follow after benefit as water flows downward" (*Shang jun shu* 23:131; *Book of Lord Shang* 23.2) is a given: the task is to allow the people to satisfy their desire for glory and riches in a way that will accord with, rather than contradict, the state's needs. Shang Yang explains how to attain this:

> wherever the name (repute) and benefit meet, the people will go in this direction. … **Farming is what the people consider bitter; war is what the people consider dangerous. Yet they brave what they consider bitter and perform what they consider dangerous because of the calculation [of a name and benefit].** … When benefits come from land, the people exhaust their strength; when the name comes from war, the people are ready to die (*Shang jun shu* 6:45-46; *Book of Lord Shang* 6.4-6.5).

…

The Legalists' view of the people as covetous and selfish was not exceptional to this intellectual current: it was shared, among others, by as significant a Confucian thinker as Xunzi □□ (ca. 310-230 BCE) and is evident in many other texts (Sato 2013). **Yet in marked distinction from Xunzi and from other Confucian thinkers, the Legalists dismissed the possibility that the elite—rulers and ministers alike—would be able to overcome their selfishness.**
…

For thinkers from the entire spectrum of Confucian thought, it was axiomatic that the government should be staffed by morally upright "noble men" who would serve out of commitment to the ruler above and the people below. For the Legalists, it was equally axiomatic that this cannot be the case. Shen Dao explains:

> Among the people, everybody acts for himself. If you [try to] alter them and cause them to act for you, then there will be none whom you can attain and employ. … In circumstances where people are not able to act in their own interests, those above will not employ them. Employ the people for their own [interests], do not employ them for your sake: then there will be none whom you cannot make use of (*Shenzi,* 24-25; Harris 2016: 112).

Shen Dao dismisses the possibility that the ministers will be driven by moral commitment; on the contrary, such exceptional individuals should not be employed at all. This sentiment recurs in *Han Feizi*, a text that expresses with utmost clarity its belief that every member of the elite—like any member of society—pursues his own interests (cf. Goldin 2005: 58-65; 2013). **Morally upright officials do exist, but these are exceptional individuals: "one cannot find even a dozen upright and trustworthy men of service (*shi* □), while the officials within the boundaries are counted in hundreds. If one cannot employ but upright and trustworthy men of service, then there will be not enough people to fill in the offices"** (*Han Feizi* 49: 451).

…

Eventually, harsh punishments will eliminate the very need for punishments:

> To prevent wrongdoing and stop transgressions, nothing is better than making punishments heavy. When punishments are heavy and [criminals] are inevitably captured, then the people dare not try [to break the law]. Hence, there are no penalized people in the state. **When there are no penalized people in the state, it is said, then: "Clarifying punishments [means] no executions."** (*Shang jun shu* 17:101; *Shang jun shu* 17.3)

Due to above pronouncements, Shang Yang gained notoriety as an advocate of oppression; but actually his attitude toward the people is much more balanced than is often imagined. The *Book of Lord Shang* frequently speaks of "loving/caring for the people" (*ai min* □□) and "benefiting the people" (*li min* □□), echoing other contemporaneous texts which proclaimed the people's well-being as the ultimate goal of policy-making (Pines 2009: 201-203).
…

The system of 20 (initially fewer) "ranks of merit" introduced by Shang Yang was one of the most daring acts of social engineering in human history. This system became the cornerstone of social life in Qin. The lowest ranks were distributed for military achievements, particularly decapitating enemy soldiers, or could be purchased in exchange for extra grain yields; successful rank-holders could be incorporated into the military or civilian administration and thereafter be promoted up the social ladder. Each rank granted its holder economic, social, and legal privileges; and since the ranks were not fully inheritable, the system generated considerable social mobility (see details in Loewe 1960 and 2010; Pines et al. 2014: 24-26; Pines 2016b). The new system attempted to unify the social, economic, and political hierarchy under the government's control, which in turn required the elimination of alternative avenues of enhancing one's socioeconomic and political status. This latter concern is strongly pronounced throughout the *Book of Lord Shang*:

> The means whereby the sovereign encourages the people are offices and ranks; the means by which the state prospers are agriculture and warfare. **Today the people seek offices and ranks, yet they are attainable not through agriculture and warfare but through crafty words and empty ways: this is called to exhaust the people.** (*Shang jun shu* 3:20; *Book of Lord Shang* 3.1).

The text insists repeatedly that the only way to make agriculture and warfare attractive is to prevent any alternative route toward enrichment and empowerment. **It specifies that "those who do not work but eat, who do not fight but attain glory, who have no rank but are respected, who have no emolument but are rich, who have no office but lead—"these are called 'villains'"** (*Shang jun shu* 18:111; *Book of Lord Shang* 18.6). Any group which tries to bypass engagement in agriculture and warfare—be these merchants who amass riches without tilling or talkative intellectuals who seek promotion without contributing to the state economically or militarily—should be suppressed or at least squeezed out of profits.
…

Shen Dao further warns the ruler that if he decides on promotions and demotions on the basis of his personal impression, this will cause inflated expectations or excessive resentment among his servants:

> When the ruler abandons the standard (*fa* □) and relies on himself to govern, then punishments and rewards, recruitment and demotion all arise out of the ruler's heart. If this is the case, then even if rewards are appropriate, the expectations are insatiable; even if the punishments are appropriate, lenience is sought ceaselessly. **If the ruler abandons the standard and relies on his heart to decide upon the degree [of awards and punishments], <u>then identical merits will be rewarded differently, and identical crimes will be punished differently.</u> It is from this that resentment arises.** (*Shenzi*, 52; Harris 2016: 120)

…

Despite their pronounced belief in monarchic form of rule, **most thinkers of the Warring States period insisted that the monarch would never succeed without a worthy aide.** Their common desideratum was attaining harmonious relations between the ministers and the rulers; not coincidentally, the common simile of these relations was that of friends, i.e. of equals. Some thinkers were even more assertive in their interpretation of a worthy minister as the ruler's de facto superior, a teacher and not just a friend (Pines 2009: 163-172). **One of the most radical manifestations of this pro-ministerial mindset of the Warring States era was the idea of abdication, according to which a good ruler may consider yielding the throne to his meritorious aide** (Allan 2016; Pines 2005). **For Legalists, in contrast, this very idea proved that the pro-ministerial discourse of their rivals was usurpation in disguise.** Ministers should never be trusted: they are neither the ruler's friends, nor his teachers, but his bitter foes and plotters, who should be checked and controlled rather than cherished and empowered.
…

The very fact that **<u>the monarch—unlike his officials—owed his position to pedigree alone</u>** meant that this position would more often than not be occupied by a mediocrity. Multiple historical examples scattered throughout *Han Feizi*

unequivocally demonstrate how devastating the ruler's ineptitude could be (Graziani 2015). The intrinsic contradiction between an institutionally infallible and humanly erring sovereign is the major source of tension in the *Han Feizi* (Pines 2013b).

Thinkers of different ideological inclinations shared the sober realization that a sovereign may be a mediocrity; **yet for them this problem was easily resolvable. Insofar as the ruler would be prudent enough to entrust everyday affairs to a meritorious aide, he would be able to continue enjoying absolute prestige, while practical matters would be decided by worthy ministers** (see, e.g., *Xunzi* 11:223-224; Hutton 2014: 112-113). **For Han Fei, though, this solution is unacceptable. Time and again he warns the ruler that nobody can be trusted:** the ruler's wife, his beloved concubine, his eldest son and heir—all hope for his premature death because this may secure their position. Threats come also from the ruler's brothers and cousins, from uncles and bedfellows, from dwarfs and clowns who entertain him, from dancers in his court; and, of course from the talkative "men-of-service" (*shi*) who conspire with foreign powers to imperil his state. Every single person around the throne should be suspected; and minimal negligence can cost a ruler his life and his power. **And the most dangerous foes are precisely those whom other thinkers considered the ruler's friends and teachers, namely his closest aides, his ministers.** Han Fei compares them to hungry tigers ready to devour the sovereign whenever the opportunity arrives:

> The Yellow Emperor said: "A hundred battles a day are fought between the superior and his underlings." The underlings conceal their private [interests], trying to test their superior; the superior employs norms and measures to restrict the underlings. **Hence when norms and measures are established, they are the sovereign's treasure; when the cliques and cabals are formed, they are the minister's treasure. If the minister does not murder his ruler, it is because the cliques and cabals are not formed.** (*Han Feizi* 8:51)

This is an amazing saying: the minister is, by his nature, deceitful and murderous, and his failure to eliminate the sovereign is simply a sign of insufficient preparations, not of unwillingness to do so. The ministers' threat to the monarch is inherent in their position, and it can be defused only through proper implementation of methods and techniques of rule.

Han Fei's repeated anti-ministerial philippics perplex the reader. **It is somewhat ironic that a thinker who actively sought employment in the rulers' courts presented his own stratum as intrinsically malicious.** As many traditional and modern scholars noticed, Han Fei's personal tragedy—he was slandered at the court of Qin, imprisoned and reportedly forced to commit suicide before being able to present his views to the King of Qin—was a by-product of the very atmosphere of the ruler-minister mistrust that the thinker himself generated.
…

Han Fei leaves his rivals no illusions: intellectuals can pursue their ideas only insofar as they are part of the state-ordained system of power, otherwise their ideas will be "cut off." Elsewhere, he concludes:

> Accordingly, **in the country of an enlightened ruler there are no texts written in books and on bamboo strips, but the law is the teaching; there are no "speeches" of the former kings, but officials are the teachers; there is no private wielding of swords, but beheading [enemies] is valor.** (*Han Feizi* 49:452)

Han Fei's suggestion to eliminate "texts written in books and on bamboo strips" and to turn officials into teachers **was implemented by his fellow student and nemesis, Li Si, soon after the imperial unification of 221 BCE.** In 213 BCE, after heated court debates, Li Si launched a comprehensive assault on "private learning," which he identified as intellectually divisive and politically subversive. He then suggested eliminating copies of the canonical books of *Poems* and *Documents*, as well as *Speeches of the Hundred Schools* [of thought] from private collections, leaving copies only in the possession of the court erudites (*bo shi* □□). **Li Si concluded his proposal by echoing Han Fei's views: "And those who want to study laws and ordinances, let them take an official as a teacher!"** (*Shiji* 87:2546; Watson 1993: 185).

Li Si's assault on private learning is often misinterpreted as the victory of "Legalist" over "Confucian" ideology, but this is wrong. Confucianism as such was not targeted; actually, it prospered among the court erudites (Kern 2000: 188-191). What mattered to Li Si—as to Han Fei—was not doctrinal unity as such, but the imposition of the state control over intellectual life, as in all other spheres of social activity. **Intellectuals were not persecuted because of the content of their ideas; but they were required either to enter government service or to quit their pursuits.** Eventually, Li Si's biblioclasm backfired. It caused not only considerable resentment in the short term, but, more ominously, brought about immense dislike of Qin—and of Legalism—among the overwhelming majority of the imperial literati for millennia to come (Pines 2014a).
…

The Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE), which was designed to rule for "myriad generations" (*Shiji* 6:236), collapsed shortly after the founder's death, brought down by a popular rebellion of unprecedented scope and ferocity. This swift collapse—which took place just a few years after Li Si's infamous biblioclasm—shaped the image of Qin for millennia to come. The dynasty was no longer a success story, but rather that of miserable failure; and the ideas which guided its policymakers were discredited as well. **Already in the first generations after the Qin, consensus was reached: its collapse was due to excessive activism, abnormal assertiveness of**

its administrative apparatus, over-reliance on penalties, senseless expansionism, and debilitating mistrust between the emperors and their entourage (Jia Yi □□ [200-168 BCE] as cited in *Shiji* 6:276-284; *Xin yu* 4: 62). All these policies could be meaningfully attributed to the Legalists, whose intellectual legacy was as a result discredited. **At best it was reduced to Sima Tan's assessment: "a one-time policy that could not be constantly applied."**

The diminishing appeal of Legalism became fully visible under the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han (r. 141-87 BCE). Although the Emperor himself adopted assertive domestic and foreign policies largely patterned after the Qin dynasty, he considered it prudent to distance himself from the Qin and Legalism, and to endorse—however superficially—Confucianism. It was during his reign that first proposals were made to ban the followers of Shang Yang, Shen Buhai, and Han Fei from holding office. Although in the short term these proposals had limited consequences (Shang Yang's legacy was still openly defended by the government representative during the court debates in 81 BCE), **in the long term the attitude toward Legalists changed. Few scholars studied their writings; even fewer were courageous enough to endorse their legacy openly.** Much like Qin itself (for which see Pines 2014a), Legalism henceforth became a negative label, associated with the policies immensely opposed by the majority of imperial literati: excessive harshness, oppression, terror at court, imperial hubris, and the like. Self-identification as a follower of Shang Yang or Han Fei became a rarity, if not an impossibility.

In imperial times, the position of Legalism was somewhat paradoxical. **On the one hand, its ideas remained highly influential, especially in the realm of administrative practice, but also with regard to the policies of the enrichment and empowerment of the state, as well as in some legal practices.** On certain occasions, some of the leading imperial reformers—from Zhuge Liang □□□ (181-234) to Su Chuo □□ (498-546), from Wang Anshi □□□ (1021-1086) to Zhang Juzheng □□□ (1525-1582)—could openly acknowledge their indebtedness to the Legalist ways of reinvigorating the government apparatus and restoring the state's economic and military prowess. **On the other hand, most political reformers and activists remained closet Legalists at best.** For the vast majority of the literati, Shang Yang, Han Fei, and their like were negative examples; hence, most of the texts associated with the Legalist school ceased circulating, and only a very few merited commentaries.
…

The endorsement of Legalism peaked under Mao Zedong □□□ (1893-1976). **Mao's intellectual activism started, incidentally, with a high-school essay written in praise of Shang Yang** (Schram 1992-2004, Vol. 1: 5-6), **and his positive view of Shang Yang and of the Qin dynasty strengthened as time passed.** In the last years of Mao's life, under the infamous "anti-Confucian" campaign, Legalism was openly endorsed and hailed as "progressive" intellectual current both in its outlook and its historical role (Li Yu-ning 1977); attempts were even made to position it as a direct predecessor of Mao Zedong's Thought (see, e.g., Liu Zehua 2012).

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_184

And back in 1958, at the second plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Eighth Congress), Mao Tse-tung said of Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang:

> He issued an order that read: **"The kin of him who for the sake of antiquity rejects the present will be eradicated to the third generation."** If you adhere to antiquity and do not recognize the new, all your family will be slaughtered. Ch'in Shih Huang buried only 460 Confucians alive. However, he has a long way to go to catch up with us. During the purge, we did away with several tens of thousands of people. We acted like ten Ch'in Shih Huangs. I assert that we are better than Ch'in Shih Huang. He buried alive 460 people, and we, 46,000--one hundred times more. Indeed, to kill, then to dig a grave and bury someone--this also means to bury alive. We are abused and called Ch'in Shih Huangs and usurpers. **We accept this and consider that we have still done little in this respect--much more can be done.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=XUk4DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT145#v=onepage&q&f=false

Chairman Mao has pointed out: "In past history, **before they won state power and for some time afterward, the slave-owning class, the feudal landlord class, and the bourgeoisie were vigorous, revolutionary and progressive; they were real tigers.** But with the lapse of time, because their opposites – the slave class, the peasant class and the proletariat – grew in strength step by step, struggled against them, and became more and more formidable, these ruling classes changed step by step into the reverse, changed into reactionaries, changed into backward people, changed into paper tigers. And eventually they were overthrown, or will be overthrown, by the people." **The fact that the landlord-class rulers changed from revering the Legalist school and opposing the Confucian school to revering the Confucian school and opposing the Legalist school corresponded to the course of historical transformation in which landlord class, as Chairman Mao has pointed out, changed from revolutionary to reactionary and from advanced to backward.**

The Ch'in dynasty was the first dynasty founded by the landlord class in Chinese history. **Soon after this exploiting class seized political power, its class contradictions with the peasants sharpened.**

Led by Ch'en Sheng and Wu Kuang, the first great peasant uprising in China's history finally broke out and overthrew the rule of the Ch'in dynasty, promoted the progress of history and demonstrated the tremendous strength of the oppressed and the exploited in creating history. Precisely as Liu Tsung-yüan (8) pointed out in "Essay on Feudalism": **Ch'in's fall "should be attributed to people's hatred and not to the system of commanderies and prefectures."**

In the course of the founding of the Han dynasty there were also debates between those who upheld feudalism, which was progressive at the time, and those who preached going back to slavery. A Confucian scholar advised Liu Pang to adopt the system of installing hereditary nobles to rule their domains and even made ready the seals for the noble ranks. But under the persuasion of his counselor Chang Liang, Liu Pang finally came round to realizing that retrogression was a dead end. **He cursed this Confucian scholar in anger, saying: "You childish Confucianist! You almost spoiled my endeavors!"**

The Ch'in dynasty's system was followed by the Han dynasty. By the time of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, the rebellion of Wu, Ch'u and five other states (9) had been crushed, **and the crucial moment of a restoration of the slave system had passed.**

> 9) Having founded the Han dynasty, **Liu Pang abolished all the princes of other families while successively conferring the title of king on the sons of his own family.** These semi-independent kingdoms later became increasingly powerful. The most powerful seven states, including Wu and Ch'u, joined forces to stage a rebellion in 154 B.C. These states were abolished after the rebellion was put down.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA139#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Qin lets slip its deer, and the world joins in a hunt" has become a Chinese adage for grand-scale political opportunism and the consequent chaotic carnage, the recurrence of which we will see at least twice in this book. The hunters had heterogeneous social backgrounds. Chen Sheng, once a hired farm hand, was the humblest, but he was literate and politically informed. **Liu Bang, village sheriff turned brigand chief, was a step up the social ladder.** Closer to the upper end of the spectrum, the Xiang family had produced generations of top Chu generals. Such pre-imperial elites constituted the bulk of warlords after Chen's uprising. **Descendants of the six former royal houses all reclaimed kingship.**127

Xiang Yu was the strongest of warlords after Qin's demise. **Reverting to the Zhou model, he divided the country into nineteen autonomous kingdoms that formed a confederation under himself as hegemonic king of Chu.** Liu Bang was accorded the kingship of Han, but quickly subdued other kings to take over Qin's old home. Thus he secured a superior economic base for the five-year struggle between Chu and Han.

The struggle between Xiang and Liu somehow resembled that between Antony and Octavian. Like Antony, Xiang was a better general and more steeped in the aristocratic tradition. Like Antony, he was initially stronger, dominated the wealthier eastern region, had opportunities to eliminate his archrival but could not bring himself to it.128 Liu was a "rogue" fond of snatching caps from literati and pissing into them; Octavian "a young thug who was reputedly capable of tearing out a man's eyes with his bare hands."129 These upstarts were more comfortable in tapping the rigorous energy and fresh thinking of lower classes. As Octavian gained advantages by controlling Italy, Liu established himself in the former Qin state.
…

A historian of Rome remarks, **"In the Revolution the power of the old governing class was broken, its composition transformed. Italy and the non-political orders in society triumphed over Rome and the Roman aristocracy.**"141 A similar transformation occurred around the time of Qin and early Han. **Chinese historians are struck by the millennium-old regime of hereditary ministers yielding to "a regime of homespun-clothed generals and premiers at the beginning of Han."**142 *Buyi*, denoting homespun cloth devoid of silk or embroidery, is the term for commoners in classical Chinese. It had intellectual as well as social significance at the dawn of imperial China, when the stair of advancement was accessible to people with diverse learning and abilities, unlike in later times when it was limited to Confucians narrowly versed in embroidered literature.143
…

While a village sheriff, Liu Bang married Lü from a local family. Liu later had more wives, but none could replace Lü, who participated in decision making and became effective ruler after Gaodì's death.144 While a triumvir juggling for power, **Octavian divorced the wife who bore him his only offspring to marry Livia,** who by birth and first marriage belonged to the Livii and Claudii, two of the most venerable Roman families. The marriage won him much aristocratic support, and Livia was increasingly involved in imperial politics.145 Lü and Livia were among the most powerful imperial women.
…

Learning the lessons of their predecessors, Augustus and Gaodì were more willing to bargain with the old establishments. Augustus paid lip service to republican institutions and Gaodì enfeoffed feudalistic kings.
…

Gross dissimulations eased the transitions to imperial peace. Augustus ostensibly preserved the form of a republic but radically subverted its function in his absolute monarchy. **The Han Dynasty loudly condemned Qin but quietly adopted most of its centralist institutions.** Did false consciousness come with a price?
…

Vespasian dated his reign from the time of his acclamation by the troops, six months before the enactment of a law that legitimized the emperor's absolute power. **The backdating of the law to accommodate the fact effectively annulled even the formal need for senatorial consultation.**39
…

However, **modern historians uncovered remarkable continuity in power and policy from Domitian to Trajan, akin to that from the Qin to the Han Dynasties:** "Trajan's rule was no less and perhaps more autocratic than that espoused by the detested Domitian, and some of the procedures and programmes Trajan assiduously pursued, and brought to fruition, were not noticeably different from those initiated by his predecessors."47 **Trajan benefited from the dirty work of Domitian, who decimated recalcitrant opponents.** Leniency toward corruption and tact in dealing with senators also helped.
…

Ten months before he defeated Xiang Yu in the battle of Gaixia in 202 BCE, Liu Bang received a letter from Hann Xin, who reported victory over the king of Qi and requested the title of effective king for himself to administer the acquired territory. **Liu was about to let loose a tirade but changed his words upon a little kick from his counselor.** Hann got the title of real king and ample incentives to fight against Xiang. He also got a surprise immediately after the victory. Liu barged into his camp and relieved him of military command.67

Hann was one of seven kings who urged the title of emperor on Liu Bang. Unlike him, the other kings had independent power bases and could have sided with Xiang. **Liu secured their alliance by the promise of sharing sovereignty in the feudalistic way. None expected all seven to be executed or exiled for treason during Gaodì's seven-year reign.** Hann, whose generalship had been indispensable to Liu's success, was the first but not the last to be falsely accused. **His remark has become a Chinese idiom: "When the hare is dead, the hound is boiled. When the birds are eliminated, good bows are buried."**68

Gaodì was spared the blame of malevolent ingratitude that rained on the First Emperor who did not slaughter supporters after success. The Han emperor reverted to the Way of ancient kings. Instead of allowing his sons and brother to remain mere commoners, he enfeoffed them to replace the slain meritorious kings. **Ten kingdoms, each with significant fiscal, personnel, and military autonomy, ruled over about two-thirds of the country in the populous east, where the six former warring states had been located.** The kingdoms were subordinate to the imperial government, which ruled the territory of the old Qin state directly through provinces. The arrangement consolidated the dynasty of the Liu family.69

The vassal kings maximized native advantages and revived regional economies. Some helped to suppress a coup in the imperial center. **These early achievements proved not the superiority of the feudalistic way, however, but only the wisdom of shedding an invidious habit gradually to avoid painful withdrawal symptoms. As society recovered from the devastations of civil war, the increasingly restive kings became destabilizing.** Ominous signs presaged a rerun of warring states, as the First Emperor and Li Si had warned. It did not happen. Qin bequeathed political insight and a precedent. Early Han officers of diverse learning and real-life experience were pragmatic and open-minded. **The Legalist Chao Cuo urged reducing the feudatories while the central government still held the edge. Jingdì, the fifth emperor, listened. Seven powerful kings rebelled at the edict of 154 BCE. They were quashed within three months, although not before Chao Cuo was executed for vitiating the love among imperial relatives.**70 **The central government, having grown in confidence and administrative capacity, directly controlled ever-expanding territories.** Feudalistic aristocrats resisted, but their last great conspiracy in 122 BCE failed to get off the ground. A century after the first unification under Qin in 221 BCE, provinces directly under a centralized bureaucratic government again covered almost the whole realm.71

Tending to the craving for calm in a society traumatized by civil war, **the first five reigns of the Han Dynasty adopted *wuwei* or a hands-off stance, a mixture of Daoist and Legalist ideas asserting that the people would be happy and well behaved if the ruler sets simple and strict regulations; then live and let live.** Excavated documents of the Qin and early Han Dynasties confirm the traditional view that Xiao He, the first Han premier, adopted most of Qin's legal codes. **His successor Cao Can embraced the Daoist stance of refraining from active involvement.** A folk song expressed contemporary appraisal: "Xiao He made laws as plain as a straight line. Cao Can followed and adhered without deviation. Rules pure and tranquil united the people in peace."72

> https://www.johnderbyshire.com/Reviews/Religion/daodejing.html
>
> "Weakening the People," for example, sounds dreadful to modern man—to "we, the people"—but is a fair extension of the meaning of *rou*, one of the key terms in *Tao Tê Ching*, which can mean "meek," "gentle" or "restrained" as well as "weak**." It is as if, starting from the proposition that "the meek shall inherit the earth," one were to argue that a state under a strong central leader, whose people were kept meek and submissive, could conquer a mighty empire.** Which, in fact, is what the *Book of Lord Shang* does argue, and what in fact happened!
> …
>
> In opposition to Confucius's yearning for traditional hierarchies and to the more meritocratic schemes of post-Confucian thinkers like Mo Tzŭ, **Han Fei Tzŭ proposed a state organized around a system of laws so all-embracing and correct that it required no elites at all to administer, nor even a very active monarch—*wu-wei* enthroned; or, to recast it in terms of a somewhat later thinker, the state withered away.**

…

Wudì acceded in 140 BCE at age fifteen and ruled until 87 BCE. **Were he a Western emperor, he would be called "the Great," but the Chinese were ambivalent about his accomplishments.** His offensive against the nomadic Xiongnu led to imperial expansion beyond the Pamir and diplomacy as far as Parthia. **To find quality officers, he regularized channels of recruitment to give the small men all across the country a standardized route to advancement.** Attracted to aristocratic culture and the aura of sage-kings, he made Confucianism the state ideology.
…

Confucians enjoyed prestige and patronage in the feudatories. **However, except as masters of ceremony, they held few offices in the early Han government toiling to get concrete socioeconomic results.** As the ruling circle became increasingly comfortable and complacent, the masters of aristocratic culture climbed up the political ladder, first by "adorning laws and policies with literature and the Canons," then by advocating the restoration of ancient ways. They flattered the emperor by images of the sage king and bombarded rival ideas with moral rhetoric. **Daoism was dismissed as fit only for servants.** Legalists were condemned for poisoning the world's morality and posing the gravest danger to stability.80 Urged by Dong Zhongshu and other Confucians, Wudì closed the government recruitment channel to scholars of other persuasions and established an imperial academy devoted exclusively to the Confucian Canons. Wudì's "dismissal of the hundred schools and enshrinement of Confucianism" has been hailed as his most benevolent achievement by some, deplored alongside the First Emperor's book burning by others.81 **Anyway, it is his most influential legacy. It ended the age of intellectual vitality and inaugurated Confucian literati-officials as the imperial ruling elite.**

Confucians triumphed over Legalists, but not completely. **The centralized and bureaucratized institutions that Legalists designed had passed the trial by fire to become the lasting architecture of imperial China.**
…

Those abiding by Confucius's teaching that "the superior man is no instrument" employed pragmatic subordinates to get things done. The rational and utilitarian thinking of Legalists was forced underground but not extinguished.83 Denounced in Confucian moralizations through millennia, it received little credit from traditional interpretations.84 Many modern historians have another view. Penetrating rhetoric and analyzing effective policies, many find Legalist substance beneath Confucian varnish: **"Such economic policies, for example, as the 'ever-normal granary,' various government monopolies of salt, iron, and other products, all probably owe as much or more to Legalism than they do to early Confucianism. Recent study shows that the same way even be true of what has traditionally been thought to be peculiar Confucian institution: the civil service examination system used in imperial times to recruit government personnel on the basis of intellect rather than birth.**"85 Perhaps the imperial civil service examination is a miniature reflection of the government: **The open, fair and meritocratic recruitment process is Legalist: its exclusive examination content that limits "merit" to mastery of the Four Books and Five Canons, Confucian.**

The ascent of Confucians was neither quick nor easy. Early Han officers were capable and farsighted. Wendì preferred Legalist ideas **and deemed sophisticated rituals irrelevant to government.** Jindì did not appoint Confucians.86 The achievements of their reigns, reputed to be among the best in Chinese history, disprove the Confucian pretention that canonical learning is necessary for moderation, low taxation, and good governance. Wudì himself was renowned for employing all kinds of talent, which he needed for solving pressing problems.87 Despite the preferential treatment, the bookish literati had a difficult time elbowing out officers with practical acumen, administrative experience, and moral rectitude in actions. Xuandì insisted on balancing Legalist and Confucian ideas. **Only in the reign of his heir Yuandì did Confucians succeed in dominating the bureaucracy.**
…

"Competing for profit with the people," the opening salvo on current policies from the literati at the conference, was a standard accusatory slogan of Han Confucians.94 It sounded righteous, but only in its vagueness. One of its victims would be the policy of the ever-normal granary, designed to smooth grain price fluctuation, a major cause of economic insecurity for the masses. The policy called for the government to buy grain at above market prices during bumper crops, store it in local granaries, and sell it at below market prices during poor harvests, thus helping both farmers and consumers. **The ever-normal granary proved a great success and would flourish in later dynasties, but it lasted only eleven years in the Han under Xuandì. Moralists ignored its social benefits and convinced Yuandì that the policy was unrighteous because the government thereby competed for profit with the people.**95 The people whose profit they protected were grain speculators and big landlords capable of stocking grain. The common folks whose distress in famines they portrayed in tearful words, their action hurt.
…

The imagined perfect world of antiquity is the major premise of literati idealism. Instead of respecting history, however, it reveals dogmatic disrespect for historical facts. The most reliable textual sources on the ancient history of China, the *Odes* and *Documents*, depict an ancient world with much oppression and cruelty.99 **When critics refer to a bloody war account of the Zhou's conquest, Mengzi says it must be false, because the Zhou king, being benevolent and thus invincible, must have won without resistance. "To believe wholly in the *Documents* is worse than to have no *Documents*."**100 Exegetes who tear the sentence out of context and rave at its "critical thinking" confuse two traits.
…

As crown prince, Yuandì deemed the impartial regulations harsh and proposed employing Confucians instead. Xuandì rebuked him: **"The Han statecraft should be a blend of the kingly way and the hegemonic way, how can it rely purely on virtue and imitation of the Zhou?"**106

Yuandì discarded the hegemonic way and relied purely on virtue. **From his reign onward, almost all Han premiers were Confucians, and high offices became uncomfortable to anyone lacking literary refinement. The ruling elite of imperial China finally came of age.** Like the ruling class of many other regimes, literati-officials derived wealth, polished leisure, and social prestige from their hold on government privileges. Literati clans formed marriage alliances and increased their socioeconomic power. To this was added the moral authority of an exclusive ideology.

Elevating Confucius to a "king without crown," literati-officials constituted the core of a status group, which some modern scholars call the cultural or ideological aristocracy of imperial China.107
…

Frequent infighting among literati-officials caused irresolution even in matters of their core competence and concern. Take, for example, the rituals for imperial ancestral temples, which employed some 12,000 musicians and masters of ceremony, four times as many guards, and countless laborers to tend sacrificial animals. Successive factions in power all implemented their own ideal. Changes back and forth caused enormous waste.108 The gain in ideal and rhetoric failed to compensate for the loss in competence and substance. **Ban Gu lamented, "Xuandì's achievements were ruined."** Yuandì agreed with contemporary critics: "most officials are not up to their jobs."198 His reign marked the beginning of the Han's long decline.110

Concentration of land and economic inequality intensified. The poor in desperation sold themselves or their children. **The swelling ranks of slaves aroused much concern, although their proportion in the population was minuscule compared to that in Roman Italy.** Yuandì's loving indulgence of relatives and high officials encouraged abuses, made worse by his ineffective successors. **In four reigns that lasted from 48 BCE to 5 CE, controlling power resided with affine families, which were related to the imperial house by marriage.** Perhaps this was a logical conclusion of politics dominated by family ethics. Even if the love of relatives excluded in-laws, filial piety sanctified the authority of the empress dowager. Logic is of little concern in the exegetical mindset, however. Literati-officials blamed affine families and saw the mandate of heaven shifting. **Calls went up for emperors to emulate the ancient sage kings Yao and Shun, who practiced *chanrang*, abdication in favor of someone worthy.** Many supported the eminent litterateur Wang Mang.111

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Mang#Regency_and_building_of_a_personality_cult

Wang Mang, having thus consolidated his power, began to further build up his personality cult, encouraging others to submit false prophecies in which he was mentioned as the second coming of Ji Dan, the Duke of Zhou and the regent for King Cheng of Zhou, or other great mythical personalities. **He also began a regime of modifying the governmental structure to recall the governments of the Zhou Dynasty and the even more ancient Shang Dynasty.**
…

In 1 CE, **after bribing the distant Yueshang tribes (probably in modern southern Vietnam) to submit offerings of an**
albino pheasant (considered a rare sign of divine favour), Wang Mang was successful in having his followers persuade Grand Empress Dowager Wang to create him the Duke of Anhan (□□□). **This was despite the Han nobility system not including dukes and no duke had ever been created in Han history up to that point.** This action gave Wang Mang a title parallel to that of the Duke of Zhou.
…

To further bolster his claims, Wang also created a false genealogy, declaring himself a descendant of the Yellow Emperor, a legendary emperor revered in Chinese culture.[9]
…

So he decided to finally seize the throne and start a new dynasty. In the winter of 8 CE, after receiving a false prophecy written by a criminal named Ai Zhang (□□) which pretended to be a divine decree from Emperor Gaozu (Liu Bang) stating that the throne should be given to Wang, and that Grand Empress Dowager Wang should follow this divine will, Wang issued a decree accepting the position of emperor, establishing the Xin dynasty.

https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1131&context=chinabeatarchive

Ban Gu tells us that in 4 CE, almost half a million people—in an empire with 60 million far flung and mostly illiterate people—petitioned the throne to grant him high honors, which he refused.

Wang Mang took the throne in very troubled times, marked particularly by the increasing concentration of land-ownership, and an increase in the number of landless people who were enslaved. Seeking solutions, **he was inspired by what were called the Old Texts—writings in an ancient script that had been found about 150 years before, during renovations at Confucius's ancestral home. If genuine—as Wang Mang believed them to be—these texts were significantly older than the other Confucian classics; among other things, they described the institutions of an era of perfect government under the ancient Duke of Zhou, Confucius' hero. Taking those institutions as a goal to strive towards (while acknowledging that perfect recovery was unlikely), Wang Mang tried to "reinstate" a system where public land would be distributed to families in equal and inalienable squares; he also banned slavery (except for people condemned to be slaves of the state as a punishment for crimes).**
…

Meanwhile, lest the land and slavery measures make him seem a committed "progressive"—in fact, the twentieth century scholar and diplomat Hu Shi (1891-1962) called him China's "first socialist"—**he also made a large number of government offices that had previously been appointed by merit**

hereditary, because he believed that that, too, conformed to the early Zhou golden age described in the Old Texts.
…

As if all this wasn't enough, Wang Mang had the bad luck to preside over atrocious weather, including punishing droughts in some places (including the capital area) and massive rains that led to huge breaks in the Yellow River dikes. It seems, in fact, that this is what undid him—peasant rebellions broke out in precisely the places that flood refugees had moved to en masse.
…

His biography in the canonical *History of the Han Dynasty* treats him as a boundlessly ambitious master villain—it acknowledges that he was popular for quite some time, but attributes this entirely to patronage he dispensed, and to virtuous gestures that were completely hypocritical. This remained the majority view throughout the imperial period. On the other hand, Hu Shi was not alone, though he was unusually fulsome—in seeing him as a visionary reformer who failed only because he was far ahead of this time, and one of the greatest statesmen in Chinese history. (And this is not a case of a modern radical looking for a forebear to praise—Hu Shi himself was firmly convinced that twentieth century China needed gradual, not radical, change, and threw in his lot, despite a number of qualms, with the Nationalists against the Communists.)

But what none of these commentators called him is what recent Western historians have insisted on calling him: a committed Confucian. For centuries it has been his departures from traditional policies—whether damned as cynical and dangerous or praised as humane and innovative—that have been salient. **By contrast recent scholarship, both pro and con, emphasizes how he justified almost everything he did in terms of classical texts, insisted on trying to return to the world that those texts described, and made far fewer compromises with the institutions that had evolved since Confucius' time than the rest of his contemporaries.** (Despite Wang Mang's fall, the Old Texts he championed became canonical thereafter, and remained central parts of Chinese intellectual life—if not literal blueprints for policy-making, until Qing scholars proved that they were hundreds of years newer than they claimed to be. By persuading generations of scholars that they had greater access to the classical age than they could otherwise have claimed, this shift had an enormous influence—but one I wouldn't dare try to specify.)

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/history/69695-china-s-influence-on-the-european-age-of-enlightenment?p=1679114#post1679114

Perhaps the thing which was of most important historical note was that he introduced the world's first fiat money (currency whose only value lies in that the government decreed it to be of value). Many of these plans were never successfully put in place. **Without mass communication, there was no way that peasants knew that land had been re-distributed to them by the emperor. The aristocrats were the in-between point between the emperor and the peasantry,** and they were not at all happy with Wang Mang's reforms, because land was the primary validator of their power. His idea of fiat money was premature, as there was no system of credit money to begin with, and merchants refused to use his currency.

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/emperor-wang-mang-chinas-first-socialist-2402977/?no-ist=

October 7, 23 A.D. The imperial Chinese army, 420,000 strong, has been utterly defeated. Nine "Tiger Generals," sent to lead a corps of 10,000 elite soldiers, have been swept aside as rebel forces close in. The last available troops—convicts released from the local jails—have fled. Three days ago, rebels breached the defenses of China's great capital, Chang'an; now, after some bloody fighting, they are scaling the walls of the emperor's private compound.

Deep within his Endless Palace, Emperor Wang Mang waits for death. **For 20 years, ever since he first contemplated the overthrow of the dissolute remnants of the the Han Dynasty, the usurper Wang had driven himself to keep to an inhuman schedule, working through the night and sleeping at his desk as he labored to transform China.** When the rebellion against him gained strength, however, Wang appeared to give up. He retreated to his palace and summoned magicians with whom he passed his time testing spells; he began to assign strange, mystical titles to his army commanders: "The Colonel Holding a Great Axe to Chop Down Withered Wood" was one.

Such excesses seemed out of character for Wang, a Confucian scholar and renowned ascetic. The numismatist Rob Tye, who has made a study of the emperor's reign, believes that he succumbed to despair. **"Frankly, my own assessment is that he was high on drugs for most of the period," Tye writes.** "Knowing all was lost, he chose to escape reality, seeking a few last weeks of pleasure."
…

Wang Mang may be the most controversial of China's hundred or more emperors. Born into one of his country's oldest noble families in about 45 B.C., he was celebrated first as a scholar, then as an

ascetic and finally as regent for a succession of young and short-lived emperors. Finally, in 9 A.D., with the death (many believe the murder) of the last of these infant rulers, Wang seized the throne for himself.
…

The 14 years of Wang Mang's reign can be divided into two parts: eight years of dramatic reform followed by six of escalating rebellion. The first period witnessed attempts to overhaul the entire system of imperial government, though whether the emperor intended to return China to the days of the semi-legendary Zhou Dynasty, which had ruled China before the Han, or introduce radical new policies of his own, remains hotly disputed. The second period witnessed the upheaval known as the Red Eyebrow Rebellion (an attempt by desperate and essentially conservative peasants to reverse some of Wang's riskier reforms), the resurgence of the Han **and the deaths of an estimated 25 million people—perhaps half the total Chinese population at that time.**
…

More recently, however, Wang Mang has undergone a startling reappraisal. **This process can be dated to 1928 and the publication of a study by Hu Shih, a renowned scholar who was then the Chinese ambassador to the United States.** In Hu's view, it was the Han Dynasty that most richly deserved condemnation, for having produced "a long line of degenerate scions." Wang Mang, on the other hand, lived simply, thought deeply and was "the first man to win the empire without an armed revolution." **Moreover, Wang then nationalized his empire's land, distributed it equally to his subjects, cut land taxes from 50 percent to 10, and was, all in all, "frankly communistic"—a remark Hu intended as a compliment.**
…

It is said he invented an early form of social security payments, collecting taxes from the wealthy to make loans to the traditionally uncreditworthy poor. **He certainly introduced the "six controls"—government monopolies on key products such as iron and salt that Hu Shih saw as a form of "state socialism"—and was responsible for a policy known as the Five Equalizations, an elaborate attempt to damp down fluctuations in prices. Even Wang's harshest modern critics agree that his ban on the sale of cultivated land was an attempt to save desperate farmers from the temptation to sell up during times of famine; instead, his state provided disaster relief. Later the emperor imposed a ruinous tax upon slave owners. It is equally possible to interpret this tax as either an attempt to make slaveholding impossible or as a naked grab for money.**
…

Wang Mang's land reforms, meanwhile, appear even more consciously revolutionary. **"The strong," Wang wrote, "possess lands by the thousands of *mu*, while the weak have nowhere to place a needle."** His solution was to nationalize all land, confiscating the estates of all those who possessed more than 100 acres, and to distribute it to those who actually farmed it. Under this, the so-called *ching* system, each family received about five acres and paid the state tax in the form of 10 percent of all the food they grew.
…

Moreover, few of the emperor's most apparently socialist policies remained in force in the face of widespread protest and rebellion. **"In the abolition of slavery and the restriction of land holdings," Dubs writes, "Wang Mang undoubtedly hit upon a measure that would have benefited society, but these reforms were rescinded within two years."**

For Dubs, the usurper's policies have mundane origins. None, he argues, was truly revolutionary, or even original to Wang. **Even the celebrated land reforms were the product of a Confucian tradition, "said to have been universal in Zhou times"—and were little more than "the dream of idealistic scholars," since the five-acre parcels handed out to peasant families were too small to make practical farms.** (According to the contemporary imperial historian Ban Gu, 10 or 15 acres was the minimum needed to support a family.)

Others argue that the emperor really did have radical ideas. Tye joins Hu Shih in preferring this interpretation, commenting on the "astonishing breadth" of Wang Mang's program, from "a national bank offering fair rates of interest to all" and a merit-based pay structure for bureaucrats to "strikingly pragmatic" taxes—**among them what amounted to the world's first income tax. For Tye, the monetary expert, Wang's fiscal reforms were intended to impoverish wealthy nobles and merchants, who were the only people in the empire to possess substantial quantities of gold.** His bronze coins, in this interpretation, released the less-privileged (who owed money) from the curse of debt, while having practically no effect on a peasantry who lived by barter.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the kaleidoscopic struggle of affine families, the Wang family, anchored on Yuandì's empress and long-lived widow, held its own. **Becoming regent in 1 BCE, Wang Mang built a granary in the capital for the poor and expanded the imperial academy to more than 10,000 students. His popularity was greatest among the literati, whose ideals he exemplified, but not confined to them; 487,572 persons around the country petitioned to honor him in 5 CE.** Four years later, Wang Mang ascended to the throne as the first and last emperor of the Xin Dynasty. **His rise and fall marked the climax of Han Confucian idealism and exposed its vacuity.**112

Rebellions from the Liu house were suppressed easily. Almost all officials accepted the new dynasty, as did most literati clans. **The mandate of heaven had shifted – until Wang Mang tried to justify the change by enacting many benevolent policies.** The sale of slaves was prohibited. An edict excoriated magnates for land encroachment, capped land possession, and ordered families that exceeded the cap to distribute the surplus to poor relatives and neighbors in the manner of well-fields.113

The literati got what they ardently advocated, but discovered a consequence that would have been obvious had they paid attention to reality. The first Han literati premiers had bought or encroached on large tracts of land.114 In their wake, literati clans amassed wealth, bought slaves, infiltrated the upper echelon of society, and grew into powerful local magnates. They themselves were a significant part of the social problem. Their self-interest would be hurt by Wang's implementation of their ideal policy.115 **A true moral choice confronted them.**

Their reaction was unambiguous. Literati turned warlords, setting a precedent for history. Extensive research on historical sources reveals that those who took up arms against Wang Mang were mainly literati clans and powerful families. **Significantly, before the implementation of Wang's policies on land distribution and slave-sale prohibition, these clans mostly supported him.** After the implementation, literati clans and powerful families everywhere rose in armed rebellions. Why? After digging into the evolution of literati clans, the researcher answers, **"Although Wang Mang courted literati-officials, he also cracked down on moguls who abused the small people. This conflicted with the interests of the majority of the powerful literati clans."**116

Talk of interests was beneath political intellectuals, who deftly changed their righteous rhetoric. Instead of denouncing inequality, they condemned usurpation. **Under the virtue of fealty, the mandate of heaven snapped back to the Han. Abdication as an alternative to hereditary power was discredited forever. Historians discern a great change in Chinese political culture that occurred between the two Han Dynasties. In the Former Han, most debates on government attended to social problems and criticized social policies. Such critique died out in the Latter Han. Henceforth gross economic inequality and the magnates' oppression of the poor became accepted norms.**117

Wang pushed a spate of reforms to revive the Way of ancient kings. They collapsed. Heaven itself frowned. The Yellow River broke its bank and, in 11 CE, made one of its nine great course changes that earned it the epiphet of "China's sorrow." Government relief efforts were woefully inadequate. Hungry refugees and displaced peasants merged into large but loosely organized forces. Rebellious elites and literati clans jumped in to reap advantages. By 23, the Xin Dynasty was over, its fourteen years a brief interlude in the Han.118

Writing early in the Latter Han, founded by a rebel, Ban Gu started the mainstream judgment of Wang Mang's reform as the ploy of an arch-hypocrite.119 **Other historians see hypocrisy on the other side. Wang's major measures had been previously proposed by Mengzi and Han literati-officials whom his detractors admired.**120

https://warpweftandway.com/teaching-yang-zhu/

Emerson makes the following reconstruction of the Yangist position: the Yangists were for private life over public life, the family over the court, **and highlighted the weakness of the Confucians, who had this hybrid system of clan loyalty and public life that was dangerous and untenable.** Some choice bits:

> *... **the court and the clan are two entirely different social groups, in both their constitution and their function, and the more Chinese culture expanded, the more fictional the pseudokinship bonds became**–for example, between the Eastern Chou and the semibarbarous states of Ch'in and Ch'u... To begin, it has to be shown how the Confucian attempt to model the state on the family was plausible at all. (539)*
>
> *... **the Confucian project amounts to an attempt to extend segmentary clan organization over an entire nation. But even on a smaller scale such systems are notoriously susceptible to fission, and at a certain indeterminate kinship distance, relatives are normally enemies.** (547)*

https://books.google.com.sv/books?id=wwE1KcgZZBMC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA220#v=onepage&q&f=false

With laughter, Sha Monk said, "O Elder Brother! As the proverb says,

> ***Three years not showing at the door,***
> ***A relative is one no more.***

> You were parted from him for five, perhaps six hundred years; you haven't even drunk a cup of wine with him, nor have you exchanged invitations or seasonal gifts. How could he possibly think of himself as your relative?"

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0001

> To be butchered on the smoking ruins of their city, to be dragged in chains to a slave-market, to see one child torn from them to dig in the quarries of Sicily, and another to guard the harems of Persepolis, these were the frequent and probable consequences of national calamities. **Hence, among the Greeks, patriotism became a governing principle, or rather an ungovernable passion.** Their legislators and their philosophers took it for granted, that, in providing for the strength and greatness of the State, they sufficiently provided for the happiness of the people. **The writers of the Roman Empire lived under despots, into whose dominion a hundred nations were melted down, and whose gardens would have covered the little commonwealths of Phlius and Platæa. Yet they continued to employ the same language, and to cant about the duty of sacrificing everything to a country to which they owed nothing.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA176#v=onepage&q&f=false

Guangwudì, who won the post-Xin civil war to found the Latter Han Dynasty, claimed descent from a surplus son of Jingdì, although six generations had eroded royal privileges. He and many associates were wealthy landlords versed in the Confucian Canons, as were many rivals whom he crushed.124 Learning and moralization did not prevent their fighting from pulverizing the people. **Household registration plummeted by two-thirds and for centuries failed to regain the Former Han level.**125

Guangwudì repealed many pedantic edicts of Wang Mang with fanfare. On socially beneficial issues, he continued Wang's policies halfheartedly. The civil war eased his task by creating room for reconstruction. **Some lands laid waste by chaotic violence were distributed to the poor or rented to the needy. Many slaves were freed and debt bondages annulled.** Further progress stalled, however. The social force that resisted Wang's agrarian reforms had not diminished but grown. Landlords capitalized on their merit in founding the new dynasty and forced Guangwudì to abandon a resurvey of farmland for fair tax assessment.126 **Despite economic progress, taxable land in the Latter Han never exceeded 90 percent of that registered at the end of the Former Han.** Graced by imperial benevolence, the elites evaded taxes and grew richer.127 Inequality spiraled. In the contests between the state and landed wealth and between rhetorical ideal and self-interest, the second of each pair won.

Farsightedness seemed not to be Guangwudì's strength. Intending to secure his dynasty, he transferred much authority from the bureaucracy to the palace, but it create havoc when his weak progeny failed to control the imperial household. Foreign defense was another example. **His abolition of military training to cut expenditures ruined the fighting capacity of the militia. Provincial governors and local magnates who hired volunteer soldiers eventually developed into warlords who tore apart the empire.**
…

The literati ethos of Latter Han was outstanding, rivaled only by that of the Song Dynasty, when neo-Confucianism emerged. Guangwudì extolled the integrity of officials who had refused to serve Wang Mang and rewarded them with high offices, thus training officers to devote themselves to the imperial family instead of to the state or the common good. Seeking personal connections became the overriding concern of officials. Ministers who appointed junior officers regarded this action as a personal favor for which the appointees were morally obligated to reciprocate. Many accrued tremendous personal power by accumulating protégés and former protégés, which enabled them to turn warlords later.133 **The ethics of personal ties in government had become a deep-rooted source of corruption, which continues to hurt today.**134
…

Besides bickering among themselves, literati-officials who controlled the bureaucracy struggled for power with the inner court, especially eunuchs, who came to dominance after helping young Huandì consolidate power in 159.137 **Unlike the great eunuchs of the Later Roman Empire who wielded power individually, eunuchs of the Latter Han formed a clique around the emperor, gaining power from proximity to him.**

Some eunuchs were undoubtedly corrupt, but others were upright and creative. **Cai Lun, for example, improved the technology of paper making so much he was traditionally credited with inventing paper.**138 **Coming from downtrodden families, eunuchs might have injected some diversity into the bookish monoculture.** Instead, they earned the spleen of cultural aristocrats, who loathed the "foul" mutilated creatures who competed for available jobs and diverted emperors away from the path of "purity." Anti-eunuch movements precipitated three nasty faction fights in the successive reigns of Huandì, Lingdì, and Shaodì. Both sides abused power and employed illegal violence, increasingly bloody. The emperor sided with literati-officials when they prosecuted eunuchs legally. When they killed eunuch associates indiscriminately, Huandì and Lingdì listened to eunuchs and proscribed partisans. More than 100 partisans were killed and 1,000 imprisoned or banished, many for sheltering fugitives. They gained huge sympathy. The banished became such celebrities that a jealous officer petitioned to join the proscription list.139 Literati-officials had their revenge under Shaodì. All eunuchs and many men unlucky enough to lack facial hair were massacred, totaling more than 2,000.140

The mainstream Chinese historiography blamed the decline of the Han on eunuchs, the "force of darkness," and applauds as heroic martyrs anti-eunuch partisans who vowed to "purify the world."141 However, maverick historians who analyzed the composition of proscribed partisans present another picture: "This

heterogeneous lot defied a single judgment. They acted impulsively, often overstepping the bounds, and might not be good administrators if appointed to office. Mutual eulogy for gaining influence is not laudable. Contemporary literati rallied to them for fame; in the Han's nomination system, a short cut to office was to form cliques to advertise celebrity."142

Many literati were upright and many partisans exhibited great personal heroism. However, their movement generally confused the war on eunuchs with the war on corruption. Corruption suffused the government. Many literati-officials were deep into it too. When a master in the Canons was convicted of gross venality, more than 1,000 literati gathered before the palace to clamor for his release.143 **When two provincial governors abused the law to massacre eunuch affiliates not convicted of crime, the literati applauded them as heroes against corruption.**144 The double standard revealed that corruption was secondary to elimination of enemies in a faction fight.145

After the accession of the child emperor Shaodì in 189, many anti-eunuch partisans gathered around the new regent He Jin and their long-time collaborator, the renowned litterateur Yuan Shao. **Yuan persuaded He to summon the general Dong Zhuo, ignoring warnings of insubordination on frontier troops in the capital. All eunuchs perished in a bloodbath.** Literati-officials realized their ideal of purifying the world. The masses once again suffered for irresponsible idealism. The army summoned burned the capital city, Luoyang, and did not stop at that. Dong deposed Shaodì and erected the puppet Xiandì. Yuan and regional officials allied to fight Dong, then turned on each other. The Han Dynasty lingered for three more decades, but only in name. **The warlords dismembering the state and devastating the people were not eunuchs but mostly famed literati-officials.**146
…

Tacitus treated the degeneration of Tiberius's reign as an unveiling of hypocrisy; Ban Gu treated Wang Mang's reign similarly.
…

Tradition censures the last emperors of the Former Han Dynasty before Wang Mang's usurpation in 9 CE. Intrigues and sexual licentiousness corrupted the court, but how did the empire fare? The literati painted grim pictures, which page after page Marxist historians collated with the conclusion, "the oppressed masses struggled on the edge of hunger and death, and history entered a dark period."149 However, **Ban Gu chose the 2 CE census as the sample of political geography in the *Book of Han*, adding, "The Han is at peak prosperity."**150 The cold statistics undoubtedly left out numerous instances of human suffering. Social and administrative deterioration did occur. Nevertheless, household registration was a sensitive measure of order and stability. A far darker period would come when desperate people fled their homes, seeking food or safety. **The 65 percent drop in census figures half a century later indicates the significance of the big picture.**151 Ban Biao, a historian who lived through the post-Wang civil war, explained why similar bedlam spared the Former Han during its last decades under bad emperors: **"The danger started from the top, and the damages did not penetrate into the populace below."**152

Such phenomena were also pronounced under Tiberius and Domitian. **Tradition condemns them for ending in reigns of terror that decimated great aristocratic families.** From provincial perspectives, however, a different assessment obtained. Both rulers managed the Empire well, choosing their governors carefully, repressing abuses, and protecting the subject population.153 The provinces became increasingly prosperous under Tiberius, and many of Domitian's policies continued into the golden reign of Trajan. **The posthumous condemnation of Domitian, enthusiastically pursued by senators, excited only tepid responses from the provinces.**154 **The atrocities of Tiberius and Domitian apparently fell mainly on the imperial entourage and the political circle closest to it, sparing most of the populace.** Tacitus, who lived through the reign of Domitian and condemned Tiberius in the *Annals*, observed elsewhere, **"the tyrant only oppresses his nearest neighbors."**155 That neighborhood was the home of traditional historians, including Tacitus and Ban Gu. Had it put colored glasses on historiography?
…

The second-century physician Galen described various kinds of ulcers that Roman country folks got in early summers from eating grass and twigs, because city dwellers left them insufficient grain to last until the next crop. He was conducting a scientific study on foods.158 **A modern historian of Antonine age remarks, "Many of the people in the rural areas lived a miserable life of continual or sporadic destitution and starvation, in contrast to many of the 'city-dwellers.' … It is strange that so little is heard about this."**159 Only recently has the question of poverty and destitution in the Empire attracted scholarly attention.160 **Traditional Chinese elites were shepherds closer to the flock. They may be condescending and lethargic on practical solutions, but they protested for the people.**
…

Tacitus and Dio were senators of consular rank, as was the younger Pliny, whose letters and panegyric provide much information on the early Antonine period. Suetonius, who wrote biographies of the first twelve Roman emperors, was an equestrian in charge of imperial correspondence under Hadrian. To these members of the upper class, perhaps the foremost quality of an emperor was his respect for and treatment of senatorial aristocrats.161

Chinese historians were elites but of lower ranks. The grand annalist, an officer "responsible for recording all actions of the ruler, to keep them careful in words and deeds," was common in many pre-imperial states. The post was dangerous when reality was ugly. **A Qi minister who murdered his lord in 548 BCE also killed the grand annalist who insisted on recording the regicide. The annalist's two brothers inherited the office successively and refused to cover up the truth.** The minister killed them both but relented when the youngest brother proved equally stubborn. Had he kept on killing, he would not have prevailed. The junior annalist was already en route to the office.162

The tradition had degenerated in imperial times, but not completely. **The office of the grand historian continued, but only with the lowest grade allowed to attend court.** As grand historian, Sima Qian fulfilled his father Sima Tan's vision in the *Records of the Historian*, which covers Chinese history from its mythical beginning to his own time in the reign of Wudì. **He was undeterred when, seven years into the project, he was found guilty of vouching**

for a general who surrendered to the Xiongnu and castrated because he could not afford the fine for commutation. Ban Gu also continued the aspiration of his father Ban Biao. He embarked on a history of the Former Han Dynasty but was arrested by the local governor for making a private enterprise of state history. His younger brother Ban Chao saved him and got him a job by appealing to the emperor. The Ban family had produced middling officers for three generations, but it was not rich. After they moved to the capital for Ban Gu's new job as an imperial librarian, Ban Chao toiled as a hired scribe to support their mother before throwing down the ink brush to join the army. Twenty years later, indiscreet politics landed Ban Gu in prison, where he died in 92, **five years before Ban Chao, as protector general of the Western Territory, dispatched a deputy in quest of the Roman Empire.**
...

Major Roman historians tended to be aristocrats working at their own leisure; their Chinese counterparts, junior officers working with state sponsorship.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA191#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Han Dynasty gradually codified most social stratifications fundamental to Confucian ethics. The circle enjoying legal privileges expanded from royalty and officials to almost the whole stratum of literati and wealthy landlords.15 **Already in Republican Rome, upper-class convicts under the death sentence were routinely allowed to escape into exile, while poor convicts were immediately executed.** Under the Empire, laws defined a person's status. The lower class was susceptible to torture; the upper class was not.16

In civil law, the crown jewel of their jurisprudence, the Romans far outshone the Chinese, who had a few laws but preferred reconciliation or arbitration to litigation.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/141
>
> **The submission to *law*: oh, with what qualms of conscience was it that the noble races throughout the world renounced the *vendetta* and gave the law power over themselves!** Law was long a *vetitum*, a blasphemy, an innovation; it was introduced with force *like* a force, to which men only submitted with a sense of personal shame.

...

The Roman and Chinese Empires lacked the rule *of* law, but both aspired to the rule *by* law and hoped their emperors would voluntarily submit to existent laws. The younger Pliny praised Trajan, Rome's thirteenth *princeps-imperator*: **"You have spontaneously subjected yourself to the laws. … What I hear for the first time, now learn for the first time, is not 'The *princeps* is above the laws,' but 'The laws are above the *princeps*.'"**21 **What was news to Pliny is the central Legalist tenet, as Shang Yang insists: "The law is what the ruler and ruled all uphold."**22 The idea was still influential in early Han. Wendì just missed being injured when a man rushing from underneath a bridge upset the horses in the imperial procession. Minister of Fairness Zhang Shizhi, having ascertained the transgression was unintentional, imposed monetary fines. **To the furious emperor who demanded a heavier penalty he replied, "The law is common to the son of heaven and all under heaven. Now the law stipulates this penalty. To change it would betray the people's trust in the law."** Wendì paused for a long time but finally agreed.23 Nevertheless, the rule by law rested on the grace of emperors. **Even Trajan turned several provinces from public territory into imperial patrimony almost overnight, without consulting the Senate.** Empress Lü got her way by simply replacing the remonstrating premier with someone more compliant.24
...

Shorn of political rights, the Roman citizen became a privileged subject, and citizenship became the badge by which conquerors discriminated against the vanquished. Such discrimination faded fast in China. **As soon as Qin annexed the six states, it granted the same status to all inhabitants in its realm. Conquerors and the conquered all became *bianhu qimin*, equal peoples in registered households with similar duties and benefits.** All men with ability in the Empire were eligible for government offices, an important privilege that in Rome was reserved for citizens only. Subsequent dynasties adopted the same policy. **Furthermore, Chinese subjects enjoyed one thing that Roman citizens lacked. The Han government urged converting swords into plowshares but did not legally disarm civilians.**29 **In contrast, the Roman Empire deprived all nonmilitary persons, citizens and subjects alike, of the right to bear arms.**30

Citizens constituted only about 10 percent of the Roman Empire's population for more than two centuries. Initially they retained some social and legal privileges, but these too gradually became attributes of wealth, not citizenship. "I bought this citizenship for a large sum," a Jerusalem tribune brags in the Bible.31 **By the Antonine age, poor citizens classified as *humiliores* lost their right to appeal, immunity to torture, and other legal protections, so that they became liable to cruel penalties previously reserved for slaves.**32 Perhaps it was not ironic that Caracalla, who in 212 granted Roman citizenship to al free inhabitants of the Empire, was known not for liberality but for rapacity. **The name "citizen" offered little benefit to tenants without legal freedom to leave the land or artisans forbidden to leace their fathers' occupations.** Caracalla's edict excited far less enthusiasm from contemporaries than from moderns. **It was not even mentioned on the coinage, the usual propaganda machine.** A historian explains, "The upper classes already knew where their interests lay, and to the lower classes it no longer made much difference."33

Constantine paid oriental despotism the highest compliment of imitation. *Despotes* became the usual term for addressing the emperor, to whom Roman citizens spoke of themselves as "your slaves."34 "But this orientalism was a superficial etiquette," a Western scholar notes; "the autocrat seldom forgot that his subjects were freemen."35 **The proportion of slaves in the Greco-Roman world far exceeded that in any oriental society. Sociologists also found that ordinary Persians enjoyed more factual freedom from state intervention in their daily lives than did the Greeks, because the Persian Empire left significant domestic autonomy to localities.**36 **What the Greeks and Romans scorned as abjectness was mainly the ceremonial homage that**

oriental peoples rendered to their rulers, including prostration. Such homage was precisely what they themselves later adopted toward their emperors. Nevertheless, the change may be superficial after all. **Centuries before they physically prostrated, the Greeks had spiritually prostrated as the Chinese never did. They worshipped their living kings and emperors as gods, and the Romans later followed this example.**37
…

A Western scholar constructs an enlightened "doctrine of adoption" for the Roman Empire: "The emperor was not a monarch of the Oriental type; … the power was not transmitted from father to son merely in virtue of blood relationship. The emperor adopted the best man among the best men."39 A closer examination does uncover evidence for an ancient doctrine of nonhereditary imperial succession, but in China, not Rome.

This may be surprising in view of the Darwinian evolutionary edge that the Chinese upper class had over its Roman counterpart. More than 100,000 persons were descended from Gaodì and his two brothers in two centuries.40 In contrast, the Roman aristocracy could not replenish itself by natural birth. The phenomenon was conspicuous enough to induce speculation about sterility caused by frequent hot baths. Or it may be simply because aristocrats preferred pleasure to child rearing, as Tacitus remarked. Anyway, despite policies that encouraged childbearing and censured celibacy, many Roman aristocratic families were empty nests.41

The Antonine emperors who adopted their successors had no biological son of their own. Acts out of necessity prove no principle. **Where choice was available, the results were unambiguous. Vespasian declared, "My son shall succeed me, or no one."** Between the rule of his family and anarchy, the Senate took no time to decide.42 While aristocrats resigned themselves to the dynastic principle, the troops and the common people embraced it. **The Praetorian Guard promptly hailed Claudius, apparently retarded as he was.** The crowd supported the choice, and legionaries balked at the rebellious conspiracy of their officers. Elagabalus was acclaimed emperor on physical resemblance to Caracalla; even a bastard son had advantages. **A historian summarizes his extensive research: "No Emperor who had a son living was ever peacefully succeeded by anyone else."**43

Even on paper, evidence is lacking for the alleged adoptive principle. Stoicism demands a good king, but is generally silent on any principle of succession. Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic philosopher-emperor, happily passed the purple to his son. **Most scholars doubt that a principle of adoption ever existed in the Roman Empire.**44

Proof of existence is easier than proof of nonexistence. Since the warring states, the Chinese developed a doctrine of abdication, *chanrang*, and constructed exemplars out of the sage kings Yao and Shun.45 **Ideally, Wendì remarked, a king should "search the world for a worthy and virtuous man and pass the throne to him."**46 In the nonideal world, abdication offers not a substitution but an escape clause from the dynastic principle under limited conditions; the mandate of heaven is not permanent. In 78 BCE, Sui Hong petitioned the emperor to emulate Yao and Shun. Eighteen years later, **Gai Kuanrao wrote in a memorial to the emperor, "He who regards the world as belonging to all men passes it to the worthy. He who regards the world as belonging to his family passes it to his son."**47 The doctrine of abdication played a prominent role in the rise of Wang Mang and the succession of the Former Han by the Xin Dynasty. **Discredited by the Xin's failure, *chanrang* henceforth becomes a euphemism that usurpers use for their purposes.**
…

Serving similar functions as Roman games, emperor-sponsored Chinese festivities helped to bind the people to the ruler. **Han emperors frequently showered on every man in the empire ranks that carried tradable social and material benefits.** Besides, each hundred households received an allotment of food and wine, presumably for a communal party.55
…

In secular ceremonies, the triumphant parade was the most pompous for Roman emperors. Many Han emperors followed the ancient ritual of leading the court in the annual plowing of a sacred field, a symbol of dedication to agriculture.57 These rites, in which the emperor shared with the people the glory of victory or the virtue of work, publicized the disparate ideologies of the two empires.

As supreme heads of state, the emperors manifested the values of their realms. **Except for the First Emperor, who diligently inspected the country, the Chinese emperor was attached to family and seldom stirred from the dragon throne in the capital.** Most people never saw his face or image. They knew him simply as "the emperor" or "the current ruler." **His personal name was not to be mentioned and his official name came posthumously.**58 In contrast, Roman emperors were public celebrities who often marched ahead of the legionary eagle standard. They frequented parades and games, where the people could express their sentiments by clamoring. Keen to advertise themselves, the emperors erected statues everywhere. Their images on coins constantly reminded their subjects to render to Caesar what was Caesar's.59
…

A senator's privileges passed on to his descendants up to three generations. Nevertheless, many senatorial families failed to entrench because of imperial persecution, low fertility, high expenditure, and the withdrawal of sons who inherited senatorial privileges but refused the burden of service. Rich provincials were eager to take their places. **Non-Italian senators, who constituted 2 percent of the Senate under Augustus, became the majority by the time of Septimius Severus.**73 The fluidity of members did not erode wealth threshold for membership. The Senate had changed from an elite Italian club to a club of empire-wide elites, but the criterion of elitism endured. Similar conditions obtained for the two lower elite orders.74

Wealth bias also permeated the army, where few not in the equestrian order made commissioned officers. Nevertheless, military merit was apparent and an army in wartime was a hotbed of opportunity. Trajan chose magistrates from his friends in the military oligarchy. During the third-century crisis, soldier-emperors rose through the ranks. **Senators accustomed to refined living withdrew from military commands.** The equestrians who replaced them similarly tended to plutocratic interests, but the divergent outlooks of disciplined

professional soldiers and leisured senatorial aristocrats created a crack in the ruling elite. It would widen to lethal proportions toward the end of the Western Roman Empire.75
…

Officers in the early Han government were diverse in socioeconomic background and intellectual persuasion. Previous occupations of farmer, swineherd, or firewood gatherer seemed not to stain their official career.77 To recruit talented officers, Wendì ordered provincial governors to recommend men with integrity and intelligence. Wudì established a regular procedure for this purpose. Each provincial governor was to nominate two candidates annually and be held accountable for their quality. The quota changed in the Latter Han to one nominee from a fixed number of people, which attenuated voices from sparsely populated frontier provinces. **The nomination system produced about 200 recruits a year.** It garnered regional knowledge, pumped fresh minds to the central government, and became a unifying force by opening a channel for people all over the empire to become involved in administration and identify with the regime.78
…

Already in early Han, Sima Tan had observed, “Confucianism is massive in corpus but sparse in essential substance, laborious in effort but meager in achievement, and seldom thorough in affairs.”80 This characteristic was amplified by a century in power. **Exegesis of one Canon exceeded a million words and was fast rising.** The expertise of expressing one drop of idea in an ocean of words created a peculiar language full of jargons, which restricted the range of discussable topics and excluded those not familiar with canonical allusions from political discourse. Learning the language required more and more effort, but entrance into government and the profits it entailed made the effort worthwhile. **“Bequeathing to your son one Canon is better than bequeathing a basketful of gold,” so went a contemporary saying.**81 The prospect of office fueled enthusiasm for education, but one sadly narrow and rigid. Empirical knowledge and objective reasoning were snubbed. Ideologically incorrect concepts, **especially political concepts that went beyond the state as a big family,** were condemned as immoral.
…

Cliques of wealthy literati clans gradually usurped the nomination system to exclude candidates from humble families. **After producing warlords that destroyed the Han Dynasty, the ideological aristocracy would grow into a bona fide aristocracy that eclipsed the throne in the subsequent period of disunity.**83

The emperor and the elite needed and benefited each other, although their relation was always tense. Confucianism served well the Chinese Empire and the literati, as did plutocracy the Roman Empire and the landlords. In comparison, **the ideology-based Chinese elite were more dependent on the throne than was the wealth-based Roman elite.** Wealth constituted an independent powerbase, but early Han experiences divulged the difficulty for Confucian masters to retain disciples without the promise of government jobs or aristocratic patronage.84 **Dependency on the state made the Chinese elite more submissive. On the other hand, softness imparted a certain tenacity. Virtue rhetoric was pliable to please new masters, whereas regionalism made the hard power based on landed wealth brittle.**

The imperial ruling elites enjoyed tremendous power and privilege over the common people. Yet they were pale images of the haughty pre-imperial aristocracies. Nostalgia bred discontent and perhaps agitation, against which ever-vigilant emperors did not hesitate to take preventive measures, justified or not. In China, cursing the living emperor or slandering the court was treasonous, and the laws of impiety penalized acts such as leaving any object belonging to the emperor on the ground. Since Augustus had criminalized libel, treason in the Roman Empire covered everything from taking into a brothel a coin bearing the emperor’s image to consulting the horoscope about the emperor’s death.85 **It is difficult to tell which records more deaths of officers on sedition charges, Ban Gu’s *Book of Han* or Tacitus’s *Annals*.** Condemnations of imperial repression fill historiography. Less noticed is the elites’ complicity in the game. Some officers gained advantage by false accusations or used legitimate regulations to settle private feuds. Such practices became tools for faction fights. Roman senators were as adept at them as Han literati. Mutual incrimination escalated, if it did not precipitate, many imperial persecutions.86

The throne and the ruling elite evolved together amid tension and power struggle. **An effective bureaucracy without which emperors could not get things done could develop into a countervailing force, as happened in eighteenth-century Europe.**
…

The Han establishment was formally more bureaucratic, although its operation was increasingly biased by personal connections among literati-officials. **Roman senators were aristocratic. It would take more than two centuries for them to yield to a Roman bureaucracy staffed by equestrians appointed to task-oriented offices.**
…

***Provincia* and *jun* both originated as military commands and transformed into civilian administration.** At its peak, the Qin Dynasty had forty-six provinces. By expansion, splitting domains, and retaining some kingdoms as income fiefs, the Han had 103 provincial-level units, abbreviated as provinces.105 **The Roman Empire had forty-six provinces at the end of the Antonine age. After Diocletian and Constantine split large provinces to prevent overpowerful governors, Roman provinces numbered 116.**106
…

The estimated peak population of each empire exceeded 50 million. Thus an average province had more than half a million inhabitants.
…

The classical city of the Greco-Roman world was one for consumption based on rent from agriculture, radically different from the medieval city, which was a production center based on trade and industry. The great majority of Roman cities were essentially rural; crafts and services existed but were minor. The urban

area was the administrative and consumption center, where absentee landlords who constituted the city's governing circle resided and spent their income.110
…

While the Greco-Roman city passed with classical antiquity, of which it was a hallmark, the county has been the most enduring administrative organization in China since its unification. In the Han bureaucracy, county officials collected taxes and managed routine matters of justice, finance, and culture. The county superintendent, nicknamed "the parent official," was the imperial officer most familiar to the common people. To get things done, he had to obtain information on local conditions and establish good relations with local magnates. Hence he relied heavily on local subofficials, who constituted more than 90 percent of his staff. **Despite lowly status and stipends, local subofficials undertook significant responsibilities and often wielded more substantive power than did their superiors appointed from outside, who came and went while the locals stayed on.** Given their familiarity with the job, knowledge of all customs, and tricks for graft, they provided invaluable service but also became an inveterate source of corruption.118

Unlike Roman patronage, the Han government was wary of local magnates; many had roots traced to pre-imperial times. The rich acted like "lords without titles." Gangs proliferated.119 Gross abuses by powerful magnates became the first mission of circuit inspectors. **Emperors selected "brutal officers" capable of standing up to the powerful and spurning the bribes of the rich, but also capable of massacring innocents together with wrongdoers when targeting an intransigent clan with hundreds of households.**120 These effects were only temporary. Increasingly, literati-officials joined the ranks of wealthy magnates. Many policies designed to reduce abuse and assuage inequality, such as the ever-normal granary and Guangwudì's land survey for fair tax assessment, fell under elite pressure cloaked in virtue rhetoric. **As literati clans grew, the Latter Han government climbed into bed with local landlords and its policy converged with that of Rome.**

6.7 The Myth of "Big Government"

The contrast between bloated Han bureaucracy and skeletal Roman government is a common stereotype. **Some say the Han employed twenty-five times more functionaries than did the Roman Empire.**121 Does the difference reflect actual employment or the comprehensiveness of employment statistics? Let us compare the governments at the ends of Former Han Dynasty and the Antonine age, when each empire was near its zenith.

The Roman top government was staffed by senators and equestrians. **As in the Republic, senatorial magistracies were honorary but came with generous expense accounts.** From the expense account for his year as governor of Cilicia, Cicero, who was exceptionally clean in office, was able to beg a surplus of 2.2 million sesterces. **In imperial times, senatorial governors annually drew about 1 million sesterces.**122 **Officers with the equestrian's rank were salaried.** High-ranking procurators, the *trecenarius*, *ducenarius*, *centenarius*, and *sexagenarius*, respectively carried annual stipends of 300,000, 200,000, 100,000, and 60,000 sesterces.123
…

As a baseline for comparison, **the average wage of a day laborer was about 3 sesterces and the annual pay of a legionary was 300 denarii or 1,200 sesterces,** of which about one third or 300 sesterces was deducted for rations and additional amounts for clothing and equipment.124 Thus a *ducenarius* received the pay of 167 legionaries or the ration of 500.
…

All told, about ninety-five high-ranking senators held active posts each year. The number of high-grade equestrians grew over time. By the end of the Antonine age, some thirty-six *ducenarius*, forty-eight *centenarius*, and fifty-one *sexagenarius* were active annually.125 **Together with the senators, about 230 high officials were active administering the Empire.**
…

In total, one estimate counted up to 10,000 functionaries operating in the forty-six provinces at the time of Trajan.126

The *Standard Histories* provide long lists of Han officers, complete with their jobs, grades, stipends, subordinates, and histories of evolution. Where as the names of Roman grades such as *ducenarius* derived from their salaries, the names of Chinese grades such as *erqianshi*, literally "two-kilo bushels," are only of ordinal significance. Their corresponding salaries were stipulated in amounts of grain measured in *hu* (1 *hu* = 19.7 liters).
…

As a baseline, the monthly ration of a foot soldiers was around 2.6 *hu*.128 Thus a mid-two-kilo received the ration of 46 soldiers.

In the ten-kilo trade were the triumvirs and a couple of honorary posts such as the emperor's tutor. **The three grades of two-kilo constituted the bulk of high officialdom.** There were ten supra-two-kilos: the heads of nine ministries plus the prefect of the capital. Twenty-seven lesser two-kilos served in the central government; more than half were commanders of guard units. The bulk of their grade, totaling about 200, served as circuit inspectors, provincial governors, and commanders in charge of army reserves. **Together with their colleagues in the capital, the total number of active high officials was not much more than 240.**129
…

Juxtaposing the Roman and Han governments down to the provincial level, they are comparable in personnel size. **Each central government employed a few dozen high officers and appointed a couple hundred more to govern the provinces. Supplementing them were hundreds of junior officers and thousands of subofficials.** However, the expenditure of the Roman government was larger because of higher salaries at the top. Together, **the compensations of 230 high Roman officials amounted to the ration of 275,150 soldiers; that of 241 Han high officials, 10,965.**

As compared, the Han government was near its maximum size, the result of rapid expansions under Wudì. Many posts would be cut by Guangwudì.133 **In contrast, expansion of the Roman government, which had been mild hitherto, would soon accelerate under Diocletian. Two centuries after the dates of our comparison, the Han high officialdom had not changed much, but the number of senior Roman officers had jumped to about 6,000.** Not the entire jump is attributable to different definitions of "high official." Except for brief periods, the Later Roman Empire had two or more simultaneous emperors, hence a duplication of central headquarters and officers. The number of Han provinces remained constant, but the number of Roman provinces more than doubled. Also, Rome increasingly appointed procurators to keep city councilors in line. All these additions increased the size of government.134 Finally, the prize of Big Government goes to Rome.
…

Excavated records show 120 junior officers and 2,044 subofficials working in Donghai's thirty-eight countries.135 Donghai was larger than most provinces. Extrapolation of its figures falls within the ballpark of the empire-wide figure in **the *Book of Han*'s list of official posts: "From aides to the premier, the total was 120,285."**136 According to this proportion, less than 300 were high officials, 7,000 were junior officials, and the remaining were subofficials.

With a population of about 50 million, the entire Han bureaucracy engaged about one functionary per 416 inhabitants. For comparison, in 2002 the U.S. federal government alone had 1.7 million civilian employees, or about one per 176 inhabitants. These do not include the large numbers of civil servants in the state, county, and local governments.137
…

The rate of rent varied across regions, but hovered above 50 percent of produce in both empires.157 A scholar argues that the Roman land tax, which was relatively low by ancient standards, provided a carapace for magnates to siphon most profits from a fixed amount of surplus.158 **The Chinese land tax was much lighter than the Roman.** It was benevolent in the Qin and early Former Han Dynasty with its economy of small peasants tilling their own lands. As time went on, land concentration increased, and many peasants became tenants.159 Xun Yue of the Latter Han wrote: "**The ancients taxed one part in ten and thought it fair. Now some Han people pay one part in a hundred for land tax, the burden is light indeed. <u>However, increasingly more land passes into the hands of the rich and powerful, who appropriate more than half of the crop for rent.</u>** The government taxes one part in a hundred, the people pay in excess of one part in two. … Dispensations from the top fail to trickle down and advantages flow to the powerful moguls."160 These moguls were increasingly dominated by literati clans.
…

Confucians, who preferred the rule by men, tolerated the law as punishment, which shared a chapter in the *Standard Histories* with war as necessary evils.

Different conceptions were apparent in the polar reactions to the first publication of law in each realm. Rome published its first code, the Twelve Tables, in 451 BCE, during the Conflict of the Orders. **The event was celebrated from the beginning. Roman annalists regarded it as a plebeian triumph over patricians.** Modern historians also credit patrician self-regulation.165 Codification of law, which selects, articulates, rationalizes, or modifies certain customary practices, increases the predictability of social intercourse. **The common people win;** clear explanations of rules elucidate available options, and written laws curb arbitrary interpretation of tradition by those in power. **The ruling class need not lose;** the codes solidify the status quo, especially existing property rights, by arresting surprising changes in customs.166

Animosity greeted China's first code of laws, published by the state of Zheng in 536 BCE amid the decline of feudalistic power. Shu Xiang, a celebrity Jin aristocrat, wrote a long letter of denunciation: "<u>When people know what to avoid, they lose fear of the authority and acquire contentiousness, because they can appeal to the written codes and hope to get away with what they do.</u>" Confucius chimed in when Jin inscribed its laws on a cauldron in 513 BCE: "Jin is about to perish; it is out of bounds. … **Now that people can appeal to the cauldron, why should they defer to the nobility?** By what can nobilities keep their status? Without hierarchical difference between the noble and the humble, how can a state survive?"167

> https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n339/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **This is [the history of] the *ius latens* of which Pomponius relates that the Roman plebs would have no more of it and hence insisted that the laws be inscribed on tablets, since vulgar letters had come from the Greeks to Rome,** as noted above. This order of civil human things was finally found ready for the monarchic states, in which the monarchs wish the laws administered according to natural equity and consequently in harmony with the understanding of the multitude, **<u>and thus make the powerful and the weak equal before the law, which monarchy alone can do.</u> And civil equity or reason of state was understood by a few men wise in public reason, and, by virtue of its eternal property, is preserved secret within cabinets.**

Significantly, neither man opposed punishment or its cruelty, which had long been routine. Fifteen years before Jin's laws, Shu handled a land dispute and imposed three death sentences respectively for murder, bribery, and corruption. His ruling won praise from Confucius. Besides harshness, the case revealed the arbitrariness of judgment. Bribery with immunity was prevalent. Shu himself was on record to abet it.168 **However, as Shu wrote in his letter, rulers decided cases as they arose and did not set rules in advance to encourage contentiousness. <u>Inscrutability and unpredictability enhanced the noble's power in the eye of the humble.</u>** In short, the Confucian target was not coercion but the publicity and consistency of the law that regulates its use.169

According to a Western scholar, **what is uniquely Chinese about Shu Xiang's letter "is its insistence upon the moral and political dangers involved in the public promulgation of the legal norms. This view of law seems to have no real parallel in any other civilization."**170
…

Consider Mengzi's answer to the question of what would happen if the sage king Shun's father committed murder: "**Shun regards discarding his kingdom as discarding a worn sandal, stealthily bears his father and escapes to the coast, where he lives happily, never giving a thought about the world."**177 **The king's hypothetical action was lauded by neo-Confucians as a revelation of the highest of heaven's principles. Shun was not a private person but the king, whose action affected the well-being of the world's people. His responsibility was especially heavy in the Confucian doctrine that hinged government on the ruler's personal example.** By parading the paradigmatic sage king's disregard of justice, desertion of his people, and indifference to the danger of the country plunging into chaos because of his flight, Mengzi's thought experiment exposed a blind spot in the ruling elite's public responsibility.
…

To avenge one's relatives was a Confucian moral code.180 However, the Qin state, looking beyond personal relations to the public good, realized that blood feuds vitiated social tranquility. Therefore the state took over the responsibility of prosecuting wrongdoers and legally suppressed private vendettas. **The Han government preserved the law, but the literati flouted it in the name of morality. Avenging wrongs on relatives and friends became a fashion in which avengers won personal fame. Revenge led to further revenge, condoned by many officials despite the law.**181 The exegetical mindset prevented the ruling elite from recognizing its selfish disdain for the common good.182

Personal revenge arouses emotion. Its replacement by retributive justice calls for rational value judgment. Reason, a universal human faculty, is the fount of law. **Aristotle writes, "He who commends that law alone should rule may thus be regarded as commending that God and reason alone should rule. … Law is thus 'reason without desire.'" Cicero writes, "When reason is fully developed, it is law."**183 Western cultures emphasize that laws are rational and that ordinary people are capable of using their own minds to understand the rationale for the conduct that laws demand. That is why laws are edifying and law abidance is not shameless but dignified.
…

Professional Roman jurists in the Empire taught and wrote law books but mostly refrained from advocacy in order to maintain impartiality.
…

One political elite analyzed: the other moralized. **While Roman jurists sweated out the details of complex cases and accumulated their experience by clear articulation, Han literati-officials sang of the Way, lofty and vague.** Their doctrine, which persisted through imperial China, was *dezhu xingfu*, the rule of virtue augmented by punishment. **Legal codes, being detailed and to the point, were deemed tedious and fit only for clerks.** Superior men prided themselves on inscrutable virtue derived from memorizing the grand principles in the Confucian Canons. Dong Zhongshu, an early promoter of *dezhu xingfu*, also pioneered *Chunqiu duanyu*, judging cases by citing the Canons, which became widely practiced by literati-officials through the Han Dynasty.186 **Confucian ethics always focused on a person's intentions: "The doctrine of *Chunqiu duanyu* is to judge by intentions. Spare those with good intentions, even if they acted against the law. Condemn those with evil intentions, even if they acted within the law."**187

> http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-14
>
> [13:18] The Duke of She told Confucius: "In my land, there are righteous men. If a father steals a sheep, the son will testify against him."
>
> Confucius said, **"The righteous men in my land are different from this. The father conceals the wrongs of his son, and the son conceals the wrongs of his father. This is the correct way!"**

…

Upright and insightful officers individually brought justice to many, but their acumen died with them. The admiration they won in folk legends bespeaks of their rarity. More often, literati-officials scorned mundane law and order.192 Only some acquired judiciary ability befitting their public duty. Many remained legally illiterate, judged cases by reciting the Confucian Canons, and gained fame thereby. By the Jin Dynasty, contemporaries complained that officers high and low knew no law. **Precedents filled more than 900 volumes. Unlike the Roman jurists who strived to resolve contradictions and build up a legal system, Han officials merely swept together arbitrary opinions, which required far less intellectual effort. For similar cases, sentences varied greatly and judgments contradicted each other.**193 **The irregularity provided more food for literati depreciation of the law and more excuse for adjudicating by virtuous whim.** The practice of passing verdicts without citing the law or giving adequate reasons persisted in imperial China.194 **To show off their benevolence, Latter Han emperors regularly granted universal amnesty, which so undermined the law that criminals planned murder ahead of expected pardon.**195 The principle of fairness had gone with the wind.

As mere punishment, the law was reduced to the coercive arm of the rule of men. The change in conception was visible in the name of the government office. **Qin's *tingwei*, which I translate as "the minister of fairness," connotes the senses of "public" and "level as water."** Its image of a balance invoked by Zhang Shizhi should be familiar to moderns.196 **After the Han and up to the end of imperial China, law and order fell under *xingbu*, the department of punishment.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA267#v=onepage&q&f=false

The “culmination of human history” was the reign of Constantine to contemporaneous historian Eusebius.1 The Later Roman Empire recovered from anarchy and civil wars. **A civilian bureaucracy came of age and effectively collected elevated taxes from the lower classes.** The enlarged military organized the best troops into mobile field armies, the cream of which attached to the emperor. **The currency was stabilized with a new gold coin partly financed by the systematic despoliation of pagan temples.** Christianity triumphed as the state religion and its church soared in power and wealth. Constantinople sprang up with dizzying speed, crowded with magnificent palaces and churches and endowed with a Senate of its own. Barbarians were defeated and captured kings fed to wild beasts.2 **A panegyric sang of Constantine, “you defy the remnants of the defeated tribe and compel them never to abandon their fears but to be in constant terror, and to keep outstretched their hands in submission.”** 3 **Persia came to bid for peace, but was rebuffed. Constantine “proposed to wage the war as a Christian crusade,” a modern historian writes.**4 He died while embarking on the campaign. That was 337 CE.
…

Archeologists uncovered evidence of thriving rural communities in many parts of the late Roman Empire. **Except for the most heavily raided frontier regions along the Rhine, most areas recovered fully. Syria prospered, as did the African provinces, a breadbasket to the Western Empire.** Production and settlement density crested in many places during the fourth century. Evidence suggests that agriculture was not depressed, despite elevated taxes to support the enlarged army and bureaucracy. Scholars explain that suitably higher taxes can stimulate increased productivity when peasant labor capacity is underutilized. The necessity to pay taxes drives peasants to work more, hence increasing production and growing the economy.19

The economy was similarly healthy toward the end of the Latter Han. The government kept taxes low. **Many of its policies, including the abolition of state monopolies on salt and iron, would warm the hearts of free-market advocates as it did Confucian literati.** Numerous inscriptions attested to the extensive construction and maintenance of roads and bridges. Productivity rose. **Fertile lands in south China increasingly yielded to the plow.** Crafts of great variety thrived, buoyed by new technologies including papermaking, the wind-powered bellows, and an early form of porcelain. Conspicuous luxury consumption soared.20
…

Previous Chinese records of diseases were mainly mass illness following natural disasters and afflictions in the army or subtropical heat. Most occurrences were local. Rarely did one make the list of ominous signs interpreted as divine warnings, with a dedicated chapter in the *Standard Histories*. Luoyang suffered in 125 and 151. Then a string of widespread epidemics popped up on the ominous list, in the years 161, 171, 173, 179, 182, 185 and 217, leaving the country in consternation. The imperial annals also recorded big epidemics in 224, 234, 292, and 311.24 The 217 flare-up claimed many in the imperial family and all four of the leading poets. Contemporaries wrote of deaths in every family and funerals held for whole clans. “Three or four in ten died” at the peak of the 320-322 outbreak in Guanzhong.25 **Significantly, during the early period of pestilence, the millenarian cult that culminated in the 184 Yellow Turban rebellion gained popularity through magical healing.** In the 208 battle of the Red Cliff, the imperial army was weakened by pestilence. It lost. Had it won, China would not have fragmented into three kingdoms.26

> https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D53%3Asection%3D4
>
> [4] Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them. **As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing;** and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.
>
> https://www.medieval.eu/cultural-consequences-justinian-plague/
>
> People must have felt the need for new sponsors in heaven, and Meier links it to some incidences of repaganization, although perhaps more specifically the fear of this phenomena among the commentators and chroniclers of that time. **Christianity was suffering in these times of massive insecurity. He writes how “The entire religious system threatened to come away from the moorings”** (p. 284). The desperate situation defied any attempts at explanation and obviously called for desperate measures.
>
> **It is in view of this we must consider the very rapid growth of the Cult of Mary,** a sign of which was the transferral of Candlemas from the 14th to the 2nd February turning a festival of Christ (the presentation in the Temple) into a Marian Festival, the purification. Sources directly refer to the “new” festival as a measure to alleviate the plague, writes Maier. **Another sign of this shift was the parallel development of iconolatry, the veneration of icons, with specific icons soon gathering special powers and fame.**

…

Estimates for the peak population range from 50 to 120 million, but the high numbers seem incredible. **Whether the peak occurred under Marcus Aurelius or Constantine is not clear.** The interim years saw wars and recurrent plagues, but remains of settlements reveal that the population in most areas had recovered by the fourth century, and

some even reached new heights. With archeologists likely to uncover more settlements, many scholars believe that the Empire had at least 70 million inhabitants on the eve of the barbarian invasion.27
…

After the Jin reunified China in 280 and initiated a program to settle refugees, the number of households jumped by 50 percent in three years.30 "Arable land" in the table reads "taxable land." By abandoning an honest land survey, Guangwudì allowed big clans to screen resources from the state. As land continued to concentrate in their hands, **tax evasion spiraled upward, which explains why acreage declined through the Latter Han despite massive development in south China. Many dispossessed peasants dropped from the household register and became drifting laborers. Others became tenants or dependents of big landlords, who were more effective is resisting state levies.**31 Considering these social trends, we can surmise that a larger population existed, but it was invisible to the government and could not be mobilized to solve urgent social problems. Could a similar problem have caused recruitment and other difficulties for Rome, which also depended on peasant registries?

After the post-Qin civil war, only three out of ten households remained on the register. After the post-Wang Mang civil war, the 57 CE census registered about one-third of the Former Han population. If we estimate that the 280 CE census figure registered only one-third of the people who survived the plagues and post-Han civil war, then China's population would be 54 million. A generation of peace and prosperity followed the reunification.32 Had it continued, the Jin would be in a decent position to deal with nomadic minorities.
…

Ancient texts lump social unrest under the rubric of "bandits," Chinese *zei* and Roman *latro*.71 Between the poles of ordinary criminals and usurpers were various agitators boiled up from the lower strata. Armed bands began to disturb *Pax Romana* in the mid-second century, when the army had to detach more troops for internal policing. The 187 "deserters' war" in Gaul engaged large forces. By the end of the fourth century, even the prefect of Rome dared not venture beyond the city wall because brigands infested Italian roads. **Throngs of travelers followed the regular tours of a governor, hoping to rub safety from his military escort. Thunderous laws were toothless against bandit collaborators, who were none other than the rich and powerful of local communities.**72
…

Economic bifurcation destabilized society as the poor in desperation joined the predatory rich or rose in protest. Local magnates offered protection in return for loyalty and gained the ability to evade more taxes. Armed bands grew, in some cases penetrated by elites who exploited peasant discontents for their own political ambitions.
…

A modern scholar describes what the Romans called *otium*: "The aristocratic ideal of leisure, inherited from the Greeks, led by an easy decline to the disdain of serious effort, to the advertising of elegant accomplishments as a pretext for sloth or emptiness."80 The aristocrats controlled high government.81 In office, **"they simply annexed the governmental machine to their style of life, which had regarded politics with studied hesitation, and administration as an opportunity to look after one's friends."**82 **Writing letters of recommendation for their friends and clients was their most assiduous job. "These were as accomplished and as jejune as the visiting cards of the mandarins of imperial China."**82 Latter Han literati provided a paradigm of such mandarins. Versed in the Canons that preach the sufficiency of exemplary personality, they swanked of *qinggao*, lofty purity, and made administrative incompetence into a virtue.83 Their ardent pursuits were fame and connections, the shortest route to advancement. Contemporaries complained, "High officials devote themselves to socializing and commend themselves pure for being aloof of administrative work."84 **"From triumvirs to provincial governors, all ignore state affairs and concentrate on receiving visitors whose Confucian robes clog the streets. … They leave documents to clerks and detainees of unheard cases to rot in prison, too busy in their private affairs of seeking influence and chasing advantages."**85 These do-nothing Roman and Chinese officials were not merely sophisticated idle mouths. Waltzing on the bridge of the *Titanic* on a collision course with an iceberg, they constituted brain tumors of the late empires.
…

Provincial governors acquired power far exceeding their official authority, because they appointed local officers, including county superintendents. Those serving long terms usurped sufficient authority over current and former appointees to screen out the central government; as a contemporary saying went, **"Orders from the region or province are received like thunderbolts. Imperial edicts arrive only to decorate the wall."**97
…

Many agitators, such as the initial Red Eyebrows in Wang Mang's reign, were desperate refugees of disasters eager to return to normal life. Unrest not mollified is usually contained if not suppressed, shackled by the insurgents' provincialism or lack of organization, as were the Jewish revolts in the Roman Empire. Chinese history is peculiar in its propensity for local fluctuations to amplify into empire-wide turmoil that ravaged the population and weakened if it did not topple the imperial government.106 **A spark spreading into a prairie fire happened thrice during the five centuries under our study. At least five more dynasty-change-related uprisings would occur in subsequent imperial history.**
…

Popular uprisings that vented mass grievances started the great rebellions in our period but did not end them. The Dazexiang mutiny against the Qin and the Yellow Turban cult against the Latter Han were suppressed. However, in each case, elites and adventurers capitalized on the commotion and turned the uprising into a ruinous anarchy of warlords. **Literati clans also commandeered the forces of the Green Foresters uprising against Wang Mang.** They escalated unrest and reaped its ultimate benefits.
…

Bandit gangs and local bullies jumped into action. **Literati clans, each with hundreds of households, rallied. Warlords called "heroes" mushroomed;** the final winner would become the founding emperor of a new dynasty.

Years or even decades of bloodletting winnowed incompetence, cultivated pragmatism, and left horrible experiences no one wanted to repeat. The carnage destroyed recalcitrant powers, taught flexibility to survivors, and opened the possibility for some social consensus. Like forest fires that burn away underbrush and clear the ground for new growth, the chaos created conditions for a period of stability. **Thus the political elite boasting of intellectual civility resorted to naked violence to solve real-world problems.**

***Geming*, into which "revolution" is translated in modern times, means in the Confucian Canons a radical shift of heaven's mandate from one family to someone unrelated.**116
…

The eighth emperor in a row to begin his reign as a child, Lingdì ascended in 168 to a throne surrounded by eunuchs and a government infested by incompetence, corruption, and factions. His proscription of anti-eunuch partisans alienated the literati. Many carried their grudge to the provinces and reinforced centrifugal regional powers.117

Ominous signs of heaven's displeasure multiplied. Most portentous was widespread disease. The plague struck in 171, then recurred. **Early in the epidemic appeared Zhang Jiao, who preached a millennium of grand peace** and attracted multitudes by healing with magic water. His disciples set up secret cells all around the country, penetrating the palace guard itself. In 181, a minister warned of potential unrest and suggested dispersion of cult members. **The government preferred toleration, not knowing the plan for armed uprising. Early in 184, within ten days of Zhang's order, eight of the empire's thirteen circuits were aflame, all in the prosperous interior.** Called the Yellow Turban for their headdresses and Moth Bandits for their large numbers, the rebels plundered communities and battered local governments. The central government hastily elevated generals, recruited volunteers, and pardoned proscribed partisans. Local elites, official and private, rallied against the rebels. Many personages of subsequent history made their debut in the fighting. **The Yellow Turban was quashed in nine months, but imitators and sympathizers continued to flare up around the empire.** The Han Dynasty was changed irreversibly.118
…

The literati's zeal to purify the world of eunuchs boiled over when the boy Shaodì succeeded Lingdì in 189. Surrounded by pardoned partisans, the famed literati-official Yuan Shao brushed aside warnings of dire consequences and urged the new regent to summon frontier generals. **Dong Zhuo was a military careerist whose potential insubordination had long worried the government. To him, the anti-eunuch summons came as a godsend.** Leading 3,000 seasoned troops into Luoyang, Dong swiftly absorbed other military forces, took control of the court, and deposed Shaodì to install his puppet, the nine-year-old Xiandì. Yuan Shao fled to the east and gathered three viceroys, seven governors, and other officials under an anti-Dong banner. In response, Dong moved the capital west to Changan and torched Luoyang to deny it to the enemy. **Hundreds of thousands of Luoyang residents were forced on the road, where myriads perished.** More starved in Changan, which was unprepared from the influx. The world rejoiced at Dong's assassination in 192. Unfortunately, the ministers who plotted it had no plan to manage his generals, who mutinied, sacked Changan, kidnapped the emperor, fought each other, and laid waste the western part of the country.120

Eastern China fared no better. Leaders of the anti-Dong coalition failed to agree on a course of action. While they vied in banqueting and rhetoric, **their pillaging troops killed almost half the population in the staging counties.**
…

Yangzi, the third largest river on earth after the Amazon and the Congo, has a discharge volume more than twenty times that of the Yellow River. Its strong eastward current would repeatedly block northern invaders in Chinese history. The 208 battle of Red Cliff set the precedent.
…

Cao Cao had promoted elementary education but offended the literati by appointing officers based on ability and performance instead of moral posture. **After Liu Bei's death, Zhuge Liang as the premier of Shu refused to indulge local elites and adopted Legalist policies of ruling by laws that were strict but clear and fair. His dedication to service and good governance won him the enduring love of the local people, who maintained shrines for ages.**124 However, they were unable to reverse a stubborn social trend. The growth of the great literati families, which began in the Latter Han, would persist through the centuries of disunity. Their estates would expand and their grip on high government offices would become effectively hereditary. Combining birth, culture, power, and wealth, the network of literati clans would culminate in a new aristocracy, *menfa shizu*.
…

In a long historical perspective, **the 208 battle of Red Cliff inaugurated protracted north-south fragmentation and separate development, ended only when the Sui Dynasty reunified China in 589.**

The Cao house picked up an effectively defunct Han court, reunited northern China, and then replaced Han by the Wei Dynasty upon merit. The Sima house that usurped the Wei throne to found the Jin Dynasty had no merit, only conspiratorial ambition. As a Wei minister, Sima Yi built up a faction and grabbed dictatorial power by a bloody coup. His grandson forced the abdication of the emperor and became Jin Wudì in 265. The Simas had been a literati family for generations. **Wudì promoted filial piety and demonstrated his love of relatives by enfeoffing many as plenipotentiary kings in strategic and populous regions.**125

For the second time, imperial China reverted to the Way of ancient kings. The Han's atavism lasted for three generations before vindicating the First Emperor's judgment, "To re-establish feudatories would be to encourage the use of arms." This time around, the retribution for ignoring history's lesson promptly descended on Wudì's successor. In the "catastrophe of the eight kings," which lasted from 300 to 307, imperial family members led hundreds of thousands of troops against each other. At its end, the lone survivor, Sima Yue, became the dictatorial regent to Huaidì. Power struggles continued to simmer. Physical damages to the country were great. Equally ruinous was the moral bankruptcy; the intrafamilial killing shattered the virtuous mask fashionable since the Latter Han. **Thus the Jin Dynasty committed hara-kiri. Ethnic minorities were ready to deliver the coup de grâce.**126

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1k4003vg&chunk.id=d0e1557&toc.id=d0e1557&brand=ucpress

In Weber as well, China is cited as one of the prototypes of a patrimonial bureaucratic state together with ancient Egypt. **The developed bureaucratic system was furnished with a rationality making it capable, at a glance, of passing for a modern bureaucracy.** However, in matters involving its content and basic principles, it could not transcend the bounds of the traditional ruling form. **In a word, it had reached the apex of the patrimonial bureaucracy. Although the *formal modernity* it possessed seemed to have complied without question with the development toward modern capitalism, in fact this made its actual compliance difficult.** The reason was that the rationality that this formal modernity imitated was in essence a one-sided, top-down, **false rationality that could not go beyond the patrimonial bureaucratic framework.**
...

Balazs, however, saw the successful modern Chinese revolution as analogous to traditional bureaucratic society. **In China, he argued, where the overwhelming majority of the population were poor peasants and the formation of a bourgeois class was weak, the intellectuals replaced the bourgeoisie in leading the revolution. The party bureaucrats who, as a result of the revolution, directed Chinese socialism—Balazs called it state capitalism—were comparable to the scholar-officials of the imperial era.** The economy was controlled by the power of the state; state farms, for example, he likened to farming on garrison lands in the earlier period.

Thus, Balazs considered Chinese socialism a contemporary edition of the old bureaucratic state and stressed its totalitarian flavor. **He pessimistically foresaw the trend toward totalitarianism—namely, bureaucratic, technocratic state control—covering the entire world, including the advanced nations of the West as well as the backward states that had formerly been colonies.**

In Balazs' understanding, the permanent quality of Chinese society revolved around the "bureaucracy." **He was forced to draw the conclusion that from the inauguration of the imperial system China had never in her history experienced feudalism—at least, it had never been effectively put into practice. Balazs argued that the Chinese Communists had dispensed with Marx's original four-stage schema (Asiatic society, classical slave society, medieval feudal society, and modern capitalist society), and in its place, with a schema borrowed from "vulgar Marxism," they had become adept at calling "feudal" everything that transpired between the "slave society" of ancient China and 1949.** Thus, Balazs argued, this all-inclusive "feudalism" only led to a confusion in understanding. Not that China's bureaucratic society wholely lacked feudal elements, **but in his view the principal ruling class in society had remained the scholar-officials, and they were not the great landowners truly befitting the station of a feudal class.**
...

[Roger Garaudy's] book, *Le problème chinois,*[62] also rejected the "dogmatic schema" that all human societies passed through the five stages of primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism; and he claimed that China had never experienced the slave mode of production. The prototypical slave system, he argued, flourished only in Mediterranean civilizations, whereas in China, as Tökei and others had noted, the Asiatic mode of production dominated society in the Shang-Chou period. From the Han dynasty on, the Asiatic mode in its prototypical form had ceased to exist, because the lack of private ownership (one of the basic features of this mode of production) disappeared owing to the privatization of land and the accumulation of slaves. **After the Asiatic mode, the feudal mode of production arrived,** but it was stamped with the remnants of the Asiatic mode and bequeathed a distinctiveness to Chinese feudalism.

Hence, Chinese feudal ownership in land, in Garaudy's view, was tied to the special privileges of the imperial bureaucrats, a sort of bureaucratic feudalism. **It differed immensely from the "pure feudalism" (of Europe) where the feudal lord was a direct recipient of rent paid in labor; and where all state functions, such as the military and the judicial system, were provided.** The transition to capitalism that European feudalism achieved by inheriting the commodity economy of classical slavery could not be brought about with this kind of feudalism. **Sprouts of capitalism, cropping up here and there, could not avoid a stage of mercantilism under state control. Rich merchants, intent on entering the official class, made the formation of a bourgeois class impossible.**

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1k4003vg&chunk.id=d0e2236&toc.id=d0e2236&brand=ucpress

In the time of Confucius, subsequent to that of Kuan-chung and Tzu-ch'an, **the task confronted by history was no longer simply the resolution of relations between aristocrats, but it had of necessity become their reaching down to make contact with the nonaristocratic strata.** Responding to these new conditions, Confucius sought a reconstruction of the moral order of society. In his famous phrase, he stated: "[There is government] when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."[5] **The proper place for prince and minister, and for father and son, had been taken for granted in the Chou patriarchal clan because they expressed the a priori condition of blood ties in human relations. Now this a priori conditionality was no longer a self-evident norm, however, and herein lies the historical importance of Confucius's words.**

Confucius's position under this new reality was not to bury traditional ethics through determination of blood ties but to value it consciously as a morality to be gained through acquired (a posteriori) effort. By the same token, this reveals the polarization of values at the time. **The contention between schools in the intellectual world of the Warring States period was a necessary phenomenon caused by the collapse of the principle of clan blood ties. The thoroughly political pragmatism of the Legalists formed the most radical countersupposition to this principle. They rejected all "communitarian" bonds that the people formed on their own, and they demanded that all men be directly under the control of the sovereign as atomized individuals.** (See the discussion of Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi's theory in the next section.) In order to complete this autocracy, a full-fledged bureaucracy was adopted, and officials never possessed any autonomy but were merely the sovereign's servants.

Legalist political views constituted one side of the new type of state in the Spring and Autumn–Warring States period. As the bureaucracy and the centralized system of commanderies and prefectures became more developed, they finally gave birth to the unified Ch'in-Han empire. This might be dubbed the final result of the dissolution of the ancient Shang-Chou state. But what social principle permeated this new historical world? The political principles of the Legalists—to bring the people as atomized individuals under control—doubtlessly constituted one aspect of the Ch'in-Han empire. **However, it would be an exaggeration to say that this alone was the sole principle at this stage. The ideas of the Confucians themselves, and in a certain sense this also served as a wellspring for the Legalists, was a view premised on the collapse of the notion of clan blood ties.** In actuality, Confucianism eventually gained access to the position of being the Han empire's guiding ideal.

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1k4003vg&chunk.id=d0e844&toc.id=d0e844&brand=ucpress

In 1939 the late Kato Shigeshi analyzed the historical differences between China and Japan. He argued that whereas in Japan a feudal system remained in existence over a long period of time, China had only experienced it early on in the Chou dynasty and that thereafter civil officials in a state bureaucracy had become the basis of Chinese government. Kato's argument goes as follows. **The Six Dynasties and late T'ang eras witnessed for a time the growth of private armies and the energetic activities of military men, but we do not see the development of a warrior class based on hereditary, lord-vassal relations, as in Japan. In China they were swallowed up into a civil government where power was centralized.** The expression *pu-ch'ü* had originally meant an army, but by the Sui-T'ang period it was a way of referring to the outcasts of society; this would indicate that military hierarchical relations did not mature into feudal hierarchical relations. Furthermore, this difference prescribed the nature of the social development of the Chinese and Japanese peoples, so that the evolution of a sound superior-inferior (lord-vassal, ruler-ruled) ethic in Japan nurtured the distinctive nature of the Japanese—profound in human emotions and firm in moral principles. It formed the basis for the sound development of the Japanese people.[4]
…

Ishimoda developed his views more fully in his later work. In his essay, "Chusei shi kenkyu no kiten: hokensei e no futatsu no michi ni tsuite" (The starting point for research into medieval history: On the two paths to feudalism),[6] he argued that the T'ang was an empire of the ancient world comparable to the Roman empire, and the peoples living along China's frontiers were subsumed within this world empire. **With the collapse of the T'ang empire came the individual formation of each of these nations and cultures.** In this process, Japan developed from an ancient state within the orbit of the T'ang toward a feudal state. Chinese society, however, gradually underwent a serious transformation through the transition from T'ang to Five Dynasties to Sung. One aspect of the shift from ancient empire to feudal state can be seen in the decentralization of power under the system of regional commanderies and the sharply militaristic nature of it. **However, the Sung dynasty, which emerged after this transitional period, took shape as a far more despotic, bureaucratic, and centralized state than any preceding dynasty. The aristocracy who had been the ruling class in ancient times collapsed precipitously, and a feudal domainal class did not crystallize as independent political forces.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Dynasties_and_Ten_Kingdoms_period

> The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (907-979) was an era of political upheaval and division in 10th-century
> Imperial China. Five states quickly succeeded one another in the Central Plain, and more than a dozen concurrent states were established elsewhere, mainly in South China. **It was the last prolonged period of multiple political division in Chinese imperial history.**[1]
> ...
>
> Towards the end of the Tang dynasty, the imperial government granted increased powers to the *jiedushi*, the regional military governors. **The An Lushan (755-763) and Huang Chao rebellions weakened the imperial government, and by the early 10th century the *jiedushi* commanded *de facto* independence from its authority. In the last decades of the Tang dynasty, they were not even appointed by the central court anymore, but developed hereditary systems, from father to son or from patron to protégé.** They had their own armies rivaling the "palace armies" and amassed huge wealth, as testified by their sumptuous tombs.[2]
> ...
>
> **Southern China, divided into several independent dynastic kingdoms, was more stable than the North which saw constant regime change.** Consequently, the Southern kingdoms were able to embark on trade, land reclamation, and infrastructure projects, laying the groundwork for the Song Dynasty economic boom. **This economic shift to the south also led to a vast southward migration.**[4]

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1k4003vg&chunk.id=d0e128&toc.id=d0e30&brand=ucpress

The invasions of Hsiung-nu, Hsien-pi, and others into North China provided the opportunity for **the first Sino-barbarian cooperation in the building of regimes, one of which, the Sui, eventually reunited China. We can see the remarkable attraction of many Chinese ways to these previously nomadic peoples once they conquered and occupied some part of China. Almost always they realized the necessity of relinquishing nomadic ways for sedentary agriculture, and often even the need to afford the military a secondary role in a society stressing the civil arts.** These two met with considerable consternation, resistance, and occasionally civil war, but ultimately won out. **So thoroughly "civilized" did the previously martial and nomadic Northern Wei become that they made lasting contributions to Chinese society and agriculture of a distinctly civil bent**—the *fu-ping* or militia system for compulsory military service, as opposed to a professional army, and the *chün-t'ien* or equitable field system for the fair parceling of arable land by the state.
...

One remarkable difference between the Six Dynasties and the so-called Dark Ages in Europe is that, while both witness the preponderance of military types because of ceaseless warfare, the military in China proved unable to form a dominant social class, even in the warrior states of the North, through which to rule over China. It might be possible militarily to create a state, even to make oneself emperor. But to rule China, or any part of it, almost always required educated bureaucrats, and in the process the "military" rulers became "civilized." **This process was particularly troubling in the North where racial antagonisms often flared.**

http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html#div-18

[17:21] Zi Lu said: “Does the noble man esteem bravery?”

Confucius said, “The noble man puts fairness first. **If the noble man is brave without fairness, he will be rebellious. If the inferior man is brave without fairness, he will become an outlaw.**”

https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2015/08/19/old-europeans-were-old-school-thugs/

Similarly, though Japanese civilization is influenced, perhaps even derived, in large part from Chinese civilization, one major distinction between the two is that in the ideal and often in practice the Chinese have subordinated military values to civilian ones to an exceptional extent for a pre-modern society. In contrast, the Japanese developed a military aristocracy which eventually superseded the civilian nobility. This results in the anachronistic romanticization of a martial ethos such as in bushido, which has no clear analogy in the Chinese world view. Obviously here I am not saying that the Chinese were a purely pacific people. And there were ages when martial values were ascendant, for example the early Tang. **But the fact that the founder of the Song dynasty, a general, encouraged a demilitarization of his ruling class makes much more sense in light of the ethos of Chinese elite culture going back to the end of the Warring States period.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/

The Mohists were deeply committed to the ideal of a harmonious, peaceful social order and to universal concern for the welfare of all the world. They condemned unprovoked military aggression and attempted to dissuade warlike rulers from attacking other states. **Far from being pacifists, however, they saw a strong defense force as crucial to state survival. Indeed, many Mohists seem to have concluded that, since social order was a paramount value and gratuitous warfare was wrong, they had a duty to assist victims of aggression. Some Mohists became specialists in defensive warfare, rushing to the aid of cities and states under threat of attack.** The last quarter of the *Mozi* preserves the texts of these militias, which present detailed information about ancient defense tactics and siege fortifications (for an overview, see Yates, 1980).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/social.html

Indeed, as Graham (1989) observes, their low social origins help to explain why the Mohists make no use of the paradigmatic moral contrast of Confucian ethics, **that between the *junzi* and *xiao ren,* terms that in Confucian usage carried a moral connotation ("noble man" vs. "petty man") but originally referred to social rank ("princeling" or "gentleman" vs. "commoner").** It may also help to explain the Mohists' frequent criticisms of the misguided judgments of the *junzi,* many of whom they probably regarded as ethically shortsighted conformists. For the Mohists, as for the Confucians, virtuous role models play an important part in moral education and practical reasoning. **To the Mohists, however, the exemplary individual is typically not the *junzi,* but the *ren ren* (humane man or man of goodwill), a term with no class overtones.**

A corollary of these conjectures about their social origins is that Mo Di and many of his early followers—including both the *Mozi* writers and their primary audience—may have had little formal education and would have been relatively unversed in the classical Chinese written language. This suggestion would help to explain the characteristic style of the core Mohist doctrinal essays, most of which are written in a simple, highly repetitive manner well suited to memorization and oral delivery, yet distinctive in the early Chinese literature for its ponderousness and inelegance. **(An anecdote in the *Hanfeizi* claims that the Mohist writing style was deliberate, because Mozi feared that even in rhetoric, ornamentation tended to interfere with utility.)** Parts of the text also show signs of having been composed in a colloquial dialect rather than the more terse, graceful written classical language.

The Mohists' social origins probably played a role in motivating certain basic features of their thought, particularly their focus on finding objective ethical standards. **For the *Ru* (Confucians), the traditional social roles and ritual etiquette of the waning Zhou dynasty provide a basis for consensus in ethical judgments. The Mohists identify far less with these traditional mores and so seek other ethical guidelines. Moreover, they think that the warfare and strife that blight their era result from errors in moral judgment.** Since some of those responsible for this disorder claim to be following traditional mores, such norms are clearly not a reliable source of ethical guidance. Hence the Mohists propose to judge practices not by whether they conform to the traditional rituals of a revered lost dynasty, but by utilitarian standards, such as whether they materially benefit society.

Their social background may also help to explain why Mohist consequentialism emphasizes material welfare and social order as basic goods that serve as standards of right. On the one hand, the Mohists were plain, down-to-earth craftsmen, tradesmen, and soldiers who could be expected to value practical utility. **But more importantly, the Mohists speak for those on the lower rungs of the social ladder who will be among the first to starve when the economy is mismanaged or to die pursuing the military ambitions of a capricious ruler.** A theme to which Mohist texts return repeatedly is the problem of meeting the basic subsistence needs of the common people.

Social factors could also have contributed to the Mohists' opposition to costly, extravagant funeral rituals and musical entertainment. As members of lower social strata, the Mohists probably felt no strong attachment to these elements of the traditional Zhou high culture and would have been inclined to see them as wasteful and pointless. **Also, the Mohists' conception of *Tian* (Heaven) as an anthropomorphic deity and their conviction that *Tian*, ghosts, and spirits reliably punish the wicked and reward the good may reflect folk religious beliefs that were less influential on Confucian and Daoist thinkers from higher social echelons.**

As Graham (1989) points out, however, despite the likely influence of the Mohists' social background on their thought, **there is no evidence that Mohism represents the ideology of a self-conscious craft or artisan class that sought to reform the established political order. Rather, the Mohists are ambitious, capable commoners for whom the passing of the old feudal system and the development of centralized, meritocratic bureaucracies have made promotion to the officer or knight (*shi*) class a possibility.** Like most other early Chinese thinkers—with the notable exception of Daoist anarchists—the Mohists advocate a centralized, hierarchical political system directed by virtuous leaders, and they aspire to positions of responsibility within such a system. Hence their doctrine of

“Elevating the Worthy” advocates promotion to office of anyone with ability, including farmers and artisans.

https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu#Chapter_III_·_Strategic_Attack

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000944559603200101

But the more serious difficulty in comparing the Indian and Chinese streams of strategic thinking stems from the strong ‘religious’ base of Indian thought. In contrast, Chinese thinking has an unmistakable ‘secular’ base. An off-shoot of the ‘religious’ element in India was the social organisation it produced. Warfare in India was almost exclusively the preserve and even the duty of the *kshatriya varna* (warrior class) which was hereditary, although specific instances of the priestly *brahman varna* can be found thinking about and engaging in warfare. **In China, although the *shi* (scholar-gentlemen) were trained in the military arts among other scholarly subjects, they did not constitute a hereditary group.**
...

Despite the great similarities -- almost identities -- between the two, there remains one major difference which has to do with the different social systems of India and China. As mentioned earlier, **SW’s thinking may be summed up in one sentence: *The victory is one where the enemy is subdued without fighting*. Such a sweeping doctrine would have been inconceivable for Kautilya because that would have devalued the entire hereditary warrior *varna*.** For this class, it was a disgrace to die anywhere except on the battlefield. So, a world without war was even theoretically inconceivable so long as one was within the established order. **But a world without war was not only conceivable but eminently desirable for those outside the fold i.e., the Buddhists and the Jainas. Emperor Ashoka established the Magadha empire as a warrior informed by the thinking embodied in the *Arthashastra*, but having done that he saw the futility of it all.** That wisdom made it impossible for him to continue as a warrior. And since he ceased to believe in the creed of warriors, his rightful place was outside the ‘Hindu’ fold, in the path of the Buddha.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR20#v=onepage&q&f=false

At the beginning of our stories, in each case about four centuries before empire formation, Rome and the Chinese states were all city sized. **In terms of political organization and economic development, however, the differences between them were as large as that between the West and the East in the nineteenth century.**13 **The Chinese world was still in the late Bronze Age, when feudalistic aristocrats basked in courtly elegance. The Mediterranean world was well into the Iron Age, when affordable metal tools and weapons empowered the working people.** The ancient worlds did not interact, but put side by side, the two histories of rise to empire make a story of China catching up with the West at high speed.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

Of the four ancient Old World civilizations, the Chinese was the youngest. Distinguishing features of civilization – writing, stratified society, urban settlement, monumental architecture – appeared in Mesopotamia and Egypt around 3000 BCE. **The Hittites used iron before 1200 BCE.**16 In China, the earliest excavated writings, in the form of inscriptions on oracle bones, dated to 1500 BCE. Metallurgical iron appeared shortly before 500 BCE and iron implements spread in the following two centuries, but their quality and prevalence varied regionally. A few specimens were of steel, but many were of poor quality iron that lay alongside tools of shell and stone in archeological sites. Weapons-grade iron, which required reduced brittleness, was rare in the warring states.17 Near the mausoleum of the First Emperor, who died in 209 BCE, archeologists unearthed iron tools in productions sites. **The product, the army of terracotta soldiers, held weapons of bronze, except some arrowheads.**18

Soon the Chinese iron technology surged, and its radical difference from contemporaneous Western technology indicates indigenous origins. Long iron swords replaced short bronze swords completely in the early Han Dynasty.19 Along with silk, Chinese iron made its way westward. By the middle of the first century CE, Roman encyclopedist Pliny the Elder wrote: **“of all the varities of iron, the palm goes to the Seric, sent us by the Seres with their fabrics and silks. The second prize goes to Parthian iron.”**
...

To endure illness, famine, and other misfortunes, people pooled their resources in communal living and production, mutual help that we may view as a form of insurance. **Scenes of Bronze Age communal farming are depicted on Achilles’ shield in Homer’s *Iliad* and in several poems in the Chinese *Odes*.**21 **Whereas the Homeric age belonged to the mythical past, communal farming was common in China well into the sixth century BCE, when historical memory was well developed. Reverting to it would become a Confucian ideal.**

The chariot, the prime weapon of the late Bronze Age in both the West and East, was expensive, demanding operational skill, and monopolized by aristocrats. Archeologists uncovered illustrations of chariots in Mycenaean tombs. **By the time Homer wrote about the Trojan War, however, their military function was so remote the poet treated them as glamorous cabs that drove warriors to the battleground, where they alighted to fight on foot.** Chariots as shock vehicles or mobile firing platforms dominated the Chinese battlefield in the Spring and Autumn period. **In contrast, the Romans used chariots only in races and triumphant parades, not in war.**22

Iron swords or spears suitable for infantry were more affordable to individual peasants. Moreover, iron tools elevated productivity and enabled family farms to generate enough surpluses not only to weather bad luck but also to buy weapons. **Iron spread in the Mediterranean world during the "dark age," about which we know little except that the state structures were weak if existent. By archaic Greece, the small peasant and infantryman were already economically independent and militarily active.** A modern scholar observes: "As metallurgy made iron weapons cheaper and more widely available, those who could use such weapons in warfare acquired higher status and with it a new claim on political power. **Athenian democracy, especially under the reforms of Cleisthenes, was made possible by the support he could count on from the infantrymen (hoplites)** who had become a critical component of Athenian military power."23 Military service was the paramount criterion for citizenship in Greco-Roman city-states, suggesting their probable military origins. **When Rome began to emerge under kings in the sixth century BCE, its social structure already contained widespread iron-using smallholders.** Self-equipped farmer-soldiers formed the basis of the Centuriate Assembly, the democratic branch of the Republican government that led Rome to acquire an empire.24

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n245/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Both Montesquieu and his panegyrists would have been more correct, had they traced back to this love of liberty all those scourges and intestine broils which harrassed Rome, from the expulsion of its Kings until the reign of the Emperors.—**Liberty perpetually convulsed the people, and the senate could only free themselves from their clamours by habitual war and foreign pillage. This perpetual state of hostility rendered the Roman the most warlike of all nations, and gave them that immense advantage which they enjoyed over all other people. To the man who has read the Roman history, nothing can be more evident.**—But if such be the merits of that liberty which expelled the Kings of Rome, that antisocial spirit, **which, sowing discord in the interior economy of families, drives them from their homes, inures them to fatigue and the inclemency of the weather, and gives them all the advantage and strength of robbers, by forcing them to live on plunder, after having denied them the sweets of social life,**—the antisocial spirit, I say, must needs possess the very same advantages.

Some commoners in feudalistic Chinese states held some political power because of their capacity as chariot warriors. Living in communal farms headed by aristocrats who controlled war gear, they were less powerful than were their Roman counterparts. **Contrary to the timing in Rome, here the states already possessed significant political structures before they promoted household farms and mass infantry.** Thus the Chinese farmer-infantryman emerged under the aegis of the state.
...

Land in ancient China was initially tied to aristocratic power. **Private land ownership emerged only in the fourth-century BCE reforms, when centralizing governments systematically allotted land to individual households in return for tax and military service.**
...

The Roman Republic being born in a competitive environment, its aristocrats were straightforward and vigorous, clear in political thinking, practical in economic cooperation, and strong in public spirit and corporate organization. In contrast, **centuries of dominance in the placid late Bronze Age produced elegant Chinese aristocrats who quoted poetry in political discourses, a habit Roman aristocrats acquired only after they conquered Greece.**197 Enjoying the fusion of hereditary rank, fief, and government office, feudalistic aristocrats cultivated virtues that rolled together familial and political concerns. **In the demanding times of socioeconomic progress and geopolitical rivalry, they could not compete with innovative upstarts, especially Legalist reformers. Yet they bequeathed their mentality to Confucian literati-officials who would constitute the "cultural aristocracy" of imperial China.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false

A leading classical scholar writes, **"it is notable that there was no internal opposition, among either Athenians or Romans, to empire as such. In Athens I do not know of a single dissenting voice; in Rome there were a tiny number."**148
...

In contrast, **Confucians, Daoists, and Mohists of the Warring States period joined in condemning the raging violence they were unable to stop. Instead of a triumphant parade, a funeral procession was suggested for victory.**150 It was the voice not only of the powerless opposition. Legalists working to strengthen the army and generals expounding the arts of war alike deemed armed conflict less effective than political manipulation in achieving results.151 **Even in essays publicly posted in Qin's capital during the reign of the future First Emperor, we find, "The military is the world's evil-boding tool. Bravery is the world's evil-boding virtue. Only with no option left does one resort to an ominous tool and practice an ominous virtue."**152 **This peculiarity struck Western scholars.**153 **One writes, "As against … Greek and Roman civilization, in traditional Chinese terms warfare was regarded as an activity in which to engage only in the last resort and only when necessity demanded."**154 **Another adds, "Herein lies the pacifist bias of the Chinese tradition. War is not easy to glorify because ideally it should never have occurred. The moral absolute is all on the side of peace."**155

> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/#AssCulLea

> This said, the *Book of Lord Shang* does speak at times of "teaching" or "indoctrination" (*jiao* □). Yet normally, this term refers not to imposition of a new set of values, but rather to the internalization of the government's regulations, which would allow the people to comply with the government's requirements without the need in coercion (cf. Sanft 2014). In a major discussion of *jiao*, the text says:
>
> > What is called "unification of teaching" is that … fathers and elder brothers, minor brothers, acquaintances, relatives by marriage, and colleagues all say: "What we should be devoted to is just war and that is all." … This is what I, your minister, call "unification of teaching." … **The people's desire for riches and nobility stops only when their coffin is sealed. And [entering] the gates of riches and nobility must be through military [service]. Therefore, when they hear about war, the people congratulate each other; whenever they move or rest, drink or eat, they sing and chant only about war.** (*Shang jun shu* 17:105; *Book of Lord Shang* 17.4)
>
> Teaching the people to "sing and chant only about war" could easily refer to military indoctrination, such as we encounter in other countries that employed mass armies. **Yet the *Book of Lord Shang* never speaks of, e.g., adoration of martial spirit, dehumanization of the enemy, identifying martiality with masculinity, and similar devices employed in militaristic education elsewhere.** Rather, for Shang Yang and other contributors to "his" book "teaching" means simply the people's internalization of the fact that the only way to satisfy their desires for riches and glory is to excel in war. Hence war, which elsewhere in the book is frankly associated with what the people hate (*Shang jun shu* 18:108; *Book of Lord Shang* 18.2), becomes the focus of the people's aspirations. "Teaching" is then not about ideological indoctrination; it is just about willful compliance with the government's policies.

…

The year after the end of the Hannibalic war that devastated Italy, the Roman Senate succeeded in driving the exhausted and reluctant people into a new theater of war, Macedon.159 After the victory at Changping on foreign soil, Qin's king refused to seize the military opportunity to take Zhao's capital, deciding instead to give his people a nine-month rest. **At the height of military conquests, the future First Emperor accepted a proposal to divert manpower to build the massive Zheng Guo Channel that would create farmlands.**160 Such guns-or-butter decisions reveal the relative militarism of the two states.

Impressions of disparate general attitudes toward warfare come with the first reading of classical literature. Historians writing about Republican Rome provided thick descriptions of fierce battles and glorious victories. The exhilaration incited envy in Tacitus, historian of *Pax Romana*: "Their subject were great wars, cities stormed, kings routed and captured. … Mine, on the other hand, is a circumscribed, inglorious field. Peace was scarcely broken – if at all."161 **In contrast, Chinese historians were so disdainful of soldiers and battles they recorded only the thinnest data with occasional mention of grand tactics.**162 Because of the difference in historiographical accent, we know much less about how the Chinese actually fought than we know about the Romans.

The Chinese had nothing remotely resembling Caesar's *The Conquest of Gaul*, but they surpassed the Romans in military theory. Six of seven Chinese military classics originated in the centuries preceding unification. Sunzi, known for his *Art of War*, was a contemporary of Confucius. Superior theory does not guarantee victory, however. Qin wisely preferred a voluble theoretician to an experienced soldier as adversary. To break the stalemate at Changping, it launched a political operation that caused Zhao to replace the grizzled field commander Lian Po by the learned Zhao Kuo, whose fiasco at the battlefield inspired the idiom "to talk fighting on paper."163 **Hann Fei argued that the vanity of book learning is a bane to a state's military strength; <u>those who can talk like a general scorn fighting as foot soldiers.</u>**164 The Romans would probably nod. **Common Roman soldiers enjoyed far higher esteem than did their Chinese counterparts, except perhaps in Qin.** The superbly trained legions had their proud identity and initiative. **A modern historian observes that the Romans "placed little weight on the tactical and strategic skills of the commanders but instead saw victory as principally won by the soldiers themselves along with the city's god."**165

The Romans "seem to have been born with weapons in their hands; never do they take a break from training or wait for emergencies to rise," observed the first-century historian Josephus. Modern historians concur: "Roman society can be seen as deeply militaristic from top to bottom, **in a way and to an extent that is not true of any Greek state, not even Sparta.**"166

…

Xunzi found the military organizations of Qi and Wei inferior to that of Qin, where Shang Yang's integration of peasantry and infantry turned the entire male population into farmer-soldiers or, more exactly, farmer-reserves.170

Qin's rule of law tried to forge public solidarity. **Xunzi observed that its people were by nature bellicose. Shang Yang's reforms criminalized private feuds and aroused the people's verve by making merit in warfare and farming the only criteria for social honor.**171 The result is visible in the terracotta army stationed near the First Emperor's mausoleum. Even in clay, the roughly 7,000 warriors exude pride worthy of the honor they received. They are not the stereotypical faceless horde. **Great effort was taken to give each statue facial individuality. Such respect for common soldiers contrasts with the shameful mistreatment of them in the imperial China of literati-officials.**172

…

A Qin man was liable to serve two years, not necessarily consecutive, during his military life from age fifteen to sixty. Evidence reveals the two-year term to be an approximation, but not a bad one.173

…

Chinese literati who condemn Qin's levy as draconian should look at the Romans. It was originally thought that after Rome expanded overseas, a qualified citizen served on the average six to seven years during his military life from age seventeen to forty-six. Recent research shows that actual terms were closer to the legal maximum of sixteen years, plus for extra years in case of grave emergency. **From 200 to 168 BCE, a yearly average of 16 percent of adult male Roman citizens served abroad. During the wars of the first century BCE, roughly one-third of adult males were engaged for years.** Such a prolonged high level of the draft would have ruined the economy if Rome's imperial expansion were not mostly financed by plunder and enslavement.175
…

Jin, the busiest state in the Spring and Autumn period, went to war about one year in two. During the 232-year period from 453 BCE – when Jin effectively disintegrated into three – to 221 BCE – when Qin united China into one, Qin went to war in at least 114 years.182

Rome engaged in war almost annually for nearly three centuries since it expanded beyond its Latin neighborhood. More specifically, it went to war in at least 203 years during the 215-period from 264 BCE – when the legions invaded Sicily – to 49 BCE, when Caesar marched on Rome. Its regularity was exceptional even in war-prone antiquity. Athens was at war only two years in three during the century and a half since the Persian War.13 **Nevertheless, Athens fought more frequently than Qin, the most militaristic state in China.**
…

The struggle with Hannibal was the Republic's largest protracted foreign war, at the peak of which it fielded 240,000 men annually. **The battle of Philippi in 42 BCE, the largest in the civil war, engaged about 200,000 Romans and a comparable number of auxiliaries for both sides.**185

The Chinese word *wan*, meaning "ten thousand" or simply "myriad," was especially common in casual usage. In many contexts, "ten *wan* troops" served the same purpose as "a thousand ships" in Homer. Armies in the tens of *wan* were common in the warring states literature. **Zhao was said to have lost more than 400,000 troops at Changping, the largest and probably the longest campaign of the period,** and still had resources left for stiff resistance. Such an army deployed by one of seven contenders seems incredibly large, considering the population and margin of surplus of the time. After China was united and economy bloomed, the Han Dynasty mobilized the resources of the whole country against the northern nomads and the literati screamed at the burden of 130,000 to 300,000 troops.186
…

Sunzi writes, "The best offensive is directed against the enemy's deliberation; next, its diplomacy; next, its army; the worst, its fortified cities."192
…

Fan Ju's phrase quoted above – "attack not only their territories but also their men" – taken by itself, is misinterpreted by a Western historian as the enunciation of a "policy of mass slaughter."194 Perhaps violence, like beauty, is in the eye of beholders. Language, context, timing, and subsequent action all refute this interpretation. **The purpose of attacking decision makers or their deliberation is precisely to reduce military costs and mass casualties.** The warring states usually did not aim to annihilate their enemies. Sunzi was only one among many to write, "Leave a gap when encircling an army. Do not press an exhausted invader."195 The enemy's desperate fight for survival may increase one's own casualties. Such tactics of limited battles may seem insipid in the West. A military historian writes:

> The overall aim of western strategy, whether by battle siege or attrition, almost always remained the total defeat and destruction of the enemy, and this contrasted starkly with the military practice of many other societies. Many classical writers commented on the utter ruthlessness of hoplites and legionaries, **and in the early modern period, the phrase *bellum romanum* acquired the sense of "war without mercy"** and became the standard military technique of Europeans abroad.196

…

Geography made water handy in China, where rivers were often diverted and dikes broken to flood cities or degrade their fortification. Such was the fate of fortified Yancheng, where a large Chu army blocked Qin's invasion in 279 BCE. **Bo Qi built a channel that directed a torrent to punch a gap in the city wall. Hundreds of thousands inside drowned,** their bodies deposited by the current in a depression thereafter called the Stinking Pond.197
…

During the last 130 years preceding unification, when the scale of wars peaked, Qin was said to have killed 1.5 million of its enemies. Bo Qi was the most ferocious of the warring states generals. In his four great battles over three decades, including the destruction of Yancheng, total enemy dead exceeded 1 million. **At that time, the population of China was estimated at 20 million.**208 Qin's brutality was notorious. Caesar's clemency was famous. Sometimes he did not kill all his prisoners but only chopped off the hands of warriors. **For his eight-year Gallic campaign, the number of enemy dead reported ranged from 400,000 to 1 million, when the total population of Gaul was about 3 million.** Adding the casualties of his wars in the east, but excluding Romans killed in the civil war, one account credited 1.2 million deaths to his legions.209 All figures include both soldiers and civilians massacred in all situations.
…

Caesar reported that after his victory over the Atuatuci, he auctioned off in a single lot all men, women, and children, totaling 53,000. Altogether, he sold up to 1 million Gauls, the proceeds of which sales gratified his officers and troops.211 **Lacking sophisticated free markets for slaves, Bo Qi had a problem with the horde of prisoners taken in Changping. He figured, "Zhao soldiers are fickle. If we do not kill them all, they may rebel."** Three years later, Bo was dismissed for refusing to command the siege of Handan. Upon receiving from the king the sword for suicide, he exclaimed, **"What crime against heaven have I committed to come to this?" After a pause he**

answered his own question: “I deserve to die. After Changping, I tricked and killed hundreds of thousands of surrendered Zhao soldiers. This is enough for the death penalty.” He cut his own throat.212

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false

For the problem of nomadic incursions, which had worried policy makers since the beginning of Han, the literati offered a breezy doctrine, iterated endlessly to counter all arguments: **“Confucius says, ‘When aliens are defiant, attract them by cultivating urbane virtue.’” “Yao performed the shield-dance ritual and the barbaric Miao submitted.” “Disband the army and promote civility, abandon force and practice virtue, demolish gates and passes, dismantle border fortification and defense, and preach benevolence and righteousness, then invasive threats on the northern frontier will disappear and the Middle Kingdom will be free of war worries.”** “The *Spring and Autumn Annals* says: The benevolent king is invincible.” “The ruler who adopts benevolent policies is indomitable in the world, where is the need for defense expenditure?”96 It was not the illusion of a few. **No sooner did a part of the Xiongnu surrender than calls for complete disarmament became so loud in the government that Yuandì had to order in 33 BCE, “Stop advocating the abandonment of border defense.”**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA187#v=onepage&q&f=false

High officers meritorious for founding the Former Han Dynasty gathered to brag, drink, and, when high-spirited, shout and bang their drawn swords on pillars. **Annoyed by his former comrades, Gaodì appointed Confucians to design protocols.** Watching hundreds of officers perform a ceremony in 200 BCE, he remarked, “Now I know the dignity of being emperor.”1
…

Guangwudì and the generals who helped him found the Latter Han Dynasty in 25 CE were mostly wealthy landlords who discussed Confucian Canons when dismounted.3 To his crown prince’s questions on strategy, **the emperor quoted Confucius: “Military affairs I have not studied.”**4
…

After defeating Antony, Augustus discharged about half of the armies on both sides. Loyal legionaries he pensioned off or settled in colonies. The soldiers he retained he organized into twenty-eight legions plus a comparable force of auxiliaries, totaling about 300,000 troops. This army dwarfed the ten to fourteen legions with which the Republic conquered an empire; Caesar had opened his Gallic campaign with six legions and won the climactic siege of Alesia with 30,000 to 40,000 legionaries plus auxiliaries.7 **Augustus faced no foreign threat but needed an army to secure his own monarchical power.** Breaking with Republican tradition, the new imperial army comprised professional soldiers serving sixteen years or more, all having sworn loyalty to the emperor’s person and family. **A large peacetime standing army organized as a strike force was a peculiarity of the Roman Empire.**
…

In China, armed forces were far less influential in imperial succession than dowager empresses backed by the ideology of filial piety.
…

Han emperors never took the field in a foreign war after Gaodì’s debacle with the Xiongnu. They participated in strategic decisions and assigned generals to fight. In contrast, the almost supreme value that the Romans put on military conquest and victory made it dangerous for an emperor to allow expeditionary generals too much glory. **Augustus with his overwhelming prestige could send legates and arrogate their honor. Lesser emperors tried to monopolize command. After Trajan, emperors were obliged to campaign in person.**60 **Despite the powerful image of leading an army, a head of state who dared not delegate field command was politically weak.** He was becoming hostage to the military.
…

Despite recruitment difficulties, Rome excluded from its army slaves and people of base occupations such as innkeepers or cooks. The honor and pride of the military admitted no compromise.149

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius7.html#c6
>
> [6.1] In the Second Punic War, when after several defeats there were no more young Roman men of military age available, the senate, on the motion of Ti. Gracchus the consul, decreed that slaves might be bought by the state, to fight against the enemy. When the tribunes reported this to the people, three persons were appointed, who collected twenty four thousand slaves. After the slaves took an oath that they would be true, faithful and courageous, while the Carthaginians remained in Italy, they sent them away to the camp. Out of Apulia also, two hundred and seventy men were bought from the Paediculi to supplement the cavalry. **How great is the strength of bitter Fortune! That city which till that time loathed to have soldiers who were exempt from tax even though they were freeborn, that very city was now constrained to summon the bodies of slaves from their servile hovels, and other slaves from the huts of shepherds, to be the chief strength of their army.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA232#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Xiongnu grew strong during the post-Qin civil wars and defeated many nomadic tribes to forge a confederacy. Among its victims was the Yuezhi, who originally dwelt on the rich pastures north of the Qilian Range, which would become the Han’s Hexi Corridor. **Evicted by the Xiongnu, the Yuezhi rode into Western history. There they**

were known as the Tokhari, the nomads who took Bactria from the Greeks who followed Alexander, according to the Greco-Roman political geographer Strabo.21 They overran Bactria in what is now northern Afghanistan in the 120s. **The Kushan Empire they founded lasted until 225.** To the north, its arts influenced the Scythians beyond the Roman frontier north of the Black Sea. To the south, its realm stretched beyond the Indus River. Roman merchants sailing from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to buy Chinese silk at the ports of what are now Pakistan and northwestern India called the hinterland Scythia.22

The Han pursued the Yuezhi as an anti-Xiongnu ally. **The Han envoy Zhang Qian reached the Yuezhi in 128 BCE, only to find them about to overrun Greek Bactria, with no intention to cooperate with the distant Han and settle their grudge against their former enemy.**
…

Parthia received an emissary from Han Wudì and returned an embassy in 113 BCE. A few years later, the first silk-bearing caravan arrived from the east via Bactria.26

Parthia offered friendly alliance to the Roman Republic in 92 BCE. Sulla treated its envoy with contempt and allowed only vassal status.
…

The Xiongnu at their apex claimed 300,000 bow drawers or adult males. From that figure was can estimate that the Xiongnu population was about 1 million, which fits the usual comment of Han officials that the Xiongnu had only the population of a large Han province. Below the Xiongnu supreme leader, titled *chanyu*, were the left and right wise kings. They presided over the ruling council comprising six pairs of hereditary aristocrats. Twenty-four generals each commanded between a few thousand to 10,000 cavalry, which together constituted an active army of roughly 150,000 warriors, about one-half of the army reserve.31
…

Zhang Qian, who had been captured by the Xiongnu and detained for ten years before escaping to reach the Yuezhi, returned from the west in 126 BCE. Based on the intelligence he gathered, he proposed befriending western states “to sever the right arm of the Xiongnu” and deprive it of much needed resources. **Especially important was Wusun, a major nomadic state with a population about half a million in the Ili Valley near the border between today’s China and Kazakhstan.** The enthusiastic Wudì sent Zhang on a second imperial embassy, laden with gifts.
…

Xuandì capitalized on Wudì’s investment in a marriage alliance with the Wusun and grasped an opportunity to negotiate a joint military operation in 72 BCE. A distant ally neutralized the Xiongnu’s advantage of withdrawing beyond the Han’s capacity of pursuit. The news of a Han mobilization sent the Xiongnu fleeing en masse, so that the Han army captured only strayed enemies, as happened before. This time, however, it was augmented by the long second arm of a strategic pincer. **Slammed into the Wusun army, the withdrawing Xiongnu forces suffered great losses.** The Xiongnu sent a large army against Wusun for revenge, only to have it decimated by a killer snowstorm. Afterward the Xiongnu declined precipitously.46

In 60 BCE, the Han established its Protectorate of the Western Territory, which ruled over thirty-six statelets and lasted on and off for more than a century.47 Thus China marched to control what is now its Xinjiang Province for the first time. **It would repeat the feat twice, the first time in the seventh century and the second in the early eighteenth century,** less than a century before the United States expanded across western America in pursuit of its own manifest destiny.
…

When Parthia meddled in the Armenian succession, Nero summoned his council and asked, “Was it to be a hazardous war or a humiliating peace?” The council decided on war without hesitation.111 **When Gaodì died, Chanyu Maodun asked for Empress Lü’s hand, saying he had always desired to reside in the Middle Kingdom. The empress rejected the insolence but sent gifts and begged him not to invade.** In the subsequent decades, Han emperors repeatedly asked their courts whether to renew the amity treaty. They preferred paying tribute and offering princesses to a hazardous war.112
…

Wudì’s offensive against the Xiongnu was closer to a war of necessity than were the wars of Augustus and Trajan; the Xiongnu had frequently invaded and were gaining strength from Han tributes. Yet his military achievement became a black spot of his reign. Literati-officials objected to posthumous honor because of it. Ban Gu obliterated it in the short praise that concludes Wudì’s annals in the *Book of Han*.114

The three martial emperors each suffered a significant setback shortly before his death. Wudì lost an army in the Western Territory. Augustus lost three legions in the Teutoburg Forest. Trajan was forced to withdraw from Mesopotamia. The defeats prompted the first two to rethink their policies. **Wudì issued the Luntai Edict, which blamed others for the defeat, halted foreign expansion, and limited military activities to maintaining readiness, so that the people could rest and devote themselves to farming and enrichment.**115 **Augustus saved his thoughts for an advice appended to his will, read posthumously. Unlike Wudì’s edict, its text has not survived. According to Tacitus, he counseled that the Empire be kept within its present frontiers.** Dio included his warning that further expansion would be difficult to defend and might cause the Empire to lose what it had already acquired.116

The similar admonitions from Wudì and Augustus elicited different responses. **Wudì’s edict came to be called the Luntai Contrition. Ban Gu exaggeratedly said that the emperor “deeply regretted his previous policies.”**117 Subsequent arguments often referred to it. Overall, Wudì’s retrenchment won applause and exerted constraint. **Contrast Tacitus’ remark on Augustus’s advice: “Either he feared danger ahead, or he was jealous.” Germanicus campaigned as if it did not exist. Hadrian did not invoke it to justify his**

controversial decision of abandoning Trajan's conquests.118 **Nor did Commodus mention it when he ended his father's war.** The rate of Roman expansion subsided after Augustus, but none of his successors won admiration for restraint.119 **Indeed, Tacitus indicted Tiberius for dereliction: "Rome was plunged in gloom, the ruler uninterested in expanding the empire."**120
…

Claudius invaded Britain mainly because he needed the military glory to firm up his shaky succession. After his conquest, no emperor could afford to be the one who lost Britain, regardless of the resources it drained from the Empire.121 Guangwudì refused to lift a finger to prevent western states from joining the Xiongnu to despoil frontier populations. **Having gained the throne by insurrection, he was eager to please his supporters, landlords of the interior unwilling to pay for frontier security.**122 **In these cases, the emperor's self-interest could take partial cover in characteristic values, Roman glory or Han urbane virtue.**
…

Han literati decried expenditures to justify their reluctance in resisting Xiongnu incursions and their eagerness for abandoning Liangzhou to Qiang rebels. **Selfishness, not virtue, led them to refuse help to frontier kin who fought for the safety of all,** countered Sang Hongyang, who compared the interior and frontier to a person's trunk and limbs. Chan Cuo wrote that frontier people yearned for protection and would desert if they felt ignored by their government.123 Their arguments were equally cogent against parochialism in the late Roman Empire. **Themistius, mid-fourth-century senator and a favorite of three emperors, opposed defending Syria or rebuilding the cities ruined by German raids: "even if we succeeded in doing so, the only ones to notice would be the Syrians, Thracians, and Gauls, and the victory in each case would belong only to the neighboring territory. But if a moderate fiscal policy were conducted, it would be for the common benefit of all those inhabiting the world."**124 **To paraphrase Yu Xu's retort to a similar argument, if Gaul fell to barbarians, Rome would not enjoy low taxes for long.**
…

In contrast, Theodosius rewarded the Goths who ravaged several provinces, contented with levying troops from them. **Guangwudì preached, "Those who sacrifice the near in pursuit of the distant labor in futility. Those who sacrifice the distant in pursuit of the near enjoy fruits in leisure."**126 Their minimization of effort won contemporary flattery. For Theodosius's complacency, his son's generation paid with the ruins of Greece and Italy. The consequences of Guangwudì's myopic foreign policy were longer coming, **but modern scholars blame it partly for the loss of northern China and the subsequent three centuries of bloody disunity.**127
…

The imperial army consisted of 300,000 to 645,000 soldiers who, serving almost lifelong terms, lived segregated from the civilian world.
…

When Trajan invaded Dacia, he met an army whose best soldiers were recruited from the Roman Empire and whose siege machines were built by Roman artisans. After his first victory, he demanded the return of all Roman deserters and forbade the Dacian king to accept the service of any Roman.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA282#v=onepage&q&f=false

When Stilicho bought the services of Visigothic troops for 4,000 Roman pounds of gold, senators cried, "This is not a treaty, but a pact of slavery." Rome and Constantinople each had about 2,000 senators; the richest senators each had an annual income of 4,000 Roman pounds of gold and 160,000 Roman pounds of silver, plus one-third as much in produce. **They routinely spent 2,000 Roman pounds of gold on a single program of seven games but stripped public artwork to pay for public security.**77 We will see that the Han literati turned into brutal warlords and the Romans massacred the families of barbarian soldiers enlisted in the Roman army. Thus urbane virtue or religious love, which featured prominently in propaganda, was not the essential ground for their opposition to defense spending. As they pushed their own agendas, imperial armies were starved of adequate provisions, just when foreign enemies threatened the survival of the empires. **Generals unsure of replacements avoided battles because they could not risk casualties.** A modern scholar observes, "Perhaps the most basic reason for the failure of the imperial government… was that the two main groups in the Latin world – the senatorial aristocracy and the Catholic Church – dissociated themselves from the fate of the Roman army that defended them. Both groups unwittingly sapped the strength of the army and of the imperial administration."78
…

Roman militarism and plutocracy has been congruous through the high Empire, when emperors and top civilian and military officers all came from the senatorial order. **Since the 260s, senators dropped from military command and their political influence waned.** Soldier-emperors rose from the ranks. Diocletian, Constantine, Valentinian I, and Valens all hailed from provinces known for army recruitment rather than cultural elegance. Yet these energetic men did not lack brains. **They were the ones to develop a civilian bureaucracy separated from the military,** for it better met practical needs of the empire.

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Historia_Augusta/Probus*.html#ref85
>
> 20 1 These spectacles finished, he made ready the war with Persia,[85] but while on the march through Illyricum he was treacherously killed by his soldiers. 2 The causes of his murder were these: first of all, he never permitted a soldier to be idle, for he built many works by means of their labour, saying that a soldier should eat no bread that was not earned. 3 **To this he added another remark, hard for them, should it ever come true, but beneficial to the commonwealth, namely, that soon there would be no need of such soldiers.** 4 What had he in his mind when he made this remark? Had he not put down all barbarian nations under his feet and made the whole universe Roman? 5 **"Soon," he said, "we**

> **shall have no need of soldiers." What else is this than saying: "Soon there will not be a Roman soldier? [Romanus iam miles erit nullus]** Everywhere the commonwealth will reign and will rule all in safety. 6 The entire world will forge no arms and will furnish no rations, the ox will be kept for the plough and the horse be bred for peace, there will be no wars and no captivity, in all places peace will reign, in all places the laws of Rome, and in all places our judges." 21 1 But in my love for a most excellent emperor I am proceeding further than a **prosaic style [pedestris sermo]** requires.
> ...
>
> That most famous remark of Probus itself reveals what he hoped to have brought about, for he said that soon there would be no need of soldiers. 23 1 He, truly conscious of his powers, stood in fear of neither barbarian nor pretender. 2 What great bliss would then have shone forth, if under his rule there had ceased to be soldiers! **No rations would now be furnished by any provincial, no pay for the troops taken out of the public largesses, the commonwealth of Rome would keep its treasures forever, no payments would be made by the prince, no tax required of the holder of land; it was in very truth a golden age that he promised. [aureum profecto saeculum promittebat]** 3 There would be no camps, nowhere should we have to hear the blast of the trumpet, nowhere fashion arms. That throng of fighting-men, which now harries the commonwealth with civil wars, would be at the plough, would be busy with study, or learning the arts, or sailing the seas. Add to this, too, that none would be slain in war. 4 O ye gracious gods, what mighty offence in your eyes has the Roman commonwealth committed, that ye should have taken from it so noble a prince?

The death of Valentinian I in 375, which almost coincided with the immigration of the Visigoths, inaugurated a new age. **A child was left on the Western throne. The blue-blooded and demilitarized aristocracy revived and by the fifth century grabbed all top positions in the civilian government.**79 The Han government followed the same path. By the second half of the Latter Han, Confucian masters occupied about 47 percent of the top offices.
...

The Roman army in the fifth century was a mystery. Official lists gave its strength at 645,000 – powerful indeed. Accounts of barbarians running around almost unchecked within the Empire, however, raise the question of just where the Roman army was.92 Many scholars argue that up to one-half of the official army existed only on paper. A soldier absent without leave remained on the official roster for four years.93 The depleted army delighted barbarian invaders but not Roman taxpayers, as a historian explains: **“whether they were alive or dead or totally imaginary, pay and allowance were issued for 645,000 men.”**94
...

Hunnic warriors did not exceed 15,000 by much, but they skillfully incorporated the peoples they defeated into their confederation **to build “an empire of many colors,” akin to the Xiongnu’s “great state of a hundred fierce peoples,” *baiman daguo*.** Their Germanic subjects were so numerous that a Germanic dialect became a major language of their realm. **The Huns realized Tacitus’s nightmare by uniting a large number of Rome’s poor northern neighbors into something akin to a rival imperial power.** If they had had a poetic virtuoso like Virgil, they might have sung the glory of raising the lowly and humbling the haughty.140

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0105%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D97
>
> [6] **For if the Scythians were united, there is no nation which could compare with them, or would be capable of resisting them;[3] I do not say in Europe, but even in Asia**—not that they are at all on a level with other nations in sense, or in that intelligence which uses to advantage the ordinary means of life.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA165#v=onepage&q&f=false

Only sixteen years when his father Valentinian I died, Gratian heralded the age of child emperors. Wealthy senatorial aristocrats, effete and inept, resurged in power. **After Hadrianople, emperors ceased to campaign in person in foreign wars and hence gave up direct control of the army.** Crucial decisions began to pass from the emperor to generals and high aristocrats, who struggled for power behind the scene.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Uq3gBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA297#v=onepage&q&f=false

Unlike Valentinian I, who gained experience as a soldier, Gratian received the best classical education. **He promptly replaced the rough and tough appointees of his father by men of letters. His tutor, a great poet, became the praetorian prefect. Senatorial aristocrats from venerable and immensely rich families monopolized all high offices in the civilian government. They had long converted from militarism to cultural elegance as dainty as that of the Han literati. Many jumped to top positions without any experience in administration, for which they had neither interest nor respect.**153

Catholic bishops were another group that crowded Gratian’s court. They shared the delicate sensitivity of aristocrats and disdained the vulgarity of soldiers.
...

Not until 441-444 did the emperor demand that aristocrats and the Catholic Church should pay regular taxes. By then **the state was so bankrupted by the loss of Africa it was unable to supply veteran troops, not to mention equip new recruits.** Even so, much of the extra revenue went to compensate dignitaries who lost African estates.157

Gratian left another detrimental legacy. **Illyricum in the Balkans was home to some of the best soldiers and military leaders in the Empire. It was hitherto under the jurisdiction of the western emperor. Gratian ceded it to the east when he appointed Theodosius to succeed Valens,** although as the dominant emperor he had no reason to give up anything. **The alienation of this military nursery reduced the number of martial competitors for government offices.** It also created great recruitment difficulties for later generals who faced a critical shortage of soldiers to counter barbarian invaders.158
…

Stilicho's preference of a dignified death to a ruinous civil war would put many pure-blooded Romans to shame. **Nevertheless, the tide had turned against naturalized citizens with the ascendancy of aristocratic and theological ideologies. No one with a German name held supreme Roman command after Stilicho.** The glass ceiling was nothing compared to the gory floor. Constantinople led the way in 400. In the coup against a powerful general of Gothic extraction, thousands of barbarians serving in the Roman army were burned to death in the church wherein they took asylum. If Alaric had been nudged by the event to stir in 401, he benefited much more in the aftermath of Stilicho's demise. The Romans slaughtered wholesale the families of more than 10,000 barbarian soldiers he enlisted, many formerly Radagaisus's Goths. The outraged husbands and fathers threw their lots with Alaric.162

The master of office who plotted the downfall of the generalissimo and took control of the government neither honored Stilicho's agreement with Alaric nor prepared for Visigothic reaction. **The imperial court was untouchable in Ravenna, protected by swamps and supplied from the sea.** Rome was more vulnerable.
…

When Alaric stormed through Greece, many cities yielded without resistance. **Zosimus wrote, "Even Sparta herself was swept away in the common destruction of Hellas. She was no longer fortified by arms or by warriors owing to the exploitation of the Romans."**169
…

The Western Empire gathered its remaining troops. The Eastern Empire assembled an armada designed to land a large army on Africa. The Vandal fleet seized the opportunity of a favourable wind to launch fireships into the invading armada. **The fireships in the 468 battle of Cape Bon burned away the last hope of the Western Roman Empire,** just as the fireships of the 208 battle of Red Cliff blazed the way to a fragmented China for centuries.172

The Visigoths sensed the wind change and switched from playing Roman politics to military expansion, until they established an autonomous kingdom in Spain and southern Gaul. Other resident barbarians promptly followed suit. **When all provinces with their tax revenues broke away, the Roman army in Italy demanded land to substitute for lost pay.**

> http://attalus.org/translate/valerius7.html#c6
>
> Because of the same defeat [of Cannae], the senate wrote back in answer to Otacilius and Cornelius Mammula, the one propraetor of Sicily, the other of Sardinia, **who both complained that the allies were not providing either pay or provisions for their fleets and armies, while they themselves did not have the resources to provide them: that the senate had no money in the treasury for foreign [longinquis] expenses, and therefore instructed them to take the best course they could to provide for themselves. In this way the senate moved the government quite out of their own hands, and in a few words abandoned Sicily and Sardinia, [his litteris quid aliud quam imperii sui gubernacula e manibus abiecit Siciliamque et Sardiniam, … dimisit]** which were two of the kindest nurses of our city, the strength and support of their wars, subdued with so much blood and sweat, **because of the severe demands of necessity.**

…

The legal ban on private arms had been lifted in 440. However, only a handful of Roman resistance efforts were known, mostly a magnate assembling a force to defend his own locality, as Valentinus did to fend off a Gothic assault on Selge.178 Rome twice opened its gates to enemies incapable of siege.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA152#v=onepage&q&f=false

When barbarians came, the resistance of Roman citizens was weaker than that of Chinese subjects under similar circumstances. Even in Rome, citizens once unsurpassed in public spirit did not defend the city symbolic of honor. Twice they opened the city gate and surrendered.

> https://archive.org/details/a589105200kinguoft/page/n151/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Overblown with self-conceit, the Romans refused him. They would listen to no conditions. **They were in a thoroughly Chinese temper. You will find the Byzantine empire in the same temper centuries after; blinded to present weakness by the traditions of their forefathers' strength.** They had worshipped the beast. Now that only his image was left, they worshipped that.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=t2c4t4yw21gC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

But it was not until the spring of 702 that a further revision of the codes was concluded and a full organization of administrative bodies was proclaimed in the *Taihôryô* or code of Taihô – Taihô being an era name, meaning Great Treasure, which was meant to introduce the new measures under good auspices.

By this new system the central government consisted of two parts, the Department of Worship (Jingi-kan) and the Department of State (Dajô-kan). **The Department of Worship took precedence over the Department of State.** It was concerned with the performance of the great religious ceremonies (such as the rites of enthronement and national purification, and the festivals of the first-fruits and harvest thanksgiving), the upkeep of shrines, the discipline of shrine wardens, and the recording and observance of oracles and divinations. **It presided over the worship of the national divinities, and had nothing to do with Buddhism. The Department of State was concerned with all secular aspects of government.**
…

The new system was very near to a faithful copy of the T'ang system, **but there were certain points in which it differed from the Chinese original, notably the precedence of the Department of Worship over the Council of State.** The fact that special recognition was accorded to the priestly functions of the sovereign shows that, despite an almost slavish adherence to the Chinese pattern in other respects, the Japanese reformers were not willing to abandon their national tradition of kingship, according to which the sovereign is in theory sacred and inviolable. Even when Chinese political thought exercised its greatest influence upon their minds **the Japanese leaders did not accept any Chinese doctrine**2 **which held that the mandate of Heaven could not be exercised by a sovereign without virtue,** since in the Japanese tradition the claim to the throne is based upon descent alone.

In one other feature the Japanese system of official grades differed, in practice perhaps more than in theory, from the Chinese system: the hierarchy in Japan was based upon birth and not upon talent. Japanese society was definitely aristocratic, and Japanese history consistently displays a deep interest in pedigree, rank and title. **The matter is put quite bluntly in an edict of 682, which provides that in selecting men for office the considerations are to be first birth, then character, and then capacity.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haibutsu_kishaku

The *haibutsu kishaku* during the Meiji Restoration, the most famous instance of the phenomenon, was an event triggered by the official policy of separation of Shinto and Buddhism (or *shinbutsu bunri*)[1] that after 1868 caused great damage to Buddhism in Japan. The destruction of Buddhist property took place on a large scale all over the country. For example, Kōfuku-ji in Nara suffered greatly. The temple, which is now a National Treasure, was hit with full force by the movement. The temple's land was seized, the priests forced to become Shinto priests, walls were torn down, trees were planted, and the area became part of one of the city's parks.[2] The anti-Buddhist riots caused damage to all large temples of the city.[3] The violence marked every region of the country permanently. **Between 1872 and 1874, 18 thousand temples were eradicated, and maybe as many again from 1868 to 1872.[4] Japanologist Martin Collcutt believes Japanese Buddhism was on the verge of total eradication.[4]**

The violence had just released pent-up popular anger at the Buddhists which had been brewing for centuries because of their close alliance with the Tokugawa in the *danka* system,[5] an alliance from which the religion had derived immense benefit. **Although the shogunate's official philosophy was lay Neo-Confucianism,[6] Buddhism had become an integral part of the state as a consequence of the Tokugawa's anti-Christian policy. To stop the propagation of the Christian religion, they had introduced the *danka* system, which obliged families to affiliate themselves with a Buddhist temple[7] and, in return, this would certify that they were not Christian.** Without this certification a normal life in Tokugawa Japan was impossible.[7] Because of this, temples could and often would blackmail parishioners.[8] Under the *danka* system families had by law several obligations towards Buddhist institutions, among them monetary donations to their affiliated temple.[7] **Because there were some 100,000 temples in a country of 30 million people, on average 300 persons had to support a temple, so the burden was considerable.[8]** Buddhism, as an institution, had a vested interest in the shogunate system, and therefore became a target of all the parties working for the downfall of the shogunate.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=YuBjNSmZ7pUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus if this sword were torn away from them, **it was inevitable that the gods of Japan, so utterly disdained by the new government, would become powerless spirits, worshipped only by the ignorant masses.**

Meanwhile, month after month, year after year, the gods Master Oen had said were so close at hand, the gods who had enflamed their hearts with such devotion, were being degraded. **The young men felt**

certain that a conspiracy was afoot to rob the gods of their dignity, to thrust them off into the distance, to make them as insignificant as possible. Thus, out of fear that the Christian West might look upon Japan as an ignorant, heathen land, the ideal of worship and government as one would be slighted more and more. The gods would finally sink to the level of feeble spirits, ephemeral beings who clung to life in the shelter of sprouting reeds rippling in the wind beside remote streams.

And the sword was to suffer a like fate. The defense of the land would no longer be entrusted to the manly warrior bearing at his side the swift thunderbolt of the immortal gods. **The national army created by Aritomo Yamagata gave no preference to the samurai class, nor did it honor the ideal of the Japanese as individuals rallying spontaneously to the defense of their native land. Rather, it was a Western-style, professional army which, in ruthless disregard of all tradition, ignored class distinctions and depended upon a draft system to supply its manpower.** The Japanese sword, giving way to the saber, had lost its soul. Now it was fated to become a mere decoration, an ornament.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Vietnam#Monarchical_period_(938%E2%80%931862)

Viet Nam, named Đại Việt (Great Viet) was a stable nation, **but village autonomy was a key feature.** Villages had a unified culture centered around harmony related to the religion of the spirits of nature and the peaceful nature of Buddhism. While the sovereign was the ultimate source of political authority, a saying was, "The Sovereign's Laws end at the village gate". The sovereign was the final dispenser of justice, law, and supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces, as well as overseer of religious rituals. **Administration was carried out by mandarins who were trained exactly like their Chinese counterparts (i.e. by rigorous study of Confucian texts).** Overall, Vietnam remained very efficiently and stably governed except in times of war and dynastic breakdown. **Its administrative system was probably far more advanced than that of any other Southeast Asian states and was more highly centralized and stably governed among Asian states. No serious challenge to the sovereign's authority ever arose, as titles of nobility were bestowed purely as honors and were not hereditary. Periodic land reforms broke up large estates and ensured that powerful landowners could not emerge. No religious/priestly class ever arose outside of the mandarins either.** This stagnant absolutism ensured a stable, well-ordered society, but also resistance to social, cultural, or technological innovations. Reformers looked only to the past for inspiration.[61]

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Spirit_of_Laws_(1758)/Book_XV#356
>
> **"In[40] Tonquin, says Dampier[41], all the mandarins civil and military are eunuchs."**

---

https://ctext.org/liji/biao-ji

27. Biao Ji: The Master said, '**Under the Xia dynasty it was the way to give honour to the nature conferred on men; they served the manes of the departed, and respected Spiritual Beings, keeping them at a distance,** while they brought the people near, and made them loyal; they put first the (attraction) of emolument, and last the terrors of power; first rewards, and then punishments; showing their affection (for the people), but not giving them honour. **The bad effect on the people was, that they became stupid and ignorant, proud and clownish, and uncultivated, without any accomplishments. Under the Yin dynasty, they honoured Spiritual Beings, and led the people on to serve them; they put first the service of their manes, and last the usages of ceremony;** first punishments, and then rewards; giving honour (to the people), but not showing affection for them. **The bad effect on the people was, that they became turbulent and were restless, striving to surpass one another without any sense of shame. Under the Zhou dynasty, they honoured the ceremonial usages, and set a high value on bestowing (favours); they served the manes and respected Spiritual Beings, yet keeping them at a distance;** they brought the people near, and made them loyal; in rewarding and punishing they used the various distinctions and arrangements of rank; showing affection (for the people), but not giving them honour. **The bad effects on the people were, that they became fond of gain and crafty; were all for accomplishments, and shameless; injured one another, and had their moral sense obscured.**'

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/18/mode/2up?view=theater

These encroachments upon the liberty of the people's religion will be still better understood when we bear in mind, that to no son of China would it ever occur to question the supreme authority wielded by the emperor and his proxies, the mandarins, not only over mankind, but also over the gods. **For the gods or *shen* are souls of intrinsically the same nature as those existing in human beings; why then, simply because they have no human bodies, should they be placed above the emperor,** who is no less than a son of Heaven, that is to say, a magnitude second to none but Heaven or the Power

above whom there is none – who governs the universe and all that moves and exists therein? Such absurdity could not possibly be entertained by Chinese reason. **So it is a first article of China's political creed that the emperor, as well as Heaven, is lord and master of all the gods, and delegates this dignity to his mandarins, each in his jurisdiction. With them then rests the decision which of the gods are entitled to receive the people's worship, and which are not. It is the imperial government which deifies disembodied souls of men, and also divests them of their divine rank.** Their worship, if established against its will or without its consent, can be exterminated at its pleasure, without revenge having to be feared from the side of the god for any such radical measure; **for the power of even the mightiest and strongest god is as nought compared with that of the august Celestial Being with whose will and under whose protection the Son reigns supreme over everything existing below the empyrean, unless he forfeits this omnipotent support through neglect of his imperial duties.**

> https://www.garynorth.com/Deuteronomy4.pdf
>
> Tertullian did not understand, or pretended not to understand, the inherently political nature of classical religion.
> …
>
> **Roman religion was itself sacrilegious, he said, "for you do homage with a greater dread and an intense reverence to Caesar, than Olympian Jove himself."**10 Of course they did; the Olympian Jove was a political construct. Caesar was the earthly manifestation of Rome's political power, and classical religion was power religion. Tertullian sought to condemn Rome's rulers for "showing impiety to your gods, inasmuch as you show a greater reverence to a human sovereignty than you do to them."11

This dogma is most highly classical, being preached by the *Shu*. Hence, with all that is contained in this oldest and holiest of all classical bibles for State and society, it is an immutable article in the canon of imperial rights for all ages. I-yin, we read there, a most virtuous statesman of antiquity, played an important part in the overthrow of the Hia dynasty and the accession to the throne of the celebrated T'ang, **who founded a new house known by the name of Shang.** That grandee spoke in the year 1753 before our era to T'ai-kiah, T'ang's grandson and successor, on his ascending the throne:

"Oh oh! it is so difficult to rely on Heaven, and its appointments to imperial dignity are precarious! **If the emperor's virtues are stable and constant, Heaven protects his throne; but if his virtues are unstable, he loses his nine possessions (the nine great divisions of the empire).** The princes of the Hia dynasty were not able to practise virtues; they offended the gods and oppressed the people. **So the Imperial Heaven protected them not, and its eye wandered over the myriads of regions to see if there were any one to whom the imperial appointment could be given; with a look of affection it sought an all-virtuous man, to make him *lord of the gods*.** Only myself and T'ang were possessed of perfect virtue, and could therefore obtain Heaven's affectionate favour; so it was he who received the glorious appointment to the imperial dignity, and thus became the owner of the people in the nine possessions."1

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/26/mode/2up?view=theater

Though thus, in general, lenity is shown by the government and its mandarins to the people's native gods and goddesses and their worship, that tolerance does by no means extend to impudent rabbles who presume to found or propagate new, unclassical doctrines and religious practices. Chinese books speak sometimes of men who set themselves up as envoys of the God of Heaven or of some other high deity, and worked miracles, pretending to have dominion over spirits and gods, and to be helped and served by them. **And almost invariably we are told that such prophets fell into the hands of the authorities, were tortured and put to death** – in short, treated as sorcerers and deceivers of the public with their miracles or black arts particularly dangerous to the State.
…

And in the first place, the State has, during a series of centuries, turned its fanatic wrath against one element of Taoism which was, as far as may be ascertained by means of the Classics, totally non-existent in the golden Confucian and pre-Confucian age, namely its monachism. Its system of worship of gods may be defensible for having existed in some form or other in those sacred times; but its monachism being certainly not so old, cannot plead that ground in favour of its right of existence.

Instituted for the purpose of giving man an opportunity to raise himself to a higher state of perfection and bliss by ingeniously devised means, Taoistic asceticism has known its halcyon days, its ups and downs, chiefly ruled by the rising and falling of the thermometer of imperial favour. **Under the T'ang-dynasty, the empire possessed, according to official statistics, 1687 Taoistic monasteries);**1 **now there is hardly a trace of them left.** Official persecution has cleared them all away, and the

crowds of *Tao-sze* or “Taoist doctors,” workers of miracles and anchorites of whom Chinese writings are full, have been converted into a class of popular pagan priests, whose name is legion.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/36/mode/2up?view=theater

As early as the year 624, when the first emperor of that house had scarcely occupied the throne for six years, the campaign was opened by the high-placed minister Fu Yih, who had passed from the service of the dethroned Sui dynasty into that of the house of T’ang. We read in his biography occurring in the Standard Annals of this house:

“**In the seventh year he presented a memorial to the emperor, in which he proposed to do away with Buddhism altogether.** “The West, where Buddha lived, and where he preached his ominous heresies,” this document said, “is far away. The Han dynasty translated the western writings and was led astray by their apparent trustworthiness, **thus causing people unloyal to their ruler and devoid of devotion and submission to their parents, to shave their heads and abandon their ruler and their parents;** they became idlers and wandering mendicants, and assumed another garb, in order to escape the paying of groundrent to government. By the spread of their ominous writings and the promulgation of their heresies, they opened, on false grounds, three roads (of transmigration into demons, pretas and animals), and laid out yet six other roads (of transition into asuras, men, and devas); – thus they inspired the ignorant with dread and fear, and deceived the class of government officers, with the result that amongst the people, they who became acquainted with them believed such falsehoods thoughtlessly, without due enquiry after their roots and sources. **And then they raked up the crimes committed by these people in times past, in order to gauge thereby their future happiness;** they taught that the gift of one single coin would give them a chance of a thousandfold reward, and that one day’s fasting might make them expect food for a hundred days. Thus they caused their ignorant victims of deception to try recklessly to do such good works, so that, instead of fearing the laws and prohibitions, these people inconsiderately indulged in transgression of the precepts of the government; **and when some committed the abominable crime of opposition, and were entangled for that in the meshes of the penal laws, then, in the dungeon, they still worshipped their Buddhas and muttered their Buddhist Sutras,** forgetting all their lassitude both during the day and the night, sustained by the hope of escaping punishment.

“It depends upon his natural destiny whether one shall live long or die an untimely death; but punishment and intimidation, and the bestowal of blessing and happiness are the business of the sovereign. **We must admit that poverty or wealth, and high or low social standing is called forth by personal labour and merit; but the ignorant Buddhist clergy with their lies maintain that all those things come from Buddha. Thus they defraud the sovereign of his prerogatives and power, and appropriate his (exclusive) rights to lead humanity towards reformation for good;** – the harm thus occasioned to the influence of the government and morality is truly lamentable. **The *Shu* says: “The sovereign alone creates blessings and intimidates; to him alone belongs all that is precious and edible; and it his subjects create blessings and inspire fear, or appropriate treasures and food, they damage his house, they bring misfortune upon his dynasty; then the men in his service further other interests than his, and become corrupt.”**1

A curious piece of state-doctrine! **On the authority of that dictum of the chief classical book, every religion stands indicted with encroachment upon the imperial omnipotence, that is, with high-treason, if, by preaching the existence of other punishments or rewards than those which terrestrial government inflicts or confers, it deters mankind from evil and encourages it to do good. For the sovereign alone has the right to punish and to recompense!** The classical principles are as much in force now as they were in Fu Yih’s time. Christians, remember therefore that, on account of your doctrines, you, like the Buddhists, stand convicted of violating the imperial rights, of weakening the imperial authority, of sowing moral corruption among the mandarinate; that in a word you disorganize and demoralize China’s government. And again, by collecting money from the converts for the maintenance of your church, as the Buddhists do, you and the latter defraud the imperial house, you sap the dynasty; the highest Confucian bible of politics itself has declared it!

But let us further peruse Fu Yih’s curious memorial. “**From Fuh-hi and Shen-nung (29th and 28th century b.C.) up to the Han and the Wei dynasties, there was no Buddhism,** and – the sovereigns in those times were wise, and their ministers faithful; their reigns were long, and great was the number of their years of life. The emperor Ming of the Han dynasty (58-76 A.D.), on account of a dream, became the first who erected images of western deities; and from that time the çramanas of western lands have spread their doctrines.
…

How much more then is there to fear, now that there are fully a hundred thousand monks and nuns in the world, who cut clothes of silk, and dress and adorn clay images, which they then employ to suppress devils, and to lead the myriads of people astray? **I propose that all these monks and nuns shall be commanded to marry one another; thus more than a hundred thousand lay families shall be**

formed, who shall give both to sons and daughters; when these shall have grown up to their tenth year, and when a second period of equal length shall have been devoted to their education and instruction, they will then naturally be an element useful to the dynasty, and yield a sufficient contingent of warriors (for the maintenance of the imperial power), while, besides, calamities in the cultivation of silk and food shall be prevented in all parts of the world between the four seas. **If the people be in this way made to understand with whom rests the power to intimidate and to create happiness,** those heretical deceptions will naturally die off, and the transformation into a state of purity and simplicity will flourish again.1

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/50/mode/2up?view=theater

Buddhism, Yao Ch'ung argues, would be all right if it preached only mental quiet, compassion and charity, the doing of good and the avoiding of evil in this earthly existence; but why drown all this in idle stories which lead to misconception? **In truth it is by no means astonishing to see such argumentation written down by an ardent adept of materialistic Confucianism, which teaches that, as long as there is slavish submission and devotion to parents and sovereigns, all human perfection will be produced by virtue of the Tao or course of the material universe itself, without any further activity being required.** Quite natural also, that in these anti-buddhistic waitings there is not a word of appreciation of the pious sentiment wherewith in this religion, by the practice of virtue and by charity towards one's fellow creatures, a higher state of perfection and bliss is sought after than this world can give. This aspiration, its centre of gravity, rests on lies and fictions, for – nothing of the sort is found in the Confucian Classics. Therefore, all doctrines leading up to this one and only Buddhistic goal are heretical, and should be exterminated without delay, to give room once more to the old-classically orthodox dogmas of Confucius and his school. **A chilling and peremptory denial of the worth of religious sentiment and moral elevation, which are the necessary effects of a striving after perfection for this world and for the world to come, is one of the chief features of all anti-buddhistic writings from Confucian pens.**

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/64/mode/2up?view=theater

"Hence, in the eighth month **[of 845 AD]** the emperor **[Wuzong]** decreed as follows:

"**We have heard that before the end of the reign of the three dynasties (of Hia, Shang, and Cheu), there was no question about any Buddha**. That after the Han and the Wei dynasty this image-worshipping religion gradually developed, was a consequence of the propagandism made for its foreign customs in the beginning; its contaminating practices thus ramified in all directions, grew and increased; and the end has been that it corrodes the good manners and customs of the empire, thus gradually rendering these unenlightened; and that, by its beguiling and misleading the inclinations of men, it leads the latter astray in masses. So it has come about that in the country of the nine provinces, as well as within the walls and gates of the two imperial capitals, the Buddhist clergy and their followers increase by the day, and the Buddhist convents daily grow in size and splendour. **Human labour is overburdened on behalf of these buildings of loam and wood; the people are being robbed of the fruits of their labour to get (the images and buildings) decorated with gold and precious things; rulers and fathers are neglected (by their ministers and their sons) on behalf of religious instructors and the moneys to be paid to them; wives are abandoned by husbands who want to live in a sphere of religious commandments; – never did any religion root up the national institutions and work mischief to humanity on a larger scale.** But there is more: when one farmer neglects agriculture, others thereby suffer hunger; when one woman keeps no silkworms, others have to endure cold for that. And now the number of monks and nuns in the world cannot even be estimated, and they all live on the agriculturist, and dress at the expense of the silk-producers. **And in the monastic buildings and the *chao-t'i*1 no one seems to care for restriction of excess, for they all have roofs reaching up into the clouds, and are beautifully adorned, so that they even compete with palatial mansions.** That under the dynasties of Tsin, Sung, Ts'i, and Liang the energy of the living was so languid and enervated, and manners and customs were so vile and so wrong – it was altogether a consequence of that state of things.2

"But there is more still. My High Ancestor (Kao Tsu) and (his successor) T'ai Tsung, by martial prowess suppressed calamitous rebellions, and by means of civil administration governed the Flowery Land of Hia. With these two levers they could adequately rule the country; how then can I possibly be entitled to disturb the balance of government by employing the religion of that insignificant land of the west! In the *Ching kwan* period (627-649) as well as in the *Khai yuen* epoch (713-741), it was abolished, but not cut away effectively, and like a stream, it once more flooded the land. Studiously have I read what others have said about it before; unofficially have I taken advice in the palace; and there remains no doubt that this evil ought to be cut off. And earnest ministers within and without the palace confirm this my serious conviction. They demonstrate in long memorials, that ultimate propriety here consists in carrying out the measure resolutely; also that the institutions of hundreds of sovereigns ought to be perfected by suppressing an evil which (otherwise) will gnaw at the sources (of good) for thousands of ages. **Why**

then shall I show indulgence where mankind is to be saved and the multitudes are to be benefited?1

“Of the 4600 and more convents that are to be pulled down within the empire, the 260,500 monks and nuns who must adopt secular life, shall be enlisted amongst the families who pay groundtax twice a year. **Of the 40,000 and more *chao-t’i* and *lan-jok* that are to be demolished, the fattest land of the best kind, measuring several thousand myriads of *khing*, shall be confiscated, and the slaves of both sexes (employed in cultivating them?) to a number of 150,000, shall be enlisted among the families that pay groundtax twice a year.** And secular life shall be adopted by more than 3000 Ta-ts’in and Muh-hu-pat belonging to the class of the Buddhist monks and nuns, or to the Bureau for the Reception and Entertainment of Foreigners, who devote themselves to the explanation of foreign religious rescripts; **with the customs of the Flowery Land of the Centre they shall no longer meddle.** Alas, the institutions of antiquity have never yet been made to operate; so, if (religions) which were granted reprieve (of extermination) are now at last done away with, how then can it be said that this is an untimely act? Drive out those idlers and sluggards without professions or trades, of whom there are now already more than a hundred thousand; demolish those red-painted useless buildings – why should there be an innumerable number of thousands of these? **And from this time, the pure and undefiled (Confucian doctrine) will teach mankind to strive after conformity to the laws and principles of inactivity (*wu-wei*),** and undisturbed quiet and ease will help the government in its task to perfect the one and only system of (archaic Confucian) manners and customs. Shall the black-haired people in the six parts of the universe1 be made to seek refuge together in the reformation for good brought about by their emperor, then it is of high consequence to mind the starting-point, namely the extermination of evil. By issuing clear rescripts every day for the benefit of the unenlightened people, Our intents and will ought to be realized.”2

With this imperial decree, Confucianism celebrated its triumph and held its jubilee, while Buddha’s church received a blow from which it was never to recover.
…

And about one year after, in the intercalary month, being the fourth of the year 847, **[the emperor Xuanzong]** issued the following decree:

“In the last year of the *Hwui ch’ang* period, the monastic buildings everywhere were reduced to a minimum; but though it must be called a religion of foreign regions, it is no religion harmful to the fundamental principles of the administration of government. **The people of the Middle Kingdom have long walked in its paths which lead to salvation; hence abolition of even a particle of it is a sin against all that is proper; and that abolition has not tended to increase the animated mountains and the regions of superior excellence.** In the prefectures throughout the empire, if the monks who used to dwell therein can rebuild them, the convents which have been pulled down in the fourth month of the fifth year of the *Hwui ch’ang* period, may altogether be rebuilt by their abbots, and the authorities shall not forbid or prevent this.”1

We read nothing, however, of a restitution of the sequestered goods and lands. The latter, in truth, had evidently passed into other hands, for we read the following passages in the Historical Books:

“**When Wu Tsung had ascended the throne and abolished Buddhism, 4600 monasteries and 40,000 *chao-t’i* and *lan-jok* were pulled down in the empire; 265,000 monks and nuns were registered as ordinary people, together with 150,000 of their male and female slaves,** and several thousand myriads of *khing* of their grounds, as also more than two thousand Ta-ts’in, Muh-hu and *T’ien*.2 In the Imperial residence as well as in the eastern capital, in each street two monasteries were left with thirty monks in each; and in the provinces, the monks left (in the convents) were of three different quantities, nowhere exceeding twenty. The fattest grounds were sold, and the proceeds delivered to the Board of Revenue; and the grounds of medium and inferior qualities were given to the grown-up house-slaves of the convents, who thus became people paying groundtax twice a year; each one of them received ten *meu* of ground. **And of the convents from which the male and female clergy had disappeared, in the two capitals, ten *khing* of the grounds were added to the fields cultivated for charitable purposes, or were given to the quarters for nursing the sick (lepers’ wards?), while in each department seven *khing* were assigned to such institutions;** and these grounds were to be administered by the elders.”3
…

The *Fung-shui*, that widely known philosophical system, both Taoistic and Confucian, which teaches that the happiness of every region or town, village or house depends upon the configurations of the surrounding hills, land, and watercourses, and that these formations can be improved by human hands, more especially by buildings in which dwell mighty gods and saints – **that system, which originated in the old ideal times of orthodoxy, had grown up and developed side by side with Buddhism, and had gained a paramount influence under the T’ang dynasty, being then a pre-eminent power in social life. Against this power the passion for demolition came to a dead stop.** In the first

instance, it probably saved from destruction a number of convents with the appertaining pagodas, built by the people at the cost of much money and labour for the consolidation and the advancement of prosperity in their districts. And re-erection of such buildings, although in more modest dimensions, could, under the pressure of this power, hardly be prevented. **It is, indeed, obvious that since the T'ang dynasty, the position of monastic buildings in the mountains as maintainers of the Fung-shui influences is far more emphasized in writings than ever it was before; confessedly Fung-shui becomes almost the main reason of their existence, the salvation of the inmates a secondary motive.** As for a conclusive proof of the influence of the Fung-shui system on the establishment and the preservation of Buddhistic monasteries and pagodas: – it is a well known fact, that even all around the Imperial metropolis, in the plains and on the hills, a great number are found, erected for the insurance or the improvement of the Fung-shui of the palace, and consequently of the imperial family and the whole empire. **And who were the founders? none others than the emperors of the anti-buddhistic dynasties of Ming and Ts'ing; and who maintain them? the sovereigns of the last-named house. But – in strict accordance with the ultra-Confucian spirit of the State – the monks who inhabit them are very few in number; their standard is low; there is among them but little walking in the paths of salvation.** Their religious activity resolves itself chiefly in a worship of the images of buddhas and bodhisatwas: the protectors of the welfare of the imperial residence and the court, that is to say, in Chinese parlance, under whose protection the Fung-shui of those two is placed.1

Defamed by official indictments for heresy; oppressed by the State and its all-dominating Confucian spirit; its monastic institutions merely tolerated on account of the Fung-shui, yea, even supported to some extent by the State for this very reason: such in the main has been the condition of Buddhism since the reign of the T'ang dynasty. **This two-faced state-policy grants Buddhism an appearance of liberty which the outside world generally regards as real,** but which now, we trust, will be estimated according to its worth.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/96/mode/2up?view=theater

Literally in the same form this fundamental article occurred in the code of the Ming. That it was never actually intended for any other purpose than to keep the number of monasteries at a minimum, is proved by a note at the head of the official commentary, in which the legislator at the same time gives vent to his aversion to monkery: **"When the Taoist and Buddhist clergy increase, the population decreases: this is a natural law. These folks do not plough, and have no trades or callings; so they dress and eat at the cost of the people; why then shall we allow them to build and thereby waste the wealth of the people? why allow them to bind up people's hair or shave their heads, and thus empty their dwellings?"**1

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/110/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1737, on the 11th day of the third month (April 10), an edict appeared, in which the emperor announced, that in consequence of two decrees ordering the Viceroys and provincial Governors by no means to relax their carefulness in regard to the issuing of the said certificates, the Governor of Nganhwui, Chao Kwoh-lin, had asked the emperor whether now, after this renewed cleansing-process, the issuing of the diplomas might perhaps be entirely stopped. To refute such an interpretation of the Imperial will was the object of the decree. The diploma, thus the decree stated, should be looked upon as serving to prevent the clergy from becoming numerous; it is a means to prevent ignorant individuals from creeping into the circle of the learned clergy, and the young and the weak from being admitted against their will, or the selfish from receiving ordination merely to share such wordly profits as monastic life might offer, and criminals from hiding themselves in it. In every respect therefore the diploma is a means of control, and calculated to keep the religious orders pure and clean. Truly, Buddhism and Taoism are deviations from orthodoxy (*i twan*), and therefore, to allow the Buddhists and Taoists to read their sacred writings without proper control is an offence against the ancient institutions regarding heresies, worse even than the heresies themselves. **But even in the Stream (the Milky Way) there are stars scattered about; and Islam and Christianity, notwithstanding numerous efforts and decrees of the dynasty, have not been exterminated; thus also Buddhism and Taoism are to be looked upon as mere professions and livelihoods, more especially resorted to by orphans and bereaved people. The exhortations of these religions for the promotion of good and the abstinence from evil, intended for the correction and the guidance of the ignorant, are, however, of no avail whatever for supplementing the imperial precepts. The Tao, established by Heaven, impartially unites everything in its charitable embrace, and has room for all who breathe under the blue Empyrean. Therefore the Buddhist and Taoist clergy should be granted liberty in-doors to burn their incense and to work out their salvation.** From their mountains and forests such recluses do not exercise so very hurtful an influence on the universal Doctrine (Confucianism); why then should they be thrown back altogether into secular society, to live there a miserable life, deprived of all means of subsistence and support? Women, however, shall on no account become nuns before a mature age has given them enough determination of will and purpose. The argument that everyone who becomes a Buddhist or Taoist monk deprives the agricultural class of a

man's labour, is untenable, as it is far from certain he would have devoted himself to agriculture. **In short, the emperor commands all Viceroys and Governors to deal gently in the matter of the certificates, and not to render admission into the Buddhist or Taoist clerical state entirely impossible by withholding those documents.** Chao Kwoh-lin has misunderstood the Imperial intentions; let it not be so with other Viceroys and Governors.1

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/116/mode/2up?view=theater

The clergy seeking their own and other people's salvation, are not forbidden to preach, recite sutras, and perform ceremonies within doors; but what is the good of this liberty where the State has cast its system of certification of clergy within such strict bounds, and has made the admission of male disciples extremely difficult, of females almost impossible, so that the number of those who could avail themselves of such liberty, is reduced to a miserably small percentage of the population? It makes this vaunted liberty into a farce. **And what is left of it in the end when we find that, besides all this, the whole female population throughout the empire are forbidden to go and worship the gods and buddhas in the temples of the convents?** It is like our forbidding women to go to church.

Should a woman make her appearance in a convent or temple, thus we have read in the *Hwui tien* (p. 113), the clergy shall drive her away, on penalty of being sentenced to the same punishment as the pious visitor herself.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/122/mode/2up?view=theater

The first measures of which the *Shi li* makes mention, were taken by Kao Tsung two months after his accession to the throne. On the 6th day of the eleventh month (19 Dec. 1735) he issued a decree, **in which he set forth that only the four social classes, viz. agriculturists, artisans, scholars and merchants, are of service to society and to the government.** "But at present there are among the Buddhist clergy so-called *ying fu*, everyone of whom branches off into families, and who from generation to generation possess fields and houses. **They drink fermented liquor and eat meat, and there is nothing they abstain from; but, worst of all, they have wives and children!**1 Such is the case also with the *hwo kū* of the Taoist clergy."2

> 1. **So the very thing which, according to Confucius and Mencius, is most deserving of praise, the Confucian government imputes to the Buddhist clergy as a crime, because it is contrary to the principles of their church.** On penalty of eighty strokes with the stick, Buddhist and Taoist monks and priests are forbidden to marry: see *Ta Ts'ing luh li*, chap. 10, the 14th title.

These men do not plough, their wives do not weave; thus they cause others to suffer from want of food and clothing, the more so as they themselves live in abundance and dress well. His Majesty calculates, that at least three agriculturists are required to support one cleric; his mind necessarily revolts against such wrong social conditions. **Not for want of reverence for the name of Buddha or Laotsze, far from it! but because no one now belonging to the religions of these prophets is found to equal the patriarchs and saints, the immortals, and the preparers of miraculous medicines – therefore he issues this decree.** The anchorites living in their remote mountain-retreats in accordance with the rescripts of their religion, performing works of merit, and contenting themselves with linen clothes and coarse food, are not so harmful to the people.3

> 3. And all along in history the monks are called a plague to the nation! Gross fanaticism is not always consistent!

But those modern priests who live in the world, eat well and dress well, and who by tens and by hundreds draw upon husbandry, the artisan and the merchant for their sustenance, without ever carrying out one letter of the instructions of their prophets – these people are the idlers useless to the State, and, moreover, a curse to the Buddhist and the Taoist religions themselves. Can they reasonably be allowed to continue to waste the people's wealth, to corrupt their manners and customs?

The Viceroys and Governors of the provinces shall therefore instruct their Prefects to summon in mass and interrogate **all such Buddhist *ying fu* clergy who are heads of families, and all Taoist clergy who dwell in the fire.** If they wish to return to secular life, they shall be permitted to do so; or they may retire into the convents, provided they obtain ordination-diplomas from the government. But they shall no more be allowed to adopt pupils. And of their property, only as much as is absolutely necessary for their sustenance shall be left to them, **the surplus shall be confiscated by the authorities, and used for the benefit of the poor.**1
…

Such is the remarkable system of laws and rescripts by which the present dynasty, and the one preceding it, have most emphatically expressed their hostile spirit with regard to convents and monastic life. Their policy, **extremely severe, but not radical,** may be easily condensed in a few lines. Nothing

can be better than to do away with monasticism altogether; to strive for the realization of this principle is an irrefutable duty naturally resulting from the anti-heretical doctrines of the Ancients, and forced upon the government by wise statesmen, who have pointed out most clearly and convincingly the dangers of monachism for the personal safety of every emperor and for the self-preservation ot dynasties. But in spite of the very best intentions enforced by orthodoxy and political wisdom, the State cannot possibly perform that duty in all its bearings, in letter and in spirit. **For devotion to the ancestors and the promotion of their felicity are also sacred duties, if not the most sacred of all laid upon humanity by Antiquity and Confucius; and it is the Buddhist clergy who monopolize the salvation of the dead. Moreover, the almighty Fung-shui, which sways the State and Society equally with overbearing power, forms an insuperable obstacle against the extermination of Buddhist religious buildings.** An unstable, two-faced policy is the only possible result of such considerations.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Christiana_expeditione_apud_Sinas

The first major book published in Europe by an author who was not only fluent in Chinese and conversant in Chinese culture but also had traveled over much of the country, Ricci-Trigault's work was highly popular, and went through at least 16 editions in a number of European languages in the several decades after its first publication.[3]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=CnkCbm7D_0kC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA257#v=onepage&q&f=false

Before closing this chapter on Chinese public administration, it would seem to be quite worthwhile recording a few more things in which this people differ from Europeans. To begin with, it seems to be quite remarkable when we stop to consider it, that in a kingdom of almost limitless expanse and innumerable population and abounding in copious supplies of every description, though they have a well-equipped army and navy that could easily conquer the neighboring nations, **neither the King nor his people ever think of waging a war of aggression.** They are quite content with what they have and are not ambitious of conquest. In this respect they are much different from the people of Europe, who are frequently discontent with their own governments and covetous of what others enjoy. **While the nations of the West seem to be entirely consumed with the idea of supreme domination, they cannot even preserve what their ancestors have bequeathed them, as the Chinese have done through a period of some thousand of years.** ...

Another remarkable fact and quite worthy of note as marking a difference from the West, is that the entire kingdom is administered by the Order of the Learned, commonly known as The Philosophers. **The responsibility for the orderly management of the entire realm is wholly and completely committed to their charge and care. The army, both officers and soldiers, hold them in high respect and show them the promptest obedience and deference, and not infrequently the military are disciplined by them as a schoolboy might be punished by his master.** Policies of war are formulated and military questions are decided by the Philosophers only, and their advice and counsel has more weight with the King than that of the military leaders. In fact very few of these, and only on rare occasions, are admitted to war consultations. **Hence it follows that those who aspire to be cultured frown upon war and would prefer the lowest rank in the philosophical order to the highest in the military, realizing that the Philosophers far excel military leaders in the good will and the respect of the people and in opportunities of acquiring wealth.**

https://www.exclassics.com/anatomy/anat9.htm

Utopian parity is a kind of government, to be wished for, rather than effected, *Respub. Christianopolitana*, Campanella's city of the Sun, and that new Atlantis, witty fictions, but mere chimeras and Plato's community in many things is impious, absurd and ridiculous, it takes away all splendour and magnificence. I will have several orders, degrees of nobility, and those hereditary, not rejecting younger brothers in the mean time, for they shall be sufficiently provided for by pensions, or so qualified, brought up in some honest calling, they shall be able to live of themselves. I will have such a proportion of ground belonging to every barony, he that buys the land shall buy the barony, he that by riot consumes his patrimony, and ancient demesnes, shall forfeit his. As some dignities shall be hereditary, so some again by election, or by gift (besides free offices, pensions, annuities,) like our bishoprics, prebends, the Basso's palaces in Turkey, the procurators houses and offices in Venice, which, like the golden apple, shall be given to the worthiest, and best deserving both in war and peace, as a reward of their worth and good service, as so many goals for all to aim at, (*honos alit artes*) and encouragernents to others. **For I hate these severe, unnatural, harsh, German, French, and Venetian decrees, which exclude plebeians from honours, be they never so wise, rich, virtuous, valiant, and well qualified, they must not be patricians, but keep their own rank, this is *naturæ bellum inferre*, odious to God and men, I abhor it.** My form of government shall be monarchical.
...

No impropriations, no lay patrons of church livings, or one private man, but common societies, corporations, &c., and those rectors of benefices to be chosen out of the Universities, examined and approved, as the literati in China.
...

These and all other inferior magistrates to be chosen as the *literati* in China or by those exact suffrages of the Venetians, and such again not to be eligible, or capable of magistracies, honours, offices, except they be sufficiently qualified for learning, manners, and that by the strict approbation of reputed examiners: **first scholars to take place, then soldiers;** for I am of Vigetius his opinion, a scholar deserves better than a soldier, because *Unius ætatis sunt quæ fortiter fiunt, quæ vero pro utilate Reipub. scribuntur, æterna:* a soldier's work lasts for an age, a scholar's for ever.
...

He that invents anything for public good in any art or science, writes a treatise, or performs any noble exploit, at home or abroad, he shall be accordingly enriched, honoured, and preferred. **I say with Hannibal in Ennius, *Hostem qui feriet erit mihi Carthaginiensis*, let him be of what condition he will, in all offices, actions, he that deserves best shall have best.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=0fYyAQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA207#v=onepage&q&f=false

Charles II made his famous remark that Vossius 'believed everything except what was in the Bible' after hearing him speak about China.1

> 1. **'Le Roi Charles II connoissoit bien son caractere; car l'entendant un jour debiter des choses incroyables de ce Pays [China], il se tourna vers quelques Seigneurs qui étoient avec lui et leur dit: *ce sçavant Theologien est un étrange homme, il croit tout hors la Bible*'** (Nicéron, *Mémoires* XIII, 133).

The scholar, whose enthusiasm for Chinese culture allegedly 'even surpassed Marco Polo's' even though he never left Europe, has been studied by historians of philosophy only in his capacity as a Sinophile.2
...

Vossius' chapter 'De artibus et scientiis Sinarum' contained a view of China which surpassed in its utopian character most of what had been written before, extolling its politics, arts, navigation, medicine, and astrology.7 **It even concluded that in China an improved version of Plato's ideal reign of the philosopher-king had been realized:** 'when their Kings sin, the philosophers have as great a liberty to admonish them, as ever the Prophets had with the Israelites. The people have the same freedom to judge the philosophers, when they do not fulfill their duty.'8

Where did Vossius get this idea, **completely at odds with the reality of Chinese autocratic rule in the seventeenth century?** His father's history of philosophy of 1650 was silent on China.9

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Vossius,_Isaac

His style was generally held to be too disputatious, and his epithets too erudite for the drawing-room. He shocked some of his colleagues by remarking of one of their number about whom inquiries were being made, **'Est sacrificulus in pago et rusticos decipit.'** Other anecdotes of a like tendency (such as that he used habitually to read Ovid during service), even if we cannot accept them literally, seem to indicate that he was very near to being a complete sceptic.
...

He passes an extravagant eulogy on the Chinese civilisation, and tries to prove that the population of Rome was fourteen millions, and that its area was twenty times greater than that of Paris and London combined.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA662&printsec=frontcover

The first Westerner to affirm Chinese philosophy's and medicine's general superiority, as well as Chinese civilization's unmatched antiquity, his was a stance Temple eagerly shared. **Temple was later scorned by Bishop Gilbert Burnet as someone who believed "things were always as they were from all eternity," considering religion "fit only for the mob. He was a great admirer of the sect of Confucius in China, who were atheists themselves but left religion to the rabble.** He was a corrupter of all that came near him. And he delivered himself up wholly to study, ease and pleasure."50

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/22/mode/2up?view=theater

Free-thinkers – and free-livers – betrayed marked predilection for China:

> Vossius apportait un traité de la Chine

> Où cette nation paraît plus que divine.

In it he said that the only aristocracy recognized by the Chinese was the aristocracy of letters; that they cherished the memory only of those princes who had been lovers of justice and of peace; that the Emperor's counsellors and favourites, philosophers all of them, reproved their master with as much freedom as that with which the prophets of old had been wont to admonish the Kings of Judaea. Had they neglected to do so they would have incurred the censure and indignation of the people. La Mothe Le Vayer is reported to have refrained with the utmost difficulty from crying, *Sancte Confuci, ora pro nobis!* but that was before he had read the works of the Chinese philosopher. When they got to know him better, when they came to take part in the dispute about ceremonies, two points clearly emerged: one was that the Chinese civilization was admirable, the other was that it was fundamentally pagan. What a windfall for the freethinkers, and how they made the most of it!

In the political sphere, for example: The Chinese know nothing of Revelation; they assign to the intrinsic power of matter everything that we attribute to the power of the spirit, the existence of which they deny, as something beyond the limits of possibility. They are blind, and perhaps stubborn. But this they have been for four or five thousand years, and neither their ignorance nor their stubbornness has robbed their political organization of a single one of those wonderful benefits which every reasonable man looks for, and should naturally derive, from a human society: amenities, plenty, the practice of the useful arts, the pursuit of learning, peace and security.1

> 1. Boulainvilliers, *Le Vie de Mahomed*, 1730, p. 180-181.

...

So far as I can judge the sentiments of the educated Chinese, in the light of accounts brought home by travellers, and particularly by Fr. Gobien in his *Histoire de l'Edit de l'Empereur de la Chine en faveur de la religion chrétienne*, **it appears to me that they are all in agreement with Spinoza in holding that there is no other reality in the universe save that Matter to which Spinoza applies the name of God, and Straton that of nature.**2

> 2. Collins, *Letter to Dodwell on the Immortality of the soul*, London, 1769, p. 289.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/646/mode/2up?view=theater

> Where Bayle had at least made a show of agreeing, in the *Dictionnaire*, out of deference to readers' sensibilities, that Chinese 'atheistic' ideas are a system so extravagant and so 'remplie de contradictions absurdes' that, despite having swayed vast numbers of people of diverse cultural backgrounds, it is hard to comprehend how anyone can embrace them, **later, in the *Continuation*, even this pretence is dropped. In his last writings, Bayle concentrates on highlighting the rational coherence of this overarching Confucian-Spinozist construct, emphatically aligning both with Stratonism,** the philosophy he judges internally the most consistent of the Greek systems of 'atheism.'43

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/594/mode/2up?view=theater

Denying sacraments like Holy Communion and others common to Christians were instituted by Christ or the apostles, **implying they were just the inventions of later theologians avid to extend their authority,** he maintains that it is unnecessary to participate in any church's established rites to attain salvation.24 No one wishing to live 'a blessed life,' holds Spinoza, but failing to participate in 'religious' rituals and ceremonies, or who lives in solitude, or under a government hostile to Christianity, like that of Japan, can be harmed thereby nor is anyone bound by the directives of any church no matter which. **So as not to contravene Japanese law, 'the Dutch who live there,' he says, 'are required by the East India Company to refrain from practicing any external rites,'**25 **but this cannot affect their spiritual status for no one's well-being can be affected by performing or not performing Holy Communion or any other religious ceremony.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA149#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The "divine law which makes men truly happy and teaches true life, is universal to all men," a law not taught by any church, or found anywhere in instituted observances and ceremonies like "baptism, the Lord's Supper, feast-days, public prayers and any others," common to Christianity, which "if they were instituted by Christ or the Apostles (which is still not clear to me) were instituted only as external signs of a universal church and not as things that contribute to happiness or have any sanctity in them." No one is bound by such "ceremonies," **and those Dutchmen in Japan "where the Christian religion is forbidden and where the Dutch residing there must refrain from all external worship, by command of the East India Company," [Toland] noted (echoing Spinoza), are no more prevented from living true Christian lives than anyone else.**100

https://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/bruyere/chap16.htm

29. If we were told that the secret motive of the Siamese Embassy had been to incite the Most Christian King to renounce Christianity, and throw his kingdom open to Siamese priests, **who would enter our homes to teach their creed to our wives,** our children and ourselves, through books and arguments, would build pagodas in the midst of our cities, setting up metal images there to be worshipped, **with what laughter and what violent scorn should we listen to such fantastic stories! And yet we travel six thousand leagues by sea to convert the Indies, the kingdoms of Siam, China and Japan, in other words to make to these nations, in all seriousness, proposals that must seem to them quite mad and quite ridiculous.** But they put up with our monks and priests; they occasionally listen to them, they allow them to build their churches and perform their missions. **What can cause this, in them and in ourselves?** may it not be the power of truth?

> La Bruyère has already referred (XII, 22) to the Siamese embassy to France, in 1686; meanwhile a French embassy had visited Siam in hopes of converting the Siamese King to Catholicism.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/868/mode/2up?view=theater

The social values of the Radical Enlightenment, in short, have an absolute quality in terms of reason which places them above any possible alternative, **always provided we bear in mind, as Isaac Vossius, William Temple, and Saint-Évremond pointed out in the late seventeenth century, and a new wave of Chinese reformers stressed in the 1890s,** there is no reason why one should search only in western philosophical traditions to find the intellectual roots of, or a cultural basis for, personal liberty, comprehensive toleration, equality sexual and racial, and a secular morality of equity – any less, indeed, than for grounding anti-slavery or anti-colonialism.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false

As for the *Chinese*, whose Opinions and Customs were unknown to us till these latter Ages; **the celebrated Mr. *Leibnitz* assures us, a that, in Matters of Morality and Politicks, the Learned of that Country far exceed ours here in *Europe*.** Perhaps this Encomium may be some what over strain'd; but however this at least is certain, tho' * Mr. *De St. Evremond* be never so much of the contrary Opinion; that there are a great many most excellent Things to be met with in the Books of b *Confucius*, (or *Cum Fu Cu*): who, not to mention the Divine Honours which have been long since paid to him in that Country; is so much esteem'd for his Philosophy, that there are in every City publick Schools, where his Works are expounded; and where one must study some time, before he can be admitted into any Post in the Government.

> * He calls him (*Tom.* 5, *p.* 69,) *the most tedious Moralist be ever read. His Sentences*, adds he, *where he is intelligible, are below the Stanza's of Pibrac; where he is obscure, he is above the Apocalypse*. **But a Man of the Character of *St. Evremond*, might be tired with the reading of a Book of Morality; and yet that be no Prejudice to the Merit of the Book.**

https://chinachannel.org/2020/04/18/leibniz/

In his *Novissima Sinica*, Leibniz defended the rites and sacrifices paid to ancestors and the Emperor, noting that these sacrifices and honors were merely spiritual modes of honoring the past and present in order to do good for the future. He also claimed that the Chinese had independently discovered theological concepts which were identical to those discovered independently in the Christian cultural matrix: *Li* (the principle/truth of Heaven) and *Shangdi* (or *Xang ti* in his spelling: God). He wrote:

> "**They sacrifice to this visible Heaven (or rather to its King) and revere in profound silence that Li which they do not name, because of the ignorance, or the vulgarity of the people, who would not understand the nature of the Li. What we call the light of reason in man, they call commandment and law of heaven.** What we call the inner satisfaction of obeying justice and our fear of acting contrary to it, all this is called by the Chinese (and by us as well) inspirations sent by the Xang ti (that is, by the true God). **To offend heaven is to act against reason,** to ask pardon of heaven is to reform oneself and to make a sincere return in word and deed in submission one owes to this very law of reason. For me I find all this quite excellent, and quite in accord with natural theology."

Observing the breakdown of relations between east and west due to conservative religious elitists pushing the rites controversy, while Europe fell ever more deeply into religious wars, Leibniz wrote that the time is coming when Europe will need the Chinese to act as missionaries to teach practical and natural religion: "Certainly the condition of our affairs [in Europe], slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, **seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology.**"
…

The last tract Leibniz was writing on his death bed, in 1716, was titled *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA406#v=onepage&q&f=false

There is not a word in the writings of either the Jesuits or Leibniz about the Chinese mentality or the Chinese race. There was one universal reason and one humanity.

Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, in the years 1712, 13, 14, & 15; by Tulišen (1667-1741); translated by Sir George Thomas Staunton (1781-1859). Published in 1821.

https://archive.org/details/narrativechines00tuligoog/page/n102/mode/2up?view=theater

We thus informed him in our reply; "the effects of the most excellent virtues of our Emperor are diffused far and wide. He loves his people like his children. **For all who breathe the air and have blood in their veins, his superintending care ensures unfailing means of procuring subsistence: whether near or remote, whether within or without (the ancient boundaries,) he regards all with the eyes of equal charity and benevolence: like heaven, he dispenses favours and protection to all which has life.** He inflicts no severe punishments, and is ever unwilling to kill.*

https://archive.org/details/narrativechines00tuligoog/page/n128/mode/2up?view=theater

We replied, "The benevolence of our most excellent Emperor is like the benevolence of heaven; **all the kingdoms of the earth are, in his contemplation, but as one family; to all the inhabitants of the earth he extends his protection, as to his own children.** There are none, therefore, upon all the earth, or throughout the whole universe, who are unawed by his greatness or insensible of his virtues, or who do not come forward to participate in the benefits which he dispenses. Thus the kings who have come in person, and the ambassadors with tribute who have been deputed to his court, amount in number, altogether, to a great multitude. Our emperor, whether the countries from whence they come be near or remote, within or without the limits of his vast empire, **receives and rewards them all with equal kindness and favour.**

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/242/mode/2up?view=theater

When Shing Tsu, the “Sage Ancestor”, the great emperor of all the Chinese in the *Khang hi* period (1662-1723), swayed the rod of supreme authority, he loved his people so ardently that, to make them happy, he endowed them with a set of politico-ethical maxims, sixteen in number, each composed of seven characters. **They prescribed the cultivation of sixteen virtues, without which mankind in China can never fare well, nor the government prosper, to wit:** – respect and submission to parents and elder brothers; harmony and concord in clan-life; peace and tolerance among fellow-villagers; application to agriculture and silk-industry; frugality; **the establishing of college-buildings for the furtherance of classical studies;** the expulsion of heresies; interpretation of the laws of the State; explication of the rules of social life; diligence in the pursuit of one’s calling; instruction of one’s children and juniors in all that is good; suppression of calumnious accusations; refusing shelter to fugitives sought by the authorities; promptitude in tax-paying; the uniting of wards into circuits for the suppression of theft and robbery; the settling of mutual differences.
…

“**The philosopher Chu (Chu Hi) says, that the religion of Śâkya does not take notice of the things in heaven and earth and between the four cardinal points, but only rules the heart, and that the religion of Lao-tsze merely aims at the preservation of the ethereal soul. <u>This correct definition given by Chu-tsze, enables us to understand the fundamental objects of Buddhism and Taoism.</u>** But from these religions a class of loafers come forth without a fixed livelihood or abode, who, assuming the names in vogue in those religions, corrupt the science of the same. The greater part of them use (their doctrines about) calamities and felicity, misfortune and happiness1 to sell for money their foolish magic and unreliable talk.

1. This refers, of course, to Paradise and Hell.

…

“So also, the religion of the Western Ocean (Europe) and its Lord of Heaven (God) belong to the unclassical products; it is only because its followers are thoroughly versed in chronology that the Dynasty employs them; understand this well!2
…

“To serve one’s parents with submissive devotion, and one’s ruler with fidelity, and to attend to the human occupations to the utmost, **suffices to accumulate heavenly bliss;** and by not seeking things

which lie beyond the sphere of duty, and by abstaining from doing what should not be done, merely attending to one's own business and trade, **all felicities may be received which the spirits bestow.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cato%27s_Letters/Letter_136

The Pope and his priests had picked out from all other superstitions their most absurd, cruel, and wicked parts and principles; and having incorporated the same with peculiar absurdities of their own, made out of all such a wild jumble of nonsense and impieties, as has driven virtue, good government, and humanity, almost out of the world; given rise to Mahometanism; and both together have almost extinguished the human race; **since there is not in those countries, where these religions entirely prevail, the tenth part of the people that they could boast in the times of the old Romans, nor in proportion to the numbers which China and Holland can now boast; where the priests have no power, and but little influence.**

https://www.brepolsonline.net/doi/pdf/10.5555/M.EER-EB.4.00046

As J.G.A. Pocock noted on the topic *per litteras*, 'what we have from Gordon is China as it appears to an extreme deist'. Gordon was all at once imbued with the Jesuits' pervasive Confuciophilia and Bayle's overturning of their (mis-)understanding of ancient Chinese thought (in other words, his denial that ancient Confucians ever knew any spiritual substance separate from matter). Above all, Gordon's 'sensible Chinese' is drawn in as a rhetorical tool to voice bitter judgements on both Catholic and Protestant inconsistencies. **Accordingly, he expressed the hope that the Christian bigots would convert into 'rational and sober Chineses'.**33

> 33. Gordon, *An Examination of the Facts and Reasonings in the Lord Bishop of Chichester's Sermon* (first published in 1732; republished in the third volume of the 1735 sixth edition of *The Independent Whig*), p. 61. J.G.A. Pocock, besides his many perceptive comments about *Cato's Letters* and Gordon's 'Discourses upon Tacitus', has also dealt extensively with early modern Western perceptions of China, chiefly in volume iv of his breathtaking *Barbarism and Religion* (see, in particular, Chapters 6 and 7), but also at various points in volumes iii and v. **Pocock (personal correspondence with the author of this volume) stresses the crucial importance of William Warburton (1698-1779) and his *Divine Legation of Moses* (1737-41), in which 'he [Warburton] contends that all non-revealed religions that worship sociability and nothing else are ultimately pantheistic. This is linked with the view that only Christians, and perhaps Jews, believe in creation *ex nihilo*. In all other systems God and matter are coequal and perhaps interdependent, so that there's no difference between Chinese philosophy and Spinozism'.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004801266.0001.000?rgn=main;view=fulltext

I SHALL now add, that it is to be apprehended, many of those who are the most forward to banish Prejudices, would be the first to feel the Want of them. It is even pitiful to think, what would become of certain modern Declaimers on that Article, were Prejudice really set aside, and were all Men to be weighed in the exact Scale of Merit, and considered in Proportion only to their intrinsic Worth. **Some Prejudices are grounded in Truth, Reason, and Nature.** Such are the Respects which are paid to Knowledge, Learning, Age, Honesty, and Courage in all civilized Countries. **Others are purely the Effect of particular Constitutions, such as the Respects, Rights, and Preheminencies ascribed to some Men by their Fellow-Subjects, on Account of their Birth and Quality; which in the great Empires of *Turky* and *China*, pass for nothing; and will pass for nothing elsewhere, as soon as Men have got rid of their Prejudices, and learned to despise the Constitutions of their Country. [1738]** It may behove those who are concerned, to reflect on this betimes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Baptiste_de_Boyer,_Marquis_d%27Argens

Jean-Baptiste rejected a legal career and while the rest of his family were devout Catholics, became a rationalist author and critic of the Church; he later wrote 'I was not my father's favourite child.'[5] **To prevent the division of family estates amongst multiple heirs, younger sons were often required to remain unmarried;** of his four younger brothers, three including
Alexandre, later Marquis D'Éguilles were enrolled in the Knights of Malta religious order and the other became a priest.[5]
...

While several generations of the de Boyer family held the position of *Procureur général*, they also had a background in the arts. Jean-Baptiste's great-uncle was the poet and dramatist Abbe Claude de Boyer (1618-1698), while his grandfather, Jean-Baptiste de Boyer (1640-1709), owned a famous art collection, with works by Titian, Caravaggio, Michelangelo, Van Dyck, Poussin, Rubens and Corregio.[8]

In 1719, his father reluctantly purchased Jean-Baptiste a commission in the Régiment de Toulouse, based in Strasbourg. Pierre-Jean de Boyer was made 'Marquis d'Argens' in 1722 and since eldest sons were permitted to use the same title, Jean-Baptiste was also known as Marquis d'Argens.[9]
...

D'Argens returned to France in 1724, where he spent the next few years obediently studying law and even acting in a number of legal cases. **The 1731 Cadière witchcraft trial appears to have been the point at**

which he rejected a legal career, while confirming his opposition to the Catholic Church and the Jesuits in particular.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/588/mode/2up?view=theater

In his *Lettres Chinoises*, one of his longest works, d'Argens' Chinese observer reports home from Paris that there are many Europeans who follow a system of philosophy which closely resembles that of the classical Chinese thinkers: **'Spinoza, savant hollandois, en a été l'inventeur, ou plûtôt le restaurateur, car l'on prétend que ses sentimens, à quelque chose pres, ont été ceux de plusieurs philosophes anciens.'**82 **He then takes the opportunity to explain several passages from the *Ethics* in French, including the infamous Proposition XIV of part I: 'quidquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi potest,'**83 **and then elaborates in the space of more than seventy pages his close identification of the ideas of 'les Européens Spinosistes' with those of the 'commentateurs modernes chinois.'**84 Naturally, remarks d'Argens, Christian missionaries working in China never tell the Chinese about Spinoza and carefully avoid mentioning the 'grand nombre de partisans' that Spinoza has 'en France, en Allemagne, en Angleterre, en Hollande, et surtout en Italie.'85

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#64.28

The all-embracing Primal *Ch'i* created Heaven and Earth.[29] **'Heaven' is [composed of] a single soul-substance; 'Man' is likewise [composed of] a single soul-substance. Although [individual] forms may differ in size, still, they are [all but] parts of the all-embracing *ch'i* of the ultimate beginnings [of the universe].[30] Ladle out every drop from the great ocean, and there will be nothing different.** Confucius said, 'The earth began from spiritual *ch'i*; the spiritual *ch'i* was wind and thunder; the wind and thunder flowed [into] form, and all things came forth to birth.'[31] **Spirit is lightning[32] which has awareness.** There is nothing into which the lightning-flash[32] cannot penetrate; [similarly], there is nothing which the spiritual *ch'i* cannot affect. Spirit [in] demons, spirit [in] emperors; giving birth to Heaven, giving birth to Earth; whole spirit, divided spirit; only [spirit] in the Beginnings, only [spirit] in man. How minute, how subtle, this stimulatingness of spirit! No creatures are without 'lightning', no creatures are without spirit.

29. Compare *Mencius*, II, B, 2.11-15, where there is found the famous term □□□□ (rendered by Legge as 'vast, flowing passion nature'), and the statement that the *ch'i* 'fills up the space between Heaven and Earth'. **However, the *ch'i* to which K'ang is referring is a neo-Confucian *ch'i*; that is to say, the 'material' *ch'i* hypostasized by the great Sung philosophers of whom the chief representative is Chu Hsi (1130-1200).**

32. It is also quite possible that this □ means electricity. Fung-Bodde so take it (see above, reference cited in n. 29, pp. 685-6). Fung states therefore that K'ang is here drawing on the ideas of Western physics to supplement the traditional Chinese conception.

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh/web/s10/ideas.pdf

In 1755 Voltaire produced a play, *The Chinese Orphan*, which he adapted from an old Chinese play that had been published in French translation in 1735. **This play, significantly described by him as "the morals of Confucius in five acts," was written as an answer to the theories of Rousseau (1712-78).** Rousseau, as we all know, wanted people to follow a back-to-nature movement, and argued that the arts, sciences, and human institutions generally, are harmful because they corrupt the simple goodness of human nature. Voltaire, to disprove these ideas, deliberately changed the original seventh century B.C. setting of his play, laying it instead in the thirteenth century A.D., when the Mongols, under Jenghis Khan, conquered China. **His purpose in so doing was to prove the superiority of human art and culture by showing how Chinese civilization finally triumphed over the warlike barbarism of the Mongols.**

http://ml.ci.uc.pt/mhonarchive/histport/pdfEDITv6oEvu.pdf

The works of Metastasio are esteemed all over Europe; and Mr. Voltaire,22 **the most universal genius perhaps which France has ever produced,** is acknowledged to be, in almost every species of writing, nearly upon a level with the greatest authors of the last age, who applied themselves chiefly to one. **The original and inventive genius of that Gentleman never appeared more conspicuous than in his last tragedy, the orphan of China. It is both agreeable and surprising to observe how the atrocity, if I may say so, of Chinese virtue, and the rudeness of Tartar barbarity, have been introduced upon the French stage,** without violating those nice decorums of which that nation are such delicate and scrupulous judges.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n85/mode/2up?view=theater

"I rejoice with my brave *chevalier* (he would write to the Marq. de Villevielle) on the expulsion of the Jesuits; **Japan led the way in driving out those knaves of Loyola; China followed the example of Japan, and France and Spain have imitated the Chinese. Would to God that all the monks were swept from the face of the earth, they are no better than those knaves of Loyola.** If the Sorbonne was suffered to act, it would be worse than the Jesuits. One is surrounded with monsters: we embrace our worthy chevalier, and exhort him to conceal his march from the enemy."22

What examples does the philosophist of Ferney adduce! The cruelties of Taikosama, who, in expelling and crucifying the missionary Jesuits, also murdered thousands and thousands of his subjects, in order to eradicate Christianity. The Chinese, less violent indeed, but with whom every persecution against the missionaries, has always been followed or preceded by a prohibition to preach the Gospel. Can the man build upon such authorities, without forming the same wish?

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA223#v=onepage&q&f=false

Commencing [in 1759] with incisive remarks on the liberty-curtailing character of aristocratic republics in general, "such as the Polish and Italian ones, which take pride in the hallowed name of freedom" but where "most people are bondsmen of the high ranking notwithstanding,"30 Forsskål lambasted **the restrictive, privileged "aristocratic" character of access of high offices and positions in the Swedish state, resulting in the country's highest posts coming into "unworthy hands." In China, by contrast, high offices were assigned according to merit, not noble status.**31 "Each and every inhabitant," held Forsskål, "should have a reasonable share in public benefits. For society is common as should liberty be also."32 This principle he combined with a plea for progressive taxation laying the heaviest burden on the wealthy and taxing the poor least. Echoing Helvétius especially, Forsskål's tract shocked the university and was banned outright by the aristocratic government, albeit only after all 500 privately printed copies had been distributed so that most were never recovered.33 **Denounced as a disciple of Spinoza and Bayle, Forsskål was debarred from an academic career in Sweden-Finland.** Scandinavia's first noteworthy post-Wolffian enlightener thus found himself obliged to resume his scholarly career abroad.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/660/mode/2up?view=theater

The Early Enlightenment's fundamental disagreement as to whether Confucianism was Spinozistic or not slowly lapsed but was never resolved. What did change was that by the middle of the century the Chinese 'card' had to a large extent been captured by Voltaire and the providential Deists and began to be dropped by the radical fringe as well as increasingly rejected by the churches and by disciples of Montesquieu repelled by the despotic character of the Chinese empire. **Prior to 1750, for several decades, all strands of the Enlightenment (except perhaps the Thomasians) had agreed that classical Chinese society was a model society adhering to an ethical system and awareness of the law of nations equalled by no other. Whether one approached the question from a *Malebranchiste*-Baylean standpoint, or a Leibnizian-Jesuit, Wolffian, or Voltairean one, it seemed there was no need of the Gospels, or any revelation, to achieve an orderly, secure society based on wisdom, justice, virtue, and 'le bien public.'** By around 1750, however, the position was perceptibly changing, with the radical tendency divesting itself of much of its former enthusiasm for China and the churches devising a counter-strategy to sap the arguments of both Voltaire and the non-providential Deists, by disparaging Chinese society itself and undermining the prestige of its *philosophia practica*.

The Abbé Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, for example, in his *Apologie de la religion chrétienne* (1769), accused the *philosophes* of having so few scruples about misleading the French public with lies that they missed no opportunity to belittle faith and religion by misinforming readers on the subject of Chinese morality and society. *The philosophes* habitually celebrate 'les moeurs et le gouvernement des Chinois comme un prodige'; yet reliable recent travellers' reports completely contradict them, presenting an entirely different picture.135

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA180#v=onepage&q&f=false

But mankind's universal destitution, misfortune, and misery, avows d'Holbach, stems not from mankind having degenerated, or strayed from the purity of the state of nature, as the deluded Rousseau imagined, but from human reason remaining stunted in its infancy, in unknowing immaturity regarding society, morality, and political theory. **In short, d'Holbach, dropping hostile allusions to Rousseau at every turn, fervently denounced the political culture of his time, and not least its veneration of classical republicanism and what he dismissed as the oppressive morality of ancient Sparta and Rome.**13 **Existing political thought seemed to him so retrograde that mankind had not yet even begun to hit on sound principles, except perhaps, in some degree, in China where government was tightly conjoined to morality and philosophy (Confucianism), and traditional "religion" supervised by priests had (supposedly) lost all hold over the governing class, with "superstition" and belief in the supernatural purged from morality and the state. There, no**

one could participate in administration unless "exempt from popular religion," thereby enabling general improvement to set in. The court at Peking rewarded merit and achievement rather than deferred to pretensions of noble lineage.14

http://www.ftarchives.net/holbach/good/gs3.htm#139

In the eastern part of Asia, is a vast, flourishing, fertile, populous country, governed by such wise laws, that the fiercest conquerors have adopted them with respect. I mean China. **Excepting Christianity, which was banished as dangerous, the people there follow such superstitions as they please, while the *mandarins*, or magistrates, having long known the errors of the popular religion, are vigilant to prevent the *bonzes* or priests from using it as an instrument of discord. Yet we see not, that Providence refuses his blessing to a nation, whose chiefs are so indifferent about the worship that is rendered to him.** On the contrary, the Chinese enjoy a happiness and repose worthy to be envied, by the many nations whom religion divides, and often devastates.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/n13/mode/2up?view=theater

The events of the last year of the 19th century have once more drawn the attention of the civilized world towards the Chinese empire, and have given birth to a stream of books, pamphlets, periodical and newspaper articles, in which various authors have tried to throw light upon the East Asiatic continent, often however only helping to increase erroneous ideas already in circulation about it.

A chief point of attraction was Christianity established there by European and American missions, now subjected for the thousandth time to murderous attacks. Curiously enough, many people, nurtured in the bosom of our Christian nations, now sided with the persecutor. Several writers brought serious accusations against the missionaries. They reproached them openly with being the cause of the outrages not only upon themselves and the communities established by them, but upon foreigners in general. These writers, too ignorant to restrain their inordinate passion for writing, did not hesitate to lay the ensuing disasters to the account of the impolitic, even criminal actions of which the preachers of the foreign religions are supposed to have been persistently and systematically guilty. **Giving their fancy full play, and looking at the faults of the missions through magnifying-glasses, rather than actuated by a love of truth, they have drawn up formal lists of the transgressions of the missions,** collected from vague rumours, one-sided accounts of Chinese officials, and idle reports spread abroad by the press both in the East and in the West.

Indeed – so some argued – the government of China and its people are altogether tolerant on the point of religion; this is an established fact which even gray-headed sinologists do not gainsay. Therefore, when missionaries and their Christian communities, and with them foreigners in general, are attacked, there can be but one reason for this, namely that the missions by their evil doings have exasperated the people and their rulers to such an extent and so persistently that their anger has boiled over. This then is the solution of the "foreign" question. Eureka!
…

For centuries the missions have, on various occasions, had painful experience of the fact that this vaunted liberty left much, very much, to be desired; and nevertheless, as far as my knowledge goes, **nobody has ever yet attempted to trace the reasons for this intolerance;** and this will justify my endeavour to do so in this work. **A chimera has to be banished from our minds and to make room for the conviction that we approach a great deal nearer the truth by admitting the Chinese State to be the most intolerant, the most persecuting of all earthly governments;** a State which, on account of certain ancient dogmatic principles in the system of political philosophy whereon it is based, could not consistently do otherwise than brandish fire and sword in the face of every religious community or sect which, since the days of Confucius, has ventured to make its appearance in China; a State, in fact, which always follows this political line of action with the most scrupulous exactitude, and must *a fortiori* be hostile to Christianity and the despised "foreign devils" who introduced it.

For many years **I also held the comfortable universal belief in China's religious liberty.** I even expressed this belief in one of my earlier writings; the few lines written under the influence of that conviction I now openly withdraw.

https://archive.org/details/2917134.0001.001.umich.edu/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Chester Holcombe, for some years Acting Minister of the United States at Pekin, says of the Chinese in his excellent book, *The Real Chinaman*: "There is no titled nobility, with its long list of elder and younger sons, sons-in-law, and cousins near and remote, to be supported from the public funds, and to fill all the more important positions of honour and profit. The few titles that are from time to time bestowed carry nothing with them but the nominal honour; they are bestowed as rewards for distinguished services, and have never been recognised as forming the basis of any claim whatever upon either offices or treasury. In a way they are hereditary, but soon run out, *since the rank decreases one grade with each generation*.

Even the imperial clan forms no exception to this rule. The author has many a time had in his employ a man who, as a relative of the Emperor, was entitled to wear the imperial yellow girdle; but he was a hod-carrier, and earned six cents a day."

With this suggestion – for the benefit of some future Government – I will close. **Let our Aristocracy, as far as it is hereditary, be "let down gently" by the rank descending one grade with each generation. This already happens with the younger children of our higher ranks, who receive courtesy titles for life.** Let a system of such courtesy titles be extended for two or three generations, and let all children in that respect count as younger children; and in a few years we should have got rid of a foolish and somewhat vulgar anachronism.

https://www.franz-oppenheimer.de/state2.htm#II_a

Neither have we meant the rigidity of the gigantic Chinese Empire, which can last only so long as foreign powers refrain from forcing its mysterious gates.[*****] **[1908]**

> [*****] Had we the space, **a detailed exposition of this exceptional development of a feudal state would be tempting. China would be well worth a more detailed discussion, since, in many aspects it has approached the condition of "free citizenship'' more closely than any people of Western Europe. China has overcome the consequences of the feudal system more thoroughly than we Europeans have; and has made, early in its development, the great property interests in the land harmless, so that their bastard offspring, capitalism, hardly came into being;** while in addition, it has worked out to a considerable degree the problems of cooperative production and of cooperative distribution.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR21#v=onepage&q&f=false

When Qin was founded at the western edge of the Chinese world, it joined the company of hundreds of tiny independent states. **Their major weapon was the chariot, an aristocratic monopoly. Their main productive organization was communal farming; private land ownership was a notion to come. Their feudalistic state with hereditary ministries was mostly undifferentiated from the ruling family. Cementing this structure were kinship and personal rapport, partially formalized in rituals.**17 **Toward the end of the Bronze Age, when the feudalistic establishment began to crumble, Confucius flourished, an impoverished aristocrat attached to the ancient régime. He brought to commoners education previously reserved for his class and provided moral grounding for many of its values, which would persist to sway imperial China.** The texts of feudalistic aristocrats, canonized in Confucianism, would mold the mind of imperial literati-officials for two millennia.18 **Nostalgia for sharing in the idealized communal farm partly explained why economic inequality in imperial China, though acute, never approached the stratospherical level in the Roman Empire.**19
...

Rome's liberty and empowerment of citizens are adduced by modern historians as factors for the success of its empire.21 **This book argues that these factors worked only in the phase of aggressive expansion, when self-equipped citizens empowered themselves, partly by filling the Republic's legions.** The Roman Empire that maintained peace and prosperity stripped citizens of all political rights. Legal rights also eroded. Social privileges shifted from citizenship to wealth. **Eventually, poor Roman citizens, legally tied to the land, enjoyed less social freedom than Chinese subjects.**22

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_occupations#Background
>
> **The four occupations system differed from those of European feudalism in that people were not born into the specific classes,** such that, for example, a son born to a gong craftsman was able to become a part of the shang merchant class, and so on. Theoretically, any man could become an official through the Imperial examinations.[14]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mQspAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA278#v=onepage&q&f=false

The stipend of a Han provincial governor was fifteen times that of the aide, the lowest person in the official ladder, with compensation comparable to that of a foot soldier. The pay for each of the ten senior centurions in a legion was thirty-three times that of a soldier, and they were below tribunes and commanders, who were below provincial governors.58

The Chinese literature brims with denunciation of the filthy rich.59 **A substantive case was Prince Kang, Guangwudì's son, who amassed 1,400 slaves, 1,200 stabled horses, and 3,688 hectares of land. This was near the top of Han wealth.** Princes also enjoyed the tax revenue of their income fiefs, but these were county sizes at best and rather lean on the 3.3 percent land tax. **Private estates larger than 5,000 hectares were almost unheard of; divided inheritance was more effective than legal caps on hoarding.**60 The Romans operated on a different order of magnitude. Six men owned one-half of the province of Africa before Nero confiscated their estates. Senatorial heiress Melania's fertile estate near Rome contained, besides a magnificent villa, 62 hamlets, each with about 400 slave cultivators. Together with her other properties in Italy, Sicily, Africa, Spain, and Gaul, her estimated income rivaled the tax revenues of two African provinces, where the land tax exceeded 15 percent. **This would put**

her among the wealthiest in Constantinople, but in Rome, she made only the middle range. A top western senator needed several hundred thousand hectares to generate his reported incomes. **Wealthy Romans dwarfed the grandees of Victorian England enriched by the industrial revolution.**61
...

By the sixth century, bishops and the clergy far outnumbered administrative officials in the Roman Empire and were better paid.64
...

The small freeholder became an endangered species. **Tenant farmers, Chinese *dianhu* and Roman *coloni*, constituted the majority in many parts of the late empires.** In the vast estates of big landlords, they toiled alongside hired hands, slaves, and workers of various forms of dependency. Rents were oppressive, upward of half of the crop.66 Nevertheless, many tenants and their landlords developed some kind of patron-client relationship. Large landlords were usually local magnates who could offer protection in exchange for submission. Those powerful enough concealed some tenants and the lands they cultivated from state levy, thus increasing both their own income and the dependency of sheltered tenants. **Standing between the government and the small folks, the magnates truncated state power by promoting mutual interests in evading tax, always easy to condemn. Many Chinese tenants were relatives of their landlords, and some families stayed for generations. Nevertheless, tenants were legally free to leave at the end of their lease.**67 **The freedom to seek better deals was denied to most Roman tenants by the time of Constantine.** Developing the plutocratic tradition, laws tied tenants and their descendants to the land and gave landlords the right to chain and punish escapee suspects. Theodosius decreed that tenants were “slaves to the land itself to which they are born.”68 The different degrees to which the government backed the wealthy landlords to squeeze poor peasants may contribute to explaining a puzzle about the Roman army.
...

Han officials and later warlords seemed to have little recruitment problem, provided they offered good terms. Sun Ce, who founded the Wu Kingdom, declared amnesty to defeated troops and tax exemption for families of volunteers, and in ten days enlisted 20,000 quality troops.69 This should not be surprising; the army offered poor peasants an alternative way to make a living. The pay and pension for Roman legionaries were generous, but the army faced chronic recruitment difficulties. In vain did emperors issue harsh draft laws, reduce qualifications, and create a military caste by making service compulsory for sons of soldiers and veterans. The almost lifelong service deterred many. **The law that bound tenants to the land deprived many of essential free choices and created a barrier to recruitment. Instead of enticing individual peasants, the army had to pry lucrative tenants from powerful landlords. The largest landlord, the emperor, legally put his tenants off-limits.** Lesser landlords did their best to scare their tenants, resist the army, and let go only the least fit men. The shortage of soldiers would grow into a cancer in the Empire.70
...

People abandoned their homes to survive. Dislocation was severe in China, where many peasants depended on large irrigational waterworks that, once damaged, could not be repaired by individual efforts. **Texts recorded the largest migration out of north China.** The refugees’ homeland would have to endure more than a century of violent wars. *Hanren* would turn from “people of the Han Dynasty” to designate ethnicity, when the Han-Chinese got their name from the disparagement of their minority masters.182 **Mobility seemed less in the Mediterranean world; strong property rights tied down landlords and legal status bound tenants.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_China#Early_modern

The Qing dynasty (1644-1912 AD) initially oversaw an expansion in slavery and states of bondage such as the booi aha.[4] They possessed about two million slaves upon their conquest of China. [1] However, like previous dynasties, the Qing rulers soon saw the advantages of phasing out slavery, and gradually introduced reforms turning slaves and serfs into peasants.[1] Laws passed in 1660 and 1681 forbade landowners from selling slaves with the land they farmed and prohibited physical abuse of slaves by landowners.[1] **The Kangxi Emperor freed all the Manchus' hereditary slaves in 1685.[1] The Yongzheng Emperor's "Yongzheng emancipation" between 1723 and 1730 sought to free all slaves to strengthen his authority through a kind of social leveling that created an undifferentiated class of free subjects under the throne, freeing the vast majority of slaves.[1]**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n273/mode/2up?view=theater

The classic of the movement was Quesnay, Louis XV's physician, who repeated the demand of “*laissez passer*” in his *Tableau économique* and in his *La Physiocratie* (1768) founded the Physiocratic school **that dominated the whole of the rest of the century. The implication of the word was that nature was to rule without restraint,** because prosperity and progress can arise only from the natural sources of economics.
...

The new doctrine seized upon all thinking classes like a fever: the salons became the centre of heated arguments about monopolies, protective tariffs, and encouragement of agriculture; and political economy became the fashionable science. **“About 1750,” said Voltaire, “the country grew tired of verse, of tragedies, comedies, romances, operas, romantic tales, still more romantic moral discussions, and disputations about charm and curtsies, and began to argue about corn.”**

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh/web/s10/ideas.pdf

The Physiocrats also argued that education should be separated from the church and made universal, for only in that way could the best available talent of the country be brought forward and trained for public service.

Most of these ideas bore an amazing resemblance to those found in Confucian political and economic philosophy. **For thousands of years the Chinese had believed that there can be good government only when a perfect harmony exists between the "Way of Man" (governmental institutions) and the "Way of Nature" (Quesnay's Natural Order).** China had always been a predominantly agrarian country, in which industries and trade played only a minor part. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese regarded agriculture as "primary" and worthy of intensive government support, while commerce was looked upon as nonproductive and, therefore, "secondary." For this reason they traditionally ranked the merchant near the bottom of the social ladder, well below the honored place they gave the farmer.

The Chinese government even went so far as to place restrictions upon the development of private trade. Herein lies the major point of difference between Chinese theory and that of the Physiocrats. **Though Quesnay and his group thought that the government should do nothing that would encourage trade, they at the same time believed in the doctrine of laissez faire**—that trade should be permitted to operate free from government restrictions.
...

The tremendous debt of the Physiocrats to China is evident in Quesnay's book *The Despotism of China* (1767), in which he presents his ideas of what a truly enlightened despotism means. In its first seven chapters he paints a glowing picture of Chinese political and economic conditions, drawing his material directly from Jesuit writings on China. In the eighth, and final, chapter he develops his own theories along the lines described above, linking them directly with the example of China.

One of the customs that most aroused Quesnay's enthusiasm was the annual ceremony performed since early times by each Chinese emperor in the spring: that of the ritual plowing of a sacred plot of land, to mark the moment when Chinese farmers were to begin their spring cultivation. **In 1768, when Quesnay's influence was at its height, this ancient ceremony was symbolically performed by the son of Louis XV at the French Court, using a small-scale model of a plow as evidence of the government's benevolent interest in agriculture! The following year the act was repeated by Emperor Joseph II of Austria, this time with a full-size plow.** No wonder that Quesnay, the inspirer of these imitations of Chinese ceremonial, was called by his followers "the Confucius of Europe"!

One of the most prominent admirers of the Physiocrats was the statesman Turgot (1727-81), who was French minister of finance from 1774 to 1776.
...

These doctrines, however, while well suited to an agrarian economy such as that of China, proved to be ill-adapted for France, where a modern system of capitalism was already beginning to develop. The forces of corruption and reaction ranged against Turgot were too great, and he was forced to resign. His attempt to reform France from the top failed. The attempt that was to succeed came violently from below some years later. It was the French Revolution in 1789.

Though the Physiocrats failed in the practical application of their doctrines, their impact on later economic theory was strong. This influence is particularly evident in the ideas of Adam Smith (1723-90), author of the classical economic work of modern times, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). **Thus the Physiocrats may truly be said to rank among the founders of modern Western political economy. And, in their insistence upon the need for universal education, they led the way in a movement that in the nineteenth century was to become a standard practice in Western democracies.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n185/mode/2up?view=theater

WHEN Voltaire swore to annihilate Christianity, he did not flatter himself with the hope of drawing the generality of nations into his apostacy. His pride seems often satisfied with the progress that Philosophism had made among those *who governed, or were made to govern,* and among *men of letters*;1 for a long time he does not appear to envy Christianity the inferior classes of society, which he does not comprehend under the appellation of the *better sort*. **The facts we are about to lay before the reader will show to what new extent the conspirators sought to carry their impious zeal, and by what artifices Christ was to be deprived of all worship even from the lowest populace.**

A doctor known in France by the name of *Duquesnai* had so well insinuated himself into the favor of Louis XV that the king used to call him his *thinker*. He really appeared to have deeply meditated on the happiness of the subject, and he may have sincerely wished it; nevertheless he was but a system-maker, **and the founder of that Sect of Sophisters called Oeconomists,** because the oeconomy and order to be introduced into the finances, and other means of alleviating the distresses of the people, were perpetually in their mouths. If some few of these oeconomists sought nothing further in their speculations, **it is certain, that their writers took no pains to conceal their hatred for the Christian religion. Their works abound in passages which at least show their wish of**

substituting natural religion to the Christian religion and revelation.2 **Their affectation of solely speaking of agriculture, administration, and oeconomy, render them less liable to suspicion, than those conspirators who are perpetually intruding their impiety.**

Duquesnai and his adepts had more especially undertaken to persuade their readers, that the country people, and mechanics in towns, were entirely destitute of that kind of instruction necessary for their professions; that men of this class, unable to acquire knowledge by reading, pined away in an ignorance equally fatal to themselves and to the state; **that it was necessary to establish free schools, and particularly throughout the country, where children might be brought up to different trades, and instructed in the principles of agriculture. D'Alembert, and the Voltairian adepts, soon perceived what advantages they could reap from these establishments. In union with the Oeconomists, they presented various memorials to Louis XV in which not only the temporal but even the spiritual advantages of such establishments for the people are strongly urged.** The king, who really loved the people, embraced the project with warmth. He opened his mind on the subject to Mr. Bertin, whom he honored with his confidence, and had entrusted with his privy purse. It was from frequent conversations with this minister, that the memorial from which we extract the following account was drawn up. It is Mr. Bertin himself who speaks:

"Louis XV," says that minister, "having entrusted me with the care of his privy purse, it was natural that he should mention to me an establishment of which his Majesty was to defray the expence. I had long since closely observed the different Sects of our philosophers; and though I had much to reproach myself with as to the practice, I had at least preserved the principles of my religion. I had little doubt of the efforts of the Philosophers to destroy it. **I was sensible that they wished to have the direction of these schools themselves, and by that means seize on the education of the people,** under pretence that the bishops and ecclesiastics, who had hitherto superintended them and their teachers, could not be competent judges in subjects so little suited to clergymen. **I apprehended that their object was not so much to give lessons on agriculture to the children of husbandmen and trades-people, as to withdraw them from their habitual instructions on their catechism or on their religion.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n157/mode/2up?view=theater

[Turgot] belonged to that Sect of Oeconomists who detested the French monarchy, and only endured a king, in order to treat him as did the first rebels of the revolution.

At length advanced to the ministry by the cabals of the Sect, he uses all his power to inspire the young king with his disgust for the monarchy, and with his principles on the authority of a throne he had sworn to maintain as minister. **He would willingly have transformed him into a Jacobin king.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n315/mode/2up?view=theater

At that time they published at Paris a periodical work under the title of *Ephémérides du Citoyen*. The Oeconomists had the direction of it, **and that class of adepts was perhaps the most dangerous. They, with all the appearance of moderation, with all the show of patriotic zeal, forwarded the revolution more efficaciously than the frantic rebels of Holbach's Club.**

https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/earth-belongs-usufruct-living

Sometime during the first week in September, Jefferson suffered an incapacitating illness of six days—perhaps one of his violent periodic headaches that seemed so often to be preceded or followed by bursts of intellectual activity.[1] It was about this time that he was also seized by an idea that exerted a compelling influence over him for the remainder of his life. **This was the belief that "*the earth belongs in usufruct to the living*," the dead having neither rights nor powers over it.**[2] **This concept of political relativism was the one great addition to Jefferson's thought that emerged from his years of residence at the center of European intellectual ferment.**

It is quite likely that the immediate stimulus causing this idea to burst suddenly upon his consciousness was provided by the physician who attended him in his illness and whom he regarded as the ablest doctor he had ever known, "a very sensible man," though **"a pure theorist, of the sect called the oeconomists, of which Turgot was considered as the head."**[3] **This was Dr. Richard Gem, an Englishman, a successful physician, an ardent devotee of republican principles, a friend of Diderot, Turgot, Dupont, Condorcet, and Morellet, and of course one of those who gathered around Baron d'Holbach, who died early in 1789.**

…

Philip Mazzei said in 1788 that he had known Gem for thirty-two years and described him as "un des meilleurs hommes du monde et veritable philosophe." He also said that he was the one who had introduced Gem and Jefferson to each other. As a physician of high standing in Paris and London and as one on terms of familiarity with the British nobility, Gem is almost certainly the author of the information about the character of the Prince of Wales that Jefferson transmitted to Jay on 11 Jan. 1789 as being from "an Englishman … of truth, sagacity, and science."[5]

But others, who looked upon republican zealots less tolerantly than Jefferson did, portrayed themselves in their comments as much as they did Gem. The Earl of Malmesbury, in Paris in 1796, recorded in his journal: "Dr. Gemm called. Atheist.
***Systême de la Nature*, economist, &c.—the cold apathetic scoundrel described by Burke."**[6]

https://archive.org/details/cu31924014201044/page/n203/mode/2up?view=theater

IT is noteworthy that of all the ideas and feelings which prepared the Revolution, **the idea of political liberty, properly so called, was the last to make its appearance, as the desire for it was the first to vanish.**

The old edifice of government had long been insecure; it shook, though no man struck it. Voltaire was hardly thinking of it. Three years' residence in England had enabled him to understand that country without falling in love with it. He was delighted with the skeptical philosophy that was freely taught among the English, but he was not struck with their political laws, which he rather criticised than praised. **His letters on England, which are one of his master-pieces, hardly contain any allusion to Parliament: he envies the English their literary liberty, but cares little for their political liberty, as though the one could exist for any length of time without the other.**

About the middle of the century, a class of writers devoted their attention to administrative questions; they had many points in common, and were hence distinguished by the general name of economists or physiocrats. They are less conspicuous in history than the philosophers; they exercised a less direct influence in causing the Revolution, but still I think its true nature can best be studied in their writings. The philosophers confined themselves, for the most part, to abstract and general theories on the subject of government; the economists dealt in theories, but also deigned to notice facts. The former furnished ideal, the latter practical schemes of reform.
…

Forty years before the Constituent Assembly divided France into departments, one of the economists suggested the alteration of all existing territorial divisions and of the names of all the provinces.

They conceived all the social and administrative reforms effected by the Revolution before the idea of free institutions had once flashed upon their mind. They were in favor of the removal of all restrictions upon the sale and conveyance of produce and merchandise. But of political liberty they took no thought; and when it first occurred to them they rejected the idea. Most of them were strongly opposed to deliberative assemblies, to local and subordinate authorities, and to the various checks which have been established from time to time in free countries to counterbalance the supreme government. "The system of counterpoises," said Quesnay, "is a fatal feature in governments." A friend of his was satisfied that "the system of counterpoises was the fruit of chimerical speculations."

The only safeguard against despotism which they proposed was public education; for, as Quesnay said, "Despotism is impossible in an enlightened nation." "Mankind," says one of his disciples, "have invented a host of fruitless contrivances to obviate the evils arising from abuses of power by governments, **but they have generally neglected the only one that could really be of service, namely, a general permanent system of public education in the essence of justice and natural order.**" Such was the literary nonsense they wanted to substitute in the place of political guarantees.
…

Even Turgot, with all his peculiar breadth of view and rare genius, was but little fonder than they of political liberty. He had no taste for it till late in life, when public opinion pointed in that direction. **Like the economists, he conceived that the best of all political guarantees was public education afforded by the state;** but he desired it to be conducted in a particular spirit, and according to a particular plan. His confidence in this intellectual course of medicine—or, as a contemporary styled it, this "educational mechanism on fixed principles"—was unbounded. "I will venture to answer," said he to the king, in a memorial on the subject, "that in ten years the nation will be so thoroughly altered that you shall not recognize it; and that, **in point of enlightenment, morality, loyalty, and patriotism, it will surpass every other nation in the world.** Children now ten years old will then be men, trained in ideas of love for their country, submissive to authority from conviction, not from fear, charitable to their fellow-countrymen, habituated to obey and to respect the voice of justice."

…

The royal power had not taken its rise in the Middle Ages, and bore no mediæval stamp. They discovered in it good as well as bad points. **It shared their proclivity for leveling all ranks, and making all laws uniform.** It detested as heartily as they did the old institutions which had grown out of the feudal system, or which favored oligarchy. **It was the best organized, the greatest and strongest government machine in Europe. Its existence seemed to them a very fortunate accident; they would have called it providential had it been the fashion then as now to allude to Providence on all possible occasions. Letronne observes that "France is much more happily situated than England; for here reforms that will change the whole state of the country can be accomplished in a moment, whereas in England similar measures are always exposed to be defeated by party strife."**

Their idea, then, was not to destroy, but to convert the absolute monarchy. "The state must govern according to the laws of natural order (*règles de l'ordre essentiel*)," says Mercier de la Rivière; "on these conditions it should be absolute." "Let the state," said another, "understand its duty thoroughly; this secured, it should be untrammeled." All of them, from Quesnay to Abbé Bodeau, were of the same mind.
…

The state, said the economists, must not only govern, it must shape the nation. It must form the mind of citizens conformably to a preconceived model. It is its duty to fill their minds with such opinions and their hearts with such feelings as it may judge necessary. In fact, there are no limits either to its rights or its powers. **It must transform as well as reform its subjects; perhaps even create new subjects, if it thinks fit. "The state," says Bodeau, "moulds men into whatever shape it pleases."** That sentence expresses the gist of the whole system.

The immense social power conceived by the economists differed from the power they had before them in point of origin and character as well as magnitude. **It was not of divine origin; it owed nothing to tradition; it was impersonal: it was called the state, not the king; it was not the heirloom of a family, it was the collective product and representative of the whole nation.** Individual rights gave way to it as the sum of the rights of all.

They were quite familiar with the form of tyranny which we call democratic despotism, and which had not been conceived in the Middle Ages. No more social hierarchies, no distinctions of class or rank; a people consisting of individuals entirely equal, and as nearly alike as possible; this body acknowledged as the only legitimate sovereign, but carefully deprived of the means of directing or even superintending the government; over it a single agent, commissioned to perform all acts without consulting his principals: to control him, a public sense of right and wrong, destitute of organs for its expression; to check him, revolutions, not laws; the agent being *de jure* a subordinate agent, in fact a master: such was the plan.

Finding nothing in their neighborhood conformable to this ideal of theirs, they went to the heart of Asia in search of a model. I do not exaggerate when I affirm that every one of them wrote in some place or other an emphatic eulogium on China. One is sure to find at least that in their books; and as China is very imperfectly known even in our day, their statements on its subject are generally pure nonsense. They wanted all the nations of the world to set up exact copies of that barbarous and imbecile government, which a handful of Europeans master whenever they please. China was for them what England, and afterward America, became for all Frenchmen. **They were filled with emotion and delight at the contemplation of a government wielded by an absolute but unprejudiced sovereign, who honored the useful arts by plowing once a year with his own hands; of a nation whose only religion was philosophy, whose only aristocracy were men of letters, whose public offices were awarded to the victors at literary tournaments.**

It is generally believed that the destructive theories known by the name of socialism are of modern origin. This is an error. These theories are coeval with the earliest economists. While some of them wanted to use the absolute power they desired to establish to change the forms of society, others proposed to employ it in ruining its fundamental basis.

Read the *Code de la Nature* by Morelly; you will find there, together with the economist doctrines regarding the omnipotence and the boundless rights of the state, several of those political theories which have terrified France of late years, and whose origin we fancy we have seen—community of property, rights of labor, absolute equality, universal uniformity, mechanical regularity of individual movements, tyrannical regulations on all subjects, and the total absorption of the individual in the body politic.

"Nothing," says the first article of this code, "belongs wholly to any one. Property is detestable, and any one who attempts to re-establish it shall be imprisoned for life, as a

dangerous madman and an enemy of humanity." The second article declares that "every citizen shall be kept, and maintained, and supplied with work at the public expense. All produce shall be gathered into public garners, to be distributed to citizens for their subsistence. All cities shall be built on the same plan; all private residences shall be alike. All children shall be taken from their families at five years of age, and educated together on a uniform plan." **This book reads as if it had been written yesterday. It is a hundred years old: it appeared in 1755, simultaneously with the foundation of Quesnay's school. So true it is that centralization and socialism are natives of the same soil: one is the wild herb, the other the garden-plant.**

Of all the men of their age, the economists would seem the least out of place at the present day; their passion for equality is so violent, their love of liberty so variable, that they wear a false air of contemporaries of our own. When I read the speeches and writings of the men who made the Revolution, I feel that I am in the company of strangers; but when I glance at the writings of the economists, I begin to fancy that I have lived with them, and just heard them talk.
…

At the time the French conceived a desire for political liberty, they were imbued with a number of notions on the subject of government which were not only difficult to reconcile with liberty, but were almost hostile to it.

In their ideal society there was no aristocracy but that of public functionaries, no authority but the government, sole and all-powerful, director of the state, tutor of individuals. They did not wish to depart from this system in the search for liberty; they tried to conciliate the two.

They attempted to combine an unlimited executive with a preponderating legislative body—a bureaucracy to administer, a democracy to govern. Collectively, the nation was sovereign—individually, citizens were confined in the closest dependence; yet from the former were expected the virtues and the experience of a free people, from the latter the qualities of a submissive servant.

It is to this desire of adjusting political liberty to institutions or ideas which are either foreign or hostile to it, but to which we were wedded by habit or attracted by taste, that we owe the many vain experiments of government that have been made during the last sixty years. Hence the fatal revolutions we have undergone. Hence it is that so many Frenchmen, worn out by fruitless efforts and sterile toil, have abandoned their second object and fallen back on their first, **declaring that there is, after all, a certain pleasure in enjoying equality under a master. Hence we resemble the economists of 1750 more closely than our fathers of 1789.**

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh/web/s10/ideas.pdf

In the years when Henry A. Wallace was Secretary of Agriculture (1933-40), he introduced many legislative measures for the relief of agriculture. Among them are some that are commonly referred to today under the general title of "the ever-normal granary." At the time they were inaugurated, these were criticized by some people as being too "radical" and "revolutionary." Yet in actual fact, the ever-normal granary is anything but new, for it was started in China more than two thousand years ago and has continued there almost ever since under various names and forms.

In the first decade of this century there was a Chinese student of political economy working for his doctor's degree at Columbia University, whose name was Chen Huan-chang. **In 1911, he published for his doctor's thesis a huge two-volume work called *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*, in which he described, among many other things, how China's first ever-normal granary was established by a certain statesman in 54 B.C.**
…

Many Ph.D. theses have a sad way of being forgotten soon after they are written. Chen's book, however, enjoyed a happier fate, for it chanced to fall into the hands of Mr. Wallace, then editor of a weekly paper in Des Moines, Iowa. It must have made a strong impression on him, for he took from it the idea of the evernormal granary and made it a permanent part of his own thinking.

He wrote about the ever-normal granary in *Wallaces' Farmer*, first in 1918, and again in 1926 and 1927. In the issue of December 6, 1918, he wrote: "**If any government shall ever do anything really worth while with our food problem it will be by perfecting the plan tried by the Chinese three thousand years ago;** that is, by building warehouses and storing food in years of abundance, and holding it until years of scarcity." On October 6, 1926, he said of the ever-normal granary: "Its principle had in it more of statesmanship than can be found in the vast majority of plans suggested for the relief of American agriculture."
…

Once more, therefore, Mr. Wallace turned to the ever-normal granary idea. In a radio speech of June 6, 1934, he pointed to its use in China and urged the adoption of something similar here. During the next few years he spoke and wrote repeatedly on the same subject. **As a result, the ever-normal granary idea found an important place in the new Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.** On February 16 of that year, the day

that the act became law, Mr. Wallace said of it: "The Act aims at a more substantial abundance than we have ever had. Various provisions will help, directly or indirectly, in setting up the Ever-Normal Granary plan." **Thus, twenty years after he had first written about it, the ever-normal granary became an integral part of American life.**
...

Back in 1911, when Chen Huan-chang wrote the book from which Mr. Wallace learned about the ever-normal granary, he ended it by saying: "The Great Similarity of Confucius will come and the world state will appear. Then the brotherhood of nations will be established, and there will be no war, but perpetual peace." Must we today face yet another war before we realize the simple fact that complete world peace—whether we call it "One World," "The Great Similarity," or any other name—is the only alternative to complete world destruction?

---

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/chinawh/web/s10/ideas.pdf

Today civil service is an accepted institution in all modern democracies. **In the year 1941, for example, nearly 2,500,000 men and women took examinations for positions in the United States government.**

So fundamental is the principle of choosing public servants on the basis of fitness that one might almost suppose it had been a cornerstone of our national thinking ever since our nation's beginnings. Yet, though few people stop to consider it, the fact is that this matter of efficiency in government is a relatively new idea in America. The first hundred years of our nation's history were racked with scandalous corruption as a result of the notorious spoils system. **Not until 1883, two years after a president of the United States had been assassinated by a disgruntled office seeker, did the public wake up and demand a system of civil service examinations that would ensure the selection of most government employees on the basis of merit rather than party loyalty.**

The civil service idea did not originate in our country, however, nor in Europe, **though it is true that in passing this legislation, Congress followed the immediate lead of Great Britain and France, both of which had taken similar action a few decades earlier.** The first county to install the merit system was China. In the year 165 B.C., China inaugurated what later became a widespread system of competitive government examinations. And during the greater part of the time from that early date until 1905, shortly before the Empire passed out of existence, the majority of Chinese applicants for public office had to prove their ability by passing one of these tests.
...

Though the European enthusiasm regarding China died away after 1789, it left behind it one very important practical heritage. This is the modern civil service system now prevailing in many Western countries.

As mentioned earlier, the Chinese examination system, from which the various European civil service systems are ultimately derived, seems to have been started in 165 B.C., when certain candidates for public office were called to the Chinese capital for examination by the emperor on their moral excellence. In following centuries the system grew until finally almost anyone who wished to become an official had to prove his worth by passing written government examinations.

From A.D. 1370 onward, the system was adjusted to include three sets of examinations, one held in the local counties, another in the capitals of the provinces, and a third—the highest examination of all—in Peking, the national capital. Some were conducted annually, and others once every three years. The honors thus attained corresponded roughly to our B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. **This system operated with great regularity until it was finally abolished in 1905.** Even today the government of China is officially pledged to its re-establishment, though in greatly modified form.

> *Paper of Ch'en Shih-jui, who graduated as 261st **among the 314 successful candidates receiving their chin-shih, or doctor's degree, in the Chinese national examination of May 25, 1894, held in Peking.** For this examination he wrote two essays and one poem. Reproduced is the first one of the essays, **dealing with the famous Confucian philosopher, Hsün Tzu, of the third century B.C.** It reveals the beautiful handwriting required from any successful candidate. The question for the essay was received at 10:00 A.M. and had to be answered in about two thousand words by sunset, that is, around 7:30 P.M. In the nine and one-half hours thus permitted, the candidate first had to compose a rough draft of his essay and then copy it into the stylized characters here shown. The copying alone, even for rapid writers, required about seven hours. The original of Ch'en's paper is in the Library of Congress.*

The examinations took place within huge walled enclosures, inside of which were thousands of small brick cells, laid out in straight rows like the houses of a town. Each cell contained a bench and table, and housed a nervous candidate. Every precaution was taken to prevent cheating. Candidates were searched before entering the enclosure, carefully watched while the examination was in progress, and not permitted to leave until it was over. **Each examination commonly lasted several days and was of unbelievable difficulty. In 1889, for example, out of more than 14,000 candidates taking the**

examination in Peking, only slightly over 300 passed. The reward for success, however, was entry into the honored ranks of the mandarins who governed the country.

The chief defect in this system was its emphasis upon literary style and a detailed knowledge of the Chinese classics, at the expense of more practical matters. Another was the failure of the Chinese government to provide anything approaching a national system of free education. Hence, most candidates had to prepare themselves for the examinations at their own expense and the inevitable result was that the majority of those able to take them came from the well-to-do. Nevertheless, the system had two important advantages. It was open, with trifling exceptions, to all members of society, **thus making it the world's most democratic means, before modern times, for selecting government officials.** And it ensured the presence in the government of men of high education.

Nothing like such a system seems to have been known among the other great civilizations of antiquity. **In the universities of Europe, written examinations seem to have been unheard of before 1702. As for government-administered civil service examinations, these were of considerably later date.** It is not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese examinations were described repeatedly in Western literature on China of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and aroused intense admiration among such men as Voltaire and Quesnay.

In France the earliest civil service system seems to have been established in 1791 shortly after the outbreak of the Revolution. After ten years, however, it was allowed to lapse, but was re-established in the 1840's. Though little attention seems to have been given to its early history, several writers on French history maintain that it owes its origin to the Chinese example.

The origins of the British civil service are better known. **During the eighteenth century a number of Englishmen wrote in praise of the Chinese examination system, some of them going so far as to urge the adoption for England of something similar. The first concrete step in this direction was taken by the British East India Company in 1806.** In that year the Company established a small college near London whose purpose was to train Company employees for administrative service in India, the British-controlled portions of which were at that time still governed by the Company on behalf of the British Crown. **The proposal for establishing this college came, significantly, from members of the East India Company's trading post in Canton, China.** Thus the principle was established of using for public administration men who possessed certain preparatory qualifications.

During the next several decades many Englishmen referred to the example of China as an argument for establishing a universal civil service system in England itself. Most persistent among them was Thomas Taylor Meadows, a gifted man who served for many years in the British diplomatic service in China. **In 1847 he published a book, *Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China*, whose main purpose, in his own words, was "to urge the institution of Public Service Competitive Examinations for all British subjects with a view to the Improvement of the British Executive and the Union of the British Empire."** In it he described the Chinese system and argued that "the long duration of the Chinese empire is solely and altogether owing to the good government which consists in the advancement of men of talent and merit only."

Such public statements finally led the British government to create a committee to investigate the matter. In 1853 this committee presented to Parliament a report entitled "The Organization of the Permanent Civil Service." The report recommended that a central board of examiners be formed to prepare examinations on the general knowledge of the candidates; that these examinations should be held regularly and should be open to all; and that promotion in government service should be based on merit instead of favoritism. All these were principles that had governed the Chinese system for many centuries. **Though bitterly attacked in Parliament, the report resulted in the creation of Britain's first civil service commission in 1855.**

The British example was undoubtedly chiefly responsible for the establishment in America of a similar civil service system. Nevertheless, some Chinese influence is also apparent. When, for example, Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island first recommended to Congress in 1868 that an American civil service system be created, his report on the subject contained a chapter on the civil service in China. The same year Emerson, who, as we have seen, was interested in China, made a speech in Boston at a reception in honor of a visiting embassy from China, in which he praised the Chinese examination system and urged that the Jenckes proposal be adopted.

As in England, however, many people who derived personal benefit from the old spoils system strongly opposed the new idea. **Some protested that the use of examinations to determine the fitness of candidates for office was Chinese, foreign, and, therefore, "un-American!" Consequently, it was not until 1883 that the proposal of 1868 was finally passed by the Congress.**

Today the principle of the civil service system has been accepted in virtually all democratic countries. More and more, persons are entering government service because of personal merit rather than political favoritism. As a result, much of the political corruption that was so common a century ago has disappeared.

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-social-darwinism-made-modern-china-248/

Chinese society is notable for its stability and longevity. From the gradual establishment of the bureaucratic imperial state based on mandarinate rule during the Sui (589–618) and T’ang (618–907)

dynasties down to the Communist Revolution of 1948, a single set of social and economic relations appears to have maintained its grip on the country, evolving only slightly while dynastic successions and military conquests periodically transformed the governmental superstructure.

A central feature of this system was the replacement of the local rule of aristocratic elements by a class of official meritocrats, empowered by the central government and selected by competitive examination. **In essence, China eliminated the role of hereditary feudal lords and the social structure they represented over 1,000 years before European countries did the same, substituting a system of legal equality for virtually the entire population beneath the reigning emperor and his family.**

The social importance of competitive examinations was enormous, playing the same role in determining membership in the ruling elite that the aristocratic bloodlines of Europe's nobility did until modern times, and this system embedded itself just as deeply in the popular culture. The great noble houses of France or Germany might trace their lineages back to ancestors elevated under Charlemagne or Barbarossa, with their heirs afterward rising and falling in standing and estates, while in China the proud family traditions would boast generations of top-scoring test-takers, along with the important government positions that they had received as a result. **Whereas in Europe there existed fanciful stories of a heroic commoner youth doing some great deed for the king and consequently being elevated to a knighthood or higher, such tales were confined to fiction down to the French Revolution. But in China, even the greatest lineages of academic performers almost invariably had roots in the ordinary peasantry.**

Not only was China the first national state to utilize competitive written examinations for selection purposes, but it is quite possible that almost all other instances everywhere in the world ultimately derive from the Chinese example. It has long been established that the Chinese system served as the model for the meritocratic civil services that transformed the efficiency of Britain and other European states during the 18th and 19th centuries. But persuasive historical arguments have also been advanced that the same is even true for university entrance tests and honors examinations, with Cambridge's famed Math Tripos being the earliest example.11

https://www.lewrockwell.com/2007/08/gary-north/stock-markets-and-economic-liberty/

The collegiate accreditation system, which was launched by Rockefeller's General Education Board in 1903, when coupled with the lust for exam-based certification, is the bane of the West. **The West has universally adopted the medieval Chinese system of exams, which screened the Mandarin bureaucrats for a thousand years. The Jesuits imported the model from Asia during the 18th-century Enlightenment, and their students adopted it when they went secular and launched the French Revolution. The Chinese model was the basis of France's écoles of Napoleon's era**. This was also true of the University of Berlin. Thomas Jefferson imported the Jesuit model for the tax-funded University of Virginia. It was solidified by the tax-funded land-grant college system, passed in 1862 as a Civil War measure.

The academic mandarins have successfully screened out most of those would-be academics who reject tax-funded education, the mandarin examination system, and the abandonment of the apprenticeship model.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Mousnier

A right-wing Roman Catholic, Mousnier had a famous feud with the Soviet Marxist historian Boris Porchnev over whether peasant revolts in 17th-century France were a function of class struggle; he argued since the concept of class was largely unknown in that period, Porchnev was wrong to identify it as a driver. **In Mousnier's view, social classes did not emerge as an important factor in French society until the 18th century, with the coming of a more market-oriented economy.**[1]

https://archive.org/details/peasantuprisings0000mous_b5d1/page/242/mode/2up?view=theater

Confronted by an all-powerful bureaucracy, recruited by competition, powerful in ideas and traditions, the emperors, even when capable and strong-willed men, sought to find agents who were entirely devoted to their interests and those of the imperial family, persons through whom they could both keep informed and ensure the execution of their orders. **They found what they needed in the eunuchs, who had been employed since Han times as intermediaries between the emperor and the bureaucracy.** Under the Ming emperors the eunuchs formed a rival power group to that of the bureaucrats. In 1644 they numbered 70,000 in the Imperial Palace and 100,000 elsewhere in the empire. The emperor recruited

them in batches of 3,000. **Most were men who had become eunuchs of their own free will, for the sake of a career.**
...

The eunuchs were in charge of the political police. In 1420 they took over the "Eastern Depot." **They could investigate anyone at all throughout the empire,** inform the emperor directly about what they discovered, **charge and arrest any person, and themselves issue edicts which had complete force of law.**
...

The eunuchs accompanied military expeditions in order to keep an eye on the army and the garrisons. They spied on all the magistrates as well as on the people, but above all on the highest magistrates. The eunuchs advised on increases in taxation as well as the creation of fresh taxes. They traveled through the provinces in order to check on the levying of taxes. They supervised the palace treasury. **They maintained that all the wealth of the empire was the emperor's private property and ought to come directly under the palace treasury, of which they were the masters.** They supervised all the manufactories directly supplying the Court and the army, and had craftsmen and laborers at their disposal for this work, men subject to forced labor.
...

According to the Chinese public opinion and the law, the highest state of society was that of the civil magistrates and of the university graduates from whom this bureaucracy was recruited. It really was a bureaucracy, recruited competitively, and organized in a hierarchy, with promotion from grade to grade by seniority and selection, but its members had the powers of magistrates. **The army officers, who were recruited by special examinations, were in theory above the civilians, but, owing to the predominant Confucian ideas, public opinion held the magistrates in higher esteem.** This elite as a whole is sometimes called by certain historians "the gentry," by analogy with England, but it would seem one should avoid using this term, which gives a false impression. **In contrast to England, it was one's office that enabled one to acquire landed property, rather than the other way round. Besides, China knew neither primogeniture nor entail. Except in the case of large patriarchal families with several generations living together, brothers parted on their father's death, and his property was divided among them.** Large concentrations of landed property did not last long, posts in the bureaucracy were not transmitted by inheritance, and, as a rule, particular families did not remain in possession of offices for any length of time. **China and England were really two different forms of society, and it is better not to use the word gentry but to speak simply of the elite.**
...

Legally, the examinations were open to all male Chinese. It was a society open to talent. **The Chinese were imbued with this idea, and the smallest peasant could aspire to become a minister. A popular saying ran: "Ministers and generals are not born to be such."** Reality did correspond to some extent to this ideal. Study did not cost much. It was enough to possess the small set of fundamental classics, one or two historical works, and some textbooks. There were elementary schools in the villages and in the patriarchal clans. Confucian free schools, open to all and subsidized by the state, existed in the chief town of each canton and prefecture.
...

At the beginning of the Ming period the law had fixed everyone in a permanent and hereditary social position: the soldiers; the craftsmen of the lower Yangtze, hereditarily under compulsion to work for the government; the peasants; and so on. But, even at that time, **provided one member of the family stayed in its legal occupation, the rest were allowed to change, and the emperor always released candidates for the public service from their hereditary obligations. Since 1550 the law on hereditary social positions had ceased to be observed.**

The birth rate in families of the elite was higher than in the other social classes, and the death rate lower. As a rule, people married within their own order. **It might, therefore, be supposed that the elite formed a closed, hereditary group. But the examination system corrected any such tendency.** Rare were the cases in which, in the third generation, an easy life had not deprived the sons of magistrates of the energy needed for success. And, besides, cleverness appears wherever it chooses. **It was very unusual for a family to be able to keep a foothold in important public office for more than two or three generations. In most cases, the grandsons and great-grandsons, finding themselves unable to get further than the first two examinations and so not succeeding in acquiring even the title of *Sheng-Yüan*, had to go to the bottom of the ladder,** teach in village schools, win a little reputation, and become an agent or clerk in a yamen - and thus the family would begin its climb back up the ladder. Many preferred to become merchants and in this way provide their sons with the comfort and leisure that were so helpful when tackling the competitive examinations.
...

But between 1752 and 1899, 87 percent of the British undergraduates at Cambridge, and 78 percent between 1899 and 1937, were sons of elite families. **The opportunities for a boy from the lower or middle classes to obtain a university degree and enter the higher civil service of Great Britain, before 1929 and the world crisis, were probably fewer than those for a young Chinese of similar origin in the Ming period.**

https://archive.org/details/peasantuprisings0000mous_b5d1/page/238/mode/2up?view=theater

Since 1368 the ruling dynasty had been that of the Ming; they had freed China from the yoke of the Mongols, the Yuan dynasty. **Because, however, it is for the best and wisest to rule, the emperor chose the ablest of his sons to succeed him, without concern for primogeniture, and it even sometimes happened that an emperor would choose his successor from outside his own family.** The emperor was absolute, having over his people all the powers of the paterfamilias in the patriarchal family, and even, in principle, still wider powers, unlimited and despotic. **In the eyes of the people, indeed, his family had received a mandate from Heaven, and he himself was the "Son of Heaven," the chosen one and vicar on earth of the Positive Essence.** This quality, however, he did not derive from his birth, or from the fact that his predecessor had chosen him, it was up to him to prove that he really had been chosen from on high, through his virtue and successes. If he ruled well, in harmony with the divine principles written in the sacred books, if he ensured his people peace and prosperity, then he was indeed the mandatory of Heaven, and all obedience was due to him. His will was law, provided it accorded with the sacred writings. **Thus, in principle, his power was limited by Confucian thought, as interpreted by the bureaucracy of magistrates.** It was in fact not easy for him to rule in disregard of the opinion of this body of men. The emperor's power, though absolute in its own sphere – politics – did not seek to regulate the whole of men's everyday lives. **A Chinese could freely choose his trade or profession, travel all across China and settle wherever he liked without being questioned by any official, and he could buy and sell landed property with facility, certainty and security. Many villages never saw any agent of the government except the tax collector.** It would therefore doubtless be better to describe the emperor's power as absolutism rather than despotism or totalitarianism.

If epidemics, famines, earthquakes, or unusually violent storms occurred, if the magistrates were corrupt, if the expenses of the Court were excessive, if taxation crushed the taxpayers, if military disasters crowded one upon another, if bandits roamed everywhere, **then there could be no doubt about it: Heaven had withdrawn its mandate, its "divine commission." The emperor was not – or was no longer – virtuous.** He was no longer following "the Way of Heaven," he was no longer in harmony with the universal order. He had failed his duties as ruler, he had not respected the proprieties, he had not conformed to the *li*. Thereby he had plunged the cosmos into disorder and unhappiness. **Mencius had written: in such a case people must revolt and change their ruler. If the rebellion succeeds, this means that the rebels are doing Heaven's will.** Periodically, at the end of each 250 to 400 years, conjunctions of circumstances of this sort occurred. It was a sign to the Chinese that not only the emperor himself but his whole family had lost the "mandate of Heaven." They regrouped themselves behind a successful leader, a pretender to the imperial throne who proceeded to found a new dynasty. **The latter then continued in obedience to the traditional rules, until a similar conjuncture occurred once more. This was the "cycle of dynasties."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=jbT5AQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA103#v=onepage&q&f=false

For the Taoists nature, and, *a fortiori*, human nature was good; hence education an artificial gloss from the outside, could only be a blight on the natural. For the Legalists human nature was evil; hence only force could control it. But, for the Confucianists human nature was good (the ‘Mencius’ strain) and therefore *amenable* to education; or it was evil (the ‘Hsün-tzu’ strain) and therefore *in need of* education. Either way, this Confucian ambiguity (corresponding to the inner-outer ambiguity, between Taoist ‘inner’ and Legalist ‘outer’) was yet another mediant affirmation, **with education standing between the Taoists’ blissful emptiness of mind and the Legalists’ trust in force instead of learning.**

The Taoist and Legalist poles have sometimes been said to come together, and in a sense they did, in their common egoism – despotic egoism of the solitary ruler (the one in the state) and anarchic egoism of the solitary hermit (the one in nature). And this common egoism made for a common revulsion from the Confucian social and intellectual discipline, which was a restraint equally on anarchy and despotism. Whereas history was the perennial Confucian study and the appeal to history the favourite Confucian polemical device, Taoism and Legalism, straddling Confucianism, spurned history equally. **For the Taoists, partisans of *wu-wei* (‘non-activity’), history was the weary story of action, man’s impairment of the state of nature; for the Legalists, the appeal to history, i.e., to precedent, was an unwelcome curb (as any curb would be unwelcome) on power, an impairment of the perfection of the ruler’s freedom of action.**

Indeed, the Legalist prescriptions were predominantly political, **while the Taoist prescriptions, so thoroughly anti-political, had, as a *constructive* force, predominantly cultural implications (though Taoism could lend itself to political destructiveness).** Confucianism was the golden mean in the sense that only Confucianism was oecumenical. Its ideas pervaded both the realm of government (as the Legalist did) and the realm of the imagination (as the Taoist did.) **Confucianism and Legalism together made political China in the bureaucratic-imperial post-classical régimes, and Confucianism and Taoism together (with Buddhism still to come) made cultural China.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=v65aBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false

The sages made rulers for the people, made teachers for them, drove off vermin, snakes and wild animals, **and made them dwellings in the central plains.** They were cold, and so the sages taught them to make clothing. They were hungry, and so the sages taught them to make food. When they lived in trees they fell, and when they dwelled in caves they became ill, so the sages taught them to make houses. The sages instituted craftsmen to supply tools for the people's use. The sages instituted merchants, in order for the people to exchange what some had and others lacked. The sages instituted doctors and medicines, in order to save the people from accidents and death. **The sages instituted funerals and rituals in order to expand the people's love and kindness.** The sages instituted rituals in order to put in sequence first and last. The sages instituted music, in order to express the people's pent-up feelings. **The sages instituted government, in order to curb the people's laziness.** The sages instituted punishments, in order to weed out the brutal. When the people cheated one another, the sages instituted tallies, official measures, and scales, in order for people to have faithfulness again. When the people stole from one another, the sages instituted city walls, armor and swords, in order to protect them. In general, whenever anything harmful came, the sages instituted preparations against it; whenever problems developed, the sages instituted defenses against them. **Yet nowadays there is the doctrine, "<u>If sages do not die, great thievery will not stop. ... Cut up the official measure and break the scales and the people will cease to fight.</u>"**8 **Alas! They have simply not reflected upon this. If there had been no sages in ancient times, humans would long ago have perished. Why? We have no feathers or fur, scales or shells in order to endure the cold and heat [of the winter and summer]; we have no claws or fangs in order to compete for food [with other animals].**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32228125_1898_The_Beginning_of_the_End_for_Chinese_Religion

On July 10, 1898, the reformist leader Kang Youwei (1858-1927) memorialized the throne proposing that all academies and temples in China, with the exception of those included in registers of state sacrifices (*sidian*), be turned into schools. The Guangxu emperor was so pleased with the proposal that he promulgated an edict (*shangyu*) the same day, taking over Kang's phrasing. On three occasions in the following weeks, the editorial in the famous Shanghai daily *Shenbao* discussed the edict not as a piece of legislation aiming at facilitating the creation ex nihilo of a nationwide network of public schools but as the declaration of a religious reform, that is, a change in religious policy that would rid China of temple cults and their specialists: Buddhists, Taoists, and spirit mediums. This it was, indeed, **although both Chinese and Western historiography have so far usually neglected to appreciate the importance of the religious element in the so-called Wuxu reforms (June 11-September 21, 1898) and later modernist policies.**
…

In this decade, and during the ensuing three decades of the Republic, probably more than half of the million Chinese temples that existed in 1898 were emptied of all religious equipment and activity.2
…

I define Confucian fundamentalism as the rejection of all ideas and practices absent from the Confucian canonical scriptures4 and anticlericalism as the rejection of the institutionalization of religion, especially monasteries and professional clerics living off liturgical services. **Anticlericalism will refer here mainly to the rejection of the Buddhist and Taoist clergies (but not Buddhism and Taoism as doctrinal systems or spiritual traditions),** although this notion can find broader uses in the late imperial Chinese context (Goossaert 2002b).

> 4. This fundamentalism overlaps very much with what historians of ideas have identified as late imperial Confucian purism (see, e.g., Chow Kai-wing 1994). As Chinese religion has three institutional components, with clerics and scriptures (the three religions: Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism), there are, in theory, three possible distinct fundamentalisms at work. **Taoist fundamentalism has been dead since at least the Sung, however, and Buddhist fundamentalism did not recover until the Republican period. The only fundamentalism at work in late imperial China is Confucian,** and, indeed, it is arguable that Confucianism is the fundamentalist component of modern Chinese religion.

…

The Meiji reformers launched a large-scale attack on Buddhism and its social network of temple parishes (Ketelaar 1990), **<u>while at the same time creating a new religious institution, the state Shintô, in order to replace the people's religious allegiance to local Buddhist communities with integration into a hierarchical state cult</u>** (Hardacre 1989).
…

Kang's memorial, *Qing chi gesheng gai shuyuan yinci wei xuetang zhe* (Memorial Requesting [the Emperor] to Order that Academies and Improper Temples Be Changed into Schools throughout the Country) (Qinghua daxue lishixi 1998, 770-73), ends with an attack on improper cults, *yinsi*. In each

village, he writes, there are several temples that all have landed property; these could all be seized and made into schools where education would be compulsory for all village children. **No mention of Buddhism and Taoism here;**10 **it is not a certain category of religious institutions (monasteries) that is targeted, but all temples (*miao*). Furthermore, Kang does not mention a quota to be seized or compensation; all temples must go.** This idea clearly fits into his larger scheme to set up Confucianism (called by him *Kongjiao*) as the state religion (*guojiao*) and to ban any other religious institution, although Kang did not elaborate much on this scheme during the 1898 reform.11

> 11. The famous memorial *Qing zun Kongsheng wei guojiao li jiaobu jiaohui yi Kongzi jinian er fei yinci zhe* (Memorial Requesting that Confucius Be Worshiped as [the Founder] of the National Religion, that a Ministry of Religion and a Church Be Established, that Years Be Counted from the Birth of Confucius, and that Improper Temples Be Suppressed), which lays out a precise plan to eradicate Chinese religion and set up Confucianism as the exclusive national religion, is actually a fake; that is, it was written later and not submitted to the throne (see Huang Zhangjian 1974, 464-70). **The text proposes creating a ministry for religion** and compelling all Chinese to attend weekly Confucian masses in their local Confucian church, where Confucian classics are read by a Confucian pastor. It also includes fierce attacks on Chinese religion. **A lax state, says Kang, has during two millennia let people build temples to all sorts of immoral deities. Now, foreigners "photograph the statues in our temples, show these pictures to each other and laugh"** (Kang 1990, 65). **Paganism, he goes on to argue, goes as far as the worship of animals and is a shame that debases China and causes it to be ranked among barbarian countries.**

He had, however, already proposed in famous letters to the emperor in 1895 to transform into Confucius temples all improper temples (*yinci*) and even proper temples to Confucian saints other than Confucius (Kang Youwei 1990, 2:97; *Shang Qingdi di'er shu* [Second Letter to the Qing Emperor], May 2, 1895; *Shang Qingdi disan shu* [Third Letter to the Qing Emperor], May 29, 1895, 2:148). **Kang's project is a wild hybridization of Confucian fundamentalism and Christianity under the influence of, notably, the Scottish Baptist missionary Timothy Richard (1845-1919). Indeed, a rumor that circulated after the publication of the July 10 edict suggested that Kang had drugged the emperor and converted him to Christianity** (Qinghua daxue lishixi 1998, 773).12 More generally, Kang exhibits a strong sensitivity to the Western perspective on Chinese religion and evinces what will be a major characteristic of Republican-period writings on religion, that is, a desire to remodel Chinese religion on a Christian-based model of what a religion should be. This desire would notably find a mature expression in the 1910s attempts by Kang's disciples to create an official Confucian religion, attempts that have been very insightfully studied by Chen Hsi-yuan (1999).13

> 12. **The fact that an edict protecting the missionaries was proclaimed the following day could only reinforce people's feelings that Christianity was out to eradicate Chinese religion** (Qinghua daxue lishixi 1998, 773; Shi Zhouren 2002, 150-53).
>
> 13. Chen (1999, chap. 2) insists that Kang Youwei still thought within a traditional Chinese framework of teachings (*jiao*) and not in terms of religions (*zongjiao*), which distinguishes him from Republican-period attempts to establish Confucianism as a state religion. At the same time, Christian competition and influence during the late nineteenth century caused Confucians to change the ways they thought of Confucianism; during the 1890s, intellectuals other than Kang, including some unrelated to him, also called for the establishment of a Confucian church on a Christian model; see, for instance, the pious and anticlerical Confucian and Buddhist Song Shu (1862-1910; *Song Shu ji*, 36; text dated 1892) and Chen Hsi-yuan (1999, 87-92). **Such change also caused a major departure from the Confucians' traditional vision of Chinese religion as a whole, including temple cults.** For this reason, I contend that, even though the notions of religion and superstition would only be used a few years later (after 1901) to describe their new approach of Chinese religion, radicals like Kang Youwei in 1898 were already part of the new discourse.

…

By contrast, **Kang Youwei, who wanted to promote exclusively the cult of Confucius, proposed to maintain temples in the *sidian* but to reclassify *all* others as *yinsi* targeted for confiscation.** He made his point clearly enough, for all available sources show that both reformers and the general public understood the July 10 edict as calling for the destruction not of a few select temples but of all temples, bar the handful of those where state sacrifices were performed.14 **In other words, Kang did not use *yinsi* in the standard sense but made it a label that applied to all local cults, which amounted to completely reinventing Confucian theology.**

…

From the outset, like in Zhang Taiyan's essay, **a fundamental point of the *miaochan xingxue* movement was expressed: Destroying temples in itself was as important as creating schools.** This was followed by two additional editorials, equally supportive of temple destruction, on August 4 and September 9.16 A short extract from the July 22 editorial will give an idea of the style of these texts:

> **If you ask what gods [these Buddhists and Taoists] sacrifice to, you find out that they are all uncanonical absurd deities which no gentleman would want to mention.** [These clerics] ruin the moral education of the people (*jiaohua*) and squander their wealth, engage in debauchery and theft, and live as parasites of the honest people. **Today's Buddhists and Taoists are really the most heinous criminals on earth. This author feels a deep hatred towards the two religions, which has made him long suffering.** But today their buildings, lands, and property are about to be turned over to the good cause; the circumstances are favorable and it seems easy. **This is a most happy day for the world!**

Three points can be made on the basis of these editorials. First, **the violence of the discourse (in both insulting vocabulary and shocking propositions, such as selling out nuns as slaves) betrays the sense of a religious reform coming to a head.** All three texts insist that previous attempts at religious reform in China had failed but that now was a unique occasion in a context in which international competition put China's survival into question. Second, the position taken by the anonymous editorialists is somewhat between Zhang Zhidong and Kang Youwei and quite close to Zhang Taiyan. They did not share Kang's rejection of the whole of Chinese religion and actually quoted Zhang Zhidong's *Quanxue pian* as if it were the inspiration behind the edict. Therefore, the three editorials touch little on the question of local cults and aim at the same target as Zhang Zhidong: the Buddhist and Taoist clergy, specifically. **They do not mention the most revolutionary themes of Kang's religious project: to put an end to the autonomy of local cults and to ban local gods and idols (statues).** On the other hand, they wax eloquent over traditional anticlerical themes illustrated by dozens of earlier *Shenbao* editorials (Goossaert 2002a) since the newspaper's creation in 1872: Buddhists and Taoists are parasites of Chinese society and both corrupt its customs (sexual propriety, in particular) and waste its resources. They must be returned to lay life by any means, beginning with the expropriation of their monasteries. Not much is said of the vast majority of Chinese temples that did not have clerics. Yet, if the *Shenbao* maintains its usual anticlerical stance, it is more uncompromising than ever. The September 9 editorial criticizes Zhang Zhidong's project for maintaining some of the monasteries, whereas the editorialist wants them all destroyed with no delay. **In other words, the *Shenbao* editorialists enthusiastically welcomed the religious reform declared by Kang Youwei but interpreted it in terms of traditional anticlericalism: to rid Chinese religion of its priests (Buddhists and Taoists) who prevented the "real clerics" of Chinese religion, Confucians, from exercising their due guidance on society.**

…

The elite's attitude toward Buddhism and Taoism was complex. They sometimes treated both as *yiduan*, heterodoxies to be banned altogether. **Most of the time, however, members of the gentry considered, as did imperial orthodoxy, that these two religions were legitimate as long as they were limited to the individual quest for sanctity within the confines of proper places: monasteries.**

What has been left out of this roster of criticisms? Ancestor worship, of course, because this is what Confucianism is about, but also, just as importantly, territorial temple cults.

…

For instance, in his brief on local religious culture, Chen Hongmou (1696-1771), an iconic model official, distinguished the legally sanctioned spring and autumn prayers from the forbidden voluntary associations and their assorted celebrations.19 In practice, it is, of course, absolutely impossible to separate territorial cults from devotional associations, **but what deserves attention is that there was, in Chen's world, a place for village temple festivals for the territorial god (spring and autumn prayers). Why? Not only because cults to territorial gods (*she*) were as canonical as you could get by Confucian standards but also, I presume, because these cults' organization reflected the social structure of the village, in contrast to the congregationalism of voluntary devotional groups.** Nothing in them contravened the natural, patriarchal social order dreamed by Chen and his colleagues.

…

Shortly after 1898, new words began to appear in the discourse on religion, usually first introduced in newspaper articles. **Most important among these are *zongjiao* for "religion," *mixin* for "superstition," and *shenquan* for "divine right or power." All were adopted from Japanese and were used to express Western notions that did not exist in the Chinese discourse until then** (Chen Hsi-yuan 2002; Nedostup 2001, 18-27). *Zongjiao* and *mixin* seem to have been made popular by Liang Qichao in 1901 (Bastid-Bruguière 1998). **The question of vocabulary is far from innocent:** The use of Western notions to describe religious practices or ideas that were heretofore discussed with native terms expressed the authors' determination to distance themselves from Chinese religion. These notions brought with them distinctions, fissures that did not exist before: **The great divide was now between *zongjiao*, "the acceptable," and *mixin*, "the unacceptable." This distinction is quite different from the traditional orthodox (*zheng*)/heterodox (*xie*) divide** (Duara 1991, 76) because many local cults and practices independent from national organizations and textual traditions, that were

once regarded as orthodox, were now branded as superstitious. From 1901 onward, each actor on the religious scene had to position himself in regard to the *zongjiao/mixin* dichotomy. **Buddhism partially succeeded, during the 1910s and 1920s, to reinvent itself as a modern religion opposed to *mixin* and, thus, came out of the antisuperstition campaigns rather well.**22 **This much cannot be said of most of the rest of Chinese religion.**
…

In fact, even though most Chinese intellectuals disliked Kang's messianism, they generally shared some of his postulates: China needed a state religion, and this could only be Confucianism, the natural religion of China.23 **It is only later, during the Republican period, that Confucianism was hailed as *not* being a religion. Concurrently, the issue of rejecting religion as such did not appear until the 1920s;** the antireligious, or atheist (*fei zongjiao*), movement at that time was formulated under the direct influence of European Marxists and freethinkers (Bastid-Bruguière 2002).
…

Cults dear to pre-1898 Confucian fundamentalists, such as Wenchang or Guandi, were suddenly rejected outright. What is more, among the elements now labeled *superstition*, which were not targets before, we find more general abstract ideas, such as the irrationality of praying to icons, or statues that are mere blocks of wood or mud. This, of course, eventually led to the questioning of all Confucian cults, including state religion and ancestor worship. **Texts from the period between 1901 and 1911 usually stopped short of this, but in the following decade, the step was taken.**
…

In other words, the most striking novelty in the elite's antisuperstition discourse is not its antipathy toward Buddhism and Taoism or even local cults—this was already present before and merely intensified—but its rejection of its own Confucian religious practices. Which is why, in my opinion, the elite's growing estrangement from Confucian religious life lay at the core of the antisuperstition movement.

This seems to be confirmed by an evolution in the press's, and especially the illustrated press's, reporting on religion. Whereas late nineteenth-century journals such as the *Dianshizhai huabao* (Illustrated News of the Lithographic Press, published in Shanghai by the Shenbao Press between 1884 and 1898) reported critically mostly on lower-class religious practices, the otherwise very similar, in both style and contents, *Shishi baoguan wushen quannian huabao* (Illustrated News of the Year 1908 Published by the Shishi baoguan) featured many articles fiercely criticizing officials going to temples or praying to deities, arguing that it could be expected the people were still ensnared in "superstitious belief in divine powers" (*mixin shenquan*) but that such behavior among educated officials was shocking (for instance 15:6586, 15:6639).
…

A third element of continuity was the mention by antisuperstition authors of pre-1898 precedents. **There are cases in earlier history in which Confucian fundamentalist officials closed large numbers of temples and turned them into schools or other community institutions, particularly during the Ming.**32 In my opinion, however, there is a difference between these earlier projects that were aimed at replacing certain improper cults (*yinsi*) with other (Confucian) institutions with both educational and religious significance and the *miaochan xingxue* idea of replacing religion with secular education. **Yet, although all these earlier endeavors were local and short lived, the fact is that, when carried out thoroughly, a fundamentalist agenda of maintaining only purely Confucian cults was quite similar in its destructive effect to what antisuperstition activists achieved.**
…

Several factors were at work. The immediate influence of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao was probably rather limited. The general mood encouraged it with the sense of crisis shared by most intellectuals, which induced in many of them a deep-felt hatred of traditional Chinese society. The introduction of Western science and, as a result, the questioning of traditional cosmology also played a role. **But even more instrumental was the widespread influence of Christianity, even among nonconverts. This influence had many different effects. First, Christians, both foreigners and Chinese converts, set the example of temple destruction and iconoclasm, such as the young Sun Yat-sen, who begun his career by smashing a statue of Guandi** (also, incidentally, the protector of the Qing dynasty; Shi Zhouren 2002, 153-54).36

> 36. One may also mention the case of gangs of Christian students who toured and vandalized Canton temples in 1911 (Rhoads 1975, 254-55).

Others, while resisting Christian influence, agreed with the Christian missionaries that Chinese religion was mere idolatry. **Seeing Christianity as the main spiritual threat to China, they tried to engage the missionaries in a debate on the religious situation in China and, thereby, adopted many of the Christian notions and categories, most importantly, the religion-superstition dichotomy.** We have seen how people like Kang Youwei and later reformers felt shame when Western observers

ridiculed Chinese temples, icons, beliefs, and rituals. Moreover, **both Christian and Chinese anti-Christian propaganda, as well as Christian-inspired Taiping propaganda, raised the tone of the religious debate to new heights.** Although this is difficult to quantify, it is likely that the general atmosphere of hateful religious discourse and polarization during the period between 1860 and 1900 was conducive to the events between 1898 and 1904.

A very explicit cause for the adoption of the antisuperstition discourse in many post-1900 texts was the Boxer Rebellion. **The shock of the Boxer insurrection, and its dreadful consequences for China, pushed many observers into the camp of those willing to do away with village religion.** Another, less explicit, motive was the religious organization of local society around temple cults, the "nexus of power" as Prasenjit Duara describes it: **Temples were (and still are) places where symbolic power was vested on local leaders, where intra-and intervillage disputes were settled, and where local projects and resource management were negotiated. This organization was seen, not without reason, as the main obstacle to the building of a new vertically integrated society, in which the state is physically present in the villages and in which all villagers obey the state alone.**

Thus, the transition from pre-1898 Confucian fundamentalism and anticlericalism to early twentieth-century antisuperstition is a complex phenomenon with many causes, **some specific to the short-term context (the Wuxu reforms, the Boxers) and some related to long-term trends (Christian and Western influence),** some intellectual (the notions of religion and superstition) and some sociopolitical (a widely felt need to overhaul the structures of local society). **All of these various causes quite suddenly coalesced during the 1898-1905 period to form the antisuperstition movement and its most important effect: the destruction of temples to build schools.**
…

The wave of confiscations encouraged by the government in January 1904 prompted some Buddhist monasteries to seek affiliation with Japanese orders and claim Japanese consular protection, as early as fall 1904, which in turn provoked outraged reactions against the monasteries (Welch 1968, 11-12, 165). More importantly, **a large part of the rural violence in the period between 1901 and 1911 was linked to new administrative offices seizing village temples and to village communities fighting for their temple and their autonomy—the two being indissociable** (Prazniak 1999 and Wang Shuhuai 1977 provide many examples). Temples were not the only local institutions to be taxed or seized, but they constituted a particularly sensitive target. **The localized but violent armed conflicts caused by the seizure of local temples, pitting the local elites in charge of political modernization against village communities and religious leaders, would probably warrant the use of the term *religious war*[40] more than the low-intensity conflicts of the period between 1600 and 1900.**

> 40. In a different context, Butler (2002, 11) discusses how **the historiography of peasant resistance to the revolutionary Mexican state's anti-Catholic policies has been often understood as primarily socioeconomic in nature (a traditional agrarian society fighting against an expanding modern state), with religion providing only an infrastructure articulating the resistance; the author criticizes such views as neglecting the purely religious motivations of both attack and resistance. I am inclined to have similar views regarding the anti-New Policies resistance in 1901-11 China.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/870/mode/2up?view=theater

For if a universalist secular ethic is indeed superior on rational grounds to other moralities, this means there must be multiple intellectual and cultural sources of such ideas whether European, Asian, American, or African. As Kang Youwei observed in the context of his attempted reform of Confucianism in the 1890s, no matter how deeply rooted obedience, family control over the individual, and social hierarchy are within a given cultural-ideological heritage, moral universalism based on equality, democracy, and personal liberty is ultimately both superior to, and compatible with, cultural difference where ancient cultural traditions are suitably adjusted, reformed, adapted, and 'modernized' in the light of these universal values.14

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#ch1.1

In 1878, when he was twenty-one, he underwent a sudden revulsion against the arduous studies he had been pursuing for so long. He records in his *Chronology* the following significant experience:

> '**While sitting in meditation, I suddenly saw that the ten thousand creatures of Heaven and Earth and I were all of the same body; a great light dawned (literally, I [received] great enlightenment), and I believed I was a sage: then I laughed with joy. Suddenly I thought of the sufferings of life: then I cried with melancholy.** Suddenly I thought of the parent I was not serving—how could I be studying?—then forthwith I packed up and went back to dwell by his grave.'[4] (p. 181.)

He thus gave up his instruction under Chu Chiu-chiang, and we find him in his twenty-second year living alone on a mountain to the south of Yin Tang *hsiang*, named Hsi Ch'iao Shan (□□□), in the Cave of the White Clouds (□□□). Here, according to his *Chronology*, he spent his time in studying Buddhist and Taoist books, and in meditation and spiritual clarification.

https://utcp.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publications/pdf/UTCPBooklet17_08_Tay.pdf

From 1884 to 1898, Kang Youwei deviated from his earlier preoccupation with spiritual-mystical cultivation and devoted himself to practical scholarship and politics. In this period, he sought to "purify" Confucianism and rescue it from the falsehood of "imperial Confucianism." He boldly declared that the teachings of Confucius were corrupted or falsified throughout history because of its association with the imperial government. **The state orthodoxy, Kang charged, was a deliberate distortion of Confucianism by the authoritarian state to serve as its ideological tool of control.** The primary task that Kang set for himself was to reconstruct the original teachings of Confucius. **The original teachings of Confucius, according to Liang Qichao, are "progressive" and preach universal love and equality, as opposed to the conservative and authoritarian tradition of imperial Confucianism.**15
…

The central tenet of Confucius teaching, Kang believed, is the doctrine of *ren* (human-ness).18 **Kang interpreted *ren* as the compassionate mind, similar to Buddhism, a mentality that "can't bear" to see the sufferings of others and the world.** He insisted, like Mencius and Wang Yangming before him, that the nature of human beings is good as they all possess *ren*. Kang believed that *ren* is a virtue endowed by Heaven and he quoted the following passage approvingly from Dong without much elaboration: "Man receives his mandate of Heaven. He takes *ren* from Heaven and thus become a man of *ren* […] *ren* is the mind of heaven."19 **According to Kang, *ren* is what allows man to achieve oneness with Heaven. In the *Datong shu*, Kang wrote, "*ren* means to form one body with all things" and "when the self and others are not separated, when all things form one body, and when the feeling of compassion is aroused, then that is the short cut of finding *ren*."**20
…

Like the Great Promulgation Campaign and the creation of state Shintoism in Meiji Japan,24 the reinvention of Confucianism as a religious-cultural system by Kang was to protect the indigenous faith [*baojiao*] and to compete with Christianity for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. **To Kang, Christianity was a great menace also because of its association with imperialism.** Kang believed that Christianity and Western imperialism fed on one another in their encroachment of non-Western societies.
…

Kang proposed to set up Confucian churches all over China, in all prefectures, counties and even villages. These national churches would be officiated by Confucian clergies and they would read the classics to the people during Sunday worship. Confucius birthday would be celebrated as a national holiday and a Confucian calendar would replace the current calendar based on the emperor's reign. The Kongjiao movement wanted to adopt the institutional strength of Christianity and replace its theological content with Confucianism.26 **More importantly, the movement sought to replace the "Son of Heaven" with Confucius as the symbol of the Chinese nation.**
…

In his Kongjiao project, Kang submitted the *Memorial Requesting (the Emperor) to Order that Academies and Improper Temples be Changed to Schools* to the throne on 10 July 1898. In this memorial, Kang vehemently attacks the immoral cults and proposed the confiscation of temple properties to provide compulsory education for village children. **Unlike Zhang Zhidong's *Exhortation to Build Schools* which proposed seizing 70 percent of temple properties, Kang did not set any quota for his plan.** It was clear from his memorial that Kang wanted the total destruction of all non-Confucian temples inside or outside the Official Sacrifice.28 In other words, Kang wanted to create a state cult exclusively for Confucius, even temples for other saints of Confucianism were not excluded from the plan.
…

However, the Kongjiao movement did not ultimately take off because Confucianism was not popular among the masses unlike the popular religion, and most importantly it lacked the support of the monarchy. The veneration of Confucius as the creator of Chinese

civilization and Confucianism as the essence of the Chinese nation desacralized the role of the monarch as the Son of Heaven and symbolic head of China.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#27.9

So, then, we will recall that in 1884-5, when K'ang Yu-wei was writing his first draft of the *Universal Principles of Mankind*, he also completed another essay, entitled *'Li Yün' Annotated*.[10] That these two studies were undertaken at the same time is not an accident. **For it is in the 'Li Yün', one of the sections of the canonical *Li Chi*[11] that the conception of *ta t'ung* is set forth.[12]**

> 10 That *'Li Yün' Annotated* actually was composed at this date has been seriously questioned by Ch'ien Mu (see his *History of Chinese Scholarship during the Last Three Hundred Years*, pp. 697-701). However, it is not within our province here to examine this question. **Whether or not *'Li Yün' Annotated* was written only as a later bulwark to K'ang's views, the conception of *ta t'ung* does come from the famous passage in the 'Li Yün'.**
>
> 11 Authorship of 'Li Yün' is unknown; **modern scholarship places collection of the *Li Chi* writings in the Former Han dynasty, and authorship at various unknown dates prior to that time.**

It may be interesting, if only to show how differing translations of classical Chinese can be, to quote this passage in the versions of four different translators. Confucius is made to say the following words.

(According to James Legge):

> '**When the Grand course was pursued, a public and common opinion ruled all under the sky; they chose men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony. Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons.** A competent provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males had their proper work, and females had their homes. (They accumulated) articles (of value), disliking that they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not willing to keep them for their own gratification. (They laboured) with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed and found no development. **Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors did not show themselves, and hence the outer doors remained open, and were not shut. This was (the period of) what we call the Grand Union.**' (*Li Ki*, 'Li Yün', pp. 364-6.)

(According to Tsuchida Kyoson):

> '**When the Great Way is realized, the following will surely take place: all the world will be a common possession; the wise and the able are elected; all people will be bound by equal ties of intimacy so that no man sees only his father as father nor only his son as son;** the old keep their case, the ripened youth has his responsibilities; the boy and the girl are trained up, widows, orphans, the disabled and the like are respectively cared for; men take their respective parts while women respectively marry; as for property, while one would hate to let it go to waste, he will not wish to have it in private possession; as for man's talents, while he would hate not to have exercised them, he will not necessarily expend them on himself; and thus plots will come to an end, **thieves and brawlers will not be seen, so that people will come to leave every door open: such an age should be called *Ta T'ung*.**' (*Contemporary Thought of Japan and China*, pp. 194-5.)

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#ch1.3

One World: A bird's-eye view

One World *is* one world because all the boundaries which created divisions (and hence oppositions) have been abolished. It is called the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality. It is a polity in which, as far as possible on this earth the causes of suffering have been done away with and all creatures are happy. **The keyword of this polity is 'public' as opposed to 'private' (which is the same word in the Chinese as 'selfish').** The sole criterion for the rightness or wrongness of things in this world is whether or not they contribute to happiness. In every way the organization of this world is intended to provide every individual with the maximum possible independence and freedom.

The child is born into this world within a public institution, and receives his nurture and education within various public institutions for the first twenty years. Thereby two things are provided for: first, that he does not have the responsibility for requiting his parents for their care, and second, that all persons will receive an equal physical, mental, and moral start in life. On the other hand, the father and mother are relieved of the burdens of providing for children, and are free to pursue their own careers as individuals. Of course, the principle of requital cannot be avoided, and the citizen of the world will be expected to repay the public for his twenty years of care and training by performing twenty years of service in some capacity of benefit to the public weal. **However, this is not at all the same thing as the private burden of the old family system, since everyone requites this public debt by the mere fact of working at his job, whatever that may be.**

The individual will have been prepared for a vocation by practical studies during his later school years. **Upon graduation from college (which will be attended by all), he will face no problem of employment, since all occupations and all the work of the world is under (what we nowadays would call) a planned economy.** Agriculture, industry, and commerce are all publicly owned and operated, as indeed are all other activities. And this world is not an ‘economic world’, nor is its citizen the ‘economic man’. **Money actually plays a small part in the lives of the people of One World, since almost everything which money now buys is then provided for by the system of the public institutions.**

When our people fall in love they will find that the matter of sexual relations and marriage is regarded by One World in a completely practical way. Practicality, in the sense of that time, means the criterion of happiness or suffering. **When people fall in love they may form alliances, which are for no longer than one year.** For it is recognized that human nature is seldom satisfied for a long period of time with the same object. Therefore it is provided that the sufferings caused by compelling people who do not wish to remain together to stay married is abolished. Of course, those who do wish to stay married may renew their contracts for as long as they are happy together. **One World will not apply any moral ban to the practice of homosexuality, either, since, judged by its criterion of happiness or suffering, no harm is done to others by the practice, and there will always be those who are happier in it than in the normal relationship.**

The men and women of One World are entirely equal. **Through the abolishment of the family, women are no longer burdened with the age-old duties of caring for children, nor are they merely playthings for men.** There being no essential differences between men and women as human beings, women are not regarded any differently than men when it comes to work or to holding office.

By the very name of it, we know that in One World there will no longer exist such private divisions as the old states. **Over all the globe, the public government holds authority, while most of the actual administration of government is in the hands of degree governments and local self-governments.** In the public government there is the public parliament, to which members are elected by each of the degrees. The public parliament consists of an upper and a lower house,[1] but there is no higher officer such as a president. Besides the public parliament, there are the various ministries. The degree governments are semi-autonomous in operation, and their organs are similar to those of the public government. **The degrees are units based on arbitrary division of the globe’s surface into areas of measurement and have no other significance. They are a practical way to solve the problems of administration and elections, and are not, therefore, sovereign political entities.** The local self-governments comprise the individual farms, factories, and stores. They are pure democracies, through their local councils in which every person has the right to express his views. **On all levels, questions will be decided by public discussion and voting. Thus, there will be no political leaders, no political parties, and no individuals holding arbitrary legislative or decision-making powers.** High office, in One World, is more a matter of honour than of actual authority. The governments of the various levels exist for only one purpose: to assure equality and efficient planning on a world-wide scale.

If one has noticed the absence of the judicial branch in our One World government, this is not an unintentional omission. For such will be the favourable social environment in this time that crimes and punishments will have been abolished. It is as a result of the conditions of the environment that men are forced into crimes, **so that when the environment is favourable, criminal behaviour will automatically cease.** Anti-social behaviour is treated in this age by what is called dishonouring the name. A more severe punishment is to hold the offender ineligible for office. **Only in the case of such heinous crimes as abortion (heinous because its wholesale practice would endanger the survival of the species), or plotting to revive old institutions like the State or military force, would there be punishment by imprisonment.**

Life as lived in One World is pleasant for all. **Machines have done away with long hours of toil, and everyone has ample leisure time.** The people of this time love to travel, and can do so with comfort in vehicles travelling on land, sea, and in the air, propelled by electricity, or perhaps by some new fuel. **The climatically unsuitable regions of the earth have been evacuated as areas of habitation, and**

the public institutions are situated in the most healthful and pleasant locations. In these institutions, as well as in the various farms, factories, and stores, the people live on a communal basis, and everything is provided for them in the way of recreational and educational facilities, as well as gardens, zoos, and the like.

With life so secure in every way, and the public institutions providing every social benefit, will our citizens not become lazy, and may not this system degenerate? With no outlet for the competitive drive in business, politics, or military activity, how can this world continue to progress? The answer is that the competitive drive has been channelled into constructive action. **The honours and rewards of this society are given to those who help to advance the arts and sciences of civilization, and to those who are outstanding for their *jen* (which, if we must have a translation, let us here render as goodness).** The striving of men of this age is for constant betterment of civilization, and to encourage it there are awarded both honours and cash. (The latter is to free them entirely from other considerations so that they can devote all of their energy to additional work in the service of civilization.)

Supreme in this time is the science of medicine. The medical authorities are the ones to whom the lives and health of all are entrusted, and they have the final say in every phase of life, from supervision of the public institutions to approval of building construction. **Medical science has eliminated infectious diseases, and indeed there are few persons in the public hospitals except for those injured in accidents and for the aged who are dying.** The latter may be mercifully put out of their sufferings if it is agreed by the physicians that there is no hope of recovery. To such an extent is the health of all persons guarded that a daily physical check-up is provided.

The power of the medical people being so great, it is necessary that we be watchful for the rise of some medical Napoleon, who might gather together a great following, and become a world ruler. And the possibility of any person being idolized and thus heading a great following is one of the few real dangers to One World. We do not permit the formation of political parties, of medical parties, or even of religious parties. **The idolization of an individual and the formation of a group which follows him faithfully would be a sure way to bring an end to One World, as it would inevitably give rise to inequalities and other evils of the Age of Disorder.**

For all human beings are entirely equal in this time. The races have become blended into one great race. Women and men are not distinguished even by the clothing they wear. Government officials are merely citizens who, having demonstrated their superior knowledge and *jen*, have been chosen by their fellow-citizens to occupy positions of honour. **And in One World, so far as it is possible, *jen* is extended even to the birds and beasts. However, there is a practical limit to this extension: the limit is reached when it becomes a choice between perfection of *jen* or the survival of the human species.** Since man must live, he cannot help but kill both those creatures dangerous to him and those creatures which are inadvertently trampled on, or breathed in. **But all other creatures are kindly treated. The eating of meat is no longer a human practice.** The most intelligent animals (monkeys) are even trained as servants.

Upon the attainment of this One World of Complete Peace-and-Equality, the ideals of Confucius have been realized. **The religions of Christianity and Islam have been left behind, in the progress of civilization. The utmost 'Law of this world' is One World. There remain ahead only the studies of the art of immortality (that is, Taoism, and of becoming a buddha).** Persons who have returned to the public their twenty years of service may thereupon follow their own inclinations in undertaking such studies. **The study of buddhahood is higher than that of becoming immortal, and still higher than the study of buddhahood is the study of 'roaming through the Heavens'.** But with such studies we have left the Law of this world, and we enter another sphere.

The world of suffering: K'ang's ideas, and Buddhism

The title of the first part of *Ta T'ung Shu* tells us in itself what impelled K'ang Yu-wei to write the book. It has also given rise to such statements as that he merely borrowed this idea from Buddhism and is not, therefore, original.[2]

> **2 Ch'ien Mu, in an otherwise able study of K'ang's thought, thus disparages the originality of *Ta T'ung Shu*. He also sees nothing but a simple borrowing from Chuang Tzu (in the completely pleasure-centred ideal of K'ang's thought), and from Mo Tzu (in the ideal of universal love).** (See *History of Chinese Scholarship during the Last Three Hundred Years*, p. 664.) One is struck, in reading criticisms of *Ta T'ung Shu*, by the fact that so few of the critics seem actually to have studied the work!

...

In a word, K'ang is completely Confucian, rather than Buddhistic, in his attitude towards the problem of suffering. And he transcends the Confucian attitude in that he looks beyond Chinese society to embrace the whole world—even the universe—in his scheme of things.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#66.36

The jungle of the world: I shall also flee from it; I shall practise the Brahmins' [Way] of immuring oneself in a snowy cave so as to purify the soul (*ching-hun*). But if all men abandoned their families and immured themselves, then it would not be [more than] several decades before the civilizations of the whole earth would revert to a world overgrown by grasses and trees and [dominated by] the birds and beasts. Still less could I bear to bring [such a state] to pass!

How about the living creatures on Mars, Saturn, Jupiter, Uranus, Neptune? I have absolutely no connection [with them]; they are too distant and obscure to expect it, I wish to love (*jen*) them, [but] they are so far off I have no way to do it. The size of the fixed stars, the numerousness of the galactic clusters, the nebulae and the globular clusters, the aspect of all the heavens, my eyes themselves have seen, and my spirit has often roamed among (literally, with) them. **Their states, men and women, codes of social behaviour (*li*), music, civilized pleasures, and their ways, [must be] vast and boundless.** In the heavens as among men: although I have no way to see them; yet if they have creatures possessed of knowledge, then they will be no different in nature than we humans of [this], our earth.

In my roaming through the heavens I have imagined all the worlds of uttermost happiness; I have imagined all the worlds of uttermost suffering. The happy I have been happy with; the suffering I have [sought] to save. Being that I am a creature of all the heavens, would it be better if I could abandon the world and the heavens, cut [myself] off from my kind, flee from the social relationships (*lun*), and be happy all by myself? Those whose perceptiveness and awareness is small, their loving-mind is also small; those whose perceptiveness and awareness is great, their *jen*-mind is also great. **Boundless love goes with boundless perceptiveness. The size and amount of love and perceptiveness are in ratio to each other.**

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#86.20

Now when states are autocracies, it is natural that they are self-centred, and it is difficult to unite them [with other states]. But if they are democracies, then federation is easy. This is because people only seek profit and benefit for themselves, and so when Good men advocate the pleasures and profits of One World it naturally accords with men's minds. The general conditions having been initiated, men will hope for it just as [naturally as] water flows downwards. Hence the arising of democracy, the flourishing of constitutions, the talk about unions (? labour unions) and communism, all are the first signs (literally, sounds) of One World.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#pt2.3

Japan was formerly feudalistic, having its Imperial House, its nobility, its feudatory lords, its knights, and its commoners. It rather resembled the [Chinese society of] the Ch'un ch'iu period (722-481 B.C.). Since the Restoration (1868) there has been a clean sweep, and therefore Japan has been able rapidly to become strong. At present, Egypt, Turkey, Persia, and Russia have their royalty, their great priests, their hereditary nobility, their commoners, and their slaves, [comprising their] five classes. Hence, the Turks are weak; and Russia, even though outwardly strong, is internally inert.

The people of America have attained equality. There is no monarch, but a president. **Since Washington established the Constitution, hereditary nobility has been regarded as seditious [*sic*]. Although there are great priests, they cannot hold office or interfere in public affairs.** [When] Lincoln freed the negro slaves, a war was fought over it, strongly contested and with much bloodshed. As a result [of this war whereby the slaves were freed], all of America's people are ordinary citizens, and have attained equality. **Even though negroes are [still] not treated equally, [America] is still the harbinger of the Era of Increasing Peace-and-Equality.** Therefore [America] is most tranquil, strong, prosperous, and happy.

China, during the Ch'un ch'iu period and before, had a feudal, hereditary nobility. The lords inherited their states, and the lesser nobles also inherited their fiefs.[1] **... At that time, even though it was not as bad as India, it was quite like medieval Europe and pre-Restoration Japan. Confucius originated the idea of equality.** [He] made clear the unity [of the Empire] so as to do away with feudalism, and derided the [institution of] hereditary nobility so as to do away with heredity of office. [He transmitted the ancient] assigned-field system[2] [so as] to do away with slavery, and wrote (□)[3] the constitution of the *Ch'un Ch'iu* so as to put a limit to the

monarch's powers. **[He] did not exalt himself [to] his followers, and [he] rejected [the authority] of great priests. Hereby caste was completely swept out from Chinese institutions.** Everyone became a commoner; anyone could [rise] from common status to be ennobled, to be a minister of state, to be a teacher or scholar; anyone could aspire to official advancement, could 'show his stuff'.[4] The evils of caste did not exist. **Verily this was the remarkable accomplishment of Confucius, and he did it two thousand years before [it was done] in Europe. [That] China has been stronger and more flourishing than India is entirely due to this.**

However, even though the prince's authority be exercised with principle, yet we have not done away with autocratic rule; **even though Kuang Wu[5] had employed the ideas of the Confucian teachings and manumitted the slaves,[6] yet an endless [number] have been given over [to be slaves in] the households of the wealthy since Ming [times].** And [persons bearing] the name of prostitute, beggar, or boat-dweller,[7] are still not able to be fully equal citizens; while the restrictions on women have not been relaxed. [These] three [types of inequality] not having been amended, the ideal of equality has not yet been fully realized, and ignorance and weakness follow thereupon. **However, the freedom of males has been attained.**
...

India's race and caste laws are the worst. Therefore, its many... races and castes should be scoured out and expunged, and all be made equal. [They should] first encourage the opening of occupations [to all]; and then universal intermarriage should be fostered. [This] transforming [process] having gone on for a long time, equality will become customary, and after that we may hope for complete unity.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#140.1

I have seen my countrymen who have been a long time in England or Australia and sometimes those living in this country who have skilfully selected their food and drink, who have been able to adopt those Western methods which are conducive to good health; their faces were as if dyed a deep red, like the Europeans. **Suppose they went about a great deal in the sun, absorbing its rays, travelling and dwelling in places swept by the wind, drinking in the air;** [suppose that] in addition there were two or three generations of interracial propagation, a certain amount of moving of southerners to the north, and a removing of mountain people to the littoral. **Within a hundred years the people of the yellow race all would gradually become white, and in addition these races would have been able naturally to join and smelt. Therefore, before One World has been perfected, the yellow people will already have changed completely into white people.**
...

Men's appearance and colour and bodily characteristics are due in part to race, in part to adaptation to environment, in part to weather, in part to food and drink, daily behaviour, housing, and exercise. [These factors] are mixed together, combined, and then [the various characteristics] are produced. (The changes which are brought about by these factors can be noted in the case of the American Indians, who were originally of the same stock as the Chinese. Examples of the argument are adduced. The case of a Chinese child taken to live with a white family in Canada is mentioned—whether an actual or hypothetical case is not clear. **By the age of seventeen or eighteen the child is ruddy complexioned and strong like the whites, because he has also eaten meat, has been out in the sunshine and fresh air, has gotten lots of exercise, etc.** The Chinese will come to resemble the Westerners in appearance by another hundred years through adopting these healthful practices, and especially since intermarriage will certainly become a common occurrence.
...

In order to put a stop to the source of propagating the black race of the tropical zone, the negroes [who have dwelt] there from of old will all be moved to Canada and to the thirtieth and fortieth degrees south of Brazil in South America.[5] For one thing, this will fill the empty [lands], and for another it will transform their appearance and colour. Perhaps their best [people] might be moved to the [regions] at the fortieth, fiftieth, and sixtieth parallels by the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Black Sea. It will be necessary to use the power of the One World public government to transfer them. **Those of them that are wealthy and able to move will be encouraged to do so; those of them that are poor and unable to move will be helped to move. We must bring about that they do not remain from generation to generation in these tropical regions to transmit to successive generations this bad race.**

The Method of Mixed Marriages

Their localities having been transferred, [the brown and black people] will then live mixed in with yellow and white people. Thereupon rules will be formulated to encourage mixed marriages. **All [yellow and white] men who can mate with brown and black women, and all [yellow and white] women who can mate with brown and black men will have conferred on them the decoration of 'person of *jen*',[6] and will [be treated with] a special kind of etiquette.** Then there will be many who will intermarry, and the races will easily be transformed. The name of the decoration will be 'race reformer'.

It may be said: by taking people of the superior races and crossing them with people of the inferior races, might we not expect it to cause the superior race to revert and become inferior? [I] say, no harm will be done. **Reckoning a thousand and several hundred years hence, there will not be many brown and black people left. Throughout the whole world there will only be the yellow and white peoples.** Taking it that there are numberless [persons of the] good yellow and white races; if they contract mixed marriages with one or two persons of the bad brown and black races, then the one or two of the inferior races are few, and forthwith there are the numberless [persons] of the good races to rectify and redress this...

The Method of Improving Food

(The kinds of foods eaten, and the preparing of them, influence the bodily shape and colour and odour. **When we can bring about that the people of the coloured races eat the same foods, properly cooked, as the yellow and white races, then they will eventually become yellow or white themselves.** We should not let the example of the negroes in America cause us to doubt this; they have had countless generations of their old ways handed down before they began to live like the whites, and we cannot expect their bodily odour to be changed in a few short generations. **But after many generations they will assuredly be changed and be as sweet as the white and yellow races.**)

Race Reformism

(The brown peoples, although inferior in appearance and intelligence, can yet be changed and smelted into yellow and white without too much difficulty by the methods above described. **This should be possible within two or three hundred years.** The black peoples, however, are a really difficult problem, owing to their extreme ugliness and stupidity. Promoting mixed marriages with them is next to impossible. **The only solution is to remove them wholesale to Canada, Sweden, and Norway, to occupy the empty lands there. This, plus improving their food and clothing, will result in their becoming brown after two or three hundred years.** Thence, they could continue to merge into lighter shades, through these methods as well as the mixed marriages encouraged with the browns. Thus, **in from seven hundred to a thousand years the blackest African negroes will be transformed into white persons.** By the time we have our One World, the people of all the earth will be of the same colour, the same appearance, the same size, and the same intelligence. This will be complete union—*ta t'ung*—of human races.

(Those brown and black people whose natural dispositions are too evil, or who have diseases, will be given drugs to make them sterile...)

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#151.1

(This is the way of savages, and not according to universal principles. And even the so-called Good men have not helped to alleviate this situation. **Now, when we consider the earliest societies, it is certain that it was women, and not men, who discovered and originated all of the arts and crafts of civilization. This is because the men were hunters, who had no time to sit at home, thinking, and finding new methods of doing things.** So it must have been the women, who stayed at home, who originated such techniques as cooking, agriculture, house-building, weaving, silk-making, clothweaving—and including the fine arts, music and writing—**while men were still brutes who spent all their time and energies in the hunt. We can see the same principle in history, when we think of strong and weak countries, such as the Mongol Empire as compared with the Six Dynasties and the Southern Sung): 'Civilization is always [highly developed] in weak states, and not in strong countries.'** (It is a shame that in our day, when the world is moving towards civilization generally, women, who originated the basic arts of civilization, are still subordinated just because of men's greater strength.)
...

Now the strict guarding of women's chastity and the separation of men and women is based on the desire to keep clear the line of descent of the family through the sons who will carry on the family name. In the Age of Little Peace-and-Happiness, the clan and religious systems all derive from this necessity to establish and preserve the family. Without the family, everyone would indulge his own desires. Without it we would return to the ways of the ancient savages, in which men and women mate indiscriminately, there is no way to establish the family, religion, or culture, and people are like animals. Furthermore, it was necessary to establish the family to protect the children. The life of savages, with its constant demand for men to fight and hunt, automatically creates a condition in which men are strong and women weak; **when religions and governments were started, it was thus the men who already had the power.** Moreover, through being used to repression for so long, women came to acquiesce in it, and to consider it right.

(**In ancient times descent of name and rank and property was matrilinear, as we can see from looking at many savage peoples today.** The reason was because of the indiscriminate mating of men and women; therefore, a child knew its mother, but not its father. In time this situation changed, as the matrilinear system did not serve the development of society as well as the patrilinear. **The patrilinear system thus enabled civilization to progress, but at the same time it was the cause of the inferior status of women.**

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#pt2.6

(While there are no nations which do not have the social relationships in varying degrees, China has extended them the most. **Thus, the honouring of ancestors, and the various charitable and social institutions carried on by Chinese clans even in foreign lands, are unmatched by other peoples. This is the reason the Chinese now form a third of the world's population;** it is due to the extended family and clan system enacted by Confucius for the Age of Disorder, which is very conducive to propagation and to consolidation into groups of like kinds. This is a great accomplishment of Confucius. The Westerner's home is where he happens to be; the Chinese always retains his ancestral home, even though he be away from it. **Thus, the Chinese system is the ultimate development of the family.**)
...

On [the Fact that] if We Wish to Attain One World of Complete Peace-and-Equality, We Must Abolish the Family

NOW, we desire that men's natures shall all become perfect, that men's characters shall all become equal, that men's bodies shall all be nurtured. [That state in which] men's characters are all developed, men's bodies are all hale, men's dispositions are all pacific and tolerant (? literally, broad), and customs and morals are all beautiful, is what is called Complete Peace-and-Equality. But there is no means whereby to bring about this Way [and yet] to eschew abolishing the family. **Thus the family is a necessity of the Ages of Disorder and Increasing Peace-and-Equality, but is the most detrimental thing to [attaining] to the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality.** To have the family and yet to wish to reach Complete Peace-and-Equality is to be afloat on a blocked-up stream, in a sealed-off harbour, and yet to wish to reach the open waterway. To wish to attain Complete Peace-and-Equality and yet to have the family is like carrying earth to dredge a stream, or adding wood to put out a fire: the more done, the more the hindrance. **Thus, if we wish to attain the beauty of complete equality, independence, and the perfection of [human] nature, it can [be done] only by abolishing the state, only by abolishing the family.**

On [the Fact that] to Leave the Family is to be Ungrateful, and would [Lead to] Annihilation of the [Human] Species; [hence] It Cannot [be Done]

(**The 'Brahmins' seek for this complete equality, independence and perfection of human nature through leaving the family and abandoning the world.** However, this practice violates the principle of requiting the favours done us, since the parents are given no return for their having given birth and nurture to such a person.) **I genuinely respect, but differ with, the subtlety and profundity of Buddhist principles.** And as to the turning of the back on the parents and fleeing, the not repaying the debt of the early [years], but instead planning [only] to take and use [for oneself]: [as to these ideas], I shall always consider them to be impossible. Moreover, civilization in the world is actually dependent upon mankind for its extension. Should mankind decrease, then intelligence would likewise diminish, and [the world] would revert to savagery. **Still further, by prohibiting intercourse between men and women, the human species would be cut off.** If we [followed] this path, then of the one-and-a-half billion human

beings on this earth, in not more than fifty years the human form would be completely extinct. After a hundred years... the whole earth would have [on it] only shrubs and forests, [with] only birds, beasts, and insects throughout its length and breadth. This is not only a thing that we cannot [allow] to happen, but is also certainly a non-existent principle... [Considering in this manner what it involves], this may be one Way, [but] it is not [the Way] that the bulk of mankind will universally consent to.

On the Good Method of Abolishing the Family and Making the World Public

Now [supposing] we desire to abolish the family and attain to Complete Peace-and-Equality, and yet also cannot bear to cut [ourselves] off from parents and spouse, for the preserving of our humaneness; then by what Way can we achieve this? **K'ang Yu-wei says there is a Way to get there. Gaining it will be gradual; [we must proceed] in orderly sequence to perfect it. [This Way] can bring about that men will have the happiness of having abolished the family without suffering leaving the family.**

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#221.13

Now the barbarous ages esteemed simplicity,[13] the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality will esteem refinement.[14] Esteeming simplicity, [we] therefore value agriculture; [given] sufficient food, this is enough. Esteeming refinement, [we] therefore value industry. [**Whatever] is wonderfully rare, extraordinarily beautiful, startling as demons and spirits, new every day without end, then [these things] are what human nature likes.**
...

Therefore, **in the barbarous ages, industry was the humblest [occupation], the [occupation employing] the fewest; and industry was shabbily treated.** In the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality, industry will be the noblest [occupation], those who are workers will be most numerous, and industry will also be the most generously treated.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#250.30

Now in universal principles originally there is no 'good' or 'evil'. [Our concepts of] right and wrong are all according to what the sages have constituted. The Buddhist Law proscribes fornication; hence, that Confucius had a wife was a transgression against [this] proscription, and he should be cast down into hell. Confucius said that to be without posterity is the gravest unfiliality; hence, the two religious leaders, Buddha and Christ, likewise transgressed against the proscription [laid down by Confucius]. The Lotus [School][32] produced Shinran,[33] and [he and] Martin Luther publicly founded new teachings (or, religions) within the bounds of Buddhism and Christianity, and carried on fornication; but the world likewise did not [consider] them to be wrongdoers—in fact, there were many who followed them...
...

In the Age of Complete Peace-and-Equality, men and women will be equal, everyone will be independent, everyone will be free. There will be no differences of dress. In the holding of positions [men and women] will be entirely alike. There will be no return to the distinctions between men and women. **[So] if we are talking about sexual relations, then the intercourse of a woman with a man, or of a man with a man, will be the same thing.** At this time people will be completely content; we [need] not fear that mankind will not be numerous, or be overly anxious [about continuation of the species]. **Those who take delight in intercourse [with each other], regardless of whether it be a man and a woman, or two men, will always go to the official [in charge of these matters][34] and make their contract, so as to avoid other disputes.**

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#pt2.9

(Therefore, although the Hindus and Buddhists are the best of men because of their prohibitions against killing even insects, their Way cannot be carried out at present. **The Way of Confucius is a progress in three stages: loving one's kin, loving all people, and finally loving all creatures. The stages correspond [of course] to the Three Ages. Though this Way is not as *good* (*jen*) as that of the Hindus and Buddhists, it is *practicable*.** The final stage will be possible of attainment because, in the One World era, substitutes will be developed for animal meat. The people of that age will loathe animal meat, and thus will of their own accord abstain

from killing animals. **They will look upon their domestic animals as people of today look upon their servants: they will pity and love them and take care of them, while using them.**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232859870_Utopias_of_Reconstruction_Chinese_Utopianism_From_Hong_Xiuquan_To_Mao_Zedong

Kang was a strong believer of the Hua-yen philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism. "Central to the Hua-yen world view," according to Hao Chang, "is a radical vision of undifferentiated oneness that precludes any dualistic mode of thinking, including the dualism of this world versus the other world."[15]

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_43.htm

What strikes terror into their hearts is precisely what makes the revolutionary masses jubilant. "Unprecedented in history" -- that's correct too. **Except for the revolution which replaced the primitive communal system by the slave system, that is, a system of non-exploitation by one of exploitation, all revolutions in the past ended in the replacement of one system of exploitation by another, and it was neither imperative nor possible to do a thorough job of suppressing counter-revolutionaries.**

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-016-0014-2

Li Shenzhi, one of the most prominent Chinese IR scholars in the last century and the former president of Chinese Academy of Social Science,5 declares in his article "Globalization and Chinese Culture" in 1994 that **"a vulgar nationalism, is totally against the trend and spirit of globalization as well as Chinese tradition… The traditional Chinese idea is 'Tianxia Zhuyi' but not 'nationalism'"** (Li 1994, 7-8).
…

Confucian cosmopolitanism, however, developed in a different background. **It did not appear and develop following the change of the world. On the contrary, it pursued an old universal world order against the emerging new system of independent states.**13
…

However, unlike the Greeks' conception, the barbarians in the eyes of the Confucians are also covered by Tianxia. They are not, as Persians to Greeks, an absolute and external image of savages, but can be converted by and integrated into the central civilization through education. What is more, even Shun and King Wan, the two legendary ideal ancient rulers highly admired by the Confucians, were recognized as "Eastern barbarian" and "Western barbarian": "Shun was born in Chû-fang, removed to Fû-hsiâ, and died in Ming-t'iâo;—a man near the wild tribes on the east. King Wan was born in Châu by mount Ch'î, and died in Pî-ying;—a man near the wild tribes on the west. Those regions were distant from one another by more than a thousand lî… **But when they got their wish, and carried their principles into practice throughout the Middle Kingdom, it was like uniting the two halves of a seal.** When we examine those sages, both the earlier and the later, their principles are found to be the same." In other words, there is no definite distinction between barbarians and non-barbarians, what matters here is not the kinship, but the "principles" one carries out. **Such a special way is considered by Liang Qichao, an early twentieth century politician and scholar, as "a Chinese idea which was developed quite early, that the world (four seas) is a family and all men are equal"** (Liang 2010, 51).

It was difficult for Greeks in the Classical Period to imagine such a "nothing outside" world, since "the other" was essential for them to building the identity of "self" (Cf., Hall 1991; Harrison 2001; Cartledge 2002). **But a new thought appeared from the very beginning of Stoicism.** According to Plutarch, "the much-admired *Republic* of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, may be summed up in this one main principle: that all the inhabitants of this world of ours should not live differentiated by their respective rules of justice into separate cities and communities, but that we should consider all men to be of one community and one polity, and that we should have a common life and an order (cosmos) common to us all" (Plutarch 1936, 329A-B).[15]

Gobineau on China: Race Theory, the "Yellow Peril," and the Critique of Modernity on JSTOR

Gobineau argued that Chinese civilization had been created by a group of Aryan conquerors from India who had brought under their heel the indigenous Malay people living there.[238] **Though Gobineau had read virtually everything written in French about China, he believed that the origins of Chinese civilization were in southern China** where he posited that the Aryans from India had first

arrived rather than the Yellow river valley which all Chinese sources regard as the "cradle" of Chinese civilization.[239]
...

Though Gobineau argued that the Chinese had been able to make some progress under the influence of their Aryan elite, ultimately miscegenation led to this elite being assimilated into the "yellow" majority, and thus the Chinese were not capable of making any further progress.[241] For Gobineau, the crucial moment occurred in 246 BC when Qin Shi Huang, the "First Emperor" unified all of the Chinese states into one.[241] He argued that **Qin had destroyed the "feudal" system created by the ancient Aryan conquerors and replaced it with "imperial leveling" that ended the Aryan elite;** Gobineau wrote "There was only this innovation, great nonetheless in itself, that this last trace of independence, of personal dignity as understood in the Aryan manner had disappeared forever before the definitive invasions of the Yellow Type [*l'espèce jaune*]".[241] As such, Gobineau argued that the Chinese were a static people incapable of change and that essentially that nothing significant had occurred in China since 246 BC and his time.[241] Furthermore, Gobineau argued that the Chinese were fundamentally a materialist people devoid of any sort of spirituality.[241] **The contrast between the Chinese ideal of a "gentleman scholar" as the supreme example of what a Chinese man should and the low social prestige of soldiers within China reflected what Gobineau disparaging saw as the materialist ordination of the Chinese.[242] By contrast, he argued that Aryans were first and foremost warriors, which, he approvingly explained, was why soldiers had such high social prestige in Europe.[243]** Gobineau wrote with contempt that because of their materialism, for the Chinese happiness was to be found in having sufficient food to keep oneself alive and sufficient clothing to avoid public nudity.[244] He did not believe in the freedom of the press as he believed that ordinary people needed to be monitored by the state, but he argued that freedom of the press was possible in China because the "exclusively utilitarian" nature of the Chinese meant unlike in the West, **there was no-one in China willing to fight and die for their ideas.[245]** Gobineau wrote that as long the Chinese population was well provided for, no Chinese "would bother to confront police truncheons for the greater glory of a political abstraction".[246]

Along the same lines, Gobineau argued that Chinese culture was "without beauty and dignity";[247] the Chinese were "lacking in sentiments beyond the humblest notion of physical utility", **and Chinese Confucianism was a "resume of practices and maxims strongly reminiscent of what the moralists of Geneva and their educational books are pleased to recommend as the *nec plus ultra* of the good: economy, moderation, prudence, the art of making a profit and never a loss".[248] Gobineau had been stationed in Switzerland early in his diplomatic career, and during his time there had developed an intense, visceral hatred of the Swiss middle class, Calvinism, and of Swiss democracy,** and his attempt to associate Confucian values with Calvinist values was definitely meant to be an insult to both.[249]

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_de_Gobineau#Reaction_to_Gobineau's_essay
>
> Summarizing Mosse's argument, Davies argued that: "The self-serving, materialistic oriental of the *Essai* was really an anti-capitalist's portrait of the money-grubbing French middle class..." while "the sensual, unintelligent and violent negro" that Gobineau portrayed in the *Essai* was an aristocratic caricature of the French poor.[79]
>
> https://www.bopsecrets.org/rexroth/essays/lamennais.htm
>
> **Like most Frenchmen [Lamennais] was completely ethnocentric. He talks a great deal about the world and all mankind, when what he really means is France and Frenchmen.**

...

Gobineau believed that China was a warning to the West of the perils of "democracy" – by which he meant meritocracy.[253] Because the Chinese state had attempted to promote education for the masses, the rule by the mandarins was meritocratic, and the exams to become a mandarin were open to all literate men, this all for Gobineau reflected the racially "stagnant" character of the Chinese.[254] Gobineau believed that the best form of government had existed in the *Ancien Régime* France with rule by a hereditary aristocratic elite in an ordered, hierarchical society. As such, Gobineau was extremely opposed to classical liberalism with its celebration of meritocracy, and he used the example of China as a warning about where classical liberals were taking the West.[255] **The supposed destruction of the Aryan elite by Qin in 246 BC was "a fact absolutely similar to what took place *chez nous* in 1789, when the innovating spirit saw as its first necessity the destruction of the ancient territorial subdivisions [of France]".[256]** About the demands of classical liberals for universal education, Gobineau wrote:

> Popular education everywhere promoted, emphasis on the well-being of subjects, complete liberty in the allotted sphere, the fullest industrial and agricultural development, production at the most modest prices, rendering all European competition difficult for the ordinary necessities of life like

> cotton, silk and pottery. These are the incontestable results of which the Chinese system can boast.[257]

Later on, in an essay criticizing the Third Republic, Gobineau wrote that most people republic meant the "chimera of liberty" via the "rule of merit", where all would be given the equal chances to rise through their abilities.[258] **He contemptuously noted that the "principle of 1789" was no different from the rule by mandarins in China, and predicted that if the republic continued to exist long enough, the French would "degenerate" down to the same level as the Chinese.[259]**

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n219/mode/2up?view=theater

May Europe be freed from one-fourth of her inhabitants! Both she and they will experience a sensation of relief.
…

What would it matter if there was a scarcity of "hands"? Perhaps people would then recollect that they had accustomed themselves to many wants merely because it was easy to gratify them it would be sufficient to unlearn some of these wants! **Perhaps also Chinamen would be called in, and these would bring with them their modes of living and thinking, which would be found very suitable for industrious ants. They would also perhaps help to imbue this fretful and restless Europe with some of their Asiatic calmness and contemplation, and—what is perhaps most needful of all—their Asiatic stability.**

https://archive.org/details/TheCompleteWorksOfFriedrichNietzscheVolX/page/n73/mode/2up?view=theater

China is an instance of a country in which dissatisfaction on a grand scale and the capacity for transformation have died out for many centuries; and the Socialists and state-idolaters of Europe could easily bring things to Chinese conditions and to a Chinese "happiness," with their measures for the amelioration and security of life, provided that they could first of all root out the sicklier, tenderer, more feminine dissatisfaction and Romanticism which are still very abundant among us.

https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n123/mode/2up?view=theater

127. **I am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner anarchical conditions: the period of quietude and "Chinadom" which Galiani prophesied for this century is now over.** Personal and *manly* capacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming more physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine men have once more become possible. **Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins at their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past.** The savage in every one of us is *acknowledged*, even the wild animal. *Precisely on that account*, philosophers will have a better chance.—Kant is a scarecrow!

https://archive.org/details/beyondgoodandevi00nietuoft/page/212/mode/2up?view=theater

267. **The Chinese have a proverb which mothers even teach their children: "*Siao-sin*" ("*make thy heart small*").** This is the essentially fundamental tendency in latter-day civilisations. I have no doubt that an ancient Greek, also, would first of all remark the self-dwarfing in us Europeans of to-day—in this respect alone we should immediately be "distasteful" to him.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/50

For the position is this: **in the dwarfing and levelling of the European man lurks *our* greatest peril,** for it is this outlook which fatigues—we see to-day nothing which wishes to be greater, we surmise that the process is always still backwards, still backwards **towards something more attenuated, more inoffensive, more cunning, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian**—man, there is no doubt about it, grows always "better"—the destiny of Europe lies even in this—**that in losing the fear of man, we have also lost the hope in man, yea, the will to be man.**

https://archive.org/details/menacemob00meregoog/page/n30/mode/2up?view=theater **[1921]**

In the track of the "Asiatic nations, passed out of history," all Europe, with a calm, imperturbable step is marching on to this final calm of a contented ant-hill, to "the crystallization of bourgeoisie," to Chinafication.

Hertzen agrees with Mill: "If some unexpected upheaval, which shall regenerate human individualism and give it strength to conquer bourgeoisie, does not occur in Europe, then, regardless of its noble antecedents and its Christianity, Europe shall become China."

…

In Europe positivism is only becoming a religion, in China it has already become one. **The spiritual foundation of China – the teachings of Lao-tse and Confucius – is a perfect positivism, a religion without a God,** "an earthly religion, without a heaven," as Hertzen expresses himself about European scientific realism. There are no mysteries of any sort, no depths and longings for "other worlds than ours." Everything is simple, everything is on a plane. Insuperable common sense, insuperable positiveness. All that is, is; and there is nothing more, nor need for anything more. **This world is all, and there is no other world save this. Heaven is not the beginning and the end, but a continuation, without beginning or end, of the earth. Earth and heaven shall not be one, as Christianity affirms, but *one substance*. The greatest empire on earth is verily the Celestial Empire, the Heaven on earth, the Median Kingdom** – the kingdom of the eternal mean, of eternal mediocrity, absolute bourgeoisie, "a kingdom not of God, but of man," as Hertzen, once more, defines the common idealism of positivism.
…

Christianity – the old Semitic yeast in the Aryan blood – **is verily just that which does not let it settle definitely, interferes with the final "crystallization," the Chinafication of Europe.**
…

That is where the chief "yellow peril" is – not without, but within; not in that China is going into Europe, but in that Europe is going into China. Our faces are still white; but already under the white skin flows not the former rich, crimson Aryan blood, but a "yellow" blood, thinner and thinner, resembling Mongolian ichor; the slit of our eyes is straight, but the outlook is beginning to slant and narrow. And the direct white light of the European day is turning into the oblique "yellow" light of the Chinese setting sun, or the Japanese rising sun. At the present time the Japanese seem to be the dressed-up apes of the Europeans; who knows but that, in time, Europeans and even Americans may seem the dressed-up apes of the Japanese and Chinese, incorrigible idealists, romanticists of the old world, who only pretend to be positivists, masters of the new world. **It may be that the war of the yellow race with the white was only a misunderstanding: kin did not recognize kin. When they shall recognize each other, however, war shall end with peace, and then there shall be "a peace of all the world," the final calm and quietude of heaven, the Celestial Empire, the Median Kingdom over all the world, from East to South, the final crystallization, the bee-hive and ant-hill of all mankind,** the solid "compressed spawn" of bourgeoisie encrusting the earthly sphere, – and not even bourgeoisie, but the *canaille*, because bourgeoisie having reached its limits and come into power is the *canaille*.

"Ponder upon it," we may conclude these reflections, as Hertzen concluded them formerly, "ponder upon it, and your hair will stand on end."

---

https://biblehub.com/proverbs/6-6.htm

6 **Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise:** 7 **Which having no guide, overseer, or ruler,** 8 **Provideth her meat in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.**

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/homo-consumericus/201101/communismsocialism-great-idea-wrong-species-e-o-wilson

E.O. Wilson, the two-time Pulitzer Prize winning author and Harvard entomologist, famously quipped regarding communism/socialism: "Great idea. Wrong species." Wilson spent much of his career studying social ants that possess highly egalitarian societies: All individuals are in the service of a queen (who is singularly assigned the reproductive duties of the colony). Hence, short of this one queen, everyone is "equal" in terms of say their sterile status (albeit individual ants might serve different roles and as such their responsibilities to the colony are indeed distinguishable).

https://archive.org/details/envytheoryofsoci0000scho/page/78/mode/2up?view=theater

However, **Baumgarten may perhaps have had in view something in the nature of 'royal envy.' The man of higher rank does not wish his subordinates to enjoy the same privileges. He is niggardly with supplies, which he rations so that none of his subordinates may be too comfortable.** This, too, is envy, but exercised from a position of effective power. Behaviour has

sometimes been observed which would be interpreted as revealing this kind of envy: the higher-ranking animal, although itself unable to eat any more, or satisfied sexually, denies both food and partner to lower-ranking animals. **It is as if it were saying: 'If I've got to stop, there's no reason for you to go on enjoying yourselves.'** This behaviour, seen from the point of view of developmental psychology, certainly contains an element of envy.
…

For instance, **we regard it as the expression of a sense of social justice when a strong man spontaneously goes to the assistance of another who is being attacked by somebody stronger than the victim but weaker than the rescuer.** Such 'noble' behavior can be observed notably in school playgrounds, in groups of children and among siblings, but also in certain groups of adults and among strangers. Now where the case is one of defending the weakest in the group so that he may not go short of food, it is even more applicable to the matter under investigation: **Why does the stronger one, who is in any case well provided for, bother about securing enough for the weaker or weakest one, who is not even a member of his own inner group? Before considering pretentious terms such as 'sympathy,' 'egalitarian justice,' 'compassion' or 'nobility,' it might be worth taking a look at animals.**

Many years ago Konrad Lorenz mentioned behavior on the part of animals that was analogous to moral conduct. **For instance, he describes the strict order of precedence that obtains in all jackdaw colonies: if any two jackdaws quarrel, a third, their superior in rank, intervenes with reflex-like authority on behalf of the lowest-ranking combatant.**

> **In the jackdaw colony those of the higher orders, particularly the despot himself, are not aggressive towards the birds that stand far beneath them: it is only in their relations towards their immediate inferiors that they are constantly irritable;** this applies especially to the despot and the pretender to the throne – Number One and Number Two.

Hence, what appears to us to be chivalry is in reality an innate reaction which does, of course, function in the preservation of the species. **It also, however, secures the position of the animal which happens to be stronger against those which, for time being, cannot assert themselves against him and so direct their aggression towards those beneath them.**28

> 28. K. Lorenz, 'Moral-analoges Verhalten geselliger Tiere,' *Universitas*, 11th year, 1951, p. 548.

http://laurabetzig.org/pdf/RomanMonogamy.pdf

I think there's plenty of evidence that Romans were not at all reluctant to raise lots of *illegitimate* children – especially by their slaves (Betzig, this volume). **Augustus, however, did not reward fathers for rearing bastards, in fact, in the *lex Papia Poppaea* of AD 9, illegitimate children were explicitly kept off the birth register** (e.g., *Digest* 27.1.2.2-3, 50.5.2.5, see Rawson 1989 24, 28). **What the emperors wanted was that Romans rear more *heirs*.**

That's what they were reluctant to do. Objections to, demonstrations against, and circumventions of the "moral" laws are alluded to in Livy, Horace, Ovid, Pliny, Martial, Juvenal, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio, to name a few. To get the laws passed at all, Augustus had to go around the senate to the tribal assembly (Mommsen 1955) Why? I think Roman fathers, like fathers across empires, *limited* the number of their heirs in order to *raise* the inheritances they left them. I'm not the only one to think so. **As early as the second century BC, Polybius, a Greek historian in Rome, said people were reluctant to raise more than a few children "so as to leave them in affluence," as late as the fourth century AD St Augustine said "fertility is a bother to wealthy people," meaning a limited *hereditas* would get split up** (Polybius, *Histories*, xxxvi.17.7, Augustine, *En Psalm*, 137.8, in Shaw 1987a, 43)
…

As Theodor Mommsen put it in his *Romisches Strafrecht*, they were "one of the most intrusive and long-lasting creations in criminal law in all history" (Mommsen 1955, 691, translated in Cohen 1991, 124).
…

Still Augustus' law – the *lex Julia de adulteriis* of 18 BC – was, again, apparently "revolutionary." **It was the first surviving Roman legislation addressed to infidelity, and it ran contrary to the republican norm that the state should stay out of its citizens' homes** (see Cohen 1991, 110, Treggiari 1991a, 293). Fragments from at least five of the nine chapters of the *lex Julia de adulteriis* survive.

According to the second chapter, a father had the right to kill his daughter's lover – provided they were caught in the act, in his own or in his son-in-law's house, **and that he kill his daughter at the same**

time. According to the jurist Papinian, most of that law reiterated a right older than the Roman republic, "<u>the novelty was in ordaining that both should be killed</u>" (Treggiari 1991a, 283). As Jane Gardner points out, "the requirement to kill both was likely to be a deterrent to killing either," that "may have been Augustus' intention" (1986, 130).

A husband was much more constrained. In the first place, **according to the *Digest*, while the father could kill an adulterer regardless of his status – he might even kill an ex-consul – a husband could just kill pimps, lictors, gladiators, condemned men, family freedmen, and slaves.** As Treggiari points out, "calculations about the status of the *adulterer* would be difficult to make in the heat of the moment" (1991a, 284). The killing was to be reported to the magistrate within three days, the status of the adulterer and the fact of adultery proved, in order for the husband to be cleared of homicide. **Even more to the point, a husband could *not* legally kill his adulterous wife** – though he might get off with hard labor or relegation, instead of death, if he did. A man who caught, but did not divorce, an adulterous wife could be charged with pandering if he let her lover go. **And a man who had killed his wife's lover was compelled to divorce his wife at once.** He could prosecute her for adultery within sixty days, but not without divorcing her first.
…

Some Christian Romans were "Orders of widows" were common from the first century, **the first "convent" in Rome was in a rich widow's house, and by the Middle Ages cloistered widows – the cloistered virgins – tended to come from the upper class** (e.g., Brown 1988, 147-148, Drijvers 1987, 24-28, Rouselle 1988, 133). Powerful men have tried to keep ex-wives from finding second husbands. **What was the fear here? That an inheritance would end up in step-children's hands.**
…

But Augustus made widow remarriage mandatory. **And he limited his prescription to women of childbearing age.** In fact, postmenopausal women were not *allowed* to remarry, since legal marriage took place "for the purpose of producing children" (Rawson 1986, 10). Stipulations in wills making succession contingent on the celibacy of an ex-spouse had to be expunged (Csillag 1976, 87). Under the *lex Julia*, widows were punished unless re-married within a year, the *lex Papia Poppaea* extended the period to two (e.g., Treggiari 1991a 73). Widows who failed to remarry might lose their dowries to the treasury (e.g., Csillag 1976, 94). Once again, **"there was probably never an attempt to enforce this in the lower classes"** (Rawson 1986, 31).

…

I think the point of Augustus' moral legislation was to sabotage the aristocracy. He made it harder for a rich man to get a rich spouse, to keep her faithful, to leave his estate to a single son and, to a lesser extent, to choose a back-up heir. Later Roman emperors stuck with those enactments, with modifications and additions, for more than three hundred years. What was the result? In Csillag's opinion, **"the historical aristocracy began to wither away. The huge latifundia disintegrated into parcels in the course of the proscriptions"** (1976, 67, cf. Hopkins 1983, Garnsey and Saller 1987, 145-155). **<u>The alphas – Roman emperors, strengthened their power by weakening the betas – the Roman aristocracy.</u>** As Syme and others point out, that may have been done in many ways. One of the most "intrusive and long-lasting" must have been the "moral" legislation.

Significantly, it all changed with Constantine's conversion. In AD 320, the first Christian emperor repealed the Augustan legislation on *caelibatus* and *orbitas*, on celibacy and childlessness, both holy conditions under the new state religion (e.g., Csillag 1976, 204-207). **He also restored the right to prosecute wives for adultery to the immediate family, making the husband's responsibility primary, calling husbands "the avenger of the marriage bed" in the Theodosian Code** (e.g., Cohen 1991, 125, see too Cantarella 1991, 234). And he abolished the law requiring that widows remarry, in fact, by the end of the fourth century widows had by law to yield rights to their first husbands' patrimonies. **If they remarried, to church fathers, remarriage banned women from the kingdom of heaven** (e.g., Saller 1991, 46, Dixon 1988, 50, Csillag 1976, 205).

At the same time, new penalties were introduced. Most had to do with contingency heirs. Divorce by mutual consent was abolished in the sixth century, by Justinian (e.g., Gardner 1986, 89). In 326, according to the *Codex Justinianus*, Constantine ruled against keeping a wife and concubine at the same time (e.g., Treggiari 1981, 77). Laws passed by Christian emperors, and eventually by the church itself, prohibited divorce and remarriage, concubinage, **and even adoption,** and they vastly extended the "incest" prohibition (e.g., Goody 1983). I think a lot about that shift makes sense. Imperial Roman legislation pitted emperors against the aristocracy. **The point was to disperse their wealth and influence by lowering their inheritance. That they did, most of all, by making them rear too many heirs.**
…

The point of the moral laws was to preserve the emperor's peace on the emperor's terms. **That meant an end to infighting among equals in the republican aristocracy, it meant the beginning of the imperial rule of one over many.**

---

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n173/mode/2up?view=theater

Then came Aristotle and Zeno. **The former taught the syllogism, a method which displays the universals in their particulars rather than putting together the particulars to form universals. The latter taught the sorites, which, like the method of modern philosophers, makes minds subtle but not sharp. Neither of them yielded anything else of note to the advantage of the human race.** Hence with great reason Bacon, great alike as philosopher and statesman, proposes, commends and illustrates the inductive method in his [*Novum*] *Organum*, and is still followed by the English with great profit in experimental philosophy.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

Some of their innovations in grammatical terminology have lasted until now: we still speak of oblique cases, genitive, dative, accusative, of verbs active (ὀρθά), passive (ὕπτια), neuter (οὐδέτερα), by the names they gave. Their corrections and fancied improvements of the Aristotelian logic are mostly useless and pedantic.
…

The zeal with which the school prosecuted logical inquiries had one practical result—they could use to perfection the unrivalled weapon of analysis. **Its chief employment was to lay things bare and sever them from their surroundings, in order that they might be contemplated in their simplicity, with rigid exactness, as objects of thought, apart from the illusion and exaggeration that attends them when presented to sense and imagination.** The very perfection and precision of this method constantly tempted the later Stoics to abuse it for the systematic depreciation of the objects analysed.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoic_logic#Later_reception

For around five hundred years Stoic logic was one of the two great systems of logic.[65] The logic of Chrysippus was discussed alongside that of Aristotle, and it may well have been more prominent since Stoicism was the dominant philosophical school.[66]
From a modern perspective Aristotle's term logic and the Stoic logic of propositions appear complementary, but they were sometimes regarded as rival systems.[30] In late antiquity the Stoic school fell into decline, and the last pagan philosophical school, the Neoplatonists, adopted Aristotle's logic for their own.[67] Only elements of Stoic logic made their way into the logical writings of later commentators such as Boethius, transmitting confused parts of Stoic logic to the Middle Ages.[66] Propositional logic was redeveloped by Peter Abelard in the 12th century, but by the mid-15th century the only logic which was being studied was a simplified version of Aristotle's.[68]

In the 18th century Immanuel Kant declared that "since Aristotle ... logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and complete body of doctrine."[69] To 19th century historians, who believed that Hellenistic philosophy represented a decline from that of Plato and Aristotle, Stoic logic was seen with contempt.[70]
Carl Prantl thought that Stoic logic was "dullness, triviality, and scholastic quibbling" and he welcomed the fact that the works of Chrysippus were no longer extant.[71] Eduard Zeller remarked that "the whole contribution of the Stoics to the field of logic consists in their having clothed the logic of the Peripatetics with a new terminology."[72]

Although **developments in modern logic that parallel Stoic logic[73] began in the middle of the 19th century with the work of George Boole and Augustus De Morgan,[68]** Stoic logic itself was only reappraised in the 20th century,[71] beginning with the work of Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz[71] and Benson Mates.[71]

https://www.academia.edu/363114/_How_Dialectical_Was_Stoic_Dialectic_in_A._Nightingale_D._Sedley_eds._Ancient_Models_of_Mind_Studies_in_Human_and_Divine_Rationality_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_2010_153-179

[Chrysippus] became so renowned in dialectic that most people thought that if there were dialectic among the gods, it would be no different from that of Chrysippus.1 (D.L.=Long and Sedley [henceforth L&S])

The enthusiastic view reported by Diogenes Laertius has been far from unanimous across the centuries, and Stoic *dialektike* has come under the fire of many ruthless critics, both in antiquity and in modern times. The most recurrent charge has been that of empty and rigid "formalism" (in modern jargon),2 or of paying too much attention to "words" (sterile terminological quibbles and logical puzzles) rather than to the "things themselves",3 with no real improvement (and indeed some regrettable devolution) in comparison with the heights reached by its main rival, Aristotelian logic.4 **The revival of the study of Stoic logic in the twentieth century was prompted by a fresh understanding and appreciation** – inspired by the modern development of formal *Aussagenlogik* – **of those very features disparaged earlier, and in particular the rigorous and formalized character of Stoic syllogistic.**5

https://books.google.fi/books?id=OietAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aristotle's logic is closely connected to geometry and to space; when we contemplate a question of whether one class includes another, **the classes we contemplate are static. The classes don't change as we think about them, and, in consequence, we can represent them spatially, with geometrical figures. But there is another sort of logic that considers the changing and dynamic – and concerns our choices in life.** When we think about choosing a course of conduct, we think across time to the future, **and the reasonableness of our choice then depends on our ability to predict its future consequences.** As a result, in addition to a logic of classification as worked out by Aristotle (syllogistic logic), there is also a logic of choice and consequence (propositional logic), **which appeared about a century after Aristotle within the ancient philosophical school of the Stoics.**

The Stoics' new approach to logic came from a new imperial world, where sovereign kings had replaced the old democracies of the past and where philosophical introspection had replaced political participation.
…

Paradoxically, the shift from citizen assemblies to sovereign kings re-inforced the idea of the equality of peoples. **Both citizens and non-citizens were now *equally powerless* in the political arena; only kings and their appointees could exercise real authority. Thus the Stoics were far less prone to view some social groups as born to rule and others as born to obey.** Instead, the citizens who now concerned them were the "citizens of the world" (or, as the Stoics put it, the "cosmopolites"), and these citizens consisted of all men and women of goodwill, whatever their nationality.

This insistence on equality, combined with an emphasis on introspection, focused the attention of these thinkers on what was introspectively common to *all* peoples – citizens or noncitizens – and on what all people might discover if only they reflected quietly on their mental habits. Writers of the period became more interested in a common human nature under the "rational law," and they believed that part of this nature was to participate in an eternal realm of rational, moral choice. The key that unlocked the door to this realm was logic.
…

But the Stoics also made a further, crucial discovery: all the new forms were in some way interconnected. **Interconnection was one of their grand themes, since, according to their view, the whole world was rationally interconnected.** The law of nature ruled a connected universe, and logic revealed the implications of this law to its citizens. In consequence, when the new logical forms turned out to be connected among themselves, the Stoics pursued them with great zeal.
…

Chrysippus, leader of the Stoics at Athens from 232 onward, was the one to arrive at the key insight that all the new forms were logically interconnected. The simplest of Chrysippus's forms are highly intuitive, and you will probably recognize many of their features as already occurring in your thinking. But Chrysippus sought to connect and elaborate these forms so as to develop what logicians now call "propositional logic" (a term whose meaning we shall explain later on), **and it also turns out that this new, propositional logic runs our digital computers. (Without the sort of logic pioneered by Chrysippus, modern computer processing would be impossible.)**
…

Once we see the equivalence of these compounds, we can see the deep, fundamental connection between the disjunctive syllogism **and a world of related logical necessities, the world first explored systematically by Chrysippus.**

In essence, what Chrysippus discovered was that many or our most common methods of argument are logically tied; suitably interpreted, each is valid only if the others are. But let's look at Chrysippus's insight in great detail.

INTERLOCKING FORMS OF ARGUMENT

The explorations of Chrysippus and his followers took place about a century after Aristotle, but their consequences were never fully exploited from a mathematical perspective until the nineteenth century. (More precisely, Chrysippus saw a great many logical connections among the simple forms we have already noted, **but the specific equivalence of these forms was mostly developed in modern times** – and only when logicians interpreted conditionals in a way that made them systematically convertible into disjunctions.)17 **Still, Chrysippus plainly realized that he was once more entering a world of connected implications and symmetries – a world of related logical necessities.**
…

Until the design of digital computers, any interest in a system like this was largely theoretical; nobody needed all the manipulations of Chrysippus to handle the ordinary situations of life.
…

THE BASIS OF COMPUTER LOGIC

It all depends on the compounds we looked at a moment ago: the disjunction, the conjunction, and the hypothetical. **The first thing to notice about these compounds is how different they are from the logic developed by Aristotle. Aristotle's logic is largely devoid of compounds.** Aristotle was surely *aware* of compounds, but he didn't pick them out for extensive study. In effect, then, what we really have here (in the hands of Aristotle and Chrysippus) are two different kinds of logic. **The two kinds are by no means incompatible; they complement each other well, but they concern different things.**
…

Thus, whereas modus ponens is valid merely in virtue of how the propositions fit together (hence, the expression "propositional logic"), Aristotle's logic relies on a more complicated "logic of terms." (The validity of a syllogism turns on things *inside* each proposition, on the terms themselves. By analogy, we might say that Chrysippus's logic combines atoms into whole molecules and then traces out the implications, but Aristotle's logic goes about dissecting each atom in turn and then relates the parts of these atoms to the parts of other atoms.) It is only Chrysippus's logic, propositional logic, that translates easily into computer circuitry.
…

In particular, the two values of true and false can be represented electronically as a circuit switched on and off.25 Such circuits can then be combined in complex arrays so that, if various elements within the array are switched on, their compounds are switched on, and the compounds can then represent the logical relations of disjunction, conjunction, and the implications represented by hypotheticals. This is the basis of modern digital computing. **As the electronic elements switch on and off, the machine's behavior mimics an exceedingly complex inference in which sets of conclusions lead to other conclusions.**

With Aristotle's logic, this effect would be impossible. Why? Because the parts of a categorical syllogism represented by the variables A, B, and C aren't "true" or "false" in the first place. Instead, A, B, and C are merely names of classes (classes like "dogs," "mortals," "Athenians," or "Thebans"); they are not statements. But since the variables merely stand for classes, we no longer have the same intimate connection between the truth of the variables and the truth of the whole.

What we see as a result is a close similarity between some of our methods of reasoning and the behavior of digital computers. And though this fact is sometimes masked by a computer scientist's tendency to speak in terms of a binary code, a series of ones and zeros, the scientist's code is simply another way of expressing the same logical truths. **The code happens to come from the nineteenth-century English logician and mathematician George Boole, whose aim was to codify the relations studied much earlier by Chrysippus (albeit with greater abstraction and sophistication).** Later generations built on Boole's insights, and we shall consider in chapter 9 how these efforts eventually gave rise to programmable computers. **But the logic that made it all possible was the interconnected logic of an interconnected universe, discovered by the ancient Chrysippus,** who labored long ago under an old Athenian stoa.
…

Living in a time of vast, autocratic regimes, Chrysippus dwelled, like all Stoics, on the rational choices of individuals, and he believed human reason at its best was a form of participation in the eternal. **Assessing truth and falsity and cleaving to the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, he sought to make the life of human beings as orderly as the cosmos itself.** For Chrysippus, the eternal law of nature was the secret of the starry heavens above, and it was the moral law within. **According to an old Athenian saying, "If the gods have any use for logic, it is the logic of**

Chrysippus."27 **However that may be, the logic of Chrysippus is certainly the logic our machines.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.186497/page/n219/mode/2up?view=theater

At this point, in the first place if I chose to agree with Epicurus and to say that not every proposition is either true or false, I would rather suffer that nasty knock than agree that all events are caused by fate; for the former opinion has something to be said for it, but the latter is intolerable. **Accordingly Chrysippus exerts every effort to prove the view that every *axiōma* is either true or false.** For just as Epicurus is afraid that if he admits this he will also have to admit that all events whatever are caused by fate (on the ground that if either of two alternatives is true from all eternity, that alternative is also certain, and if it is certain it is also necessary. This, he thinks, would prove both necessity and fate), **similarly Chrysippus fears that if he fails to maintain that every proposition is either true or false he will not carry his point that all things happen by fate and spring from eternal causes governing future events.** But Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of an atom; and so in addition to gravity and impact there arises a third form of motion, when the atom swerves sideways a minimal space (termed by Epicurus *elachiston*).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=TS8hSCfmBQgC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA193#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is remarkable that in selecting material from [Cicero's] *De Fato* as his first illustrative example in propositional logic Boole happened to choose an important early source of information on Stoic logic, of which so little is extant. The historical value could hardly have been appreciated by Boole since it wasn't until the present century that an adequate historical understanding of Stoic logic as a propositional logic was achieved (Mates, 1953, 1961). Nevertheless Boole clearly saw that what was involved was propositional logic, not term (or class) logic.

https://ericsiggyscott.wordpress.com/2018/03/04/what-is-stoic-logic/

But if we take "logic" **in its narrow, modern sense,** then Stoic logic—the system of formal logical reasoning developed by the prolific philosopher Chrysippus in the 3rd century B.C.E.—is *uncannily similar* to the kind of logic you find at the beginning of introductory logic textbooks today. They were **way ahead of their time.**

Today, almost nobody knows much about Aristotle's syllogisms, but every computer programmer, digital circuit engineer, mathematician, and philosopher is fluent in something very close to Stoic logic.

This is because the Chrysippus developed the first full-fledged system of **propositional logic,** which is closely related to modern **Boolean logic.** If you've ever taken an Artificial Intelligence class, a Discrete Mathematics class, or some other general introduction to logic, then you've already been exposed to most of Stoic logic's key components.
…

But we don't know much more than that about Stoic logic. This is because almost everything we know about it, and certainly everything in this post, comes from **one fragment** of an ancient textbook preserved in Diogenes Laertius's 3rd-century C.E. anthology of philosophy.

The prolific works of Chrysippus, while arguably even more famous and important than Aristotle for the ancients, did not survive the decline of ancient civilization, and it was Aristotle's logic that dominated logical work in the Latin West.

Logicians didn't pick up where the Stoics left off and start developing the science of logic to new heights until George Boole and Gottlob Frege picked up propositional logic again in the late 1800's and launched the modern revolution of **mathematical logic,** digital circuits, programming languages, Artificial Intelligence, and more.

At the heart of all this, however, are still Chrysippus's good ol' **propositions.** With all that is new, Stoic logic is still doing a lot of the real work in these modern technologies.

http://www.traditionalstoicism.com/stoic-matrix/

Moving from the ancient theory of the four elements to the modern Standard Model of Matter doesn't refute Stoic theology. And, since the Stoics derived their theology from their reflections on the natural order of things, Stoic theology ought to be updated. For the Stoics, whether ancient or modern, theological progress goes hand in hand with scientific progress. So we need to update Stoic theology.

I'll start by proposing a modern definition of the Stoic God. After that, I'll tell you why I think it captures the core elements of Stoic theology. Other ways of thinking about the Stoic God are certainly possible. This modern Stoic theology is inspired by computer science. It's part of digital physics, or, more accurately, digital metaphysics. The idea is that our universe is a software process running on a hardware substratum. That substratum is a computing machine. Of course, it isn't very much like the computer I'm using to type this up. It's a computer in the sense that it performs certain abstractly

defined functions. The idea that our universe is a software process is sometimes referred to as the simulation hypothesis. But that's not quite right, because a simulation is an imitation of some original system, like a simulation of the weather. But our universe isn't a simulation of anything. It is what it is. By now you will have guessed that I mean to say that the computer is the Stoic God. Can this be defended? It can.

The Stoics drew a crucial contrast between God and matter, with God being active and matter being passive. This contrast is preserved: the activity of the divine hardware generates all the activity in the software. The software is utterly passive. The Stoics also thought of God as purely rational. Computers are logical machines. The activity of the divine computer is purely rational activity. The Stoics were determinists. Computer-generated worlds unfold deterministically. They are deterministically generated by the logic of their programming. Fate is an algorithm. The Stoic God was omniscient, knowing all that happens in the universe. The computer that runs a program can observe the program it runs. More precisely, one part of that program, the cosmic part, can be observed by another part. But this leads to another parallel. **The Stoics were polytheists. And digital theology is also polytheistic. Any complex program is divided into subroutines. The cosmic programming of our universe is clearly very complex. It is a whole composed of subroutines, and these subroutines are lesser deities.** They are not, of course, the literal gods and goddesses on Mount Olympus. But the ancient Stoics themselves rejected that idea as mere superstition.

The Stoic God is analogous to a self-programming computer. It is a hardware machine, but, like all computers, it has an operating system. Its operating system is written directly into its hardware (or, more technically, into its firmware). The operating system contains, among other features, a program for writing programs. The Stoics used the design argument to justify the existence of their God. The argument works just fine: the universe exhibits a programmatic order (expressed in the laws of physics); but where there is a program, there needs to be a programmer; therefore, there exists some cosmic programmer. This cosmic programmer just turns out to be a deeper program, written into the operating system of God. The fine-tuning argument can also be used to justify the existence of the divine self-programming machine: our universe is finely-tuned for life; if it is finely tuned, then there exists some tuner; so there exists some tuner. This tuner adjusted the parameters of our physical laws so that life would be likely to emerge. And this tuner is the self-programming logic of the divine computer.

This computational way of thinking about the Stoic God also coheres with several other aspects of Stoic theology. **The Stoic God doesn't seem to be a personal or conscious God like the Christian God. It is a kind of impersonal rationality. It is mind-like, but it might not really be a mind. So think of artificial intelligence.** The kinds of mind-like programs that have artificial intelligence (call them "artillects") aren't really minds. They can be extremely smart, but they don't have psychologies or conscious selves. **They are alien minds, if they are minds at all, and that strangeness provides a way to think about the Stoic God. Its intelligence resembles AI rather than human mentality.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/#EntSov

Yet scheming ministers aside, the sovereign should beware of his own mistakes, which may be even worse than his foes' plans. **The monarch is the most revered individual, but also the weakest chain in the government apparatus.** He can be duped by his underlings, is prone to misjudge them, and his actions may frequently endanger the very foundations of political order that he is supposed to safeguard. **Hence, the thinker repeatedly urges the ruler to refrain from any personal activities, any reliance on personal knowledge, and any manifestation of personal likes and dislikes.** "He who relies on personal abilities is the worst ruler"; "When the sovereign abandons the law and behaves selfishly, there is no difference between the rulers and the ruled"; **"When the ruler has selfish kindness, the ruled have selfish desires"** (*Han Feizi* 48:432; 6:32; 45:414 *et saepe*). The ruler should refrain from any action; **echoing the *Laozi* □□, Han Fei urges him to remain empty and tranquil** (*Han Feizi* 5:27). The thinker summarizes his recommendations:

> The ruler does not reveal his desires; should he do so, the minister will carve and embellish them. He does not reveal his views; should he do so, the minister will use them to present his different [opinion]. … **The way of the enlightened sovereign is to let the knowledgeable completely exhaust their contemplations**—then the ruler relies on them to decide on matters and is not depleted of knowledge; to let the worthy utilize their talents—then the ruler relies on them, assigns tasks, and is not depleted of abilities. When there is success, the ruler possesses a worthy [name]; when there is failure, the minister bears the responsibility. (*Han Feizi* 5:27)

This is a curious recommendation: the ruler should completely nullify himself both in order to preserve his authority against scheming ministers, and to acquire—unjustly!—a good name at the minister's expense. **Yet this sovereign, who has neither desires nor observable views, becomes the ultimate slave of his office.** For the sake of self-preservation he must abolish his personality, being completely submerged by the system which he ostensibly runs. **A.C. Graham provocatively notices that the ruler in Han Fei's system "has no functions which could not be performed by an elementary computer. … Might one even say than in Han Fei's system it is ministers who do the ruling?"** (Graham 1989: 291). **This paradox of an entrapped sovereign, who enjoys God-like omnipotence, but who is required to refrain from any**

activism in order to preserve this omnipotence is one of the most fascinating manifestations of the intrinsic contradiction of the authoritarian system. When it comes from a thinker who is often described as singularly authoritarian-minded, it deserves utmost attention.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false

The great puzzle that Hobbes cannot explain is: Why would anyone want to become the Sovereign? Since the toils and dangers of attempting to rise to supreme power are by definition an insane goal for every human *qua* human – since we are compelled by nature to seek survival and avoid danger – how does the Sovereign achieve power in the first place? Hobbes seems to assume that these tyrants emerge like spontaneous natural forces. He envisions them as supplying the institutionalized terror that, by simulating the terror of the state of nature where the absence of government exposes us all to the daily danger of violent death, will remind every subject that no advantage to be gained from breaking the contract and attempting to tyrannize could possibly outweigh the dangers involved ([1971] p. 202). **At least one "real man" is needed to keep the "human beings" in line.**37 **But Hobbes's theory cannot account for the possibility of such a man.**

> 37. Consider Habermas (1973) p. 57: **the political absolutism of Hobbes's Sovereign is necessary to bring about the utopia of social peace envisioned by Thomas More.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA473#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is not that [the Sovereign] must go from being a Nero to a Marcus Aurelius, the kind of transition from an exploitive tyrant to a benevolent monarch the classics would have urged (a distinction based, in Hobbes's language, on "differences in wit"), but that he must go from being a Nero *or* a Marcus Aurelius to being a kind of detached and invisible manager. **Indeed, his method of ruling could arguably be best carried out by an impersonal mechanism** – say a constitution that, through checks and balances, retards political ambition by sluicing the people's passions into three mutually impeding branches of government – **rather than a flesh-and-blood human being at all, with all his potential for inconstancy and whim.**

https://thenewutopian.com/2022/11/02/understanding-carl-schmitts-political-theology/

Who has the power to decide and declare a state of exception and act without limits in that situation? The President? The Governor? The Prime Minister? A judge? If you are struggling to identify an official or figure who has this power, **fear not, for this is exactly what Schmitt says we should expect in liberal democracy.**

"All tendencies of modern constitutional development point toward eliminating the sovereign in this sense." In other words, one of the foremost goals of modern constitutions is to actively eliminate the sovereign, to remove the possibility of a figure who can decide the state of exception and act without legal limits.
…

Schmitt then goes on to attack the rationalist Kantians who fail to understand this exception and the monopoly of the sovereign to decide when the exception exists. The rationalists believe that the legal order can set up contingencies and "suspend itself." The idea that the legal order can just "suspend itself" and that the emergency, that which is out of the law, can be decided by the legal order, is completely incoherent. But this is a hallmark of liberal constitutionalism. Think back to just moments ago when you tried to imagine who in your State is sovereign. **If you failed to come to some certain conclusion, this is because liberal constitutionalism wants to eliminate the sovereign, but also to "regulate the exception as precisely as possible."** Our current political-legal order attempts to "spell out in detail the case in which law suspends itself."
…

If you are American or English, or any other Westerner, you have heard and likely believe in the so-called "rule of law." What can this mean other than that the law rules, the law is sovereign. This is also, strangely enough, where theology enters the equation. **Schmitt says, "The modern idea of the state, according to Krabbe, replaces personal force (of the king, of the authorities) with spiritual power."** He then goes on to quote Krabbe, who says, "We no longer live under the authority of persons, be they natural or artificial (legal) persons, but under the rule of laws, (spiritual) forces. This is the essence of the idea of the modern idea of the state." Krabbe continues, saying, **"These forces rule in the strictest sense of the word. Precisely because these forces emanate from the spiritual nature of man, they can be obeyed voluntarily."**
…

The growth of decentralization (Americans would understand this to be federalism) and self-government have only helped the idea of it being the laws which have power. In this conception, the state is just a law-making body. We conceive of the state as making laws or rewriting laws, not really in enforcing those laws. It is because of this that "The state is confined exclusively to producing laws." **This stems mostly from the**

Enlightenment emphasis on the legislative power. When you read Locke, when you read Rousseau, when you read the Federalist Papers, they are all very clear that the power to legislate—to make laws—is the most important power and the one that the state is *most* concerned with. **This is why the architects of the American Constitution focused so heavily on the legislative branch as compared to the executive and especially the judicial.** They sincerely believed the legislative to be the most powerful, rightly so in their mind, but also the most dangerous.
…

If you have to be "given" authority by anyone and can have it revoked at any time by some legal procedure, you are not the sovereign. As for what Locke says about authority and law, remember in Chapter I when Krabbe said we no longer live under the authority of persons but of law. This is precisely what Locke means by saying that law gives authority and used the word law and not just the command of a monarch, a *person*.

Schmitt then differentiates between two different types of juristic scientific thought, and one of those types is the "decisionist" type (a term Schmitt coins) led by Thomas Hobbes, a major figure in Schmitt's thought. Here we get into some more theology. Schmitt mentions Hobbes' response to the idea of the separation of powers between the spiritual and temporal realm. **Hobbes says that it is not possible to have one abstract power be superior or inferior to another. "For Subjection, Command, Right and Power are accidents not of Power but of Persons." In other words, the ability to subject others, command others, have rights, and hold power are not abstract concepts floating out in space, but are attributes of very real people who have the very real and present ability to carry out or possess those things.** Hobbes is, then, both a decisionist inasmuch as he believed *authoritas, non veritas facit legem* (authority, not truth, makes law) and a personalist inasmuch as he believed it is persons who hold authority.

> https://garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf
>
> They have never asked themselves the obvious question: *What are the institutional connections that make possible a successful revolution?* They have been taught by traditional historiography to look at political events or military events. They have been taught by Marx to examine class alignments, and by Charles Beard and his intellectual heirs to examine the personal economic self-interest of the participants. **Historians in recent years have been far more willing to consider the influence of religious ideas, but they have been trained to play down the "great man theory of history." They have been taught, above all, that serious, reputable scholars do not raise the question of conspiracies.** Special-interest groups, yes; elites, yes;108 just not conspiracies.
>
> Why is this? I think the reason is theological. **Conspiracies point too closely to personalism as the basis of historical change, and personalism points to a God who brings sanctions in history.**109

…

Also very important is the analogy between miracles and the exception in jurisprudence. Schmitt says this particular analogy is key to understanding modern developments of state theory. **This is because the modern world has rejected the miracle. It has rejected the exception. "The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world. This theology and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a miracle, but also in the sovereign's direct intervention in a valid legal order."**
…

For instance, **Descartes wrote to Mersenne, "It is God who established these laws in nature just as a king establishes laws in his kingdom." Then, during the Enlightenment and the development of deism, the sovereign (the king) was cast aside and, as Schmitt says, the machine was assumed to just run by itself.** Then, Rousseau introduced the idea of the General Will, which postulated that the people are sovereign (though some, like my friend Drake, point out that such a concept actually originates with St. Bellarmine). **With these developments, the personalism and the decisionism of Hobbes was forgotten. No longer does an absolute sovereign person intervene and provide unity against the competing interests within the state and nation.** Now, the people are an organic unity, and the theistic and deistic God alike are no longer relevant where political metaphysics is concerned.
…

Schmitt foresaw the consequences of these still relatively fresh developments at the time and believed that **"Conceptions of transcendence will no longer be credible to most educated people, who will settle for either a more or less clear immanence-pantheism or a positivist indifference towards any metaphysics."**
…

To the first of these, Schmitt says that **"Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the 'nature' of man and presupposes that he is either 'by nature good' or 'by nature evil.' This issue can only be clouded by pedagogic or economic explanations, but not evaded."**

…

Cortés was especially concerned with Original Sin, though Schmitt correctly points out that Cortés had a far more radical belief concerning Original Sin than the council of Trent. "The dogma of Original Sin promulgated by the Council of Trent is not radical in any simple way. In contrast to the Lutheran understanding, the dogma asserts not absolute worthlessness but only distortion, opacity, or injury, and leaves open the possibility of the natural good." Cortés view of man as being thoroughly evil was, to Schmitt, "more horrible than anything that had ever been alleged by an absolutist philosophy of the state in justifying authoritarian rule."
…

Describing this class as it was in the 19th century, Schmitt says, "**Although the liberal bourgeoisie wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he had to be powerless;** it demanded freedom and equality but limited voting rights to the propertied classes in order to ensure the influence of education and property on legislation, as if education and property entitled that class to repress the poor and uneducated; it abolished the aristocracy of blood and family but permitted the impudent rule of the moneyed aristocracy, the most ignorant and the most ordinary form of an aristocracy; **it wanted neither the sovereignty of the king nor that of the people.** What did it actually want?"
…

Probably one of my favorite lines comes when **Schmitt cites Cortés as believing that Liberalism only existed "in that short interim period in which it was possible to answer the question 'Christ or Barabbas?' with a proposal to adjourn or appoint a commission of investigation."**
…

"The essence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the decision to be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion." Schmitt and Cortés hit the nail on the head here. **I have sat in university classes before where liberalism was, more or less, described exactly this way, except it was meant to be a strength rather than a weakness.**
…

Meanwhile, **"American financiers, industrial technicians, Marxists socialists, and anarcho-syndicalist revolutionaries unite in demanding that the biased rule of politics over unbiased economic management be done away with. There must no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological problems."** They have largely succeeded. The World Economic Forum and the Great Reset are basically the end of this programme. The ultimate goal is the managerial State, the nanny state, where there is no politics, just money management and management of people through a Human Resources State.

https://www.academia.edu/1386606/
A_philosophy_of_concrete_life_Carl_Schmitt_and_the_political_thought_of_late_modernity

As is well known, for Foucault the paradigm for disciplinary power is precisely a machine, namely Jeremy Bentham's prison-machine, Pan-opticon.185 Foucault describes the structure of Bentham's machine as follows:

> At the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheral building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.186

No great imagination is required in order for one to recognize the similarity between Foucault's Panopticon and Schmitt's description of Kelsen's theory of law. **Firstly, just as Kelsen's legal order, defined as an "uninterrupted system of orders",**187 **Panopticon is also a gapless ("enclosed") system.**188 **Secondly, just as in Kelsen's legal order in which the sovereign must be radically repressed, Panopticon dispenses with "the need for the prince".**189 Like Kelsen's order, which is based on "the rejection of all 'arbitrariness'",190 it aims at repressing those "sudden, violent, discontinuous forms that are bound up with the exercise of sovereignty".191 Thirdly, just as in Kelsen's order, **in which there are no real or fictitious persons but only the "impersonal validity of an impersonal norm",**192 Panopticon functions anonymously. It neutralizes, automatizes and de-personalizes power: "Power has its principle not so much in a person as in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up."193 **Undoubtedly, <u>there must be someone to operate the machine but it</u>**

<u>does not matter who:</u> “Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine.”194

---

https://charltonteaching.blogspot.com/2019/02/leftist-motivation-how-resentment-and.html

<u>There are two aspects to Leftist motivation – one is self-interested, and the other is what provides a veneer of morality. Neither would work well alone.</u>

If Leftism was wholly self-interested, it would not be a success – the key to Leftism is that it enables people to be self-interested while also feeling good about it – feeling, indeed, altruistically superior about it. **But if Leftism was *genuinely* altruistic, self-sacrificing at an immediate and personal level, it would not be popular.**
…

The Leftist attacks his own class, sex, race - and designates the group as an evil exploiter - but not him-self. **He asks his class/ sex/ race to give-up their status, power and wealth - but not himself... at least not-*here* and not-*now*.**

The Leftist leader displaces the sacrifice away from himself and into the future, and often other places. So **the Leftist leader's mantra is Not me, Not here, Not now**... Arguing that "People like me should give up their jobs to minorities - but not me".
…

So this is the psychology that has led to Leftism taking-over the world. It is selfish - which is why it is so very popular; and it is moral - which makes it even more popular.

But, crucially to Leftism's success, ***the selfishness is proximate, direct, immediate; while the altruistic, sacrificial morality is abstract, impersonal and remote*.**

https://zippycatholic.wordpress.com/2014/08/02/feeding-cthulu-with-freedom/

The usual thinking among the noobs is that Cthulhu’s leftward swim is fueled by progressive insistence on **equality**. This is at best only a half truth.

Equality is not the *most basic* commitment of liberalism. The most basic commitment of liberalism is right there in its name: political liberty, also known as *freedom*. **<u>Insistence on equal rights is a *consequence* of making freedom into a political priority.</u>**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#FNanchor_5_12
>
> Sometimes the value of a thing does not lie in that which it helps us to achieve, but in the amount we have to pay for it,—what it *costs* us. For instance, **liberal institutions straightway cease from being liberal, the moment they are soundly established: once this is attained no more grievous and more thorough enemies of freedom exist than liberal institutions! One knows, of course, what they bring about: they undermine the Will to Power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley exalted to a morality, they make people small, cowardly and pleasure-loving,—by means of them the gregarious animal invariably triumphs. <u>Liberalism, or, in plain English, the *transformation of mankind into cattle.*</u>** The same institutions, so long as they are fought for, produce quite other results; then indeed they promote the cause of freedom quite powerfully. **Regarded more closely, it is war which produces these results, war in favour of liberal institutions, which, as war, allows the illiberal instincts to subsist.** For war trains men to be free. What in sooth is freedom? Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves. It is to preserve the distance which separates us from other men. To grow more indifferent to hardship, to severity, to privation, and even to life itself. **<u>To be ready to sacrifice men for one’s cause, one’s self included.</u> Freedom denotes that the virile instincts which rejoice in war and in victory, prevail over other instincts; for instance, over the instincts of “happiness.”** The man who has won his freedom, and how much more so, therefore, the spirit that has won its freedom, tramples ruthlessly upon that contemptible kind of comfort which tea-grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats worship in their dreams. **The free man is a *warrior.***
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm
>
> **But unheroic though bourgeois society is, it nevertheless needed heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war, and national wars to bring it into being.** And in the austere classical traditions of the Roman Republic the bourgeois gladiators found the ideals and the art forms, the self-deceptions, that they needed to conceal from themselves the bourgeois-limited content of their

> struggles and to keep their passion on the high plane of great historic tragedy. Similarly, at another stage of development a century earlier, Cromwell and the English people had borrowed from the Old Testament the speech, emotions, and illusions for their bourgeois revolution. **When the real goal had been achieved and the bourgeois transformation of English society had been accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk.**
>
> http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/010850.html#liberalism
>
> I've said the same many times. **The ultimate practical object of liberalism is a world consisting of equal individuals who have been liberated from all traditional cultures and nations and whose equality is ensured by an unaccountable global elite.** But that's not a contradiction. Since equality requires the elimination of all normal institutions and societies, there must be some ruling regime. **But this regime is not seen as possessing "power," which is bad and unequal. Since it directs mankind in the name of the equal rights of all, it is simply identical with goodness.**

https://counter-currents.com/2021/08/conservative-blank-slatism/#comment-1742021

The Left does not say that All Men are "created" equal, but that All Men can be MADE TO BE equal, by every metric, BECAUSE they are all infinitely-malleable Blank Slates. The "infinitely malleable" comes before the "equal".

> https://archive.org/details/LeoStraussThoughtsOnMachiavelli_201411/page/n295/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The good society in the new sense is possible always and everywhere since men of sufficient brain can transform the most corrupt people, the most corrupt matter, into an incorrupt one by the judicious application of the necessary force.** Since man is not by nature ordered toward fixed ends, he is as it were infinitely malleable. This view becomes a settled conviction long before philosophers begin to think of "evolution."
>
> https://archive.org/details/ambivalenceofber0000monr/page/182/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Certainly **Mandeville's main point is that it is impossible to distinguish what we 'naturally' approve from what we have been taught to approve.** We do not, he insists, have any natural tendency to seek the good of the whole, the public good. **Man is fit for society only in the sense that grapes are fit for wine: that is to say, he may be made so, by skill and industry; but it is not enough simply to let nature take its course.** Man is not naturally virtuous, but he is malleable.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=h1jNQKLbDqoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT12#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **The French eighteenth-century thinker Claude-Adrien Helvétius made the implicit explicit, arguing that proper instruction and legislation would not only enable but compel humans to attain complete virtue. This highly questionable psychological theory became the common heritage of liberalism, socialism, and communism,** which in varying degrees rely on instruction and/or coercion to achieve their respective objectives. In some respects, the Communist state established by Lenin in Russia in November 1917 was a grandiose experiment in public education, undertaken on the Helvétius model for the purpose of creating an entirely new type of human being, one rid of vices, including acquisitiveness.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA564&printsec=frontcover

As regards secularizing human knowledge and the frame of the "Scientific Revolution," this left the European mind for a time divided into four camps or seedbeds of what became the Western Enlightenment – Aristotelians wholly rejecting such reform, Baconians going a quarter of the way, moderates going half-way (Cartesians), and radicals going the full course (Spinozists).

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/10/mode/2up?view=theater

Of the two enlightenments, the moderate mainstream was without doubt **overwhelmingly dominant in terms of support, official approval, and prestige practically everywhere except for several decades in France from the 1740s onwards.** Nevertheless, in a deeper sense, and in the long run, **it proved to be much the less important of the two enlightenments.** For it was always fatally hampered by its Achilles heel, namely that all its philosophical recipes for blending theological and traditional categories with the new critical-mathematical rationality proved flawed in practice, not to say highly problematic and shot through with contradiction. **Cartesian dualism, Lockean empiricism, Leibnizian monads, Malebranche's occasionalism, Bishop Huet's fideism, the London Boyle Lectures, Newtonian physico-theology, Thomasian eclecticism, German and Swedish**

Wolffianism, all the methodologies of compromise presented insuperable disjunctions and difficulties, rendering the whole philosophico-scientific-scholarly arena after 1650 exceedingly fraught and unstable.

The radical wing **who scorned all such dualistic systems,** and attempts at adjustment, may have been a tiny fringe in terms of numbers, status, and approval ratings, among both elites and in popular culture, but they proved impossible to dislodge or overwhelm intellectually. **Those who reduced the worldly and spiritual to a single continuum and erected a single set of rules governing the whole of reality, beginning in a sense with Hobbes but especially with Spinoza, were everywhere denounced, banned, and reviled. Yet the universal opposition of churches, governments, universities, and leading publicists, as well as the great bulk of the common people, could not alter the fact that it was precisely these philosophical radicals extending the Galilean-Cartesian conception of rationality, and criterion of what is 'true,' across the board, pushing it as far as it would go, and allowing no exemptions whatsoever, who often seemed to evince the greatest intellectual consistency and coherence.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/808/mode/2up?view=theater

The Postmodernists attacking the Enlightenment, defenders of the Enlightenment, and the Enlightenment legacy today **have frequently repeated the charge that Enlightenment thinking about moral issues was confused and incoherent,** leading to a failure to establish a viable secular morality independent of theology and traditional metaphysics which allegedly encouraged and contributed to the disintegration and pulverizing of the modern secular moral identity and the collapse of efforts to meaningfully combine moral values with social benevolence.
…

Hence to invoke the moral philosophies of Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Kant who all strove to circumvent the thoroughgoing naturalism of the materialists which they recognized must lead to a complete divorce between morality and Christian tradition makes no sense if the project of the exercise is to fault an 'Enlightenment' project which tried to base morality purely on natural premises. MacIntyre himself, criticizing Kant, affirms that it is 'of the essence of reason that is lays down principles which are universal, categorical, and internally consistent' and that 'a rational morality will lay down principles which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently be obeyed by every rational agent on every occasion.'97 It is this critique itself which is a complete contradiction. **For the conservative moral and social theories of Locke, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Hume, and Kant were all expressly intended to avoid forging moral philosophy systematically on the basis of philosophical reason and nature, in the interest of salvaging major elements of tradition, custom, and theology.**

All these moral philosophers are by definition and by design not just inconsistent but wholly at odds with the consistent naturalism sought by Spinoza, Bayle, Boulainvilliers, Diderot, and d'Holbach. **It was the moral theories of the hard-core French High Enlightenment,** Du Marsais, Diderot, d'Argens, Helvétius, d'Holbach, and Condorcet, which follow Spinoza and Bayle in adopting a fully secular and universalist ethic based exclusively on the 'common good,' equity, and equality, **that were designed to be philosophically coherent and consistent; and, for this very reason, the Postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment entirely lacks force in relation to them.**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/868/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Postcolonialists together with Postmodernist philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor were mistaken in supposing there is no coherent or viable moral core to the Enlightenment and in claiming to have 'exposed the moral fictions that mask modern morality's lack of a foundation and cover up the fact that what it presents as values are nothing but the preferences of arbitrary will and desire.'12 **However, these commentators were to some extent correct – even if they never managed to express the point clearly or accurately – in their suspicion that a consistent and coherent Enlightenment moral philosophy was never very strongly promoted,** or adequately expounded, in the thought of many of those philosophers and scientists traditionally acknowledged as the principal heroes of the Enlightenment, most notably Locke, Newton, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Kant.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA138#v=onepage&q&f=false

Their relative conservatism does not mean Wollaston, Chubb, Morgan, and Woolston contributed nothing to radical thought. **There is the dialectical aspect to consider.** Their arguments were deeply challenging for most while at the same time, the young Franklin found, for some, annoyingly tentative, half-baked, and unconvincing in a way positively provoking reaction against their studied moderation. Here again the insights of Leo Strauss seem relevant. Although **Strauss knew that the stream he was the first to label "moderate Enlightenment" proved crucial to separation of state and religion,** and forging the modern religiously neutral, legal, and legislative context, he nevertheless considered the

kind of philosophical harmonizing and mediation offered by Locke, Le Clerc, Reimarus, Mendelssohn – all the moderate enlighteners (even Hume and Voltaire) – too obviously flawed philosophically to underpin a stable, durable truly viable Enlightenment "moderation." **Often their arguments degenerated into an under-the-counter, discreet surrender to philosophical "atheism"** of a kind bound to lead to socially, morally, religiously disintegrative consequences.43 It is an argument valid to a degree, **though he certainly overstated his case in claiming such harmonizations (*Vereinbarungen*) always "work as vehicles of the [radical] Enlightenment, and not as dams against it; for the radical Enlightenment, the moderate Enlightenment is the best friend."**44

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/370/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1715, when Louis XIV died, the most imaginative French anticlericals confined themselves to private impiety and calls for reform within the Church: their ideal was a kind of Anglicanism – a reasonable, respectable established church with little political power, no passion for repressing the free commerce of ideas, and no religious fervor. In 1788, when Louis XVI convoked the Estates General, the surviving philosophes were asking for complete disestablishment, a laic state. **By that time, and even before, the audacious but playful blasphemies of Epicurean aristocrats had given way to the aggressive and humorless militancy of writers like Holbach and Diderot.**

> https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/203/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Alas! What sounded so strange at the time is now **[1854]** preached from the rooftops on the other side of the Rhine, and the fanatic zeal of some of these preachers is horrible! We now have fanatic monks of atheism, grand inquisitors of unbelief, who would have burned Mr. de Voltaire at the stake, because he was in his heart a stubborn deist. As long as such doctrines remained the secret property of an aristocracy of intellectuals and were discussed in an elegant secret language which was incomprehensible to the servants who stood at attention behind us while we blasphemed during our private philosophical dinners—**for that long I also belonged to the reckless *Esprits forts*,**4 **who for the most part were like those liberal grandseigneurs who tried to chase away the boredom of their idle lives at court with the new ideas of revolution.** But when I noted that the coarse plebeians, the working Joes, also began to discuss the same themes in their dirty symposia, where only tallow lights and paraffin lamps were burning instead of wax candles and candelabras; **when I saw that dirty apprentice shoe-makers and tailors had the audacity to deny the existence of God in the crude language of their lodges—when atheism began to reek strongly of cheese, brandy, and tobacco; suddenly my eyes were opened,** and what I had not understood with my reason, I now understood with my sense of smell, with the feelings of nausea, and my atheism, God be praised!, was at an end.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2333/pg2333-images.html#link2H_4_0004

But when Frederic was at Rheinsberg, Voltaire was still a courtier; and, though he could not always curb his petulant wit, he had as yet published nothing that could exclude him from Versailles, and little that a divine of the mild and generous school of Grotius and Tillotson might not read with pleasure. In the Henriade, in Zaire, and in Alzire, Christian piety is exhibited in the most amiable form; and, some years after the period of which we are writing, a Pope condescended to accept the dedication of Mahomet. The real sentiments of the poet, however, might be clearly perceived by a keen eye through the decent disguise with which he veiled them, and could not escape the sagacity of Frederic, who held similar opinions, and had been accustomed to practise similar dissimulation.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater

Gibbon tried to do little more than to amuse and instruct a select circle of educated men and women, most of whom were probably unbelievers even before they read the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Polemicists like Condorcet, on the other hand, tried to do nothing less than to make a revolution in politics, economics, and social relations.

https://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/gibbone/autobiog/memoirs/visits.htm#Revolution

I beg leave to subscribe my assent to Mr. Burke's creed on the revolution of France. I admire his eloquence, I approve his politics, I adore his chivalry, and I can almost excuse his reverence for church establishments. **I have sometimes thought of writing a dialogue of the dead, in which Lucian, Erasmus, and Voltaire should mutually acknowledge the danger of exposing an old superstition to the contempt of the blind and fanatic multitude.**

https://counter-currents.com/2012/06/from-salon-to-guillotine/

Toward the middle of the eighteenth century a shift in both subject matter and tone came over this world of elegant discourse. **The traditional *saloniste* gave way to the *philosophe*,** an armchair statesman who, despite his lack of real responsibilities, focused on public affairs and took himself and his talk with extreme seriousness.
…

The societies gradually acquired an openly partisan character: **whoever agreed with their views, however stupid, was considered "enlightened."** By 1776, d'Alembert acknowledged this frankly, writing to Frederick the Great: "We are doing what we can to fill the vacant positions in the Académie française in the manner of the banquet of the master of the household in the Gospel: with the crippled and lame men of literature" (p. 35).

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15700/15700-h/15700-h.htm#THOUGHTS

In the modern world, before this time, there has been no instance of this spirit of general political faction, separated from religion, pervading several countries, and forming a principle of union between the partisans in each. But the thing is not less in human nature. The ancient world has furnished a strong and striking instance of such a ground for faction, **full as powerful and full as mischievous as our spirit of religious system had ever been, exciting in all the states of Greece (European and Asiatic) the most violent animosities and the most cruel and bloody persecutions and proscriptions.** These ancient factions in each commonwealth of Greece connected themselves with those of the same description in some other states; and secret cabals and public alliances were carried on and made, not upon a conformity of general political interests, but for the support and aggrandizement of the two leading states which headed the aristocratic and democratic factions. For as, in later times, **the king of Spain was at the head of a Catholic, and the king of Sweden of a Protestant interest, (France, though Catholic, acting subordinately to the latter,)** in the like manner the Lacedemonians were everywhere at the head of the aristocratic interests, and the Athenians of the democratic.
…

In the mean time a system of French conspiracy is gaining ground in every country. This system, happening to be founded on principles the most delusive indeed, but the most flattering to the natural propensities of the unthinking multitude, and to the speculations of all those who think, without thinking very profoundly, must daily extend its influence. **A predominant inclination towards it appears in all those who have no religion, when otherwise their disposition leads them to be advocates even for despotism. Hence Hume, though I cannot say that he does not throw out some expressions of disapprobation on the proceedings of the levellers in the reign of Richard the Second, yet affirms that the doctrines of John Ball were "conformable to the ideas of primitive equality *which are engraven in the hearts of all men*."**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/canavan-select-works-of-edmund-burke-vol-3#lf0005-03_head_006

In the Revolution of France two sorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to it's pursuits; the philosophers and the politicians. They took different ways: but they met in the same end. The philosophers had one predominant object, which they pursued with a fanatical fury, that is, the utter extirpation of religion. To that every question of empire was subordinate. They had rather domineer in a parish of Atheists, than rule over a Christian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly subservient to their proselytizing spirit, in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himself.
…

Let no one judge of them by what he has conceived of them, when they were not incorporated, and had no lead. They were then only passengers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and without being aware of it, partook of its influence. In that situation, at worst, their nature was left free to counterwork their principles. They despaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They considered them as a reserved privilege for the chosen few. **But when the possibility of dominion, lead, and propagation presented themselves, and that the ambition, which before had so often made them hypocrites, might rather gain than lose by a daring avowal of their sentiments, then the nature of this infernal spirit, which has "evil for it's good," appeared in its full perfection.** Nothing, indeed, but the possession of some power, can with any certainty discover what at the bottom is the true character of any man.
…

This fanatical atheism left out, we omit the principal feature in the French Revolution, and a principal consideration with regard to the effects to be expected from a peace with it.

THE OTHER SORT OF MEN were the politicians. To them who had little or not at all reflected on the subject, religion was in itself no object of love or hatred. They disbelieved it, and that was all.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n157/mode/2up?view=theater

> Maurepas was now old and decrepit, but had all the vices of youth. Voltaire transforms him into a philosopher, and he coalesced with the Sect through levity and indolence. **He believed in nothing; he was without hatred against the altar, as without affection for the Sophisters. He would with equal indifference wittily lash a bishop or D'Alembert. He found D'Argenson's plan for the destruction of the religious orders, and he followed it.** He would have soon set aside the impious minister, had he known him that would conspire against the religion of the state. **An enemy to all convulsions, and without any fixed principles of Christianity, he thought it at least impolitic to attempt its destruction.** He certainly was not a man capable of stopping a revolution, but he did not forward it. He rather let others do the harm, than did it himself; but unfortunately that harm which he let others do was great. Under his administration philosophism made a terrible progress.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2170/pg2170-images.html#link2H_4_0023

> **Nor was any objection ever raised to what was so evidently just and wise, till bigotry and chicanery formed that disgraceful league against which we are now contending.** But, it is said, it is unreasonable to grant a boon to men because they have been many years doing wrong. The length of the time during which they have enjoyed property not rightfully their own, is an aggravation of the injury which they have committed, and is so far from being a reason for letting them enjoy that property for ever, that it is rather a reason for compelling them to make prompt restitution. With this childish sophistry the petitions on our table are filled. **Is it possible that any man can be so dull as not to perceive that, if this be a reason, it is a reason against all our statutes of limitation?**

Neutral with regard to that object, they took the side which in the present state of things might best answer their purposes. **They soon found that they could not do without the philosophers; and the philosophers soon made them sensible that the destruction of religion was to supply them with means of conquest, first at home, and then abroad.** The philosophers were the active internal agitators, and supplied the spirit and principles: the second gave the practical direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the composition, sometimes the other. **The only difference between them was in the necessity of concealing the general design for a time, and in their dealing with foreign nations; the fanaticks going strait forward and openly, the politicians by the surer mode of zigzag. In the course of events this, among other causes, produced fierce and bloody contentions between them.** But at the bottom they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and substantially in all the means of promoting these ends.
…

THERE WAS NO POINT ON WHICH the discontented diplomatic politicians so bitterly arraigned their Cabinet, as for the decay of French influence in all others. **From quarrelling with the Court, they began to complain of Monarchy itself; as a system of Government too variable for any regular plan of national aggrandizement.**
…

They had continually in their hands the observations of *Machiavel* on *Livy.* They had *Montesquieu's Grandeur & Décadence des Romains* as a manual; and they compared with mortification the systematic proceedings of a Roman senate with the fluctuations of a Monarchy. They observed the very small additions of territory which all the power of France, actuated by all the ambition of France, had acquired in two centuries. **The Romans had frequently acquired more in a single year.** They severely and in every part of it criticised the reign of Louis the XIVth, whose irregular and desultory ambition had more provoked than endangered Europe.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10827/pg10827-images.html

> Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the hands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous progress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always ruled by princes; **as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than the rule of a prince.**

https://archive.org/details/threelecturesde01kinggoog/page/n61/mode/2up?view=theater

That sense of justice which allowed privileges, when they were as strictly official privileges as the salary of a judge, or the immunity of a member of the House of Commons; when they were earned, as in the Middle Ages, by severe education, earnest labour, and life and death responsibility in peace and war, will demand the abolition of those privileges, when no work is done in return for them, with a voice which must be heard, for it is the voice of truth and justice.

But with that righteous voice will mingle another, most wicked, and yet, alas! most flattering to poor humanity—the voice of envy, simple and undisguised; of envy, which moralists hold to be one of the basest of human passions; which can never be justified, however hateful or unworthy be the envied man. And when a whole people, or even a majority thereof, shall be possessed by that, what is there that they will not do?

Some are surprised and puzzled when they find, in the French Revolution of 1793, the noblest and the foulest characters labouring in concert, and side by side—often, too, paradoxical as it may seem, united in the same personage.

https://archive.org/details/romanandteutonas003327mbp/page/n277/mode/2up?view=theater

> A body of men acting in concert for a public purpose will do things which they would shrink from with disgust, if the same trick would merely put money into their private purses; and this is too often the case when the public object is a good one. **Then the end seems to sanctify the means, to almost any amount of chicanery.**
>
> So it was with those old monks. An abbey had no conscience. An order of monks had no conscience. **A Benedictine, a Dominican, a Franciscan, who had not himself a penny in the world, and never intended to have one, would play tricks, lie, cheat, slander, forge, for the honour and the wealth of his order;** when for himself, and in himself, he may have been an honest God-fearing man enough.

https://hipsterconservative.com/2012/07/01/commonplace-the-tory-slide/#more-732

> “But here, for instance, is an incitement to destroy churches.”
>
> “And why not? You’re a sensible man, and of course you don’t believe in it yourself, but you know perfectly well that you need religion to brutalise the people. Truth is honester than falsehood…”
>
> “I agree, I agree, I quite agree with you, but it is premature, premature in this country…” said Von Lembke, frowning.
> …
>
> “It’s not so, not so at all,” he cried, carried away and more and more mortified in his amour-propre. “You’re young, and know nothing of our aims, and that’s why you’re mistaken. You see, my dear Pyotr Stepanovitch, you call us officials of the government, don’t you? Independent officials, don’t you? But let me ask you, how are we acting? Ours is the responsibility, **but in the long run we serve the cause of progress just as you do.** We only hold together what you are unsettling, and what, but for us, would go to pieces in all directions. We are not your enemies, not a bit of it. **We say to you, go forward, progress, you may even unsettle things, that is, things that are antiquated and in need of reform. <u>But we will keep you, when need be, within necessary limits, and so save you from yourselves</u>, for without us you would set Russia tottering, robbing her of all external decency, while our task is to preserve external decency.** Understand that we are mutually essential to one another. In England the Whigs and Tories are in the same way mutually essential to one another. Well, you’re Whigs and we’re Tories. That’s how I look at it.”

Lembke loses the argument by admitting to Verkhovensky that he does think religion is superfluous and that agitation can be, within certain bounds, a help to progress. **His only true belief is that Russia ought to be great, and that the agitations of the anarchists will discredit her. <u>He would welcome increased governing power and a republican revolution in which he might consolidate all the traditional governing bodies under his own rule.</u>**

https://archive.org/details/liberalismissin0000sard/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

The moderate Liberal is just as bad as his extreme confrere, but he takes good care not to appear so. **Social conventionalities and good manners are everything to him; these points secured, the rest is of little importance.** Provided his iniquity is kid-gloved, it finds ready extenuation in his own mind. The niceties of polite society preserved, his Liberalism knows no bounds. **<u>He would not burn a convent—that would appear too brutal, but the convent once burned, he has no scruple in seizing upon the outraged property.</u> The cheap impiety of a**

penny paper grates on his well-bred nerves; the vulgar blasphemy of Ingersoll he deprecates; but let the same impiety and the same blasphemy appear in the columns of a so-called reputable journal, or be couched in the silken phraseology of a Huxley in the name of science, and he applauds the polished sin. It is with him a question of manner, not matter. At the mere mention of the name of a nihilistic or socialistic club, he is thrown into a cold sweat, for there, he declares, the masses are seduced into principles which lead to the destruction of the foundations of society; **yet, according to him, there is no danger, no inconvenience in a free lyceum where the same principles are elegantly debated and sympathetically applauded;** for who could dare to condemn the scientific discussion of social problems?

https://occidentaldissent.com/2023/08/08/american-history-series-intellectual-change-in-the-1930s/

The following excerpt comes from the chapter "The Intellectuals Abandon the Caste Establishment" in E. Digby Baltzell's book *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America*:
…

> Thus the concept of the conditional reflex was discovered before the First War when a brilliant and aristocratic Russian of the old regime, I.P. Pavlov, showed that dogs do not associate by rational thought or according to any inborn instincts, but largely as a result of their conditioning. At the same time, in this country, a rural South Carolinian, John B. Watson, who mistrusted philosophic introspection and the existence of any such thing as an inner conscience, founded Behaviorism which, by the end of the twenties, was not only the most fashionable school of psychology in this country but also became the central theory of human nature upon which the great industry of advertising was being built. **It was no wonder that Pavlov was threated with great deference and respect by the Bolshevik revolutionists, and that Watson eventually left John Hopkins to become a vice president of one of the nations most successful advertising agencies. Faith in conditioning became the basis of social control in the new manipulative society, composed of citizen comrades in the U.S.S.R. and citizen consumers in the U.S.A.**
> …
>
> The [1930s] witnessed the complete triumph of naturalistic relativism over transcendental absolutism; theology was replaced by anthropology; and the universalism of the inner consciences of men gave way before the particularistic conditioning of the external environment. **The popularity of Marxian socialism on the Left was quite understandable because it was, after all, only an extreme example of a naturalistic environmentalism which most educated men in the West adhered to anyway. For they now shared John Dewey's faith in the plasticity of human nature** and the possibility of progress if only the environment could be reformed or transformed through social engineering in order to allow the natural goodness of human nature to express itself fully, unfettered by the harmful conditioning of a competitive bourgeois culture.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n147/mode/2up?view=theater

But there are two sorts of Communist. The one, the credulous type, obsessed by doctrine or feminine sentimentality, remote from and hostile to the world, condemns the wealth of the wicked who prosper and also, at times, the poverty of the good who do not prosper. This lands him either in vague Utopias or throws him back upon asceticism, the monastic life, Bohemia, or vagabondism, which proclaims the futility of all economic effort. **But the other, the "worldly" type with the realist political outlook, hopes through its followers to destroy society,** either from envy or revenge, because of the low place assigned in it to their personality and talents, or, alternatively, to carry away the masses by some program or other for the satisfaction of his own will-to-power. But this, too, likes to hide itself under the cloak of some religion.

https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/244663/democratic-partys-civil-war-here-daniel-greenfield

There are really two Democratic parties.

One is the old corrupt party of thieves and crooks. Its politicians, black and white, are the products of political machines. They believe in absolutely nothing. They can go from being Dixiecrats to crying racism, from running on family values to pushing gay marriage and the War on Women. They will say absolutely anything to get elected.

Cunning, but not bright, they are able campaigners. Reformers underestimate them at their own peril because they are determined to win at all costs.

The other Democratic Party is progressive. Its members are radical leftists working within the system. They are natural technocrats and their agendas are full of big projects. They function as community organizers, radicalizing and transforming neighborhoods, cities, states and even the country.

They want to win, but it's a subset of their bigger agenda. Their goal is to transform the country. If they can do that by winning elections, they'll win them. But if they can't, they'll still follow their agenda.

Sometimes the two Democratic parties blend together really well. Bill Clinton combined the good ol' boy corruption and radical leftist politics of both parties into one package.

https://world.wng.org/2000/05/stoic_rules?

The 90-hour-a-week Wall Street and dot-com workers of business and technology, and the Janet Renos of the administration, are mainly stoics, doing what feels good according to their moral codes, sacrificing momentary pleasure for the longer-run satisfactions provided by disciplined endeavor to expand the reach of technology, business enterprise, or government. Even though Bill Clinton survived, hedonism in high places obviously has a limited appeal to those not in on the action, but stoicism has much longer legs. And so it is internationally. Communism has always appealed to covetous bullies who lust after power for the opportunity to crack open the heads of the rich. But it also has appealed to some stoics who declared their willingness to forsake worldly pleasures and work tirelessly to overturn a system that they believe breeds poverty and war.

---

https://archive.org/details/creationaphilos02blacgoog/page/n50/mode/2up?view=theater **[1712]**

But further; **since these gentlemen show so much industry in propagating their opinions, and are so fond of making proselytes to atheism; since they affect a zeal in countenancing, applauding, and preserving, those whom they have delivered from religious prejudices, and reformed and refined with their free, large, and generous principles: how comes it to pass, that they neglect to inform and improve their nearest relations?** Are they careful to instruct their wives and daughters, that they need not revere the imaginary phantom of a God; that religion is the creature of a timorous and superstitious mind, or of crafty priests, and cunning politicians; that, therefore, **they are free from all restraints of virtue and conscience, and may prostitute their persons in the most licentious manner, without any remorse, or uneasy reflection; that it is idle to fear any divine punishment hereafter; and as to the shame and dishonour that may attend the liberties they take, in case they become public, that scandal proceeds from the gross mistakes of people perverted with religion,** and misguided by a belief of a divine being, and of rewards and punishments in an imaginary life after this.

Do they take pains to inform their eldest sons, that they owe them no gratitude or obedience; that they may use an uncontrolled freedom in indulging all their appetites, passions, and inclinations; that, **if they are willing to possess their father's honour and estate, they may by poison or the poignard, take away his life;** and, if they are careful to avoid the punishment of the magistrate, by their secret conduct, they may be fully satisfied of the innocence of the action; and as they have done themselves much good, so they have done their father no injury, and therefore may enjoy in perfect tranquillity the fruits of their parricide? **Whatever they may affirm among their loose friends, I cannot conceive they can be guilty of so much folly, as to propagate these opinions in their own families, and instruct their wives and children in the boundless liberties, which, by the principles of atheism, are their undoubted right; for in all actions, where religion does not interpose and restrain us, we are perfectly, as has been said, free to act as we think best for our profit and pleasure.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/112/mode/2up?view=theater

There is in every house something that is above the father himself. It is the domestic religion; it is that god whom the Greeks called the hearth-master, – *ἑστια δέσποινα*, – whom the Romans called *Lar familiaris*. This divinity of the interior, or, what amounts to the same thing, the belief that is in the human soul, is the least doubtful authority. This is what fixed rank in the family.
...

To indicate the power of the husband over the wife, the Romans had a very ancient expression, which their jurisconsults have preserved; it is the word *manus*. It is not easy to discover the primitive sense of this word. The commentators make it the expression of material force, as if the wife was placed under the brutal hand of the husband. It is quite probable that this is wrong. **The power of the husband over the wife results in no wise from his superior strength. It came, like all private law, from the religious belief that placed man above woman.**
...

This religion is in accord with nature; it says that the father shall be the chief of the worship, and that the son shall merely aid him in his sacred functions. **But nature requires this subordination only during a certain number of years; religion requires more. Nature brings the son to his majority; religion does not grant it to him, according to ancient principles;** the sacred fire is indivisible, and the same is true of property.
…

A son born of concubinage was not placed under the authority of the father. Between his father and himself there existed no community of religion; there was nothing, therefore, that conferred authority upon the one and commanded obedience of the other. Paternity, of itself, gave the father no rights.

> http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Patria_Potestas.html
>
> **It was a condition of the *Patria Potestas* that the child should be begotten in *matrimonium legitimum*** (Gaius, I.55-107; Inst. 1 9-11). By the old law, the subsequent marriage of the parents did not legitimate a child born before the marriage. But it seems to have early become the fashion for the Emperor, as an act of grace, to place such child on the same footing as legitimate children. The legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium* only became an established rule of law under Constantine, and was introduced for the advantage of children who were born in concubinage [CONCUBINA.]

…

The old language had another word which properly designated the father, and which, as ancient as *pater*, is likewise found in the language of the Greeks, of the Romans, and of the Hindus (*gânitar*, *γενέτωρ*, *genitor*). The word *pater* had another sense. In religious language they applied it to the gods; in legal language to every man who had a worship and a domain. The poets show us that they applied it to every one whom they wished to honor. The slave and the client applied it to their master. It was synonymous with the words *rex*, *ἄναξ*, *βασιλεύς*. **It contained in itself not the idea of paternity, but that of power, authority, majestic dignity.**

Yoram Hazony on X: **Locke never had children. Neither did Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, or Kant.** Rousseau had children but gave them all up for adoption. In other words, Enlightenment rationalism was the construction of men who had no real experience of family life or what it takes to make it work.

Most of Western political thought today revolves around the theory of the free, atomic individual, taking on obligations only when he or she consents.

This theory was invented by men who did live more or less this way. But anyone who has raised children knows this theory isn't true. I'm not free to choose my children and they aren't free to choose me. Very often obligation has little or nothing to do with consent.

The same is true of political society more generally. If my country is attacked, my obligation to defend it arises not from consent but from bonds of loyalty to family and neighbors and to a way of life I've inherited. This isn't true for everyone, but it's true for most.

How long will these simple, obvious truths be suppressed? Enlightenment rationalism teaches a political theory made in the image of unmarried, childless individuals.

But no nation can endure this way. The freedom of unmarried, childless philosophers isn't something that the people in a real nation can actually have.

https://archive.org/details/theprovinciallet00pasciala/page/278/mode/2up?ref=ol&view=theater

The only thing to which I can venture to allude, out of all the books which he showed me, and these in French, too, is a passage which you will find in Father Bauny's Summary, p. 165, relating to certain little familiarities, which, provided the intention is well directed, he explains "*as passing for gallant*;" and you will be surprised to find, at p. 148, a principle of morals, as to the power which daughters have to dispose of their persons without the leave of their relatives, couched in these terms: **"When that is done with the consent of the daughter, although the father may have reason to complain, it does not follow that she, or the person to whom she has sacrificed her honor, has done him any wrong, or violated the rules of justice in regard to him; for the daughter has possession of her honor, as well as of her body, and can do what she pleases with them, bating death or mutilation of her members." Judge, from that specimen, of the rest.** It brings to my recollection a passage from a Heathen poet, a much better casuist, it would appear, than these reverend doctors; for he says, "that the person of a daughter does not belong wholly to herself, but partly to her father and partly to her mother, without whom she cannot dispose of it, even in marriage." **And I am much mistaken if there is a single judge in the land who would not lay down as law the very reverse of this maxim of Father Bauny.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/572/mode/2up?view=theater

It was, however not Spinozism but Cartesianism which produced the first systematic theory arguing for the equality of women. It was, moreover, precisely one of the philosophically most problematic features of Descartes's system, his rigid dualism, which, for the first time, made it possible to circumvent traditional ideas affirming the natural subordination, dependency, and weaker character of the female sex. Cartesian dualism did this by postulating a wide gulf between body and mind and by denying all possibility of interaction between these distinct substances.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francois-barre/

Poulain was born in Paris in 1648, as the third child to wealthy Catholic parents. As many younger sons he was destined for a church career and he earned his bachelor's degree in theology at Sorbonne in 1666. This lower degree was generally considered sufficient for priesthood, but Poulain did not at this point of his life seek to be ordained and this decision, though temporary, is often connected with his growing interest in Cartesian philosophy (Stuurman 2004: 30). In his second main work *De l'éducation des dames* [On the Education of Ladies] (1674), a set of five conversations between a Cartesian teacher, a young man and two young women, Poulain describes how the teacher Stasimachus became a follower of René Descartes' philosophy. Stasimachus tells his young interlocutors how, one day, when he found

> all the sciences of the Schools particularly distasteful, by a great stroke of luck I allowed myself to be taken off by a friend to hear a Cartesian lecturing on a subject concerning the human body. (TTen 245; TTfr 281)

…

Scholars also agree that after leaving university, Poulain was teaching literature and a textbook on translating Latin into French, published anonymously in 1672, has been attributed to him (Stock 1961: 19-20; Welch 2002a: 9). In the following year he published *De l'égalité des deux sexes* [On the Equality of the Two Sexes] (1673), the first and most widely known of his three feminist treatises. One year later it was followed by *De l'éducation des dames* and in the next year by *De l'excellence des hommes, contre l'égalité des sexes* [On the Excellence of Men, against the Equality of the Sexes] (1675). Despite its name the third treatise continues Poulain's defense of equality between the sexes by overturning his rhetorically presented arguments on the behalf of the excellence of men. **This treatise is less Cartesian than the two earlier ones and more engaged with theological arguments. In this respect it resembles earlier treatises participating in the Renaissance *querelle des femmes*,** the debate about the superiority of women versus men, such as Cornelius Agrippa's *De nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus* [On the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex] (1509/1529).

At some point after publishing his three feminist treatises, Poulain returned to theology and he was ordained a Catholic priest in 1679. His decision to take up a church career after having written treatises heavily critical of Scholastic philosophy might seem odd. There is no doubt that Poulain used Cartesian arguments as a basis for his feminist claims and that he was critical of Scholasticism, but we must also note that his third treatise is in many respect a reconciliation between his feminism and theology.

…

In Picardy Poulain witnessed the persecution of Protestants and this is often interpreted as paving the way for his own conversion from Catholicism to Calvinism. He left his parish in 1688 and after a short stay in Paris, where his conversion is assumed to have taken place, he moved to Geneva, where he received the status of *habitant* in December 1689 (Stuurman 2004: 242-243).

…

In 1693, and again in 1696, Poulain was accused for being a Socinian, an accusation that was related to his rationalistic approach to theology, which did not draw a strict distinction between theology and philosophy (Stuurman 2004: 248-249).

…

At the very beginning of the preface to *De l'égalité des deux sexes*, Poulain writes that the

> best idea that may occur to those who try to acquire genuine knowledge, if they were educated according to traditional methods, is to doubt if they were taught well and to wish to discover the truth themselves. **As they make progress in this search for truth, <u>they cannot avoid noticing that we are full of prejudices, and that it is necessary to get rid of them completely in order to acquire clear and distinct knowledge.</u>** (T1en 119; TTfr 53)[1]

This paragraph is an excellent summary of Descartes' method for the search for truth as it is presented in all his major works. In the *Discours de la méthode*, for example, Descartes writes that

> since I now wished to devote myself solely to the search for truth, **I thought it necessary to […] reject as if absolutely false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order**

> **to see if I was left believing anything that was entirely indubitable.** (CSM I, 126-127; AT VI, 31-32)

…

The egalitarian aspect of Descartes' method is also emphasized and Stasimachus points out that "almost all of us have enough reason and good sense to seek the truth", which is found when "we have formed clear and distinct ideas" (ibid.). Poulain's text is a very close echo of the first paragraph of Descartes' *Discours de la méthode*, where he famously claims that

> **the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false—which is what we properly call 'good sense' or 'reason'—is naturally equal in all men.** (CSM I, 111; AT VI, 2)

…

Descartes famously compares the whole of philosophy, which is here understood as including all different forms of knowledge, to a tree, where the

> **roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences,** which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals. (CSM I, 186; AT IXB, 14)

…

Poulain puts less emphasis than Descartes on the hierarchical structure of sciences implied by the original metaphor of a tree, but he does adopt Descartes' emphasis on physics and in *De l'égalité* **he uses the idea of the unity of the sciences in order to argue that women are as able as men to master all forms of knowledge.** Here Poulain is arguing against those who claim that women are unable to hold civil offices and to rule over others and he points out that these people

> fail to notice that the mind needs only discernment and accuracy in all its actions, and that anyone who displays these qualities in one context is capable of applying them as easily and in the same way to everything else. Morality and social science do not change the nature of our actions; the latter always remain physical, […] **Once someone understands the laws of motion in natural philosophy, they can apply them to all changes and all variations that occur in nature. Similarly, if someone has once understood the true principles of the social sciences, they do not experience a new challenge when applying them to novel situations that occur.** (T1en 174; TTfr 116-117)

…

His argument criticizes the Scholastic tradition in two ways. First, he argues against the common view (originally presented by Aristotle) that since women's deliberative faculty lacks sufficient authority, women have difficulties governing themselves and therefore cannot govern others (Aristotle, *Politics* 1260a12-14). Second, **Poulain criticizes the idea, dominant among the Scholastics, that different forms of knowledge require different methods and that theoretical reasoning does not as such ground practical judgment (see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140b1-7, for the distinction between practical reason (*fronesis*) and theoretical knowledge).** Defenders of women, who, like Christine de Pizan, wrote within the Aristotelian tradition, found it necessary to argue separately that women are as capable as men in their practical judgment as in their theoretical reasoning (see in particular *Livre de la Cité des Dames* [The Book of the City of Ladies], 1405, part I, chap. 43). **Poulain's argument is novel in its emphasis on the unity of science, from which it follows that if women are capable of theoretical reasoning, which was a less controversial claim, they are also capable of practical judgment.** This argument is directly based on the criticism of Scholastic science that Descartes develops in the preface to the French translation of *Principia philosophiae* and which culminates in the idea of the unity of all the sciences (CSM I, 185-186; AT IXB, 12-14).

…

In the second part of *De l'égalité*, Poulain claims that "the mind has no sex" and loosely connects his claim to Descartes' dualism (T1en 157-158; TTfr 99-100). The claim in itself was not new—**we find it already in the theological doctrine of Augustine, who holds that the rational souls of women and men are equally created in the image of God** (*De trinitate* XII 7.12), and in Poulain's time it had recently been stated, with strong feminist emphasis, by Marie le Jars de Gournay (G-EMW 65; G-OC 978). **Still, many of Poulain's contemporaries as well as modern scholars agree that Descartes' dualism strengthened the idea that the mind has no sex** (different positions have been argued by Hoffmann 1969; Perry 1985; Harth 1992: 81-86; Atherton 1993; O'Neill 1999 and 2011; Broad 2002: 4-12 and 2017; Pellegrin 2011: 28-37 and 2019: 568-569; Reuter 2013 and 2019: 38-41; Detlefsen 2017). It might seem surprising that Poulain does not make more out of Descartes' dualism than he actually does.

…

Again, Poulain proceeds directly to a study of the mind-body union and here his reference to the distinction between mind and body is even more fleeting than in *De l'égalité*.

The lack of any explicit discussion of the soul as a distinct substance has led Desmond Clarke to argue that Poulain rejected Descartes' notion of the soul as a substance and held this notion to be a mere Scholastic residue. According to Clarke, Poulain defended the view that the

> union of the body and the soul and their reciprocal interdependence was a more fundamental datum of human experience than the speculative distinction of the soul as a scholastic substance. (Clarke 2013: 43)

Following the same line of inquiry Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin argues **that for Poulain "anthropology is more decisive than metaphysics"** (Pellegrin 2019: 576).
…

Right at the beginning of the first part of *De l'égalité*, Poulain compares prejudice concerning the sexes to other equally persistent, but unjustified beliefs. First, he points out that apart

> from a few scholars, **everyone thinks that it is indubitable that the Sun moves around the Earth,** despite the fact that what we observe in the revolutions of the days and the years leads those who examine it to believe that it is the Earth that moves around the Sun. (T1en 122; TTfr 59)

Second, **he refers to people, who imagine that animals are intelligent beings guided by reason,** just

> like primitive people who suppose that there are little souls inside the clocks and machines that they are shown though they know nothing about their construction or their inner springs. (T1en 122-123; TTfr 59)

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Poulain refers to social prejudices, which cause people to believe that their own country is the best, because it is most familiar, and

> **that the religion in which they were reared is the true religion that must be followed, even if they may never have thought of examining it or comparing it with other religious traditions.** (T1en 123; TTfr 60)

These social prejudices also include beliefs concerning wealth and rank, and Poulain points out that "the unequal distribution of goods and offices causes many people to conclude that human beings are not equal to each other" (ibid.).
…

When discussing prejudices about the inferiority of women, Poulain emphasizes that these are particularly difficult to overcome because they are shared by both men and women. He writes that these beliefs, though unjustified, seem

> all the more convincing when one considers how women themselves tolerate their condition. They accept it as if it were natural to them, either because they do not think at all about what they are or because, having been born and reared in dependency, they think about it in the same way as men. (T1en 126; TTfr 63)

…

In *De l'égalité* he points out that "[s]elf-knowledge is absolutely necessary in order to address [the equality of the sexes] properly" and following his emphasis on the bodily aspect of the human condition, he adds that this concerns "especially knowledge of the body" (T1en 155; TTfr 97). In *De l'éducation*, Poulain devotes the whole fourth conversation to the topic of self-knowledge and though he does not in this context explicitly address the question of the equality of the sexes, he makes several important remarks on how our self-knowledge is affected by the prejudiced opinions of others. Stasimachus explains:

> We are prejudiced about nearly everything that exists, and most of all about ourselves. We are not only the authors of the prejudice but also its theater and its victims. As far as the things that touch us most closely are concerned, we immolate ourselves to our ghosts, so to speak. […] **Although we are made in a certain way, and nature makes us realize that and protests constantly against our own imagination, we still try to be the way people tell us we are.** (TTen 212; TTfr 243)

…

He was clearly aware of the ongoing French discussion of self-knowledge, where Neo-Augustinian thinkers such as Pierre Nicole and Blaise Pascal questioned its possibility, and he combined a defense of the achievability of self-knowledge against those who claim that knowing oneself is

> **like moving mountains and that we will never get to the end of it, that man is hidden from himself, that there are countless hidden recesses of the heart he can never uncover** (TTen 211; TTfr 242)

…

He explains that we need to trace the prejudiced opinion about women "back to its origin" and that would

> **involve evaluating what was done in earlier times by reference to current practices, and judging ancient customs by comparison with those that we see developing in our own day.** If we had followed that rule, we would not have fallen into so many mistakes in innumerable judgments. And, in respect of the current condition of women, **we would have recognized that they were dominated only by the law of the strongest,** and that it was not because of a lack of natural capacity or merit on their part that they failed to share the advantages that give men a superior position in society. (T1en 126; TTfr 6364)

According to Poulain, the law of the stronger (*la Loi du plus fort*) is in several respects arbitrary. He emphasizes that with the exception for the dependence of children upon their parents, dependence "is a purely physical or civil relation" and it should be "considered only as an effect of change, violence, or custom" (T1en 153; TTfr 95). As argued by Stuurman, **Poulain can have been influenced by Thomas Hobbes' views about the artificial nature of political power** (Stuurman 2004: 177-178). Inequality is not natural and neither is the male sex oppressive by nature. Poulain explicitly rejects the idea that men, when they usurped power over women, were "driven by some hidden instinct—that is, by a general command of the author of nature—to act in this way" (T1en 126; TTfr 63). God has not made men oppressive. **From the arbitrary nature of the power relation between the sexes follows also that "women might have [favored their sex] had they been in a similar situation"** (T1en 152; TTfr 95). Neither sex is by its nature oppressive or submissive.

Poulain does not deny that men are, on an average, physically stronger than women or that "the interruptions of pregnancy and its after-effects reduced the strength of women for periods of time" and made them dependent on "their husbands' assistance" (T1en 127; TTfr 65). **This was not a problem, though, as long as "families consisted of just a mother, a father, and a few small children" but it became problematic when families expanded into larger units, when household chores became more diversified and all family members submitted to the rule of the father** (T1en 127-128; TTfr 65).

Poulain is committed to the idea of an original golden age, preceding the present diversified society, and he emphasizes the idea of original liberty in particular in his third treatise *De l'excellence des hommes*, where he also describes the process through which natural liberty was lost. **He explains that when**

> **some men took advantage of their strength and their leisure to try to subjugate others, the golden age of liberty gave way to an iron age of servitude. Self-interest and wealth were so bound together through domination that it became impossible not to have to depend on others.** This combination increased in proportion to the distance from the state of innocence and peace, giving rise to greed, ambition, vanity, extravagance, idleness, pride, cruelty, tyranny, deceit, schisms, wars, chance, worries—in short, all the infirmities of mind and body that afflict us. (TTen 313; TTfr 392)

…

In *De l'égalité* Poulain describes how **the original voluntary dependence between husband and wife becomes subjugation when wars forced women "to accept as husbands unknown strangers who considered them merely as the most beautiful part of their booty"** (T1en 128; TTfr 66).

…

In *De l'excellence* he compares political society and the "society of marriage [which] is composed only of two persons, of whom one, therefore, cannot use authority and coercion towards the other" (TTen 280; TTfr 313). Poulain argues that marriage does not require a hierarchical division of power because it is "not founded on fear, but on love" (ibid.). **Marriage can thus be based directly on the natural equality of wife and husband, without either of them usurping power over the other, whereas a society of three or more people, where one is "able to join forces with another to force the third to abide", requires submission to laws and sovereigns, otherwise people will "be**

constantly at war” (ibid). In order to avoid war and tyranny established through war, political society requires sovereign power, **but like Hobbes, Poulain emphasizes that the right to command**

> **does not belong naturally to any one person more than to another, since it consists in the voluntary submission of those who give it to the one who is vested with it.** (ibid.)

…

Poulain’s criticism of a scholastic notion of ‘nature’ is most explicit in a passage where he argues against **“Lawyers’ opinions”, which carry “a lot of weight for many people because they profess specifically to give everyone their due”** (T1en 152; TTfr 94). **These Scholastic lawyers, among whom scholars claim that Poulain includes Hugo Grotius** (Stuurman 2004: 166-167), **say “that it is nature that assigns women to the lowest functions in society and removes them from public offices”,** but they would, according to Poulain,

> be hard pressed if they were required to explain intelligibly what they mean by ‘nature’ in this context, and to explain how nature distinguished the two sexes, as they claim. (T1en 152; TTfr 94-95)

…

Poulain argues:

> **It is easy to see that sexual differences apply only to the body.** Since, strictly speaking, the body alone is involved in the reproduction of human beings and the mind merely gives its assent and does so in the same manner in everyone, **it follows that the mind has no sex.** (T1en 157; TTfr 99-100)

Here, Poulain is primarily concerned with the nature of the mind, but the way he connects reproduction and assent is also noteworthy and corresponds to his emphasis, in *De l’excellence*, that when a woman and a man “agree to live together it is purely voluntary” (TTen 280; TTfr 313; see also *De l’égalité*, T1en 153; TTfr 95). **From his claim about equal consent, Poulain draws the conclusion that if “the mind is considered in itself, it is found to be equal and to have the same nature in all human beings, and to be capable of every kind of thought”** (T1en 158; TTfr 100; see also section 2.2).

The equality of independent minds is not enough, though, since human beings are compounds of minds and bodies. Minds are constantly affected by bodies. Therefore Poulain continues by arguing that the bodies of the sexes are also similar in all cognitively relevant respects. He claims that this is particularly true of the brain:

> [The fact that the mind functions no differently in one sex than in the other] is even clearer if one considers only the head, which is the unique organ of scientific knowledge and in which the mind exercises all its functions. Even with the most detailed anatomical investigations, we cannot observe any difference in this organ between men and women. The brains of the latter are completely similar to ours; they receive and combine sensory impressions there in the same way as we do, and they store them for the imagination and memory in exactly the same way. (T1en 158; TTfr 101)

…

In *De l’égalité*, Poulain writes that **“dependence and servitude are contrary to the law of nature which makes all men equal”** (TTen 78; TTfr 95) **and a few pages later he points out that when humans are imagined separate from civil society, they are found “completely free and equal, with only a desire for self-preservation and an equal right to everything that would be necessary to achieve it”** (T1en 164; TTfr 106). Poulain does not elaborate on what he means by the law of nature or by the state of nature preceding civil society. It is not clear to what extent he is relying on the Scholastic tradition of natural law, which he would have known from his studies at Sorbonne, and to what extent he is inspired by more recent developments, such as the natural law theory of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes.

Both passages cited above are situated in contexts that do have Hobbesian connotations: in the first case Poulain is distinguishing natural equality from the arbitrary nature of dependence in the civil state (see also section 3.2) and in the second case he continues:

> **But [the woman studying law and politics] would also notice that this equality would involve them in war or a permanent state of mutual distrust, which would be inconsistent with their objective, and that the natural light of reason would dictate that they could not live in peace unless everyone surrendered their rights and made contracts or conventions.** She would also see that, in order to validate these decisions and to protect people from anxiety, it would be necessary to have recourse to a third party who would have authority to

> force everyone to observe what they had promised to others. (T1en 164; TTfr 106; see also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part I, chap. 13-15)

On these grounds, and considering which works were available in Poulain's intellectual context, Stuurman concludes that "Hobbes is his most likely source" (2004: 177). The probable influence of Hobbes is very illuminating, in particular when we consider Poulain's view of the arbitrary nature of power, but Stuurman seems to overemphasize the Hobbesian nature of Poulain's views when he indicates that Poulain rejects natural sociability (Stuurman 2004: 178). Poulain does indeed emphasize the role of fear as a motive for political society in *De l'égalité* (T1en 164; TTfr 106) as well as *De l'excellence* (TTen 280; TTfr 313), **but it is crucial to note that he does not consider fear to be a necessary aspect of the natural condition of humankind. The description of "the golden age of liberty", which Poulain gives in *De l'excellence*, is a description of natural sociability:**

> **At the dawn of the world, traces of which are still to be seen in the innocent loves of shepherds and shepherdesses and in the pleasures of the rustic life, which is untroubled by the fear of powers or enemies, all men were equal, just, and sincere, since their only rule and law was that of good sense. (**TTen 313; TTfr 392)

…

Poulain's discussions of natural equality and liberty in *De l'excellence* are framed by theological references, including a reference to "St. Augustine, who claims that man should place nothing above himself save God alone" (TTen 279; TTfr 312; also Wilkin 2019: 234-236). Poulain may have in mind a passage in *De civitate Dei* (book XIX, chap. 15), where Augustine writes:

> **God wanted rational man, made to his image, to have no dominion except over irrational nature. He meant no man, therefore, to have dominion over man, but only man over beast. So it fell out that those who were holy in primitive times became shepherds over sheep rather than monarchs over men,** […]. (Augustine 413-427 [2008: 223])

Kinch Hoekstra, among others, has emphasized that this chapter from *De civitate Dei*, as well as a passage in *De doctrina Christiana* (book I, chap. 23), where Augustine states that human beings are naturally equal, influenced discussions about natural equality and liberty well into the seventeenth century (Hoekstra 2013: 95). When we look for the normative basis of Poulain's claim that all humans are equal (shepherds and all), this theological origin, deriving equality from the creation of humankind, is at least as probable as Hobbes' account of equality (for an influential interpretation of the normative nature of the latter, see Hoekstra 2013).

https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/10/mode/2up?view=theater

16. If the Nature of man were not to be morally governed by proposed *Truth* and *Good*, his *Reason* and *Will* were vain; he should not be ruled as a men but as a stone or beast: sense must do all: all humane government were impossible or evil, for want of capable subjects: no Villany must be controlled: **folly must bear equal sway with wisdom: children must not obey their Parents, any more than Parents their children. Yea by the Principles of this *Maledictus Spinosa* and his tribe, the children that can but conquer natural instinct, and escape humane punishment, may as lawfully kill their Parents to get the inheritance, as Love and Honour them: and the Parents may as lawfully murder all their children, to avoid the trouble of keeping them, as to nourish them.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT649#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Rejecting humility, repentance, and pity, arguing we should be benevolent towards others on the basis of reason and justice, not pity,** are typical *exempla* of Spinoza's applied moral mechanics, a moral relativity pivoting, as Nietzsche recognized, seeing this as a point where his own uncompromising naturalism converges with Spinoza's, on wholly eliminating the concept of unmitigated or innate "evil."31 **The elementary principle of Spinoza's morality, that "evil" does not exist while "cheerfulness" [hilaritas] cannot be excessive and is always "good," recalled in the minds of the theologians of his time the impiety of ancient heretical sects like the Pelagians whose rejection of Original Sin was universally condemned.** Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza proposed a naturalist doctrine of good and bad, a relativity existing prior to the forming of states that seemed shamelessly "evil" to most readers by suggesting the supreme "Christian" virtue of humility is inherently bad **and that extra-marital intercourse, homosexuality, and love of wine – and even very occasionally assassination – are variously good or bad depending on circumstances, while melancholy, self-denying abstinence, and self-abasement are always intrinsically "bad"** (*Ethics* IV, Prop. 42).32

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT768#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Informal oligarchy being as damaging as monarchy and formal aristocracy, the well-ordered democratic republic must ensure all adult men are eligible "to vote in the supreme council and serve in offices of state." **This then poses the question: "is it by nature or by institution that women are under the power of men [foeminae ex natura an ex instiuto sub potestate virorum sint]? For if this happens merely through institutional practice, then there is no compelling reason for us to exclude women from the government."** This point brings the reader to the last surviving page of the *Tractatus*, often called Spinoza's "black page," where he breaks off shortly before his death.124 **Hugely disappointing to the modern reader after all the inspiring insights just preceding it, neither a pointer to modernity nor at all inspiring,** this last page reflects what all human history thus far seemed to show. Woman's "weakness," argues Spinoza, is what prevents men and women governing the state together: "wherever in the world men and women are found, we find men ruling and women being ruled and both sexes thus living in harmony." **He barely considers the possible objections to this,** merely adding: "if women were naturally equals of men and equally endowed with strength of mind and ability – abilities wherein human power and therefore human right consist – **then surely so many and such a wide variety of nations would have produced instances where men are ruled by women and are brought up to be inferior in ability.** Since one sees such instances nowhere, one may conclude that women do not naturally possess equal right with men and necessarily give way to men."125 The most that can be said in Spinoza's defence here is that in his age rampant tyrannizing over women was indeed universal.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT281&hl=fi&pg=PT254#v=onepage&q&f=false

In one fashion or another, all premodern polities depended for legitimacy on popular trust in the wisdom and virtue of the surrogate fathers ordained to rule by nature or nature's God. Even in our own age, governments owe rather more of their authority than anyone will openly admit to the all-too-human longing, bred of childhood experience, for paternal protection and guidance.
…

To establish the premise of his argument, Locke had to debunk a species of political thinking with deep roots in the human soul **and substitute an entirely different understanding supported by man's less deeply rooted passion for mastery, freedom, and dominion.** Thus, where his less astute political associates were content to defend the Whig cause by attacking patriarchal government alone, Locke embedded in his *Two Treatises* a general assault on the patriarchal family and took great pains in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* to make clear what it would mean for domestic society to be organized for the purpose of preparing children to be masters of their own destiny; self-reliant **and, in a new and thoroughly modern sense, rationally free.**4
…

To render persuasive Hobbes's account of the state of nature and his own doctrine of revolution, Locke had to overcome the powerful instinct, instilled by childhood experience and reinforced by revelation and the voice of inherited reason, that leads men to entrust their fate to surrogate fathers. In this process he had to disprove God's provision for man and nature's endowment without scaring off or making dispirited the great mass of supporters he wished to enlist in freedom's cause.
…

His immediate task was made easier by the fact that, in their desperation, the champions of Stuart absolutism had adopted an explicitly patriarchal and providentialist justification of authority in its most extreme and least palatable form.16

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hall-collected-works-of-james-wilson-vol-1#lf4140_label_753
>
> This is the proper place for considering a question of very considerable importance in civil society, and concerning which there has been much diversity in the sentiments of writers, and in the laws and practice of states: has a state a right to prohibit the emigration of its members? may a citizen dissolve the connexion between him and his country?
> …
>
> The notion of natural, perpetual, and unalienable allegiance from the citizen to the society, or to the head of the society, of which he was born a member, has, by some writers and in some countries, been carried very far indeed: and their practice has been equally rigorous with their principles. **The well known maxim, which the writers upon the law of England have adopted and applied to this case is,l "Nemo potest exuere patriam."6 It is not, therefore, as is holden by that law, in the power of any private subject to shake off his allegiance, and to transfer it to a foreign prince.** Nor is it in the power of any foreign prince, by naturalizing or employing a subject of Great Britain, to dissolve the bond of allegiance between that subject and the crown.
> …

The sentiments of Mr. Locke on this subject go much further. "'Tis plain," says he,q "by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to the age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself under; what body politick he will unite himself to."

"O glorious regulations!" says Cicero,r "originally established for us by our ancestors of Roman name; that no one of us should be obliged to belong to more than one society, since a dissimilitude of societies must produce a proportioned variety of laws; that no one, contrary to his inclination, should be deprived of his right of citizenship; **and that no one, contrary to his inclinations, should be obliged to continue in that relation. The power of retaining and of renouncing our rights of citizenship, is the most stable foundation of our liberties.**"

In the digest of the Roman law,s it is laid down as a rule, that every one is at liberty to choose the state, of which he wishes to be a member.

q. On Civ. Gov. s. 118. r. Pro. Balb. c. 13. s. Dig. l. 49. t. 15.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT281&hl=fi&pg=PT281#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, if, in the *Second Treatise*, **Locke eschewed the traditional moral vocabulary and failed or very nearly failed even to mention charity, the soul, sin, ethics, morality, virtue, nobility, honor, gallantry, duty, valor, country, patriotism, loyalty, friendship, and love,** he had good reason.96
…

In repudiating divine right, in asserting that magistrates have no business enforcing outward piety or even suppressing the propagation of heresy, and in intimating that the public authority should concern itself with virtue and vice only to the degree necessary for the material welfare and preservation of mankind, **Locke turns his back on nearly all previous regimes – pagan, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim alike.** In contending that absolute monarchy is "inconsistent with Civil Society," he denies the legitimacy of virtually every polity then existent on the European continent and elsewhere.98 **In rejecting the notion that conquest is a legitimate mode of acquisition, he condemns the ordinary practice of the ancients and that of Europe's martial aristocracy in the more recent past;** and in arguing that victory, even in a just war, can confer on a conqueror no lasting right to govern, he justifies not just Greek resistance against Ottoman rule but – as his close friend William Molyneux was quick and, in Locke's judgment, imprudent in pointing out – Irish unwillingness to be bound by the decisions of England's unrepresentative Parliament. Moreover, as Gershom Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson soon made evident, in asserting that **it would be right and proper to enslave those who have launched a war of aggression but unjust similarly to subjugate their wives and children,** Locke, in effect, denounces as tyrannical the system of slavery introduced by Europeans into the New World in the sixteenth century and maintained there since.100 **Finally, in making consent the foundation of all relationships between adults, he not only condemns the patriarchal family;**101 **in the face of the clear teaching of the Gospels, he defends divorce and treats it as a perfectly normal event.**102

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT405#v=onepage&q&f=false

Since I find in Locke a towering ambition to reshape all human institutions, extraordinary political cunning, and a keen insight into the social import of fashion, I am less certain than most scholars that, when he composed his *Two Treatises of Government*, he paid no attention to the ultimate implications of his argument for the question of Negro slavery. Much has been made of the fact that Locke owned stock in the Royal African Company; never have those who are so quick to convict him of hypocrisy noted that he sold his stock in 1675 – **some years before he is known to have begun wrestling with the questions of political principle that occasioned his addressing the problem of slavery in his *Two Treatises of Government*.**
…

It typifies Locke's rhetoric that he should initially insist (I.vi.52-53) that paternal power should properly be called parental power and then cover his tracks (II.vi.71-76, xv.170, 173-74) by reverting to the traditional terminology. **There is no reason to suppose that he would have been shocked by Josiah Tucker's contention that the logic of his argument required conceding the franchise to women:** *A Treatise Concerning Civil Government*, 25-27, 34-35.

102. Cf. Locke, *TTG* Lv.44-49 (esp. 47), II.vii.78-83, xvi.183 with Matt. 5:31-32, Mark 10:4-12, Luke 16:18. **In 1667, Locke listed "polygamy and divorce" among the "things indifferent" that "have a title … to toleration."** See Locke, "An Essay Concerning Toleration" 86, 94-95. In the journal he kept in 1678, under the rubric *Atlantis*, he wrote, "He that is already married may marry another woman with his left hand. … **The ties, duration and conditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the contract of marriage between the parties.**"

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government

Sidney proves to be closer to the Greek and Roman classics than Locke is. **It is characteristic that Sidney quotes frequently from the ancients while Locke hardly ever does.**
…

Characteristically, Sidney never calls the pre-civil state the "state of nature" as Locke does even when it degenerates into a state of war. Lockean man exists naturally in this state, which is one of poverty, danger, and insecurity. **He becomes political by escaping nature, not by following it. Reason, for Locke, is the device by which man escapes and conquers nature, by constructing government and by engaging in capitalist industry.** For Sidney, man's nature is reason, as he constantly repeats. Sidney calls the Hobbesian state of nature—the war of all against all—"epidemical madness," which men would fall into only if God abandoned the world (I.17). Man is born free, but Sidney does not think it natural for man to live without law. **Without using Aristotle's formula, Sidney continues to think of man as a political and rational animal by nature.**

Sidney's law of nature goes beyond the conditions of self-preservation and includes the several virtues that the rational life comprises. This conception continues the natural law tradition stemming from the ancients. However, **Locke's doctrine of natural law breaks with the tradition in its being grounded in the individual's fundamental right to life and liberty. In Locke's moral universe the center is no longer man's end, but man or man's freedom.** In this he follows Hobbes.12

The two men view commerce quite differently. **For Locke, commerce is a principal means by which man escapes the privation that unimproved nature condemns him to. Sidney too praises wealth as an end of statesmanship, but only because of its contribution to a nation's fighting strength** (a consideration similar to Hamilton's in *Federalist* 11); moneymaking he otherwise rejects as corrupting (II.22, 23).

Sidney never questions the right of the father to rule in the family. **But Locke speaks of *honoring,* not obeying, the father *and mother.* Civil society for Sidney is still an association of fathers as heads of families** (II.4). **Locke's more radical individualism throws into question the traditional family, which is based on the different purposes, by nature, of male and female.**

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP57#v=onepage&q&f=false

And O most unhappy *England!* who hast so many Colleges, Seminaries of Priests, more in Number, and more Rich and Glorious than in other Countries, Found most of *them by Priests*, whose Statutes *Arm their Governours with Arbitrary Power to press the Members for the Service of the Priesthood*, **and where the Youth of our Nobility, and Gentry are trained up to Unmanly Servile Principles, to Honour their Parents, as next under God, the Author and Fountain of their Beings,** and also to obey them for his sake, as Chiefs under him in their Families; to fear God, the *God of Nature*, the God, whose *Providence is over all his Works*, who *doth whatsoever he pleases*, both *in Heaven, and Earth*, and for his sake, to Reverence his Priests, and to be subject to the Supream Civil Potentates, because they are his Ministers, and have no Superior but him. **It is long of these Nurseries of Priests, and the Doctrines taught in them, that we cannot set our Country at perfect Liberty, as we desire. It is long of them, and their Commentaries upon one of *Moses*'s Commandments, that we cannot make Men believe † that *as soon as they come to Reason, they are free from the Yoke of Paternal Power, that they have no Obligations to their Fathers, who begot them for their Pleasure, nor to their Mothers, who bore them for their Ease*; that Priests without Distinction, Priests of all Ages, *Patriarchal*, *Jewish*, and *Christian*, as well as *Pagan Priests*, are and always have been Cheats, and Impostours alike, and that Kings are the Servants of the People.**

> † ***These impious Sayings are commonly in the mouthes of Atheistical men, and Deists:*** *And they are contrary to the Doctrine which the Light of Nature, and all undepraved Mankind, particularly of the* Pythagoreans, *who founded the Duty of Children to their Parents primarily, as to the of Principles of their Being; and secondarily as to their Benefactors.*

> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/a55147.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

> This exception (*Caesar*) is by you remov'd, and the Father made capable to succeed the Son, supposing the Son to have been in his Father's power, which supposal too you took always for granted, having respect to **that prime and fundamental Law of Nature, which does at no time acquit Children from a subjection to their Parents, *nor allows to Rational beings, what is wildly practis'd among brutes alone, that strength should give the onely Title to Dominion and Command*. [nec, uti inter pecudes, sic inter homines potestatem et imperium valentioribus dedit]**

> https://archive.org/details/threelecturesde01kinggoog/page/n97/mode/2up?view=theater

> But there are solid defects in “Télémaque”—indicating corresponding defects in the author’s mind—which would have, in any case, prevented its doing the good work which Fénelon desired; defects which are natural, as it seems to me, to his position as a Roman Catholic priest, however saintly and pure, however humane and liberal. **The king, with him, is to be always the father of his people; which is tantamount to saying, that the people are to be always children, and in a condition of tutelage; voluntary, if possible: if not, of tutelage still.** Of self-government, and education of human beings into free manhood by the exercise of self-government, free will, free thought—of this Fénelon had surely not a glimpse. **A generation or two passed by, and then the peoples of Europe began to suspect that they were no longer children, but come to manhood;** and determined (after the example of Britain and America) to assume the rights and duties of manhood, at whatever risk of excesses or mistakes: and then “Télémaque” was relegated—half unjustly—as the slavish and childish dream of a past age, into the schoolroom, where it still remains.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000gayp/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

The old clean-cut social hierarchies retained much of their prestige, but they were on the defensive in the face of powerful social aspirations and a growing desire for social mobility. **Especially in the middle ranges of Western European society, the father’s power over his children and the husband’s power over his wife markedly declined. The patriarchal family, still the pattern in the seventeenth century, was giving way to the nuclear family, with its well-defined boundaries against the community and its growing intimacy and equality.** Within certain limits, still rather rigid but distinctly expanding, young girls were being permitted to choose their partners. Eighteenth-century fiction suggests that the tension between parental demands for obedience and young lovers’ demands for freedom was unresolved, but – witness the novels of Richardson – it was becoming old-fashioned if not contemptible to force girls into an uncongenial connection for the sake of parental prestige or profit.
…

In the seventeenth century – as Milton’s portrayal of Adam and Eve made plain to all – no one had doubted that women were inferior to men. But then, at the end of the 1690s, Daniel Defoe, who was always a pioneer, sharply took his fellowmen to task for their scurvy treatment of women; **had women the education of men, he argued in his *Essay upon Projects*, their supposed inferiority would soon vanish.** And it as Defoe, not Milton, whom the eighteenth century was to follow.
…

David Hume insisted, in good progressive fashion, that “marriage is an engagement entered into by mutual consent,” and he opposed the “male tyranny” which “destroys that nearness of rank, not to say equality, which nature has established between the sexes.” Deeply appreciative of female company, he noted, rather winningly, that “our free commerce with the fair sex, more than any other invention, embellishes, enlivens, and polishes society.”62 Yet even Hume could not quite escape traditional prejudices: the essays he explicitly addressed to women have an unwonted coyness, and he could still resort to the well-worn platitude that women were a subject “little to be understood.”63 *The Encyclopédie* displays the same ambivalence: it delineated its womanly ideal as the pious, thrifty, gentle, orderly – and submissive – housewife, and described woman, rather as Hume had described her, as everything man was not: touching, charming, invaluable – and mysterious. At the same time, it vigorously criticized the legal disabilities on women for violating the natural equality of all human beings and for disregarding the well-established fact that women often proved more energetic, competent, and intelligent than men. **Much of the supposed inferiority of women, the *Encyclopédie* argued, was merely the evil consequence of male dominance.** In a sensible essay “Sur les femmes,” Diderot expressed the same view.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas-de-Caritat-marquis-de-Condorcet#ref272130

Condorcet, wholly a man of the Enlightenment, sought to extend the empire of reason to social affairs. He advocated economic freedom, religious toleration, legal and educational reform, the abolition of slavery, and—unusually for his time—equal rights for women, including woman suffrage. **He rejected the almost-universal prejudice, even among “enlightened” thinkers, that women were intellectually inferior to men, regarding it as an illegitimate excuse for excluding women from public life as well as from many forms of education.** Women’s intellectual and supposed physical inferiority were also misused as an irrelevant bar to most occupations, he held. In his essay *Sur l’admission des femmes au droits de la cité* (1790; *On the Admission of Women to the Rights of Citizenship*), Condorcet argued that the widely shared assumption that the natural rights of men are based on their capacities for reason and moral action logically implies that women possess the very same rights:

> **The rights of men stem exclusively from the fact that they are sentient beings, capable of acquiring moral ideas and of reasoning upon them.** Since women have the same qualities,

> they necessarily also have the same rights. **Either no member of the human race has any true rights, or else they all have the same ones; and anyone who votes against the rights of another, whatever his religion, colour or sex, automatically forfeits his own.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA208#v=onepage&q&f=false

The political Stoicism of the French Revolution was an undoubtedly masculine affair.35 But if, finally, we step outside the scaffolding provided by Lenin's argument and cross over to the other side of the English Channel, **we can find Stoic philosophy being creatively appropriated by women for their own political projects** in the era of the Revolution. Catharine Macaulay had used Elizabeth Carter's edition of Epictetus extensively when she was writing her *Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth*, published in 1783, which offered an explicit defence of Stoicism against the arguments of Hobbes and Hume.36 **When Mary Wollstonecraft reviewed Macaulay's 1790 *Letters on Education*, she specifically commended the sympathetic exposition of Stoic principles: 'the doctrines of the Stoics are clearly stated by Mrs. M. and some unjust aspersions wiped off, which bigotry and ignorance have industriously propagated, to render doctrines ridiculous or odious, which deserve respect.'**37 This favourable orientation to Stoicism is also visible in the argument of Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. **There we find relentless appeals to reason and nature as trumps over mere social convention, however widespread; we find the Stoic denigration of emotion deployed to rescue women from their identification as passionate creatures, thereby to restore them to rationality, and therefore to equality with men; and we find the critique of appearance and reputation,** which draws on Stoic elements discernible in Rousseau.38 And if this book opened with Ernst Cassirer's opinion that Thomas Jefferson was 'speaking the language of Stoic philosophy' when he drafted the Declaration of Independence, it can appropriately close with perhaps the finest example of Mary Wollstonecraft doing the same:

> **Would men but generously snap our chains, and be content with rational fellowship instead of slavish obedience,** they would find us more observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faithful wives, more reasonable mothers – **in a word, better citizens.** We should then love them with true affection, because we should learn to respect ourselves.39

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wQaJCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT27#v=onepage&q&f=false

Above all, so far from being stiff with orthodox religion, it was almost the first irreligious home in all human history. **Theirs was the first generation that ever asked its children to worship the hearth without the altar.**
...

I remember one, who locked up his daughters like prisoners; and one of them said to me, "You see he thinks nobody else can think at all, except himself and Herbert Spencer." I remember another who was an extreme Radical, a champion of liberty everywhere except at home. The point is of some historic importance. Tyrants, religious or irreligious, turn up anywhere. **But this type of tyrant was the product of the precise moment when a middle-class man still had children and servants to control; but no longer had creeds or guilds or kings or priests or anything to control him. He was already an anarchist to those above him; but still an authoritarian to those below.**

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/pollock-the-genius-of-the-common-law#lf1381_label_059
>
> **There was the medieval stage in which every man was supposed to have his proper state of life, and the law had to see that he was kept in it.** We cannot fix a point of time when this conception of social welfare ceased to be officially accepted. Official and judicial opinion are rather apt to lag behind the general movement of ideas, but they do move, and older and younger colleagues are not likely to move at the same pace: just as, in dating a manuscript, one has to remember that an ancient scribe may be writing the hand of the last generation at the same time that a young one is eager to display the very newest graces of penmanship. **We shall not be far wrong in placing the period of transition between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the reforms of 1832. Next came the reign of utilitarian individualism, under which unlimited competition was to be the universal regulator, and it was thought that the State ought not to hinder this beneficent operation of human nature and could do nothing to help it beyond removing artificial obstacles. In the faith of that doctrine our fathers (I mean the fathers of men now growing old) lived through their active years, and their sons were brought up in its atmosphere. It prevailed for approximately half a century.** Then, well within the memory of men not much past the prime of life, it became a tolerated, indeed a probable or plausible, opinion, that the State was abdicating its functions by remaining passive, and should not only leave the road open for ability, but give active assistance in suppressing unfavourable external conditions and equalizing opportunities. **The present generation is full of this spirit, [1911]** and its power seems likely to increase for some time yet.
>
> https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/264/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But she did have an important difference with Haeckel. He was "conservative" in at least some of his moral views; that is, he believed that moral degeneracy – from stealing to sexual libertinism – had biological causes, and could therefore be eliminated by artificial selection. **The moral traits that Haeckel and the monists wished to select were, in Gasman's words, "strongly conservative and frequently puritanical to the point of ludicrousness."**28 **Not so with Margaret Sanger.**

> While she certainly shared Haeckel's desire to cleanse humanity of a variety of physical and mental defects, the liberation of sexuality from such conservative and puritanical confines, that is, from Christianity, defined her program from beginning to end.

http://kpolanyi.scoolaid.net:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10694/565/Con_13_Fol_06%20REVISED.pdf?sequence=3

> > 2. Titanic Individualism derives the value of personality from the assertion that there is no God. **It is not to be confused with the Individualism of Luther or Calvin or Rousseau, the Individualism prescribed under its different aspects in the rise of Capitalism. It is the atheist Individualism of Kierkegaard's Seducer, of Stirner's Only One, of Nietzsche's Superman, the philosophy of a short transition period in which Liberal Capitalism was triumphant.**

---

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/baptized_patriarchalism.pdf

Sometime in the early 1960's, R.J. Rushdoony wrote the following critique of the Roman family. It was published in 1971, but he had written it years earlier when he was a fulltime employee of the William Volker Fund in California.

> In early Greek and Roman cultures, paternal power was religious power, a power continuous with all being and essentially divine, requiring duties of the father and conferring him with authority. The father, as Fustel de Coulanges has shown, in *The Ancient City*, was under law; but, it must be added, he was not only under law but a part of that law and continuous with it in the chain of being. He was thus to a degree the law incarnate, in that he possessed a measure of the ultimate law in his person. **This manifestation of law moved steadily from the father to the state, so that the state, originally the creature of the family and of the fathers, made itself the father,** and the source of law, with the family turned into its creature.2

The Roman state steadily absorbed the Roman family under the Empire. This is the perpetual threat to all patriarchalism. **The patriarchal system begins with almost total loyalty to the father, but eventually this loyalty is transferred to the state because the state takes over the family's welfare functions and its sacramental office.** Bread and circuses are provided by the state. Copulating priestesses replace the father's lustral rites.
...

The family is not an agency of public law enforcement, for it cannot lawfully impose sanctions outside its own boundaries. The ability of the state to tax away the wealth of the family makes the state the primary agency in society if it is a question of family vs. state. The family will always lose the contest. **Only by converting the family into a mini-state – warlordism – can patriarchalism reverse the drift into centralized statism.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n71/mode/2up?view=theater

Achaean society is a patriarchal despotism tempered with the beauty and anger of woman, and the fierce tenderness of parental love.* Theoretically the father is supreme: he may take as many concubines as he likes,† he may offer them to his guests, he may expose his children on the mountaintops to die, or slaughter them on the altars of the thirsty gods. Such paternal omnipotence **does not necessarily imply a brutal society, but only one in which the organization of the state has not yet gone far enough to preserve social order; and in which the family, to create such order, needs the powers that will later be appropriated by the state in a nationalization of the right to kill. As social organization advances, paternal authority and family unity decrease, freedom and individualism grow.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/110/mode/2up?view=theater

The family did not receive its laws from the city. If the city had established private law, that law would probably have been different from what we have seen. It would have established the right of property and the right of succession on different principles; for it was not for the interest of the city that land should be inalienable and the patrimony indivisible. **The law that permitted a father to sell or even to kill his son – a law that we find both in Greece and in Rome – was not established by a city. The city would rather have said to the father, "Your wife's and your son's life does not belong to you any more than their liberty does. I will protect them, even against you; you are not the one to judge them, or to kill them, if they have committed a crime; I will be their judge."** If the city did not speak thus, it is evident that it could not. Private law existed before the city. When the city began to write its laws, it found this law already established, living, rooted in the customs, strong by universal

observance. **The city accepted it, because it could not do otherwise, and dared not modify it, except by degrees.**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/338/mode/2up?view=theater

At Thebes and at Corinth it was still in vigor in the eighth century. At Athens legislation still showed some preference for the oldest. At Sparta the right of primogeniture continued until the triumph of democracy. There were cities where it disappeared only after an insurrection. **At Heraclea, Cnidus, Istros, and Marseilles the younger branches took up arms to destroy at the same time the right of primogeniture and the paternal authority.**1 **From that time Greek cities that had not before counted more than a hundred men enjoying political rights, could count five or six hundred.** All the members of aristocratic families were citizens, and magistracies and the senate were open to them.

https://archive.org/details/cu31924100532054/page/418/mode/2up?view=theater

The code of Draco was written when the struggle of the two classes was at its height, and before the Eupatrids were vanquished. Solon prepared his at the moment when the inferior class gained the upper hand. The difference between these codes, therefore, is great.

Draco was a Eupatrid; he had all the sentiments of his caste, and was "learned in the religious law." **He appears to have done no more than to reduce the old customs to writing without in any way changing them.** His first law is this: “Men should honor the gods and heroes of the country, and offer them annual sacrifices, without deviating from the rites followed by our ancestors.”
…

A curious article of this legislation which has been preserved shows in what spirit it was made.2 It grants the right of prosecution for a murder only to the relatives of the dead and the members of his gens. **We see by this how powerful the gens still was at that period, since it did not permit the city to interfere in its affairs, even to avenge it. A man still belonged to the family more than to the city.**
…

In opposition to Draco, who permitted only the family of the victim to prosecute one for a crime, Solon granted this right to every citizen.2 Here was one more old patriarchal right abolished.
…

Athens still had its archons, and Rome its consuls. Nor was anything changed in the ceremonies of the public religion; the repasts of the prytaneum, the sacrifices at the opening of the public assembly, the auspices and the prayers, – all were preserved. **It is quite common with man, when he rejects old institutions, to wish to preserve their exterior forms.**

In reality all was changed. Neither institutions, nor laws, nor beliefs, nor manners were in this new period what they had been in the preceding.
…

The regulating principle from which all institutions now derive their authority – the only one which is above individual wills, and which obliges them all to submit – is public interest. What the Latins call *res publica*, the Greeks *τό κοινόν*, replaces the old religion. This is what, from this time, establishes institutions and laws, and by this all the important acts of cities are judged. In the deliberations of senates, or of popular assemblies, when a law is discussed, or a form of government, or a question of private right, or a political institution, no one any longer asks what religion prescribes, but what the general interest demands.

A saying is attributed to Solon which well characterizes this new *régime*. Some one asked him if he had given his country the best constitution. "No," he replied, "but the one which is the best suited to it." **Now it was something quite new to expect in forms of government, and in laws, only a relative merit. The ancient constitutions, founded upon the rules of a worship, were proclaimed infallible and immutable. They possessed the rigor and inflexibility of the religion.** Solon indicated by this answer that, in future, political constitutions should conform to the wants, the manners, and the interests of the men of each age. There was no longer a question of absolute truth; the rules of government were for the future to be flexible and variable. **It is said that Solon wished at the most that his laws might be observed for a hundred years.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#CHAPTER_VIIId
>
> At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save theocracy. They reasoned like Caligula, and, at that period, reasoned aright. **It takes a long time for feeling so to change**

> **that men can make up their minds to take their equals as masters, in the hope that they will profit by doing so.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.87543/page/n123/mode/2up?view=theater

> I have been told, however, by some of those who have observed the formation of these rules, that they do not purport to emanate from the personal authority of their author or authors; nor do they assume to be dictated by a sense of equity; **there is always, I am assured, a sort of fiction, under which some customs as to the distribution of water are supposed to have existed from all antiquity,** although in fact no artificial supply had been even so much as thought of. It is further stated that, though it is extremely common among English functionaries to speak of the distribution of water as regulated by the agreement of the villagers, yet no such idea really enters the mind of the community or of its representatives as that there can be or ought to be an express or implied contract among the cultivators respecting their several shares. **And it is added that, rather than have a contract or agreement, it would appear to them a much more natural and reasonable arrangement that the distribution should be determined by casting lots. Authority, Custom, or Chance are in fact the great sources of law in primitive communities as we know them, not Contract.**

https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n223/mode/2up?view=theater

To the rationalist thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries primitive man appeared as a completely free agent following the caprices of his own will. It was only when he had bowed his neck beneath the social yoke that forbidden fruits, defined as such by the law, made their appearance. And a pious fraud gave to this same law the semblance of a divine revelation. **It followed that Power was the author of every prohibition and rule of conduct, with religion acting as Power's ghostly policeman.**

Today's view of the subject is very different. **The further we seek to know primitive men, the more struck we are, not by the extreme liberty of their behaviour, but, on the contrary, by its extraordinary strictness.** In very backward societies the life of man consists of an extremely narrow cycle of actions which are always alike. **Far from this regularity being the work of a lawgiver, it may be seen even in communities in which there is a minimum of government.**

The savage derives an obvious satisfaction from conformity. **To all attempts to impel him into an uncustomary activity he evinces a repugnance which soon reaches the point of panic.** It is easily explained. Every novelty arouses emotions of indistinct fear. The "things that are not done" make up an enormous mass in which the distinctions with which we are familiar—the immoral, the illegal, the shocking, the dangerous—have not yet been drawn.
…

A whole structure of such tales supports a structure of rites, ceremonies, and practices which are of an entirely obligatory character, **and in regard to which the savage is infinitely less capable of insubordination than we are in regard to laws which are known to us to be of human origin and to be maintained by human constraints.**
…

What seems to us to be the highest expression of authority, that of saying what should and what should not be done, of distinguishing the lawful from the unlawful, becomes an attribute of political Power only at a very late stage of its development.

This fact is of capital importance. **For a Power which lays down the good and the just is, whatever form it takes, absolute in a quite different way from one which takes the good and the just as it finds them already laid down by a supernatural authority.** A Power5 which regulates human behaviour according to its own notions of social utility is absolute in a quite different way from one whose subjects have had their actions prescribed for them by God. And here we glimpse the fact that the denial of a divine lawgiving and the establishment of a human lawgiving are the most prodigious strides which society can take towards a truly absolute Power. So long as a supernatural origin was ascribed to law, this step remained untaken.

> 5. A more or less late stage according to the particular people and civilization. **We know that at Rome the secularization of the law was especially precocious.**

…

So it was with the least religious peoples in history, the Greeks and the Romans.6 No doubt the principles of Roman law quickly lost any tincture of religious connotation. But their civil ordinances and

institutions are, as Ihering has shown, the exact reproduction of ancient ordinances and institutions which had a sacred character.7
…

On the other hand, **fresh activities and contacts throw up new problems, rendering necessary new patterns of behaviour.** How are these new rules to be formulated? For a truly religious people there is but one way. The divine law is the one foundation of morality and the sole basis of jurisprudence; as questions are put, the doctors of religion formulate the answers, basing themselves on the principles of the Book. In that way a nation, trusting to ecclesiastical jurisprudence, can do without a legislature at all. **The Jewish people, for instance, could, even though dispersed, settle in this way the most embittered disputes. This example of practical legislation formulated in the absence of any duly constituted state seems not to have received the attention it should have from political thinkers.** In the Islamic world the jurisprudence based on the Koran has played a similar role.9

In these instances, then, laws are not made. Interpretation of the law provides the necessary answers to all particular cases. **Legislation becomes no more than a jurisprudence, and jurisprudence a casuistry.**
…

It cannot be too much emphasized that at the root of these two interventions two very different principles are at work, the one moral or religious and the other social or expedient. Nor should it be overlooked that the second principle comes into play only through a deficiency of the religious sense, by reason that the gods of Western man are conceived as having only a limited circle of interests. **The Romans are, perhaps, the least mystical people ever seen on the face of the earth. And that is the reason why they so soon distinguished from the *fas*, which is what the gods enjoin, the *jus*, which is the work of men's brains.**
…

Note the slow, timid pace at which this power develops. **At first there is nothing more than a restatement of custom.**17 **Then, by slow degrees, innovating laws are introduced, which are, however, deliberately presented as returns to good old customs.** Through the practice of legislation the idea gains ground little by little that the laws or law may not only be restated but created —by formal proclamation.

> 17. **The idea of anyone whatsoever being able to make laws which are repugnant to custom is completely foreign to the Middle Ages.** For instance, when St. Louis issues an ordinance (1246), in what language does he do it? He says that he has summoned to Orleans the barons and the notables of the country that they may determine what the custom of the country is, as now declared by the king and commanded by him for observance:
>
> "**Nos volentes super hoc cognoscere veritatem et quod erat dubium declarare,** vocatis ad nos apud Aurel baronibus et magnatibus earundem terrarum, habito cum eis tractatu et consilio diligenti, communi assertione eorum, didicimus de consuetudine terrarum illarum, quae talis est. …
>
> "Haec autem omnia, prout superius continentur, de communi consilio et assensu dictorum baronum et militum volumus et praecipimus de coetero in perpetuum firmiter observari." Cited by Carlyle, Vol. V, p. 54.
>
> **We here see legislation to be a matter of determining and authenticating custom.** Hence the presence of the "barons and magnates," who are there as a jury of fact. It would therefore be a mistake to regard the assemblage of barons and king as a joint legislative body, of which the king in Parliament would be the modern equivalent. **But it is easy to see that these meetings of the king and his *curia* to determine what is custom came in the end to be a means of dictating it. And it is easy to imagine how this happened. It was by giving out for customary and constant what was in fact new.** Cf. in this connection what Maine said about the supply of water in India.
>
> https://archive.org/details/B-001-015-424/page/n99/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> An example given by Sumner Maine° shows how great is the repugnance felt by uncivilized peoples to government by deliberative decisions. While he was a civil servant in India, the government constructed irrigation channels with a view to providing the village communities with water: it was left to the communities to distribute the water. What happened? Once all was in train and the delicate task of apportionment had been done, the villagers decided to forget that a human authority had allotted to each his water! **They persuaded themselves into the fictitious belief that their portions of additional water had been assigned them by a very ancient custom, at the back of which lay a primitive ordinance!**28

…

There comes a time when, just because of the vitality given to it by its folkways, a people expands and comes into contact with a number of very different societies; at first it mocks them in derision, then it takes to examining more attentively beliefs and modes of conduct which are different from its own. “The just and the unjust are mainly a matter of geography. A change of three degrees in elevation shatters an entire jurisprudence.”18

On the one hand, **these contacts affect favourably minds which are capable of rising above outward forms and perceiving the underlying unity of laws, as was the case with the Jesuit missionaries in China;** on the other, they are dangerous to baser minds, which, through failure to realize the inner coherence of the entire scheme of a society’s beliefs and customs, regard themselves as free to adopt at random some way of life or other, and then take to wondering whether any way of life is really necessary.

Finding that one of their beliefs is not universally held, they conclude that neither is it necessary, without stopping to think that as regards their own society it may be necessary.
…

In Greece, for instance, **whereas the Pythagoreans had affirmed the divine origin and nature of law**19 **and the immutability of customary laws,** the philosophers started to represent laws as being purely the work of men’s hands, which had been maintained by the device of a fictitious intervention from above.20

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n441/mode/2up?view=theater

In general, however, the power of the father declined as that of the government rose; democracy entered the family when it left the state. In the early Republic the fathers had been the state; the family heads formed the Curial Assembly, and the clan heads probably constituted the Senate. Rule through family and clan diminished as population became more abundant and diverse, and life more mobile, commercial, and complex; **kinship, status, and custom were replaced by contract and law.**[4] Children won greater freedom from their parents, wives from their husbands, individuals from their groups. Trajan compelled a father to emancipate a son whom he had maltreated; **Hadrian took from the father the right of life and death over his household and transferred it to the courts;** Antoninus forbade a father to sell his children into slavery.[5]

> https://biblehub.com/john/18-31.htm
>
> **Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death:**

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n297/mode/2up?view=theater

How many organising forces have already been seen to die out! For example, that of the *gens* or clan which for millennia was far mightier than the power of the family, and indeed already ruled and regulated long before the latter existed. We ourselves see the important notions of the right and might of the family, which once possessed the supremacy as far as the Roman system extended, always becoming paler and feebler. In the same way a later generation will also see the State become meaningless in certain parts of the world,—an idea which many contemporaries can hardly contemplate without alarm and horror.

https://archive.org/details/dailylifeinancie035465mbp/page/n107/mode/2up?view=theater

IN THE second century of our era the ancient law of the *gens* had fallen into disuse ("*totum gentilicium ius in desuetudinem abisse*"); and nothing but the memory – the "archaeological memory" one might almost say – remained of the principles on which the patriarchal family of ancient Rome had been based: relationship through the male line (*agnatio*) and the unlimited power of the *pater familias*.1

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=dj9H5lbB6zwC&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> 17. If there be no agnate, the same law of the Twelve Tables calls to the inheritance the *gentiles*:2 **and who the *gentiles* are we have informed you in the first Commentary. And since we told you there that the whole of the laws relating to *gentiles* had gone into disuse, it is superfluous to treat in detail of the same matter here.**
>
> https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The family, so loose and feeble during the last centuries of the Roman Empire, became increasingly tightly knit from the sixth century on, functioning as the nucleus of society. **The ancient *gens*, or clan, lost any significance, and even the usage of the *nomen gentile*, or family name, was abandoned. Practically, the nuclear family was the essential social**

microstructure, but ideologically the Byzantines went even further, proclaiming celibacy and virginity as the highest social ideal.

…

According to the ancient code of the Twelve Tables, a mother had no right of succession to a son who had died intestate. Under Hadrian, the *senatus consultum Tertullianum* admitted her as a legitimate heir **on the condition that she possessed the *ius liberorum*, which rested on her having had three children (four, if she was a freed woman). Then, by the *senatus consultum Orphitianum* passed under Marcus Aurelius, children were entitled to inherit from their mother, whatever the validity of the union from which they sprang, and to take precedence of other relatives in this matter.**2

This completed the development which had undermined the ancient system of civil inheritance, wrecking the fundamental conception of the Roman family and recognising instead the claims of "blood" in the sense in which our modern societies have accepted them. The Roman family is henceforth based on the *coniunctio sanguinis*, because, according to the lofty conception of Cicero in the *De Officiis*, this natural tie was the best qualified to bind human beings in affection and mutual goodwill: "*et benevolentia devincit homines et caritate.*"3

During the same period the two essential weapons of the *patria potestas* were gradually blunted: the father's absolute authority over his children, and the husband's absolute authority over the wife placed "in his hand" (*in manum*) as if she were one of his daughters (*loco filiae*). By the second century of our era they had disappeared completely. The *pater familias* had been deprived of the right of life or death over his children which had been granted him by the Twelve Tables and the sacred, so-called Royal Laws.4 But until the beginning of the third century, when abandoning a child was considered the equivalent of murder,5 he might expose his new-born child to perish of cold and hunger or be devoured by dogs on one of the public refuse dumps, unless it was rescued by the pity of some passer-by.6

…

Having once spared the infant at its birth, however, the *pater familias* had no power afterwards to get rid of his child, either by selling him (*mancipatio*) into slavery – **the *mancipatio* was now tolerated only as a legal fiction for the contradictory objects of adoption or manumission** – or by putting him to death. A father's right to slay his child was still recognized in the 1st century B.C., as is proved by the case of Aulus Fulvius, an accomplice of Catiline;9 but had later become a capital crime. Before Constantine equated with parricide the murder of a son by his father,10 Hadrian had punished by banishment to an island a father who had slain his son in the course of a hunt, though the son was guilty of having committed adultery with his father's second wife;11 **and the emperor Trajan had compelled another father, guilty only of having maltreated his son, to emancipate the youth forthwith, and when the boy died, did not allow the father to share in his estate.**12

Similarly, after the end of the republic, the emancipation of a child had entirely changed in significance and effect. **In ancient days it was a punishment, less drastic than death or slavery, but nevertheless severe enough, for in breaking the ties that bound the child to the family, it condemned him to an exclusion from the family which inevitably resulted in his being disinherited.** Now, emancipation had become a benefit. Thanks to the praetorian legislation of the *bonorum possessio* introduced at the beginning of the empire, it enabled a son to acquire and administer his own property without being deprived of his paternal inheritance. **Fathers were reluctant to have recourse to emancipation as long as it had the appearance of a punishment. But as soon as it became an advantage to the son, the cost falling only on the parent, fathers began to practise it as a matter of course. The laws had once more adapted themselves to public feeling which, condemning the atrocious severities of the past,** asked in the days of Trajan and of Hadrian nothing more of paternal authority than that natural affection with which a jurist of the third century finally identified it: "*patria potestas in pietate debet, non atrocitate consistere.*"13

This was enough completely to alter the atmosphere of the Roman home, and to imbue the relationship between father and son with a tenderness which was far removed from the coldness and rigorous discipline that Cato the Elder had maintained in his family.

…

Pliny the Younger preached a tolerance or, if the word is preferred, a liberalism which appeals to us. **But, unhappily, the Romans failed to strike the happy mean. They were not content to lessen the old severity; they yielded to the impulse to become far too complaisant.** Having given up the habit of controlling their children, they let the children govern them, and took pleasure in bleeding themselves white to gratify the expensive whims of their offspring. The result was that they were succeeded by a generation of idlers and wastrels like the Philomusus, whose misadventure Martial recounts.

…

And it would not have been possible if the women had not been emancipated, as much or even more than the children, from the family solidarity which the exercise of the *patria potestas* had imposed of old; the two perished together.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n357/mode/2up?view=theater

996 Because of the humanity of the times (as displayed in the affection of popular commonwealths for their sons and the desire of monarchies to see fathers devoted to their sons), **since the cyclopean authority of the family fathers over the persons of their children had already vanished, the emperors sought to do away also with the authority they still had over their acquisitions.** To this end, they introduced first the *peculium castrense* to attract young men to war, then extended it to the *peculium quasi castrense* to attract them to the imperial service, and finally, to satisfy the sons who were neither soldiers nor clerks, introduced the *peculium adventitium*. They deprived the paternal power of its influence over adoptions, now no longer restricted to a few close relations. They universally encouraged formal adoptions (*adrogationes*), which were somewhat difficult in that citizens who were family fathers in their own right thereby became subordinate members of others' families. **They counted emancipations as benefits. They gave to legitimation by a subsequent marriage all the efficacy of solemn nuptials. But above all, since the *imperium paternum* seemed to detract from their own majesty, they directed that it should be called the *patria potestas*.** This was in accordance with their own example, introduced with great sagacity by Augustus; for in order not to arouse the jealousy of the people, who might want to take from him some part of his *imperium*, he assumed the *tribunicia potestas*, thus declaring himself the protector of Roman liberty. **In the tribunes of the plebs this had been a *de facto* power, for they had never held *imperium* in the republic.**
…

997 Hence the free Roman commonwealth was entirely conceived in the triple formula: ***senatus auctoritas, populi imperium, tribunorum plebis potestas*.** And the two terms *imperium* and *potestas* retained in the laws this original exactness of meaning, the former being ascribed to the major magistrates, **such as consuls and praetors, and extended to all who had the right to impose the death penalty,** and the latter being ascribed to the minor magistrates such as the aediles, as it was supported by but modest powers of coercion—*modica coërcitione continetur*.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#fathers

The law of nature instructs most animals to cherish and educate their infant progeny. The law of reason inculcates to the human species the returns of filial piety. But the exclusive, absolute, and perpetual dominion of the father over his children, is peculiar to the Roman jurisprudence, (102) and seems to be coeval with the foundation of the city. (103) The paternal power was instituted or confirmed by Romulus himself; and, after the practice of three centuries, it was inscribed on the fourth table of the Decemvirs. **In the forum, the senate, or the camp, the adult son of a Roman citizen enjoyed the public and private rights of a *person*: in his father's house he was a mere *thing*;** confounded by the laws with the movables, the cattle, and the slaves, whom the capricious master might alienate or destroy, without being responsible to any earthly tribunal.
…

The Roman father, from the license of servile dominion, was reduced to the gravity and moderation of a judge. The presence and opinion of Augustus confirmed the sentence of exile pronounced against an intentional parricide by the domestic tribunal of Arius. Adrian transported to an island the jealous parent, who, like a robber, had seized the opportunity of hunting, to assassinate a youth, the incestuous lover of his step-mother. (110) **A private jurisdiction is repugnant to the spirit of monarchy; the parent was again reduced from a judge to an accuser;** and the magistrates were enjoined by Severus Alexander to hear his complaints and execute his sentence. **He could no longer take the life of a son without incurring the guilt and punishment of murder;** and the pains of parricide, from which he had been excepted by the Pompeian law, were finally inflicted by the justice of Constantine. (111)
The same protection was due to every period of existence; **and reason must applaud the humanity of Paulus, for imputing the crime of murder to the father who strangles, or starves, or abandons his new-born infant;** or exposes him in a public place to find the mercy which he himself had denied.
…

If the father could subdue his own feelings, he might escape, though not the censure, at least the chastisement, of the laws; and the Roman empire was stained with the blood of infants, till such murders were included, by Valentinian and his colleagues, in the letter and spirit of the Cornelian law. **The lessons of jurisprudence** (113) **and Christianity had been insufficient to eradicate this inhuman practice, till their gentle influence was fortified by the terrors of capital punishment.** (114)

> 113. The opinion of the lawyers, and the discretion of the magistrates, had introduced, in the time of Tacitus, some legal restraints, which might support his contrast of the *boni mores* of the Germans to the *bonae leges alibi*—that is to say, at Rome (de Moribus Germanorum, c. 19.). **Tertullian (ad Nationes, l. i. c. 15) refutes his own charges, and those of his brethren, against the heathen jurisprudence.**
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_III/Apologetic/Ad_Nationes/Elucidations/The_Charge_of_Infanticide_Retorted_on_the_Heathen
>
> For if we are infanticides in one sense, you also can hardly be deemed such in any other sense; because, **although you are forbidden by the laws to slay new-born infants, it so happens that no laws are evaded with more impunity or greater safety,** with the deliberate knowledge of the public, and the suffrages[4] of this entire age.[5]

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1836&context=fac_artchop

A ruling, a rescript, of the Emperor Antoninus Pius (died 161), though given for an individual situation, was treated as of general importance. It is discussed in the *Institutes of Gaius* 1.53 and is even quoted in the *Institutes of Justinian* 1.8.1:

> Slaves are in the power of their masters **(which power, indeed, comes from the law of nations: for we can observe that among all nations alike masters have the power of life and death over their slaves)** and anything acquired through a slave is acquired by his master. **But nowadays, no one who is subject to our sway is allowed to treat his slaves with severity other than for a cause recognized by the laws. For, by a constitution of the divine Antoninus Pius, anyone who kills his own slave without cause is to be punished in the same way as one who kills the slave of another.** And even excessive harshness of masters is controlled by a constitution of the same Emperor. For, on being consulted by certain provincial governors about those slaves who flee to a sacred temple or to a statue of the Emperor, he ruled that, if the severity of the masters appear insupportable, they are bound to sell the slaves on favorable terms and the price is to be given to the masters – and rightly: **for it is in the interest of the state that no one should abuse his property.** These are the words of the rescript dispatched to Aelius Marcianus: 'The power of masters over their slaves should be unlimited nor should any man's rights be detracted from. But it is in the interest of masters that relief against cruelty, starvation or unbearable savagery should not be denied to those who rightly complain. Adjudicate, therefore, on the complaints of those of the household of Julius Sabinus who take refuge at the statue and, if you find them treated more harshly than is seemly or affected by shameful harm, bid them be sold so that they do not return to the power of their master. And, if he seeks to circumvent my constitution, let this Sabinus know that, on my learning of it, I shall be severe with my dealing with him.7
>
> https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/5qbuee/by_the_second_century_ad_killing_your_slaves_was/
>
> **To summarize, the only thing that ever *was* illegal with regard to your own slaves, was, from the 1st and 2nd centuries on, either killing someone just for being unable to work, or killing your slave without 'sufficient' reason.** And whatever that sufficient reason was would be for a court of law from the master's peers to find out, if a lawyer could be find to bring the case to trial on behalf of the dead slave.
>
> https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1836&context=fac_artchop
>
> Another rescript of 376 of the Emperor Valens, Gratian and Valentinian suggests that the reality of the protection offered to slaves was grim:
>
> > When slaves thunder forth as accusers of their masters, none of the judges is to await the outcome; it is settled that no inquiry is to be made, no investigation to be held, but the authors of the wicked accusations are to be burnt along with the statements of the accusations, with all the instruments of the writing and of the intended criminal charge. **We make an exception of attempted high treason, in which betrayal is honorable even for slaves, for this crime too is directed against domini (i.e., the emperors).**10

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/Europe/Italy/_Texts/HODIHI/2d_edition/2/2*.html#ref:Pyrrhus_and_Fabricius

As both Maximin and Priscus seem still to have adhered to the worship of Olympian divinities, we are driven, however reluctantly, to the conclusion that by this time the traitors, the time-servers, and the hypocrites had ranged themselves on the side of successful Christianity, and that when the Emperor wanted a man of indisputably high character and sterling honesty to mask by his innocence a dark and nefarious design, his thoughts naturally turned to the few remaining Pagan statesmen, who probably held at his court a position not unlike that of the Roman Catholics under Queen Elizabeth or the Huguenots under Louis XIII.

https://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/texts/priscus.html

"The creators of the Roman republic," I said, "who were wise and good men, in order to prevent things from being done at haphazard **made one class of men guardians of the laws, and appointed another class to the profession of arms, who were to have no other object than to be always ready for battle,** and to go forth to war without dread, as though to their ordinary exercise having by practice exhausted all their fear beforehand. **Others again were assigned to attend to the cultivation of the ground, to support both themselves and those who fight in their defence,** by contributing the military corn-supply.
...

The Romans treat their servants better than the king of the Scythians treats his subjects. They deal with them as fathers or teachers, admonishing them to abstain from evil and follow the lines of conduct whey they have esteemed honourable; **they reprove them for their errors like their own children. They are not allowed, like the Scythians, to inflict death on them.** They have numerous ways of conferring freedom; they can manumit not only during life, but also by their wills, and the testamentary wishes of a Roman in regard to his property are law."

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_III/Apologetic/Apology/Chapter_VI

The laws, too, your fathers in their wisdom had enacted concerning the very gods themselves, you their most loyal children have rescinded. The consuls, by the authority of the senate, banished Father Bacchus and his mysteries not merely from the city, but from the whole of Italy. The consuls Piso and Gabinius, no Christians surely, forbade Serapis, and Isis, and Arpocrates, with their dogheaded friend,[3] admission into the Capitol—in the act casting them out from the assembly of the gods—overthrow their altars, and expelled them from the country, being anxious to prevent the vices of their base and lascivious religion from spreading. These, you have restored, and conferred highest honours on them. What has come to your religion—of the veneration due by you to your ancestors? **In your dress, in your food, in your style of life, in your opinions, and last of all in your very speech, you have renounced your progenitors. You are always praising antiquity, and yet every day you have novelties in your way of living.** From your having failed to maintain what you should, you make it clear, that, while you abandon the good ways of your fathers, you retain and guard the things you ought not. Yet the very tradition of your fathers, which you still seem so faithfully to defend, and in which you find your principal matter of accusation against the Christians—I mean zeal in the worship of the gods, the point in which antiquity has mainly erred—**although you have rebuilt the altars of Serapis, now a Roman deity, and to Bacchus, now become a god of Italy, you offer up your orgies,**—I shall in its proper place show that you despise, neglect, and overthrow, casting entirely aside the authority of the men of old.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Women_of_the_Caesars/Woman_and_marriage_in_Ancient_Rome

"Many things that among the Greeks are considered improper and unfitting," wrote Cornelius Nepos in the preface to his "Lives," "are permitted by our customs. **Is there by chance a Roman who is ashamed to take his wife to a dinner away from home? Does it happen that the mistress of the house in any family does not enter the anterooms frequented by strangers and show herself among them? Not so in Greece: there the woman accepts invitations only among families to which she is related, and she remains withdrawn in that inner part of the house which is called the *gynaeceum*, where only the nearest relatives are admitted.**"

https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Anglica/NL48_Scott.htm

I do not know why the ancient authorities, without having thoroughly considered the subject, conferred upon women the right of acting as witnesses. It was, indeed, well known, and they themselves could not fail to be aware that it was dishonorable for them to appear frequently before the eyes of men, and that those who were modest and virtuous should avoid doing so. For this reason, as I have previously stated, I do not understand why they permitted them to be called as witnesses, a privilege which resulted in their frequently being associated with great crowds of men, and holding conversation with them of a character very unbecoming to the sex. Did they think that in public matters the statements of women should be heard,

> ***when they had been admitted to give evidence as men do; like the Scythian women who We know were in the habit of arming themselves in company with their husbands, for the purpose of making war?***

This passage, one of the most significant in all the little work of Nepos, draws in a few, clear, telling strokes one of the most marked distinctions between the Greco-Asiatic world and the Roman. Among ancient societies, the Roman was probably that in which, at least among the better classes, woman enjoyed the greatest social liberty and the greatest legal and economic autonomy. **There she most nearly approached that condition of moral and civil equality with man which makes her his comrade, and not his slave**—that equality in which modern civilization sees one of the supreme ends of moral progress.

The doctrine held by some philosophers and sociologists, that military peoples subordinate woman to a tyrannical régime of domestic servitude, is wholly disproved by the history of Rome. If there was ever a time when the Roman woman lived in a state of perennial tutelage, under the authority of man from birth to death—of the husband, if not of the father, or, if not of father or husband, of the guardian—that time belongs to remote antiquity.

When Rome became the master state of the Mediterranean world, **and especially during the last century of the republic, woman, aside from a few slight limitations of form rather than of substance, had already acquired legal and economic independence,** the condition necessary for social and moral equality. As to marriage, the affianced pair could at that time choose between two different legal family régimes: marriage with *manus*, the older form, in which all the goods of the wife passed to the ownership of the husband, so that she could no longer possess anything in her own name; or marriage without *manus*, in which only the dower became the property of the husband, and the wife remained mistress of all her other belongings and all that she might acquire. **Except in some cases, and for special reasons, in all the families of the aristocracy, by common consent, marriages, during the last centuries of the republic, were contracted in the later form;** so that at that time married women directly and openly had gained economic independence.

During the same period, indirectly, and by means of juridical evasions, this independence was also won by unmarried women, who, according to ancient laws, ought to have remained all their lives under a guardian, either selected by the father in his will or appointed by the law in default of such selection. **To get around this difficulty, the fertile and subtle imagination of the jurists invented first the *tutor optivus*, permitting the father, instead of naming his daughter's guardian in his will, to leave her free to choose one general guardian or several, according to the business in hand, or even to change that official as many times as she wished.**

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#kindred

The degrees of kindred (146) are numbered by the civilians, ascending from the last possessor to a common parent, and descending from the common parent to the next heir: my father stands in the first degree, my brother in the second, his children in the third, and the remainder of the series may be conceived by a fancy, or pictured in a genealogical table. In this computation, a distinction was made, essential to the laws and even the constitution of Rome; **the *agnats*, or persons connected by a line of males, were called, as they stood in the nearest degree, to an equal partition; but a female was incapable of transmitting any legal claims; and the *cognats* of every rank, without excepting the dear relation of a mother and a son, were disinherited by the Twelve Tables, as strangers and aliens.** Among the Romans a *gens* or lineage was united by a common *name* and domestic rites; the various *cognomens* or *surnames* of Scipio, or Marcellus, distinguished from each other the subordinate branches or families of the Cornelian or Claudian race: **the default of the *agnats*, of the same surname, was supplied by the larger denomination of *gentiles*; and the vigilance of the laws maintained, in the same name, the perpetual descent of religion and property.** A similar principle dictated the Voconian law, (147) which abolished the right of female inheritance. As long as virgins were given or sold in marriage, the adoption of the wife extinguished the hopes of the daughter. **But the equal succession of independent matrons supported their pride and luxury, and might transport into a foreign house the riches of their fathers. While the maxims of Cato** (148) **were revered, they tended to perpetuate in each family a just and virtuous mediocrity: till female blandishments insensibly triumphed; and every salutary restraint was lost in the dissolute greatness of the republic. The rigor of the decemvirs was tempered by the equity of the praetors. Their edicts restored and emancipated posthumous children to the rights of nature; and upon the failure of the *agnats*, they preferred the blood of the *cognats* to the name of the gentiles whose title and character were insensibly covered with oblivion.** The reciprocal inheritance of mothers and sons was established in the Tertullian and Orphitian decrees by the humanity of the senate. **A new and more impartial order was introduced by the Novels of Justinian, who affected to revive the jurisprudence of the Twelve Tables.** The lines of masculine and female kindred were confounded: the descending, ascending, and collateral series was

accurately defined; **and each degree, according to the proximity of blood and affection, succeeded to the vacant possessions of a Roman citizen.** (149)

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n355/mode/2up?view=theater

993 However, **the jurisconsults of the last [period of Roman] jurisprudence, by estimating the things of the unknown earliest times by those of their own quite late times,** which is the source of innumerable errors noted in this work, **believed that the Law of the Twelve Tables had called the daughters of families to the inheritances of their fathers who had died intestate,** in virtue of the word *suus* [in the phrase *sui heredes*], following the rule that the masculine gender includes women also. But heroic jurisprudence, of which we have had so much to say in this work, took the words of the laws in their strictest meaning, so that the word *suus* meant only the son of a family. Invincible proof of this is afforded by the formula for the institution of posthumous children, introduced many centuries later by Gallus Aquilius, which is phrased *Si quis natus natave erit*, lest from the word *natus* alone it should not be understood that a posthumous daughter is included. **Because of his ignorance of these matters, Justinian in the *Institutes* affirms that the Law of the Twelve Tables by the use of the word *adgnatus* had called male and female agnates alike, but that later the middle jurisprudence had made the law more rigid by restricting it to sisters of the same blood.** Thus by chance and yet happily this jurisprudence came to be called middle for the reason that, beginning with these cases, it mitigated the rigors of the Law of the Twelve Tables, whereas the ancient jurisprudence which preceded it had guarded its words with the greatest scrupulousness.
...

Finally Justinian abolished the distinction between legacies and trusteeships, merged the Falcidian [i.e. Pegasian] fourth [part of an estate reserved to the heir] with the Trebellian, minimized the distinction between testaments and codicils, and put agnates and cognates on precisely the same footing as regards inheritance *ab intestato*. And the latest Roman laws went to such lengths in favor of last wills that, **whereas in ancient times they were declared invalid on the slightest pretext, nowadays they must always be interpreted in such a way as to favor their validity.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n249/mode/2up?view=theater

671 **Wives were bought with heroic dowries,** a usage which survived as a solemnity in the nuptials of the Roman priests, which were contracted *coemptione et farre*, "by mutual [mock] sale and spelt" [-bread offering]. (This was also the custom among the ancient Germans, according to Tacitus, and we may therefore assume the same of all the earliest barbarous peoples.) Wives were maintained as a necessity of nature for the procreation of children. In other respects they were treated as slaves, as is [still] the custom of nations in many parts of our [old] world and almost everywhere in the new. **When the wife brings the dowry, it purchases the liberty of her husband and is a public confession on his part of inability to bear the expense of marriage, which is perhaps the reason for the many privileges with which the emperors favored dowries.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/3D*.html#ref118

Now such traits as these would indicate a certain savageness; and yet there are other things which, although not marks of civilisation perhaps, are not brutish; **for instance, it is the custom among the Cantabrians for the husbands to give dowries to their wives, for the daughters to be left as heirs,** and the brothers to be married off by their sisters. The custom involves, in fact, a sort of woman-rule—but this is not at all a mark of civilisation.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44884/44884-h/44884-h.htm#Footnote_1253

> 1253. We must remark that so far from the dowry given by men to their wives being an evidence of civilization, it is a custom common amongst barbarous people, and indicative of nothing so much as the despotic power of the man over the wife. **These dowries were generally a sum of money from the husband to the father of his intended, on the payment of which he acquired the same power over her as over a slave.** Aristotle, speaking of the ancient Greeks, tells us expressly that they bought their wives, (Polit. ii. c. 8,) and observing that amongst barbarous nations women were always regarded in the same light as slaves, **he cites the example of the Cyclopes, who exercised, according to Homer, sovereign authority over their families** (Odyss. l. ix. 114). This custom was so well established amongst the Greeks at the time of the poet, that he does not hesitate to introduce it amongst the gods (Odyss. viii. 318). It was not unknown among the Jews, and Strabo, in his fifteenth book, tells us that the Indians bought their wives.

http://laurabetzig.org/pdf/RomanMonogamy.pdf

But these notorious women had another thing in common: their dowry was, or approximated, the Roman empire. Marcus was most explicit about it. Reminded of various indiscretions, he responded, "'If we send our wife away, we must also return her dowry.' And what was her dowry? The Empire, which he had inherited from his father-in-law" (SHA, *Marcus Antoninus*, xix.7-9). Everybody played by these rules. Juvenal's sixth satire, an apotheosis of misogyny, says "she brought him three million; in exchange he calls her chaste" (*Satires*, vi.137). **Martial had a horror of rich women, "Why have I no desire to marry riches? / Because, my friend, I want to wear the breeches"** (*Epigrams*, viii.12). **Theophrastus might have put it best: "It is difficult to support a poor wife, and torture to put up with a rich one"** (in Jerome, *Adversus Iovinianum*, i.47, translated in Treggiari 1991a, 192). To the extent that a wife's riches raise his own, and his heir's, reproductive prospects, a husband might let her be promiscuous (cf. Betzig 1992b).

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius8a.html#c3

[3.3] **Hortensia, the daughter of Q. Hortensius, when the order of wives was too heavily taxed by the triumvirs, and none of the men dared undertake to speak on their behalf, pleaded the wives' case before the triumvirs, not only with boldness, but with success.** By reviving the image of her father's eloquence she obtained, that the greatest part of the imposition was remitted. Q. Hortensius then lived again in the female sex, and breathed in the words of his daughter. **If his male descendants had copied her force and vigour, so great an inheritance of Hortensian eloquence would not come to an end in the speech of a woman.**

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Appian/Civil_Wars/4*.html#ref:No_taxation_without_representation

33 1 "**Why should we pay taxes when we have no part in the honours, the commands, the state-craft,**[b] for which you contend against each other with such harmful results? 'Because this is a time of war," do you say? When have there not been wars, **and when have taxes ever been imposed on women,** who are exempted by their sex among all mankind?

> [b] Students of American history will recognize one of the grounds of the American Revolution: "No taxation without representation!" *Nihil novi sub sole*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nKPKBwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false

Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law by Paul J. du Plessis (Oxford University Press, 2015).

4.4.2.2. Women

> Papinian, *Questions, book 31*: There are many points in our law in which the condition of females is inferior to that of males. (D. 1.5.9.)

Disarming honesty from Papinian – and, yet, the position of women in Roman law and society was favourable compared with other ancient societies (some modern ones too). For example, **Roman wives achieved a degree of legal emancipation that would have been the envy of married women in many European legal systems prior to the late-nineteenth century.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6kVLH5gGZVYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA231#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Carcopino makes the improbable claim that during the first and second centuries A.D., Roman women "enjoyed a dignity and an independence at least equal if not superior to those claimed by contemporary feminists":** Jérôme Carcopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 1968), 85.

https://archive.org/details/dailylifeinancie035465mbp/page/n115/mode/2up?view=theater

In Hadrian's day a married woman did not need a guardian even to draft her will, and a father no more dreamed of forcing his daughter to marry against her will than of opposing a marriage on which she had set her heart, for, as the great jurist Salvius Iulianus maintained, a marriage could not be made by constraint, but only by consent of the parties thereto, and the free consent of the girl was indispensable: "*nuptiae consensu contrahentium fiunt; nuptiis filiam familias consentire oportet*."27

It can be understood that this new definition of marriage revolutionised its nature. There are certain causes which inevitably entail certain consequences. In our own days we have seen the French legislator first minimise and finally abolish all obstacles to the triumphant wishes of a marrying couple. **All remnants of parental authority disappeared with the parents' right to oppose a match desired by their children.** The same phenomenon occurred in the Roman empire. Having shaken off the

authority of her husband by adopting the marriage *sine manu*, the Roman matron was freed from the leading strings of guardianship by the free choice the times allowed her in contracting a union. She entered her husband's home of her own free will and lived in it as his equal.

Contrary to general opinion – which colours the conditions existing under the empire with memories of the early days of the republic and of long-lapsed republican customs – it is certain that the Roman woman of the epoch we are studying enjoyed a dignity and an independence at least equal if not superior to those claimed by contemporary feminists. More than one ancient champion of feminism under the Flavians, Musonius Rufus for one, had claimed for women this dignity and independence on the ground of the moral and intellectual equality of the two sexes.28

28. Cf. Favez, *Bull. Soc. Ét. des Lettres de Lausanne* (Oct. 1933) 1-9.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Union_for_Women%27s_Suffrage

During World War II (1939-45) the UFSF was inactive. General Charles de Gaulle granted women's suffrage in 1944, and Brunschwicg therefore chose not to revive the UFSF.[1]

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n415/mode/2up?view=theater

Having been wed for property or politics rather than for love, some women considered their duty fulfilled if they surrendered their dowries to their husbands and their persons to their lovers. “Did we not agree,” an adulteress in Juvenal explained to her unexpected husband, “that we should both do as we liked?”[45] **The “emancipation” of women was as complete then as now, barring the formalities of the franchise and the letter of dead laws. Legislation kept women subject, custom made them free.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/25012/25012-h/25012-h.html#noteref_8

4. I shall once more relate the history of the “Ring”. This is its proper place. It is also the history of a salvation except that in this case it is Wagner himself who is saved—**Half his lifetime Wagner believed in the *Revolution* as only a Frenchman could have believed in it.** He sought it in the runic inscriptions of myths, he thought he had found a typical revolutionary in Siegfried.—“Whence arises all the evil in this world?” Wagner asked himself. From “old contracts”: he replied, as all revolutionary ideologists have done. In plain English: from customs, laws, morals, institutions, from all those things upon which the ancient world and ancient society rests. **“How can one get rid of the evil in this world? How can one get rid of ancient society?” Only by declaring war against “contracts” (traditions, morality).** *This Siegfried does.* He starts early at the game, very early—his origin itself is already a declaration of war against morality—he is the result of adultery, of incest... Not the saga, but Wagner himself is the inventor of this radical feature, in this matter he *corrected* the saga... Siegfried continues as he began: he follows only his first impulse, he flings all tradition, all respect, all *fear* to the winds. Whatever displeases him he strikes down. He tilts irreverently at old god-heads. **His principal undertaking, however, is to emancipate woman,—“to deliver Brunnhilda.”... Siegfried and Brunnhilda, the sacrament of free love, the dawn of the golden age, the twilight of the Gods of old morality—*evil is got rid of*... For a long while Wagner's ship sailed happily along this course.** There can be no doubt that along it Wagner sought his highest goal.—What happened? A misfortune. The ship dashed on to a reef; Wagner had run aground. The reef was Schopenhauer's philosophy; Wagner had stuck fast on a *contrary* view of the world. What had he set to music? Optimism? ...

Brunnhilda, who according to the old plan had to retire with a song in honour of free love, **consoling the world with the hope of a socialistic Utopia in which “all will be well”;** now gets something else to do. She must first study Schopenhauer. She must first versify the fourth book of “The World as Will and Idea.”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6xFarBgmCcMC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA67#v=onepage&q&f=false

Without Wagner’s music there would have been no *Birth of Tragedy*; however, once in existence, the philosophy that Nietzsche formulated based on Wagner’s music was quite capable of going on without him. Indeed, it had to, because Wagner in *Parsifal,* his final work, returned more to the ambivalence he had expressed in *Tannhäuser* than to the paean to free love and adultery that had inspired Nietzsche so much in *Tristan*.

https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_X-UROGF6ZcUC/page/45/mode/2up?view=theater

The vices of men, tolerated by the law, and rather justified than energetically condemned by the morality of philosophers, were made into excuses for the vices of women.69 **After the time in Greece and Rome when ancient austerity was relaxed, and political virtues gave place to individual egoism, married women themselves broke free from the ties to which they**

submitted in the interest of the Republic, and hastened in the path of unruly emancipation, where they followed the *hetaerae* and courtesans. They acquainted themselves with the art and literature of Greece, which instead of forming their taste only familiarised them with vice. The time had gone by when the Romans, less corrupted than now, forbade their wives and daughters to read the poets and philosophers of Greece, in the fear that instead of learning wisdom they would find only lessons in libertinism.70
…

Divorce was in complete accord with the spirit of ancient society. **Marriage, deprived of all moral character, was no longer a sacred bond, an alliance of souls, although a Roman jurisconsult had defined it as a community of things human and divine.**83
…

This license, which powerless laws and corrupt morality allowed to women, along with the disuse of the ancient more solemn forms of marriage, ended in complete annihilation of the husband's power, which existed only in name under the Empire.92 Marriage thus lost the last remnant of its importance in public opinion. The depravity of woman and of all society increased at a rate to which no human law could oppose a sufficiently strong barrier. **Woman in freeing herself from the tyranny of ancient institutions, had also emancipated herself from the external laws of morality; she had freed herself only to increase her burden of vice, for which the civilization of the pagan world provided no remedy.**

https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_X-UROGF6ZcUC/page/193/mode/2up?view=theater

Christianity could never have proclaimed an emancipation of woman as it was carried out by the Roman ladies of the decadence, or as it is taught by modern socialism. With marvellous intelligence of the needs of nature and life, two domains are divided between husband and wife, so as to claim the whole activity of each. **Human life has two sides, public and private; God has given to each sex the limits which none pass without penalty.** Neither men nor women ever leave their own sphere without wounding the universal conscience of the human race.

https://archive.org/details/ancientlaw030840mbp/page/n153/mode/2up?view=theater

These three ancient forms of marriage fell, however, gradually into disuse, **so that, at the most splendid period of Roman greatness, they had almost entirely given place to a fashion of wedlock—old apparently, but not hitherto considered reputable—which was founded on a modification of the lower form of civil marriage.** Without explaining the technical mechanism of the institution now generally popular, I may describe it as amounting in law to little more than a temporary deposit of the woman by her family. The rights of the family remained unimpaired, and the lady continued in the tutelage of guardians whom her parents had appointed and whose privileges of control overrode, in many material respects, the inferior authority of her husband. The consequence was that the situation of the Roman female, whether married or unmarried, became one of great personal and proprietary independence, for the tendency of the later law, as I have already hinted, was to reduce the power of the guardian to a nullity, while the form of marriage in fashion conferred on the husband no compensating superiority. But Christianity tended somewhat from the very first to narrow this remarkable liberty. **Led at first by justifiable disrelish for the loose practices of the decaying heathen world, but afterwards hurried on by a passion of asceticism, the professors of the new faith looked with disfavour on a marital tie which was in fact the laxest the Western world has seen. The latest Roman law, so far as it is touched by the constitutions of the Christian Emperors, bears some marks of a reaction against the liberal doctrines of the great Antonine jurisconsults.** And the prevalent state of religious sentiment may explain why it is that modern jurisprudence, forged in the furnace of barbarian conquest, and formed by the fusion of Roman jurisprudence with patriarchal usage, has absorbed, among its rudiments, much more than usual of those rules concerning the position of women which belong peculiarly to an imperfect civilisation.
…

The principal and most powerful solvent of the revived barbarism of Europe was always the codified jurisprudence of Justinian, wherever it was studied with that passionate enthusiasm which it seldom failed to awaken. It covertly but most efficaciously undermined the customs which it pretended merely to interpret. But the Chapter of law relating to married women was for the most part read by the light, not of Roman, but of Canon Law, **which in no one particular departs so widely from the spirit of the secular jurisprudence as in the view it takes of the relations created by marriage. This was in part inevitable, since no society which preserves any tincture of Christian institution is likely to restore to married women the personal liberty conferred on them by the middle Roman law,** but the proprietary disabilities of married females stand on quite a different basis from their personal incapacities, and it is by keeping alive and

consolidating the former that the expositors of the Canon Law have deeply injured civilisation. There are many vestiges of a struggle between the secular and ecclesiastical principles, but the Canon Law nearly everywhere prevailed.
…

The systems however which are least indulgent to married women are invariably those which have followed the Canon Law exclusively, or those which, from the lateness of their contact with European civilisation, have never had their archaisms weeded out. The Scandinavian laws, harsh till lately to all females, are still remarkable for their severity to wives. And scarcely less stringent in the proprietary incapacities it imposes is the English Common Law, which borrows far the greatest number of its fundamental principles from the jurisprudence of the Canonists. Indeed, the part of the Common Law which prescribes the legal situation of married women may serve to give an Englishman clear notions of the great institution which has been the principal subject of this chapter. **I do not know how the operation and nature of the ancient Patria Potestas can be brought so vividly before the mind as by reflecting on the prerogatives attached to the husband by the pure English Common Law,** and by recalling the rigorous consistency with which the view of a complete legal subjection on the part of the wife is carried by it, where it is untouched by equity or statutes, through every department of rights, duties, and remedies. **The distance between the eldest and latest Roman law on the subject of Children under Power may be considered as equivalent to the difference between the Common Law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery in the rules which they respectively apply to wives.**

> https://www.bl.uk/sisterhood/timeline
>
> The Married Women's Property Act was first introduced in 1870. It allowed women to be the legal owners of money they earned, and to inherit property. **Prior to this Act, everything a woman owned or earned became her husband's property when she married.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/a589105200kinguoft/page/n349/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> While the Roman clergy did real good to Europe, **in preserving the scientific elements of Roman law, they did harm by preserving therewith other elements**—Roman chicane, and Roman cruelty. In that respect, as in others, 'Rome conquered her conquerors;' **and the descendants of those Roman lawyers, whom the honest Teutons called adders, and as adders killed them down, destroyed, in course of time, Teutonic freedom.**
>
> But those descendants were, alas! the clergy.
> …
>
> Looking on the world, and on the future of the human race, through a medium compared with which the darkest fancies of a modern fanatic are bright and clear, they did not shrink from inflicting penalties, the very mention of which makes the blood run cold. **Suspecting, if not alternately envying and despising, all women who were not nuns; writing openly of the whole sex (until unsexed) as the snare and curse of mankind; and possessed by a Manichæan belief in the power and presence of innumerable demons, whose especial victims were women; they erected witch-hunting into a science;** they pandered to, and actually formalized, and justified on scientific grounds, the most cruel and cowardly superstitions of the mob; and again and again raised literal crusades against women, torturing, exposing, burning, young and old, not merely in the witch-mania of the 17th century, but through the whole middle age. It is a detestable page of history. I ask those who may think my statement exaggerated, to consult the original authorities. Let them contrast Rothar's law about the impossibility of witchcraft, with the pages of the Malleus Maleficarum, Nider's Fornicarium, or Delrio the Jesuit, and see for themselves who were the false teachers. And if they be told, that the cruelties of the Inquisition were only those in vogue according to the secular law of the day, let them recollect that the formulizers of that law were none other than the celibate Roman clergy.

https://books.google.gr/books?id=qlU37xo9LeUC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA100#v=onepage&q&f=false

A comparison of Byzantine laws with those of Western Rome again indicates the importance of the nuclear family in the East. **In Rome divorce in accordance with the wish of either party was still allowed in the ninth century.**65 **In Byzantium, the ancient practice of free divorce had been abolished by the eight century.** The independence of the property of the spouses, acknowledged in the Justinianic code, gave way to the notion of familial property, formed of the dowry and the pre-nuptial gift, as an indivisible whole.66 Only after the husband's death was property divided. It had to be shared equally by the wife and the children. The concept of primogeniture was unknown.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=KzmlBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA116#v=onepage&q&f=false

However, the most significant alterations occur in divorce law. **In classical Roman law, marriage, as a simple private contract based on affection, could be easily dissolved unilaterally or conjointly.** Throughout late antiquity, influenced primarily by Christianity, emperors had limited this, so that divorce by mutual assent was forbidden, and a strict set of conditions were given for unilateral divorce. However, **E.2.9. represents stringency beyond precedent,** and indeed is seldom repeated by later Byzantine emperors. Only adultery by the wife, impotence of the husband, or a spouse either plotting against the other or becoming a leper were considered legitimate grounds for divorce.
…

Echoing the *prooimion*, the wisdom of the creator educates mankind on a seminal issue, here the indissolubility of marriage. **This distinctly un-Roman statement is justified through reference to both God the Father in the Old Testament, and Jesus Christ in the New, with the Isaurians and their law code fulfilling and following the heavenly legislators.**
…

It then proceeds to delineate the only grounds permitted to break the sacrament of marriage, permission couched as a form of economy given *in extremis*. Having done so, E.2.9.4 concludes that even insanity was not legitimate grounds for divorce and that:

> Except on these known grounds it is not possible to dissolve a marriage, for as it is written, 'whom God has joined let not man put asunder' (Mt. 19.6)166

Hence the word of God was cited to complete this radical tightening of divorce law, vividly conveying the mindsets of the Isaurians. It was Scripture and its commandments that dominated utterly their rhetoric and motivated change. Overall then, the marriage law of the *Ecloga* evinces both considerable continuity with Justinianic law and important alterations. However, the fundamental shift is rhetorical and conceptual, the transforming of marriage into a Christian sacrament ordained by God, and therefore protected by the pious emperors.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#Footnote_7_48

> [7] Marriage, for instance, being a civil contract, has civil effects without which society cannot even subsist. **Suppose a body of clergy should claim the sole right of permitting this act,** a right which every intolerant religion must of necessity claim, is it not clear that in establishing the authority of the Church in this respect, **it will be destroying that of the prince, who will have thenceforth only as many subjects as the clergy choose to allow him?** Being in a position to marry or not to marry people, according to their acceptance of such and such a doctrine, their admission or rejection of such and such a formula, their greater or less piety, **the Church alone, by the exercise of prudence and firmness, will dispose of all inheritances, offices and citizens, and even of the State itself, which could not subsist if it were composed entirely of bastards.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/180/mode/2up?view=theater

Rousseau ends his *Social Contract* with a stab and then a flourish of his rhetorical sword.

As for the stab – one with a point relevant to our current dispute over who will define marriage, the church or the state – **Rousseau makes it clear that the clergy cannot retain power over marriage. That is, there must be civil marriage, marriage redefined as a "civil contract."** If the priests retain power to make marriages, they retain the power to define marriage – a significant power that would not be in the hands of the civil sovereign.28 With Rousseau, as with the proponents of gay marriage (and even "civil unions") today, the aim is to drive the Christian understanding of marriage into extinction. **The Christian view of marriage is the product of what Rousseau calls an "intolerant religion,"** and therefore it violates his civil religion's one negative dogma: thou shalt not be intolerant.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap44.htm#freedom

The dignity of marriage was restored by the Christians, who derived all spiritual grace from the prayers of the faithful and the benediction of the priest or bishop. The origin, validity, and duties of the holy institution were regulated by the tradition of the synagogue, the precepts of the gospel, and the canons of general or provincial synods; (121) and the conscience of the Christians was awed by the decrees and censures of their ecclesiastical rulers. **Yet the magistrates of Justinian were not subject to the authority of the church: the emperor consulted the unbelieving civilians of antiquity,** and the choice of matrimonial laws in the Code and Pandects, is directed by the earthly motives of justice, policy, and the natural freedom of both sexes. (122)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=w6cwDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false

Late in 1790, the Père Duchesne most colorfully expressed his "indignation aganst the 'indissolubricité' [a pun: indissol-lust-ibility] of marriage." After describing several stormy marriages ending in bizarre murders, he called for

legalizing divorce and ending arranged marriages: “Here’s what our fucking marriage is … **it’s held together only by chains; it was okay when we were fucking slaves. <u>But now we are free: it’s not money, fuck, which should make marriages; it’s no longer fathers’ authority, it’s inclination and taste.</u>**”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=ztMuAAAAMAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA203#v=onepage&q&f=false

You know that marriage is here a civil contract only, which I have seen entered into at the *bureau* of the municipality, and which consists merely in the parties declaring, before certain witnesses, their wish to be united, and entering their names in a register; **but of late all but flaming republicans have thought it necessary to strengthen the engagement, by privately superadding the ceremony of the church.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/canavan-select-works-of-edmund-burke-vol-3#lf0005-03_head_005

Other Legislators, knowing that marriage is the origin of all relations, and consequently the first element of all duties, have endeavoured, by every art, to make it sacred. **The Christian Religion, by confining it to the pairs, and by rendering that relation indissoluble, has, by these two things, done more towards the peace, happiness, settlement, and civilization of the world, than by any other part in this whole scheme of Divine Wisdom.** The direct contrary course has been taken in the Synagogue of Antichrist, I mean in that forge and manufactory of all evil, the sect which predominated in the Constituent Assembly of 1789. Those monsters employed the same, or greater industry, to desecrate and degrade that State, which other Legislators have used to render it holy and honourable. By a strange, uncalled-for declaration, they pronounced, **that marriage was no better than a common civil contract.**

> P. 128, l. 12. *common civil contract.* Here again Burke goes back to the early legislation of the Revolution. Subsequent legislation, in European countries least to be suspected of revolutionism, has justified the advocates of the measure.

It was one of their ordinary tricks, to put their sentiments into the mouths of certain personated characters, which they theatrically exhibited at the bar of what ought to be a serious Assembly. One of these was brought out in the figure of a prostitute, whom they called by the affected name of “a mother without being a wife.” **This creature they made to call for a repeal of the incapacities, <u>which in civilized States are put upon bastards.</u>** The prostitutes of the Assembly gave to this their puppet the sanction of their greater impudence. In consequence of the principles laid down, and the manners authorised, bastards were not long after put on the footing of the issue of lawful unions. Proceeding in the spirit of the first authors of their constitution, succeeding assemblies went the full length of the principle, and gave a licence to divorce at the mere pleasure of either party, and at a month’s notice. With them the matrimonial connexion is brought into so degraded a state of concubinage, that, I believe, none of the wretches in London, who keep warehouses of infamy, would give out one of their victims to private custody on so short and insolent a tenure. There was indeed a kind of profligate equity in thus giving to women the same licentious power. **The reason they assigned was as infamous as the act; declaring that women had been too long under the tyranny of parents and of husbands.**

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/nov/06.htm
>
> Enlightenment, culture, civilisation, liberty--**in all capitalist, bourgeois republics of the world all these fine words are combined with extremely infamous, disgustingly filthy and brutally coarse laws in which woman is treated as an inferior being,** laws dealing with marriage rights and divorce, with the inferior status of a child born out of wedlock as compared with that of a "legitimate" child, laws granting privileges to men, laws that are humiliating and insulting to women.
>
> The yoke of capital, **the tyranny of "sacred private property",** the despotism of philistine stupidity, the greed of petty proprietors – these are the things that prevented the most democratic bourgeois republics from infringing upon those filthy and infamous laws.
>
> The Soviet Republic, the republic of workers and peasants, promptly wiped out these laws and left not a stone in the structure of bourgeois fraud and bourgeois hypocrisy.

…

In Rome, whilst Rome was in its integrity, the few causes allowed for divorce amounted in effect to a prohibition. They were only three. The arbitrary was totally excluded; and accordingly some hundreds of years passed, without a single example of that kind. **When manners were corrupted, the laws were relaxed; as the latter always follow the former, when they are not able to regulate them, or to vanquish them. <u>Of this circumstance the Legislators of vice and crime were pleased to take notice, as an inducement to adopt their regulation:</u>** holding out an hope, that the permission would as rarely be made use of.

http://attalus.org/translate/valerius2a.html#c1

[1.4] **There was no divorce between man and wife until five hundred and twenty years after the city was founded.** The first was Spurius Carvilius, who divorced his wife for being barren. Though he appeared to have a good excuse for what he did, yet there were those who blamed him enough, **being such as believed that conjugal loyalty was to be preferred above desire for children.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Cambac%C3%A9r%C3%A8s,_Jean_Jacques_R%C3%A9gis_de

CAMBACÉRÈS, JEAN JACQUES RÉGIS DE, duke of Parma (1753-1824), French statesman, was born at Montpellier on the 18th of October 1753. He was descended from a well-known family of the legal nobility (*noblesse de la robe*). He was designed for the magistracy of his province; and in 1771, when for a time the provincial parlement was suppressed, with the others, by the chancellor Maupeou, he refused to sit in the royal tribunal substituted for it. **He continued, however, to study law with ardour, and in 1774 succeeded his father as councillor in the court of accounts and finances of his native town.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques-R%C3%A9gis_de_Cambac%C3%A9r%C3%A8s#Private_life

Cambacérès was a homosexual, his sexual orientation was well-known, and he does not seem to have made any effort to conceal it. He remained unmarried, and kept to the company of other bachelors. Napoleon is recorded as making a number of jokes on the subject.[12]

http://www.cambaceres.org/vie-poli/code-civ/cod-civi.htm

Lawyer of formation and man of the Lights, **Cambaceres seems according to Vialles to have taken as a starting point three principles in the drafting of the first civil law:**

> ***- to approach the natural right as much as possible, because the natural laws are higher than all the others.***
> ***- to maintain a unit complete in the legislation, because the truth is one and indivisible.***
> ***- to bring most extreme simplicity in the legal regulations, because few laws are enough for the honest men.***

…

The ideas of the Lights are illustrated in particular in the definition of the relationship between the parents and the children: *Monitoring and protection here are rights of the parents; to nourish, raise, establish their children, here are their duties. The children will be equipped by learning, as of their tender childhood, a trade of agriculture or mechanical art. (...) The children of the fatherland will show their harvests, their cultures, their work and they will say emulously astonished: here are our treasures."* (Cambaceres).

The text removes, for the same reasons, the concept of illegitimacy and reform the principles of the adoption: *"The adoption is the foreign branch graft on an ancient trunk; it revives the sap of it; it embellishes its stem of new kids; and, by this happy insertion, it crowns the tree of a new harvest of flowers and fruits.* ***Admirable institution that you had the glory to renew*** *and which binds so naturally to the Constitution of the Republic,* ***since it brings without crisis the division of great fortunes."***

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adoption#Middle_ages_to_modern_period
>
> **The nobility of the Germanic, Celtic, and Slavic cultures that dominated Europe after the decline of the Roman Empire denounced the practice of adoption.**
> [14] **In medieval society, bloodlines were paramount; a ruling dynasty lacking a "natural-born" heir apparent was replaced, a stark contrast to Roman traditions.** The evolution of European law reflects this aversion to adoption. English common law, for instance, did not permit adoption since it contradicted the customary rules of inheritance.

…

All the children share the family inheritance equally, except for a negligible share whose head of household can lay out with his own way.

…

The Convention begins the reading and the discussion of the various articles. **The discussion stumbles on the equality of the husbands, and under the impulse of Merlin of Douai, the conventional ones reject the article instituting the joint management of the goods of the household.** Some articles are then voted, in particular on the divorce, but the Montagnards taken along by Levasseur and

Fabre d'Eglantine find too much the project inspired by the spirit of the men of law and make vote a decree establishing a commission of 6 philosophers charged to reform the project.
…

On August 26, 1796, Cambaceres goes up again to the platform to defend his civil code law: ***"Today that all is changed in the political order, it is essential to substitute for the old laws a code of simple laws."*** (Cambaceres). **He is attacked by the conservatives of Five hundreds, which considers certain provisions immoral (divorce, rights granted to the children born except marriage and the principle of equality of the heirs).**
…

On September 9, 1802, the discussion is resumed with the Council of State, the meetings are chaired by the First Consul or the Second Consul in his absence. Cambaceres prepares all work by communicating the documents relating to the agenda, as well as the extracts of his three codes, which is worth to him some criticisms on behalf of the advisers of State who find these preceding projects too impregnated of the ideas of the Lights or the Revolution. **It carries out practically all the debates, Bonaparte known as of him: *"Cambaceres makes the lawyer general; it speaks sometimes for, sometimes against"*.** On the 109 meetings of the Council of State necessary to the discussion of the Civil code, 52 are chaired by Cambaceres. **The influence of the First Consul results in a very Mediterranean design of the family subjected to the authority of the father of family, while the influence of Cambaceres allows the introduction of the divorce by consent and a recognition of the adoption in conformity with the preceding projects.**

http://www.cambaceres.org/vie-poli/redde/redde.htm

On May 15, Cambaceres argues against heredity: *"That there is not this stupid institution, anachronistic and destroying, which entrusts the capacity to that which by chance was born the first"* then it resigns of its functions of Second Consul. The following day, Bonaparte convenes Cambaceres with Saint-Cloud to try to make it change opinion. He proposes the station of Archchancellor to him (station created on the councils of Talleyrand who coveted it). Cambaceres accepts and to cross short to the rumours of dissensions between the two men, **it is Cambaceres, president of the Senate, which proclaims the Empire on May 18 in Saint-Cloud.**

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.3Philosophical/page/n25/mode/2up?view=theater

If the Jacobin theory be true, then woman must be allowed access to every male avocation, including government, and war if she wishes it, to suffrage, to every political office, **to as absolute freedom from her husband in the marriage relation as she enjoyed before her union to him, and to as absolute control of her property and earnings as that claimed by the single gentleman, as against her husband.**

https://www.covenanter.org/reformed/2016/5/22/womens-rights-women

"Women's Rights" mean the abolition of all permanent marriage ties. We are told that Mrs. Cady Stanton avowed this result, proclaiming it at the invitation of the Young Men's Christian Association of New York. **She holds that woman's bondage is not truly dissolved until the marriage bond is annulled.** She is thoroughly consistent.
…

Such a co-partnership of equals with independent interests must be separable at will, as all other such co-partnerships are. The only relation between the sexes which will remain will be a cohabitation continuing so long as the convenience or caprice of both parties may suggest; and this, with most, will amount to a vagrant concubinage.

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n35/mode/2up?view=theater

Moreover it was the majestic and beneficent Roman law which more than any other single element brought civilization back to Europe following the barbaric deluge of the Dark Ages.2 From Rome we have inherited our conceptions of law, the State, and the family.3 **The high, firm, secure legal position of woman in European and American civilization, which makes our civilization superior to all other types, is a legacy from the Roman law. The Civil Law was the first to work out and recognize the equality of women with man.**4

> 3. See Chamberlain, *The foundations of the nineteenth century*, London, 1911, whose work has already gone through eight editions.

…

More than this. **As a country we are now repeating the activity of Rome in legislation.** The development of our American law into jurisprudence has been, especially during the last century and a half, most usually by a return to the

Civil Law of Rome. And this returning is still in progress. The most striking illustrations—and there are many—are these three. (1) **The feudal Common Law ideal that husband and wife are one and that one is the husband, has been repudiated in nearly all American states. Married women now have restored to them the power to control their separate property independently of their husbands. And this is simply the re-enactment of the doctrine of Roman law as to the freedom of married women.** (2) Every American state has laws of inheritance similar to those of Rome.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=IRkMm73NCEUC&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA233#v=onepage&q&f=false

There is not a word in Roman Law that upholds the doctrine of indissoluble marriage. The clergy in the time of Justinian persuaded him to curtail in many ways the unlimited right of divorce, but the restrictions that Justinian imposed were swept away again by his successor104 within a few months after Justinian's death. It is the doctrine of the Canon Law that marriage cannot be terminated by divorce,105 and that doctrine became dominant in medieval Europe, but such was never the doctrine of the Roman Law. In fact, under the Roman Law a covenant between parties to a marriage that the marriage should never be dissolved by divorce **was held invalid as depriving the parties of their vested rights.**106

Moreover, what is sometimes called a limited divorce, a divorce mensa et thoro, (from board and bed), which is nothing but a legal separation and called a limited divorce in distinction from absolute divorce, a vinculo matrimonii, (from the bond of marriage), was not known to the Roman Law. **Divorces in Roman Law were all absolute. The marital separation known as divorce a mensa et thoro, which is recognized in some states, but which is not divorce at all since the parties still remain married, was the creation of the Canon or Ecclesiastical Law.**107
…

In modern Civil Law countries the doctrines of the Church or Canon Law that marriage is sacred and the tie indissoluble, remained the law for a long time. In fact, it was also the law of England till the Divorce Act of 1858.

http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/23*.html#ref33

The history of the law of divorce may be considered separately, for the legislation on this subject under the autocracy forms a remarkable and unpleasing exception to the general course of the logical and reasonable development of Roman jurisprudence. Here ecclesiastical influence was active, and the Emperors from Constantine to Justinian fluctuated between the wishes of the Church on one side, and on the other common sense and Roman tradition.
…

Roman law recognised two ways in which a marriage could be dissolved—divorce by mutual consent, and the repudiation of one spouse by the other.[35] **Divorce by mutual consent was always regarded as a purely private matter and was never submitted to a legal form, and even the Christian Emperors before Justinian did not attempt to violate the spirit of the Roman law of contract by imposing any limitations.** It was reserved for Justinian to prohibit it, unless the motive was to allow one of the spouses to embrace a life of asceticism.[36] This arbitrary and rigorous innovation was intolerable to his subjects, and after his death his successor was assailed by numerous petitions for its repeal. The domestic misery resulting from incompatibility of temper was forcibly represented to him, and he restored the ancient freedom as a concession owing to the frailty of human nature.[37]
…

One-sided divorce had been equally unfettered; Augustus only required that the partner who decided to dissolve the marriage should make a formal declaration to this effect in the presence of seven citizens. **Constantine introduced a new and despotic policy. He forbade one-sided divorce entirely except for a very few specified reasons.**
…

The general tenor of these enactments of Justinian, **though they were temporarily set aside in the eighth and ninth centuries,** remained in force throughout the later period of the Empire, and the ecclesiastics never succeeded in bringing the civil into harmony with the canonical law which pronounced marriage indissoluble, and penalised a divorced person who married again as guilty of adultery.

https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/roman-law-and-the-idea-of-europe/ch2-exiled-romanists-between-traditions-pringsheim-schulz-and-daube

The third and final book (Schulz's main works are books) was *Classical Roman Law* (1951). In it, Schulz continued to deepen the thesis of classicism, humanism and liberalism as the great foundations of the Roman legal tradition. In all of the books, the great uniting factor is (beyond the continuing belief in interpolationary research) **the separation between law and politics:** of the harmfulness of needless legislative inputs and the interference of political power in the law.

Within the praise of the Roman legal achievement, there were still elements that may be understood through the background of Nazi racial laws, for example, his exaltation of the Roman law of marriage:

> **The classical law of marriage is an imposing, perhaps the most imposing, achievement of the Roman legal genius. For the first time in the history of civilization there appeared a purely humanistic law of marriage, viz. a law founded on a purely humanistic idea of marriage as being a free and freely dissoluble union of two equal partners for life.** (Schulz 1951, 103)

Recent scholars have questioned the accuracy of Schulz's idealistic interpretation (Urbanik 2016: 483). While the Nazi legal machinery regulated marriage with the aim of the preservation of racial purity and the continuation of the race through procreation, **Schulz's Roman marriage was its complete opposite, a radical alternative to not only the Nazi marriage laws that forbade marriage between unsuitable partners such as Jews and 'Aryans' but also the modern European laws that were founded on the legal oppression of women and the obstacles placed on divorce.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch07.htm#ch07-1

The marriage and family laws established by the October revolution, once the object of its legitimate pride, are being made over and mutilated by vast borrowings from the law treasuries of the bourgeois countries. And as though on purpose to stamp treachery with ridicule, the same arguments which were earlier advanced in favor of unconditional freedom of divorce and abortion – "the liberation of women," "defense of the rights of personality," "protection of motherhood" – are repeated now in favor of their limitation and complete prohibition.

The retreat not only assumes forms of disgusting hypocrisy, but also is going infinitely farther than the iron economic necessity demands. To the objective causes producing this return to such bourgeois forms as the payment of alimony, there is added the social interest of the ruling stratum in the deepening of bourgeois law. **The most compelling motive of the present cult of the family is undoubtedly the need of the bureaucracy for a stable hierarchy of relations, and for the disciplining of youth by means of 40,000,000 points of support for authority and power.**

While the hope still lived of concentrating the education of the new generations in the hands of the state, the government was not only unconcerned about supporting the authority of the "elders", and, in particular of the mother and father, but on the contrary tried its best to separate the children from the family, in order thus to protect them from the traditions of a stagnant mode of life. Only a little while ago, in the course of the first five-year plan, the schools and the Communist Youth were using children for the exposure, shaming and in general "re-educating" of their drunken fathers or religious mothers with what success is another question. At any rate, this method meant a shaking of parental authority to its very foundations. In this not unimportant sphere too, a sharp turn has now been made. **Along with the seventh, the fifth commandment is also fully restored to its rights as yet, to be sure, without any references to God. But the French schools also get along without this supplement, and that does not prevent them from successfully inculcating conservatism and routine.**

Concern for the authority of the older generation, by the way, has already led to a change of policy in the matter of religion. **The denial of God, his assistance and his miracles, was the sharpest wedge of all those which the revolutionary power drove between children and parents.** Outstripping the development of culture, serious propaganda and scientific education, the struggle with the churches, under the leadership of people of the type of Yaroslavsky, often degenerated into buffoonery and mischief. The storming of heaven, like the storming of the family, is now brought to a stop. The bureaucracy, concerned about their reputation for respectability, have ordered the young "godless" to surrender their fighting armor and sit down to their books. **In relation to religion, there is gradually being established a regime of ironical neutrality. But that is only the first stage. It would not be difficult to predict the second and third, if the course of events depended only upon those in authority.**

---

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D925

> Nor could they then regard
> The general good, nor did they know to use
> In common any customs, any laws:
> **Whatever of booty fortune unto each**
> **Had proffered, each alone would bear away,**
> **By instinct trained for self to thrive and live.**
> And Venus in the forests then would link
> The lovers' bodies; for the woman yielded
> Either from mutual flame, or from the man's
> Impetuous fury and insatiate lust,
> Or from a bribe – as acorn-nuts, choice pears,
> Or the wild berries of the arbute-tree.
> ...
>
> Afterwards,
> When huts they had procured and pelts and fire,
> And when the woman, joined unto the man,

Withdrew with him into one dwelling place,
... ...

Were known; and when they saw an offspring born
From out themselves, then first the human race
Began to soften. For 'twas now that fire
Rendered their shivering frames less staunch to bear,
Under the canopy of the sky, the cold;
And Love reduced their shaggy hardiness;
And children, with the prattle and the kiss,
Soon broke the parents' haughty temper down.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/600/mode/2up?view=theater

Lahontan's Amerindians also regulate sexual life and marriage more rationally than the whites. **Young women are left entirely free to choose, or agree to, their own husbands without any tyranny of the family.** Divorce, as Jean-Frédéric Bernard reminded readers, recycling Lahontan's material in his great compendium on the world's religions of 1723, is readily available but rarely required since their marriages, being better founded, last longer and develop more satisfactorily than those of Europeans.55 Whereas European men boast of their sexual exploits but impose on women an exacting code of chastity and modesty, and a ruthless surveillance of reputations, a double standard entailing a heavy stigma where women are suspected of extramarital intercourse, **the Canadian Indians, allegedly, made no fetish of virginity or chastity, leaving young women and men free to experiment sexually both before and after marriage.**

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n66/mode/2up?view=theater

I know the Humour of the Savages better than a great many *French* People that have liv'd among 'em all their Life-time; for I study'd their Customs so narrowly and exactly, that all their Conduct of Life is as perfectly well known to me, as if I had been among 'em all my Life-time: **And 'tis this Exact Knowledge that prompts me to say, That they are altogether Strangers to that Blind Fury which we call Love.**
…

The Savages never quarrel among themselves, neither do they reproach or affront one another; One man among them is as good as another, for all are upon the same Level. They have no Disorders occasion'd by a Girl or a Wife, for the Women are Wise, and so are their Husbands: The Girls indeed are a little foolish, and the Young Men play the fool with them not unfrequently: But then you must consider that a Young Woman is allow'd to do what she pleases; let her Conduct be what it will, neither Father nor Mother, Brother nor Sister can pretend to controul her. **A Young Woman, say they, is Master of her own Body, and by her Natural Right of Liberty is free to do what she pleases.** But on the other hand the Married Women being allow'd the Priviledge of quitting their Husbands when they please, had as good be dead as be guilty of Adultery. In like manner, the Husbands being entituled to the same Priviledge, would look upon themselves as infamous, if they were faithless to their Wives.
…

You must take notice, that forasmuch as the Savages are Strangers to *Meum* and *Tuum*, to Superiority and Subordination; and live in a State of Equality pursuant to the Principles of Nature; they are under no apprehension of Robbers or Secret Enemies, so that their Huts are open Night and Day. You must know farther, that Two Hours after Sun-set, the Old Superannuated Persons, or the Slaves (who never lie in their Masters Huts) take care to cover up the Fire before they go. 'Tis then that the Young Savage comes well wrapt up to his Mistress's Hut, and lights a sort of a Match at the Fire; after which he opens the Door of his Mistresses Apartment, and makes up to her Bed: If she blows out the Light, he lies down by her; but if she pulls her Covering over her Face, he retires; that being a Sign that (he will not receive him. **The Young Women drink the Juice of certain Roots, which prevents their Conception, or kills the Fruit of the Womb; for if a Girl proves with Child, she'll never get a Husband.**
…

This People cannot conceive that the *Europeans,* who value themselves upon their Sense and Knowledge, should be so blind and so ignorant as not to know that Marriage in their way is a source of Trouble and Uneasiness. To be ingag'd for one's Life time, to them is matter of Wonder and Surprise. **They look upon it as a monstrous thing to be tied one to another without any hopes of being able to untie or break the Knot.** In fine, in spite of all the Reasons and Arguments that that Subject affords, they lay down this for a firm and unmoveable Truth, that we *Europeans* are born in Slavery, and deserve no other Condition than that of Servitude.
…

‘Tis allowable both for the Man and the Woman to part when they please. Commonly they give one another eight Days Warning; sometimes they offer Reasons to justifie their Conduct, but for the most part the usual Plea is, that they are sick and out of order, and that Repose is more proper for them than the fatigue of a married Life. Then the little pieces of the Rod that were distributed among the Relations of the married Persons, are brought into that Hut in which the Marriage was Solemniz’d, and burnt in their Presence. You must observe that this Separation is accomplish’d without any Dispute or Quarrel. Both the Men and the Women thus unmarried may be marry’d again to whom they please: But commonly they lie bye three or six Months before they consummate their second Marriage.
…

The Savages go always by the Mothers Name. To make this plain by an example: the Leader of the Nation of *Hurons*, who is called *Sastaretsi*,1 being Married to a Daughter of another *Huron* Family, by whom he has several Children, that General’s Name is extinct at his Death, for that his Children assume the Name of the Mother. Now, it may be ask’d how **the Name of *Sastaretsi* has been kept up for the space of Seven or Eight Hundred Years among that People,** and is likely to continue to future Ages? But the Question is easily Answered, if we consider, that the Sister of this *Sastaretsi* being Married to another Savage, whom we shall call *Adario*, the Children Springing from that Marriage, will be called *Sastaretsi* after the Mother, and not *Adario* after this Father. When I asked them the Reason of the Custom, they replyed, that the Children having received their Soul from their Father, and their Body from their Mother, ‘twas but reasonable that the Maternial Name should be perpetuated. I represented to them I do not know how often, that God alone was the only Creator of Souls, **and that it was more reasonable to derive the original of that Custom from the certainty that they had of the Mother beyond that of the Father;** but they possitively affirmed that this reason was absurd, without offering any proof.1
…

I observ’d before, that if once a Girle proves with Child, she never gets a Husband; but I ought to have added that some young Women will not hear of a Husband, through a principle of Debauchery. That sort of Women are call’d *Ickone ne Kioussa*, i.e. Hunting Women: for they commonly accompany the Huntsmen in their Diversions. To justify their Conduct, they alledge that they find themselves to be of too indifferent a temper to brook the Conjugal yoak, to be too careless for the bringing up of Children, and too impatient to bear the passing of the whole Winter in the Villages. Thus it is, that they cover and disguise their Lewdness. Their Parents or Relations dare not censure their Vicious Conduct; on the contrary they seem to approve of it, **in declaring, as I said before, that their Daughters have the command of their own Bodies and may dispose of their Persons as they think fit; they being at their liberty to do what they please. In short, the Children of these Common Women are accounted a Lawful Issue, and intitled to all the Privileges of other Children;** abateing for one thing, namely, that the noted Warriours or Counsellours will not accept of ‘em for their Sons in Law, and that they cannot enter into Alliance with certain Ancient Families; though at the same time these Families are not possessed of any peculiar Right or Preheminence. **The *Jesuits* do their utmost to prevent the Lewd Practices of these Whores, by Preaching to their Parents that their Indulgence is very disagreeable to the Great Spirit,** that they must answer before God for not confineing their Children to the measures of Continency and Chastity, and that a Fire is Kindled in the other World to Torment ‘em for ever, unless they take more care to correct Vice.

To such Remonstrances the Men reply, *That’s Admirable*; and the Women usually tell the Good Fathers in a deriding way, *That if their Threats be well grounded, the Mountains of the other World must consist of the Ashes of souls*.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n236/mode/2up?view=theater

Once more, I’ll take the liberty to mention another piece of Madness practis’d among you, which indeed is down right Cruelty to my Mind. Your Marriages are indissolvable, and yet a Youth and a Girl that burn in the mutual flames of Love, can’t marry without the consent of their Parents. Both the one and the other must marry who their Fathers please, in opposition to their own Inclination, tho' their Aversion to the Person propos’d be so great, that they hate him mortally. **The inequality of Age, Estate and Birth is the source of all these Inconveniences; they overrule the mutual Love of the two Parties that like one another.** What Cruelty! What Tyranny! and that practis’d by a Father upon his own Children. Do you meet with such things among the *Hurons*? **Among them every one’s as Rich and as Noble as his Neighbour; the Women are entitled to the same Liberty with the Men, and the Children enjoy the same Privileges with their Fathers. A young *Huron* may marry one of his Mother's Slaves, and neither Father nor Mother are impower’d to hinder him.** This Slave by so doing becomes a free Woman; and since her Beauty pleases, why should not the Youth prefer her to the great General’s Daughter that is not so handsome? To continue the faults of your Constitution: Is it not a piece of Injustice among you who abhor a community of Goods, **that a Nobleman or Gentleman should give his eldest Son almost all that he has, and force the other Brethren and Sisters to rest satisfied with a Trifle, tho’ perhaps that eldest Son is not a Lawful Child, and all the rest are? The Consequence of this is, that they throw their Daughters into perpetual Prisons,** with a sort

of Barbarity which is not suitable to the Christian Charity that the Jesuits preach up. **As for the other Sons, they are forc'd to turn Priests and Monks, in order to live by the fine Trade of praying to God against their will, of preaching what they do not practise, and of persuading others into the belief of what they disbelieve themselves.** If any of 'em take up a Military Profession, they design the pillaging the Nation more than the guarding off her Enemies. The *French* do not fight for the Interest of their Country as we do; 'tis their own Interest and preferment to higher Posts that they have in view. The Love of their Country and of their Fellow-Citizens does not prevail so much with them as Vanity, Ambition and Riches. In fine, my dear Brother, I conclude this Discourse in assuring thee, That the Christians Self-love is a piece of Folly that the *Hurons* will ever condemn; **and that Folly which tinctures all your Actions is remarkable in a distinguishing manner in the way of your Amours and Marriages;** which, I must say, is as unaccountable as the People are who suffer themselves to be catch'd in that Noose.
…

That Liberty which the *Hurons* preach up occasions dismal Disorders. **In their way the Children are Masters as well as the Fathers; and Wives who ought naturally to be subject to their Husbands are invested with an equal Authority.** The Daughters scorn the Advice of their Mothers when there's a Lover in the case. In a Word, all this scene of Liberty reduces the way of Life to a continued course of Debauchery, **by granting to Nature, in Imitation of the Brutes, an unlimited satisfaction to all its Demands.** Your single Women place their Wisdom in concerting and concealing their lewd Adventures. To run with *a Match in your Villages, is the same thing as strolling after a Whore in ours. All your young Men roll from Hut to Hut upon such Adventures while the Night lasts.
…

If there's any thing of Wantonness and Debauchery amongst our Wenches, there is at least this difference, that the Rule is not General, as it is amongst yours; and besides they don't go so brutishly to work with it.

https://archive.org/details/newvoyagestonor00paltgoog/page/n230/mode/2up?view=theater

What is the reason that the Women-Savages, being so rarely Fruitful, have the Increase of their Nation so little in view, that a Woman shall make her self Miscarry when the Father of the Child dies, or is kill'd, before she is brought to Bed? You'll tell me, she do's it to save her Reputation; because, without that Precaution she would never have another Husband. But it would seem the Interest of the Nation, which lies in its Increase and Multiplication, is but little regarded by your Women. Now, it is not so with ours, for, as you said t'other day, our *Coureurs de Bois* and many others, find very often new Children in their Houses, at their return from their Journeys: But they are not much dissatisfied, upon the consideration, **that this adds so many Bodys for the Nation, and so many Souls for Heaven:** Tho' after all, their Women undergo as much disgrace upon such occasions as yours do, and sometimes are Imprisoned for Life, while yours are allow'd to entertain as many Gallants as they please afterwards. **'Tis a most abominable piece of Cruelty for a Woman to make away with her Child: A Crime which the Author of Life will never pardon: And this is one of the greatest Abuses to be reformed among you.** You ought to discountenance Nakedness too; for the liberty which your Boys have of going Naked, makes a terrible Hurricane in the Minds of your young Girls; as they are not made of Brass, so the view of those parts which decency forbids me to name, can't but call up the Amorous Fire, especially when the young Wantons shew that Nature is neither dead nor untrue to the Adventures of Love.

Adario. **I take it, you account for the Barrenness of our Women admirably; for I perceive how that may come to pass: And as for the Criminal Practice of our young Women in taking Potions to make themselves Miscarry; I find your Reflexions upon it are very just. But what you say of Nakedness do's not stand to Reason.** I allow that in a Nation where distinctions of Property are acknowledged, you are very much in the right of it, to cover not only such parts as ought not to be nam'd, but even all the parts of the Body. What use would the *French* make of their Gold and their Silver, if they did not imploy it in providing themselves with fine Cloaths? **Since in your Country Men are valued according to their Dress, is it not a great advantage to be able to cover any Defect in Nature with a handsome Habit? In earnest, Nakedness ought not to offend any but such as allow Property.** A deform'd or decrepit Man among you has found the Secret of appearing Handsome or well Dress'd, in a Beau Perriwig and fine Cloaths; under which 'tis impossible to distinguish Artificial Shapes from such as are Natural.

> https://archive.org/details/cityofsaintsacro00burt/page/107/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The ancient Persians taught their progeny archery, riding, and truth-telling; **the Prairie Indian's curriculum is much the same, only the last of the trio is carefully omitted.**
> …

> **The children, "born like the wild ass's colts," are systematically spoiled with the view of fostering their audacity;** the celebrated apophthegm of the Wise King – to judge from his notable failure at home, he probably did not practice what he preached – which has caused such an expenditure of birch and cane in higher races, would be treated with contempt by the Indians. The fond mother, when chastening her child, never goes beyond dashing a little cold water in its face – for which reason to besprinkle a man is a mortal insult – a system which, perhaps, might be naturalized with advantage in some parts of Europe. **The son is taught to make his mother toil for him, and openly to disobey his sire; at seven years of age he has thrown off all parental restraint; nothing keeps him in order but the fear of the young warriors. At ten or twelve he openly rebels against all domestic rule, and does not hesitate to strike his father;** the parent then goes off rubbing his hurt, and boasting to his neighbors of the brave boy whom he has begotten.
>
> http://sino-platonic.org/complete/spp207_germani_xiongnu.pdf
>
> **For according to Sima Qian, amongst the Xiongnu it is the custom for "the young and strong to eat the fatty and delicious food and the elderly to eat what is left over. Thus they value the strong and healthy and despise the elderly and weak":** (*Shiji* 110. 2879). When a Chinese envoy accuses the Xiongnu of what, in his eyes, is a barbaric and despicable practice, **Zhonghang Yue retorts that this custom is in fact in the best interests of the elderly:** (*Shiji* 110. 2899–2900)
>
> > The elderly [of the Xiongnu] are unable to fight. Therefore we give their fatty and delicious food to the young and strong, and thus the elderly may be protected and defended. In this way are both able to protect one another for a long time. So how can you say that the Xiongnu do not respect the elderly?
>
> As with the Germani, Xiongnu society's defining activity is warfare, and in their case it is so important as to dictate familial relations – **resulting in an inversion of what the Chinese would have considered to be the civilized, hierarchical arrangement mandated by Confucianism, adherence to which was held up as the absolute barometer of moral cultivation and virtue.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46333/pg46333-images.html#Footnote_4_63

They ceased to fall asleep under the first tree, or in the first cave that afforded them shelter; they invented several kinds of implements of hard and sharp stones, which they used to dig up the earth, and to cut wood; they then made huts out of branches, and afterwards learnt to plaster them over with mud and clay. **This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and distinguished families, and introduced a kind of property, in itself the source of a thousand quarrels and conflicts.** …

The first expansions of the human heart were the effects of a novel situation, which united husbands and wives, fathers and children, under one roof. The habit of living together soon gave rise to the finest feelings known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection. Every family became a little society, **the more united because liberty and reciprocal attachment were the only bonds of its union. The sexes, whose manner of life had been hitherto the same, began now to adopt different ways of living. The women became more sedentary, and accustomed themselves to mind the hut and their children, while the men went abroad in search of their common subsistence.**

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/174/mode/2up?view=theater

To put it in a slightly different perspective, if society should follow Rousseau, and define what is natural by his Lucretian analysis of human origins, then that society would come to view heterosexual intercourse as one option among many for releasing sexual tension and enjoying sexual pleasure. **No option would have any precedence over any other, for no option would be any more natural than any other.**

To return to our analysis of Rousseau, it is clear that society would not be natural; that is, **human beings are naturally asocial, and society was one more accident brought about in the slow meandering of human evolution.** How did it come about? According to Rousseau, the desire of man to relieve himself of the pain of exposure to the elements brought him to build crude shelters, the first great "revolution" in the "almost imperceptible progress from beginnings," **where the "habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to men: conjugal love and paternal love." Oddly enough, it was only then "that the first difference was established in the way of life of the two sexes, which until this time had had but one."**59

Not only were conjugal and paternal love not natural – however sweet they may be – but the distinction of the sexes was for the most part artificial. **Rousseau thereby radicalized the homogeneity of the atomic**

presocial individuals: the original condition of human beings was nearly genderless, that is, with little or no distinction between the sexes. (Or to offer the same assertion in a contemporary form, male and female are naturally equal, but society has artificially created distinctions, or exaggerated distinctions, between them.)

It followed that love and marriage, whatever pleasures may come from them, were strictly speaking unnatural, and their development was deleterious. In this assertion, Rousseau duplicated Lucretius's argument exactly. In the state of nature, there was *only* sexual desire: "Everyone [male and female alike] peaceably waits for the impulsion of nature, yields to it without choice with more pleasure than frenzy; and the need satisfied, all desire is extinguished." Falling away from this natural state created all the anxiety and passion of romance, and our natural tranquillity is thereby lost. "It is therefore incontestable that love itself, like all the other passions, has acquired only in society that impetuous ardor which so often makes it fatal for men."60 Jealousy was unknown to the purely natural human being; "free love" is our natural condition. **The 1960s was not the origin of the free love movement; it was simply the popular flowering of a seed planted before the birth of Christ and revivified by Rousseau.**

https://archive.org/details/10booksthatscrew0000wike/page/44/mode/2up?view=theater

What, then, did Rousseau imagine? If we might be a bit glib, **whereas Hobbes's men in the state of nature were gorillas – nasty, brutish, and curiously short – Rousseau's primitive men were suave, peaceful, innocent, carefree, and cheerfully libidinous bonobos.** Rousseau therefore gave us a new Adam, a carefree, make-love-not-war ancestral archetype who became the societal ideal of the "free love" movements.
...

Rousseau goes so far in his imaginative destruction of love and the family that he denies even the love of mother and child. "**The mother nursed her children at first for her own need;** then, habit having endeared them to her, she nourished them afterward for their need. As soon as they had the strength to seek their own food, they did not delay in leaving the mother herself; and as there was practically no other way to find one another again than not to lose sight of each other [in the jungle or forest], they were soon at a point of not even recognizing one another."6
...

Because man is so primitive, he has no idea of beauty: "any woman is good for him."7 As for his string of offspring, given that he's off into the trees once his "need" is "satisfied," "he did not recognize his children"8 even if he happened to stumble upon them later on.

There you have it: Rousseau's paradise, his new and improved Adam and Eve. **Sex entirely devoid of all the unpleasant duties and entanglements of love!** A mere "blind inclination, devoid of any sentiment of the heart," that produces "only a purely animal act," satisfying a passing brute desire. And when the desire is quenched, "the two sexes no longer recognize each other, and even the child no longer meant anything to his mother as soon as he could do without her."9 **Every cad's paradise! Paternity without strings!** No pestiferous pangs of conscience!

There were no twinges of conscience for natural man, Rousseau assured the reader, because "the moral element of love is an artificial sentiment born of the usage of society."10 Since neither the love of husband and wife, or parent and child, is natural, then neither are the moral duties that rise from marriage and childbearing. (Rousseau added, with more than a little hint of autobiography, that the moral element of love is an artificial sentiment **"extolled with much skill and care by women in order to establish their ascendancy and make dominant the sex that ought to obey."**11)

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n553/mode/2up?view=theater

Let not the reader be imposed upon by the term *Patriarchal life*. **The illuminizing Hierophant speaks of Abraham and of the Patriarchs, of the father *priest and king*, sole *sovereign* over his family.** He is not to expect to see the father surrounded by his children, exercising the sweetest of all dominions, and each child, docile to the dictates of nature, revering the orders and anticipating the will of a beloved father. No; this empire is as imaginary as his priesthood. **We have seen in the degree of *Mage*, that the illuminized Patriarch can no more pretend to the acknowledgement of a God than can an Atheist. We must then begin by withdrawing from the Patriarchal life that interesting sight of the father offering up to heaven the prayers of his children, sacrificing in their name, and exercising in the midst of them the functions of the priest of the living God.** In the next degree of the mysteries all his dominion over his children is to disappear, as his priesthood has already done. Nor was I afraid to assert in the beginning of this work, *If Jacobinism triumphs—your very children shall be torn from you*. I now repeat it; **all this pretended sovereignty of the father is but a conspiracy against the paternal authority.** The proofs are extant in the codes of the Sect.

Here again is Weishaupt deprived of the glory of the invention. **Rousseau and the Encyclopedists had long since told us, that *the authority of the father ceased with the wants of the son*; this was one of their principles of rebellion.** The man who invented his Illuminism only to convert it into the common sewer of every antichristian and antisocial error, could not leave your children in the dark as to

these lessons of independence, though under the sanctuary of the paternal roof; **nor with respect to the pretended right of governing themselves, and of acknowledging no other law than that of their reason, as soon as they were strong enough to disobey, or no longer needed your assistance.** Tell the illuminizing Hierophant, that your children belong to you; it will be useless, for he has already answered, "***The paternal authority ceases with the wants of the children; the father would wrong his children, should he pretend to any authority over them after that period.***" This is but a principle laid down in the lesser mysteries. Follow up the consequences, or rather leave it to the revolution to develope such a principle. The reader will soon see to what this authority of the father is reduced. **Scarcely can the child lisp the words Equality and Liberty, or that of Reason, when the commands of his parents become the most horrid despotism, oppression, and tyranny.—Nor is the Patriarchal sovereign to expect any more affection than obedience from his subjects or his children. In imparting the doctrines of Equality and Liberty, the Hierophant had taught them to blaspheme the *love of one's family* even still more than *the national love, or the love of one's country*, as being the more direct and immediate principle of the most disastrous *Egoism*.** Let the father then enquire by what bonds his children still remain united to him, or how they are subjected to him, when, without fear, **they may openly resist his Patriarchal power as soon as their feeble arms have acquired sufficient strength to gather the fruits which were to serve them as food.** No, this hellish Sect acknowledges no ties. All those of nature, as well as those of government or religion, were to be dissolved in Weishaupt's last mysteries. **The child, like the savage tyger of the forest, was to abandon his parents when strong enough to go alone in quest of his prey. And this is what the Sect calls restoring man to his primitive state of nature, to the Patriarchal life,** to those days when filial piety compensated for all the necessary laws of civil society.

https://archive.org/details/FoundationsOfNineteenthCenturygrundlagenDesNeunzehntenJahrhunderts/page/n207/mode/2up?view=theater

The Romans did not invent marriage, they did not invent law, they did not invent the constitutional freedom-giving State; all that grows out of human nature and is found everywhere in some form and to some degree; but what the Aryan races had conceived under these notions as the bases of all morality and culture had nowhere been firmly established till the Romans established it.*

* For the Aryan peoples in particular, *see* Leist's excellent *Gräco-italienische Rechtsgeschichte* (1884) and his *Altarisches Jus civile* (1896), also Jhering's *Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropäer*. **The ethnical investigations of the last years have, however, shown more and more that marriage, law and State exist in some form everywhere, even among the savages of least mental development. And this must be strongly emphasised, for the evolution mania and the pseudo-scientific dogmatism of our century have brought into most of our popular books absolutely invented descriptions,** which are very difficult to remove from them, in spite of the sure results of exact research; and from here these descriptions also force their way into valuable and serious books. **In Lamprecht's famous *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. i., for instance, we find what is supposed to be a description of the social conditions of the old Teutonic peoples, sketched "under the auspices of comparative ethnology"; here we are told of a time when among these peoples a "community of sex limited by no differences of any kind prevailed, all brothers and sisters were husbands and wives to each other and all their children brothers and sisters, &c:"; the first progress from this state, as we are to suppose, was the establishment of the mother's right, the so-called *Matriarchate* – and so the tale continues for pages; one fancies one is listening to the first stuttering of a new mythology.** As far as the mother-right is concerned (*i.e.*, family name and right of inheritance after the mother, as the fatherhood was always a common one), Jhering has convincingly shown that even the oldest Aryans, before the breaking off of a Teutonic branch, knew nothing of it (*Vorgeschichte*, p. 61 ff.), and the very oldest parts of the Aryan language point already to the "supreme position of the husband and father of the household" (Leist, *Gräco-ital. Rechtsgeschichte*, p. 58); that supposition therefore lacks every scientific basis. [This was meantime confirmed by Otto Schrader, *Reallexicon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, 1901, p. xxxiii.] It is still more important to establish the fact that the "comparative ethnography" appealed to by Lamprecht has found community of sex nowhere in the world among human beings. In the year 1896 a small book appeared which summarises in strictly objective fashion all the researches that refer to this, Ernst Grosse's *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft*, **and there we see how the so-called empirical philosophers, with Herbert Spencer at their head, and the so-called strictly empirical anthropologists and ethnologists, honoured as "authorities" (with praiseworthy exceptions like Lubbock), simply started from the *à priori* supposition that there must be community of sex among simpler peoples, since the law of evolution demands it, and**

then everywhere discovered facts to confirm this. But more exact and unprejudiced investigations now prove for one race after the other that community of sex does not exist there, and Grosse may pat down the apodictic assertion: **"There is, in fact, no single primitive people whose sexual relations approached a condition of promiscuity or even hinted at such a thing. The firmly knit individual family is by no means a late achievement of civilisation, it exists in the lowest stages of culture as a rule without exception"** (p. 42). Exact proofs are to be found in Grosse; besides, all anthropological and ethnological accounts of recent years testify how very much we have undervalued the so-called savages, how superficially we have observed and how thoughtlessly we have drawn conclusions about primitive conditions, of which we know absolutely nothing with surety. [Lately Heinrich Schurtz, in his *Altersklassen und Männerbunde, eine Darstellung der Grundformen der Gesellschaft*, 1902, **has fully shown that the arguments for promiscuity in early times, which are wont to be drawn from phenomena of "free love" to-day, are to be interpreted quite differently, and that, on the contrary, "with the most primitive races marriage, and in connection with it the formation of society on a purely sexual basis, is more strongly developed"** (p. 200).] As this subject is essentially of the greatest importance and throws a peculiar and very noteworthy sidelight upon scientific modes of thought and power of thought in our century, I should like to add one more instinctive example. The original inhabitants of central Australia are, as is well known, supposed to belong to the most backward, intellectually, of all peoples; Lubbock calls them "wretched savages, who cannot count their own fingers, not even the fingers of one hand" (*The Prehistoric Age*, Germ, trans., ii. 151). One can imagine with what contempt the traveller Eyre wrote of the "remarkably peculiar cases where marriage is forbidden" in this wretched race, "where a man may not marry a woman who has the same name as he, even though she be by no means related to him." Strange! **And how could these people come to have such inexplicable caprices when it would have been their duty, according to the theory of evolution, to have lived in absolute promiscuity?** Since that time two English officials, who lived for years among these savages and gained their confidence, have given us a detailed account of them (*Royal Society of Victoria*, April 1897, summary in *Nature*, June 10, 1897), and it appears that their whole intellectual life, their "conceptive life" (if I may say so) is so incredibly complicated that it is almost impossible for one of us to comprehend it. **These people, for example, who are supposed not to be able to count up to five, have a more complicated belief than Plato with regard to the transmigration of souls, and this faith forms the basis of their religion.** Now as to their marriage laws. In the particular district spoken of here there lives an ethnically uniform race, the Aruntas. Every marriage union with strange races is forbidden; thereby the race is kept pure. But the extremely baneful effects of long-continued inbreeding **(Lamprecht's Teutons would long have become Cretins before ever they entered into history!)** are prevented by the Australian blacks by the following ingenious system: they divide (mentally) the whole race into four groups; for simplicity I designate them *a b c d*. A youth from the group *a* may only marry a girl from group *d*, the male *b* only the female *c*, the male *c* only the female *b*, the male *d* only the female *a*. The children of *a* and *d* form once more the group *b*, those of *b* and *c* the group *a*, those of *c* and *b* the group *d*, those of *d* and *a* the group *c*. I simplify very much and give only the skeleton, for I fear my European reader would otherwise soon reach the stage of likewise not being able to count up to five. That such a system imposes important restrictions on the rights of the heart cannot be denied, **but I ask, how could a scientifically trained selector have hit upon a more ingenious expedient to satisfy the two laws of breeding which are established by strict observation, namely, (1) the race most be kept pure, (2) continuous inbreeding is to be avoided?** (*see* chap, iv.). Such a phenomenon calls for reverence and silence. When contemplating it one gladly keeps silent regarding such systems as those already mentioned as belonging to the end of the nineteenth century. But what must we feel when we turn our glance from the extremely laboured efforts of these worthy Australian Aruntas to Rome and behold here, in the middle of a frightful world, the sacredness of marriage, the legal status of the family, the freedom of the head of the household rising up out of the heart of the people, for it was at a much later period that it was engraved on bronze tables?

https://thenewutopian.com/2022/11/02/understanding-carl-schmitts-political-theology/

Oh, and as a random aside, Schmitt saw the calls for a return of matriarchy and the longhouse far before Bronze Age Pervert. **“Anarchists today see in the patriarchal family and in the monogamy the actual state of sin,” (for they believed God and theology to be the only sin), “and… they preach the return of matriarchy, the supposedly paradisiacal original state…”**

https://majorityrights.com/weblog/comments/curbing_the_appetites_of_women

It was the creation of [the role of the father]—only a few thousand years ago—which made patriarchal civilization possible. Prior to that, mankind had to muddle through the million years of the Stone Age with the female-headed reproductive arrangements of the ghetto, the barnyard and the rain forest.
…

In the Matriarchal System the reproductive unit consists of the mother and her offspring, the father playing a marginal role, wandering into and out of the "family," subject to dismissal at the mother's bidding. The central fact about this kind of family is its naturalness. **Roman jurists spoke of maternity as a natural fact, "natura verum," and of paternity as merely a matter of civil law. "In all but a few species," writes Sarah Hardy, "females are permanent residents in social groups, males mere transients." This is the reproductive arrangement of all lower mammals.** It has been the reproductive arrangement of the human race itself until recently.

https://www.marxist.com/origin-of-the-family-engels-morgan.htm

"Bachofen finds evidence in support of these propositions in countless passages of ancient classical literature, which he had assembled with extraordinary diligence," states Engels. Bachofen's interpretation of the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus shows the struggle between the declining mother right and the rising victorious father right in the Heroic Age. Today, such valuable insights and evidence would be treated as "unscientific" by many anthropologists. However, it is with such observations, carefully interpreted that a real picture can be built up. **Engels himself states that "ancient classical literature teems with traces of a condition that had in fact existed before monogamy among the Greeks and the Asiatics, in which not only a man had sexual intercourse with more than one woman, but a woman had sexual intercourse with more than one man, without violating the existing custom."**
…

Following the "promiscuous" stage, **in the earliest "consanguine family", humans banned sexual relations between parents and children, but permitted relations between brothers and sisters and cousins within the gens.** This was later prohibited in the "punaluan family", where joint marriage was practiced between groups and between different kin groups. "It is thus clear that", wrote Engels, "wherever group marriage exists, descent is traceable only on the maternal side, and thus the female line alone is recognised."
…

"**This gentile constitution is wonderful in all its childlike simplicity! Everything runs smoothly without soldiers, gendarmes or police; without nobles, kings, governors, prefects or judges; without prisons, without trials.** All quarrels and disputes are settled by the whole body of those concerned – the gens or the tribe or the individual gentes among themselves… Although there are many more affairs in common than at present – the household is run in common and communistically by a number of families, the land is tribal property, only the small gardens being temporarily assigned to the household – still, not a bit of our extensive and complicated machinery of administration is required...

> "There can be no poor and needy – the communistic household and the gens know their responsibility towards the aged, the sick and those disabled in war. All are free and equal – including the women. There is as yet no room for slaves or, as a rule, for subjugation of alien tribes…
>
> "This is what mankind and human society were like before class divisions arose."[17]

…

Those who attempt to ascribe the idea of a matriarchy to Engels – which seems a common accusation – are barking up the wrong tree. This also applies to those who broadly accept Engels' analysis, such as Evelyn Reed, the feminist anthropologist who fiercely defends the existence of matriarchy. **Engels never held this view or even mentioned the term. What he and Morgan believed was not in matriarchy, but that matrilineal descent at one time was universal.** From the point of view of method, and also current information, everything tends to point in this direction.
…

This view was built largely upon the evidence of Morgan and his close association with the Iroquois. This tribal society was certainly matrilineal, the descent through the mother, and had an exceptionally high regard for women. **Women had a large say in the government of the longhouse or household of the matrilocally extended family.** However, this does not mean that this society was the mirror opposite of a patriarchal, male dominant, male oppressive society. As already stated, Engels was not even happy with the concept of "mother right", but accepted it as a term of shorthand. **Nevertheless, it is certain that there was no female oppression in these early societies. This arose with the development of private property and the division of society into classes and, in the words of Engels, "the world historical defeat of the female sex."**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=JDtNDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false

Through a detailed discussion of a wide range of relevant passages in Chap. 4, *The Metaphysical Insignificance of Gender*, **I show that Stoic metaphysics considers gender to be insignificant (*adiaphoron*). On the level of rationality, which for the Stoics is the most essential human feature, there is no difference between men and women.** Furthermore, I scrutinize the position of gender in the categories of Stoic metaphysics, and posit that genderedness should be understood as a "common quality" (*koinos poion*), in other words, something that all human beings have, but whether one is of a specific gender, for example, a woman, is to be understood as an individual quality (*idios poion*). According to the Stoics, the reproductive capacity is one of the rational capacities of the human soul, which makes gender appear as comparable to the senses. **Thus, one's gender is as irrelevant for human rationality as, say, eye color is for the sight.**
…

Chapter 8, *The Stoics on Equal Educability of Girls and Boys, and the Origin of Gendered Characteristics*, **shows how in Stoicism, childhood is considered, for the most part, a gender-neutral phase of human life.** The assumption in the discussion is that girls and boys are equally educable for the highest purpose of life, which is to become fully rational, virtuous, and happy (which go together in Stoicism). **The Roman Stoic Musonius argued that girls and boys should be educated in exactly the same manner. I show that this position follows naturally from premises commonly accepted by Stoic thinkers from Zeno to the Romans.**

It is also crucial to examine critically the goal of Stoic philosophy, that is, the character of the sage, and whether this ideal is gendered or not. As I show in Chap. 9, *To Become Properly Manly – Gender, Happiness, and the Figure of the Sage*, **the Ancient sources often contrast the Stoic "masculinity" with Epicurean "femininity,"** and thus these two different styles of philosophy with their respective goals (rationality versus pleasure) are presented in gendered terms. I suggest that the Stoic sage must indeed get rid of certain "effeminate" characteristics (given that characteristics such as vanity are classified as feminine), but that it does not follow from this that it was easier for men to become sages than it does for women. On the contrary, **I will show that both and women to undergo several radical changes in Stoic philosophical therapy in order to become happy, and that the Stoic position is also critical about several traditional traits of masculinity.**
…

In Chap. 12 *"Holding Women in Common" – Gender in Early Stoic Utopias* I propose that the arguments concerning the utopian state should be read as a thought experiment of what a perfectly virtuous society would be like. **One significant result of this experiment is the realization that many of the traditional customs and institutions, such as institutionalized marriage and the external control of sexual relations, are irrelevant to true happiness and would not exist among perfectly virtuous individuals.** There are also potential problems arising from the exclusively male perspective of the Stoic proposal (as well as of Plato, who famously promoted the "common ownership of wives" in his *Republic*). **My analysis shows, however, that even though the early Stoics did not explicitly promote gender equality this idea follows naturally from some generally accepted Stoic premises.** In fact, the idea of a rational and equal community of male and female sages is inbuilt in the utopian ideal.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=JDtNDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA203#v=onepage&q&f=false

Ignoring the case of Thrasonides, who was expressly in love with a woman, Inwood comments on the Diogenes Laertius passage by stating: "By and large, it seems, the young people in question [i.e. the young people a Stoic sage will fall in love with] will be men – i.e. the assumed form of *erôs* is homosexual."3 **However, after this remark, he admits that there is no textual evidence that would suggest that the "noble *erôs*" could not similarly apply to women, as well. Inwood concludes: "(T)he official Stoic theory did not make much fuss over the issue of homosexual versus heterosexual love, for philosophical purposes."** (1997: 59).

> 3. A.W. Price claims that, like Plato, the early Stoics preferred pederastic relationships for pedagogic purposes (with the exception of the utopias which, in Price's words, "feature educational equality between the sexes" in both Plato and the Stoics). (2002: 170-199).

I agree with Inwood's conclusion, since, as I see it, **it follows from the doctrine of *adiaphora* that the gender of the sexual partner is a matter of indifference. Indeed, the sources do not give any clear indication that the Stoic arguments could not apply similarly to both men and women.** The general principle of Stoic ethics is that the moral evaluation is directed toward the person's character, not toward the act itself. **A good erotic subject would be able to**

do the right choices, behave in the right way, and build the right kind of a relationship with his or her partner. This is what matters, not one's gender, or the gender of the beloved one. Thus, what is at stake in the Stoic distinction of between good and bad *erôs* is not simply a hierarchic preference of one type of erotic relation over another, or classifying certain types of sexual acts as good and other ones as bad.4

> 4. However, this attitude somewhat changes when we get to the Roman Stoics who often prefer male-female relations and sometimes even express harsh criticism against same-sex relationships. For example, **Musonius Rufus' lecture about sexual matters states that neither adultery nor "relationships in which males relate to males" should be tolerated because they are "contrary to nature."** In Cynthia King 2011: 55-56.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/23*.html#ref63

Unnatural vice was pursued by the Christian monarchs with the utmost severity. Constantius imposed the death penalty on both culprits, and Theodosius the Great condemned persons guilty of this enormity to death by fire.[65]
Justinian, inspired by the example of the chastisement which befell "those who formerly lived in Sodom," and firmly believing that such crimes were the immediate causes of famines, plagues, and earthquakes, was particularly active and cruel in dealing with this vice. In his laws,[66] he contented himself with imposing the penalty of death, but in practice he did not scruple to resort to extraordinary punishments. It is recorded that senators and bishops who were found guilty were shamefully mutilated, or exquisitely tortured, and paraded through the streets of the capital before their execution.[67]

The disproportion and cruelty of the punishments, which mark the legislation of the autocracy in regard to sexual crimes, and are eminently unworthy of the legal reason of Rome, were due to ecclesiastical influence and the prevalence of extravagant ascetic ideals. That these bloodthirsty laws were in accord with ecclesiastical opinion is shown by the code which a Christian missionary, **untrammelled by Roman law,** is reported to have imposed on the unfortunate inhabitants of Southern Arabia.

We saw how in the reign of Justin, Christianity was established in the kingdom of the Himyarites by the efforts of the Christian king of Ethiopia. When Abram was set upon the throne, Gregentius was sent from Alexandria to be the bishop of Safar, the chief city of the Himyarites.[68] The laws which Gregentius drew up in the name of Abram are preserved. **Doubts of their authenticity have been entertained; but even if they were never issued or enforced, they illustrate the kind of legislation at which the ecclesiastical spirit, unchecked, would have aimed. It is characteristic that sexual offences occupy a wholly disproportionate part of the code.** Fornication was punished by a hundred stripes, the amputation of the left ear, and confiscation of property. If the crime was committed with a woman who was in the *potestas* of a man, her left breast was cut off and the male sinner was emasculated. Similar but rather severer penalties were inflicted on adulterers. Procurers were liable to amputation of the tongue. Public singers, harp-players, actors, dancers, were suppressed, and any one found practising these acts was punished by whipping and a year's hard labour. To be burned alive was the fate of a sorcerer. Severe penalties were imposed for failing to inform the public authorities of a neighbour's misconduct. **On the ground of St. Paul's dictum that the man is the head of the woman, cruel punishments were meted out to women who ventured to deride men.[69]**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/366/mode/2up?view=theater

Le Beaumelle, who spent much time at the Procope during 1750, recalled witnessing a heated debate between Boindin and an adversary over the execution of homosexuals, a highly vexed issue at the time in Holland and England as well as France. On that occasion, **Boindin maintained that sodomy is no more evil than masturbation** and that were it 'contrary to nature,' it would have been roundly condemned by all ancient and modern peoples who have respected and venerated the voice of nature, including the Greeks, Persians, and Romans, **whereas, actually, homosexuality has been severely condemned and punished only by Christians.**110

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/666/mode/2up?view=theater

Laurent François's *Preuves de la religion de Jésus-Christ contre les Spinosistes et les Déistes* (4 vols., Paris, 1751), for instance, rightly identifies Spinoza's moral thought as the underpinning of contemporary French materialism, but construes it as just a levelling of men to the status of animals and plants. **By eliminating absolute good and evil Spinoza allegedly provided a purely libertine creed which legitimizes fornication, homosexuality, adultery, murder, and robbery.**
…

Spinoza invokes intellectual love of God but what his morality really amounts to, held François, is some "cruels paradoxes' legitimizing antisocial behaviour, even the most horrendous crimes.14 **Love of God here is no more than 'la cupidité ou l'amour des biens sensibles.' Are not sensuality, licentiousness, and adultery matters of complete indifference to the *esprits forts*?**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleonic_Code#Other_French_Napoleonic-era_codes

In 1791, Louis Michel le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau presented a new criminal code to the National Constituent Assembly.[22] **He explained that it outlawed only "true crimes", and not "phony offences created by superstition, feudalism, the tax system, and [royal] despotism".[23] He did not list the crimes "created by superstition". The new penal code did not mention blasphemy, heresy, sacrilege, witchcraft, incest, or homosexuality, which led to these former offences being swiftly decriminalised.** In 1810, a new criminal code was issued under Napoleon. As with the Penal Code of 1791, it did not contain provisions for religious crimes, incest, or homosexuality.

> https://archive.org/details/maurice00fors/page/184/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **'I'm afraid I can only advise you to live in some country that has adopted the Code Napoleon,'** he said.
> …
>
> **'France or Italy, for instance. There homosexuality is no longer criminal.'**

---

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philo/#ManHisWork

From the end of the second century BCE, however, many philosophers were active propagandists for antisemitism.[1] One might have expected that Stoicism, with its cosmopolitism and rational humanism, would have avoided this kind of attitude. **In fact, as we can see in Posidonius, Seneca, or Chaeremon, Stoic antisemitism was a product not of racism, but of an erroneous understanding of rationalism and universalism.** For these men, the Jews were a very superstitious nation, blemished by strange habits and strong animosity towards foreigners.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.55010/page/n643/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The Greeks, perceiving their failure to Hellenize the Jews, feared for their own future in a state where the majority remained persistently Oriental, and bred so vigorously. **Forgetting the legislation of Pericles, they complained that the Jewish law forbade mixed marriages, and that the Jews for the most part kept to themselves.**
>
> http://www.attalus.org/translate/diodorus34.html
>
> [1] King Antiochus [VII Sidetes] besieged Jerusalem. The Jews withstood the siege for some time; but when all their provisions were used up, they were forced to send ambassadors to him, to seek terms for a truce. **Many of his friends urged him to storm the city, and to root out the whole nation of the Jews; for they only of all people hated to mix with any other nations, and treated them all as enemies.**
> …
>
> When Antiochus' friends had spoken about all these things, they earnestly advised him **to root out the whole nation, or at least to abolish their laws, and compel them to change their former manner of living.** 5 But the king, being of a generous spirit and mild disposition, received hostages and pardoned the Jews: but he demolished the walls of Jerusalem, and took the tribute that was due.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_VI/Chapter_11

Seneca, among the other superstitions of civil theology, also found fault with the sacred things of the Jews, and especially the sabbaths, affirming that they act uselessly in keeping those seventh days, whereby they lose through idleness about the seventh part of their life, and also many things which demand immediate attention are damaged. The Christians, however, who were already most hostile to the Jews, he did not dare to mention, either for praise or blame, lest, if he praised them, he should do so against the ancient custom of his country, or, perhaps, if he should blame them, he should do so against his own will. When he was speaking concerning those Jews, he said, **"When, meanwhile, the customs of that most accursed nation have gained such strength that they have been now received in all lands, the conquered have given laws to the conquerors."** By these words he expresses his astonishment; and, not knowing what the providence of God was leading him to say, subjoins in plain words an opinion by which he showed what he thought about the meaning of those sacred institutions: **"For," he says, "those, however, know the cause of their rites, whilst the greater part of the people know not why they perform theirs."**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Christian_Library/Dialogue_with_Trypho

WHILE I was going about one morning in the walks of the Xystus,[1] a certain man, with others in his company, having met me, said, "Hail, O philosopher!" And immediately after saying this, he turned round and walked along with me; his friends likewise followed him. And I in turn having addressed him, said, "What is there important?"

And he replied, **"I was instructed," says he, "by Corinthus the Socratic in Argos,** that I ought not to despise or treat with indifference those who array themselves in this dress,[2] but to show them all kindness, and to associate with them, as perhaps some advantage would spring from the intercourse either to some such man or to myself. It is good, moreover, for both, if either the one or the other be benefited. On this account, therefore, whenever I see any one in such costume, I gladly approach him, and now, for the same reason, have I willingly accosted you; and these accompany me, in the expectation of hearing for themselves something profitable from you."

"But who are you, most excellent man?" So I replied to him in jest.[3]

Then he told me frankly both his name and his family. **"Trypho," says he, "I am called; and I am a Hebrew of the circumcision, and having escaped from the war[4] lately carried on there, I am spending my days in Greece, and chiefly at Corinth."**

> https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap16.htm#tole
>
> Notwithstanding these repeated provocations, the resentment of the Roman princes expired after the victory, nor were their apprehensions continued beyond the period of war and danger. **By the general indulgence of Polytheism, and by the mild temper of Antoninus Pius, the Jews were restored to their ancient privileges,** and once more obtained the permission of circumcising their children, with the easy restraint that they should never confer on any foreign proselyte that distinguishing mark of the Hebrew race. (4)
>
> > 4. It is to Modestinus, a Roman lawyer (1. vi. regular.), that we are indebted for a distinct knowledge of the edict of Antoninus. See Casaubon ad Hist. August. p. 27.

https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html

Fr. 20

[So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. **A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples.**
…

Fr. 30

… time … and we contrived this in order that, **even while [sitting at] home, [we might be able to exhibit] the goods of philosophy, not to all people here [indeed], but to those of them who are civil-spoken; and not least we did [this] for those who are called «foreigners,» though they are not really so. For, while the various segments of the earth give different people a different country, the whole compass of this world gives all people a single country, the entire earth, and a single home, the world.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=8ZnFAAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false

But widespread pagan antisemitism is a myth. Whereas Greek and Roman writers did provide some material taken by Catholics to use against the Jews, **nowhere among the pre-Christians do we find the elemental hatred of the Jewish spirit that we discover among early Catholic writers and Christianized Roman officials.**
…

Out of 161 Greek and Roman authors who discussed Jews, only 28 disparaged them.1 **Even in an extreme case, when the Jews of Judea revolted against the Romans in the first and second centuries C.E., the Romans treated them no more savagely than any other seditious people of the empire.** The Greeks and Romans found many reasons to respect the Jews: their antiquity, their well-documented history, and their great sacred literature. Up to the fourth century CE, many non-Jews, both pagan and Catholic, also admired the Jews' family and community life, their monotheism, their rejection of images, their elevated moral code, and their emphasis on the inherent value of human life. Considerable numbers of God-fearing Gentiles, although not properly converted to Judaism, worshipped at the gates of the synagogues. Roman and Catholic law and custom early on recognized the Jews as a *gens* (a people) and Judaism, according to Church Father Tertullian, as "a most distinguished and undoubtedly legal religion."2
…

The contrast between the almost incidental pagan aversion to Jews and the fundamental Catholic bitterness is striking. Even among this minority of non-Christian Greek and Roman writers who were inimical to the Jews, we do not find attempts to restrict Jewish civil liberties or segregate Jews from the rest of society. **What there was of pagan hostility had no theological basis and no Church to sanction anti-Jewish policies.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=8ZnFAAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA2#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Pulzer's point is similar to that of Tal's: "I am more strongly convinced than I was when I wrote the book that a tradition of religiously-inspired Jew hatred … was a necessary condition for the success of antisemitic propaganda, **even when expressed in non-religious terms and absorbed by those no longer religiously observant.**"8
> …
>
> **Some protective Roman legal traditions, some Catholic feelings of charity, and the Jews' ambivalent role as suffering examples of the consequences of offending God provided Jews with a precarious place within Catholic society.** But until their emancipation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – and to this day, for some – Jews had only a very tenuous legal and moral right to exist, let alone act as citizens.
>
> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.88362/page/n49/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> From an early date some, and, since the Edict of Caracalla all, had been full Roman citizens, suffering from no disabilities. **But when authority passed into the hands of the zealous and jealous daughter-religion, with its theories of exclusive salvation, the position of Judaism changed.** Its adherents, from being in a position almost of privilege, were now reduced to one of inferiority, which ultimately extended not only to the political but also to the economic field. In the end, **they were brought down to the level of social outcasts and, in our own day, the attempts made to redress the balance caused the reaction which led to the phenomenon of antisemitism with all its appalling results.**
>
> It is true that Constantine, contrary to what is popularly believed, did not himself embrace Christianity at the time of the Edict of Milan; it is true, too, that for some time to come there was no actual legislation against Judaism as such, its position under the pagan emperors being nominally maintained. Nevertheless, **the changed atmosphere soon became apparent in the administrative vocabulary, which by now had in mind the Jews of the Diaspora – including Italy – more than those of half-deserted Palestine. The "highly distinguished religion, of indubitable legality" did not become illegal, but it began to be referred to in imperial enactments as a "sacrilegious gathering" or "nefarious sect"** – a change of attitude which the executive faithfully maintained. In 315, its adherents were threatened with burning if they dared to persecute those who had deserted their fold for "the faith of the true God." The old imperial legislation against seduction to the monotheistic faiths was renewed, but against them alone, converts and those who won them over being threatened with the death penalty. **Even intermarriage between Jews and Christians, unless of course the former abandoned their faith, became a capital offense.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NagdhSUgB9oC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

Pagan and Christian anti-Jewish attitudes were mixtures, often strikingly inconsistent mictures, of benevolent and malevolent elements. Christian hostility to Jews, similarly, cannot be seen as a single entity but rather as something that notably evolved in history; significant differences may be traced from the ancient times up through the Reformation. So too, with paganism over the years: **The pagan beliefs of the Nazis cannot be plausibly linked with the paganism of Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, or Marcus Aurelius.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Gay

Born Peter Joachim Fröhlich to a Jewish family in Berlin,[5] he was educated as a child at Berlin's Goethe-Gymnasium. He and his family fled Nazi Germany in 1939, when he was 15 years old.[6]

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

In speaking of the Enlightenment as pagan, therefore, I am referring not to sensuality but to the affinity of the Enlightenment to classical thought.1 Words other than pagan – Augustan, Classical, Humanist – have served as epiphets to capture this affinity, but they are all circumscribed by specific associations: they illuminate segments of the Enlightenment but not the whole.

> 1. **It is worth emphasizing that the philosophes did not lay claim to all possible varieties of paganism.** Before the eighteenth century was over, the philosophes were under severe pressure from a Germanic ideology, a strange mixture of Roman Catholic, primitive Greek, and folkish Germanic notions – a kind of Teutonic paganism. Its inspiration was the *Nibelungenlied*, not Vergil's *Aeneid*; German folk songs, not Horace's *Odes*. **Sometimes the benevolent critic, more often the implacable adversary of the Enlightenment, this Teutonic paganism, quite as much as traditional Christian doctrine, was to become a formidable rival to the Mediterranean paganism of the philosophes.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/168/mode/2up?view=theater

Diderot called the intolerant man not merely a bad citizen but a bad Christian as well; he argued that Jesus, Paul, Origen and other Church Fathers had preached peace, not a sword, and had taught pious Christians to win over their erring brothers by persuasion, not constraint. Voltaire took the same unexceptionable line in his polemics. But such adroit posturing barely concealed the philosophes' conviction that Christianity was the worst of fanaticisms. Writing to Voltaire in 1762, Diderot asked rhetorically, "Isn't this mania for granting probity only to the members of your own sect peculiar to Christianity?"9 Voltaire knew the answer. **The Church Fathers, he wrote, thought "that the whole world should be Christian. They were therefore necessarily the enemies of the whole world, until it was converted."**1 **In one of his rare kindly observations about the Jews, prompted not by kind feelings toward the Jews but by hostility to the Christians, Voltaire notes that "the Jews didn't want the statue of Jupiter in Jerusalem; but the Christians didn't want it in the Capitol."**2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=w39m4aohL9gC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nothing is more revealing than an analysis of Voltaire's main work, the *Dictionnaire philosophique*. Of its 118 articles,37 **thirty or more attack the Jews, "our masters and our enemies, whom we believe and whom we detest"** (art. "Abraham"), "the most abominable people in the world" (art. "Anthropofagi"), "whose laws do no say a word about spirituality and the immortality of the soul" (art. "Soul"), and so on from "Torture" down to Z. "Job" who finds favor in Voltaire's eyes is not a Jew at all, but an Arab.39
…

But the great anti-Semitic fervor reflected in his writing dates from the last period of his life. These were the fifteen years of his old age when the Calas and La Barre affairs had endowed him with a prophetic grandeur and he undertook to remake contemporary society and became the undisputed Messiah of the Century of Enlightenment.
…

"I have done more in my time than Luther or Calvin." So said Voltaire in this period of eschatological expectation. He was the head of a new deist church, which was hoping for a messianic era on the morrow, established as a result of his words and his "little band" of apostles, and which dreamt of enrolling the enlightened despots75 in its crusade. **This was the Voltaire who exclaimed in letters and writing: "A small reform was made in the sixteenth century, a new one is loudly called for."**76 "A beautiful century is in preparation. … A new revolution is beginning. …"77 "Two or three years would be enough to make an eternal epoch."78 **D'Alembert, his favorite disciple, was the man "of whom Israel expects the most."**79

https://books.google.fi/books?id=BratRq-06SsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA18#v=onepage&q&f=false

Isaiah Berlin has observed that when Herder visited France he 'suffered that mixture of envy, humiliation, admiration, resentment and defiant pride which backward peoples feel towards advanced ones' (Berlin, 1976, p. 180). However that may be, Herder caricatured the spirit of French cosmopolitanism with a fine spirit of irony:

> All national characters, thank God, have become extinct! We all love one another, or, rather, no one feels the need of loving anyone else. We all associate with one another, all are completely equal cultured, polite, very happy! **We have, it is true, no fatherland, no one for whom we live; but we are philanthropists and citizens of the world. Most of the rulers already speak French, and soon we all shall do so. And then – bliss! The golden era is dawning again when all the world has one tongue and one language! There shall be one flock and one shepherd!** (Quoted in Ergang, 1931, p. 96)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=NagdhSUgB9oC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA160#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nineteenth-century socialists were self-consciously heirs of the Enlightenment and through it of pagan antiquity. They were thus universalistic, humanitarian, and egalitarian.
...

Socialist opposition to anti-Semitism did not entail sympathy for Jewish religion, nationalism, or ethnic particularism, each of which were viewed as divisive, as hostile to human solidarity. Judaism was, indeed, particularly guilty in the eyes of many socialists: **As heirs of Enlightened paganism, they rejected the Jewish sense of enduring specialness,** what socialists considered the stubbornly irrational attachment of Jews to absurd rituals and taboos. More to the point, socialists frowned at what they believed to be the refusal of Jews to accept equal membership in *humanitas*, the human family.

https://archive.org/details/greeks-romans-germans/page/321/mode/2up?view=theater

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler coldly explained the propagandistic and political utility of reducing multiple opponents into a single common denominator: "It belongs to the genius of a great leader to make even adversaries far removed from one another seem to belong to a single category, **because in weak and uncertain characters the knowledge of having different enemies can only too readily lead to the beginning of doubt in their own right.**"183

https://pdfcoffee.com/christian-antisemitism-michael-l-brown-pdf-free.html

As the depravity of our materialistic culture deepens and the concrete results of rejecting faith and reason become more painfully obvious, the lazy will search for scapegoats. **Instead carefully analyzing the intellectual heritage of contemporary heresies, some will blindly lay blame on whole tribes and nations.**
...

Right-wing Jew haters blame Jewish people for every facet of modernity that offends them. They will cherry-pick lists of genuine villains throughout history and trot out the Jews who took part in mostly Gentile movements.

https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2010/08/26/pryce-klages/

From A Letter Re: "Anti-Semitism"

I've never endorsed the claim that the Nazi Bonzes [big-wigs] belonged to a superior race. However, I must also add that I have consistently refused to accept the claim of a certain other race to be the "chosen people." The arrogance is identical in both cases, but with this significant distinction: after waging war against mankind for more than three thousand years, Jewry has finally achieved total victory over all of the nations of the earth.

Therefore, I will have nothing to do with the contemporary kowtowing on the part of almost the entire civilized world before **the haters of all mankind (Tacitus spoke of Christians, but he certainly meant the Jews, as will be obvious to every alert reader of his works).** I despise all this kowtowing to the Jews as an utterly mendacious tactical ploy. (*GL*, 1350)

https://pages.vassar.edu/pharos/2018/08/03/stoic-philosophy-masking-hate/

Lurking behind *Stoicschool.org*'s deployment of technical Stoic terminology like *apatheia*, *logos*, and *epignosis*, images of classicizing statuary and architecture, and a comparison of ancient and modern notations for the final, formal, material, and efficient causes for God, one finds a relentless drumbeat of every imaginable form of hate, **all in apparent ignorance or willful avoidance of ancient Stoicism's core belief in the equality of all human beings.**

---

https://www.academia.edu/18154555/Stoicism_and_the_Virtue_of_Toleration

Epictetus shifts the analysis of endurance from the more general sphere of that which befalls us to our verbal disagreements with others; in doing so, he frames toleration as the recognition that the beliefs of others are neither up to us nor do they matter for our individual happiness. Marcus Aurelius further emphasizes the other-regarding dimensions of such a conception of toleration; for Marcus, toleration is a part of justice—it is an obligation that we have towards other human beings by virtue of our shared rationality. Toleration is thus part of what it means to live well in the world with others.

As was mentioned in the introduction, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius develop a conception of toleration as a personal and social virtue, and not as a political principle. This distinction is reflected by the fact that this Stoic conception of toleration emerges during the same period in which Christians are persecuted within the Roman Empire, and those persecutions are continued by Marcus Aurelius in his political role as emperor.98 **That Marcus may have believed that the persecution of Christians was justified need not dissuade us from considering Marcus' interpretation of Stoic endurance as entailing a conception of toleration—most conceptions of toleration set limits to what and who can be tolerated.**
…

There are elements of the Stoic conception of toleration that appear to anticipate later developments: for example, the Stoic insistence that the beliefs of others are ultimately up to them might be viewed as anticipating Locke's argument in *A Letter Concerning Toleration* that religious belief cannot be compelled; and the focus on our shared rationality might be viewed as anticipating certain Kantian and neo-Kantian approaches to toleration. Yet, the self-regarding dimension of toleration tends to be neglected within these approaches.
…

In this regard, it might be worth attending to the ways in which Seneca's use of *tolerantia* in situations involving the endurance of physical pain (though not itself a conception of toleration) informs the articulations of the concept we find in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Epictetus emphasizes, in particular, the need to cultivate the ability to endure the criticisms of others,102 **and frames such cultivation as a type of *askēsis*.**103 These examples deal with mental, not physical, pain; yet they speak to the need to engage critically with others in order to learn how to endure the discomfort that often accompanies being confronted by disagreement and difference.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Thoughts_of_the_Emperor_Marcus_Aurelius_Antoninus/Book_II

BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, **and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the divinity,** I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth.[1] To act against one another, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.

http://ambedkar.org/ambcd/38B1.%20Who%20were%20the%20Shudras%20PART%20I.htm#_msoanchor_99

The disabilities of the Pagans began with the advent of Christianity. Originally, when all the Romans followed the same Pagan worship, religion could occasion no difference in the enjoyment of civil rights. Under the Christian Emperors, heretics and apostates as well as Pagans and Jews, were subjected to vexatious restrictions, particulary as regards their capacity to succeed to property and to act as witnesses. Only orthodox Christians who recognised the decisions of the four oecumenical councils had the full enjoyment of civil rights.

https://ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume1/chap23.htm#univ

He extended to all he inhabitants of the Roman world the benefits of a free and equal toleration; **and the only hardship which he inflicted on the Christians was to deprive them of the power of tormenting their fellow-subjects,** whom they stigmatised with the odious titles of idolaters and heretics. The Pagans received a gracious permission, or rather an express order, to open ALL their temples; (34) and they were at once delivered from the oppressive laws and arbitrary vexations which they had sustained under the reign of Constanine and of his sons. **At the same time, the bishops and clergy who had been banished by the Arian monarch were recalled from exile, and restored to their respective churches; the Donatists, the Novatians, the Macedonians, the Punomians, and those who, with a more prosperous fortune, adhered to the doctrine of the council of Nice.**

Julian, who understood and derided their theological disputes, invited to the palace the leaders of the hostile sects, that he might enjoy the agreeable spectacle of their furious encounters. The clamour of controversy sometimes provoked the emperor to exclaim, "Hear me! the Franks have heard me, and the Alemanni"; but he soon discovered that he was now engaged with more obstinate and implacable enemies; and though he exerted the powers of oratory to persuade them to live in concord, or at least in peace, he was perfectly satisfied, before he dismissed them from his presence, that he had nothing to dread from the union of the Christians. **The impartial Ammianus has ascribed this affected clemency to the desire of fomenting the intestine divisions of the church; and the insidious design of undermining the foundations of Christianity was inseparably connected with the zeal which Julian professed to restore the ancient religion of the empire.** (35)

> https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n59/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **When he wishes, during this war against *the wretch*, to give his reasons for tolerating the Socinians, it is, he says, *because Julian would have favoured them, and he hates what Julian hated, and despises what he* (Julian) *despised.***4
>
> 4. 4. To Frederic, 8 Nov. 1773, Vol. 66, Let. 46, P. 112.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_41

I thought that the leaders of the Galilaeans would be more grateful to me than to my predecessor in the administration of the Empire. For in his reign **it happened to the majority of them to be sent into exile, prosecuted, and cast into prison, and moreover, many whole communities of those who are called "heretics"[2] were actually butchered, as at Samosata and Cyzicus, in Paphlagonia, Bithynia, and Galatia, and among many other tribes also villages were sacked and completely devastated; whereas, during my reign, the contrary has happened.** For those who had been exiled have had their exile remitted, and those whose property was confiscated have, by a law of mine received permission to recover all their possessions.[3] Yet they have reached such a pitch of raving madness and folly that **they are exasperated because they are not allowed to behave like tyrants or to persist in the conduct in which they at one time indulged against one another, and afterwards carried on towards us who revered the gods.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Introduction#Biographical_notes

But Gallus Caesar, Julian's half-brother, soon after his promotion in 351 and his appointment to govern the East, came under the influence of Aetius, who, for the next three years while he resided at Antioch, was his spiritual adviser. **When Gallus heard that Julian, then studying at Ephesus with Maximus the theurgist, was inclined to "Hellenism," he more than once sent Aetius to admonish his younger brother, who contrived to reassure them both.[40]** After the disgrace and execution of Gallus by Constantius at the end of 354, Aetius was exiled to Phrygia by the Emperor, partly because of his alarming influence and extreme Arianism, partly because of his intimacy with Gallus. Expelled from his office of deacon and repudiated by the Arians, he was still in exile on Julian's accession, when he was recalled to Constantinople and treated with peculiar favour. In spite of the title of Julian's letter of recall,[41] Aetius was not made a bishop until the reign of Valens. After Julian's death he retired to an estate in Lesbos which had been given him by Julian, but later he went to Constantinople, and in spite of his heresy was made a bishop, though probably without a see. **In the histories of the fourth-century Church, such as those of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret, he is the most important of all the heretics and apparently the most dangerous to the unity of the Church.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_15

I have remitted their sentence of exile for all in common who were banished in whatever fashion by Constantius of blessed memory, on account of the folly of the Galilaeans.[2] **But in your case, I not only remit your exile, but also, since I am mindful of our old acquaintance and intercourse, I invite you to come to me.** You will use a public conveyance[3] as far as my headquarters, and one extra horse.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_55

Moreover the Emperor Julian, faithless to Christ, in his attack on Diodorus[2] *writes as follows to Photinus the heresiarch*:[3] **O Photinus, you at any rate seem to maintain what is probably true, and come nearest to being saved,** and do well to believe that he whom one holds to be a god can by no means be brought into the womb. But Diodorus, a charlatan priest of the Nazarene, when he tries to give point to that nonsensical theory about the womb by artifices and juggler's tricks, is clearly a sharp-witted sophist of that creed of the country-folk.

> 1. These fragments of a lost letter are preserved only in the Latin version of Facundus Hermianensis, who wrote at Constantinople about 546 A.D. For a partial reconstruction of the original see Neumann, *Contra Christianos*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 5. This letter may have been written at any time between Julian's arrival at

> Antioch in July 362 and his departure thence, in March 363. The Greek original is represented by curious and sometimes untranslatable Latin. **Photinus, bishop of Sirmium, where Constantius resided in 351, was tried, deposed and banished by a synod convened there by Constantius. According to Sozomen 4. 6, he wrote many Greek and Latin works in support of his heretical views on the divinity of Christ, which were opposed by both Arians and Nicaeans.**
>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_XIX/Chapter_23
>
> For they believe that they are by no means counter working their own hurtful craft by promoting belief in Christ, so long as their calumniation of Christians is also accepted; for they thus secure that even the man who thinks well of Christ declines to become a Christian, and is therefore not delivered from their own rule by the Christ he praises. **Besides, their praise of Christ is so contrived that whosoever believes in Him as thus represented will not be a true Christian but a Photinian heretic, recognizing only the humanity, and not also the divinity of Christ,** and will thus be precluded from salvation and from deliverance out of the meshes of these devilish lies.

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/155818899.pdf

The impact which the word *monogenes* had for the dogmatic specification of Christ as consubstantial with the Father is well known. **Much less is known of the impact which that word had on the development of the Christian view of the universe. The extent of such an impact may be surmised if we recall that with the Greeks and Romans the word *monogenes* (*unigenitus*) had the universe for its supreme reference point.** Examples of this can be found in the writings of Plato, Plutarch and Cicero, to mention only some major spokesmen of classical antiquity.3 **They referred to the universe as the entity that alone was "begotten" from the divine principle because they saw in it the only genuine emanation from the Supreme Good or Prime Mover.**

The gain that derived for the universe through its being most intimately united with the Supreme Good or Prime Mover was only apparent. **The divinization of the universe within Plato's or Aristotle's pantheism meant the destruction of the universe as a coherent entity. Permanence with no change, a chief attribute of divinity, could be grafted, not without some arbitrariness, only to the realm of the fixed stars. Already the realm immediately below it, the realm of the planets (including the sun and the moon) suggested by its changes a departure from divine, that is, unchanging rationality. This was implied in the word *planet*, which in its Greek form stands for an erratically wandering body. As to the terrestrial realm, not a few changes within it could easily appear the embodiment of partial irrationality.**
...

Of course, Arius claimed to retain the notion of the Father as a true Creator. But as far as can be reconstructed from his statements, he carefully avoided probing into the problem of whether Christ as a mere creature could still be the Father's instrument for creating out of nothing the universe of beings of which He was one. **The Christ of Arius could only be a *demiourgos* or a mere shaper of a matter yet unshaped but already existing.**

In view of Arius's strategy, that of careful concealment, he could not be expected to probe into the ulterior effect of his applying the expression *monogenes* to Christ as a mere creature. Still, because of the classic pagan use of that term, Arius's step should have seemed fateful. Its ultimate aim was to make Christianity acceptable to the Hellenistic world, a world still pagan for the most part. It was no accident that bishops eager to cozy up to Constantine's establishment, more pagan than Christian, tried to prevent the condemnation of Arius. **Yet, if that condemnation had been prevented, Christianity would have run a most serious risk of being transformed into a form of pantheism; first into its refined version already expounded by Plotinus, and then into its crudely animistic Porphyrian form.**

Harnack did not see beneath the surface when he stated that had Arius not been resisted Christianity would have quickly been reduced to an obscure Jewish sect. As such it would have remained monotheistic, for a while at least. **Most likely, Christianity would have become a welcome place for kabbalism with its pantheistic ramifications.** It was in monotheistic Jewish ambience, which so resolutely opposed God's self-revelation in Christ, that kabbala flourished from Patristic times on. **It is also a fact, acknowledged in standard Jewish encyclopedias,**20 **that Jewish intelligentsia has, by and large, espoused pantheism. Spinoza and Einstein were no accidents in that respect.**
...

Yet, whatever the paucity of sources about Arius, they strongly suggest that underlying his voluntarist scheme of salvation there was a Stoic cosmology with its succession of worlds as places for the soul's purification.

About such worlds the most important thing to note is that they cannot constitute a fully-ordered totality. Herein lies a fact long overlooked. **The pagan Greeks, who coined the word cosmos for the universe (*to pan*) failed to speak of the universe as a fully-ordered entity.** Order was conspicuously absent in Democritus's cosmology and in the cosmology of subsequent atomists, such as the Epicureans. **The universe of the Stoics was subject to periodic conflagrations, hardly a mark of orderliness. Plato's universe was perfect only in its heavenly sections.** The sublunary world was, according to Plato, only partly ordered. The same is true about Aristotle's universe. There is the more disorder in Plotinus's emanationist universe the farther it leads from the One.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/18377/18377-h/18377-h.htm#CHAPTER_I

It is only the philosophy of the day put into a Christian dress. It starts from the accepted belief that the unity of God excludes not only distinctions inside the divine nature, but also contact with the world. **Thus the God of Arius is an unknown God, whose being is hidden in eternal mystery.** ...

The Holy Spirit bears to the Son a relation not unlike that of the Son to the Father. Thus the Arian trinity of divine persons forms a descending series, separated by infinite degrees of honour and glory, resembling the philosophical triad of orders of spiritual existence, extending outwards in concentric circles.

Indeed the system is heathen to the core. **The Arian Christ is nothing but a heathen idol invented to maintain a heathenish Supreme in heathen isolation from the world. Never was a more illogical theory devised by the wit of man.** Arius proclaims a God of mystery, unfathomable to the Son of God himself, and goes on to argue as if the divine generation were no more mysterious than its human type. He forgets first that metaphor would cease to be metaphor if there were nothing beyond it; then that it would cease to be true if its main idea were misleading. He presses the metaphor of sonship as if mere human relations could exhaust the meaning of the divine; and soon works round to the conclusion that it is no proper sonship at all. **In his irreverent hands the Lord's deity is but the common right of mankind, his eternity no more than the beasts themselves may claim. His clumsy logic overturns every doctrine he is endeavouring to establish. He upholds the Lord's divinity by making the Son of God a creature, and then worships him to escape the reproach of heathenism, although such worship, on his own showing, is mere idolatry.** He makes the Lord's manhood his primary fact, and overthrows that too by refusing the Son of Man a human soul. **The Lord is neither truly God nor truly man, and therefore is no true mediator. Heathenism may dream of a true communion with the Supreme, but for us there neither is nor ever can be any.** Between our Father and ourselves there is a great gulf fixed, which neither he nor we can pass.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/18377/18377-h/18377-h.htm#CHAPTER_IV

Arius had long ago laid down the absolute unlikeness of the Son to the Father, but for years past the Arianizers had prudently softened it down. Now, however, 'unlike' became the watchword of Aetius and Eunomius, and their followers delighted to shock all sober feeling by the harshest and profanest declarations of it. The scandalous jests of Eudoxius must have given deep offence to thousands; but the great novelty of the Anomœan doctrine was its audacious self-sufficiency. **Seeing that Arius was illogical in regarding the divine nature as incomprehensible, and yet reasoning as if its relations were fully explained by human types, the Anomœans boldly declared that it is no mystery at all. If the divine essence is simple, man can perfectly understand it. 'Canst thou by searching find out God?' Yes, and know him quite as well as he knows me.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/18377/18377-h/18377-h.htm#CHAPTER_V

The Sirmian manifesto is the turning-point of the whole contest. **Arianism had been so utterly crushed at Nicæa that it had never again till now appeared in a public document.** Henceforth the conservatives were obliged in self-defence to look for a Nicene alliance against the Anomœans. Suspicions and misunderstandings, and at last mere force, delayed its consolidation till the reign of Theodosius, **but the Eusebian coalition fell to pieces the moment Arianism ventured to have a policy of its own.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_influence_theory_of_atonement

It was not until Anselm, with his satisfaction theory of atonement, that a theory of atonement was specifically articulated.[5] The moral influence theory was developed, or most notably propagated, by Abelard (1079-1142),[1][2][note 1] as an alternative to Anselm's satisfaction theory.[1]

Abelard not only rejected the idea of Jesus' death as a ransom paid to the devil,[3][2] which turned the Devil into a rival god,[2] but also objected to the idea that Jesus' death was a "debt paid to God's honor."[3] He also objected to the emphasis on God's judgment, and the idea that God changed his mind after

the sinner accepted Jesus' sacrificial death, which was not easily reconcilable with the idea of "the perfect, impassible God [who] does not change."[3][8] **Abelard focused on changing man's perception of God as not offended, harsh, and judgmental, but as loving.[3] According to Abelard, "Jesus died as the demonstration of God's love,"** a demonstration which can change the hearts and minds of the sinners, turning back to God.[3][4]
...

A related theory, the "moral example theory," was developed by Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) in his work *De Jesu Christo servatore* (1578). He rejected the idea of "vicarious satisfaction."[note 2] According to Socinus, Jesus' death offers us a perfect example of self-sacrificial dedication to God."[4]
...

During the 18th century, versions of the moral influence view found overwhelming support among German theologians, most notably the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.[12]
...

A strong division has remained since the Reformation between liberal Protestants (who typically adopt a moral influence view) and conservative Protestants (who typically adopt the penal substitution theory).

http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~thomasw/abelard.htm

The *quaestio* on the Atonement, found early in Book II, has been the target of both scholarly study and theological polemic ever since Bernard of Clairvaux's energetic propaganda war against Abelard. **In his *Letter to Pope Innocent Concerning Certain Heresies of Peter Abelard* Bernard charged Abelard with exemplarism and Pelagianism.** By 'exemplarism' I mean the view that the Passion has redemptive efficacy only as an unparalleled example of divine love. **There is no "objective transaction" in the Atonement (as Swinburne calls it): no penal substitution, in which Christ undergoes on our behalf the punishment for our sins,** no payment of a ransom to deliver us from the power of the Devil, but simply a manifestation of divine love that awakens an answering love in the believer.(3) By 'Pelagianism' I mean the view that human beings do not need divine grace in order to act rightly. Bernard argues that Pelagianism follows from exemplarism. If our redemption consists in some change of heart brought on by our response to Christ's loving example, then it is we who accomplish our own redemption. **Abelard, according to Bernard, "makes the glory of our redemption and the pinnacle of our salvation consist, not in the power of the Cross or the price of Christ's blood, but in the improvement of our own way of life (*in nostrae ... conversationibus profectibus*)."(4)**

Bernard, as Philip Quinn dryly noted, "was far from being a fair-minded philosophical critic,"(5) and his recounting of Abelard's views is full of the pervasive misunderstandings of one who has been blinded by partisanship. But if Bernard was led astray because he was too keen on condemning Abelard as a heretic, other readers have been misled because they were too keen on commending Abelard as a hero. For example, **Hastings Rashdall praised Abelard lavishly for at last stating the doctrine of the Atonement "in a way which had nothing unintelligible, arbitrary, illogical, or immoral about it"(6)--precisely *because* Abelard was an exemplarist and eschewed such bizarre notions as penal substitution and the ransom paid to the Devil.**
...

Whether Abelard is a Pelagian will largely depend on how we characterize Pelagianism. If we define it as the view that one can act rightly apart from grace, Abelard is (as I have already argued) no Pelagian. **But then one might worry that he escapes Pelagianism only on a technicality, since he considers our natural powers gifts of grace--they even fit his definition of grace as "a gift not conferred on the basis of prior merits"** (60). **So suppose instead that we define Pelagianism as the view that human beings in their present state can will rightly through an unaided exercise of their power of free choice. On that definition Abelard is indeed a Pelagian.** In the *Sententie Hermanni* he says that "unless we say that man from himself through free choice from his nature has the ability to love God and cleave to him, we cannot avoid the conclusion that grace predetermines our merits."(26) In other words, if we are so enervated by the sickness of sin that we cannot, on our own, either accept or refuse the medicine of divine grace, some patients will be lost solely because the Great Physician gratuitously withholds treatment. Such caprice, Abelard thinks, cannot be reconciled with the divine charity that is both manifested and made effective in the Passion of Christ.

> 13. **The ransom theory was the dominant theory of the Atonement for the first millennium or so of Christian thought.** Unlike the theory of penal substitution, it can claim some basis in the words of Christ himself. In Matthew 20:28 and Mark 10:45, Jesus says, "The Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for the sake of many." **In his attack on Abelard Bernard clearly regards the ransom theory as a non-negotiable element of orthodoxy, but no less a figure than Anselm of Canterbury had denied it:** see *Cur Deus Homo* I.7.

https://www.theopedia.com/atonement-of-christ

- ***The Recapitulation Theory:*** Originated with Irenaeus (125-202 AD). He sees Christ as the new Adam, who systematically *undoes* what Adam did. Thus, where Adam was disobedient concerning God's edict concerning the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, Christ was obedient even to death on the wood of a tree. Irenaeus is the first to draw comparisons between Eve and Mary, contrasting the faithlessness of the former with the faithfulness of the latter. In addition to reversing the wrongs done by Adam, **Irenaeus thinks of Christ as "recapitulating" or "summing up" human life.**
- ***The Satisfaction (or Commercial) Theory:*** The formulator of this theory was the medieval theologian Anselm of Canterbury (1034-1109), in his book, *Cur Deus Homo* (lit. *Why the God Man*). In his view, God's offended honor and dignity could only be satisfied by the sacrifice of the God-man, Jesus Christ. "Anselm offered compelling biblical evidence that the atonement was not a ransom paid by God to the devil but rather a debt paid to God on behalf of sinners."[1] **Anselm's work established a foundation for the Protestant Reformation,** specifically the understanding of justification by faith.
- ***The Penal-Substitution Theory:*** This view was formulated by the 16th century Reformers as an extension of Anselm's Satisfaction theory. **Anselm's theory was correct in introducing the satisfaction aspect of Christ's work and its necessity, however the Reformers saw it as insufficient because it was referenced to God's honor rather than his justice and holiness and was couched more in terms of a commercial transaction than a penal substitution.** This Reformed view says simply that Christ died for man, in man's place, taking his sins and bearing them for him. The bearing of man's sins takes the punishment for them and sets the believer free from the penal demands of the law: The righteousness of the law and the holiness of God are satisfied by this substitution.
- ***The Moral-Example Theory (or Moral-Influence Theory):*** Christ died to influence mankind toward moral improvement. This theory denies that Christ died to satisfy any principle of divine justice, but teaches instead that His death was designed to greatly impress mankind with a sense of God's love, resulting in softening their hearts and leading them to repentance. **Thus, the Atonement is not directed towards God with the purpose of maintaining His justice, but towards man with the purpose of persuading him to right action. Formulated by Peter Abelard (1079-1142) partially in reaction against Anselm's *Satisfaction theory*, this view was held by the 16th century Socinians.** Versions of it can be found later in F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Horace Bushnell (1802-1876).
- ***The Governmental Theory:*** **God made Christ an example of suffering to exhibit to erring man that sin is displeasing to him.** God's moral government of the world made it necessary for him to evince his wrath against sin in Christ. Christ died as a token of God's displeasure toward sin and it was accepted by God as sufficient; but actually God does not exact strict justice. **This view was formulated by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and is subsequently found in Arminianism, Charles Finney, the New England Theology of Jonathan Edwards (the younger), and Methodism.**

https://www.academia.edu/299389/Rousseaus_Political_Philosophy_Stoic_and_Augustinian_Origins

Bouwsma was swift to concede that these were rather imprecise labels, but he emphasised that they did usefully serve to “designate antithetical visions of human existence”8 that were peculiarly relevant to the understanding of humanism. **For too long, he contended, scholars had thought of Renaissance humanism as an attempt to recover an authentic classicism embodied in the works of Plato and Aristotle, whereas it was the philosophy of the Stoics and of Augustine that represented “genuine alternatives for the Renaissance humanists to ponder.”**9

This opposition between “Stoicism” and “Augustinianism” had many dimensions.10 **A Stoic, for example, would emphasise that the human being partook of the substance rather than of the image of God, whereas for an Augustinian it is the other way around.** A Stoic would insist that careful study of the natural world would render it intelligible to us, and help us to discover how we should live, and would be optimistic about the possibilities of a natural theology. However, for the Augustinian the truths of religion are revealed in Scripture, not discovered in Nature. **A Stoic would hold to the Socratic teaching that it is impossible to know the good and not to do it,** that virtue is a kind of knowledge, that we come to virtue through reason; but an Augustinian would stress the frailty of human reason and its capacity to be led astray in the absence of divine illumination.

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/the_failure_of_american_baptist_culture.pdf

The myth of neutrality is obviously the *theological first-cousin* of the myth of free-will, so ably destroyed by Martin Luther in his debates with Erasmus over the *Bondage of the Will*. Because so many in the "Religious Right" are governed by an Arminian, rather than Augustinian, theology, they easily fall prey to the myth of neutrality. **The presumptuous claim of the unbeliever is that he *could* become a Christian if he wanted to; that he *could* agree with the teachings of Scripture if he chose to, but just hasn't been persuaded for lack of evidence. The Arminian agrees. The unbeliever tells himself and the world that his thinking processes are just fine. Not just in the area of "religion" or "spiritual" matters,**39 **but in every subject, and every discipline. And there is no dissent from the Arminian.** In fact, the Arminian would be the first to tell the natural, unregenerate man that, if he

> wanted to, he could see the Kingdom (John 3:3), understand the Christian system (I Cor. 2:14), objectively hear the Word of God (John 8:43), and receive its truth (John 14:17). Following this fair-minded and non-partisan examination of the truths of Christianity, the unregenerate man could then submit to the Lordship of Christ (but only if *he* made the decision - I Cor. 12:3), and then subject himself to the whole law of God, surely becoming a great Christian statesman (Rom. 8:7). Clearly, the Arminian, in affirming the sovereign will of unsaved man over the sovereign grace of the Triune God, runs pell mell against the Word of God.

https://archive.org/details/theprovinciallet00pasciala/page/188/mode/2up?ref=ol&view=theater

And again taking up Father Bauny, he pointed to the same place he had before quoted, exclaiming, “Look now – see the ground on which he establishes his opinion! I was sure he would not be deficient in good proofs. **Read what he quotes from Aristotle, and you will see that, after so express an authority, you must either burn the books of this prince of philosophers or adopt our opinion.** Hear, then, the principles which support Father Bauny: Aristotle states first, *‘that an action cannot be imputed as blameworthy, if it be involuntary.’”*
…

The Jesuit seemed to be confounded more with the passage from Aristotle, I thought, than that from St. Augustine; but while he was thinking on what he could reply, a messenger came to inform him that Madame la Mareschale of ——, and Madame the Marchioness of ——, requested his attendance. So taking a hasty leave of us, he said: “I shall speak about it to our fathers. They will find an answer to it, I warrant you; we have got some long heads among us.”

https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/full/10.3366/more.2017.0025

Henri de Lubac, who was in fact a solid defender of the sincerity and orthodoxy of Erasmus's theological mission, may have been nodding when he claimed that Erasmus “was not much of a philosopher.”[1] This at least seems to be Dealy's primary thesis.
…

Erasmus's *De taedio Iesu* and the *Enchiridion* are not, as previous scholarship has thought, “mere rehashes of traditional views. They are radical books in that they lay out a new way of looking at oneself and at larger issues.” The new way is aided by the truth Erasmus found in Stoic philosophy that was adapted for Christian purposes. As in Stoic philosophy, “intention” is a crucial factor in the virtuous action. An act carried out with a virtuous disposition is a right action, whereas the same one done without a virtuous disposition is not virtuous. The Christian takes over where Stoicism left-off. It is a fault, then, to perform even religious ceremonies that lack a spiritual purpose.

Dealy argues that no humanist prior to Erasmus ever truly grasped the Stoic two-dimensional but unitary (*katorthoma/kathekon, honestum/indifferens, honestum/utile, decretal/praecepta*) mindset. Certainly no Christian thinker before Erasmus applied this mindset to the surrounding world. Although I do not profess any particular expertise in Stoic philosophy, Dealy's arguments strike me as thorough and sound. Dealy reasons that Erasmus's debt to Stoic philosophy is seen in particular in his grasp, aided by Stoicism, of universal biological instincts. Erasmus saw this exemplified in Jesus's distress in Gethsemane. **According to Dealy, by carefully editing Cicero's *De officiis*, Erasmus had come to see what his humanist predecessors had not seen clearly, namely the core way of thinking of the Stoics.**
…

Everyone knows that Hubert Jedin, the famous historian of the Council of Trent, and Joseph Lortz, the leading Catholic Church historian of the twentieth century, dismissed Erasmus as one who allegedly utterly repudiated Scholasticism, and indeed dogma altogether. Dealy's book will not contribute to lending credence to such retrograde views.

https://archive.org/details/historyofchurch0003hugh/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1516 Erasmus was close on fifty, and he had reached that position as an influence in European life which no man of letters before, and none since—not even Voltaire—has ever attained.3
…

Erasmus attacked the German unsparingly, but with what weapons? Here was a philosophical question, and the humanist had done nothing about philosophy, all his life, but ridicule the miserable philosophers of his experience.

"Caught unprovided with any such technical formation," says a theological historian,1 of the controversy about Free Will, "[these humanists] had only their personal tastes to trust to, and their own powers of initiative, **seeking shelter, for good or ill, behind such Greek writers as Origen and St. John Chrysostom, whose scattered views had never been formed into a systematic theory about these problems, nor enjoyed any appreciable prestige in the Church.** The intervention of such improvised theologians had the effect of creating, inside the theological system of Catholicism, a new antithesis whose consequences were to be far reaching indeed. ..." **And Mandonnet instances Erasmus**1 **who; "without any study of the classical theology of the Church, improvises solutions, and despite his circumspection he comes to affirm such enormities as this '<u>That nothing comes about without the will of God, I readily allow; but, generally, the will of God depends on our will.</u>'"**2
...

In the hands of Erasmus, Catholic dogma thins out until it vanishes to nothing; and he would meet the problem of the real need, of even the most ordinary of mankind, for knowledge of the mysteries appropriate to the level of their intelligence, by scrapping technical language on all sides. **Precision in these matters, he thought, was not worth what it cost; and even, for example, such a vitally necessary tool as the term *homoousion* ought to go, ought never to have been devised.**
...

Upon Catholic theology Erasmus, then, left no lasting mark; nor did his failure to appreciate its importance do any damage or lessen its prestige. Here the contemptuous blows he struck fell upon the air. For one thing the revival had begun; and next, theology had already become what it has since remained, a technique that only interested theologians and clerics. **The sole effect of his excursions into theology was to discredit Erasmus with the theologians for ever.**

https://beggarsallreformation.blogspot.com/2010/05/erasmus-was-wrong-luther-was-right-says.html

While Father McSorley doesn't agree with all of Luther's argumentation in the *Bondage of the Will*, he does stand with Luther in condemning the position argued by Erasmus.
...

> Secondly, and more unfortunately, we find the leading scholar of the Roman Church doing a bad job in presenting the Church's teaching on free will. **Erasmus defines free will as "*the power of the human will by which man can apply himself toward or turn himself away from the things which lead to eternal salvation*."** This is a seriously defective definition of free will. Instead of defining free will in terms of the ability to choose between certain alternatives, Erasmus defines free will in terms of salvation--without mentioning grace. Erasmus gives no hint in his definition that man the sinner is enslaved to sin until he is liberated by grace. **The definition is surely one of the "extraordinary blunders" which, according to P. Hughes, characterize *De libero arbitrio*** (p.112).
> ...
>
> Now, several years after his excommunication, Luther finds the leading Catholic intellectual saying that the following Neo-Semipelagian position is a tenable option: "... [H]*aving not yet received the grace which forgives sin, man can, by his natural powers, perform works which, as they say are morally good, by which justifying grace is merited not de condigno but de congruo* ..." (p.113).
>
> Erasmus reveals his total unawareness of the Church's rejection of Semipelagianism in the *Hyperaspistes*, his lengthy response to Luther's reply to him in *De servo arbitrio*. Of the Ockham-Biel opinion, Erasmus says that as far as he knows it has not been rejected by the Church (p. 113).
>
> Further, developing the concept of "natural" or "common" grace that he had mentioned in *De libero arbitrio*, Erasmus distinguishes a "human faith," which is "a type of knowledge preparatory to the light of faith, "*from a "faith which through grace justifies." Then he explains: "... as there are degrees of justice, so there are degrees of gifts until you reach that which is merely natural. But even this is grace, since God is the author of nature. Thus Augustine is needlessly afraid of saying that the initium gratiae arises from man.*" **Erasmus seems completely unaware that Pelagius had said exactly the same thing to Augustine: <u>free will is a *donum Dei*; therefore no other donum is necessary!</u> In this sense Pelagius could also say as Erasmus does: "We ascribe everything to God's goodness"** (p. 113-114).

https://beggarsallreformation.blogspot.com/2010/05/erasmus-as-problem-not-reformation.html

Lortz saw Erasmus as the threat to the Church, not Luther. Lortz explains that this view is not new: during the sixteenth century the papal nuncio Aleander recognized it also:

> “There was only one man on the Catholic side who in some measure recognized in time the danger embodied by Erasmus. This was the papal nuncio, Aleander, himself a humanist of some standing... [he

> said] **‘God forbid that we see fresh papal briefs to Erasmus couched in the same tone as that printed at the beginning of his New Testament and containing an approving explanation by the pope of a work in which he expresses views on confession, indulgences, divorce, papal authority, etc., which Luther has simply to take over. But the poison of Erasmus works even more dangerously…’**”
>
> “Erasmus at length came into contact with Luther. But Catholics did not see the true Erasmus even in this controversy. They applauded his book on free will, because it contradicted Luther; but they failed to see that **the primary aim of the book was to propose an optimistic morality that left little room for grace, sin and redemption**" [Catholic Scholars Dialogue With Luther (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), p. 7]

...

Lortz though clarifies this in regard to Erasmus:

> "Though he did not deny the reality of grace and talked of the insufficiency of man despite his free will in a most orthodox manner, he did preach Christianity primarily as morality. **In the practical order he so emphasized man's own powers of intellect and will that he came dangerously close to moralism.**
>
> -snip-
>
> In his disputation on freedom of will, any number of times we are told in the most orthodox fashion, at times quite emphatically, that all of man's powers and gifts come from God, that man must beware of pride and self-sufficiency, that everything a man can do with his intellect and will belongs to God (Diatribe, 75). But for one thing, this Diatribe was written by Erasmus as a proof of his orthodoxy, and secondly, the picture of man which Erasmus gives us in his pedagogical and moral tracts, in his letters and by his example, is more to the point. **The answer is not too encouraging.** At the very least we are forced to assert that he did not draw the practical consequences from his statements that attribute everything to God and His Grace. (p. 73)

...

Lortz states,

> **[Erasmus] has no more concept of dogma as an exact statement of Christian teaching than did the men of the Enlightenment or modern liberal Protestants.** No one recognized this fact more clearly and made more of it than Luther in the First Preface to his work *Vom geknechteten Willen*" (p. 71-72).
>
> -snip-
>
> We must say something more on the adogmatism mentioned before. **If, as Erasmus thought, dogma is something superfluous; if, as he thought, the doctrine of Christianity could and should be restricted to a few general points, Erasmus was quite near the erroneous interpretation which would equate Christianity with monotheism. When this is done, Christianity becomes indistinguishable from the other higher religions and thus, relativism is just around the corner.**
>
> If all this is true, then we have to agree that Erasmus constituted a grave threat to the Church—not because of the frequently frivolous and mocking criticism he directed at it, but because of his adogmatism, moralism, and relativism.
>
> The pope at the time was the humanist Leo X who had a great regard for Erasmus and was quite unaware of the threat which the latter constituted for the Church. **Thus we find the papal delegate Alexander writing from the Diet of Worms in 1521: "For heaven's sake, don't send us any more privileges for Erasmus. The man is doing far more harm than Luther ever can."** Luther was precisely the one who recognized and rejected the danger from the quarter of the humanists. With all the violence of his characteristically one-sided approach, Luther turned from the cultural morality he found in the humanists to the religion of faith as he found it in St. Paul [pp. 73-74].

https://www.covenanter.org/reformed/2015/7/8/appendix-martin-luther-to-nicolas-armsdoff-concerning-erasmus-of-rotterdam

This is also a notable instance of the piety of Erasmus!—In his letter upon ‘Christian philosophy,’ which is published with his New Testament, and used in common throughout all the churches, when he had propounded the question,—**‘Why Christ, so great a teacher, descended from heaven, when there are many things taught even among the heathens which are precisely the same, if not more perfect;’—he answers, ‘Christ came (which I doubt not but he believed most Erasmianly) from heaven, that He might exemplify those things more perfectly and more fully than any of the saints before Him!’**

Thus, this miserable renewer of all things, Christ, (for so He reproaches the Lord of glory) has lost the glory of a Redeemer, and becomes only one more holy than others.—This sentiment could not be expressed in ignorance, but must have been designed and willful; because, even those who do not truly believe, know, and every where confess, that Christ descended from heaven to redeem us men from sin and death.

This was the sentiment that first alienated my mind from Erasmus. <u>From that moment, I began to suspect him of being a plain Democritus or Epicurus, and a crafty derider of Christ:</u> for he every where intimates to his fellow Epicureans, his hatred against Christ: though he does it in words so figurative and insidious, that he leaves himself a clue for raging most furiously against those Christians, who, from being offended at his suspicious and double meaning words, will not interpret them as standing in favour of their Christ.

https://www.ccel.org/g/gibbon/decline/volume2/chap54.htm#Reformation

Yet the services of Luther and his rivals are solid and important; and the philosopher must own his obligations to these fearless enthusiasts. (34)

> 34. "Had it not been for such men as Luther and myself," said the fanatic Whiston to Halley the philosopher, "you would now be kneeling before an image of St. Winifred."
>
> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century#lf6114_label_337
>
> A philosopher, in a time of crisis, may have to put on a suit of armour. To that suit of armour he may owe his life, and his capacity to go on philosophizing. But that does not make the armour the source of his philosophy. Indeed, while it is being worn it may well impede free speculation, which can be resumed only when the battle is over and it has been put off. **The virtue of Calvinism, in respect of the Enlightenment, may perhaps be reduced to this.** As a suit of armour it proved serviceable in battle, and though more uncomfortable to wear, proved easier to discard than the archaic, ornamentally encrusted chain-mail which protected, but also stifled the philosophers of the rival Church.

…

Since the days of Luther and Calvin, a secret reformation has been silently working in the bosom of the reformed churches; many weeds of prejudice were eradicated; **and the disciples of Erasmus** (38) **diffused a spirit of freedom and moderation.**

> 38. **Erasmus may be considered as the father of rational theology.** After a slumber of a hundred years, it was revived by the Arminians of Holland, Grotius, Limborch, and Le Clerc; **in England by Chillingworth,** the latitudinarians of Cambridge, (Burnet, Hist. of Own Times, vol. i. p. 261 - 268, octavo edition.) Tillotson, Clarke, Hoadley, etc.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false

Much depended on this issue, as Leibniz above all perceived, because the fragile synthesis between Protestantism and Aristotelianism that had been put in place by Melanchthon in the sixteenth century (and since then maintained) relied for its coherence upon man being made in the image of God.4

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false

> 33. Melanchthon was far less prejudiced against Aristotle's philosophical achievement than Luther, although he shared the latter's distaste for the tradition of scholastic commentary through which Aristotle had been assimilated to Catholic theology. **Faced with the task of prescibing the philosophical texts to be studied in Protestant universities, he decided to adopt for teaching purposes that portion of ancient philosophy which contained the greatest body of acceptable truths in all branches of the subject** ('… zum grossen Teil Wahres überliefert, die Wissenschaften nach wahren Grundsätzen aufbaut und am wenigsten Irrtümer hat': K. Hartfelder, *Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae* (Berlin, 1889), p. 211). **Melanchthon was hostile on philosophical grounds to the Stoa, sceptics and Epicureans,** so it was likely that he would achieve a rapprochement with Aristotle, especially since the range of Aristotle's works was sufficiently comprehensive to cover all the branches of philosophy where instruction was required. Melanchthon edited the *Nicomachean Ethics* in 1528, and also produced compendia derived from the *Physics* and *Ethics*, which remained standard university handbooks for over a century. It was a basic contention of the *Epitome* **that divine *Logos* and Aristotle's natural law were identical:**
>
> > But moral philosophy is part of divine law. For it is the law of nature itself observed and explained by able men, just as able men detected the beginnings of Arithmetic in the minds of men, and afterwards arranged the variety of proportions into a method. **However there is agreement that the law of nature is the very law of God in respect of those virtues which reason comprehends. And no more appropriate of true definition can be devised than if we define moral philosophy as part of divine law or of the decalogue,**

> **insofar as reason suffuses it.** [P. Melanchthon, *Philosophiae Moralis Epitome* (Strasbourg, 1538), *praefatio*, pp. 2-3]

After Melanchthon it was almost impossible to criticise as aspect of Aristotelian ethics without incurring accusations of impiety, so closely (and ironically) had Aristotle been incorporated into the teaching of Protestant universities: 'The Aristotelian philosophy, as modified by Melanchthon, is seen by many as the essential correlate of protestant religious dogma, so that for them an attack on the authority of Aristotle is regarded as an attack on protestant belief' (Hartfelder, *Philipp Melanchthon*, p. 248).

https://researchportal.vub.be/en/publications/the-early-german-reception-of-spinozas-tractatus-theologico-polit

Luther was a hard-boiled determinist as we can read in his *De Servo Arbitrio* (1525) written against Erasmus of Rotterdam. On these issues concerning the freedom of the will any Lutheran philosopher was well aware of the theological determinism and *servum arbitrium* being essential to Lutheran anthropology. Lutherans were all determinists and they combatted libertarian views in action theory. **Now, these philosophers saw that an equally tough determinism was expressed in the works of the heretic and atheist Spinoza. This was a real problem for them since they also understood very well the consequences of Spinoza's determinism, namely so-called atheism.** This problem and the subsequent disintegration of Lutheran orthodoxy began in the late 17th century and came to a crisis in the 18th century, it was a process which took place in many fields at the same time, among them anthropology, practical philosophy and action theory. **Indeed, Spinoza precipitated this crisis through which Lutheran theologians and philosophers – whose teachers had been tough determinists – became libertarians and defended the freedom of the will. That's strange, isn't it? In the course of the 18th century practically all Protestant university theologians and philosophers were libertarians or even became Pelagians.** The conviction was that the free will is not able to make a righteous life possible for each individual, but that each individual can by a life according to the free will ultimately be judged in a righteous way by a righteous God. **Luther would have been enraged if he had known this.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Ochino,_Bernardino

OCHINO, BERNARDINO (1487-1564), Italian Reformer, was born at Siena in 1487. **At an early age he entered the order of Observantine Friars, the strictest sect of the Franciscans, and rose to be its general, but, craving a yet stricter rule, transferred himself in 1534 to the newly founded order of Capuchins, of which in 1538 he was elected vicar-general.** In 1539, urged by Bembo, he visited Venice and delivered a remarkable course of sermons, showing a decided tendency to the doctrine of justification by faith, which appears still more evidently in his *Dialogi VII.* published soon after. He was suspected and denounced, but nothing ensued until, at the instigation of the austere zealot Caraffa, the Inquisition was established at Rome, June 1542.
...

Escaping by way of Strassburg he found an asylum in England, where he was made a prebendary of Canterbury, received a pension from Edward VI.'s privy purse, and composed his chief work, *A Trajedy or Dialogue of the unjust usurped Primacy of the Bishop of Rome* (1549). This remarkable performance, originally written in Latin, is extant only in the translation of John Ponet, bishop of Winchester, a splendid specimen of nervous English. The conception is highly dramatic; the form is that of a series of dialogues. **Lucifer, enraged at the spread of Christ's kingdom, convokes the fiends in council, and resolves to set up the pope as Antichrist. The state, represented by the emperor Phocas, is persuaded to connive at the pope's assumption of spiritual authority; the other churches are intimidated into acquiescence; Lucifer's projects seem fully accomplished, when Heaven raises up Henry VIII. and his son for their overthrow. The conception bears a remarkable resemblance to that of *Paradise Lost*; and it is almost certain that Milton, whose sympathies with the Italian Reformation were so strong, must have been acquainted with it, and with some of his later works. In the *Labyrinth* (dedicated to Queen Elizabeth of England), a discussion of the freedom of the will, he covertly assailed the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination,** and showed that his views were tinged with Socinianism.

The accession of Mary in 1553 drove him from England, and he became pastor of the Italian congregation at Zürich. In 1563 the long-gathering storm of obloquy burst upon the occasion of the publication of his *Thirty Dialogues*, **in one of which his adversaries maintained that he had justified polygamy under colour of a pretended refutation. His dialogues on divorce and the Trinity were also obnoxious.** Ochino was banished from Zürich, and, after being refused a shelter by other Protestant cities, directed his steps towards Poland, at that time the most tolerant state in Europe. He had not resided there long when the edict of the 6th of August 1564 banished all foreign dissidents. Flying from the country, he encountered the plague at Pinczoff; three of his four children were carried off; and he himself, worn out by age and misfortune, died in solitude and obscurity at Schlakau in

Moravia, about the end of 1564. **His reputation among Protestants was at the time so bad that he was charged with the authorship of the treatise *De tribus impostoribus*, as well as with having carried his alleged approval of polygamy into practice.** It was reserved for Dr Benrath to justify him, and to represent him as a fervent evangelist and at the same time as a speculative thinker with a passion for free inquiry. The general tendency of his mind ran counter to tradition, **and he is remarkable as resuming in his individual history all the phases of Protestant theology from Luther to Socinus.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Pucci,_Francesco

PUCCI, FRANCESCO (1540-1593?), theological writer, was born at Florence in 1540 (Gaspari). He was of the same family as the conservative cardinals Lorenzo Pucci (*a.* 1531), Roberto Pucci (*a.* 1547), and Antonio Pucci (*a.* 1544), but his own bent was towards literature and freethought. Following Tuscan custom, he began life in a mercantile house at Lyons.
…

He corresponded with Francesco Betti, a Roman of noble family, who advised him to come to Basle and lay his difficulties before the future heresiarch, Fausto Paulo Sozzini (Socinus). Pucci reached Basle about May 1577, and held a written disputation with Sozzini on the question of immortality. **Pucci regarded all creatures as imperishable; Sozzini denied the natural immortality of man, treating a future life as a conditional privilege.** On 4 June Pucci formulated his positions, under ten heads; Sozzini replied on 11 June; Pucci finished a rejoinder on 1 July. The discussion was interrupted by the expulsion of Pucci from Basle. **He had publicly maintained an extreme form of Pelagianism, printing theses, 'De Fide natura hominibus universis insita,' in which he claimed that all men are by nature in a state of salvation.**
…

His peculiar views exposed him to persecution and imprisonment; on his release he betook himself to Holland, **where he made the acquaintance of Justus Lipsius at Leyden.** In Holland he attached himself to a 'concilium peregrinantium Christianorum,' and invited the adhesion of Sozzini. He soon moved on to Antwerp. By 1585 he had resorted to Sozzini in Poland. **At Cracow he fell in with John Dee [q. v.] and Edward Kelley [q. v.], who passed for Roman catholics, and were bent on a new universal reformation.** They initiated Pucci into their angelic experiences, and about the middle of 1585, despite the strong remonstrances of Sozzini, he accompanied them to Prague. On his arrival there, an angelic voice bade him re-enter the Roman communion, which he at once did. He wrote to Sozzini and other friends, entreating them to follow his example.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA103#v=onepage&q&f=false

If moralizing, irenicist, "unchurched" radically anti-theological Christianity flourished most, after 1600, in the Netherlands, while in Germany the confessionalization better succeeded in cutting back the radical tendency,16 **the earliest roots of the Radical Reformation, reaching back before Servetus, were to be found, as with Radical Renaissance, in Italy rather than Germany or the Low Countries.** Socinus – or, to give him his full name, Faustus Sozzini (1539-1604) – from Siena, first began preaching that Christ was not divine and rejecting immortality of the soul whilst at Lyon and Geneva a decade after Servetus' execution, in the early 1560s.
…

One who went still further and whose notion of a true Reformation led to his being denounced as an outrageous neo-Pelagian by Jesuits, Lutherans, Calvinists, and liberal Protestant opponents of Predestination alike was **the "Florentine beast," as Erastus called him,** the Italian humanist Protestant and early ally of Socinus, Francesco Pucci (1543-97).17 Horrified by the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of the Protestants in Paris, in August 1572, Pucci abjured Catholicism and, from then on, devoted his energies to what he understood as the true Reformation of Christianity which both the "Anti-Christ in Rome," he believed, and Luther and Calvin, were obstructing. He strove to secure theological reconciliation among Christians and universal peace through political action – a program for which he tried to enlist the French king, Henri IV, while the latter struggled to reunite France amid the French Wars of Religion.

If all Christian independents within the seventeenth-century Radical Reformation, rejecting dogmatic theology, devoted their efforts to searching for universal truth and human betterment, and defended intellectual freedom, **appealing to all *omnibus veritatis studiosis* [searchers for the truth] to reduce Christianity's basic *fundamenta fidei* to as few and as rational doctrines as possible, Pucci boiled Christianity down to just one: rational belief in a God, creator of the universe, who is infinitely merciful toward all men. This, together with his extreme Pelagianism,** entailing the immortality of all souls, and the doctrine that "natural reason" alone suffices for Christian salvation without any sacramental or priestly intervention, **proved too much even for Socinus.** Anxious to rally especially Italian humanist exiles driven abroad by religious or political persecution, alongside the

residual dissident crypto-Protestant underground in Italy itself (found especially in Venice), Pucci published (in England) his *Informatione della religione christiana* (1580) in Italian. But for him, mobilizing Italian dissent was just an initial stage of the true universal Reformation.18
…

Allying with other foes of autocracy and anti-Medici exiles from Florence, Pucci represented a variant of Radical Reformation **that showed how Christianity could become conjointed with a basically philosophical and political standpoint.**
…

Radical anti-theological Christian universalist rationalism of which Pucci was such a striking example, **the tendency later encompassing the Dutch Collegiants, developed gradually into a pan-European underground which, though very different in some respects from the underground Neo-Epicureanism of the sixteenth century, was equally a founding element of what, after 1650, developed into the "Radical Enlightenment."**20

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Socinus

I. Lelio Francesco Maria Sozini (1525-1562) was born at Siena on the 29th of January 1525. His family descended from Sozzo, a banker at Percena, whose second son, Mino Sozzi, settled as a notary at Siena in 1304. **Mino Sozzi's grandson, Sozzino (d. 1403), was ancestor of a line of patrician jurists and canonists, Mariano Sozzini senior (1397-1467) being the first and the most famous, and traditionally regarded as the first freethinker in the family.** Lelio (who spells his surname Sozini, latinizing it Sozinus) was the sixth son of Mariano Sozzini junior (1482-1556) by his wife Camilla Salvetti, and was educated as a jurist under his father's eye at Bologna. **He told Melanchthon that his desire to reach the *fontes juris* led him to Biblical research,** and hence to rejection of "the idolatry of Rome."
…

II. Fausto Paolo Sozzini (1530-1604) was born at Siena on the 5th of December 1539, the only son of Alessandro Sozzini, "princeps subtilitatum," by Agnese, daughter of Borghese Petrucci, a descendant of Pandolfo Petrucci, the Cromwell of Siena.
…

To the able women of his family he owed the strong moral impress which marked him through life; **his early intellectual stimulus came from his uncle Celso, a nominal Catholic, but an *esprit fort*, founder of the short-lived *Accademia dei Sizienti* (1554), of which young Fausto was a member.** In 1556 his grandfather's will, leaving him one-fourth of the family estates, made him independent. Next year he entered the *Accademia degli intronati*, the centre of intellectual life in Siena, taking the academic name "Il Frastagliato," his badge *Un mare turbato da venti*, his motto *Turbant sed extollunt*. About this time Panzirolo (*De claris legg. interpp.*, first published 1637) describes him as a young man of fine talent, with promise of a legal career; but he despised the law, preferring to write sonnets.
…

In Sozzini's scheme of doctrine, terms in themselves orthodox were employed in a heretical sense. Thus Christ was God, though in nature purely human, namely as ***un Dio subalterno, al quale in un dato tempo il Dio supremo cedette il governo del mondo*** (Cantù). In matter of worship Sozzini distinguished between *adoratio Christi*, the homage of the heart, imperative on all Christians, and *invocatio Christi*, the direct address of prayer, which was simply permissive (Blandrata would have made it imperative); though in Sozzini's view, prayer, to whomsoever addressed, was received by Christ as mediator, for transmission to the father.
…

Of his non-theological doctrines the most important is his assertion of the unlawfulness, not only of war, but of the taking of human life in any circumstances. Hence the comparative mildness of his proposals for dealing with religious and anti-religious offenders, though it cannot be said that he had grasped the complete theory of toleration. Hence, too, his contention that magisterial office is unlawful for a Christian.

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=masters-theses

Fausto, who actually had no formal training in the field of theology, ignored the authority and traditions of the existing creeds and set to work to form his doctrines rationally, objectively, and independently of traditional sources. **E. M. Wilbur describes this approach stating that Fausto "went to Scripture as to a corpus juris, explored its teaching inductively, and built up his system out of those."**12
…

In comparing Fausto Sozzini and his methods with the theologians of his time, Dr. Harnack makes this observation:

> It is not that Christ is the revelation in the book, but in the book God has made manifest Himself, His will, and the way of salvation. If we recall here the fact that similar expressions are to be found in Calvin, we must not forget that as little as any other of the reformers did Calvin ever leave it out of view, that the Bible is given to faith. **But of that we find nothing in Faustus. There is not even an approach made to discovering lines of connection between the outward revelation contained in the Bible and the nature of religion; what we have rather, is – on the one hand, – the book, on the other hand the human understanding.**13

http://contra-gentes.blogspot.com/2008/04/doctrinal-chaos-argument-one-of.html

Some Christians, **having been influenced by autonomous philosophy,**10 **have forced Scripture to say whatever their rationalistic epistemology dictates. This is not sola Scriptura but partim Scriptura/partim philosophia.** Take free-will in the early church, for example:

> "The earlier patristic period represents the age of the exploration of concepts, when the proclamation of the gospel within a pagan culture was accompanied by an exploitation of both Hellenistic culture and pagan philosophy as vehicles for theological advancement… Indeed, by the end of the fourth century, the Greek fathers had formulated a teaching on human free will based upon philosophical rather than biblical foundations. **Standing in the great Platonic tradition, heavily influenced by Philo, and reacting against the fatalisms of their day, they taught that man was utterly free in his choice of good or evil… It is quite possible that the curious and disturbing tendency of the early fathers to minimize original sin and emphasize the freedom of fallen man is a consequence of their anti-Gnostic polemic… Justin's anti-fatalist arguments can be adduced from practically any of the traditional pagan refutations of astral fatalisms, going back to the second century B.C.**"11

This form of epistemology arose again within Protestant circles during the Arminian Remonstrance. For an example of this, see Walls and Dongell's *Why I am Not a Calvinist* **where they admit that the Arminian idea of libertarian free-will is derived not from Scripture but from contested philosophical arguments.**

> https://archive.org/details/completeworksrie033168mbp/page/n255/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 288. ***Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride.*—The "Free-Will" theory is anti-religious.** Its ultimate object is to bestow the right upon man to regard himself as the *cause* of his highest states and actions: it is a form of the growing *feeling of pride*.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century#lf6114_label_313

Arminianism or Socinianism, not Calvinism, was the religion of the pre-Enlightenment. Calvinism, that fierce and narrow re-creation of medieval scholasticism, was its enemy: the last enemy which died in the last ditches of Holland, England, Switzerland, Scotland.
…

Indeed, Calvinism can be seen as an outgrowth of it, an obscurantist deviation from it, rather than *vice versa.* In order to see this, and to follow the two-hundred-years dialogue between the two movements, we must go back to the figure who stands at the source of both of them as of so much else: Erasmus.

V

If Arminianism is free will in theory, tolerance in practice, within a reformed, primitive, visible, Christian Church, Erasmus is the first Arminian; and indeed the Dutch Arminians recognized the fact. So did their English disciples: Erasmus was the inspiration not only of Arminius and Grotius but also of Grotius' disciples at Great Tew. **Equally if Socinianism is the application of critical, solvent human reason to religious texts and to religious problems, within a similar Church, Erasmus is the first Socinian, and this paternity was recognized too. The Swiss and Italian *émigrés* who founded the Socinian movement in Switzerland and carried it to Poland—Castellio, Acontius, Lelio Sozzini himself—were disciples of Erasmus.** Even in the narrow sense of the word, the sense in which its enemies used it, Socinianism derives from Erasmus. For the peculiar tenet of the early Socinians, the particular result of their application of reason to Scripture, was the rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, and so of the divinity of Christ; and although Erasmus had not exposed himself on this topic, any more than many later Socinians were to do, it was his textual scholarship which was the basis of their rejection. He demonstrated, with a cogency that was proof against his own later half-hearted withdrawals, that the only biblical text which could be used to support that doctrine was spurious. **It can therefore be said that Sozzini and Arminius merely gave their names to particular developments of a philosophy which they had received from Erasmus.**
…

Erasmus himself preached his doctrines from the Right, to the Establishment. But he did not capture the Establishment, and in the generation after his death, his disciples had to reconsider their position. Either they must surrender to the Catholic Church which meant that they must give up their essential philosophy, or they must take up arms against that Church and, in so doing, accept radical leadership and the transformation of that philosophy. The choice was disagreeable, but could hardly be avoided—unless one were to seek a refuge outside the area of struggle, in distant Transylvania or anarchical Poland.
...

The same fear would bring them together again and again, whenever freedom had to be sacrificed to discipline, private criticism to common faith. **But whenever that fear was suspended the two parties to the alliance naturally drew apart.** In times of security why should the rational, sceptical, mystical heirs of Erasmus accept the leadership of intellectual reactionaries, scholastical bigots, blinkered Augustinians, Hebraic fundamentalists? They could afford to stand on their own.
...

The same threat would create a similar alliance in France; but there the fact of civil war, and the nice balance of forces, would enable many of the humanists to preserve a middle position between the Churches. **Those who in England and Holland were liberals within the Calvinist fold, in France might be Huguenots—but might equally be Catholic *politiques*.** In either case, their loyalty to their religious party was conditional.
...

If the years 1590–1625, in the Protestant world, are the age of Bacon and Selden and Grotius, in the Catholic world they are the age of Montaigne and de Thou, Davila and Sarpi. All these were recognized as precursors by the men of the Enlightenment. **Montaigne was the heir to the scepticism of Erasmus, the father of that seventeenth-century Pyrrhonism which relaxed the dogmas of the Churches and the Aristotelean cosmology behind them.**33 De Thou, Davila and Sarpi are named by Gibbon as the second founders, after Machiavelli and Guicciardini, of "philosophic history." Davila is indeed the Machiavelli of the seventeenth century, the favourite reading of "civil historians" and philosophic statesmen. **De Thou, the most Protestant of Catholic historians**—the founder, according to modern Catholic writers, of the persistent "Protestant bias" in sixteenth-century French historiography34—**was an admirer of Erasmus: indeed, his greatest crime in the eyes of the Church was that in his *History* he not only mentioned the forbidden name of Erasmus but described him as *grande huius saeculi decus,* "the great glory of this century."** And as for Sarpi, how can we think of that generation without him? At every turn we find ourselves faced by that indefatigable polymath: the Servite friar who corresponded with the Protestants of Europe in order to create a solid, non-doctrinal front against papal aggression; the historian who sought to show that European history had taken a false turn at the Council of Trent; **the statesman who insisted, alone among Catholics, on the Socinian doctrine of the separation of Church from State;** the social scientist whose analysis of the economic power of the Church improves upon that of Selden, foreshadows that of Giannone, and was hailed by Gibbon as "a golden volume" which would survive the papacy itself, "a philosophical history and a salutary warning."35

Most of these "Catholic Erasmians" of the early seventeenth century were heretics within their Church, just as the Arminians were heretics in the Protestant Churches.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_106

No impartial person, competently acquainted with the history of the Reformation, and the works of the earlier Protestant Divines, at home and abroad, even to the close of Elizabeth's reign, will deny that the doctrines of Calvin on Redemption and the natural state of fallen man, are in all essential points the same as those of Luther, Zuinglius, and the first Reformers collectively. These Doctrines have, however, since the re-establishment of the Episcopal Church at the return of Charles II., been as generally[72] exchanged for what is commonly entitled Arminianism, but which, taken as a complete and explicit Scheme of Belief, it would be both historically and theologically more accurate to call *Grotianism*, or Christianity according to Grotius. The change was not, we may readily believe, effected without a struggle. In the Romish Church this latitudinarian system, patronized by the Jesuits, was manfully resisted by Jansenius, Arnauld, and Pascal; in our own Church by the Bishops Davenant, Sanderson, Hall, and the Archbishops Usher and Leighton: and in the latter half of the preceding Aphorism the reader has a *specimen* of the *reasonings* by which Leighton strove to invalidate or counterpoise the *reasonings* of the innovators.

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_243
>
> We both disclaim alike every attempt to explain any thing *into* Scripture, **and every attempt to explain any thing *out of* Scripture. Or if we regard either with a livelier aversion, it is the latter, as being the more fashionable and prevalent. I mean the practice of both high and low *Grotian* Divines to *explain away* positive assertions of Scripture on the pretext, that the *literal sense* is not agreeable to reason, that is, THEIR *particular* reason.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/298/mode/2up?view=theater

Many tributaries, then, contributed to this pacific current, but as Wilhelm Dilthey showed half a century ago in a series of brilliant essays, its chief ingredient was Stoicism. Neo-Stoicism fertilized debate all through Western Europe, most fruitfully in the centers of internecine religious conflict. In the rebellious Netherlands, the center of learning and religious controversy, educated men turned to Stoicism as a cure for the disease of civil war.
…

The Arminians argued that the truths by which men must live are Christian truths; they are found in the loving teachings of the New Testament, and they remain true outside and without revelation. It was with this group that Hugo Grotius, the founder of modern international law and an admirer of Galileo, associated himself, to his cost and his glory. **Steeped in Seneca and Cicero, and explicitly their disciple, Grotius applied their philosophical method to impose order on a disordered world:** there are certain ideas common to all rational men, and these ideas are discovered by reason; they do not depend on theology. “Natural law,” he wrote in a famous passage, “is so unalterable that God himself cannot change it.” Assuming that God did not exist, he wrote in another, equally famous passage, the rules of natural law would retain their validity. **With these pronouncements, natural law, which had occupied a subordinate place in the Christian scheme of things, made its declaration of independence.**

This hypothetical construction of a natural law without God was not meant in any way to throw doubt on God’s existence: Grotius was an impressive historical critic of sacred texts, **a great Erasmian,** whose annotations on the Old and New Testaments long held the field and survived to become one of John Wesley’s favorite books, while Samuel Johnson could recommend Grotius’s religious writings to “every man whose faith is yet unsettled.” Grotius reduced Christianity to a few central tenets, rationalized the doctrine, and championed freedom of the will against Calvinist Predestination, but the Resurrection of Jesus remained for him an undisputed, indisputable truth.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA105#v=onepage&q&f=false

If, as Machiavelli uniquely showed, there are concealed ways Neo-Epicureans could intervene effectively both politically and intellectually in the public sphere, to question the prevailing norms, without fully revealing the motivation and deep subversion lurking beneath, this was equally true of the Radical Reformation Nicodemites. No one more skillfully demonstrated this than Grotius.

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the sometimes bold, sometimes timid, heir of Erasmus, was a crypto-Socinian who accomplished much by way of denting the pillars of theocracy and sway of miracle-based theology while renewing the Christian ideal on the basis of unity and the universalism of the Christian message. A victim of the persecution unleashed by the Calvinist Counter-Remonstrant triumph over the Dutch Arminians, in 1618, he set out to prioritize Christianity’s moral content, in justice, and render its theology subordinate, problematic and secondary.24
…

Indeed, the Arminian-Grotian current came to form a vital part of the backcloth to the Western Socinian-Unitarian tradition **which full-frontally attacked and undermined Lutheran and Calvinist theology not least by referring “back to the *Consensus veterum sapientium*” and subtly absorbing “in a humanistic sense a pre-Christian ‘natural’ theology.”**
…

Abjuring all voluntarism, Grotius denied God is an absolute master over his creatures. They remain subject to His commands in a weak sense, but he answers the question how God should be thought of in relation to natural justice by stating that **God is a “rector” or “princeps” presiding over the moral community. When God punishes he is not enforcing His own will but that of the community,** upholding the moral order that men naturally embrace from the natural law. There is nothing arbitrary in his judgments of the kind of expects from a “dominus absolutus.” **“In this life,” as Jeremy Bentham later echoed this idea, “there are laws of nature which the Deity cannot or will not interrupt.”**36 For Grotius, as for Bentham, Natural Law would be valid “etsi Deus non daretur” [even if God did not exist].37 God, of course, is not subject to the law like a human judge but rather the ultimate supervisor, adjuster, and guardian of that law. But here lay a troubling dilemma from which Grotius could never really extricate himself: if God punishes wrongdoers not because they have offended Him but the Natural Law, a universal natural law is implied that exists beyond and independently from, and even in some sense above God. **It was a stance differing significantly from that of Pufendorf and Locke who viewed natural law as binding on men expressly by virtue of God’s command.**38
…

Yet, it was not the hints of Anti-Trinitarianism, or dissolving ties between the Old and New Testaments, that Socinians sufficiently radical to join ranks with Spinozism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries principally found appealing in Grotius, but rather insistence on the contiguousness and ultimate oneness of reason, natural theology, natural law, and Revelation. By unifying all reality and morality in this way, Grotius proved subversive with respect to all churches and even the Radical Reformation itself as a distinct religious bloc. Claiming Christianity's fundamental core consists of just a few principles acknowledged by all churches, with the residue of Christian doctrine being secondary and dispensable, powerfully reinforced the trend to marginalize all theology in favor of moral and political philosophy. **His was a universalism drawing pagan and Christian justice, and pagan and Christian piety, ultimately together, here once again sharing kinship with Socinianism and Anglo-American Unitarianism.**40
…

Grotius has often been deemed a vital link between "the Erasmian tradition" of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.45 **But he was a crucial link also, the evidence shows, between Reformation and Radical Enlightenment. The connecting thread was a demythologized Christianity, shorn of theological doctrine that focused on a core of moral precepts compatible with pagan-classical natural-law ethics.** In this respect, Grotius was among the first movers, followed by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle, of the seventeenth century's transfer of religious authority from theology to philosophy, and modernity's subordination of religious authority to individual liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and the common good of the human community understood in a secular, moral sense.

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=masters-theses

MacLachlan, in his study of Socinianism in seventeenth century England, states that this steady flow of Socinian thought provided a "solvent to the harsh Calvinism of those times, with its rigorous views of Justification and Atonement, a corrective to irrational and intolerant dogmatism, a standing criticism of the Athanasian and scholastic dogma of the Trinity, **(and) this stream of Socinian ideas from abroad was to merge with native English protests against the prevailing orthodoxy and at length bear fruit in the rational Christianity of a John Locke and an Isaac Newton, and in the Unitarianism of a Joseph Priestley.**"

https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Lord Falkland and [Dr Chillingworth] had such extraordinary clear reasons, **that they were wont to say at Oxford that if the great Turk were to be converted by natural reason, these two were the persons to convert him.**
…

My tutor, William Browne, has told me that Dr Chillingworth studied not much, but when he did, he did much in a little time. **He much delighted in Sextus Empiricus.***

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Stanhope,_4th_Earl_of_Chesterfield
>
> Eugenia Stanhope, the impoverished widow of Chesterfield's illegitimate son, Philip Stanhope, was the first to publish the book *Letters to His Son on the Art of Becoming a Man of the World and a Gentleman* (1774), which comprises a thirty-year correspondence in more than 400 letters.
> …
>
> Samuel Johnson said of the letters that **"they teach the morals of a whore, and the manners of a dancing-master" as means for getting on in the world as a gentleman.**[9]
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Lt9vDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA186#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **The good Protestant conviction, that the Pope is both Antichrist and the Whore of Babylon, is a more effectual preservative in this country against popery, than all the solid and unanswerable arguments of Chillingworth.**
>
> The idle story of the pretender's having been introduced in a warming pan into the queen's bed, though as destitute of all probability as of all foundation, has been much more prejudicial to the cause of Jacobitism than all that Mr. Locke and others have written, to show the unreasonableness and absurdity of the doctrines of indefeasible hereditary right, and unlimited passive obedience.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=fYeP_htzw14C&lpg=PA63&hl=fi&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false

Trevor-Roper suggested that Falkland and his friends were searching for a solution to the bitter religious and theological warfare which surrounded them, and they found one in the ideal of concord and tolerance shared by Erasmus, Grotius and the Dutch Arminians. This irenic, rationalist position was dubbed by Trevor-Roper 'the wide Socinian tradition' and within its lineage Great Tew held an important place.2 On this reading, it was the

critical, even sceptical approach to Christianity adopted by the Socinians which commended them to this Oxfordshire set.

Trevor-Roper's account of Great Tew has not gone unchallenged, and an alternative reading was offered by Richard Tuck. **Tuck questioned the credentials of Falkland's circle as liberal and tolerant thinkers, and argued that in the 1640s they were responsible for some of the most trenchant defences of royal power and authority.** He noticed that several of the men of Great Tew actually held to very strong notions of sovereignty, and suggested that these political ideas were inseparable from their wider project.
…

Of all Falkland's friends, it was William Chillingworth (1602-1644) who felt most keenly the attractions of Socinianism and who travelled the most turbulent religious path.
…

When Chillingworth returned from Douai, he was in need of support and hospitality in England. Not long after his arrival in England, Falkland's Catholic mother, Lady Elizabeth Cary (1585-1639), took him into her household, offering him his board and a good supply of intelligent conversation. She, however, believed him still to be within the Roman fold. She was much mistaken; **not only had Chillingworth abandoned his Catholicism but he also entertained serious reservations about a range of doctrines, including the Trinity.** He made little effort to conceal his doubts and soon Lady Elizabeth became aware of his unusually sceptical stance. When she found out that he had been spreading the seeds of doubt among her children, she was horrified. Immediately, she threw him out of her house.4

Chillingworth soon found a far more congenial environment in which to work out his faith, in the house of Lady Elizabeth's eldest son Lucius, Lord Falkland. **Having inherited the house at Great Tew in 1625 from his maternal grandfather, Falkland settled there in around 1632 and put the house to good use.**5 His visitors included the playwright Ben Jonson (1572-1637), poets such as Edmund Waller (1606-1687), and the divines Henry Hammond (1605-1660), Gilbert Sheldon (1598-1677) and George Morley (1598-1684). John Aubrey recalled that 'all the excellent of that peaceable time' gathered there, and the civil war Royalist and historian Edward Hyde would immortalize this circle after the Restoration.6 Great Tew was clearly a scholarly place, but its visitors were not there simply to read and debate in the abstract. Falkland's friends tended to be men of action who sought to engage with questions they deemed important for themselves and for the commonwealth.7
…

Furthermore, Falkland's sister Lucy Cary (b. 1619) attributed her brother's disdain for the Catholic Church to the evil influence of Socinus. **She recalled that he was not hostile to Catholicism, nor settled on strong religious beliefs, until the early 1630s when 'meeting with a book of Sosinus his it opend to him a new way.'**14
…

Hugh Cressy (1605-1674), one-time fellow of Merton and friend of Hyde and Falkland, recalled that in refuting the papists Chillingworth had relied upon Socinus' '*Answer* to certaine *Theses Posnanienses*.'15 Socinus had twice replied to theses from the Jesuit College of Posnan in Poland, firstly in his *Assertiones theologicae de trino et vno deo* and then in the *Defensio Animadversionum Adversus Gabrielem Eutropium*, both published posthumously in 1618. Cressy is presumably referring to these texts. **He also claimed to have lent Falkland Socinian books; indeed, Cressy boasted that he was the first to bring them into England.**16
…

It was a position he continued to hold throughout the 1630s, **famously proclaiming that 'the BIBLE onely is the Religion of Protestants.'**35

Although Chillingworth shared the Socinians' approach to Christianity, he did want to distance himself from their specific theological doctrines. In his published writings he consistently maintained that he believed in the Trinity and the atonement – and denied that the label 'Socinian' could be applied to him.36
…

It was clear to Chillingworth that the scriptural evidence for the Trinity was not conclusive – and Chillingworth was careful to avoid the subject as far as possible. The only extensive discussion he undertook was in a private letter, and here he listed in great detail the patristic evidence for the Arian position in the second and third centuries AD. It had obviously been a subject of intense study for him and this study increased his doubts about the Trinity. His failure to integrate the Trinity into his conception of Christianity would be seized upon by his enemies.37 **More generally, the vision of Christianity set forth in Chillingworth's writings and sermons is not one in which the Trinity or the divinity of Christ play much part. Instead, he preferred to focus on the moral duties which all men lay under.**
…

And Falkland went on to say: **'I professe my self not onely to be an Anti-Trinitarian, but a Turk, whensoever more reason appeares to me for that, then for the Contrary.'** Falkland eschewed any such profession of anti-Trinitarianism or Turkism, and it seems that Falkland did not intend any irony here. Certainly his good friend Edward Hyde assumed that Falkland accepted the divinity of Christ.38 But Falkland did not

elaborate on the doctrine of the Trinity and it is not entirely clear where it fitted in to his understanding of Christianity.
...

More recently, however, the wise words of the Christian Fathers had become associated with a single heretical sect: the Socinians. Venting his disappointment and frustration upon his congregation, he sighed:

> **Among the ancient fathers, we find not only that Christ is a lawgiver, but that he hath published laws which were never heard of before; that he hath enlarged the ancient precepts, and enjoined new; and yet now it is socinianism to say but half so much.** Clemens Alexandrianus (3. Strom, in fine) saith, that Christ is more than a lawgiver; he is both Logos kai Nomos, and quotes St Peter for it.48

According to Chillingworth, the Fathers – particularly in the Greek world – saw Christ as the moral leader par excellence, whose ethical precepts outdid all the previous philosophers for the wisdom and virtue they contained.

When he interpreted the message of Christianity in terms of rules and laws, **Chillingworth stepped outside the world of Reformed exegesis and onto the sandy ground occupied at that time by the Remonstrants and the Socinians.** As suggested earlier, these groups emphasised Christ's commands at the expense of the Mosaic Law and even the natural law, and encouraged men to put Christ's words into practice.
...

In Poland and the United Provinces these questions had taken on a real urgency, where radical spirits emphasised the pacifist strand in Christ's teaching and refused to make Christianity compatible with human society. More moderate voices had been heard, **notably Episcopius, Grotius and Ruar, who pressed a version of Christianity less destructive of civil society as they knew it – and one less hostile to non-revealed principles of social life.** But all groups emphasised the importance of following the laws of Christ for those who wanted to reach heaven; and they played down the significance of any previous divine commands, whether known from the Old Testament or from natural reason, when it came to salvation.49
...

Falkland shared his friend's disdain for the claims of the Catholic Church, but his own understanding of Christianity differed significantly from Chillingworth's. His ideals were those of the great Dutch writer Desiderius Erasmus (c. 1466-1536) and the Christian humanists – and they had a rather different view of the relationship between Christianity and nature. **Erasmus, whom Falkland 'much esteemed,' drew on Platonic and Stoic traditions to portray the natural world as a place of concord, held together by a set of natural laws which regulated and maintained it.** Falkland was deeply attracted to Erasmus' version of this ideal of unity and it appears most strongly in the Platonic passages of Falkland's poetry.62
...

One of the fellows of The Queen's College, Oxford, Thomas Crosfield (1602-1663), remarked in his diary for 1636:

> That Socinianisme will never be received within our Kings dominions 'tis thought, because of these and the like positions thereby maintained w[hi]ch are repugnant to our State & government, as namely
>
> 1. **That noe magistrats are to be tolerated as we have them**
> 2. **That no warre either offensive or defensive is lawfull**
> 3. **That in Polonia onely is the pure form of Church government[.]**67

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Williams#Early_life

Williams had a spiritual conversion at an early age, of which his father disapproved. **He was apprenticed as a teen under Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) the famous jurist, and he was educated at Charterhouse School under Coke's patronage,** and also at Pembroke College, Cambridge (Bachelor of Arts, 1627).[10]

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/the_failure_of_american_baptist_culture.pdf

Roger Williams, the Baptist founder of Rhode Island, was, as I understand it, a very gifted man, both in intellectual ability and personal presence. **Edward Coke, that famous British jurist, is said to have been so impressed with him that he sent him off to study at Cambridge University in England.** When Williams came to the American colonies, he was offered one of the principal teaching positions in the Massachusetts Bay area at only 28 years of age.
...

I'll try to stick to the particulars of Williams's own position. **He claimed that no individual or group could sit in judgment over another individual or group, because man is a fallen, natural creature.** He picked up some of this from the Calvinists, though as I understand them, he misunderstood what they were saying. He believed that man was so fallen into sin as to be incapable of making right decisions in religious matters. There

was no grace given to solve this problem sufficiently. The Reformed, or Calvinist theologians never believed that.
...

Here's what Williams said:

> The conscience is found in all mankind, more or less; in Jews, Turks, Papists, Protestants and pagans ... **I have fought against many several sorts of consciences; is it beyond all possibility that I have not persecuted Jesus in some of them?**

...

Convinced that all men are bound to err, Williams trusted no one. He became a "perfectionist." I'm sure you're somewhat familiar with the term. **He was satisfied with no one's judgments but his own and those who agreed with him in every detail – those who understood grace as truly as he did. He expected all or nothing.**

In search of the perfect church, I am told, Williams separated himself from the Church of England. It promoted some errant practices, and so he could be no part of it. Many others of his day, as well, were leaving that church. But his perfectionism then forced him to spurn the Boston church and the Puritan commonwealth of Massachusetts because it too, despite the ocean's distance, had not separated itself completely from the English church. The Puritans were not pure enough for him. He then separated himself from the Plymouth congregation (itself known for its perfectionism and separatism) because it had not proved as perfectionistic and separatistic as he had at first thought it to be. One account of this last situation I think you will find interesting. As Mr. Edmund Morgan records it: "**The cause of Williams's discontent, by his own account, was the fact that the Plymouth church had not proved as separatist as he first supposed it to be. When members of the church returned on visits to England, they attended Church of England services there, and were not cast out of the Plymouth church for doing so.** In this way the Plymouth church was communicating with the churches of England and by implication acknowledging them to be true churches. Williams, by remaining a member, shared in this acknowledgment; therefore he must leave them." **He ended up taking communion only with his wife.**

Williams did have some strange ideas on the nature of the Church. **Just as the individual was to be perfect, separated from the world into the mystical body of Christ, so the church also was to be separated from the natural, physical realm. It was so holy and perfect, so full of *grace*, that it could have no connection to the natural, fallible, material world.** It was a "spiritual" thing. He saw the New Testament as a repudiation of the Old, **and denied that there was any parallel between the fallible, historical, physical Israel of the Old Covenant, and the infallible, eternal, "holy mystic nation" of the New Covenant.**

This led him to deny the application of any Christian standards to any concrete area of life, especially politics. **The testament of Christ, he said, is "opposite to the very essentials and fundamentals of the nature of a civil magistracy, a civil commonwealth or combination of men, which can respect only civil things." There was no connection in his thinking between this world and the spiritual one, between nature and grace.** He also says, "civil weapons are improper in this business and are never able to reach the soul ... being of a material civil nature ... (they) cannot extend to spiritual and soul causes." **To tie the church to the state, he said, would be "to put God and Christ and Spirit out of heaven and subject them to natural, sinful, inconstant men ... and so, naturally, to Satan himself, by whom all peoples are guided."***
...

He wrote to one fellow, the governor of Massachusetts in fact, "abstract yourself from the dung heap of earth." As he saw it, the Christian and the church have no place in a sick, dying world. I can't help but think of the response which Jesus gave to just such a thought: "It is not those who are healthy who need a physician, but those who are sick; I did not come to call the righteous, but sinners."
...

But particularly annoying to me, K.D., is the low opinion which the "religious liberty" proponents have of the church, despite the accolades with which they praise it. Williams thought that the church was to be "pure," as he defined purity. But at the same time, he refers to the church as though it is irrelevant. Somehow, it seems, God would have been better off to leave the world alone, let it have its right to do what it pleases, without the life-giving influence of the preaching of the Word and communal prayer and praise. **As far as Williams and, it seems to me all those with him, are concerned, the church of Jesus Christ is completely unnecessary for social stability. The church, according to Williams is "... like a corporation ... (which) may dissent, divide, break into schisms, yea, wholly break UP ... and yet the peace of the city be not in the least measure impaired or disturbed. Because the essence ... of the city is essentially distinct. ... The city was before and stands entire when such a corporation ... is thrown down."** The one social institution through which grace is pre-eminently made available (through the preaching of the Word of God) now has no necessary connection to the properly functioning city. As I see it, that was Cain's attitude. Grace is not needed for nature. Society can function well without it. To me, K.D., this doesn't seem like Christianity. It seems like the religion of man apart from God. The world is "a dung heap" and the church and the Christian message are not really needed. Men are free to do what they want, and we don't make any effort to yank them from the dung. After all, our consciences might be mistaken about the truth.

...

Williams and his followers, and for that matter all those who support the "religious liberty" idea, all embrace the religion of Deism in principle and practice, if not also in name. I hope I don't sound too dogmatic to you, but this Deism is so slippery a notion that it could come into our thinking without our ever really knowing it. And frankly, K.D., that worries me.

As I understand it, one of the "fathers" of this religion was a fellow named Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Quite a name to carry around. Now Mr. Cherbury believed that despite the fact that man is in nature, a state removed from grace, he is a rational being. **Here's where I think Williams was contradictory in his thinking; man's conscience is so marred that he can't be assured of the legitimacy of any of his actions in a world that's a dungheap; yet he's not so unreasonable and not so covered with the soot that he can't make a proper society – a "city" as he called it. I think he was influenced by Mr. Cherbury or someone like him.**
...

In fact, one would have to conclude as Williams did (by implication), that Christianity is dispensable – it is only *one* religion among many in a pluralistic, yet reasonable world. The reason of enlightened men is enough. We can best facilitate religious concord among men by letting "Reason" dictate religious communal needs. A Christianity which is too distinctive will just get in the way.

I don't think that it is some fluke of history, K.D., that Williams postulated the success of a society without the Christian religion at its base at the same time that Mr. Cherbury was writing on these universal notions. By 1636, the year of the founding of Rhode Island, *De Veritate* was in its second edition, and soon to be coming out in its third edition in 1639. As I see it, Williams, like Cherbury, was a product of his times. All men were looking for a way to end the religious disputes and wars in Europe and it seemed like this idea of "Reason"/"Common Notions" could do the job.
...

In particular, it has to do with Williams's analogy of the church as a corporation. He said: "... the essence ... of the city ... is essentially distinct. ... The city was before and stands entire when such a corporation ... is thrown down." In support of his idea that the city can exist without the church, it seems to me that he has somewhat of a primitivistic attitude. I don't mean that he is bringing up an outmoded idea. But, he seems to be supporting his case from history, and primitive history at that. He seems to idealize the city, and I would guess the ancient ones at that – cities like Greece and Rome. **A number of Protestants in Williams's day looked up to those pagan cities as paragons.** One fellow in particular, Hugo Grotius, preferred the ancient cities as models of strength and stability; as illustrations from history they had great weight in discussions such as this because they were taken "from better times and better people." I see a great deal of Williams's "religious liberty"/"liberty of conscience" idea in Grotius, and I wouldn't be surprised if history ends up showing some connection between the two.
...

Williams, we could say, was a hyper-Calvinist who ended up having to abandon all his religion for a social peace based on reason.

Grotius, on the other hand, was an Arminian. He did not believe that man was really depraved at all. And just as Williams's view of man – irredeemably depraved – affected his view of the relationship of nature to grace, so Grotius's view affected his position on the Nature/Grace relationship. **For Williams, grace could not be found in nature. But that was no great problem. Reason was satisfactory. His reason was a bottom-line common denominator retreat zone; it was purely natural, but it would do the job.**

But for Grotius, man was not so depraved as to make grace really necessary for nature. Man and nature already had enough capabilities to exist as a well-functioning city. What strikes me is that when one has a dichotomy between the realms of nature and grace, he ends up doing away with grace altogether. Grotius, as an Arminian, believed in a "free" and undepraved will in man – he ended up denying the need for God's grace in the social realm. Natural man already had enough grace on his own. He still had some grace in him and so he could depend upon his own enlightened reason. **Just like the Greek and Roman cities, the modern city could be based on man's innate ability to reason. The church could add some good things, but they would just be "extras," nothing absolutely necessary.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=8-9oAgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA191#v=onepage&q&f=false

The clergy of the American founding era may indeed have preached a Lockeanized Protestantism, but Nussbaum argues that the message Williams brought to the colonies was a Stoicized Protestantism. Certainly she is right that early American thought was suffused with a reverence for Roman republicanism and Stoicism, especially Cato and Cicero. Besides the obvious formal influences (frequent artistic depictions of George Washington in toga and laurel wreath, calling the upper house of congress “the Senate”), Nussbaum argues for a more specific influence: **“The Stoics taught that every single human being, just by virtue of being human, contains a portion of the divine … Ethical capacity (often called ‘conscience’ in later followers of Stoicism) is therefore worthy of boundless reverence; it is in effect the person, the core of our humanity.”** Williams

does not cite Stoic thinkers directly but was likely familiar with them. More important for Nussbaum's case is that his religious thought was already influenced by the Stoics via its influence on Protestantism's emphasis on individual faith. "We should, then, hear Roger Williams's appeals to conscience in a stoic, as well as a Protestant, context, **or, rather, recognize that his Protestant context was steeped in Stoicism.**"72

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/591ccf16db29d6afe8606726/t/598023ae3e00be8e7b42ddf5/1501569967988/reyes.pdf

Whereas many legal scholars tend to focus on the ideas of the Framers themselves and their antecedents in the writings of John Locke, Nussbaum concentrates instead on the seventeenth-century writings of Roger Williams. "We should not focus only on the eighteenth-century arguments of the Framers, ignoring this prior, and distinctively American, tradition, quintessentially embodied in Williams's *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution* (1644)" (p. 36). **Beginning with the idea of conscience itself, Nussbaum notes that Williams was strongly influenced by the Stoic idea "that all human beings are of equal worth in virtue of their inner capacity for moral striving and choice, and that all human beings, whoever and wherever they are, are owed respect"** (p. 45). Williams understands the faculty of conscience in much the same way that the Stoics understood the faculty of moral striving – i.e., "as a general power of choice, the directing capacity of our lives" (p. 52). **But Williams goes beyond the Stoics in adding emotional and imaginative elements to this capacity, and in emphasizing its susceptibility to harm.** "Williams ... sees that the conscience is not invulnerable: it can be damaged and crushed, and it needs space to unfold itself' (p. 53). Violation of a person's liberty of conscience is a terrible wrong, evocatively described by Williams as "Soule rape" (p. 37).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA79#v=onepage&q&f=false

To get still clearer about this distinction, let's think of two memorable images used by seventeenth-century **philosopher Roger Williams, a creative and critical follower of the Stoics,** when he spoke of the deprivation of religious liberty. Some types of deprivation, he said, are like "imprisonment": those are the types that allow you to believe freely but prevent you from acting on your beliefs. But some types go deeper, and he called them "soul rape," thinking of the inner damage to character and integrity caused by being forced to affirm things you don't really believe. Respect for human dignity entails contending against both forms of insult.

https://chrisnavin.com/2008/09/01/martha-nussbaum-channels-roger-williams-in-the-new-republic-the-first-founder/

She tells the story of Roger Williams, founder of Rhode Island, who held deep religious beliefs, yet, Nussbaum argues, was someone who cast his moral thinking deeper than those beliefs, **drafting the Rhode Island charter on the idea *'individual human conscience:'***

"Conscience, for Williams, plays the role that the directive faculty of moral choice plays in the ancient Stoic authors whom he studied: it is a faculty of searching and choosing, although for Williams it includes imagination and emotion as well as ethical reasoning. It is, Williams holds, the main source of our identity as agents: it is "indeed the man.""

So, Williams tempered his religious beliefs with classical learning and a certain political pragmatism...**yet he also tempered that political pragmatism with his religious beliefs (avoiding a true, hard-hearted Stoicism).** Nussbaum further suggests that some of Williams' thinking even pre-saged Immanuel Kant:

"Just as Kant asks a person to test the principle of his or her conduct by asking whether it could without contradiction be made a universal law for all human beings, so Williams's critique of the leaders of Massachusetts and Connecticut is that their idea cannot pass a test of that sort: they love freedom–but only for themselves."

"For both, the source of moral principles, and of all moral worth, is ultimately in our own freedom, and that freedom must be respected."
...

Nussbaum goes on to contrast John Locke with Roger Williams, and points out how Williams was more sympathetic to the idea that:

"...different religious doctrines meet and overlap in a shared moral space. Each religious person will connect this moral space to his own higher religious goals and ends; ***but within that space we are all able to speak a common language and share moral principles.*** *As I have argued, this idea of overlap is ultimately more fruitful than the idea of separation."*

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/21f2_47e.htm

Forty miles north of Providence, Rhode Island, another experiment was in progress in 1640. In Boston dwelled the Puritans, **the most self-consciously biblical people in history.** They had turned to the Bible in search of moral and political order. Their Body of Liberties (1641) served as their political charter, and that charter was biblical to the core, even citing specific Bible verses to justify its laws.

It was against the Puritans' vision of a New Israel in the New England wilderness that the citizens of Rhode Island rebelled, and in doing so, they led the world, step by step, into a political conspiracy against God.

Governor John Winthrop in 1630 had hoped that Massachusetts would serve the whole world as a city on a hill, a bright beacon of biblical Christianity that would persuade men to construct a biblical civil order in their lands. **But is was not Winthrop's beacon that illuminated the future; it was Roger Williams' beacon, a blinding light that promised autonomy from God for humanist political man.**

That light has blinded Winthrop's Christian heirs. The thought that a nation can and should be explicitly, publicly Christian is unacceptable to men and women who openly affirm the need for Christian families, Christian schools, and Christian everything else. **"There is no neutrality," they proclaim, until someone mentions civil government.**

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The first skirmish in the struggle to create the modern world was in the winter of 1636, when Roger Williams fled Massachusetts and headed into the wilderness of what was to become Rhode Island. Williams successfully created a new colony, but it was far more than a new colony; it was a new concept of civil government. **It was a concept that has become dominant today—the distinguishing mark of political modernism.** He founded a colony that was openly secular; there would be no church-state connection, or even a religion-state connection.

In 1642, the General Court of Rhode Island organized a new government. It required an oath of office from magistrates to “walk faithfully” and taken “in the presence of God.”6 There was no other mention of religion.
…

In response, in 1647, acts and orders were agreed upon. **The colony was again identified as “democratical,” meaning “a government held by the free and voluntary consent of all, or the greater part of the free inhabitants.”**8 This supplemental document admitted the existence of “our different consciences touching the truth as it is in Jesus,” and affirmed “each man’s peaceable and quiet enjoyment of his lawful right and liberty. ...”9 It enacted civil laws and sanctions for various crimes, including murder, rebellion, misbehavior, witchcraft, adultery, fornication, perjury, kidnapping, whoremongering, etc. It did not, as had been done in Massachusetts, identify these crimes as crimes listed in the Old Testament, with passages cited (e.g., Massachusetts’ Body of Liberties, 1641). Instead, it made this statement:

> These are the laws that concern all men, and these are the penalties for transgression thereof, which, by common assent, and ratified and established throughout the whole colony; and otherwise than thus what is herein forbidden, all men may walk as their consciences persuade them, everyone in the name of his god. And let the saints of the most high walk in this colony without molestation in the name of Jehovah, their God for ever and ever, etc., etc.10

This meant, however, that non-saints had the same civil powers and immunities, that they, too, could walk in the colony without molestation, and more to the point covenantally, vote in all colonial elections, “everyone in the name of his god,” or lack thereof.

In 1663, Charles II, as a self-identified Christian monarch, granted to them in the name of “the true Christian faith,” a special dispensation: they would not have to worship God according to the Church of England, “or take or subscribe the oaths and articles made and established in that behalfe; ...” **The charter then adopted language that was to be repeated again and again in the next hundred years of chartergranting and constitution-making: “... noe person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called into question, for any differences in opinione in**

matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd colony: …"11 This he called a "hopefull undertakeinge."12

The charter mentioned "the good Providence of God, from whome the Plantationes have taken their name,"13 but that was a mere formality; the heart of the experiment was judicial. **What is remarkable in retrospect—and what has become standard fare in making the case for modern Christian pluralism—was the King's express hope that by severing the colony's civil government from religion, the settlers "may bee in the better capacity to defend themselves, in theire just rights and liberties against all the enemies of the Christian ffaith, and others, in all respects."**14

https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/quakerstudies/vol14/iss1/2/

Ted Underwood's pioneering work *Primitivism, Radicalism, and the Lamb's War* (1997) finally established an understanding of early Quaker theology on its own terms. By investigating theological debates between Quakers and Baptists, Underwood argued that it was a profound, although abstract, commitment to primitive Christianity that fashioned Quaker perceptions of divine inspiration; **forming a theology that was non-Trinitarian, highly spiritual, and dismissive of Scripture and traditional doctrine. Quaker theology was less the product of revolution specifically and more 'the *fag-end* of the Reformation'.**22
…

Early Quaker conceptions of the Light within seemed to rest upon a Christology which tended towards a quasi-Unitarian position that emphasised the oneness of Christ and God the Father, largely disregarding the Holy Spirit (I use the term 'Unitarian' advisedly to refer to the belief in the unipersonality of the Godhead: this should not be confused with certain types of Unitarianism, such as Arianism and Socinianism, which stressed the humanity of Jesus rather than his divinity).31 **The terms Christ, God, and Holy Spirit were not denied, but appeared to have been used interchangeably to describe the Light, rather than to acknowledge the existence of distinct divine persons.** Early Quakers most commonly identified the Light with Christ, professing that the pre-incarnate and the incarnate Christ were the same. **Christ on earth was, therefore, not manifest in human form, but a celestial being in the vessel of a human body.**
…

On the eve of the Restoration, George Fox's epic apology *The Great Mistery of the Great Whore Unfolded* (1659) encapsulated the intensity and character of the theological war with anti-Quakers that had been raging during the 1650s. From scores of anti-Quaker tracts, Fox had selected particular accusations against Quakerism and rebutted them point by point. In referring to the Quakers' perception of Christ's human body, Richard Baxter (1615-1691) had asked, '*Do not they blasphemously make Christ an Idoll, that call our Temples, Idols Temples* [?]'; **Fox's riposte was that, 'Christ's body was and is the Temple of God, who ended all outward Temples made with hands, and so that is no idol, but others are Idols, held up by you and the Pope'.**44
…

In *The Sandy Foundation Shaken* (1668), which was partly a printed account of the oral debate, **Penn reasserted his belief that Scripture and 'right reason' affirmed 'ONE to be God, and God to be ONE', and that since satisfaction was 'dependant on the Second Person of the imagin'd Trinity', it was but a 'Vulgar Doctrine'.**93
…

It would appear that there was an assumption by many non-Quakers that the Quaker's denied the incarnate Christ and shirked away from his divinity. This was far from the case; however, it may be speculated that Quakers were able to use this erroneous theological assumption to their advantage. **By professing to believe in the deity of Christ in unity with God, Quakers might have been able convince non-Quakers of their Trinitarianism without actually undermining their quasi-Unitarian theology. While in prison, Penn wrote to Arlington, stating that he had 'always expressly own'd & maintain'd the eternall diety of Jesus Xt, and substantiall unity of Father, Word & Spirit'.**100 Penn subsequently made a similar, public declaration in *Innocency with Her Open Face* (1669).101 **Once set in the context of Quaker theology, Penn's comments can be construed as little more than a carefully worded affirmation of non-Trinitarian Quakerism;** yet it was reported that Stillingfleet, among others, was convinced that Penn 'is sensible of the Impiety & Blasphemy of his said Hereticall Opinions, and that he doth recant and retract the same'.102 A sober, apparently Trinitarian, confession of faith, rather than a clear and detailed recantation, was enough to see an order given for Penn's release on 28 July 1669.
…

The perception that the Quakers were cloaked antitrinitarians was as strong as ever: as an indignant Francis Bugg later claimed, **'They [the Quakers] tell you they own a Scripture Trinity, but mean not a word of it'.**104
…

Like many anti-Quakers, Leslie was convinced of an unholy alliance between Quakerism and Socinianism: a diabolic plot to uproot and destroy Christianity. **Such a view may initially seem unfathomable since early**

manifestations of the former pertained to a belief in Christ's total divinity, while the latter emphasised his humanity. However, the offence of antitrinitarianism lay not merely in its false description of the Godhead, but also in its theological implications. Hence, Leslie was able to allege that, 'the *Quakers* are direct *Socinians* for they positively deny the [doctrine of] Satisfaction'.136 Here then, both enthusiasts and rationalists were drawn together by their supposed blasphemy against the person of Christ: **the lie against the truth of atonement, whereby the implicit appeal to human perfectibility proved the state of pride necessary to maintain the delusion.** In one attack, Leslie noted that George Whitehead 'Runs on *Blaspheming*, and (with the *Socinians*) *Ridiculing* the Doctrin of *Satisfaction* by *Jesus Christ*, whom he Denies to be *God-Man* or the *Saviour* of the World'.137 **Penn was also denounced as a blasphemer for continuing 'the old *Socinian* Job Trot' that Christ's satisfaction was '*Irreligious* and *Irrational*'.**138
...

They observed that **George Fox had, in his seminal *Newes coming up Out of the North* (1653), dismissed the Scriptures as 'Carnal', describing how the 'GOSPEL IS BUT DUST, *MATTHEW*, *MARK*, *LUKE*, and *JOHN*, which is the Letter'.**151
...

For Faldo, the claim that 'there is no such thing as *Ordinances* now under the *Gospel*' was one of '*the* Capital *Errours and Blasphemies of the Quakers*'.167 He noted that, in 1655, James Parnell (bap. 1636, d. 1656) had dismissed baptism without to '*be formal imitation, and the invention of man, and so a meer delusion*', and the Lord's Supper to be nothing but '*Feeding upon the husk and shadow, which is carnal*'.168 **Emboldened, William Smith (d. 1673) had played the proverbial card of Reformation polemic by claiming that the ordinances of baptism and bread and wine '*rose from the Pope's invention*';**169 whereas, John Higgins (1633-1667) had claimed that '*Water-Baptism was but the administration of* John'.170

http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/hume.superstition.html

On the other hand, our sectaries, who were formerly such dangerous bigots, are now become very free reasoners; **and the quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of deists[8] in the universe, the literati, or the disciples of CONFUSCIUS in CHINA.[9]**

https://archive.org/details/theologicalwork00blangoog/page/n272/mode/2up?view=theater

The only sect that has not persecuted are the Quakers; **and the only reason that can be given for it is, that they are rather Deists than Christians. They do not believe much about Jesus Christ, and they call the scriptures a dead letter.** Had they called them by a worse name they had been nearer the truth.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n433/mode/2up?view=theater

Although this is rather a jejune interpretation of the phenomenon of religion, **Schleiermacher's writings have inspired whole generations of Protestant theologians. He was also indubitably one of the first and most powerful dialecticians that Germany ever had. But fundamentally he was only a renegade disciple of the Enlightenment.** He possessed merely the will to believe, just as he also leaned pretty strongly, but not quite whole-heartedly, to pantheism, often treating God and the Universal as identical concepts, and evincing the highest possible respect for Spinoza.

http://www.bible-researcher.com/mathison.html

In his own effort to overturn orthodox Christianity, **Charles Beecher (1815-1900) denounced "creed power" and argued for "the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible."** The universalist minister A.B. Grosh (d. 1884) declared in a similar way, "In religious faith we have but one Father and one Master, and the Bible, the Bible, is our only acknowledged creed book."

The radical American version of "solo" Scriptura reached its fullest expression in the writings of the Restorationists as they applied the principles of Democratic populism to Enlightenment Christianity. In 1809, the Restorationist Elias Smith (1769-1846) proclaimed, "Venture to be as independent in things of religion, as those which respect the government in which you live." Barton Stone (1772-1844) declared that the past should be "consigned to the rubbish heap upon which Christ was crucified." Alexander Campbell (1788-1866) made his individualistic view of Scripture very clear, declaring, "I have endeavored to read the Scriptures as though no one had read them before me, and I am as much on my guard against reading them to-day, through the medium of my own views yesterday, or a week ago, as I am against being influenced by any foreign name, authority, or system whatever."

---

https://biblehub.com/numbers/16-3.htm

And they gathered themselves together against Moses and against Aaron, and said unto them, Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation [hā-ʻê-ḏāh] **are holy, every one of them, and the LORD is among them: wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the congregation** [qə-hal] **of the LORD?**

https://kostaskonstantinou.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Ambrose-Bierce-The-Unabridged-Devils-Dictionary.pdf

Troglodyte, n. Specifically, a cave-dweller of the paleolithic period, after the Tree and before the Flat. A famous community of troglodytes dwelt with David in the Cave of Adullam. **The colony consisted of ‘‘every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented’’—in brief, all the Socialists of Judah.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#FNanchor_7_14
>
> All pioneers of the spirit have, for a while, the grey and fatalistic mark of the Chandala on their brows: *not* because they are regarded as Chandala, but because they themselves feel the terrible chasm which separates them from all that is traditional and honourable. **Almost every genius knows the “Catilinarian life” as one of the stages in his development, a feeling of hate, revenge and revolt against everything that exists, that has ceased to evolve… Catiline—the early stage of every Cæsar.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater

It is from the intellectual “mob,” **with the failures from all academic professions,** the spiritually unfit and morally inhibited, at its head, that the gangsters of Liberal and Bolshevist risings are recruited.
…

Among all these jurists, journalists, schoolmasters, artists, and technicians one is apt to overlook one type, the most sinister of all: the sunken priest. Religion is the personal relation to the powers of the world around us, expressed in a world view, in pious usages and the personal attitude of renunciation. A church is the organization of a priesthood which fights for its temporal power. It brings the forms of religious life, and therewith the people who cling to them, under its power, and it is therefore the born enemy of all other forms of power: State, rank, or nation. **During the Persian Wars the priesthood of Delphi agitated on behalf of Xerxes and against the national defence.** Cyrus was able to conquer Babylon and overthrow Naboned, the last king of the Chaldees, because the priesthood of Marduk was in league with him. The histories of ancient Egypt and ancient China are full of examples of the sort, and in the West there was only occasionally truce between monarchy and church, throne and altar, nobility and priesthood, when an alliance between them against a third party promised to be advantageous. **“My kingdom is not of this world” is the deep saying which is true of every religion and is betrayed by every church.**

> https://www.thenation.com/article/society/thanksgiving-pilgrims-cult/
>
> Some of the Puritans’ controlling doctrine and behavior started at the jump, but much of it developed beginning around the 1640s and 1650s, when founders and elders became rigidly determined to hold what they’d built and developed—**that is, when they became corrupted by power and refused to relinquish it. For example, as more community members developed the inner conviction of being saved, ministers feared their leadership would lose authority. In response, they started preaching *uncertainty*, saying that, actually, God was hardly saving anyone, and therefore residents were unlikely to be among the so-called elect.** This shift in doctrine made it almost impossible to gain entry into the church, a reality especially hard on teenagers whose entire identities had been built around entry.

https://archive.org/details/Jewish-Antiquities-vol-8/page/20/mode/2up?view=theater

(6) As for the fourth of the philosophies, *b* Judas the Galilaean *c* set himself up as leader of it. **This school agrees in all other respects with the opinions of the Pharisees, except that they have a passion for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are convinced that God alone is their leader and master. [ἡγεμόνα καὶ δεσπότην] They think little of submitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance to fall on kinsmen and friends if only they may avoid calling any man master. [δεσπότης]**

https://biblehub.com/john/6-15.htm

Therefore when Jesus perceived that they were about to come and take Him by force to make Him king, He departed again to the mountain by Himself alone.

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/328/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The Reformer preacher Leonard Ryssenius roundly denounced Walten’s doctrine of ‘natural right,’ which he attributed to Hobbes as well as Spinoza, **and especially Walten’s principle that any**

> **society or nation has an inherent and inalienable right to change its laws, its government, and even its religion.** Walten requires government to conform to the people's wishes in matters of faith as well as government, irrespective, protested the shocked preacher, of whether the new faith is authentic Christianity, debased Christianity, or a wholly 'false' religion. …
>
> **Walten's political theory, held Ryssenius, thus stripped William III of everything that is royal, making him a mere servant of Parliament:** 'gy set Koning William [*sic*],' he added sarcastically, 'een schoone kroon op det hooft' [you set a fine crown on King William's head].21

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_William_IV_of_Prussia#Revolutions_of_1848

> He did, however, remain dedicated to unification for a time, **leading the Frankfurt Parliament to offer him the crown of Germany on 3 April 1849, which he refused, purportedly saying that he would not accept a "crown from the gutter" (German: "Krone aus der Gosse").**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/sidney-discourses-concerning-government#lf0019_label_735

But to show that our ancestors did not mistake the words of the Apostle, 'tis good to consider when, to whom, and upon what occasion he spoke. The Christian religion was then in its infancy: his discourses were addressed to the professors of it, who tho they soon grew to be considerable in number, were for the most part of the meanest sort of people, servants or inhabitants of the cities, rather than citizens and freemen; joined in no civil body or society, nor such as had or could have any part in the government. **The occasion was to suppress the dangerous mistake of many converted Jews and others, who knowing themselves to be freed from the power of sin and the Devil, presumed they were also freed from the obligation of human laws. And if this error had not been cropp'd in the bud, it would have given occasion to their enemies (who desired nothing more), to destroy them all;** and who knowing that such notions were stirring among them, would have been glad, that they who were not easily to be discovered, had by that means discovered themselves.

https://biblehub.com/jude/1-4.htm

4 **For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained** [*progegrammenoi*] **to this condemnation, ungodly men, turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness, and denying the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ.** … 8 **Likewise also these filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominion,** [*kyriotēta*] **and speak evil of dignities.** [*doxas*] … 11 **Woe unto them! for they have gone in the way of Cain, and ran greedily after the error of Balaam for reward, and perished in the gainsaying** [*antilogia*] **of Core.** … 16 **These are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts; and their mouth speaketh great swelling words, having men's persons in admiration because of advantage.**

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228277490_Christian_Pacifism_Before_Constantine

The Tertullianists rejected the human body, sexuality, and bodily pleasures. Tertullian wanted virgins to be veiled, and condemned a second marriage by a widower as fornication. He censured every type of painting and sculpture. **He denounced Catholics as "Psychici" because of their affection for the natural world.**91

> 91. **It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only early Christian sects which were officially pacifist were heretical sects which hated the created world.** The hostility to Creation is directly opposed to Jewish and Christian doctrine from the first chapter of *Genesis* all the way through the New Testament.

…

In another book from this period, he argued that Christians should not flee from persecutors, even though Jesus had told the disciples to do so.94

…

Tertullian is the most famous pacifist of early Christian writers, but he cannot be considered representative of mainstream Christian thought. **His pacifism was the one of the products of a heresy founded on hatred of the material world, and a longing for human suffering.**

> http://anglicanhistory.org/england/jnfiggis/defects1917/13.html
>
> This brings me to the second point, the notion that all war is wrong. **That notion rests on the presupposition best expressed by the great Quaker orator, "Force is no remedy."** The ground is different from that discussed above, and in some respects inconsistent with it. The former rests on materialistic arguments; this, on the contrary, is a perverted spiritualism. So far

as I can understand it the claim that force is no remedy involves the notion that, since realities are spiritual, all attempts at achieving ends by material means are doomed to failure. **This argument, then, rests on the idea of the godlessness of all the world of Nature; ultimately it is Manichean, seeking spirituality purely in abstraction, logically destructive of the Incarnation and the Resurrection of the Body.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2439/pg2439-images.html#link2HCH0004

If early fathers of the Church had occasionally used language which seemed to imply that they disapproved of all resistance, they had also occasionally used language which seemed to imply that they disapproved of all war and of all oaths. **In truth the doctrine of passive obedience, as taught at Oxford in the reign of Charles the Second, can be deduced from the Bible only by a mode of interpretation which would irresistibly lead us to the conclusions of Barclay and Penn.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_40

I have behaved to all the Galilaeans with such kindness and benevolence that none of them has suffered violence anywhere or been dragged into a temple or threatened into anything else of the sort against his own will. **But the followers of the Arian church, in the insolence bred by their wealth,** have attacked the followers of Valentine[2] and have committed in Edessa such rash acts as could never occur in a well-ordered city. **Therefore, since by their most admirable law they are bidden to sell all they have and give to the poor that so they may attain more easily to the kingdom of the skies, in order to aid those persons in that effort, I have ordered that all their funds, namely, that belong to the church of the people of Edessa, are to be taken over that they may be given to the soldiers, and that its property[3] be confiscated to my private purse.[4] This is in order that poverty may teach them to behave properly and that they may not be deprived of that heavenly kingdom for which they still hope.**

https://archive.org/details/ecclesiasticalh02valogoog/page/188/mode/2up?view=theater

He moreover interdicted such as would not abjure Christianity, and offer sacrifice to idols, from holding any office the court: **nor would he allow Christians to be governors of provinces; "for," said he, "their law forbids them to use the sword against offenders worthy of capital punishment."**2

2. The emperor probably alludes to such passages as Matt. xxvi. 52, and John xviii. 11, which he throws in the teeth of Christians, as incapacitating them for civil office.

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214/npnf214.viii.v.iv.iii.html

Canon III.

If any one shall teach a slave, under pretext of piety, to despise his master and to run away from his service, and not to serve his own master with good-will and all honour, let him be anathema.

https://biblehub.com/kjv/1_timothy/6.htm

1 **Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed.** 2 **And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them, because they are brethren; but rather do them service, because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit. These things teach and exhort.** 3 **If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness;** 4 **He is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings,** 5 **Perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness: from such withdraw thyself.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47422/47422-h/47422-h.htm#Page_185

Even while the policy of the Roman Church and clergy was steadily directed to the extinction of feudal slavery in Western Europe, it does not appear that the doctors of that church assailed the master's rights or preached insubordination to the slaves. Why then did St. Paul judge it necessary to leave on record so startling a denunciation? **The question is answered by the events of our age: these words were written for us on whom these ends of the world have come. And we have here a striking proof that his pen was guided by omniscient foreknowledge.** The God who told Paul what to write, foresaw that though the primitive church stood in comparatively slight need of such admonitions, the century would come, after the lapse of eighteen ages, when the church would be

> invaded and defiled by the deadly spirit of modern abolitionism, a spirit perverse, blind, divisive and disorganizing, which would become the giant scourge and opprobrium of Christianity.

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/200/mode/2up?view=theater

It would be surprising if amongst the swarm of students of all sorts and classes who congregated at Oxford there had been none who snatched at such ideas and scattered them abroad, simplified into propagandistic slogans. **And indeed Langland, writing on the morrow of the great revolt, has told in *Piers Plowman* how speculations concerning the State of Nature penetrated from the universities to the common people,** and with what effect:

> **Envy heard this; and bade friars go to school,**
> **And learn logic and Law, and also Contemplation,**
> **And preach to men of Plato, and prove it by Seneca,**
> **That all things under heaven ought to be in common.**
> He lies, as I live, who to the unlearned so preaches,
> For God made to men a law, and Moses taught it,
> Thou shalt not covet any thing that is thy neighbour's.

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/234/mode/2up?view=theater

When he first comes clearly into view, in his early thirties, **Müntzer appears neither as a victim nor as an enemy of social injustice but rather as an 'eternal student,' extraordinarily learned and intensely intellectual.** After becoming a university graduate and then a priest he led a restless, wandering life, always choosing places where he could hope to further his studies.
…

What Müntzer needed if he was to become a new man, sure of himself and of his aim in life, was not indeed to be found in Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone. It was to be found, rather, in the militant and bloodthirsty millenarianism that was unfolded to him when in 1520 he took up a ministry in the town of Zwickau and came in contact with a weaver called Niklas Storch. **Zwickau lies close to the Bohemian border, Storch himself had been in Bohemia and it was essentially the old Taborite doctrines that were revived in Storch's teaching.** He proclaimed that now, as in the days of the Apostles, God was communicating directly with his Elect; and the reason for this was that the Last Days were at hand. First the Turks must conquer the world and Antichrist must rule over it; but then – and it would be very soon – the Elect would rise up and annihilate all the godless, so that the Second Coming could take place and the Millennium begin. What most appealed to Müntzer in this programme was the war of extermination which the righteous were to wage against the unrighteous. **Abandoning Luther, he now thought and talked only of the Book of Revelation and of such incidents in the Old Testament as Elijah's slaughter of the priests of Baal, Jehu's slaying of the sons of Ahab and Jael's assassination of the sleeping Sisera.** Contemporaries noted and lamented the change that had come over him, the lust for blood which at times expressed itself in sheer raving.

By force of arms the Elect must prepare the way for the Millennium; **but who were Elect? In Müntzer's view they were those who had received the Holy Spirit or, as he usually called it, 'the living Christ.' In his writings, as in those of the Spiritual Libertines, a clear distinction is established between the historical Christ and the 'living' or 'inner' or 'spiritual' Christ who is imagined as being born in the individual soul;** and it is the latter who possesses redemptive power. Yet in one respect the historical Christ retains great significance: by submitting to crucifixion he had pointed the way to salvation. For he who would be saved must indeed suffer most direly, he must indeed be purged of all self-will and freed from everything that binds him to the world and to created beings. First he must voluntarily subject himself to an ascetic preparation and then, when he has become fit and worthy to receive them, God will impose further and unutterable sufferings upon him. These last afflictions, which Müntzer calls 'the Cross,' may include sickness and poverty and persecution, all of which must be borne in patience – but above all they will include intense mental agonies, weariness with the world, weariness with oneself, loss of hope, despair, terror. Only when this point has been reached, when the soul has been stripped utterly naked, can direct communication with God take place. This was of course traditional doctrine, such as had been held by many Catholic mystics of the Middle Ages; but when Müntzer comes to speak of the outcome he follows another and less orthodox tradition. For according to him when once 'the living Christ' enters into the soul it is for evermore; and the man so favoured becomes a vessel of the Holy Spirit – **Müntzer even speaks of him 'becoming God.'** Endowed with perfect insight into the divine will and living in perfect conformity with it, such a man is incontestably qualified to discharge the divinely appointed eschatological mission; and that is precisely what Müntzer claimed for himself. It was not for nothing that this *propheta* had been born within a few miles of Nordhausen, the centre of that underground movement in which the doctrine of the Free Spirit blended with that of the flagellants.
…

Yet all this does not – as has someties been suggested – necessarily mean that Müntzer cannot have imagined his Millennium as egalitarian, even as communistic. It could equally well mean that he regarded the existing order as irremediable until the catastrophes of the Last Days had run their course, and at the same time took it for granted that once that had happened the primal State of Nature would automatically be restored. Such phantasies, which had never lost their fascination since the days of the Taborites, are known to have been familiar in the circles which Müntzer moved. **According to a fairly reliable source Müntzer's first teacher,**

the weaver Niklas Storch, held views on these matters which are hardly to be distinguished from those of the Brethren of the Free Spirit; maintaining that God makes all men alike naked and so sends them into the world, that they may be all of the same rank and may share all things equally amongst them. Again, Müntzer knew the young Humanist Ulrich Hugwald; and Hugwald had written a work prophesying that mankind would return 'to Christ, to Nature, to Paradise,' which he defined as a state without war or want or luxury and in which every man would share all things as with his brethren. Moreover on the grounds that a peasant's life was nearest to that which God had appointed for Adam and Eve, Hugwald ended by turning himself into a peasant; and so did the Humanist Karlstadt, who was a close associate and even a disciple of Müntzer's.

> https://gameo.org/index.php?title=Hugwald,_Ulrich_(1496-1571)
>
> **Paul Burckhardt correctly says that in these pompous writings there is no trace of old-evangelical heresy. They are rather the ideas of Erasmus; i.e., a blending of humanism with the Gospel.**
> …
>
> He remained for a time an adherent of the Anabaptists, abandoned his scholarly career and took up turning and agricultural tasks, but then left them, became a schoolmaster at Burg and later professor at the University of Basel.

…

As for Müntzer himself, when he writes of the Law of God he certainly seems to equate it with that original and absolute Natural Law which was supposed to have known no distinctions of property or status.

http://www.godrules.net/library/luther/NEW1luther_d17.htm

You, and everyone else, must bear me witness that I have taught with all quietness, have striven earnestly against rebellion, and have diligently held and exhorted subjects to obedience and reverence toward even your tyrannous and ravenous rule. **This rebellion cannot be coming from me. But the murderprophets, who hate me as much as they hate you, have come among these people and have gone about among them for more than three years, and no one has resisted them save me alone.**

…

On the basis of what has been said, all your articles are easily answered; for even though all of them were right and proper according to the law of Nature, nevertheless you have forgotten the Christian law, since you have not put them through by means of patience and prayer to God, as Christian people ought, but have undertaken, with impatience and violence, to wrest them from the rulers, and extort them by force; and this is against the law of the land and against natural justice.

…

Again, it is not true when you declare that you teach and live according to the Gospel. **There is not one of the articles which teaches a single point of the Gospel, but everything is directed to one purpose; namely, that your bodies and your properties may be free. In a word, they all deal with worldly and temporal matters.**

> https://biblehub.com/jo26 hn/6-26.htm
>
> **Jesus answered them and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled.**
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch07.htm
>
> But while at the time of their emergence the small-holding owners, **in their accord with society, in their dependence on natural forces and submission to the authority which protected them from above, were naturally religious,** now that they are ruined by debts, at odds with society and authority, and driven beyond their own limitations, they have become naturally irreligious.
>
> **Heaven was quite a pleasing addition to the narrow strip of land just won,** especially as it makes the weather; **it becomes an insult as soon as it is thrust forward as a substitute for the small holding.**
>
> https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/jul/16c.htm

> Everywhere in Europe the peasant *was* revolutionary when he fought against the feudals, the serf-owners and landowners. **Once the peasant had obtained his freedom and a little piece of land he, as a general rule,**
> ***made his peace* with the landowners and priests and became a reactionary.** The development of capitalism, however, begins in its turn to pull the peasant out of the embraces of reaction and leads him to the Social-Democrats.

…

ON THE THIRD ARTICLE

"There shall be no serfs, for Christ has made all men free." <u>That is making Christian liberty an utterly carnal thing.</u> Did not Abraham and other patriarchs and prophets have slaves? Read what St. Paul teaches about servants, who, at that time, were all slaves. Therefore this article is dead against the Gospel. It is a piece of robbery by which every man takes from his lord the body, which has become his lord's property. For a slave can be a Christian, and have Christian liberty, in the same way that a prisoner or a sick man is a Christian, and yet not free. **This article would make all men equal, and turn the spiritual kingdom of Christ into a worldly, external kingdom; and that is impossible. For a worldly kingdom cannot stand unless there is in it an inequality of persons, so that some are free, some imprisoned, some lords, some subjects, etc.; and St. Paul says in Galatians 3:28, that in Christ master and servant are one thing.** On this subject my friend Urban Regius has written enough; you may read further in his book.

ON THE OTHER EIGHT ARTICLES

The other articles, about freedom of game, birds, fish, wood, forests; about services, tithe, imposts, excises, Todfall, etc., — **these I leave to the lawyers, for it is not fitting that I, an evangelist, should judge or decide them.** It is for me to instruct and teach men's consciences in things that concern divine and Christian matters; there are books enough about the other things in the imperial laws. I have said above that these things do not concern a Christian, and that he cares nothing about them. He lets anyone else rob, take, skin, scrape, devour, and rage, for he is a martyr on earth.

Therefore the peasants ought rightly let the name of Christian alone, <u>and act in some other name, as men who want human and natural rights, not as those who seek Christian rights.</u> This means that on all these points they should keep still, suffer, and make their complaints to God alone.

http://www.lutherdansk.dk/On%20war%20against%20Islamic%20reign%20of%20terror/On%20war%20against%20Islamic%20reign%20of%20terror1.htm

Even in our own times, what was Muenzer seeking, except to become a new Turkish emperor? He was possessed of the spirit of lies and therefore there was no holding him back; he had to go at the other work of the devil, take the sword and murder and rob, as the spirit of murder drove him, and he created such a rebellion and such misery.

…

It is part of the Turks' holiness, also, that they tolerate no images or pictures and are even holier than our destroyers of images. **For our destroyers tolerate, and are glad to have, images on gulden, groschen, rings, and ornaments;** but the Turk tolerates none of them and stamps nothing but letters on his coins. **He is entirely Muenzerian, too, <u>for he overthrows all rulers and tolerates no gradations of government, such as princes, counts, lords, nobles and other feudatories; but he alone is lord over all in his own land, and what he gives out is only pay, never property or rights of rulership.</u>**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/peasant-war-germany/ch02.htm

His theologic-philosophic doctrine attacked all the main points not only of Catholicism but of Christianity as such. **Under the cloak of Christian forms, he preached a kind of pantheism, which curiously resembles the modern speculative mode of contemplation,** and at times even taught open atheism. He repudiated the assertion that the Bible was the only infallible revelation. The only living revelation, he said, was reason, a revelation which existed among all peoples at all times. **<u>To contrast the Bible with reason, he maintained, was to kill the spirit by the latter, for the Holy Spirit of which the Bible spoke was not a thing outside of us; the Holy Spirit was our reason.</u> Faith, he said, was nothing else but reason become alive in man, therefore, he said, pagans could also have faith.** Through this faith, through reason come to life, man became godlike and blessed, he said.

> https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA85#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Now that *something* by Vertue of which those *Atheists* dream men *Christians*, is, *Reason*. 'Tis precisely upon the Account of their being *Reasonable Creatures*, that they call Men *Christians*. They

> derive the Words, *Christians*, and *Christianity* from *Christ*, which signifying the being *Anointed* with *Reason*, according to them; they conclude, that whoever has *Reason*, is *Anointed* as *Christ* was, and consequently a *Christian*. **A *Reasonable* Creature, as such, is therefore what those Men understand by ther Term, *Christian*, and it is in this very Sense, that the Atheist *Spinoza* own'd himself a Christian.**
> …
>
> Agreeably hereunto, and in confirmation hereof, those men do include all Mankind, of what Sect, Denomination, or Belief soever, in their *Truly Universal*, *Catholick* and *Christian Church*.

…

Muenzer preached these doctrines mostly in a covert fashion, under the cloak of Christian phraseology which the new philosophy was compelled to utilise for some time. **The fundamental heretic idea, however, is easily discernible in all his writings, and it is obvious that the biblical cloak was for him of much less importance than it was for many a disciple of Hegel in modern times.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA99#v=onepage&q&f=false

Once the early Anabaptist groups' armed militant chiliasts, the Münsterites and Batenburgers, were suppressed by the authorities in the borderlands between Germany and the Netherlands, in the years 1535-8, Anabaptist currents in the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Germany developed mainly as pacifist clandestine communities using preaching, books, and concealed networks to stabilize their movement.3 Not only Catholics and Lutherans but also the first Calvinist missionaries **were appalled to find so many independent-minded Anabaptists, David-Jorists, insurgent ex-Lutherans, Nicodemists, "Libertines," and confirmed indifferentists, refusing to conform to any of the main confessions.**4

…

Many adherents of the fringe movements were in fact eventually absorbed and "confessionalized" into the "Lutheran," "Zwinglian," or Calvinist blocs, and eventually brought under ecclesiastical authority, direction by the clergy, and the sway of dogma. **But some Anabaptist and "Libertine" groups stalwartly resisted all catechisms, elaborate doctrine, and clergy,** continuing to reject ecclesiastical supervision of any kind, pushing Luther's maxim "sola Scriptura" to extremes he would not have dreamt of.

Sebastian Franck (1499-*c.* 1543), who joined the Reform party in 1525 and began propagating his vision of an invisible spiritual universal church from 1530, was among the earliest and purest examples of the type. He abhorred all theological polemics and rejected heresy-hunting.5 Guided by the "light" emanating from the Holy Ghost, he rejected all dogmatic theology, fomenting a religiosity based of a free conscience, heresies that resulted in his expulsion from Strasbourg, in 1531, and Ulm in 1539.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Encyclopedia_Americana_(1920)/Franck,_Sebastian

His liberal religious ideas, however, antagonized the authorities, and he removed from Nuremberg to Strassburg in 1529 where two years later he published his chief work, 'Chronica, Zeitbuch und Geschichtsbibel' (1531).

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/258/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1524 that old source of anarcho-communistic doctrine, the spurious Fifth Epistle of Clement, had been printed in Basle. **In 1531 the Humanist Sebastian Franck had summarized it in a lively, colloquial German which found many readers; and he had also added his own comments:**

> Shortly after that, Nimrod began to rule and then whoever could manage it got the better of the other. And they started dividing the world up and squabbling about property. **Then Mine and Thine began.** In the end people became so wild, they were just like wild beasts. Each wanted to be finer and better than the other, in fact wanted to be his master. **Yet God had made all things common, as today still we can enjoy air, fire, rain and sun in common, and whatever else some thieving, tyrannical man cannot get hold of and keep for himself.**

https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.vi.xxi.html#fna_vi.xxi-p40.1

5. **Those who are desirous to introduce anarchy[683] object that, though anciently kings and judges presided over a rude people, yet that, in the present day, that servile mode of governing does not at all accord with the perfection which Christ brought with his gospel. Herein they betray not only their ignorance, but their devilish pride, arrogating to themselves a perfection of which not even a hundredth part is seen in them.**

[683] French, **“Ceux qui voudroyent que les hommes vesquissent pesle mesle comme rats en paille;”— Those who would have men to live pell-mell like rats among straw.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false

Servetus’ execution was sanctioned by all the main rival churches, but outraged the clandestine underground of so-called “libertine” independents and adversaries of theocratic power. Particularly appalled and disgusted were Bernardo Ochino (1487-1564), a Siennese estranged from Catholicism who fell foul of Calvin and, after being expelled for Anti-Trinitarian leanings and other heresies from Zurich in 1563, died a hounded outcast in Moravia; David Joris (*c.* 1501-56), a Dutch ex-Anabaptist estranged from Menno besides Calvin and Luther who spent his last years at Basel as a “spiritualist” rejecting all external conformity; and Sebastian Castellio (1515-63), a Savoyard whom Calvin had brought to Geneva to head the municipal college and who became one of the established churches’ most learned and resolute foes. **For Castellio, Catholics and Protestants were equally remote from the truth; the true guide for mankind lies nowhere in theology or church doctrines but exclusively in following Christ’s example. A humanist deeply influenced by Erasmus and Franck’s “spiritualism,” Castellio upheld freedom of conscience, vigorously discounted everything ecclesiastical from doctrine to hierarchy, and, not unlike Spinoza later, presented Christianity as essentially just justice and love;** his *De Haereticis, an sint persequendi* (1554) comprehensively abjured the very concept of “heresy,” wholly denying the right of the Calvinist Church, or any church, to persecute.9 **No one more clearly represents the suppressed legacy of the Radical Reformation that later resurfaced in the seventeenth century and helped generate the Radical Enlightenment.** All Castellio’s writings, needless to say, were banned by Catholics and Protestants alike. Even so, something of his legacy lived on and, fostered in particular by Dirk Volckertsz Coornhert (1522-90), established lasting roots, especially in the Low Countries.10
…

Coornhert, for his part, firmly rejected Original Sin and Predestination, conceiving man as free and capable of improvement. **Son of an Amsterdam merchant, he remained nominally within Catholicism but preached toleration and individual liberty of conscience** while pouring reproaches on the David-Jorists, Schwenkfeldians, and other liberal Anabaptist groups seeking converts and influence within the Dutch, German and Swiss Radical Reformation, as well as on Calvinists, Lutherans, Zwinglians, and Catholics, wherever these seemed to him too hierarchical and fixated on the personalities and teachings of their spiritual leaders.15 **His campaign against intolerance,** the tyranny of religious persecution, and dividing Christianity into mutually hostile churches, sects, and factions, **was unrelenting and second in impact to none.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirck_Coornhert

After learning Latin in 1552, Coornhert published Dutch translations from Cicero, Seneca and Boethius.[1] His 1562 translation of the first twelve books of Homer's *Odyssey* is one of the first major works of Dutch Renaissance poetry.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica,_Ninth_Edition/Theodore_Cornhert

Cornhert was also famous as a theologian. At thirty years of age, having become interested in theology, and being desirous of consulting St Augustine, he commenced the study of Latin. **He entered into controversy alike with Catholics and Reformers, with both of whom he refused to communicate.** Reformers, he said, were sadly wanted, but those who called themselves such were not the kind that the church required; what was needed was apostles directly inspired from heaven. **Till such were sent, he advised all churches to join together in an undogmatic communion.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/298/mode/2up?view=theater

Dirck Coornhert, who witnessed the start of the Dutch rebellion against Spain, was **the first in a distinguished line of Dutch Stoics to embody its ideal of public service and intellectual brotherhood:** he was a statesman and theologian, Humanist and Christian. **He knew the Romans well: he translated Seneca and Cicero’s *De Officiis* and drew from them the irenic message that all men are brothers.** The warring sects, he wrote, are not so deeply divided as narrow passions have led them to believe; the true Word of God is the healing Word of Christ and that alone.

Coornhert’s most important pupil was Jacobus Arminius, who came to preach against his heresies and stayed to preach for them. In Arminius’s sermons, Calvinism is softened to gentle instruction designed to lead sinful men toward a reform of their lives. **Through Dutch Arminianism, a growing and articulate minority in the seventeenth-century Netherlands despite its defeats at the hands of rigid Calvinists, Neo-Stoicism obtained a wide hearing.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA59#v=onepage&q&f=false

Another fundamental reason why the West's "Radical Enlightenment" found its initial sources and roots in the Republic rather than elsewhere was that the Radical Reformation of Servetus, Castellio, Socinus, and Coornhert acquired, through the Dutch Revolt of 1572, deeper roots and a far wider early following there than, for example, in England, Germany, or Scandinavia.103

https://biblehub.com/genesis/13-10.htm

10 **And Lot lifted his eyes and saw all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere (before the LORD destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah) like the garden of the LORD, like the land of Egypt as you go toward Zoar.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT847#v=onepage&q&f=false

Due to far-reaching religious fragmentation, **more sects had surfaced in Holland than all the rest of Europe put together.** The contrast between Swiss and Dutch Protestantism, argued Stouppe, could hardly be greater. **Where the upright Swiss venerated Christ's divinity, devoutly debarring sectarianism and suppressing Anti-Trinitarians, the outrageous Dutch Republic refused to shield core Christian doctrine, so that now [1673] large numbers were questioning the "divinité de Jesus-Christ."** If this belief so central to Christianity should collapse, with it would lapse the entire structure of theological and church supremacy over morality, society, and education. **Where the Canton Geneva piously had "those two heretics [Michael Servetus and Scipio Gentilis]" burnt at the stake for their heinous "errours against the Divinity of Jesus Christ," as befitted the case, the contemptible Dutch refused to "put any Socinians to death, whatever their errours may be."**56 **So disastrous an influence were the Arminian Remonstrants that they were practically as bad as the Mennonites in harbouring Socinians and trampling the Holy Trinity under foot.** The "land of the States General is not of our [Reformed] religion"; Dutch toleration ravages Christianity.57

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/28/mode/2up?view=theater

The Lutheran theologian Heinrich Benthem who toured Holland in 1694, **while granting that not everything Dutch was bad, nevertheless compiled a remarkably long list of points that appalled him. He expressed revulsion at the relative freedom of women as well as servants and children,**59 **and horror at the weak position of the church authorities,** ascribing the licentiousness rife in Dutch cities to the public church's inability to compel city governments to close the 'music halls' for which Amsterdam's harbour area was notorious, as well as brothels and other dens of vice, and clamp down on prostitution.60 **He was shocked by the freedom enjoyed by Jews and Socinians as he was by the lack of deference of Dutch workmen for their social superiors and, more generally, the absence of any clearly defined social hierarchy.** Lack of clear social stratification in urban life seemed to him to be the root of the unprecedented latitude permitted, or at least not prevented, regarding personal lifestyle and dress. **Worst of all, though, in his opinion, the festering sore on which all the rest fed, was 'die grosse Religions-Freyheit' [great religious freedom] the regents allowed.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false

Menno Simons (*c*. 1496-1561), **who did more than any other to stabilize and reinvigorate Low Countries Anabaptism after the crushing of the chiliastic militants,** arguably the foremost figure of the Dutch Reformation, had several toes in the Radical Reformation, being strongly committed to irenicism and toleration. Like other Mennonite leaders, he agreed governments should confine their attention to purely human affairs and not concern themselves with consciences.12 **However, he laid greater stress than the hard core Radical Reformation of the so-called "libertines" on the congregation as a force for discipline, and the need for submission to creed and communal norms.**13 It was those who rejected all strict congregationalism, including the Mennonite and Remonstrant creeds, as well as all Trinitarian theology, formal clergy, and intolerance, like the flock of Hubert Duifhuis (1531-81) at Utrecht, and Caspar Coolhaes (1536-1615) at Leiden, that strove hardest to keep the various strands of opposition to the main blocs "a-confessional," **forging a strand of "Radical Reformation" especially apt to contribute to the milieu from which Radical Enlightenment sprang.**

https://occidentaldissent.com/2019/12/19/luther-and-liberalism/

Martin Luther was not a proto-liberal. **It is a Catholic myth that the Reformation inexorably led to liberalism.** The Anabaptists were the most radical fringe group that came out of the Reformation.

Today, Anabaptists are the most socially conservative religious group with the highest birthrate in the United States. The Amish population **has exploded since the 1960s**.

> https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/25/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **The battle against Catholicism in Germany was nothing but a war begun by spiritualism when it saw that it carried merely the title of ruler and ruled only *de jure*, whereas sensualism, by a time-honored deception, was the true ruler and ruled *de facto*.** The indulgence sellers were chased away, the priest's lovely concubines were replaced by cold wives, the charming images of the Madonna were smashed, and here and there a Puritanism emerged with utmost hostility towards the senses. **The battle against Catholicism in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the other hand, was a war begun by sensualism when it saw that it ruled *de facto* and yet each of the acts of its rule was mocked as illegitimate and denounced in the harshest way by spiritualism, which claimed to rule *de jure*.**

…

The Reformation overlapped with the Age of Discovery, the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution. There were other important things going on in Western Europe in the 16th century. **The roots of liberalism can be traced back to the rediscovery and translation of classical texts in this period that revived naturalism, skepticism and materialism and the development of modern science and technology that discredited the cosmology of the Medieval world which was based on Aristotle and Ptolemy.** It was making sense of these developments that inspired modern philosophy in the 17th century. The development of seafaring global commercial empires by England and the Netherlands led to population growth and made London and Amsterdam into the first large modern cities. **Luther was an Augustinian. John Locke was a Pelagian.** It wasn't Luther that led to Locke. It was the empiricism that was the foundation of his philosophy.

The Republic of Letters which was the forerunner of the Enlightenment wasn't Protestant or Catholic. It was a secular intelligentsia that developed long after Luther's time when the first scientific institutions like the Royal Society and the French Academy of Sciences were being established in the late 17th century. Liberalism was essentially an attempt to create a new moral paradigm that was grounded on the new science. In total contrast to Luther and Augustine, **it was based on an optimistic view of mankind that holds that man is born good and isn't tainted with Original Sin and is only corrupted by society and that reason and the will is capable of discerning and acting on the good or that we are sanctified through our works or that our society is progressing and becoming morally better all the time.**

https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=masters-theses

TOLERATION

> Whilst we compose a catechism, we prescribe nothing to any man: whilst we declare our own opinions, we oppress no one. **Let every person enjoy the freedom of his own judgment in religion;** (*R.C.*, Preface, p. xcvi.)
>
> **It is not therefore within the province of any visible church, much less of the civil magistrate; to impose their own interpretations on us as laws, or as binding on the conscience; in other words, as a matter of implicit faith.** If however there be any difference among professed believers as to the sense of Scripture, it is their duty to tolerate such differences in each other, until God shall have revealed the truth to all. (*C.E.*, XVI, 267.)

This collation provides ample evidence of the influence which the well-formulated Socinian system exercised upon Milton's thinking. We have seen that Milton's doctrines are strikingly similar to those of the Socinians in all major respects.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=njn-dglZFHIC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false

In presenting the bishops as the real underminers, Milton tries to outflank their defenders' political arguments and to situate himself as a defender of royal authority. To this extent he remains within the Foxean tradition of which sees the monarchy as reclaiming a lost balance between civil and ecclesiastical power; but for Milton the balance is by now very problematic. **In his private studies he had worked his way through the histories of Greece and Rome and was shocked when he moved on to the reign of Constantine, the first Christian emperor, to find a marked and steady process of decline in civility (*An Apology against a Pamphlet*, *MPW*, 1, 943-4). The ferocity of Milton's attack on Constantine would have shocked many Puritans, and marked a decisive break with the Foxean tradition.**

> https://www.exclassics.com/foxe/foxe135.htm

> Like as in the primitive age of the church, and in time of Dioclesian and Maximilian; when the devil saw that he could not prevail against the person of Christ which was risen again, he turned all his fury upon his silly servants, thinking by the Roman emperors utterly to extinguish the name and profession of Christ out from the earth; so in this latter age of the world Satan, being let loose again, rageth by the Turks, thinking to make no end of murdering and killing, till he have brought, as he intendeth, the whole church of Christ, with all the professors thereof, under foot. **But the Lord, I trust, will send a Constantine to vanquish proud Maxentius; Moses, to drown indurate Pharaoh; Cyrus, to subdue the stout Babylonian.**

Milton shares with Harrington a dark view of the relations between monarchy and papacy. **If the clergy extolled Constantine, it was because he extolled them,** and this sharply calls his judgement in question. Emperor and church become a corrupt mutual admiration society (*Of Reformation*, *MPW*, 1, 554), and this is because of structural connections between political inequality and corruptions of discourse. It is not just that monarchs are led astray by the corrupt blandishments of the clergy: if that were the case, once monarchs regained control of the church a proper balance would return. Milton's starting point is that even after the Reformation, with the monarchy notionally in charge of the church, corruption had continued. He does, it is true, insist that Presbyterian religion is perfectly consistent with civil obedience, **but the examples he gives are the Dutch and Swiss republics, and the French Huguenots who had been urged in the 1620s to take up arms against their king** (1, 609-10).

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55901/pg55901-images.html#link2H_4_0014 **[August 1825]**

Some of the heterodox doctrines which he avows seemed to have excited considerable amazement, particularly his Arianism, and his theory on the subject of polygamy. Yet we can scarcely conceive that any person could have read the Paradise Lost without suspecting him of the former; nor do we think that any reader, acquainted with the history of his life, ought to be much startled at the latter. **The opinions which he has expressed respecting the nature of the Deity, the eternity of matter, and the observation of the Sabbath, might, we think, have caused more just surprise.**
...

Milton did not strictly belong to any of the classes which we have described. He was not a Puritan. He was not a freethinker. He was not a Royalist. **In his character the noblest qualities of every party were combined in harmonious union.** From the Parliament and from the Court, from the conventicle and from the Gothic cloister, from the gloomy and sepulchral circles of the Roundheads, and from the Christmas revel of the hospitable Cavalier, his nature selected and drew to itself whatever was great and good, while it rejected all the base and pernicious ingredients by which those finer elements were defiled. Like the Puritans, he lived

> "As ever in his great task-master's eye."

Like them, he kept his mind continually fixed on an Almighty Judge and an eternal reward. And hence he acquired their contempt of external circumstances, their fortitude, their tranquillity, their inflexible resolution. **But not the coolest sceptic or the most profane scoffer was more perfectly free from the contagion of their frantic delusions, their savage manners, their ludicrous jargon, their scorn of science, and their aversion to pleasure.** Hating tyranny with a perfect hatred, he had nevertheless all the estimable and ornamental qualities which were almost entirely monopolised by the party of the tyrant.
...

To this all his public conduct was directed. For this he joined the Presbyterians; for this he forsook them. He fought their perilous battle; but he turned away with disdain from their insolent triumph. He saw that they, like those whom they had vanquished, were hostile to the liberty of thought. **He therefore joined the Independents, and called upon Cromwell to break the secular chain, and to save free conscience from the paw of the Presbyterian wolf.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Milton,_John_(1608-1674)

Milton had come to stand apart from all sects, though apparently finding the quakers most congenial. He never went to any religious services in his later years. **When a servant brought back accounts of sermons from nonconformist meetings, Milton became so sarcastic that the man at last gave up his place** (RICHARDSON).

"Umpire Conscience": Freedom, Obedience, and the Cartesian Flight from Calvin in "Paradise Lost" on JSTOR

I shall argue that Milton's contribution was forebodingly split. His stated aim was to assert Christian liberty, which we know was dear to his heart. **A second, unintended legacy, to which we shall return in due course, approaches Cartesian individualism. It might be called the dark double of Christian liberty, something Milton deeply feared, yet helped Descartes to unloose on the world.**

https://www.academia.edu/3758118/Against_Throne_and_Altar

For all his apparent piety, Milton did not share the disdain for music, the theater, and the pagan classics evidenced by the more radical and austere among his fellow Puritans, and he championed divorce, looked favorably on polygamy, argued on biblical grounds against the doctrine of the Trinity, depicted Christ as God's adoptive son, endorsed a free-will doctrine similar to that of Arminius, embraced materialism, rejected creation *ex nihilo*, affirmed the indissoluble union of body and soul, **and advocated a complete separation of church and state. By virtually any standard but his own, he must be judged a heretic.**3
…

How anyone as intent on the liberation of the multitude from clerical tutelage as was Milton could ever have imagined presbyterianism consistent with the division of responsibilities between minister and magistrate that he quite rightly regarded as its prerequisite is a genuine mystery. **That before long he felt compelled to redirect against the English presbyterians and their Scottish allies the ire that he had once reserved for the Roman Catholic Church and English episcopacy is certainly no wonder.**
…

And with Paolo Sarpi's great history in mind, he then warned, "But we do hope to find out all your tricks,/Your plots and packing wors then those of *Trent*,/That so the Parliament/May with their wholsom and preventive Shears/Clip your Phylacteries, though bauk your Ears/And succour our just Fears/When they shall read this clearly in your charge/*New Presbyter* is but *Old Priest* writ Large."124 **By this time, Milton was ready to denounce as disguised popery the religious settlement in nearly every corner of Protestant Europe** – though, even in his fury, he was not prepared to suggest as a punishment proper to its exponents the gruesome penalty exacted under Charles I on the English presbyterian leader William Prynne.
…

If, in the end, Milton came to think the Rump no better than the Long Parliament, it was not solely because of the ignorance and corruption that its members displayed. It was even more because in 1652, at the instigation of Owen and his colleagues, **the Council of State had suppressed *The Racovian Catechism,* which Milton in the course of his duties had licensed for publication, and because in February of that year a parliamentary committee had raked him over the coals for sanctioning the printing of that Socinian tract and had seen to it that the authority to license books and periodicals was placed in the hands of someone less friendly to the *libertas philosophandi*.**126 By the same token, if, eventually, Milton came to despise and loathe the Lord General victorious at Dunbar and Worcester, it was not solely because the latter had betrayed the republican cause. It was also because, in 1654, as Lord Protector, Cromwell had issued two ordinances implementing Owen's plan, establishing thereby a national church supported by a tithe enforceable at law, imposing upon its otherwise independent congregations a regime of centralized magisterial supervision, and providing for a qualified toleration of "gathered" churches outside the state system.127 In Milton's opinion, this amounted to the institution of "a state-tyranie over the church" and even to a species of "civil papacie." The Lord Protector had become, he implied, "no less antichrist in this main point of antichristianism" and "no less a pope ... than he at *Rome*." **In his considered judgment, "they who force, though professing to be protestants, deserve as little to be tolerated themselves" as the Roman Catholics, "being no less guiltie of poperie in the most popish point."**128
…

John Milton was either profoundly confused and at loggerheads with himself, as Blake contended. Or, like Marsilius of Padua, on whose political thinking he certainly drew, the author of *Areopagitica*, *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained*, and *Samson Agonistes* was an Averroist of sorts, attempting to come to grips with the cultural hegemony of a revealed religion that he judged not only ill suited in its inherited form to the purpose of promoting secular ends such as moral virtue, domestic harmony, and devotion to the common good but incompatible with the well-being of philosophy as well.
…

If Milton really was an Averroist of sorts, the author of *Paradise Lost* was neither a devout Christian nor a genuine Socinian nor even, as some have supposed, a believing Arian. **He was a thoroughgoing and highly circumspect infidel instead.** He was a philosophical poet on the model of Vergil and Dante.135 He was an enlightened practitioner of *kalām*, who penned *De doctrina Christiana* not as a statement of his private creed but as the outline for a Christianity shorn, insofar as possible, of doctrines philosophically unsound and politically dangerous. If this hypothesis is true, Milton may well have regarded himself as a prophet on the lines envisaged by Alfarabi, the Arab *falāsifa*, and Maimonides. He was a man possessed of uncanny capacity to charm and persuade those wholly reliant upon the imagination for their understanding of the world, as he well knew, **and in the poetry he composed late in the 1650s and thereafter, he appears to have been intent on deploying his remarkable rhetorical gifts in verse for the purpose of reshaping in a politic fashion the superstition dominant in his own time.** If this hypothesis is true, if there really is more to Milton's commitment to "the reforming of Reformation it self" than immediately meets the eye, one would then cite his commitment to philosophy and the profound anticlericalism to which this gave rise if one were called

upon to explain **how a man seemingly so pious could have chosen as his "particular friend" and "crony" a figure so notorious for libertinism as was Marchamont Nedham**136 – the remarkable publicist to whose achievements as a popularizer and adaptor of Machiavellian political science we now must turn.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA10#v=onepage&q&f=false

Two of the most vital new intellectual forces of the 1650s were the theological ideas growing out of the religious movement known as Independency and the philosophy and religion of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford was one of the places where these two new forces were felt most strongly, and Stubbe was one of the principal innovators there on both fronts, engaged as he was in promoting Hobbes's philosophy and in championing the cause of extreme Independency in defiance of the Presbyterians. **Stubbe was in fact a Hobbesist and a radical Independent. On the surface nothing could appear more contradictory.**
…

By April 1656 Stubbe and Hobbes had become friends – and one may well ask how a young radical Independent and the theorist of absolute sovereignty could strike up a close relationship and even, as it turns out, an intellectual collaboration, for Stubbe had begun, with Hobbes's approval, if not at his instigation, to translate *Leviathan* into Latin.8 Nor was this the only occasion for collaboration. Since 1655 Hobbes had been engaged in a pamphlet feud with Dr John Wallis, the Presbyterian divine and Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford.
…

In a letter to Christian Huygens in 1659, Wallis made these purposes clear:

> **Our Leviathan is furiously attacking and destroying our Universities (and not only ours but all) and especially ministers and the clergy and all religion,** as though the Christian world had not sound knowledge … and as though men could not understand religion if they did not understand mathematics. Hence it seemed necessary that some mathematician should show him … how little he understands the mathematics from which he takes his courage.30

…

What is established, however, is that Stubbe saw no conflict between his dual attachment to Hobbes and to the Independents, that for him at least Hobbes's philosophy gave powerful support to the cause of radical Independency. **It is also clear that Hobbes, for whatever reason, did nothing to disabuse his young admirer of this association and seems to have done a great deal to encourage it.**
…

The authority of ministers comes from the civil sovereign and thus they do not have, as Wallis claimed they did, any independent spiritual authority. The clergy does not possess any extraordinary supernatural sanction conveyed by Apostolic succession and the imposition of hands. There is no divine right of ministers. **Hence any layman might assume the office of a minister and even administer the sacraments should the civil sovereign appoint him to do so.**69 **In these matters Stubbe was in complete agreement with Hobbes, as the correspondence makes clear.**70 Indeed to the tract in which Hobbes set out his opposition to Wallis's ecclesiology, Stubbe contributed an anynomous attack on Wallis's knowledge of classical sources and grammar.71
…

Stubbe went to some lengths to maintain his anonymity in his collaboration with Hobbes in order to protect himself from attack or, as he put it, **'that my zeal to serve you be not my ruin & undoing.'**73

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA56#v=onepage&q&f=false

In an important discourse written in 1665 or 1666109 and published twenty years later as *A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature* (1686), [Robert Boyle] claimed that there is (presumably in England):

> **a sect of men, as well professing Christianity, as pretending to philosophy, who (if I am not misinformed of their doctrine) do very much symbolize with the ancient heathens, and talk much indeed of God,** but mean such a one as is not really distinct from the animated and intelligent universe, but is on that account very differing from the true God that we Christians believe and worship.110

…

'In fine,' Stubbe wrote, 'without prejudicing this age … **he seemed to me by his faith and by his charitableness to include in his soul some grains of the Golden Age and to be a relic of those**

times when piety and miracles were sincere.’131 Before 1660 Stubbe had argued for a return to primitive Christianity. Now in 1666 he is espousing the same ideal.
…

For Stubbe Greatrakes’s cures were so many emblems of this pure Christianity, **this lay religion in which spiritual power is democratized because immanent in nature. For Stubbe, Greatrakes was *The Miraculous Conformist*, ‘a relic of those times when piety and miracles were sincere’ (and every man his own priest) and an omen that such a church might be restored.** Not only then is *The Miraculous Conformist* Hobbesist in the sense that the spiritual world (if not God himself) is subsumed into the material order; it is also Hobbesist in the conclusion it draws from this, namely, in its denial of the clergy’s claim to possess a monopoly of spiritual authority on earth.

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A42823.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

M. *Stubbe* hath kept a noise ever since he could *open,* against *all men,* except M. *Hobbs,* and the *Republicans*; and all *things,* but *Quakerism* and *Democracy.*
…

The sum of it is *this:*

> *He served his Patron Sir* Hen. Vane, *by whom he was transcendently obliged, and he is ashamed that he hath done so little, rather than that he hath done so much for him.* He confesseth himself a *Vassal* and a *Slave,* and such he saith are *exempt from ignominy,* though their *masters might be accounted traytors.* **He pleads the example of the friend of *Gracchus,* who justified his *treason* by his *friendship,* and said he should have *burnt the Capitol if* Gracchus *had bid him.*** Thus he tells us he hath *Apologized for himself a thousand times.*

…

But he hath a *president* to warrant him: *BLESSIUS* pleaded his friendship to *GRACCHUS* to justifie his *seditions,* and would have *burnt* the *Capitol* if *Gracchus had bid him:* Thus M. *Stubbe* saith, he hath *apologized for himself a thousand times:* he served *Sir H. Vane,* and was (as he owns himself) his *Slave,* and *so* he is cleared from all *imputations*: Yea, if his *Patron* had bid him, he would have *kill'd* his *Father,* and *murder'd* his *Sovereign. This* is the *sense* of his *Apology.*
…

And how heavy and intolerable that was, he expresseth [*ibid.*] in *these* words, ***I often communing with mine own Soul in private, use to parallel our Bondage under the* Norman *Yoke, and our Deliverance therefrom, to the Continuance of the Children of* Israel *in* Aegypt, *and their Escape at last from that slavish Condition.* This put him in mind to compare *our Deliverers* (forsooth) to *MOSES,* and 'twas not, he saith, *One* Moses, *But many illustrious Personages, whose Memory* (he prophesies) *shall live, when that of* Thrasybulus, Timoleon, Epaminondas, Brutus, Valerius, *or any Worthies* Greece *or old* Rome *could ever boast of, shall cease to be mention'd.*** [against M. *B.* p. 3.] What a *Seer* was M. *Stubb!*
…

That the same should *befal us as did the Children of* Israel *after they had cast off* Pharaoh'*s Yoke,* [Vind. of Sir *H. V.* p. 3.] Yea, that at last, we should *return not to* Goshen, *but the most dismal parts of* Aegypt, *rather than proceed to our Felicity.* [p. 5.] *These* things were so far from being *likely,* that notwithstanding all the Discouragements the *Good old Cause* met with, which are parallel'd to those befel the *Israelites* in their *Iourney, p.* 4. **yet our *Prophetick Rumper* heartens himself in *these* Words,** *I assure my self that these are but the Pangs of that Birth, in which we shall at last cry out, a Man-Child is born,* [p. 4, 5.] For Confirmation of which he adds, that *God will not lose his own Mercies, and all is but as the wandring Iews in the Desert, or as the going back of the Sun upon the Dial of* Ahaz *ten Degrees, which was a sign of Recovery to disconsolate and languishing* Hezechias, *p.* 5. and so he grows confident of the final issue of things, and the *Prisoners of Hope shall receive double Satisfaction, and the ransomed of the Lord shall return,* ib. ***This* is the man, Sir, that cries out in Astonishment at my *Puritanism* and *Fanaticism* [p. 11. of his Book against me] because I call some of the *Aristotelian* Doctrines, *Heathen Notions.***
…

He saith, [p. 18. of his Vindication of Sir *H. V.*] **That he may *suppose* M. *Baxter* is *totally ignorant of Syriack and Arabick,* and that his *Skill in Hebrew* is as *little,* which he referrs to M. *Robertson* to prove, and thereupon he takes it for granted, insulting in *these* following Words, *Dare He boast unto the World, what time he spent in Impertinencies,* viz. Reading the *Fathers* and *Schoolmen,* p. 13. *and yet be ignorant of that, which is almost the* Unum Necessarium *in his Function*? viz. *Hebrew.* But why M. *Harry* must *that* be the almost *Vnum Necessarium* to M. *Baxter's Function,* which *not one of the Fathers in the* Nicene *Council (whose Creed is so***

***famous) understood*? as you tell us in your Apology for the Quakers,** [p. 85. of Light out of Darkness.]
…

And yet *these* two Books, speaking such *contradictory* things, bear date the *same* Year; onely indeed, the Designs were very *different,* and M. *Stubb* was to serve a *divers Interest* in them; **in the one to recommend himself to the *Quakers* and other *wild* Fanaticks; and in the other to vent his *Malice* against M. *Baxter*:** And things in *his Divinity* must be *affirmed* or *denied,* as there is occasion. **He is still *consistent* with *one* Principle, *Self*; But never was yet *steady* to *any other.***
…

If a man of Learning, and tolerably in his Wits endeavour to make the *first Christians, Martyrs,* and *Reformers* like the *Quakers* in their *Opinions* and *Deportment,* He cannot be supposed primarily to design the *Crediting* those *distracted Enthusiasts,* but to vilifie all *Christians,* except some of M. *Stubb*'s sort called *Mahometans*; and our *Defender* of Religion knows well enough that the *Testimonies* he alledgeth to prove those sickbrain'd People to be *like* all the *best Christians,* will prove *as much,* that the best Christians were like *Them*; **and so a more *desperate* Enemy than the *Quakers* is gratified: How far he intended *this,* let those conjecture, who have heard of his Kindness and Concern for M. *Hobbs:*** And how far he designs the promoting the *Interest* of *Religion*, and the *Church of England*, let the most *charitable* man alive judge upon the whole.

https://biblehub.com/2_john/1-7.htm

7 **For many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an antichrist.** … 10 **If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed: For he that biddeth him God speed is partaker of his evil deeds.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT921#v=onepage&q&f=false

As if Oldenburg and Boyle would not be sufficiently outraged by this, Spinoza discloses his thoughts also on Oldenburg's third point, namely the nature of Jesus Christ: **"I say that it is completely unnecessary for salvation to know Jesus Christ according to flesh. Rather we should take an entirely different view of God's eternal son, namely as God's eternal wisdom as manifested in all things, and especially the human mind, above all that of Christ Jesus. For no one can reach the state of beatitude without this, given that [such philosophical wisdom] alone teaches what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad."** Such wisdom as humans possess is manifested most perfectly through Jesus Christ and exactly this, "as he revealed it to them, was what his disciples preached," **so that they could pride themselves above all others in the spirit of Christ.**

Finally, "as for what certain churches add to this – that God assumed a human nature [naturam humanam] – I warned expressly that I do not understand what they mean. **Indeed, to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if someone was to tell me that a circle had assumed the nature of a square,**" implying that Socinian Collegiants and other Anti-Trinitarians were far less irrational here than mainstream Christians.83
…

"Your assertion that Christ's passion, death and burial, is to be believed literally but his resurrection allegorically," [Oldenburg] complains in this his last surviving letter to Spinoza, "is not supported by any argument that I can see. In the Gospels, Christ's resurrection seems to be narrated as literally as the rest – and on this article, the Resurrection, stands the entire Christian religion and its truth, and with its removal, the mission of Christ Jesus and his heavenly teaching collapse." **That of course was precisely Spinoza's point.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT971#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> More was at loggerheads with a variety of opponents, but **"this cunning hypocrite Spinoza […] secretly deriding all religions and God and Christ however in his writing he prattles of justice, charity, and the spirit of Christ,"** he detested differently and more intensely than any other opponent except perhaps for the Jesuits and Quakers.
>
> https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/362/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Such, for instance, was **Spinosa, the great leader of our modern infidels, in whom are to be found many schemes and notions much admired and followed of late years:—such as undermining religion under the pretence of vindicating and explaining it: the maintaining it not necessary to believe in Christ according to the flesh: the persuading men that miracles**

> **are to be understood only in a spiritual and allegorical sense:** that vice is not so bad a thing as we are apt to think: that men are mere machines impelled by fatal necessity.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14217a.htm

The writings of the Arabian philosopher Al Farabi and of his commentator Ismail show striking similarities, even in the smallest details, with the later system of Spinoza.

> https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02150c.htm
>
> St. Thomas Aquinas used the "Grand Commentary" of Averroes as his model, being, apparently, the first Scholastic to adopt that style of exposition; and though he refuted the errors of Averroes, and devoted special treatises to that purpose, **he always spoke of the Arabian commentator as one who had, indeed, perverted the Peripatetic tradition, but whose words, nevertheless, should be treated with respect and consideration.** The same may be said of Dante's references to him. **It was after the time of St. Thomas and Dante that Averroes came to be represented as "the arch-enemy of the faith".**

...

After the death of his father in 1654, Spinoza was almost completely cast off by his family and, having no means, taught in the private Humanistic school of the ex-Jesuit and freethinker Franz van den Enden. Here he perfected himself in Latin and continued his philosophical investigations by the study of St. Augustine, the Stoics, Scholasticism (in a somewhat superficial manner), the philosophy of the Renaissance and that of some modern writers, especially of Hobbes. His later psychology shows extraordinary similarities with the teachings of Marcus Marci and of Glisson. **Spinoza now frequented almost exclusively the society of Christians, i.e. of the free-thinking sort, and especially of Mennonites.**
...

Originally Spinoza seems to have had the intention to found a kind of philosophical world-religion. He believed that the basic ideas of his view of the world were to be found among the old Hebrews, in Christ, and in St. Paul. In his opinion this philosophy, without the Holy Scripture, sufficed for the truly wise. In order to understand his conception of the original Christianity it must be remembered that his acquaintance from the beginning had been among latitudinarian Christians, who emphasized the moral life, not dogma, that, with many of his Christian friends, **he regarded the Antitrinitarians as the most genuine Christians, that he found traces of his philosophy in the writings of Christian mystics, and finally that among the first writings which had introduced him to Christianity had been Hobbes's books "De cive" and "Leviathan".**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT557&hl=fi&pg=PT557#v=onepage&q&f=false

After the excommunication Spinoza apparently became briefly involved with the Quaker mission in Amsterdam. He probably helped translate into Hebrew a Quaker pamphlet by Margaret Fell that was intended to convert Jews to Quakerism. He worked with the English Quaker theologian Samuel Fisher, who was developing a lengthy critique of scriptural religion, arguing that true religion is found in the spirit, not in pieces of parchments, manuscripts, or books, all of which are man-made. Fisher's theory, published in English ten years before Spinoza's *Tractatus*, contains much of the biblical criticism later advanced by Spinoza.
...

A strange aspect of Spinoza's life is that from the moment he left the synagogue he was living with Christian millenarians. His patron, Peter Serrarius, was Spinoza's contact with the outside world. Letters to Spinoza from abroad were sent to Serrarius, who then had them delivered to Spinoza, and Spinoza sent his answers via Serrarius, who had contacts, such as Oldenburg, in other countries. Nothing in the belief systems of the two men indicates what they could have had in common or why this relationship kept on until Serrarius's death in 1669. Serrarius became a believer in the Jewish pseudo-messiah, whom Spinoza must have rejected out of hand. Other millenarian groups that Spinoza associated with, such as the Quakers and the Collegiants, were more spiritual, expecting a spiritual transformation of the world. Spinoza may have intellectually transformed their millenarian view of the kingdom of God on earth into the journey of the mind to being eternally with God, from which the world is seen from the aspect of eternity. This would be a spiritual kingdom, divine in a nonhistorical sense.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA262&printsec=frontcover

Perhaps most crucial of all these close allies was the veteran bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz the Elder (*c.* 1616-87) whose home and bookshop was a gathering point of Socinian meetings or "conventicles" as well as lovers of dissident books, **that is books containing what a Catholic ecclesiastic later styled everything "bizarre and impious" contrived by "petulant and arrogant minds."** His shop stocked the finest array of Descartes' works in the vernacular as well as Latin then to be found anywhere. But he was also one of the main clandestine publishers of Collegiant pamphlets,

illicit pamphlets being one of the main channels by which Collegiants projected their universalism and irenicism to the outside world. **If no one in Holland did more to spur diffusion of Descartes' thought than this enterprising publisher, no one else did more to publicize Collegiant rejection of the commonly accepted notions of what Christianity is and how it needs to be fundamentally reformed to become at all authentic.**3

A member of the Amsterdam booksellers' guild since 1640, locally famed for his skills in clandestine diffusion of banned Socinian ideas denying the Holy Trinity, Christ's divinity, Original Sin and more, Rieuwertsz's bookshop "in't Martelaarsboek" (in the Martyrs' Book), was located near the homes of De Vries and Jelles in the long, narrow street now called the Dirk van Hasseltssteeg, then the Dirk van Assensteeg, running off the Nieuwezijds Voorburgwal, situated nearer the Nieuwendijk end.4 **It was a meeting place where "many Socinian persons go now and then to listen to lectures together," reported a Reformed pastor to the Amsterdam Reformed Church council, on 29 November 1657, "though no one can ascertain or discover whether any Socinian prayer gathering was held there. Every day Jan Knol disseminates his poison there."**5 That the ambience of Rieuwertsz's bookshop was informally intensely Socinian, the Reformed Church council knew for certain. Due to its suffused, whispered collective denial of Christ's divinity and the Trinity, Rieuwertsz's house, observes a pamphlet of 1655, was nicknamed "the School of Mockers."6

Jan Knol (d. 1672) was a prominent Amsterdam Collegiant preacher, resolutely anti-Trinitarian and averse to all conventional theology, eloquent and sharp-tongued, with a taste for pamphlet polemics and satirical humour – and greatly resented by the city's Reformed pastors. **He was an important supplementary influence on the *cercle Spinoziste* as it evolved at the end of the 1650s;** later the Koerbagh brothers were among those attending Socinian gatherings at his home.7 It was Knol who translated into Dutch the Polish Brethren's Socinian "Rakow Catechism" which appeared in 1659, published in Amsterdam but with its title-page falsely stating "Rakow" as place of publication.8 **In 1669, Knol's defiance of the world's principal churches reached its peak when he famously stated that "Christ never said he was the true God; if he had said that then the Jews were right to kill him."**9 Bigoted fury overflowed at this report, but despite an angry official inquiry by the city government, pressured by the Reformed consistory, Knol eluded serious consequences through the lack of witnesses willing to testify against him.
…

Jelles, Balling, Knol, and Rieuwertsz also had a regular association with Rijnsburg where Spinoza lived in 1661-3, a village with which Collegiants had special ties; **but they had no connection with the academic circles he frequented in and around Leiden,** or with his subsequent milieu in Voorburg or The Hague and its environs where he would spend the last stages of his life. So his life-long friendship with these personages must almost certainly have originated well before 1660.
…

In late 1658, Zwicker profited from his new-found freedom in Amsterdam to publish anonymously his *Irenicum Irenicorum*, one of the strongest pleas for universal peace and toleration of the era, **reconstructing early Christian teaching prior to the ecumenical Council of Nicaea (AD 325) to show how all the main churches had conspired in the fourth century AD to forge a gigantic web of fabricated theology, an edifice of religious fraud and superstition with the Holy Trinity at its core,** dating from three centuries after the crucifixion without any genuine ties to the New Testament or authentic early Christianity let alone the Old Testament.
…

Zwicker's insisting "I am neither a Lutheran, nor Calvinist, nor Remonstrant, nor Greek [Orthodox], nor papist, nor Mennonite, nor member of whatever sect of today," presented no difficulty for Comenius. Apart from resenting Zwicker's rather arrogant tone and manic zeal, the sole sticking point was the Trinity. There is not, Zwicker concurred with the Socinians, a word about the Trinity in the Gospels, **and firmly denying Christ's divinity is the sole way to restore Christian integrity.** It was here that Comenius fiercely dissented. Not that Zwicker, in reconstructing history of early Christianity and attempting to wrest it from the churches, was entirely at one with mainstream Socinian tradition either. **Socinians usually eschewed historical research, preferring to rely on deductive "reason" aided by the Holy Ghost.** Consequently, Zwicker felt disinclined to label himself a "Socinian," and to an extent stood alone against Comenius and those supposedly insisting on "reason" but avoiding the historical approach he favoured.

Forgetting they shared a common irenicist platform uniting all the Radical Reformation fringe groups, the initial friendship between Comenius and Zwicker erupted into bitterness and ferocious public dispute. So infuriated was Comenius by Zwicker's subordinating Scripture to historical research and reason, that he publicly denounced him in the most vehement terms, in early 1660, publishing a rebuttal of his plans for peace and unity among Christians entitled *De Irenico Irenicorum Admonitio*. He went so far as to denounce his erstwhile comrade to the Amsterdam Reformed consistory for illegal anti-Trinitarianism.18 **That even the most universalist, irenicist creeds lapse into unbridled hatred**

and fury the moment the Trinity and Christ's divinity are broached was a lesson not lost on Spinoza.
…

Originally from Harlingen, in Friesland, born around 1620 and a bachelor all his life, **Spinoza's close friend Jarig Jelles served, from 1653, as a deacon in the liberal Mennonite congregation of Galenus,** a group reportedly much drawn to Rieuwertsz's bookstore and closely allied with other Collegiants.
…

His liberal faction stalwartly opposed the strict Mennonites, rejecting the idea of any church being governed by elders laying down authority and spiritual guidance for individual members.23
…

Rather than selling his business, he seems to have continued to draw on its proceeds while his former assistant ran it, living off what he had gained, and entered into a world of discussion and study among the Collegiants, observed Bayle later,24 where, from early on, unlike Serrarius and Comenius, he figured among the zealous "Cartesians" and firm anti-Trinitarians.25 **His Christian fervour resolutely subordinated belief and faith to "reason," "true reason" in Jelles' eyes being "the spirit of Christ"; everything not firmly grounded on "reason," especially in the Old Testament which he heavily subordinates to the New, but in the New also, he firmly discarded.**

Despite lacking a higher education and Latin, Jelles was an outstanding example, notes Bayle, of a type to reinforce Spinoza's, Van den Enden's, and the Koerbaghs' **deep conviction that those lacking university degrees are not thereby debarred from insight, engaging with philosophy, and the search for truth,** and that what they lack constitutes no barrier to reaching the highest level of discernment with a success many academics and ecclesiastics well-endowed with Latin and university degrees regularly fail to attain owing to "superstition." **That a person ignorant of Latin need not belong to what Spinoza termed the "multitude," whereas most of those possessing Latin and university degrees do, became a point fundamental to his outlook.**
…

Also crucial to Spinoza's life-story, and the close bond between Spinoza and his Collegiant friends, was their radically anti-Trinitarian naturalist conception of Christ, an approach fully embraced by Jelles who negated all the theological doctrines and mysteries of the main churches – the Trinity, Resurrection, Redemption, church sacraments, Ascension, Original Sin, and especially the "divinity of Christ." For Jelles, restoring God's unity and oneness meant reducing Christ to just a specially inspired, elevated man, an inspired Jew who became a supreme moral leader, but one lacking all supernatural status or quality, **making him the "Son of God," as Spinoza later concurred, only in the metaphorical sense of reaching "eternal wisdom" and God's awareness of himself.**27

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_International_Jew/Volume_3/Chapter_44
>
> **"No Jew," says the American Israelite, "will conceal his gratification when he finds Christians virtually admitting that liberal Christianity is practically an acceptance of the doctrine of liberal Judaism."**
>
> Unfortunately, this is true. Liberal Christianity and Liberal Judaism meet, but only by the surrender of all that is distinctively Christian in doctrine. **A liberal Christian is more Jewish than Christian.** The statement may sound harsh and arouse resentment, but it is a very simple matter for any liberal Christian to convince himself of this by reading the volume of liberal Jewish doctrine put out by Kaufman Kohler, president of the Hebrew Union College. **Liberalism is the funnel by which Christianity is expected to run into Judaism, just as liberalism so-called in other departments of life is expected to bring about certain other Jewish aims.**

…

Zealous to convert Jews, Serrarius merged that burning aspiration with encouraging them to dream of their future return to their ancient homeland, restoration of the Temple in Jerusalem, and resumption of Levitical rituals.37 Most contemporaries were horrified. Knowing Serrarius, Boreel, Leon Templo, and Menasseh shared a common project in part, one disgusted Calvinist theologian, Samuel Maresius (1599-1673), at Groningen, labelled the mystical Spiritualist Serrarius a *semi-Judaeus* despite him firmly supporting (unlike many other Collegiants) the doctrine of the Trinity.38
…

While everyone had agreed all along that main churches, Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants alike, had got everything confused, and no clergy or dogmas were justified, Quakers fiercely repudiated Serrarius' and Galenus' claim that Christ left no instructions about the forming of a true Christian community **and**

the Collegiant notion that anyone truly cultivating the "spirit of Christ" is just as justified as another. Once they grasped its universalist, anti-sectarian character, the Quakers angrily opposed what in French has been termed the "anti-confessionalisme radical" of Galenus and his liberal Mennonite supporters including Balling and Jelles, and the Collegiant movement generally.75
…

Collegiants, less appalled by Quaker rejection of pending millennial redemption than Serrarius and Boreel, chiefly objected to the mystical wayward uses to which Quakers often put "the Light," their blank refusal to equate "the Light" with philosophical reason. Some "rationalists" close especially to Galenus joined in Serrarius' campaign, the leading figure among this "rationalist" faction of Rijnsburgers rejecting Quaker notions of "the Light" being Pieter Balling (d. 1664) **who, by 1662-3, we see from their correspondence, figured among Spinoza's closest friends and allies and was the translator of his book on Cartesian philosophy into Dutch.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA104#v=onepage&q&f=false

The post-1620 Collegiant movement emerging in Holland was a movement continually reinforced by outcasts from different main churches **as well as defecting Arminians and liberal Anabaptists appalled by the splits and relentless polemics embroiling mainstream conservative and progressive Mennonites.** If all Collegiants were "unchurched Christians," rejecting clergy and ecclesiastical authority and adhering to an open form of congregationalism, many or most remained indifferent or hostile to "philosophy"; **during the third quarter of the seventeenth century only a small but crucial fringe among them, combining abjuring clergy, congregational discipline, the Trinity, and sacraments with liberty of conscience and unrestricted theological rationalism, entered into alliance with Spinozism.** By the 1650s and 1660s, the combination of individual freedom of conscience and expression with stripping away congregational discipline and traditional theology had coaxed **a handful of remarkable Socinian Collegiants, inspired by Cartesianism, to the view that philosophical and theological "truth" is and must be identical, leading them into eager debate with members of the *cercle spinoziste* and alliance with Spinoza.**21

Collegiants convened on the basis of no clergy, no catechism, no congregational discipline and every individual free to express their own personal views and conscience.22 Full freedom of conscience inevitably meant Collegiants accommodated a wide variety of viewpoints, some of them retaining belief in the Trinity and other "mysteries."23 The vehement criticism directed against them by Calvinists, Lutherans, Catholics, Zwinglians, and strict Mennonites and the mainstream Remonstrant Church nevertheless chiefly highlighted their collective Anti-Trinitarianism and eventual rejection of virtually all traditional Christian theology, including immortality of the soul.
…

Only a minority fringe, much as among English Unitarians later, in Joseph Priestley's day, pushed their rationalizing principle to the point of merging of theology and philosophy, blending the light of reason in Bible criticism with the philosophical-scientific explanations of nature's laws, and philosophical reason.41

Prime representatives of this latter "philosophical" Collegiant current were Spinoza's friends Pieter Balling (d. 1669), author of *Het Licht op den Candelaar* [Light on the Candlestick] (Amsterdam, 1662), the translator who rendered much of Spinoza's early work into Dutch, Jarig Jelles (*c.* 1620-83), Spinoza's longstanding ally of over twenty years who composed the Preface to the *Opera Posthuma*, in 1677, and Jan Rieuwertsz (*c.* 1616-87), publisher of all Spinoza's books. **Balling may have diverged markedly from free-thinkers like Meyer in remaining zealous about winning his readers for the *light*, and pursuing spiritual truth and a pious life, but that does not make his abjuring dogma, rejection of "mysteries," comprehensive tolerance, and veneration of "reason" any less subversive.**42 Such men, and later also Jan Bredenburg (1643-91), who wrestled long and hard with the implications of Spinoza's philosophy, shaped a dissident wing of the Collegiant movement that before long found itself openly at war with the more conventional mainstream. "Philosophical" Collegiants found themselves under siege by the many Anti-Trinitarian Bible fundamentalists attending Collegiant meetings and amidst Socinianism generally. **In the 1680s and 1690s, prominent Collegiants like the influential preacher Frans Kuyper (Franciscus Cuperus, 1629-91) began denouncing philosophical "unchurched Christians" as a veritable plague, blighting the true Socinian Anti-Trinitarian movement. Proclaiming the reality of supernatural entities, spirits, devils, and satanic (as well as benign magical) powers, Kuyper denounced Bredenburg and his supporters as a disruptive Spinozistic betrayal from within.**43 This anti-philosophical trend tended to prevail in the end: most late eighteenth-century American Unitarians followed the latter tradition in taking the Bible narrative, *supernaturalia*, and miracles more literally than the philosophical independents; **in Britain too Priestley's version of Unitarianism tied to science, philosophy, and political emancipation was hastily abandoned after 1800.**

Only one particular narrow offshoot from the Radical Reformation ended up directly fusing with the Radical Enlightenment **by erasing all distinction between theology and philosophy and reducing the miraculous and belief in *supernaturalia* practically to nothing.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/128/mode/2up?view=theater

Balling's tract *Het Licht op den Kandelaar* [The Light on the Candlestick] of 1662, published under the name of the Quaker leader William Ames, has often been regarded as the first 'Spinozist' publication. But what is most significant about it is precisely the delicate, ambivalent, and also precarious ambiguity of its stress on the 'inner light' and unmistakable mysticism of its identification of 'the light' of reason as Man's true guide with Christ, the 'spirit' and 'the Truth,' with which it endeavours to reconcile Cartesian reason, and Spinozism, with Collegiant spirituality.63

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/342/mode/2up?view=theater

According to Balling, at the time one of Spinoza's closest friends, mankind is adrift on a sea of confusion, scepticism, and perplexity and in dire need of rescue. Our hopes of salvation, he asserts, lie in finding the 'light of truth, the true light which enlightens every person who comes into the world,'9 for only this guide provides a 'principle which is certain and infallible and whereby growing and progressing one can ultimately reach a blessed state of salvation.'10 **Nevertheless, unlike the 'inner light' of Serrarius and the Quakers – the guidance of the Holy Spirit – Balling's 'true light,' however well clothed in spiritual terms, turns out, on examination, to be essentially the 'clear and distinct knowledge of truth in the intellect of every person by which he is so entirely convinced as to the nature and essence of things that it becomes impossible to doubt it,' in other words, the mathematical rationality of the Cartesians.**11

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/204/mode/2up?view=theater

In the Dutch version [of *Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres*] Meyer speaks contemptuously of the public Church whose 'fortresses' his arguments had like a conquering army, 'stormed and devastated,'48 **but more respectfully of the Socinian and anti-Trinitarian fringe whom he – albeit carefully differentiating his philosophical from their theological stance**49 **– summons to join him as friends in an unbreakable alliance against the common foe.** None the less, Meyer chides them for their unwillingness to interpret Scripture wholly in accordance with 'reason,' their invoking the Holy Ghost to assist and enlighten them, so that they too languish in confusion and theological strife of their own making. **What Socinians and such Remonstrants as truly revere the memory of Episcopius should do, he urges, is follow him in making philosophy the sole and 'infallible measure' of Scripture.**50 Meyer adamantly denies there is any divine inspiration, or 'inner light,' distinct from the 'natural light of reason,' to aid men in this quest.51
…

Ironically, Beelthouwer even invokes 'the most learned Spinoza' against the *Philosophia*, suggesting, as does other evidence, that Spinoza had been and remained extremely discreet and cautious in discussions and in his dealings with the Collegiants.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA123#v=onepage&q&f=false

But one must bear in mind that Spinoza's circle consisted of two somewhat disparate groups, Collegiants like Jelles, Balling, and Rieuwertsz on the one side, and freethinkers sharply critical of even the most radical Collegiant fringe for being inconsistent in their rationalism, headed by Meyer, Koerbagh, and Van den Enden, on the other. The details of his life and letters show Spinoza went to considerable pains to mediate between, and bridge, these two not quite identical impulses which Meyer and Koerbagh identified as close allies but which did not entirely converge as regards "reason" and "faith."97 For Koerbagh, the spiritualists, Quakers, and Brownists were sometimes on the right track, like the most rational Socinians, but, equally, "are often simple, foolish people" who failed to embrace reason comprehensively enough.98 Jelles undoubtedly considered Spinoza's system a "Christian" philosophy,99 while Koerbagh states that "only the Socinians are free of religious fallacies,"100 and Spinoza pronounces Christ "the supreme philosopher." **But one must also remember that, for Spinoza, Scripture was intended only to teach the common people "obedience" to the moral and religious law and not correct their superstitious beliefs,** which, according to Spinoza and his following, Christ and the Apostles made no effort to do.
…

If the saving of a man's soul becomes, as Koerbagh expresses it, "salvation by which someone who is ignorant is guided through instruction to understanding, knowledge and wisdom, and through reason to the truth,"102 **then we have crossed the line from Radical Reformation to pure Radical Enlightenment.** If "to write inspired by the Holy Ghost is to write while endowed with an

enlightened mind, in accordance with reason and unchangeable laws,"103 then the Holy Ghost has effectively vanished, and been secularized.

The contention that "Spinoza's religious thought remains closer [...] to the Christians who rejected him than to the atheists of the Enlightenment who adopted him as their own,"104 **superficially presents a paradox enticing to some but hardly one that is cogent.** For Spinoza there are no miracles, and have never been, and the reason one finds so many narrated in the Old and New Testaments is simply that "it is not the intention of the Bible, as we have shown, to explain things in terms of natural causes but only to speak of things that commonly occupy people's imagination, and to do so in a manner and style calculated to inspire wonder about things and thus impress devotion upon the minds of the common people."105
...

"Miracles could not demonstrate to [the ancient Hebrews] that God cares equally for all men: only philosophy can teach this."106 In Spinoza's thought whether one believes in Christ or not is simply irrelevant to salvation and "blasphemy" is redefined as what is "contrary to reason."

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA442&printsec=frontcover

In the *Korte Verhandeling*, Spinoza calls God's eternal decree his "providence" **and employs also several other terms taken from Christian theology, such as "son of God" and "predestination," reflecting the Collegiant milieu within which his system originally arose. In the *Ethics*, by contrast, he dispenses with all such terms, including "creation,"** reflecting a conscious de-Christianizing of his terminology and way of expressing himself following his departure from Amsterdam.10

https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/170/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza asserts that the Biblical teaching regarding providence is identical with the philosophic teaching. **On the other hand, he asserts that only philosophy (and hence not the Bible) teaches the truth about providence; for only philosophy can teach that God cares equally for all men, i.e., that one fate meets the just and the unjust;**38 **in other words, that there is no providence at all.** This agrees with the implicit thesis that there is a fundamental antagonism between reason and faith. —Spinoza uses "prophecy" and "Bible" as virtually synonymous terms, and he asserts that the only source for our knowledge of the phenomenon of prophecy is the Bible. **But he also asserts that the augurs of the pagans were true prophets,**39 **and thus implies that the first book of Cicero's *De divinatione*, for example, would be as good a source for the study of prophecy as the Bible.**

The contradictions regarding Christianity, or the New Testament, require a somewhat more extensive treatment. **Spinoza asserts first that no one except Jesus (whom he regularly calls Christ) has reached the superhuman excellence sufficient for receiving, without the aid of the imagination, revelations of supra-rational content;** or that he alone—in contradistinction to the Old Testament prophets in particular—truly and adequately understood what was revealed to him. **He is therefore prepared to say that the wisdom of God has taken on human nature in Christ, and that Christ is the way of salvation.**40 **These statements must be understood, i.e., corrected, in the light of Spinoza's denial of supra-natural phenomena.** Since the laws of nature in general, and of human nature in particular, are always and everywhere the same, or since there is never anything radically "new," the mind of Jesus, who had a human body, cannot have been superhuman.41 In other words, since man has no higher faculty than reason, or since there cannot be supra-rational truths, Jesus cannot possibly have been more than the greatest philosopher who ever lived. The second of the two thematic treatments of Jesus which occur in the *Treatise* fully confirms this conclusion. **If Spinoza affirms "with Paul" that all things are and move in God, he can be presumed to have believed that his own doctrine of God as the immanent cause of all things goes back to Jesus himself.** He even proves that Jesus' knowledge was of necessity purely rational, because Jesus was sent to teach the whole human race and therefore he had to conform to the opinions common to the whole human race, i.e., to the fundamental principles of reason; whereas the Old Testament prophets had to conform merely to the opinions of the Jews, i.e., to a particular set of prejudices.42 Or, more precisely, whereas the Old Testament prophets were themselves under the spell of the popular prejudices, Jesus and the apostles only adapted freely the expression of their rational thoughts to the popular prejudices.43 Not indeed the exoteric teaching of the New Testament but its esoteric teaching is genuinely philosophic. This conclusion is, however, strikingly at variance with the chief purpose of the *Treatise*. The radical separation of philosophy and Bible would be a preposterous demand if the esoteric teaching of the New Testament were the peak of philosophic wisdom. **Besides, when Spinoza affirms "with Paul" that all things are and move in God, he adds that the same view was perhaps held by all ancient philosophers and by all ancient Hebrews.** He speaks with high regard of Solomon's teaching about God and he calls Solomon simply "the philosopher." Yet philosophy, as Spinoza conceives of it, presupposes the knowledge of mathematics, and Solomon had hardly any mathematical knowledge;

moreover, the people accepted Solomon's sayings as religiously as those of the prophets, whereas the people would deride rather than respect philosophers who lay claim to authority in religious matters. Thus it would be more accurate to ascribe to Solomon, not philosophy, but popular wisdom, and accordingly to apply the same description to the teaching of Jesus.44 This agrees with the facts that, according to Spinoza, the doctrine of "the Scripture," i.e., of both Testaments, contains "no philosophic things but only the most simple things," and that he probably regarded his teaching, i.e., the true philosophic teaching, about God as opposed to all earlier teachings.45 The rational teaching that Spinoza would seem to have seriously ascribed to Jesus, was hardly more than rational morality. Yet he does not consistently maintain that the true moral teaching was discovered, or preached for the first time, by Jesus. To say nothing of the fact that it is by nature accessible to all human beings at all times, it was certainly known to, and preached by, the prophets and wise men of the Old Testament.46 The teaching that is characteristic of Jesus or of the New Testament in general is not rational morality itself but its combination with such a "history" as permitted its being preached to the common people of all nations. In other words, the substance of the teaching of the two Testaments is identical. They differ only in this: the Old Testament prophets preached that identical teaching by virtue of the Mosaic Covenant, and therefore addressed it only to the Jews, whereas the apostles preached it by virtue of the passion of Jesus, and therefore addressed it to all men.47 Now the combination of rational morality with a "historical" basis of either kind implies that the rational morality is presented in the form of a divine command, and hence that God is presented as a lawgiver. Thus the New Testament demands obedience to God as does the Old, and therefore both Testaments are equally in conflict with the philosophic teaching according to which God cannot be conceived as a lawgiver. **"To know Christ according to the spirit" means to believe that God is merciful; but philosophy teaches that it does not make sense to ascribe mercy to God.**48 In short, the New Testament is not more rational than the Old. There is then no reason why the apostles, for example, should have been more emancipated from the prejudices of their age than the Old Testament prophets had been. **In defending his *Treatise* in one of his letters, if not in the *Treatise* itself, Spinoza admits that all apostles believed in the bodily resurrection of Jesus and hence were under the spell of popular prejudices.**49 There may be more of reasoning in the New Testament than in the Old, and the greatest Old Testament prophet may never have produced a single legitimate argument; but this does not mean of course that there are no illegitimate arguments in the New Testament.50 Philosophic statements occur especially in Paul's Epistles, but no more than in the writings ascribed to Solomon. Paul's philosophic utterances could be traced to his desire to be a Greek with the Greeks, or to make the Gospel acceptable to a multitude tainted by philosophy; the most philosophic utterances of the New Testament would thus appear to be simply borrowings from Greek philosophy. Furthermore, since these utterances were made in deliberate accommodation to the prejudices of their addressees, they do not necessarily agree with Paul's own views. **Above all, Paul's pedagogic use of philosophy seems to have laid the foundation for the fatal fusion of philosophy and theology against which the whole *Treatise* is directed. Certainly Paul's teaching of justification "by faith alone" contradicts what Spinoza considers the central and most useful teaching of the Bible.**51 One could think for a moment that by insisting on the universalistic character of the New Testament, as distinguished from the particularistic character of the Old, Spinoza denies the identity, which he elsewhere asserts, of the moral teaching of the two Testaments. Yet he quotes the statement "love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy" in order to prove, not the difference, but the basic identity of the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount with that of Moses. **The difference between the commands "hate thine enemy" (i.e., the foreigner) and "love thine enemy" is exclusively due to the changed political circumstances of the Jewish people: Moses could think of the establishment of a good polity, whereas Jesus (just as Jeremiah before him) addressed a people which had lost its political independence.**52 Spinoza does not consistently grant that what the New Testament teaches in regard to private morality is superior to the Old Testament teaching. But even if he did, **this would be outweighed in his opinion by the fact that Christianity, owing to the circumstances of its origin, offers much stronger support for the dualism of spiritual and temporal power, and therewith for perpetual civil discord,** than the Old Testament teaching, which was originated by Moses, who was king in fact if not in name. For the safety of the community is the highest law.53

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA338&printsec=frontcover

Just when Spinoza was first finding his feet, in 1656-7, after leaving the synagogue, the indefatigable Jan Hendriksz Glazemaker (1620-82), collaborating closely with the elder Rieuwertsz, was zealously rendering the bulk of Descartes' sizeable oeuvre into Dutch. Glazemaker was indeed among the most remarkable of those playing a formative part in Spinoza's life.

A born Amsterdammer from a Frisian Mennonite family, living on the picturesque Brouwersgracht in central Amsterdam, married since 1651 to a daughter of a prominent Frisian Mennonite surveyor and mathematics teacher,47 Glazemaker's first occupation, before becoming a professional translator in the mid-1650s, was as a glass grinder (hence his surname). **Despite having a brother-in-law who was a leader of the conservative "Flemish Mennonite" wing, Glazemaker's sectarian background framing his early life and personal friendships evidently ceased shaping his personal outlook**

(aside from his life-long antipathy to Calvinists and Catholics) from around the time he became friendly with Spinoza.

The very first translations of Descartes into the vernacular, in the Netherlands, began appearing only in 1656 and these early translations were all the work of this one enthusiast and collaborator with Rieuwertsz, as were many later ones. **Glazemaker was a serious, indefatigable ideologue.** As a translator, he rarely bothered with polishing or embellishing his prose, and of the prodigious quantity of material he translated for publication during his post-1655 career little was literary in character. **Rather, it was always Glazemaker's unswerving purpose, in alliance with Rieuwertsz, to make a great quantity of precious knowledge available to the ordinary reading public possessing no Latin or French,** especially philosophy, science, and mathematics together with reliable information about distant parts of the world. He aimed to produce a lot fast but accurately, clearly and straightforwardly, always using current Dutch terms without importing into his prose unfamiliar terminology from Latin, Greek, or other tongues, to help readers to imbibe important new perspectives with relative ease.48 His, and his group's, aim was to transform the world by enlightening their brethren.

Glazemaker achieved fame by diffusing Cartesianism among the public in an accurate, easily accessible style winning local renown that lasted over half a century.49 During the crucial late 1650s, he stood out as the sole major translator of Descartes' works into Dutch and among the principal early volumes he and Rieuwertsz brought out was Descartes' *Proeven der wysbegeerte* (Amsterdam, 1659), a collection of Descartes' papers on astronomy, anatomy, animals, and measurement, **together with his *Letter to Voetius* rejecting that Calvinist fundamentalist's fierce criticism that perfectly illustrates Glazemaker's role as propagator of a popular Cartesianism lending particular emphasis to mathematical precision and repudiating Calvinist intolerance.** Significantly, a copy of the *Proeven* figured among the books in Spinoza's personal library when he died, among the very few in Dutch that he possessed.50
…

Several reports of the 1660s indicate also that Glazemaker was no longer a Collegiant or Socinian in any meaningful sense but now an "atheist," at least in seventeenth-century terms. In his case, this charge was solidly grounded. Research on his travel translations shows Glazemaker was a classic representative of the early "Radical Enlightenment" in its strict definition – that is a publicist tying rejection of religious authority to democratic republicanism while seeking to disabuse the ordinary public of their trust in old beliefs, authorities, and hierarchies, or what he calls delusions, ignorance, and "superstition." **He clearly reflects the ease with which a consistent thinker could shift from Socinian and Collegiant perspectives to a strictly secular Radical Enlightenment stance.**

Indications of Glazemaker's new outlook appear in his 1666 rendering of Marco Polo's travels where, in the wake of La Peyrère and Vossius, he shows avid interest in China and eagerness to demolish biblical chronology as well as insistence on "reason" as the key to understanding the world. Removing what he considered impurities from the French version (rendered from the original Italian) he was translating from, **he shows not just eagerness to delete all references to Christ being divine and to the Trinity, as one might expect from a Socinian, but an undisguised *anti-Christianisme* that stretches considerably further.** Not satisfied with removing all reference to saints, the Virgin Mary, the holy cross and relics, he erased from his version the original text's references to *supernaturalia* of whatever kind, including angels, devils, miraculous events, all references to religion as a divinely given guide and to revelation. In his translation, unlike the original text, no one is ever converted from one faith to another supernaturally or in a spiritually meaningful way. **With astounding boldness, Glazemaker even claims in his preface to the reader that "because the zeal of our first Christians largely destroyed the ancient sciences, not much is left that can be utilized by us, and what survives of [the ancients'] theology, history, law studies, medicine and philosophy fell into such contempt, and these sciences became all so decayed, that even in the case of principal ancient authors who were not taken from us, we cannot properly understand, let alone emulate, their marvelous and pre-eminent wisdom."**51 Christianity's role he apparently viewed as essentially destructive.

Since the early Christians did not assist the progress of humanity and human knowledge, according to Glazemaker, but rather massively set it back, it is pertinent to ask whether he still remained in any meaningful sense within the Collegiant fold at the time of Spinoza's exit from the synagogue or whether he was already reputed to be a "Cartesian atheist." In 1657 and again in 1658, he and Rieuwertsz published the first Dutch translation of the Koran (rendered from Du Ryer's 1647 French version) with some supplementary material about the life of Muhammed and early Islamic history. This, it has been suggested, reflects the greater tolerance and relative unconcern for Muslim rejection of Christ's divinity characteristic of Mennonites and Anabaptists generally, a feature seemingly fitting with Socinian views.52 But while Glazemaker does represent Islam as a false religion and illusory, claiming the Koran derives largely from the rabbinic Talmud, he discards the usual antagonistic attitude typical of earlier Anabaptist authors and Du Ryer, and altogether breaks with Christian tradition, including the Mennonite

approach, by attempting to expound Islamic teaching in a serious fashion without any slanderous comment.
…

Arguably, the most striking feature of the "true religion" Spinoza formulated and taught in the early 1660s is the use of his doctrine of God, and what he considered the veritable Christian message, to fuse in some respects mutually hostile strands incipiently attracted to his teaching – **that of individualist freethinkers of largely secularizing bent, like Glazemaker, Van den Enden, Bouwmeester, and Meyer, and that of the larger group of Collegiant background and devotion with which he had been connected possibly longer, Jelles, Balling, Rieuwertsz, and De Vries.** Among Spinoza's friends, the "rationalist" Collegiants were those most likely to act as human bridges between the worlds of dissident fringe Christian religious culture and Cartesianism, between Christ the teacher of men and zeal for freethinking philosophy.
…

The ancient (and early modern) Epicurean alternative was to foster a non-combative secret counter-culture content to cultivate its own garden concealed from the rest. **This is insufficient, explains Spinoza, at the close of Part II of the *Ethics*, because knowledge of the truth opens the door to much that is useful for the lives of all men and for society.** The true philosophy "besides assuring us complete peace of mind, also teaches us in what our greatest happiness, or blessedness, consists [in quo nostra summa felicitas sive beatitude consistit], assuredly exclusively in the knowledge of God which induces us to conduct ourselves in accordance only with what love and piety recommend." From this both the individual and society as a whole benefit **and we "clearly understand how far those stray from the truth who, in exchange for their virtue and most elevated actions, as if in exchange for the greatest servitude, expect to be honoured by God with the greatest rewards as if virtue itself, and serving God, were not happiness itself and the greatest freedom."**60
…

The circle around Van den Enden, wrote Borch, **now amending his previous remarks,** do "believe in God and are not really atheists since they believe in God albeit in another manner than has been accepted up to now – they conceive God to be the nature of things, the best of what is in nature, almost the quintessence of all virtue and perfection; the more they acquire both of these with enthusiasm, the closer they are to God [quam quo optatius obtinerent eo se esse Deo viciniores].71

> 71. Borch, *Itinerarium* ii, 102; Mertens, "Van den Enden and Religion," 65; "**nempe Deus esse naturam rerum et optimum quodque in natura,** atque quasi quintam essentiam omnium et optimum virtutem et perfectionem, quam quo optatius optinerent eo se esse Deo viciniores."

…

Where Maimonides amended Averroes by arguing that philosophical truth fundamentally pervades the words of Torah and biblical prophecy, and that the people should be taught selected key parts of philosophical truth but philosophical truth dressed in easily grasped parables and poetic terms for their benefit, that is that philosophical truth and science should be broadcast among the multitude via Scriptural "interpretation," but that ultimately philosophy and religion comprise the same fundamental truth, **Elijah Delmedigo, from whom Spinoza borrowed much of his appreciation of the Averroist riddle,** criticizes and reprimands Maimonides for mixing Scripture and philosophy. He reverted to a more strictly Averroist stance, **while claiming the barriers between the worlds of the "multitude" and that of the "select few" can be slowly shifted by the progress of science.**

Spinoza's approach of the early 1660s, though, more drastically reworks the Averroist conundrum, introducing a new element. While agreeing that truth cannot contradict truth, and with Elijah Delmedigo that Maimonides erred in contending that biblical prophecy mirrors the truths established by philosophy in poetic easily understood forms, he rejects Averroes', Maimonides', and Delmedigo's concurrence that revealed religious truth constitutes the essential foundation to which all society must adhere, **reversing the hierarchy so that philosophy and science are now the primary basis of truth to which all else must conform.**
…

Fusing the New and Old Testaments together (for philosophical purposes), but also pointing out that the Koran and other Scriptures should be included here, Spinoza concedes that a residue of truth is found in Scripture (in fact in all Scriptures) dressed up in parables that remain of vital importance to the many given that the multitude can never penetrate beyond this residue. But at the same time Spinoza held that by group cultivation of philosophy, science, and biblical criticism it is possible to radically alter the balance between the "select few" and the multitude, intellectually and politically, and in this way change the basic dynamics of the Averroist conundrum. **By means of clandestine networking and group formation, the "select few, the sages," can gradually encroach and gain the initiative and even perhaps eventually capture control of law-making (much as Maimonides hoped to do),** achieving moral and political leadership by subordinating

Scripture to reason, reforming religion no less than philosophy and wresting control of “true religion” from churchmen.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA368&printsec=frontcover

Many times during his life Spinoza would be accused of being an “atheist” spreading “atheistic” philosophy, a charge that always angered and troubled him. He invariably rejected the accusation outright. **Yet, in rejecting the charge, instead of veiling or qualifying his claim that there is no knowing God who can change the immutable laws of Nature that govern all reality, guide the course of events, or perform miracles, or who rewards or punishes men, he invariably reacted, strikingly, by treating the accusation as a moral slur, wrongly implying he was purveying immorality.** When, for example, the Utrecht Cartesian Van Velthuysen accused him of being an “atheist,” in 1671, Spinoza rebuked him for being indifferent to “what manner of life I pursue”; saying that had he known “he would not so readily have been convinced that I teach atheism, at atheists are usually inordinately fond of honours and riches, which I have always despised as is known to all who are acquainted with me.”43 **Though entirely typical of Spinoza and his attitudes, it is a strange reply to the charge of not believing in the Christian God.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/236/mode/2up?view=theater

Hence, Dutch and later radical writers typically follow Spinoza, as Du Marsais does in *Le Philosophe*, **in redefining ‘piety’ and ‘religion’ to denote reverence for the law conceived not as the ruler’s will but as expression of the common interest, while simultaneously redefining ‘atheism’ and ‘godlessness’ to mean defiance of society’s laws and well-being.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/158/mode/2up?view=theater

Indeed, for Spinoza, whose explanation of this is surely one of the most astounding passages in his *oeuvre*, it matters not a whit whether one understands these doctrines theologically or philosophically: ‘whether God is believed to be everywhere actually or potentially, whether he governs things freely or by natural necessity; or lays down laws as a ruler or teaches them as eternal truths’ [deinde nihil etiam ad fidem si quis credat quod Deus secundum essentiam vel secundum potentiam ubique sit; quod res dirigit ex libertate, vel necessitate naturae].118

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/154/mode/2up?view=theater

The Bible, Spinoza argued, was written by and for the ignorant, the vulgar, and the superstitious. “Scripture does not contain grand theories or philosophical matters, but only very simple matters, which can be perceived even by the slowest.”19 In other words, the Bible is for dummies.

Needless to say, these dimwits aren’t philosophers or scientists. But they can at least appreciate a good, stirring moral tale. And that’s helpful. The simple-minded need to be taught how to behave. But they need to be taught in a way that suits their less-than-sharp intellectual abilities. **The Bible can be a useful tool for that purpose, as long as it doesn’t give the vulgar plebs any pretensions to knowledge of truths above reason.**

That’s the kind of thing that makes the plebs uppity. If they think they possess supernaturally revealed doctrinal or moral truths that stand above and judge the state, they’re actually dangerous. That’s why the Bible has to be reduced to the role of moral cheerleader.

All You Need Is Love

Vulgar people must be taught by the Bible, **but in way that makes them more, not less, obedient to the state.** For Spinoza, that means reducing the entire message of the Bible to one simple platitude: “obedience toward God consists only in love of neighbor…”20
…

The complete insignificance of belief in Spinoza’s version of Christianity is highlighted by the fact that Spinoza sets his view out as a complete antithesis of Luther’s view that we are saved by faith alone, not by works. For Spinoza, precisely the opposite is true: “We can judge no one to be faithful or faithless except on the basis of works. Namely, if the works are good, however he may dissent in his dogmas from the other faithful, he is still faithful. And on the contrary, if the works are evil, however he may agree in words, he is still faithless.”25

For Spinoza, differences in theology are utterly inconsequential. All that matters is that you are externally moral and hence law-abiding. And even atheists can be law-abiding citizens.
…

There’s a world of difference between respecting religious liberty because you believe that human beings have a fundamental need to be persuaded by truth, and hence to freely and sincerely assent to it, on the one hand, and, on the other, thinking with Spinoza that, since religion is irrational and based merely on one’s subjective feelings and desires, it should be confined to the realm of taste, “to each his own.”

If we’re honest, we have to admit the notion that we all have the right to define our own religious beliefs whatever way we please – a principle that so many of us modern Christians accept as an integral part of our Christianity – must actually come from somewhere else, rather than from Christianity. And wherever it may originally have arisen, we certainly find it in Spinoza.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1178&printsec=frontcover

Eventually, De Swaen discovered the probable clandestine publisher was the Collegiant bookseller Jan Rieuwertsz, and Neercassel went personally to see him, demanding to know point blank whether he was editing Spinoza’s manuscripts. **Rieuwertsz lied to his face, denying all knowledge of such a project.** Neither among the Christians nor the Jews of Amsterdam, reported Neercassel to Barberini on 25 November 1677, “have I found anyone who had seen this manuscript or knew anything about it.” He had uncovered some more facts, though, he added, naively passing on misinformation with which Rieuwertsz had fobbed him off. When Spinoza died “last summer,” Neercassel reported back to Rome, he left as “**heir to his writings a certain Mennonite or rather Socinian bookseller of Amsterdam. This publisher, named Jan Rieuwertsz, is accustomed to publish whatever is bizarre and impious thought up by impudent and arrogant minds.** This bookseller assured me that, among Spinoza’s belongings he found no writings apart from some manuscript meditations on the principles of Cartesian philosophy and that [apart from his Descartes book] no other book of Spinoza’s has appeared except for the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.”48
…

When interrogated by Neercassel, Rieuwertsz hence lied outright. By then, the *Opera Posthuma* was already largely printed and almost ready for surreptitious distribution. **But it was a crucial moment, and Neercassel allowed himself to be put off the scent just when outright suppression might still have succeeded.** He was consequently responsible for the failure of Steno’s and the Inquisition’s effort.

https://web.archive.org/web/20101221043517/http://www.mcusa-archives.org/mhb/Plantenga-Plockhoyt.htm

New Amstel’s Sheriff Van Sweringen noted at the time that Carr almost succeeded in "destroying the quaking society of Plockhoy to a naile," and, in essence, erasing it from posterity’s pages. Alas, no journalists or photographers were present to document the tragedy. And so little remains of this proud man stripped of colony, country, and purpose. **Yet, Plockhoy survived, miraculously reappearing, blind and destitute, with his wife in the Mennonite town of Germantown, Pennsylvania, thirty years later.**
…

Young Plockhoy’s best friend, the physician Galenus de Haan, a few years Plockhoy’s senior, was to have an enormous influence on Plockhoy’s life and writings. **The two boys were part of the sizeable Mennonite community that had emigrated from Switzerland around 1570.** But now the Mennonites in Holland were undergoing severe sectarian fractures at this time.

De Haan’s father was the leader of the Mennonite congregation. **Meanwhile, the anti-sectarian Collegiants challenged the Mennonites to stop their internal bickering. Collegiants were basically progressive Mennonites who advocated replacing ministers, creeds, in effect, all organized churches with *collegia prophetica*, meetings in the round where people of various faiths could gather to read Scripture, sing psalms, and discuss the Bible and contemporary issues.** Both de Haan and Plockhoy became ardent Collegiants. They were convinced that these *collegia* were the "only way to abolish all lording over consciences." The Collegiants broke away – ironically – from the schismatics (a schism of a schism).
…

Plockhoy arrived in 1648 and wasted no time installing himself among Amsterdam’s intellectual circles, becoming involved in an ad hoc clique of writers, "lovers of the noble art of poetry," and artists known as the Parnassis of Y. [today spelled "Ij," the name of the river behind Amsterdam].

The Parnassians [or Reformateurs] were not some gaggle of sour academics or blithe band of bohemians but a serious "art school for the promotion of virtue." **They gathered frequently in an informal manner around a table in the Sweet Rest, an inn owned by the group’s "head poet," the irreverent Jan Zoet, to engage in heated discussions "of political and philosophical import." Other members included renowned artist-Mennonite, Govert Flinck and poets Karel Verloove and Jacob Steendam.**

They hoped to improve the moral tenor of Amsterdam through the "abolition of various customs," and advance the cause of the poor, which they did by establishing the Oranje-Appel orphanage together with the Mennonites.

Zoet usually commenced the evening by asking a "meaningful and soul-searching question" like "When a man by marriage is bound to a woman, may he sleep with his maid-servant without transgression?" To this Plockhoy replied "yes," claiming the Bible did indeed condone polygamy. Some of the Parnassis members, including Zoet, agreed. The versified repartees grew robust, perhaps fueled by small measures of gin. Plockhoy's poet-friends, Steendam and Verloove, offended by Plockhoy's arguments, issued bitter rebuttals. Steendam characterized Plockhoy and his supporters as "patriarchs of polygamy." In 1662 however, the two offered poems to support Plockhoy's elaborate settlement prospectus.
…

Plockhoy, however, thought it best to found an idealistic community somewhere removed from the sins of the rest of the world. **[It seems he failed to see the inconsistency with his universalist ideas.]** Other firebrands held sway over Plockhoy's development. Samuel Hartlib, a Polish progressive, was convinced the entire state needed transforming. Gerard Winstanley, of the Diggers, presented Cromwell with plans for communal utopias. Leveller Giles Calvert, advocated for the poor and probably published Plockhoy's *A Way Propounded* as well as activist and **Christian communalist, William Walwyn, who may have aided Plockhoy with the English wording in his pamphlets. They, in turn, were probably influenced by the German utopian, Johann Andreae's [1586-1654] blueprints for a geometrically fortified "republic of workers living in equality."**

Plockhoy set to work to win Cromwell's support for his plans. His first letter, dated June 24, 1658, addressed Cromwell as the "Mighty and (as I hope) Prudent Lord." **The letter, perhaps written with Hartlib assisting with the English, presented his essential ideas of equality in faith, religious tolerance, and the extension of the Lord's kingdom via the Collegiant's *collegia prophetica*.**
…

With Parliament back in session in January 1659, he redoubled his efforts sending letters to both Parliament and Cromwell's son – and successor – Richard.

That same month, Plockhoy published his pamphlet, *The Way to the Peace and Settlement of These Nations…* "to awaken Public Spirits" and foster interest among English citizens. The pamphlet, signed "Pieter Cornelius van Zurik-Zee, a lover of truth and peace," consisted of the two Cromwell letters **and one written to Parliament on the subject of the *collegia prophetica,* which encompassed his (and Hartlib's) ecumenical vision of religious tolerance and an all-embracing universal church which would finally empower the disinherited.**

Plockhoy's ideas, however, got lost in the bedlam that followed the Commonwealth's disintegration. Still this did not discourage him. Plockhoy was never content with mere what-if pipe dreams. **He wanted action, concrete results as his ideas drifted from religious to social activism to "give ear to the poor." There is evidence, however scant, that Plockhoy and his circle convinced some "well affected persons" to sanction the development of three cooperative communities** to "promote so good and pious a work." Donors offered 100 pounds each to bring the "little commonwealths" to fruition. **Some evidence hints that the communes *were* developed – one each in London, Bristol, and Ireland, with plans for more on the mainland.**
…

His 84-page *Korte Verhael van Nieuw Nederlants,* ("Brief Account of New Netherland…"), published in October, bundled the seven letters in one pamphlet and announced his intention to found a settlement for "the many poor and needy families." In it Plockhoy tried to allay the fears of more conservative parties who thought his insistence of communal equality would mean a loss of individuality. He also reassured sponsors that although his experimental community would be based on moral concerns, it would still be profitable and competitive in the marketplace.

His collaborative and not so brief *Kort en Klaer Ontwerp*… ("Brief and Concise Plan…") sounded more like a travel brochure meant to lure settlers to a mythical land of limitless abundance. "New Netherland is the flower, the noblest of all lands … birds obscure the sky, so numerous in their flight, the animals roam wild … fish swarm in the waters and exclude the light…" Poems by old Parnassis friends, Steendam and Verloove, encouraged Plockhoy and assured sponsors that his ideas were sound. **[Steendam who had lived in New Netherland, 1650-1660, wrote glowing reports from the New World, touting its many virtues – "the purity of the air…" – making him, arguably, not only the New World's first poet but also its first publicist.]**
…

Most notable among Plockhoy's neighbors in this sparsely populated area were the Lenni Lenape and Nanticoke tribes. **They were portrayed as tall, athletic, trustworthy, and curiously relaxed.** They settled local waterways where they fished, farmed, and hunted. **According to Dutch scholar, Claes Wassenaer, who, in the 1630s, wrote: "There is little authority known among these nations. They live almost all free."**
…

Plockhoy had been intent on avoiding the mistakes of the Puritans who had used their spiritual beliefs to justify wiping out the natives from their chosen land, and those of traders and hucksters inspired only by profit and power. But unforeseen circumstances forced Plockhoy to focus on agriculture, a comprehensive criminal code, and more extensive defenses, including the institution of sentry duty. **Plockhoy also discovered, to his disillusionment, that he had to coerce others into rotating decision-making responsibilities and new tasks.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/176/mode/2up?view=theater

Essential components of Van den Enden's radical egalitarianism are the ideas of Plockhoy, who was closely associated with his first foray into the domain of political thought, the *Short Account* (1662) of 'New Netherland's situation, virtues, natural advantages and suitability for colonization,'13 a text which reflects the fervent commitment to settlement in North America prevalent among some fringe religious groups in Dutch society before the conquest of the colony by the English in 1664. A Zeelander from Zierikzee, who first made his mark among the Amsterdam Collegiants in the late 1640s, Plockhoy had long been an ardent advocate of equality and unrestricted religious toleration.14 **Attracted to the social radicalism which flourished briefly in England during and after the Civil War, he migrated there and, in 1659, published a pamphlet, *The Way to Peace and Settlement of these Nations*, imploring the new tottering Cromwellian regime to enact a fuller, more comprehensive religious freedom than it had yet been willing to countenance.** A second tract, published in May 1659, entitled *A Way Propounded to Make the Poor in these and other Nations Happy*, unveils plans for forming a new kind of co-operative society on the outskirts of London, with eventually a daughter community 'about Bristol, and another in Ireland where we can have a great deal of land for little money.'15

A pious Collegiant, Plockhoy taught Van den Enden no religion, philosophy, or political thought. But he undoubtedly contributed to his fervent egalitarianism and transmitted to him elements of his ideas on co-operative labour and lifestyle, concepts not without some significance in the history of socialism. **Thus, nearly three centuries later, the Manchester Co-operative Union in 1934 acknowledged that if 'our co-operative movement must have a father or a founder Peter Cornelius Plockhoy has an excellent claim to that distinction.'**16 Plockhoy's aim was to create a 'little commonwealth' separate from the rest of society, an élite of work and spiritual values **based on co-operative principles in order that 'we may the better eschue the yoke of the temporall and spirituall pharaohs, who have long enough domineered over our bodies and souls and set up again (as in former times) righteousness, love and brotherly sociableness, which are scarce any where to be found.'**17 The co-operative was to share ownership, risk, capital, and work, and no form of hierarchy or leadership of any kind would be allowed. Profits would be shared among the members equitably and because only a quarter of the women were required for cleaning and cooking when groups of families live together in communal complexes or settlements, over three-quarters of the women and girls, he urged, would be free to engage in the same manual labour as the men. It remained unclear, though, a feature exploited by Plockhoy's enemies, how concomitant erosion of family unit and strict monogamy would be prevented.18

In Plockhoy, the principle of equality plainly applies to women as much as men, though he does not stress this particularly, and derives from his fervent Collegiant, anti-Church convictions, **his insistence on Christ's 'abolishing amongst his disciples all preheminency or domineering of one over another,' so that the 'gifts and meanes of subsistence in the world (for necessity and delight) should be common.'**19 Van den Enden doubtless endorsed his requirement that clergy of whatever kind must be debarred from their ideal American commonwealth and that in its religious assembly there should be 'no preheminency, or sole privilege … of offering anything or of speaking first.'20 Consequently, such a co-operative would need to vet prospective new members to ensure only **'honest, rationall, impartiall persons,' that is, personalities free from rigid confessional allegiances as well as vice,** were admitted. Those too mired in ordinary confessional thinking to be suitable as full members were to receive wages, and find their own accommodation, 'till they are fitted and prepared to be members of our society.'21
…

Doubtless noble lineage 'puffeth up,' contends Plockhoy, but 'what else is it but a meer name, the vanity thereof who sees it not? The very foundation of it is nothing else but the noyse of the tongue and the report of others.'23 'For princes are not born on purpose,' he held, 'to reare up stately palaces, the

learned are not born for the writing of many unprofitable and for the most part frivolous books; the rich are not born to boast of their gold, silver and christal vessels; the rest of the people are not born for so many various unprofitable handy-crafts,' labouring so that the rich and powerful might enjoy a sweet life off their labour.24 **Honest, well-meaning, and unprejudiced men and women were to work in Plockhoy's utopia, sharing the fruits of their toil untroubled by rulers, nobles, lawyers, or clergy, an 'honest' week's work for members being fixed by him at thirty-six hours.**25

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/360/mode/2up?view=theater

Anthonie van Dale (1638-1708) was one of the leading medical men of late seventeenth-century Haarlem, and the first dean of the civic medical college established by the city government in 1692 to regulate medical practice.20 **Raised among the Mennonite community,** he was an ardent for not just of medical quackery, but all types of superstition, and an avid scholar.
…

Besides his medical work and scholarly researches, **Van Dale, like many Mennonite doctors, also served his congregation as a lay preacher, albeit briefly, being unsuited to this role and tending to exasperate his congregation by dragging too much classical erudition into sermons.**22
…

The great merit of Van Dale's enterprise is his massive argumentation, buttressed by innumerable quotations from Greek and Roman texts, proving one by one that the renowned oracles of antiquity were all frauds artfully contrived to foment credulity and herd the superstitious masses in the interest of the few. Of course, Van Dale too had learnt from others **and, besides Vossius, acknowledged his debt to Boccalini, the sixteenth-century Englishman Reginald Scot, his Mennonite predecessor Abraham Paling, and the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides,** whom he repeatedly cites approvingly. Yet he could justly claim to the first to argue (at least in detail) that all ancient oracles and auguries were bogus and that the Greek oracles did not cease with Christ's coming.30
…

Medical scholars, he asserts, had incontrovertibly disproved all recent cases of 'possession' and shown, whatever the clergy may claim, that none of those reported is genuine.35 Likewise characteristic of Van Dale, as of Blount, is **the epic vision of a classical world gripped by unceasing intellectual and ideological strife between enlightened philosophers such as the 'Cynici, Academici en Sceptici, de Epicureen en Aristotelici,'** on one side, and on the other, priestly guardians of altars and sanctuaries. The former use reason-based philosophy to expose the craft and deceit of the 'Oracle-monks' who, **backed by their intellectual allies, the Platonists and Pythagoreans,** retaliate by denouncing their opponents as 'atheisten.'36
…

The only claim of Van Dale with which Baltus could agree was that no one before him had ever argued comprehensively that demons and spirits did not infuse the pagan sanctuaries; not even the 'atheist' Pliny had done that.73

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/398/mode/2up?view=theater

But while granting that Bekker had had a greater impact than anyone else in this sector of German culture, Goldschmidt questioned whether intellectually he really transcended the Haarlem physician. If it seems so superficially, he averred, this is because Van Dale is more insidious: '**what Van Dale did furtively and under cover, Balthasar Bekker, as an outspoken Dutchman, broadcast with mouth wide open and uninhibitedly;** where Van Dale entered in felt-soled slippers, Bekker clattered wearing Polish boots so that his stamping could be heard in the streets.'181 But that is merely a difference of style. In essence, all Bekker's ideas were already worked out in the 'damned books' of Van Dale.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Arnold,_Gottfried

His first work, *Die Erste Liebe zu Christo*, to which in modern times attention was again directed by Leo Tolstoy, appeared in 1696. It went through five editions before 1728, and gained the author much reputation. In the year after its publication he was invited to Giessen as professor of church history. The life and work here, however, proved so distasteful to him that he resigned in 1698, and returned to Quedlinburg**. In 1699 he began to publish his largest work, described by Tolstoy (*The Kingdom of God is within You*, chap, iii.) as "remarkable, although little known," *Unparteiische Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie*,** in which he has been thought by some to show more impartiality towards heresy than towards the Church (cp. Otto Pfleiderer, *Development of Theology*, p. 277).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=megGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA134#v=onepage&q&f=false

Gottfried Arnold and other 'enthusiastic' historians, however, who believed that all condemnation of heterodoxy was a sign of oppression by an established church, had to shift the decline of faith to an earlier stage. If they did not do so, it became impossible to explain why particular heresies had been persecuted as early as the age of Constantine the Great. Christian Hoburg, for example, believed that the accession of Constantine already marked the corruption of the early church: **'when the pagan emperor [that is, Constantine] with his pagan mores, laws and regulations entered the kingdom of Christ, Christianity became a Babel.'**23

> https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/dahn/voelker1/voe1216.html
>
> Des Apostaten Haß und Verdammnis ist dreizehn jahrhundertelang beinah ein Glaubensartikel der Christenheit gewesen. **Billiger und gerechter über ihn hat zuerst ein protestantischer Pietist, Gottfried Arnold, in seiner *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* 1699,** dann ein halbes Jahrhundert später Mr. de Bletrie in der gründlichen Lebensbeschreibung Julians sich ausgesprochen. **Ihnen folgt der Marquis d'Argens, ein Günstling Friedrichs des Großen, in seiner Herausgabe der *Défense du paganisme par l'empereur Julien*, Berlin 1764,** worin er doch noch kirchlicher erscheint, als man von einem Freunde Voltaires erwarten sollte.

…

The suppression of so-called heretics was no more than another example of the suppression of the weaker by the stronger, which entered the world with Cain's murder of Abel.41 There was no self-evident Christian doctrine, especially in the first three centuries after Christ's death, when there was no agreement, which texts were to be included in the Bible, and no scriptural norm of faith existed.42 Faith at that time was measured in terms of the believer's spirituality. **God's works and thoughts, moreover, were often too profound and mysterious to be grasped by human reason.** The orthodoxy constructed by the 'Ketzermeister,' the 'masters of heresy,' mixed fallible human reason, pagan philosophy and human authority with Christian religion.43

https://books.google.fi/books?id=megGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA145#v=onepage&q&f=false

As Peter Reill nicely put it, **Arnold's 'criticism was so intense that it surpassed anything written by the most thoroughly anticlerical eighteenth-century philosophe.'**7

…

Arnold's work was very influential in the development of eighteenth-century Pietism, virtually capturing church history for the Pietists and requiring later writers to situate themselves in relation to him. It has been called a 'Copernican Revolution' in the historiography of heresy.10 Christian Thomasius borrowed from him on many points, although he later distanced himself from Pietism and Arnold's 'enthusiasm.'11 The structure of Arnold's argument was also very attractive to many later misfits and would-be rebels, no matter what their religious sympathies. **Goethe used Arnold's pattern to cast his own *Philosophy of Color* of 1810 as a brave heresy unjustly persecuted by Newtonian orthodoxy.**12

…

It is clear that Spinoza was not very important to Arnold, since only seven out of the 2,690 quarto pages of the 1729 edition deal with Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury, and Spinoza together.

…

Hobbes is accused of atheism by theologians because he criticized the clergy, but he really just wanted to bring unity to religion (1082-3).

…

Like Hobbes, Herbert of Cherbury was accused of atheism by the clergy because they felt threatened by his ideas. **He went too far because he jettisoned Christ from his vision of a unifying minimal religion, and Arnold does not hesitate to call this a 'miserable and perverted' means of achieving unity** (1084). **But, crucially, even this could be blamed on the clergy. The cause of such atheism or naturalism, Arnold says, is the criminal condition of the clergy, which could drive anyone to doubt the truths of Christian teaching** (1084).

…

Arnold surveys many refutations of Spinoza, concluding that if he did actually become an atheist, it was for the same reason as Herbert. The perverted teaching and praxis of so many clergymen that teach and indeed attempt to live their teaching, but then actually live by unrighteousness, drove him to it (1088). The implication of Arnold's 'impartiality' is that the bad behavior of the orthodox justifies any heretic whatsoever.

Arnold scholars have rightly noted that Arnold's work is a Nietzschean 'Umwertung aller Wertungen,' in which the orthodox are the true heretics and some of the heretics are the

truly orthodox.14 **This is conspiracy theory according to which certain kinds of players cannot do anything right.** It is stronger than the 'impartiality' of the Marxist, according to whom some members of the bourgeoisie can break away from their class and lead the working class: in Arnold's judgment no clergyman for an organized church can do anything right. It is stronger than the 'impartiality' of the post-colonialist, according to which at least the theorists of anti-colonialism are doing something good, even if they are European or American. **No sect theologian can do anything good for Arnold.** His is an 'impartiality' of victimhood in which the persecuted can blame everything on the orthodox.15

> 15. Parallel to the post-colonial claim that every evil that will ever befall Africa can be blamed on colonialism.

Although Arnold's 'impartiality' is radically antinomian and anarchistic in church affairs, it is quite compatible with authority in politics, on the ground that politics does not matter. This is one reason why the Pietists were appreciated by many German princes.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/406/mode/2up?view=theater

A Zeelander by origin, who studied theology in the 1660s, initially at Utrecht under Voetius, and then at Leiden under Cocceius, Leenhof began to be noticed in the Republic of Letters from the early 1680s when, as a still relatively young Reformed preacher at Zwolle, **he emerged as a fervent Cartesio-Cocceian in the fight against Voetian fundamentalism.**2 In 1684 he published a tract at Amsterdam, castigating the Frisian Reformed *classis* of Zevenwolden for their sweeping condemnation of Cocceian theology and, not least, their charge that out of Descartes' 'school come atheists and libertines.'3 The Voetians, complains Leenhof, habitually resort to smear tactics to try to discredit not only Descartes, whom they allege was given to 'unchastity and whoring,' but all respectable Cartesio-Cocceian authors by equating their writings with those of **'Averroes, Simplicius, Lucianus, Vaninus, Socinus, Koerbagh, Torrentius, Hobbes, Spinoza, etc.'**4
…

In the letters to Wittichius, **Leenhof holds that there can be no *creatio ex nihilo* (creation from nothing) and that the very notion involves contradiction since an infinitely perfect Being cannot act otherwise than perfectly.**9 If God's creation is perfect, the universe cannot ever have *not* existed, for God without the universe would be imperfect.
…

Wittichius, staggered that Leenhof should champion Spinoza against Descartes, refused to see any paralogism in the idea of creation out of nothing.11 On the contrary, he maintained **(rather like Rousseau in his *Émile* eighty-one years later),**12 that only the doctrine of two substances, and the impossibility of interaction between extension and thought, enables those who seek philosophical truth to circumvent the absurdities of scholasticism on one side, and the fatal trap of Spinoza's 'one substance' on the other.13

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.23766/page/n255/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Young man, hear me with confidence. I will always be honest with you. If conscience is the creature of prejudice, I am certainly wrong, and there is no such thing as a proof of morality; **but if to put oneself first is an inclination natural to man, and if the first sentiment of justice is moreover inborn in the human heart, let those who say man is a simple creature remove these contradictions and I will grant that there is but one substance.**
>
> You will note that by this term *substance* I understand generally the being endowed with some primitive quality, apart from all special and secondary modifications. If then all the primitive qualities which are known to us can be united in one and the same being, we should only acknowledge one substance; but if there are qualities which are mutually exclusive, there are as many different substances as there are such exclusions. You will think this over; **for my own part, whatever Locke may say, it is enough for me to recognise matter as having merely extension and divisibility to convince myself that it cannot think, and if a philosopher tells me that trees feel and rocks think**1 **in vain will he perplex me with his cunning arguments; I merely regard him as a dishonest sophist, who prefers to say that stones have feeling rather than that men have souls.**

Although Leenhof published relatively little between 1682 and 1700, his reputation as a leading Cartesio-Cocceian apologist ineluctably dragged him into the morass of the Bekker affair. **For the Voetians, the Bekker imbroglio provided a unique opportunity to publicize the dreadful pitfalls of Cartesianism and Cocceianism,** and Leenhof was a perfect target.14 Henricus Brink, Bekker's chief antagonist in Friesland, published in 1691 his 768-page *Toetsteen der Waarheid* (The Touchstone of Truth), **a vitriolic attack on those who embraced 'Cartesian novelties' with, according to him, catastrophic consequences only now becoming apparent.** Brink assails Leenhof, alongside

Wittichius and Burman, as a chief protagonist of Descartes' 'clear and distinct ideas,' and the 'geometric method' of reasoning, as criteria of truth in theology.15 Brink disdainfully brackets Leenhof with Bekker as a writer who claims comets are purely natural phenomena, not divine portents, and with Wittichius and Burman, as an advocate of Cartesian heliocentrism.16

From the 1680s Leenhof lived and worked in Zwolle, outwardly championing a tolerant, scientifically tinged Calvinism while privately cultivating Spinozism. His radical ideas were philosophical and moral but also extended to social issues, education, sexuality, and politics. It was indeed in the sphere of political ideas that he first revealed his Spinozistic leanings more openly in 1700, publishing two remarkable treatises on the life and views of King Solomon, both ostensibly about the Biblical figure but actually propounding a thinly veiled republican ideology.17
…

The ill-fated text appeared simultaneously in Zwolle and Amsterdam in June 1703 and again the following year. Nowhere does the book refer explicitly to any forbidden philosopher or doctrine. **But this was virtually Leenhof's only precaution.** Otherwise, it is fairly obvious throughout that he is using familiar theological terms in an unorthodox manner to propagate ideas which had little connection with Christianity as commonly understood. Individually, his unconventional way of putting things and double meanings would have aroused no great concern. But the frequency and variety of such expressions, and their cumulative effect, persuaded almost everyone that he was using coded language to disseminate an undeclared, illicit system of philosophy, morality, and social thought.31
…

Leenhof replied with a new work – his 107-page *Hemel op Aarden Opgeheldert* (Heaven on Earth Clerified) commonly called the *Opheldering*. **Likening his detractors' conduct to Voetius' vilification of Descartes as an 'atheist**,'46 he acknowledged having written the now infamous letters sent to Wittichius in 1681, but insisted these were private texts not intended for publication, which, moreover, had been doctored by the editor. **He admitted having 'read *that* philosopher attentively,' but saw no justification for his critics' reproaches there, since good as well as reprehensible things are found in his writings.**47 **Many scholars, he claimed, privately acknowledged that Spinoza had improved on Descartes' account of the passions.** From the outset, as Oldenburg's correspondence with him in the *Opera Posthuma* shows, upright God-fearing men had found valuable things in Spinoza.48
…

The Zwolle *Articles of Satisfaction* in 1704 represent a remarkable attempt to fortify religion against radical philosophy by erecting a high wall between the Churches' teaching and Spinozism. Defining 'Spinozism' as a movement or quasi-religion engaged in universal conflict with Christian belief and values, **the admirably concise ten articles, submitted to the Zwolle city government on 1 September, represent a remarkable feat of intellectual compression. In particular Article 3 is noteworthy, listing as it does seventeen core Spinozist tenets identified as fundamentally at odds with Christianity.** The first five are that there is only one substance which encompasses everything, including God, that there is no God distinct from Nature, that all creatures belong to this single whole, **that there is therefore only one infinite order of causes which determines everything that occurs, necessarily, so that Nature is an independent and separate cause of itself which, through a fixed necessity, produces and creates itself.**84 Sixth is the doctrine that body and soul are not separate entities but one and the same thing, and that there are no *anima separata*, that is, spirits separate from bodies, and thus no ghosts, apparitions, angels, or Devil.85

Seventh is the doctrine that **there is, in the human understanding, no natural innate distinction between good and evil, these notions being human inventions designed to 'keep the common, ignorant people in obedience.'**86 Eighth is the concept that everything derives from nature, following an eternally necessary order, so that there is no moral responsibility 'whereby the reasonable creature stands under the Law of God as his true Lord and Lawgiver.'87 Ninth comes the doctrine **that the power of nature, irrespective of the Fall, governs all men under the same play of passions, so that the moral status of mankind is always the same.** Next follows Spinoza's teaching that the human will is exclusively determined by natural causes and always determined necessarily – a point heavily emphasized in the *Redenkundige Aanmerkingen*.88 Eleventh is the doctrine that the 'highest good' is the pure understanding of God's eternal order, leading to 'mastery of passions and self-conservation in joy and cheerfulness.'89 That death is the end of the individual with no resurrection of bodies, or Last Judgement, follows next; after which, thirteenth, comes the doctrine that **there is 'no divine Revelation and that it is the political authority which institutes all organized religion, Holy Scripture accordingly having no more authority than the writings of Hermes, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, Seneca, and other such moralists' and being 'written according to the understanding of the common people to inculcate obedience.'**90 Next is the claim that Biblical prophecy and other Biblical books were written on the basis of 'imagination' and confused ideas. **Fifteenth is the concept that there is a philosophical 'general religion' (Algemene Gods-dienst), superior to revealed religion,** which permits the free expression of all views and which has

few or no points of doctrine other than love of God and one's neighbour, the pursuit of salvation without Christ, and obedience to the secular law and the State.91 Penultimately comes the doctrine that grace is the innate tendency of our nature towards acceptance of God's eternal order;92 and finally, seventeenth, the claim that it is permissible to tell lies to preserve oneself.
…

A strong impression had been made, by a book published back in May at Enkhuizen, by a preacher there, Franciscus Burmannus, who claimed that Spinozism was spreading rapidly in the Netherlands and that there were now many 'Spinozists, that is wicked God-forsaking atheists in our Fatherland who even hold meetings in some principal cities where … under pretext of philosophical debate, the principles of Spinoza and his atheism are inculcated into our silly, undisciplined youth, as everyone knows and is all too true.'98 Proclaiming Spinoza the 'most godless atheist the world has ever seen,' Burmannus warns that the further spread of Spinozism would bring the Republic to the very brink of religious, moral, and social disaster. **Among the most pernicious of Leenhof's principles, he claimed, were his political ideas, and not least his Spinozist doctrine of toleration.** If the 'highest happiness in so far as it can be derived from reason' means Salvation is of this world then, as Leenhof holds, the laws of the State must be directed solely to enabling citizens to live safely in accordance with reason and the pursuit of this worldly 'highest good.' Such a concept of politics means prizing social peace and stability, avoiding war, and regulating religion so as best to instil reverence for the laws of the State. **In such a society, warned Burmannus, all religions would be equally valid. What could be more reprehensible, he asks, than that the secular authorities should permit 'freedom of thought and speech' to everyone, including atheists and Spinozists, on the ground that toleration promotes stability and social peace?**99
…

Spinoza, held Burmannus, introduces the carnal and base doctrines of Epicurus, so that men, 'guided by bodily needs, which he considers the foundation of everything, should seek tranquillity of mind and lasting happiness, making this life (which is followed by no other) the most that is possible for human beings.'101
…

The chief significance of the Leenhof furore was that it demonstrated more clearly than any comparable episode **the feasibility of distilling from Spinoza a complete system of social, moral, and political ideas** built of philosophical principles totally incompatible with authority, tradition, and revealed religion, **which could be effectively popularized and infiltrated into the consciousness of the non-academic reading public, without readers necessarily even realizing they were imbibing Spinozism.**
…

The book which undoubtedly caused the greatest offence to the synods in the closing stages of the Leenhof affair, however, was the clandestinely and anonymously published *Philalethes Brieven* (Letters of Philalethes) which appeared at Amsterdam in 1712. Extracts from *Philalethes* were circulated at the meeting of the South Holland Synod in July 1712. Typically of Goeree, who was probably the author, this text ridicules the belief in angels and spirits, questions the divine authorship of Scripture, denies the Trinity, and, following Beverland, reduces the Fall to an allegory of sexual desire.186 **Regarded as exceptionally offensive was the author's contention that because Christ and his Apostles were concerned only to instil obedience, and not to teach the people truth, they made no effort to counter superstitious belief in magic, demons, and the Devil** even though such credence is complete nonsense.187
…

Highlighting the concept of the eternal and necessary order of things, or causes, as a prime component of Leenhof's thought, in his *Modesta Disquisitio* (Halle, 1723) Lange postulates a general parallelism of the systems of Spinoza and Leenhof, which he terms fatalism 'Spinoziano-Leenhofianum.'207 For them, God is no legislator or Lord of the universe, he contends, **while Scripture's account of the Almighty is just a colourful allegory adjusted to the notions of the common people.**208 In another onslaught on Wolffianism, published in German in Halle in 1724, Lange again stresses Leenhof's fatalism, and this-worldly conception of the *summum bonum*, again linking him with both Spinoza and Wolff.209 **Especially pernicious in Leenhof, he argues, is the cunning concealment he had practised until 1703 and his having surreptitiously 'brought [his Spinozism] to the pulpit.'**210

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/550/mode/2up?view=theater

Wolff's contention that his system is eminently compatible with Christian truth, Lange likens to the fraudulent pretensions of **the anonymous author of the preface to Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma* (Jelles) who has the impudence to claim Spinoza's philosophy is 'Christian' in essence.**72

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PP65#v=onepage&q&f=false

And lastly, It hath very much engag'd the *Anabaptists* and *Quakers* in its Praises, because the Author hath written with all his Might and Malice, against *Tythes*; and discovered that noble Saying and *Theorem* of *Spinoza*, that in the Christian Religion, *no one more than another can be a Priest*.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2613/pg2613-images.html#linknoteref-21

Fox insisted much on the not less weighty argument that the Turks never show their bare heads to their superiors; and he asked, with great animation, whether those who bore the noble name of Christians ought not to surpass Turks in virtue.29
…

Passages, which had been, in the apprehension of all the readers of the Gospels during sixteen centuries, figurative, he construed literally. Passages, which no human being before him had ever understood in any other than a literal sense, he construed figuratively. **Thus, from those rhetorical expressions in which the duty of patience under injuries is enjoined he deduced the doctrine that selfdefence against pirates and assassins is unlawful.** On the other hand, the plain commands to baptize with water, and to partake of bread and wine in commemoration of the redemption of mankind, he pronounced to be allegorical.
…

And thus it was that Fox made some converts to whom he was immeasurably inferior in every thing except the energy of his convictions. By these converts his rude doctrines were polished into a form somewhat less shocking to good sense and good taste. No proposition which he had laid down was retracted. No indecent or ridiculous act which he had done or approved was condemned; but what was most grossly absurd in his theories and practices was softened down, or at least not obtruded on the public; whatever could be made to appear specious was set in the fairest light; his gibberish was translated into English; meanings which he would have been quite unable to comprehend were put on his phrases; **and his system, so much improved that he would not have known it again, was defended by numerous citations from Pagan philosophers and Christian fathers whose names he had never heard.**37

> 37. "Especially of late," says Leslie, the keenest of all the enemies of the sect, "**some of them have made nearer advances towards Christianity than ever before;** and among them the ingenious Mr. Penn has of late refined some of their gross notions, and brought them into some form, and has made them speak sense and English, of both which George Fox, their first and great apostle, was totally ignorant. ... They endeavour all they can to make it appear that their doctrine was uniform from the beginning, and that there has been no alteration; and therefore they take upon them to defend all the writings of George Fox, and others of the first Quakers, and turn and wind them to make them (but it is impossible) agree with what they teach now at this day." (The Snake in the Grass, 3rd ed. 1698. Introduction.) **Leslie was always more civil to his brother Jacobite Penn than to any other Quaker. Penn himself says of his master, "As abruptly and brokenly as sometimes his sentences would fall from him about divine things; it is well known they were often as texts to many fairer declarations."** That is to say, George Fox talked nonsense and some of his friends paraphrased it into sense.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1468/1468-h/1468-h.htm#linknoteref-292

The Quakers were also guiltless of all offence against James and his House. They had not been in existence as a community till the war between his father and the Long Parliament was drawing towards a close. They had been cruelly persecuted by some of the revolutionary governments.
…

Though, as a class, they mixed little with the world, and shunned politics as a pursuit dangerous to their spiritual interests, one of them, widely distinguished from the rest by station and fortune, lived in the highest circles, and had constant access to the royal ear. This was the celebrated William Penn. **His father had held great naval commands, had been a Commissioner of the Admiralty, had sate in Parliament, had received the honour of knighthood, and had been encouraged to expect a peerage.** The son had been liberally educated, and had been designed for the profession of arms, but had, while still young, injured his prospects and disgusted his friends by joining what was then generally considered as a gang of crazy heretics.
…

The French philosophers of the eighteenth century pardoned what they regarded as his superstitious fancies in consideration of his contempt for priests, and of his cosmopolitan benevolence, impartially extended to all races and to all creeds.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2439/pg2439-images.html#linknoteref-435

Nothing had amazed or mortified the King more than the enthusiasm which the Dissenters had shown in the cause of the Bishops. **Penn, who, though he had himself sacrificed wealth and honours to his conscientious scruples, seems to have imagined that nobody but himself had a conscience,** imputed the discontent of the Puritans to envy and dissatisfied ambition. They had not had their share of the benefits promised by the Declaration of Indulgence: none of them had been admitted to any high and honourable post; and therefore it was not strange that they were jealous of the Roman Catholics.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2612/pg2612-images.html#linknoteref-634

The conduct of Penn was scarcely less scandalous. **He was a zealous and busy Jacobite; and his new way of life was even more unfavourable than his late way of life had been to moral purity.** It was hardly possible to be at once a consistent Quaker and a courtier: but it was utterly impossible to be at once a consistent Quaker and a conspirator. **It is melancholy to relate that Penn, while professing to consider even defensive war as sinful, did every thing in his power to bring a foreign army into the heart of his own country.** He wrote to inform James that the adherents of the Prince of Orange dreaded nothing so much as an appeal to the sword, and that, if England were now invaded from France or from Ireland, the number of Royalists would appear to be greater than ever. Avaux thought this letter so important, that he sent a translation of it to Lewis.635 A good effect, the shrewd ambassador wrote, had been produced, by this and similar communications, on the mind of King James. His Majesty was at last convinced that he could recover his dominions only sword in hand. **It is a curious fact that it should have been reserved for the great preacher of peace to produce this conviction in the mind of the old tyrant**.636

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2613/pg2613-images.html#linknoteref-37

Penn came to the rendezvous, and spoke at length in his own defence. He declared that he was a faithful subject of King William and Queen Mary, and that, if he knew of any design against them, he would discover it. Departing from his Yea and Nay, he protested, as in the presence of God, that he knew of no plot, and that he did not believe that there was any plot, unless the ambitious projects of the French government might be called plots. Sidney, **amazed probably by hearing a person, who had such an abhorrence of lies that he would not use the common forms of civility, and such an abhorrence of oaths that he would not kiss the book in a court of justice, tell something very like a lie, and confirm it by something very like an oath,** asked how, if there were really no plot, the letters and minutes which had been found on Ashton were to be explained. This question Penn evaded.
...

After about three years of wandering and lurking he, by the mediation of some eminent men, who overlooked his faults for the sake of his good qualities, made his peace with the government, and again ventured to resume his ministrations. The return which he made for the lenity with which he had been treated does not much raise his character. **Scarcely had he again begun to harangue in public about the unlawfulness of war, when he sent a message earnestly exhorting James to make an immediate descent on England with thirty thousand men.**39

https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/murphy-the-political-writings-of-william-penn#lf6418_head_067

For, *First,* The *Jews,* that had most to say for their Religion, and whose Religion was *Twin* to their State, (both being joined, and sent with Wonders from Heaven) *Indulged* Strangers in their Religious Dissents. **They required but the Belief of the *Noachical* Principles, which were common to the World:
No *Idolater,* and but a *Moral Man,* and he had his *Liberty,* ay, and some *Privileges* too, for he had an Apartment in the Temple, and this without Danger to the Government. Thus *Maimonides,* and others of their own Rabbies, and *Grotius* out of them.**9

The *Wisdom* of the *Gentiles* was very admirable in this, that though they had many Sects of Philosophers among them, each dissenting from the other in their Principles, as well as Discipline, and that not only in Physical Things, but Points *Metaphysical,* in which some of the Fathers were not *free,* the School-men *deeply engaged,* and our present Academies but too much *perplexed;* yet they *indulged* them and the best Livers with singular Kindness: The greatest Statesmen and Captains often becoming *Patrons* of the Sects they best affected, honouring their *Readings* with their Presence and Applause. **So far were those Ages, which we have made as the Original of Wisdom and Politeness, from thinking
Toleration an Error of State, or dangerous to the Government.** Thus *Plutarch, Strabo, Laertius,* and others.10

To these Instances I may add the Latitude of Old *Rome,* that had almost as many Deities as Houses:
For *Varro* tells us of no less than *Thirty Thousand* several *Sacra,* or Religious Rites among her People, and yet without a Quarrel:11 **Unhappy Fate of *Christianity!* the best of Religions, and yet her Professors maintain less Charity than Idolaters, while it should be peculiar to them. I fear, it shews us to have but little of it at Heart.**

But nearer Home, and in our own Time, we see the Effects of a discreet *Indulgence,* even to Emulation. *Holland,* that *Bog* of the world, neither Sea nor dry Land, now the *Rival* of tallest Monarchs; not by *Conquests, Marriages,* or Accession of *Royal Blood,* the usual Ways to Empire, but by her own superlative *Clemency* and *Industry;* for the one was the Effect of the other: She cherished her People, whatsoever were their *Opinions,* as the reasonable Stock of the Country, the Heads and Hands of her Trade and Wealth; and making them easy in the main Point, their *Conscience,* she became Great by them; This made her fill with *People,* and they filled her with *Riches* and *Strength.*
…

I will begin with that of *Israel,* the most exact and sacred Pattern of *Monarchy,* begun by a valiant Man, translated to the best, and improv'd by the wisest of Kings, whose Ministers were neither *Fools,* nor *Fanaticks:* Here we shall find Provision for Dissenters: **Their *Proselyti Domicilii* were so far from being compelled to their National Rites, that they were expresly forbid to observe them.** Such were the *Egyptians* that came with them out of *Egypt,* the *Gibeonites* and *Canaanites,* a great People, that after their several Forms, worshipt in an *Apartment* of the same Temple. The *Jews* with a Liturgy, they without one: The *Jews* had *Priests,* but these none: The *Jews* had Variety of Oblations, these People burnt Offerings only. **All that was required of them was the natural Religion of *Noah,*** in which the Acknowledgment and Worship of the true God, was, and it still ought to be, the main Point**; nay, so far were they from Coercive Conformity, that they did not so much as oblige them to observe their *Sabbath,*** though one of the Ten Commandments: *Grotius* and *Selden* say more.
…

Valentinian the Emperour (we are told by *Socrates Scholasticus*) *was a great Honourer of those that favoured his own Faith;* ***but so, as he molested not the*** **Arrians *at all.*** And *Marcellinus* farther adds in his Honour, *That he was much Renown'd for his Moderate Carriage during his Reign; insomuch, that amongst sundry Sects of Religion, he troubled no Man for his Conscience, imposing neither This nor That to be observed; much less, with menacing Edicts and Injunctions, did he* compel *others, his Subjects, to bow the Neck, or* conform *to that which himself Worshipped, but left such Points as clear and untoucht as he found them.*13
…

The *Grand Seignior, Great Mogul, Czars* of *Muscovia, King* of *Persia;* the Great *Monarchs* of the *East* have *long allow'd and prosper'd with a Toleration:* And who does not know that this gave Great *Tamerlane* his mighty Victories? In these Western Countries we see the same Thing.

Cardinal d'Ossat in his 92d Letter to *Villeroy,* Secretary to *Henry* the Fourth of *France,* gives us Doctrine and Example for the Subject in hand;14

> Besides (says he) that Necessity has no Law, be it in what Case it will; our *Lord Jesus Christ* instructs us by his Gospel, *To let the Tares alone, lest removing them may endanger the Wheat.* That other *Catholick* Princes have allow'd it without *Rebuke.* That particularly the Duke of *Savoy,* who (as great a Zealot as he would be thought for the Catholick Religion) Tolerates the Hereticks in three of his Provinces, namely, *Angroyne, Lucerne* and *Perone.* That the King of *Poland* does as much, not only in *Sweedland,* but in *Poland* it self. That all the Princes of the *Austrian* Family, that are celebrated as Pillars of the *Catholick Church,* do the like, not only in the Towns of the Empire, but in their proper Territories, as in *Austria* it self, from whence they take the Name of their Honour. In *Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, Lusatia, Stirria, Camiolia* and *Croatia* the like. That *Charles* the Fifth, Father of the King of *Spain,* was the Person that taught the King of *France,* and other *Princes,* how to yield to such Emergencies. **That his Son, the present King of *Spain,* who is esteemed *Arch Catholick,* and that is, as the *Atlas* of the *Catholick Church, Tolerates* notwithstanding at this Day, in his Kingdoms of *Valentia* and *Granada,* the *Moors* themselves in their *Mahometism,*** and has offered to those of *Zealand, Holland,* and other *Hereticks* of the Low Countries, the *free Exercise* of their pretended Religion, so that they will but *acknowledge* and *Obey* him in *Civil Matters.*

It was of those Letters of this extraordinary Man, for so he was (whether we regard him in his Ecclesiastical Dignity, or his greater Christian and Civil Prudence) **that the great Lord *Fulkland* said, *A Minister of State should no more be without* Cardinal d'Ossat's *Letters, than a Parson without his Bible.***

> https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11342a.htm
>
> French cardinal, diplomat, and writer, b. at Larroque-Magnoac (Gascony), 20 July, 1537; d. at Rome, 13 March, 1604, **was the son of a blacksmith.** He was sent to the College of Auch as tutor to the sons of a nobleman, then to Paris, **where he became the pupil and friend of the famous Ramus, whom he defended in two pamphlets against Charpentier, rector of the university. He next studied law at Bourges under Cujas and became an advocate before the Parliament of Paris,** while acting as tutor to Jean de la Barrière, the future reformer of the Feuillants.
> …
>
> Villeroy, the minister of foreign affairs, himself consulted him on all matters in any way connected with Rome. d'Ossat, through his influence and talents, secured for Henry IV the pope's aid and, when necessary, **induced the Holy See to accept, at least, without public protest, such measures as the expulsion of the Jesuits, the non-publication of the Council of Trent, the**

> **Edict of Nantes, the Franco-Turkish and Franco-English alliances, the annulment of Henry IV's marriage with Margaret of Valois, and the conclusion of that between the Duc de Bar and Catherine de Bourbon, Henry's sister and a stubborn Calvinist. At the same time d'Ossat used his influence at Rome for the benefit of the historian de Thou, the philosopher Montaigne, and the savant Peiresc.**
> ...
>
> Wiquefort in his "Mémoires sur les ambassadeurs" finds in them "the clearest and most enlightened judgment ever displayed by any minister", and Lord Chesterfield wrote to his son that the "simplicity and clearness of Cardinal d'Ossat's letters show how business letters should be written".

...

The several *Species of Christians,* that this *Genus* divideth it self into, are those divers Perswasions we have within this Kingdom; The *Church of England, Roman-Catholicks, Grecians, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists,* ***Quakers, Socinians:*** **These I call so many Orders of Christians, that unite in the Text, and differ only in the *Comment;* All owning *One Deity, Saviour and Judge, Good Works, Rewards and Punishments:*** Which Bodies once Regulated, and holding of the Prince as *Head of the Government, Maintaining Charity, and Pressing Piety, will be an Honour to Christianity, a Strength to the Prince, and a Benefit to the Publick:* For in Lieu of an unattainable, (at best an unsincere) *Uniformity,* we shall have in *Civils Unity, and Amity in Faith.*

The *Jews* before, and in the Time of *Herod,* were divided into divers Sects. There were *Pharisees, Sadducees, Herodians,* and
Essenes. They maintain'd their Dissent without Ruin to the Government: And the Magistrates fell under no Censure from Christ for that *Toleration.*
...

I have cited other Emperors in the Body of this Discourse; but because the Worst are to be commended when they do well, *Valens* himself, **charm'd with the Sweetness and Strength of the Philosopher *Themistius,*** in his Elegant Oration, grew Moderate towards the Orthodox, whom a little before he had severely treated: Of which these were the Heads; *That he Persecuted without Reason People of Good Lives: That it was no Crime to think or believe otherwise than the Prince believed: That he ought not to be troubled at the Diversity of Opinions: That the* Gentiles *were much more divided in their Judgment than the* Christians: *That it sufficeth, that every Sect aimed at the Truth, and lived virtuously.*50

https://archive.org/details/mystryfoxcraft00leedrich/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater

Nay, I could shew wherein the Jews own more of Christ then the Quakers own; for the Quakers would make nothing of Christ but moral virtues. *What is Christ* (says W. Penn) *but Meekness, Justice, Mercy, Patience, &c. Address to Protestants*, pag. 119. where also he declares moral men to be Christians; and you see before, he calls it a deadly Poison to make any distinction between Christian and Moral. **Thus the Quakers are forced upon this shift to allow moral heathens, Turks and Jews to be Christians, because they have no other way in the world to prove themselves Christians; there is only this difference, the Jews and Infidels are the better, as being more free from deceit, because they make no pretence to Christianity, and the Quakers do.**

But how strange is their delusion, who cannot see that at this rate there was no need at all of the holy Apostles being sent to the Jews and Heathens to preach the Gospel of Peace and Salvation by Christ crucifyed. **Nor indeed could there be any need of Christ's coming, and being crucifyed. But the Quakers plainly say as much, for their Books tell us that his coming in the flesh, and being crucifyed was but a figure, and for our example, as I have formerly shewed.**

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA827&printsec=frontcover

Plainly, Spinoza along with members of his circle, the Koerbaghs, Meyer, and Bouwmeester prominent among them, were intent on changing the meaning of the word "atheist" just as they sought to change the meaning of the terms "heretic" and "religion." An "atheist" is certainly correctly defined as a God-denier, agree the Koerbaghs, but if correct understanding is the sole path of true knowledge of God and few possess that true knowledge, while those not knowing God correctly are "atheists," as most of their opponents seem to think, **then the "great majority including the theologians are atheists, since the name of God is known by all, his reality but by few. For it is the theologians who teach the people untruth, notably that the world was created from nothing by a knowing God." True theology, by contrast, teaches that nothing can come from nothing and is part of worldly philosophy because in worldly philosophy alone is found "[true] knowledge of God."**77
...

“Muhammed was indeed an impostor,” affirms Spinoza, “since he completely abrogates that freedom which the universal religion concedes and which I have shown on every ground, by the natural light and by what the prophets revealed, should be wholly conceded.” As for Islam as a religion, the case was exactly as with the pagans. Where Muslims worship God on the basis of “justice and charity towards their neighbour, I believe that they have the spirit of Christ and are saved whatever beliefs they may possess based on ignorance and oracles.”78
…

The “spirit of Christ [spiritus Christi],” remained Spinoza’s regular circumlocution, later used when replying to Albert Burgh, negating not just Christ’s divinity, like the Socinians, but also his miracles, resurrection, special access to the divine, special Scriptural status, status as Redeemer, **and even his identification with the biblical Jesus, effectively redefining “Christ” as essentially a symbol of “justice and charity”** so that every believing Muslim or Jew possesses exactly the same access to the “spirit of Christ” as the most meticulous churchgoer.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA21#v=onepage&q&f=false

But even among sincere believers, following the path of moderation, **it had always been the non-religious component of their plans for improvement that rendered their efforts integral to the Enlightenment. The category “Religious Enlightenment” only meaningfully applies to reformers who, while sincere believers or at least defenders of ecclesiastical authority (not at all the same thing), nevertheless aimed to reform Christendom, or in the case of Moses Mendelssohn, Judaism,** by rejecting, or greatly toning down, confessional barriers, intolerance, and dogmatism. Religious Enlightenment qualified as Enlightenment specifically through advancing toleration and inter-confessional dialogue, by banishing religious conflict, and espousing strands of modern science, **Newtonianism above all,** suited to reconciling religion with science, and hence religion with philosophy.50

https://americanvision.org/22483/thomas-paine-and-his-reliance-on-the-bible/

Mark A. Noll, formerly Francis A. McAnaney Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame now holds the position of Research Professor of History at Regent College, makes a similar argument:

> If Paine’s *Age of Reason* (with its dismissive attitude toward the Old Testament) had been published before *Common Sense* (with its full deployment of Scripture in support of republican freedom), the quarrel with Britain may have taken a different course. **It is also likely that the allegiance of traditional Christian believers to republican liberty might not have been so thoroughly cemented.** And it is possible that the intimate relation between republican reasoning and trust in traditional Scripture, which became so important after the turn of the new century, would not have occurred as it did. (Mark A. Noll, *America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 84.)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=L50vDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT486#v=onepage&q&f=false

In return, **I only laughed heartily at him, and rallied him upon his grave arguments from the Old Testament to prove that monarchy was unlawful in the sight of God. “Do you seriously believe, Paine,” said I, “in that pious doctrine of yours?”** This put him in good humor, and he laughed out. “The Old Testament!” said he, “I do not believe in the Old Testament. I have had thoughts of publishing my sentiments of it, but, upon deliberation, I have concluded to put that off till the latter part of life.”

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2613/2613-h/2613-h.htm#linknoteref-143
>
> **By this time the philosophy of the eighteenth century had purified English Whiggism from that deep taint of intolerance which had been contracted during a long and close alliance with the Puritanism of the seventeenth century.** Enlightened men had begun to feel that the arguments by which Milton and Locke, Tillotson and Burnet, had vindicated the rights of conscience might be urged with not less force in favour of the Roman Catholic than in favour of the Independent or the Baptist. **The great party which traces its descent through the Exclusionists up to the Roundheads continued during thirty years, in spite of royal frowns and popular clamours, to demand a share in all the benefits of our free constitution for those Irish Papists whom the Roundheads and the Exclusionists had considered merely as beasts of chase or as beasts of burden.**
>
> https://reason.com/2006/07/01/in-praise-of-john-wilkes-2/

> Endorsing one bill for religious tolerance, [Wilkes] declared, **"I wish to see rising in the neighborhood of a Christian cathedral, near its Gothic towers, the minaret of a Turkish mosque, a Chinese pagoda, and a Jewish synagogue, with a temple of the sun, if any Persians could be found to inhabit this island and worship in this gloomy climate the God of their idolatry."**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n577/mode/2up?view=theater

"In order to raise the public spirit, **he must with the greatest ardour preach up *the general interest of humanity, and inculcate the utmost indifference for all associations or secret unions which are only formed among the subjects of one particular nation*.**"19 **Here the impious legislator blasphemously cites for an example Christ, and his pretended indifference for his family.**

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-35-02-0331

Our Sentiments are uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty—**That Religion is at all times and places a Matter between God and Individuals—That no man aught to suffer in Name, person or effects on account of his religious Opinions—That the legetimate Power of civil Goverment extends no further than to punish the man *who works ill to his neighbour*:**
…

Sir, we are sensible that the President of the united States, is not the national Legislator, & also sensible that the national goverment cannot destroy the Laws of each State; **but our hopes are strong that the sentiments of our beloved President, which have had such genial Effect already, like the radiant beams of the Sun, will shine & prevail through all these States and all the world till Hierarchy and tyranny be destroyed from the Earth.**
…

> RC (DLC); in Dodge's hand, signed by all; at head of text: "The address of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut; assembled October 7th. 1801. To *Thomas Jefferson* Esqr: President of the united States of America"; endorsed by TJ as received 30 Dec. and so recorded in SJL.
>
> A Baptist elder in Connecticut, Nehemiah Dodge began his career in the ministry in Hampton in 1788 before moving on to Southington. He published many tracts and orations **and fought for disestablishment. About 1820, upon becoming a Universalist, he served as pastor of the Universalist Church in New London.**

https://kdhist.sitehost.iu.edu/H105-documents-web/week11/Owen1826.html

Robert Owen, **"Oration Containing a Declaration of Mental Independence,"** Public Hall, New Harmony, Indiana (July, 4, 1826).
…

Still, however, these men, whose minds were in advance of the age in which they lived, were encircled by the prejudices which they and their fathers brought from Europe, and which had descended to the inhabitants of those regions through many ages of despotism, superstition and ignorance. And although a few of these highly-gifted men of the Revolution saw a stronger and clearer light at the distance, as they supposed, of some ages before them; they were too conscious of the extent of the old errors around them to attempt more than to secure the means in the Constitution which they formed, by which their successors might work their way to the superior distant light, and gain for themselves the innumerable advantages which real mental liberty could bestow upon them.
…

Upon an experience, then, of nearly forty years, which owing to a very peculiar combination of circumstances, has been more varied, extended and singular, than perhaps has ever fallen to the lot of any one man, and, during which period, my mind was continually occupied in tracing the cause of each human misery that came before me to its true origin;—I now declare, to you and to the world, that Man, up to this hour, has been, in all parts of the earth, a slave to a TRINITY of the most monstrous evils that could be combined to inflict mental and physical evil upon his whole race.

I refer to PRIVATE, OR INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY—ABSURD AND IRRATIONAL SYSTEMS OF RELIGION—AND MARRIAGE, FOUNDED ON INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY COMBINED WITH SOME ONE OF THESE IRRATIONAL SYSTEMS OF RELIGION.
…

The revolution, then, to be now effected, is the destruction of this HYDRA OF EVILS—in order that the many may be no longer poor, wretched beings,—dependent on the wealthy and powerful few; that Man may be no longer a superstitious idiot, continually dying from the futile fear of death; that he may no longer unite himself to the other sex from any mercenary or superstitious motives, nor promise and pretend to do that which it depends not on himself to perform.
…

Rejoice, then, with me, my friends, that this light is now set upon a hill, for it will increase daily, more and more, until it shall be seen, felt, and understood, by all the nations of the earth.

https://archive.org/details/selectionsfromw00fourgoog/page/n132/mode/2up?view=theater

Owen's scheme of communism had some vogue at first, because it was a mask for party spirit, a veil to cover the secret plan which tends to destroy the clergy and religion. That perspective caused the whole *coterie* of atheism to rally round the preacher Owen. As for his other two dogmas, that of community of goods is so pitiful that it is not worthy of refutation; that of the sudden abolishment of marriage is also a monstrosity.
…

However, it is a proof of the intellectual convulsion of the age that it has allowed itself to be deluded in regard to the most important problem of the social world, in regard to the associative mechanism, **by a preacher who has neither new doctrines nor distinct dogmas. His scheme of destruction of the clergy is a residue of revolution:** if all the classes that abused their functions were to be abolished, I know not what class among the civilised could be maintained. **His dogma of communism is a rehash of Sparta and Rome; that of free love is likewise a plagiarism from various peoples, among others the Nepaulians, the Otaheitans, etc.**—(N. M., 473.)

https://archive.org/details/worldrevolutionp00webs/page/106/mode/2up?view=theater

Like Robert Owen, Saint-Simon frankly declared that the existing social system was dead and must be completely done away with. The French Illuminatus, however, did not fall into the error of his English contemporary, of alienating public opinion by the repudiation of Christianity; **on the contrary, faithful to the directions of Weishaupt, Saint-Simon, in his book *Le Nouveau Christianisme*, set out to prove that his system was simply the fulfilment of Christ's teaching on the brotherhood of man, which had become perverted by the belief in the necessity for subduing the flesh; "therefore in order to re-establish Christianity on its true basis it was necessary to restore its sensual side, the absence of which strikes its social action with sterility."**1
…

The wild-eyed revolutionary waving a red flag will never gain so many converts as the mild philosopher who preaches peaceful revolution carried out on the principles of Christian love and brotherhood. **It was this old deception of representing Christ as a Socialist which made the strength of Saint-Simonism, and that, practised later on by the so-called Christian Socialists of our own country, not only drew countless amiable visionaries into Socialism, but at the same time drove many virile minds from Christianity to seek relief in Nietzscheism.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/10/23.htm

It is, however, curious, that whilst the English Socialists are generally opposed to Christianity, and have to suffer all the religious prejudices of a really Christian people, the French Communists, being a part of a nation celebrated for its infidelity, are themselves Christians. One of their favourite axioms is, that Christianity is Communism, "*le Christianisme c'est le Communisme*". This they try to prove by the bible, the state of community in which the first Christians are said to have lived, etc. But all this shows only, that these good people are not the best Christians, although they style themselves so; **because if they were, they would know the bible better, and find that, if some few passages of the bible may be favourable to Communism, the general spirit of its doctrines is, nevertheless, totally opposed to it, as well as to every rational measure.**

https://www.marxists.org/subject/art/lit_crit/works/belinsky/gogol.htm

That you base such teaching on the Orthodox Church I can understand: it has always served as the prop of the knout and the servant of despotism; but why have you mixed Christ up in it? What have you found in common between Him and any church, least of all the Orthodox Church? He was the first to bring to people the teaching of freedom, equality, and brotherhood and to set the seal of truth to that teaching by martyrdom. **And *this* teaching was men's *salvation* only until it became organized in the Church and took the principle of Orthodoxy for its foundation.** The Church, on the other hand, was a hierarchy, consequently a champion of inequality, a flatterer of authority, an enemy and persecutor of brotherhood among men – and so it has remained to this day. **But the meaning of Christ's message has been revealed by the philosophical movement of the preceding century. And that is why a**

man like Voltaire who stamped out the fires of fanaticism and ignorance in Europe by ridicule, is, of course, more the son of Christ, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone, than all your priests, bishops, metropolitans, and patriarchs – Eastern or Western.

https://www.garynorth.com/ProductiveChristians.pdf

The abolitionist movement was, it is true, a religious movement. But its religion was antichristian humanism.
...

And Charles Grandison Finney, "the Billy Graham of the nineteenth century," was at the heart of the movement. Theologically, he was a Pelagian, a heretic. Bennet Tyler observed, in 1854, that "no orthodox body of Christians could receive him into their pulpit. No doubt he published works that contained rousing and startling truths; **but even truth was given forth alongside of much error which counteracted all.** And now he seems to be drifting no one can tell whither. ... He adjusts whatever he finds in the Bible to his own preconceived metaphysical determinations, instead of submitting his metaphysical musings to the test of unerring wisdom."13

> https://chalcedon.edu/resources/books/noble-savages-exposing-the-worldview-of-pornographers-and-their-war-against-christian-civilization
>
> The revivalist Charles G. Finney provided Americans, according to B.B. Warfield, with **“less a theology than a system of morals. God might be eliminated from it entirely without essentially changing its character. All virtue, all holiness is made to consist in an ethical determination of Will.”**11

https://archive.org/details/DiscussionsOfRobertLewisDabneyVol.3Philosophical/page/n367/mode/2up?view=theater

(4.) The best argument for any creed is the godly living of its professors. Protestantism used to have a grand and victorious advantage on that point. She is ceasing to wield it. **The wealth begotten by her very virtues of industry, thrift, and probity has debauched many of her children. "Jeshurun has waxen fat, and kicked."** An unbounded flood of luxury sweeps Protestant families away. **[April, 1894]**
...

The statesmen and divines of the Reformation, the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, Winthrops, and Mathers, were strong advocates of State education; they were such because they believed in the close union of church and State; because their conception of the State was thoroughly theocratic. Had these men been asked, What think you of a theory of education which should train the understanding without instructing the religious conscience; which should teach young immortal spirits anything and everything except God; which should thus secularize education, a function essentially spiritual, and should take this parental task from the fathers and mothers, on whom God imposed it, to confer it on the human and earthly organism, expressly secular and godless? they would have answered with one voice, It is pagan, utterly damnable. But they thought that the State might educate, because the State with them was Christian. **Thus State education was firmly grafted into the Puritan colonies. New England, with her usual aggressiveness, has pushed her usage all over the empire. Meantime the Jeffersonian doctrine of the absolute severance and independence of church and State, of the entire secularity of the State, and the absolutely equal rights, before the law, of religious truth and error, of paganism, atheism, and Christianity, has also established itself in all the States; and still the politicians, for, electioneering ends, propagate this State education everywhere. By this curious circuit "Christian America" has gotten herself upon this thoroughly pagan ground;** forcing the education of responsible, moral, and immortal beings, of which religion must ever be the essence, into the hands of a gigantic human agency, which resolves that it cannot and will not be religious at all.

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/the_failure_of_american_baptist_culture.pdf

The poor have no claim on Christians simply by virtue of being poor; to assert the contrary is to fall into a manicheanism which identifies goodness or election with external position. **Liberal concern for the poor, for racism, for women, etc., does not develop out of Scripture but out of Enlightenment humanism and Marxism. The agendas are set long before the Scriptures are consulted,** and the Scriptures are generally grossly distorted. (How often, for instance, do we hear anything about righteous Job, the "richest man in the east," whose riches were doubled by God after his trial? Or of wealthy Abraham?) **Liberalism has always gone to Scripture to pick and choose phrases which support**

the humanistic agenda. This has nothing to do with Christianity. It is simply an intellectual form of occultist Bible-mancy. Nor will it do to say that conservative Christians also pick and choose (though this is very true), because orthodox Christians at least try to do justice to what the Bible actually says, treating it as God's Word (infallible and inerrant).

> https://biblehub.com/exodus/23-2.htm
>
> **Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou speak in a cause to decline after many to wrest judgment: 3 Neither shalt thou countenance a poor man in his cause.**
>
> https://biblehub.com/leviticus/19-15.htm
>
> **Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.**

---

https://biblehub.com/genesis/50-20.htm

But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.

https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12517c.htm

He practised law with some success, and in later life deplored the zeal he had devoted to his profession.
...

"Contra Symmachum" must have been written at Rome; **the second book belongs to the period between 29 March and December, 403.** All other works antedate the journey to Rome.
...

Prudentius identifies the Church with Rome and, in thus transforming it, preserves that ancient belief in the eternity of the city. He can be impartial towards the pagan and praise him for services rendered the State. He is proud of the senate, seeing its majority Christian. **Christianity is come to crown the Roman institutions.**

https://archive.org/details/L398PrudentiusIISymmachusCrownsOfMartyrdomScenesFromHistory/page/n63/mode/2up?view=theater

Shall I tell you, Roman, what cause it was that so exalted your labours, what it was that nursed your glory to such a height of fame that it has put rein and bridle on the world? God, wishing to bring into partnership peoples of different speech and realms of discordant manners, **determined that all the civilised world should be harnessed to one ruling power and bear gentle bonds in harmony under the yoke, so that love of their religion should hold men's hearts in union;** for no bond is made that is worthy of Christ unless unity of spirit leagues together the nations it associates. Only concord knows God; it alone worships the beneficent Father aright in peace. The untroubled harmony of human union wins his favour for the world; by division it drives Him away, with cruel warfare it makes Him wroth; it satisfies Him with the offering of peace and holds Him fast with quietness and brotherly love. In all lands bounded by the western ocean and lightened by Aurora at her rosy dawning, the raging war-goddess was throwing all humanity into confusion and arming savage hands to wound each other. **To curb this frenzy God taught the nations everywhere to bow their heads under the same laws and become Romans** — all whom Rhine and Danube flood, or Tagus a with its golden stream, or great Ebro, those through whose land glides the horned river of the western world, those who are nurtured by Ganges or washed by the warm Nile's seven mouths. **A common law made them equals and bound them by a single name, bringing the conquered into bonds of brotherhood.** We live in countries the most diverse like fellow-citizens of the same blood dwelling within the single ramparts of their native city, and all united in an ancestral home. Regions far apart, shores separated by the sea, now meet together in appearing before one common court of law, in the way of trade in the products of their crafts they gather to one thronged market, **in the way of wedlock they unite in legal marriage with a spouse of another country; for a single progeny is produced from the mixed blood of two different races.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n399/mode/2up?view=theater

1097 Let us now conclude this work with Plato, who conceives a fourth kind of commonwealth in which good honest men would be supreme lords. This would be the true natural aristocracy. **This commonwealth conceived by Plato was brought into being by providence from the first beginnings of the nations. For it ordained that men of gigantic stature, stronger than the rest, who were to wander on the mountain heights as do the beasts of stronger natures, should, at the first thunderclaps after the universal flood, take refuge in the caves of the mountains, subject themselves to a higher power which they imagined as Jove, and, all amazement as they were all pride and cruelty, humble themselves before a divinity.** For in this order of human things we cannot conceive how divine providence could have employed any other counsel to halt them in their bestial wandering through the great forest of the earth, in order to introduce among them the order of human civil things.

1098 Here was formed a state so to speak of monastic commonwealths or of solitary sovereigns under the government of a Greatest and Best whom they themselves created for their faith out of the flash of the thunderbolts, in which this true light of God shone forth for them: that He governs mankind. Hence they came to imagine that all the human benefits supplied to them and all the aids provided for their human needs were so many gods, and feared and revered them as such. Then, between the powerful restraints of frightful superstition and all the goading stimuli of bestial lust (which must both have been extremely violent in such men), as they felt the aspect of the heavens to be terrible to them and hence to inhibit their use of vencry, they must have learned to hold in check the impulse of the bodily motion of lust. **Thus they began to use human liberty, which consists in controlling the motions of concupiscence and giving them another direction;** for since this liberty does not come from the body, whence comes concupiscence, it must come from the mind and is therefore properly human. The new direction took the form of forcibly seizing their women, who were naturally shy and unruly, dragging them into their caves, and, in order to have intercourse with them, keeping them there as perpetual lifelong companions. Thus, with the first human, which is to say chaste and religious, couplings, they gave a beginning to matrimony. Thereby they became certain fathers of certain children by certain women. Thus they founded the families and governed them with a cyclopean family sovereignty over their children and their wives, such as was proper to such proud and savage natures, so that later as cities arose men might be found disposed to stand in awe of the civil sovereignty. Thus providence ordained certain household commonwealths of monarchic form under fathers (in that state princes) best in sex, age and virtue. These fathers, in the state we must call that of nature (which was identical with the state of the families), must have formed the first natural orders, as being those who were pious, chaste and strong. Since they were settled on their lands and could no longer escape by flight (as they had previously done in their feral wanderings), in order to defend themselves and their families they had to kill the wild beasts that attacked them. And in order to provide sustenance for themselves and their families, as they had ceased foraging, they had to tame the earth and sow grain. **All this for the salvation of the nascent human race.**

1099 **Meanwhile, scattered through the plains and valleys and preserving the infamous communism of things and of women, there remained a great number of the impious, the unchaste and the nefarious—impious in having no fear of gods, unchaste in their use of shameless bestial venery, and nefarious in their frequent intercourse with their own mothers and daughters.** After a long time, driven by the ills occasioned by their bestial society, weak, astray and solitary, relentlessly pursued by the robust and violent **because of quarrels engendered by their infamous communism, they came at last to seek refuge in the asylums of the fathers.** The latter, taking them under their protection, proceeded to extend their family kingdoms to include these *famuli* through the clienteles. Thus they developed commonwealths on the basis of orders naturally superior by reason of virtues certainly heroic. First, piety, for they adored divinity, though because of their little light they multiplied and divided it into many gods formed according to their various apprehensions. (This is worked out and confirmed by Diodorus Siculus and more clearly by Eusebius in his *De praeparatione Evangelica* and by St. Cyril of Alexandria in his *Adversus Iulianum imperatorem*.) And in the virtue of their piety they were also endowed with prudence, taking counsel from the auspices of the gods; with temperance, coupling each with the one woman whom he had taken under the divine auspices as a perpetual companion for life; with strength for slaying beasts and taming the earth; and with magnanimity in giving succor to the weak and aid to those in danger. **Such was the nature of the Herculean commonwealths, in which the pious, wise, chaste, strong and magnanimous cast down the proud and defended the weak, which is the mark of excellence in civil governments.**

1100 But finally the family fathers, having become great by the religion and virtue of their ancestors and through the labors of their clients, began to abuse the laws of protection and to govern the clients harshly. **When they had thus departed from the natural order, which is that of justice, their clients rose in mutiny against them. But since without order (which is to say without God) human society cannot stand for a moment, providence led the family fathers naturally to unite themselves with their kindred in orders against their clients.** To pacify the latter, they conceded to them, in the world's first agrarian law, the bonitary ownership of the fields, retaining for themselves the optimum or sovereign family ownership. Thus the first cities arose upon reigning orders of nobles. And as the natural order declined which had been based, in accordance with the then state of nature, on

[superiority of] kind, sex, age and virtue, providence called the civil order into being along with the cities. And first of all [civil orders], that which approximated most closely to nature: that in virtue of nobility of humankind **(for in that state of affairs nobility could be based only on generating in human fashion with wives taken under divine auspices)** and thus in virtue of a heroism, the nobles should rule over the plebeians (who did not contract marriage with such solemnities), and now that divine rules had ceased (under which the families had been governed by divine auspices) and the heroes had to rule in virtue of the form of the heroic governments themselves, that the principal basis of these commonwealths should be religion safeguarded within the heroic orders, and that through this religion all civil laws and rights should belong to the heroes alone. But since nobility had now become a gift of fortune, providence caused to arise among the nobles the order of the family fathers themselves, as being naturally more worthy because of age. And among the fathers it caused the most spirited and robust to arise as kings **whose duty it should be to lead the others and gird them in orders to resist and overawe the rebellious clients.**

1101 But with the passage of the years and the far greater development of human minds, **the plebs of the peoples finally became suspicious of the pretensions of such heroism and understood themselves to be of equal human nature with the nobles,** and therefore insisted that they too should be taken into the civil orders of the cities. Since in due time the peoples were to become sovereign, providence permitted a long antecedent struggle of plebs with nobility over piety and religion in the heroic contests for the extension of the auspices by the nobles to the plebeians, with a view to securing thereby the extension of all public and private rights regarded as dependent on the auspices. Thus the very care for piety and attachment to religion brought the people to civil sovereignty. In this respect the Roman people went beyond all others in the world, and for that reason it became the master people of the world. In this way, as the natural order merged more and more with the civil orders, the popular commonwealths were born. In these everything had to be reduced to lot or balance, and providence therefore, in order that neither chance nor fate should rule, ordained that the census should be the measure of fitness for office. Thereby the industrious and not the lazy, the frugal and not the prodigal, the provident and not the idle, the magnanimous and not the faint-hearted—in a word, the rich with some virtue or semblance thereof, and not the poor with their many shameless vices—were considered the best for governing. In such commonwealths the entire peoples, who have in common the desire for justice, command laws that are just because they are good for all. Such a law Aristotle divinely defines as will without passions, which would be the will of a hero who has command of his passions. These commonwealths gave birth to philosophy. By their very form they inspired it to fashion the hero, and for that purpose to interest itself in truth. **All this was ordained by providence to the end that, since virtuous actions were no longer prompted by religious sentiments as formerly, philosophy should make the virtues understood in their idea, and by dint of reflection thereon, if men were without virtue they should at least be ashamed of their vices.** Only so can peoples prone to ill-doing be held to their duty. And from the philosophies providence permitted eloquence to arise and, from the very form of these popular commonwealths in which good laws are commanded, to become impassioned for justice, and from these ideas of virtue to inflame the peoples to command good laws. Such eloquence, we resolutely affirm, flourished in Rome in the time of Scipio Africanus, when civil wisdom and military valor, which happily united in establishing at Rome on the ruins of Carthage the empire of the world, must necessarily have brought in their train a robust and most prudent eloquence.

1102 But as the popular states became corrupt, so also did the philosophies. **They descended to skepticism. Learned fools fell to calumniating the truth. Thence arose a false eloquence, ready to uphold either of the opposed sides of a case indifferently.** Thus it came about that, by abuse of eloquence like that of the tribunes of the plebs at Rome, when the citizens were no longer content with making wealth the basis of rank, they strove to make it an instrument of power. And as furious south winds whip up the sea, so these citizens provoked civil wars in their commonwealths and drove them to total disorder. Thus they caused the commonwealths to fall from a perfect liberty into the perfect tyranny of anarchy or the unchecked liberty of the free peoples, which is the worst of all tyrannies.

1103 To this great disease of cities providence applies one of these three great remedies in the following order of human civil things.

1104 It first ordains that there be found among these peoples a man like Augustus to arise and establish himself as a monarch and, by force of arms, take in hand all the orders and all the laws, which, though sprung from liberty, no longer avail to regulate and hold it within bounds. On the other hand providence ordains that the very form of the monarchic state shall confine the will of the monarchs, **in spite of their unlimited sovereignty, within the natural order of keeping the peoples content and satisfied with both their religion and their natural liberty. For without this universal satisfaction and content of the peoples, monarchic states are neither lasting nor secure.**

1105 Then, if providence does not find such a remedy within, it seeks it outside. And since peoples so far corrupted had already become naturally slaves of their unrestrained passions—of luxury, effeminacy, avarice, envy, pride and vanity—and in pursuit of the pleasures of their dissolute life were falling back into all the vices characteristic of the most abject slaves (having become liars, tricksters, calumniators,

thieves, cowards and pretenders), providence decrees that they become slaves by the natural law of nations which springs from the nature of such nations, and that they become subject to better nations which, having conquered them by arms, preserve them as subject provinces. **Herein two great lights of natural order shine forth. First, that he who cannot govern himself must let himself be governed by another who can. Second, that the world is always governed by those who are naturally fittest.**

1106 But if the peoples are rotting in this last civil illness and cannot agree upon a monarch from within, and are not conquered and preserved by better nations from without, then providence for their extreme ill has its extreme remedy at hand. For such peoples, like so many beasts, have fallen into the custom of each man thinking only of his own private interests and have reached the extreme of delicacy, or better of pride, in which like wild animals they bristle and lash out at the slightest displeasure. **Thus in the midst of their greatest festivities, though physically thronging together, they live like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice.** By reason of all this, providence decrees that, through obstinate factions and desperate civil wars, they shall turn their cities into forests and the forests into dens and lairs of men. In this way, through long centuries of barbarism, rust will consume the misbegotten subtleties of malicious wits, that have turned them into beasts made more inhuman by the barbarism of reflection than the first men had been made by the barbarism of sense. For the latter displayed a generous savagery, against which one could defend oneself or take flight or be on one's guard; but the former, with a base savagery, under soft words and embraces, plots against the life and fortune of friends and intimates. Hence peoples who have reached this point of premeditated malice, when they receive this last remedy of providence and are thereby stunned and brutalized, are sensible no longer of comforts, delicacies, pleasures and pomp, but only of the sheer necessities of life. **And the few survivors in the midst of an abundance of the things necessary for life naturally become well behaved and, returning to the primitive simplicity of the first world of peoples, are again religious, truthful and faithful. Thus providence brings back among them the piety, faith and truth which are the natural foundations of justice as well as the graces and beauties of the eternal order of God.**

1107 The clear and simple observation we have made on the affairs of the entire human race, if we had been told nothing more by the philosophers, historians, grammarians and jurisconsults, would lead us to say certainly **that this is the great city of the nations founded and governed by God.** Lycurgus, Solon, the decemvirs and the like have been eternally praised to the skies as wise legislators, because it has hitherto been believed that by their good measures and laws they had founded Sparta, Athens and Rome, the three cities that outshone all others in the fairest and greatest civil virtues. Yet they were all of short duration and even of small extent as compared with the universe of peoples, which was constituted by such orders and secured by such laws that even in its decay it assumes those forms of states by which alone it may everywhere be preserved and perpetually endure. And must we not then say that this is a counsel of a superhuman wisdom? **For without the force of laws (whose force, according to Dio as cited in the Axioms [308], is like that of a tyrant), but making use of the very customs of men (in the practice of which they are as free of all force as in the expression of their own nature, whence the same Dio said that customs were like kings in commanding by pleasure), it divinely rules and conducts [the aforesaid city].**

1108 It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations (and we took this as the first incontestable principle of our Science, since we despaired of finding it from the philosophers and philologists), **but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human race upon this earth.** Men mean to gratify their bestial lust and abandon their offspring, and they inaugurate the chastity of marriage from which the families arise. The fathers mean to exercise without restraint their paternal power over their clients, and they subject them to the civil powers from which the cities arise. The reigning orders of nobles mean to abuse their lordly freedom over the plebeians, and they are obliged to submit to the laws which establish popular liberty. The free peoples mean to shake off the yoke of their laws, and they become subject to monarchs. **The monarchs mean to strengthen their own positions by debasing their subjects with all the vices of dissoluteness, and they dispose them to endure slavery at the hands of stronger nations.** The nations mean to dissolve themselves, and their remnants flee for safety to the wilderness, whence, like the phoenix, they rise again.

https://archive.org/details/historicallectur00king/page/164/mode/2up?view=theater

But in any case, government by a ruling caste, whether of the patriarchal or of the feudal kind, is no ideal or permanent state of society. So far from it, it is but the first or second step out of primeval savagery. For the more a ruling race becomes conscious of its own duty, and not merely of its own power—the more it learns to regard its peculiar gifts as entrusted to it for the good of men—so much the more earnestly will it labour to raise the masses below to its own level, by imparting to them

its own light; **and so will it continually tend to abolish itself, by producing a general equality, moral and intellectual; and fulfil that law of self-sacrifice which is the beginning and the end of all virtue.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aufheben

Hegel stated that *aufheben* is uniquely exempt from the historical process in that it is supposed to be true for all time and never changes or develops further as in *das absolute Wissen* ("absolute knowledge"). **The synthesis both abolishes and preserves the thesis and the antithesis,** an apparent contradiction which leads to difficulties in interpreting this concept (and to translate *aufheben*). In Hegel's logic self-contradiction is legitimate and necessary.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1349/1349-h/1349-h.htm#link2HCH0010

Try the same method with a Mussulman, and you will soon find that all your efforts are fruitless. He has already a theology and a prophet of his own, and sees no reason why he should exchange them for those which you have to offer. **Perhaps he will show you more or less openly that he pities your ignorance and wonders that you have not been able to ADVANCE from Christianity to Mahometanism. In his opinion—I am supposing that he is a man of education—Moses and Christ were great prophets in their day, and consequently he is accustomed to respect their memory; but he is profoundly convinced that however appropriate they were for their own times, they have been entirely superseded by Mahomet, precisely as we believe that Judaism was superseded by Christianity.**

> https://biblehub.com/matthew/23-29.htm
>
> **"Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! Because you build the tombs of the prophets and adorn the monuments of the righteous,** 30 **And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.**
>
> *Stephen Wolfe on X*: After reading the venerable dead on the doctrine of God, justification, sanctification, etc., you should then read them on politics, and take them just as seriously.
>
> *𝔽orms ℝespecter (0/100 bangers) on X*: "But when it comes to politics they were products of their time. **The One True Political System of liberal democracy hadn't yet been revealed. They couldn't know any better.**"
>
> *Brandon Zaffini on X*: **"Whig history is wrong. Christianity had nothing to do with our glorious present."** "Well that's a relief as I don't find the present all that glorious. I think we need a change." **"Just kidding. Whig history is right. If you abandon the present, you're probably not a Christian."**

https://archive.org/details/cu31924014201044/page/n37/mode/2up?view=theater

The French Revolution acted, with regard to things of this world, precisely as religious revolutions have acted with regard to things of the other. It dealt with the citizen in the abstract, independent of particular social organizations, just as religions deal with mankind in general, independent of time and place.
…

By seeming to tend rather to the regeneration of the human race than to the reform of France alone, it roused passions such as the most violent political revolutions had been incapable of awakening. It inspired proselytism, and gave birth to propagandism; **and hence assumed that quasi religious character which so terrified those who saw it, or, rather, became a sort of new religion, imperfect, it is true, without God, worship, or future life, but still able, like Islamism, to cover the earth with its soldiers, its apostles, and its martyrs.**

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/blanqui/1849/to-mountain.htm

Citizens, the Mountain had sublime inspirations, daughters of the gospels and philosophy. But it never possessed those positive theories that only grow slowly from a close analysis of the social body, just as the art of healing is born of the revelations of anatomy. Nevertheless, if it was lacking in the organizing force of science, the impulses of the heart sufficed to dictate to it the immortal slogan of the future: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, **and that admirable symbol, the Declaration of Rights, which broadly interpreted contains the seed of all that will come in the future society.**

Unfortunately, it's the fate of the works of genius that have shaken the world to perish asphyxiated under the clouds of incense under which superstitious admirers drown them. The vivifying spirit of the master dies suffocated by the narrow observance of the text. **The Law of Moses succumbed to the desperate embrace of the Pharisees. The Koran will be extinguished, turned into stone by the**

immobility of its imbecilic sectarians. And the Gospels themselves would have been sealed in their tomb by the idolatrous hands of its disciples – who had become its gravediggers – if their immortal ideas, escaping from the icy corpse around which they knelt, had not reappeared ever more shining in the new incarnation that will perpetuate them among humanity. The Declaration of Rights, a formula born yesterday, is already suffering the fate of the old dogmas which in their period of decrepitude almost always become instruments of reaction against the redemptory labors of their revealers. **The Judaic cult of the letter killed the revolutionary spirit of the symbol.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=R12wB-fUdkoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

One of the features of the French Enlightenment's dominant ideology thesis was the view that lurking behind lofty, idealistic phrases were self-interested motives. According to the *philosophes*, political elites "conspired" to create ideologies which would rationalize and disguise their self-interested motives and help them deceive and manipulate their subordinates. **Hence, on this view, political elites were well aware of the deceptive nature of their ideologies.**

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm#chap15
>
> **But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen,** because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. **Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.**
>
> https://iep.utm.edu/machiave/#SH2e
>
> However, he is most famous for his claim in chapter 15 of *The Prince* that **he is offering the reader what he calls the "effectual truth" (*verità effettuale*), a phrase he uses there for the only time in all of his writings.** Although the effectual truth may pertain to military matters (e.g., P 14 and P 17), it is comprehensive in that it treats all the things of the world and not just military things (P 18). **Surprisingly, there is still relatively little work on this fundamental Machiavellian concept.**
> …
>
> Unlike Machiavelli himself, **those who damn the tumults of Rome do not see that these disorders actually lead to Roman liberty** (D 1.4).
> …
>
> Some commentators believe that effects are only effects if they are seen or displayed. They thus see the effectual truth as proto-phenomenological. Others take a stronger line of interpretation and believe that effects are only effects if they produce actual changes in the world of human affairs. Touching rather than seeing might then be the better metaphor for the effectual truth (see P 18).

Hegel, however, introduced a radically new step in the theory of ideological false consciousness when he suggested that **even the great political rulers of history – the Caesars and Napoleons – were themselves deceived by their ideologies and ignorant of the real motives behind their political thoughts and actions.**

According to Hegel's philosophy of history, **historical actors were agents or instruments of a historical process which transcended their conscious minds yet motivated their passions and ideas.**
…

As a historical materialist, Engels's objective was to demonstrate that

> **the political and religious theories were not the causes … [of the] so-called religious wars of the 16th century** [but in fact] very positive material class-interests were at play … [And] if the class struggles of that time appear to bear religious earmarks, if the interests, requirements and demands of the various classes hid themselves behind a religious screen, it little changes the actual situation, and is to be explained by conditions of the time.37

…

According to Engels, sixteenth-century Germany was ripe for the overthrow of feudalism and the political ascendancy of the nascent bourgeoisie; it was not ready, however, for the kind of revolutionary programs advanced by the more radical elements of the peasant movement. Furthermore, what was

clearly impossible was any attempt to realize a history-ending apocalypse. Hence, if Münzer had had a clearer, nonideological consciousness of the historical and social forces present in his epoch, he would have seen that the real interests of the peasantry would have been best served by an alliance with the reformist German middle class against the feudal and Church aristocracy. But outraged by the injustice and impiety of his society, and motivated by an irrational belief in the approach of the Last Judgment, Münzer would not accept an alliance with any group which did not share the same intense religious feelings and radical chiliastic aspirations as himself. **Münzer's ideological beliefs and decisions led to the political isolation of the peasantry,** and their ultimate defeat.
…

While such alliances made sense in the French Revolution of 1789, which was wedged against feudal absolutism, it no longer was in the rational interests of the proletariat to continue such alliances in the changed social circumstances of the early nineteenth century, according to Marx. In their ideological commitment to the "republican-democratic" ideology, Marx argued, the French proletariat was failing to perceive its real interests.

> https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/08/07.htm
>
> Proof: the first outbreaks of the French proletariat.[8] **The workers in Lyons imagined their goals were entirely political, they saw themselves purely as soldiers of the republic, while in reality they were the soldiers of socialism.**

https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv3n2/ivant.htm

Molotov. It is necessary to show historical incidents in a comprehensive way. For example the incident with the drama of Demyan Bedny *Bogatyp.* Demyan Bedny mocked the baptism of Russia, **but in reality acceptance of Christianity was a progressive event for its historical development.**

Stalin. Of course, we are not good Christians but **to deny the progressive role of Christianity at that particular stage is impossible.** This incident had a very great importance because this turned the Russian state to contacts with the West, and not to an orientation towards the East.

---

https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1997/1997.03.16/

Irwin shows, with an historical acumen too rare in most discussions of such topics, that Kant (and Reid as well) significantly misunderstood ancient eudaimonism. Kant's central criticism of ancient ethics is that it tends to subordinate morality and the practical reason which accompanies it to non-moral considerations, such as 'inclination' or indeed any conception of the highest good which is not itself defined by a moral law. **This criticism hits the Epicurean position hardest; but, as Irwin points out, Kant recognizes sporadically that Stoicism can escape it, since the Stoics do acknowledge the supremacy of morality even within the framework of eudaimonistic thinking.** (Irwin claims that Aristotle and Plato would escape on the same grounds.)
…

[Annas] finds the Stoics taking clearer and sharper-edged positions than Aristotle in moral philosophy; **in this they resemble Kant more than Aristotle, who is methodologically committed to respecting widely held moral beliefs. The Stoic tendency is rather to press theoretical distinctions until they conflict with such common beliefs.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q&f=false

The result of all this is that (to employ anachronistic modern categories) Stoic ethics comes to resemble a strange amalgam of elements familiar to us from utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. On the one hand, because the life according to nature is one in which we ought to act in ways likely to secure more rather than fewer preferred indifferents, and because the cosmopolitan sage is unconcerned about prioritising the securing of preferred indifferents for him- or herself rather than for other people, **it's not implausible to see the sage as engaging in the kinds of calculations utilitarians make about the likely real-world welfare consequences of the actions they are considering performing.** And just as there is a debate within utilitarian ethics as to whether utilitarianism is best understood in terms of acts or rules, **there is a debate within the Stoicism literature about whether the Stoics though that 'natural laws' were general, universal, and exceptionless** (as Julia Annas, Phillip Mitsis, and Gisela Striker contend) or whether they are better understood as heuristics, which the Stoic sage would have set aside when it was appropriate so to do (which is the view of A.A. Long and Brad Inwood).42 **On the other hand, the Stoics agree with Kantian moralists that two otherwise identical actions can have entirely different moral values, since morality is relevant to the intentions or dispositions with which a person acts and had nothing to do with the actual consequences of one's actions.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA270#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence: [...] *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me*" (*KpV* 5:161).1 While through the study of nature we become aware of our animal nature, our moral condition raises us above animality and makes us aware of our dignity as persons. This is the famous dictum which summarizes Kant's philosophical stance. **In writing these beautiful words, he was probably inspired by Seneca** (*Ep.* 64.5-7; *Constant.* 8.2-4; Santozki 2006: 226-7; Seidler 1981: 674-6).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_64

6. **And virtue herself will have the same effect upon you, of making you admire her and yet hope to attain her. In my own case, at any rate the very contemplation of wisdom takes much of my time; I gaze upon her with bewilderment, just as I sometimes gaze upon the firmament itself, which I often behold as if I saw it for the first time.** 7. Hence I worship the discoveries of wisdom and their discoverers; to enter, as it were, into the inheritance of many predecessors is a delight. It was for me that they laid up this treasure; it was for me that they toiled. But we should play the part of a careful householder; we should increase what we have inherited. This inheritance shall pass from me to my descendants larger than before. **Much still remains to do, and much will always remain, and he who shall be born a thousand ages hence will not be barred from his opportunity of adding something further.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT377#v=onepage&q&f=false

Kant retains the Stoic notion of virtue, while rejecting its natural basis (Santozki 2006: 180). He strongly denied that morality could be based upon nature or anthropology (*MS* 6:216-7). The realm of nature (to which human nature belongs) and the realm of freedom (or morality) have different and heterogeneous forms of legislation.
…

For Kant, living in agreement with nature is not a valid moral principle, because it is heteronomous: here reason plays only an instrumental role, since the end of actions is already given. As he claimed in his university lectures, it is not a principle of morality but of prudence, and not even a good one, since it is unclear whether it is really good to do what accords with nature (Kant 2004: 51-2 [page-numbering of Kaehler's manuscript]).

Despite the structural parallelism regarding the moral point of view that can be traced between both philosophies, they diverge when it comes to *oikeiôsis* as the grounding of morality. Even though Kant never explicitly referred to this Stoic doctrine, the following words might be interpreted as a direct critique of it: "In a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its *preservation*, its *welfare*, in a word its *happiness*, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose" (*GMS* 4:395; Himmelmann 2003: 129-30). **Since instinct would have been a more appropriate means for that end, Kant considers that we have reason for something other than achieving happiness.**
…

For Kant, the specific function of reason in morality is to grasp the heterogeneous nature of duty and happiness and establish the proper order between them.
…

In the beginning of the second part of *Religion*, Kant praises the Stoic conception of virtue. Virtue "designates courage and valour [...] and, hence, presupposes the presence of an enemy" (*Religion* 6:57). Seneca's maxim *vivere militare est* (*Ep.* 96.5) resounds here. **However, Kant criticizes the Stoics for taking the natural inclinations as the enemy, instead of acknowledging that evil lies in our own will.** It is "the *malice* (of the human heart) which secretly undermines the inner attitude with soul-corrupting principles" (*Religion* 6:57, translation modified).

…

Being good amounts to having a virtuous inner attitude, i.e. a "subjective determining ground to fulfill one's duty" (*MS* 6:410). **However, Kant is careful not to define virtue as the "*possession* of a complete *purity* of inner attitudes," but as an "inner attitude *in struggle*"** (*KpV* 5:84, translation modified). **The moral level that corresponds to human beings is progress towards virtue and not its full possession (sanctity). Since virtue, considered objectively, is an "ideal and unattainable," morality commands "constant approximation to it."** From the perspective of the subject of virtue (ourselves), we are always starting "from the beginning" because we are affected by our inclinations (*MS* 6:409).

Kant deems the Stoic notion of virtue to be in real danger of leading into "moral enthusiasm" (*KpV* 5:84). **The problem is that the Stoic ideal of the sage raises "himself above the animal**

nature of the human being" and "is not subject to any temptation to transgress them moral law" (*KpV* 5:127). The sage carries out actions "not from duty but as bare merit" (*KpV* 5:85). Such actions, for Kant, lack moral value. In his understanding, virtue (as strength) is what allows us to overcome the incentives of our inclinations and, thus, to carry out actions *from duty*, which is precisely what gives them moral value.
…

> 8. **In his pre-critical writings, Kant's frequent references to the highest good respond to a slightly different interest.** He sees in it the answer to the articulation between the *principium diiudicationis* and *principium executionis*, that is, the definition of the moral standard and its capacity to move the will. **For Kant, "Epicurus wanted to give virtue an incentive and took from it its inner worth. Zeno wanted to give virtue an inner worth and took from it its incentive. Only Christ gave it inner worth and also an incentive. […] The incentive based on the other world is also in itself the same as renunciation of all advantages"**(*R* 6838, 19:176). **However, in his critical works, Kant introduces the notion of respect for the moral law as a sufficient incentive and, thus, the articulation of *diiudication* and *execution* completely changes** (Seidler 1981: 185-94).

Kant follows the Stoics in taking virtue as the supreme moral principle, but he strongly criticizes them, firstly, for their superhuman representation of the sage and, secondly, for downplaying the role of happiness in human volition. Regarding the first critique, the problem is that the Stoic sage, in claiming that virtue, as moral perfection, can be fully achieved in this life, exceeds the limits of human nature (*KpV* 5:127). Seneca even claimed that the sage has an advantage over the gods, since he is virtuous by merit (*Ep*. 3.14, 52:6; 53.11-12; *Prov*. 6.6). **For Kant, as has been explained, it is only possible to conceive an endess progress towards moral perfection.** Interestingly enough, such progress is "the *real* object of our will" (*KpV* 5:122, emphasis added). In contrast with the idealism of the Stoic sage, Kant's approach offers a more *realist* conception of morality, consistent with our finite nature. **We have a intermediate status: between our inclinations (happiness) and duty (moral law).** Since inclinations "do not of themselves accord with the moral law, which has quite different sources" (*KpV* 5:84), human beings are located at an intersection (Seidler 1981: 145).
…

In both approaches, virtue is the apex of morality and always within our power. Therefore, being moral is not a chimera, but a real possibility. However, **in the philosophical tradition, such a possibility has frequently been spurned as other-worldly or as Stoic, in a pejorative sense.** The way Kant appropriates Stoicism, it has been argued, demonstrates that purity of virtue is attainable for intermediate beings like us and that **the enemy of morality is not our natural inclinations (including emotions and desire for happiness), but lack of rational control over them. Virtue requires us not to suppress, but to subordinate them.** Subordination establishes a kind of order. The principle of such order lies within the agent, in our person. In the capacity to establish that order we discover our freedom and dignity. **In Stoicism Kant found an outstanding catalyst to channel his powerful intuitions.**

https://iow.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2013/03/13-De-Frouville-Background-Kant-and-Stoic-Cosmopolitanism.pdf

Kant's debt to Stoic cosmopolitanism cannot be well understood if we confine our discussion to the political sphere and to the political writings. That is why, in my own characterization of Stoicism, I have started from the moral core of their ideas about reason and personhood, rather than from a more superficial description of their institutional and practical goals. **It is this deep core that Kant appropriates, the idea of a kingdom of free rational beings equal in humanity, each of them to be treated as an end no matter where in the world he or she dwells.** As in Stoicism, this idea is less a specific political proposal than a regulative ideal that should be at the heart of both moral and political reflection and that supplies constraints upon what we may politically will. It also supplies moral motives of respect and awe that will provide us with powerful incentives to fulfill the moral law. We can easily recognize these ideas as formative in the *Grundlegung*, where, as Reich has argued, Kant's way of connection the Formula of Universal Law to the Formula of Humanity is his own non-teleological recasting of the argument of *De Officiis* Book III, where Cicero interprets the Stoic idea of life in accordance with nature as entailing a universal respect for humanity (III. 26-7). (As Reich shows, there are many other points of contact between the works, so much so that it appears that Kant closely followed Cicero's argument.) **We may also recognize Stoic ideas as formative in the Second Critique, where famous conclusion concerning the mind's awe before the starry sky and the moral law within closely echoes the imagery of Seneca's Letter 41, expressing awe before the divinity of reason within us.**
…

Again, **both the Stoics and Kant have blind spots, and not always in the same place. Kant's cosmopolitanism allows him to fall short of the Greek and even the Roman Stoics with regard to the equal personhood and dignity of women,**41 **while we are especially shocked by the**

Stoics' general tendency to accept the institution of slavery, if not all of the practices associated with it.42

> 41. On the equality of women in the Stoic ideal community, see Schofield, *The Stoic Idea*, and, for the Roman Stoics, Musonius Rufus' two short treatises, "That Women Too Should Do Philosophy," and "Should Sons and Daughters Have the Same Education?"

Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory by Richard Beardsworth (2011).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=DFlZ8xIXIY4C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA17#v=onepage&q&f=false

1. The Historical Background to the Cosmopolitan Disposition.

There are three major moments of cosmopolitan thought prior to recent and current re-engagement with its problematic and disposition. The first is the Stoic moment, the second that of natural law theory, the third that of European Enlightenment thought, in general, and Kantian cosmopolitanism, in particular.

As a specific way of thinking the world as a *polis* (literally, a city-state or polity), cosmopolitanism emerges, from out of religious and mythical cosmology, in the Greek Stoic writings of Diogenes (c. 413-327 BCE), Zeno the Stoa (c. 334-262 BCE) and Chrysippus (c. 280-206 BCE). Diogenes the Cynic is considered the first to describe himself as 'a citizen of the world'. 'When anyone asked him what country he came from, he said, "I am a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitês*)"', that is, a member of the *polis* of the universe (Laertius, n.d.). The self-description meant specifically, for Diogenes, that all natural or man-made borders are morally contingent. A citizen, by chance, of the Athenian *polis*, Diogenes belonged morally to the universe. The cosmopolitan disposition emerges out of this ironic, moral outlook on the contingency of Athenian citizenship and political empire. This outlook leads to two conceptions of the *polis*: one transcendent and borderless; the other contingent and bounded. Outside the terms of myth and religion, it provides the intellectual framework that permits the normative critique of empirical politics and loyalties. For Zeno and Chrysippus, the universe constitutes a *polis* because it is organized under law in distinction to chaos (Schofield, 1991, pp. 67-86). Members of the *cosmopolis* are gods and men only insofar as they obey laws through reason. Wider citizenship requires greater rationality. In Stoic cosmopolitanism a relation of identity is thereby set up among the universe (*cosmos*), reason (*logos*), law (*nomos*) and citizenship (*cosmopolitein*). **This identity, together with the moral and normative framework it endorses, is refined in Roman Stoicism at the historical moment of violent transition from the Roman republic to the Roman *imperium*, in the authorships of Cicero (106-43 BCE), Seneca (4 BCE-65 CE), and Marcus Aurelius (121-180 CE).** Seneca writes for example:

> Let us embrace with our minds two commonwealths (*res publicae*): one great and truly common – in which gods and men are contained, in which we look not to this or that corner, but measure the bounds of our state (*civitas*) with the sun; the other the one to which the particular circumstances of birth have assigned us – the commonwealth of the Athenians or the Carthaginians or some other city (*urbs*) which pertains not to all men but to a particular group of them. Some give service to both commonwealths at the same time – some only to the lesser, some to the greater. (Seneca, *De otio,* Book 4, quoted in Schofield, 1991, p. 91)

Seneca's conception of the two cities offers not only a critique of empire, but, again, the terms within which the lesser, contingent *polis* can be appraised through a rational understanding of humanity and a moral conception of community and solidarity. This conception ultimately places the field of politics under the normative horizon of rational moral constraint. **The Greek and Roman variants of Stoic cosmopolitanism provide therefore the embryonic language through which ethical behaviour is untied from religious custom and retied to political and legal system.**

With the Christianization of the Roman Empire of the fourth century CE, the moral tenor of cosmopolitanism is resituated within the universality of Judeo-Christian monotheism. Augustine's *The City of God*, for example, pits the city of the Christian God and its moral duties against those of Rome when Augustine restricts himself to the power relations between them; when he attempts to lay out a comprehensive political theory, he subordinates the laws of the latter to those of the former (Augustine, 1972, Book V). **With the European dissemination of Christian institutions (dogma, diocese, church, monastery) Stoic moral cosmopolitanism fuses with Christian universalism to forge, from the late European medieval age through to the Renaissance, the critical language of natural law theory. From Aquinas to important Thomists like Francisco di Vitoria (1492-1546 CE) and Francisco Suârez (1548-1617 CE), natural laws are deemed those given to humans as rational offspring of divinely-inspired creation** (Finnis, 1992). These laws are those of 'natural' justice to which positive legal laws should bend: they are, most importantly, those of moral equality, of peaceful co-belonging, of just war (Brown et al., 2004, pp. 311-23). **Despite its evident ambiguities and hypocrisies ensconced within the language of Christendom (to which I return), natural law theory thereby prepares the ground for modern political egalitarianism.**

In the third moment, of European Enlightenment thought, a consequent and more systematic cosmopolitanism emerges. I claim that it provides the overall framework within which contemporary cosmopolitan ideas are, in general, discussed, even if weaker forms of cosmopolitanism resist the move to universalize moral personhood. This framework is best found in the work of Immanuel Kant and his ethical and political writings (1784, 1785,

1788, 1793, 1795, 1797). Kant constitutes such an instrumental figure in modern cosmopolitanism and its contemporary reconfigurations that this chapter returns to him several times; here I situate his thought in the context of this brief history. **Indebted to the Stoics (Nussbaum, 1997), Kant aims to maintain the identity posited between human nature, reason and law *within* modernizing processes.** The cosmos can no longer be placed under the rule of law. Human cognitive agents know nothing of its internal workings as a whole. Rational concepts of the world are accordingly 'speculative ideas' only; they have no real relation to the empirical and cannot be verified (Kant, 1781/1929, pp. 315-26). These ideas have, conversely, speculative interest: they are thoughts of totality that testify to the rational vocation of the human species. More importantly, this interest is not only speculative, it is also practical. Reason has, for Kant, an immediate effect on the human will (1788/1956, pp. 74-91). As both rational and sensible beings, humans necessarily take a pure moral interest in the moral law. If human beings feel guilt when they believe that they have behaved wrongly, if they admire examples of virtue in both the moral and political domains, it is because they have a rational will, however overriding their inclinations to self-interest prove to be in everyday life (1785/1987, pp. 55). For Kant, the existential 'fact' of the rational will places ethical motivation immediately in the empirical field. Kant then extrapolates that human beings are members of a 'kingdom of ends'. Transposed from the ethics of the New Testament – for Kant, the most moral of all religious writings – this kingdom constitutes an ethical realm in which each has an absolute worth in himself or herself (ibid., p. 56). **It is this absolute worth of the individual that makes the New Testament morally outstanding.** When taken as means to others' ends, individuals have a 'price'. When considered as ends in themselves – that is, autonomous givers to themselves of their own ends – they have 'value' and 'dignity' (ibid.). Bearing dignity, individuals constitute 'moral persons' with their own agency (ibid., pp. 57 and 63). Moral personality anticipates a system of universal laws in which it is both subject of, and subject to, these laws (self-determination).

Kant's moral community of ends is a direct translation of the Stoic cosmopolitan *polis*, supplemented by Christian individuality, in the context of modernity. The dignity of the moral person organizes the moral and normative critique of hierarchical societies. It leads Kant, politically, to a liberal republicanism: the political philosophy of a liberal community in which each person is free to the extent that his freedom does not harm the freedom of others under the rule of 'public law' (in Kantian terms, *das Recht*). I come back to this critical understanding of liberalism several times in my responses to IR critiques of cosmopolitanism. Morality is thus harnessed to politics through the mechanism of law (*das Recht*) (Kant, 1793 and 1795).

Kant's liberal republicanism is both consistent and systematic. If the category of moral personality is universal for all rational human beings, then, for Kant, the moral critique of empirical polity must itself be universal. The universality of personal dignity is therefore a given at all levels of political organization. In his essay 'Perpetual Peace', for example, the ideology of liberal republicanism leads Kant to posit, beyond the international laws of states' mutual obligations to each other, a cosmopolitan law (*ius cosmopoliticum*) of states *and* individuals, and a world republic in which both states and individuals achieve political personality as 'world citizens' (Kant, 1795/1991, pp. 98-104).

> https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/02/12/governor-of-russia-s-kaliningrad-says-german-philosopher-immanuel-kant-directly-tied-to-war-in-ukraine
>
> **According to Alikhanov, it was German philosophy, whose "godlessness and lack of higher values" began with Kant, that created the "sociocultural situation" that led, among other things, to the First World War.**
>
> > Today, in 2024, **we're bold enough to assert that not only did the First World War begin with the work of Kant, but so did the current conflict in Ukraine.** Here in Kaliningrad, we dare to propose—although we're actually almost certain of it—that it was precisely in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and his *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* [...] that the ethical, value-based foundations of the current conflict were established.
>
> **The governor went on to call Kant one of the "spiritual creators of the modern West," saying that the "Western bloc, which was shaped by the U.S. in its own image," is an "empire of lies."** Kant, he said, is referred to as the "father of almost everything" in the West, including freedom, the idea of the rule of law, liberalism, rationalism, and "even the idea of the European Union."

https://archive.org/details/cu31924021569284/page/n323/mode/2up?view=theater

216. "GERMAN VIRTUE."—There is no denying that from the end of the eighteenth century a current of moral awakening flowed through Europe. **Then only Virtue found again the power of speech. She learnt to discover the unrestrained gestures of exaltation and emotion, she was no longer ashamed of herself,** and she created philosophies and poems for her own glorification. If we look for the sources of this current, we come upon Rousseau, **but the mythical Rousseau, the phantom formed from the impression left by his writings (one might almost say again, his mythically interpreted writings)** and by the indications that he provided himself. He and his public constantly worked at the fashioning of this ideal figure. **The other origin lies in the resurrection of the Stoical side of Rome's greatness, whereby the French so nobly carried on the task of the Renaissance. With striking success they proceeded from the reproduction of antique forms to the reproduction of antique characters.** Thus they may always claim a title to the highest honours, as the nation which has hitherto given the modern world its best books and its best men. How this twofold archetype, the mythical Rousseau and the

resurrected spirit of Rome, affected France's weaker neighbours, is particularly noticeable in Germany, which, in consequence of her novel and quite unwonted impulse to seriousness and loftiness in will and self-control, finally came to feel astonishment at her own newfound virtue, and launched into the world the concept "German virtue," as if this were the most original and hereditary of her possessions. The first great men who transfused into their own blood that French impulse towards greatness and consciousness of the moral will were more honest, and more grateful. **Whence comes the moralism of Kant? He is continually reminding us: from Rousseau and the revival of Stoic Rome.** The moralism of Schiller has the same source and the same glorification of the source. The moralism of Beethoven in notes is a continual song in praise of Rousseau, the antique French, and Schiller. **"Young Germany" was the first to forget its gratitude, because in the meantime people had listened to the preachers of hatred of the French.** The "young German" came to the fore with more consciousness than is generally allowed to youths. When he investigated his paternity, he might well think of the proximity of Schiller, Schleiermacher, and Fichte. **But he should have looked for his grandfathers in Paris and Geneva, and it was very short-sighted of him to believe what he believed: that virtue was not more than thirty years old.** People became used to demanding that the word "German" should connote "virtue," and this process has not been wholly forgotten to this day.—Be it observed further that this moral awakening, as may almost be guessed, has resulted only in drawbacks and obstacles to the *recognition* of moral phenomena. **What is the entire German philosophy, starting from Kant, with all its French, English, and Italian offshoots and by-products? A semi-theological attack upon Helvetius,** a rejection of the slowly and laboriously acquired views and signposts of the right road, which in the end he collected and expressed so well. To this day Helvetius is the best-abused of all good moralists and good men in Germany.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n839/mode/2up?view=theater

We must now turn our attention to a new species of Jacobins who are making an amazing progress in Germany. These are the disciples of a Doctor KANT, who, rising from darkness, and from the chaos of his Categories, proceeds to reveal the mysteries of his Cosmopolitism. According to this system, I. It *is melancholy* to be obliged to seek, *in the hopes of another world*, for the end and destiny of *the human species*.—II. It is not of man conducted by reason, as it is of brutes led by instinct. The former has each for his end the development of all his faculties; while in the latter, the end is accomplished in each individual brute. Among men, on the contrary, the end is for the species, and not for the individual; for the life of man is too short to attain the perfection and the complete development of his faculties. In the class of man, *all the individuals pass and perish; the species alone survives, and is alone immortal*.—III. With respect to man again, the end of the species cannot be accomplished; that is to say, his faculties can only be entirely developed in *the most perfect state of society*.—IV. **That perfect state of society would be *a general confederacy* of the inhabitants of the earth, so united together, that dissentions, jealousies, ambition, or wars, would never be heard of.**—V. Thousands and thousands of years may elapse before this happy period of perpetual peace may come; but, "whatever may be the idea conceived of the free exercise of our will, *it is nevertheless certain, that the apparent result of that volition, the actions of man, are, as well as all the other facts of nature, determined by general laws*." This nature proceeds with a slow but certain step toward its object. Vices, virtues, sciences, the dissentions of mankind, are in her hands but the sure and infallible means by which she leads the human species from generation to generation to the most perfect state of civilization. Sooner or later the epoch of the general confederation, of universal peace, must come; nevertheless, even at that period, *the human species will have proceeded but half way toward its perfection*.27—**I know not whether this doctrineer Kant will inform us in what the other half of the way toward perfection consists; but in the meantime his disciples, who are daily increasing, tell us, "that Europe must necessarily dissolve itself into as many republics as there are now monarchies; and then only will the human species show itself in all its strength and grandeur; then people incapable of governing will no longer be seen at the head of nations; *they will then rise to that high state of perfection at present attained by the French nation, where birth is nothing, but genius and talents every thing.*"**28 **Other adepts, however, perfectly understand what is alluded to by the other half way toward perfection; and these acknowledge man only to be in a state of perfection when he recognizes no other master but himself, no other law but his reason. In short, it is man according to the professor of *Jena*, it is the *Magus* of Weishaupt or of Baboeuf.**29

Notwithstanding the different methods of proceeding, it is easy to see that the system of *Kant*, at present Professor at *Konigsberg*, ultimately leads to the same end as that of *Weishaupt*, heretofore Professor at *Ingolstadt*. The same hatred for revelation is to be found in both, as well as the same spirit of impiety, which cannot brook the idea of a world to come, where all delusion must cease in the presence of the Creator, and where the end of man and of the human species will be proclaimed at the tribunal of a remunerating and avenging God. ***Kant* and *Weishaupt*, with similar pretensions to superior genius, are equally baffled in their attempts, falling into the most voluntarily absurd propositions, that leave the present generation no other consolation in its afflictions, than the empty Cosmopolites who, in thousands and thousands ot years, are, as we are told, to inhabit this earth.** In both we may observe that same hypocrisy pretending to great sensibility and virtue, pretending not to know, that every individual who shall be persuaded that he is not born for any fixed or personal end, will soon shape his conduct according to his views or to his pleasures, and will little regard the future Cosmopolites, their universal peace, or the happiness that is to be spread over the

earth twenty or thirty ages after his death. The same inept fatalism is taught by them both, wishing to represent nature as acting exactly as it pleases, in spite of our volition, and prevailing over our passions by its *general laws*; and nevertheless represent mankind as slow in seconding the grand object of Nature, just as if we were free to accelerate or to retard its views, by our actions. The only difference that can be perceived between these two prototypes of German Jacobinism, is, that the one at Konigsberg envelopes his views in a pacific cant; while the other, in his mysteries, animates and infuriates his Epopts, teaching that the day is not far distant when the adepts are to resort to force, in order to crush and stifle every thing that should dare to resist them. But notwithstanding the pacific cant of the former, his doctrines also make his hearers thirst after that great day when the children of Equality and Liberty are to reign. His colleagues in the universities do not teach his principles with his coolness; the disciples become violent; the Jacobins smile; and as the system spreads, the offspring of both these teachers unite and form alliances in their tenebrous abodes. **Under pretence of this perpetual peace that is to be enjoyed by future generations, they have begun by declaring a war of cannibals against the whole universe; nor is there to be found scarcely one of their offspring, that is not ready to betray his country, his laws, and his fellow-citizens, to erect that Cosmopolitan Empire announced by the Professor Kant, or to enthrone the *Man-king* of the modern *Spartacus*.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:The_Genealogy_of_Morals.djvu/193

25. **No! You can't get round me with science, when I search for the natural antagonists of the ascetic ideal,** when I put the question: "*Where* is the opposed will in which the *opponent ideal* expresses itself?" Science is not, by a long way, independent enough to fulfil this function; in every department science needs an ideal value, a power which creates values, and in whose *service* it *can believe* in itself—**science itself never creates values.** Its relation to the ascetic ideal is not in itself antagonistic; speaking roughly, it rather represents the progressive force in the inner evolution of that ideal. Tested more exactly, its opposition and antagonism are concerned not with the ideal itself, but only with that ideal's outworks, its outer garb, its masquerade, with its temporary hardening, stiffening, and dogmatising—it makes the life in the ideal free once more, while it repudiates its superficial elements. These two phenomena, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same basis––I have already made this clear––the basis, I say, oft the same over-appreciation of truth (more accurately the same belief in the *impossibility* of valuing and of criticising truth), and consequently they are *necessarily* allies, so that, in the event of their being attacked, they must always be attacked and called into question together. **A valuation of the ascetic ideal inevitably entails a valuation of science as well; lose no time in seeing this clearly, and be sharp to catch it!**
...

Considered physiologically, moreover, science rests on the same, basis as does the ascetic ideal: a certain *impoverishment of life* is the presupposition of the latter as of the former––add, frigidity of the emotions, slackening of the *tempo*, the substitution of dialectic for instinct, *seriousness* impressed on mien and gesture (seriousness, that most unmistakable sign of strenuous metabolism, of struggling, toiling life). **Consider the periods in a nation in which the learned man comes into prominence; they are the periods of exhaustion, often of sunset, of decay—the effervescing strength, the confidence in life, the confidence in the future are no more. The preponderance of the mandarins never signifies any good, any more than does the advent of democracy, or arbitration instead of war, equal rights for women, the religion of pity, and all the other symptoms of declining life.** (Science handled as a problem! what is the meaning of science?—upon this point the Preface to the *Birth of Tragedy*.) No! this "modern science"—mark you this well—is at times the *best* ally for the ascetic ideal, and for the very reason that it is the ally which is most unconscious, most automatic, most secret, and most subterranean! They have been playing into each other's hands up to the present, have these "poor in spirit" and the scientific opponents of that ideal (take care, by the bye, not to think that these opponents are the antithesis of this ideal, that they are the *rich* in spirit—that they are *not*; I have called them the *hectic* in spirit). As for these celebrated victories of science; there is no doubt that they are *victories*—but victories over what? There was not for a single minute any victory among their list over the ascetic ideal, rather was it made stronger, that is to say, more elusive, more abstract, more insidious, from the fact that a wall, an outwork, that had got built on to the main fortress and disfigured its appearance, should from time to time be ruthlessly destroyed and broken down by science. **Does any one seriously suggest that the downfall of the theological astronomy signified the downfall of that ideal?**—Has, perchance, man grown *less in need* of a transcendental solution of his riddle of existence, because since that time this existence has become more random, casual, and superfluous in the *visible* order of the universe? Has there not been since the time of Copernicus an unbroken progress in the self-belittling of man and his *will* for belittling himself? Alas, his belief in his dignity, his uniquenesses irreplaceableness in the scheme of existence, is gone—he has become animal, literal, unqualified, and unmitigated animal, he who in his earlier belief was almost God ("child of God," "demi-God"). Since Copernicus man seems to have fallen on to a steep plane—he rolls faster and faster away from the centre—whither? into nothingness? *into the "thrilling sensation of his own nothingness"*—Well! this would be the straight way—to the *old* ideal?—***All* science (and by no means only astronomy, with regard to the humiliating and deteriorating effect of which Kant has made a remarkable confession, "it annihilates my own importance"), all science, natural as much as *unnatural*—by unnatural I mean the self-critique of reason—nowadays sets out to talk man out of his present opinion of himself, as though that opinion had been nothing but a bizarre piece of conceit; you might go so far as to say that science finds its peculiar pride, its peculiar bitter form of stoical ataraxia, in preserving man's *contempt of himself*, that state which it took so much trouble to bring about, as man's final and most serious**

claim to self-appreciation (rightly so, in point of fact, for he who despises is always "one who has not forgotten how to appreciate"). But does all this involve any real effort to *counteract* the ascetic ideal? Is it really seriously suggested that Kant's *victory* over the theological dogmatism about "God," "Soul," "Freedom," "Immortality," has damaged that ideal in any way (as the theologians have imagined to be the case for a long time past)?––**And in this connection it does not concern us for a single minute, if Kant himself intended any such consummation. It is certain that from the time of Kant every type of transcendentalist is playing a winning game––they are emancipated from the theologians; what luck!**––he has revealed to them that secret art, by which they can now pursue their "heart's desire" on their own responsibility, and with all the respectability of science.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm

"Virtue," "duty," "good for its own sake," goodness grounded upon impersonality or a notion of universal validity—these are all chimeras, and in them one finds only an expression of the decay, the last collapse of life, the Chinese spirit of Königsberg. Quite the contrary is demanded by the most profound laws of self-preservation and of growth: to wit, that every man find his *own* virtue, his *own* categorical imperative. **A nation goes to pieces when it confounds *its* duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing works a more complete and penetrating disaster than every "impersonal" duty, every sacrifice before the Moloch of abstraction.**—To think that no one has thought of Kant's categorical imperative as *dangerous to life*!... The theological instinct alone took it under protection!—**An action prompted by the life-instinct proves that it is a *right* action by the amount of pleasure that goes with it: and yet that Nihilist, with his bowels of Christian dogmatism, regarded pleasure as an *objection*. ...** What destroys a man more quickly than to work, think and feel without inner necessity, without any deep personal desire, without pleasure—as a mere automaton of duty?
...

Didn't Kant see in the French Revolution the transformation of the state from the inorganic form to the *organic*? Didn't he ask himself if there was a single event that could be explained save on the assumption of a moral faculty in man, so that on the basis of it, "the tendency of mankind toward the good" could be *explained*, once and for all time? **Kant's answer: "That is revolution."** Instinct at fault in everything and anything, instinct as a revolt against nature, German *décadence* as a philosophy—*that is Kant*!—

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/kant,_immanuel.html

As to Kant's version of morality, **it was appropriate to the kind of zombies that would inhabit that kind of [Kantian] universe: it consisted of total, abject *selflessness*.** An action is moral, said Kant, only if one has no desire to perform it, but performs it out of a sense of *duty* and derives no benefit from it of any sort, neither material nor spiritual; a benefit destroys the moral value of an action. (Thus, if one has no desire to be evil, one cannot be good; if one has, one can.)

Those who accept any part of Kant's philosophy—metaphysical, epistemological or moral—deserve it.
...

The arch-advocate of "duty" is Immanuel Kant; he went so much farther than other theorists that they seem innocently benevolent by comparison. "Duty," he holds, is the only standard of virtue; but virtue is not its own reward: if a reward is involved, it is no longer virtue. The only moral motivation, he holds, is devotion to duty for duty's sake; only an action motivated exclusively by such devotion is a moral action (i.e., an action performed without any concern for "inclination" [desire] or self-interest).
...

If a man *wants* to be honest, he deserves no moral credit; as Kant would put it, such honesty is "praiseworthy," but without "moral import." **Only a vicious represser, who feels a profound desire to lie, cheat and steal, but forces himself to act honestly for the sake of "duty," would receive a recognition of moral worth from Kant and his ilk.**

This is the sort of theory that gives morality a bad name.

The widespread fear and/or resentment of morality—the feeling that morality is an enemy, a musty realm of suffering and senseless boredom—is not the product of mystic, ascetic or Christian codes as such, but a monument to the ugliest repository of hatred for life, man and reason: the soul of Immanuel Kant.

http://rebirthofreason.com/Articles/Younkins/Immanuel_Kant_Ayn_Rands_Intellectual_Enemy.shtml

Kant says that an act is moral only if no benefit of any kind is derived from it. He excludes all personal desires and benefits from the realm of morality. To be moral, a man must perform his duty

without reference to any personal goals, values, or effects on his own life and happiness. A benefit destroys the moral value of an action.

https://archive.org/details/ambivalenceofber0000monr/page/132/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Mandeville always insists that there is no virtue without self-denial,** and sneers at Shaftesbury for maintaining the contrary. It might seem to follow from this (and Mandeville seems to imply it, often enough) **that apparently virtuous behaviour is not genuinely so if it has its origin in a 'passion' and is merely a disguised form of self-liking, The self has not been denied: vanity has been pandered to.** The moral virtues whose origin is described in *An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue* are not, on this view, really virtues at all. **True virtue occurs only when human nature has been transcended altogether, and that is possible only with divine assistance.** When Mandeville says that he does not deny that virtue sometimes occurs, he may merely mean to acknowledge that a few saints may, with God's help, rise above human limitations. He says more than once that he is talking about 'Men in Nature' and not 'Devout Christians, who alone are to be excepted here, being preternaturally assisted by the Divine Grace.'57 He always insists that Devout Christians are extremely rare, even in the religious houses. Whether he is sincere in this or not, **it is obviously a useful ploy, since it enables him to dispose of any counter-examples that may be brought against him without abandoning the thesis that human nature, as such, is completely selfish.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.157427/page/n11/mode/2up?view=theater

IF you asked twenty good men to-day what they thought the highest of the virtues, nineteen of them would reply, Unselfishness. But if you asked almost any of the great Christians of old he would have replied, Love. You see what has happened? A negative term has been substituted for a positive, and this is of more than philological importance. The negative ideal of Unselfishness carries with it the suggestion not primarily of securing good things for others, but of going without them ourselves, as if our abstinence and not their happiness was the important point. I do not think this is the Christian virtue of Love. The New Testament has lots to say about self-denial, but not about self-denial as an end in itself. We are told to deny ourselves and to take up our crosses in order that we may follow Christ; and nearly every description of what we shall ultimately find if we do so contains an appeal to desire. **If there lurks in most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing, I submit that this notion has crept in from Kant and the Stoics and is no part of the Christian faith.**

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

According to Alexander Kojève's analysis of Kant's life-work, an analysis supported by strategically placed although exceedingly subtle passages found in Kant's writings, the Königsberg philosopher posited the extra-empirical objects (of practical reason) in order merely to bolster his own personal preferences and moral discipline, still only insufficiently disengaged from traditional religious belief. **Without free will, God, and an immortal soul, Kant would have felt that his moral sense of duty was groundless, and this feeling, in turn, would have led, according to Kojève, to 'self-contempt.' Kojève goes as far as to say that Kant was a 'hypocritical sceptic,' unable to choose between his theoretical conclusions and his self-imposed moral stance.**1

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/164/mode/2up?view=theater

Positive religion has no longer any meaning for enlightened mankind, Kant writes. **The church's faith was perhaps necessary earlier in order to bring all men to the moral view.**25 **Now, however, the philosopher's task is to make the church's faith superfluous:** through education men may be brought to live without a religious faith, while the philosopher makes new contributions toward the approaching pure religion of reason in which God will be all in everything.

Kant envisages then the gradual impact of practised free thought on people's sentiments so that they will experience an increase of their aptitudes to behave freely and change the foundations of government.26 There is here a whole conscious strategy to reach this goal, **although, as Karl Barth remarked, Kant's works are so demanding that most readers remain unaware of the "cold deliberateness" with which he pursued his "enthusiasm" for the new world.** The foundation stone of the strategy, as expressed in Kant's entire lifework, is the hope to place reason on such a firm basis that it may serve the main objective: the formulation of a natural religion as the organizing principle of the new community of men. Three stages may be distinguished in this strategy: **first, the removal from the religious purview of all those elements that hinder the universal union of all religions into one single church.** For this purpose Christianity must be stripped of superstitions, miracles, revelation, atonement, grace, and hierarchy.
…

Once the main roadblocks (faith and hierarchy) are eliminated, **there will be no obstacle left before the public use of individual reason. By this Kant understood the philosophers' books and the reading public studying these books with an emancipated mind.**27 We recognize the pattern suggested by the Renaissance magi and taken up, more elaborately, by Hegel a little later. Bruno's *capitano*, Campanella's Sun Priest, Andreae's metaphysician-God, **Hegel's all-comprehending sage,** and the *duces* and emperor-figures of Joachites and others are varities of the type to which Kant's savant can now be added.28
…

And there was also the Königsberg philosopher's fear of censorship, eventually of the loss of his chair. **True, he had vowed never to write and publish what he did not believe to be true, but he preferred to confide his innermost thoughts to his notes which were published in 1920 only. Therein we find a much more radical Kant, one for whom man's inner moral autonomy is justified by the God within him.** Two passages from the somewhat disjointed notes – Kant was obviously searching for the correct and definitive formulation of his thought – show that he too believed in an ontologically promoted man, a complete self-legislator. "**The proposition: There is a God, says nothing more than: There is in the human morally self-determining Reason a highest principle which determines itself, and finds itself compelled unremittingly to act in accordance with such a principle.** God can only be sought in us." And: "**God must be represented not as a substance outside me, but as the highest moral principle in me.** … The Idea of that which human reason itself makes out of the World-All is the active representation of God. Not as a special personality, substance outside me, but as a thought in me."29
…

In a letter written in 1793 to a Berlin editor, he refused to share his correspondent's abhorrence before the turn the Revolution was taking, reaffirming his faith in the kind of social theories Rousseau and Abbé de St. Pierre were proposing. The *ought to happen*, he argued, can be made to happen – if only governments are willing to act with this conviction in mind, "making things possible by this very action."30 **Thus the cautious Kant, always governed by reason, adopted the view that the virtuous and perfect republic cannot be realized through gradual reform but must be effected through a revolution in man's disposition.** He can become "a new man by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation." Granted, he writes in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, that the revolution in France accumulates miseries and horrors, the kind that a sensible man would not plan at any price; **but this is unimportant, the revolution finds in the minds of uninvolved spectators a *sympathy* (Kant's italics), a spiritual participation bordering on enthusiasm. This proves that the moral disposition of mankind inclines in this direction.**

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n29/mode/2up?view=theater

If there was a mercy for which Barruel was most grateful, it was the restoration of the Society of Jesus and his official readmission into it on October 18, 1815. The five years left for him he devoted to the continuation of his campaign to shed light on the thinking of the antagonists of the Church. He started writing a long book along the lines of his *Helviennes*. **In it he was to expose, on a grand scale, the deadly threat which the philosophy of Kant posed to genuine Catholicism.** This is not a mere conjecture. In the closing part of the *Memoirs* (see pp. 802-03), Barruel held Kant's rationalism to be of no less a threat to Christianity than the one posed by Weishaupt's illuminism. **For as Barruel rightly saw, the chief motivation of Kant the philosopher was the same as that of Weishaupt: to make the idea of Revelation appear utterly irrational and establish the total autonomy of human reason, thereby setting up man as his own sovereign and god.**

That book of Barruel on Kant would have become a prophetic work, though unbeknownst to him. **He could hardly suspect that a century or so later, many among his fellow Jesuits would take the view that Aquinas cannot be made meaningful to modern man unless Kant is grafted on him. Were Barruel alive today, he would perhaps write a huge "Memoirs Illustrating the History of Aquikantism."** He certainly would not be taken in by a Boutroux or a Blondel, nor even by such confreres of his as Maréchal, Coreth, or Rahner.

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/10/catastrophic-spider.html

> *Taken as a whole, the Kantian influence on modern Christianity is so deep and pervasive that I believe in makes sense to speak of three great periods of Christian theology, each associated with a dominant philosopher. (1) The first period is the Platonic or Neoplatonic Christianity of the early church fathers; (2) The second is the Aristotelian Christianity of medieval or Scholastic theology; (3) and the third is the Kantian Christianity of the modern age …*

> *As I see it, the validity of the new synthesis depends entirely on one issue: the ability to control Kant, to keep 'Kant-in-a-box,' as it were.* ***For pure Kantianism is incompatible with Christianity... [I]f a Kantian conception of autonomy prevails, then God has become the servant of modern humanism and the synthesis is invalid.***
>
> Robert P. Kraynak, *Christian Faith and Modern Democracy*

As I noted in my recent post on God and obligation, from an Aristotelian-Thomistic point of view, God only ever wills in accordance with reason and thus, given that reason is of its nature directed towards the good, only ever wills what is good. **But He does so, not in obedience to a law outside Himself, but rather in accordance with His own nature.** For He does not "have" rationality or goodness; rather, He *is* His infinite Intellect, He *is* perfect Goodness. To use the language central to Kant's ethics, you might say that He is "autonomous," that He is a "self-legislator" – that He follows no law save that which is dictated by His own rational nature.

But of course, Kant himself applies these concepts to *us*. *We* must in his view be "autonomous" if we are to be truly free – not lawless, to be sure, but not "heteronomous" either, not bound by a law external to us. Rather, we must be "self-legislators," bound only by a law that is somehow of our own making. Kant also famously describes us as "ends in ourselves," and holds that a truly moral community is one whose members strive to create a "kingdom of ends," an order in which all are treated as self-legislating ends in themselves.

These ideas have been enormously influential. They inform the egalitarian liberalism of John Rawls, the libertarianism of Robert Nozick, and even the conservatism of Roger Scruton. As Kraynak emphasizes, they have also permeated contemporary Catholic and Protestant thought. **Modern people of all political and religious persuasions have come to see "respect for persons," "human rights," "human dignity,""freedom," and the like – rather than, say, submission to the natural law or to the will of God – as the fundamental categories in terms of which to address moral and political issues. To this extent, "We are all Kantians now."**
…

Or as Someone once put it, "Not my will, but Thine, be done." If that is heteronomy, so much the worse for Kantian autonomy.
…

Nietzsche famously characterized Kant as a "catastrophic spider" because he took him to have insinuated an essentially Christian morality into the secular German philosophical tradition. The truth is that he insinuated an essentially un-Christian morality into the Christian tradition, and into Western civilization as a whole. Rather than appropriating this work, conservatives and Christians should strive to undo it. Kraynak is right, we need to keep Kant in a box. A pine box, with a stake through his heart.

---

https://www.academia.edu/13367123/Review_of_Runar_M._Thorsteinsson_Roman_Christianity_and_Roman_Stoicism_A_Comparative_Study_of_Ancient_Morality_Oxford_Oxford_University_Press_2010_2013_

Unlike most early Christians, Musonius 'is optimistic about human capacity to live virtuously' and 'believes that human beings are born with an inclination towards virtue, and that they are good by nature' (p. 44; see Stobaeus 2.38.1-3). This traditional Stoic belief contrasts so sharply with early Christian 'negative' views of human nature that one wonders it is not given lengthy treatment here.
…

Thorsteinsson challenges traditional views in Chapter 10 (the conclusion). He argues that whereas one usually considers Stoics haughty egotists and Christians social activists, it was Stoic teachings that stressed universal social ethics while Christian morality was introverted. **Traditional reading of the Christian letters mistakes pan-ecclesial language for universal. Universal humanitarianism is endemic to Stoicism and *not* Christianity. The latter retains a 'fundamental distinction between "us" and "them"'** (p. 209). Thorsteinsson's approach is thus original in method and conclusion.

https://helda.helsinki.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/079f2c0f-faac-4129-86a5-5402c4f27c89/content

In the beginning of *Discourses* 4.7, Epictetus speaks of children and lunatics who do not fear the tyrant, his guards, and their swords. Because of their lack of understanding, children and lunatics can be fearless before such threats (sections 1–5). From lunatics Epictetus proceeds to the Galileans, who are also fearless: **"Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind toward the things which have just been mentioned, and also habit, as with the Galileans, cannot reason and demonstration teach a man that God has made all things in the universe?"** (εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτως διατεθῆναι πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, *Discourses* 4.7.6; trans. W.A. Oldfather, LCL). **The reference to God as a creator is the beginning of an extensive argumentation that one can attain fearlessness through philosophical demonstration** (sections 6–11).

https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07/anf07.iii.iii.v.html

The Stoics and some others are supposed to have entertained much better sentiments respecting the divine nature, who say that there is kindness in God, but not anger. A very pleasing and popular speech, that God is not subject to such littleness of mind as to imagine that He is injured by any one, since it is impossible for Him to be injured; so that that serene and holy majesty is excited, disturbed, and maddened, which is the part of human frailty. For they say that anger is a commotion and perturbation of the mind, which is inconsistent with God. Since, when it falls upon the mind of any one, as a violent tempest it excites such waves that it changes the condition of the mind, the eyes gleam, the countenance trembles, the tongue stammers, the teeth chatter, the countenance is alternately stained now with redness spread over it, now with white paleness. But if anger is unbecoming to a man, provided he be of wisdom and authority, how much more is so foul a change unbecoming to God! And if man, when he has authority and power, inflicts widespread injury through anger, sheds blood, overthrows cities, destroys communities, reduces provinces to desolation, how much more is it to be believed that God, since He has power over the whole human race, and over the universe itself, would have been about to destroy all things if He were angry.

Therefore they think that so great and so pernicious an evil ought to be absent from Him. And if anger and excitement are absent from Him, because it is disfiguring and injurious, and He inflicts injury on no one, they think that nothing else remains, except that He is mild, calm, propitious, beneficent, the preserver. **For thus at length He may be called the common Father of all, and the best and greatest, which His divine and heavenly nature demands.** For if among men it appears praiseworthy to do good rather than to injure, to restore to life rather than to kill, to save rather than to destroy, and innocence is not undeservedly numbered among the virtues,—and he who does these things is loved, esteemed, honoured, and celebrated with all blessings and vows,—in short, on account of his deserts and benefits is judged to be most like to God; **how much more right is it that God Himself, who excels in divine and perfect virtues, and who is removed from all earthly taint, should conciliate the whole race of man by divine and heavenly benefits! Those things are spoken speciously and in a popular manner, and they allure many to believe them**; but they who entertain these sentiments approach nearer indeed to the truth, but they partly fail, not sufficiently considering the nature of the case. For if God is not angry with the impious and the unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and the righteous. Therefore the error of those is more consistent who take away at once both anger and kindness. For in opposite matters it is necessary to be moved to both sides or to neither.

> https://www.cslewisinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Reflections_2012_07-What-if-God-is-Alive-Not-the-Impersonal-Life-Forc-1630.pdf
>
> **An "impersonal God"—well and good. A subjective God of beauty, truth and goodness, inside our own heads—better still. A formless life-force surging through us, a vast power which we can tap—best of all.** But God Himself, alive, pulling at the other end of the cord, perhaps approaching at an infinite speed, the hunter, king, husband—that is quite another matter.

https://archive.org/details/nativistprophets0000cron/page/352/mode/2up?view=theater

There is no evidence that those who envisaged the afterlife as a release of the individual soul to the world of endless light combined it with belief in collective purification for life on a transfigured earth until we reach the third/ninth-century evidence. In principle it could have been in response to Islam that the Zoroastrians began to combine the two ideas. More probably, however, they had begun to do so under the Sasanians, in tandem with their sponsorship of bodily resurrection. **Christianity integrated elite and masses in the same moral community on a scale hitherto unknown in the ancient world. To be competitive the Zoroastrians now had to emphasise the communal nature of their own religion too: those who considered themselves righteous could not simply escape to their private world of bliss; all adherents of the good religion had to be assembled for collective purification and transformation.** Since the idea of individual ascent to

heaven was well entrenched in the tradition it could not simply be eradicated, so life in heaven (and hell) was accepted as a phase on the way to collective judgement – **or, if the combination already existed, this was the only view that was deemed acceptable now.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Fragment_of_a_letter_to_a_priest#cite_ref-18

Now it would perhaps have been well to say earlier from what class of men and by what method priests must be appointed; **but it is quite appropriate that my remarks should end with this. I say that the most upright men in every city, by preference those who show most love for the gods, and next those who show most love for their fellow men, must be appointed, whether they be poor or rich. And in this matter let there be no distinction whatever whether they are unknown or well known.** For the man who by reason of his gentleness has not won notice ought not to be barred by reason of his want of fame. **Even though he be poor and a man of the people, if he possess within himself these two things, love for God and love for his fellow men, let him be appointed priest.** And a proof of his love for God is his inducing his own people to show reverence to the gods; a proof of his love for his fellows is his sharing cheerfully, even from a small store, with those in need, and his giving willingly thereof, and trying to do good to as many men as he is able. We must pay especial attention to this point, and by this means effect a cure. **For when it came about that the poor were neglected and overlooked by the priests, then I think the impious Galilaeans observed this fact and devoted themselves to philanthropy.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Letters/Letter_22

In every city establish frequent hostels in order that strangers may profit by our benevolence; I do not mean for our own people only, but for others also who are in need of money. I have but now made a plan by which you may be well provided for this; for I have given directions that 30,000 modii of corn shall be assigned every year for the whole of Galatia, and 60,000 pints[4] of wine. I order that one-fifth of this be used for the poor who serve the priests, and the remainder be distributed by us to strangers and beggars. **For it is disgraceful that, when no Jew ever has to beg, and the impious Galilaeans support not only their own poor but ours as well, all men see that our people lack aid from us.**[5] Teach those of the Hellenic faith to contribute to public service of this sort, and the Hellenic villages to offer their first fruits to the gods; **and accustom those who love the Hellenic religion to these good works by teaching them that this was our practice of old.** At any rate Homer makes Eumaeus say: "Stranger, it is not lawful for me, not even though a baser man than you should come, to dishonour a stranger. For from Zeus come all strangers and beggars. And a gift, though small, is precious."[6]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA246#v=onepage&q&f=false

Secondly, **the new humanism has taken over universalism from its Christian roots; or else moves to retrieve it from Stoic sources,** as with an influential modern school of thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (often called “neo-Stoicism”).
…

For Aristotle, even distributive justice only makes sense within the framework of the common project of the polis. Only Stoicism offers an exception to this narrow focus of beneficence among the ancients. But even here, the Stoics, who really did conceive of solidarity as species-wide, in a sense held to the same framework; they simply extended it, seeing us as part of the great cosmopolis of all Gods and humans.

> https://sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr08.htm#an_fr_124_1
>
> In the realm of thought, on the whole, the Polis triumphed. Aristotle based his social theory on the Polis, not the nation. Dicaearchus, Didymus, and Posidonius followed him, and we still use his language. Rome herself was a Polis, as well as an Empire. **And Professor Haverfield has pointed out that a City has more chance of taking in the whole world to its freedoms and privileges than a Nation has of making men of alien birth its compatriots. A Jew of Tarsus could easily be granted the civic rights of Rome: he could never have been made an Italian or a Frenchman. The Stoic ideal of the World as 'one great City of Gods and Men' has not been surpassed by any ideal based on the Nation.**
>
> https://sacred-texts.com/cla/fsgr/fsgr06.htm#an_fr_73_1
>
> **The real religion of the fifth century was, as we have said, a devotion to the City itself.** It is expressed often in Aeschylus and Sophocles, again and again with more discord and more criticism in Euripides and Plato; for the indignant blasphemies of the Gorgias and the Troades bear the same message as the ideal patriotism of the Republic. **It is expressed best perhaps, and that without mention of the name of a single god, in the great Funeral Speech of Pericles.**

…

Once again, Montesquieu says it best:

> *Rien n'est plus près de la Providence divine que cette bienveillance générale et cette grande capacité d'aimer qui embrasse tous les hommes, et rien n'approche plus de l'instinct des bêtes que ces bornes que le coeur se donne lorsqu'il n'est touché que de son intérêt propre, ou de ce qui est autour de lui.*47
>
> (Nothing is closer to divine Providence than this general benevolence and this great capacity to love that encompasses all men; and nothing comes nearer to animal instinct than these limits that the heart gives itself when it is affected only by its own interest or by that which is around it.)

And so the new humanism needed, and found, inner sources of benevolence. And this in more than one way.

One was through **a strong sense of the powers of disengaged instrumental reason, whose dispassionate impersonality was taken as sufficient for universal beneficence. This is where modern humanism shows its roots in neo-Stoicism;** except, of course, that what has been lost is the idea of a providential course of things, designed by a beneficent God, which the wise person must learn to accept and endorse.
…

Bertrand Russell has given expression to this in our century. In "The Essence of Religion," he distinguishes two natures in human beings, one **"particular, finite, self-centred; the other universal, infinite, impartial."** The infinite part "shines impartially":

> Distant ages and remote regions of space are as real to it as what is present and near. **In thought, it rises above the life of the senses, seeking always what is general and open to all men.** In desire and will, it aims simply at the good, without regarding the good as mine or yours. In feeling, it gives love to all, not only to those who further the purposes of the self. Unlike the finite self, it is impartial; its impartiality leads to truth in thought, justice in action, and universal love in feeling.48

Another way of immanentizing moral power was through a sense of a pure, universal will, an inner power before which we stand in awe, as with Kant. **This is a close relation to the disengaged reason I have just described,** except that the source of benevolence is not the width of things surveyed. It is rather that the very power to act by universal law is an object of wonder and infinite respect.
…

After all, some of the earlier views also placed these sources in a sense within us; **the neo-Stoic idea, for instance, that reason was a spark of God within us. Doesn't a Kantian sense the same spark, and just give a different explanation for it?**

Now there is undoubtedly something to this idea. There are, for instance, clearly continuities between Kantian moral experience and that of the Stoics and neo-Stoics, on whom Kant drew heavily. But it is quite wrong to think that the difference is *just* a matter of background explanations; that there is something like a raw feel which Lipsius and Kant share, only differing in their attributions of underlying causal mechanisms; as two people might have the same sore throat while proposing different aetiologies of their malady.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anne_Robert_Jacques_Turgot

Anne Robert Jacques was educated for the Church, and at the Sorbonne, to which he was admitted in 1749 (being then styled
abbé de Brucourt). He delivered two remarkable Latin dissertations, *On the Benefits which the Christian Religion has conferred on Mankind*, and *On the Historical Progress of the Human Mind*.[6] **In 1750 he decided not to take holy orders, giving as his reason that "he could not bear to wear a mask all his life."**[7]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA478#v=onepage&q&f=false

By contrast moral behavior was clearly subject to improvement, **though what he meant by the moral implied a set of fixed criteria, ideals common to the wise philosophers of his age, generally accepted by Hume and Montesquieu, Beccaria, Lessing, and Kant. The moral was a combination of Stoic virtues and rules of general conduct with a measure of utility, the whole suffused with Christian love and charity.** Future moral progress signified the end of war, cruelty, and crime, and the extension of virtues throughout all strata of European society and among all the nations of the world. It entailed the general practice of tolerance and leniency and obedience to reason, **acceptance of law out of rational conviction rather than any dread of worldly punishment or**

superstitious fear of torments in Hell. If men acted solely on grounds of utility and reason, if they extended free inquiry and assimilated its scientific findings into the practical sphere of everyday action, then they were progressing. To the degree that man became mild, gentle, loving, tranquil, his moral behavior was improving.

Turgot never fell in with the rabid anticlericalism of some of his Encyclopedist friends, even after he had left the Church. He retained a profound respect for the moral virtues of Christianity, which he considered a further purification and not a corruption of natural religion. **Under the canopy of the medieval Church the bestial nature of the northern barbarians had been tamed and in time they had been transformed into polite, reasonable, well-behaved, compassionate members of society.**35 Christianity had abolished slavery, prohibited infanticide, established asylums for the sick and the weak, preached brotherhood and love. **The church had been one of the great civilizing and moralizing forces in the history of mankind.** His friend and loyal disciple Condorcet, alive to the bloody religious persecutions, inquisitions, massacres, and crusades, was unable to stomach this summation of the historical evidence.

https://biblehub.com/deuteronomy/31-20.htm

For when I shall have brought them into the land which I sware unto their fathers, that floweth with milk and honey; and they shall have eaten and filled themselves, and waxen fat; then will they turn unto other gods, and serve them, and provoke me, and break my covenant.

> https://www.the-highway.com/Another_Gospel.html
>
> **The gospel of Satan is not a system of revolutionary principles, nor yet a program of anarchy. It does not promote strife and war, but aims at peace and unity.** It seeks not to set the mother against her daughter nor the father against his son, but fosters the fraternal, spirit whereby the human race is regarded as one great “brotherhood”. It does not seek to drag down the natural man, but to improve and uplift him. It advocates education and cultivation and appeals to “the best that is within us”. **It aims to make this world such a congenial and comfortable habitat that Christ’s absence from it will not be felt and God will not be needed.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/332/mode/2up?view=theater

In his famous *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, that gnomic, inspired, not wholly translucent product of his last years, Lessing recognizes the history of Christianity as a stage in the development of mankind, an essential and temporary stage, like adolescence in the cycle of life.
…

The Old Testament is the primer of humanity, **containing one great truth, the unity of God,** and hints and anticipations of truths reserved for later years. Then Christ appeared, a better pedagogue, bringing the second dispensation, teaching immortality, original sin, and justification. But this, even at its purest, is not man’s goal. When mankind is ready and the time is ripe, a third dispensation will come forth, the third gospel predicted by medieval enthusiasts.
…

For all its concern with religious figures and religious experience, it foresees a time when men will act morally not from hope of reward or fear of retribution, not in obedience to higher commands, but from an inner freedom, as autonomous self-directed ethical beings. The *Erziehung* confirms the scanty reports of Lessing’s friends, who testified that he felt bound to no sect, no creed: it makes explicit what he had implied in his other theological writings: the heart of religion is ethics. **Christian mysteries are symbols and allegories, aids to understanding.** In 1777, when he had completed most of the *Erziehung*, he published his moving short dialogue *Das Testament Johannis*, which reiterates this lesson over and over again, like a litany: “Little children, love each other.” That is the beginning and the end. It is “enough if men hold on to Christian love; what happens to the Christian religion does not matter.”7 **It is here that Lessing, for all his stress on *Christian* love, openly joins the deists of the British and French Enlightenments; the love he calls for is universal, it is the love human beings feel for each other not as children of God, not as brothers in Christ, but as fellow men; a love implicit in Stoic cosmopolitanism, achieved only after man has liberated himself from all sects, including Christianity.** This is the gospel of fraternal love, born in religious emotion but emancipated from all sectarian loyalties, that Lessing preaches in his finest work, *Nathan der Weise*, the masterpiece in the didactic theatre of the Enlightenment.
…

It is in this dual humanism that Lessing’s radicalism resides: **it is a philosophical religion which uses tradition only to transcend it.** Its vocabulary retains the flavor of Christian expressions; it echoes the

apocalyptic vision of Joachim of Floris and takes Leibniz's speculations seriously. And yet all these traces are like haunting memories which recede before its daylight reality. **Lessing's God is immanent in the world: He realizes Himself as men realize themselves;** revelation is a grand metaphor with purely naturalistic significance: it is intuitive insight into supreme moral truths.

http://www.tischner.org.pl/Content/Images/tischner_7_salij.pdf

After all, in its first meaning "solidarity" pointed at a legal capability of every member of a group of people to accept all due benefits or to take responsibility for all its debt.1

> 1. "**Solidarity obligations (*in solidum*, *pro solido*) occurred when there were many subjects either on the side of debtors (passive solidarity) or on the side of creditors (active solidarity),** while there was only one service rendered. Fulfilling the service by one of the debtors freed others of the debt, similarly, accepting the service by one of the creditors meant that the liabilities of the others expired." *Prawo rzymskie. Słownik encyklopedyczny* [The Roman Law: Encyclopedic Dictionary], ed. Witold Wołodkiewicz, Warszawa 1986, p. 142, entry: SOLIDUM.

...

In France the adherents of de-christianization and of the secularization of morality chose solidarity as the successor to Christian love. Christian love, they argued, is a waste of moral energy as it is divided between God and one's neighbors. Moreover, they claimed that it is marked with egoism and bigotry. **Already Kant imputed self-interest to people that are prompted to do good by the hope for their eternal reward.** On the other hand, Comte, who perceived as mean-spirited loving others "as one's self" (in addition mediated by the love of God), **proposed to the people of the new epoch the attitude of altruism, which he defined as loving others "more than oneself," loving others for their own sake, not for God's.** Solidarity then would be love purified from the waste, bigotry and egoism allegedly typical of Christianity.

Such a program of overcoming Christian love was explicitly formulated by August Comte's disciple, Pierre Leroux (d. 1871):

> **I was the one who first borrowed the concept of solidarité from the legal usage so as to introduce it to philosophy, that is, according to my idea, to religion. I wanted to replace Christian caritas with human solidarietas ... Christianity is the greatest religion of the past, but there exists something greater than Christianity: humanity. ... Today's society is able to organize the love of one's neighbor with the help of the principle of mutual solidarity, as the love of one's neighbor is, in fact, egoism.** So at last from now on society has a religious principle. The Church may cease to exist. ... The age of humanity supersedes the age of Christianity. What is it that this new religion requires? Similarly to the Greek mathematician Archimedes, it requires nothing else but strength, leverage and a place to stand. We are the strength, the lever is the idea of progress. Give me an ontological certainty, and we shall have an unfailing place to stand. What is this certainty? It is the interdependence of all people.2

No wonder that this first usage of the word "solidarity" caused mistrust toward this concept in francophone Christian circles. **As late as the inter-war period, the most important contemporary French theological encyclopedia upheld, from the Christian perspective, the alleged opposition between solidarity and love.**3 However, this usage of the term "solidarity" disappeared, perhaps even in the French-speaking countries.

> 3. **"Social solidarity, as secularized and systematically in opposition toward Christian love, is not able to bring the good effectively neither to individuals nor to nations, for it does not take into account their true, eternal aim."** *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique*, vol. 2, Paris 1932, c. 2260, entry CHARITÉ; quoted after P. J. Cordes, ibid. **It is worth noting that such extreme supernaturalism would have never been promoted by Aquinas who unambiguously valued natural virtues (*virtutes acquisitae*),** although in the present state of the fall they do not reach the eternal aim and their ultimate objective is only the earthly common good. (Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, 1-2 q. 63

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.96264/page/n57/mode/2up?view=theater

It is remarkable, however, that while some of the early Fathers were the undoubted precursors of Beccaria, their teaching, unlike that of the philosophers in the eighteenth century, had little or no appreciable influence in mitigating the severity of the penal code. Indeed, the more carefully the Christian legislation of the Empire is examined, and the more fully it is compared with what had been done under the influence of Stoicism by the Pagan legislators, the more evident, I think, it will appear that the golden age of Roman law was not Christian, but Pagan. **Great works of codification were accomplished under the younger Theodosius, and under Justinian; but it was in the reign of Pagan emperors, and especially of Hadrian and Alexander Severus, that nearly all the most important**

measures were taken, redressing injustices, elevating oppressed classes, and making the doctrine of the natural equality and fraternity of mankind the basis of legal enactments. Receiving the heritage of these laws, the Christians, no doubt, added something; but a careful examination will show that it was surprisingly little. **In no respect is the greatness of the Stoic philosophers more conspicuous than in the contrast between the gigantic steps of legal reform made in a few years under their influence, and the almost insignificant steps taken when Christianity had obtained an ascendancy in the Empire, not to speak of the long period of decrepitude that followed.** In the way of mitigating the severity of punishments, Constantine made, it is true, three important laws prohibiting the custom of branding criminals upon the face, the condemnation of criminals as gladiators, **and the continuance of the once degrading but now sacred punishment of crucifixion, which had been very commonly employed; but these measures were more than counterbalanced by the extreme severity with which the Christian emperors punished infanticide, adultery, seduction, rape, and several other crimes, and the number of capital offences became considerably greater than before.**1 **The most prominent evidence, indeed, of ecclesiastical influence in the Theodosian code is that which must be most lamented.** It is the immense mass of legislation, intended on the one hand to elevate the clergy into a separate and sacred caste, and on the other to persecute in every form, and with every degree of violence, all who deviated from the fine line of Catholic orthodoxy.2

https://archive.org/details/romanlawinmoder01shergoog/page/n163/mode/2up?view=theater

Just what Roman law owes to Christianity has been long and greatly obscured by the religious feeling and prejudice of investigators. The ecclesiastical writers on the one hand would make us believe that all that is good in Roman law can almost always be predicated as derived from Christianity. But this is too sweeping an assertion and does not recognize the influence of Greek culture, philosophy, and ethics,636 which—long before the Empire became Christian—had already given to Roman law that vigor, strength, justice, and supreme excellence of spirit which made Roman law pre-eminently just.

The writers prejudiced against Christianity on the other hand belittle its influence and maintain that scarcely any good results came from it into Roman law,—an erroneous view, perhaps arising through a spirit of criticism deservedly passing judgment on the intolerance, scandals, and quarrels of Christian sects in the Latin Roman Empire.

The correct appreciation of the influence of Christianity lies between these two extreme points of view. It is Christianity as a system of highest ethical truths whose influence is shown in the Roman law. Christianity perfected, and at times transformed under the higher influence of Christian ideals of justice, the work of Greek philosophy in fashioning Roman law. **Greek culture had already laid the foundations and nearly all of the superstructure of Roman law as a universal law of rational ethics fitted for the whole world: *the work of Christianity was to perfect* the system of law erected upon such a solid foundation** by adding to the beauty of the superstructure, strengthening it by removing structural weaknesses, and enlarging or transforming Roman law in the spirit of Christian ethics so as to produce greater justice and benefit to mankind.

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/23*.html#ref46

This [attempt to ban divorce] was perhaps the only department in which the Church exercised an influence on the civil law. It did not aim at nor desire any change in the laws concerning slaves, for slavery was an institution which it accepted and approved.[47] In practice, of course, **it encouraged mitigation of the slave's lot, but there it was merely in accord with general public opinion. Enlightened pagans had been just as emphatic in their pleas for humanity to slaves as enlightened Christians,[48] and for the growing improvement in the conditions of slavery since the days of Cicero, the Stoics are perhaps more responsible than any other teachers.**

> 48. Take, for instance, the views expressed by the pagan Praetextatus in the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius Macrob. *Sat.* (I.11). **Dill observes (*Roman Society*, p136): "The contempt for slaves expressed by S. Jerome and Salvianus is not shared by the characters of Macrobius."**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=dsfIwajjGaQC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> 2. When the whole company had shuddered at this, Praetextatus smiled: ‘Evangelus, I actually want you to judge me a humbug unworthy of belief if the explanation I provide fails to persuade you on both topics. To start with slaves: **are you joking, or do you seriously believe that there is a category of human being for which the immortal gods deign neither to care nor to provide?** Or is it perhaps that you can’t stand the thought that slaves are to be reckoned human? Listen, then, and learn how outraged heaven was by a slave’s punishment.
> ...
>
> 6. ‘You can see how concerned the highest god was about a slave. **But tell me, how do you come by this hugely foolish disgust for slaves, as though they neither derive their**

existence and sustenance from the same elements as you nor draw the same breath of life from the same source?

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_14

When Rutilus delights in the sound of a cruel flogging, deeming it sweeter than any siren's song, and being himself a very Antiphates,[1] or a Polyphemus, to his trembling household, is he inculcating gentleness, and leniency to slight faults; **does he hold that the bodies and souls of slaves are made of the same stuff and elements as our own;** or is he inculcating cruelty, never happy until he has summoned a torturer, and he can brand some one with a hot iron for stealing a couple of towels?

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Alexander*/4.html#ref50

3 At a later time, however, when he had been hit by an arrow and was suffering great pain, he said: **"This, my friends, that flows here, is blood, and not**

'Ichor, such as flows from the veins of the blessed gods.'"[51]

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.093.than.html

"But, Assalayana, **the brahmans' brahman-women are plainly seen having their periods, becoming pregnant, giving birth, and nursing [their children]. And yet the brahmans, being born through the birth canal, say,** 'Brahmans are the superior caste; any other caste is inferior. Only brahmans are the fair caste; any other caste is dark. Only brahmans are pure, not non-brahmans. Only brahmans are the sons & offspring of Brahma: born of his mouth, born of Brahma, created by Brahma, heirs of Brahma.'"
…

"What do you think, Assalayana? **Have you heard that in Yana & Kamboja and other outlying countries there are only two castes—masters & slaves—and that having been a master one (can) become a slave, and that having been a slave one (can) become a master?**"

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Sikhism

Amar Das preached the doctrine of forgiveness and endurance, upheld Guru Nanak's abrogation of caste distinctions, and his precepts were implicitly followed by his successors. He used to place all his Sikhs and visitors in rows and cause them to eat together, not separately, as is the practice of the Hindus. He said: "**Let no one be proud of his caste,** for this pride of caste resulteth in many sins. He is a Brahman who knoweth Brahma (God). Every one prateth of four castes. **All are sprung from the seed of Brahm. The whole world is formed out of one clay, but the Potter hath fashioned it in various forms.**"

---

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoics drank at the same source: distinguishing the passive principle, inert, formless matter, and the active principle, reason or logos, which is inherent in matter, they concluded that the logos organizes all things in and through matter. The universe alone exists, said Zeno (as quoted by Cicero in *De Natura Deorum*), and it makes use of reason since the universe is the best thing that exists and it is better to use reason than not use it. The universe is, therefore, god, at work immanently in matter. **In this way, we discover the double origin of materialist atheism,** mentioned before: the Greek atomists formulated one version, which cannot account for beings possessing the plus of life, of psychic phenomena, and of thought; **the Greek Stoics formulated the other version which admits an immanent organizing principle, and turns, as a consequence, into a materialistic pantheism.**22

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false

The fundamental assertion underpinning all of Stoic physics is the claim that only bodies exist, a claim that dates back to Zeno himself. This may be seen as a direct challenge to the Platonic claim that the material world that we experience is merely a shadow of another realm where real existence lies. Indeed, it echoes a position attributed to one of the parties in the discussion of the nature of existence in Plato's dialogue the *Sophist* (on this see Brunschwig 1988).

In the *Sophist* Plato mounts a famous attack on materialism as an ontological position (245e-249d). **He refers to a battle between giants and gods over whether "being" pertains only to physical**

objects or whether it pertains to non-physical entities. The materialist giants insist that being is "the same as body." Anything that they cannot touch or squeeze in their hands, as they can with bodies, does not exist at all. Thus they must deny the existence of non-bodily entities such as soul, intelligence, justice and virtue. For Plato, these conclusions are not only unpalatable but also probably disingenuous, for no one seriously denies the reality of these things. This extreme position is tempered, Plato suggests, by more moderate materialists who claim that the soul does exist but that in order to exist it must be a special kind of body.

For Plato, it will be possible to catch out the materialists, of whatever sort they may be, if he can force them to admit the existence of something that is not a body (247c). Such an admission would destroy the materialist claim that being a body is the only true mark of existence. Notice that Plato explicitly assumes that for something to be something at all it must have "being" or existence (237d). Now, with regard to intelligence, justice and virtue, Plato's more moderate materialists find themselves embarrassed, and have to accept that perhaps these things can exist without being bodies. Plato then expands upon his conception of existence but characterizing it as a capacity to act or be acted upon, and suggests to the moderate materialists that perhaps this should be the true mark of existence rather than being a body. Yet Plato's materialists appear to have rejected this characterization (248a).

Now let us turn to the Stoics. **Zeno follows the giants in the *Sophist* by insisting that being or existence should be identified with body, despite the concession by Plato's moderate materialists. He reaffirms that only bodies exist. Rather than fall into the Platonic trap of being forced to admit that the soul or justice or virtue do not exist, however, he is prepared to claim that all these things exist and are indeed bodies.** He also accepts Plato's characterization of existence as the capacity to act or be acted upon, but reserves this solely for bodies, against Plato's intention. Finally, he calls into question Plato's assumption that for something to be something at all it must exist. For Zeno, there can be real things that are not bodies, and so do not exist according to his materialist ontology, but yet are nevertheless in some sense real, as we shal see shortly.

So, for the Stoics if anything exists or has the capacity to act or be acted upon then it is a body (see e.g. Cicero, *Acad*. 1.39). This will be as true for the soul, justice, virtue or wisdom as it will be for more tangible physical objects such as sticks and stones. **In this way, Zeno faces Plato's challenge to materialism head on, refuses to compromise as Plato's moderate materialists had, and reaffirms the uncompromising materialism of the giants.**

Despite this fairly uncompromising materialism, there are a few entities that cannot be conceived as bodies and yet that the Stoics would not want to say are nothing at all. One such example would be the sense or meaning of an utterance, the "sayables" that we encountered in the previous chapter. Another would be void, which is clearly not a body but yet is presumably something in some sense if it is to be an object of thought at all. In fact, the Stoics suggest four types of entity that fit into this category of being "something" (*ti*) yet not being bodies: void, time, place and "sayables" (*lekta*). **As they claim that only bodies exist, these other entities are in some sense real but cannot be said to exist. Instead, they are said to "subsist."**
…

So, only bodies exist, and these four incorporeals subsist. It is worth noting what this ontological scheme leaves out. **Significantly it leaves out universals in the form of Platonic Ideas. For the Stoics, such Ideas neither exist nor subsist.** As existence and subsistence appear to be the only two categories of "something," such entities are dismissed as "not-something" (Simplicius, *in Cat*. 105,9-11), and classed alongside hallucinations and phantoms of the imagination. However, it would perhaps be a mistake to think of "not-something" as another clearly defined category within the Stoic ontological scheme. Instead, being labeled "not-something" precisely means that the item in question has no place at all in Stoic ontology, failing to find a place under the Stoic supreme genus of "something."

The Stoics thus explicitly reject universals conceived as Platonic Ideas. Every entity that falls under their highest genus of "something" must be something particular: only individual particulars exist (Syrianus, *in Metaph*. 104,21). **Consequently they have often been presented as the first nominalists,** rejecting the existence of universal concepts altogether. But presumably they, like anyone else, would want to be able to give at least *some* sort of account of universal concepts such as the colour "red," an account of what it is that this particular red object and that one share in common.
…

For Chrysippus there are no universal entities, whether they be conceived as substantial Platonic Forms or in some other manner.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false

Everything that we have seen thus far would lead one to conclude that the Stoics are empiricists, claiming that all of our knowledge derives from experience. In Chapter 4 we shall see that the Stoics

also reject the existence of universals, adding further weight to this conclusion. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that the Stoics are broadly speaking empiricists and some have drawn parallels between Stoicism and ideas in Locke and Hume (see e.g. Hankinson 2003: 63). Beyond the general character of their epistemology that we have just considered, **probably the most important piece of evidence in support of the claim that the Stoics are empiricists is a passage from the doxographer Aetius: "When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon.** On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. The first method of inscription is through the senses" (4.11.1-2).

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D11
>
> **THE Stoics affirm that every man, as soon as he is born, has the principal and commanding part of his soul, which is in him like a sheet of writing-paper, to which he commits all his notions.** The first manner of his inscribing is by denoting those notions which flow from the senses. Suppose it be of a thing that is white; when the present sense of it is vanished, there is yet retained the remembrance; when many memorative notions of the same similitude do concur, then he is said to have an experience; for experience is nothing else but the abundance of notions that are of the same form met together. Some of these notions are naturally begotten according to the aforesaid manner, without the assistance of art; the others are produced by discipline, learning, and industry; these only are properly called notions, the others are prenotions. But reason, which gives us the denomination of rational, is completed by prenotions in the first seven years. The conception of the mind is the vision that the intelligence of a rational animal hath received; **when that vision falls upon the rational soul, then it is called the conception of the mind, for it hath derived its name from the mind (ἐννόημα from νοῦς). Therefore these visions are not to be found in any other animals; they are appropriated only to Gods and to us men.**

This clearly pre-empts Locke's famous characterization of the mind as a blank sheet of paper in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (2.1.2). Locke's intention was to argue against those who claimed that there exist in the mind innate ideas at the time of birth:

> It is an established opinion amongst some men that there are in the Understanding certain innate principles, some primary notions, *koinai ennoiai*, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the Soul receives in its very first being and brings into the world with it. (*Essay* 1.2.1, in Locke 1975: 48)

But here we face an apparent problem. The *koinai ennoiai* that Locke refers to here also have their origin in Stoicism. They are the Stoics' "common conceptions," these being generalizations held by everyone. **So, although the Stoics appear to pre-empt Locke in presenting the mind as a blank sheet of paper, they also appear to be the source of the position that Locke is explicitly attacking.** Indeed, Leibniz was well aware of this, as we can see in the Preface to his *New Essays on Human Understanding*, conceived as a reply to Locke:

> There is the question about **whether the soul in itself is completely empty like tablets upon which nothing has been written (*tabula rasa*), as Aristotle and the author of the *Essay* maintain,** and whether everything inscribed on it comes solely from the sense and from experience, or whether the soul contains from the beginning the source of several notions and doctrines. … The Stoics call these principles *prolepses*, that is, fundamental assumptions, or what is taken as agreed in advance. **Mathematicians call them common notions (*koinai ennoiai*).** (Leibniz 1989: 292)

How does Leibniz arrive at this image of the Stoics as innatists, given the evidence that we have already seen from Aetius?
…

Seneca briefly addressed this issue in a letter dealing with question of how we first acquire knowledge of goodness. **He says that Nature does not teach this to us directly; Nature does supply us with the *seeds* of knowledge of goodness, but not with that knowledge itself** (*Ep.* 120.4). If Nature does not furnish us with knowledge of goodness directly then this suggests that we do not have innate moral concepts (option (a)), despite Epictetus' claim. We might understand Seneca's reference to a *seed* as referring to an innate tendency or disposition, one that might lead us to develop knowledge of goodness after birth, via observation (option (b)). Alternatively we might understand this as a reference to a naturally arising unconscious preconception, a postnatal *product* of experience that forms the foundation of a fully developed conception of goodness (a version of option (c)). It is difficult to be sure which of these last two readings is best, given how brief the discussion is.

It has been suggested that despite the shared "blank sheet" imagery, the Stoic position is in an important sense innatist, and as such is quite different from that of Locke. **Although the Stoics may**

not be conceptual innatists, it has been suggested that they are "dispositional innatists," proposing the existence of innate appetites and aversions (Scott 1988: 146), option (b).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

Aristotle also believed in natural law. In the *Rhetoric* (1.1375a.25-b.8) he accepted the legitimacy of the "higher law" argument in court, whenever the law conflicted with justice. But Aristotle believed that humans used their reason to deduce natural law from experience. In Book I of the *Politics* he claimed regarding the human: **"Justice which is his salvation belongs to the polis: for justice, which is the determination of what is just, is an ordering of the political association." Virtue was not innate, but the product of training by the polis. Epicurus** (Diogenes Laertius, *History of Philosophy*, 10.122-135) **supported Aristotle's position. He claimed: "It is wise, however, to evaluate all these things by measuring one against other and discovering what is beneficial and what is harmful. For sometimes we consider good to be evil and also the opposite." Reason, not intuition, led humans to moral truth.**

But it was the Stoics who placed natural law theory at the center of their philosophy. Cleanthes, a third-century B.C. disciple of Zeno, the fourth-century B.C. founder of Stoicism, taught that virtue lay in "living agreeably to nature in the exercise of right reason." **In Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus," God's reason flowed through the universe, giving order to everything.** Humans were distinct from other species in possessing a reason of their own, though it was connected to the divine reason. Many were destined to spurn the divine gift and lead a senseless, wicked life. (In this view, humans appear at a disadvantage to the other species. They are made distinct not only by consciousness but also by their ability to err.) Cicero concurred. In *De legibus (*1.33) he defined law as "right reason applied to command and prohibition." He conceived of the universe as "one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members." **Natural law was not handed down by the gods, but was the glue which connected them to humans in the one great organism of the universe. Reason and matter were two parts of the same whole, the former acting upon the latter. The first-century Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca (*Epistles*, 65.2) defined God as "creative reason," both the "First Cause" and the universal glue.** Both Cicero and Seneca found evidence of God's existence in the alleged consensus concerning it. Seneca wrote: "In our eyes the fact that all men agree upon something is proof of its truth. For instance, we infer that the gods exist, for this reason, among others – that there is implanted in everyone an idea concerning deity, and there is no people so far beyond the reach of laws and customs that it does not believe at least in gods of some sort." Cicero added: **"On every matter the consensus of all peoples is to be regarded as the law of nature."** Similarly, Epictetus (*Discourses*, 1.22.1) believed that humans were born with common, consistent preconceptions. Two of these preconceptions were that righteousness is good, and that good is more profitable and worthy of choice than evil.1

The Stoics assumed a middle position between Plato and Aristotle concerning the mechanics of natural law. Although the Stoics portrayed natural law as embedded in human nature through a sort of intuition, they argued that it could be accessed only with the help of reason acting upon sensory information. Maryanne Cline Horowitz aptly summarized this aspect of Stoic philosophy: "They believed that the mind is born predisposed to certain ideas which are not yet consciously held. These ideas are evoked and developed through the stimulus of sense impressions and the development of reason." Cicero wrote regarding nature and man: "It is true that she gave him a mind capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted at birth and without instruction some small intimations of the greatest truths, and thus, as it were, laid the foundation for education and instilled into those faculties which the mind already had what may be called the germs of virtue. But of virtue itself she merely furnished the rudiments; nothing more. Therefore it is our task (and by when I say 'our' I mean that it is the task of art) to supplement those mere beginnings by searching out the further developments which were implicit in them, until what we seek is fully attained." Cicero used the two analogies of sparks and seeds to clarify his position. **At one point he stated that human souls were all sparks temporarily separated from the Great Flame (the World Soul), but that a spark might be extinguished by a bad upbringing.** At another he argued (*De legibus*, 26.4) that the seeds of virtue manifested themselves in the social nature of humans, in their "gregarious impulses." (The two analogies differed somewhat: nurturing a seed into a full-grown plant generally requires more conscious effort than keeping a flame lit.) Similarly, Seneca claimed (*Epistles*, 49.11): "At our birth, nature made us teachable, and gave us reason, not perfect, yet capable of being perfected." He added: "Every living being possessed of reason is inactive if not first stirred by some external impression; then the impulse comes, and finally assent confirms the impulse." Regarding virtue he wrote (120.4-8): "Nature could not teach us this directly; she has given us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself." He contended (110.46): "Even in the best of men, before you refine them by instruction, there is but the stuff of virtue, not virtue itself." **The Stoics believed that humans possessed the requisite experience to trigger innate impulses by about age seven. Only Epictetus seemed to favor the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas. He asked (*Discourses*, 2.11.3): "Who has come into being without an innate concept of what is good and evil, honorable and base, appropriate and inappropriate?"** Epictetus insisted (1.22.1; 4.1.41-43) that disagreements between humans did not concern general principles, but merely regarded their application to specific situations. **Everyone understood the idea of evil, but only through the aid of philosophy could humans learn that death was not evil.** Even so, this was an admission that only through the medium of reason could natural law be brought down to earth and play a meaningful role in human life.2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q&f=false

Here is part of Diogenes' version, in which he quotes from Chrysippus:

> **An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation,** because Nature from the outset endears it (*oikeiousēs*) to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work *On Ends*; his own words are, "The dearest thing (*prōton oikeion*) to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof." (DL 7.85)

According to the theory of *oikeiōsis* the basic desire or drive in all animals (including human beings) is for self-preservation. The one thing that is most important to us is our own existence and its continuation. Consequently our most primitive choices and actions are shaped byt what we think will enhance or damage our own physical constitution. We choose what we think will be good for us and we avoid what what we think will be bad for us. **This seemingly selfish (or at least self-centred) attitude is the basis for all of Stoic ethics. Although this may seem to be paradoxical it is arguably one of the strengths of the Stoic position, for it is an ethical theory that takes seriously the primitive behaviour of animals and human beings,** and does not try to pretend that selfish motivations are not at the heart of most people's actions.

On the basis of this instinct for self-preservation, individuals ascribe value. Thus what will enhance our constitution we term "good" and what will damage it we term "bad." **Unlike Platonism, which posits the existence of an absolute, transcendent concept of "the Good" to which all value ascriptions may be referred, Stoicism grounds value ascriptions in this naturalistic and physiological theory of *oikeiōsis*.**
…

If I am doing my best to be a rational being who is free and independent of others, then I will sometimes have to make choices that may *appear* not to further my own self-preservation. For instance, if a tyrant threatens to kill me if I do not agree to do certain things that I find objectionable or think to be wrong – If I am to preserve myself as a rational being – I should stand up to the tyrant even if this may mean the loss of my life (see e.g. Epictetus, *Diss.* 1.2). But why? How could getting myself killed possibly contribute to my self-preservation? Well, it may not contribute to my self-preservation in so far as I am merely a living animal, but giving in to the tyrant will equally destroy me as an independent rational being. I may remain biologically alive if I give in to the tyrant, but I will have lost something far more important, having reduced myself to a slave. Thus the Stoic doctrine of self-preservation will, in cases of rational beings – that is, philosophers working towards the ideal of the sage – sometimes lead to choices that may actually threaten an individual's physical existence. **But then as Socrates famously put it, it is not merely living, but living well that matters** (Plato, *Crito* 48b). This thought stood behind Socrates' decision to face his execution rather than take advantage of the opportunity to escape. It should be stressed, however, that such choices are not *against* our natural impulse for survival; they remain the product of a desire for self-preservation, simply operating with a different conception of the self, one above basic animal needs and everyday human preferences. **Cicero reports that as one develops one's understanding, one places greater priority on being consistent in what one does than on mere material benefits** (*Fin.* 3.21). In the case of Socrates, living by a consistent set of principles was far more important than merely living at whatever the price. As Epictetus put is, **"such a man is not to be saved by any shameful means; he is saved by dying, and not by running away"** (*Diss.* 4.1.165).

Paradoxically, then, it is the Stoic theory of self-preservation that forms the basis for their later infamous defence of suicide (see Rist 1969: ch. 13). Suicide may well be the end for an individual *qua* animal, but it may be the most appropriate act of the individual *qua* rational human being. **In some circumstances, suicide may be the only rational action.**

> https://www.lacan.com/zizhollywood.htm
>
> True freedom is not a freedom of choice made from a safe distance, like choosing between a strawberry cake or a chocolate cake; **true freedom overlaps with necessity, one makes a truly free choice when one's choice puts at stake one's very existence – one does it because one simply "cannot do it otherwise." When one's country is under a foreign occupation and one is called by a resistance leader to join the fight against the occupiers, the reason given is not "you are free to choose," but: "Can't you see that this is the only thing you can do if you want to retain your dignity?"** No wonder that all early modern egalitarian radicals, from Rousseau to Jacobins, admired Sparta and imagined the republican France as a new Sparta: there is an emancipatory core in the Spartan spirit of military discipline which survives even when we subtract all historical paraphernalia of Spartan class rule, ruthless exploitation of and terror over their slaves, etc.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is possible to give two quite different readings of Stoic physics. One reading would focus on the role of *pneuma* as a force that, in various degrees of tension, forms the material objects of Nature. The Stoics outline three principal conditions of *pneuma*, each reflecting a different level of "tension" (*tonos*). The first is "cohesion" (*hexis*), and this is the force that gives unity to a physical object; it is the force that holds together a stone, for instance. The second is "nature" (*phusis*), and this is the force by virtue of which something may be said to be alive. It is *pneuma* as *phusis* that constitutes the principle of life in biological organisms such as plants. The third is "soul" (*psuchē*), and this form of *pneuma* constitutes the principle of life in animals that have the powers of perception (impressions), movement (impulses)

and reproduction (see Philo, *Legum Allegoriacum* 2.22-3). The difference between these three types of natural entity is simply one of differing levels of tension in their *pneuma*. This has been characterized as a difference in organizational complexity. They stand on a continuum, the difference between them being one of degree rather than kind. One could thus imagine an evolutionary account of the development of life and higher forms of life purely in terms of increasing complexity within Nature. **It is thus possible to make Stoic physics sound quite modern and thoroughly naturalistic** (see e.g. Sambursky 1959). **And such a reading seems perfectly reasonable given that, as we have seen, the Stoics are uncompromising materialists.**

Alternatively one might read the Stoics as quite religious philosophers, as pantheists who conceive God as the providential ruling force in Nature, echoing the role played by the Demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus*. Such a reading has plenty of support in the ancient texts, such as the discussion of Stoic theology in Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods* and in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*. Here is an extract from Cleanthes' *Hymn* in order to give a flavour of this aspect of Stoicism:

> Zeus, giver of all, you of the dark clouds, of the blazing thunderbolt,
> save men from their baneful inexperience
> and disperse it, father, far from their souls; grant that they may achieve
> the wisdom with which you confidently guide all with justice
> so that we may requite you with honour for the honour you give us
> praising your works continually, as is fitting for mortals …
> (translated in IG II-21)

These sort of sentiments are seemingly a world away from the naturalistic account of Stoic physics. For us, there is a strong tendency to want to distinguish sharply between the philosophical or scientific on the one hand and the religious on the other.
…

Whereas the late ancient Church Fathers and early modern Christian readers of Stoicism were often keen to stress the *difference* between God and Nature in the light of Christian teaching (and so stress the distinction between the two principles), numerous ancient sources note that the Stoics were happy to *identify* God with Nature, even if that claim might sometimes be qualified to say that God is the active force *within* Nature. For the Stoics, the cosmos is a living being (DL 7.142). So our question is as much about whether the cosmos as a living being is conscious or not. **We should also bear in mind that some ancient critics took the Stoic identification of God with Nature to be a manoeuvre designed to enable them to continue to use the label "God" even though their naturalistic philosophy had no need of it. As Plotinus put it, "they bring in God for the sake of appearances, [a God] who has his being from matter in a certain state" (*Enneads* 6.1.27).**

> https://ccel.org/ccel/plotinus/enneads/enneads.vii.i.html
>
> 27. On other grounds also, it is indefensible not to have reserved the high place for the true first-principle of things but to have set up in its stead the formless, passive and lifeless, the irrational, dark and indeterminate, and to have made this the source of Being. **In this theory God is introduced merely for the sake of appearance: deriving existence from Matter he is a composite, a derivative, or, worse, a mere state of Matter.**

Similar criticisms were later raised against Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, for whenever one uses the word "God" one could simply replace it with "Nature" and so "God" no longer has any explanatory force. **Spinoza was attacked by his early readers as being an atheist who held on to the label "God" merely for the sake of appearances, just as Plotinus had criticized the Stoics for doing the same.**

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Stoics

It remained for Zeno to carry this to a much greater extent and to seek out or invent "natural principles" (λόγοι φυσικοί) and moral ideas in all the legends and in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod. In this sense he was the pattern if not the "father" of all such as allegorize and reconcile. Etymology was pressed into the service, and the wildest conjectures as to the meaning of names did duty as a basis for mythological explanations. The two favourite Stoic heroes were Hercules and Ulysses, and nearly every scene in their adventures was made to disclose some moral significance.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA181#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Given the fame of Stoic allegory in the Hellenistic period, it bears emphasis that this school has not shaped Philo's allegorical method because it ignored authorial intention.** Aiming to

> “accommodate fables” to their scientific notions, Stoics “converted [them] into physiological terms.” They extrapolated “scientific theory” even from “impious fables” because they assumed that their authors were unaware of the deeper meanings of their own texts. A key role in justifying such allegories is played by etymologies, which point beyond an author’s intention to a larger reservoir of unintended meanings. While Philo sometimes uses etymology as an additional justification for allegory, such instance have been overemphasized.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nicene_Fathers/Volume_IV/Minucius_Felix/The_Octavius_of_Minucius_Felix/Chapter_21

“Read the writings of the Stoics,[1] or the writings of wise men, you will acknowledge these facts with me. On account of the merits of their virtue or of some gift, Euhemerus asserts that they were esteemed gods; and he enumerates their birthdays, their countries, their places of sepulture, and throughout various provinces points out these circumstances of the Dictæan Jupiter, and of the Delphic Apollo, and of the Pharian Isis, and of the Eleusinian Ceres. **Prodicus speaks of men who were taken up among the gods, because they were helpful to the uses of men in their wanderings, by the discovery of new kinds of produce. Persæus philosophizes also to the same result;** and he adds thereto, that the fruits discovered, and the discoverers of those same fruits, were called by the same names; as the passage of the comic writer runs, that Venus freezes without Bacchus and Ceres.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n109/mode/2up?view=theater

Though the Stoics were religious to the point of superstition, yet they did not invoke the terrors of theology to enforce the lesson of virtue. **Plato does this even in the very work, the professed object of which is to prove the *intrinsic* superiority of justice to injustice. But Chrysippus protested against Plato's procedure on this point, declaring that the talk about punishment by the gods was mere ‘bugaboo.’**3

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-4#lf0062-04_head_038

15. Moreover, in his books against the same Plato, concerning Justice, [Chrysippus] immediately at the very beginning leaps into a discourse touching the Gods, and says, that Cephalus did not rightly avert men from injustice by the fear of the Gods, and that his doctrine is easily misrepresented, and that it affords to the contrary many arguments and probabilities **impugning the discourse concerning divine punishments, as nothing differing from the tales of Acco and Alphito (or Raw-Head and Bloody-Bones), with which women are wont to frighten little children from their unlucky pranks.**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D44

[44] But when he comes to pronounce the verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his witness—**that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. [id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius]**

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D102

[102] “What significance, then,” someone will say,[1] “do we attach to an oath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; **it is the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never angry, never hurtful.** This is the doctrine not only of those[2] who teach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes no trouble upon others, but also of those[3] who believe that God is ever working and ever directing His world.
…

But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. **For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) [quae nulla est] but the obligations of justice and good faith.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Juvenal_and_Persius/The_Satires_of_Juvenal/Satire_13
>
> "What? Is there to be no punishment for that perjured soul and his impious fraud?" Well, suppose him to have been hurried off in heavy chains, and slain (what more could anger ask?) at our good pleasure; yet your loss still remains, your deposit will not be saved; and the smallest drop of blood from that headless body will bring you hatred along with your consolation. **"O! but vengeance is good, sweeter than life itself." Yes; so say the ignorant,** whose passionate hearts you may see ablaze at the slightest cause, sometimes for no cause at all; any occasion, indeed, however small it be, suffices for their wrath. **But so will not Chrysippus[23] say, or the gentle Thales,[24] or the old man[25] who dwelt near sweet Hymettus, who would have given to his accuser no drop of the hemlock-draught which was administered to him in that cruel bondage.** Benign Philosophy, by degrees, strips from us most of our vices, and all our mistakes; it is she that first teaches us the right. **For vengeance is always the delight of a little, weak,**

> **and petty mind; of which you may straightway draw proof from this—that no one so rejoices in vengeance as a woman.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pericles*.html#ref65

> 2 And it seems to me that his otherwise puerile and pompous surname is rendered unobjectionable and becoming by this one circumstance, that it was so gracious a nature and a life so pure and undefiled in the exercise of sovereign power which were called Olympian, **inasmuch as we do firmly hold that the divine rulers and kings of the universe are capable only of good, and incapable of evil.** 3 In this we are not like the poets, who confuse us with their ignorant fancies, and are convicted of inconsistency by their own stories, **since they declare that the place where they say the gods dwell is a secure abode and tranquil, without experience of winds and clouds, but gleaming through all the unbroken time with the soft radiance of purest light,**—[66] implying that some such a manner of existence is most becoming to the blessed immortal; **and yet they represent the gods themselves as full of malice and hatred and wrath and other passions which ill become even men of any sense.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Strabo/1B1*.html#ref51

And what is new is pleasing, and so is what one did not know before; and it is just this that makes men eager to learn. But if you add thereto the marvellous and the portentous, you thereby increase the pleasure, and pleasure acts as a charm to incite to learning. At the beginning we must needs make use of such bait for children, but as the child advances in years we must guide him to the knowledge of facts, when once his intelligence has become strong and no longer needs to be coaxed. **Now every illiterate and uneducated man is, in a sense, a child, and, like a child, he is fond of stories; and for that matter, so is the half-educated man, for his reasoning faculty has not been fully developed, and, besides, the mental habits of his childhood persist in him. Now since the portentous is not only pleasing, but fear-inspiring as well, we can employ both kinds of myth for children, and for grown-up people too. In the case of children we employ the pleasing myths to spur them on, and the fear-inspiring myths to deter them;** for instance, Lamia[52] is a myth, and so are the Gorgon, and Ephialtes,[53] and Mormolyce.[54] Most of those who live in the cities are incited to emulation by the myths that are pleasing, when they hear the poets narrate mythical deeds of heroism, such as the Labours of Heracles or Theseus, or hear of honours bestowed by gods, or, indeed, when they see paintings or primitive images or works of sculpture which suggest any similar happy issue of fortune in mythology; but they are deterred from evil courses when, either through descriptions or through typical representations of objects unseen, they learn of divine punishments, terrors, and threats—or even when they merely believe that men have met with such experiences. **For in dealing with a crowd of women, at least, or with any promiscuous mob, a philosopher cannot influence them by reason or exhort them to reverence, piety and faith; nay, there is need of religious fear also, and this cannot be aroused without myths and marvels. For thunderbolt, aegis, trident, torches, snakes, thyrsus-lances,—arms of the gods—are myths, and so is the entire ancient theology. But the founders of states gave their sanction to these things as bugbears wherewith to scare the simple-minded.** Now since this is the nature of mythology, and since it has come to have its place in the social and civil scheme of life as well as in the history of actual facts, the ancients clung to their system of education for children and applied it up to the age of maturity; and by means of poetry they believed that they could satisfactorily discipline every period of life. **But now, after a long time, the writing of history and the present-day philosophy have come to the front. Philosophy, however, is for the few, whereas poetry is more useful to the people at large and can draw full houses**—and this is exceptionally true of the poetry of Homer. And the early historians and physicists were also writers of myths.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm

> **To see anything honest in such a man as Paul, whose home was at the centre of the Stoical enlightenment,** when he converts an hallucination into a *proof* of the resurrection of the Saviour, or even to believe his tale that he suffered from this hallucination himself—this would be a genuine *niaiserie* in a psychologist.

https://www.academia.edu/35754657/Only_natural_John_Toland_and_the_Jewish_question

Methodologically, Toland's concern in the *Origines* is not so much to put other historical sources on the same footing as Scripture (the kind of approach adopted in the *Hodegus*); instead, his treatment denies *any role whatsoever* for Scriptural account. **Ostensibly a commentary on Strabo's *Geographica*, the text in fact presents a wholly non-Biblical account of Moses, using Classical authors alone** – Diodorus of Sicily and Cicero (*De Divinatione* and *De Natura Deorum*), for example, as well as Strabo himself. Sacred history becomes subsumed by secular history.
…

As Toland's highly significant citation of Strabo has it,

> Moses taught that the Aegyptians were mistaken in representing the Divine Being by the images of beasts and cattle, as were also the Libyans; and that the Greeks were also wrong in modelling

> gods in human form; for, according to him, God is this one thing alone that encompasses us all and encompasses land and sea – the thing which we call heaven, or universe, or the nature of all that exists.57

Moses (or even "Moses Strabonicus", as Toland now styles him) was "in fact" a pantheist – which means, in more up-to-date terms, a Spinozist: "*Mosem enimvero fuisse Pantheistam, sive, ut cum recentioribus loquar, Spinosistam.*"58 **This Tolandian Moses teaches us that there is no divinity or divine presence (*Numen*) distinct from matter and the unified structure of the world; he shows that nature itself is the one and supreme Deity (*unicum esse & supremum Deum*);** and he shows that "creation" is the parts, "the creator" the whole. Moses, or "Moses Strabonicus", is taken to have instigated an essentially civil religion, built around the *Naturae lex*, or natural law, consisting only of moral commandments, and bereft of ritual, rite and sacrifice. Furthermore, **this Tolandian Moses never mentions the immortality of the soul (*animorum immortalitatis*) or any post-mortem rewards or punishments; and the term "Jehovah" that he employs simply means "what exists in itself [*quod per se existit*]", by necessity – much like the Greek *to hon*.**59 In effect, then, this is Moses *becoming-Spinoza*.

> http://www.attalus.org/translate/diodorus40.html
>
> 4 He made no representation or image of gods, because he considered that nothing of a human shape was applicable to God; **but that heaven, which surrounds the earth, was the only God, and that all things were in its power.**

---

https://archive.org/details/influenceofgreek00hatc/page/248/mode/2up?view=theater

The relation of the *Logos* to God, as distinguished from its functions, is expressed by several metaphors, all of which are important in view of later theology. They may be gathered into two classes, corresponding to the two great conceptions of the relation of the universe to God which were held respectively by **the two great sources of Philo's philosophy, the Stoics and the Platonists. The one class of metaphors belongs to the monistic, the other to the dualistic, conception of the universe. In the former, the *Logos* is evolved from God; in the other, created by Him.**1

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philo/#ScepPythPlat

Philo's many allusions to the theme of "assimilation to God" prove how conscious he was of the difference between Stoic immanence and Platonic transcendence. At the core of Stoic ethics lay the concept of *oikeiôsis*, which required both adaptation to Nature and absolute obedience to her guidance. The word *oikeiôsis* derives from *oikos*, meaning house. **The goal of a Stoic's life was to know every hidden recess of "Nature's house" and to dwell respectfully therein. On the contrary, for Middle Platonists who were readers and commentators of the *Theaetetus*, the goal was to depart from nature, a dwelling of sensations and injustice, in order to become as similar as possible to God.**

> http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-x/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_04101903_e-supremi.html
>
> While, on the other hand, and this according to the same apostle is the distinguishing mark of Antichrist, man has with infinite temerity put himself in the place of God, raising himself above all that is called God; in such wise that although he cannot utterly extinguish in himself all knowledge of God, he has contemned God's majesty and, **as it were, made of the universe a temple wherein he himself is to be adored. "He sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself as if he were God"** (II. *Thess*. ii., 2).
>
> http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/arts/lit/PDFs/ScrewtapeLetters_CSL.pdf
>
> If, on the other hand, the middle years prove prosperous, our position is even stronger. Prosperity knits a man to the World. **He feels that he is "finding his place in it", while really it is finding its place in him.** His increasing reputation, his widening circle of acquaintances, his sense of importance, the growing pressure of absorbing and agreeable work, **build up in him a sense of being really at home in earth which is just what we want.**

…

Similarly, Philo's focus on *logos* should never suggest that he feels a temptation toward Stoicism. Themes and language of immanence are for him only a means to better understand the world created by God. When he praises the philosophers who recommend "living according

to nature", he uses a famous Stoic formula, but immediately after explains that this means "to follow God" (*Migr.* 128). For a Stoic, the two formulae were strictly synonymous. In Philo's thought, the former is valid only if it is followed by a reference to God, who is transcendent by definition.
…

In *Opif.* 117, soul is compared to a puppet show, the seven puppets being manipulated by the *hègemonikon*, the central rational element. **This metaphor strongly reminds us of the Stoic comparison with the octopus, but is also very different from this image. The octopus is a living unity, while the puppet master is essentially different from his puppets. The Stoic metaphor of the octopus is a monist one, but the Philonian image, inspired from Plato (*Laws* 644d), is strongly dualistic.** The puppets are not even irrational beings as they are mere objects.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D4%3Achapter%3D4
>
> PLATO and Pythagoras, according to their former account distribute the soul into two parts, the rational and irrational. By a more accurate and strict account the soul is branched into three parts; they divide the unreasonable part into the concupiscible and the irascible. **The Stoics say the soul is constituted of eight parts;** five of which are the senses, hearing, seeing, tasting, touching, smelling, the sixth is the faculty of speaking, the seventh of generating, **the eighth of commanding; this is the principal of all, by which all the other are guided and ordered in their proper organs, as we see the arms of a polypus aptly disposed.**
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0166%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D644d
>
> Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose—for as to that we know nothing;

…

One major intellectual revolution in the passage from the Hellenistic period to Middle Platonism was a relative abandoning of the concept of *oikeiôsis* (natural kinship) which, originating with the Stoics, became a foundation of ethics not only in Stoicism but also in Epicureanism and the late Aristotelianism of Antiochus of Ascalon. The Hellenistic period was that of a naturalism that only the sceptic Academy undertook to fight it. The great change brought by Middle Platonism was the irruption of transcendence which seemed to have been forgotten for at least two centuries. And in the case of Philo, transcendence was not only philosophical, but also religious, mainly that of the God of the Bible. Philo sometimes uses the term *oikeiôsis*, but never in the Stoic meaning, always with semantic transformations. He could not accept the idea, central in the dogma of *oikeiôsis*, that children as well as animals are the image of nature. His own description of the world of childhood is a frightening one, a description Sigmund Freud would not have spurned. For him the main ethical purpose is to become closer and closer to God, and so to be in a spiritual kinship with Him. **At this point, Philonian *oikeiôsis* is not different from the Platonic *omoiôsis*.** It is not, as in Stoicism, an initial impulse, indicating the path of nature, but the result of a pious asceticism, getting rid of desire and passionate impulses.
…

In his allegorical interpretation of *Det.* 119-120, Philo contrasts bad and good passions, but he introduces hope and repentance, biblical virtues, among the latter. **It was not simply a terminological change, but the sign of a deep ontological change. In Stoic doctrine, only the present exists. To be a sage means to understand that the past and the future have no real existence, but are mainly spaces of projection for passions.**
…

In the treatise *De virtutibus*, *metanoia* (repentance) and *eugeneia* (nobility) have special importance. **The first concept, considered an unhappy passion by the Stoics,** is the equivalent of the Jewish concept of *teshuva.* In Philo, it expresses the strong connection between theological and moral reflection.
…

In Stoicism, virtue, or human perfection, is the natural end (*telos*) of the programming of mankind by Providence. In Philo, things are more complex because of Original Sin. **For the Stoics, there was no ontologisation of evil in a world which was entirely rational, and to become as perfect as God was not an absurd project.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philo/supplement1.html

Philo defines himself as a thinker of his time by drawing intensely upon the topic of becoming like God to the greatest extent possible, the famous formula of Plato's *Theaetetus* 176b. **This was the motto of the Middle Platonic period, a transcendental substitute for the Stoic theme of *oikeiôsis*, i.e. the adaptation to nature. This latter theme was based on the idea that the *alpha* and *omega* of ethics were located in nature, without any reference to an extra-natural transcendence.** Philo is one of the major protagonists of an intellectual and spiritual change that reintroduced the idea of transcendence into the philosophical tradition.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0172%3Atext%3DTheaet.%3Asection%3D176b
>
> *Socrates:* But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. **Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can;** [176b] **and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA194#v=onepage&q&f=false

> An anonymous, running commentary on the dialogue, the first of its kind extant from antiquity, has been dated by Harold Tarrant to the first century BCE. **The author opposes the prevailing Skeptic tendency of the Platonic school and shows that even Plato's most Skeptical dialogue, the *Theaetetus*, can be interpreted in dogmatic fashion.** The commentator criticizes those who "consider Plato as an Academic [i.e., a Skeptic], who expounds nothing by way of dogma." In response to this approach he offers a close reading of the *Theaetetus* and argues that Plato did not disawow knowledge as such, but only refrained from teaching it in a manner of dogmatic instruction, preferring instead a dialogical style.3 The digression, which orients the reader to search for secure knowledge in god, naturally assumes new significance.
>
> Another Alexandrian interpreter of the *Theaetetus* is known to us, namely, Eudorus, active in the first century BCE.5 This Platonist also highlights the digression and explores its precise meaning in the following way: "Plato describes this [the ideal of godlikeness] most clearly by adding 'as far as possible,' wisely referring only to what was possible, namely, [becoming like god] through virtue. **The creation and government of the world belong to god, while the organization of life and the management of one's existence belong to the wise man.**"6
> …
>
> Eudorus's keen interest in the topic of godlikeness is shared by the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus*. While the latter's explanations on the relevant lines are lost, **we still possess his statement that "godlikeness," rather than the Stoic ideal of *oikeiosis*, or familiarity with oneself, is the basis of justice. The commentator distinguishes between Plato's transcendental approach, which points to higher spiritual realms, and the Stoic demand that humans should derive the pattern of right action from their own nature.** This sharp distinction warns us that modern assumptions about a pervasive syncretism may be exaggerated in the Alexandrian context. **John Glucker criticizes scholars who attribute too much importance to Antiochus's brief visit to Alexandria, when he supposedly founded an influential school of Stoicizing Platonism.**7 The interpretations of Plato's *Theaetetus* suggest that Alexandrian intellectuals enthusiastically focused on transcendental ethics, self-consciously distancing themselves from the Stoic approach and its emphasis on the immanence of values.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA99#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Platonic philosopher Cotta rejects Stoic theology because of its emphasis on monotheism and divine immanence. In his view, the orderliness of the cosmos cannot be explained by reference to a single god who permeates the world like a breath. **While Philo in the *Allegorical Commentary* is sympathetic to Cotta's reservations, in the *Exposition* he adopts the Stoic approach, without, however, fully accepting its implied immanence.** He now stresses the importance of the creation for grasping the nature of the monotheistic God. **Whereas he earlier conceived of God as essentially beyond the creation, he now identifies God primarily as the demiurge.**
…

Philo's move from a distinctly transcendent approach, which marginalizes the creation, to a Stoic position, which emphasizes it, throws important light on subsequent intellectual developments. **Judaism and orthodox Christianity adopted a perspective close to Philo's views in the *Exposition*, while pagan authors in the Greek East and "Gnostics" assumed a transcendent perspective congenial to Philo's approach in the *Allegorical Commentary*.**
…

Subsequent pagan authors are no longer known to advocate a literal creation of the world. A distinctly Greek community emerges around the metaphorical readings of the *Timaeus*. Two figures throw important light on these developments in the Greek East: the philosopher and scholar Porphyry (late third century CE) and the emperor Julian the Apostate (fourth century CE) Both criticized Christianity and wrote treatises to revive the Greek heritage. Porphyry wrote the first extant running commentary on the *Timaeus* which has been characterized as "undoubtedly the most comprehensive and thorough of its kind." **He dismissed the literal interpretation of the text as "impious" because it assumes an imperfect demiurge, either unable or unwilling to shape a perfect world.** Porphyry's polemical tone suggests that he made these statements in contrast to Christian claims. Moreover, Julian refers to the *Timaeus* as "our account" of the creation, which he distinguishes from the biblical story embraced by the Christians. The *Timaeus* in its metaphorical sense has become the pagan counterpart ot the book of Genesis. **Not surprisingly, Sallustius, close friend of Julian and mastermind of his effort to restore the old cults in a world turned Christian, raised the notion of an eternal cosmos to the level of a pagan dogma.**28

https://www.ellopos.com/blog/4399/philo-on-the-migration-of-abraham/31/

(178) What then shall we say? **The Chaldeans appear beyond all other men to have devoted themselves to the study of astronomy and of genealogies; adapting things on earth to things sublime, and also adapting the things of heaven to those on earth, and like people who, availing themselves of the principles of music, exhibit a most perfect symphony as existing in the universe by the common union and sympathy of the parts for one another, which though separated as to place, are not disunited in regard of kindred.** (179) These men, then, imagined that this world which we behold was the only world in the existing universe, and was either God himself, or else that it contained within itself God, that is, the soul of the universe. **Then, having erected fate and necessity into gods, they filled human life with excessive impiety, teaching men that with the exception of those things which are apparent there is no other cause whatever of anything, but that it is the periodical revolutions of the sun, and moon, and other stars, which distribute good and evil to all existing beings.** (180) **Moses indeed appears to have in some degree subscribed to the doctrine of the common union and sympathy existing between the parts of the universe,** as he has said that the world was one and created (for as it is a created thing and also one, it is reasonable to suppose that the same elementary essences are laid at the foundations of all the particular effects which arise, as happens with respect to united bodies that they reciprocally contain each other); (181) **but he differs from them widely in their opinion of God, not intimating that either the world itself, or the soul of the world, is the original God, nor that the stars or their motions are the primary causes of the events which happen among men;** but he teaches that this universe is held together by invisible powers, which the Creator has spread from the extreme borders of the earth to heaven, making a beautiful provision to prevent what he has joined together from being dissolved; for the indissoluble chains which bind the universe are his powers. (182) On which account even though it may be said somewhere in the declaration of the law, **"God is in the heaven above, and in the earth beneath," let no one suppose that God is here spoken of according to his essence.** For the living God contains everything, and it is impiety to suppose that he is contained by any thing, but what is meant is, that his power according to which he made, and arranged, and established the universe, is both in heaven and earth.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As_above,_so_below
>
> Among historians of philosophy and science, the verse is often understood as a reference to the supposed effects of
> celestial mechanics upon terrestrial events. This would include the effects of the Sun upon the change of seasons, or those of the Moon upon the tides, but also more elaborate astrological effects.[4]
>
> According to another common interpretation,[5] the verse refers to the structural similarities (or 'correspondences') **between the macrocosm (from Greek *makros kosmos*, "the great world"; the universe as a whole, understood as a great living being) and the microcosm (from Greek *mikros kosmos*, "the small world"; the human being, understood as a miniature universe).**[6] This type of view is found in many philosophical systems world-wide,[7] the most relevant here being ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, where notable proponents included Anaximander (c. 610-c. 546 BCE),[8] Plato (c. 428 or 424-c. 348 BCE),[9] the Hippocratic authors (late fifth or early fourth century BCE and onwards),[10] and the Stoics (third century BCE and onwards).[11]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=nVBDDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PA227#v=onepage&q&f=false

Discussing Abraham's departure from Chaldea (Gen 11:31), he attributes to its inhabitants Stoic tenets, which the patriarch appropriately leaves behind. "These men," he complains, "assumed that this visible cosmos was the only thing in existence, either considering it to be a god or containing god in itself as the soul of the whole. Having divinized fate and necessity, they filled the life of man with much impiety, teaching that nothing except the phenomena exists as the cause of everything, and that the circuits of the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies portion out good things and their opposite to each of the existing thing." Philo has outlined here a central Stoic doctrine embraced by Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius, according to which the cosmos is

penetrated by the divine rather than subordinated to it. Rejecting this approach, Philo stresses that Moses "differs from [this] opinion about God and holds neither the cosmos nor the soul of the cosmos to be the primal God." The visible world is instead held together by the invisible bonds of God, who takes "forethought that what was well bound should not be loosened." **The notion of divine bonds providentially holding together the cosmos and thus negating the laws of nature, according to which every creation implies destruction, echoes Plato's *Timaeus*.**6 In this dialogue the demiurge keeps the created cosmos bound together and protects its from destruction. Philo relies on this Platonic image when opposing Stoic cosmology and insisting on God's transcendence.

Given Philo's strong objections to Stoic cosmology, it is not surprising that he dismisses the Stoics' proof of the demiurge from the observance of nature. **He personally appeals to his readers to stop looking at heaven and earth, turning inward instead to an exploration of their own nature. It is in their souls that they will perceive God, as if through a mirror.** Here, too, Philo uses Platonic terms and recommends divine frenzy as a state of higher perception. He is still far removed from the later stages of his career, when he praises the Stoic Panaetius for rejecting the idea of the world's conflagration, raises the creation to the level of a Jewish dogma, and uses it as the main proof of God, deducing divine providence from the observation of nature.7

Stoic Ethics Subverted

Most of Philo's engagements with Stoic philosophy belong in the category of subversion. He is clearly familiar with Stoic ethics and ostensibly approves of them, but then clearly refrains from using the ideas in a Stoic sense.
…

Philo uses the notion of *apatheia* in a highly idiosyncratic manner. Most conspicuously, he applies it in the context of a divided soul, assuming that the material part, or the *thumos*, is metaphorically cut out rather than subdued. **The Platonic idea of a divided soul is thus once more affirmed. The Stoics, by contrast, argued that freedom from the emotions can be achieved because all passions result from rational assent and are therefore completely under human control.** Cicero often mentions this ideal as a key aspect of Stoic ethics, focusing on its positive outcome, namely, peace of mind and a life according to nature.14 **While the Stoics appealed to individuals to take personal responsibility for their emotions and liberate themselves from material constraints, Philo impresses on his readers God's strict demands.** Whereas the Stoics warned of a departure from reason and nature, Philo identifies the "disobedient" part as an element rebelling against God. *Apatheia* becomes a goal in itself rather than a way to achieve personal tranquility. **In Philo's interpretation the person conforming to God's will enjoys freedom from the emotions, and *apatheia* is connected to the "waiting for salvation by God."** The discussion culminates in a prayer that the soul "having waited for God's salvation may attain happiness." Philo adds a biblical verse from the book of Exodus, where God is depicted as casting horse and rider into the sea. According to Philo's allegorical interpretation God throws away the four passions. Philo thus has translated Stoic ethics into Jewish theology with a Platonic flavor.15

Philo's subversive reading of Stoic notions of passion and *apatheia* implies significant criticism. **He is obviously unable to accept the idea of a unified soul that operates on rational grounds, sometimes judging things wrongly and thus producing passion.** He instead holds onto Platonic ethics and systematically assumes the division of the soul, with its characteristic tension between the different parts.
…

Upon arrival in Rome, however, Philo embraces the Stoic approach more wholeheartedly and develops an ethical theory oriented toward the immanent world. As we saw in chapter 8, he then speaks about passion as a "movement contrary to nature" and describes in thoroughly Stoic terms the intellectual process that goes into the experience of desire, namely, wrongly assuming something to be good that is actually indifferent. **In his mature and more Roman period Philo more rarely refers to the division of the soul,** avoiding such Platonic terminology even in the context of the creation of human beings in God's image, where he stresses that only humanity's good aspects can be ascribed to the deity. Regarding the passions, he thus moves from a superficially Stoic yet basically Platonic approach to a more Stoic position.17
…

Philo uses the term *oikeiosis* eleven times in the *Allegorical Commentary*, *kathekonta* sixteen times, and *katorthomata* seventeen times. He is obviously interested in engaging Stoic discourses and once explicitly refers to the distinction made "by philosophers" between righteous actions and the first appropriate acts. Such philosophers were undoubtedly Stoics, as Philo echoes their definition of these terms. **He associates the appropriate acts with the first stage of life, when a person automatically acts with a view to self-preservation, while righteous acts belong to the mature stage of life and are consciously chosen for their own sake.** Reason, he moreover stresses with the Stoics, is the source of right acts.20

Philo, however, does not fully embrace Stoic concepts. Unlike Chrysippus, **he never presents the primary stage of life as a positive starting point that reveals a person's true nature and provides a guideline for ethics. He equally ignores the classical Stoic position that "notions of justice and goodness come naturally."** Philo instead offers a highly idiosyncratic interpretation of the terms *katorthomata* and *kathekonta*. In his scheme they are diagonally opposed approaches, signifying secularism and religious devotion, respectively. Primary acts amount to inferior human opinions, while righteous acts are

“sacred and holy and purified notions.” God, Philo explains, nourishes the human soul with sacred ideas.21 **Stoic terms, which emphasize the individual human mind, have been translated into religious concepts, which deprecate human autonomy and celebrate divine beneficence.** Philo’s implied criticism of the primary acts corresponds to his outspoken rejection of Protagoras’s principle that “man is the measure of all things.”

…

The notion of *oikeiosis* undergoes a similar transformation. Under Philo’s pen it comes something like fellowship or even union with God. Taking as his starting point the biblical command to “love God and listen and cleave to him” (Deut. 30:20), he offers the following explanations: “His [Moses’s] way of calling them [the Israelites] to give honor to him [God], who is the worthy object of strong longing and love, is most expressive, showing the constant and continuous and unbroken nature of the harmony and union that comes through making God our own (*oikeiosis*).” Philo does not explain what exactly he means by “making God our own.” **It is clear, however, from the context that his idea fundamentally differs from the Stoic notion of a person’s affinity with his or her own nature as part of the universe.**

…

Philo uses additional theological and Platonic notions to develop his highly idiosyncratic understanding of the term *oikeiosis*. He once equates it with fellowship with God, as opposed to indulgence in sense perception. The righteous person, who is symbolized by Leah, Jacob’s hated wife, will distance himself or herself from everything created and material in order to make God his or her own. **Philo translates the Stoic concept, which relies on the immanence of virtue, into a strongly transcendent theology in Platonic style. Instead of implementing one’s own, natural constitution, one is asked to alienate oneself from the world and strive for the utterly Other.** Human insights come from divine impregnation rather than an observation of nature.

…

Philo is clearly aware of these Stoic discussions. He speaks of the mind distinguishing between “the good and the indifferent and the bad.” He moreover mentions that Jacob, who eliminates the passions, possesses self-mastery and “a sense of utter indifference to the things that are indifferent.” **Philo takes these categories for granted to the extent that he never explains them. He does not even discuss the most complicated of them, namely, indifferent things.** At the same time, however, he also does not mention nature or processes o self-evaluation, so central to the Stoic argument. This arouses questions about Philo’s intentions. While familiar with these Stoic notions, he evidently has no interest in their precise meaning and theoretical underpinnings. **Once he even uses the term “indifferent” as a synonym to counterfeit good and evil, thus collapsing Stoic categories.**25

…

In the case of ethics, too, Philo shows a more Stoic orientation in his later writings, **as can be seen in his detailed discussion of individual choice in the treatise *Every Good Man Is Free*.** He repeats here the distinction between good, bad and indifferent things but now supplies some explanations missing in his earlier works. The reader learns that good things derive from virtue and are consciously chosen. The righteous person, Philo adds, always acts thus, while not even contemplating bad acts. **Concerning indifferent things, “the mind as on a balance preserves equipoise, having been trained neither to yield to them, as if they have compelling power, not to feel annoyed by them, as if they are worthy of escape” (*Prob*. 61).** The righteous preserve their inner freedom, not being compelled to do anything contrary to virtue. In his later career Philo fully embraces the Stoic terms, which he briefly mentions in the *Allegorical Commentary* without yet exploring their full meaning. **It is clear that in his youth Philo had just begun to recognize Stoic ethics, making some gestures toward it within an otherwise Platonic and decidedly theological system.**

…

When Philo in the *Allegorical Commentary* discusses the ideal of living in agreement with nature, he also expresses views similar to those of Cleanthes. **Once he says that “the first men said the goal of happiness is to be able to live in accordance with nature.”**27 **These “first men” are undoubtedly Stoics, as they are uniquely known in antiquity for this definition of life’s goal.**

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/maimonidean-controversy

In the view of H.A. Wolfson, all of Western religious philosophy, whether in Hebrew, Latin, or Arabic "garb," is essentially the same regarding the problematical relationship between revelation and reason. In Wolfson's scheme, *Philo was the first "synthetic" philosopher, **and the greatest figure in the history of Western philosophy after Plato and Aristotle, because he attempted to synthesize biblical revelation (which did not know philosophy) and philosophy (which was pagan and did not know revelation), and all subsequent philosophy in the Middle Ages was "Philonic" in structure, until Spinoza destroyed that structure and made possible modern philosophy by freeing philosophy from revelation** (Wolfson, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (1947)).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_IV#7

7. "Nature," says my opponent, "gives me all this." **Do you not perceive when you say this that you merely speak of God under another name? for what is nature but God and divine reason, which pervades the universe and all its parts? [Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen deo? Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et divina ratio toti mundo partibusque eius inserta?]** You may address the author of our world by as many different titles as you please; you may rightly call him Jupiter, Best and Greatest, and the Thunderer, **or the Stayer, so called, not because, as the historians tell us, he stayed the flight of the Roman army in answer to the prayer of Romulus, but because all things continue in their stay through his goodness.** If you were to call this same personage Fate, you would not lie; for since fate is nothing more than a connected chain of causes, he is the first cause of all upon which all the rest depend. **You will also be right in applying to him any names that you please which express supernatural strength and power: he may have as many titles as he has attributes. [tot appellationes eius possunt esse, quot munera]**

8. Our school regards him as Father Liber, and Hercules, and Mercurius: he is Father Liber because he is the parent of all, who first discovered the power of seed, and our being led by pleasure to plant it; he is Hercules, because his might is unconquered, **and when it is wearied after completing its labours, will retire into fire; [in ignem recessura]** he is Mercurius, because in him is reasoning, and numbers, and system, and knowledge. **Whither-soever you turn yourself you will see him meeting you:** nothing is void of him, he himself fills his own work. Therefore, most ungrateful of mortals, it is in vain that you declare yourself indebted, not to God, but to nature, **because there can be no God without nature, nor any nature without God; they are both the same thing, differing only in their functions. [nec natura sine deo est nec deus sine natura, sed idem est utrumque, distat officio]** If you were to say that you owe to Annaeus or to Lucius what you received from Seneca, you would not change your creditor, but only his name, because he remains the same man whether you use his first, second, or third name. **So whether you speak of nature, fate, or fortune, these are all names of the same God, using his power in different ways.** So likewise justice, honesty, discretion, courage, frugality, are all the good qualities of one and the same mind; if you are pleased with any one of these, you are pleased with that mind.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_IV#18

Take away union, and you will rend asunder the association by which the human race preserves its existence; yet you will take it away if you succeed in proving that ingratitude is not to be avoided for itself, but because something is to be feared for it; for how many are there who can with safety be ungrateful? **In fine, I call every man ungrateful who is merely made grateful by fear. [Denique ingratum voco, quisquis metu gratus est.]**

19. **No sane man fears the gods; for it is madness to fear what is beneficial, and no man loves those whom he fears. [Deos nemo sanus timet; furor est enim metuere salutaria, nec quisquam amat, quos timet.] You, Epicurus, ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him out of the world.** There is no reason why you should fear this being, cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and that of another world, without the society either of animals, of men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor interested in us.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_VI#21

21. "I should be sure," replies he, "that the sun and the moon wished to do us good, if they were able to refuse to do so; **but they cannot help moving as they do.** In short, let them stop and discontinue their work." See now, in how many ways this argument may be refuted. One who cannot refuse to do a thing may nevertheless wish to do it; **indeed there is no greater proof of a fixed desire to do anything, than not to be able to alter one's determination. [immo maximum argumentum est firmae voluntatis ne mutari quidem posse]** A good man cannot leave undone what he does: for unless he does it he will not be a good man.
...

"Let the sun and moon cease to wish to benefit us," says our adversary. I answer, "Remember what has been said. **Who can be so crazy as to refuse the name of free-will [ut eam neget voluntatem esse] to that which has no danger of ceasing to act, and of adopting the opposite course, since, on the contrary, he whose will is fixed for ever, must be thought to wish more earnestly than any one else.** Surely if he, who may at any moment change his mind, can be said to wish, **we must not deny the existence of will in a being whose nature does not admit of change of mind.**

22. "Well," says he "let them stop, if it be possible." What you say is this:--Let all those heavenly bodies, placed as they are at vast distances from each other, and arranged to preserve the balance of the universe, leave their appointed posts: let sudden confusion arise, so that constellations may collide with constellations, that the established harmony of all things may be destroyed and the works of God be shaken into ruin; let the whole frame of the rapidly moving heavenly bodies abandon in mid career those movements which we were assured would endure for ages, and let those which now by their regular advance and retreat keep the world at a **moderate temperature, [aequo temperantia]** be instantly consumed by fire, so that instead of the infinite variety of the seasons all may be reduced **to one uniform condition; [eant in unum omnia]** let fire rage everywhere, followed by dull night, and let the bottomless abyss swallow up all the gods." Is it worth while to destroy all this merely in order to refute you? **Even though you do not wish it, they do you good, and they wheel in their courses for your sake, though their motion may be due to some earlier and more important cause.**

23. Besides this, **the gods act under no external constraint, but their own will is a law to them for all time. [quod non externa cogunt deos, sed sua illis in lege aeterna voluntas est] They have established an order which is not to be changed, and consequently it is impossible that they should appear to be likely to do anything against their will, since they wish to continue doing whatever they cannot cease from doing, and they never regret their original decision. [nec umquam primi consilii deos paenitet] No doubt it is impossible for them to stop short, or to desert to the other side, but it is so for no other reason than that their own force holds them to their purpose. It is from no weakness that they persevere; no, they have no mind to leave the best course, and by this it is fated that they should proceed.** When, at the time of the original creation, they arranged the entire universe, they paid attention to us as well as to the rest, and took thought about the human race; **and for this reason we cannot suppose that it is merely for their own pleasure that they move in their orbits [itaque non possunt videri sua tantum causa decurrere]** and display their work since we also are a part of that work. We are, therefore, under an obligation to the sun and moon and the rest of the heavenly host, because, although they may rise in order to bestow more important benefits than those which we receive from them, yet they do bestow these upon us as they pass on their way to greater things. Besides this, they assist us of set purpose, and, therefore, lay us under an obligation, because we do not in their case stumble by chance upon a benefit bestowed by one who knew not what he was doing, but they knew that we should receive from them the advantages which we do; so that, **though they may have some higher aim, though the result of their movements may be something of greater importance than the preservation of the human race, [servare mortalia] yet from the beginning thought has been directed to our comforts, and the scheme of the world has been arranged in a fashion which proves that our interests were neither their least nor last concern.** It is our duty to show filial love for our parents, although many of them had no thought of children when they married. Not so with the gods: they cannot but have known what they were doing when they furnished mankind with food and comforts. Those for whose advantage so much was created, could not have been created without design. **Nature conceived the idea of us before she formed us, [Cogitavit nos ante natura, quam fecit]** and, indeed, we are no such trifling piece of work as could have fallen from her hands unheeded. See how great privileges she has bestowed upon us, how far beyond the human race the empire of mankind extends; consider how widely she allows us to roam, not having restricted us to the land alone, but permitted us to traverse every part of herself; consider, too, the audacity of our intellect, the only one which knows of the gods or seeks for them, and how we can raise our mind high above the earth, and commune with those divine influences: you will perceive that man is not a hurriedly put together, or an unstudied piece of work. Among her noblest products nature has none of which she can boast more than man, and assuredly no other which can comprehend her boast. What madness is this, to call the gods in question for their bounty? If a man declares that he has received nothing when he is receiving all the while, and from those who will always be giving without ever receiving anything in return, how will he be grateful to those whose kindness cannot be returned without expense? **and how great a mistake is it not to be thankful to a giver, because he is good even to him who disowns him, or to use the fact of his bounty being poured upon us in an uninterrupted stream, as an argument to prove that he cannot help bestowing it. [necessario dantis]** Suppose that such men as these say, "I do not want it," "Let him keep it to himself," "Who asks him for it?" and so forth, with all the other speeches of insolent minds: still, he whose bounty reaches you, although you say that it does not, lays you under an obligation nevertheless; indeed, perhaps the greatest part of the benefit which he bestows is that he is ready to give even when you are complaining against him.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_Benefits/Book_VII#1

The cynic Demetrius, who in my opinion was a great man even if compared with the greatest philosophers, had an admirable saying about this, that one gained more by having a few wise precepts ready and in common use than by learning many without having them at hand. "The best wrestler," he would say, "is not he who has learned thoroughly all the tricks and twists of the art, which are seldom met with in actual wrestling, but he who has well and carefully trained himself in one or two of them, and watches keenly for an opportunity of practising them. **It does not matter how many of them he knows, if he knows enough to give him the victory; and so in this subject of**

ours there are many points of interest, but few of importance. You need not know what is the system of the ocean tides, why each seventh year leaves its mark upon the human body, why the more distant parts of a long portico do not keep their true proportion, but seem to approach one another until at last the spaces between the columns disappear, how it can be that twins are conceived separately, though they are born together, whether both result from one, or each from a separate act, why those whose birth was the same should have such different fates in life, and dwell at the greatest possible distance from one another, although they were born touching one another; **it will not do you much harm to pass over matters which we are not permitted to know, and which we should not profit by knowing. Truths so obscure may be neglected with impunity.**[1] **Nor can we complain that nature deals hardly with us, for there is nothing which is hard to discover except those things by which we gain nothing beyond the credit of having discovered them; whatever things tend to make us better or happier are either obvious or easily discovered.** Your mind can rise superior to the accidents of life, if it can raise itself above fears and not greedily covet boundless wealth, but has learned to seek for riches within itself; **if it has cast out the fear of men and gods, and has learned that it has not much to fear from man, and nothing to fear from God; [si deorum hominumque formidinem eiecit et scit non multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil]** if by scorning all those things which make life miserable while they adorn it, the mind can soar to such a height as to see clearly that death cannot be the beginning of any trouble, though it is the end of many; if it can dedicate itself to righteousness and think any path easy which leads to it; **if, being a gregarious creature, and born for the common good, it regards the world as the universal home, [si sociale animal et in commune genitus mundum ut unam omnium domum spectat]** if it keeps its conscience clear towards God and lives always as though in public, fearing itself more than other men, then it avoids all storms, it stands on firm ground in fair daylight, and has brought to perfection its knowledge of all that is useful and essential. All that remains serves merely to amuse our leisure; yet, when once anchored in safety, the mind may consider these matters also, though it can derive no strength, but only culture from their discussion."
...

Let him say to himself, "Pleasure is uncertain, short, apt to pall upon us, and the more eagerly we indulge in it, the sooner we bring on a reaction of feeling against it; we must necessarily afterwards blush for it, or be sorry for it, **there is nothing grand about it, nothing worthy of man's nature, little lower as it is than that of the gods;** pleasure is a low act, brought about by the agency of our inferior and baser members, and shameful in its result. True pleasure, worthy of a human being and of a man, is, not to stuff or swell his body with food and drink, nor to excite lusts which are least hurtful when they are most quiet, **but to be free from all forms of mental disturbance, both those which arise from men's ambitious struggles with one another, and those which come from on high and are more difficult to deal with, which flow from our taking the traditional view of the gods, and estimating them by the analogy of our own vices.**" **[et ea, quae intolerabilis ex alto venit, ubi de dis famae creditum est vitiisque illos nostris aestimavimus]**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_9

16. People may say: "But what sort of existence will the wise man have, if he be left friendless when thrown into prison, or when stranded in some foreign nation, or when delayed on a long voyage, or when cast upon a lonely shore?" **His life will be like that of Jupiter, who, amid the dissolution of the world, when the gods are confounded together and Nature rests for a space from her work, can retire into himself and give himself over to his own thoughts.**[10] **In some such way as this the sage will act; he will retreat into himself, and live with himself.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_47

You should therefore not be deterred by these finicky persons from showing yourself to your slaves as an affable person and not proudly superior to them; they ought to **respect [colant]** you rather than fear you. 18. Some may maintain that I am now offering the liberty-cap to slaves in general and toppling down lords from their high estate, because I bid slaves respect their masters instead of fearing them. They say: "This is what he plainly means: slaves are to pay respect as if they were clients or early-morning callers!" **Anyone who holds this opinion forgets that what is enough for a god cannot be too little for a master. Respect means love, [Qui colitur, et amatur] and love and fear cannot be mingled.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_48

For that is exactly what philosophy promises to me, that I shall be made equal to God. [ut parem deo faciat] For this I have been summoned, for this purpose have I come. Philosophy, keep your promise!

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_73

12. Yes, that is what I mean, Lucilius; **and I invite you to heaven by a short cut. [et te in caelum compendiario voco] Sextius used to say that Jupiter had no more power than the good man. [plus non posse quam bonum virum]** Of course, Jupiter has more gifts which he can offer to mankind; but when you are choosing between two good men, the richer is not necessarily the better, any more than, in the case of two pilots of equal skill in managing the tiller, you would call him the better whose ship is larger and more imposing. 13. **In what respect is Jupiter superior to our good man?** His goodness lasts longer; but the wise man does not set a lower value upon himself, just because his virtues are limited by a briefer span. Or take two wise men; he who has died at a greater age is not happier than he whose virtue has been limited to fewer years: **similarly, a god has no advantage over a wise man in point of happiness,[8] [sic deus non vincit sapientem felicitate]** even though he has such an advantage in point of years. That virtue is not greater which lasts longer. 14. Jupiter possesses all things, but he has surely given over the possession of them to others; the only use of them which belongs to him is this: he is the cause of their use to all men. **The wise man surveys and scorns all the possessions of others as calmly as does Jupiter, and regards himself with the greater esteem [se magis suspicit] because, while Jupiter cannot make use of them, he, the wise man, does not wish to do so.**
...

16. Do you marvel that man goes to the gods? God comes to men; nay, he comes nearer, – he comes into men.[10] No mind that has not God, is good. Divine seeds are scattered throughout our mortal bodies; **if a good husbandman receives them, they spring up in the likeness of their source and of a parity with those from which they came. [quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria iis ex quibus orta sunt surgunt]** If, however, the husbandman be bad, like a barren or marshy soil, he kills the seeds, and causes tares to grow up instead of wheat. Farewell.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_95

47. Precepts are commonly given as to how the gods should be worshipped. **But let us forbid lamps to be lighted on the Sabbath, since the gods do not need light, neither do men take pleasure in soot.** Let us forbid men to offer morning salutation and to throng the doors of temples; mortal ambitions are attracted by such ceremonies, but God is worshipped by those who truly know Him. Let us forbid bringing towels and flesh-scrapers to Jupiter, and proffering mirrors to Juno;[24] **for God seeks no servants. Of course not; he himself does service to mankind, everywhere and to all he is at hand to help.** 48. **Although a man hear what limit he should observe in sacrifice, and how far he should recoil from burdensome superstitions, he will never make sufficient progress until he has conceived a right idea of God, –** regarding Him as one who possesses all things, and allots all things, and bestows them without price. 49. And what reason have the gods for doing deeds of kindness? It is their nature. One who thinks that they are unwilling to do harm, is wrong; they *cannot* do harm. **They cannot receive or inflict injury; for doing harm is in the same category as suffering harm. The universal nature, all-glorious and all-beautiful, has rendered incapable of inflicting ill those whom it has removed from the danger of ill.**

50. The first way to worship the gods is to believe in the gods; the next to acknowledge their majesty, to acknowledge their goodness without which there is no majesty. Also, to know that they are supreme commanders in the universe, controlling all things by their power **and acting as guardians of the human race, even though they are sometimes unmindful of the individual.** They neither give nor have evil but they do chasten and restrain certain persons and impose penalties, and sometimes punish by bestowing that which seems good outwardly. **Would you win over the gods? Then be a good man. Whoever imitates them, is worshipping them sufficiently.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_123

"No man is good by chance. Virtue is something which must be learned. Pleasure is low, petty, to be deemed worthless, shared even by dumb animals – the tiniest and meanest of whom fly towards pleasure. Glory is an empty and fleeting thing, lighter than air. Poverty is an evil to no man unless he kick against the goads.[5] Death is not an evil; why need you ask? **Death alone is the equal privilege of mankind. Superstition is the misguided idea of a lunatic; it fears those whom it ought to love; it is an outrage upon those whom it worships. [Superstitio error insanus est: amandos timet, quos colit uiolat.] For what difference is there between denying the gods and dishonouring them?**"

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n333/mode/2up?view=theater

Therefore Seneca has little use for metaphysics or theology. One may prove out of his writings that he was a monotheist, a polytheist, a pantheist, a materialist, a Platonist, a monist, a dualist. Sometimes God is to him a personal Providence who watches over all, “loves good men,”[33] answers their prayers, and helps them by divine grace;[34] in other passages God is the First Cause in an unbroken chain of causes and effects, and the ultimate force is Fate, “an irrevocable cause which carries along human and divine

affairs equally ... leading the willing and dragging the unwilling along."[36] A like indecision obscures his conception of the soul: it is a finely material breath animating the body; but it is also "a god dwelling as a guest" in the human frame.[37] He speaks hopefully of a life beyond death, where knowledge and virtue will be perfected;[38] and again he calls immortality "a beautiful dream."[39] **In truth Seneca has never thought these matters out to a consistent (or public) conclusion; he talks of them with the cautious inconsistency of a politician who agrees with everybody. He has followed too successfully his father's oratorical lessons, and expresses every point of view with irresistible eloquence.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_VI/Chapter_10

That liberty, in truth, which this man wanted, so that he did not dare to censure that theology of the city, which is very similar to the theatrical, so openly as he did the theatrical itself, was, though not fully, yet in part possessed by Annæus Seneca, whom we have some evidence to show to have flourished in the times of our apostles. **It was in part possessed by him, I say, for he possessed it in writing, but not in living.** For in that book which he wrote against superstition,[1] he more copiously and vehemently censured that civil and urban theology than Varro the theatrical and fabulous. For, when speaking concerning images, he says, "They dedicate images of the sacred and inviolable immortals in most worthless and motionless matter. They give them the appearance of man, beasts, and fishes, and some make them of mixed sex, and heterogeneous bodies. They call them deities, when they are such that if they should get breath and should suddenly meet them, they would be held to be monsters." Then, a while afterwards, when extolling the natural theology, he had expounded the sentiments of certain philosophers, he opposes to himself a question, and says, "Here some one says, Shall I believe that the heavens and the earth are gods, and that some are above the moon and some below it? **Shall I bring forward either Plato or the peripatetic Strato, one of whom made God to be without a body, the other without a mind?"** In answer to which he says, "And, really, what truer do the dreams of Titus Tatius, or Romulus, or Tullus Hostilius appear to thee? Tatius declared the divinity of the goddess Cloacina; Romulus that of Picus and Tiberinus; Tullus Hostilius that of Pavor and Pallor, the most disagreeable affections of men, the one of which is the agitation of the mind under fright, the other that of the body, not a disease, indeed, but a change of color." Wilt thou rather believe that these are deities, and receive them into heaven? But with what freedom he has written concerning the rites themselves, cruel and shameful! "One," he says, "castrates himself, another cuts his arms. **Where will they find room for the fear of these gods when angry, who use such means of gaining their favor when propitious? But gods who wish to be worshipped in this fashion should be worshipped in none.**
...

This liberty Varro did not enjoy. It was only the poetical theology he seemed to censure. The civil, which this man cuts to pieces, he was not bold enough to impugn. But if we attend to the truth, the temples where these things are performed are far worse than the theatres where they are represented. Whence, with respect to these sacred rites of the civil theology, Seneca preferred, as the best course to be followed by a wise man, to feign respect for them in act, but to have no real regard for them at heart. **"All which things," he says, "a wise man will observe as being commanded by the laws, but not as being pleasing to the gods."** And a little after he says, "And what of this, that we unite the gods in marriage, and that not even naturally, for we join brothers and sisters? We marry Bellona to Mars, Venus to Vulcan, Salacia to Neptune. Some of them we leave unmarried, as though there were no match for them, which is surely needless, especially when there are certain unmarried goddesses, as Populonia, or Fulgora, or the goddess Rumina, for whom I am not astonished that suitors have been awanting. **All this ignoble crowd of gods, which the superstition of ages has amassed, we ought," he says, "to adore in such a way as to remember all the while that its worship belongs rather to custom than to reality."** Wherefore, neither those laws nor customs instituted in the civil theology that which was pleasing to the gods, or which pertained to reality. But this man, whom philosophy had made, as it were, free, nevertheless, because he was an illustrious senator of the Roman people, **worshipped what he censured, did what he condemned, adored what he reproached,** because, forsooth, philosophy had taught him something great,—namely, not to be superstitious in the world, but, on account of the laws of cities and the customs of men, **to be an actor, not on the stage, but in the temples,**—conduct the more to be condemned, that those things which he was deceitfully acting he so acted that the people thought he was acting sincerely. But a stage-actor would rather delight people by acting plays than take them in by false pretences.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA118#v=onepage&q&f=false

Seneca's *spuria* merit independent discussion. The *Epistulae Pauli et Senecae* were a set of fourteen letters supposedly exchanged between Seneca and St Paul, in which Seneca expresses support for Christian thought and sympathy for victims of Nero's persecution. They probably date to the fourth century, and were the backbone of medieval attempts to reframe Seneca as a Christian martyr (Ker 2009). *De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus* is the *Formula vitae honestae* of St Martin of Braga (d. 579), still considered valuable today because it is probably based on a real lost work of Seneca (Ott 1910: vol. 9). It was usually accompanied by *De moribus*, a collection of 145 maxims, sometimes falsely attributed to Martin of Braga, but probably the work of an unknown Christian author before 657. Another maxim collection called *Proverbia* (or *Sententiae*) consists of the maxims of Publilius Syrus – a first-century BC Latin author and mime, originally a slave from Syria – which had been mixed with pieces of the *De moribus*. **The authenticity of these four texts was challenged by Erasmus in 1515, who excluded them from his new *Opera Omnia*, but that by no means ended their popularity.**

…

Petrarch was ahead of his peers by recognizing that the *De quattuor virtutibus* was not genuine Seneca (Kraye 2001: 22), **but his 1348 letter to Seneca (*Familiares* [*Fam.*] XXIV.5) demonstrates perfectly how spurious and peripheral sources transformed Renaissance reading. Petrarch hails Seneca as an "incomparable teacher of moral philosophy" citing Plutarch who, he says, in comparing Greek and Latin excellence in different arenas,** comparing Virgil to Homer, Cicero to Demosthenes, Caesar to Alexander, **admits that the Greeks are wholly inferior in moral philosophy having no one to match Seneca.** This is spurious already, since no such passage exists in Plutarch, and Petrarch did not have Plutarch, only the medieval fabrication *Institutio Traiani* (Petrarch 1910: 55-6). Most of Petrarch's letter treats his distress at Seneca's dangerous choice to remain so close to Nero. **He criticizes Seneca for inviting disaster by writing *Octavia* criticizing Nero while remaining in his power, and for serving and flattering someone he thought so wicked.** Petrarch acknowledged that the attribution of *Octavia* to Seneca may be wrong, but his characterization of Seneca's opinion of Nero is clearly based on the *Octavia* throughout the letter. Seeking some higher motive for Seneca's choice to remain at Nero's side, Petrarch suggests that he might have been thought it was important to persecute the strange and dangerous new Christian cult: but he rejects that, citing the Pauline letters. Petrarch laments that Seneca did not pursue his friendship with Paul far enough to become a martyr himself, and dates the letter in the 1348th year from the birth of "Him Whom I do not know whether you knew or not."

Petrarch's use of sources is particularly telling. Suetonius and the *Octavia* are the dominant voices by far (Petrarch 1910: 55-68). Petrarch draws once each upon the *Tristia*, Martial and Dante, on some of his own works, and adds the spurious Plutarch and Pauline letters, though he likely also had in mind references to the Seneca-Paul correspondence in Jerome (*De viris illustribus* 12) and Augustine (*Ep.* 153.14; cf. Petrarch 1910: 66 n. 68). Seneca's own voice appears only in two allusions to the *De clementia* and two extracts from the letters, both chosen for references to other figures, Cicero (Seneca, *Ep.* 40; Petrarch 1910: 55 n. 1) and Cleanthes (Seneca, *Ep.* 107; Petrarch 1910: 57 n. 7). **There is practically no Seneca in this letter to Seneca, but there is firm confirmation that Seneca merits the title "prince of moral philosophers."** Petrarch's impassioned exploration made the question of why the greatest authority on virtue would serve at the right hand of a tyrant central for the reading of thousands of later students who would approach Seneca – or what they thought was Seneca – because Petrarch told them to. **Even after the *Octavia* left Seneca's corpus, Petrarch's letter remained.**
…

Only Cicero and Virgil rivaled Seneca in primacy on early humanist reading lists, and so unique was his status as a moral philosopher by the end of the 1300s that the University of Piacenza had a professor of philosophy and a separate Professor of Seneca (Seneca 1910: ci). **And in the first decades of Seneca's publication, more often than not, volumes for sale were actually the spurious Pauline letters, *De Moribus* or *De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus*, even better than any real Seneca to satisfy readers who wanted advice on morals and virtues from the quasi-Christian prince of moral philosophers.** Well may we understand why Petrarch in his *De remediis utriusque fortunae* – possibly the most Stoic work produced in the entire Renaissance – devoted an entire dialogue to the burden of having too many books, lamenting that one who owns countless books owns countless errors which a lifetime's industry can never sort from truth (Petrarch 1967: 35). And Petrarch's *De remediis* was in turn based on the spurious *De remediis fortuitorum*, a genuinely classical work whose attribution to Seneca went unquestioned in an era when the Roman Stoic was as much a genre as a person: the genre of virtue-cultivating moral philosophy.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/264/mode/2up?view=theater

Seneca, who was still called a Father of the Church at the Council of Trent, was restored to his pagan stature in two important editions of his works, one by Erasmus in 1515, the other by Justus Lipsius in 1605. Neither of these editors intended to stir up conflict between Stoicism and Christianity, but their scrupulous work on Seneca's text enabled later readers to understand his thought without any fictitious pieties.

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/166/mode/2up?view=theater

Gassendi was much more careful than Bruno and Vanini in insisting on a separation of God and Nature, yet he seemed unable to prevent himself from making all the wrong insinuations. "Nature cannot be without God, nor God without Nature; … God and Nature are the same thing, the very same Being; for these different Names are only different Titles of the same God," he wrote – **and then dutifully hid those words in a fabricated citation from Seneca.**122

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/468/mode/2up?view=theater

Stoic ideas of the soul's corporeality and mortality, and their marked divergence from Plato here, previously heavily understated by generations of Christian Stoic commentary, were shown to be crucial to Greek Stoicism by Jakob Thomasius.255

---

https://www.academia.edu/855421/Is_God_a_Mindless_Vegetable_Cudworth_on_Stoic_Theology

In 1598 Thomas James, the first Librarian of the Bodleian and translator of the 'Neostoic' author Guillaume Du Vair, proclaimed that 'no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and nearer approaching unto Christianitie than the philosophie of the Stoicks'.1
...

By 1765 – just over a century and a half later – Stoicism had undergone a dramatic transformation. Far from being the most 'godly and christianly'4 philosophy that Lipsius, James, and others had presented to the public in the late sixteenth century, Stoicism was now presented by Diderot and d'Alembert in their *Encyclopédie* as a form of materialism, determinism, and atheism.5

> 5. See *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers*, 17 vols (Neufchastel, 1751-65), vol. 15, 528: **'Il n'est pas difficile de conclure de ces principes, queles stoïciens étoient matérialistes, fatalists, & à proprement parler athées'.**

...

The reasons for this dramatic and unexpected shift in the assessment of Stoicism are of course complex. **One important strand appears to have been a move away from reading the primarily moral works of the late Stoic authors Seneca and Epictetus (as Lipsius and Du Vair had done) and towards a concern with the fragments of the earlier Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus. This shift is especially clear in Brucker's history, which warns readers not to be impressed by the apparently noble accounts of God, the soul, and other topics in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius without first gaining a proper understanding of the philosophical principles that stand behind them.** It is only by grasping Stoicism as a philosophical system that we shall be able to judge it properly, and we can only do that via a patient reconstruction of the doctrines of the early Stoa involving the collation of fragments from the doxographical reports of Diogenes Laertius, Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and others.7

> 7. See Brucker, *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, vol. 1, 909 (in the translation of Enfield, vol. 1,323): 'Great care should be taken, in the first place, not to judge of the doctrine of the Stoics from words and sentiments, detached from the general system, but to consider them as they stand related to the whole train of premises and conclusions. **For want of this caution, many moderns, dazzled by the splendid expressions which they have met with in the writings of the Stoics concerning God, the soul, and other subjects, have imagined that they have discovered an invaluable treasure: whereas, if they had taken the pains to restore these brilliants to their proper places in the general mass, it would soon have appeared, that a great part of their value was imaginary**' (*expendenda esse verba & sententias Stoicorum non extra systematis nexum, sed juncto toto consequentiarum syrmate, quo ex principiis semel admissis conclusions derivantur,*
> *Accidit enim viris magnis, ut speciosis Stoicorum*
> *dictis de Deo, de animo, de officiis seducti, nescio quos thesaurus se invenisse putaverint, qui intra systematis nexum & ex vero eius sensu considerati carbones exhibebant*). **Brucker goes on to suggest,** vol. 1, 911 (in Enfield, vol. 1, 324), **that the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius are not adequate to illustrate the essential doctrines of Stoicism; to do that one must examine the reports in Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius, and Stobaeus.**

...

It is precisely this sort of dialogue between the ancient and the modern that marks Ralph Cudworth's monumental *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (hereafter *TIS*), published in 1678.10 **This work deserves to stand alongside Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Locke's *Essay* as the third great work of seventeenth century English philosophy.** It has not received that accolade as widely as it might, no doubt in part due to its length (900 folio pages), but also due to its detailed and extensive (if not laborious and relentless) quotation from and discussion of a bewildering array of ancient philosophical texts, from the earliest Presocratics through to the last Neoplatonists.
...

The *TIS* was published roughly in the middle of the period during which Stoicism was transformed from theism to atheism (i.e. 1584-1765). It also contains what must be the most sustained discussion of Stoic theology from the early modern period.
...

Ironically, what we find in the *TIS* is arguably the finest history of philosophical atheism ever written, a veritable textbook of atheism.20 In fact, some of his contemporaries came to a similar assessment, attacking him for stating the reasons in favour of atheism a little too clearly, as Shaftesbury noted in his attempt to defend Cudworth.21

> 20. Detailed philosophical responses have often proved counterproductive: Galen inadvertently preserved important information about Stoic psychology otherwise lost in his polemic against it in *De Placiticis Hippocratis et Platonis,* and John Philoponus did the same for Proclus in his *Contra Proclum*.

…

The second new type, the fourth and final type of atheism, Cudworth calls variously Spermatick or Cosmo-Plastick atheism and like Hylozoick atheism is built upon a conception of living matter. **The difference between these two is that while Hylozoick atheism attributes a life principle or force to each material entity, Spermatick or Cosmo-Plastick atheism posits just one living principle animating all of the corporeal world. This principle is, however, 'without any sense or conscious understanding'.**28

…

The Atomical, Hylopathian, Hylozoick, and Cosmo-Plastick, are associated with Democritus, Anaximander, Strato, and the Stoics respectively.30 What all these forms of atheism share in common is corporealism; they admit no other substance beyond body or matter. Cudworth writes:

> **all atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substance, they being acted also, at the same time, with an hylomania, whereby they madly dote upon matter, and devoutly worship it, as the only numen.**31

In fact, perhaps the key characteristic of atheism for Cudworth is that:

> all animality, sense and consciousness, is a secondary, derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, arising out of particular concretions of matter organized and dissolved together with them.32

The essence of atheism, then, is the claim that consciousness is an emergent property. As he puts it elsewhere, all forms of atheism share the claim that all conscious life, all souls and minds, is generated out of matter or 'educed out of nothing, and reduced into nothing'.33 Theism, by contrast, places animalish, sentient, and conscious nature as the first principle of the universe, in the form of God.

The other characteristic that Cudworth attributes to all four types of atheism is a belief in the necessity of events (we already seen that determinism is Cudworth's greatest concern), although he says that there are in fact two types of atheistic necessity. **The Anaximandrians and Democritists posit a material necessity or absolute necessity, while the Stoics and Stratonists posit a plastic necessity or hypothetical necessity.**34 **While the former can include fortune or chance, the latter is methodical and orderly.**

Although Cudworth does not explicitly rank these different forms of atheism there is a sense in which he is far more upset by the Stoic and Stratonic forms. While Democritical and Anaximandrian atheists may appear to be more thoroughgoing insofar as they deny the existence of any principle of life within their dead matter, making both life and consciousness emergent properties, Cudworth *qua* Cartesian sees this mechanical view of nature the natural complement of theism, to the extent that this dead matter requires transcendent intervention to account for its motion. **Stoic and Stratonic atheism, by contrast, have no need for a first cause for they have their own immanent principle of movement.**

…

Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was not an atheist; rather he was a 'corporeal theist', albeit an 'ignorant, childish, and unskillful theist':40

> **Heraclitus and Zeno […] are not accounted Atheists, because they supposed their fiery matter, to have not only life, but also a perfect understanding originally belonging to it, as also the whole world to be an animal.**41

…

However, if Zeno had claimed that the whole of Nature was not conscious then he would have been an atheist, claiming that:

> **the whole world is no animal, but as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastick or spermatick nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense.** And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.43

Zeno did not claim this, though, and nor did a number of his immediate successors, the most significant of whom was Chrysippus.44 Diogenes Laertius informs us that:

> The doctrine that the cosmos is an animal, rational, animate, and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise *On Providence*, by Apollodorus in his *Physics*, and by Posidonius. **It is an animal in the sense of an animate substance endowed with sensation;** for animal is better than non-animal, and nothing is better than the cosmos, *ergo* the cosmos is an animal. **And it is endowed with soul, as is clear from our several souls being each a fragment of it.**45

On Cudworth's own terms, the most important of the early Stoics are clearly not atheists. **Their cosmos is rational, ensouled, and intelligent (λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν).** If their god is an animal, as it seems to be, then the Stoics are theists. Only if their god has merely vegetative life without consciousness – only if the Stoic god is a mindless vegetable – should Stoicism be classed as a type of atheism.

So why did Cudworth associate one of his four principal types of atheism with Stoicism? Cudworth draws on two ancient pieces of evidence. The first is a passage from Seneca's *Natural Questions* in which Seneca appears to waver between the competing claims that the world is either an animal or a vegetable:

> **Whether the world is an animal, or a body governed by nature, like trees and plants, there is incorporated in it from its beginning to its end everything it must do or undergo.**46

46. Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones* III.29.2: *Sive animal est mundus, sive corpus natura gubernabile, ut arbores, ut sata, ab initio eius usque ad exitum quicquid facere quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est.*

Cudworth acknowledges that Seneca appears unwilling or unconcerned to choose between the two options, but this makes him all the more suspicious. He pushes this suspicion further by noting that some earlier scholars have also doubted whether Zeno really ever held the cosmos to be an animal, although he doesn't name them.47

It should also be noted that Cudworth amends the text of Seneca in this passage: *sive animal est mundus*, 'whether the world is an animal', is Cudworth's own emendation of the text, which the manuscript tradition records as *sive anima est mundus*, 'whether the world is a soul'. Although this might look as if Cudworth is amending the text to fit his own concerns, in fact the contrast he wants to make is clear in both readings, **and a number of subsequent editors of the *Natural Questions* have adopted Cudworth's reading.**48

Seneca's indecision, suspicious as it may look, is hardly grounds on its own to cast the Stoics as one of the archetypal groups of ancient atheists. Cudworth's second piece of evidence for Stoic atheism is more forthright. Earlier we saw Diogenes Laertius report that a whole series of important Stoics, including Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius, all affirmed that the cosmos was indeed a rational, animate, and intelligent animal. The next line of Diogenes' account adds that:

> Boethus, however, denies that the cosmos is an animal.49

Boethus of Sidon was a relatively minor Stoic of the second century BC with heterodox views on a number of points of Stoic physical theory: he rejected the doctrine of periodic conflagration, posited the eternity and incorruptibility of the world, and denied that the world was an animal.50 Cudworth, however, calls him

> an eminent and famous Stoical Doctor [who] did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any sentient, conscious or intellectual nature presiding over it, and [who] consequently must needs make it to be but […] a body governed by a plastick or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs.51

Cudworth goes on to claim, with no real grounds at all, that other Stoics may well have made this claim before Boethus, and that 'it is very probable' that Boethus had many followers. It is certainly doubtful that any Stoics before Boethus made this claim, as Diogenes' report explicitly singles him out as the sole exponent of this heterodox view. Moreover, **Cicero's account of Stoic theology in *De Natura Deorum*, written in 45 BC, makes no mention of Boethus and repeats the standard Stoic argument reported by Diogenes that if there is rational mind in humans then there must surely be rational mind in Nature.**52 **Among later Stoics, Epictetus certainly does not follow Boethus' lead and if anything goes the other way, embracing a more personalistic conception of god rather than reducing him to a mindless vegetable.**53 In Cudworth's defence, he does acknowledge that Boethus'position, like all forms of atheism, is a corruption of a once theistic worldview and he labels this degenerate position 'pseudo-Stoical'.54

Cudworth's objection to this pseudo-Stoical atheism is that it reduces consciousness to an emergent property. The ancient sources don't mention 'consciousness' of course **(and in fact Cudworth may have coined the English word in this very discussion),** but they do mention sensation (αἴσθησις, distinguishing animals from plants and vegetables) and reason (λόγος, distinguishing humans from other animals). What Cudworth insists on is that:

> the sensitive souls of brute animals, and the rational souls of men, could never possibly emerge out of one single, plastic and vegetative soul in the whole universe.55

On this point he is in complete agreement with the early Stoics and in particular with a series of theological arguments made by Zeno and reported by Cicero:

> Nothing that is inanimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.56

So, despite branding Stoicism as one of the four principal types of atheism, **Cudworth's own position is in fact quite close to the orthodox Stoic view in rejecting the idea that sensation, intelligence, or consciousness might be an emergent property.**
…

The same conjunction can be found later in the eighteenth century in the *Encyclopédie*: **the article on Spinoza opens by contrasting Spinoza's philosophy with Epicurus and Strato before identifying it with Stoicism. The only significant difference between Stoicism and Spinozism, the article's author suggests, is Spinoza's rejection of providence.**63

Despite this later tradition of identifying Stoicism with both Spinozism and atheism one thing is hopefully clear, namely that while Stoicism may not be easily assimilated to Christianity, it is not straightforwardly a form of atheism either. Cudworth is the only author of this period to offer a thorough analysis of these issues with clear definitions and conditions for what it means to be a theist or an atheist. **Despite the reputation as atheists that the Stoics acquired in the eighteenth century, Cudworth shows well before that tradition even became established that it is mistaken, even if he may have contributed to its development himself.** According to his definitions of theism and atheism the orthodox early Stoics remain theists, even if their theism is far from orthodox Christianity, because their god is sentient. **For the orthodox Stoa consciousness is not an emergent property for that would imply that a part might have greater perfection than the whole, and nothing, they claim, can be better than the cosmos.**64

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-4#lf0062-04_head_036

One may perhaps light upon some nations so barbarous and savage as not to think there is a God; but there was never found any man who, believing a God, did not at the same time believe him immortal and eternal. Certainly, those who were called Atheists, like Theodorus, Diagoras, and Hippo, durst not say that the Divinity is corruptible, but they did not believe that there is any thing incorruptible; not indeed admitting the subsistence of an incorruptibility, but keeping the idea of a God. **But Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled (as one may say) heaven, earth, air, and sea with Gods, have not yet made any one of all these Gods immortal or eternal, except Jupiter alone, in whom they consume all the rest;** so that it is no more proper for him to consume others than to be consumed himself. For it is alike an infirmity to perish by being resolved into another, and to be saved by being nourished by the resolution of others into himself. **Now these are not like other of their absurdities, gathered by argument from their suppositions or drawn by consequence from their doctrines; but they themselves proclaim it aloud in their writings concerning the Gods, Providence, Fate, and Nature, expressly saying that all the other Gods were born, and shall die by the fire, melting away, in their opinion, as if they were of wax or tin.** It is indeed as much against common sense that God should be mortal as that man should be immortal; nay, indeed, I do not see what the difference between God and man will be, if God also is a reasonable and corruptible animal. **For if they oppose us with this subtle distinction, that man is mortal, and God not mortal but corruptible, see what they get by it.** For they will say either that God is at the same time both immortal and corruptible, or else that he neither is mortal nor immortal; the absurdity of which even those cannot exceed who set themselves industriously to devise positions repugnant to common sense. I speak of others; for these men have left no one of the absurdest things unspoken or unattempted.

To these things Cleanthes, contending for the conflagration of the world, says, that the sun will make the moon and all the other stars like to himself, and will change them into himself. Indeed, if the stars, being Gods, should contribute any thing to the sun towards their own destruction by contributing to its conflagration, it would be very ridiculous for us to make prayers to them for our salvation, and to think them the saviors of men, whose nature it is to accelerate their own corruption and dissolution.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/goodwin-the-morals-vol-4#lf0062-04_head_038

And a little after, **taking away all ambiguity, he says: "For no particular thing, not even the least, can be otherwise than according to common Nature and its reason."** But that common Nature and the common reason of Nature are with him Fate and Providence and Jupiter, is not unknown even to the antipodes. For these things are everywhere inculcated by the Stoics; and Chrysippus affirms that Homer said very well,

> Jove's purposes were ripening,*

having respect to Fate and the Nature of the universe, according to which every thing is governed. How then do these agree, both that God is no way the cause of any dishonest thing, and again, that not even the least thing imaginable can be otherwise done than according to common Nature and its reason? For amongst all things that are done, there must of necessity be also dishonest things attributed to the Gods. **And though Epicurus indeed turns himself every way, and studies artifices, devising how to deliver and set loose our voluntary free will from this eternal motion, that he may not leave vice irreprehensible; yet Chrysippus gives vice a most absolute liberty, as being done not only of necessity or according to Fate, but also according to the reason of God and best Nature.**
…

If then he who esteems the Gods corruptible is equally absurd with him who thinks them not to be provident and gracious to men, **Chrysippus is no less in an error than Epicurus. For one of them deprives the Gods of beneficence, the other of incorruptibility.**

39. And moreover, Chrysippus, in his Third Book of the Gods treating of the other Gods being nourished, says thus: “The other Gods indeed use nourishment, being equally sustained by it; but Jupiter and the World are sustained after another manner from those who are consumed and were engendered by fire.” Here indeed he declares, that all the other Gods are nourished except the World and Jupiter; but in his First Book of Providence he says. “**Jupiter increases till he has consumed all things into himself.** For since death is the separation of the soul from the body, and the soul of the World is not indeed separated, but increases continually till it has consumed all matter into itself, it is not to be said that the World dies.”

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_5.html

I will quote here a small section out of Epictetus's *Diatribes*, in which the essence of Stoicism is expressed more accurately than in Seneca's interminable writings, or in all the meditations of the Stoics that have come down to us. Epictetus says: **"Verily this is the wand of Mercury; all that thou touchest with it will become gold. Give me what thou wilt and I will turn it into a Good (*ho theleis phere, kagô auto agathon poiêsô*). Bring hither sickness and death, poverty and suffering, condemnation to death; through the magic wand all this shall be turned to profit."** (*Diatr*. III, 20.)

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_6.html

Epictetus was the philosopher whom Pascal loved best. He esteemed in him the man who had grasped the idea of duty better than any other. In so far as Epictetus preached submission to fate and readiness to accept from the gods, without murmur, the difficulties of life, Pascal was altogether on his side. **Yet something repelled him from Epictetus. And this "something" he called, in a very strong phrase, "*superbe diabolique*".** We may, I think, assume that Pascal found this "diabolical pride" in the words which I quoted above. Epictetus believed that he was the most modest of men, and that his gift of working miracles, far from being in contradiction with his general doctrine of our duties towards the gods, grew, on the contrary, logically and naturally out of his doctrine. Our duty, our very first duty, was to live "in accordance with nature", and thus he who lives in accordance with nature achieves most. The teaching of Plotinus appears at first sight to be the same. For him too the miracle of final union with God is only possible for those who by *katharsis*, by faultless fulfillment of supreme duty, have put their souls in a state in which the barriers which divide man from the higher world drop away automatically. To be able to perceive supreme beauty our soul must first itself become beautiful. And just like the Stoics, Plotinus sees *katharsis* in liberation from the power of the body. And Plotinus – I emphasize this now because it is of decisive importance – hymned his miracle of the final liberation and union with God incomparably better than Epictetus his Mercury's wand. But they were both seeking the miracle. The manner of seeking was the same with both; **both were convinced that it is only after overcoming the self-evident truths transmitted to us by the senses that we can attain the last freedom, the freedom of creation out of nothingness which Epictetus calls the good and Plotinus union with God.**

Pascal did not know Plotinus; but I think that if he had known him, he would have spoken of *superbe diabolique* in his case also. And he would have kept this opinion, even if his learned friends from Port Royal had pointed out that St. Augustine himself had been unable to withstand the charm of the last great Greek philosopher, and that the works of the leading Fathers of the Church and of the incomparable mediaeval mystics are full of Plotinus's spirit; he would – strange as it may seem at first sight – have cried out with fear and horror that behind this lies without doubt an "*enchantement et assoupissement surnaturel*"; in other words, that the ambition entertained both by the Stoics and also by the Neo-Platonists and the Early Fathers and mystics who were influenced by Greek philosophy, of overcoming self-evident truth, has been transformed by supernatural force into its contrary. Both Epictetus, who believed that he possessed Mercury's magic wand, **and Plotinus, who thought that after liberation from the body he would climb up to heaven and unite with the Divine Essence, were victims of their pride. They wanted to be as God and to create out of nothingness; and they created out of nothingness and thought that their creation could be ranked with God's creation or even above it.**

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_7.html

I quoted a saying of Spinoza's that daily experience teaches us that success and failure fall in like measure on the just and unjust. Are these words correct? They contain an objective truth known to mankind for many thousands of years past; but can we admit this truth? **We have just heard from Socrates that no one can do harm to a good man.** How reconcile these two mutually contradictory assertions? For in our world, in which the law of contradiction is omnipotent, they cannot exist side by side. Either the truth of daily experience will devour Socrates' truth, or it will be devoured by it; the same is true also for a whole series of other truths for which there is no salvation possible either in

dream or in reality. From these truths we cannot awake; they have permeated our whole being; the animate and the inanimate world are in their power. What are we to do? How accept the inacceptable, overcome the invincible? **There was only the one answer, which Socrates gave to the Cynics and which the Stoics exalted into a theory.** The inevitable and the invincible must in some way be recognized as acceptable; or, as Epictetus says, "Give me what thou wilt, and I will turn it into a good." The philosopher becomes a worker of miracles; he must become one! **Not among the Stoics alone, as is usually assumed, but in all systems of antiquity and modernity ethics becomes the fundamental and central part of philosophy, which in its turn feeds all the rest, even ontology.**

What then, is ethics? After all that we have said no one will deny that **ethics at the present time, as also in the past and the future, is the art of performing natural miracles, i.e. miracles which agree with reason and submit to the necessity which reason recognizes in the world order.** Read Epictetus' *Diatribes* or Plotinus's *Enneads*, and you will be convinced; then, too, you will understand why Pascal speaks of Epictetus's *superbe diabolique*, and feel how significant is the specific gravity of his exclamation: "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but not the philosophers' God."

https://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/ijb/jb33_8.html

The Middle Ages and modern times, up to our day, intoxicate themselves with the ideas of the Stoics transmitted through Plotinus. St. Augustine and Master Eckehardt, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, like the philosophers living today, all feel the more or less clearly expressed conviction that we must content ourselves with natural miracles, since the supernatural are impossible. This thought is, of course, never expressed in these words. The proof of the impossibility of the supernatural miracle is not generally connected in any way with the assertion that we must content ourselves with natural miracles. Even among the Stoics the words which we quoted about Mercury's wand are isolated. The theory of knowledge, i.e. the doctrine of objective truth, is usually worked out quite independently of ethics and theodicy, the purpose of which is the justification of the world and the Creator.

Yet it is not for nothing that so much is said of the "unity" of the philosophic outlook. Ethics has always been indissolubly bound up with the theory of knowledge; it proceeded from it and was conditioned by it. When that theory set out its principle of natural necessity or the impossibility of the miraculous, nothing remained for ethics and theodicy except to offer in place of the impossible supernatural miracles their own natural and possible miracles. Self-evident truth shows that two idlers, Anytus and Meletus, poisoned Socrates, whom Plato calls the best of all men, and the Delphic god the wisest of all men. Man cannot alter this, for as reason tells us, what once has been done cannot be undone. Reason, and surely reason alone, knows what is possible and what impossible. And it knows, too, that our business is only to strive for the possible and not to yearn after the impossible. **There is nothing left for ethics but, having taken over ready-made reality from reason, to declare that that reality never existed; that it is not even reality but only appearance; that genuine reality is not that which is given to man, but that which man himself creates. For, as the Stoics taught, only that which we have in our power is of value to us, while everything which we have not in our power is indifferent to us and is thus as though it did not exist for us; or more simply still, as though it did not exist at all.**
...

Even Plotinus, who knows that a mystery can never become a universally accessible truth, is as clear and honest in his ethics and theodicy as the Stoic sages. **To work miracles, he teaches, one has only to deny the body; not only one's own body, but the whole physical world.** The world of bodies is not subject to man. We cannot make lonely Socrates become stronger than Anytus and Meletus, with the Athenians who stood behind them. We cannot make the blind to see, the deaf to hear, conquered conquerors, the dead to live, etc. But we can, as the Stoics teach, say to ourselves: It is one to us whether we are blind or see, conquered or conquerors, whether we live or die. All this does not touch us, but only our bodies. Even if the fatherland perishes, we can say that it is one to us. Everything that happens in the physical, sensuous world is indifferent to us. The human soul is not called on to obey but to command. The Good is independent and follows its own laws. **The Good does not acquire its principles from the outer world, it subjects the outer world to its principles. All impressions coming from without are only messengers (*angeloi*) who report what happens; but the soul is the king (*basileus*),** to whom supreme power is given to rule over all. But if this is so, if the power to bind and to loose belongs to the soul, *whom or what should it fear*? **There is nothing in the universe which he need fear whose soul has denied the physical world.**

Both for the Stoics and for Plotinus it was absolutely self-evident that battle against the "natural necessity" which the world begets is vain. We can only fight against the human ego, against our valuation of that which is given us. We grumble, are angry, rejoice, weep, triumph, despair, hope, etc., according to whether fate brings us success or failure. Every one believes that this must be so and cannot and ought not to be altered. But this is just what can and must be altered. **We only need to transfer that which men treasure or fear into the sphere of the indifferent and we turn ourselves from slaves into kings, from men into gods.** The free being, king or God, takes and

expects nothing from any one. He fears neither poverty nor sickness nor banishment, nor even death. The toad is crushed, Socrates is poisoned, the fatherland perishes; all that must be so, it does not touch the sage and does not affect him. The magic wand works its natural miracles and the reasonable man despises the words which Job in the Bible pours out in the belief that his sorrow could in some supernatural balances prove itself heavier than the sand of the sea. "*Was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig.*" ("What is real is rational.")

I keep on speaking of Plotinus and Epictetus as though I were identifying Stoicism with Neo-Platonism. I think this should have been done long ago; not, of course, an identification, but a much closer assimilation than has hitherto been usual. The "doctrines" of the Stoics and of the Neo-Platonists spring without any doubt from the same root.
…

According to Thomas Aquinas, God Himself can achieve nothing which does not accord with the principles of human reason. ***Ex nihilo nihil fit*; accordingly that which is has always been, and nothing will ever be added to that which has been. Therefore, only natural miracles are possible and God Himself, as Spinoza proved so brilliantly in his *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, can only be a natural miracle created by man.** But since man can only create "ideal" entities, only principles and ideas, then God Himself, whom man has created, must be a purely ideal entity.

Man has no power over the world of realities; not merely can he create no single living creature, he cannot even call into being a lifeless thing, not even an atom which barely achieves reality. Thus God too can create nothing; the world exists of itself from all eternity, in virtue of the same "natural necessity". **Yes, but does the world exist at all? Is it not merely a deceptive veil, a mirage, of which we must free ourselves at all costs?** The Biblical tradition that God created the world out of nothing is completely inacceptable to our reason, it runs counter to the true essence of reason; the scientific truth that *ex nihilo nihil fit* will never bow its proud head before this theological truth. Since the law of contradiction, in its turn, will never yield, it is inevitable that the two truths should have sooner or later to fight out together a supreme final battle. (*agôn megistos kai eschatos tais psychaîs prokeitai*. *Enn*. I, vi, 7.)
…

Hegel was able to defend the ontological proof of God with a good conscience; he knew that his Logos suffered nothing from it, and that the sovereign rights of reason, so far from suffering, received new confirmation, while Mercury's wand remained in his hands. **God will be robbed of the possibility of achieving supernatural miracles; but man will keep all the more safely that power of his to do natural miracles of which Epictetus boasted.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA97#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is striking, in fact, **that many of the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century editions of the *Meditations* that were published in England and France begin with remarks in their various prefaces about why readers should prefer the Stoic emperor to the (then) far better-known Seneca.**

If Isaac Casaubon had been the first modern scholar to understand the significance of the *Meditations* as an important source of Stoic philosophy in his commentary on Persius of 1605, his son Meric was the first editor to give the work its modern title, *Meditations concerning Himself*, publishing the first English translation in 1634 (dedicated to the royalist archbishop William Laud), and a Greek-Latin edition in 1643 (dedicated to the parliamentarian John Selden),105 **and in his preface he observed that 'Yet shall you not find in him [Marcus Aurelius] those blasphemies, in exaltation of this humane power and libertie, which you shall in Seneca, and other Stoics.'**106 Thomas Gataker's Greek-Latin edition of 1652 was a remarkable feat of scholarship – indeed, the history of the Cambridge University Press judges that it was 'the single major scholarly achievement of the press' during the period of the Civil War and interregnum.107
…

Gataker discusses the three surviving Stoic authors – Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and Seneca – and opines that 'Of these three, Seneca is the first in Time, but in my Opinion, the least in Value, and Merit.'109 Gataker concedes that Seneca has his strong points: 'He has a great many shining Sentences, his Precepts are admirable, his Manner noble, and his way of arguing very acute in many places.'110 These were, however, outweighed by his vices, which were enumerated as flattery and hypocrisy with respect to the emperors and **an inconsistency of attitude with respect to the Epicureans,** and Gataker, also registers his dislike of the aspects of Seneca's philosophical style, anticipating, to my mind, Nietzsche's later description of Seneca as the 'toreador of virtue (*der Toreador der Tugend*):111
…

But it was Gataker who presented the most elaborate account of the confluence of Marcus Aurelius's Stoicism and Christian teaching, arguing that **'it may be boldly asserted, there are no remaining monuments of the ancient strangers, which none nearer to the doctrine of CHRIST, than the writings and admonitions of these two; Epictetus and Antoninus.'**
…

Asking why Christians should take instruction from this pagan author, Gataker answers that ‘A careful perusal and serious reflection on these Meditations of Antoninus, are several ways useful,’ **for what was ‘summarily proposed’ in the New Testament is ‘more extensively applied’ and ‘more fully explained’ by Marcus Aurelius.** ‘Further, in these following books, the good Providence and kindness of God shines forth; and He did not suffer his own image to be quite worn out and lost in man who had falled off from him.’116
…

Gataker in turn passes swiftly over the Stoic emperor’s less Christian opinions, such as ‘his ambiguity on the immortality of the soul.’118

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page263

217. **[Bayle] observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from this principle, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that they were necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of the universe, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, who directs it.** The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in the eighth chapter of the fifth book of his *Meditations*. 'Duplici ratione', he says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod tibi natum et tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera quod universi gubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsius procurandae (της ευοδιας και της συντελειας και της συμμονης αυτης) ex parte causa est.'
…

But the principal error of this emperor and of the Stoics was their assumption that the good of the universe must please God himself, because they imagined God as the soul of the world. This error has nothing in common with my dogma, according to which God is *Intelligentia extramundana*, as Martianus Capella calls him, or rather *supramundana*.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_the_Emperor_Julian/Fragment_of_a_letter_to_a_priest#cite_ref-16

And that you may understand what I mean by this, let no one who has been consecrated a priest read either Archilochus or Hipponax[17] or anyone else who writes such poems as theirs. And in Old Comedy let him avoid everything of that type – for it is better so – and indeed on all accounts philosophy alone will be appropriate for us priests; **and of philosophers only those who chose the gods as guides of their mental discipline, like Pythagoras and Plato and Aristotle, and the school of Chrysippus and Zeno.** For we ought not to give heed to them all nor to the doctrines of all, but only to those philosophers and those of their doctrines that make men god-fearing, and teach concerning the gods, first that they exist, secondly that they concern themselves with the things of this world, **and further that they do no injury at all either to mankind or to one another, out of jealousy or envy or enmity.** I mean the sort of thing our poets in the first place have brought themselves into disrepute by writing, and in the second place such tales as the prophets of the Jews take pains to invent, and are admired for so doing by those miserable men who have attached themselves to the Galilaeans.

---

http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/fathers/eusebius_pe_06_book6.html

[OENOMAUS][13] 'To think then that thou should'st sit in Delphi unable, even should'st thou wish it, to keep silence! So Apollo, the son of Zeus, now wishes, not because he wishes, but because he is ordained by necessity to wish! But since I have been led on, I know not how, into this argument, I am inclined to pass over all the rest, and inquire into a matter that is appropriate and well worth inquiry. For, so far as it depends on the philosophers, there has been lost out of human life, whether one likes to call it a rudder, or ballast, or foundation----**there has been lost the governing power of our life, which we suppose to be absolute over the highest necessity; but Democritus, unless I am mistaken, and Chrysippus think to prove the noblest of man's faculties, according to the former, a slave, and according to the latter, half-enslaved.** Their argument, however, is worth no more than a man can claim for the things of man: but if deity also now makes war upon us, good heavens, what will become of us?'
…

'Neither therefore let Chrysippus, the author of the semi-slavery, whatever that exactly is, attend in the Porch, nor think that those drivellers will attend there to listen to him, the Nobody: neither let him take his stand and struggle about nothing against Arcesilaus present in person, and Epicurus not present.

'For what Arcesilaus is, and what Epicurus, or what the Porch is, or what the young men, or what the Nobody, he neither knows nor can know; for he knows not even, what comes far earlier, whether he himself is anything.

'But neither will you gods nor Democritus endure that any one should talk thus: for there is no more trustworthy criterion than that of which I speak; nor if there seem to be any others, could they be made equal to this, or, if made equal, could not surpass it.

'So then, some one may say, since thou, O Democritus, and thou, O Chrysippus, and thou, O prophet, are indignant if any one should wish to deny your consciousness of yourselves----for of those many books of yours it is no longer possible to deny the existence----come, let us also be indignant on the other side.
…

'**For surely the most ridiculous of all things is this, the mixture and combination of the two notions, that there is something in men's own power, and that there is nevertheless a fixed chain of causation.**
…

'Cease therefore from thy wrath, O Zeus, the lord of famine: for that which has been destined will be, and that is what thy chain has been appointed to do: and we are nothing compared to it. And thou too cease, Apollo, from uttering vain oracles: for just that which will be, will be, even though thou keep silence.
…

'**And how is it, O Apollo, that thou praisest that famous Lycurgus, who was not virtuous either willingly or by choice, but unwillingly?** That is if a man can be virtuous unwillingly. But what ye do now is just as if one were to praise and honour those who are beautiful in body, but to blame and punish the ugly.

'For the wicked might justly say to you, You did not permit us, O ye gods, to become virtuous; and not only so, but you even forced us to be wicked. And as to the virtuous, if they walk about with their elbows stuck out, one will not permit it, but will say to them, O Chrysippus and Cleanthes and the rest of your band, since you have been made to be virtuous, I give praise to virtue, but no praise to you in whom virtue resides.

'**Nay, even Epicurus, against whom you, Chrysippus, so often railed, I acquit of the charges, so far at least as you can judge. For how is he to blame, who was not of his own accord luxurious or unjust, as you so often reproached him?**

https://web.archive.org/web/20120207131036/http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius1.htm

I call natural fate the order of natural causes, which, not being hindered, by their force and nature do produce a certain and the selfsame effect. Aristotle is of this sect, if we give credit to Alexander [of] Aphrodisi[a]s his interpreter. Likewise, Theophrastus, who writes plainly, that destiny is the nature of each thing. By their opinion it is destiny that a man begets a man; and so that he dies of inward natural causes and not by violence or force, it is destiny. Contrarily, that a man should engender a serpent or a monster, it is besides destiny: also to be killed with a sword or by fire. This opinion is not very offensive, for that indeed it ascends not so high as the force of fate or destiny. And does not every one escape falling that keeps himself from climbing aloft? **Such a one is Aristotle almost everywhere writing ought of celestial matters, except it be in his book of the world, which is a golden treatise savoring of a more celestial air.*** **I read moreover in a Greek writer that Aristotle thought that fate was no cause, but that chance was in some sort an alteration or change of the cause of such things as were disposed by necessity. O the heart of a philosopher: that dares to account fortune and chance among the number of causes but not destiny.**

> * **The Aristotelian book *De mundo,* to which Lipsius apparently refers here, is now regarded by most scholars as a product of the Hellenistic period, after Aristotle's death and the rise of the Stoic school; in it a follower of Aristotle tries to rethink Aristotle's theory of the first mover in response to the Stoic conception of providential Zeus, with the result that attributes of the providential god get attributed to Aristotle's first mover in ways that Aristotle himself probably never intended.** Lipsius, a neo-Stoic, naturally finds a Stoicized Aristotelian more congenial than Aristotle himself, although Lipsius does not recognize that the author of the *De mundo* is not Aristotle!--JG

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Alexander_of_Aphrodisias

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, pupil of Aristocles of Messene**, the most celebrated of the Greek commentators on the writings of Aristotle,** and styled, by way of pre-eminence, ὁ ἐξηγητής ("the expositor"), was a native of Aphrodisias in Caria. He came to Athens towards the end of the 2nd century A.D., became head of the Lyceum and lectured on peripatetic philosophy. The object of his work was to free the doctrine from the syncretism of Ammonius and to reproduce the pure doctrine of Aristotle.

...

His commentaries were greatly esteemed among the Arabians, who translated many of them. There are also several original writings by Alexander still extant. **The most important of these are a work *On Fate*, in which he argues against the Stoic doctrine of necessity; and one *On the Soul*, in which he contends that the undeveloped reason in man is material (νοῦς ὑλικός) and inseparable from the body.** He argued strongly against the doctrine of immortality. He identified the active intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός), through whose agency the potential intellect in man becomes actual, with God.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_of_Aphrodisias#Original_treatises

On Providence survives in two Arabic versions.[25] **In this treatise, Alexander opposes the Stoic view that divine Providence extends to all aspects of the world; he regards this idea as unworthy of the gods.[25] Instead, providence is a power that emanates from the heavens to the sublunar region, and is responsible for the generation and destruction of earthly things, without any direct involvement in the lives of individuals.[25]**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/Book_V#cite_ref-30
>
> **Like Plato, [Aristotle] held that God was incorporeal; that his providence extended to the heavenly bodies, that he is unmoved, and that earthly events are regulated by their affinity with them (the heavenly bodies).** Besides the four elements he held that there is a fifth, of which the celestial bodies are composed. Its motion is of a different kind from that of the other elements, being circular. Further, he maintained the soul to be incorporeal, defining it as the first entelechy [i.e. realization] of a natural organic body potentially possessed of life.[31]

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/alexander/

Greek philosophy had no precise term for "free will" as did Latin (*liberum arbitrium* or *libera voluntas*). The discussion was in terms of responsibility, what "depends on us" (in Greek *ἐφ ἡμῖν*). Alexander believed that Aristotle was not a strict determinist like the Stoics, and Alexander himself argued that some events do not have *predetermined* causes.

In particular, he held that man is responsible for self-caused decisions, and can choose to do or not to do something. This appears to be not very different from the Stoic Chrysippus' idea that one can assent or dissent to an action. Chrysippus said actions are pre-determined (fated) but not necessitated.

Alexander denied three things – necessity (ἀνάγκη), the foreknowledge of fated events that was part of the Stoic identification of God and Nature, and determinism in the sense of a sequence of causes that was laid down beforehand (προκαταβεβλημένος) or *predetermined* by antecedents (προηγουμένος).
...

Alexander makes it clear that the role of chance is to break the causal chain of determinism. If this means that some things happen at random and "for no reason" (μάτην) then so be it. And the randomness is ontological, not merely the result of human ignorance.

Alexander is not being original here. **He is reading Aristotle as denying the Leucippean necessity. Epicurus denies necessity even more clearly with his "swerve."**

Leucippus said,

> Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity.
>
> οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης

Aristotle clearly accepts that things happen at random. In his *Metaphysics* he makes the case for chance as an uncaused cause (causa sui).

> Nor is there any definite cause for an accident (συμβεβηκός), but only chance (τυχόν), namely an indefinite (ἀόριστον) cause.
>
> οὐδὲ δὴ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον οὐδὲν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχόν: τοῦτο δ' ἀόριστον. (*Metaphysics*, Book V, 1025a25)

Without such indefinite (uncaused) causes, everything would happen by necessity.

> It is obvious that there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible apart from the actual processes of generation and destruction; for if this is not true, everything will be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some cause, other than accidental, of that which is generated and destroyed. Will *this* be, or not? Yes, if *this* happens; otherwise not. (*Metaphysics*, Book VI, 1027a29)

For Alexander, as for Aristotle, a random event "for no reason" provides a fresh start or new beginning (ἀρχή) of a causal chain (ἄλυσις) that can not be traced back indefinitely. This effectively puts an end to the Stoic ideas of foreknowledge and *pre*-determination.

These new beginnings are associated with chance (τύχη) and happen by themselves (αῦτόματος)
…

Alexander says that what gives man the power of a rational assent is the existence of new beginnings. He goes to the extreme of making this the essence of humanity (sounding very Hegelian),

> To be rational (λογικῷ) is nothing other than to be the origin (ἀρχή) of one's actions. (*De Fato*, XIV, 184.15)

> For man is the origin (ἀρχή) and cause (αίτια) of actions that happen through him (δι’ αὐτοῦ) (*De Fato*, XV, 185.11)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alexander-aphrodisias/#AlePhi

It is unclear whether there had been a genuinely Peripatetic contribution to this debate before Alexander. If there was not, Alexander clearly filled a significant gap. Though Aristotle himself in a way touches on all important aspects of the problem of determinism—logical, physical, and ethical—in different works, **he was not greatly concerned with this issue, nor does he entertain the notion of fate (*heimarmenê*) as a rational cosmic ordering-force, as the Stoics were going to introduce.** In *De interpretatione* 9, he famously proposed to solve the problem of ‘future truth’ by suspending truth-values for statements in the future tense concerning individual contingent events. In his ethics he deals with the question of whether individuals have free choice, once their character is settled. As Aristotle sees it, there is little or no leeway, but he holds individuals responsible for their actions because they collaborated in the acquisition of their character (*EN* III, 1-5). **In his physical works Aristotle limits strict necessity to the motions of the stars, while allowing for a wide range of events in the sublunary realm that do not happen of necessity but only for the most part or by chance (*Phys*. II, 4-6).** Though he subscribes to the principle that the same causal constellations have the same effects, he also allows for ‘fresh starts’ in a causal series (*Metaph*. E 3). Given these various limitations, Aristotle had no reason to treat determinism as a central philosophical problem either in his ethics or in his physics. **The situation changed, however, once the Stoics had established a rigorously physicalist system ruled by an all-pervasive divine mind. It is this radicalization of the determinist position that sharpened the general consciousness of the problematic, as witnessed by the relentless attacks on the Stoics by their opponents, most of all by the Academic skeptics and the Epicureans, which lasted for centuries.**

This long-standing debate prompted Alexander to develop an Aristotelian concept of fate by identifying it with the natural constitution of things, including human nature (*On Fate*, ch. 2-6). Since there is always the possibility that something happens against the natural and normal order of things, there are exceptions to what is ‘fated’ and there is room for chance and the fortuitous. **Most of the treatise is occupied not with the defense of this Peripatetic position, but rather with attacks on the various aspects of the determinist position. Alexander claims to show why the Stoics’ attempt (though he nowhere names them) to defend a compabilitist position must fail.** The determinists, he says, are neither entitled to maintain a coherent concept of luck and the fortuitous, nor of contingency and possibility, nor of deliberation and potency. **The bulk of this polemical discussion concentrates on the difficulties for the Stoic position by claiming that their concept of fate makes human deliberation superfluous and therefore imports disastrous consequences for human morality and life in general** (chs. 7-21). Alexander also presents, albeit in a dialectical fashion intended to lead to the defeat of the Stoic tenets, the arguments used by the Stoics in their defense of **contingency, chance, and human responsibility. As he claims time and again, the Stoics can defend the use of these terms at best in a verbal sense.** In addition, their notion of divine foreknowledge and prophecy turns out to be incoherent (chs. 22-35). The stringency and originality of Alexander’s critique cannot be discussed here (cf. Sharples 1983; Bobzien 1998). While his presentation is not free from repetition and while the order of the arguments leaves something to be desired, it is an interesting text that displays a lively engagement with the issues and quite some philosophical sophistication. He argues that truly free action requires that at the time one acts, it is open to one both to do and not to do what one does in fact then do. Thus Alexander originates the position later known as ‘libertarianism’ in the theory of free action. **Alexander’s construction of an Aristotelian account of fate and divine providence that limits them to nature and its overall benign order clearly argues for a weak conception of fate; but it is the only one that Alexander regards as compatible with the principles of Aristotelian philosophy of nature and ethics.** That the concept of fate greatly intrigued him is confirmed by the fact that he returns to the issue in his addendum (‘Mantissa’) to the treatise *On the Soul* and in some of his *Problems* (2.4.5, cf. Sharples 1983, esp. the Introduction).

The attempt to 'naturalize' crucial concepts in Aristotle's philosophy is typical of Alexander's philosophical stance in general. He regards universals as inseparable from particulars and as secondary to them, and stresses the unity of matter and form. Similarly, he treats the human soul as the perishable form imposed upon the bodily elements to constitute a living human being. He argues that the intellect develops from an embodied intellect (that is focused upon the material world) to a state that eventually contains forms that are not embodied. He rules out personal immortality by identifying the active intellect with pure form and with God, the Unmoved Mover (see *On the Soul* and Caston 2012). **In his emphasis on a naturalist point of view he appears remarkably free from the increasingly spiritualistic and mystical tendencies of his own time.** In the treatise *On Mixture and Increase* Alexander expands on problems that Aristotle touched upon only briefly in *On Generation and Corruption* I 10, **but his main concern is—as it is in his *On Fate*—to prove that the Stoic position of a 'thorough' mixture of two substances cannot be maintained.** These treatises suggest that at the beginning of the third century philosophical discussions between the traditional schools were still lively. We have, of course, no other evidence on that issue.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_I/Volume_II/City_of_God/Book_V/Chapter_9

The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything against them in argument unless he had first demolished divination.[1] And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things, and maintains with all his might that there is no such knowledge either in God or man, and that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God, and attempts by vain arguments, and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted, to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).

But, in refuting these conjectures of the mathematicians, his argument is triumphant, because truly these are such as destroy and refute themselves. **Nevertheless, they are far more tolerable who assert the fatal influence of the stars than they who deny the foreknowledge of future events.** For, to confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things, is the most manifest folly. **This Cicero himself saw, and therefore attempted to assert the doctrine embodied in the words of Scripture, "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."**[2] **That, however, he did not do in his own person, for he saw how odious and offensive such an opinion would be;** and therefore, in his book on the nature of the gods,[3] he makes Cotta dispute concerning this against the Stoics, and preferred to give his own opinion in favor of Lucilius Balbus, to whom he assigned the defence of the Stoical position, rather than in favor of Cotta, who maintained that no divinity exists. **However, in his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of the prescience of future things.** But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will.
...

Cicero, then, contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word, which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But, whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. **For he either denies that God exists,—which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book *De Natura Deorum*,**—or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future things, what is that but just "the fool saying in his heart there is no God?" For one who is not prescient of all future things is not God.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

As Boethius puts it, "Neither unfittingly nor inconsistently did Aristotle, when speaking about propositions, put off a disputation concerning higher realities and concerning things perhaps not pertaining to the logical art" (*2 In Periherm*. 3.9, 198,10-14). Following suit, Boethius neither expands on what Aristotle says about "higher realities" nor tells how Aristotle might respond to the Stoics, although he considers the Peripatetic accounts of chance, freedom, and material nature to be better than those of the Stoics. Boethius is dissatisfied with the flat corporealism of the Stoics – in this instance as it results in a fatalistic understanding of reality.

Boethius connects the Stoics' fatalism with their mistaken reading of Aristotle. Aristotle's acceptance of openness in the future, owing to both human freedom and natural realities themselves, fits well with how Aristotle explicates "the mode of propositions concerning the future" (*2 In Periherm*. 3.9, 198,4-8). **Every proposition about a future contingent event is either true or false, says Aristotle, although its truth or falsity is not yet definite.** Indeed, the indefinite character of the truth or falsity of a proposition about a future contingent befits the event's openness either to come about or not to come about. The Stoics do not see it this way, no doubt because they are at odds with Aristotle concerning "the higher realities." Hence they interpret Aristotle through the lens of fatalism. **Aristotle claims that propositions about future contingents are *either* true *or* false, but the Stoics "judged them to be [in Aristotle's view] *neither* true *nor* false"** – and, Boethius adds, "they judged falsely" (*2 In Periherm*. 3.9, 208,6-7).

…

In fact, **Boethius continues, if every such proposition were definitely true or definitely false, then one would have to hold that all things come about out of necessity** – as do the Stoics.
…

For the Stoics, Aristotle's rejection of fatalism amounts to a rejection of a key principle of logic itself, the so-called principle of bivalence.

---

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/stoicism/where-were-the-stoics-in-the-late-middle-ages/5BDF853E30B62224D8489CC9E317CFE1

Where were the Stoics in the late Middle Ages? The short answer is: everywhere and nowhere.

Stoicism is not a sport for gentlemen; it requires far too much rigorous intellectual work. Most of Western history consists of gentlemen's centuries. **But there were the couple of centuries, the fourth and the third B.C., in which the ancient philosophical schools were created, and there were the three centuries from A.D. 1100 to 1400, when medieval scholasticism flourished – centuries that produced a considerable number of tough men ready to chew their way through all the tedious logical stuff that disgusts a gentleman and to make all the nice distinctions that a gentleman can never understand but only ridicule,** distinctions necessary to work out a coherent, and perhaps even consistent, picture of the structure of the world. In this respect, a good scholastic and a good Stoic are kindred spirits. As an attitude to doing philosophy, Stoicism is everywhere in the late Middle Ages.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA85#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Stoic influence on Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury is vast, but identifying specifics is difficult. There are many reasons for this: foremost is the diversity of views that fall under the banner of Stoicism. **Vaguely Stoic themes are ubiquitous throughout the twelfth century.** Second, it is unclear what sources Abelard and Salisbury had access to. The frequency of florilegia and excerpts means it is at least possible that Abelard and Salisbury were not aware of all views expressed even in works they cite. Much of the influence is second hand.
…

The *Dialogues* offer the most obvious of Abelard's development of Stoic themes. In these imaginary conversations a Philosopher and a Jew and a Christian have been debating the nature of happiness and the path to man's greatest good.
…

Of the three characters, it is the Philosopher who is the principal exponent of Stoic ideas. The Philosopher identifies himself as a circumcised descendant of Ishmael. In the twelfth century this could only mean that he is a Muslim raised in an Islamic country. Abelard had a limited understanding of Islam. **The Philosopher offers nothing uniquely or even stereotypically Muslim. Rather, Abelard felt that Islamic society was more intellectually tolerant than Christian Europe** (Marenbon and Orlandi 2001: li). **The Philosopher comes from a land where he would have been freer to be a non-religious adherent of classical philosophy. He offers many clearly identifiable Stoic views.** Natural law is a rational ordering of the universe: it is not merely a standard of justice against which promulgated law is judged, all promulgated law – human and revealed – derives from and is contained in the natural law (*Coll*. §133). The Philosopher argues that virtue is the only path to happiness, and goes on to claim that happiness is attainable in this life (§§80-4). He argues for the unity of the virtues and that there are no degrees to the virtues (§98). **He cites Seneca as the greatest moralist, and Cato as a moral examplar** (§131). In political philosophy he emphasizes the common good described as expanding the sphere of unity and fellow feeling between people.

However the Philosopher also embodies Abelard's ambivalence toward strictly secular philosophy. **In his *Theologia Christiana* (*Th. Chr.)* Abelard argues that virtuous pagans had found love of God and merited salvation through the study of the natural law** (*Th. Chr.* 2.21 seq.). **In the Christian era, philosophers had lost their way. Seneca for example claims "I do not obey God, I agree with him"** (*Ep*. 96.2). Agreement with God is not love of God. Similarly, the Philosopher holds austere or secular views that Abelard himself argues show an insufficient love of God.2 The Philosopher argues that pity and grief are weaknesses and vices (*Coll*. §128). Abelard recognizes them as to some degree irrational, both reflecting an inability to accept God's will. Nonetheless, Abelard sees them as human manifestations of love (*Sen*. 94.195). Abelard's rejection of these, and other Stoic claims below, reflects his judgment that the Stoicism presented in Seneca and Cicero is secular and limited.

…

In the *Dialogues* the Philosopher identifies himself as an adherent of natural law. Natural law is universal, known to all men by reason (*Coll*. §133). Drawing on Seneca and Cicero (esp. *De inventione* 2.160-2), there are uniquely Stoic elements to his account of natural law. The Philosopher claims the natural law is a code of laws, not a standard against which posited law is judged. All positive law is a derived subset of the natural law. Understanding and following natural law is thus sufficient for virtue and happiness. **Revealed law – the old law followed by the Jew, and the new law of the gospels – are mere derivations from the natural law. They add nothing necessary for virtue or happiness** (*Th. Chr.* 2.48). **Obviously, this is not Abelard's view, but it is close. Neither the Jew nor the Christian refute this claim. It is striking that the Christian seems to accept that the law of the gospels, particularly the precept to love God and neighbor, is in fact contained in the natural law. This view is found in Abelard's other writings as well.** In his commentary on Romans (*ad* 2:13) he claims that the golden rule is found in the natural law. But it is in Book 2 of the *Theologia Christiana* that the view gets its fullest expression. **There Abelard writes that not only philosophers but secular and illiterate men who love the natural law are virtuous** (*Th. Chr.* 2.24). **He concludes that love of natural law saved the virtuous pagans because "[i]f we carefully consider the precepts of the evangelists, there is nothing which the philosophers did not follow"** (*Th. Chr. 2*.43-4).

As stated, this looks like Pelagianism. The ancient philosophers had earned salvation by the use of natural reason, before Christ's atonement, and without divine grace. Abelard's account of grace and the atonement are complicated and well beyond the scope of this chapter. **Nonetheless his commitment to a Stoic-influenced understanding of natural law set the parameters for his theorizing on these subjects** (see Williams 2004). Abelard's account has a potential path through this difficulty.3 In a few texts Abelard suggests that if a virtuous pagan truly loves the natural law, then God could reveal the knowledge necessary for salvation. Given Abelard's claim that there is nothing in revealed law that is not in natural law this implies a limitation on the human ability to fully understand the natural law, a limitation overcome in the example of Christ's sacrifice. **This allows Abelard to maintain that the atonement was exemplary, not transactional, and to explain how the virtuous pagans were saved.**
…

Abelard's Christian accepts the unity of the virtues. This is Abelard's own view as he has a unique contribution to this discussion. The Christian rejects the lack of degree in virtue, also Abelard's own view. The Christian then modifies the claims about virtue being the path to happiness. The Christian's arguments are confusing. If the dialogues are unfinished this is where Abelard is likely to have developed a clearer view. To speculate only a little, love is the missing element from the Philosopher's view. **Philosophers of the Christian era had lost sight of precisely the element of natural law that the New Law "reveals," Love.**

The Christian does not pull all the threads of Abelard's ethics together. Nonetheless, for the Christian, and for Abelard, there is a connection between justice the chief virtue, and love as commanded by natural law. It seems Abelard wanted to combine two Stoic views: the unity of the virtues in justice and the love of God and neighbor that is commanded by natural law. But he wanted to reject the Stoic view that virtue is sufficient for happiness and happiness is attainable in this life. His success in doing this would depend on his ability to account for the atonement and to leave a place for salvific grace.

The Christian's starting point is the rejection of the Stoic claim there are no degrees of virtue. The Philosopher quotes arguments from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (3.21) and *De officiis* (2.34-5), the latter at length (*Coll*. §98). He then adds that **the only reason people think there are degrees of virtue is because humans judge based on actions and consequences, not intentions.** The consequences of some actions are more damaging, but the Philosopher claims that wrong intention behind different acts is equally wrong in showing scorn for God (§§98-9).
…

The point of the *Dialogues* is to establish the highest good and the path to attaining it. This is where the Philosopher most clearly advocates Stoic views, while the Christian is more clearly rejecting these and developing others. The Christian's view is closer to those expressed in Abelard's other writings, but it is not a wholesale rejection of the Philosopher's Stoicism. **Abelard would have been comfortable calling his own view a corrected Stoicism.**
…

The Philosopher's account begins with a truly odd bit of scholarship. **Abelard's Philosopher equates Seneca's account of happiness, Epicurus' account of pleasure, and the kingdom of heaven. Seneca himself had praised Epicurus, but the Philosopher asserts that "there is no distance between them … excelling in virtues is having a tranquil soul and vice versa"** (*Coll*. §82). The Philosopher does not combine the views; rather, Epicurus and Seneca have the same view. The apparent

difference is just in terminology: “This is what Epicurus meant when he said that the highest good is pleasure, that is to say, when the soul’s peacefulness is so great that its quiet is neither disturbed externally by bodily affliction nor internally by the conscience of any sin nor does any vice stand in its way, but its excellent will is entirely fulfilled” (§87). It seems likely that Abelard believed this was based on Seneca’s testimony, as did John of Salisbury. But the Philosopher goes further: **“I think that the happiness which Epicurus calls ‘pleasure’ your Christ calls ‘the kingdom of heaven.’ What does a thing’s name matter so long as the thing itself stays the same”** (§92). The Christian’s terse response is simply “No […] our views about the highest good differ considerably” (§93).
…

The Philosopher initially asserts the Stoic position that the virtuous man is happy – has attained the highest good – regardless of his physical conditions. A virtuous man being tortured is still happy; he has attained the highest good for man (§84). **However, when pressed by the Christian, the Philosopher capitulates. He states that the will is always impeded while the soul is imprisoned in the body. The embodied soul does not have true liberty and thus can never be truly happy** (§87). **The Philosopher then lists cold, rain, and poor clothes as impediments to true happiness.** This has caused some consternation in the secondary literature (see e.g. King 1995; Marenbon 1997; Normore 2004). The Philosopher has clearly conflated a non-moral good (e.g. dry socks) with a moral good (happiness). The Stoics’ position here is clear: dry socks are merely a preferred indifferent. The moral good is still happiness and the virtuous person is happy in the rain. **If it were Abelard’s goal in the dialogue to have the Christian demolish the Stoic position then certainly he has erred in having the dispute hinge on such a shallow and conflated understanding of good.** It is absurd to think that Abelard was unaware of the shift from moral to non-moral goods. So what was his point? **The Philosopher takes several stances that Abelard could easily have found in Seneca or Cicero, but that Abelard himself does not agree with. This is one of them. Seneca in many places makes the same controversial concession that the Philosopher makes** (*Ep*. 102.23; 65.16). It is at least possible that the Philosopher has presented the Stoic position as Abelard understands it. There are many reasons for Abelard to have developed the case in this way. He argued that ancient philosophers who followed the natural law were led to love God and were thus saved. But he also appears to have thought that philosophers since Christ’s revelation of the New Law were not up to that ancient standard. It is not surprising to see Abelard give the Philosopher a position he disagrees with. **It is a bit surprising that the position is so obviously flawed. However, since the view is found in his foremost source it only supports Abelard’s view of the Christian-era fall of philosophy.**
…

As noted above the Philosopher’s secular common-good account of justice differs from Abelard’s. It can be argued that Cato loved his neighbor and thus acted justly. For Abelard this is not enough. True virtue is to love your neighbor because it shows love of God. **The end of justice is love of God not perfect community** (*Sen*. 248 seq.; see Marenbon 1997).
…

The rejection of the equal degree of virtue allows the Christian his other great innovation: there are degrees of reward and punishment. The saved are happy but not equally so. Those who love God more are rewarded with a deeper understanding of God and are therefore happier. They are also inspired to love God more and thus their happiness is not static (*Coll*. §150). This is radically dfferent from the Stoic-Epicurean tranquility of mind that the Philosopher advocates.
…

Abelard, on the other hand, praises Seneca as the best teacher of morals (*Ep*. 7; Radice 1974: 243-4). **Indeed, his ethical theory is not merely influenced by Seneca’s Stoicism; I believe Abelard would happily call his view Stoic.**
…

Abelard’s logic is strikingly similar to Stoic logic. **His main source for Stoic thought, Seneca, was not a logician. Seneca, in fact, doubted the value of studying logic** (see e.g. *Ep*. 45; Barnes 1997: 12-23) **and complained that the study of wisdom had been replaced by the study of words** (*Ep*. 108.23). So it is not at all clear that there is any direct explicit Stoic influence to Abelard’s logic. Stoic logic is propositional and concerned with the distinctions between arguments and “assertables” or propositions (Bobzien 2003). Abelard’s discussion of all these topics is strikingly similar. In some cases Abelard uses the same technical terms. However, as Ebbesen has written, the route of transmission of these terms from Stoics to Abelard “defies my imagination” (Ebbesen 2004: 120). **Lapidge has claimed that “Stoic logic […] was virtually unknown” in the twelfth century** (Lapidge 1988: 85), **while Ebbesen has suggested that some elements of Stoic logic “had become the common property of educated people […], but the system as a whole was discarded”** (Ebbesen 1982: 103). Others are confident that there is a genuine continuity between ancient Stoic logic and Abelard (see Boh 1982). The route of continuity, if there is one, is prohibitively difficult to reconstruct. **Lapidge suggest that a brilliant and attentive reader “could possibly have formed some (albeit incomplete) notion of Stoic logic** (Lapidge 1988: 87) **from what few elements of Stoic logic were available (in Apuleius**

and Martianus Capella). Abelard was just such a brilliant and attentive reader, who was drawn to novel and contrarian ideas. It is in this loosest sense that Abelard's logic is a continuation of the Stoic tradition. Abelard has learned the elements, hints, and suggestions that, unattributed to the Stoics, were part of the intellectual tradition. **Just like the ancient Stoics, he then used these ideas to develop a system of logic that illustrated some of the shortcomings in Aristotelian logic and provided a solution.** Unlike in his ethics, Abelard would not have known enough Stoic logic to acknowledge the influence. But his reconstruction is built on a Stoic foundation and is a source of transmission for "Stoic" logic into the later Middle Ages.

Abelard is best known for his nominalist theory of universals. The theory of universals has many similarities to Stoic views, but the direct influence of Stoicism is quite thin. In his *Logica "ingredientibus"* (*Ll*) **Abelard rejects completely the claim that there are real universal things: "nothing exists that is not discrete"** (*Ll* 1 19.23).
…

John is not a Stoic: in his *Policraticus* (*Pol*.) he describes himself as an Academic Skeptic (7, prol.; Nederman 1990: 147-8), reserving judgement in all matters that are doubtful to the wise and professing moderation in all his views. As such he sets up extremes: the Stoic believes all things are necessary; the Epicurean, that all things are by chance (7.1; Nederman 1990: 149). **John's *Policraticus* was widely read and circulated for several hundred years after its publication in 1159, probably more so than any identifiable Stoic text, and certainly more than any works by Abelard.** John is a conduit for many Stoic views but his presentation is not always subtle, sometimes inaccurate, and occasionally false.

It is difficult to assess the depth of John's knowledge of Stoicism. John's primary source was Seneca, whom he identifies as an ardent Stoic (*Entheticus* 1267). John shares Abelard's opinion that Seneca was a pre-eminent moral philosopher and so gets his sense of Stoic ethics and virtue theory from Seneca. **On the other hand there is Marcus Terentius Varro. Recognized as a Stoic for his writing on language, John tells us that "no one wrote better, or said worse things"** (*Entheticus* 1180).
…

The Stoics, in order to preserve the necessity of fate, make contingent things necessary. The Epicureans, in order to preserve the contingency of events, deny the necessity of fate. Because the denial of either free will or the necessity of fate is absurd, John, the Academic, rejects both extreme views, and asserts that there is a changeless disposition of changeable things. How this works is beyond the scope of human knowledge (*Pol*. 2.20-1). In *Policraticus* 2, chapter 22, he picks up what he takes to be a classical Stoic objection. John's view allows the impossible to follow from the possible. God foreknows that John will choose *X*. If it is possible that John not choose *X* then from this possibility follows the impossibility that God's foreknowledge is false. **John's initial response is "Let the Stoics proclaim their stunning paradoxes." He will not attempt to limit the infinite power of God within the confines of his own "dull wits"** (*Pol*. 2.22). **The sense one gets from John is that, outside the realm of moral philosophy, Stoicism offers the kind of cleverness one expects from bright undergraduates.**
…

But John's view lacks the depth of Abelard's Stoic commitment. He seems to equate natural and divine law, but where Abelard's Philosopher holds a clearly Stoic view that divine law is a derived subset of natural law, John holds that scripture is a second law that is the written version of the divine/natural law (*Pol*. 4.2). John holds the most general Stoic view that the natural law is a code of regulatory principles that other law is derived from, not a standard of justice to which other law answers. **John also adds a uniquely Academic twist, asserting that while some precepts of the natural law are eternal and necessary and applicable in all instances, others are flexible (*Pol*. 4.12.6), although he doesn't give examples.** Cicero, in what one author has called a fit of Stoic grandeur, declares that the natural law does not need interpretation because it is the same in the minds of all rational people (Dickinson 1963: xxxvi). John is too involved in practical governance to accept that.
…

John's view is very far from Abelard's. For John there is no question that the ancient philosophers did not merit salvation, although they may have been granted salvific grace. Additionally John finds Stoicism unable to achieve even the lower secular happiness.
…

John is aware that he is making a moral good – happiness – depend on the position and use of external goods. But John need not be troubled by this. **The moral good achieved through virtue and goods is the lower secular happiness that can be enjoyed in this world.** It is not man's highest good, the happiness of salvation. John further doubts that it is possible to be a Stoic sage without grace (*Pol*. 3.1).
…

John has no knowledge of Stoic logic as such. The Stoics are omitted entirely in his presentation of the history of logic. **Logic was introduced as a branch of philosophy by Plato, systematized by Aristotle, and transmitted through Porphyry and Boethius** (*Met.* 2.2; McGarry 1955: 76-7).

In fact, John lists two Stoic beliefs as proof that they had no logic. **If the Stoics had bothered to learn logic they would not have fallen into the error of thinking that all sins were equally bad and that matter and form were coeternal with God** (see e.g. *Met.* 2.2).

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Jean_de_Meun

Jean de Meun says that in his youth he composed songs that were sung in every public place and school in France. In the enumeration of his own works he places first his continuation of the *Roman de la rose* of Guillaume de Lorris (*q.v.*). The date of this second part is generally fixed between 1268 and 1285 by a reference in the poem to the death of Manfred and Conradin, executed (1268) by order of Charles of Anjou (d. 1285) who is described as the present king of Sicily. M. F. Guillon (*Jean Clopinel*, 1903), however, considering the poem primarily as a political satire, places it in the last five years of the 13th century. Jean de Meun doubtless edited the work of his predecessor, Guillaume de Lorris, before using it as the starting-point of his own vast poem, running to 19,000 lines. **The continuation of Jean de Meun is a satire on the monastic orders, on celibacy, on the nobility, the papal see, the excessive pretensions of royalty, and especially on women and marriage.** Guillaume had been the servant of love, and the exponent of the laws of "courtoisie"; Jean de Meun added an "art of love," exposing with brutality the vices of women, their arts of deception, and the means by which men may outwit them. **Jean de Meun embodied the mocking, sceptical spirit of the *fabliaux*.** He did not share in current superstitions, he had no respect for established institutions, and he scorned the conventions of feudalism and romance. His poem shows in the highest degree, in spite of the looseness of its plan, the faculty of keen observation, of lucid reasoning and exposition, and it entitles him to be considered the greatest of French medieval poets. He handled the French language with an ease and precision unknown to his predecessors, and the length of his poem was no bar to its popularity in the 13th and 14th centuries. **Part of its vogue was no doubt due to the fact that the author, who had mastered practically all the scientific and literary knowledge of his contemporaries in France, had found room in his poem for a great amount of useful information and for numerous citations from classical authors.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.100122/page/n117/mode/2up?view=theater

The sweet breeze of Guillaume de Lorris was followed by the east wind of chilling scepticism and cruel cynicism of his successor. The vigorous and trenchant spirit of the second tarnished the naive and lightsome idealism of the first. **Jean de Meun is an enlightened man, who believes neither in spectres nor in sorcerers, neither in faithful love nor in the chastity of woman,** who has an inkling of the problems of mental pathology, and puts into the mouths of Venus, Nature, and Genius the most daring apology for sensuality.
...

The intimate circle of Jean de Meun's admirers consisted of men in the service of princes, both priests and laymen. It is identical with that of the first French humanists. One of them, Jean de Montreuil, provost of Lille, secretary to the dauphin and later to the duke of Burgundy, was the author of a good many Ciceronian epistles, and, like his friends, Gontier and Pierre Col, he corresponded with Nicolas de Clemanges, the grave censor of the abuses in the Church. We now find him devoting his talents to the defence of the *Roman de la Rose* and of its author, Jean de Meun. He asserts that several of the most learned and enlightened men honour the *Roman de la Rose* so much that their appreciation resembles a cult (*paene ut colerent*), and that they would rather do without their shirt than this book.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.100122/page/n335/mode/2up?view=theater

To find paganism, there was no need for the spirit of the waning Middle Ages to revert to classic literature. The pagan spirit displayed itself, as amply as possible, in the *Roman de la Rose*. Not in the guise of some mythological phrases; it was not there that the danger lay, but in the whole erotic conception and inspiration of this most popular work of all. From the early Middle Ages onward Venus and Cupid had found a refuge in this domain. But the great pagan who called them to vigorous life and enthroned them was Jean de Meun. **By blending with Christian conceptions of eternal bliss the boldest praise of voluptuousness, he had taught numerous generations a very ambiguous attitude towards Faith.** He had dared to distort Genesis for his impious purposes by making Nature complain of men because they neglect her commandment of procreation, in the words:

> Si m'aist Diex li crucefis,
> Moult me repens dont homme fis.2

It is astonishing that the Church, which so rigorously repressed the slightest deviations from dogma of a speculative character, suffered the teaching of this breviary of the aristocracy (for the *Roman de la Rose* was nothing less) **to be disseminated with impunity.**

https://archive.org/details/pursuitofmillenn0000norm_i9m3/page/194/mode/2up?view=theater

About 1270 the egalitarian State of Nature was presented, for the first time since Antiquity, in a work of literature. Jean de Meun, a layman of enquiring mind, living in the middle of the Latin Quarter of Paris, profoundly influenced by current debates in the University, thoroughly versed also in Latin literature, dealt with the matter at some length in his vast poem the *Roman de la Rose*. **No other vernacular work in the whole of medieval literature was so popular – some 200 manuscript copies in French still survive and there were numerous translations. It was through the *Roman de la Rose* that a social theory which so far had been familiar only to learned clerics became accessible to large numbers of the laity.** Jean de Meun's description of the Golden Age and the decline therefrom is a sociological essay which is both serious and popular – **a foretaste, some five centuries in advance, of the second part of Rousseau's *Discours sur l'inégalité*** and, like that work, itself a document of great interest to the student of social myths.

'Once upon a time, in the days of our first fathers and mothers,' writes the poet, 'as the writings of the Ancients bear witness, people loved one another with a delicate and honest love, and not out of covetousness and lust for gain. Kindness reigned in the world.' In those days tastes were simple, people nourished themselves from fruit and nuts and herbs, they drank only water, they dressed in the skins of beasts, they knew nothing of agriculture, they lived in caves. **Yet there was no hardship for the earth gave freely all the food they needed. Lovers embraced on beds of flowers, beneath curtains of leaves (for this writer free love was an important part of the primal bliss). 'There they danced and disported themselves in sweet idleness, simple quiet people who cared for nothing but to live joyously and in all friendship with one another. No king or prince had yet, like a criminal, snatched up what belonged to others. All were equals and had no private property of their own. They knew well the maxim that love and authority never yet dwelt companiously together. … And so, my friend, the Ancients kept one another company, free from any bond or constraint, peacefully, decently; and they would not have given up their liberty for all the gold in Arabia and in Phrygia…'**

Unfortunately this happy state of affairs was brought to an end by the appearance of an army of vices – Deceit, Pride, Covetousness, Envy and the rest. Their first act was to set Poverty and her son Larceny loose upon the earth, which so far had known nothing of them. Next

> these demons, mad with rage and envy at seeing human beings happy, invaded the whole earth, sowing discord, chicanery, disagreements and lawsuits, quarrels, disputes, wars, slanders, hatred and rancour. **As they were infuatuated with gold, they had the earth fleeced, they dragged from her bowels the hidden treasures, metals and precious stones.** For Avarice and Covetousness have lodged in the human heart the passion for acquiring wealth. Covetousness makes money and Avarice locks it away – unhappy creature that she is, and she will never spend it but will leave it to her heirs and executors to manage and guard, if no mischance befalls it first.
>
> As soon as mankind became the prey of that band, it abandoned its first way of life. Men never paused from doing evil; they became false and began to cheat; **they fastened on properties, they divided the very soil and in doing so they drew boundaries,** and often in settling these boundaries they fought and snatched whatever they could from one another; the strongest got the biggest shares…

In the end the anarchy became so intolerable that men had to elects someone to restore and keep order. **They chose 'a big villein, the biggest-boned, the most strapping, the strongest they could find; and they made him prince and lord.'** But he needed help and so taxes and dues were instituted to pay for the apparatus of coercion; it was the beginning of the royal power. Money was coined, weapons were manufactured –

> and at the same time men fortified cities and castles and built great palaces covered with sculpture, for those who held these riches were much afraid lest they should be taken from them, either by stealth or by force. Then they were much more to be pitied, those unhappy men, for they never knew any security again, from the day when, out of greed, they took for themselves what had previously been common to all, as are the air and the sun.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Latini,_Brunetto

LATINI, BRUNETTO (*c.* 1210-*c.* 1294), Italian philosopher and scholar, was born in Florence, and belonged to the Guelph party. After the disaster of Montaperti he took refuge for some years (1261-1268) in France, but in 1269 returned to Tuscany and for some twenty years held successive high offices. **Giovanni Villani says that "he was a great philosopher and a consummate master of rhetoric, not only in knowing how to speak well, but how to write well. … He both began and directed the growth of the Florentines, both in making them ready in speaking well and in knowing how to guide and direct our republic according to the rules of politics."**

http://www.florin.ms/tesorettintro.html

Quentin Skinner in his *Foundations of Modern Political Thought* ably discusses the relationship between rhetoric and politics in medieval Florence, and sees the figure of Brunetto Latino as of the utmost importance. **He speaks of the Guelph party as that which desired to maintain the ancient liberties of the city, yet which was of the people, having overthrown the oligarchs of the feudal aristocracy. He notes that the Ghibellines were those who hankered for the old ways, for conservative stability, for law and order, and for a strong central power.** The Guelphs were antagonistic to the Popes and to Frederick II's imperial dynasty, which continued with King Manfred. The Ghibellines curried favour with both Pope and Emperor. Skinner sees the Guelph party as the 'Freedom' party, the Ghibellines as the 'Peace' party (I.8-48).

https://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Italian/DantInf15to21.php

I carry on speaking, no less, with Ser Brunetto, and ask who are the most famous and noblest of his companions. And he to me: 'It is good to know of some: of the rest it would be praiseworthy to keep silent, as the time would be too little for such a speech. **In short, know that all were clerks, and great scholars, and very famous, tainted with the same sin on earth.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bBHcDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR5&hl=fi&pg=PA114#v=onepage&q&f=false

Brunetto was an unrepentant Guelf, truculently committed to the independence of the Florentine republic and thereby insufficiently appreciative of the need for a noble monarch, an earthly replica of the divine king in heaven. From about 1304, Dante clearly embraced the need, the divine mandate for precisely such an earthly monarch. Brunetto died in 1294, presumably unaware of his protégé's political adjustment.
…

What is indisputable is that Brunetto Latini was an enthusiastic proponent of republican liberty; an unapologetic enemy of partisan politics that ignored or undermined the common good; a true believer in the value of the possession and practice of virtue, not genealogical inheritance, as the measure of nobility; a harsh disparager of the art of ruling by artifice, fear, and misdirection; a prescient advocate of the position that the accumulation of private weath corrupts political life and jeopardizes widespread liberty; **and a tireless promoter of the ideals of the ancient Roman republican in contrast to the principles of the subsequent Roman empire.**49
…

> 2. Peter Armour observes, "It is uncertain whether Brunetto's last words to Dante in *Inferno* XV, 119-20 … refer to the lengthy prose *Tresor* in French or to the innovatory Italian narrative poem, the *Tesoro*, or perhaps both. The former, precursor of [Dante's] *Convivio*, was more famous; but the latter had suggested the starting point for the vernacular *Comedy* and, as a poem, however defective or 'municipal' in its language, would have been the more appropriate vehicle for immortality." **"Brunetto, the Stoic Pessimist,"** *Dante Studies* 112 (1994): 14.
> …
>
> 4. That Brunetto Latini was an unapologetic, staunch advocate of republicanism and a strident adversary of monarchism is indisputable. Julia Bolton Holloway observes, **"In his persona as Aristotle [in *Trésor*] [Brunetto] was even to deliberately mistranslate the text of *Nicomachean Ethics* where it praised monarchy, changing this to the opposite, the praise of the commune, the republic, of government by people, not princes … the *Trésor* was a book likely commissioned by republican Florentine bankers and compiled by Brunetto Latini – to educate kings and emperors how to govern constitutionally. … It was used by aristocrats and revolutionaries to correct tyranny."** *Twice-Told Tales*, 8, 13.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

We do not hear of materialism and atheism until the twelfth century in Italy where the Epicurean and Stoic traditions were then revived, mainly from Arab sources. This would indicate, incidentally, that the two great ancient speculative systems next to Plato's and Aristotle's, namely atomistic materialism and the spiritualism of the gnostic and hermetic kind, had merely gone underground at the end of Hellenistic culture, and surfaced again as the Church's hold on men's mind weakened.
…

Atheism as such could not manifest itself explicitly for a long time. Yet it was present in all its elements in the late medieval Italian universities, especially at Padua. Italian naturalism received its main tenets from the philosophy of Averroës (1126-1198), which denied divine providence, human freedom, and personal immortality, and regarded the world as eternal. **This was akin to Stoic and atomist principles, and soon conquered the Franciscan school at Oxford too.** In 1269, that is in the last

years of Thomas Aquinas's life, the bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, condemned the Averroist theses but they continued to prosper in Italy: belief in nature's inner power (the world-soul), in Lucretius's atoms, in the atomist composition of the soul, etc. **As one can see, this naturalism was eclectic, it took its ingredients from neo-Platonism, the Stoics, Epicurus, the Arabs,** and it inspired its adepts with more enthusiasm than with the desire to reach systematic conclusions.

In the next century, that is by the time Italian atheists abounded in the intellectual milieux of Paris where they helped to spread the 'libertine' movement, there developed a climate reminiscent of Epicurus' Gardens. We learn that police officials were accusing Théophile de Viau (1590-1626) of teaching that one should forget the Christian religion and recognize no other god than Nature to which we owe an entire submission, to the point of becoming like beasts.24 **We learn also that Viau put his trust 'in fate rather than in Providence' because he believed that matter was eternal and that the World-Soul (the Stoics' immanent logos) caused the elements to assemble in ephemeral forms (Epicurus).**

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/72/mode/2up?view=theater

Like their ancestors in the Hellenistic and Roman times, the late medieval disciples of Pyrrho, Lucretius, and Zeno were practically indistinguishable from one another. As showed before, they combined Stoic thought with Epicurean action or contrariwise, Epicurean thought with Stoical action. Whatever the combination, there is no doubt that they were the transmitters of the Hellenic and Hellenistic-Roman ethical systems to the western world, and thus the shapers of humanistic ideals and ethics. **Their teaching found a fertile ground among some representatives of Christian thought, like Roger Bacon, William Ockham, Cusanus, and even some mystics. These men were inside but on the edge of the Christian mainstream, and their hand was immeasurably strengthened by Epicurean-Stoic arguments with which they had little real affinity, but which focused, like theirs did although for different reasons, on a definition of man liberated of transcendence. To be more precise, the just-mentioned Christian thinkers did not seek to abolish faith in God, they sought in their respective ways to rehabilitate man's cognitive faculties to independence from the faculty of faith.** Even when the objective was the opposite, as in the case of Nicholas of Cusa and some mystics, the location of a common principle of faith and knowledge, the result was still a split between the two. Faith remained based on all the accumulated authority and thus thought to be secure and unattackable, but philosophy, trying to provide faith with speculative and even mathematical support, strengthened only itself, while in fact undermining faith in God. In 'negative theology,' for example, God became all the things that the world was not, so that ultimately nothing that comes into reason's purview could be stated in religious discourse.13 God ceased to be a worthy object of knowledge since knowledge was now sought at the opposite pole from faith.

The contribution of the Stoic-Lucretian-Pyrrhonic sects to the cleavage of divine and human science is hard to overestimate. **According to their triple heritage, their late-medieval and Renaissance disciples pictured God in one of two ways: either as a self-enclosed happiness, or an utter void.** The first statement denies revelation, incarnation, and redemption, that is God's sustained relationship with the world and with man, the second is simply atheistic. In either case, man remained the center of the universe, and from his status it followed that everything else not measured and passed by human standards could be safely stripped away.

https://archive.org/details/historyofchurch0003hugh/page/382/mode/2up?view=theater

But it was not only Platonism—in its purer and in its baser forms—that came to life again in the West as a force in men's lives. **Stoicism also revived; and Epicureanism. Once more man is invited to the belief in the perfectibility of his nature, and to accept the doctrine of his own goodness.** To the Christian doctrine of the fall and its effects on human nature, of all men's need of healing grace, there is opposed the new, more elegantly stated, cult of man as he is, meditations on a way of life unfettered by sobering thoughts of man as he ought to be. The new man is to be made perfect by the full freedom to indulge his every impulse, to satisfy his every desire; for this alone is life. Man is simply an animal endowed with the power to think, master of his fate indeed, sole captain of his soul, to whom all that is possible is lawful. Never before was the "natural" so attractively portrayed to the Christian world as good and perfectible.
…

Morals begin, in every city and court of Italy, their gadarene descent, and among the most notorious of these ill-living antagonists of Christian ideals are the humanists of the *Curia Romana*. Nowhere did the new worship of antiquity produce greater contempt and hatred for the culture and the religion inspired by other sources, than in this circle. Poggio made the sins of priests and religious the butt of his filthy *Facetiae* and in his work on Avarice he mocked the very spiritual ideals that should have prevented sin. **Valla, author of the *De Voluptate*, made an**

open attack on the ideal of chastity declaring that prostitutes were more useful to mankind than nuns. Aretino wrote the *Oratio Heliogaboli ad meretrices*. Alberti, correct it would seem in his personal conduct, did not scruple to accept the dedication of **Beccadelli's infamous *Hermaphrodite.***2

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lorenzo-valla/

Meanwhile he had moved to Pavia in 1431, stimulated by his friend Panormita (Antonio Beccadelli, 1394-1471)—with whom he was soon to quarrel—and had begun to teach rhetoric. **He had to flee Pavia, however, in 1433 after having aroused the anger of the jurists. In a letter to a humanist jurist friend of his, Catone Sacco (1394-1463), Valla had attacked the language of one of the lawyers' main authorities, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-1357).**

https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/collegeofhumanities/history/exhistoria/volume5/Bryne_Vallas_De_voluptate_48-73.pdf

Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406-1457) suffered the dubious distinction of being Martin Luther's favourite humanist.2 As such, he has been depicted as the most avant-garde of quattrocento thinkers: the forerunner of Erasmus; an innovator in philology and textual criticism; a rhetorician who cleared away the moribund tangle of scholastic Aristotelian categories and replaced them with a philosophy of language based on usage.3 Yet Valla is also a profoundly contradictory figure. **His rival, the humanist scholar Poggio Bracciolini, preferred to describe him as the grand heresiarch of Christianity.**4 Valla disproved the historical truth of the Donation of Constantine, demolishing papal claims to Italian sovereignty and was eventually brought before the Neapolitan Inquisition, but ended his life as apostolic secretary in the papal curia.5 **These, and other apparent contradictions in his life and writings, have led to Luther's favourite humanist being labelled 'a seriously flippant theologian'.**6
…

In *De voluptate*, Valla follows a similar scheme, comparing Stoic, Epicurean, and Christian moral philosophies. Three orators examine whether the true good for man lies in Stoic virtue, in an Epicurean love of corporeal pleasures or in the Christian vision of God. Valla gives these parts to his contemporaries: **the jurist Catone Sacco speaks for the Stoics,** the poet Maffeo Vegio attacks Stoicism by espousing the teachings of Epicurus, and Antonio da Rho, a Franciscan friar, pronounces a Christian verdict upon them both.9

Valla wrote about Epicureanism before the Renaissance rediscovery of classical Epicurean texts. **Poggio Bracciolini had not yet circulated his newly-discovered manuscript of first century Epicurean philosopher Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, and Valla wrote without access to Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*, which discussed Epicurus' teachings in greater detail.**10 Nor had Valla read one of the core texts of Stoic thought in the later Renaissance, as manuscripts containing the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus were fragmentary and scattered across Italy.11 **Valla's discussion of the ancient schools of philosophy, therefore, was not based on any new information, but on what could be gleaned from the writings of Cicero and Seneca.**
…

Focusing on Valla's apparent sympathy with his first, Epicurean orator, it was argued that he had constructed a new vision of man based upon a more positive evaluation of *voluptas* (pleasure), writing the celebration of sensory pleasures into Christian doctrine, even to the extent of creating a 'Christian Epicureanism'.12 William Bouwsma, for example, declared the composition of *De voluptate* as the moment at which humanism threw off the shackles of ascetically-inclined, medieval 'stoicising' Christianity.13
…

In his treatise on the Donation of Constantine, Valla, challenging the idea that any land annexed by the Roman Empire could be transferred to papal control, scorned the myth of primitive, virtuous Rome:

> You say to me 'the Romans justly waged war upon nations and they justly deprived them of liberty' […]. Yet no offence could have been so serious as to warrant peoples' everlasting slavery, since they have often waged wars through the fault of a prince or some great citizen in the state, and then, after being defeated, were undeservedly penalised with slavery.46

…

Valla thus denies that any comparison can be made between pagan falsehood and revealed truth. **On this reading it cannot be argued that Epicurean philosophy comes closer to Christian truth than Stoicism, for both philosophies lacked any conception of the proper *finis* of man.**51
…

Yet his denial of ethical value to ancient moral systems is striking when compared to Bruni's defence of Aristotle and Plato. Asked whether those philosophers had been good men, **Bruni replied: 'did they live according to their own custom? As if indeed virtue and moral seriousness were not the same as they are now!'**53 **For Valla, virtue had indeed always been the same, but it had never been known to Aristotle or Plato.**
…

In *De voluptate*, the golden age is adduced by both Stoic and Epicurean orators in order to vindicate their respective moral philosophies. For the Stoic Catone, the golden age is proof that man requires a civilising influence, because human society naturally tends to disorder and turmoil.63 **Saturn is celebrated as a law-giver, a ruler who brought order and stability.**64 Conversely, the Epicurean Vegio characterises the golden age as a time in which men learned to take a delight in living.65 Vegio's golden age is exemplified by indulgence: **the figure of Saturn is almost dwarfed by veneration of Bacchus. There is no mention of 'justice': it is a period recognised as good because of mass enjoyment of pleasure. More strikingly, the golden age is not located in any precise time-frame; there is no mention of man falling away from it or of the end of Saturn's reign. By adopting an Epicurean lifestyle, men can return to it today.**66

Finally, Antonio da Rho, the Christian orator, propounds a third vision of the golden age in his closing sermon. **He provides a critique of the Epicurean golden age and, like Lactantius, adapts the idea for Christian thought. The age was 'golden' because of its virtue.** This narrative also provides another reason for explaining why those who lived before Christ fall short of salvation, and must be irretrievably condemned. **Rho leans on Lactantius' definition of the golden age as a period of 'pagan monotheism', arguing that there was a time when monotheistic virtue was known and practiced on earth.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA140#v=onepage&q&f=false

One of the key objections to the notion that the soul perished with the body was that it undermined God's just governance of the universe because when, as often happened, good deeds went unrewarded and evil ones unpunished in the present life, this injustice could not be rectified in except in the afterlife (Pomponazzi 1948: 347-8). Pomponazzi counters this objection by arguing that virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment, so that, even without an afterlife, virtue is always rewarded and vice always punished. **Drawing a distinction between "essential" (*essentiale*) and "accidental" (*accidentale*) rewards and punishments, he says that the "essential reward of virtue is virtue itself," for "human nature can possess nothing greater than virtue itself, since it alone makes man secure and removed from every perturbation,"** while the essential punishment of vice is guilt: and just as guilt is far worse than the accidental punishment of paying a penalty, so a person who acts virtuously "without hope of reward" is considered more virtuous than one who does so in hope of an accidental reward and is therefore rewarded "more essentially" (*magis essentialiter*) than one who is rewarded "accidentally" (*accidentialiter*) (Pomponazzi 1948: 361-3; 1954: 200-4; Kristeller 1956b). **Although Pomponazzi employs the scholastic terminology and ponderous style of argumentation characteristic of Aristotelian university philosophers, the doctrine he presents is recognizably Stoic.** The texts he adduces in support of it, however, are by Plato (*Apology* 41d, which he incorrectly cites as *Crito*) and Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1.11 and 7.6; and *Problems* 30.11).15 **This is probably because he realized that Aristotle and Plato, the most renowned philosophers of antiquity, would carry much more weight on this crucial issue than the Stoics,** who had not yet achieved a position of undisputed authority in Renaissance philosophy.

For very different reasons, Alexander of Aphrodisias also did not mention the Stoics in his treatise *On Fate*, even though it was directed against their deterministic doctrines. **Alexander's decision not so name his opponents was most likely motivated by his desire to confront determinism as an independent philosophical position, rather than as a part of the Stoic system** (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1983: 19-20). When, however, Girolamo Bagolino, an Aristotelian professor at the University of Padua in the 1510s and 20s, translated the treatise into Latin in 1516,16 he was able to identify the Stoics as Alexander's target by relying on Aulus Gellius's quotation (*Attic Nights* 7.2.3) of Chrysippus's definition of fate (Kraye 2008: 8-10). **So when Pomponazzi read the treatise in Bagolino's Latin**

version, he knew that Alexander was attacking the Stoics. Pomponazzi did not, however, share Alexander's hostility to Stoic determinism and, in fact, explicitly defended it, in his treatise *On Fate, Free Will and Predestination*, written in 1520 but published posthumously in 1567,17 as more coherent, on a purely philosophical level, than either Peripatetic or Christian providentialism. **Aristotle, Pomponazzi claims, contradicted his own principle that motion cannot be self-initiated, set out in *Physics* 8, when, for the sake of promoting moral responsibility in works such as the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he endorsed the notion of free will** (Pomponazzi 2004a: II 548-53).18

> 18. In his lectures on Aristotle's *De partibus*, held from 1521-1524, however, **he presented both the Stoic position that temperaments are entirely determined by organic factors and the Peripatetic view that temperaments are predisposed, rather than determined, by the body,** without deciding between the two (Pomponazzi 2004b: 222-3; Perfetti 2012: §5).

As for the Christian belief in divine providence, Pomponazzi maintains that, from a strictly philosophical perspective, it left the omnipotent Christian God vulnerable to the accusation of injustice, since he had not eliminated evil and sin from the world, even though he had the power to do so. Stoic fate, by contrast, was a product of the eternal and immutable structure of the universe, to which even the divinity was subservient (ibid.: I 414-16). **Once again, therefore, Pomponazzi has recourse to a Stoic doctrine, this time identified as such,** for the purposes of theodicy, finding in the pagan sect powerful philosophical vindications of divine justice.

After surveying all the views, both philosophical and religious, on determinism and providence, **Pomponazzi concludes that the opinion of the Stoics was the most consistent and the least likely to be contradicted.** Nevertheless, on the grounds of faith, which he always insisted was superior to philosophical reasoning, he accepted the truth of the church's position on divine providence (ibid.: I 448-9, and 892-9), just as he accepted its decree on the immortality of the soul.

In addition to Alexander, Pomponazzi's sources of information about Stoicism included Cicero, Seneca and Diogenes Laertius. **Yet his account of Stoic determinism bears more relation to his own brand of Aristotelian astral fatalism than it does to the authentic philosophy of the Stoics.** Rather than referring to specific doctrines of individual Stoic philosophers such as Zeno or Chrysippus, he instead uses the generic label "the Stoics," often, it seems, to provide a cover for his polemical assertion of astrological determinism – **"we see that sublunary matters are governed by the heavenly bodies"**19 – against both Alexandrist and Christian Aristotelianism (ibid.: I lxi-lxii, xcii-cix).

Stoicism occupied a paradoxical place in Pomponazzi's philosophy: **he associated one of its principal ethical doctrines with Plato and Aristotle, yet presented his own celestial determinism in Stoic guise.** Both maneuvers were possible because, in the early decades of the sixteenth century, Stoicism remained to a large extent unexplored territory on the fringes of Renaissance philosophy.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/848/mode/2up?view=theater

After this, this same key article continues with an obviously subversive account of Pomponazzi, depicted here as a loyal Aristotelian in some respects but one who nevertheless ridiculed everything to be found in the Gospels and the Fathers. Pomponazzi was a major figure in the history of philosophy, according to the *Encyclopédie*, but one primarily concerned to undermine basic Catholic dogma, **holding that either Man does not possess free will or else God is ignorant of future events and does not intervene in the course of human affairs, since the doctrine of divine providence is logically wholly incompatible with human liberty.**34

http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/New_Journal_Samples/MISP0363-6550~26~1/053.PDF

> 4. John Herman Randall, Jr. in *The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science* (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1961) summarizes Pomponazzi's place in the change of world views saying, "**[Pomponazzi is] Called 'the last Scholastic and the first man of the Enlightenment'** he did indeed partake of the natures of both; of the latter in his fiery zeal against theologians, his scorn for all comfortable and compromising modernism in religion and his sober vision of the natural destiny of man; **of the former in his refusal to leave the bounds of the Aristotelian tradition, in his meticulous use of the medieval method of refutation, and in his painstaking attention to the reasons by which a position was defended.** But as the Renaissance man between the two, he shared the spirit of his age: its concentration on man and his destiny, its view of human nature as the link between heaven and earth, **its reverence for the authority of the ancients – for him, Aristotle – and despite all theory, its Stoic temper of mind**" (87-9).

…

It is quite common for commentators to claim that Pomponazzi has a Stoic view of virtue.5 This picture is essentially deterministic in nature. That is, the gods set up the universe according to predetermined

laws and that virtuous person accepts one's lot in life simply by living according to these laws. **Pomponazzi, however, also follows Aristotle's theory of virtue as a good habit developed by consistent good choices made in freedom.** Because of his devotion to Aristotle, then, Pomponazzi must sort out the meaning of virtue as having both Stoic and Aristotelian elements – a combination seeming to have many inherent and perhaps irreconcilable contradictions.
…

In such a system there is a conflict between the ordered universe of Aristotle's *Physics* and his doctrine of virtue as set forth in the *Ethics*, which demands, free choice and the capacity to form habits. Moral virtue is for Aristotle a state of character having as its abiding disposition the choice of the mean.7
…

Depending on whether one reads Aristotle from an Averroist view point or from the perspective of Alexander of Aphrodisias, one will come to different conclusions concerning Aristotle's own text. **Alexander seems to emphasize the ethical context.** The strict Averroist interpretation stresses the physics and metaphysics of causality. Consequently, the notion of free choice would have little place in Aristotle despite the existence of Aristotle's ethics.10

> 10. Ibid. Maurer shows in his analysis of Siger of Brabant, probably the most famous of the Parisian Averroists, that all extraordinary physical events often called magic and miracles can be explained by purely natural but perhaps unknown causes. Such happenings never result simply from words spoken by a human being or from the free choice of a human. Whether Pomponazzi actually read Siger's texts is not clear, but he was conscious of Siger's positions, for as Pine points out, **"Within the limits of reason alone, Siger denied the existence of demons, ascribed miracles to the influence of the Intelligences, and held for the cyclical return of all events … All these positions would later be explicitly accepted by Pomponazzi."** *Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance*, 269-70.

In a word, the Aristotelian theory of the governance of the Intelligences supersedes human free choice. There is, however, the interpretation of Aristotle that emphasizes the notion of free choice provided by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander has three points that indicate the existence of free choice. First, one cannot deny the occurrence of chance and accidental events. Secondly, everyone has personal experience of deliberation concerning a problem. Third, there are evil results, such as the inability to assign responsibility for a human action, that flow from accepting determinism as a philosophical position.11 **Some read Pomponazzi's treatment of fate as a response to Alexander's attack on the Stoic doctrine and the source of Pomponazzi's own discussion of contingency.**12 Pine concludes that the situation of Pomponazzi's Aristotelianism is very much up in the air. Following the Paduan school, Pomponazzi certainly esteems Averroes and his follower Siger of Brabant. A superficial reading of the early parts of *De fato* looks like Pomponazzi simply rejects any talk of freedom, but as Pine points out and as a quick look at the chapter headings of Book 3 indicates the work actually tries to reconcile the conflicting trends surrounding a deterministic universe and free choice. "**Unable to resolve the contradiction, Pomponazzi decides that Cicero was right when he said that Aristotle was a determinist who believed in fate. The position taken in the *Ethics*, Pomponazzi concludes, is intended to hide determinism out of fear of persecution. So Aristotle said one thing and believed another.**"13

> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dZ2hUU_HHcqDB5Hla4DhyZhg5epJ-79U8I8G9LTPBTg/edit
>
> Hobbes himself was not unwilling to ascribe dissimulation to Aristotle, without any imputation of moral fault. At the end of an attack on the doctrine of separated essences, Hobbes writes:
>
> > **it may be [Aristotle] knew [this doctrine] to be false philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.** (L xlvi, 18, 692)
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=J57Irdoky70C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA100#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Mr Hobbes was wont to say that had Descartes kept himself wholly to geometry, that he had been the best geometer in the world. **He did very much admire him, but said that he could not pardon him for writing in the defence of transubstantiation which he knew to be absolutely against his judgment.**

…

This set of problems surrounding a deterministic universe and moral virtue seems to resist solution on merely philosophical grounds. **This is especially galling to Pomponazzi, since he clearly wants to avoid theological intrusion into the realm of philosophical speculation.** In the end, however, he must turn to his medieval predecessors who are both philosophers and theologians for help in solving

the problem. He develops a rather sophisticated rational theology that ultimately helps him out as he struggles with freedom and determinism.
…

In Immanuel Kant one sees the progress of his thought as an attempt to move from a view of the necessity embedded in a doctrine of physical causality as advanced in *Critique of Pure Reason* to reestablishing freedom as a special kind of intelligible causality under the control of the rational agent in *Critique of Practical Reason*. Like Pomponazzi, Kant felt a need to allow both philosophy and science to stand on their own. When one comes to morality, however, one must introduce elements that do not easily coincide with deterministic science. **Pomponazzi was not yet separated completely from his medieval predecessors and only moves slightly from his predecessors' theological solutions for the problem.** Kant, because of Hume's devastating critique of the idea of cause and his Enlightenment background, provides a solution that is totally philosophical. But the stage for such a solution was not yet set during Pomponazzi's generation.

A comparison of Kant and Pomponazzi on these matters would be an especially enlightening exercise for three reason. First, **both philosophers esteem, but also see the limitations of Stoic ethics.**
…

In Pomponazzi's case, the Scientific Revolution is just beginning; in Kant's case, that revolution had become the accepted intellectual way of talking about our physical universe and our relationship to that world.

https://www.academia.edu/25590448/Stoicism_in_the_Renaissance

Ficino's Platonist attempt to demonstrate the immortality of the soul on rational grounds was challenged a few decades later by the Aristotelian Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), who argued in his *De immortalitate animae* that it was impossible to offer such a proof. **Although Pomponazzi was a committed Aristotelian, he also made use of Stoic arguments.** In response to the concern that denial of the immortality of the soul would remove the possibility of post-mortem punishment and so undermine virtuous behaviour, he argued along Stoic lines that virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment (*De immortalitate animae* 14; Pomponazzi 2012, 180-1). **He also pointed to Seneca as an example of someone who held the soul to be mortal while remaining morally upright,** motivated by the Stoic doctrine that 'virtue alone is happiness, and vice misery', and pursuing only those external goods which serve virtue, while avoiding those which hinder it (*De immortalitate animae* 14; Pomponazzi 2012, 202-5). **In a later work Pomponazzi was more explicit, stating that there is nothing disadvantageous to agreeing with the Stoics that the soul is mortal** (Pomponazzi 2004, II: 892-5).
…

For Ficino, Stoicism is compromised by its metaphysics because human happiness ultimately depends on the existence of an immortal soul. For Pomponazzi, by contrast, Stoic ethics stands autonomously and remains attractive independent of one's view about the nature of the soul.
…

In his *De fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione* (published posthumously in 1567), he defended Stoic determinism against the criticisms of the ancient Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias, **arguing that the Stoic theory was more consistent and coherent than either the Aristotelian position or the Christian doctrine of divine providence** (Pomponazzi 2004, 1:414-17; with Kraye 2016). **His use of material from a Greek Aristotelian commentator like Alexander (even though in a Latin translation by Girolamo Bagolino, 1516) marked a step forwards in the recovery of ancient sources of information about Stoic doctrine.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pomponazzi/#FateProv

Several months after Pomponazzi completed *On Incantations* in 1520, he finished *De fato, de libero arbitrio, et de praestinatione*, (*On Fate, Free Will, and Predestination*) a work that addressed Alexander of Aphrodisias's *De fato*, which had been printed in Girolamo Bagolino's Latin translation in 1516. **In this work, Alexander criticized Stoic deterministic understandings of causation because they deny the possibility of chance, contingency, and human choice.** In *On Fate*, Pomponazzi largely sided not with Alexander but in favor of his Stoic opposition.
…

The fifth and final book of *On Fate* continues the theological discussions of the previous two books, **turning to an examination of predestination, a concept that according to Pomponazzi is not mentioned by philosophers but is key to Christian theology,** being tied to doctrines on fate and God's providence.
…

The epilogue reiterates his conviction that the Stoic conception of the universe is preferable. **He maintained that if the universe is like an animal, the sublunary world represents excrements, while the heavenly spheres are perfect, free of evil. Finally, he confessed that he has never understood how Christian theologians preserve divine providence and human free will, describing it as an illusion and a trick** (5. *epilogus*. 7-10).

https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Pietro_Pomponazzi#Fate_and_Free_Will

Pomponazzi completed his treatise *De fato* (*On Fate*) in 1520. It was the most involved of his works, discussing whether the human will can be free or not, and the conflict between determinism and Christian thought.

In the first section, he discussed divine rule and human free will. **Although his main thought was close to Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose opinion was that the human will can select between two equal alternatives, Pomponazzi concluded by yielding free will to the determinism of natural laws.** This determinism, similar to that promoted by the Stoics, was criticized by Alexander.

In the second section, Pomponazzi attempted to mitigate the uncertainty regarding human freedom and perpetual divine foresight. He examined in detail the theories of previous philosophers such as Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, concluding that no philosophical demonstration could support the doctrines of the Church. **He even went so far as to say that the Stoic thought on fate and freedom is less contradictory; the god in Stoicism is the indwelling principle of order in the cosmos, while the god in Christianity, though he is almighty, merciful, and good, is puzzlingly not able to block evil.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dwdZEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA333#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hadn't Pico and Ficino shown that we are part animal, part angel? Are we not made to partake even of divinity, in some small way? Didn't Aristotle himself say in his *Ethics* that we are capable of reaching beyond a merely human life, to reach ultimate felicity through theoretical contemplation? How then can intellect be inevitably linked to embodiment? Pomponazzi anticipates this line of objection, and responds that contemplation is indeed something quasi-divine, which is precisely why we shouldn't make it the purpose of human life. **Look around: most people are peasants or artisans, and even among the elite very few men and hardly any women are concerned with philosophy (354). Which is perfectly fine, says Pomponazzi. Our aim as humans is to be morally upright, to make good use of what Aristotle called *practical* intellect. We do have a theoretical intellect too, which can be used to grasp universal truths, but this is just a kind of bonus that comes on top of the happiness already secured through a virtuous life (356).** Indeed, to insist that human life loses its purpose if we are not immortal is to suggest that the only reason to be good is to gain reward and avoid punishment in the afterlife, whereas in fact virtue should be pursued here and now for its own sake (375).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA141#v=onepage&q&f=false

A more substantial engagement with Stoicism was made by Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), perhaps better known as an Aristotelian. His distaste for the then dominant Averroist interpretation of Aristotle led Pomponazzi to Aristotle's ancient commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias in search of a purer reading of Aristotle's texts. Although Pomponazzi did not follow Alexander in detail, he did share with him a more naturalistic approach to Aristotle. More importantly though, Pomponazzi would have learned much from Alexander about Stoicism, and it has been suggested that Pomponazzi adopted a number of Stoic ideas. The first of these is the claim that virtue is its own reward (and not the ground for some other reward in an afterlife, which Pomponazzi rejected). The second is the Stoic attempt to reconcile freedom with determinism, which Pomponazzi thought was the most plausible of the many responses to this classic problem. He outlines the reasons why in his treatise *On Fate* (*De Fato*), written in 1520 and inspired by his reading of Alexander's treatise of the same name. **However, Pomponazzi rejected Alexander's position (and his criticisms of the Stoics), instead affirming the Stoic claims that contingency and chance are illusions, and that what appears to human beings as freedom is in fact subsumed within a larger wholly determined Nature. Consequently Pomponazzi's philosophy has been characterized as "a rather Stoic Aristotelianism"** (Randall 1948: 279).

---

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/74/mode/2up?view=theater

Yet, next to humanism as craftsmanship and as genuine love of learning, there was another humanism, perhaps inseparable from the first. **What French scholars brought back from Padua after 1530, and what Italian humanists brought to the rest of Europe during the sixteenth century was an atheistic ideology, part infatuation with whatever the Ancients did or wrote, part conviction that the Christian religion, opposed to the Ancients' paganism, was an indefensible system of superstitions. Today scholars argue that there was an unbroken continuity from the teachings at Padua through the humanists, libertines and deists to the French *philosophes* of the**

eighteenth century, and it is difficult to disagree with them. The inspiration, the themes, even the methods of arguing are the same. The latter in particular shows this similarity, a similarity of strategy which portrays the writings of the whole movement. **The apparent objective of the French Étienne Dolet and Pierre Bayle, or of the English John Toland was to defend God against atheists.** This is done by showing that the best defense is to place God out of bounds to philosophers whose reasoning leads them irresistibly to skepticism or Epicureism. The next step is to show that most men regarded as religious entertain nothing but superstitions, an attitude which brings God and religion into disrepute. **If one must choose between a superstitious person and an atheist, Bayle argued, the latter is the better man since pagan history shows that those having no knowledge of God can still lead morally irreproachable lives (Socrates, Epicurus, Cato, Brutus), whereas many professed Christians were evil, fanatical and cruel men.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA70#v=onepage&q&f=false

Humanists and Paduans joined together in the same way in which ancient and new learning usually unite. Their combined influence spread throughout Italy, from Padua to Bologna to Florence. It extended also to France through the intermediary of those Paduans who journeyed to Italy to study: Étienne Dolet, Sadolet, Longueil, Bunel, who transmitted the Paduan doctrine to Montaigne, Simon de Neuville and the jurist Boyssonné, the friend of Rabelais. **As the students returned to France, they established Paduan centers throughout the country – at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Cahors, Orléans, Lyons. Since many of them entered the magistracy or public administration, they were prepared to lend aid to persecuted Paduans anywhere;** and although the two outstanding thinkers of Renaissance France, Rabelais and Montaigne, were not Paduans, they were nonetheless saturated with their doctrine.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA655#v=onepage&q&f=false

It was this situation which gave rise to the free-thinker, the “libertin,” **derived from Italian naturalism, but derived also from that greatest of free-thinkers, Montaigne.** It was a motley crew, composed of those whom we now call the “erudite” free-thinkers (Charron, Naudé, Sorbière, La Mothe le Vayer, Guy Patin, and the leader of the group, Gassendi), the Horatian, satiric, epicurean poets (Théophile de Viau, Desbarreaux, Dehénault, Mme Deshoulières, Blot, Chaulieu, and La Fare), the innumerable writers of travel literature, the utopian novelists (Rabelais, Cyrano, Vairasse, Foigny, Tyssot de Patot, Gilbert, Fénelon), **and the deists (beginning with Rabelais and Montaigne in a mild way, continuing with Gassendi and Sir Herbert of Cherbury, and establishing themselves firmly as an intellectual movement with Spinoza and a whole long line of English pseudo-spinozists and a corresponding line of French followers – Boulainvilliers, Fréret, Dumarsais, Mirabaud, Meslier).** Throughout the closing years of the sixteenth century, and during the whole of the seventeenth down to the opening years of the eighteenth, there was always one or other of these groups to carry on the free-thinking tradition. **The Italian naturalists came first since the whole movement came out of Italy via Padua; but by the end of the sixteenth century it was firmly implanted in the intellectual centers of Europe, especially France.** In France, with the aid of Montaigne, they gave way to the erudite free-thinkers who flourished from the early twenties of the seventeenth century until the early seventies.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Dolet,_%C3%89tienne

DOLET, ÉTIENNE (1509-1546), French scholar and printer, was born at Orleans on the 3rd of August 1509. A doubtful tradition makes him the illegitimate son of Francis I.; but it is evident that he was at least connected with some family of rank and wealth. From Orleans he was taken to Paris about 1521; and after studying under Nicolas Bérauld, the teacher of Coligny, he proceeded in 1526 to Padua.
…

Returning to France soon afterwards he proceeded to Toulouse to study law; but there he soon became involved in the violent disputes between the different “nations” of the university, was thrown into prison, and finally banished by a decree of the parlement. **In 1535 he entered the lists against Erasmus in the famous Ciceronian controversy,** by publishing through Sebastien Gryphe (Gryphius) at Lyons a *Dialogus de imitatione Ciceroniana*; and the following year saw the appearance of his two folio volumes
Commentariorum linguae Latinae.
…

That he was not altogether unaware of the dangers to which he was exposed from the bigotry of the time is shown not only by the tone of his mottoes—*Préserve moi, Seigneur, des calomnies des hommes*, and *Durior est spectatae virtutis quam incognitae conditio*—but also by the fact that **he endeavoured first of all to conciliate his opponents by publishing a *Cato christianus*, or Christian moralist, in which he made profession of his creed.** The catholicity of his literary appreciation, **in spite of his ultra-Ciceronianism,** was soon displayed by the works which proceeded from his press—ancient and modern, sacred and secular, from the New Testament in Latin to Rabelais in French.

…

Whether Dolet is to be classed with the representatives of Protestantism or with the advocates of anti-Christian rationalism has been frequently disputed; **by the principal Protestants of his own time he was not recognized, and by Calvin he is formally condemned, along with Agrippa and his master Villanova, as having uttered execrable blasphemies against the Son of God;** but, to judge by the religious character of a large number of the books which he translated or published, such a condemnation is altogether misplaced. His repeated advocacy of the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue is especially noticeable.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA98#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the case of the Lyon-based humanist Bonaventure des Periers (*c*. 1510–*c*. 1543), author of the atheistic text *Cymbalum mundi* (1537), for example, and the 'sect of atheists' reportedly thriving in Lyon, in France, in the 1530s and 1540s, **we see a direct convergence and overlapping of Radical Reformation and Radical Renaissance.**1

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Des_P%C3%A9riers,_Bonaventure

DES PÉRIERS, BONAVENTURE (*c*. 1500-1544), French author, was born of a noble family at Arnay-le-duc in Burgundy at the end of the 15th century. The circumstances of his education are uncertain, but he became a good classical scholar, and was attached to various noble houses in the capacity of tutor. In 1533 or 1534 Des Périers visited **Lyons, then the most enlightened town of France, and a refuge for many liberal scholars who might elsewhere have had to suffer for their opinions. He gave some assistance to Robert Olivetan and Lefèvre d'Étaples in the preparation of the vernacular version of the Old Testament, and to Étienne Dolet in the *Commentarii linguae latinae*.** In 1536 he put himself under the protection of Marguerite d'Angoulême, queen of Navarre, who made him her *valet-de-chambre*. He acted as the queen's secretary, and transcribed the *Heptaméron* for her. It is probable that his duties extended beyond those of a mere copyist, and some writers have gone so far as to say that the *Heptaméron*
was his work. **The free discussions permitted at Marguerite's court encouraged a licence of thought as displeasing to the Calvinists as to the Catholics.**

> https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/25/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> As opposed to the humble seriousness with which the battle was conducted in Germany, in France one fought with lewd wit; instead of having theological disputations, one here wrote amusing satires. The object of the latter was usually to show the contradiction which arises with oneself when one claims to be entirely spirit. Here the most delightful stories flourished, about pious men who are involuntarily defeated by their animal nature, or who wish to save their aura of holiness and flee to hypocrisy. **The Queen of Navarre had already depicted such situations in her novellas.**38 **Her usual theme is the relationship of monks to women, and she wants not just to shake our diaphragm but also the institution of monasticism.**
>
> 38. Marguerite d'Angouléme (1492-1549) wrote a collection of novellas, *Heptaméron*, in the style of the *Decameron*.

This free inquiry became scepticism in Bonaventure's *Cymbalum Mundi* … (1537), and the queen of Navarre thought it prudent to disavow the author, though she continued to help him privately until 1541. The book consisted of four dialogues in imitation of Lucian. Its allegorical form did not conceal its real meaning, and, when it was printed by Morin, probably early in 1538, the Sorbonne secured the suppression of the edition before it was offered for sale. **The dedication provides a key to the author's intention: *Thomas du Clevier* (*or Clenier*) *à son ami Pierre Tryocan* was recognized by 19th-century editors to be an anagram for *Thomas l'Incrédule à son ami Pierre Croyant*.** The book was reprinted in Paris in the same year. It made many bitter enemies for the author. Henri Estienne called it *détestable*, and Étienne Pasquier said it deserved to be thrown into the fire with its author if he were still living. Des Périers prudently left Paris, and after some wanderings settled at Lyons, where he lived in poverty, until in 1544 he put an end to his existence by falling on his sword. In 1544 his collected works were printed at Lyons. The volume, *Recueil des œuvres de feu Bonaventure des Périers*, included his poems, which are of small merit, **the *Traité des quatre vertus cardinales après Sénèque*,** and a translation of the *Lysis* of Plato.

https://www.academia.edu/25590448/Stoicism_in_the_Renaissance

Calvin's intellectual career began with an edition of and commentary on Seneca's *De clementia*, published in 1532. In his preface he defended both Seneca's style and his philosophy from his recent critics. **In the realm of ethics Seneca reigns supreme (*potissimum regnat*), in Roman philosophy and**

literature he stands second only to Cicero, and reading his works gives one both profit and delight (Calvin 1969, 10-13).
…

Calvin argued in the *Institutio Christianae religionis* that his own doctrine differed from Stoicism in that he did not share the Stoic view that there existed a necessity in nature connecting all things (Calvin 1539, 265). Instead he insisted that God was master of all natural events. **In fact, this view differed little from Seneca's own position (cf. *De beneficiis* VI.23.1), especially as interpreted by Augustine (in *De civitate Dei* V.8).** This is especially clear in his *De aeterna Dei praedestinatione* of 1552, where Calvin repeats the view of Seneca that God 'always wills the same thing, and this is the praise of his constancy' (Calvin 1552, 934).

> https://ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes/institutes.v.ix.html
>
> 9. This conflict which believers maintain against the natural feeling of pain, while they study moderation and patience, Paul elegantly describes in these words: "We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed," (2 Cor. 4:8, 9). You see that to bear the cross patiently is not to have your feelings altogether blunted, and to be absolutely insensible to pain, according to the absurd description which the Stoics of old gave of their hero as one who, divested of humanity, was affected in the same way by adversity and prosperity, grief and joy; or rather, like a stone, was not affected by anything. And what did they gain by that sublime wisdom? they exhibited a shadow of patience, which never did, and never can, exist among men. Nay, rather by aiming at a too exact and rigid patience, they banished it altogether from human life. **Now also we have among Christians a new kind of Stoics, who hold it vicious not only to groan and weep, but even to be sad and anxious. These paradoxes are usually started by indolent men who, employing themselves more in speculation than in action, can do nothing else for us than beget such paradoxes.** But we have nothing to do with that iron philosophy which our Lord and Master condemned—not only in word, but also by his own example. For he both grieved and shed tears for his own and others' woes.
>
> https://ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes/institutes.v.v.html#fna_v.v-p105.1
>
> **I know how unjustly they calumniate this our doctrine; for they say it is the paradox of the Stoics concerning the equality of sins:** but we shall easily convict them out of their own mouths. I ask them whether, among those sins which they hold to be mortal, they acknowledge a greater and a less? If so, it cannot follow, as a matter of course, that all sins which are mortal are equal.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/296/mode/2up?view=theater

Realism, eclecticism, skepticism – these were not, strictly speaking, philosophies; they were intellectual positions that made philosophy possible. But just as we cannot draw a clear distinction between the constructive and destructive aspects of the philosophes' thought, so we cannot draw a clear distinction between these positions and and the philosophical principles toward which they were hospitable. **In the great campaign against Christianity, all – Stoicism and Epicureanism as much as Skepticism, especially Stoicism – had their place.**
…

The affinity of Stoic and Christian teachings had enabled the Church Fathers to claim Stoicism as a groping precursor of the Truth and to incorporate much of it into the capacious amalgam of Christian philosophy. But the divergence of Stoic and Christian doctrine was as real as the affinities, **and what man has joined together he can put asunder.** Now in the time of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, when men of good will and pacific inclinations stood appalled at their world, the formulas of Stoic philosophy seemed a possible basis for the restoration of order. **Slowly scholars began to disentangle Stoic doctrine from its Christian formulations. Stoicism remained Christian in temper for a hundred years, but at least the old pagan philosophy was made available in all its purity.** Seneca's works and Cicero's most Stoical dialogues were responsibly edited and widely read; Epictetus's noble manual was translated into Latin and French; from 1567 on, Frenchmen could read *La doctrine d'Épictète philosophe, comme l'homme se peut rendre vertueus, libre, heureus, & sans passion*.
…

The Humanists had prepared the way for that solution; their realism made possible a secular view of political power and a secular, or at least no longer specifically Christian, justification for political obligation; their critical philology, combined with their admiration for antiquity, prepared educated men to read Christian documents with skeptical detachment, and pagan philosophers with sympathy; **their appeal to nature laid the foundations for what Wilhelm Dilthey has called the "natural system," a style of thought that ordered the world by natural law, natural morality, and natural theology.**
…

Throughout Western civilization there were men – still in a minority, but vocal and often highly placed – who agreed that the road to peace lay in the discovery of a religion catholic in the true sense of that word, a religion anchored in the nature of man rather than in historical or

geographic accident, rational in character, with a short catalogue of doctrines expressing universal truths which all sensible human beings could accept.
…

Jean Bodin is characteristic of this motley army of philosophical peacemakers: a believer in sorcery, witchcraft and number mysticism, he was also a pioneering economist and sociologist whose theories of climate and inflation lived to exert their influence on Montesquieu. **He was another Pico in the uncanny breadth of his erudition,** a typical Renaissance scholars with his profuse accumulation of miscellaneous facts and fanciful constructions, but he was also a modern in his careful reading of Polybius and Guicciardini, in his critical method for reading documents and testing historical assertions. **He was a learned lawyer who tried to construct a universally valid legal theory from his comparative studies,** but his political and social theory reflect his immediate experience as much as his technical learning: they are a response to the French Wars of Religion and of bloody St. Bartholomew's Night, when his own life had been in danger. He was anything but a modern rationalist, but his most remarkable efforts are among the early masterpieces of modern critical rationalism. **His celebrated *Six livres de la république* attempts to establish a coherent theory of sovereignty on secular grounds – to discover, that is, a rational foundation for the state; its pendant, the *Colloquium heptaplomeres*, not published until the nineteenth century but widely distributed before then, depicts religion in debate – one might almost say, religion *as* debate.** As Dilthey has observed, his sharply drawn, sympathetically perceived characters anticipate the protagonists of Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*: Jew and Lutheran, pagan and Catholic agree that all schools of belief are sisters, that all are the daughters of natural religion; the speakers conclude that dogmatism is absurd and suspension of judgment indispensable, that men must tolerate one another and seek the truth humbly in their own way. **Thus political absolutism and religious toleration, the improbable twins of the modern state system, make their first appearance in the writings of this enigmatic sixteenth-century French lawyer.**

https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/22*.html#ref30

2 But when his fears were ended, and he saw that the time had come when he could do as he wished, he revealed the secrets of his heart and by plain and formal decrees ordered the temples to be opened, victims brought to the altars, and the worship of the gods restored. 3 And in order to add to the effectiveness of these ordinances, he summoned to the palace the bishops of the Christians, who were of conflicting opinions, and the people, who were also at variance, **and politely advised them to lay aside their differences, and each fearlessly and without opposition to observe his own beliefs. [quisque nullo vetante religioni suae serviret intrepidus] 4 On this he took a firm stand, [Quod agebat ideo obstinate]** to the end that, as this freedom increased their dissension, **he might afterwards have no fear of a united populace, knowing as he did from experience that no wild beasts are such enemies to mankind as are most of the Christians in their deadly hatred of one another.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Works_of_Francis_Bacon,_Volume_1/Essays/Of_Atheism

The causes of atheism are, divisions in religion, if they be many; **for any one main division addeth zeal to both sides, but many divisions introduce atheism:**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/26

Was there in London but one religion, despotism might be apprehended; if two only, they would seek to cut each other's throats; but as there are at least thirty, they live together in peace and happiness.

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

Madison hated the churches, hated the concept of Christendom, **and self-consciously devised the Constitution to create multiple factions that would cancel each other out.**

http://ironink.org/2017/05/presuppositional-methodology/

So, our singular religion has the one god who says that all gods are welcome in the public square as long as none of the gods and their commands are taken more seriously than the god of pluralism and its commands. **As such we are back to Rome where any god was allowed in the public square except those gods whose adherents refused to offer up incense to Caesar. In a pluralistic arrangement, it is the god who limits the other gods, who is the god of the public square, and it is that god's religion that is followed in defiance of all the other religions. That god is the State in whom we live and move and have our being.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA170#v=onepage&q&f=false

The libertines also had their works, all deistic in nature – *Les Trois imposteurs*, the *Heptaplomeres*, Vallée's *Fléo de la foy*, and *Quatrains du deiste*, all of which circulated in manuscript copies, while Théophile's and Vanini's works were also printed. Curiously, three of these treatises came out of the last years of the sixteenth century, one of them, **the *Heptaplomeres*, being Bodin's last work.** The fourth, the *Quatrains*, dates from around 1622. Bodin's work, especially the *Heptaplomeres*, and the *Quatrains* seem to have enjoyed a wide popularity. Although the *Heptaplomeres* has never been published, it has been studied by Chauviré who found manuscripts in Latin and in French translation eight of them at the Bibliothèque Nationale, and three of them at the Bibliothèque Mazarine. **But the astounding evidence of how widespread deism was can be inferred from Chauviré's remark that in Germany about fifty manuscripts exist in public libraries and about thirty in private libraries. Not even Meslier, a century later, enjoyed that kind of popularity.** More impressive than the numbers of people possessing a copy are the names of some of the owners mentioned by Chauviré: Naudé, Patin, Christina of Sweden, Leibniz, John Milton, Huet, and Bayle. It was an interest which extended throughout the seventeenth century.

The plan of the *Heptaplomeres* is simple: seven friends meet at the home of Coroni, a Catholic of Venice, and take part in a long discussion of the verity of the Christian religion and its relation with other religions: Jewish, Mohammedan, Pagan. **Coroni's six interlocutors are Octave Fagnola, a renegade Christian who has now turned Muslim; Antoine Curtius, a Calvinist; Frederich Podamicus, a Lutheran; Salomon Barcassius, a Jew; Diego Toralba, an apologist for natural religion; and Jérôme Senamus, who is indifferent to all religious sects.**
…

Curtius asserts that nothing is more dangerous in a republic than to have two factions, either political or religious. On the other hand, there is no danger of civil war if there are several factions. **This idea eventually became Voltaire's famous remark, in the *Lettres philosophiques*, that one religion is tyrannical, two religions try to cut each other's throat, while thirty live in peace.**
…

Coroni upsets things by stating that it is better to have a false religion than no religion at all. But Frederich objects that if we excuse those who follow a false religion sincerely, cannot legitimately uphold the persecution of impiety. Curtius takes the stand that if the laws of God are published openly no one had a right to ignore them. But how are we to decide between so many contradictory laws, so many contradictory religions, asks Senamus. We must seek the one which is best and truest, replies Toralba. Who doubts, interrupts Frederich, that the Christian is the true religion or the only one? But there are so many parts of the world which have never heard of it, objects Octave. We can't pick the best religion by the number of people represented, but by the forceful reasons which God has presented, maintains Curtius. Do we really have a right to to bring up and discuss matters of this sort, asks Coroni. Toralba replies that in his opinion it is better to keep silent than to speak lightly of sacred things. Salomon, too, finds it is very dangerous to discourse on religion.
…

It is certainly true that the author did not miss many dangerous subjects which he was still bringing up long after the main point had been made. **Very early in the conversation Octave, the renegade turned Muslim, made it** (p. 46, Chauviré, ed.): **"Tous les hommes sont agréables à Dieu qui avec sincérité d'âme adorent une divinité quand même ils ne sauroient pas quelle elle est, parce disent-ils que la source de toutes les actions est dans la volonté dont Dieu connoist toujours le fond et la pureté."**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=eWYyBwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Though my acquiantance with learned men has been very slight and recent, I shudder when I think how many I have met who are at once brilliant thinkers and atheists. **An unpublished book by Bodin is being circulated from hand to hand (and like Naudé, I wish that it would never be published); a most effective work, which he calls "the secret of sublime things"**23 **and in which he is the professed enemy of the Christian religion. The dialogues of Vanini are child's play compared to it.** I have read it carefully, and I thank God with all my heart for instructing me in these philosophical defenses, by which I was able easily to turn back his shafts.
>
> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/686/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The Abbé Houtteville noted in 1740 the penetration of such flagrantly anti-Christian texts as Bodin's *Colloque Heptoplomères* and the tracts of Orobio de Castro into the most fashionable 'cabinets' of Paris.16
>
> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/694/mode/2up?view=theater

The fullest published catalogue of surviving copies lists in 172 in French (though, in fact, more have been traced) besides a small number of contemporary translations into Latin, German, English, and Italian.63 Accordingly, the *Traité* survives to around four times the extent of the next most widely disseminated illicit philosophical text written between 1650 and 1750, namely Du Marsais' *Examen* (see Table 2). **Its only real rival in popularity was Bodin's *Colloque Heptoplomères*, a work percolating much more widely after around 1700 than in the past but which was nevertheless written over a century before and is replete with what the *esprits forts* of 1700 must have regarded as thoroughly antiquated and absurd indications of belief in supernatural forces such as demons and witches.**64 Moreover, and again like Bodin's *Colloque*, the *Traité* spread geographically much more widely than most other *clandestina*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Bodin#Private_position_in_the_Colloquium

In 1588, Bodin completed in manuscript a Latin work *Colloquium heptaplomeres de rerum sublimium arcanis abditis*
(Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime).
...

Bodin's theory, as based in considerations of harmony, resembles that of Sebastian Castellio.[98] **He has been seen as a scriptural relativist, and deist, with Montaigne and Pierre Charron;**[99] **also in the group of learned Christian Hebraists with John Selden, Carlo Giuseppe Imbonati, and Gerhard Vossius.**[100] By reputation, at least, Bodin was cited as an unbeliever, deist or atheist by Christian writers who associated him with perceived free-thinking and sceptical tradition of Machiavelli and Pietro Pomponazzi, Lucilio Vanini, Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza:
Pierre-Daniel Huet,[101] Nathaniel Falck,[102] Claude-François Houtteville.[103] **Pierre Bayle attributed to Bodin a maxim about the intellectual consequences of the non-existence of God (a precursor of Voltaire's, but based on a traditional commonplace of French thinkers).**[104] Wilhelm Dilthey later wrote that the protagonists in the Colloquium anticipate those of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*.[105]

The Colloquium was one of the major and most popular manuscripts in clandestine circulation in the early modern period, with more than 100 copies catalogued.[106] it had an extensive covert circulation, after coming into intellectual fashion. **The 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica states "It is curious that Leibniz, who originally regarded the *Colloquium* as the work of a professed enemy of Christianity, subsequently described it as a most valuable production".**[107] **Its dissemination increased after 1700, even if its content was by then dated.**[108] It was interpreted in the 18th century as containing arguments for natural religion, as if the views expressed by Toralba (the proponent of natural religion) were Bodin's; wrongly, according to Rose, whose reconstruction of Bodin's religious views is a long way from belief in a detached deity.[109] Grotius had a manuscript. **Gottfried Leibniz, who criticized the Colloquium to Jacob Thomasius and Hermann Conring, some years later did editorial work on the manuscript.** Henry Oldenburg wanted to copy it, for transmission to John Milton and possibly John Dury,[110] or for some other connection in 1659.[111] In 1662 Conring was seeking a copy for a princely library.[112] It was not to be published in full until 1857, by Ludwig Noack, from manuscripts collected by Heinrich Christian von Seckenberg.[113] **Bodin was influenced by philosophic Judaism to believe in the annihilation of the wicked 'post exacta supplicia'.**[114]

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=zmdjDwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&hl=fi&pg=PR10#v=onepage&q&f=false

A magical revival took place at the end of the 15th century, in great part thanks to Marsilio Ficino's works, and his translations of Neoplatonic and Hermetic sources. Thus, at the moment the witch-hunts began to intensify, philosophical treatises emerged to offer a well-defined intellectual framework for the magical practices the coming into prominence.
...

Within this world view, a special role was reserved for the universal spirit, a thin, airy substance believed to mediate between the celestial and sublunary worlds and to facilitate the traffic of higher powers with the world below. By virtue of this spirit the magician was said to unite or "marry" heaven and earth. **One could rightly argue that this universal spirit was inherited from the pneumatic doctrine of the Stoics rather than from the Neoplatonic school. A strict distinction between these philosophical currents, however, was not yet in force, certainly not before Justus Lipsius's works on Stoicism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Ct9K-x61CH0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thirty years ago, Furley's own attempted explanation of the phenomenon which he had discovered – Lucretius' lack of interest in Stoicism – was that Stoic physics was little more than a down-market version of Aristotelian physics, too unimportant to occupy Lucretius' time. **Such an explanation would be unlikely to be put forward today, when the power, originality, and contemporary influence of Stoic physics are widely acknowledged, while it is Aristotle's importance to Hellenistic philosophers that has become increasingly controversial.**129

> 129. **The rehabilitation of Stoic physics was largely the work of Sambursky (1959),** while the new challenge to Aristotle's Hellenistic influence has come from Sandbach (1985).

https://iep.utm.edu/telesio/

Using the Stoic notion of *spiritus* (translating the Greek word *pneuma*), [Telesio] criticized Aristotle's hylomorphism. As a fiery substance and an internal principle of motion, *spiritus* is the principle of sensitivity: by the way of heat, it pervades the entire cosmos, so that all beings are capable of sensation. **In addition to grounding Telesio's epistemology, then, the notion of *spiritus* lies at the core of his natural philosophy.**
…

It is important to note that the materialist and empiricist approach Telesio displayed in his early works did not come out at first; **the main source was an open-minded reading of the texts written by the early commentators of Aristotle's works, such as Alexander of Aphrodisia, recently revisited by a new generation of scholars, such as, for example, Pietro Pomponazzi.** At the University of Padua, the young Telesio could learn the new critical approach to Aristotle's works.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/telesio/

Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) belongs to a group of independent philosophers of the late Renaissance who left the universities in order to develop philosophical and scientific ideas beyond the restrictions of the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. Authors in the early modern period referred to these philosophers as 'novateurs' and 'modern'. **In contrast to his successors Patrizi and Campanella, Telesio was a fervent critic of metaphysics and insisted on a purely empiricist approach in natural philosophy—he thus became a forerunner of early modern empiricism.** He had a remarkable influence on Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno, Pierre Gassendi, Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes and on freethinkers like Guillaume Lamy and Giulio Cesare Vanini.
…

Telesio blamed both Aristotle and Galen for relying on elaborate reasoning rather than sense perception and empirical research. **His fervent attacks against the greatest authorities of the Western philosophical and medical traditions led Francis Bacon to speak of him as "the first of the moderns"** (*Opera omnia* vol. III, 1963, p. 114). **He was perhaps the most strident critic of metaphysics in late Renaissance times. It was obviously due to his excellent relationships with popes and clerics that he was not persecuted and was able during his own lifetime to publish his rather heterodox writings, which went on the index shortly after his death.**
…

Telesio's vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions. According to his *De rerum natura*, the only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold. These principles were meant to replace the Aristotelian metaphysical principles of matter and form.
…

In Telesio's philosophy, there is no such thing as a transcendent mind or idea. **All things act solely according to their own nature, starting from the primary forces of cold and heat. The Epicurean chance is enclosed in Telesio's Stoic-influenced philosophy of nature** (Kessler 1992): **everything can produce everything,** an idea which was soon to be sharply rejected by Francesco Patrizi da Chierso, one of the most important contemporary readers of Telesio ("Obiectiones", in the appendix of Telesio's *Varii libelli*, p. 467 f.).
…

To ascribe psychic functions to a specific part of the body implies **a rejection of the difference between organic and inorganic life, which dichotomy was central to the Aristotelian, Platonic and Christian traditions.** According to Telesio, there is a quantitative and not a qualitative difference here, which consists in the higher degree of complexity and the higher degree of warmth that some physical bodies possess. Whereas metals or stones are homogenous bodies, organic bodies consist of heterogeneous parts, including the bodily (though invisible) spirit in the nerves and brain (DRN book V, ch. II). And just as there is no metaphysical difference between living and non-living bodies, there also does not exist a qualitative difference between animals and humans—in both, it is the same spirit which coordinates the functions and operations of the different bodily parts.
…

Telesio combined the medical theory of spirit with a basically Stoic notion, that of the *hegemonikon*, according to which the spirit in the brain is responsible for all the states and operations traditionally ascribed to the tripartite soul: “the animal ... is governed by one substance residing in the brain” (*Quod animal universum* ch. XXV; Var. lib. p. 254).
...

In his explanation of sense perception Telesio comes close to the Democritan theory which he combines with the basic Stoic notion of *conservatio sui*, a key term in Telesio's philosophy. Pleasure is identified with the sensation of self-preservation, pain is the sensation of destruction (DRN book VII, ch. III; vol. III, p. 10).
...

The ethics exposed in the 9th book of *De rerum natura* is strictly naturalist. **The only objective which Telesio ascribes to the spirit is self-preservation and self-improvement,** the former lying in its ability to react suitably to influences from the external world, the latter in its capability of finding means to improve its state of being. This comes about through theoretical knowledge, specifically through natural philosophy and medicine (cf. DRN book VIII, ch. XXI) and through learning to control one's own emotions and desires. According to Telesio, we can voluntarily provoke and suppress affections and their related actions (DRN book IX, ch. I; vol. III, p. 332f.); what is more, we are able to master the degree to which we desire and are affected (DRN book IX, ch. II; vol. III, p. 334). **The principle of moral virtue is said to be a knowledge of what is helpful and what is damaging for survival and well-being in human society. All virtues and vices are reduced to self-conservation.**
...

Telesio's God is not the God who acts in nature and history, though he did not deny the possibility of miracles (DRN book IV, ch. XXV; vol. I, p. 176). The God Telesio seems to imagine can be compared to a mechanic. Just as the best mechanic creates an artefact which will work without interruption and default, so the power of the almighty divine artist is represented in a cosmos which is able to generate and to sustain itself without ever running the danger of corruption (see DRN book I, ch. X).

Besides the natural soul or spirit Telesio accepted the existence of an immortal soul superimposed by God (DRN book V, ch. II-III). **But in his theory of psychology and ethics the soul does not play any significant role, for which reason researchers have often held it to be an addition designed to avoid conflicts with the Church.** On the other hand, there do exist certain modes of behavior which cannot be explained in a purely naturalistic and materialistic way, such as the human striving for eternity and the martyrs' denial of the highest objective of self-preservation. **But far from building a bridge to the philosophical tradition, Telesio's definition of a second, divinely superimposed soul as “forma corporis et praecipue spiritus” deals a deathblow to Aristotle's teachings. According to Telesio, the idea of an immortal soul was totally unknown to the heathen Aristotle, who is severely criticized for confusing the concept of a natural spirit with the religious idea of a soul** (DRN book V, ch. II-III):

> And when we have reproved Aristotle and will continue to reprove him for having introduced the soul into the body as its peculiar form, we have not condemned him and we will not condemn him because he equated the soul created by God (a thing which one might suspect was completely unknown to him) with the form of humans, but rather because... he equated the soul which was generated from the semen and which is the only one which senses, causes movements and is (so to speak) something akin to the semen, with the form of the body. (Vol. II, p. 218f.)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bruno

Filippo Bruno was born in January or February 1548, son of Giovanni Bruno, a soldier of modest circumstances, and Fraulissa Savolina, at Nola, about 17 miles north east of Naples. **At the unusually late age of seventeen, beguiled perhaps by the prospect of a life dedicated to learning, he entered the Dominican convent** of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples, assuming the name Giordano. In 1572 he became a priest and later that year began to study theology formally, obtaining his doctorate in July 1575. That year he was investigated by his Provincial for his heretical views, concerning among other things, probably the Trinity (Firpo 2000, 125), a delicate topic in Reformation Europe. This was not the first occasion on which he had scandalized his fellow friars and, exasperated with the constraints of the religious life, he fled the convent in early 1576.
...

Not by chance does Bruno have the distinction of being the only known sixteenth-century philosopher to have been excommunicated from all three major confessions: Roman Catholic (Naples, 1576), Calvinist (Geneva, 1579) and Lutheran (Helmstedt, 1589).
...

Greek philosophy from Plato onwards was a debased version of the true wisdom known to ancient sages such as Hermes Trismegistus among the Egyptians and Pythagoras, Parmenides and Empedocles among the early Greeks. The task, then, was to restore an authentic ancient philosophy by elaborating upon what could be discerned in the few surviving Egyptian and Pythagorean

records of it with the help of vestigial truths preserved in Greek philosophy. **Even Aristotle, "the stupidest of all philosophers", who had done his best to "pervert the opinions of the ancients and oppose the truth"** (BOI I, 182, 730), **sometimes included, despite himself, valuable ideas gleaned from his predecessors.** The many other philosophical sources that Bruno eclectically pressed into service—Presocratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, medieval, Arabic, scholastic and Renaissance—had the same purpose: the articulation of a philosophy true to the principles of an ancient wisdom all but obliterated by Aristotle and his followers.
…

Medieval and Renaissance philosophers and theologians had, disastrously, held the opposite view. **Philosophically, they looked to Plato, Aristotle and Averroes as authorities, rather than to Hermes, the Chaldeans, Pythagoras and other early Greek sages.** Exegetes had consequently misinterpreted those parts of Scripture that touched on philosophical matters, incorrectly reading literally passages that described nature and the universe figuratively and vice versa. **This did not dissuade Bruno from adopting scholastic ideas when it suited his purposes. He acknowledged the Dominican Thomas Aquinas as an important influence, praised the metaphysical speculations of thirteenth-century Oxford Franciscans (e.g., Duns Scotus) and extolled Averroes as a better commentator on Aristotle than any late Greek commentator, despite the Arab philosopher's ignorance of the Greek language. It was contemporary scholasticism that bore the brunt of Bruno's animosity,** above all for its emphasis on Latin style at the expense of intellectual substance—a vice contracted from Renaissance humanism, for which he had no patience.
…

Heat generated by fire vaporized water to produce the air of the kind that we breath, and this vaporous air merged seamlessly into the empty, dimensionless, space beyond the atmosphere surrounding a celestial body. **This space was the aether, though not the aether of conventional cosmology. It was the continuum spread throughout the universe and through the corporeal things contained in it, binding them together—not unlike the Stoic *pneuma* interpreted as *hexis*—without, however, moving them.** It was, in other words, *spiritus*, the motionless immaterial medium through which soul, the principle of motion, operated. As such, *spiritus* or aether was the container—non-terminated space—in which all things were located.

Bruno's elemental theory disproved outright the dominant Aristotelian view that the universe was finite but infinitely divisible. **It also disproved ancient atomism. Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius and others had, it is true, correctly surmised that the universe was infinite and comprised an infinite number of finite, indivisible, atoms. But their atoms were solids, although imperceptible ones, of various shapes, weights and sizes floating in a vacuum, a conclusion that led to a mechanistic view of the universe, which Bruno did not countenance. Correctly understood, atoms were incorporeal spheres with spatial locations. Soul, working through the intermediary of aether or spirit, joined these incorporeal, identical, spheres to make a body.** Indeed, they were not so much components as instances of the universe. Intrinsically dimensionless, their centres coincided with their circumferences. Conversely, since the universe was an infinite, indivisible (*atomus*) sphere, its centre was omnipresent. Both were absolute physical monads, indivisible unities, the centres and circumferences of which coincided. They differed inasmuch as the *maximum* was the "unfolding" of the *minimum* and a *minimum* was the "enfolding" of the *maximum*.
…

The soul that Bruno identified as one of the four principles of corporeality was the World or Universal Soul. The universe was an organism in which each principal body and the life sustained on it participated in a common animating principle, in the same way as the many parts of the human body were vivified by one and the same soul. **Even supposedly inanimate things had a vestigial presence of life. Rocks, for example, were alive to the same degree as the bones or teeth of animals were.** The Universal Soul was "all-in-all", that is, present wholly and indivisibly in each and every thing to the degree that it was capable of receiving it, just as, to borrow Plotinus's analogy (*Enneads*, VI.4.12), a single voice was audible to everyone in a room, however great the audience. Bruno, like others before him, attributed the doctrine of "all-in-all", in a dematerialized version, to Anaxagoras. **He also adduced several scriptural witnesses, notably the Book of Wisdom (1:7), thereby identifying the Universal Soul implicitly with the Holy Spirit: "For the Spirit of the Lord filleth the world: and that which containeth all things hath knowledge of the voice". No matter that the Council of Sens (1140) had anathematized this association.**
…

The Stoics, as Bruno knew, had similarly proposed that the cosmos comprised two mutually dependent principles, the World Soul or *pneuma* and matter, active and passive respectively, with the former accommodating Mind. Indeed, when introducing his account of the Universal Soul and Universal Matter in *On the Cause, the Principle and the One* (1584), he included the Stoics among the several schools and authors who had identified the World Soul and matter as the active and passive principles of the physical world. **Stoic philosophy also contributed to Bruno's doctrine in**

surreptitious ways. In the *Pimander* (chaps 10–12) Hermes Trismegistus had declared that the cosmos was composed of matter and soul and that the latter included Mind. Again, Virgil (*Aeneid*, VI.724-727) had described the super- and sublunary regions as animated from within by *spiritus*, which Bruno identified in this context with the Universal Soul, and added that they were moved by a Mind diffused throughout their vast mass. **Hermes Trismegistus and Virgil were, according to conventional wisdom, reporting the wisdom of the ancient Egyptians and the Pythagoreans respectively.** As such, Bruno considered them authorities for his interpretation. Neither, however, was authentic. **The comments in the *Pimander* are just one of many Stoic borrowings that reflect the eclectic intellectual ambient of Alexandrian Egypt in which Hermetic works of this kind were composed. And unbeknown to Bruno, Virgil's lines drew on Stoic rather than Pythagorean thought** (Knox 2013).

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermeticism#Core_texts
>
> The *Hermetica* is a collection of texts attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, and it forms the foundational literature of the Hermetic tradition. These writings were composed over several centuries, primarily during the Hellenistic, Roman, and early Christian periods, roughly between 200 BCE and 300 CE.
> …
>
> **In the religio-philosophical *Hermetica*, the ultimate reality is called by many names, such as God, Lord, Father, Mind (*Nous*), the Creator, the All, the One, etc.[16] In the Hermetic view, God is both the all (Greek: *to pan*) and the creator of the all:** all created things pre-exist in God[17] and God is the nature of the cosmos (being both the substance from which it proceeds and the governing principle which orders it),[18] yet the things themselves and the cosmos were all created by God. **Thus, God ('the All') creates itself,[19] and is both transcendent (as the creator of the cosmos) and immanent (as the created cosmos).[17] These ideas are closely related to the cosmo-theological views of the Stoics.[20]**

Bruno's two universal principles resembled Stoic doctrine in another respect. For the Stoics, "first matter" was an unqualified substance (*ousia*). For Bruno, too, Universal Matter was a substance and in act, not a *prope nihil* ("almost nothing") of the kind imagined by Aristotle. **The similarities, however, cease at this point. For the Stoics, whatever existed, even soul and matter, was corporeal,** capable of acting on or being acted upon by another corporeal entity. By contrast, neither of Bruno's principles was corporeal. **The Universal Soul was an intelligible reality; and Universal Matter was not corporeal in the Stoic sense.** Inherently qualityless, dimensionless, impassive and inactive, Universal Matter was a medium that had the potentiality to become all things.
…

A masterpiece relied on using appropriately a range of colours, not just "gold and finest purple" (BOL I.1, 310, 312). **Plotinus inspired the analogy (*Enneads*, III.2.11), but Bruno, as ever, gave it a distinctive twist. For Plotinus, it illustrated how the hierarchical arrangement of all things necessarily entailed a descent from perfect being to the absence of being, from the absolutely good to the not-good. In Bruno's philosophy, no such hierarchy existed.** Something abject was like a splodge of paint which, drab though it appeared on the palette, once applied, lent a painting the desired effect (BOL I.1, 312). In other words, accidents that they all were, **things acquired ontological significance only insofar as they were part of God's "perfect" image, the universe. As such, the latter was an epiphany incomparably more splendid and revelatory than that proferred by any individual, whether "Egyptian, Syrian, Greek or Roman"** (BOL I.1, 205). The Syrian that Bruno had in mind was Jesus Christ, who was born in Bethlehem and bought up in Nazareth, both towns, as St Luke (2:2) mentioned in his account of the nativity, being located in what the Roman Empire at the time knew as Syria. **It was the universe, not the first Adam or, as St Paul had called Jesus (1 Corinthians 15:45), the second Adam (Genesis 1:26; 2 Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 1:5; Hebrews 1:3), that was made in God's "image".**
…

The idea that plants and animals were the "living effects of Nature", that "Nature was God in things", had led the ancient Egyptians to worship images of the gods in the form of animals. Each living thing, in addition to its intrinsic being, incorporated something divine from the gods "according to its capacity and measure" (BOI II, 354-355). The "Egyptian" inspiration for Bruno's comments in this instance was a passage in Ficino's paraphrase of *On the Mysteries of the Egyptians* (VII.1-3) in which Iamblichus distinguished God as the cause of generation, Nature, from God in himself.

These and other Platonic borrowings sometimes obscure Bruno's overarching idea of God as the One Being in which two substances of equal ontological status, the Universal Intellect and Universal Matter, were reconciled. It was, however, only on sufferance that he engaged with Platonism. Repeatedly he suppressed Neoplatonic distinctions between one ontological entity and another (BOI I, 651-653; BOL II.2, 178) or used them instrumentally rather than in the conviction that they were philosophically valid (BOL I.4, 103). **Philosophy must aim at "simplicity" (BOL I.3, 236);**

hence his contempt for Francesco Patrizi (1529-97), the most eminent Platonist of the day (BOI I, 676–677). All things were accidents of the One Being, intelligibilia included, and hence all things engaged with matter in some respect. **Accordingly he denied, with a good dose of sarcasm, Platonism's central tenet: that the Ideas and the intelligences apprehending them were transcendent realities** (BOI I, 720-721; BOL I.2, 118, 304, 309-313, 483). In what sense could they be outside an infinite universe?

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/482/mode/2up?view=theater

> 119. Bruno, *De immenso*, 8.10, in *Opera Latine conscripta*, 2.314. **Firing a barb in the direction of the Stagirite, the Nolan says, "God is not an external intelligence who leads us around in circles. It is more worthy of God to be the internal principle of motion, which is his own nature, his own appearance."** Cited in Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 41.

…

The question of whether Bruno's philosophy was pantheistic preoccupied nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars. Most concluded, often ruefully, that his God remained theistic and retained, even if only minimally, an element of the transcendental. **Regrettably, therefore, he could not be declared unequivocally the founder of modern philosophy, the precursor of Spinoza and Hegel.** During his trial Bruno himself, hoping to reassure his inquisitors, emphasized the theistic features of his philosophy.
…

It shares with Stoicism, which is conventionally considered pantheist, the view that there was a providential principle, God, operating within the universe, that was more than just the sum of its parts. Nor does Bruno's view differ radically from Spinoza's distinction between God as *natura naturans* and the universe as *natura naturata*, a distinction, incidentally, that Bruno knew in its original medieval formulation but did not avail himself of (BOI I, 702). **Indeed, it might be argued that Bruno's philosophy is more authentically "pantheist" than Spinoza's, given that the term implies that the cosmos or universe is divine.** Bruno's philosophy, unlike Spinoza's (Nadler 2016, §2.1), makes this claim in no uncertain terms.
…

The cosmos provided the setting for human beings to demonstrate that they merited everlasting salvation. **For Bruno, however, they were, no less than anything else, transient modes or "corruptible substances", in essence, "accidents" of the One Being** (BOI I, 664, 729; II, 125, 181-182). **They were, as for Spinoza (*Ethics*, pt IV, prop. 4), part of nature, not a privileged species for which, as Christian doctrine maintained, nature had been created.**

Human beings, understood as combinations of body and soul, perished. But what of their souls? Bruno stated unequivocally that they were individual, that is to say, that they were indestructible, "atomic". **Death was an illusion, no more than the dissolution of an ephemeral conjunction of soul and matter. We should await mutation serenely, not fear death, as Pythagoras, or more exactly Ovid's 'Pythagoras', had rightly observed** (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 15.153–175; BOI I, 665). Bruno's doctrine of metempsychosis required him to uphold the soul's immortality, even though, as he noted, he interpreted the doctrine differently from Pythagoras, Pythagoreans, Plato, Platonists, the Sadducees, Scripture (Psalm 36:6 [KJV]), Origen and the Druids. Souls of the dead did not endure a shadowy existence in some other world before reincarnation in the manner that the "Pythagorean" Virgil (*Aeneid*, VI.743-751) and others had described (BOI II, 511-515). That is to say, on the death of one body, a soul did not retain the personality that it had accrued and commandeer another body, like a helmsman changing ships. Rather, we should understand that the soul turned its operative powers to forming a new body, the limitations of which were determined by Providence (BOL III, 257, 429-430).
…

A soul was an incorporeal centre of animation governing the atoms conglomerating around it as the body grew and flourished. As the body grew older and decayed, the soul contracted its powers inwardly, eventually dissociating itself altogether from the body. It remained, nevertheless, an individual centre of animation capable of forming another body. Insofar, however, as it was disengaged from dimension, it "expanded" seamlessly into the infinite space of the universe. Or rather, given that infinite space was replete with souls, it expanded into the aether or *spiritus* diffused throughout space. **Hence, in the *Kabbala of the Pegasean Horse* (1585), one of his most irreligious works, Bruno described an ass who, on his death, passed into the underworld and noticed there "that all spirits are from the sea of one spirit and that all return to that spirit"** (BOI II, 450-451). This interpretation of *spiritus* as the unity of discrete individual souls, distinct from the undifferentiated unity of the Universal Soul, conformed with Bruno's elemental theory and definition of space in relation to Universal Matter (see Section 3). Scripture, as always, supported his view.

> Well it is said, too, in Holy Scripture [*Ecclesiastes* 12:7] that the body dissolves into dust, that is to say, atoms [see again Section 3], and that the spirit returns to its source [God]. (BOL III, 256)

…

Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (in one phase of his career) and other Renaissance authors had held similarly "Pelagian" views that philosophy led to self-perfection and "deification". Yet they had stopped well short of denying the integrity of Christianity. Philosophy and religion were, so to speak, two parallel paths, suited to different audiences. Bruno had no such scruples. Philosophy—Bruno's philosophy of God as immanent in an infinite universe as announced in *The Ash Wednesday Supper*—was the true bread of life. It "illuminated the blind", "loosed the tongue of the dumb", "cured the lame", so that the human spirit could once again "progress" (BOI I, 454). Its powers, that is, were miraculous, Christ-like, salvific. By contrast, Christianity was fraudulent. **Under a thin veil of irony, all the while denying the irony, Bruno praised the various guises under which Christianity taught that ignorance of the natural world led the soul to God. Among its many deceits were: scriptural injunctions to acknowledge our ignorance, notably, the Pauline theme of folly; the ascetic mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and mystics generally; claims that the light of faith and revelation were superior to human knowledge; Augustine's emphasis on the fallen nature of mankind, particularly the corruption of knowledge innate to it; injunctions to be childlike and meek; and the humility and obedience that the Christian clergy sought to instill among its flock** (BOI II, 381-384, 415, 418, 422-430, 443-448; BOL I.2, 316). The philosopher should ignore these "foolish dreams" (BOL I.3, 200)—in practical as well as in intellectual endeavor. To be virtuous was to strive against adversity, to embody a coincidence of opposites. "Where opposites meet, there is order, there resides virtue" (BOI II, 549). **Who deserved praise the more: someone who healed a worthless cripple, or a man who liberated his homeland or who reformed, not a mere body, but a mind** (BOI II, 264-267)? In other words, who was the true savior: Christ or Bruno?

Simultaneously, with the same indignation that Spinoza and Nietzsche would later voice, Bruno impugned the clerical caste. Living parasitically off the labors of others and affecting "a foul-smelling melancholy", i.e., *accidia* (BOL II.2,189-190; BOI II, 238-239), **they advocated the solitary life and renunciation of this world for the next. Such men had extinguished the divine light that had made the souls of the ancients "heroic and divine", those very men whom they condemned for their pride** (BOI I, 453). **If we followed the counsel of these clerics, we would have no temples, no chapels, no hospices, no hospitals, no colleges, no universities** (BOI II, 238, 267). Of all peoples, the ancient Romans had best understood the value of "glory" for establishing and maintaining civilization. A true religion, like that of the ancients, extolled men of action, strength of body and mind and worldly glory (BOI II, 267-268). Similar comments on clerical duplicity, glory and religion occur in Machiavelli, whose works Bruno probably read.

Nevertheless, religion had a role to play. **The "uneducated populace"** (BOI I, 525; II, 514-515) **could not aspire to philosophical perfection. They needed laws and sanctions to keep their conduct in check.** Religion, with its promises of reward and punishment in an afterlife, served this purpose. When Moses had led the Israelites from captivity, they were no more than an uneducated rabble. To govern them, he established laws and enforced them with terrifying accounts of an almighty, wrathful God who administered retribution in an afterlife. Scripture, whether Jewish, Islamic or Christian, had been composed with this practical goal in mind (BOI I, 522–528). Admittedly, Bruno conceded, Scripture did sometimes record philosophical truths. Genesis and the Book of Job were conspicuous repositories. This was only to be expected, given that Scripture was a tributary of "the ancient philosophy" (see Section 2). For the most part, however, it simplified. Several passages of Scripture (e.g., Ecclesiastes, 1:5-6; Joshua 10:12-13) implied that the sun circled the motionless earth. This was a simplification made for the benefit of the uneducated. Disquisitions based on a true, heliocentric, interpretation of celestial motion would have, at best, confused them and, at worst, led them, counterproductively, to dismiss Scripture's tales of divine retribution (BOI I, 522-525).

…

The crucial deviation was his denial of miracles, the most important of all testimonies to the Christian faith. Given that the laws of nature were, essentially, "God in things", they were inviolable (BOL I.2, 316). Repeatedly Bruno mocked, allusively, the miracles reported in the Old and New Testament, including those performed by Moses and Christ. Christ's were *bagatelle*, "sleights of hand" (BOI II, 383). **They were no more than natural magic, effects produced by manipulating "occult", that is, natural, though imperceptible, forces** (BOL III, 427). Or, indeed, they may have been the fruits of demonic magic, a comment which implied that Christ had commerce with demons. **Christ began to perform miracles, Bruno noted, only "after his struggle with the devil in the desert"** (BOL II.2, 181). The allusive style in which Bruno disguised his views only served to accentuate his blasphemies, mixing as they did ridicule and contempt with heresy. **Handwritten annotations in copies of his works show that contemporaries or near contemporaries recognized his intentions easily enough.**

Philosophers, “heroes”, did not need Scripture’s bogus threats of retribution and promises of future rewards to cajole them into behaving morally. They understood the “pattern” (*istoria*) of Nature inscribed within [them]’ (BOI II, 24-25), that God, in other words, was with and within them (BOI I, 455-456; II, 658), and governed their actions accordingly.
…

In so doing they became themselves “greater than those gods whom blind commoners worship” (BOI II, 24). Stripped, in short, of its false claims, Christianity could be seen for what it was, a “foolish faith and blind credulity” (BOI II, 386, 398), “a wretched story” (BOL I.2, 172), “a worthless, pernicious fable” (BOI II, 400), a continuation of Judaism, a religion invented by that “pestilent, leprous and wholly pernicious” race, the Jews (BOI II, 314-315; for similar stereotypical anti-Jewish comments, see Section 2 and the caveat there regarding the extent to which they reflect Bruno’s views). With its threats that the world would end and its stories of a God who wrought miracles at whim, **it had cowed a “stupefied” world into despising Nature—“God in things”—and, “having smashed the tables of Nature” (cf. Exodus, 32:19), looked forward joyfully to the ruin of all things** (BOL I.2 123).

Bruno’s several clashes with ecclesiastical authorities testify to his impatience with Christianity of whatever shade. The sectarian violence that plagued the sixteenth century plainly showed that it had done the very opposite of what religion should do, “bind” men and women together, an allusion to an etymological derivation of the Latin word *religio* from *religo*, “I bind”, commonly invoked by Latin authors of all periods (BOL II.2, 181). There are, however, many indications that Bruno found Protestantism the more irksome variant. **Above all Protestants’ denial of the efficacy of “good works” and free will and, conversely, their emphasis on the inner spirit, predestination and justification through “faith alone”, were unconducive to civil order, political stability and material prosperity.** At several points Bruno’s turn of phrase suggests that his attack on Protestant theology was directed in the first instance against Luther’s *On the Bondage of the Will* (1525) and that, in formulating his riposte, he drew on Erasmus’s *On Free Will* (1524), the work that had prompted Luther to write his treatise in the first place.
…

“It is reasonable to denounce Bruno”, wrote the French mathematician, philosopher and theologian Marin Mersenne (1588–1648), “as one of the most evil men that the earth has ever borne” (Mersenne 1624 [2005, 173]). What perturbed Mersenne and many others, including Descartes, was not so much Bruno’s doctrines concerning the earth’s mobility, the elemental homogeneity of the universe, the plurality of worlds and other cosmological innovations, but rather the underlying doctrine of the World Soul and its perceived corollaries: pantheism, demonology, magic, metempsychosis, the claim that God’s absolute power necessitated an infinite product, the essential identity of human, plant and animal souls, the elimination of individual responsibility, denial of miracles—in short, “atheism”.

> http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/arts/lit/PDFs/ScrewtapeLetters_CSL.pdf
>
> I have great hopes that we shall learn in due time how to emotionalise and mythologise their science to such an extent that what is, in effect, a belief in us, (though not under that name) will creep in while the human mind remains closed to belief in the Enemy. The “Life Force”, the worship of sex, and some aspects of Psychoanalysis, may here prove useful. **If once we can produce our perfect work—the Materialist Magician, the man, not using, but veritably worshipping, what he vaguely calls “Forces” while denying the existence of “spirits”—then the end of the war will be in sight.**

…

Brucker conceded that there were some resemblances but concluded that Bruno did not merit the charge of “Spinozism” (ibid., 52), arguing that, for Bruno, the universe emanated from, rather than was identical with, God (see Section 5). **Then, spectacularly, in the second half the eighteenth century Bruno passed from being a heinous atheist to, in Herder’s estimation, someone comparable to, indeed “undoubtedly still more divine” than St John** (McFarland 1969, 77). The key moment was the publication in 1785 of F. H. Jacobi’s *On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn*, in which Jacobi, without Mendelssohn’s consent, published an exchange of letters between them concerning Lessing’s alleged “Spinozism” and Spinoza’s philosophy more generally. **Jacobi, an opponent of Enlightenment rationalism, praised Spinoza’s philosophy, in the “purified” form proposed by some exponents, as an exemplary manifestation of what pure reason, left to its own devices, could achieve.** Equally, however, it manifested the limitations of reason, more specifically rational theism. It led essentially to materialism, fatalism and atheism. In 1789, Jacobi issued an expanded edition of his work, which included, in a new preface, a brief discussion of Bruno and his monism and, in an appendix, a German paraphrase of *On the Cause, the Principle and the One* together with an extended quotation from the second dialogue in the original Italian. **His purpose in combining Spinoza and Bruno was to provide “a summa of the philosophy of the ἓν καὶ πάν”, a reference to Lessing’s “pantheist” theology as well as an allusion to Heraclitus’s**

monism. “It was difficult to give a purer or better explained summary of pantheism” than that provided by this “dark man”, Giordano Bruno (Jacobi 1789, IX, XI).

In the ensuing intellectual uproar, the *Pantheismusstreit* (“Pantheism controversy”) that dominated late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century German philosophy, Bruno emerged as the great precursor of Spinoza and a major philosopher in his own right. **Spinoza and Spinozists had followed in Bruno’s footsteps, concluded F. W. J. Schelling, who thereupon wrote a dialogue, *Bruno or On the Divine and Natural Principle of Things* (1802), setting out a Platonized form of Spinozism.** Goethe, writing to Schiller, while expressing reservations, confided that what he understood or thought he understood of the dialogue was in tune with his “innermost convictions” (McFarland 1969, 247).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA231#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the allegory of the triumphant beast the many-headed monster had to be expelled from the city that men might freely pursue, in diverse ways, the life of truth, a new order that a repentant Jove, foreseeing the end of his reign after the fulfillment of the cycle of the great year, had determined to institute. Since all things, like all men, core contrarieties within them, the same planets that now exuded vices could by order of Jove emit virtues, which made a renovation of the physical and the moral world possible. *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast* predicted an imminent reformation. There would be soon a return to the pristine virtues of hermetic religion; vice, symbolized by the behavior of the old Jove of the pagan pantheon and his licentious companions, would be banished, perhaps not forever, but at least for another cycle of of the great year. Jove performed a symbolic act: He ordered his firstborn, Minerva, to hand him the box kept under a pillow on his bed that held nine smaller boxes containing the medicated eye salve prescribed to purge the human mind both of its false knowledge and its evil dispositions. Though the council of the gods over which Jove presided was convened in pagan heaven, the moral values of Christian Europe were in question – a common type of subterfuge for the discussion of contemporary religion. **But the golden age of pagan myth that looked backward was mocked by Bruno, since only in the harmony of civil society, not primitive animalian existence, was the identification of human with divine reason becoming manifest. An ideal world, a composite of elements from three past civilizations, the Egyptian Hermetic religion, Hellenic reason, and Roman law, with Christian and Judaic forms conspicuously underplayed, would be inaugurated after the expulsion of the triumphant beast. The Inquisitors were not far wrong in their conviction that the beast was intended to symbolize the Church.**

The Inquisitors had hit upon the most obviously heretical of Bruno’s allegorical dialogues. They did not have to single out the many passages from Renaissance hermetic literature that are either paraphrased or directly transcribed to recognize in this dialogue a transparent attack on all versions of Christianity.
…

Bruno was the Pansophist most alienated from any Christian establishment. Contempt for the practices of all existing positive religions, Judaism, Protestant sects, Catholicism, was joined with a derision of Christian theology for its blind involvement with the Aristotelian philosophy that had stifled thought. **After his rejection of the inanities of Aristotle, Bruno tended to revert to the sibylline concepts of the pre-Socratics as correct reflections of the real physical universe.** To the Church in which he was born he became a heresiarch. But Calvinists could take no comfort from his acerbic portrayal of the Protestant temper. His trial before the Genevan Consistory for defaming one of its elders and his humble confession of guilt and repentance in order to escape imprisonment had left their mark. **Proof of Protestant truth hinged upon whether it gave birth to fruits – to academies, universities, temples, hospitals, colleges, and institutes of arts and sciences.** The promulgators of the new catechism were sharply examined: Would these establishments multiply or decay under Protestant tutelage after the old monastic foundations had been expropriated?
…

In the *Spaccio* there are digressions on the power of Roman law to strike down men of iniquity, but the idealization of Rome is vague and at most the repetition of a banal stereotype.
…

Bruno approached closest to preaching social reform in the allegorical *Spaccio*, with its nonascetic, unmartial, utilitarian utopia, its respect for the Roman communal virtues of law and order.
…

A truly reformed religion would put an end to war and persecution and outlaw theological quibbling, banning punishment for those who held rival opinions about the universe. Aristotle the ass and his asinine followers would surrender their hold on the human mind as men turned to the study of God in things once again.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/490/mode/2up?view=theater

Earlier, Bruno's image in Protestant lands had benefited from the papacy's banning his books and burning him alive in Rome in February 1600. His published writings being all but unobtainable, accurate knowledge of his doctrines scarcely existed, which only encouraged the tendency to view him as a quasi-Protestant executed for denouncing Catholic 'corruption' of religion, **as did the Inquisition's secrecy as to the reasons for his trial, which in fact had little to do with magic or hermeticism, as Frances Yates maintained,** but mainly concerned his doctrines of the plurality of worlds and eternity and infinity of the cosmos as well as his Copernican heliocentrism, denial of Creation, Christ's divinity, and the immortality of the soul (individual souls for Bruno being 'operations' of the 'universal soul'), **and his heretical identification of the Holy Spirit with an eternal world-soul something like the Stoic *anima mundi*.**128

Bayle's bombshell that Bruno was not a quasi-Protestant heretic victimized by papal tyranny, or a magician, but a philosophical monist, atheistic naturalist, and denier of miracles, demonology, and the immortality of the soul whose 'hypothèse est au fond toute semblable au spinozisme,' and that both Bruno and Spinoza 'ne reconnoissent qu'une seule substance,' **was therefore far closer to the mark than most historians have been willing to accept until recently.**129 **For Bruno *did* believe that substance is eternal and can neither be created nor destroyed but merely changes its manifestations;**130 **and was rightly recognized by Bayle and Toland as a precursor of Spinoza's conception of motion innate in matter.**131
…

Like Bayle, Toland, who spent much time studying the question of Bruno, reworked Bruno's system into what has been called **'a hylozoic natural philosophy devoid of mystical symbolism.'**133 During his visits to Holland and Germany in 1701-2 and 1707-8, he carried around with him, and showed to interlocutors, his own copy of Bruno's then very rare *Spaccio della bestia trionfante* (of which even Bayle had no direct acquaintance),134 drawing Leibniz, La Croze, and others into intensively debating a figure he helped reconfigure into a pantheist who rejected 'toute religion révélée en general.'135 His argument was accepted by some, including the Prussian royal librarian La Croze, who reacted to the attempts to rehabilitate Bruno with alarm, believing the consequences could be serious should scholars fail to register the true nature of Bruno's heresies; but there was also much opposition. For many, Bruno continued to be depicted as a heroic proto-Protestant combating Catholic 'superstition' who was tyrannically suppressed by Rome and now was being infamously betrayed Bayle and Toland. **Others, including Leibniz, preferred to defend Bruno in other ways, as a Neoplatonist and hermeticist convinced that the active principle in matter is an all-pervading divine force unifying material reality in a way first grasped by the ancient Egyptians.**136

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA147#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Yet, one conviction we know for certain Toland adhered to throughout, a belief profoundly characteristic of the Radical Enlightenment: that the bulk of what men take to be true, including their most cherished religious convictions, is false and dangerously so; **the chief menace facing mankind is neither Pope nor Catholicism, as Protestants believe, but Bruno's "Beast," as he called global ignorance in 1709, the multifarious superstition which (as he claims) everywhere holds sway over credulous men, in all places and at all times"** [Bestia haec sit multifaria Superstitio, quae credulis (ut vult) hominibus, omne loco et tempore, late dominatur]."93

https://books.google.fi/books?id=RzxyDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA85#v=onepage&q&f=false

This is why Bayle on Spinoza could sound like Saint Augustine on the Stoics, or why Cudworth and Le Clerc could sound like Mersenne in 1624, before Spinoza had been born, on what the learned Minim monk saw as Bruno's revival of the Stoic doctrine of the soul of the world:

> **Do not imagine that they [the Stoics] recognize any other God except this soul, which is this nature to which they refer all the actions of man and all the miracles which are done below. They do not want any author [or] creator of the heaven and earth, which they believe to have existed from all eternity.** [*Ne vous imaginez pas qu'ils recognaissent autre Dieu que cet âme, qui est cette nature à laquelle ils rapportent toutes les actions de l'homme, et tous les miracles qui se font ici-bas: ils ne veulent point d'auteur créateur du ciel, et de la terre, qu'ils present avoir été de toute éternité*].126

…

Almost a century later, the theologian Niceron made similar observations about Bruno's *Dialoghi de la Causa*, referring it back to the persecuted medieval philosopher David de Dinant and ahead to Spinoza:

> The second [dialogue] discusses the first principle or cause, and claims to show how the efficient and formal cause unite in one single subject, which is the soul of the Universe; … In the third,

> **Bruno shows that David de Dinant was correct to consider matter as a divine thing; and he maintains that the substantial form never perishes, and that matter and form differ only as power and act, from which he concludes that the entire Universe is only one Being** … Finally, in the fifth, he concludes that the actually existing Being is one, infinite, immobile, and indivisible. One sees from all this that the Doctrine of this Book *is* similar to Spinozism. [*Le second traite du principe, ou de la cause premieré, et prétend faire voir comment la cause efficient et la formelle, se réunissent à un seul sujet, qui est de l'Univers; … Brunus montre dans le troisième, que David de Dinant avait raison de considérer la matière comme une chose divine; et soutient que la forme substantìelle ne périt jamais, et que la matière et la forme ne diffèrent que comme la puissance et l'acte, d'où il conclut que tout l'Univers n'est qu'un Etre … Enfin, dans le cinquième il conclut que l'Etre réellement existant est un, infini, et indivisible. On voit par-là que la Doctrine de ce Livre* est *semblable au Spinosisme*].128

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/14/mode/2up?view=theater

The Stoic element of unmistakable when Filoteo, a character in Bruno's *La Cena de le Ceneri* (third dialogue), argues that God is infinite because all of his substance is in the world, permeating all its parts. The infinity of this world-god or world-soul is an important ingredient of pantheism: if the world were finite *and* divine, there would be something outside it which would not be god, consequently another reality, another principle. **Bruno was particularly insistent on the infinity of the universe, hence of God who is coextensive with it.** The universe is god and god is the universe. As Alexandre Koyré recently noted in conclusion of his study, Renaissance cosmology which teaches the infinite duration and extension of the universe – in which eternal matter moves without a rational purpose, a *telos*, in eternal space – inherited all the ontological attributes of the divinity.8 **What Koyré omits to say is that Bruno's, Spinoza's, the Stoics', etc., universe, the *hen kai pan*, does not speak, does not impart a revelation.** It is *one*, but it is not the God of scripture.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=GNyM4gkSsd8C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA21#v=onepage&q&f=false

Francis Bacon introduced certain spirits or "pneumaticals" into his speculations. **In a system reminiscent of that of the Stoics, those ancient critics of atomism, Bacon concluded that gross matter must be associated with active, shaping, material spirits,** the spirits being responsible for the forms and qualities of tangible bodies, producing organized shapes, effecting digestion, assimilation, and so forth.6

> 6. **Bacon's early atomism gave way in his mature years to a position thought to have been influenced by his chemical/alchemical readings, a position much closer to Stoicism than has generally been recognized:** Robert Hugh Kargon, *Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 43-54;

https://philarchive.org/archive/MANTCM

Disagreement exists in particular about Bacon's atomist and animistic ideas. **Robert Kargon has maintained that Bacon progressively abandoned his early theory of atomism and replaced it with a contrasting pneumatic matter theory.** Graham Rees has gone even further, claiming that Bacon never made a positive commitment to atomism, which only played a methodological role, for example in his invocation of the Democritean method of dissecting nature to uncover its subtleties. **Rees also maintains that Bacon's pneumatism was the sole foundation of his so-called semi-Paracelsian matter theory. However, there also exists a very different viewpoint, which suggests that although Bacon changed his views on atomism repeatedly, he never rejected it completely** (Partington, Urbach). Benedino Gemelli's recently published important study seems to substantiate the latter view. By focusing on Bacon's relation to classical atomism and its sources, Gemelli is able to conclude that **although Bacon rejected the vacuum, the atom nevertheless represented for him the smallest unit of matter,** though it played no direct role in his experimentalist program.1
…

This point of view casts doubt upon Kargon's view, which holds that Bacon first subscribed to an atomistic terminology and subsequently exchanged it for the pneumatic language of alchemy. Kargon believes that Bacon's lexical shift points to a break-away from a mechanistic and atomistic theory in favor of an animistic and pneumatic one.124 **But it is impossible to find such a mechanistic-atomistic model even in Bacon's early writings. Kargon errs in thinking that Bacon's atomism was ever close to some Democritean orthodoxy.**125 **In fact, we hardly ever find purely mechanistic explanations in his work.** It is certainly true that mechanistic and animistic approaches were combined in later works like the *De sapientia veterum*, in which atomic motion at a distance is explained in terms of material sympathies. **Yet even in Bacon's earliest writings, atomist and pneumatic vocabularies are interconnected.** In fact, alchemical vocabulary and mechanical notions are interwoven: processes of alteration and separation, the flight of the spirits and the appetites of Cupid coexist with concepts such as the vacuum and minimal particles.
…

But would it be true to say that the prevalence of non-mechanical explanations is a direct consequence of the active role of pneumatic matter? I do not think so; **because Bacon's non-mechanical or animistic approach to the problem of motion is not the only one that is compatible with pneumatic matter. Bacon could have reasoned like Descartes some decades later, explaining the movements of spirits in a mechanistic way.**
…

The third and last period is most clearly exemplified by the *Novum organum*, in which Bacon distinguishes between hard atoms-*cum*-vacuum and flexible matter without any vacuum. The reasons behind Bacon's modified view have nothing to do with the antithesis between mechanistic atomism and animistic pneumatism, as has sometimes been claimed. As we have seen, **Bacon had always conceived of atoms and pneumatic matter as coexistent and certainly not as antithetical.**133 **Nor was his criticism of atomism in the *Novum organum* accompanied by the introduction of an exclusively or even predominantly pneumatic theory of matter.** His reasons were rather epistemological and operational. He felt that the atom was also scientifically unproductive.
…

Irrespective of the correctness of either conjecture, it is evident that questions concerning the ultimate material principles of matter have no importance in Bacon's last philosophy, because no causative operational role is assigned to atoms any longer. Atoms, if they exist, would be blind and undetermined and would therefore not be able to cause the motions of matter. Rather, the origin of these motions is to be found in the schematisms.136

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was, unlike Machiavelli, directly concerned with natural philosophy. He allied himself with the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus early in his career, praising them openly in his *Cogitationes de Natura Rerum*, *De Principiis atque Originibus* and *Essays*.14 **His early support did much to enhance the status of atomism in England in the first half of the seventeenth century, even though he later withdrew some of his enthusiasm – not from materialism, but from a simple revival of Epicureanism.** In short, he remained a materialist, even while asserting that the details of atomism should be the result of a full investigation into nature, rather than a hypothesis that prematurely restricted research.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=BEYWDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false

Here it is worth mentioning that Bacon's account of material appetites was influenced by at least three important developments of early modern philosophy: the recovery of Stoic thought, especially through the mediation of Justus Lipsius (1547-1606), the great editor of Seneca and Tacitus;5 **the philosophy of Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588), who, through his reading of Galen (in particular, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*), had retrieved decisive elements of Stoic metaphysics;**6 **and finally Lucretian Epicureanism.** These were all authors and traditions which shared in a definition of life as driven by ingrained tendencies to self-preservation. In line with Stoic, Epicurean and Telesian assumptions, and in a way drawing eclectically on their different traditions, Bacon, too, explained motion as a form of desire, enlivening matter from within.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA12#v=onepage&q&f=false

Who was Justus Lipsius? He was born in 1547 in Overijse in Brabant.3 **He studied at the Jesuit college in Cologne from 1559 and was for a short while, from 1562 to 1564, a novice member of the order.** Having obtained a bachelor's degree in arts, he moved to Louvain in 1564 to study law, though at this time he seems to have concentrated instead on his humanist studies, developing a reputation as an acute Latin philologist and publishing four books of *Variae lectiones* in 1568. In that year he joined Cardinal Granvelle's staff and travelled through Italy to Rome, where he studied the Tacitus manuscripts in the Vatican Library. A period of migration followed. Lipsius was back at Louvain in 1570, but he left in 1572 to the chair in history at the university in Jena, a Lutheran foundation. He returned to Cologne to marry the recently widowed Anna van den Calstere in 1573, and in 1574 he published his great edition of Tacitus and left his post at Jena to return to Louvain, where he finally completed his law degree. Moving to a chair at the new Calvinist college in Leiden in 1578, Lipsius there published his two most significant original works, the philosophical dialogue *De constantia* in two books in 1583 and the six books of *Politica* in 1589. **The publication of the *Politica* provoked a sharp public exchange in 1590-91 with Dirck Koornhert, who had accused Lipsius of favouring the methods of the Spanish Inquisition and of Machiavellianism ('*ille machiavellisat*'). In the wake of this controversy, Lipsius left Leiden in 1591, reconverted to Catholicism in Mainz, and took up a chair in ancient history and Latin in Louvain the following year.** His great work of this final period was his edition of Seneca, published in 1605; he also compiled two handbooks of Stoic philosophy, the *Manuductio*, on ethics, and the *Physiologia Stoicorum*, on physics; there were other works on ancient Rome, especially on its military affairs, and a new book on politics, the *Monita et exempla*, in 1605. Lipsius died in Louvain in March 1606; legend has it that he rejected the consolation of Stoicism in his deathbed and gestured at a crucifix, insisting 'haec est vera patientia.'

The scholarship on Justus Lipsius as a moral and political thinker dates above all from the publication in 1914 of Léontine Zanta's *La renaissance du stoïcisme au XVIe siècle*. This books charted the translation and dissemination of classical texts and the increasing use of Stoic tropes, arguments, and values in the writings of the time, and presented in its second part an anatomy of the main ideas of **the Neostoic 'triumvirate' of Justus Lipsius, Guillaume du**

Vair, and Pierre Charron, whose books did much to systematise and and popularise this Stoic current in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
…

She also successfully defended her work at the Sorbonne in May 1914, with *La renaissance* becoming the first thesis on a philosophical subject by a woman to be accepted by a French university for the degree of *docteur d'État*. Santa was a significant feminist: she published her *Psychologie du féminisme* in 1922, for example, and campaigned for the rights of professional women in the interwar French press. She was also an inspirational figure for the young Simone de Beauvoir.7
…

Oestreich's claims for the historical significance of Lipsius's project were not small. In his view, the new emphasis on discipline on the part of the writers who contributed to the Netherlands movement played a key role in the military revolution that transformed first European warfare and then the internal organisation of the European states themselves. Prince Maurice of Orange had been one of Lipsius's students in Leiden in 1583-84, Oestreich observed, and he 'always referred to Lipsius as his teacher.'18 **Neostoicism was credited with being one of the major forces behind the consolidation of absolutist ideology, to the extent that it might be said to mark the moment when the national security state came to supplant the free city republic as the focus of political theorists' attention and loyalties.**19 Max Weber had argued for the importance of a Protestant ethic associated above all with Calvinism for understanding the increasing intensification of processes of rationalisation in early modern Europe that helped to stabilise early capitalist relations of production,20 and Otto Hintze had gone on to suggest that there was an affinity between Calvinism and modern *raison d'état* arguments.21 **Oestreich offered a variation on the theme, suggesting that it might have been Neostoic ideology that had helped to spread an ethic of duty that bordered on asceticism, and that in the context of the early modern absolutist monarchies, furthermore, it made more sense to ascribe significant social and economic effects to this secular ideology than to any religious doctrine.**22 Oestreich's presentation of Lipsius and his interpretation of the political content of Neostoicism has been a very influential one, and his work continues to be cited down to the present (recently, for example, in Charles Taylor's large book on the history of the possibility of a secular society).23
…

One way to interpret these aspects of Lipsius's presentation is significantly to discount them – to consider them as superficial or largely rhetorical elements, and to read much of the first three books of the *Politica* as a conventional fireworks display of humanist erudition rather than as any kind of distinctive, interesting, or original political argument. **What Lipsius gives us, on this view, is a variation on the Machiavellian theme, but one disguised in Senecan clothing. As Waszink puts it, 'Having carved out for himself a good moral persona, or "ethos," by carefully adhering to traditional morality, Lipsius in the last three books comes to discuss and defend practical prudence, reason of state (though not by that word), *prudentia mixta*, and a limited use of deceit if it serves the common good.'**88 It is the second half of the *Politica* – Waszink calls this 'the realistic half of the book' – and especially the argument of book 4 that present the most distinctively Lipsian political thought; indeed, on this view, the first chapter of book 4 can be read as a 'new preface,' introducing the theme of the prince's own personal prudence, with which Lipsius will be preoccupied for the rest of the work.89
…

On the other hand, one of the component parts of virtue is 'goodness,' which Lipsius considers 'does not strictly speaking belong to this structure of politics' (1.6, quia in hoc Civili aedificio proprie non ei locus), and in the third book he threatens to undermine his own analytic separation of prudence and virtue altogether **when he quotes Aristotle approvingly as saying that 'prudence is the ruler's characteristic and sole virtue.'**94

It would be too swift, however, to dismiss these conventional elements in the *Politica* as just so much rhetoric concealing the true Machiavellian teaching. To do so would be to obscure the way in which these components of the argument **do not constitute a pure restatement of the traditional Senecan political theory but rather are building blocks in the construction of a modified Senecan framework, which in fact is what allows the text to function both as a critical response to as well as a partial appropriation of Machiavellian political theory.**
…

In the famous discussion of 'mixed prudence' – that is, of prudence mixed with some kind of deceit – **Lipsius argues that it is permissible for the prince 'to depart slightly from human laws; but only in order to preserve his position, never to extend it. For *Necessity, being a great defender of the weakness of man, breaks every law*.'**108 Richard Tuck acutely commented on this passage that here 'Lipsius captured exactly the difference between these late sixteenth-century theorists and Machiavelli, or what they took the difference to be,' that '[l]aws could be broken for *preservation*, but not for any other reason, such as the enhancement of a ruler's or his country's *glory*.'109
…

Second, as Anthony Levi has argued, it is more plausible to interpret Lipsius's occasional favourable references to Sceptical arguments not as indicating any broadly sympathetic orientation towards Scepticism of his own but rather specifically as a tactical move to downplay or deny the most obviously un-Christian implications of the more Stoic arguments he was advancing elsewhere – concerning the omnipotence of the wise man, for example, or the impossibility of his sinning.113
…

In his well-known lecture of 1 February 1978, Michel Foucault gave an account of what he called **the 'enormous literature on government' that 'explodes in the middle of the sixteenth century,'** and we are now well placed to see where Lipsius's *Politica* stands in relation to that body of work.136 It is always tempting, after all, to draw connections between Lipsius's project and Foucault's. In *Discipline and Punish*, for example, the earliest examples of the disciplinary model of social institutions that Foucault considers are military manuals from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, which were to some extent plagiarised from Lipsius's writings on warfare, though Lipsius is

not mentioned in that book,137 and it is striking that Foucault told his audience at the Collège de France at the start of the lecture on governmentality that '[t]he sixteenth century return to Stoicism revolves around this reactualization of the problem of how to govern oneself.'138 **Foucault describes the literature on government, furthermore, as standing in a self-consciously critical relationship to Machiavelli's *Prince*, which he calls a 'point de répulsion' for the genre.**139 **In particular, the works on government rejected the idea that 'the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity and externality, of transcendence, to his principality,'**140 such that, for Machiavelli, 'What is to be protected is the principality as the relationship of the Prince to his subjects and his territory, and not directly, immediately, fundamentally, or primarily, the territory and its inhabitants.'141

https://www.academia.edu/35745755/The_Varieties_of_neostoic_Virtue_Erasmus_to_Diderot

Justus Lipsius, the most learned among the early apologists of Seneca and promoter of the authoritative seventeenth-century edition of the *Corpus Senecanum*, took pains to avoid any possible objection from Protestant quarters. Among the extant *Fragmenta* of lost Senecan treatises, he inserted colourful remarks written by the philosopher against the coarse superstitious practices of the Roman people. The secondary source of these passages was no less than Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*,9 with his favourable comments on them. Moreover, Lipsius' introductory *Vita Senecae*, to which the fragments are appended, is a thorough rehabilitation of the moralist, philosopher and writer, **unjustly accused of hypocrisy and mischief by his ancient detractors, such as Suilius, Cassius Dio, Xiphilinus and their modern emulators.**

Lipsius' masterful edition of Seneca had several reprints.10 **It was usually read in conjunction with his epoch-making vindication of Stoicism contained in the tract *De Constantia*,** and particularly in his *Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam*, a monumental textbook, popular for several decades as an exhaustive historical summary and commentary of the ancient sources.11

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/416/mode/2up?view=theater

Inspired by this ideal of *pax philosophica*, most humanists were nevertheless less concerned to demonstrate the happy junction of truths, or remove difficulties with it, than shelter with as little disturbance as possible under the presumption of an ultimate harmonious union of theology and philosophy.

Humanist discussion of Graeco-Roman Stoicism was a case in point. **Stoic morality was extolled, and by the end of the sixteenth century enormously influential; but the monistic, determinist, and materialist doctrines on which it rested were ignored and Stoic, like other pre-Christian concepts of God, Providence, soul, and free will, systematically if mostly unwittingly misrepresented in a conventionally Christian sense.**22 Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) may have been a great scholar who did more than anyone to promote the austere Christian neo-Stoicism fashionable in European high culture in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but he too expounded Stoicism, like innumerable lesser contemporaries, as essentially a preparation and paving the way for Christianity.23 **Nor by any means, from the perspective of a Jakob Thomasius, Le Clerc, or Bayle, were these the only shortcomings of his approach.** For his very concern with screening out everything contradicting Christian theology encouraged him to ignore, as he did, the earlier surviving Greek sources, and focus instead on later Latin accounts, especially Seneca,24 **thereby intruding extraneous ingredients, including an infusion of Platonism and Neoplatonism, partly so as to impart negative connotations to matter and nature and imply, quite falsely, Stoic commitment to a transcendent spirituality** even where, in the eyes of later scholars, such interpretation blatantly contradicts authentic Stoic doctrine.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/300/mode/2up?view=theater

But in his own century and even in the eighteenth century, another Dutch Christian Stoic, Justus Lipsius, was a far more powerful cultural force than Grotius. Lipsius lived to see his Stoic tract *De constantia* reprinted in twenty-four Latin editions and translated into seven modern languages before his death in 1606. His compilation of antique political writings, the *Politicorum libri sex*, which gave wide circulation to Tacitus, and his introductions to Stoic philosophizing, which he published shortly before his death, found an enormous public. **For a hundred and fifty years Lipsius sold more books than Bacon or Bodin, and he was probably better known than Montaigne.** Gibbon delighted in his "vivacity";4 Montesquieu owned Lipsius's edition of Tacitus, *De constantia*, the *Politicorum*, and other works; Voltaire had Lipsius's commentary of Polybius at Ferney; Diderot relied on his critical edition of Seneca in his *Essai sur les Règnes de Claude et de Néron*;5 while the fathers of the German Enlightenment, the academic philosophers Thomasius and Wolff, recommended Lipsius to their students. Some writers – a very few – give their name to the age in which they live; most are its creatures: **Lipsius achieved fame by giving people what they wanted.** Stoicism was the fashion: when Du Vair's *Philosophe morale des stoïques* appeared in English in 1598, the translator put a significant epigraph on the title page: *Non quaero quodmihi utile est, sed quod multis* – "I do not look for what is useful to me, but to the many."6

Evidently what the many thought useful was a Stoicism a Christian could accept, **and Lipsius, the most pliable of scholars, supplied it:** his Stoicism adds up to a philosophy firmly grounded in erudition; it allowed men to feel some satisfaction in themselves, pointed toward a solution of confessional squabbles, and was at once new and acceptable. It was learned: **Lipsius recapitulated in his personal history the history of Humanism, for, as he said, he had begun as a philologist and ended as a philosopher: *e philologia philosophiam feci*.**7 It anchored the ideal of social order in man's moral worth: its ethical rationalism taught men to be patient in the face of adversity and pious in the face of fanaticism. It offered an answer to the crisis of the age that had not been offered before: **when David Chrytäus, a Protestant theologian, hailed *De constantia* as a work students must read, "for the like has not been seen or written in philosophy for a thousand years,"**8 **he meant to pay a hyperbolic compliment, but he was pronouncing a historical truth. Such secular morality had not been preached even in the Italian Renaissance.** Its acceptance of power translated Machiavelli's disillusioned insights into a theory for the evolving modern state.

At the same time, Lipsius paraded his doctrine as safe to Christian customers. He enjoyed enlisting the Church Fathers, whose affection for Stoicism was well known, in his campaign to keep Seneca respectable without making him into a Christian. He expounded Stoic ideas with precision and real zest, but when they conflicted with Christian doctrine, when they taught the supremacy of fate or man's right to suicide, he rejected them: Stoicism, he reiterated, was not the true philosophy, but of all untrue philosophies it came closest to the Revealed Faith.

I cannot insist enough that in Lipsius's age this procedure did not necessarily signify insincerity, **although Lipsius' religious professions might well arouse some suspicion, timid as he was and supple, ridden with self-satisfaction, ambition, and a restless worldliness. His repeated, opportune shifts from one confession to another stirred up comment even in his own time, a time resigned to such oscillations. But then, whatever his real convictions, what matters in the history of the Enlightenment is that as the years passed and his writings went into edition after edition, Lipsius's Stoicism retained its vigor while his apologetic Christianity lost its relevance.** The official ideology of Christian civilization had united ethics and politics and subjected both to theology. In Lipsius's writings these bonds were weakened: his *De constantia*, with its sympathetic exposition of Stoic ethics as the doctrine of the good life according to nature, **was both cause and symptom of the separation of ethics from theology;** his *Politicorum*, with its treatment of the state as a rational construct guided by realistic considerations of power, was both cause and symptom of the separation of ethics from politics. **The Christian tinges of his Stoicism were evidence of the tenacious hold of religion over men's minds, but his eighteenth-century readers treated Lipsius as the Church Fathers had treated Cicero: they kept what they found congenial and threw the rest away.**

https://web.archive.org/web/20120207131036/http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/lipsius1.htm

We are tossed, as you see, these many years with the tempest of civil wars: and like sea-faring men are we beaten with sundry blasts of troubles and sedition. If I love quietness and rest, the trumpets and rattling of armor interrupts me. **If I take solace in my country gardens and farms, the soldiers and murderers force me into the town.** Therefore, Langius, I am resolved, leaving this unfortunate and unhappy Belgica [Flanders]--pardon me my dear country--to change land for land, and to fly into some other part of the world, where I may neither hear of the name, nor facts of a Pelops brood [a legendary family among whom incest and murder were committed].
...

First you are not ignorant that man consists of two parts, soul and body. **That being the nobler part resembles the nature of a spirit and fire. This more base is compared to the earth.** These two are joined together, but yet with a jarring concord, as I may say, neither do they easily agree, especially when controversy arises about sovereignty and subjection. For either of them would bear sway and chiefly that part which ought not. **The earth advances itself above the fire, and the dirty nature about that which is divine.** Here hence arise in man dissensions, stirs, and a continual conflict of these parts warring together. The captains are reason and opinion. That fights for the soul, being in the soul: this for, and in the body. **Reason has her offspring from heaven, yea from God: and Seneca gave it a singular commendation, saying that there was hidden in man part of the divine spirit.** This reason is an excellent power or faculty of understanding and judgment, which is the perfection of the soul, even as the soul is of man. **The Greeks call it noun, the Latins mentem, and as we may say jointly, the mind of the soul. For you are deceived if you think all the soul to be right reason,** but that only which is uniform, simple, without mixture, separate from all filth or corruption: and in one word, as much as is pure and heavenly. **For albeit the soul be infected and a little corrupted with the filth of the body and contagion of the senses: yet it retains some relics of his first offspring, and is not without certain clear sparks of that pure fiery nature from whence it proceeded.**

Herehence come those sings of conscience in wicked men: here hence those inward gnawings and scourges: **herehence also comes it that the wicked even against their wills approve virtuous living and commend it. For this good part in man may sometimes be pressed down, but never oppressed: and these fiery sparks may be covered, but not wholly extinguished.** Those little coals do always shine and show forth themselves, lightening our darkness, purging our uncleanness, directing our doubtfulness, guiding us at the last to constancy and virtue. **As the marigold and other flowers are by nature always inclined towards the sun: so hath reason a respect unto God, and to the fountain from whence it spring.**
...

In skirmishing I am to assault foot by foot, as the ancients speak, three affections utter enemies to this our constancy. Dissimulation, piety, commiseration or pity.
...

I see your sorrow indeed, but the cause I must search out more narrowly. **Is it for the commonwealth's sake? O player, put off thy vizard [mask]: thy self are the cause thereof. We see oftentimes the country boors trembling and running together with earnest prayers when any sudden misfortune or insurrection approaches, but as soon as the danger is past, examine them well and you shall perceive that every one was afraid of his own field and corn.** If fire should happen to be kindled in this city, we should have a general outcry: the lame and almost the blind would hasten to help quench it. What think you? For their country's sake? Ask them and you shall see, it was, because the loss would have redounded to all, or at the least, the fear thereof. So falls it out in this case. **Public evils do move and disquiet many men, not for that [not because] the harm touches a great number, but because [they] themselves are of that number.**
...

Behold, if war be among the Ethiopians or Indians, it moves thee not (thou art out of danger): if it be in Belgica thou weepst, criest out rubbest thy forehead, and smitest thy thigh. **But now if it were so that thou didst bewail the public evils as public, and for themselves, there should be no difference had of thee between those countries and this.**

Thou wilt say, It is none of my country. O fool: Are not they men, sprung first out of the same stock with thee? Living under the same globe of heaven? Upon the same mold of earth? Thinks thou that this little plot of ground environed by such and such mountains, compassed with this or that river, is thy country? Thou art deceived. The whole world is our country, wheresoever is the race of mankind sprung of that celestial seed. Socrates being asked of what country he was, answered: Of the world. [This is a doubtful attribution; it is with greater probability attributed to Diogenes the Cynic.--JG] For a high and lofty mind will not suffer itself to be penned by opinion within such narrow bounds but conceives and knows the whole world to be his own. We scorn and laugh at fools, who suffer their masters to tie them with a straw or small thread to a post, where they stand as if they were fettered fast with iron. **Our folly is not inferior to theirs, who with the weak link of opinion are wedded to one corner of the world.**
...

This first skirmish seemed to me very hot, wherefore interrupting him I replied, what liberty of speech is this that you use? Yea, what bitter taunting? Do you in this wise pinch and prick me? I may well answer you with Euripides' words,

> Add not more grief unto my strong disease,
> I suffer more (God wot) than is mine ease.

Langius smiling at this, I perceive then, said he, you expect wafer cakes or sweet wine at my hands; but ere whiles you desired either fire or razor: and therein you did well. **For I am a philosopher, Lipsius, not a fiddler: my purpose is to teach, not to entice thee; to profit, not to please thee; to make thee blush, rather than smile; and to make thee penitent, not insolent. The school of a philosopher is as a physician's shop, so said Rufus [Musonius?] once, wh[i]ther we must repair for health, not for pleasure.**
...

But you assign me the whole world for my country. Who denies that? Yet withal you may not gainsay, that besides this large and universal country, there is another more near and dear unto me, to the which I am tied by a secret bond of nature, except you think there be no virtue persuasive nor attractive in that native soil which we first touched with our bodies and pressed with our feet; where we first drew our breath; where we cried in our infancy, played in our childhood, and exercised ourselves in manhood; where our eyes are acquainted with the firmament, floods, and fields; where have been by a long continuance of descents our kinsfolk, friends, and companions, and to many occasions of joy besides, which I may expect in vain in another part of the world. **Neither is all this the slander packthread of opinion, as you would have it seem, but the strong fetters of nature herself.** Look upon all other

living creatures. The wild beasts do both know and love their dens; and birds their nests. Fishes in the great and endless ocean sea, desire to enjoy some certain part thereof. What need I speak of men who, whether they be civil or barbarous, are so addicted to this their native soil that whosoever bears the face of a man will never refuse to die for and in it. Therefore Langius this newfound curious philosophy of yours, I neither perceive as yet the depth of it, nor mind to make profession thereof. I will listen rather to the true saying of Euripides,

> Necessity forces every wight
> To love his country with all his might.

Chapter XI

Here is confuted the second affection of too much love to our country; which love is falsely termed piety. *Whence this affection springs, and what is our country properly and truly.*

Then Langius smiling replied: **Certes you are a marvelous pious young man: and I fear me that the brother of Marcus Antonius [apparently he means Antoninus Pius, who adopted Marcus Aurelius and made him his heir and successor--JG] is now in danger to be deprived of his surname. But it falls out fitly that this affection offers itself in sallying before his ensign: I will assault him therefore, and overthrow him lightly. And first will I take from him the spoil of that precious garment wherewith he is unworthily attired.** This affection to our country is commonly called pietas, that is piety: why it should be so named I neither see nor can suffer it. **For wherefore should we call it by the name of piety, which is an excellent virtue, and properly nothing else but a lawful and due honor and love towards God and our parents.** Why should our country be placed in the mids[t] between these? Because, say they, it is our most ancient and holiest mother. O fools, injurious to reason and nature herself: is she our mother? How? Or wherefore? Truly I see no such reason: And if thou, Lipsius, if thou be sharper sighted than I, lighten my dark senses. **Is it because she first received us into this world? (For so thou seemest to affirm before) So might any taverner or innkeeper. Is it because she cherishes us? Much better does some silly maid or nurse.** Is it because she nourishes us? So do cattle, trees, and corn daily: And, among the greater substances which do borrow nothing of the earth, the firmament, air, and water. **Finally, change thou thy habitation, and every other part of the world will do thus much for thee. These are floating and fleeing words, savoring of nothing, but an unpleasant juice of popular opinion. They alone are our parents that began, shaped, and bore us: we be see of their seed, blood of their blood, and flesh of their flesh.** If any of these things agree any ways to our country, then I confess that I go about wrongfully to bereave it of this duty of piety.

You will say that great learned clerics have so spoken of it. They have indeed so spoken, following the common opinion, but not that they were so persuaded themselves. But if thou wilt follow the truth, thou shalt attribute that sacred and high title to God, and also, if thou think good, to our parents; **but as for this affection to our country, being first bridled and restrained to a mean, let it be contented in god's name with the title of Love or Charity.**

Yet is this only a contention about the name; let us come nearer to the thing itself. **Which I do not wholly take away, but temperate [temper], and, as it were, scarify it with the lancelot of right reason.** For as a vine if it be not pruned, spreads itself too far abroad, so do affections fly about with full sail being blown with the plausible puffs of popularity.

And notwithstanding here by the way I confess--for I am not degenerated from a man, nor from a citizen--I confess, I say, that **every one of us has an inclination and good will to his lesser country, the causes whereof I perceive are to you unknown. You would have it to be from nature: but the truth is, it grows of custom, or of some decree and ordinance.** For after that men forsook their wild and savage manner of living, and began to build houses and walled towns, to join in society, and to use means offensive and defensive, behold then a certain communion necessarily began among them, and a social participation of diverse things. **They parted the earth between them with certain limits and bounds; they had temples in common; also marketplaces, treasuries, seats of judgment; and principally ceremonies, rites, laws. All which things our greediness began in time so to esteem and make account of, as if they were our own in particular, and so they be in some sort, for that every private citizen had some interest in them, neither did they differ from private possessions, saving that they were not wholly in one man's power.** This consociation and fellowship gave the form and fashion to a new erected state, which now we call properly the commonwealth, or our country. Wherein when men saw the chiefest stay of each person's safety to consist, laws were enacted for the succor and defense thereof; **or at the least such customs were received by tradition from the predecessors to their posterity, that grew to be of like force as laws. Herehence it comes to pass that we rejoice at the good of the commonwealth, and be sorry for her harm; because our own private goods are secure by her safety, and are lost by her overthrow. From this fountain do spring the streams of our goodwill and love toward her;**

which affection in respect of the common good (the secret providence of God leading thereunto) our ancestors increased, by all possible means establish and maintaining the majesty of their country.

It appears therefore in my judgment, that this affection had his beginning from custom, and not from nature, as you pretend. Else why should not the same measure of that affection be indifferently in all men? Why should the nobility and rich men have more care of their country than the poor people, who commonly take care for their private matters but none at all for the public affairs? Which thing falls out otherwise in all passions that be governed by the instinct of nature. Finally what reason can you allege that so small and light an occasion should oftentimes assuage, yea wholly extinguish it? See how every day some for anger, some for love, some for ambition forsake their country? And what a multitude are drawn away by that idol lucre? **How many Italians forsaking Italy the queen of countries only for greediness of gain have removed their dwellings into France, Germany, yea even into Sarmatia? How many thousand Spaniards do ambition draw daily into another world from us? These arguments prove invincibly that the band whereby we are linked thus to our country is but external and accidental, in that it is so easily broken by one inordinate lust.**

Moreover, Lipsius, you are greatly deceived in describing this country of ours: **for you tie it very narrowly to that native soil where we were born and had our education, with other like frivolous allegations, from whence you labor in vain to pick out natural causes of our affection toward her. And if it be the native soil where we were born that deserves this title of our country then were Brussels only my country, and Iscanum yours; and to some other man, a poor cottage or cell; yea unto many, not so much as a cottage, but a wood, or else the open field;** what then? **Shall my good will and affections be shut up within those narrow walls? Shall I settle my disposition and love upon one town or house as my country?** What folly were that? You see also that by your description none are happier than those that are born in the woods and open fields, which are always flourishing, and seldom or never be subject to desolation or wasting. **No, no, our country is not as you take it, but it is, some one state, or as it were one common ship, under the regiment of one prince, or one law:** which I confess we ought to love, to defend, and to die for it; yet must it not drive us to lament, wail and despair. Well said the poet,

> A happy quarrel is it and a good,
> For country's cause to spend our dearest blood.

He said not that we should weep and lament, but die for our country. For we must so far forth be good commonwealth's men, that we also retain the person of good and honest men, which we lose if we betake us to childish and womanlike [sic] lamentations.

Last of all, Lipsius, I have thee learn this one hidden and deep mystery, that if we respect the whole nature of man, all these earthly countries are vain and falsely so termed, except only in respect of the body, and not of the mind or soul, which descending down from that highest habitation, deems all the whole earth as a jail or prison, but heaven is our true and rightful country, wh[i]ther let us advance all our cogitations, that we may freely say with Anaxagoras to such as foolishly ask us whether we have no regard to our country? Yes verily but yonder is our country, lifting our finger and mind up toward heaven.
...

Langius with this conference having scattered abroad some dark mists from my mind, I bespake him thus. My father, **what by admonitions, and what by instructions you have done me great good; so that it seems that I am now able to moderate my affection toward the native soil, or commonwealth wherein I was born,** but not toward the persons of my fellow citizens and countrymen. For how should I not be touched and tormented with the calamities of my country for my countrymen's sake, who are tossed in this sea of adversities, and do perish by sundry misfortunes? Langius taking my tale by the end, This is not, quoth he, properly sorrow, but rather commiseration or pitying, which must be despised of him that is wise and constant; whom nothing so much beseems as steadiness and steadfastness of courage, **which he cannot retain, if he be cast down not only with his own mishaps, but also at other men's.** What Stoical subtleties are these? Said I. Will you not have me to pity another man's case? Surely it is a virtue among good men, and such as have any religion in them?
...

Once the East flourished. Assyria, Egypt and Jewry excelled in war and peace. **That glory was transferred into Europe, which now like a diseased body seems unto me to be shaken, and to have a feeling of her great confusion night at hand.**
...

Have you Germans in time past been fierce? Be ye now milder than most people of Europe? Have you Britons been uncivil heretofore? Now exceed you the Egyptians and people of Sybaris in delights and riches. Has Greece once flourished? Now let her be afflicted. Hast Italy

swayed the scepter? Now let her be in subjection. You Goths, you Vandals, you vilest of the barbarians, peep you out of your lurking holes, and come rule the nations in your turn. Draw near ye rude Scythians, and with a mighty hand hold you a whiles the reins of Asia and Europe; yet you again soon after give place and yield up the scepter to another nation bordering on the ocean. Am I deceived? **Or else do I see the sun of another new empire arising in the West?**
…

Howbeit whether she shake or fall, whether she impair or wholly perish, be thou not afflicted, **but take unto thee the noble courage of Crator,** who when Alexander asked whether he would have his country restored again to liberty; "why should I?" said he, "for it may be that another Alexander will oppress her."

https://www.academia.edu/20107304/Epictetus_in_Early_Modern_Europe_1453_1758

Lipsius did not, like Hobbes and Descartes, launch a full-throated attack on the Aristotelian scholasticism of his time, but he did sidestep Aristotelian Thomism more or less completely: Gerhard Oestreich has noted, for example, that there are only two references to the work of Aquinas in the published works of Lipsius, one of which is found in his *Lovanium*, a guide to the university town of Louvain.15

https://www.exclassics.com/anatomy/anat9.htm

I must needs except Lipsius and the Pope, and expunge their name out of the catalogue of fools. For besides that parasitical testimony of Dousa,

> "A Sole exoriente Mæotidas usque paludes,
> Nemo est qui justo se æquiparare queat."

…

Lipsius saith of himself, that he was *humani generis quidem pedagogus voce et stylo*, a grand signior, a master, a tutor of us all, and for thirteen years he brags how he sowed wisdom in the Low Countries, as Ammonius the philosopher sometimes did in Alexandria, *cum humanitate literas et sapientiam cum prudentia: antistes sapientiæ*, he shall be *Sapientum Octavus*. The Pope is more than a man, as his parats often make him, a demi-god, **and besides his holiness cannot err, *in Cathedra* belike:** and yet some of them have been magicians, Heretics, Atheists, children, and as Platina saith of John 22. *Etsi vir literatus, multa stoliditatem et lævitatem præ se ferentia egit, stolidi et socordis vir ingenii,* a scholar sufficient, yet many things he did foolishly, lightly.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA160#v=onepage&q&f=false

Justus Lipsius – or Joest Lips – was born in Isque, close to Louvain, on the 18 October 1547, to a landowning Catholic family of the minor gentry. **His grandfather, Martin, was a friend of Erasmus.** A certain legend describes the night preceding Lipsius's birth wherein his mother had a vision of two white children embracing each other in her room, symbolizing Lipsius's two loves, philology and philosophy. As a bright and precocious student, Lipsius was sent to the Jesuit college in Cologne at the age of 13 where he learned Latin and Greek, and then, at the of 16, he went to the University of Louvain to study law. Orphaned at the age of 19, he accompanied Cardinal Granvelle to Rome as a secretary (1567-69).
…

Despite being a celebrated professor at Leyden, Lipsius left there in 1591, and took up the Chair of History and Latin Literature in Louvain in 1592. (Lipsius was motivated to leave Leyden for a variety of reasons, including certain tensions in international politics, the ambiguity of his religious position, his weak character, his desire for tranquility rather than glory, and the influence of his wife.) **Louvain was a very large university where the teaching of Aristotle and St Thomas predominated. But as a professor of Latin, Lipsius had more opportunity to present students with authors whom he particularly admired, especially the Stoics.** In 1604, under the guise of making an introduction to his 1605 edition of Seneca (Lipsius 1605), he published both the *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* and the *Physiologia Stoicorum*. **He planned to write a third tome, on Stoic ethics, but this was never written.** He died in 1606 and, quite piously, asked his wife to consecrate his best professorial gown to the Virgin Mary.
…

Lipsius, first of all, had to justify his use of pagan philosophy, rather than holy texts, in his discussions of the good life: why prefer the *bonae litterae* to the *sacrae litterae*? He defended this preference based on his position as a professor of Latin, a position distinct from that of a theologian. Speaking about the path to wisdom, he writes in the second preface of *De constantia* (Du Bois 1873: 122):

> In traversing [this path], I should think that even human letters offer comfort and, indeed, assistance. I know that Augustine's counsel, in recovering the writings of the philosophers, is to vindicate in our use that which is taken from these unjust possessors.

Like the Israelites who, after having crossed the Red Sea, were able to use the spoils of the Egyptians, Christians at the end of the Renaissance should be able to use the spoils of pagan philosophers so long as they melt down these spoils, as it were, and modify them for their own use. **And this idea allowed Lipsius to distinguish himself from two opposing types of philosophy: Skepticism and Aristotelian scholasticism.** And it also helped him to advance new ideas such as the right of the individual against tradition, the presence of reason throughout the world, a physical and political world both ordered by laws, and a voluntarist psychology. The obligation to "melt the spoils," however, introduces a strong constraint: one must read the Stoics, but without departing from orthodox Christian doctrine. There are two possible strategies here: first, one can revive Stoic doctrine but make some adjustments borrowed from Christian Neoplatonism (i.e. concerning the sovereign good, the uniqueness of God, and sin); or second, one can give a pure exposition of the doctrine but not endorse it, and show how it is opposed to Christianity **(i.e. by looking at the corporeal nature of the soul or the paradoxes of the Stoic sage).**
…

Common notions, the principles and foundations of science and wisdom, are principally internal, originating within us, and they are not deployed but by virtue of experience. They are the seeds of truth or the sparks of divine reason (which is fire):

> **We know that the Stoics hold that one part of the divine spirit resides in us, and that this is reason itself** – which if it shines in its light and place is completely pure, genuine, right, and divine. But now it is shut up in the body, as in a prison,4 and it is agitated and abducted by opinions. And yet it retains the little flames of its origin and, through itself and by means of its nature, it sees truth and honesty. These little flames – or sparks if you prefer (the Greeks call them sparks, living fires, or the remains of fire) – stretch themselves out and reveal themselves in certain sensations or judgements which are implanted in us, or innate, in nearly all kinds of people and, eminently, in the highest nature.5 (*Man.* 2.11)

…

The divinization of the human being – a traditional theme of religion – **results more from the ever larger part that reason plays in human nature, rather than a filial adoption by divinity.** The emotional aspects of the love of God are noticeably absent: the God which Lipsius describes is cosmic, impersonal, and abstract; the love associated with God is above all an intellectual love.
…

Lipsius retains the thesis according to which virtue suffices for beatitude, which is defended by all the ancient sages, as well as the equality or connection of the virtues founded on the unity of rightness. **The virtues are linked together: their structure expresses their inseparability and hence their equality; all are equally and simultaneously required, as we cannot have one without equally having all the others.** And so there is no prudence without strength, justice, or temperance: "Prudence, when it involves giving each their due, is justice; when it involves choice, it is temperance, and when it involves endurance, it is fortitude" (*Man.* 3.4).18 **But from this thesis, there follow certain paradoxes, such as the equality of the sages,** the constancy of their happiness, and their self-sufficiency; the sage alone is free, rich, handsome, regal, magistrate, seer, rhetorician, and even priest, since he is the sole knower of divine matters who contains divinity within himself better than all others.

There are, nevertheless, certain difficulties here such as the equality of faults, the rejection of forgiveness, and the right to suicide. The paradox of the equality of faults (examined in *Man.* 3.21) follows directly from the thesis of the unity of virtue and of the radical fissure established between rightness and badness, the good and the bad. **If Lipsius condemns this, it is more as a jurist than as a moralist, for this leads to the identification of simple error with trespass and crime, and thus renders impossible all juridical procedure.** After having recalled the formal justification that all fault or error is equally (i.e. formally) outside of rightness, Lipsius distinguishes between faults, not according to the intention behind them, but according to the material nature of the fault and its effects. **The negligent pilot commits a more serious fault if his negligence puts cargo that is more precious in jeopardy.** And so faults are equal without being similar: they are formally equal as being opposed to that which is right but they are dissimilar by virtue of the respective difference of their material nature and the seriousness of their effects.
…

But the true reason for this rejection of suicide is not in the above passage: **voluntary suicide is a form of pride. And it is on this specific point that Lipsius, the *philosophus Christianus*, separates himself from the *Stoicus*.** The Stoics affirmed that the sage is equal to God because he

shares the same virtue (*Man.* 3.14; Seneca, *Ep.* 73.12). And herein lies the fundamental error: to be sure, the virtue is formally the same, but it is materially different in duration, force, and power. The sage can indeed be the companion or retainer of divinity, but he can never be His equal; **Stoicism, moreover, makes the sage's virtue not only equal to God, but superior, because he becomes a sage by his own efforts, whereas God is virtuous by nature** (*Man.* 3.14). For Lipsius, an irredeemable distance separates human beings from God: in the final analysis, God is an inimitable and unequalable as he is incomprehensible (*Const.* 2.13).

Politics and history

In politics, Lipsius is very conservative. The six books of the *Politics*, just as the *Monita et exampla politicorum*, are devoted to the formation and counsel of princes. **If there is a cosmopolitanism of the sages, it is reserved for an elite. On the other hand, Lipsius takes up Tacitus's description of the masses, similar to the Stoic *stultus*:** "[They are] of unstable character, prone to rebellion and strife, eager for change, and opposed to order and quiet" (*Polit.* 4.5).21 The people are unstable, without judgment, suspicious, credulous, mutinous, contemptuous of public affairs, brave in words yet cowardly in actions, and excessive in everything. This constitutive inability makes it such that the people represent a multitude perpetually faced with disintegration and whom the prince must unite by the law. And for this reason, pre-eminence is accorded to both the monarchy and the virtue of obedience.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA72#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> In his examination of this text, Jürgen Overhoff does not use the language of 'red' and 'black' Tacitism, **but he squarely aligns the author of the 'Discourse of Lawes' with the absolutist Tacitists, in opposition here to the Venetian republicans;**86 he emphasises the importance of Lipsius's edition of Tacitus and of his *Politica* for the discourse of early seventeenth-century Tacitism;87 and he draws attention in particular to Lipsian claims that find a powerful echo in Hobbesian political theory, namely, that **'human beings were rebellious by nature, that their unbridled conduct caused discontent and civil war, and that therefore the sovereign judgment of all things belonged to princes, not to private individuals.'**88
> …
>
> But now consider a moment in the *Politica*, at 6.4.89 Lipsius quotes a line from Tacitus about how the 'instigators of civil war' will do various things, 'gathering all the basest men in nightly meetings,' 'utter complaints and ambiguous remarks about the Prince' and, 'when they have attracted other helpers of the rebellion as well' they proceed 'in a more daring way: and profess liberty and precious words as their motive':
>
> > **But how falsely they do so! Because *in order to overthrow the government, they pretend to defend freedom; and when they have overthrown it, they attack freedom as well.***90
>
> The last words from Tacitus in Lipsius's text come from *Annals* 16.22.91 **They are not, however, presented in that text as an opinion of the historian himself but are put into Capito Cossutianus's mouth,** and Capito Cossutianus was not so much reflecting in general on the activities of those who would start civil wars as he was specifically criticising Stoic politicians, as part of the justification he offers to Nero for seeking to kill off Thrasea Paetus.
>
> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> **Nor doe I find any that think a *Monarchy* tolerable otherwise than upon Terms of *Election,* except it be *Lipsius,* and such partiall Pen-men as Himself, who were held in pension or relation by *Hereditary Tyrants.***
>
> …

Lipsius is original in defending for the prince a virtue of doubtful value: mixed prudence (*prudentia mixta*). This virtue is conditioned by factual situations as the State is not constituted by virtuous citizens but by "the shrewd, the insane, the bad, and the dishonest," and order and public health are ends more necessary to the State than to the prince (*Polit.* 4.13). Obtaining the end of public health in the midst of unfavorable conditions (such as the wickedness of the people and the setbacks of fortune) imposes on the prince, by a certain necessity, **a choice of means and conduct described by a classic saying that one must "unite the fox with the lion"** (ibid.).22 **This *honesta fraus* is a "crafty deliberation done apart from virtue, or the laws, for the good of the prince and his state"** (*Polit.* 4.14). Political deception can be light, moderate, or strong. The *levis fraus* (dissimulation) is the only one authorized and recommended; the *media fraus* (deception, corruption) is like a poison mixed with a medication: it is unclear what will happen in such a situation but it will certainly be dangerous and noxious; but this, however, can sometimes be tolerated. The *magna fraus* (treachery, injustice) is entirely condemned.
…

This obsession also leads him to hold the theory that the State should have but one religion – *unam religionem in uno regno servari* (*Polit.* 4.3) – though this is paradoxical from a Catholic living in a Reformed country. But this counsel is essentially prudential, since religious conflicts have fomented wars in Europe. This view, however, provoked a polemic with Dick Coornhert, who reproached Lipsius

for supporting the control of conscience (against which the Reformation developed). Without entering into the details of this dispute,23 it is worth noting that, while Coornhert relied on the idea that truth would prevail over heresy in the end, Lipsius saw that there was sedition implicit in religious conflict, even if the conflict was simply theoretical. The perspective that Lipsius invokes is never the triumph of the truth but rather the protection of order as a condition of peace. **If Lipsius supports strict control of religious matters by the prince, it is not in the name of a particular religion, since this counsel is applicable to every political situation: it is, indeed, in the name of public order and peace.**

> https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A52748.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext
>
> ***Lipsius*** **tells us,*** **that in the Isle of *Japan,* there are no lesse than *nine Religions,* every man being at liberty to professe which he please: So that in the same House you might see the Husband of one Religion, the Wife of another, the Son of a third; and yet no heart-burning nor difference among them, to the disturbance of the Family.** The *Turk* (we see) also allows an equal Liberty to *Christians* and *Jews,* yet his Empire hath long continued firme and Peaceable, notwithstanding the variety of Opinions tolerated among those of his own Sect, and others. The case is the same likewise in severall *Christian* dominions; as *Poland, Transylvania, Hungary,* and even in the Protestant Dominions in *Germany.* Yet the experiment is brought nearer home to us by our neighbours the *States* of *Holland,* who by a prudent toleration of severall Professions, have established themselves in such a measure of Peace, Plently, and Liberty, as is not to be equalled by any of the Nations round about them. **And the Reasons why those Nations continue in Peace, notwithstanding their difference in *Religious Opinions,* are confessed by the same *Lipsius* (a great *Roman Catholick*) to be these:** *First,* because the *Prince,* and he that is the *High Priest,* among them, carry themselves with the same Aspect upon all, giving no Countenance to one more than another. ***Secondly,* because they severely punish such as offer to disturb their Neighbours about any matter relating to *Religion.*** *Thirdly,* because they suffer not that Religion to be evill spoken of, which is publiquely professed by the *Prince* or *State*: whereby it is implyed, that a *Toleration* of different opinions in Religion, can be no prejudice to the Peace of a Nation, so long as these Rules are observed; but rather a grand Preservative of publique Quiet; whereas persecutions for matter of Religion have ever been all the world over the great Incentives of Sedition.

A bourgeois conservatism

The pages which Lipsius devotes to politics denote, finally, a bourgeois conservatism concerned more with order than progress. Military discipline is the model of civic discipline, and this discipline is self-discipline – the ability to endure cold, hunger, and fatigue. The watchword is **no longer *sustine et abstine* but *sustine et labora*. Lipsius's Neostoicism thus ensures the progression from aristocratic and feudal virtues (e.g. heroic courage) to bourgeois virtues** (e.g. order and method, simplicity, the valuing of work and duty), and all this in honor of the United Provinces in the Golden Century.
…

Natural theology describes a God who is transcendent in his incomprehensibility, but immanent in the form of reason that orders the world. By putting the theological questions of grace, original sin, predestination, and redemption in parentheses, as questions relevant to higher considerations, Lipsius is able to defend an optimism that is applicable to times of crisis, despite having a profound pessimism about his own times. **This optimism is both archaeological (i.e. the world was created by reason which is present in things but hidden) and eschatological (i.e. the world will be regenerated and restored by the patient and continued work of reason).**
…

The final trait of Lipsius's work to emphasize here, as it is without doubt the most essential, is its naturalism. This is, first of all, evident in the description of the genesis of the individual and in the formation of the soul, **but it is particularly clear in the constitution of a morality separated from any theological foundation.** Indeed, Lipsius's discussions of morality do not concern human misery or sinfulness; they are, rather, a study of the passions as sicknesses, their connections with prejudice, and the means to deliver the mind from the mastery of representations. **This naturalism** – the foundation of a morality and a theology, if not a natural religion – **has as its principle the affirmation of the unity of nature, its integral penetration by reason, and thus its scientifically intelligible character.** This explicit and constant rejection of ontological dualism authorizes, at the same time, the affirmation of the harmony of human beings and nature, and the study of a voluntarist organization of society.

For all that, this naturalism is not easily Christianized: **the total mixture (*krasis*), physical process, is rejected in favor of the ontologico-logical theory of the deployment of divine reason in causal time.** The suicide of the sage, equal to God, is rejected: human beings cannot imitate God, follow in his steps, or equal him. Lipsius did not envision the creation of a new school or even a new age of

Stoicism. He wanted to render accessible the physics of the Stoics and, in so doing, the rest of their philosophy. But in doing this, he gave new life to such concepts as common notions, assent, and free necessity; he made theories on the identity of God, nature, and universal reason, on liberty and destiny, and on the constancy of the will all familiar; **shifting from erudite knowledge to an intellectual common conscience, he advanced a perspective on the world that is rational, voluntarist, and individualist, and which differentiated itself very quickly from the classical age to become quasi-evidential, a process hiding its source.** In a related way, the mechanist movement in science, religious irenicism, the movement of subjective and rational natural rights, the great systems of the classical ages up to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, are all involved in collecting, diffusing, and diffracting this heritage.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA27#v=onepage&q&f=false

Where an exclusive humanism was undoubtedly available was in Epicureanism. And it is no surprise that Lucretius was one of the inspirations for explorations in the direction of naturalism, e.g., with Hume. **But Epicureanism just as it was couldn't really do the trick. It could teach us to achieve ataraxia by overcoming our illusions about the Gods. But this wasn't what was needed for a humanism which could flourish in the modern context.** For this was becoming one in which the power to create moral order in one's life had a rather different shape. It had to include the active capacity to shape and fashion our world, natural and social; and it had to be actuated by some drive to human beneficence. To put this second requirement in a way which refers back to the religious tradition, modern humanism, in addition to being activist and interventionist, had to produce some substitute for agape.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA124#v=onepage&q&f=false

There's a long story here; but very shortly put, we can see that this new understanding of world and time, originally arising within a Christian outlook, is taken over by secular variants; we might better say, gradually slips over more and more in a secular direction, **starting perhaps with the neo-Stoicism of Justus Lipsius.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA116#v=onepage&q&f=false

He is a key figure in my story, not only because he articulates an ethical theory of this new, reconstructive range, but also because he led the way in showing how to apply this view in the political-military realm. Lipsius invents a (sort of) Christianized Stoicism. It leans to the Stoic side.
…

He rejects miseratio, or misericordia, the compassion of feeling, in favour of the compassion of active intervention, but on the basis of a full inner detachment. The nuance was not lost on theologians of his day, and the sentences criticizing miseratio were deleted in the Spanish translation of *De Constantia*.56
…

But that means that he is not upset, disturbed. It doesn't mean that he doesn't react. On the contrary, **Lipsius, in a way which is typical of this whole modern epoch, departs from Stoicism in his activism.** We might say that he is closer to the Roman, or Senecan, version than to that of Epictetus, although he cites both these authors as his inspiration. But in fact he goes beyond even the Romans. **It is not a matter just of doing one's duty in the world, but of waging active struggle for the good. Lipsius' work is full of military metaphors, and some of his earliest enthusiastic readers were concerned with military affairs,** as we shall see.

There is even here an important doctrinal departure from the Stoa. Lipsius firmly believes in our free will. We are responsible for our world. Reason should galvanize will, and will impose discipline, which will arm us for the struggle with evil and disorder. The firmness or perseverance doesn't just denote the strength passively to bear suffering; but it means the power to engage unrelentingly in the good fight.

Why did this (semi)-Christianized Stoicism have such an impact in its time? And on both sides of the confessional barrier; in Lipsius' native Netherlands, in Germany, in France? Calvinists, Lutherans, Catholics praised it. And indeed, **Lipsius managed to teach at Universities of all three faiths: Louvain, Jena, Leiden** – a very rare feat at the time.

There were two obvious reasons: First, if **many members of the élite, under the impress of the ideal of civility, were less tolerant of violence and disorder than their forebears,** then they were doubly appalled to see that the cause of Reform, instead of bringing greater peace and order, had been in many cases the occasion of greater strife and conflict, and often of a particularly vicious kind. These

people were looking for a version of their faith which would be less obsessed with confessional orthodoxy, and more concerned with the essentials that all churches shared. **In a sense, these were people who shared some of the spirit of Erasmus, but in the circumstances, they had frequently become what in France were known as "les politiques."** They were concerned above all with peace and accommodation, and they strongly opposed the sectarian fanatics of the Ligue. **Two of Lipsius' most prominent French followers were Catholics of this stamp, Charron and du Vair, one a priest and the other a bishop.**

Secondly, like the politiques, Lipsius' readers wanted to do more than bemoan the vicious conflict; they wanted to put an end to it, and build a new political order. **They were often people with military and governmental responsibility; rulers, generals, and civil servants.**
…

But first I want to register the shift that has taken place, one which in fact moves in the direction of the later Deism, and eventually exclusive humanism.

Once again, we have to avoid the anachronism of seeing this as a step along a straight path. **Lipsius' view was at its core theistic; and his God was not presiding over the benign, harmonious universe of eighteenth-century Deism. But the eclipse of certain crucial Christian elements, those of grace and of agape, already changed quite decisively the centre of gravity of this outlook.** Moreover, there didn't seem to be an essential place for the worship of God, other than through the cultivation of reason and constancy; that was in a sense, the strength of this philosophy, because the worship of God was exactly what all the fighting was supposed to be about in the sixteenth century. **This silence could be seen as an invitation to belong to "the church of your choice," to use a somewhat anachronistic expression (more aptly, the church of your ruler's choice).** But it could also be seen as a relegation of worship as ultimately unnecessary and irrelevant.

God is still very crucial, because he is the source of reason, and in following it we are following his image in us. But it appears that what we have to do to do his will is to become an excellent human being, and nothing further. This prepares the ground for the anthropocentrism of later Deism, after this has made a further shift towards disconnecting our reasoning powers from the work of God in us. An important turning has been made. **Neo-Stoicism is the zig to which Deism will be the zag.**
…

Lipsius' political doctrine in his *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae, libri sex* of 1589 takes the stance that I've been calling "politique," that is, he is concerned to recover order and stability out of the reigning condition of confessional civil war in much of Europe. He favours a monarchical form of government, and gives little attention to the claims of the estates. But his prince is to be guided by strict moral principles, and is to dedicate his efforts to the public weal.

This work, however, goes beyond giving general advice, and contains detailed prescriptions for army reform. These stress the importance of drill and order in forming an effective armed force. But his conception of discipline goes beyond this; he wants to inculcate moral change. **His ideas is to create a professional army, where the old values of personal honour and plunder would be sidelined, and the soldiers would be actuated by the Stoic principles of continentia, modestia, abstinentia** – self-control, moderation, and abstinence.61

In other words, the aim of training is not only to produce the discipline of coordinated movement and obedience to command, but also to make the soldier over morally, and inculcate a professional ethic of service and self-control. The irresponsible mercenary armies, which were often as much a danger to the subjects of their employer as to his enemies, are to be replaced by disciplined troops, who will make it a point of honour to refrain from rapine and plunder.

Now the importance of this was twofold, on a particular, and on a more general level. **The particular result was that Lipsius' advice was taken by the initiators of the military reforms in the Netherlands in the 1590s, which included some of his ex-pupils (especially Maurice of Orange). These by introducing strict training created an effective military force which was then widely imitated in Europe – in the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus, and in Cromwell's New Model Army, for example.**

On a more general level, Lipsius set the tone for serious reformers of high moral purpose in the next century, **be they (as they sometimes were) rulers, or more often high civil servants, administrators, generals,** who initiated reforms aiming to reconstruct various dimensions of society. He proposed, first, a lofty moral goal of service to the general weal, to be grounded in a personal ethic of austerity and self-discipline; this was to be the basis of far-reaching remaking of institutional and social life, through the discipline and training of the subordinate population; and it was to result in the internalization of the values of self-control and industriousness among these subjects.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA123#v=onepage&q&f=false

> If, in Renaissance expectations, the product of a Platonic education was a heaven-bound sage like Plotinus or Augustine, and the product of an Aristotelian education was a divine logician like Theophrastus or Aquinas, the product of a Stoic education virtuous and incorruptible statesman like Cicero, Seneca or the ideal leader who was the hoped-for product of humanist neoclassical education.

In short, something like what has been called the "protestant work ethic," in an atmosphere comparable to the "inner-worldly asceticism" (innerweltliche Askese) of which Max Weber talked,62 was to be created, but very much through the active, reconstructive efforts of political authority. **It may indeed be argued that this ethic of active state intervention, in the period of absolute governments, did as much to introduce a rationalized, disciplined, and professionalized mode of life as the Calvinist ethic of the calling. Neo-Stoicism, very much strengthened by Calvinism, worked in some places from above by means of state bureaucracies, to bring about the changes that Calvinism and Pietism wrought in other places from below, through dedicated, self-denying entrepreneurs and voluntary associations.**63

In their activism, and their dedicated asceticism, neo-Stoicism and Calvinism were very similar. And indeed, Calvin too started his life by publishing a study of Seneca.
…

But this high point had rarely been defined so ambitiously as the Calvinist or neo-Stoic programmes of the seventeenth century. This was so in two respects: first, in that the aim was to do away with violence and social disorder altogether, leaving only individual crime at one end of the spectrum, and the legitimate violence of the state in war and the repression of crime in the other; secondly, in that the goal was to inculcate at least some of the norms of civility and a properly ordered life in *everyone*. These goals were, of course, linked, in that it is only through attaining something like the second that one could hope to realize the first.

An ambition of this kind is unprecedented in European history, **although there seem to have been comparable attempts in China at different moments.**
…

And we have in a sense achieved the goal of inculcating "civility" in everyone, with the vast majority of the population literate, having many years of schooling, sharing certain norms of disciplined work and ordered peaceful life. So much so that we are shocked and horrified at signs that some youth are regressing to violence and a way of life which utterly abandons family life and the work ethic. **Our unreflecting norm is even beyond the point that the reforms of Calvinist divines and neo-Stoic ministeriales aimed at starting four centuries ago.**
…

Since Augustine was the maître à penser of the Reformers, how did they imagine that they could step beyond the limits that he so persuasively defined? The answer is not that they believed the elect were more numerous, but rather, as we saw above, that they saw a dispensation in which the elect would rule, and discipline the whole society.
…

Thus were the Augustinian limits by-passed among Calvinists. In the less orthodox climate of neo-Stoicism, they seem rather to have faded from view.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA155#v=onepage&q&f=false

But my thesis is that the effect of the Christian, or Christian-Stoic, attempt to remake society in bringing about the modern "individual in the world" was much more pervasive, and multitracked. It helped to nudge first the moral, then the social imaginary in the direction of modern individualism. This becomes evident in the new conception of moral order which we see emerging in modern Natural Law theory, and which I mentioned in the previous chapter.19 **This was heavily indebted to Stoicism, and its originators were arguably the Netherlands neo-Stoics, Justus Lipsius and Hugo Grotius. But this was a Christianized Stoicism, and a modern one, in the sense that it gave a crucial place to a willed remaking of human society.**

https://www.iep.utm.edu/neostoic/

This article concludes that the term 'Christian Stoicism' is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Although Stoicism may be characterized as a pantheist philosophy, it is also a materialist and determinist philosophy, **so the orthodox Christian can never, at the same time, be a Stoic. However,**

the orthodox Christian can admire certain parts of Stoic ethics; and the Neostoic movement indicates that in the late Renaissance many indeed did.
…

The term 'Neostoicism' appears to have been coined by Jean Calvin. In his *Institutio Religionis Christianae* ('Institutes of the Christian Religion') of 1536, **Calvin made reference to 'new Stoics' (*novi Stoici*)** who attempted to revive the ideal of impassivity (*apatheia*) instead of embracing the properly Christian virtue of heroically enduring suffering sent by God (*Inst.* 3.8.9). While the true Christian acknowledges the test sent to him by God, these modern 'Neostoics' pretend to deny the existence of such suffering altogether.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA153#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Following upon the discussion in the 1539/41 *Institutes*, Calvin addressed the issue of determinism in his 1545 treatise against the religious freethinkers that he called "Libertines," **whom he accused of holding a pantheistic determinism that failed to understand the complex role of secondary causes in divine providence** (Calvin 1868: 183-98; 1982: 238-58).14 He again refuted the allegation of teaching Stoic fate in his 1550 treatise *Concerning Scandals*, where he repudiated the Stoic "intricacy of connected causes" (Calvin 1870a: 39; 1978: 53-4).

…

The existence of a forged correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul, accepted as genuine by St. Augustine and St. Jerome, may well have contributed to the thought that it was possible to combine Stoic ethics with Christian teaching. **In marked contrast, the attempt to revive Stoic pantheistic physics by David of Dinant ended with declarations of heresy and the burning of books.** His identification of God with primary matter led to his condemnation in 1210 and he was forced to flee France. Consequently none of his works survive except as brief quotations in the hostile polemics of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. **Although medieval Christian authorities were apparently open to the use of Stoic ethics as a supplement to Christian teaching, they certainly remained suspicious of Stoic physics, which was at best pantheistic and at worst materialist and atheistic.**
…

Thus Lipsius affirms the power of philosophical analysis to enable one to overcome the emotions. This conflicts with the attitudes of both the mature St. Augustine and Calvin. Although Neostoicism includes numerous concessions to Christian teaching, **this affirmation of the power of reason shows that its philosophical commitment to Stoicism took priority over a strict adherence to the Christian faith.**
…

In *Philosophie morale de Stoïques* Du Vair treads a very careful path indeed in his attempt to combine Christianity with his admiration for Epictetus. He suggests that, although it would be improper for anyone to prefer the profane and puddle water of the pagan philosophers to the clear and sacred fountain of God's word, nevertheless the Stoics must be acknowledged as the greatest reproach to Christianity, insofar as they managed to live the noblest and most virtuous lives *without* the true light of the Christian God to guide them.
…

In the *Doctrina Estoica* (the full title is *Nombre, Origen, Intento, Recomendación y Descendencia de la Doctrina Estoica*) Quevedo attempted to connect Stoic thought with the Bible. **Noting that the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, was of Semitic origin,** Quevedo claimed that the biblical account of Job's heroic endurance in the face of adversity was the inspiration behind Stoic philosophy.

https://www.academia.edu/28895217/Stoicism_unbound_Ciceros_Academica_in_Tolands_Pantheisticon_

What seems indisputable, however, is that Lipsius's version of Stoicism exerted an enormous influence, stretching from Christian divines to Corneille to Cartesian moral philosophy. Lipsius was at the centre of a network of letters, spread across Europe; and he is known to have had more than 700 correspondents with whom he remained in regular enough contact. *De Constantia* itself was produced in more than 80 different editions between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries, half of them in different vernacular languages (see Van Den Haeghen, *Bibliographie Lipsienne*); and further works like his 'Guide to Stoic Philosophy, the *Manuductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam libri tres*, and his 'Stoic Natural Philosophy', the *Physiologiae Stoicorum libri tres*, both published in 1604, consolidated and continued the reservoir that he had already established. (Although the 1604 works treated a broader range of Stoic themes and issues, the 'tone' of neo-Stoicism had already been determined by the more popular *Constancy*.) In effect, Lipsius did so much to form 'Stoicism' as it was generally understood in the early modern period.14

> 14. As A.A. Long has observed: 'Anyone seriously interested in Stoicism at the time had to read Lipsius; his accounts of the school were the fullest available' ('Stoicism and Philosophical Tradition', 379). See, too, Kraye, 'Revival of Hellenistic Philosophies', 102: **'Thanks to Lipsius, Stoicism extended into the seventeenth century on a new footing. Freed from the obstacles that had hindered its**

reception in the Renaissance, Stoic ethics was all the rage until about 1660'; and Lagrée, 'Constancy and Coherence'.

…

Christian Stoicism might be as legitimate, and as influential, as Christian Platonism or Christian Aristotelianism; **nonetheless, it was only made possible by denying what was intrinsic to Stoicism itself – namely, the complete immanence of the divine.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q&f=false

But the responsibility of the writer of the *Essais* is great than that. Among his literary descendents were five of the leaders of this movement:1 Charron, La Mothe le Vayer, Naudé, Guy Patin, and Sorbière. The remarkable thing is that a number of the writers of the time recognized the connection between Montaigne and Charron. The poet Sarasin called the two the breviary of "libertins"; D'Assoucy makes both of them the leaders of deism. **Naudé, one of the descendents, himself wrote in the *Considérations sur les coups d'État* of his high esteem for the two: "Seneca has been of more assistance to me than Aristotle; Plutarch more than Plato; Juvenal and Horace more than Homer and Virgil; Montaigne and Charron more than all the others put together."** Even Gassendi wrote to his friend Pibrac: "Tu fais bien de me recommender d'emmener Charron dans ma solitude. Quel juge plus sûr! **Surtout si on lui donne pour compagnons ceux dont il a lui-même fait son profit: Montaigne, Lipse, Sénèque, Plutarque, Cicéron."** And when Chanet undertook to refute *La Sagesse* he spoke of the large number of those who took Charron for Socrates and the *Apologie* for gospel.

Indeed, Charron, the priest of Condom, was known personally to Montaigne. He had been an instructor at Bordeaux in 1576, but Montaigne had already withdrawn to his château. Charron could have known him in 1582, when he was again in Bordeaux, though we have no evidence that he did. **In 1586, however, Montaigne gave Charron a copy of Ochino's *Catechism*, in which Charron recorded the event in a Latin inscription. It is not certain that this edifying treatise (its author was a Franciscan turned Lutheran) sealed the friendship; it merely establishes a date**. That the relationship was close and enduring can be seen in the facts that Montaigne permitted his family court of arms to be adopted by Charron, since there was no male heir, and Charron later left a substantial legacy to a member of Montaigne's family. He might well be grateful to his old friend, since Montaigne furnished him with a mine of material, **so much so that if it is true that the *Essais* reduced the wisdom of antiquity to a myriad number of maxims, Charron did the same thing for the *Essais* in his *Sagesse*. Sabrié stated that the latter work was the anthology of humanism, but that is what the *Essais* are. What Charron really did, as Busson has pointed out, was to establish an order, a dogmatism, and a classification within the anthology. Bayle noted that Charron "fit un merveilleux cas des *Essais* et en adopta plusieurs maximes," and added that the theologian learned more from the gentleman than the gentleman from the theologian.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA105#v=onepage&q&f=false

All through the sixteenth century writers protest their need to feel free of the constraints of the ancient authorities, Aristotle in particular, **and having paid lip service to intellectual freedom, go on to write thoroughly Aristotelian treatises.**

…

While Charron feels free, for example, to question the inclusion of fire as one of the elements (an Aristotelian concept but one that had already been denied in the sixteenth century by Pierre de la Ramée and discarded by Paracelsus), and to abandon the old explanation of the cause of meteors (questioned by many men in the sixteenth century), he still clings to a basically Aristotelian universe. In this role, Charron is only a critic who is pointing to some discrepancies in the system. **It will take the creative genius of men like Galileo, Gassendi and Descartes to dare to abandon the old philosophy more drastically and attempt to replace it completely.**2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

When, for example, Charron dismissed the epistemological theory of Aristotle as erroneous, he introduces another theory that he says was held by sages – meaning the Stoics.2 **There was some talk in the sixteenth century of going beyond the ancients and striking out on new paths, but inevitably these paths lead back to well-worn ones.** One author of a book on natural and moral philosophy stated defiantly that "c'est tirannie autrement d'assujetter tout soudain nostre pensée au dire d'un homme … abestit et rebouche nostre entendement, pour admirer seulement, et attribuer tout à l'opinion des anciens."3 Unfortunately, his book only sets the authorities in opposition to each other and

says nothing new. **Gabriel Naudé claimed that quotations of the ancients were important as authorities: "It is to enrich my discourse just as our lawyers seek to enrich their pleadings."**4
…

Charron had been given a typical sixteenth century education which meant that he was completely familiar with the works of Aristotle as they were taught in the schools. He also indicates a knowledge of Platonic ideas all through his writings. **But Charron's favorite ancient sources were the Stoics, and Seneca supplied him with more quotations than any other pagan author.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false

Even if a writer did not adhere to Aristotelian ethics, he was always familiar with the doctrines and would refer to them, even by way of rebuttal. **Charron, for example, always points out his disagreement with Aristotle. He refers to him as the "dogmatist" whose ideas must be reexamined.**
…

One modern critic has proposed three reasons for the interest generated by Stoic thought: the tremendous popularity of *Plutarch's Lives* amongst Frenchmen had given men a taste for the grandeur of heroic men filled with moral steadfastness; **humanists had responded favorably to the exaltation of men's powers that Stoic thought promotes;** and the naïve belief that Stoicism was in conditional accord with Christianity broadened its appeal and gave it respectability.1 These general explanations, however, do not always apply to specific cases. **Charron, for one, was neither interested in heroism nor in adapting Stoic thought to Christian doctrine. Quite the opposite, he found in Stoicism a naturalistic ethic which answered his need for the separation of religion from moral philosophy.**

A modern philosopher has an explanation for the genesis of Stoicism in ancient Greece that may be more pertinent in Charron's case and in the general French response from 1590 until 1640. **Moses Hadas attributes the birth of Stoic and Epicurean thought to the dislocation felt by the Greeks in a changing political situation,** when Alexander the Great created a large empire and the loyalties one given to small city-states were necessarily dissolved. As man sought to reconcile "the claims of his individuality with the demands of his overwhelmingly enlarged environment," one of two responses was possible: **either make the world less important, as the Epicureans did, or make the man more important, as the Stoics did.**2 The Stoics accomplished this enlargement through attaching man to the universe at large, to putting him at harmony with the total, great movement of nature.

The allegiance of seventeenth century Frenchmen was similarly subject to enlargement by the demands of an expanding and increasingly powerful state. The centralizing tendencies of Henry IV, cut short by his murder, were intensified under the rule of Richelieu and Louis XIII. More important, the Reformation and the Copernican revolution had shaken the fixed status of man in a world that had been intellectually organized in a static, hierarchic order.
…

The Stoic revival, of course, did not met universal approval. **But even for those authors who were influenced by it, the Stoic doctrines were mixed in with other, sometimes opposing ideas. The revival of skepticism, for example, found favor with some writers, and in the case of Pierre Charron, was almost as influential in his moral philosophy as his Neostoicism was.** While there could be no developed sceptic ethical system, the entire doctrine could be interpreted in terms that applied to moral behavior. The skeptics rejected all dogmatic philosophy and took their standards of conduct from the customs of the country in which they lived. They also advocated a detachment from any emotional and mental commitments. We shall find echoes of these ideas in Charron's work.

There remain two other philosophies whose ideas blended into the stream of sixteenth century thought, Platonism and Epicureanism. **The Renaissance Platonism did not develop a separate ethical system based on Platonic thought for, like Marcilio Ficino, they were more involved with metaphysical questions.** But the Platonic theory of love and the neoplatonic devotion to the contemplative life were widely known and discussed. The ethical ideas of the Epicureans were popular with some humanists; especially favored was the belief that intellectual pleasure was the goal of human life. **A few Platonic and Epicurean ideas found their way into *De la sagesse*.**
…

The earliest sixteenth century French discussion of morality based entirely on ancient sources was a series of orations pronounced in 1576 before the Palace Academy that flourished briefly under Henry III. The majority of the members of the Academy were the Pléiade group of poets led by Ronsard, although other humanists were included. The Ronsard group had been influenced by the neoplatonism of the Florentine Academy, particularly by the works of Marcilio Ficino, and their moral discussions were based closely on Aristotelian ethics laced with neoplatonism. **The first series of orations was**

addressed to the question whether the intellectual or the moral virtues were to be preferred and the answers were standard Aristotle. The only orator to deem the moral virtues preferable was Ronsard. He argued that the moral virtues, because they are concerned with activity render men thereby "plus charitables, pitoyables … fors aux perils, … plus obeissans a nos superieurs."1 **These are a long distance from the benefits of active virtue that will be taught by Charron, who rejected Aristotle's division of virtues into intellectual and moral in any case.** But Ronsard does include one argument that will reappear in *Sagesse*. Many cities have flourished in honor and virtue, says Ronsard, which had little science: one can live well without the "truths" acquired through contemplation.2

When Pierre Charron began to write *De la sagesse*, about twenty years after the Palace Academy flourished, the Neoplatonism of the Pléiade group was no longer fashionable. Instead, Stoic thought had strongly permeated French life. There is no doubt that the religious wars had helped to create the change in sentiment. In several of the 1576 speeches, the Stoic doctrine of the passions was spoken of with scorn; one anonymous discourse disagreed with "la fauce opinion des Stoiciens."3 **But the wars had engendered such passions that to many thoughtful men writing during the period from 1580 to 1600 the Stoic emphasis on the elimination of the passions through reason appeared a wise suggestion.**4 **The Stoics' appeal for Charron was broader than that one issue, however, and was probably the most important philosophical school from which he borrowed.** But he also brought to his writing the scholastic heritage from his university training, a sympathetic view of the Epicureans, and a tendency to reject Aristotle on all issues.

The major premise that underlies the ethical thought of Charron is that virtue is its own reward. This is orthodox Stoicism but it was a doctrine that had been adopted by the leading Aristotelian philosopher of the Renaissance, Pietro Pomponazzi, even though it was not found in Aristotle explicitly. I want the wise man, said Charron, "soit bon et aye sa volonté ferme et resolu à la droiture et preud'-hommie, pour l'amour de soy-mesme, et à cause qu'il est homme."1
…

The major sixteenth adapters of Stoic thought, Justus Lipsius and Guillaume Du Vair, were both concerned with reconciling Stoic thought with Christianity **and neither stress the completely naturalistic aspect of virtue. Charron, in contrast, goes to great lengths not only to make virtuous behavior totally natural, but to dissociate it explicitly from religion.** *Preud'hommie*2 and religion, insists Charron, comprise two distinct areas of behavior, and spring from two different sources in man. Religion comes after *preud'hommie* for it is "une vertu speciale et particuliere… qui peust estre sans [les autres vertus] et sans probité."4
…

Charron believed that the pagans from whom his program of wisdom ultimately derived were completely virtuous men. If one claimed, as many Catholics tried to do, that virtuous behavior was meritorious behavior, performed to preserve the grace of God, then the ancient pre-Christians, the Jews, and other religious sectarians could not be deemed virtuous. By insisting that morality was part of man's natural endowment, seminated in his soul at the time of his birth, Charron could argue logically that man's particular religious convictions during his lifetime were irrelevant to his moral wellbeing.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA36#v=onepage&q&f=false

He found many of the specific suggestions and ideas for improvement in Montaigne's *Essais*, as Montaigne had culled them from classical authors. **Several proposals that are only implicit in Montaigne became explicit in Charron.** According to *Sagesse*, for example, the wise man's duty is to study true piety. As he develops this theme, Charron makes a clear distinction between piety on the one hand and moral integrity on the other.
…

Montaigne says that morality will satisfy divine justice. Charron, however, wants probity to exist for its own sake because it is fundamental to man's nature to be moral. And in fact, Charron did not need Montaigne as a source for the suggestion that piety and conscience were different things, for other sixteenth century authors had voiced a similar idea.

Some differences between Montaigne and Charron arise because Charron adhered more consistently to Stoic thought than Montaigne did. In some instances where Charron utilized Stoic thought, it is likely that he and Montaigne were using a common source, such as Seneca's letters, rather than that Charron borrowed the phrases through the medium of Montaigne. When Montaigne wrote the essay, "De l'Inconstance de nos Actions" some time between 1572 and 1574 **(during what critics call his Stoic phase of development)**, he followed Seneca and agreed it was desirable to follow a "certain et asseuré train, qui est le principal but de la sagesse."3 But later in life, in a chapter written between 1585 and 1588, when he no longer was bound by Stoic thought, Montaigne wrote: "C'est estre, mais ce n'est pas vivre, que se tenir attaché et oblige par necessité à un seul train."4

While Montaigne changed his mind about constancy, Charron never did, for he consistently calls for a constant path for the wise man. Charron's second foundation for wisdom is stated "Avoir un but et train de vie certain," and is Stoic dictum.
…

Because he believes wisdom can be acquired through study and self-correction, Charron proposes a plan of action that will effect the change from man, slave of opinion, to wise man. Montaigne may have entertained the idea of self-reform when he wrote his first essays between 1572 and 1580 but in his later essays he rejects it. He writes in one of his last essays, "Je n'ay pas corrigé, comme Socrates, par force de la raison mes complexions naturelles, et n'ay aucunement trouble par art mon inclination. Je me laisse aller, comme je suis venu, je ne combats rien."4 **Charron, therefore, was not only rejecting Montaigne's "naturalness," he was proposing a plan that Montaigne specifically disparaged.**
…

Montaigne, while still young, **retired from an active life as a lawyer** and devoted his time to self-study and and the leisurely pursuits of a nobleman.4 Charron was a busy churchman all his life, involved in activities, and except for his temporary desire to retreat to a monastery, he was committed to a life of work. **He viewed his role as an indoctrinator; he was always the preacher and the teacher.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

Charron felt no need to cite his borrowings from any author no longer alive. **He gives his sources in *De la sagesse* only when he borrows from two of his living contemporaries.** Charron may have feared that Guillaume Du Vair and Justus Lipsius would challenge him in print for his use of their works because he does acknowledge his debt to them.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false

Charron's emphasis on the will is in keeping with the attention that was focused on this faculty since the fourteenth century with the rise of voluntarism. It is also in agreement with the emphasis placed on the will by the later Roman Stoics, notably Epictetus. **For Aristotle, the will obeyed the reason, and the scholastic followers of Aristotle, notably St. Thomas, treated the will as a blind faculty which followed reason's direction.** But St. Augustine had described the will as a vital faculty, independent of reason, and the scholastic followers of Augustine developed this distinction further. For Duns Scotus, "the whole cause of the will's willing is purely and simply the will."3
…

Although he makes the will more decisive, much of Charron's doctrine of the will is copied from Du Vair's *De la constance*, which Du Vair in turn had adopted from Epictetus.
…

Charron's use of the word reason is equivocal and it is difficult to be precise about his meaning. **The ambiguity was present in Montaigne's *Essais* and was a result of the blurring of different converging traditions, the scholastic and the Stoic.** For Charron, reason is first a divine principle in man, a ray of divinity placed in man's nature at his birth to guide his life, and is part of universal reason: "Bien vivre, c'est vivre selon nature … entendant par nature l'equité et la raison universelle qui luit en nous, qui contient et couve en soy les semences de toute vertu, probité, justice."2 This was a Stoic definition, transmitted in the writings of Cicero, among others.
…

Because he makes reason (as judgment) the final arbiter in all ethical cases, Charron can be called a complete ethical rationalist (although he distrusts reason as a speculative tool and in that sense he is antirationalist). He wanted opinion to be ignored, imagination to be bypassed, and understanding alone to have its say. When understanding did not have enough information with which to make a judgment, or when the information was too faulty or suspect, then judgment was deferred. The will should not act until it receives a decision from reason.
…

Charron defined justice, the second virtue, by using the commonplace formula: "Justice est render à chascun ce qui lui appartient, à soy premierement et puis à autruy."3 **A comparison of this definition with that of Du Vair provides an insight into the completely secular morality that Charron proposed in contrast to Du Vair's desire to reconcile Stoicism with Christianity.** Du Vair said justice was: "Premierement le conjoindre les hommes avec Dieu: secondement de concilier les hommes les uns avec les autres."4 **While Du Vair always expressed the belief in his writings that man should put his duty to God before all else, Charron always emphasized that man's first duty was to himself.** The obligation to be a moral man was, in Charron's eyes, the finest expression of this duty.

In his discussion of the virtues, **Charron rejected the Aristotelian formula, still widely held in the sixteenth century, that virtue was a mean between two extremes.** For Aristotle, vice was the "passive obedience to natural instinct, virtue the control of instinct by a sense of duty … the rule discerned by reason."5 Man's instinct to hoard, according to this formula, led to avarice as a vice and to liberality as a virtue. The scholastic writers retained the Aristotelian definition which became the "golden mean" and it was still popular among humanist moralists. **When Charron abandoned the idea, he substituted the Stoic belief that virtue was that which was according to reason and nature. It was not a mean but an absolute.**

The question of what constituted virtue was a lively one during the late sixteenth century **and the Stoic formula used by Charron in abandoning the Aristotelian definition was not the only answer suggested. Bodin, for one, followed the Stoics only halfway.** Agreeing that virtue was a divinely infused quality, "une qualité loiable à l'ame," he believed that vice was simply the absence of virtue.1 From there Bodin moved to Platonism for the remainder of his moral treatise.
…

The major reason why Charron is not able to adopt fully the Stoic position that the sage can reach a state of near perfection of his nature is that Charron's view of human life is not completely optimistic. In fact, to apply the words optimist or pessimist to Charron is not violate the complexity of is position. **There was a deep-rooted Augustinian vein in Charron that left him fully aware of the feebleness of human nature and that consequently was often at odds with Stoic optimistic belief in progress towards perfection.** Indeed, the entire first book of *De la sagesse* is dedicated to the proposition that mankind is in a sorry state. Relying heavily on Montaigne's "Apologie de Raimond Sebond," Charron hammered home themes already developed by Sebond and Montaigne: man is weak, miserable, full of irresolution, and yet filled with foolish pride. **But whereas Montaigne used this slate of misery to suggest man adopt a state of balanced scepticism and the enjoyment of what was good and uncorrupted in his nature, Charron used it to suggest the need for a total revamping:** "Il faut en general recognoistre sa foiblesse, sa misere, et en venir à une reformation et amendement universelle."2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA109#v=onepage&q&f=false

For Charron, as well as for many sixteenth century writers, opinion is associated with the "vulgar people" and carries the additional burden of being thought the product of the imagination, a lower faculty of the intellective soul than reason and also the source of the passions (a doctrine derived from the Stoics who had identified the passions with false judgments or opinion). In Charron's epistemology, information that comes through the senses is transmitted to the imagination which examines it crudely and gives an opinion, which, because it is not subject to reason, will be uncertain and false and will breed the passions. In a man who is wise, sense information will be rerouted by the imagination up to the higher faculty of the understanding where it will be subject to the rule of reason.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA126#v=onepage&q&f=false

It is more appropriate to call Charron a partial sceptic. He distrusts reason as a speculative tool and he denies that truth can be found – this is scepticism. But he wants reason to be used to regulate one's life through understanding and judgment – this is not scepticism. As a moralist, Charron approaches life and learning with a sceptical attitude, which means he believes all human knowledge must be open to questioning and that all beliefs must be held as only relative. He has shown that both reason and the sense are subject to error and uncertainty and he has posited the use of "follow nature" as a guide to living. Charron wants men to keep their minds open and free to judge from a fluid position; he promotes suspension of judgment as an antidote to dogmatism.
…

Charron's scepticism is first a purge, used to clear away that accumulation of ills he calls opinion; then it switches to an intellectual suppleness and fluidity that saves man from the deadliest of sins, presumption and attachment to dogma.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA140#v=onepage&q&f=false

Montaigne chided those who believed that there were such things as perpetual and immutable natural laws. Show me one law, he said, that is in credit everywhere.

Charron followed Montaigne's views on particular justice only up to the point where his Stoic leaning conflicted with his sceptic relativism inherited from Montaigne. The Stoics believed there was a law of nature with which the individual could place himself in harmony and Charron followed the Stoics in this belief. There was, he said, a law of equity and natural reason which is perpetually in each man, placed in him by God; "un éclat et rayon de divinité, une defluxion et

dependence de la loy eternelle qui est Dieu mesme."2 **All positive, man-made laws were only copies of this eternal law and special expressions of it:**

> **La loy de Moyse en son Decalogue en est une copie externe et publique, la loy des Douze Tables,** et le droit romain, les enseignements moraux des theologies et philosophes, advis et conseils des jurisconsultes, les edits et ordonnances des souverains ne sont que petites et particulieres experiences d'icelle.3

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

For one, Charron did not believe in mind-body dualism, for, following Montaigne, he kept insisting they were inseparable. But because he did treat the soul as divided into different faculties or layers, Charron still claimed that the passions arose in the sensitive soul and he made the imagination the mental seat of the passions. **Because the imagination served as the intermediary between the senses and the understanding (the highest level of reason), he kept the understanding free of blame for passion, and free of the charge of making false judgments. Reason had to remain inviolate for Charron because it was the source of the natural law in man and a ray of the divinity.** It was thus incapable of error since it served as the ethical principle in man.
…

Must all the passions be eliminated as the Stoics suggest? Yes, says Charron, for if a man wished to become a sage, the first preparatory step was an exemption and freedom from all things which can prevent wisdom. The external evils are the errors and vices of the world; the internal evils are the passions. **But Charron warns against the misunderstanding that the Stoic doctrine of the elimination of the passions engendered when it was confused with the sceptic doctrine of apathy. He is not, he emphasized, advocating a stupid insensitivity and unpraiseworthy apathy, nor is he advocating fleeing from life and hiding oneself from all that might awaken the passions.** Rather, he desires a universal wisdom, active and firm, which resorts to reasonable examination and judgment before reaction is given to events. The key is preparedness of soul, or active premeditation, which makes the subsequent impassibility a positive and not a negative response to life.
…

Charron's wise man is engaged in activity of all sorts; there is never any hint of retreat to a tower or Neoplatonic happiness through the contemplation of truth.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA46#v=onepage&q&f=false

The *Petit traicté* starts out with bravado. **Had my book been popularly received, says Charron, it would have fallen beneath its pretensions. It is not meant for the common and low degree of people and there are many others who judge it to be good.**1
…

Charron answers other objections to his specific ideas about religion, knowledge and morality by repeating a few of the major ideas from *Sagesse*. **He emphasizes that *Sagesse* was meant to teach human wisdom and not divine and to prepare a man for civil life, not for the cloister.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA15#v=onepage&q&f=false

We know that Pierre Charron was born in Paris in 1541 and was the son of a bookseller who had twenty-four other children. Charron received an education at the University of Paris nevertheless, because, says La Rochemaillet, his parents recognized his fine mind and so took care to "faire bien instruire dès son jeune âge aux bonnes lettres."2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA75#v=onepage&q&f=false

Charron's book is for those human beings who wish to separate themselves from what he calls the vulgar herd, the common people who must live at the level of beasts because they are not equipped by nature and training to be more than that. **Charron's moralist teaching in unabashedly elitist; Stoicism was also a philosophy for the few.** But that reform must be an ultimate goal for the few who have the strength of soul to pursue the life of wisdom, Charron never doubts.
…

Charron, as no one before him had done, separated religion from ethics by insisting that they were two different behaviors, springing from different motives in man. Charron believed that it was not only feasible to separate them, but desirable. By confounding them, both were debased. Through separation, each emerged pure and simple, to be followed clearly for its own sake. **Because he earnestly believed virtue was its own reward, he also thought the idea practical.**
…

Febvre took exception to the work of Henri Busson which traced the sources and the increasing development of rationalism and free thought in the French intellectual community **during the latter two thirds of the sixteenth century.**2 Interestingly enough, however, the views of both Febvre and Busson are justified.
…

There is no doubt that the average Frenchman's life, as Febvre phrased it, was lived from baptism to extreme unction in an atmosphere of faith, but this does not negate the conclusion that many serious thinkers of the time began to view religion in naturalistic terms and sought new limits and boundaries for religious beliefs.

> https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/luc/wl3/wl307.htm
>
> *Zeus*. My dear, a discussion somehow arose yesterday between Timocles the Stoic and Damis the Epicurean; **there was a numerous and respectable audience (which particularly annoyed me), and they had an argument on the subject of Providence. Damis questioned the existence of the Gods, and utterly denied their interest in or government of events,** while Timocles, good man, did his best to champion our cause.
> …
>
> It is no such terrible disaster, if a few people go away infected. **There are plenty who take the other view--a majority of Greeks, the body and dregs of the people, and the barbarians to a man.**
>
> *Zeus*. Ah, Hermes, but there is a great deal in Darius's remark about Zopyrus--I would rather have had one ally like Damis than be the lord of a thousand Babylons.

…

During this period, called "era of pagan Christianity" by Peter Gay, **there was a movement for many humanists away from orthodoxy in an attempt to balance Christianity with classical thought, a mixture that was precarious and sometimes fatal to the individual's Christian belief.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA87#v=onepage&q&f=false

But had Charron drifted away from orthodox Catholicism by stating that God was unknowable and that He should be worshipped on spirit? While Charron's work might not appeal to the scholastic doctors and prelates who placed *De la sagesse* on the Index in 1605, Charron could point to nominalist tradition for predecessors. The fifteenth century theologian Gabriel Biel was concerned with the sufficient knowledge of God. Biel concluded that proper cognition of God was impossible because God transcended man's intelligence.
…

When Charron wanted to provide authoritative support for his statement that God was unknowable, he cited Dionysius the Areopagite. The works of Dionysius became the favorite reading of people devoted to spiritual religion in France in the sixteenth century. Charron also cited Dionysius several times in his "Discours de la Divinité" in the section devoted to man's inability to know God. **The Frenchman who founded the Oratory in 1611, Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, was a great reader of Dionysius also and was influenced by him.**1
…

But what is the moral obligation based upon? In the long run, it must be based on the wise man's faith that he has a natural obligation to be a good man. **This faith derives from his belief that a ray of the Universal Reason shined in each man, giving his reason and virtue to conduct his moral life.** So it is faith that allows the wise man to have faith.

Charron's basic attitude, therefore, is one of fideism when he urges unquestioning submission to Revelation as the primary task for the Christian. But because he really believes in a separation between the religious instinct in man and his other areas of activity, this fideistic attitude does not penetrate far into the total behavior of the Christian man. **Charron never says believe in order to understand; rather he says believe because it is a great comfort to believe, for what you understand is a different matter. The facts of Revelation are accepted as they are but the human mind is left free to use reason when discussing death, morality and knowledge in general without referring back to those truths revealed by faith.**
…

Charron has disturbed many modern critics because he left out any discussion of original sin. Charron's wise man is capable of arriving at a near-perfect virtue on his own without any extraordinary grace. Man, Charron had said, is naturally good and follows evil for profit or pleasure. *Preud'hommie* is internal and essential: "Estre et consenter de vivre homme, estre et vouloir

estre homme de bien."1 Charron's wise man is not burdened with guilt or a sense of sin so long as he orders his will and reason into an internal pattern of virtue and wisdom. This patterned code is originally implanted in the soul by God working through Universal Reason; then it becomes an internalized judgment seat and there is no need of another authority, not even external laws, to decide the questions of right and wrong. **The misery felt by man and described so vividly in the first book of *De la sagesse* is due to the conditions of human existence with all its frustrations and limitations and is not a result of original sin or fall from grace.**

> http://www.romans45.org/articles/finney.htm
>
> According to Finney, sinners can freely reform their own hearts, and must do so themselves if they are to be redeemed. **Once again, this is sheer Pelagianism:**
>
> > "[Sinners] are under the necessity of first changing their hearts, or their choice of an end, before they can put forth any volitions to secure any other than a selfish end. And this is plainly the everywhere assumed philosophy of the Bible. That uniformly represents the unregenerate as totally depraved,[3] and calls upon them to repent, to make themselves a new heart" [*Systematic Theology,* 249].
> >
> > 3. Although Finney employs the expression *totally depraved,* he makes clear that he speaks of a purely voluntary condition, not a constitutional depravity.

This doctrine might disturb orthodox Catholics of Charron's day but it could not surprise them because the sixteenth century had already been saturated with translations of pagan moralists and historians whose heroes were untouched by original sin; in consequence, the Christian humanists ignored or minimized the import of the Fall.
…

For Christian humanists the fact of original sin was secondary to the belief that redeemed man was capable of guiding his life to virtue using right reason. Charron's disregard of original sin is probably more disturbing to modern critics that it was to his contemporaries.
…

Charron's religion is an intellectual one; there is little talk of compassion, no talk of love for one's fellow man stimulated by religion, **no reference to Jesus Christ as savior in *Sagesse*.** Yet we do find the phrase "grandeur of God" often in Charron; it was a phrase that would reappear frequently in the seventeenth century.

To be fair to Charron, **we must remember that he did not write *De la sagesse* for the common man. Charron insisted that he was writing for future "sages," those whose education and vocation gave them the training and the motivation to perfect themselves as men of wisdom.** For such men, perhaps, the highly intellectualized religion that Charron proposed was tenable, But *De la sagesse* was read by many who were not sages and who found Charron's compartmentalization of behavior into Christian and natural an invitation to reduce the importance of religion in their lives or to eliminate it completely.

Charron was a religious man; there is no doubt of that. *Les Trois Veritéz* and *Discours Chrestiens* proved Charron's devotion to Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular. And in all his writings he stresses the psychological importance of religion to man as a source of peace and consolation.

But as we saw in the chapter on morality, Charron was steeped in the literature of antiquity. **He had found in Stoicism a philosophy that could be adapted to the needs of his time and he borrowed its doctrines without hesitation.** In his eyes the ancient philosophers were good and moral men; yet, they were not Christians. He came to view religion, therefore, as another element in man's life which could be added to a naturally developed probity and moral integrity. In his determination to accommodate pagan philosophy to sixteenth century life, **Charron moved religion from its position as the central focus of man's existence to make it part of a sub-system in whose center was natural wisdom.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA49#v=onepage&q&f=false

Although *Sagesse* has been called the "summa" of humanism at the end of the sixteenth century, we could argue that Charron does not summarize humanism so much as **he exhibits how far French thought had drifted away from the sheer delight with classical antiquity found in French humanists at mid-century.** In the same way that Malherbe's reforms in poetry have been called a "rupture with the literary tradition of humanism," **Charron's writings represent a break with much of the typical thought of earlier humanists. There is little idealism, absolutely no appreciation for "belles lettres" or for any artistic accomplishments of the ancients. Antiquity survives only as it provides models of moral behavior that Charron sees as exemplary;** in the writings of the ancients he finds precedents for his own teaching.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA122#v=onepage&q&f=false

By his stress on the active as opposed to the contemplative quality of learning, particularly by defining wisdom as a practical moral virtue rather than a passive knowledge of things divine or human, Charron completes what Eugene Rice calls the secularization of wisdom accomplished during the Renaissance. During the Middle Ages, Rice explains, wisdom had a specifically Christian definition, and was ultimately directed towards the knowledge of God. Rice concludes: **"Charron ends and makes explicit the transformation by which the Renaissance reconverted wisdom from its Christian service, stripped it of its transcendant meanings, and restored it to its earlier human associations."**2

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA133#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 1604 the Papal Nuncio, Innocenzo Del Buffalo, wrote a letter to a cardinal in which he calls Charron a machiavellian:

> [There is a] libro scandoloso come fu uno li giorni passait, conforme all impia dottrina di Machiavello, intitolato La Sapienta, composto da un Theologo, cantore della Cathedrale di Condom, il quale finite che ebbe questa infame opera piena di eresie mori di morte subitanea.3

Charron's political ideas were used by two seventeenth century authors who were both admirers of Machiavelli. They blended Charron's political pragmatism into their books along with praise for Machiavelli, apparently finding no real difference between them.4 One of them, Gabriel Naudé, **a scholar, sceptic, and believer in an absolutist state,** wrote *Considerations sur les Coups d'Etat* in about 1640. **He used the ancients for this book, Naudé says, but "Montaigne et Charron que tous les precedens."**5 He quotes Charron's statements on the political prudence for a sovereign, on mixing justice with necessity, and suspension of justice for reason of state, and makes them his fundamental doctrines.1

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA144#v=onepage&q&f=false

There were two generations of free-thinking libertines who were influenced by Charron. **The first generation were young noblemen and literary men, poets, dramatists and novelists, who were concentrated in Paris and around the court of the young Louis XIII.**3 **Under the general conditions of freedom and license which originated from the court circles during the regency of Marie de Medici from 1610 till about 1625 when Richelieu assumed a position of strength in the government, these young men felt free to express their ideas overtly, even to flaunt them;** and Charron's *De la sagesse* was their "breviary." When Richelieu's rise to power put an end to this activity and the overt libertine behavior was crushed, a new generation of erudite libertines grew to maturity that was content to voice its questions and disagreement with authority in private or in circumscribed published forms. The second group looked to Charron's *De la sagesse* as an inspirational handbook.

> https://www.exclassics.com/anatomy/anat158.htm
>
> So it will ever be, some of all sorts, good, bad, indifferent, true, false, zealous, ambidexters, neutralists, lukewarm, libertines, atheists, &c. They will see these religious sectaries agree amongst themselves, be reconciled all, before they will participate with, or believe any: they think in the meantime (which Celsus objects, and whom Origen confutes), "We Christians adore a person put to death with no more reason than the barbarous Getes worshipped Zamolxis, the Cilicians Mopsus, the Thebans Amphiaraus, and the Lebadians Trophonius; **one religion is as true as another, new fangled devices, all for human respects;" great-witted Aristotle's works are as much authentical to them as Scriptures, subtle Seneca's Epistles as canonical as St. Paul's, Pindarus' Odes as good as the Prophet David's Psalms, Epictetus' Enchiridion equivalent to wise Solomon's Proverbs.** They do openly and boldly speak this and more, some of them, in all places and companies.

…

A poem which circulated in manuscript form in Paris in about the year 1622 called *Quatrains du Deiste* expressed overtly the religious beliefs on some of these freethinkers. The poem caused enough excitement to arouse Marin Mersenne, a Parisian monk and scholar, to refute it in a polemical work in which **he blamed Jerome Cardan, Giordano Bruno and Charron of undermining religion. The deist of the poem makes a distinction between his worship and that of the superstitious believer or bigot. The deist believes that God is without power to punish humanity for He cannot contravene His own will.** There is not hell, according to the deist; it is only an invention of man and believed in by superstitious worshippers.2

> 2. Charron called the belief that one should be a good man because there is a paradise or hell, "chetive et miserable preud'hommie!" *Sagesse*, II, 5, 359.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA149#v=onepage&q&f=false

Garasse's *La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou prétendus tels* appeared in August, 1623, written in the same mocking and pugnacious tone that mars all of Garasse's writings. **It actually presents a good picture of the libertine movement by its format which describes in full the maxims and their "proofs" espoused by the libertines;** Garasse wishes to show they are absurd and then he gives his rebuttal for each maxim. Some of the maxims which Garasse accuses the libertines of believing are: a wit (or sage) is free in his belief, and does not let himself be captivated by the common beliefs which are proposed to the simple populace; **all things are governed by destiny which is irrevocable;** there is no other divinity or sovereign power in the world than nature.

The source for many of these maxims, according to Garasse, is Charron's *De la sagesse*. **Charron is listed, along with Cardan and Lucilio Vanini, in the second rank of the libertine's library; the first rank honors go to Pomponazzi, Paracelsus, and Machiavelli.**
…

Garasse specifically charges Charron with popularizing the belief that there are three types of minds – vulgar, common and sage. According to Garasse's interpretation of Charron, the vulgar are the ordinary Christians and members of any religion who follow religious doctrines unquestioningly. **The second degree are those who have somewhat more sense than the lowest rank of the populace because they see clearly the superstitions by which the common peoples live but they do not have the strength of will to break their ties to this servitude; they are employed in affairs of state and in political life. The third type, according to Garasse, are those set apart from the ordinary life pursued by the common people; such as Socrates among the Greeks, Seneca among the Romans and "Charron entre les François."**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

Charron's contemporaries clearly thought he had said something bold and different, whether he had copied phrases from Montaigne or not. **The book was popular for three decades;** *Sagesse* was reprinted twenty-four times by 1634. The *Petit traicté de sagesse*, published posthumously in 1606, was reprinted fourteen times by 1645.
…

Literary historians, puzzled that for a time Charron's *Sagesse* was more popular than Montaigne's *Essais*, point to the preference of the seventeenth century reader for order and method, traits found in Charron's book that Montaigne lacked.1 The beginning seventeenth century was a time of "reform" in French literature when order and discipline in writing became valuable.
…

Charron himself adopted a greater authoritarian tone in his writings than Montaigne did and this mood was suited to a time that accepted deference to authority as natural. **Yet, at the same time that Charron respected order, he encouraged intellectual liberty and inner independence, and this proposal would endear him to the erudite libertines of the seventeenth century who lived by a doctrine of outward obedience and inward freedom.**4

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=RtHLCgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **But the worst thing of all is that atheism walks today [1703] in France with its head up, that pretended wits are in fashion there, and piety is turned to ridicule.** This venom spreads with the French spirit, and wherever this genius puts it foot and makes itself superior, it brings it with it.
> …
>
> One must have a sufficiently good opinion of the Bourbon princes to believe that evils happen and will happen despite them, and that they do not favor profligacy or impiety: **but bad habit, once minds have got the taste of it, is stronger than ordinances, and we see it now in France itself, where, under a king [who is] devout, austere and absolute, disorder and irreligion have surpassed anything that has ever been seen in the Christian world.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4988HcMPk8cC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA171#v=onepage&q&f=false

Literary historians dismiss Charron as a "hack," an author who composed a book by philosophy by borrowing much of its content from the works of other writers. Historians of philosophy cannot point to Charron as a first-rate thinker; he took many of his ideas from other authors. **But Charron does command a place in intellectual history, in the zone reserved for authors whose books are**

popularly received and exert great influence on their own and future generations. Of all the moral treatises written at the end of the sixteenth century in France, *De la sagesse* emerges as the most organized, clearest, and most comprehensive. More than that, it was the most influential. **In several instances, Charron's book pointed to new directions in French thought as it moved out of the Renaissance and toward the age of Reason. Charron is an example of an author whose work surpasses the writer's personal importance.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/302/mode/2up?view=theater

> **When Charron quotes or paraphrases moderns, as he does incessantly, he turns to his master Montaigne, to Bodin, Du Vair, and Lipsius; when he appeals to antiquity, he appeals to Cicero and Seneca.** Charron's teaching was persuasively simple and courageously secular: man's highest is wisdom, and conversely, it is wisdom that defines man's nature and guarantees man's dignity. Wisdom is not easy, for the senses are deceptive and reason is feeble, but if man eschews theological squabbling or metaphysical brooding, he may direct his will toward his supreme task, self-knowledge, and achieve his supreme purpose, which is to live according to nature. **Charron's ideal is thus the Stoic sage humanized by a liberal dash of skeptical modesty.** While Charron was not a philosophe before his time – he was a priest and a theologian – the values he celebrates, in open deference to his favorite Romans, are the values of the Enlightenment: the supremacy of philosophy and the autonomy of man; the superiority of eclecticism to dogma, of intelligent ignorance to grandiose rationalism, and of practical moral reflection to theoretical speculation. **It seems as though Stoicism was detaching itself from Christianity only to be reabsorbed into the great philosophical reappraisal of the seventeenth century: in Charron, in Lord Herbert of Cherbury's famous deist tract *De veritate*, in Descartes or in Spinoza, whenever men are told to live according to nature, to acquire knowledge by discovering universal truths and the natural laws by which physical and the moral world are governed – whenever we encounter such ideas, we are witnessing Stoicism lending strategic support to the campaign for the independence of philosophy.** By the middle of the seventeenth century, and even more distinctly in the Enlightenment, Stoicism had become a part – an important part, but still only a part – of a comprehensive view of the world which men had come to call libertinism, or freethinking, and which I have called the autonomy of criticism.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=kjfwCAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

Amyraut later describes the three kinds of indifferentism to which the three parts of his book are devoted: 'la religion d'Epicure', which denies providence; the 'philosophes' (Stoics?) who admit providence but deny that we have any revelation concerning the service of God; and those who agree that, in addition to providence, 'Dieu a révélé particulièrement quelque chose de soi, et de la maniere de service qu'il lui faut rendre, mais n'estiment pas que cela oblige à suivre une forme de religion certaine et determinée; secte de gens inconnue des anciens et née de nos temps' (ibid., pp. 7-8).
…

However that may be, the decade from about 1620 to 1630 stands out as a distinct stage in the prehistory of deism mainly because of the existence of the *Anti-bigot*.
…

As for the substance of 'deism', leaving the *Anti-bigot* on one side, there are reports of a type of free-thought which appears to the modern reader, who knows of Voltaire and Rousseau, to be deistic, together with the publication of a work which is now considered to be the earliest expression of English deism, Herbert's *De veritate*. Yet the term 'deism' was not applied at the time, nor for many years to come, either to Herbert or to the free-thought reported on by Silhon and others. **Insofar as there is any connection between the various manifestations of free-thought which resemble eighteenth-century deism, it is a diffuse neo-Stoicism.**42

> 42. **Strowski affirms that Descartes, Balzac and Corneille are 'remplis de l'esprit stoïcien'** (*Pascal et son temps*, Vol. I, p. 123). As regards Herbert, Rossi discusses the Stoic background of deism and concludes that in view of Herbert's humanist education and tendencies to Stoicism 'dobbiamo attribuire il suo deismo in gran parte a suggerimenti classici e umanistici, e sopratutto al *De natura deorum* di Cicerone' (*Lord Herbert*, Vol. I, p. 499).

This movement, Christianized in the work of Justus Lipsius, Guillaume Du Vair, and Charron, was a powerful influence on Herbert of Cherbury and is clearly perceptible in the moral ideas of the *Anti-bigot*.

https://www.sullivan-county.com/nf0/index.htm

> The beginnings of English Deism appear in the seventeenth century. Its main principles are to be found in the writings of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (d. 1648), who devoted the latter part of a life spent in a military and diplomatic career to a search for a standard and a guide in the conflicts of creeds and systems. **He was a friend of Grotius, Casaubon, and Gassendi, and during a long sojourn in France made himself acquainted with the thought of Montaigne, of Bodin, and especially of Charron.** His works are: *De Veritate* (Paris, 1624); *De religions Gentilium errorumque apud eos causes* (London, 1645); and two minor treatises, *De cause errorum* and *De religions laici*. The first work advances a theory of knowledge based upon the recognition of innate universal characteristics on the object perceived, **and rigidly opposed to knowledge supernatural in its origin and determinable in only by strife and conflict.** The second work lays down the common marks by which religious truth is recognized. These are (1) a belief in the existence of the Deity, (2) the obligation to reverence such a power, (3) the identification of worship with practical morality, (4) the obligation to repent of sin and to abandon it, and, (5) divine recompense in this world and the next. **These five essentials (the so-called "Five Articles" of the English Deists) constitute the nucleus of all religions and of Christianity in its primitive, uncorrupted form. The variations between positive religions are explained as due partly to the allegorization of nature, partly to self-deception, the workings of imagination, and priestly guile.**

The 'libertins' described by Silhon also profess typically Stoic ideas, of a very rudimentary kind, although they are more critical of Christianity than the Stoics were wont to be towards established religion. A tentative reconstruction of this neo-Stoic attitude, on the assumption (also tentative) that it did in fact exist, might include the belief in God, in the immortality of the soul, and in the primacy of the moral aspect of religion. **Revealed religion is viewed with scepticism, though not necessarily with disfavour; both the *Anti-bigot* and the free-thinkers described by Silhon concede that it may have social advantages.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA210#v=onepage&q&f=false

Stoicism was not confined to the study and the lecture room. In a debased instrumentalized version it could be adapted for ideological ends. Nicolas Faret's *L'Honnête Homme ou L'Art de plaire à la cour* (Faret 1925 [1630]) is a good example.
…

In Faret and later writers, *honnête homme* in fact emerges as the nearest equivalent of the English "gentleman," in that it registers moral imperatives, but relates these to the maintenance of a social position. Thus Faret speaks of the courtier's prime goal as being virtue, **but it turns out that this is the means to the end of establishing one's reputation** (23). The mastery of passion is likewise held up not as a pure ethical ideal but as a maxim for social interaction: we should master ourselves and command our feelings ("affections") if we wish to gain the good feeling of others (69). **This shows how Stoicism could be adapted to play a role in the process sometimes called "curialization":** the imposition, concomitant with and conducive to the establishment of royal absolutism, of new standards of self-restraint and self-control, **first on courtiers, and then on society at large** (see Elias 1983: 104-11).

Its influence on literary culture was immense. Pierre Corneille (1606-84), the first of France's three great playwrights of the seventeenth century, was too much of a dramatist not to realize the theatrical problems of putting Stoicism on the stage. A character who reacts impassively to appalling misfortunes is unlikely to stir the sympathy or the emotions of the audience. **Yet the struggle to overcome emotion, he knew, can be intensely dramatic.**

> http://www.lexikus.de/bibliothek/NAPOLEON-AND-THE-QUEEN-OF-PRUSSIA/BOOK-V/CHAPTER-XLII-NAPOLEON-AND-GOETHE
>
> **Tragedy was at all times the school of great men. It is the duty of sovereigns to encourage, patronize, and reward it.** In order to appreciate it correctly, we need not be poets ourselves; we only need knowledge of human nature, of life, and of a cultivated mind. Tragedy fires the heart, elevates the soul, and can or rather must create heroes. **I am convinced that France is indebted to the works of Corneille for many of her greatest men.** If he were living I would make a prince of him.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false

In his detailed surveys of the uses of Stoicism in the writings of French humanists and apologists in the first half of the seventeenth century, Julien-Eymard d'Angers distinguished six basic orientations towards the Stoics. There was Christian Stoicism (*un stoïcisme christianisant*), which he associated with Jean-Pierre Camus or, in England, Joseph Hall. He used the label 'Stoic Christianity' (*un Christianisme stoïcisant*) to characterise the works of Etienne Binet or Nicolas Caussin. François de Sales was a representative of what d'Angers called Christian humanism. There was also **the new Cartesian humanism, which might accept the Epictetan distinction between what was and what was not in our power, but which attacked Stoic apathy** using the categories of the new physics, which treated the body as a machine, and the new physiology, which presented a distinctive account of the separation of body and mind. Fifth, **there was the 'double attitude' of the *libertins érudits*, for while they approved of the Stoics insofar as**

the Stoics challenged the monopoly the Christian apologists claimed to possess with respect to virtue, they disapproved of the Stoics' dogmatism.11 Finally, there was the nascent anti-Stoicism of the 1640s, to be considered in what follows.12 This took on its distinctive form in the pages of Jansen's *Augustinus*, but it quickly demonstrated that it was not by any means confined to narrow Jansenist circles.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA147#v=onepage&q&f=false

The simple integration of skepticism, stoicism, and epicureanism, for instance, which began in Montaigne's work **and culminated in the appeal to Plutarch, Seneca, Lucretius, Sextus Empiricus, and Cicero for support in the *Apologie*,** obviously evidences the importance of the three philosophies in Montaigne's masterpiece. Indeed, the one quality of his *Essais* which makes them something greater than Sebond's apology, and even his own, is the way in which the Gascon integrated the Judaic-Christian and the stoic-epicurean with the aim of giving the fullest possible interpretation to life.
…

There was between Montaigne and Pascal (1600-60), a whole development of stoicism.4 **The *Manual* of Epictetus was translated and republished innumerable times before 1660.** Seneca more than Epictetus permeated the time; La Mothe, Chapelain, Bouchard, all professed respect for him. For example, **La Mothe wrote: "Je n'ai guère vu d'homme de vertu qui n'aimât Sénèque très ardemment."** Strowski has traced this stoicism, first in Montaigne himself, where the misfortunes of the times led him to look to his welfare by means of the cultivation of his soul, based upon two principles: we must place our contentment in ourselves and in the things over which we have some control, and good and evil depend upon our opinions of them. **At the time of writing the *Apologie*, however, skepticism undermined all Montaigne's ideas, and one would expect that in the general upheaval the stoicism he had adopted would vanish. But stoicism was no longer a mode of intelligence; it had become the personality of Montaigne. Being an individual stoicism, it could not be taught, though it exercised a tremendous influence in Europe for over a century. Montaigne thus created a modern stoicism, which was not without its followers.** Juste Lipse, for his part, in the *De constantia libri due* (1584), also applied stoicism to the misfortunes of the time. In subsequent works, the *Manuductio ad philosophiam stoicam* and the *Physiologia stoicorum* (1604), he endeavored to present systematically the stoic philosophy concerning physics, the nature of God, the soul of the world, providence, fate, and the origin of evil. Lipse's work was at the same time an exposition as well as an apology and it united the tenets of Christianity with the ideas of Zeno and Epictetus. Like the early stoics of the Renaissance (Coras, *Altercation en forme de dialogue de l'Empereur Adrian et du philosophe Epictète*, 1558; Riveaudeau, *La Doctrine d'Epictète stoïcien*, 1567), Juste Lipse turned his efforts to the christianization of stoicism.
…

Strowski concludes (I, 123): **"Ainsi vers l'année 1640, en France, le plus grand écrivain en prose, Balzac; le plus grand philosophe, Descartes; le plus grand poète, Corneille, sont tout remplis de l'esprit stoïcien. L'esprit stoïcien s'est universellement insinué."** Busson (pp. 379-427) confirms Strowski: "C'est par la *Sagesse*, par les traités de Du Vair, par les études de Juste Lipse que le XVII siècle va être pénétré de Stoïcisme."
…

Man could be told that he lived not for himself or for specific rewards, but for the community. Devotion to society, therefore, is a beautiful thing and brings with it a satisfaction which is its own reward. Thus new viewpoint was particularly helpful because the breakdown in the belief of the soul's immortality had impaired to some extent the consequent doctrine of rewards and punishments. Stoicism thus became a rule of conduct, **a laicization of morality,** and an ideal way of life.
…

Besides, **having proclaimed human ideals natural rather than supernatural, the proponents of the stoic way of life naturally proposed the salvation of the good, wise men of antiquity.** Against this idea, the Jansenists protested, assailing it as an impossible deism.

At the time when Jansenism (1645) began to combat stoicism, epicureanism was also revived. The philosopher who devoted himself diligently, from 1628 until his death in 1655, to the rehabilitation of Epicurus was Gassendi.
…

The important thing, however, is not that there were particular groups of people, such as the alchemists and the doctors, who espoused epicureanism during the fifty years which preceded Gassendi's resolve to rehabilitate Epicurus and his philosophy. **The real significance lies in the fact that, in concert with stoicism, epicureanism exercised the role of creating a new kind of morality, which became in part individual and then social, and which consisted fundamentally in asserting that the goal**

of life is personal pleasure and social amelioration. The same merging process took place, therefore, between stoicism and epicureanism as between stoicism and Christian ethics.

---

https://archive.org/details/cu31924029017931/page/n17/mode/2up?view=theater

In the first place, **his ETHICS is a compound of the opinions of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, something not very difficult, for Seneca had already reconciled them very well.** He wishes us to follow reason, or the nature of things as the Stoics said, with which everybody will agree. He adds that we ought not to be disturbed by the things which are not in our power. This is exactly the dogma of the Portico which established the greatness and liberty of their sage, so praised for the strength of mind which he had in resolving to do without the things which do not depend upon us and to endure them when they come in spite of us. It is for this reason that I am wont to call this ethics the art of patience. The Sovereign Good, according to the Stoics and according to Aristotle himself, was to act in accordance with virtue or prudence; and the pleasure resulting therefrom together with the resolution mentioned above is properly that tranquility of the soul, or indolence, which the Stoics and Epicureans sought and equally recommended under different names. **One has only to examine the incomparable *Manual* of Epictetus and the *Epicurus* of Laertius to acknowledge that Descartes has not advanced the practice of morals.** But it seems to me that this art of patience in which he makes the art of living consist, is yet not the whole. A patience without hope does not endure and does not console, and it is here that Plato, in my opinion, surpasses the others, for by good arguments he makes us hope for a better life and approaches nearest to Christianity. It is sufficient to read the excellent dialogue on the *Immortality of the Soul or the Death of Socrates*, which Theophile has translated into French, to conceive a high idea of it. **I think that Pythagoras did the same, and that his metempsychosis was merely to accommodate himself to the range of common people, but that among his disciples he reasoned quite differently.** Also Ocellus Lucanus, who was one of them, and from whom we have a small but excellent fragment on the universe, says not a word of it. It will be said that Descartes establishes very well the EXISTENCE OF GOD and the immortality of the soul. **But I fear that we are deceived by fine words, for the God, or Perfect Being, of Descartes is not a God such as we imagine him and such as we desire; that is to say, just and wise, doing everything for the good of creatures as far as is possible, but rather he is similar to the God of Spinoza, namely, the principle of things, and a certain sovereign power or primitive nature which sets everything in action and does everything which is feasible. The God of Descartes has neither *will nor understanding*, since according to Descartes he has not the *Good* as the object of the will nor the *True* as object of the understanding. Also he does not wish that his God should act according to some end, and for this reason he rejects from philosophy the search after final causes, under the adroit pretext that we are not capable of knowing the ends of God.** Plato, on the contrary, has very well shown that God being the author of things and provided he acts according to wisdom, true physics is to know the ends and the uses of things, for science is the knowledge of reasons, and the reasons of what has been made by an understanding are the final causes or the designs of him who made them, and these appear from the use and the function which they have. This is why the consideration of the use of parts is so useful in anatomy. **This is why a God such as that of Descartes leaves us no other consolation than that of patience *par force*.** He says in some passages that matter passes successively through all possible forms; that is to say, that his God does everything which is feasible and passes, following a necessary and fated order, through all possible combinations; but for this the mere necessity of matter sufficed, or rather his God is nothing but this necessity, or this principle of necessity, acting in matter as it can. **It must not, therefore, be believed that this God has any more care of intelligent creatures than of the others.** Each one will be happy or unhappy, according as it will find itself involved in great torrents or whirlpools; and he is right in recommending to us patience without hope (in place of felicity).

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/74/mode/2up?view=theater

In a more lapidary manner, Leibniz remarked: ***'Descartes pense tout bas ce que Spinoza dit tout haut,'*** D. murmurs to himself what Spinoza states aloud.

Descartes alone cannot be blamed for this approach, his was merely part of a chain of arguments by Epicureans, Stoics, skeptics, neo-academicians (radical skeptics), atomists, libertines, and naturalists. His God, as both Pascal and Leibniz understood it, was not the God of Christians, it was that of the philosophers, **more exactly the Stoic god who abandons humanity to a hopeless patience, to a self-rewarding feeling of noble acceptance.**

> http://inters.org/faith-reason-pascal-memorial
>
> God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and savants.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA130#v=onepage&q&f=false

Descartes clearly stands in the neo-Stoic stream of thought. **He was influenced by Lipsius' French disciples, du Vair and Charron; and there is no doubt that he would have been exposed to Lipsius' thought at Laflèche at the hands of his Jesuit teachers. Neo-Stoicism in Lipsius' formulation had already departed from the original model, as we saw: in its emphasis on the will, and in its mind/body dualism.** Descartes pushes further along these lines of departure, and develops a quite different view.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA208#v=onepage&q&f=false

He suggests they discuss Seneca's *On the Happy Life*, but soon becomes irritated by the treatise's verbosity and lack of conceptual clarity, and this leads him to develop his own ethical reflections. These are consciously syncretistic, in that he aims to find the common core in which Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics agree. Happiness is not itself the supreme good, but the contentment that comes from possessing that good. **The supreme good itself is virtue, because it is the only one that depends entirely on our free will.** Here he agrees with the Stoic Zeno, but he rejects Zeno's dissociation of virtue and pleasure:

> By equating all the vices, however, he made this virtue so severe and so inimical to pleasure **that I think only depressed people, or those whose minds are entirely detached from their bodies,** could be counted among his adherents. (*To Elisabeth, 18 August 1645, AT IV 276*)

(The last sentence is particularly important: **for all his metaphysical belief in the real distinction of mind and body, Descartes's ethical reflections always presuppose the union of body and soul.**)

> https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18269/pg18269-images.html#SECTION_II
>
> I cannot forgive Descartes. **In all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to dispense with God.** But he had to make Him give a fillip to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA192#v=onepage&q&f=false

As already mentioned, there is a fundamental anti-Stoic bent in Bacon's therapy of the soul, in that the health of the mind is heavily dependent on the health of the senses and the contribution of external reality (nature). In recognizing the reality of material needs, Bacon's therapy of the soul departed significantly from models of Stoic self-mastery.
…

Like Bacon, finally, Descartes shunned the Stoic extremes of ethical rationalism, evident in some of the descriptions of virtue left by pagan philosophers, which often were nothing more than manifestations of indifference and cruelty (*une insensibilité ou un orgueil, ou un désespoir, ou un parricide*) (Descartes 1964-74: VI 8).

Descartes's medicine of the mind, however, differed from Bacon's original template in some decisive respects. Because of his jaded consideration of the mental faculties, Bacon had shunned situations in which the mind was left to its own devices (*intellectus sibi permissus*). By contrast, Descartes enjoyed the exercise of thinking (*j'avais tout loisir de m'entretenir de mes pensées*), which he regarded as the only way to attain the truth (Descartes 1964-74: VI 1-2). **In his confident attitude towards the power of inner meditation, Descartes proved to be more "Stoic" than Bacon. While Bacon regarded specimens of plant and animal life, childhood, and bouts of mental illness as a rich source of experimental discoveries to be employed in natural histories of human passions and desires, for Descartes, the experimental significance of this material towards a better understanding of the *cogito* was minimal.** Indeed, he pointed out that in the early stages of our life, appetites and wrong opinions inculcated by teachers had prevented us from using the full potential of our reason (*l'usage entire de notre raison*, in Descartes 1964-74: VI 13). This does not mean that Descartes was not aware of the impact that material and external constraints would have on the mind.
…

An important difference from Bacon's medicine of the mind had to do with Descartes's view of the will. Unlike Bacon, who was particularly concerned with the possibility that our will may be overwhelmed by uncontrollable desires, Descartes considered the will to be a rational appetite (Descartes 1964-74: VI 25-6, 28). **Therapy was therefore quite different: rather than shaping appetites into patterns of virtuous action, starting with appetites at their most primitive level, as Bacon had explained in the *Novum Organum* and *Sylva sylvarum*** (Bacon 2004: 382-416: 1857-74: II 602, 618), **Descartes envisaged the control of the passions as a top-down exercise, in which (and this too betrayed a more favourable disposition towards Stoic therapies of the mind) the will was able to retrain long-established chains of responses to reality in more rational sequences.**

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

> The major figures among the Framers were wiser men than Robespierre, and more influenced by traditional Christianity, but they were Enlightenment men to the core. Their veneer and their constituencies were different from those of the French Revolutionaries, but not their theology. *Their religion was civic religion.* **The difference is, they saw civic religion as a decentralized, individual matter rather than as a state affair; it was to aid the national government but not be part of the national government.**
> …
>
> **The rival political philosophies of the two wings of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, Scottish *a posteriori* (empirical) rationalism vs. French *a priori* (deductive) rationalism,** developed out of these two rival conceptions of the civil contract. Locke's compact offered three stated goals that provided legitimacy to any civil contract: life (i.e., self-preservation), liberty, and property. Rousseau's theory had none. The General Will supposedly speaks through the state, and no one can stay its sovereign hand.
> …
>
> In this sense, Madison was as utopian and as messianic as Rousseau was; the difference lies in his approach. He was a man of the Scottish Enlightenment, a man in revolt against Presbyterianism. Rousseau was a man in revolt against political authoritarianism and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. **Each man's system resembled his enemy's system. Madison wanted to overcome Presbyterianism by making the world socially Congregational and national politics neutral.** Rousseau wanted to overcome Roman Catholicism by making the world socially unitarian and all politics state-salvational.

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

> 1. Sparta's greatness was attributed by Descartes to the fact that its laws, 'having been originated by a single individual, all tended to a single goal': *Discourse on Method* (*Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 12, lines 20-5). **A century earlier, Machiavelli paid a similar tribute to Lycurgus. Vico, for whom Lycurgus is a social myth, regards such individualism as being characteristic of Descartes' blindness to the nature of man and history.**

In taking this approach in his directions on how to conduct one's thoughts, **he combined the advantages of logic, geometrical analysis and algebra** (Descartes 1964-74: VI 17-18). Although he regarded medicine as the most important discipline among the arts devoted to foster man's well-being, and in spite of presenting himself as a *physicien* of the passions (Descartes 1964-74: XI 326), **the founding metaphors in Descartes's *cultura animi* were architectonic and mathematical, not medical.** While Bacon had recognized the inescapability of a pre-existing condition (be that a "soil," a "body" or even an "object"), for Descartes the solution consisted in laying new foundation and ordering the train of thought according to relations of geometrical and mathematical nature (Descartes 1964-74: VI 29). To be sure, the idea of starting completely afresh gave Descartes immense freedom – in imagination, in desire and in will. The medical analogy (originally embraced by Chrysippus) was based on the idea that mental clarity would emerge out of a condition of illness, **a process in which, as argued by Bacon, distortions and prejudices (the *idola*) were already present and could never be completely erased. Descartes's mathematical and architectonic model, by contrast, presupposed a disembodied self,** which, precisely because it enjoyed an extraordinary level of creative freedom (*ce Moy, c'est a dire, l'Ame par laquelle ie suis ce que ie suis*), could reconstruct the horizons of its experience in the most appropriate way (Descartes 1964-74: VI 33).

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Indeed, **in his work on *The World* (1633; not published because of Descartes' fear of exposing himself to vexations), Descartes posits the Lucretian world of matter (extension),** supposedly created by God, but in which the laws of matter are so 'marvellously established that even if we assume that God created nothing else [but matter and motion], these laws suffice to let the material parts arrange themselves in good order.' **This is another formulation of Gassendi's view, later adopted by Newton, that God created the atoms – which then behaved according to the Lucretian description. The difference between the Greek (and Roman) atomists' original chaos and that of Descartes is that the latter is created. Subsequent generations were, however, entitled to ignore the creator, regard the material world as self-engendered, and the laws of nature derived from matter itself. This is not the atheism of Epicurus and Lucretius, it is nearer to Stoic atheism and its immanent *logos*;** it was to contribute to the vague formulas of deism, on the one hand, and to integral materialism, on the other.

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D5

> We are so much in the power of chance, that change itself is considered as a God, and the existence of God becomes doubtful. **But there are others who reject this principle and assign events to the influence of the stars[19], and to the laws of our nativity; they suppose that God, once for all, issues his decrees and never afterwards interferes. [semelque in omnes futuros umquam deo decretum, in reliquum vero otium datum.]** This opinion begins to gain ground, and both the learned and the unlearned vulgar are falling into it.

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%C3%AEtres_et_possesseurs_de_la_nature#L'expression_dans_son_contexte

> «Mais, **sitôt que j'ai eu acquis quelques notions générales touchant la physique, et que, commençant à les éprouver en diverses difficultés particulières, j'ai remarqué jusques où elles peuvent conduire, et combien elles diffèrent des principes dont on s'est servi jusques à présent, j'ai cru que je ne pouvois les tenir cachées sans pécher grandement contre la loi qui nous oblige à procurer autant qu'il est en nous le bien général de tous les hommes:** car elles m'ont fait voir qu'il est possible de parvenir à des connaissances qui soient fort utiles à la vie; et qu'au lieu de cette philosophie spéculative qu'on enseigne dans les écoles, **on en peut trouver une pratique, par laquelle, connaissant la force et les actions du feu, de l'eau, de l'air, des astres, des cieux, et de tous les autres corps qui nous environnent, aussi distinctement que nous connaissons les divers métiers de nos artisans, nous les pourrions employer en même façon à tous les usages auxquels ils sont propres, et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature.** Ce qui n'est pas seulement à désirer pour l'invention d'une infinité d'artifices, qui feraient qu'on jouirait sans aucune peine des fruits de la terre et de toutes les commodités qui s'y trouvent, **mais principalement aussi pour la conservation de la santé, laquelle est sans doute le premier bien et le fondement de tous les autres biens de cette vie;** car même l'esprit dépend si fort du tempérament et de la disposition des organes du corps, que, **s'il est possible de trouver quelque moyen qui rende communément les hommes plus sages et plus habiles qu'ils n'ont été jusques ici, je crois que c'est dans la médecine qu'on doit le chercher.**»
>
> — René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, texte établi par Victor Cousin, Levrault, 1824, tome I, sixième partie

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/310/mode/2up?view=theater

The victory was won largely by practising scientists – by Boyle and Newton – but it was prepared by the great propagandists of science early in the seventeenth century – by Bacon and Descartes – philosophers who, for all the antagonism of their later disciples and all the divergences in their temperament and method, were close allies. Both, as d'Alembert recognized, "introduced the spirit of experimental science."5 Both were intellectual mavericks, developing their ideas outside and against the universities.
…

Since Bacon's utilitarian empiricism did not essentially conflict with Descartes's severe mathematical intellectuality, **it followed that in the sciences the most highly developed rationality was also the most useful.** In fact, Bacon's and Descartes's ideas on method converged because they agreed on the true purposes of philosophy: the end of true philosophizing was mastery over nature.
…

Mankind, Descartes predicted in a powerful paragraph of his *Discours de la méthode*, may "render themselves masters and possessors of nature";1 they can abolish labor, improve health, lengthen life, and banish the terrors of old age. But they will do all this only if they find their powers and their limits and repudiate the past: **Descartes begins the great work of his maturity, *Les passions de l'âme*, with the observation that "in nothing do the sciences we have inherited from the ancients appear more defective than in what they have written on the passions."** Their work is so slight and so untrustworthy that a total revolution is necessary: "I feel myself obliged to write as if I were treating of a matter to which no one before me had ever paid due attention."2 This was strong talk, especially in a book filled with reminiscences from Stoic philosophy, **but it was obviously essential to the morale of the innovators of the age. If there were a debtor's prison for intellectuals who have failed to acknowledge their obligations, it would be filled with the natural philosophers of the scientific revolution.**

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/newton-stm/#2

Descartes, it can be justly said, is the founder of the other main school of the "mechanical philosophy" of the 17th Century, which stood in direct opposition to atomism on the issue of the possibility of a vacuum and which adapted the Aristotelian doctrines on the nature of time, space, and motion to the new world view.

3. Descartes' Innovation

Although avowedly anti-Aristotelian in many regards, particularly on the view, shared with atomists, that all qualitative change on the macroscopic scale is reducible to the rearrangement and/or motion of matter on the microscopic scale, it was Descartes' ambition to carry out this program by retaining what is essentially Aristotle's notion of Prime Matter. The pure elements (earth, air, fire, and water) of Aristotle's physics could mutate into one another by alteration of the fundamental qualities definitive of them. These were the four haptic qualities of hot, cold, wet, and dry. Because of this, there had to be something distinguishable, at least in thought, from qualities that persist during elemental alteration. This quality-less substratum is what Aristotle referred to simply as matter, or as it is often called, Prime Matter, in order to avoid confusion with the macroscopically identifiable, quality-laden, homogenous portions of everyday objects. **Unlike atomists, who attributed at least the quality of hardness (impenetrability) to the ultimate particles of matter, Descartes argued that matter, or synonymously, body [corpus] has no qualities whatsoever, but only quantity, i.e., extension. In other words, body and extension are literally one and the same [res extensa]. An immediate corollary is that there can be no vacuum, for that would require an extended region devoid of body—a manifest contradiction.**
…

Descartes, who lived in reach of Papal authority and feared [Galileo's] fate, had found a clever way of espousing Copernicanism without falling prey to accusation of heresy. According to his definition of motion "properly speaking", he contends, the earth is truly at rest.

In Newton's system of the world as set out in Book III of the *Principia*, the earth patently moves absolutely. In anticipation, Newton indicates how to reconcile this with scripture by observing that, if usage determines the meanings of words, then in ordinary discourse (including the Bible) the terms 'time', 'space', 'place', and 'motion' are properly understood to signify the relative quantities; only in specialized and mathematical contexts do they denote the absolute quantities. (Keep in mind Newton's title, *The **Mathematical** Principles of Natural Philosophy*.)

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n91/mode/2up?view=theater

In this world-philosophy, therefore, there can be nothing subconscious or even half-conscious, no undefinable soul-stirrings, no dark impulses, no secret inklings; no sensations even, except in so far as they are the expression of clear thought. To covet anything means to regard it as true; to abhor anything is to regard it as false. Good actions are those based on an adequate knowing; evil actions those which ensue from incorrect imaginings. **Animals and plants are, as we have heard already, mere automata; their sensations are nothing but bodily movements which obey purely mechanical laws; for everything which happens without thought is a purely physical process.** Descartes goes so far as to assert that they neither see nor hear, hunger nor thirst, rejoice nor sorrow. They know, he says, no more about their vital manifestations than does a clock which strikes six or seven. He goes, in his logical course, even further still and declines to place even human sensations among the spiritual processes; for him they are likewise mere phenomena of movement. The passions are only false judgments, confused, incorrect, obscure notions; and there is therefore no justification for their existence, and they can and must be conquered by reason, reason being the faculty of "clear and distinct" conceptions. **We recognize here the habit of mind—akin to that of the Greek Stoa, but adjusted to the point of view of the man of the world—which hovered over the seventeenth century as an ethical ideal: that of the man who has tamed and rationalized all his instincts by the clear methodology which has become his *life-form*; who looks down upon everything that is the outcome of elementary instincts and the unregulated sphere of the will as uncivilized and plebeian,** tasteless and barbaric, unphilosophical and unaesthetic; who feels everything not subject to reason to be subaltern and in bad form. But already the eighteenth century is heralded in the conviction that everything that conflicts with reason represents an unripe moral formation and an aberration of nature, destined to be overcome in the course of progress.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA77#v=onepage&q&f=false

Let us reiterate that the similitude of the passions stripped of their objects is a rationality of the origins, not of the end. **Like the Cartesian ego, it is an abstraction of the conditions for pure selfhood from all mediating traditions and social practices.** Machiavelli's delicate interplay between Fortuna and man, embodied in the cycles of history and the rise and decline of republics and principalities, **becomes in Hobbes a frozen dichotomy between nature as a field of random happenstance and the anthropocentric power to re-fashion it so as to maximize survival.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA267#v=onepage&q&f=false

In the Mersenne group could be seen at times, particularly between 1634 and 1637, Thomas Hobbes. It was not his first visit to the Continent, since he had spent a part of 1628 in France and Italy and 1629 in Paris, where he studied mathematics and natural science. **He brought a rather diversified experience to Mersenne's group. He had known Francis Bacon in his youth and had gotten from him the idea of a science of nature, but he had shown no interest in Bacon's experimental philosophy. In this respect, he was more a follower of Descartes whose inductive method he admired and whose views on mechanics he even pushed to radicalism in political**

theory. However, he rejected Descartes's metaphysics, and was even persuaded by Mersenne to compose the "Troisièmes Objections" to the *Méditations*. Here he followed Gassendi, who had also criticized Descartes's metaphysics at Mersenne's suggestion in an "Objection."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Augustinian Catholic critics of Stoicism in seventeenth-century France tended to view it as a philosophy organised around the attribution of excessive power to the free human will. In Protestant Europe, by contrast, Stoicism was much more likely to be criticised as a philosophy of determinism, or as one that denied the freedom of the will.
…

Before Hobbes was stigmatised as a kind of Epicurean, however, he was interpreted for equally polemical purposes as being, in Jon Parkin's words, 'a sort of unusual stoic,'1 in particular in his celebrated controversy with John Bramhall, the Arminian bishop of Derry.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA69#v=onepage&q&f=false

An intriguing visuals connection between Lipsius and Hobbes was forged by 1672, when Richard Royston republished Nathaniel Wanley's recent translation of *De constantia*, which was given the new title, *War and peace reconciled*. For this edition, Royston recycled the frontispiece that Robert Vaughan had prepared for the edition of Hobbes's *Philosophical Rudiments concerning government and society* that he had earlier published in 1651, with the peculiar result that a portrait of Hobbes, flanked by representations of 'Dominion' and 'Liberty,' stood at the front of an edition of Lipsius.72 But perhaps this was not as strange as it sounds. As I noted at the end of the first chapter, there a number of ways in which Hobbes's theoretical project, culminating in the *Leviathan* of 1651, can be read as continuing to work with central themes from Lipsius's political thought. **Both writers agreed with Augustine that the goal of political life was to secure an earthly peace, but they disagreed with the Augustinian tradition through their 'politique' defence of the subordination of religious concerns to those of politics.** Both Hobbes and Lipsius were more or less sceptical with respect to traditional arguments about the value of republican freedom, and both defended an account of determinism in human affairs, whether Lipsius's 'fate' or Hobbes's materialist physics. More recently, a number of scholars have fleshed out some historical connections between Lipsius and Hobbes. Richard Tuck's *Philosophy and Government*, for example, tells an interesting and influential story about the trajectory of what he calls 'the new humanism' of Lipsius and Montaigne, a sceptical, Neostoic discourse that was transformed once by Grotius into modern natural rights theory and again by Thomas Hobbes into the language of social contract theory.73 Others have traced a series of further connections between the Lipsian and the Hobbesian disciplined citizen.74

Hobbes's psychological theory also shows a kind of continuity with Stoic theory. As noted by Richard Tuck, 'Our entire emotional life, according to Hobbes, extraordinary as this might seem, is in fact a complicated set of beliefs about the best way of securing ourselves against our fellow men, with all the familiar complexities of love, pride and laughter in the end reducible simply to a set of ideas about our own relative safety from other people's power.'75 **The reduction of emotion to belief is characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy, and when Hobbes argued that the bad effects of the more antisocial passions were specifically produced by mistaken judgements, he was arguing on distinctively Stoic terrain.**
…

There is an obvious sharp asymmetry between Hobbes and the Stoics with respect to the emotions.76 For the Stoics, the project of replacing the erroneous passions, or *pathe*, with their rational counterparts, the *eupatheiai*, was bound up with the goal of living according to nature and achieving the *summum bonum*. For Hobbes, by contrast, it was axiomatic that there was no such thing as the *summum bonum*. But if we focus not on the *summum bonum* but on avoiding the *summum malum*, the war of all against all, through the construction of civil peace, then the architectural resemblance between Hobbes's theory and Stoicism persists. **In place of the individual practicing Stoic therapies with an eye to the extirpation of the passions, it is the Hobbesian sovereign who maintains the conditions under which it becomes possible for citizens to be able to live peaceably together through their obedience to the sovereign's commands.** Considered from this point of view, Hobbes's theory looks quite a bit like those of the Neostoic moralists as presented by Quentin Skinner, **with 'this cardinal duty of submission' at its core.** But if we can read Hobbes here as a kind of Neostoic submission theorist, we can also read him as someone who is taking the Jacobean or the Tacitist critique of the Stoic politician very seriously indeed.

https://www.academia.edu/10054222/Mixing_Bodily_Fluids_Hobbess_Stoic_God

Most importantly, [Hobbes] rejected the Epicurean metaphysics of atoms and the void. Like Descartes and the Stoics, he took the world to be a material plenum with parts divisible *ad infinitum*. Furthermore, the immanent, pantheistic God of the Stoics suited his philosophical program much better than the removed, anthropomorphic gods of the Epicureans. Modern Epicureans like Gassendi were compelled to partly repudiate and/or 'Christianize' epicurean theology (Johnson 2003); but, as we will see below, Hobbes was happy to embrace the Stoic god in more or less pristine form. **Nevertheless, a compelling case for Hobbes's theology as Epicurean has recently been made by Springborg 2012.**
…

Since Hobbes considers 'incorporeal substance' contradictory, Bramhall asks, what then does he 'leave God himself to be?'14 **Hobbes's reply is bold and direct, though not published until after his death:** 'To his lordship's question here: *what I leave God to be?* I answer: I leave him to be a most pure, simple, invisible spirit corporeal.'15

15. EW iv, 313. Hobbes endorses a corporeal God in at least two other places: *An Historical Narration Concerning Heresy*, EW iv, 398; *Considerations Upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Thomas Hobbes*, EW iv, 427. **The corporeal God doctrine might have been expounded privately much earlier. Descartes' 1641 letter to Mersenne dismisses Hobbes's mention (in a lost letter to Descartes) of 'the corporeal soul and God' (*anima & Deo corporeis*).** AT 3, 287. See Curley 1995 and Springborg 2012.

…

The influence of classical Stoicism, as well as the Renaissance 'Neo-Stoical' school, upon Hobbes's political philosophy has been well documented.20 In contrast, the Stoical roots of his theology, and their relation to his ambitious program in natural philosophy, have not been so thoroughly explored. This is especially worth remedying because Hobbes, like the Stoics, conceived all of the parts of knowledge as ideally unified and integrated.21

…

Immediately before offering his model of the infinite spirit's operation, Hobbes seems to signal his debt to the Stoic tradition. He notes that theword 'spirit,' which for him means 'thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body,' in 'Latin signifies "breadth, air, wind" and in Greek "πνεῦμα (pneuma)."'30

30. Ibid. See also *Leviathan* III, xxxiv, 3, C 242. So it is ironic that the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, in his decidedly anti-Hobbesian tome, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678), diagnoses atheists as suffering from 'pneumatophobia': 'an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances' (TIS Vol. I, Bk. 1, Chap. xxx, 200). **Cudworth goes on to concede that 'all corporealists are not to be accounted atheists.' Some 'Corporeal Theists' hold, for example, that 'God to be a certain subtle and ethereal, but intellectual, matter pervading it [the world] as a soul. He mentions the Stoics as holding such a view, who are then derided not as atheists but rather 'ignorant, unskilled and childish theists'** (TIS I, Vol. I, Bk. i, Chap. xxx, 202). Cudworth didn't seem to realize Hobbes himself is a corporeal theist in this sense.

…

Hobbes's own favored intellectual milieu, both at home and in exile – the so-called Cavendish Circle of the Cavendish brothers, William and Charles, Margaret, wife of Charles, Walter Charleton, Kenelm Digby, and others – was immersed in Stoic thought, including the Christianized 'Neo-Stoic' school of Lipsius.

…

A Roman Christian-Stoic, Tertullian insisted, like Hobbes, on the philosophical and Biblical veracity of materialism about God and finite souls. He endorsed the 'probable opinion of the Stoics,' explicitly derived from Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, that the soul is a corporeal 'breath' or 'spirit' that permeates the body. The problem with dualism, he argues, is that it makes soul-body interaction problematic since 'there is nothing in common between things corporeal and things incorporeal.'84 Tertullian's authority is repeatedly invoked by Hobbes in works that develop and defend the corporeal God doctrine in the 1660's.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/32/mode/2up?view=theater

Most truly said St. Austin, "Our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power."j This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature. "We need not turn over any obscure books" to find out this truth. **"The poets chant it in the theatres, the shepherds in the mountains; the pastors teach it in their churches, the doctors in the universities; the common people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world, do assent unto it;"k except a handful of men, who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical principles.** Fourthly, this necessity which T.H. hath devised, which is grounded upon the necessitation of a man's will without his will, is the worst of all others; and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoics, that it increaseth them, and rendereth them unanswerable. No man blameth fire for burning whole cities; no man taxeth poison for destroying men; but those persons, who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/82/mode/2up?view=theater

T.H. mistakes the scope of the reason; the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Zeno, a rigid Stoic, which is not worth a button in this cause; nor in the servant's being an adversary to Stoical necessity, for it appears not out of the story that the servant did "deride necessity," but rather that he pleaded it in good earnest for his own justification; **nor in the success of**

the fray; we were told even now that no power doth justify an action but only that which is "irresistible,"g such was not Zeno's; and therefore it advantageth neither of their causes, neither that of Zeno, nor this of T.H. **What if the servant had taken the staff out of his master's hand and beaten him soundly; would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the master?—that the necessity of destiny did compel him to strike again.** Had not Zeno smarted justly for his paradox? And might not the spectators well have taken up the judges' apophthegm, concerning the dispute between Corax and his scholar, "an ill egg of an ill bird."h **But the strength of this argument lies partly in the ignorance of Zeno, that great champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence but with a cudgel.** No man (saith the servant) ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. If a strong man shall take a weak man's hand perforce, and do violence with it to a third person, he whose hand is forced is innocent, and he only culpable who compelled him. The minor was Zeno's own doctrine. What answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? Very learnedly he denied the conclusion, and cudgelled his servant; telling him in effect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten. And partly in the evident absurdity of such an opinion, which deserves not to be confuted with reasons but with rods. There are four things, said the philosopher, which ought not to be called into question: first, such things whereof it is wickedness to doubt; as, whether the soul be immortal, whether there be a God; **such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but 'cast into the sea with a mill-stone about his neck,' as unworthy to breathe the air or to behold the light:** secondly, such things as are above the capacity of reason; as, among Christians, the mystery of the Holy Trinity: thirdly, such principles as are evidently true; as, that two and two are four, in arithmetic, that the whole is greater than the part, in logic: fourthly, Part such things as are obvious to the senses; as, whether the snow—be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with fire; and he that denied motion, to be beaten until he recanted. So he who denies all liberty from necessitation, should be scourged until he become a humble suppliant to him that whips him, and confess that he hath power either to strike or to hold his hand.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/102/mode/2up?view=theater

J.D.—Thirdly, **let this opinion be once radicated in the minds of men, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the study of piety.** Who will bewail his sins with tears? what will become of that "grief," that "zeal," that "indignation," that holy "revenge," which the Apostle speaks of? if men be once throughly persuaded that they could not shun what they did. A man may grieve for that which he could not help; but he will never be brought to bewail that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own error, but from an antecedent necessity. Who will be careful or solicitous to perform obedience, that believeth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can neither go beyond nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evil shall happen to us; but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, **the only reason, why those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature and the strength of reason and the evidence of Scripture do for that present transport them from their ill-chosen grounds, and expel those Stoical fancies out of their heads. A complete Stoic can neither pray nor repent nor serve God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church as well as commonwealth, religion as well as policy.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/116/mode/2up?view=theater

First, say they, the Stoics did "subject Jupiter to destiny," but we "subject destiny to God." I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one and the same;—"*fatum quasi effatum Jovis.*" Hear Seneca;—"Destiny is the necessity of all things and actions, depending upon the disposition of Jupiter,"d &c. **I add, that the Stoics left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoical Christians do to God over His decrees; either for the beginnings of things, as Euripides,e or for the progress of them, as Chrysippus,f** or at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally. So Virgil,—"*Sed trahere et moras ducere*,"g &c. **So Osiris, in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life "*ultra fato constituta tempora*"—"beyond the times set down by the destinies."h**

Next, they say, that the Stoics did "hold an eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes," but they believe that God doth act "*praeter et contra naturam*"—"besides and against nature." **I answer, that it is not much material, whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity.**
…

J.D.—Because T.H. disavows these two distinctions, I have joined them together in one paragraph. He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny into Stoical and Christian; no more do I. We agree in the

conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledge no such necessity either as the one or as the other; **and because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly detest the naked destiny of the Stoics, as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly), under another form of expression, introduce it again at the back door after they had openly cast it out at the fore door. But T.H. rusheth boldly, without distinctions (which he accounts but "jargon") and without foresight, upon the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoics.** He confesseth, that "they may be two kinds of doctrine." "May be?" Nay, they are, without all peradventure. **And he himself is the first who bears the name of a Christian that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes not the names of "Stoical" and "Christian" destiny (do not blame him), though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoic.** To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make ourselves ridiculous. Why might not I first call that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christians, Christian destiny, and that other maintained by Stoics, Stoical destiny? But I am not the inventor of the term. If he had been as careful in reading other men's opinions as he is confident in setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing but the name itself often used. **But if the name of "*fatum Christianum*'' do offend him, let him call it with Lipsius, "*fatum verum*":** who divides destiny into four kinds; 1. "mathematical" or astrological destiny, 2. "natural" destiny, 3. "Stoical" or "violent" destiny, and 4. "true destiny"; which he calls ordinarily "*nostrum*"—"our" destiny, that is, of Christians, and "*fatum pium*," that is, godly destiny, and defines it just as T.H. doth his destiny, to be a "series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel."k **Though he be more cautelous than T.H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwreck upon, yet the divines thought he came too near them;** as appears by his Epistle to the reader in a later edition,l and by that note in the margent of his twentieth chapter,—"Whatsoever I dispute here, I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admonished, I will correct it; one may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy."m **So fearful was he to overshoot himself; and yet he maintained both true liberty and true contingency. T.H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any "sect."** And I say, so much the worse. It is better to be the disciple of an old sect, than the ringleader of a new.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/214/mode/2up?view=theater

3. Thirdly, he is mistaken in this also, that he saith, those ancient philosophers did never "draw into argument the almighty power of the Deity."c **For we find in Tully,d and in Chrysippus (as he is alleged by Eusebius),e that one of the main grounds of the Stoics was the prescience of God;** and that the predictions of their oracles and prophets could not be certain, unless all things came to pass by inevitable necessity.

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D27
>
> HERACLITUS, who attributes all things to fate, makes necessity to be the same thing with it. **Plato admits of a necessity in the minds and the actions of men, but yet he introduceth a cause which flows from ourselves. The Stoics, in this agreeing with Plato,** say that necessity is a cause invincible and violent; that fate is the ordered complication of causes, in which there is an intexture of those things which proceed from our own determination, so that some things are to be attributed to fate, others not.
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0404%3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D29
>
> PLATO says, that it is an accidental cause and a casual consequence in things which proceed from the election and counsel of men. Aristotle, that it is an accidental cause in those things which are done by an impulse to a certain end; and this cause is uncertain and unstable: there is a great deal of difference betwixt that which flows from chance and that which falls out by Fortune; for that which is fortuitous admits also of chance, and belongs to things practical; but what is by chance cannot be also by Fortune, for it belongs to things without action: Fortune, moreover, belongs to rational beings, but chance to rational and irrational beings alike, and even to inanimate things. **Epicurus, that it is a cause not always consistent, but various as to persons, times, and manners. Anaxagoras and the Stoics, that it is that cause which human reason cannot comprehend;** for there are some things which proceed from necessity, some things from Fate, some from choice and free-will, some from Fortune, some from chance.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/286/mode/2up?view=theater

Lastly, this distinction maketh T.H. worse than the Stoics themselves; for the Stoics, together with their fate, did also maintain the freedom of the will; and as we find in many authors, both theirs and ours, did not subject the soul of man nor the will of man to the rigid dominion of destiny. The Stoics "substracted some causes, and subjected others to necessity: **and among those which they would not have to be under necessity, they placed the will of man; lest it should seem not to be**

free, if it were subjected to necessity."p Chrysippus made two sorts of causes; principal causes, which did necessitate and compel all things, except the will of man; and adjuvant causes, as objects, which did only excite and allure.

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/374/mode/2up?view=theater

And though Lipsius incurred some dislike by reason of some inusitate expressions, yet there is no cause why T.H. should please himself so much as to think that Lipsius was of his opinion. **He was no such friend of any sort of destiny, as to abandon the liberty of the will. The Stoics themselves came short of T.H. his universal necessity. Yet I do not blame him, if he desire to have one partner in such a desperate cause as this is.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofmostrever04bram/page/426/mode/2up?view=theater

In answer to this, in the first place, he denieth the major,—that "the Divine substance is indivisible."p **If he had not been a professed Christian, but a plain Stoic, I should not have wondered so much at this answer; for they held, that God was corporal.q If the Divine substance be not indivisible, then it is material, then it is corporal, then it is corruptible, then the Anthropomorphites had reason to attribute human members to God.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/a64353.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext

It will also follow from this principle of yours, that Idolatry which you somwhere[b] condemn as sinful, is no crime; it being no other than an amicable officiousness in one part of the Deity towards the other, if the Universe be God; **and here a saying of *Athenagoras*[c] comes in fit time into my mind; and it is to this effect. If God and Matter be the same thing under differing appellations; we are impious if we deny to Stones and Trees, to Gold and Silver divine honor. Lastly, if the Universe be God, then *Cain*, and *Cham*, and *Pharaoh*, and *Herod*, and *Pilate*, and *Iuda*, and (that I may say it with sufficient emphasis) the Teacher also of this doctrin is part of the Deity.**
...

And first,[d] what kind of attribute, I pray you, is immaterial or incorporeal substance? Where do you find it in the Scripture? **Whence came it hither, but from *Plato* and *Aristotle*, Heathens, who mistook those thin inhabitants of the brain they see in sleep, for so many incorporeal men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things corporeal?** Do you think it an honour to God to be one of these? And would you learn Christianity from *Plato* and *Aristotle?* But seeing there is no such word in the Scripture, how will you warrant it from natural reason? **Neither *Plato* nor *Aristotle* did ever write of, or mention an incorporeal spirit;** for they could not conceive how a spirit, which in their language was [in non-Latin alphabet], (in ours, a wind) could be incorporeal.

Stud.

In this first Endeavour (for a Reason I cannot style it) there are many things which appear to me absurd. **You tell us that the Attribute of Incorporeal was borrowed from the Heathens, *Plato* and *Aristotle*; and yet almost in the same breath, you say, that neither of them did ever write of, or mention an incorporeal spirit. You reproach us, as learning Christianity (in stead of which you ought to have used the more proper term of Natural Theology) from such Heathens; and thereby you seem to herd with that ignorant multitude, who of late decry'd all humane Learning, upon pretence that it was heathenish and prophane, as if the Pearl of Wisdome and Reason were so besmear'd by the usage of the Heathens, as to be rendred unfit for the touch and service of a Christian Philosopher. You again are too much in their humour, whilest you require express mention of a term in holy Scripture, and upon the supposed silence of it, reject the notion which may be delivered in another form of words.** And moreover, when you say that *Plato* and *Aristotle* could not conceive a spirit, by reason that with them it signified a wind, to be incorporeal; therein also you ought not to have used such confidence in your assertion: for if wind be motion, and motion be so unglued and loose, as to pass from Body to Body, I know not whether the name of wind may not more promote, than obstruct the apprehension of an incorporeal Being. **We are informed by *Sextus Empiricus*,[a] that some of the Antients contended expresly for the incorporeity of motion. I mean by motion, that force so little yet understood, which is the cause of the translation of bodies, and not, as you somewhere speak, the relinquishing of one place, and acquiring another.**
...

Mr. *Hobbes.*

There[a] are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth.

Stud.

Herein, I confess, you disagree not from your self, though you seem at the widest distance from the truth. And *Regius*[b] is much more to be blamed for inconsistency, who asserting that the Soul might be a mode of the Body, did yet profess that the Will was free; and, in his own phrase, *sui juris.* **For your self, it was fit, upon supposition of your belief of a Corporeal Universe, that you should maintain a necessity of**

Willing. For if every thing be Matter, each effect in the World, being the meer result of motion in Matter, will be produced by fatal impulse: And, likewise, that producing impulse, will be necessitated by a former, and so on in so long an order, as cannot be pursu'd, (without the admittance of an Incorporeal God) to any end of it, distinctly known. **Wherefore the *Stoicks,* long before you, supposing God to be a kind of Fire, and the Soul to be a subtil Body; held also the opinion of Irresistible Fate. And *Plutarch,* and *Stobaeus* take notice of both Opinions together, as I find them cited by *Lipsius* in his *Manuduction*[c] to that Philosophy: Upon which occasion, a worthy and learned person, hath in his Discourse at the Funeral of Bishop *Hall,* deservedly call'd you the *New Stoick.*** If then there be nothing more divine in Man, than Matter and Motion; he does as necessarily chuse or refuse, as Fire ascends, or a Stone is pressed towards the Earth.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

None of the ancient systems fell so rapidly as the Stoa. It had just touched the highest point of practical morality, and in a generation after M. Antoninus there is hardly a professor to be named. **Its most valuable lessons to the world were preserved in Christianity; but the grand simplicity of its monism slumbered for fifteen centuries before it was revived by Spinoza.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT625#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Spinoza's political model is dramatically different, not just due to the historical circumstance that Spinoza lived in the Dutch Republic at the height of the "True Freedom," but because his "ex solo Libertatis amore [from love of liberty alone]" embraces a freedom that is personal and alert to oneself **but always joined to a universal project linking us all with each other,** rooted in rigorous self-criticism and criticism of others but also cooperation and assisting each other. The path to human happiness involves pursuing an active, conscious "love of liberty," fending off vices, indolence, and bad passions, and focusing one's critical-analytical intellect on the virtues personal and collective. **It is a part-Stoic, part-Epicurean conception of the moral self, and of philosophy as such,** inseparably tied to freedom of expression and debate, and freedom of political judgment, **locating sovereignty in society itself instead of above it.** Spinoza lodges sovereignty in the "common good" of society, retaining and transferring as much as possible of the individual and group freedoms of the "state of nature" to his ideal democratic republic. Here, Spinoza stands closer to Rousseau than to Hobbes;35 however, in postulating a hard, lonely path to personal liberty, and a still more arduous path to collective "freedom," Spinoza stands as distant from Rousseau as from Hobbes.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT642#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Originating in an attempt to reform Descartes' system, Spinoza's philosophy radically diverged from the essentials of Cartesian dualism, absorbing important strands of medieval Jewish philosophy, ancient Stoicism, Roman historiography, the science culture of his time, and Hobbes.**

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA229&printsec=frontcover

Van den Enden, "taught with good success and a great reputation," affirms the 1706 English version of Colerus' biography, **"so that the richest merchants of [Amsterdam] entrusted him with the instruction of their children until they discovered he was teaching his students something else besides Latin. For it was eventually found out that he sowed the seeds of atheism in the minds of those young boys."**2 Van den Enden was indeed a remarkable personality and striking presence in Spinoza's life. Surveying the scene, in 1694, the Reformed minister Salomon Van Til (1643-1713), deplored how "the evil" of early modern atheism had spread in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, **noting that it began in Italy, spread next to France and finally to Holland.** The Devil, he added, "the Prince of Darkness, found a great tool for diffusing this evil in an Amsterdam schoolmaster who, in this turbulent city, sought to use every opportunity to spread his view that Nature is the only God, and who later, in France, entangled in internal intrigue, ended his life on the gallows." **But a younger disciple of Van den Enden then took up his sinister cause, building on his foundation to "give that view a fine appearance."**
…

But several sources concur that Spinoza first encountered the later notorious ex-Jesuit prior to his expulsion from the community, and Van den Enden seems to have been the chief influence on the young Spinoza's studies and familiarity with Roman rhetoric, literature, history, and the theatre from quite early on. **Spinoza eventually attained a high level of Latinity (if not quite up to the expert level of Van den Enden, or his later friends, Lodewijk Meyer and Johannes Bouwmeester, or, for that**

matter, Descartes) and undeniably showed a life-long keen interest in aspects of Roman literature, especially drama and history.
…

Since nothing in Van den Enden's thought and writing foreshadows Spinoza's own emergence as a radical Cartesian, scientist, or Bible critic, and he apparently penned nothing of a radical character before the early 1660s, aside from elevating his Latin, this leaves two main respects in which the pre-1660 Van den Enden undoubtedly contributed to shaping Spinoza's distinctive outlook. These were his particular style of teaching and their common deep affection for the Roman classics including Seneca and ancient Stoicism. **Spinoza both appreciated and criticized ancient Stoicism and, in those key areas where he already by 1658 diverged from mainstream Cartesianism such as his determinism, one substance doctrine, and equation of God and Nature, Spinoza's emerging stance does seem in certain respects like a fusion of Cartesianism with ancient Stoicism.**28 Contemporaries often exaggerated this seeming link to Stoicism. "No egg more resembles another than does Spinoza's system that of the Stoics," averred one Dutch scholar in 1690, restating here not just the view of Bayle but also that of Van Til, Jacques Bernard, Leibniz, Buddeus and many another.29

One modern scholar has gone so far as to claim that the "central doctrines and the connections between them" in Spinoza's *Ethics* "constitute […] a reworking of Stoicism."30 This is assuredly overstating the case. Apart from anything else, Spinoza always rejected the teleological conception of divine providence central to Stoicism and has a rather different and narrower conception of virtue.31 **Still, the young Spinoza was familiar with strands of ancient Stoicism, in particular Seneca, and some affinities *are* striking.** Glazemaker's translation of Seneca's *Moral Letters to Lucilius* published in two volumes, in 1654 and 1671,32 was among the astoundingly few works in Dutch found in Spinoza's personal library at the time of his death. Although Colerus, Van Til, Goeree, and other sources, like Steno, identify Van den Enden as the chief source of the "atheistic" tendency which to them was the prime feature of Spinoza's thought, it seems probable that, **while introducing Spinoza to the world of classical humanism, the Dutch art scene, the Roman historians and tragedians, and elevating his Latin to a proficient level,** as regards identifying God with Nature, Van den Enden at most did no more than chime in with an anti-Scripturalism and denial of divine providence and immortality of the soul, by the late 1650s already firmly anchored in Spinoza's outlook, as the Inquisition evidence of 1658, discussed further on, confirms.
…

When Spinoza first met him, possibly as early as the late 1640s, Van den Enden had no discernible interest in, or connection with Cartesians or scientists, and no particular involvement with philosophy. He had not yet become remotely the democratic republican he became later. **He was though, like Antonio Pérez, someone with exceptional knowledge of political propaganda, secret diplomacy and court intrigue, as well as the power-seeking of Jesuits and other religious orders, which must have added to the reasons why Spinoza, in later years, liked to think destiny had afforded him rare insight into the mechanics of power and politics behind the scenes that other political theorists lacked.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT93#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Undoubtedly, **[Spinoza's] unusual, complex family history,** and the activities of Duarte Fernandes, Abraham d'Espinoza, and his grandfather, Henrique Garces, **were a factor in what would otherwise seem an improbable, even incomprehensible, tendency for Spinoza to assume, in his political writings, that he possessed some special awareness of the hidden mechanics of social and political power, access to the inner practicalities and secrets that other political theorists lacked.** Knowing the "Baruch" after whom he was named and, still more, Duarte, together with the latter's seven sons and other family members, were deeply immersed in conspiracy and secret international dealings which they mingled with commerce, family affairs, and religious alliance was assuredly an element in his believing he possessed unique insight, some exceptional ability to penetrate the behind-the-scenes hidden workings of influence and power which would otherwise seem bizarre, pretentious, and inexplicable.

…

He opened his soon highly successful school on the Singel, the canal marking the boundary edge of medieval Amsterdam but now at the heart of the seventeenth-century city, just a short walk from Spinoza's house. Opening in 1652 or the next year, assisted by his two daughters, now in their teens – **who had themselves received what, at the time, for girls, was an exceptionally thorough classical education** – Van den Enden's Latin school on the Singel quickly won renown, proving attractive especially to wealthy parents pertaining to churches other than the Reformed and hence reluctant to entrust their sons to the official civic Latin School where sternly Calvinist attitudes prevailed.
…

It is perfectly plausible that what most impressed Spinoza, apart from Van den Enden's literary skills and mastery of the classics, was not any freethinking leanings but simply the astounding mix of confessions represented in his school which was highly unusual and its lack of attachment to any particular confession. Although sons of Calvinists also attended, Van den Enden's school brought its few staff, including the young Spinoza, into daily contact with a unique array of sons of dissenting Arminians, strict Mennonites, liberal Mennonites, Collegiants, and sons of leading members of the Lutheran congregation, notes Colerus, and Catholics besides.50
…

There is nothing surprising about Spinoza's acquiring a budding interest in Cartesianism, in the mid-1650s, **but there is some question as to who or what prompted him to reach the impressively high level of expertise in Cartesianism linked to mathematics and optics that we know he had achieved by the late 1650s.** Since this was clearly not Van den Enden or his school, we should consider the testimony of the Danish anatomist, geologist, and churchman Niels Stensen, or Steno as he was usually known, a close associate and friend of Spinoza during the period of 1660-3. **According to his testimony to the Congregation of the Faith in Rome, in September 1677, a few months after Spinoza's death, Spinoza's rejection of the idea of a benign creator of the world and of divine providence stemmed from two distinct and quite separate factors in his early development: interaction with Van den Enden on the one hand,**56 **and, secondly, immersion, owing to other influences, in the philosophy of Descartes, in optics and in science generally.**57 **This way of expressing the point deserves close attention: Steno regarded Van den Enden and Cartesianism as two essentially distinct albeit partly simultaneous influences on Spinoza.**
…

When he first got to know him in the early 1660s, Steno reported later, in 1677, Spinoza had given up Talmudic and rabbinic studies with which he had occupied himself for some years, **impelled by two distinct factors** – the intervention of a "certain Van Enden suspected of atheism" and, secondly, "reading the philosophy of Descartes."64
…

Still, even if we accept that rather than Van den Enden, others such as Hudde, Glazemaker, and De Bie, enthusiasts steeped in optics and mathematics, prompted and spurred Spinoza's plunging into Cartesianism, mathematics, and optics, including microscope-making, in the mid- and late 1650s Van den Enden undoubtedly eventually emerged among the most notorious and prominent of the group that evolved later into the *cercle Spinoziste*, **and played a leading role in Spinoza's encounter with Stoicism and other ancient philosophy, and especially in encouraging his blanket repudiation of religious authority and perhaps in tying this rejection to democratic republicanism, the defining characteristic of the nascent Radical Enlightenment.**77

8.iv Learning from the Roman Playwrights Terence and Seneca

Among the innovative aspects of Van den Enden's teaching particularly relevant to Spinoza's further development was a didactic methods that proved highly successful with the parents and public as well as his students – his practice of getting his pupils to stage plays in Latin. Using ancient Roman plays in the original language had long been a technique of Renaissance era teachers but was not, or was no longer, the norm in the Republic. The first recorded performance staged by Van den Enden and his students, a representation of the "destruction of Troy" based on Virgil, took place in February 1654 during celebrations surrounding the marriage of an Amsterdam burgomaster's daughter, Cornelia van Vlooswijck. In 1657, Van den Enden's school, then at the peak of its success, received permission to stage two plays of Terence at the Amsterdam civic theatre and the drama *Philedonius* written by Van den Enden himself. The highpoint of Van den Enden's didactic career and impact on Amsterdam's cultural life was his students' performances at the main Amsterdam civic theatre, or [*Stads*]*schouwburg*, of Terence's *Andria*, on 16 and 17 January 1657, his *Eunuchus*, on 21 and 22 May 1658, and the *Trojan Women* [Troades] of Seneca, on 28 and 29 May 1658.78

The plays of Terence, of Publius Terentius Afer (*c.* 185-*c.* 159 BC), a writer of North African Berber extraction brought to Rome originally as a slave, but, due to exceptional gifts, given a solid Latin and Greek education by his owner and eventually freed, and those of the Stoic philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca (d. AD 65), were particularly prized for teaching purposes. The moral lessons and maxims of Terence and Seneca Spinoza certainly never forgot. He appears indeed to have taken part in these performances, or else helped prepare pupils to perform them, because philological analysis of the *TTP* and his other works reflects his being steeped in Terence and Seneca, no doubt as a consequence of his years as Van den Enden's protégé. *Eunuchus*, in particular, **a play abounding in subversive humorous comment on human error and delusion, by a slave,** seems to have appealed to Spinoza.79 The relevant hints in Spinoza's mature prose were first noted in a philological study of Spinoza's writing undertaken in the years 1900-15 by Jan Hendrik Leopold (1865-1925), among the foremost Dutch poets since Vondel and an accomplished classicist **much preoccupied with Stoic and Epicurean influences in Dutch culture.**80 His study was continued

later by Omero Proietti and Foppe Akkerman. Unattributed quotes and phrases borrowed from Terence, they showed, pervade Spinoza's writing, proving that phrases derived from Terence lingered in Spinoza's recollection, almost word for word, for the rest of his life.

Given that no direct confirmation of Spinoza's links to Van den Enden are found in his writings, repeated use of phrases from Terence's and Seneca's plays constitutes the most concrete evidence of creative interaction with Van den Enden beyond mere study of Latin grammar.81
…

Although Seneca too remained a living force in Spinoza's mind, most echoes from his time at Van den Enden's school derive from Terence's plays, especially *Andrea* and the *Eunuchus*, Terence's Latin being clearly the favourite source of rhetorical inspiration for Spinoza while composing the *TTP*, the *Ethics*, and the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus*. Indeed, it is likely that Spinoza actually acted the principal role, the wise slave Parmeno, in *Eunuchus*, on stage, since the largest number of Terence-borrowings in his later writing derive from that particular role.83 **Both his plays and Terence himself clearly afforded the Roman world an unforgettable demonstration of the power of education to emancipate and elevate the enslaved that left an indelible mark on Spinoza.** Leopold and Proietti also argued that Spinoza must have kept up his reading of Terence's Latin during his later years, from the late 1660s onwards.

Seneca, the other Roman playwright whose plays Van den Enden principally used as teaching tools, was an author whose tragedies (in the Basle edition of 1541) still figures in Spinoza's library at the time of his death. Proietti notes that Spinoza's earliest work, the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* with its key autobiographical passages, echoes several phrases from Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*. In Spinoza's mature works, borrowings from Seneca occur less often than those from Terence, but include wording encapsulating one of Spinoza's most characteristic political maxims, notably his use of Seneca's dictum from *The Trojan Women* "violenta imperia nemo continuit diu, moderate durant [violent regimes never survive for long whereas moderate regimes do last]," **a (questionable) maxim echoed twice in the *TTP*, first in the chapter five where Spinoza writes: "however human nature does not allow itself to be absolutely compelled, and as the tragedian Seneca says, no one has maintained a violent regime for long; it is moderate regimes that endure,"**84 and in chapter sixteen where Spinoza repeats: "for no one has maintained a violent government for long, as Seneca says."85 *Trojan Women* is a tragedy about atrocities, sacrilege, and who was responsible, during the devastation of Troy following the eventual fall of the city to Agamemnon and his army.

Van den Enden's own neo-Latin play, *Philedonius*, was performed by his students at the end of 1656 and on 13 and 37 January 1657. It was afterwards published in Amsterdam, in 1657, with a poetic preface by the great Dutch poet Joost van den Vondel (1587-1679). In the recent scholarly literature about Spinoza, scholars disagree concerning this curious play. **Marc Bedjai and Wim Klever claim it seeks, under a mask, to promote a radical philosophical message and even expresses something approaching proto-Spinozism; against this, Proietti, Mertens, and others hold that the play and its chief figure, Philedonius, led by painful experience to contemplate *aeterna* [eternal things], repudiating the love of finite and ephemeral things that had preoccupied his youth, is entirely traditional and unexceptional in content whether from a Christian or Senecan Stoic perspective.** Proietti even suggests it reveals a crypto-Jesuit Catholicizing tendency.
…

Stung by Van den Enden's success at the civic theatre, the Amsterdam Reformed consistory stepped up its opposition. Two weeks before the first performance of Terence's *Andria*, a play about a convoluted love relationship, in January 1657, the Amsterdam Reformed Church council learnt that a "certain Van den Enden, popish schoolmaster here," was preparing to stage a Terence comedy at the Schouwburg performed by his pupils including children of Reformed Church members. "As much as possible should be done," the consistory resolved, "to prevent this," starting with having the Reformed parents spoken to and told "many reasons why they should not allow their children to participate." Due to this intervention, all participants in subsequent performances were offspring of Catholic or non-Reformed Protestant families.
…

All considered, it seems Van den Enden while assuredly Spinoza's mentor in classical studies, rhetoric, and studying the statesmanship and diplomacy of the recent past, was not his mentor in anti-Scripturalism, Cartesianism, or his philosophical conception of God.90 **Where Van den Enden definitely preceded Spinoza, during the early 1660s, was in affixing their post-1660 common rejection of religious authority to democratic republicanism.** In addition, he seems also to have strongly influenced Spinoza's views on pedagogic technique, opposing prevailing patterns of education and redefining what is most beneficial for society in the educational sphere.
…

Van den Enden was already breaking with his Catholic heritage and the Catholic Church to a degree when he established his school, because schools of Catholic complexion in Amsterdam approved by Catholic priests did not teach children belonging to other confessions. The most striking feature of his didactic method, standing in stark contrast to all other schools in the United Provinces, was simply that his school was not attached to, nor endorsed by, any confession whatsoever. It accepted boys from all backgrounds, Reformed, Catholic, Lutheran, Collegiant. Not being subject to any particular religious authority, **his school's de-confessionalizing tendency reflected Van den Enden's growing antipathy to confessional and ethnic distinctions. Children, according to his educational doctrine, should be treated as a group all equal in importance, much as he later regarded *evengelijkheid*, equality of status, as the key principle in political theory.** Where children are too young to grasp the purpose of the Republic's laws intellectually they should be imbued with respect for rules based on equality and freedom via ceremonies and their school's veneration of them.
…

Though a teacher of Latin first and foremost, paradoxically, Van den Enden thought Latin should generally be replaced by the vernacular for most higher education purposes so as to render education inclusive rather than an area reserved for elites. In contrast to universal practice in the universities, teaching should be in vernacular "so that all and everyone of the citizens can freely hear and obtain access to it."95 He recommended also that the local vernacular should be everywhere supplemented by teaching boys and girls a second modern language, an internationally agreed modern language capable of replacing Latin as the new universal language (suggesting French for this role) linking nations and peoples.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA57&printsec=frontcover

The thesis that Spinoza was lured from Jewish orthodoxy by De Prado become still more unlikely **when we consider Spinoza's sole surviving autobiographical passage at the start of his first extant text,** his treatise on the *Emendation of the Intellect* composed in Amsterdam shortly after his expulsion. Thanks to Mignini's and Van de Ven's research, Spinoza, it is now accepted, composed this, his earliest surviving work, the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* [*TIE*] (probably including the relevant remarkable autobiographical passage), no later than 1659, and probably several years earlier.17
…

"After experience had taught me that all things that regularly occur in everyday life are empty and futile," Spinoza recalls in this passage, echoing Seneca's sentiments in his *Letters to Lucilius*, about the difficulty of a philosopher's life, "and I realized that all things which were the cause or object of my fear had nothing which is intrinsically good or bad in them, except insofar as the mind is moved by them, **I decided at last to try to discover whether there is anything that is the true good, discernible as such in itself and by which alone the mind is affected when everything else is stripped away.**"20 Later in life, Spinoza expressly acknowledged that when young, and understanding things only in a more partial and fragmentary way, he had been too ready to reject contemptuously that part of himself drawn to honours and wealth and "not in keeping with a philosophical attitude of mind," the things that formerly seemed "to me *vana*, *inordinata*, *absurda* [vain, disordered and absurd]".21
…

Clearly, Spinoza's "highest good" in the 1650s was very much a personal exploration and not yet his quest for the "common good" of the later 1660s which was as much a political and social as individual preoccupation. Originally, his restless quest was essentially for individual personal salvation. The undoubted echoings of the Stoic philosopher Seneca here is often taken as grounds for dismissing this lengthy, unusually personal-sounding passage as something purely rhetorical, something essentially marginal to Spinoza's biography, being reminiscent of Augustine's *Confessions* and Descartes' *Meditations* encased in Cicero and Seneca.23 But that is hardly plausible. Accepting this thesis that this passage amounts to nothing more than autobiographically irrelevant Seneca-style rhetoric, as tend to do those defending the Révah (and Popkin) thesis of a sudden change in Spinoza's outlook only shortly before the 1656 drama, means directly contradicting Spinoza's claim that "often I attempted to do so [break away from the established pattern of my life] but always in vain," a conclusion which scarcely seems justified. **No matter how captivated Spinoza was, in the late 1650s, with Latin studies, and drawn to Seneca especially – and his taste for Seneca does represent a notable feature of his biography – rhetorical effect directly contrary to the actual facts remained always completely alien to Spinoza's deeply earnest nature.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT563#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **It was not only in the Septuagint, it has to be said, that Spinoza showed little interest, but Greek and Greek studies of whatever sort.** Indeed, a striking feature of his life and library

> is that unlike many or most prominent scholars and thinkers of previous generations since the Renaissance, Spinoza showed relatively little interest even in the philosophy of the Greeks, **his attitude to Plato and Aristotle remaining remarkably dismissive and to Stoics and Epicureans distant and non-committal.**44

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/866/mode/2up?view=theater

The diverse intellectual currents which fed into the Radical Enlightenment ranged from late medieval Averroism to Renaissance naturalism, from early eighteenth-century English Deism and pantheism to Polish and Collegiant Socinianism, from liberal Sephardic Judaism to forms of Cartesianism and the rhetoric of the English Levellers. **But this vast diversity notwithstanding, the only kind of philosophy which could (and can) coherently integrate and hold together such a far-reaching value condominium in the social, moral, and political spheres, as well as in 'philosophy,' was the monist, hylozoic systems of the Radical Enlightenment generally labelled 'Spinozist' in the 'long' eighteenth century,** even though in some cases, such as those of Du Marsais, Meslier, and, perhaps, Toland and Collins, there may possible have been little or no direct derivation.

Only these kinds of systems with their powerful unifying tendency and intellectual cohesion were included by Diderot in the corpus of philosophy which, in his remarks on Helvétius in 1773, he called 'clear, distinct and frank.'10 **Intellectually and ideologically, nothing else could so effectively bind all the elements of the Radical Enlightenment into a cohesive whole and this, as was widely acknowledged at the time, was the reason why so many of the key controversies in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy revolved principally around propositions and constructions originally formulated by Spinoza or Bayle.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA93#v=onepage&q&f=false

Removing miracles and divine providence more comprehensively than Hobbes, Spinoza and his circle stepped beyond ancient and early modern Epicureanism and Averroism by tying the assault on religious authority to political engagement, a combination largely lacking previously, **and adopting Galileo's decidedly non-Epicurean mathematical science as the overriding, exclusive verifying criterion, the sole authority for deciding what is and is not "true," while fusing this with Descartes's revolutionary principle that all physical reality is governed by a single coherent set of physical laws.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/158/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinoza, then, emerged as the supreme philosophical bogeyman of Early Enlightenment Europe. Admittedly, historians have rarely emphasized this. **It has been much more common, and still is, to claim that Spinoza was rarely understood and had very little influence, a typical example of an abiding historiographical refrain which appears to be totally untrue** but nevertheless, since the nineteenth century, has exerted an enduring appeal for all manner of scholars.
…

Fundamental shifts in the mental world of western civilization no doubt originate in vast social forces and a multitude of cultural influences. **But the examples of Erasmus and Calvin remind us how a few wholly outstanding individual minds may, at crucial moments, through their thoughts and writings, lend decisively formative expression to rising impulses across an entire continent. Spinoza, furthermore, appeared on the scene just as the implications of the New Philosophy and the rise of the mechanistic world-view were first becoming widely evident, providing new, exhilarating perspectives inconceivable just a few years before.** Of course, the Naturalist and materialist philosophies of ancient Greece and Rome had persisted in the consciousness of western man in a widely suffused if strongly repressed, furtively cultivated, fashion, perceptible but heavily camouflaged, in the writings and conversation of the *libertins érudits*. **But it was only in the 1650s and 1660s that prospects for reviving and reformulating such notions in conjunction with the mechanistic reasoning of Galileo and Descartes arose. Before then there was little opportunity to promulgate a bold, comprehensive, modern Naturalism,** albeit less owing to official repression, such as the burning of Bruno and Vanini and the condemnation of Galileo, than **because until Galileo's insights had been universalized by Descartes to produce the new rigorously mechanistic world-view, the indispensable conceptual apparatus – mathematical rationality as the sole and exclusive criterion of truth – remained lacking.**

Bayle, then, showed consummate judgment in commencing his seminal article on Spinoza in his *Dictionnaire*, by stressing **that the building-blocks of Spinoza's system were not new, but that he considered Spinoza the first 'qui ait réduit en système l'athéisme, et qui en ait fait un corps de doctrine lié et tissu selon les manières des geometres.'**3

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA155#v=onepage&q&f=false

> The history of atheism was, as one might expect of Buddeus, the logical and parallel story to the history of religious thought. Indeed, he had made the parallels explicit in a book written between his two histories of philosophy, *Theses de atheismo et superstitione* (1717). In this work he argued that atheist ideas had been consistent from the time of the Greeks onwards and are either of a sceptical kind, expressly denying the existence of divinity, or of a dogmatic kind, denying certain attributes of God, such as freedom. These two categories can be further subdivided into four different types that correspond to the four main sects of Greek philosophy: **first the two sceptical forms, Epicureanism and 'Spinozism'** (by which term he meant the eleatics, whose pantheism and monism Spinoza was alleged to have renewed); **and then Aristotelianism and Stoicism, the two kinds of atheistical dogmatism.** All these forms of atheism had followed a clear, traceable path to the present day, but the most influential, and therefore dangerous, in the post-Renaissance world had been 'Spinozism.' The explanation for this success lay not simply in Spinoza's arguments for the identity of God with material substance, but in his attempt to demonstrate this with fashionable rigour, *more geometrico*: **'But Spinoza was the first man who reduced this impiety to a systematic form with the utmost zeal, and fitted the geometric method to it, yet with an unfortunate outcome.'**15

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/142/mode/2up?view=theater

Descartes' dualism suffered from a set of inner contradictions. The spiritual realm seemed to be added on as an afterthought. (Or perhaps he had retained it disingenuously, only to avoid persecution by religious authorities, who would rightly suspect materialism as tending to atheism.)

Spinoza's answer: cut the dualism in half, ditch any notion of immaterial entities, and embrace materialist monism. Spinoza became an even more radical materialist than either Machiavelli or Hobbes.
…

Spinoza scholar Edwin Curley calls Spinoza "arguably the most Machiavellian of the great modern political philosophers."4 **And Spinoza himself praised Machiavelli as "that most farseeing man."**5

Anyone reading Spinoza's most famous work, the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (the *Theologico-Political Treatise*), will also see Hobbes's footprints all over it. **Hobbes's *Leviathan* was immensely influential among the radical circle in Amsterdam of which Spinoza soon became the center.**6

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT965#v=onepage&q&f=false

Spurred no doubt by Descartes' unprecedented success in transforming modern thought and science, Spinoza's plans to reform religion, politics and the world were breathtakingly ambitious.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA409&printsec=frontcover

Not long after Spinoza's move from Rijnsburg to Voorburg, in early August 1663, his friend Simon de Vries arrived at his new lodgings with a packet from Amsterdam, sent by Lodewijk Meyer, containing the printed proofs of Spinoza's pending first published book, his *Renati Des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae Pars I & II*. This was his exposition of Descartes' philosophy, setting out the basic principles of Descartes' system, especially as expounded in the latter's *Principia philosophiae* [Principles of Philosophy], the work Descartes began in 1641 and published in 1644, presenting his natural philosophy as a coherent whole based on his metaphysical claims. Spinoza had reworked these into a new rigorous and concise format, with a simple eloquence that would soon impress readers.

Descartes, Spinoza explains, calls "all things into doubt, not as a skeptic who has no other end than doubting, but to free his mind from prejudices so that finally he might discover the firm and unshakable foundations of the sciences."
…

With Part One, Proposition 14, Spinoza entirely endorses Descartes' un-Baconian contention that, since God is no deceiver, our thoughts about reality must be true wherever we find that "we must necessarily assent" to a proposition expressed and perceived "clearly and distinctly."2
…

"More than anyone else," Steven Nadler rightly affirms, Meyer "was responsible for bringing Spinoza's writings to publication, both while Spinoza lived and after his death with the posthumous publication of his works."6 **If not perhaps *the* chief organizer, Meyer was certainly among the prime orchestrators of "Spinozism" as a body of text and a philosophical underground movement.**
…

Descartes (Figure 14.1) was the first thinker to go beyond Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, in conceiving the entire physical universe, the whole of physical reality, to be governed by a single, overarching and cohering set of fixed natural laws that are everywhere, always applicable, and mathematical in character, **a principle never previously upheld, not even by Galileo, and one to which Spinoza**

would always strongly adhere. This was the solidest (and most un-Baconian) link between Descartes and Spinoza. Descartes was also the first to claim all philosophical, or for that matter any other doctrines must be proved with "clear and distinct" propositions and arguments possessing the same precision as mathematics, or as Spinoza expresses it in his *Principles*, Descartes, having proved God exists, created the world and is no deceiver, could conclude that "mathematical truths, or all things that seem to him most evident, cannot be at all suspect."11
…

One obvious way that Spinoza is here reforming Descartes and Cartesianism is by expounding his principles using the "geometric method" as his main tool of presentation and argument. Throughout his career as a philosopher from the late 1650s until his death, the *ordo geometricus* remained Spinoza's preferred method of ordering and presenting his philosophy. **He clearly thinks that "geometric" style is the aptest way to expound also the essentials of Descartes' philosophy. But Descartes himself had not thought so, which is why Meyer was so anxious that Spinoza should "render in the Synthetic order what Descartes wrote in the Analytic."** Although intensely interested in geometry too, like his adherents in Leiden and Amsterdam, and while occasionally dabbling in using geometric style, generally speaking Descartes had avoided it as it seemed to have no direct application to metaphysical problems and hence many particular issues he sought to research, including how body and mind connect (though he never really got far with this point). Such topics, it seemed to him, require an analytical approach – start with the problem, dissect it into its parts and analyse these to find the causes.17
…

The basic reason why analysis and synthesis on a geometric basis are not complementary for Spinoza, in contrast to the others, when it came to presenting his (and Descartes') philosophy, is that **pure analysis tends to reinforce as well as conceal or leave untouched adjoining and surrounding fallacious and fictitious assumptions, notions, and inferences whereas the chief task of philosophy, for Spinoza, Meyer, and their entire group, was to eradicate the wrong thinking they deemed universally prevalent (including in Bacon and Descartes).** The only safeguard against analysis of problems leading to retention of incorrect assumptions – such as Descartes' doctrine that there are two basic substances – is an unbreakable chain of undeniable inference from clear and certain definitions, hence an overarching geometric method used systematically. Thus, **while analysis is indispensable to extending our knowledge piecemeal, it is *ordo geometricus* alone that enables one to sum up, link the parts together and present the wider picture.** Although *ordo geometricus* was universally in fashion among the Dutch Cartesians of the 1650s and 1660s, including Van Schooten, Hudde, and Christiaan Hyugens, three of the leading figures making Holland briefly the centre of the Europe's mathematical world in the mid-seventeenth century, **Spinoza alone extends the new three-dimensional geometric outlook with its lines, surfaces, planes, motions, and proportions to everything including discussion of God, good and evil, and the human passions.**
…

During the editing process and finalizing the proofs, Spinoza and Meyer collaborated closely. Writing from Voorburg, on 26 July 1663, replying to Meyer's query as to whether he had correctly edited the propositions in a particular section (which he had) Spinoza responds also to his worry about his reference to the "personality" of Christ where, originally, Spinoza wrote "I do not know what the theologians mean by the word 'personality.'" **That the "son of God is the father himself follows very clearly," answers Spinoza,** from his axiom that "two things that converge in agreement with a third thing agree with each other. But this matter is of no importance whatever to me, so if you think this [form of words] can offend some theologians, then do as seems best to you." **While, like most of Spinoza's friends, Meyer too denied Christ's divinity, for reasons of prudence he deleted Spinoza's original expression, substituting vaguer wording only faintly implying that Jesus cannot be the "Son of God":** "it is quite false that God can communicate his eternity to creatures." Since the "Son of God" cannot be a living creature that is born, dies, or is resurrected, he must be "rather, like the father, eternal." **For the first time Spinoza implicitly committed to the printed page what has been aptly termed his "anti-theological Christology."**20
…

Moreover, Spinoza points out [in September 1661] in the same letter [to Oldenburg], to its no doubt astounded recipient, **Descartes separates human will from the intellect and envisages it as free in a way that he, Spinoza, wholly rejects.** Meyer underlines this particular divergence in his preface, pointing out that Spinoza, contrary to Descartes, thinks "the will is not distinct from the intellect." Neither are the passions which sway our wills separate from our intellects, the passions being, for Spinoza, in essence inadequate idea controlling our actions.27 **Undeniably, the strategy Spinoza and Meyer resort to is a distinctly curious, even bizarre for an ambitious young philosopher and his admirers to adopt but also subtle, devious, and effective.** During his final months at Rijnsburg, Spinoza was aligning cautiously with, but simultaneously less obviously distancing himself from, the Dutch Cartesians.
…

Spinoza is hence also stricter (and more un-Baconian) than Descartes in never straying from mathematic reason as "this unshakable foundation of ours" for certain knowledge. **Mathematics becomes, for the first time, the absolute basis of all science and sound knowledge without theology being allowed access at any point.**
…

Spinoza's *Descartes' Principles* played an important part in his emergence as an intellectual force on the contemporary Dutch scene and internationally. **Locke read the book soon after it appeared, he mentions in a notebook he began in 1664, leaving a note to himself to read more of this author's work.**54 **The first time Leibniz ever mentions Spinoza in a surviving letter was in April 1669, when, agreeing with his mentor, Jacob Thomasius, that "the disciple [Clauberg] is clearer than the master [Descartes]," he remarks that none of the principal interpreters of Descartes whom he lists as "Clauberg, De Raey, Spinoza, Clerselier, Heereboord, Tobias Andriae, and Henricus Regius," provide anything but "paraphrases" of Descartes' main ideas,** suggesting that either he had not studied Spinoza's book closely or was going merely by hearsay without having yet examined the book himself.55
…

The Oldenburg correspondence, however, proves conclusively that Spinoza not only rejected all of Descartes' main premises and considered his own standpoint more compelling but, at the same time, remained fearful of presenting his objections to Descartes too directly. When advising Oldenburg that he had composed the book to instruct "a certain young man [Johannes Casearius (1642-77)] to whom I did not want to teach my opinions openly,"82 he virtually admits that the text's purpose was to instil his own ideas covertly, masked as Cartesian ideas. **Had Spinoza referred to his exposition of Descartes as his own brainchild, this would have been tantamount to confessing that he was deliberately undermining Descartes' system in an underhanded fashion and doing so as a preparatory step, hoping to clear the way for his *Ethics*,** the first three parts of which were complete by the summer of 1665 but which, though much more important to himself and his friends, he long hesitated to publish.
…

Still more important, though, stressed Steno, in 1680, three years after Spinoza's death, while residing in Leibniz's proximity in Hanover, this surreptitious design was the work not just of Spinoza but also of Meyer and the entire group around him. In 1680, Steno refers to the *Spinozistas* as a clique who by then had become "many" but already then, at that time, in 1663-4, formed a formidable cell. If in the early 1660s those joining Spinoza in subverting Descartes' system were far fewer than later, **he himself had known several of these individuals quite well and could attest to the deviousness of their long-term design.**87 A deliberate mix of Descartes' philosophy with a partly concealed subversive revision of Descartes' thought, a group strategy devised by Meyer, Balling, Rieuwertsz, and Bouwmeester as well as Spinoza, their undoubted goal was to combine demolishing Aristotelian scholasticism insofar as it survived in the universities with profiting from Cartesianism's recent advances in the Dutch universities to rework Descartes' system sufficiently inconspicuously to carry at least some of the latter's impressively substantial and growing following with them.
…

Unsurprisingly, academics felt a decided reluctance during the next six years, until publication of the *TTP*, to publicize, debate, or contest Spinoza's philosophical approach to Descartes openly. Better to sweep it under the carpet, without making it the point of contention. To that extent Spinoza's strategy proved clever and effective. Only behind the scenes did Spinoza's boldly reforming, irreligious revisions published at this juncture provoke an incipient negative response among some Cartesians as well as among the anti-Cartesian academic fraternity. **Cartesian anxiety to guard and publicly shield Cartesianism's reputation led to avoidance of any open clash over Spinoza's exposition throughout the rest of the 1660s, leaving the door ajar, so to speak, in such fashion that Spinoza can be said to have won the opening round in his assault on the religious and intellectual status quo by default, leaving him and his following strengthened and and empowered to carry the process further.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/210/mode/2up?view=theater

Nothing is more pernicious than Spinoza's Bible criticism, held Maresius**, insisting that its principles are derived directly from Cartesianism, albeit spiced with Machiavelli and Hobbes.**99 Van Andlo and his friends disclaim responsibility, but was it not they who first began the campaign for 'freedom to philosophize,' arrogantly disregarding the strictures of the academic senates and guidelines fixed by the provincial States, with the consequence that there was not such excessive 'freedom to philosophize' that the very foundations of authority and orthodoxy were daily crumbling?100
…

Maresius depicts the intellectual predicament of the Reformed Church and universities in the direst terms. **Academic life in the Netherlands, he held, was seething with detestable 'doctrines unheard of hitherto until today,'** and saturated with libertinism and 'indifferentism,' which had surged up with unprecedented force since the advent of Cartesianism in the middle of the century. …

Spinoza was leading the attack. **But it was, held Maresius, Cartesianism which had sapped the Church's defences and opened the gates,** enabling Spinoza to mount so appalling a threat. Moreover, even now, with the danger clearly manifest, the Cartesians continued to erode the authority of Holy Writ instead of springing to its defence. God, affirms the sacred text, commanded the sun and the moon to stand still in the sky so that Joshua could finish the battle. **'You maintain,' he admonished his opponents, that this passage of Scripture conflicts with 'your clear and distinct philosophical concepts' and is not to be believed literally.** But how will your 'philosophy' save you when the writer of the *Philosophia* resumes his wicked campaign, invoking Descartes' principles against the core mysteries of the Christian faith?106

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/30/mode/2up?view=theater

While the pro-Cartesian Cocceian faction of the Reformed Church blamed the intellectual crisis on the perversion of Cartesianism by 'bastard Cartesians' and 'Spinozists,' Reformed theologians of the hard-line Calvinist 'Voetian' mould, as well as many dissenting and Catholic clergy, tended to attribute the whole of what they saw as a social catastrophe to Cartesianism itself. **It was due to Descartes, as the Reformed preacher Jacobus Koelman expressed it in 1692, that Holland was now rife with a 'dreadful mass' of 'atheists, libertines, New Sadducees, Hobbists, mockers and the like'; for all of them were intellectually nurtured on Cartesianism, including 'den Cartesiaan Spinosa, ook Coerbach'** [the Cartesian Spinoza, and also Koerbagh].71

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/486/mode/2up?view=theater

Then, in the late 1680s, [Huet] went further, publicly attacking the Cartesians, provoking a storm at Caen, and publishing his *Censura philosophiae Cartesianae* (1689) and *De Concordia Rationis et Fidei* (1690), **vehemently anti-Cartesian works which delighted the Jesuits but greatly disturbed Bossuet, denouncing 'geometrical' reason, the reason of Descartes and Spinoza, as entirely illusory, a broken reed.**70 'Their imagined eternal truths,' he held, 'are really pure abstractions lacking all reality.'71 What does a line which has no width, or a perfect circle, have to do, he demanded, with the real world? **Once himself a Cartesian, Huet had become the leading French philosophical anti-rationalist, sceptic, and fideist.**72

Huet fought to establish a new relationship between reason and faith, defining true reason as that of philology and 'solid erudition,' not the shadowy, empty reason of Descartes. The root cause of the spiritual malaise gripping France, the 'sickness' of the age he calls it, was, according to his diagnosis, the insidious and growing tendency to subordinate Revelation to reason, an impulse deriving from Descartes and culminating in 'Benedictus Spinoza, author of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* … that horrible and sacrilegious book full of impiety, ignorance and madness.'73 **Cartesian 'reason,' he urges, leads directly and inevitably to the triumph of Spinoza and therefore the ruin of everything. For Descartes' methodology of 'clear and distinct' ideas replaces all authority, as well as reason based on 'true erudition,' with a mathematical logic which destroys everything accepted in the past, effectively licensing everyone to follow Spinoza's path.**
…

Spinoza's unequalled malignancy Lamy ascribes (like Bayle) to his ability to weld it all into a 'nouveau système,' **thereby imparting to old errors 'un tour de nouveauté et un certain air d'enchaînement qui diminue beaucoup l'horreur que la nature même y a attaché.'**89 **No one else had successfully integrated the mass of absurd 'extravagances' found in the works of others 'sans ordre, sans méthode, sans suite, et d'une manière disloquée, *tanquam scopiae dissolutae*,' into a coherent 'corps de doctrine et un système suivi, comme a fait Spinosa.'**90 Consequently, absurdities which would have had little impact singly radiate a fatal attraction on corrupt, presumptious libertines who 'se picquent de force d'esprit' when seemingly forged into a coherent and cogent whole by Spinoza, **cunningly mingled, to lend plausibility, with 'des principes incontestables.'**91 Lamy's objective is to blast Spinoza but also, and no less important, to rescue Cartesianism from the suspicion of having given birth to Spinozism.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/62/mode/2up?view=theater

In France, it was the celebrated court preacher Father Jean-Baptiste Massillon who first sounded the alarm regarding the progress of philosophy among the aristocracy, in a series of sermons against 'incredulity' beginning in 1699.22 **In a later sermon, delivered in 1704, also in the royal chapel at Versailles, with some of those he was criticizing sitting before him,** he interprets this sudden

aristocratic thirst for philosophy, much like Weber, as a form of rebellion against religion and the Church. He denounces it as an arrogant bid for personal independence, a device for quieting uneasy consciences with a veneer of high-sounding verbiage to camouflage profligacy and lust.
…

Massillon distinguishes two distinct strains of New Philosophy invading the courtly world of Paris and Versailles. Both are corrupting and based on 'raison orgueilleuse.' **But the philosophy of the Cartesians and providential deists who postulate 'un Dieu oisif, retiré en lui-même … ne daignant pas à s'abaisser à regarder ce qui passé sur la terre,' and virtually indifferent to the men he has created,**27 **while harmful, is yet not so fatal as the more radical tendency, championed by hardened *esprits forts*, defined, according to Massillon, by advocacy of an 'enchaînement fatal d'événements,' a God lacking both freedom and power.** It is these new philosophical *incrédules* who deny divine Providence and believe in nothing except what is demonstrated by mathematical reason, in other words, Spinoza's followers, who threaten mankind with moral, religious, and social annihilation.28

Avoiding direct engagement with the Cartesians, Massillon alludes to them, and all other modern mechanists except Spinoza, only indirectly, citing ancient Greek thinkers as surrogates for those he says are again disseminating the 'vains préceptes de la philosophie.' **By identifying Spinoza alone among modern philosophers spreading dangerous ideas by name, Massillon emphasizes his unparalleled centrality in the rise of French incredulity.** What an amazing phenomenon it is, he stresses, that Spinoza a foreigner of obscure and low birth, should be apotheosized in France into a modern philosophical 'saint' in the imaginations of libertine courtiers and aristocrats, ladies as well as men, a model upon which to base not just their thoughts but their very lives. **Spinoza has indeed, he laments, become the universal 'saint' of the *esprit forts*.**29

http://ia804508.us.archive.org/28/items/remarksuponmrsam12caro/remarksuponmrsam12caro.pdf

***Descartes* and his Followers have asserted, and *Mathematically proved*, That the *Essence* of *Matter* consists in *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Depth*. That no extended Substance can think, nor any thinking Substance be extended.** That Extension and Thinking are Attributes of two Substances, *Originally* and *Eternally*, different and distinct the one from the other. ***Spinoza*, who would have in all but one single Substance, runs Counter to his *Master*, and asserts, That these Two Attributes, to wit, Thinking and Extension, are but Two different Modifications of one and the same Substance.** Hence it is, that he blames *Descartes*, for making the Essence of Matter to consist in Extension alone.
…

And though Mr. *L*. takes it as a Commendation of himself to the World, to be the Scholar of so great a *Master* as *Descartes*, *and must always acknowledge to that justly Admired Gentleman, the great Obligation of his first Deliverance from the unintelligible Way of Talking of the Schools in his time*, L. 1. B. W. p. 103. yet he joyns with *Spinoza* to oppose *Descartes*, when his Doctrine destroys the Hypothesis of One Substance.
…

Mr. *L*. having borrowed his Notion of the *Identity* of the same *Man* from *Spinoza*, does not allow of a permanent Substance in Man, which may receive, and constantly retain an *Original Innate Idea of God*; **consequently he wrote the First Book of his Essay, in order to prove, that we have no *Innate Ideas*, especially of *God*. The *Cartesians* have *demonstrated* that we have.** In the famous *Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of his Essay*, wherein Mr. *L*. after *Spinoza*, **has established the Existence of *Eternal Thinking Matter*, and given the *Holy Name* of *God*, to that *Chimaera*,** he has these Words, *How far the Idea of a most Perfect Being, which a Man may frame in his own Mind, does, or does not prove the Existence of God, I will not here examine*, Ibid. S. 7. **And this, even this, under pretence of *Zeal* for spreading the Knowledge of the Existence of God.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/482/mode/2up?view=theater

Implacably opposed to Andala, Johannes Regius (1656-1738), originally also a Reformed preacher, was selected for a chair in theology at Franeker in 1685. He taught at the university for over half a century (1685-1738), disagreeing with his antagonist about practically everything except that the four-cornered philosophical strife between Cartesianism, empiricism, Leibnizian-Wolffianism, and Spinozism was a crisis of ideas in religion, morality, politics, and society, as well as scholarship and science, of unparalleled gravity.39 **In 1714 he emerged in the public sphere as a fervent advocate of the new empiricism, in a work published in the vernacular at Rotterdam. The long and catastrophic ascendancy of Cartesianism in Dutch intellectual life, he complains, had advanced so far that no one who was not a Cartesian was thought to have any merit or ability and those who, like himself, dared to oppose the prevailing tendency were mocked as ignoramuses.** Yet if Cartesianism is 'so clear, sure and such a well-lit entrance to truth,' he declaimed, 'is it not amazing that

thinkers such as Spinoza, Malebranche, Poiret, the writer of the *Betoverde Weereld* [Bekker] and another well known to us [Leenhof], great exponents and advocates of this philosophy, should have lapsed into such vile and grotesque errors?'40
…

'We know,' he avers, 'that Spinoza developed his philosophy with greater consistency from his premises and principles than Descartes; for it is easy to improve what another found first and repair its defects.'42 Spinoza, furthermore, **'is less cautious than Descartes and says straight out, uninhibitedly, what Descartes, owing to circumstances and his desire to pass for a Christian, neither wished, nor dared, to say.'**43
…

The climax came in 1718-19 when Regius asserted that only empiricism can save religion, and smash the Spinozist threat, in two hard-hitting Latin treatises, in the title of the first, *De Cartesio Spinozae praelucente* (1718) styling Descartes the precursor and herald of Spinozism. Unshaken by the ensuing storm of protest, **he followed this up with his *Cartesius verus Spinozismi Architectus* (Descartes the true Architect of Spinozism, 1719), in which he claims all the most damaging and pernicious intellectual trends of recent decades stemmed from Cartesianism:** 'Van Hattem who poisoned much of Zeeland with his venom was a Cartesian; Bekker revered Descartes; and what was Geulincx if not a Cartesian?'44 'And what of De Volder? … Even if unable wholly to absolve himself of Spinozism,' he publicly paraded as a Cartesian, **while Leenhof, undeniably Spinozist, for decades professed Cartesianism.** Voetius, Spanheim, Hoornbeek, Mastricht, Leydekker, and his own teacher De Vries, he reminded readers, unanimously 'judged this philosophy a mound of all evil, containing the seeds of every grave error.'45
…

Furthermore, held Regius, the blasphemous Spinozistic proposition that God acts only necessarily, and not out of His free will, is also inherent in Cartesianism. For Descartes affirms God is the First Cause and Prime Mover, and that the world functions only in accordance with *regulas necessarias* (necessary laws).50 **Since these necessary laws derive from the First Cause, and are innate in God's perfection, it follows that when God acts He acts necessarily in accordance with those *regulas* 'because he cannot act contrary to His own nature and perfection.'**51
…

In fact Descartes generates a fog of confusion around the mind-body nexus which, on his premises, **can only be resolved by Spinoza's simple but pernicious expedient of reducing mind and body to one and the same substance.**52 **The truth is, concludes Regius scornfully, Descartes' rickety system finds its fullest and only consistent realization in Spinoza;** and this the Cartesians offer mankind as philosophy 'safe, unique, true, most useful and necessary for the salvation of religion!'53

https://archive.org/details/pretendeddifficu00gurd/page/224/mode/2up?view=theater

> **THE singular Notion which *Des Cartes* advanced concerning Brutes, That all their Actions, tho' some of them looked like an Effect of Thinking, were yet nothing but the Movements of a Machine; and the Success this Opinion met with in the World,** did probably give our present *Atheist* the Hardiness of affirming, That all Kind of Thought was nothing but Motion in a proper Structure of the Parts of Body.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/52/mode/2up?view=theater

The precise implications of Descartes' two substances might be debatable but Cartesianism, argues Benedetti, plainly generates radical offshoots which, as everyone sees, destroy faith, tradition, and morality. Noting that the anonymous writer (Lodewijk Meyer) of the *Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres*, a work which had caused great scandal in the north, expressly invokes Descartes and derives his venomous principles from the latter's philosophy,177 Benedetti adduced as the clearest proof that Cartesianism produces atheistic and Naturalistic ideas the intellectual genesis of Spinoza himself: **does not the anonymous author (Jarig Jelles) of the preface to Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma* insist that in his youth Spinoza steeped himself in Descartes?** Benedetti also cites Bayle's article on Spinoza to prove that Spinoza's doctrine that God is equivalent to the unalterable laws of nature derives directly from the mechanistic categories introduced by Descartes.
…

Genovesi praises Descartes for demolishing scholasticism, using 'doubt' as an instrument of enquiry to overcome scepticism, **and introducing 'freedom to philosophize';** and agrees that the human soul is *substantia incorporea*, totally distinct from matter.185 But, like Vico and Doria, he also finds Cartesianism seriously flawed, solid insights fatally laced with error, leading ultimately to 'fanaticism' and the overthrow of Christian truth:186 **after all, out of Cartesianism, he concluded scathingly, emerged 'Bekkerianismus et Spinozismus.'**187

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/672/mode/2up?view=theater

Spinelli proclaimed Descartes' doctrine of two substances to be fundamentally at odds with Spinoza's one-substance metaphysics: thus **'what Spinoza lays down as the basis of his sect, Renato entirely rejects as a chimaera.'**46 Doria countered by emphasizing the weakness of Descartes' conception of the Creation in time and space in the Sixth Meditation and elsewhere.47 While Descartes was doubtless a loyal Catholic, his account of the Creation is so incoherent that **'following Renato's doctrine we ought not to believe in the Creation in time, and from nothing, because he urges us to consider nothing true if we lack a clear and distinct idea of it.'**48 **Worse still, Descartes' account of Creation, like his muddled concept of substance, invites the Spinozist endeavour which feeds on the defects of Cartesianism** to 'demonstrate that Creation in time, and from nothing, by God is impossible.'49

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/758/mode/2up?view=theater

Having warmly welcomed the first edition of Voltaire's work on Newton, the Jesuits were even more positive in their reception of the second edition of June 1744. All the considerable advantages of Voltaire's 'Newtonian' Enlightenment, from a Jesuit standpoint, were pointedly noted on that occasion: **Newton, held Voltaire's new Jesuit allies, reinforces the liberty of God and the freedom of will in man given by God; whereas the pernicious Cartesian system, as Voltaire stressed, is 'la source de celui de Spinoza.'**

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/848/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The long and highly contentious article 'Aristotélisme,' a piece largely drawn from Bayle, Boureau-Deslandes, and Brucker which was fiercely attacked by Berthier,31 d'Alembert privately admitted had purposely been designed to antagonize and ridicule the Jesuits.32 **Among other provocative strategies, the anonymous authors, probably Yvon, Diderot, and d'Alembert together, focus unduly on Strato.** Certainly they assert that it was ridiculous for Strato to contend that a nature that feels and knows nothing should nevertheless invariably conform to eternal laws but the way it does so, rhetorically asking whether anyone can conceive that nature's eternal laws were not established by 'une cause intelligente,' prompted suggestion that the real aim here was precisely to implant such a conception in the reader's mind. **Claiming it was Strato's system which Spinoza renewed in modern times, the authors point out that the only significant difference between the systems of Strato and Spinoza is the one-substance doctrine which, they say, Spinoza borrowed from Xenophanes, Melissus, and Parmenides.**33

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/51/mode/2up?view=theater

The philosophy of Spinoza, the third son of René Descartes, as presented in his main work the *Ethics*, is just as distant from the materialism of his brother Locke as from the idealism of his brother Leibniz. Spinoza does not struggle analytically with the question of the ultimate sources of our knowledge. He gives us his great synthesis, his explanation of the divinity.

Benedict Spinoza teaches: there is only one substance; this is God. All finite substances derive from it, are contained in it, appear in it, and disappear in it; they have only a relative, passing, accidental existence. The absolute substance reveals itself to us both in the form of infinite thought and in the form of infinite extension. Infinite thought and infinite extension together are the two attributes of the absolute substance. **We can know only these two attributes; however, God, the absolute substance, has perhaps still others of which we do not know. "Non dico me deum omnino cognoscere, sed me quaedam ejus attributa, non autem omnia, neque maximam intelligere partem."**84

Only malice or lack of judgment could describe this teaching as "atheistic." No one has ever expressed himself more sublimely about the divinity than Spinoza. **Instead of saying that he denies God, one could say that he denies the human.** For him, all finite things are only modes of the infinite substance. All finite things are contained in God. The human soul is only a light ray of infinite thought, and the human body is only an atom of infinite extension. God is the infinite cause of both, of souls and bodies, *natura naturans*.85

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n55/mode/2up?view=theater

His philosophical fame (which, however, only became world-wide a century after his death) rests on his *Theologico-Political Treatise* (*Tractatus theologico-politicus*), the first great attempt at a historical criticism of the Bible, and on his *Ethics*, in which his system is exhaustively set forth. **Incidentally, no book ever merited its title less than this.** ...

In his Psychology Spinoza makes *appetitus*, the striving for self-preservation, the basic force in human nature. That which assists in this striving we call good; that which handicaps it, evil. **We do not desire things because they are good, but we call them good because we desire them (thus ignoring the fact that all the higher religions,**

and particularly Christianity, have invariably seen the principle of Evil in desire and the sense-world that is the object of desire). All emotions may be divided into two basic forms, active and passive; the first of these are accompanied by pleasure or joy, the second by pain or grief. Under this classification sympathy belongs to the harmful emotions, because it causes pain; therefore, although we should help those who suffer, it should be done without personal concern and as the result of reasonable judgment. It is the same with repentance; for to the bad deeds, which are in themselves a misfortune, it adds the pain of contrition. **Similar non-moral principles are laid down by Spinoza in respect of politics. He says, for instance: "A treaty between nations exists as long as the cause for it exists; fear of shame or hope of gain."** But the soul reaches its highest peak in the *amor Dei intellectualis*, the intellectual love of God, which is nothing else but knowledge of the infinite substance—something remote indeed from the love of God as commonly conceived. And since every man is but a portion of the God-nature, God in this love loves himself.

We make bold to declare that the system, of which the foregoing is only an aphoristic sketch, is the work of a diseased mind of marvellous acuteness. Cartesian rationalism was tolerable by reason of its inconsequence; but Spinoza thinks out each idea with such inexorable logic as to annul it; the idea of God ending in naked atheism; the idea of causality in dead automatism; the difference between mind and body in the assertion that there is no relation whatever between them; the desirability of controlling the emotions in the postulate of insensibility; pantheism—the identity of God with Nature—in a hopeless naturalism which completely despiritualizes the world and makes it a ghastly spectral waste. **In short, his abnormally consequent thinking abolishes the objects of this thinking, destroys them, disintegrates them, thinks them out of existence.** What is left as "ultimate truth" is an empty equation made up of a God who is a nothing and a world which is less than a nothing.

It is usual to class Spinoza's system among the pantheistic system, but this is misleading. Pantheism is based, it is true, on the equation of God and the world, and in so far the classification is justifiable. But it must be remembered that the *Deus* whom Spinoza identifies with *natura* is no god, but a blind dead nullity, an impotent mathematical figure, such as the sign or the number 0. **Irremediable confusion has resulted from aligning the Spinozistic pantheism with that of Mysticism, for the latter arrives at its principle of universal Godhead, not by formulation of logical conclusions, but by religious experience;** and if likewise it reaches a vision of God as infinite, intangible, indefinable Substance, it does so out of deepest reverence and loftiest faith and not out of nihilism and mathematical obsessions. In other words, the mystic arrives at his conception of God through pious agnosticism; he is so filled with the greatness of God that it vanishes beyond his ken, whereas the Spinozist, on the contrary (if indeed there has ever been a genuine one except Spinoza himself) arrives at a similar result through self-glorified rationalism: **he is so absorbed in his own greatness and the infallibility of the operations of his thoughts that the Godhead vanishes from his ken also, dissolved in sheer logical concepts.**

The monstrousness of this system (which at the same time constitutes its incomparable originality) becomes perfectly clear if we consider that it is the only one which has been able to get through without a single trace of teleology. It goes without saying that all spiritualistic philosophers have placed the conception of a purpose in the forefront of their systems. But those of the opposite tendency also have been unable to dispense with it. **Not the sturdiest materialism, not the airiest scepticism, before or after Spinoza, has dared to maintain that cosmic causality unwinds itself in the same volitionless and intentionless fashion as a sorites.** Many have been the attempts to operate with blind forces, unconscious impulses of the will, and unintelligent instincts. But all these powers pursue, whether they know it or not, a definite aim. Even if we imagine the world as built up of nothing but just stupid atoms, they too want something or other, in virtue of a certain dull directionalism which determines their order and movement. Darwinism itself, which is regarded as the most forcible antithesis of all metaphysical attempts to explain the universe, is in fact a superlative teleological system, in that it makes the concept of evolution its cardinal principle. Monism again, its derivative, which boasted of having dethroned the theological view of the universe for ever, is diligently exerting itself to prove a supreme final rightness in all natural phenomena. And the most extravagant of pessimists still believes in *evil* purposes and admits of at least *one* purpose in the world's happenings: namely, its ruin; just as the most complete atheist accepts a world which, though godless, obeys definite intentions, and the most extreme phenomenalist the illusion of such a world. **But a world in which one thing follows from another in the same manner as the equality of the radii follows from the nature of a circle; in which, in a word, the sole cause of any object or phenomenon is its *definition*—there is only one man who could have invented it.** ...

Chesterton writes:1

> "And if great reasoners are often maniacal, it is equally true that maniacs are commonly great reasoners. ... **If you argue with a madman, it is extremely probable that you will get the worst of it; for in many ways his mind moves all the quicker for not being delayed by the things that go with good judgment.** He is not hampered by a sense of humour or by charity, or by the dumb certainties of experience. He is the more logical for losing certain sane affections. Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is in this respect a misleading one. **The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.** The madman's explanation of a thing is always complete, and often in a purely rational sense satisfactory. ... His mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle. ... In the same way the insane explanation is quite as complete as the sane one, but it is not so large. ... Now, speaking quite externally and empirically, we may say that the strongest and most unmistakable *mark* of madness is this combination between a logical completeness and a spiritual contraction. ... He [the madman of experience] is in the clean and well-lit prison of one idea: he is sharpened to one painful point. ... **Materialism has a sort of insane simplicity. It has just the quality of the madman's argument; we have at once the sense of it covering everything and the sense of it leaving everything out.** ... He [the materialist] understands everything, and everything does not seem worth understanding."

This characterization fits Spinoza and his system like a glove.

It is this pure rationality in Spinoza, too, that produces that intolerable chill which emanates from his work: not, as some of his admirers would have us believe, the cold of aerie heights, but the cold of the

vacuum. We have the austere and comfortless feeling of being somewhere in the vast interstellar spaces—in a medium which permits of no life, no heat, no breathing, no sound, and lets nothing through but the severe light of a distant unknown sun. **We freeze when we read in his *Ethics* that nothing could be or should be different from what it is; that all things are equally perfect, all actions equally good, because all are equally necessary, even as no mathematical theorem is more perfect than another.**

> https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/n139/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 11. **God, Nature, substance, are all one; and *Power and being* is perfection: and ends and finall causes are false imaginations, and so are the Notions of good and evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, fairness and deformity, thence arising: Reality is perfection.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA231#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> One tract stressing the huge impact of "philosophy" on Denmark, *En Grønlaenders Beskrivelse over Kiøbenhavn* **[1771]** [A Greenlander's Description of Copenhagen], is strikingly mild in condemning the unbelievers in Copenhagen who had "torn themselves from and denied all religion," convinced the world has existed as it is since all eternity. These, explains this anonymous text, adopt as their hero a certain Dutch Jew called Spinoza who, in a thick, tedious book of metaphysical Latin, attempts to **"prove all of nature is only one substance and that all Nature's parts are only just so many modifications of it, so that all that one sees in the whole of nature, is equally as divine, as royal, as grand, so that the writer and his pen are equally important, both just modifications of nature's whole."**83
>
> https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/pdf/marx_religion_of_revolution.pdf
>
> With Engels we find some of these themes made explicit. His discussion of the eternal cycle of matter is illuminating. **Matter, he wrote, is in eternal motion, "a cycle in which every finite mode of existence of matter ... is equally transient, and wherein nothing is eternal but eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws according to which it moves and changes."**165 In fact, under Engels's earlier assumptions, even the laws of change themselves are changing.
>
> https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/88/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **[The miracles] could not teach them that God cares equally for all, for this can be taught only by philosophy:** the Jews, and all who took their knowledge of God's providence from the dissimilarity of human conditions of life and the inequalities of fortune, persuaded themselves that God loved the Jews above all men, though they did not surpass their fellows in true human perfection.

https://www.academia.edu/37708754/Spinoza_and_the_Kabbalah_From_the_Gates_of_Heaven_to_the_Field_of_Holy_Apples

Leibniz famously claimed that

> **Spinoza formulated his monstrous doctrine from a combination of the Cabala and Cartesianism, corrupted to the extreme [*Spinosa vero ex combinatione Cabalae et Cartesianismi, in extremitates corruptorum, mostrosum suum dogma formavit*].**5

...

Here is an excerpt from Spinoza's reply to Oldenburg's query.

> I favor an opinion concerning God and Nature far different from the one Modern Christians usually defend. For I maintain that God is, as they say, the immanent, but not the transitive, cause of all things. **That all things are in God and move in God, I affirm, I say, with Paul, and perhaps also with all the ancient philosophers, though in another way – *I would also be so bold as to say, with all the ancient Hebrews, as far as we can conjecture from certain traditions, corrupted as they have been in many ways*** [*et auderem dicere, cum antiquis omnibus Hebraeis, quantum ex quibusdam traditionibus, tametsi multis modis adulterates conjicere licet*]. Nevertheless, some people think the *Theological-Political Treatise* rests on the assumption that God is one and the same as Nature (by which they understand a certain mass, *or* corporeal matter). This is a complete mistake.27

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page348

After all, I think one must not reproach any but the adherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency; for they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happen by a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material and subjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God of intelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of necessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equally zealous in refuting an unendurable necessity.
…

372. **With the Hebrew Cabalists, *Malcuth* or the Kingdom, the last of the Sephiroth, signified that God controls everything irresistibly, but gently and without violence, so that man thinks he is following his own will while he carries out God's.** They said that Adam's sin had been *truncatio Malcuth a caeteris plantis*, that is to say, that Adam had cut back the last of the Sephiroth, by making a dominion for himself within God's dominion, and by assuming for himself a freedom independent of God, but that his fall had taught him that he could not subsist of himself, and that men must needs be redeemed by the Messiah. **This doctrine may receive a good interpretation. But Spinoza, who was versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, and who says (*Tractatus Politicus*, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving of freedom as they do, establish a dominion within God's dominion, has gone too far.** The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominion of necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everything emanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and man's choice does not exempt him from necessity. **He adds that men, in order to establish what is termed *Imperium in Imperio*, supposed that their soul was a direct creation of God, something which could not be produced by natural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination, a state of things contrary to experience.** Spinoza is right in opposing an absolute power of determination, that is, one without any grounds; it does not belong even to God. But he is wrong in thinking that a soul, that a simple substance, can be produced naturally. **It seems, indeed, that the soul to him was only a transient modification;** and when he pretends to make it lasting, and even perpetual, he substitutes for it the idea of the body, which is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing.

> https://freemasonrywatch.org/holly.html#VI
>
> Mackey stated: "It was necessary, therefore, that, to render himself comprehensible, the EN SOPH should make himself active and creative. But he could not become the direct creator; because, being infinite, he is without will, intention, thought, desire or action, all of which are qualities of a finite being only." (Ibid, p.167)
>
> **The roots of secular humanism with its deification of man and its anthropomorphizing of God are seen here as the Kaballist creates a god who is inept.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/518/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Humanity, held Whiston, had every reason to thank Newton for his discoveries, for had the atheistic thinkers with their ‘rigid fatality and necessity’ been right and the attribute of divine choice been lacking, **the ‘Supreme Being himself would be below mankind, a meer fatality, and no way worthy of any veneration, or love or gratitude from his creatures.’**23

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Jacobi,_Friedrich_Heinrich

A conversation which he had held with Lessing in 1780, **in which Lessing avowed that he knew no philosophy, in the true sense of that word, save Spinozism,** led him to a protracted study of Spinoza’s works. The *Briefe über die Lehre Spinozas* (1785; 2nd ed., much enlarged and with important *Appendices*, 1789) expressed sharply and clearly Jacobi’s strenuous objection to a dogmatic system in philosophy, and drew upon him the vigorous enmity of the Berlin clique, led by Moses Mendelssohn. Jacobi was ridiculed as endeavouring to re-introduce into philosophy the antiquated notion of unreasoning belief, was denounced as an enemy of reason, as a pietist, **and as in all probability a Jesuit in disguise,** and was especially attacked for his use of the ambiguous term “belief.”
…

As Jacobi starts with the doctrine that thought is partial and limited, applicable only to connect facts, but incapable of explaining their existence, it is evident that for him any demonstrative system of metaphysic which should attempt to subject all existence to the principle of logical ground must be repulsive. Now in modern philosophy the first and greatest demonstrative system of metaphysic is that of Spinoza, and it lay in the nature of things that upon Spinoza’s system Jacobi should first direct his criticism. A summary of the results of his examination is thus presented (*Werke*, i. 216-223): (1) Spinozism is atheism; **(2) the Kabbalistic philosophy, in so far as it is philosophy, is nothing but undeveloped or confused Spinozism; (3) the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolff is not less fatalistic than that of Spinoza, and carries a resolute thinker to the very principles of Spinoza;**

(4) every demonstrative method ends in fatalism; (5) we can demonstrate only similarities (agreements, truths conditionally necessary), proceeding always in identical propositions; **every proof presupposes something already proved, the principle of which is immediately given (*Offenbarung*, revelation, is the term here employed by Jacobi, as by many later writers, *e.g.* Lotze, to denote the peculiar character of an immediate, unproved truth); (**6) the keystone (*Element*) of all human knowledge and activity is belief (*Glaube*). Of these propositions only the first and fourth require further notice. Jacobi, accepting the law of reason and consequent as the fundamental rule of demonstrative reasoning, and as the rule explicitly followed by Spinoza, points out that, if we proceed by applying this principle so as to recede from particular and qualified facts to the more general and abstract conditions, we land ourselves, not in the notion of an active, intelligent creator of the system of things, but in the notion of an all-comprehensive, indeterminate *Nature*, devoid of will or intelligence.

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/59/mode/2up?view=theater

> **Pantheism is the clandestine religion of Germany, as was predicted fifty years ago by those German writers who campaigned so intensively against Spinoza.** The fiercest of these opponents of Spinoza was Fr. Heinr. Jacobi, who is occasionally honored by being named among the German philosophers.97 He was nothing but a quarrelsome sneak, who, disguising himself in a philosopher's cloak, made his way in among the philosophers, first whimpering to them about his love and his tender soul, and then letting loose against reason.

https://archive.org/details/BarruelMemoirsIllustratingTheHistoryOfJacobinism/page/n549/mode/2up?view=theater

Let the Sieur D'Alembert assert, that nothing can be more opposite to Atheism than Spinosism;17 or let Spinosa say, that, so far from being an Atheist, he converts every thing into God; will such an excuse raise pity or indignation in the reader? **To deny that there is any other God than the world, is evidently denying the only being that can justly be called God. It is laughing at men, to wish to make them believe, that the person is preserved because they do not dare destroy the name, at the very time that the name of God is only used as an agent for the annihilation of every idea of a Deity.**

> 17. Panegyric of Montesquieu.

https://chalcedon.edu/magazine/van-tils-illustrations

> Once while Van Til was a youth traveling on a train in Holland, he noticed a father with his young daughter sitting in his lap. Apparently, the father urged his daughter to do something when she suddenly slapped her father in the face. Van Til's application? The girl's behavior illustrates rebels who live in God's world and who are supported by God's common grace (Ps. 24:1). **They sit, as it were, on the lap of God, and it is precisely because they sit on God's lap that they are able to deliver the slap of ingratitude.**

https://archive.org/details/poeticalworkscon00blacuoft/page/96/mode/2up?view=theater

> Spinosa next, to hide his black design,
> And to his side th' unwary to incline,
> **For heaven his ensigns treacherous displays,**
> **Declares for God, while he that God betrays:**
> For whom he's pleas'd such evidence to bring,
> As saves the name, while it subverts the thing.
> …
>
> Sages, no longer Egypt's sons despise,
> For their cheap God, and savoury deities!
> No more their coarse divinities revile!
> **To leeks, to onions, to the crocodile,**
> **You might your humble adorations pay,**
> **Were you not Gods yourselves, as well as they.**

https://trisagionseraph.tripod.com/marxf.html

> The Kabbalah, a survival of gnosticism, splits God into multiple personalities: **Spinoza's God is *'ein sof,'* who retains traditional divine attributes such as self-sufficiency, eternity and immutability. Since very little can be said about this god and because there is no point in talking to him, people don't say much to or about him, and thus after one generation Deists lose any memory of him.** But the God of Israel, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the

> Kabbalists make into a joint project between the only actual God, — *'ein sof*,' the god of the Deists, — and the people, whose praises inflate this partially man-created god, as if he were a Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade balloon, trailing behind Israel, who are dragging him along.

https://archive.org/details/moraldarwinismho0000wike/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater

> But the next intellectual move is questionable, **and we need to be wide awake to see what Epicurus was really up to.** We see all around us, Epicurus rightly argued, that things in nature grow and decay, come into being and pass out of existence. But if nature itself were not, at bottom, eternal, then soon enough everything would have been reduced to nothing. However, we see that such is not the case, for the universe is full of things. Since nothing itself can give birth to nothing, Epicurus reasoned, there must be something which never comes into being and never passes away. **Therefore, the universe itself must be eternal.**8
>
> But the eternality of the universe does not follow from the truth that “nothing” cannot be a cause or source. **An alternative to his view is that nature is not itself eternal,** but contingent (that is, *not* eternal, mortal, subject to decay etc.).
> …
>
> This shift of eternality from the divine to nature was essential to Epicurus’s therapeutic goal. The universe itself, in being eternal, takes on immortality, and hence one of the essential characteristics of divinity.11 **The universe does not inherit, however, the other characteristics of divinity, intelligence and will,** which are the chief causes of human anxiety according to Epicurus.

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA141#v=onepage&q&f=false

> Let us, first, State the Case: **Our Modifications borrowed what they call *Nature*, their *State of Nature*, and the most part of the Doctrine they build upon it from *Epicurus*. It’s *Mind*, *Soul*, *Spirit*, or *Intellect*, which they call its *Modification*, or Attribute of *Thinking*, from *Plato*, and its *Eternity* from *Aristotle*.**

https://archive.org/details/godknowledgeofre0000moln/page/26/mode/2up?view=theater

What was the end of the road for Lessing became Hegel’s starting inspiration. These are some of the statements he made in his lectures on the history of philosophy, statements pertaining to our topic: “Spinozism is accused of atheism because no distinction is made in it between God and the world. ... God disappears and only nature remains. ... **Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing as the world, it is merely a form of God. ... This is the Eastern view of things, which first found expression in the West with Spinoza. To be a follower of Spinoza is the essential beginning of all philosophy. For when man begins to philosophize, the soul must bathe in this ether of the One substance, in which everything we hold true has disappeared. This negation of all particulars, to which every true philosopher must have come, is the liberation of the mind and its absolute freedom.**”28

https://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/13964-spinoza-baruch-benedict-de-spinoza

Spinoza was attracted by the atmosphere of free thought characteristic of the Dutch capital. He learned Latin, immediately after leaving school, from Franz van den Ende, **an adventurer and polyhistor who had established himself in Amsterdam; under him he studied as well mathematics, physics, mechanics, astronomy, chemistry, and the medicine of the day.** Spinoza likewise acquired a knowledge of the scholasticism developed in the school of Thomas Aquinas.

Epoch-making for the development of Spinoza's thought was his acquaintance with the works of Descartes, who led Europe in the attempt to found a philosophy based upon reason, not tradition.
…

Spinoza was thus cast out at the age of twenty-three from all communion with men of his own faith and race, **and there is no evidence of his coming into communication with a single Jewish soul from that time to his death** (the "I. O." among his correspondents, formerly assumed to be Isaac Orobio, turned out to be Jacob Oosten). It is clear that Spinoza had already formed a circle of friends and disciples, **mainly of the Mennonite sect known as Collegiants, whose doctrines were similar to those of the Quakers;** and that he had attended a philosophical club composed mainly of these sectaries, one of whom, Simon de Vries, acted as secretary.
…

He finished the "Ethics" in Aug., 1665, at Voorburg, a suburb of The Hague, to which he had removed in April, 1663, probably to be near the De Witt brothers, then at the height of their power. John de Witt had become acquainted with Spinoza, and either at this time, or a little later, gave him a small pension. From Voorburg Spinoza used to send portions of his "Ethics," written in Dutch, to his band of disciples in Amsterdam, who translated them into Latin and wrote him letters in the same language dealing with the

difficulties of his theories. **Before publishing this work, however, so subversive of the ordinary views of theology and philosophy, Spinoza determined to pave the way by an animated plea for liberty of thought and expression in the commonwealth.** To this he devoted the next four years, the result being the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus."
...

Through von Tschirnhausen, Spinoza came into correspondence with Leibnitz, then (1672) in Paris. He appears to have had some suspicions of Leibnitz's trustworthiness, and it was not till four years later, when the brilliant young diplomat visited him at The Hague, **that Spinoza exposed his full mind to Leibnitz and produced that epoch-making effect upon the latter which dominated European thought in the eighteenth century.**
...

His biographer, Colerus, however, asserts that he was never received into any Christian community, and Spinoza in one of his letters (lxxiii., ed. Land) **expressly declared that to him the notion that God took upon Himself the nature of man seemed as self-contradictory as would be the statement that "the circle has taken on the nature of the square."**
...

The logical foundation of his whole system lies in the denial of the validity of all relative propositions, leaving the Absolute as the sole reality of the universe. **On this see B. Russell, "Principles of Mathematics" (p. 448, Cambridge, 1903), which work is so far a justification of Spinoza's method in that it proves the possibility of deducing all the principles of pure mathematics and physics from a certain number of indefinables and indemonstrables.** All turns with Spinoza, as with Descartes and the scholastics, on getting true and adequate knowledge of the essences of things.
...

The conception of God as the Supreme Being and as substance is common to all medieval philosophy, Spinoza's originality consisting in recognizing extension as one of His attributes: this, it will be remembered, was one of the test questions which led to his excommunication. **Here he is approached very nearly by the views of Ḥasdai Crescas,** who in his "Or Adonai" (I. ii. 1) points to the use of the word "maḳom" (locality) for the Deity, and concludes that "as the dimensions of the vacuum are included in the dimensions of the corporeal and its contents, so is God in all parts of the world. He is their place that supports and holds them." Crescas goes on to disprove the Aristotelian claim that an infinite material magnitude is impossible.
...

At the same time, **the modes as parts of attributes seem to be derived from Bruno,** who also makes the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata. Bruno regards all nature as animated—a close approach to Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes. On the other hand, Bruno may have taken this notion from some of the cabalists, and in arguing that God is the immanent and not the transient cause of the universe, Spinoza himself claims that he agrees with the Hebrew masters, so far as he could conjecture from certain adulterated views ("Epistolæ," lxxiii.). **The plan of the universe, as indicated above, though this is not given by Spinoza himself, resembles in large measure that of the Sefirot, and suggests that, much as he derided them, Spinoza obtained much general suggestion from the cabalists.** He even appears to quote, in the "Ethics" (II. vii., note), Moses Cordovero on the identity of the thinker, thought, and the object thought of; this, however, is a general Aristotelian principle (see Jew. Encyc. x. 370, s.v. Remaḳ). In Spinoza's view the doctrine of immanence bears a remarkable resemblance to that of emanation.
...

Finally, the somewhat mystical views as to the eternity of the intellectual love, Sir Frederick Pollock suggests, were derived from the Averroism of Gersonides, who considered that contemplative knowledge was the only proper function of the eternal mind, and, therefore, that the individual soul was immortal as regards the knowledge possessed by it at the time of death, though, being then deprived of an organism, it could not in any way extend it after death (see Pollock, "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy," 2d ed., pp. 270-271, London, 1899).
...

It has been suggested by Joël that the development of Spinoza's thought was somewhat as follows: **His early training was entirely from Jewish philosophers, but he was withdrawn from them by the attraction of Descartes, who freed his mind from the principle of authority in philosophy, and, as it appears, in religion; but he was never a pure Cartesian, not even when he wrote his account of the philosophy of Descartes, and he came back to the Jewish philosophers to solve the conflicting elements of Descartes' thought, with the important difference, however, that he did not attempt to reconcile the conclusions to which they led him with the statements of Scripture.** His thought is thus Jewish, cast in a Cartesian mold, the chief difference being with regard to the authority of Scripture, and it is, accordingly, in his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" that his views are found most opposed to Jewish views.
...

But the principal person upon whom Spinoza's thought and personality had a decisive effect was Leibnitz (1646-1716), whose system of philosophy, as developed by Wolff, dominated the continent of Europe throughout the whole of the eighteenth century up to Kant, and whose views, developed by Herbart and Lotze, have again come to the fore in recent times. **Those of Leibnitz's works that have been published give**

little evidence of any connection with Spinoza other than in the latter's calling as optician, and his public utterances on Spinozism were in every case hostile and derogatory; but more recent evidence shows that during the critical period of his development, from 1676 to 1686, he took a more favorable attitude toward both Spinoza and Spinozism, and this has been traced to an intimate personal association of the two philosophers during a whole month in 1676, not long before Spinoza's death. It was during this period that Leibnitz developed from a pure Cartesian into an opponent of Descartes, chiefly as regards the definition of body and the principles of motion, both of which subjects it is known that Leibnitz discussed with Spinoza. **On reading the "Opera Posthuma," Leibnitz declared that the absence of teleology was the only thing with which he did not agree. When, however, a strong outcry broke out against Spinoza's "atheism," Leibnitz devoted himself to finding an escape from Spinozism, and it took him nearly ten years before he arrived at his theory of the monads, which he declared to be the only solution of the difficulty** (see L. Stein, "Leibniz und Spinoza," Berlin, 1890). **The most recent investigator of the philosophy of Leibnitz declares that in his views on soul and body, on God and ethics, he "tends with slight alterations of phraseology to adopt (without acknowledgment) the views of the derided Spinoza"** (B. Russell, "Philosophy of Leibniz," p. 5, Cambridge, 1900).

This opposition of Leibnitz practically ruined any chance of influence by Spinoza on the Germany of the early part of the eighteenth century, where the philosophy of the former and his follower Wolff was all-powerful. **A revival of interest, however, was brought about by Jacobi's declaration that Lessing was a professed Spinozist and had declared that "there is but one philosophy, the philosophy of Spinoza."** Mendelssohn, who in philosophy was a Wolffian, devoted some of his "Morgenstunden" to defending the memory of his friend Lessing from what he considered to be an aspersion, and this again tended to discourage any active adherence to Spinoza in Germany. **Kant, by making the problem of metaphysics how man knows instead of what he knows, changed the course of metaphysical thought for a time; but renewed attention was drawn to Spinoza by his followers, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the last-named of whom declared that to be a philosopher one must first be a Spinozist.** Schleiermacher expressed himself in the highest terms of Spinoza, and Novalis called the so-called "atheist" a "God-intoxicated Jew." This revival of interest in Spinoza was due possibly to the influence of Herder and Goethe, who had both given utterance to great admiration for Spinoza's life and thought. The wide influence of Goethe, whose philosophical views were entirely Spinozistic and were expressed in some of the profoundest of his poems, was perhaps the chief influence which drew to Spinoza the attention of such men as Coleridge, Auerbach, Matthew Arnold, Froude, and Renan.
...

By a sort of instinct Spinoza seems to have anticipated, by deductions from first principles, many of the most fundamental principles of modern science; e.g., the conservation of energy (in his belief that the total quantity of motion in the universe is constant); **the non-existence of a vacuum;** and the existence of nothing real in the universe but configurations and motions (expressly stated in the "Ethics" I., Appendix).
...

The conatus has been regarded as anticipating even the theory of evolution, but this is due to mistaking the statical nature of Spinoza's thought. Nevertheless, **the two great exponents of philosophical evolution Herbert Spencer and Haeckel have adopted many, if not most, of Spinoza's views,** which have thus become representative of science as opposed to religion. **Meanwhile there has been a recent tendency to resort once more to Leibnitz for a defense of the faith, as shown in the Gifford lectures of Professors Ward and Royce, so that at the present day, at any rate in the English-speaking world, the problem of philosophy is once more resolved into the opposition of Spinoza and Leibnitz.** Thus, of the chief contemporary English philosophers, F. H. Bradley, with his follower A. E. Taylor, may be regarded as representing Spinoza, while G. E. Moore and his disciple B. Russell are adherents of the school of Leibnitz.
...

In any case, Spinoza's thought is so definitely connected either by derivation or by opposition with that of the Jewish medieval thinkers **that it must be regarded either as the consummation or as the evisceration of Jewish philosophy.**

https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/240/mode/2up?view=theater

Again, **the Pharisees, in order to shake the position of men richer than themselves, began to set on foot questions of religion, and accused the Sadducees of impiety, and, following their example, the vilest hypocrites, stirred, as they pretended, by the same holy wrath which they called zeal for the Lord, persecuted men whose unblemished character and distinguished virtue had excited the popular hatred,** publicly denounced their opinions, and inflamed the fierce passions of the people against them.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=me6ig1nqlKIC&lpg=PT557&hl=fi&pg=PT557#v=onepage&q&f=false

Amsterdam had a free Jewish community, unrestricted by Christian authorities as long as it did not cause public scandal. This community consisted mainly of people, such as Spinoza’s parents, from Spain or Portugal who had been forcibly converted to Catholicism and severely persecuted by the Inquisition. **Most of them had had no instruction in Judaism but were desirous of reclaiming their ancestral religion, and thus, in effect, created their own Judaism, independent of the tradition.**

…

Spinoza then deduced his central pantheistic thesis: "Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived" (1.15). **God has infinite attributes, of which only two, thought and extension, can be known by us.**
…

This sweeping pantheistic picture – God being everything, everywhere, the only cause acting from his own nature – is presented as a series of deductions from the initial definitions.

The reader might not realize this conception constitutes an amazing critique of popular and institutional religion, since nothing is said about Judaism, Christianity, or other belief systems. Spinoza's appendix severely attacks popular belief. Popular religion results from fear and superstition and from interpreting the world in teleological terms, God acting in terms of human purposes. **When events do not accord with human expectations, people then say that God's judgments transcend human understanding. Spinoza announced that such a doctrine might have concealed the truth from humans forever, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of truth.**
…

Part of this foolishness comes from trying to apply human value categories to the world. But "good" and "bad" are relative to human outlooks and are not objective features of the world. **The foolish believers worry about the problem of evil and do not realize that God creates solely from his own nature, not in terms of what humans like or dislike.**
…

Spinoza then expounded on what can be known about God or nature in terms of the two attributes, thought and extension. Since these are ways of conceiving God, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." **That is, seeing the world in terms of thought is the same as seeing the world in terms of extension. These are two coequal ways of understanding God.** Logic and psychology provide ways to understand the world in terms of thought, and natural science provides the way of understanding it in terms of extension.

Spinoza here offered a novel way of resolving a central metaphysical problem that had bedeviled Descartes, that of explaining the relation of mind and body and how, if they have totally different characteristics, one affects the other. For Spinoza, these are just two different ways of looking at the same world, seen either in terms of thought or in terms of physics. **They do not influence each other; they are the same as the other. The world can be explained by natural science or by a thought system, and it is one and the same world, God or nature, that is being explained.** Spinoza accepted the new mechanistic physics as the right way of understanding the world in terms of extension. Individual physical or mental things are modes of substance: **the physical ones are modes of God in terms of the attribute of extension; mental ones are modes of God in terms of the attribute of thought. The modes are *natura naturata* (nature created), whereas God is *natura naturans* (nature creating).** Modes are transitory, whereas God or substance is eternal.
…

About thirty years after Spinoza's death, the first modern author of a history of the Jews, the Huguenot Jacques Basnage, looked for people who had known Spinoza. He asked the chief rabbi about him. **(The current chief rabbi was actually the person who had read out the excommunication order against Spinoza.) Basnage was told by the rabbi that there was nothing original in Spinoza's work, that it was just the view of the Jewish kabbalists, disguised in Cartesian terms. The rabbi, a student of Abraham Cohen Herrera, may well have recognized his teacher's Neoplatonism pervading Spinoza's metaphysics.** (There seems no doubt that Spinoza read Herrera; he used one of Herrera's key phrases in the *Ethics*.) Basnage placed his account of Spinoza's system in his central chapter on the kabbalists. **Part of Spinoza's genius may have been to turn the pantheistic elements of kabbalism into a thoroughgoing naturalistic picture of the world, a metaphysics for a world without any supernatural deity.** Harry Wolfson claimed Spinoza transformed medieval Jewish philosophical views into a new modern system, using ideas from Moses Maimonides, Hasdai ibn Crescas, and Herrera, among others. **Pierre Bayle said Spinoza was the first to reduce atheism to a system. The German Romantics called him "a God intoxicated man." Wolfson said he was the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns, the first who needed no supernatural doctrines in his philosophy.**

https://archive.org/details/worshippingstate0000wike/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

God isn't above creation or above history; he *is* creation, he *is* history. **In direct contrast to Christianity, an immaterial God never became flesh. For Spinoza, all flesh (that is, all matter) always was and is God.**

The implications of Spinoza's pantheism are far-reaching. **First of all, Spinoza collapsed creator and creature, destroying the essential distinction introduced at the very beginning of the Bible.** Pantheism makes a god of this world and thus completely undermines the entire Judeo-Christian understanding of reality that flows from the creator-creature distinction in Genesis. Removing that creator-creature distinction allows for a reintroduction of pagan animism and idolatry, the worship of the divine in creatures. **Spinoza's "monism" was a radical rejection of the First Commandment.**

Spinoza's rejection of "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" paved the way for the Romantic idolatry of nature. **The Romanticism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not only a reaction against the mechanistic Enlightenment view of nature – the conception of nature as a clock and God as the distant clockmaker. Romanticism was also a full embrace of Spinoza's pantheism, a pulling of God into nature.**
...

Even though Spinoza himself directed his devotion to nature, the historical result of his pantheism was uncritical religious devotion to the state. The secular state was thereby sacralized, made divine itself; it became, in the minds of its devotees, a real manifestation of the divine in and through history. The pantheistic state that had its seed in Spinoza would come to full flower in the ruminations of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), who declared that the Prussian state was the fullest manifestation of the immanentized "spirit" of God.
...

Instead of a duality between church and state, we now have only a duality between the individual and the state. The church as an effective intermediate institution is neutralized. *Now the individual must face the state alone*.
...

Where did Spinoza's relativist version of religious liberty come from? More or less straight from Hobbes,29 but buttressed by Spinoza's pantheism.

Spinoza, like Hobbes, denied the reality of objective good and evil. **But Spinoza based his argument against moral absolutes upon the notion that God is everything – and therefore everything and everyone is God. Since God has "the highest right to everything," and everyone is a manifestation of God, then "each individual has the highest right to everything it can do."**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA341#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> First and foremost is the natural right of every man. Nature enjoys a sovereign right over everything in its power. Its rights extend to the limits of its power, and are identified with the power of God. **Every man is a part of the power of nature and of God, and therefore enjoys within those limits the free expression of those rights. Hence the supreme law of nature is: "that each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself."** But when the power ceases in the state of nature, the right ceases.

Since God is above the law, then each of us (in our natural, pre-civil state – another idea Spinoza took from Hobbes) is a law unto himself, with a right to do anything he likes.30 **Just as God cannot sin, so individuals, in the "state of nature" cannot sin. The "natural state is … without religion and law, and consequently without sin and wrong," a truth that Spinoza tells the reader is "confirmed by the authority of Paul."**31

> https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/200/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges **that previous to the law – that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is no sin.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/tractatustheolog00elweuoft/page/210/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> **No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God,**1 nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance. The state of nature must by no means be confounded with a state of religion, **but must be conceived as without either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul.**

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Spinoza speaking of the Holy Scriptures, and of Reason, gives you his Judgment in the following manner:

> "**Truly, I cannot sufficiently admire, that some People wou'd have us submit that greatest Gift, that Divine Light, *Reason*, to Dead, (*i.e. the Holy Scriptures*) Letters, which might have been deprav'd by Human Malice:** That it shou'd be thought no Wickedness at all, to speak meanly of Human Mind, the true Copy of God's Word, nay, to think it Corrupt, Blind, and Lost; **and on the other hand, that it shou'd be counted great Wickedness, to think so of the Letter and Idol, (*i.e. the Holy Scriptures*) of God's Word. Those Men think it Pious, not to trust our own Reason and Judgment, and Impious, to doubt of the Faithfulness of those who handed down to us the Sacred Books, which, indeed, is mere Folly, and not Piety.**" *Tract. Theol. Polit. Chap.* 15. p. 186.

In another place, he asks,

> **"Shall I not acquiesce in the true Word of God, (*i.e. Reason*) which is in the Mind, and which can never be, either Deprav'd or Corrupted?"** *Oper. Post. Epist.* 74. p. 174

And elsewhere, this *Atheist* maintains, That *Human Mind* is a *Portion* of the *Divine Mind*, as we shall see afterwards.

https://books.google.nl/books?id=X_1MAQAAMAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA117#v=onepage&q&f=false

So that, **according to this * *Collection* of *Modifications*,** all Things and Actions are subject to an Absolute Necessity of Fate, as is said before. But this is not all, for after having Establish'd several False and Absurd Positions, that Collection concludes thus:

> "**Hence it follows, That Human Mind is a part of the Infinite Mind (*i.e. of* Plato's *Infinite Mind, or Soul of the World*) of GOD:** And, therefore, when we say, that Human Mind perceives this or that, we say nothing else, but that GOD who constitutes the Essence of Human Mind, has this or that Idea, *Ib. Part* 2. *Corrol. Prop.* 11."

Hereby, You see why those Materialists do so highly extol Human *Reason*, and will not allow, that reasonable Creatures are, or can be subject to any Laws whatsoever in Matters of Conscience or Religion, besides those of their own *Reason*, viz. because their *Minds* are real *Parts* of the *Mind* of their *God*. *Secondly*, That it is upon the same Account, they call their *Reason*, an *Immediate*, an *Original Revelation*, and the Holy Scriptures, a *Historical*, or *Traditional Revelation*, to Depreciate and Degrade them.

https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/162/mode/2up?view=theater

Those who think that reason or philosophy or science ought to be subservient to theology, are characterized by Spinoza as skeptics, or as men who deny the certainty of reason, **and the true philosopher cannot be a skeptic.**23

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cQ8xzDLYWfsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA246#v=onepage&q&f=false

Probably the most common usage today of the term "sceptic" is a religious unbeliever.42 In this sense, with the qualifications of the last paragraph kept in mind, **I think it is fair to count Spinoza as a sceptic about religion, even though his views go well beyond mere doubt to complete denial. If Spinoza was an irreligious sceptic, he was most un- or antisceptical in the areas of scientific and philosophical knowledge.**
…

Considering how serious *la crise pyrrhonienne* was in the middle of the seventeenth century, and especially how serious it was for Descartes, it is somewhat surprising to see how calmly Spinoza faced it, and how simple he found it was to dispose of it.
…

The classification of the sceptic as mentally blind had already occurred in *Principles of Descartes' Philosophy*. **One wonders what evidence Spinoza could give besides appealing to how clear and certain various truths were to him.**

Spinoza was obviously perplexed by his supposed sceptic. He went on to say that such a person could not affirm or doubt anything. He cannot even say that he knows nothing – in fact, he "ought to remain dumb for fear of haply supposing something which should smack of truth."54 **If these skeptics "deny, grant or gainsay, they know not that they deny grant or gainsay, so that they ought to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence."**55

In all of Spinoza's comments so far, it is basically an ad hominem argument about the mentality and character of the sceptic or doubter; Spinoza has yet to come to grips with the

sceptic's arguments, regardless of whether the sceptic is in a position to affirm or deny them. Later on in the *Improvement of the Understanding*, Spinoza made clear what is at issue. **"Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is most certain. We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we have no clear and distinct idea."**56 When we reflect on the idea of God, we know he can be no deceiver with the same certitude as we know that the sum of the angles of a triagle equals two right angles.
…

In his later works, the *Tractatus* and the *Ethics*, Spinoza made even clearer his reasons for rejecting scepticism as a serious possibility in the rational world of philosophy. **(It should be noted that Spinoza infrequently discussed scepticism, and when he did it it was usually as an aside.)** In the *Tractatus*, in dealing with the proof of the existence of God, Spinoza started off: "Since God's existence is not self-evident"58 **and then added an important footnote that appears at the end of the book, in which he said,** "We doubt the existence of God, and consequently everything else, as long as we do not have a clear and distinct idea of God, but only a confused idea. Just as he who does not rightly know the nature of a triangle, does not know that its three angles are equal to two right angles, so he who conceives the divine nature in a confused way does not see that existence pertains to the nature of God." **At the end of the note Spinoza declared that when it becomes clear to us that God exists necessarily, and "that all our conceptions involve God's nature and are conceived through God's nature, thus we can accept *finally, that everything that we adequately conceive is true.*"**59

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA27-IA1#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **Every particular desire or emotion can be either good or bad depending on circumstances except for one solitary major exception: by Part IV, Proposition 61 of the *Ethics*, "a desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive."**33 **Never was there a more unbending rationalist.**
>
> https://www.amazon.com/Infallibility-Inescapable-Rousas-John-Rushdoony/dp/B000O2PYMS
>
> "The doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture can be denied, but the concept of infallibility as such cannot be logically denied. **Infallibility is an inescapable concept. If men refuse to ascribe infallibility to Scripture, it is because the concept has been transferred to something else.** The word infallibility is not normally used in these transfers; the concept is disguised and veiled, but in a variety of ways, infallibility is ascribed to concepts, things, men and institutions."

…

As some of the earlier quotations indicate, the choice for Spinoza is either knowing God and all that follows from that knowledge, or knowing nothing. Since we know something, like that a triangle is equal to two right angles, a truth that shows itself in the act of knowing it, we do not have to bother with scepticism, but rather with analyzing our truth to discover what makes it true, namely God. The sceptic knows nothing, as he has all his purported doubts. He is in a state of ignorance that only genuine knowing experience could cure. **He may be in the state of suspending judgment, which means "that he is not adequately perceiving the thing."**62 **As soon as he does he will give up his scepticism.**

Spinoza did not see scepticism as the specter haunting European philosophy. The quotations I have used are almost the totality of his discussion of the matter. Unlike Descartes, who had to fight his way through scepticism to arrive at dogmatic truth, Spinoza simply began with an assurance that his system was true, and anyone who did not see this was either truth-blind (like colorblind) or was an ignoramus. The ignoramus can be helped if he can improve his understanding, and know something clearly and certainly, or adequately.

Spinoza's epistemological dogmatism is probably the furthest removed from scepticism of any of the new philosophies of the seventeenth century. It is a genuine antisceptical theory trying to eradicate the possibility or meaningfulness of doubting or suspending judgment. Spinoza started his system at the point that others were trying to get to after they overcame the sceptical menace.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assume_a_can_opener
>
> President Ronald Reagan told the joke to students and faculty at Purdue University on April 9, 1987, saying: "It seems an economist, a chemist, and an engineer were stranded on a desert island. And between them they had only a single can of beans, but no can opener. The engineer suggested that he climb a palm tree to a precise height, then throw the beans a precise distance at a precise angle. 'And

> when the can hits,' he said, 'it will split open.' 'No,' said the chemist. 'We'll leave the can in the sun until the heat causes the beans to expand so much the can will explode.' 'Nonsense,' said the economist. 'Using either method we'd lose too many beans. According to my plan, there will be no mess or fuss and not a single bean will be lost.' Well, the engineer and the chemist said, 'We're certainly willing to consider it. What's your plan?' **And the economist answered, 'Well, first assume we have a can opener.'**"[11]

…

For Spinoza there are no real sceptics, only ignoramuses. With his tremendous assurance, based on his clear and certain, and true and adequate, idea of God, Spinoza could answer his former disciple, Albert Burgh, who had asked "*How I* [Spinoza] *know that my philosophy is the best among all that have ever been taught in the world?*"64 by saying: "I do not presume that I have found the best philosophy, but I know that what I understand is the true one."65 **If Spinoza is asked how he knows this, his answer is that he knows it in the same way as he knows that the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles; "that this suffices no one will deny who has a sound brain and does not dream of unclean spirits who inspire us with false ideas as if they were true. For truth reveals both itself and the false."**66

Spinoza's thoroughgoing antiscepticism about knowledge reinforced his scepticism about religious knowledge. Based on the true and adequate idea of God, which is clear and obvious when one understands it, it is evident that God cannot be the figure represented in popular religion. God's judgments might have been claimed to far transcend our understanding. **"Indeed, it is for this reason, and this reason only, that truth might have evaded mankind forever had not Mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, revealed to men a different standard of truth."**67 **Our clear and certain ideas show that God does not have motives, or act for the achievement of purposes.** There are no value properties in nature that God is trying to augment. All the nonsense people say on these matters

> goes on to show that everyone's judgement is a function of the disposition of his brain, or rather, that he mistakes for reality the way his imagination is affected. Hence it is no wonder – as we should note in passing – that we find so many controversies arising among men, resulting finally in scepticism. … Men's judgement is a function of the disposition of the brain, and they are guided by imagination rather than intellect. **For if men understood things, all that I have put forward would be found, if not attractive, at any rate convincing, as Mathematics attests.**68

Thus for Spinoza the religious controversies built on ignorance of the idea of God just lead to scepticism. **If people approached the problem first through mathematical ideas and then through knowledge of God, they will see how false and how stupid popular religion is. The complete dogmatism of Spinoza then justifies a doubt and finally a negation of popular religion.**

> https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/Authority_and_the_Adventurer_p6.html
>
> But my belief that miracles have happened in human history is not a mystical belief at all; I believe in them upon human evidences as I do in the discovery of America. Upon this point there is a simple logical fact that only requires to be stated and cleared up. **Somehow or other an extraordinary idea has arisen that the disbelievers in miracles consider them coldly and fairly, while believers in miracles accept them only in connection with some dogma.** The fact is quite the other way. **The believers in miracles accept them (rightly or wrongly) because they have evidence for them. The disbelievers in miracles deny them (rightly or wrongly) because they have a doctrine against them.** The open, obvious, democratic thing is to believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a miracle, just as you believe an old apple-woman when she bears testimony to a murder.
> …
>
> If it comes to human testimony there is a choking cataract of human testimony in favour of the supernatural. If you reject it, you can only mean one of two things. **You reject the peasant's story about the ghost either because the man is a peasant or because the story is a ghost story. That is, you either deny the main principle of democracy, or you affirm the main principle of materialism--the abstract impossibility of miracle.** You have a perfect right to do so; but in that case you are the dogmatist. It is we Christians who accept all actual evidence--**it is you rationalists who refuse actual evidence being constrained to do so by your creed.**
>
> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/412/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> While the chief strength of Spinoza's Bible criticism was doubtless its rejection of *a priori* assumptions about Scripture's status and its stringent empiricism, it is wrong to infer from this, as

has been claimed, that his was, therefore, basically a 'bottom-up, inductive approach – more British-looking than Continental' – or propose that 'Spinoza wants to start not with general presuppositions, whether theological or philosophical dogma, but with particulars and facts – with history – and then work his way up to broader generalizations.'6 **Far from contrasting his approach with that of the Cartesians, or likening it to that of 'Bacon, whose works Spinoza knew in detail,' the unyielding differentiation between the natural and supernatural of Spinoza's naturalism derived its force, and power to innovate, precisely from his reworking of Cartesian conceptions of nature and substance.** Had Spinoza really emulated Bacon (of whom in fact he was openly disdainful),7 or subscribed to Bacon's criteria, and the experimental empiricism of the Royal Society, then he, like them, would surely have failed to envisage history as an exclusively natural process devoid of magical actions, spirits, supernatural agency, or miracles, and adhered to a literalist, deeply reverential notion of the Bible as Bacon, Boyle, and Newton all actually did.

…

Pierre Bayle in the *Dictionnaire historique et critique* devoted his longest article, in fact a book-length one, to Spinoza.69 This article is usually glossed over as a simple misunderstanding of Spinoza's categories, but Bayle was not one to purposely misread his opponents. To do justice to Bayle's attack on Spinoza would require a very lengthy article, if not a book. For present purposes, I think one of his points is interesting, namely that Spinoza's rationalism would justify the most irrational conclusions. In remarks Q and T, **Bayle tried to show that if Spinoza had argued logically he would have seen that there is no philosopher who has less reason to deny the existence of spirits and of hell than Spinoza. Bayle tried to show that it followed from the unlimited nature of the Spinozistic deity that he could, and maybe did, create spirits, demons, and so on, as well as an underworld.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/44/mode/2up?view=theater

Although Spinoza often used the word 'God,' remarks Voltaire, in fact he was a much more openly and consistently 'atheistic' writer than almost anyone else in his time, **there being very few truly consistent atheistic writers since many *esprits forts* in practice waver, are sceptical, or vary their views.** Spinoza, by contrast, in always the classic rigorous 'atheist,' argues Voltaire, because he allows only one substance, totally excludes all divine providence and supernatural agency, and, like Strato (Voltaire is here following Bayle), rejects all teleology and 'argument from design.' **Furthermore, he does so allowing no room for doubt, as a complete anti-sceptic.**10 **Only La Mettrie, suggests Voltaire in one place, can be compared with Spinoza in this respect. Indeed, Voltaire accounted Spinoza a much more consistent 'atheist' than Epicurus or the vast majority of other ancient Greek thinkers, Strato and Diagoras alone excepted.**11

Admittedly, Spinoza indignantly rejected the designation 'atheist' but this is because he was not an 'atheist' under the terms of his own (and other Early Enlightenment materialists') redefining of the term 'atheism' to mean refusal to acknowledge the natural order and the obligations of the rational man. In terms of what was normally meant by 'atheism' during the Enlightenment, namely denial of all supernatural agency in the cosmos, including rejection of a providential God who created and guides the cosmos, and watches over the actions of men, Spinoza unquestionably *was* an 'atheist.' **Hume too, hence, was certainly correct to refer to 'true atheism' as a set of sentiments 'for which Spinoza is so universally infamous.'**12 Nor is there any contradiction, since he identified God with the totality of nature, between Spinoza's asserting that 'God is an extended thing' [Deus est res extensa] and his brusque dismissal of the notion that God is 'corporeal.' As he expresses his view in Proposition XV of the *Ethics*, **'except God, no substance can be or, consequently, be conceived,' from which it follows that 'God is unique,' that there is only one substance in nature, and that this is absolutely infinite.** Since both the modes of extended being and thought cannot be conceived without substance, it follows that both 'modes can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone.'

Consequently, everything is in God and 'nothing can be or be conceived without God.'13 With this metaphysics Spinoza eliminated all notions of a normative world created by God with the intention that it should function in one way rather than another. God does not and cannot knowingly govern the world or regulate human affairs. **Spinoza's one-substance doctrine also eliminates the traditional view that men consist of a separate substance, or combination of substances, thereby possessing a specially close and significant relation to God and his alleged purposes on earth.** This in turn removed the ontological gulf between Man and other creatures and products of nature so that men are left superior to other animals and living things only insofar as they wield greater power or contrive to think more complex ideas.14 Spinoza's philosophy, like that of Hobbes', is inherently empiricist in its premisses at least (and in some respects, perhaps, more consistently so than Locke's), and hence not at all 'rationalist' in the sense Anglo-American philosophers have in mind when they point to the wide gap between 'empiricism' and 'rationalism' – **since, as with Hobbes, Spinoza's one-substance doctrine means that all knowledge of reality must necessarily originate in**

experience, activity, and sensation, given that there is nothing else. Moreover, in contrast to Locke there is no such thing, in Spinoza, as 'faculties' or powers of the mind substantially distinct from the body.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/256/mode/2up?view=theater

For Spinoza, in contrast to Boyle, believed it is the senses, not the intellect, which are deceptive and weak. For the senses can not show those who seek the truth anything except the phenomena of nature, the causes of which they seek to investigate. Consequently, it is reason and intellect which do the real work, albeit proceeding on the basis of experience.85
…

Though Boyle the empiricist was profoundly critical of Cartesianism on various counts, he nevertheless also adhered to a strictly dichotomous conception of the universe, dividing reality between those things made by God proper to be known by man and the unknowable essence of God, the divine mysteries and the supernatural, and likewise regarded motion as introduced into the world from outside by God. He was equally an upholder of a mechanistic conception of reality, claiming that while miracles entail suspension of the normal laws of nature, the miraculous power of God is sparingly used and, as far as possible, operates alongside and through the mechanical laws of nature. **For Boyle, as for Descartes, since God 'is the Creator of matter and the sole introducer of local motion into it, so all the laws of that motion were at first arbitrary to Him; and depended upon His free will.'**89 On this ground, contends Boyle, the possibility of miracles is clear.
…

That the 'mechanical laws of nature' can be superseded, or avoided, is proved for us every moment of the day, adds Boyle with an 'empirical' flourish, by what he calls the 'arbitrarious notions in the human body that cannot be truly accounted for by meer natural philosophy.'93 Notably, the 'proof' our senses provide of man's 'arbitrary' will, Boyle argues, demonstrates that things can occur 'by some other power than meerely mechanical.'94 In this way Boyle propounded a mainstream, broadly acceptable vision of science which, by demonstrating that the laws of science do not govern all reality, **and the possibility of incorporeal powers infusing and transcending the 'regular operations of Nature,' overturns and nullifies Spinoza's 'atheistic' universality and the invariability of the 'regular operations of nature.'**

https://archive.org/details/leo-strauss-persecution-and-the-art-of-writing/page/166/mode/2up?view=theater

For reasons which we shall state later, Spinoza tries to present his views about theological subjects with a great deal of restraint. <u>There is, however, one fundamental point regarding which he consistently refuses to make any unambiguous concessions</u>, and this is precisely the possibility of miracles as supra-natural phenomena. Whereas he speaks without hesitation of supra-rational teachings, he consistently rejects the possibility of miracles proper. If he had always rejected the possibility of supra-rational teachings, he would have had no choice but either simply to identify the Biblical teaching with the rational teaching—and this would have been fatal to the separation of philosophy from theology—or else simply to deny all truth to all Biblical teachings as revealed teachings. **The utmost he could dare was not always to deny the fact of supra-rational revelation but always to deny its supra-natural or miraculous character, and he could not do this consistently or conveniently without denying the possibility of miracles proper altogether.** To avoid the break with the Bible in the crucial point, he had to assert that the possibility of miracles proper is denied by the Bible itself. To maintain this assertion in the presence especially of the New Testament accounts of the resurrection of Jesus—of accounts which, as Spinoza admitted, are incompatible with his spiritualistic interpretation of Christianity—, he had no choice but to suggest that any Biblical accounts of miracles proper cannot be really Biblical but must be sacrilegious additions to Holy Writ.31

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/218/mode/2up?view=theater

No other element of Spinoza's philosophy provoked as much consternation and outrage in his own time as his sweeping denial of miracles and the supernatural. In fact, **<u>Spinoza stands completely alone among the major European thinkers before the mid-eighteenth century in ruling out miracles.</u>** Hobbes had ventured to cast doubt on them, stressing that 'ignorant and superstitious men make great wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from nature … admire not at all,' underlining the 'aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended miracles.'1 But equally, Hobbes grants there have been, and may be, miracles, that 'a miracle, is a work of God (besides his operation by way of nature, ordained in the Creation) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation,' and that only the public Church can rightly judge what is, and what is not, a miracle.2 **It is worth noting in passing that Hobbes does not rule out magic either, acknowledging the likelihood, affirmed by the account of Pharaoh's**

magicians in the Book of Exodus, that wondrous events can also occur through the operations of magic.3

Between the rise of Christianity and the mid-eighteenth century then, only Spinoza categorically denies the possibility of miracles and supernatural occurrences wrought by magic. Equally, he was by far the best-known denier of miracles. Thus, the Lutheran professor Johann Heinrich Müller, in his inaugural lecture on the subject of miracles in the university of Altdorf (Nuremberg) in 1714, **declared that among those who bring miracles into question 'Benedictus Spinoza, the most renowned restorer and propagator of the myth that God is not distinct from the universe, is by far the most prominent.'**4
…

Very different in tone and style, if not content, is Spinoza's treatment of miracles in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* of 1670. **The uncompromising formulations of the soon notorious chapter VI 'On Miracles,' or 'impious sophistries' as Henry More called them,**12 **were the reverberate for decades through every land in Europe,** echoed by the numerous attempts to refute them, echoes amplified among other publications by Müller's oration at Altdorf, which includes lengthy verbatim quotations from Spinoza's text.13 **That chapter begins with a clear hint that Spinoza,** one of whose purposes in publishing the *Tractatus* was to weaken the authority and prestige of the public Church with a view to making it easier for his allies and himself to publish their books, **aspires not just to interpret the world but change it.**14 Spinoza openly derides the credulity of the multitude and the nonsensical nature of what most people believe. **Indeed, in the entire history of modern thought, only Marx and Nietzsche have so openly and provocatively repudiated almost the entire belief-system of the society around them, as Spinoza does here.** Most people, he insists, 'have no sound conception either of God or Nature, confuse God's decisions with human decisions, and imagine Nature to be so limited they suppose man to be its chief part.'15

Since 'the universal laws of Nature are God's decrees,' he argues, **it follows from the necessity and perfection of the divine Nature** that 'if anything were to happen in Nature contrary to her universal laws, it would also be necessarily contrary to the decree, intellect and Nature of God or, **if anyone were to assert that God performs an act contrary to the laws of Nature, he would at the same time have to maintain that God acts contrary to His own Nature**' which is absurd.16
…

Later, for the Newtonians and others, the distinction between 'above Nature' and 'contrary to Nature' was to be fundamental. But 'if there were to occur in Nature anything that did not follow from her laws,' replies Spinoza, 'this would necessarily be opposed to the order which God maintains eternally in Nature through her universal laws.' **This would be contrary to Nature and Nature's laws and, consequently, 'such a belief would cast doubt on everything and lead to atheism.'**20
…

By negating God's Will and Intelligence, Spinoza leaves no room for traditional notions of divine Providence. But he adroitly retains the phrase, redefining 'Providence' to signify something altogether different, that 'God's decrees and commandments, and consequently God's Providence are, in truth, nothing but Nature's order, that is to say when Scripture tells us this or that was done by God or God's Will, nothing more is meant than that it happened in accordance with Nature's law and order, and not, as the common people believe, that Nature temporarily suspended her action, or that her order was suspended.'23

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/244/mode/2up?view=theater

One vehement late seventeenth-century antagonist denounced Spinoza as the founder of a new idolatry: worship of the 'spectre' of 'mathematical certitude.'10 Hence Spinoza's conception of truth, and the criterion for judging what is true, is 'mathematical logic,' and mathematical rationality universally applied provides, **from Spinoza to Marx,** the essential link between the Scientific Revolution and the tradition of radical thought.11
…

The rise of the 'mechanistic world-view' commencing with Galileo and Descartes, and especially, the formulation and refinement of the laws of motion, itself intensified the growing conceptual antithesis in European culture and thought between the 'natural' and 'supernatural.' The sharpening of this antithesis, in other words, is a typical and general seventeenth-century phenomenon. Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, Malebranche, and innumerable lesser figures all contributed in various ways to heightening awareness, and stimulating debate about, this growing dichotomy of reality. **Yet, as the Lutheran professor Johann Heinrich Müller averred in his inaugural lecture on miracles, at Altdorf in 1714, only Spinoza creates an absolute and irreconcilable antithesis between these increasingly distinct spheres, or ways of comprehending reality, dismissing the 'supernatural' as a total figment of our imagination.** Re-embodying the principles of classical Greek atheism,

according to Müller, Spinoza is the prime ‘propagator’ and ‘restorer’ of ideas which set the ‘natural’ in fundamental conflict with the ‘miraculous,’ thereby threatening the whole basis of Christian (and, he might have added, also Jewish and Islamic) civilization – ideas, faith, authority, morality, and the political and social order.17
…

Everything that Descartes had said surpasses human understanding, Meyer had stated, can, according to Spinoza ‘not only be conceived clearly and distinctly, but also explained very satisfactorily – provided only Man’s intellect is guided in the search for truth and knowledge of things along a different path from that which Descartes opened up.’21 **In effect, Descartes’ mechanistic world view was being radically extended to encompass the whole of reality.**

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA441&printsec=frontcover

Since “freedom” in Spinoza’s *Ethics* signifies not lack of constraint, but possessing “power,” God is also the only omnipotent being. It is from God’s infinite power and nature alone that things flow which means that nothing can exist outside God, signifying that there is no Devil, no demons, no magic, no heaven or hell, no afterlife and no divine authority interpreted by men separate from nature, only the unchanging, unalterable laws of nature, that is God’s omnipotence which “has been actual from eternity and will remain the same actuality to eternity,”7 **beyond which nothing exists and nothing is exempt.**

> https://biblehub.com/2_peter/3-3.htm
>
> **Knowing this first, that there shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts, And saying, Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things** [panta] **continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.**

Only those who do grasp that “God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same,” are in position to understand “true religion” which is essentially pursuit of the moral and social good of men, some fragments of which, fortunately, are patchily present in (albeit much of the time are also damagingly absent from) every earthly church and religious stream, whether Christianity, Judaism, Islam, or another, equally and without distinction. A further consequence of Spinoza’s proof of God’s existence is that **nothing exists that is more sacred than other things and no one exists who is closer to God than anyone else, rendering all religious ceremonies and sacraments without exception total human fictions, sometimes useful in a limited way, but frequently not.** One readily sees how and why Spinoza’s position looked “atheistic” and “blasphemous” according to the notions of early modern times (and the nineteenth century), but was not at all “atheistic” according to Spinoza himself and his followers.

Because “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things,” according to Proposition 18, and nothing possesses an independent existence outside God, **there is not such thing as either evil or sorcery, wrongdoing in human terms being as much the consequence of God as the purest piety. Philosophers rejecting this conclusion, he says, claim “God does all things for the sake of the good,” locating a great deal outside of God which does not depend on God, thereby delimiting his infinite presence and power, creating imaginative schemas installing limits on God’s power, intellect, and will. This, the usual approach when envisaging a benevolent God, Spinoza rejects as an “absurdity” not worth discussing.**8 God is neither benevolent nor malevolent. God’s attributes are eternal and immutable, “all things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes (Proposition 21) have always had to exist and be infinite”; so something determined to produce a given effect “has necessarily been determined in this way by God, and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an effect (Proposition 26).” Consequently, nothing occurs contrary to the fixed laws of nature and there have never been or could be any miracles or revelation.
…

A further consequence is that there can be no “creation” in the sense of giving specific existence to defined formal essences such as mankind, or indeed anything else not resulting from pure natural cause and effect shaping things through the passage of time. There can be no such thing as an essence remaining when an essential feature characterizing that thing is removed.9
…

Since only one substance exists, everything men and animals think, will, and imagine, corresponds somehow to what is real **and, rather than being right or wrong, is really, in Spinoza’s terms, either adequate or inadequate.**
…

Since there can be no fundamental gap between human nature and nature itself, what men do is determined exclusively by nature as a whole, and our history is simply part of natural history.
…

Spinoza is especially concerned to reject all aspects of theological thinking that envisage mankind as a privileged segment of nature, all notion that the gods, and later God, purposely designed nature and it plants and animals for our particular use in order to feed and sustain men.
…

In particular, he refrains from asserting the essential superiority of humans over animals on the basis of intelligence or their supposedly being a specific, distinct essence defined by possessing reason. Men are simply part of nature like every animal and, at bottom (contra Descartes), there is nothing fundamentally different about the mind-body relationship in men than in animals, **an outcome enabling him to easily skirt the irresolvable difficulties Descartes became entangled in** when arguing that animals do possess perception, memory, imagination, and experience of passions, like humans, as well as muscles, hearts, and capacity for movement but, lacking souls (minds), are nevertheless unable to consider what they see, form judgements or reach decisions according to rational argument. Thus dogs and horses, like humans, experience fear, hope, and pleasure, and can be taught to perform certain actions when humans give a signal, but do all this, holds Descartes, without giving their feelings or actions any thought. For Spinoza, by contrast, humans possess no thinking ability, or soul, that is above and beyond the rest of nature. **Spinoza, though, it must be said, is not particularly informative on the subject of animal life. For someone interested in dissection and spending much time staring through microscopes, he noted down remarkably little about live bodies in general, animals and humans in relation to animal life.**11

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/774/mode/2up?view=theater

Spurning Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz ‘for having established metaphysical structures on general principles by a priori reasoning,’ Condillac did indeed fervently admire Locke and Newton, and their disciples, above all for relying only ‘on observation and experiment, on accumulating and testing the data of experience, **and on only using abstract terms as instruments of classification.**’112 Explaining Condillac’s distinction between *l’esprit systématique*, the new empiricist approach **which Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay, like Condillac, considered an essential feature of ‘enlightened’ thought,** and *l’esprit de système*, the approach of the seventeenth-century system-builders, Gay stressed that Condillac’s heroes ‘are Locke and Newton,’ two giants, the first of whom ‘exposed the absurdity of building vast constructions on abstract principles’ and the second of whom achieved his great feats by ‘modestly contenting himself with observing the world without trying to create one out of his head.’113

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/158/mode/2up?view=theater

When placed in a full historical context, **Spinoza evidently had no real rival even in England as the chief progenitor and author of ‘that hideous hypothesis,’ as Hume (ironically?) called it, the ‘doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in which [Spinoza] supposes both thought and matter to inhere,’**1 eliminating divine Providence and governance of the world, in other words, the Naturalistic, materialist, one-substance undercurrent culminating in La Mettrie and Diderot.
…

For even the last, the mid-eighteenth century, phase in the formation of the Radical Enlightenment, **the probing towards the concept of evolution from inert matter, and of higher from lower form of life, was derived, as its foremost champion, Diderot, stressed, directly from the doctrine that motion is inherent in matter,** a concept generally regarded with horror and universally acknowledged in Enlightenment Europe as quintessentially Spinozist. **The claim that Nature is self-moving, and creates itself, became indeed the very trademark of the *Spinosistes*. Thus the origins of the evolutionary hypothesis seemingly reinforce Einstein’s proposition that the modern scientist who rejects divine Providence and a God that governs the destinies of man, while accepting ‘the orderly harmony of what exists,’ the intelligibility of an imminent universe based on principles of mathematical rationality, in effect believes ‘in Spinoza’s God.’**2

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.463394/page/n201/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Page one plunges us at once into the maelstrom of metaphysics. Our modern hard-headed (or is it soft-headed?) abhorrence of metaphysics captures us, and for a moment we wish we were anywhere except in Spinoza. But then metaphysics, as William James said, is nothing but an attempt to think things out clearly to their ultimate significance, to find their substantial essence in the scheme of reality,—or, as Spinoza puts it, their essential substance; and thereby to unify all truth and reach that “highest of all

> generalizations" which, even to the practical Englishman,36 [H. Spencer] constitutes philosophy. **Science itself, which so superciliously scorns metaphysics, assumes a metaphysic in its every thought. It happens that the metaphysic which it assumes is the metaphysic of Spinoza.**

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA386&printsec=frontcover

Replying in September 1661, Spinoza assures Oldenburg, **in his earliest surviving letter,** of the pleasure their friendship and unfolding debate, including about Bacon, gave him "albeit I do not think this will be a means of binding you closer to me unless I have your kind indulgence." He fully realized the wide gap between his and Oldenburg's assessments of Bacon's relevance as well as between his and Oldenburg's respective religious views.5 **His own premises about God conceived as First Cause, and substance, he explains, differed substantially from those of Descartes, but also from Bacon's, both of whom, as regards philosophy and religion, in his view, "had gone far astray from true knowledge." This must have astounded, even shocked, Oldenburg.** After briefly outlining his definitions of God, extension and motion and why he thought there can be only one substance encompassing the totality of everything, Spinoza reluctantly passed on to what he considered Descartes' and Bacon's shortcomings but only to oblige Oldenburg, he remarked, **since "it is not my custom to expose the errors of others."**6

Someone with Spinoza's eagerness to keep up-to-date with recent science might well have been expected to scorn Bacon's geocentrism, rejection of Copernicus and heliocentrism,7 and suspensive eclecticism, or persistent disinclination to choose between alternative and rival explanatory models.8 Still, one wonders if Spinoza fully grasped how far Bacon was lionized by members of the London Royal Society as their founding father and chief inspiration, second in importance only to England's monarch himself.
…

Someone of Spinoza's temperament was in any case unlikely to feel drawn to Bacon's view knowledge, experimentation, and fact-gathering as a quest of for power and dominion over the world, or elitist view of science as a carefully organized and regulated pursuit best conducted under the supervision of rulers and courtiers. Spinoza's epistemology from its beginnings in the treatise on the *Emendation of the Understanding* to its fullest exposition in the *Ethics* does indeed envisage knowledge acquisition as a means to empowerment, but less over nature than over our own thoughts, relationship to nature, and state of mind. In principle, Spinoza's empowerment through gaining knowledge is essential to the happiness of everyone but deferential towards nature.10 For Bacon, who lived in great style at his country retreat near St Albans, receiving many high-born visitors, the details and findings of scientific research were less a topic for general reasoning and discussion than an elevated, exclusive sphere, shrouded in secrecy, a special preserve of court and aristocracy,11 **where knowledge progresses less from "arcane learning to public knowledge," as some scholars claim, than from the private arcane to a shared collective aristocratic sphere of carefully guarded group arcana lodged at the heart of statecraft.**12
…

The more specific critique of Bacon which Spinoza offered Oldenburg related mainly to Bacon's epistemology. Descartes and Bacon he brackets together as regards what he termed "their third error," the unfortunate fact, after confusing First Cause and substance, that "they have never grasped the true cause of error." Spinoza agreed with Descartes, Bacon, and Boyle that thus far in history human reason and science had proved astoundingly error-prone **and doubtless sympathized with Bacon's innovative stress on error as being as much the result of internal wrong inference from facts as seizing on incorrect perceptions. But he did not agree with Bacon and Boyle that any of this was due to "the Fall," or that the true exit from human error is by adhering to carefully recorded experimental observations reached under strict conditions while keeping these findings separate from wider reasoning,** firmly segregated from what Oldenburg's colleague, Robert Hooke, the first curator of experiments at the Royal Society, called the "dangers in the process of human reason."13 How can one observe and collect facts prior to evaluating those data, if like Joshua watching the sun stand still, one lacks all critical awareness of one's own prior assumptions when gathering them? How can a strictly cause and effect-based outlook on the world arise from simply conducting experiments? Oldenburg must have been taken aback by Spinoza's full-frontal dismissal of Descartes and Bacon together on all basic premises concerning God, cause, and substance. Spinoza's almost contemptuous evaluation of Bacon meant spurning, apart from its fact-gathering and zeal for experiments, the entire methodological and ideological basis of England's Royal Society. No wonder, when afterwards reporting his exchanges with Spinoza to Boyle, Oldenburg characterized him as a bizarre and eccentric being.14

Despite beginning by saying he would not expand on Bacon's epistemological errors since "he speaks very confusedly on this subject, and simply makes assertions while proving hardly anything," Spinoza launched into a scathing critique. **Oldenburg's jaw must have dropped at Spinoza's objecting to**

Bacon's discussion of intellect and error, presumably referring to his *Novum Organon* (1620): "in the first place, [Bacon] takes for granted that the human intellect, quite apart from the fallibility of the senses, is by its very nature liable to error, and configures everything after its own nature rather than after the analogy of our universe, so that it is like a mirror presenting an irregular surface to the rays it receives, mixing its own nature with the nature of real things, and so forth." Spinoza rounds here on a key feature of Bacon, his belief that the human intellect, aside from fallacies to which our senses are prone to lead us, errs inevitably by its essential nature as well as our upbringing and education, so that it cannot reflect accurately by reasoning **but "imagines" everything it encounters according to its own nature: "omnique fingit ex anologia suae naturae."**15

The origins of human error, held Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, lie not just in the complexity of what lies outside of our minds but in our very thought processes, reasoning itself, having deep roots in human nature and our innate inclinations and backgrounds so that amending our misconceptions is not simply a question of locating mistakes in our reasoning, **as in Descartes and Spinoza,** but of recognizing and limiting the consequences of the inherent error proneness of human reason itself. On these grounds, the new culture of experimental science Bacon founded and inspired demanded purging the mind of its prior accumptions and suppositions, and exclusive reliance on observed and recorded objective tests that do not assume greater regularity and uniformity in nature than is demonstrated **and do not rely to any meaningful extent on intellect.**16
…

Spinoza would never accept that rigorous, mathematically precise reasoning based on correct premises or findings can lead to wrong conclusions, whereas for Bacon mathematics is not a reflection of nature's operations, or key to unlocking nature's laws and secrets. Its usefulness for science in Bacon's system remained in fact extremely limited. Oldenburg for his part remained solidly Baconian, as he showed with his second letter to Spinoza, of September 1661, insisting that "our conceptions of the mind" are highly uncertain since "our mind conceives many things that do not exist and is most prolific in multiplying and augmenting things once conceived" with the consequence that it is hard to see how one can infer the existence of God just from a conception that we have of Him. **Against this, Spinoza insists the human mind and will are determinate parts of a being that is itself part of nature, or in union with nature, maintaining that both our adequate and inadequate ideas hence inescapably follow the same unalterable laws as the rest of reality,** so that men can in fact learn to sift adequate ideas reflecting reality accurately from inadequate ideas that also reflect reality but inaccurately, albeit, he explains in his *Emendation*, exclusively where one learns how to strictly infer one true idea from another, conquering prejudice and the effects of the imagination driving inadequate thinking by developing one's capacity for making accurate distinctions based on true ideas. Our immense range of inadequate ideas that need casting aside are of three types, the false, fictional, and doubtful, **but all are rooted in the human imagination and hence are in union with nature.**18
…

In Bacon's discussion of Bible hermeneutics, in his *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, the Bible is the one text that should never be approached in a purely naturalistic fashion, as if just any human text. "Divine inspiration" is indispensable for interpreting Scripture, held Bacon, who for this reason made no effort to develop a naturalistic explanation of religion. Furthermore, for Bacon, wherever doubts arise as to how to understand a particular Bible passage, the public church must be the final arbiter, a principle entirely alien to Spinoza.
…

Within Spinoza's framework, all parts and particular things pertaining to reality whether physical or mental are reduced to the level of the empirical, the world of the spirit and belief no less than physical objects, whereas for Bacon, Boyle, Locke, and Newton **much of reality is correctly interpreted only via prior presumption of Christian truth, supernatural agency, and "the Fall,"** and hence much of their reality remained "above reason" and beyond experiment, science, and the empirical.
…

Observation of itself is of little use, contends Spinoza, rejecting Bacon's (and Oldenburg's) narrower empiricism and their separation of science from philosophy (and theology), without an exacting, rigorously correct reasoning deriving inferences from it. To this extent, and in his suspicion of pure experiment without any philosophical principles underpinning it, Spinoza was far more Cartesian than Baconian.22 But, for Spinoza, both Descartes and Bacon err in defending "freedom of the will" and, as a result, compound human error by positing supposedly free volitions. **To Spinoza, this meant embracing nonsense not just about human motivation and conduct but also about inference and deduction.** Both Descartes and Bacon, held Spinoza, land themselves in insoluble difficulties concerning the will, by making this a mental construct wholly detached from any unified human body-mind entity, an approach that can only produce endless muddle.
…

Answering Oldenburg's second letter, in late September or October 1661, with a hint of impatience, Spinoza apologizes for keeping his missive to a minimum "for want of time." He was preparing "to go to Amsterdam," he explains, to spend a week or two there. **"From a philosopher," he answers somewhat testily, "one may expect that he knows the difference between fiction and a clear and distinct conception, and knows also the validity of this axiom, that every [adequate] definition, or clear and distinct idea, is true."**27 **Nothing could be more un-Baconian.** The effect was again to highlight the deep divide separating the Baconian from the Cartesian approach. Spinoza concludes by reminding Oldenburg that contrary to his view that "God has nothing formally in common with created things," he maintains "the exact opposite," namely that God is not outside or distinguishable from the reality of all that is.
...

Unlike Boyle and the Royal Society, Spinoza (like Descartes) believed experiments on their own cannot do much, even when offering correct results (which is frequently not the case), without careful correlation within a correctly conceived wider conceptual frame, one consistent with mathematical principles and logic and providing a coherent overview of reality which, to his mind, is precisely where Kepler, Bacon, and Boyle, and to an extent Descartes and the Dutch Cartesians, fell down: **they combined observed results with notions of God and the universe, actual recorded data with residual alchemical and Aristotelian and, in Kepler's case, Platonic mystical notions,** that to Spinoza's mind are fundamentally incorrect. Boyle trusted in the transmutation of chemical elements by chemical processes altering the basic characteristics of the element, thinking actually much closer to traditional alchemy than Spinoza's contrary view. Spinoza died a decade before Newton made his great scientific breakthrough, but no doubt would have regarded his mixing mathematical science with passionate commitment to theology, and attributing gravity to divine Providence, a breach of proper scientific method no less striking than Boyle's.41
...

Shortly afterwards, Oldenburg sent Spinoza two more letters, in August 1663, again touching on his differences with Boyle, reporting **"an excellent experiment [...] which greatly distresses those who affirm a vacuum, but very much pleases those who deny it [like Descartes, the Cartesians, and Spinoza]."**71

https://engelsbergideas.com/reviews/spinozas-enlightenment/

Like Descartes, Spinoza never grasped (as mathematicians such as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton did) that the new science involved a fundamental break with the Aristotelian conviction that natural philosophy could be part of philosophy as a whole. Like Descartes (and indeed even more than Descartes) Spinoza believed it must be possible to deduce truths about the natural word, as in Euclidean geometry, from indisputable first principles.

Spinoza, who earned a living grinding lenses, and who entered into correspondence with the Royal Society, was always hostile to Baconian science. **Bacon, he wrote to Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society, in 1661, was quite wrong to take 'for granted that the human intellect, quite apart from the fallibility of the senses, is by its very nature liable to error, and configures everything after its own nature rather than after the analogy of our universe, so that it is like a mirror presenting an irregular surface to the rays it receives, mixing its own nature with the nature of real things'. For Spinoza, the human intellect is part of the divine intellect, and so, in essence, infallible.**

Israel wants to present Spinoza as the precursor of all that is valuable in modernity, but surely one of the most valuable accomplishments of intellectual life since 1600 is the exploration of the ways in which our minds mix their own nature with the nature of real things, like a mirror presenting an irregular surface to the rays it receives – Spinoza perfectly understands the Baconian point, but cannot bring himself to acknowledge its force. **And yet, it is hard to see how one can present a strong claim for free speech and democracy unless one grounds it in a recognition of our inescapable fallibility – the key word here being 'inescapable', for Spinoza had no doubt that people are, for the most part, every bit as error-prone as Bacon said they were. He just believed that philosophers need not be like other people.**

> https://biblehub.com/luke/18-11.htm
>
> **The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, 'God, I thank You that I am not like other men—extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this tax collector.**
>
> https://biblehub.com/commentaries/luke/18-11.htm
>
> The words remind us—**(1) of the title which Marcus Aurelius gave to his Stoic *Meditations*—"*Thoughts* (or better, perhaps,**

> ***communings*) *with himself*"—in which he, too, begins with thanksgiving and self-gratulations on the progress he had made in virtue from his youth onward (*Meditt.* i. 1);** (2) of the more modern theory which recognises the value of prayer as raising the thoughts of man to a higher level, by a kind of self-mesmerising action, but excludes from it altogether the confession of sin, or the supplication for pardon, or the "making our wants known unto God" (Philippians 4:6).

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/144/mode/2up?view=theater

He who ensures for himself a place in heaven is no longer the god-fearing man who cleanses himself from the stain of original sin and wins his way aloft by his good works – not he, but the Sage, the philosopher:

"The principles I have laid down bring out clearly the lofty character of the Philosopher. … It is hardly possible that his spirit should be troubled. **Possessing by virtue of a kind of eternal necessity knowledge of himself, of God and of things in general he never ceases to be, and true peace of the spirit is his for all eternity.**"2

But the wisdom he has in mind is no cheap, commonplace brand, easily acquired, <u>but something that surpasses the stoicism of the Stoics themselves.</u> Harmonious, and not to be won without a struggle, it is worthy to rival Christianity.
…

To have been the first to reduce atheism to a system, to have given it definite doctrinal form, to have integrated and inter-related its several parts, after the manner of the geometricians, all this was by no means calculated to evoke Pierre Bayle's disapproval. Far from it. Still there was one point in Spinoza's metaphysic which did repel him. If he describes his teaching as the most monstrous hypothesis anyone could possibly imagine, the most irrational, the most diametrically opposed to the clearest deductions of human reason, it was not that he was trying to gave that teaching a wider currency while pretending to denounce it.
…

"That men should hate one another, that they should spring out of a thicket and murder one another, that thy should range themselves in armies to butcher one another, that the victors should sometimes make a meal off the vanquished – **all that one can understand because men are, we suppose, different from on another, and because 'What is yours' and 'What is mine' excite warring passions among them.** But if men are but modes of one and the same being, if the God that changes himself into a Turk is one and the same as the God that changes himself into an Hungarian, then, that there should be wars and battles between them, is the most outrageous idea ever thought of, surpassing the wildest ravings of the craziest brain that ever found a home in a madhouse."1

If we look about for a philosopher capable of standing up to Spinoza on equal terms, capable of understanding his *Ethics* and of countering his ideas with a reasoned refutation based on a philosophy of his own, we shall find but one, and he was Leibniz. **The *Tractatus*, however, was another matter; no need to be terribly learned to understand that, at least the gist of it,** and to quarry it for stones to throw at the Bible, and at the royal power.
…

This explains the widely divergent estimates that have come down to us regarding the nature and scope of his influence. **Arnauld has is that the freethinking school got all their ideas from Spinoza. Jurieu retorts that not ten unbelievers in a million ever so much as heard of him.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/460/mode/2up?view=theater

The tighly linked chain of reasoning characteristic of Stoicism since Chrysippus, 'second founder of Stoicism,'191 and the rigour with which ethics is derived from natural philosophy, seem to foreshadow Spinoza's *more geometrico* argumentation, similarly integrating cosmology, natural philosophy, and the human condition. **'One is reminded' when contemplating the impressive coherence of the Stoic system, as one scholar put it in 1971, 'as so often in Stoicism, of Spinoza.'**192
…

'Piety' or true 'religion' for them, as for Spinoza, depends on acquiring the right notions about God and revering God-nature, as it is.193 **As in Spinoza, there is neither any act of Creation nor an independent, free Creator.** The Stoic God, noted Burmannus in 1688, is strictly subject to fate and wholly immanent in the world and in no sense separate from it.194
…

In Stoicism, there can be no disembodied spirits or supernatural forces any more than in Spinoza – indeed a striking parallel.197 Both Stoics and Spinoza saw men as determined in their thoughts, desires, and conduct, motivated by *conatus*, or their inevitable and natural striving to conserve themselves. This nurtures a pattern of appetite and aversion which shapes Man's will and all his thoughts and desires.198 **Another affinity is the systematic monism of the Stoic vision, in marked contrast to Aristotelianism and Platonism.** Reality constitutes a single coherent whole in Stoicism,

no less than Spinozism, and one governed by the same set of rationally ordered rules from which nothing is exempt, or as Diderot expresses it in his article on Stoicism in the *Encyclopédie*, 'ce tout est un.'199 In both, this identification of God with a rationally structured Nature unencumbered by any purely spiritual dimension in characterized by conceptually distinct, but actually combined, active and inert aspects of nature – Spinoza's *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata* echoing the Stoic 'principe actif,' or God, as Barbeyrac expresses it, as distinct from inert Stoic matter, 'le principe passif.'200
…

Bayle remarks of Stoicism in his *Dictionnaire* that no thinkers stressed more 'la fatale nécessité des choses,' nor spoke more splendidly, at the same time, of man's liberty, than the Stoics.204 **Exactly this same apparent paradox also permeates Spinozism.**

In his late work, though Bayle ceased identifying Stoicism as the prime ancient parallel to Spinozism, citing Stratonism instead, he also highlighted what he now saw as serious inconsistencies in Stoicism, comparing these to contradictions he found in Jaquelot's arguments and others of the *rationaux*. Bayle now held not that the doctrine of the necessity of all things conflicts with human liberty, for in Strato, as in Hobbes, Spinoza, and Collins (and his own late thought), it does not, but rather that it is the Stoic (and Christian) idea of divine providence which cannot be reconciled with our freedom.205 In the *Continuation* (1705), Bayle states that the Stoics, unlike Strato, acknowledge matter to be 'un principe passif distingué de Dieu,' so that they actually believe not only that God 'étoit l'âme ou l'entendement de la matière' but that he does, after all, in some sense govern the cosmos.206

All the affinities between Spinoza and the Stoics in the end, Bayle came to see, are more apparent than real.
…

Meticulously distinguishing the strands of ancient thought, **Cudworth subtly differentiates between authentic Stoics 'such as suppose a Deity, that acting wisely, but necessarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world' such as was taught by Zeno and Chrysippus, 'whom the Jewish Essenes seemed to follow,' and a few later Stoics who should be classed as 'atheists.'**212
…

Here, Stoicism is more precisely 'pantheistic' than Spinozism. 'The Stoics looked at God partly as the divine mind, separate from his work, that is the world,' noted Vossius, 'and partly as that spirit, mixed in with the world which animates and governs it.'222 When, on the other hand, Spinoza says all things are in God, he means not that there is a divine spirit permeating the whole but that the parts cohere into the whole and the whole governs the parts. The Stoic world-soul is replaced by a blind, unknowing, mechanistic process.
…

Identification of God with Nature in Spinozism is more total than in Stoicism and the monism more consistent.225 **A clear divergence between Stoic divine providence and Spinoza's determinism (and Bayle's Stratonism), and one which, according to Bayle in the *Continuation*, entails an insoluble contradiction, is that where evil remains strictly neutral, in Strato and Spinoza, an unavoidable necessity for which no one is morally responsible, the difference between good and bad, virtue and vice, being like that between pleasure and pain,**226 **it is quite otherwise in Stoicism. For the Stoics, argues Bayle, must claim the evils afflicting men are essential to the health of the universe, 'et à la félicité de Dieu.'**227 Upholding divine providence, like Zeno, Chrysippus, and Epictetus, it is unavoidable, however difficult, to claim God intends only the good and frowns on evil and, therefore, that what seems evil to us cannot be evil to him. Chrysippus' efforts on this question Bayle dismisses as absurdly contradictory and those of the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius (ruled AD 161-80) even more so.228
…

What has aptly been termed the 'transcendent naturalism' of the Stoics is anchored in their conception of human life as part of a rational whole **which meant that for them, no less than for Aristotle, there is a τέλος, or goal of life which frames their moral philosophy, except that in Aristotle the 'end' of Man is a more localized phenomenon less tied to the world order than in Stoicism.**232
…

And to live thus, 'according to the harmony of the divinity in each of us with the will of the administrator of the universe,' is the life of virtue ensuring a smooth and happy flow of life.234 Hence, in Stoicism divine providence both wills and expects a particular ethical response from Man and this is why, in Stoicism, virtue is unitary and indivisible – something one either has or lacks.235 **This claim that Man's soul is part of God struck Bayle as a thoroughly 'mauvais dogme.'**236

Spinoza, on the other hand, as Nietzsche was later delighted to discover,237 **spurns all teleology, Stoic, Aristotelian, or any other, in depicting nature.**238 This results in an unbridgeable difference between the two ethical structures, the actively providential structure of the Stoic cosmos consciously framing the principles of human nature and virtue in ways inconceivable in Spinoza.239 Admittedly, Spinoza grants that all creatures are motivated by their *conatus*, or internalized drive for self-preservation and advantage. But he does not maintain, like the Stoics, that this is ordained by an all-seeing, rational providence which ensures that creatures should so function and evolve, thereby imparting an absolute quality to the concepts of 'good' and 'bad.'240 **Moreover, where Stoic *conatus*, stressing preservation and realization of the self, was formulated partly against Epicureanism with its claim that pleasure is the universal basis of human motivation, Spinoza merges the previously opposed Stoic and Epicurean principles, subsuming pleasure within his conception of Man's instinctive pursuit of happiness, and avoidance of unhappiness, the driving mechanism of Man's *conatus*.**241

> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Abook%3Dpos%3D3%3Asection%3D119
>
> Let us now recapitulate briefly. [119] As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed[1] to moral rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. **And therefore Calliphon and Dinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they imagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure with moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast!** But moral rectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why, the supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and mixture of absolutely contradictory qualities.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1149&printsec=frontcover

Spinoza had a stoical, imperturbable character [van een stoiquen of ongevoeligen imborst was], Van der Spijck's wife, Margareta Ketteringh, recalled in conversation with Colerus, always showing patient endurance and not complaining about his "wasting disease," or any ailments. So pronounced was this feature of his personality that "he often chided others," she added, "when they complained or showed themselves cowardly and faint-hearted about their illnesses."22

https://sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/corr/corr56.htm

But I answer, **that as it is clear that chance and necessity are two contraries, so is it also clear, that he, who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature, must utterly deny that the world has been made by chance; whereas, he who affirms, that God need not have made the world, confirms, though in different language, the doctrine that it has been made by chance;** inasmuch as he maintains that it proceeds from a wish, which might never have been formed. However, as this opinion and theory is on the face of it absurd, it is commonly very unanimously admitted, that God's will is eternal, and has never been indifferent; hence it must necessarily be also admitted, you will observe, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature. Let them call it will, understanding, or any name they like, they come at last to the same conclusion, that under different names they are expressing one and the same thing. If you ask them, whether the divine will does not differ from the human, they answer, that the former has nothing in common with the latter except its name; especially as they generally admit that God's will, understanding, intellect, essence, and nature are all identical; **so I, myself, lest I should confound the divine nature with the human, do not assign to God human attributes, such as will, understanding, attention, hearing, &c.** I therefore say, as I have said already, that *the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature, and that it has not been made by chance*.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA218#v=onepage&q&f=false

Zeno is reported to have said that "the whole world and heaven are the substance of god" (Diog. Laert. 7.148).2 **Spinoza argued in his *Ethics* that "[e]xcept God, no substance can be or be conceived"** (IP14).3
…

One source reported of the Stoics, "The things which happen first become causes to those which happen after them. **In this way all things are bound together, and neither does anything happen in the world such that something else does not unconditionally follow from it and become causally attached to it,** nor can any of the later events be severed from the preceding events as so as not to follow from one of them."6 Spinoza wrote, "Every individual thing, i.e., anything whatever which is finite and has a determinate existence cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause" (IP28). For both Stoics and Spinoza, all objects are effects necessitated by their causes. **Both parties would like William James's depiction of the universe as an "iron block," wherein "those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb:**

the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible" (W. James 1956: 150).
…

At the same time as Stoics and Spinoza advocate metaphysical monism with the accompanying thesis that the one thing has supreme causal efficacy, they do not eliminate the phenomena of ordinary experience. Horses, the planet Earth, Winston Churchill and other objects of our day-to-day lives are real: they are situated in a causal stream, which ensures that they have causal efficacy even as they are being caused to act. Spinoza called such beings modifications of the one substance or, more simply, "modes."7 **Stoics did not have a technical term equivalent to Spinoza's "modes" but it is clear they were equally determined to preserve individual beings' reality and power.**8
…

In a letter written at the end of his life Spinoza said, "the fatalistic necessity of all things and action" forms "the principal basis of all the contents of the [*Ethics*]" (Letter 75). He argues, "this inevitable necessity of all things does not do away with either divine or human laws … [W]hether the good that follows from virtue … emanates from the necessity of the divine nature, it will not on that account be more or less desirable" (ibid.). On the Stoic side, they believed that although everything is fated to occur exactly as it does, it is not the case that "the bestowal of privilege and correction do not exist. But if this is so, all the things mentioned remain, even if all things come about in accordance with fate – right and wrong actions, honours, punishments, bestowals of privilege, commendations and censures."10

Let us leave metaphysics behind. While Stoics and Spinoza devoted enormous attention to problems of metaphysics and epistemology, both parties would have regarded the work which they undertook in those domains as ultimately justified by the practical rewards it had to offer. In the Preface to Part II of his *Ethics*, **Spinoza says that he will proceed to deduce only those conclusions from Part I which "can lead us as it were by the hand to the knowledge of the human mind and its utmost blessedness."** Likewise, the Stoic protagonist in Cicero's *De finibus* argues that one has to study physics only because knowledge of physics will help one live a better life: "one cannot make correct judgements about good and evil unless one understands the whole system of nature … **Those ancient precepts of the wise that bid us to 'respect the right moment,' 'follow god,' 'know oneself,' and 'do nothing in excess' cannot be grasped in their full force without a knowledge of physics**" (*Fin.* 3.73; Cicero 2001: 88).
…

Diogenes Laertius writes, "[The Stoics] say that there are three good feelings: joy, watchfulness, wishing. **Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling;** and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned [desire]" (Diog. Laer. 7.116). **Both Stoics and Spinoza believe that the ideal moral agent, the sage or the free man, will experience emotions, all of which will be of the healthy sort.**
…

Rather, we have control in the sense that "it depends on you, on the kind of person you are, whether you give assent" (Frede 2011: 81). Spinoza would have no patience for such a subtle position. He bluntly declares, **"The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one"** (IP32).17

Another major source of disagreement would be over cosmic teleology, the thesis that the universe has an end or purpose, and divine providence, the thesis that the universe is arranged by God to benefit human beings. These ideas were central to Stoicism.18 **They were also completely rejected by Spinoza.**19

> 19. See esp. IApp. **Spinoza is especially targeting divine providence taken as expressing the inscrutable will of an unknowable God. If divine providence can be construed in different terms, then Spinoza might respond to it differently.**

Those differences notwithstanding, there is much that is deeply Stoical about Spinoza's thought. Scholars been saying as much for centuries. For example, in an essay possibly written while Spinoza was still alive, Leibniz described Spinoza as leading a "sect of new Stoics" which held that "things act because of [the universe's] power and not due to a rational choice."20 In his famous *Dictionary*, **Pierre Bayle wrote that "[t]he doctrine of the world-soul, which was … the principal part of the system of the Stoics, is at bottom the same as Spinoza's."**21 In the third edition of his *New Science*, Vico argues that because they made "God an infinite mind, subject to fate, in an infinite body," the Stoics were "the Spinozists of their day."22 Leibniz, Bayle and Vico are but three of those who have been struck by how Stoical Spinoza was.

Arguably the most important modern philosopher to be influenced by Stoicism is Spinoza, who was in fact accused by Leibniz to be a leader of the "sect" of the new Stoics, together with Descartes (Long 2003). There are indeed a number of striking similarities between the Stoic conception of the world and Spinoza's. In both cases we have an all-pervasive God that is identified with Nature and with universal cause and effect. While it is true that the Stoic understanding of the cosmos was essentially dualistic—in contrast with Spinoza's monism—the Stoic "active" and "passive" principles were nonetheless completely entwined, ultimately yielding an essentially unitary reality. **Long points out, however, that a major difference was Spinoza's concept of God's infinite attributes and extension, in marked contrast to the finite (if eternal) God of the Stoics: "the upshot of both systems is a broadly similar conception of reality—monistic in its treatment of God as the ultimate cause of everything, dualistic in its two aspects of thought and extension, hierarchical in the different levels or modes of God's attributes in particular beings, strictly determinist and physically active through and through."** He goes on to remark that the similarities are even more marked in terms of ethics, and "Spinoza's ethics becomes transparently and profoundly Stoic." That said, another major difference is that Spinoza did not believe in an underlying teleology to the world. For him Nature has no aim and God does not direct the cosmic drama. **Indeed, as Long puts it: "If the Stoics had taken Spinoza's route of denying divine providence, they would have avoided a battery of objections brought against them from antiquity onward." In an important sense, perhaps, one can think of Spinoza as *updating* the Stoic system to modern times,** a project that is currently seeing a number of concerted efforts.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT965#v=onepage&q&f=false

In one of his last letters, of December 1714, he says of his system of philosophy, based on monads, that it was "exactly via these monads" that "Spinozism is destroyed [le Spinosisme est détruit]," **and that, were there no monads, then Spinoza "would be right."** With this Leibniz became the first of a line of modern German philosophers, Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling among them, acknowledging Spinoza as a great thinker presenting a unique unprecedented challenge, leaving Christianity dangerously exposed: **and that were it not for their own particular philosophical contribution (with only Hegelianism following Leibniz in actually defending Christianity), Spinoza would be right.**96

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false

Whereas Pufendorf found Stoic moral theory very helpful in providing an answer to Hobbes, Leibniz in essence believed that Platonism could perform the same function in respect of the same antagonist.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=WwbswboNmk0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> **But Leibniz was the last of the great Christian Platonists, and left the world just as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant were about to transform and "secularize" it:** Hume by converting morality into psychology ("sentiments" of approval and disapproval disjointed from "reason"),38 Rousseau by reverting to pre-Christian antiquity (the "Spartan mother" with a radically civic "general will"),39 and Kant by rethinking Aristotelian *telos* (in order to respect persons as "ends" who ought never to be treated merely as "means," and in order to define morality as "pure practical teleology").40
>
> https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/47/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But Leibniz was neither a fool nor a scoundrel, **and from the high perspective of his doctrine of harmony he could very easily defend the whole of Christianity.** I say the whole of Christianity, meaning that he defended it against half-Christianity. He demonstrated the consistency of the orthodox as opposed to the half-measures of their opponents. He never wanted to do more than this. **And, afterwards, he stood on that point of indifference, where the most various systems were only various sides of the same truth.** This point of indifference was later recognized by Mr. Schelling and given a rigorous foundation by Hegel, as a system of systems.78
>
> > 78. Schelling and Hegel both used the term *Indifferenzpunkt*, borrowed from magnetism (the point of indifference of a magnet is halfway between its poles), to characterize a philosophical viewpoint uniting seemingly contradictory views (see the note below on the term "philosophy of identity").

https://philarchive.org/archive/FORLAT-2

For the Stoics, *all* things are connected in single causal nexus that they called a chain (*heirmos*) of fate (*heirmarmenê*).14 On this view, everything is knowable ahead of time, at least in principle**.** Accordingly, many Stoics, including Chrysippus, apparently accepted the reality of divination.15 **And Leibniz, too, allows that prophecy is in principle consistent with his system, namely**

because “the present is pregnant with the future” and because of the “perfect interconnection of things.”16
…

According to this Stoic cosmobiology, the divine principle is the “world soul” that animates and unifies the whole cosmos in such a way that all its parts stand in a relationship of mutual “sympathy” (*sympatheia*).21 Cicero thus attributes to the Stoics a picture of the “sympathy, conspiring, and unbroken affinity of all things” (*tanta rerum consentiens conspirans continuata cognatio*) (*Nat. D.* 2.19). The general features of this account of a universal harmony among creatures are not particularly Stoic; its essential elements can be found in Plato and (according to ancient sources) the Pythagoreans.22 What is distinctly Stoic is the marriage of this account of the interconnectedness of things with the rationalism that interprets this interconnectedness as a universal causal interdeterminism.

Leibniz too upholds not just causal determinism, but also this universal *inter*connectedness: “all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean” (*Theodicy* §9).23 **It is in this sense that Leibniz tells us that the true metaphysics embraces the “Stoic connectedness” (*la connexion Stoïcienne*).**24 Leibniz even echoes the Stoic cosmobiology when he says that “everything conspires [*sumpnoia panta*] in the universe, as Hippocrates says of the human body.”25
…

For example, Note U of Bayle’s *Dictionary* entry on Epicurus contains a lengthy extract from Cicero’s *De fato* 22-5 (in LS 20E) regarding alternatives to Chrysippus’s Stoic conception of fate. In Leibniz’s own comment on Bayle, he shares, or rather amplifies, Cicero’s dismissive attitude toward the swerve of Epicurus and Lucretius, calling it a “comical” self-contradiction (*Theodicy* §321). **But Leibniz faults Cicero (and Bayle) for taking Carneades’s revision to be an improvement: it merely obscures the same absurdity of the swerve by transferring the uncaused motion from the body to the soul “where it is easier to confuse matters … as if the great principle which states that nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body”** (*Theodicy* §322; cf. §§308, 135).38 Carneades’s alternative seems absurd to Leibniz because he assumes with Chrysippus that an indifferent mind could not cause any motions.
…

For Leibniz, although it is certain that I *shall* choose according to me preponderant motive, nothing *necessitates* me to so choose since that choice is not absolutely (or geometrically or metaphysically) necessary: the unchosen alternative remains possible for me in the sense that neither my choice by itself, nor the whole world that is inseparable from the choice, is necessary by its own nature. **Leibniz famously articulates this contingency in terms of a metaphysics of unactualized possible worlds – something clearly foreign to anything in Stoicism.**45 Despite this, Leibniz sees the Stoics as aiming at a *desideratum* of his own, namely an account of the “third course” (not allowed by Bayle) between the indifference of equipose of the Jesuits and the absolute necessity of the Jansenists and Calvinists (*Theodicy* §370-1) and thus an account of God’s decrees that can “keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and arbitrary decrees” (*Theodicy*, Preface, G VI 37; H 61). **Leibniz thus tells us that Chrysippus “sought a middle course”; the ancient Stoics “were at the same time in favor of determination and against necessity, although they were accused of attaching necessity to everything”** (§331; cf. Cicero, *Fat.* 39).
…

On Chrysippus’s account, all facts about the past are necessary and some (but, crucially, not all) facts about the future are necessary as well. For Leibniz, by contrast, contingency is a feature of the created world quite generally since there would be no logical self-contradiction in things being different than they are. Nevertheless, what Leibniz recognizes and appreciates is that Chrysippus aims to accommodate an indifference of alternative possibilities without compromising the account of the certainty of a future that comes to be through determinate causes. Hence when Leibniz, in the *Theodicy*, identifies figures committed to the offending “absolute necessity” of things, **he points not to the Stoics, but to Strato (the Peripatetic) from antiquity, and to Abelard, Spinoza, Hobbes, and others among the moderns.**48
…

The same accounting for evil appears in Leibniz’s mature thought: **“the most distinguished masters of composition quite often mix dissonances with consonances.”**73 Leibniz acknowledges Stoic antecedents to this view. He cites Chrysippus’s view in this connection that

“there are sometimes portions in a comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend grace to the whole poem” and defends this view from the objections of Plutarch (*Theodicy* §334).74
…

In this way, the Stoics do not simply deny that physical evils are evils, but instead say that they serve a human good or else to punish the wicked. Plutarch complains that on this view punishment would be unjust since the origin of vice is itself “in accord with the reason of Zeus.”81 But Leibniz seems to positively embrace such a view – at least in an early letter: “Taken together with punishment or atonement, sins are good, i.e. harmonious. For there is no harmony except as a result of contraries.”82 **Commenting later on Bayle’s claim that the rationalism of the Stoics leads them to the absurd view that vice is *useful*, Leibniz notes that “they were right, it’s the truth”: without vice, there would be less virtue and it would be less great. And rejecting the ridicule heaped upon the Stoics by Plutarch, Leibniz affirms that even gout can be useful.**83

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page324

331. **The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the Thomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and against necessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity to everything. Cicero says in his book *De Fato* that Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that others were opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); and that Chrysippus sought a middle course.** I think that Cicero is mistaken as regards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and went even too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions on contingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he was justifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher of Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events, denied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this determination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of Coimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion between things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims it, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or determination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the thing in its causes and in its reasons.

332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by Chrysippus; **but Justus Lipsius observed, in his *Stoic Philosophy*, that the passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preserved for us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher** (*Noct. Att.*, lib. 6, c. 2). Here it is in epitome. Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion of all events. Against this is urged in objection, that it follows that the acts of the will would be necessary, and that criminals, being coerced into evil, should not be punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from the original constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence; that souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger resistance to the impressions of external causes; but that those whose natural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to be perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principal causes and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whose rotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape, whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless it has need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the objects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its own constitution.

333. **Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, whether he will or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is almost of the same opinion** (*Dictionary*, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. H). He says that this philosopher does not get out of the bog, since the cylinder is regular or uneven according to what the craftsman has made it; and thus God, providence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render it necessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to the Stoics, evil came from matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said that the stone on which the craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce a good cylinder. M. Bayle cites against Chrysippus the fragments of Onomaus and Diogenianus that Eusebius has preserved for us in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); and above all he relies upon Plutarch's refutation in his book against the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit. G. **But this refutation does not amount to very much. Plutarch maintains that it would be better to deny power to God than to impute to him the permission of evils; and he will not admit that evil may serve a greater good.** I have already shown, on the contrary, that God cannot but be all-powerful, even though he can do no better than produce the best, which includes the permission of evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedly that what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the perfection of the whole.

334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not only in his fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, c. 1) where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a reason which is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies the comparison of a stage

play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarch quotes it himself). **There he says that there are sometimes portions in a comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend grace to the whole poem.** He calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions. We have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy for full understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; but since Plutarch assents to the fact, there is reason to believe that this comparison was not a poor one. **Plutarch replies in the first place that the world is not like a play to provide entertainment. But that is a poor answer: the comparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part may make the whole better.** He replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part of the comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. This reply is of no value either: for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also a very small part of the universe.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=WwbswboNmk0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA260#v=onepage&q&f=false

But Leibniz had already written a suitable epitaph for himself, one which expresses exactly his own view of his life and efforts: “Provided that something of importance is achieved, I am indifferent whether it is done in Germany or in France, for I seek the good of mankind. I am neither a phil-Hellene nor a philo-Roman, but a *philanthropos*.”87 And he had, long since, summarized the whole sense of his social philosophy in a single sentence. **“Justice is … that which is useful to the community, and the public good is the supreme law – a community, however, let it be recalled, not of a few, not of a particular nation, but of all those who are part of the City of God and, so to speak, of the state of the universe.”**88

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eWYyBwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA106#v=onepage&q&f=false

LETTER TO THOMAS HOBBES

July, 1670
…

As I have said, I have always understood your works in this way, and I acknowledge that I have received great light from them in carrying out a work on rational jurisprudence on which I am collaborating with a friend. **For I observed the unbelievable subtlety and soundness of expression with which the Roman jurisconsults gathered their answers which are preserved in the Pandects - qualities in which your own writings strongly resemble theirs. I realized that a large part of them were arrived at almost entirely by demonstration from the law of nature alone and that the rest were deduced with the same degree of certainty from a few principles which were arbitrary, it is true, but drawn from the practice of the Republic.** When I first set my feet in the paths of jurisprudence, therefore, I began four years ago to work out a plan for compiling in the fewest words possible the elements of the law contained in the Roman Corpus (in the manner of the old Perpetual Edict), so that one could, so to speak, finally demonstrate from them its universal laws. **There are many laws which will prove refractory to this method, especially in the Imperial Rescripts, because they do not belong to natural law. However, these are clearly discernible among the rest and will be counterbalanced by the multitude of the others - especially since I venture to assert that half of the Roman law is mere natural law. And it is well known that almost all of Europe uses this law wherever it has not been distinctly invalidated by local custom.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=WwbswboNmk0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA266#v=onepage&q&f=false

That is why he constantly argues against the “dangerous opinion” that “all justice, all morality comes not from the nature of things but from the despotic will of God [*non rerum natura sed despotico quodam Dei arbitrio constet*].”35 If one historicizes and personalizes these dislikes and likes, he is hostile to Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza (as radical voluntarists who deny or destroy Platonic eternal verities), and he is favorable to Plato, St. Paul, and (much of) Augustine – **indeed unless one recalls Leibniz’ prominent place in modern mathematics and science he will look briefly (in the moral sphere) like an ancient chastising modernity.** Robert Mulvaney, in his excellent “Divine Justice in Leibniz’ ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’” (1975), captures Leibniz’ philosophical likes and dislikes, hopes and fears, perfectly when he says that **“Leibniz’ life-long opposition to Cartesian voluntarism and to the Hobbesian-Thrasymachian identification of justice and power” led him to insist that there is “a standard of goodness [which is] objective, so to speak, even for God.” And Mulvaney goes on to say, more clearly than any recent Leibniz interpreter, that this “standard” consists in “the principles of justice contained in the Roman law” – especially when *honeste vivere* rises from “live honorably” to “live piously,” and piety in turn becomes “wise charity” – and that “this makes of the Roman law a considerably more *a priori* body of legal and moral prescriptions than has typically been realized.”**36 **(This correct view would be readily supported by Leibniz’ remarkable equating of Roman jurisprudence with nature, eternity, divinity, charity, and “written reason” in the *Elements of Perpetual Justice* [1695]; that text, which comes from the same year as the “New System” of substances, makes it even more clear that for the mature Leibniz the jurisprudence of the Eternal City is truly eternal, indeed *la raison écrite*.)**37

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false

Anthony Ashley Cooper, from 1699 the third Earl of Shaftesbury, was heir to this line of antivoluntarist argument. His credentials as an anti-Hobbist strongly sympathetic to the perspective of the latitude-men were secured with his first publication, an edition of Benjamin Whichcote's sermons, **the introduction to which presented the sermons as an antidote to Hobbes, for whom there was 'only one Master-Passion, Fear, which has, in effect devour'd all the rest, and left room only for that infinite Passion towards Power after Power, Natural (as he affirms) to All Men, and never ceasing but in Death.'**52 Throughout his life, Shaftesbury's philosophical sympathies continued to follow the latitudinarians' preferences among the ancient philosophers. Indeed, he transformed these preferences into a general theory about the development of the history of ancient philosophy in a letter of 1 October 1706 to the Huguenot Pierre Coste. Much of the letter presents a discussion of Horace, beginning with Shaftesbury's description of his encounter with André Dacier's 1681 edition of Horace:

> I could not but look into Monsieur Dacier out of a kind of insulting malice, to see how he with his Court models of breeding and friendship would relish that place of Horace, which you commend so heartily. … **But Mons. Dacier knew little of the simplicity of Horace or measure of his irony.**53

Shaftesbury then advances his own interpretation of Horace's philosophical commitments, dividing his career into 'three principal states or periods,' that of his 'free republican state,' followed by his 'debauched, slavish, courtly state,' followed in turn by his 'recovering, returning state,' a pendulum movement from one kind of philosophy to another and back.54 Indeed, Shaftesbury argues, **there were only two kinds of 'real distinct philosophies, the one derived from Socrates,' which he calls 'civil, social, Theistic,' which passed 'into the old Academic, the Peripatetic, and Stoic; the other derived in reality from Democritus, and passing into the Cyrenaic and Epicurean.'**

> The first, therefore, of these two philosophies recommended action, concernment in civil affairs, religion. The second derided all, and advised inaction and retreat, and with good reason. For the first maintained that society, right, and wrong was founded in Nature, and that Nature had a meaning, and was herself, that is to say in her wits, well governed and administered by one simple and perfect intelligence. **The second again derided this, and made Providence and Dame Nature not so sensible as a doting old woman.**

The new Academy, according to Shaftesbury, could be ignored altogether: 'it had no certain precepts, and so was an exercise or sophistry rather than a philosophy.'53

Shaftesbury's own philosophy was clearly aligned in this 'civil, social, Theistic' tradition. Can we be more precise and call it Stoic? One might think that one obstacle to interpreting the *Characteristics* in substantially Stoic terms is that the book barely mentions the Stoic philosophers at all, and neither Marcus nor Epictetus appeared in the original index of *Characteristics*. **But Shaftesbury did signal his interest in the Stoics there, albeit in a cryptic fashion: the emblematic illustration on the title page of the first volume of *Characteristics* depicted a calm harbour and a ray of light on a bowl of water, images that derived from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, respectively,** and that were both referenced in a footnote in *Miscellany* 4:

> **Apprehension [*hypolepsis*] is everything, and this is up to you.** Therefore, remove the apprehension when you wish, and there is a great calm as though you were rounding the headland, and all is still and the bay is still: Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 12.22. The soul is like the basin of water. Fancies [*phantasiai*] are like the ray of light that strikes upon the water. Thus, when the water is disturbed, the ray seems too to be disturbed; but it is not. And so when anyone is agitated, it is not the arts and the virtues that are confounded but the spirit in which they exist. And when this steadies, they do as well: Epictetus, *Discourses*, 3.3.20-2.56

Had he been too cryptic? Isabel Rivers has pointed out that for the second edition of the book, Shaftesbury 'added a cross reference to the relevant pages in the *Miscellaneous Reflections* at the foot of the emblem,' to make things a bit more transparent.57 Shaftesbury's contemporaries and near contemporaries were certainly aware of his interest in the Stoics, in any case, and the *General Dictionary*, which was one of the English versions or adaptations of Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, had this to say:

> among the writings which he most admired, and carried always with him, were the moral works of Xenophon, Horace, the *Commentaries* and *Enchiridion* of Epictetus as published by Arrian, and Marcus Antoninus. These authors are now extant in his library, filled throughout with marginal notes, references and explanations, all written with his own hand.58

The depth of Shaftesbury's interest in the Stoics has become clearest in the twentieth century, however, with the publication of his private philosophical notebooks by Benjamin Rand in 1900. These two books, now in the Public Record Office, contain philosophical reflections, organized thematically and dated (though Rand stripped the dates out when he published them), that Shaftesbury began in Rotterdam in August 1698, after he had left the House of Commons (where he has sat as one of the Members for Poole in Dorset) and before he reentered public life as the third earl, following his father's death in 1699. Additional paragraphs were added in two further spells, in England in 1699-1700, and back again in Holland in 1703-4. The contents of the notebooks emboldened scholars to start declaring Shaftesbury a Stoic in fairly unequivocal terms. **For Rand, he was 'the greatest Stoic of modern time,' to be ranked alongside Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius: 'The Greek slave, the Roman emperor, and the English nobleman must abide the great exponents of stoical philosophy.'**59 In an article published in 1923, 'Shaftesbury as Stoic,' Esther A. Tiffany argued that the unpublished Stoic notebooks could plausibly be read as the intellectual foundation for the published *Characteristics*, which had hitherto mostly been interpreted as inspired by the Platonism of the previous generation, and her view was endorsed by Alfred Owen Aldridge in his 1951 study of 'Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto.'60

…

One fruitful way of coming to grips with Shaftesbury's project is to read it as an extended response to the philosophy of the man who had directed his own education, John Locke. Locke never published a major work devoted to ethical theory, however much some of his friends, such as James Tyrrell, were keen that he do so.61 But from the unpublished *Essays on the Law of Nature* through to the two published editions of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, scholars have been able to reconstruct the development of his moral thinking, **which headed increasingly towards a perspective on morality with certain resemblances to that of Samuel Parker, insofar as it combined a hedonistic conception of happiness with the thought that the existence of divine rewards and punishments in the hereafter was necessary to motivate obedience in this world to principles of morality. On Locke's mature view, there were neither innate moral principles nor a natural law that could be known by 'the general consent of men.' For motivation to be rational, it required reference to the agent's good, understood in hedonistic terms. For the natural law to bind, therefore, it had to be God's will, backed up with supernatural punishments for those who disobeyed.**62 For Lawrence E. Klein, 'Though he never called Locke an Epicurean, it should be clear that Locke was a signal instance for Shaftesbury of the infestation of the best thought of the era by Epicurean motives.'63 And as Shaftesbury himself famously wrote in a letter to his young friend Michael Ainsworth, years after Locke died,

> **It was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes's character and base slavish principles in government took off the point of his philosophy.** 'Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) *unnatural*, and without foundation in our minds.64

…

Shaftesbury's theorisation of innate ideas was one decisively Stoic moment in his argument that stands at the heart of his reply to Locke. As Daniel Carey has argued, **Shaftesbury was here 'indebted to a Stoic adaptation of what was originally an Epicurean concept – that of prolepsis, which can be translated as "preconception" or anticipation."'** Prolepses were 'naturally formed concepts; they did not depend on or derive from instruction or from experience,' and they both constituted a truth criterion, for disputed matters could be settled by an appeal to a prolepsis, and made empirical knowledge itself possible, enabling us 'to make sense of experience in the world, to recognise things because we were predisposed toward them.'72 Epictetus spoke of prolepsis in his *Discourses*, and Shaftesbury used the Greek term as the title of one of the sections of his unpublished notebooks. In *The Moralists*, he spoke of 'presentations' and 'preconceptions' in terms that recall the Stoic prolepsis, and in the *Miscellaneous Reflections* he wrote of 'our natural Anticipation,' with a footnote connecting this notion up to the 'presentations' and 'preconceptions' he had discussed earlier.73 Prolepses were innate ideas (although Shaftesbury sometimes preferred the language of their being 'connatural'), but they could be deployed in ways that evaded Locke's particular criticisms from the *Essay*. **'The enormous advantage of the concept of prolepsis for Shaftesbury,' Carey writes, 'was that it implied the possibility of knowledge without guaranteeing it – it was an anticipation rather than a fully formed idea or principle.'**74 Analogously to taste in matters of aesthetics, moral judgment has a natural foundation, but one that needed to be cultivated, and when that process of cultivation or education went wrong, the connatural prolepses ended up being misapplied. **All humans might have the relevant prolepses, therefore, but the fact of observed radical diversity in the world did not in and of itself undermine Stoic claims about the moral uniformity of humankind.**75

The other strikingly Stoic moment in the presentation of Shaftesbury's core moral philosophical argument – another Epictetan moment, in fact – is his brief reference to the 'principal or leading part.' (The notebooks also refer to the 'principal and commanding part.')76 As we saw above, the language of the *hegemonikon* was being used by the Cambridge Platonists; indeed, Stephen Darwall speculates that Shaftesbury might have had access to Cudworth's unpublished manuscripts on the will, which also draw heavily from Epictetus, when he visited Locke and Damaris Masham at Oates.77 Shaftesbury's reference to the *hegemonikon* in the *Inquiry* comes in a passage in which he is clarifying the relevant differences between humans and animals. 'For though we may vulgarly call an ill horse vicious,' he observes, 'yet we never say of a good one, nor of any mere beast, idiot or changeling, though ever so good-natured, that he is worthy or virtuous.'78 **In addition to being generous, compassionate, and so on, one had to be able to 'reflect on what he himself does or see others do' to have the potential to qualify as virtuous, and our affections had to be 'equal, sound, and good.'**
…

With regard to both the prolepses and the *hegemonikon*, **concepts derived from Stoic theory have been fitted by Shaftesbury into a substantially Lockean epistemological and psychological framework.** This made for an attractive argumentative strategy. Considered as an attempted refutation of Locke's philosophy, Shaftesbury's theory was more likely to be persuasive to the extent that it shared its philosophical foundation with those of Locke's own enterprise rather than presenting itself as a fundamental alternative substantially derived from ancient models. In both those cases, furthermore, it was the Stoic element of the argument that did much of the work to drive the argument away from Locke's own conclusions. **The prolepses underpinned Shaftesbury's argument for the natural moral unity of the human race, and, as with the earlier Cambridge Platonists, the argument that the distinction between virtue and vice was to be centered on the operation of the *hegemonikon* rather than on the content of our actual behaviour** provided an alternative to Locke's voluntarist ethics, in which the moral life threatened to be reduced to external conformity to sanctions-backed laws.
…

This vision of the moral life as a kind of psychic harmony intimately related to personal happiness was a broadly Platonic one; the building blocks of the argument that sustained that vision, however, were recognisably versions of Stoic concepts.
…

Shaftesbury's theory might have been republican, but it was emphatically not democratic. Shaftesbury considered moral judgment, like aesthetic taste, to be a fine art that required extentive cultivation in propitious circumstances; indeed, he explicitly linked philosophy to good breeding – which was a Shaftesburian key word:

> To philosophize, in a just signification, is but to carry good breeding a step higher. For the accomplishment of breeding is to learn whatever is decent in company, or beautiful in arts, and the sum of philosophy is to learn what is just in society and beautiful in nature, and the order of the world.94

In Shaftesbury's aristocratic republic, a well-bred sociable elite governed both itself and the wider population. **Shaftesbury may have opposed Locke's philosophy insofar as it seemed to deny us the power of self-command, but Shaftesbury considered that the bulk of humanity did lack just that in practical terms, and although there is no reason to think that he believed that the dogmas of the Church of England were true, nevertheless, he thought that the established Church played an important role in upholding public morals.** For this reason, Shaftesbury always sought to dissociate himself from those contemporary Deists – many of whom he knew well – who were critics of the Church, and who sought to undermine its privileged role in public life.
…

The question of sedition loomed large for Shaftesbury, given his own lineage. His grandfather, the first earl, was the most controversial figure at the centre of the politics of what has come to be called the exclusion crisis, or the attempt by the opposition Whigs to get the Duke of York excluded from the line of succession to the throne in 1680-81 on the grounds of his adherence to the Roman Church.
…

For John Dryden, in 'Absalom and Achitophel,' widely regarded as the finest satire in the English language, the first earl (Achitophel) was 'For close designs, and crooked counsels fit; / Sagacious, bold, and turbulent of wit; / Restless, unfixed in principles and place; / In power unpleased, impatient of disgrace.'96 In his essay, *Sensus communis*, the first earl's grandson, the third earl, presented a novel perspective on the politics of sedition.

Shaftesbury began his discussion of the matter by expressing surprise that anyone could subscribe to the Hobbesian view that society and government are both artificial. 'For my own part,' he observed, 'this herding principle and associating inclination is seen so natural and strong in most men, that one might readily affirm it was even from the violence of this passion that so much disorder arose in the general society of mankind.'97 The problems of faction and sedition arose from an excess of sociability, not from its deficiency. **In smaller groups it was easier to discern the general good, but on a much larger scale, 'Universal good, or the interest of the world in general, is a kind of remote philosophical object,'** and it was not possible readily to apprehend 'a national interest, or that of a whole people, or body politic.' Men therefore congregated 'in less parties,' where they 'may be intimately conversant and acquainted with one another' and could 'better taste society, and enjoy the common good and interest of a more contracted public.'98
…

Far from the seditious politician being the self-absorbed, proud man portrayed by the Jacobean anti-Stoics, for Shaftesbury, **'the very spirit of faction, for the greatest part, seems to be no other than the abuse or irregularity of that social love, and common affection, which is natural to mankind,'** so that it was 'of all characters, the thorough-selfish one is the least forward in taking party.'102
…

Following the latitudinarians and the Cambridge Platonists, Shaftesbury was consistently hostile to those who emphasised divine rewards and punishments as the key motivation for adhering to religion.116
…

Shaftesbury's God was not, in Darwall's words, 'the God of orthodox Christianity Who transcends nature and consigns mortals to a supernatural heaven or hell but an organizing presence immanent in nature.'118 While Shaftesbury was familiar with the language of Deism, it was not a language he much used, and certainly not to describe his own position, which he considered straightforwardly theist.119

In the literature of the Deists, Stoic themes make their appearance from time to time. **Jonathan Israel has drawn attention to Anthony Collins's insistence in his *Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty* of 1717 that the latter's argument be understood as descending from the Stoics rather than from the Epicureans, for (he maintained) not only were the Epicureans on the side of the libertarians in this controversy but their 'absurd principles' could not be used to ground anything at all.**120 The key issue in this section of his argument turned on the question of religiosity: Collins was distancing himself from the '*Epicurean Atheists*, who were the most popular and most numerous sect of the *Atheists* of antiquity,' as well as being 'the great asserters of *Liberty*,' to identify his argument with that of 'the *Stoicks*, who were the most popular and most numerous sect among the religionaries of antiquity' and 'the greater asserters of fate and necessity.'121 **In the Latin liturgy that John Toland presented in his *Pantheisticon* of 1720, he imagines his pantheists chanting Stoic slogans.** 'To lead a happy Life Virtue alone is sufficient / And is to itself an ample Reward,' they declaim; and when the president follows up with 'What's Honest is the sole Good,' the response comes, 'Neither is there any Thing useful but what is laudable.'122

When Samuel Clarke gave the Boyle Lectures in 1705, against the Deists and in defence of Christian orthodoxy, **he argued that 'whoever denies a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, must of necessity by a chain of unavoidable Consequences be forced to recur to downright Atheism.' The only possible 'middle Opinion,' he judged, was 'that Assertion of the *Stoicks*' that 'in all Cases and under all Circumstances' virtue was 'absolutely *Self-sufficient* to its own Happiness.'**

https://www.academia.edu/19876318/Stoicism_on_the_Threshold_of_the_Scottish_Enlightenment

Just as an aside, incidentally, **it's very striking, at least to me, that in Charles Taylor's new and enormous book, *A Secular Age*, he argues that the two key historical moments that made modern secularism possible were Neo-Stoicism on the one hand and what he calls Providential Deism on the other hand:** in his own distinctive and still quite Hegelian idiom, he writes that "Neo-Stoicism is the zig to which Deism will be the zag." Whatever we think of Taylor's general argument, though, **we can certainly take the third Earl of**

Shaftesbury's private notebooks as an excellent example of the kind of response I'm talking about, drawing heavily on the later Roman Stoics in fashioning a sharp alternative to conventional Christian cosmologies. These notebooks were published by Benjamin Rand under the title, *Philosophical Regimen*; the originals are preserved in the Public Record Office; **and they are thoroughly laced with quotations from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.512045/page/45/mode/2up?view=theater

England was his place of refuge. **[1726]** Newton was no more; but his spirit was infused into his countrymen, whom he had taught to trust to experiment, and calculation only in the study of nature. Locke, whose death was likewise recent, had been the first to give the theory of the human understanding founded on experience, and to show the path which may safely be followed in metaphysical pursuits. **The philosophy of Shaftesbury, commented on by Bolingbroke, and embellished by the versification of Pope, had given birth in England to that deism which announced morality, founded on motives such as might affect great minds without offence to reason.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA140#v=onepage&q&f=false

Among the most notable early eighteenth-century formulations of radical "deism" denouncing superstition, persecution, and all stirring of collective fury against victims using theological notions, figured the *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm* (1708) by Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), **a work tending to outright rejection of all previous philosophy and theology.**51

Shaftesbury chose ridicule as his favored device for attacking institutionalized theology along with what he saw as its crutches – obsolete metaphysical and moral philosophy.52 **First and perhaps profoundest of the philosophical influences on Diderot,** Shaftesbury's secular philosophical cult of "moral sentiment" proved attractive to several later eighteenth-century French and other freethinkers.53 Like the Dutch *cercle* of the 1660s, but unlike Hobbes, Locke, and the "Christian deists" including Chubb, Shaftesbury offered a purely natural morality wholly independent of Revelation and religion.54 **Where La Mettrie and Helvétius identified the self-seeking quest for pleasure as the key to understanding human conduct, sympathy, and morality, Diderot and d'Holbach followed Shaftesbury in viewing pleasure as an inadequate basis for explaining human aspirations and morality.** His non-Epicurean conception of "virtue" Shaftesbury viewed as central to, and inherent in, absolute universal truth, in his eyes something quite separate from theology and religion Christian or otherwise. It was a striking philosophical departure, **exalting a "virtue" like that of the ancient Stoics,** as a worldly necessity for all men, something universal, essential to happiness and vital for a sound politics.

Seeking to detach morality from religion, Shaftesbury moved to dismantle Locke, for whom, as Jefferson too later objected, Revelation and morality were closely linked, and ultimately inseparable.55 Here Shaftesbury shared common ground with Bayle, whom he got to know personally during the nine months he spent in Rotterdam down to April 1699. Nevertheless, although these two highly gifted savants appear to have discussed philosophy during their conversations in Holland, and while Bayle had a high regard for the English lord, whom he addresses, in the surviving letters between them, with great deference, there is no indication that they proceeded far together, as regards serious dialogue. **Despite agreeing about "virtuous atheists" and being equally keen to separate morality from faith, Shaftesbury seems to have felt that he shared few points of view with the exiled Huguenot.** Bayle's letters to Shaftesbury, after 1699, mostly concern recommended rare and expensive volumes, often classical works offered at Rotterdam book auctions, apt for the earl's library at his splendid rural retreat near Salisbury.56

Following publication of Diderot's rendering of the earl's first treatise, *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue* of 1699, in early 1745 (the copy presented to Rousseau is dated 16 March 1745), **Shaftesbury's moral philosophy entered the mainstream French High Enlightenment, and became integral to it. In 1745, appreciable risk still attached to confronting French readers with the notion that morality is inherent in nature's design, and human life, and does not stem from faith or religious authority, but is solely accessible through reason with nothing requiring explanation by divine revelation or churchmen.** According to false details on the title-page (where neither Diderot's, nor Shaftesbury's name appears), the book was published "at Amsterdam" although it was probably produced in Paris.57 Though he translated rather freely, Diderot had vested much effort in the task, and was confident he had accurately rendered Shaftesbury's philosophy along with his own numerous addenda and editorial "reflections."58

Shaftesbury acknowledges that "design" proclaims divine intention and purpose; and it is here that he diverged furthest from Spinozism and showed himself a neo-Stoic. Nature was Shaftesbury's "God" – a rationalist naturalism with a Platonist tinge, steeped in ancient Greek Stoicism, with which Shaftesbury claimed close affinity, formed his creed.59 *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue* views the world as a unity organized under a single set of principles. Passions as

such, for Shaftesbury, are never intrinsically "good" or "bad" but all relatively good or bad depending on their social effects and consequences in different contexts. **Thus, "*Kindness* and *Love* of the most natural sort" can be harmful if "immoderate and beyond a certain degree,"**60 **while feelings like envy or malice, however despicable, originate in excesses of better passions.** Morality hence possesses no existence outside nature and society. It cannot be cultivated in a solitary individual and never depends on, or is revealed by, a divine being independent of nature.61 Politics and morality align at a fundamental level and one cannot possess a proper notion of virtue without grasping that the "publick Interest" is the measure of what is "admirable or blameable," right or wrong.62 Men's passions, all human life, must attune to "the good" in general: the standard of good and bad in our world is how well human actions conform and contribute to "the publick Good, or good of the Species." What is "disserviceable or contrary to that main End" is bad, "corrupt and *ill*."63 Shaftesbury's "main end" lends his ethical philosophy a universalist quality and cohesion, binding politics, society, and morality together and directly clashing with Locke's notion of the coexistence of radically different moral systems. **Where Locke asserts moral diversity, and irreducibility of cultural differences, the impossibility without religious authority of grasping the moral core of the Gospel's teaching, Shaftesbury dismisses this as error rooted in his former private tutor's perusing too many extravagant traveler's tales and inability to see irrational conduct, corruption, and barbarism as lapses from universal moral norms.**64

Another feature of Shaftesbury's moral thought contradicting Locke paralleled Bayle in viewing "the atheist" as no more prone to violate basic morality than others. **"Atheists" could be good while, in Shaftesbury, priests, fanatics, and Jews, his three most morally corrupt categories, are always more inclined to pervert truth than others.** (Unlike Toland, but like some eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century radicals, Shaftesbury nurtured marked anti-Semitic prejudices.)65 He also fiercely resented the Epicurean tendency in ancient and modern thought (which in his schema included Spinozism). **All philosophical moralists of the ancient and modern world, he classified, like Leibniz, "in two broad categories," Stoic and Epicurean. The first cultivate virtue, the "common good," and public-spiritedness and are "real deists"** while the latter, irretrievably "egotistical, hedonistic, and dismissive of virtue" in his Stoic sense, are hence mere "nominal deists."66

By assailing the despicable league of "Superstition and Enthusiasm" tied to political authority that buttressed the despotic structures of the Early Modern world, the Epicurean sect was not wholly devoid, he conceded in one letter (*Letter* 328 [18]), of beneficial consequences**: Epicureanism does help banish the deities "out of the Universe and Nature of Things," and dismantle ecclesiastical authority as well as discredit the obsession with saving souls Shaftesbury ranked among society's worst defects.**67 Basically, though, Shaftesbury viewed Epicureanism, including Hobbes, distinctly negatively, **attributing to them the idea that "it was only *Force* and *Power* which constituted *Right*,"** that there was no natural justice, "no such thing in reality as *Virtue*; no Principle of Order in things above, or below; no secret *Charm* or Force of Nature, by which every-one was made to operate willingly or unwillingly towards publick *Good*, and punish'd and tormented if he did otherwise."68 Rejecting Epicureanism and Spinozism in this manner lent Shaftesbury's thought a moralizing, optimistic gloss **that appealed especially to his Huguenot protégé, Pierre Desmaizeaux (1673-1745).**69

Morality for Shaftesbury is simultaneously a social phenomenon and fact of nature, shaped by human needs, passions, and social impulses, and quintessentially disinterested, a rising above, a transcending of egoism and selfishness, and rejection of the other malignant emotions, or "perturbations" as he calls them, like cruelty, ruthlessness, and brutality, in the interest of the whole, **a principle Diderot inbued from him.**70 Where Locke's morality required a divine lawgiver meting out reward and punishment in the hereafter, such an approach struck Shaftesbury as not just ungrounded but unethical, being crudely self-centered – a restraining of inner impulses to please higher authority in the hope of attaining an ultimate reward. For Shaftesbury, neither fear of Hell nor hope for redemption can be virtuous emotions. **The virtuous man's reward lies solely in the enjoyment of virtue itself (as with the Stoics – but also Spinoza),** like the reward of the elevated person who, through striving to refine his or her taste, savors the universal laws of good taste, the sublime, and of beauty.71 **The idea that disinterested virtue and pursuit of "the Good" are more likely consistently to prevail in the collective drives or impulses of societies than in individuals and their passions no doubt helped Diderot formulate his later pivotal idea of the *volonté générale*, which is indeed closely related to Shaftesbury's as well as the *cercle spinoziste*'s general good, or "publick Interest."**72

Shaftesbury and the young pre-1746 Diderot both seemingly claim the moral philosophy they extol presupposes a benevolent God. Both claim to uphold a genuine *théisme* or deism. Although for Shaftesbury these terms were practically interchangeable,73 he sometimes professed to distinguish between them – whereas "the *Atheists*" fail to do so.74 **Ultimately, though, a troubling swirl of ambiguity, or "imposture," envelops Shaftesbury's benevolent all-knowing God – as with the Stoic "God" more generally.** Shaftesbury's divinity, or rational order of nature, is undoubtedly benevolent, yet "He" is far from omnipotent, indeed turns out to be not just powerless to judge men fit

for Heaven or Hell but no regulator of the laws of nature or author of the principles of ethical life either. Divine providence in Shaftesbury is simply drastically curtailed, carrying no implication of divine governance of the course of affairs and history. His Providence merely lends men their physical and emotional character and attributes while exercising no more sway over their preferences, choices, and actions than other events.75 **The classes of modern philosophy Shaftesbury expressly repudiates (those of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza) denied divine providence, he argued,** by refusing to recognize that the "Order or Harmony of Things in general" includes moral, political, and aesthetic dimensions that are eternal and inherent in that order.76 **His stress on the common good – which some scholars, pointing to his identification of Nature and God, deemed Spinozistic – while representing a parallel strand of Radical Enlightenment that was discreet, conversational, super-tolerant, and gentlemanly, diverges from Spinoza's system by firmly vesting divine virtue in nature itself.**77 In this respect, he struck out on a path from which Toland, reverting in his moral theory to the Spinozist format, notably diverged.78

> 77. See Porter, *Enlightenment*, 160; **the perceived parallels with Spinoza and Spinozism (which I myself consider exaggerated for reasons explained above) have been especially stressed in Stewart, *Nature's God*,** 65, 140, 143, 153, 163, 169, 281-2, 292-3, 297-9, 301, 304.

Divine providence is the rational and benevolent order of the universe and, for Shaftesbury, what lends meaning and moral perspective to men's lives. His ethical principles are fixed, universal, and eternal, leaving no room for changes in the relationship of what he calls the "publick Interest" to virtue. **By contrast, in "Epicurean atheism," including Spinoza, nature possesses "no Intention at all, no Meaning or Design."**79 **Even so, detaching moral truth from religious authority is Shaftesbury's no less than Spinoza's or Bayle's aim,** a separation he resolutely embedded in his republican politics. His hostility to all religious authority, and eliminating divine direction of the course of affairs, **places Shaftesbury firmly among the prime moral and philosophical architects of the "Radical Enlightenment." A vehement streak not just of anticlericalism but revolt against religious authority pervades the entirety of his *oeuvre*.** For this reason, Shaftesbury felt drawn to unbelieving freethinkers like Toland, Collins, and Tindal, and his texts helped turn Franklin, the American Radical Enlightenment's first major figure, into a "real doubter in many points of our religious doctrine."80

Shaftesbury's morality is inherently closely linked to politics, law, administration, and power. A principal function of any valid moral scheme, concurred Diderot, is to enable us to evaluate and judge the conduct of peoples and governments.81 Such a view of morality and virtue, spurred by Shaftesbury, entailed a wholly new, unifying, approach also to history and historiography, elevating history into what it became for Condorcet later – "l'histoire du genre humain." **Here too, though conventionally receiving less attention in studies of English "deism" than Toland or Collins, Shaftesbury arguably stands as the most quintessentially Enlightenment-orientated, the most fully enlightened and enlightening, as well as most radical of the early English Enlightenment's principal figures:** "To love the Publick, to study universal Good, and to promote the Interest of the whole World, as far as lies within our power," he writes in his 1707 *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*, is "surely the Height of Goodness, and makes that Temper which we call *Divine*."82 This distancing of the moral order from organized religion, linking it to human advancement in politics and social organization, is a recurring theme in Shaftesbury's thought, clasping virtue to his fervent republicanism. Here was radical thought attired in uplifting, beautiful words, **the poetic touch Montesquieu acknowledges in his *Pensées* when accounting Plato, Malebranche, Montaigne, and "milord Shaftesbury" to be philosophy's "quatre grands poètes."**83

The universal character of Shaftesbury's moral criticism is striking. Abjuring contractarian political thought in the manner of Hobbes and Locke, he broke with conventional thinking and **underlined the systematic quality of his cosmopolitanism of virtue and moral universalism. His mankind was a moral unity in characteristics, aptitudes, and needs in an age of rapid European expansion overseas, trends with which his grandfather, the first earl, had been closely associated. The latter's secretary, Locke, had contributed projects and plans to promote colonial settlement in North America,** and while it is doubtless true that some scholars have significantly overstated Locke's complicity in justifying slavery, and in propagating unflattering perceptions of the different, the exotic, and the unchristian, he was at best ambivalent about black slavery and seizure of land formerly belonging to Native Americans; equally, while Locke did not advocate outright intolerance of Catholics and Catholicism, he certainly heavily circumscribed and qualified that toleration.84 **By contrast, the third earl roundly rejects all suggestion that Europeans possessed superior rights or virtues arising from their beliefs or Protestant commitments.** Mocking the contemporary public's thirst for whatever was "most unnatural and monstrous," deriding the "credulous Mr Locke's willingness to believe wild stories about savage tribes of the New World,"85 **Shaftesbury combined rejection of moral relativism with aversion to arrogant Eurocentrism in travel literature, and all suggestion that savage, exotic peoples were morally of a lower status to those who pass as "Christians."**

…

The Marxist social theorist and historian Neil Davidson claims the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) was, for Shaftesbury, **the "latest instalment in the inter-systemic conflict between England, centre of the still insecure capitalist order (with some support from the declining United Provinces), and France, the dominant feudal absolutist power.**"86 What transpired during the closing years of the seventeenth century and opening years of the eighteenth in Shaftesbury's eyes, was indeed an inter-systemic struggle, but not between rival economic and social systems. Rather than a struggle between capitalism and feudalism, the ideological war into which he threw himself aimed to thwart Louis XIV's "universal monarchy," and prevent monarchy buttressed by organized religion frustrating hopes for republican emancipation of society, and free mankind from overweening absolutism, intolerance, "superstition," and ecclesiastical tutelage of the individual.

The conflict between the rival powers stemming from the Glorious Revolution, Shaftesbury viewed as a political and social conflict certainly, a conflict of world-systems and institutions, but especially a war of philosophy on ignorance and superstition, freethinking versus bigotry, human dignity versus servility, piety and fanaticism, Enlightenment against Counter-Enlightenment. **If less openly confrontational than his conspiratorial grandfather, the first earl, Toland, or Collins,** Shaftesbury was no less contemptuous of monarchy, conventional religiosity, and everything broadly accepted. **He was a classic radical enlightener in tying rejection of religious authority to democratizing republicanism. Urging "frequent parliaments," like Toland, he felt dissatisfied with the Glorious Revolution, shocked by the court influence and corruption that flourished under William III and subsequently. "He saw so many of those, who were zealous for the Revolution so much pervert the design of it," remarked Toland, "and so willfully endeavouring to frustrate the chief ends of it, that he could attribute it to nothing but court-influence, which at length turn'd his stomach at times against the court itself."**87 This could not estrange him from 1688 as such, but did lead "him to a hearty contempt and detestation of many Revolutioners."88

The aim of his *A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm* was not to persuade readers that organized religion breeds rigid severity, intolerance, mass devotion, superstition, and a destabilizing zeal menacing everyone; all this Shaftesbury considered too obvious to require explanation. He aimed to convince rather that the menace collective religious passion and dogmatism pose to society and individual must be fought by the virtuous for social and political reasons, and combated in the appropriate manner – gently, without fanaticism, without repression or persecution, with a tolerant eye deploying reason alone and all reason's critical tools – not least ridicule and laughter. **The latter was a resource reason had too often neglected hitherto in mankind's ceaseless and unremitting war against the ferocity and stupidity of collective religious fervor.**89 In this conflict of values, Britain and Holland were thankfully gaining ground: "there is a mighty Light which spreads its self over the world," he assured Le Clerc, in March 1706, eighteen months after the Anglo-Dutch victory at Blenheim (August 1704), **thanks to "those two free Nations of England and Holland; on whome the Affairs of all Europe now turn: and if Heaven sends us soon a peace suitable to the great Successes we have had, it is impossible but Letters and Knowledge must advance in greater Proportion than ever."**90

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/348/mode/2up?view=theater

Shaftesbury especially took an elevated view of the global Nine Years War (1688-97) with Louis XIV and James II, convinced 'our alliance and union with the Dutch' would contribute to the future 'happiness of Europe, by carrying the point of liberty and a balance further than first intended, or thought of; **so as to bring not Europe only but Asia (which is now concern'd) and in a manner the whole world under one community; or at least to such a correspondence and intercourse of good offices and mutual succour, as may render it a more humane world than it was ever known and carry the interest of human kind to a greater height than ever.**'15
…

Shaftesbury's conception of the 1688 Revolution, which he judged the decisive moment the English won their liberty and the power of 'doing good' in the world, was rooted not only in his republican ideology but also his – and Molesworth's, Toland's, and Collins's – lifelong quest, profoundly influenced by the Greeks, to construct 'a system of virtue independent of religion, or the belief of a Deity.'19 While Shaftesbury's professed theism was doubtless genuine, and fervent 'benevolence' and aristocratic sensitivity too much for the down-to-earth Mandeville, divine providence in his philosophy, differently from in Voltaire, nevertheless plays hardly any part in fashioning the new moral, political, and cultural order he aspired to build on human nature alone. **A declared opponent of 'atheism,' reluctant to be associated with the less respectable Toland and Collins, he too nevertheless sought to uncouple morality and politics from theology** and firmly approved Bayle's principle 'that Atheism has no direct tendency either to take away and destroy the natural and just sense of right and wrong or to the setting up of a false species of it.'20
…

Like Bayle, whose importance he well understood and with whom he remained on cordial terms, he venerated the Greek achievement in all branches of philosophy but, unlike Bayle (and Hobbes), admired also the Greek achievement in politics. Most of all, though, he admired the ancient 'Grecians' grasp of moral issues which he thought altogether superior to ours. **By turns hopeful and gloomy about his contemporary world, he accounted the classical Greeks 'more civilized and more polite than we ourselves, notwithstanding we boasted so much of our improv'd wit and more refined manners.'**22
...

The narrow insularity, chauvinism, monarchism, and growing philistinism of the gentry, London coffee-houses, and indeed Oxford and Cambridge, the menace of small talk, complacency, and a vacuous sociability, filled him with deep pessimism, **lending a special edge to his fierce anti-Toryism and dislike of much of his own Whig party; 'our best policy and breeding is, it seems, to look abroad as little as possible,' he observed sarcastically, in his *Characteristics*, 'contract our views within the narrowest compass and despise all knowledge, learning or manners which are not of a home growth.'**24 **Yet, in a way, Shaftesbury himself, true republican idealist and freethinking cosmopolitan though he was, was part of the problem.** A man of admirable sensitivity, learning, and refinement, his particular attitude to 'enlightenment' reveals, as Diderot grasped later, a delicate reclusiveness and elitist, anti-democratic tendency, **linked to an increasingly gloomy view of the prospects for truly advancing liberty and enlightening and civilizing the masses.**25

In deteriorating health, Shaftesbury early on retired from politics but persevered to the last with his philosophical efforts. Admiring Bayle,26 **he knew Locke intimately but, after 1694, refused all further relations with him,** scorning his epistemology and despising his (in his view) vain, unprepossessing character; in correspondence with others he freely ridiculed Locke's efforts, especially his constant dithering, from edition to edition of the *Essay*, regarding 'liberty and necessity' and categorical rejection of 'innate ideas,' which he firmly opposes in his *Characteristics* (1711).27 In fact, he considered Locke's empiricism too simplistic and unconvincing to require much time discussing. **Antagonistic to Spinoza and Hobbes and especially the latter's authoritarian politics, and more suspicious than they of 'reason,' he freely granted that Hobbes, unlike Locke, was at least a 'genius in philosophy.'**28

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA87#v=onepage&q&f=false

Shaftesbury, no Spinozist but a radical enlightener in tendency, considered Hobbes a firm adherent of Epicureanism, expressing hostility to both Hobbes and Epicureanism especially because of their passive, evasive view of civil society and the public sphere.48

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA132#v=onepage&q&f=false

When the deist earl of Shaftesbury published his *Letter Concerning Enthusiasm* in 1708, a text making no open awowal of deism, and still less of atheism, but urging a wider toleration, and scoffing at zealotry, he provoked a major national furor, **drawing furious indignation from Dissenters no less then Anglicans, all the main Protestant churches insisting on strict application of the 1689 Toleration Act's provisions, and repression of Anti-Trinitarianism together with deism and atheism.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/162/mode/2up?view=theater

Such a perspective could only further what eventually became a basic Spinozist dilemma: liberty of thought and expression include freedom of belief and religious conviction; but how, in good conscience, can a true *philosophe* countenance the churches' sway over the people without seeking to impose curbs, restrictions proposed by philosophy to safeguard the 'common good' and its secular social morality? **Here we see the first seeds of that 'philosophical' intolerance of which the young Turgot, after reading Diderot's first book, the *Pensées philosophiques*, complained in 1746: accusing Toland and Collins of aggression and intolerance towards Christianity, he records that he had heard that Shaftesbury too 'poussait sa haine pour le christianisme jusqu'à l'intolérance.'**129

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/152/mode/2up?view=theater

While Locke avoids direct contact with the paradoxical Substance-God that emerges from his proof, tellingly, his successors in the deist movement walk right up to it and shake its hand. A case in point is Locke's greatest pupil, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. "Is there any difficulty in fancying the universe to be one thing?" Shaftesbury asks in his celebrated *Characteristicks*.69 "All things cohere and conspire: all things are one, and are comprehended in the nature of the universe," he adds in his posthumously published work.70 His defense of a Spinozan necessitarianism is almost strident: "Everything that happens is from the same nature (the nature of the whole), and,

therefore, to be dissatisfied with what happens, is to be dissatisfied with nature."71 **"If any one cause be removed ... the whole (which is one concatenation) must necessarily be rendered imperfect, and hence totally perish," he continues.**72 Of every thing and event in the world, he insists, **"this was necessary, from causes necessary, and (whether Providence or atoms) could be thus only, and could not have been otherwise."**

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/280/mode/2up?view=theater

Shaftesbury, to be sure, has many bad things to say about Hobbes (more on that in a moment), **and he makes just enough noise about the eternal nature of virtue to have been cast as a Platonist or Stoic of sorts.** Yet the roots of his moral philosophy are firmly planted in the immanent conception of his Epicurean predecessors.50
...

Though Shaftesbury's conception passes through an idea concerning "the moral sense" that requires further discussion, **the essential fact is that virtue, as he understands it, ultimately coincides with individual utility.** "Virtue is the good and vice the ill of everyone,"52 he says: "virtue and interest may be found at last to agree";43 and "moral rectitude, or virtue must accordingly be the advantage, and vice the injury and disadvantage of every creature."54

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/298/mode/2up?view=theater

In the eighteenth-century tradition that matters for the Americans, **it is Shaftesbury who – ironically, given his professed disdain for all things Epicurus – best articulates this Neo-Epicurean idea of conscience:** "No creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill without being sensible at the same time that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible creature may be said to have conscience."110

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/402/mode/2up?view=theater

Shaftesbury, too, was a contented, even avid churchgoer. Notwithstanding his overt hostility to Christian doctrine, Shaftesbury maintained that the "established rites" of the English church are "enough to answer to the highest character of religion."23 Bishop Berkeley, the self-appointed foe of deism in all its forms, observed with chagrin that the freethinkers of the age could be counted on to attend church for all the wrong reasons.
...

In his habits with respect to church life, Franklin more or less followed the custom established by his early philosophical guide Shaftesbury. In the course of building his multimillion-dollar business empire, he discovered that he could make many more profitable contacts mingling at the local church than slinging ales at the local tavern. After he accumulated his fortune, he made it a habit to donate regularly to church groups of every denomination. Throughout his life, he enjoyed dropping in for services. On hot days, he liked the cool air; on rainy days, he dried off.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Shaftesbury,_Anthony_Ashley_Cooper,_3rd_Earl_of

According to a curious story, told by the third earl himself, the marriage between his father and mother was negotiated by John Locke, who was a trusted friend of the first earl. The second Lord Shaftesbury appears to have been a poor creature, both physically and mentally. At the age of three his son was made over to the formal guardianship of his grandfather. Locke, who in his capacity of medical attendant to the Ashley household had already assisted in bringing the boy into the world, though not his instructor, was entrusted with the superintendence of his education. **This was conducted according to the principles enunciated in Locke's *Thoughts concerning Education*, and the method of teaching Latin and Greek conversationally was pursued with such success by his instructress, Mrs Elizabeth Birch, that at the age of eleven, it is said, Ashley could read both languages with ease.** In November 1683, some months after the death of the first earl, his father entered him at Winchester as a warden's boarder. **Being shy and constantly taunted with the opinions and fate of his grandfather, he appears to have been rendered miserable by his schoolfellows, and to have left Winchester in 1686 for a course of foreign travel. He was brought thus into contact with those artistic and classical associations which exercised so marked an influence on his character and opinions.** On his travels he did not, we are told by the fourth earl, "greatly seek the conversation of other English young gentlemen on their travels," but rather that of their tutors, with whom he could converse on congenial topics. In 1689, the year after the Revolution, Lord Ashley returned to England, and for nearly five years he appears to have led a quiet and studious life. **There can be no doubt that the greater part of his attention was directed to the perusal of classical authors, and to the attempt to realize the true spirit of classical antiquity.**

...

In the popular mind, Shaftesbury is generally regarded as a writer hostile to religion. But, however short his orthodoxy might fall if tried by the standards of any particular church, his temperament was pre-eminently religious. This fact is shown in his letters. The belief in a God, all-wise, all-just and all-merciful, governing the world providentially for the best, pervades all his works, his correspondence and his life. **Nor had he any wish to undermine established beliefs, except where he conceived that they conflicted with a truer religion and a purer morality.**

To the public ordinances of the church he scrupulously conformed. But, unfortunately, there were many things both in the teaching and the practice of the ecclesiastics of that day which were calculated to repel men of sober judgment and high principle. **These evil tendencies in the popular presentation of Christianity undoubtedly begot in Shaftesbury's mind a certain amount of repugnance and contempt to some of the doctrines of Christianity itself;** and, cultivating, almost of set purpose, his sense of the ridiculous, he was too apt to assume towards such doctrines and their teachers a tone of raillery.

But, whatever might be Shaftesbury's speculative opinions or his mode of expressing them, all witnesses bear testimony to the elevation and purity of his life and aims. As an earnest student, and ardent lover of liberty, an enthusiast in the cause of virtue, and a man of unblemished life and untiring beneficence, Shaftesbury probably had no superior in his generation. His character and pursuits are the more remarkable, considering the rank of life in which he was born and the circumstances under which he was brought up. **In many respects he reminds us of the imperial philosopher Marcus Aurelius, whose works he studied with avidity, and whose influence is stamped upon his own productions.**
...

The egoist and the altruist are both imperfect. In the ripe perfection of humanity, the two impulses will be perfectly adjusted.
...

From these results we see that Shaftesbury, opposed to Hobbes and Locke, is in closing agreement with Hutcheson (q. v.), and that he is ultimately a deeply religious thinker, **inasmuch as he discards the moral sanction of public opinion, the terrors of future punishment, the authority of the civil authority, as the main incentives to goodness, and substitutes the voice of conscience and the love of God.** These two alone move men to aim at perfect harmony for its own sake in the man and in the universe.

Shaftesbury's philosophical activity was confined to ethics, aesthetics and religion. **For metaphysics, properly so called, and even psychology, except so far as it afforded a basis for ethics, he evidently had no taste.** Logic he probably despised as merely an instrument of pedants—a judgment for which, in his day, and especially at the universities, there was only too much ground.

The main object of the *Moralists* is to propound a system of natural theology, and to vindicate, so far as natural religion is concerned, the ways of God to man. **The articles of Shaftesbury's religious creed were few and simple, but these he entertained with a conviction amounting to enthusiasm.** They may briefly be summed up as a belief in one God whose most characteristic attribute is universal benevolence, in the moral government of the universe, and in a future state of man making up for the imperfections and repairing the inequalities of the present life. Shaftesbury is emphatically an optimist, but there is a passage in the *Moralists* (pt. ii. sect. 4) which would lead us to suppose that **he regarded matter as an indifferent principle, coexistent and co-eternal with God,** limiting His operations, and the cause of the evil and imperfection which, notwithstanding the benevolence of the Creator, is still to be found in His work. If this view of his optimism be correct, Shaftesbury, as Mill says of Leibnitz, must be regarded as maintaining, not that this is the best of all imaginable but only of all possible worlds. **This brief notice of Shaftesbury's scheme of natural religion would be conspicuously imperfect unless it were added that it is popularized in Pope's *Essay on Man*, several lines of which, especially of the first epistle, are simply statements from the *Moralists* done into verse.** Whether, however, these were taken immediately by Pope from Shaftesbury, or whether they came to him through the papers which Bolingbroke had prepared for his use, we have no means of determining.

The influence of Shaftesbury's writings was considerable both at home and abroad. His ethical system was reproduced, though in a more precise and philosophical form, by Hutcheson, and from him descended, with certain variations, to Hume and Adam Smith. Nor was it without its effect even on the speculations of Butler. **Of the so-called deists Shaftesbury was probably the most important, as he was certainly the most plausible and the most respectable. No sooner had the *Characteristics* appeared than they were welcomed, in terms of warm commendation, by Le Clerc and Leibnitz.** In 1745 Diderot adapted or reproduced the *Inquiry Concerning Virtue* in what was afterwards known as his *Essai sur le Mérite et la Vertu*. In 1769 a French translation of the whole of

Shaftesbury's works, including the Letters, was published at Geneva. Translations of separate treatises into German began to be made in 1738, and in 1776-1779 there appeared a complete German translation of the *Characteristics*. **Hermann Hettner says that not only Leibnitz, Voltaire and Diderot, but Lessing, Mendelssohn, Wieland and Herder, drew the most stimulating nutriment from Shaftesbury. "His charms," he adds, "are ever fresh. A new-born Hellenism, or divine cultus of beauty presented itself before his inspired soul."**

https://www.academia.edu/35745755/The_Varieties_of_neostoic_Virtue_Erasmus_to_Diderot

3. Shaftesbury: «the greatest Stoic of modern times»

The reputation of the third Earl of Shaftesbury – «the greatest Stoic of modern times» in Rand's opinion20 – has been discussed by several scholars, who have remarked that this eulogy is at least one-sided. In fact, **it is based almost exclusively on the editor's painstaking transcription of the *Askemata*, or *Philosophical Regimen*, the philosopher's personal notebooks written in the years 1699-1702 and filled with paraphrases or quotations from both of his favourite authors of the late-Stoa: Marcus Aurelius the emperor and Epictetus the slave.** The English aristocrat, a pupil of John Locke but in a sense a self-taught moralist and freethinker, drew from both the *Enchiridion* and the *Meditations* the nourishing lymph for his own edification and a therapeutic remedy against the «English malady». As more recent critics have remarked, however, the sources of Shaftesbury's broader theory of morality can also be found elsewhere, in Plato, Cicero, Locke and particularly the Cambridge Neo-Platonists. This means that his idea of Nature, the leitmotif of both *the Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit* and the dialogue *The Moralists*, is essentially eclectic: a *contaminatio* of widespread reflections about the great chain of being, the hierarchy of matter and living creatures, the prevalence of good over evil, divine finality and metaphysical optimism or «theodicy», **in the same sense of the word as Leibniz intended when he declared he had recognized in the *Characteristicks* «presque toute ma Theodicée avant qu'elle eût vu le jour.»**21.

It is irrelevant to decide whether Anthony Ashley Cooper, a rhapsodic thinker and writer, fits more or less completely into Neostoicism or into another of the traditional schools the historians of thought of the eighteenth century still defined as philosophical «sects». His aesthetics and ethics were the very peculiar results of a non-scholastic education and of a lasting, passionate symbiosis with the archetypes of ancient wisdom. **He fully revived the classical ideal of καλὸς κἀγαθός, as referred to by Aristotle and Xenophon, where good taste in the liberal arts is undistinguishable from correct moral behaviour, and «virtue or merit» is the outcome of an inward inclination towards justice and good, the sparkle of a general cosmic harmony.** Shaftesbury put within the range of human feelings, as prior to rational faculties, an infallible «taste» for distinguishing good and evil, the clue of all natural and social affections. **His idea of the original goodness of human nature, in** spite of a certain reticence about its doctrinal basis, is consistent with a neo-Pelagian system of theodicy. In *The Moralists* the author rejected the biblical myth of paradise lost under the mocking metaphor of a classical myth:

> **It was easy to answer every objection by a Prometheus, as «Why had mankind originally so much folly and perverseness? Why so much pride, such ambitions and strange appetites? Why so many plagues and curses entailed on him and posterity?» Prometheus was the cause** [...]22

As to ethics, the implications of Shaftesbury's Neostoic/Neoplatonizing metaphysics are systematically developed in his youthful *Inquiry*. **He devoted his most elaborate arguments not only to deepening the gap between positive religion and morality,** but also to establishing the full autonomy of ethics. For he asked his reader:

> If we are told a man is religious we still ask what are his morals? But if we hear at first that he has honest morals, and is a man of natural justice and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, whether he be religious and devout.23

Virtue, in other words, has its reward in itself and must be pursued for its own sake. No action may be defined as truly virtuous if performed in view of a reward in the hereafter and, inversely, there is no merit in refraining from sin simply out of the fear of future punishment. More generally speaking, generosity, beneficence and philanthropy are not «mercenary» virtues. **If we consider his subtle distinctions concerning the various shades of theism, deism, atheism and superstition, we can realize to what extent Shaftesbury appreciated Pierre Bayle's critique of idolatrous beliefs.** In his *Letter concerning enthusiasm* he fought a noble battle against the fanaticism of the French *Camisards* and in the *Miscellaneous reflections* he ironically discredited the enthusiasm of the sectarian zealots belonging to both the Roman Catholic and Protestant creeds. **This means that Shaftesbury's syncretic Stoicism was implicitly at variance with any form of contemporary Augustinian theology, whether Calvinist or Jansenist.**

https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/142/mode/2up?view=theater

Cratylus,2 **a man prejudiced against the Christian religion,** of a crazy constitution, of a rank above most men's ambition, and a fortune equal to his rank, had little capacity for sensual vices, or temptation to dishonest ones.

2. Shaftesbury.

Cratylus, having talked himself, or imagined that he had talked himself, into a stoical enthusiasm about the beauty of virtue, did, under the pretence of making men heroically virtuous, endeavour to destroy the means of making them reasonably and humanly so: a clear instance that neither birth, nor books, nor conversation can introduce a knowledge of the world into a conceited mind, which will ever be its own object, and contemplate mankind in its own mirror!

Alc. Cratylus was a lover of liberty, and of his country, and had a mind to make men incorrupt and virtuous upon the purest and most disinterested principles.

Cri. [1 It is true the main scope of all his writings (as he himself tells us)2 was to assert the reality of a beauty and charm in moral as well as in natural subjects; to demonstrate a taste which he thinks more effectual than principle; to recommend morals on the same foot with manners; and so to advance philosophy on the very foundation of what is called agreeable and polite. **As for religious qualms — the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, and such matters — this great man sticks not to declare that the liberal, polished, and refined part of mankind must needs consider them only as children's tales and amusements of the vulgar.**3 For the sake therefore of the better sort, he hath, in great goodness and wisdom, thought of something else, to wit, a *taste* or *relish*: this, he assures us, is at least what will influence; since, according to him, whoever has any impression of gentility (as he calls it) or politeness, is so acquainted with the decorum and grace of things as to be readily transported with the contemplation thereof.4] His conduct seems just as wise as if a monarch should give out that there was neither jail nor executioner in his kingdom to enforce the laws, but that it would be beautiful to observe them, and that in so doing men would taste the pure delight which results from order and decorum.5

1. What follows, within brackets, was introduced in the second edition.

Alc. After all, **is it not true that certain ancient philosophers, of great note, held the same opinion with Cratylus,** declaring that he did not come up to the character, or deserve the title of a good man, who practised virtue for the sake of anything but its own beauty?

Cri. I believe, indeed, that some of the ancients said such things as gave occasion for this opinion.
...

14. *Alc*. But, **whatever the Stagirite and his Peripatetics might think, is it not certain that the Stoics maintained this doctrine in its highest sense,** asserting the beauty of virtue to be all-sufficient, that virtue was her own reward, that this alone could make a man happy, in spite of all those things which are vulgarly esteemed the greatest woes and miseries of human life? **And all this they held at the same time that they believed the soul of man to be of a corporeal nature, and in death dissipated like a flame or vapour.**

Cri. It must be owned the Stoics sometimes talk as if they believed the mortality of the soul.1 Seneca, in a letter of his to Lucilius, speaks much like a minute philosopher in this particular. But, in several other places, he declares himself of a clear contrary opinion, affirming that the souls of men after death mount aloft into the heavens, look down upon earth, entertain themselves with the theory of celestial bodies, the course of nature, and the conversation of wise and excellent men, who, having lived in distant ages and countries upon earth, make one society in the other world.
...

The Stoics, therefore, though their style was high, and often above truth and nature, yet it cannot be said that they so resolved every motive to a virtuous life into the sole beauty of virtue as to endeavour to destroy the belief of the immortality of the soul and a distributive Providence. After all, allowing the disinterested Stoics (therein not unlike our modern Quietists) to have made virtue its own sole reward, in the most rigid and absolute sense, yet what is this to those who are no Stoics? If we adopt the whole principles of that sect, admitting their notions of good and evil, their celebrated apathy, and, in one word, setting up for complete Stoics, we may possibly maintain this doctrine with a better grace; at least it will be of a piece, and consistent with the whole. **But he who shall borrow this splendid patch from the Stoics, and hope to make a figure by inserting it into a piece of modern composition, seasoned with the wit and notions of these times, will indeed make a figure, but perhaps it may not be in the eyes of a wise man the figure he intended.**2

https://archive.org/details/worksofberkeley02berkuoft/page/210/mode/2up?view=theater

16. *Alc*. It must be owned there is a fair outside, and many plausible things may be said for the Christian religion taken simply as it lies in the gospel. But it is the observation of one of our great writers,2 that the first Christian preachers very cunningly began with the fairest face and the best moral doctrines in the world. It was all love, charity, meekness, patience, and so forth. **But when by this means they had drawn over the world and got power, they soon changed their appearance, and shewed cruelty, ambition, avarice, and every bad quality.**

2. See Shaftesbury's *Characteristics* vol. III. pp. 114, 115.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Ashley-Cooper,_3rd_Earl_of_Shaftesbury#Philosophical_moralist

His first published work was an anonymous *Preface* to the sermons of Benjamin Whichcote, a prominent Cambridge Platonist, published in 1698. In it he belaboured Hobbes and his ethical egoism, but also the commonplace carrot and stick arguments of Christian moralists.[3]
…

His major principle was harmony or balance, rather than rationalism. In man, he wrote,

> "Whoever is in the least versed in this moral kind of architecture will find the inward fabric so adjusted, […] **that the barely extending of a single passion too far or the continuance […] of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable ruin and misery**".[19]

This version of a golden mean doctrine that goes back to Aristotle was savaged by Mandeville, **who slurred it as associated with a sheltered and comfortable life, Catholic asceticism, and modern sentimental rusticity.**[20]

https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/24838#The_reaction_to_Hobbes

Shaftesbury countered that, contrary to Hobbes, humans in a state of nature were neither good nor bad, but that they possessed a moral sense based on the emotion of sympathy, and that this emotion was the source and foundation of human goodness and benevolence. Like his contemporaries (all of whom who were educated by reading classical authors such as Livy, Cicero, and Horace), Shaftesbury admired the simplicity of life of classical antiquity. **He urged a would-be author "to search for that simplicity of manners, and innocence of behavior, which has been often known among mere savages; ere they were corrupted by our commerce"** (*Advice to an Author*, Part III.iii). Shaftesbury's denial of the innate depravity of man was taken up by contemporaries such as the popular Irish essayist Richard Steele (1672-1729), who attributed the corruption of contemporary manners to false education. Influenced by Shaftesbury and his followers, 18th-century readers, particularly in England, were swept up by the cult of Sensibility that grew up around Shaftesbury's concepts of sympathy and benevolence.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-vol-1-book-i#lf1032-01_head_009

> And here I cannot conclude this Note without a beautiful Passage taken out of EPICTETUS'S Discourses, collected by ARRIAN, in which we have an excellent Argument *ad hominem* against such as deny the natural Inclination of Men to Society. The Stoick Philosopher thus attacks his Antagonists.
> …
>
> **The late Lord *Shaftesbury* has reasoned in the same manner, but with a lively Turn, which gives his Piece the Air of an Original, against *Hobbes,* who with still more Warmth than his Master *Epicurus,* undertook to persuade the World that all Men are by Nature so many Wolves one to another.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA258#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hutcheson's affinity with Stoic ideas clarifies some of his criticisms of Bernard Mandeville, the notorious author of *The Fable of the Bees* (1714/1723). **Mandeville attacked Shaftesbury and the Stoics in an ambiguous Augustinian tone, insisting on the dominance of pride, vanity and flattery in human nature and society, and on the artificiality of human virtues like honor and politeness.**

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA149#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Recent scholarship on the Enlightenment has been interested in the idea that **the late seventeenth century witnessed a kind of confluence of the traditions of Augustinian criticism and the neo-Epicureanism deriving from Pierre Gassendi.**
> …
>
> **Pierre Bayle, finally, interpreted the Epicurean account of human nature as one that was powerfully consonant with the traditional Augustinian account of humanity in its postlapsarian condition.**7 As John Robertson has summarised the Augustinian engagement with themes from Epicurean philosophy, 'it was from this encounter that there developed the realization that a society of purely self-interested men, driven by their passions rather than their reason, could nevertheless survive and meet its needs, with little or even no external assistance from Divine Providence and only limited intervention by government.'8

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/kaye-the-fable-of-the-bees-or-private-vices-publick-benefits-vol-2#lf0014-02_head_011

I am your Convert, and shall henceforth look upon the *Fable of the Bees* very differently from what I did; for tho' in the *Characteristicks* the Language and the Diction are better, the System of Man's Sociableness is more lovely and more plausible, and Things are set off with more Art and Learning; yet in the other there is certainly more Truth, and Nature is more faithfully copied in it, almost every where.

Cleo. I wish you would read them both once more, and, after that, I believe you'll say that you never saw two Authors who seem to have wrote with more different Views. **My Friend, the Author of the *Fable,* to engage and keep his Readers in good Humour, seems to be very merry, and to do something else, whilst he detects the Corruption of our Nature;** and, having shewn Man to himself in various Lights, he points indirectly at the Necessity, not only of Revelation and Believing, but likewise of the Practice of Christianity, manifestly to be seen in Men's Lives.

Hor. I have not observ'd that: Which way has he done it indirectly?

Cleo. **By exposing, on the one hand, the Vanity of the World, and the most polite Enjoyments of it; and, on the other, the Insufficiency of Human Reason and Heathen Virtue to procure real Felicity; for I cannot see what other Meaning a Man could have by doing this in a Christian Country, and among People, that all pretend to seek after Happiness.**

Hor. And what say you of Lord *Shaftsbury?*a

Cleo. First, I agree with you, that he was a Man of Erudition, and a very polite Writer; he has display'd a copious Imagination, and a fine Turn of thinking, in courtly Language and nervous Expressions: But as, on the one hand, it must be confess'd, that his Sentiments on Liberty and Humanity are noble and sublime, and that there is nothing trite or vulgar in the *Characteristicks;* so, on the other, it cannot be denied, that the Ideas he had form'd of the Goodness and Excellency of our Nature, were as romantick and chimerical as they are beautiful and amiable; **that he labour'd hard to unite two Contraries that can never be reconcil'd together, Innocence of Manners and worldly Greatness;** that to compass this End he favour'd Deism, **and, under Pretence of lashing Priestcraft and Superstition, attack'd the Bible it self; and lastly, that by ridiculing many Passages of Holy Writ, he seems to have endeavour'd to sap the Foundation of all reveal'd Religion, with Design of establishing Heathen Virtue on the Ruins of Christianity.**

https://www.academia.edu/20107304/Epictetus_in_Early_Modern_Europe_1453_1758

> The final work I want to consider in this paper is the first English translation of the entire set of *Discourses*. **This only happened in 1758,** which -- given the popularity of Epictetus over the previous two hundred years -- seems a surprisingly long time to have had to wait.24
> …
>
> Her friend the archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Secker (1693-1768; himself a schoolfriend and theological ally of Joseph Butler) encouraged Carter to produce the Epictetus edition, which turned out to be a lucrative venture, earning her £1,000 and enabling her to buy a house in London.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA172#v=onepage&q&f=false

> […] **Talbot later added that, 'It is terrifying to think what effects a book so mixed up of excellence and error might have in this infidel age, if it is not be sufficiently guarded with proper notes and animadversions.'**106 Carter initially resisted, wondering whether any infidel 'will find any great comfort in the study of Epictetus, unless he is perverse enough to take comfort in finding himself obliged to practise the morality of the Gospel without its encouragements and supports.'107 Her resistance prompted Talbot to weigh in once again on Secker's behalf:
>
> > **Many persons will study your book who scorn to look into the Bible.** … You do not believe that any but good persons will read this book. Fine gentlemen will read it because it is new; fine ladies because it is yours; critics because it is a translation out of Greek; **and Shaftesburian Heathens because Epictetus was an honour to heathenism, and an idolator of the beauty of virtue.**108
>
> Carter gave in, and her published introduction was more or less of the kind that Secker had wanted her to write. That introduction began by juxtaposing the Stoics and the Epicureans, **in a manner reminiscent of Pascal in the 'Discussion with Monsieur de Sacy.'** Philosophers of both sects agreed that the 'End of Man' was 'to live conformably to nature,' but they disagreed on what this meant in practice. Neither sect 'seem to have understood Man in his mixed Capacity,' with the result that **the Epicureans 'debased him to a mere Animal'** and placed the human good in pleasure, **while the Stoics 'exalted him to a pure Intelligence.'**

https://archive.org/details/ambivalenceofber0000monr/page/184/mode/2up?view=theater

This passage was in a way turned against Mandeville by John Brown, who suggested that Mandeville's own opinions about human nature might be explained in this way no less than Shaftesbury's:
…

> **The noble Writer is known to have been of a Frame the very Reverse of this: His *Constitution* was neither more nor less opposite to Dr. Mandeville's, than his Philosophy.** His sensual appetites were weak, his Imagination all alive, noble and capacious; his Passions were accordingly refined, and his public Affections (in *Fancy* at least) predominant … Among the *Epicureans* we ever find men of high Health, florid complexions, firm Nerves, and a Capacity for

> Pleasure: **Of the *Stoic* Party are the delicate or sickly Frames, Men incapable of the grosser sensual Enjoyments, and who either *are* or *think* themselves *virtuous*.**10

https://books.google.fi/books?id=DydcAAAAQAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false

I differ from My Lord *Shaftsbury* entirely, as to the Certainty of the *Pulchrum & Honestum*, abstract from Mode and Custom: I do the same about the Origin of Society, and in many other Things, especially the Reasons why Man is a Sociable Creature, beyond other Animals. I am fully persuaded, His Lordship was in the Wrong in these things; but this does not blind my Understanding so far, as not to see, that he is a very fine Author, and a much better Writer than my self, or you either.
…

But what Proportion does that bear to **Three large Volumes, and the many admirable Things he has said against Priestcraft, and on the Side of Liberty and Human Happiness.**

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004801266.0001.000?rgn=main;view=fulltext

WE esteem it a horrible Thing, to laugh at the Apprehensions of a future State, with the Author of the *Characteristics*[*]; or with him who wrote the Fable of the Bees, to maintain that *moral Virtues are the political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride*[*]; **that *in Morals there is no greater Certainty, than in Fashions of Dress*[*]; *that*,** indeed, *the Doctrine of good Manners teacheth Men to speak well of all Virtues; but requires no more of them in any Age or Country, than the outward Appearance of those in Fashion.*[*] **Two Authors of Infidel Systems these, who setting out upon opposite Principles, are calculated to draw all Mankind, by flattering either their Vanity, or their Passions, into one or other System.**

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=Mau9wgEACAAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false

Far more accurate was Brampton Gurdon's affirmation, in 1723, that since "Spinoza is the only person among modern Atheists that has pretended to give us a regular scheme of Atheism […] I cannot act unfairly in making him the representative of their party, and in proving the weakness and absurdities of the atheistick scheme, by shewing the faults of his."150 **Whilst assailing the "Spinozists" in England, Gurdon recognized that Shaftesbury, propagating a different conception of substance and God from Spinoza, was not strictly of the "Spinozist" party;**151 and hence, needing a more complete "Spinozist," aimed his shafts, aptly enough, at Toland.152

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/612/mode/2up?view=theater

In reality, Toland was not so facile and unoriginal as many detractors alleged. Indeed, his more significant writings, such as his *Letters to Serena*, *Adeisidaemon*, *Origines Judicae*, **and his astounding quasi-theological project, the *Nazarenus* (1718), in which he seeks to dechristianize Christianity and remodel it as a republican civic religion designed only to teach the common people morality,** demonstrate his original, creative side and some depth.113 Moreover, he had an exceptionally strong consciousness of the public sphere and the need, on republican grounds, not just for an 'entire liberty of conscience' but a robustly constructed civic religion based on a **'purefied Christianity' (i.e. dechristianized civic religion)** which would provide political society with 'rules for virtue and religion.'114

https://books.google.fi/books?id=FM0VBoVW8nEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA157#v=onepage&q&f=false

Toland, like Stubbe, held a vitalistic conception of nature, and just as Stubbe opposed his radical Galenism to the natural philosophy of Boyle and the Royal Society, so Toland deployed his pantheistic materialism against Newton and the Newtonians.116
…

In 1718, the very year in which both the Bangorian controversy and the parliamentary debate over toleration reached their height, Toland published *Nazarenus: Or Jewish, Gentile and Mahometan Christianity*, a historical and polemical work which he intended as a contribution to the argument for toleration.124 It was probably addressed to Molesworth.125

Like Stubbe, he borrowed from Selden the notion of the precepts of Noah, the fundamental natural law observed first by Old Testament Jews and then by the first Christians, Nazarenes as Toland called them, who were also Jews.126 These Nazarenes were Arians and the Noahic precepts prescribed that they tolerate all Gentile Christians who held divergent views.127 Toland insisted that this was the sort of Christianity enjoined by the Scriptures, which were in this regard in complete accord with the law of nature.128 Going further, he wrote: **'the one main design of Christianity was to improve and perfect the knowledge of the law of nature … Now, all this is very intelligible,**

easy, and consistent, according to the Nazarene System: … and I foresee that many … will say that I advance a new Christianity, though I think it undoubtedly to be the old one.'129 The upshot of Toland's historical argument concerning the primitive church was to banish special supernatural revelation from Christianity and to reduce true religion to the observance of merely natural law. Though he claimed that the Scriptures deliver the truths of natural law, it was not Scripture that he cited in spelling out his case. **Rather he quoted the pagan Cicero at length to make the point that the whole purpose of religion was to teach 'the Noahic precepts: … since sound reason or the light of common sense is the catholic and eternal rule, without which mankind could not subsist in peace or happiness one hour. It is the fundamental bond of all society, where there is or there is not revealed religion.'**130 **By deploying Selden's Hebrew studies, Toland succeeded in paganizing Christianity, and in terms very similar to Stubbe's, who half a century earlier achieved the almost identical result, also with Selden's help.**

Like Stubbe, Toland argued that this first Christianity of Jesus and his immediate followers survived in pockets in the late Roman empire and was eventually appropriated by Mohammed to become the basis of Islam.131

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

> Mathematics and science, while officially democratic impulses, are in fact far closer to priestly efforts, with membership closed to those who do not understand the language of mathematics, just as the Pythagorean priesthood had been closed on this basis.
> …
>
> **Mathematics is a universal language, just as Latin was among educated men until the 1880s, when Harvard University began its pace-setting curriculum revision.** (There are two other such languages: music and international money.) **It was this quest for universal laws of nature and society that undergirded speculative Freemasonry.**
> …
>
> **The ethical goal of both Masonry and Talmudic Judaism is the same: to keep gentiles from reading and applying Old Testament law in society.** (The traditions and legends are also similar, according to at least one favorable student of Masonry.)119 **Masonry defends a common-ground, non-revelational morality for all members. In this, it agrees entirely with rabbinic Judaism regarding gentiles.**120 What is remarkable is that this same idea of a common morality since Noah has been adopted by both modern Reformed theology and modern dispensationalism.121

https://www.academia.edu/35754657/Only_natural_John_Toland_and_the_Jewish_question

The opening statements of *Reasons* already provide an unequivocal indication of Toland's materialist credo. Human beings are (unsentimentally) located in their naturalistic context: we are defined not as some "kingdom within a kingdom", but within a taxonomy of species.25 Some animals might become relatively independent within a few months of birth and thus forego "any ties of kindred, acquaintance, friendship or confederacy"; humans, however, "being longer a rearing than any other creature, and absolutely incapable to subsist afterwards without the company of other Men", are fundamentally social.26 **The "contract" that unites us is thus an ontological rather than merely legalistic affair; and so, by inference, postulating this contract as an agreement between pre-constituted, autonomous, and rival agents has to be, at best, an unhistorical illusion. What takes priority is our species as a whole, and our common membership of the same.** This is the basis on which debate about naturalization should be centred.

In turn, Toland argues for a general, not solely Jewish, naturalization; he stresses the need for an historical understanding of peoples and cultures; and he subjects ill-conceived ethnic essentialism to a dismissive critique.27
…

For Toland, our position within nature – our "species-being", we might even say – provides the ultimate justification for political cosmopolitanism; and Toland's concern, ultimately, is with "the promoting of Humanity, and the doing good to all Mankind".31
…

Thus although he talks about the "pre-eminence and immortality of the MOSAIC REPUBLIC in its original purity", Toland's concern is resolutely non-theological – perhaps even anti-theological.48 (As Justin Champion's pithy summary has it, "Toland's reading is profoundly non-millennial".49) The "eternity" that Toland invokes here is that of an objectively correct conception – a "Form", so to speak.50 **As far as Toland is concerned, Moses realized a philosophical truth – even if, in**

popular imagination, "this form of Government was immediately reveal'd to MOSES from heaven on mount Sinai."51 **And this is why, in a striking twist, Toland's main "evidence" on behalf of the significance of the Mosaic schema is none other than Cicero,** the "consummate statesman" who was also, of course, the intellectual heir of Plato and Aristotle.52

> 50. Interestingly, John Selden, the great seventeenth-century scholar whose work Toland constantly presupposes, had stressed that the "natural law" outlined in the Bible was a matter of humanity's rational apprehension rather than revelation and tradition.

> 52. Ibid., 238. **Cicero is massively important in Toland's oeuvre, consistently cited and appealed to as a philosophical authority. This general commitment and the specific invocation here are no doubt important elements in a wider shift in post-Restoration Anglophone discourse, whereby – roughly speaking – Roman "civic" texts replace Scripture;** see East, "Cicero the Pantheist"; Leask, "Stoicism Unbound".

…

To reiterate, then, whereas Toland's text may resonate with all kinds of millenarian themes and thus echo the religiously inspired promulgation of a Hebrew Republic, his intention is to redirect these forces and energies, relocating them, ultimately, within a *philosophical* domain.54 **According to Toland, we might say, Spinoza supplants Habakkuk.**

…

As we saw, in passing, the *Reasons* invokes *rabbinic* authority, in the form of Simone Luzzatto's *Discorso*; in fact, **roughly one fifth of the *Reasons* is a direct summary of Luzzatto's text.**62 As we also saw, in passing, the aspects of the *Discorso* that seem to have had the most explicit influence on the *Reasons* are the "economic" case for parity of esteem: in effect, this states that treating the Jews fairly would be good for the economy. However, it also seems worth noting that this is by no means as much as Luzzatto himself has to say, in his argument for more enlightened treatment of the Jewish people: **whereas the first ten chapters of the *Discorso* concentrate on this "commercial" argument, the last eight chapters are dedicated to discussing (in a manner strongly marked by Machiavelli) the supreme significance of Mosaic law for modern states, and to demonstrating Moses's greatness as a statesman who provided principles for the citizens of a universal republic, or *cosmopolis*.**

…

After all, the materialistic, naturalistic principles that Toland's Moses espouses (or is made to espouse) are surely the real foundation for the specific claims that the *Reasons* makes: Toland's case for political naturalization follows organically, even logically, from a profound philosophical naturalism65– a naturalism to which Moses himself (supposedly) subscribed.66

> 66. The combination of Toland's naturalism and his materialist channeling of an earlier "Hebrew Republicanism" helps to explain the gulf that apparently separates him from other so-called Deist thinkers. On the kind of contemptuous attitude – towards both ancient Israel and contemporary Jews – demonstrated by writers like Herbert of Cherbury, Thomas Hyde, Bolingbroke, and Thomas Morgan, see Manuel, *Broken Staff*, 175–91.

…

For all the influence of and reference to wider intellectual and cultural currents – from Lockean Toleration67 to mercantilism to millenarianism – perhaps, as Pierre Lurbe suggests, **"the most important and original assertion of the whole book" is Toland's statement that the "Jews […] are both in their origine and progress, not otherwise to be regarded, than under the common circumstances of human nature."**68 **It is a staggeringly modern claim,** emerging directly from Toland's materialist convictions, and one that allows us, today, retrospectively "to bear witness to what was in the process of becoming thinkable".69

https://archive.org/details/reasonsfornatur00tolagoog/page/n4/mode/2up?view=theater

> *Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously every one with his neighbour?* Mal. 1.10.

> ***Utinam qui ubique sunt Propugnatores hujus Imperii, possent in hanc Civitatem venire, & contra Oppugnatores Reipublicae de Civitate exterminari.*** Cic. in Orat. pro L. Corn. Balbo. cap. 2.

https://archive.org/details/reasonsfornatur00tolagoog/page/n16/mode/2up?view=theater

Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland.

As most Animals are immediately after their birth capable to provide for themselves, without any assistance from their own Species or others among their fellow-creatures; so we see that few of

them preserve any ties of kindred, acquaintance, friendship, or confederacy together; there being no mutual obligations, dependance, or necessity long remaining, to produce or cement these duties. Such as are longer a bringing up by their dams, or forc'd to keep under the protection of their sires (as Horses for example) do the longer retain a visible kindness and distinction for them, and such as not only in their breeding want the help of their own Species, but all their lives after depend upon the good-will of some other (as we may remark in Dogs) do preserve a continual regard of love, obedience, friendship, and gratitude to that degree, as not seldom to expose their lives for their masters, or to pine sometimes even to death for the loss of their benefactors. **But Man being longer a rearing than any other creature, and absolutely incapable to subsist afterwards without the company of other Men,** contracts from the very beginning, not only the relations of father, mother, brothers, sisters, and other degrees of kindred, as those to whom he's first, and most, and longest indebted for his preservation or pleasure; but he likewise in process of time forms the notions of acquaintance, neighbourhood, friendship, affinity, association, confederacy, subjection, and superiority, as never being able, during his whole life, to subsist in any tolerable degree of security or delight, without the help of such. **Tis therefore the duty of every Man to contribute as much as he can, whether by his advice or by his industry, to the welfare of his whole species, and particularly of his family; but in a special manner to the safe and flourishing condition of that country or society to which he immediately belongs, as in whose happiness his own is so necessarily involved.**

II.

BEING always sensible of this obligation, I have in many instances done my uttermost to promote the good of my country, according as the circumstances or situation of my affairs wou'd permit me; and particularly, I have more than once or twice (as opportunity offer'd) enforc'd the usefulness and necessity of a GENERAL NATURALIZATION.
…

As soon as I declare I mean the *Jews*, it will be easily conceiv'd, that my principal aim is not be popular, however heartily I may serve my Country: and I am inexpressibly pleas'd, that the most effectual way to do so, is the promoting of Humanity, and the doing good to all Mankind.

III.

I KNOW it will be presently said, that I am a lover of Paradoxes; and others (if they please) may reckon for a Paradox any truth, which is ever so little remote from common observation, or that they have no mind shou'd be told.

https://archive.org/details/reasonsfornatur00tolagoog/page/n32/mode/2up?view=theater

I AM not ignorant how much the world is govern'd by prejudices, and how farr some, who wou'd not be counted of the vulgar, are yet sway'd by vulgar errors. One of the most general is the prevailing notion of a certain genius, or bent of mind, reigning in a certain Family or Nation. That there is in reality such a Byass frequently observable, I go not about to deny; but only maintain that it wholly proceeds from Accident, and not from Nature. The different methods of Government and Education, are the true springs and causes of such different inclinations all over the world; as it demonstrably appears from the progressive changes, which alterations in those two main points have effected in most countries, both of the modern and antient times. **Compare the present *Greece* and *Italy* with the past; or even old *England* with the new, and you can doubt of the matter no longer.**

> https://archive.org/details/cu31924021569284/page/n169/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 323. To be a Good German means to de-Germanise Oneself.—**National differences consist, far more than has hitherto been observed, only in the differences of various grades of culture, and are only to a very small extent permanent (nor even that in a strict sense). For this reason all arguments based on national character are so little binding on one who aims at the alteration of convictions—in other words, at culture.** If, for instance, we consider all that has already been German, we shall improve upon the hypothetical question, "What is German?" by the counter-question, **"What is *now* German?"** and every good German will answer it practically, by overcoming his German characteristics.

I reject not all that is attributed to the climate; but as Government and Education even get the better of that, so it is frequently chang'd by the inhabitants, and has been so for many ages by the *Jews*. If an *English* Cock or Mastiff transported hence, degenerates in the first race, there's no reason it shou'd not hold as true of the Men, at least in the second or third. As for the *Jews* in particular, whatever genius will be allow'd to have influenc'd 'em in *Judea* (for I enter not here into that matter) tis evident, that since their dispersion, they have no common or peculiar inclination distinguishing 'em from others; but visibly partake of the Nature of those nations among which they live and where they were bred. **The ordinary sentiments and manners of the *Portuguese* or *Italian Jews*, differ not from those of the other *Portuguese* or *Italians*.** The *Germans* differ from the *Polish Jews* as much as *Poles* do from *Germans*; and so do those of *Ispahan* or *Constantinople* from such as are born at *London* or *Amsterdam*.
…

The *Jews* therefore are both in their origine and progress, not otherwise to be regarded, than under the common circumstances of human nature. The *Romans* were not less esteem'd for being descended

from Shepherds and Fugitives (which original they had in common with the *Jews*) than are the *English* for being the progeny of barbarous pyrates, and a repeated mixture of several nations. Notwithstanding all this, **so great is the aversion which diversity of manners in general begets among men, and especially contrary rites or doctrines of Religion, that, farr from mutual love and good offices, as creatures of the same species, they foolishly despise and hate one another for their civil customs, but cruelly persecute and murder one another on the score of their religious ones.**

https://archive.org/details/reasonsfornatur00tolagoog/page/n42/mode/2up?view=theater

This is the never-failing effect of letting the *Clergy* meddle in state-affairs. Now leaving the Reader to collect what he pleases of this sort in the histories of other nations, I'll present him with the following instances, out of many others in our *Annals*, concerning the hard usage of this miserable people, whom I wou'd have as easily naturaliz'd as any others: **for I am not asham'd to say with PLINY, that * *I desire the greatness of my Country in all respects, but more especially in the increase of Citizens, which make the true strength and ornament of towns* in a free country.**

> * Cupio enim Patriam nostram omnibus quidem rebus augeri, maxime tamen Civium numero: id enim oppidis firmissimum ornamentum. *Lib.* 7. *Ep.* 32.

https://archive.org/details/reasonsfornatur00tolagoog/page/n60/mode/2up?view=theater

The Emperor CONSTANTINE did by public Edict permit the *Jews* to exercise magistracy, as to be *Decurions* or Aldermen, at *Triers* and *Colen*: which same privilege was granted 'em before, to be enjoy'd all over the world, by the Emperor ALEXANDER SEVERUS. In a word, they ought to be so naturaliz'd in *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, as, **like the *Quakers*,** to be incapacitated in nothing, but where they incapacitate themselves. A GENERAL NATURALIZATION, and a TOTAL INCAPACITY from Offices, are perfect inconsistencies: **for as one, who understood this matter very well, * says,** *If few have been found ever since mankind existed that wou'd for their own native country, without the expectation of any reward, expose their bodies to the weapons of their enemies; do you think there may be such a person found, that will undergo dangers for another Government, where not only he receives no reward, but that he is absolutely excluded from any?*

> * Etenim cum pro sua Patria pauci post genus hominum natum reperti sint, qui, nullis praemiis propositis vitam suam hostium telis objecerint; pro aliena Republica quemquam fore putatis qui se opponat periculis, non modo nullo proposito praemio, sed etiam interdicto. *Cic. Orat. pro L. Corn. Balbo, cap.* 10.

…

Nay, if his assertions hold good (as I doubt not but they will) **they wholly lose their pains, who so pompously labor to show that the *Jewish* religion was not made for all times and places,** which, it seems, the professors of it never affirm; so that such disputants fight with their own shadows, or set up an adversary of their own arming, the easier to subdue him. **LUZZATTO expresly maintains, that as their religion, consider'd as it is *Jewish*, or distinct from the LAW OF NATURE, was solely calculated for their own Nation and Republic;** so they were never commanded to instruct others in their peculiar rites and ceremonies, tho they are every where enjoin'd to magnify to all the world the divine goodness, wisdom, and power, with those duties of men, and other attributes of God, which constitute NATURAL RELIGION. Among Innumerable passages of the *old Testament* that favor this doctrine, he cites the eleventh verse of the First chapter of MALACHY, where this Prophet, in the person of JEHOVAH, says, ***From the rising of the Sun even unto the going down of the same, my name is great among the nations; and in every place incense is offer'd unto my name, and a pure offering: for my name is great among the nations, says the Lord of Hosts.*** **The substantive verb not being here exprest (according to an ordinary usage of the *Hebrew* Language) the *Jews* supply it in the present tense, and the *Christians* in the future:**
…

Such *Christians* as assert the possibility of the *Heathen*'s salvation, allow the privilege but to a few extraordinary persons; **and commonly accompany their notion with all the cautions of a Paradox,** which very modesty betokens the meanness of their number.

XXII.

TIS certain, on the other hand, that the *Jews* never excluded the vertuous *Gentiles* from heaven, no more than one sett of *Gentiles* did all or any other people in the world. Some *Christians* only of all mankind, have establish'd the DAMNING THEOLOGY, as if the usefulness or necessity of their Religion cou'd not be inferr'd without it: nor are these more charitable to one another, part of 'em expresly damning all other *Christians* but those of their own Communion; and such Communions, as will not use this harsh language, yet declaring that the state of all others is at least very perillous, if not restraining Salvation in effect, tho not in words, to the few elect of their own cant and livery.
…

To say no more on this subject, the *Jews* do maintain in their books, what I had confirm'd to me out of the mouths of many learned Rabbins, that were they now in full possession of their old Government and Country, they wou'd not endeavor to convert all the world to their THEOCRACY; the rest of the nations not being concern'd in their commemorative rites, peculiarly relating to the History of the *Israelites*.

...

Did all the world profess this doctrine uncorrupted, and conscientiously observe this practice (tho attended with any rites not cruel, impure, or prophane) the *Jews* wou'd not onely hold the possibility of their salvation, but look upon them likewise as brethren, notwithstanding these shou'd not reciprocally own their particular REVELATION; **yet abstaining always from offering any affront to their worship, which indeed no body ought to do to any people nor in any case: and the *Jews* are peremtorily commanded by their Legislator, *not to revile the Gods of other nations.*** [Exodus 22:28]

> https://biblehub.com/commentaries/exodus/22-28.htm
>
> (28) *Thou shalt not revile the gods.*—**The LXX. and Vulgate give the passage this sense; and so it was understood, or at any rate expounded, by Philo (*De Vit. Mos.* ii. 26) and Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* iv. 8, § 10), who boasted that the Jews abstained from reviling the gods of the nations.** But the practice of the most pious Israelites in the best times was different (1 Kings 18:27; Psalm 115:4-8; Psalm 135:15-18; Isaiah 41:29; Isaiah 44:9-20; Jeremiah 10:11-15, &c.).
>
> The paraphrase *judges* (RVm.) is not here admissible; for though 'to go to God' might mean to go to the judges, as the representatives or spokesmen of God, **this would not justify 'God' in any connexion being taken to signify *judges*.** LXX. θεούς, Vulg. *diis*, AV. *the gods*; and so Jos. *Ant.* iv. 8, 10, *c. Ap.* ii. 33, and Philo, *Vit. Mos.* iii. p. 166, *de Mon.* i. p. 219 (cited by Kn.), understanding the passage, in a sense agreeable the circumstances of their own time, of heathen gods: **but this, though quite legitimate grammatically, would make the precept one very alien to the spirit of the OT.**
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=DfNWoG1P_zgC&lpg=PR2&hl=fi&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Be *Religious* without hypocrisy in your observances; however do not be too religious, nor overly zealous in *Religious matters*. In Religion, avoid words that are not profitable to yourself, nor of any service to others.
>
> All Nations have a zeal for their own *Religion*: **it is not seemly nor prudent, sensible, nor Politic to deride a Religion in a foreign country where one resides, or happens to be; for *Moses* says, *thou shalt not slander the Gods of the Nations wherein thou livest.*** In any event, each is entitled to have a free choice in Religious and Philosophical matters.

https://www.academia.edu/28895217/Stoicism_unbound_Ciceros_Academica_in_Tolands_Pantheisticon_

Ciceronian notions enjoy a privileged place in Toland's overall *oeuvre*.3

> 3. Evans, *Pantheisticon*, 153, suggests that **'Toland's veneration of "Tully" is hard to estimate; it seems boundless.'** See, too, Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken*, Chap. 6 (170-95).

In the course of his biography of Milton, for example, Cicero is named, rather hyperbolically, 'the greatest Philosopher ... in the World' (Toland, *Life of Milton*, 192). The *Vindicius Liberius* provides a partial translation of Cicero's fragment '*On the Commonwealth,*' and approvingly cites his summary of the *res publica* (Toland, *Vindicius Liberius*, 190-1, citing *De. Rep*. 3.43-5). The epigram attached to Toland's poem *Clito* is a quotation from *De Oratore* – specifically, book 2, cap.9. The Preface to the *Letters to Serena* tells us that the first of the five *Letters* – 'The Origin and Force of the Prejudices' – amounts to a meditation upon Cicero's depiction, in *De Legibus* 1.17, of the production and reproduction of prejudice through the process of 'socialization': family, educators, the manufacturers of culture, *et al.*, 'when they receive us tender and ignorant, infect and bend us as they please' (Toland, *Letters to Serena*, 56). The Third *Letter*, 'The Origin of Idolatry, and the Reasons of Heathenism,' draws extensively on historical evidence provided by Cicero – principally, in *De Divinatione, Tusculanes disputationes* and *De Natura Deorum*. **And Toland's *Adeisidaemon* and *Origines Judaicae*, published together in 1709, both employ Cicero's scathing critique of superstition, in *De Divinatione*, as preludes, or at least scene-setting statements.**
...

It is in the *Pantheisticon*, however, that the anti-theocratic weapons Toland finds in Cicero receive their most conspicuous deployment. The very notion of a pantheistic 'fellowship' is presented as a Ciceronian borrowing (P, 65 [49]; and Cicero is also cited as an authority regarding the nomenclature of the 'chair' of the Pantheistic banquet (P, 13 [4]). **But more substantially, and concentrated mainly in the mock 'liturgy' that makes up the book 's *Formula*, Toland offers, not so much a summary of 'Cicero's philosophy' (whatever exactly that may have been), but more a presentation of Cicero's layered and subtle summary of 'Old Academic' and Stoic principles,** in *Academica* 1. Toland's point, it seems, is to outline the kind of position with which the Sceptics took issue, without really concerning himself with the nature of those Sceptical objections. Accordingly, **the main epistemological issues of the 'Lucullus' *Academica* – especially the Academics' questions around *katalêpsis* ('rational grasp' or true knowledge) – are effectively**

sidelined in favour of the Stoic compendium, covering 300 years of philosophical debate, that Cicero's Varro provides.

As it happens, a tangle of historiographical issues pervades the segment of the *Academica* that Toland employs here. **Varro's history of ideas is explicitly founded on the work of Cicero's teacher, Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 125-68 BCE), and it implies a striking continuity between Stoic and Old Academic views – to the extent that Polemon, Plato's third successor as Scholarch of the Academy (and teacher of Zeno of Citium, the first Stoic), seems to emerge as a kind of progenitor of Stoic corporealism.** (Put otherwise: what is ostensibly the presentation of Old Academic notions is simultaneously the presentation of Stoic notions.) The veracity of this 'dual depiction' is by no means clear-cut: **it may well be the case that, quite illegitimately, Cicero's Antiochus retrojects a Stoic conception onto the fourth-century Academy, forcing Platonism (post-Plato) into a materialist locus that it never in fact occupied.**8
…

It seems worth noting, too, that Jacob Thomasius (1622-84), one of the most respected scholars of the seventeenth century, would also identify the passage as essentially Stoic: **although Cicero is speaking of the Academy, Thomasius noted, it is certain that what he says squares better with the Stoics: 'Caeterum loquitur ibi quidem Cicero de Academicis: sed certum est in Stoicos haec melius quadrare'** (Thomasius, *Dissertatio*, XIV, s.12, 180; see, too, s.13). Toland's extensive application of the *Academica* passage (*qua* Stoic summary) thus enjoys – implicitly, at least – a significant contemporary imprimatur. Moreover, as we shall see, Thomasius also plays an important role in undermining neo-Stoicism (by questioning the compatibility of Stoicism and Christianity), and in identifying Stoicism with Spinozism.
…

By concentrating on the *Academica*'s condensed, doxographical, outline, Toland is able to highlight the way in which the Stoicism to which he subscribes departs fundamentally from any notion of a Platonic or Aristotelian 'theology': although informed by a tradition that posited a 'world soul' as a causal factor acting on passive material, the Stoic conceptions cited here are marked above all by their refusal of any transcendent agent **(such as the Platonic Demiurge or the Aristotelian Prime Mover);** and if there is anything like a 'divine logic' operative within the Stoics's system, as articulated here, it is in no wise at a metaphysical remove from nature.9
…

Perhaps most strikingly of all, Toland's invocation of the Stoic principles of *Academica* 1 also allows him to finesse the adumbrated panpsychism of his earlier work. **The cosmos, he now declares, can be taken to make manifest an immanent intelligence: in Bréhier's eloquent summary of Stoic thought, 'it is in sensible things that Reason acquires the plenitude of its reality'** (Bréhier, *Hellenistic and Roman Age*, 37). Or, as Cicero himself (cited by Toland) has it:

> All the Things that are in the World are *Parts* of the World, and comprised in an *intelligent Nature*, endowed with perfect *Reason*, and the same *Eternal*; for there's nothing stronger to bring it to Destruction: This Force they call the SOUL [*ANIMUM*] of the World, as also a MIND [*MENTEM*], and perfect WISDOM [*SAPIENTIAMQUE*], and consequently GOD. (P, 61 [*recte* 79] [60]; *Academica*, 1.28-29)

God and Nature are thus one and the same thing: **we are perfectly entitled to posit a reigning intelligence in the cosmos; but this 'God' can only be found *within* Nature – *Natura sive Deus*, as the Stoic prefiguration of Spinoza has it.**
…

This monistic whole can be understood as operating according to two 'principles' – one active, the other 'passive' – which were separable in conceptual terms but necessarily intertwined: for Spinoza, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*; for the Stoics, *to poioun* and *to paschon*. **Both Spinoza and the Stoics locate 'perfection' in reality itself – not in some noumenal or wholly transcendent domain.** Both reject the possibility of contingency and advocate a strict metaphysical determinism; as a result, both suggest that 'freedom' means living according to this natural order (rather than some imagined 'free will') *via* the operation of 'right reason.' Both agree that the existent is driven by a foundational self-preservation, or *conatus* – and yet both agree that wise and virtuous individuals will be able to take an active and rational hold of their passions, locating them in a wider, natural, context.
…

Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), for example, may have been slightly ambiguous in his overall assessment of Spinoza, but his great
Dictionary – such a formative intellectual source for so much eighteenth-century thought25 – reiterated Spinoza's status as latter-day Stoic. **Just like Cleanthes or Chrysippus, Spinoza, in effect, undid transcendence and rendered the 'world soul' a wholly naturalistic affair; the principal**

difference seemed to be that at least the Stoics maintained some kind of providential role for the divine. (See the unattributed English translation of the *Dictionary*, vol. 3, 273–6.)
…

As we have seen, the *Pantheisticon* highlights precisely the materialistic pantheism in Stoic thought that was incompatible with any Christianized, neo-Stoic, account; as we can now see, this philosophical alignment provides us with further evidence of Toland's commitment to and identification with Spinozism. What is more, 'Toland's Spinozism' is not solely the concern, or even discovery, of modern scholarship.26 Toland himself had explicitly identified Spinozism with pantheism in his *Origines Judaicae*: Moses, he states, can properly be conceived as a Pantheist – or, to employ a more contemporaneous trope, a *Spinozist*: 'Mosem enimvero fuisse Pantheistam, sive, ut cum recentioribus loquar, Spinosistam' (Toland, *Origines Judaicae*, in *Adeisideaemon*, 117). Meanwhile, contemporaneous commentary had already noted the profound Spinozistic influence upon both deism, in general, and Toland, in particular. **William Carroll's *Spinoza Reviv'd* (1711), for example, had declared deism to be founded upon a 'Spinozerian' atheism. And William Wotton, in his *Letter to Eusebia* (1704), made plain that, for him, Toland's project was designed 'to supply all the Defects of Spinoza's thesis: i.e., make the world without a God'** (Wotton, *Letter to Eusebia,* 48 – a point echoed by Gurdon's *Pretended Difficulties*, 153-4).

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/162/mode/2up?view=theater

In his faux liturgy for the Masons, Toland asks his brothers to sing with him in praising "GOD, whom you may call the *Mind*, if you please, and the *Soul* of the Universe," and bids all to chant with him: "*The Sun is my Father, the Earth my Mother, the World's my Country, and all Men are my Relations.*"110 As in numerous other instances, Toland here unites his Spinozism with an eclectic mix of hermeticism, Neoplatonic visions of a radiating cosmic intelligence, ancient Egyptian sun-worship, and Stoic rhetoric about a universal brotherhood – a cocktail that served as a powerful elixir of radical ideas across Europe and in America.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-PIGAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA84#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hear, therefore, (noble Equals) consider with yourselves, and always shew in you Actions, the unerring Rule for living well, dying happily, and doing all Things properly. **A Rule, I say, not to be deceived, and a Law never deceiving, to be delivered to you now, in the very Words, in which formerly *Marcus Tullius* inimitably expressed it.** [Cic. de Repub. lib. iii. Lactant. lib. vi. cap. 8.]

> https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.vi.viii.html
>
> Therefore the law of God must be undertaken, which may direct us to this path; that sacred, that heavenly law, which Marcus Tullius, in his third book respecting the Republic,[1137] has described almost with a divine voice; whose words have subjoined, that I might not speak at greater length:
>
> > "There is indeed a true law, right reason, agreeing with nature, diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from wrong by forbidding; which, however, neither commands nor forbids the good in vain, nor affects the wicked by commanding or forbidding. It is not allowable to alter[1138] the provisions of this law, nor is it permitted us to modify it, nor can it be entirely abrogated.[1139] Nor, truly, can we be released from this law, either by the senate or by the people; nor is another person to be sought to explain or interpret it. **Nor will there be one law at Rome and another at Athens; one law at the present time, and another hereafter: but the same law, everlasting and unchangeable, will bind all nations at all times; and there will be one common Master and Ruler of all, even God, the framer, arbitrator, and proposer of this law;** and he who shall not obey this will flee from himself, and, despising the nature of man, will suffer the greatest punishments through this very thing, even though he shall have escaped the other punishments which are supposed to exist."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-PIGAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q&f=false

Cicero, to whom our Society is indebted for so many, and such excellent Things, towards the End of the First Book *of Laws*, has furnished us with *A distinct, and exact Idea of the best and most accomplished Man*. Let the Learned then read, and form themselves according to this Rule.

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-treatise-on-the-laws#lf0044-02_head_004
>
> When this man shall have surveyed the heavens, the earth, and the seas, studied the nature of all things, and informed himself whence they were generated, to what state they return, the time and manner of their dissolution, what parts of them are mortal and perishable, and what divine and

> eternal?—when he shall have attained in a great measure, the knowledge of that Being who superintends and governs them, and shall look on himself as not confined within the walls of one city, or as the member of any particular community, but as a citizen of the universe, considered as a single Commonwealth:—on such a grand representation of things as this, and on such a prospect and knowledge of nature, how well, O heavens! would such a one understand the precepts of the Pythian Apollo by knowing himself? **How insignificant would he then esteem, how thoroughly would he contemn and despise, those things which by vulgar minds are held in the highest admiration.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-PIGAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA14#v=onepage&q&f=false

They are called, for the most Part, *Pantheists*, upon Account of an Opinion concerning GOD and the UNIVERSE, peculiar to themselves; **but diametrically opposite to the *Epicureans*, *Chaologists*, and *Oneiropolists*, as they acknowledge no first Confusion, no Fortune, much less Chance, to be the Maker of the World.**

[In the Analogy of the Term, the *Pantheists* are more opposed to *Atheists*; but Use, that great Master of Language will have it otherwise.]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-PIGAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA20#v=onepage&q&f=false

As to the Devices of *Epicurus*, who asserted, *That these Things were cemented, and concreted together,* ***by rough and smooth, and hooked and crooked Bodies,*** *not forgetting the Interposition of his Void*, we shall leave them to himself, with his fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, and Declination of the same not extrinsically determined; acting, perhaps, something in his Distances between divers Worlds; **that we should not dwell long upon the eternal Descent of Atoms to a Line, and such like Paralogisms, when in an infinite Space, neither the highest nor the lowest, nor the middle nor the last, can be conceived.**

> https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07/anf07.iii.ii.iii.xvii.html#fnf_iii.ii.iii.xvii-p12.5
>
> **For where or from whence are these atoms? Why did no one dream of them besides Leucippus only?** from whom Democritus,[436] having received instructions, left to Epicurus the inheritance of his folly. And if these are minute bodies, and indeed solid, as they say, they certainly are able to fall under the notice of the eyes. If the nature of all things is the same, how is it that they compose various objects? They meet together, he says, in varied order and position as the letters which, though few in number, by variety of arrangement make up innumerable words. **But it is urged the letters have a variety of forms. And so, he says, have these first principles; for they are rough, they are furnished with hooks, they are smooth. Therefore they can be cut and divided, if there is in them any part which projects. But if they are smooth and without hooks, they cannot cohere.** They ought therefore to he hooked, that they may be linked together one with another. But since they are said to be so minute that they cannot be cut asunder by the edge of any weapon, how is it that they have hooks or angles? For it must be possible for these to be torn asunder, since they project.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-PIGAAAAcAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA22#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Ethereal Fire environing all Things, and therefore supreme; permeating all Things, and therefore intimate, of which a Kitchen Fire is a certain analogical and imperfect Similitude; the Ether, I say, by a wonderful Structure of the Brain thereunto adjusted, and by exterior Objects that act on the Brain, through the Means of the Nerves of the Senses, and excite therein various Imaginations, duly executes all the Machinery of Conception, Imagination, Remembrance, Amplification, and Diminution of Ideas. **It is this Fire alone, more fleet than Thought itself, and by far more subtil than any other Kind of Matter, which can with so quick a Motion run over the tended Cords and Ligaments of the Nerves, and variously agitate them, according to the different Impressions of Objects upon the Nerves. What is more, the Ether is a reviving Fire, infusing a sweet and gentle Warmth, not burning, not dissipating, not consuming as ordinary Fire.*** *It rules all Things,* (says the Author of the Treatise upon Diet) *it disposes of all Things, according to Nature, without Noise, and imperceptible, either to the Sight, or Touch. In it is Soul, Mind, Prudence, Encrease, Motion, Diminution, Alteration, Sleep, Watching, it governs all in all Things, and never suffers celestial and terrestial Beings to be at Rest.* **This Fire is *Horace*'s *Particle of divine Breath*, and *Virgil*'s *inwardly nourishing Spirit, heavenly Origin, fiery Vigour*, and if there by any other Name, which he uses to express it. *The Animal Spirits* of the Moderns, and their *Liquidity of Nerves*, are but empty titles, unless they denote this Fire.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Harvard_Classics_Vol._3/Religio_Medici_I#cite_ref-70
>
> XXXII. **Now, besides these particular and divided Spirits, there may be (for ought I know,) an universal and common Spirit to the whole World. It was the opinion of Plato, and it is yet of the Hermetical Philosophers.** If there be a common nature that unites and types the scattered and divided individuals into one species, why may there not be one that unites them all? However, I am sure there is a common Spirit that plays within us, yet makes no part of

us; and that is, the Spirit of GOD, the fire and scintillation of that noble and mighty Essence, which is the life and radical heat of Spirits, and those essences that know not the vertue of the Sun; **a fire quite contrary to the fire of Hell. This is that gentle heat that brooded on the waters, and in six days hatched the World; this is that irradiation that dispels the mists of Hell, the clouds of horrour, fear, sorrow, despair; and preserves the region of the mind in serenity.** Whosoever feels not the warm gale and gentle ventilation of this Spirit, though I feel his pulse, I dare not say he lives: for truely, without this, to me there is no heat under the Tropick; nor any light, though I dwelt in the body of the Sun.

https://xinxingren.gen.nz/neoclassics/KangYouwei_1958.html#43.7

This *ch'i* is a concept even more ancient than Mencius's theory, and has played a great part in Chinese philosophy, especially in the Sung neo-Confucianism. *Ch'i*, says K'ang, is lightning (or electricity) which has 'awareness', or in other words, what is commonly called 'spirit'. All things arose from *ch'i* and all things are moved by it. 'No creatures are without "lightning", no creatures are without spirit.' **It is this 'aware-*ch'i*', then, which ensures the 'compassionate mind': 'If there is perception and awareness, then there is attraction. Thus it is with the lodestone; how much more is it with man!'**[8]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=yjaEkWbwBm0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA218#v=onepage&q&f=false

In his lectures Nietzsche succinctly equates Logos, fire, the One, intelligence, and lightning: "Hippolytus testifies that [for Heraclitus] fire is 'Wisdom [which] is one – to know the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things.' It is an intelligence (γνώμη) connecting all things to one another." Nietzsche then gives his German rendition, which, again, translates to "Listening not to me but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that *one thing* knows all." **Nietzsche closely links Heraclitus's Logos to the German terms *Wille* (will), *Wollen nach Zwecken* (will to ends), *Kraft* (force), *Seele* (soul), *Geist* (spirit), and *Feuerkraft* (fiery power); here the young Nietzsche circles and approximates formulations of a not-far-off principle of the will to power.** This theory of the will to power, like his mature writing style, is still years in the future, but the buddings of it are decipherable here; **centers of will to power, quanta of power, are foreshadowed as Heraclitus's fiery particles of absolutely nonpersistent force, time atoms, which are already centers of will and power here.** Unlike Heidegger's antiscientific interpretation, Nietzsche's view associates Heraclitus with von Baer and Helmholtz.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/58/mode/2up?view=theater

It comes then as no surprise that Le Dantec's materialism does not rise above the level fashionable more than a century before, among the *philosophes*. Monism means for Le Dantec that elementary particles possess an elementary consciousness: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen etc. have theirs. Obviously then, the particles of which these particles are composed also have their elementary consciousness, and so on, ad infinitum. **Probably the process ends logically in Stoic theory with its fiery spirit permeating the entire material universe.**

---

https://archive.org/details/naturesgodhereti0000stew_o9j9/page/142/mode/2up?view=theater

"I am told by those, who are very capable of informing me, that the modern Atheist has given up the system of *Epicurus* as absurd and indefensible, and adheres to that of the Fatalists," reported the poet Richard Blackmore in the preface to his 1712 jeremiad against the philosophy of the age. Blackmore named Hobbes, Vanini, and Spinoza as the fatalists in question, though he and the other serious critics had little doubt about which one counted as the fatalist-in-chief.27 Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) – one of nineteen-year-old Franklin's drinking buddies in London, author of the first thoroughly secular interpretation of human society, and a committed follower of Spinoza himself – **detected the same shift in radical chic: "This doctrine, which is Spinosisme in epitome … begins to prevail again, and the atoms [of Epicurus] lose ground,"** he announced in *The Fable of the Bees* of 1714.28

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/kaye-the-fable-of-the-bees-or-private-vices-publick-benefits-vol-2#lf0014-02_head_011

Hor. As we our selves, and every thing we see, are the undoubted Parts of some one Whole, some are of Opinion, that this all,a the τὸ πὰν, the Universe, was from all Eternity.

Cleo. **This is not more satisfactory or comprehensible, than the System of *Epicurus,* who derives every thing from wild Chance, and an undesign'd Struggle of senseless Atoms.** When we behold things,

which our Reason tells us could not have been produced without Wisdom and Power, in a degree far beyond our Comprehension, can any thing be more contrary to, or clashing with that same Reason, than that the things, in which that high Wisdom and great Power are visibly display'd, should be coeval with the Wisdom and Power themselves, that contriv'd and wrought them? **Yet this Doctrine, which is *Spinosism* in Epitome, after having been neglected many Years, begins to prevail again, and the Atoms lose ground:** for of Atheism, as well as Superstition, there are different Kinds, that have their Periods and Returns, after they have been long exploded.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/474/mode/2up?view=theater

Like practically all other commentators, Hadzsits argues that the philosophes on the whole rejected Lucretius' physics and metaphysics but found something admirable in his "anti-clericalism."

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/104/mode/2up?view=theater

With his usual felicity, Voltaire summed up the position of the movement. "Lucretius is admirable in his exordiums, in his descriptions, in his ethics, in everything he says against superstition. That beautiful line, *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*, will last as long as the world lasts. **If he had not been as ridiculous as all the rest as a physical scientist, he would have been a divine man.**"7

https://aeon.co/essays/lucretius-the-flat-earth-and-the-malaise-of-modern-science?fbclid=IwAR00qNC0XQ3jY3ZjxxAT6a7c6fZBpVEn_yDFKVka4Jwbs6mpKSslOFArXIk

For instance, although both Greenblatt and Ridley have surely given *On the Nature of Things* a close reading, neither of them notes the most startling thing about the cosmology that the poem espouses: **its author thought that the Earth was flat. This is so incongruous with the view of Lucretius as an ancient writer who anticipated some essential elements of modern science that it has been largely forgotten.** Indeed, you can read a standard reference book such as *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius* (2007) from cover to cover and be none the wiser. …

Lucretius then explains that it's an error to think that the Earth is at the centre of the Universe because, as the Universe is infinite, it can't have a centre. **He's arguing against ideas found in Aristotle's lectures *On the Heavens*, which contain the earliest detailed arguments for a spherical Earth.** Writing in the mid-300s BCE, Aristotle said that the Earth sits at the centre of the Universe, to where all heavy matter naturally travels. So, for Aristotle, falling downwards means moving towards the centre of the Earth, while for Lucretius is means drifting in an arbitrary linear direction. It's immediately clear why Aristotle thinks that the Earth is round, since heavy objects fall towards it in all directions. In contrast, **Lucretius ridicules the idea that anything could be on the other side of the world because it would fall off into the vastness of space.** He didn't just reject a spherical Earth, he thought it was daft.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D1241

> **And men began such work**
> **At first as much with tools of silver and gold**
> **As with the impetuous strength of the stout copper;**
> But vainly – since their over-mastered power
> Would soon give way, unable to endure,
> Like copper, such hard labour. **In those days**
> **Copper it was that was the thing of price;**
> **And gold lay useless, blunted with dull edge.**
> Now lies the copper low, and gold hath come
> Unto the loftiest honours. **Thus it is**
> **That rolling ages change the times of things:**
> **What erst was of a price, becomes at last**
> **A discard of no honour;** whilst another
> Succeeds to glory, issuing from contempt,
> And day by day is sought for more and more,
> And, when 'tis found, doth flower in men's praise,
> Objects of wondrous honour.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Collins,_Anthony

In philosophy, Collins takes a foremost place as a defender of Necessitarianism. **His brief *Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty* (1715) has not been excelled, at all events in its main outlines, as a statement of the determinist standpoint.**

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/614/mode/2up?view=theater

Belonging to the affluent gentry class, educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, **a refined wit and polished host who loved conviviality, fine food, and was especially fond of Tuscan wines,** Collins was acceptable in the most select circles – until the publication of *A Discourse of Freethinking* (London, 1713) – and was 'visited several times by Queen Anne' as well as 'noblemen and ladies of quality who took delight in walking in his fine gardens.'118 Later, while his books and ideas were boycotted, he largely retained his social status.
…

Collins' paradoxical argument that the 'doctrine of necessity is too generally suppos'd to be irreligious and atheistical' and that in reality it is the sole viable solution to the problem of the human will and the sole truly 'religious' view,149 recurs in his later work *A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Liberty* (1717). **Here he notes the 'great Episcopius' acknowledged the 'asserters of necessity have seeming experience on their side'** and that 'other asserters of liberty seem driven into it on account of suppos'd inconveniences attending the doctrine of necessity.'150 However, the latter are utterly mistaken. For fundamentally, it is belief in 'liberty … or power to act or not to act, to do this or another thing under the same circumstances' which is 'an impossibility and atheistical.'151 To grasp his thesis that liberty 'can only be grounded on the absurd principles of Epicurean atheism,' or what he terms the 'Epicurean system of chance,' one only has to glance back, he says, at the history of ancient thought. **For the 'Epicurean atheists who were the most popular and most numerous sect of atheists of antiquity, were the great asserters of liberty, as on the other side, the Stoicks, who were the most popular and most numerous sect among the religionaries of antiquity were the great asserters of fate and necessity.'**152 Hence, to postulate 'freedom of the will,' he insisted, is 'atheistical.'

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/154/mode/2up?view=theater

Among the books reviewed by *L'Europe Savante* in its first year was Collins' *A Philosophical Inquiry, concerning Human Liberty* (1717), published by R. Robinson of Saint Paul's Church Yard in London. The journal provided an unbiased account of Collins' Spinozistic rejection of free will and argument that all human action is necessarily determined, **including his assertion that in the ancient world it was the Epicureans who believed in free will and were the largest group among the 'atheists' who 'étoient partisans de la liberté'** while the Stoics, 'qui formoient la secte la plus nombreuse des Déistes, soutenoient la nécessité.' Among the Jews of antiquity it was the allegedly irreligious Sadducees who claimed that man is free while 'les Esséniens et les Pharisiens, à qui Jésus-Christ no reprochoit que leur hypocrisie, croioient que l'homme étoit nécessité.'73

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/102/mode/2up?view=theater

Promoting 'good sense in the world,' according to Collins, is something best done, as he remarks in a letter to Des Maizeaux of September 1721, **by employing 'the philosophical works' of 'some superior genius [like Cicero] to hinder it from being hissed out of the world by the knaves and fools.' Cicero's works he thought particularly 'applicable to all sorts of folly and superstition by those who have eyes to see and ears to hear; and which must have a good effect on many from the establish'd credit and authority of the author,' such clearing away being essentially the same task in his day, it appeared to him, as it had been in Roman times.**49 **Ancient and modern credulity and ignorance was all of one piece.** This tendency to unite all of history around the battle against superstition whether ancient or modern, pre- or post-Christian, is equally evident in Radicati, Meslier, Jean-Frédéric Bernard, and d'Argens.50

https://archive.org/details/pretendeddifficu00gurd/page/92/mode/2up?view=theater

The only Subterfuge *Spinosa* has, and a mere Subterfuge it is, is this; **That he takes it for granted, there is no such Thing as a *Vacuum*;** and therefore that there can be no real Separation of one Part of Matter from another.

IN the first place, This is taking for granted, and Building his whole Scheme upon what Sir *Isaac Newton*, a much better Philosopher than himself, has since his Time given the World strong Reasons for believing to be false, *viz. That there are no Spaces void of Matter*.
…

HOW much soever Our modern *Atheist* may think fit to laugh at the *Epicureans*, yet I think, in this Respect, they have taken better Care of their Gods than he has done. The *Epicureans* saw that their Material Gods could never be permanent Beings, if they were in the Way of their Atoms; that their Frame would be in continual Danger of being disordered, if not destroyed by their continual Incursions: **and therefore they wisely removed them out of their numberless Worlds, where the Atoms were continually jostling each other, and placed them in Security in their Intramundan Spaces:** But our

modern *Atheist* has taken no such Care of his God, for he has left him in all the Hurry and Confusion of Things, continually altering and changing his State and Condition, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse; he is the Subject of all the Generations, and all the Corruptions that are seen in the World. **For, as what others would call particular Beings or Substances, are with *Spinosa* only Modes of the same One Substance GOD; so it must be GOD that is the Subject of all the Changes;** and yet *Cotta* in *Tully de Natura Deorum*, speaks of it as an undoubted *Axiom* in *Philosophy*, *Si ortus est Deorum, interitus sit necesse est*. p. 56.
...

And therefore *Spinosa*'s Argument will only prove the Immortality, not the Immutability of his Self-existent Being.

'TIS plain from *Plutarch*, That he thought a Being might be immortal, and yet an imperfect and mutable Being. For thus he expresses himself in his Treatise against the *Stoicks*, where he is ridiculing the Stoical Notion of *Jupiter*, into whom the *Stoicks* supposed all other Beings, Gods as well as Men, to be transformed at the Conflagration; "*Chrysippus*," says he, "and *Cleanthes*, when they had filled the whole World with what they called Gods, they took no Care of securing any of them from Corruption but *Jupiter* only, in whom all the rest of the Gods were lost." And then he makes this Remark, **"That his destroying of them, was no better a Proof of his own Immutability than it was of theirs."** For, says he, "It is no more an Argument of Weakness and Mutability in the Gods, that they are changed and *corrupted* into *Jupiter*, than it is in *Jupiter* into whom they are changed."*

---

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

Paolo Mattia Doria (1662-1746), the Genoese patrician and *érudit* who resided in Naples from the late 1680s, subsequently playing a key part in that city's spectacular intellectual life during the Early Enlightenment, a seasoned observer of the philosophical currents of the age,18 in 1732 published a book deploring the sudden fervour for the ideas of Locke and Newton 'in Rome, in Naples, and in other parts of Italy' and the progress of English empiricism, since the late 1720s, in a land already rent from top to bottom by warring philosophies.19 What he terms the 'furore Lockense' served, in his view, only to escalate and convolute further what was now **a five-cornered contest in which scholastic Aristotelianism, though in full retreat, still fought on tenaciously against three competing cohorts of respectable *moderni* – *Lochisti*, the *Cartesiani-Malebranchisti*, and the devotees of the Leibnizian-Wolffian system. The *Lochisti* might be gaining ground rapidly, and many clergy had joined them, but all they would accomplish, admonished Doria, would be to further split the middle ground. By contributing to the pulverization of Italy's former cultural, intellectual and spiritual cohesion, they were simply opening the door, albeit inadvertently, to the awesome fifth column, the radicals or *Epicurei-Spinosisti* as he terms them – who reject all authority and established ideas and despise Revelation, the Church, and Christian morality.**20 Italy was in the grip of a gigantic and horrifying dilemma. Doria considered Locke dangerous, Cartesianism 'damaging to civil society,'21 and Pierre Bayle of Rotterdam *perniciosissimo*;22 **yet all these were innocence itself, he declares, compared with the threat to Church and society posed by the radicals.**23 **For those 'who deny God the attributes of goodness, love, intelligence and providence,' the *Spinosisti*, not only demolish all religion but are also 'destructive of civil society.'**24

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/458/mode/2up?view=theater

Roëll roundly denied the Stoics reduce God to Nature like the Spinozists,175 as did Doria (until towards the end of his life), who praised the Stoics for acknowledging, not unlike the Pythagoreans and Platonists, a God immanent in the world, infinite and yet intelligent.176 **Doria, like Vico later, changed his mind about this and equated Stoicism with Pliny's system or that 'renewed in our days by Benedict de Spinoza.'**177

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n27/mode/2up?view=theater

5 The ray of the divine providence illuminating a convex jewel which adorns the breast of metaphysic denotes the clean and pure heart which metaphysic must have, **not dirty or befouled with pride of spirit or vileness of bodily pleasures, by the first of which Zeno was led to put fate, and by the second Epicurus to put chance, in the place of divine providence.**

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/24/mode/2up?view=theater

In 1692, Vico wrote a poem, in a conventional genre, on despair and the vanity of human wishes. None of these works are today of more than biographical interest. **The poem (*Affetti di un disperato*)**1 **expresses Lucretian-Epicurean sentiments which he was later exceedingly anxious to disclaim. It contains no trace of orthodox Christian belief,** and constitutes an important evidence

of the preoccupations in the last decade of the century of Vico and his freethinking friends, to whom he appears to have been closer than his autobiography would lead one to believe.

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/54/mode/2up?view=theater

The theorists whom he singled out for attack were those who seemed to him to have perpetrated unhistorical anachronisms: like the upholders of theories of natural law or social contract, who credited primitive men with some of the civilised attributes of their own 'magnificent' age;1 **and those rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, or utilitarians like Hobbes and Locke, or 'Epicureans' like Gassendi, who, however deeply they differed from one another, all assumed the existence of a fixed, unchanging human nature, common to all men, everywhere, at all times, a fully developed moral and psychological structure from which rights, obligations, laws, flowing from universal goals, identical to all men, could be logically deduced.** Vico attacks the great jurists Grotius, Selden, Pufendorf, whose gifts and erudition he admired, and to whose notions of social laws (especially Grotius') he acknowledge a profound debt, **for their blindness to the idea of development, *nascimento*, coming to birth, from which *natura* is derived,** whereby one generation, or culture, grows into another. Blind to this, they cannot see the organic interconnection which unites the various fields of activity which belong to any one particular stage of social growth. **Above all, he charges them with ignoring the cardinal truth that all valid explanation is necessarily and essentially genetic, in terms either of human purposes, which change with changing circumstances, or of the alteration of circumstances by these purposes themselves, that is, by human action, or the interplay of purposes and 'blind' circumstances or environment, which often leads to consequences unintended by men.**

The central idea at the heart of Vico's thought is that, in the individual and society alike, phase follows phase not haphazardly (as the Epicureans thought), nor in a sequence of mechanical causes or effects (as the Stoics thought), but as stages in the pursuit of an intelligible purpose – man's effort to understand himself and his world, to realise his capacities in it. History for him is the orderly procession (guided by Providence, working through men's capacities) of ever deepening types of apprehension of the world, of ways of feeling, acting, expressing, each of which grows out of, and supersedes, its predecessor. To each type or culture necessarily belong some characteristics not found in any other. **So begins the conception of the 'phenomenology' of human experience and activity, of men's history and life as determined by their own, at first unconscious, the progressively more conscious, creative moulding, that is, mastery of nature both living and dead.** In the forms given it by Hegel and Marx and their followers, this idea dominates the modern world. It is for this that Marx praised him. Of this view of men and history, for better and for worse, Vico is the pioneer.

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/78/mode/2up?view=theater

Self-interest is not, and could never have been, the mainspring of action: passion, duty, tradition, a sense of human or national solidarity; shame, conscience, awe, the sense of a divine presence – these cannot be reduced to 'modifications'4 **of the rational egoism of a nation of shopkeepers, 'hucksters'**5 **often deflected by irrational passions or frustrated by ignorance, which Vico declares to be Spinoza's caricature of men; and Locke is no better.**

https://archive.org/details/threecriticsofen0000berl_z2z0/page/98/mode/2up?view=theater

His attack on Grotius' doctrine of natural law is no less subversive than if he had directly assailed its Catholic version, for example that of Aquinas and his predecessors and the Spanish Thomists, in which Grotius's principles are rooted. The *New Science* in effect rejects the notion of absolute, timeless values, and its historicism is as fatal to the Christian as to any other doctrine of natural law. **His doctrine of the evolution of mankind from the *ferini* – the bestial creatures who wandered over the earth, at any rate after the Flood – is, as has been noted by all the commentators, taken from Epicurus and Lucretius: it is to be met in Euripides, Cicero, Horace, Diodorus Siculus, and later in the most notorious naturalists and atheists of the eighteenth century and later; but it has no point of contact with Catholic orthodoxy.** The attack upon it of the learned Dominican Francesco Finetti in 17683 was perfectly justified, and, as Croce ultimately came to concede, Duni's attempts to defend Vico's self-proclaimed orthodoxy are totally unconvincing.

> 3. G.F. Finetti, ***Apologia del genere umano accusato di essere stato una volta una bestia*** (Venice, 1768), reprinted by Croce as *Difesa dell' autorita della sacra scrittura contro Giambattista Vico* (Bari, 1936).

…

Although Vico makes a point of distinguishing *bestioni* from the 'scempi di Grozio,' the 'abbandonati di Puffendorfio' and the 'violenti di Obbes,'2 **there is no relevant difference**

between them; Vico protests too much about this, as indeed he does his piety and devotion to the precepts of the Church.
…

Moreover, Vico's use of critical methods first applied by Spinoza and *Père* Simon, the fathers of higher criticism, is obvious enough. **Vico loathed Spinoza, but did not escape the influence of his method: he applies it only to pagan antiquities, but he applies it.**

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n109/mode/2up?view=theater

335. No nation has believed in a god all body or in a god all mind but not free. And so neither the Epicureans who attribute to God body alone, and chance together with body, nor the Stoics who (in this respect the Spinozists of their day) make God an infinite mind, subject to fate, in an infinite body, could reason of commonwealths or laws; **and Benedict Spinoza speaks of the commonwealth as of a society of shopkeepers. Cicero was indeed right when he told the Epicurean Atticus that he could not discuss laws with him unless he first granted the existence of divine providence.** Such is the compatibility of these two sects, the Stoic and the Epicurean, with Roman jurisprudence, which takes divine providence for its first principle!

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/666/mode/2up?view=theater

Thus 'Providence' in Spinoza means the impossibility of any miraculous or supernatural intervention 'contrary to Nature.'12 **But it is hard to see that Vico's usage, even if more discreetly formulated, is fundamentally different except that Vico clearly refuses to allow that man as an individual is fully determined in his actions.**
…

What is providential about Vico's vision of the historical process is that it is universal and, within a natural framework, immutable. **Nothing could be further from Bossuet's demonstration of the play of Providence in history.**

Furthermore, in Vico the distinction between sacred and profane history, between Christian and non-Christian history, totally disappears and a fundamental similarity, comparability, and moral validity is assigned to all societies and all stages of human development. Hence, despite some occasional rhetoric to the contrary, Christ the Redeemer, the rise of the Christian Church, and ecclesiastical authority are in fact stripped of functional significance in the workings of human history. A prime instance, **almost *the* supreme example, of Vico's 'divine Providence' in action is the unparalleled stability and durability over many centuries of the Roman Empire.** What is so impressive about ancient Rome, holds Vico, is her success in synthesizing laws and institutions of 'divine origin' with a rational conception of justice based on a universal right 'observed equally among all the nations.'14 But this unrivalled Roman greatness, based, claims Vico, on 'divine Providence,' was providential not in any theological sense but merely in the sense that men understood Rome's institutions to be infused by divine will. Thus, Vico asserts, neither the Epicureans who consider God to be exclusively material, 'nor the Stoics who, in this respect were the Spinozists of their day, and make God an infinite mind, subject to fate, in an infinite body,' were capable of properly conceiving, let alone upholding, law, institutions, and politics. Spinoza, claims Vico, 'speaks of the commonwealth as if it were a society of traders,' failing to grasp the irrational drives, fears, ideals, and so forth which shape so much of human conduct.15

It is a remarkable allegation since it is primarily Spinoza who seeks to explain founding institutions, and especially organized religion, as deriving from irrational drives, fears, and ideals.
…

On this reading, Vico intends to supply a corrective to Spinoza, many of whose ideas about human nature, the common good, the origin of society, and organized religion he accepts, supplementing his austere view of man, God, and truth by demonstrating that the truth of the philosophers can never be the truth of the people and must remain segregated, excluded from the sphere of commonly held and publicly approved notions which underpin institutions, laws, and government.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n233/mode/2up?view=theater

And at their very birth providence causes the commonwealths to spring forth aristocratic in form, in conformity with the savage and solitary nature of the first men. This form consists entirely, as writers on political theory point out, in guarding the boundaries and the orders, **so that peoples newly come to humanity might, by the very form of their governments, continue for a long time to remain enclosed within these boundaries and orders, and so forget the infamous and nefarious promiscuity of the bestial and feral state.** But the minds of men were preoccupied with particulars and incapable of understanding a common good; they were accustomed never to concern themselves

with the affairs of others, **as Homer makes his Polyphemus tell Ulysses (and in this giant Plato recognizes the fathers of the families in the so-called state of nature preceding the civil state).** Providence therefore, by the aforesaid aristocratic form of their governments, led them to unite themselves to their fatherlands in order to preserve such great private interests as their family monarchies were (for this was what they were entirely bent upon), **and thus, beyond any design of theirs, they were brought together in a universal civil good called commonwealth.**

630 Now here, by those divine proofs we spoke of above in the Method, let us consider and meditate on the simplicity and naturalness with which providence ordered these affairs of men, of which they said truly though in a false sense that they were all the work of the gods. And let us consider in this connection the immense number of civil effects which may all be traced to those four causes which, as will be observed throughout this work, are the four elements as it were of the civil universe; namely, religion, marriage, asylum and the first agrarian law which we have discussed above. Then let us ask ourselves if, among all human possibilities, so many and such various and diverse effects could in any other way have had simpler or more natural beginnings among those very men who are said by Epicurus to have been born of chance and by Zeno to have been creatures of necessity. Yet chance did not divert them nor fate force them out of this natural order.

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n395/mode/2up?view=theater

But Christian Europe is everywhere radiant with such humanity that it abounds in all the good things that make for the happiness of human life, ministering to the comforts of the body as well as to the pleasures of mind and spirit. And all this in virtue of the Christian religion, which teaches truths so sublime that it receives into its service the most learned philosophies of the gentiles and cultivates three languages as its own: Hebrew, the most ancient in the world; Greek, the most delicate; and Latin, the grandest. **Thus, even for human ends, the Christian religion is the best in the world, because it unites a wisdom of [revealed] authority with that of reason, basing the latter on the choicest doctrine of the philosophers and the most cultivated erudition of the philologists.**
…

Hence we could not refrain from giving this work the invidious title of a *New Science*, for it was too much to defraud it unjustly of the rightful claim it had over an argument so universal as that concerning the common nature of nations, in virtue of that property which belongs to every science that is perfect in its idea, **and which Seneca has set forth for us in his vast expression: *Pusilla res hic mundus est, nisi id, quod quaerit, omnis mundus habeat*—"This world is a paltry thing unless all the world may find therein what it seeks."**1

1. *Naturales Quaestiones* VII, 31: *Pusilla res mundus est, nisi in illo quod quaerat omnis mundus habeat*. – "The world is a paltry thing unless it offers matter for the researches of all the world."

https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n405/mode/2up?view=theater

That which did all this was mind, for men did it with intelligence; it was not fate, for they did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so acting are perpetually the same.

1109 **Hence Epicurus, who believes in chance, is refuted by the facts, along with his followers Hobbes and Machiavelli; and so are Zeno and Spinoza, who believe in fate.** The evidence is clearly in favor of the contrary position of the political philosophers, whose prince is the divine Plato, who affirms that providence rules the affairs of men. It was therefore with good reason that Cicero refused to discuss laws with Atticus unless the latter would give up his Epicureanism and first concede that providence governed human affairs. **Pufendorf ignored it in his hypothesis, Selden assumed it, and Grotius excluded it; but the Roman jurisconsults established it as the first principle of the natural law of nations.** For in this work it has been fully demonstrated that through providence the first governments of the world had as their entire form religion, on which alone the state of the families was based; and passing thence to the heroic or aristocratic civil governments, religion must have been their principal firm basis. Advancing then to the popular governments, it was again religion that served the peoples as means for attaining them. **And coming to rest at last in monarchic governments, this same religion must be the shield of princes.** Hence, if religion is lost among the peoples, they have nothing left to enable them to live in society: no shield of defense, nor means of counsel, nor basis of support, nor even a form by which they may exist in the world at all.

1110 **Let Bayle consider then whether in fact there can be nations in the world without any knowledge of God! And let Polybius weigh the truth of his statement that if the world had philosophers it would have no need of religions!** For religions alone have the power to cause the peoples to do virtuous works by stimulation of the senses, which alone move men to perform them; and the reasoned maxims of the philosophers concerning virtue are of use only when employed by a good eloquence for kindling the senses to do the duties of virtue.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Pufendorf,_Samuel

PUFENDORF, SAMUEL (1632-1694), German jurist, was born at Chemnitz, Saxony, on the 8th of January 1632. His father was a Lutheran pastor, and he himself was destined for the ministry. Educated at Grimma, he was sent to study theology at the university of Leipzig. Its narrow and dogmatic teaching was profoundly repugnant to him, and he soon abandoned it for the study of public law.
…

In the *De jure naturae et gentium* Pufendorf took up in great measure the theories of Grotius and sought to complete them by means of the doctrines of Hobbes and of his own ideas. His first important point was that natural law does not extend beyond the limits of this life and that it confines itself to regulating external acts. He combated Hobbes's conception of the state of nature and concluded that the state of nature is not one of war but of peace. But this peace is feeble and insecure, and if something does not come to its aid it can do very little for the preservation of mankind. **As regards public law Pufendorf, while recognizing in the state (*civitas*) a moral person (*persona moralis*), teaches that the will of the state is but the sum of the individual wills that constitute it, and that this association explains the state. In this a priori conception, in which he scarcely gives proof of historical insight, he shows himself as one of the precursors of J. J. Rousseau and of the *Contrat social*.** Pufendorf powerfully defends the idea that international law is not restricted to Christendom, but constitutes a common bond between all nations because all nations form part of humanity.
…

In his *De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem* he traces the limits between ecclesiastical and civil power. This work propounded for the first time the so-called “collegial” theory of church government (*Kollegialsystem*), which, developed later by the learned Lutheran theologian Christoph Mathäus Pfaff (1686-1760), formed the basis of the relations of church and state in Germany and more especially in Prussia.

This theory makes a fundamental distinction between the supreme jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters (*Kirchenhoheit* or *jus circa sacra*), which it conceives as inherent in the power of the state in respect of every religious communion, and the ecclesiastical power (*Kirchengewalt* or *jus in sacra*) inherent in the church, but in some cases vested in the state by tacit or expressed consent of the ecclesiastical body. **The theory was of importance because, by distinguishing church from state while preserving the essential supremacy of the latter, it prepared the way for the principle of toleration. It was put into practice to a certain extent in Prussia in the 18th century; but it was not till the political changes of the 19th century led to a great mixture of confessions under the various state governments that it found universal acceptance in Germany.** The theory, of course, has found no acceptance in the Roman Catholic Church, but it none the less made it possible for the Protestant governments to make a working compromise with Rome in respect of the Catholic Church established in their states.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=megGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA131#v=onepage&q&f=false

In turning first to the jurist and philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) I will focus on his history of the papacy, which first appeared in 1679 and in which Pufendorf commented on the question of heresy in a historical perspective.11
…

The origins of the papal monarchy, he writes, lie in the peculiar situation of the Christian church under the pagan emperors. Their hostility to Christianity forced the early church to administer itself to a large extent. **Under the Christian emperors, however, as under any Christian orthodox ruler, this self-administration became superfluous,** because the emperors were now willing to assume responsibility for certain external matters in the church. **The problem was that in late antiquity the clergy could not be removed from the administrative positions they had occupied under paganism.** Pufendorf explained that the Christian emperors were ‘new-comers’ (*novitii*) and could not deprive the bishops of their power, especially as the bishops were supported by the majority of the population, which was now Christian. **The first Christian emperors also failed to realize that the primitive church’s direction of itself was only provisional and a result of the special circumstances under pagan rule.**12

What proved to be particularly dangerous were the disciplinary powers Christians had exercised over their fellow believers under pagan rule. As Pufendorf wrote, ‘this [power of discipline] can easily be abused and grow into a sort of political power, severely restricting the sovereign’s powers.’13 Before Constantine extended toleration to the Empire’s Christians they had preferred to settle their disputes by

appealing to the arbitration of their bishop, **because they did not want to acquire a reputation for litigiousness among the pagans and because pagan morality and laws were too lax by Christian standards.** Nevertheless, the bishops at no point held coercive powers of jurisdiction over the members of their church. They therefore did not encroach on the rights of the pagan sovereign.14

By the time both the majority of the population and the Roman emperors had converted to Christianity the recourse to the authority of the bishops became superfluous, because now a sympathetic Christian emperor could enforce the stricter moral and legal standards desired by Christians. **'For this reason it [the authority of the bishops] became irrelevant, after all commonwealths together with their princes had embraced Christianity, because this sanctity of morals no longer served to shame the pagans, since after the disappearance of pagans all citizens aspired to the same purity in moral life.'**15

https://archive.org/details/hindumannerscust1906dubo/page/310/mode/2up?view=theater

> **In Europe, where the Christian religion has inspired a salutary horror for certain unnatural offences, one would find it difficult to believe the stories which show to what lengths these disgusting vices are carried by the greater number of heathens and Mahomedans, to whom they have become a sort of second nature.**
> …
>
> If the Christian religion had done nothing more than render these iniquities revolting and execrable, that alone would be sufficient to ensure our love and respect for it.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tSE6DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PT200&hl=fi&pg=PT182#v=onepage&q&f=false

It seems hardly to have mattered that, in 1654, the Roman Catholic church placed *De cive* on its *Index librorum prohibitorum*. **The religious strife in France and elsewhere, as well as the Thirty Years War in central Europe, had prepared the way for the acceptance of a radically Erastian doctrine.** Within a few years of the book's initial appearance in Holland, those on the continent who professed natural public law were hailing Hobbes as having equaled, if not bested, the great jurist Hugo Grotius. **Samuel Pufendorf was reduced to trying to make sense of Grotius's jurisprudence in strictly Hobbesian terms;** and in the preface to his seminal *Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis*, he wrote, "We confess no small debt to Thomas Hobbes, whose hypothesis in his book *De cive*, though it smacks a bit of impiety (*quid profani*), is nonetheless in other respects sufficiently shrewd (*arguta*) and reasonable (*sana*)."25

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA41#v=onepage&q&f=false

To defend his achievement in jurisprudence by means of the history of the discipline **was tactically necessary if the charge of incipient secularisation was not to be levelled plausibly at his controversial theory** of the separate scope and methods of natural law and moral theology: innovation had to be concealed behind the unimpeachable authority of generally admired predecessors. Specifically, such a procedure would allow him to present his views as no more than an extrapolation of the moral opinions of respected Stoic writers:

> First of all are denounced the destructive, new and unheard of principles. **These now are drawn from the consideration of nature and of man, as divine works, and they square them as much as possible with the sacred inheritance of the Stoics, but exactly with Christian religion.**3

…

Two considerations seem to have inspired this change of direction: a desire to satisfy the criticisms of Johann Böcler and Hermann Conring that he handicapped his argument by his refusal to cite authorities; **and, more crucially, the discovery that he could only preserve the Grotian account of natural law from the damaging criticisms of Hobbes by invoking the opinions of the Stoics on the source of moral obligation.**4 Thus, in the sections of the *De Jure Naturae* which aim to provide the foundations of a science of morality to underpin the Grotian superstructure, the arguments depend crucially on extensive use of ancient sources.
…

Pufendorf clearly was not initially receptive to all these methodological recommendations; **but they do seem to have become of decisive importance in the course of the composition of *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*, which was completed before his arrival in Sweden in 1670 to take up his professorial chair at Lund.** We know of no other formative intellectual experience that occurred in the intervening years. If such an event had happened, then a writer as garrulously autobiographical as Pufendorf would not have resisted a reference to it in the final collection of his polemical writings, the *Eris Scandica*. On the contrary, **there is considerable evidence, both internal to *De Jure Naturae* and circumstantial to its publication, which suggests that Pufendorf spent much of his remaining time at Heidelberg engaged in re-reading ancient works on moral philosophy, especially Stoic ones,** once he realised that they could be of substantial and not merely cosmetic assistance to him in refuting Hobbes. In a note appended to his edition of the Boineburg correspondence, Christian Thomasius, who as Pufendorf's friend and follower was uniquely qualified to know, testifies to the direct influence of Böcler's words on Pufendorf's studies:

> Pufendorf was not able to refute these accusations of Böcler concerning his neglect of ancient writers more effectively than by actually citing those authors everywhere in his *Institutiones juris naturae et gentium*, which was published afterwards, and by drawing evidence and examples from them.62

62. Thomasius, *Paulo plenior Historia Juris Naturae*, appendix II, note n.p. 182. The same point is made by Brucker in his *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, where C.A. Heumann is cited as the authority: '**In one year at Heidelberg he read more books than Beckmann looked at in a lifetime … he not only gained an outstanding knowledge of ancient literature by means of which he afterwards adorned his work on the law of nature and of nations,** but he also had around him a great number of students devoted to study and hanging on his words' (*Historia Critica Philosophiae*, vol. V, tomus IV, *pars altera*, liber II, caput IV, § xiii, p. 755).

The preface to the first edition of *De Jure Naturae* makes a point of stressing the use of ancient sources: **'That I have not detracted from the honour due to antiquity is clear from the way in which on very occasion I prefer to cite the ancient authors to witness to my theses.'**63
…

He could say with perfect justice: 'However my attempts to refine natural law do not derive in any way from Cartesian principles,' **since Descartes himself had been unable or unwilling to extend the implications of his new logic into the field of ethics.**69 Pufendorf's exasperated assertion that **'I waged hand-to-hand combat with Hobbes while Descartes did not treat with moral philosophy,'** deserves our sympathy.70
…

Horst Denzer has shown that in the books as a whole there are 310 major references to Stoic authors, far more than any other individual ancient philosopher or school of thinkers receives.72

72. H. Denzer, *Moralphilosophie und Naturrecht bei Samuel Pufendorf* (Munich, 1972), p. 260. The detailed breakdown of citations according to authors is as follows: **Cicero: 155 references; Seneca: 109 references; Marcus Aurelius: 12 references; Epictetus: 34 references (including those derived through Arrian).**

The bulk of these citations occur in the early sections of the book and there is a particular concentration in the second chapter of book II entitled 'On the Law of Nature in general.' **It is here that we may observe Pufendorf's eclectic method of operation combining conceptual analysis of both a modern author (Grotius) and of ancient Stoic insights, to rebut central contentions from *De Cive*.**
…

As one might expect, Pufendorf's respect for the one remaining historical source for natural jurisprudence – ancient philosophy – is greater: 'the memorable writings of ancient philosophers contain not a few maxims that provide clarifications of natural law.'92 This contribution had received insufficient notice. As a consequence of Aristotle's significance has been overrated and the Stoics altogether forgotten:

For although among the different sects of ancient philosophers the opinions of the Stoics seem to be able to be arranged (with some emendations) very easily into a solid system of natural law, **these were neglected and only the doctrines of Aristotle seized power in the schools of philosophy.**93

The Stoic theory was of greater contemporary relevance since Stoic morality was not tied to a specific religious, political or national context, as Aristotle's self-consciously was. Aristotle's work aimed to provide an analysis of political phenomena existing in fourth-century Greece. Thus, the generations of commentators on Aristotle who had argued that his natural law was conceived in objective abstraction were quite incorrect:

Not to speak about the other parts of his philosophy, **Aristotle's Ethics, if you leave aside the passaged that deal with the principles of human actions, seem to contain scarcely anything but the duties of a citizen in any Greek republic.** Just as also in his Politics, he appears to have had the institutions of his own Greek states very much before his eyes, and to have valued their freedom above everything. This was a serious flaw in the training that was about to be offered to serve the uses of the whole human race.94
…

In essence Hobbes is regarded as having revived Epicureanism in ethics just as his friend and contemporary Gassendi had done in physics:

The old theory of the Epicureans appealed to him very much either through a similarity of taste or because he identified it in the practice of states (which justify all matters in relation to the state's own preservation and advantage), or even, I conjectured sometimes, through the example and in emulation of his great friend Pierre Gassendi: **when the latter had undertaken to rehabilitate the views of the Epicureans, and in his *Physica* in particular, Hobbes decided to publish in the world of learning his [Gassendi's] opinions on ethics cloaked in a new structure.**99

By describing Hobbes as an 'Epicurean' Pufendorf was using that term as a precise label rather than, as so often among opponents of Hobbes, as a mere term of abuse. **For this description is immediately paralleled by a statement of Pufendorf's own 'Stoicism,'** with which he associates Richard Cumberland, whose *De Legibus Naturae*, published in the same year as the *De Jure Naturae*, had put up a similarly 'Stoic' opposition to Hobbes:

So far as I can tell Richard Cumberland destroyed his [i.e. Hobbes'] theory very effectively in England with his learned and able book *De Legibus Naturae*. **At the same time he established the contrary thesis which approximates closely to the views of the Stoics, and which of the two was my view too.**100

For Pufendorf, the shorthand labels 'Stoic' and 'Epicurean' represent not crude reductive slogans but a mirror of the way he had encountered and transcended Hobbesian natural law within his own mind.

The essay ‘De Origine’ concludes with a section deploring the acrimony and irrelevance of the theological polemics that had been directed at Grotius, Hobbes and now Pufendorf himself. He reveals that one purpose of the *De Jure Naturae* had been to provide a definition of natural law that would place the subject outside the reach of these distracting disputes so that the spheres of interest represented by theology and natural law would be recognised as distinct:

> In it [i.e. the preface to *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*] my particular purpose was, so far as my abilities allowed, to embrace all those topics that related to the discipline of natural law and arrange them in an order that was neither loose nor rough. **Next my intention was to abolish in natural law all theological controversies, and adapt it to the understanding of the whole of mankind, who disagreed in many different ways over religion: I note that this was also done by Richard Cumberland, who was however a theologian by profession.**101

Once the principle was recognised that natural law applied uniquely to the human forum (but within that area was the creation of man himself) there would be no more room for fractious disputation: ‘Of course this discipline can never shine with native brilliance and blossom in tranquil and happy peace unless it has been raised above those storms.’102 However, this expectation was oversanguine, even disingenuous; for whatever the defects of his own theory of the origin of natural law in divine imposition, **Alberti was entirely correct in identifying the fact that Pufendorf’s locating of natural law in the social instincts and calculations of the individual left little role for religion at all in human life: ‘in all eight books there is nothing to be read about any obligation that derives from that religion, and indeed rather too little about religion itself.’**103

https://books.google.fi/books?id=vx75FeIRcRYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PR18#v=onepage&q&f=false

The form of solution to this second problem was to derive a set of universal principles of right from two premises no person could reasonably doubt: **a scientifically reconstructed condition common to all persons, ‘the state of nature,’ and the empirically verifiable self-love or concern each person has with their own preservation** (Seidler 1990). The first would free natural law from its dependency on the study of existing law codes and the Aristotelian starting point of commonly held opinions, and would thus emancipate it from the charge of relativism launched by Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) and Pierre Charron (1541-1603). The latter provided a good (preservation) which all could accept despite their disagreements over higher order goods, thus freeing the derivation of natural law from attachment to any particular religion (Zurbuchen 1986).
…

First are the negative service duties of not injuring others, as Grotius and Hobbes had correctly discerned (I.6). However, these are insufficient. To eliminate the occasion of anti-social reaction it is also necessary to act towards others in a manner which evinces recognition of and displays respect for their equality of dignity as men, so that their highly sensitive and easily provoked self-esteem is not injured (I.7). **This thesis that modern society also needs to rest on the mutual recognition of the equal dignity of all men, as opposed to the feudal and Renaissance honour ethic based in inequality** (I.7.3), **is one of Pufendorf’s most profound and consequential insights** (*DJN*, III.2).
…

Hence Pufendorf, following Cicero, carefully distinguishes between rational or long-term utility and depraved or short-term utility and argues that social duties are consistent with, but not based upon, the former (*DJN*, II.3.10). Actions based on the latter are inconsistent with sociality and, for this reason, self-defeating. If it is made the measure of right, as with Hobbes’s subjective right of self-preservation, the society in which man would be able to achieve even his basic security would never evolve (*DJN*, II.3.11, II.3.16).

In *On the natural state of man*, written in 1675, Pufendorf again contrasts his theory with Hobbes’s and finally abandons his attempts to distinguish two sense of utility, thus freeing his theory from any necessary connection to utility. **He says the rational sense of utility has passed from common usage and the spurious sense, in which the utility is defined in contrast to both socially fitting and regard for others, has gained exclusive sway (thereby explaining his critics’ misunderstanding)** (Seidler, 1990: no. 10, p. 95L, p. 122E).

Henceforth, as he replies to Beckmann, **‘the basic premise from which I draw the principles of natural law [sociality] stands in direct opposition to the theory of Hobbes [based on a right of self-preservation]. For I come very close to the reasonable system of the stoics, whereas Hobbes serves up a rechauffé of Epicurean theories.’** (*ES*).

> https://archive.org/details/newscienceofgiam030174mbp/page/n135/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 397 And finally Pufendorf begins with an Epicurean hypothesis, supposing man to have been cast into this world without any help or care from God. Reproved for this, he defends himself in a special dissertation, **but, because he does not admit providence as his first principle, he cannot even begin to speak of law,** as we have heard Cicero tell Atticus the Epicurean in his dialogue *De legibus*.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=GulESADToWsC&lpg=PA1&hl=fi&pg=PA161#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **Although Pufendorf and Cumberland had both positioned themselves as 'Stoic' critics of Hobbes's 'Epicureanism,' Hutcheson in the inaugural lecture filed Pufendorf along with the Epicureans. He conceded that Pufendorf's philosophy 'ascends a little higher' than theirs,** for his argument that 'knowledge of the great and good God and of the duty which he requires us is easy for man' and that 'clear indications of this are given by the very constitution of our nature as creatures who desire happiness which can only be obtained in social life.'47 **But Hutcheson thought that Pufendorf was nevertheless fundamentally mistaken, in that his argument still supposed that 'men were driven into society merely by external advantage and dread of external evils, contrary to the nature of their hearts, contrary to all their natural desires and affections.'**

Finally, the theory of sociality is clearly constructed with reference to the passage on society and gratitude in Seneca's *On benefits*, IV.18, quoted in *DJN*, II.3.15:

> By what other means are we preserved but by the mutual assistance of good turns? This commerce and intercourse of kindness adds strength and power to life; and, in case of sudden assaults, puts it into a better condition of defence. **Take us all asunder and what are we but an easy and unequal prey to wild beasts?** Man by nature is weak on every side: society fortifies his infirmity and arms his nakedness. Those two excellences, of reason and of society, render him the most potent of all creatures, who would otherwise be obnoxious to injuries from everything about him. Thus, by the help of the union, he commands the world, who, if divided, would scarce be a match for any living rival. And it is society alone which gives him his sovereign sway over inferior creation. This was a thing which first restrained the violence of diseases, which lent crutches and support to old age, and administered consolation to grief. Take away this, and you cut asunder the bond of union, the vital string of mankind.

Grotius cites the same passage, but he interprets it to involve a natural disposition to love society for its own sake (*appetitus societatis*), in addition to self-love (*DJB*, Prel. dis. 8 n.2). Hobbes denies this: 'we do not … by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it' (*Of the citizen*, p. 42). Pufendorf accepts Hobbes's argument while rejecting what Hobbes does with it. As a result, for Pufendorf, the passage from Seneca does not make reference to a social disposition, but rather it encapsulates the six features of the human condition that conjointly render society necessary. Although this conjunction furnishes man with good reasons to be social, the narrow motive of self-love leads him to enmity instead, as Pufendorf is the first to point out (I.3.5-6). Even the love of humanity that he claims is a natural sympathy for others, while important, is too weak to temper this bleak picture (I.8.1, II 1.11). To bring man's selfish motivation in line with his strategically other-regarding social duties, and so his rational utility, the benevolent Christian God enforces duties through fear of his punishments (I.3.10-13). Since belief in a benevolent and punishing God is thereby a necessary condition of social life (I.3.13), duties to God are the first of the social duties (I.4).

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/liberty-matters-knud-haakonssen-pufendorf-on-power-and-liberty#response2

Pufendorf's major book, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations,* is so long and detailed that even his admirers call it ponderous and tedious. It will challenge the memory capacity of even our most advanced e-readers and the patience of our most advanced human readers.
…

Pufendorf in his day was seen as comparable to these greats, before suffering a decline in reputation in the next century. One indication of the esteem in which he was held is Locke's recommendation of Pufendorf's *On the Law of Nature* as "the best book of that kind" in his *Thoughts concerning Reading and Study*.[4]
…

Pufendorf's ambition was thus very great as a matter of philosophy—to reconcile the very social (or, as we might say, communitarian) Grotius with the very individualist (or we might say proto-liberal) Hobbes.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA79#v=onepage&q&f=false

In 1706 Leibniz was asked to give his opinion on Pufendorf's epitome of his natural law theory, *De Officio Hominis et Civis*. The result was an essay entitled 'Opinions on the Principles of Pufendorf.' **In this long letter Pufendorf is reproved for being a muddled Thrasymachus: in other words, for starting from the same voluntarist principles as Hobbes, and then failing to follow them through 'since the greater part of the thoughts expounded … are not consistent with the principles … [for] to those who undertake to maintain paradoxes it happens easily that, when good sense prevails in them, they forget their own doctrines.'**24
…

Pufendorf had managed to exclude Hobbes from his substantive law of nature by reformulating the Grotian principle of sociability as a watered down form of sociality; **but it appeared to Leibniz that Hobbes had been re-admitted as the presiding genius of both civil society and Heaven itself.**
…

Indeed, his essay was regarded throughout much of the eighteenth century as the most distinguished critique of Pufendorf that appeared in the thirty years of polemical exchanges that followed the publication of the *De Jure Naturae*.29 However, his accusation that Pufendorf's theory was confused and inconsistent was incorrect: if Leibniz had studied Pufendorf's replies to his critics with care he could have appreciated how Pufendorf could plausibly maintain a non-Hobbesian moral epistemology that nevertheless derived the duties of man solely from human nature and the circumstances of human life. **This account is not immune to Leibniz' larger criticisms on the question of the sources of obligation, but it *was* coherent.**
…

By removing God and the eternal verities vested in Him from the compass of natural law, Pufendorf had removed any point of external moral reference which transcended the legislative creations and obligations of human nature. **This exclusion was consistent and productive as long as human nature was regarded as reliable and natural law as self-regulating. <u>But once human nature was admitted to be inconsistent and incapable of regularly observing its contracted commitments, then the only recourse possible if society was not to disintegrate was to the voluntarism of the sovereign, even though that source of obligation had been successfully excluded from moral epistemology in the abstract.</u>** And if, in addition, the vocabulary of civic rights had been rewritten as one of civic duties, then it was no surprise that Pufendorf's developed political theory began to take on a suspiciously Hobbesian appearance. **This identity is all the more apparent in the terse summary form on Pufendorf's *De Officio Hominis et Civis*, where, shorn of the qualifications and detailed explanations of the *De Jure Naturae*, the argument begins in places to seem a mere crib from Hobbes' *De Cive*.** It was ironic but inevitable that a project that had succeeded in providing non-voluntarist epistemological foundations for natural law should display a superstructure of practical politics far closer to Hobbes'.

https://researchportal.vub.be/en/publications/the-early-german-reception-of-spinozas-tractatus-theologico-polit

It's remarkable to see that a Lutheran university professor was able and allowed to engage productively with the *Leviathan* (1651). Of course he got some problems, but what he did, was in principle possible. This was exactly not the case with Spinoza. **Nobody at a university level could engage productively with Spinoza, contrary to Hobbes who was nevertheless attacked by many as an atheist.** That's an interesting contrast, right? Pufendorf, however, obviously didn't think of Hobbes as immoral and atheist, because otherwise a positive engagement with Hobbes wouldn't have been possible. **In contrast, it was precisely the idea that atheists can't possibly be moral that defined Pufendorf's stance towards Spinoza.** Regarding natural law theory, I think Pufendorf is most important in his voluntaristic understanding of natural law as only existent and obligatory because of its creation and ordainment by God the legislator. **For many German legal philosophers dealing with Spinoza the question whether Hugo Grotius was right or not in positing his *etiamsi daremus* was very important, but for Pufendorf there wouldn't be any law whatsoever without a divine legislator.** In the very beginning of *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625) where Grotius announces his theory of natural law, he states that the norms of natural law are valid and binding even if there would be no God, *etiamsi daremus non esse Deum*. However, Grotius adds that even if there was no God, it would be a crime and unlawful to think this. In the end, for Grotius, the norms – the natural laws – do not depend in any way on God, neither in their existence or in their obligatory character. This was the naturalization and secularization of the idea of morality. On the other hand, you have a voluntaristic faction to which Pufendorf belonged and also John Locke, for example. **Locke argued that the elimination of God, even in thought, dissolves everything since there's only one possible motive to act morally and according to the law, namely the sanctions composed by God in the afterlife. One finds the same thought expressed in the words of Pufendorf and other members of this faction.** The Grotian faction, however, asserted that there's a natural law independent of God's will – which evidently gave rise to much discussion in Protestant circles.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT298#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> The later renowned German jurist, **Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), who enrolled in Leiden in the spring of 1660, and years later would bitterly condemn Spinoza's demolition of natural law theory in the second (1684) edition of his famous *De Jure naturae et gentium* [the Law of Nature and the Nations] (1672),**23 likewise recounts this, to contemporaries, lurid tale evidently doing the rounds in the environs when Pufendorf, Borch, De Volder, and others attending the lectures of Heidanus, De Raey, Heereboord, and Gronovius first got to hear of Spinoza. During this formative period for these young scholars, Pufendorf later reminisced, in a letter of June 1688, to one of Germany's leading early Enlightenment scholars, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), he had happened to encounter Spinoza personally.
>
> Though not the first occasion Pufendorf expressed hostility to Spinoza and his doctrines, this letter of 1688, curiously mixing Latin and German, is notably personal. **Recalling that over a quarter of a century earlier, when studying at Leiden in 1660-1, he had entered into conversation with the young Spinoza, he found him audacious and brash, a "leichtfertiger Vogel [frivolous bird]," and "deorum hominumque irrisor [mocker of gods and men]." <u>Spinoza even had the effrontery, he heard then, to have his copies of the New Testament and the Koran bound together!</u>** Spinoza's lack of formal academic training and deference for scholarly authority made him appear outrageously pretentious to the likes of Pufendorf who always denied that there was anything profound in Spinoza and, apparently, made

no effort to read Spinoza's chief work, the *Ethics*, when it appeared, or even most of the *TTP*.24 **Still, in 1688 he concurred with Thomasius that scholars must devote whatever time and effort was required to destroy this outrageous Sophist ["dass man ihn funditus destruire"], because somewhat to Pufendorf's amazement, since 1661 Spinoza, for all his absurdity, turned out to be a formidable threat to faith, authority, and the hierarchical social order he, Pufendorf, strove so unremittingly to uphold.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/196/mode/2up?view=theater

According to Spinoza, as also the *Symbolum*, Stosch, Wagner, Lau, and Wachter who, in 1704, published at Berlin a forty-four-page Latin treatise on Natural Law incorporating (without mentioning Spinoza) Spinoza's ethical doctrines, and several phrases verbatim from his *Tractatus politicus*, **there can be neither good nor bad in the state of nature, and Natural Law boils down to saying that divine justice is equivalent to divine power, that is the power of nature.**159
…

Spinozism means the only natural law is the law of an impersonal, morally neutral nature or as Wachter puts it: 'conservatio sui est juris naturalis' [self-conservation is the law of nature].161
…

Pufendorf may have in part engineered a 'profound "de-transcendentalising" of civil governance,'166 **and 'desacralising separation of transcendent morality and civil authority,' as one scholar puts it,** albeit in Leibniz's judgment fatally separating politics from true morality,167 **but Barbeyrac, fighting Bayle no less than Spinoza and Leibniz, sought to reverse this tendency in Pufendorf, bending Natural Law back the other way.**
…

The Pufendorfian conception of Natural Law, though still immensely powerful in the Lutheran universities as a social and political theory, had by the 1730s become a philosophical cripple, retreating before a rival Leibnizian-Wolffian Natural Law tradition based on a more metaphysical conception of justice and an equally devastating Hobbesian-Spinozist retort, drawing in part on Gundling's reworking of Hobbes, on Stosch, Wachter, and Lau, and, finally, culminating in Johann Jakob Schmauss (1690-1757), a great expert on Grotius, Pufendorf, and all Natural Law theory besides, among other things, Spanish and Portuguese history, appointed professor of Natural Law at Göttingen by George II, King of England and elector of Hannover, with the founding of the university, in 1734.175

Scorning Barbeyrac, acutely aware of both Hobbes and Spinoza,176 **Schmauss argued against Pufendorf and Thomasius that the only Natural Law that really exists is Hobbes's and Spinoza's drives, instincts, and impulses.** In his private 'collegia' at Göttingen and, at the end of his life, in his notorious, posthumously published, critique of Grotius and Pufendorf, both of whom he sought to unseat from their previous pre-eminence in German academe, Schmauss helped undermine one of the most crucial linchpins of the German conservative princely Enlightenment.177

https://oll.libertyfund.org/page/liberty-matters-knud-haakonssen-pufendorf-on-power-and-liberty#response1

In keeping with the post-Osnabrück constitutional order, however, **Pufendorf's natural law could not itself be grounded in a true philosophy, in the manner of Thomism, Spinozism, or Hobbesianism. Instead it took the form of an erudite humanist *copia*. This assembled a vast array of classical, Christian, and modern authorities designed to authorize Pufendorf's account of man in his natural and civil conditions, thence the pluralist architecture of religious and civil governance.** In both its pluralist content and its humanist method Pufendorf's natural law thus marked a crucial departure from the forms of Catholic and Protestant natural law that had dominated German universities in the period of territorial confessionalization, between the 1550s and 1650s. **This scholastic style of natural law—through which theologians accessed divine law which the prince was then supposed to enact as civil law—had been suited to the theocratically oriented Augsburg polities, but would not survive Osnabrück as a basis for public law, even if it continued as academic philosophy.**

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/272/mode/2up?view=theater

A German, engaged as a teacher in Sweden, took up the task, and set his indelible seal on the theories which were taking shape. Samuel Pufendorf was the first to occupy the chair of natural and international law at the University of Lund offered him by Charles XI of Sweden. **"The duty of the man and the citizen": strange to hear those words, at that early date! We seem to be at least a hundred years ahead of the times. If anyone had asked us to what era they appertained, we should unhesitatingly have answered that they belonged to the phraseology of the French Revolution; and it is a fact that the work did contain certain basic ideas which, handed on from one thinker to another, came finally to exert a decisive influence on the collective mentality of the ensuing century: philosophical abstraction**

taking the place of history, since we may look upon "the first man as having fallen from the clouds, so to speak, with the same inclinations as those possessed by men when they come into the world to-day"; social morality, duty, being human action precisely conforming to the laws which command us to perform it; the political pact. **Civil society which succeeds the state of nature by way of marriage, the family, the constitution of the body-politic, reposes of necessity on agreements;** the several individuals covenanting together to unite in one body, and to regulate by common consent whatever concerns the common safety, and the common weal; those to whom the sovereign authority is entrusted pledge themselves to do all that in them lies to preserve the security and welfare of all; the rest promising them their loyal obedience.

Natural Law gains form and substance; it now not only asserts its rights in war, it imperiously demands a place, and takes it, in the political constitution of the different states; it plays a predominant part in social life: **"the law of nature is one which is so uniformly adapted to all that is sociable and reasonable in human nature that, unless its dictates were obeyed, it would be impossible for mankind to live together in peace and security." Pufendorf does not deny the divine power, but he relegates it to another plane:** there is the plane of pure reason, and there is the plane of Revelation; in the same manner, there is the plane of natural law and the plane of moral theology; the plane of duties which impose themselves upon us because the right use of our natural reason makes us regard them as essential to the maintenance of human society as a whole, and there is the plane of duties which we are called upon to fulfil because God in Holy Writ has laid them upon us. That said, **he adduces arguments designed to show that these planes do not clash, that they may work together, and only succeeds in demonstrating how profoundly they disagree.** Theology is concerned with Heaven; human reason, with earth. Pufendorf confines himself to earth; Heaven seemed to him altogether too remote.

The Swedish pastors saw only too plainly the dangers of this divided, or rather, avowedly one-sided allegiance; and against this exponent of the theory of natural law there arose such a storm of indignation that he was compelled to call in the aid of the secular arm to avoid being driven from his post. He was not driven from it; on the contrary, he won the day.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_label_281

Now this *Equality* of Mankind does not alone consist in this, that Men of ripe Age have almost the same *Strength,* or if one be weaker, he may be able to kill the stronger, either by *Treachery,* or *Dexterity,* or by being better furnished with *Weapons;* but in this, that though Nature may have accomplished one Man beyond another with various Endowments of Body and Mind; yet nevertheless he is obliged to an Observation of the *Precepts* of the *Law Natural* towards the meaner Person, after the same manner as *himself* expects the same from *others;* and has not therefore any greater Liberty given him to insult upon his Fellows.35

> 35. For Pufendorf equality arises neither from **a common ability to inflict harm (Hobbes) nor from the universal possession of a soul or rational faculties (the scholastics),** but from the fact that all men are subject to the same duties of sociability.

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_label_193

By which I mean not only *Atheism* and *Epicurism,* but all other Sentiments which are prejudicial to Human Society, or destructive of good Manners; such being incompatible with true Religion, and overturning the very Foundation of the Morality of Human Actions; of which kind there are many Instances.21

The first I shall mention is the Stoical Conceit of *Fate* or *Destiny,* and (which nearly resembles it) *Judicial Astrology;* by which it being supposed, that all things happen in the World by an internal and inevitable Necessity, Men must be looked upon as the simple Instruments only of their own Actions; for which, consequently, they are no more accountable upon this Presumption, than a Clock is answerable for the Motion of its Wheels.
...

When we have thus arm'd our Minds against all false Opinions of the Divine Nature and Worship, the main Concern behind is, for a Man accurately to examine his own Nature, and to study to *know himself.*22

> 22. **Despite Pufendorf's objections to Stoic fatalism, the advice on care of the self in sections IV–VIII contains a compendium of neo-Stoic rules for cultivating the self and restraining the passions and desires in accordance with the limited ends of personal and civil tranquillity.**

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/tooke-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-1673-2003#lf0217_label_164

Nor do they think less unworthily of *God,* who call him the ****Soul of the World.* For the Soul of the World, let them conceive of it as they please, must signifie a *Part* of the World; and how can a *Part* of

a Thing be the *Cause* of it, that is, be something *before* it self? But if by the *Soul* of the World, they mean that *first* and *invisible Being,* from which all Things receive their Vigour, Life, and Motion, they only obtrude upon us an *obscure* and *figurative* Expression for one that is *plain* and *obvious.*

> * **See the Continuation of various Thoughts about Comets, &c. by Mr. Bayle.** [(Barbeyrac's note III.1, p. 57.) Like Bayle, Pufendorf was opposed to Stoic and Deistic treatments of God, in the pantheistic manner, as the world's animating principle. This formed part of Pufendorf's rejection of natural theologies purporting to offer metaphysical insight into God's nature.]

---

https://web.archive.org/web/20070626052251/http://web.princeton.edu/sites/English/csbm/papers/Mulsow_paper.pdf

During the 1660s, under the leadership of Jakob Thomasius, philosophical and theological criteria were developed, which would become very influential in the following decades. **According to Thomasius' "Schediasma historicum" of 1665, from a theological point of view, philosophy needed to guarantee a clear separation of Creator from Creation, of God from Nature.**11 **It should thus only spring from Christian Aristotelianism, not from Stoicism or Neoplatonism.** Accordingly, the history of heresies of early Christianity and of the Middle Ages provided vast evidences for this thesis. There the deviations of the problematic philosophical traditions became manifest, particularly among the followers of pseudepigraphical authors such as Dionysius Areopagita.12

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page77

One must confess, notwithstanding, with the incomparable Grotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of the monks' barbarous Latin. **I have therefore oft-times wished that a man of talent, whose office had necessitated his learning the language of the Schoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth, and that another Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the Schoolmen what these two learned men have done in respect of the Fathers.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page265

It is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat misanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find wickedness everywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they give to them. I speak of those who do it in all seriousness, to draw thence evil conclusions, by which their conduct is tainted; for there are some who only do it to show off their own acumen. People have found that fault in Tacitus, and that again is the criticism M. Descartes (in one of his letters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book *De Cive,* of which only a few copies had at that time been printed for distribution among friends, but to which some notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have. **For although M. Descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man of talent, he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims, in the assumption there made that all men are wicked, or the provision of them with motives for being so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in his admirable *Tables of Practical Philosophy* that the πρωτον ψευδος, the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that he took *statum legalem pro naturali,* that is to say that the corrupt state served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state most befitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according to Aristotle, that is termed *natural* which conforms most closely to the perfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term *natural state* to that which has least art,** perhaps not taking into account that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the question of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not be of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon it the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA20#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thomasius was still very much a part of the protestant scholasticism of north Germany even though he belonged to the more progressive 'Altdorf' branch of Aristotelianism that had tried to accommodate the recent work of Suarez rather than looking back to the ethical writings of Melanchthon.33 Thus he had strong reservations about the syncretic habit of making pagan philosophy conformable with Christianity: **'Nothing corrupts our history of philosophy more disgracefully than attempts to reconcile parts of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and other gentiles with the Christian faith.'**34 **But although Thomasius distanced himself from religious syncretism, he remained wedded to its philosophical parallel by retaining the assumption that all seventeenth-century *novatores* could be assimilated to Aristotelianism,** and that nothing other than a cyclical interpretation of the history of philosophy was tenable. Although he doubted aspects of the tradition in which he had been educated, he could not envisage an alternative paradigm, and so finally conformed.35

We know from the testimony of his son that Jakob Thomasius was interested in, and lectured on, the works of Grotius; but again he did not allow this notable receptivity to new work to alter his general Aristotelian stance on ethics, a point he shared among others with Hermann Conring.36 In a posthumous collection of his father's dissertations, significantly

dedicated to Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius lamented that his father had been born in the wrong time and place to carry his admirable freedom from academic prejudices into a thorough reform of philosophical method in Leipzig:

> And without doubt that blessed man, now dead, would have reached a closer understanding of the true and sole philosophy, since he was endowed with unwearying diligence as well as outstanding integrity of mind. **If the time in which he was writing had granted him the degree of freedom which we (snarling sophists permitting) enjoy,** and if there had not been a firm conviction that Aristotle was the best of all philosophers … then fear of quarrels, which seemed to arise daily among those who strove to increase their knowledge beyond the opinions of the old teachers, would not have impeded the best of men from proceeding further on this path of truth.37

For his son, the elder Thomasius was an eclectic *manqué*, **a transitional figure who embodied the most advanced views in north German academic life before the advent of Pufendorf.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/472/mode/2up?view=theater

The pioneer of the new 'history of philosophy' was undoubtedly Leibniz's teacher Jakob Thomasius (1622-84) at Leipzig and, **aside from Bayle and Le Clerc in Holland, most key practitioners of this new speciality worked in German Lutheran universities.**11 Only decades later did this form of study catch on strongly elsewhere.
…

Thanks to Jakob Thomasius 'who in his time scarcely had an equal in history of philosophy,' notes Brucker,30 **followed by the contributions of Bayle and Buddeus, the new field of study blossomed as an authentically critical-historical endeavour, developing on a wholly new basis.**31 As a result, theological premises, *prisca theologia* and supernatural agency, demonology, magic, and slavish deference to authorities finally came to be firmly separated (and in the case of the radicals wholly eradicated) from what was now viewed as the immensely arduous evolution of human reason. **Within a short space of years, beginning in the 1660s and 1670s, it became *de rigueur* to debate the history of knowledge and thought in secular, non-supernatural terms.**
…

Thomasius' efforts to retrieve authentic Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Epicureanism and other traditions from the layers of distortion left by the uncritical scholarship of the humanists, and his reasons for doing so, impressed Leibniz, and, through him, to an extent influenced the whole Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition.45 'Tu non philosophorum, sed philosophiae historiam dabis' [you render the history not of philosophers, but of philosophy], Leibniz remarked of his old tutor, wholeheartedly agreeing that truth is scattered widely, must be meticulously searched for, scrupulously selected, and authentically blended, to deliver a genuine synthesis of ancient and modern, and East and West.46

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/494/mode/2up?view=theater

Historia philosophica, held Heumann, summing up the German conservative enlightened eclectic agenda which in substance was that of Buddeus and Brucker too, equips students and the wider public to discern the true character and pedigree of ideas, and their implications, and hence determine whether they are 'good' or 'evil,' 'Christian' or 'unChristian,' desirable or undesirable, **'corrupt Catholic' or 'upright Protestant.'** History of philosophy, he, like they, urged, is a way of defending faith, authority, and tradition critically and reasonably without relying on mere authority, indeed freeing the mind from the shackles of 'authorities' while simultaneously opening the door to genuine philosophizing. For these thinkers believed only the modern Eclectics, sifting the full range of what is available with expertise, discernment, and a Christian conscience, deserved to be called true 'philosophers.' **Here was a crucial new ideal in the history of mankind which Heumann deemed part of a wider transformation of modern thought and culture, one which he attributed above all to the younger Thomasius who, in his eyes, had set out to and succeeded in reforming everything in the world of erudition and thought in the right direction** – ideas, criticism, history of philosophy, and the education of the general public – and doing so by means of the incomparable new Eclectic method**. Christian Thomasius, he proclaimed, was truly the 'Luther' of philosophy.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false

To keep moral theology separate from moral theory required both a restriction on the practical sphere of theologians that went far beyond other commentators, and the asking of awkward questions about the origins of sovereignty. **Moreover Leibniz' more relaxed views on the social place and impact of theologians made him a more optimistic advocate for confessional reunion than his opponents, at a time when this particular cause was popular at many princely courts.** Hence neither Pufendorf's *De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem* (1687) nor Thomasius' *Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae* (1687), the works in which the concepts of moral theology were most fully developed, were especially well received on this key issue.

Indeed, at the end of Pufenforf's life his pupil Thomasius became involved (with Pufendorf's tacit support) in a damaging dispute with the Danish Lutheran court chaplain, H.G. Masius (1653-1709), on just these points.30 This controversy revolved around the question of the source of *summa potestas*: Masius argued that sovereigns derived their absolute authority directly from God and that the best defence of that absolutism lay specifically in the Lutheran church, seen to have a more reliable political track record than either of the Catholic or Reformed communions. **Thomasius responded, (following Pufendorf's lead) as a lawyer rather than as a theologian, that sovereignty came only indirectly from God and was vested in the people who surrendered it to the ruler under contract. Therefore there could be no room for an intermediate supportive authority such as the Lutheran Church,** which in any case would be as likely as any other Church to cause breaches of the civil peace in support of its own ends. Only the state could supervise religious matters, and then grant toleration in some cases. Masius' case might seem a bizarre piece of special pleading, conceding as it did that Lutheranism had an alarming potential to endorse the most extreme forms of unbridled absolutism; nevertheless Thomasius – and by extension Pufendorf – were forced on to the defensive and revealed positions on the origins of sovereignty and the desirable social and political influence of organised religion that were clearly out of step with contemporary opinion. **No monarch in northern Germany, however secular-minded, was likely to rejoice in the derivation of his sovereignty from popular contract as opposed to divine donation; and for this reason the debate also had severe practical consequences too for Thomasius, in that the electoral court in Dresden was persuaded (unsurprisingly) by a complaint from the king of Denmark to require him to leave Saxony in March 1690, and settle in neighboring Brandenburg. Thomasius sensibly did not follow up his derivation of sovereignty from the people in his new career at the Prussian university of Halle.**

While Thomasius is often considered to have pressed Pufendorf's thought in more radical directions than the latter intended, it is revealing that in this instance – as in fact, in many others – **the younger man was simply bringing into the open implications that were deeply embedded in Pufendorf's own major works.** As Michael Seidler has recently shown in his discussion of Pufendorf's defence of the Glorious Revolution, there is an inherent right to rebel located in Pufendorf's concept of sovereignty based upon a double contract, because the people have a defined collective identity ahead of the formation of government. **It is above all in cases of defence of religious belief that this right may be asserted, a point that was to be seized upon by Huguenot readers of Pufendorf,** as much as by Thomasius.31

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA139#v=onepage&q&f=false

Repeatedly he emphasises that the intellectual means existed for thinkers to achieve the insights finally gained in recent times, but that they did not seize the opportunity. The *lumen naturae* was blurred by sectarian tendencies so that the intellect was used sophistically to support traditional and convenient hypotheses, rather than to explore the issues on their own terms. **For this reason it is the Stoics among the philosophers of ancient Greece who approach nearest to a knowledge of the source of jurisprudence, because their doctrine of sociability curbs the selfish will of men,** replacing it with a concept of *decorum* or a sense of the obligations human beings must accord one another if their own desire for approbation is to be met.94 Conversely, the patristic moralists are to be reproved for having persisted with a form of mystical Platonism that only served to confuse the two *lumina* at a time when they could have been separated; and likewise an opportunity was missed at the Reformation when the rival Protestant confessions allowed their disagreements over interpretation of Scripture to affect the scope they afforded to *lumen naturae*. **Although the advent of Grotius could be interpreted as a piece of divine providence, Pufendorf's hesitations (and his own) in revealing the full deviance of their modern theory of natural law from scholastic orthodoxy delayed the full acceptance of the separate spheres of reason and revelation, and could be construed as a failure to pursue unambiguously the course dictated by the intellect.**95

Nevertheless, for Thomasius, the 'history of morality' had been a progressive enterprise that had resulted in the definitive solution to a problem that had delayed the development of ethics into a science comparable to post-Renaissance natural philosophy. **This had now been achieved under Thomasius himself.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Thomasius,_Christian

THOMASIUS, CHRISTIAN (1655-1728), German jurist and publicist, was born at Leipzig on the 1st of January 1655, and was educated by his father, Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684), at that time head master of the Thomasschule. **Through his father's lectures Christian came under the influence of the political philosophy of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf,** and continued the study of law at Frankfort-on-Oder. In 1684 he commenced the career of professor of natural law at Leipzig, and soon attracted attention by his abilities, but particularly by his daring attack upon traditional prejudices, in theology and jurisprudence. **In 1687 he made the daring innovation of lecturing in German instead of Latin,** and in the following year published a monthly periodical (*Scherzhafte und ernsthafte, vernünftige und einfältige Gedanken über allerhand lustige und nützliche Bücher und Fragen*) in which he ridiculed the pedantic weaknesses of the learned, **taking the side of the Pietists in their controversy with the orthodox, and defending mixed marriages of Lutherans and Calvinists.** In consequence of these and other views, he was denounced from the pulpits, forbidden to lecture or to write (May 10, 1690), and his arrest was ordered. The latter he escaped by flight to Berlin, and the elector Frederick III. offered him a refuge in Halle, with a salary of 500 talers and the permission to lecture. He took part in founding the university of Halle (1694), where he became second and then first professor of law and rector of the university. **He was one of the most esteemed university teachers and influential writers of his day.** He died, after a successful and honourable career, on the 23rd of September 1728.

https://archive.org/details/crisisofeuropean0000haza/page/172/mode/2up?view=theater

No great while since, the death had occurred of a celebrated jurist, one of those terrifying people who are quite sure that they are the repositories of all truth and all justice, and remorselessly condemn their brothers for their own good. **Benedict Carpzow is said to have boasted that he had read the Bible right through from cover to cover fifty-three times and that he had received Holy Communion at least once a month while devoting his life to tightening up regulations directed against, and increasing the penalties exacted from, the practitioners of the black art. He had convicted, or been the means of convicting, some thousands of them.** However, it so happened that it was Germany that was destined to produce, a generation later, the man who, of all others, was most effective in opposing these barbarous cruelties. His name was Christian Thomasius and his mere emergence on the scene is sufficient to show how the times had changed.

At Leipzig, where he was born in 1655, Christian Thomasius had been reared on sound principles, as befitted a respectable professor's son. He had been taught to think on Aristotelian lines and to believe precisely what those austere guardians of orthodoxy, the pastors, taught him to believe. At the age of twenty, having completed his training, he went to Frankfort, there to become a teacher in his turn. He knew exactly what it behoved him to do in order to uphold authority, and to safeguard traditions which left no scope of latitude in the conduct of everyday life.

But it so happened that, in the year 1675, he made acquaintance with the works of Pufendorf who, by drawing a distinction between Natural Law and Divine Law, had completely laicized the character of juridical studies. For Thomasius, this was nothing short of a revelation.
...

In 1680, he returned to Leipzig as a *privat docent* and gave full rein to his ideas. His teaching soon became widely known as something both novel and provocative. **Metaphysics, he said, was simply beating the air; as for theology, let the theologians keep it to themselves. There were only two branches of knowledge that really mattered: logic and history;** the former because it taught you to think clearly; the latter because it afforded you a number of useful examples, some to be imitated; some, not. Knowledge, he said, should have some tangible object in view, should lead to some immediate practical advantage; justice should be social justice. Of prejudice of every kind, of prejudice, the parent of every ill, he was the determined and relentless foe. Prejudices came of giving children and young people the most pitiable rubbish to swallow, and never encouraging them to reason things out for themselves. Another cause lay in the haphazard way people take in whatever they are told to believe. And he would wind up by repeating his favourite *dicta*: the light of Nature is one thing; the light of Revelation, another.
...

There's no better seasoning than a pinch of humour. He spiced his rationalism with a very generous pinch indeed when, in 1688, he brought out a journal on the lines of what he thought a journal ought to be. Again there was a mighty fluttering in the dove-cots of the doctrinaires. It turned out, this journal, not to be in Latin, like the *Acta eruditorum* of which Leipzig was so immensely proud, but in German. Thomasius thought the world of it. A journal at once flippant and serious, frivolous yet sober, **a journal inspired by the spirit of a man who was himself the very personification of Irony and Reason: Erasmus!**
...

But it is not only the philosopher that speaks; the professor of law, the barrister who has had some experience in defending people charged with witchcraft in the criminal courts takes up the case. In Saxony, there were laws, and quite recent ones, which laid down that anyone who should so far forget himself as a Christian, as to make a compact with the Devil, should, whether he had harmed anyone or not, be tied to the stake and burned until he was dead. Ah! **by the ever-spreading light of the Cartesian philosophy,** by the march of reason, let the German jurists and theologians cease to fall into an error that leads to crime!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Glanvill#The_supernatural

> *Saducismus Triumphatus* was also translated into German in 1701.[20] The German edition was used extensively by Peter Goldschmidt in his similar work *Verworffener Hexen- und Zauberer-Advocat* (1705). This work brought the *Saducismus Triumphatus* to the attention of Christian Thomasius, a philosopher, legal professor and sceptic in Halle. **Over the next 21 years, Thomasius published translations of works by English sceptics:** John Webster and Francis Hutchinson, as well as John Beaumont's *An Historical, Physiological and Theological Treatise of Spirits*, **all of which were accompanied by vitriolic prefaces attacking Glanvill, Goldschmidt and their belief in witchcraft.**[21]

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/370/mode/2up?view=theater

In Germany, hostility to Van Dale and Fontenelle was expressed by numerous writers, including Grapius86 and Loescher, the latter **remarking in 1708 that many people now claimed sorcery does not exist,** deeming the Biblical story of the feats performed by Pharaoh's magician mere figurative language adopted to the primitive understanding of the common folk at the time. **This attitude, he says, stems from Van Dale and, following him, especially Bekker, Lahontan, and Thomasius,** the three chief propagators of such ideas in German-speaking lands.87

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/396/mode/2up?view=theater

Also positive, in part, was Christian Thomasius, **who headed the German intellectual campaign against witchcraft belief and trials which culminated in the Prussian royal decree of December 1714, requiring magistrates to refer all cases concerning witchcraft to the Crown, a measure which largely brought witch trials in northern Germany to an end.**171

https://www.artandpopularculture.com/The_Essays_of_Arthur_Schopenhauer%3B_Studies_in_Pessimism#OF_WOMEN.

And in view of this aspect of the institution of monogamy, **Thomasius' profoundly learned treatise, *de Concubinatu*, is well worth reading; for it shows that, amongst all nations and in all ages, down to the Lutheran Reformation, concubinage was permitted;** nay, that it was an institution which was to a certain extent actually recognized by law, and attended with no dishonor. It was only the Lutheran Reformation that degraded it from this position. **It was seen to be a further justification for the marriage of the clergy;** and then, after that, the Catholic Church did not dare to remain behind-hand in the matter.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=megGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA134#v=onepage&q&f=false

Both Arnold and Thomasius drew on earlier authors, such as Joachim Betkius (1601-1663) or Christian Hoburg (1607-1675).22 **These authors adopted a more sceptical attitude towards doctrinal orthodoxy than either Pufendorf or the traditionalist Lutherans.** Hoburg and Betkius emphasized the state of the believer's heart and his or her sincere love of God, rather than the particular doctrinal opinions which accompanied this love. **Doctrinal orthodoxy was secondary, maybe even superfluous.**
…

Thomasius' description of the age of Constantine was very similar to that offered by authors such as Hoburg, Betkius and Arnold. In a journal, the *Observationes Selectae* of 1700, Thomasius published within one volume three historical investigations of the time and character of Constantine the Great.
…

In a much later work, the *Historia contentionis inter imperium et sacerdotium* of 1722, **he wrote that it was an error to believe that the state of the Christian church under Constantine had been 'florentissima,' 'most flourishing.'** The emperors had not been the pious nursing fathers of the church and ambitious priests had gained the upper hand well before the investiture contest in the reign of emperor Henry IV. **Only gradually, Thomasius writes, did he himself recognize that the idealization of the church under the early emperors was a relic of 'political papism' (*Papatus politici*)** and begin to search for the origins of clerical tyranny in the early church.32

Like Arnold and other 'enthusiastic' historiographers of the early church, **Thomasius believed that an original faith of the heart, which consisted in sincere love of God and one's neighbours, was already in the early church replaced by a *Hirnglaube*, a faith of the mind, obsessed with doctrinal correctness.** The origin of this corruption, Thomasius suggested, was an almost natural and inevitable decline from the purity of the apostolic age. In the time of Christ and the apostles saving faith was regarded as a work of the heart, rather than doctrinal orthodoxy. But already in the second century, even before the accession of Constantine, faith was gradually reduced to doctrines based on philosophical speculation and adopted by the intellect, without any regard to the purity of the believer's heart.33 As in many other histories of the church, Greek philosophy and Jewish legalism were presented as the main culprits for this development.34 **Until the end of the apostolic age the sole criteria of faith were 'love of one's fellow brethren and the fruits of the spirit, that is, charity, joy, peace, lenity, benignity, goodness, faith, amiability and moderation.' There was no belief that this consisted in 'certain and determinate words, and, so to say, technical terms, but it was believed that it was sufficient to put forward the divine mysteries in any words whatsoever, as long as they did not detract from the spirit and its fruits.'**35 It was also impossible for humans to use anything other than metaphors when speaking of the divine mysteries, because these mysteries exceeded human comprehension and could not be described in literal expressions. **There could therefore be no heresy in the sense of a divergent doctrine, because no definite conception of the divine mysteries existed and, in any case, was not necessary for faith.**36 Doctrine, and the definition of heresy as a deviation from doctrine, were part of 'priestcraft' and invented by the corrupt clergymen, who entered the church immediately from the end of the apostolic age onwards.
…

In 1693 Thomasius published a piece by Arnold on the early Christians39 **and later praised Arnold's *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* as the 'best and most useful book with the exception of Holy Scripture.'**40

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel_Wagner

> Wagner studied under scholar Christian Thomasius in Leipzig, and in 1691 published a philosophical tract critical of Thomasius, "Discourse and doubts in Christ: a Thomasian introduction to courtly philosophy."[1] [2] The tract satirically dubbed Thomasius the "German Socrates" and attracted attention within philosophical circles, including from Leibniz, who sought to contact Wagner.[1] In the same year, after a dispute over rent, Wagner was expelled from university and imprisoned. Following his release, **Wagner traveled in 1693 to Halle, where as a result of his increasingly libertine views he wholly broke with Thomasius, who by contrast was becoming more conservative.**[1][2]

https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/44841/shantz-ahnert-religion-and-origins-german-enlightenment-faith-and

Scholars for whom Thomasius's beliefs are an embarrassment have largely ignored his religious thought; such beliefs clash with the portrayal of Thomasius as the father of a largely secular German Enlightenment who gave no meaningful place to religion in his philosophy (p. 126). Ahnert aims to challenge a scholarly paradigm that finds it difficult to reconcile religious interests with Enlightenment thought, whether in the work of Thomasius, Isaac Newton or Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In sum, this book represents another nail in the coffin of the Peter Gay school of thought, which views the Enlightenment largely in terms of "the rise of modern paganism" (p. 122).[1]
…

In chapter 1, "Historical Contexts," we are introduced to Thomasius as a precocious and brash young student who finished his master's degree at the University of Leipzig by age seventeen. He delighted in directing sarcasm at the members of the university establishment, **many of whom were friends of his father, Leipzig philosophy professor Jacob Thomasius (1622-84).**
…

Thomasius's efforts to undermine Lutheran forms of power in religion made his thought attractive to the Brandenburg prince, who sought to control the Lutheran elites in his territory. In March 1690, Thomasius moved across the border from Saxony to Brandenburg. He soon became a court councilor and a lecturer at the *Ritterakademie* in Halle.

In chapter 2, "Religion and the Limits of Philosophy," Ahnert shows that **Thomasius's religious notions resembled the beliefs of groups on the fringe of German Protestantism, religious mystics and millenarian sects, who emphasized "sincerity and the believer's heart over the authority of institutions, formulaic professions of faith, and subtle doctrinal argument"** (pp. 3, 33). Like religious radicals, Thomasius warned against overestimating the power of the human intellect in religious matters, noting the corruption that resulted when this principle was not observed. Thomasius increasingly emphasized the importance of the human will, not reason, as the dominant factor in human beings. He was influenced by his reading of Augustine, the Jansenists, Pierre Poiret, Gottfried Arnold and Christian Hoburg (pp. 30f). Ahnert's argument is nicely nuanced; he finds three different phases in Thomasius's relation to religious enthusiasm. **When Thomasius argued that the purpose of the Bible was not to provide doctrines, but to be a manual of regeneration, A.H. Francke and the Halle theologians distanced themselves from him and affirmed the importance of Lutheran doctrine as the norm for faith.**

In chapter 3, "The Prince and the Church," Ahnert shows how Thomasius's critique of reason's role in religion led him to question the validity of orthodox Lutheran theological debate and reject Lutheran "papalism" and "priestcraft." According to him, the orthodox Lutheran system justified clerical political power, while neglecting the importance of charity and Christian living. **After 1693, Thomasius criticized any notion of doctrinal orthodoxy, tied as it was to "clerical self-interest" and Lutheran "papal" religion** (p. 44). **The orthodox Lutheran *Dreiständelehre* limited the prince's power to external matters and granted that only to Lutheran princes. Thomasius, however, defended the right of the Calvinist prince of Brandenburg to reform religious rituals in his lands, even against the will of the Lutheran church. In 1695, Thomasius argued that the godly prince maintained the right to alter *adiaphora*, adding that "nearly all ecclesiastical rituals were *adiaphora* and therefore subject to the will of the prince"** (p. 49). **Ahnert continues, "[n]o external cult was prescribed by God … true faith was internal, requiring no external worship"** (p. 55). **In Thomasius's opinion, then, the ruler was free to reform any rituals tending toward "'papalist' superstition" that the Reformation had failed to remove** (p. 51). As the defender of public peace, the prince was also within his rights to undermine theological controversies that

might disturb the peace of his territory. Thomasius was supported in these views by his Halle colleague, jurist Johann Samuel Stryk.

In part 2, "History," Ahnert considers Thomasius's views on church and legal history, specifically the history of the church's decline. In chapter 4, "Ecclesiastical History and the Rise of Clerical Tyranny," Ahnert shows that for Thomasius, the source of the early church's corruption was the tendency to reduce faith to doctrinal orthodoxy--the same problem he found in the Lutheran church of his own day: "The original faith taught by Christ and the apostles was the faith of the heart, rather than the mind" (p. 60). **Thomasius dated the corruption of the church back to the second century and the early Christian emperors. His criticism included Constantine, whom Thomasius saw as "an impious, even criminal, tyrant," whose conversion to Christianity "made this corruption worse, because it created an alliance between a corrupt clerisy and secular power"** (p. 60f). In these views, Thomasius followed radical spiritualists such as Gottfried Arnold, whom he had known since the 1690s and whose *Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie* (1699-1700) he praised as "the best and most useful book with the exception of holy scripture" (p. 63). Arnold argued that "the attempt to establish doctrinal orthodoxy and enforce it was an excuse for the clergy to persecute those they considered their opponents" (p. 63).

In chapter 5, "The History of Roman Law," Ahnert shows that there was more than "Germanism" at work in Thomasius's disparagement of Roman law. Thomasius participated in a widespread debate among German jurists over the applicability of Roman law to the Holy Roman Empire. **But he was largely alone in critiquing Justinian's sixth century *Corpus iuris canonicis* on the grounds that it reflected the corrupted state of late antique Christianity. It contained "the fruits of Papist religion" and defined faith in terms of theological doctrines and opinions rather than the state of the heart** (pp. 69f). When Tribonian compiled the *Corpus*, he was swayed by the false opinions of clergy who claimed that knowledge of the law required knowledge of Scripture. Thomasius also showed that throughout Christian history, Roman law was used to facilitate papal influence in secular jurisdictions. Two examples were the appeal to *laesio enormis* (great provocation or injustice) and *aequitas cerebrina* (false equity) as grounds for bringing secular cases before ecclesiastical courts (pp. 75, 78f).
…

Ahnert's work raises a number of issues inviting further study. For example, he shows that all the great changes in Thomasius's thought came between 1693 and 1699. His religious views "steadily became more extreme from the mid-1690s onward" (p. 17).
…

Given Ahnert's emphasis upon Thomasius's leanings towards enthusiastic religion, it comes as a surprise when Ahnert concludes that Thomasius's views were *not* specifically Pietist (pp. 26, 126). Similarly, at various points in the study, Ahnert aligns Thomasius with hermeticist natural philosophy and with Pascal, but the connections tend to hang in the air.

> https://researchportal.vub.be/en/publications/the-early-german-reception-of-spinozas-tractatus-theologico-polit
>
> WS: Thomasius surely remained curious to the end of his life – his library was also full of dangerous books –20 but my answer would be very short and simple: **I think it's impossible to produce a coherent picture of Thomasius.**
> …
>
> WS: **Well, I stressed the tensions in Thomasius's ideas, but one thing remains clear: there's no way for him to accept or to tolerate atheism, for Pufendorfian reasons.** What I actually want to remark is that there's no positive trace of Pierre Bayle in Thomasius. Of course he knew the *Pensées diverses sur la comète* (1682), **the thesis of the *athée vertueux*, but he didn't support that idea and his silence on Bayle is revealing.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=megGDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA155#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this regard as in others, Thomasius is usually seen as a representative of the early *Aufklärung*, whose limited defense of toleration would eventually lead to and be eclipsed by the unfettered freedom of reason and conscience characteristic of the high Kantian *Aufklärung*.1
…

The two sides of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht* could never be doctrinally or philosophically reconciled and were instead held together by continuous argument and negotiation, and by the unstable

metaphorics of public and private, external and internal religion. Yet both sides were hostile to so-called 'Papist' religion, understood to be a public church – Protestant or Catholic – exercising civil power by claiming custody of the 'keys to the kingdom' and a monopoly on transcendent true faith.13 **From the political-juristic perspective Papalism was seen as a clerical infringement of the prince's civil sovereignty; from the standpoint of Protestant spiritualism it was regarded as a corruption of inner faith through the clerical imposition of a sophistic philosophical religion.**14

> 13. Beyond its prime eponymous target, Protestant writers like Arnold and Thomasius levelled the charge of Papalism at any church held to be making such a claim, particularly the Lutheran church, whose leading theologians Thomasius called 'our Papists.'

…

Thomasius published two discourses on heresy during 1697. The first, a disputation delivered under his direction by Johannes Christoph Rube in July, was titled *An haeresis sit crimen*, translated into German as *Ob Ketzerei ein strafbares Verbrechen sei?* (*Is Heresy a Punishable Crime?*) in 1705.16 In November, responding to a series of attacks on this disputation, and seeking a more discursive presentation of the arguments than that afforded by its dialogue form, Thomasius published *De jure principis circa haereticos*, which was also translated into German in 1705, under the title *Vom Recht evangelischer Fürsten gegen die Ketzer* (*The Right of Protestant Princes regarding Heretics*).17
…

Thomasius's historical approach is clear from the outset. **In refusing to allow the authority of the church fathers to define heresy, he comments that Augustine had already allowed pagan Platonic philosophy to corrupt pure Christianity, by using a hybrid theosophy to attack his rivals, the Donatists and Pelagians,** thereby displaying the link between heretic-mongering (*Ketzermacherei*) and religious sectarianism (216-22). Thomasius will thus base his judgments only on 'divine revelation and sound reason' and, having cleared the decks, elicits a definition of heresy from Orthodox which he sources to several prominent Lutheran theologians and jurists, including Benedict Carpzov: **'Heresy is an obstinate error in the foundations of faith by a person who is or was a member of the church' (226). This Augustinian construction, which former part of medieval canon law, had been incorporated in the Saxon constitution during the sixteenth century and was repeated by Carpzov in his influential *Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium* of 1635: 'I call heresy a *pertinacem in articulis fidei errorem*.'**18 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it formed the basis of many Saxon heresy prosecutions, several of which resulted in execution by burning or decapitation.

Thomasius's *tour de force* demolition of this definition reads like a synopsis of Protestant *Staatskirchenrecht*. In the first place, he has Christian argue, church membership cannot provide the standard for determining heresy because the visible church contains both good and bad Christians. Moreover, the truly faithful cannot be assembled into a public visible institution, being scattered across nations **and religions** in an invisible church (227-8). The ultimate effect of separating the church as a civil institution from faith as the inner relation to God was thus to deprive the community of the faithful of concrete historical form, hence to detach it from the civil community.19

> 19. Cf. Heckel, 'Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts,' pp. 368, 389. **Thomasius's sharp separation of the visible and invisible church marks a key point of difference from Locke. Locke continues to regard the (visible) church as a society bound together by its members' belief in a true mode of worship.** To avoid the looming problem of heresy, Locke observes that there is a plurality of such churches and that no-one can judge which form of worship is the one truly pleasing to God. Nonetheless, Locke retains the *concept* of a true visible church as (in Thomasian terms) the manifestation of religious community in the form of a public association; and this allows him to expand liberty of conscience into the natural civil right of dissenting Christians to public worship, on the religious grounds of their true inner faith. (See Locke, 'Letter Concerning Toleration,' pp. 110-11, 120-21, 127-8, 140.) **Thomasius's insistence that no public church can be regarded as an assembly of the truly faithful produces a much deeper incision between the civil and religious, in effect denying that any form of public worship could be true, and thereby precluding a defence toleration in terms of the civil rights of true believers.**

Next, in attacking the notion of the 'foundation of faith,' Thomasius begins with a historical relativising tactic, arguing that what has counted as foundational has changed over time and between rival Christian sects (228-32). **But this only a curtain-raiser to a far more aggressive strategy in which Thomasius rejects the whole idea that faith has intellectual foundations about which one might be in error, treating this idea as symptomatic of the corruption of Christianity by Greek philosophy.** The true foundations of faith are simple and non-intellectual, consisting only in love of Christ and one's neighbour and contempt for oneself, such that even the uneducated can see that the doctrinal disputes of theologians over heresy are about useless subtleties (234). **Thomasius continues that the philosophical penetration of Christianity has produced a 'brain faith' (*Hirnglaube*),** characterised by delusion that faith arises from the understanding and knowledge, rather than from the heart and the will (236-45). Finally, this shows why it is meaningless to characterise heresy in terms of

error, because the divine can never be an object of knowledge for human reason, which means that there can be no earthly validation of doctrines claiming knowledge of heavenly things (248-54). **With this argument Thomasius in effect declares the illegitimacy of all claims to cognitive theological truth in the articles and confessions of statutory religions.**

Having shown that heresy cannot be understood as the intellectual error of a member of the true church, in the second part of the disputation Thomasius argues that, even if it were a speculative error, heresy could not be classed as a crime.
…

The human will is indeed given to such vices as lust, ambition and greed, but only immorality that breaks out in conduct disturbing civil peace will count as a crime and be subject to legal sanction: 'So no-one will be punished on account of his thoughts; and the vices which are common to the whole human race and are incapable of being eradicated, – such as envy, ambition, greed and lust – cannot be punished, as long as they do not break out in external deeds and hence do the state no great harm' (270). **The punishments for heresy demanded by Lutheran theologians – removal from civil office, fines, deportation – are therefore unacceptable, because they apply civil sanctions to a moral matter; and the same goes for excommunication when it provides a trigger for such sanctions** (273-80).

Orthodox has a final argument, however, and it is one that reveals a significant ambivalence in Thomasius's discourse. What about the case where a heretical religion does cause uproar and civil disturbance?
…

Thomasius's initial response to this challenging problem is to claim that it is morally impossible to compel the silence of those who sincerely believe in a certain truth; **for there is a natural desire to speak what is in the heart and to share this with others who might benefit from it** (283). Here, by envisaging heretics and dissenters as publicly testifying to an inner truth, Thomasius's spiritualist theology is in potential tension with his political jurisprudence; **for he is entertaining a position which, were it to be pushed further, would ground toleration of heresy in a subjective moral right, in something like the Lockean manner.**

It is highly significant therefore that Thomasius does not take this further step.20 Instead, in countering Orthodox's argument that erroneous doctrines should be suppressed because they cause civil disturbance, Thomasius moves in a different direction: 'This common objection assumes that care for the salvation of his subjects is a matter for the prince; yet it has already been shown elsewhere that he acts in a quite different way. A prince is responsible for the external calm and peace in the country, but no damage is done to this even if a false doctrine is spread about' (286).

> 20. **Here I differ from Stephan Buchholz, who argues that Thomasius did not back away from his spiritualist conception of heresy (as repressed true faith) until the publication of his *Historia contentionis inter imperium et sacerdotium* in 1722.**

…

If the tension between Thomasius's spiritualist theology and statist jurisprudence plays a significant role in the first of his two discourses on heresy, then the balance has tipped in favour of the latter by the time of his second – *On the Right of Protestant Princes regarding Heretics* – perhaps in order to strengthen his defence of toleration against his critics.24 In this discourse Thomasius advances a wholly historical and political view of the church and heresy. Heresy, he argues, cannot be understood as an error of faith by members of a true church because, since Constantine's time, Christianity has been divided into rival sects, and heresy is simply a charge wielded by the *Pfaffen* (power hungry clergy) in order to achieve the political suppression of their rivals. **Thomasius draws the relativistic conclusion in a similar way to Locke: 'In the juristic sense [*Juristischen Verstande*] all religions will thus be held orthodox. In the clerical sense [*Pfaffen Verstande*], though, each [religion] will be orthodox to itself, which the clergy of the other party will yet call heretical'** (331).

The degree to which this view entails the subordination of the history of theology and philosophy to a history of civil government is shown in his account of the manner in which Greek philosophy penetrated Christianity via the church fathers. **This, Thomasius argues, contaminated the pure sources of Christianity with intellectualist doctrine,** allowing the clergy to appropriate the role of learned expositors, and to establish the philosophical subtleties through which they could dominate the laity and persecute their rivals as heretics:

> Some would find it paradoxical if I said that from the time of Constantine the Great to the Reformation, all of the controversial questions, which were supposed to belong to the Christian religion, and from which heresies arose, were in fact purely and simply philosophical – metaphysical and logical for the most part; **and, therefore, that so many millions of men have been murdered and banished not for God's sake, but for the sake of Aristotle's or Plato's**

> **metaphysics. Nonetheless, this paradox is only too true.** Those who do not believe it need only read the *Panarium* of Epiphanius, and the history of the Councils.25 Only in them can one tally all of the conflicts over the terms *essence*, *persona*, *hypostasis*, *substance*, *property*, and similar (325).26

On this basis, Thomasius makes an explicit case for the necessity of moving from a theological to a juridical conception of heresy. Heresy, he argues, can only be understood via the political and juridical conception of a ruling religion, such that: 'heresy is a deviation from the ruling religion.' (329).
…

Thomasius thus regards freedom of conscience **not as a subjective right against the state but as an exercise of religious liberty made possible by the state.**27
…

For Thomasius, however, **the religious freedom of dissenters is circumscribed by the same condition that restricts the freedom of their orthodox tormentors:** the fact that sovereignty is grounded in the preservation of social peace. Somewhat unexpectedly, though, the fact that Thomasius does not found the state in the moral agreement of its subjects allows him to develop a broader conception of toleration than Locke. **For, by grounding the state in such a moral contract, Locke found himself denying toleration to Catholics and atheists, on the argument that they would not or could not abide by such an agreement.** Thomasius, on the other hand, found that he could extend toleration to Catholics and atheists precisely because his statist conception of sovereignty did not require subjects to reach this kind of moral agreement.28
…

This is why, despite his own spiritualist theology, Thomasius's arguments for toleration of heresy differ markedly from Locke's, **and even more so from the later metaphysical arguments for the freedom of public reason mounted by such intellectuals as Priestley and Kant.** For Thomasius, heresy should be tolerated not because the human intellect must have the right to seek truth in community, but because toleration is the best way of neutralising communities seeking to persecute others on the basis of a truth they have found.31

Thomasius's defence of heretics and dissenters is thus not based on a philosophy in which a truth discovered in the free privacy of individual reason might form the basis of a free public sphere of self-governing citizens. **Instead, Thomasius closes his second discourse on heresy by echoing his mentor Pufendorf's fundamental separation between the kingdom of truth and the civil kingdom.**32 **The former is occupied by the personae of teacher and learner bound together by relations of love and emulation to the exclusion of all civil coercion; while the latter contains the personae of sovereign and subject bound together by the coercively enforced exchange of obedience for protection to the exclusion of all concern with truth** (345-50).

https://journals.jcu.edu.au/linq/article/download/2317/2271

Kant is typically seen as waging an heroic defence of reason against Lutheran orthodoxy and Prussian reaction, the latter bent on "stamping out the enlightenment" following the death of Frederick the Great. This is the view found in many philosophical discussions of the *Conflict* and echoed in many self-congratulatory discourses on the "critical" role of the humanities.
…

The court bureaucracy wanted a university that would train administrators, pastors and teachers whose primary loyalty would be to the emergent territorial state, rather than to trans-territorial Lutheranism, or to the medieval form of the university as an autonomous urban corporation. This dictated building a new kind of university, directly responsible to a state ministry, and dedicated to the mundane common weal, rather than to the glory of God or the defence of the true faith. **These were the "statist" terms in which Halle was founded in 1694; in which the teaching of law was given priority over theology;** and in which Christian Thomasius – a noted "Staatsdenker" – was appointed to head the faculty of law.

On the other hand, the city of Halle had been a hive of Pietist activity since the 1670s. Distinguishing itself from Lutheran orthodoxy via a critique of sacramentalism, and characterised by the pursuit of a "true inner religion," Pietism had assumed spiritual and social dominance under the leadership of Philip Spener and A.H. Francke. This "social movement" was also characterised by an intense public ethical activism which was responsible for producing the infrastructure of a welfare society in Halle – orphanages, schools, workhouses, factories, trading companies – before the state had entered the field.

For a time the Pietists and the statists – personified in Francke and Thomasius – could make common cause against Lutheran orthodoxy. The emblem of this strange alliance was the so-called public-private division; that is, the segregation of private religious worship from the exercise of civil

authority. Forged in the furnace of religious civil war, this policy was the means of keeping the warring confessions apart by secularising the governmental sphere and instituting toleration in the private sphere. It should be clear though that the Pietists and the statists policed this boundary from opposite sides: the former as the means of preserving the "invisible church" of Pietism against the public power of orthodox Lutheranism; the latter as the means of removing the religious confessions from the political domain altogether. **The instability of the initial alliance became apparent as soon as the Pietists themselves achieved social dominance in Halle, in the last decades of the seventeenth century.** For then they forgot about the public-private division and set about using the instruments of civil power to enforce the "true inner religion."

One of the first results of this development was a bitter conflict between the University's faculties of theology, law and philosophy, beginning at the turn of the century and lasting until the 1740s and beyond. As the meeting point for a religion bent on using the state as an instrument of spiritual discipline, a state bent on subordinating religion to civil governance, and a hyper-rationalist philosophy faculty for whom both state and religion were little more than expressions of "pure ideas," the University of Halle provided the ideal theatre for tripartite internecine warfare. Initially it was the Pietists who played this vicious game with greatest ferocity and success. The (temporary) silencing of Thomasius in 1713 and the exiling of the rationalist philosopher Christian Wolff in 1723, secured by Francke through supporters in the court bureaucracy, make today's "culture wars" seem quite tame.
…

First, the work of Kant's that initially attracted the censor's attention – the *Religion* – is by no means an irenic work of pure philosophy removed from religious controversy. On the contrary, **it is a work that denigrates Catholicism as a primitive sacramentalism, denies that Judaism is a religion at all, and proclaims the obsolescence of both religions in relation to the imminent appearance of a "pure rational faith" from the historical bosom of Protestantism.** (Here Kant's debts to both Pietism and Deism are evident). Second, it must be remembered that at this time the public-private division – interpreted as freedom of private devotion coupled with a strict policing of public polemics – was itself viewed as a cornerstone of "enlightenment." Wöllner's (nowadays notorious) Edict on Religion had recently restated this policy with the pronouncement that: **"A subject of the Prussian state is declared free to hold what religious views he likes, so long as he quietly performs his duties as a good citizen of the state and so long as he keeps any peculiar opinion to himself and carefully guards himself from spreading it or persuading others, making them uncertain in their faith or leading them astray."** This was the means of enforcing toleration and removing the warring confessions from the political sphere. Are we right in suggesting then that the policy threshold transgressed by the publication of Kant's *Religion* was not one set by orthodox theology, but was in fact the state's own threshold for keeping religious conflict out of the civil domain?

In light of this we can suggest that Kant's censuring was symptomatic not of a struggle between enlightenment and religious orthodoxy but of a conflict between two different kinds of enlightenment. Compare, in this regard, Kant's defence with Thomasius's quite different argument for depriving theology faculties of the right to legally decide theological disputes. **Thomasius too has been described as a hero of the enlightenment – and, indeed, in a sense he was – but not of the same enlightenment that Kant championed.** For Thomasius's argument is that the attempt to impose a legally-binding theological decision in the civil sphere, by claiming access to universal truth, can only court the disaster of religious civil war – given, that is, the existence of confessional disagreement over what is to count as "universal truth." **The government's duty is thus not to establish civil society on the basis of universal truth. Rather, it is to ensure that no group claiming access to such truth is permitted to jeopardise social peace by imposing it in the civil sphere. This is also the thrust of Wöllner's Edict which can be treated as "enlightened" in the same sense as Thomasius's doctrine.**

Kant on the other hand argues for limiting the civil power of the theology faculty – at least with regard to philosophical discussion – **on the grounds that the philosophy faculty is indeed the vehicle for the pursuit of universal truth, while theology and law reach no higher than social utility.** Kant moreover thinks that civil society should and can be based on this philosophical truth, which his *Doctrine of Right* labels the "Law of Freedom," rather than on the merely historical and prudential goal of social peace. **To this end Kant sets limits to religious toleration. It is permitted for rulers to tolerate various confessions for the time being, pending the imminent withering away of the sacramental religions and the historical appearance of the "pure rational faith."** Ordinary people however must not adopt this stance – that is, the view that all religions are equally true and useful in their place – for such toleration ("indifferentism") would prevent them from pursuing the universally "true rational religion" and convincing others of its truth. **Unlike Thomasius, Kant thus sees the state not as the means of securing a harmless contestation between rival universal truths, but as itself the future (democratic) expression of one such truth, that of philosophical reason.**

This helps to explain the limits to Kant's defence of the autonomy of the faculties. **For Kant only the philosophy faculty should be free of governmental supervision, as it is the only faculty dedicated to the pursuit of "truth" construed as spontaneous individual critical reflection. The faculties of law and theology must submit to such supervision, because their role is to secure the civil and moral governance of the people through the teaching of disciplinary "statutes."** This state of affairs is acceptable, Kant argues, owing to the moral incompetence of the people – Kant calls them "*Idioten*" in the *Conflict* – at the present stage of their historical development. Before the people can "throw off their self-incurred tutelage" they must renounce the "earlier" sacramentalisms of Catholicism, Judaism and orthodox Protestantism. For this to happen though they must acquire the ability to undertake a rational reinterpretation of Christian doctrine, **transforming their "sensuous" belief in the historical truth of the sacraments and the Bible into a sophisticated allegorical reading of them as symbols of a purely rational "moral law" within man.**

What Kant doesn't explain though is how the people are to pass from their historical moral incompetence into the condition of rational self-governance. **He makes no reference to mass elementary schooling, for example, which the Pietists had initiated at Halle and which the state was in the process of building into a governmental system.**

This is because for Kant the defining condition of the rational pursuit of moral truth is that it is carried out in accordance with "self-chosen laws" and not on the basis of ordained statutes such as those of law and theology. The kind of rational-allegorical reinterpretation of Christianity that Kant calls "pure rational faith" is itself however the product of a sophisticated and arduous intellectual discipline. Kant might well identify this discipline with the "free use of reason," but he was confronted by a population as yet lacking the required intellectual equipment. For Kant, **blind to the social and disciplinary conditions of his species of reason,** this lack could only appear as a refusal to be free. He thus oscillates between assuming that knowledge of rational principle is always already present in the "ordinary consciousness," and relying on Prussia's formidable "warfare-welfare" state to pick up the slack if the people should choose not to exercise this knowledge. **The trouble with this flip-flop is that it treats the state sometimes as an unnecessary and dangerous rival to the rational individual, and sometimes as the corporate embodiment of reason itself. It becomes less surprising to observe then that during the revolutionary 1840s Kantianism could support the most corrosive libertarianism and the most unbridled statism.**

> https://voxday.net/2024/05/28/the-intellectual-father-of-clown-world/
>
> It’s also worth noting that Kant cribbed from Aristotle without correctly attributing the concept, while changing the terms he utilized in order **to make his justification of elite despotism appear to be more palatable to the public that will be enslaved, not because they are “natural slaves” per Aristotle, but cowards in a state of “self-incurred minority”.**

…

If, as I have suggested, there was no single enlightenment, but a variety of practices of reason and government in contingent relation to each other, then the least we can do is re-open these questions. When we do then neglected figures like Thomasius will step out of the long shadow cast by Kantian philosophy and post-Kantian critical theory. Amongst other things, such figures may tell us that certain intellectual disciplines, long regarded as exemplary of toleration and reason, are themselves the bearers of an uncompromising moralism and an intolerant rationalism.

---

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/136/mode/2up?view=theater

In the 1720s, the issue of toleration was again well to the fore in Hamburg when liberal elements in the Senate, anxious about the city’s economic difficulties, **and drawing on the arguments of Christian Thomasius, the leading theorist of toleration in Germany, Christian Wolff, and others,** introduced new proposals for a limited toleration, notably through the reform group known as the Hamburg Patriotic Society.5 **By this stage, philosophy was clearly making its mark; but it was not as strong as traditional arguments opposed to toleration. The Patriots were denounced from the pulpit as ‘indifferentists’ and advocates of Christian Thomasius’ ideas,** and again the toleration proposals were thwarted.

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Heineccius,_Johann_Gottlieb
>
> **Heineccius belonged to the school of philosophical jurists.** He endeavoured to treat law as a rational science, and not merely as an empirical art whose rules had no deeper source than expediency. Thus he continually refers to first principles, and he develops his legal doctrines as a system of philosophy.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/18267/pg18267-images.html#Page_142

In Winckelmann's **[b. 1717]** youth there were no philological studies apart from the ordinary bread-winning branches of the science—**people read and explained the ancients in order to prepare themselves for the better interpretation of the Bible and the Corpus Juris.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q&f=false

These textbooks often provided much needed income for academic philosophers, most of whose small income – even in Kant's time – was derived from taking on an inordinate amount of teaching. Indeed, if one follows the career paths of successful German philosophers **it is striking how often they subsequently move from the philosophy faculty to posts in the law or theology faculties, which were rather better remunerated.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false

On the frontispiece of his pathbreaking *Introductio ad Philosophiam Aulicam* (Introduction to Court Philosophy), Christian Thomasius presents a future courtier with a choice between three different paths or 'ways' of which the central one is the path to truth lying between two alternatives – **the false doctrines of the Cartesians on the one hand and those of the Aristotelians on the other. At the end of the path of truth is a monarch surrounded by courtiers** – a trite and self-serving image, perhaps – but nevertheless an accurate picture of the relationship Thomasius envisaged between royal authority, university institutions and professional vocations within state service, for which the newer universities provided crucial initial training. **Within the first half of the eighteenth century these goals were to be achieved in north German Protestant culture.** Scholars at the new universities of Halle, Jena and Göttingen took advantage of the protection from traditional theological strictures that operated in these new royal foundations **to generate curricula that were oriented towards practical subjects that would provide a training for future civil servants, lawyers, doctors and clergy. In return for a commitment to direct higher education towards the professional needs of the state, academics won the freedom to practise a truly eclectic and cosmopolitan philosophy protected from the arbitrary interference not only of theologians, but also in practice, of the monarchs.**60
…

Thus the Thomasians were quick to appreciate not only the need to attune their university programme to the political and confessional requirements of state and court, but also the potential appeal to sovereigns and university patrons of their natural law theory, **which had for the first time clearly distinguished jurisprudence from moral theology as a core element of any philosophy course that would ultimately produce graduates in law or theology.**
…

The university of Halle, founded in 1694 at the instigation of Elector Frederick III of Prussia, was largely the creation of two leading figures of the early German Enlightenment, Thomasius and August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), who for different reasons places a high value on the beneficent role of practical knowledge. **Thomasius had found protection in Prussian territory from the Protestant Aristotelians of Leipzig, who had expelled him for lecturing in the vernacular and challenging the authority of the theology faculty to determine the content of teaching in ethics;** while Francke was devoted to the creation of a pietist educational infrastructure stretching from basic schooling to university level.
…

Despite the association between Halle and Thomasius, it should not be forgotten how much was contributed to the institutional development of Halle by Christian Wolff (1679-1754). His insistence that philosophy alone possessed a rational deductive method of demonstration is often dismissed as no more than a sophisticated throwback to scholasticism. **But this is to miss the central claim behind his system, which was that the unique ability of philosophy to aspire to the status of mathematical certainty should entitle it to lead the other faculties.** This was bound to lead to strife at a time when many of the professors of philosophy were also professors in the other faculties, and although the pretext for his expulsion from Halle by Frederick William I in 1723 was a charge of impiety, **in fact the real reason lay in his attempt to free the faculty of philosophy further from the influence of theologians, and assert its right to an independence and predominance that anticipates the claims of Kant's *Contest of the Faculties*.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=tLLx3hfc6UYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false

What made these structures possible in turn was a mix of discipline and dedication, which allowed Prussia, for instance, to raise more money, and train more soldiers, in relation to population and wealth than any of its rivals. **Philip Gorski has argued convincingly that the sources of this extraordinary performance were to be found in part in the neo-Stoic philosophy that was very widespread among élites, but even more so in the Calvinist or Pietist faith of the dynasty and leading political figures.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cYdcr2h1aYYC&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s

This is the first major archivally-based study of the political career of Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, State Chancellor of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1753 to 1792. Author of the diplomatic revolution of 1756 and a brilliant foreign minister of the Austrian Empire, **Kaunitz was virtually the third head of state under Maria Theresia and Joseph II. He emerges from this study as the key figure in the development of**

enlightened absolutism in the Habsburg monarchy and the guiding spirit behind the modernization of the state.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=cYdcr2h1aYYC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA11#v=onepage&q&f=false

Neo-stoic by temperament and conviction, Maximilian Ulrich's philosophy of education was influenced by Jansenist and Protestant models, which deprecated maternal and female influences and stressed hard work, self-discipline and emotional restraint.
…

Maximilian Ulrich was not the kind of man who doubted the social and political role he felt God entrusted to the aristocratic elite, but he was a man painfully aware of changing times and of the need to change with them. Above all, both in his capacity as governor of Moravia and as father, he was aware of the inadequacies of the educational institutions of the Monarchy, of their inability to provide the kind of practical, technical and professional skills necessary to exercise a role of political leadership successfully. **Hence, rather than send his son to the local Jesuit college, Maximilian Ulrich resolved to engage a private tutor for the boy once he reached the age of fifteen. This tutor was to receive the post of major-domo (*Hofmeister*) to the young Kaunitz heir; he was first to act as instructor; then he was to supervise the young man's university studies; finally, he was to accompany him on his grand tour, which in those days represented the culmination of a noble's education.** The qualifications Maximilian Ulrich sought in a major domo were imposing, but he seems to have found them to his entire satisfaction in the native Bohemian, Johann Friedrich von Schwanau.

Schwanau was a typical product of the early German Enlightenment. He had studied philosophy, law and history at Prague, Halle and Leyden, and followed in the intellectual tradition of Christian Thomasius with his tolerant pluralism and eudemonism. Schwanau was also a disciple of the mathematical deductive rationalism of Christian Wolff, which manifested itself above all in his insistence on rigorous logic. Under the stern eye of Maximilian Ulrich, an earnest taskmaster who personally administered history and geography tests to his children, **Schwanau tutored Wenzel Anton for four years in a manner far more rigorous than anything his peers were experiencing.** Then, in the fall of 1730, his young charge was ready for university.
…

There can be little doubt Kaunitz was a conscious epicurean, for he clearly believed in indulging the senses in moderation, and we can conclude from his behavior that in best epicurean fashion he defined pleasure as the absence of pain, not as libertine self-indulgence.
…

He was certainly no ascetic or puritan: he collected erotic literature and delighted in the nudes in his art collection.47 But he is reported to have shrunk from excessive carnal indulgence.48
…

He was such a man of routine, a lover of neatness and exactness, that the charge of pedantry was frequently leveled at him. His work habits were meticulous, and he prized punctuality and frugality. His life, in short, followed a path of predictable regularity.50 Love of order also characterized Kaunitz's mind. **We have seen how his tutor, Schwanau, was at pains to inculcate the mathematical deductive reasoning of Christian Wolff in young Kaunitz, and all through his life he was to be celebrated for his inexorable logic.** In was precisely this characteristic that so impressed Maria Theresia about her young ambassador's reports, and so silenced his critics that his reputation as a superior genius remained untouched. **His conclusions invariably left the impression of almost Thomistic certainty, though his Cartesian "political algebra" was invariably devoid of sentiment and illusion,** stressing always careful reflection and critical analysis.51 He abhorred hastiness and superficiality and refused to be rushed. As a consequence, his reports were often delayed and, when finally presented, frequently prolix – though seldom verbose and invariably stylish and easy to read. Orally, on the other hand, Kaunitz was a man of few words.
…

When analyzing Kaunitz's studied reserve and considered restraint, **it becomes clear to what extent he was influenced by one of the main intellectual currents of his age: neo-stoicism. The enthusiasm of Thomasius and Wolff for the popular neo-stoic, Justus Lipsius, remained a hallmark of Leipzig during Kaunitz's university years, and certainly the neo-stoic legacy was evident in Kaunitz's thought:** his eudemonism and stress on the common good; his self-conception as a dutiful and upright citizen who never tired of stressing civic virtues to others; his notion of the state as a rational construct buttressing an ethical order; **and his disdain for confessional intolerance.** But much of the neo-stoic ideal is also evident in Kaunitz's demeanor: a confident, cultivated, courteous gentleman, he disdained false and base behavior, strove for urbanity, and set great store by the cultivation of his aesthetic sensibilities.53

> https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/108/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> The Jesuits, entrusted with academic and book censorship in Austria since the onset of the Thirty Years' War, when Ferdinand III had charged them with the eradication of Protestant intellectual influence from his lands, had no wish to relinquish their grip over this powerful cultural device.58

> **However, by the 1740s, favoured though they were by the devout Empress Maria Theresa, this surviving stronghold of clerical power was coming increasingly under siege from secularizing forces of the moderate Enlightenment at Court, led by Count Kaunitz.** …
>
> In choosing Van Swieten, a protégé of Kaunitz, to direct the Austrian state censorship, Maria Theresa was committing her territories to a particular type of enlightened cultural policy. For Van Swieten was equally committed to far-reaching reform along moderate lines and preserving Austria from radical influences. **Obstruction of the entry into Austria of Montesquieu, Leibniz, Wolff, Thomasius, Newton, and Locke ceased, these being the safe writers.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Wolff,_Christian

His enemies, however, gained the ear of the king Frederick William I. and represented to him that, **if Wolff's determinism were recognized, no soldier who deserted could be punished, since he would only have acted as it was necessarily predetermined that he should.** This so enraged the king that he at once deprived Wolff of his office, and commanded him to leave Prussian territory within forty-eight hours on pain of a halter. The same day Wolff passed into Saxony, and presently proceeded to Marburg, to which university he had received a call before this crisis. The landgrave of Hesse received him with every mark of distinction, and the circumstances of his expulsion drew universal attention to his philosophy. It was everywhere discussed, **and over two hundred books and pamphlets appeared for or against it before 1737, not reckoning the systematic treatises of Wolff and his followers.** In 1740 Frederick William, who had already made overtures to Wolff to return, died suddenly, and one of the first acts of his successor, Frederick the Great, was to recall him to Halle. His entry into the town on the 6th of December 1740 partook of the nature of a triumphal procession. In 1743 he became chancellor of the university, and in 1745 he received the title of *Freiherr* from the elector of Bavaria. **But his matter was no longer fresh, he had outlived his power of attracting students, and his class-rooms remained empty.** He died on the 9th of April 1754.

The Wolffian philosophy held almost undisputed sway in Germany till it was displaced by the Kantian revolution. It is essentially a common-sense adaptation or watering-down of the Leibnitzian system; or, as we can hardly speak of a system in connexion with Leibnitz, Wolff may be said to have methodized and reduced to dogmatic form the thoughts of his great predecessor, which often, however, lose the greater part of their suggestiveness in the process. Since his philosophy disappeared before the influx of new ideas and the appearance of more speculative minds, it has been customary to dwell almost exclusively on its defects—the want of depth or freshness of insight, and the aridity of its neo-scholastic formalism, which tends to relapse into verbose platitudes. But this is to do injustice to Wolff's real merits. These are mainly his comprehensive view of philosophy, as embracing in its survey the whole field of human knowledge, his insistence everywhere on clear and methodic exposition, and his confidence in the power of reason to reduce all subjects to this form. **To these must be added that he was practically the first to "teach philosophy to speak German." The Wolffian system retains the determinism and optimism of Leibnitz, but the monadology recedes into the background, the monads falling asunder into souls or conscious beings on the one hand and mere atoms on the other. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony also loses its metaphysical significance,** and the principle of sufficient reason introduced by Leibnitz is once more discarded in favour of the principle of contradiction which Wolff seeks to make the fundamental principle of philosophy.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218820/page/n175/mode/2up?view=theater

That which Gottsched had done for poetry and poetics Christian Wolff did for all sections of learning and philosophy. He put into palatable form for the general public the ideas (though not the most profound and original ideas) of Leibniz, broadening them and watering them down to a thin, fluid, saltless porridge, but at the same time bringing them into a definite and self-contained system that, incidentally, was most unsuited to the restless genius of Leibniz.
…

Wolff wrote numerous stout volumes—more than thirty in all—on logic, metaphysics, teleology and moral, physics and physiology, the laws of nature and of nations, and empirical and rational psychology (the former describing the mind as it appears to external experience, the latter showing it for what it really is). **He wrote his textbooks at first in German, and later in Latin as well, with a view to securing for them an international circulation as *praeceptor universi generis humani*.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=m_N5DwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR123&hl=fi&pg=PA123#v=onepage&q&f=false

Most theoreticians of the law of nations in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Germany were Protestants, as were all three of the court councilors we have discussed so far. **However, there were also Catholic writers who theorized about the law of nations,** among which Ompteda names three in his *Literatur des gesamten natürlichen und positiven Völkerrechts*. They were Johann Sigismund Stapf of the University of Freiburg who authored *Ius naturae et gentium* in 1735,1 Johann Adam Ickstatt of

the University of Würzburg who authored *Elementa juris gentium* in 1740, and Joseph Franz Lothar Schrodt of the University of Prague who authored *Systema iuris gentium* in 1780.2 **Of these three, Ickstatt's work was the first comprehensive piece fully devoted to the law of nations.**
…

It is noteworthy that he did not choose to attend a university in the archbishopric of Mainz (Mainz or Erfurt), nor one of the nearby Catholic universities at Trier, Cologne or Würzburg. Instead he went to the Protestant university at Marburg and it was at this same university that Christian Wolff began teaching after his expulsion from the Prussian University of Halle in 1723. **Ickstatt became an ardent student of Wolff's, with whom he maintained a close relationship until the latter's death in 1754.**3

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Weishaupt
>
> Weishaupt's father Johann Georg Weishaupt (1717-1753) died[5] when Adam was five years old. **After his father's death he came under the tutelage of his godfather Johann Adam Freiherr von Ickstatt[6] who, like his father, was a professor of law at the University of Ingolstadt.**[7] Ickstatt was a proponent of the philosophy of Christian Wolff and of the Enlightenment,[8] and he influenced the young Weishaupt with his rationalism.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/310/mode/2up?view=theater

The Imperial Academy of Sciences, for which Peter had already started recruiting internationally known scholars able to provide high-level teaching as well as promote debate and research (particularly in mathematics and physics) in 1721, was inaugurated in 1724, **essentially along the lines proposed by Leibniz and his disciple Wolff.** Its first session was attended by sixteen newly appointed academicians, thirteen of whom were German; none was British or Russian.

In most branches of philosophy, throughout the later years of the tsar's reign, and still more in the decades after his death, in 1725, **Leibnizio-Wolffianism in fact remained by far the dominant intellectual stream in Russia** and while Wolff (twice) declined the emperor's invitations to come to St Petersburg in person, he became the academy's first honorary member and, over the years, continued to send detailed advice, not least about appointments, which was often acted on.63 **In political thought, meanwhile, Prokopovich, the tsar's chief ideologist, proclaimed Pufendorf Russia's most favoured thinker; and in the next generation Pufendorfian and Thomasian Natural Law gained an even stronger grip.**64 Indeed, the preponderance of German intellectual influence in the Russian Enlightenment generally became still more marked after Peter's death than before, though its hegemony never went unchallenged.
…

Only very slowly did French intellectual and cultural influences challenge the earlier German-Dutch ascendancy, and it was apparently not until the mid 1750s, when Elizabeth's current favourite Ivan Shuvalov (1727-97) emerged as head of a pro-French faction in the imperial palace which also acted as a powerful engine for promoting the reputations of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and other moderate *philosophes*, that one can speak of a shift towards French cultural primacy.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/186/mode/2up?view=theater

As an ambassador to Constantinople and *voevoda* of Kiev from 1708-18, [Dmitry Golitsyn] had amassed a six-thousand-volume library **and launched an extensive personal project for translating such Western political theorists as Grotius, Pufendorf, and John Locke. Under their influence, Golitsyn became, in effect, Russia's first secular political theorist. He was the first native Russian to popularize the familiar Western idea of objective natural law.**59 At the same time, Golitsyn became the spokesman for the new service nobility by drawing up the constitutional project of 1730 in an effort to limit autocratic authority by a council of the higher nobility. This project represented a genuine innovation rather than a traditionalist protest movement. **The models were Swedish, and the objective was to extend the Petrine reforms further in the same Westward direction which the original reforms pointed.**60

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1901/1901.03376.pdf

Trediakovsky, Lomonosov, and a third poet and playwright who worked in St. Petersburg, Alexander Sumarokov (1717-1777, a Cadet Corps graduate), would become key figures of Russian classicism in poetry, **and the three Russian poets who most strongly transformed Russian literature—the first two by developing theory and practical rules for Russian verse, and all three by their prolific writing.**

But Lomonosov did not have time to settle into the Academy early in 1736 before he had a second fantastically lucky educational break: he was chosen to be sent to the West to study science.
…

Marburg, a rather small school in a rather small town, was not the foremost German university. Its distinction was that it was relatively progressive; **it had been founded in 1527 as the first specifically Protestant University in the German states** (other German universities, most prominently Wittenberg where Luther taught, had become Protestant after their foundings), and its professors could deviate from Catholic dogma and were receptive to the new arts and sciences (figure 4). In 1738 it had only 122 students. **There were no students from Russia before, and practically none after Lomonosov, Reiser, and Vinogradov.** Out of 470 Russian students accepted in German Universities in 1698-1810, just four were sent to Marburg (the chief draw was Göttingen with 129).
…

Leibniz had also suggested that Peter the Great take on Wolff as an advisor in his plans for the St. Petersburg Academy, and Peter had complied. Wolff followed Leibniz in adopting a rationalist approach to all matters, emphasizing the priority of logic and deduction. Like Descartes, Wolff thought that the scientific method should resemble mathematics, with clear definitions and logical connections. Wolff inherited Leibniz's dream of a *mathesis universalis*, or universal science, which would cover not just the natural world but all human activities including art, politics, and religion, whose language was so precise that, in it, everything could be said clearly.
…

On the negative side, as an exponent and popularizer of Leibniz, Wolff passed on Leibniz's skepticism of Newton's revolutionary work, most notably concerning Newton's belief in action at a distance. **Wolff, indeed, was a key holdout in Europe against Newtonianism;** his textbook on physics, which Lomonosov translated into Russian (figure 9), has little on Newtonian mechanics.27 **The fact that Lomonosov "remained largely uninfluenced by Newton's physical theories," writes Boss, "was Wolff's worst legacy to his Russian disciple."**28
…

As Pushkin would say: "Lomonosov was a great man. Between Peter I and Catherine II, he alone is an original associate of enlightenment. He created the first university. He, better to say, himself *was* our first university."

SUMAROKOV: Life and Works from Early Modern Russian Letters: Texts and Contexts on JSTOR

The Russian Boileau, the Russian Racine, the Russian Molière, the Russian Lafontaine, the Russian Voltaire – these are some of the titles contemporaries accorded to Alexander Petrovich Sumarokov. The foremost representative of Russian Classicism, Sumarokov aspired to be the founder of a new, modern European literature in Russia. He founded and directed the Russian national theater (for which he supplied most of its early repertory), published the first private literary journal in Russia, **helped establish the norms of the new literary language,** and provided models of virtually every current European poetic and dramatic genre, including fable, song, sonnet, elegy, satire, eclogue, idyll, epigram, ballad, madrigal, rondeau, folktale, and a wide variety of odes – panegyric, spiritual, philosophical, Anacreontic, Horatian, and Sapphic – as well as the first Russian tragedies, comedies, operas, and ballets. **While his reputation declined in the early nineteenth century when a new Romantic generation repudiated the tradition Sumarokov had tried to establish,** Sumarokov was arguably the first professional writer in Russia, in that (at least after 1756) he was the first to dedicate himself to literary pursuits full-time.
…

Catherine's ascension must have seemed to Sumarokov like a triumph of his own political ideals, and he celebrated the empress in a series of laudatory odes (notably, in the later 1750's he had largely disdained writing such works to Elizabeth). **The longest of these, an ode printed on July 8, 1762, and reissued three weeks later, has been called a poeticized version of the famous manifesto that Catherine had published on coming to the throne, in which she echoed Montesquieu's condemnation of despotism and praise of monarchy based on law.**
…

In his response to the essay contest Catherine suggested to the Free Economic Society in 1766 concerning the desirability of granting property rights to peasants and in his notes on the draft of the empress's *Nakaz* (Instruction, 1767), Sumarokov staunchly defended the institution of serfdom. Catherine was apparently not pleased with what he wrote and commented that "Mr. Sumarokov is a good poet but … he does not have sufficient clarity of mind to be a good lawgiver." Be that as it may, Sumarokov was an outspoken defender of serfs' human and legal rights and sharply attacked such practices as selling serfs "like cattle," that is, apart from their land. **While asserting fundamental human equality according to nature, Sumarokov also defended the necessity of social hierarchy.** The essential point was that each social order fulfill its duty appropriately.
…

Dimitrii the Pretender also presented a defense of Russian Orthodoxy, which was juxtaposed to Catholicism's "false doctrine" that demanded blind obedience. **Characteristically, Sumarokov advocated a rationalistic view of Orthodoxy that did not see any necessary or apparent**

contradiction between reason and divine revelation. Sumarokov's religious thought was in the quasi-Protestant tradition of Feofan Prokopovich, main architect of Peter I's church reform, a stance characteristic of eighteenth-century Russian religious thought.

https://archive.org/details/iconaxeinterpret00bill/page/234/mode/2up?view=theater

One sees the beginning of the reaction in Alexander Sumarokov, the director of the St. Petersburg theater, whose tragedies, comedies, and opera libretti provided the mainstay of the repertoire throughout the eighteenth century. **Though always operating within the framework of secular enlightenment, Sumarokov tried to lead Russian taste back from hedonistic Voltairianism to Fénelon, Racine, and the Stoic philosophers of antiquity.**

He gave Russian tragedy a disciplined fidelity to the classical unities of time and place and at the same time a bias for instructive moralistic themes. The aim of tragedy was "to lead men to good deed," "to cleanse passion through reason."57 His short scenes and fables also sought to edify, **and his writings did more than those of any other single figure of the age to provide Russian aristocratic thinkers with a new lexicon of abstract moral terminology. Far less religious than a natural scientist like Lomonosov,** this natural philosopher attached the supreme value to reason, duty, and the common good. Even while writing "spiritual odes," **he was calling for a new secular morality of aristocratic self-discipline.**

To some extent, Sumarokov's ideal was that of "the immortal Fénelon" in *Télémaque*: *vaincre les passions*. This pseudo-classical poem was the first French work to become a smash literary hit in Russia. It was translated several times, and inspired a Russian continuation: the *Tilemakhida* of Tred'iakovsky – just as the *Télémaque* had been offered by Fénelon as a kind of continuation of Homer's *Odyssey*.

The search for links with the classical world led Sumarokov and other philosophically inclined Russian aristocrats to Stoic philosophy. The play that had been staged in Kiev in 1744 on the occasion of Elizabeth's pilgrimage to the Monastery of the Caves was *The Piety of Marcus Aurelius*.58 **The vanquished villain in the play was Anger, just as it was invariably passions like self-seeking and carnal love in the plays of Sumarokov.** Falconet's statue of Peter was originally modeled on the statue of Marcus Aurelius in Rome, and was popularly referred to as Marcus Aurelius; Fonvizin's translation of the contemporary *Elegy of Marcus Aurelius* appeared in 1771; **and La Harpe cited Marcus Aurelius as a model for all kings in his memorandum to Catherine on the education of Alexander I.**59 The Stoic calm of the Roman emperor was seen as a model for the Russian aristocrat's efforts to master passion with reason. As Sumarokov put it:

> **The man of reason**
> **Moves on through time with tolerance,**
> The happiness of true wisdom is not moved to rapture
> And does not groan with sorrows.60

The stoicism of Seneca also gained a following through such books as *The Moral Cures of the Christianized Seneca*, which promised to "correct human morals and instill true health" with the "true wisdom" of Stoic philosophy.61

This concept of "true wisdom" (*premudrost'*) was at variance with the ethos of Catherine's court even when advanced by scrupulously loyal monarchists like Sumarokov. Like the concept of natural law that was simultaneously being introduced into the philosophy curriculum of Moscow University, "true wisdom" seemed to propose a standard of truth above that of the monarch's will. Unsystematic Voltairianism, with its ideal of a cultivated earthly life and urbane scepticism, was more to Catherine's liking. Rather than Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, she wanted her courtiers to read Tatishchev's *Honorable Mirror of Youth*. By 1767 this manual had undergone five editions, with its homely reminders (often reinforced with proverbs) not to repeat the same story incessantly, pick teeth with a knife, or keep spurs on while dancing. In such a world, morality tended to be Epicurean rather than Stoic.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eu4GEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT107#v=onepage&q&f=false

In July 1721, Christian Wolff (1679-1754), in some issues (among which was China) a follower of Leibniz, delivered a public lecture (i.e. *Oratio de Sinarum Philosophia practica*) one Confucian,17 arguing that Chinese morality was more natural and even more rational than the revealed ethics of Christian religion. **He openly said in gaining the conclusion of his speech: 'Here, Gentlemen, is the exposition of the principles of the wisdom of the ancient Chinese. They are in accord with my own principles, as I have frequently said publicly elsewhere**18 **and as I hope to have shown convincingly to this illustrious assembly.'**19
…

Thomasius did not play a direct role in the expulsion of Wolff, being, as we said, close to the pietists but against their strict and violent acts. **However, Thomasius blamed Wolff's appraisal of Confucian philosophy, calling the Wolffians 'Konfuzianer'**20 (Confucians), fully aware of the equivalence between Confucianism and Spinozism, thus, accusing more or less covertly Wolff of supporting atheism and pantheism.

…

The debate continued and Wolff did not leave the field and in 1730 delivered the discourse *De rege philosophante et philosopho regnante* published the next year,24 which was translated into English by Santhoroc in 1750. **In this discourse Wolff not only stressed again his great commitment to Chinese civilization, but also depicted the Chinese political system as the realization of the Platonic Republic,** rejoining through this claim several controversial philosophers such as Isaac Vossius and Bayle himself, together with their sources, namely the Jesuits. As Donald Lach points out, **almost every writing of Wolff made at least some reference to China and brought to mind the similarities between Confucianism and his own moral thought.** We can summarize that Wolff really connected the moral universalism of Leibniz coherently – without the ecumenical aim of the latter – with the French libertine debate on Scepticism and on ethics as an experimental issue. **Clearly, Wolff's aim was not to defend an alleged 'Chinese philosopher,' but instead to prove the universalism of his rational metaphysical and moral system (practical philosophy) against the theological theories of pietists.** While a morality which descended from theology and religion was connected to a specific civilization, a morality which descended only from reason (deduction from common experiences and mathematical method) was universal and, this was Wolff's claim, it had already a great course in China.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=1PnZ_FuYLnsC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false

In this lecture he used the example of the ethical beliefs of the Chinese to reiterate Grotius' point that even if God did not exist, nevertheless natural law would still persist. For the Chinese had neither a natural nor a revealed religion, and yet still they were able to erect principles by which they could live virtuously which were derived solely from their own reason: **'The Chinese did not offer any teaching on human actions, and they did not take any view on the exercise of the virtue and on conduct except that they understood very well what suited the human mind.'**22
…

Actions are not good or bad because God has ordained them so, but because they are intrinsically good or bad to the extent that they have assisted in the perfection or imperfection of the individual.46 Natural law consists, therefore, not in the arbitrary will of a superior, but in the ability of unaided human reason to make acts of moral discrimination automatically.47 Reason's capacity for deductive thought gives complete access to natural law, and we believe ourselves to be pursuing perfection according to its dictates even when we do evil. **In these cases the clear representations of reason are blurred by the senses, imagination, or emotions and we are led into error and imperfection; but reason's pursuit of perfection according to what it judges to be natural law is logically unimpugned.**48
…

Beyond his initial act of Creation, God has been left little to do within the system: this is the direct result of Wolff's departure from the metaphysics of Leibniz which had kept the relationship between God and man close at every level of metaphysics and ethics; **under a system grounded on self-perfection instead of reunion with the divine and greatest of perfections, God is redundant beyond the first postulates.**
…

But he had already stated the essence of the point in his series of ethical writings in German: **'If nature, God and men simultaneously bind us in obligation, so this one and only standard is as much a natural as a divine and a human law.'**59

Not only did these doctrines lead very quickly to a clear separation of international law from any clear derivation in the law of nature (a *caesura* to be opened up above all by Vattel), but also they seemed to indicate a substantial degree of rapprochement with the later work of Thomasius. The systematic demonstration of the existence of perfect and imperfect obligations was even more radical in its implications than Thomasius' separation of the spheres of *justum* and *honestum* because it effectively denied a role for God in the creation of either. **Thomasius had left some links at least between divine justice and natural law; but in Wolff both natural and civil law were the product of human reflection and action alone.** In Thomasius, the spheres of revelation and natural theology, its study, were left metaphysically distinct; in Wolff there was no room for revealed truth that could not be confirmed by reason.
…

Notwithstanding the manifest differences of doctrine and method between figures as diverse as Bruno, Campanella, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz and Christian Thomasius, Brucker wishes to describe them all as eclectics since they exercised liberty of thought across the whole range of philosophy and chose selectively those periods of the history of philosophy that assisted their own enterprises.74

Leibniz and Wolff are given special prominence as heroes in the account of modern philosophy because in Brucker's opinion they had successfully reconciled the demands of faith and reason in their systems. Yet the descriptions of their work and the influence upon them of Descartes is taken almost unaltered from the partisan histories of the Wolffians Ludovici and Hartmann, which are wholly rationalist in tone. The impression is given that rationalism has triumphed despite Brucker's claims to the contrary. **Although Spinoza is condemned in the same terms that Buddeus had employed, no accusations of Spinozism are carried over to the Wolffian school.**75 The writings of Wolff represent what is most recent and substantive within German philosophy: indeed in the second volume a substantial *mantissa*, or appendix, is added to include reference to Wolff's later series of writings in Latin which had not fully appeared at the time of first edition of Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae*. It is noticeable that contemporaries were themselves unsure whether rationalism or Lutheranism was uppermost in Brucker's mind during

the composition of the *Historia Critica Philosophiae*: certainly, **when Diderot came to plunder Brucker extensively for the *Encyclopédie* he was able to ignore the discussion of religion and concentrated on the expositions of secular philosophy** [...]

https://archive.org/details/heine-on-the-history-of-religion-and-philosophy-in-germany/page/63/mode/2up?view=theater

Christian-Lutheran original sin and Leibnizian-Wolffian optimism are incompatible. For this reason, the French mockery of optimism displeased our theologians very little. Voltaire's wit came to the rescue of naked Original Sin. The German Pangloss, though, lost a great deal in this annihilation of optimism and looked long and hard for a similar doctrine of consolation, until Hegel's phrase "Everything that is, is rational" gave him at least a partial substitute.109

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wolff-christian/

Kant, who himself owed much to Wolff for both the form and content of his philosophy, would later recognize him in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason as "the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers" (B xxxvi).
...

A central and perhaps unifying concept in Wolff's practical writings is the concept of "perfection". In an early letter to Leibniz, dated 4 May 1715, Wolff explains the importance that the concept serves in his ethics:

> **I need the notion of perfection for dealing with morals.** For, when I see that some actions tend toward our perfection and that of others, while others tend toward our imperfection and that of others, the sensation of perfection excites a certain pleasure [*voluptas*] and the sensation of imperfection a certain displeasure [*nausea*]. And the emotions [*affectus*], by virtue of which the mind is, in the end, inclined or disinclined, are modifications of this pleasure and displeasure; I explain the origin of natural obligation in this way... **From this also comes the general rule or law of nature that our actions ought to be directed toward the highest perfection of ourselves and others.** (Leibniz 1989a: 231-232)

According to Wolff, the ultimate goal of human action is to attain, or at least approximate, the highest degree of perfection that is possible. Humans, as individuals or groups, should strive for perfection insofar as moral worth and goodness reside in the objective essence of humankind. **In a strict sense, each person is obligated by the law of nature to instantiate perfection in his/her own life. Actions that tend toward perfection produce pleasure and actions that tend toward imperfection produce displeasure (or pain).** In many respects, this consequentialist feature of Wolff's ethical theory resembles various forms of utilitarianism that were emerging in England during the mid-to-late eighteenth century.

Also central to Wolff's practical philosophy is its autonomy from theological doctrine. **Although maintaining that a universal ethics is certainly compatible with the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Wolff is adamant that morality does not depend on revelation or God's divine commands.** Advocating the separation of philosophy and religion is a theme that Wolff developed and defended throughout his entire career and it is a feature of his thought that secures him a place among other philosophers of Europe's Enlightenment.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT417#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> When discussing the different principles of morality, in the *Critique of Practical Reason,* **Kant places the Stoics and Wolff together, labeling their principle as "perfection" (*Vollkommenheit*)** (*KpV* 5:40). It is not completely clear why he did so (Seidler 1981: 126). He might have been influenced by Garve's translation of *virtus* as "internal perfection" (*innere Vollkommenheit*) (Santozki 2006: 173). By perfection, Kant means talent and skill to achieve an end. Probably influenced by Baumgarten, he understands that following the Stoic principle *naturae convenienter vivere* leads to one's perfection (Baumgarten 1760: 21). For the rationalists, what leads to perfection is the optimal thing to be done. This could be the reason why Kant places Wolff and the Stoics together.

---

https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/roper-the-crisis-of-the-seventeenth-century#lf6114_label_327

Gibbon's intellectual progress typified the pre-history of the Enlightenment. First, he would succumb to the majestic system of Bossuet: "the English translations of the two famous works of Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, achieved my conversion," he would write, "and I surely fell by a noble hand." Then, **following the example of the Socinian Chillingworth and the Pyrrhonist Bayle,** whose "acute and manly understandings" had been entangled in the same sophistries, he returned to his native Protestantism and was finally re-educated in Lausanne by Arminian teachers and the works of emancipated Huguenot scholars of the Dispersion.40

In all this, where is Calvinism? Where is “radical Protestantism”? **Except as enemies of the Enlightenment they are nowhere to be found.** Their part, it seems, is no more positive than that of the Dominican and Franciscan inquisitors in the Roman Church—except that their repression was, happily, less effective. Indeed, where Calvinism was strongest—in Scotland—**we find the seeds of Enlightenment not so much in its Arminian deviationists, whom it was able to suppress, as in its open enemies, who hid from it in secluded corners or fled to safety abroad.** For the Scottish Enlightenment—that wonderful, unexplored subject which Scottish historians have disowned in order to reiterate old party war-cries about the battle of Bannockburn and the dubious virtue of Mary Stuart—perhaps owed more to Scottish Jacobites, even to Scottish Catholics, than to Scottish Presbyterians: to the Jacobite physician Archibald Pitcairne, denounced as a deist or atheist and more at home in Leiden than in Edinburgh; to the Jacobite scholar William Ruddiman secluded in his protective library; to the episcopalian north-east captured by the mysticism of Antoinette Bourignon; to the Catholic lairds who nourished heretical ideas in isolated castles and peel-towers and the Catholic hedge-priests who visited them. The founder of critical history in Scotland, Thomas Innes, was an *émigré* Catholic priest in the service of the Pretender. **The chevalier Ramsay, precursor of the encyclopaedists, began as one of the mystics of the north-east, became the secretary of the Catholic Quietist Madame Guyon and ended as a Catholic deist, tutor of the young Pretender.** The 10th Earl Marischal, friend of Frederick the Great, patron of Rousseau, was an *émigré* Jacobite. **David Hume was a Jacobite till 1745;** his friend Lord Kames remained one thereafter. And without these, what is the Scottish Enlightenment?41

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA151#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> Against the Jansenists’ brand of ultra-Augustinianism Fénelon presented an alternative vision, one based on a notion of pure or disinterested love, a love that should in particular characterise our orientation towards God, for Fénelon contended that we ought to love God without any regard for our personal salvation or damnation. This opinion, associated with the so-called Quietism of Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte-Guyon, better known as Madame Guyon, lay at the root of Fénelon’s epic dispute with Bishop Bossuet, a dispute that was to end in 1699 when Innocent XII denounced twenty-three propositions from Fénelon’s *Maxims of the Saints* and Fénelon formally submitted to papal authority. This kind of love was also the leitmotif of Fénelon’s political theory. **The ‘idea of pure disinterested love,’ he wrote, somewhat implausibly, ‘dominates the political theories of all ancient legislators.’**11 Plato was the ancient philosopher from whom Fénelon drew the most inspiration (in Patrick Riley’s words, he ‘loved the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* with non-concupiscent passion’),12 **but it may be significant that his Scottish disciple, the Chevalier Ramsay, described the Stoics as followers of Plato in his *Essay on Civil Government* ‘according to the principles of the late Archbishop of Cambray,’ in which he also defended the natural sociability of humankind in Stoic terms,** quoting Cicero on how we are all ‘Citizens of one and the same City,’ with the universe ‘one great Common-wealth,’ **and Marcus Aurelius on how ‘If Reason is common to all, the Law is also common,’** so that ‘we therefore live under one and the same Government, and the whole World is consequently but as one City.’13

https://www.garynorth.com/conspiracyinphiladelphia.pdf

The first question was: “Who taught the tutors of the members of the Virginia dynasty?” And the second question was like unto it: “What books did the members of that dynasty read?” He did not answer these questions in great detail, but the general answers he suggested were these: **the tutors, more often than not, had been educated in some Scottish university or by a graduate of such a university,** and the books they assigned to their students were the books of the Scottish Enlightenment. Whether he was right or wrong, these are the sorts of questions that historians ought to be asking.

…

Madison, after remaining in New Jersey to study with Witherspoon for an extra year, returned to Virginia and vowed to devote his
life to overturning the religious oaths required to hold public office in Virginia, a task that he and Jefferson achieved in early 1786. He was not in revolt against his teacher; he was applying what he had been taught, as he continued to do for the remainder of his career.12 **The next year, he did much better (or worse) than this: he made illegal any such oath at the national level. Yet it was Witherspoon who had introduced him to the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers through his syllabus on “Moral Philosophy”: David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Lord Kames, and Adam Ferguson. It was these writings, he later said, that had brought him to his views on civil and religious liberty,**13 i.e., apostate covenantalism.

…

At the heart of the Enlightenment’s right-wing branch philosophically (the Scottish Enlightenment)51 and also its left-wing branch (the French *philosophes*, but above all, Rousseau) was **the doctrine of natural law (whatever is to be restricted by the state) and natural rights (what man can naturally do).** *This commitment to natural law theory, in fact, was what made both branches part of the same movement.* It would not be far from wrong to summarize the origins of the two wings as follows:

> The Scottish Enlightenment philosophy was developed by Presbyterians who had abandoned Christian orthodoxy, but who maintained certain outward forms of belief by substituting a new humanistic theory of contracts for the Calvinistic theory of covenants.52 **Continental Enlightenment philosophy was developed by graduates of Roman Catholic institutions who had abandoned Christianity altogether, and who substituted the state for the church as the agency of social salvation.**53

The former were closet heretics; the latter were open apostates. The former were philosophical nominalists; the latter were philosophical realists. The former were methodological individualists; the latter were methodological collectivists. The former saw the "natural" development of society as the unplanned, evolutionary outcome of voluntary legal contracts among men, contracts capable of revision; the latter saw society as a voluntary metaphysical contract that cannot subsequently be broken after consummation, and which is incarnate in the state. Both groups sought to establish a new order of the ages by substituting their respective forms of the covenant for the biblical forms.
…

But as Christianity fades in influence, and as covenant-breakers become more consistent, this element of common grace will necessarily fade. This is what has happened all over the world as Christianity has been replaced by either right wing Enlightenment empiricism-experimentalism or left wing Enlightenment *a priorism*. **It does not make any long-term difference whether the legal system is based on humanistic common law or humanistic Napoleonic law; the end result is humanism.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/54/mode/2up?view=theater

Adam Ferguson, the son of a Presbyterian minister, obediently studied for the ministry and actually served for several years as a regimental chaplain, but his preference for classical studies was invincible. In 1754 he gave up his clerical profession and turned, as he told Adam Smith, "downright layman,"1 and ten years later he was appointed to the chair of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. There, Dugald Stewart recalled, his lectures revealed a character that "conjoined the simplicity, elevation, and ethical hardihood of the early Roman with Grecian refinement and eloquence."2 **The preacher's son had turned into a Stoic.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA254#v=onepage&q&f=false

With the famous exception of Hume, however, many Scottish thinkers undeniably expressed positive views of some (but not all) Stoic philosophers, and of some (but not all) of the central Stoic tenets. Some of these they appear to have integrated into their new philosophies in more or less eclectic ways, often motivated by the Enlightenment's interest in a Science of Man. **The favorite sources seem to have been Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus and Cicero rather than Seneca, Zeno and Diogenes Laertius,** and inspiration was found in Stoic moral philosophy rather than cosmology, theology or logic.

It is equally often noted that the Scottish Enlightenment was quite open to Christianity – again with the well-known exception of Hume, and in contrast to the French Enlightenment. Many thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment spent some considerable effort on showing the compatibility of certain Stoic principles with certain Christian ones. **Commentators thus frequently characterize the Scottish Enlightenment as marked by "Christian Stoicism."**1 This seems not inappropriate, yet the notion of Stoicism is notoriously vague, and Christianity underwent fiery debates on orthodoxy – questions about providence, predestination, mankind's moral status, the nature of God and Christ, the interpretation of the scriptures and the sacraments, the status of revelation, and many others frequently provoked more than just polite debates among theologians only.
…

In numerous Latin *theses philosophicae* written by university regents, the sections on moral philosophy contain references to the above-mentioned Calvinist doctrines**. Discussions of Aristotle's and Descartes's ethics, for example, are often followed by critical reactions to these philosophers' ignorance or undue neglect of the fall.**3
…

Also, one might wish to relate the Stoic *hêgemonikon* to a Christian conception of natural conscience, explaining how the Gentiles could be "a law unto themselves" (Rom. 2:14). If orthodox Calvinists allow for this move, they also insist that not being acquainted with the Bible provides no excuse for sinning against the divine law.4
…

In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Stoics are commonly aligned with Hobbes because of their theory of the *fatum* (e.g. Middleton 1675: 21; Boyd 1693: 7), **and they get criticized alongside Descartes for their claim that postlapsarian human beings could acquire control over the passions** (Forbes 1680: §IX). With the reception in Scotland of the ethics of Descartes and of Cambridge Platonists such as Henry More, another type of criticism appears more frequently, namely the rejection of the Stoic ideal of *apatheia*. Explicitly against the Stoics, and implicitly against Calvinist orthodoxy, the passions are presented as a useful part of human nature which ethics shall teach us how to govern duly (e.g. Middleton 1675: 22; Boyd 1693: 6-7). More's *Enchiridion ethicum* was present in several Scottish university curricula until the visitation by Presbyterian committees in the 1690s, and it is marked by Stoic ideas, albeit rejecting *apatheia*. The Cambridge Platonists' treatment of notions like conscience, the *hêgemonikon* and the moral sense, their emphasis on natural sociability and the naturalness of virtue are absorbed by several Scottish academic philosophers, and strongly re-emerge in Hutcheson.

Stoicism may have been viewed rather critically in seventeenth-century Calvinist Scotland, but there are most interesting exceptions, notably Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636/38-1691). In the 1660s, Mackenzie published several collections of non-academic essays that explicitly embrace Stoicism, including *Religio Stoici* (1663), *Solitude preferr'd to Publick Employment* (1665) and *The Moral History of Frugality: With Its Opposite Vices* (1691). Besides writing on traditional Stoic themes – arguing that virtue is its own reward, and that it is easier to be virtuous than vicious – Mackenzie's engagement with Stoicism in *Religio Stoici* is heavily concerned with the tensions between Scottish Presbyterians and Episcopalians. **Mackenzie criticizes "the Doctrine of Predestination, as some teach it; wherein they well have Man to play the mere Spectator in his own Salvation"** (Mackenzie 1713: 19). Mackenzie instead wants to preserve our power and responsibility, and claims that each creature has "innate Qualities, sufficient to act every thing requisite for its Subsistance" (ibid.), with God keeping a "Prerogative Royal, a Power to bend and bow these Inclinations upon extraordinary Occasions, for the Good of the Universe" (Mackenzie 1713: 20). Such a position "seems to suit best with the Principles, both of Christianity and Stoicism. With Christianity, because it gives a Check to Presumption, and suffers not Man to think himself the sole Arbiter of his own Condition," **and "with Stoicism, because it pulls the Heads of a Sluggard from his Bosom, and sets them at Work to prepare for himself, and not to repose his unreasonable Hopes upon Divine Providence; which only keeps those from sinking, who endeavour to swim"** (ibid.).

> https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2439/2439-h/2439-h.htm#linknoteref-142
>
> Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh was the most distinguished victim. **He had long held the office of Lord Advocate, and had taken such a part in the persecution of the Covenanters that to this day he holds, in the estimation of the austere and godly peasantry of Scotland, a place not far removed from the unenviable eminence occupied by Claverhouse.** The legal attainments of Mackenzie were not of the highest order: but, as a scholar, a wit, and an orator, he stood high in the opinion of his countrymen; and his renown had spread even to the coffeehouses of London and the cloisters of Oxford. The remains of his forensic speeches prove him to have been a man of parts, but are somewhat disfigured by what he doubtless considered as Ciceronian graces, interjections which show more art than passion, and elaborate amplifications, in which epithet rises above epithet in wearisome climax.
>
> https://books.google.fi/books?id=NtMmZA7D-h0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA112#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> There was the Bluidy Advocate MacKenyie, **who, for his worldly wit and wisdom, had been to the rest as a god.**

https://modernstoicism.com/a-stoic-ghost-tour-george-mackenzie-1636-1691-by-maximilian-longley/

In Edinburgh, around the time of Charles II's restoration to the throne, Mackenzie became a lawyer. He also published a bad novel, *Aretina*. He married in 1662. The young lawyer promptly received an important assignment from the royal government. The prisons were filling to bursting with suspected witches. Doubtful of many of these accusations but determined to clear the court dockets, the Privy Council sent Mackenzie and others as judges into the supposedly witch-plagued areas to resolve the numerous charges. Mackenzie examined witchcraft cases in Lothian where men and women – but mostly women – had been kept in prison in dismal conditions, and often subjected to illegal torture (for *legal* torture, see below). **One woman told Mackenzie that she had confessed to being a witch because, locked up and deserted by everyone, she had despaired of her life and confessed in hopes she would be executed.** Mackenzie helped release innocent suspects, and the skepticism of royal officials like Mackenzie helped stop the witch-panic.
…

In 1663, **while busy with his legal practice,** Mackenzie published *Religio Stoici, With a Friendly Addresse to the Phanaticks of all Sects and Sorts.*
…

Mackenzie quoted an unnamed "wise Stoick" as declaring that "*it were impossible to live in a world void of God, and void of providence."* **The Stoics were "were in all pro[ba]bility a tribe of *John* Baptist's," preparing the way for Christ.** "And certainly, if men had disbanded that execrable troup of Lusts, against which [the Stoics] preached, and had listnd (as the *Stoicks* Book of Discipline enjoyned) to their own private consciences, and had by retiredness abstracted themselves from the reach of temptations, it had facilitated much their conversion*."* Stoicism could have taught the rich young man (Mark 10:17-22) to despise riches, and would have led the rich Dives to avoid the gluttony which brought him to hell (Luke 16:19-31). Nicodemus (John 3:2-21), if he had been a Stoic, would have approached Jesus publicly, not secretly, despite the risk of punishment – the Stoic "doctrine might have taught [Nicodemus], that *fear* was a passion unworthy to be lodged in the soul of man: And that there is nothing here [on earth] which a man either should, or needeth, to fear." (pp. 2, 10, 12-13, 15-16).

Why, Mackenzie wondered, were ultra-Presbyterians so obsessed with the details of regulating religion? God's "decrees of saving or damning [the world's] citizens, is a trade we shall never be able to practice: why should we have such an itch to understand it?" Mackenzie rejected the Presbyterian doctrine of predestination by which man had no choice in whether he was saved or damned. **To Mackenzie it was more consistent both with Christianity and Stoicism to view creation as comparable to a watch – the maker (God) allowed it the most part to run on, while intervening occasionally to fix it (miracles).** To the Stoic, such a doctrine fits best with good philosophy, "because it pulls the hand of the sluggard from his bosome, and sets them awork to prepare for himself, and not to repose his unreasonable hopes upon divine providence." (pp. 21, 27, 31-33) **(William Paley's much-abused watch would be invoked for a different purpose than Mackenzie's timepiece).**

"These embodyed angels; the Stoicks," recognized that mere fortune and fate could not be resisted, so they "slighted" fortune" and "submitted to" fate, thus gaining "a calmness of spirit" in spite of "external accidents." (p. 36) So Mackenzie's views of free will seemed complicated, but in any case were opposed to those of the Presbyterians.

Despite superficial differences, wrote Mackenzie, all Christians were of "one religion," and "Speculations in Religion are not so necessary, and are more dangerous than sincere practice." Believers should have faith in Christ and do good deeds, and as for those details "not absolutely necessary to being saved" people should recognize whichever practices were imposed by law in the established church. (pp. 40-45, 51-52, 86-87, 141)

Mackenzie appeared to depart a little from Stoicism in a book he first published in 1665, in which he urged the readers to shun public life and live in rural solitude. While there were Senecan precedents for philosophical retirement, especially for elderly philosophers and those facing a government they could not in good conscience work for (Margaret Graves and A. A. Long (ed. and trans), *Seneca Letters on Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015*,* 70, 71, 74, 79, 80, 204, 539-40), Mackenzie seemed to go further, praising retirement for its own sake. Almost as a reluctant concession, Mackenzie allowed for public service for those summoned to duty for their country, but rejected government service as a life plan (Mackenzie, *Solitude,* 103-06). **In all this, Mackenzie seemed to come closer to the Epicureans, with their distrust of public life, than to the Stoics** (Eugene O'Connor, ed. and trans., *The Essential Epicurus* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 64-66, 71, 72, 81, 83, 84, 101). **But if Mackenzie was Epic-curious, it did not keep him out of public life.**

Returning to more recognizably Stoic themes in his 1667 book *Moral Gallantry,* Mackenzie sought to appeal to the nobles and gentry of Scotland with the argument that virtue was honorable and that vice was "mean" (dishonorable). **The nobles had a strong sense of aristocratic honor, but Mackenzie complained this was a mistaken idea of honor, where the nobles contended for position and lived grandly at their creditors' expense.** To bring the nobles into a more correct sense of honor, Mackenzie proposed not to merely repeat Stoic precepts, but to show how these precepts fit with the nobles' own aristocratic prejudices. Not only could the nobles themselves be led down the path to virtue, the lower orders would be encouraged to follow the nobles' example. (pp. 16-17, 19)

Here is Mackenzie's argument against vindictiveness, aimed at an aristocratic audience: "It is one of the most picquant revenges to undervalue our enemies so far, as not to think them worth our noticeing." (pp. 130-31)

Similarly, virtue would help a nobleman seeking political advancement. Who would "cabal" with an untrustworthy man? Fame could best be attained by virtuous deeds – "who can so justly expect universal praise, as these who design universal advantage?" (pp. 33, 36, 38, 112-13)

Vice involved the most un-aristocratic failing imaginable: "fear…that unmanly passion." A brave man would rather suffer than be a coward or a liar. (pp. 46-47, 56-57)

More vices were listed, as well as their "mean" attributes: vanity (falsehood), envy (sneakiness), Adultery and fornication (earning criticism from one's own servants), greed (serving riches, even though a man's riches should be *his* servant) (pp. 49-50, 60-61, 64, 82-88, 118-21).

Mackenzie gave considerable attention to the vice of drunkenness, which he seemed to consider a particular problem with the nobility. **Proof that drunken carousing was "mean" was that nobles were afraid to be seen at their revels by their own servants,** and that the expense of drunken parties wasted the reveler's estate. (pp. 102-08)

Don't be arrogant in good fortune or angry when fortune deserts you, Mackenzie advised his readers, because it is "more gallant to bear adversity with a generous courage, than to be a fool or flattered by prosperity, which vanquishes as oft, those for whom, as those against whom, it fights." **Don't be proud of "Estates and Territories," since Pompey gave kingdoms to his slaves "yet Epictetus, who was a slave, is more admired, than" Pompey. Any man has the world and the "glorious heavens" available to him, while "the meanest beggar pours out his excrements" on the estates of the wealthy.** (pp. 121-22)

Mackenzie reached an unadorned Stoic conclusion: "Vertue and true Honor teacheth us to subject our interest to our selves, and puts it in our own power to make our selves happy." If you "brave" suffering, you show that only guilt can make you tremble, not the vicissitudes of fortune. (pp. 129 ff.)

...

Mackenzie continued to deplore the religious divisions of his country. About 200 Presbyterian ministers had been purged in the early 1660s, and, as Mackenzie saw it, this had unnecessarily alienated the parishioners and "join'd them all in one common discontent." Mackenzie still saw some good signs in the religious gloom, as Robert Leighton, bishop of Dunblane and then archbishop of Glasgow, "drew many into Episcopacy, by his exemplary life, rather than debates... **His great principle was, that devotion was the great affair about which churchmen should employ themselves; and that the gaining of souls, and not the external government, was their proper talk**" (Mackenzie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland,* pp. 77-78, 161-62). Leighton seemed to embody the religious broad-mindedness Mackenzie had preached in *Religio Stoici.* Sadly for Mackenzie's hopes, there were not a lot of Leightons prominent on either side.
...

Mackenzie grew friendlier with Lauderdale until the latter had Mackenzie appointed as King's Advocate – roughly the Attorney General or chief prosecutor of Scotland – in 1677.

A year into his new job, **Mackenzie published *The laws and customes of Scotland, in matters criminal,* which became an influential legal commentary.** In the section of the book dealing with witchcraft, Mackenzie made use of the knowledge he had acquired as a judge in witchcraft cases and from reading historical accounts of other witchcraft trials. **He said witchcraft did in fact exist – after all, both the Bible and the Scottish criminal code prohibited it – but "from the horridness of this Crime, I do conclude, that of all Crimes it requires the clearest relevancy, and most convincing probation. And I condemn, next to the witches themselves, these cruel and too forward judges who burn persons by the thousand as guilty of this crime."** Mackenzie deplored abuses such as mass arrests, supervision of the trial process by people without legal training, the illegal torture of suspects, and unduly-credulous acceptance of confessions potentially produced by torture or despair. Mackenzie censured the "Prickers" who offered to stick pins into suspects' flesh, in hopes of discovering a "devil's mark." The whole thing was a "meer cheat," said Mackenzie, citing a "Pricker" who had been arrested for unrelated crimes and admitted that his supposed expertise was bogus. (pp. 91-92)

Mackenzie also called for rejection of any testimony about witches supposedly changing shape or flying through the air, which he proclaimed impossible (without God's assistance, which of course would not be afforded to witches). (pp. 80 ff) **Putting his teachings into practice, Mackenzie, on the government's behalf, dismissed charges against four alleged witches in 1680.** It is likely that the influence of Mackenzie's treatise contributed to the abatement of Scottish witch-panics.

The Episcopalian-versus-Presbyterian issue came to a head after Mackenzie took office, and the new King's Advocate gave his support to the government's policy of repression. The militant Presbyterians increasingly met in menacing outdoor Conventicles, bearing arms to fend off government attackers. Mackenzie recalled later that dignitaries in the rebellion-prone west advised that the only way to peacefully address the problem in the region was by abolishing the Episcopal establishment. To Mackenzie and the government, thus "Sacrificing the *Laws* to the *Humours* [whims] and *Passions* of *private Men*" would be to embolden the Presbyterians with concessions, going down the road which had led the previous king (Charles I) to surrender his prerogative and then lose his head (Mackenzie, *A Vindication of the Government in Scotland, During the Reign of Charles II,* p. 12). Mackenzie considered the Presbyterian "fanaticks" dangerous on political not theological grounds, given their devotion to the Covenant to impose Presbyterianism by force. And now they were meeting in arms to defy the established order, threatening a renewal of civil war.

To subdue the discontented areas by force, **the government sent soldiers from the Highlands to live on the property of dissenting landlords. Persistent dissenters were again sent to the colonies.** A radical faction of Covenanters, known as Cameronians, declared war on the government, and an assassination plot led to the killing of Archbishop James Sharp of Glasgow. Goaded into rebellion, the Covenanters were defeated with the help of English troops at the June 21, 1679 battle of Bothwell Bridge.

About 1,400 prisoners from this battle were brought to Edinburgh, and held for trial in a portion of what later became Grayfriars Kirkyard. The prisoners were held on huts, where conditions were, says historian Ian B. Cowan, "almost" better than conditions in regular prisons (Cowan, pp. 99-102). The prisoners were held during the summer months, not for the lengthy periods Mackenzie had earlier observed with witchcraft suspects. All but 300 pledged not to rebel again and were released. **The stubborn 300 were put on a ship for servitude in Barbados, but the prison ship sank in Scottish waters and fewer than 40 people survived.**

Mackenzie obtained an opinion from the leading judges of Scotland that anyone suspected of supporting the Cameronian terrorists could be ordered to disavow the group's pro-assassination manifesto on pain of death. By this procedure, soldiers sometimes shot defiant Cameronians on the spot – earning this era the sobriquet of the "Killing Times." Even if Presbyterian dissenters did not belong to the small Cameronian sect, fines and colonial servitude were still invoked. Mackenzie superintended the prosecution of several defendants in murder and treason cases during this period, and his biographer Andrew Lang found that the King's Advocate sometimes cut legal corners to get convictions, and in several instances went along with the torture of suspects (Lang, pp. 194-202, 235-74). To be legal, torture required the approval of the Scottish Parliament or Privy Council. There were only 39 approved uses of torture in the 100-year period ending in 1690, and Mackenzie shared responsibility for some of this handful.

Donald Cargil, the only surviving Cameronian minister, published a decree in September 1680 purporting to excommunicate King Charles and his Scottish ministers, including Mackenzie. **In describing the crimes for which Mackenzie was "deliver[ed] up to Satan," Cargil not only listed the persecution of "the people of God," but also Mackenzie's "pleading for Sorcerers, Murderers, and other Criminals." Finally, Cargil's proclamation condemned Mackenzie "for his ungodly, erroneous, phantastick and blasphemous Tenets printed to the world in his Pamphlets and Pasquills" – in other words, Mackenzie's published works** (Cargil, pp. 15-16). Mackenzie may be the only Stoic author to be put on the equivalent of a religious hit list for his books (Cargil was executed in 1681).

1684 marked the publication of two treatises by Mackenzie. There was *The institutions of the law of Scotland,* which would become another of Mackenzie's influential legal treatises. The other 1684 work was *Jus Regium,* a defense of monarchical government, opposing Presbyterian theorists who justified revolt against kings. **Mackenzie wrote that neither the people nor the Kirk (Church) could hold the king accountable for alleged wrongdoing – only God could do that.** Mackenzie acknowledged that there was a danger that a king might be a tyrant, though the fear of rebellion (even though rebellion was always wrong) might keep a tyrant in check. In any case, it was better to submit prayerfully to the rule of a tyrannical king than to rebel and bring on the far worse evils of civil war. Mackenzie also defended the unqualified right of the Catholic James Duke of York, brother to King Charles (who had no legitimate children) to inherit the crown.

With Charles' death in 1685, the Duke of York became King James VII (known as James II in England). **Mackenzie lost his job in 1686 when, along with the Scots Parliament, he refused to let Catholics worship openly or hold office,** as the Catholic James wanted.
…

He even professed a willingness to live in Holland – the home ground of the new king – but he ended up stopping at the University of Oxford, England, instead – an institution sympathetic to monarchists like himself.

Mackenzie had finally reached the quiet retirement he had preached in the mid-1660s. Far from being idle, he took up his pen to write his two final published works. First was *A Vindication of the Government in Scotland, During the Reign of Charles II* – Mackenzie blamed the Presbyterian Covenanters as the aggressors (see, e. g., pp. 3-4, 8-9, 25-26). **Finally Mackenzie wrote one more Stoic work, published just after his death in 1691.** *The Moral History of Frugality* urged readers to be content with what wealth they had, and if they had a large amount, to use it to help others. **Mackenzie observed that frugality had been praised by the Stoics, Pythagoras, "and even Epicurus himself." This providentially paved the way for Christ, since the pagan public grew accustomed to the pagan philosophers' objections to the sins Christ condemned. Mackenzie commended the Quakers as exemplars of frugality.** Luxury – living large and buying vanities for oneself – was a vice which harmed the public. "I think there would be no Poor were it not for luxury and Avarice, for all would have somewhat, and none would have too much." (pp. 12-13, 25-27, 84, 95)

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_National_Biography,_1885-1900/Mackenzie,_George_(1636-1691)

In the earlier part of his career his sympathies were with the popular party rather than with the government; **and in his 'Religious Stoic,' 1663, he declared that in contemplating the history of Christianity his heart bled when he considered 'how scaffolds were dyed with Christian blood, and the fields covered with the carcases of mutilated Christians.'**
…

On 23 Aug. 1677 he was, on the dismissal of Sir John Nisbet [q. v.], appointed king's advocate, and on 4 Sept. he was admitted a privy councillor. **On his accession to office Mackenzie found the gaols full of prisoners who had been left untried by Nisbet, chiefly because he had not been bribed either to prosecute or release them. These he set at liberty; and while under his direction the prosecution of the covenanters was more ruthlessly pursued, strict legal formalities were much more scrupulously observed,** one of his first cares being to frame certain rules by which greater precision was required both as to time and place in drawing indictments.
…

It was to him the government looked both for the legislative enactments appropriate to the special circumstances and for the relentless and ingenious application of the law to the cases of individual offenders. **While Graham of Claverhouse was the main agent in the discovery and apprehension of suspected 'malignants,' Mackenzie made sure that none whom there was good reason to believe guilty should escape the prescribed penalties.**
…

After the passing of the act, 17 Aug. 1686, abrogating the penal laws against the catholics, Mackenzie resigned his office of king's advocate, **and for a short time acted as counsel for covenanting prisoners, whom his own enactments had helped to bring within the grasp of the law.**
…

His eager interest in constitutional history, and his overbearing temper, are partly accountable for his misuse of legal forms to obtain convictions; **and his hatred of religious fanaticism seems also to have itself verged on fanaticism.**

http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/32740/10139387.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Mackenzie advocated stoic wisdom in response to what he identified to be the socio-political problems of his contemporary world: fanaticism, and social and political instability. Mackenzie wrote of himself that he was by "Religion, a Protestant, ... and by Humour, a Stoick."6 **He found personal refuge in such wisdom in what he described to be a "bigot age."**7
…

On the other hand, I propose that Mackenzie's neostoicism has allowed him to confront what he saw as the ultimate danger in his contemporary world on all fronts. **The latitudinarian tendency of his so-called stoic humour allowed him to challenge the Covenanting mindset from a complex footing and on a fundamental level.** Mackenzie appealed to a set of stoically inspired dispositions that put into question the axiomatic beliefs on which much of the religio-political convictions of the Covenanters depended.
…

It is worth noting that his biographer, Andrew Lang, likened Mackenzie to another fictional character—a character already possessing a split personality: "A biographer wholly destitute of sympathy for his hero makes dull work; I trust that my sympathy with the Dr. Jekyll in Mackenzie has not blinded me to the Mr. Hyde in his composition."4
…

In 1656 he entered the University of Bourges, in France, to study law. **He graduated from Bourges on 24 October 1658 with a diploma *in utroque*, which meant competence in both civil and canon law.**16 **He later described Bourges as "that Athens of Jurists"**17 **and the time he spent there was particularly formative.**
…

Bourges of the time has been described as "the most exciting institution for legal study not only in France but in all Europe."22 However, since most of the university records were destroyed during the French Revolution, not much can be discerned about Mackenzie's academic experience at Bourges.23
…

Bourges was committed to instruction in the *mos docendi Gallicus* (the French way of teaching), the legal humanism initiated by Andrea Alciati in the 1520s. The teaching of the canonical texts of Roman philosophy and history amended the emphasis to the study of the *Justinian's Code*,25 which offered students a better understanding of law in its ancient and classical context.26 **The result of this deep familiarity with classical literature and Roman history was an equally deep appreciation by the alumni of the classical political and philosophical thought.**27

This appreciation on part of its alumni is better understood when we recognize that many students had no intention of practicing law.28 Mackenzie, it seems, did not belong to that group, yet his public career extended from his legal one and inhabited a domain in which this mentioned appreciation most clearly came into play. In any case, one may at least claim that Mackenzie's so-called humorous commitment to neostoicism matured during the time he spent in Bourges. **Similarly, such commitment could not have been affected in any way but positively in the Netherlands, which is the birthplace of neostoicism.**
…

An interesting footnote at the concluding section of *Religious Stoic*'s first edition reads: "The Author intended this Discourse only as an Introduction to the Stoicks morals, but probably, he will, for many years, stop here."33 Mackenzie had three more publications come out under his name before the end of the decade: *A Moral Essay, Preferring Solitude to Public Employment* (1665), *Moral Gallantry* (1667), and *A Moral Paradox: Maintaining That It Is Much Easier to be Vertuous then Vitious* (1667).
…

It is necessary in this context to perhaps comment on Mackenzie's absolutism—something which I will examine and evaluate more thoroughly in due time—: **in the early modern context, absolutism is hardly synonymous with tyranny or arbitrary government.** (In fact, reservations were probably far more prevalent with regards republicanism and democracy than with absolute rule of monarch. The former were more likely to bring about tyranny, arbitrary government, chaos and destruction.) **It is in this context that law is so very important—not only for Mackenzie, but for this period—because it guarantees against arbitrariness.**
…

As its title suggests, *Religio Stoici* alludes to Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici* (1643), and this puts Mackenzie's text within the context of the *Religio*-literature initiated by Browne and for which, Dryden's *Religio Laici* (1683) is the most famous example of discussions concerning the role of reason in religious matters.6 This literature enjoys a noteworthy place in the history of pleas for religious toleration and peaceful coexistence in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British Isles.
…

For instance, in his article on the two works, D. Havenstein argues that Mackenzie was not only responding to Browne's work, but also imitating it in many ways.7 Havenstein argues that the personal similarities between Mackenzie and Browne provide material that serves as an interesting background to compare their respective *Religios*.8 Havenstein points to the fact that the two wrote their works in different, but similar periods. Moreover, both were young men when they authored their respective *Religios*, and this contributed to the character of their works.9 **Also, their professions—Browne a physician, Mackenzie a lawyer—were considered with equal suspicion, and suffered from numerous stigmata including that of atheism.**10

10. Ibid., 19: **"Few lawyers die well, few physicians live well."**

…

Jackson points to Mackenzie's conviction that "the church inevitably comprised irreconcilable elements, rendering consensus impossible,"13 which in turn necessitated an external conformity in religious worship to be imposed by the civil magistrate. **The externally imposed and qualitatively formal aspects, which the secular authority is responsible in enforcing, are acceptable, in the final analysis, because they are essentially *adiaphora*—**that is to say, they are not essential to faith and individual's salvation. For instance, pursuing a sartorial theme, Mackenzie wrote in *Religio Stoici:*

> **The *Phanaticks* enveigh against Presbyterian Gowns. The *Presbyterian* tears the Episcopal lawn Sleeves, and thinks them the whore of *Babel*'s shirt. The *Episcopist* flouts at the popish Robes, as the livery of the beast.**14

Jackson observes in passing, with reference to this passage, **that the young John Locke prudently kept such sentiments—thus publicly voiced by Mackenzie in *Religio Stoici*—private around the end of 1662.**15

> 15. Jackson, "Latitudinarianism," 78:
>
> > "In this context, Mackenzie's *Religio Stoici* publicly voiced sentiments prudently kept private by the young John Locke, around the end of 1662, when he upheld the civil magistrate's right to prescribe *adiaphora*, given the potential infinity of subjective distinctions able to be drawn between 'a gown worn in the market-place and the self-made gown worn in church'."

…

The fact that Mackenzie integrates the notion of *adiaphora*, a notion that has a stoic heritage—which was, undeniably known at the time—also indicates that his *Religio Stoici* was true to both qualifications of religious and stoic.

…

Historical scholarship of roughly the last half century has shown the paradigmatic significance of neostoicism for the European intellectual, cultural and artistic, as well as political endeavours.18

> 18. See William J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," *Itinerarium Italicum* (1975): 401-421; and, Gerhard Oestrich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and also, Margaret Osler, ed. ***Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility. Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The stoic tone may also be seen in writings of historical and legal character. This scholarship has also established the English neostoic current within the grander phenomenon.19 Yet in comparison, the Scottish stoics have been somewhat neglected. It was only in the last couple of decades that historians of early modern Scotland have begun paying attention to Scottish neostoicism. The work of David Allan has been particularly important to this effort. **Allan's *Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland*, for example, catalogues the most noteworthy Scottish neostoics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.**20

> 20. Allan discusses four groups of Scottish neostoics, who he sequences in his work form the second through to the fifth chapter respectively, in thematic and chronological fashion: (1) **sixteenth-century neo-Latin poets: George Buchanan,** John Leech, William Barclay, Thomas Dempster, and David Wedderburn; (2) Early seventeenth-century Scottish aristocracts and couriers: William Drummond of Hawthornden, Sir William Alexander, Alexander Seton, Sir Robert Ker and his son William, and David Hume of Godscroft; (3) **Scottish royalists of the 1640s:** Montrose, Sir Robert Spottiswood, Sir Robert Gordon, and Alexander Ross; (4) Restoration churchmen and politicians: Robert Leighton, Gilbert Burnet, and Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh.

…

Conveniently enough, Mackenzie seems to have been anticipating this in the very first sentence of *Religio Stoici*: **"I am, by Religion, a *Protestant*, and such confide little in merit, and by Humour, a *Stoick*, and such are most inconcerned in censures."**23 **This autobiographical comment is that by which he prefaced his *Religio Stoici*, and essentially, his writings to follow.** Centuries later, it is effectively these two aspects that he professed, which sustain the interest that intellectual historians have in his treatises.

Interestingly enough, this sentence belongs to the first preface of *Religio Stoici*'s first 1663 edition, and was excised from later editions. It is curious why it was left out from subsequent editions, yet the answer to such question might turn out to be very simple indeed. For Mackenzie might have thought, quite reasonably, that proclaiming his religious and philosophical position from the outset was rhetorically weak and possibly unwise as it might raise suspicion about what was to follow.

…

Firstly, traditional historiography had deemed only the Scotland of mid-eighteenth century onwards as deserving the attention of the intellectual historian. Reducing Scotland to the backwaters of European arts and letters prior to this period had therefore remained the scholarly custom. This attitude has gone serious revision in recent historiography, although there still remains a lot to be done and there is

consensus about this among most contemporary historians. Thus, such tendency on tradition historiography's part accounts considerably for the absence of works on the likes of Mackenzie. Most interestingly, this is to a considerable extent, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Scottish historical tradition's doing, which one might not necessarily expect.

Secondly, it is in line with this last observation that one recognizes the second reason to why Scots' intellectual endeavours prior to the eighteenth century, particularly those in a clear neostoic tone, have drawn limited attention in scholarship. **The degree of appreciation for ancient and classical wisdom that the Scottish philosophe felt was rather limited in contrast to his/her counterpart of the prior century or two.** This certain lack of appreciation seems slightly more felt for stoicism, especially for its expression in the Senecan spirit in which the more contemplative and solitary aspects of stoicism is emphasized. Moreover, even when appraisal of stoicism is required, it is performed with reference to a figure of the contemporary generation (or the previous last), who is not traditionally viewed as a stoic. **This is seen, for example, in the case of Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), who commented on Francis Hutcheson's (1694-1746) avowed stoicism as exemplary in an age in which the word stoic almost became—supposedly—a derogatory accusation.**24 Pointing to stoicism's more Ciceronian intonations—the praising of an active life and pursuit of virtue in a public sphere—Ferguson commended Hutcheson's personal stoicism as deserving commendation in terms of such stoicism. **However, Ferguson is adamantly critical on what would be the more Senecan intonations of stoicism, which he does not really recognize as stoicism, and reduces it to a way of life that is to be unyieldingly denied.**25

Mackenzie's case requires a third factor to be added to this list: his infamous legacy as the king's bloody advocate and tool of tyranny. Traces of this reputation may be observed even centuries later. **For example, one owner of *Religio Stoici* inscribed his copy, in 1846, with a skull, cross-bones and the injunction: 'Remember!'**26
…

So, Andrew Shifflett writes: **"In England, at least, Stoicism was seldom about 'never resisting the prevailing government' and blindly accepting things as they were. Even in its least resolute forms, it could be a subtle casuistry of political activism."**2

Secondly, and in relation to the first, both retirement and public life are means to an end. They do not qualify as ends in themselves:

> **The Stoic ethos involved several paradoxical literary and political concepts, most notably constancy accompanied by a fascination with violence, indifference mirroring extremities of anger, and retirement involving quests for honour and authority.** While the ancient Stoic often turned away from war and politics toward inwardly directed battles of honour, the seventeenth-century Stoic directed those battles outwardly and symbolically in the literary 'arena.'3

This is to say, then, that the seventeenth-century neostoical perspective partly conceives retirement and public life as almost states through which an individual may go, while struggling in pursuit of a more fundamental cause: "The world is a living organism for the Stoic, and each person can serve it wisely and well when they recognise that, as humans, they share the same fate as all other persons."4

The second concerns Mackenzie's latitudinarianism and his position as somewhat an advocate of religious toleration. In this regard, Mackenzie's neostoicism—or its formative effect in shaping his own position towards religious toleration—is not as clearly obvious. At first sight, it may seem as if there is no standard Stoic principle with which one may associate religious toleration in any straightforward fashion. In fact, the rather ambiguous and adaptable nature of the Stoic school may be seen to provide ample evidence in favour of toleration or lack thereof. **Yet, Mackenzie's Erastian disposition—and Erastianism is traditionally associated with toleration—is clear enough: "as every private Christian should be tolerated by his fellow-subjects, to worship God inwardly according to his Conscience; So all should conspire in that exterior uniformity of Worship, which the Laws of his Countrey injoyn."**5 It is not only possible to assess this stance by the use of neostoic criteria.

There is one fundamental tenet of stoic ethical doctrine that qualifies as useful for the advocacy of toleration: *adiaphora*. *Adiaphora*, in a religious context, would refer to anything that is essentially indifferent to true belief and good conduct.

It is also possible to account for Mackenzie's neostoically stained religious toleration as having been inspired neostoicism outlook on the relationship between politics, religion and society, *and* the extent to which private judgment in matters of conscience may be practiced and the state's jurisdictional limits to interfere in such matters. **In a neostoical order of things, family, community, society, the state or nation, and humanity as a whole, are agents that are justified in putting limits on the individual.** When the ineptness of the individual against nature is considered, all of these social arrangements can be assumed to be to the benefit of all. **This understanding is clearly in irreconcilable discord with Calvinism.**
…

For the likes of Mackenzie, absolutism did not mean tyranny or arbitrary government. Quite contrarily, an absolute monarchy curbed the possibility of such evils. Mackenzie believed and argued that a politically stable, safe and prospering commonwealth was guaranteed by the crown operating within the limits of the rule of law.

Accordingly, **an absolutism deprived of an emphasis on the rule of law would misrepresent Mackenzie's political stance.** Furthermore, such absence would also prevent us from observing the underlying neostoical *Weltanschauung* sustaining Mackenzie's word and deed. **His royalism and absolutism is accompanied by a higher principle, legalism.** Government, no matter in what form, is carried out through law.7

Expanding on Mackenzie's legalism proves instructive and useful in understanding how neostoicism played a paradigmatic function in this period. It goes without saying that it has significant implications on the conception and development of natural law theory.8

When thought in contrast to the rigid, uncompromising and dogmatic position of the Covenanter, the appeal to natural law proves significant. Whether or not he intended may be debated, however one cannot deny that by virtue of this appeal, Mackenzie entertained the possibility of a higher order or meta-domain that may be used by conflicting legal jurisdictions.
…

The fifth and last neostoical aspect concerns the Advocates' Library and Mackenzie's long-lasting personal effort to found it. The speech he gave at the opening and the library's catalogue at its initiation provides sufficient grounds and ample reason to consider it in terms of Mackenzie's neostoicism: **"Our library will be," he said, "a modern Lyceum and a new Stoa where brilliant wits will be exercised in harmless encounters."**9

An assessment of the Advocates' Library and what it meant for Mackenzie promises to offer further dimensions to his neostoicism. For one, it puts into play **the early modern stoical fascination with gardens, which is, more traditionally, associated with Epicureanism.** Yet, when reconsidered in light of the earlier interpretation of the otium-negotium dichotomy as constituting more a continuum than as offering two mutually exclusive choices, the garden—literally or metaphorically—offers something significant for an early modern figure like Mackenzie that is extensively in line with neostoic sentiment. **The Advocates' Library is not only a garden of sorts for legal professionals to escape from the outside, but it is also a place where one can prepare for that very outside in which evils are harboured and perpetuated.**
…

In the final analysis, my argument intends to illustrate that it is possible to subsume the majority of Mackenzie's life-long pursuits under an effort to combat a particular type of person or of thinking—that of the Covenanter, which he saw as symptomatic of the ills of his age. **In this sense, I believe it is even possible to qualify him as a proto-Enlightenment *philosophe*.** It is unreasonable to count Mackenzie among the giants of the seventeenth-century on whose shoulders the succeeding century's influential thinkers stood. In the manner Sorkin has come to categorize numerous other influential figures, Mackenzie was perhaps a second-tier thinker; **yet, he cast a far ranging and much more concrete sway than the likes of even Newton and Locke who were undoubtedly and often unreservedly gods to any eighteenth-century *philosophe*.**
…

His thinking does not make it all the way to an advocacy of natural religion; yet, his political philosophy as proposed in *Jus Regium*, when considered in tandem with his histories, tends to indicate an appeal to natural law theories. **This is an approach that is categorically distinct from that of the Covenanters, despite its overall *ancien regime* conceptual framework.**

We see in Mackenzie the beginning of the criticism of Protestantism's overt emphasis on true belief. He repeatedly asserts that a blind devotion to matters of conscience that cannot be proven should not obstruct good morals in terms of right behaviour. In other words, partaking in despicable acts while subscribing to "true doctrine" does not make an individual a good Christian or citizen. **Mackenzie was already effectively calling for a kind of reformation of manners decades prior the advocacy of which proliferated in early eighteenth-century Scotland, especially Edinburgh.**4 **Mackenzie constantly complained about the lack of civility that existed around him.** It may seem strenuous but the moderate nerve of the Scottish Enlightenment proper may be traced in part back to Mackenzie and the likes of him.5

Ahnert's presentation of the importance of Richard Sher's account of the centrality of moderatism is instructive:

> Richard Sher, too, in his seminal work on the 'Moderate' clergy of eighteenth-century Edinburgh argued that Francis Hutcheson had been the first to put forward a synthesis of Christianity with central tenets of ancient Stoicism. **That combination of ancient Stoicism with a less rigid form of Calvinism was then adopted 'most enthusiastically and completely' by the 'Moderate literati' of mid-eighteenth-century Edinburgh,** including Ferguson, Blair, and Robertson.6

One specific characteristic of Mackenzie's ideological orientation that justifies further its candidacy to being a precursor to moderatism pertains to his neostoicism. **Recent decades have witnessed an indisputable growth in scholarship that accounts for the vital role religion had played in the European Enlightenment. "The term 'religious' or 'clerical Enlightenment' is firmly established in the historiography."**7 This is very much the case for the Scottish Enlightenment—in fact, the Scottish Enlightenment is possibly the ideal example.

The hero of Sher's intellectual-historical narrative is Francis Hutcheson, **yet there is no recognition of the likes of Restoration figures such as Mackenzie, Gilbert Burnet, Robert Leighton and others with**

respect to how much they have produced in writing and in action what was in great part an advocacy of Stoic virtue or a properly Christian(ized) stoicism. David Allan catalogued the prevalence of neostoicism in Restoration Period Scottish politics, philosophy and culture in his *Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland*. I maintain that there is much to be found in Mackenzie's literary output and public career to understand how the so-called moderate literati of Edinburgh—as Sher calls them—came into existence.

---

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hutcheson/#HutcMeta

Hutcheson's most detailed statement of his sentimentalism and substantive moral and aesthetic theory is to be found in his 1725 (and subsequently revised) work, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. **Indeed, at least in early editions of the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson considered this essay an attempt to defend the (broadly considered) sentimentalist doctrines of Lord Shaftesbury, as expressed in the *Characteristiks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711).** Indeed, the subtitle of the book's first edition runs as follows:

> **In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explain'd and Defended, against the Author of the *Fable of the Bees:*** and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are establish'd, according to the Sentiments of the Antient Moralists. With an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subjects of Morality. (*Inquiry*)

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT392#v=onepage&q&f=false

Originally from Ireland, Hutcheson studied in Glasgow under the moral philosopher Gershom Carmichael and the controversial unorthodox theologian John Simson, succeeding Carmichael in the Glasgow chair of moral philosophy in 1729. **It seems that Hutcheson was the first academic moral philosopher in Scotland to adopt a relatively important body of Stoic ideas,** together with Carmichael and the Aberdonian George Turnbull.

Like many subsequent proponents of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hutcheson had a lively interest in Shaftesbury's writings, with which he became acquainted in the Molesworth circle in Dublin.
…

The extent to which Shaftesbury sees his moral enterprise inspired by Stoicism, especially in the variety of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, becames even more obvious when one consults his unpublished works, in particular his notebooks, the *Askêmata*, and manuscripts like the *Pathologia*. All over Europe, and throughout the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury's philosophy was very influential, and he may be considered one of the crucial thinkers through whom Stoic ideas made their way into the Enlightenment.5
…

Hutcheson presents this second claim as a refutation of the position that explains every action as ultimately motivated by self-love, a view he attributed to Hobbes, Pufendorf, the Epicureans and the "Christian Moralists" – which may mean the French Augustinians and the Scottish Presbyterians alike (Hutcheson 2002: 134; Maurer 2013: 291ff.). Hutcheson's own view, that there is natural benevolence, he sees endorsed by thinkers like Shaftesbury and the "Antiqui" or ancient moralists – meaning in particular the Stoics and Cicero (Hutcheson 2002: 205; Brooke 2012: 161). Hutcheson thus makes the Stoics precursors of his claim that we are naturally sociable. **It is telling, however, that he does not acknowledge that many interpretations of the Stoic *oikeiôsis* mention a psychological primacy of self-preservation** – he focuses on the Stoics' emphasis on the reality of other-directed affections, such as the *storgê* and friendship. Hutcheson's interest in the theme of sociability makes him treat Hobbes and the Stoics as opponents, like Shaftesbury, whereas in the dominant seventeenth-century focus on questions of free will and determinism, Hobbes and the Stoics were often grouped together. In any case, given that the Stoics were suspicious from the point of view of orthodox Calvinism, Hutcheson's position seems quite bold, and his claim that benevolence is a natural virtuous tendency – his interpretation of *vita secundum naturam* – creates tensions since it can equal rejecting the doctrines of postlapsarian corruption and dependence on grace.6

His claims about the moral sense Hutcheson sees again backed by Shaftesbury and the Stoics. In his inaugural oration *De naturali socialitate* (On the natural sociability of mankind) (1730), Hutcheson uses the Stoic term *hêgemonikon* to refer to natural conscience and the moral sense, appropriating the traditions he finds in both Stoicism and Christianity (Hutcheson 2006: 199; Rivers 2000: 213f.; Brooke 2012: 161ff.). Following the Stoics, Shaftesbury and the Cambridge Platonists on this point means again positioning himself against Calvinist orthodoxy, according to whom our corrupt faculties are ineffective in directing us towards the good without the Bible and divine grace. **This contrast is most clearly visible in their respective views of the present moral state of human nature, where for Hutcheson evident signs are preserved that we are "designed for every virtue, for all honest**

and illustrious things" (Hutcheson 2006: 200). **One of the key sources for this positive view of Hutcheson is clearly Stoicism.**

Another crucial feature of Hutcheson's moral philosophy that resonates well with Stoicism is his assertion in the *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections* that the **"Perfection of Virtue consists in 'having the *universal calm Benevolence*, the prevalent Affection of the Mind, so as to limit and counteract not only the selfish Passions, but even the *particular kind Affections*'"** (Hutcheson 2002: 8).
…

Thus, even a quite powerless agent may reach the most perfect virtue – a point Hutcheson links with an interesting reference to the Stoics: **"And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the Stoicks, 'That a Creature suppos'd Innocent, by pursuing Virtue with his utmost Power, may in Virtue equal the Gods"** (ibid.). **Hutcheson's own, similar claim, which is hardly compatible with the Calvinist doctrine of postlapsarian corruption, is that "no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the most heroic Virtue"** (Hutcheson 2004: 134).
…

Hutcheson's affinities with some Stoic ideas should not make us think that he endorses all the central Stoic tenets, let alone that he would develop a coherent Neostoic system – James Moore is right to point out that Hutcheson was "eclectic" in his Stoicism (Moore 2007: 135ff.). Some Stoic ideas about theology, for example, were hardly compatible with Hutcheson's understanding of Christianity. Regarding moral philosophy, **Hutcheson places much less emphasis on reason, and he has a much more favorable view of the emotions,** in line with earlier critics of the Stoic teaching on apathy.
…

The outcome is that for Hutcheson, there is a calm, and thus acceptable, affection towards a present evil. This was famously absent from the original Stoic table with only three *constantiae*, which was tied to their distinction in moral ontology between internals and externals (Maurer 2010: 39f).

This significant deviation dovetails with Hutcheson's insistence on our natural concern for the well-being of others. Take the example of pity, the emotional reaction upon facing the misery of others: **Hutcheson mentions that pity could block reason and motivate harmful actions, but the passion is an expression of our social nature and thus should not be eradicated in self-cultivation. What counts is the right government of our emotions – the ideal of apathy is part of the "Vanity of some of the lower rate Philosophers of the *Stoick Sect*," whose "boasting of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity" is inconsistent with the order of nature** (Hutcheson 2002: 83). Virtue involves being vulnerable to the well-being of others.
…

In the *Essay*, Hutcheson wrote, referring to Simplicius on Epictetus: "We know that our State is *absolutely Good*, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil" (Hutcheson 2002: 43). Regarding Christianity more specifically, Hutcheson and Moore's Introduction **deplores the persecutions of Christians by Christians, mentions the Apostle Paul's own persecutions, and stresses the importance of morality over doctrine,** which is the tone of much of the Scottish Enlightenment:

> 'Tis needless, I hope, **to prevent another silly prejudice; as if because the author was not a Christian, he could have no real piety or virtue acceptable to God,** none of these divine influences, which we are taught are necessary to every good work. (Hutcheson and Moore 2008: 21f.)7

https://www.academia.edu/38412132/Ciceros_Duties_and_Adam_Smiths_Sentiments_How_Smith_Adapts_Ciceros_Account_of_Self_interest_Virtue_and_Justice

'The fame of Cicero flourishes at present, while that of Aristotle is utterly decayed.' So wrote Adam Smith's companion and philosophical ally, David Hume, of the intellectual trends of his time. Although Cicero acquired a reputation as a second-rate thinker or a mere popularizer of Greek ideas in the nineteenth century, eighteenth century thinkers considered him a serious and original philosopher in his own right, especially on moral and political matters. **Hume does not exempt himself from the trend he identifies, writing that he kept Cicero's *On Duties* 'in my Eye in all my Reasonings'** (Hume 1932, 34). **Indeed, Neal Wood has gone so far as to compare Cicero's relationship to Enlightenment thinkers with Aristotle's role in the late Medieval scholasticism, so pervasive was his influence.**1
…

Adam Smith is in some ways the archetypal Enlightenment thinker – if there could be such a thing. *The Wealth of Nations* appears to many as inaugurating the economic orientation characteristic of modernity, and modernity's preoccupation with the issue of self-interest seems reflected in **Smith's famous claim that 'it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest'** (WN I.2). However, scholars of Adam Smith know that he also offers a sophisticated account of our moral motivations in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*) that belies his reputation as a simplistic advocate for acquisitive selfishness.
…

But, if we see Smith rather as a Ciceronian, we can more easily make sense of this controversy, as Cicero himself had a complex and ambiguous relationship with Stoicism; he describes himself as borrowing freely if eclectically from Stoic teachings, particularly in his most influential work, *On Duties* (I.6).6 **In fact, Smith affirms and rejects precisely the same Stoic teachings as Cicero does, often giving the same reasons for his judgments.**
…

According to MacIntyre, in rejecting Biblical and Aristotelian teleology, the thinkers of that period found themselves in a quandary. **They had inherited a set of moral beliefs and precepts, but the underlying justification for that morality (pre-modern teleology) had been dispensed with. They therefore sought a new rational justification for morality.** MacIntyre believes this project was doomed to fail because the eighteenth century thinkers did not see that the moral system they sought to rationalize could only be made coherent through the now-abandoned teleology. **MacIntyre points to the Scottish philosophers Hume and Smith as especially unaware of the 'impossible and quixotic character of their self-appointed quest'** (MacIntyre 2007, 55). **In a way, the analysis of this essay in a case study that confirms *part* of MacIntyre's claim. Smith does indeed take Ciceronian moral claims, strips them of their original justification by natural law, and grounds them instead in his own sentiment-based psychology.**
…

That there has as yet been no systematic attempt to explore the relationship between Smith and Cicero's moral and political thought can be partly attributed to the apparent paucity of Smith's explicit references to Cicero in *TMS* – fewer than twenty. Yet there are numerous occasions where Smith makes use of Cicero's ideas or expressions, sometimes translating them verbatim without attribution. Martha Nussbaum explains:

> **Smith, who usually footnotes with care the Greek and Roman philosophical texts he cites, simply assumes his audience's familiarity with Cicero's *De Officiis* … feeling that to mention the source would be to insult the learning of the audience, the way we might do with Shakespeare or the Bible.** (Nussbaum 2000, 179)

…

In different ways, earlier thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville had established self-interest as an ineradicable and thus legitimate source of motivation. This development created strong pressure for subsequent moral thinking to accommodate or otherwise deal with the claims of self-interest. The putatively modern nature of this issue forms the basis for a view that considers Smith's thought exemplary of the Enlightenment's position fundamentally in opposition to that of the ancient moralists.11

But, such a view of ancient moral thought **(one that, following more contemporary scholarly interests, often focuses on the Greeks)** fails to account for the immense impact of Cicero from the Renaissance through the eighteenth century. To a far greater extent than his fellow classical authors, Cicero was concerned with the relationship between self-interest and virtue. His most influential work (and one of the two featured in Smith's Glasgow lectures), *On Duties*, is entirely devoted to an attempt to reconcile the useful (*utile*) with the morally upright (*honestas*) without collapsing the latter into the former.12 Cicero asserts: 'whatever is morally upright must also be useful' and 'nothing more destructive could have been introduced into human life' than the denial of this truth (*On Duties* II.9–10).
…

In offering his typology of moral systems, Smith first groups the systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics together as those who believe virtue to lie in propriety – that is, 'the suitableness of the affection from which we act to the object which excites it' (*TMS* VII.ii.1). As for Smith himself, while he asserts that propriety is not the 'sole ingredient' in every virtuous action, he insists that 'there is no virtue without propriety' (*TMS* VII.ii.1). Thus, by describing virtue as inseparable from propriety, Smith suggests that his closest philosophical affinity is not to his fellow moderns, but to the ancients. Smith's own self-identification poses a serious problem for the thesis of Deneen, MacIntyre, and others attempting to cast him as a leader in the Enlightenment break with classical notions of virtue.
…

It may seem strange that in aligning himself with the ancient Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics, Smith would group all of those schools together. The teachings of each school differed substantially from the others, and their adherents frequently quarreled – sometimes bitterly – with each other. Yet, there is one classical thinker who groups the philosophical schools in precisely the same way: Cicero. Cicero presents these three schools as a united front on the subject of virtue and duty against the hedonistic system of the Epicureans.
…

Among the three major schools of thought that connect virtue to propriety, Smith tips his hand as to which he finds the most important. **Smith devotes nearly five times as much space to his discussion of Stoicism as he does to the Platonists and the Aristotelians *combined*.** In his discussion of Zeno, Epictetus and others, Smith often acknowledges that his information comes directly from Cicero, as when he examines the death of the Roman Stoic, Cato the Younger (*TMS* VII.ii.1). As discussed above, scholars have noted Smith's obvious interest in Stoicism and have pointed out several striking similarities between Smith's work and Stoic ideas. Yet, Smith's clear repudiation of certain key Stoic tenets has made attempts to claim Smith as a latter-day Stoic problematic.
…

Drawing on examples such as Smith's discussion of Cato, Norbert Waszek offers perhaps the most extreme (although, hardly the only) version of the Smith-as-Stoic view. **He sees in Smith an esoteric teaching that advocates a thoroughly Stoic 'path of "perfect virtue" that is open to a small élite'** (Waszek 1984, 591). According to orthodox Stoic doctrine, only a Stoic sage can perform the 'perfect duties' or '*katorthoma*,' while everyone who falls short is equally vicious. As a result, this strain of Stoic thought holds that humanity consists of a (very) small number of wholly virtuous people, and the vast mass of individuals, who are entirely unvirtuous and only differentiated among each other by the extent to which they were able to falsely appear virtuous. Such is the Stoic doctrine Waszek believes Smith espouses esoterically.

If Smith does espouse it, it must be *very* esoterically indeed, since he explicitly condemns it. Although he admires the austere integrity of Cato's death as depicted by Cicero, Smith also writes 'nature, in her sound and healthful state, seems never to prompt us to suicide,' and suggests that the urge to kill oneself is a 'disease' (*TMS* VII.ii.1.34). Moreover, Smith addresses directly the Stoic position about perfect duties:

> As all the actions of the wise man were perfect, and equally perfect; so all those of the man who had not arrived at this supreme wisdom were faulty, and as some Stoics *pretended*, equally faulty … As in shooting at a mark, the man who missed it by an inch had equally missed it with him who had done so by a hundred yards … **the man who has killed a cock, for example, improperly and without a sufficient reason, [equal] with him who had murdered his father.** (*TMS* VII.ii.1.40, emphasis added)

As if Smith's description of this Stoic position did not make his view of it sufficiently clear, he then writes that it **'is evidently too absurd to deserve any serious consideration. It is, indeed, so very absurd that one can scarce help suspecting that it must have in some measure been misunderstood'** (*TMS* VII.ii.1.41). With such an authoritative pronouncement on the matter, it seems reasonable to reject the contention that Smith harboured secret allegiance to this version of Stoicism.

Indeed, Smith critiques the whole family of propriety-oriented moral theories for their harshness, singling out Stoicism for special censure. They fail to give the gentler moral virtues, such as kindness, mildness, and good humour their due:

> The ancient systems, which place virtue in propriety, **seem chiefly to recommend the great, the awful, and the respectable virtues, the virtues of self-government and self-command;** fortitude, magnanimity, independency upon fortune, the contempt of all outward accidents, of pain, poverty, exile, and death. It is in these great exertions that the noblest propriety of conduct is displayed. **The soft, the amiable, the gentle virtues, all the virtues of indulgent humanity are, in comparison, but little insisted upon,** and seem, on the contrary, by the Stoics in particular, to have been often regarded as mere weaknesses which it behoved a wise man not to harbour in his breast. (*TMS* VII.ii.4.2)

We might then wonder: if orthodox Stoicism appears in such a harsh light to Smith, why he would expend such effort analysing it? **In addition, a scholar of Stoicism might object that Smith's depiction of that tradition as harsh and demanding is a mischaracterization. For instance, Seneca possessed unimpeachable Stoic credentials and yet wrote *De Clementia*, in which he strongly recommends many gentler virtues. Nevertheless, Smith includes Seneca among those Stoics who make unrealistically harsh moral claims** (*TMS* III.3.44). Ultimately, for our purposes, what Stoicism is *for Smith* matters far more than what view a more comprehensive historical survey of the Stoic School as a whole might yield. But in an important way, Smith's somewhat one-sided account may

be taken as still further evidence of his reliance on Cicero, since Cicero depicts the drawbacks of orthodox Stoicism in precisely the same light as Smith does. Moreover, Cicero's alternative to that version of Stoicism is the one Smith himself adopts.
…

Smith explicitly points to Cicero's *On Duties* as the necessary corrective to Stoic harshness and absolutism. Smith writes:

> The Stoics in general seem to have admitted that there might be a degree of proficiency in those who had not advanced to perfect virtue and happiness. They distributed those proficient into different classes, according to their degree of advancement; and they called the imperfect virtue which they supposed them capable of exercising, not rectitudes, but proprieties, fitnesses, decent and becoming actions, for which a plausible reason could be assigned, what Cicero expresses by the Latin word *officia* … The doctrine of those imperfect, but attainable virtues seems to have constituted what we may call the practical morality of the Stoics. It is the subject of Cicero's *Offices*. (*TMS* VII.ii.1.42)13

It may be tempting to attribute Smith's preference for gentle virtues to the influence of his friend Hume. But, in his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume himself appeals to Cicero's authority for his judgment (Hume 1930, 2.1). In the letter to Hutcheson, mentioned above, Hume affirms his indebtedness to Cicero on this point (Hume 1932, 34). Thus, even if Smith's proximate source were Hume, it would seem that the ultimate source for this preference for gentle virtues remains Cicero. Yet, Smith's choice to cite Cicero rather than Hume in support of his argument suggests that both he and Hume were influenced by the same source: Cicero himself.
…

Bernard Mandeville's argument for the utility of vice plays a very similar role in Smith's argument to the one played by Epicureanism in Cicero's.17

> 17. **In fact, Smith connects Epicureanism to Mandeville, in part to demonstrate how much worse Mandeville is in comparison.** But, it is noteworthy that, as he does with Mandeville, Smith acknowledges that there is a modicum of truth the Epicurean position, which even its staunchest opponents must recognize. Smith cites Cicero in support of this contention (*TMS* VII.ii.4.5).

Mandeville's thought is the only example Smith gives of a 'licentious system,' which obliterates entirely the very concept of virtue as anything other than pretense. When treating Mandeville's ideas, Smith's typically measured prose gives way to almost Ciceronian rhetoric of denunciation. Mandeville's system is a 'great fallacy,' 'absurd,' 'sophistry.' He teaches vice 'to appear with more effrontery, and to avow the corruption of its motives with a profligate audaciousness which had never been heard of before' (*TMS* VII.ii.4). **Perhaps the author of *The Wealth of Nations*, who wrote that 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest'** (*WN* I.2), **feared that his ideas would be easily conflated with Mandeville's valorization of selfishness.** Indeed, Smith acknowledges that Mandeville's philosophy contains a kernel of truth that accounts for its pervasive influence. Mandeville's recognition that selfish motives can play a role even in apparently moral behaviour is an idea Smith shares. Yet, for Smith, this insight does not vitiate the status of virtue or justify brute egoism. Thus, by dramatically denouncing Mandeville, Smith can emphasize the differences in their theories.

Mandeville had attempted to show, for instance, that much of our apparently moral behaviour is in truth motivated by a selfish desire for approval and praise (and thus, not really moral or virtuous at all). Smith acknowledges the same phenomenon. But instead of viewing the praise-seeking motivation behind so much good behaviour as proof of the hollowness of our pretensions to virtue, Smith argues that this relationship ennobles our love of praise – precisely because it leads us to perform good actions. Smith writes that the love of virtue is 'the noblest and the best passion in human nature. The second is the love of true glory, a passion inferior no doubt to the former, but which in dignity appears to come immediately after it' (VII.ii.4.8).

The love of praise (and its more exalted manifestation, glory) is a famous Ciceronian theme. Smith cites Cicero's condemnation of those who disdain glory and the praise of others to support his argument (*TMS* III.2.30). For Cicero, the love of praise was the peculiar mark and motivation of *magnitudo animi* – greatness of soul (*On Duties* I.13). It drives an individual to do good for his political community.
…

But the second question is psychological; it focuses on what enables us to recognize virtue, and what motivates us to prefer virtuous behaviour and to disapprove of its opposite. On this issue, Smith clearly parts ways with all of the ancient thinkers, even Cicero. But, rather than abandoning him, Smith instead regularly injects his own psychological account to bolster Cicero's normative claims.

Immediately after his approving account of Cicero's modifications to Stoic orthodoxy, Smith abruptly states: 'the plan and system which Nature has sketched for our conduct, seems to be altogether different from that of Stoic philosophy' (*TMS* VII.2.1.43). According to Smith, the Stoics attribute right moral action to 'the awful and benevolent voice of that divine Being distinctly calling upon us to do so' (*TMS* VII.ii.1.26). On this topic, Cicero offers little in the way of an alternative to the Stoic view, falling into the Smith's category of those who 'make reason the principle of approbation' (*TMS* VII.ii.2). Aside from his discussion of the love of praise, Cicero does not dwell on issues of moral psychology.

Herein lies Smith's critique of Cicero and the other ancient moralists. It is not that they inaccurately identify moral action, but that they cannot properly account for the psychological motivations for acting and judging morally: 'None of these systems either give, or even pretend to give any precise or distinct measure by which this fitness or propriety of affection can be ascertained or judged of.' Smith explains his solution: 'That precise and distinct measure can be found nowhere but in the sympathetic feelings of the impartial and well-informed spectator' (*TMS* VII.ii.1.49). As he continues, Smith elaborates on the point that the problem with the ancient moral systems lies in their rudimentary account of our psychology: they cannot account for why certain actions give rise to particularly intense feelings of approbation or resentment. Neither unaided reason nor teleology offer can actually motivate us to prefer or oppose moral action. The answer, Smith tells us, lies in the impartial spectator, and the interaction of the imaginary spectator with our own sense of self-interest. If one could but affix such a psychology to the moral pronouncements of Cicero's modified Stoicism, one would ground Cicero's philosophy on a firm foundation. In other sections of *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, it seems that this is precisely what Smith does. Whereas Cicero's great work is a book of 'duties' (*officia*) – naturally focused on moral responsibilities and outcomes, Smith's work is devoted to 'sentiments' – the psychological motivations behind the judgments and actions we make in the moral sphere.
…

In contrast to the Stoics, who found the moral law inscribed by Providence in nature, Smith argues that our moral frameworks come neither *a priori*, nor through a pure, rational analysis of existence. The germ of moral intelligence is located in experience, but because we can never truly experience the world through the perspective of another, we must depend on imagination: **'though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers … it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception'** (*TMS* I.i.1.2).19
…

Smith explicitly denies that sympathy is a manifestation of self-love (*TMS* VII.iii.1.4). But it is in a certain sense self-regarding.21 When acting or judging the actions of others, instead of merely considering our own self-interest, **we consult how we would feel if we were in their situation, and through this process, we begin to approximate a disinterested observer of the situation.**
…

Smith critiques the Stoics for imagining that we act rightly because of the prompting voice of the divine. **But, Smith makes the judgment of our fellow humans the substitute for God's voice.** This illustrates almost literally the process by which Smith's more sophisticated psychology replaces those of the ancients.
…

Smith explains that one can have a functioning – if unpleasant – society without all of the other virtues, but one cannot do without justice (*TMS* II.ii.3). It is therefore striking that Smith uses Cicero's exact expression to explain it. First, consider the case as Cicero portrays it:

> **When a man runs in the stadium, he ought to strive and compete to the greatest possible extent in order to win, but he ought in no way to trip those with whom he is racing or push them down; thus, in life, it is not unjust for anyone to pursue whatever he finds useful, but to despoil another is a violation of justice.** (*On Duties*, 3.42)22

22. Cicero himself takes this example from Chrysippus. But, as none of the latter's works are extant, and Smith's phrasing so nearly matches that of Cicero, we are again compelled to conclude that Cicero is Smith's source.

For Cicero, the metaphor of the race illustrates how justice works, but it in no way describes the psychological motivations that maintain these rules of justice. Now, let us compare this to Smith's example, quoted almost verbatim from Cicero (without attribution), but with an addition and an explanation:

> In the race for wealth, and honors and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play,

> which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other … They readily, therefore, sympathize with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and indignation. He is sensible that he becomes so, and feels that those sentiments are ready to burst out from all sides against him. (*TMS* II.ii.2.2)

Smith takes Cicero's metaphor and assents wholeheartedly to the moral lesson it illustrates. In both cases, the individual's self-interest is accommodated, but also restrained within set bounds. For Smith, Cicero is correct as to the *content* of justice. But Smith innovates upon Cicero's version by adding his own psychological account that includes the actor-spectator relationship, the impartial spectator, and the fear of blame to explain how we arrive at this conclusion.

This pattern continues in Smith's account of the relationship between justice and beneficence. Beneficence is one of the gentler virtues that Smith and Cicero both advance as a corrective to Stoicism's harsh demands. Let us first consider Cicero's account of justice and beneficence. According to Cicero, justice and beneficence are in fact two aspects of the same virtue (*On Duties* I.20). Yet, Cicero offers no reason why we ought to consider them so, or even what precisely their connection consists in. **All Cicero says on the matter is that justice and beneficence relate to 'the community of human beings among themselves' (*societas hominum inter ipsos*).**
…

But whereas Cicero had vaguely located this connection in human sociability, Smith sees that the connection lies in the two related human sentiments that are evoked in each case: resentment and gratitude. Resentment and gratitude are connected by their relation to a mean point of merit. **Resentment is the natural response to harm that exceeds the bounds of merit (the province of justice), and gratitude is the natural response to kindness that exceeds merit (the province of beneficence).**

For Smith, justice is policed by the sentiment of resentment. When an individual violates the principles of justice (say, by tripping a competitor in a race), the victim and the spectators experience resentment and anger towards the violator (*TMS* II.i.5).23

> 23. See Griswold (1999, 233, 235–236). **Griswold rightly notes Smith's awareness that our sympathy in the case of violated justice has a certain illusory quality, as we sympathize even with the dead, and we feel resentment on their behalf if they were wrongfully killed, even though the dead presumably feel nothing themselves.**

…

In his 'Discourse on Cicero,' Montesquieu laments that Cicero had not lived in a 'more enlightened time,' so that he could ground his philosophy on something more firm (Montesquieu and Fott 2002, 733). We may view these aspects of Smith's engagement with Cicero as an unexpected way of realizing Montesquieu's dream.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/smith-moral-political/#SumSmiMor

And [Smith] shows how a belief in an afterlife may be necessary if we are to see the universe as just, which in turn is important if we are to maintain our commitment to the value of acting morally (168-70). **In all these ways, but especially the last, he anticipates Kant's moral argument for belief in God, without ever quite saying that there *is* a God.** At the same time, he makes clear that any religion that gives priority to ritual or creed over morality is baleful, and poses grave dangers to a decent and peaceful society (TMS 176-7; cf. WN 802-3).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA263#v=onepage&q&f=false

Adam Smith (1723-1790), who studied in Glasgow under Hutcheson, and later followed him in the chair of moral philosophy, is another central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment quite commonly classified as "Christian Stoic." In their *Introduction* to Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, D.D. Raphael and J. Macfie wrote:

> Smith's ethical doctrines are in fact a combination of Stoic and Christian virtues – or, in philosophical terms, a combination of Stoicism and Hutcheson. **Hutcheson resolved all virtue into benevolence, a philosophical version of the Christian ethic of love.** At an early stage in TMS [*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*] Adam Smith supplements this with Stoic self-command. *(Raphael and Macfie 1976: 6)*

That such general claims need further specification is evident from the discussion of Hutcheson, **whose very emphasis on benevolence was considered as incompatible with true Christianity by one faction in the Kirk as it contradicts the doctrine of postlapsarian corruption. In Smith's time,**

doctrinal orthodoxy was less pressed upon, partly due to the Moderate Party's influence in the Kirk. This institutional shift considerably changed the context for philosophers like Smith, encouraged the spreading of new ideas, and connected with a favorable reception of Stoicism, which seems to have offered interesting options especially for moral philosophy.10 Explicit discussions of Stoic ideas in Smith's moral philosophy exemplify interesting features of their reception in the aftermath of Hutcheson, and commentators have suggested that a variety of central themes in Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759, 6th edn 1790) are rooted in Stoicism, in particular Smith's account of sympathy, his insistence on self-command, his concept of conscience and his treatment of providence and tranquility.11 **Smith's changing views of Christianity should also be kept in mind: Rivers (2000: 260) suggests that "[t]owards the end of his life [Smith] became increasingly critical of Christian doctrine and Christian virtues."**

Smith is often interestingly ambiguous in his use of Stoic and Christian concepts. He calls the moral faculty, or conscience, **the "great demigod in the breast"** (Smith 2002: 291 [*TMS* 6.3.25]). **This is reminiscent of the Stoic *hêgemonikon*,** and of the tradition continued by the Cambridge Platonists, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. However, Smith strongly emphasizes the gradual development through social interaction of the "idea of exact propriety and perfection" upon which the "wise and virtuous man directs his principal attention" in his moral judgments (ibid.). Smith's developmental and naturalizing approach distinguishes his conception of conscience from those of many earlier writers, and with questions about his account of providence this has provoked discussions about his relation to both Christian natural theology and Stoicism (Heydt forthcoming).
…

Smith's tonality regarding self-cultivation differs from Hutcheson's and the Stoics' in an interesting point. Hutcheson presented universal benevolence as the perfection of virtue and the proper aim of self-cultivation. **Smith, however, strongly warns us not to neglect the inner circles in favor of cultivating the most distant one: to man is allotted "the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country: that he is occupied in contemplating the more sublime, can never be an excuse for his neglecting the more humble department"** (Smith 2002: 279 [TMS 7.2.3.6]). **Accordingly, commentators have highlighted that Smith rejects Stoic cosmopolitanism** (Forman-Barzilai 2010: 124f.; Hanley 2009: 187), and that he insists on the importance of the inner circles for the moral reality of human creatures.12 **This becomes particularly clear in Smith's discussion of parental love as a justified form of partiality. We rarely blame an excess in parental affection, and the "stoical apathy is, in such cases, never agreeable"** (Smith 2002: 164 [*TMS* 3.3.14]). In the other dimension, Smith's insisting on not neglecting the self in general, and on the positive aspects of self-love in particular, opposes Hutcheson's more critical view of self-love.

Smith's aversion to both Stoic universalism and rigorist conceptions of Christianity becomes apparent when he discusses the need for "some sort of impartiality between ourselves and others," and the need to "correct the inequalities of our passive feelings" regarding ourselves and others (Smith 2002: 160 [*TMS* 3.3.7]). **He juxtaposes two "severe" philosophical attempts to achieve this, namely that of the "whining and melancholy moralists" (which includes Pascal), and that of the Stoics. The former "have laboured to increase our sensibility to the interests of others"** (ibid. [*TMS* 3.3.9, 8**]) by attracting attention solely to the calamities of others** – which leads to artificial commiseration and is useless, since we cannot help those who are "out of the sphere of our activity" (Smith 2002: 162 [*TMS* 3.3.9]): **Stoics like Epictetus, by contrast, have attempted to achieve impartiality "by diminishing our sensibility to what peculiarly concerns ourselves"** (Smith 2002: 162 [*TMS* 3.3.11]). Especially when we are directly concerned, self-command is crucial, but "stoical apathy" or extreme insensibility are misplaced regarding oneself and regarding others (Smith 2002: 164 [*TMS* 3.3.14]; 181 [*TMS* 3.3.44]).

In Book 7 of *TMS*, Smith discusses different streams of Stoicism: "The independent and spirited, but often harsh Epictetus" mainly taught the "contempt of life and death" and "the most entire submission to the order of Providence," **whereas "the mild, the humane, the benevolent Antonius" taught "the most complete contentment with every event which the current of human affairs could be possibly cast up"** (Smith 2002: 339 [*TMS* 7.2.1.35]). Smith seems more attracted to the second tonality in Stoicism, given his emphasis on humanity, sympathy and public spirit. Yet even if Smith may lean towards the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius, the Epictetan theme of submission to providence with the goals of rendering oneself less vulnerable to external circumstances, and of acquiring happiness and natural tranquility, is important to him. **The idea of a well-ordered whole underlies Smith's ethical outlook,** and he combines this with an emphasis of the importance of the individual qua part of the whole (Smith 2002: 325 [*TMS* 7.2.1.19]). **Most importantly, Smith sees morality, happiness and providence bound together:**

> [B]y acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, **to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.** *(Smith 2002: 193 [TMS 3.5.7])*

…

Adam Ferguson famously expressed his admiration for Stoic philosophy in his *Principles of Moral and Political Science* (1792), advertising its active dimension as opposed to retreat. This aspect is highlighted in Dugald Stewart's *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* (1829) as well, where the Stoics are also discussed through the lens of the *Dialogue concerning Happiness* (1744) **by Shaftesbury's nephew James "Hermes" Harris.**
…

Hume was the Enlightenment's exception in being generally more critical of the Stoics – but then again, he was an exception regarding suicide, since he questioned arguments against it. However, there were of course also attacks on the Stoics and their eighteenth-century proponents from another angle: **orthodox Calvinists continued to condemn the very combination of Christianity and Stoicism. John Witherspoon's *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* (1753), a grim satirical attack on the members of the Moderate Party and Hume, exemplifies the conservatively orthodox Calvinists' views of the Moderates' leaning towards Stoicism.** Witherspoon attacks Hume's expulsion of self-denial and humility from the virtues (Witherspoon 1763: ix), condemns the Moderates' emphasis on moral practice over doctrinal orthodoxy (ibid.: 29f.), **and their interest in Shaftesbury and in heathen philosophers.** Marcus Aurelius in particular is mentioned in sarcastic tone (ibid.: 30f.): "an eminent person, of the moderate character, says, his Meditations are the BEST book, that ever was written for forming the heart" (ibid.: 31; see also Rivers 2000: 188f.; Sher 1985: 57-9). **Examples like these demonstrate that the answer to the question whether Stoicism and the Christian religion were compatible was far from univocally positive.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Moral_Sentiments/Part_IV#Chap._I:_Of_the_beauty_which_the_appearance_of_Utility_bestows_upon_all_the_productions_of_art,_and_of_the_extensive_influence_of_this_species_of_Beauty

Power and riches appear then to be, what they are, enormous and operose machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniencies to the body, consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, which must be kept in order with the most anxious attention, and which in spite of all our care are ready every moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessor. They are immense fabrics, which it requires the labour of a life to raise, which threaten every moment to overwhelm the person that dwells in them, and which while they stand, though they may save him from some smaller inconveniencies, can protect him from none of the severer inclemencies of the season. **They keep off the summer shower, not the winter storm, but leave him always as much, and sometimes more exposed than before, to anxiety, to fear, and to sorrow; to diseases, to danger, and to death.**

But though this splenetic philosophy, which in time of sickness or low spirits is familiar to every man, thus entirely depreciates those great objects of human desire, **when in better health and in better humour, we never fail to regard them under a more agreeable aspect.** Our imagination, which in pain and sorrow seems to be confined and cooped up within our own persons, in times of ease and prosperity expands itself to every thing around us. We are then charmed with the beauty of that accommodation which reigns in the palaces and oeconomy of the great; and admire how every thing is adapted to promote their ease, to prevent their wants, to gratify their wishes, and to amuse and entertain their most frivolous desires. **If we consider the real satisfaction which all these things are capable of affording, by itself and separated from the beauty of that arrangement which is fitted to promote it, it will always appear in the highest degree contemptible and trifling.** But we rarely view it in this abstract and philosophical light. We naturally confound it in our imagination with the order, the regular and harmonious movement of the system, the machine or oeconomy by means of which it is produced. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex view, strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow upon it.

And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the whole face of the globe, have turned the rude forests of nature into agreeable and fertile plains, and made the trackless and barren ocean a new fund of subsistence, and the great high road of communication to the different nations of the earth. The earth by these labours of mankind has been obliged to redouble her natural fertility, and to maintain a greater multitude of inhabitants. **It is to no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, and without a thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself the whole harvest that grows upon them. The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never was more fully verified than with regard to him. The capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will receive no more than that of the meanest peasant.** The rest he is obliged to distribute among those, who prepare, in the nicest manner, that little which he himself makes use of, among those who fit up the palace in which this little is to be consumed, among those who provide and keep in order all the different baubles and trinkets, which are employed in the oeconomy of greatness; all of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity or his justice. The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. **The rich only select from the heap**

what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. **They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces.** In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for.
...

All constitutions of government, however, are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end. **From a certain spirit of system, however, from a certain love of art and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from any immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA192#v=onepage&q&f=false

References to a Stoic-type Providence are ubiquitous in the text of *TMS*, and indeed determine its whole approach to the moral sentiments. Again and again we are told that "nature" has designed our sentiments in ways that work out well, even without our conscious good intentions.35 Nor is this mere "order without design," as Rothschild would have it: **there is clearly a conception of a divinely ordered universe here, even if the deity in question is more like Stoic Zeus than like the Christian God.** Indeed, when Rothschild entitles her final chapter "A Fatherless World," suggesting that it is in this world that Smith believes that we live, she oddly distorts the passage from which she draws the phrase; for right after asserting the existence of a "great, benevolent, and all-wise Being," Smith writes, "To this universal benevolence … the very suspicion of a fatherless world, must be the most melancholy of all reflections" (235).

Thus what is surprising about the occurrence of the phrase "the invisible hand" in *TMS* is that anything much has been made of it. **It is just a passage like so many others in the work, in which Smith asserts that an arrangement produces good results without our conscious participation.** The rich contribute to general well-being because "[t]hey are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions" (184-85). Besides the fact we have already remarked, namely that the statement is both false and inconsistent with *WN*, there is nothing remarkable about it. **It would be very odd indeed if we could read Providence utterly out of *TMS*, and bizarre to read all its occurrences as "ironic," as Rothschild believes the "invisible hand" passage is.**36

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA150#v=onepage&q&f=false

Moreover, lest we think that some human beings are intrinsically above others with respect to the key elements of human dignity, Smith immediately insists that this is not the case. **The "difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less then we are aware of"** (28). The differences we observe among men are the effect, rather than the cause, of the division of labor:

> **The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education.** When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. (28-29)

The idea that all human beings are profoundly equal with respect to basic capacities that are the seat of human dignity, and that distinctions of class and rank are artificial, is a familiar Stoic idea. But Smith gives them a new twist, in two significant ways. First, he emphasizes the importance of work and the influence of occupation on one's human abilities, something that did not particularly interest the Stoics. Second, he shows that different conditions of life do not merely create different classes and ranks of people in the eyes of those who are foolish enough to care about such things; they actually form the person, directly affecting the development of human abilities.
…

Unlike the Stoics, who asked for decent treatment of slaves while holding that the institution itself was matter of indifference, Smith sees that institutions matter for a life worthy of human dignity and that slavery, colonial domination, and certain forms of domination by the rich over the poor are violations of basic justice.
…

Smith, then, rather than departing radically from the Stoic tradition, removes a gross inconsistency in Stoic thought. For it is inconsistent to deny the importance of external goods in the context of material distribution, but to insist so strongly on their importance in the context of aggression and respect. Thinking more deeply about labor than the Greek and Roman authors did helps Smith to correct this mistake, and thus to realize the potential of the Stoic doctrine more fully.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Smith#The_Theory_of_Moral_Sentiments

In 1759, Smith published his first work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* sold by co-publishers Andrew Millar of London and Alexander Kincaid of Edinburgh.[73] Smith continued making extensive revisions to the book until his death.[e] **Although *The Wealth of Nations* is widely regarded as Smith's most influential work, Smith himself is believed to have considered *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* to be a superior work.[75]**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA182#v=onepage&q&f=false

All this is true up to a point: Smith does distance himself in some ways from Stoicism and does criticize Stoic *apatheia* as a guide to the "domestic affections." **But neither author spend enough time distinguishing what is criticized from what is retained.** Such an effort pays off: Smith's actual doctrine is far odder than the relaxed and sympathetic one they impute to him.
…

Stoicism, he argues, urges us to think ourselves "not as something separated and detached, but as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast commonwealth of nature" (140). Thus we should regard our own immediate concerns as no more important than any other part of this large system. When a calamity befalls us, or our friends and relations, we should view it in the same way that we view a calamity befalling any other citizen of the world. (He cites a lengthy passage of Epictetus to make the point [141].)

Smith now introduces a crucial distinction, and it is this that commentators typically miss. There are, he says, two sorts of personal calamities that might prompt us to an excessive reaction. One sort affects us "only indirectly, by affecting, in the first place, some other persons who are particularly dear to us; such as our parents, our children, our brothers and sisters, our intimate friends" (142). **(Note that spouses are absent, here as in Smith's own life.)** The other sort affects us directly, either in body or in reputation. The distinction proves fundamental to Smith's critique of Stoicism. For the critique applies only to the first sort of calamity: **"The man who should feel no more for the death or distress of his own father, or son, than for those of any other man's father or son, would appear neither a good son nor a good father. Such unnatural indifference, far from exciting our applause, would incur our highest disapprobation"** (142). Smith elaborates this point at some length, stressing the importance of filial piety and other such "natural" sentiments in human life. Excessive sentiments in such cases are viewed indulgently; defective sentiments are "always peculiarly odious" (143). And it is here that Smith arrives at the conclusion to which Rothschild alludes, that the poets and novelists are better guides in such cases than Stoic philosophers:

> The stoical apathy is, in such cases, never agreeable, **and all the metaphysical sophisms by which it is supported can seldom serve any other purpose than to blow up the hard insensibility of a coxcomb to ten times is native impertinence.** The poets and romance writers, who best point the refinements and delicacies of love and friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections, Racine and Voltaire; Richardson,32 Maurivaux, and Riccoboni; are, in such cases, much better instructors than Zeno, Chrysippus, or Epictetus. (143)

…

Smith now turns to the second class of misfortunes, making it immediately clear that his treatment of these will be different: "It is otherwise in the misfortunes which affect ourselves immediately and directly." Here, he argues, it is the excess that is odious, and defect of reaction is not odious. Indeed, **"there are but very few cases in which we can approach too near to the stoical apathy and indifference"** (143). **Even that qualified utterance is dropped in what follows, as Smith strongly urges us to have contempt for people who are oppressed by their own personal calamities.** A young child, he argues, may be pardoned if it is inconstant, for it has just entered "the great school of self-command."
…

In the service of making his point about indifference to one's own misfortunes, Smith is led to repudiate some of the best insights of *WN* about poverty and misery and their effect on the mind. Poverty, he now holds, is nothing very serious:

> The mere want of fortune, mere poverty, excites little compassion. Its complaints are too apt to be the objects rather of contempt than of fellow-feeling. We despise a beggar; and, though his importunities may extort an alms from us, he is scarce ever the object of any serious commiseration. (144)

Smith now adds that the fall from riches to poverty does sometimes excite commiseration on the part of others – even though "in the present state of society, this misfortune can seldom happen without some misconduct, and some very considerable misconduct too, in the sufferer" (144). Despite this alleged fact, friends typically commiserate with this falling person; he himself, however, will be most admired if he accommodates himself "with the greatest ease" to the situation and carries on with firmness.
…

These final reflections show that Smith has distanced himself from Stoicism only in one respect, and in a way that introduces inconsistency into his account. **In other respects he stands squarely with the Stoics: differences in fortune are never properly the object of intense or eager concern.** At most they have the status of preferred or dispreferred indifferents – where one's own personal calamities are at issue. Indeed, in another late passage (279-288) Smith goes one step further even than the Stoics, criticizing the Stoic doctrine of suicide as capitulation to weakness on the part of Stoic heroes. "It is only the consciousness of our own weakness, of our own incapacity to support the calamity with proper manhood and firmness, which can drive us to thus resolution" (287). **Contrast the "savage" of America, who can withstand the most terrible torments with equanimity.** "He places his glory in supporting those torments with manhood, and in retorting those insults with tenfold contempt and derision" (288).

Not only did Smith thus add to the sixth edition passages that ally his position with that of the Stoics, where one's own personal calamities are concerned. He also let stand other passages that have exactly this point. Thus, in the discussion of utility in book IV, Smith claims that Providence has not abandoned the poor, even though it looks that way: "In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them. **In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possess the security which kings are fighting for**" (185). And in book I, after a preliminary and less developed sketch of the asymmetry thesis (we may indulge melancholy passions in the calamities of our friends, (48-49), Smith asserts very strongly that "it is quite otherwise with the person principally concerned" (49). He is "mean and despicable, who is sunk in sorrow and defection upon account of any calamity of his own … The weakness of sorrow never appears in any respect agreeable, except when it arises from what we feel for others more than from what we feel for ourselves" (49). A similar catalogue of examples follows, **culminating with the shameful behavior of a French duke, the Duc de Biron, who actually wept on the scaffold** (49-50). Thus not even the critique of Stoicism embodied in the sixth edition is really new with edition six: the asymmetry thesis is present already, if in a less developed form.

Similarly, in the following chapter, Smith insists that true tranquility can be attained in any station of life: **ambitious concern with station is therefore all vain and inappropriate** (50). Here Smith explicitly states that the life of the "meanest laborer" is no worse than any other:

> What then is the cause of our aversion to his situation, and why should those who have been educated in the higher ranks of life, regard it as worse than death, to be reduced to live, even without labour, upon the same simple fare with him, to dwell under the same lowly roof, and to be clothed in the same humble attire? Do they imagine that their stomach is better, or their sleep sounder in a palace than in a cottage? The contrary has been so often observed, and, **indeed is so very obvious, though it had never been observed,** that there is nobody ignorant of it. (50)

Once again, these Stoicizing passages **(highly reminiscent of Seneca's letters)** contradict the subtle insights of *WN*, which knows well that nutrition and health are not equal among the social classes, that though the working classes have more children, far fewer are able to grow up to adulthood.

And as we have already begun to see, the tension between *TMS* and *WN* is not just a normative tension, with *TMS* asking us to disregard as unimportant what *WN* appears to regard as highly important, urgently in need of correction. There are empirical claims in *TMS* that are quite plainly at odds with the more careful empirical work on *WN*: the claim already mentioned that people cannot fall into poverty without considerable fault – which is belied by so many passages about the way monopolies, colonial masters, and other social forces work; the claim made in the passage just cited, that the digestion and sleep of the poor are as good as those of the rich – belied by *WN*'s

discussions of nutrition and infant mortality; the claim, immediately before this passage, that the “wages of the meanest laborer can supply” all the “necessities of nature” – belied, again, by discussions of high infant mortality, as well as by the account of education;

https://www.academia.edu/299389/Rousseaus_Political_Philosophy_Stoic_and_Augustinian_Origins

A natural question to pose to strict Augustinians is to ask how human society is able to function in any tolerably well-ordered way if humanity is as Fallen as they assert. Nicole had famously argued that although self-love – *amour-propre* – was indeed depraved, the ties of self-interest that bound one person to another worked to produce a kind of social cohesion.56 These ties were generated by a disreputable cupidity, not a worthy charity, to be sure, but the resulting society could *look* very similar to what a society might look like if all its inhabitants were to have been motivated by true charitable love of God and neighbour. On this account, it is when we begin interacting with other people, generating ties of interdependency through the exchange of goods and services, adjusting our behaviour to fit the expectations of others, that the depraved effects of self-love begin to be redeemed, in an earthly register, at least. **Human action remans motivated by a sinful self-love and is to that extent deplorable, but a trick of divine providence brings about a certain kind of social harmony.**57
…

I have introduced two alternative Augustinian social theories into this chapter. On the one hand, there was Pierre Nicole’s argument about the unintended consequences of self-love, which is more familiar to us in Adam Smith’s later version, in which it is known as the Invisible Hand argument. **If everyone’s behaviour is motivated by narrow self-interest – the secular version of Augustinian self-love – then the aggregate outcomes can still tend to the benefit of all, including the poorest members of the society.**60 **As Smith secularises the Augustinian argument, interestingly enough, he also Stoicises it, too,** for Smith was extremely interested in Stoic moral philosophy, and much of it finds its way into the pages of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.61

---

https://archive.org/details/jewishrevolution0000jone/page/482/mode/2up?view=theater

Descartes was rescued by his friend and former classmate at the Jesuit college of La Fleche, Fr. Martin Mersenne, who assured Church and State authorities Descartes was most certainly not and most probably never had been “invisible.” **Mersenne would become one of Descartes’ greatest promoters on the continent;** he launched that effort in *Quaestiones in Genesim*, a key work marking the transition from the Renaissance modes of magical thinking into those of the scientific era. Mersenne’s *Quaestiones* was a direct attack on the tradition of occultism as practiced by Ficino, Pico, and Reuchlin – all of whom were accused of promoting Jewish magic. He later expanded his attack on Cabala by attacking Fludd, with whom he exchanged a famous series of letters.

By the time dust settled, Jewish occult science was history on the continent. **Numerology and Gematria were replaced by mathematics, and Descartes was enthroned as the philosopher who would determine the course of history on the continent for the next three centuries.** The Aristotelian *quidnuncs* had been routed by Reuchlin and the Reformation, which acted as a vehicle for Jewish Cabalism. When Mersenne destroyed that tradition, he paved the way for the triumph of Descartes, whose philosophy would sketch out all possible philosophical options. **Descartes’ radical disjunction of the world into *res extensa* and *res cogitans* led to both materialism and idealism. Descartes’ explication of the *res extensa* led inexorably to the materialism of Spinoza, and the revolutionary ideology of his followers, Toland and Collins, which led to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and Karl Marx.** But his explication of the *res cogitans* led just as inexorably to the idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and other apostles of the reaction to Revolution that became Romanticism in Germany.

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/48/mode/2up?view=theater

Descartes and Leibniz had been the last thinkers to anchor ‘natural knowledge to the strongest possible foundation, the all-powerful, eternal God.’29 Afterwards, under the cloak of an elegant religious indifferentism, the materialist theses inherited from the Ancients were accepted as unquestionable truths. **The *philosophe* Morellet left in his *Mémoires* a good description of intellectual activity in the baron d’Holbach’s salon where on a frivolous conversational tone three men, Diderot, the doctor Roux, and d’Holbach himself ‘worked out the dogmas of absolute atheism.’ It is also in that salon that Descartes was turned from a careful but fundamentally still religious thinker into an atheist, a precursor of Spinozism.** From Spinoza’s formula, *deus sive natura* (‘God, which means Nature’), the first term was now boldly dropped. D’Holbach celebrated Nature as a creator and lawgiver of man, the necessary framework of all his thoughts. ‘There is nothing beyond the Great Totality (*grand tout*),’ super-natural beings are only phantoms of which nobody can have clear ideas. **D’Holbach stressed again and again the point which we recognized as the central thesis of atheism: there is nothing outside the universe, its laws determine us since we are part of it. Both Lucretians and Stoics had said that much.**

https://parrhesiajournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/parrhesia32_guyau.pdf

Spinoza's vast system, which assimilates the systems of Epicurus and Hobbes, contains the fundamental theories of the French and English schools. At the same time, however, it seeks to surpass them by recasting the ethics of happiness [*la morale du bonheur*] in terms of the ethics of intelligence [*morale de l'intélligence*] and placing the highest pleasure in supreme knowledge [*savoir*]. **Spinoza exercised direct influence on d'Holbach, and a more or less indirect influence on all the other thinkers that we will discuss later on, such as Helvetius.**

1. **An absolute negation of all that we understand by morality [*moralité*] and a reduction of everything, including the will, to the necessary laws of nature, which are also the necessary laws of intelligence:** this is, in concise terms, what Spinozism is. There is no other absolute than eternal necessity, which is the cause of the existence of everything that exists. Everything else is relative. The absolute is that which is; and when we speak of what *could* or *should* be, we are simply uttering judgements on perfection and imperfection, on good and evil. **Through a strange illusion we take these judgements for what is most absolute, when in fact there is nothing more relative than them. For what are, in effect, perfection and imperfection, which the Platonists wished to posit as the absolute archetypes of our intellect?**
…

In the same way in which perfection and imperfection are relative to our thought, so good and evil are relative to our desires, as Epicurus and Hobbes have shown. "For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good or bad, and even indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholic, [bad for one who is mourning,] and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf. … Good and evil do not indicate anything positive in things considered in themselves."
…

We make our desires – and our thoughts – the measure of things, and thus we create the chimera of an absolute moral order which would surpass the relative orders of physics and logic. On the contrary, **it is morality that is relative, while nature is absolute. This is the implied principle of every Epicurean and utilitarian system, expressed in all its rigour: Spinoza brings it to light with his unshakable logic.**

Since there is no absolute good, what is, then, the relative good? – Spinoza answers the same as Hobbes and Epicurus: "By *good* I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful [*utile*] for us." (*E* IV, D1). The useful, in turn, is that which produces joy, and joy is caused by the satisfaction of desire: it is still the Epicurean definition, except that Spinoza adds a metaphysical complement to it: desire is the tendency of our being to persevere in being. This desire is the basis of self-love, just as Hobbes and La Rochefoucauld described it. "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of anything other than himself." (*E* IV, P25).

The good is, for a being, to succeed in this effort to conserve and satisfy its nature. The good, therefore, is nothing other than this *success* and it amounts to *power* [*puissance*]; and it is this power [*puissance*] that we call virtue: **"By virtue and power I understand the same thing."** (*E* IV, D8).6

But he who is *able* to satisfy the fundamental desire of conservation is he who *knows* what the best means for achieving it. *Power*,7 for a rational being such as man,8 is *knowledge*. Therefore, **true power [*puissance*] resides in reason, without which we would not be able to calculate utility with certainty.**
…

If we [first] consider the individual, leaving aside society, then virtue for him consists in obtaining the greatest possible happiness. In order to do this, he must satisfy his true nature in the best possible way. Now, this true nature is reason, since reason is the essence of man. The activity which is proper to reason is that of understanding, and understanding is to perceive the necessity of things. This necessity is Nature or, if you wish, God. **Thus, Spinoza refers the ethics of happiness [*morale du bonheur*] to the ethics of intelligence [*morale de l'intélligence*], that is to say, Epicureanism to Stoicism.** "What we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; nor does the soul, *insofar as it uses reason*, judge anything else useful to itself except what leads to understanding." (*E* IV, P26) We know nothing that is *certainly good* or *bad* except that which leads us to really understanding things, or that which can prevent us from understanding them. (*E* IV, P27).
…

To understand the absolute necessity of eternal nature amounts to understanding that which, while being subject only to its own law, is free. Therefore, understanding this necessity means understanding eternal freedom. It is through understanding that one participates in this freedom and identifies with it. The science of necessity and the science of freedom are one and the same thing. **Again, Spinoza adds a**

Stoic principle to Epicureanism. The point where these two doctrines come together is the intellectual intuition which crowned Aristotelian ethics, namely the identity of human and divine thought, or the consciousness of eternity. "We feel and know by experience that we are eternal."11 This awareness, which produces supreme joy, is the real love of oneself, and it is simultaneously the love of God. The mystical ideal of the Hebrews and the Christians seems here to merge with the moral theories of antiquity and in the broad synthesis proposed by Spinoza. His conception of nature is all-encompassing: **the utility of the greatest possible happiness is nature enjoying itself; and the intellectual freedom of the Stoics, which is the very knowledge of necessity, is nature possessing itself. Finally, the mystical ecstasy, through which individuality is absorbed in universal being, is nature penetrating itself and finding its eternal existence underneath its ephemeral modes.**

3. Spinoza has shown the nature of the good for the individual: the individual's relative good is that which satisfies his desires. **His absolute good is that which is no longer individual,** it is not merely in relation to him but is universal and necessary: it is nature or God. For, again, there is no other absolute than being itself in its eternal necessity.
…

This physics of custom [*moeurs*] that the French Epicureans would later erect, and that psychology of custom under the law of association that the English utilitarians would later establish, Spinoza conceived them first – and he did something even more remarkable: he constituted a geometry of custom. "I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies." (*E* III, Pref.). **Spinoza proceeds *a priori*, by deduction, and he contemptuously opposed his method to that "*historiette* of the soul," *haec historiola animae*, which was still satisfying to Bacon and his school.**12
…

4. In what concerns politics, we find the same [theoretical] movement in Spinoza and Hobbes. The latter wanted a full abdication of the individual in favour of the sovereign; **but, as a matter of fact, this abdication is [ultimately] impossible.**20 Indeed, there is a power and a right which we can never abdicate: the power of thinking. Why? Because this power expresses the very necessity of our nature, that is to say, our reason. **We cannot be deprived of our reason, which will be the refuge of freedom in Spinoza's politics. It dwells within man as an inalienable power [*puissance*] and as an inalienable right:** it is the necessity of thinking which is identical to the freedom of thought. **The true goal of politics is to organise**21 **the strongest possible physical power to prevent passion from tearing men apart; and, at the same time, it is to make this physical power increasingly useless, replacing it with the power [*puissance*] of reason. Now, the strongest physical power is not that of the absolute monarch, as Hobbes believed, but it is rather the general force of the whole people,**22 or the force of democracy. On the other hand, the greatest rational power [*puissance*] is that of general reason [*raison générale*];23 the more this reason develops in the individuals, the more these individuals are united among themselves. Therefore, in Spinoza, we find a relatively liberal politics which aims to place the greatest interest within the greatest freedom of thought; that is to say, within the greatest necessity of reason, or in the greatest possible unity of all [particular] interests by the universal interest of reason. **This liberal**24 **revolution in utilitarian doctrine will be henceforth an accomplished fact: Hobbes will remain as the sole partisan of despotism.**

In this way, the great system of the rationalist Spinoza effected the synthesis between Epicurean or utilitarian ethics and Stoic ethics. The only element that seems to be absent from Spinozism is the ideal of a real progress of nature, or the idea of "*evolution*,"25 **an idea which the German metaphysicians (especially Hegel) and the English ethicists [*moralistes*]**26 **(especially Spencer) will stress.** To this metaphysics of universal evolution they will add an ethics of universal evolution. But in the end the principles remain the same: a relative good takes the place of the absolute good; this relative good is ultimately reduced to a progressive knowledge [*connaissance*] of a progressive utility, by means of which the interest of each individual is more and more identified with a universal interest.

https://www.google.fi/books/edition/Spinoza_Life_and_Legacy/4snKEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA42&printsec=frontcover

If Spinoza's penetration of Britain from the 1670s was, in the long run, more subversive than that of Hobbes earlier, at least in terms of cultural diffusion and formative effect on deism and the early Enlightenment, **a still more potent factor shaping the broad historical phenomenon of Spinoza's unparalleled, astounding impact on the Western Enlightenment was the appearance, at the close of the Franco-Dutch War of 1672-8, of Spinoza's *TTP* in a highly competent French version soon widely disseminated across Western Europe.** This remarkable development, beginning in 1677-8, and its cultural and social consequences, could almost be deemed a kind of retaliatory Dutch invasion of France, a poetic vengeance for Louis XIV's invasion of the Republic, in 1672, an invasion of France more effective than the republican conspiracy which brought Spinoza's old

Latin master, Franciscus van den Enden, to the gallows, at the Bastille in 1674. Spinoza's retaliatory counter-invasion was an incursion no one had expected and that caused a much profounder, longer-lasting shock than van den Enden's 1674 anti-monarchical conspiracy in Normandy.

If neither the excellent quality of the French translation of the *TTP* nor its Dutch publisher's success in disseminating the books widely51 **signifies much philosophically or affects how we construe Spinoza today, this pocket-sized duodecimo edition, easy to peruse in carriages and coffee-shops, and carry about unnoticed, exerted a massive impact on European culture and society in the immediate aftermath of Spinoza's death, between 1678 and the early eighteenth century, especially on higher culture and society outside scholarly circles, more so probably than any other edition presenting Spinoza's ideas.** The fact that the translator rendering the book into elegant French happened to be a keen adherent of Spinoza, able to render his views accurately and effectively, but at the same time was a prominent anti-Louis XIV propagandist, helps to explain the stunning scale of Spinoza's generally explosive post-1678 French impact and his sudden posthumous assault on French absolutism.52

The 1678 French version of the *TTP*, then, became the principal channel by which Spinoza's thought penetrated beyond the restricted world of academe and Latin-reading theologians and philosophers to become a major resource, a *machine de guerre*, of Europe's aristocratic libertines, freethinkers, and boldly independent high society readers of whatever stripe, causing a shift of decisive cultural importance. However, this impact, if far-reaching, was far from being evenly balanced: **it was definitely not Spinoza's democratic republicanism that attracted the libertine, freethinking constituency, nor indeed Spinoza's ethical counsel and guidance regarding how to live a good life.** What drew a broad new following, massively pervading the early Enlightenment and colouring the diffusion of the underground Radical Enlightenment, was the attack on "superstition" and "priestcraft," Spinoza's comprehensive rejection of religious authority.53

https://books.google.fi/books?id=6qHLEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT980#v=onepage&q&f=false

One consequence of the initial absence of Spinoza's name and image behind the *TTP* was that for a time it was hard for French readers to make the connection between the Latin *TTP* **and its French version now circulating under three different, entirely false titles.** Three months after Spinoza's death, on May 26 1679, the young Bayle, now thirty-one, writing to his friend and correspondent, the ex-Protestant minister and scholar, Vincent Minutoli (1639-1709), mentions having just read a book published by "Jacob Smith" at Amsterdam the previous year, entitled *Traitté des cérémonies superstitieuses des juifs, tant anciens que modernes* "which is certainly the work most filled with impious doctrines I have ever read [bien le plus rempli de doctrines impies que j'aie jamais lu]. **Never have I seen Holy Scripture treated so cavalierly. The author claims all the Old Testament books, down to but not including the *Chronicles*, are a collection of histories which Ezra compiled from different sources intent on assembling an accurate chronicle of his people's history," but did so gathering texts by different authors agreeing with each other with respect to neither chronology nor sequence of facts, with Ezra hoping to have selected the most probable versions. Ezra's death then intervened before he could redact all his material, leaving a mass of undigested papers without any proper order, so that subsequent editors compiled separate books with names such as 'Exodus,' the Book of Joshua and so forth explaining, or so claims the *Traitté*'s author, why one finds scant coherence, concord and accuracy in the Bible's factual narratives and why these cause theologians so many headaches. In its political chapters, the anonymous author asserts that the sovereign is the proper ruler over religious matters in society "which makes me think that the author is the famous Spinosa, who has assembled similar thoughts in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*."**41 Down to 1680, even Bayle did not realize that the illicit French work suddenly causing uproar in 1678-9, copies of which would be repeatedly seized by royal officers during the 1680s, was actually the *TTP*. Then a still pious Protestant Christian (he changed later),42 Bayle, in 1678-9, was among those who read the French version of the *TTP* after reading the Latin, initially not realizing that it was simply a French translation of Spinoza's book.
…

The difficulty was how to counter Spinoza's basic ideas without encouraging a Spinozist breakthrough into the fashionable world of libertine courtiers, unbelievers and malcontent nobles and army officers of the type who colluded with Van den Enden in anti-absolutist conspiratorial activism in Normandy.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=wrx9BgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA415#v=onepage&q&f=false

We can conclude that the general tendency in the century seems to be in the direction of preserving epicurean hedonism at the expense of stoic virtue, although the victory was not at all complete until the third Regency (1715-23). Nonetheless there was a surprising amount of

epicureanism in the period of the young King's reign (1660-80) which, in spite of an effort to reinstate the power of stoic virtue (1685-1715), became more dominant as the century wore on.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/568/mode/2up?view=theater

In the preface to his *Essay*, Boulainvilliers begins his task by denying that Bayle, in his article in Spinoza in his *Dictionnaire*, had adequately understood **the argument of the *Ethics*, 'le plus dangereux livre qui ait été écrit contre la religion.'**29
…

Boulainvilliers affirms, on the contrary, the non-providential nature – the necessity and absolute interdependence – of all that occurs. **He also follows Spinoza in denying that abolition of knowing, intelligent, personal God means there can be no love of God or any true morality. On the contrary, he holds, the new outlook means that one can attain a higher, more meaningful love of God, through understanding that he is intimately connected to one's own being,** that He gives one one's existence and properties 'mais qu'il me les donne libéralement, sans reproche, sans intérêt, sans m'assujétir à autre chose qu'à ma propre nature.'32 Such an awareness of God, he maintains, dispels all fear, anxiety, defiance, and all the defects of an 'amour vulgaire ou intéressé' such as generally pervades man's religiosity. **Nor is there anything reprehensible in expressing love for God in the context of whatever religious cult one happens to have been raised in, provided one is always mindful that its theology is meaningless and strips away those feelings of partiality and hatred which inevitably accompany 'la religion vulgaire,' thereby transforming conventional confessional allegiance into a cult worthy of being practised by a rational person ('par un esprit raisonnable').**33

Boulainvilliers embraces Spinoza's doctrine of one substance and denies that God is separate from the universe, or has will or intelligence. He also accepts that all things are determined and that there is no freedom of the will, **human motivation being based on the two primary passions, 'le joye et la tristesse,' of which all other passions are but 'modifications.'**34 But the idea of a God who judges human actions, rewarding the good and punishing the evil, which Voltaire and many moderate deists of subsequent decades deemed indispensable to humanity, though radically revised, is not altogether discarded by Boulainvilliers. **There is little sense, he urges, in continuing to teach that God directly intervenes in individual lives, dispensing temporary reward and punishment here, and eternal bliss or retribution in the hereafter. But it is still possible, indeed vital, to affirm that those that live virtuously will find happiness in this life and those who live dissolute lives, and are uncharitable to others, will be wretched.**35

A masterpiece of the Early Enlightenment, **Boulainvilliers' *Essay de métaphysique* circulated only in manuscript during the remainder of his life. It was soon destined to become a principal vehicle of Spinozism in France and all Europe,** however, as it constituted around half – and much the most impressive part – of the collection clandestinely published by Lenglet Dufresnoy in Amsterdam, under the title *Réfutation des erreurs de Benoît de Spinosa*, with 'Bruxelles' falsely declared as the place of publication on the title-page, in 1731.36

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C%C3%A9sar_Chesneau_Dumarsais

Born in Marseille, **Dumarsais trained in Paris as a lawyer, before abandoning the bar to pursue the life of the mind,** subsisting on occasional law students and later on the meager revenue from a *pension* in the city's Faubourg-Saint Victor.

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentint0000unse_i6k5/page/126/mode/2up?view=theater

Perhaps the most vigorous, certainly a most characteristic justification of their philosophical vocation, was the anonymous essay, *Le philosophe*, first published in 1743. It had a remarkable career. Voltaire, who later published two versions of it, claimed that it had circulated in manuscript since 1730, and Diderot, to whom the essay has often been attributed, abridged it for the *Encyclopédie*. *Le philosophe* thus bears the Enlightenment's official stamp of approval.

It begins with the warning that the title of philosopher has become too cheap. Some men claim it as a reward for shunning polite society, others for displaying their hatred of religion. The true philosopher has an orderly view of the world, a "spirit of observation and exactitude." As a true empiricist, he respects the limits of knowledge but is determined to know what can be known. Precisely because he recognizes no deity other than human society, he is far better equipped than the orthodox believer to serve his fellow men. He is neither frantic about sociability nor churlish about solitude, but "knows how to divide himself between retreat and commerce with men." **The philosopher (and here is the appeal to antiquity) is a true humanist: he is "the Chremes of Terence" who can apply to himself the famous line *homo sum, humani a me nihil alienum puto* – "I am a man, I think nothing human alien to me."**1

This mode of argument and this quotation from Terence had been worn smooth long before; they were no longer new when Seneca used them in his ninety-fifth Epistle. **But their very triteness confirms the continuity of between classical and eighteenth-century modes of thought.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/256/mode/2up?view=theater

According to Du Marsais, the psychology of life without religion in the conventional sense leads the ideal man, *le philosophe*, to embrace probity and uprightness and the reputation of being upright: 'c'est là son unique religion.'78 'La société civile,' and its requirements and well-being, argues Du Marsais, become for him the only divinity on earth which he recognizes, and this divinity he cultivates and honours by giving an exact and conscientious attention to his social responsibilities and through his resolve to be a useful member of society.
…

By contrast the man of 'faith' in the usual sense, or the 'superstitieux,' as Du Marsais prefers to call such a person, even when raised to positions of the highest responsibility in society, still himself in some sense a stranger here on earth, a temporary visitor whose chief responsibility is to transcendent beings, values, and aims rather than the worldly well-being of men, a theme later much expanded on by Diderot.79
…

Reaffirming Spinoza's principle **that the more one lives according to reason directed towards one's own self-interest, the more one is fitted for life in society,** Du Marsais holds that the dishonest man is as opposite to the true image of the *philosophe*, conceived as the ideal man of reason, as a simpleton with scant understanding. **Managing his passions, the *philosophe* may be somewhat inclined to towards sensual satisfaction and pleasure but never towards crime or antisocial activity.**81

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/468/mode/2up?view=theater

There is indeed a wide gap between Stoicism and radical thought as regards the passions, and how reason curbs emotion which was made a point of also by Du Marsais, in his *Le Philosophe* of around 1720, where he wanted the ideal man still to be a man; the Stoic ideal, he says, is impossible, just a phantom. **Where the Stoics seek to eliminate the passions, which is impossible and senseless, Du Marsais wants to put the passions to use and employ them constructively.**250

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheistst0000moln/page/80/mode/2up?view=theater

What should we think, indeed, of Helvetius who mixed in one ideological formulation Montesquieu, the Stoics, and, in anticipation, the utilitarians? Like a latterday Pico della Mirandola, he saw in man virtue only, the vices derived from institutional contradictions and confusion created by laws. 'Morality is frivolous if not regarded as one with politics and legislation?' (*de l'Esprit*, 1758). Man, on the other hand, is devoid of vice, hence a majority of them is 'always armed with a power sufficient to suppress vice and place men under the necessity of being virtuous' (*Idem*). The Stoic moral element is unmistakable, based on natural justice, not directed at the soul's immortality and not dependent on divine sanction. **One can measure the degeneracy of this ethical system from Epictetus to Helvetius in whose view man is automatically virtuous, the consensus can be legislated, and – what irony! – passion, or will to power is authorized to enforce the rule of virtue, that is of (Stoic) reason.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/732/mode/2up?view=theater

Whilst the clandestine manuscripts exerted their greatest impact during the 1720s and 1730s, two rival materialist solutions competed. One of the hand, **an older conception of the soul as something consisting of invisible, superfine particles of matter, animating animals as well as men, and emanating, like fire or light, from heavier substances, associated with Epicureanism, Lucretius, and Gassendi, retained some support;**2 **against this pushed a more specifically 'Spinozist' tendency, conflating body and mind into one, deploying hylozoism and one-substance doctrine to eliminate the notion of soul as something distinct from bodies.**3 An anonymous manuscript probably of the 1730s, entitled *L'Âme matérielle* or *L'Âme mortelle*, collating extracts from Bayle, Malebranche, and others,4 used an eclectic method to bracket animals and human intelligence together, as one, but also classifies mind as something quite separate from body. **Expressly rejecting Spinoza's rival thesis, it opts for an Epicurean approach, claiming the mortal soul must be a super-fine substance composed of corpuscles distinct from the body and varying from individual to individual, as well as species to species,** a hypothesis supposedly accounting for why temperaments vary, some men feeling anger or sexual desire more strongly than others.5 Generally, though, one-substance doctrine came to seem the most plausible solution and body and soul

were increasingly merged into a single entity,6 or as the *Dissertation sur la formation du monde* (1738) calls it 'la substance matérielle,' 'la substance infinie,' or 'la substance universelle,' the only thing which is eternal.7
…

But besides Epicurean strands and this predominant monism, **we find also, in some texts, a curious tendency to combine the divergent Epicurean and Spinozist conceptions by reworking Spinoza's doctrine of the mind, with Bayle's help, in a particular way, to yield a pseudo-*Spinosiste* materialist vitalist doctrine,** as exemplified, for instance, in de Maillet's *Sentimens des philosophes sur la nature de l'âme*, dating from the 1720s, and clandestinely published, in 1743, in Du Marsais's collection *Nouvelles Libertés de penser*.19

Benoît de Maillet (1656-1738), having reviewed the opinions of other philosophers, expounds in his third chapter as the 'Sentimen de Spinoza' what was in fact plainly his own personal view – **a vitalist, semi-Averroist *Spinosisme*, inspired in part by Bayle's discussion of Averroism,** envisaging human souls as emanations from an 'âme universelle du monde,' pervading all matter including the air, and animating all living things. **This universal soul, which Maillet expressly equates with Spinoza's *natura naturans*,**20 **is claimed to be definitely material but composed of 'une matière déliée,' matter highly dynamic, like fire,** which unites itself to things apt to be animated by it as flames seize hold of combustible things.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=E2G6wM-yRmEC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA453#v=onepage&q&f=false

One did not have to be a devout Christian to believe in the future destruction of the world. A Stoic secularist of the Enlightenment who took his Seneca seriously could learn from the *Natural Questions* that universal deluges and conflagrations were in the nature of things, that the good principle became exhausted with time and a cosmic renewal was periodically necessary. The subsoil was soaked with subterranean streams ready to burst the crust of the earth whenever the tenuous balance of the elements was upset. Eruptions of the waters might alternate with great fires and mankind was left in doubt as to the particular manner of the cosmic catastrophe.

> https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.231118/page/n337/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Seneca, though always eloquent, adds little to Aristotle and Aratus, and borrows abundantly from Poseidonius. He believes in divination despite Cicero, lapses into ludicrous teleology despite Lucretius, and interrupts his science at every turn to inculcate morality; he passes skillfully from mussels to luxury, and from comets to degeneration. **The Fathers of the Church liked this mixture of meteorology and morals, and made the *Quaestiones Naturales* the most popular textbook of science in the Middle Ages.**
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D91
>
> > But for the rest, – lest we delay thee here
> > Longer by empty promises – **behold,**
> > **Before all else, the seas, the lands, the sky:**
> > **O Memmius, their threefold nature, lo,**
> > **Their bodies three, three aspects so unlike,**
> > **Three frames so vast, a single day shall give**
> > **Unto annihilation!** Then shall crash
> > That massive form and fabric of the world
> > Sustained so many aeons! Nor do I
> > Fail to perceive how strange and marvellous
> > This fact must strike the intellect of man, –
> > Annihilation of the sky and earth
> > That is to be, – and with what toil of words
> > 'Tis mine to prove the same;
>
> http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D5%3Acard%3D324
>
> > Yet if, percase, thou deemest that ere this
> > Existed all things even the same, but that
> > Perished the cycles of the human race
> > In fiery exhalations, or cities fell
> > By some tremendous quaking of the world,
> > Or rivers in fury, after constant rains,
> > Had plunged forth across the lands of earth
> > And whelmed the towns – **then, all the more must thou**
> > **Confess, defeated by the argument,**

That there shall be annihilation too
Of lands and sky.

…

Religious geologists like Burnet and Whiston had still adhered to the conception of one great flood in harmony with the text of Genesis; atheists who accepted the theories of the eccentric young engineer Nicolas Boulanger, a member of Baron d'Holbach's circle, were not content with the single geological revolution of the planet and hypothesized a long series of upheavals each one of which wiped out virtually every vestige of previous civilized existence. What survived the catastrophes were a few physical remnants of the many floods, seashells swept to the mountaintops by colossal waves, and the mythical traditions of all peoples, which in distorted form and with a religious envelopment preserved the memory of the terrible events mankind had once suffered.3

…

The relationship between Boulanger's theory and that of his ancient Stoic predecessor Seneca was generally recognized, and those who took a Christian view of the end of the world were at pains to refute them both.

…

In Boulanger's bizarre theory, the two notions were joined in a way that was at first totally incomprehensible to a later age, which made of the dogma of unlimited progress the very raison d'être of moral action. **For Boulanger, while the civilized world was destined to be destroyed periodically and there was nothing to circumvent it, it was the duty of the philosopher here and now to rid mankind of the false myths of divinity and a punishing God, myths generated by the last deluge and conflagration, and to proceed with the work at hand, the attainment of such happiness as mankind might yet enjoy before the wheel again began its descent.**

https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/842/mode/2up?view=theater

Furthermore, as [the publishing project] grew, Diderot at least always planned it to be also an antidote to English cultural and intellectual hegemony, thinking of it in part, as he assured the judicial authorities from his cell at Vincennes in August 1749, as something undertaken 'à la gloire de la France et à la honte de l'Angleterre.'8 Its anti-Baconianism and anti-Newtonianism were indeed to be among its prime features.

The pending struggle which opponents were to dub *la guerre de l'Encyclopédie* was arguably the most decisive of all Enlightenment controversies. Recruiting more and more contributors – their ranks eventually swelled to around 160 – the editors assembled a remarkable team, though only a probably quite small minority, including Du Marsais who was responsible for the articles on grammar and d'Holbach who had settled in Paris, after completing his studies at Leiden in 1749, and quickly became a close ally of Diderot's, held atheistic and radical opinions broadly in line with those of the chief editors. However, there was also a sizeable middle group, at this stage including Rousseau, Claude Yvon, and the Abbé de Prades, who in ways subtle and not so subtle were being dragged along by Diderot. The years 1746-9 being the most intense phase of the friendship between Diderot and Rousseau, it was only natural the latter should be reckoned one of the team and directly involved, being entrusted, early on, with the articles on music.9

…

No doubt something of the gradually mounting tension between Rousseau's intense Deism and Diderot's atheistic materialism, as well as between d'Alembert's and Diderot's differing conceptions of encyclopedism, was already discernible well before 1750, when Rousseau first made his name by winning the Academy of Dijon annual prize competition for his essay arguing that the progress of the sciences and arts had contributed to the corruption, rather than the advance, of morality. **But in the late 1740s and during the first phase of the war of the *Encyclopédie*, down to 1752, Rousseau, shy, less articulate, and less developed intellectually than his slightly younger comrade, bottled up his steadily growing worries and doubts and let himself be swept along, in Diderot's wake, *en route*, that is, to materialism, philosophical atheism, and Spinozism.** Undoubtedly, this long-bottled-up reluctance helped prepare the ground for the subsequent violent quarrel between the two men, and the sharpness of the later ideological break between Rousseau and the *encyclopédistes*, a group to which, until the early 1750s, he certainly belonged. This was also the reason Rousseau was later accused of blatant hypocrisy, and abjuring his own earlier views, in denouncing the *encyclopédistes*' philosophy as 'atheistic' **and their books as even more insidious and dangerous than the 'rêveries' 'des Hobbes et des Spinoza.'**11

…

If much of the paranoid logic of Jansenist *anti-philosophie* with its talk of *Spinosiste* conspiracies was wildly exaggerated and distorted, Diderot's prime contribution, the *Encyclopédie*, undeniably, despite mounds of camouflage, did fit their accusations; it was, in

essence, a ‘Spinosiste’ conspiracy or what an anti-philosophie journal in Paris in 1802 called an assemblage of ‘scepticism, materialism, and atheism.’12 **It was what *L’Esprit des lois* was at this very time accused of being but was not.** During the ‘Querelle de *L’Esprit des lois*,’ Spinoza again became the main focus of the debate about naturalism in France. Partly, this was because the charge of ‘Spinozism’ was the most potent that could be levelled against Montesquieu but it was also because his multiple assailants preferred not to draw attention to the little-read materialist works of Diderot and La Mettrie and because they assumed that by toppling **the ‘maître’ of the *esprit forts*, as Laurent François dubbed Spinoza in 1751,** his French underlings, Diderot above all, would more or less automatically founder in his wake.
…

The editor of the Jesuit *Mémoires de Trévoux*, Father Berthier, abandoning the friendly attitude he had earlier displayed towards Voltaire and Condillac, and deeply shocked by (but having completely ignored) the *Lettre sur les aveugles*, reviewed the *Prospectus* in January 1751, reacting to Diderot’s statement of his plans with a menacing mix of sarcasm, criticism, and unease.18 Granting the literary *monde* deemed the brochure impeccably written, Berthier noted in a decidedly ironic tone Diderot’s claim that no one had ever before conceived or executed so vast and innovative a publishing project. (Given Johann Heinrich Zedler’s prior and larger, if admittedly less philosophical, *Universallexicon* (Leipzig, 1731-54) in sixty-four volumes, Diderot’s boast as to priority and scale was not in fact justified.)
…

It was impossible not to recognize the signs of radical infiltration in the article on the soul, ‘Âme,’ for instance, where the treatment of the soul’s immortality struck Berthier in the *Mémoires de Trévoux* as suspicious throughout, no less in the part by the Abbé Claude Yvon than in the latter section, by Diderot, stressing the close interaction of body and soul in inducing moods while rejecting the idea that the soul has a ‘seat’ in the body.26

Yvon’s section rather oddly drew much of its argumentation from Jaquelot’s now obsolete *Dissertations* (1697), a laborious Protestant Cartesian text chiefly concerned with trying to counter Spinoza’s demolition of that very doctrine; still odder was the suspiciously large amount of space assigned here to ‘le trop fameux Spinosa’ himself and his premiss that there is only one substance in the universe as well as his denial of the soul’s immortality. Any reader was bound to wonder why he was reading whole passages about Spinoza in an article supposedly about immortality on the soul. **Yvon, moreover, had incautiously followed Bayle in tying Aristotelian Averroism to Spinozism, attributing to Spinoza the idea of a ‘universal soul permeating all matter,’**27 ending with the curious remark that Spinoza’s ‘absurde systéme’ had also been embraced by Hobbes.28
…

Nowhere in the initial volume of the *Encyclopédie*, though, was it clearer that what was being laid before the French public was a veiled but systematic attack on physico-theology, and hence the entire Christian Enlightenment, than in the article ‘Animal.’ This article, composed by Diderot himself, together with Buffon’s assistant Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton, using extracts from Buffon, focused, as we have seen, mainly on he experiments and debates conducted in 1740-2 by Réaumur and his disciples Trembley and Bonnet.36 But one quickly sees that the design here is the utter overthrow of Réaumur’s long-standing hegemony over the life sciences in western Europe as well as underhandedly to propagate materialism. Réaumur, in the *Encyclopédie*’s account of the animal realm, is firmly unseated chiefly by being ignored, and replaced by a Buffon who had only recently become famous, almost overnight, **albeit a Buffon subtly doctored by Diderot to erase the residual dualism of his ‘molécules vivantes’ and inanimate matter.**37 Not only does Diderot here largely remove the distinction between the animal and vegetable realms ‘par des nuances insensibles de l’animal au végétal’ but, despite ambivalently acknowledging that there may be a clear difference between plant and mineral life, effectively erodes that too with his prediction that further research would probably identify ‘des êtres intermédiaires’ (intermediary beings), organized bodies without the power to reproduce like animals and plants but capable of movement and with some semblance of life.38 **The whole thrust of the article was to render redundant the traditionally and conventionally firm divisions between animal, vegetable, and inanimate matter.**
…

It rapidly emerged, meanwhile, that the second volume of the *Encyclopédie* again included numerous suspect passages, some rumoured to have been illegally interpolated afterwards into articles cleared by the censors. **The entry on the Canadian Indians, for example, cites Lahontan,** who was roundly classified by theological authors like Loescher as a ‘Spinozist,’52 **as the chief authority on the topic, as someone who had lived among them for ten years,** though it admits his Indians are so scornful of Christianity that one wonders whether he may perhaps have doctored their comments.53
…

The crescendo of complaints led a week later to the interim decision of the royal *Conseil d’état*, of 7 February 1752, to ban the first two volumes of the *Encyclopédie*, forbidding their further sale or

distribution in the kingdom under pain of heavy fines and the halting of the project overall. Diderot's papers were seized by the royal police and there was talk of his being sent back to prison, this time with d'Alembert along with him.56 **The *Encyclopédie*, significantly, was suppressed by order of the crown not just as inimical to religion, and apt to promote incredulity and corruption of morals, but in part also for the strikingly naturalistic and republican-sounding account of political power in the article 'Autorité politique,'** an anonymous entry by Diderot, and his first important contribution to political thought, shrewdly highlighted and attacked by Berthier and the Jesuit press in order to damage him further.57 This article, **long to be recalled by *anti-philosophes* as the first open betrayal of monarchy by the *philosophes*,** explicitly states that the *bonheur des peuples* is the chief function of government, **that absolute power cannot be 'légitime,'** and that there exists an underlying contract between crown and people carrying reciprocal responsibilities; it also daringly extols Henri IV, religious toleration, and the Edict of Nantes.58
…

Even though the *anti-encyclopédistes* continually insisted that the real issue was materialism and the attack on miracles, **in the circumstances Diderot's tactically adroit reply – Locke, Locke, Locke – completely undermined their position. There *can* be no Catholic objection to Locke, he retorted,** except perhaps to complain that under certain circumstances Locke's system could be perverted into materialism by the ill intentioned. But if that is the case, contended Diderot and Yvon, **why do not de Prades's adversaries still more stridently decry the Sorbonne's former, and now apparently reviving, defence of Descartes's innate ideas?** Now that they seem to be questioning their own prior endorsement of Locke, de Prades's critics seemed to be ridiculously resorting to the wholly discredited 'innate ideas' of Descartes and Malebranche.79 Surely they must be denounced? **For there is no one who does not know that it was by taking Descartes's principles too far that 'Spinosa a bâti son système.'** Yet 'I do not believe,' adds the *Apologie*, with consummate irony, that any antagonist of de Prades regards himself or wishes to be regarded 'comme un Spinosiste.'80

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/704/mode/2up?view=theater

The two authors who most effectively summed up the radical thought of the early Enlightenment era in the middle of the eighteenth century were both Frenchmen – La Mettrie and the famous chief editor of the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot. In their published writings a tradition of thought stretching back a century to the 1650s was powerfully restated and rendered into one of the central planks of the European Enlightenment as a whole.
…

Two intriguing articles, one very long, the other extremely short, **which by their contrast vividly exemplify the tension between mainstream and undercurrent in the *Encyclopédie*,** are two adjoining pieces in the fifteenth volume, entitled respectively 'Spinosa' and 'Spinosistes.' There was never any question that the main article dealing with Spinoza in the *Encyclopédie* would need to be, or at least appear to be, unremittingly negative, and it is.
…

Ostensibly Spinoza's philosophy is condemned as 'ce système monstrueux' and its doctrines dismissed as grotesque. Yet precisely the Spinozist teachings seemingly derided in the main article were, at this very time, being explored with great seriousness, and increasingly embraced, by Diderot himself. For example, it is proclaimed 'la dernière des absurdités de croire et de dire que l'oeil n'a pas été fait pour voir, ni l'oreille pour entendre,'55 and no less absurd to think the first men emerged from the earth, **yet these were the very contentions La Mettrie and Diderot had been recently advancing.** The discrepancy between surface and reality becomes all the more striking in the light of the very short next article 'Spinosiste' which, unlike the long article, is known to have been written by Diderot personally.56 **Here the main point is that we should not confuse 'les Spinosistes anciens' with 'les Spinosistes modernes.' The 'principe général' of the latter 'c'est que la matière est sensible' and that animate bodies can evolve from inert bodies. From this, we are told, the modern Spinozists conclude 'qu'il n'y a que de la matière, et qu'elle suffit pour tout expliquer.'**57 **For the rest, 'ils suivent l'ancien Spinosisme dans toutes ses conséquences'** – in other words, **modern and traditional Spinozists are the same except that the former are more emphatically materialist and committed to the principle of evolution.**58

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA243#v=onepage&q&f=false

The Epicurean Stoicism of the French Enlightenment

Roman Stoic texts, and especially the works of Seneca, were a central influence on French Enlightenment thought. Parallels between the social and political conditions in the first and eighteenth centuries gave his works a renewed relevance. For example in his *De beneficiis* Seneca set forth the three graces that bind a hierarchical world: gracious giving, grateful receiving, and graceful

requiting that make the world go round – a traditional gift economy anticipating a market exchange of goods and services.
…

Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great were the foremost patrons of the French Enlightenment, **but Catherine would not permit Voltaire's and Diderot's writings to be published in Russia; and Frederick would not allow Rousseau to write on politics or religion while in Prussian territory, although Frederick, and his Field Marshall, James Keith, were Rousseau's most reliable patrons.** Keith's friend, David Hume, another recipient of aristocratic patronage, persuaded Rousseau to come to England, telling him that the better price authors received from booksellers would facilitate economic independence. Hume, and other Britons, held the enlightened illusion that booksellers were the modern patrons of literature. All major writers of the eighteenth century were recipients of aristocratic or royal patronage and most prided themselves on their independence of mind. The republic of letters was not a self-sustaining marketplace of ideas. **Jean d'Alembert decried patronage in *Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands* although he was in receipt in five pensions.** Seneca's views on patronage and Stoic virtue helped eighteenth-century thinkers negotiate the challenge of combining political servility with intellectual autonomy, the real servility of Epictetus with the imagined sovereignty of Marcus Aurelius. The age of Enlightenment was the age of Frederick, as Kant firmly declared in response to his question "What is Enlightenment?"

Besides the monarchical Stoicism of Seneca, the republican figures of Cato and Brutus were widely deployed in eighteenth-century literature on both sides of the English Channel. The two Catos (Marcus Portius and Marcus Portius Utencensis) and two Brutuses (Lucius Junius and Marcus Junius) were often merged in eighteenth-century literature as exemplars of republican virtue. In this age of imperial rivalries, **French thinkers invariably presented England as Carthage,** which, as Cato the Elder indicated, should be destroyed (Andrew 2011). **The severity of republican Stoicism was embodied in the French Revolution by Maximilien Robespierre who tarnished for subsequent generations the Stoic ideals of virtue and duty.** However, before the Revolution, the Senecan ideals of generosity, clemency and tranquil happiness corresponded to the ideals of the Roman Empire more than the Roman Republic; as Miriam Griffin (1984: 95) pointed out, the Senecan virtues of generosity and clemency "presuppose the inferior position of those they benefit." Senecan virtues were not those of the austerity and severity associated with the names of Cato and Brutus; they were also quite distant from the Machiavellian republicanism of miserly economy, cruel justice, and restless acquisitiveness (Brooke 2012: 22-5).
…

Montesquieu declared that Stoicism "exaggerated only those things in which there is greatness: scorn for pleasures and pains." Montesquieu suggests here that a more Epicurean form of Stoicism would suit the age of "doux commerce" better than the allegedly pre-commercial or martial Romans. Diogenes Laertius's' *Life of Zeno*, a basic source of eighteenth-century opinions about Stoicism, indicated that Zeno "was very economical, and descended even to the meanness of the barbarians, under the pretence of economy." The civilized *lumière* would never descend to barbarism. In the entry "Philosophie" in Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, **we read that the *philosophe* rejects "Stoic insensibility" and needs, beyond strict necessity, "a respectable (*honnête*) superfluity necessary to an honorable (*honnête*) man." A modified form of Stoicism, which we shall call "epicurean,"**1 **was the only form of Stoicism suitable to the age.**
…

Seneca was widely esteemed as the philosophic equal to Plato and Aristotle in the eighteenth century, a reputation he did not enjoy in any century before or since (Ross 1974: 116-65). **Indeed, from Bernard Fontenelle's *Une digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes* (1688) to Anne-Louise-Germaine de Staël's *De la Littérature* (1799) Roman philosophy was judged superior to Greek philosophy.**
…

Diderot called the author of *Anti-Sénèque* "dissolute, shameless, buffoon, flatterer," someone who "was made for the life of the courts and the favor of the great. He died, as he had to die, a victim of his own intemperance and madness" (Diderot 1969-73: XII [*EVSP*] 641; XIII [*ERCN*] 463). La Mettrie did in fact die after eating a large helping of *pâte de faison aux truffes*, which may have been tainted, but which to Diderot was a just dessert for anti-Stoical intemperance. **Diderot followed Diogenes Laertius's *Life of Zeno* in which Zeno is strongly opposed to Epicurean gluttony.** Diderot got the story of La Mettrie's end from Voltaire, a rival with La Mettrie for the favors of Émilie du Châtelet and Frederick the Great.
…

Indeed La Mettrie (1996: 135; cf. 2004) wrote in *Anti-Sénèque*: "To appreciate worth in worthy, and to reward it is divine. Kings; imitate the hero of the North and be heroes of humanity, as you are its leaders. When you lower yourselves to become patrons, you raise yourselves." This charge of toadyism

might have more weight if it did not come from Diderot, a flatterer of Catherine the Great whom he held to be a great despot, through Voltaire, who flattered both Frederick and Catherine, while judging both to be despotic.
…

Diderot (1969-73: XIII [*ERCN*] 360) cited Rousseau's letter to Malesherbes, and claimed that Rousseau had told him many times that he hated benefactors because benefactions engender unbearable duties of reciprocation, **to support his view that Rousseau was "a prodigy of ingratitude," truly "satanic" in his proud ingratitude, the chief vice from the perspective of Seneca's *De beneficiis*, which Diderot thought to be "sublime," "divine" and "celestial," surpassing all of Seneca's other writings in its fecundity** (Diderot 1969-73: XII [*EVSP*] 690, 696; XIII [*ERCN*] 474, 545). Viewed from the perspective that Diderot judged Rousseau, La Mettrie was properly grateful to Frederick, who had given him protection after he had been hounded from France for his materialist philosophy, after repairing the body parts of the French wounded at the Battle of Fontenoy. **Diderot was inconsistent in taxing his fellow plebeian Rousseau for ingratitude and La Mettrie for being a court jester.**
…

La Mettrie's view that good and evil have no relationship to happiness was fundamentally what aroused the ire of both D'Holbach and Diderot. D'Holbach insisted that La Mettrie "reasoned on morals as a real madman [*vrai frénétique*]." Nature, D'Holbach thought, demonstrates "that vice is an evil and that virtue is a real good." D'Holbach did not blame the Epicurean philosophy of La Mettrie **and cited Seneca's *De vita beata*:** "Ita non ab Epicuro impulsi luxuriantur, sed, vitiis dediti, luxuriam suam in philosophiae sinu abscondunt" – "It was not Epicurus who drove them to debauchery, but, having given themselves over to vice, they hide their debauchery within his philosophy" (Holbach 1966: II 343-4).
…

Diderot shared D'Holbach's view that La Mettrie was an apologist for vice and a detractor of virtue (Diderot 1969-73: XII [*EVSP*] 641; XIII [*ERCN*] 463-4). **Although La Mettrie praised Seneca for being eclectic, Diderot thought La Mettrie had distinguished Stoicism and Epicureanism too sharply and presented too severe a portrait of Seneca and his teaching.** Diderot did seem to side with La Mettrie when he wrote: "There is in Stoicism a monkish spirit that displeases me" but went on to say that **"it is however a philosophy to bring to court, near the Great, in the exercise of their public functions, or it is a lost voice that cries in the desert"** (Diderot 1969-73: XIII [*ERCN*] 466).
…

Rousseau's savage, in his prize-winning *Discours sur les arts et les sciences* (1750), enjoyed "the perfect quietude of the Stoic." This work, which Diderot claimed was his idea – namely, that Rousseau should oppose the progress of the arts and sciences because all the other competitors for the prize would praise their progress – and which Rousseau came to after a revelation on his way to console his very unstoical friend incarcerated in Vincennes, launched his career as a *lumière* critical of enlightenment. **Diderot preferred Rousseau's next work, *Discours sur l'inegalité* (1755), because it was more Epicurean** (Brooke 2012: 189). Rousseau frequently cited Seneca favorably but was inclined to the more republican Stoicism of the two Catos, Brutus and Cicero. Besides the political difference of republican and monarchical Stoicism, Rousseau differed philosophically from D'Holbach, Diderot and La Mettrie with respect to determinism and free will, and with the *lumières* of the role of conscience and reason in moral and political conduct. **Rousseau** (1964: 64) **declared his moral populism in his *Discours sur les arts et les sciences*: conscience is "the sublime science of simple souls."**
…

Rousseau's moral freedom (*Du contrat social* 1.8) consists in obeying those moral rules we make for ourselves; autonomous citizens are bound by neither divine nor natural law but only by those rules that come from all and apply to all – no monarchic or aristocratic legislation, no privileges or examptions from the rule of law. Kant, whom others have called a Stoic for his morality of strict duty regardless of interests or inclinations, called Rousseau the Newton of the moral realm, the first to demonstrate the moral laws of human freedom.
…

Despite the apparent Stoicism of Rousseau's and Kant's doctrine of moral autonomy, that is, the subordination of instinct, sensuous appetite and natural inclination to duty, justice and law, **this doctrine marks more of a break with classical Stoicism than the determinist naturalism or Epicurean Stoicism of D'Holbach and Diderot. The Greek Stoics had no word for the Latin *voluntas*, the French *volunté*, the German *Wille*, or the English *will*. To be sure, Epictetus's *Discourses* followed Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* in emphasizing the role of "choice" or "deliberated desire" (*prohairesis*) in human conduct.** But will in the sense of a faculty distinct from reason and desire was not present in the early Stoics, and only became fundamental in Christianity. Our moral choices take on more weight with doctrines of personal immortality; choosing to sin consigns one to hell, while choosing the narrow path of righteousness leads to heaven. With its emphasis on the afterlife, and of the urgency to choose between heaven and hell, Christianity needed the notion of "free

will" in a way that Stoicism did not. In *De civitate Dei* (14.6), **Saint Augustine wrote: "Man's will, then, is all-important. If it is badly directed, the emotions will be perverse; if it is rightly directed, the emotions will be not merely blameless but even praiseworthy."** In this criticism of Stoic doctrines of *apatheia* or mastery of desire, fear, joy and grief, Saint Augustine's centrality of will marks a departure from earlier Stoic doctrine (Brooke 2012: 4-5), even if the unpredictable interventions of God's grace render "free will" problematic all over again.

Although Rousseau's *Confessions* may be the antithesis of Saint Augustine's *Confessions* since the former repudiates original sin or asserts the original goodness of men and the latter endorses it or asserts the innate depravity of men, there may be an Augustinian dimension in Rousseau's emphasis on a moral will not subservient to passion or self-interest. **That is, perhaps Rousseau was less pagan than Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, La Mettrie, Helvétius and D'Holbach or more of a Protestant than his fellow *lumières*.** While I cannot support my belief that Rousseau was a Christian here, **I might fall back on a sociological sense of Protestant in the spirit of George Santayana's remark to Bertrand Russell that they might both be atheists but he was a Catholic atheist and Russell was a Protestant atheist.** The categories of Rousseau's and Kant's moral philosophy (free will, moral autonomy, conscience) are Protestant, while the categories of Diderot's and D'Holbach's thought (reason, heteronomy, natural law) are Catholic atheism or paganism. **Stoicism is stretched quite thin to comprehend both Rousseau's autonomous will and Diderot's deterministic naturalism but nevertheless it did serve both thinkers' versions of modern natural right.**
…

Anticipating Rousseau's *Confessions*, the normally placid Hume attempted to get his own side of his unhappy relationship with Rousseau, in *Exposé succinct de la contestation qu'est entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau*, published in 1766 with the assistance of Voltaire and D'Alembert, despite the good advice of Adam Smith who thought relationship rarely break down when only one party is at fault and who told Hume that it would bring no credit to himself if he published his *Exposé*. After chronicling Rousseau's emotional sensitivity and inbalance, **Hume denounced Rousseau's ingratitude to himself and his other patrons, and concluded with a quotation from Seneca's *De beneficiis* (7.29) to the effect that ungrateful recipients of patronage do not impair the virtue of donors.**

Diderot's *Essai sur le vie de Sénèque le philosophe* and his *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron* were an apology for his own life, and a counter to Rousseau's *Confessions*, as well as an apology for the life and work of Seneca. Diderot insisted that his *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron* did not intend to lampoon Rousseau despite the many critical comments on Rousseau in his life of Seneca but "it is my apology" (Diderot 1969-73: XIII 361). **Diderot had translated Plato's Socratic *Apology* when he was incarcerated in Vincennes but he was hardly as Stoical as the pre-Stoical Socrates.** Diderot "recanted his work, gave away the name of the publisher, his bookseller, and that of his mistress and partner in crime, the writer Mme de Puisieux." Later when he came to write his *Essai sur les régnes de Claude et de Néron*, the role of Socrates, Elena Russo has observed, was taken up by Rousseau in public opinion, and hence **"Diderot's Seneca was thus a *pis-aller*; a makeshift role model appropriate to a tainted philosopher who had several times bowed to necessity, played the game, and recanted his ideas"** (Russo 2009: 9-10). Seneca had abjectly begged to be returned to Rome after being exiled to Corsica by Claudius, and the parallels between Diderot's and Seneca's life hardly stop there. **Seneca was a *novus homo* who made his fortune in the capital, as Diderot was a provincial bourgeois who moved to Paris to make his fortune.** Diderot defended Seneca (and himself) for taking benefactions from Nero and becoming extremely wealthy, while praising virtuous poverty (Griffin 1976: 286), by denouncing Diderot's contemporaries in the republic of letters who criticized Seneca but not those of senatorial rank for becoming rich in Nero's era. "Where does this partiality arise from? I know it: it is because they are only the Great, and that Seneca was a sage" (Diderot 1969-73: XIII [*ERCN*] 407). Diderot was a plebeian from the provinces, a sage who tutored and had taken patronage from a tyrant, and who did not think wealth was the exclusive property of birth and social standing.

Although he thought Seneca's *De beneficiis* was the profoundest of his works, Diderot did criticize Seneca for saying that graceful giving and receiving could be compared to a courtesan's art of providing spicy favors, varying them according to the wishes of her patrons (Diderot 1969-73: XII [*EVSP*] 691), and also Seneca's view that one could not refuse a gift from a tyrant. Diderot grandly asserted that the philosopher prefers death to compliance with tyranny (Diderot 1969-73: XII [*EVSP*] 672; XIII [*ERCN*] 345, 455). However, not only did he recant to Bourbon despotism but also he whitewashed Catherine the Great's accession to power, after the death of her husband Peter, and the heir to the Russian throne, Ivan. **Together with Voltaire, Diderot suppressed the French ambassador, Claude Carloman de Rulhière's account of Catherine's *coup d'ètat*** (Lentin 1974: 14; Russo 2009: 10). Just as Seneca's patron, Agrippina, murdered her husband, Claudius, and employed the philosopher as spin doctor and as tutor to her son Nero, Catherine employed Voltaire and Diderot as public relations officers and offered Diderot's friend, Jean d'Alembert, vast sums to tutor Catherine's son. D'Alembert turned down the position, saying that he was prone to hemorrhoids and that he had heard that this malady was fatal in Russia – Catherine had claimed that her husband had died from this ignominious affliction. Diderot was

less well off than Voltaire and D'Alembert and thus was induced to attend Catherine's court. Frederick the Great wrote to Voltaire on 24 May 1770 that Diderot was guilty of more than the trifling crime of covering up Catherine's usurpation; **namely, he (and not only he) was paid to justify Russian imperialism in the Balkans and Poland.**
…

It is cowardly to silence the truth (455); indeed, "what is the point of philosophy if it remains silent? Either speak up, or renounce the title of educator of the human race. It is your destiny to be persecuted; people will see you drink hemlock" (513-4) as Socrates did but Diderot did not. **Catherine did not allow her subjects to read anything written by her protégés, Diderot and Voltaire.** Diderot recommended "a useful and great idea" of D'Alembert's, that men of letters should leave a will where they can write freely what conscience dictates unrestrained by the fear and circumspection essential in despotic regimes; writers would then be able "to ask pardon of their century for only having a posthumous sincerity" (464).
…

The French Enlightenment espoused Stoicism for providing a naturalistic basis of morality to supersede Christian belief in the supernatural identity of human beings, the destiny of the immortal soul, and divine rewards and punishments in the hereafter. Most of the *philosophes* advocated a less austere form of Stoicism than that presented in Diogenes's life of Zeno. The mainstream of the *lumières* (Diderot, D'Holbach and Helvétius) espoused laws of nature that guided moral conduct, **and thus found La Mettrie's amoral hedonism repugnant, despite the fact they shared his determinist naturalism and his view that the pursuit of pleasure animates all human endeavor. They differed from La Mettrie in thinking that, besides the fear of the public executioner, social approbation and censure could prevent antisocial activities; the desire for glory or simply social esteem will induce persons to serve the public good.**

Nor did Diderot, Helvétius and D'Holbach think Rousseau's conscience to be an infallible inner light or reliable guide to conduct. **Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* entry on *conscience* indicated that its common usage is antinomian and the only rational meaning of the word is "what the English express by the word *consciousness*," and they lamented, "can only be rendered in French by periphrasis"** (Davies 1990: 44-50). Nor did they trust Rousseau's public conscience as laws willed by all and applicable to all. In opposition to Rousseau, *les lumières* were not populists. **Diderot** (1969-73: XIII [*ERCN*] 506) **baldly declared that people need enlightenment from above. "The man of the people is the stupidest and wickedest of men; to make men less common [*se dépopulariser*] or make men better, that is the same thing. The voice of the philosopher who counters that of the people is the voice of reason."** The Rousseauan or Kantian notion of moral autonomy, of rules made by will rather than discovered by reason, seemed to *les lumières* to cast off the anchors of natural law, to pursue an illusory transformation of human nature, no longer limited by natural attachments to life, liberty, property and happiness or the commodious life made possible by commerce. **The Protestant Stoicism of Rousseau, however much it aimed to recreate classical republicanism, marked a radical break from classical Stoicism, from natural law comprehensible to human reason.** Rousseau was the radical innovator who supplanted human nature with history as the fundamental category of political philosophy.

---

https://www.academia.edu/299390/How_the_Stoics_Became_Atheists

Given that the Stoics taught, among many other things, the materiality of God, indeed, the identification of God with nature, a strict physical determinism, and a doctrine of eternal recurrence, it might seem surprising that the neo-Stoics were able to redeploy Stoic arguments in the service of the Christianities they professed. **But there were ways in which this could be done. Lipsius, for example, possessed an effective monopoly over the interpretation of Stoic physics, owing to his authorship of the standard textbook on the subject, the *Physiologiae stoicorum*, published in 1604.** This book did present a series of arguments that were recognizably Stoic, and provided a series of references to relevant Greek and Latin texts which had not previously been analysed or edited in any systematic way, but it also managed to falsify the arguments of the Stoics to a considerable extent. **Lipsius denied, for example, that the Stoics taught a pantheistic materialism when he claimed that they had argued that 'God is contained in things but not infused with them.'**3 An alternative and more common approach was to avoid the matter of Stoic physics altogether.
…

In the long run, neo-Stoic syncretism was unsustainable. But even in the middle of the seventeenth century, the best scholarship on the Stoics could still be placed in the service of Christian Stoicism, as Thomas Gataker's edition of Marcus Aurelius demonstrates.
…

Although Spinoza's most detailed arguments about the nature of God were elaborated in the First Part of his *Ethics*, first published as a part of the *Opera postuma* in 1677, the notorious argument against the possibility of miracles in chapter 6 of the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, which ignited the controversy in 1670, deployed an account of the

nature of things which touched on Stoic cosmology in significant ways. Spinoza's argument against the possibility of miracles was premised, in the first instance, on the identification of the laws of nature with the decrees of God. More particularly, however, the violence which Spinoza's account of God in the *Tractatus* performed on traditional Christian notions of Providence conjured up all of the anxieties and objections which had been expressed against Lipsius' arguments about Stoic fate and divine Providence in *De constantia*. **For Spinoza to assert that 'God's decree, command, edict and word are nothing other than the action and order of Nature' was to proclaim the truth about Stoic determinism that Lipsius had endeavoured to deny, or, at least, to shuffle under the carpet.**19

Jakob Thomasius (1622–84), the father of the more eminent philosopher Christian and the tutor of Leibniz, **was the first scholar to publish an attempted refutation of the argument of the *Tractatus*: Spinoza's book was first published in Amsterdam in January 1670 (though the title page said Hamburg), and Thomasius had his own *Adversus anonymum, de libertate philosophandi* published in Leipzig in May of the same year.**20 **The same Thomasius would also appear to be the first author to worry at length in print about the Stoics' physics specifically in terms of the atheist implications of their materialist cosmology.** In 1676, he published a neo-Aristotelian attack on Lipsius's syncretist ambition to reconcile Christian theology and Stoic physics, *Exercitatio de stoica mundi exustione*, in which he claimed that 'Nothing has more disgracefully corrupted the history of philosophy than the attempt to reconcile the Christian faith, now with Plato, now with Aristotle, now with the Stoics or other pagan groups.'21
…

If Thomasius forged the path, Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) followed in his footsteps.23 In his 1697 *Dictionary* entry on 'Spinoza', he observed that the Stoic doctrine of 'the soul of the world' was the same as the argument that Spinoza had made, and in the article on 'Jupiter', he described the pantheism of the Stoics as 'a real Atheism'.24 **But if Bayle was the first major writer to brand the Stoics as atheists on account of their pantheism, the writer who devoted the most time and attention to an investigation, elaboration, and denunciation of this axis of Stoic/Spinozist/atheist evil was Johann Franz Buddeus** (1667–1729), professor at Halle and Jena, who devoted a series of studies over the length of his career to different aspects of the matter. The first was a short work on the errors of the Stoics,25 which was followed by a work on 'Spinozism before Spinoza',26 a widely read treatise on *Atheism and superstition*,27 a scholarly edition of Marcus Aurelius with a detailed introductory essay,28 and his important works on the history of philosophy,29 which is the focus of interest in what follows.
…

Given Buddeus's triple preoccupation with atheism, Stoicism and Spinoza, it is perhaps not surprising that his methodological innovation in the historiography of philosophy had a specific application to precisely this polemic. Indeed, this distinctive method seems to have been developed out of Buddeus's extensive reflections on Stoicism, **after his observation that the moral precepts of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, which appeared attractive and assimilable to Christian truth, were in fact generated by deeper arguments deeply antithetical to religious orthodoxy,** indeed, were generated by arguments familiar to the contemporary world above all through the philosophy of Spinoza.37 According to Buddeus's presentation, the single most important dogma of the Stoics was their identification of God with the world, and the various other principles that they maintained were held ultimately to follow from this.38 In the realm of Stoic moral philosophy, **the contradiction between the admirable individual maxims of the Stoics and the impious premises by which they were generated found its expression in the hypocrisy of individual Stoic philosophers, a subject in which Buddeus was quite interested.**39

In the work on atheism, Buddeus distinguished between two varieties of atheists:

> In the first category, I put those who shamelessly and straightforwardly deny the existence of God, or those who – owing to their bad faith – can only deny or ignore the atheism which necessarily flows from their principles. **In the second category, I put those who set up principles from which one can validly infer conclusions which are either prejudicial or injurious to the Providence and the liberty of God.**40

Buddeus assigned the Epicureans to the first category, and the Stoics and Aristotle to the second, but he then distinguished between the latter two, in order to make an argument as to why the former are closer to Spinoza than the latter:

> **While Aristotle remained content to assert that God was always present in the world, the Stoics maintained that he was immanent in the world itself, as was clearly demonstrated by JAC THOMAS** *de Exustione Mundi Stoica Dissert*. 15. Their system, therefore, is closer to that of Spinoza than is Aristotle's.41

Early in this study, Buddeus noted that many readers have found in the Stoics 'their fine sentences concerning religion, virtue, etc.', and he commented, characteristically, **'But these only serve to show that one can infer valid conclusions from false principles, or that the Stoics at least did not always reason logically.'**42
…

Although Buddeus developed his arguments about the proper methods for understanding ancient philosophers over his entire academic career – he died in 1729 and his final work, the *Compendium historiae philosophiae observationibus illustratum* was edited and published by his son-in-law in Halle in 1731 – **his core argument that equated the philosophical systems of Spinoza and the Stoics was available from 1701,** with his treatise on 'Spinozism before Spinoza'. But this argument could be sidestepped by means of an approach to the Stoics which de-emphasized their physics or cosmology, or which denied that the ethics and the physics had much to do with one another. As I have suggested above, the tendency of the new historiography of philosophy associated with Pufendorf was to examine ancient philosophy by subject-area rather than by school, and it is to one of the most important texts for the development of philosophical eclecticism itself that I now want to turn. 'An historical and critical account of the science of morality' by Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744) was published as a preface to his celebrated edition of Pufendorf's treatise *Of the law of nature and nations* in 1706. **This essay presented an account of the history of moral philosophy which was organized around a central argumentative thread, and which linked together ancient and**

modern ethics, culminating in his account of the natural law system of Pufendorf as the one which was uniquely able to come to grips with the problems bequeathed by the Grotian system, which itself had, in Barbeyrac's famous phrase, 'broken the ice' of the scholastics' moral thought. In chapter XXVII of this work, Barbeyrac discussed the Greek Stoics.45

In contrast to many of the Stoic and anti-Stoic writings of the seventeenth century, Barbeyrac's style was analytical rather than either apologetical or polemical. His points were backed up with precise references both to ancient texts and modern scholarship, and he generally followed the best authorities: Bayle, Jakob Thomasius, and Buddeus feature, for example, in his apparatus. He was careful also to make sure his observations were relevant to the philosophical subject matter under discussion. **When he referred to the accusations of hypocrisy and vice which attend the lives of various Stoics, for example, he commented that 'these are personal faults, and extend not to their doctrines',** and while he mentioned what were generally taken to be the least acceptable opinions of the Stoics – cannibalism, incest, the doctrine that all sins are equal, and the fact that **'What the Stoics said about the love of Beautiful boys is, at least, liable to very odd constructions'**46 – his rejection of these positions was peripheral to his main inquiry, for he understood the interest and importance of Stoic ethics to lie elsewhere.

Barbeyrac's distinctive move was explicitly to separate Stoic physics from its ethics. With regard to the former, he wrote: **'These principles, I must own, are monstrous; and the several philosophers of that Sect have, each in particular, added there to some new Absurdities.'**47 With regard to the latter, his opinion was quite different, and fully in the tradition of Thomas Gataker: **'However, except a few things, nothing can be more beautiful than their Morality, very near approaching that of the Gospel, which alone is entirely conformable to the Dictates of right Reason.'**48

> https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/jun/07/change-your-life-near-enemies-buddhism
>
> Yet one of the most insightful bits of Buddhist psychology has yet to reach a widespread modern audience: the notion of **the "near enemy".** According to this way of thinking, for every desirable habit or state of mind, there's a "far enemy", which is its obvious antithesis. Thus hatred, it won't surprise you to learn, is the far enemy of love. **Near enemies, on the other hand, are much sneakier and harder to spot, because they so closely resemble the thing they're the enemy of.** Needy, possessive co-dependency can look and feel a lot like love, when really it corrodes it.
>
> https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_29061896_satis-cognitum.html
>
> "There can be nothing more dangerous than those heretics **who admit nearly the whole cycle of doctrine, and yet by one word, as with a drop of poison,** infect the real and simple faith taught by our Lord and handed down by Apostolic tradition" (Auctor *Tract. de Fide Orthodoxa contra Arianos*).

...

The ancient ethical writer for whom Barbeyrac professed most admiration was Cicero, and he praised *De officiis* in particular, presenting its author as himself a kind of eclectic, who borrowed as he saw fit from the various doctrines of the sects.52 On the face of it, this might seem to mark a retreat to a kind of Renaissance Ciceronianism, with Barbeyrac holding up Cicero's Stoic-like moral doctrine as the one to be preferred, whilst disdaining interest in the Stoics' philosophy of nature, but it is important to see that it is not. Barbeyrac's broader argument was that it was the modern natural rights tradition in general and the system of Pufendorf in particular which provided the right account of the proper justification of the content of ethics. **From this standpoint, the Ciceronianism of the Renaissance represented the last appearance of the ancient doctrines, before they were swept away by the Grotian revolution in the post-sceptical 'science of morality'.** And this was the revolution that gave rise to the modern natural law theory whose exponents were able to fashion an adequate reply to the skeptical criticisms of Cicero's ethics which had been formulated above all by Montaigne.53

On one level, therefore, Barbeyrac agreed with Buddeus: Stoic physics was full of error, and when the Stoic system was fully understood, it had to be rejected. But the contrasts in their respective styles and approaches were dramatic. Buddeus's historiography was one in which Stoicism as a system appeared in both ancient and modern contexts, substantially unaltered, whether in the theory of Chrysippus or Spinoza; **Barbeyrac's presentation, by contrast, had no time for this kind of transhistorical argument: the true scientists of morality learn from one another's mistakes, neither simply replicating nor anathematizing the Stoics'ethics.** By breaking up the unity of the Stoics' system, furthermore, Stoicism became a series of philosophical resources or arguments that could be drawn upon selectively, indeed, eclectically. **In moving to insulate the Stoics' ethics from their physics, finally, Barbeyrac made an important move, and one that Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and others would reiterate later in the century.**54

...

Methodologically, Mosheim aligned himself with Buddeus's approach when he wrote that

> The discipline of this sect is not to be learned from the magnificent phrases of this or that Stoic, but the whole of it ought to be placed before our view as a system, and afterwards a judgment formed as to the utility and excellence of the several dogmas ... Wherefore, if the dogmas or sayings of this or that Stoic be considered in themselves, we shall never be at a loss for arguments to justify and uphold the cause of this sect. For my part, I consider that the goodness and badness of any doctrine should be judged of from its fundamental principles, and from its general tenor and context, **and that we should take into especial consideration, not what some have said or written, but what they ought to have said or written consistently with the rest of their opinions.**56

...

The third place to look in order to find the influence of Buddeus's presentation of the Stoics is in the works of his most illustrious student Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770), **whose colossal *Historia critica philosophiae* became the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy before the followers of Kant and of Hegel got to work on rewriting that history in order to place in the foreground the achievements of these latter-day masters.**61 **Brucker is a far more significant figure than Buddeus, considered both in terms of his own historiographical achievement and of his influence upon academic posterity,** but when it came to writing about the Stoics, Brucker was largely content to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor,62 most characteristically when he observed that one should not judge the Stoics from words and sentiments 'detached from the general system' but that one should 'consider them as they stand related to the whole train of premises and conclusions'.63

Following Buddeus again, Brucker's judgement on Stoicism was resolutely hostile, **and despite his 'critical' method, his discussion was couched in familiar terms:** the Stoics wasted much time and threw away much ingenuity 'upon questions of no importance',64 they 'largely contributed towards the confusion, instead of the improvement of science, by substituting vague and ill-defined terms' in place of 'accurate conceptions';65 with respect to their moral philosophy, Brucker found that it was 'an ostentatious display of words, in which little regard was paid to nature and reason',66 which, while it aimed at raising 'human nature to a degree of perfection before unknown' in fact served 'merely to amuse the ear' with 'fictions which can never be realised'; **his conclusion was that 'a system of philosophy, which attempts to raise men above their nature, must commonly produce either wretched fanatics, or artful hypocrites'.**67 Turning then from the ethics to the physics, he resisted the move of those apologists for the Roman Stoics, who tried to equate Stoic fate with divine Providence:

> This doctrine, according to Zeno and Chrysippus (who herein meant to combat Epicurus's doctrine of the fortuitous concourse of atoms) implies an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects, within which all events are included, and to which the Deity himself is subject: **whereas the later Stoics, changing the term Fate into the Providence of God, discoursed with great plausibility on this subject, but still in reality retained the antient doctrine of universal fate.**68

And in his discussion of the modern authorities who had written on the Stoics, **Brucker consistently criticized the syncretist ambitions of Lipsius, Heinsius, Schioppius, and Gataker,** appealing to the scholarship of Thomasius and Buddeus in support of his opinions.69

> 69. On Gataker, Brucker wrote: 'I think it is clear enough from the above that this very erudite man was deceived by the study of the Stoa, **and did not attend to the real hypotheses of the Stoics accurately enough and without prejudice, but certainly granted much to emotion and hatred, through which he persecuted the philosophy of Epicurus, and even tacitly attacked Gassendi himself, who was fighting on behalf of the most learned Epicurus;** so there is no need to add more here.' Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, IV, p. 500.

Brucker drew heavily on Buddeus when writing his account of Stoicism, and Brucker was, in turn, the chief source for Denis Diderot (1713–84) when he was compiling the articles on the history of philosophy for the *Encyclopédie*. Indeed, many articles on this subject essentially consist of lengthy passages from Brucker's work, translated into French and only very lightly edited, and the article on 'Stoicisme' is a very good example of this.70 In this way, therefore, Buddeus's anti-Spinozist views on the nature of Stoicism ended up being presented substantially intact before a significant new reading public in the pages of the *Encyclopédie*. Presenting in outline form the basic principles of the Stoics, Diderot worked closely with Brucker's text and agreed with Buddeus when he wrote that **'it is not difficult to conclude from these principles that the Stoics were materialists, fatalists and, strictly speaking, atheists'.**

The decisive difference this time around, of course, was that in Diderot's view of the matter, to be a materialist, fatalist atheist was no bad thing at all.

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/400/mode/2up?view=theater

Voltaire, **who borrowed most of his ideas from Bayle, Fontenelle, Locke, Newton, Collins,** and other Early Enlightenment writers, readily granted that it was during the late seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth that superstition in general, and credulous dread of magical forces and demons in particular, **first began unmistakably recede throughout Europe. He was aware that the half-century preceding his own youth was one of the most decisive in the history of the world. Nor did he doubt that the onset of 'philosophy' was the engine, the driving force, of this great revolution in human history: the waning of superstition, he held, was due above all to 'Bayle et les bons esprits qui commençaient à éclairer le monde.'**200

https://archive.org/details/radicalenlighten0000isra/page/6/mode/2up?view=theater

There is indeed an urgent need for Enlightenment historians to put much more emphasis on what was happening before and down to the 1740s. Indeed, there is a case for arguing that the most crucial developments were already over by the middle of the eighteenth century. Certainly the Radical Enlightenment arose and matured in under a century, culminating in the materialistic and atheistic books of La Mettrie and Diderot in the 1740s. These men, dubbed by Diderot the 'Nouveaux Spinosistes,'16 wrote works which are in the main a summing up of the philosophical, scientific, and political radicalism of the previous three generations. Seen in this light they represent the extreme, most uncompromising fringe of the general trend in culture and ideas towards rationalization and

secularization. **But their less radical colleagues undoubtedly had a far greater impact on attitudes and popular culture. In fact, neither the Reformation of the sixteenth century nor the so-called 'High Enlightenment' of the post-1750 period – often little more than footnotes to the earlier shift – even begins to compete with the intellectual upheaval of the Early Enlightenment in terms of sheer impact, and the depth and extent of the intellectual and spiritual changes it brought about.** It may be that the story of the High Enlightenment after 1750 is more familiar to readers and historians, but that does not alter the reality that the later movement was basically just one of consolidating, popularizing, and annotating revolutionary concepts introduced earlier. Consequently, **even before Voltaire came to be widely known, in the 1740s, the real business was already over.**

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/46/mode/2up?view=theater

Ira O. Wade contends that the whole Enlightenment was contained in the seventeenth-century movement of libertinism and its variants, as the latter had been contained in the *Essays* of Montaigne.28 **If true, this would indicate that the materialism of the eighteenth century is an imprecise, eclectic presentation of the Epicurean, Stoic and skeptic currents,** with such names thrown in for good measure as Descartes, Gassendi, Newton, and others. We should not be overly impressed with the presence of these names, they do not guarantee the seriousness of Enlightenment thought on the level of science.

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA308#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **The men who were brought by events to the head of our revolution were, by a necessary consequence of the education they had received, steeped in ancient views which are no longer valid, which the philosophers whom I mentioned above [Rousseau, the abbé de Mably] had made fashionable.**
>
> *Benjamin Constant, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns" (1819, in Constant 1988)*

http://www.racerealist.com/yockey_2.htm

> **The purest expression of the doctrine of Liberalism was probably that of Benjamin Constant. In 1814 he set forth his views of the "progress" of "man."** He looked upon the 18th century Enlightenment with its intellectualistic-humanitarian cast as merely preliminary to the true liberation, that of the 19th century. Economics, industrialism, and technics represented the means of "freedom." Rationalism was the natural ally of this trend. Feudalism, Reaction, War, Violence, State, Politics, Authority -- all were overcome by the new idea, supplanted by Reason, Economics, Freedom, Progress and Parliamentarism. **War, being violent and brutal, was unreasonable, and is replaced by Trade, which is intelligent and civilized.** War is condemned from every standpoint: economically it is a loss even to the victor. **The new war technics -- artillery -- made personal heroism senseless, and thus the charm and glory of war departed with its economic usefulness.** In earlier times, war-peoples had subjugated trading-peoples, but no longer. Now trading-peoples step out as the masters of the earth.

...

Burke understood this theoretical exercise as an embarrassing aping of the ancients. He refers in the *Reflections* to Cicero's *Paradoxes of the Stoics* and Horace's *Epistles* in order to expose to ridicule the desire of the French Revolutionaries to form a constitution on philosophical first principles. Cicero, writes Burke,

> **ludicrously describes Cato as endeavouring to act, in the commonwealth, upon the school paradoxes,** which exercised the wits of the junior students in the Stoic philosophy. If this was true of Cato, these gentlemen copy after them in the manner of some persons who lived about this time – *pede nudo Catonem*. (Burke 2003: 145)

The fool who thinks he can attain Cato's genius simply by walking barefoot like him (or, in the source in Horace, the fool who thinks he can become a great poet simply by drinking wine) reappears in the fake classical costume of contemporary Paris. Whereas the paradoxes of the "original authors" were exercised "as means of cultivating their taste and improving their style," the paradoxes of contemporary writers, and especially Rousseau, "brought forth purely as a sport of fancy, to try their talents, to rouse attention and excite surprise" are misread in Paris as "serious grounds of action, upon which they proceed in regulating the most important concerns of the state" (Burke 2003: 145). **Rousseau's effort was to rouse a disaffected and complacent public with his shocking call to a Spartan civil existence – in this he is influenced by Shaftesbury's uses of paradox in the *Characteristics*, as a**

way of activating virtue through dialogic thought experiment that shows itself continually disinclined to "take party" (Shaftesbury 1999: 234). But according to Burke, Rousseauian paradox had been realized, in Paris, in a way never intended by its original author, and with violent consequences. **Burke writes of "the prevalent opinion in Paris, that an unfeeling heart, and an undoubting confidence, are the sole qualifications for a perfect legislator"** (Burke 2003: 143), picking up on the cultural worry about Stoic hard-heartedness found in Smith and Hume, and that is repeated elsewhere in anti-radical polemic.
…

The text that Coleridge refers to in which the "Stoical morality" had, he alleges, been recently revived is William Godwin's *Enquiry concerning Political Justice*, which was read widely in radical circles after its publication in 1793. As Jonathan Sachs has argued, examples of Roman heroism are crucial to Godwin in his effort to prove the existence of disinterested, universal benevolence – to show, as Godwin argues by quoting Hutcheson in his "Account of the Seminary" from 1783, that "self-love is not the source of all our passions, but that disinterested benevolence has it seat in the human heart" (Godwin 1993: 20). His effort to substantiate this claim gives a Stoic tenor reminiscent of Marcus Aurelius to Godwin's general principle as it is articulated in *Political Justice*:

> The man who vigilantly conforms his affections to the standard of justice, who loses the view of personal regards in the greater objects that engross his attention […] has an uncommonly exquisite source of happiness […] He is filled with harmony within; and the state of his thoughts is uncommonly favourable to what we may venture to style the sublime emotions of tranquility. (Godwin 1976: 383)

Godwin takes Smith's idea of the sympathetic imagination to a radically disinterested extreme. The fact that we are "able in imagination to go out of ourselves, and become impartial spectators of the system of which we are part" (Godwin 1976: 381) **should lead us, according to Godwin, to use our power of reason to recognize that our ties to those parts of the system which are most proximate to us are founded in a prejudice for the familiar and the known. Instead, our benevolent actions should be determined by a strict principle of rational utility; it is "the consideration of my neighbour's moral worth, and his importance to the general weal,"** Godwin writes earlier in the *Enquiry*, that forms "the only standard to determine the treatment to which he is entitled" (Godwin 1976: 171).
…

A benefactor ought to be esteemed, Godwin claims, "**not because he bestowed a benefit upon me, but because he bestowed it upon a human being.** His desert will be in exact proportion to the degree in which that human being was worthy of the distinction conferred" (Godwin 1976: 171).
…

In 1796 John Thelwall gave a series of lectures on Roman history, first in London, later in the provinces, that attracted provincial audiences numbering sometimes 5,000 (Sachs 2010: 49). **The subject of Roman history gave Thelwall, or so he hoped, the latitude needed to discuss political freedom and tyranny without risk of arrest and possible deportation or even execution for treason,** under increasingly draconian conditions of censorship brought about by Pitt's Treason and Seditious Meetings Act of late 1795. The texts of the lectures were not published, and so we do not know whether Thelwall discussed the Stoics at all (although it would seem unlikely), but the influence of Stoic ethics is evident one year earlier, in a series of political lectures delivered at the Beaufort Buildings in London. **These endorse and radicalize Godwin's attack on gratitude, and develop it into a further attack on the perceived weakness of sorrow and regret. Gratitude, or the "return of benefits"** (Thelwall 1795: 230) **writes Thelwall, "has a tendency to draw the human mind from the consideration of the whole and fix it, from a principle of self-love, upon a few individuals"** (Thelwall 1795: 227). **Like Godwin, Thelwall appeals to a principle of rational calculation in order to argue for universal, indifferent sympathy.** Justice commands us, "without favour or regard to personal feelings, to cultivate felicity in every bosom capable of receiving its impression, **and remove sorrow and affliction from every sentient being,** wherever the opportunity is presented" (Thelwall 1795: 229-30). Benefit should only, consequently, be offered according to "the capacity and the inclination of [an] individual to do good in his turn to other human beings whom it may be in his power afterwards to serve" (Thelwall 1795: 230).

Thelwall highlights the role of memory both in acts of revenge and gratitude. **The vengeful or grateful man, he writes, "act from the same selfish spring of motion, that is to say, the recollection of the benefits or injuries heaped upon himself, and the hatred or love he feels towards the individuals"** (Thelwall 1795: 232). Thelwall's strategy is instead to draw attention to wider forms of historical remembrance, especially the politically motivated remembering of republican, and the forgetting or repression of loyalist, atrocities in France.
…

Gratitude, for Thelwall, is guilty of fettering great and noble minds that were "born for the universe" (Thelwall 1795: 235) **to local attachments and, as he argues in a proto-Nietzschean way, to the tyranny of remembering.** Although more immediate sources for Thelwall's and Godwin's views might be found in the writings of Ferguson, for example, who celebrates the lack of gratitude found among native Americans in his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767, in Godwin 1993), or even in Hutcheson (see Jones 1993: 92), the opposition between the virtues of firmness, equality and freedom and the mores of contemporary civil society give their arguments a Stoic tenor. Thelwall also recognizes, in a way strikingly reminiscent of Seneca, the similar structure that animates gratitude and revenge, **making compassion an unstable support for justice and, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, "cruelty's first cousin"** (Nussbaum 2001: 362).
…

"What did Wordsworth think he was doing in his writings of the first decade of the nineteenth century?" asks Adam Potkay in a recent study. "A short answer would be: better conforming himself to stoicism, specifically to the civic-minded Roman stoicism of Cicero and Seneca and their modern heir, Shaftesbury" (Potkay 2012: 149). The influence of Stoicism on Wordsworth's poetry and prose has long been acknowledged. In a chapter-length study of that relation in her book *Wordsworth's Reading of Roman Prose* (1946), a chapter which acknowledges numerous proper studies of the impact of Stoicism on Wordsworth, Jane Worthington argued that a study of Wordsworth's poems composed between 1804 and 1814 "reveals a wealth of pure Stoic philosophy in language frankly reminiscent of the Latin writers" (Worthington 1946: 45). At one point in his notes for *The Excursion*, Worthington shows, Wordsworth is able to identify two lines of a quotation from the Elizabethan poet Samuel Daniel incorporated into the poem as themselves a quotation from Seneca's *Quaestiones naturales*. As far as we know, **Wordsworth was the first to identify Daniel's translation of Seneca, suggesting that his knowledge of the Roman Stoic "was as wide as it was thorough**" (1946: 45), **not least since Seneca's text was much less well-known than the *Epistles* or the *Dialogues*.**

Coleridge, as we saw earlier, had urged Wordsworth on to the writing of a poem that would give new hope to those who, as a result of the failure of the French Revolution, were descending into "an almost epicurean selfishness, disguising the same under the soft titles of domestic attachment and contempt for visionary *philosophes*."
…

In his lecture on revealed religion of 1795 discussed above, Coleridge argued that while the Stoics "believed a God indeed or at least seemed to believe one," it was "a material God, a principle of fire, to which they sometimes attributed Intelligence and sometimes obscurely denied it." **They did not think of this God as a first Cause, Coleridge continues, "but [as] the result of the organization of the Universe, in the same way as our minds have been supposed to be the effects of the peculiar organization of our Bodies."** Coleridge links this belief to the sin of pride, which he describes as "the most absurd, and to a wise man, the most disgusting of human Vices" (Coleridge 1971: 156-7). In coming to this conclusion, he finds himself in a long tradition of poets who are critical of Stoic pride, stretching from Milton, who has Christ describe "The Stoic lost in philosophic pride / By him call'd virtue" (Milton 1971: 563) in *Paradise Regained*, through to T.S. Eliot, who describes the "stoical attitude" in the early twentieth century as "the reverse of Christian humility" (Eliot 1927: 9).
…

"A man," writes Eliot, "does not join himself with the Universe so long as he has anything else to join himself with" (Eliot 1927: 9). **Reviewing *The Excursion* in 1814, William Hazlitt (whose father, like the young Coleridge in 1795, had been a Unitarian preacher) wrote that in Wordsworth's poetic vision, "[i]t is as if there were nothing but himself and the universe"** (Hazlitt 1930-34: 11).
…

In his *Biographia Literaria*, for example, [Coleridge] associated the claims of another Wordsworth poem of the early nineteenth century, the "Immortality Ode," with what he took to be the pantheism of Spinoza and Behmen (Coleridge 1983: II 139); later, in his *Opus Maximum* in the early 1820s, **he associated the passage quoted as the epigraph to this essay, from "Tintern Abbey" with its celebration of a motion and a spirit rolling through all things, with "the Anima Mundi of the Stoics" and "the unica substantia of Spinoza, that mysterious nothing which alone is," and which for Coleridge is a "Phantom set up in lieu of God"** (Coleridge 2002: 112).
…

This also conditions the modernist hostility to Romantic excess, Irving Babbitt writing in 1919 that while no one would "question that Wordsworth has passages of great ethical elevation," **"in some of these passages he simply renews the error of the Stoics who also display at times great ethical elevation; he ascribes to the natural order virtues that the natural order does not give"** (Babbitt 1919: 286). **Romanticism arguably continues to be a key conduit for kinds of radical pantheism**

that link Spinoza and the Stoics, and arguably serves as a source for modern proponents of such theories such as Gilles Deleuze.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_268

That what you see *is* blood, *is* flesh, is itself the work, or shall I say, the translucence, of the invisible Energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to inferior powers (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of Nature), which repeat a similar metamorphosis according to *their* kind;—these are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but *facts*; to deny which is impossible, not to reflect on which is ignominious. And we need only reflect on them with a calm and silent spirit to learn the utter emptiness and unmeaningness of the vaunted Mechanico-corpuscular Philosophy, with both its twins, Materialism on the one hand, and Idealism, rightlier named *Subjective Idolism*, on the other: the one obtruding on us a World of Spectres and Apparitions; the other a mazy Dream!

Let the Mechanic or Corpuscular Scheme, which in its absoluteness and strict consistency was first introduced by Des Cartes, be judged by the results. By its fruits shall it be known.

In order to submit the various phenomena of moving bodies to geometrical construction, we are under the necessity of abstracting from corporeal substance all its *positive* properties, and obliged to consider bodies as differing from equal portions of space[163] only by figure and mobility.

> [163] **Such is the conception of body in Des Cartes' own system, *body* is every where confounded with *matter*, and might in the Cartesian sense be defined, Space or Extension, with the attribute of Visibility. As Des Cartes at the same time zealously asserted the existence of intelligential beings, the reality and independent Self-subsidence of the soul, Berkeleyanism or Spinosism was the immediate and necessary consequence.** Assume a *plurality* of self-subsisting souls, and we have Berkeleyanism; assume one only (*unam et unicam substantiam*), and you have Spinosism, that is, the assertion of one infinite self-subsistent, with the two attributes of thinking and appearing. *Cogitatio infinita sine centro, et omniformis apparitio.*

And as a *fiction of science*, it would be difficult to overvalue this invention. It possesses the same merits in relation to Geometry that the atomic theory has in relation to algebraic calculus. But in contempt of common sense, and in direct opposition to the express declarations of the inspired historian (*Genesis i.*) and to the tone and spirit of the Scriptures throughout, Des Cartes propounded it as *truth of fact*: and instead of a World *created* and filled with productive forces by the Almighty *Fiat*, left a lifeless Machine whirled about by the dust of its own Grinding: as if Death could come from the living Fountain of Life; Nothingness and Phantom from the Plenitude of Reality! the Absoluteness of Creative Will!

Holy! Holy! Holy! let me be deemed mad by all men, if such be thy ordinance: but, O! from *such* madness save and preserve me, my God!

When, however, after a short interval, the genius of Kepler, expanded and organized in the soul of Newton, and there (if I may hazard so bold an expression) refining itself into an almost celestial clearness, had expelled the Cartesian
vortices;[164] then the necessity of an active power, of positive forces present in the material universe, forced itself on the conviction. For as a Law without a Law-giver is a mere abstraction; so a *Law* without an Agent to realize it, a *Constitution* without an abiding Executive, is, in fact, not a Law but *an Idea*. In the profound emblem of the great tragic poet, it is the powerless Prometheus fixed on a barren Rock.

> [164] **For Newton's own doubtfully suggested ether, or *most* subtle fluid, as the ground and immediate Agent in the phenomena of universal gravitation, was either not adopted or soon abandoned by his disciples;** not only as introducing, against his own canons of right reasoning, an *ens imaginarium* into physical science, a suf*fiction* in the place of a legitimate sup*position*; but because the substance (assuming it to exist) must itself form part of the problem, it was meant to solve. **Meantime Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, which originated in Spinosa, found no acceptance;** and, lastly, the notion of a corpuscular substance, with properties *put* into it, like a pincushion hidden by the pins, could pass with the unthinking only for any thing more than a confession of ignorance, or technical terms expressing a hiatus of scientific insight.

And what was the result? How was this necessity provided for? God himself—my hand trembles as I write! Rather, then, let me employ the word, which the religious feeling, in its perplexity suggested as the substitute—the *Deity itself* was declared to be the real agent, the actual gravitating power! **God (says Dr. Priestley) not only does, but *is* every thing. *Jupiter est quodcunque vides.* And thus a system, which commenced by excluding all life and immanent activity from the visible universe and evacuating the natural world of all nature, ended by substituting the Deity, and reducing the Creator to a mere anima mundi: a scheme that has no advantage over Spinosism but its inconsistency,** which does indeed make it suit a certain Order of intellects, who, like the *pleuronectæ* (or flat fish) in ichthyology which have both eyes on the same side, never see but half of a

subject at one time, and forgetting the one before they get to the other are sure not to detect any inconsistency between them.

And what has been the consequence? **An increasing unwillingness to contemplate the Supreme Being in his *personal* attributes:** and thence a distaste to all the peculiar doctrines of the Christian Faith, the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and Redemption.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT507#v=onepage&q&f=false

In fact, Dewey's former student Randolph S. Bourne (1886-1918), short-lived but exerting significant influence, published an extended attack on Stoicism. **Believing in a complex mix of cosmopolitanism and local identity, Bourne saw Stoicism as the precondition for the Christianity he abhorred:** "If we say we feel instinctively that the Christian-Stoical ethics is nobler than the Greek ideal, it is because we have lived so long and so submissively in an ugly, deformed world of social misery and maladjustment that we have lost our sense of true ethical values" (Bourne 1913: 370).

Bourne may have viewed Stoicism as "the senility of Greek thought and the infancy of Christian faith" (Bourne 1913: 365). But for Boston Brahmin and Unitarian Henry Adams (1838-1918), a celebrated intellectual and author of the autobiographical masterpiece, *The Education of Henry Adams*, Stoicism was the alternative to Christianity. In the face of his sister's premature death, Adams considered that "Stoicism was perhaps the best [anodyne]," as he could not understand how a "personal deity" would allow his sister to suffer. Later, in admiring the courage demonstrated by several close friends in rapid decline, Adams acknowledged that "the affectation of readiness for death is a stage rôle, and stoicism is a stupid resource, though the only one" (H. Adams 1918: 288-9, 395). **After completing *Education* and himself infirm, he turned to Marcus Aurelius, writing to a former student that: "I would give a new cent to have a really good book on the Stoics. If there is one, lend it to me. I need badly to find one man in history to admire. I am in near peril of turning Christian, and rolling in the mud in an agony of human mortification"** (Stevenson 1955: 348). Adams's choice of Stoicism as the lesser of two evils suggests that, despite Pragmatism's pervasive influence, intellectuals could still find solace in Stoicism.

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Adams
>
> **Both his paternal grandfather, John Quincy Adams, and great-grandfather, John Adams, one of the most prominent among the Founding Fathers, had been U.S. Presidents. His maternal grandfather, Peter Chardon Brooks, was one of Massachusetts' most successful and wealthiest merchants.** Another great-grandfather, Nathaniel Gorham, signed the Constitution.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randolph_Bourne
>
> Bourne was a student of Dewey's at Columbia, but he rejected Dewey's idea of using the war to spread democracy. (He was a member of the Boar's Head Society.[4]) **In his pointedly titled 1917 essay "Twilight of Idols", he invoked the progressive pragmatism of Dewey's contemporary William James to argue that America was using democracy as an end to justify the war, but that democracy itself was never examined.** Although initially following Dewey, he felt that Dewey had betrayed his democratic ideals by focusing only on the facade of a democratic government rather than on the ideas behind democracy that Dewey had once professed to respect.
>
> Bourne was greatly influenced by Horace Kallen's 1915 essay, "Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot". Like Kallen, Bourne argued that Americanism ought not to be associated with Anglo-Saxonism. In his 1916 article "Trans-National America," Bourne argued that the United States should accommodate immigrant cultures into a "cosmopolitan America," instead of forcing immigrants to assimilate to the dominant Anglo-Saxon-based culture.

...

Royce's appreciation pointed to the need for a different sort of Stoicism, **as Bourne's historical assault seems to have rung the death knell in the North for Stoicism in its classical formulation.** Theologians long considered the Hellenistic period – with its mystery religions, universal philosophies, and Maccabean martyrdom – the divinely directed prolegomenon to Christianity. This association might legitimize Stoicism for believers, but to non-believers, such as Bourne, it acted otherwise. **From Emerson through Dewey, Transcendentalists and Pragmatists turned from the anthropomorphic god of the Abrahamic tradition to a universal religious naturalism. Ironically, Stoicism might have largely fit that bill – were it not fatally associated with Christianity.**

---

https://archive.org/details/theworldaswillan01schouoft/page/114/mode/2up?view=theater

The ideal explained in the Stoical philosophy is the most complete development of practical reason in the true and genuine sense of the word; it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of his reason, and in it his difference from the brutes shows itself most distinctly. For the ethics of Stoicism are originally and essentially, not a doctrine of virtue, but merely a guide to a rational life, the end and aim of which is happiness through peace of mind. **Virtuous conduct appears in it as it were merely by accident, as the means, not as the end.** Therefore the ethical theory of Stoicism is in its whole nature and point of view fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress directly upon virtue, such as the doctrines of the Vedas, of Plato, of Christianity, and of Kant. The aim of Stoical ethics is happiness: **τελος το ευδαι μονειν (*virtutes omnes finem habere beatitudinem*)** it is called in the account of the Stoa by Stobæus (Ecl., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also p. 138).
...

In this purely rational system of ethics the contradiction reveals itself thus, the Stoic is obliged in his doctrine of the way to the blessed life (for that is what his ethical system always remains) to insert a recommendation of suicide (as among the magnificent ornaments and apparel of Eastern despots there is always a costly vial of poison) for the case in which the sufferings of the body, which cannot be philosophised away by any principles or syllogistic reasonings, are paramount and incurable; thus its one aim, blessedness, is rendered vain, and nothing remains as a mode of escape from suffering except death; in such a case then death must be voluntarily accepted, just as we would take any other medicine.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/David_Strauss:_the_Confessor_and_the_Writer#VI.

Now, as an idea—even that of Strauss's concerning the universe—has no face, if there be any face in the question at all it must be that of the idealist, and the procedure may be subdivided into the following separate actions:—**Strauss, in any case, throws Schopenhauer open, whereupon the latter slaps Strauss in the face.** Strauss then reacts religiously; that is to say, he again begins to belabour Schopenhauer, to abuse him, to speak of absurdities, blasphemies, dissipations, and even to allege that Schopenhauer could not have been in his right senses. Result of the dispute: **"We demand the same piety for our Cosmos that the devout of old demanded for his God";** or, briefly, "He loves me."

https://www.academia.edu/9354166/Sublime_Losers_Stoicism_in_Nineteenth_Century_German_Philosophy

In Hegel's view the Stoic's maxim "living in accord with nature" is formally empty: the Stoic can follow this maxim in *any* determinate context. Rather than throwing off his chains, the Stoic reasons they do not matter. "My leg you will fetter," as Epictetus explains, "but my moral purpose not even Zeus himself has power to overcome" (*Disc.* 1.1.25).
...

The Stoic ideal that one could achieve freedom through reason alone answered to this need to flee from a world that offered individuals no scope to exercise their freedom. Stoicism gave these individuals an illusion of freedom in the context of universal enslavement. **Stoicism became popular under the Roman Empire, he argues, because its atomising despotism made the mind in isolation the only impregnable spiritual fortress** (Shklar, 1976: 62).
...

Hegel maintains that the Stoic's abstract individualistic Notion of freedom could only become a concrete reality in the context of the ethical community of a constitutional State. **The Stoics rightly identified freedom as the *telos* of self-consciousness, but they did not recognise that freedom required more than abstract thought alone.**
...

For Schopenhauer Stoic philosophy is the perfect development of this human capacity for rational, abstract spectatorship. By taking the spectator's view from above, he adds, Stoics cultivate the kind of equanimity that enables heroes to undertake noble action in defiance of their own fears and grief.
...

In sharp contrast to Hegel, however, Schopenhauer does not object to Stoic indifference, only to its feasibility. Ultimately, he argues, Stoic indifference is impossible: it contradicts the essential nature of humankind, indeed of being itself. Schopenhauer understands Stoicism as a perennial, yet *false* hope that philosophy or reason might lift us above the storms of reality.
...

"Stoic ethics" he acknowledges "is in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to adapt that great privilege of humanity, reason, to an important and salutary end, namely that of raising us above the suffering and pain that every life encounters" (WWR I 90). Stoicism, as he puts it "*allows us to participate*

to the highest degree in that dignity which attaches to us as rational beings distinct from animals" (WWR I, 90).
...

He aims to *complete* the Stoics' immature concept of freedom. Hegel's critique of Stoic abstract freedom provided a springboard for the major nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies of political freedom.
...

Stoicism's noble failure, he claims, means we must accept that suffering is a permanent, inextinguishable condition of existence. Schopenhauer's critique of Stoic happiness or *eudaimonia* became the springboard for major nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies of nihilism.

https://ericgerlach.com/european-philosophy-schopenhauer/

Schopenhauer, more pessimistic about the use of reason than Kant, saw the gulf and gap between the world and our ideas as a stormy abyss that forever frustrates our idealizations. **He agreed with Kant that the mind works categorically and mathematically, but the gap between our conceptions and the 'thing-in-itself' turned Schopenhauer from Kant's Rationalism and mathematical science to Buddhism and the ecstasy of art. Much as Marx took Hegel and "stood him on his head", turning Hegel's dialectical *Idealism* into dialectical *materialism*, Schopenhauer stood Kant on his head, in some ways following his own teacher Fichte.**
...

In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates uses the Allegory of the Cave to illustrate how the common people believe in shadows, while the wise few wander outside and see the sun itself. However, for Plato, the shadows are the desires that keep us bound, and the things outside the cave are eternal ideas. **For Schopenhauer, the shadows are abstract ideas, and the sun outside is the will of the cosmos. It is reason that is delusion, and desire the underlying reality.** Freud would later attempt to systematize this insight as the psychological practice of Psychoanalysis. For Schopenhauer thinking is delusional abstraction that separates us from our true self. It is *individuation of abstraction*, the abstract idea of separate selves, separate from the world and each other, that causes the cosmic will to be at odds with itself, which causes the selfishness often associated with will.
...

Schopenhauer did believe that the world was alive, but did not believe that it was rational. Schopenhauer's solution to the problem of evil was to reject the idea that a living world is a rational world. While he believed that the world shared a single will, he believed that rationality had turned the world against itself, each part striving against the other parts, just as Schopenhauer's teacher Fichte had interpreted Kant.

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.175719/page/n391/mode/2up?view=theater

We saw, in the first volume, that Luther's biography was an embodiment of Haeckel's "fundamental biogenetic law" in that he recapitulated in his own life-course the whole course of development of the Middle Ages. The same is true of Nietzsche in respect of the Modern Age. The product of a pastoral *milieu*, he starts from German Protestantism. **He receives his early education at the Schulpforta Gymnasium, the seat of the finest Humanist traditions.** He studies theology and ancient philology at Bonn and Leipzig under famous tutors, and teaches at Basel, the city of Erasmus, as Jacob Burckhardt's youngest colleague. **The upper current of his life's stream runs through the intellectual world of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, of Pietism and Classicism.** Upon this there follows a definitely Romantic epoch, and upon this, again, a definitely scientific and eventually agnostic one. Last of all, there are symptoms of a mystical one. In short, he ran through all the phases of the Modern Age from Wittenberg to the World War. He was a Lutheran, a Cartesian, a Wagnerian, a Comtist, a Darwinian, a Pragmatist, and (in passing) even a Nietzschean. **If examined as to his position in the history of philosophy, he would undoubtedly have to be called a Schopenhauerite; his "system" can be reduced to the formula: the world as will to power.**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/19322/19322-h/19322-h.htm

"For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more *than others*? do not even the publicans so?" (Matthew v, 46. [18])—**Principle of "Christian love": it insists upon being well *paid* in the end...**

> https://archive.org/details/stoicphilosophy210murr/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Many religions, after basing their whole theory of conduct on stern duty and self-sacrifice and contempt for pleasure, lapse into confessing the unreality of their professions by promising the faithful as a reward that they shall be uncommonly happy in the next world. **It was not that they really disdained pleasure; it was only that they speculated for a higher rate of interest at a later date.** Notably, Islam is open to that criticism, and so is a great deal of popular Christianity. Stoicism is not. It maintains its ideal unchanged.

https://theamericansun.com/2021/10/19/failed-egoists-the-irrelevance-of-right-nietzscheanism/

Yet at the same, Nietzsche goes on to castigate belief in the afterlife as harmful to the attainment of "the general welfare," in
***The Antichrist*:** "The vast lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, all natural instinct—henceforth, everything in the instincts that is beneficial, that fosters life and that safeguards the future is a cause of suspicion. So to live that life no longer has any meaning: this is now the "meaning" of life... **Why be public-spirited? Why take any pride in descent and forefathers? Why labour together, trust one another, or concern one's self about the common welfare, and try to serve it?... Merely so many 'temptations,' so many strayings from the 'straight path.'**"

But of course in *Beyond Good and Evil* he reiterates his advocacy of egoism, such that "I submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, **I mean the unalterable belief that to a being such as 'we,' other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves.** The noble soul accepts the fact of his egoism without question, and also without consciousness of harshness, constraint, or arbitrariness therein, but rather as something that may have its basis in the primary law of things," and moreover that "every system of unegoistic morality which takes itself unconditionally and appeals to every one, not only sins against good taste, but is also an incentive to sins of omission, an ADDITIONAL seduction under the mask of philanthropy—and precisely a seduction and injury to the higher, rarer, and more privileged types of men."

> https://archive.org/details/lifeofchrist00papi/page/4/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> But, although his songs were sweet to the ear, **he never succeeded in explaining exactly what he meant when he spoke of this adorable "Life" to which men should sacrifice such a living part of themselves as their need to repress their own animal instincts:** nor could he ever say in what way Christ, the true Christ of the Gospels, opposed Himself to life, He who wanted to make life higher and happy.

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n301/mode/2up?view=theater

Nevertheless, in a general summing up, I should like to know how much must be excused in a nation which, not without blame on the part of all of us, has had the most mournful history of all nations, **and to which we owe the most loving of men (Christ), the most upright of sages (Spinoza),** the mightiest book, and the most effective moral law in the world?

https://theamericansun.com/2021/10/19/failed-egoists-the-irrelevance-of-right-nietzscheanism/

His literary merits not in dispute, Nietzsche's ethics ultimately boil down to Spinozism. **It was Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) that bombastically proclaimed:** "It is plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it." / **"As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor bad." Spinoza was also one of the first men to denigrate humility and repentance as vices and not virtues.** It is no coincidence he was regarded as a scandalous atheist, with his clockwork god existing solely as immanentist primary substance, all matter as modes of his existence.

> https://archive.org/details/bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_the-second-part-of-the-n_baxter-richard_1680/page/n139/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> 24. **Humility is no Vertue, nor cometh from reason.**
> 25. **Repentance is no Vertue, nor of reason, but a double misery.**
> 26. He that is in fear, and doth good to escape evil, is not led by reason.
> 27. A free mind thinks not of death, nor of good or evil.

The will to power finally breaks down into Spinoza's *conatus*, the attribute where "everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being," and which "endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question." Identity of essence and existence. Stirner's own Einzige elevates the individual transitory ego to the status of primary substance with the entire world being modes of its Extension and Thought, the ego as personal self-deification. **In fact, in a letter dated to July 30, 1881 Nietzsche confessed that "in five main points of [Spinoza's] doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology,**

the moral world-order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergences are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science." Though in his later writings he would heap scorn on Spinoza, this core convergence would remain unperturbed.

http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/orthodoxy/ch7.html

> No one will deny that he was a poetical and suggestive thinker; but he was quite the reverse of strong. **He was not at all bold. He never put his own meaning before himself in bald abstract words: as did Aristotle and Calvin, and even Karl Marx, the hard, fearless men of thought.** Nietzsche always escaped a question by a physical metaphor, like a cheery minor poet. He said, "beyond good and evil," because he had not the courage to say, "more good than good and evil," or, "more evil than good and evil." **Had he faced his thought without metaphors, he would have seen that it was nonsense.** So, when he describes his hero, he does not dare to say, "the purer man," or "the happier man," or "the sadder man," for all these are ideas; and ideas are alarming. He says "the upper man," or "over man," a physical metaphor from acrobats or alpine climbers. Nietzsche is truly a very timid thinker. He does not really know in the least what sort of man he wants evolution to produce.

Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity on JSTOR

Nietzsche's contemptuous attitudes toward Kant's ethical theory, however, should not mislead us. For there are some fundamental and important points of agreement between the two philosophers. **Although Kant and Nietzsche maintained radically different conceptions of the will, for both the autonomy of the will is their central ethical conception. They are also equally adamant in their rejections of hedonism, utilitarianism, or any purely consequentialist theory of value.** Another point of agreement concerns their attitudes toward pity. Even though Nietzsche's critique of pity displays a richness and sophistication lacking in Kant's, Kant's conception of pity plays a significant and largely unrecognized role in Nietzsche's assessment of the value of pity. **While Nietzsche might not have precisely the same reasons as Kant, he would agree with him that pity is morally worthless, and is something right-thinking persons would "... desire to be free from."**2

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/David_Strauss:_the_Confessor_and_the_Writer#VI.

It is almost incredible that Strauss availed himself of nothing in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* while compiling his Testament of modern ideas, and that he knew only how to appeal to the coarsest realistic taste must also be numbered among the more striking characteristics of this new gospel, **the which professes to be but the result of the laborious and continuous study of history and science, and therefore tacitly repudiates all connection with philosophy.** For the Philistine captain and his "We," Kantian philosophy does not exist. **He does not dream of the fundamental antinomy of idealism and of the highly relative sense of all science and reason. And it is precisely reason that ought to tell him how little it is possible to know of things in themselves.** It is true, however, that people of a certain age cannot possibly understand Kant, especially when, in their youth, they understood or fancied they understood that "gigantic mind," Hegel, as Strauss did; and had moreover concerned themselves with Schleiermacher, who, according to Strauss, "was gifted with perhaps too much acumen." It will sound odd to our author when I tell him that, **even now, he stands absolutely dependent upon Hegel and Schleiermacher, and that his teaching of the Cosmos, his way of regarding things *sub specie biennii*, his salaams to the state of affairs now existing in Germany, and, above all, his shameless Philistine optimism,** can only be explained by an appeal to certain impressions of youth, early habits, and disorders; for he who has once sickened on Hegel and Schleiermacher never completely recovers.

https://archive.org/details/dawnofday029675mbp/page/n141/mode/2up?view=theater

The fact that the man who performs social, sympathetic, disinterested, and benevolent actions is now considered as the moral man: this is perhaps the most general effect, the most complete transformation, that Christianity has produced in Europe; **perhaps in spite of itself, and not by any means because this was part of its essential doctrine. But this was the residuum of those Christian feelings that prevailed at the time when the contrary and thoroughly selfish faith in the "one thing needful," the absolute importance of eternal and personal salvation, together with the dogmas upon which this belief had rested, were gradually receding,** and when the auxiliary beliefs in "love" and "love of one's neighbour," harmonising with the extraordinary practice of charity by the Church, were thereby coming to the front. **The more people gradually became separated from the dogmas, the more did they seek some sort of justification for this separation in a cult of the love of humanity:** not to fall short in this respect of the Christian ideal, but to excel it if possible, was the secret stimulus of all the French free-thinkers from Voltaire to Auguste Comte; **and this latter with his famous moral formula "vivre pour autrui" has indeed out-christianised even Christianity!**

It was Schopenhauer in Germany and John Stuart Mill in England who were the means of bringing into the greatest prominence this doctrine of sympathetic affections and of pity or utility to others as a principle of action; but these men themselves were only echoes. From about the time of the French Revolution these doctrines have manifested themselves in various places with enormous force. Since then they have shown themselves in their coarsest as well has their most subtle form, and all Socialistic principles have almost involuntarily taken their stand on the common ground of this doctrine. **At the present time there is perhaps no more widely spread prejudice than that of thinking that we know what really and truly constitutes morality.** Every one now seems to learn with satisfaction that society is beginning to adapt the individual to the general needs, and that it is at the same time the happiness and sacrifice of each one to consider himself as a useful member and instrument of the whole. **They have still, however, doubts as to the form in which this whole is to be looked for, whether in a state already existing, or in one which has yet to be established, or in a nation, or in an international brotherhood, or in new and small economic communities.** On this point there is still much reflection, doubt, struggling, excitement, and passion; but it is pleasant and wonderful to observe the unanimity with which the “ego” is called upon to practice self-denial, until, in the form of adaptation to the whole, it once again secures its own fixed sphere of rights and duties,—until, indeed, it has become something quite new and different. **Nothing else is being attempted, whether admitted or not, than the complete transformation, even the weakening and suppression of the individual:** the supporters of the majority never tire of enumerating and anathematising all that is bad, hostile, lavish, expensive, and luxurious in the form of individual existence that has hitherto prevailed; they hope that society may be administered in a cheaper, less dangerous, more uniform, and more harmonious way **when nothing is left but large corporations and their members.** All that is considered as good which in any way corresponds to this desire for grouping men into one particular society, and to the minor cravings which necessarily accompany this desire,—this is the chief moral current of our time; sympathy and social feelings are working hand in glove. **(Kant is still outside of this movement: he expressly teaches that we should be insensible to the sufferings of others if our benevolence is to have any moral value,—a doctrine which Schopenhauer, very angrily, as may easily be imagined, described as the Kantian absurdity.)**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/David_Strauss:_the_Confessor_and_the_Writer#VII.

"Ever remember," says Strauss, "that thou art human, not merely a natural production; ever remember that all others are human also, and, with all individual differences, the same as thou, having the same needs and claims as thyself: this is the sum and the substance of morality" (p. 277). But where does this imperative hail from? How can it be intuitive in man, seeing that, according to Darwin, man is indeed a creature of nature, and that his ascent to his present stage of development has been conditioned by quite different laws—**by the very fact that he was continually forgetting that others were constituted like him and shared the same rights with him;** by the very fact that he regarded himself as the stronger, and thus brought about the gradual suppression of weaker types. Though Strauss is bound to admit that no two creatures have ever been quite alike, and that the ascent of man from the lowest species of animals to the exalted height of the Culture-Philistine depended upon the law of individual distinctness, **he still sees no difficulty in declaring exactly the reverse in his law: "Behave thyself as though there were no such things as individual distinctions."** Where is the Strauss-Darwin morality here? Whither, above all, has the courage gone?

In the very next paragraph we find further evidence tending to show us the point at which this courage veers round to its opposite; for Strauss continues: **"Ever remember that thou, and all that thou beholdest within and around thee, all that befalls thee and others, is no disjointed fragment, no wild chaos of atoms or casualties, but that, following eternal law, it springs from the one primal source of all life, all reason, and all good: this is the essence of religion"** (pp. 277-78). Out of that "one primal source," however, all ruin and irrationality, all evil flows as well, and its name, according to Strauss, is Cosmos.

Now, how can this Cosmos, with all the contradictions and the self-annihilating characteristics which Strauss gives it, be worthy of religious veneration and be addressed by the name "God," as Strauss addresses it?—"Our God does not, indeed, take us into His arms from the outside (here one expects, as an antithesis, a somewhat miraculous process of being "taken into His arms from the inside"), but He unseals the well-springs of consolation within our own bosoms. **He shows us that although Chance would be an unreasonable ruler, yet necessity, or the enchainment of causes in the world, is Reason itself.**" (A misapprehension of which only the "We" can fail to perceive the folly; because they were brought up in the Hegelian worship of Reality as the Reasonable—that is to say, in the canonisation of success.) **"He teaches us to perceive that to demand an exception in the accomplishment of a single natural law would be to demand the destruction of the universe"** (pp. 435-36).
...

Only the smallest portion of the Straussian book—that is to say, but a few isolated pages—refer to what Strauss in all justice might call a belief, namely, **that feeling for the "All" for which he demands the piety that the old believer demanded for his God.**

...

How differently, and with what intensity of conviction, did the ancient Stoic believe in the All and the rationality of the All! And, viewed in this light, how does Strauss's claim to originality appear? But, as we have already observed, it would be a matter of indifference to us whether it were new, old, original, or imitated, so that it were only more powerful, more healthy, and more natural. Even Strauss himself leaves this double-distilled emergency-belief to take care of itself as often as he can do so, in order to protect himself and us from danger, and to present his recently acquired biological knowledge to his "We" with a clear conscience. **The more embarrassed he may happen to be when he speaks of faith, the rounder and fuller his mouth becomes when he quotes the greatest benefactor to modern men—Darwin.** Then he not only exacts belief for the new Messiah, but also for himself—the new apostle.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Use_and_Abuse_of_History_for_Life#2

Ultimately, of course, what was once possible can only become possible a second time on the Pythagorean theory, that when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again, the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail; **so when the stars have a certain relation, a Stoic and an Epicurean will form a conspiracy to murder Caesar, and a different conjunction will show another Columbus discovering America.** Only if the earth always began its drama again after the fifth act, and it were certain that the same interaction of motives, the same *deus ex machina* the same catastrophe would occur at particular intervals, could the man of action venture to look for the whole archetypic truth in monumental history, to see each fact fully set out in its uniqueness: it would not probably be before the astronomers became astrologers again. **Till then monumental history will never be able to have complete truth;** it will always bring together things that are incompatible and generalise them into compatibility, will always weaken the differences of motive and occasion.

https://www.academia.edu/9354166/Sublime_Losers_Stoicism_in_Nineteenth_Century_German_Philosophy

Nietzsche was very well versed in Stoicism. **His schooling at the famous Schulpforta gymnasium (1858-1864) and his subsequent training as a classical philologist at Bonn and then Leipzig (1864-1869) focused intensively on Stoicism.** Nietzsche was attracted to Stoicism in both theory and practice. At Schulpforta Nietzsche set fire to his own hand to demonstrate to his sceptical school friends the truth of Livy's anecdote about the Roman patriot Mucius Scaevola who thrust his hand in the Etruscan enemies' cauldron to demonstrate his indifference to pain and contempt for their threats (Livy 2. 12-13; Hayman, 1980: 28). Roman Stoics celebrated Mucius' action as worthy of greater praise than virtuous actions undertaken in safety (Seneca *Ep*. 66. 49-53). At university Nietzsche published his first three works on the sources of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*, one of the major sources of Stoic thought (See KGW II/1, 75-167; 169-90;191-245).1 **Drawing on Max Oehler's research, Nussbaum notes that Seneca and Epictetus books are among the most heavily read and annotated in his library** (Nussbaum, 1994: 149, fn 35; Oehler, 1934). **In his inaugural Basel lecture 'Homer and Classical Philology' (1869) Nietzsche memorably invoked Seneca's lament that rise of sophistic teaching had transformed philosophy, the study of wisdom, into philology, the study of mere words: *Itaque quae philosophia fuit, facta philologia est* (*Ep*. 108.23) In what he calls a "confession of faith," Nietzsche declared his intention of performing the reverse operation: turning philology into philosophy;** that is to say, of transforming a discipline that teaches us how to commentate into one that teaches us how to live (KGW 2.1. 248-269). In his first confession of faith Nietzsche endorsed Seneca's and the Stoic's conception that philosophy ought to teach us how to live, not debate.
...

Nietzsche identifies a strong family resemblance between a whole range of modern moral and political ideologies and principles, including liberalism, utilitarianism, Schopenhauer's morality of pity, **and all forms of communitarianism such as Hegel's thesis of the primacy of *Sittlichkeit*.** Nietzsche claims that these ideologies and principles are refractions of a 'herd' morality that aims to eliminate all fear in collective life. In contesting the overarching morality of his age Nietzsche explicitly singles out ancient Stoicism's ethical *eudaimonism* as a praiseworthy alternative to the 'maximin' principle (i.e. the principle of maximising the prospects of the least well-off) he believed fundamentally shapes most modern ideologies (see Rawls, 1999).

For this reason Nietzsche sees merit in Stoic philosophy precisely where Hegel and Schopenhauer found fault. As we have seen, **Hegel conceived Stoic's purely internal freedom as a way station on the road to a more complete notion of collective freedom. Hegel saw the Christian hope of metaphysical reconciliation as one step beyond Stoicism's conception of abstract freedom and his own 'communitarian' ethics as the fullest realisation of the Notion of freedom.** Schopenhauer identified the Stoic's '*nil admirari*' as a recipe for happiness that broke down before *brute factum* of the metaphysical will to life. Stoic philosophy, he held, cannot make the unbearable bearable. **In collapsing under the weight of its own internal contradictions Schopenhauer argued that**

the failure of Stoicism points towards the necessity of a complete nihilistic devaluation of life. By contrast in his positivistic period Nietzsche defends Stoicism's ethic of rational sovereignty against Christian, Hegelian and Schopenhauerian versions of modern communitarian ethics. And he also defends Stoic fortitude against the second and final stage of Schopenhauer's ethics: nihilistic life denial and resignation.

In ancient Stoic philosophy Nietzsche believed he had found a salutary reminder of an ancient ethic based on pride in oneself and love of fate that stood in sharp opposition to the self-contempt and hatred of this world that he saw as the basis of Christian and secularised versions of Christian ethics. Nietzsche therefore draws on Stoicism's ethics of individual *eudaimonism* as a plausible and appealing alternative to the collectivist moralities that he saw as the "moral undercurrent of the age" (D 132). Nietzsche laments that Stoicism had become unfashionable in the nineteenth century:

> How the overall moral judgments have shifted! **The great men of antique morality, Epictetus for instance, knew nothing of the now normal glorification of thinking of others, of living for others,** in light of our moral fashion they would have to be called downright immoral, for they strove with all their might *for* their *ego* and *against* feeling with others that is to say, with the sufferings and moral frailties of others!" (D 131)

…

Epictetus' model Stoic, he notes, "believes strictly in reason" and "<u>lacks all fear of God</u>" (D 546). For Stoics practical reason alone is sufficient to realise individual freedom and happiness. Through reason they free themselves from the emotional judgements that hold them hostage to fortune. **Nietzsche applauds Stoicism for precisely the same reason Hegel criticised it: *viz*., that the Stoic conception of freedom has no determinate content and is compatible with *any* circumstances,** including the universal enslavement characteristic of the Roman Empire:

> **Epictetus' … ideal human being … is without class and possible in every class …** He differs from the *Christian*, above all in that the Christian lives in *hope*, in the promise of inexpressible glories, in that he accepts gifts and expects and receives the best he knows at the hands of divine love and grace and not at his own hands: **while Epictetus does not hope and does not accept the best he knows as a gift** – he possesses it, he holds it bravely in his own hands, he defends it against the whole world if the world wants to rob him of it (D 546).

…

Nietzsche conceives philosophies that defend the primacy of *Sittlichkeit* and mutual recognition as intellectual masks of social timidity or fear. According to Nietzsche, what motivates this ethos is a fear of individuals who pursue their own highest flourishing independently of the collective desire for happiness or security of the greatest number (D 174; BGE 201). On this view Hegelian communitarianism merely masks a slavish need for security. **Nietzsche then celebrates Stoic ethical *eudaimonism* as an untimely reminder that <u>the communitarian morality has not always been conceived of as the highest embodiment of reason and freedom.</u>** Nietzsche genealogically debunks modern communitarianism and its Hegelian variants as expressions of a fear of freedom, rather than the *sine qua non* of freedom. As he describes it, modern ethics is a "tyranny of timidity" (D 174).
…

Nietzsche claims that by one important measure this Stoicism is a higher morality than Christian and Schopenhauerian pity:

> ***Said to be higher!* You say that the morality of pity is a higher morality than that of stoicism? Prove it!** But note that 'higher' and 'lower' in morality is not to be measured by a moral yardstick: for there is no absolute morality. So take your yardstick from elsewhere and – watch out! (D 139)

…

Nietzsche's politics opposes the principle that politics should aim to eliminate all unavoidable fear, suffering and cruelty. **Nietzsche's politics gives license instead to the pursuit of "more distant goals *even at the cost of the suffering of others*"** (D 146). **Nietzsche identifies Stoicism, with its insensibility towards suffering, one's own as much as others', as an ally in the development of his illiberal politics** (see Ure 2014).

<u>As Nietzsche's naturalistic project developed momentum in the 1880s, however, he re-evaluates Stoicism.</u> Gradually Stoicism became for Nietzsche an object of severe criticism rather than a laudable ethical *eudaimonism*. **Arguably, despite Nietzsche's explicit repudiation of Stoicism, his own ideal of *amor fati* and his doctrine of eternal recurrence are implicitly indebted to and express a type of Stoicism, in particular what Sellars calls 'cosmic Stoicism'** (see Hadot, 2002: 144-145; Sellars, 2006; Nabais, 2006: 85-96; Long 2006: 281-282; & Ure 2009). Here, however, I want to

concentrate on Nietzsche's explicit analysis of Stoicism. Nietzsche shifts from advocating Stoicism's ethical *eudaimonism* as an antidote to modern 'communitarian' morality to sharply criticising its extirpation of the passions and idealisation of tranquil self-control. **Rather than favourably contrasting Stoic *eudaimonism* against the Christian, Hegelian and Schopenhauerian moral undercurrents of his age, Nietzsche begins to criticise it against his *own* emerging ethics and politics.** By the early 1880s Nietzsche no longer sees the Stoics as sublime losers but as timid, sickly, unheroic 'winners.'
…

However, Nietzsche does not contest Stoicism exclusively on the terrain of *eudaimonism*. **After taking cognisance of Darwinian and evolutionary theories Nietzsche seeks to establish new naturalistic principles for evaluating ethical judgements and perspectives. With his turn to ethical naturalism he evaluates Stoicism in terms of its contribution to the species' preservation and power rather than individual 'happiness'. Nietzsche maintains that if we assess Stoicism from this 'naturalistic' standpoint it turns out that its *eudaimonism* is at odds with the species' needs.** Third then from this new naturalistic vantage point Nietzsche maintains that Stoicism impedes the kind of species' learning processes that take place through the passions. Stoic ethics, he implies, deprives the species of the intelligence of the emotions. **The passions Nietzsche holds are necessary conditions of existence: they help sustain and expand the species' mastery of nature.** Nietzsche shifts from endorsing Stoicism's ideal of rational self-command to criticizing and rejecting its definition of human flourishing as a pathological limitation on the cultivation and expression of the drive to power that he believes characterises all passions (BGE 198). Nietzsche takes the view that the flourishing of the highest human types requires that they cultivate and intensify the drive to power in the passions. **Against the Stoics then Nietzsche revalues the passions not only as the source of a higher type of joy, but also crucially because they are necessary conditions of the species' full flourishing.**
…

If Stoic joy (*gaudium*) is a purely internal state, a fortress heavily defended against the 'gifts of chance,' Nietzschean joy is an incorporation or mediation of 'external' goods, which requires an openness to chance, registered by passions like fear and hope. **Stoic philosophers or 'soul doctors,' Nietzsche suggests "*lied* to us about the unhappiness of passionate people … they knew very well about the superabundant happiness of this type of person, but kept deathly silence about it, since it constituted a refutation of their theory on which happiness arises only with the annihilation of passion and the silencing of the will!"** (GS 326).

Far from praising Stoic *eudaimonism* as an exception to the moral undercurrent of his age, Nietzsche now identifies it as continuous with the contemporary moral timidity that aimed at eliminating all sources of fear and danger. **If Hegelian communitarianism and Schopenhauerian pity adapt or sacrifice individuals to the whole, ensuring they pose no danger to the collective,** then the Stoic ideal of *ataraxia* eliminates those passions that might motivate individuals to risk their own or others' security and 'happiness' for the sake of a higher goal. Nietzsche now identifies Stoics as petty, weak individuals whose indifference or insensibility is motivated by a fearful prudence that seeks to limit the risk or danger of a passionate life.

Nietzsche applies this criticism to all the ancient forms of ethical *eudaimonism*: "All those moralities that address themselves to the individual for the sake of his 'happiness' … what are they but counsels for behaviour in relation to the degree of *dangerousness* in which the individual lives with himself; recipes against the passions" (BGE 198). **The Stoic's "indifference and statue like coldness against the hot-headed folly of the affects," he argues "is, measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot 'science,' much less 'wisdom,' but rather to say it once more, three more times, prudence, prudence, prudence mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity"** (BGE 198).
…

The crucial shift in Nietzsche's evaluation of *eudaimonistic* moralities like Stoicism follows a similar line of thought: **that the passions cause pain, disturbance or turmoil is not a valid objection against them if the criterion of value is species' preservation and power rather than pleasure or happiness.** "There is as much wisdom in pain" Nietzsche asserts "as in pleasure: like pleasure, pain is one of the prime *species-preserving forces*. If it weren't, it would have perished long ago: that it hurts is no argument against it … They are the heroic human beings, the great pain-bringers of humanity, those few or rare ones need the same apology as pain itself … They are eminently *species-preserving* and *species-enhancing* forces …"(GS 318). Nietzsche acknowledges that like Odysseus the "hardy seafarer 'Man' must have learnt to adjust his sails in thousand ways" **including the *Stoic* adjustment of pulling in his sails or contracting himself at the sign of great danger "otherwise he would have gone under too quickly and the ocean would have swallowed him too quickly"** (GS 318). Yet the heroic human beings who are species-preserving and species-enhancing, he claims, feel nausea at this Stoic contraction. **The true species' 'heroes' open themselves and others to pain and risk and in doing so potentially expand the species' capacity to master its environment.** For

Nietzsche the true joy that comes from philosophy is not the monotony of cloudless, trouble free skies, but the openness to the storm of the passions that expand the scope of our power and intelligence.

Nietzsche's rejection of Stoic *eudaimonism* is symptomatic of his shift away from hedonistic criteria to 'naturalistic' criteria of preservation and power. **From this new perspective Nietzsche indicts all eudaimonistic moralities, including Stoicism, because they measure the value of things in accordance with pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain, he argues, are "mere epiphenomena and wholly secondary" measures** (BGE 225). **The primary measure, he implies, is the expansion of the species' power.**
…

Nietzsche wants to test or "risk the proposition: <u>what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but rather something else – let us say health, future, growth, power, life</u>" (Nietzsche GS P 2). **Yet even as Nietzsche rejects Stoicism as a failed philosophical therapy he nevertheless seeks to retain its ideal of the philosophical physician and with it the belief that philosophy can function therapeutically.** Nietzsche hopes for the emergence of philosophical physicians who could identify the conditions of existence necessary for the health, future, growth, power and life of humanity. "I am still waiting for the philosophical *physician* in the exceptional sense of the term" he remarks "someone who set himself the task of pursuing the problem of the total health of a people, race or of humanity" (GS, P 2).

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52263/pg52263-images.html#REASON_IN_PHILOSOPHY

Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are in their opinion objections,—even refutations. That which is cannot evolve; that which evolves *is* not. Now all of them believe, and even with desperation, in Being. But, as they cannot lay hold of it, they try to discover reasons why this privilege is withheld from them. "Some merely apparent quality, some deception must be the cause of our not being able to ascertain the nature of Being: where is the deceiver?" **"We have him," they cry rejoicing, "it is sensuality!" These senses, *which in other things are so immoral,* cheat us concerning the true world.** Moral: we must get rid of the deception of the senses, of Becoming, of history, of falsehood.—History is nothing more than the belief in the senses, the belief in falsehood. **Moral: we must say "no" to everything in which the senses believe: to all the rest of mankind: all that belongs to the "people."** Let us be philosophers, mummies, monotono-theists, grave-diggers! —And above all, away with the *body,* this wretched *idée fixe* of the senses, infected with all the faults of logic that exist, refuted, even impossible, although it be impudent enough to pose as if it were real!

2. **With a feeling of great reverence I except the name of *Heraclitus.* If the rest of the philosophic gang rejected the evidences of the senses, because the latter revealed a state of multifariousness and change, he rejected the same evidence because it revealed things as if they possessed permanence and unity.** Even Heraclitus did an injustice to the senses. The latter lie neither as the Eleatics believed them to lie, nor as he believed them to lie,—they do not lie at all. The interpretations we give to their evidence is what first introduces falsehood into it; **for instance the lie of unity, the lie of matter, of substance and of permanence.** Reason is the cause of our falsifying the evidence of the senses. In so far as the senses show us a state of Becoming, of transiency, and of change, they do not lie. But in declaring that Being was an empty illusion, Heraclitus will remain eternally right. The "apparent" world is the only world: the "true world" is no more than a false adjunct thereto.

http://www.christianciv.com/Atheists_Confess.htm

> **Academic philosophers, ever since the time of Parmenides, have believed that the world is a unity. … The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this is rubbish.** I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without any unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness or any of the other properties that governesses love. **<u>Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to be said for the view that there is a world at all.</u>** … Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 98.

…

In its origin language belongs to an age of the most rudimentary forms of psychology: if we try to conceive of the first conditions of the metaphysics of language, *i.e.* in plain English, of reason, we immediately find ourselves in the midst of a system of fetichism. For here, the doer and his deed are seen in all circumstances, will is believed in as a cause in general; the ego is taken for granted, the ego as Being, and as substance, and the faith in the ego as substance is projected into all things—in this way, alone, the concept "thing" is created. Being is thought into and insinuated into everything as cause; from the concept "ego," alone, can the concept "Being" proceed. **At the beginning stands the tremendously fatal error of supposing the will to be something that actuates,—a faculty. Now we know that it is only a word.**[1]

[1] Nietzsche here refers to the concept “free will” of the Christians; this does not mean that there is no such thing as will—that is to say a powerful determining force from within.—TR.

…

In India, as in Greece, the same mistake was made: “we must already once have lived in a higher world (—instead of in a much lower one, which would have been the truth!), we must have been divine, for we possess reason!” … Nothing indeed has exercised a more simple power of persuasion hitherto than the error of Being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics for instance: in its favour are every word and every sentence that we utter!—**Even the opponents of the Eleatics succumbed to the seductive powers of their concept of Being. Among others there was Democritus in his discovery of the atom.** “Reason” in language!—oh what a deceptive old witch it has been! **I fear we shall never be rid of God, so long as we still believe in grammar.**

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/005489.html

Thus, in Nietzsche’s opinion, morality cannot be grounded in either transcendence or reason. Nietzsche is therefore cited as signaling the end of the Enlightenment, which was grounded in reason and which had already presumably ended any reliance upon the authority of the transcendent. **Nietzsche wasn’t saying anything new about God or the transcendent; he was saying something new about *reason*, which was the God of the Enlightenment.**

https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1924/lit_revo/ch08.htm

More than that. Man at last will begin to harmonize himself in earnest. He will make it his business to achieve beauty by giving the movement of his own limbs the utmost precision, purposefulness and economy in his work, his walk and his play. **He will try to master first the semiconscious and then the subconscious processes in his own organism, such as breathing, the circulation of the blood, digestion, reproduction, and, within necessary limits, he will try to subordinate them to the control of reason and will.** Even purely physiologic life will become subject to collective experiments. The human species, the coagulated *Homo sapiens*, will once more enter into a state of radical transformation, and, in his own hands, will become an object of the most complicated methods of artificial selection and psycho-physical training. **This is entirely in accord with evolution. Man first drove the dark elements out of industry and ideology, by displacing barbarian routine by scientific technique, and religion by science. Afterwards he drove the unconscious out of politics, by overthrowing monarchy and class with democracy and rationalist parliamentarianism and then with the clear and open Soviet dictatorship. The blind elements have settled most heavily in economic relations, but man is driving them out from there also, by means of the Socialist organization of economic life. This makes it possible to reconstruct fundamentally the traditional family life.** Finally, the nature of man himself is hidden in the deepest and darkest corner of the unconscious, of the elemental, of the sub-soil. Is it not self-evident that the greatest efforts of investigative thought and of creative initiative will be in that direction? **The human race will not have ceased to crawl on all fours before God, kings and capital, in order later to submit humbly before the dark laws of heredity and a blind sexual selection!** Emancipated man will want to attain a greater equilibrium in the work of his organs and a more proportional developing and wearing out of his tissues, in order to reduce the fear of death to a rational reaction of the organism towards danger. There can be no doubt that man’s extreme anatomical and physiological disharmony, that is, the extreme disproportion in the growth and wearing out of organs and tissues, give the life instinct the form of a pinched, morbid and hysterical fear of death, which darkens reason and which feeds the stupid and humiliating fantasies about life after death.
…

Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. **The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx.** And above this ridge new peaks will rise.

https://archive.org/details/10bookseverycons0000wike/page/316/mode/2up?view=theater

It might seem that Rand the atheist would also be a materialist, but in fact she quite rightly saw materialism at the foundation of modern socialism, collectivism, skepticism, and relativism. Like true conservatives, Rand rejected materialism, arguing that the proof that we human beings are creatures of both soul and body is that we use our mind to actively re-form matter according to our immaterial ideas. **Our creative intellectual power clearly manifests our spiritual nature, providing a definitive proof of the power of mind over matter.** All the technical, architectural, agricultural, mechanical, electrical artifacts of civilization that help lift us up above mere animal survival are proof-positive that materialism is false. **This is the central error of Marxists, whom Galt calls the “savages who stutter that ideas are created by men’s means of production. …”**44 **They do not see that the truth is quite the opposite: ideas create the various modes of production.** The industrialists, by virtue of mind, are “the conquerors of matter.”45

…

Classic liberalism grew out of, and was based on, the Kantian anthropology of Man as an autonomous individual, operating in self-conscious freedom, grounded in his capacity for reason. This would have been, for example, Thomas Jefferson’s understanding of human anthropology.

…

Men are no longer conscious agents grounded in reason; men are now unconscious products of their biology exercising their sovereign wills, which no one really understands. This latter functioning is now called “freedom.”

Liberalism then referees this free-for-all by application of its principle of “equality,” another Enlightenment term that has been transfigured. **Rather than referring to equal participation in national destiny and political choice, equality now means an equality of wills within society, wills among which society can make no distinctions.** So, they are all deemed “equal.” This is the anthropology of advanced liberalism, quite a different thing from that originally understood by men like Jefferson.

> https://archive.org/details/enlightenmentcon0000isra/page/466/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Another point of divergence is that **Spinoza uses the notional equivalence of each person’s individual will, like Bayle later, to buttress equality, and human universality,** which then, in turn, become principal pillars of their common moral theory, and idea of common good, as well as of their divergent political doctrines. Spinoza and Bayle, in other words, held that ‘tous les hommes veulent être heureux’ and that while this entails perennial conflict of wills and interests it is also what makes societies fearful of anarchy and willing to curb individual desires in the interest of the collective whole, inducing men to constitute moral and political systems.242 **The consequence drawn by both philosophers is that a realistic morality must be purely natural, eschewing all teleology as well as the supernatural, entrenched in the principles of individual freedom and the fundamental equality of all men.**

https://archive.org/details/declineofwest01spenuoft/page/342/mode/2up?view=theater

Even Nietzsche, that most passionate opponent of "herd morale," was perfectly incapable of limiting his zeal to himself in the Classical way. He thought only of "mankind," and he attacked everyone who differed from himself. Epicurus, on the contrary, was heartily indifferent to others’ opinions and acts and never wasted one thought on the "transformation" of mankind. He and his friends were content that *they* were as they were and not otherwise.
...

In Hellas there was a pantheon of morales as there was of deities, as the peaceful coexistence of Epicureans, Cynics and Stoics shows, **but the Nietzschean Zarathustra—though professedly standing beyond good and evil—breathes from end to end the pain of seeing men to be other than as he would have them be, and the deep and utterly un-Classical desire to devote a life to their reformation—his own sense of the word, naturally, being the only one.**

https://archive.org/details/BirthOfTragedy/page/n29/mode/2up?view=theater

The initiates in the Eleusinian mysteries hoped for a rebirth of Dionysus, which we now can understand as a premonition of the end of individuation: the initiates’ thundering song of jubilation cried out to this approaching third Dionysus. And only with this hope was there a ray of joy on the face of the fragmented world, torn apart into individuals, as myth reveals in the picture of Demeter sunk in eternal sorrow, who *rejoices* again for the first time when someone says to her that she might be able *once again* to give birth to Dionysus. In these established views we already have assembled all the components of a profound and pessimistic world view, together with the *mysterious doctrine of tragedy*: **the basic acknowledgement of the unity of all existing things, the observation that individuation is the ultimate foundation of all evil, art the joyful hope, that the spell of individuation is there for us to break, as a premonition of a re-established unity.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Klages#Thought

As a philosopher, Klages took the Nietzschean premises of *Lebensphilosophie* "to their most extreme conclusions." He drew a distinction between life-affirming *Seele* (soul) and life-destroying *Geist* (spirit or intellect). ***Geist* represented the forces of "modern, industrial, and intellectual rationalization", while *Seele* represented the possibility of overcoming "alienated intellectuality in favor of a new-found earthly rootedness."**[40]

http://kpolanyi.scoolaid.net:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10694/565/Con_13_Fol_06%20REVISED.pdf?sequence=3

Klages is Nietzsche without the Superman. Spann is Hegel shorn of his dialectic. Both omissions are so vital that they suggest a caricature rather than a portrait. But as with Klages so with Spann the change serves only to increase the reactionary effect. **Nietzsche rid of anarchist-individualism; Hegel deprived of revolutionary dynamics; the one reduced to an exalted Animalism, the other to a static Totalitarianism;** obviously the change enhances greatly the methodical usefulness of their systems from the point of view of Fascist philosophy.

https://ari.aynrand.org/issues/government-and-business/individual-rights/racism/

Racism is the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism. It is the notion of ascribing moral, social or political significance to a man's genetic lineage — the notion that a man's intellectual and characterological traits are produced and transmitted by his internal body chemistry. Which means, in practice, that a man is to be judged, not by his own character and actions, but by the characters and actions of a collective of ancestors.

Racism claims that the content of a man's mind (not his cognitive apparatus, but its *content*) is inherited; that a man's convictions, values and character are determined before he is born, by physical factors beyond his control. **This is the caveman's version of the doctrine of innate ideas — or of inherited knowledge — which has been thoroughly refuted by philosophy and science. Racism is a doctrine of, by and for brutes. It is a barnyard or stock-farm version of collectivism,** appropriate to a mentality that differentiates between various breeds of animals, but not between animals and men.

Like every form of determinism, racism invalidates the specific attribute which distinguishes man from all other living species: his rational faculty.

https://archive.org/details/scientificorigin0000gasm/page/34/mode/2up?view=theater

And this position was maintained by Haeckel and the Monists with the utmost seriousness and dedication. They held to no Hegelian ideas about history as the process of unfolding of reason, nor to any Marxian conceptions about the conquest of nature by the social and technological forces of production, nor to any Comtian stages of intellectual development. **To the Monists, rather, civilization as a distinctively human creation literally did not exist. 'History,' Haeckel wrote, is 'wrongly taken to mean' the history of 'civilization, morals etc.'** What he meant was that the ordinary history of the deeds, thoughts, and institutions of men was a pale and insignificant reflection of reality. For him, any consideration of civilization apart from nature and its laws was simply not worthwhile. **Real history, he insisted, 'joins what is called the history of the world to the stem-history of the vertebrates.'**20

https://archive.org/details/DarreRichardNeuordnungUnseresDenkens194044S.ScanFraktur_201708/page/n41/mode/2up?view=theater

Den prahlerischen Ideen des Jahres 1789, den Ideen von Gleichheit, Freiheit und Brüderlichkeit, die den Verbrecher wie den Edlen werten, **und ihrer lebensentfremdenden, die Heiligkeit des Blutes veruntreuenden Vergottung der Vernunft setzen wir entgegen das Gesetz unseres Blutes.**

…

Nietzsche had, if unconsciously, divided his allegiance between the Superman and the Blond Beast; Klages decided for the latter. **He sums up both the greatness and the limitations of his master thus: "Nietzsche was the philosopher of the Orgiastic; the rest was no good."** The "rest" means Zarathustra, Titanic Individualism, the Superman.

Klages is appalled at Nietzsche's inconsistency. He rails against Christianity – this feeble-nerved, vile, and cowardly religion of slaves in rebellion against the laws of Nature and Life, **and yet refuses to comply with these laws himself, fatuously pursuing the phantom of some "higher" and "nobler" form of existence. Nietzsche, for all his passionate aversion to Christianity, Klages suspects, never quite overcame the Christian superstition that animal life was not enough.**

…

The core of Klages's anthropology is between the *Body and the "Soul"* on the one hand, the *Mind* on the Other. Body and "Soul" belong together; for the "Soul" signified with Klages not *anima*, but *animus*: the physiological companion of the Body. The Mind stands apart; it is the principle of consciousness. **It is an inimical irruption into the Body-Soul world;** in fact, a disease. Before this fateful intrusion occurred man remained in animal harmony with his environment, a life-pervaded part of Nature. With its occurrence, consciousness starts. The Ego emerges. The "Soul" is gripped by the Mind, becomes a person – a form of parasitism on Life in which the "Soul" is reduced to a mere satellite of the Ego. But the main form in which the Mind takes hold of Life is the Will; for domination is inherent in the Mind; it is the source of all Will to Power. The urge of animal instinct is not purposive; it is more akin to the forces at work in parturition; like the *ἀνανκή* of the Greeks. **Conscience and ethics are the symptoms of a Mind-process of which Christianity is the most pernicious form. That which is called the Spirit is poison to the**

“Soul”; it is Will to Power bent on the destruction of life. When it has succeeded, the end of mankind will have come.

For Klages, psychology is emphatically not a theory of consciousness. Life is unconscious. He distinguishes six fundamental concepts in psychology; only two of which are conscious. The Body finds expression in the process of sensation and the impulse to movement; the “Soul,” in the process of contemplation and in the impulse to form (i.e., the magical or mechanical realisation of images); the Mind, in the act of apprehension and the act of volition. **The first four relating to the Body and “Soul” can take place without consciousness; they are “genuine” processes which in their totality constitute animal and human vitality. Apprehension and Will are conscious; they are the product of that extraneous and life-destroying principle, the Mind.**

This is a far cry from Nietzsche’s voluntarism. According to Nietzsche volition is a natural function of life; the Will to Power, the very embodiment of vitality. **With Klages, the Will is a product of the Mind; but the Mind is not a genuine part of vitality, it is the parent of that deadliest of all parasites of life, the Spirit which Nietzsche himself denounced in Christianity as the enemy.**

Here, then, is the Source of all the inconsistencies in Nietzsche. **In vain did he try to oppose the Will to Power to Christianity, for fundamentally they are akin.** In affirming the Will to Power, Nietzsche unwittingly reaffirmed Christianity in disguise. In the ethics of Love, the danger is not in Love, but in the Ethics. Yet, are the ethics of Zarathustra no less ethics for being antichristian? Personality is a parasite of Life, whether it is the personality of man or the Superman. Thus a mistaken psychology leads from contradiction to contradiction. **For either we must accept Will as a natural expression of vitality – and then we must affirm what Nietzsche refused to affirm, moral conscience and ethics** – or we must deny, like Klages, that the Will and the Mind are natural to man, and then we can consistently refuse, as he does, to submit to domination of the Christian “Spirit” of Love over life. Fundamentally it is the choice between two concepts of man: **man endowed with consciousness and man devoid of it. The position of Vitalism cannot be doubtful: natural man and natural society do not involve the individual consciousness.** The reality of man lies in his capacity not to be a person.1

> 1. The formation of images by the still uncorrupted “Soul” is a central part of this anthropology. It is part of a theory of the Eros which is presented as an emotional ecstasy of a universal and essentially non-possessive nature, only superficially related to sexuality.

…

The vast influence of Nietzsche on modern National-Socialism is due to a considerable extent to the conviction induced by Klages’s life work that Nietzsche’s Vitalism can be – logically, must be – detached from Individualism.

---

https://creation.com/monkey-minds

Interestingly, **many evolutionists acknowledge that evolution would predispose us to hold false beliefs.** Yet they only seem to trade on this insight when it is convenient for them, when they are trying to dismiss ideas that they don’t like, such as Christianity. **For example, Darwin himself, when he experienced a lingering conviction that a Designer was necessary to explain the world, brushed aside his own thoughts in this way:**

> “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. **Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?**”[5]

But Darwin was inconsistent to selectively doubt his reasoning powers only when they led him to God. If evolution really proves that human reasoning is thoroughly unreliable, then evolutionists ought to doubt every belief at which they arrive through reason, including all scientific knowledge, and even evolution itself.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Spencer#Synthetic_philosophy

Spencer's philosophical system seemed to demonstrate that it was possible to believe in the ultimate perfection of humanity on the basis of advanced scientific conceptions such as the first law of thermodynamics and biological evolution.

In essence, Spencer's philosophical vision was formed by a combination of deism and positivism. On the one hand, he had imbibed something of eighteenth-century deism from his father and other members of the Derby Philosophical Society and from books like George Combe's immensely popular *The Constitution of Man* (1828). **This treated the world as a cosmos of benevolent design, and the laws of nature as the decrees of a 'Being transcendentally kind.' Natural laws were thus the statutes of a well-governed universe that had been decreed by the Creator with the intention of promoting human happiness.** Although Spencer lost his Christian faith as a teenager and later rejected any 'anthropomorphic' conception of the Deity, he nonetheless held fast to this conception at an almost subconscious level. At the same time, however, he owed far more than he would ever acknowledge to positivism, in particular in its conception of a philosophical system as the unification of the various branches of scientific knowledge.
...

Bertrand Russell stated in a letter to Beatrice Webb in 1923: **'I don't know whether [Spencer] was ever made to realize the implications of the second law of thermodynamics; if so, he may well be upset. The law says that everything tends to uniformity and a dead level, diminishing (not increasing) heterogeneity'.**[23]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5X-46TqjDv0C&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA155#v=onepage&q&f=false

Alongside Foucault stands Gilles Deleuze (1925-95), who engaged explicitly with the Stoics in his 1969 book *Logique du sens*. There, his principal interest in the Stoics is twofold: they offer a theory of meaning or sense as a non-existing entity (i.e. the incorporeal sayables or *lekta*), **and they offer a decidedly anti-Platonic image of the philosopher. For Deleuze, the Stoics stand at the beginning of a tradition of philosophy of immanence that opposes the transcendence of Platonism,** a tradition that runs through Spinoza and Nietzsche and up to Deleuze himself.
...

In *Mille plateaux* we find a complex physics of flows and forces, **combined with an ethic to dismantle the boundaries between self and cosmos,** reminiscent of passages in Marcus Aurelius along with a politics of cosmopolitanism. Although the differences from Stoicism are many, *Mille plateaux* nevertheless contains a number of unexpected echoes of some of the central themes of ancient Stoicism. **Indeed, such echoes can be found throughout Deleuze's work, some coming directly from the Stoa, others mediated via Spinoza and Nietzsche (both important influences on Deleuze).** Like Nietzsche before him, one of Deleuze's principal philosophical projects is to construct **a philosophy of immanence that can stand as a genuine alternative to the Platonic tradition. The Stoics were the first, claims Deleuze, to offer any such alternative.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT496#v=onepage&q&f=false

Foucault is neither a historian of ancient philosophy or culture (like Hadot) nor a philosopher going back to ancient doctrines to fuel his own (like Deleuze). He rather uses history to question our contemporary conception of ourselves as subjects, which is the outcome of a "factitious history that would display a sort of continuous development of knowledge of the self" (Foucault 2001: 442; 2005: 461).
...

He distinguishes three ancient connections between care of the self and knowledge of oneself. The fame of the first two, the Platonic model of reminiscence and the Christian model of exegesis, resulted in the ignorance of a third model, the Hellenistic constitution of the self as a goal to reach (Foucault 2001: 245-8; 2005: 256-9). **The first two models are based on the requirement to know oneself, to reach the truth about oneself,** which, according to Foucault, was connected to the production of a subjected self (or obeying subject), just like its modern equivalents (Potte-Bonneville 2004: 174-93).
...

This agenda explains why Foucault insists so much, and sometimes too much given their common Socratic background, on the differences between the Platonic and the Stoic modalities of the care of the self. This focus is in turn a strong hint that Foucault's interest in Stoicism has a common thread with Deleuze's, despite their very different approaches and choices of Stoic texts. **For Deleuze equally stresses Stoic anti-Platonism:** Plato pictures the philosopher as ironic and ascending to a position high above the ground, whereas the Stoic philosopher practices humor and wanders on the surface of the world, like Heracles (Deleuze 1969: 152-66; 1990: 127-41). According to Foucault, Platonism amounts to the subordination of the care of the self to a global knowledge of oneself, which requires a conversion to a transcendent reality: this is the reminiscence model (Foucault 2001: 201-2; 2005 209-10), which overshadowed the Hellenistic model.

Deleuze and Foucault also insist on this opposition because they have contemporary adversaries that they see as heirs of Platonism, chiefly phenomenology, which leads us back to the philosophical debate between subject and structure. As already noted, **Deleuze blames Husserl for betraying the Stoic inspiration** and reducing meaning to concept and the transcendental field to consciousness (Deleuze 1969: 117-18; 1990: 96-7). To Foucault, Husserl is a prominent example of someone who views philosophy as a great, continuous and deepening search for self-knowledge (Foucault 2001: 443; 2005: 461). Another, more ambivalent, adversary is psychoanalysis. **While Deleuze is not as critical of Freud in *Logic of Sense* as he and Guattari will be a few years later in *Anti-Oedipus*, he already offers to read psychoanalysis in a Stoic and structuralist way as a "science of pure events" by equating phantasms with events and minimizing as irrelevant or uninteresting the search for the causes or the deep meaning of phantasms** (Deleuze 1969: 245-7; 1990: 210-12).
…

In his lectures about Hellenistic philosophy, **Foucault is similarly offering to read Epicurean or Stoic texts as ancient instances of *ars theoretica* which show that men have not always tried to achieve autonomy through knowledge of themselves.** Foucault questions this "scientific" model, on which both psychoanalysis and Marxism still rely, and wants to invent a different type of knowledge that could undermine power in various fields, because he thinks the Platonic and Christian models of self-knowledge and their offshoots are bound to reinforce *subjectivation* as social power. **By contrast, according to Foucault, Hellenistic and Roman philosophers do not oppose knowing nature and knowing oneself, as Socrates does in Plato's *Alcibiades*:** they are not looking for the proper object of knowledge but for a proper way of knowing, which delivers rules of conduct and self-transformation and which Foucault calls "spiritual knowledge [*savoir spirituel*]" (Foucault 2001: 295; 2005: 308). **According to this model, the care of the self is not subordinate to knowledge of oneself obtained through reminiscence or self-exegesis and does not shy away from the world:** "all the objectives of traditional Stoic morality are in fact not only compatible with, but can only really be attained, can only be met and accomplished at the cost of the knowledge of nature that is, at the same time, knowledge of the totality of the world. We can only arrive at the self by having passed through the great cycle of the world" (Foucault 2001: 255; 2005: 266).

Despite the apparent similarity between their perspectives, **Hadot criticized Foucault for misinterpreting Stoicism as self-oriented and aesthetical, thus ignoring its ambition to overcome the self and ascend to universal reason** (Hadot 1995: 206-12).
…

Still, Foucault describes knowledge of the world as a way, or a means, of caring for oneself, whereas Hadot sees it as a way of transcending the self. One could explain the difference by the fact that **Foucault is more concerned with practices than philosophical tenets, but also by Hadot's somewhat Neoplatonic perspective.** For Roman Stoics, knowing nature and following reason allows you to get rid of you emotions and subjective biases about the world, but not your self: you should never lose sense of your individual abilities and duties arising from your nature, social position and biography.
…

This confirms that Foucault's appropriation of Stoicism is as much ethical as epistemological, since it is concerned with the definition of knowledge as an art, **in which truth is not an end in itself but a way of transforming oneself to act in the world.** Foucault appears to find eventually in Stoicism something similar to what Deleuze put forward, namely an anti-Platonic conception of philosophy as an art capable of grasping what is happening to us here and now and of preparing us to make the best of it. **Foucault thus describes the ancient Stoic as an "athlete of the event" (as opposed to the Christian "athlete of himself") and compares Stoic exercises to what can be found in Zen** (Foucault 2001: 308, 213; 2005: 322, 222). This is clearly reminiscent of Deleuze's analysis of the Stoic sage's handling of events (Deleuze 1969: 171-2; 1990: 148-9), which already mentioned Zen.

---

https://www.garynorth.com/freebooks/docs/html/gnbd/appendix_e.htm

The foundation of Stoic philosophy was a denial of the Creator-creature distinction. Its outlook was summed up by Epictetus:

> "*When a man has learnt to understand the government of the universe and has realized that there is nothing so great or sovereign or all-inclusive as this frame of things wherein man and God are united … why should he not call himself a citizen of the universe and a son of God?*"(58)

https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0236%3Atext%3Ddisc%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D19

Let any of you show me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to blame[8] either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about any thing, not to consider himself damaged by any thing, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous; **and why should I not say it direct? desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellowship with Zeus.**[9]

https://archive.org/details/stoicphilosophy210murr/page/26/mode/2up?view=theater

We are led to a very definite and complete Pantheism. The Sceptic begins to make his usual objections. "God in worms?" he asks. "God in fleas and dung beetles?" **And, as usual, the objector is made to feel sorry that he spoke.** "Why not?" the Stoic answers; "cannot an earthworm serve God? Do you suppose that it is only a general who is a good soldier? Cannot the lowest private or camp attendant fight his best and give his life for his cause? Happy are you if you are serving God, and carrying out the great purpose as truly as such-and-such an earthworm?" That is the conception. **All the world is working together. It is all one living whole, with one soul through it. And, as a matter of fact, no single part of it can either rejoice or suffer without all the rest being affected. The man who does not see that the good of every living creature is his good, the hurt of every living creature his hurt, is one who wilfully makes himself a kind of outlaw or exile; he is blind, or a fool.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indra%27s_net

The metaphor of Indra's net of jewels plays an essential role in the metaphysics of the Chinese Buddhist Huayan school,[10] where it is used to describe **the interpenetration or "perfect interfusion" (Chinese: *yuánróng*,) of microcosmos and macrocosmos,** as well as the interfusion of all dharmas (phenomena) in the entire universe.[5]
...

Timothy Brook uses the metaphor:

> Buddhism uses a similar image to describe the interconnectedness of all phenomena. It is called Indra's Net. When Indra fashioned the world, he made it as a web, and at every knot in the web is tied a pearl. Everything that exists, or has ever existed, every idea that can be thought about, every datum that is true—every dharma, in the language of Indian philosophy—is a pearl in Indra's net. **Not only is every pearl tied to every other pearl by virtue of the web on which they hang, but on the surface of every pearl is reflected every other jewel on the net.** Everything that exists in Indra's web implies all else that exists.[23]

...

In *Indra's Net* (2014), Rajiv Malhotra uses the image of Indra's net as a metaphor for

> the profound cosmology and outlook that permeates Hinduism. Indra's Net symbolizes the universe as a web of connections and interdependences [...] I seek to revive it as the foundation for Vedic cosmology and show **how it went on to become the central principle of Buddhism, and from there spread into mainstream Western discourse across several disciplines.**[26]

https://archive.org/details/theistsatheiststst0000moln/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

We reach the core of the pantheistic position when when we say that the world (world-all, universe, cosmos) is the only being that is Being, and there is nothing outside this Being. We recognize here the position of Parmenides from Elea (ca. 540-470 B.C.) and of the Stoics. For Parmenides, Being fills everything, non-being in inconceivable; Being has been from all eternity since it cannot have arisen out of the inconceivable which is also non-existent. **The Stoics held that only the World-Soul exists and it permeates everything so that the world is identical with it, with the one Being.** Justus Lipsius, the sixteenth century Stoic, argued in his *Physiologia* that the World-Soul constructed both itself and the world. Parmenides and the Stoics perceived, of course, like everybody else, the multiplicity of this world's objects and experiences; conceptually, however, they reduced this multiplicity to 'Nature' or 'World-Soul.' **In the third century, one of the Church's early philosophers, Lactantius, argued against this thesis by pointing out that the Stoics intermingle Nature, World, God, Mind, Body, and a work well executed, all as one Being.**
...

They share the same soul or spirit (*pneuma*), or the same corporeal nature, as the Stoics taught who did not clearly distinguish between matter and the World-Soul permeating it. The belief in the exclusivity and universality of matter permeated by spirit (so that the World-All is also wholly sentient), is illustrated by Van der Leeuw who mentions tribes where death is always regarded as violent since there can be no natural death other than by magic or by some other supernatural action.4

https://archive.org/details/alberunisindiaac01brnm/page/252/mode/2up?view=theater

> **The Zanj are so uncivilised that they have no notion of a natural death.** If a man dies a natural death, they think he was poisoned. Every death is suspicious with them, if a man has not been killed by a weapon.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction-lectures.htm

> **Death itself is looked upon by the Negroes as no universal natural law; even this, they think, proceeds from evil-disposed magicians.**

https://archive.org/details/humanalltohuman033380mbp/page/n131/mode/2up?view=theater

> **In those times people knew nothing of natural laws;** neither for earth nor for heaven is there a "must"; a season, the sunshine, the rain may come or may not come. In short, every idea of natural causality is lacking. **When one rows, it is not the rowing that moves the boat, but rowing is only a magical ceremony by which one compels a *dæmon* to move the boat. All maladies, even death itself, are the result of magical influences. Illness and death never happen naturally; the whole conception of "natural sequence" is lacking,**—it dawned first amongst the older Greeks, that is, in a very late phase of humanity, in the conception of *Moira,* enthroned above the gods.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.21897/page/n93/mode/2up?view=theater

But while the Stoics regarded our universe as an island of being in an ocean of void, they did not admit the possibility that other such islands might exist beyond our ken. The spectacle of the starry heavens, which presented itself nightly to their gaze in all the brilliancy of a southern sky – that was all there was of being; beyond that lay nothingness. **Democritus or the Epicureans might dream of other worlds, but the Stoics contended for the unity of the cosmos,**1 **as staunchly as the Mahometans for the unity of God; for with them the cosmos was God.**
...

In the 'efflagration,' when everything went back to the primeval aether, the universe would be pure soul and alive equally through and through. In this subtle and attenuated state it would require more room than before, and so expand into the void, contracting again when another period of cosmic generation had set in. Hence the Stoic definition of the Void or Infinite as 'that into which the cosmos is resolved at the efflagration.'

In this theory of the contraction of the universe out of an ethereal state and ultimate return to the same condition one sees a resemblance to the modern scientific hypothesis of the origin of our planetary system out of the solar nebula and its predestined end in the same. **Especially is this the case with the form in which the theory was held by Cleanthes, who pictured the heavenly bodies as hastening to their own destruction by dashing themselves, like so many gigantic moths, into the sun.** Cleanthes however did not conceive mere mechanical force to be at work in this matter. **The grand apotheosis of suicide which he foresaw was a voluntary act; for the heavenly bodies were Gods, and were willing to lose their own in a larger life.**1

Thus all the deities except Zeus were mortal, or at all events, perishable. Gods, like men, were destined to have an end some day. **They would melt in the great furnace of being as though they wore made of wax or tin. Zeus then would be left alone with his own thoughts,**2 **or as the Stoics sometimes put it, Zeus would fall back upon Providence.** For by Providence they meant the leading principle or mind of the whole, and by Zeus, as distinguished from Providence, this mind together with the cosmos, which was to it as body. In the efflagration the two would be fused into one in the single substance of aether.3 And then in the fulness of time there would be a restitution of all things. Everything would come round again exactly as it had been before.1

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics

On the one hand, soul is corporeal, else it would have no real existence, would be incapable of extension in three dimensions (and therefore of equable diffusion all over the body), incapable of holding the body together, as the Stoics contended that it does, herein presenting a sharp contrast to the Epicurean tenet that it is the body which confines and shelters the light vagrant atoms of soul. **On the other hand, this corporeal thing is veritably and identically reason, mind, and ruling principle (λόγος, νοῦς, ἡγεμονικόν); in virtue of its divine origin Cleanthes can say to Zeus, "We too are thy offspring," and a Seneca can calmly insist that, if man and God are not on perfect equality, the superiority rests rather on our side.**
...

Finally, the same cause, a relaxation of tension, accounts for sleep, decay and death of man and for the dissolution of the world; after death the disembodied soul can only maintain its separate existence, even

for a limited time, by mounting to that region of the universe which is akin to its nature. **It was a moot point whether all souls so survive, as Cleanthes thought, or the souls of the wise and good alone, which was the opinion of Chrysippus; in any case, sooner or later individual souls are merged in the soul of the universe, from which they proceeded.**

> https://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html
>
> **The Stoics (wanting to say more singular things than others on this subject) deny that the souls are absolutely imperishable, but then say that those of fools are destroyed immediately after the parting of the body, while those of virtuous men survive, though they too are destroyed sometime.**

---

https://www.basicincome.com/bp/pantheismcertainlyis.htm

Pantheism is congenial to our minds not because it is the final stage in a slow process of enlightenment, but because it is almost as old as we are. It may even be the most primitive of all religions, and the *orenda* of a savage tribe has been interpreted by some to be an "all-pervasive spirit." It is immemorial in India. **The Greeks rose above it only at their peak, in the thought of Plato and Aristotle; their successors relapsed into the great Pantheistic system of the Stoics.**

> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Stoics
>
> **The most real realities to Plato and Aristotle had been thought and the objects of thought, νοῦς and νοητά, whether abstracted from sensibles or inherent in "matter," as the incognizable basis of all concrete existence. But this was too great an effort to last long. Such spiritualistic theories were nowhere really maintained after Aristotle and outside the circle of his immediate followers. The reaction came and left nothing of it all; for five centuries the dominant tone of the older and the newer schools alike was frankly materialistic. "If," says Aristotle, "there is no other substance but the organic substances of nature, physics will be the highest of the sciences," a conclusion which passed for axiomatic until the rise of Neoplatonism.**
>
> http://www.scifiwright.com/2010/08/the-war-against-the-war-between-science-and-faith-revisited/
>
> In later times, the Jews lacked the Christian notion that Jesus was the *monogenes* or *unigenitus*, the only-begotten of God. **Pantheists like the Greeks tended to identify the *monogenes* or *unigenitus* with the universe itself, or with the heavens.** Jaki writes:
>
> > Herein lies the tremendous difference between Christian monotheism on the one hand and Jewish and Muslim monotheism on the other. **This explains also the fact that it is almost natural for a Jewish or Muslim intellectual to become a pantheist.** About the former Spinoza and Einstein are well-known examples. As to the Muslims, it should be enough to think of the Averroists.
>
> …
>
> Philo, a contemporary of Jesus, tried to interpret the first chapter of Genesis, but his view "showed him closer to Greek eternalism than to Biblical creationism." The earliest *midrashim* "showed that Jewish theologians were no longer willing to uphold the doctrine of the complete submission of matter to the Maker of all." In the Mutazalite tradition of Islam there was also a tendency to slide towards emanationism and pantheism, as a result of endorsing the pantheistic necessitarianism of Aristotle. **Jaki clearly affirms that in Christianity, a slide into pantheism was prevented because the doctrine of the creation was bolstered up by faith in the Incarnation.**

Modern Europe escaped it only while she remained predominantly Christian; with Giordano Bruno and Spinoza it returned. With Hegel it became almost the agreed philosophy of highly educated people, while the more popular Pantheism of Wordsworth, Carlyle and Emerson conveyed the same doctrine to those on a slightly lower cultural level. So far from being the final religious refinement, Pantheism is in fact the permanent natural bent of the human mind; the permanent ordinary level below which man sometimes sinks, under the influence of priestcraft and superstition, but above which his own unaided efforts can never raise him for very long. **Platonism and Judaism, and Christianity (which has incorporated both) have proved the only things capable of resisting it. It is the attitude into which the human mind automatically falls when left to itself.** No wonder we find it congenial. If "religion" means simply what man says about God, and not what God does about man, then Pantheism

almost *is* religion. And “religion” in that sense has, in the long run, only one really formidable opponent—namely Christianity. **Modern philosophy has rejected Hegel** and modern science started out with no bias in favour of religion; but they have both proved quite powerless to curb the human impulse toward Pantheism. It is nearly as strong today as it was in ancient India or in ancient Rome. Theosophy and the worship of the life-force are both forms of it: **even the German worship of a racial spirit is only Pantheism truncated or whittled down to suit barbarians.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MO4GEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false

On the contrary, modern Confucians believed that the soul dies when the body dies. Ricci suggested that this new, incorrect theory came from Buddhism, named ‘sect of idols,’ whose adepts spread in China the hideous theory that:

> **all this world is composed of a single substance, whose creator along with the sky and the earth, men and animals, trees and herbs, the four elements, are all one continuous body being these its members. From this one substance they [the Chinese] draw the charity that we are supposed to have mutually, because all men are similar to God, being them out of his substance.** We are confuting this theory not only through arguments, but even making use of the authority of their ancient [philosophers], who taught a deeply different doctrine.81

This paragraph is probably the first effective description of the Buddhist theory of *pratītyasumutpāda* that reached European thinkers. This theory claims the dependent origination of all things from one substance; hence everything is only an accident of this substance.

> https://books.google.fi/books?id=tVLt99uleLwC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false
>
> I would now like to supplement Keown’s excellent work by proposing that one can discern the operation of practical reason in the Buddha’s eight-fold path and also in one of his most famous sayings: “They who know causation (*pratītyasumutpāda*) know the Dharma.”52 Let us unpack the meaning of this pithy proposition. First, **a better translation of the Sanskrit phrase *pratītyasumutpāda* is “interdependent coorigination.”** Second, the word “Dharma” can be translated as “truth,” “moral law,” or “righteousness.” The word fuses the worlds of facts and values. Sometimes the the term is used to describe basic moments of reality, an anticipation of the quanta of energy of contemporary physics. Dharmas in this sense are not substantial things but events and processes. **Whereas the elements of Hume’s field of experience are externally related and brought together by custom and habit, the Buddha’s field of experience is dominated by internal relations, that is, relations of interdependence. To put it in other terms, Hume was captured by a mechanistic worldview of inert atoms bouncing around in empty space, but the Buddha embraced what is best called an organic, holistic, interdependent world,** one that has been reaffirmed in many disciplines, including contemporary physics. The Buddhist virtue of compassion (*karuṇā*) is based on the interrelatedness of all life, and this was the fundamental moral discovery of the Buddha’s Enlightenment. **The Buddha realized that compassion and sympathy can have no meaning if Sāṃkhya *puruṣa*, Jain *jīva*, or Vedāntist *ātman* are, as these schools hold, independent substances.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=MO4GEAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false

Following the reviews of the *Confucius sinarum philosophus*, he also presented the two Buddhist doctrines and Buddha’s deathbed confession (see §2.1.). Bayle confirmed the atheism of the inner doctrine, that of emptiness:

> Whether it is already monstrous to suggest that plants, animals and men are effectively the same thing and to base that [idea] on the claim that each particular being is detached from its principle, it is even more monstrous to assert that this principle does not have thought, power or virtue … **Even Spinoza was not so absurd** … (ibid., rem. B, 254-5)92

Bayle judged Buddhist theory as untenable, because the first principle was immanent to nature, as for Spinoza, but different from the Dutch philosopher, this Buddhist principle was lacking the active power of Substance to create accidents.

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/17147/17147-h/17147-h.htm#page77

7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the West that still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers which disputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They were dubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author, who was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, **and who appeared to be the one of all his race that penetrated**

furthest into Aristotle's meaning. This Commentator, extending what Greek expositors had already taught, maintained that according to Aristotle, and even according to reason (and at that time the two were considered almost identical) there was no case for the immortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The human kind is eternal, according to Aristotle, therefore if individual souls die not, one must resort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher. Or, if there are always new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls existing from all eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, according to the doctrine of the same Aristotle. **Therefore it is a necessary conclusion that the souls, that is, the forms of organic bodies, must perish with the bodies, or at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs to each one individually.** Thus there will only remain the active understanding common to all men, which according to Aristotle comes from outside, and which must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as the wind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ pipes.

8. **Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof.** It is not true that Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity of the human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinity is impossible. **Yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst Aristotelians, and induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunary intelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation in it. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so far as to advocate a universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this universal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are born and die.** According to this opinion the souls of animals are born by being separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body which they can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when the body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. **Many even went so far as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thought that this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very ancient and apt to dazzle the common herd.** It is expressed in these beautiful lines of Vergil (*Aen.*, VI, v. 724):

Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra,
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum.

And again elsewhere (*Georg.*, IV, v. 221):

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri.

9. **Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, but there is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soul which swallows all the rest.** Those who are of this opinion might be called 'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only one soul that subsists. **M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion almost universally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States of the Grand Mogul;** it appears even that it has gained a footing with the Cabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth, converted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name Moses Germanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinoza revived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confuted this proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. **It is known that Spinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual souls are but transient modifications.** Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau in Saxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have it that he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; as was also a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain quite pleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of epigrams, which have just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' doctrine of deification was liable to such a sinister interpretation. Gerson already has written opposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose intention was evidently good and whose expressions are excusable. **But it would be better to write in a manner that has no need of excuses:** although I confess that oft-times expressions which are extravagant, and as it were poetical, have greater force to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement.

10. **The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, carried to great lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled irreligion in certain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the Quietism of Foë, originator of a great Chinese sect. After having preached his religion for forty years, when he felt death was approaching, he declared to his disciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil of metaphors, and that all reduced itself to Nothingness, which he said was the first source of all things. That was still worse, so it would seem, than the opinion of the Averroists.** Both of these doctrines are indefensible and even

extravagant; nevertheless some moderns have made no difficulty about adopting this one and universal Soul that engulfs the rest. It has met with only too much applause amongst the so-called freethinkers, and M. de Preissac, a soldier and man of wit, who dabbled in philosophy, at one time aired it publicly in his discourses.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=LT5WAAAAYAAJ&hl=fi&pg=PA44#v=onepage&q&f=false

But there arose since his Time another g Philosopher, whose impious Notions at length prevail'd; and have continue'd to this day to be the opinions most commonly receiv'd. His * Disciples have an *exterior Doctrine*, which they preach to the People, to retain them, say they, in their Duty; and which consists in teaching, **that there is a real Difference between *Good*, and *Evil*; *Just*, and *Unjust*:** and that there is another Life, where every one shall be punish'd or rewarded, according to that which he hath done in this. **But their || *interior Doctrine*, which is only for the *initiated*; is upon the upshot a kind of *Spinosism*; which at once entirely expunges both Religion, and Morality.**

https://dailystoic.com/stoicism-buddhism/

As philosopher and author Nassim Taleb once wrote on the similarities between the two: "A Stoic is a Buddhist with attitude."

---

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.57913/page/n375/mode/2up?view=theater

The quintessence of **this thoroughly worldly and unmetaphysical thought** is to be found in the famous sermon near Benares, the Four Noble Truths that won the prince-philosopher his first adherents.2 **Its roots lay in the rationalist-atheistic Sankhya philosophy, the world-view of which it tacitly accepts, just as the social ethic of the 19th Century comes from the Sensualism and Materialism of the 18th and the Stoa (in spite of its superficial exploitation of Heraclitus) is derived from Protagoras and the Sophists. In each case it is the all-power of Reason that is the starting-point from which to discuss morale,** and religion (in the sense of belief in anything metaphysical) does not enter into the matter. **Nothing could be more irreligious than these systems in their original forms**—and it is these, and not derivatives of them belonging to later stages of the Civilizations, that concern us here.
...

As the Stoic appropriated Heraclitus's idea of Logos and flattened it to a materialist sense, as the Socialism based on Darwin has mechanicalized (with the aid of Hegel) Goethe's deep idea of development, **so Buddhism treated the Brahman notion of *Karma*, the idea (hardly achievable in our thought) of a being actively completing itself. Often enough it regarded this quite materially as a world-stuff under transformation.**
...

Stoicism is directed to *individual self-management*, to statuesque and purely present being, without regard to future or past or neighbour. Socialism is the dynamic treatment of the same theme; it is defensive like Stoicism, but what it defends is not the pose but the working-out of the life; and more, it is offensive-defensive, for with a powerful thrust into distance it spreads itself into all future and over all mankind, which shall be brought under one single regimen. Buddhism, which only a mere dabbler in religious research could compare with Christianity,1 is hardly reproducible in words of the Western languages. **But it is permissible to speak of a Stoic Nirvana and point to the figure of Diogenes, and even the notion of a Socialist Nirvana has its justification in so far that European weariness covers its flight from the struggle for existence under catchwords of world-peace, Humanity and brotherhood of Man.**

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.41741/page/n323/mode/2up?view=theater

Of the real teaching of Buddha little can be now ascertained—for it all appears in the colours of the later fellah-religion baptized by his name—**but one of the unquestionably authentic ideas concerning "conditioned arising"**3 **is the derivation of suffering *from ignorance*—ignorance, namely, of the "Four Noble Truths." This is true rationalism. Nirvana, for them, is a purely intellectual release and corresponds exactly with the "Autarkeia" and "Eudaimonia" of the Stoics.** It is that condition of the understanding and waking-consciousness for which Being no longer is.

The great ideal of the educated of such periods is the Sage. The sage goes back to Nature—to Ferney or Ermenonville, to Attic gardens or Indian groves—which is the most intellectual way of being a megalopolitan. **The sage is the man of the Golden Mean. His askesis consists in a judicious depreciation of the world in favour of meditation.** The wisdom of the enlightenment never interferes with comfort. Moral with the great Myth to back it is always a sacrifice, a cult, even to extremes of asceticism, even to death; but Virtue with Wisdom at its back is a sort of secret enjoyment, a superfine intellectual egoism. **And so the ethical teacher who is outside real religion becomes the Philistine. Buddha, Confucius, Rousseau, are arch-Philistines, for all the nobility of their ordered ideas, and the pedantry of the Socratic life-wisdom is insurmountable.**

...

The system of Lakayata was the prolongation of the contempt for a de-souled world which had been the common characteristic of Gotama Buddha, Mahavira, and the contemporary Pietists, and which they in turn had derived from Sankhya atheism. Socrates is alike the heir of the Sophists and the ancestor of the Cynic itinerants and of Pyrrhonian skepsis. All are manifestations of the superiority of the megalopolitan intellect that has done with the irrational for good and all and despises any waking-consciousness that still knows or acknowledges mysteries.

https://buddhistsocialism.weebly.com/conclusion-ndash-changing-everything-buddhist-influence-in-the-work-of-marx.html

What Marx appears to do is 'lift-out' the central core of the Buddha's 'materialist' interpretation of history, and applied it to the very different conditions within which he lived. **This is why the outer content of the Marxist theory is entirely different to the Buddha's teaching, and yet the underlying vision of reality is exactly the same. Mind is not separate from matter and any assumption that it is – is nothing but religious delusion and illusion! Marx and Buddha agree that 'mind' is entirely dependent upon (functioning) organic 'matter' for its presence and continued existence.** Mind 'emerges' from the brain, and is therefore, an extension of matter. This explains why the Buddha describes a number of categories of thought as being comprised entirely of 'matter'. Thought, for Marx and Buddha is a form of 'rarefied' matter, with the functioning brain being a special organisation of organic matter. Marx and Engels state:

> 'Or does critical criticism believe that it has even begun to grasp historical reality when it continuous to exclude from the moment of history the theoretical and practical relations of men to nature, natural science and industry? Or does it think it has in fact already understood any period without having understood for example the industry of that period, the immediate mode of production of life itself? **Of course, spiritualistic, theological critical criticism knows only (at least it imagines it does) the main political, literary and theological events of history. Just as it separates thinking from the senses, the soul from the body, and itself from the world, so it separates history from natural science and industry, and sees history's point of origin not in coarse material production on the earth, but vaporous clouds in the heavens.**'
>
> Karl Marx: *Holy Family* (1845) – Quoted from: Alfred Schmidt: *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, Verso, (2014) – Page 21

https://archive.org/details/recordofbuddhist00ichi/page/n21/mode/2up?view=theater

If I have gladly given my time and help to you as formerly to Kasawara and Bunyiu Nanjio, it was not only for the sake of our University, to which you had come to study Sanskrit and Pâli, but in the hope that a truly scholarlike study of Buddhism may be revived in Japan, and that your countrymen may in time be enabled to form a more intelligent and historical conception of the great reformer of the ancient religion of India. **Religions, like everything else, require reform from time to time; and if Buddha were alive in our days he would probably be the first to reform the abuses that have crept into the Buddhism of Tibet, China, and Japan, as well as of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. A reformed Buddhism, such as I look forward to, would very considerably reduce the interval which now separates you from other religions,** and would help in the distant future to bring about a mutual understanding and kindly feeling between those great religions of the world in place of the antagonism and the fiendish hatred that have hitherto prevailed among the believers in Christ, in Buddha, and Mohammed—a disgrace to humanity, an insult to religion, and a lasting affront to those who came to preach peace on earth, and good will toward men.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Sikhism

Nanak, like Buddha, revolted against a religion overladen with ceremonial and social restrictions, and both rebelled against the tyranny of the priesthood. The tendency of each religion was to quietism, but their separate doctrines were largely influenced by the surroundings of their founders. **Buddha lived in the centre of Hindu India and among the many gods of the Brahmans. These he rejected, he knew of nought else, and in his theological system there was found no place for divinity. Nanak was born in the province which then formed the borderland between Hinduism and Islam.** He taught that there was one God; but that God was neither Allah nor Ram, but simply God; neither the special god of the Mahommedan, nor of the Hindu, but the God of the universe, of all mankind and of all religions. **Starting from the unity of God, Nanak and his successors rejected the idols and incarnations of the Hindus, and on the ground of the equality of all men rejected also the system of caste.** The doctrines of Sikhism as set forth in the *Granth* (*q.v.*) are that it prohibits idolatry, hypocrisy, class exclusiveness, the concremation of widows, the immurement of women, the use of wine and other intoxicants, tobacco-smoking, infanticide, slander and pilgrimages to the sacred rivers

and tanks of the Hindus; and it inculcates loyalty, gratitude for all favours received, philanthropy, justice, impartiality, truth, honesty and all the moral and domestic virtues upheld by Christianity. Sikhism mainly differs from Christianity in that it inculcates the transmigration of the soul, and adopts a belief in predestination, which is universal in the East.
…

Nanak seems to have been produced by the same cyclic wave of reformation as fourteen years later gave Martin Luther to Europe. He taught, “There is but one God, the Creator, whose name is true, devoid of fear and enmity, immortal, unborn and self-existent, great and bountiful.” He held that the wearing of religious garb, praying and practising penance to be seen of men, only produced hypocrisy, and that those who went on pilgrimages to sacred streams, though they might cleanse their bodies, only increased their mental impurity. He pointed out that God “before all temples prefers the upright heart and pure,” and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth, and not with the idolatrous accessories of incense, sandal-wood and burnt-offerings. **He abrogated caste distinctions, and taught in opposition to ancient writings that every man had the eternal right of searching for divine knowledge and worshipping his Creator.** This doctrine of philosophic quietism was common to his successors, until in the time of the sixth guru, Har Govind, it was found necessary to support the separate existence of Sikhism by force of arms, and this led to the militant and political development of the tenth and most powerful of the gurus, Govind Singh. **The Sikhs of to-day, though they all derive primarily from Nanak, are only recognized as Singhs or real Sikhs when they accept the doctrines and practices of Guru Govind Singh.**
…

Har Govind was a hunter and eater of flesh, and encouraged his followers to eat meat as giving them strength and daring. It is largely to this practice that the Sikhs owe the superiority of their physique over their surrounding Hindu neighbours.
…

The establishment of Singh Sabhas, of Sikh newspapers, and the spread of education have largely tended in the same direction, but the strict ethical code of Sikhism and the number of its obligatory divine services have caused many to fall away from the faith: **nor does the austere Sikh ritual appeal to women, who generally prefer Hinduism with its picturesque material worship and the brightness of its innumerable festivals.**

> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346866907_UNIVERSALITY_OF_THE_SIKH_PHILOSOPHY_AN_ANALYSIS
>
> **Accepting the Will of God or Understanding the 'Divine' (The knowledge of the "Divine Will") means the destruction of the ego – whether it is the racial ego, the religious ego, the spiritual ego, or the individual ego:**
> “Nanak hukme je bujhe ta haumai kahi na koe” [SGGS, Jap 2, p 1]; meaning: O Nanak, one who understands 'Divine Will', is freed from ego.)
>
> The racial and religious ego, which is the root cause of religious wars, is far more dangerous than the individual ego. **But the individual ego is the building block for any kind of ego. The iron curtain of individual ego separates us from each other and from understanding God.**
> …
>
> **Albert Einstein discovered: the energy can convert into matter and matter can convert into energy. The basic units: atoms and subatomic particles—that form molecules, and cells, and tissues, and organs, and individuals, are our common origin. The atoms and subatomic charged particles do not grow old and are ageless and timeless. The atoms in a child or a seedling are no younger than that of a wrinkled person or a yellowing leaf.** It is only when we look at life in a specific form, we fall victims to our separation from rest of things. That separation is called the ego. **The ego is a false self that we made up to compete with God based on the thought that we’re separate.** That iron curtain of selfish ego separates us from Universal Spirit or God. Once we accept the God within and realize that it's not possible to be separate from God and that we are one with God, then we know that we are love and we are peace and we are joy and we are happiness and we are eternal.
>
> In everyday living, just as a sunbeam can’t separate itself from the sun, and a wave can’t separate itself from the ocean, we can’t separate one mind from another. We have characteristics of our own like Individual waves that can be high or low, aggressive or passive but part of the same ocean. Similarly, we can look at ourselves like the spokes on a wheel, all radiating out from the same center. If we define ourselves according to our position on the rim, we seem separate and distinct from one another. But if we define ourselves according to the center of the wheel, we’re a shared identity with the same mind. Our grades, credentials, jobs, cars, and homes are like a spoke at the

> rim, a sunbeam, and a wave—all with characteristics of their own but a part of the same source—the wheel, the sun and the ocean. **We are all part of one indivisible divine mind or the universal mind or Universal Energy or God.** Our individual mind or soul (atma) is divine image of supreme (or Parmatma), but we have to recognize it (mun tu jot saroop hai, apna mool pashaan...
> [SGGS, p 441;] meaning: O my soul you're the image of Divine light; so know your source). And the same mind or one mind, is the same as one God (Ek Onkar).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=bsXawgEACAAJ&lpg=PA64&hl=fi&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q&f=false

Nor is the idea of equal human dignity peculiar to the philosophical traditions of the West, although those traditions will be my focus in the present book. In an India riven by hierarchical ideas of caste and of occupations assigned at birth, Buddhism has long brought a different idea, the idea of human equality. **Although Gandhi reinterpreted the Hindu tradition in a more egalitarian manner than was conventional, the Buddhist antecedents of the new nation's founding principle of equal citizenship were dramatized by Gandhi, Nehru, and the other national founders by placing the Buddhist wheel of law at the center of the flag. The main architect of India's constitution, B.R. Ambedkar, one of the great legal minds of the twentieth century, converted to Buddhism late in his life and remained entranced by it throughout his life.** An "untouchable" (now *dalit*), he insisted on framing the constitution in ways that put the idea of equal human dignity front and center.3 He wrote an entire book on the Buddha, published in 1957, shortly after his death, in order to make clear that tradition's idea of human equality.4

https://books.google.fi/books?id=2EMSDAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA202#v=onepage&q&f=false

Kant is well aware of the fact that none of these things is a remotely suitable candidate for a self. **Therefore, he places the noumenal self outside all possible experience, in a realm of things in themselves to which we have no access and about which we can have no knowledge.** Although we cannot know that this noumenal self exists, it is possible to form the belief (Ger. *Glaube*) that it does; for Kant, in order for us to make sense of our capacity to make rational decisions, and, in particular, our ability to follow the moral law, we must form this belief. This follows from the fact that our practical freedom can be understood, according to Kant, only as a manifestation of this non-spatial, atemporal noumenal self.

It is vital to the intuitive plausibility of Kant's position that his readers should *identify* with this noumenal self. To see why, **consider the difference between having a self that is transcendentally free and being possessed by a spirit or demon that controls your body at its own whim.** The only difference lies in whether you identify with the noumenon that has seized control of your body.

But of course, the noumenal self is not easy to identify with. How could something that is outside space and time, and is free from all the distinguishing characteristics I attribute to myself, be who I really am? Moreover, it will be hard to avoid the suspicion that pushing the self into a noumenal realm to which we have no epistemic access is merely a way for Kant to conceal from himself, and his followers, **the frightening and disturbing fact that the self is absolutely nonexistent.**
...

But whatever might be said against innate great compassion, **it is at least no more problematic than Kant's unknowable autonomous will.** In fact, it is considerably less problematic, since it is a possible object of experience. Whenever you feel an impulse of sincere generosity, pity, or love, you are aware of great compassion – but unclearly, as if through a dirty window. In deep spiritual experiences, you can see it clearly, if only for a brief time. The enlightened are never separated from it.

In fact, the unenlightened are never separated from it either. Selfishness, defined as the sincere wish for oneself to be truly happy, and partiality, defined as the sincere wish for "us" to be truly happy, are the forms great compassion takes when it is distorted by the false belief in a self and what belongs to a self. Philosophical theories of the person, such as Kant's noumenal self, prop up this belief, subtly reinforcing the painful distortions that hinder our freedom. But when these theories have been thoroughly smashed, and when the great icebergs of self-grasping and self-cherishing are melted by the sun of wisdom, then the water of compassion will flow freely over the whole world, and the trees and grass will grow by themselves.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Use_and_Abuse_of_History_for_Life#9

If we wished to express in the fewest words what Hartmann really has to tell us from his mephitic tripod of unconscious irony, it would be something like this: our time could only remain as it is, if men should become thoroughly sick of this existence. **And I fervently believe he is right. The frightful petrifaction of the time, the restless rattle of the ghostly bones, held naively up to us by David Strauss as the most beautiful fact of all—is justified by Hartmann not only from the past, *ex causis efficientibus*, but also from the future, *ex causa finali*.** The rogue let light stream over our time from the last day, and saw that it was very good,—for him, that is, who wishes to feel the

indigestibility of life at its full strength, and for whom the last day cannot come quickly enough. True, Hartmann calls the old age of life that mankind is approaching the "old age of man": but that is the blessed state, according to him, where there is only a successful mediocrity; **where art is the "evening's amusement of the Berlin financier," and "the time has no more need for geniuses, either because it would be casting pearls before swine, or because the time has advanced beyond the stage where the geniuses are found, to one more important," to that stage of social evolution, in fact, in which every worker "leads a comfortable existence, with hours of work that leave him sufficient leisure to cultivate his intellect." Rogue of rogues, you say well what is the aspiration of present-day mankind:** but you know too what a spectre of disgust will arise at the end of this old age of mankind, as the result of the intellectual culture of stolid mediocrity. It is very pitiful to see, but it will be still more pitiful yet. "Antichrist is visibly extending his arms:" yet it *must be so*, for after all we are on the right road—of disgust at all existence.
…

We are told how he has lived, with monumental clearness, by that famous page with its large typed sentences, on which the whole rabble of our modern cultured folk have thrown themselves in blind ecstasy, because they believe they read their own justification there, haloed with an Apocalyptic light. **For the unconscious parodist has demanded of every one of them, "the full surrender of his personality to the world-process, for the sake of his end, the redemption of the world":** or still more clearly,—"the assertion of the will to live is proclaimed to be the first step on the right road: for it is only in the full surrender to life and its sorrow, and not in the cowardice of personal renunciation and retreat, that anything can be done for the world-process. … The striving for the denial of the individual will is as foolish as it is useless, more foolish even than suicide. … The thoughtful reader will understand without further explanation how a practical philosophy can be erected on these principles, **and that such a philosophy cannot endure any disunion, but only the fullest reconciliation with life.**"

https://archive.org/details/essayonaristocra00bran/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater

In Germany, for instance, Eduard von Hartmann thinks very differently of the aim of history. His published utterances on the subject are well known. In conversation he once hinted how his idea had originated in his mind: “It was clear to me long ago,” he said, “that history, or, to use a wider expression, the world process, must have an aim, and that this aim could only be negative. For a golden age is too foolish a figment.” **Hence his visions of a destruction of the world voluntarily brought about by the most gifted men. And connected with this is his doctrine that humanity has now reached man’s estate, that is, has passed the stage of development in which geniuses were necessary.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Hartmann,_Karl_Robert_Eduard_von

The conception of the Unconscious, by which von Hartmann describes his ultimate metaphysical principle, is not at bottom as paradoxical as it sounds, being merely a new and mysterious designation for the Absolute of German metaphysicians. The Unconscious appears as a combination of the metaphysic of Hegel with that of Schopenhauer. The Unconscious is both Will and Reason and the absolute all-embracing ground of all existence.
…

When the greater part of the Will in existence is so far enlightened by reason as to perceive the inevitable misery of existence, a collective effort to will non-existence will be made, and the world will relapse into nothingness, the Unconscious into quiescence.
…

He differs from Schopenhauer in making salvation by the “negation of the Will-to-live” depend on a collective social effort and not on individualistic asceticism.

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Encyclopedia_Americana_(1920)/Hartmann,_Karl_Robert_Edouard_von

Man is developed from the animal, and with the appearance of the first human being the deliverance of the world is in sight, **for only in man does consciousness reach such height and complexity as to act independently of the will.**
…

The one foundation for ethics is pessimism, for no other view of life recognizes that evil necessarily belongs to existence and can cease only with existence itself. **The essential feature of the morality built upon this basis is the realization that all is one** and that, while every attempt to gain happiness is illusory, yet before deliverance is possible, all forms of the illusion must appear and be tried to the utmost. Even he who recognizes the vanity of life best serves the highest aims by giving himself up to the illusion, and living as eagerly as if he thought life good. It is only through the constant attempt to gain happiness that men can learn the desirability of nothingness; and

when this knowledge has become universal, or at least general, deliverance will come and the world will cease. No better proof of the rational nature of the universe is needed than that afforded by the different ways in which men have hoped to find happiness and so have been led unconsciously to work for the final goal. **The first of these is the hope of good in the present, the confidence in the pleasures of this world, such as was felt by the Greeks. This is followed by the Christian transference of happiness to another and better life, to which in turn succeeds the illusion that looks for happiness in progress, and dreams of a future made worth while by the achievements of science. All alike are empty promises, and known as such in the final stage, which sees all human desires as equally vain and the only good in the peace of Nirvana.**

The relation between philosophy and religion lies in their common recognition of an underlying unity, which transcends all the apparent differences and divisions due to individual phenomena. Many changes must take place in the existing religions before they will be suited to modern conditions, and the resulting religion of the future will be a concrete monism.

> http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/orthodoxy/ch7.html
>
> We think the cat superior because we have (or most of us have) a particular philosophy to the effect that life is better than death. **But if the mouse were a German pessimist mouse, he might not think that the cat had beaten him at all. He might think he had beaten the cat by getting to the grave first.** Or he might feel that he had actually inflicted frightful punishment on the cat by keeping him alive. Just as a microbe might feel proud of spreading a pestilence, so the pessimistic mouse might exult to think that he was renewing in the cat the torture of conscious existence.

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503389/page/n39/mode/2up?view=theater

It is from this cowardice in the face of life that Buddhism and its offshoots arose in the Indian Culture at the corresponding stage in time. These cults are now becoming fashionable with us.

http://exiledonline.com/feature-story-the-case-for-nuclear-winter/

Nihilism's one great weakness was that it had always been an elite cult, not considered transmissible to the masses. This was in fact why Buddhism was replaced by a mindless demotic cult like Hinduism in India: Nirvana was too cold a doctrine for peasants who equated fecundity with happiness.

But in the early twentieth century, a demographic anomaly appeared: the elite was big, and getting bigger. They brought their cult with them; **art began serving as the propaganda wing of Nihilism. What we call "Modernism" was actually a multimedia offensive which was beginning to make Nihilism palatable to the masses.** The fuzzy "Modern/Postmodern" distinction is best seen as a change in popular religion: **from 1910-1945, art did an honorable job of preparing the masses to abandon their attachment to the biosphere; from 1945 to the present, art borrows Nihilist images, diction and narrative without the least intention of employing them to free us from attachment to organic life.**

https://archive.org/details/hindutva-vinayak-damodar-savarkar-pdf/page/n35/mode/2up?view=theater

No prelude to a vast tragedy could be more dramatic in its effect in foreshadowing the culminating catastrophe than that incident in the life of the Shakya Sinha, **when the news of the fate of the little tribal republic of the Shakyas was carried to their former Prince when he was just laying the foundation stone of the Buddhistic Church. He had already enrolled the flower of his clan in his Bhikkusangha and the little Shakya Republic thus deprived of its bravest and best, fell an easy victim to the strong and warlike in the very life time of the Shakya Sinha. The news when carried to him is said to have left the Enlightened unconcerned.** Centuries rolled on; the Prince of the Shakyas had grown into the Prince of Princes–the Lokajit–the great conqueror of worlds. The confines of his little Shakya State expanded and embraced the confines of India; and as if to give a touch of poetical precision and poetical justice, the woeful fate that had overtaken the tribal republic of Kapil-Vastu befell the whole of Bharatvarsha itself and it fell an easy prey to the strong and warlike–not like Shakyas to their own kith and kin–but the Lichis and Huns. **Of course the Enlightened would perhaps remain as unaffected as ever, even if this news could ever reach him like the first.** But the rest of Hindus then could not drink with equanimity this cup of bitterness and political servitude at the hands of those whose barbarous violence could still be soothed by the mealy-mouthed formulas of

Ahimsa32 and spiritual brotherhood, and whose steel could still be blunted by the soft palm leaves and rhymed charms.
…

Even then, to set an example, did India declare her will to 'take more pleasure in the conquest of peace and righteousness than in the conquest of arms.' Nobly she tried: Ah! so nobly as to make herself ridiculous in the eyes of lust and lucre. Had she not issued Royal edicts to the effect that the very water be strained before it was poured out for horses and elephants to drink, so as to enable the tiny lives in the waters to escape immediate death? **And had she not opened corn-throwing centres in the midst of the seas that fish be fed in the oceans of the world?** Nor had the very fish ceased to feed on each other!
…

The consciousness that **the first great and the most successful attempt to wean man from the brute inherent in him** was conceived, launched and carried on from century to century by a galaxy of great teachers, Arhats and Bhikkus who were born in India, who were bred in India and who owned India as the land of their worship, fills us with feelings too deep for words.

https://nationalvanguard.org/2015/08/the-racial-will-to-live/

Late in the sixth century B.C. a young Aryan prince named Siddhartha, doubtless influenced by the Lokayata prevalent in intellectual circles, evolved an atheistic pessimism that differed from a strict materialism only in the assumption that an individual's will-to-live (as distinct from his mind and personality) could survive his death. This palingenesis of the will (which must be sharply distinguished from the reincarnation of a soul) strikingly resembled the basis of the modern philosophy of Schopenhauer, **and Siddhartha, yielding to our racial instinct to deduce and formulate universal laws, presented it as true for all men. His doctrine therefore appealed to sentimental Aryans who were concerned for "all mankind" and had an itch to "do good" for the lower races by pretending that those races were their equals.**

They accordingly preached the philosophy of Siddhartha and gradually transformed that bleak pessimism into a religion complete with gods, saviors, and innumerable angels and demons, and they called Siddhartha "the Enlightener of Mankind" (*Buddha*). **As an odd mixture of philosophy and religion, Buddhism became the Established Religion of India, consummated the mongrelization of the Aryans and their submergence in the prolific native races, and then, its work of subversion accomplished, it disappeared from India** and survived only as a grossly superstitious religion in Tibet, China, Japan, and adjacent Mongolian territories, and, with many doctrinal differences, in Ceylon and Southeast Asia, where it appears to have become as decadent as Christianity among us.

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap11.htm

There was a certain Aryan strength in Gautama's cosmic negation.6 It requires fortitude to reject life **and to believe that all the things that we instinctively prize and desire, such as health, bodily vigor, sexual love, beauty, culture, wealth, learning, intelligence, and even our own individuality are all empty illusions, and that the greatest good is annihilation.** It requires even greater fortitude to accept that belief together with its obscure and dubious corollary, which denies us the immediate release of suicide and imposes on us the painful necessity of dragging out an existence in which we reject everything that healthy men desire and for which they live. That is to endure a death in life. Whether there is truth in that cosmic negation is a problem that each man must solve by his own powers of reason, and a problem that only men of great courage will consider at all.
…

If we abstain from sexual intercourse to avoid inflicting on others the curse of life and all its miseries, we are behaving rationally and even nobly, if the premise is correct;
…

If we declare that the manifest differences between races and between the individuals of every race become, for all practical purposes, infinitesimal in comparison with the vast futility of all human life, we are affirming a hope for the annihilation of all species of anthropoids capable of suffering or even of all species of animals that have sentient life;

---

http://realtruthlife.blogspot.com/2011/05/khuddaka-nikaya-sutta-nipata-vasettha.html#.X5DRfZJxc2x

7. 'I will explain to you, O Vasettha,'--so said Bhagavat,--'in due order the exact distinction of living beings according to species, for their species are manifold. (600)

8. 'Know ye the grass and the trees, although they do not exhibit (it), the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (601)

9. 'Then (know ye) the worms, and the moths, and the different sorts of ants, the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (602)

10. 'Know ye also the four-footed (animals), small and great, the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (603)

11. 'Know ye also the serpents, the long-backed snakes, the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (604)

12. 'Then know ye also the fish which range in the water, the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (605)

13. 'Then know ye also the birds that are borne along on wings and move through the air, the marks that constitute species are for them, and (their) species are manifold. (606)

14. **'As in these species the marks that constitute species are abundant, so in men the marks that constitute species are not abundant.** (607)

15. 'Not as regards their hair, head, ears, eyes, mouth, nose, lips, or brows, (608)

16. 'Nor as regards their neck, shoulders, belly, back, hip, breast, female organ, sexual intercourse, (609)

17. 'Nor as regards their hands, feet, palms, nails, calves, thighs, colour, or voice are there marks that constitute species as in other species. (610)

18. **'Difference there is in beings endowed with bodies, but amongst men this is not the case, the difference amongst men is nominal (only).**[1] (611)

> 1. Pakkattam sasarîresu,
> Manussesv-etam na viggati,
> Vokarañ ka manussesu
> Samañña pavukkati.

...

54. 'The man who knows his former dwellings, who sees both heaven and hell, and has reached the destruction of births, him I call a Bramana. (647)

55. **'For what has been designated as "name" and "family" in the world is only a term, what has been designated here and there is understood by common consent.**[1] (648)

> 1. Samañña h' esa lokasmim
> Namagottam pakappitam,
> Sammukka samudagatam
> Tattha tattha pakappitam.

56. 'Adhered to for a long time are the views of the ignorant, the ignorant tell us, one is a Bramana by birth. (649)

57. **'Not by birth is one a Bramana, nor is one by birth no Bramana; by work (kammana) one is a Bramana, by work one is no Bramana.** (650)

https://archive.org/details/dli.bengal.10689.12501/page/n105/mode/2up?view=theater

The earliest legend about the origin of kingship occurs in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*,2 one of the later Vedic texts, perhaps of the 8th or 7th century B.C. This tells how the gods and demons were at war, and the gods were suffering badly at the hands of their enemies. So they met together and decided that they needed a *rājā* to lead them in battle. They appointed Soma* as their king, and the tide soon turned in their favour. **This legend suggests that in the earliest times kingship in India was thought to be based upon human need and military necessity, and that they king's first duty was to lead his subjects in war.** A little later the *Taittīriya Upaniṣad*3 repeats the story, but in a significantly altered form; the discomfited gods did not elect their ruler, but sacrificed to the high god Prājapati, who sent his son Indra to become their king. **At this stage the king was still thought of as primarily a leader in war – "they who have no king cannot fight" says the text – but kingship was already given divine sanction and the king of the immortals, who was the prototype of all earthly kings, held his office by the appointment of the Most High.**

...

But the centre of brahmaṇic culture was the Gangä-Yamunā Doāb. **If among the Kurus and Pañcälas, who were the chief tribes of this region, the king was hedged about with divine mystery, elsewhere his status may have been less exalted, for the Buddhists had their own legend of the origin of kingship, which involved no heavenly prototype but looked back to a primitive social contract.**7 The story of this is put into the mouth of the Buddha himself, and, whether or not it is really his, it certainly represents the thought on the subject in the eastern part of India in the centuries following the Buddha's death, for the Jainas, who rose at about the same time and in the same region, had a somewhat similar legend.8

In the early days of the cosmic cycle mankind lived on an immaterial plane, dancing on air in a sort of fairyland, where there was no need of food or clothing, and no private property, family, government or laws. Then gradually the process of cosmic decay began its work, and mankind became earthbound, and felt the need of food and shelter. **As men lost their primeval glory distinctions of class (*varṇa*) arose, and they entered into agreements one with another, accepting the institutions of private property and the family.** With this theft, murder, adultery, and other crime began, and so the people met together and decided to appoint one man among them to maintain order in return for a share of the produce of their fields and herds. He was called "the Great Chosen One" (*Mahāsammata*), and he received the title of rājā because he pleased the people. The derivation of the word *rājā* from the verb *rañjayati* ("he pleases") is certainly a false one, but it was widely maintained and is found even in non-Buddhist sources.

The story of the Mahāsammata gives, in the form of a myth worthy of Plato, one of the world's earliest versions of the widespread contractual theory of the state, which in Europe is specially connected with the names of Locke and Rousseau. It implies that the main purpose of the government is to establish order, and that the king, as head of the government, is the first social servant, and ultimately dependent on the suffrage of his subjects. **Thus in ancient Indian thought the question of the origin of monarchy two strands are evident, the mystical and contractual, often rather incongruously combined.**

In thought, if not in practice, it was the mystical theory of kingship which carried most weights with succeeding generations. The author of the *Arthaśāstra* had no illusions about the king's human nature, and seems to have had little time for mysticism, but he recognized that legends about the origin of kingship had propaganda value. In one place he advises that the king's agents should spread the story that, when anarchy prevailed at the dawn of the aeon, men elected the mythical first king Manu Vaivasvata to kingship.9 **He thus encourages a contractual theory. In the same passage, however, he states that the people should be told that, as the king fulfils the functions of the gods Indra (the king of the gods) and Yama (the god of death) upon earth, all who slight him will be punished not only by the secular arm but also by heaven. When the king harangues his troops before battle he is advised to tell them that he is a paid servant just as they are;**10 but at the same time he is told to go to the length of having his secret agents disguised as gods, and allowing himself to be seen in their company, in order that his simpler subjects may believe that he mixes with the gods on equal terms.11 Aśoka and other Mauryan kings took the title "Beloved of the Gods" (*Devānampiya*), and, though they seem not to have claimed wholly divine status, they were no doubt looked on as superior semi-divine beings.

https://tipitaka.fandom.com/wiki/Agganna_Sutta

Lord, what the Brahmins say is this: 'The Brahmin caste is the highest caste, other cases are base; **the Brahmin caste is fair, other castes are dark;** Brahmins are purified, non-Brahmins are not, **the Brahmins are the true children of Brahma, born from his mouth, born of Brahma, created by Brahma, heirs of Brahma.** And you, you have deserted the highest class and gone over to the base class of shaveling petty ascetics, servants, dark fellows born of Brahma's foot! It's not right, it's not proper for you to mix with such people!'
...

"**Now since both dark and bright qualities, which are blamed and praised by the wise, are scattered indiscriminately among the four castes, the wise do not recognize the claim about the Brahmin caste being the highest. Why is that? Because, Vasettha, anyone from the four castes who becomes a monk, an Arahant who has destroyed the corruptions,** who has lived the life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached the highest goal, destroyed the fetters of becoming, and become emancipated through super-knowledge--**he is proclaimed supreme by virtue of Dhamma and not of non-Dhamma.**
...

"Vasettha, all of you, through of different birth, name, clan and family, who have gone forth from the household life into ascetic life, if you are asked who you are, should reply: 'We are ascetics, followers of the Sakyan.' **He whose faith in the Tathagata is settled, rooted, established, solid, unshakeable by any ascetic or**

Brahmin, any deva or mara or Brahma or anyone in the world, can truly say: 'I am a true son of Blessed Lord, born of his mouth, born of Dhamma, created by Dhamma, an heir of Dhamma.' Why is that? Because, Vasettha, this designates the Tathagata: 'The body of Dhamma', that is, 'The body of Brahma', or 'Become Dhamma', that is, 'Become Brahma'.

"There comes a time, Vasettha, **when, sooner or later after a long period, this world contracts. At a time of contraction, beings are mostly born in the Abhassara Brahma world. And there they dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious--and they stay like that for a very long time. But sooner or later, after a very long period, this world begins to expand again.** At a time of expansion the beings from the Abhassara Brahma world, having passed away from there, are mostly reborn in this world. **Here they dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious--and they stay like that for a very long time.**

"At that period, Vasettha, **there was just one mass of water, and all was darkness, blinding darkness.** Neither moon nor sun appeared, no constellations or stars appeared, night and day were not distinguished, nor months and fortnights, no years or seasons, **and no male and female, beings being reckoning just as beings.** And sooner or later, after a very long period of time, savory earth spread itself over the waters where those beings were.
...

So they set to with their hands, breaking off pieces of the stuff in order to eat it. **And the result of this was that their self-luminance disappeared.** And as a result of the disappearance of their self-luminance, the moon and the sun appeared, night and day were distinguished, months and fortnights appeared, and the year and its seasons. To that extent the world re-evolved.

"And those beings continued for a very long time feasting on this savory earth, feeding on it and being nourished by it. And as they did so, their bodies became courser, and a difference in looks developed among them. Some beings became good-looking, others ugly. **And the good-looking ones despised the others,** saying: 'We are better-looking than they are.' And because they became arrogant and conceited about their looks, the savory earth disappeared.
...

"And then, after the creepers had disappeared, rice appeared in open spaces, free from powder and from husks, fragrant and clean-grained. and what they had taken in the evening for supper had grown again and was ripe in the morning, and what they had taken in the morning for breakfast was ripe again by evening, with no sign of reaping. **And these beings set to and fed on this rice, and this lasted for a very long time. And as they did so, their bodies became coarser still, and the difference in their looks became even greater. And the females developed female sex-organs, and the males developed male organs.** And the women became excessively preoccupied with men, and the men with women. Owing to this excessive preoccupation with each other, passion was aroused, and their bodies burnt with lust. And later, because of this burning, they indulged in sexual activity. But those who saw them indulging threw dust, ashes or cow-dung at them crying: 'Die, you filthy beast! How can one being do such things to another!' Just as today, in some districts, when a daughter-in-law is led out, some people throw dirt at her, some ashes, and some cow-dung, without realizing that they are repeating an ancient observance. **What was considered bad form in those days is now considered good form.**
...

However, **when those beings made a store of rice and lived on that, husk-powder and husk began to envelop the grain, and where it was reaped it did not grow again, and the cut place showed, and the rice grew in separate clusters.**

"And then those beings came together lamenting: '**Wicked ways have become rife among us: at first we were mind-made, feeding on delight... and the rice grows in separate clusters.** So now let us divide up the rice into fields with boundaries.' So they did so.
...

And they thought: '**Suppose we were to appoint a certain being who would show anger where anger was due, censure those who deserved it, and banish those who deserved banishment! And in return, we would grant him a share of the rice.**' So they went to the one among them who was the handsomest, the best-looking, the most pleasant and capable, and asked him to do this for them in return for a share of the rice, and he agreed.

"'**The People's Choice' is the meaning of Maha-Sammata,** which is the first regular title to be introduced. 'Lord Of The Fields' is the meaning of Khattiya, the second such title. And 'He Gladdens Others With Dhamma' is the meaning of Raja, the third title to be introduced. This, then, Vasettha, is the origin of the class of Khattiyas, in accordance with the ancient titles that were introduced for them.
...

"Then some of these beings thought: 'Evil things have appeared among beings, such as taking what is not given, censuring, lying, punishment and banishment. We ought to put aside evil and unwholesome things.' And they did so. '**They Put Aside Evil And Unwholesome Things' is the meaning of Brahmin, which is the first regular title to be introduced for such people. They made leaf-huts in forest places and**

meditated in them. With the smoking fire gone out, with pestle cast aside, gathering alms for their evening and morning meals, they went away to a village, town or royal city to seek their food, and then they returned to their leaf-huts to meditate. People saw this and noted how they meditated. 'They Meditate' is the meaning of the Jhayaka, which is the second regular title to be introduced.

"**However, some of those beings, not being able to meditate in leaf-huts, settled around towns and villages and compiled books. People saw them doing this and not meditating. 'Now These Do Not Meditate' is the meaning of Ajjhayaka, which is the third regular title to be introduced. At that time it was regarded as a low designation, but now it is the higher.**
...

"And then, Vasettha, some of those beings, having passed off, **adopted various trades, and this 'Various' is the meaning of Vessa,** which came to be the regular title for such people.
...

"And then, Vasettha, **those beings that remained went in for hunting. 'They Are Base Who Live By The Chase', and that is the meaning of Sudda,** which came to be the regular title for such people.
...

"And then, Vasettha, **it came about that some Khattiya, dissatisfied with his own Dhamma, went forth from the household life into ascetic life,** thinking: 'I will become an ascetic.' And a Brahmin did likewise, a Vessa did likewise, and so did a Sudda. And from these four classes the class of ascetics came into existence. Their origin was from among these very same beings, like themselves, no different, and in accordance with Dhamma, not otherwise.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism_and_Hinduism#Scriptures

Buddhist authors like Bhavaviveka and Saṅghabhadra argued that the Vedas were authored by ancient people who were spiritually and philosophically unqualified as well as being morally deficient.[71] In his critique, Bhavaviveka actually draws on some passages found in the Hindu Samkhyakarika and in the work of Gaudapada, which holds that Vedic sacrifice is impure **and of "mixed nature" (miśrībhāva).** Bhavaviveka points to the presence of killing (found in various sacrifices), sexual promiscuity (in a Vedic ritual called Gosava) and use of alcohol (in a rite called Sautrāmaṇī) in the Vedas to argue that they were authored by evil people **and compares them to the foreign scriptures of the "Magas" (i.e. the Persian Magi).**[72]
...

The Buddha is recorded as having criticized the Vedic Brahmanical religion in the *Canki Sutta* (Majjhima Nikaya 95) as a lineage which blindly passes on scriptures without having true knowledge of things:

> Suppose there were a file of blind men each in touch with the next: the first one does not see, the middle one does not see, and the last one does not see. So too, Bhāradvāja, in regard to their statement the brahmins seem to be like a file of blind men: the first one does not see, the middle one does not see, and the last one does not see. What do you think, Bhāradvāja, that being so, does not the faith of the brahmins turn out to be groundless?[74]

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti pithily expressed his disagreement with the religion of the Vedas as follows:

> Accepting the authority of the Vedas, **believing in individual agency,** hoping for merit from bathing, **taking pride in caste,** undertaking rites for the removal of evils: these are the five signs of stupidity, the destruction of intelligence.[75]

https://www.cs.colostate.edu/~malaiya/ashoka.html

12 Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, honors both ascetics and the householders of all religions, and he honors them with gifts and honors of various kinds.[22] But Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, does not value gifts and honors as much as he values this -- that there should be growth in the essentials of all religions.[23] **Growth in essentials can be done in different ways, but all of them have as their root restraint in speech, that is, not praising one's own religion, or condemning the religion of others without good cause. And if there is cause for criticism, it should be done in a mild way.** But it is better to honor other religions for this reason. By so doing, one's own religion benefits, and so do other religions, while doing otherwise harms one's own religion and the religions of others. **Whoever praises his own religion, due to excessive devotion, and condemns others with the thought "Let me glorify my own religion," only harms his own religion.** Therefore contact (between religions) is good.[24] One should listen to and respect the doctrines professed by others. Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, desires that all should be well-learned in the good doctrines of other religions.
...

There is no country, except among the Greeks, where these two groups, Brahmans and ascetics, are not found, and there is no country where people are not devoted to one or another religion.[26] Therefore the killing, death or deportation of a hundredth, or even a thousandth part of those who died during the conquest of Kalinga now pains Beloved-of-the-Gods. Now Beloved-of-the-Gods thinks that even those who do wrong should be forgiven where forgiveness is possible.

Even the forest people, who live in Beloved-of-the-Gods' domain, are entreated and reasoned with to act properly. **They are told that despite his remorse Beloved-of-the-Gods has the power to punish them if necessary, so that they should be ashamed of their wrong and not be killed.** Truly, Beloved-of-the-Gods desires non-injury, restraint and impartiality to all beings, even where wrong has been done.

Now it is conquest by Dhamma that Beloved-of-the-Gods considers to be the best conquest.[27] And it (conquest by Dhamma) has been won here, on the borders, even six hundred yojanas away, where the Greek king Antiochos rules, beyond there where the four kings named Ptolemy, Antigonos, Magas and Alexander rule, likewise in the south among the Cholas, the Pandyas, and as far as Tamraparni.[28]
...

All men are my children. What I desire for my own children, and I desire their welfare and happiness both in this world and the next, that I desire for all men. You do not understand to what extent I desire this, and if some of you do understand, you do not understand the full extent of my desire.
...

The people of the unconquered territories beyond the borders might think: "What is the king's intentions towards us?" **My only intention is that they live without fear of me, that they may trust me and that I may give them happiness, not sorrow.**
...

Beloved-of-the-Gods speaks thus:[33] It is now more than two and a half years since I became a lay-disciple, but until now I have not been very zealous.[34] But now that I have visited the Sangha for more than a year, I have become very zealous. **Now the people in India who have not associated with the gods do so. This is the result of zeal and it is not just the great who can do this. Even the humble, if they are zealous, can attain heaven.** And this proclamation has been made with this aim. Let both humble and great be zealous, let even those on the borders know and let zeal last long.
...

Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, speaks thus: **My Dhamma Mahamatras too are occupied with various good works among the ascetics and householders of all religions.** I have ordered that they should be occupied with the affairs of the Sangha. I have also ordered that they should be occupied with the affairs of the Brahmans and the Ajivikas. I have ordered that they be occupied with the Niganthas.[43]

> https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/acton-the-history-of-freedom-and-other-essays#lf0030_label_020
>
> But [toleration] was first proclaimed and established by enactment, not in polytheistic and philosophical Greece, but in India, by Asoka, the earliest of the Buddhist kings, two hundred and fifty years before the birth of Christ.

---

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/Buddhism#cite_ref-27

We can see now that the very event which seemed, in the eyes of the world, to be the most striking proof of the success of the new movement, the conversion and strenuous support, in the 3rd century B.C., of Asoka, the most powerful ruler India had had, only hastened the decline. The adhesion of large numbers of nominal converts, more especially from the newly incorporated and less advanced provinces, produced weakness rather than strength in the movement for reform. **The day of compromise had come. Every relaxation of the old thoroughgoing position was welcomed and supported by converts only half converted.** And so the margin of difference between the Buddhists and their opponents gradually faded almost entirely away. The soul theory, step by step, gained again the upper hand. The popular gods and the popular superstitions are once more favoured by Buddhists themselves. The philosophical basis of the old ethics is overshadowed by new speculations. **And even the old ideal of life, the salvation of the Arahat to be won in this world and in this world only, by self-culture and self-mastery, is forgotten, or mentioned only to be condemned.** The end was inevitable. The need of a separate organization became less and less apparent. **The whole pantheon of the Vedic gods, with the ceremonies and the sacrifices associated with them, passed indeed away. But the ancient Buddhism, the party of reform, was overwhelmed also in its fall; and modern Hinduism arose on the ruins of both.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arhat#In_Mah%C4%81y%C4%81na_Buddhism

There are even some Mahāyāna texts that regard the aspiration to arhatship and personal liberation as an outside path.[23]
Instead of aspiring for arhatship, Mahayanins are urged to instead take up the path of the bodhisattva and to not fall back to the level of arhats and śrāvakas.[7] **Therefore, it is taught that an arhat must go on to become a bodhisattva eventually. If they fail to do so in the lifetime in which they reach the attainment, they will fall into a deep samādhi of emptiness, thence to be roused and taught the bodhisattva path, presumably when ready. According to the *Lotus Sutra*, any true arhat will eventually accept the Mahāyāna path.[24]**

Mahāyāna teachings often consider the śrāvaka path to be motivated by fear of saṃsāra, which renders them incapable of aspiring to buddhahood, and that they therefore lack the courage and wisdom of a bodhisattva.[25] Novice bodhisattvas are compared to śrāvakas and arhats at times. **In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, there is an account of sixty novice bodhisattvas who attain arhatship despite themselves and their efforts at the bodhisattva path because they lacked the abilities of prajnaparamita and skillful means to progress as bodhisattvas toward complete enlightenment** (Skt. *Anuttarā Samyaksaṃbodhi*). This is because they are still viewed as having innate attachment and fear of saṃsāra.
...

The Mahayana discerned a hierarchy of attainments, with samyaksambuddhas at the top, mahāsattvas below that, pratyekabuddhas below that and arhats further below.[33] **"But what was it that distinguished the *bodhisattva* from the *sravaka*, and ultimately the *buddha* from the *arhat*? The difference lay, more than anywhere else, in the altruistic orientation of the *bodhisattva*."**[34]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karu%E1%B9%87%C4%81#Mahayana_Buddhism

In Mahāyāna Buddhism, *karuṇā* is one of the two qualities, along with enlightened wisdom (Sanskrit: *prajña*), to be cultivated on the bodhisattva path. According to scholar Rupert Gethin, this elevation of *karuṇā* to the status of prajña is one of the distinguishing factors between the Theravāda arahant ideal and the Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal:

> **For the Mahāyāna... the path to arhatship appears tainted with a residual selfishness since it lacks the motivation of the great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) of the bodhisattva,** and ultimately the only legitimate way of Buddhist practice is the bodhisattva path.[16]

...

In Tibetan Buddhism, one of the foremost authoritative texts on the Bodhisattva path is the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* by Shantideva. In the eighth section entitled *Meditative Concentration*, Shantideva describes meditation on Karunā as thus:

> Strive at first to meditate upon the sameness of yourself and others. **In joy and sorrow all are equal;** Thus be guardian of all, as of yourself. The hand and other limbs are many and distinct, but all are one--the body to be kept and guarded. Likewise, different beings, in their joys and sorrows, are, like me, all one in wanting happiness. This pain of mine does not afflict or cause discomfort to another's body, and yet this pain is hard for me to bear because I cling and take it for my own. And other beings' pain I do not feel, and yet, because I take them for myself, their suffering is mine and therefore hard to bear. And therefore I'll dispel the pain of others, for it is simply pain, just like my own. And others I will aid and benefit, for they are living beings, like my body. **Since I and other beings both, in wanting happiness, are equal and alike, what difference is there to distinguish us, that I should strive to have my bliss alone?**[18]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bodhicitta

Thus, the Indian Buddhist author Shantideva (8th century) writes in his *Bodhicaryavatara*:

> Those who long to transcend the hundreds of miseries of existence, who long to relieve creatures of their sorrows, who long to enjoy many hundreds of joys, must never abandon bodhicitta. **When bodhicitta has arisen in him, a wretch, captive in the prison of existence, he is straightway hailed son of the Sugatas [the Buddhas], to be revered in the worlds of gods and men.**[9]

...

The Lojong (*mind training*) practices:

> Others as equal to self: Exchanging self and others: (Tonglen) the Sending and Receiving while breathing practice,
>
> Others as more important: **Viewing all other sentient beings as having been our mothers in infinite past lives,** and feeling gratitude for the many occasions on which they have taken care of us.

http://www.thephora.net/forum/forum/the-academy/religion-and-mythology/88267-ancient-buddhist-sutra-preaching-modern-liberal-ethics?p=1834311#post1834311

Mahayana Buddhism said that the Buddhist sage should strive to enlighten all beings. **They said it was selfish to be striving for one's own individual enlightenment, especially when Buddhism taught there was not such entity as the self. By accenting the central Buddhist notion that there was no self, the later Mahayana Buddhists transformed the notion of the Buddhist sage into a totally altruistic being.**
...

The bodhisattva, like the good utilitarian, is concerned for all persons equally. The bodhisattva "must educate his mind that he may feel in each case the same affection for all creatures that naturally centres in his son, or in himself."[clvi] There is no privileging of the

bodhisattva's personal sorrows or personal concerns over the concerns of other people. **"Another's sorrow is to be destroyed by me because it is sorrow like my own sorrow… Since a neighbor and I are equal in desiring happiness, what is the unique quality of the 'self' which requires an effort for happiness?"**[clvii] This is what the bodhisattva continually says to herself: "All sorrows, without distinction are ownerless; and because of misery they are to be prevented… Not just in myself. Everywhere!"[clviii]
…

Not only should the bodhisattva accept torture from humans in a loving manner, he should also accept painful treatment from animals. **For if he is attacked and eaten by wild animals "he should react with the thought: 'If these wild beasts should devour me, then just that will be my gift to them."**[clxvii]

http://www.iivs.de/~iivs01311/SDLE/Part-1-04.htm

As a tantric saying puts it, "What binds the fool, liberates the wise" (Dasgupta, 1974, p. 187), **and another, more drastic passage emphasizes that, "the same deed for which a normal mortal would burn for a hundred million eons, through this same act an initiated yogi attains enlightenment"** (Eliade, 1985, p. 272). According to this, every ritual is designed to catapult the initiate into a state beyond good and evil.
…

Firstly, through breaking a taboo for which there is often a high penalty, the adept confirms the core of the entire Buddhist philosophy: the emptiness (*shunyata*) of all appearances. "I am void, the world is void, all three worlds are void", the *Maha Siddha* Tilopa triumphantly proclaims—**therefore "neither sin nor virtue" exist** (Dasgupta, 1974, p. 186). The *shunyata* principle thus provides a metaphysical legitimization for any conceivable "crime", as it actually lacks any inherent existence.

A second argument follows from the emptiness, the "equivalence of all being". Neither purity nor impurity, neither lust nor loathing, neither beauty nor ugliness exist. There is thus "no difference between food and offal, between fruit juice and blood, between vegetable sap and urine, between syrup and semen" (Walker, 1982, p. 32). A fearless *maha siddha* justifies a serious misdeed of which he has been accused with the words: "**Although medicine and poison create contrary effects, in their ultimate essence they are one;** likewise negative qualities and aids on the path, one in essence, should not be differentiated" (quoted by Stevens, 1990, p. 69).
…

The third—somewhat ad hoc, but nonetheless frequent—justification for the "transgressions" of the *Vajrayana* consists in the Bodhisattva vow of *Mahayana* Buddhism, which requires that one aid and assist every creature until it attains enlightenment. **Amazingly, this pious purpose can render holy the most evil means. "If", we can read in one of the tantras, "for the good of all living beings or on account of the Buddha's teaching one should slay living beings, one is untouched by sin. … If for the good of living beings or from attachment for the Buddha's interest, one seizes the wealth of others, one is not touched by sin", and so forth** (Snellgrove, 1987, vol. 1, p. 176). In the course of Tibetan history the Bodhisattva vow has, as we shall show in the second part of our study, legitimated numerous political and family-based murders, whereby the additional "clever" argument was also employed, that one had "freed" the murder victim from the world of appearances (*samsara*) and that he or she thus owed a debt of thanks to the murderer.

The fourth argument, which was also widespread in other magical cultures, is familiar to us from homeopathy, and states:
similia similibus curantur ('like cures like'). In this healing practice one usually works with tiny quantities, major sins can thus be expiated by more minor transgressions.

The fifth and final argument attempts to persuade us that enlightenment *per se* arises through the radical inversion of its opposite and that there is absolutely no other possible way to break free of the chains of *samsara*. **Here, the tantric logic of inversion has become a dogma which no longer tolerates other paths to enlightenment.** In this light, we can read in the *Guhyasamaja Tantra* that "the most lowly-born, flute-makers and so forth, such [people] who constantly have murder alone in mind, attain perfection via this highest way" (quoted by Gäng, 1988, p. 128).

https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2018/08/stanford-scholar-discusses-buddhism-origins

As far as we know, Mahayana Buddhism began to take shape in the first century BCE. This religious movement then rapidly developed in a number of different places in and around what is now India, the birthplace of Buddhism.

Buddhism itself started sometime in the fifth century BCE. We now think that the Buddha, who founded the religion, died sometime toward the year 400 BCE.
…

Mahayana Buddhists strive to copy the life of the Buddha and to replicate it infinitely. That effort was the origin of the bodhisattva ideal. A bodhisattva is a person who wants to become a Buddha by setting out on the great way.
…

The development of Buddhism and its literature is much more complicated than we have realized. In the middle of the 20th century, scholars thought Mahayana Buddhism was developed by lay people who wanted to make a Buddhism for everybody. **It was compared to the Protestant movement in Christianity. But we now know that this picture is not true.**

The evidence shows that Mahayana Buddhism was spearheaded by the renunciants, the Buddhist monks and nuns. These were the hardcore practitioners of the religion, and they were responsible for writing the Mahayana scriptures and promoting these new ideas. The lay people were not the initiators.

http://lirs.ru/do/lanka_eng/lanka-intro.htm#introduction

To state the truth, sentient beings are all Bodhisattvas, however ignorant and ready to err they may be. They are all Jinaputras, the sons of the Victorious, and harbour in themselves every possibility of attaining enlightenment. The Bodhisattvas who have gone up successively all the rungs of the Bhumi ladder, and who are thus capable of extending their help over us, are really our own brethren. Therefore, Mahamati of the Lanka opens his questions generally with this: "I and other Bodhisattvas, etc." Mahamati is our mouthpiece voicing our wants and aspirations.

Thus is not the place to consider historically how the conception evolved in Buddhism whose primitive object seems to have consisted in the realisation of Arhatship. **But we can state this that the essence of Bodhisattvahood is an unequivocal affirmation of the social, altruistic nature of humankind.** Whatever enlightenment one gains, it must be shared by one's fellow-beings. This idea is classically expressed in the Mahayana by the so-called "Ten Vows of Samantabhadra". The Bodhisattva is a man of "inexhaustible vows'' (*dasanishthapada*). Without these he is not himself. **To save the world, to bring all his fellow-beings up to the same level of thought and feeling where he himself is, and not to rest, not to enter into Nirvana until this is accomplished, how infinitely long and how inexpressively arduous the task may be.** This is the Bodhisattva. Vowing to save all beings, which is technically known as Pūrva-praṇidhāna in Mahayana terminology, cannot even for a moment be separated from the life of the Bodhisattva.

The Buddha being surrounded by these noble-minded sons cannot fail finally to release all beings from the bondage of karma and ignorance and thirst for life.

---

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tan_Chung

Tan Chung (born 18 April 1929, in Matubahar, Johor[1]) is an authority on Chinese history, Sino-Indian relations and cultural exchange. He has been a doyen of Chinese cultural studies in India for nearly half a century.[2]

http://ignca.gov.in/divisionss/kalakosa/area-studies/east-asia-programme/across-the-himalayan-gap/31248-2/

First of all, I think we should not conceive Buddhism as an Indian cultural conquest of China. From a holistic perspective we must treat the entire course of the history of Buddhism as a Sino-Indian joint venture. **We must see the interrelation between China's being heavily converted into a Buddhist country and the fading away of Buddhism in India** – the cradle of its birth. When we interconnect these two developments we get a picture of Buddhism leaving India for China, and eventually settling down there. **Why did Buddhism leave India? Because the development of Mahayanism which transformed an originally self-purification movement** (a movement replacing *Atmagraha* or ego-clinging by *Dharmagraha* or truth-clinging as vividly described by Prof. Feng Youlan/Fung Yulan of Beijing University) **into a universal cosmology. Such a universal cosmology could prosper only when there was a universal empire on earth which existed only in China, not India.** I am oversimplifying a little to say that **after the Gupta period, the socio-political development in India was not conducive to the evangelism of Mahayana which had virtually eclipsed the "Hinayana" schools of teaching.**

Secondly, we should turn to China to see that **while the imperial system was declining in India during the 6th and 7th century, this was the period that China succeeded in reviving the Empire.** When the Sui and Tang rulers of China, and even their precursors like the Liang Emperor Wu (reigning from 502 to 549) and Topa Wei Emperor Xiaowen (reigning from 471 to 499) in divided China, took up such a revival, **they discovered the deficiency of the Han imperial political legacy and diligently searched from the Indian civilization what could cement the new imperial system in China.** The result was a happy marriage of the Mahayana imperial cosmo-political ideology with the socio-political reality on the soil of China. What I want to highlight is that Mahayanism was not merely the dogma propounded by Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu, but the entire socio-political spiritualism which helped China to give her universal imperial system the second lease of life from the 6th century up to 1911.
…

In the Chinese efforts we see a substantial input from the lay Chinese ruling elite **whose utmost interest or ultimate aim was not to develop Buddhadharma in China, but to strengthen the Chinese imperial system.** This explains why in China so many Buddhist monasteries and temples bear the word “guo” (state), and so many of them prided themselves on the receipt of imperial patronage and attention.
…

Returning to Pannikkar’s observation about Indian Buddhist preachers’ arriving in China “to influence and not to be influenced”, the actual picture is that they, eminent among them like Kumarajiva, Bodhidharma, Amoghavajra etc., had taken China as their own country and tried to build the Tusita utopia on her soil. **In contrast no Chinese Buddhist monks participated in such extraordinary altruistic international synergy (in India), hence the creation of the asymmetry. It is clear here that the two civilizations had decided to experiment cultural synergy only on Chinese soil – to marry Mahayana universalism in the mind with Chinese universalism on the ground.**
…

We have the famous Tang Dynasty authority and commentator of the “Thirteen Classics” of Han Confucianism, Kong Yingda (574-648), **making a refreshing interpretation of the ancient Chinese conception of “Tianzi” i.e. the “Son of Heaven” (a designation for the Emperor) as “fu tian mudi, ziyang xiamin” which may be translated as “Heaven be the father and Earth be the mother, while they and their agent the Emperor nurture the subjects as their children.”**20. Such a definition sounds quite revolutionary to Han dynasty and pre-Han Chinese imperial thinking.

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/mouzi_disposing_error.pdf

Mouzi said … “What Confucius said was meant to rectify the way of the world, and what Mencius said was meant to deplore one-sidedness. Of old, when Confucius was thinking of taking residence among the nine barbarian nations, he said, ‘If a noble person dwells in their midst, what rudeness can there be among them?’24 … The commentary says, ‘The north polar star is in the center of Heaven and to the north of man.’25 From this one can see that the land of China is not necessarily situated under the center of Heaven. **According to the Buddhist scriptures, above, below, and all around, all beings containing blood belong to the Buddha-clan.** Therefore I revere and study these scriptures. Why should I reject the Way of Yao, Shun, Confucius, and the Duke of Zhou? Gold and jade do not harm each other, crystal and amber do not cheapen each other. You say that another is in error when it is you yourself who err.”

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/40/mode/2up?view=theater

But then Fu Yih himself spoke: “The rules for private and social life (li, see p. 8) start from servility to parents, and end in submission to the emperor; if these duties are observed, the natural principles of devotion and submission to parents and of fidelity towards the sovereign will flourish, and the conduct of ministers and of sons will become perfect. **But Buddha passed across the city-walls and deserted his family, thus by his flight turning his back upon his father; he, the married man, thus renounced his emperor; the continuator of the line of his ancestry renounced the duties towards his parents. Siao Yü does not come out of a hollow mulberry tree (he is no anchorite), and yet he follows that religion which acknowledges no father;** I now hear that the man without filial submission and devotion, who cares nothing for his parents, is called Yü.” Yü could make no reply. He only clasped his hands, and spoke: “This is a man, in fact, whom hell has made.”

https://books.google.fi/books?id=-GLGnRspmcAC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA76#v=onepage&q&f=false

Falin provided the most interesting and detailed response to direct charges of the Buddha’s ethnic alienness in his 622 work *On destroying heresy* (*Po xie lun*), a detailed point-by-point response to Fu Yi’s 621 “Memorial on requesting the abolishment of the Buddhist law.” He paraphrases one of Fu Yi’s eleven reasons for outlawing Buddhism as follows: **“The non-Han of the Western Regions have faces of men and hearts of beasts; they are the evil spawn of greed and contrariness. The Buddha was born in the West and is the source of a bewitching evil effluvia.”**88 **Falin then responds by questioning the ethnic, and indeed, the human, identity of some of the most famous Han forebears. He cites statements in *The records of the Grand Historian* that describe the mythical culture hero Fuxi and other legendary figures in Chinese history having animal**

bodies and human heads or vice versa. He also repeats the common assertion that the sage kings Yu and Wen, founders of the Xia and Zhou dynasties, respectively, were born among (proto-Tibetan) Qiang tribesmen. Furthermore, he goes on, the Yuan clan (formerly known as the Tuoba before they sinicized their surname) who ruled the Northern Wei dynasty were likewise born from non-Han, yet all received the Confucian mandate of Heaven to rule. Although Tang elites by and large recognized the legitimacy of the Northern Wei, the equation of a nomadic Xianbei clan to the founding fathers of dynasties that were the most culturally significant in Chinese traditional thought was a highly transgressive statement that must have ruffled more than a few feathers. Falin concludes: “Although they were born in obscure and mean lands and their appearances were rude and ugly, they each administered according to Heaven and used their authority over the people while cherishing their sagely virtue. … **If you say that those who are born among the Qiang barbarians or come from the Rong caitiffs are wicked, then Fuxi and Yu are not sages, and Laozi and King Wen are not worthy of imitation and respect.**”89

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huineng

Dajian Huineng; (February 27, 638-August 28, 713), also commonly known as the Sixth Patriarch or Sixth Ancestor of Chan, is a semi-legendary but central figure in the early history of Chinese Chan Buddhism. According to tradition he was an uneducated layman who suddenly attained awakening upon hearing the Diamond Sutra. Despite his lack of formal training, he demonstrated his understanding to the fifth patriarch, Daman Hongren, who then supposedly chose Huineng as his true successor instead of his publicly known selection of Yuquan Shenxiu.
…

Since Huineng came from Guangdong and was physically distinctive from the local Northern Chinese, the Fifth Patriarch Hongren questioned his origin as a "barbarian from the south," and doubted his ability to attain enlightenment. Huineng impressed Hongren with a clear understanding of the ubiquitous Buddha nature in everyone, and convinced Hongren to let him stay.[11] The first chapter of the Ming canon version of the *Platform Sutra* describes the introduction of Huineng to Hongren as follows:

> The Patriarch asked me, "Who are you and what do you seek?"
>
> I replied, "Your disciple is a commoner from Xinzhou of Lingnan. I have travelled far to pay homage to you and seek nothing other than Buddhahood."
>
> "So you're from Ling-nan, and a barbarian! How can you expect to become a Buddha?" asked the Patriarch.
>
> **I replied, "Although people exist as northerners and southerners, in the Buddha-nature there is neither north nor south. A barbarian differs from Your Holiness physically, but what difference is there in our Buddha-nature?**[12]

…

Modern scholarship has questioned his hagiography, **with some researchers speculating that this story was created around the middle of the 8th century, beginning in 731 by Shenhui, who supposedly was a successor to Huineng,**[6] **to win influence at the Imperial Court.** He claimed Huineng to be the successor to Hongren, instead of the then publicly recognized successor Shenxiu:[2][1]

> **It was through the propaganda of Shenhui (684-758) that Huineng (d. 710) became the also today still towering figure of sixth patriarch of Chan/Zen Buddhism, and accepted as the ancestor or founder of all subsequent Chan lineages** […] using the life of Confucius as a template for its structure, Shenhui invented a hagiography for the then highly obscure Huineng. At the same time, Shenhui forged a lineage of patriarchs of Chan back to the Buddha using ideas from Indian Buddhism and Chinese ancestor worship.[2]

…

According to Schlütter and Teiser, **the biography of Huineng explained in the Platform Sutra is a compelling legend of an illiterate, "barbarian" layman who became a Patriarch of Chan Buddhism.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=v65aBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA128#v=onepage&q&f=false

If rulers do not issue orders, they lose that by which they are rulers. If ministers do not put into effect the orders of the rulers and govern the people, and if the people do not produce grain, hemp and silk, make tools and vessels, and exchange goods in order to serve those above, then they deserve to be punished. **Yet nowadays there is the Buddhist teaching that says, "One must cast aside ruler and minister, do away with father and son, forbid the Way of mutual nurturing," in order to seek their so-called "purity" and "nirvana."** Alas! On the one hand, Buddhists and Daoists are fortunate that they did not come during the Three Dynasties, so that they were not eliminated by Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, and Kongzi; on the other hand, they are unfortunate that they did not come *before* the Three Dynasties, so that they were not corrected by Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, the Duke of Zhou, and Kongzi.
…

This being the case, how should things be dealt with? I say, "If *they* are not blocked, the Way will not flow. If *they* are not stopped, the Way will not be practiced. Treat their people as people [rather than as monks and priests]. Burn their books. Convert their temples into houses. Illuminate the Way of the Former Kings in order to guide them. **Let widows, widowers, orphans, the bereft, the abandoned and the sick be nurtured. Couldn't this be done?**"

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/42/mode/2up?view=theater

"Under the emperor Chung Tsung (705-710)," thus it is written in the Dynastic Histories, "the princesses and the imperial cognates generally, had proposed to the emperor to consecrate people as monks and nuns; there had also been a certain number who sacrificed their private wealth for the building of monasteries, while it had been so general a custom for wealthy families and people of influence to found such edifices, in order to shirk therein the services due to the government, that the country far and wide abounded with them. But now (in 714) Yao Ch'ung presented a memorial to the emperor, running as follows: "**Buddha does not dwell outside man, but is to be found in his heart.** Buddhochinga was a most clever man, but he was of no use for keeping the realm of Chao entire;1 and Kumārajiva possessed many arts and capacities, but did not save Ts'in from destruction.2 Ho Ch'ung saw his family die out,3 and Fu Yung was defeated and killed;4 Siang of Ts'i and the emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty could not escape disastrous events (comp. page 39). **If you merely show earnestness of mind, compassion and charity, making your measures tend to the good of others, so that the creatures of Azure Heaven enjoy peace and happiness, then you are a being like Buddha;** and how then is it useful to bestow consecration at random upon vicious people, who thus are made to demolish the orthodox doctrines?" The emperor, on receiving this argument, ordered his officers to make secret enquiries about the clergy; and more than twelve thousand, who were members of it with false and irregular designs, were sent back into the lay world."1

No less than by the authorship of this violent attack upon the liberty of religious life, Yao Ch'ung has gained for himself never-fading laurels in the Confucian school by his last will.
…

I set forth that the keeping of myriads of images everywhere, is not a matter proceeding from the five elements of the human constitution,4 **and that the Buddhist religion would be quite complete if it occupied itself with nothing else than the promotion of mental quiet, charity and commiseration, and with doing good, and abstaining from vice; – why then does it so deliberately drown itself in stories and tales, and has it led itself into wrong paths by a wordly-minded clergy?** It makes of the parables with which it illustrates its exhortions, authentic historical verities; by translating sutras and painting images it destroys the professions and trades, and subverts family-life; for by those sutras and idols the people are made to give themselves (to religious life), which means the same thing as caring about nobody any longer.
…

The Tathāgata's spirit of universal charity furthers the interests of the beings; but, surely, this is not the case if it harms the creatures who have not enough, and enriches an influential clergy who have more than enough."1
…

Remarkable, however, are Yao Ch'ung's instructions to his children: do not allow yourselves to be blinded by these doctrines; but if this be already done, and you feel bound to celebrate for me the customary Buddhist masses, well, let it be done, but without extravagance. Where a declared enemy of this religion spoke thus to his own children brought up under his own eyes, there, surely, the Buddhistic doctrines and practices of salvation must have taken very deep root in the heart of the nation, in its customs and manners. Possibly the father himself was not altogether free from the belief in their value.

https://archive.org/details/sectarianismreli01groo/page/76/mode/2up?view=theater

Ngeu-yang Yiu, who lived from 1017 to 1072, the renowned compiler of the New History of the Five Dynasties, relates in the appendix of the twelfth chapter the following:

"In the year following that in which the emperor mounted the throne, 3336 Buddhistic monasteries were demolished in the empire. At that time, the central government was short of coined money; hence the Emperor decreed that the bronze Buddha-images throughout the empire should be broken to pieces, in order to cast the metal into money. **I have heard, thus he spoke, that Buddha said he considered the corporeal existence as idle, and that the thing most necessary consists in doing good unto others. If he did still exist with his real body, he would cherish the desire to cut it into pieces on behalf of the world; so there is still less reason for preserving those brass images.** From that moment, none of his ministers had the courage to argue against him."1

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1179/073776993805307448

Southern Song thinkers like Zhu Xi (1130-1200) experimented with clements of Buddhist ontology and epistemology to create a coherent new world view that concentrated as much on the spiritual cultivation of the self as on the perfection of moral duty. As Jonathan Haeger has argued, **Neo-Confucianism succeeded through its interaction with Buddhism to rob the latter of its influence over the elite.**11 Because of this borrowing, Zhu Xi maintained a defensive stance toward Buddhism (and Taoism)12 **This stance encouraged him and his disciples to look to the pre-Buddhist Confucian tradition for antecedents for these new developments, for they needed to explain what they were doing on non-Buddhist grounds.** In sympathy with their efforts, Theodore de Bary has suggested that we regard the increasing concern with the mind not as a Neo-Confucian appropriation of a Buddhist concept but as a creative response within the Confucian tradition to the interactions of the Three Teachings in the Song.13 **This formulation shares a touch of Zhu Xi's defensiveness against the charge that he masks rather than credits his debts to Buddhism.** However these interactions may be construed, they did not yield an explicit formulation of the idea that the Three Teachings can be combined into a unity. **The famous dictum of Emperor Xiaozong (r. 1163-89), "Use Buddhism to rule the mind, Taoism to rule the body, and Confucianism to rule the world,"** indicates the continuing appeal of compartmentalist logic in the Southern Song.

http://ignca.gov.in/divisionss/kalakosa/area-studies/east-asia-programme/across-the-himalayan-gap/31248-2/

From the thinking of Zhang Zai we can detect a new element of holistic perspective integrating Heaven, Earth and Humanity almost identical to what was advocated in *Taipingjing* which took its final shape during the time of Zhang Zai. **The difference between Zhang Zai's writings and *Taipingjing* lies in the fact that while the latter was virtually an underground literature with extremely limited circulation among the exalted circles, the former joined the writings of past sages, including Confucius and Mencius, to become the exalted learned discourse, and curricula for the candidates of the Imperial Examinations. Thus, even if the Input was minute and subtle, its impact would be great.** This makes it worthwhile for us to glean more from Zhang Zai's observations:

> "Heaven and Earth share their virtues, sun and moon shine together."
>
> **"Sages integrate among all other people while their own entities disappear, thus peace prevails over the universe"**

(This contrasts with the Confucian saying: "The gentleman makes peace but does not integrate with others.")

> **"When the in-group and out-group are integrated, and when the self and all beings are equal, the essence of Tao is grasped."**
>
> "There should be equality and justice between two, not partiality towards self."
>
> "When the heart is in the state of *Sunyata,* equality and justice can be achieved, then it is relatively easy to see the right and wrong, then one knows what one should do and what one should not."
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Zai
>
> **The most significant contribution of Zhang Zai to Chinese philosophy is his concern of qi as the basis of his ontocosmology.** The qi or vital force is, according to Zhang Zai, the fundamental substance by which all processes of the universe can be explained.
> ...
>
> Fifth, the perpetual motion of the physical world is not originally caused by any outside force. **He states that the cosmos depends on nothing to be its first mover, for the qi as such is a vital and self-moving force that alone makes all change and motion possible** (Huang (1968)).
> ...
>
> Neo-Confucians primarily valued Zhang Zai's doctrine of the sage "forming one body with the universe." **This doctrine represents both the Confucian contiguity with its classical Confucian heritage and an enlargement of the Neo-Confucian system.** At the center of Zhang Zai's teaching is the idea of ren, humaneness or human-heartedness, in many ways the salient teaching of the classical Confucian tradition. **This basic quality, which was for Confucius and Mencius the bond between human society and the ways of Heaven (tian) and hence fundamental to the underlying moral structure of the universe, was expanded by Zhang Zai to encompass the universe itself,** since for the sage to form "one body with the universe" suggests the complementarity and fundamental identity of microcosm and macrocosm. The doctrine illustrates as well Zhang Zai's belief in the fundamental goodness and purpose of the universe and in the potential of the individual to realize the ideal of the sage. In the teaching of "forming one body with the universe," Zhang Zai also claimed to distinguish Confucianism clearly from Buddhism and Daoism. **For him the universe and its processes have a real existence.** In turn, human life is looked upon as intrinsically valuable and ultimately the very foundation for the realization of sagehood. For Zhang Zai, such a view is clearly distinguishable from Daoism and Buddhism, both of which require a radical departure from the universe as it is given in order to fulfill the soteriological quest. **In Zhang Zai's terms, Daoism and Buddhism both emphasize**

escape from the world, while Confucianism finds fulfillment and ultimate identity precisely within the changes found in this world, a world of qi rather than of emptiness. The sage accepts the ultimate reality of qi and its inherent goodness, he acknowledges the infusion of ren throughout the very structure of the universe itself, **and thus he can fulfill the ideal of the sage, "forming one body with the universe."**[3]

https://books.google.fi/books?id=v65aBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA134#v=onepage&q&f=false

> ***The "Western Inscription" is a brief statement that the philosopher Zhāng Zai (1020-1077) wrote and posted on the Western wall of his study*** *(hence its title). This inspiring work became one of the fundamental expressions of the ethical views of the Confucian revival of the Song dynasty. After you have read it, ask yourself: In what ways is the ethics of "The Western Inscription" similar to that of Buddhism, and in what ways is it different?1—Eds.*

Heaven is the father; Earth is the mother.2 **And I, this tiny thing, dwell enfolded in Them. Hence, what fills Heaven and Earth is my body, and what rules Heaven and Earth is my nature. The people are my siblings, and all living things are my companions. My ruler is the eldest son of my parents, and his ministers are his retainers.** To respect those great in years is the way to "treat the elderly as elderly should be treated." To be kind to the orphaned and the weak is the way to "treat your young ones as young ones."3 The sage harmonizes with Their Virtue; the worthy receive what is most excellent from Them.

All under Heaven who are tired, crippled, exhausted, sick, brotherless, childless, widows or widowers—all are my siblings who are helpless and have no one else to appeal to. To care for them at such times is the practice of a good son. To be delighted and without care, because trusting Them, is the purest filial piety. To defy Them is to rebel against Virtue. To do harm to benevolene is to be a thief [of people's virtue].4 One who aids the bad is an unworthy child, while one who makes proper use of his body is an exemplary one.5

https://ignca.gov.in/divisionss/kalakosa/area-studies/east-asia-programme/across-the-himalayan-gap/31248-2/

Buddha was called "Pingdengwang" in Chinese literature which term is the Chinese translation of "Mahasamataraja" (King of Equality) of ancient Indian concepts. **China has, thus, imported the concept of "equality" *(pingdeng)* not from the French Revolution (as it was generally believed), but from India (from the Buddhist movement).** I have put forward the theory (and written elsewhere) that Buddhism gave birth to a "Struggle Ethic" to balance the ideological loner of the Confucian "Harmony Ethic", and injected a new dimension of "mahasamata" (great equality) into the Chinese idealism "Taiping" which used to denote "great harmony and peace".

https://books.google.fi/books?id=dtO6CgAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA159#v=onepage&q&f=false

The concept of 'equality' is the invention of Buddhism. **Buddha's teaching of '*upeksa*' (ability to see everyone and everything as equal and not with discrimination)** is something akin to the 'All men are created equal' in the American 'Declaration of Independence.' In the Chinese cultural tradition, Buddha is '*pingdengwang*' (*upeksa-raja*/king of equality). **In the Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures, the concept of '*zhipingdeng*' (*prajna-upeksa*/wisdom equality) or a conviction that denies the existence of special gift or genius, is the antithesis of Confucian ideology which highlights the importance of the intellectual elite. The roots of the struggle against Hindu Brahmins in India which underlay the foundation of Buddhism can also be seen in the anti-Confucian-elitism movement on China.**
...

Buddha's nickname of '*pingdengwang*/*Upeksaraja*' arose from the Buddhist belief that all humans are destined to another life according to the principle of equal justice – hence the need of the '*Upeksaraja*' to preside over transmigration.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upek%E1%B9%A3%C4%81

> **To practice *upekkha* is to be unwavering or to stay neutral in the face of the eight vicissitudes of life** – which are otherwise known as the *eight worldly winds* or *eight worldly conditions*: loss and gain, good-repute and ill-repute, praise and censure, and sorrow and happiness (the *atthaloka dhamma*).[1]

...

Let us also re-visit the Sui Emperor Wen (541-604) who was born and brought up in a Buddhist nunnery under the care of a nun when his father Yang Zhong (a duke under the regime of Northern Zhou), was busy fighting wars. His name was actually Yang Jian and he was a staunch Buddhist believer both before and after he ascended the throne as Sui Emperor Wen. **He reunited China in 581, and ushered in more than**

three centuries of consecutive zealous pro-Buddhist regimes (2 dynasties and 11 emperors) if we overlook the 6-year aberration of Tang Emperor Wuzong. Both the Sui and Tang dynasties were established as a result of a victorious armed uprising overthrowing the *ancien regime* with the blessings of the Buddha. **But the Tang Dynasty not only firmly established the structure of reunification of the *super-state* of China, but established it with a clear ideology adopting the Buddhist legendary story of '*xiangmo*/*maravijaya*/overcoming the demons.'**
…

The Mile/Maitreya/Future Buddha was used on one hand to reinvigorate the authorities of Chinese *super-state*. However, on the other hand, **we also see the down-trodden of China trying to overthrow the established socio-political order in the name of Maitreya Buddha.**
…

A man named Han Shantong, who was the head of 'White Lotus Society,' rose as a popular rebel leader amidst the widespread belief that 'Tianxia *daluan, Milefo xiasheng* (There is chaos in the universe, hence there is the reincarnation of Maitreya Buddha on earth). **This ignited a mass rebellion of the 'Army of Red Scarf,' also now as 'Red Army,' or 'incense-burning army,' because of its worshipping of the Buddha.** Though Han Shantong was shortly captured by the Yuan government, the identity of the 'Maitreya Buddha' was passed on to another man of his namesake, Han Lin'er, and the armed rebellion lasted for 15 years from 1352 to 1366 in the name of Maitreya Buddha.

Chinese history is notable for large-scale peasant wars, all of which had their crude revolutionary ideology which definitely did not originate from the culture of 'Confucianism.'

---

http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/chj/chj14.htm

Buddhists had long been divided into *Astikas* and *Nāstikas*, the one party maintaining, with the Sarvāstivādins and others, the existence of the soul, the reality of life after death, the existence of an Oversoul, and the other denying all these things, and in some cases even allowing to material substances no more than a phenomenal existence. Nāgārjuna's philosophy mediated between the two views. The Madhyamika system, of which he was the interpreter, taught that the soul might be said to exist or not to exist, according to the way in which you looked at it. The soul of the individual is like the wave of the sea, it has an apparent separate existence for a moment, then it disappears in the body of the ocean once more. It was never a distinct entity. So with the Buddhas: they appear in the world, and we look upon them as individual Beings. But that is all only apparent. **Buddhas and Saviours are but waves that appear on the surface of the ocean of God's love. They come and they go, and men talk of their deaths or their Nirvanas; but the ocean of God's love is unchanged.** Only the surface waves have changed. It was thus that Nāgārjuna was able to recognize the essential oneness of Amitābha, of Vairoc'ana, of S'akyamuni. It was thus that the Mahāyāna faith, of which he was the great doctor, was able to adapt itself to the Taoism of China, to the Shinto of Japan. **It was thus that the Buddhist gnosis of the second century tried to overthrow the Christian faith of the Catholic Church. Docetism is nothing but the Madhyamika doctrine applied to the problem of getting rid of the offence of the Cross and the uniqueness of Christ.**

Nāgārjuna did not reject the teachings of either Astikas or Nāstikas. He divided Truth into two parts, an apparent truth and a true truth, a distinction which is constantly cropping up in Japanese Buddhism. The one, *Zokutai*, is "truth by general consent," the truth as held by Nāstikas, who believed that nothing existed. The other, *Shintai*, is "true truth," the fulfilment of truth, which was to make perfect that which the Astikas held in part only. The one is the absolute Truth, the other is the Truth adapted to the mental and spiritual circumstances and capacities of the hearers. The distinction is to be found in every Buddhist sect in Japan; it underlies the distinction between the two classes of hearers in Manichaeism. **Was it not the whole contention of the Gnostics that ordinary Christianity was but a form of *Zokutai*, a "truth by common consent," and that they themselves were the possessors of the *Shintai*, "the true Truth," the perfect Gnosis?**

https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125972337.pdf

Neoplatonists, Manicheans, Gnostics, Buddhists oppose matter to spirit in the same way as they oppose evil to good, **therefore asceticism and death for them is a blessing, liberation from matter.** Tolstoy also has a connection with these teachings, but he initially got to know them not directly, but through the enlighteners of the 18th century.
…

Tolstoy follows the tradition of associating the body itself with evil. V. Semenko subtly notes: personality for him is also corporeal and material, therefore it is good to get rid of it. Tolstoy believes that this liberation leads to spiritual growth, which Prince Andrei Bolkonsky experiences on the eve of death. The hero perceives dying as awakening in a purely Buddhist way («War and World»: Vol. IV, Part 1: XVI). Yu. Prokopchuk writes: «Tolstoy liked to

compare life with sleep, he likened death with awakening. Prince Andrew came to this very thought shortly before his death; Tolstoy included the same in his Reading Circle» on November 7» [5]. The writer clearly expresses this idea in the preface to the «Summary of the Gospel»: **«True life is not only a life outside of time-present, but it is also a life outside of personality—it is a life shared by all people and it is expressed by love»** [6].
...

The first writer who combined Buddhist and Christian motifs was St. John of Damascus as the author of «The Tale of Barlaam and Joasaph». Buddhist realities have been transformed into completely Christian ones. **The third religion is formed from two traditional beliefs in Tolstoy's world. On the one hand, Tolstoy as Buddhist denies the personality and personal love that binds a person to the wheel of samsara. Buddhists call for killing love. On the other hand, Tolstoy is Christian. The source with which the spirit of the deceased Andrei Bolkonsky will merge is universal Divine Love.** God is Love in Christianity, nirvana has nothing to do with love in Buddhism. Nirvana is personal nothingness and impersonal bliss.

God is Love in The Gospel, therefore He loves, and does not destroy the human personality at all. Tolstoy points out that the erasure of personal love and the whole personality is a condition for connecting with the source of love.

If Tolstoy follows the path of the «universal union» of religions in «War and World» [8], then he creates a Buddhist world in the story «Assyrian king Asarhadon». **Here there is a remotely Christian preaching of love between people, but its necessity follows from purely Buddhist logic.** The identity in this story is denied, and the one whom the king is going to execute may turn out to be the king himself.

Tolstoy's move from a more Christian understanding of death, as in the case of Andrei Bolkonsky, to a Buddhist view of it, as in the story of Asarhadon, was due to the writer's unique teaching about simplicity.

Simplicity is the indivisible core of man. Tolstoy believes that personal memory and personal love are too subjective and superficial. **He is looking for the fundamental foundations of being, which are based on the universal nature of man, but not on his original personality. Such an idea does not correspond to Christian teaching. Socrates, and not only Buddhism, influenced this teaching.** Tolstoy created an idealized biography of this philosopher. Plato describes the last day of Socrates in the Socratic dialogue «Phaedo». Proving the immortality of the soul, Socrates asserts that the soul is simple as an idea, and therefore eternal. Describing the spiritual quest of the heroes and experiencing it himself, Tolstoy understands that the sphere of intelligence and personal manifestations is changeable, it cannot be eternal and simple. Tolstoy denies personality as a vain, changeable and devoid of simplicity. **Not only do Buddhist views underlie this denial, Socrates also influenced Tolstoy. The soul must always be identical with itself and indivisible if it wants to be immortal. The eternal and indivisible experience of personality can be reduced to the formula: «I am me». This is simplicity. The soul is eternal equality with itself.** The simplicity of the soul is manifested in the fact that childhood, maturity and old age of a person have an important common property. This common property lies in the fact that the simple and unchangeable human soul is always preserved. The personality develops, but the soul remains unchanged. **The personality will die, the soul will connect with the source of love («War and World») or will incarnate again and again. The soul is not equal to personality, the soul is the negation of personality and the affirmation of universal human nature.** It is her movement that underlies the swarm life. Tolstoy believes in the immortality of the soul and does not believe in the immortality of the individual. This is especially clearly seen in the context of Tolstoy's Buddhist belief in rebirth. **Every new birth is a new memory, a new experience and a new personality.** Consequently, the personality is changeable and transitory, and the soul is eternal and simple. The soul will be saved; the personality will perish. The foundations of these ideas are already laid in the history of the death of Prince Andrei Bolkonsky.

Christianity puts an equal sign between the soul and the personality. The soul will be saved with all the specifics of its personal memory and personal love, because God is love and does not destroy anything of what He has created. The personality in Christianity is not the result of earthly experience, like Tolstoy's, it is a creation of God, therefore it is immortal.

The Christian code of the dying at Russian culture is completely destroyed by Tolstoy. He made a thanatological revolution. The doctrine of death is fundamental to Russian culture. **Tolstoy does not believe that Christ is Risen. For Tolstoy, the Resurrection is meaningless, since the human person is vain and meaningless.**
...

Tolstoy studies the natural and unnatural movements of human nature, **which are also partly correlated with Christian anthropology, but Buddhist tendencies in his work become more pronounced over time.**
...

Tolstoy is really a mirror of the Russian revolution, because he made a revolution in thanatology, which is the basis of any cultural system. **Tolstoy denied the Resurrection of Christ and the value of the human person, striving to create his gospel and his religion on the basis of Christianity and Buddhism.**

https://archive.org/details/christianityand00andrgoog/page/n343/mode/2up?view=theater

> • It is said by Tolstoi ("My Religion"): **"To believe in a life to come unfits men to labour in the present, to renounce themselves, and to serve humanity. There is no real labour for the race so long as we believe in a future life."**

http://sites.utoronto.ca/tolstoy/vol3/pages%2062-75%20criticism%20volume%203.pdf

When asked about the essential difference between early Buddhism and early Christianity, he says, "There is none, in both there is a gospel of the God of love and a denial of a personal god."21
...

He remarks to his secretary, in 1908. "I read everything about Buddhism, what a strange teaching! And how it was perverted! Such an abstract teaching and suddenly there appeared the same creation of gods, the idol worship, the paradise and the hell... Quite the same superstitions as in Christianity."23
...

The ethical aspect of *Tat tvam asi* inspired Tolstoy's short story "Asarhadon, King of Assyria" (1903).25 In this story the two warring kings Asarhadon and Lailie, one defeated and the other one victorious, exchange their personalities. Asarhadon is put in the place of Lailie who is about to be executed. The result of the exchange is Asarhadon's spiritual conversion; **he realizes that "life is one in all and shows in himself or herself only a part of this all-pervasive life"**26 and "... you can only improve life in yourself by destroying the barriers that divide your life from others and by thinking of others as yourself and by loving them."27

https://archive.org/details/studiespolitica00figggoog/page/n102/mode/2up?view=theater

From the point of view of Christian ethics self-sacrifice, which means the spirit of giving, is not at all identical with the self-annihilation which is the last word of the Pessimism of modern times, and of some systems of Oriental ethics. Love does not destroy, it enhances individuality.

The gulf between the Christian ideal of Love, and the ideals of Buddha, Schopenhauer and Tolstoi, which mean the destruction of the individual, is at bottom irreconcileable; yet both by adversaries and believers, the mistake of confounding the one with the other is often made.

https://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Gilbert_K_Chesterton/Orthodoxy/The_Maniac_p8.html

There is a sceptic far more terrible than he who believes that everything began in matter. It is possible to meet the sceptic who believes that everything began in himself. He doubts not the existence of angels or devils, but the existence of men and cows. For him his own friends are a mythology made up by himself. He created his own father and his own mother.
...

It is amusing to notice that many of the moderns, whether sceptics or mystics, have taken as their sign a certain eastern symbol, which is the very symbol of this ultimate nullity. When they wish to represent eternity, they represent it by a serpent with his tail in his mouth. There is a startling sarcasm in the image of that very unsatisfactory meal. **The eternity of the material fatalists, the eternity of the eastern pessimists, the eternity of the supercilious theosophists and higher scientists of to-day is, indeed, very well presented by a serpent eating his tail, a degraded animal who destroys even himself.**
...

As we have taken the circle as the symbol of reason and madness, we may very well take the cross as the symbol at once of mystery and of health. **Buddhism is centripetal, but Christianity is centrifugal: it breaks out.** For the circle is perfect and infinite in its nature; but it is fixed for ever in its size; it can never be larger or smaller. But the cross, though it has at its heart a collision and a contradiction, can extend its four arms for ever without altering its shape. Because it has a paradox in its centre it can grow without changing. The circle returns upon itself and is bound. The cross opens its arms to the four winds; it is a signpost for free travellers.

https://creationism.org/csshs/v09n2p27.htm

He denied Christ's deity and resurrection, all miracles and the supernatural, and rewrote the Gospels accordingly. **He insisted man must perfect himself by his own unaided efforts, and saw prayer as "calling forth in oneself the divine element while renouncing ... all which can distract one's feelings, [and] testing oneself, one's actions, one's desires ... according to the highest demands of the soul."[18]** His followers were mostly educated people like himself, and most were unhappy at heart as was he His later diaries abundantly prove that his inner misery after his "conversion" was outwardly due to his family's refusal to share his new ascetic moralism, but inwardly and chiefly to his daily and hopeless failure to perfect himself despite continuous, sincere and scrupulous efforts. At first he briefly rejoined the Orthodox Church and diligently observed its rituals as the peasant believers did. **However, when he received Communion for the first time after many years, he "felt a pain in my heart"; only his determined "feeling of self-abasement and humility" helped him endure it,**

and he "could not go a second time."[19] The Orthodox Church excommunicated him in 1901, a belated acknowledgment of his apostasy.

Tolstoy's Confession shows that he was in no way converted away from his own self, certainly not to the sovereign, transcendent ("other-than-self") Creator and Redeemer of the Bible whom he rejected with all his heart, soul, mind, and strength. Instead, he was "converted" from periodical to full-time, singleminded dedication to his own self and its moral perfection by his own efforts.

http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/religions_buddhism.htm

Karuna and agape lead the disciple to do similar, strikingly selfless deeds—but in strikingly different spirits. Both points are shown by the Buddhist story of a saint who, like St. Martin of Tours, gave his cloak to a beggar. But the Buddhist's explanation was not "because I love you" or "because Christ loves you" but rather: "This is the enlightened thing to do. For if you were freezing and had two gloves on one hand and none on the other hand, would it not be the enlightened thing to do to give one of the gloves to the bare hand?"

The Buddhist point is not the welfare of the recipient, but the liberation of the giver from the burden of self. The same end could be achieved without a recipient.

---

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf

2. The bhikkhu who wants to accomplish this sets about seeking the cause and condition for that mentality-materiality; just as when a skilled physician encounters a disease he seeks its origin, or just as when a compassionate man sees a tender little child lying on its back in the road he wonders who its parents are.

[NEITHER CREATED BY A CREATOR NOR CAUSELESS]

3. To begin with, he considers thus: "**Firstly this mentality-materiality is not causeless, because if that were so, it would follow that [having no causes to differentiate it,] it would be identical everywhere always and for all. It has no Overlord, etc., because of the non-existence of any Overlord, etc. (XVI.85), over and above mentality-materiality. And because, if people then argue that mentality-materiality itself is its Overlord, etc., then it follows that their mentality-materiality, which they call the Overlord, etc., would itself be causeless.** Consequently there must be a cause and a condition for it. What are they?"

> https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/jootla/wheel414.html#fnt-9
>
> A brahma known as Baka once reflected privately that he and his plane of existence were everlasting. He thought that there could be no higher plane of rebirth and was convinced he had overcome suffering. The Buddha discerned his deep-seated wrong view and decided to pay him a visit.
> ...
>
> **The Buddha agrees that if he clung to earth (or any other aspect of existence) he would remain under the control of Maha Brahma (and Mara too),** but he adds: "I understand your reach and your sway to extend thus: Baka the Brahma has this much power, this much might, this much influence." **The Buddha points out that beyond the thousandfold world system over which Baka reigns there are planes of existence of which he is totally unaware, and beyond all conditioned phenomena there is a reality that transcends even "the allness of the all" — a consciousness without manifestation, boundless, luminous on all sides — to which Baka has no access.** Demonstrating his superiority in knowledge and power, the Buddha uses his psychic powers to humble Baka and his entire assembly. By the end of the discourse, these once haughty beings marvel at the might of the recluse Gotama: "**Though living in a generation that delights in being... he has extirpated being together with its root.**"[12]
>
> https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/Gnosticism
>
> The reason why suffering and evil exist in this world is because it is actually governed by this flawed Demiurge who mistakenly believes himself to be the absolute God and demands arrogantly to be worshipped as such. This is the deity worshiped by many Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam and others) who are materialistic, vicious and not in possession of true spiritual wisdom. **He is, thus, analogous to Mahabrahma in Hinduism and some forms of Buddhism, who also mistakenly believes himself to be the ultimate authority while the rest of the gods snigger behind his back.**

http://hinduonline.co/HinduReligion/Saints/DvaitaPhilosophy.html

Whereas Advaita preaches that Atman and Brahman are one and the same, which is not evident to the atman till it comes out of a so-called illusion, Madhvacharya puts forth that Brahman (Vishnu/God) and Atman (soul) are eternally different, with God always the Superior one. It is the same point that Madhvacharya reinforces in one of his doctrines, "Yadi Namaparo Na bhavet Shri Hari, khathamasya vashet Jagatedabhoot. Yadi Namanatasya Vashe Sakalam, Khathamevath nitya sukham Na Bhaveth"

"If you feel there is no God, how do you explain as to why you cannot free yourself from the limitations on Earth? If you feel YOU are the one in control of everything (as Advaita preaches that Soul and God are one and the same), then how come you don't enjoy happiness always and are also subject to sorrow and pain (as God is supposed to be an eternity of happiness)?"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transtheism

Transtheism refers to a system of thought or religious philosophy which is neither theistic nor atheistic, but is beyond them. The word was coined by either philosopher Paul Tillich or Indologist Heinrich Zimmer.[1] Zimmer applies the term to Jainism, which is theistic in the limited sense that gods exist but are irrelevant as they are transcended by *moksha* (that is, a system which is not non-theistic, but in which the gods are not the highest spiritual instance). **Zimmer (1953, p. 182) uses the term to describe the position of the Tirthankaras having passed "beyond the godly governors of the natural order".**

https://archive.org/details/heartofjainism029660mbp/page/n17/mode/2up?view=theater

Yet once again Jainism, with its explicit belief in a plurality of eternal spirits, every material entity having its own individual spirit, *jīvātmā*, no less expressly disbelieves in the Supreme Spirit, the *Paramātmā*. Jainism is definitely atheistic, if by atheism we mean the denial of a divine spirit. In the philosophy of the Jainas no place is reserved for God. **Indeed it seems probable that the first Jainas did not acknowledge gods at all. They early taught that one should not say 'God rains', but just 'the cloud rains'. Thus one of their fundamental principles would seem to have been that there is no power higher than man. This principle, however, it is instructive to note, soon proved unworkable, and it has long since been practically abandoned.** The Jainas do worship, yet are the objects of their worship neither God nor gods. Denying God, they worship man, to wit, the Venerable (*Arhat*) the Conqueror (*Jina*), the Founder of the (four) Orders (*Tīrthaṅkara*). **Now this revolt from God-worship, and the acceptance in its stead of man-worship, this startling anticipation of Positivism, may well claim one's attention, if only as affording some idea of the possibilities of intellectual frailty.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_in_Jainism#Siddhas

The Acharanga Sutra 1.197 describes *siddhas* in this way:

> The liberated soul is not long nor small nor round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor green nor white; neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh nor smooth; it is without body, without resurrection, without contact (of matter), it is not feminine nor masculine nor neuter. **The siddha perceives and knows all, yet is beyond comparison.** Its essence is without form; there is no condition of the unconditioned. It is not sound, not colour, not smell, not taste, not touch or anything of that kind. Thus I say.[12]

...

Ācārya Hemacandra in the 12th century put forth the Jain view of the universe in the *Yogaśāstra*:[17]

> This universe is not created nor sustained by anyone; It is self-sustaining, without any base or support.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism_and_non-creationism#Reception

The Jaina position on God and religion from a perspective of a non-Jain can be summed up in the words of Anne Vallely.

> Jainism is the most difficult religion. We get no help from any gods, or from anyone. We just have to cleanse our souls. In fact other religions are easy, but they are not very ambitious. In all other religions when you are in difficulty, you can pray to God for help and maybe, God comes down to help. But Jainism is not a religion of coming down. In Jainism it is we who must go up. We only have to help ourselves. **In Jainism we have to become God.** That is the only thing.[22]

...

As Paul Dundas puts it – "while Jainism is, as we have seen, atheist in a limited sense of rejection of both the existence of a creator God and the possibility of intervention of such a being in human affairs, **it nonetheless must be regarded as a theist religion in the more profound sense that it accepts the existence of divine principle, the paramātmā i.e. God, existing in potential state within all beings**".[24]

However the usage of the word "paramatma" is not entirely accurate as there is no concept of "param-atma" or supreme atma in Jainism. **Each atma has its own unique identity and remains independent even after**

achieving moksha, unlike certain Hindu schools of thought where the atma merges with paramatma on achieving mukti.

http://www.mailstar.net/india-pakistan.html

A plaque at a Jain temple in Khajuraho (see photo below) reads:

> **Every soul is independent. None depends on another. {this is a rejection of Monism}**
> All souls are alike. None is superior or inferior.
> **Every soul is in itself absolutely omniscient and blissful.** The bliss does not come from outside. Not only-Soul, but every object of the universe, is subject to change by itself, without any external interference.
> All human beings are miserable due to their own faults, and they can themselves be happy by rectifying the same.
> The greatest mistake of a soul is non-recognition of its real self and it can only be rectified by recognising itself.
> There is no separate existence of God. **Everybody can attain Godhood by making supreme efforts in the right direction.**
> **Know thyself; recognize thyself; be immersed in thyself – you will attain Godhood**.
> God is neither the creator nor the destructor of the universe. He is merely a silent observer and omniscient.
> One, who, even after knowing the whole universe can remain unaffected and unattached is God.

The Jains call their own sadhus (monks) "gods".

> https://www.academia.edu/13367123/Review_of_Runar_M._Thorsteinsson_Roman_Christianity_and_Roman_Stoicism_A_Comparative_Study_of_Ancient_Morality_Oxford_Oxford_University_Press_2010_2013_
>
> **Epictetus's ideals find their consummation in the Stoic sage, 'father' to all humankind and 'perfect human being'.** He is a 'divinely guided, universal philanthropist' (p. 70).

http://www.revilo-oliver.com/rpo/RPO_NewChrist/chap11.htm

Aryans (and some other races, notably the American Indians) instinctively admired the spiritual strength and fortitude of men who can bear intense physical pain without flinching and without yielding to the normal physical reactions. The ability stoically to endure pain always arouses admiration, but it can usually be exhibited only in some worthwhile undertaking, such as war or comparable situations, as, for example, by the justly famous and honored C. Mucius Scaevola. In post-Vedic India, however, admiration for such fortitude was distorted into the doctrine of *tapas*, the belief that by simply enduring pain inflicted upon himself a man automatically acquired a spiritual (i.e., supernatural) power. **We should particularly note that *tapas* produces such power by a kind of natural law, which operates independently of the wishes of the gods and is not in any way affected by the motives of the man who practices the austerities.**

The power of *tapas* is illustrated by the story that is exquisitely retold by Lafcadio Hearn in his *Stray Leaves*: **Two evil princes, determined to obtain ascendancy over even the Thirty-three Gods, practice austerities on a mountain top,** remaining absolutely motionless, standing on their great toes only, and keeping their eyes fixed upon the sun. After many years their self-mortification gave them such divine power that the weight of their thoughts shook the lands, as by an earthquake, and the mountain smoked with their holiness. They were thus able to destroy cities and make deserts of populous lands. (The world and the gods were saved only by the creation of Tilottama, the most beautiful of all women.)

> https://archive.org/details/beyondgoodandevi00nietuoft/page/8/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> With all your love for truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such hypnotic rigidity to see Nature *falsely*, that is to say, Stoically, that you are no longer able to see it otherwise – and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that *because* you are able to tyrannise over yourselves – **Stoicism is self-tyranny – Nature will also allow herself to be tyrannised over:** is not the Stoic a *part* of Nature?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ājīvika

The predetermined fate of living beings and the impossibility to achieve liberation (*moksha*) from the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth was the major distinctive philosophical and metaphysical doctrine of their school of Indian philosophy.[6][15]

Ājīvikas further considered the *karma* doctrine as a fallacy.[16] **Ājīvika metaphysics included a theory of atoms which was later adapted in the Vaiśeṣika school, where everything was composed of atoms, qualities emerged from aggregates of atoms, but the aggregation and nature of these atoms was predetermined by cosmic laws and forces.**[6][17]
...

The name *Ajivika* for an entire philosophy resonates with its core belief in "no free will" and complete *niyati*, literally "inner order of things, self-command, predeterminism", leading to the premise that good simple living is not a means to salvation or moksha, just a means to true livelihood, predetermined profession and way of life.[27][28] **The name came to imply that school of Indian philosophy which lived a good simple mendicant-like livelihood for its own sake and as part of its predeterministic beliefs, rather than for the sake of after-life or motivated by any soteriological reasons.**[12][27]

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Song_of_the_Strange_Ascetic

> Now who that runs can read it,
> The riddle that I write,
> Of why this poor old sinner
> Should sin without delight;
> But I, I cannot read it
> (Although I run and run),
> Of them that do not have the faith,
> And will not have the fun.

...

Paul Dundas states that the Jain and Buddhist texts cannot be considered reliable source of Ājīvika history and philosophy, because "it seems doubtful whether a doctrine [of Ajivikas] which genuinely advocated the lack of efficacy of individual effort could have formed the basis of a renunciatory path to spiritual liberation", and that "the suspicion must be that the Jains and Buddhists deliberately distorted Ajivika doctrine for their own polemical purposes".[14]

http://robertlstephens.com/essays/shafarevich/001SocialistPhenomenon.html#pagestart_287

> Max Müller, for example, thought that for Buddha himself Nirvana was the fulfillment and not the elimination of existence, **assuming that a religion that offered *Nothingness* as an ultimate goal could never have existed.**

http://sites.utoronto.ca/tolstoy/vol3/pages%2062-75%20criticism%20volume%203.pdf

> Max Muller, a prominent 19th century orientalist and one of the chief sources of Tolstoy's knowledge on Buddhism, was mystified by Nirvana although he accepted Buddhist ethics. For him as for his predecessor Buddhist scholar Burnouf and St. Hilaire, Nirvana meant annihilation. Muller, relying on the same etymology of Nirvana accepted by Colebrook writes: "Every Sanskrit scholar knows that Nirvana means originally the blowing out, the extinction of light, and not absorption. The human soul, when it arrives at its perfection, is blown out. ..."34 and "**True wisdom consists in perceiving the nothingness of all things, and in a desire to become nothing,** to be blown out, to enter into the state of Nirvana."35 **Muller could conceive that all efforts at self-perfection which Buddhism preaches would result in "... trap bridge hurling man into abyss, at the very moment when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the Eternal."**36

---

https://books.google.fi/books?id=WyPWBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT77#v=onepage&q&f=false

> **The Stoic last in Philosophic pride,** [300]
> By him call'd vertue; and his vertuous man,
> Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing
> **Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer,**
> As fearing God nor man, contemning all
> Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life, [305]
> Which when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can,
> For all his tedious talk is but vain boast,
> Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.

https://books.google.fi/books?id=uSEIrw6QryoC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA185#v=onepage&q&f=false

At the age of seventeen, Washington read Sir Roger L'Estrange's English translation of Seneca's principal dialogues. As Samuel Eliot Morison noted: "The mere chapter headings are the moral axioms that Washington followed through life."
…

Forrest McDonald has noted that Washington was "a man of honor, not religion" (we might say a man with a Stoic, rather than a Christian, conception of ethics), explaining: "The one considers vice as offensive to the Divine Being, the other as something beneath him."

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA309#v=onepage&q&f=false

Samuel Taylor Coleridge's turn away from radicalism in the mid-1790s saw him work with an opposition between Christian and Stoic ethics. One of his *Lectures on Revealed Religion*, delivered in Bristol in May 1795, draws a contrast between ancient philosophy and Christian principles of action as embodied in Christ's character. Coleridge explains his decision to dwell in his lecture on "Christ's character and doctrine because the Stoical Morality which disclaims all the duties of Gratitude and domestic Affection has been lately revived in a book popular among the perceived Friends of Civil Freedom" (Coleridge 1971: 164). **If Christ's character, for Coleridge, is typified by filial affection, humility, self-abasement (and even at one point patriotism),** the Stoic's hyper-confidence sees him abjure all personal ties and domestic attachments. **The Stoics, for Coleridge, were totally regardless of all domestic affections. They held it right to abstain from vice, "not because their fellow Creatures would be injured, but because Vice was beneath them"** (Coleridge 1971: 157).
…

In an aphorism from his *Aids to Reflection* (1825) entitled "The Christian No Stoic," Coleridge writes:

> Of the sects of ancient philosophy the Stoic is, perhaps, the nearest to Christianity. Yet even to this sect Christianity is fundamentally opposite. **For the Stoic attaches the highest honor (or rather, attaches honor *solely*) to the person that acts virtuously in spite of his feelings, or who has raised himself above the conflict by their extinction;** while Christianity instructs us to place small reliance on a Virtue that does not *begin* by bringing the Feelings to a conformity with the commands of Conscience. (Coleridge 1993: 96)

If Stoicism (unlike Epicurean materialism) shares with Christianity a commitment to a providential harmony in creation, and if it shares a referral of human suffering to a higher order, **this is all the more reason to draw a sharp dividing line between them.** Religion, Coleridge claims in the same aphorism, "doth not destroy the life of nature, but adds to it a life more excellent" (Coleridge 1993: 95-6). **Elsewhere in the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge argues that the Stoic's "high, comprehensive and *notional*" sense of virtue should be abandoned "as a relic of paganism," to "modern Pagans" such as Shaftesbury, while Christians should restore it to "its original import, viz. Manhood or Manliness,"** and use it "exclusively to express the quality of Fortitude; Strength of Character in relation to the resistance opposed by Nature and the irrational Passions to the Dictates of Reason" (Coleridge 1993: 195).
…

It is almost as if radicals need to advertise, in Coleridge's account, a cruel indifference to their local attachments in order to motivate their going out to a cosmopolitan, rational perspective. Against this claim, Coleridge insists that, from a Christian view, "[t]he intensity of private attachments encourages, not prevents, universal philanthropy" (Coleridge 1971: 163).

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44795/44795-h/44795-h.htm#Page_6

Let it not, however, be forgotten, that the powers of the understanding and the intellectual graces are precious gifts of God; and that every Christian, according to the opportunities vouchsafed to him, is bound to cultivate the one and to acquire the other. Indeed, he is scarcely a Christian who wilfully neglects so to do. What says the apostle? **Add to your faith *knowledge*, and to knowledge *manly energy*: for this is the proper rendering of αρετην, and not *virtue*, at least in the present and ordinary acceptation of the word.[18]**

> [18] **I am not ashamed to confess that I dislike the frequent use of the word virtue, instead of righteousness, in the pulpit: and that in prayer or preaching before a Christian community, it sounds too much like *Pagan* philosophy.** The passage in St. Peter's epistle is the only scripture authority that can be pretended for its use, and I think it right, therefore, to notice that **it rests either on an oversight of the translators, or on a change in the meaning of the word since their time.**

…

I mean at the same time to oppose the disciples of SHAFTESBURY and **those who, substituting one Faith for another, have been well called the pious Deists of the last century, in order to distinguish**

them from the Infidels of the present age, who *persuade* themselves, (for the thing itself is not possible) that they reject all Faith.
...

But the place of starting was at the meeting of *four* roads, and one only was the right road. I proceed, therefore, to preclude the opinion of those likewise, **who indeed agree with me as to the moral Responsibility of man in opposition to Hobbes and the Anti-Moralists, and that he is a fallen creature, essentially diseased, in opposition to Shaftesbury and the misinterpreters of Plato;** but who differ from me in exaggerating the diseased *weakness* of the Will into an absolute privation of all Freedom, thereby making moral responsibility, not a mystery *above* comprehension, but a direct contradiction, of which we do distinctly comprehend the absurdity.
...

And here it will not be impertinent to observe, that what the eldest Greek Philosophy entitled *the Reason* (ΝΟΥΣ) and *Ideas*, the philosophic Apostle names *the Spirit* and *Truths spiritually* discerned: **while to those who in the pride of learning or in the over-weening meanness of modern metaphysics decry the doctrine of the Spirit in Man and its possible communion with the Holy Spirit, as *vulgar* enthusiasm, I submit the following sentences from a Pagan philosopher, a nobleman and a minister of state**—"Ita dico, Lucili! SACER INTRA NOS SPIRITUS SEDET, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. BONUS VIR SINE DEO NEMO EST." SENECA, *Epist.* xli.
...

The fact is simply this. **Luther considered the pretensions to Free-will *boastful*, and better suited to the "budge doctors of the Stoic Fur," than to the preachers of the Gospel,** whose great theme is the Redemption of the Will from Slavery; the restoration of the Will to perfect Freedom being the *end* and consummation of the redemptive process, and the same with the entrance of the Soul into Glory, that is, its union with Christ: "GLORY" (*John* xvii. 5.) being one of the names or tokens or symbols of the Spiritual Messiah.
...

It would no longer be the God in whom we *believe*; **but a stoical FATE, or the superessential ONE of Plotinus, to whom neither Intelligence, nor Self-consciousness, nor Life, nor even *Being* can be attributed; nor lastly, the world itself, the indivisible one and only substance (*substantia una et unica*) of Spinoza,** of which all *phænomena*, all particular and individual things, lives, minds, thoughts, and actions are but modifications.
...

Lastly, there are among us, though fewer and less in fashion than among our ancestors, **persons who, like Shaftesbury, do not belong to "the herd of Epicurus," yet prefer a philosophic Paganism to the morality of the Gospel. Now it would conduce, methinks, to the child-like humility, we have been discoursing of, if the use of the term, Virtue, in that high, comprehensive, and *notional* sense in which it was used by the ancient Stoics, were abandoned, as a relic of Paganism, to these modern Pagans: and if Christians restoring the word to its original import, namely, Manhood or Manliness, used it exclusively to express the quality of Fortitude;** Strength of Character in relation to the resistance opposed by Nature and the irrational Passions to the Dictates of Reason; Energy of Will in preserving the Line of Rectitude tense and firm against the warping forces and treacheries of temptation. Surely, it were far less unseemly to value ourselves on this moral strength than on strength of body, or even strength of intellect. But we will rather value *it* for ourselves: and bearing in mind the old adage, *Quis custodiet ipsum custodem?*—we will value it the more, yea, then only will we allow it true spiritual *worth*, when we possess it as a gift of *grace*, a boon of mercy undeserved, a fulfilment of a free *promise* (1 Corinth. x. 13.).
...

The mistake consists in supposing the Pharisees to have been a distinct *sect*, and in strangely over-rating the number of the Sadducees. The former were distinguished not by holding, as matters of religious belief, articles different from the Jewish Church at large; but by their pretences to a more rigid orthodoxy, a more scrupulous performance. They were, in short (if I may dare use a phrase which I dislike as profane, and denounce as uncharitable), the *Evangelicals* and strict *professors* of the day. **The latter, the Sadducees, whose opinions much more nearly resembled those of the *Stoics* than the Epicureans (a remark that will appear paradoxical to those only who have abstracted their notions of the Stoic Philosophy from Epictetus, Mark Antonine, and certain brilliant inconsistencies of Seneca), were a handful of rich men, *Romanized* Jews, not more numerous than infidels among us, and holden by the People at large in at least equal abhorrence. Their great argument was: that the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments injured or destroyed the purity of the Moral Law for the more enlightened classes, and weakened the influence of the Laws of the Land for the people, the vulgar multitude.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA326#v=onepage&q&f=false

"Social stoicism," writes one mid-Victorian reviewer, is "one of the most singular features of the age in which we live and with respect to certain classes of society, it is both very true and most important" (Anon. 1860: 496). Thomas Carlyle referred similarly to the "cheerful Stoicism" of the British aristocracy (Anon. 1903: 62), while J.A. Mangan identified **"a hard secular morality,"** characterized by "stoicism, hardiness and endurance" as defining manliness in the English public schools in the late nineteenth century (Mangan and Walvin 1987: 1).

Although, when considered in this way, there is evidence of a much wider reception of Stoicism, it was never what might be termed a popular attitude to life. The same review impresses upon the reader that the seeming stoicism of of the lower classes in England is illusory, as it forms no part of a consistent training and they are unable to control their emotions most of the time. Such reserve as they display "does not rise above the level of habit and instinct"; **true "social Stoicism" serves rather to distinguish the English gentleman from others in society: "Almost all the essential characteristics of the manners of English gentlemen [...] are derived ultimately from the traditional estimate of courage and manliness which prevails amongst boys at public schools [...]. The result of this is that the social stoicism of the best-educated part of the community goes very much deeper than the composed and undramatic manner of other classes of Englishmen"** (Anon. 1860: 496).
...

Matthew Arnold declared in his review of Long's translation that he wanted make Marcus Aurelius as popular as Thomas a Kempis's *Imitation of Christ* and his name as familiar as Socrates (M. Arnold 1869: 14).

https://books.google.fi/books?id=eZSPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA175#v=onepage&q&f=false

In Eliot's judgment one cheers oneself up out of pride, and pride is what really interests him about Stoicism. "The Senecan attitude of Pride," "this individualism, this vice of Pride," "the self-consciousness and self-dramatization of the Shakespearean hero" that "seems to mark a stage, even if not a very agreeable one, in human history, or progress, or deterioration, or change": **for Eliot these things are bigger than Seneca and bigger than Shakespeare** (Eliot 1950; 112, 119). **Of course a Christian bias can be heard in his insistence that the "human weakness" shown by Othello is a "universal human weakness," in the claim that "Christians have had something better," and in his long paragraph on Dante, who is said to have been fortunate to live at a time when "thought was orderly and strong and beautiful"** (Eliot 1950: 110, 116). **It is interesting that Eliot refers to Nietzsche's "late variant" of Stoicism – "there is not much difference between identifying oneself with the Universe and identifying the Universe with oneself"** (Eliot 1950: 119-20) – for his critique is itself a late variant of the long tradition of anti-Stoicism that reaches back to the fourteenth book of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*.

https://www.crosswalk.com/church/pastors-or-leadership/insights-from-c-s-lewis-on-why-pride-is-the-greatest-sin.html

> Teachers, in fact, often appeal to a boy's pride, or, as they call it, his self-respect, to make him behave decently. **Many a man has overcome cowardice, or lust, or ill-temper, by learning to think that they are beneath his dignity—that is, by pride.** The Devil laughs. He is perfectly content to see you becoming chaste and brave and self-controlled...provided, all the time, he is setting up in you the Dictatorship of Pride—just as he would be quite content to see your chilbains cured if he was allowed, in return, to give you cancer. For pride is spiritual cancer: it eats up the very possibility of love, or contentment, or even common sense.
> ...
>
> The real black, diabolical pride, comes when you look down on others so much that you do not care what they think of you. Of course, it is very right, and often our duty, not to care what people think of us, if we do so for the right reason; namely, because we care so incomparably more what God thinks.
>
> But the proud man has a different reason for not caring. He says **'...All I have done has been done to satisfy my own ideals—or my artistic conscience—or the traditions of my family—or, in a word, because I'm That Kind of Chap. If the mob like it, let them. They're nothing to me.'"**

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/10/catastrophic-spider.html

For this reason it is a grave error to think that the only problem with Kantian "self-legislator" and "ends in themselves" talk is that, absent the sort of moral standards that were taken for granted in

Kant's own time, it has a tendency to degenerate into a kind of libertinism. If you honor your parents, you do not murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not lie, and do not covet, you do well. You will have fulfilled what Christ called the second commandment – to love one's neighbor. But you will not have fulfilled the first and greatest – to love God above all things. And if the *reason* you obey the second is precisely to honor man as an end in himself, you are in danger of *violating* the first and greatest. Kant himself was, of course, a very austere man; he would have been absolutely horrified at what liberals and libertarians now defend in the name of "autonomy." Accordingly, the original sin of Kantianism is not abortion, fornication, dope smoking or the like. **It is, rather, the codification of modern man's blasphemous self-obsession, the raising of "It's all about me" to a moral first principle. And the blasphemy is only heightened, not lessened, if the only reason the blasphemer refrains from the sins in question is that he thinks them incompatible with his pathological self-regard.**

http://biblehub.com/commentaries/acts/17-18.htm

Many of the Stoics were sought after as tutors for the sons of noble families, and occupied a position of influence not unlike that of Jesuit confessors and directors in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main drawbacks were (1) that in aiming at apathy for themselves they shut out sympathy with others as disturbing their tranquillity; (2) that in striving after an ethical perfection in the strength of their own will they anticipated the position of the Pelagians in the history of the Christian Church; and (3) that, as with the Pharisees, the high ideal was often but a mask for selfish and corrupt lives. They, also, were too often "hypocrites," acting a part before the world to which their true character did not correspond. **In the language of the satirist—*Qui Curios simulant et Bacchanalia vivunt.* ["They pose as heroes, and as drunkards live."]—Juvenal, *Sat.* ii. 3.**

It is evident that there would be many points of sympathy between the better representatives of this school and St. Paul, but for them also the message that spoke of Jesus and the Resurrection—of God sending His Son into the world to be first crucified and then raised from the dead—would seem an idle dream, **and they would shrink from the thought that they needed pardon and redemption, and could do nothing true and good in their own strength without the grace of God.**

> https://archive.org/details/Josephus02War13/Josephus%2001%20Life%2C%20Against%20Apion/page/n23/mode/2up?view=theater
>
> Being now in my nineteenth year **I began to govern my life by the rules of the Pharisees, a sect having points of resemblance to that which the Greeks call the Stoic school.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dictionary_of_Christian_Biography_and_Literature_to_the_End_of_the_Sixth_Century/Novatianus_and_Novatianism

Novatian, the founder of Novatianism, is said by Philostorgius to have been a Phrygian by birth, a notion which may have originated in the popularity of his system in Phrygia and its neighbourhood (Lightfoot's *Colossians*, p. 98). **He was, before his conversion, a philosopher, but of what sect we cannot certainly determine, though from a comparison of the language of Cyprian in *Ep.* lv. § 13, *ad Antonian.*, with the Novatianist system itself, we should be inclined to say the Stoic.**

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11604a.htm

In it Pelagius denied the primitive state in paradise and original sin (cf. P.L., XXX, 678, "Insaniunt, qui de Adam per traducem asserunt ad nos venire peccatum"), insisted on the naturalness of concupiscence and the death of the body, and ascribed the actual existence and universality of sin to the bad example which Adam set by his first sin. **As all his ideas were chiefly rooted in the old, pagan philosophy, especially in the popular system of the Stoics, rather than in Christianity, he regarded the moral strength of man's will (*liberum arbitrium*), when steeled by asceticism, as sufficient in itself to desire and to attain the loftiest ideal of virtue.**

https://books.google.fi/books?id=INcgAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA314#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thus, although he grudgingly prefers the moderation of Stoicism over the hedonism of the Epicureans among the successors to Socrates, for St. Augustine, the Stoics' belief in the natural human capacity for virtue and wisdom is at bottom as vain as the Epicureans' more openly and self-consciously shameless belief that the individual's pleasure is all that matters ([1958] pp. 115-116). **As he puts it in a characteristic if charmless passage, whereas the Epicureans openly make virtue into a whore, for the Stoics she is superficially more ladylike but still has a shady reputation.** Indeed, the profession of virtue among pagan teachings is a more dangerous snare of Satan than those that are openly licentious, for whereas hedonism works openly as a streetwalker, **Stoicism,** which is every bit as much a slut for tempting us to believe we can be virtuous without God's help as hedonism is in telling us

to embrace fleshly pleasures, **is harder to spot because she is, as Frank Sinatra might put it, a classier broad.**

http://internetbiblecollege.net/Lessons/Augustinian%20Attitudes%20To%20Victory%20Over%20Temptation.htm

Augustine's pagan ascetic attitudes to sex can be seen in his following words:

> "It is, however, one thing for married persons to have intercourse only for the wish to beget children, which is not sinful; it is another thing for them to desire carnal pleasure in cohabitation, but with the spouse only, which involves venial sin...(not only by fornication and adultery, which are damnable disgraces, but also by any of those excesses of cohabitation such as do not arise from any prevailing desire of children, but from an overbearing lust of pleasure, which are venial sins in man and wife), yet, whenever it comes to the actual process of generation, **the very embrace which is lawful and honourable cannot be effected without the ardour of lust, so as to be able to accomplish that which appertains to the use of reason and not of lust.** Now, this ardour, whether following or preceding the will, does somehow, by a power of its own, move the members which cannot be moved simply by the will, and in this manner it shows itself not to be the servant of a will which commands it, but rather to be the punishment of a will which disobeys it. It shows, moreover, that it must be excited, not by a free choice, but by a certain seductive stimulus, and that on this very account it produces shame."[7]

Pagan attitudes such as the above are partly based on the Neo-Platonist attitude that the human body is evil and on Stoic philosophers' hatred or indifference to pleasures and bodily passions. Augustine's teachings here have brought millions of churchgoers throughout history into bondage.

Augustine's attitude to sex in marriage was not derived from the Bible but from pagans like the Roman Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus. In the first century A.D., Rufus said that sexual intercourse should only ever be used for bearing children and never for "mere pleasure-seeking".[8]

https://www.academia.edu/19876318/Stoicism_on_the_Threshold_of_the_Scottish_Enlightenment

In Book XIV of *City of God*, Augustine developed a critique of the Stoics in the context of his consideration of the situation of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. **Adam in his Unfallen state might have been able to control himself in the manner that the Stoics suggest any person can, but even so, he still turned his will away from God and ate the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.** And in a Fallen world, Stoicism is a delusory philosophy.
…

The association of Stoicism with pride persists through the centuries, of course, but it seems to me that it is these seventeenth-century French Augustinians who do the most interesting work in picking up and developing Augustine's arguments, as part of their much more wide-ranging critique of the fashionable neo-Stoicisms of the period, many of which were derived from readings and interpretations of Seneca. **So, Jansen explicitly links Stoicism with a philosophical moment in the genealogy of the Pelagian heresy in *Augustinus*, and it is striking that in his discussion of secular philosophy uninformed by grace, all of his citations are from Stoic sources, and most of them are from Seneca.**2
…

The particular danger of Seneca's seductive writing was that his "errors are refined, suited to man's nature and similar to that in which the demons engaged our first parents"—thus bringing the discussion back to where we started, with Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Seneca "can be read with profit", [Malebranche] agreed, but only "by those who see things correctly and know the foundation of Christian morality"—**and in this regard Seneca is classified along with the Qu'ran and the works of Nostradamus.**10

> https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Quintilian/Institutio_Oratoria/10A*.html#ref105
>
> 125 I have deliberately postponed the discussion of Seneca in connexion with the various departments of literature **owing to the fact that there is a general, though false, impression that I condemn and even detest him.** It is true that I had occasion to pass censure upon him when I was endeavouring to recall students from a depraved style, weakened by every kind of error, to a severer standard of taste. 126 **But at that time Seneca's works were in the hands of every young man, and my aim was not to ban his reading altogether, but to prevent his being preferred to authors superior to himself, but whom he was never tired of disparaging; for, being conscious of the fact that his own style was very different from theirs, he was afraid that he would fail to please those who admired them. But the young men loved him rather than imitated him, and fell as far below him as he fell below the ancients.** 127 For I only wish they had equalled or at least approached his level. But he pleased them for his faults alone, and each individual sought to imitate such of those faults as lay within his capacity to reproduce: and then brought reproach on his master by boasting that he spoke in the genuine Senecan manner. 128
> Seneca had many excellent qualities, a quick and fertile intelligence with great industry and wide knowledge, though as regards the last quality he was often led into error by those whom he had entrusted with the task of investigating certain subjects on his behalf. 129 **He dealt with almost every**

> **department of knowledge; for speeches, poems, letters and dialogues all circulate under his name.** In philosophy he showed a lack of critical power, but was none the less quite admirable in his denunciations of vice. **His works contain a number of striking general reflexions and much that is worth reading for edification; but his style is for the most part corrupt and exceedingly dangerous, for the very reason that its vices are so many and attractive.** 130 One could wish that, while he relied on his own intelligence, he had allowed himself to be guided by the taste of others. **For if he had only despised all unnatural expressions and had not been so passionately fond of all that was incorrect, if he had not felt such affection for all that was his own, and had not impaired the solidity of his matter by striving after epigrammatic brevity, he would have won the approval of the learned instead of the enthusiasm of boys.** 131 But even as it is, he deserves to be read by those whose powers have been formed and firmly moulded on the standards of a severer taste, if only because he will exercise their critical faculties in distinguishing between his merits and his defects. For, as I have said, there is much in him which we may approve, much even that we may admire. Only we must be careful in our selection: would he had been as careful himself. **For his genius deserved to be devoted to better aims, since what it does actually aim at, it succeeds in achieving.**

https://archive.org/details/cicerostusculand00ciceuoft/page/350/mode/2up?view=theater

XXXVI. **All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn, olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and property of life, are derived from the Gods;** and, indeed, with reason, since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory, which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves.

But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them, indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice. No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise. It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to return. **It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does not contradict their being inherent in us.**

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_94

55. We should, therefore, have a guardian, as it were, to pluck us continually by the ear and dispel rumours and protest against popular enthusiasms. **For you are mistaken if you suppose that our faults are inborn in us; they have come from without, have been heaped upon us. [Erras enim, si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci; supervenerunt, ingesta sunt.]** Hence, by receiving frequent admonitions, we can reject the opinions which din about our ears. 56. **Nature does not ally us with any vice; she produced us in health and freedom. [Nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: illa integros ac liberos genuit.]**

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/48193/48193-h/48193-h.htm#sect16

Such men conclude that free-will concurs with the grace and work of God, as a preceding and efficient cause of salvation. **Not unlike this is the saying of Dionysius, which is more pernicious still: "Although devils and man fell, yet all their natural faculties remained whole and entire; their mind, their memory, their will," etc. If this be true therefore it will follow, that man by his own natural powers can save himself.**

> https://ironink.org/2023/01/mcatee-contra-doug-wilson-on-sodomy/
>
> However, here we see the Pelagian (Non-Reformed) anthropology glimmering through. The sinfulness of sin is not found in our volition cooperating with the sin. The sinfulness of sin is found in the reality of sin – chosen or unchosen – present in our lives. **It is Pelagian to say that it is our choice that makes sin to be sin.** Keep in mind that in the OT there were sacrifices for unintentional sins. The unintentionality behind the sin did not relieve the sinner from the guilt that came with having committed the unintentional sin.

https://www.academia.edu/35745755/The_Varieties_of_neostoic_Virtue_Erasmus_to_Diderot

The latter played the role of the defendant, so to speak, in a kind of literary, religious and erudite trial: the rigorist bishop Cornelius Jansenius and his followers were the accusers, while an heterogeneous troupe of Catholic apologists – Jesuits, Franciscans and Molinists, more or less directly inspired by the Jesuits and

particularly by the *Metaphysica* of the Spanish theologian Francisco Suarez – acted as witnesses in the defence of the pagan sage.14
…

As to the anti-Stoics, the *Augustinus* by Cornelius Jansen – a posthumous monument of erudite controversy in four volumes in folio – appeared the same year, 1642. **It launched a seminal campaign of rigourism through radical re-examination of all the sources, both Christian and pagan, that Jansen assembled against the latitudinarians, Jesuits, Thomists and Molinists.** By the end of the first volume, the author's harangue directly attacks the ancient Stoics and their modern admirers. His theological and moral arguments were founded on a radical thesis: in pagan antiquity the Stoic sect, taken as a whole, had been no less than the precursor and main inspirer of Pelagius and his followers, guilty of the pestiferous heresy that Augustine had denounced and dispelled. **Jansen said, «Ethnica philosophia genuit Pelagianismus [...] Pelagiani ethnicorum philosophorum imitatores et sectatores.»**15 **By denying the fall of Adam and its consequences, Pelagius stressed the self-sufficiency of man as a moral agent, the superfluity of the Christian revelation and the full autonomy of human action. If no original sin had been committed by the first couple, then Christ was to be considered at best a reformer, not the Saviour. Pelagius, in Jansen's views, was a man full of diabolical pride and vanity, a direct inheritor of the pagan ethics of the Porch.** A number of quotations from the *Epistolae ad Lucilium* exalting the most ascetic Stoic virtues – the appeal to pure nature, *apatheia*, the sage's effort to conquer happiness by himself, his pretended equality with God – are anathema to Jansenius: **«Immani superbia proprius Pelagii character et omnium discipulorum eius.»**16

https://books.google.fi/books?id=mTdUtsbybqkC&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PA80#v=onepage&q&f=false

The beliefs of the Stoics 'do infinitely differ from the belief of Christians,' Senault observes, but this owed not to any errors of reasoning on the part of the Stoics, for they 'had a little more light then others.' Rather, **the mistake that the Stoics made was that they did nor realise the limits of philosophical reason itself.** The root cause of this failure was their pride, the same pride that had preceded the Fall. Fallen man who lived without the intercession of grace was 'possesst with self-love' and 'could propose no other end than his own interests.' In the case of the Stoic philosophers, then, **'whatsoever names they gave unto their Vertues, one might easily finde, that they were animated onely by the desire of Honor or Voluptuousness.'**26
…

Senault did draw very regularly on one Stoic author in particular. **Anthony Levi reports that of 370 quotations from Latin authors to be found in *De l'usage des passions*, 151 are from Seneca's writings, and Seneca's account of the passions is, by and large, treated quite favourably.**27 But Seneca's argument is not regularly identified as Stoic in Senault's text, and while his doctrine might have been treated sympathetically, the man himself is the target of an ad hominem attack in *L'homme chrestien*. **'Reason without Grace hath hitherto brought up nothing but proud Scholars,'** Senault observes, before turning to consider the case of Seneca, identifying him explicitly with the Pelagian heresy:

> Whatever is rumored of the Letters and Conferences between *Seneca* and Saint *Paul*, **I have always believed the conversion of that Stoick harder than that of the Covetous and most imprudent Lascivious.** The Pride that animated his spirit, was so strong a bulwark against grace, that he had never stoopt to the Maximes of Christianity, if that Conqueress of hearts had not employed all her charms and all her forces to bring him under. ... **This Philosopher had he kept his opinions, had been the first Authour of *Pelagianisme* in the world; and his pride making him the capital enemy of grace, had obliged him to side with reason against her.**28

https://www.academia.edu/299389/Rousseaus_Political_Philosophy_Stoic_and_Augustinian_Origins

Although the main text of [Senault's] later treatise, *L'homme criminel*, barely touches on Stoicism at all, it is clear from its preface that an attack on Stoicism was a significant part of its purpose:

> Pride has made so powerful an impression in the soul of man, as that all the pains he suffers are not able to efface it. ... This error being the outmost of all our evils, religion labours only how to disabuse us therein. ... Only the Stoics, whose whole philosophy is enlivened with vainglory, did believe that if man were irregular, it was only because he would be so. ... **Pelagianism may be said to have had it originally with this proud sect, and that diverse ages before Pelagius's birth, Zeno and Seneca had taken upon them the defence of corrupted nature; for they allotted all her disorders to man's constitution and education, not knowing any other sins save such as be merely voluntary.** ... Not knowing that reason was blind and liberty a captive, they impudently affirmed that ... their felicity depended upon their own proper power. ...43

https://books.google.fi/books?id=5ZOPCwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&hl=fi&pg=PT297#v=onepage&q&f=false

Jacques Esprit (1611-77), who collaborated on the early drafts of La Rochefoucauld's *Maximes*, was for a time attached to the Oratory. His own treatise *La Fausseté des vertus humaines* (Esprit 1996) was published posthumously in 1678: **denouncing the hypocrisy of seventeenth-century courtiers, it also inveighs against the pagan philosophers. Clearly it is mainly the Stoics Esprit has in mind.** These philosophers set up moral virtue as an idol, in place of God; they failed to realize that their underlying motivation was the desire for praise (75-6).
…

In his *Maximes* of 1665-78, La Rochefoucauld (2001) is probably not advancing the same religious agenda as Esprit: **he exhibits the disturbing omnipresence of self-love without ascribing it to original sin, or urging divine grace as the sole remedy; but his debt to his sometime friend is apparent in those few maxims where he specifically targets pagan philosophers:** their indifference in the face of death was simply a "taste" on the part of their self-love (§46); their scorn for wealth was a strategy designed to compensate them for their lack of it (§54); their constancy in the face of death was motivated by concern for their posthumous reputation (§504). **Again, it is clearly the Stoics who are meant: in fact the frontispiece of the first edition of the *Maximes* (reproduced in many modern editions) shows a putto playfully tearing the noble mask off a bust of Seneca to reveal the ugly face beneath.** More generally, La Rochefoucauld's anti-Stoic remarks are part of a relentlessly argued demonstration of the incapacity of reason, virtue, and willpower actually to influence behavior.
…

Without a strong and coherent ideology or powerful common interest to unite them, the *frondeurs* (of whom La Rochefoucauld was one) fell apart in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination and resentment; and when in 1660 Louis XIV began his personal rule, he effectively asserted his power over both social groups. He did so not, however, by inculcating Stoic discipline as an ethos for the absolutist regime; far from it. He sought prestige through military conquest and lavish court entertainments; he won over the aristocracy by the appeal to pleasure and ambition.

https://archive.org/details/TheCompleteWorksOfFriedrichNietzscheVolX/page/n171/mode/2up?view=theater

> 122. ***The Element of Moral Scepticism in Christianity.*—Christianity also has made a great contribution to enlightenment, and has taught moral scepticism in a very impressive and effective manner – accusing and embittering, but with untiring patience and subtlety; it annihilated in every individual the belief in his virtues: it made the great virtuous ones, of whom antiquity had no lack, vanish for ever from the earth, those popular men, who, in the belief in their perfection, walked about with the dignity of a hero of the bull-fight. When, trained in this Christian school of scepticism, we now read the moral books of the ancients, for example those of Seneca and Epictetus, we feel a pleasurable superiority,** and are full of secret insight and penetration,—it seems to us as if a child talked before an old man, or a pretty, gushing girl before La Rochefoucauld:—we know better what virtue is!

https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1997/1997.03.16/

Despite the surprisingly extensive range of similarities between the two theories, Aristotle and Kant must differ (see also the papers by Cooper and Jerome Schneewind). Basic differences in philosophical anthropology, **and the fact (often suppressed by modern commentators) that Kant is thinking in a (post-)Christian framework** make disagreement inevitable. For Aristotle, the self-love of virtuous people and the friendship of the virtuous for each other is refreshingly, though naively straightforward. **For Kant, even good people stand in need of an external standard and constraint. For Aristotle as for the Stoics** (again, strangely neglected in any essay where they would be most welcome), **human nature is at least in principle capable of achieving simple goodness.** For Kant, as Woods reads him, human nature is so deeply resistant to reason, so fundamentally divided, that even the best of us has constant need of a moral rule as a counterbalance to our propensity to the dangerous kind of self-love. This is one point on which even proponents of ancient virtue ethics should be able to see that Kant's theory is better grounded and more realistic than Aristotle's.

http://www.counter-currents.com/2016/03/schopenhauers-critique-of-democracy/

Finally, there is Schopenhauer's magnificent, biting critique of utopian rabble-rousing and the entire project of materialist-egalitarian "progress":

> People have always been very discontented with governments, laws, and public institutions; for the most part, however, this has been only because they have been ready to blame them for the wretchedness which pertains to human existence as such. But this misrepresentation has never been put forward in more deceitful and impudent a fashion than it is by the demagogues of the present day. **As enemies of Christianity, they are optimists: And according to them the world is "an end in itself," and thus in its natural constitution an altogether splendid structure, a regular abode of bliss. The colossal evil of the world which cries against this idea they attribute entirely to governments: If these would only do their duty there would be Heaven on earth,** i.e. we could all, without work or effort, cram ourselves, swill, propagate, and drop dead – for this is a paraphrase of their "end in itself" and the goal of the "unending progress of mankind" which in pompous phrases they never weary of proclaiming. (154)

https://www.covenanter.org/reformed/2016/5/22/womens-rights-women

God gave the people of this land great and magnificent blessings, and opportunities and responsibilities. They might and should have made it the glory of all lands. But they have betrayed their trust: they have abused every gift: **above all have they insulted him by flaunting in his face an impudent, atheistic, God-defying theory of pretended human rights and human perfectibility which attempts to deny man's subordination, his dependence, his fall and native depravity, his need of divine grace.** It invites mankind to adopt material civilization and sensual advantage as their divinity. It assumes to be able to perfect man's condition by its political, literary, and mechanical skill, despising that Gospel of Christ which is man's only adequate remedy. **It crowns its impiety by laying its defiling hands upon the very forms of that Christianity, while with the mock affection of a Judas it attempts to make it a captive to the sordid ends of Mammon and sense.**

https://restorus.org/articles/politics/book-review-carl-schmitts-concept-political/

The more benevolent you believe humans to be, the more radical your politics. Schmitt roots these views in theology. He argues that theology is only real theology when the theologian considers human beings to be sinful by nature.[13] Schmitt elaborates by saying, **"The fundamental theological dogma of the evilness of the world and man leads, just as does the distinction of friend and enemy, to a categorization of men and makes impossible the undifferentiated optimism of a universal conception of man. In a good world among good people, only peace, security, and harmony prevail. Priests and theologians are here just as superfluous as politicians and statesmen."**[14]
…

We may only content ourselves by noting that Schmitt ends chapter seven by resting politics on the truth in Genesis 3.15. **To affirm the scripture is to affirm Schmitt's politics; to deny the friend/enemy distinction is to deny Genesis 3.15, which for Schmitt is a mere step away from denying the rest of the Word.**

https://occidentaldissent.com/2022/08/28/bruce-gore-the-seeds-of-revolution-in-calvins-thought/

The key turning point which paved the road to liberalism came in the 17th century when the traditional, negative view of human nature that was rooted in Augustinianism – one that was shared by Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation – was challenged by the revival of the Pelagian heresy. This is the positive view of human nature which had been marginalized for over a thousand years by St. Augustine. Human beings really aren't corrupted by Original Sin. Humans are born good. Humanity can be morally perfected. **The problem is not the bondage of the will as Luther thought, but society that drags us down and holds us back from creating paradise on earth.**

Christianity was holding us back. It was leading us down a blind alley and thwarting progress. We can use reason, science and common sense to create a better world. **Not only has The Science and common sense shown that race is a social construct, but
we have recently discovered that the "gender binary" is a myth too.**